Staking pools, malicious players and game theory - Economics - Ethereum Research


    
    
  
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      Staking pools, malicious players and game theory
    


      
          
            
              
              
                Proof-of-Stake
              
            
            



            
              
              
                Economics
              
            
            
      

        

            

            
              
                kakia89
                
              

              



              
                  
                    August 23, 2022,  6:06pm
                  
                  

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              We study delegation of stake to pools from a game theoretical angle. We argue that pools in PoS protocols are different from those in PoW protocols and derive a lower bound on the share of reward that the pool runner should keep for itself to guarantee the safety of the whole protocol in the presence of malicious players. The lower bound is surprisingly easy. It is equal to the (suspected) share of the malicious players in the whole system.

For the rest, check out the paper:

  

      arxiv.org
  

  
    

2203.05838.pdf


  278.79 KB


  

  
    
    
  


  



            


            
              
1 Like
            

            
                
	
        
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