A
DIALOGUE
Concerning
that
JUS
,
or
RIGHT
of
Government
amongst
the
SCOTS
.
Persons
,
GEORGE
BVCHANAN
,
And
THOMAS
MAITLAND
.
THomas
Maitland
beeing
of
late
returned
home
from
France
,
and
I
seriously
enquiring
of
him
the
state
of
affaires
there
,
began
(
for
the
love
I
bear
to
him
)
to
exhort
him
to
continue
in
that
course
he
had
taken
to
honour
,
and
to
entertain
that
excellent
hope
in
the
progress
of
his
studies
.
For
if
I
,
being
but
of
an
ordinary
spirit
,
and
almost
of
no
fortune
,
in
an
illiterat
age
,
have
so
wrestled
with
the
iniquity
of
the
times
,
as
that
I
seeme
to
have
done
somewhat
:
then
certainly
they
who
are
born
in
a
more
happy
age
,
&
who
have
maturity
of
years
,
wealth
and
pregnancy
of
spirit
,
ought
not
to
be
deterred
by
paines
from
noble
designes
,
nor
can
such
despair
beeing
assisted
by
so
many
helps
.
They
should
therefore
go
on
with
vigour
to
illustrat
learning
,
and
to
commend
themselves
and
those
of
their
nation
to
the
memory
of
after
ages
,
&
posterity
,
yea
if
they
would
but
bestirre
themselves
herein
somewhat
actively
,
it
might
come
to
pass
,
that
they
would
eradicat
out
of
mens
minds
that
opinion
,
that
men
in
the
cold
regions
of
the
world
,
are
at
as
great
distance
from
learning
,
humanity
,
&
all
endowments
of
the
mind
,
as
they
are
distant
from
the
Sun.
For
as
Nature
hath
granted
to
the
Affricans
,
Egyptians
,
and
many
other
Nations
more
subtile
motions
of
the
mind
,
and
a
greater
sharpness
of
wit
,
yet
she
hath
not
altogether
so
far
cast
off
any
nation
,
as
to
shut
up
from
it
an
entry
to
vertue
and
honour
.
Hereupon
,
whilst
he
did
speak
meanly
of
himself
(
which
is
his
modesty
)
but
of
me
more
affectionatly
than
truely
:
at
last
the
tract
of
discourse
drew
us
on
so
far
,
that
when
he
had
asked
me
concerning
the
troubled
state
of
our
countrey
,
and
I
had
answered
him
as
far
as
I
judged
convenient
for
that
time
;
I
began
by
course
to
ask
him
,
what
was
the
opinion
of
the
Frenches
or
other
Nations
with
whom
he
had
conversed
in
France
,
concerning
our
affaires
?
For
I
did
not
question
,
but
that
the
novelty
of
affaires
(
as
is
usual
)
would
give
occasion
and
matter
of
discourse
thereof
to
all
▪
Why
(
saith
he
)
do
you
desire
that
of
me
?
For
seeing
you
are
wel
acquaint
with
the
course
of
affaires
,
and
is
not
ignorant
what
the
most
part
of
men
do
speak
,
and
what
they
think
,
you
may
easily
guess
in
your
own
conscience
,
what
is
,
or
at
least
should
be
the
opinion
of
all
.
B
:
but
,
the
further
that
forrain
Nations
are
at
a
distance
,
they
have
the
less
causes
of
wrath
,
hatred
,
love
and
other
perturbations
,
which
may
divert
the
mind
from
truth
,
and
for
the
most
part
they
so
much
the
more
judge
of
things
sincerely
,
and
freely
speak
out
what
they
think
:
that
very
freedome
of
speaking
and
conferring
the
thoughts
of
the
heart
doth
draw
forth
many
obscure
things
,
discovers
intricacies
,
confirme
doubts
and
may
stop
the
mouth
of
wicked
men
,
and
teach
such
as
are
weak
.
M
:
Shall
I
be
ingenuous
with
you
?
B
:
why
not
?
M
:
Although
I
had
a
great
desire
after
so
long
a
time
,
to
visite
my
native
Country
,
Parents
,
Relations
,
and
friends
,
yet
nothing
did
so
much
inflame
my
desire
,
as
the
clamour
of
a
rude
multitude
:
For
albeit
I
thought
my selfe
well
enough
fortified
either
by
my
own
constant
Practice
,
or
the
morall
precepts
of
the
most
learned
,
yet
when
I
came
to
fall
upon
the
present
case
,
I
know
not
how
I
could
conceale
my
pusillanimity
.
For
when
that
horrid
villany
not
long
since
here
perpetrat
,
all
with
one
voice
did
abominat
it
,
the
Author
hereof
not
being
known
;
the
multitude
,
which
is
more
acted
by
precipitancy
,
than
ruled
by
deliberation
,
did
charge
the
fault
of
some
few
upon
all
;
and
the
common
hatred
of
a
particular
crime
did
redound
to
the
whole
Nation
,
so
that
even
such
as
were
most
remote
from
any
suspicion
were
inflamed
with
the
infamy
of
other
mens
crime
.
When
therefore
this
storme
of
calumny
was
calmed
,
I
betook
my self
very
willingly
into
this
port
,
wherein
notwithstanding
I
am
afraid
,
I
may
dash
upon
a
rock
.
B.
Why
,
I
pray
you
?
M.
Because
the
atrociousness
of
that
late
crime
doth
seeme
so
much
to
inflame
the
minds
of
all
already
exasperat
,
that
now
no
place
of
Apology
is
left
.
For
,
how
shall
I
be
able
to
sustain
the
impetuous
assaults
,
not
only
of
the
weaker
sort
,
but
also
of
those
who
seeme
to
be
more
sagacious
,
who
will
exclaime
against
us
,
that
we
were
content
with
the
slaughter
of
an
harmeless
youth
,
an
unheard
of
cruelty
,
unless
we
should
shew
another
new
example
of
atrocious
cruelty
against
women
,
which
sexe
very
enemies
do
spare
when
cities
are
taken
in
by
force
.
Now
from
what
villany
will
any
dignity
or
Majesty
deterre
those
,
who
thus
rage
against
Kings
?
or
what
place
for
mercy
will
they
leave
,
whom
neither
the
weakness
of
sexe
,
nor
innocency
of
age
will
restrain
?
Equity
,
Custome
,
Lawes
,
the
Respect
to
Soveraignty
,
Reverence
of
Lawful
Magistracy
,
which
hence
forth
they
will
either
retain
for
shame
,
or
coërce
for
fear
,
when
the
power
of
supreame
authority
is
exposed
to
the
ludibry
of
the
basest
of
the
people
,
the
difference
of
equity
and
iniquity
,
of
honesty
and
dishonesty
being
once
taken
away
,
almost
by
a
publick
consent
,
there
is
a
degeneracy
into
cruel
barbarity
.
I
know
I
shall
hear
these
,
and
more
atrocious
than
these
spoken
how
soon
I
shall
returne
into
France
again
;
all
mens
ears
in
the
mean
time
being
shut
from
admitting
any
Apology
or
satisfaction
.
B.
But
I
shall
easily
liberat
you
of
this
fear
,
and
our
Nation
from
that
false
crime
.
For
,
if
they
do
so
much
detest
the
atrociousness
of
the
first
crime
,
how
can
they
rationally
reprehend
severity
in
revenging
it
?
or
if
they
take
it
ill
,
that
the
Queen
is
taken
order
with
,
they
must
needs
approve
the
first
deed
;
choose
you
then
,
which
of
the
two
would
you
have
to
seeme
cruel
.
For
neither
they
nor
you
can
praise
or
reproach
both
,
provided
you
understand
your selves
.
M.
I
do
indeed
abhorre
and
detest
the
Kings
murther
,
and
am
glad
that
the
Nation
is
free
of
that
guilt
,
and
that
it
is
charged
upon
the
wickedness
of
some
few
.
But
this
last
fact
I
can
neither
allow
nor
disallow
,
for
it
seemes
to
me
a
famous
and
memorable
deed
,
that
by
counsel
and
diligence
they
have
searched
out
that
villany
,
which
since
the
memory
of
man
is
the
most
hainous
,
and
do
pursue
the
perpetrators
in
a
hostile
manner
.
But
in
that
they
have
taken
order
with
the
chief
Magistrat
,
and
put
contempt
upon
Soveraignty
,
which
amongst
all
Nations
hath
been
alwayes
accounted
great
and
sacred
.
I
know
not
how
all
the
Nations
of
Europe
will
relish
it
,
especially
such
as
live
under
Kingly
Government
;
surely
the
greatness
and
novelty
of
the
fact
doth
put
me
to
a
demurre
,
albeit
I
am
not
ignorant
what
may
be
pretended
on
the
contrary
,
and
so
much
the
rather
,
because
some
of
the
Actors
are
of
my
intimate
acquaintance
.
B.
Now
I
almost
perceive
,
that
it
doth
perhaps
not
trouble
you
so
much
,
as
those
of
forrain
Nations
,
who
would
be
judges
of
the
vertues
of
others
to
whom
you
think
satisfaction
must
be
given
.
Of
these
I
shall
set
down
three
sorts
especially
,
who
will
vehemently
enveigh
against
that
deed
.
The
first
kind
is
most
pernicious
,
wherein
those
are
,
who
have
mancipated
themselves
to
the
lusts
of
Tyrants
,
and
think
every
thing
just
and
lawfull
for
them
to
do
,
wherein
they
may
gratify
Kings
,
and
measure
every
thing
not
as
it
is
in
it self
,
but
by
the
lust
of
their
Masters
.
Such
have
so
devoted
themselves
to
the
lusts
of
others
,
that
they
have
left
to
themselves
no
liberty
either
to
speak
o●
do
.
Out
of
this
Crew
have
proceeded
those
,
who
have
most
cruelly
murthered
that
innocent
Youth
,
without
any
cause
of
enmity
,
but
through
hope
of
gain
,
honour
,
and
power
at
Court
to
satisfy
the
lust
of
others
.
Now
whilst
such
feign
to
be
sorry
for
the
Queens
case
,
they
are
not
grieved
for
her
misfortunes
,
but
look
for
their
own
security
,
and
take
very
ill
to
have
the
reward
of
their
most
hainous
crime
,
(
which
by
hope
they
swallowed
down
)
to
be
pulled
out
of
their
throat
.
I
judge
therefore
that
this
kind
of
men
should
not
be
satisfied
so
much
by
reasoning
,
as
chastised
by
the
severity
of
Lawes
,
and
force
of
Armes
.
Others
again
are
all
for
themselves
;
these
men
,
though
otherwise
not
malicious
,
are
not
grieved
for
the
publick
calamity
(
as
they
would
seeme
to
be
)
but
for
their
own
domestick
damages
,
and
therefore
they
seeme
to
stand
in
need
rather
of
some
comfort
,
than
of
the
remedies
of
perswasive
reasoning
and
Lawes
.
The
rest
is
the
rude
multitude
,
which
doth
admire
at
all
novelties
,
reprehend
many
things
,
and
think
nothing
is
right
,
but
what
they
themselvs
do
or
see
done
:
For
how
much
any
thing
done
doth
decline
from
an
ancient
custome
,
so
farr
they
think
it
is
fallen
from
justice
and
equity
.
And
because
these
be
not
led
by
malice
and
envy
,
nor
yet
by
self-interest
,
the
most
part
will
admitt
information
,
and
to
be
weaned
from
their
errour
,
so
that
being
convinced
by
the
strength
of
reason
,
they
yeeld
:
Which
in
the
matter
of
Religion
,
we
find
by
experience
very
often
in
these
dayes
,
and
have
also
found
it
in
preceeding
ages
.
There
is
almost
no
man
so
wilde
,
that
can
not
be
tamed
,
if
he
will
but
patiently
hearken
to
instruction
.
M.
Surely
we
have
found
oftentimes
that
very
true
.
B.
When
you
therefore
deale
with
this
kind
of
People
so
clamorous
and
very
importunat
,
ask
some
of
them
,
what
they
think
concerning
the
punishment
of
Caligula
,
Nero
or
Domitian
,
I
think
there
will
be
none
of
them
so
addicted
to
the
name
King
,
that
will
not
confess
,
they
were
justly
punished
.
M.
Perhaps
you
say
right
,
but
these
very
same
men
will
forthwith
cry-out
,
that
they
complain
not
of
the
punishment
of
Tyrants
,
but
are
grieved
at
the
sad
calamities
of
lawfull
Kings
.
B.
Do
you
not
then
perceive
how
easily
the
People
may
be
pacified
?
M.
Not
indeed
,
unless
you
say
some
other
thing
.
B.
But
I
shall
cause
you
understand
it
in
few
words
,
the
People
(
you
say
)
approve
the
murther
of
Tyrants
,
but
compassionat
the
misfortune
of
Kings
,
would
they
not
then
change
their
opinion
,
if
they
clearly
understood
what
the
difference
is
betwixt
a
Tyrant
and
a
King
?
Do
you
not
think
that
this
might
come
to
pass
,
as
in
many
other
cases
?
M.
If
all
would
confess
that
Tyrants
are
justly
killed
,
we
might
have
a
large
entry
made
open
to
us
for
the
rest
,
but
I
find
some
men
,
and
these
not
of
small
authority
,
who
while
they
make
Kings
liable
to
the
penalties
of
the
Lawes
,
yet
they
will
maintain
Tyrants
to
be
sacred
persons
;
but
certainly
by
a
preposterous
judgment
,
if
I
be
not
mistaken
,
yet
they
are
ready
to
maintain
their
Government
,
albeit
immoderat
and
intolerable
,
as
if
they
were
to
fight
for
things
both
Sacred
&
Civil
.
B.
I
have
also
met
with
several
Persons
oftentimes
,
who
maintain
the
same
very
pertinaciously
;
but
whether
that
opinion
be
right
or
not
,
we
shall
further
discuss
it
hereafter
at
better
conveniency
.
In
the
mean
time
,
if
you
please
,
let
us
conclude
upon
this
,
upon
condition
,
that
unless
hereafter
it
be
not
sufficiently
confirmed
unto
you
,
you
may
have
liberty
to
retract
the
same
.
M.
On
these
termes
indeed
I
will
not
refuse
it
.
B.
Let
us
then
conclude
these
two
to
be
contraries
a
King
and
a
Tyrant
.
M.
Be
it
so
.
B.
He
therefore
that
shall
explain
the
Original
and
cause
of
Creating
Kings
,
and
what
the
duties
of
Kings
are
towards
their
people
,
and
of
people
towards
their
Kings
,
will
he
not
seeme
to
have
almost
explained
on
the
other
hand
,
what
doth
pertain
to
the
nature
of
a
Tyrant
.
M.
I
think
so
.
B.
The
representation
then
of
both
being
laid
out
,
do
you
not
think
that
the
people
will
understand
also
,
what
their
duty
is
towards
both
?
M.
It
is
very
like
they
will.
B.
Now
Contrary
wise
,
in
things
that
are
very
unlike
to
one
another
,
which
yet
are
contained
under
the
same
genus
,
there
may
be
some
similitudes
,
which
may
easily
induce
imprudent
persons
into
an
errour
.
M.
Doubtless
,
there
may
be
such
,
and
especially
in
the
same
kind
,
where
that
which
is
the
worst
of
the
two
doth
easily
personat
the
best
of
both
,
and
studies
nothing
more
,
than
to
impose
the
same
upon
such
as
are
ignorant
.
Buc.
Have
you
not
some
representation
of
a
King
and
of
a
Tyrant
impressed
in
your
mind
?
For
if
you
have
it
,
you
will
save
me
much
pains
.
M.
Indeed
I
could
easily
express
what
Idea
I
have
of
both
in
my
mind
,
but
I
fear
,
it
may
be
rude
and
without
forme
,
therefore
,
I
rather
desire
to
hear
what
your
opinion
is
,
lest
whilst
you
are
a
refuting
me
,
our
discourse
become
more
prolixe
,
you
being
both
in
age
and
experience
above
me
;
and
are
well
acquaint
not
only
with
the
opinions
of
others
,
but
also
have
seen
the
customes
of
many
,
and
their
Cities
.
B.
I
shall
then
do
it
,
and
that
very
willingly
,
yet
will
I
not
unfold
my
own
opinion
so
much
,
as
that
of
the
Ancients
,
that
thereby
a
greater
authority
may
be
given
to
my
discourse
,
as
not
being
such
as
is
made
up
with
respect
to
this
time
,
but
taken
out
of
the
opinions
of
those
,
who
not
being
concerned
in
the
present
controversy
,
have
no
less
eloquently
than
briefly
given
their
judgment
,
without
hatred
,
favour
,
or
envy
,
whose
case
was
far
from
these
things
;
and
their
opinions
I
shall
especially
make
use
of
,
who
have
not
frivolously
trifled
away
their
time
,
but
by
vertue
and
counsel
have
flourished
both
at
home
and
abroad
in
well
governed
Common
wealths
.
But
before
I
produce
these
witnesses
,
I
would
ask
you
some
few
things
,
that
seeing
we
are
at
accord
in
some
things
of
no
smal
importance
,
there
may
be
no
necessity
to
digress
from
the
purpose
in
hand
,
nor
to
stay
in
explaining
or
confirming
things
that
are
perspicuous
and
well
known
.
M.
I
think
we
should
do
so
,
&
if
you
please
,
ask
me
.
B.
Do
you
not
think
that
the
time
hath
been
,
when
men
did
dwell
in
cottages
,
yea
and
in
caves
,
and
as
strangers
did
wander
to
and
fro
without
Lawes
,
or
certain
dwelling
places
,
and
did
Assemble
together
as
their
fond
humours
did
lead
them
,
or
as
some
comodity
,
and
comon
utility
did
allure
them
?
M.
for
sooth
I
beleeve
that
:
seeing
it
is
consonant
to
the
course
and
order
of
nature
,
and
is
testified
by
all
the
histories
of
all
Nations
almost
,
for
Homer
doth
describe
the
representation
of
such
a
wilde
and
barbarous
kind
of
life
in
Sicily
,
even
in
the
time
of
the
Trojans
.
Their
Courts
(
saith
he
)
do
neither
abound
with
Counciles
nor
Judges
,
they
dwell
only
in
darksome
caves
,
and
every
one
of
them
in
high
mountains
ruleth
his
own
house
,
wife
and
Children
,
nor
is
any
of
them
at
leisure
to
communicat
his
domestick
affaires
to
any
other
.
About
the
same
time
also
Italy
is
said
to
be
no
better
civilized
,
as
we
may
easily
conjecture
from
the
most
fertile
regions
almost
of
the
whole
world
,
how
great
the
solitude
and
wastness
there
was
in
places
on
this
side
of
Italy
.
B.
But
whether
do
you
think
the
vagrant
and
solitary
life
,
or
the
associations
of
men
civilly
incorporat
,
most
agreable
to
nature
?
M.
The
last
without
all
peradventure
,
which
utility
the
mother
almost
of
justice
and
equity
did
first
convocat
,
and
commanded
to
give
signes
or
warnings
by
sound
of
trumpet
and
to
defend
themselves
within
walls
,
and
to
shut
the
gates
with
one
key
.
B.
But
,
do
you
think
that
utility
was
the
first
and
main
cause
of
the
association
of
men
?
M.
Why
not
,
seeing
I
have
heard
from
the
learned
,
that
men
are
born
for
men
.
B.
Uitility
indeed
to
some
seems
to
be
very
efficacious
,
both
in
begetting
and
conserving
the
publick
society
of
mankind
;
but
if
I
mistake
not
,
there
is
a
far
more
venerable
,
or
ancient
cause
of
mens
associating
,
and
a
more
antecedaneous
&
sacred
bond
of
their
civil
community
,
otherwise
,
if
every
one
would
have
a
regard
to
this
own
private
advantage
,
then
surely
that
very
utility
would
rather
dissolve
than
unite
humane
society
together
.
M.
Perhaps
that
may
be
true
,
therefore
I
desire
to
know
what
other
cause
you
will
assigne
.
B.
A
certain
instinct
of
nature
,
not
only
in
man
,
but
also
in
the
more
tamed
sort
of
beasts
,
that
although
these
allurements
of
utility
be
not
in
them
,
yet
do
they
of
their
own
accord
flock
together
with
other
beasts
of
their
own
kind
,
But
of
these
others
we
have
no
ground
of
debate
:
Surely
we
see
this
instinct
by
nature
so
deeply
rooted
in
man
,
that
if
any
one
had
the
affluence
of
all
things
,
which
contribute
either
for
maintaining
health
,
or
pleasure
and
delight
of
the
mind
,
yet
he
will
think
his
life
unpleasant
without
humane
converse
.
Yea
,
they
who
out
of
a
desire
of
knowledge
,
and
an
endeavour
of
investigating
the
truth
,
have
with
drawn
themselves
from
the
multitude
,
and
retired
to
secret
corners
,
could
not
long
endure
a
perpetual
vexation
of
mind
,
nor
,
if
at
any
time
they
should
remit
the
same
,
could
they
live
in
solitude
,
but
very
willingly
did
bring
forth
to
light
their
very
secret
studies
,
and
as
they
had
laboured
for
the
publick
good
,
they
did
communicat
to
all
the
fruit
of
their
●abour
.
But
if
there
be
any
man
who
doth
wholly
take
delight
in
solitude
,
and
flee
from
converse
with
men
,
and
shun
it
.
I
judge
it
doth
rather
proceed
from
a
distemper
of
the
mind
,
than
from
any
instinct
of
nature
,
such
as
we
have
heard
of
Tim●n
the
Athenian
,
and
Bellerophon
the
Corinthian
,
who
(
as
the
Poet
saith
)
was
a
wandering
wretch
on
the
Elean
coast
,
eating
his
own
heart
,
and
fleeing
the
very
footsteps
of
men
.
M.
I
do
not
in
this
much
dissent
from
you
,
but
there
is
one
word
nature
here
set
down
by
you
,
which
I
do
often
use
rather
out
of
custom
,
than
that
I
understand
it
,
and
is
by
others
so
variously
taken
,
and
accommodat
to
so
many
things
,
that
for
the
most
part
I
am
at
a
stand
to
what
I
may
mainly
apply
it
.
B.
Forsooth
at
present
I
would
have
no
other
thing
to
be
understood
thereby
,
than
that
LIGHT
infused
by
GOD
into
our
Minds
,
for
when
God
formed
that
Creature
more
Sacred
,
and
capable
of
a
Celestial
Mind
,
and
which
might
have
dominion
over
the
other
creatures
,
he
gave
not
only
eyes
to
his
Body
,
whereby
he
might
evite
things
contrary
to
his
condition
,
and
follow
after
such
as
might
be
usefull
,
but
also
he
produced
in
his
Mind
a
certain
LIGHT
,
whereby
he
might
discerne
things
filthy
from
honest
;
this
Light
some
call
Nature
,
others
the
Law
of
Nature
,
for
my
own
part
,
truly
I
think
it
is
of
a
Heavenly
stamp
,
and
I
am
fully
perswaded
▪
that
Nature
doth
never
say
one
thing
,
and
Wisdom
another
.
Moreover
,
God
h●th
given
us
a●
abridgment
of
that
LAW
,
which
might
contain
the
whole
in
few
words
,
viz.
that
We
should
love
Him
with
all
our
Soul
,
and
our
Neighbours
as
our selves
,
all
the
books
of
Holy
Scriptur
which
treat
of
ordering
our
conversation
,
do
contain
nothing
else
but
an
explication
of
this
Law.
M.
You
think
then
that
no
Orator
or
Lawyer
,
who
might
congregat
dispersed
men
▪
hath
been
the
Author
of
humane
society
,
but
God
only
?
B.
It
is
so
indeed
,
and
with
Cicero
,
I
think
there
is
nothing
done
on
earth
more
acceptable
to
the
great
God
,
who
rules
the
World
,
than
the
associations
of
men
legally
united
,
which
are
called
Civil
Incorporations
,
whose
several
parts
must
be
as
compactly
joyned
together
,
as
the
several
members
of
our
Body
,
&
every
one
must
have
their
proper
function
,
to
the
end
there
may
be
a
mutual
cooperating
for
the
good
of
the
Whole
,
&
a
mutual
propelling
of
injuries
,
and
a
foreseeing
of
advantages
,
and
these
to
be
communicat
for
engaging
the
benevolence
of
all
amongst
themselves
▪
M.
You
do
not
then
make
utility
,
but
that
Divine
Law
rooted
in
us
from
the
beginning
,
to
be
the
cause
(
indeed
the
far
more
worthy
and
Divine
of
the
two
)
of
mens
incorporating
in
Political
Societies
.
B.
I
mean
not
indeed
that
to
be
the
Mother
of
Equity
and
Justice
,
as
some
would
have
it
,
but
rather
the
handmaid
,
and
to
be
one
of
the
Guards
in
Cities
wel
constitute
.
M.
Herein
I
also
agree
with
you
.
B.
Now
as
in
our
Bodies
consisting
of
contrary
Elements
,
there
are
diseases
,
that
is
,
perturbations
,
and
some
intestine
tumults
,
even
so
there
must
be
of
necessity
in
these
greater
Bodies
,
that
is
in
Cities
,
which
also
consist
of
various
,
(
yea
and
for
the
most
part
)
contrary
humours
,
or
sorts
of
men
,
and
these
of
different
ranks
,
conditions
and
natures
,
and
which
is
more
,
of
such
as
can
not
remain
one
hour
together
approving
the
same
things
:
And
surely
such
must
needs
soon
dissolve
and
come
to
nought
;
if
one
be
not
adhibited
,
who
as
a
Physician
may
quiet
such
disturbances
,
and
by
a
moderat
and
wholesome
temperament
confirme
the
infirme
parts
and
compesce
redundant
humours
,
and
so
take
care
of
all
the
members
,
that
the
weaker
may
not
languish
for
want
of
nutrition
,
nor
the
stronger
become
luxuriant
too
much
.
M.
Truely
,
it
must
needs
be
so
.
B.
How
then
shall
we
call
him
who
performeth
these
things
in
a
Civil
Body
?
M.
I
am
not
very
anxious
about
his
name
,
for
by
what
name
soever
he
be
called
,
I
think
he
must
be
a
very
Excellent
and
Divine
Person
,
wherein
the
wisdom
of
our
Ancestors
seemeth
to
have
much
foreseen
,
who
have
adorned
the
thing
in
it self
most
illustrious
with
an
illustrious
name
.
I
suppose
you
mean
King
,
of
which
word
there
is
such
an
emphasis
,
that
it
holds
forth
before
us
clearly
a
function
in
it self
very
great
and
excellent
.
B.
You
are
very
right
,
for
we
designe
GOD
by
that
name
.
For
we
have
no
other
more
glorious
name
,
whereby
we
may
declare
the
excellency
of
his
glorious
nature
,
nor
more
suteable
,
whereby
to
signify
his
Paternal
care
and
Providence
towards
us
.
What
other
names
shall
I
collect
,
which
we
translate
to
denote
the
function
of
a
King
?
Such
as
Father
Aeneas
,
Agamemnon
,
Pastor
of
the
People
,
also
a
Leader
,
Prince
,
Governour
.
By
all
which
names
such
a
signification
is
implyed
,
as
may
shew
that
Kings
are
not
ordained
for
themselves
,
but
for
the
People
.
Now
as
for
the
name
we
agree
wel
enough
:
If
you
please
,
let
us
conferre
concerning
the
function
,
insisting
in
the
same
footsteps
we
began
upon
.
M.
Which
,
I
pray
?
B.
Do
you
remember
what
hath
been
lately
spoken
,
that
an
Incorporation
seemeth
to
be
very
like
our
body
,
Civil
commotions
like
to
diseases
,
and
a
King
to
a
Physician
?
If
therefore
we
shall
understand
what
the
duty
of
a
Physician
is
,
I
am
of
the
opinion
,
we
shall
not
much
mistake
the
duty
of
a
King.
M.
It
may
be
so
,
for
the
rest
you
have
reckoned
are
very
like
,
and
seem
to
me
very
near
in
kin
.
B.
Do
not
expect
that
I
will
here
describe
every
petty
thing
,
for
the
time
will
not
permit
it
,
neither
doth
the
matter
in
hand
call
for
it
:
but
if
briefly
these
agree
together
,
you
shall
easily
comprehend
the
rest
.
M.
Go
on
then
,
as
you
are
doing
.
B.
The
scope
seemeth
to
be
the
same
to
us
both
.
M.
Which
?
B.
The
health
of
the
body
,
for
curing
of
which
they
are
adhibited
.
M.
I
understand
you
,
for
the
one
ought
to
keep
safe
the
humane
body
in
its
state
,
and
the
other
the
Civil
body
in
its
state
,
as
far
as
the
nature
of
each
can
bear
,
and
to
reduce
into
perfect
health
the
body
diseased
.
B.
You
understand
very
wel
,
for
there
is
a
twofold
duty
incumbent
to
both
,
the
one
is
to
preserve
health
,
the
other
is
to
restore
it
,
if
it
become
weak
by
sickness
.
M.
I
assent
to
you
.
B.
For
the
diseases
of
both
are
alike
.
M.
It
seemeth
so
.
B.
For
the
redundance
of
things
hurtfull
,
and
want
or
scarcity
of
things
necessary
are
alike
noxious
to
both
,
and
both
the
one
and
other
body
is
cured
almost
in
the
same
manner
,
namely
either
by
nourishing
that
which
is
extenuat
and
tenderly
cherishing
it
,
or
by
asswaging
that
which
is
full
and
redundant
by
casting
out
superfluities
,
and
exercising
the
body
with
moderat
labours
.
M.
It
is
so
,
but
here
seems
to
be
the
difference
,
that
the
humours
in
the
one
,
and
manners
in
the
other
are
to
be
reduced
into
a
right
temperament
.
B.
You
understand
it
wel
,
for
the
Body
Politik
as
wel
as
the
Natural
hath
its
own
proper
temperament
,
which
I
think
very
rightly
we
may
call
Justice
.
For
it
is
that
which
doth
regard
every
member
,
and
cureth
it
so
as
to
be
kept
in
its
function
.
This
sometimes
is
done
by
letting
of
blood
,
sometimes
by
the
expelling
of
hurtfull
things
,
as
by
egestion
;
and
sometimes
exciting
cast-down
and
timorous
minds
,
and
comforting
the
weak
,
and
so
reduceth
the
whole
body
into
that
temperament
I
spoke
of
:
and
being
reduced
,
exerciseth
it
with
convenient
exercises
,
and
by
a
certain
prescribed
temperature
of
Labour
and
rest
,
doth
preserve
the
restored
health
as
much
as
can
be
.
M.
All
the
rest
I
easily
assent
to
,
except
that
you
place
the
temperament
of
the
body
Politik
in
Justice
:
seing
temperance
even
by
its
very
name
and
profession
doth
justly
seem
to
claime
these
parts
.
B.
I
think
it
is
no
great
matter
on
which
of
them
you
conferre
this
honour
.
For
seing
all
vertues
,
whereof
the
strength
is
best
perceived
in
action
,
are
placed
in
a
certain
mediocrity
and
equability
,
so
are
they
in
some
measure
connected
amongst
themselves
,
and
cohere
,
so
as
it
seems
to
be
but
one
office
in
all
,
that
is
,
the
moderation
of
lusts
.
Now
in
whatsoever
kind
this
moderation
is
,
it
is
no
great
matter
how
it
be
denominat
:
albeit
that
moderation
,
which
is
placed
in
publick
matters
,
and
mens
mutual
commerces
,
doth
seem
most
fitly
to
be
understood
by
the
name
of
Justice
.
M.
Herein
I
very
willingly
assent
to
you
.
B.
In
the
creation
of
a
King
,
I
think
the
Ancients
have
followed
this
way
,
that
if
any
among
the
Citizens
were
of
any
singular
excellency
,
and
seemed
to
exceed
all
others
in
equity
and
prudence
,
as
is
reported
to
be
done
in
bee-hives
,
they
willingly
conferred
the
government
or
kingdom
on
him
.
M.
It
is
credible
to
have
been
so
.
B.
But
what
if
none
such
as
we
have
spoken
of
,
should
be
found
in
the
City
?
M.
By
that
law
of
Nature
,
whereof
we
formerly
made
mention
,
equals
neither
can
;
nor
ought
to
usurpe
dominion
:
for
by
nature
I
think
it
just
,
that
amongst
these
that
are
equal
in
all
other
things
,
their
course
of
ruling
and
obeying
should
be
alike
.
B.
What
if
a
People
,
wearied
with
yearly
ambition
be
willing
to
elect
some
certain
Person
not
altogether
endowed
with
all
Royal
Vertues
,
but
either
famous
by
his
Noble
descent
,
or
warlike
valour
?
will
you
not
think
that
he
is
a
lawfull
King
?
M.
Most
lawfull
,
for
the
People
have
power
to
conferre
the
Government
on
whom
they
please
.
B.
What
if
we
shall
admitt
some
acute
man
,
yet
not
endowed
with
notable
skill
,
for
curing
diseases
?
shall
we
presently
account
him
a
Physician
,
as
soon
as
he
is
chosen
by
all
?
M.
Not
at
all
▪
for
by
learning
and
the
experience
of
many
arts
,
and
not
by
suffrages
is
a
man
made
a
Physician
.
B.
What
maketh
Artists
in
other
Arts
?
M.
I
think
there
is
one
reason
of
all
.
B.
Do
you
think
there
is
any
Art
of
Reigning
or
not
?
M.
Why
not
.
B.
Can
you
give
me
a
reason
why
you
think
so
?
M.
I
think
I
can
,
namely
that
same
which
is
usually
given
in
other
Arts.
B.
What
is
that
?
M.
Because
the
beginnings
of
all
Arts
proceed
from
experience
.
For
whilst
many
did
rashly
and
without
any
reason
undertake
to
treat
of
many
things
,
and
others
again
through
exercitation
and
consuetude
did
the
same
more
sagaciously
,
noticing
the
events
on
both
hands
,
and
perpending
the
causes
thereof
,
some
acute
men
have
digested
a
certain
order
of
Precepts
,
and
called
that
Description
an
Art.
B.
Then
by
the
like
animadversion
may
not
some
Art
of
Reigning
be
described
,
as
wel
as
the
Art
of
Physick
?
M.
I
think
there
may
.
B.
Of
what
Precepts
shall
it
consist
?
M.
I
do
not
know
at
present
.
B.
What
if
we
shall
find
it
out
by
comparing
it
with
other
Arts
?
M.
What
way
?
B.
This
way
:
there
be
some
Precepts
of
Grammar
,
of
Physick
,
and
Husbandry
.
M.
I
understand
.
B.
Shall
we
not
call
these
Precepts
of
Grammarians
and
Physicians
Arts
and
Lawes
also
,
and
so
of
others
?
M.
It
seems
indeed
so
.
B.
Do
not
the
Civil
Lawes
seem
to
be
certain
Precepts
of
Royal
Art
?
M.
They
seem
so
.
B.
He
must
therefore
be
acquaint
therewith
,
who
would
be
accounted
a
King.
M.
It
seemes
so
.
B.
What
if
he
have
no
skill
therein
?
Albeit
the
People
shall
command
him
to
reigne
,
think
you
that
he
should
be
called
a
King
?
M.
You
cause
me
here
hesitate
:
For
if
I
would
consent
with
the
former
discourse
,
the
suffrages
of
the
People
can
no
more
make
him
a
King
,
than
any
other
Artist
.
B.
What
think
you
shall
then
be
done
?
for
unless
we
have
a
King
chosen
by
suffrages
,
I
am
afraid
we
shall
have
no
lawfull
King
at
all
.
M.
And
I
fear
also
the
same
.
B.
Will
you
then
be
content
that
we
more
accuratly
examine
what
we
have
last
set
down
in
comparing
Arts
one
with
another
?
M.
Be
it
so
,
if
it
so
please
you
.
B.
Have
we
not
called
the
Precepts
of
Artists
in
their
several
Arts
,
Lawes
?
M.
We
have
done
so
.
B.
But
I
fear
we
have
not
done
it
circumspectly
enough
.
M.
Why
?
B.
Because
he
would
seem
absurd
who
had
skill
in
any
Art
,
and
yet
not
to
be
an
Artist
.
M.
It
were
so
:
B.
But
he
that
doth
performe
what
belongs
to
an
Art
,
we
will
account
him
an
Artist
,
whether
he
do
it
naturally
,
or
by
some
perpetual
and
constant
tenour
and
faculty
.
M.
I
think
so
.
B.
We
shall
then
call
him
an
Artist
,
who
knowes
wel
this
rational
and
prudent
way
of
doing
any
thing
wel
,
providing
he
hath
acquired
that
faculty
by
constant
practice
.
M.
Much
better
than
him
who
hath
the
bare
Precepts
without
use
and
exercitation
.
B.
Shall
we
not
then
account
these
Precepts
to
be
Art
?
M.
Not
at
all
,
but
a
certain
similitude
thereof
,
or
rather
a
shaddow
of
Art.
B.
What
is
then
that
Governing
Faculty
of
Cities
,
which
we
shall
call
Civil
Art
or
Science
?
M.
It
seemes
you
would
call
it
Prudence
:
out
of
which
,
as
from
a
fountain
or
spring
,
all
Lawes
,
provided
they
be
usefull
for
the
preservation
of
humane
society
,
must
proceed
and
be
derived
.
B.
You
have
hit
the
nail
on
the
head
,
if
this
then
were
compleat
and
perfect
in
any
person
,
we
might
say
he
were
a
King
by
nature
,
and
not
by
suffrages
,
and
might
resigne
over
to
him
a
free
Power
over
all
things
:
but
if
we
find
not
such
a
man
,
we
shall
also
call
him
a
King
,
who
doth
come
nearest
to
that
eminent
excellency
of
Nature
,
embracing
in
him
a
certain
similitude
of
a
true
King.
M.
Let
us
call
him
so
,
if
you
please
.
B.
And
because
we
fear
he
be
not
firme
enough
against
inordinat
affections
,
which
may
,
and
for
the
most
part
use
to
decline
men
from
truth
,
we
shall
adjoyn
to
him
the
Law
,
as
it
were
a
Colleague
,
or
rather
a
bridler
of
his
lusts
.
M.
You
do
not
then
think
that
a
King
should
have
an
arbitrary
Power
over
all
things
.
B.
Not
at
all
:
for
I
remember
,
that
he
is
not
only
a
King
,
but
also
a
man
,
erring
in
many
things
by
ignorance
,
often
failing
willingly
,
doing
many
things
by
constraint
:
yea
a
creature
easily
changeable
at
the
blast
of
every
favour
or
frown
,
which
natural
vice
a
Magistrat
useth
also
to
increase
:
so
that
here
I
chiefly
find
that
of
the
Comedy
made
true
,
All
by
licence
become
worse
.
Wherefore
the
most
prudent
have
thought
it
expedient
to
adjoyne
to
him
a
Law
,
which
may
either
shew
him
the
way
,
if
he
be
ignorant
,
or
bring
him
back
again
into
the
way
,
if
he
wander
out
of
it
:
by
these
,
I
suppose
,
you
understand
,
as
in
a
representation
,
what
I
judge
to
be
the
duty
of
a
true
King.
M.
Of
the
cause
of
creating
Kings
,
of
their
name
and
duty
you
have
fully
satisfied
me
.
Yet
I
shall
not
repine
,
if
you
please
to
add
ought
thereto
:
Albeit
my
mind
doth
hasten
to
hear
what
yet
seemes
to
remain
,
yet
there
is
one
thing
which
in
all
your
discourse
did
not
a
little
offend
me
,
which
I
think
should
not
be
past
over
in
silence
,
viz.
that
you
seem
somewhat
injurious
to
Kings
,
and
this
very
thing
I
did
suspect
in
you
frequently
before
,
whilst
I
often
heard
you
so
profusely
commend
the
ancient
Common-Wealths
,
and
the
City
of
Venice
.
B.
You
did
not
rightly
herein
judge
of
me
.
For
I
do
not
so
much
look
to
the
different
forme
of
Civil
Government
(
such
as
was
amongst
the
Romans
,
Massilians
,
Venetians
and
others
,
amongst
whom
the
authority
of
Lawes
were
more
powerfull
,
than
that
of
men
)
as
to
the
equity
of
the
forme
of
Government
;
nor
do
I
think
it
matters
much
,
whether
King
,
Duke
,
Emperour
,
or
Consul
be
the
name
of
him
who
is
the
Chiefest
in
Authority
,
provided
this
be
granted
,
that
he
is
placed
in
the
Magistracy
for
the
maintenance
of
equity
,
for
if
the
Government
be
lawfull
,
we
must
not
contend
for
the
name
thereof
.
For
he
whom
we
call
the
Duke
of
Venice
is
nothing
else
but
a
lawfull
King
:
and
the
first
Consuls
did
not
only
retain
the
honours
of
Kings
,
but
also
their
empire
and
authority
,
this
only
was
the
difference
,
that
not
one
,
but
two
of
them
did
reigne
(
which
also
you
know
was
usual
in
all
the
Lacedemonian
Kings
,
)
who
were
created
or
chosen
not
constantly
to
continue
in
the
government
,
but
for
one
year
.
We
must
therefore
alwayes
stand
to
what
we
spoke
at
first
,
that
Kings
at
first
were
institute
for
maintaining
equity
.
If
they
could
have
holden
that
soveraignty
in
the
case
they
had
received
it
,
they
might
have
holden
and
kept
it
perpetually
;
but
this
is
free
and
loosed
by
Lawes
.
But
(
as
it
is
with
humane
things
)
the
state
of
affaires
tending
to
worse
,
the
Soveraigne
Authority
which
was
ordained
for
publick
utility
degenerated
into
a
proud
Domination
.
For
when
the
lust
of
Kings
stood
in
stead
of
Lawes
,
and
men
being
vested
with
an
infinite
and
immoderate
power
,
did
not
contain
themselves
within
bounds
,
but
connived
at
many
things
out
of
favour
,
hatred
,
or
self-interest
,
the
insolency
of
Kings
made
Lawes
to
be
desired
.
For
this
cause
therefore
Lawes
were
made
by
the
People
,
and
Kings
constrained
to
make
use
not
of
their
own
licentious
wills
in
judgment
,
but
of
that
Right
or
Priviledge
which
the
people
had
conferred
upon
them
.
For
they
were
taught
by
many
experiences
,
that
it
was
better
,
that
their
liberty
should
be
concredited
to
Lawes
than
to
Kings
,
whereas
the
one
might
decline
many
wayes
from
the
Truth
,
but
the
other
being
deafe
both
to
intreaties
and
threats
might
still
keep
one
and
the
same
tenor
.
This
one
way
of
Government
is
to
Kings
prescribed
,
otherwise
free
,
that
they
should
conforme
their
actions
and
speech
to
the
Prescripts
of
Lawes
,
and
by
the
sanctions
thereof
divide
rewards
and
punishments
,
the
greatest
bonds
of
holding
fast
together
humane
society
.
And
lastly
,
even
as
saith
that
famous
Legislator
,
A
King
should
be
a
speaking
Law
,
and
the
Law
a
dumb
King.
M.
At
first
you
so
highly
praised
Kings
,
that
you
made
their
Majesty
almost
glorious
and
sacred
,
but
now
,
as
if
you
had
repented
in
so
doing
,
I
do
not
know
within
what
strait
bonds
you
shut
them
up
,
and
being
thrust
into
the
prison
(
I
may
say
)
of
Lawes
,
you
do
scarce
give
them
leave
to
speak
.
And
as
for
my
part
,
you
have
disappoynted
me
of
my
exspectation
very
farre
.
For
I
exspected
,
that
(
according
to
the
most
famous
Historians
)
you
should
have
restored
the
thing
which
is
the
most
glorious
both
with
God
and
man
,
into
its
own
splendor
,
either
of
your
own
accord
,
or
at
my
desire
,
in
the
series
of
your
discourse
,
which
being
spoiled
of
all
ornaments
,
you
have
brought
it
into
subjection
,
and
that
Authority
,
which
through
all
the
world
is
the
chiefest
,
you
having
hedged-in
round
about
and
made
it
almost
so
contemptible
,
as
not
to
be
desired
by
any
man
in
his
right
witts
.
For
what
man
in
his
right
witts
would
not
rather
live
as
a
private
man
with
a
mean
fortune
,
than
being
still
in
action
about
other
mens
affaires
,
to
be
in
perpetual
trouble
,
and
neglecting
his
own
affaires
,
to
order
the
whole
course
of
his
life
according
to
other
mens
rules
?
But
if
that
be
the
tearmes
of
Government
every
where
proposed
,
I
fear
there
will
be
a
greater
scarcity
of
Kings
found
than
was
of
Bishops
in
the
first
infancy
of
our
Religion
.
Nor
do
I
much
wonder
,
if
Kings
be
regarded
according
to
this
plate-forme
,
being
but
men
taken
from
feeding
cattel
,
and
from
the
plough
,
who
took
upon
them
that
glorious
dignity
.
B.
Consider
I
pray
you
,
in
how
great
an
errour
you
are
,
who
does
think
that
Kings
were
created
by
People
and
Nations
not
for
Justice
,
but
for
pleasure
,
and
does
think
there
can
be
no
honour
,
where
wealth
and
pleasures
abound
not
;
wherein
consider
how
much
you
diminish
their
grandour
.
Now
that
you
may
the
more
easily
understand
it
;
compare
any
one
King
of
those
you
have
seen
apparelled
like
a
Childs
puppet
brought
forth
with
a
great
deale
of
pride
and
a
great
many
attendants
,
meerly
for
vain
ostentation
,
the
representation
whereof
you
miss
in
that
King
whom
we
describe
.
Compare
,
I
say
,
some
one
of
those
,
who
were
famous
of
old
,
whose
memory
doth
even
yet
live
,
flourisheth
&
is
renowned
to
all
posterity
.
Indeed
they
were
such
as
I
have
now
been
describing
.
Have
you
never
heard
what
an
old
woman
,
petitioning
Philip
King
of
Macedon
to
hear
her
cause
,
answered
him
,
he
having
said
to
her
,
he
had
no
leisure
,
to
which
she
replyed
,
then
cease
(
said
she
)
to
be
King
?
Have
you
never
heard
,
(
I
say
)
that
a
king
victorious
in
so
many
batells
,
and
Conqueror
of
so
many
nations
,
admonished
to
do
his
duty
by
a
poor
old
wife
,
obeyed
,
&
acknowledged
that
it
was
the
duty
of
kings
so
to
do
?
Compare
then
this
Philip
not
only
with
the
greatest
Kings
that
are
now
in
Europe
,
but
also
with
all
that
can
be
remembred
of
old
,
you
shall
surely
find
none
of
them
comparable
to
those
either
for
prudence
,
fortitude
,
or
activity
:
few
equal
to
them
for
largeness
of
dominions
.
If
I
should
enumerat
Agesilaus
,
Leonidas
and
the
rest
of
the
Lacedemonian
Kings
(
O
how
great
Men
were
they
)
I
shal
seem
to
utter
but
obsolete
examples
.
Yet
one
saying
of
a
Lacedemonian
maid
I
cannot
pass
over
with
silence
,
her
name
was
Gorgo
the
daughter
of
Cleomedes
,
she
seeing
a
servant
pulling
off
the
stockings
of
an
Asian
Ghuest
,
and
running
to
her
father
cryed
out
,
father
,
the
Ghuest
hath
no
hands
;
from
which
speech
of
that
maid
you
may
easily
judge
of
the
Lacedemonian
discipline
,
and
domestick
custome
of
their
Kings
.
Now
those
who
proceded
out
of
this
rustick
,
but
couragous
way
of
life
,
did
very
great
things
:
but
those
who
were
bred
in
the
Asiatick
way
,
lost
by
their
luxury
and
sloth
the
great
dominions
given
them
by
their
Ancestors
.
And
,
that
I
may
lay
aside
the
Ancients
,
Such
a
one
was
Pelagius
not
long
ago
among
the
people
of
Galicia
,
who
was
the
first
that
weakned
the
Saracen
forces
in
Spain
,
yet
him
and
all
his
the
grave
did
inclose
,
yet
of
him
the
Spanish
Kings
are
not
ashamed
,
accounting
it
their
greatest
glory
to
be
descended
of
him
.
But
seeing
this
place
doth
call
for
a
more
large
discourse
,
let
us
returne
from
whence
we
have
digressed
.
For
I
desire
to
shew
you
with
the
first
what
I
promised
,
namely
that
this
forme
of
government
hath
not
been
contrived
by
me
,
but
seemes
to
have
been
the
same
to
the
most
famous
men
in
all
ages
,
and
I
shall
briefly
shew
you
the
spring
from
whence
I
have
drawn
these
things
.
The
books
of
M
:
Tullius
Cicero
which
are
intituled
of
Offices
,
are
by
common
consent
of
all
accounted
most
praise
worthy
,
in
the
second
book
thereof
these
words
are
set
down
verbatim
.
It
seemes
as
Horodotus
saith
that
of
old
well
bred
Kings
were
created
,
not
amongst
the
Medes
only
,
but
also
amongst
our
Ancestors
for
executing
of
justice
,
for
whilst
at
first
the
people
were
oppressed
by
those
that
had
greatest
wealth
,
they
betook
themselves
to
some
one
who
was
eminent
for
vertue
▪
who
whilst
he
kept
off
the
weakest
from
injuries
,
establishing
equity
,
he
hemmed
in
the
highest
with
the
lowest
by
equall
lawes
to
both
.
And
the
reason
of
making
lawes
was
the
same
as
of
the
Creation
of
Kings
,
for
it
is
requisite
that
justice
be
alwayes
equall
,
for
otherwise
it
were
not
justice
.
If
this
they
did
obtain
from
one
good
and
just
man
,
they
were
therewith
well
pleased
:
when
that
did
not
occurre
,
lawes
were
made
,
which
by
one
and
the
same
voice
might
speak
to
all
alike
.
This
then
indeed
is
evident
,
that
those
were
usually
chosen
to
governe
,
of
whose
justice
the
people
had
a
great
opinion
.
Now
this
was
added
,
that
these
Rulers
or
Kings
might
be
accounted
prudent
,
there
was
nothing
that
men
thought
they
could
not
obtain
from
such
Rulers
.
I
think
,
you
see
from
these
words
,
what
Cicero
judgeth
to
be
the
reason
of
requiring
both
Kings
and
lawes
,
I
might
here
commend
Zenophon
a
witness
requiring
the
same
,
no
less
famous
in
war-like
affairs
,
than
in
the
study
of
Philosophy
,
but
that
I
know
you
are
so
well
acquaint
with
his
writings
,
as
that
you
have
all
his
sentences
marked
.
I
pass
at
present
Plato
and
Aristotle
,
albeit
I
am
not
ignorant
how
much
you
have
them
in
estimation
.
For
I
had
rather
adduce
for
confirmation
men
famous
in
a
midle
degree
of
affaires
,
than
out
of
Schools
.
Far
less
do
I
think
fit
to
produce
a
Stoick
King
,
such
as
by
Seneca
in
Thyestes
is
described
:
Not
so
much
because
that
idea
of
a
King
is
not
perfect
,
as
because
that
examples
of
a
good
Prince
may
be
rather
impressed
in
the
mind
,
than
at
any
time
hoped
for
.
But
lest
in
those
I
have
produced
there
might
be
any
ground
of
calumny
,
I
have
not
set
before
you
Kings
out
of
the
Schythian
solitude
,
who
did
either
ungird
their
own
horses
,
or
did
other
servile
work
,
which
might
be
very
far
from
our
manner
of
living
;
but
even
out
of
Greece
,
and
such
,
who
in
these
very
times
,
wherein
the
Grecians
did
most
flourish
in
all
liberall
sciences
,
did
rule
the
greatest
nations
,
or
wel
governed
Cities
:
and
did
so
rule
,
that
whilst
they
were
alive
were
in
very
great
esteeme
amongst
their
people
,
and
being
dead
left
to
posterity
a
famous
memory
of
them selves
.
M.
If
now
you
ask
me
what
my
judgment
is
,
I
scarce
dare
confess
to
you
either
mine
inconstancy
or
timidity
,
or
by
what
other
name
it
shall
please
you
to
call
that
vice
.
For
as
often
as
I
read
these
things
you
have
now
recited
in
the
most
famous
Historians
,
or
hear
the
same
commended
by
very
wise
men
,
whose
authority
I
dare
not
decline
:
and
that
they
are
approved
by
all
good
and
honest
men
to
be
not
only
true
,
equitable
&
sincere
,
but
also
seeme
strong
and
splendid
Again
as
oft
as
I
cast
mine
eyes
on
the
neatness
and
elegancy
of
our
times
,
that
antiquity
seemeth
to
have
been
venerable
and
sober
,
but
yet
rude
,
and
not
sufficiently
polished
,
but
of
these
things
we
may
perhaps
speak
of
hereafter
at
more
leisure
.
Now
if
it
please
you
,
go
on
to
prosecute
what
you
have
begun
.
B.
May
it
please
you
then
that
we
recollect
briefly
what
hath
been
said
?
so
shall
we
understand
best
what
is
past
,
and
if
ought
be
rashly
granted
,
we
shall
very
soon
retract
it
.
M.
Yes
indeed
B
:
First
of
all
then
we
agree
,
that
men
by
nature
are
made
to
live
in
society
together
,
and
for
a
communion
of
life
.
M.
that
is
agreed
upon
.
B
:
That
a
King
also
chosen
to
maintain
that
society
is
a
man
eminent
in
vertue
:
M
:
it
is
so
.
B
:
And
as
the
discords
of
men
amongst
themselves
brought
in
the
necessity
of
creating
a
King
,
so
the
injuries
of
Kings
done
against
their
Subjects
were
the
cause
of
desiring
lawes
.
M
:
I
acknowledge
that
.
B
:
we
held
lawes
to
be
a
proofe
of
the
Art
of
government
,
even
as
the
preceps
of
Physick
are
of
the
medicinal
Art.
M
:
it
is
so
,
B.
But
it
seems
to
be
more
safe
(
because
in
neither
of
the
two
have
we
set
down
any
singular
and
exact
skill
of
their
severall
arts
)
that
both
do
,
as
speedily
as
may
be
,
heal
by
these
prescripts
of
Art.
M
:
It
is
indeed
safest
.
B
:
Now
the
precepts
of
the
Medicinal
Art
are
not
of
one
kind
.
M
:
How
?
B
:
For
some
of
them
are
for
preservation
of
health
,
others
for
restauration
thereof
.
M.
Very
right
.
B.
What
say
you
of
the
governing
Art
?
M
:
I
think
,
there
be
as
many
kinds
.
B
:
Next
then
it
seems
,
that
we
consider
it
.
Do
yo
think
,
that
Physicians
can
so
exactly
have
skill
of
all
diseases
,
and
of
their
remedies
,
as
nothing
more
can
be
required
for
their
cure
?
M
:
Not
at
all
,
for
many
new
kinds
of
diseases
arise
almost
in
every
age
,
and
new
remedies
for
each
of
them
,
almost
every
yeer
are
by
mens
industry
found
out
,
or
brought
from
far
countries
.
B
:
what
think
you
of
the
lawes
of
Commonwealths
M
:
Surely
their
case
seemes
to
be
the
same
.
B
:
Therefore
neither
Physicians
,
nor
Kings
can
evite
or
Cure
all
diseases
of
Commonwealths
,
by
the
precepts
of
their
Arts
,
which
are
delivered
to
them
in
writ
.
M
:
I
think
indeed
they
cannot
.
B
:
what
if
we
shall
further
try
of
what
things
lawes
may
be
established
in
Commonwealths
,
and
what
cannot
be
comprehended
within
lawes
.
M
:
That
will
be
worth
our
pains
.
B
:
There
seems
to
be
very
many
and
weighty
things
,
which
cannot
be
contained
within
lawes
.
First
,
all
such
things
as
fall
into
the
deliberation
of
the
time
to
come
.
M
:
All
indeed
.
B
:
next
,
many
things
already
past
,
such
are
these
wherein
truth
is
sought
by
conjecturs
,
confirmed
by
witnesses
,
or
extorted
by
torments
.
M
:
Yes
indeed
.
B
:
In
unfolding
then
these
questions
what
shal
the
King
do
?
M
:
I
see
here
there
is
no
need
of
a
long
discourse
,
seeing
Kings
do
not
so
arrogat
the
supream
Power
in
those
things
which
are
institute
with
respect
to
the
time
to
come
,
that
of
their
own
accord
they
call
to
councill
some
of
the
most
prudent
.
B
:
What
say
you
of
those
things
which
by
conjectures
are
found
out
,
and
made
out
by
witnesses
,
such
as
are
the
crimes
of
murther
,
adultery
and
witchcraft
;
M
:
These
are
examined
by
the
skill
of
Lawyers
,
Discovered
by
diligence
,
and
these
I
find
to
be
for
the
most
part
left
to
the
judgment
of
Judges
.
B
:
And
perhaps
very
right
;
for
if
a
King
would
needs
be
at
the
private
causes
of
each
Subject
,
when
shal
he
have
time
to
think
upon
peace
&
war
,
and
those
affaires
which
maintain
and
preserve
the
safety
of
the
commonwealth
?
And
lastly
when
shall
he
get
leave
to
rest
?
M
:
neither
would
I
have
the
cognition
of
every
thing
to
be
brought
unto
a
King
,
neither
can
one
man
be
sufficient
for
all
the
causes
of
all
men
,
if
they
be
brought
unto
him
:
that
counsel
no
less
wise
than
necessary
doth
please
me
exceeding
well
,
which
the
father
in
law
of
Moses
gave
him
in
dividing
amongst
many
the
burden
of
hearing
causes
,
whereof
I
shall
not
speak
much
,
seeing
the
history
is
known
to
all
.
B
:
But
I
think
,
these
judges
must
judge
according
to
law
.
M
:
They
must
indeed
do
so
.
But
as
I
conceive
,
there
be
but
few
things
,
which
by
lawes
may
be
provided
against
,
in
respect
of
those
which
cannot
be
provided
against
.
B
:
There
is
another
thing
of
no
less
difficulty
,
because
all
these
things
which
call
for
lawes
,
cannot
be
comprehended
by
certain
prescriptions
.
M
:
How
so
?
B
:
Lawyers
,
who
attribute
very
much
to
their
own
Art
,
and
who
would
be
accounted
the
Priests
of
justice
,
do
confess
that
there
is
so
great
a
multitude
of
affaires
,
that
it
may
seeme
almost
infinit
,
and
say
that
daily
arise
new
crimes
in
Cities
,
as
it
were
severall
kinds
of
ulcers
,
what
shall
a
lawgiver
do
herein
,
who
doth
accommodat
lawes
both
to
things
present
and
preterit
?
M
:
Not
much
,
unless
he
be
some
divine-like
person
.
B
:
An
other
difficulty
doth
also
occurre
,
and
that
not
a
small
one
,
that
in
so
great
an
Inconstancy
of
humane
frailty
,
no
Art
can
alnost
prescribe
any
things
altogether
stable
and
firme
.
M
:
There
is
nothing
more
true
than
that
.
B
:
It
seemeth
then
most
safe
to
trust
a
skilfull
physician
in
the
health
of
the
patient
,
and
also
the
Kings
in
the
state
of
the
Common
wealth
.
For
a
Physician
without
the
rule
of
Art
will
often
times
cure
a
weak
patient
either
consenting
thereto
,
or
against
his
will
:
and
a
king
doth
either
perswade
a
new
law
yet
usefull
to
his
subjects
,
or
else
may
impose
it
against
their
will.
M
:
I
do
not
see
what
may
hinder
him
therein
.
B
:
Now
seeing
both
the
one
and
the
other
do
these
things
,
do
you
think
that
besides
the
law
,
either
of
them
makes
his
own
law
?
M
:
It
seemes
that
both
doth
it
by
Art.
For
we
have
before
concluded
not
that
to
be
Art
which
consists
of
preceps
,
but
vertue
contained
in
the
mind
,
which
the
Artist
usually
makes
use
of
in
handling
the
matter
which
is
subject
to
Arts.
Now
I
am
glad
(
seeing
you
speak
ingenuously
)
that
you
being
constrained
,
as
it
were
,
by
an
interdiction
of
the
very
truth
,
do
so
far
restore
the
King
from
whence
he
was
by
force
dejected
.
B
:
Stay
,
you
have
not
yet
heard
all
.
There
is
an
other
inconvenient
in
the
authority
of
lawes
.
For
the
law
being
as
it
were
a
pertinacious
,
and
a
certain
rude
exactor
of
duty
,
●hinks
nothing
right
,
but
what
it self
doth
●ommand
.
But
with
a
King
,
there
is
an
●xcuse
of
infirmity
and
temerity
,
and
place
●f
pardon
left
for
one
found
in
an
errour
.
The
law
is
deaf
,
cruel
and
inexorable
.
●
young
man
Pleads
the
frailty
of
his
years
,
●
woman
the
infirmity
of
her
sexe
,
another
●is
poverty
,
drunkenness
,
affection
.
What
●aith
the
law
to
these
excuses
?
Go
Officer
or
●erjeant
,
conveene
a
band
of
men
,
hoodwink
him
,
scourge
him
,
hang
him
on
a
tree
.
Now
you
know
how
dangerous
a
think
it
is
,
〈◊〉
so
great
a
humane
frailty
,
to
have
the
hope
●f
safety
placed
in
innocency
alone
.
M
:
In
●ery
truth
you
tell
me
a
thing
full
of
hazard
.
●●
Surely
as
oft
as
these
things
come
into
●ind
,
I
perceive
some
not
a
little
troubled
.
M
:
You
speak
true
.
B
:
When
therefore
I
●onder
with
my self
what
is
before
past
as
●anted
,
I
am
afraid
lest
the
comparison
of
●
Physician
and
of
a
King
in
this
case
seeme
●ot
pertinently
enough
introduced
.
M
:
In
what
case
?
B
:
when
we
have
liberat
both
●f
the
servitude
of
preceps
,
and
given
them
●
most
a
free
liberty
of
curing
.
M
:
What
●oth
herein
especially
offend
you
?
B
:
When
●ou
hear
it
,
you
will
then
judge
,
Two
●uses
are
by
us
set
down
,
why
it
is
not
expe●ient
for
a
people
that
Kings
be
loosed
from
〈◊〉
bonds
of
lawes
,
namely
love
and
hatred
,
●hich
drive
the
minds
of
men
to
and
fro
in
judging
.
But
in
a
Physician
it
is
not
to
be
feared
,
lest
he
faile
through
love
,
seeing
he
expecteth
a
reward
from
his
patient
being
restored
to
health
.
But
if
a
patient
understand
that
his
Physician
is
solicited
by
intreaties
,
promises
and
money
against
his
life
,
he
may
call
another
Physician
,
or
if
he
can
find
none
other
,
I
think
it
is
more
safe
to
seek
some
remedy
from
books
how
deaf
soever
,
than
from
a
corrupt
Physician
.
Now
because
we
have
complained
of
the
cruelty
of
lawes
,
look
if
we
understand
one
another
sufficiently
.
M
:
How
so
?
B
:
We
judged
an
excellent
King
,
such
as
we
may
more
see
in
mind
than
with
bodily
eyes
,
not
to
be
bound
by
any
lawes
.
M
:
By
none
.
B
:
Wherefore
?
M
:
I
think
,
because
,
according
to
Paul
,
he
should
be
a
law
to
himself
and
to
others
,
that
he
may
express
in
life
what
is
by
law
enjoyned
.
B
:
You
judge
rightly
;
and
that
you
may
perhapst
the
more
admire
,
severall
ages
before
Paul
,
Aristotle
did
see
the
same
,
following
nature
as
a
leader
,
which
therefore
I
say
,
that
you
may
see
the
more
clearly
what
hath
been
proved
before
,
to
wit
,
that
the
voice
of
God
and
nature
is
the
same
.
But
that
we
may
prosecute
our
purpose
.
What
shall
we
say
they
had
a
respect
unto
,
who
first
made
lawes
?
M
:
Equity
I
think
,
as
hath
been
said
before
.
B.
I
do
not
now
demand
that
,
what
end
they
had
before
them
,
but
rather
what
patterne
they
proposed
to
temselves
▪
M
:
Albeit
perhaps
I
understand
that
,
yet
I
would
have
you
to
explain
it
,
that
you
may
●onfirme
my
judgment
,
if
I
rightly
take
it
〈◊〉
,
if
not
,
you
may
amend
my
error
.
B
:
You
know
,
I
think
,
what
the
dominion
is
●f
the
mind
over
the
body
.
M
:
I
seem
to
●now
it
.
B
:
You
know
this
also
,
what
●ver
we
do
not
rashly
,
that
there
is
a
certain
●dea
thereof
first
in
our
minds
,
and
that
it
is
●
great
deale
more
perfect
than
the
works
to
●e
done
,
which
according
to
that
patterne
the
●hiefest
Artists
do
frame
and
as
it
were
●xpress
.
M
:
That
indeed
I
find
by
experi●nce
both
in
speaking
and
writing
,
and
per●eive
no
less
words
in
my
mind
,
than
my
●inds
in
things
wanting
.
For
neither
can
●ur
mind
shut
up
in
this
dark
and
troubled
●rison
of
the
body
perceive
the
subtilty
of
all
●hings
▪
nor
can
we
so
endure
in
our
mind
the
●epresentations
of
things
,
however
foreseen
in
●iscourse
with
others
,
so
as
they
are
not
●uch
inferiour
to
these
which
our
intellect
●ath
formed
to
it self
.
B
:
What
shall
we
say
●hen
which
they
set
before
them
,
who
made
●●wes
?
M
:
I
seem
almost
to
understand
what
you
would
be
at
.
Namly
,
that
they
in
●ouncill
had
an
Idea
of
that
perfect
King
,
and
●hat
they
did
express
a
certain
Image
,
not
of
●he
body
but
of
the
mind
,
according
to
that
●●resaid
Idea
as
near
as
they
could
.
And
would
have
that
to
be
in
stead
of
lawes
which
〈◊〉
is
to
think
might
be
good
and
equitable
M
:
You
rightly
understand
it
,
For
that
is
the
very
thing
I
would
say
.
But
now
I
would
have
you
to
consider
what
manner
of
King
that
is
which
we
have
constitute
at
first
,
was
he
not
one
firme
and
stedfast
against
hatred
,
love
,
wrath
,
envy
,
and
other
perturbations
of
the
mind
?
M
:
We
did
indeed
imagine
him
to
be
such
a
one
:
or
beleeved
him
to
have
been
such
to
those
Ancients
.
B
:
But
do
lawes
seeme
to
have
been
made
according
to
the
idea
of
him
?
M
:
Nothing
more
likely
.
B
:
A
good
King
then
is
no
less
severe
and
inexorable
,
than
a
good
law
.
M
:
He
is
even
as
severe
:
but
since
I
can
change
neither
,
or
ought
to
desire
it
,
yet
I
would
slaken
both
somewhat
,
if
I
can
.
B
:
But
God
desires
not
that
mercy
be
shewed
even
to
the
poor
in
judgment
,
but
commandeth
us
to
respect
that
one
thing
which
is
just
and
equal
,
and
to
pronounce
sentence
accordingly
.
M
:
I
do
acknowledge
that
,
and
by
truth
am
overcome
.
Seing
therefore
it
is
not
lawfull
to
loose
Kings
from
the
bonds
of
lawes
,
who
shal
then
be
the
lawgiver
?
Whom
shall
we
give
him
as
a
Pedagogue
?
B
:
Whom
do
you
think
fittest
to
performe
this
duty
?
M
:
If
you
ask
at
me
,
I
think
the
King
himself
.
For
in
all
other
Arts
almost
we
see
their
precepts
are
given
by
the
Artists
;
whereof
they
make
use
,
as
it
were
of
comments
,
for
confirming
their
memory
,
and
putting
others
in
mind
of
their
duty
.
B
:
On
the
contrary
I
see
no
difference
:
let
us
grant
that
a
King
is
at
liberty
and
solved
from
the
lawes
,
shall
wee
grant
him
the
power
to
comand
lawes
?
For
no
man
will
willingly
lay
bonds
and
fetters
upon
himself
.
And
I
know
not
whether
it
be
better
to
leave
a
man
without
bonds
,
or
to
fetter
him
with
slight
bonds
,
because
he
may
rid
himself
thereof
when
he
pleases
.
M
:
But
when
you
concredit
the
helme
of
government
rather
to
lawes
than
to
Kings
,
beware
I
pray
you
,
lest
you
make
him
a
Tyrant
,
whom
by
name
you
make
a
King
,
who
with
authority
doth
oppress
and
with
fetters
and
imprisonment
doth
bind
,
and
so
let
him
be
sent
back
to
the
plough
again
,
or
to
his
former
condition
yet
free
of
fetters
.
B
:
Brave
words
:
I
impose
no
lord
over
him
,
but
I
would
have
it
in
the
peoples
power
,
who
gave
him
the
authority
over
themselves
,
to
prescribe
to
him
a
modell
of
his
government
,
and
that
the
King
may
make
use
of
that
justice
,
which
the
people
gave
him
over
themselves
.
This
I
crave
.
I
would
not
have
these
lawes
to
be
by
force
imposed
,
as
you
interpret
it
,
but
I
think
that
by
a
common
council
with
the
King
,
that
should
be
generally
established
,
which
may
generally
tend
to
the
good
of
all
.
M
:
You
will
then
grant
this
liberty
to
the
people
?
B
:
Even
to
the
people
indeed
,
unless
perhaps
you
be
of
another
mind
.
M
:
Nothing
seemes
less
equitable
.
B
:
Why
so
;
M
:
You
know
that
saying
,
A
beast
with
many
heads
.
You
know
,
I
suppose
,
how
great
the
temerity
and
inconstancy
of
a
people
is
.
B
:
I
did
never
imagine
that
that
matter
ought
to
be
granted
to
the
judgment
of
the
whole
people
in
general
,
but
that
near
to
our
custome
a
select
number
out
of
all
estates
may
conveen
with
the
King
in
council
.
And
then
how
soon
an
overturne
by
them
is
made
,
that
it
be
deferred
to
the
peoples
judgment
.
M
:
I
understand
well
enough
your
advice
.
But
by
this
so
carefull
a
caution
you
seem
to
help
your self
nothing
.
You
will
not
have
a
King
loosed
from
lawes
,
why
?
Because
,
I
think
,
within
man
two
most
cruell
monsters
lust
and
wrath
are
in
a
continuall
conflict
with
reason
.
Lawes
have
been
greatly
desired
,
which
might
repress
their
boldness
,
and
reduce
them
too
much
insulting
,
to
regard
a
just
government
.
What
will
these
Counsellours
given
by
the
people
do
?
Are
they
not
troubled
by
that
same
intestine
conflict
?
Do
they
not
conflict
with
the
same
evils
as
well
as
the
King
?
The
more
then
you
adjoyn
to
the
King
as
Assessors
there
will
be
the
greater
number
of
fools
,
from
which
you
see
what
is
to
be
expected
.
B
:
But
I
expect
a
far
other
thing
than
you
suppose
.
Now
I
shall
tell
you
why
I
do
expect
it
.
First
,
it
is
not
altogether
true
what
you
suppose
,
viz.
That
the
assembling
together
of
a
multitude
is
to
no
purpose
,
of
which
number
there
will
perhaps
be
none
of
a
profound
wit
:
for
not
only
do
many
see
more
and
understand
more
than
one
of
them
apart
,
but
also
more
than
one
,
albeit
he
exceed
their
wit
and
prudence
.
For
a
multitude
for
the
most
part
doth
better
judge
of
all
things
,
than
single
persons
apart
.
For
every
one
apart
have
some
particular
vertues
,
which
being
united
together
make
up
one
excellent
vertue
,
which
may
be
evidently
seen
in
Physicians
pharmacies
,
and
especially
in
that
antidot
,
which
they
call
Mithredat
.
For
therein
are
many
things
of
themselves
hurtfull
apart
,
which
being
compounded
and
mingled
together
make
a
wholesome
remedy
against
poyson
.
In
like
manner
in
some
men
slowness
and
lingering
doth
hurt
,
in
others
a
precipitant
temerity
,
both
which
being
mingled
together
in
a
multitude
make
a
certain
temperament
and
mediocrity
,
which
we
require
to
be
in
every
kind
of
vertue
.
M
:
Be
it
so
,
seeing
you
will
have
it
so
,
let
the
people
make
lawes
and
execute
them
;
and
let
Kings
be
as
it
were
keepers
of
Registers
.
But
when
lawes
seeme
to
clash
,
or
are
not
exact
and
perspicuous
enough
in
sanctions
,
will
you
allow
the
King
no
interest
ormedling
here
,
especially
since
you
will
have
him
to
judge
all
things
by
written
lawes
,
there
must
needs
ensue
many
absurdities
.
And
,
that
I
may
make
use
of
a
very
common
example
of
that
law
commended
in
the
Schooles
,
If
a
Stranger
scale
a
wall
,
let
him
die
,
What
can
be
more
absurd
than
this
,
that
the
Author
of
a
publick
safety
(
who
have
thrust
down
the
enemies
pressing
hard
to
be
up
)
should
be
drawn
to
punishment
,
as
if
he
had
in
hostility
attempted
to
scall
the
walls
.
B
:
That
is
nothing
.
M
:
You
approve
then
that
old
saying
,
the
highest
justice
is
the
highest
injury
.
B.
I
do
indeed
.
If
any
thing
of
this
kind
come
into
debate
,
there
is
need
of
a
meek
interpreter
,
who
may
not
suffer
the
lawes
which
are
made
for
the
good
of
all
to
be
calamitous
to
good
men
,
and
deprehended
in
no
crime
.
B.
You
are
very
right
,
neither
is
there
any
thing
else
by
me
fought
in
all
this
dispute
,
(
if
you
have
sufficiently
noticed
it
)
than
that
Ciceronian
Law
might
be
venerable
and
inviolable
Salus
populi
suprema
Lex
esto
.
If
then
any
such
thing
shall
come
into
debate
,
so
that
it
be
clear
what
is
good
&
just
,
the
kings
duty
will
be
to
advert
that
the
Law
may
reach
that
rule
I
spoke
of
,
but
you
in
behalf
of
Kings
seems
to
require
more
,
than
the
most
imperious
of
them
assume
.
For
you
know
that
this
kind
of
questions
is
usually
deferred
to
judges
,
when
Law
seemeth
to
require
one
thing
,
and
the
Lawgiver
another
:
even
as
these
lawes
which
arise
from
an
ambiguous
right
or
from
the
discord
of
Lawes
amongst
themselves
.
Therefore
in
such
cases
most
grievous
contentions
of
Advocats
arise
in
Judicatories
,
and
Orators
preceps
are
diligently
produced
.
M.
I
know
that
to
be
done
which
you
say
.
But
in
this
case
no
less
wrong
seemes
to
be
done
to
Lawes
than
to
Kings
.
For
I
think
it
better
to
end
that
debate
presently
from
the
saying
of
one
good
man
,
than
to
grant
the
power
of
darkning
rather
than
interpreting
Lawes
to
subtile
men
,
and
sometimes
to
crafty
Knaves
;
for
whilst
not
only
contention
ariseth
betwixt
Advocat
for
the
causes
of
parties
contending
,
but
also
for
glory
,
contests
are
nourished
in
the
mean
time
,
right
or
wrong
,
equity
or
iniquity
is
called
in
question
:
&
what
we
deny
to
a
King
,
we
grant
to
men
of
inferiour
rank
,
who
study
more
to
debate
than
to
find
out
the
truth
.
B.
You
seeme
to
me
forgetfull
of
what
we
lately
agreed
upon
.
M.
What
is
that
?
B.
That
all
things
are
to
be
so
freely
granted
to
an
excellent
King
,
as
we
have
described
him
,
that
there
might
be
no
need
of
any
Lawes
.
But
whilst
this
honour
is
conferred
to
one
of
the
people
,
who
is
not
much
more
excellent
than
others
,
or
even
inferiour
to
some
,
that
free
and
loose
licence
from
lawes
is
dangerous
.
M.
But
what
ill
doth
that
to
the
interpretation
of
law
.
B.
Very
much
.
Perhaps
you
do
not
consider
,
that
in
other
words
we
restore
to
him
that
infinit
and
immoderat
power
,
which
formerly
we
denyed
to
a
King
,
namely
that
according
to
his
own
hearts
lust
he
may
turn
all
things
upside
down
.
M.
If
I
do
that
,
then
certainly
I
do
it
imprudently
.
B.
I
shall
tell
you
more
plainly
,
that
you
may
understand
it·
When
you
grant
the
interpretation
of
Lawes
to
a
King
,
you
grant
him
such
a
licence
,
as
the
Law
doth
not
tell
what
the
Lawgiver
meaneth
,
or
what
is
good
and
equall
for
all
in
generall
,
but
what
may
make
for
the
Interpreters
benefit
,
so
that
he
may
bend
it
to
all
actions
for
his
own
benefit
or
advantage
,
as
the
Lesbian
rule
.
Ap.
Claudius
in
his
Decemviratus
,
made
a
very
just
law
,
that
in
a
liberall
cause
or
Plea
,
sureties
should
be
granted
for
liberty
.
What
more
clearly
could
have
been
spoken
.
But
by
interpreting
the
same
Author
made
his
own
Law
useless
.
You
see
;
I
suppose
how
much
liberty
you
give
a
Prince
by
one
cast
,
namely
that
what
he
pleaseth
the
Law
doth
say
,
what
pleaseth
him
not
,
it
doth
not
say
.
If
we
shall
once
admit
this
,
it
will
be
to
no
purpose
to
make
good
Lawes
for
teaching
a
good
prince
his
duty
;
and
hemme
in
an
ill
King.
Yea
,
let
me
tell
you
more
plainly
,
it
would
be
better
to
have
no
Lawes
at
all
,
than
that
freedom
to
steal
should
be
tolerat
,
and
also
honoured
under
pretext
of
Law.
M.
Do
you
think
that
any
King
will
be
so
impudent
,
that
he
will
not
at
all
have
any
regard
of
the
fame
and
opinion
that
all
men
have
of
him
?
Or
that
he
will
be
so
forgetfull
of
his
Subjects
,
that
he
will
degenerat
into
their
Pravity
,
whom
he
hath
restrained
by
ignominy
,
imprisonment
,
confiscation
of
goods
,
&
in
a
word
with
very
grievous
punishments
?
B.
Let
us
not
believe
that
these
things
will
be
,
if
they
had
not
been
done
not
long
ago
&
that
to
the
exceeding
great
hurt
of
the
whole
world
.
M.
Where
do
you
tell
these
things
were
done
?
B
▪
Do
you
ask
,
where
?
As
if
all
the
Nations
in
Europe
did
not
only
see
,
but
feele
also
how
much
mischief
hath
the
immoderat
power
,
and
unbridled
Tyranny
of
the
pope
of
Rome
brought
upon
humane
affaires
.
Even
that
power
which
from
small
beginning
&
seemingly
honest
he
had
got
,
every
man
doth
know
that
no
less
can
be
feared
by
unwary
persons
.
At
first
,
Lawes
were
proposed
to
us
,
not
only
drawn
out
of
the
innermost
secrets
of
nature
,
but
given
by
God
himself
,
explaind
by
the
Prophets
from
the
holy
Spirit
,
at
last
by
the
Son
of
God
,
&
by
the
same
God
confirmed
,
committed
to
the
writings
of
those
praise
worthy
men
,
expressed
in
their
life
,
&
sealed
with
their
blood
.
Neither
is
there
in
the
whole
Law
any
other
place
more
carefully
,
commendably
,
or
more
clearly
delivered
,
than
that
of
the
Office
of
Bishops
.
Now
seeing
it
is
Lawfull
to
no
man
to
add
any
thing
to
these
Lawes
,
to
abrogat
or
derogat
ought
therefrom
,
or
to
change
any
thing
therein
,
there
did
remain
but
one
interpretation
,
&
whilst
the
Pope
did
arrogat
it
,
he
not
only
did
oppress
the
rest
of
the
Churches
,
but
claimed
a
Tyrranny
the
most
cruell
of
all
that
ever
were
,
daring
to
command
not
only
men
but
Angels
also
,
plainly
reducing
Christ
into
order
,
if
this
be
not
to
reduce
him
into
order
,
that
what
thou
wilt
have
done
in
heaven
,
in
earth
&
amongst
the
damned
in
hell
,
be
ratified
:
what
Christ
hath
commanded
,
let
it
be
ratified
,
if
thou
wilt
;
for
if
the
Law
seeme
to
make
but
little
for
your
behoofe
,
interpreting
it
thus
you
may
back-bend
it
,
so
that
not
only
by
your
mouth
,
but
also
according
to
the
judgment
of
your
mind
Christ
is
constrained
to
speak
.
Christ
therefore
speaking
by
the
mouth
of
the
Pope
,
Pipin
is
set
in
Childericks
place
of
government
,
Ferdinandus
of
Arragon
substitute
to
John
King
of
Navarre
:
the
Son
arose
in
armes
against
his
father
,
and
subjects
against
their
King.
Christ
is
full
of
poison
,
then
he
is
forced
by
witches
,
so
that
he
killeth
Henry
of
Luxemburg
by
poison
.
M.
I
have
heard
these
things
often
before
,
but
I
desire
to
hear
more
plainly
somewhat
of
that
interpretation
of
lawes
,
B.
I
shall
offer
you
one
example
,
from
which
you
may
easily
understand
,
how
much
this
whole
kind
is
able
to
do
.
The
Law
is
,
A
Bishop
must
be
the
husband
of
one
wife
,
than
which
Law
what
is
more
clear
,
&
what
may
be
said
more
plain
?
One
wife
,
(
saith
the
Law
)
one
Church
,
(
saith
the
Pope
)
such
is
his
interpretation
.
As
if
that
Law
were
made
not
to
repress
the
Lust
of
Bishops
but
their
avarice
.
Now
this
explanation
,
albeit
it
saith
nothing
to
the
purpose
,
yet
doth
contain
a
judgment
honest
and
pious
,
if
he
had
not
vitiated
that
Law
again
by
another
interpretation
.
What
doth
therefore
the
Pope
devise
for
excuse
?
It
varieth
(
saith
he
)
in
regard
of
persons
,
cases
,
places
&
times
.
Some
are
of
that
eminent
disposition
,
that
no
number
of
Churches
can
satisfy
their
pride
.
Some
Churches
again
are
so
poor
,
that
they
cannot
maintain
him
who
was
lately
a
begging
Monk
,
if
he
now
have
a
mitre
,
if
he
would
maintain
the
name
of
a
Bishop
.
There
is
a
reason
invented
from
that
crafty
interpretation
of
the
Law
,
that
they
may
be
called
Bishops
of
one
Church
,
or
other
Churches
given
them
in
Commendam
,
and
all
may
be
robbed
.
Time
would
faile
me
,
if
I
should
reckon
up
the
cheats
,
which
are
daily
excogitat
against
one
Law.
But
albeit
these
things
be
most
unbeseeming
as
well
the
name
of
a
Pope
,
as
of
a
Christian
,
yet
their
tyranny
rests
not
here
.
For
such
is
the
nature
of
all
things
,
that
when
they
once
begin
to
fall
they
never
stay
untill
they
fall
headlongs
into
destruction
.
Will
you
have
me
to
shew
you
this
by
a
famous
example
?
Do
you
not
remember
upon
any
of
the
Roman
Emperours
blood
who
was
more
cruell
and
wicked
than
C.
Caligula
?
M.
There
was
none
that
I
know
of
.
B.
Now
what
was
his
most
nefarious
villany
think
you
?
I
do
not
speak
of
those
deeds
which
Popes
do
reckon
up
in
some
reserved
cases
,
but
in
the
rest
of
his
life
.
M.
I
do
not
at
present
remember
.
B.
What
do
you
think
of
that
,
that
having
called
upon
his
horse
,
he
invited
him
to
sup
with
him
?
Set
a
golden
grain
of
barley
before
him
,
and
made
him
Consul
?
M.
Indeed
it
was
most
impiously
done
B.
What
think
you
of
that
,
how
he
made
the
same
horse
his
colleague
in
the
Priesthood
?
M.
Do
you
tell
me
that
in
good
earnest
?
B.
Indeed
in
good
earnest
,
nor
do
I
admire
that
these
things
seeme
to
you
feigned
.
But
that
Roman
Jupiter
of
ours
hath
done
such
things
,
that
those
things
done
by
Caligula
may
seem
true
to
Posterity
.
I
say
Pope
Julius
the
third
,
who
seemes
contended
with
C.
Caligula
a
most
wicked
wretch
for
preheminence
of
impiety
.
M.
What
did
he
of
that
kind
?
B.
He
made
his
Ape-keeper
,
a
man
almost
more
vile
than
the
vilest
beast
,
his
Colleague
in
the
Papary
.
M.
Perhaps
there
was
another
cause
of
choosing
him
.
B.
Some
are
reported
indeed
,
but
I
have
picked
out
the
most
honest
.
Seeing
then
so
great
a
contempt
not
only
of
the
Priesthood
,
but
also
a
forgetfulness
of
humanity
arise
from
this
freedome
of
interpreting
Lawes
,
beware
you
think
that
to
be
a
small
Power
.
M.
But
the
Ancients
seeme
not
to
have
thought
it
so
great
a
business
of
interpreting
,
as
you
would
have
it
seeme
to
be
.
Which
by
this
one
argument
may
be
understood
,
because
the
Roman
Emperours
granted
it
to
Lawyers
:
which
one
reason
doth
overturne
your
whole
tedious
dispute
,
nor
doth
it
only
refute
what
you
spoke
of
the
greatness
of
that
power
,
but
that
also
which
you
most
shun
,
it
perspicuously
declareth
what
power
they
granted
to
others
of
answering
rightly
,
was
not
denyed
to
themselves
,
if
they
had
been
pleased
to
exerce
that
office
,
or
could
have
done
it
by
reason
of
greater
affaires
.
B
:
As
for
those
Roman
Emperours
,
whom
the
Souldiers
did
choose
indeliberatly
,
&
without
any
regard
to
the
common
good
of
all
,
These
fall
not
under
this
notion
of
Kings
which
we
have
described
so
that
by
those
that
were
most
wicked
were
they
chosen
who
for
the
most
part
were
most
wicked
,
or
else
laid
hold
upon
the
Government
by
violence
.
Now
I
do
not
reprehend
them
for
granting
power
to
Lawyers
to
interpret
the
Law.
And
albeit
that
power
be
very
great
,
as
I
have
said
before
,
it
is
notwithstanding
more
safely
concredited
to
them
to
whom
it
cannot
be
an
instrument
of
Tyranny
.
Moreover
it
was
concredited
to
many
whom
mutuall
reverence
did
hold
within
the
bounds
of
duty
,
that
if
one
decline
from
equity
,
he
might
be
refuted
by
another
.
And
if
they
should
have
all
agreed
together
into
fraud
;
the
help
of
the
judge
was
above
them
,
who
was
not
obliged
to
hold
for
Law
what
ever
was
given
by
Lawyers
for
an
answer
.
And
over
all
was
the
Emperour
,
who
might
punish
the
breach
of
Lawes
.
They
beeing
astricted
by
so
many
bonds
were
hemmed
in
,
and
did
fear
a
more
grievous
punishment
,
than
any
reward
of
fraud
they
could
expect
:
you
see
,
I
suppose
then
that
the
danger
to
be
feared
from
such
kind
of
men
was
not
so
great
.
M.
Have
you
no
more
to
say
of
a
King
?
B.
First
,
if
you
please
,
let
us
collect
together
,
what
is
already
spoken
,
so
that
the
more
easily
we
may
understand
,
if
any
thing
be
omitted
.
M.
I
think
we
should
do
so
.
B.
We
seemed
to
be
at
accord
sufficiently
concerning
the
origine
&
cause
of
creating
Kings
,
&
making
Lawes
,
but
of
the
Lawgiver
not
so
:
but
at
last
,
though
somewhat
unwillingly
I
seeme
to
have
consented
,
being
enforced
by
the
strength
of
truth
.
M.
Certainly
you
have
not
only
taken
from
a
King
the
power
of
commanding
Lawes
,
but
also
of
interpreting
them
,
even
whilst
I
as
an
Advocat
strongly
protested
against
it
.
Wherein
I
am
afraid
,
if
the
matter
come
to
publick
hearing
,
lest
I
be
accused
of
prevarication
,
for
having
so
easily
suffered
a
good
cause
,
as
it
seemed
at
first
,
to
be
wrung
out
of
my
hands
.
B.
Be
of
good
courage
:
for
if
any
accuse
you
of
prevarication
in
this
case
,
I
promise
to
be
your
defence
.
M.
Perhaps
we
will
find
that
shortly
.
B.
There
seems
to
be
many
kinds
of
affaires
which
can
be
comprehended
within
no
Lawes
,
whereof
we
laid
over
a
part
on
ordinary
judges
,
&
a
part
on
the
Kings
councill
by
the
Kings
consent
.
M.
I
do
remember
we
did
so
indeed
.
And
when
you
was
doing
that
,
wot
you
what
came
into
my
mind
?
B.
How
can
I
,
unless
you
tell
me
?
M.
Me
thought
you
made
Kings
in
a
manner
like
stone
seals
,
which
for
the
most
part
so
seeme
to
lean
on
the
tops
of
pillars
as
if
they
did
sustain
the
whole
fabrick
:
whereas
in
effect
they
bear
no
more
burden
,
than
any
other
stone
.
B.
What
?
good
Advocat
of
Kings
,
do
you
complain
that
I
lay
on
them
a
little
burden
,
seeing
both
day
and
night
they
do
nothing
else
,
than
seek
out
others
to
bear
burden
with
them
,
or
upon
whom
they
may
altogether
lay
the
burden
,
&
so
disburden
themselves
.
And
in
the
mean
time
you
seeme
to
take
it
in
ill
part
that
I
afford
them
help
labouring
under
their
burden
.
M.
I
also
very
willingly
admit
these
auxiliaries
,
but
such
would
I
have
as
may
serve
,
but
not
command
,
such
as
may
shew
the
way
,
but
not
Lead
in
the
way
,
or
more
truly
draw
,
or
rush
them
forward
as
some
warlike
engine
,
and
leave
a
King
no
other
power
but
to
assent
to
them
.
Therefore
I
presently
expect
that
having
ended
our
discourse
concerning
a
King
,
you
would
step
aside
to
speak
of
Tyrants
,
or
some
where
else
.
For
you
have
inclosed
a
King
within
so
narrow
bounds
,
that
I
am
afraid
,
lest
,
if
we
tarry
longer
therein
,
you
drive
him
out
of
his
greatest
wealth
,
&
highest
dignity
,
&
banish
him
as
it
were
into
some
desert
Island
,
where
,
being
spoiled
of
all
his
honour
he
wax
old
in
poverty
&
misery
.
B.
You
feared
,
as
you
pretend
,
the
crime
of
prevarication
;
but
I
am
afraid
,
lest
in
calumniating
you
wrong
the
King
,
whom
you
endeavour
to
defend
.
First
,
I
would
not
have
him
to
be
idle
,
unless
you
would
appoint
idle
master
builders
,
secondly
,
you
deprive
him
of
good
Ministers
&
friends
,
whom
I
have
adjoyned
unto
him
not
as
keepers
,
but
would
have
them
called
by
him
to
bear
a
part
of
his
labour
,
&
these
being
driven
away
you
surround
him
with
a
band
of
Knaves
,
who
make
him
to
be
feared
by
his
subjects
,
neither
do
you
think
he
will
be
formidable
,
unless
we
allow
him
a
great
power
of
doing
wrong
.
I
would
have
him
to
be
by
his
subjects
beloved
,
not
to
be
guarded
by
the
terrour
,
but
goodwill
of
his
subjects
,
which
armes
alone
do
make
Kings
invincible
,
unless
you
gainsay
this
,
I
trust
I
shall
shortly
prove
it
.
For
I
shall
lead
him
out
of
these
you
call
straits
into
light
:
&
by
one
Law
shall
give
him
so
much
authority
and
enlargment
,
that
if
he
desire
more
,
he
may
seeme
impudent
.
M.
Indeed
I
long
to
heare
that
.
B.
I
shall
then
fall
upon
that
matter
,
that
I
may
satisfy
your
desire
as
soon
as
I
can
.
A
little
before
we
have
confessed
,
that
no
Law
can
be
so
accurately
cautioned
concerning
any
affair
,
but
that
malicious
subtilty
may
invent
some
fraud
.
This
perhaps
will
be
the
better
understood
by
the
example
already
proposed
.
By
the
Law
it
is
ordained
,
that
no
parents
transmit
their
benefices
to
their
bastards
.
Here
in
effect
the
Law
seemes
clear
,
yet
a
cheat
is
found
out
:
that
the
father
substitute
some
other
man
,
&
that
he
may
deliver
that
same
benefice
to
the
bastard
of
the
former
possessor
.
Thereafter
,
when
as
it
was
carefully
ordained
by
Law
,
that
the
son
should
by
no
means
enjoy
that
benefice
which
his
father
had
possessed
before
:
yet
by
this
caution
it
was
never
a
white
the
better
.
For
against
that
Law
a
paction
was
found
out
amongst
Priests
,
that
each
of
them
should
substitute
the
Son
of
the
other
in
his
office
.
And
when
that
was
also
forbidden
,
the
Law
was
also
eluded
by
another
kind
of
cheat
:
a
pretender
was
set
up
against
the
father
,
who
might
pretend
he
had
a
right
to
that
benefice
.
Whilst
the
father
seemingly
is
a
contending
with
this
supposed
Sycophant
,
the
Son
doth
petition
the
Pope
for
the
benefice
,
if
so
be
that
the
right
unto
that
benefice
belong
not
to
either
of
the
parties
contending
for
it
,
and
so
the
son
by
his
fathers
prevarication
doth
enjoy
his
fathers
benefice
,
and
over
cometh
both
the
parties
,
who
willingly
&
freely
yeeld
up
their
plea.
Thus
you
soe
how
many
Kinds
of
cheats
are
invented
against
one
Law.
M.
I
see
it
.
B.
Do
not
Lawgivers
seeme
to
do
altogether
the
same
herein
which
Physicians
do
,
who
whilst
they
endeavour
by
applying
a
plaister
to
compesce
the
eruptions
of
flegme
,
or
of
some
other
hurtfull
humour
,
the
humour
restrained
in
one
place
seeks
issue
in
many
places
at
once
:
&
as
a
certain
hydra
having
one
head
cut
off
,
many
heads
start
up
in
place
of
one
.
M.
Nothing
more
like
.
B.
what
was
incumbent
for
a
Physician
to
do
at
first
for
freeing
the
whole
body
at
once
of
peccant
humours
.
Ought
not
the
Politik
physician
to
do
the
same
in
this
case
,
for
freeing
the
whole
common
wealth
of
evill
manners
?
M
:
I
think
that
to
be
the
right
way
of
cure
,
albeit
it
be
difficult
.
B·
And
if
this
can
be
obtained
,
I
think
there
would
be
need
of
few
Lawes
.
M.
It
is
indeed
so
.
B.
Doth
not
he
alone
seeme
to
conferre
more
for
the
publick
good
who
can
apply
this
remedy
,
than
all
the
conventions
of
all
estates
met
for
making
of
Lawes
?
M.
Doubtless
far
more
.
But
that
I
may
make
use
of
the
Comick
Poets
words
,
who
is
able
to
undertake
so
weighty
a
charge
.
B.
What
if
we
shall
lay
it
over
on
the
King
?
M.
Merrily
spoken
indeed
.
What
was
soon
done
and
easy
you
have
committed
to
the
whole
people
:
but
if
any
thing
be
difficult
and
intricat
,
you
will
lay
it
over
upon
the
King
alone
,
as
if
you
thought
him
not
sufficiently
bound
tying
him
round
about
with
so
many
fetters
,
unless
you
lay
upon
him
a
most
grievous
burden
under
which
he
may
also
succumbe
.
B.
It
is
not
so
,
but
we
contend
for
a
business
easy
for
him
to
be
done
,
we
beseech
,
he
would
suffer
himself
to
be
exorable
.
M.
What
is
that
,
I
pray
?
B.
That
as
fathers
ought
to
carry
towards
their
Children
,
so
in
all
his
life
he
would
behave
himself
towards
his
subjects
whom
he
ought
to
account
as
children
.
M.
What
is
that
to
the
purpose
in
hand
?
B.
Surely
this
one
is
certainly
the
chiefest
remedy
against
corrupt
manners
,
and
lest
you
suppose
that
it
is
an
invention
of
mine
,
hear
what
Claudianus
saith
.
Thou
King
must
as
a
father
rule
thy
Subjects
,
and
no
less
have
a
care
of
all
than
of
they
self
;
let
not
thy
own
desire
only
move
thee
,
but
also
the
publick
desires
of
thy
people
.
If
thou
commandest
ought
to
be
done
by
all
,
and
to
be
obeyed
,
obey
the
same
first
thy self
.
Then
will
the
people
become
the
more
observant
of
equity
,
nor
will
refuse
to
bear
any
burden
,
when
they
see
their
King
himself
obedient
to
what
he
commands
.
The
whole
world
doth
act
conforme
to
the
example
of
a
King.
The
Lawes
of
Kings
prevaile
not
so
much
to
incline
mens
minds
unto
obedience
,
as
the
conversation
of
the
Rulers
.
For
the
fluctuating
multitude
doth
alwayes
change
as
their
prince
doth
.
Do
not
Imagine
that
the
Poet
pregnant
for
understanding
&
learning
did
in
vain
believe
so
great
force
to
be
herein
,
for
people
are
so
addicted
to
the
imitation
of
Kings
,
in
whom
any
image
of
honesty
doth
shine
or
appeare
,
and
so
endeavour
to
express
their
manners
,
that
whose
vertue
they
admire
,
they
endeavour
also
to
imitat
some
of
their
vices
in
speech
,
apparell
in
deport
.
But
in
conforming
themselves
to
the
King
in
gesture
,
manners
of
speech
they
not
only
desire
to
imitat
him
,
but
also
by
flattery
they
insinuat
themselves
into
the
minds
of
great
ones
,
&
by
these
arts
they
hunt
after
riches
,
honour
,
and
preferment
,
because
they
know
we
have
it
by
nature
,
that
we
love
not
only
our selves
,
and
our
own
concernes
,
but
embrace
our
own
likeness
though
vicious
in
others
.
Now
that
which
we
demand
not
wickedly
and
arrogantly
,
but
by
intreaty
endeavour
to
obtain
,
hath
a
far
greater
force
,
than
the
threatnings
of
Lawes
,
the
ostentation
of
punishments
,
or
armies
of
souldiers
.
This
reduceth
a
People
without
force
into
modesty
,
conciliateth
to
a
King
his
subjects
good-liking
,
increaseth
and
maintaineth
the
publick
tranquillity
,
and
the
wealth
of
every
one
severally
.
Let
therefore
a
King
carefully
consider
,
that
he
is
set
on
the
theatre
of
the
world
,
and
for
a
spectacle
proposed
to
all
,
so
as
no
word
or
deed
of
his
can
be
concealed
,
The
vices
of
Kings
can
never
be
kept
secret
.
For
the
supream
light
of
fate
suffers
nothing
to
ly
hid
in
obscurity
,
and
fame
enters
into
all
secret
places
,
and
finds
out
obscure
corners
.
O
how
much
doth
it
concerne
Kings
to
be
circumspect
on
all
hands
;
seeing
neither
their
vices
nor
their
vertues
can
be
concealed
,
nor
yet
without
a
great
universall
change
of
affaires
.
But
if
any
do
yet
doubt
,
what
great
importance
there
is
in
the
conversation
of
a
Prince
,
for
the
emendation
of
the
publick
discipline
,
let
him
take
but
a
view
of
the
small
beginning
of
the
State
of
Rome
.
That
rude
people
consisting
of
shepherds
and
countrey
in
habitants
,
I
shall
not
say
worse
,
naturally
fierce
,
having
got
a
very
cour●gious
King
,
and
having
pitched
once
their
tents
,
for
soliciting
the
peace
of
the
neighbouring
nations
,
and
provoking
them
to
fight
,
how
much
do
you
think
of
hatred
and
fear
was
bred
in
their
neighbours
?
When
again
that
very
same
people
had
set
over
them
a
pious
and
just
King
,
they
were
so
suddenly
changed
,
that
being
wholly
devoted
to
the
worship
of
their
Gods
and
to
acts
of
justice
,
that
to
wrong
them
their
neighbours
judged
it
a
crime
,
even
those
very
neighbours
,
I
say
,
whose
lands
before
they
had
laid
waste
,
whose
cities
they
had
burnt
,
and
their
children
and
Kinsmen
they
had
carried
away
into
bondage
.
Now
if
in
that
barbarity
of
manners
,
&
rudeness
of
times
Numa
Pompilius
,
(
who
a
little
before
was
brought
out
of
another
nation
at
enmity
with
them
,
and
made
King
)
could
do
so
much
:
what
shall
wee
xpect
,
or
rather
,
what
shall
we
not
expect
of
those
princes
,
who
being
supported
by
affinity
,
vassalls
,
and
much
wealth
left
them
by
their
Ancestors
,
obtain
the
Government
?
And
are
born
and
brought
up
in
expectation
thereof
.
Now
how
much
should
it
stirre
up
their
minds
unto
vertue
,
that
they
hope
to
have
the
praise
not
of
one
day
,
as
Stage-players
do
,
the
scene
being
once
past
,
but
the
goodwill
,
admiration
,
and
perpetuall
remembrance
of
their
life
to
all
posterity
,
and
know
that
honours
in
heaven
are
prepared
for
them
?
I
wish
I
could
express
in
words
the
representation
of
that
honour
which
in
mind
I
have
conceived
.
Now
that
I
may
somewhat
propose
unto
your
view
the
same
by
some
of
the
first
draughts
and
lineaments
thereof
,
consider
with
your self
,
how
the
brasen
serpent
erected
by
Moses
in
the
desert
of
Arabia
,
did
heal
the
wounds
made
by
other
serpents
by
a
very
look
of
the
people
thereon
.
Imagine
that
out
of
the
whole
people
there
were
some
stung
by
serpents
,
and
running
together
for
present
cure
,
others
astonished
at
the
newness
of
the
miracle
,
and
all
celebrating
with
all
kind
of
praise
the
immense
and
incredible
goodness
of
God
:
when
they
perceive
that
the
pain
of
that
deadly
wound
was
not
taken
away
,
either
by
medicaments
,
with
the
torment
of
the
patient
,
by
the
Physicians
labour
and
assiduous
carefulness
of
friends
,
nor
by
any
long
space
of
time
,
but
reduced
unto
health
in
a
moment
.
Compare
now
a
King
with
that
serpent
,
and
so
compare
him
,
that
you
may
reckon
a
good
King
amongst
the
greatest
benefits
of
God
who
alone
without
any
expence
of
thine
,
and
without
thy
paines
and
labour
,
doth
relieve
a
Kingdome
of
all
its
troubles
,
setleth
perturbations
,
and
in
a
short
space
bringeth
the
inveterat
ulcers
of
minds
unto
a
cicatrice
or
scar
:
neither
is
he
only
a
procurer
of
health
to
those
who
behold
him
near
at
hand
,
but
also
to
such
as
are
a
far
off
,
and
have
no
hope
to
see
him
,
in
whose
image
so
great
a
force
is
presented
to
the
minds
of
his
subjects
,
that
it
doth
easily
performe
what
the
prudence
of
Lawyers
,
the
science
of
Philosophers
,
and
the
experience
of
so
many
ages
in
collecting
their
severall
arts
could
never
performe
.
Now
what
greater
honour
,
dignity
,
eminency
or
majesty
can
be
told
or
excogitat
to
be
in
any
man
,
that
by
speech
,
converse
,
sight
,
fame
,
and
a
tacite
species
presented
to
the
mind
,
he
may
reduce
the
most
luxurious
to
modesty
,
the
violent
to
equity
,
and
those
that
are
furious
unto
a
right
mind
.
Can
you
ask
of
God
a
greater
benefit
than
this
so
much
for
the
good
of
mans
concernes
?
If
I
mistake
not
,
this
is
the
true
representation
of
a
King
,
not
that
of
a
King
guarded
with
weapons
of
war
,
ever
fearing
others
,
or
making
others
afraid
,
by
his
hatred
towards
his
people
measuring
his
peoples
hatred
against
him
.
This
representation
which
we
have
given
,
Seneca
in
his
Thyestes
hath
expressed
in
very
pleasant
colours
,
which
verse
I
doubt
not
but
you
know
,
seeing
it
is
most
elegant
.
Do
I
now
seeme
to
speak
basely
and
contemptuously
of
a
King
?
and
bind
him
fast
loaded
with
the
fetters
of
Lawes
within
a
goale
,
as
you
did
lately
say
?
And
not
rather
do
bring
him
forth
into
light
,
and
assemblies
of
men
,
and
set
him
upon
the
publick
theatre
of
mankind
,
accompanied
not
with
the
arrogant
company
of
archers
and
armed
men
,
and
rogues
cloathed
in
silk
,
but
guarded
in
safety
by
his
own
innocency
,
not
with
the
terrour
of
armes
,
but
by
the
love
of
his
people
:
and
not
only
at
freedome
and
set
aloft
,
but
honoured
,
venerable
,
sacred
,
and
eminent
,
and
coming
forth
with
the
good
wishes
and
fortunat
acclamations
of
the
people
,
and
whithersoever
he
goeth
,
turning
the
faces
,
eyes
and
hearts
of
all
towards
him
.
What
acclamation
,
or
what
triumph
can
be
compared
with
this
daily
Pomp
?
Or
if
God
in
humane
likeness
should
come
down
into
earth
,
what
greater
honour
could
be
given
him
by
men
,
than
that
which
would
be
given
to
a
true
King
,
that
is
to
the
lively
image
of
God
?
For
neither
can
love
bestow
,
nor
flattery
invent
a
greater
honour
than
this
.
What
do
you
think
of
this
representation
of
a
King
?
M.
So
splendide
&
magnificent
indeed
it
is
,
that
it
seemes
nothing
can
be
said
or
imagined
more
magnificent
.
But
in
these
corrupt
times
of
ours
,
it
is
hard
to
find
this
magnanimity
,
unless
carefull
education
make
an
honest
and
good
nature
and
disposition
.
For
the
mind
being
principled
with
good
instructions
and
acts
from
infancy
,
and
by
age
and
daily
practice
confirmed
,
endeavours
by
vertue
to
attain
to
true
glory
;
in
vain
it
is
tempted
by
the
allurements
of
lusts
,
or
weakned
by
the
impressions
of
adversity
.
For
thus
learning
doth
perfect
naturall
parts
,
and
good
breeding
doth
strengthen
the
mind
:
so
that
it
findeth
occasion
of
exercising
vertue
amongst
the
very
recreations
of
pleasures
,
and
these
things
which
usually
terrify
weak
ones
,
by
reason
of
difficulty
,
vertue
doth
account
them
as
a
matter
of
praise
.
Seeing
then
there
is
so
great
importance
in
learning
for
all
conditions
of
life
,
with
what
great
care
and
solicitude
should
men
foresee
,
that
the
tender
minds
of
Kings
be
righly
principled
,
even
from
their
very
infancy
.
For
seeing
many
are
the
benefits
of
good
Kings
towards
their
Subjects
,
and
contrary
wise
,
many
calamities
proceed
from
wicked
Princes
,
than
nothing
doth
seeme
to
have
a
greater
influence
upon
every
rank
of
men
,
than
the
cariage
and
conversation
of
Kings
and
others
,
who
joyntly
rule
publick
affaires
.
For
what
is
done
well
or
ill
by
private
persons
,
is
for
the
most
part
hid
from
the
multitude
:
or
by
reason
of
such
mens
obscure
condition
their
example
belongeth
to
few
.
But
all
the
words
and
deeds
of
those
,
wh●
hold
the
helme
of
publick
affaires
;
canno●
be
concealed
,
beeing
written
as
it
were
〈◊〉
a
publick
monument
,
as
Horace
saith
,
but
ar●
set
before
all
men
for
imitation
.
For
the●
do
not
turne
mens
affections
to
themselves
〈◊〉
studying
to
please
them
,
but
by
very
kindl●
allurements
of
utility
.
And
whither
soeve●
the
inclinations
of
Kings
do
drive
,
they
mak●
the
publick
discipline
wheele
about
wit●
them
.
But
I
am
afraid
,
that
our
Kings
wi●●
not
be
intreated
to
performe
what
you
hav●
now
mentioned
.
For
they
are
so
marred
by
th●
allurements
of
pleasures
,
&
deceived
with
th●
false
shew
of
honour
,
that
I
think
they
〈◊〉
almost
that
which
some
Poets
report
to
hav●
befallen
the
Trojans
who
were
in
compan●
at
sea
with
Paris
.
For
the
true
Helena
bein●
left
in
Egypt
with
Protheus
a
holy
and
truel●
religious
man
,
they
did
contend
so
Pertina●ciously
the
space
of
ten
years
for
her
likeness
that
it
was
the
end
of
a
most
pernicious
war
and
of
the
most
flourishing
Kingdome
in
thos●
times
.
For
impotent
Tyrants
embracin●
that
false
representation
of
a
Kingdome
when
they
have
once
obtained
it
by
right
〈◊〉
wrong
,
cannot
lose
it
without
destruction
Now
if
any
do
admonish
them
,
that
the
tru●
Helena
for
whom
they
imagine
to
fight
,
is
els●
where
concealed
,
they
would
call
him
ma●
▪
B.
I
am
indeed
glad
that
you
somewhat
unde●●stand
the
beauty
of
that
true
daughter
〈◊〉
Jupiter
from
this
her
likeness
,
such
as
it
is
,
albeit
you
do
not
see
her self
.
But
if
these
lovers
of
that
Helena
,
to
their
great
dammage
,
did
see
the
perfect
image
of
the
true
Helena
,
pourtrayed
with
her
lively
colours
by
some
Protegenes
or
Appelles
,
I
do
not
question
but
they
would
admire
her
and
fall
in
love
with
her
.
And
if
they
did
not
command
their
affections
to
enjoy
that
other
,
they
might
fall
into
those
grievous
punishments
,
which
Perseus
in
his
Satyres
doth
imprecat
on
Tyrants
.
O
Supream
Father
of
the
Gods
,
be
pleased
thus
to
punish
cruell
Tyrants
,
when
any
execrable
lust
dipt
in
raging
Poyson
doth
stirre
up
their
spirits
,
let
them
see
what
vertue
is
,
and
let
them
pine
away
for
sorrow
,
because
they
despised
her
.
And
therefore
seeing
we
are
fallen
in
to
make
mention
of
Tyrrants
,
may
it
please
you
,
that
straight
way
we
proceed
to
speak
of
them
?
M.
Yea
,
unless
you
think
some
other
thing
should
be
first
spoken
.
B.
I
suppose
we
shall
not
deviat
,
if
we
proceed
in
the
same
footsteps
for
finding
out
a
tyrant
,
wherein
we
did
insist
in
seeking
out
a
King.
M.
I
think
so
.
For
by
that
means
we
shall
very
easily
understand
what
difference
there
is
betwixt
them
,
if
set
one
against
another
they
be
duely
considered
.
B.
And
first
of
all
that
we
may
begin
at
a
Tyrants
name
,
of
what
Language
,
it
is
uncertain
.
I
therefore
think
it
now
necessary
for
us
to
seek
therein
the
Greek
,
or
Latine
Etymology
.
Now
what
the
Ancients
did
call
Tyranny
,
I
think
is
not
unknown
to
any
who
are
well
versed
in
humane
literature
.
For
Tyrants
were
called
both
by
the
Greeks
and
Latines
,
who
had
the
full
power
of
all
things
in
their
hands
,
which
power
was
not
astricted
by
any
bonds
of
Lawes
,
nor
obnoxious
to
the
cognition
of
judges
.
Therefore
in
both
languages
,
as
you
know
,
not
only
the
noble
heroes
,
and
most
famous
men
,
but
the
chiefest
of
the
Gods
,
and
so
Jupiter
also
is
called
Tyrannus
:
and
that
even
by
those
who
both
think
and
speak
honourably
of
the
Gods.
M.
I
know
indeed
that
well
enough
:
and
the
rather
I
much
admire
,
whence
it
is
come
to
pass
,
that
that
name
now
for
so
many
ages
is
accounted
odious
,
and
also
amongst
the
most
grievous
reproaches
.
B.
It
seemes
certainly
to
have
fallen
out
in
this
word
,
which
happeneth
to
be
in
many
others
:
for
if
you
consider
the
nature
of
words
,
it
hath
no
evill
i●
it
.
And
albeit
some
words
have
a
more
pleasant
sound
in
the
ears
of
hearers
,
and
others
a
more
unpleasant
,
yet
of
themselves
they
have
no
such
thing
,
so
as
to
stirre
up
the
mind
to
wrath
,
hatred
,
or
hilarity
,
or
otherwise
to
creat
pleasure
or
pain
and
trouble
If
any
such
thing
befall
us
,
that
happens
to
fall
out
usually
,
not
from
the
word
,
but
from
the
consuetude
of
men
,
and
image
thereof
conceived
by
the
hearers
.
Therefore
a
word
which
amongst
some
men
〈◊〉
honest
,
amongst
others
cannot
be
heard
●ith
some
preface
of
,
with
reverence
.
M
:
●
remember
that
the
like
is
befallen
the
●ames
of
Nero
and
Judas
,
whereof
the
one
●mongst
the
Romans
,
and
the
other
amongst
●he
Jewes
was
accounted
by
great
men
very
●amous
and
honourable
.
But
thereafter
by
●o
fault
of
these
names
,
but
of
these
two
●en
,
it
hath
come
to
pass
,
that
even
the
●ost
flagitious
men
will
not
have
these
names
●o
be
given
their
children
:
they
being
buried
●nder
such
infamy
.
B
:
The
same
also
is
●erspicuous
to
have
befallen
the
word
Tyrant
,
●or
it
is
credible
,
that
the
first
Magistrats
,
●ho
were
thus
called
,
were
good
men
;
or
●rom
hence
,
that
this
name
was
sometime
so
●onourable
,
that
it
was
attribut
to
the
Gods.
●ut
those
that
came
afterward
made
it
so
famous
by
their
wicked
deeds
,
that
all
●en
abhorred
it
as
contagious
and
pestilen●ous
,
and
thought
it
a
more
light
reproach
〈◊〉
be
called
an
hang-man
than
a
Tyrant
.
M
:
●erhaps
it
was
the
same
as
befell
the
Kings
〈◊〉
Rome
after
the
Tarquinii
were
deposed
in
●●e
name
Dictator
after
M.
Antonius
and
〈◊〉
:
Dolabella
were
Consuls
.
B
:
Just
so
.
And
●●
the
Contrary
,
base
and
vulgar
names
have
●een
made
famous
by
the
vertue
of
men
●●lled
thereby
.
As
amongst
the
Romans
,
●●millus
,
Metellus
,
Scropha
:
and
amongst
●●e
Germans
,
Henry
,
Genserick
,
Charles
.
●his
you
shall
the
better
understand
,
if
taking
away
the
name
of
Tyrant
,
you
consider
the
thing
,
notwitstanding
that
this
kind
of
government
hath
continued
in
its
former
honour
and
respect
amongst
many
famous
Nations
,
as
the
Aesymnetae
amongst
the
Greecians
,
and
the
Dictators
amongst
the
Romans
:
for
both
were
lawfull
Tyrants
.
Now
Tyrants
they
were
,
being
more
powerfull
than
the
lawes
but
lawfull
they
were
,
as
being
chosen
by
consent
of
the
people
.
M
:
What
am
I
hearing
?
Tyrants
and
yet
lawfull
?
Indeed
I
did
expect
a
far
other
thing
from
you
:
bu●
now
you
seeme
to
confound
the
difference
of
all
Kings
and
Tyrants
.
B
:
Indeed
bo●●
Kings
and
Tyrants
amongst
the
Ancien●
seeme
to
have
been
altogether
one
and
th●
same
;
but
I
suppose
in
diverse
ages
:
for
〈◊〉
think
the
name
of
Tyrants
was
more
ancient
thereafter
when
they
became
weary
of
t●●
name
,
in
their
place
succeeded
Kings
〈◊〉
more
plausible
name
,
and
more
gentle
g●●vernment
,
and
when
they
also
began
to
degenerat
,
the
moderation
of
lawes
〈◊〉
adhibited
,
which
might
set
limites
to
th●
boundless
lusts
of
their
government
.
〈◊〉
men
according
to
the
exigence
of
times
,
〈◊〉
their
usuall
way
,
seeking
out
new
remedi●
became
weary
of
the
old
way
of
government
and
sought
out
new
wayes
.
Now
our
prese●●
purpose
is
to
handle
both
kinds
of
govern●ment
,
namely
that
wherein
as
well
the
●●●vernment
of
Kings
as
of
lawes
is
the
〈◊〉
●owerfull
:
and
the
worst
kind
of
Tyranny
,
●herein
all
things
are
contrary
to
a
King●ome
,
and
have
undertaken
to
compare
●hem
one
with
another
.
M
:
It
is
so
.
And
earnestly
expect
you
would
fall
upon
that
.
B
:
At
first
then
we
had
agreed
,
that
a
King
was
created
for
maintaining
humane
society
,
●nd
we
determined
his
office
and
duty
,
that
by
the
prescript
of
lawes
he
should
allow
every
man
his
own
.
M
:
I
do
remember
●hat
.
B
:
First
then
,
he
that
doth
not
receive
●
government
by
the
will
of
the
people
,
but
●y
force
invadeth
it
,
or
intercepteth
it
by
fraude
,
how
shall
we
call
him
?
M
:
I
suppose
,
a
Tyrant
.
B.
There
be
also
many
other
differences
,
which
I
shall
briefly
run
through
,
because
any
man
may
easily
collect
them
from
Aristotle
:
for
the
government
of
Kings
is
according
to
nature
,
but
that
of
Tyrants
is
not
.
A
King
doth
rule
his
subjects
,
and
reigne
over
them
by
their
own
consent
.
Tyrants
reigne
over
them
nill
they
,
will
they
.
A
Kingdome
is
a
principality
of
a
Free
man
among
free
men
:
Tyranny
is
a
principality
of
a
Master
over
his
slaves
.
For
defence
of
a
Kings
safety
the
subjects
watch
and
ward
,
For
a
Tyrant
forrainers
do
watch
to
oppress
the
Subjects
.
The
one
beareth
rule
for
the
Subjects
welfare
,
the
other
for
himself
.
M.
What
do
you
say
of
those
who
have
gotten
into
their
hand
the
supreame
authority
by
force
and
without
the
peoples
consent
,
and
yet
for
many
years
did
so
rule
that
the
people
were
not
weary
of
their
government
?
for
what
could
be
wanting
in
Hiero
the
Syracusan
King
,
or
in
Cosmo
〈◊〉
Mediees
the
Florentine
Duke
to
make
them
just
Kings
,
except
the
peoples
suffrages
?
B.
Indeed
we
cannot
exeeme
them
out
of
the
number
of
Tyrants
.
For
it
was
nobly
spoken
by
a
notable
Historian
,
albeit
you
may
indeed
rule
your
countrey
and
friends
by
violence
and
force
,
and
correct
their
faults
,
yet
it
is
unseasonable
.
Then
again
,
such
do
seeme
to
do
just
like
robbers
,
who
cunningly
dividing
their
ill
gotten
goods
,
do
seek
the
praise
o●
justice
by
injury
,
and
of
liberality
by
robbery
▪
yet
do
not
obtain
what
they
hunt
for
;
by
the
odiousness
of
one
ill
deed
they
lose
all
the
thanks
of
their
ostentative
bounty
,
and
so
much
the
less
assurance
of
their
civill
disposition
do
they
give
their
Subjects
,
and
that
because
they
do
not
that
for
their
Subjects
good
,
but
for
their
own
government
,
namely
,
that
they
the
more
securely
may
enjoy
their
own
lusts
and
pleasures
,
and
establish
a
soveraignty
over
the
posterity
to
come
,
having
somewhat
mitigated
the
peoples
hatred
.
Which
when
they
have
once
done
,
they
turne
back
again
to
their
old
manners
.
For
the
fruit
which
is
to
follow
may
easily
be
known
by
the
sower
thereof
.
For
he
hath
the
same
strength
and
power
to
revoke
all
things
at
his
pleasure
,
and
to
transferre
unto
himself
the
strength
of
all
lawes
,
even
as
if
he
would
abrogat
all
lawes
.
But
this
kind
of
Tyrants
had
been
perhaps
tolerable
,
if
without
the
common
destruction
of
all
it
could
have
been
taken
away
,
even
as
we
do
endure
some
bodily
diseases
rather
than
throw
our
life
into
the
hazard
of
a
doubtsome
cure
.
But
they
who
bear
rule
,
not
for
their
Countrey
's
good
,
but
for
their
own
self
interests
,
have
no
regard
to
the
publick
utility
,
but
to
their
own
pleasure
and
lust
,
they
place
the
stability
of
their
authority
in
the
peoples
weakness
,
and
think
that
a
Kingdom
is
not
a
procuration
concredited
to
them
by
God
,
but
rather
a
prey
put
into
their
hands
.
Such
are
not
joyned
to
us
by
any
civil
bond
,
or
bond
of
humanity
,
but
should
be
accounted
the
greatest
enemies
of
God
and
of
all
men
.
For
all
the
actions
of
Kings
should
aime
at
the
publick
safety
of
their
Subjects
,
and
not
at
their
own
wealth
.
By
how
much
Kings
are
raised
above
other
men
,
so
much
should
they
imitat
the
celestiall
bodies
,
which
having
no
good
offices
of
ours
given
to
them
,
yet
do
infuse
on
humane
affaires
a
vital
and
bountifull
vertue
of
heat
and
light
.
Yea
the
very
titles
wherewith
we
have
honoured
Kings
(
if
you
remember
)
might
put
them
in
mind
of
their
munificence
.
M
:
Me
thinks
I
remember
,
namely
,
that
they
should
use
a
paternal
indulgence
towards
their
Subjects
committed
to
them
as
towards
children
;
the
care
of
a
Shepherd
in
procuring
their
profit
:
as
Generals
in
maintaining
their
safety
,
as
Governours
in
excellency
of
vertues
,
and
as
Emperours
commanding
those
things
which
might
be
usefull
.
B.
Can
he
then
be
called
a
father
,
who
accounts
his
Subjects
slaves
?
or
a
Shepherd
,
who
doth
not
feed
his
flock
,
but
devoureth
them
?
or
a
Pilot
,
who
doth
alwayes
study
to
make
shipwrack
of
the
goods
in
his
ship
,
and
who
(
as
they
say
)
makes
a
leck
in
the
very
ship
wherein
he
sailes
?
M.
By
no
means
.
B.
What
is
he
then
,
who
doth
not
rule
for
the
peoples
good
,
but
still
doth
all
for
himself
,
who
doth
not
strive
with
good
men
in
vertue
,
but
contendeth
to
exceed
the
most
flagitious
wretch
in
vices
?
who
leadeth
his
subjects
into
manifest
snares
?
M.
Indeed
such
shall
not
be
by
me
accounted
either
a
generall
,
or
Emperour
,
or
Governour
.
B.
If
you
then
shal
see
any
usurping
the
name
of
a
King
,
and
in
no
kind
of
vertue
excelling
any
of
the
people
,
but
inferiour
to
many
therein
,
not
fatherly
affectionat
towards
his
subjects
,
but
rather
oppressing
them
by
arrogant
domineering
,
and
that
thinketh
the
people
is
concredited
to
him
for
his
own
gain
and
not
for
their
safeguard
;
Will
you
imagine
that
such
a
man
is
truely
a
King
,
albeit
he
goes
vapouring
with
a
great
many
in
guard
about
him
,
and
openly
be
seen
with
gorgeous
aparrell
,
and
make
a
shew
of
punishments
;
can
he
conciliat
the
people
,
and
catch
their
applause
by
rewards
,
games
,
pompous
shewes
,
and
even
mad
underminings
,
and
what
ever
is
thought
to
be
magnificent
;
will
you
,
I
say
,
account
such
a
man
a
King
?
M.
Not
indeed
,
If
I
would
understand
my self
aright
,
but
void
of
all
humane
society
.
B.
Within
what
limites
do
you
circumscribe
humane
society
;
M.
Within
the
very
same
limites
wherein
by
your
preceeding
discourse
you
seemed
to
include
it
,
namely
within
the
hedge
of
lawes
.
Which
whosoever
transgress
,
be
they
Robbers
,
Thieves
,
or
Adulteres
,
I
see
them
publickly
punished
,
and
that
to
be
accounted
a
just
cause
of
their
Punishment
,
because
they
transgressed
the
limites
of
humane
society
.
B.
What
say
you
of
those
,
who
would
never
once
enter
within
these
hedges
?
M.
I
think
they
should
be
accounted
enemies
to
God
and
men
,
and
reckoned
amongst
wolves
,
or
some
other
kind
of
noisome
beasts
,
rather
than
amongst
men
:
which
whosoever
doth
nourish
,
he
nourisheth
them
for
his
own
destruction
and
others
:
&
whosoever
killeth
them
,
doth
not
only
good
to
himself
,
but
to
all
others
.
But
if
I
had
power
to
make
a
law
,
I
would
command
(
which
the
Romans
were
wont
to
do
with
monsters
)
such
kind
of
men
to
be
carried
away
into
solitary
places
,
or
to
be
drowned
in
the
depths
of
the
sea
afar
from
the
sight
of
any
land
,
lest
by
the
contagion
of
their
carcases
they
might
infect
other
men
.
And
rewards
to
the
killers
of
them
to
be
discerned
not
only
by
the
whole
people
,
but
by
every
particula●
person
:
as
useth
to
be
done
to
those
who
have
killed
wolves
or
namely
that
these
Spirits
beares
,
or
apprehended
their
whelpes
.
For
if
such
a
monster
should
be
borne
,
&
speak
with
a
mans
voice
,
&
have
the
face
of
a
man
,
&
likeness
of
other
parts
,
I
would
have
no
fellowship
with
him
;
or
if
any
man
divested
of
humanity
should
degenerat
into
such
cruelty
,
as
he
would
not
meet
with
other
men
but
for
their
destruction
,
I
think
he
should
be
called
a
man
no
more
than
Satyres
,
Apes
,
or
bears
,
albeit
they
should
resemble
man
in
countenance
,
gesture
and
speech
.
B.
Now
,
If
I
mistake
not
,
you
understand
what
a
King
,
and
what
a
Tyrant
the
wisest
Ancients
meant
in
their
writings
.
Will
it
please
you
then
that
we
propose
some
idea
of
a
Tyrant
also
,
such
as
we
gave
in
speaking
of
a
King
?
M.
Yes
,
that
I
do
earnestly
desire
,
if
it
be
not
a
trouble
to
you
.
B.
You
have
not
forgot
,
I
suppose
,
what
by
the
poets
is
spoken
of
the
Furies
,
and
by
our
divines
of
the
nature
of
evill
Spirits
,
are
enemies
of
mankind
,
who
whilst
they
are
in
perpetuall
torments
,
yet
do
rejoice
in
the
torments
of
men
.
This
is
indeed
the
true
idea
of
Tyranny
.
But
because
this
idea
can
only
be
discerned
in
the
imagination
,
but
not
by
any
of
the
senses
,
I
shall
set
before
you
another
idea
,
which
not
only
the
mind
may
discerne
,
but
the
senses
also
perceive
,
and
as
it
were
represented
to
the
very
eye
.
Imagine
you
see
a
ship
tossed
by
waves
in
the
sea
,
and
all
the
shoares
round
about
not
only
without
haven
or
harbour
but
also
full
of
most
cruell
enemies
,
and
the
Master
of
the
Ship
in
contest
with
the
Company
,
and
yet
to
have
no
other
hope
of
safety
than
in
their
fidelity
,
and
the
same
not
certain
,
as
Knowing
well
that
he
puts
his
life
into
the
hands
of
a
most
barbarous
kind
of
men
,
and
void
of
all
humanity
,
whom
by
money
he
may
hold
trusty
,
and
who
for
greater
gain
may
be
conduced
to
fight
against
him
.
Such
indeed
is
that
life
which
Tyrants
embrace
as
happy
.
They
are
afraid
of
enemies
abroad
,
and
of
their
Subjects
at
home
,
and
not
only
of
their
subjects
,
but
of
their
domesticks
,
Kinsfolk
,
brethren
,
wives
,
children
,
and
near
relations
.
And
therefore
they
have
alwayes
war
,
either
a
forrain
war
with
their
neighbours
,
civil
war
with
their
Subjects
,
or
a
domestick
war
within
doores
,
or
else
they
are
still
in
fear
thereof
.
Neither
do
they
expect
aid
any
where
but
by
a
mercenary
way
,
they
dare
not
hire
good
men
,
nor
can
they
trust
bad
men
;
what
then
in
all
their
life
can
be
to
them
pleasant
?
Dionysius
would
not
let
his
daughters
once
become
women
to
trim
him
,
fearing
to
let
the
razor
come
to
his
throat
.
Temoleon
was
killed
by
his
own
brother
,
Alexander
Pheraeus
by
his
own
wife
,
and
Sp
:
Cassias
by
his
own
father
.
He
that
still
hath
such
examples
set
before
his
eyes
,
what
a
torture
do
you
imagine
he
carryeth
about
in
his
breast
?
Seeing
he
thinks
that
he
is
the
mark
set
for
all
mankind
to
shoot
at
.
Neither
is
he
only
while
awake
tormented
with
these
tortures
of
conscience
,
but
also
is
awakned
out
of
his
sleep
by
terrifying
sights
both
of
the
living
and
dead
,
and
agitat
by
the
fire
brands
of
hellish
furies
.
For
the
season
which
nature
doth
grant
for
rest
to
all
creatures
,
and
also
to
men
for
relaxation
of
their
cares
,
to
him
is
turned
into
horrours
and
punishment
.
M.
Forsooth
you
have
handled
these
things
very
acutely
,
but
I
know
not
if
truely
also
,
but
yet
,
if
I
mistake
not
,
they
make
not
so
much
for
our
purpose
.
For
they
who
have
the
power
to
choose
what
Kings
they
please
,
in
them
is
the
power
to
bind
by
lawes
such
as
they
have
chosen
.
But
you
know
that
our
Kings
are
not
chosen
,
but
born
Kings
.
To
whom
I
have
alwayes
thought
it
to
be
no
less
hereditary
,
that
their
will
and
pleasure
should
stand
for
law
,
than
the
Kingdome
it self
.
Nor
am
I
rashly
induced
to
be
of
this
opinion
,
but
convinced
by
severall
great
Authors
,
with
whom
I
am
not
ashamed
to
be
mistaken
,
(
if
at
all
I
be
in
any
mistake
or
errour
.
)
For
not
to
make
mention
of
others
,
Lawyers
do
affirme
,
that
by
the
Royall
law
which
is
made
for
the
government
of
Kings
,
all
the
peoples
power
is
so
transmitted
into
them
,
that
their
will
and
pleasure
should
be
accounted
for
lawes
.
And
indeed
from
this
law
did
those
threatnings
of
a
certain
Emperour
arise
,
that
he
would
quite
take
away
from
lawyers
all
their
science
,
wherein
they
so
much
boast
,
by
one
Edict
.
B.
You
do
very
well
,
that
whilst
you
cite
a
most
wicked
Author
of
one
of
the
greatest
deeds
,
thought
good
to
suppress
his
name
.
For
that
was
C
,
Caligula
,
who
wished
but
one
neck
for
all
the
people
of
Rome
.
Now
in
that
Emperour
there
was
nothing
of
a
man
,
far
less
of
a
King
,
beside
his
shape
,
you
are
not
then
ignorant
how
much
authority
may
be
due
to
him
.
But
as
for
the
Royal
law
▪
what
it
is
,
when
,
by
whom
,
and
in
what
words
it
was
made
the
very
lawyers
make
no
mention
.
For
that
power
was
never
in
any
of
the
Roman
Emperours
,
seeing
from
them
appeals
were
made
to
the
people
.
But
that
ordinance
,
whereby
L
:
Flaccus
having
oppressed
the
liberty
of
the
people
of
Rome
,
established
by
the
silence
of
other
lawes
;
the
Tyranny
of
L
:
Sylla
,
no
man
did
ever
hold
for
a
law
.
For
of
that
ordinance
such
was
the
strength
,
that
whatever
L
:
Sylla
had
done
,
should
be
ratified
,
Which
law
never
any
free
people
was
so
infatuat
,
as
willingly
to
permit
to
be
imposed
on
them
.
Or
if
any
such
were
,
he
were
indeed
worthy
to
serve
perpetually
Tyrants
,
and
be
punished
for
his
folly
.
But
if
any
such
law
have
been
,
let
us
think
it
was
an
example
proposed
to
us
for
caution
,
but
not
for
imitation
.
M.
Indeed
you
admonish
well
.
But
that
admonition
belongeth
to
them
in
whose
power
it
is
to
creat
such
Kings
as
most
please
them
,
but
to
us
it
doth
not
at
all
belong
,
who
do
not
by
suffrages
elect
the
best
Kings
,
but
accept
of
those
that
by
chance
are
given
us
.
That
also
of
a
certain
lawyer
seemes
properly
to
quadrat
with
us
,
who
have
given
to
our
Kings
Ancestors
that
right
and
authority
over
us
and
our
posterity
,
that
they
and
their
posterity
should
perpetually
hold
their
empire
and
authority
over
us
.
I
wish
then
you
had
admonished
them
(
I
mean
our
Ancestors
)
who
once
had
it
in
their
own
power
entirely
to
admit
such
Kings
as
they
pleased
.
But
now
that
counsell
of
yours
too
late
serves
only
for
this
,
not
to
amend
the
faults
that
are
not
in
our
power
,
but
deplore
our
Ancestors
folly
,
and
acknowledge
the
misery
of
our
condition
.
For
what
can
be
left
to
those
that
are
made
slaves
,
but
to
be
punished
for
other
mens
folly
?
And
that
our
punishment
may
be
made
more
light
,
let
us
asswage
them
by
patience
:
let
us
not
provoke
their
wrath
,
by
tumultuating
importunely
,
whose
dominion
over
us
we
cannot
cast
off
,
nor
diminish
their
power
,
nor
flee
from
their
force
or
weakness
.
Now
that
Royal
law
,
to
which
you
are
so
much
an
Adversary
,
was
not
made
in
favours
of
Tyrants
,
as
you
would
have
it
seeme
to
be
,
because
it
was
approved
by
Justinian
a
very
Just
Prince
.
With
whom
so
plain
flattery
would
not
have
had
place
.
For
with
a
foolish
Prince
that
of
the
Poet
would
prevaile
whom
doth
false
honour
help
,
or
lying
infamy
terrify
,
but
a
lewd
man
and
a
lyar
?
B.
Indeed
Justinian
,
as
history
reports
,
was
a
great
mighty
man
albeit
some
do
report
him
to
have
been
cruelly
ingrate
to
Bellisarius
.
But
let
him
be
such
as
you
judge
he
was
,
yet
you
may
remember
,
that
it
is
recorded
by
some
almost
of
that
same
age
with
him
,
that
Tribonius
,
a
chief
man
amongst
the
compilers
of
these
lawes
,
was
a
very
wicked
man
,
and
so
might
easily
be
induced
to
gratify
also
a
very
bad
Prince
.
But
even
good
Princes
do
not
hate
this
kind
of
flattery
.
For
Even
those
who
will
not
kill
any
man
,
do
yet
desire
to
have
it
in
their
power
,
and
there
is
nothing
which
he
dare
not
believe
of
himself
,
seeing
his
power
equall
to
that
of
the
Gods
is
commended
.
But
let
us
returne
to
our
own
Princes
:
to
whom
you
say
the
Kingdome
doth
come
by
inheritance
and
not
by
suffrages
.
Now
of
our
own
only
I
speak
,
for
if
I
shall
digress
to
speak
of
forrain
Princes
,
I
fear
lest
our
discourse
become
more
prolixe
than
we
intended
.
M.
I
think
you
should
do
so
.
For
forrain
affaires
do
not
much
belong
to
our
dispute
in
hand
.
B.
That
I
may
therefore
begin
at
the
first
Principles
.
This
is
sufficiently
agreed
upon
,
that
our
Princes
were
chosen
for
their
vertue
,
who
should
governe
others
.
M.
So
do
the
writers
of
our
affaires
record
.
B.
Nor
is
this
less
known
,
that
many
who
have
reigned
cruelly
and
wickedly
have
been
called
to
account
by
their
Subjects
:
some
adjudged
to
perpetuall
imprisonment
,
others
punished
partly
by
exile
,
and
partly
by
death
,
against
whose
killers
no
inquisition
was
ever
made
,
even
when
their
Sons
or
kinsmen
were
assumed
into
their
stead
.
But
who
ever
had
killed
good
Kings
,
were
most
severely
punished
,
so
as
no
where
else
was
murther
more
severely
revenged
.
And
because
it
would
be
tedious
to
rehearse
every
one
,
I
shall
produce
some
few
of
these
last
Kings
,
whose
memory
is
most
recent
.
The
nobility
did
so
grievously
punish
the
murther
of
James
the
first
,
(
having
left
as
heir
his
son●
of
six
years
of
age
)
that
by
a
new
and
exquisit
kind
of
punishment
they
put
to
death
severall
persons
of
very
eminent
families
,
and
peers
of
the
land
,
both
for
wealth
and
vassalage
eminent
:
On
the
contrary
,
who
did
condole
the
death
of
James
the
third
,
a
man
flagitious
and
cruell
?
far
less
revenge
it
?
But
in
the
death
of
James
the
fourth
his
Son
,
the
suspition
of
the
crime
was
punished
with
death
,
neither
were
our
Ancestors
piously
inclined
towards
good
Kings
,
but
also
gentle
&
mercifull
towards
wicked
Kings
.
For
when
one
of
King
Culen's
Enemies
had
killed
him
in
his
journey
,
whilst
he
is
coming
to
give
an
●ccount
of
his
administration
,
he
was
severe●y
punished
by
a
sentence
of
the
Estates
of
●arliament
.
And
likewise
was
punished
as
〈◊〉
enemy
he
who
had
killed
Evenus
in
prison
,
who
had
been
adjudged
to
perpetuall
bonds
.
And
the
violent
death
or
parricide
of
him
●hey
punished
,
whose
wicked
and
vicious
●ife
oll
men
had
hated
,
M.
I
do
not
so
much
●nquire
at
present
what
some
time
hath
been
done
,
as
by
what
right
Kings
reigne
amongst
us
.
B.
That
we
may
therefore
returne
there●nto
,
as
in
our
first
Kings
until
Kenneth
the
●hird
,
who
first
setled
the
Kingdome
in
his
own
family
,
it
is
very
clear
what
was
the
peoples
power
in
creating
their
Kings
,
and
●aking
order
with
them
,
even
so
it
is
necessary
we
know
,
that
he
either
did
that
against
the
peoples
will
,
or
by
perswasion
obtained
it
M.
That
cannot
be
denied
.
B.
Moreover
,
If
by
force
he
compelled
the
people
to
obey
him
,
then
how
soone
the
people
began
to
have
confidence
in
their
own
strength
,
they
might
have
cast
off
that
violent
yoke
of
Government
imposed
upon
them
:
Seeing
all
Lawes
received
by
Kings
and
people
do
pronounce
,
and
nature
it self
doth
call
for
it
,
that
whatever
is
done
by
force
and
violence
,
may
be
undone
by
the
like
violence
.
M.
What
if
the
people
being
by
fraud
eircumvented
,
or
by
fear
forced
did
surrender
themselves
into
that
slavery
:
what
for
excuse
can
be
pretended
,
but
that
they
perpetually
continue
in
that
case
,
into
which
it
was
once
agreed
they
were
to
be
in
?
B.
I●
you
debate
with
me
from
that
agreement
what
excuse
there
is
for
undoing
the
same
I
shall
on
the
other
hand
lay
down
some
reasons
why
pactions
and
agreements
may
be
dissolved
.
And
first
of
all
,
such
as
are
made
through
force
or
fear
,
in
all
common-wealths
concerning
these
there
is
a
sure
Law
,
draw●
from
Natures
spring
.
Lawes
allow
restitution
to
be
fully
made
to
such
as
are
by
frau●
circumvented
,
and
think
that
it
should
be
kept
for
pupills
,
and
such
other
persons
▪
who
by
just
Law
they
would
have
to
be
defended
.
What
Assembly
therefore
of
me●
can
require
more
justly
to
have
restitution
than
a
whole
people
,
to
whom
the
wrong
is
done
,
which
indeed
is
not
done
against
one
part
of
the
commonwealth
,
but
floweth
fa●
abroad
into
all
the
members
of
that
politick
body
?
M.
I
know
this
Law
to
be
made
use
of
in
the
cases
of
private
persons
,
nor
is
it
unjust
.
But
there
is
no
necessity
we
should
debate
herein
,
seeing
it
is
far
more
credible
(
which
is
recorded
by
Historians
)
that
tha●
right
was
by
the
peoples
will
granted
to
Kings
.
B.
It
is
also
credible
that
so
great
a
matter
was
not
obtained
without
some
great
cause
.
M.
I
do
easily
assent
thereto
.
B.
What
do
you
think
was
the
chief
cause
thereof
?
M.
What
other
,
except
that
which
is
recorded
?
wearisomness
of
ambition
,
tumults
,
murthers
,
intestine
wars
,
often
with
with
the
utter
destruction
of
the
one
party
,
and
alwayes
with
very
great
dammage
of
●oth
.
For
such
as
did
obtain
the
government
,
endeavoured
to
cut-off
their
brethren
,
and
almost
all
their
near
kinsmen
,
that
they
might
leave
the
government
the
more
peace●ble
to
their
children
,
even
as
we
hear
is
done
amongst
the
Turks
,
and
as
we
see
amongst
the
chief
of
Clanns
in
our
Islands
,
and
in
Ireland
.
B.
To
which
of
the
two
do
●ou
think
was
that
contention
most
pernici●●s
,
to
the
people
or
to
the
Princes
?
M.
Certainly
to
the
Kings
,
seeing
the
greatest
〈◊〉
of
the
people
securing
themselves
doth
usually
stand
spectators
of
Princes
contests
,
and
yeeld
alwayes
as
a
prey
to
the
victors
.
●
.
It
seemes
then
that
Princes
rather
for
themselves
,
than
for
the
good
of
the
people
desired
to
establish
the
Kingdom
in
their
own
family
.
M.
That
is
very
probable
.
B.
Now
that
●hey
might
obtain
that
which
did
so
much
concerne
the
perpetual
dignity
,
wealth
and
safety
of
their
family
,
it
is
probable
,
that
they
did
dispense
or
remit
to
one
another
somewhat
of
their
right
:
and
that
they
might
the
more
easily
obtain
the
peoples
goodwill
,
●iking
and
consent
,
they
on
their
part
gave
●hem
some
ease
.
M.
I
believe
that
.
B.
You
will
certainly
confess
it
incredible
,
that
●or
so
great
a
benefit
bestowed
on
their
Kings
,
●hey
should
endure
to
be
in
a
worse
case
than
formerly
they
were
in
.
M.
It
is
altogether
incredible
.
B.
Neither
would
Kings
have
desired
it
with
so
great
ambition
,
if
they
had
known
it
would
prove
hurtfull
to
their
children
,
and
unprofitable
to
the
people
.
M.
Not
at
all
.
B.
Imagine
then
that
some
one
in
Parliament
of
the
free
people
did
freely
ask
the
King
,
what
if
to
any
King
should
succeed
a
Son
that
is
a
fool
,
or
mad
?
Will
you
set
such
over
us
to
rule
us
,
who
cannot
rule
or
governe
themselves
?
M.
I
think
there
was
no
need
to
make
use
of
that
exception
,
seeing
by
the
Lawes
it
is
provided
against
such
a
case
.
B.
Well
said
indeed
.
Let
us
then
see
,
if
Kings
had
obtained
from
the
people
a
free
power
over
the
lawes
,
whether
that
had
been
unprofitable
,
especially
to
those
who
desired
to
foresee
the
good
of
their
own
family
in
time
coming
.
M.
Why
shall
we
think
that
that
power
would
be
unprofitable
?
B.
Because
nothing
doth
so
much
contribute
for
the
continuance
of
a
Government
,
as
that
temperament
of
Government
,
seeing
it
is
both
honourable
for
Kings
,
and
Moderat
,
and
safe
for
the
people
.
The
mind
of
man
hath
somewhat
sublime
and
generous
imbred
therein
by
nature
,
that
it
will
obey
none
,
unless
he
governe
profitably
:
Nor
is
there
any
thing
more
prevalent
for
maintaining
humane
society
,
than
the
mutuall
exchange
of
benefits
,
and
therefore
Theopompus
seemes
to
have
wisely
answered
his
wife
●pbraiding
him
that
by
adding
the
Epbory
he
●ad
diminished
the
power
of
his
authority
,
●nd
had
left
the
Kingdome
to
his
Sons
less
●han
he
had
gotten
it
.
It
is
,
saith
he
,
so
much
the
more
firme
and
sure
.
M.
What
you
relate
of
continuance
,
I
perceive
is
most
true
.
For
I
think
the
Kingdomes
of
the
Scots
and
Danes
are
the
most
ancient
of
all
that
are
in
Europe
,
nor
do
they
seeme
by
any
other
means
to
have
attained
that
antiquity
,
than
by
the
moderation
of
the
supreame
authority
,
whilst
in
the
mean
time
the
Kingdomes
of
the
Frenches
,
Englishes
and
Spaniards
have
past
so
often
out
of
one
family
into
another
.
But
I
do
not
know
if
our
Kings
have
been
so
wise
as
Theopompus
.
B.
As
they
have
not
been
so
prudent
,
do
you
imagine
that
the
people
were
so
foolish
,
as
to
neglect
an
occasion
so
opportune
put
into
their
hand
?
or
that
they
were
so
struck
with
fear
,
or
seduced
by
flatteries
,
as
to
give
themselves
over
into
slavery
willingly
?
M.
Perhaps
it
was
not
.
But
if
the
people
(
which
indeed
might
be
)
were
so
blind
,
that
they
did
not
see
what
might
concerne
their
own
good
,
or
being
careless
would
not
see
what
might
be
for
their
benefit
,
so
as
to
contemne
it
,
should
they
not
then
be
justly
punished
for
their
folly
?
B.
It
is
not
probable
,
that
any
such
thing
was
done
,
seeing
we
may
see
the
contrary
to
be
observed
even
to
our
dayes
.
For
besides
that
wicked
Kings
,
as
often
as
they
intended
tyranny
over
their
Subjects
were
alwayes
restrained
,
some
vestiges
〈◊〉
the
ancient
customes
do
yet
continue
in
som●
ancient
familes
.
For
the
Old
Scots
even
〈◊〉
our
very
dayes
do
choose
their
heads
of
clans
and
having
chosen
them
,
do
give
them
council
of
Elders
,
to
which
councill
who
soever
gives
not
obedience
,
is
deprived
〈◊〉
all
honour
,
and
dignity
.
What
therefore
〈◊〉
with
very
great
care
observed
in
the
parts
would
they
be
negligent
of
for
the
security
and
safety
of
all
?
And
would
they
willingl●
redact
themselves
into
bondage
to
him
,
wh●●
was
to
possess
a
lawfull
Kingdome
in
stea●
of
some
benefit
?
and
would
they
freely
giv●
over
their
liberty
acquired
by
vertue
,
defend●ed
by
armes
,
not
interrupted
for
so
many
ages
,
to
one
not
expecting
it
,
without
force●
without
war
?
For
the
calamity
of
John
Bal●o●
doth
shew
that
that
power
was
never
granted
to
our
Kings
,
besides
the
punishments
so
often
taken
for
their
Maladministration
.
Who
about
two
hundred
and
sixty
years
ago
was
by
the
nobility
rejected
,
because
he
had
subjected
himself
and
his
Kingdome
to
the
authority
of
Edward
King
of
England
,
and
Robert
the
first
was
substitute
in
his
stead
.
The
same
doth
also
shew
that
perpetual
custome
continued
from
the
beginning
of
our
Government
.
M.
What
custome
do
you
speak
of
?
B.
When
our
Kings
are
publickly
inaugurat
,
they
solemnely
promise
to
all
the
People
,
that
they
will
observe
the
Lawes
,
rites
and
old
statutes
of
their
predecessors
,
&
use
the
●ame
power
which
they
have
received
from
them
,
that
whole
order
of
ceremonies
doth
shew
,
&
the
first
entry
of
our
Kings
into
every
City
,
from
all
which
it
may
be
easily
understood
,
what
kind
of
power
they
did
receive
from
our
predecessors
,
to
wit
,
none
other
than
that
they
swear
to
maintain
the
Lawes
being
chosen
by
suffrages
.
This
condition
of
reigning
did
God
propose
to
David
,
and
his
posterity
,
and
promiseth
they
should
reigne
so
long
,
as
they
should
obey
the
Lawes
he
had
given
them
,
those
things
indeed
they
do
,
as
is
probable
that
our
Kings
received
from
our
Ancestors
a
power
not
immense
,
but
within
certain
limites
bounded
and
limited
.
And
further
there
was
the
confirmation
of
a
long
time
,
and
the
usurpation
of
a
perpetual
right
by
the
people
,
never
reprehended
by
a
publick
decree
.
M.
But
I
fear
it
cannot
be
easily
obtained
of
Kings
as
being
perswaded
by
that
probability
to
condescend
to
these
Lawes
however
sworn
unto
,
or
usurped
by
the
people
:
B.
I
also
believe
,
it
is
no
less
hard
to
perswade
the
people
to
pass
from
the
right
received
from
their
Ancestors
,
approved
by
the
use
of
so
many
ages
,
and
practised
by
one
continuall
tenour
.
I
do
not
think
it
needfull
to
proceed
by
conjectures
what
the
people
is
to
do
,
since
I
see
what
they
have
done
already
.
But
if
by
the
obstinat
pertinacy
of
both
the
business
come
to
armes
,
he
that
prevaileth
will
give
what
Law
and
right
he
pleaseth
to
the
vanquished
:
but
this
will
not
longer
continue
than
he
who
is
vanquished
,
having
again
gathered
together
his
forces
,
shall
take
up
Armes
again
.
In
all
which
contentions
men
usually
still
fight
with
very
great
damage
of
the
People
,
but
with
the
utter
overthrow
of
Kings
.
For
from
this
spring
do
flow
all
the
destructions
of
all
Kingdoms
.
M.
It
must
needs
be
so
.
B.
I
have
perhaps
gone
back
further
than
was
needfull
;
to
the
end
you
might
clearly
understand
what
kind
of
Government
there
was
amongst
us
of
old
.
For
if
I
had
reasoned
with
you
according
to
the
rigour
of
the
Law
,
I
might
have
gained
my
poynt
in
a
far
more
compendious
way
.
M.
Albeit
you
have
almost
satisfied
me
already
,
yet
I
shall
willingly
hear
what
that
is
.
B.
I
would
then
have
you
first
of
all
to
answer
me
this
question
.
Do
you
not
approve
the
definition
of
Law
set
down
by
Lawyers
,
who
say
that
Law
is
,
that
which
the
People
knew
when
demanded
by
him
to
whom
the
prerogative
of
demanding
belongeth
.
M.
Indeed
I
do
approve
it
.
B.
We
have
agreed
,
that
the
faults
of
Lawes
being
found
out
,
they
may
be
amended
or
abrogat
by
the
Law
givers
.
M.
We
did
so
.
B.
I
suppose
you
perceive
now
,
that
such
as
are
borne
Kings
are
by
the
Lawes
and
Suffrages
of
the
People
created
,
no
less
than
those
whom
we
said
were
elected
●n
the
beginning
.
And
that
in
receiving
of
Lawes
there
will
not
be
remedies
wanting
in
●he
People
,
who
are
the
Lawgivers
,
not
on●y
against
force
and
fraud
,
but
also
against
ne●ligence
.
M.
I
perceive
that
clearly
.
●
.
Only
here
is
the
difference
,
that
the
Law
●oncerning
our
Kings
was
made
severall
ages
●efore
,
and
when
any
doth
enter
into
the
●ingdome
,
there
useth
to
be
no
new
Law
●ade
,
but
the
old
Law
is
approven
,
and
●●tified
.
But
amongst
those
who
have
their
●eeting
of
Estates
at
the
election
of
every
●ing
,
the
Law
useth
to
be
made
,
the
King
●reated
and
approved
,
and
so
to
enter
into
●s
Government
.
M.
It
is
so
.
B.
Now
if
●ou
please
,
let
us
briefly
recapitulat
what
we
●re
at
accord
in
from
the
very
beginning
.
●o
that
if
ought
be
rashly
approven
,
it
may
●e
retracted
.
M.
I
am
content
.
B.
First
●f
all
then
,
it
seemes
that
a
King
is
created
〈◊〉
the
peoples
sake
,
and
that
nothing
more
●xcellent
is
given
us
of
God
than
a
good
King
,
●nd
more
pestilentious
than
a
wicked
King.
●
:
Very
right
.
B
:
We
have
also
said
that
wicked
King
is
called
a
Tyrant
.
M·
We
●●ve
said
so
.
B.
And
because
there
is
not
●●ch
plenty
of
good
men
,
so
as
to
choose
those
●ho
may
prove
good
Kings
,
nor
so
great
a
●●ppiness
of
birth
,
as
that
good
Luck
may
●●fer
us
those
that
are
good
:
if
we
have
not
●●ch
as
we
would
wish
,
yet
we
have
such
as
●ther
consent
hath
approved
,
or
chance
hath
●●fered
.
Now
the
hazard
that
occureth
either
in
choosing
new
Kings
,
or
in
appro●ving
such
as
are
given
us
by
birth
,
was
th●
cause
that
we
desired
Lawes
,
which
migh●
modify
the
Government
of
Kings
.
No●
these
Lawes
should
be
nothing
else
but
th●
express
image
(
as
far
as
may
be
)
of
a
goo●
Prince
.
M.
We
are
at
accord
in
that
als●
B
:
It
now
remaineth
,
as
I
suppose
,
for
〈◊〉
to
speak
of
the
punishment
of
Tyrants
.
M
▪
That
only
seemes
to
remain
unspoken
of
.
●
If
then
a
King
break
all
the
bonds
of
Lawes
and
plainly
behave
himself
as
a
public
enemy
,
what
think
you
should
be
done
this
case
?
M
:
Indeed
I
am
at
a
stand
her
For
albeit
the
reasons
you
have
given
see●
to
convince
me
,
that
we
ought
to
have
〈◊〉
society
with
that
King
,
yet
so
great
is
t●●
strength
of
a
constant
custome
that
in
my
opin●●on
it
hath
the
strength
of
a
Law
:
Whi●●
custome
doth
so
closely
cleave
to
men
in
the
minds
,
that
if
at
any
time
it
hath
brought
an
errour
,
better
it
is
to
tolerat
it
,
than
〈◊〉
marre
the
constitution
of
the
whole
body
whilst
we
endeavour
to
cure
a
disease
that
but
small
by
custome
.
For
such
is
the
natur●
of
some
diseases
,
that
better
it
is
to
endu●●
the
pain
they
bring
,
than
to
call
for
doub●
some
remedies
,
in
the
applying
whereo●
albeit
the
cure
may
be
wrought
,
yet
th●
bring
such
sharp
paines
in
their
cure
,
as
th●●
the
cure
of
the
disease
is
more
pernicious
th●●
the
disease
it self
.
Next
,
that
whi●●
troubles
me
more
is
,
I
see
that
Governme●●
which
you
call
Tyranny
confirmed
by
the
Word
of
God
,
and
what
you
abhorre
as
the
●●tter
overthrow
of
Lawes
,
God
doth
call
●he
Law
of
the
Kingdome
;
the
authority
of
●hat
passage
of
Scripture
doth
move
me
more
●han
all
the
arguments
of
Philosophers
.
If
you
do
not
explain
this
to
me
,
the
comments
of
men
will
not
be
of
so
great
account
with
●e
,
but
that
I
may
instantly
fall
away
to
the
Adversaries
side
.
B
:
You
are
,
as
I
perceive
,
●n
the
common
errour
,
and
that
very
grie●ous
,
who
do
endeavour
to
confirme
Tyranny
by
Tyranny
.
For
how
great
the
Tyranny
of
custome
is
in
the
minds
of
men
,
wherein
●t
hath
taken
deepest
root
,
and
too
often
we
have
found
it
in
this
our
age
,
Herodotus
an
an●ient
writer
doth
give
us
warning
by
an
old
example
,
but
I
need
not
old
examples
.
Be
well
advised
.
Consider
with
your self
how
many
things
there
be
of
great
moment
,
wherein
you
following
the
dictates
of
reason
have
fallen
from
a
custome
inveterat
so
many
ages
past
,
so
that
now
you
might
have
learned
by
domestick
experiments
,
that
there
is
no
custome
more
full
of
dangers
than
that
which
in
a
publick
way
they
command
us
to
follow
.
I
bid
you
look
well
to
it
round
about
,
how
many
ruines
,
and
how
great
slaughters
will
you
see
therein
?
but
if
it
be
more
clear
(
as
we
say
)
than
the
very
light
,
I
need
not
tarry
longer
in
proving
or
illustrating
a
thing
so
perspicuous
.
Now
as
for
that
passage
of
Scripture
,
which
from
the
history
of
the
Kings
you
rather
signify
than
explain
,
beware
,
I
pray
you
,
you
think
that
the
things
which
God
doth
abhorre
in
the
life
of
Tyrants
,
are
by
him
allowed
to
Kings
.
Now
lest
this
be
,
I
bid
you
first
consider
what
that
people
sought
of
the
Lord
:
then
what
causes
of
a
new
petition
they
had
.
Lastly
,
what
the
Lord
did
answer
them
.
First
,
they
ask
a
King
,
but
what
a
King
?
a
Lawfull
King
?
such
a
one
they
had
.
For
Samuel
was
given
them
by
the
Lord
,
whose
prerogative
it
was
to
set
a
King
over
them
.
He
had
for
many
years
judged
them
Lawfully
according
to
prescript
of
Gods
Law
:
but
whilst
in
his
old
age
his
sons
did
judge
,
they
did
many
things
wickedly
,
and
judged
contrary
to
the
Lawes
.
I
see
no
reason
why
they
should
ask
the
change
,
or
rather
amendement
of
the
Government
,
or
expect
the
same
from
the
Lord
,
who
not
long
before
had
quite
rooted
out
the
whole
family
of
Heli●
almost
for
the
like
cause
.
What
do
they
then
ask
?
A
King
,
such
as
their
neighbouring
nations
had
,
who
at
home
might
be
a
judge
to
them
,
and
abroad
a
leader
of
their
Armies
.
Now
in
effect
such
were
Tyrants
.
For
as
the
people
of
Asia
are
of
a
more
servile
disposition
than
those
of
Europe
,
so
did
they
the
more
easily
obey
the
commands
of
Tyrants
.
There
is
no
mention
made
for
ought
I
know
,
by
any
historian
of
any
Lawfull
King
in
Asia
.
Moreover
,
it
doth
easily
appear
that
a
Tyrant
,
and
not
a
King
is
there
described
,
in
regard
the
Lord
in
Deuteronomy
had
prescribed
to
them
a
forme
not
only
different
from
this
in
that
place
cited
by
you
,
but
also
plainly
contrary
thereto
,
according
to
which
forme
Samuel
and
the
other
judges
had
judged
so
many
years
,
which
whilst
they
did
reject
,
the
Lord
complaines
,
that
he
was
by
them
rejected
.
M
:
But
the
Lord
doth
not
call
him
Tyrant
,
but
ever
King.
B
:
He
calles
him
indeed
King
:
for
it
is
peculiar
to
the
Lord
,
to
use
the
common
speech
of
the
people
,
as
often
as
he
speaketh
to
a
people
.
And
therefore
he
maketh
use
of
that
word
with
the
vulgar
people
:
but
lest
an
ambiguous
use
thereof
might
deceive
,
he
doth
eloquently
expound
what
the
use
of
that
word
was
amongst
neighbouring
Nations
.
M
:
As
that
may
be
true
,
yet
that
of
the
Apostle
Paul
doth
urge
us
more
narrowly
,
who
commandeth
us
to
pray
for
the
safety
of
Princes
:
he
is
so
far
from
permitting
us
to
revile
Government
,
much
less
to
dethrone
such
as
are
invested
therewith
,
or
to
kill
them
being
thrown
down
.
But
what
Princes
doth
he
recommend
to
our
prayers
?
the
most
cruell
that
ever
were
,
Tiberius
,
Caligula
,
Claudius
,
Nero.
For
Pauls
Epistles
were
almost
contemporary
with
them
.
B.
That
you
make
so
much
account
of
the
authority
in
Paul
,
so
as
one
sentence
of
his
hath
more
weight
with
you
than
the
writings
of
all
Philosophers
and
Lawyers
,
I
think
you
do
well
:
but
see
that
you
consider
well
his
judgment
,
or
meaning
:
for
you
must
not
examine
the
words
only
,
but
in
what
time
,
to
whom
,
and
why
he
wrote
.
First
then
let
us
see
what
Paul
did
write
.
For
he
writeth
to
Titus
Chap.
3.
Put
them
in
mind
to
be
subject
to
Principalities
and
powers
,
and
to
be
ready
to
every
good
work
.
I
suppose
,
you
see
,
what
end
of
obedience
and
subjection
he
appoints
.
He
likewise
to
Timothy
Chap.
2.
Doth
write
,
that
we
should
pray
for
all
men
,
even
for
Kings
,
and
other
Magistrats
,
that
,
saith
he
,
we
may
live
a
peaceable
life
in
all
godliness
and
honesty
.
And
here
you
see
what
end
of
praying
he
appoints
:
namely
not
for
the
Kings
safety
,
but
the
churches
tranquillity
,
from
which
it
will
be
no
difficult
thing
to
conceive
also
the
forme
of
prayer
.
Now
in
his
Epistle
to
the
Romans
,
he
doth
define
a
King
near
to
a
Logick
subtilty
,
for
saith
he
,
he
is
a
Minister
to
whom
the
sword
is
given
by
God
,
for
punishing
the
wicked
,
and
for
cherishing
and
relieving
the
good
.
For
saith
Chrisostome
,
these
things
are
not
by
Paul
written
of
a
Tyrant
,
but
of
a
true
and
Lawfull
Magistrat
,
who
is
the
vice-gerent
of
the
true
God
on
earth
,
whom
whosoever
resisteth
,
doth
certainly
resist
the
ordinance
of
God.
Now
albeit
we
ought
to
pray
for
wicked
Princes
,
we
should
not
thence
conclude
,
that
their
vices
should
not
be
punished
:
nor
will
it
more
follow
that
we
should
not
punish
the
rapines
of
Robbers
,
for
whom
we
are
also
commanded
to
Pray
.
And
if
we
should
obey
a
good
Prince
,
it
will
not
therefore
follow
that
we
should
not
resist
a
wicked
Prince
.
But
if
you
consider
the
reason
which
did
move
Paul
to
write
these
things
look
that
the
place
or
argument
make
not
much
against
you
.
For
he
wrote
this
to
chastise
the
rashness
of
some
,
who
did
deny
the
authority
of
Magistrats
to
be
necessary
for
Caligula
,
Nero
,
Domitian
,
and
such
like
Tyrants
,
why
they
should
not
be
punished
as
breakers
of
divine
and
humane
Law
,
you
have
nothing
here
from
Paul
,
who
treats
of
the
power
of
Magistrats
,
but
not
of
the
wicked
Ministers
of
that
power
,
nor
will
they
be
at
all
Magistrats
,
if
you
examine
that
Kind
of
Tyrants
according
to
Pauls
rule
.
But
if
any
will
debate
that
wicked
Princes
are
also
ordained
by
God
,
look
that
this
his
discourse
be
not
captious
.
For
(
as
they
say
in
proverb
)
God
may
put
a
hard
wedge
to
cleave
a
hard
knot
,
so
doth
he
set
up
a
wicked
man
for
punishing
of
wicked
men
:
but
no
man
in
his
right
wits
dare
affirme
,
that
God
is
therefore
the
Author
of
evill
,
or
wickedness
,
even
as
no
man
is
ignorant
that
he
is
the
Author
of
punishing
wicked
men
.
A
good
Magistrat
also
for
the
most
part
chooseth
a
wicked
man
to
be
an
hangman
for
punishing
guilty
persons
.
And
albeit
indeed
that
a
Magistrat
doth
assume
such
an
hangman
for
that
office
,
yet
no
impunity
is
granted
him
or
all
his
misdeeds
.
Nor
will
the
Magistrat
have
him
to
be
so
above
the
Lawes
,
as
that
he
cannot
be
questioned
thereby
.
I
will
not
stay
longer
upon
this
similitude
,
lest
Court
flatterers
cry
out
that
I
speak
basely
of
the
supreame
Magistrat
.
But
however
they
exclaime
,
certainly
this
they
cannot
deny
,
that
the
hangmans
function
is
a
part
of
the
publick
office
,
and
perhaps
of
the
Royall
office
,
or
at
least
by
the
testimony
of
very
Kings
:
who
complain
that
their
Majesty
and
person
is
wronged
,
as
oft
as
any
of
their
publick
Ministers
is
wronged
,
or
violence
done
to
them
.
Now
the
punishment
of
wicked
Malefactors
,
and
what
ever
else
of
that
kind
,
doth
belong
to
the
Kings
office
.
What
say
you
of
Majors
or
Provosts
in
Towns
?
what
of
Generals
of
Armies
?
what
of
Baillies
.
What
of
Sherifs
?
doth
not
Paul
command
us
to
be
subject
to
them
?
doth
he
hold
them
for
private
persons
?
Now
an
account
useth
to
be
taken
for
mal-administration
of
all
,
not
only
of
Inferiour
Magistrats
;
but
also
of
such
as
are
equal
to
Kings
.
I
would
therefore
have
them
,
who
from
Pauls
words
do
dreame
that
so
great
a
power
is
given
to
Kings
,
to
shew
me
from
him
,
that
Kings
only
are
here
to
be
understood
by
the
name
of
power
,
and
therefore
they
only
are
to
be
exeemed
from
the
punishment
of
Lawes
:
or
if
,
when
we
say
powers
,
other
Magistrats
be
also
understood
by
the
same
Author
,
who
are
ordained
by
God
for
the
same
use
:
I
would
have
them
also
to
shew
me
where
all
Magistrats
are
loosed
from
the
Lawes
,
and
pronounced
free
from
the
fear
of
punishment
:
or
if
this
immunity
be
granted
to
Kings
only
,
but
denyed
to
others
who
are
set
in
authority
.
M.
But
Paul
will
have
all
to
be
subject
to
the
higher
powers
.
B
:
He
commandeth
so
indeed
,
but
by
this
name
of
Power
he
must
needs
comprehend
other
Magistrats
,
unless
perhaps
we
imagine
that
Paul
doth
think
no
power
at
all
to
be
in
those
Commonwealths
,
which
have
not
Kingly
Government
,
but
plainly
an
anarchy
therein
.
M
:
I
do
not
believe
that
,
nor
is
it
probable
:
and
the
rather
I
am
of
this
opinion
,
because
the
current
of
all
the
most
learned
Interpreters
on
the
place
make
for
you
:
who
think
that
Pauls
dispute
there
was
against
those
that
affirmed
that
no
Lawes
and
Magistrats
did
at
all
belong
to
them
.
B
:
What
say
you
to
that
which
I
lately
spoke
.
Do
you
think
,
that
those
Tyrants
before
mentioned
of
all
men
the
most
cruell
,
are
meant
by
the
Apostle
?
M
:
Yes
,
but
what
produce
you
against
me
to
hinder
me
from
the
belief
thereof
?
especially
seeing
Jeremy
doth
earnestly
advise
the
Jewes
,
and
that
by
command
of
God
,
to
obey
the
King
of
Assyria
,
and
by
no
means
to
reject
his
authority
,
and
thence
they
inferre
by
the
like
reason
,
that
obedience
should
be
given
to
other
Tyrants
also
how
cruell
soever
.
B
:
That
I
may
answer
first
to
what
you
last
spoke
,
you
must
take
notice
,
that
the
Prophet
doth
not
command
the
Jewes
to
obey
all
Tyrants
,
but
the
King
of
Assyria
alone
:
Now
if
you
would
conclude
the
forme
of
a
Law
from
that
which
is
commanded
to
be
done
to
one
single
person
,
first
you
are
not
ignorant
(
for
Logick
hath
taught
you
that
)
what
a
great
absurdity
you
will
make
,
next
you
will
be
in
danger
to
be
assaulted
by
the
opposers
of
Tyranny
with
the
like
weapons
:
for
you
must
either
shew
what
singular
thing
there
is
in
that
matter
,
or
propose
it
to
be
imitat
by
all
every
where
,
or
if
you
cannot
do
this
,
you
must
acknowledge
,
that
whatever
is
enjoyned
concerning
any
one
person
by
any
speciall
command
of
God
,
it
doth
alike
belong
to
all
.
If
you
shall
once
admit
this
(
which
you
must
needs
do
)
it
will
be
instantly
objected
,
that
Ahab
was
killed
by
Gods
command
,
and
a
reward
was
also
promised
and
performed
to
him
that
should
kill
him
.
When
ever
therefore
you
betake
your self
to
that
refuge
,
you
must
obey
all
Tyrants
:
because
God
by
his
Prophet
did
command
his
people
to
obey
one
Tyrant
.
It
will
be
instantly
replyed
,
that
all
Tyrants
ought
also
to
be
killed
,
because
Ahab
at
the
command
of
God
was
killed
by
the
Captain
of
his
host
.
Therefore
I
advise
you
to
provide
a
more
firme
defence
from
Scripture
for
Tyrants
,
or
then
laying
the
same
aside
at
present
you
may
have
your
recourse
to
the
Philosophers
schoole
.
M
:
I
shall
indeed
think
upon
it
.
But
in
the
mean
time
let
us
returne
from
whence
we
have
disgressed
.
What
do
you
bring
from
Scripture
,
why
Tyrants
may
be
Lawfully
killed
.
B
:
First
of
all
I
profer
this
,
that
seeing
it
is
expresly
commanded
to
cut
off
wickedness
and
wicked
men
,
without
any
exception
of
rank
or
degree
,
and
yet
in
no
place
of
sacred
scripture
are
Tyrants
more
spared
than
private
persons
.
Next
,
that
the
definition
of
powers
delivered
by
Paul
doth
not
wholly
belong
to
Tyrants
,
because
they
accommodat
not
the
strength
of
their
authority
for
the
benefit
of
the
people
,
but
for
fulfilling
their
own
lusts
.
Further
we
should
diligently
consider
how
much
Power
Paul
doth
grant
to
Bishops
,
whose
function
he
doth
highly
and
truely
praise
,
as
being
some
way
like
unto
Kings
,
as
far
as
the
nature
of
both
their
functions
can
admit
.
For
Bishops
are
Physicians
of
internall
diseases
,
as
Kings
are
Physicians
of
externall
distempers
,
and
yet
he
would
neither
of
them
to
be
free
from
,
or
not
liable
to
the
jurisdiction
of
the
other
.
And
even
as
Bishops
are
subject
to
Kings
in
the
exercise
of
their
Civil
Government
,
so
ought
Kings
tobey
the
spirituall
admonitions
of
Bishops
.
Now
albeit
the
amplitude
and
dignity
of
Bishops
be
so
great
,
yet
no
law
divine
or
humane
doth
exeeme
them
from
the
punishment
of
crimes
.
And
to
pass
by
others
.
The
very
Pope
,
who
is
accounted
the
Bishop
of
Bishops
,
who
so
exalts
himself
above
all
Kings
,
that
he
would
be
accounted
a
certain
God
amongst
men
,
yet
is
he
not
exempted
from
the
punishment
of
Lawes
,
no
not
by
his
own
Canonists
,
a
kind
of
men
very
devoted
to
him
.
For
seeing
they
would
think
it
absurd
that
God
(
for
they
do
not
hesitat
to
call
him
thus
)
should
be
obnoxious
to
mens
censure
,
and
think
it
unjust
that
the
greatest
crimes
and
most
filthy
abominations
should
pass
unpunished
in
any
,
and
yet
they
have
found
out
a
way
whereby
crimes
may
be
punished
,
and
the
Pope
accounted
sacred
&
inviolable
.
For
the
priviledge
of
the
Pope
is
one
thing
,
and
of
that
man
who
is
Pope
is
another
,
say
they
,
and
whilst
they
exeeme
the
Pope
(
whom
they
deny
can
erre
)
from
the
cognition
of
the
Lawes
,
yet
do
they
confess
him
to
be
a
man
obnoxious
to
vices
and
punishment
of
vices
:
nor
have
they
more
subtilly
than
severely
declared
their
judgment
herein
.
It
would
be
tedious
to
rehearse
,
what
Popes
(
to
speak
after
their
usuall
way
)
what
men
personating
Popes
,
who
not
only
alive
were
forced
to
renounce
their
popedome
,
but
being
dead
were
pulled
out
of
their
graves
,
and
thrown
into
Tiber.
But
to
omit
old
histories
.
The
recent
memory
of
pope
Paul
the
fourth
is
fresh
in
our
mind
,
for
his
own
Rome
did
witness
a
publick
hatred
against
him
by
a
new
kind
of
decree
.
For
they
vented
their
fury
(
he
being
by
death
taken
away
)
against
his
nearest
kinsfolk
,
his
statues
and
painted
images
or
pictures
.
Nor
should
this
interpretation
seeme
more
subtil
,
whereby
we
separat
the
power
from
the
person
in
power
,
than
Philosophy
doth
acknowledge
,
and
the
Ancient
Interpreters
do
opprove
,
nor
is
the
rude
multitude
and
strangers
to
subtile
disputing
ignorant
thereof
;
for
the
meanest
tradsmen
take
it
for
no
blot
upon
their
trade
,
if
a
Smith
or
Baker
be
hanged
for
robbery
,
but
are
rather
glad
that
their
society
is
purged
of
such
villains
.
But
if
there
be
any
of
another
mind
,
I
think
it
is
to
be
feared
,
that
he
seemes
to
be
rather
grived
at
those
mens
punishment
with
whom
he
is
associat
in
their
villany
▪
than
for
the
infamy
of
their
society
.
I
am
of
the
opinion
,
if
Kings
would
abandon
the
counsells
of
wicked
men
and
flatterers
and
measure
their
own
greatness
rather
by
duties
of
vertue
,
than
by
the
impunity
of
evill
deeds
,
they
would
not
be
grieved
for
the
punishment
of
Tyrants
,
nor
think
that
Royall
Majesty
is
lessened
by
whatsomever
destruction
of
Tyrants
,
but
rather
be
glad
that
it
is
purged
from
a
most
filthy
blot
of
wickedness
:
especially
seeing
they
use
to
be
highly
offended
with
robbers
,
and
that
very
justly
,
if
any
of
them
in
their
malefices
pretend
the
Kings
name
.
M
:
Forsooth
,
they
have
just
cause
,
But
laying
these
things
aside
a
I
would
have
you
go
on
to
the
other
head
you
proposed
.
B
:
What
heads
do
you
mean
?
M
:
Namely
in
what
time
,
and
to
whom
Paul
wrote
those
things
,
for
I
desire
to
know
what
the
knowledge
thereof
doth
make
for
the
argument
in
hand
.
B
:
I
shall
herein
obey
you
also
.
And
first
I
shall
speak
of
the
time
,
Paul
wrote
these
things
in
the
very
infancy
of
the
Church
,
in
which
time
it
was
not
only
necessary
to
be
blameless
,
but
none
was
to
give
occasion
to
such
as
sought
occasion
of
reproaching
,
and
unjust
causes
of
staining
the
Professors
of
Christianity
:
Next
he
wrote
to
men
of
severall
nations
,
and
so
gathered
together
into
one
society
out
of
the
whole
body
of
the
Roman
Empire
,
amongst
whom
there
were
but
few
very
rich
,
yea
almost
none
,
who
either
had
ruled
,
or
could
rule
,
or
were
in
any
great
account
amongst
their
fellow
Citizens
,
they
were
not
so
many
in
number
,
and
these
almost
but
strangers
,
and
for
the
most
part
but
lately
freed
of
bondage
,
and
others
but
tradsmen
and
servants
.
Amongst
them
there
were
many
who
did
further
pretend
Christian
Liberty
,
than
the
simplicity
of
the
Gospell
could
suffer
.
Now
this
Company
of
people
out
of
the
promiscuous
multitude
,
which
did
won
their
living
,
though
meanly
,
by
hard
labour
,
was
not
to
be
so
carefull
of
the
state
of
the
Common
wealth
,
of
the
majesty
of
the
Empire
,
and
of
the
conversation
and
duty
of
Kings
,
as
of
the
publick
tranquility
,
and
their
domestick
affairs
,
nor
could
they
justly
claime
any
more
,
than
to
ly
lurking
under
the
shadow
of
what
ever
Government
they
were
under
.
If
that
people
had
attempted
to
lay
hold
upon
any
part
of
Government
they
should
have
been
accounted
not
only
foolish
,
but
,
mad
.
Nor
should
they
come
out
of
their
lurking
holes
to
breed
trouble
to
those
that
did
hold
the
helme
of
publick
affaires
in
hand
.
Immature
licentiousnes
was
also
to
be
repressed
,
an
unfit
interpreter
of
Christian
liberty
.
What
then
doth
Paul
write
?
doubtless
,
new
precept
no
but
only
these
usuall
precepts
,
namely
,
that
Subjects
should
obey
their
Rulers
,
servants
their
Masters
,
and
wives
their
hus
bands
,
nor
should
we
think
the
Lords
yoke
,
how
light
soever
doth
liberat
us
of
the
bonds
of
our
duty
,
but
vvith
a
more
attentive
mind
than
before
to
be
bound
thereunto
,
so
that
we
should
omit
nothing
through
all
the
degrees
of
duties
in
our
relations
,
that
might
any
wayes
make
for
acquiring
the
favour
and
goodwill
of
men
.
And
so
it
should
come
to
pass
,
that
the
name
of
God
should
be
well
spoken
of
amongst
the
Gentiles
because
of
us
,
and
the
glory
of
the
Gospell
more
largely
propagate
.
For
Performing
of
these
things
,
there
was
need
of
publick
peace
,
the
keepers
whereof
were
Princes
and
Magistrats
,
albeit
wicked
.
May
it
please
you
,
that
I
set
before
you
a
manifest
representation
hereof
?
Imagigine
that
one
of
our
Doctors
doth
write
to
the
Christians
,
that
live
under
the
Turks
,
to
men
,
I
say
,
of
mean
fortune
,
fore
dejected
in
mind
,
weak
and
few
in
number
,
and
exposed
to
the
injuries
of
all
and
every
one
.
What
else
,
I
ask
you
,
would
he
advise
them
,
than
what
Paul
did
advise
the
Church
that
then
was
at
Rome
,
or
what
Jeremy
advised
the
exiles
in
Assyria
?
Now
this
is
a
most
sure
argument
that
Paul
had
a
regard
to
those
mens
condition
to
whom
he
did
write
,
and
not
to
all
others
,
because
he
diligently
sets
home
the
mutuall
duties
of
husbands
towards
thier
wives
,
of
wives
towards
thier
hus
bands
,
of
Parents
towards
thier
children
,
and
of
children
towards
their
parents
,
of
servants
towards
thier
Masters
,
and
of
Masters
towards
thier
servants
.
And
albeit
he
writes
what
the
duty
of
a
Magistrat
is
,
yet
he
doth
not
give
them
any
particular
compellation
,
(
as
he
had
done
in
the
preceeding
relations
.
)
For
which
cause
we
shall
judge
that
he
gave
no
other
precepts
for
Kings
and
others
in
Authority
:
especially
seeing
thier
lust
was
to
be
much
more
restrained
,
that
of
private
persons
?
What
other
cause
may
we
imagine
,
than
that
at
that
time
there
were
no
Kings
or
Magistrats
in
the
Church
to
whom
he
might
write
?
Imagine
that
Paul
doth
now
live
in
our
dayes
,
wherein
not
only
the
people
,
but
Princes
also
Profess
Christianity
.
At
the
same
time
,
let
there
be
some
Prince
,
who
doth
conceive
that
not
only
should
humane
Lawes
,
but
also
divine
Lawes
be
subject
to
his
lust
and
pleasure
,
and
who
will
have
not
only
his
decrees
,
but
also
his
very
nods
to
be
accounted
for
Lawes
,
like
that
man
in
the
Gospel
,
who
neither
did
feare
God
,
nor
reverence
man
,
who
distributes
the
Church
revenues
amongst
villains
and
rascals
,
if
I
may
so
say
;
and
doth
mock
the
sincere
worshipers
of
God
,
and
accounts
them
but
fools
and
mad
men
,
or
fanaticks
:
what
would
Paul
write
of
such
to
the
Church
?
If
he
were
like
himself
,
he
would
certainly
deny
that
he
should
be
accounted
a
Magistrat
.
He
would
interdict
all
Christians
to
have
any
communion
with
him
,
either
in
dyet
,
speech
,
or
converse
,
and
Leave
him
to
the
people
to
be
punished
by
the
Lawes
,
and
would
think
they
did
nothing
but
their
duty
,
if
they
should
account
him
not
to
be
their
King
,
with
whom
they
were
to
have
no
fellowship
by
the
Law
of
God.
But
there
will
not
be
wanting
some
Court
slaves
,
or
Sycophants
,
who
finding
no
honest
refuge
,
become
so
impudent
,
as
to
say
,
that
God
being
angry
against
a
people
doth
set
Tyrants
over
them
:
whom
as
hangmen
he
appoints
for
punishing
them
.
Which
to
be
true
I
do
confess
;
yet
it
is
true
,
that
God
many
times
doth
stirre
up
from
amongst
the
lowest
of
the
people
some
very
mean
,
and
obscure
men
to
revenge
tyrannicall
pride
and
weakness
:
For
God
,
(
as
before
is
said
)
doth
command
wicked
men
to
be
cut-off
:
and
doth
except
neither
degree
,
sexe
,
or
condition
,
nor
yet
any
man.
For
Kings
are
not
more
acceptable
to
him
than
beggars
.
Therefore
,
we
may
truely
averre
,
that
God
being
alike
the
●●her
of
all
,
to
whose
providence
nothing
lyes
〈◊〉
,
and
whose
power
nothing
can
resist
,
will
〈◊〉
leave
any
wickedness
unpunished
.
More●●er
,
another
will
stand
up
and
ask
some
●●ample
out
of
Scripture
of
a
King
punished
〈◊〉
his
Subjects
:
which
albeit
I
could
not
pro●●ce
,
yet
it
will
not
presently
follow
,
that
●ecause
we
do
not
read
such
a
thing
therein
to
●●ve
been
done
,
that
it
should
be
accounted
〈◊〉
an
high
crime
and
malefice
.
I
may
rehearse
●mongst
many
Nations
very
many
and
sound
●awes
,
whereof
in
holy
write
there
is
no
●xample
.
For
as
the
consent
of
all
Nations
●oth
approve
,
that
what
the
Law
doth
com●and
,
is
accounted
just
,
and
what
it
forbid●eth
,
is
unjust
,
so
since
the
memory
of
man
〈◊〉
was
never
forbidden
,
that
what
should
not
●e
contained
in
Lawes
,
should
not
at
all
be
●one
.
For
that
servitude
was
never
received
,
●or
will
the
nature
of
things
so
fruitfull
of
new
examples
suffer
the
same
to
be
received
,
that
whatever
is
not
by
some
Law
commanded
,
or
recorded
by
some
famous
example
,
should
be
accounted
for
a
great
crime
and
malefice
.
If
therefore
any
man
shall
ask
of
me
an
example
out
of
the
sacred
Scriptures
,
wherein
the
punishment
of
wicked
Kings
is
approven
,
I
shall
again
ask
him
,
where
is
the
same
reprehended
?
But
if
nothing
done
without
some
example
doth
please
:
how
many
Civil
statutes
shall
we
have
continued
with
us
?
how
many
Lawes
?
for
the
greatest
Part
thereof
is
not
taken
out
of
any
old
example
,
but
established
against
new
deceits
and
that
witho●●
example
.
But
we
have
already
answered
th●●se
that
require
examples
more
than
was
nee●●full
:
Now
if
the
Jewish
Kings
were
not
p●●nished
by
their
Subjects
,
they
make
not
muc●
for
our
purpose
in
hand
.
For
they
were
not
first
created
by
the
people
,
but
were
by
Go●
given
them
.
And
therefore
very
justly
,
〈◊〉
who
was
the
Author
of
that
honour
,
was
〈◊〉
punish
their
misdeeds
.
But
we
debate
,
th●●
the
people
,
from
whom
our
Kings
enjoy
wh●●●ever
priviledge
they
claime
,
is
more
pow●●●full
than
their
Kings
:
and
that
the
who●●
people
have
that
same
priviledge
over
them
which
they
have
over
every
one
in
particula●
of
the
whole
people
.
All
the
rights
and
priv●●ledges
of
forrain
nations
,
who
live
unde●
Lawfull
Kings
do
make
for
us
:
all
the
Nation●
which
are
Subject
to
Kings
chosen
by
themselves
,
do
commonly
agree
herein
,
that
whatever
priviledge
the
people
hath
given
to
any
the
same
they
may
require
again
very
justly
▪
All
commonwealths
have
still
retained
th●●
priviledge
.
Therefore
Lentulus
,
having
con●spired
with
Catiline
for
overturning
the
commonwealth
of
Rome
,
was
compelled
to
renounce
his
Praetorship
,
and
the
Decemviri
,
the
makers
of
the
Roman
Lawes
,
were
taken
order
with
,
even
whilst
they
enjoyed
th●
supream
authority
:
Some
Dukes
of
Venice
,
and
Chilpericus
King
of
france
,
laying
aside
their
Royall
honours
,
as
private
men
spen●
their
dayes
in
Monasteries
.
And
not
long
ago
▪
Christiernus
King
of
the
Danes
,
twenty
years
almost
after
he
was
deprived
of
his
Kingdome
did
end
his
life
in
prison
.
Now
the
Dictatorship
(
which
was
a
Kind
of
Tyranny
)
was
in
the
peoples
power
.
And
this
priviledge
hath
been
constantly
observed
,
that
publick
benefices
granted
amiss
,
and
the
liberty
granted
to
ingrate
persons
set
at
liberty
(
whom
Lawes
do
very
much
favour
)
might
be
taken
back
again
.
These
things
we
have
spoken
of
forrain
Nations
,
lest
we
alone
seeme
to
have
usurped
any
new
priviledge
against
our
Kings
.
But
as
to
what
doth
properly
belong
to
us
,
the
matter
might
have
been
handled
in
few
words
.
M
:
What
way
?
For
this
I
am
very
desirous
to
heare
.
B
:
I
might
enumerat
twelve
or
more
Kings
,
who
for
great
crimes
and
flagitious
deeds
have
been
either
adjudged
to
perpetuall
imprisonment
,
or
escaped
the
just
punishment
of
their
wickedness
either
by
exile
or
voluntary
death
.
But
lest
any
blame
me
for
relating
old
and
obsolete
stories
,
if
I
should
make
mention
of
Culen
,
Even
,
and
Ferchard
,
I
shall
produce
some
few
within
the
memory
of
our
forefathers
.
All
the
Estates
in
a
publick
convention
judged
James
the
third
to
have
been
justly
killed
,
for
his
great
cruelty
and
flagitious
wickedness
towards
his
Subjects
,
and
did
caution
that
none
of
them
who
had
aided
,
consented
,
or
contributed
money
,
or
had
been
active
therein
to
be
called
thereafter
into
question
therefore
.
That
they
therefore
did
judge
the
deed
to
be
duely
and
orderly
done
,
it
being
once
down
,
doubtless
they
desired
it
might
be
set
down
for
an
example
in
tim●
coming
,
surely
no
less
,
than
L
:
Quintiu●
sitting
in
judgment
did
Commend
Serviliu●
Ahalus
for
having
killed
before
the
bench
Sp●
Mellus
turning
his
back
and
refusing
to
com●pear
into
judgment
,
and
that
he
was
not
guilty
of
blood
shed
,
but
thought
him
to
be
nobi●litat
by
the
slaughter
of
a
Tyrant
,
and
al●
posterity
did
affirme
the
same
.
What
Subjec●
hath
ever
approved
the
slaughter
of
one
affec●ting
Tyranny
?
what
do
you
suppose
would
he
have
done
with
a
Tyrant
robbing
the
good
of
his
Subjects
and
shedding
their
blood
What
hath
our
men
done
?
do
not
they
seem●
to
have
made
a
Law
,
who
by
a
publick
decre●
without
any
punishment
have
past
by
a
flagiti●ous
crime
committed
,
if
such
like
shall
happe●
in
time
coming
?
for
at
most
there
is
no
diffe●rence
whether
you
judge
concerning
tha●
which
is
done
,
or
make
a
Law
concerning
what
is
to
be
done
.
For
both
wayes
a
judg●ment
is
past
concerning
the
Kind
of
the
crime
and
concerning
the
punishment
or
reward
o●
the
actor
.
M.
These
things
will
perhaps
hav●
some
weight
amongst
us
.
But
I
know
not
how
other
Nations
abroad
will
take
them
.
You
se●
I
must
satisfy
them
.
Not
as
in
a
judiciall
way
I
were
to
be
called
in
question
for
the
crime
▪
but
openly
amongst
all
concerning
the
fame
not
mine
(
for
I
am
far
from
any
suspition
thereof
)
but
of
my
countrey
men
.
For
I
am
afraid
,
lest
forrain
Nations
will
rather
blam●
the
decrees
,
wherewith
you
suppose
you
are
sufficiently
protected
,
than
the
crime
it self
full
of
cruelty
and
hatred
,
But
you
know
,
if
I
mistake
not
,
what
is
usually
spoken
according
to
the
disposition
and
opinion
of
every
one
on
both
hands
,
concerning
the
examples
you
have
proposed
.
I
would
therefore
(
because
you
seeme
to
have
expeded
what
is
past
,
not
so
much
from
the
decrees
of
men
,
as
from
the
springs
of
Nature
)
you
would
briefly
expound
if
you
have
ought
to
●ay
for
the
equity
of
that
Law.
B.
Albeit
that
may
seeme
unjust
to
stand
at
the
bar
to
plead
amongst
forrainers
for
a
Law
approved
from
the
very
first
times
of
our
Scots
Government
by
Kings
,
by
the
constant
practice
of
so
many
ages
ago
,
necessary
for
the
people
,
not
unjust
for
Kings
,
but
Lawfull
,
but
now
at
last
accused
of
illegality
;
yet
for
your
sake
I
shall
try
it
.
And
as
if
I
were
debating
with
those
very
men
who
would
trouble
you
,
I
first
ask
this
.
What
do
you
think
here
worthy
of
reprehension
?
Is
it
the
cause
?
why
is
it
sought
for
?
or
is
it
the
Law
it self
which
you
reprehended
?
for
the
Law
was
sought
for
repressing
the
unjust
lusts
of
Kings
.
Whoever
doth
condemne
this
,
must
likewise
condemne
all
the
Lawes
of
all
Nations
,
for
all
Lawes
were
desired
for
the
very
same
cause
.
Do
you
reprehend
the
Law
it self
?
do
you
think
it
Lawfull
that
Kings
be
exempted
of
,
or
not
lyable
to
the
Lawes
?
let
us
then
see
if
that
be
also
expedient
.
And
for
proving
that
it
is
not
expedient
for
the
people
,
there
needs
not
many
words
.
For
it
in
the
former
discourse
we
have
rightly
compared
a
King
to
a
Physician
,
as
it
is
not
expedient
for
people
that
impunity
be
permitted
to
a
Physician
for
killing
whom
he
pleaseth
,
so
it
is
not
for
the
good
of
all
,
that
a
promiscuous
licence
be
granted
to
Kings
for
making
havock
of
all
.
We
have
no
cause
then
to
be
offended
with
a
people
,
whose
chief
power
it
is
in
making
Lawes
,
if
as
they
desire
a
good
King
to
be
set
over
them
,
even
so
a
Law
to
be
set
over
a
King
none
of
the
best
.
But
if
this
Law
be
not
for
the
Kings
use
,
or
profit
,
let
us
see
if
the
people
should
be
dealt
with
to
remit
somewhat
of
their
priviledge
,
and
of
abrogating
it
not
for
the
space
of
three
dayes
,
but
according
to
our
usuall
way
we
indict
a
Parliament
to
meet
within
fourty
dayes
.
In
the
mean
time
,
that
we
may
reason
together
concerning
the
Law
,
tell
me
,
doth
he
seeme
to
respect
the
good
of
a
mad
man
,
who
looseth
his
bonds
?
M.
Not
at
all
.
B.
What
do
you
think
of
him
who
giveth
to
a
man
sick
of
a
feaver
,
so
as
he
is
not
far
from
madness
,
a
drink
of
cold
water
though
earnestly
craving
it
,
do
you
think
he
deserveth
well
of
that
sick
man
?
M.
But
I
speak
of
Kings
of
a
sound
mind
.
I
deny
that
there
is
any
need
of
medicine
for
such
as
are
in
health
,
nor
of
Lawes
for
Kings
of
a
sound
mind
.
But
you
would
have
all
Kings
to
seeme
wicked
,
for
you
impose
Lawes
upon
all
.
B.
I
do
not
think
that
all
Kings
are
wicked
.
Nor
do
I
think
all
the
people
to
be
wicked
,
and
yet
the
Law
in
one
voice
doth
speak
to
the
whole
people
.
Now
wicked
men
are
afraid
at
that
voice
,
good
people
do
not
think
it
belongs
to
them
.
Thus
good
Kings
have
no
cause
to
be
offended
at
this
Law
,
and
wicked
Kings
,
if
they
were
wise
,
would
render
thanks
to
the
Law
giver
,
who
hath
ordained
what
he
understood
would
not
be
pro●●table
for
them
,
nor
to
be
Lawfull
for
them
to
do
.
Which
indeed
they
will
not
do
,
if
so
be
they
shall
once
returne
again
to
their
right
mind
.
Even
as
they
who
are
restored
to
health
do
render
thanks
to
their
Physician
,
whom
before
they
had
hated
,
because
he
would
not
grant
their
desires
whilst
they
were
sick
.
But
if
Kings
continue
in
their
madness
,
who
ever
doth
most
obey
them
,
is
to
be
judged
their
greatest
enemy
.
Of
this
sort
are
flatterers
,
who
by
flattering
their
vices
do
cherish
and
increase
their
disease
,
and
at
last
together
almost
with
Kings
are
utterly
ruined
.
M.
I
cannot
indeed
deny
,
but
that
such
Princes
have
been
&
may
be
restrained
by
Law-bonds
.
For
there
is
no
monster
more
violent
and
more
pestiferous
than
man
,
when
(
as
it
is
in
the
Poets
fables
)
he
is
once
degenerat
into
a
beast
.
B.
You
would
much
more
say
so
,
if
you
consider
how
many
wayes
a
man
becomes
a
beast
,
and
of
how
many
severall
monsters
he
is
made
.
Which
thing
the
old
Poets
did
acuely
observe
and
notably
express
,
when
they
say
that
Prometheus
in
the
framing
of
man
did
give
him
some
particle
out
of
every
living
creature
.
It
would
be
an
infinite
work
for
me
to
relate
the
natures
of
all
one
by
one
.
But
certainly
two
most
vile
monsters
do
evidently
appear
in
man
,
wrath
and
lust
.
But
what
else
do
Lawes
act
or
desire
,
but
that
these
monsters
be
obedient
to
right
reason
?
and
whilst
they
do
not
obey
reason
,
may
not
Lawes
by
the
bonds
of
their
sanctions
restrain
them
?
who
ever
the●
doth
loose
a
King
or
any
other
from
these
bonds
doth
not
loose
one
man
,
but
throwes
in
against
reason
two
monsters
exceeding
cruell
and
armeth
them
for
breaking
asunder
the
barrs
of
Lawes
:
so
that
Aristotle
seemeth
to
have
rightly
and
truely
said
,
that
he
who
obeyeth
the
Law
,
doth
obey
both
God
and
the
Law
:
but
he
that
obeyeth
the
King
,
doth
obey
both
a
man
and
a
beast
.
M.
Albeit
the●se
things
seeme
to
be
said
appositely
enough
yet
I
think
we
are
in
a
mistake
two
wayes
▪
First
,
because
the
last
things
we
have
spoken
seem
not
to
agree
well
enough
with
the
first
▪
Next
,
because
,
as
we
may
well
know
w●
seem
not
to
have
yet
come
to
the
main
poin●
of
our
debate
.
For
a
litle
before
we
were
a●
agreement
that
the
voice
of
the
King
and
Law
ought
to
be
the
same
,
here
again
we
make
him
Subject
to
the
Lawes
.
Now
though
we
grant
this
to
be
very
true
,
what
have
we
gaine●
by
this
conclusion
?
for
who
shall
call
to
a●
account
a
King
become
a
Tyrant
?
for
I
fear
priviledge
without
strength
will
not
be
po●werfull
enough
to
restrain
a
King
forgetfu●●
of
his
duty
,
and
unwilling
to
be
drawn
unt●
judgment
,
to
answer
for
maladministration
.
B.
I
fear
ye
have
not
well
pondered
what
we
have
before
debated
concerning
the
royall
power
.
For
if
ye
had
well
considered
it
,
you
had
easily
understood
what
you
now
have
said
,
that
betwixt
them
there
is
no
contradiction
.
But
that
you
may
the
more
easily
take
it
up
,
first
answer
we
,
when
a
Magistrat
or
clerk
doth
utter
the
words
of
a
proclamation
before
an
Herauld
.
Is
not
the
voice
of
both
one
and
the
same
?
I
say
of
an
herauld
and
of
a
clerk
?
M.
It
is
the
same
indeed
.
B.
Which
of
the
two
seeme
greatest
?
M.
He
who
first
doth
utter
the
words
.
B.
What
is
the
King
who
is
the
Author
of
the
Edict
.
M.
Greater
than
both
.
B.
Then
according
to
this
similitude
let
us
set
down
the
King
,
the
Law
,
and
the
people
.
The
voice
is
the
same
both
of
King
and
Law.
Which
of
the
two
hath
the
authority
from
the
other
?
The
King
from
the
Law
,
or
the
Law
from
the
King
?
M.
The
King
from
the
Law.
B.
From
whence
collect
you
that
?
M.
Because
the
King
was
not
sought
for
to
restrain
the
Law
,
but
the
Law
to
restrain
the
King.
And
from
the
Law
he
hath
that
,
whereby
he
is
a
King
,
for
without
the
Law
he
would
be
a
Tyrant
.
B.
The
Law
then
is
more
powerfull
than
the
King
:
and
is
as
a
Governess
,
and
moderatrix
both
of
his
lust
and
actions
.
M.
That
is
already
granted
.
B.
What
?
Is
not
the
voice
of
the
people
and
the
Law
the
same
?
M.
The
very
same
.
B.
Which
of
the
two
is
most
powerfull
,
the
people
or
the
Law
?
M.
I
think
,
the
whole
people
.
B.
Why
do
you
think
so
?
M.
Because
the
people
is
as
it
were
the
parent
of
the
Law
,
certainly
the
Author
thereof
,
they
being
able
to
make
or
abrogat
it
,
as
they
please
.
B.
Seeing
then
the
Law
is
more
powerfull
than
the
King
,
and
the
people
more
powerfull
than
the
Law
,
we
must
see
before
which
we
may
call
the
King
to
answer
in
judgment
.
Let
us
also
discuss
this
.
Are
not
the
things
which
for
some
others
sake
are
institute
,
of
less
account
than
those
for
whose
sake
they
are
required
or
sought
?
M.
I
would
have
that
more
clearly
explained
.
B.
Follow
me
thus
;
is
not
a
bridle
made
for
the
horse
sake
?
M.
It
is
so
.
B.
Are
not
sadless
,
girdings
and
spurrs
made
for
horses
?
M.
They
are
.
B.
Now
if
there
were
no
horse
,
there
should
be
no
use
of
such
things
.
M.
None
at
all
.
B.
A
horse
is
then
better
than
all
these
.
M.
Why
not
?
B.
Why
?
a
horse
,
for
what
use
is
he
desired
?
M.
For
very
many
uses
,
and
first
of
all
for
obtaining
victory
in
war.
B.
We
therefore
do
esteeme
the
victory
to
be
of
more
worth
than
horses
,
armes
and
other
things
,
which
are
prepared
for
the
use
of
war.
M.
Of
more
worth
indeed
it
is
.
B.
What
did
men
especially
regard
in
creating
a
King
?
M.
The
peoples
good
,
as
I
suppose
.
B.
But
would
there
be
no
need
of
Kings
,
if
there
were
no
socities
of
men
?
M.
None
at
all
.
B.
The
people
then
is
better
than
the
King.
M.
It
must
needs
be
so
.
B.
If
the
people
to
better
,
they
are
also
greater
.
When
a
King
then
is
called
to
judgment
before
a
people
,
the
lesser
is
called
in
to
judgment
before
the
greater
.
M.
But
when
shall
we
hope
for
that
happiness
,
that
the
whole
people
agree
unto
that
which
is
right
.
B.
That
indeed
is
scarce
to
be
hoped
for
.
And
to
expect
it
,
is
certainly
needless
:
otherwise
a
Law
could
neither
be
made
,
nor
a
Magistrat
created
.
For
neither
is
almost
any
Law
alike
to
all
,
nor
is
there
almost
any
man
in
that
popular
favour
,
so
as
to
have
no
man
either
an
enemy
to
him
,
or
envious
or
slanderer
of
him
;
this
now
is
desired
,
that
the
Law
be
usefull
for
the
greatest
part
,
and
that
the
greatest
part
have
a
good
opinion
of
him
that
is
to
be
chosen
.
What
if
the
greatest
part
of
the
people
may
enjoyne
a
Law
to
be
made
,
and
creat
a
Magistrat
,
what
doth
hinder
,
but
that
they
also
may
judge
him
,
and
appoint
judges
over
him
?
Or
if
the
Tribunes
of
the
people
of
Rome
,
and
the
Lacedemonian
Ephori
were
sought
to
modify
the
power
of
Magistracy
,
should
it
seeme
unjust
to
any
man
,
if
a
free
people
,
either
upon
the
like
or
different
account
,
did
foresee
their
own
good
in
suppressing
the
bitterness
of
Tyranny
?
M.
Now
I
seeme
almost
to
preceive
what
a
people
can
do
:
but
it
is
a
matter
of
difficulty
to
judge
what
they
will
do
,
or
appoint
to
be
done
.
For
the
greatest
part
almost
doth
require
old
and
usuall
customes
,
and
hateth
novelty
,
which
the
rather
is
to
be
admired
,
seeing
there
is
so
great
an
inconstancy
in
meat
,
apparell
,
buildings
,
and
in
all
houshold
furniture
.
B.
Do
not
think
that
these
things
are
spoken
by
me
,
that
I
would
have
any
new
thing
in
this
Kind
to
be
done
,
but
that
I
might
shew
you
it
hath
been
of
old
,
that
a
King
should
answer
in
judgment
before
Judges
,
which
you
did
believe
to
be
almost
incredible
,
or
at
least
a
novelty
.
For
to
pass
over
,
how
often
it
hath
been
done
by
our
Ancestors
,
as
partly
before
we
have
said
,
and
you
may
also
easily
collect
from
history
;
did
you
never
hear
of
those
who
contended
for
the
Kingdome
to
have
appealed
to
Arbiters
?
M.
I
have
indeed
heard
it
to
have
been
sometimes
done
amongst
the
Persians
.
B.
And
our
writers
affirme
that
the
same
was
done
by
Grimas
and
Milcolumbus
.
But
lest
you
alleadge
that
that
Kind
of
Arbiters
were
wount
to
be
assumed
by
the
Contenders
own
consent
,
let
us
come
to
the
ordinary
Judges
.
M.
Here
I
am
afraid
you
may
as
far
prevail
,
as
if
a
man
should
spread
nets
in
the
sea
to
catch
whales
.
B.
Why
so
,
I
pray
you
?
M.
Because
all
apprehending
,
restraint
,
and
punishment
is
carryed
on
by
the
more
powerfull
against
the
weaker
.
But
before
what
judges
will
you
command
a
King
to
compear
?
Before
them
over
whom
he
hath
the
supream
power
to
judge
?
whom
he
can
compesce
by
this
one
word
,
I
Forbid
;
B.
What
if
some
greater
power
be
found
which
hath
that
right
priviledge
or
jurisdiction
over
Kings
,
which
Kings
have
over
others
?
M.
I
desire
to
hear
that
.
B.
We
told
you
,
if
you
remember
,
that
this
power
is
in
the
people
.
M.
In
the
whole
people
indeed
,
or
in
the
greatest
part
thereof
.
I
also
yeeld
thus
further
,
that
it
is
in
those
to
whom
the
people
,
or
the
greatest
part
of
them
shall
transmit
that
power
.
B.
You
do
well
,
in
holding
in
my
pains
.
M.
But
you
know
that
the
greatest
part
of
the
people
is
corrupted
either
through
fear
,
or
reward
,
or
through
some
hope
of
a
bribe
and
impunity
,
so
as
they
preferre
their
own
benefit
and
pleasures
or
lusts
to
the
publick
utility
,
and
also
safety
.
Now
there
are
very
few
who
are
not
hereby
moved
:
according
to
that
of
the
Poet.
Good
people
are
indeed
rare
,
scarce
so
many
in
number
,
as
there
be
gates
in
Thebes
,
or
issues
of
the
River
Nilus
.
Now
all
the
rest
being
a
naughty
rable
fatned
with
blood
and
rapine
enjoy
their
venal
liberty
,
and
envy
the
liberty
of
others
.
Now
that
I
may
pass
from
those
with
whom
the
name
of
wicked
Kings
also
is
sacred
.
I
also
omit
those
,
who
,
albeit
they
are
not
ignorant
what
is
Lawfull
and
just
or
right
,
yet
preferre
a
quiet
slougfulness
to
honest
hazards
,
and
hesitating
in
their
minds
do
frame
their
consultations
on
the
expectation
of
the
event
:
or
follow
the
good
fortune
of
either
party
▪
but
not
the
cause
.
How
great
this
multitude
will
be
,
you
see
.
B.
Great
indeed
:
but
yet
not
very
great
.
For
the
wrong
of
Tyrants
may
reach
many
,
but
their
good
deeds
very
few
.
For
the
advarice
of
the
vulgar
is
insatiable
,
as
a
fire
is
the
more
vehemently
kindled
by
adding
few
all
thereto
!
But
what
is
by
force
taken
away
from
many
,
doth
rather
increase
the
hunger
of
some
few
,
than
satiat
their
lust
.
And
further
the
fidelity
of
such
men
for
the
most
part
is
unstable
.
As
saith
the
Poet.
Fidelity
doth
stand
and
fall
with
fortune
.
But
if
they
would
also
continue
firme
in
their
judgment
,
they
should
not
be
accounted
in
the
number
of
good
subjects
,
for
they
are
the
violators
,
or
rather
betrayers
of
humane
society
:
which
vice
if
not
sufferable
in
a
King
,
is
far
less
tolerable
in
a
private
person
.
Who
then
are
to
be
accounted
the
right
subjects
?
they
who
give
obedience
to
the
Lawes
,
maintain
and
defend
humane
society
,
who
rather
undergo
all
paines
and
Labours
,
and
all
hazards
for
common
safety
,
than
spend
their
time
sluggishly
in
idleness
void
of
all
honesty
?
who
set
before
their
eyes
not
their
present
enjoyments
,
but
the
remembrance
of
eternity
.
But
if
there
be
any
whom
fear
and
self
interest
recall
from
hazards
,
yet
the
splendor
of
some
notable
atchievment
,
and
the
beauty
of
vertue
will
raise
up
dejected
minds
:
and
those
who
dare
not
be
Authors
or
Leaders
,
will
not
decline
to
become
associats
.
If
therefore
subjects
be
reckoned
,
not
by
number
,
but
by
dignity
and
worth
,
not
only
the
better
part
,
but
also
the
greater
part
will
stand
for
their
liberty
,
honesty
and
safety
.
But
if
the
whole
common
people
dissent
,
this
sayes
nothing
to
our
present
debate
:
for
we
demand
not
what
is
to
be
done
,
but
what
may
Lawfully
be
done
.
But
now
let
us
come
to
the
ordinary
judiciall
sentences
:
M
:
That
I
just
now
look
for
.
B
:
If
any
private
man
contend
that
his
inheritance
,
or
some
part
of
his
land
is
unjustly
detained
by
the
King
,
what
do
you
think
should
this
privat
man
do
?
shall
he
pass
from
his
land
,
because
he
cannot
set
a
judge
over
the
King
?
M
:
Not
at
all
,
but
he
may
command
not
the
King
,
but
his
proxy
to
compear
in
judgment
.
B
:
Now
see
what
strength
that
refuge
hath
whereof
you
make
use
.
For
it
is
all
one
to
me
,
whether
the
King
compear
,
or
his
proxy
,
or
Advocat
,
for
both
wayes
,
the
litis-contestation
will
redound
to
the
Kings
loss
:
the
dammage
or
gain
will
redound
to
him
not
to
his
Advocat
by
the
event
of
the
sentence
.
In
end
he
is
found
guilty
,
that
is
,
he
whose
cause
is
agitat
.
Now
I
would
have
you
consider
not
only
how
absurd
it
is
,
but
also
unjust
to
pass
sentence
against
a
King
for
a
perty
inheritance
for
lights
in
a
house
,
or
for
ease
droppings
thereof
,
and
no
sentence
to
be
past
for
parricide
,
witchcraft
,
or
treason
.
To
make
use
of
the
severity
of
the
Law
in
lesser
matters
,
and
the
greatest
licence
and
impunity
to
be
permitted
in
the
greatest
crimes
.
So
that
that
old
proverb
seemes
plainly
true
,
Lawes
are
very
like
spiders
webs
,
which
hold
flies
fast
,
but
let
bigger
beasts
pass
through
,
Nor
is
that
complaint
and
indignation
of
some
just
,
who
say
that
it
is
neither
honest
nor
equitable
,
that
judgment
should
pass
against
a
King
by
a
man
of
an
inferrour
rank
,
seeing
they
see
it
received
and
admitted
in
debate
about
money
or
land
;
and
the
greatest
peers
next
to
the
King
for
the
most
part
compear
before
the
Judges
,
who
are
inferiour
to
them
in
riches
,
nobility
,
and
valour
.
And
not
much
above
the
vulgar
rank
:
and
far
more
below
the
guilty
,
than
the
greatest
Peers
are
below
Kings
.
Nor
yet
for
all
this
do
these
Noble
men
,
or
Peers
think
it
any
derogation
to
their
dignity
.
Now
if
we
shall
once
admit
this
,
that
no
man
can
be
sisted
before
a
judge
,
unless
the
judge
be
every
way
superior
to
the
person
arraigned
,
the
inferiour
rank
must
attend
and
wait
on
untill
the
King
either
please
,
or
be
at
leisure
,
to
cognosce
concerning
the
guilty
noble
man
,
but
what
if
their
complaint
be
not
only
unjust
,
but
also
false
?
For
no
man
coming
before
a
judge
doth
come
before
an
Inferiour
person
,
especially
seeing
so
great
an
honour
is
by
God
himself
conferred
upon
the
order
of
Judges
,
that
he
calleth
them
not
only
Kings
but
also
Gods
,
and
as
much
as
can
be
,
doth
communicat
to
them
his
own
dignity
.
Therefore
those
Roman
Popes
,
who
did
graciously
indulge
Kings
to
kiss
their
feet
,
who
did
send
for
honours
sake
to
such
as
came
to
meet
them
,
their
mules
,
who
did
tread
upon
the
neeks
of
Emperours
,
being
called
to
answer
in
judgment
,
did
obey
,
and
being
compelled
by
judges
renounced
their
Popedome
.
John
the
twenty
second
being
from
flight
brought
back
,
was
thrust
into
prison
,
and
scarce
at
last
relieved
by
money
,
and
submitted
to
him
that
was
put
into
his
place
,
and
therefore
he
did
approve
the
sentence
of
the
Judges
.
What
did
the
Synode
of
Basile
▪
did
it
not
appoint
and
ordain
by
the
common
consent
of
all
the
members
thereof
,
that
the
Pope
is
subject
to
the
Councill
of
Priests
.
Now
these
fathers
were
perswaded
upon
what
account
they
did
so
,
which
you
may
find
out
of
the
Acts
of
these
Councills
.
Kings
then
who
confess
the
Majesty
of
Popes
to
be
so
far
above
them
,
as
that
it
doth
overshadow
them
all
with
the
top
of
its
celsitude
,
I
know
not
how
they
think
therein
their
dignity
to
be
diminished
,
wherein
the
Pope
did
not
think
he
was
disparaged
to
descend
from
so
high
athrone
,
namely
to
stand
to
the
judgment
and
sentence
of
the
Cardinals
:
hereby
you
may
see
how
falce
their
complaint
is
,
who
disdain
to
be
arraigned
at
the
bar
of
an
Inferiour
judge
,
for
it
is
not
Titius
,
Sempronius
,
or
Stichus
that
doth
in
a
judiciary
way
condemne
and
assoile
,
but
the
Law
,
to
which
Kings
should
yeeld
obedience
.
The
most
famous
Emperours
Theodosius
and
Valentinianus
accounted
honourable
.
I
shall
here
set
down
their
own
words
,
because
they
deserve
the
memory
of
all
ages
.
It
is
(
say
they
)
a
word
well
beseeming
the
Majesty
of
a
King
to
confess
he
is
a
Prince
tyed
to
the
Lawes
.
And
we
declare
that
it
is
more
to
submit
a
principality
to
the
Lawes
than
to
enjoy
an
Empire
.
And
what
we
now
declare
by
this
our
edict
,
we
will
not
suffer
to
be
infringed
.
These
things
the
very
best
Princes
judged
right
and
by
Law
established
,
and
some
of
the
worst
see
the
same
.
For
Nero
being
apparelled
in
the
dress
of
Harpers
,
is
said
to
have
not
only
observed
their
carriage
and
motions
,
but
also
when
it
came
to
be
judged
who
had
done
best
,
that
he
stood
solicitous
betwixt
hope
and
fear
for
the
victory
.
For
albeit
he
knew
he
would
be
declared
victor
,
yet
he
thought
the
victory
would
be
the
more
honest
,
if
he
should
obtain
it
,
not
by
the
flattery
of
the
judges
,
but
by
due
debate
:
and
he
thought
the
observation
of
the
Law
did
contribute
not
for
the
diminution
of
his
authority
,
but
for
the
splendor
of
the
victory
.
M
:
Your
discourse
,
I
perceive
,
is
not
so
insolent
,
as
at
first
I
took
it
,
when
you
said
,
you
would
have
Kings
obedient
to
the
Lawes
:
for
it
is
not
so
much
founded
upon
the
authority
of
Philosophers
,
as
of
Kings
,
Emperours
and
Councils
of
the
Church
.
M
:
But
I
do
not
well
understand
that
you
say
,
it
is
not
man
but
the
Law
that
judgeth
.
B
:
Call
to
mind
what
was
said
a
little
before
:
did
we
not
say
,
that
the
voice
of
the
King
and
of
the
Law
is
the
same
?
M
:
We
did
so
.
B
:
What
the
voice
of
the
Clerk
,
and
Herauld
is
,
when
the
Law
is
published
?
M
:
The
very
same
.
B
:
But
which
of
the
two
hath
the
authority
from
the
other
,
whether
the
judge
from
the
Law
,
or
the
Law
from
the
judge
?
M
:
The
judge
from
the
Law.
B
:
The
strength
of
the
sentence
is
then
from
the
Law
,
and
the
pronunciation
of
the
words
of
the
Law
is
alone
the
judges
.
M
:
It
seemes
so
.
B
:
Yea
,
there
is
nothing
more
certain
,
for
the
the
sentences
of
judges
pronounced
according
to
the
Law
are
ratified
,
else
they
are
reseinded
.
M
:
There
is
nothing
more
true
than
that
.
B
:
You
see
then
that
the
judges
authority
is
from
the
Law
,
and
not
the
Lawes
authority
from
the
judge
.
M
:
I
see
it
is
so
.
B
:
The
Low
and
mean
condition
of
him
that
proclaimeth
the
Law
doth
not
diminish
the
dignity
thereof
,
but
the
dignity
of
the
Lawes
is
still
the
same
,
whether
the
King
,
a
Judge
,
or
an
Herauld
proclame
it
.
M
:
It
is
so
indeed
.
B.
The
Law
then
being
once
established
,
is
first
the
voice
of
the
King
and
then
of
others
.
M
:
It
is
so
.
B
:
Whilst
then
the
King
is
condemned
by
a
Judge
,
he
seemes
to
be
condemned
by
the
Law.
M
:
That
is
very
clear
.
B
:
If
by
the
Law
,
then
he
is
condemned
by
his
own
voice
,
as
seemes
,
no
less
than
if
it
were
written
with
his
own
hand
.
B
:
Why
then
do
we
so
much
weary
our selves
concerning
a
judge
,
seeing
we
have
the
Kings
own
confession
,
that
is
to
say
,
the
Law
?
Let
us
also
consider
this
,
which
is
but
presently
come
into
my
minde
.
When
a
King
in
what
cause
soever
doth
sit
in
judgment
as
a
judge
,
should
he
not
lay
aside
the
person
of
all
others
,
and
to
have
no
respect
to
brother
,
Kinsman
,
friend
or
foe
,
but
retain
only
the
person
of
a
judge
?
M
:
He
ought
so
to
do
.
B
:
Ought
he
not
to
remember
that
person
only
,
whose
proper
act
it
is
he
is
about
.
M
:
I
would
have
you
tell
me
that
more
clearly
.
B
:
Take
heed
then
:
when
any
man
doth
secretly
take
away
another
mans
goods
,
what
do
we
say
he
hath
done
?
M
:
I
think
,
he
hath
stollen
them
.
B
:
How
do
you
call
him
for
this
deed
?
M
:
A
Thief
.
B
:
How
do
you
say
he
hath
done
,
who
makes
use
of
his
neighbours
wise
,
as
him
own
?
M
:
We
say
he
hath
committed
adultery
.
B
:
How
shall
we
call
him
?
M
:
An
Adulterer
.
B.
How
do
we
call
him
that
judgeth
?
M
:
A
Judge
.
B.
To
others
also
after
this
manner
from
the
actions
they
are
about
,
names
may
berightly
give
.
M.
They
may
.
B
:
When
a
King
then
is
to
pass
a
sentence
,
he
is
to
lay
aside
all
other
persons
.
M
:
Indeed
he
should
,
especially
those
that
may
prejudge
either
of
the
parties
in
judging
.
B
:
How
do
you
call
him
against
whom
the
sentence
is
past
,
from
that
act
of
judgment
?
M
:
We
may
call
him
,
guilty
.
B
:
And
is
it
not
equitable
that
a
judge
lay
aside
such
persons
as
may
prejudge
the
sentence
?
M
:
certainly
he
should
,
if
so
be
,
such
persons
be
more
regarded
than
the
cause
:
yet
such
persons
pertain
not
to
a
judge
.
Seeing
God
will
have
no
respect
to
be
had
to
the
poor
in
judgment
.
B
:
If
then
any
man
,
who
is
a
painter
or
a
Grammarian
debate
before
a
judge
concerning
the
art
of
painting
against
a
painter
,
he
is
not
a
Grammarian
,
for
the
science
of
grammer
should
not
herein
availe
him
.
M
:
Nothing
at
all
.
B
:
Nor
the
art
of
painting
availe
the
other
,
if
the
debate
be
concerning
Grammer
.
M
:
Not
a
white
more
.
B
:
A
judge
then
in
judgment
must
acknowledge
but
one
name
,
to
wit
,
of
the
Crime
,
or
guilt
,
whereof
the
Adversary
or
plaintife
doth
accuse
his
party
or
defendant
to
be
guilty
.
M
:
No
more
.
B
:
What
if
a
King
be
guilty
of
parricide
,
hath
he
the
name
of
a
King
,
and
what
ever
doth
belong
to
a
judge
?
M
:
Nothing
at
all
,
but
only
of
a
parricide
,
for
he
commeth
not
into
controversy
concerning
his
Kingdome
,
but
concerning
his
parricide
.
B
:
What
if
two
parricides
be
called
to
answer
in
judgment
,
the
one
a
King
,
and
the
other
a
poor
fellow
,
shall
not
there
be
a
like
way
of
procedure
by
the
judge
of
both
?
M
:
The
very
same
with
both
,
so
that
I
think
that
of
Lucan
is
no
less
true
than
elegantly
spoken
.
Viz
Cesar
was
both
my
leader
and
fellow
in
passing
over
the
Rhine
.
Whom
a
malefice
doth
make
guilty
,
it
maketh
alike
.
B
:
True
indeed
.
The
process
then
is
not
here
carried
on
against
a
King
and
a
poor
man
,
but
against
their
parricides
:
For
then
the
process
should
be
led
on
concerning
the
King
,
if
it
should
be
asked
which
of
the
two
ought
to
be
King
:
Or
if
it
come
into
question
,
whether
Hiero
be
King
or
a
Tyrant
,
or
if
any
other
thing
come
into
question
which
doth
properly
belong
to
the
Kings
function
.
Even
as
if
the
sentence
be
concerning
a
painter
,
when
it
is
demanded
,
hath
he
skill
in
the
art
of
painting
.
M
:
What
if
a
King
will
not
willingly
compear
,
nor
by
force
can
be
compelled
to
compear
.
B
:
Then
the
case
is
common
with
him
as
with
all
other
flagitious
persons
.
For
no
Thief
or
warlock
will
willingly
compear
before
a
judge
to
be
judged
.
But
I
suppose
,
you
know
,
what
the
Law
doth
permit
,
namely
to
kill
any
way
a
thief
stealing
by
neight
,
and
also
to
kill
him
if
he
defend
himself
when
stealing
by
day
.
But
if
he
cannot
be
drawn
to
compear
to
answer
but
by
force
,
you
remember
what
is
usually
done
For
we
pursue
by
force
and
armes
such
robbers
as
are
more
powerfull
than
that
by
Law
they
can
be
reached
.
Nor
is
there
almost
any
other
cause
of
all
the
warres
betwixt
Nations
people
and
Kings
than
those
injuries
which
,
whilst
they
cannot
be
determined
by
justice
,
are
by
armes
decided
.
M
:
Against
enemes
indeed
for
these
causes
warres
use
to
be
carried
on
,
but
the
case
is
far
otherwise
with
Kings
,
to
whom
by
a
most
sacred
oath
interposed
we
are
bound
to
give
obedience
.
B
:
We
are
indeed
bound
:
but
they
do
first
promise
that
they
shall
rule
in
equity
and
justice
.
M
:
It
is
so
.
B
:
There
is
then
a
mutuall
paction
betwixt
the
King
and
his
subjects
.
M
:
It
seemes
so
.
B
:
Doth
not
he
who
first
recedes
from
what
is
covenanted
,
and
doth
contrary
to
what
he
hath
covenanted
to
do
,
break
the
contract
and
covenant
?
M
:
He
doth
.
B
:
The
bond
then
being
loosed
,
which
did
hold
fast
the
King
with
the
people
,
what
ever
priviledge
or
right
did
belong
to
him
,
by
that
agreement
and
covenant
who
looseth
the
same
,
I
suppose
is
lost
.
M
:
It
is
lost
.
B
:
He
then
with
whom
the
Covenant
was
made
becometh
as
free
as
ever
he
was
before
the
stipulation
.
M
:
He
doth
clearly
enjoy
the
same
priviledge
,
&
the
same
liberty
.
B
:
Now
if
a
King
do
those
things
which
are
directly
for
the
dissolution
of
society
,
for
the
continuance
where
of
he
was
created
,
how
do
we
call
him
?
M
:
A
Tyrant
,
I
suppose
.
B
:
Now
a
Tyrant
hath
not
only
no
just
authority
over
a
people
,
but
is
also
thier
enemy
.
M
:
He
is
indeed
an
enemy
.
B
:
Is
there
not
a
just
and
Lawfull
war
wich
an
enemy
for
grievous
and
intolerable
injuries
?
M
:
It
is
for
sooth
a
just
war.
B
:
What
war
is
that
which
is
carried
on
with
him
who
is
the
enemy
of
all
mankind
,
that
is
,
a
Tyrant
?
M
:
A
most
just
war.
B
:
Now
a
Lawfull
war
being
once
undertaken
wich
an
enemy
,
and
for
a
just
cause
,
it
is
Lawfull
not
only
for
the
whole
people
to
kill
that
enemy
,
but
for
every
one
of
them
.
M
:
I
confess
that
.
B
:
May
not
every
one
out
of
the
whole
maltitude
of
mankind
assault
with
all
the
calamities
of
war
,
a
Tyrant
who
is
a
publick
enemy
,
with
whom
all
good
men
have
a
perpetuall
warfare
.
M
:
I
perceive
all
Nations
almost
to
have
been
of
that
opinion
For
Thebe
is
usually
commended
for
killing
her
husband
,
Timoleon
for
killing
his
brother
,
and
Cassius
for
killing
his
Son
:
and
Ful
vius
for
killing
his
own
son
going
to
Catiline
,
and
Brutus
for
killing
his
own
sons
and
kinsmen
,
having
understood
they
had
conspired
to
introduce
Tyranny
again
:
and
publick
rewards
were
appointed
to
be
given
,
and
honours
appointed
by
severall
Cities
of
greece
to
those
that
should
kill
Tyrants
.
So
that
(
as
is
before
said
)
they
thought
there
was
no
bond
of
humanity
to
be
kept
with
Tyrants
.
But
why
do
I
collect
the
assent
of
some
single
persons
,
since
I
can
produce
the
testimony
almost
of
the
whole
world
?
For
who
▪
doth
not
sharply
rebuke
Domitius
Corbulo
,
for
neglecting
the
safety
of
mankind
,
who
did
not
thrust
Nero
out
of
his
Empire
,
when
he
might
very
easily
have
done
it
?
And
not
only
was
he
by
the
Romans
reprehended
,
but
by
Tyridates
the
Persian
King
,
being
not
at
all
afraid
,
lest
it
should
afterward
befall
an
example
unto
himself
.
But
the
minds
of
most
wicked
men
enraged
wich
cruelty
are
not
so
void
of
this
publick
hatred
against
Tyrants
,
but
that
sometimes
it
breaketh
out
in
them
against
their
will
,
and
forceth
them
to
stand
amazed
with
terrour
at
the
sight
of
such
a
just
and
Lawfull
deed
.
When
the
Ministers
of
Casus
Caligula
a
most
cruel
Tyrant
were
with
the
like
cruelty
tumultuating
,
for
the
slaughter
of
thier
Lord
and
Master
,
and
required
those
that
had
killed
him
to
be
punished
,
now
and
then
crying
aloud
,
who
had
killed
the
Emper
,
our
:
Valerius
Asiaticus
one
of
the
Senators
standing
in
an
eminent
high
place
from
whence
he
might
be
heard
,
cryed
out
aloud
:
I
wish
I
had
killed
him
.
At
which
word
these
tumultuary
persons
void
of
all
humanity
stood
as
it
were
astonished
,
and
so
fore
bore
any
more
to
cry
out
tumultuously
.
For
there
is
so
great
force
in
an
honest
deed
,
that
the
very
lightest
shew
there
of
,
being
presented
to
the
minds
of
men
,
the
most
violent
assaults
are
allayed
,
and
fierce
fury
doth
languish
,
and
madness
nill
it
will
it
doth
acknowledge
the
soveraignty
of
reason
.
Neither
are
they
of
another
judgment
,
who
with
their
loud
cryes
mixe
heaven
and
earth
together
.
Now
this
we
do
easily
understand
either
from
hence
,
that
they
do
reprehend
what
now
is
done
,
but
do
commend
and
approve
the
same
seemingly
more
atrocious
,
when
they
are
recorded
in
an
old
history
:
and
thereby
do
evidently
demonstrat
(
that
they
are
more
obsequious
to
their
own
particular
affections
,
than
moved
by
any
publick
dammage
.
But
why
do
we
seek
a
more
certain
witness
what
Tyrants
do
deserve
,
than
their
own
Conscience
?
thence
is
that
perpetuall
fear
from
all
,
and
chiefly
from
good
men
:
and
they
do
constantly
see
hanging
above
their
own
necks
the
sword
which
they
hold
still
drawn
against
others
,
and
by
their
own
hatred
against
others
they
measure
other
mens
minds
against
them
.
But
contrariwise
good
men
,
by
fearing
no
man
do
often
procure
their
own
hazard
,
whilst
they
weigh
the
good
will
of
others
towards
them
,
not
from
the
vicious
nature
of
men
,
but
from
their
own
desert
towards
others
.
B
:
You
do
then
judge
that
to
be
true
,
that
Tyrants
are
to
be
reckoned
in
the
number
of
the
most
cruell
brute
beasts
;
and
that
Tyrannicall
violence
is
more
unnatuall
than
poverty
,
sickness
,
death
,
and
other
miseries
which
may
befall
men
naturally
.
M
:
Indeed
when
I
do
ponder
the
weight
of
your
reasons
,
I
cannot
deny
,
but
these
things
are
true
.
But
whilst
hazards
and
in
conveniences
do
occurre
,
which
follow
on
the
back
of
this
opinion
,
my
mind
as
it
were
tyed
up
with
a
bridle
,
doth
instantly
I
know
not
how
,
faile
me
,
and
bendeth
from
that
too
stoicall
and
severe
right
way
towards
utility
,
&
almost
falleth
away
.
For
if
it
shall
be
lawfull
for
any
man
to
kill
a
Tyrant
,
see
how
great
a
gape
you
do
open
for
wicked
men
to
commit
any
mischief
,
and
how
great
hazard
you
creat
to
good
men
:
to
wicked
men
you
permit
licentiousness
,
and
le
ts
out
upon
all
the
perturbation
of
all
things
.
For
he
that
shall
kill
a
good
King
,
or
at
least
none
of
the
worst
,
may
he
not
pretend
by
his
wicked
deed
some
shew
of
honest
and
Lawfull
duty
?
or
if
any
good
Subject
shall
in
vain
attempt
to
kill
a
Prince
worthy
of
all
punishment
,
or
accomplish
what
he
intended
to
do
,
how
great
a
confusion
of
all
things
do
you
suppose
most
needs
follow
there
upon
?
Whilst
the
wicked
do
tumultuat
,
raging
that
their
head
and
leader
is
taken
away
from
them
,
neither
will
all
good
men
approve
the
deed
,
nor
will
all
those
who
do
approve
,
the
deed
,
defend
the
doer
and
author
of
their
liberty
against
a
wicked
crew
.
And
many
under
an
honest
pretext
of
peace
will
vaile
their
own
laziness
,
or
rather
calumniat
the
vertue
of
others
,
than
confess
their
own
slothfulness
.
Surely
this
remembrance
of
self
interest
,
and
excuse
of
leaving
the
publick
cause
,
and
the
fear
of
dangers
,
if
it
doth
not
break
the
courage
,
yet
it
weakneth
the
same
,
and
compelleth
it
to
preferre
tranquillity
,
albeit
not
very
sure
,
to
an
uncertain
expectation
of
liberty
.
B
:
If
you
well
remember
what
is
before
spoken
,
this
your
fear
will
be
easily
discussed
.
For
we
told
you
that
there
be
some
Tyrannies
allowed
by
the
free
suffrages
of
a
people
,
which
we
do
honour
with
royall
titles
,
because
of
the
moderat
administration
.
No
man
,
with
my
will
,
shall
put
violent
hand
on
any
such
,
nor
yet
on
any
of
those
,
who
even
by
force
or
fraud
have
acquired
soveraignty
,
providing
they
use
a
moderat
way
in
their
government
.
Such
amongst
the
Romans
were
Vespasianus
,
Titus
,
Pertinax
;
Alexander
amongst
the
Grecians
,
and
Hiero
in
Syracusa
.
Who
albeit
they
obtained
the
Government
by
force
and
armes
,
yet
by
their
justice
and
equity
deserved
to
be
reckoned
amongst
just
Kings
,
Besides
,
I
do
only
shew
what
may
be
Lawfully
done
,
or
ought
to
be
done
in
this
case
,
but
do
not
exhort
to
attempt
any
such
thing
.
For
in
the
first
a
due
consideration
of
the
case
,
and
a
clear
explanation
thereof
is
sufficient
:
but
in
the
last
there
is
need
of
good
counsell
in
undertaking
,
of
prudence
in
assaulting
,
and
courage
in
acting
.
Now
seeing
these
things
are
either
promoved
or
overturned
by
the
circumstances
of
time
,
person
,
place
,
and
other
instruments
in
carrying
on
the
business
:
if
any
shall
rashly
attempt
this
,
the
blame
of
his
fault
can
be
no
more
imputed
to
me
,
than
his
fault
to
a
Physician
,
who
hath
duely
described
the
remedies
of
diseases
,
but
were
given
by
another
to
the
patient
unseasonably
.
M
:
One
thing
seemes
yet
to
be
wanting
to
put
an
end
to
this
dispute
which
if
you
shall
add
,
I
shall
think
I
have
received
a
very
singular
Kindness
of
you
:
the
matter
is
this
,
let
me
understand
,
if
there
be
any
Church
Censures
against
Tyrants
?
B
:
You
may
take
it
when
you
please
out
of
the
first
Epistle
of
Paul
to
the
Corinthians
,
where
the
Apostle
doth
forbid
to
have
any
fellowship
either
at
meat
or
discourse
with
openly
lewd
and
flagitious
men
.
If
this
were
observed
amongst
Christians
,
such
lewd
men
,
unless
they
did
repent
,
might
perish
by
hunger
,
cold
,
and
nakedness
.
M
:
A
grievous
sentence
indeed
that
is
.
But
I
do
not
know
if
a
people
,
that
allow
so
much
liberty
every
way
to
their
Rulers
,
will
believe
that
Kings
should
be
punished
after
this
manner
.
B
:
Surely
the
Ancient
Ecclesiastick
writers
without
exception
did
thus
understand
that
sentence
of
Paul.
For
Ambrose
did
hold
out
of
the
Assembly
of
the
Christians
Theodosius
the
Emperour
,
and
Theodosius
obeyed
the
said
Bishop
:
and
for
what
I
know
,
Antiquity
doth
more
highly
extoll
the
deed
of
no
other
so
much
,
nor
is
the
modesty
of
any
other
Emperour
more
commended
.
But
to
our
purpose
,
what
difference
is
there
betwixt
the
exclusion
out
of
Christian
fellowship
,
and
the
interdiction
from
fire
and
water
?
this
last
is
a
most
grievous
sentence
imposed
by
Rulers
against
such
as
refuse
to
obey
their
commands
:
and
the
former
is
a
sentence
of
Church
men
.
Now
the
punishment
of
the
contempt
of
both
authorities
is
death
:
but
the
Secular
judge
denounceth
the
death
of
the
body
,
the
Ecclesiastick
judge
denounceth
the
destruction
of
the
whole
man.
Therefore
the
Church
will
not
account
him
worthy
of
death
,
whom
it
doth
expell
out
of
the
fellowship
of
christians
,
while
he
is
alive
,
and
banisheth
him
into
the
fellowship
of
Divils
,
when
dead
.
Thus
according
to
the
equity
of
the
cause
I
think
I
have
spoken
abundantly
,
if
therewith
any
Forrainers
be
displeased
,
I
desire
they
would
consider
how
unjustly
they
deal
with
us
.
For
whilst
there
be
many
Nations
both
great
and
wealthy
in
Europe
,
having
all
their
own
peculiar
Lawes
,
they
deale
arrogantly
who
would
prescribe
to
all
that
modell
and
forme
of
government
which
they
them
selve●
enjoy
.
The
Helvetians
government
is
a
common
wealth
,
Germany
useth
the
name
or
Title
of
Empire
,
as
a
lawfull
government
.
Some
Cities
in
Germany
,
(
as
I
am
informed
)
are
under
the
rule
of
Princes
.
The
Venetians
have
a
Seignory
tempered
of
these
.
Muscovia
hath
a
very
Tyranny
in
stead
of
government
.
We
have
indeed
but
a
little
Kingdome
,
but
we
enjoy
it
these
two
thousand
years
free
of
the
empire
of
forrain
Nations
.
We
did
Creat
at
first
Lawfull
Kings
,
we
did
impose
upon
our selves
and
them
equall
and
just
Lawes
,
the
long
continuance
of
time
doth
shew
they
were
usefull
.
For
more
by
the
observation
thereof
than
by
force
of
armes
hath
this
Kingdom
stood
intire
hitherto
:
Now
what
iniquity
is
this
,
that
we
should
desire
either
to
abrogat
,
or
neglect
the
Lawes
,
the
good
whereof
we
have
found
by
experience
for
so
many
ages
?
Or
what
impudence
is
that
in
others
,
that
where
as
they
cannot
scarce
defend
their
own
government
,
endeavour
to
weaken
the
state
and
good
order
of
another
Kingdome
?
What
?
are
not
our
Lawes
and
statutes
usefull
not
only
to
our selves
,
but
also
to
our
neighbours
?
For
what
can
be
more
usefull
for
keeping
peace
with
our
nearest
neighbours
,
than
the
moderation
of
Kings
?
for
from
immoderat
lust
unjust
wars
are
for
the
most
part
rashly
undertaken
,
wickedly
prosecuted
and
carried
on
,
and
shamfully
with
much
disgrace
left
off
.
And
further
,
what
more
hurtfull
can
there
be
to
any
Common
wealth
,
than
bad
Lawes
amongst
their
nearest
neighbours
,
whereof
the
contagion
doth
usually
spread
far
and
wide
?
And
why
do
they
thus
trouble
us
only
,
seeing
so
many
Nations
round
about
have
their
severall
Lawes
and
statutes
of
their
own
,
and
no
Nation
hath
altogether
the
same
Lawes
and
statutes
as
others
about
them
have
?
and
why
are
they
now
offended
at
us
,
seeing
we
make
no
new
Law
,
but
continue
to
observe
what
we
had
by
an
ancient
priviledge
?
and
seeing
we
are
not
the
only
persons
,
nor
the
first
persons
,
nor
yet
is
it
at
this
time
that
we
make
use
of
our
Lawes
.
But
our
Lawes
are
displeasing
to
some
.
Perhaps
their
own
Lawes
displease
them
also
.
We
do
not
curiously
enquire
what
the
Lawes
of
other
Nations
are
.
Let
them
Leave
us
our
own
well
known
by
the
experience
of
so
many
years
.
Do
we
trouble
their
Councills
?
or
in
what
business
do
we
molest
them
?
But
you
are
seditious
,
say
they
.
I
could
freely
give
them
an
answer
:
what
is
that
to
them
?
we
are
timultuous
at
our
own
perrill
,
and
at
our
own
dammage
.
I
might
enumerat
a
great
many
seditions
that
are
not
hurtfull
either
to
Common
wealths
or
Kingdoms
.
But
I
shall
not
make
use
of
that
defence
.
I
deny
any
Nation
to
be
less
seditious
than
we
.
I
deny
that
any
Nation
hath
ever
been
more
moderat
in
seditions
than
we
.
Many
contentions
have
fallen
out
for
Lawes
,
and
right
of
government
,
and
administration
of
the
Kingdome
,
yet
the
main
business
hath
been
still
kept
safe
.
Our
contentions
never
were
,
as
amongst
many
others
,
with
the
destruction
of
the
people
,
nor
with
the
hatred
of
our
Princes
,
but
only
out
of
love
to
our
own
countrey
,
and
desire
to
maintain
our
Lawes
.
Hovv
often
in
our
time
have
great
armies
stood
in
opposition
to
one
another
?
hovv
oft
have
they
retired
and
vvithdravvn
from
one
another
,
not
only
vvithout
vvound
,
but
vvithout
any
harme
,
yea
vvithout
so
much
as
a
reproach
?
Hovv
often
hath
the
publick
utility
setled
the
private
grudges
?
hovv
often
hath
the
rumor
of
the
enemies
approach
extinguished
our
intestine
hatred
and
animosity
?
In
all
our
seditions
vve
have
not
been
more
modest
than
fortunat
;
seeing
for
the
most
part
the
party
most
just
hath
been
alvvayes
most
fortunat
:
and
even
as
vve
have
moderatly
vented
our
hatred
,
so
have
vve
to
our
prof●t
and
advantage
condescended
to
an
agreement
.
These
things
at
present
do
occurre
,
vvhich
might
seeme
to
compesce
the
speeches
of
malevolents
,
refute
such
as
are
more
pertinacious
,
and
may
satisfy
such
as
are
of
a
more
temperat
disposition
.
But
by
vvhat
right
other
Nations
are
governed
,
I
thought
it
not
much
to
our
purpose
.
I
have
briefly
rehearsed
our
ovvn
vvay
and
custome
,
but
yet
more
amply
than
I
intended
,
or
than
the
matter
did
require
:
because
I
undertook
this
pains
or
you
only
.
And
if
it
be
approved
by
you
,
I
have
enough
.
M
:
As
for
me
,
you
have
abundantly
satisfied
me
:
but
if
I
can
satisfy
others
also
,
I
shall
think
I
have
received
much
good
by
your
discourse
,
and
my self
eased
of
very
much
trouble
.
FINIS
.