Tam
Marti
,
Quam
Mercurio
.
The
true
and
lively
Portraiture
of
the
Hoble.
and
learned
Knight
Sr.
Walter
Ralegh
.
Ro
:
Vaughan
sculp
:
The
Cabinet-Council
:
Containing
the
Cheif
ARTS
OF
EMPIRE
,
And
MYSTERIES
of
STATE
;
DISCABINETED
In
Political
and
Polemical
Aphorisms
,
grounded
on
Authority
,
and
Experience
;
And
illustrated
with
the
choicest
Examples
and
Historical
Observations
.
By
the
Ever-renowned
Knight
,
Sir
WALTER
RALEIGH
,
Published
By
JOHN
MILTON
,
Esq
;
Quis
Martem
tunicâ
tectum
Adamantinâ
dignè
scripserit
?
London
,
Printed
by
Tho.
Newcomb
for
Tho.
Johnson
at
the
sign
of
the
Key
in
St.
Pauls
Churchyard
,
near
the
West-end
.
1658.
To
the
READER
.
HAving
had
the
Manuscript
of
this
Treatise
,
Written
by
Sir
Walter
Raleigh
,
many
years
in
my
hands
,
and
finding
it
lately
by
chance
among
other
Books
and
Papers
,
upon
reading
thereof
,
I
thought
it
a
kinde
of
injury
to
withhold
longer
the
work
of
so
eminent
an
Author
from
the
Publick
;
it
being
both
answerable
in
Stile
to
other
Works
of
his
already
Extant
,
as
far
as
the
subject
would
permit
,
and
given
me
for
a
true
Copy
by
a
Learned
Man
at
his
Death
,
who
had
Collected
several
such
peices
.
John
Milton
.
THE
Principal
Contents
.
-
CHAP.
I.
THe
Definition
and
Division
of
Publick
Weals
and
Soveraign
States
,
according
to
their
several
Species
or
Kindes
.
Pag.
1.
-
Chap.
2.
Of
Soveraign
or
Monarchick
Government
,
with
its
essential
Marks
,
and
specifical
Differences
.
Pag.
2.
-
Chap.
3.
Of
Monarchies
Seigniorile
,
exemplified
in
the
Turkish
and
West-Indian
Empire
.
Pag.
5.
-
Chap.
4.
Of
Monarchies
Royal
,
with
the
Means
to
maintain
them
.
Pag.
7.
-
Chap.
5.
Of
Monarchies
Tyrannical
.
Pag.
9.
-
Chap.
6.
Of
new-found
Monarchies
and
Principalities
,
with
the
Means
to
perpetuate
them
.
Pag.
10.
-
Chap.
7.
Of
Councils
and
Counsellors
in
general
.
Pag.
14.
-
Chap.
8.
Of
Councils
in
some
particular
Monarchies
,
Aristocraties
and
Democraties
.
Pag.
15.
-
Chap.
9.
Of
Officers
and
Commissioners
with
their
respective
Distinctions
.
Pag.
17.
-
Chap.
10.
Of
Magistrates
,
their
Qualifications
and
Elections
.
Pag.
18.
-
Chap.
11.
Observations
intrinsically
concerning
every
Publick
State
in
Points
of
Justice
,
Treasure
,
and
War
.
P.
20.
-
Chap.
12.
Extrinsick
Observations
,
shewing
how
to
deal
with
Neighbor
Princes
and
Provinces
respectively
,
how
to
prevent
their
Designs
,
and
decypher
their
Intendments
.
Pag.
24.
-
Chap.
13.
Observations
confirmed
by
Authorities
of
Princes
and
Principalities
,
charactering
an
excellent
Prince
or
Governor
.
Pag.
28.
-
Chap.
14.
Of
the
Princes
intimate
Counsellors
and
Ministers
of
State
,
with
their
several
Requisites
.
Pag.
32.
-
Chap.
15.
The
Art
of
Ruling
,
or
Mystery
of
Regiment
.
Pag.
38.
-
Chap.
16.
Of
Princely
Authority
;
wherein
it
consists
,
and
how
far
to
be
extended
and
delegated
.
Pag.
40.
-
Chap.
17.
Of
Power
and
Force
;
and
how
to
be
raised
and
maintained
.
P.
42.
-
Chap.
18.
Of
Conspiracy
and
Treason
;
with
the
causes
and
ways
of
prevention
or
discovery
.
Pag.
44.
-
Chap.
19.
Of
Publick
Hate
and
Contempt
,
with
the
occasions
and
means
to
redress
and
avoid
it
.
Pag.
47.
-
Chap.
20.
Of
Diffidence
and
Dissimulation
in
the
mannage
of
State
Affairs
.
Pag.
54.
-
Chap.
21.
Of
War
Defensive
and
Invasive
;
with
Instructions
touching
Laws
of
Arms
,
Soldiers
,
and
Military
Discipline
.
Pag.
56.
-
Chap.
22.
Of
Generals
and
Commanders
,
and
their
requisite
Abilities
in
Martial
enterprises
and
expeditions
.
Pag.
67.
-
Chap.
23.
Of
Councils
in
War
,
and
Directions
Tactick
and
Stratagematick
;
with
advice
how
to
make
an
honorable
Peace
.
Pag.
71.
-
Chap.
24.
Of
Civil
War
,
with
the
Causes
and
Remedies
thereof
.
Pag.
80.
-
Chap.
25.
A
Collection
of
Political
Observations
(
confirmed
by
Reason
and
Experience
)
advertising
Princes
,
Statesmen
,
and
private
persons
how
to
demean
themselves
in
all
Fortunes
and
Events
.
Pag.
88.
-
Chap.
26.
Maximes
of
State
,
or
Prudential
Grounds
and
Polemical
Precepts
,
concerning
all
Estates
,
and
forms
of
Policy
in
times
of
Peace
or
War
,
&c.
confirmed
by
select
Narrations
,
and
Historical
Parallels
.
Pag.
153.
THE
Cabinet
Council
:
Containing
the
chief
Arts
of
EMPIRE
,
AND
Mysteries
of
State
.
CHAP.
I.
The
Definition
and
Division
of
Publick
Weales
and
Soveraign
States
,
according
to
their
several
species
or
kinds
.
A
Common-wealth
is
a
certain
Soveraign
Government
of
many
Families
,
with
those
things
that
are
common
among
them
.
All
Common-wealths
are
either
-
Monarchies
,
-
Aristocraties
,
-
Democraties
.
A
Monarchie
is
that
State
where
the
Soveraignty
resteth
in
the
person
of
one
only
Prince
.
An
Aristocratie
,
is
where
some
small
part
of
the
people
have
in
the●
as
a
body
corporate
,
the
Soveraignty
and
supream
power
of
the
whole
State
.
A
Democrati●
,
is
where
all
the
people
have
Power
and
Authority
Soveraign
.
So
doth
it
appear
,
that
the
place
and
person
where
the
Soveraigntie
resteth
,
doth
cause
the
State
to
be
either
a
Monarchie
,
an
Aristocratie
,
or
Popular
Government
.
CHAP.
II.
Of
Soveraign
or
Monarchick
Government
,
with
its
Essential
markes
,
and
Specifical
differences
.
SOveraigntie
is
an
absolute
and
perpetual
power
in
every
publike
State
and
he
is
properly
and
only
a
Soveraign
,
that
acknowledgeth
no
Superior
or
Equal
,
nor
holdeth
of
any
other
Prince
,
person
or
power
,
but
God
and
his
own
sword
.
The
First
mark
of
Soveraigntie
is
absolute
Power
and
Authority
to
command
all
Subjects
in
general
,
and
every
of
them
in
particular
,
without
consent
of
any
other
person
or
persons
,
either
greater
or
inferior
to
himself
.
The
Second
mark
of
Majesty
is
Authority
to
make
War
,
and
conclude
Peace
at
his
pleasure
.
The
Third
is
Power
to
bestow
all
Honors
and
cheif
Offices
at
his
pleasure
.
The
Fourth
marke
of
Soveraigntie
is
Appellation
.
The
Fifth
mark
and
last
,
is
power
to
pardon
all
Subjects
by
rigor
of
Law
or
otherwise
condemned
in
Life
,
Lands
,
Goods
,
or
Honors
.
These
Powers
are
not
to
be
imparted
to
any
Officer
,
Deputy
or
other
Magistrate
,
but
in
the
Princes
absence
,
and
for
some
urgent
occasion
.
Monarchies
are
of
three
sorts
-
Signioril
,
-
Royal
,
-
Tyrannical
.
The
Diver●●tie
of
Monarchies
doth
no●
proceed
from
the
Nature
of
the
State
,
but
the
diverse
proceedings
of
those
Princes
that
governe
;
for
great
difference
there
may
be
between
the
nature
of
the
Common
wealth
and
the
Government
thereof
.
That
Prince
that
giveth
the
Magistracies
,
Honors
and
Offices
without
respect
of
Nobility
,
Riches
or
Vertue
,
may
be
said
to
governe
popularly
.
And
that
Monarchy
may
be
said
to
b●
governed
Aristocratically
,
when
the
Monarch
imparteth
the
principal
Honors
and
Offices
to
the
Noble
and
Rich
men
only
.
The
same
difference
there
is
to
be
found
in
States
Aristocratical
and
Popular
:
for
the
one
and
the
other
may
be
both
Signioril
,
or
Tyrannical
.
A
Monarch
Signioril
is
he
who
by
force
of
Arms
and
just
War
,
is
made
owner
of
mens
bodies
and
goods
,
and
governeth
them
as
a
Master
of
a
Familie
governeth
base
Servants
and
Slaves
.
A
Monarch
Royal
,
is
he
whose
Subjects
are
obedient
unto
his
Laws
,
and
the
Monarch
himself
obeyeth
the
Lawes
of
God
and
Nature
,
suffering
every
Subject
to
enjoy
liberty
natural
,
with
property
in
Lands
and
Goods
,
governing
as
a
Father
governeth
his
Children
.
A
Monarch
Tyrannical
,
is
he
who
without
regard
to
the
Law
of
God
or
Nature
,
commandeth
Free-men
as
Slaves
,
and
useth
their
Lands
and
Goods
as
his
own
.
CHAP.
III.
Of
Monarchie
Signioril
,
Exemplified
in
the
Turkish
and
West-Indian
Empire
.
ALL
people
subject
to
Princes
,
are
governed
as
Free-men
by
their
Prince
and
certain
other
particular
Lords
of
Lands
and
Liberties
;
who
not
by
the
Princes
Commission
but
by
antient
Lawes
or
Custom
have
Inheritance
and
Tenements
;
or
else
they
are
by
one
Prince
and
his
Ministers
commanded
,
which
Ministers
have
not
by
Law
,
or
Ordinance
,
any
Authority
or
Interest
of
themselves
,
but
being
like
to
the
people
(
base
men
and
slaves
)
they
command
only
by
Commission
in
the
Princes
name
;
and
the
Authority
of
those
Ministers
doth
cease
at
the
Princes
pleasure
,
so
that
the
people
doe
not
acknowledg
any
superior
but
the
Prince●
nor
owe
any
service
to
other
mean
Lords
:
So
as
all
the
people
stand
without
propertie
in
Lands
or
Goods
;
for
example
,
the
Empire
of
Turky
and
the
West
Indies
.
The
Provinces
of
this
Monarchie
are
allotted
to
sundrie
Magistrates
or
Ministers
,
and
they
altered
and
removed
at
the
Princes
pleasure
;
but
it
is
otherwise
in
a
Monarchie
Royal
,
because
the
Monarch
is
there
accompanied
with
many
mean
Lords●
And
albeit
those
mean
Lords
are
Subjects
unto
the
Prince
,
yet
have
they
particular
Tenants
who
may
not
without
just
cause
be
dispossessed
by
the
Prince
;
and
those
people
having
had
dependency
of
their
Lords
and
their
Ancestors
,
do
ever
beare
unto
them
a
certain
naturall
love
and
dutifull
respect
:
who
so
therefore
compareth
these
Principalities
,
shall
perceive
,
that
to
Conquer
a
State
Signioril
there
is
great
difficultie
;
but
being
conquered
,
it
may
easily
be
maintained
for
the
difficultie
to
conquer
such
a
State
,
proceedeth
from
the
lack
of
mean
Lords
to
call
in
and
assist
the
Prince
that
doth
invade
:
who
therefore
desireth
to
subdue
a
Nation
thus
governed
,
must
of
force
assault
,
all
the
people
,
and
rather
trust
in
his
own
strength
then
the
aide
of
the
Country
.
But
if
he
can
prevaile
,
then
one
only
feare
remaineth
,
which
is
the
Princes
posteritie
,
which
necessarily
must
be
extinguished
,
because
the
Princes
race
only
hath
interest
both
in
the
People
and
Soldiers
.
But
to
enter
a
Monarchy
Royal
,
is
an
enterprise
of
no
great
difficulty
,
when
he
that
doth
enter
,
hath
the
friendship
and
aide
of
some
mean
Lords
to
take
his
part
,
and
prepar
the
place
where
he
is
to
arrive
.
CHAP.
IIII.
Of
Monarchies
Royal
,
with
the
means
to
maintaine
them
.
MOnarchies
Royal
,
are
for
the
most
part
antient
and
hereditary
,
and
consequently
easie
to
be
governed
.
For
it
is
sufficient
for
the
Prince
to
maintain
the
old
Laws
,
●and
on
occasion
temporize
with
those
accidents
that
happen●
such
a
State
cannot
be
taken
from
the
Prince
without
excessive
force
;
and
if
it
be
,
it
shall
be
soon
recovered
.
Example
,
England
and
France
.
But
if
a
Monarchie
newly
conquered
,
be
annexed
unto
an
old
,
and
not
properly
antient
,
then
is
it
with
much
more
difficulty
maintained
.
First
,
for
that
men
naturally
inclined
to
variation
are
easily
induced
●o
take
arms
against
him
that
newly
governeth
.
Secondly
,
every
new
Prince
is
forced
to
exact
aswell
upon
those
Subjects
that
joyned
with
him
as
those
that
did
resist
him
,
and
therefore
shall
offend
both
.
Example
,
Ireland
annexed
to
the
Crown
of
England
:
Sicilia
and
Naples
to
Spain●
.
The
means
to
maintain
such
a
Monarchie
;
is●
First
to
extinguish
the
race
of
him
that
was
anciently
Prince
.
Secondly
,
to
continue
all
Lawes
and
Customes
in
the
former
force
;
for
so
shall
the
Subject
find
nothing
altered
but
the
Prince
,
and
therefore
will
soon
rest
contented
:
and
the
rather
if
that
new
Monarchie
and
the
antient
dominion
of
the
Prince
be
of
one
Language
:
But
if
the
people
be
of
a
contrary
Language
and
humor
,
then
to
hold
it
,
there
needeth
great
industrie
and
fortune
:
in
that
case
the
best
way
is
that
the
Prince
should
inhabit
there
,
as
well
to
incounter
all
inconveniences
proceeding
from
the
Subject
,
as
to
preserve
the
people
from
oppression
of
his
own
Ministers
.
Another
way
is
to
send
thither
certain
Colonies
,
and
plant
them
in
fit
places
,
or
else
to
settle
some
garisons
both
of
horse
and
foot
;
but
Colonies
are
less
chargeable
to
the
Prince
:
As
for
the
people
inhabitant
(
who
must
necessarily
remove
,
they
being
a
small
number
and
dispossessed
)
they
cannot
have
power
to
offend
:
for
in
that
case
,
this
Rule
or
Maxime
shall
be
found
true
,
that
men
must
be
either
kindly
intreated●
or
with
all
extremity
oppressed
;
because
of
light
injuries
they
may
be
revenged
,
but
of
utter
oppre●●ion
they
cannot
.
A
Third
way
to
hold
a
conquered
dominion
,
is
,
to
cherish
and
defend
the
neighbors
of
little
power
,
and
oppress
or
keep
under
those
that
are
most
potent
;
and
above
all
to
take
order
that
no
forraign
Prince
or
power
doe
enter
;
for
it
is
ever
to
be
looked
for
,
that
so
many
of
the
nation
as
are
discontented
,
either
for
ambition
or
feare
,
will
be
ever
readie
to
bring
in
strangers
;
and
to
conclude
this
matter
of
Principalitie
annexed
,
I
say
it
behoveth
every
Prince
possessed
of
such
a
State
,
never
to
increase
the
power
of
any
potent
neighbor
,
never
to
oppress
those
that
are
of
small
power
,
never
,
to
permit
any
forraign
potentate
to
enter
,
but
ever
to
plant
Colonies
and
Garisons
,
or
else
to
make
that
dominion
his
cheif
habitation
.
CHAP.
V.
Of
Monarchies
Tyrannical
.
TYrannical
Princes
are
not
advanced
by
favor
,
neither
doe
they
trust
unto
Fortune
,
but
by
degrees
of
Warr
,
or
else
by
some
other
indirect
meanes
do
aspire
unto
greatness
;
and
therein
do
maintain
themselves
by
all
wayes
either
honest
or
dishonest
,
without
respect
of
Justice
,
Conscience
or
Law
either
of
Nations
or
Nature
:
A
Prince
by
such
impious
means
aspired
,
and
desiring
to
hold
that
he
hath
gained
,
will
take
order
that
the
Cruelties
he
committeth
may
be
done
roundly
,
suddenly
,
and
as
it
were
at
an
instant
;
For
if
they
be
exe●nted
at
leasure
and
by
piece-meale
,
then
will
the
Princes
fears
continue
long
,
and
the
terror
in
Subjects
take
deeper
impression
,
whose
nature
is
such
that
either
they
must
be
bound
by
benefits
,
or
by
cruelty
made
sure
from
offending
;
Example
,
Dionysius
and
Agathocles
.
CHAP.
VI
.
Of
new
found
Monarchies
and
Principalities
,
with
the
means
to
perpetuate
them
.
SOme
other
Princes
there
are
that
from
private
Estate
have
aspired
to
Soveraignty
not
by
unnatural
or
impious
proceedings
as
the
former
,
but
by
vertue
and
fortune
,
and
being
aspired
have
found
no
great
difficulty
to
be
maintained
;
for
such
a
Prince
having
no
other
dominion
,
is
forced
to
settle
himself
where
he
is
become
a
Prince
;
But
here
is
to
be
noted
that
albeit
such
a
man
be
vertuous
,
yet
wanting
fortune
,
his
vertue
proveth
to
small
purpose
,
and
fortune
without
vertue
doth
seldome
work
any
great
effect
.
Howsoever
it
be
,
a
Prince
being
aspired
,
both
by
the
aide
of
the
one
and
of
the
other
,
shall
notwithstanding
find
some
difficulty
to
hold
what
he
hath
gotten
:
because
he
is
forced
to
introduce
new
Lawes
and
new
Orders
of
government
differing
from
the
old
,
aswell
for
his
own
security
,
as
confirmation
of
the
Government
:
for
avoiding
of
which
dangers
he
is
to
consider
whether
he
be
of
himself
able
to
compell
his
Subjects
to
obey
,
or
must
pray
in
aide
of
others
;
If
he
can
doe
the
first
,
he
needeth
not
doubt
;
but
being
driven
to
the
other
,
his
greatness
cannot
long
continue●
for
albeit
a
matter
of
no
difficultie
it
is
to
perswade
a
people
,
yet
to
make
them
constant
,
is
a
work
well
neer
impossible
.
Example
,
Thes●us
,
Cyrus
,
Romulus
.
The
Second
sort
of
new
Princes
are
such
as
be
aspired
by
favor
or
corruption
,
or
by
the
vertue
or
greatness
of
fortune
or
friends
:
A
Prince
by
any
or
all
these
means
advanced
,
and
desirous
to
hold
his
Estate●
must
indeavor
by
his
own
vertue
to
maintain
himself
without
depending
upon
any
other
:
which
may
be
done
by
this
means
;
First
;
to
assure
all
enemies
from
offending
.
Secondly
,
to
win
the
love
and
friendship
of
so
many
neighbours
as
possibly
he
may
.
Thirdly
to
compass
all
designes
tending
to
his
honor
or
profit
,
and
bring
them
to
pas●
either
by
fraud
or
force
:
Fourthly
,
to
make
himself
honoured
and
followed
of
Captains
and
Soldiers
.
Fifthly
,
to
oppress
all
those
that
would
or
can
offend
.
Sixthly
to
be
obsequious
&
liberal
to
frinds
,
magnanimous
&
terrible
to
Foes
.
Seventhly
,
to
c●sse
all
old
and
unfaithfull
bands
and
entertain
new
.
Eighthly
,
to
hold
such
Amitie
with
Kings
and
Princes
,
as
they
ought
reasonablie
to
favor
him●
or
else
they
would
offend
;
easily
they
cannot●
Example
,
Giovannie
,
Torrigiani
,
Caesar
Borgi●
.
The
Third
and
last
meanes
whereby
private
persons
doe
aspire
to
Principalities
,
is
not
force
and
violence●
but
meer
good-will
and
favor
of
men
.
The
cause
or
occasion
thereof
,
is
only
vertue
,
or
fortune
,
or
at
least
a
certain
fortunate
craft
and
wittiness
;
because
he
aspireth
either
by
favor
of
the
People
,
or
by
favor
of
the
Nobilitie
;
for
these
contrary
humors
are
in
all
Common wealths
to
be
found
.
And
the
reason
thereof
is
,
that
the
great
men
do
ever
endeavor
to
oppress
the
people
,
and
the
people
do
labor
not
to
be
oppressed
by
them
.
Of
these
divers
appetites
one
of
these
three
ef●ects
doe
proceed
,
viz.
Principalitie
,
●iberty
,
or
Licencious
life
.
Principality
may
come
either
by
love
of
the
multitude
,
or
of
the
great
men
:
for
when
any
of
these
factions
do
find
it self
oppressed
,
then
do
they
soon
consent
to
make
one
a
Prince
,
hoping
by
his
vertue
and
valor
to
be
defended
.
Example
,
Francesco
Sforz●
,
Alessandro
de
Medici
.
A
Prince
in
this
●ort
aspired
,
to
maintain
his
Estate
,
must
first
consider
well
by
which
of
these
factions
aforesaid
he
is
advanced
:
for
if
by
favor
of
great
men
he
be
aspired
,
then
must
he
meet
with
many
difficulties
;
for
having
about
him
divers
persons
of
great
qualitie
,
and
such
as
were
but
lately
his
equals
,
hardly
shall
he
command
them
in
such
sort
as
it
behoveth
;
But
if
the
Prince
be
advanced
by
the
people●
few
or
none
shall
hardly
disobey
him
.
So
it
appeareth
that
a
Prince
made
by
the
multitude
is
much
more
secure
then
he
whom
the
Nobilitie
preferreth
:
for
common
people
doe
not
desire
to
enjoy
more
then
their
own
,
and
to
be
defended
from
oppression
;
but
great
men
doe
studie
not
only
to
hold
their
own
,
but
also
to
command
and
insult
upon
inferiors
.
Note
that
all
Monarchies
are
P●incipalities
,
But
all
Principalities
are
not
Monarchies
.
CHAP.
VII
.
Of
Councils
,
and
Counsellors
in
general
.
A
Senate
or
Council
is
a
certain
lawful
assembly
of
Counsellors
to
give
advice
to
him
or
them
that
have
in
the
comon
Weale
Power
Soveraign
.
A
Counsellor
is
called
in
the
Latine
Senator
;
which
word
signifieth
in
effect
an
old
man
:
The
Grecians
and
Romans
also
most
commonly
composed
the●●
Councils
of
ancient
and
expert
persons
;
for
if
they
or
the
greater
part
of
them
had
bin
young
men
,
then
might
the
Council
have
more
properly
bin
called
a
Juvenate
then
a
Senate
.
The
chief
and
most
necessary
note
required
in
a
Counsellor
is
to
have
no
dependance
of
any
other
Prince
or
Common-weale
;
either
Oath
,
Homage
,
Natural
obligation
,
Pention
,
or
reward
:
In
this
point
the
Venetians
have
bin
ever
most
precise
,
and
for
that
reason
,
doe
not
admit
any
Cardinal
or
other
Clergieman
to
be
either
of
or
at
their
Councils
,
therefore
when
the
Venetian
Sena●e
is
assembled
,
the
Usher
being
ready
to
shut
the
dore
cryeth
aloud
,
Fuora
Preti
,
Depart
Priest
.
]
Note
also
that
in
every
state
of
what
quality
soever
,
a
secret
or
Cabinet-Council
is
mainly
necessary
.
CHAP.
VIII
.
Of
Councils
in
some
particular
Monarchies
,
Aristocraties
,
and
Democraties
.
THe
King
of
Spaine
,
for
the
government
of
his
Dominions
hath
seven
Councils
(
viz
)
the
Council
of
the
Indies
,
the
Council
of
Spaine
,
the
Council
of
Italy
and
the
Low
Countries
,
the
Council
of
War
,
the
Council
of
Orders
,
the
Council
of
Inquisition
,
and
the
Council
Royal.
In
France
are
three
Councils
(
viz
)
the
Council
Privy
,
the
Council
of
Judges
,
which
they
call
Presidents
et
Conc●liers
de
Parlament
,
and
the
great
Council
which
they
call
assemblei
d●
troys
estates
.
Of
Councils
in
Aristocraties
.
In
V●nice
beside
the
Senate
and
great
Council
are
four
Councils
(
viz
)
the
Sages
of
the
Sea
,
the
Sages
of
the
Land
,
the
Co●ncil
of
Tenn
,
the
three
presidents
of
Quarantia
,
and
the
Senate
:
All
which
Councils
do
amount
to
120
persons
,
with
the
Magistrates
.
The
great
Council
of
Ragusa
consisteth
of
60
persons
,
and
hath
another
privie
Council
of
12.
Of
Councils
in
Democraties
.
Genoua
hath
3
Councils●
the
great
Council
of
200
,
the
Senate
which
consisteth
of
60
,
and
the
privie
Council
which
hath
26
Counsellors
:
so
it
doth
appear
that
in
all
Commonwealths
,
be
they
Monarchies
,
Aristocracies
,
or
Popular
States
,
The
Council-privie
is
most
necessarie
and
often
used
;
Also
this
difference
is
to
be
noted
between
the
Councils
in
Monarchies
,
and
the
Councils
in
Aristocracies
and
States
Popular
;
that
is
to
say
,
that
all
deliberations
●it
●o
be
published
,
are
in
a
Monarchie
consulted
and
resolved
upon
in
the
Council
privie
,
and
after
ratified
by
Common
Council
;
But
in
Optimacies
or
popular
government
the
Custom
is
contrary
.
Here
also
is
to
be
noted
that
albeit
the
use
an●
Authorit●
of
ever●
Senate
and
Privie
Councel
is
most
needful
,
yet
hath
it
no
Authority
to
command
but
in
the
name
of
those
in
whom
the
Soveraignty
resteth
;
for
if
Councellors
had
power
to
command
absolutely
,
then
should
they
be
Soveraigns
,
and
consequently
all
execution
at
their
pleasure
;
which
may
not
be
without
detracting
from
Majestie
,
which
is
a
thing
so
soveraign
and
sacred
,
as
no
Citizen
or
Subject
of
what
quality
soever
,
may
touch
or
approach
thereunto
.
CHAP.
IX
.
Of
Officers
and
Commissioners
with
their
respective
Distinctions
.
AN
Officer
is
a
person
publick
,
that
hath
charge
ordinary
and
limited
by
Law
.
A
Commissioner
is
also
a
person
publick●
but
his
charge
is
extraordinary
and
limited
by
Commission
.
Officers
are
of
two
●orts
,
and
so
be
Commissioners
;
the
one
hath
power
to
command
,
and
are
called
Magistrates
;
the
other
hath
authority
to
execute
:
so
the
one
and
the
other
are
persons
publick
:
yet
are
not
all
publick
persons
either
Officers
or
Commissioners
.
Commissioners
are
ordained
to
govern
in
Provinces●
in
Warr
,
in
Justice
,
in
disposing
the
Treasure
,
or
some
other
Function
concerning
the
State
;
but
all
Commissions
do
spring
and
proceed
from
the
Soveraign
,
Magistrates
,
and
Commissioners
.
And
here
is
to
be
noted
that
every
Commission
ceaseth
if
he
that
granted
the
Commission
doth
dye
,
or
revoke
it
,
or
if
the
Commissioners
during
his
Commission
shall
aspire
to
Office
and
Authority
equall
to
his
that
made
it
.
CHAP.
X.
Of
Magistrates
,
their
Qualifications
and
Elections
.
A
Magistrate
is
an
Officer
having
power
to
command
in
the
State
;
and
albeit
that
every
Magistrate
be
an
Officer
,
yet
every
Officer
is
not
a
Magistrate
,
but
they
only
that
have
power
to
command
.
Also
in
making
of
Officers
and
Magistrates
in
every
Commonweale
,
three
things
are
specially
to
be
observed
(
viz
)
who
doth
make
them
,
what
men
they
are
that
should
be
made
,
and
the
forme
and
manner
how
they
are
made
.
The
first
appertaineth
to
him
or
them
in
whom
the
Soveraigntie
resteth
;
the
second
also
belongeth
to
Majestie
;
yet
therein
the
Laws
are
commonly
followed
,
especially
in
Aristocracies
and
States
popular
;
In
the
one
the
Magistrates
are
chosen
out
of
the
most
wealthy
or
most
noble
:
In
the
other
,
elected
out
of
the
whole
multitude
.
The
forme
and
manner
of
choosing
Magistrates
in
Aristocracies
and
States
Popular
,
is
either
by
election
,
by
lot
,
or
by
both
,
and
their
Office
is
to
compel
those
that
doe
not
obey
what
Soveraigntie
commandeth
:
for
all
force
of
Commandment
lyeth
in
compulsion
.
Commandment
likewise
is
of
two
sorts
:
the
one
may
be
called
Soveraign
and
absolute
,
above
Lawes
,
above
Magistrates
,
and
above
people
.
In
Monarchies
such
command
is
proper
to
the
Prince
only
;
in
Aristocracies
it
resteth
in
the
Nobility
:
and
in
Democracies
the
people
have
that
power
.
The
second
Commandments
are
Subject
both
to
Soveraignty
and
Law
.
Here
is
to
be
noted
that
every
Magistrate
may
recall
his
own
Commandement
,
and
forbid
what
he
did
Command
,
yet
cannot
revoke
that
which
he
hath
Judged
.
[
](A57360e-2520-b)*
Also
in
presence
of
the
Soveraign
,
all
Authority
of
Magistrates
ceaseth
;
and
in
presence
of
great
Magistrates
the
inferior
have
no
power
;
and
Magistrates
equall
cannot
doe
any
thing
but
by
consent
,
if
his
Colleagues
or
fellow-Magistrates
be
present
.
CHAP.
XI
.
Observations
intrinsically
concerning
every
publick
State
in
points
of
Justice
,
Treasure
,
and
Warr
.
THe
First
concern
matter
Intrinsick
.
The
Second
touch
matter
Extrinsick
.
Matters
Intrinsick
are
three
.
-
The
Administration
of
Justice
.
-
The
Mannaging
of
the
Treasure
.
-
The
disposing
of
things
appertaining
to
War
.
Matters
Extrinsick
are
also
three
.
-
The
skill
how
to
deale
with
neighbours
.
-
The
diligence
to
vent
their
designes●
-
The
way
how
to
win
so
much
confidence
with
some
of
them
,
as
to
be
made
partaker
of
whatsoever
they
mean
to
enterprise
.
Touching
Administratio●
of
Justice
.
The
good
and
direct
Administration
of
Justice
,
is
in
all
places
a
Principal
part
of
government
;
for
seldome
or
never
shall
we
see
any
people
discontented
and
desirous
of
alteration
,
where
Justice
is
equally
administred
without
respect
of
persons
;
and
in
every
State
this
consideration
is
required
,
but
most
of
all
in
Countries
that
doe
front
upon
other
Princes
,
or
were
lately
conquered
:
Hereunto
the
Princes
vigilancy
and
the
Magistrates
uprightness
are
especially
required
;
for
oftentimes
the
Prince
is
deceived
,
and
the
Magistrates
corrupted
;
it
behoveth
also
the
Prince
to
maintain
the
Judges
and
Ministers
of
Justice
in
their
reputation
,
and
yet
to
have
a
vigilant
eye
upon
their
proceedings
,
and
the
rather
if
their
Authority
doe
include
equity
,
and
from
their
censure
be
no
appeale
;
and
if
their
Office
be
during
life
,
and
they
are
men
born
and
dwelling
in
the
same
Country
;
all
these
things
are
duly
to
be
considered
of
the
Prince
;
for
as
to
call
the
Judges
into
q●estion
,
is
as
it
were
to
disgrace
the
Judicial
seate
;
so
to
wink
at
their
corruptions
were
matter
of
just
discontent
to
the
Subject
;
in
this
case
therefore
the
Prince
cannot
doe
more
then
by
his
wisdom
to
make
choise
of
good
men
;
and
being
chosen
,
to
hold
them
in
good
reputation
so
as
the
ordinary
course
of
Justice
may
proceed
;
for
otherwise
great
disorder
,
contempt
,
and
general
confusion
will
ensue
thereof
.
Secondly
he
is
to
keep
his
eye
open
upon
their
proceedings
;
and
Lastly
to
reserve
unto
himself
a
supream
power
of
Appellation
.
Touching
the
Treasure
.
The
want
of
money
is
in
all
States
very
perilous
,
and
most
of
all
in
those
which
are
of
least
strength
,
and
doe
confine
upon
Nations
with
whom
they
have
commonly
War
,
or
unassured
peace
,
but
most
perilous
of
all
to
those
Governments
which
are
remote
from
the
Prince
,
or
place
where
they
are
to
be
relieved
.
The
means
to
leavie
Treasure
are
four
.
-
First
,
the
Customs
and
Impositions
upon
all
sorts
of
Merchandize
and
Traffique
is
to
be
looked
unto
and
advanced
.
-
Secondly
,
the
excessive
eating
of
usury
must
be
suppressed
.
-
Thirdly
,
all
super●luous
charges
and
expences
are
to
be
taken
away
.
-
Lastly
,
the
doings
and
accounts
of
Ministers
are
severally
to
be
examined
.
Touching
the
matter
of
Custom
and
Impost
,
thereof
assuredly
a
great
profit
is
in
every
State
to
be
raised
;
chiefly
where
Peace
hath
long
continued
,
and
where
the
Country
affordeth
much
plenty
of
Commodities
to
be
carried
out
,
and
where
ports
are
to
receive
shipping
.
The
moderating
of
Interest
is
ever
necessary
,
and
chiefly
in
this
age
,
by
reason
that
money
aboundeth
in
Europe
;
since
the
Trafficke
into
the
Indies
;
for
such
men
as
have
money
in
their
hands
great
plenty
,
would
in
no
wise
imploy
the
same
in
Merchandize
,
if
lawful
it
were
to
receive
the
utmost
usury
,
being
a
course
of
most
profit
and
greatest
security
.
The
taking
away
of
superfluous
expences
is
no
other
thing
then
a
certain
wise
and
laudable
parsimony
;
which
the
Romans
and
other
well
governed
States
did
use
.
These
expences
consist
in
Fees
,
Allowances
,
and
Wages
granted
to
Ministers
of
little
or
no
necessity
;
also
in
Pensions
,
Rewards
,
Entertainmens
and
Donaries
,
with
small
difficultie
to
be
moderated
,
or
easily
to
be
suppressed
.
[
](A57360e-2860-b)*
By
abridging
or
taking
away
of
these
needless
expences
a
marvelous
profit
will
be
saved
for
the
Prince
;
but
if
he
continue
them
,
and
by
imposing
upon
the
people
doe
think
to
increase
his
Treasure
or
Revenew
,
besides
the
loss
of
their
love
,
he
may
also
hazzard
their
obedience
,
with
many
other
inconveniences
.
Touching
Warr
.
Whatsoever
Prince
or
Common
weale
is
Neighbor
to
any
people
which
can
,
will
,
or
were
wont
to
offend
,
it
is
necessary
to
have
not
only
all
things
prepared
for
defence
of
his
Person
and
Country
,
but
also
to
forecast
and
use
every
caution
and
other
diligence
:
for
the
inconveniencies
which
happen
to
government
,
are
suddain
and
unlookt
for
;
yea
the
providence
and
provision
required
in
this
case
ought
to
be
such
as
the
expences
all
other
waies
imployed
must
stay
to
supply
the
necessity
of
war
.
CHAP.
XII
.
Extrinsick
observation
,
shewing
how
to
deale
with
Neighbor
Princes
and
Provinces
respectively
,
how
to
prevent
their
designes
,
and
decypher
their
intendments
.
THis
first
point
of
matter
extrinsick
is
of
such
quality
as
being
well
handled
procureth
great
good
,
but
otherwise
becometh
dangerous
;
for
the
proceeding
must
be
diverse
according
to
the
diversitie
of
the
ends
which
the
Prince
or
Governor
intendeth
;
for
if
he
desire
to
continue
peace
with
his
Neighbors
,
one
way
is
to
be
taken
;
but
otherwise
●e
is
to
work
that
seeketh
occasion
to
break
,
and
to
become
an
Enemy
to
one
or
more
of
his
Neighbors
.
If
he
do
desire
to
live
peaceably
with
all
,
then
he
is
to
observe
these
Rules
(
viz.
)
First
,
to
hold
and
continue
firmly
all
contracts
and
capitulations
Secondly
,
to
shew
himself
resolved
neither
to
offer
nor
take
the
least
touch
of
wrong
or
injury
.
Thirdly
,
with
all
care
and
favor
to
further
Commerce
and
reciproke
traffick
for
the
profit
of
the
Subject
,
and
increase
of
the
Princes
Revenue
.
Fourthly
,
covertly
to
win
so
great
confidence
with
Neighbors
,
as
in
all
actions
of
unkindness
among
them
he
may
be
made
Umpire
.
Fifthly
,
to
become
so
well
bele●ved
with
them
as
he
may
remove
such
diffidences
as
grow
to
his
own
disadvantage
.
Sixthly
,
not
to
deny
protection
or
aid
to
them
that
are
the
weakest
,
and
cheifly
such
as
do
and
will
endure
his
fortune
.
Lastly
,
in
Favouring
,
Aiding
,
and
Protecting
(
unless
necessity
shall
otherwise
s●
require
)
to
do
it
moderately
,
so
as
they
who
are
to
be
aided
,
become
not
Jealous
,
and
consequently
seek
Adherency
elswhere
,
which
ofttimes
hath
opened
way
to
other
Neighbors
that
desire
a
like
●ccasion
.
How
to
prevent
their
designes
.
This
Point
in
time
of
War
is
with
great
diligence
to
be
looked
unto
;
also
in
time
of
Peace
to
prevent
all
occasions
that
may
kindle
Warr
is
behoveful
;
for
to
foresee
what
may
happen
to
the
prejudice
of
a
Prin●●s
Profit
or
Reputation
,
is
a
part
of
great
Wisdom
.
The
means
to
attain
the
Intelligence
of
these
things
are
two
.
The
First
is
by
Friends
,
the
next
by
Espials
;
the
one
for
the
most
part
faithfull
,
the
other
not
so
assured
These
matters
are
well
to
be
considered●
for
albeit
the
nature
of
man
desireth
nothing
more
then
curiously
to
know
the
doings
of
others
,
yet
are
those
things
to
be
handled
with
so
great
secrecy
and
dissimulation
as
the
Princes
intent
be
not
in
any
wise
suspected
,
nor
the
Ministers
made
odious
;
for
these
sometimes
to
win
themselves
reputation
,
do
devise
causes
of
difference
where
no
need
is
,
divining
of
things
future
which
prove
to
the
prejudice
of
their
own
Prince
.
To
win
Confidence
with
Neighbours
.
This
is
chiefly
attained
unto
by
being
Loved
and
Honored
;
for
these
things
do
work
so
many
good
effects
,
as
daily
experience
sufficeth
without
any
express
Example
to
prove
them
of
great
force
.
The
waies
to
win
Love
and
Trust
,
is
in
all
Actions
to
proceed
Justly
,
and
sometimes
to
wink
at
Wrongs
,
or
set
aside
unnecessary
revenges
;
and
if
any
thing
be
done
not
justifiable
,
or
unfit
to
be
allowed
,
as
oftentimes
it
happneth
,
there
to
lay
the
blame
upon
the
Minister
,
which
must
be
performed
with
so
great
show
of
revenge
and
dissimulation
by
reproving
and
punishing
the
Minister
,
as
the
Princes
offended
may
be
satisfied
,
and
beleive
that
the
cause
of
unkindness
proceeded
from
thence
.
Now
only
it
resteth
that
somewhat
should
be
said
touching
Provision
,
to
the
end
the
people
may
not
be
drawn
into
despaire
by
Famine
or
extream
Dearth
of
Victual
,
and
chiefly
for
want
of
Corne
,
which
is
one
Principal
Consideration
to
be
regarded
,
according
to
the
Italian
Proverb
,
Pane
in
Piazza
,
Giustitia
in
Palazzo
,
siverezza
per
tutto
:
whereunto
I
could
wish
every
Prince
or
Supream
Governor
to
be
thus
qualified
(
viz.
)
Facile
de
audienza
:
non
facil●de
credenz●
,
desi●s●
de
spedition
,
essemplare
in
costunii
proprii
,
&
inquei
de
sua
casa
tale
chevorra
governare
,
e
non
e●●er
governato
da
altr●
;
●e
della
raggione
.
CHAP.
XIII
.
Observations
confirmed
by
Authorities
of
Princes
and
Principalities
,
Charactering
an
excellent
Prince
or
Governor
.
EVery
good
and
lawful
principality
is
either
elective
or
successive
:
Of
them
,
election
seemeth
the
more
ancient
;
but
succession
in
divers
respects
the
better
;
Minore
discrimine
sumitur
Princeps
quam
qu●eritur
.
Tac.
The
chief
and
only
endeavor
of
every
good
Prince
,
ought
to
be
the
commodity
and
security
of
the
Subjects
;
as
contrarywise
the
Tyrant
seeketh
his
own
private
profit
with
the
oppression
of
his
people
.
Civium
non
servitus
sed
tutela
tradita
est
.
Sal.
To
the
perfection
of
every
good
Prince
,
two
things
are
necessarily
required
(
viz
)
Prudence
and
Vertue
;
the
one
to
direct
his
doings
,
the
other
to
governe
his
life●Rex
eris●●i
recte
feceris
.
Hor.
The
second
care
which
appertaineth
to
a
good
Prince
,
is
to
make
his
Subjects
like
unto
himself
;
for
thereby
he
is
not
only
honored
,
but
they
also
the
better
governed
;
Facile
imperium
in
bonos
.
Plaut.
Subjects
are
made
good
by
two
meanes
(
viz
)
by
constraint
of
law
,
and
the
Princes
example
;
for
in
all
estates
,
the
people
do
imitate
those
conditions
whereunto
they
see
the
Prince
enclined
;
Quiquid
faciunt
principes
,
pr●ecipere
videantur
.
Quintil.
All
vertues
be
required
in
a
Prince
,
but
justice
and
clemencie
are
most
necessary
;
for
justice
is
a
habit
of
doing
things
Justly
,
as
well
to
himself
as
others
,
and
giving
to
every
one
so
much
as
to
him
appertaineth
;
This
is
that
vertue
that
preserveth
concord
among
men
,
and
whereof
they
be
called
good
:
●us
&
●equitas
vincula
civitatum
:
Cic.
[
](A57360e-3350-b)*
It
is
the
quality
of
this
vertue
also
to
proceed
equally
and
temperately
;
it
informeth
the
Prince
not
to
surcharge
the
Subjects
with
infinite
laws
;
for
thereof
proceedeth
the
impoverishment
of
the
Subjects
and
the
inriching
of
Lawyers
,
a
kind
●f
men
which
in
ages
more
antient
,
did
seem
of
no
necessity
:
Sine
causidicis
satis
●oelices
olim
fuer●
futur●eque
sunt
urbes
.
Sal.
The
next
vertue
required
in
Princes
is
Clemency
,
being
an
inclination
of
the
mind
to
lenity
and
compassion
,
yet
tempered
with
severity
and
judgment
;
this
quality
is
fit
for
all
great
personages
,
but
chiefly
Princes
,
because
their
occasion
to
use
it
is
most
;
by
it
also
the
love
of
men
is
gained
;
Qui
vult
regnare
,
languida
regnet
manu
.
Sen.
After
Clemency
,
Fidelity
is
expected
in
all
good
Princes
,
which
is
a
certain
performance
and
observation
of
word
and
promise
;
this
vertue
seemeth
to
accompany
Justice
,
or
is
as
it
were
the
same
,
and
therefore
most
fit
for
Princes
:
Sanctissimum
generis
humani
●onum
.
Liv.
As
Fidelity
followeth
Justice
,
so
doth
Modesty
accompany
Clemency
;
Modesty
is
a
temperature
of
reason
,
whereby
the
mind
of
man
is
so
governed●
as
neither
in
action
or
opinion
he
over-deemeth
of
himself
,
or
any
thing
that
is
his
;
a
qualitie
not
common
in
fortunate
folk
;
and
most
rare
in
Princes
.
Super●ia
commune
nobilitatis
malum
.
Sal.
This
vertue
doth
also
moderate
all
external
demonstration
of
Insolence
,
Pride
,
and
Arrogance
,
and
therefore
necessary
to
be
●nown
of
Princes
,
and
all
others
whom
●avor
or
Fortune
have
advanced
:
Impone
●oelicitati
t●●e
fr●enos
,
facilius
illam
reges
.
Curt.
But
as
Princes
are
to
observe
the
bounds
of
Modesty
,
so
may
they
not
forget
the
the
Majesty
appertaining
to
their
supream
●onor
,
being
a
certain
reverend
greatness
due
to
princely
vertue
and
royal
State
;
A
grace
and
gravity
no
lesse
beseeming
a
●rince
then
vertue
it self
;
for
neither
overmuch
familiarity
,
nor
too
great
austeritie
●ought
to
be
used
by
Princes
:
Facilitas
●ntoritatem
,
severitas
amorem
minuit
.
Tac.
To
these
vertues
we
may
apply
Liberality
,
which
doth
not
only
adorn
,
but
highly
advance
the
honor
due
to
Princes
;
there●y
also
the
good
will
of
men
is
gained
;
for
nothing
is
more
fitting
a
Princes
nature
then
Bounty
,
the
same
being
accompanied
with
judgment
,
and
performed
according
to
the
laws
of
liberality
;
Perdere
multi
sci●nt
,
donare
nesciunt
.
Tac.
It
seemeth
also
that
Prudence
is
not
only
fit
,
but
also
among
other
vertues
necessary
in
a
Prince
;
for
the
daily
use
thereof
is
in
all
humane
actions
required
,
and
chiefly
in
matters
of
State
and
Government
.
Prudentia
imperantis
propria
et
unica
virtus
.
Arist.
The
success
of
all
wordly
proceeding●
doth
shew
that
prudence
hath
compassed
the
prosperous
event
of
humane
actions
,
more
then
force
of
arms
or
other
power●Mens
una
sapiens
plurium
vincit
manus
.
Eurip.
Prudence
is
either
natural
,
or
received
from
others
;
for
who
so
can
counsel
himself
what
is
fit
to
be
done
,
needeth
not
the
advice
of
others
;
But
they
that
want
such
perfection
,
and
are
nevertheless
capable
,
and
are
willing
to
know
what
others
informe
,
ought
to
be
accompted
wise
enough
:
Laudatissimus
est
qui
cuncta
vid●bit
,
sed
laudandus
est
is
qui
paret
rectè
monenti
.
Hesiod
.
CHAP.
XIIII
.
Of
the
Princes
intimate
Counsellors
and
Ministers
of
State
,
with
their
several
Requisites
.
ALbeit
the
excellent
spirit
of
some
Princes
be
such
as
doth
justly
deserve
the
highest
●ommendation
;
yet
for
that
every
course
of
life
needeth
the
aid
of
men
,
and
the
mind
of
one
cannot
comprehend
the
infinite
care
appertaining
to
publick
affairs
;
it
behooveth
Princes
to
be
assisted
:
Magna
negocia
,
adjutoribus
egent
.
Tac.
These
assistants
may
be
properly
divided
into
Counsellors
and
Ministers
;
the
one
to
advise
,
the
other
to
execute
:
without
Counsel
,
no
Kingdom
,
no
State
,
no
private
house
can
stand
;
for
,
experience
hath
proved
that
Common
weals
have
prospered
so
long
as
good
counsell
did
governe
,
but
when
favor
,
fear
,
or
voluptuosness
entred
,
those
nations
became
disordered
;
and
in
the
end
subject
to
slavery
:
Quiddam
sacrum
profecto
est
consultatio
.
Plato
.
Counsellors
are
men
specially
selected
to
give
advice
to
Princes
or
Commonwealths
,
as
well
in
peace
as
in
war
:
the
chief
qualities
required
in
such
men
,
are
Fidelity
and
Knowledg
;
which
two
concurring
do
make
them
both
good
and
wise
,
and
consequen●●y
fit
for
Counsel
;
Prudentis
proprium
m●nus
rectè
con●ulere
.
Arist.
The
election
of
Counsellors
is
and
ought
to
be
chiefly
among
men
of
long
experience
,
and
grave
years
;
for
as
youth
is
fittest
for
action
in
respect
of
corporal
strength
;
so
elder
folk
having
felt
the
force
of
every
fortune
,
and
observed
the
course
of
worldly
proceedings
do
seem
most
meet
for
consultation
:
Consilia
senum
,
facta
juvenum
.
Pla●●
.
Albeit
we
say
that
the
excellency
of
wisdom
should
be
in
Counsellors
;
yet
do
we
not
require
so
quick
and
fiery
a
conceipt
as
is
more
apt
for
innovation
then
orderly
government
.
Hebet
●ores
quàm
acutiores
meliùs
Remp.
a●ministrant
.
Thucyd.
To
Fidelity
and
Experience
we
wish
that
our
Councellors
should
be
endued
with
Piety
,
Liberty
,
Constancy
,
Modesty
,
and
Silence
;
for
as
the
aid
and
assistance
of
God
is
that
which
governeth
all
good
counsels
,
so
liberty
of
speech
and
magnanimus
uttering
of
what
is
good
and
fit
,
is
necessary
in
Counsellors
.
Likewise
to
be
constant
and
not
to
varie
in
opinion
,
either
for
feare
or
favor
,
is
very
commendable
:
Also
as
modesty
in
giving
Counsel
escheweth
all
offences
,
and
gaineth
good
will
;
so
secrecy
is
the
best
and
most
secure
meanes
to
govern
all
publick
affairs
:
Res
magnae
sustineri
non
possunt
ab
●o
qui
tacere
nequit
.
Curt.
The
first
obstacle
to
good
Counsel
is
●ertinacy
or
Opiniativeness
,
a
condition
far
unfit
for
Counsellors
;
yet
some
men
are
so
far
in
love
with
their
own
Opiniastre
conceipts
as
that
they
cannot
patiently
endure
opposition
.
Secondly
,
Discord
must
from
Counsellors
be
removed
,
because
private
offence
many
times
impeacheth
publick
proceedings
.
Thirdly
affection
is
an
enemy
to
counsel
,
the
same
being
commonly
accompanied
with
anger
,
wherewith
nothing
can
be
rightly
or
considerately
done
.
Lastly
Avarice
seemeth
a
vice
worthy
to
be
abhorred
of
all
Counsellors
because
it
driveth
away
both
Fidelity
and
Honesty
,
the
principall
pillars
of
all
good
counsell
:
Pessimum
veri
affectus
et
judicii
venenum●
utilitas
.
Tac.
To
good
Counsell
other
impediments
there
are
,
which
square
not
with
wisdom
;
for
all
crafty
and
hazarding
Counsells
do
seem
in
the
beginning
likely
to
succeed
;
but
afterwards
and
chiefly
in
the
end
do
prove
hard
and
of
evil
event
.
It
therefore
seemeth
behovefull
to
be
wary
in
resolving
,
and
bold
in
executing
:
Animus
vereri
qui
scit
,
scit
tutò
aggredi
.
Pub.
An
other
let
to
good
consultation
is
immoderate
desire
,
which
every
wise
man
must
endeavor
to
restrain
.
Cupiditate
pauca
rectè
fiunt
,
circumspectione
plurima
:
Thucyd.
Thirdly
haste
,
is
an
Enemy
to
good
deliberation
;
for
whoso
greedily
desireth
any
thing
,
proceedeth
rashly
;
and
rash
proceeding
endeth
ever
in
repentance
.
Scelera
impetu
,
bona
consilia
morâ
vales●unt
.
Tac.
Of
Ministers
of
State
.
Having
already
spoken
of
Counsellors
,
somwhat
is
to
be
spoken
of
Ministers
;
I
mean
those
that
either
publickly
or
privately
serve
the
Prince
in
any
function
;
in
choice
of
which
men
,
care
must
be
had
,
First
that
they
be
person
honestly
born
;
for
no
man
descended
of
base
parentage
may
be
admitted
,
unless
in
him
be
found
some
noble
and
excellent
vertue
;
Optimus
quisque
Nobilismus
.
Plato
.
Secondly
,
they
ought
to
be
of
honest
condition
,
and
of
good
●ame
;
for
that
common-weal
is
better
and
more
secure
,
where
the
Prince
is
not
good
,
then
is
that
where
his
Ministers
are
evill
.
It
seemeth
therefore
that
Ministers
should
be
men
of
good
quality
and
blamelesse
.
Emitur
sola
virtute
p●testas
.
Claud.
Thirdly
,
consideration
is
to
be
had
of
their
Capacity
and
fitness
for
that
Function
wherein
they
are
to
be
used
;
for
as
some
men
are
apt
for
learning
,
so
others
are
naturally
disposed
to
arms
.
Also
it
is
necessary
that
every
one
square
with
the
office
whereuntoh
e
is
appointed
,
in
which
matter
some
Princes
have
used
great
caution
;
for
as
they
little
liked
of
men
excellent
,
so
they
utterly
detested
the
vitious
;
the
one
they
doubted
to
trust
in
regard
of
themselves
,
the
other
were
thought
a
publick
indignity
to
the
State
.
VVise
men
have
therefore
resolved
that
those
witts
which
are
neither
over
haughty
and
singular
,
nor
they
which
be
base
or
dull
are
fittest
for
Princes
secrets
and
services
;
howsoever
we
may
hereof
say
with
Tacitus
:
Nesci●
quomodo
Aulica
hae●
comitia
affect
us
dirigit
,
et
fato
quodam
ac
sorte
nascendi
,
ut
caetera
,
it
a
principum
inclinatio
in
hos
,
offensio
in
illos
est
.
Tac.
And
because
the
course
and
quality
of
mens
lives
serving
in
Court
,
is
of
all
other
the
most
uncertain
and
dangerous
,
great
heed
and
circumspection
ought
therein
to
be
used
;
for
whoso
serveth
negligently
forgetting
the
dutifull
endeavors
appertaining
to
the
place
,
seemeth
to
take
a
way
of
no
good
speed
:
Quanto
quis
obsequio
promptior
,
tanto
●onoribus
et
●pibus
extollitur
.
Tac.
It
shall
also
become
such
a
man
to
look
well
unto
his
own
profit
and
behave
himself
rather
boldly
then
bashfully
:
Malus
minister
Regi●
imperii
p●dor
.
Sen.
To
be
modest
,
and
closely
to
handle
all
actions
;
is
also
a
course
well
beseeming
a
Courtier
;
neither
shall
he
do
well
to
attribute
any
good
success
to
his
own
vertue
or
merit
,
but
acknowledg
all
to
proceed
from
the
Princes
bounty
and
goodness
,
by
which
meanes
envy
is
eschewed
,
and
the
Prince
not
robbed
of
his
honor
.
Haec
est
conditio
Regum
,
casus
tantum
advers●s
hominibus
tribuant
,
secundos
virtuti
suae
.
Prov.
Emped
.
And
to
conclude
these
precepts
summarily
,
I
say
it
behooveth
a●l
ministers
and
servants
in
Court
to
be
patient
,
wary
and
of
few
words
:
Fraudum
sedes
Aula
.
Sen.
CHAP.
XV
.
The
Art
of
ruling
,
or
Mystery
of
Regiment
.
TO
governe
,
is
a
certain
skill
how
to
command
and
continue
Subjects
in
due
obedience
,
so
as
offend
they
ought
not
,
or
if
they
will
they
cannot
;
wherein
two
speciall
things
are
to
be
considered
(
viz
)
the
nature
of
Men
,
and
the
nature
of
the
State●
but
first
the
condition
of
the
vulgar
must
be
well
conceived
;
Noscenda
natura
vulgi
,
et
quibus
modis
temperanter
hab●atur
.
Tac.
The
disposition
of
divers
men
is
,
some
are
apt
to
anger
,
some
are
hardy
,
some
fearful
;
it
therefore
behooveth
the
Prince
to
accommodate
his
government
to
the
humor
of
people
whom
he
governeth
:
Principis
est
virtus
maxima
nosse
suos
.
Mart.
Likewise
the
nature
of
Commonweals
is
mutable
and
subject
to
change
,
and
Kings
are
not
only
accompanied
with
fortune●
but
also
followed
with
hate
,
which
breedeth
a
continuall
diffidence
,
chiefly
towards
those
that
are
nearest
to
Majesty
:
Suspectus
semper
invisusq●e
dominantibus
quisquis
proximus
destinatur
.
Tac.
Moreover
the
vulgar
sort
is
generally
variable●
rash
,
hardy
,
and
void
of
judgment
;
ex
opinione
multa
,
ex
veritate
pauca
judicat
.
Cic.
To
confirm
a
Government
,
force
and
armes
are
of
greatest
necessity
;
by
force
I
mean
the
guards
and
armes
which
Princes
use
for
their
defence
or
ornament
;
Miles
in
foro
,
Miles
in
curia
principem
comitari
debet
.
Tac.
To
this
may
be
added
fortification
and
strong
buildings
,
in
these
days
much
used
by
new
Princes
,
and
others
also
to
whom
people
yield
,
not
willing
obedience
.
In
ancient
times
Princes
planted
Colonies
as
well
to
suppress
rebellion
in
conquered
Countries
,
as
to
front
suspected
neighbors
:
Coloniae
vera
sedes
servitutis
.
Tac.
The
government
of
Princes
is
also
greatly
increased
by
a
vertue
,
which
I
call
a
commendable
affection
in
Subjects
,
proceedi●g
of
love
and
authority
:
These
effects
do
grow
from
the
Princes
own
merit
,
but
their
being
liveth
in
the
mind
of
the
People
;
this
love
is
gained
by
lenity
,
liberality
,
and
mercy
;
yet
is
every
of
them
to
be
tempered
:
Nec
aut
reverentiam
terrore
,
aut
amorem
humilitate
captabis
.
Plin.
Affection
is
also
no
way
sooner
won
then
by
liberality
,
the
same
being
used
with
Judgment
and
Moderation
.
Bellorum
sociis
,
periculorum
c●n●ortibus
,
sive
de
te
ben●
ac
fortiter
—
meritis
.
Sen.
By
●ndulgence
likewise
and
Princely
affability
the
love
of
men
is
gained
;
for
the
multitude
desire
no
more
then
necessary
food
,
and
liberty
to
use
ordinary
recreation●●Vulgo
,
sicut
pueris
,
omne
ludicrum
in
pretio
est
.
Sen.
CHAP.
XVI
.
Of
Princely
Authority
;
wherein
it
consists
,
and
how
far
to
be
extended
and
delegated
.
AUthority
is
a
certain
reverent
impression
in
the
minds
of
Subjects
and
others
touching
the
Princes
vertue
and
government
;
it
resteth
chiefly
in
admiration
and
●ear●Ingenita
quibusdam
gentibus
ergareges
●uos
veneratio
.
Curt.
Authority
consisteth
in
three
things
;
(
viz
)
the
form
of
Government
,
the
strength
of
the
Kingdom●
and
the
condition
of
the
Prince
;
for
in
them
all
reputation
and
●ecurity
resteth
:
Majest
as
imperii
,
salut●s
●utela
.
Curt.
Whoso
desireth
to
governe
well
,
it
behoveth
him
to
use
severity
,
constancy
,
and
restraint
;
for
over
much
lenity
introduceth
contempt
,
and
certain
hope
of
impunity
;
the
condition
of
men
being
such
as
canno●
be
restrained
by
shame
,
yet
it
is
to
be
commanded
by
fear
:
Salutaris
s●veritas
vincit
inanem
speciem
clementiae
.
Cic.
Yet
ought
severity
to
be
used
with
great
respect
and
sparingly
,
because
over
great
terror
breedeth
desperation
:
Poena
ad
paucos
,
metus
ad
omnes
perveniat
.
Cic.
To
governe
constantly
is
nothing
else
but
to
continue
the
old
and
antient
laws
in
force
without
change
or
innovation
unles
exceeding
great
commodity
or
urgent
necessity
shall
so
require
:
for
where
extream
punishments
are
used
,
reformation
is
always
needfull
;
Nocet
interdum
priscus
rigor
&
nimia
severitas
.
Tac.
Also
to
restrain
Authority
is
a
matter
of
great
necessity
●nd
worthy
a
wise
Prince●
else
he
maketh
others
partakers
of
the
honor
and
power
to
himself
only
due
,
the
same
being
also
dangerous
:
Periculosum
privati
hominis
nomen
supra
(
immó
&
juxta
)
principes
extolli
.
Tac.
It
seemeth
also
perilous
that
great
Authority
given
to
private
men
should
be
long●
for
thereby
oftentimes
they
are
made
in●olent
and
apt
to
innovation
:
Libertatis
sive
principatus
magna
imperia
diuturna
sse
n●
sinas
.
Liv.
Authority
is
also
reinforced
and
enlarged
by
power
,
without
which
no
Prince
can
either
take
from
others
or
defend
his
own
:
Parum
tuta
sine
viribus
majestas
.
Liv.
CHAP.
XVII
.
Of
Power
and
Force
;
and
how
to
be
raised
and
maintained
.
Power
and
Stength
is
attained
by
these
●ive
ways
,
Mony
,
Armes
,
Counsell
,
Friends
and
Fortune
;
but
of
these
the
first
and
most
'
forcible
is
mony
:
Nihil
tam
munitum
quod
non
exp●gnari
pecuni●
possit
.
Cic.
Next
to
mony
armes
are
of
most
use
,
as
well
to
defend
as
to
offend
;
to
keep
,
as
to
conquer
;
for
oftentimes
occasion
is
to
be
offered
as
well
to
take
from
others
,
as
to
hold
what
is
our
own
:
Sua
retinere
privatae
est
domus
,
de
alie●is
certare
Regia
laus
est
.
Tac.
Also
of
great
and
necessary
use
is
Counsell
,
to
devise
how
Arms
ought
to
be
employed
or
enforced
:
Arma
concilio
temperan●a
.
Tac.
Likewise
Friends
and
Confederates
do
greatly
increase
the
vertue
of
power
,
the
same
being
such
as
have
both
wit
and
ability
to
aid
:
In
caducum
parietem
ne
inclina
:
Adri
.
The
last
,
yet
not
the
least
part
of
power
,
consisteth
in
Fortune
;
whereof
daily
experience
may
be
seen
;
for
the
success
of
all
humane
actions
seem
rather
to
proceed
from
fortune
then
vertue
.
Omni
ratione
potentior
fortuna
.
Curt.
To
these
particularities
concerning
power
,
we
may
add
the
qualities
of
the
Prince
,
which
greatly
grace
his
authority
;
these
are
partly
internal●
and
partly
external
;
by
the
one
I
mean
the
vertues
of
the
mind
,
by
the
other
a
certain
seemly
behavior
and
comly
gesture
of
the
body
;
of
the
first
kind
I
do
suppose
piety
and
providence
to
be
the
chief
,
for
piety
maketh
a
Princk
venerable
,
and
like
unto
God
;
Oportet
principem
res
divinas
videri
curare
seri●
&
ant●
omnia
.
Arist.
Providence
is
a
forecast
and
likely
conjecture
of
things
to
come
,
supposed
to
be
in
those
Princes
that
in
their
actions
proceed
slowly
and
circumspectly
;
it
seemeth
also
a
course
of
Princely
discretion
to
be
retired
and
not
ordinarily
to
converse
with
many
:
Autoritatem
absentiâ
tueare
.
Suet.
CHAP.
XVIII
.
Of
Conspiracy
and
Treason
;
with
the
Causes
and
ways
of
prevention
or
discovery
.
COnspiracy
is
commonly
addressed
to
the
Princes
person
;
Treasons
are
addressed
again●t
his
Government
,
Authority
,
Country
,
Subjects
,
or
places
of
strength
.
These
Mischiefs
are
easily
feared
,
but
hardly
eschewed●
for
albeit
open
Enemies
are
openly
encountred
,
yet
Fraud
and
Subtilty
are
secret
foes
,
and
consequently
not
to
be
avoided
:
Occulta
pericula
n●que
praevidere
n
q●e
vitare
in
promptu
●st
.
Salust
.
The
danger
of
conspiracy
preceedeth
of
divers
causes
,
as
Avarice
,
Infidelity
of
Subjects
,
Ambition
in
Servants
,
and
coruption
in
Soldiers
,
therefore
with
great
difficulty
to
be
avoided
:
Vitae
tuae
dominus
est
,
quisquis
suam
contempsit
.
Sen.
Notwithstanding
it
seemeth
that
either
by
Inquisition
,
Punishment
,
Innocency
,
or
Destiny
,
the
evill
affection
of
men
may
be
oftentimes
discovered
:
1.
For
whoso
will
curiously
inquire
and
consider
the
actions
and
ordinary
speeches
of
men
(
I
mean
those
that
be
persons
of
honor
and
reputation
)
may
oftentimes
vent
the
Myne
that
lurketh
in
the
minds
.
Quoniam
raro
nisi
male
loqunti
male
faciunt
.
Lips
.
2.
Punishment
is
likewise
a
thing
so
terrible
that
the
consideration
thereof
with
the
hope
of
reward
doth
often
discover
those
dangerous
intentions
:
Cruciaiu
aut
praemio
cuncta
pervia
sunt
.
Tac.
But
as
it
is
wisdom
in
Princes
to
give
ear
to
informers
,
so
are
they
not
always
to
be
believed
;
for
Hope
,
Envy
,
Hate
,
or
some
other
passion
oftentimes
draws
them
to
speak
untruly
.
Quis
innocens
esse
potest
si
accusare
sufficit
?
Tac.
3.
The
third
and
likeliest
defence
against
conspiracy
is
the
Princes
own
Innocency
;
for
never
having
injured
any
man
,
it
cannot
be
thought
there
liveth
any
Subject
so
lewde
as
will
endeavor
to
hurt
him
.
Fidelissima
custodia
principis
ipsius
in●ocentia
.
Pli●
.
4.
The
last
and
best
bulwark
to
withstand
the
force
of
this
mischief
we
call
destiny
;
which
preceeding
from
the
Fountain
of
divine
providence
,
may
be
truly
called
the
will
of
God
;
in
whose
only
power
it
resteth
to
protect
and
defend
good
Pri●ces
.
Ille
erit
à
latere
tuo
,
&
custodiet
pedem
tuum
n●
capiaris
.
Salo.
Treasons
are
most
commonly
enterprized
by
covetous
persons
,
who
preferring
private
profit
before
fame
or
fidelity
,
do
not
fear
to
enter
into
any
impious
action
:
To
this
humor
ambitious
men
,
dissentious
,
and
all
such
as
be
desirous
of
Innovation
,
are
inclined
:
Pulcra
loquentes
iidem
in
pectore
prava
strue●tes
.
Hom.
To
these
Offenders
no
punishment
as
equal
to
their
impious
merit
,
can
be
devised
,
being
persons
odious
as
well
to
friend
as
foes
:
Proditores
etiam
in
quos
antepo●unt
,
invisi
s●●t
.
Tac.
CHAP.
XIX
.
Of
publick
Hate
and
Contempt
,
with
the
occasions
and
means
to
redress
and
avoid
it
.
HAving
briefly
touched
the
Vertues
and
Means
whereby
Princes
are
maintained
●n
Authority
and
Honor
,
let
something
be
said
of
the
causes
from
whence
their
ruine
doth
proceed
;
the
cheif
whereof
seemeth
to
be
Hate
and
Contempt
:
Hate
cometh
of
Feare
,
which
the
more
Common
it
is
,
the
more
Dangerous●Nulla
vis
imperii
tanta
est
,
quae
prement●
met●
possit
esse
di●turna●
Cic.
The
causes
of
Feare
are
Punishments
Impositions
and
Rigor
;
and
therefore
it
behooveth
a
Prince
not
only
to
shun
them
,
but
to
eschew
those
actions
whereby
he
may
reasonably
incur
their
suspition
.
Sentias
enim
homines
ut
metuant
a●t
oderint
,
●non
minus
opinio●e
&
fama
,
quam
certa
aliqua
ratione
moveri
.
Cic.
Yet
Punishment●
Imposition
,
and
Censure
are
in
all
States
necessary
,
although
they
shew
and
seem
terrible
,
and
consequently
breed
a
certain
desperation
in
Subiects
,
unless
they
be
discreetly
and
modestly
used
;
for
extreme
and
frequent
punishments
taste
of
cruelty
;
great
and
many
Imposts
●avour
of
Covetousness
;
censure
of
manners
when
it
exceedeth
the
quality
of
offences
,
doth
seem
Rigor
in
these
matters
;
therefore
it
behooveth
the
Prince
to
be
moderate
and
cautelous
,
chiefly
in
Capital
Punishment
,
which
must
be
confined
within
the
bounds
of
Justice
.
Sit
apud
principem
parsimonia
etiam
vilissimi
sanguinis
.
Sen.
But
if
for
securitie
sake
the
Prince
be
forced
to
punish
,
let
the
same
be
done
with
shew
of
great
sorrow
and
lothness
:
Tanquam
invitus
&
magnocum
tormento
ad
castigandum
veniat
.
S●n
.
Let
all
punishments
also
be
slowly
executed●
for
they
that
are
hastily
punished
do
seem
to
have
bin
willingly
condemned
;
neither
ought
any
Capital●
Punishment
to
be
inflicted
but
only
that
which
is
profitable
to
the
Commonweale
,
and
for
example
sake
.
Non
●am
ut
ipsi
pereant
,
quam
ut
alios
pereundo
deterreant
.
Sen.
In
punishing
also
a
special
respect
must
be
had
,
that
no
shew
of
content
or
pleasure
be
taken
therein
.
Formarabiei
est
sanguine
&
vulneribus
gaudere
.
Sen.
Also
in
punishing
equality
must
be
observed
,
and
the
nature
of
the
punishment
according
to
the
Custom
.
Nec
eisdem
de
causis
alii
plectantur
,
alii
ne
appellentur
quidem●
Cic.
But
in
punishing
publick
offences
wherei●
a
multitude
have
part
,
the
execution
ought
to
be
otherwise
,
and
as
it
were
at
an
instant
,
which
may
haply
seem
terrible
,
but
in
effect
is
not
.
Frequens
vindicta
paucorum
odium
reprimit
,
omnium
irritat
.
Sen.
Another
meanes
to
satisfie
a
people
offended
is
to
punish
the
Ministers
of
cruelty
,
and
with
their
blood
to
wash
away
the
common
hatred
.
Piaculares
publici
odii
victimae
.
Plin.
By
this
King
David
did
appease
the
Gibeonites
.
The
next
cause
of
discontent
cometh
of
Impositions
under
which
word
is
comprehended
all
levies
of
mony
,
a
matter
nothing
pleasing
to
people
,
as
that
which
they
esteem
equall
to
their
own
lives
.
Pecunia
anima
&
sanguis
est
mortalibus
.
Plaut.
First
,
to
remove
hate
conceived
of
this
cause
,
there
is
nothing
better
then
publick
expostulation
of
necessity
:
for
what
Commonwealth
or
Kingdom
can
be
without
Tributes
?
Nulla
quies
gentium
sine
armis
,
nec
arma
sine
stipendiis
,
nec
stipendia
sine
Tributis
haberi
queunt
,
Tac.
The
second
remedy
against
Hate
for
impositions
is
to
make
moderate
Levies
and
rare
.
For
as
Tiberius
the
Emperor
was
wont
to
say
,
a
Sheep
should
be
fleeced
not
flead
.
Qui
nimis
emungit
,
elicit
sanguin●m
.
Tac.
Thirdly
,
also
to
eschew
the
offence
of
People
it
behoveth
the
Prince
to
have
a
vigilant
eye
on
Informers
,
Promoters
,
and
such
fiscal
Ministers
,
whose
cruelty
and
covetous
proceedings
do
oftentimes
occasion
great
hate
;
but
this
mischief
may
be
,
though
hardly
,
encountred
,
either
by
choosing
honest
Officers
,
or
(
proving
otherwise
)
not
only
to
remaine
them
but
to
use
them
as
spunges
,
Exprimendi
post
qu●m
biberint
.
Suet.
In
all
impositions
or
Taxations
,
no
cruelty
or
force
ought
to
be
used
,
the
second
cause
to
kindle
hate
:
and
to
meet
with
that
mischief
,
nothing
is
better
then
to
proceed
moderately
,
and
without
extremity
.
Ne
Boves
ipsos
,
mox
agros
,
postremò
corpora
servitio
aut
poenae
tradant
,
Tac.
The
fourth
remedy
is
the
Princes
own
parsimony
,
not
giving
so
largely
to
private
persons
as
thereby
to
be
forced
to
take
from
the
multitude
.
Magnae
opes
no●
tam
multa
capiendo
,
quam
haud
multa
perdendo
,
quaerunt●r
.
Maecaenas●
The
last
help
against
hate
is
in
taxation
to
proceed
equally
,
indifferently
,
and
without
favor
or
respect
;
and
that
the
Assessors
of
Taxes
may
be
elected
of
the
meaner
sort
of
people
.
Populus
maximam
fidem
rerum
suarum
hab●t
.
Tac.
Touching
Censure
,
which
we
numbred
amongst
the
causes
whereof
hate
is
conceived
,
much
needeth
not
to
be
spoken
,
because
the
same
is
discontinued●
or
rather
utterly
forgotten
;
yet
doth
it
seem
a
thing
necessary
,
being
a
certain
observation
and
controlement
of
such
evill
manners
,
and
disorders
as
were
not
by
Law
Corrigible
;
these
Officers
were
of
the
Romans
called
Magistri
pudoris
&
mod●stiae
.
Livi.
To
the
Function
of
Censures
these
two
things
are
anciently
subject
Manners
,
and
Excess
;
Under
Manners
I
comprehend
Wantonness
,
Drunkenness
,
Dicing
,
Brawling
,
Perjury
,
and
all
such
Lewdness
as
Modesty
condemneth
.
These
disorders
were
anciently
punished
by
the
discretion
of
●ensors
in
all
Ages
and
Sexes
,
to
the
end
that
Idleness
might
be
generally
avoided
.
Vniversa
plebs
habeat
neg●tia
sua
,
quibus
àmal●
publico
detineatur
.
Salust
Excess
includeth
Riotousness
,
expence
of
Money
,
Prodigal
housekeeping
,
Banqueting
,
and
Superfluitie
in
Apparrel
,
which
things
are
the
mothers
of
many
mischeifs
.
It
also
seemeth
in
some
sort
perillous
to
the
Prince
that
the
Subject
should
exceed
either
in
Covetize
or
Consuming
.
Nemo
nimis
excedat
,
sive
amicorum
copiâ
,
sine
opum
.
Arist.
The
punishment
inflicted
upon
these
sorts
of
offenders
,
were
either
Ignom●ny
,
or
Pecuniarie
punishments
,
Censoris
judicium
d●mnato
nihil
affert
nis●
ruborem
.
Tac.
The
first
and
chiefest
meanes
to
remove
these
inconveniences
,
is
the
Princes
own
example
,
whose
life
being
well
censured
,
easily
reduceth
others
to
order
.
●ita
principis
censura
perpetu●
.
Plin.
Secondly
,
Those
disorders
may
be
taken
away
without
danger
,
if
the
Censures
doe
proceed
by
degrees
and
leasurely
;
for
the
nature
of
man
may
not
suddenly
be
altered●Vitia
quaedam
tol●it
facilius
princeps
,
si
eorum
sit
p●
ti●n●
.
Sen.
These
are
the
cheifest
rules
whereby
to
eschew
hate
;
but
impossible
it
is
for
any
Prince
or
Minister
utterly
to
avoid
it
;
for
being
himself
good
,
he
incurreth
the
offence
of
all
bad
folk
:
if
he
be
evil
,
good
men
will
hate
him
;
this
danger
therefore
Wise
and
Vertuous
Princes
have
little
regarded
:
because
hate
may
be
gained
as
well
by
good
as
evil
doing
.
Odia
qui
nimium
timet
,
regnare
nescit
.
Sen.
One
other
means
to
remove
this
error
,
is
,
to
reward
the
good
and
well
deserving
Subjects
;
for
no
man
can
think
him
cruell
that
for
love
to
Vertue
useth
Austeritie
:
which
wil
appear
when
he
bestoweth
bountif●lly
on
the
good
.
Praemio
&
●oena
Respublica
continetur
Solon
.
The
other
Vice
which
indangereth
the
State
of
Princes
,
we
call
Contempt
,
being
a
certain
base
and
vile
conceipt
,
which
entereth
into
the
Subjects
,
strangers
or
servants
,
of
the
Prince
and
his
Proceedings
;
for
the
Authority
of
a
King
may
be
resembled
to
the
powers
of
mans
mind
,
whereunto
the
hands
,
the
feet
,
the
eyes
,
do
by
consent
obey
.
Vires
imperii
in
consensu
obedientium
sunt
Livi.
The
causes
of
Contempt
do
proceed
chiefly
from
the
form
of
Government
,
Fortune
,
or
the
Princes
manners
;
the
form
of
Government
becometh
contemptible
,
when
the
Prince
desiring
to
be
thought
merciful
,
ruleth
rather
pittifully
then
justly
:
which
manner
of
proceeding
taketh
away
all
reverence
in
the
people
,
and
in
liew
thereof
entereth
liberty
,
or
at
least
a
certain
boldness
to
offend
;
Facultas
faciendi
quod
cuilibet
visum
,
non
p●test
comprimere
ingenitam
si●gulis
hominibus
pravitatem
.
Tac.
Also
to
be
Mutable
,
Irresolute
,
light
and
Inconsiderate
in
bestowing
the
Honors
and
Offices
of
State
,
maketh
the
Prince
contemptible
;
Qui
praesentibus
fruitur
,
nec
in
longi●s
consultat●
Arist.
But
if
contempt
be
caused
by
Fortune
,
or
as
may
be
said
more
reasonably
,
by
destiny
,
and
that
those
fri●nds
do
fail
who
ought
in
duty
to
defend
the
Prince
and
his
Authority
,
then
is
there
small
hope
to
eschew
contempt
.
Fato
obnoxia
virtus
.
Pl●ut
.
The
Princes
manners
do
breed
contempt
,
when
he
yeildeth
his
affections
to
sensuality
and
sloth
,
or
if
he
incur
the
suspition
of
Simplicity
,
Cowardise
,
or
any
such
Vice
,
unworthy
the
Dignity
he
beareth●
Common
people
do
sometimes
also
disesteem
the
Prince
for
external
and
light
causes
,
as
deformity
of
person
,
sickness
or
such
like
.
Mos
vulgi
est
,
fortuita
&
externa
ad
culpam
trahe●e
.
Tac.
CHAP.
XX
.
Of
Diffidence
and
Dissimulation
in
the
mannage
of
State
Affairs
.
ALbeit
roundness
and
plain
dealing
be
most
worthy
praise
,
chiefly
in
private
persons
;
yet
because
all
men
in
their
actions
do
not
so
proceed
it
behooveth
Wise
Men
and
Princes
above
others
at
occasions
to
semble
and
dissemble
;
for
as
in
all
actions
a
Prince
ought
to
be
slow
and
advised
;
so
in
consent
and
beleiving
haste
and
facility
is
most
dangerous
;
and
though
credulity
be
rather
an
error
then
a
fault
;
yet
for
Princes
it
is
both
unfit
and
perilous
.
Wherefore
it
importeth
them
to
be
defended
with
this
caution
,
Nihil
credendo
,
atque
omnia
cav●ndo
.
Ci●
.
Notwithstanding
he
must
not
shew
himself
diffident
or
distrustful
utterly
;
but
as
I
wish
he
should
not
over-slightly
believe
all
men
,
so
ought
he
not
for
small
causes
distrust
every
man
.
Multi
faller●
d●cuerunt
,
dum
timent
falli
.
Sen.
Dissimulation
is
as
it
were
begotten
by
diffidence
,
a
quality
in
Princes
of
so
great
necessity
as
moved
the
Emperor
Tiberi●●
to
say
,
Nescit
regnare
,
qui
nescit
dissim●lare
.
The
necessity
of
dissimulation
is
chiefly
to
be
u●ed
with
strangers
and
enemies
:
it
also
sheweth
a
certain
di●cretion
in
Magistrates
sometimes
to
disguise
with
friends
when
no
offence
doth
thereof
follow
.
Do●i
non
sunt
d●li
,
nisi
ast●
colas
.
Plaut.
This
kind
of
craf●
albeit
in
every
mans
conceipt
not
praisable
,
is
nevertheless
tolerable
,
and
for
Princes
and
Magistrates
(
the
same
being
●sed
to
good
ends
)
very
necessary
.
But
those
cunnings
which
are
contrary
to
vertue
,
ought
not
of
honest
men
to
be
used
:
neither
dare
I
commend
Adulation
and
Corruption
;
though
they
be
often
used
in
Court
and
are
of
some
learned
writers
allowed
.
Decipere
pro
moribus
temporum
,
prudentia
est
.
Plin.
By
great
subtiltie
and
frauds
contrary
to
Vertue
and
Piety
,
I
mean
Perjury
and
Injustice
,
which
though
all
men
in
words
detest
,
yet
in
deeds
are
used
of
many
,
perswading
themselves
by
Cavillations
and
Sophistications
to
excuse
the
impiety
o●
their
false
Oathes
:
as
it
is
written
of
Lysander
,
Pueros
●●lis
,
viros
juramentis
circumvenire
solebat
.
Plut.
CHAP.
XXI
.
Of
Warr
Defensive
and
Invasive
:
with
Instructions
touching
Laws
of
Armes
,
Soldiers
,
and
Military
Discipline
.
THe
Art
Military
is
of
all
other
qualities
most
necessary
for
Princes
;
for
without
it
they
cannot
be
defended
;
force
of
men
only
sufficeth
not
,
unless
the
same
be
governed
by
Council
,
and
Martial
Wisdom
.
Duo
sunt
quibus
resp●
servatur
;
in
hostes
fortitudo
,
&
domi
concordia
.
Tac.
Military
knowledge
concerneth
Warr
,
and
every
Warr
is
either
Forreign
or
Domestical
.
Touching
Forriegn
it
must
be
considered
when
it
must
be
begun
,
how
to
continue
it
,
and
when
to
be
ended
;
to
begin
War
,
a
Prince
is
,
to
take
heed
that
the
cause
be
just
,
and
the
enterprise
advisedly
entred
into
.
Sunt
enim
&
belli
sicut
pacis
jura
,
j●st●que
ea
non
minus
ac
fortiter
gerere
debes
.
Liv.
The
Laws
of
Arms
are
in
all
Common-weales
to
be
duly
observed
:
for
to
enter
fight
rashly
and
without
respect
to
reason
,
were
beastly
;
also
to
kill
or
slay
would
work
no
better
effect
,
then
that
all
Nations
should
without
mercy
murder
one
another
;
Barbarority
coe●em
coede
,
&
sanguinem
sangnine
expiare
.
Sal●
No
Warr
therefore
is
to
be
made
but
such
as
is
just
.
And
in
every
just
War
these
three
things
are
to
be
looked
into
(
viz
)
that
the
Author
be
of
Authority
,
that
the
cause
be
good
,
and
the
end
just
;
for
in
all
States
,
the
Prince
,
or
they
in
whom
the
Soveraignty
resteth
,
are
the
just
Author●
of
Warr
:
others
have
no
such
Authority
.
Si
quis
privatim
si●e
public●
s●ito
,
pacem
bellumve
feceri●
,
capitale
esto
.
Plat●
.
Warrs
are
of
two
sorts
:
Defensive
and
Offensive●
the
one
to
resist
,
the
other
to
invade●
against
defence
nothing
can
be
said
,
because
it
is
natural
and
necessary
.
Est
non
modo
justum
sedetiam
nec●ssarium
cum
vi
vis
illata
defendi●ur
.
Cic.
Defensive
Warr
is
of
two
sorts
,
either
to
defend
thine
own
,
or
thy
friends
;
for
it
is
reason
that
every
one
should
keep
securely
that
which
to
him
appertaineth
:
and
therewith
also
by
Arms
to
defend
the
liberty
of
Country
,
Parents
,
and
Friends
.
Nullum
bellum
à
civitate
suscipitur
nisi
aut
pro
fid●
aut
pro
salute
.
C●c
.
The
like
reason
leadeth
us
to
assist
and
protect
friends
:
for
the
common
obligation
of
humane
society
doth
so
require
.
Qui
enim
non
obsistit
si
potest
,
injuriae
,
tam
est
in
viti●
,
quam
si
parentes
aut
patriam
,
aut
socios
deserat
.
Cic.
Invasion
is
also
just
and
allowable
,
but
not
ever
;
for
who
so
hath
bin
robbed
,
or
spoiled
of
his
Lands
,
or
Goods
,
may
lawfully
seek
repossession
by
force
:
yet
so●
as
before
any
force
be
used
,
he
first
civilly
seek
restitution
,
wherein
if
Justice
be
denied
,
then
is
the
use
of
Arms
necessary
:
●ustum
bellum
quib●s
necessarium
;
&
pia
arm●
quibus
nulla
nisi
in
armis
relinquitur
spes
.
Liv.
Likewise
invasion
is
lawfull
against
Barbarians
,
whose
Religion
and
Impiety
ought
to
be
abhorred
,
chiefly
if
they
be
potent
and
apt
to
offend
;
for
the
cause
of
such
Warr
is
compulsion
and
suppression
of
evil
.
Cui
lioenti●
iniquitatis
eripitur
,
utiliter
vincitur
.
August
.
Finally
,
To
conclude
this
matter
of
in●asion
,
I
say
,
That
no
revenge
,
no
desire
of
●onor
or
Empire
,
are
any
lawful
causes
of
●ar
;
but
the
intent
thereof
ought
to
be
●irected
onely
to
def●nce
and
security
:
For
●ise
men
do
take
arms
to
win
Peace
,
and
●n
hope
of
rest
they
endure
travel
.
Ita
bil●um
suscipiatur
u●
nihil
aliud
quam
pax
●uaesita
vid●atur
.
Cic.
Having
said
somewhat
against
unjust
●ar
,
let
us
speak
of
temerity
and
unad●ised
War
,
an
enterprise
worthy
discom●endation
.
Omnes
bellum
sumunt
facil●
,
●gerrimè
de●inunt
:
n●c
in
ejusdem
pot●state
in●tium
&
finis
est
.
Sal.
A
wise
Prince
therefore
ought
neither
to
undertake
any
unlawful
invasion
nor
without
sober
and
mature
deliberation
enter
●nto
any
War
,
as
he
that
is
unwilling
to
offend
,
yet
of
courage
e●ough
to
defend
.
Nec
pr●voces
bellum
,
nec
timeas
.
Plin.
To
make
War
,
three
things
are
required
.
Money
,
Men
,
and
Arms
;
and
to
maintain
a
War
,
Provision
and
Council
are
needful
:
Therefore
a
wise
Prince
before
he
begins
a
War
,
doth
carefully
consider
what
forces
and
charge
thereunto
belongeth
.
Diu
●pparandum
est
bellum
,
ut
vincas
melius
.
Pub.
Above
all
other
Provisions
,
car●
must
be
had
,
that
Bread
be
not
wanting
;
for
without
it
,
neither
victory
nor
life
can
be
looked
for
.
Qui
frumentum
necessariumque
commeatum
non
praepar●t
,
vincitur
sine
ferro●
Vegetius
.
Lastly
,
it
behoveth
a
Prince
always
to
have
Arms
in
readiness
,
I
mean
,
Harness
,
Horses
,
Weapons
,
Artillery
,
Engines
,
Powder
,
and
every
other
thing
necessary
either
for
service
on
Horse
or
Foot
:
We
may
adde
hereunto
Ships
,
and
Shipping
of
all
sorts
,
with
every
furniture
of
offence
or
defence
;
for
these
preparations
make
a
Prince
formidable
,
because
no
man
dare
do
or
attempt
injury
to
that
King
or
people
where
preparation
is
ever
ready
to
revenge
.
Qui
de●iderat
pacem
,
praeparat
bellum●
Ca●●
.
By
men
we
mean
a
multitude
of
Subjects
armed
,
trained
to
defend
or
offend
:
These
are
of
two
sorts
,
Captains
and
Soldiers
;
and
Soldiers
are
either
Footmen
or
Horsemen●
the
one
of
great
use
in
the
Champion
,
the
other
in
Mountainous
places
;
also
for
defence
or
assault
of
Towns
or
Grounds
fortified
most
necessary
,
and
consequently
meet
for
service
in
all
places
,
which
moved
Tacitus
to
say
,
Omne
in
pedite
robur
,
Tac.
For
sudden
service
,
Horses
do
seem
most
●eet
,
and
the
execution
of
any
enterprise
●s
by
them
most
speedily
performed
:
Ne●ertheless
the
actions
of
●ootmen
do
seem
more
certainly
executed
,
chiefly
if
they
be
well
armed
,
and
skilfully
led
;
for
so
ex●erience
hath
of
late
time
proved
;
be●ides
,
●hat
they
are
of
less
expence
and
of
greater
●umber
.
In
universum
aestimanti
plus
in
●edite
robur●
Tac.
Having
thus
proved
,
that
both
Horse
and
●oot
be
necessary
;
let
us
remember
,
that
●nless
they
be
serviceable●
great
numbers
●re
to
small
purpose
.
Manibus
opus
est
bello
,
●on
multis
nominibus
,
Livi.
To
make
Soldiers
serviceable
,
consisteth
●n
good
choice
and
good
Discipline
;
the
one
at
this
day
little
regarded
.
Emunt
mili●em
,
non
legunt
,
Livi.
Soldiers
ought
to
be
elected
out
of
the
most
honest
and
able
number
of
Bodies
;
and
every
Company
composed
of
men
known
one
to
the
other
;
for
thereby
they
are
made
the
more
confident
:
But
hereof
is
small
heed
taken
;
for
commonly
they
are
Purgamenta
urbium
suarum
,
Curt.
Touching
Discipline
,
it
seemeth
that
thereof
the
external
Form
,
and
not
the
certain
Substance
,
is
observed
:
For
as
in
former
ages
,
Soldiers
endeavoured
to
be
vertuous
and
modest
,
so
now
they
rather
study
to
excel
in
Riot
,
then
in
Martial
knowledge
.
Ex●ercitus
lingua
quam
manu
promptior●
praedator
est
sociis
,
&
ipse
praeda
hostium●
Sal.
For
as
much
as
Soldiers
are
made
good
by
election
and
choice
,
it
seemeth
that
the
foundation
and
ground
of
service
consisteth
in
the
discretion
and
judgment
o●
those
that
have
authority
to
make
Election
;
yet
will
we
adde
,
that
they
must
be
chosen
of
natural
Subjects●
for
strangers
are
covetous
,
and
consequently
corruptible
;
they
are
also
mutinous
and
cowardly
:
Thei●
custom
likewise
is
to
rob
,
burn
,
and
spoyl
both
friends
and
foes
,
and
to
consume
the
Princes
treasure
.
Ossa
vides
regum
vacui●
ex●ucta
medullis●
Juven.
But
the
Native
Soldier
is
faithful
and
obedient●
resolute
in
fight
,
loving
to
his
Countrey
,
and
loyal
to
his
Prince
.
Gent●●
quae
sub
regibus
s●nt
,
pro
Deo
col●nt
.
Curt●
Native
Soldiers
are
of
two
sorts
,
(
viz.
)
They
that
be
in
continual
pay
,
and
they
that
are
trained
ready
to
serve
,
but
do
notwithstanding
attend
their
own
private
affairs
,
until
they
be
called
:
The
first
are
for
all
Princes
necessary
.
In
pace
decus
,
in
bello
prae●idiu●
.
Tac.
Of
this
sort
no
great
number
ought
to
be
,
as
well
to
●schew
disorder
,
as
also
to
save
expences
.
The
second
kinde
of
foot
Soldiers
are
to
be
levied
in
Villages
,
as
people
more
patient
of
pains
,
and
fit
for
the
Wars
;
yet
so
judiciously
disposed
as
the
Citizens
.
Odio
praesentium
&
non
cupidine
mutationis
.
Tac.
Touching
the
number
of
these
extraordinary
Soldiers
,
that
must
be
referred
to
discretion
:
Bellum
parare
,
simul
&
aerario
parcere
.
To
conclude
,
I
say
these
numbers
of
ordinary
and
extraordinary
foot
ought
to
be
according
to
the
number
of
the
people
,
not
inserting
any
Gentlemen
;
for
service
on
hors-back
is
to
them
onely
proper
.
Alas
rusticis
non
tribu●
;
in
nobilitatem
&
in
divites
haec
à
pauperibus
onera
inclines
.
Livi.
The
most
certain
notes
whereby
to
conceive
the
disposition
of
men
fit
to
become
Soldiers
,
are
these
five
.
The
Country
where
they
are
born
,
their
age
,
proportion
of
body
,
their
quality
of
minde
,
and
their
faculty
.
Touching
First
,
The
Countrey
,
it
is
a
thing
apparently
proved
,
that
Mouutainous
Regions
,
or
barren
places
,
and
Northern
habitations
do
breed
wits
well
disposed
to
the
War
.
Locorum
asperitas
hominum
quoque
ingenia
durat
.
Curt.
Secondly
,
The
Age
most
apt
for
the
War
,
was
anciently
observed
to
be
about
eighteen
years
,
and
so
the
Romans
used
.
Facilius
est
ad
virtutem
instruere
novos
milites
,
quàm
revocare
pr●eteritos
.
Veget.
Thirdly●
The
stature
of
a
Soldier
ought
to
be
observed
:
Marius
liked
best
the
longest
Bodies
;
Pyrrhus
preferred
large
and
well
proportioned
men
;
but
Vegetius
in
his
choice
,
rather
esteems
strength
then
stature
:
●t●lius
est
fo●tes
milites
●sse
quàm
grande●
.
Veget.
Fourthly
,
The
Minde
or
Spirit
of
a
Soldier
ought
to
be
enosidered
;
for
that
Minde
which
is
quick
,
nimble
,
bold
,
and
con●ident
,
seemeth
apt
for
War
:
He
is
also
of
good
hope●
that
loveth
honor
more
then
ease
or
profit
:
In
brief
,
Is
qui
nihil
metuit
nisi
turp●m
●amam
.
Sal.
Lastly
,
it
is
to
be
marked
in
what
art
or
faculty
a
man
hath
been
bred
:
for
it
may
be
presumed
that
Fishers
,
Fowlers
,
Cooks
,
and
others
trained
up
in
effeminate
arts
are
unfit
for
Martial
endeavor
:
And
as
these
men
were
in
respect
of
their
trade
thought
unme●t
so
in
old
time
,
slaves
and
masterless
men
were
repulsed
from
arms
,
as
persons
in●amous
.
Sed
nunc
tales
sociantur
armis
quales
Domini
haber●●astidiunt
.
Veget.
How
Soldiers
ought
to
be
chosen
,
these
few
words
we
have
spoken
,
may
su●fice
.
Let
us
therefore
say
somewhat
of
Discipline
.
Choice
findeth
out
Soldiers
,
but
Discipline
doth
make
and
continue
them
fit
for
service
.
Paucos
viros
fortes
natura
procreat
,
b●na
institutione
plures
redda●
indu●●ria
:
Veget.
Discipline
is
a
certain
severe
confirmation
of
Soldiers
in
their
Valor
and
Vertue
,
and
is
performed
by
four
means
,
Exercise
,
Order
,
Compulsion
,
and
Example
.
The
two
first
appertain
to
Valor
,
the
third
to
Vertue
,
the
last
to
both
:
But
of
Exercise
,
first
,
I
say
,
That
a
Soldier
being
chosen
,
ought
to
be
informed
in
Arms
,
and
used
in
Exercise
and
Action
;
the
word
exerciti●m
impor●eth
nothing
else
.
Exercit●●
dic●tur
quod
melius
fit
exercitando
.
Varro
Order
consisteth
in
dividing
,
disposing
,
and
placing
of
men
aptly
at
all
occasions
to
be
commanded
,
as
the
Leaders
shall
direct
.
This
matter
requireth
a
large
discourse
,
and
therefore
I
refer
it
to
skilful
Captains
and
Writers
,
as
Polybius
,
Vegetius
,
De
la
Nonne
,
and
others
.
Compulsion
and
Correction
,
is
that
which
bridleth
and
governeth
the
manners
of
Soldiers
:
For
no
order
can
be
observed
amongst
them
,
unless
they
be
continent
,
modest
,
and
abstinent
;
for
continency
is
cheifly
to
be
shewed
in
their
diet
,
and
moderate
desires
.
Degenerat
à
robore
ac
virtute
miles
assuetudine
voluptatum
.
Tac●
The
Modesty
of
a
Soldier
is
perceived
by
his
Words
,
Apparel
,
and
Actions
:
For
to
be
a
vaunter
,
or
vain-glorious
boaster
,
is
far
unfit
in
him
that
professeth
Honor
or
Arms
,
seeing
true
Vertue
is
silent●Viri
militiae
nati
,
●actis
magni●
ad
verborum
linguaeque
ce●tamina
,
rudes
.
Tac.
The
Apparel
of
a
Soldier
sheweth
modesty
,
if
therein
he
do
not
exceed
;
for
albeit
it
fitteth
well
the
Profession
of
Arms
,
to
be
well
armed
and
decently
apparelled
;
yet
all
superfluity
savoreth
of
ignorance
or
vanity
.
Horriaum
militem
esse
decet
,
non
cae●atum
auro
argentoque
sed
ferro
.
Livi.
Abstinence
is
also
fit
for
all
Soldiers
;
for
thereby
guided
,
they
refrain
from
violence
,
and
insolency
;
by
that
rule
also
they
are
informed
to
govern
themselves
civilly
in
the
Country
where
they
serve
,
and
likewise
in
●heir
Lodgings
:
Never
taking
any
thing
from
the
owner
,
nor
committing
any
outrage
.
Vivant
cum
provincialibus
●ure
civili●
ne●
insolescat
animus
quise
sensit
armatum
.
The
last
mark
of
Discipline
we
called
Example
,
under
which
word
is
Comprehended
reward
and
punishment
:
For
men
are
rewarded
when●oever
they
receive
for
any
excellent
or
singular
Service
,
Honor
or
Riches
.
And
for
Evil
,
they
have
their
due
when
they
taste
the
punishment
thereunto
belonging
.
Necessarium
est
acrius
ille
dimicet
,
quem
ad
opes
&
dignitates
ordo
militiae
&
imperatoris
judicium
c●nsuevit
evehere
.
Veget.
Likewise
as
Gold
and
Glory
belongeth
to
good
and
well
deserving
Soldiers
;
so
punishment
is
due
to
those
that
be
vitious
and
cowardly●
for
nothing
holdeth
Soldiers
in
obedience
so
much
as
the
severity
of
discipline
.
Milites
impe●atorem
potius
quam
hostem
metuere
debent●
Veg.
CHAP.
XXII
.
Of
Generals
and
Commanders
,
and
their
requisite
Abilities
in
Martial
enterprises
and
expeditions
.
OF
Soldiers
let
this
little
suffice●
we
will
now
speak
of
what
quality
Cheiftants
and
leaders
ought
to
be●
for
upon
them
dependeth
the
welfare
of
whole
Armies
.
Militaris
turba
sine
duce
,
corpus
sine
sp●●itu
.
Curte.
A
●heif
or
General
in
Warr
,
is
either
of
his
own
Authority
cheif
,
or
a
general
that
commandeth
in
the
name
of
another
.
Of
the
first
sort
are
Emperors
,
Kings
,
and
Princes
;
of
the
other
,
be
their
Deputies
,
Lievtenants
,
Collonels
,
and
indeed
all
generall
Commanders
in
the
War
:
Now
whether
it
be
more
expedient
that
the
Prince
should
command
in
person
or
by
deputy
,
divers
wise
men
have
diversly
thought
,
therefore
it
may
be
be
thus
distinguished
;
if
the
War
do
then
only
concern
some
particular
part
or
Province
,
then
may
the
same
be
performed
by
a
Lievtenant
;
but
if
the
whole
Fortune
of
a
Prince
do
thereupon
depend
,
then
is
he
to
command
in
his
own
person
and
not
otherwise
.
Dubiis
bellorum
ex●mplis
summae
r●rum
&
imperi●
seipsum
reservat
.
Tac.
It
therefore
importeth
the
Prince
sometimes
by
his
own
presence
,
sometimes
by
his
deputation
to
performe
that
Office
:
but
however
occasion
shall
require
,
it
ever
behoveth
that
one
only
commander
ought
to
be
;
(
for
plurality
of
Cheiftaines
doth
rarely
or
never
worke
any
good
effect
)
yet
with
this
caution
that
he
be
of
experience
,
and
wise
.
In
b●●lica
praefectura
major
asp●ctus
habendus
peritiae
quam
virtutis
a●t
morum●
Arist.
The
quali●ies
required
in
a
Cheiftaine
are
these
,
Skill
,
Vertue
,
Providence
,
Authority
,
and
Fortune
By
skill
we
meane
he
should
be
of
great
knowledge
,
and
long
experience
or
to
make
a
sufficient
Captai●e
;
the
information
of
others
,
or
his
own
reading
is
not
enough
.
Qui
●orit
quis
ordo
agminis
,
quae
cura
exploa
ndi
,
quantus
urgendo
trahendove
bello
modus●
Cic●
Military
vertue
is
a
certain
vigor
or
force
both
of
body
and
minde
to
exercise
Soldiers
aswell
in
fained
war
as
to
fight
with
the
Enemy
;
and
summarily
a
Captain
ought
to
be
Laboriosus
in
negotio
,
fortis
in
periculo
,
industrius
in
agendo
,
celeri●
in
conficiendo
.
Cic.
Next
to
vertue
we
placed
providence
as
necessary
in
great
Captains
;
for
being
of
such
wisdome
they
will
not
hazard
nor
commit
more
to
fortune
then
necessity
shal
inforce
;
yet
true
it
is●
fools
and
vulger●
folks
that
commend
or
discommend
actions
according
to
succeess
,
were
wont
to
say
:
Cunctatio
servilis
,
statim
exequi
,
Regium
est
.
But
advised
and
provident
Captains
do
think
;
Temeritas
praeterquam
quod
stulta
,
est
etiam
infelix
.
Livi.
Albeit
providence
be
the
best
mean
of
good
speed
;
yet
some
Captains
of
that
quality
and
in
skill
excelling
,
have
bin
in
their
actions
unlucky
;
when
others
of
less
sufficiency
have
marvellously
prevailed
;
we
may
therefore
reasonably
say
with
,
Cic.
Quod
olim
Maxmo
,
Marcello
,
Scipi●ni
,
Mari●
&
ceteris
m
gnis
Imperatoribus
non
solum
propter
virt●t●m
,
sed
etiam
propter
fortunam
saepius
imperia
mandata
,
atque
excercitus
esse
commissos
.
Cic.
Lastly
,
we
wished
authority
to
be
in
Cheiftains
;
for
it
greatly
importeth
what
opinion
or
conceipt
the
Enemy
hath
of
such
a
Governor
,
and
likewise
how
much
his
friends
and
confederates
do
esteem
him
:
but
the
cheif
and
only
means
to
maintain
Authority
,
is
Austerity
and
Terror
.
Dux
Authoritatem
maximam
●●veritate
sumat
,
omnes
culpas
militares
legibus
vindicet
,
nulli
errantium
credatur
ignoscere●
V●get
.
Also
experience
hath
proved
that
such
Cheiftains
as
were
affable
and
kind
to
their
Soldiers
,
were
much
loved
,
yet
did
they
incur
a
contempt
:
but
on
the
otherside
those
that
commanded
severely
and
terribly
,
although
they
gained
no
good
will●
yet
were
they
ever
obeyed
:
Dux
facilis
inutilis
.
App.
CHAP.
XXIII
.
Of
Councils
in
War
,
and
directions
Tactik
and
Stratagematik
:
with
advice
how
to
make
an
honorable
Peace
.
AFter
men
found
and
framed
fit
for
the
Warr
,
to
small
or
no
purpose
shall
they
●erve
,
unless
they
be
imployed
by
wisdom
or
good
Council
.
Mon
minus
est
Imperator
is
consili●
quam
vi
perficere
.
Tac.
Council
in
War
is
of
two
sorts
;
direct
Council
and
indirect
;
the
f●rst
sheweth
a
plain
and
orderly
course
for
●roceeding
,
as
to
lay
hold
on
occasion
:
for
as
in
all
other
human
actions
occasion
is
of
great
force
;
Occasio
in
bello
solet
amplius
juvare
quam
virtus
.
Veget.
As
occasions
presented
are
means
of
good
success
;
so
fame
worketh
great
effects
in
the
Wars
;
therefore
it
behooveth
a
Captain
to
be
constant
,
and
not
apt
to
beleive
the
vain
rumors
and
reports
of
men
.
Mal●
imperatur
,
cum
regit
vulgus
duces
suos
.
Sen.
Confidence
is
also
to
be
eschewed
;
for
no
man
is
sooner
surprised
,
then
he
who
●eareth
le●t
:
also
contempt
of
the
Enemy
hath
bin
occasion
of
great
discomfitures
,
therefore
as
a
Captain
ought
not
to
fear
,
so
should
he
not
contemn
his
Enemy
.
Nimia
●●ducia
semper
obnoxia
.
Aemyl
.
As
security
,
and
overmuch
estimation
of
our
own
vertue
or
valor
is
hurtfull
:
so
doth
it
import
every
good
Captain
to
be
well
informed
not
only
of
his
own
forces
,
but
also
of
what
strength
the
Enemy
is
;
likewise
it
behooveth
him
to
know
the
situation
of
the
Country
and
the
quality
of
the
people
,
with
every
other
circumstance
.
Moreover
,
the
Generals
honor
and
capacity
ought
to
be
known
with
the
condition
and
nature
of
the
Enemy
.
Impetus
acres
c●nctatione
languescunt
,
aut
in
perfidiam
mutantur
.
Tac.
Tem●●ty
in
War
is
also
dangerous
;
for
wise
Captains
were
wont
not
to
enterprise
any
thing
without
deliberation
and
good
opportunity
,
unless
they
were
thereunto
by
necessity
inforced
.
In
rebus
asperis
&
tenuispe
,
fortissima
quaque
consilia
tutissima
sunt
.
Livi.
Some
wise
men
not
superstitiously
but
discreetly
do
think
prodigious
signes
from
Heaven
or
on
Earth
are
not
to
be
neglected
,
neither
are
dreams
in
time
of
War
to
be
contemned
.
Nam
amat
benignitas
numini●
,
seu
quod
merent●r
homine●
,
seu
quod
tangitur
●orum
affectione
,
his
quoque
rationibus
prodere
quae
impendent
.
Aemi
.
A
wise
Captain
will
also
wait
oportunities
and
spy
out
fit
times
when
the
Enemy
is
wearied
,
or
pretending
fear
,
draw
him
into
danger
;
which
advantages
with
many
other
,
are
gained
chiefly
by
observing
of
time
;
Quia
si
in
occasionis
momento
,
cuj●s
praetervolat
o●p●rtunitas●
cunctat●s
paulum
●●eris
,
nequicquam
mox
omissam
querare●
Livi.
Next
the
observation
of
Time
,
the
Place
is
to
be
well
considered
,
whether
it
be
for
thine
advantage
or
thine
enemies
.
Amplius
prodest
locus
●aepè
quàm
virtus
.
Veget●
Thirdly
,
It
importeth
much
,
that
men
be
well
ordered
,
trained
,
and
prepared
for
the
fight
;
for
the
want
of
Art
is
cause
of
many
disadventures
,
and
many
times
a
small
supply
of
choice
Soldiers
on
horsback
or
foot
,
doth
seem
to
the
enemy
very
terrible
:
Likewise
a
sudden
shout
or
conceit
hath
amazed
a
whole
Army
.
Milites
v●nis
&
inanibus
,
magis
quam
justis
formidinis
causis
moventur
.
Curt.
Fourthly
,
It
were
to
good
purpose
,
that
in
ordering
of
men
for
fight
,
Soldiers
of
one
Cou●try
or
Nations
,
should
be
ranged
together
,
and
above
all
to
foresee
,
that
the
least
loss
of
Blood
be
among
the
Natural
Subjects
,
and
so
handle
the
Matter
,
that
the
cheif
slaughter
light
upon
strangers
and
Mercenaries
.
Ingens
victoriae
dec●s
,
citra
domesticum
sanguinem
●ellanti
.
Tac.
The
Generals
own
courage
and
lively
disposition
to
fight
,
will
greatly
animate
the
multitude
of
Soldiers
;
as
a
contrary
countenance
or
appearance
of
Fear
,
will
exceedingly
maze
and
dant
.
Necesse
estad
●ugam
p●rati
sint
,
qui
ducem
suum
sentiunt
desperare
.
Veget.
It
were
also
for
thy
great
advantage●
that
the
forces
should
be
ordered
for
the
fight
,
before
the
enemy
be
prepared
.
First
,
For
that
thou
maist
the
better
perform
,
what
thou
thinkest
fit
to
be
done
.
Secondly
,
That
thereby
thine
own
forces
will
thereof
receive
great
courage
,
being
readiest
to
assail
the
enemy
,
and
to
begin
the
fight
.
Plus
animi
est
inferenti
periculum
,
quam
propulsanti
.
Livi.
After
Victory
it
is
not
the
best
policy
to
execute
the
enemies
with
extteam
cruelty
,
but
proceed
moderately
;
for
it
shall
suffice
the
Victory
is
thine
.
●lausis
ex
d●speratione
crescit
audacia
,
&
cum
spei
nihil
est
,
sumit
arma
f●rmid●
.
Veget.
Lastly
,
I
would
advise
that
the
General
should
be
wary
in
his
Actions
,
and
in
every
enterprise
to
frustrate
the
Soldiers
from
spoils
and
pil●age
.
Saepe
obstitit
vincentibus
●ravum
inter
ipsos
certamen
,
omisso
hoste
spolia
consectandi
.
Tac.
Of
direct
Councils
,
let
that
we
have
said
suffice
.
We
will
now
speak
of
Councils
indirect
,
commonly
called
by
the
Greek
word
,
Stratagems
or
Subtile
practices
:
Which
manner
of
proceeding
,
hath
been
in
times
past
of
divers
grave
Writers
condemned
.
Vir
nemo
mentis
altae
clanculum
velit
occidere
hostem
.
Eurip.
Notwithstanding
the
opinion
of
this
,
and
divers
other
Writers
worthy
credit
,
it
seemeth
reasonable
,
and
in
piety
allowable
:
that
Stratagems
and
Subtilt●es
may
be
used
in
the
War
,
yet
with
such
Caution
as
the
same
may
stand
with
Fidelity
and
Honor
:
For
Fraud
being
used
contrary
to
Contracts
and
Agreements
made
with
the
enemy
,
is
meer
Treachery
:
As
to
poyson
him
or
her
,
a
murtherer
to
kill
him
,
were
plain
Impiety
.
Faederatum
injustè
fallere
impium
.
Livi.
Also
out
of
the
War
covertly
to
kill
a
particular
enemy
by
secret
Assault
or
Practice
,
is
not
warrantable
,
either
by
Faith
or
Honor
;
yet
to
use
all
craft
,
cunning
,
and
subtilty
in
open
War
,
is
both
allowable
and
praisable
;
and
so
is
thought
by
Christian
Writers
.
Cum
justum
bellum
suscipitur
,
ut
apertè
pugnet
quis
aut
ex
insidiis
,
nihil
ad
justitiam
interest
.
Aug.
The
same
is
also
approved
by
divers
Authors
of
good
credit
.
Confice
●ive
dolo
seu
stricto
cominus
euse
.
The
same
is
also
affirmed
by
Xenophon
,
Reipsa
nihil
utilius
in
bello
dolis
.
Thus
having
briefly
touched
what
Counsels
are
required
in
War
,
let
us
consider
how
Victory
is
to
be
used
;
for
the
end
of
every
good
War
is
Peace
:
To
the
enjoying
whereof
,
three
things
are
required
,
Wariness
,
Mercy
,
and
Modesty
;
because
over-great
confidence
may
happily
impeach
the
end
of
good
Success
.
Res
se●und●●
neglig●n●iam
creant
.
Livi.
I
also
wish
the
Victory
to
be
handled
mercifully
,
because
all
Conquests
are
in
their
own
nature
cruel
enough
.
And
the
Ire
of
insolent
Soldiers
,
forces
the
conquered
to
become
desperate
.
Gravissime
morsus
irrita●ae
necessitatis
.
Curt.
To
proceed
Modestly
,
is
also
an
honorable
quality
in
him
that
conquereth
:
For
in
prosperous
Fortunes
,
men
do
hardly
refrain
covetous
and
proud
doings
;
yea
,
some
good
and
great
Captains
have
in
like
cases
forgotten
what
did
best
become
them
.
In
rebus
secundis
etiam
●gregii
D●ces
insolesc●nt
.
Tac.
After
Victory
followeth
Peace
:
For
if
War
did
ever
continue
,
no
State
or
Government
could
stand
:
Therefore
how
great
,
or
how
long
soever
the
War
be
,
the
end
must
be
Peace
;
the
name
whereof
is
not
onely
sweet
,
but
also
comfortable
,
Pax
una
triumphis
innumeris
potior
.
Peace
is
not
only
good
and
profitable
to
him
that
is
victorious
,
but
also
to
those
that
are
victored
.
Pacem
reduci
velle
victori
,
expedit
,
victo
necesse
est
.
Tac.
Nevertheless
until
good
and
honorable
Peace
be
offered
,
Arms
may
not
be
laid
aside
:
Wherein
I
wish
Tullies
advice
to
be
followed
.
Bellum
gerendum
est
;
●i
bellum
omitt●mus
,
pace
n●nquam
fr●emur
.
Livi.
In
Treaty
of
Peace
,
two
things
must
be
considered
:
First
,
That
the
conditions
be
honorable●
To
condiscend
to
any
base
conditions
,
is
unto
a
Princely
minde
not
onely
great
indignity
,
but
also
intolerable
.
Cum
dignitate
potius
cadendum
,
quam
cum
ignominia
serviendum
Plut.
It
also
importeth
,
the
Peace
should
be
simple
,
true
,
and
unfeigned
;
for
all
feigned
and
dissembling
Amity
is
to
be
doubted
.
Pace
suspecta
tutius
est
bellum
.
Mithrid
.
The
fittest
season
to
speak
of
Peace
,
is
either
when
the
War
beginneth
,
or
during
the
time
that
the
enemies
be
of
equal
force
;
for
if
the
war
continueth
,
it
must
behove
the
weaker
to
yield
to
necessity
:
Not
unlike
the
Shipmaster
,
who
to
save
himsel●
doth
cast
the
greatest
part
of
his
loading
into
the
Sea
:
Necessiiati
pare
,
quam
ne
dii
quidem
superant
.
Livi.
Finally
,
Having
generously
defended
thy self
,
and
performed
all
things
required
in
a
magnanimous
Captain
,
and
finding
nevertheless
thy
force
insufficient
,
it
cannot
be
dishonorable
to
accept
Peace
.
Wherefore
laying
aside
Hatred
and
Hope
,
which
are
but
weak
supporters
,
thou
maist
recommend
thee
and
thine
to
the
approved
discretion
of
an
honorable
enemy
.
Victores
secundae
res
in
miserationem
ex
ir●
vertunt
.
Livi.
Now
for
as
much
as
every
Peace
promiseth
rest
and
quiet
,
as
well
to
the
victorious
as
to
the
victored
;
we
may
adde
thereunto
,
that
the
Prince
victorious
receiveth
thereby
Honor●
Profit
,
and
Security
.
For
although
his
happiness
may
occasion
Hope
o●
greater
success
yet
in
respect
of
Fortunes
mutability
,
it
shall
be
good
and
glorious
to
lis●en
to
peace
.
Decorum
principi
est
cum
victoriam
propè
i●
manibus
habeat
,
p●cem
no●
ab●●ere●
ut
sciant
omnes
te
&
suscipere
ju●●è
bellum
&
finire
.
Livi.
It
seemeth
also
the
more
Honorable
;
for
who
so
is
victorious
,
doth
give
Peace
and
not
take
it
:
He
also
sheweth
himself
discreet
by
using
a
moderation
in
Victory
,
and
no
extremity
in
spoiling
,
which
our
wise
and
godly
Writers
have
commended●Pacem
contemnentes
,
&
gloriam
appetentes
,
●acem
perdunt
&
gloriam
.
Bern.
Peace
is
also
profitable
for
the
victorious
,
because
continual
War
breedeth
weariness
,
and
of
violent
proceeding
desperation
and
peril
cometh
.
Maximi
&
mortiferi
morsu●
esse
solent
morientium
bestiarum
.
Sen.
Likewise
Peace
is
more
assured
then
any
victory
.
Hope
of
the
one
is
in
thine
own
power
;
the
other
in
the
hand
of
God
:
Adde
thereunto
the
force
of
Fortune
,
which
hath
great
power
in
all
humane
actions
.
In
rebus
secundis
nihil
in
quenquam
superbè
a●
violenter
consulere
decet
,
nec
praesenti
credere
Fortunae
,
cum
quià
v●sper
ferat
,
incertus
sis
.
Sen.
Also
conditions
of
Peace
ought
to
be
reasonable
and
freely
bestowed
:
For
no
people
can
live
contented
under
such
a
Law
as
forceth
them
to
loath
the
State
wherein
they
are
.
Misera
pax
bello
benè
mutatur
.
Sen.
CHAP.
XXIIII
.
Of
Civil
War
,
with
the
causes
and
Remedies
thereof
.
THE
greatest
and
most
greivous
calamity
that
can
come
to
any
State
is
Civil
War
;
for
therein
Subjects
take
arms
against
their
Prince
or
among
themselves
,
whereof
followeth
a
misery
more
lamentable
then
can
be
described
.
Non
at
as
,
non
dignitas
quenquam
protegit
,
quo
minus
●l●pra
caedibus
,
&
caedes
st●pris
misceantur
.
Tac.
The
first
cause
of
Civ●l
War
proceedeth
of
destiny
for
God
in
his
own
divine
providence
foreseeth
many
years
before
,
that
great
and
mighty
Empires
shall
be
ruined
.
In
s●●agna
ruunt
:
laetis
hi●c
numina
rebus
Cresen●●
p●suere
modum
—
Lucan
.
The
second
cause
is
,
excesse
,
riot
,
and
dissolute
life
;
for
nothing
breedeth
Civil
Fury
so
soon
as
over
great
happiness
;
also
pompous
Apparell●
banquetting
and
prodigall
spending
consumeth
riches
,
and
plenty
is
turned
into
poverty
;
for
by
these
means
●re
men
brought
into
desperation
.
Rapacissimo
●uique
ac
perditissim●
,
non
agri
aut
faenus
sed
sola
instrumenta
vitiorum
manebunt
.
Tac.
Now
to
consider
how
destiny
might
be
eschewed
,
were
in
vain
:
For
such
a
remedy
no
wit
or
wisdom
can
devise
;
being
the
decree
of
God
,
no
doubt
it
is
inevitable
.
Ita
fato
placuit
,
nullius
rei
eodem
semper
loc●
stare
fortunam
.
Sen.
There
is
nothing
exempt
from
the
peril
of
mutation
;
the
earth
,
Heavens
,
and
whole
World
is
thereunto
subject
.
Certi●
eunt
cuncta
temporibus
;
nasci
debent
,
crescere
,
extingui
.
Sen.
Touching
the
second
causes
of
Civil
War
some
remedies
may
be
used
,
because
it
preceedeth
of
Faction
,
Sedition
or
Tyranny
.
I
call
Faction
a
certain
association
of
divers
persons
combined
to
the
offence
of
others
.
It
proceedeth
often
of
private
or
publick
displeasure
,
and
more
often
of
ambition
.
Nemo
eorum
qui
in
Rep.
versantur
,
quo●
vincat
,
sed
a
quibus
vincatur
,
aspicit
.
Sen.
1.
Factions
are
of
two
sorts
;
for
either
they
consist
of
many
or
of
few
persons
:
both
be
dangerous
,
but
the
former
more
apt
to
take
arms
;
and
that
party
which
proveth
weakest
,
prayeth
arms
of
forrain
forces
.
2.
The
other
faction
wherein
are
fewer
partakers
,
be
commonly
great
personages
or
men
of
more
importance
than
ordinary
people
;
and
that
proveth
most
perillous
and
bloody
.
N●bilium
factiones
trah●nt
adse
,
&
in
partes
,
universum
etiam
populum●
Arist.
Albeit
some
wise
men
have
held
opinion
that
factions
are
necessary
,
yet
cannot
that
conceipt
be
reasonably
maintained
,
unless
it
be
upon
confines
and
in
such
places
where
conspiracy
is
feared
,
which
Cato
in
hisprivate
Family
used
.
Semper
contentiunculas
aliquas
aut
dissensum
inter
servos
callidè
serebat
,
s●●pectam
habens
nimiam
c●ncordiam
●rum
,
m●tuensque
.
Plut.
Factions
amongst
the
Nobility
,
are
somtimes
suppressed
by
forbidding
colors
,
or
unknown
badges
to
be
worn
;
also
to
inhibit
names
or
watch-words
of
mutinies
is
necessary
,
which
was
Mecae●as
counsel
to
Augustus
;
and
Aristotle
thinketh
it
fit
that
Laws
should
be
made
against
the
Factions
of
Noblemen
.
Nobilium
contentiones
&
part●s
etiam
legibus
oportet
prohibere
conari
.
Arist.
Another
cause
of
civil
war
,
we
call
sedition
,
which
is
a
suddain
commotion
or
assembly
of
common
people
against
their
Prince
or
his
Magistrates
:
the
Original
of
which
disorders
may
proceed
of
divers
causes
,
but
chiefly
of
oppression
.
Imminentium
periculorum
remedium
,
ipsa
peric●la
arbitrari
.
Arist.
Again
,
Fear
may
be
the
occasion
of
Sedition
,
as
well
in
him
that
hath
done
injury
,
as
in
him
that
looketh
to
be
injured
,
and
is
desirous
to
prevent
it
before
it
cometh
.
It
may
proceed
also
of
over-great
mildness
in
Government
.
Non
●iseriis
sed
licentia
,
tantum
concitum
turbarum
,
las●ivire
magis
plebem
quàm
saevire
.
Livi.
Sedition
many
times
ariseth
of
Poverty
,
or
of
the
Artificers
,
whose
Arts
are
grown
out
of
use
,
and
consequently
no
means
whereof
they
can
live
.
Semper
in
civitat●
,
quibus
opes
nullae
sunt
,
bonis
invident
,
veter●
odere
,
n●va
expetunt
,
odio
rerum
suarum
m●tari
omnia
student
.
Sab.
Lastly
,
Sedition
cometh
of
Tyranny
,
Insolency
,
or
Mutinous
disposition
of
certain
Captains
,
Cavaliers
,
or
Ringleaders
of
the
people
for
albeit
the
multitude
is
apt
to
innovation
,
yet
doth
it
stand
firm
,
until
some
first
mover
taketh
the
matter
in
hand
.
Multitudo
omnis
,
sicut
mare
,
per
se
immobilis
.
Livi.
Of
these
Movers
some
are
Ambitious
,
who
wanting
other
means
to
aspire
,
hope
by
practice
of
Sedition
,
to
compass
their
designs
;
or
else
they
are
Unthrifts
,
who
having
consumed
their
own
,
seek
by
violence
to
possess
themselves
of
other
mens
:
Or
else
they
are
vain
and
light
persons
,
that
without
cause
or
reason
,
attempt
innovation
,
themselves
know
not
for
what
.
Non
tam
praemiis
periculor●m
,
quàm
ipsis
periculis
laeti
,
pro
certis
&
olim
partis
,
nova
,
ambigua
,
ancipitia
malunt
.
Thus
having
told
the
causes
of
Sedition
,
I
wish
the
remedies
were
prepared
.
Omne
malum
nascens
facilè
opprimitur
,
inveteratum
fit
plerumque
robustius
.
Cic.
The
first
way
to
suppress
Sedition
,
is
Eloquence
and
excellent
perswasion
,
which
oftentimes
worketh
great
effects
among
the
multitude
;
chiefly
when
it
proceedeth
from
some
reverend
and
grave
person
,
for
his
wisdom
and
integrity
of
life
honored
:
For
the
Prince
himself
is
not
to
take
this
office
in
hand
,
unless
necessity
so
inforce
:
Integra
autoritas
principis
majoribus
remediis
servetur
.
Tac.
If
perswasion
cannot
prevail
,
then
force
must
compel
:
But
before
such
violent
proceedings
,
use
art
and
cunning
either
to
appease
the
people
,
or
at
least
to
disunite
them
;
and
rather
if
the
Prince
do
offer
fair
and
●romise
plausibly
:
Verba
apud
populum
plurimum
valent
.
Tac.
It
is
lawful
also
in
such
cases
for
Princes
to
use
subtilty
;
and
the
same
not
prevailing
,
to
wash
away
the
stain
thereof
with
Clemency
:
For
when
Arms
are
laid
down
,
and
every
one
yielded
,
general
punishment
were
needless
.
Omnium
culpa
fuit
,
paucorum
sit
poena
.
Tac.
The
last
cause
of
Sedition
we
named
Tyranny
,
which
is
a
certain
violent
Government
,
exceeding
the
Laws
of
God
and
nature
.
The
difference
between
Kings
and
Tyrants
is
this
;
the
one
imployeth
arms
in
defence
of
Peace
,
the
other
useth
them
to
terrifie
those
of
whom
his
cruelty
hath
deserved
hate
:
Auferre
,
trucidare
,
raper●
,
falsis
nominibus
imperium
,
atque
ubi
solitudinem
fecerint
,
pacem
appellant
.
Tac.
The
quality
of
Tyrants
is
to
esteem
Promooters
more
then
good
Ministers
,
because
those
men
are
the
scourge
of
infinite
others
.
They
are
also
Protectors
of
impious
persons
,
and
stand
in
daily
doubt
of
Noble
and
Vertuous
Men
.
Nobilitas
,
opes
,
amissi
g●stique
honores
,
pro
crimine
:
Et
ob
virtutes
certissimum
exitium
.
Tac.
Tyrants
do
also
endeavor
to
suppress
the
knowledge
of
Letters
and
civil
life
,
to
the
end
all
good
arts
should
be
exiled
,
and
Barbarism
introduced
.
Pellunt
sapientiae
prof●ssores
,
&
omnes
●onas
artes
in
exiliu●
ag●nt
.
Tac.
These
and
such
like
,
be
the
conditions
of
Tyrants
,
who
for
the
most
part
are
deposed
and
slain
;
for
as
Kings
live
long
and
deliver
their
Dominions
to
their
Children●
and
Posterity
;
so
Tyrants
being
feared
and
hated
of
all
men
,
cannot
continue
in
their
estate
.
Ad
generum
Cereris
●ine
●oede
&
vulnere
pauci
Descendunt
reges
&
sicca
●orte
Tyranni
.
Juven.
The
Remedies
of
these
Mischiefs
which
proceed
from
the
violence
of
such
a
Prince
,
are
Persecution
or
Patience
.
Many
generous
spirits
have
used
the
first
;
perswading
themselves
rather
to
die
,
then
endure
the
sight
of
a
Tyrant
.
Also
the
Grecians
did
think
it
a
service
acceptable
to
murther
the
person
of
such
an
impious
Prince
.
Graeci
●omines
deorum
honores
tribuebant
iis
qui
Tyrannos
necaverunt
.
Cic.
Nevertheless
,
in
Christian
consideration
the
other
course
is
to
be
taken
:
Let
patience
therefore
incounter
this
mischief
;
for
seeing
all
Kings
,
as
well
the
bad
as
the
good
be
sent
by
God
,
they
must
be
indured
.
Res
est
gravis
occidere
regalem
stirpem
.
Homer
.
Persecution
is
not
onely
perilous
,
but
for
the
most
part
infortunate
:
For
thereof
present
revenge
is
taken
by
that
Prince
that
succeedeth
.
Facinoris
●jus
ultor
est
,
quis●uis
successerit
.
Tac.
The
murder
of
Tyrants
is
also
followed
with
many
inconveniences
worse
then
civil
War
it self
.
Principes
boni
,
votis
expetendi
,
qualescunque
tolerandi
.
Tac.
For
as
Fire
,
Floods
,
and
other
inevitable
Plagues
are
necessarily
to
be
suffered
:
So
evil
Princes
in
their
covetousness
and
cruelty
ought
to
be
patiently
indured
,
because
their
office
is
to
command
,
and
subjects
must
obey
.
Indigna
,
digna
habenda
sunt
,
Rex
quae
facit
.
Sen.
And
as
it
is
the
use
of
vulgar
people
to
finde
faults
in
the
long
raign
of
Princes
;
so
the
ambition
of
great
Subjects
is
desirous
of
novelty
.
Praesens
imperium
subditis
semper
grave
.
Thucyd.
To
conclude
,
we
say
that
the
best
remedy
against
Tyranny
,
is
Patience
:
For
so
long
as
men
are
,
so
long
will
Vices
be
.
Regum
ingenia
toleranda
,
neque
usui
crebrae
mutationes
.
Tac.
CHAP.
XXV
.
A
Collection
of
Political
Observations
(
confirmed
by
Reason
and
Experience
)
advertising
Princes
,
Statesmen
,
and
private
Persons
how
to
demean
themselves
in
all
Fortunes
and
Events
.
TO
the
perfections
of
Men
,
three
things
are
necessarily
required
;
Nature
,
Nurture
,
and
Use
:
The
first
giveth
capacity
,
aptness
,
and
understanding
;
which
are
graces
from
above
.
Nurture
,
is
learning
,
knowledge
,
art
,
or
order
.
Use
,
is
practice
,
experience
,
and
orde●ly
observation
;
whereof
may
be
conceived
,
that
Nature
alone
sufficeth
not
;
nor
can
Nurture
work
any
good
effect
,
where
natural
aptness
wanteth
;
and
they
can
frame
no
perfection
,
unless
experience
be
also
conjoyned
.
Nemo
nascitur
sapiens
,
sed
fit
.
Sen.
Ambassadors
,
Negotiants
,
and
generally
all
other
Ministers
of
mean
fortune
,
in
conversation
with
Princes
and
Superiors
,
must
use
great
respect
,
shewing
themselves
rather
ceremonious
then
presumptious
,
and
acknowledge
their
obligation
great
,
for
the
●avor
and
grace
,
they
find
in
those
which
might
command
them
.
It
is
no
wisdom
ever
to
commend
or
discommend
the
actions
of
men
by
their
success
;
for
oftentimes
some
enterprises
attempted
by
good
Counsel
,
end
unfortunately
;
and
others
unadvisedly
taken
in
hand
,
have
happy
success
.
Who
so
then
commendeth
inconsiderate
Counsels
for
their
fortunate
event
,
thereby
encourageth
men
to
jar
and
discomfort
the
wiser
sort
to
speak
what
they
know
,
and
by
experience
have
proved
.
In
Actions
publick
and
every
other
matter
of
great
moment
,
the
beginning
is
well
to
be
considered
:
For
afterwards
it
lieth
not
in
our
power
,
without
dishonor
to
abandon
what
was
begun
.
The
time
doth
not
always
serve
,
nor
is
apt
occasion
always
offered
to
enterprise
what
we
would
;
yet
who
so
doth
expect
every
opportunity
,
shall
either
attempt
nothing
at
all
,
or
if
he
do
,
the
same
for
the
most
part
turneth
to
his
own
disadvantage
.
When
any
resolution
is
taken
,
either
with
over-great
haste
,
or
too
much
affection
,
seldom
it
receiveth
good
success
:
For
he
that
doth
the
one
,
hath
no
leisure
to
consider
;
the
other
transporteth
the
minde
so
as
it
cannot
conceive
more
then
that
which
presently
presseth
.
To
these
we
adde
others
,
I
mean
some
of
them
that
have
leisure
,
and
are
void
of
affection
,
yet
for
want
of
natural
capacity
,
or
for
continual
negligence
in
their
doings
,
never
bring
any
thing
well
to
pass
.
Who
so
desireth
to
be
beloved
in
a
Commonwealth
,
must
rest
content
with
that
which
men
do
give
,
and
the
Laws
allow
him
to
take
:
So
shall
he
neither
incu●
danger
nor
envy
;
for
indeed
,
that
which
is
taken
or
extorted
from
others
,
and
not
that
which
is
given
,
doth
make
men
hated
.
Arms●
Laws
,
and
Religion
,
may
not
in
any
well
governed
State
be
dis-joyned
;
for
every
one
of
them
in
particular
maintaineth
them
all
united
.
In
actions
of
War
,
courage
and
conduct
are
of
great
necessity
;
yet
all
good
Government
consisteth
in
using
the
Vertues
Moral
;
and
in
handling
the
matter
of
Martial
Policy
,
it
is
fit
to
imitate
the
proceedings
of
antient
and
approved
Captains
.
Among
Mortal
Men
,
there
is
nothing
more
common
then
to
believe
the
estate
of
one
man
to
be
better
then
an
other
;
for
hereof
it
cometh
,
that
every
one
endeavoreth
rather
to
take
from
others
with
travel
,
then
to
enjoy
his
own
with
rest
.
The
state
of
Pri●ces
is
good●
being
well
used
;
so
is
the
fortune
of
private
men
,
if
therewith
they
be
contented
.
The
rich-man
liveth
happily
,
so
long
as
he
useth
his
riches
temperately
;
and
the
poor
man
that
patiently
endureth
his
wants
,
is
rich
enough
.
Whensoever
a
man
is
so
dangerously
distressed
,
as
either
proceeding
or
standing
,
he
liveth
in
like
peril
,
then
doth
it
behove
him
in
any
wise
,
to
resolve
upon
action
.
The
reason
is
,
that
so
long
as
nothing
is
done
,
the
same
accidents
that
caused
his
dangers
,
do
still
remain
in
their
former
force
;
but
if
he
endeavor
to
enterprise
somewhat
,
either
he
may
meet
with
means
to
make
him
secure
,
or
at
the
hardest
,
shew
himself
of
so
great
courage
and
wit
,
as
he
dare
and
can
attempt
a
way
to
do
it
.
It
seemeth
a
thing
of
great
difficulty
,
or
rather
impossible
for
any
Prince
or
Magistrate
to
eschue
the
evil
speech
and
bad
report
of
men
;
for
if
they
be
good
and
vertuous
,
then
they
incur
the
backbiting
of
leud
persons
;
if
evil
,
then
will
all
good
men
exclaim
against
them
.
All
Commonwealths
ought
to
desire
peace
,
yet
it
is
necessary
ever
to
be
prepared
for
the
war
;
because
peace
disarmed
,
is
weak
,
and
without
reputation
:
Therefore
the
Poets
feign
,
that
Palla●
the
Goddess
of
Wisdom
did
always
appear
armed
.
Every
Prince
(
well
advised
)
ought
to
govern
his
Subjects
and
Servants
in
such
sort
,
that
by
his
affability
and
vertue
they
may
be
induced
rather
to
serve
voluntarily
,
then
for
pay
or
hope
of
preferment
.
For
otherwise
doing
,
whensoever
the
Prince
shall
want
means
to
pay
,
the
Subjects
likewise
will
fail
of
good
will
to
serve
.
But
he
that
faithfully
loveth
,
doth
neither
in
prosperity
become
arrogant
,
nor
in
contrary
Fortune
retire
,
or
complain
of
the
small
favor
he
findeth
:
For
(
till
death
)
love
and
life
remain
at
the
Princes
Commandment
.
Where
poor
men
finde
Justice
,
evil
men
are
punished
,
Measures
and
Weights
be
just
,
Youth
well
nurtured
,
and
old
folk
free
from
avarice
,
there
is
the
Commonwealth
good
and
perfect
.
In
War
between
Neighbors
,
neutrality
is
commendable
;
for
by
that
means
we
eschue
many
troubles
and
great
expences
,
so
long
as
the
forces
of
either
side
be
so
equal
in
strength
,
as
we
need
not
to
fear
the
victory
of
any
:
For
so
long
their
discord
is
our
security
,
and
o●tentimes
offereth
us
means
to
increase
our
own
state
and
reputation
.
The
cheif
reasons
to
move
War
,
are
,
the
Justice
of
the
Cause
,
the
Facillity
of
Success
,
and
the
Profit
of
the
victory
.
In
all
Humane
actions
it
behoveth
to
a●commodate
the
Council
of
Men
unto
present
necessity
,
and
never
to
expose
security
to
manifest
peril
,
nor
hope
of
that
which
without
great
difficulty
or
impossibility
cannot
be
obtained
.
It
is
the
nature
of
men
having
escaped
one
extream
,
which
by
force
they
were
constrained
long
to
endure
,
to
run
headlong
into
the
other
extream
,
forgetting
that
Vertue
doth
always
consist
in
the
mean
.
The
multitude
is
inclined
to
innovation
,
and
easily
induced
by
false
perswasion
,
and
consequently
easily
transported
by
seditious
leaders
.
Men
are
naturally
disposed
to
fear
those
things
which
threaten
danger
and
terror●
yet
unless
these
perils
by
some
new
accident
be
daily
revived
,
that
fear
by
little
and
little
vanisheth
,
and
Security
recovereth
the
place
.
Whoso
findeth
himself
contemned
,
or
not
respected
,
becometh
discontent
;
which
humor
in
generous
mindes
,
breedeth
oftentimes
adventerous
imaginations
,
whereof
audacious
attempts
have
followed
,
cheifly
in
persons
of
authority
and
reputation
;
for
he
that
hopeth
no
good
,
feareth
no
evil
:
Yet
true
it
is
,
that
dangerous
enterprises
,
the
the
more
they
be
thought
upon
,
the
less
hope
they
give
of
good
success
,
for
which
reason
conspiracies
not
suddainly
executed
are
for
the
most
part
revealed
or
abandoned
.
All
people
do
naturally
imitate
the
manners
of
their
Prince
,
and
observing
his
proceedings
resolve
to
hate
or
love
him
:
But
if
they
happen
once
to
ha●e
the
Prince
,
then
his
doings
,
good
or
evil
,
are
afterwards
not
good
;
but
if
at
the
beginning
he
gained
the
love
of
the
people
,
then
every
bad
action
is
reputed
a
vertue
:
as
though
he
could
not
be
induced
to
do
amiss
without
good
cause
or
reason
.
Greatly
are
Princes
deceived
if
in
the
election
of
Ministers
they
more
respect
their
own
particular
affection
,
then
the
sufficiency
of
the
person
elected
.
A
Prince
having
conquered
any
new
Dominion
,
is
thereby
rather
incombred
then
strengthned
,
unless
the
same
be
after
well
governed
;
and
seldom
is
it
seen
that
a
principality
by
ill
means
gotten
,
hath
bin
long
injoyed
.
As
to
the
perfection
of
the
whole
body
soundness
of
head
only
sufficeth
not
,
unless
the
other
members
also
do
their
office
;
even
so
it
is
not
enough
that
a
Prince
be
faultless
,
but
it
behooveth
also
that
the
Magistrates
and
Ministers
should
perform
their
duty
.
Great
Princes
rarely
resist
their
appetites●
as
for
the
most
part
private
men
can
:
for
they
being
alwaies
honored
and
obeyed
,
do
seldom
with
patience
indure
the
want
of
any
thing
reasonable
,
as
being
perswaded
that
what
they
desire
is
just
,
and
that
their
Commandment
hath
power
to
remove
all
difficulties
.
All
men
are
naturally
good
when
no
respect
of
profit
or
pleasure
draws
them
to
become
evill
.
But
this
worlds
corruption
,
and
our
frailty
is
such
,
as
easily
and
often
for
our
particular
interest
we
incline
to
the
worst
;
which
was
the
cause
that
wise
Law-makers
found
out
reward
and
punishment
:
the
one
to
incite
men
to
good
,
the
other
to
fear
them
from
being
evill
.
A
Tyrant
indeavoreth
to
maintain
his
Estate
by
three
means
.
First
,
he
practiseth
to
hold
all
Subjects
in
extream
awe
,
and
to
be
basely
minded
,
to
the
end
they
should
want
courage
to
take
arms
against
him
.
Secondly
,
he
kindleth
diffidence
and
discord
among
the
great
men
;
thereby
to
remove
occasion
of
conspiracy
and
combination
.
Lastly
,
he
holdeth
them
disarmed
and
idle
,
so
as
they
ne●ther
know
nor
can
attempt
any
thing
against
him
To
govern
,
is
nothing
else
but
to
hold
Subjects
in
love
and
obedience
:
for
in
respect
of
the
end
,
they
ought
not
,
and
in
regard
of
the
other
they
cannot
attempt
any
thing
contrary
to
the
governors
will
and
their
duty
.
The
Laws
and
Ordinances
of
a
Common-weale
made
at
the
beginning
thereof
when
men
were
good
,
do
often
prove
unprofitable
when
they
are
become
evill
;
and
therefore
new
Laws
are
made
according
to
the
accidents
which
happen
.
The
discontent
or
disorder
of
people
is
ever
occasioned
by
the
inequality
of
their
goods
,
because
the
poorer
sort
would
be
made
equall
to
the
rich
:
but
the
offence
that
grows
among
great
men
is
the
desire
of
honor
;
for
they
being
equal
,
do
indeavor
to
aspire
to
equall
authority
.
A
Prince
that
desireth
by
means
of
his
Ambassador
to
deceive
an
other
Prince
,
must
first
abuse
his
own
Ambassador
,
to
the
end
he
should
do
and
speak
with
more
earnestness
,
being
indeed
perswaded
that
the
intent
and
meaning
of
his
Master
is
simple
which
happily
would
not
,
were
he
privy
that
his
Princes
meaning
were
to
dissemble
.
This
course
is
also
commonly
holden
by
those
that
by
imployment
of
a
third
person
would
perswade
any
thing
fained
or
false
.
For
the
performance
of
conditions
in
treaty
of
Peace
or
League
of
Amity
,
the
Promises
,
Vowes
,
and
Oathes
of
Princes
are
of
great
effect
;
yet
because
fidelity
in
a
man
is
not
ever
certain
,
and
time
doth
daily
offer
occasions
of
variation
,
there
is
no
assurance
so
secure
and
good
as
to
stand
so
prepared
as
the
Enemy
may
want
able
means
how
to
offend
.
To
resolve
in
matters
doubtfull
,
or
answer
requests
which
we
are
not
willing
to
grant
,
the
least
offensive
way
is
not
to
use
direct
denial
,
but
by
delaies
prolong
the
time
and
so
in
place
of
effect
,
afford
good
expectation
.
The
old
Proverbe
●aith
:
Magistratus
virum
ostendit
:
which
is
no
less
true
then
ancient
:
for
men
in
such
fortune
are
occasioned
not
only
to
make
proof
of
their
sufficiency
,
but
also
to
discover
their
affections
;
and
the
more
their
greatness
is
,
the
less
respect
they
have
to
contain
those
passions
which
are
natural
.
Albeit
great
troubles
and
continual
adversity
seem
insupportable
;
yet
is
there
nothing
more
dangerous
,
then
ouermuch
prosperity
;
and
being
pressed
by
new
appetites
,
they
disturb
their
own
security
.
In
speaking
of
occurrents
doubtfull
,
it
is
alwaies
wisdom
to
fain
Ignorance
,
or
at
least
alledge
that
we
beleive
then
not
:
for
most
commonly
they
are
utterly
untrue
,
or
far
other
then
vulgarly
is
believed
.
The
Actions
of
men
are
commonly
liked
or
disallowed
according
to
the
bad
or
good
success
:
attributing
that
to
Council
which
sometimes
is
due
to
fortune
.
The
multitude
of
men
were
wont
to
be
more
pleased
with
suddain
then
slow
resolutions
;
and
many
times
accompt
those
enterprises
generous
,
which
are
rashly
and
inconsideratly
attempted
.
Great
difference
there
is
between
Subjects
desperate
,
and
others
which
are
only
discontented
:
for
the
one
desire
nothing
but
present
alteration
,
which
they
indeavor
with
all
hazard
:
the
other
wish
for
innovation
,
inciting
any
motion
or
practice●
because
their
intent
is
to
attend
time
,
and
that
occasion
may
present
it self
.
A
benefit
bestowed
on
him
who
thinketh
himself
greatly
injured
,
doth
not
suffice
to
raze
the
same
out
of
his
memory
,
cheifly
if
the
benefit
be
given
at
such
time
as
no
meer
motion
but
necessity
may
seem
the
occasion
thereof
.
That
Peace
ought
to
be
desired
which
removeth
suspition
,
which
assureth
us
from
perill
,
which
bringeth
quiet
certain
,
and
acquitteth
us
of
expences
:
But
when
it
worketh
contrary
effects
,
it
may
be
called
a
dangerous
war
covered
with
the
name
of
deceitfull
trust
,
not
unlike
a
perilous
poyson
ministred
in
lieu
of
a
wholsom
Medicine
.
The
effect
of
things
,
and
not
externall
show
or
seeming
,
ought
to
be
regarded
;
yet
it
is
incredible
what
great
grace
is
gained
by
courteous
speech
and
affability
:
the
reason
whereof
is
as
I
suppose
that
every
man
beleiveth
he
doth
merit
more
then
indeed
he
is
worthy
,
and
consequently
holdeth
himself
injured
when
soever
he
findeth
men
not
to
afford
him
like
estimation
.
Men
ought
in
any
wise
,
to
refrain
to
doe
or
say
any
thing
which
may
offend
,
for
which
respect
it
were
great
folly
either
in
presence
or
absence
to
utter
displeasing
speech
unless
necessity
inforceth
.
The
matters
whereof
Councellors
are
cheifly
to
consider
,
be
five
.
The
Princes
revenue
,
Peace
and
Warr
,
Defence
,
Traffick
,
and
what
Laws
are
to
be
made
.
In
giving
Council
divers
things
are
to
be
observed
;
but
amongst
them
are
two
of
most
importance
.
First
,
it
behooveth
,
that
he
who
is
Counselled
should
be
wise
;
for
seeing
Council
is
nothing
else
but
a
certain
considerate
discourse
of
things
to
be
done
or
not
done
,
if
he
who
is
to
take
Council
be
not
of
discretion
,
then
will
he
refuse
all
good
advice
offered
,
and
rather
●ncline
to
that
which
his
own
fancie
affecteth
because
the
want
of
Judgement
draweth
him
to
take
pleasure
in
vain
things
;
and
as
one
incapable
of
what
is
good
and
true
,
will
follow
that
which
is
evil
and
false
:
so
on
the
other
side
if
he
that
giveth
Council
be
not
faithfull
,
then
will
he
a
Thousand
waies
disguise
and
dissemble
the
truth
,
and
consequently
miscarry
the
mind
of
him
that
is
Counselled
:
yea
in
the
end
utterly
abuse
him
.
The
affairs
and
proceedings
of
the
world
are
so
variable
and
accompanied
with
so
many
chances
and
changes
,
as
impossible
it
seemeth
to
judge
what
is
best
:
therefore
experience
enformeth
,
that
the
conjectures
of
the
most
wise
prove
vain
and
uncertain
.
I
therefore
mislike
the
Judgment
of
those
men
,
that
will
let
slip
opportunity
of
present
good
(
though
it
be
small
)
for
feare
of
a
future
evill
,
notwithstanding
it
be
greater
,
unless
the
evill
be
very
near
at
hand
,
or
certain
.
For
if
that
doe
not
follow
which
is
feared
,
then
wilt
thou
repent
to
have
omitted
that
which
was
desired
.
Whensoever
a
general
opinion
is
conceived
of
the
singular
vertue
and
knowledge
of
any●man
,
although
he
be
indeed
ignorant
and
far
unworthy
that
accompt
,
yet
it
is
hard
to
remove
such
a
settled
conceipt
:
the
reason
is
,
that
men
having
at
the
first
given
credit
to
common
report
,
do
make
thereof
so
deep
an
impression
as
afterwards
without
great
difficulty
cannot
be
removed
.
The
Bodies
of
Men
,
Munition
,
and
Mony
may
justly
be
called
the
sinews
of
War
,
yet
of
them
the
two
first
are
more
necessary
,
for
Men
and
Arms
have
means
to
find
Mony
and
Meate
:
but
Mony
and
Meate
cannot
so
easily
find
Soldiers
and
swords
.
One
wise
Generall
having
but
a
Thousand
men
,
is
more
to
be
feared
and
esteemed
then
twenty
Commanders
of
equall
Authority
:
for
they
being
commonly
of
divers
humors
,
or
judging
diversly
,
do
never
,
or
very
rarely
what
is
to
be
done
,
and
consequently
lose
much
time
before
any
resolution
can
be
taken
.
A
Prince
of
mean
force
ought
not
in
any
wise
to
adventure
his
Estate
upon
one
daies
fight
:
for
if
he
be
victorious
he
gaineth
nothing
but
glory
:
but
if
he
lose
,
he
is
utterly
ruined
.
The
most
part
of
men
are
delighted
with
Histories
,
for
the
variety
of
accidents
therein
contained
:
yet
are
there
few
that
will
imitate
what
they
read
,
and
finde
done
by
others
;
being
perswaded
that
imitation
is
not
only
hard
but
impossible
,
as
though
the
Heavens
and
Men
were
changed
in
their
Motion
or
Order
,
and
Power
,
which
they
anciently
had
.
The
Nature
of
men
is
such
as
will
not
endevor
any
thing
good
,
unless
they
be
forced
thereunto
:
for
where
liberty
aboundeth
,
there
confusion
and
disorder
follow
.
It
is
therefore
supposed
that
Hunger
and
Poverty
make
men
industrious
:
but
good
Lawes
inforce
them
to
be
honest
;
for
if
men
were
of
themselves
good
,
then
Laws
were
needless
.
There
are
two
kinds
of
Adulation
:
The
First
proceedeth
from
a
subtil
malice
:
The
Second
cometh
by
an
ordinary
use
of
conversation
;
the
one
tendeth
to
profit
and
deceiving
;
the
other
hath
no
further
design
then
a
respect
or
fear
to
offend
.
Whereunto
the
most
honest
are
in
some
sort
bound
.
Whoso
bindeth
himself
to
flattery
,
doth
thereby
bewray
his
intent
,
either
to
gain
,
or
not
to
lose
that
he
hath
.
For
the
person
flattered
is
alwaies
superior
to
him
that
doth
flatter
,
or
at
least
one
as
may
in
some
sort
stand
him
in
stead
.
It
may
therefore
be
inferred
that
only
men
of
base
and
miserable
condition
,
and
such
as
cannot
help
or
hurt
,
be
free
from
flatterers
.
And
contrariwise
magnanimous
and
fortunate
folke
,
proud
men
and
such
as
content
themselves
with
their
present
estate
,
are
seldom
found
to
be
flatterers
.
Every
wise
Prince
doth
presuppose
that
times
of
trouble
may
come
,
and
that
all
such
occasions
he
shal
be
forced
to
use
the
service
of
men
diversly
qualified
.
His
study
therefore
is
in
the
mean
time
so
to
entertain
them
as
when
those
storms
arise
he
may
rest
assured
to
command
them
;
for
whosoever
perswades
himself
by
present
benefits
to
gain
the
good
will
of
men
,
when
perills
are
at
hand
,
shall
be
deceived
.
In
ancient
times
Princes
and
Governors
were
wont
when
peace
and
security
were
most
like
to
continue
,
to
find
or
fain
occasions
to
draw
their
Subjects
to
fear
,
to
the
end
that
doubt
might
move
them
to
be
more
carefull
of
their
own
weldoing
;
for
well
they
knew
it
a
general
defect
in
men
to
be
reachless
,
and
never
willing
to
use
industry
;
unless
by
necessity
they
were
constrained
.
All
Histories
do
shew
,
and
wise
Polititians
do
hold
it
necessary
,
that
for
the
well
governing
of
every
Commonweal
it
behooveth
to
presuppose
that
all
men
are
evil
,
and
will
declare
themselves
so
to
be
when
occasion
is
offered
;
for
albeit
some
inconvenience
doth
lie
hid
for
a
time
,
it
proceedeth
from
a
covert
occasion
,
which
for
want
of
experience
was
not
found
untill
time
the
Mother
of
Truth
discover
it
.
Neutrality
is
always
a
thing
dangerous
and
disallowable
,
because
it
oftendeth
all
parties
:
He
that
is
strong
looketh
to
be
assisted
in
his
greatness
;
and
he
that
is
weak
not
being
defended
,
holdeth
himself
offended
:
the
one
is
not
assured
from
Foes
,
and
the
other
holdeth
no
friends
.
Albeit
neutrality
procure
present
quiet
and
security
,
during
the
troubles
of
others
;
yet
after
the
samefalleth
out
a
disadvantage
,
because
it
entertaineth
a
certain
falseness
,
and
so
in
short
space
will
be
perceived
;
not
unlike
those
men
that
borrow
upon
usury
;
for
albeit
they
enjoy
a
certain
time
,
without
trouble
or
charge
,
yet
the
same
being
spent
,
and
the
day
of
payment
come
,
they
then
feel
the
great
danger
which
their
short
pleasure
hath
purchased
.
Whoso
examineth
all
humane
actions
shall
find
that
in
eschewing
one
inconvenience
,
wepresently
incur
another
.
As
for
example
,
if
we
endeavor
to
make
our
dominions
mighty
,
it
behooveth
to
have
the
same
fully
r●plenished
with
people
,
and
well
armed
,
and
so
being
,
they
are
not
easily
governed
.
On
the
other
side
,
if
our
Country
be
not
well
peopled
,
or
disarmed
,
then
it
is
easily
holden
in
obedience
;
yet
therwith
so
weake
that
it
can
neither
increase
the
bounds
therof
,
nor
defend
it selfe
.
It
is
therfore
necessary
in
all
our
deliberations
to
consider
what
inconvenience
is
least
,
and
choose
that
,
as
the
best
:
for
to
find
all
perfect
,
void
and
secure
of
suspect
or
imperfection
,
is
impossible
.
A
Prince
being
instantly
required
to
take
part
with
other
Princes
,
the
one
being
in
arms
against
the
other
,
if
he
deny
both
incureth
suspicion
of
both
,
and
may
be
thought
to
have
secret
intelligences
with
one
or
both
of
them
;
so
as
either
of
them
shall
accompt
him
an
enemy
,
and
consequently
he
that
proves
victorious
will
be
revenged
;
and
the
other
holding
him
suspected
will
not
acknowledg
his
Friendship
.
It
is
the
use
of
men
to
presume
much
upon
their
own
merit
,
and
seeing
the
success
of
some
others
to
be
such
as
without
cause
or
desert
are
aspired
to
dignity
thereby
uncouraged
they
promised
to
themselves
the
like
:
Nevertheless
being
entred
into
the
course
of
their
design
,
and
finding
many
crosses
and
impeachments
,
they
do
not
a
little
repent
their
over-weening
and
presumption
,
but
also
many
times
utterly
abandon
their
rash
and
unadvised
enterprize
;
neither
can
I
think
th●t
the
vertue
or
sufficiencie
of
any
man
without
the
favor
of
the
heavens
can
advance
him
;
for
as
the
Poet
saith
,
Ne●
velle
juvat
,
potiúsue
nocet
,
si
fata
repugnant
Whoso
serveth
a
Prince
far
from
his
presence
,
shall
with
great
difficulty
content
him
.
For
if
he
commit
any
error
,
it
shall
be
aggravated
:
besides
that
the
instructions
sent
unto
him
cannot
be
particularly
conceived
,
because
the
State
of
worldly
things
doth
daily
alter
.
Also
to
serve
alooffe
,
is
a
thing
full
of
danger
and
far
from
reward
:
which
inconvenience
may
for
the
most
part
be
avoided
by
him
that
attendeth
near
to
his
Princes
person
.
Let
no
man
that
cometh
to
serve
in
Court
,
assure
himself
by
his
wisdom
to
be
advanced
or
eschew
all
encounters
.
Neither
is
he
to
bear
himself
so
careless
as
to
commit
all
to
fortune
,
but
be
perswaded
that
this
wordly
life
is
like
to
a
voyage
by
Sea
;
wherein
albeit
Art
with
the
favor
of
the
wind
may
do
much
,
yet
can
we
not
assure
our selves
to
arrive
safe
in
the
Haven
appointed
;
for
daily
experience
doth
shew
,
that
some
strange
ships
in
the
calmest
weather
,
are
drowned
or
impeached
by
the
way
,
when
others
much
weaker
and
disarmed
passe
securely
.
Among
men
worthy
of
commendations
,
those
have
merited
best
that
first
planted
true
Religion
:
next
they
that
framed
Kingdoms
and
Commonwealths
;
the
third
place
is
due
to
such
as
have
augmented
or
enlarged
their
dominions
;
lastly
learned
men
deserve
fame
and
memory
:
and
as
every
of
these
are
worthy
of
fame
and
honor
;
so
ought
they
to
be
accompted
infamous
that
introduce
Atheism
,
or
the
subversion
of
kingdoms
,
or
are
become
enemies
to
Learning
and
Vertue
.
Whosoever
taketh
in
hand
to
governe
a
Multitude
either
by
way
of
liberty
,
or
principality
,
and
cannot
assure
himse●f
of
those
persons
that
are
Enemies
to
that
Enterprise
,
doth
frame
a
State
of
short
perseverance
:
yet
true
it
is
that
such
Princes
be
infortunate●
as
for
their
own
security
are
inforced
to
hold
a
course
extraordinary
,
and
have
the
multitude
their
enemy
;
for
he
that
hath
few
foes
may
with
small
dishonor
be
assured
;
but
he
that
is
generally
hated
can
by
no
means
live
assured
;
and
the
more
cruelty
he
useth
,
the
weaker
his
principality
proveth
.
In
commending
another
man
great
moderation
is
to
be
used
;
for
as
contumely
offendeth
him
against
whom
it
is
used
;
so
great
praise
,
besides
that
it
is
uttered
with
danger
to
his
judgment
that
speaketh
it
,
the
same
doth
oftentimes
offend
him
that
heareth
it
.
For
self
love
which
commonly
possesseth
men
,
causes
the
good
or
evil
we
hear
,
to
be
measured
with
our
own
.
And
consequently
every
man
that
is
touched
with
like
deserts
and
defects
,
doth
grow●
offended
that
his
commendation
is
not
set
forth
,
and
feareth
lest
his
imperfection
should
be
discovered
.
It
is
often
,
or
rather
ever
seen
,
that
the
force
of
Leagues
not
used
in
their
first
heat
,
becomes
cold
;
because
Suspition
soon
entereth
,
which
in
short
space
will
destroy
whatsoever
was
concluded
,
and
may
not
without
long
time
be
rejoyned
.
The
power
of
Ambition
which
possesseth
the
mindes
of
men
,
is
such
,
as
rarely
or
never
suffereth
them
to
rest
:
The
reason
thereof
is
,
That
nature
hath
framed
in
them
a
certain
disposition
to
desire
all
things
,
but
not
to
obtain
them
;
so
as
our
desires
being
greater
then
our
power
,
thereof
followeth
discontent
and
evil
satisfaction
.
Hereof
also
proceedeth
the
variation
of
Fortune
;
for
some
men
desiring
to
get
,
and
others
fearing
to
lose
that
they
have
gotten
,
do
occasion
one
man
to
injure
another
,
and
consequently
Publick
Wars
do
follow
;
by
means
whereof
,
one
Countrey
is
ruined
,
and
an
other
inlarged
.
Princes
of
great
power
,
and
cheifly
those
that
are
Inhabitants
of
the
North
,
having
many
Children
,
were
wont
to
be
much
inclined
to
the
Wars
,
as
well
to
win
unto
themselves
honor
,
as
also
to
get
possessions
for
their
Sons
;
which
manner
of
proceedings
did
oftentimes
remove
such
disturbance
as
the
plurality
of
Brethren
bringeth
.
These
and
other
reasons
induced
Princes
to
attempt
War
against
those
Kingdoms
,
which
in
their
opinion
seemed
easily
conquered
,
or
whereunto
they
can
pretend
litle
;
for
by
colour
thereof
they
may
the
rather
justifie
their
proceedings
.
When
a
Prince
deferreth
to
answer
an
Ambassador
,
it
proceedeth
from
some
of
these
respects
;
either
because
he
will
take
time
to
resolve
himself
of
somewhat
whereof
he
doubteth
,
or
that
he
intendeth
covertly
to
deny
that
which
is
demanded
,
or
that
he
esteemeth
not
the
Prince
that
doth
demand
,
or
that
he
disdaineth
the
person
by
whom
the
demand
is
made
,
or
else
that
he
intendeth
to
hear
from
his
own
Ministers
to
be
better
resolved
:
Wherefore
a
discreet
Negotiator
ought
in
such
cases
to
consider
which
of
these
reasons
move
the
Prince
where
he
is
employed
,
to
entertain
him
with
delays
,
and
make
his
dispatch
accordingly
.
The
sufficiency
of
good
Counsellors
consisteth
in
four
things
.
First
,
They
ought
to
be
wise
and
skilful
how
to
handle
their
affairs
,
directing
all
doings
to
publick
commodity
.
Secondly
,
To
be
just
in
their
proceedings
,
giving
to
every
one
that
which
to
him
appertaineth
.
Thirdly
,
To
be
stout
,
and
void
both
of
partial
respects
and
fear
.
And
lastly
,
To
be
temperate
and
moderate
in
their
desires
.
Whoso
desireth
to
govern
well
and
securely
,
it
behoveth
him
to
have
a
vigilant
eye
to
the
proceedings
of
great
Princes
,
and
to
consider
seriously
of
their
designs
:
For
it
is
a
matter
of
small
difficulty
to
live
in
peace
with
him
who
desireth
our
amity
,
and
provideth
for
others
that
endeavor
to
offend
us
.
The
intelligences
that
Princes
study
to
attain
,
are
procured
by
divers
means
:
Some
are
brought
by
report
,
some
vented
by
conversation
and
sounding
,
some
by
means
of
espials
;
but
the
most
sure
and
credible
accurrents
,
are
those
which
come
from
Ambassadors
,
cheifly
those
that
either
for
the
greatness
of
their
Prince
,
or
their
own
Vertue
,
be
of
most
reputation
.
For
those
men
conversing
daily
with
great
personages
,
and
pondering
diligently
their
Manners
,
Words
,
Wisdom
,
and
the
order
of
each
mans
proceedings
,
yea
,
of
the
Prince
himself
,
may
with
commodity
attain
unto
matters
of
importance
sooner
then
they
that
are
Writers
of
rumors
,
or
that
take
upon
them
to
conjecture
of
things
to
come
.
Whensoever
a
people
is
induced
to
commit
so
great
an
error
,
as
to
give
reputation
to
one
onely
man
,
to
the
end
he
should
oppress
all
those
great
men
whom
they
hate
,
they
thereby
give
him
opportunity
to
become
their
Prince
;
and
so
being
assisted
with
their
favor
and
aid●
he
may
likewise
extinguish
all
the
rest
of
the
Nobility
;
and
they
being
extirpated●
he
will
also
endeavor
to
tyrannize
over
the
people
,
by
wh●se
help
he
aspired
.
So
many
as
are
not
consenting
to
the
Tyranny
,
rest
enemies
to
the
person
of
the
Tyrant
,
who
can
by
no
means
gain
the
love
of
all
.
For
impossible
it
is
,
that
the
riches
of
any
Tyrant
should
be
so
great
,
and
the
Honors
he
can
give
so
many
as
may
satisfie
all
.
Hereof
it
cometh
,
that
those
Tyrants
that
are
favored
of
the
people
,
and
disfavored
of
the
Nobles●
are
most
secure
;
because
their
Tyranny
is
supported
with
a
greater
strength
(
having
the
mul●itude
their
friends
)
then
is
the
Tyrant
whom
the
humor
of
the
Nobles
onely
hath
advanced
.
A
dangerous
thing
it
is
in
all
Common-wealths
by
continual
punishing
,
to
hold
the
mindes
of
Subjects
in
suspition
;
for
men
ever
fearing
their
ruine
,
will
(
without
respect
)
determine
to
save
themselves
,
and
as
men
desperate
,
attempt
innovation
.
All
capital
executions
ought
therefore
to
be
executed
suddenly
,
and
as
it
were
at
one
instant●
so
to
assure
the
mindes
of
men
from
further
molestation●●
The
intent
of
every
wise
Prince
that
maketh
War
,
either
by
election
or
ambition
,
is
to
gain
and
hold
what
is
gotten
:
Also
to
use
the
matter
so
as
thereby
he
may
inrich
himself
,
and
not
impoverish
his
own
people
or
Countrey
.
He
that
inlargeth
his
Dominions
,
doth
not
always
increase
his
power
;
but
he
that
increaseth
in
force
as
well
as
in
Dominion
,
shall
thereby
grow
great
;
otherwise
he
gaineth
no
more
then
is
shortly
to
be
lost
,
and
consequently
he
ruineth
himself
:
For
who
spends
more
in
the
War
,
then
he
gains
by
Victory
,
loseth
both
labor
and
Cost
.
Every
Prince
and
Commonwealth
must
above
all
things
take
heed
,
that
no
necessity
how
great
soever
,
do
perswade
him
to
bring
into
his
Dominion
any
Auxiliary
Soldiers
;
because
the
hardest
conditions
the
enemy
can
offer
,
are
more
easie
then
is
such
a
resolution
.
A
Prince
sheweth
his
ruine
at
hand
,
whensoever
he
beginneth
to
break
the
Laws
and
Customs
,
which
are
antient
,
and
have
been
long
time
obeyed
by
the
people
of
his
Dominion
.
That
Prince
which
careth
to
keep
himself
secure
from
conspiracy
,
ought
rather
to
fear
those
to
whom
he
hath
done
over-great
favors
,
then
them
whom
he
hath
much
injured
:
For
these
want
opportunities
,
the
other
do
not
;
and
both
their
desires
are
as
one
;
because
the
Appetite
of
commanding●
is
always
as
much
or
more
then
the
desire
of
revenge
.
Whensoever
a
Prince
discovers
a
conspiracy
,
he
must
well
consider
the
quality
thereof
,
measuring
the
force
of
the
Conspirators
with
his
own
;
and
finding
them
many
and
mighty
,
the
knowledge
thereof
is
to
be
dissembled
,
until
the
Princes
power
be
prepared
to
oppose
them
;
otherwise
he
hazardeth
his
own
security
.
It
hath
been
by
long
experience
found
better
to
send
one
General
to
an
Army
,
though
he
be
of
mean
sufficiency
,
then
to
give
the
same
Authority
to
two
or
more
excellent
personages
with
equal
Commission
.
He
that
coveteth
to
be
over-much
loved
,
often
times
becomes
contemptible
;
and
he
that
endeavoreth
to
be
over-much
feared
,
is
ever
hated
:
And
to
hold
the
mean
between
them
,
cannot
be
exactly
done
,
because
nature
will
not
so
permit
.
Whoso
aspireth
to
any
dignity
,
must
resolve
himself
to
endure
the
envy
of
men
,
and
never
to
be
moved
for
any
offence
conceived
against
him
,
though
they
that
be
offended
,
be
his
dear
Friends
:
Neither
shall
he
for
the
first
affront
or
encounter
,
relinquish
his
hope
;
for
he
that
constantly
maketh
head
against
the
assault
of
Fortune
,
shall
after
with
facility
arive
where
he
designed
.
In
giving
Council
to
a
Prince
or
Commonwealth
,
and
therewith
desiring
to
eschue
danger
and
offence
,
no
other
mean
is
to
be
taken
then
that
the
Counsellor
shall
without
passion
or
perswasion
pronounce
his
opinion
,
and
never
to
affirm
any
thing
as
a
resolution
,
but
with
modesty
to
defend
that
he
speaketh
;
so
as
the
Prince
which
follows
his
advice
,
may
seem
to
do
it
voluntarily
,
and
not
forced
by
the
importunity
of
him
that
gave
the
Council
.
A
discreet
Captain
being
in
the
Field
against
the
enemy
,
of
whose
vertue
he
hath
had
no
proof
,
ought
first
by
light
skirmishes
to
feel
of
what
vertue
he
is●
and
not
to
enterprise
any
general
adventure
,
to
the
end
that
Terror
or
Fame
should
not
daunt
nor
discourage
his
own
Soldiers
.
Albeit
Fraud
be
in
all
actions
detested
,
yet
is
the
same
in
Martial
enterprises
commendable
and
glorious
:
For
that
Captain
who
compasseth
his
designs
by
wit
or
stratagem
,
is
no
less
commended
then
he
that
vanquisheth
the
Enemy
by
violence
and
Force
.
In
times
of
extremity
,
when
resolution
must
be
taken
for
the
having
or
utter
losse
of
the
State
,
then
no
regard
is
to
be
had
of
Justice
or
Injustice
,
Mercy
or
Cruelty
,
Honor
or
Ignominy
,
but
rather
setting
aside
all
respects
,
that
course
is
to
be
follow
which
defended
the
lives
and
liberties
of
men
.
Whoso
desireth
to
know
what
will
be
hereafter
let
him
think
of
that
is
past
;
for
the
World
hath
ever
bin
in
in
a
circular
revolution
:
Whatsoever
is
now
,
was
heretofore
and
things
past
or
present
are
no
other
then
such
as
shall
be
again
:
redit
orbis
in
orbem
.
A
Prince
that
desireth
to
obtain
any
thing
at
the
hand
of
another
,
must
if
it
be
possible
urge
a
suddain
answer
,
and
lay
before
him
that
is
moved
,
a
necessity
to
resove
presently
,
giving
him
to
understand
that
denial
or
delaies
may
breed
a
perilous
and
suddain
indignation
.
There
is
nothing
more
difficult
,
doubtful
and
dangerous
then
to
attempt
Innovation
:
for
he
that
taketh
in
hand
an
enterprize
of
such
quality
,
maketh
all
those
his
Enemies
which
lived
well
under
the
old
order
,
and
findeth
them
cold
defenders
that
affect
his
novelties
,
which
coldness
proceedeth
chiefly
of
incredulity
;
for
men
are
not
easily
induced
to
beleeve
a
new
thing
till
experience
hath
proved
it
to
be
good
.
There
is
no
art
nor
other
knowledg
so
seemly
and
necessary
for
a
Prince
as
the
Art
Military
with
the
ordinances
and
discipline
thereof
:
for
that
is
the
only
skill
required
in
him
that
commandeth
,
and
such
a
vertue
as
doth
not
only
maintain
them
that
are
born
Princes
,
but
often
advanceth
private
men
to
that
dignity
.
The
deep
impressions
which
old
injuries
make
in
the
minds
of
great
men
cannot
with
new
benefits
be
razed
out
;
it
is
also
to
be
remembred
that
injuries
be
done
all
together
:
For
they
offend
the
lesse
,
and
wil
be
forgotten
the
sooner
;
but
benefits
should
by
little
and
little
be
bestowed
,
●o
shal
the
memory
of
them
long
continue
.
A
small
pleasure
or
displeasure
presently
done
,
doth
move
more
then
a
great
good
turn
bestowed
in
times
past
;
for
the
taste
of
things
present
doth
make
a
deeper
impression
in
the
minds
of
men
,
then
doth
the
memory
of
things
past
,
or
expectation
of
things
to
come
.
It
is
a
matter
of
small
difficulty
to
sound
the
discont
ntment
of
other
men
.
For
every
one
doth
willingly
tell
the
well
and
ill
deserving
of
friends
,
and
likewise
how
much
or
how
little
foes
can
do
,
if
we
have
patience
to
hear
,
which
patience
is
the
beginning
of
all
good
speed
;
but
he
that
delighteth
to
speak
much
,
and
hear
little
,
shall
ever
inform
others
more
then
he
himself
can
learn
.
Among
other
dangers
which
a
Prince
incurreth
by
being
disarmed
,
the
greatest
is
,
that
thereby
he
becometh
contemptible
;
for
no
comparison
there
is
between
men
armed
and
them
that
are
disarmed
:
and
no
reason
there
is
that
he
that
is
armed
should
yield
obedience
to
him
that
is
disarmed
,
neither
is
it
like
that
a
Prince
disarmed
can
be
secure
from
his
own
Subjects
armed
.
A
Prince
ignorant
of
Martial
knowledg
,
among
other
misfortunes
cannot
be
esteemed
or
trusted
of
his
own
Soldiers
;
it
behooveth
him
therefore
as
well
in
time
of
peace
as
war
to
exercise
arms
,
which
may
be
done
by
two
meanes
;
the
one
by
action
of
body
,
the
other
by
contemplation
of
mind
.
The
body
may
be
exercised
in
hunting
,
hawking
,
and
such
like
pastimes
;
thereby
to
be
made
apt
to
endure
travel
:
his
mind
likewise
may
be
informed
by
reading
of
Histories
,
and
the
consideration
of
actions
performed
by
excellent
Captains
,
observing
the
occasion
of
their
victories
or
losses
to
the
end
he
may
imitate
the
one●
and
eschew
the
other
.
He
that
doth
not
as
other
men
do
,
but
endeavoureth
that
which
ought
to
be
done
,
shall
thereby
rather
incur
peril
then
preservation
for
whoso
laboreth
to
be
sincerely
perfect
and
good
,
shall
necessarily
perish
,
living
among
men
that
are
generally
evil
.
A
Prince
that
useth
liberality
to
his
prejudice
,
ought
not
to
regard
the
infamy
of
Miserable
,
because
his
parsimony
will
in
time
enable
him
to
be
liberal
,
and
so
may
declare
himself
to
be
,
having
by
parsimony
increased
his
power
,
and
therefore
without
imposing
upon
the
people
,
may
defend
himself
from
all
such
as
will
make
war
;
so
shall
he
use
liberality
to
all
them
from
whom
he
taketh
nothing
,
who
are
infinite
;
and
use
miserliness
to
those
only
to
whom
he
giveth
,
who
are
but
few
.
There
is
nothing
that
consumeth
it self
like
to
liberality
;
for
if
it
be
long
used
,
it
taketh
away
the
meanes
to
continue
it
,
and
consequently
doth
make
men
poor
and
basely
minded
:
or
else
to
eschew
poverty
they
shall
be
forced
to
extortion
and
become
odious
.
It
is
better
to
incur
the
name
of
covetous
(
which
is
a
scandal
without
hate
)
then
with
desire
to
be
accounted
liberal
,
deserve
the
infamie
of
oppression
(
an
ignominy
accompanied
with
hatred
.
)
A
Prince
ought
to
be
slow
in
believing
,
and
advised
in
proceeding
;
he
should
also
beware
not
to
make
himself
over
much
feared
,
but
in
all
his
actions
shew
great
wisdom
tempered
with
curtesie
;
so
shall
not
over
much
confidence
induce
him
to
be
careless
,
nor
over
much
diffidence
render
him
intolerable
.
Whoso
observeth
,
shall
see
that
men
offended
,
less
respect
him
whom
they
love
,
then
him
whom
they
fear
.
For
love
is
maintained
by
a
certain
reciproque
obligation
,
which
because
men
are
evill
,
useth
to
be
by
every
occasion
of
profit
broken
.
But
fear
is
continued
by
a
certain
dread
of
punishment
which
never
faileth
.
A
Prince
that
holdeth
in
the
fi●ld
an
Army
wherein
are
great
numbers
of
Soldiers
,
ought
not
to
care
though
he
be
accompted
cruell
:
For
without
such
an
opinion
conceived
,
he
cannot
keep
his
forces
united
,
nor
apt
to
attempt
any
enterprize
.
Men
for
the
most
,
do
use
rather
to
judg
;
by
their
eyes
,
then
by
their
hands
,
for
every
one
may
see
,
but
few
can
certainly
know
.
Every
one
seeth
what
thou
seemest
to
be
,
but
few
can
understand
what
thou
art
indeed
;
and
these
few
dare
not
oppose
themselves
to
the
opinion
of
many
which
have
the
Majesty
of
Estate
to
defend
them
.
Also
in
the
actions
of
all
men
,
and
chiefly
Princes
,
from
whom
is
no
appellation
,
the
end
is
ever
observed
.
Machiavel
.
A
Prince
being
forced
to
use
the
condition
of
beasts
,
must
among
them
make
choice
of
the
Fox
and
the
Lyon
;
for
the
Lyon
cannot
take
heed
of
snares
,
and
the
Fox
is
easily
overcome
by
the
Wolves
,
it
behooveth
him
therefore
to
be
a
Fox
to
discover
the
snares
,
and
a
Lyon
to
terrify
the
Wolves
.
A
Prince
newly
advanced
cannot
observe
those
rules
which
are
the
cause
that
men
be
accompted
good
;
he
being
many
times
constrained
for
defence
of
his
state
to
proceed
contrary
to
promise
,
contrary
to
charity
,
and
all
vertue
;
and
consequently
it
behooveth
him
to
have
a
mind
apt
to
alteration
,
as
the
wind
and
variation
of
fortune
shall
direct
;
yet
ought
he
not
to
abandon
the
good
,
if
so
he
can
,
but
be
ready
to
use
what
is
evil
if
so
he
shall
be
inforced
.
Every
Prince
ought
to
have
two
ears
,
the
one
Intrinsick
in
respect
of
Subjects
,
the
other
Extrinsick
in
respect
of
forraine
Potentates
,
from
whom
●he
may
be
defended
with
good
Arms
,
and
good
Friends
:
Also
matters
Intrinsick
will
ever
stand
well
so
long
as
all
things
abroad
rest
firm
.
A
Prince
that
is
favored
of
the
multitude
,
need
not
to
doubt
conspiracy
;
but
contrariwise
where
the
people
is
generally
discontented
,
and
hateth
the
Prince
,
then
may
he
reasonably
doubt
every
thing
,
and
every
person
;
for
no
man
is
so
poor
,
that
wanteth
a
weapon
wherewith
to
offend
,
W●en
any
occasion
is
presented
to
have
that
thou
desirest
,
fail
not
to
lay
hold
thereof
:
For
these
worldly
things
do
vary
,
and
that
so
suddenly
,
as
hard
it
is
to
assure
our selves
of
any
thing
,
unless
the
same
be
already
in
hand
:
On
the
other
side
if
any
trouble
threaten
thee
,
defer
it
so
long
as
thou
maist
;
for
time
may
occ●sion
some
accident
to
remove
all
dangers
.
The
Prince
that
doubtech
the
fidelity
of
his
Subjects
,
must
of
force
build
Fortresses
;
but
he
that
feareth
forreign
force
more
then
his
own
people
,
were
better
to
leave
them
unbuilt
.
Howsoever
it
be
,
that
Prince
that
desireth
generally
to
be
respected
and
esteemed
,
must
perform
some
notable
enterprise
,
and
give
testimony
of
great
Vertue
and
Valor
.
A
Prince
shall
do
well
at
all
times
to
be
counselled
so
as
no
man
do
presume
to
give
counsel
but
when
the
Prince
doth
ask
it
.
It
is
al●o
to
be
noted
,
that
he
who
is
not
of
himself
wise
,
cannot
be
well
counselled
of
others
,
unless
happily
he
yield
to
some
wise
men
the
Government
of
his
whole
Affairs
.
For
good
counsels
from
whomsoever
they
proceed
,
shall
be
thought
to
come
from
the
Prince
,
and
not
the
wisdom
of
the
Prince
to
proceed
from
the
counsel
of
others
.
He
that
taketh
delight
to
be
employed
in
Publick
Affairs
,
must
by
all
means
endeavor
to
continue
in
such
Services
:
For
oft
one
business
dependeth
on
another
,
whereunto
the
Florentine
Proverb
may
be
applied
,
Di
cosa
,
nasae
cosa
&
il
tempole
governa
.
Some
men
have
not
onely
desired
,
but
also
compassed
honor
and
profit
;
yet
being
in
possession
of
both
,
were
not
therewith
so
satisfyed
as
they
hoped
to
be
;
which
being
believed
,
would
happily
extinguish
the
immeasurable
ambition
wherewith
many
men
are
possessed
.
By
experience
I
have
learned
that
great
folly
it
is
to
account
that
ours
which
we
have
not
,
or
spend
presently
in
hope
of
future
gain
.
Therefore
Merchants
during
the
adventure
of
their
goods
,
do
not
increase
domesticall
expences●
but
fearing
the
worst
assure
what
is
in
hand
.
For
such
men
as
have
gained
unto
themselves
reputation
and
are
accounted
vertuous
,
to
maintain
that
conceipt
and
eschew
envy
,
there
is
nothing
better
then
a
life
retired
from
daily
conversation
,
&
chiefly
of
the
multitude
.
Fugiat
sapiens
commercia
vulgi●
The
end
that
moveth
a
Prince
to
make
war
,
is
to
enrich
himself
,
and
impoverish
the
enemy
:
neit
her
is
victory
desired
for
other
purpose
then
thereby
to
become
the
more
mighty
,
and
make
the
enemy
weak
;
consequently
wheresoever
thy
victory
doth
impoverish
thee
,
or
thy
gain
therein
doth
weaken
thee
,
it
followeth
that
either
thou
passe
or
undergoe
that
mark
whereunto
the
intention
of
war
was
directed
.
And
that
Prince
is
by
victory
enriched
,
that
can
oppress
the
enemies
power
and
become
Master
of
his
goods
and
possessions
.
And
that
Prince
is
by
victory
impoverished
when
the
enemy
notwithstanding
he
be
victored
can
still
maintain
himself
,
and
the
spoyls
and
possessions
are
not
taken
to
the
use
of
the
Prince
victorious
,
but
imparted
unto
his
Soldiers
.
For
then
may
he
be
thought
in
his
own
loosing
infortunate
,
and
in
victory
unhappy
;
for
if
he
be
vanquished
,
then
must
he
indure
the
offence
by
foes
;
and
being
victorious
shall
be
forced
to
abide
the
wrong
offered
by
Friends
:
which
as
they
be
less
reasonable
,
so
are
they
also
less
supportable
;
because
he
is
still
by
impositions
forced
to
burthen
the
Subjects
,
whereof
m●y
be
inferred
,
that
the
Prince
having
in
him
any
generosity
cannot
justly
rejoyce
at
that
victory
which
causeth
the
Subjects
to
lament
.
Who
so
desireth
to
obtain
any
thing
,
hopeth
to
compass
his
desire
,
either
by
intreaty
,
presents
,
or
threatning
;
for
so
shall
he
to
whom
the
request
is
made
,
be
moved
either
with
compassion
,
profit
,
or
fear
:
Nevertheless
with
covetous
and
cruel
men
,
and
such
as
are
in
their
opinion
mighty
,
none
of
these
can
prevail
.
And
consequently
in
vain
do
they
labor
,
that
go
about
by
suit
to
stir
them
to
pity
,
by
gifts
to
gain
them
,
or
by
threats
to
fear
them
.
Who
so
is
perswaded
that
any
Common-weal
can
continue
disunited
,
doth
greatly
deceive
himself
:
True
it
is
,
that
some
divisions
do
maintain
the
Estate
,
but
other
do
indamage
the
same
They
which
do
harm
,
are
such
as
with
Sects
and
Pertakings
be
accompanied
;
they
which
help
without
Sects
and
Pertakings
be
maintained
.
A
wise
Governor
therefore
,
albeit
he
cannot
so
exactly
foresee
but
some
enemies
will
arise
in
the
State
,
yet
may
he
take
order
that
no
Factions
may
thereby
grow
.
It
is
therefore
to
be
noted
,
that
the
Citizens
of
every
Estate
,
may
aspire
to
Reputation
,
either
by
private
or
publick
means
.
Reputation
by
publick
means
,
is
gained
chiefly
in
the
War
,
either
by
obtaining
victory
in
some
Battel
,
or
surprising
of
some
City
;
or
else
by
performing
some
Ambassage
d●ligently
,
prosperously
:
but
private
Reputation
is
gotten
by
doing
favor
to
this
or
that
man
and
protecting
them
from
Magistrates
,
giving
them
money
,
advancing
them
unworthily
to
Honor
and
Office
;
and
by
great
Feasts
,
entertaining
the
multitude
;
of
which
manner
of
proceeding
,
Se●●s
,
Factions
,
and
Partakings
do
grow
:
And
as
Reputation
thus
gained
is
dangerous
,
so
the
other
without
Faction
is
profitable
;
because
the
same
is
founded
on
Common
welfare
,
and
no
private
profit
:
And
albeit
among
Citizens
of
this
sort
,
will
oft
arise
great
hate
,
yet
wanting
followers
for
their
particular
profit
,
the
State
shall
not
be
indangered
,
but
rather
strengthned
;
for
every
man
endeavoring
to
deserve
well
,
will
hold
himself
within
the
bounds
of
Civil
life
,
and
by
Vertuous
Merits
labor
to
be
advanced
.
To
perswade
or
disswade
particular
persons
,
is
a
ma●ter
of
no
difficulty
:
for
if
words
suffice
not
,
yet
Authority
will
prevaile
:
but
hard
and
perillous
it
is
to
remove
a
false
opinion
conceived
by
a
whole
multitude
,
for
therein
faire
speech
and
no
compulsion
must
be
used
.
The
best
means
which
wise
Captains
can
use
to
make
their
Soldiers
resolute
,
is
to
take
from
them
all
hope
,
which
resolution
may
also
be
increased
with
the
love
of
our
Country
and
confidence
in
the
Captain
:
for
confidence
groweth
by
the
valor
of
men
,
and
Discipline
in
former
Victories
,
and
trust
reposed
in
the
leader
.
The
love
of
our
Country
is
naturall
,
but
the
aff●ction
we
bear
to
the
Captain
proceedeth
rather
from
his
vertue
,
then
the
benefits
he
hath
be●●owed●
Necessity
also
may
do
much
,
and
chiefly
that
where
no
choise
is
left
,
but
either
overcome
by
armes
,
or
dye
in
desperation
.
There
is
nothing
of
so
great
force
to
hold
an
Armie
united
,
as
the
reputation
of
the
Captain
,
which
proceedeth
only
from
his
vertue
;
for
neither
Dignity
nor
Authority
without
Valor
can
work
that
effect
.
The
first
care
that
a
Captain
must
have
,
is
to
hold
his
Soldiers
well
punished
and
paied
;
for
where
payment
faileth
,
punishment
ought
not
to
be
inflicted
:
and
consequently
no
reason
it
is
to
punish
him
for
robbery
,
whom
want
of
pay
enforceth
to
shift
;
but
where
the
Soldier
is
payed
,
and
not
punished
(
offending
)
then
will
he
without
respect
become
insolent
towards
his
Captain●
whereof
insue
Mutinies
,
Discord
,
and
utter
Ruine
It
is
a
custom
very
honorable
not
to
promise
more
then
thou
wilt
assuredly
performe
:
yet
true
it
is
that
whosoever
is
denied
(
though
justly
)
doth
rest
illcontented
;
for
men
indeed
are
not
governed
by
reason
:
otherwise
it
is
for
him
that
promiseth
:
and
so
good
promises
shall
stand
in
stead
of
performance
;
besides
that
,
he
may
find
excuse
enough
,
because
the
most
part
of
men
are
so
simple
,
that
faire
words
alone
have
power
to
abuse
them
,
cheifly
when
they
proceed
from
a
person
of
Reputation
and
Authority
.
The
best
way
therefore
is
not
to
promise
precisely
,
but
entertain
the
Suitors
with
answers
general
,
and
full
of
good
hope
:
yet
not
such
as
shall
directly
and
absolutely
bind
.
The
greatest
and
most
material
displeasures
that
use
to
arise
between
the
Nobility
and
People
,
are
caused
by
the
diversity
of
humors
,
the
one
laboring
to
command
,
the
other
endevoring
not
to
obey
;
so
as
all
troubles
and
disorders
in
every
Commonweale
do
thereof
receive
nutriment
.
The
City
which
is
maintained
rather
by
Factions
then
Lawes
,
so
soon
as
one
Faction
is
become
strong
and
without
opposition
,
the
same
of
necessity
must
be
divided
in
it self
:
for
those
particular
causes
which
were
at
the
first
taken
,
are
not
of
force
enough
to
maintain
it
.
It
is
the
nature
of
men
not
to
indure
any
discom●odity
,
unless
necessity
do
thereunto
enforce
them
:
which
may
apparently
be
perceived
by
their
habitations
;
for
as
the
feare
of
Warr
draweth
them
to
places
of
strength
(
for
their
defence
)
so
that
perill
being
past
,
they
do
for
the
most
part
remove
themselves
to
inhabit
Countries
of
more
commodity
and
profit
.
It
may
seem
strange
,
and
no
even
measure
(
yet
approved
by
experience
)
that
where
many
of●end
few
are
punished
.
Also
petty
errors
are
severely
corrected●
but
great
and
grievous
crimes
be
rewarded
.
In
like
manner
,
where
many
receive
wrong
,
few
seek
revenge
.
For
injuries
universal
,
are
with
more
patience
then
particular
offences
endured
.
All
or
the
greatest
part
of
men
that
have
aspired
to
riches
or
power
,
have
attained
thereunto
either
by
force
or
fraud
:
and
without
they
have
by
craft
or
cruelty
gained
,
to
cover
the
foulness
of
their
fact
,
they
call
purchase
as
a
name
more
honest
.
Howsoever
he
that
for
want
of
will
or
wit
useth
not
those
means
,
must
rest
in
servitude
and
poverty
.
The
reason
thereof
is
that
as
nature
hath
laid
before
men
the
chief
of
all
fortunes
,
so
she
disposes
them
rather
to
Rapine
then
honest
Industrie
,
and
more
subject
to
bad
then
good
endeavors
:
hereof
it
cometh
,
that
one
man
eateth
an
other
,
and
he
that
is
weakest
must
alwaies
goe
to
the
worst
.
Where
necessity
forceth
,
boldness
is
reputed
Wisdom
,
and
in
great
enterprises
perill
is
not
to
be
made
accompt
of
.
For
those
attempts
that
begin
with
danger
,
alwaies
end
with
honor
,
or
reward
;
also
from
one
perill
there
is
no
way
to
escape
,
but
by
entring
into
another
.
A
wise
man
ought
not
to
desire
to
inhabit
that
County
where
men
have
more
Authority
then
Lawes
.
For
indeed
that
Country
deserves
to
be
desired
where
every
one
may
securely
enjoy
his
own
;
not
that
,
where
with
facility
it
may
be
taken
away
;
and
that
friends
for
feare
to
lose
their
own
,
are
inforced
to
forsake
them
.
Some
Magistrates
either
by
over
great
zeale
or
ignorance
take
a
course
of
Rigor
,
which
being
for
the
present
favored
,
they
are
ever
the
more
imployed
,
as
men
meet
to
extirpate
inconveniences
.
But
thereby
the
Subjects
are
often
drawn
into
desperation
,
and
consequently
have
recourse
unto
armes
,
as
their
uttermost
refuge
.
In
this
case
a
wise
Prince
for
appeasing
the
people
is
forced
to
disallow
his
Ministers
,
and
sometimes
also
to
inflict
publick
punishment
.
A
Prince
naturally
suspicious
,
and
having
about
him
persons
inclined
to
envie
,
is
easily
induced
to
mistrust
those
men
that
have
served
him
with
most
sufficiency
:
which
danger
they
cannot
eschew
,
because
they
who
are
worthiest
commendation
are
oftentimes
envied
by
such
persons
as
have
access
unto
the
Prince
.
Who
so
cannot
endure
both
envy
and
hate
,
must
re●rain
to
enterprise
great
matters
:
for
great
honors
being
desired
of
many
,
it
behooveth
him
that
aspireth
unto
them
,
to
be
for
his
dignity
envied
,
and
for
his
Authority
hated
;
which
Authority
albeit
the
same
be
well
used
,
yet
they
who
hate
or
envie
(
perswading
themselves
it
might
be
better
handled
)
indeavor
to
oppress
that
power
,
as
fearing
it
will
be
worse
.
Among
other
things
which
worketh
the
inconveniences
of
Commonweales
,
Ambition
and
Desperation
are
cheif
;
of
both
,
Desperation
is
worst
:
for
Ambition
may
attend
occasion
;
Desperation
will
not
,
as
that
cannot
endure
delaies
.
Historians
desiring
to
write
the
actions
of
men
,
ought
to
set
down
the
simple
truth
,
and
not
say
any
thing
for
love
or
hatred
:
also
to
chuse
such
an
opportunity
for
writing
as
it
may
be
lawful
to
think
what
they
will
,
and
write
what
they
think
,
which
is
a
rare
happiness
of
the
time
.
In
commending
or
disallowing
the
actions
of
men
it
is
a
course
very
requisite
to
consider
the
beginning
,
the
proceeding
,
and
end
:
so
shall
we
see
the
reasons
and
causes
of
things
,
and
not
their
bare
events
only
,
which
for
the
most
part
are
governed
by
fortune
.
It
is
a
matter
of
much
necessity
,
that
every
man
,
and
chiefly
a
Prince
should
in
his
first
actions
,
give
some
testimony
of
Vertue
;
for
falling
at
first
into
obloquie
,
doe
he
well
or
ill
,
all
is
ill
taken
.
The
Custome
of
the
Common
people
is
to
judge
rather
by
their
eyes
then
by
their
eares
:
which
is
the
cause
they
allow
more
of
external
shew
then
inward
vertue
:
and
true
it
is
,
where
excellency
of
mind
,
and
beauty
of
body
concur
,
the
commendation
due
to
such
a
person
is
far
the
greater
.
Gratior
est
pulchro
veniens
è
corpore
virtus
.
A
Prince
or
great
personage
that
constantly
endureth
adversity
deserveth
great
praise
:
yet
greater
commendation
is
due
to
him
that
beareth
himself
modestly
in
his
happiness
.
For
miseries
are
oft
born
with
patience
,
but
felicity
corrupteth
.
To
be
descended
of
Princes
or
great
Parsonages
,
is
a
matter
of
meer
fortune
,
and
so
to
be
esteemed
:
but
adoption
proceedeth
from
the
Judgment
of
men
;
therefore
seemeth
incorrupt
and
seldom
abused
.
It
hath
been
long
observed
,
and
is
a
rule
which
rarely
faileth
,
that
he
shall
be
ever
suspected
of
the
Prince
in
possession
,
whom
men
acco●pt
worthy
to
be
a
Prince
in
reversion
.
It
hath
been
a
use
very
ancient
to
give
credit
to
Astrologers
,
and
other
such
persons
who
by
their
star-learning
or
blind
divination
,
take
upon
them
to
tell
of
things
to
come
.
The
reason
thereof
is
that
the
most
part
of
men
beleive
that
soonest
which
they
least
understand
;
And
if
they
see
the
event
of
a
prediction
though
it
hapneth
by
meer
chance
to
fall
out
according
to
that
was
premised
,
thereupon
they
settle
so
firme
an
impression
,
as
albeit
many
other
faile
,
yet
the
good
conceipt
of
their
cunning
cannot
be
removed
.
Liberality
is
a
vertue
which
gaineth
love
,
but
much
are
they
deceived
whom
riot
in
lieu
thereof
abuseth
.
To
cast
away
and
consume
is
soon
learned
,
but
to
give
in
good
order
few
have
the
skill
.
In
time
of
suddain
mutiny
,
conspiracy
,
and
offence
of
people
,
the
wisest
resolution
is
not
to
oppose
force
to
prevent
fury
,
but
rather
give
space
for
the
bad
to
amend
,
and
the
good
to
consent
:
for
treasons
prevaile
on
the
sudden
,
but
good
Council
gathers
forces
by
leasure
.
Mature
deliberation
ought
ever
to
be
used
,
but
when
armes
are
to
determine
,
speedy
execution
is
the
best
:
because
no
delay
in
that
enterprise
is
fit
which
cannot
be
commended
before
it
be
ended
.
Who
so
is
pleased
to
observe
the
proceedings
of
men
in
Authority
,
shall
observe
that
some
of
them
hold
a
plain
course
without
respect
:
others
projecting
for
time
to
come
do
forecast
how
to
hold
their
present
good
fortune
or
at
least
to
escape
danger
:
for
they
mistrusting
present
prosperity
and
fearing
a
change
,
prepare
beforehand
some
private
friends
to
oppose
against
publick
hatred
:
whereof
may
be
inferred
,
that
no
care
is
taken
of
innocency
,
but
every
one
studieth
how
to
pass
without
punishment
.
In
Captains
and
all
Military
Commanders
,
three
things
are
required
,
Vertue
,
Discipline
,
and
Authority
;
but
in
private
Soldiers
obedience
and
courage
only
sufficeth
;
for
by
due
obeying
,
and
no
curious
scanning
the
leaders
direc●ions
are
maintained
;
and
the
Army
in
danger
is
alwaies
most
valiant
,
which
before
the
danger
is
most
quiet
.
Let
the
Soldier
therefore
be
well
armed
and
valiantly
minded
.
To
advise
and
dsrect
must
be
the
Captains
care
.
It
is
a
matter
of
no
great
moment
,
yet
alwaies
worthy
the
noting
,
that
any
exterior
behavior
,
or
garment
presenting
pride
or
greatness
,
chiefly
in
persons
lately
advanced
,
though
no
man
be
thereby
interessed
or
injured
,
doth
move
in
others
a
certain
offence
:
for
the
nature
of
man
is
such
,
as
beholdeth
the
new
prosperity
of
others
with
an
envious
eye
,
and
wisheth
a
moderation
of
fortune
nowhere
so
much
as
in
those
we
have
known
in
equall
degree
with
our selves
In
all
enterprises
of
Warr
,
(
if
present
necessity
doth
not
otherwise
require
)
leisure
and
deliberation
ought
to
be
used
;
for
often
it
sufficeth
in
lieu
of
Wisdom
,
●o
take
the
advantage
of
other
mens
folly
.
All
men
that
are
to
consider
of
great
actions
,
ought
to
be
informed
whether
that
which
is
undertaken
be
profitable
for
the
Commonweale
,
honorable
to
themselves
,
and
easy
to
be
effected
:
or
at
least
not
greatly
difficult
.
Also
he
that
perswadeth●
is
to
be
examined
whether
besides
bare
words
and
Counsel
,
he
will
joyn
his
own
perill
;
and
if
fortune
favour
the
attempt
,
to
whom
the
principal
glory
shall
redound
.
The
perils
which
accompanie
private
enterprises
,
are
far
unlike
to
those
which
he
doth
enter
that
aspireth
to
principality
.
For
in
private
attempts
a
man
may
pause
or
proceed
as
he
will
;
But
to
him
that
aspires
to
Empire
there
remains
no
middle
course
,
but
either
by
Victory
to
triumph●
as
a
Prince
;
or
being
vanquished
to
endure
death
as
a
Traytor
.
Let
no
man
in
his
prosperity
,
give
much
credit
to
common
applause
or
service
assured
by
any
of
whom
in
meaner
fortune
he
hath
had
no
experience
:
for
the
base
people
are
learned
in
no
lesson●
only
without
difference
of
truth
or
falshood
to
flatter
men
in
Authority
,
and
with
shouts
and
words
of
great
rejoycing
make
shew
of
great
affection
.
As
overmuch
haste
is
dangerous
,
so
too
great
delay
oftentimes
proveth
disadvantagious
:
for
albeit
consultation
ought
to
foregoe
action
,
yet
to
dispute
long
and
in
the
end
reject
the
advice
of
either
side
,
or
take
a
middle
course
(
whith
in
cases
of
doubt
and
danger
is
worst
)
was
ever
accompted
great
discretion
.
There
is
no
course
more
comely
,
nor
any
resolution
so
well
beseeming
a
wise
man
,
having
made
proof
of
his
own
vertue
(
and
finding
in
age
no
fortune
due
to
such
effect
)
as
to
retire
himself
from
the
Court
and
company
;
for
so
shall
he
shun
the
inconveniences
of
contempt
and
the
discommodity
of
travell
(
Jucunda
senectuti
otia
)
yet
true
it
is
that
whoso
hath
lived
a
Prince
or
governed
as
a
publick
person
,
cannot
expect
security
in
a
private
estate
.
Whensoever
danger
draweth
near
,
and
terror
is
at
hand
,
all
men
look
about
,
but
none
willingly
adventure
:
For
in
such
cases
every
man
will
give
Council
,
but
few
will
take
par●
of
the
peril
.
In
Commonwealths
where
Sects
or
Partialities
he
,
the
Leader
of
any
side
is
able
to
kindle
Civil
War
;
yet
is
he
unable
to
moderate
the
Victory
:
For
to
stir
up
dissentions
and
troubles
,
the
worst
man
most
commonly
bears
the
stroke
;
but
peace
and
quietness
are
not
established
but
by
men
of
rare
gifts
and
excellent
vertue
.
It
may
seem
strange
and
contrary
both
to
courtesie
and
Christian
profession
,
that
men
are
far
more
mindful
of
injuries
done
unto
them
,
then
of
benefits
received
by
them
.
The
reason
thereof
is
,
that
Thankfulness
is
accompted
a
burden
,
but
Revenge
is
sweet
,
and
reckoned
a
great
gain
.
Of
reconciled
foes
,
and
such
as
know
that
our
harms
were
caused
by
their
means
,
we
oft-times
expect
favor
,
as
perswaded
that
new
friendship
will
repair
the
loss
of
old
displeasure
:
But
the
matter
doth
seldom
so
fall
out
;
for
the
quality
of
mans
nature
is
ever
to
hate
those
whom
he
hath
hurt
,
and
love
them
whom
he
hath
made
beholding
.
Quos
laeserunt
oderunt
.
Tac.
To
common
persons
and
such
as
are
ignorant
in
matters
of
State
,
every
Taxation
and
Imposition
seemeth
heavy
or
superfluous
;
yet
the
wiser
sort
know
,
that
the
end
of
all
publick
endeavour
is
to
confirm
people
in
Peace
,
and
Peace
cannot
be
maintained
without
arms
;
nor
Arms
without
Pay
,
nor
Pay
without
Impositions
.
As
fortunate
folk
are
envied
,
so
are
the
poor
contemned
;
which
rule
reacheth
also
to
Princes
:
The
one
lives
in
Plenty
with
War
,
the
other
in
Poverty
with
Peace
.
For
seldom
is
it
seen
,
that
those
people
are
assaulted
where
nothing
is
to
be
gained
,
and
whose
base
Beings
afford
no
other
spoils
then
blood
and
beggery
.
Wisemen
have
observed
that
in
matter
of
State
,
and
the
managing
thereof
,
three
things
are
especially
to
be
looked
unto
:
The
first
is
,
Occasion
;
the
second
,
the
●ntentions
of
other
Men
;
the
third
,
our
own
Affection
.
For
there
is
nothing
that
slippeth
away
so
soon
as
Occasion
;
nothing
so
difficult
as
to
judge
what
an
other
man
intendeth
;
nor
any
thing
more
nocent
then
our
own
immoderate
desires
.
It
hath
been
ever
a
course
observed
by
wise
Princes
,
but
much
more
by
Aristocraties
and
Popular
States
,
against
Force
and
Fury
of
the
multitude
,
to
defend
themselves
with
Silver
and
Gold
.
How
much
more
it
importeth
all
Princes
to
lead
a
vertuous
life
,
and
give
daily
example
of
Piety
and
Justice
,
appears
apparantly
in
the
proceedings
of
the
Roman
Bishops
;
who
by
the
well-doing
of
some
few
of
them
at
the
first
,
became
greatly
honored
;
but
afterwards
they
became
contemptible
:
For
the
Reverence
which
men
did
bear
to
the
●anctity
of
their
lives
●ailing
,
it
was
impossible
of
so
contrary
Manners
and
Examples
to
look
for
like
effects
.
The
success
of
the
War
cheifly
dependeth
on
the
Reputation
of
the
Prince
,
which
declining
,
the
vertue
also
of
the
Soldiers
faileth
:
Likewise
the
fidelity
of
the
people
decayeth
,
and
their
money
to
maintain
the
War
,
ceaseth
;
contrariwise
,
the
courage
of
the
enemy
is
increased
,
they
that
stood
doubtful
become
resolved
,
and
every
difficulty
augmenteth
.
The
Authority
which
Princes
give
,
is
chiefly
in
respect
of
Wisdom
and
Valor
:
Yet
true
it
is
,
that
for
the
most
part
,
they
accompt
them
the
wisest
men
that
can
best
accommodate
themselves
to
their
humor
.
The
greatest
distress
and
difficulty
which
can
come
to
any
Army
,
doth
proceed
of
these
causes
:
Want
of
money
,
scarcity
of
victuals
,
hatred
of
people
,
discord
of
Captains
,
disobedience
of
Soldiers
,
and
their
flying
to
the
enemy
,
either
of
necessity
or
freewil
.
A
Prince
or
great
Magistrate
having
long
maintained
the
reputation
of
Wisdom
and
Vertue
,
must
take
heed
that
no
rash
or
dangerous
resolution
do
taint
the
Honorable
Fame
of
his
former
life
:
For
to
be
t●ansported
with
anger
against
his
own
profit
,
is
lightness
;
and
to
esteem
small
dangers
more
then
great
,
is
want
of
judgment
.
A
Prince
or
Person
of
great
estate
,
must
be
wary
not
to
inure
the
conceit
of
double-dealing
:
For
little
sincerity
and
trust
is
looked
in
his
actions
,
of
whom
there
is
an
opinion
of
craft
and
falshood
conceived
.
Experience
hath
always
proved
,
that
whatsoever
the
most
part
of
men
desire
,
rarely
cometh
to
pass
:
The
reason
hereof
is
,
that
the
effects
of
Humane
actions
commonly
depend
on
the
will
of
a
few
;
and
their
intentions
ever
differing
from
the
greater
number●
the
end
and
success
cannot
be
other
then
as
pleaseth
the
few
that
are
to
direct
them
.
There
is
nothing
more
dangerous
then
to
enterprise
a
War
,
or
other
actions
of
importance
upon
popular
perswasion
;
for
such
expectations
are
vain
,
and
such
designs
fallible
:
Also
the
Fury
of
the
multitude
is
great
,
when
danger
is
little
or
far
off
;
but
perils
growing
great
and
near
,
their
courageth
quaileth●
as
they
whose
Passions
have
no
rule
or
measure
.
It
is
strange
to
see
how
apt
men
are
to
doubt
displeasure
threatned
by
enemies
,
cheifly
when
they
draw
near
;
for
the
people
do
naturally
over-much
fear
dangers
at
hand
,
and
esteem
less
then
is
fit
of
things
present
:
Also
to
make
small
accompt
of
those
that
are
far
from
them
,
because
divers
remedies
may
be
hoped
as
well
by
time
,
as
other
accidents
.
The
offensive
words
or
answers
of
indignation
,
proceeding
from
great
Princes
,
ought
never
to
admit
displeasure
into
the
mindes
of
them
against
whom
they
are
spoken
:
For
having
by
Speech
uttered
a
great
part
of
Choler
,
the
edge
of
their
Deeds
becomes
the
calmer
,
and
more
easily
appeased
:
Such
is
the
condition
of
noble
and
generous
Spirits
.
To
judge
right
of
other
mens
merit
,
seems
of
great
difficulty
;
for
time
and
tryal
is
thereto
required
;
also
it
is
not
easie
to
answer
the
expectation
of
men
,
but
oft-times
inconsiderate
,
and
not
measured
in
due
proportion
.
It
is
a
part
of
great
discretion
to
divide
the
seasons
of
Affairs
and
Vacations
:
For
as
it
fitteth
well
a
Prince
or
Person
of
Dignity
in
times
of
Audience
and
Judgment
,
to
be
grave
,
heedful
,
and
austere
:
So
those
Offices
performed
,
all
shew
of
authority
and
sad
looks
ought
to
be
set
apart
;
for
by
that
means
,
neither
courteous
behavior
shall
detract
from
the
Reverence
due
to
his
place
,
nor
severity
diminish
the
love
which
to
his
Behavior
appertaineth
.
Magistrates
must
look
into
all
things
,
but
not
exact
all
things
to
rigor
.
Light
faults
may
be
pardoned
,
but
great
offences
severely
corrected
;
yet
not
always
proceeding
to
punishing
,
but
oft
contented
with
repentance
.
To
be
bitter
in
rebuking
is
also
fit
for
a
Magistrate
,
shewing
himself
sowre
to
the
bad
,
and
sweet
to
the
good
;
framing
both
Countenance
and
Condition
according
to
the
merit
of
men
;
and
be
perswaded
that
it
is
more
honest
to
offend
,
then
to
hate
.
Soldiers
must
be
encouraged
in
all
Fortunes
to
stand
resolved
,
and
not
to
be
danted
with
any
passed
misadventure
;
ever
attending
a
time
and
opportunity
of
revenge
;
which
commonly
cometh
to
passwhere
mens
mindes
are
united
:
For
common
danger
must
be
repelled
with
union
and
concord
.
Among
other
reasons
wherewith
Soldiers
are
encouraged
,
Necessity
and
Distress
doth
oft
inforce
them
:
For
as
men
of
vertue
perform
the
actions
of
Arms
for
Honor
,
so
the
coward
must
do
them
for
his
security
.
All
Enterprises
attempted
by
Arms
,
are
honorable
;
but
those
that
are
done
in
Countreys
remote
,
are
more
praisable
:
For
the
less
they
be
in
knowledge
,
the
greater
is
the
glory
to
atchieve
them
.
To
be
truly
and
faithfully
loved
,
is
a
thing
greatly
to
be
desired
;
for
Terror
and
Fear
are
weak
works
of
Affection
:
For
they
being
taken
away
,
he
that
ceaseth
to
fear
,
will
soon
begin
to
hate
;
and
as
they
that
by
force
are
kept
under
,
obey
with
ill
will
;
so
they
that
govern
without
Line
justly
,
rule
against
Right
.
Some
men
either
deserving
to
be
accompted
of
excellent
wisdom
,
or
singular
in
that
skill
whereof
they
make
pro●ession
,
do
ordinarily
love
the
proceedings
of
others
,
taking
that
advantage
of
their
ill
success
;
yet
sure
it
is
,
that
Disaster
and
unhappy
Event
of
some
Actions
,
proceed
not
of
disorder
,
nor
Humane
imperfection
,
but
from
a
certain
fatal
Fury
,
which
neither
Council
nor
Constancy
of
Men
can
withstand
.
It
is
a
matter
of
much
difficulty
,
or
rather
impossible
for
any
Prince
to
maintain
the
Law
,
Civil
or
Military
without
severity
:
For
where
men
hope
to
be
easily
pardoned
,
there
are
they
apt
to
offend
.
Contrarily
where
mens
actions
are
precisely
fitted
,
there
do
they
live
in
over
great
aw
,
and
Hatred
doth
always
accompany
such
Severity
.
The
best
course
therefore
is
to
punish
offences
severely
,
and
reward
vertuous
Merits
liberally
;
so
shall
Fear
be
converted
to
reverend
respect
,
and
none
have
cause
to
complain
:
For
as
it
lies
in
each
mans
power
to
shun
offending
,
so
is
it
in
their
power
also
to
deserve
well
,
and
merit
reward
.
Whosoever
after
mature
deliberation
,
hath
resolved
what
course
to
hold
in
the
Action
he
hath
in
hand
,
must
not
after
repent
or
fear
any
difficulty
:
For
such
thoughts
would
break
the
vigor
of
the
Minde
,
and
impeach
the
proceedings
of
that
which
was
resolved
.
And
albeit
some
differences
do
happily
arise
,
yet
must
he
believe
that
every
other
course
would
have
been
accompanied
with
the
same
or
greater
impediments
.
Yong
men
for
the
warmness
of
their
Blood
,
and
for
not
having
before-time
been
deceived
by
Fortune
,
more
willingly
enterprise
Actions
rather
honorable
then
severe
.
But
old
men
as
well
for
that
their
heat
is
cooled
,
as
also
for
having
attempted
many
things
in
vain
,
make
choice
of
Enterprises
severe
rather
then
those
that
are
followed
with
Fame
and
Glory
.
The
greatness
of
one
Prince
is
nothing
else
but
the
ruine
and
distress
of
another
:
Likewise
his
strength
is
the
weakness
and
oppression
of
others
.
Some
Conquests
are
of
such
quality
,
as
albeit
a
victorious
Captain
merit
triumphal
Honor
;
yet
a
modest
refusal
becomes
his
greater
glory
.
The
Dignity
of
Magistrates
is
not
assured
without
Arms
;
for
when
Obedience
faileth
,
no
other
means
is
left
to
continue
a
people
united
.
As
willing
Obedience
in
Subjects
is
the
Princes
strength
,
so
is
the
same
their
own
security
:
For
as
by
the
Princes
Authority
the
people
are
governed
,
so
by
their
consent
he
is
maintained
.
Three
things
men
covet
with
immoderate
desire
,
Lands
,
Riches
,
and
Honors
;
but
as
seldom
they
compass
their
full
content
,
so
are
they
for
the
most
part
to
endure
a
destiny
far
other
then
they
wished
.
Strange
it
is
,
yet
by
experience
proved
true
,
that
in
time
of
danger
,
Fortune
or
(
rather
Destiny
)
so
much
amazeth
the
judgment
of
wise
men
,
as
seldom
they
conceive
what
resolution
is
best
to
be
taken
.
No
great
Free-City
can
long
continue
quiet
,
unless
the
same
be
used
to
foreign
assaults
:
For
wanting
foes
without
,
some
inward
enmity
will
arise
,
not
unlike
to
strange
bodies
of
men
,
which
being
secure
from
external
injury
,
are
nevertheless
by
their
own
poise
oppressed
.
As
every
Pilot
of
ordinary
skill
knoweth
in
calm
and
quiet
Seas
to
direct
the
course
of
his
Ship
;
so
every
Governor
of
capacity
doth
understand
how
the
affairs
of
State
are
in
peaceable
times
to
be
handled
:
But
when
Tempests
are
,
and
Subjects
bent
to
Sedition
;
the
one
requires
an
excellent
Sailer
,
the
other
the
aid
of
some
excellent
Wisdom
.
It
oft
happens
,
that
publick
Duty
is
opposite
to
private
Friendship
;
so
as
we
are
either
forced
to
omit
the
Offices
due
to
our
Countrey
,
or
draw
our
dearest
friends
into
danger
:
In
which
case
we
are
to
prefer
publick
respect
,
before
particular
Obligation
.
The
nature
of
base
people
is
such
,
as
either
they
obey
slavishly
,
or
command
insolently
:
For
liberty
being
the
mark
whereat
they
aim
,
is
by
them
of
that
quality
,
neither
moderately
desired
,
nor
discreetly
continued
;
and
always
there
are
some
seditious
Leaders
to
be
found
,
who
of
disorder
are
inclined
to
kindle
the
ire
and
offence
of
ignorant
people
.
Dux
rebu●
motis
,
facile
invenitur
.
Salust
.
Experience
hath
oft
proved
,
that
Men
in
best
Fortune
,
and
such
as
esteem
themselves
most
secure
,
even
then
fall
soonest
into
disadventure
,
because
those
dangers
unfeared
be
as
it
were
contemned
,
and
not
regarded
.
To
enter
needless
dangers
,
was
ever
accounted
Madness
,
yet
in
times
of
extream
peril
and
apparent
distress
,
bold
and
hazardous
attempts
are
greatest
security
.
The
divers
Adventures
which
happen
to
men
,
may
well
inform
that
much
better
it
is
,
cheifly
in
Arms
,
to
be
governed
by
Reason
then
by
Fortune
.
A
certain
Peace
is
ever
accounted
better
security
then
Victory
hoped
or
expected
.
Melior
tutiorqu●●●rta
pax
quàm
sperata
victoria
.
Livi.
If
to
our
Prosperity
God
were
pleased
to
add
the
Grace
of
Wisdom
,
we
should
thereby
judge
not
onely
of
what
is
past
,
but
also
of
all
that
can
succeed
hereafter
.
Rarely
or
never
can
we
consider
truly
of
worldly
proceedings
,
unless
first
we
have
felt
the
deceits
of
Fortune
.
Discord
or
Dissention
in
any
State
or
City
,
offers
opportunity
to
such
men
as
are
ambitious
to
work
their
will
:
For
the
humor
of
Sects
and
Partialities
is
such
as
the
weaker
Faction
doth
ever
chuse
rather
to
call
for
aid
of
strangers
,
then
yield
to
the
Dominion
of
an
adverse
party
.
Ancient
Customs
may
not
violently
and
suddenly
be
taken
away
.
Fortune
which
altereth
all
things
,
will
by
little
and
little
wear
them
out
of
use
.
To
be
oft
in
fight
,
and
converse
much
with
men
,
breedeth
a
kinde
of
Satiety
:
therefore
it
behoveth
persons
of
great
estate
and
Authority
to
be
retired●
le●t
over-much
familiarity
should
detract
from
the
reverence
due
to
honorable
Estate
.
The
natures
of
men
not
content
to
live
according
to
their
Fortune
and
Birth
,
are
of
all
others
most
prone
to
Envy
;
because
they
hate
the
vertue
and
welfare
of
all
such
as
are
in
estimation
above
them
.
Great
heed
is
to
be
taken
,
that
no
Citizen
or
Subject
,
be
suffered
to
aspire
to
such
greatness
,
as
cannot
be
forced
to
obey
the
Laws
;
and
no
order
there
is
of
more
necessity
,
then
that
every
man
of
what
quality
soever
,
may
be
without
respect
accused
and
judged
.
For
conservation
of
particular
Greatness
and
Dignity
,
there
is
nothing
more
noble
and
glorious
,
then
to
have
felt
the
force
of
every
Fortune
.
It
is
the
quality
of
wise
men
onely
,
to
know
how
to
use
Prosperity
,
and
never
to
trust
too
much
to
the
favors
of
present
Happiness
.
A
man
well
advised
in
his
Prosperity
,
beareth
not
himself
towards
others
either
proud
or
violent
;
nor
must
he
believe
in
his
own
present
felicity
,
for
the
Day
knows
not
what
the
Night
bringeth
:
He
onely
is
to
be
reputed
a
man
,
whose
minde
cannot
be
puft
up
by
prosperity
,
nor
dejected
by
any
adverse
Fortune
.
Men
of
Cholerick
humor
are
easily
moved
with
insolent
Speeches
,
but
wise
men
laugh
them
to
scorn
.
The
way
whereby
a
Prince
eschues
the
hate
of
Subjects
,
is
,
hot
to
take
from
them
their
Lands
or
Goods
;
yet
albeit
the
blood
of
some
few
be
tainted
,
unless
the
same
be
accompanied
with
Confiscation
(
which
a
Prince
is
rarely
forced
to
use
)
it
seldom
causeth
him
to
become
odious
.
A
Rule
most
certain
it
is
,
that
he
who
commands
any
thing
unpleasing
,
must
by
severe
means
cause
it
to
be
observed
;
and
who
desireth
to
be
obeyed
,
must
know
how
to
command
:
And
he
onely
knows
how
to
command
,
that
doth
compare
his
own
force
with
those
that
are
to
obey
;
wherein
finding
a
proportion
,
then
he
may
boldly
proceed
,
otherwise
forbear
.
In
Actions
of
difficulty
great
courage
is
to
be
used
,
and
who
so
compasseth
any
thing
by
violence
,
cannot
maintain
it
by
mildness
,
nor
command
by
affability
:
He
therefore
that
is
of
nature
soft
,
should
do
best
to
refrain
all
extraordinary
commands
,
and
in
matters
ordinary
imploy
the
vertue
of
his
milde
spirit
;
because
ordinary
punishments
are
not
imputed
to
the
Prince
or
his
Magistrates
,
but
to
the
Laws
and
Ordinances
of
State
.
When
Necessity
presseth
,
desperation
is
deemed
Wisdom
,
and
generous
mindes
do
not
accompt
of
danger
,
because
those
attempts
which
begin
with
peril
,
do
for
the
most
part
end
with
glory
.
He
that
endeavors
to
be
good
among
many
that
are
evil
,
or
will
uphold
that
which
those
labor
to
pull
down
,
of
Force
worketh
his
own
undoing
.
All
Commonwealth●
alter
from
order
to
disorder
,
from
disorder
to
order
again
;
for
Nature
having
made
all
worldly
things
variable
,
so
soon
as
they
have
attained
their
utmost
perfection
and
height
,
they
must
descend
;
so
from
good
they
fall
back
to
evil
,
and
from
evil
they
return
to
good
.
War
begets
quiet
,
quiet
idleness
,
idleness
disorder
,
disorder
ruine
;
likewise
ruine
order
,
order
vertue
,
vertue
glory
and
good
fortune
.
Wise
men
have
observed
,
that
Arms
were
before
Learning
,
and
Captains
before
Philosophers
;
for
good
and
well
regulated
Armies
having
gained
victory
,
established
rest
and
security
,
whereof
the
Study
of
Letters
and
Liberal
Sciences
ensued
.
That
Country
deserveth
to
be
loved
of
all
men
,
which
loves
all
men
indifferently
,
and
not
that
Countrey
which
respecting
the
best
part
,
advanceth
a
few
:
No
man
therefore
is
to
be
blamed
,
if
for
such
cause
he
desire
rather
to
abandon
then
embrace
his
Countrey
.
Commonwealths
are
Bodies
mixt
,
yet
have
they
of
Bodies
simple
some
resemblance
:
And
as
in
these
,
many
infirmities
grow
,
which
without
violent
Medicines
cannot
be
cured
;
so
in
the
other
many
mischiefs
arise
,
which
a
good
and
godly
Patient
should
offend
to
leave
uncured
,
though
therein
be
use
both
force
and
fire
.
Those
Wars
be
most
just
which
are
most
necessary
;
and
those
Arms
are
most
merciful
where
no
hope
of
help
remains
but
in
them
onely
.
In
Actions
which
promise
either
publick
glory
,
or
private
honor
,
men
may
be
reasonably
perswaded
to
adventure
life
and
living
,
because
great
hope
there
is
to
die
with
Reputation
,
or
live
to
recover
that
Peace
which
War
hath
consumed
:
But
where
men
are
no
less
oppressed
by
insolency
of
Commanders
,
then
by
insolency
of
Foes
,
there
is
the
calamity
doubled
,
and
of
two
evils
the
danger
of
War
seemeth
least
;
for
that
hath
end
,
the
other
is
infinite
.
Who
so
perswades
himself
to
be
no
less
esteemed
in
evil
then
good
Fortune
,
is
deceived
:
For
promises
made
,
during
distress
,
are
rarely
performed
,
unless
the
same
necessity
continue
.
The
intent
of
every
Prince
,
or
other
State
that
makes
War
,
is
to
inrich
himself
,
and
impoverish
the
enemy
:
Neither
is
Victory
for
other
occasions
sought
,
nor
the
possessions
of
the
enemy
to
other
end
desir'd
,
then
to
make
themselves
mighty
,
and
their
enemy
weak
.
It
follows
then
,
that
so
oft
as
the
victory
impoverishes
them
,
or
the
gains
weaken
them
,
either
they
pass
or
come
short
of
that
mark
whereat
the
War
was
aimed
.
Ancient
and
wel-governed
Common-wealths
were
wont
by
their
Conquests
to
fill
the
Treasuries
with
Gold
and
Silver
,
to
give
reward
to
Soldiers
,
to
spare
the
people
from
Tributes
,
to
make
Triumphs
and
Publick
Feasts
:
But
in
later
times
the
Wars
have
used
,
first
,
to
consume
the
Treasure
,
and
after
impoverish
the
people
without
assuring
them
from
their
enemies
.
A
Prince
or
State
that
leaves
promises
unperformed
,
by
reason
of
unexpected
impediments
,
and
for
no
ill
intent
,
ought
not
to
be
blamed
:
Neither
are
such
accidents
any
just
cause
or
colour
why
friends
should
abandon
their
confederates
.
Where
Magistrates
govern
justly
,
Subjects
obey
dutifully
;
where
private
persons
grow
rich
,
and
Princes
enlarge
their
Empire
;
there
is
the
Commonwealth
blessed
,
and
the
people
fortunate
.
CHAP.
XXVI
.
Maximes
●f
State
,
or
Prudential
grounds
and
Polemical
Precepts
,
concerning
all
Estates
,
and
forms
of
Policie
in
times
of
Peace
or
War
,
&c.
confirmed
by
select
Narations
,
and
Historical
Parallels
.
ALL
Cities
and
Towns
of
State
are
b●ilded
either
by
people
dwelling
in
or
about
the
place
where
they
are
builded
,
or
else
they
are
made
by
strangers
:
Of
the
first
are
Athens
and
Venice
,
of
the
other
Alexandria
and
Florence
.
The
fortune
of
every
City
builded
,
and
vertue
of
the
builder
,
appeareth
by
choice
of
the
place
,
and
quality
of
Laws
:
for
as
fertile
places
occasion
men
to
be
slothfull
,
unless
by
good
laws
they
be
forced
to
labor
,
so
barrenness
compells
them
to
industry
;
which
reason
induceth
wise
men
to
plant
habitations
in
either
:
Examples
of
the
first
are
Ferrara
and
Rome
,
of
the
second
Ragus●
and
Genoa
.
All
Laws
whereby
Commonwealths
are
governed
were
either
made
by
some
one
excellent
man
,
and
at
an
instant
;
or
else
they
were
ordained
at
sundry
times
according
to
such
accidents
as
befel
.
Example
,
the
laws
of
Sparta
made
at
the
beginning
Lycurgu●
,
the
laws
of
Rome
at
sundry
times
.
The
government
of
every
City
in
time
becomes
corrupt
;
Principality
changeth
into
Tyranny
:
the
Optimacy
is
made
the
government
of
the
people
;
and
the
Popular
estate
turns
to
licentious
disorder
;
which
instability
or
alteration
moved
some
Law-makers
to
take
order
that
in
the
government
of
their
City
there
should
be
a
mixture
of
all
three
,
and
was
the
cause
that
t●e
policy
of
Sparta
continued
●00
years
,
when
the
popular
State
of
Athens
endured
not
one
hundred
.
Example
,
the
laws
of
Sparta
made
by
Lycurgus
,
and
the
Laws
of
Athens
by
S●lon
.
Whoso
taketh
in
hand
to
frame
any
State
or
government
,
ought
to
presuppose
that
all
men
are
evil
,
and
at
occasions
will
shew
themselves
so
to
be
.
Example
,
the
envy
of
the
people
of
Rome
to
the
Nobles
,
and
their
Insolency
towards
them
appeared
not
so
long
as
the
Kings
governd
;
but
the
Tarquins
being
banished
,
opportunity
was
thereby
offerd
that
the
malice
of
the
one
and
the
other
became
discovered
.
The
divers
honors
of
the
Nobility
and
people
,
the
one
desiring
to
command
,
the
other
not
to
obey
,
are
the
cause
of
continual
troubles
,
unless
some
third
mean
there
be
of
more
authority
then
either
,
to
bridle
the
force
of
both
.
Example
,
The
Kings
in
Rom●
expulsed
,
forthwith
arose
much
mutiny
,
and
could
not
be
supprest
till
the
Tribum
Plebis
were
created
;
whose
authority
wrought
the
same
effect
which
the
Kings
had
done
.
Some
States
endeavor
to
enlarge
their
dominions
,
and
some
others
labour
only
to
maintain
that
estate
they
antiently
possest
.
Example
of
the
first
was
the
City
of
Rome
,
of
the
second
Sparta
.
All
States
desiring
to
live
at
liberty
,
think
fit
that
every
man
should
be
permitted
to
accuse
any
Citizen
that
offendeth
,
which
manner
of
proceeding
works
two
excellent
effects
:
First
that
the
people
should
not
dare
for
fear
of
accusing
to
attempt
ought
against
the
State
;
or
if
they
do
,
they
shall
be
presently
and
without
respect
punished
.
Secondly
by
liberty
of
accusing
,
every
man
hath
meanes
to
utter
the
offence
wherewith
he
can
charge
others
,
which
he
could
not
;
unless
it
were
lawfull
to
take
such
an
ordinary
course
,
and
consequently
be
driven
to
ways
extraordinary
,
particular
revenge
,
or
callingin
forreign
forces
.
Example
,
Coriolanus
and
Appius
,
Claudius
at
Rome
,
Lucannone
at
Chinsi
,
Francisco
Valeri
in
Florence
.
A
accusations
are
in
every
State
necessary
,
so
slanders
are
dangerous
,
and
worthy
of
punishment
;
the
difference
betwixt
accusations
and
slanders
,
is
,
that
the
one
is
publickly
performed
before
Magistrates
,
with
good
proofs
and
Witnesses
to
maintain
the
truth
of
the
accusation
;
but
slanders
are
as
well
publickly
performed
as
dispersed
in
secret
and
places
of
repair
without
Witness
and
Justification
,
so
as
every
man
may
be
slandered
,
but
few
are
orderly
accused
.
Example
,
Appius
Claudius
accused
by
L.
Virginius
;
Furius
Camillus
,
slandered
by
Manlius
Capitoliuus
.
The
only
meanes
to
suppress
Slander
is
,
to
give
authority
to
some
persons
of
repute
to
compel
every
slanderer
to
become
an
accuser
;
and
if
the
accusation
prove
true
,
then
to
reward
the
accuser
,
or
at
least
not
to
punish
him
.
Example
Manlius
the
slanderer
of
Camillus
for
his
untrue
information
punished
.
A
rule
most
certain
and
assured
it
is
,
that
every
Kingdom
and
State
at
the
first
well
framed
,
or
after
well
informed
,
doth
take
the
perfection
thereof
from
the
wisdom
of
some
excellent
man
,
who
ought
not
to
be
blind
though
in
a
matter
of
great
moment
he
happily
useth
some
extraordinary
violenc
or
proceedings
;
for
he
that
employeth
force
to
mend
and
not
to
mar
,
deserves
commendation
.
Example
,
Romulus
,
Lycurgus
,
Cleomenes
.
There
lives
no
man
so
simple
or
wise
,
so
wicked
or
well
disposed
,
but
prefers
those
persons
that
are
praisable
,
before
those
that
are
blamable
:
notwithstanding
for
that
well
near
all
men
are
beguiled
in
discerning
what
indeed
is
good
,
deeming
that
honorable
which
in
truth
is
otherwise
;
they
suffer
themselves
either
willingly
or
ignorantly
to
be
carried
into
a
course
which
merrits
rather
infamy
then
commendation
.
Example
,
every
man
wisheth
himself
Timoleon
or
Agesilaus
,
rather
then
Dionysius
or
Phalaris
;
rather
a
Titus
or
Trajan
,
then
Caligula
or
Vitellius
.
Who
reads
Histories
treating
of
great
Actions
shall
perceive
that
good
Princes
indeed
are
more
secure
and
better
defended
by
the
love
of
the
People
,
and
Fidelity
of
Counsellers
,
then
were
they
that
entertained
many
Legions
and
Men
of
War
.
Example
,
of
all
those
Emperors
which
raigned
after
C●esar
untill
Maximi●us
the
greatest
number
were
for
their
vices
taken
and
slain
,
only
Galba
and
Pertinax
excepted
who
were
good
Emperors
.
A
Prince
of
great
knowledge
both
in
Armes
and
Wisdom
so
firmly
setleth
the
foundation
of
Government
,
as
albeit
his
successor
be
of
the
less
vertue
;
yet
may
he
be
maintained
even
by
the
memory
of
his
predecessor
:
but
if
it
happen
that
the
third
Prince
prove
not
more
like
the
first
then
the
second
,
then
all
that
is
past
goeth
to
ruine
.
Example
,
The
Martial
Valor
of
Romulus
was
the
cause
that
Numa
might
governe
safely
in
peace
:
which
Tullus
could
not
have
done
,
had
he
bin
unlike
to
Romulus
;
nor
should
Bajazet
Emperor
of
Turky
have
enjoyed
the
state
of
his
Father
Mahomet
and
left
the
same
to
his
posterity
,
if
Selim
his
son
had
not
been
more
like
to
his
Grandfather
then
to
Bajazet
his
Father
.
The
succession
of
two
excellent
Princes
,
cheifly
if
they
be
of
long
life
,
works
wondrous
effects
:
the
like
is
seen
in
Optimacies
or
Popular
States
,
where
the
Governors
successively
elected
be
men
of
great
vertue
and
understanding
.
Example
,
The
first
appeared
in
Philip
of
Macedon
,
and
Alexander
his
Son
,
the
second
in
the
Consuls
of
Rome
.
In
every
State
where
Soldiers
are
not
,
the
fault
thereof
proceeds
from
the
Governors
.
Wise
Princes
were
therefore
wont
even
in
times
of
Peace
to
cause
warlick
exercises
to
be
used
;
for
without
them
the
most
warlick
nations
become
not
only
ignorant
in
Martial
knowledge
,
but
also
effeminate
.
Example
,
Pelopida●
&
Epa●i●ondas
in
Thebes
,
and
King
Tullus
in
Rome
as
well
in
peaceable
as
troublesome
times
used
exercise
of
Armes
.
No
Prince
or
State
well
advised
,
hazards
his
whole
estate
upon
the
valor
of
some
few
persons
,
nor
ought
to
strength
of
straight
places
where
the
Enemy
is
to
pass
.
Example
,
Tully
King
of
Rome
,
&
Metius
King
of
Alba
,
condiscended
that
three
of
their
Nobility
for
either
side
chosen
should
enter
Combate
,
and
that
Nation
which
were
victorious
should
command
the
other
.
Francis
the
French
King
going
to
recover
Lombardy
,
was
by
the
Switzers
attended
into
two
or
three
places
in
the
Mountains
,
hoping
there
to
repulse
him
,
but
the
King
taking
another
way
,
passed
securely
and
prevaild
.
Every
State
well
governed
doth
reward
men
of
good
merit
,
and
punish
all
offenders
;
and
if
any
person
of
good
desert
shall
wilfully
be
a
delinquent
,
the
same
man
ought
notwithstanding
his
former
service
,
be
punisht
.
Example
,
The
same
Horatio
that
in
Combat
gained
the
victory
against
the
Albani
,
having
insolently
slain
his
own
sister
,
was
notwithstanding
his
egregiou●
Act
and
the
fresh
memory
thereof
,
called
into
triall
of
his
life
,
and
with
great
difficulty
obtained
pardon
:
and
Manlius
who
had
with
great
glory
saved
the
Capitol
,
for
moving
sedition
in
Rome
,
was
after
from
the
same
cast
down
headlong
.
Every
wise
man
having
performed
any
great
service
to
his
Prince
or
Country
,
ought
to
be
content
with
such
recompence
as
it
shall
please
the
Prince
or
Country
to
bestow
:
measuring
the
same
according
to
the
Power
of
the
giver
,
and
not
the
merit
of
him
that
receiveth
.
Example
,
Horatius
Cocles
for
having
lost
his
hand
in
defence
of
the
bridge
of
Rome
,
and
Mutius
Scaevola
suffering
his
hand
to
be
burnt
for
his
attempt
to
kill
King
Porsenna
,
were
rewarded
with
a
small
portion
of
Land
;
and
Manlius
that
defended
the
Capitoh
from
the
Galleys
,
had
no
greater
reward
then
a
little
measure
of
meale
.
Ingratitnde
is
a
vice
so
natural
and
Common
,
as
not
only
private
persons
,
but
Princes
and
States
also
either
through
covetousnes
or
suspition
are
therewith
infected
.
Example
,
Vespasian
proclamed
Emperor
,
was
chiefly
aided
by
Antonius
Primus
,
and
by
his
helpe
prevailed
against
Vitellius
;
in
reward
of
which
service
Vespasian
removed
him
from
the
command
of
his
Army
and
gave
that
honor
to
Mutianus
.
Consalvo
Ferranoe
having
taken
the
Kingdom
of
Naples
from
the
French
,
was
first
remov'd
from
his
Command
of
the
Castles
and
Soldiers
,
and
in
the
end
brought
into
Spain
where
in
disgrace
he
ended
his
life
Collatinus
Tarquinius
who
with
the
aide
of
Bru●us
suppressed
the
Tarquins
of
Rome
,
and
with
him
Pub●Valerius
were
banisht
for
no
other
cause
but
for
being
of
the
name
of
Tarquin
,
theother
because
he
built
a
house
upon
mount
Coelio
.
All
Errors
that
great
Captains
commit
,
are
either
wilfull
or
ignorant
,
towards
the
one
and
the
other
of
which
offenders
to
use
greater
lenity
then
the
quality
of
their
offences
deserves
,
seemeth
necessary
:
for
men
of
honor
suffer
nought
by
the
infamy
which
evill
service
doth
bring
.
It
is
also
to
be
considered
that
a
great
Captain
being
cumbred
with
many
cares
,
cannot
proceed
in
his
actions
couragiously
if
he
stand
in
daily
doubt
to
be
punisht
for
every
error
that
hapneth
.
Example
,
Sergius
and
Vi●gi●ius
were
before
Veio
,
the
one
part
of
the
Army
on
the
one
side
of
the
City
,
the
other
not
far
from
the
place
.
Sergius
being
assaulted
by
the
Falisci
was
not
aided
by
Virginius
,
neither
would
he
require
his
help
,
such
was
the
envy
the
one
bare
to
the
other
;
and
●onsequently
their
offence
is
wilful
and
worthy
of
capital
punishment
.
Likewise
when
Varro
by
his
ignorance
,
received
an
overthrow
by
Hannibal
at
Cann●
,
he
was
nevertheless
pardoned
and
honorably
welcomed
home
by
the
whole
Senate
.
Whensoever
an
inconvenience
ariseth
within
or
without
the
State
,
it
seems
a
resolution
more
sure
to
dissemble
the
knowing
thereof
,
then
to
seek
by
sudden
violence
to
suppress
it
.
Example
,
Cosmo
de
Medices
having
gained
extraordinary
reputation
in
Florence
,
the
Citizens
imagined
,
that
to
suffer
the
same
to
increase
,
was
dangerous
,
and
therefore
they
banished
him
:
Which
extream
proceeding
,
so
offended
the
friends
of
Cosm●
,
being
the
stronger
,
as
they
forced
the
Citizens
to
revoke
him
,
and
make
him
Prince
of
that
City
.
The
like
hapned
in
Rome
,
where
Caesar
for
his
vertue
,
much
admired
and
followed
,
became
afterwards
to
be
feared●
and
they
that
feared
,
not
considering
their
force
to
be
inferior
to
the
power
of
Caesar●
endeavoring
to
oppress
him
,
were
the
occasion
of
his
greater
glory
.
In
every
Republick
,
an
excessive
Authority
given
to
one
or
two
persons
for
long
time
,
proveth
dangerous
,
cheifly
when
the
same
is
not
restrained
.
Example
,
The
Dictatorship
given
to
Caesar
for
life
,
was
an
occasion
to
oppress
the
Liberties
of
the
R●mans
.
The
same
effect
was
before
that
time
like
to
follow
the
Decemvirat●
,
by
suffering
Appius
Claudiu●
to
prolong
the
time
of
his
Dignity
.
The
Ambition
of
Men
is
such
,
as
rarely
they
will
obey
when
formerly
they
have
commanded
;
neither
do
they
willingly
accept
of
mean
Office
,
having
before
sate
in
higher
place
:
Yet
the
Citizens
of
well-governed
States
,
did
not
refuse
as
well
to
obey
as
command
.
Example
,
The
victory
the
Romans
obtained
against
the
Veienti
,
Q.
Fabius
was
slain
,
having
the
year
before
been
Consul
:
Nevertheless
he
then
served
in
meaner
place
under
C.
Manilius
,
and
M.
Fabius
his
own
Brother
then
Consul
.
There
is
nothing
more
strange
,
yet
by
experience
proved
true
,
That
men
in
adverse
Fortune
be
much
grieved
,
and
in
prosperity
also
discontented
;
which
is
the
reason
,
that
not
being
forced
to
fight
for
necessity
,
they
will
nevertheless
contend
for
Ambition
;
and
that
humor
doth
as
well
possess
those
that
live
aloft
,
as
others
whom
Fortune
holdeth
down
.
Example
,
The
people
of
Rome
having
by
the
Authority
of
the
Tribunes
obtained
to
make
themselves
secure
from
oppression
of
the
Nobility
,
forthwith
required
,
That
the
Honor
and
Office
of
State
might
be
also
imparted
unto
them
.
The
like
Ambition
moved
them
to
have
their
part
of
Lands
by
force
of
Lex
Agragia
,
which
was
at
last
the
overthrow
of
the
Roman
liberty
.
It
seemeth
that
people
displeased
with
some
Innovations
hapned
in
the
State
,
do
sometime
without
just
Reasons
complain
of
those
that
govern
:
Not
unlike
to
a
sick
man
who
deemeth
that
the
Physician
,
not
the
Fever
,
is
the
cause
of
his
grief
.
Example
,
The
people
of
Rome
were
perswaded
that
the
Ambition
of
Consuls
was
the
cause
of
continual
War
,
therefore
required
that
no
more
Consuls
should
be●
yet
were
they
content
that
certain
Tribunes
should
command
with
like
Authority
,
so
was
nothing
altered
in
the
Government
but
the
Governors
title
,
which
alone
did
content
them
.
Nothing
can
corrupt
and
alter
the
nature
of
man
so
much
,
or
so
soon
as
the
immoderate
desire
of
Honor●
in
so
much
as
men
of
honest
mindes
and
vertuous
inclinations
are
sometimes
by
Ambition
,
drawn
to
abuse
that
goodness
whereunto
they
are
inclined
.
Example
,
Appius
Claudius
having
lived
long
an
enemy
to
the
Multitude
,
hoping
by
their
aid
to
continue
his
Authority
of
the
Decemviri
in
Rome
,
became
their
Friend
,
and
disfavored
the
factions
of
great
men
.
Likewise
Q.
Fabius
a
man
of
singular
vertue
,
being
also
called
to
that
dignity
by
Appius
self
,
adulterated
his
nature
and
became
like
unto
him
.
Seldom
or
never
is
any
people
discontented
without
just
cause
;
yet
if
happily
they
be
asked
whereof
their
offence
proceedeth
,
many
times
for
want
of
some
fit
man
to
pronounce
their
grief
,
they
●●and
silent
.
Example
,
The
Romans
at
the
death
of
Virginia
,
were
gathered
together
armed
upon
Mount
Sacr●
and
being
asked
by
the
Senate
,
for
what
cause
they
so
did
?
no
answer
was
made
;
until
Virginio
Father
of
the
Virgin
had
procured
,
that
twenty
of
the
Tribunes
might
be
made
to
be
as
head
of
the
p●ople
,
and
confer
with
the
Senate
.
A
great
Folly
or
rather
meer
Madness
it
seemeth
to
desire
any
thing
,
and
tell
before-hand
that
the
end
and
purpose
of
the
desire
is
evil
;
for
thereby
he
sheweth
reason
why
it
ought
not
to
be
granted
.
Example
,
The
Romans
required
of
the
Senate
that
Appius
and
the
rest
of
the
Decemviri
should
be
delivered
into
their
hands
,
being
determined
to
burn
them
all
alive
.
The
first
part
of
their
request
seemed
reasonable
,
but
the
end
thereof
unreasonable
.
A
course
very
dangerous
it
is
in
all
States
,
by
continual
accusing
and
punishing
,
to
hold
the
Subject
in
doubt
and
daily
fear
:
For
he
that
stands
always
looking
for
some
trouble
,
becometh
careless
and
apt
to
attempt
innovation
.
Example
,
The
Dec●mviri
being
opprest
,
the
Tribunes
authorised
in
their
place
,
endeavored
daily
to
call
in
question
the
most
part
of
the
Dec●mviri
,
and
many
other
Citizens
also
,
whereof
great
inconveniences
arose
,
and
much
danger
would
have
ensued
,
had
not
a
Decree
propounded
by
M.
Duillius
been
made
,
that
for
one
year
no
Roman
Citizen
should
be
accused
.
Strange
it
is
to
see
how
men
in
seeking
their
own
security
,
lay
the
injuries
which
they
fear
u●on
other
men
;
as
though
it
were
necessary
,
either
to
offend
or
be
offended
.
Example
,
The
Romans
among
themselves
,
united
and
strong
,
always
endeavored
to
offend
the
Nobles
;
and
the
Nobles
likewise
being
perswaded
they
were
strong
,
labored
to
oppress
the
people
:
Which
humors
were
the
cause
of
continual
troubles
.
To
make
estimation
and
choice
of
men
fit
to
govern
,
the
best
course
is
to
consider
in
particular
;
otherwise
it
might
be
imagined●
that
among
the
Multitude
or
meaner
people
,
they
being
the
greatest
number
,
might
be
found
some
persons
of
more
perfection
.
Example
,
The
people
of
Rome
desiring
that
the
Consulship
might
be
given
among
them
as
men
of
most
merit
,
did
by
all
means
endeavor
to
obtain
that
honor
;
but
being
come
to
election
,
and
every
mans
vertue
particularly
considered
,
there
could
not
be
among
the
Multitude
onel●
one
found
fit
for
so
great
a
place
;
and
therefore
the
people
themselves
consented
,
that
the
dignity
should
still
remain
as
it
was
.
To
perswade
a
Multitude
to
any
enterprise
,
is
easie
,
if
that
which
is
perswaded
,
doth
promise
either
profit
or
honor
;
yet
oft
under
that
external
apparence
li●s
hid
loss
or
disadvantage●
Example
,
The
Romans
perswading
themselves
that
the
slow
proceeding
of
F●bius
Maximus
in
the
War
,
was
both
chargable
and
cowardly
,
required●
That
the
General
of
the
Horse
might
direct
the
War
;
which
course
had
ruined
Rome
,
if
the
wisdom
of
Fabius
had
not
been
.
Likewise
when
Hannibal
had
divers
years
raigned
in
Ital●
,
one
M.
Centenius
Penula
,
a
man
of
base
birth
,
yet
a
Soldier
o●
some
repute
,
undertook
that
if
he
with
such
Volunti●rs
as
would
follow
him
,
might
have
authority
to
fight
,
he
would
within
few
days
deliver
Hannibal
either
alive
or
dead
:
Which
offer
was
by
the
Senate
accounted
rash
,
yet
for
fear
to
offend
the
people
,
granted
;
and
Penula
with
his
Soldiers
was
cut
in
pieces
.
To
appease
a
Mutiny
or
Tumult
in
any
Camp
or
City
,
there
is
no
means
more
speedy
or
successful
,
then
if
some
person
of
great
quality
and
respect
,
present
himself
to
the
people
,
and
by
his
wisdom
lay
before
them
the
damage
of
their
Discords
,
perswading
them
to
Peace
and
Patience
.
Example
,
The
faction
of
the
●rateschi
and
Arratiati
in
Florence
;
the
one
ready
to
assault
the
other
.
Francisco
Soderini
Bishop
of
V●terra
in
his
Episcopal
Habit
,
went
between
the
parties
and
appeased
them
:
Also
Count
Egremont
by
the
Authority
of
his
wisdom
and
presence
,
supprest
a
great
mutiny
in
Antwerp
between
the
Martinists
and
Papists
.
A
people
corrupted
,
do
rarely
or
never
observe
any
Order
or
Ordinance
,
unless
by
force
of
some
Princes
power
they
be
thereto
inforced
;
but
where
the
Multitude
is
incorrupt
and
religious
,
all
things
are
done
justly
,
and
without
compulsion
.
Example
,
Camillus
at
the
victory
against
the
Urienti
,
vowed
that
the
tenth
part
of
the
pillage
should
be
offered
to
Apollo
;
but
the
Senate
supposing
that
the
people
would
not
consent
to
so
great
a
Contribution
,
studied
to
dispence
with
that
vow
,
and
to
please
Apollo
and
the
people
also
by
some
other
means
:
Whereat
the
people
shewed
themselves
openly
offended
,
and
willingly
gave
no
less
then
the
sum
formerly
decreed
.
When
the
Free-Cities
of
Germany
are
occasioned
to
make
money
for
any
Publick
Service
,
the
Magistrates
impose
One
or
two
in
the
hundred
on
every
City
,
which
done
,
every
one
is
sworn
to
lay
down
so
much
as
in
his
own
Conscience
he
is
able
;
and
he
with
his
own
hand
,
no
other
witness
being
present
,
casteth
the
money
into
a
Coffer
prepared
for
the
purpose
;
which
he
would
not
,
if
his
own
Conscience
did
not
inforce
him
.
When
any
extraordinary
occasion
happens
to
a
City
or
Province
,
some
prodigious
voice
is
heard
,
or
some
marvellous
sights
are
seen
.
Before
T.
Gracchus
General
of
the
Roman
Army
was
betraid
by
Flavius
Lucanus
,
the
Aruspices
discovered
two
Serpents
eating
the
Entrails
of
the
Beasts
sacrified
;
which
done
,
they
vanished
:
which
vision
as
they
divined
,
prognosticated
the
Generals
death
:
Likewise
F.
Savanar●la
foretold
the
coming
of
King
Charls
the
Eight
into
Italy
:
And
M.
Sedigitus
when
the
Galls
first
came
towards
Rome
,
informed
the
Senate
he
heard
a
voice
much
londer
then
any
mans
,
crying
aloud
,
Galli
veniunt
.
The
multitude
of
base
people
is
naturally
audacious
and
apt
to
innovation
;
yet
unless
they
be
directed
by
some
persons
of
Reputation
and
Wisdom
,
rarely
do
they
joyn
in
any
action
of
great
import
.
Example
,
The
Romans
when
their
City
was
taken
and
sackt
by
the
Galls
,
went
to
Veio
with
determination
to
dwell
there
:
The
Senate
informed
thereof
,
commanded
that
upon
great
pain
,
every
Citizen
should
return
to
Rome
,
whereat
the
people
at
first
mocked
;
but
when
every
man
particularly
within
himself
considered
his
own
peril
,
all
in
general
determined
to
obey
the
Magistrates
.
In
the
employment
of
Men
for
Service
,
neither
Age
nor
Fortune
ought
so
much
to
be
regarded
as
Vertue
;
for
yong
men
having
made
tryal
of
their
valor
,
soon
become
aged
,
and
thereby
either
unapt
or
unable
to
serve
:
Therefore
well-governed
Commonwealths
,
preferred
Military
Vertue
before
any
other
respect●
.
Example
,
Valerius
G●rvinus
with
others
made
Consul
the
Three
and
twentieth
year
of
his
age
,
and
Pompey
triumphed
in
his
youth
.
No
wise
or
well
advised
Prince
or
other
State
will
undertake
without
excessive
Forces
to
invade
the
Dominions
of
any
other
Prince
,
unless
he
assure
himself
of
some
Friends
there
to
be
a
Mean
,
and
as
it
were
a
Gate
to
prepare
his
passage
.
Example
,
The
Romans
by
aid
of
the
Sagu●tines
entred
Spain
,
the
Aetoli
called
them
into
Greece
,
the
H●diai
into
France
:
Likewise
the
Palaeologi
incited
the
Turk
to
come
into
Thrace
;
and
Ludovicus
Sforza
occasioned
Charls
the
French
King
to
come
into
Italy
.
A
Republick
desirous
to
extend
the
bounds
thereof
,
must
endeavor
to
be
fully
furnished
with
Inhabitants
,
which
may
be
done
both
by
Love
and
Force
:
Love
is
gained
by
suffering
strangers
to
inhabit
the
City
securely
;
and
Force
compels
people
to
come
thither
,
when
other
Cities
and
Towns
near
at
hand
be
demolished
or
defaced
:
And
impossible
it
is
without
this
order
of
proceeding
,
to
enlarge
any
City
or
make
the
same
of
greater
power
.
Example
,
The
Romans
to
enlarge
their
City
demolished
Alba
,
and
many
other
Towns
,
and
therewith
also
entertained
all
strangers
courteously
:
So
as
Rome
grew
to
such
greatness●
that
the
City
onely
could
arm
Six
hundred
and
forty
thousand
men
;
but
Sparta
or
Athens
could
never
exceed
Twenty
thousand
,
for
that
Lycurgus
had
inhibited
the
access
of
strangers
.
A
Commonwealth
that
consumes
more
Treasure
in
the
War
,
then
it
profits
in
Victory
,
seems
to
have
rather
hindred
then
honored
or
inriched
the
State
.
A
wise
Captain
therefore
in
his
actions
,
ought
as
well
to
profit
the
Republick
,
as
to
gain
to
himself
glory
.
Example
,
the
Consuls
of
Rome
did
seldom
desire
Triumph
,
unless
they
returned
from
the
War
loaden
with
Gold
,
Silver
,
and
other
rich
spoils
fit
to
be
delivered
into
the
Common
Treasury
.
All
Foreign
Wars
with
Princes
or
other
States
taken
in
hand
,
be
either
for
Ambition
or
Desire
of
glory
,
or
else
for
necessity
.
Examples
,
the
Romans
for
their
Ambition
conquered
many
Nations
,
with
intent
onely
to
have
the
obedience
of
the
people
;
yet
did
they
suffer
them
to
hold
possession
of
their
Houses
,
and
sometimes
they
were
permitted
to
live
onely
with
their
old
Laws
.
Likewise
Alexander
the
Great
endeavored
to
suppress
many
Princes
for
his
glory
,
but
did
not
dispossess
the
people
,
nor
kill
them
.
Otherwise
it
is
where
a
whole
Nation●
inforced
by
Famine
or
Fury
of
War
,
abandon
their
own
dwellings
,
and
are
forced
to
inhabit
elswhere
.
Example
,
The
G●ths
and
other
people
of
the
North
invaded
the
Roman
Empire
,
and
many
other
Provinces
,
whereof
their
alteration
of
names
did
ensue
;
as
Illyria
now
called
Slavonia
,
England
formerly
named
Britain
.
A
common
conceit
and
saying
it
is●
That
Money
makes
the
War
strong
,
and
is
the
force
and
sinews
thereof
;
as
though
he
who
hath
most
Treasure
,
be
also
most
mighty
;
but
experience
hath
apparently
shewed
the
contrary
.
Example
,
After
the
death
of
Alexander
,
King
of
Macedon
,
a
mul●itude
of
Galls
went
into
Greece
,
and
being
there
arived
,
sent
certain
Ambassadors
to
the
King
,
who
supposing
to
make
them
afraid
of
his
power
,
shewed
them
his
treasure
,
which
wrought
a
contrary
effect
;
for
the
Galls
before
desirous
of
Peace
,
resolved
then
to
continue
the
War
,
in
hope
to
win
that
mighty
mass
of
Money●
Likewise
Darius
should
have
vanquished
Alexander
,
and
the
Greeks
might
have
conquered
the
Romans
,
if
the
richer
Prince
might
ever
by
his
Money
have
prevailed
.
Every
League
made
with
a
Prince
or
Republick
remote
,
is
weak
and
rather
aideth
us
with
Fame
then
Effect
,
and
consequently
deceiveth
all
those
that
in
such
Amity
repose
Confidence
.
Example
,
The
Florentines
being
assaulted
by
the
King
of
Naples
and
the
Pope
,
prayed
aid
of
the
French
King
,
who
being
far
distant
,
could
not
in
time
succor
them
;
and
the
Cedicini
desiring
aid
of
the
Capuani
against
the
Samnits
,
a
people
of
no
force
,
were
deceived
.
A
Prince
whose
people
is
well
armed
and
trained
,
shall
do
better
to
attend
his
enemy
at
home
,
then
by
invasion
to
assault
his
Countrey
:
But
such
Princes
whose
Subjects
are
disarmed
,
had
need
to
hold
the
enemy
aloof
.
Example
,
The
Romans
,
and
in
this
age
the
Swisses
,
being
well
armed
,
may
attend
the
War
at
home
;
but
the
Carthaginians
and
Italians
being
not
so
well
furnished
,
did
ever
use
to
seek
the
enemy
.
The
Plurality
of
Commanders
in
equal
Authority
,
is
for
the
most
part
occasion
of
slow
proceeding
in
the
War
.
Example
,
There
was
at
one
time
in
Rome
created
four
Tribuni
Militares
with
authority
of
Consuls
,
viz.
T.
Quintu●
after
his
Consulship
,
Cajus
Furius
,
M.
Posthumus
,
and
A.
Cornelius
Cassus
,
amongst
whom
arose
so
much
diversity
and
contrariety
of
opinion
,
as
nothing
could
be
done
till
their
authority
ceased
,
and
M.
Ae●ylius
made
Dictator
.
A
Victory
obtained
by
any
great
Captain
with
the
Authority
of
his
Princes
Commission
,
Counsel
,
and
Directions
,
ought
ever
to
be
imputed
rather
to
the
wisdom
of
the
Prince
,
then
the
valor
of
the
Captain
:
Which
made
the
Emperors
of
Rome
to
permit
no
Captains
(
how
great
soever
his
victories
were
)
to
Triumph
,
as
before
that
time
the
Consuls
had
done
;
and
even
in
those
days
a
modest
refusal
of
Triumph
was
commended
.
Example
,
M.
Fulvius
having
gained
a
great
victory
against
the
Tuscans
,
was
both
by
the
consent
of
the
Senate
and
people
of
Rome
,
admitted
to
Triumph
;
but
the
refusal
of
that
Honor
proved
his
greater
glory
.
All
they
that
from
private
estate
have
aspired
to
Principality
,
either
by
Force
or
Fraud
become
thereunto
,
unless
the
same
be
given
,
or
by
inheritance
descended
:
Yet
it
is
rarely
seen
,
that
Force
alone
prevaileth
,
but
Fraud
without
Force
oft
times
sufficeth
.
Example
,
Agathocles
by
such
means
became
Prince
of
Syracusa
;
John
Galeazzo
by
abusing
his
Uncle
Barnabas
,
gained
the
Dominion
of
Lombardy
;
and
Cyrus
circumvented
Cyaxares
his
Mothers
Brother
,
and
by
that
craft
aspired
to
greatness
.
Sudden
Resolutions
are
always
dangerous
;
and
no
less
peril
ensueth
of
slow
and
doubtful
delays
.
Example
,
When
Hieron
Prince
of
Syracusa
died
,
the
War
even
then
being
in
great
heat
between
the
Romans
and
Carthaginians
,
they
of
Syracusa
consulted
,
whether
it
were
better
to
follow
the
Fortune
of
Rome
or
Carthage
.
In
which
doubt
,
they
continued
until
Apollonides
a
chief
Captain
of
Syracusa
laid
before
them●
that
so
long
delay
would
make
them
hated
both
of
Romans
and
Carthaginians
.
Likewise
the
Florentin●s
being
by
Lewis
the
Twelfth
required
to
give
his
Army
passage
towards
Naples
,
mused
so
long
upon
answer
,
that
he
became
their
enemy
,
and
they
forced
to
recover
his
favor
full
dearly
.
To
govern
a
State
is
nothing
else
but
to
take
such
order
as
the
Subjects
may
not
,
or
ought
not
offend
;
which
may
be
done
,
either
by
removing
from
them
all
means
to
disobey
,
or
by
affording
them
so
great
favors
,
as
reasonably
they
ought
not
to
change
their
Fortune
;
for
the
mean
course
proveth
dangerous
.
Example
,
the
Latins
being
by
the
valor
of
Camillus
overcome
,
yeelded
themselves
to
endure
what
punishment
it
pleased
the
Romans
to
inflict
.
An
ingenious
and
magnanimous
answer
being
made
unto
wise
Magistrates
,
doth
oft
obtain
both
Pardon
and
Grace
.
Example
,
When
the
Privernates
had
rebelled
,
and
were
by
force
constrained
to
return
to
the
obedience
of
the
Romans
,
they
sent
certain
of
the
City
unto
Rome
to
desire
pardon
;
who
being
brought
before
the
Senate
,
one
of
the
Senators
asked
the
Privernates
,
what
punishment
themselves
did
think
they
had
deserved
:
The
same
,
quoth
they
,
which
men
living
in
freedom
,
think
they
are
worthy
of
.
Whereto
the
Consul
thus
replied
,
Quid
si
p●enam
remittimus
?
Qualem
nos
pacem
vobiscum
habituros
speremus
?
The
P●ivernates
answered
,
Si
bonam
dederitis
,
&
fidel●m
&
perpetuam
:
Si
malam
,
haud
diuturnam
.
Which
answer
was
thought
to
proceed
from
generous
men
,
and
therefore
they
were
not
onely
pardoned
,
but
also
honored
and
received
into
the
number
of
the
Roman
Citizens
.
All
Castles
,
Fortresses
,
and
Places
of
strength
,
be
made
for
defence
either
against
the
enemy
or
Subject
:
In
the
first
case
they
are
not
necessary
,
in
the
second
dangerous
.
For
thereby
the
Prince
may
at
his
pleasure
take
occasion
to
insult
upon
the
Subject●
when
much
more
seemly
he
might
settle
his
estate
upon
the
love
and
good
affection
of
Men
.
Example
,
The
Castle
of
Millan
made
by
Duke
Francisco
●●orza
,
incited
his
Heirs
to
become
insolent
;
and
consequently
they
became
odious
;
which
was
also
the
caus●
that
so
soon
as
that
City
was
assaulted
,
the
enemy
with
facility
did
possess
it
.
That
Prince
or
Potentate
which
builds
his
Severity
rather
upon
the
trust
he
hath
in
Fortresses
,
then
the
love
of
Men
,
shall
be
deceived
:
For
no
place
is
so
strong
,
as
can
long
defend
it self
,
unless
by
the
love
and
aid
of
Men
it
be
in
time
of
necessity
succored
.
Example
,
Pope
Julio
having
drawn
the
Bentivoli
out
of
Bologna
,
built
there
a
strong
Castle
;
the
Governor
thereof
robbed
the
people
,
and
they
therewith
grieved
,
in
a
short
time
took
the
Castle
from
him
.
So
after
the
revolt
of
Genoa
,
Lewis
the
Twelfth
came
to
the
recovery
thereof
,
and
builded
there
the
strongest
Fortification
of
Italy
,
as
well
for
site
as
the
circumstances
inexpugnable
.
Nevertheless
the
Citizens
rebelled
,
and
within
sixteen
moneths
the
French
were
forced
to
yield
the
Castle
and
Government
to
Octavio
Fragosa
.
To
build
Forts
upon
places
of
strength
,
either
for
defence
of
our
own
,
or
to
hold
that
which
is
taken
from
others
,
hath
ever
proved
to
small
purpose
.
Example
,
The
Romans
having
supprest
the
Rebellion
of
the
Latins
and
Privernates
;
albeit
they
were
people
Warlike
,
and
lovers
of
Liberty
;
yet
to
keep
them
Subject
,
built
there
no
Castles
,
nor
other
places
fortified
:
And
the
Lacedemonians
did
not
onely
forbear
to
fortifie
the
Towns
they
conquered
,
but
also
left
their
cheif
City
of
Sparta
unwalled
.
The
necessity
or
use
of
Fortification
,
is
onely
upon
Frontires
or
such
principal
places
where
Princes
make
their
Habitation
;
to
the
end
the
fury
of
sudden
assaults
may
be
staid
,
and
time
for
succor
entertained
:
Otherwise
,
example
,
the
Castle
of
Millan
being
made
to
hold
the
State
in
obedience
,
could
not
so
do
either
for
the
house
of
Sforzi
or
France
.
Guido
Vbaldo
,
Duke
of
Velin
,
driven
from
his
Dominion
by
Caesar
Borgia
,
so
soon
as
he
recovered
his
Countrey
,
caused
all
the
Forts
to
be
demolished
:
For
by
experience
he
found
the
love
of
Men
was
the
surest
defence
,
and
that
Fortifications
prevailed
no
less
against
him
then
for
him
.
The
causes
of
Division
and
Faction
in
every
Commonweal
proceed
most
commonly
of
Idleness
and
Peace
,
and
that
which
uniteth
,
is
Fear
and
War
.
Example
,
The
Vejenti
and
Elinsci
having
intelligence
of
great
contention
between
the
Nobility
and
People
of
Rome
,
thought
that
a
fit
opportunity
to
oppress
the
one
and
the
other
:
But
the
Romans
informed
of
such
an
intention
,
appeased
all
Domestick
anger
,
and
by
the
Valor
of
their
Arms
conducted
by
Gn.
Manlius
and
M.
Fabius
defeated
the
Enemies
Forces
.
The
means
to
usurpe
an
estate
disjoynted
is
first
before
Arms
be
taken
,
to
become
as
it
were
an
Arbitrator
or
a
friend
indifferent
;
and
after
Arms
be
taken
,
then
to
send
moderate
aid
to
the
weak
side
,
as
well
to
entertain
the
War
between
the
Factions
,
as
also
to
consume
the
strength
both
of
the
one
,
and
the
other
,
yet
in
no
wise
to
employ
any
great
forces
,
for
thereby
either
party
may
discover
the
intents
to
suppress
them
.
Example
,
The
City
of
Pistoia
fallen
into
division
,
the
Florentines
took
occasion
sometimes
to
favor
the
one
,
and
some
times
the
other
,
that
in
the
end
both
sides
weary
of
the
War
,
voluntarily
yeilded
to
their
devotion
.
Philippo
Viscount
,
hoping
sundry
times
by
occasion
of
Faction
to
oppress
the
Fl●rentin●●
,
did
often
assault
them
with
great
forces
,
which
was
the
cause
that
they
became
reunited
;
and
consequently
the
Duke
deceived
of
his
expectation
A
great
Wisdom
it
is
to
refrain
Opprobriousand
Injurious
speech
:
for
as
neither
the
one
nor
the
other
can
an●
whit
decrease
the
Enemies
force
,
so
doth
it
move
him
to
greater
hate
,
and
more
desire
to
offend
.
Example
,
Gabides
a
General
of
the
Persians
having
long
besieged
Amida
,
became
weary
,
and
preparing
to
abandon
the
enterprise
,
raised
his
Camp
,
which
they
of
the
City
beholding
,
began
to
revile
the
Persians
,
and
from
the
Walls
reproved
them
of
Cowardise
;
which
undiscreet
words
so
highly
offended
G●bides
,
as
thereupon
he
resolved
to
continue
the
siege
,
and
within
few
daies
wun
the
City
.
Tiberi●s
Grac●hus
appointed
Captain
of
certain
bands
of
men
,
whom
for
want
of
other
Soldiers
the
Romans
entertained
,
proclamed
in
his
Camp
,
that
no
man
upon
pain
of
death
should
contumeliously
call
any
Soldier
slave
,
either
in
earnest
or
jest
.
Nam
fac●tiae
asperae
quando
nimium
ex
vero
traxere
,
acrem
sui
memoriam
relinquunt
.
Likewise
Alexander
the
great
having
conquered
well
near
all
the
East
,
brought
his
forces
before
Tyre
,
they
fearing
Alexanders
fury
,
offered
upon
honorable
considerations
to
yeild
him
obedience
,
only
requiring
,
that
neither
he
nor
any
of
his
forces
should
enter
the
City
,
which
motion
after
four
Moneths
Alexander
accepted
,
and
so
signified
by
his
Ambassador
who
arriving
in
Tyre
was
by
the
proud
Citizens
slain
,
whereat
Alexander
grew
into
Choler
and
being
ready
to
forsake
the
siege
,
staid
his
forces
,
and
in
the
end
sacked
the
City
and
put
the
people
to
the
sword
.
A
Prince
or
any
other
State
being
assaulted
by
an
Enemy
of
far
more
puissance
then
himself
,
ought
not
to
refuse
any
honorahle
compositions
,
chiefly
when
they
are
offered●
for
no
conditions
can
be
so
base
,
but
shall
in
some
sort
turn
to
the
advantage
and
honor
of
him
that
accepts
them
.
Example
,
Anno
1512.
certain
Florentines
procured
great
forces
of
Spaniards
to
come
thither
,
as
well
to
reposess
the
Medici
then
banisht
,
as
also
to
sack
the
City
;
promising
that
so
soon
as
the
Army
of
Spain
did
come
into
the
Florentine
dominion
,
the
faction
of
Medici
would
be
ready
armed
to
receive
them
.
But
the
Spaniards
being
come
,
found
no
forces
at
all
to
joyn
with
them
;
and
therefore
wanting
victual
,
offered
composition
.
The
Florentines
finding
the
Enemy
distressed
grew
insolent
and
refused
peace
,
whereof
followed
the
loss
of
Prato
,
and
many
other
inconveniencies
.
The
like
happened
to
them
of
Tyre
,
as
before
.
The
denial
or
delay
of
Justice
desired
in
revenge
of
injuries
either
publick
or
privately
offered
,
is
a
thing
very
dangerous
to
every
Prince
or
other
State
,
for
that
the
party
injured
doth
oft
by
indirect
meanes
though
with
hazard
of
his
country
and
himself
seek
satisfaction
:
Example
,
the
complaint
which
the
Galli
made
against
the
Fabii
who
sent
Ambassadors
in
favor
of
the
Tossani
,
not
being
heard
,
nor
any
punishment
inflicted
upon
them
for
fighting
against
the
Law
of
Nations
,
was
the
cause
that
the
Galli
were
offended
with
the
States
,
whereof
followed
the
sack
of
Rome
;
and
the
delay
of
Justice
in
Philip
of
Macedon
,
for
not
revenging
the
incestuous
oppression
of
Attalus
to
Pausanias
,
was
the
motive
to
murther
that
King
.
Whoso
endeavors
the
alteration
of
any
State
,
must
of
necessity
proceed
with
all
severity
,
and
leave
some
memorable
example
to
those
that
shall
impunge
the
Ordinance
of
Government
newly
settled
.
Example
,
when
Junius
Brutus
had
by
his
great
valor
banisht
the
Tarquins
,
and
sworn
the
People
that
no
King
should
ever
raign
in
Rome
:
within
short
time
after
,
many
young
Nobles
,
among
whom
was
Brutus
son
,
impatient
of
the
equality
of
the
new
government
,
conspired
to
recall
the
Tarquins
;
but
Brutus
thereof
informed
,
caused
his
own
son
not
only
to
be
condemned
to
death
,
but
was
himself
present
at
the
execution
.
As
health
and
soundness
of
the
hands
,
legs
,
and
other
outward
members
cannot
continue
life
,
unless
the
heart
and
vital
spirits
within
be
strong
and
firm
;
so
fortifications
and
Frontier-defences
do
not
prevail
,
unless
the
whole
Corps
of
the
Kingdom
and
People
be
well
armed
:
Example
,
when
the
Emperor
came
into
●tal●
,
and
had
with
some
difficulty
past
the
confines
of
the
Venetians
welnear
without
ressistance
;
his
army
marcht
to
Venice
,
and
might
doubtless
have
possest
the
City
,
had
it
not
been
defended
with
water
.
Likewise
the
English
in
their
assault
of
France
,
excepting
a
few
encounters
on
the
Frontires
,
found
no
puissant
resistance
within
the
Realm
.
And
Anno
1513
they
forced
all
that
State
,
and
the
King
himself
to
tremble
,
as
oft
before
they
had
done
;
but
contrariwise
the
Romans
knowing
that
life
lay
in
the
heart
,
ever
held
the
body
of
their
State
strongest
:
for
the
nearer
the
enemy
approacht
Rome
,
the
better
they
found
the
Countrey
armed
and
defended
.
The
desire
to
command
soveraignly
is
of
so
great
force
,
as
doth
not
only
work
in
those
that
are
in
expectation
of
principality
,
but
also
in
them
that
have
no
title
at
all
.
Example
,
this
appetite
moved
the
wife
of
Ta●quinius
Priscus
contrary
to
all
natural
duty
to
incite
her
husband
to
murder
her
own
Father
Servius
,
and
possesse
his
Kingdom
,
as
b●ing
perswaded
it
were
much
more
honorable
to
be
a
Queen
then
to
be
the
daughter
of
a
King
.
The
violation
of
ancient
Laws
,
Orders
,
and
Customs
,
under
which
people
have
long
time
lived
,
is
the
chief
an●
only
cause
whereby
Princes
hazard
their
Estate
and
Royal
Dignity
.
Example
albeit
the
deflowring
of
Lucrece
was
the
occasion
,
yet
was
it
not
the
cause
that
moved
the
●omans
to
take
arms
against
Tarquin
;
for
he
h●ving
before
that
fact
of
Sex●us
his
Son
,
governed
Tyrannically
,
and
taken
from
the
Senate
all
Authority
,
was
become
odious
both
to
the
Senate
,
Nobility
,
and
People
,
who
finding
themselves
well
governed
,
never
seek
or
wish
any
other
liberty
or
alteration
.
A
Prince
that
desires
to
live
secure
from
conspiracy
,
hath
cause
rather
to
fear
those
on
whom
he
hath
bestowed
over
great
riches
and
honors
,
then
those
whom
he
hath
greatly
injured
;
because
they
want
meanes
to
offend
;
the
other
have
many
opportunities
to
do
it
.
Example
,
Perennius
the
Prime
favorite
of
●ommodus
the
Emperor
conspired
his
death●Plantianus
did
the
like
to
S●verus
,
and
S●janus
to
Tiberius
;
for
being
advanced
to
so
great
honors
,
riches
,
and
Offices
as
nothing
remained
desirable
but
the
Imperial
title
,
they
conspired
against
the
persons
of
their
Soveraigns
in
hope
of
the
dignity
;
but
in
the
end
they
endured
that
punishment
which
to
such
disloyalty
and
ingratitude
appertaineth
.
An
Army
which
wants
Experience
,
albeit
the
Captain
be
expert
,
is
not
greatly
to
be
feared●
neither
ought
an
Army
of
well
traind
Soldiers
to
be
much
esteemed
,
whose
Captain
is
ignorant
.
Example
,
Caesar
going
into
Africa
against
Afranius
and
Petraeus
whose
army
was
full
of
old
Soldiers
,
said
he
feared
them
little
,
Quia
ibat
ad
exercitum
sine
duce
.
Contrariwise
,
when
he
went
to
P●arsalia
to
encounter
Pompey
,
he
said
,
Ibo
ad
duce●
sine
exercitu
.
A
Captain-General
commanding
an
Army
ought
rather
to
governe
with
curtesie
and
mildness
,
then
with
over-much
austerity
and
severity
.
Example
,
Q.
and
Appius
Claudius
being
Consuls
,
were
appointed
to
govern
the
War
.
To
Q.
was
allotted
one
Army
which
served
very
dutifully
;
but
Appius
commanding
the
other
with
great
cruelty
,
was
by
his
Soldiers
unwillingly
obeyed
.
Nevertheless
Tacitus
seems
of
contrary
opinion
,
saying
,
Plus
poena
quam
obsequium
val●t
.
Therefore
to
reconcile
these
different
Conceits
,
I
say
,
that
a
General
having
power
to
command
men
,
either
they
are
confederates
or
Subjects
:
If
confederates
or
voluntaries
,
he
may
not
proceed
to
e●tream
punishment
;
if
Subjects
,
and
his
power
absolute
,
they
may
be
governed
otherwise●
yet
with
such
respect
,
as
the
insolence
of
the
General
inforce
not
the
Soldiers
to
hate
him
.
Honor
may
sometime
be
got
as
well
by
the
loss
as
gaining
of
victory
.
Every
man
knoweth
glory
is
due
to
the
Victor
,
and
we
deny
not
the
same
priviledge
to
the
vanquished
,
being
able
to
make
proof
that
the
loss
proceeded
not
from
his
default
.
Neither
is
it
dishonorable
to
violate
those
promises
whereto
the
necessity
or
disadvantage
of
War
inforceth
.
And
forced
promises
which
concern
a
whole
State
,
are
not
binding
,
and
rarely
or
never
kept
,
nor
is
the
Breaker
thereby
to
receive
disgrace
.
Example
,
Posthumus
the
Consul
having
made
a
dishonorable
peace
with
the
Samnits
,
was
by
them
with
his
whole
Army
sent
home
disarmed
.
Being
arived
at
Rome
,
the
Consul
informed
the
people
they
were
not
bound
to
perform
the
base
conditions
he
was
compelled
to
yield
unto
;
albeit
,
he
and
those
few
that
promised
,
were
bound
to
perform
them
.
The
Senate
thereupon
concluded
to
send
him
prisoner
to
Samno
,
where
he
constantly
protested
the
fault
to
be
onely
his
own
;
wherefore
the
people
by
that
peace
incurred
no
dishonor
at
all
:
And
Fortune
so
much
favored
Posthumus
,
as
the
Samnites
were
content
presently
to
return
him
to
Rome
;
where
he
became
more
glorious
for
losing
the
Victory
,
then
was
Pontius
at
Samno
for
having
won
the
victory
.
Wise
men
have
long
observed●
that
who
so
will
know
what
shall
be
,
must
consider
what
is
past
;
for
all
worldly
things
hold
the
same
course
they
had
at
●irst
.
The
reason
is
,
that
as
long
as
men
are
possest
with
the
same
Passions
with
former
ages
,
consequently
of
these
doings
the
same
effects
ensue
.
Example
,
The
Almains
and
French
have
ever
bin
noted
for
their
Avarice
,
Pride
,
Fury
,
and
Infidelity
,
and
so
in
divers
ages
,
experience
hath
proved
even
to
this
present
:
For
perfidious
dealing
the
French
have
given
sufficient
proof
,
not
onely
in
ancient
times
,
but
also
in
the
time
of
Charls
the
Eighth
,
who
promised
to
render
to
the
Florentines
the
Forts
of
Pisa●
but
having
divers
tim●●
received
money
,
held
them
notwithstanding
in
possession
.
The
Florentines
found
the
like
in
the
Almains●
for
in
the
Wars
of
the
Visconti
,
Dukes
of
Milan
,
they
prayed
aid
of
the
Emperor
,
who
promised
them
great
forces
;
in
consideration
whereof●
he
was
to
receive
of
the
Florentines
One
hundred
thousand
Crowns
in
hand
,
and
as
much
more
when
his
Army
was
arived
in
Italy
,
both
which
payments
were
performed
;
but
as
soon
as
the
Emperor
came
to
Verona
,
he
devised
cavillations
of
unkindness
,
whereupon
he
returned
home
.
A
Prince
desirous
to
obtain
any
thing
of
another
,
must
if
occasion
so
permit
,
urge
his
demand
so
earnestly
and
press
for
so
sudden
and
present
answer
,
as
he
who
is
prest
may
not
have
leisure
to
consider
how
to
excuse
himself
in
denial
.
Example
▪
Pope
Julio
endeavored
to
drive
out
of
Bologna
all
the
Bentivoli
in
which
action
he
thought
the
aid
of
the
French
necessary
,
and
that
the
Venetians
should
stand
neutral
;
and
by
divers
messengers
did
sollicite
them
to
that
effect
;
but
not
receiving
any
resolute
answer
,
he
thought
fit
with
those
few
forces
he
had
to
take
his
journey
to
Bol●gna
,
whereupon
the
Venetians
advertised
him
they
would
remain
neutral
,
and
the
French
King
forthwith
sent
him
forces
as
fearing
the
Popes
indignation
;
likewise
the
Tuscans
having
formerly
desired
aid
of
the
Samnites
against
the
Romans
,
took
Armes
suddenly
and
obtained
their
request
which
the
Samintes
had
before
denied
.
When
a
multitude
offendeth
,
all
may
not
be
punisht
,
because
they
are
too
many
:
to
punish
part
and
leave
the
rest
unpunisht
,
were
injurie
to
the
sufferers
;
and
to
those
that
escape
,
an
encouragement
to
offend
again
;
therefore
to
eschew
all
extremity
,
mean
courses
have
bin
anciently
used
.
Example
,
When
all
the
Wives
of
the
Romans
conspired
to
poyson
their
Husbands
,
a
convenient
number
of
them
were
punisht
,
and
the
rest
suffered
to
pass
▪
Likewise
at
the
conspiracy
of
the
Bacchanals
in
the
time
of
the
Macedonian
War
,
wherein
many
thousands
Men
and
Women
had
part
,
every
tenth
person
only
was
put
to
death
by
lot
;
although
the
offence
were
general
,
by
which
manner
of
punishing
,
he
that
suffered
,
complaind
on
his
fortune
;
and
he
that
escaped
,
was
put
in
feare
that
offending
again
,
the
same
punishment
might
light
upon
himself
,
and
therefore
would
no
more
offend
.
A
Battel
or
great
action
in
Armes
ought
not
to
be
enterprised
without
special
Commission
or
Command
from
the
Prince
,
otherwise
the
General
incurs
great
danger
,
Example
▪
Papyrius
the
Dictator
punisht
the
General
of
the
horse
in
the
Roman
Army
,
for
having
fought
without
his
consent
,
although
he
had
in
battaile
slain
20000
Enemies
without
loss
of
200
of
his
own
,
and
Caesar
commended
his
Captain
Silanus
for
having
refrained
to
fight
,
though
with
great
advantage
he
might
.
Also
Count
Egmont
hazarded
the
favor
of
the
King
his
Master
for
giving
battel
to
Marshall
de
Thermes
,
albeit
he
were
victorious
:
for
upon
the
success
of
that
action
the
loss
or
or
safety
of
all
the
Low
Countries
depended
.
To
govern
without
Council
is
not
only
dangerous
in
Aristocracies
and
Popular
States
,
but
unto
independent
Princes
an
occas●on
of
utter
ruine
.
Example
,
Hieron
the
first
King
of
Sicile
in
all
his
proceedings
used
the
advice
of
Counsels
,
and
lived
fifty
years
prosperously
in
Peace
,
but
his
grandchild
succeding
,
refusing
all
Counsell
lost
his
Kingdom
,
and
was
with
all
his
Kinsfolk
and
Friends
cruelly
slain
.
In
all
Monarchies
the
Senate
or
privyCouncil
is
or
ought
to
be
composed
of
persons
of
great
dignity
,
or
men
of
approved
wisdom
and
understanding
.
Example
,
In
Polonia
no
man
is
Counsellor
unless
he
be
a
Palatine
,
a
Bishop
,
a
C●st●llan
,
a
Captain
,
or
such
a
one
as
hath
bin
Ambassador
▪
and
in
Turky
the
title
of
Counsellor
is
not
given
but
only
to
the
four
Bassaes
.
the
two
Cad●lesquir●s
,
the
twelve
Beglerbegs
,
and
Kings
son
,
who
in
his
Fathers
absence
,
is
as
it
were●
a
president
of
the
Divano
or
Senate
.
Many
Princes
Ancient
and
Modern
have
used
to
select
out
of
their
Council
,
two
or
three
or
four
at
most
to
whom
only
they
did
impart
their
affairs
.
Example
,
The
Emperor
Augustus
had
Maec●nas
and
Agrippa
,
Julius
Caesar
,
Q
●aedius
and
Cor.
Balbus
,
whom
he
only
trusted
with
his
Cipher
and
secrets
,
being
Counsellors
of
the
Cabinet
(
as
we
now
call
them
.
)
The
alteration
of
old
Laws
or
introduction
of
new
,
are
in
all
States
very
dangerous
,
notwithstanding
any
appearance
of
profit
or
publick
utility
,
which
moved
wise
Governors
to
decree
,
that
ancient
Lawes
once
established
might
never
be
called
in
question
.
Example
,
The
Athenians
decreed
that
no
Law
should
be
propounded
to
the
people
without
the
consent
of
the
Senate
:
the
like
use
is
observed
in
Venice
where
no
Petition
is
prefered
to
the
Senate
but
by
advice
of
the
Sages
;
and
among
the
Locrians
the
Custom
was
that
whosoever
presented
any
new
Law
to
be
confirmed
,
should
come
with
a
halter
about
his
Neck
,
and
be
therewith
hanged
if
his
request
were
rejected
;
also
Lycurgus
to
prevent
the
alteration
of
his
Lawes
,
did
sweare
the
people
of
Sparta
to
observe
them
untill
his
return
,
and
thereupon
retired
himself
into
voluntary
exile
,
with
intent
never
to
returne
.
When
necessity
or
good
reason
moves
Innovation
or
Abolition
of
Laws
,
a
course
more
secure
it
is
to
do
it
rather
by
degrees
then
suddenly
.
Example
,
The
Romans
finding
the
Laws
of
the
twelve
Tables
unprofitable
,
suffered
them
to
be
observed
or
neglected
at
discretion
,
but
would
not
publickly
suppress
them
for
fear
of
calling
other
Laws
into
contempt
:
so
did
they
continue
700
years
,
and
were
then
cassed
by
Ebutius
the
Tribune
.
But
Agis
King
of
Lacedemon
desirous
to
revive
the
Laws
of
Lycurgus
,
long
discontinued
,
enforced
all
men
to
bring
in
their
evidence
and
writings
to
be
cancelled
,
to
the
end
a
new
partition
of
Lands
and
Goods
might
be
made
,
which
suddain
and
violent
proceeding
proved
so
fatal
,
that
it
moved
a
dangerous
sedition
,
wherein
he
was
deposed
and
with
his
Mother
and
Friends
put
to
death
;
which
Example
haply
moved
the
Venetians
not
to
attempt
any
thing
against
the
Authority
of
Augustino
Barberino
their
Duke
:
but
after
his
death
,
and
before
the
Election
of
Lovedono
,
the
Signiory
publisht
new
Ordinances
detractive
from
the
Ducal
Anthority
.
Whoso
hath
won
to
himself
so
great
Love
and
Affection
,
as
thereby
to
become
master
of
the
forces
,
and
at
his
pleasure
commands
the
Subjects
apt
for
Armes
,
may
also
without
right
or
title
assure
himself
of
the
whole
Estate
.
Example
,
Hugh
Capat
a
Subject
to
the
Crown
of
France
,
being
greatly
honored
by
the
Soldiers
,
found
means
thereby
to
prevent
Charles
Duke
of
Lorraine
of
the
Crown
,
being
right
heire
by
descent
from
Charlemaine
.
And
albeit
the
Families
of
the
Paleologi
,
Ebrami
and
Turcani
be
of
the
blood
Royall
and
Right
Heires
to
the
Turkish
Empire
,
when
the
Ottaman
Line
shall
faile
;
yet
it
is
like
that
the
cheif
Bassa
having
the
love
of
the
Janisaries
will
usurpe
the
State
,
because
the
Paleologi
and
other
Competitors
be
far
from
the
Turks
person
,
poor
and
without
means
to
purchase
the
Soldiers
favor
.
A
Commander
General
in
Armes
,
ought
upon
paine
of
great
punishment
be
enjoyned
,
not
to
imploy
or
retain
any
forces
longer
then
the
time
of
his
Commission
.
Example
,
The
Dictators
of
Rome
were
in
this
point
so
precise
,
as
never
any
of
them
dared
to
transgress
the
time
prefixed
,
till
Caesar
obtained
that
dignity
should
continue
in
him
for
life
:
which
was
the
cause
of
his
usurpation
of
the
State
.
Also
the
Thebans
commanded
,
that
if
the
General
of
their
Army
did
hold
his
forces
one
day
longer
then
the
time
prefixt
,
he
should
thereby
incur
danger
of
death
:
which
Justice
was
executed
upon
Epaminondas
and
Pelopidas
.
Banishment
of
great
Lords
,
or
Citizens
of
great
Reputation
,
hath
bin
in
divers
places
diversly
used
:
for
in
the
one
,
they
were
inforced
only
to
absent
themselves
without
further
infliction
;
in
the
other
,
Banishment
was
accompanied
with
Confiscation
,
a
course
of
great
danger
.
Example
,
In
Argos
,
Athens
,
Ephesus
,
and
other
Cities
of
Greece
,
the
Citizens
puissant
in
Friends
,
Vertue
or
Riches
,
were
many
times
banisht
for
envy
or
feare
,
but
never
or
very
rarely
forced
to
absent
themselves
longer
then
Ten
years
;
and
that
without
loss
of
goods
,
which
was
the
cause
that
never
any
of
them
Warred
against
the
Country
:
but
Dion
being
banisht
Syracusa
by
Dyonysius
Junior
,
and
Coriolanus
from
Rome
,
did
make
mighty
Wars
against
their
own
Country
.
The
like
was
done
by
the
Medici
in
Florence
.
Honorable
and
Magnanimous
men
were
wont
,
not
only
to
enterprise
great
Acts
,
but
also
to
suffer
patiently
al
injuries
which
Foes
or
Fortune
could
expose
them
to
:
as
resolved
,
that
no
Calamity
was
so
great
as
to
make
their
minds
abject
,
or
to
forget
the
dignity
appertaing
to
persons
vertuous
:
Example
.
After
the
defeat
of
the
R●man
Army
upon
the
River
A●●ia
,
the
Galli
persued
the
Victory
even
to
Romes
Walls
:
whither
being
come
,
and
finding
the
gates
open
,
without
any
signe
of
resistance
they
entred
the
Streets
,
where
all
honorable
Palaces
were
also
unshut
,
which
caused
the
Galli
greatly
to
doubt
.
Nevertheless
looking
into
the
houses
,
they
found
in
every
of
them
a
Senator
set
in
a
Chaire
of
State
,
and
in
his
hand
a
Rod
of
Ivory
;
his
person
was
also
vested
with
Robes
of
dignity
,
which
Majestick
spectacle
did
marvelously
amate
the
Galli
not
having
before
that
time
seen
any
such
Reverend
sight
;
and
therefore
did
not
only
refrain
to
offer
violence
,
but
highly
admired
the
Roman
Courage
,
cheifly
in
that
Fortune
.
Nevertheless
at
length
a
rude
Gall
hapned
with
his
hand
to
touch
the
white
beard
of
M.
Papyrius
,
whereat
he
taking
great
disdain
struk
him
with
his
Rod
,
in
requitall
whereof
the
Barbarian
slew
Papyrius
,
and
by
that
example
all
the
other
Senators
and
persons
of
dignity
were
also
slain
.
Albeit
the
knowledge
and
study
of
Letters
be
both
commendable
and
necessary
in
all
well
regulated
States
;
yet
if
under
so
honest
pretence
,
idleness
enter
,
such
abuses
must
seasonably
be
foreseen
and
removed
.
Example
,
When
Diogenes
and
Carneades
two
excellent
Philosophers
,
were
sent
Ambassadors
from
Athens
to
the
Romans
,
many
of
the
Nobility
that
before
disposed
themselves
to
Arms
,
allured
with
their
Eloquence
and
marvellous
wisdom
,
began
with
great
admiration
to
follow
them
:
and
in
lieu
of
Armes
,
turned
their
endeavors
to
the
studie
of
Letters
,
which
the
wise
Cato
discerning
,
procured
the
Senate
to
decree
that
(
to
eschew
all
inconveniences
which
so
honest
idleness
might
breed
)
no
philosophers
should
from
thenceforth
be
received
into
Rome
.
The
Honor
due
to
Magistrates
was
anciently
much
regarded
,
and
contrarywise
all
irreverent
and
undutifull
behavior
with
great
severity
punisht
.
Example
,
The
Censors
of
Rome
degraded
a
Citizen
only
for
having
yawned
loud
in
their
presence
:
and
another
called
Vectius
was
slain
in
the
field
for
not
doing
due
reverence
to
a
Tribune
when
he
past
by
him
It
is
also
observed
,
that
the
son
of
Fab.
Maximus
when
he
was
Censor
,
meeting
his
Father
on
horseback
,
and
seeing
the
Serjeants
affraid
to
speak
to
him
to
dismount
,
did
himself
command
him
so
to
do
,
which
Command
the
Father
cheerfully
and
willingly
obeyed
,
saying
,
Domestick
power
must
give
place
to
Publick
Authority
.
Tyrannous
Princes
having
incurred
the
universal
hate
of
people
,
found
no
meanes
so
meet
to
preserve
them
from
Popular
fury
,
as
to
execute
or
deliver
into
their
hands
their
own
cheef
Minions
and
intimate
Counsellors
.
Example
,
Tiberius
delivered
to
the
People
his
favorite
Seianus
:
Nero
,
Tig●llinus
.
Henry
King
of
Swede
committed
to
their
fury
his
best
beloved
servant
George
Preston
;
Caracaella
caused
all
his
flatterers
to
be
slain
that
had
perswaded
him
to
kill
his
brother●
The
like
was
done
by
Caligula
,
whereby
he
escaped
himself
.
A
Prince
that
rewards
or
pardons
a
person
that
kills
another
Prince
,
albeit
by
that
means
he
is
aspired
to
Soveraignty
,
shall
thereby
both
incur
great
danger
and
hate
,
and
encourage
men
therein
to
attempt
the
like
against
himself
Therefore
wise
Princes
have
not
only
left
such
services
quite
unrecompenced
,
but
also
most
severely
punished
them
.
Example
.
The
Emperor
Severus
put
all
those
to
death
that
consented
to
the
murder
of
Pertinax
;
and
Alexander
the
great
executed
him
that
slew
Darius
,
as
abhorring
that
Subject
that
would
lay
violent
hands
on
his
Prince
,
notwithstanding
he
were
an
enemy
.
Likewise
Uitellius
put
to
death
all
the
Murderers
and
conspirators
against
Galba
;
and
Domitian
executed
his
Secretary
Epaphroditus
for
the
Murder
of
Nero
,
although
he
instantly
desired
his
aid
.
The
vertuous
and
vitious
examples
of
Princes
incite
Subjects
to
imitate
the
same
Qualities
;
which
rule
never
or
very
rarely
fails
.
Example
,
Francis
the
First
King
of
France
,
and
other
Princes
in
divers
ages
and
places
,
had
great
esteem
of
Learned
Men
;
and
forthwith
all
the
Princes
,
Nobles
,
Nobility
,
and
Clergy
,
disposed
themselves
so
earnestly
to
study
,
as
before
that
time
had
not
been
seen
so
many
and
so
great
a
number
of
Learned
Men
,
as
well
in
Tongues
as
Sciences
.
Contrariwise
,
Alexander
the
Great
,
otherwise
a
Prince
of
great
vertue
,
by
his
immoderate
use
of
drinking
,
did
draw
the
greatest
number
of
his
Court
and
people
also
to
delight
in
drunkenness
.
The
like
effect
followed
the
excessive
intemperance
of
Mithridates
,
King
of
Amasia
.
The
last
and
not
the
least
considerable
,
is
to
observe
how
great
effects
Devotion
and
Contempt
of
Humane
glory
worketh
in
the
mindes
not
onely
of
private
persons
,
but
of
Kings
and
Princes
also
,
who
have
oft
abandoned
worldly
Profit
,
Honor
,
and
Pleasure
,
to
embrace
the
contemplative
retired
life
.
Example
,
Rami●us
King
of
Aragon
,
Verecundus
King
of
Spain
,
Charlemain
Son
of
Carolus
Martellus
,
Matilda
Queen
of
France
,
Amurath
K.
of
Turbay
,
with
many
others
.
Imperio
Maximus
,
exemplo
Major
.
FINIS
.
Notes, typically marginal, from the original text
Notes for div A57360e-2360
*
Commissions
determine
in
presence
of
him
that
granted
them
.
Notes for div A57360e-2530
*
So
Henry
the
4
of
France
by
puting
his
Courtiers
to
boordwages
was
said
to
make
mony
with
his
Teeth
.
Notes for div A57360e-3170
*
The
author
of
the
Epistle
Dedicatory
to
the
Dutchesse
of
Suffolk
,
prefixt
to
Mr.
Latimer
sermons
,
●aith
that
Lawyer●
cove●ousness
hath
almost
devoured
England
.
Notes for div A57360e-5610
Discipline
.
Notes for div A57360e-8310
Tam
bené
quam
malé
facta
premunt
.
Mart.