A political catechism, or, Certain questions concerning the government of this land, answered in his Majesties own words, taken out of his answer to the 19 propositions, pag. 17, 18, 19, 20. of the first edition; with some brief observations thereupon. Published for the more compleat setling of consciences; particularly of those that have made the late protestation, to maintain the power and priviledges of Parliament, when they shall herein see the Kings owne interpretation what that power and priviledges are. It is this twentieth day of May, An. Dom. 1643. ordered by the Committee of the House of Commons in Parliament concerning printing, that this booke entituled, A Politicall catechism, be printed. Iohn White.
Parker, Henry, 1604-1652.
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A political catechism, or, Certain questions concerning the government of this land, answered in his Majesties own words, taken out of his answer to the 19 propositions, pag. 17, 18, 19, 20. of the first edition; with some brief observations thereupon. Published for the more compleat setling of consciences; particularly of those that have made the late protestation, to maintain the power and priviledges of Parliament, when they shall herein see the Kings owne interpretation what that power and priviledges are. It is this twentieth day of May, An. Dom. 1643. ordered by the Committee of the House of Commons in Parliament concerning printing, that this booke entituled, A Politicall catechism, be printed. Iohn White.
Parker, Henry, 1604-1652.
Charles I, King of England, 1600-1649.
England and Wales. Sovereign (1625-1649 : Charles I)
England and Wales. Parliament.
[2], 14 p.
Printed for Samuel Gellibrand, at the Brazen Serpent in Pauls Church-yard,
London :
1643.
Two editions are filmed consecutively, both labeled E.104[8]. The first is Wing P416A, and has an ornamental border enclosing title. The second is Wing P416, which does not have a border.
In this edition, line fifteen of title reads: "herein see the kings owne interpreta-"; Title enclosed within an ornamental border.
By Henry Parker -- Cf. Wing.
Reproduction of the original in the British Library.
eng
England and Wales. -- Parliament -- Early works to 1800.
England and Wales. -- Sovereign (1625-1649 : Charles I). -- His Maiesties answer to the XIX propositions of both Houses of Parliament.
Royal supremacy (Church of England) -- Early works to 1800.
Great Britain -- Politics and government -- 1642-1649 -- Early works to 1800.
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A
POLITICAL
CATECHISM
,
OR
,
Certain
Questions
concerning
the
Government
of
this
Land
,
Answered
in
his
Majesties
own
words
,
taken
out
of
His
Answer
to
the
19
Propositions
,
Pag.
17
,
18
,
19
,
20.
of
the
first
Edition
;
with
some
brief
Observations
thereupon
.
Published
for
the
more
compleat
setling
of
Consciences
;
particularly
of
those
that
have
made
the
late
Protestation
,
to
maintain
the
Power
and
Priviledges
of
Parliament
,
when
they
shall
herein
see
the
Kings
owne
Interpretation
what
that
Power
and
Priviledges
are
.
We
can
do
nothing
against
the
Truth
,
but
for
the
Truth
.
2
Cor.
13.
8.
It
is
this
twentieth
day
of
May
,
An.
Dom.
1643.
Ordered
by
the
Committee
of
the
House
of
Commons-in
Parliament
concerning
Printing
,
that
this
Booke
entituled
,
A
Politicall
Catechism
,
be
printed
.
IOHN
WHITE
.
LONDON
Printed
for
SAMUEL
GELLIBRAND
,
at
the
Brazen
Serpent
in
Pauls
Church-yard
,
1643.
A
Politicall
Catechism
,
Serving
to
instruct
those
that
have
made
the
Protestation
concerning
the
power
and
priviledges
of
Parliament
;
taken
out
of
his
Majesties
Answer
to
the
19
Propositions
.
Question
.
HOW
many
Simple
kinds
are
there
of
Civill
Government
of
States
,
and
Common-wealths
?
Answer
.
There
are
three
kinds
of
Government
among
men
;
Absolute
Monarchy
,
Aristocracy
,
and
Democracy
,
page
,
17.
Qu.
2.
Are
there
any
of
these
Simple
Formes
perfect
?
Ans.
All
these
have
their
particular
Conveniences
and
Inconveniences
,
page
17.
Observ.
1
Experience
hath
taught
men
everywhere
to
acknowledge
this
,
and
accordingly
there
never
was
long
(
if
at
all
)
continued
any
of
these
Forms
exactly
Simple
;
though
some
have
more
seemed
such
then
others
.
Also
in
all
mixtures
there
is
commonly
some
one
of
these
Forms
more
conspicuous
then
the
rest
,
from
whence
such
a
particular
Government
hath
its
denomination
.
Q.
3.
Is
the
State
of
England
governed
by
any
one
of
these
kinds
simply
?
A.
The
Experience
and
Wisdom
of
your
Ancestors
hath
.
moulded
this
[
Government
]
out
of
a
mixture
of
these
.
page
18
,
Q.
4
What
kind
of
government
then
is
that
of
the
state
of
England
?
A.
Regulated
Monarchy
.
page
18.
Observ.
1.
If
this
Government
be
a
mixture
of
all
these
,
and
a
Regulated
Monarchy
;
then
it
is
a
fond
thing
with
us
to
talk
of
an
Absolute
Monarchy
,
and
what
an
Absolute
Monarch
is
,
or
may
doe
.
And
it
is
only
the
language
of
Flattery
that
holds
such
Discourses
.
2
It
need
not
be
counted
a
Solecisme
(
as
some
would
perswade
us
)
to
speak
of
Free
Subjects
in
a
Monarchy
,
such
a
Monarchy
as
ours
is
.
3
If
this
Government
be
a
mixture
of
all
three
,
then
the
House
of
Commons
,
the
Representative
Body
of
the
People
,
must
needs
be
allowed
a
share
in
Government
(
some
at
least
)
which
yet
is
denyed
,
page
19.
4
If
this
Government
be
a
mixture
,
then
is
not
the
Government
according
to
these
Lawes
,
Solely
Trusted
to
the
King
,
as
seems
to
be
affirmed
page
18.
5
If
the
Government
be
Regulated
,
why
do
men
tell
us
that
the
King
is
above
all
Law
?
for
it
is
by
Lawes
that
he
is
Regulated
.
6
If
the
King
bee
Regulated
by
the
Law
,
then
is
the
King
Accountable
to
the
Law
,
and
not
to
God
only
,
as
men
would
make
us
beleeve
.
7
If
the
Monarchy
or
Regall
Authority
it selfe
bee
Regulated
,
then
whatsoever
is
done
by
the
King
,
undeniably
without
and
beyond
the
limits
of
that
Regulation
,
is
not
Regall
Authority
.
And
therefore
.
8
To
resist
the
Notorious
Transgressions
of
that
Regulation
,
is
no
Resisting
of
Regall
Authority
.
And
9
It
is
so
farre
from
being
a
Resisting
of
the
Ordinance
of
God
,
that
it
is
not
so
much
as
Resisting
the
Ordinance
of
man
.
Q
5.
By
whom
was
this
government
framed
in
this
sort
?
or
who
is
to
be
accounted
the
Immediate
Efficient
of
the
Constitution
thereof
?
A.
The
Experience
and
Wisdom
of
your
Ancestors
hath
so
moulded
this
,
page
18.
Observ.
1.
If
our
Ancestors
were
the
moulders
of
this
Government
,
then
the
King
hath
not
his
power
,
Solely
,
or
Immediately
,
by
Divine
Right
.
2
Much
lesse
hath
he
his
Power
or
Authority
by
Right
of
Conquest
.
3
But
the
Immediate
Originall
of
it
was
from
the
People
.
And
if
so
,
Then
—
4
In
questioned
cases
,
the
King
is
to
Produce
his
Grant
(
for
he
hath
no
more
then
what
was
granted
)
and
not
the
People
to
shew
a
Reservation
;
For
all
is
presumed
to
be
Reserved
,
which
cannot
be
proved
to
be
granted
away
.
Q.
6
Is
this
Regulated
and
mixt
Monarchy
,
as
good
as
an
Absolute
Monarchy
,
or
better
,
or
worse
?
A.
This
Excellent
Constitution
of
this
Kingdom
,
(
the
Ancient
,
Equall
,
Happy
,
Well-poysed
,
and
never
enough
Commended
Constitution
of
the
Government
of
this
Kingdom
.
page
17.
)
hath
made
this
Nation
so
many
years
both
Famous
and
Happy
,
and
to
a
great
Degree
of
Envy
.
page
20.
Q.
7
How
comes
it
to
passe
that
this
Constitution
is
so
Excellent
.
A.
The
Experience
and
Wisdom
of
your
Ancestors
hath
so
moulded
this
,
out
of
a
mixture
of
these
,
as
to
give
to
this
Kingdom
(
as
farre
as
Humane
Prudence
can
provide
)
the
Conveniences
of
all
three
,
without
the
Inconvenience
of
any
one
p.
18
Observ.
1.
Then
those
that
would
place
in
the
King
,
an
Absolute
and
Abitrary
Power
to
do
what
he
List
,
are
Destructive
to
the
Nations
Happinesse
,
and
Enemies
to
the
Kingdom
.
2.
If
this
Mixture
cause
this
happinesse
,
then
it
is
not
the
Greatnesse
of
the
Kings
Power
over
his
People
,
but
the
Restraint
of
that
Power
that
hath
made
this
Kingdom
famous
and
Happy
;
for
other
Kings
have
Power
as
large
,
but
not
so
much
restrained
;
which
Largenesse
of
their
Power
hath
Raised
those
Kings
indeed
,
(
but
not
their
Kingdoms
)
to
a
great
degree
of
Envy
.
3.
Hence
we
discern
,
that
it
is
Possible
for
Kings
to
envy
their
Peoples
Happinesse
,
because
the
largenesse
of
the
Peoples
Happinesse
depends
much
upon
the
Restraint
of
the
Kings
Exorbitant
Power
.
4.
If
this
Mixture
and
well-Poised
Constitution
have
raised
this
Kingdom
to
so
Great
a
Degree
of
Envy
,
no
marvell
if
Iesuiticall
Councells
be
Active
to
overthrow
this
Happy
Constitution
.
Q.
8
What
is
the
Conveniency
or
Good
of
Monarchy
?
A.
The
Vniting
of
a
Nation
under
one
Head
,
to
Resist
Invasion
from
abroad
,
and
Insurrection
at
home
.
page
18.
Obs.
1.
What
Pernicious
Councellours
are
they
then
to
a
Monarch
that
advise
him
to
bring
in
from
abroad
German
Horse
,
or
an
Irish
Army
,
or
a
Fleet
of
Danes
to
invade
this
Kingdom
;
or
to
imploy
Dunkeirk
Ships
to
seaze
upon
his
Merchants
,
which
is
so
formally
contrary
to
the
proper
Good
or
End
of
Monarchy
it self
?
2.
Or
are
they
better
or
worse
that
Advise
him
to
Authorize
,
or
even
permit
any
in
his
Name
to
Plunder
,
Rob
,
Spoil
▪
Imprison
any
of
his
Subjects
,
whom
they
have
found
peaceably
in
their
houses
,
or
at
work
in
the
Fields
,
and
have
not
disobeyed
any
Legall
Command
of
his
?
Q.
9
What
is
the
Ill
of
Absolute
Monarchy
?
or
the
Inconvenience
to
which
it
is
Lyable
?
A.
The
Ill
of
Absolute
Monarchy
,
is
Tyranny
.
page
18.
Obs.
1.
Therefore
the
more
Absolute
a
Monarch
is
,
the
more
prone
to
be
a
Tyrant
.
2.
Therfore
also
it
is
safer
to
Restrain
the
King
of
some
Power
to
do
us
good
then
to
grant
him
too
much
opportunity
to
do
us
hurt
;
and
the
Danger
is
greater
to
the
People
in
Englarging
the
Kings
Power
,
then
in
restraining
it
somewhat
.
Q.
10
What
is
the
Good
or
Conveniency
of
Aristocracy
?
A.
The
good
of
Aristocracy
is
the
Coniunction
of
Councells
in
the
Ablest
Persons
of
a
State
for
publike
Benefit
.
page
18
Obs.
●
.
Then
surely
it
is
for
the
Publike
Benefit
of
the
State
,
that
this
Conjunction
of
Councells
in
Parliament
should
be
made
use
of
more
then
once
in
thirteen
or
fourteen
years
;
and
the
Law
for
a
Trienniall
Parliament
(
if
there
were
not
others
before
for
the
holding
of
a
Parliament
yearly
)
was
a
most
necessary
Law
,
as
also
that
it
should
not
be
dissolved
for
fifty
dayes
.
2.
It
was
not
then
Intended
in
the
Constitution
of
this
Government
,
that
the
King
in
the
Greatest
Matters
of
Importance
for
Publike
Benefit
,
should
only
hear
what
they
say
,
and
then
follow
it
or
reject
it
Meerly
at
his
owne
Pleasure
;
for
this
may
be
as
well
done
in
an
Absolute
Monarchy
.
3.
Neither
is
it
agreeable
to
the
Constitution
of
this
Kingdom
,
to
withdraw
the
King
from
affording
his
Presence
to
his
Great
Councell
of
State
,
that
so
the
private
Counsels
of
Private
men
may
be
preferred
before
those
whom
the
Law
and
the
Constitution
of
the
Kingdom
▪
counts
the
Ablest
to
Iudge
of
Publike
Benefit
.
Q.
11
What
is
the
Ill
of
Aristocracy
,
or
the
Inconvenience
to
which
it
is
Lyable
?
A.
The
Ill
of
Aristocracy
is
Faction
and
Division
.
page
.
18.
Obs.
What
shall
we
say
then
to
those
Private
Councellors
that
have
abused
the
King
,
by
perswading
him
first
to
withdraw
himself
from
his
Parliament
,
and
then
to
call
away
the
Members
of
both
Houses
,
when
yet
without
the
Consent
of
both
Houses
this
Parliament
cannot
be
Adjourned
to
another
Place
,
much
lesse
Dissolved
?
Yet
if
all
would
have
come
away
at
call
,
had
it
not
been
Dissolved
for
want
of
Legall
Numbers
Remaining
?
And
what
Greater
Faction
or
Division
can
there
be
,
then
such
as
Divide
between
King
and
Parliament
,
and
between
the
House
and
their
Members
?
Are
not
they
most
Pernicious
Instruments
,
that
make
Monarchie
it self
,
(
whose
end
is
to
unite
as
was
said
before
)
thus
far
guilty
of
Faction
and
Division
?
Q.
12
What
is
the
Good
,
or
Convenience
of
Democracy
?
A.
The
good
of
Democracy
is
Liberty
,
and
the
courage
and
Industry
which
Liberty
begets
page
18.
Obs.
1.
Then
the
more
Liberties
are
Encroached
upon
,
the
more
the
People
will
be
rendred
Cowardly
and
Poor
,
as
may
be
plain
enough
seen
by
comparing
the
Valour
and
Riches
of
this
Nation
in
Q.
Elizabeths
dayes
,
with
what
hath
been
of
Late
Dayes
.
2.
The
King
himself
,
when
once
his
Subjects
by
having
lost
their
Liberties
shall
lose
withall
their
Courages
,
will
prove
the
greatest
Looser
;
for
then
his
Kingdom
will
be
an
easie
Prey
to
any
Forrain
Invader
,
or
even
to
a
home-bred
Usurper
,
that
could
gather
any
sudden
Strength
,
and
would
Promise
more
Libertie
.
Q.
13
What
is
the
Ill
of
Democracy
,
or
the
Inoonvenience
to
which
it
is
Lyable
?
A.
The
Ills
of
Democracy
are
Tumults
,
Violence
,
and
Licentiousnesse
.
page
18.
Obs.
If
these
be
the
Evils
for
which
the
Peoples
Liberty
ought
to
be
Restrained
by
the
Mixture
in
this
Government
,
then
the
Restraint
of
the
Liberty
should
be
measured
according
to
the
Exigency
of
these
Evils
,
and
so
much
Liberty
need
onely
be
Restrained
as
is
sufficient
for
the
Prevention
of
these
Evils
.
Q.
14
What
is
the
mixture
of
this
Kingdom
,
which
gives
it
the
Conveniences
of
all
the
three
forementioned
kinds
of
Government
,
without
the
Inconveniences
of
any
one
.
A.
In
this
Kingdom
the
Lawes
are
Ioyntly
made
by
a
King
,
by
a
house
of
Peeres
,
and
by
a
house
of
Commons
chosen
by
the
people
:
All
having
free
Votes
,
and
particular
priviledges
.
page
18.
Obs.
1.
Whereas
there
hath
been
great
Question
made
by
many
what
is
meant
by
the
Power
and
Priviledges
of
Parliament
,
mentioned
in
the
Protestation
,
which
hath
been
so
generally
made
thorowout
the
Kingdom
?
There
is
no
Reason
to
doubt
but
those
things
which
the
King
grants
afterward
,
to
be
the
particular
Priviledge
of
each
House
,
and
of
both
,
are
their
certain
Priviledges
according
to
Law
,
and
the
Constitution
of
the
Kingdom
;
and
to
the
maintaining
of
them
every
one
that
hath
made
the
Protestation
is
most
strictly
bound
,
without
peradventure
or
shift
.
2.
That
the
Priviledges
which
the
King
challenges
to
Himself
,
are
to
be
yeelded
to
,
onely
so
far
forth
as
they
are
consistent
with
the
Acknowledged
Priviledges
of
the
two
Houses
;
because
the
Monarchy
being
Acknowledged
to
be
a
Regulated
Monarchy
,
and
the
Government
mixt
of
Aristocracy
and
Democracy
,
as
well
a
Monarchy
;
it
is
the
Priviledges
of
the
two
Houses
of
Parliament
that
makes
the
mixture
,
and
so
they
must
Regulate
and
Interpret
the
Priviledges
of
the
King
,
and
not
the
Priviledges
of
the
King
Regulate
or
Interpret
theirs
,
save
onely
to
the
maintaining
still
the
Regall
Dignitie
,
and
the
Succession
according
to
Laws
.
Q.
15
What
Priviledges
doth
the
King
chalenge
to
himself
?
A.
The
Government
according
to
these
Lawes
is
trusted
to
the
king
:
power
of
treaties
of
warre
and
peace
,
of
making
Peeres
,
of
choosing
Officers
,
and
Councellors
for
State
Iudges
for
Law
,
Commanders
for
Forts
and
Castles
;
giving
Commissions
for
raising
men
to
make
Warre
abroad
,
or
to
preuent
or
prouide
against
Inuasions
and
Insurr●ctions
at
home
▪
Benefit
of
Confiscations
,
power
of
pardouing
,
and
some
other
of
like
kind
are
placed
in
the
King
.
page
18.
Obs.
1.
That
all
these
are
ordinarily
in
the
King
,
Experience
and
Custom
Teaches
,
even
those
that
Know
not
the
Law
by
reading
;
but
by
what
hath
been
noted
before
,
and
follows
after
,
it
is
to
be
understood
only
so
,
as
not
to
prejudice
the
Priviledges
of
the
Houses
of
Parliament
,
specially
in
cases
of
Necessitie
,
(
of
which
hereafter
.
)
Also
—
2.
It
is
acknowledged
here
,
that
the
Government
,
Trusted
,
is
to
be
according
to
the
Lawes
,
and
so
all
these
Things
are
not
Absolutely
in
the
King
;
as
for
instance
,
Pardons
,
the
Law
denies
Power
of
Pardoning
wilfull
Murther
;
And
Benefit
of
some
Confiscations
belongs
to
some
Private
Lords
of
Mannours
.
3.
If
Government
onely
according
to
Law
be
trusted
to
the
King
then
to
Resist
Notorious
Illegall
Violences
is
not
to
Resist
the
Kings
Authority
.
Q.
16
For
what
end
is
this
Authority
trusted
to
the
King
,
and
Placed
in
him
?
A.
For
our
Subiects
sake
these
rights
are
vested
in
us
p
17
The
Prince
may
not
make
use
of
this
high
and
perpetuall
power
to
the
hurt
of
those
for
whose
good
he
hath
it
.
page
.
19.
Obs.
1.
Then
the
Good
of
the
Subjects
is
ever
to
be
preferred
before
the
Monarchiall
Greatnesse
of
the
King
(
the
End
is
ever
more
considerable
then
the
Means
)
Salus
Populi
is
suprema
Lex
.
2.
Whosoever
counsels
the
King
to
any
Thing
against
the
good
of
his
Subjects
,
is
the
Kings
Enemy
as
well
as
the
Common-wealths
,
by
Attempting
to
turn
him
from
that
which
is
the
end
of
his
Authoritie
.
Q.
17
To
what
purpose
especially
are
the
priviledges
of
the
house
of
Commons
and
the
house
of
Peeres
?
A.
That
the
Prince
may
not
make
use
of
this
High
and
perpetuall
power
to
the
hurt
of
those
for
whose
good
he
hath
it
:
and
make
use
of
the
name
of
publike
Necessity
for
the
gain
of
his
priuate
Fauourites
and
Followers
&c.
page
19.
Obs.
1.
The
Law
then
supposes
,
that
such
Cases
may
fall
out
,
though
it
then
Charge
the
Blame
upon
those
Favorites
and
Followers
,
and
not
upon
the
King
(
as
we
shall
see
by
and
by
.
)
2.
We
need
not
wonder
then
why
Private
Favorites
and
Followers
are
such
Enemies
to
Parliaments
and
their
Priviledges
,
which
are
on
purpose
to
hinder
their
gains
:
Of
which
also
more
anon
.
3.
The
two
Houses
are
by
the
Law
it
seems
,
to
be
Trusted
,
when
they
Declare
,
that
the
Power
is
made
use
of
for
the
Hurt
of
the
People
;
and
the
Name
of
Publike
Necessitie
made
use
of
for
the
Gain
of
Private
Favorites
and
Followers
,
and
the
like
.
Q
18
What
are
the
speciall
priviledges
of
the
House
of
Commons
towards
this
?
A.
The
House
of
Comm●ns
,
an
Excellent
conseruer
of
Liberty
—
is
solely
Intrusted
with
the
first
propositions
concerning
the
Leauies
of
Moneys
which
is
the
Sinnews
as
well
of
peace
as
of
warre
&c
page
19
Obs.
1.
It
seems
then
the
House
of
Commons
is
presumed
to
be
more
carefull
for
the
Subjects
Liberties
,
then
either
the
King
,
or
the
House
of
Peers
.
2.
Then
it
must
needs
be
strange
for
any
to
conceive
(
as
the
Kings
Declarations
would
Perswade
)
that
the
House
of
Commons
would
Fight
against
and
Subvert
the
Libertie
and
Propriety
of
the
Subject
,
and
the
Kings
Favorites
and
Followers
Fight
for
them
,
and
Protect
them
.
3.
Then
no
Moneys
may
be
Levyed
,
neither
for
Peace
nor
Warre
,
no
not
under
Pretence
of
Publike
Necessity
,
(
as
Ship-money
and
Monopolies
were
)
without
the
House
of
Commons
first
propound
and
Grant
it
.
4.
If
the
House
of
Commons
be
an
Excellent
Conserver
of
Libertie
,
it
must
Needs
have
some
Power
in
some
Cases
to
Levie
Mony
even
without
the
Kings
consent
;
or
else
it
will
be
utterly
unpossible
to
conserve
Libertie
at
all
.
Of
which
likewise
more
anon
.
Q.
19.
But
if
the
Kings
Private
Favorites
and
Followers
have
●ctually
perswaded
him
to
any
Thing
against
the
Laws
and
Liberties
of
the
Subject
with
what
further
Power
and
Priviledge
is
the
House
of
Commons
Intrusted
toward
the
Conserving
of
Liberty
?
A.
With
the
Impeaching
of
those
▪
who
for
their
own
Ends
though
countenanced
by
any
surreptitiously-gotten
command
of
the
King
,
haue
violated
that
Law
,
which
he
is
bound
(
when
he
knowes
it
)
to
protect
;
and
to
the
protection
of
which
they
were
bound
to
aduise
him
,
at
least
not
to
serue
him
in
the
contrary
.
page
19.
Obs.
1.
Then
it
is
no
Excuse
to
any
that
Violate
the
Laws
,
that
they
serve
the
King
in
it
.
2.
The
Law
counts
all
Commands
from
the
King
,
which
are
any
way
contrary
to
the
Law
,
Surreptitiously-Gotten
.
3.
Then
the
Parliament
speaks
according
to
the
Law
,
when
they
constantly
lay
the
Blame
of
all
violations
upon
the
Kings
Favorites
and
Followers
,
and
their
getting
Surreptitiously
Commands
from
him
,
and
not
upon
the
King
himself
.
4.
No
Command
of
the
King
is
to
hinder
the
Commons
from
Impreaching
such
as
have
violated
the
Law
.
5.
The
King
is
bound
not
to
Protect
any
of
his
Followers
and
Favorites
against
the
Commons
Impeachment
of
them
;
because
he
Knows
and
Affirms
,
that
he
is
bound
to
Protect
the
Laws
,
and
that
this
is
the
Law
,
that
the
Commons
are
to
Impeach
such
.
Qu.
20.
What
is
the
speciall
Priviledge
of
the
House
of
Peers
in
the
former
Case
of
such
Favorites
and
Followers
of
the
Kings
as
are
Impeached
by
the
Commons
?
and
so
to
decide
all
Matters
in
Questions
between
the
King
and
the
People
.
A.
The
Lords
being
trusted
with
a
Iudicatory
power
are
an
Excellent
Screen
and
Bank
between
the
Prince
and
the
people
,
to
Ass●st●nch
against
any
Encroachments
of
the
other
,
and
by
iust
Iudgments
to
preserue
that
Law
which
ought
to
be
the
Rule
of
euery
one
of
the
three
,
page
19.
Qu.
21.
But
have
the
two
Houses
Power
to
put
their
judgements
into
Execution
,
as
well
as
to
Impeach
and
Iudge
?
A.
The
power
of
punishment
is
already
in
your
hands
according
to
Law
,
page
20.
Obs.
1.
Then
again
it
is
no
wonder
that
the
Kings
Favorites
and
Followers
hate
Parliaments
,
(
who
not
onely
Hinder
their
Gain
,
but
have
Power
to
punish
them
)
when
they
have
violated
the
Laws
.
2.
Then
the
Lords
(
and
much
more
the
two
Houses
together
)
are
supreme
Judges
of
all
matters
in
Difference
between
the
King
and
the
People
,
and
have
Power
to
Prevent
all
the
Kings
Encroachments
upon
the
People
,
as
well
as
the
Peoples
upon
him
.
3.
Then
the
King
is
Bound
not
to
Protect
any
whom
the
Lords
upon
the
Impeachment
of
the
Commons
,
have
Judged
Delinquents
;
For
he
hath
granted
that
he
is
bound
to
Protect
the
Law
,
and
that
according
to
Law
the
Power
of
Punishing
(
even
of
his
Favourites
and
Followers
,
'fore
spoken
of
)
is
in
their
hands
,
and
they
cannot
punish
them
,
so
long
as
he
Protects
them
.
4.
Then
the
Law
Allows
them
as
the
Supreme
Judicatory
(
even
th●t
which
must
be
a
Skreen
between
the
King
and
the
People
,
and
Assist
the
People
against
the
Kings
Encroachments
,
and
punish
the
Kings
Favorites
and
Followers
,
though
countenanced
by
Surreptitiously-Gotten
Commands
from
the
King
)
a
Power
to
bring
such
as
they
have
Judged
,
(
or
are
to
Judge
)
to
Condign
Punishment
,
which
is
granted
to
all
Inferiour
Judges
in
their
Circuits
and
Iurisdictions
.
5.
Then
if
those
Delinquents
get
the
King
to
Protect
them
,
or
surreptiously
get
Commands
of
him
,
to
Raise
Arms
to
Shelter
themselves
against
the
Iudgement
of
the
two
Houses
;
the
two
Houses
have
Power
by
the
Law
to
Raise
not
onely
the
Posse
Comitatus
of
those
Counties
where
such
Delinquents
are
▪
to
apprehend
them
;
but
also
the
Posse
Regni
,
the
Power
of
the
whole
Kingdom
if
need
be
;
or
else
the
Power
of
Punishment
is
not
in
their
hands
according
to
Law
,
and
it
would
be
safer
contemning
and
scorning
and
opposing
the
highest
Iudicatory
,
the
Parliament
,
then
any
Inferiour
Court
,
a
Judge
of
Assize
,
or
the
like
:
and
they
that
could
get
Commands
to
Violate
the
Law
before
,
would
easily
get
Protection
against
the
Parliament
when
they
are
Questioned
,
if
the
Parliament
had
no
Power
to
Raise
Arms
to
suppresse
them
.
Qu.
22.
But
if
there
be
an
Attempt
or
Danger
,
that
the
Kings
Favorites
and
Followers
go
about
to
change
this
Regulated
Monarchy
into
an
Arbitrary
Government
,
and
so
into
a
Tyrannie
,
is
there
Authoritie
in
the
Houses
sufficient
according
to
what
was
sore
mentioned
to
remedy
this
?
A.
Power
Legally
Placed
in
Both
Houses
is
more
then
sufficient
to
Preuent
and
Restrain
the
power
of
Tyrannie
P.
20.
Obs.
1.
Then
at
least
what
ever
Power
is
Necessary
to
Prevent
or
Restrain
the
Power
of
Tyrannie
is
confessed
to
be
Legally
placed
in
both
Houses
;
for
else
there
is
not
Power
sufficient
,
much
lesse
,
more
then
sufficient
.
2.
Then
it
is
Lawfull
for
the
two
Houses
to
Raise
Arms
to
defend
themselves
in
case
an
Army
be
Raised
against
them
,
for
else
they
have
not
Power
sufficient
to
restrain
the
Power
of
Tyrannie
:
There
is
no
Greater
Attempt
of
Tyrannie
then
to
Raise
Arms
against
the
Houses
of
Parliament
,
and
there
is
no
way
to
Restrain
this
Tyrannie
,
but
by
Raising
Arms
in
their
own
Defence
:
Lesse
then
this
cannot
be
sufficient
.
3.
If
a
Legall
Power
be
placed
in
them
,
not
onely
to
Restrain
,
but
prevent
the
power
of
tyrannie
,
then
they
are
the
Legall
Iudges
,
when
there
is
danger
of
Tyrannie
;
and
they
have
Legall
Power
to
Command
their
judgement
to
be
obeyed
,
for
Preventions
as
well
as
Restraint
of
Tyrannie
.
4.
Then
it
is
Lawfull
for
them
to
provide
for
their
own
and
the
Kingdoms
safetie
,
and
they
have
Legall
Power
to
command
the
People
to
this
purpose
;
not
onely
when
Arms
are
Actually
Raised
against
them
,
but
when
they
Discern
,
and
accordingly
Declare
a
Preparation
made
towards
it
:
for
if
they
let
alone
altogether
the
Exercise
of
their
Power
,
till
Arms
are
Actually
Raised
against
them
;
they
may
in
all
likelihood
finde
it
too
late
,
not
onely
to
Prevent
,
but
even
to
Restrain
the
Power
of
Tyrannie
.
5.
Then
they
have
Legall
Power
in
such
Times
of
Danger
,
to
put
into
safe
hands
,
such
Forts
,
Ports
,
Magazines
,
Ships
,
and
Power
of
the
Militia
,
as
are
Intended
,
or
likely
to
be
Intended
,
to
Introduce
a
Tyranny
;
for
else
they
cannot
have
Power
sufficient
to
Prevent
or
Restrain
the
Power
of
Tyrannie
.
6.
Then
they
have
Legall
Power
to
Levie
Moneys
,
Arms
,
Horse
,
Ammunitions
,
upon
the
Subjects
,
in
such
cases
of
Danger
,
even
without
or
against
the
Kings
Consent
;
for
it
cannot
be
imagined
that
in
such
cases
when
the
Kings
Favourites
and
Followers
have
gotten
Commands
from
him
,
to
Protect
them
in
their
Delinquencies
,
and
Attempts
to
Introduce
Tyrannie
,
that
ever
he
will
consent
to
●evies
of
Moneys
against
those
Favourites
and
Fol●owers
of
his
,
or
to
the
Raising
Arms
against
them
,
specially
he
being
still
in
their
hands
,
and
among
them
,
and
not
with
his
Parliament
;
and
without
such
Levies
of
Moneys
,
&c.
it
is
not
possible
for
the
two
Houses
of
Parliament
to
Prevent
or
Restraine
sufficiently
the
Power
of
Tyrannie
.
7
They
that
have
made
the
Protestation
,
to
maintain
and
defend
the
Power
and
Priviledges
of
Parliament
,
may
see
in
all
these
Things
(
Acknowledged
by
the
King
,
and
clearly
Following
from
his
Acknowledgements
)
what
is
that
Power
,
and
what
are
Priviledges
of
Parliament
,
which
they
have
so
solemnly
in
the
Presence
of
Almighty
God
Vowed
,
Promised
and
Protested
to
maintain
,
&c.
8.
And
finally
,
since
the
two
Houses
of
Parliament
have
so
often
and
fully
Declared
their
Intentions
in
settling
the
Militia
,
securing
Hull
and
the
Magazine
there
,
and
the
Navie
at
Sea
,
with
the
Ports
and
Forts
,
and
afterward
in
Raising
Arms
under
the
Command
of
the
Earl
of
Essex
,
and
last
of
all
,
Levying
Moneys
by
voluntary
Contibutions
and
Assessements
;
they
have
onely
used
that
Legall
Power
which
is
in
them
for
the
Punishment
of
Delinquents
,
and
for
the
Prevention
and
Restraint
of
the
Power
of
Tyrannie
,
of
all
which
they
are
the
Legall
Judges
;
and
all
the
Subjects
of
this
Kingdom
are
bound
by
the
Laws
to
obey
them
herein
,
and
those
doubly
bound
that
have
made
the
late
Protestation
.
That
the
Reader
may
the
better
discern
how
the
Answers
here
applied
do
agree
with
the
words
of
his
Majesties
Answer
to
the
19
Propositions
,
I
have
here
transcribed
so
much
of
it
as
concerns
this
particular
.
Page
17.
We
call
God
to
witnesse
,
that
as
for
our
subiects
sake
these
Rights
are
vested
in
Vs
,
so
for
their
sakes
as
well
as
for
our
own
)
we
are
resolued
not
to
quit
them
nor
to
subuert
(
though
in
a
parliamentary
way
)
the
ancient
,
equall
,
happy
well-poysed
,
and
neuer-enough-commended
Constitution
of
the
gouernment
of
this
kingdom
.
There
being
three
kinds
of
gouernment
amongst
men
Absolute
Monarchy
,
Aristocracy
,
and
Democracy
,
and
all
these
hauing
their
particular
conveniences
and
inconveniences
.
page
18.
The
experience
and
wisdom
of
your
Ancestors
hath
so
moulded
this
out
of
a
mixture
of
these
,
as
to
giue
to
this
Kingdom
(
as
farre
as
humane
prudence
can
prouide
)
the
conveniences
of
all
three
,
without
the
inconveniences
of
any
one
,
as
long
as
the
Ballance
hangs
euen
between
the
three
Estates
▪
and
they
run
ioyntly
on
in
their
proper
channell
begetting
Verdure
and
Fert●lity
in
the
meadows
on
both
sides
)
and
the
ouer-flowing
of
either
on
either
side
,
raise
no
Deluge
or
Inundation
.
The
Ill
of
Absolute
Monarc●y
is
Tyranny
,
The
Ill
of
Aristocracy
is
Faction
and
Diuision
,
The
Ills
of
Democracy
are
Tumults
,
Violence
,
and
Licent●ousnesse
:
The
good
of
Monarchy
is
the
Vniting
a
Nation
under
one
Head
,
to
Resist
Inuasion
from
abroad
,
and
Insurrection
at
home
:
The
good
of
Aristocracy
is
the
coniunction
of
Councell
in
the
Ablest
persons
of
a
State
for
the
publike
benefit
:
The
good
of
Democracy
is
Liberty
,
and
the
courage
and
industry
which
Liberty
begets
.
In
this
kingdom
the
Laws
are
iointly
made
by
a
King
,
by
a
house
of
Peeres
,
and
by
a
house
of
Commons
chosen
by
the
people
,
all
hauing
free
Votes
and
particular
priviledges
.
The
gouernment
according
to
these
Laws
is
trusted
to
the
King
,
power
of
Treaties
of
war
&
peace
,
of
making
Peeres
,
of
chusing
Officers
&
Counsellours
for
State
Iudges
for
Law
,
Cōmanders
for
Forts
&
Castles
giving
Cōmissions
for
raising
men
to
make
war
abroad
,
or
to
preuent
&
provide
against
Invasions
or
Insurrections
at
home
,
benefit
of
Consiscations
,
power
of
pardoning
▪
&
some
more
of
the
like
kinde
are
placed
in
the
King
.
—
Again
,
Page
19.
that
the
Prince
may
not
make
use
of
this
high
and
pertetuall
power
to
the
hurt
of
those
for
whose
good
he
hath
it
,
and
make
use
of
the
name
of
publike
Necessity
for
the
gain
of
his
priuate
Fauorites
and
Followers
to
the
detriment
of
his
people
;
the
house
of
Commons
an
excellent
Conseruer
of
Liberty
▪
but
neuer
intended
for
any
share
in
Gouernment
,
or
the
chusing
of
them
that
should
gouern
)
is
solely
intrusted
with
the
first
Propositions
concerning
the
Leauies
of
moneys
(
which
is
the
sinews
as
wel
of
peace
as
warre
,
and
the
unpeaching
of
those
who
for
their
own
ends
,
though
countenanced
by
any
surreptitiously-gotten
cōmand
of
the
King
,
haue
violated
that
Law
,
which
he
is
bound
(
when
he
knows
it
)
to
protect
,
&
to
the
protection
of
which
they
were
bound
to
aduise
him
,
at
least
not
to
serve
him
to
the
contrary
:
&
the
Lords
being
trusted
with
a
Iudicatory
power
,
are
an
excellent
screen
and
bank
between
the
Prince
and
people
,
to
assist
each
against
any
Incroachments
of
the
other
,
and
by
iust
iudgements
to
preserue
that
Law
which
ought
to
be
the
Rule
of
euery
one
of
the
three
.
—
Pag.
20.
Since
therefore
the
Power
Legally
placed
in
both
Houses
is
more
then
sufficient
to
preuent
and
restrain
the
power
of
Tyrannie
:
—
since
this
would
be
a
totall
Subuersion
of
the
Fundamentall
Laws
,
and
that
excellent
Constitution
of
this
Kingdom
,
which
hath
made
this
Nation
so
many
years
both
Famous
&
Hapy
to
a
great
degree
of
envy
;
since
to
the
power
of
punishing
(
which
is
already
in
your
hands
according
to
Law
)
if
—
since
the
encroaching
of
one
of
these
Estates
upon
the
power
of
the
other
is
unhappy
in
the
effects
both
to
them
&
all
the
rest
—
Pag.
2●
.
Our
answer
is
▪
Nolumus
Leges
Angliae
mutari
.
But
this
We
promise
,
that
We
will
be
as
carefull
of
preserving
the
Lawes
in
what
is
supposed
to
concern
wholly
our
Subiects
,
as
in
what
most
concerns
Our self
:
For
indeed
We
professe
to
belieue
that
the
preseruation
of
euery
Law
concerns
Vs
,
those
of
Obed●ence
being
not
secure
,
when
those
of
protection
are
Violated
.
FINIS
.