THE
POLITICKS
OF
France
.
CHAP.
I.
1.
What
the
Politicks
are
.
2.
What
their
Object
,
End
,
and
Means
.
3.
The
different
sorts
of
Governments
.
4.
That
Monarchy
is
the
best
.
THE
Politicks
are
the
Art
of
Governing
States
.
The
Ancients
have
call'd
'em
a
Royal
and
a
most
Divine
Science
,
surpassing
in
excellency
,
and
superior
to
all
others
.
They
have
allow'd
them
the
same
precedence
in
practical
Learning
,
which
the
Metaphysicks
and
Theologie
,
have
among
the
Speculative
.
The
means
which
the
Politicks
prescribe
,
are
comprised
under
the
heads
of
an
exact
Observance
of
Religion
,
a
doing
Justice
in
all
cases
;
a
providing
that
the
People
be
protected
in
the
times
of
Peace
and
War
;
and
a
preserving
the
State
in
a
just
and
laudable
mediocrity
,
by
exterminating
the
extremes
of
Poverty
and
of
Riches
.
The
Politicks
have
three
principal
branches
:
Namely
,
the
three
sorts
of
regular
Governments
,
in
which
Men
live
under
the
Authority
of
Laws
.
The
First
is
Monarchy
,
in
which
one
only
Prince
doth
command
for
the
Publick
good
.
The
Second
is
Aristocracy
;
in
which
the
honestest
and
wisest
Persons
,
being
elected
out
of
all
the
Subjects
,
have
the
Direction
and
Administration
of
Publick
Affairs
.
The
Third
is
Democracy
,
in
which
all
Deliberations
and
Orders
are
held
,
and
do
pass
by
the
Agency
and
Vote
of
the
People
.
The
principal
end
to
which
a
Democracy
tendeth
,
is
Liberty
.
That
of
an
Aristocracy
,
is
Riches
and
Virtue
.
The
end
of
a
Monarchy
,
is
,
the
Glory
,
the
Virtue
,
the
Riches
,
and
the
Liberty
of
the
Country
.
A
Tyranny
,
the
most
dangerous
of
all
vicious
and
unlawful
Governments
,
stands
in
direct
opposition
unto
Monarchy
.
A
Tyrant
commandeth
meerly
for
his
own
Personal
,
not
the
Publick
Profit
:
A
King
does
the
contrary
.
Tyranny
is
destructive
to
the
Glory
,
the
Virtue
,
the
Riches
,
and
the
Liberty
of
the
People
.
An
Aristocracy
often
falls
into
an
Oligarchy
;
and
this
happens
when
a
determinate
number
of
persons
is
no
longer
chosen
out
of
the
whole
to
Govern
,
and
the
choice
is
made
of
the
Rich
and
Noble
only
;
not
generally
out
of
all
the
Citizens
.
Sometimes
there
riseth
up
Oligarchy
,
even
within
Oligarchy
;
and
this
comes
to
pass
,
when
the
Magistrates
are
chosen
of
the
Noblest
and
Richest
of
some
preferred
Families
,
not
of
all
the
rich
Gentry
.
An
Aristocracy
is
in
some
sort
an
Oligarchy
,
but
much
better
than
that
which
is
simply
such
:
Forasmuch
as
in
an
Aristocracy
,
Justice
is
administred
to
persons
of
all
ranks
,
according
to
desert
;
which
in
an
Oligarchique
State
is
not
done
.
A
well-temper'd
Aristocracy
is
of
long
duration
,
and
seldom
comes
into
the
danger
of
suffering
any
Change.
An
Oligarchy
,
on
the
contrary
,
such
as
was
the
Government
of
the
Decem-viri
,
or
Ten
,
at
Rome
,
and
of
the
Thirty
at
Athens
,
is
easily
corrupted
.
For
the
persons
who
are
in
command
,
do
frequently
usurp
a
Soveraign
Authority
.
Such
Usurpation
is
not
stiled
a
Tyranny
;
(
for
this
is
of
one
alone
)
but
strictly
a
Dynastie
;
that
is
,
a
Potentacy
or
Power
,
violently
assumed
and
retained
,
contrary
to
the
disposition
of
the
Laws
.
The
Greeks
(
whose
the
word
Dynastie
is
,
)
do
take
it
in
this
case
,
in
an
ill
sense
.
An
Aristocracy
and
an
Oligarchy
are
dissolved
,
when
some
one
among
the
Rich
,
the
Noble
,
or
the
Brave
,
does
attain
to
an
overgrown
height
.
Thus
Caesar
became
Master
of
Rome
.
The
Aristocracy
is
also
in
danger
,
when
they
that
Govern
,
come
into
contempt
with
the
multitude
,
or
are
hated
by
them
,
so
that
the
inferiors
grow
factious
,
and
mutiny
against
them
,
as
hapned
at
Rome
,
when
the
Tribunes
of
the
People
were
first
created
.
The
apprehensions
which
the
more
than
ordinary
virtue
of
some
excellent
persons
,
gave
the
People
of
Greece
,
caused
the
introducing
of
Ostracisme
among
the
Athenians
,
and
of
Petalisme
at
Syracuse
:
Punishments
,
but
glorious
for
such
as
were
condemn'd
to
them
.
A
Democracy
likewise
,
sometimes
,
turns
into
an
Oligarchy
.
And
that
is
,
when
the
dregs
of
the
ignorant
people
,
seduced
by
evil
Orators
,
(
whom
the
Greeks
call
Demagogues
,
or
,
Leaders
of
the
People
)
do
dispose
of
Affairs
tumultuously
,
with
uproar
and
violence
,
without
respect
to
Law
or
Equity
.
Thus
the
Athenians
seduced
by
their
speakers
,
did
put
to
death
Aristogenes
,
and
other
Captains
who
had
fought
in
company
with
Thrasibulus
,
and
gain'd
a
notable
Victory
upon
the
Lacedomonians
,
their
enemies
.
Obligarchies
are
the
means
sometimes
that
People
lose
their
liberty
:
and
fall
into
servitude
.
Pisistratius
became
Tyrant
of
Athens
that
way
,
and
Dionysius
of
the
Syracusians
.
There
are
as
various
Monarchies
,
Aristocracies
,
and
Democracies
,
as
there
are
different
manners
of
men
.
But
I
have
discours'd
all
this
only
cursorily
;
and
I
design
not
any
further
to
engage
my self
in
these
matters
,
my
purpose
being
to
speak
precisely
of
the
concerns
of
the
French
Monarchy
.
There
are
two
sorts
of
Monarchy
,
unto
which
all
Regal
Governments
,
of
whatever
quality
imaginable
,
are
reduced
;
whether
Elective
,
Hereditary
,
Barbarous
,
Despotical
,
or
any
other
.
The
first
of
these
is
entituled
,
The
Lacedemonian
;
in
which
the
King
hath
but
a
limited
Authority
.
The
second
Aeconomical
;
in
which
the
King
hath
a
Sovereign
and
Absolute
power
in
his
Kingdom
,
as
the
Father
of
a
Family
hath
in
his
house
.
'T
is
no
longer
a
question
,
Whether
Monarchy
be
the
best
Government
,
the
case
having
been
often
debated
by
Politicians
,
and
still
decided
for
Regality
.
And
indeed
it
is
of
greatest
Antiquity
,
least
susceptible
of
change
;
most
conform
unto
the
Government
of
GOD
himself
;
and
not
only
represents
the
Authority
which
a
Father
exerciseth
in
his
house
,
but
it
also
necessarily
occurs
in
an
Aristocracy
,
and
in
Democracy
it self
.
For
,
both
in
the
one
and
the
other
of
these
States
,
the
Sovereignty
is
entirely
one
;
so
that
no
single
person
can
possess
any
the
least
parcel
of
it
.
In
an
Aristocracy
,
no
one
of
the
Senators
is
a
Sovereign
;
but
the
whole
Senate
being
united
of
one
accord
,
is
King.
In
a
Democracy
,
no
one
of
himself
hath
power
to
make
the
least
Ordinance
;
the
People
assembled
are
the
Monarch
.
Thus
every
where
appears
an
indivisible
Sovereignty
;
so
conform
to
the
Laws
of
Nature
is
Monarchy
.
In
fine
,
it
may
be
said
,
that
there
never
was
Aristocracy
,
but
founded
upon
the
corruptions
and
ruins
of
some
Monarchy
:
moreover
,
that
Tyranny
,
it
's
direct
contrary
,
is
the
worst
of
all
Governments
.
Now
from
all
that
I
have
said
,
it
follows
by
a
necessary
consequence
,
That
the
Monarchique
State
is
better
than
any
other
.
CHAP.
II.
1.
Of
the
true
good
and
happiness
of
States
.
2.
Of
the
true
good
and
happiness
of
a
King.
3.
How
Felicity
may
be
acquired
.
THings
reckon'd
under
the
notion
of
Good
,
are
of
three
sorts
.
Corporal
,
as
Health
,
Beauty
,
Strength
,
Agility
,
and
the
like
.
External
,
which
we
commonly
call
Goods
of
Fortune
;
as
Birth
,
Riches
,
Dignities
,
Reputation
,
Friends
,
and
such
others
.
The
third
sort
are
those
of
the
Soul
:
these
are
simply
and
absolutely
good
,
that
is
,
good
of
themselves
;
and
so
they
can
be
no
other
but
virtue
alone
.
Things
accounted
good
are
no
further
such
indeed
,
than
as
they
promote
our
Felicity
,
and
bring
us
to
it
;
Corporal
and
External
things
are
not
instruments
to
effect
this
.
But
the
good
of
the
Soul
is
the
true
happiness
.
Felicity
is
not
a
simple
habit
;
otherwise
a
man
asleep
would
be
happy
:
but
it
consisteth
in
action
,
which
is
the
true
use
of
Virtue
.
The
Soul
makes
us
capable
of
living
happily
:
for
happiness
is
measured
by
virtue
▪
nor
can
we
be
counted
happy
,
but
proportionably
as
we
are
counted
good
.
The
intention
of
Political
Science
is
,
to
bring
to
pass
,
that
men
lead
their
lives
happily
;
as
I
have
observ'd
in
the
precedent
Chapter
.
'T
is
therefore
certain
,
that
it
requires
they
be
actually
virtuous
.
All
that
I
have
been
discoursing
is
of
constant
and
confesseth
truth
.
Whence
clearly
results
,
That
the
Politicks
consider
virtue
in
a
much
more
noble
manner
than
Ethicks
do
;
for
these
,
confining
themselves
to
the
forming
of
idle
speculations
,
can
produce
but
an
imperfect
felicity
,
which
the
Schools
do
call
Theoretical
.
The
Politicks
on
the
contrary
go
further
,
and
causing
us
to
exercise
virtue
,
do
give
us
a
Practical
,
that
is
,
solid
and
perfect
Felicity
.
In
fine
,
it
is
not
doubted
,
but
the
Act
is
preferrable
to
the
habit
.
Besides
,
the
Ethical
or
Moral
discourses
of
virtue
,
can
have
no
other
aim
,
but
at
most
,
the
welfare
of
particular
persons
;
which
does
not
always
produce
that
of
the
Publick
:
And
the
Politicks
,
regarding
the
welfare
of
an
whole
State
,
provide
at
once
for
that
of
each
particular
;
as
a
good
Pilot
,
in
endeavouring
the
safety
of
his
Ship
,
procures
necessarily
,
the
safety
of
all
that
are
embarqued
in
it
.
Also
,
the
care
of
the
welfare
of
particular
persons
,
seems
to
be
beneath
the
Politicks
,
except
so
far
as
it
is
necessary
for
the
publick
good
.
Yet
sometimes
particular
Men
must
of
force
suffer
for
the
Publick
Good
;
as
when
a
Malefactor
is
punished
,
and
when
some
Houses
are
pull'd
down
to
save
a
Town
from
Fire
,
and
from
Enemies
.
The
happiness
of
a
State
is
of
the
same
quality
with
that
of
particular
persons
.
For
as
we
say
,
a
Man
is
happy
when
he
hath
Strength
,
Riches
,
and
Virtue
;
in
like
manner
we
say
a
Common-wealth
is
happy
when
it
is
potent
,
rich
,
and
justly
governed
.
A
Monarch
is
,
in
reference
to
His
State
,
what
the
Soul
is
to
Man.
There
is
no
doubt
therefore
,
but
that
the
proper
Goods
of
a
King
are
those
of
the
Soul
:
and
that
he
can
possess
no
other
.
Fortune
being
beneath
a
true
Soveraign
,
and
extrinsick
to
Him
,
cannot
give
him
ought
of
that
kind
from
Gold
or
Glory
:
All
that
He
hath
doth
arise
from
His
own
Virtue
,
His
Power
,
His
Treasures
,
and
the
various
effects
of
Beneficence
which
he
holdeth
in
His
Hand
,
do
not
constitute
His
Happiness
:
as
GOD
Himself
is
not
Blessed
by
external
Blessings
,
but
only
confers
them
as
a
distribution
made
to
His
Creatures
,
and
that
He
may
cause
them
by
sensible
means
to
experiment
His
Goodness
.
The
Magnificence
of
a
Man
renders
him
considerable
,
if
his
Spirit
in
it
be
Great
and
Heroick
.
But
it
is
not
enough
to
have
spoken
of
that
which
constitutes
Felicity
,
we
must
take
some
account
of
the
means
which
conduce
unto
it
.
Nature
,
Constancy
and
Reason
,
do
contribute
to
endue
us
with
Virtue
.
The
two
former
do
enrich
the
Mind
,
and
dispose
it
to
receive
Virtue
;
then
Reason
being
cleared
by
the
light
of
Precepts
,
makes
it
spring
up
,
and
cultivates
it
.
Of
all
Precepts
,
those
of
greatest
efficacy
are
the
Political
,
which
being
indeed
Laws
,
do
command
and
oblige
Men
to
obey
,
in
a
manner
,
blindly
:
necessitating
and
constraining
us
to
live
well
,
whether
we
will
or
no.
'T
is
upon
this
ground
it
hath
been
said
,
That
there
lies
no
servitude
at
all
in
submitting
to
the
power
of
the
Law
;
and
that
it
's
the
proper
act
of
Men
truly
free
,
to
reduce
their
inclinations
,
and
subject
their
practice
to
the
same
:
Forasmuch
as
the
conforming
of
Life
and
Manners
to
the
impulses
of
Virtue
,
which
is
always
right
,
always
uncorrupt
,
is
in
truth
a
setting
our
our selves
at
full
liberty
,
and
an
enfranchisement
from
the
Empire
of
importunate
and
irregular
Passions
.
But
of
these
general
Theses
enough
.
It
is
time
at
length
to
enter
upon
the
subject
which
occasion'd
my
taking
up
the
design
of
this
present
Treatise
.
CHAP.
III.
1.
Of
the
French
Monarchy
.
2.
Of
the
Situation
and
Quality
of
France
.
3.
Of
the
Nature
of
the
French.
THE
Monarchick
Government
doth
not
more
excell
other
Governments
,
than
the
French
Monarchy
doth
all
other
Monarchies
on
Earth
.
It
is
hereditary
,
and
for
Twelve
whole
Ages
there
hath
been
seen
Reigning
from
Male
to
Male
,
upon
the
Throne
of
France
,
the
August
Posterity
of
Meroue
of
Charlemagne
,
and
of
Hugh
Capet
.
For
it
is
exactly
proved
,
that
these
three
Races
of
our
Kings
,
are
Branches
issued
out
of
the
same
Stock
.
This
very
Succession
,
so
Legitimate
as
it
hath
been
,
and
so
long
continued
,
makes
at
present
the
surest
foundation
of
the
welfare
of
the
State
;
and
carries
in
it
Splendor
,
Reputation
and
Majesty
.
Indeed
to
how
many
Ills
are
Elective
Kingdoms
exposed
?
How
many
Cabals
?
How
many
Complottings
;
and
in
truth
,
Wars
,
are
kept
on
foot
by
so
many
different
agitations
?
The
one
and
the
other
Roman
Empire
,
and
the
Kingdom
of
the
Poles
,
do
administer
sensible
proofs
of
this
Opinion
.
If
the
Spartans
heretofore
did
draw
so
great
an
advantage
from
the
Honour
they
had
to
be
commanded
by
Princes
of
the
Blood
of
Hercules
:
The
French
have
far
greater
cause
to
glory
;
since
in
the
Catalogue
of
His
Majesties
triumphant
Ancestors
,
there
may
be
counted
an
hundred
Heroes
greater
than
Hercules
himself
.
Is
there
a
Monarch
in
the
World
,
whose
just
power
is
more
absolute
,
than
that
of
our
King
?
and
by
consequent
,
is
there
a
Monarchy
comparable
to
the
French
Monarchy
?
It
is
necessary
that
the
power
of
a
good
King
be
not
confin'd
within
other
bounds
than
Reason
and
Equity
do
prescribe
:
otherwise
there
will
ever
be
division
between
Princes
and
People
,
to
the
ruin
of
them
both
.
What
a
disorder
would
it
be
in
Man
,
if
the
Eye
or
Hand
should
fail
of
following
the
impulses
of
the
Soul
?
this
disobeying
and
rebellious
Member
would
prove
dead
,
or
seized
with
a
Palsie
.
If
then
the
whole
Body
should
fall
into
an
universal
revolt
against
the
Spirit
of
Man
,
all
the
Symmetry
,
the
Order
and
oeconomy
would
be
utterly
defaced
.
Thus
the
Subjects
in
a
Monarchy
,
once
ceasing
to
yield
their
King
a
full
Obedience
,
and
the
King
ceasing
to
exercise
His
Soveraign
Authority
over
them
,
the
Political
Ligatures
are
broken
,
the
Government
is
dissolved
,
by
little
and
little
all
is
reduced
to
extream
calamities
,
and
oft-times
to
Anarchy
,
and
an
annihilation
.
Such
are
the
inconveniencies
that
occur
in
Royalties
of
the
Lacedemonian
kind
,
where
the
Prince
hath
but
a
limited
Authority
;
and
if
all
that
England
suffer'd
in
the
late
times
were
pourtray'd
here
,
it
would
be
easie
to
observe
of
what
importance
it
is
unto
the
felicity
of
a
Monarchy
,
that
the
Prince
do
in
it
command
without
restriction
.
In
fine
,
the
obedience
of
instrumental
parts
,
as
those
of
Organical
Bodies
,
and
the
Subjects
of
a
State
,
is
of
so
indispensible
a
necessity
,
that
the
common
good
and
conservation
of
that
Whole
,
which
they
compose
,
depends
upon
it
.
In
Democracies
,
even
the
most
tumultuous
and
disorderly
,
all
must
bow
under
the
Will
of
the
multitude
,
though
blind
,
ignorant
and
seduced
:
in
like
manner
,
the
parts
of
the
Bodies
of
Brutes
must
act
by
their
motions
,
though
they
be
in
rage
and
madness
.
And
the
reason
of
this
necessity
is
,
that
the
Body
and
the
Soul
,
which
is
the
form
thereof
,
are
but
one
indivisible
Whole
;
so
a
King
and
Subjects
are
together
but
one
whole
,
that
is
,
one
State.
In
fine
,
the
French
Monarchy
is
accompanied
with
all
the
mixture
that
can
be
desired
for
a
compleat
and
perfect
Government
.
The
Counsellors
of
State
do
compose
an
excellent
Oligarchy
in
it
;
The
Parliaments
,
and
other
Officers
of
Judicature
do
form
an
Aristocracy
;
The
Provosts
of
Merchants
,
the
Mayors
,
the
Consuls
,
and
the
General
Estates
do
represent
rarely
well
limited
Democracy
;
so
that
all
the
different
modes
of
governing
by
Laws
,
being
united
in
the
Monarchy
,
do
render
it
as
excellent
and
consummate
,
as
Reason
can
propose
.
The
Regality
of
France
is
therefore
of
the
Oeconomick
kind
;
in
which
the
King
hath
an
absolute
power
in
his
State
,
as
the
Father
of
a
Family
in
his
House
;
and
though
he
govern
at
His
pleasure
,
and
without
contradiction
,
it
is
always
for
the
good
of
His
Kingdom
:
even
as
the
Master
of
an
House
does
Rule
it
with
an
entire
Authority
,
and
incessantly
provides
for
the
accommodating
of
this
Family
.
There
is
nothing
Despotical
nor
Barbarous
in
France
,
as
in
the
States
of
the
Moscovites
and
Turks
.
In
short
,
our
Laws
are
Holy
and
Equitable
,
to
a
greater
degree
than
in
any
Common-wealth
that
ever
was
;
and
they
are
conceived
with
so
much
prudence
and
judgement
,
that
they
are
apt
to
make
the
People
happy
in
the
gentle
times
of
Peace
,
and
enable
them
to
triumph
in
the
occasions
of
War.
The
Situation
and
Compactness
of
France
are
known
to
all
the
World
;
so
that
it
would
be
a
needless
labour
,
should
I
here
expatiate
,
to
shew
the
Beauty
and
Richness
of
our
Grounds
and
of
our
Rivers
:
or
declare
how
we
abound
in
Wine
,
in
Corn
,
in
Silk
,
in
Wools
,
in
Cloth
,
in
Wood
,
in
Cattle
,
in
Salt
,
in
Mines
,
and
in
Money
;
how
necessary
we
are
to
our
neighbours
;
and
to
what
degree
we
may
forego
their
Succors
and
their
Merchandise
.
I
might
justly
be
accus'd
of
a
fondness
for
superfluous
Discourse
,
if
I
should
particularly
consider
all
these
great
advantages
;
and
as
much
,
if
I
should
speak
of
the
pureness
of
the
Air
,
and
the
incredible
number
of
Inhabitants
:
the
most
ignorant
having
a
full
and
an
assured
knowledge
of
'
em
.
I
shall
only
say
,
that
it
need
not
be
wondred
at
,
if
Men
whom
Fortune
brings
forth
,
and
breeds
up
in
so
excellent
a
Climate
,
be
capable
of
handsomly
contriving
,
and
successfully
executing
the
haughtiest
Enterprizes
.
In
fine
,
it
s
an
unspeakable
satisfaction
to
a
Man
that
sets
himself
to
Treat
of
the
Politicks
of
France
,
that
he
may
know
the
French
,
of
all
the
People
upon
Earth
,
are
the
most
susceptible
of
Learning
,
of
Policy
,
and
of
Government
.
For
if
one
consider
the
Situation
of
the
Country
,
he
may
be
assured
,
that
the
Constellations
of
Heaven
are
eminently
favourable
to
it
.
The
Experience
and
Skill
of
the
Ancients
do
inform
us
,
that
the
Situation
of
Regions
is
the
prime
cause
of
the
temperature
of
the
Men
in
'em
;
as
it
is
of
the
quality
of
the
Plants
and
Fruits
which
they
produce
.
The
Laws
of
this
State
being
so
Judicious
as
they
are
,
do
argue
the
Wisdom
of
those
that
enacted
them
;
and
of
the
People
that
accepted
them
;
whereof
the
long
duration
of
the
Monarchy
is
a
second
proof
.
On
the
other
hand
,
the
great
Acts
of
the
French
do
speak
their
Valour
.
They
serve
in
our
Age
,
for
examples
to
all
Nations
in
matter
of
execution
;
and
not
only
so
,
but
are
as
eminent
likewise
for
their
Counsels
:
And
they
have
choice
of
the
best
Generals
on
Earth
to
lead
Armies
,
as
well
as
of
the
best
Soldiers
.
That
heat
and
impetuosity
which
is
taken
to
be
visible
in
all
their
attempts
,
is
an
effect
of
their
high
Courage
;
and
the
confidence
they
shew
,
with
somewhat
less
of
restraint
and
respect
than
prudence
could
wish
,
can
be
imputed
to
nothing
but
their
fearlesness
:
In
fine
,
the
Emperor
Charles
the
Fifth
,
declared
with
very
much
judgment
,
That
the
French
seem'd
to
be
Fools
,
but
were
really
wise
.
Now
,
since
we
know
what
France
is
,
let
us
examine
what
may
most
conduce
to
the
well-governing
of
it
,
to
the
conserving
it
in
Plenty
,
and
in
Reputation
;
in
what
it
may
be
augmented
,
and
how
its
interests
with
the
neighboring
States
ought
to
be
secured
.
In
a
word
,
let
us
see
what
way
may
be
taken
to
maintain
the
parts
that
compose
it
,
in
so
regular
an
harmony
,
that
they
may
all
incessantly
contribute
to
the
weal
of
the
Monarchy
.
CHAP.
IV.
1.
Of
the
Clergy
.
2.
Vseful
means
to
obstruct
Frauds
in
Beneficiary
cases
.
3.
Of
the
Monastick
Religious
of
each
Seu.
OUr
Ancestors
have
ever
been
great
observers
of
Religion
.
Long
before
the
coming
of
JESUS
CHRIST
,
the
Druids
were
their
Priests
,
and
had
an
entire
direction
,
not
only
of
affairs
relating
to
the
service
of
their
false
Gods
,
but
of
those
too
which
concern'd
distributive
Justice
;
even
in
the
general
Assemblies
held
by
all
the
Gauls
,
whether
for
confirmation
of
Peace
,
or
for
reconciliation
of
disagreeing
parties
,
who
might
embroil
the
Republiques
,
or
whether
the
making
of
some
common
National
enterprises
was
in
question
,
still
there
was
no
resolution
formed
,
but
by
their
advice
.
No
wonder
then
,
if
since
the
Truth
of
the
Gospel
appeared
,
and
made
known
the
holiness
of
Christianity
,
the
Prelates
have
conserv'd
so
many
Prerogatives
and
Considerations
.
They
have
been
called
to
the
Royal
Counsels
;
they
have
assisted
at
the
decision
of
the
most
important
affairs
,
they
have
every
where
hold
the
first
rank
;
much
hath
been
attributed
to
their
Judgments
,
and
the
respect
had
for
their
Character
and
Dignity
,
hath
gotten
them
great
and
signal
priviledges
,
which
have
exempted
them
from
contributing
to
the
burthens
of
the
State
;
though
at
the
same
time
wealth
was
heap'd
upon
them
by
Alms
and
Foundations
.
But
as
Church-men
,
after
the
mode
of
the
Court
of
Rome
,
use
to
convert
whatever
is
freely
granted
them
into
a
point
of
Religion
;
in
such
manner
,
that
by
little
and
little
,
they
engage
the
tender
Consciences
of
the
faithful
in
vain
scruples
,
and
possesses
them
with
a
superstitious
fear
of
offending
;
they
have
not
been
wanting
to
assert
and
maintain
,
that
these
exemptions
and
privileges
were
not
liberally
given
them
;
that
Kings
did
but
settle
them
in
possession
of
an
advantage
which
was
by
Divine
Right
inseperable
from
their
Profession
:
that
they
,
while
Men
of
War
fought
for
the
Glory
and
Liberty
of
their
Country
,
sufficiently
did
their
part
,
in
lifting
up
,
as
as
was
anciently
done
,
their
eyes
and
hands
to
GOD
,
to
impetrate
His
powerful
Protection
:
that
their
Arms
were
Prayers
,
Oblations
,
and
Penitence
,
which
they
never
forbore
to
use
for
the
publick
safety
;
that
from
the
Caves
and
Deserts
whither
they
retired
,
they
sent
up
Meterials
to
the
highest
Heavens
,
which
formed
into
Thunder
there
,
might
fall
back
upon
,
and
beat
down
the
enemies
of
the
French
name
.
In
fine
,
That
if
Gentlemen
gave
their
blood
,
and
the
People
their
sweat
and
labours
for
the
welfare
of
the
Kingdom
,
they
Day
and
Night
did
pour
out
Tears
at
the
feet
of
Altars
to
disarm
the
wrath
of
GOD.
Upon
such
reasonings
as
these
the
Ecclesiasticks
have
founded
their
pretences
for
possessing
those
goods
,
of
which
,
publick
and
private
Piety
had
made
them
Proprietors
,
without
concerning
themselves
for
what
success
the
general
affairs
of
the
State
might
have
.
But
this
is
not
all
,
they
have
tried
by
divers
reiterated
attempts
,
to
make
themselves
Masters
of
all
the
Temporal
Jurisdiction
,
and
draw
Civil
causes
unto
their
Tribunal
:
nor
have
they
forgotten
any
pretext
which
they
thought
might
promote
this
dangerous
enterprise
;
sometimes
they
have
pleaded
,
That
the
Church
alone
having
right
to
judge
of
the
Validity
of
Marriages
,
as
being
▪
a
Sacrament
,
all
that
depended
on
'em
ought
to
be
handled
before
Ecclesiastick
Judges
.
Sometimes
again
,
That
Christians
binding
themselves
in
their
Contracts
by
an
Oath
,
the
cognisance
appertain'd
to
them
.
Such
Kings
as
perceived
that
these
attempts
did
tend
to
the
overthrow
of
their
Authority
,
withstood
them
with
a
right
Kingly
vigour
.
But
what
difficulties
were
there
not
of
necessity
to
be
overcome
for
a
full
attainment
of
their
end
?
and
what
resistance
did
not
the
Church-men
make
to
maintain
themselves
in
so
unreasonable
an
Usurpation
?
Our
History
affords
us
examples
of
it
,
which
I
cannot
call
to
mind
without
grief
and
wonder
.
Their
obstinacy
hath
gone
so
very
far
,
that
they
have
forced
our
Kings
to
grant
them
Declarations
upon
unequitable
and
disadvantageous
conditions
;
and
so
capitulate
with
them
both
for
the
Tenths
and
Acknowledgments
of
the
Lands
which
they
possess
;
as
also
for
the
Rights
of
Mortmain
and
Indemnity
.
I
cannot
tell
by
what
name
I
should
call
these
proceedings
.
Our
Sirs
of
the
Clergy
could
not
doubt
,
but
that
being
born
Subjects
of
the
Crown
,
nothing
could
release
them
of
this
duty
;
and
that
the
privileges
which
they
have
,
or
rather
which
they
have
invaded
,
being
founded
upon
the
holiness
of
their
Character
,
could
not
extend
to
these
Temporal
Goods
,
which
always
are
the
States
.
Yet
the
old
error
is
so
potent
,
and
their
imagination
so
strongly
prepossess'd
for
these
Immunities
,
that
they
can
scarce
acknowledge
the
Kings
Sovereignty
to
this
day
.
What
clamour
did
they
not
raise
about
the
Arrest
of
the
last
Commission
of
Oyer
in
Auvergne
?
with
what
fervour
did
they
charge
their
Deputies
to
remonstrate
to
His
Majesty
concerning
it
?
Yet
this
Arrest
innovateth
nothing
;
but
is
,
in
all
respects
,
conform
to
the
prescript
,
and
pursuant
to
the
use
of
Charles
the
VIII
.
his
Pragmatique
Sanction
,
Kings
and
Emperors
,
never
practis'd
otherwise
in
such
cases
.
Nor
can
it
be
deny'd
,
but
that
Religion
coming
,
among
others
,
under
a
Political
consideration
;
and
Kings
being
Protectors
of
the
Church
,
of
its
Doctrine
,
and
of
its
Canons
,
it
's
a
part
of
their
Office
to
notifie
to
men
the
Laws
of
GOD.
The
Tables
were
consigned
to
the
hands
of
Moses
,
not
to
the
hands
of
Aaron
;
and
in
the
Temple
of
GOD
,
the
Law
of
GOD
was
often
heard
by
the
People
,
from
the
Mouth
of
their
Kings
.
'T
is
upon
this
account
that
Melchisedec
was
both
King
and
Priest
;
and
't
is
from
this
intention
that
the
Emperors
confirmed
the
first
Synods
,
that
They
sometimes
gave
judgments
contrary
to
Sydonical
decisions
;
and
that
other
Christian
Princes
have
had
liberty
to
receive
,
or
not
receive
Councils
,
though
Legitimate
and
Universal
.
Nothing
is
more
consentaneous
to
perfect
equity
,
than
that
the
Gentlemen
of
the
Clergy
be
obliged
to
contribute
to
the
publick
charges
:
They
receive
vast
sums
from
the
State
;
and
what
they
pay
to
the
King
out
of
'em
,
amouts
not
to
a
sixth
part
of
what
they
duly
ought
to
pay
.
But
to
reduce
them
gently
to
reason
,
approaches
must
be
made
by
degrees
;
and
in
ways
that
may
be
to
them
unperceivable
.
First
,
they
may
be
calmly
told
of
the
right
of
Mortmain
,
which
being
part
of
the
ancient
inheritance
of
the
Crown
cannot
be
alienated
.
They
may
ever
and
anon
be
put
in
mind
,
that
Residence
is
of
Divine
Right
;
that
it
is
unbecoming
a
Prelate
,
or
an
Ecclesiastick
,
to
keep
a
great
Table
,
to
have
a
multitude
of
Pages
,
Horses
,
Dogs
;
intimation
may
be
made
them
,
that
the
King
intends
to
restore
the
ancient
Law
of
Fiefs
;
by
which
all
sorts
of
persons
concerned
,
are
obliged
to
set
forth
,
at
any
time
,
a
certain
number
of
Soldiers
,
equipped
and
paid
at
their
charge
.
In
fine
,
they
may
be
required
to
make
a
new
valuation
of
ordinary
Rents
.
For
what
pretext
will
they
have
to
complain
,
or
be
discontented
?
Can
they
find
any
fault
at
all
in
it
if
His
Majesty
doth
put
things
in
their
Primitive
State
;
which
is
the
foundation
of
all
publick
Order
and
Discipline
?
Other
insinuative
means
may
be
set
on
work
,
which
shall
make
no
shew
at
first
,
yet
may
prove
in
the
sequel
,
of
incredible
advantage
to
the
King's
Affairs
.
While
I
speak
here
of
the
Clergy
,
I
pretend
not
to
speak
of
any
but
Bishops
,
Canons
,
Parish-Priests
,
and
Chappellans
.
I
know
well
,
that
taking
the
word
Clerus
in
its
ancient
latitude
,
it
may
be
said
to
comprehend
all
Christians
:
but
I
extend
it
not
so
much
as
to
Monasticks
,
who
in
truth
were
,
at
their
rise
,
so
far
from
having
particular
and
conventual
Churches
,
as
now
they
have
,
that
they
were
reckoned
Laicks
,
that
is
,
of
the
People
,
and
had
their
places
separate
from
the
Priests
.
Whatever
care
Kings
hitherto
could
possibly
take
to
hinder
frauds
in
Beneficiary
matters
,
they
have
not
been
able
to
find
means
effectual
for
it
:
Their
prudence
hath
been
still
surmounted
by
the
pravity
of
men
,
which
never
wanteh
artifice
and
expedients
in
occasions
that
concern
their
profit
.
However
,
these
frauds
are
of
such
a
quality
,
and
so
important
,
in
reference
to
the
salvation
of
all
Christians
,
that
the
charitable
sagacity
of
the
Laws
ought
to
be
indefatigably
exercised
about
them
:
neither
Pains
nor
Authority
should
be
spared
,
in
a
design
whose
accomplishment
is
so
necessary
.
And
indeed
,
what
mischief
doth
not
follow
;
for
example
,
when
a
wicked
man
,
by
intrusion
,
gets
possession
of
some
Benefice
with
Cure
of
Souls
,
all
his
Sacerdotal
Functions
are
so
many
Sacriledges
;
(
for
he
is
a
suspended
person
,
ipso
facto
)
all
the
Absolutions
he
gives
are
null
;
the
Fruits
of
the
Benefice
cannot
be
his
,
because
he
is
not
the
lawful
Guardian
of
it
;
and
so
his
appropriating
them
to
his
use
,
is
a
continued
Larceny
;
for
which
he
is
indispensibly
bound
to
make
restitution
.
But
be
it
a
Bishop
that
commits
this
act
of
intrusion
;
and
all
the
Consecrations
of
Priests
which
he
shall
solemnize
are
null
,
whence
will
result
a
nullity
of
all
the
Absolutions
those
pretended
Priests
shall
give
.
What
a
concatenation
of
Crimes
?
what
a
dreadful
series
of
Evils
,
Simonies
,
Confidences
,
and
other
bad
means
which
are
used
to
finger
Benefices
,
do
tend
to
the
same
Consequences
.
Sure
,
the
cure
of
this
Malady
,
Mortal
to
so
many
thousands
of
Souls
,
is
an
atchievement
worthy
of
a
King.
I
am
of
Opinion
then
,
that
to
cut
up
the
root
of
all
these
disorders
,
the
King
might
create
a
Secretary
in
his
Council
of
Conscience
;
and
when
this
Officer
is
in
possession
of
his
charge
,
a
Declaration
of
His
Majesties
should
come
forth
;
by
which
,
to
obviate
the
great
abuses
that
have
crept
int-Beneficiary
matters
,
it
should
be
ordained
that
all
the
Benefices
in
the
Kingdom
be
Registred
by
the
said
Secretary
of
that
Council
,
and
no
dispatch
there
made
until
the
Deeds
,
upon
which
a
Benefice
is
claimed
,
have
been
seen
and
signed
,
and
placed
in
the
Register
by
the
same
Secretary
,
upon
pain
of
the
nullity
of
all
that
may
have
been
petition'd
for
,
and
granted
;
Cognizance
of
all
causes
arising
in
consequence
of
this
Declaration
,
must
be
given
to
the
Grand
Council
,
and
this
addition
of
Jurisdiction
would
facilitate
the
verification
of
it
.
This
Declaration
would
produce
several
advantages
.
One
is
,
that
there
could
be
no
more
fraud
used
,
in
order
to
demissions
,
or
to
resignations
;
and
the
Bankers
of
the
Court
of
Rome
would
no
longer
have
means
to
promote
the
cheats
of
pretenders
to
Benefices
.
Another
is
,
that
the
King
would
exactly
know
all
that
the
Church
does
possess
in
France
;
which
is
a
matter
of
extreme
necessity
,
both
for
the
regulating
of
the
Tenths
,
and
also
for
other
considerations
.
A
third
advantage
would
be
,
that
in
process
of
time
this
Secretary
of
Conscience
might
make
a
Bank
in
the
Roman
Court
,
which
is
,
to
the
King
,
of
unspeakable
consequence
:
for
by
this
means
,
all
the
Money
that
goes
into
Italy
out
of
France
would
be
known
;
and
upon
such
knowledge
it
would
be
more
easie
for
him
to
take
his
measures
with
the
Pope
and
Colledge
of
Cardinals
.
A
fourth
advantage
is
,
that
the
King
,
by
degrees
,
might
become
Master
of
all
the
Benefices
of
the
Kingdom
,
in
the
same
manner
as
the
Pope
is
Master
of
the
Bishopricks
and
Abbies
;
which
would
augment
the
Royal
Authority
.
That
I
may
explain
my self
,
I
will
resume
the
thing
from
its
original
.
In
the
first
Age
of
Christianity
,
the
first
Bishopricks
were
conferred
without
any
Bulls
from
the
Pope
at
all
.
Afterward
He
bethought
Him
,
to
send
or
write
unto
the
Chapters
,
who
then
chose
the
Bishops
,
and
recommended
to
them
,
to
respect
the
merit
of
such
or
such
a
one
,
when
they
should
proceed
to
the
Election
.
I
think
that
Alexander
the
III.
was
the
first
Inventer
of
these
kind
of
Letters
;
and
they
were
called
Bulls
,
because
they
were
seal'd
up
with
the
Pope's
Seal
,
(
Bulla
being
Latin
for
a
Seal
.
)
At
the
beginning
,
these
Letters
which
the
Popes
thus
sent
,
were
but
simple
Letters
of
favour
and
recommendation
:
but
it
hapning
that
the
Chapters
reverenced
them
,
and
that
here
and
there
,
at
least
,
one
,
who
had
obtained
them
,
was
chosen
;
all
pretenders
to
Bishopricks
came
to
believe
,
that
it
was
necessary
to
obtain
them
.
Thus
,
what
was
at
first
but
,
as
hath
been
said
,
a
recommendation
,
became
at
length
a
point
of
right
and
duty
.
Such
was
its
Rise
.
Now
this
being
certain
,
there
may
be
use
made
of
the
example
:
and
thus
,
when
a
considerable
Benefice
should
be
vacant
,
the
King
might
order
,
that
a
Letter
be
written
to
the
Patron
,
and
some
Person
recommended
to
his
Nomination
.
There
is
no
cause
to
doubt
,
but
the
Patron
will
Nominate
whom
His
Majesty
hath
thus
recommended
;
so
that
insensibly
it
will
grow
a
Custom
,
to
take
the
King's
recommendations
,
as
otherwhile
persons
did
those
of
the
Popes
;
and
as
the
Bulls
became
at
length
necessary
for
Bishopricks
and
Abbies
,
so
the
King's
Letters
shall
become
necessary
for
all
sorts
of
Benefices
,
and
He
render
Himself
Master
of
all
Church-men
.
The
King
,
in
this
,
will
have
sufficient
reason
,
because
He
being
Protector
of
Religion
,
which
is
the
prime
Pillar
of
every
State
,
it
is
His
interest
to
know
whether
they
that
shall
be
provided
of
Benefices
,
be
Orthodox
,
and
of
good
Life
;
lest
they
spread
some
bad
Doctrine
among
the
people
;
for
Heresies
and
Scandals
do
cause
division
in
the
Common-wealth
,
as
well
as
Schisms
in
the
Church
.
Besides
,
it
concerns
the
tranquillity
of
the
State
,
that
Curates
,
who
have
the
direction
of
Consciences
,
be
well-inclin'd
for
the
good
of
the
Kingdom
,
and
ready
to
keep
particulr
Persons
in
their
duty
.
To
descend
now
unto
the
case
of
the
Monastick
Religious
,
and
find
out
a
way
(
for
rendring
them
useful
to
the
State
)
to
take
them
off
from
that
laziness
and
loathsome
beggery
in
which
they
live
,
as
also
reduce
them
to
such
a
number
as
may
be
proportionate
to
other
ranks
of
men
in
the
Kingdom
.
It
is
to
be
noted
,
that
there
are
three
sorts
of
Monasticks
.
The
first
is
made
up
of
the
Orders
of
S.
Augustin
,
S.
Benedict
,
S.
Bernard
,
and
Premonstrey
.
These
are
they
that
possess
the
bulkie
riches
of
the
Church
;
I
mean
the
Abbies
and
Priories
.
The
second
sort
comprehends
the
Carthusians
,
the
Minimes
,
the
Coelestins
,
the
Feuillans
,
and
some
others
,
who
possess
Goods
with
propriety
,
and
beg
not
but
by
Toleration
.
The
third
kind
,
is
that
of
the
meer
Mendicants
,
who
subsist
by
Alms
,
as
do
the
Jacobins
,
the
Cordeliers
,
the
Carmelites
,
and
their
branches
,
that
is
,
the
Reform'd
,
as
they
term
'em
,
who
are
issued
from
them
.
These
,
notwithstanding
their
Vow
of
Monastick
Poverty
,
yet
are
not
destitute
of
some
foundations
:
but
they
plead
for
themselves
,
that
the
Pope
is
Proprietor
of
the
Goods
,
they
do
but
take
the
Profits
;
which
certainly
is
a
vain
and
frivolous
subtilty
.
The
Female
Religious
being
comprised
under
these
three
kinds
,
there
is
no
need
to
make
of
them
a
separate
Article
.
There
are
too
to
many
Monks
.
It
s
an
abuse
so
prejudicial
to
the
Kingdom
,
that
the
King
can
no
longer
dissemble
it
:
it
is
time
to
take
it
seriously
and
effectually
in
hand
.
For
Monks
live
in
single
state
,
they
raise
no
Families
,
get
no
Children
,
and
so
are
barren
grounds
that
bring
forth
no
fruit
to
the
Crown
.
Beside
,
the
blind
obedience
by
which
they
are
tyed
to
the
pleasure
of
the
Pope
,
doth
form
a
foreign
Monarchy
in
the
very
bowels
of
France
;
and
into
it
they
train
along
the
credulous
people
,
which
is
a
thing
of
very
great
consequence
.
This
Politie
is
founded
on
the
abusive
and
pernicious
Maxims
of
Rome
;
which
too
are
purely
Political
.
For
,
that
the
obedience
which
Monasticks
give
the
Pope
,
is
Religious
,
there
is
no
colour
to
pretend
:
nor
is
there
a
Christian
but
sees
what
his
duty
binds
him
to
in
this
case
;
and
is
altogether
subject
to
his
Holiness
in
Doctrinals
,
without
need
of
making
particular
vows
to
oblige
him
.
The
name
of
Religion
in
the
matter
,
is
but
a
phantasm
,
and
a
false
pretext
which
the
Court
of
Rome
assumeth
,
to
augment
its
Temporal
Power
,
and
to
have
its
creatures
in
all
quarters
.
By
consequence
the
abuses
ought
to
be
retrenched
,
as
was
done
by
Charlemagne
in
his
time
,
and
sundry
other
great
Kings
.
But
for
the
effecting
of
this
I
should
not
at
all
advise
,
that
the
attempt
be
openly
made
.
For
that
would
be
to
draw
upon
the
undertakers
,
the
importune
clamours
of
all
the
Monks
,
and
their
Zealots
;
nay
,
to
draw
Rome
upon
their
backs
,
which
might
cost
them
some
trouble
.
In
fine
,
it
would
be
to
draw
on
them
the
People
;
who
are
ever
fond
of
Novelties
that
surprise
them
,
or
are
prejudicial
to
them
,
and
always
averse
to
those
which
they
have
foreseen
,
and
are
profitable
for
them
.
'T
is
therefore
by-ways
that
must
be
taken
.
The
first
which
seems
to
me
fit
to
be
pitcht
upon
,
would
be
,
to
require
of
the
Monastick
Communities
,
that
they
dispatch
Missions
unto
America
,
and
the
Indies
,
to
convert
the
Salvages
,
and
administer
the
Holy
Sacraments
to
Christians
.
The
Monks
,
who
are
commonly
imprudent
,
will
strain
to
set
forth
the
greatest
number
of
their
fraternity
they
possibly
may
,
in
hope
to
make
considerable
Establishments
;
thus
there
will
be
forwardness
enough
to
embarque
.
The
present
juncture
is
advantageous
for
this
design
.
For
they
are
charged
with
more
Persons
than
they
are
able
to
maintain
;
Charity
being
evidently
cooled
toward
them
.
A
second
means
may
be
,
to
debar
them
the
conversation
of
Women
.
It
is
scandalous
to
see
Religious
Men
receive
visits
from
them
in
Churches
;
and
there
,
in
presence
of
the
Holy
Sacrament
,
spend
whole
Afternoons
with
them
.
For
remedy
it
might
be
ordained
,
that
they
should
have
Parlours
,
where
Women
might
go
to
consult
them
.
The
thing
is
a
point
of
deceney
;
and
Parlours
,
the
Carthusian
Friars
,
and
all
Nuns
,
generally
have
.
The
third
means
might
be
,
that
the
Fathers
of
such
as
enter
into
Religion
,
should
pay
an
Annual
Pension
to
the
Order
,
by
way
of
Alms
,
during
their
Sons
life
;
which
is
the
practice
in
Spain
.
This
Pension
,
some
will
say
,
causeth
in
Spain
an
huge
multiplication
of
Monks
.
But
't
is
not
the
Pension
that
fills
the
Cloisters
in
that
Country
;
't
is
the
licence
the
Monks
have
to
do
what
they
please
.
In
France
they
are
not
upon
such
Terms
.
A
fourth
means
,
is
to
oblige
the
Monasticks
to
abide
in
their
Convents
,
and
not
go
abroad
but
very
rarely
,
and
for
urgent
affairs
:
so
do
the
Carthusians
.
A
fifth
,
to
embroil
the
Monks
with
the
Bishops
;
for
which
they
are
sufficiently
disposed
.
A
sixth
,
to
prohibit
that
Children
of
Sixteen
(
when
as
yet
they
know
not
what
they
do
)
bind
not
themselves
by
Vows
,
which
engage
them
for
the
whole
remainder
of
their
lives
:
but
remit
that
Ceremony
till
their
22d
.
year
of
Age.
The
seventh
means
would
be
to
suppress
that
Congregation
,
as
they
call
it
,
among
Monastick
persons
,
(
as
for
instance
,
there
are
the
Congregations
of
S.
Maur
,
)
and
command
,
that
the
Religious
who
make
profession
in
an
house
,
do
there
fix
;
not
coursing
from
Lower
Britannie
,
for
example
,
unto
Paris
;
nor
incessantly
changing
,
as
their
wont
is
,
unless
some
indispensible
necessity
does
oblige
to
such
changes
.
The
Carthusians
keep
in
their
houses
,
and
run
not
from
place
to
place
:
Nuns
do
the
same
.
The
Voyages
of
Monks
,
and
all
their
transmigrations
,
have
no
other
end
,
but
to
get
an
universal
acquaintance
.
Beyond
all
this
,
it
may
be
declared
to
the
Monks
,
(
at
least
its
a
thing
that
should
be
done
in
its
season
)
how
that
the
King
understands
not
their
Monastick
Profession
does
Exempt
them
from
his
Jurisdiction
.
Thus
the
Orders
being
purged
from
their
impurities
,
will
resume
their
ancient
Iustre
,
and
be
true
Seminaries
of
Doctrine
and
Sanctity
.
In
fine
,
no
person
will
doubt
,
but
the
King
may
take
cognisance
of
all
that
concerns
the
external
Policy
of
the
Church
;
because
this
is
in
such
sort
annexed
to
the
Government
of
States
,
that
not
a
Patriarch
,
nor
even
the
Pope
himself
,
can
make
any
regulation
of
it
without
His
Majesties
consent
.
That
reason
of
State
which
presseth
for
a
retrenching
of
the
number
of
Monks
,
does
also
reflect
upon
Nuns
;
and
that
with
the
more
Justice
,
because
the
greatest
part
of
young
Women
,
who
become
Votaries
,
are
driven
thereunto
by
the
violence
of
their
kindred
.
There
will
never
want
just
means
to
hinder
this
abuse
from
having
a
longer
course
.
As
for
instance
,
Young
Women
may
be
declared
incapable
of
making
vows
before
22
years
of
age
at
the
least
.
It
may
be
enacted
,
that
they
never
shall
be
Professed
,
[
i.
e.
setled
of
the
Order
]
in
the
Convent
where
they
have
had
their
Education
,
either
as
Pensionaries
or
Novices
.
This
would
be
well
enacted
.
For
oft-times
the
Nuns
,
in
hope
to
the
gainers
by
their
Portions
,
do
flatter
the
silly
Maidens
,
and
persuade
'em
to
live
with
them
.
All
kind
of
humane
iuducements
must
be
remov'd
,
and
the
inspirations
of
the
Holy
Ghost
,
left
to
their
full
operation
.
It
may
again
be
ordained
,
that
Recluses
do
take
no
Money
,
as
a
Portion
,
but
only
simple
Pensions
yearly
for
life
,
and
those
likewise
cautiously
limited
.
A
Law
too
may
be
made
,
that
the
Goods
which
might
fall
to
a
Daughter
from
her
Parents
,
and
her
collateral
Kindred
,
should
at
their
Decease
,
fall
to
the
State
,
and
the
King
by
representation
,
be
invested
with
the
same
Right
to
the
Goods
of
the
deceased
as
this
Daughter
had
had
,
to
recompence
the
Publick
for
the
loss
sustained
by
a
Recluse
,
being
incapacitated
to
raise
a
Family
.
Further
,
a
general
Regulation
might
▪
be
made
of
all
Marriages
of
young
Women
,
with
due
respect
had
to
the
quality
of
each
of
'em
in
particular
;
and
it
might
be
ordered
,
that
in
case
any
of
them
would
take
up
a
Religious
life
,
they
should
carry
as
much
with
them
into
Religion
,
as
into
the
Married
state
.
For
if
the
Order
was
▪
that
Daughters
becoming
Votaries
,
should
have
less
Portions
than
those
that
Married
,
Fathers
,
so
hugely
covetous
they
are
,
would
compell
them
to
the
Cloister
.
But
when
they
shall
find
no
profit
in
taking
this
course
,
they
will
rather
chuse
to
dispose
of
them
in
Marriage
,
and
make
Alliances
by
that
means
.
This
subject
inclines
me
to
say
summarily
,
that
the
moderating
of
Portions
is
a
piece
of
the
ancient
Civil
Law
of
the
French
,
and
of
divers
other
Nacions
,
in
which
Daughters
had
nothing
at
all
.
Thence
it
is
as
we
see
in
the
Customs
,
that
a
Nobleman
is
licensed
to
Marry
his
Daughter
with
a
Nosegay
of
Roses
,
and
she
becomes
disabled
to
pretend
to
any
other
Portion
,
provided
the
Match
be
suitable
and
fitting
.
This
moderation
is
necessary
:
Forasmuch
,
as
the
vast
wealth
which
is
given
to
Daughters
in
Marriage
,
does
incommode
the
richest
Houses
.
Moreover
,
Gentlemen
themselves
would
no
more
contract
undue
Alliances
;
and
so
the
Nobility
recover
their
ancient
esteem
.
Young
Womens
Birth
,
their
Beauty
,
their
Discretion
,
their
Virtue
,
and
their
Ability
in
the
management
of
Domestick
Affairs
,
would
be
to
them
instead
of
Wealth
.
They
would
make
it
their
care
to
lay
up
a
rich
Stock
of
so
many
precious
things
,
that
perhaps
it
may
one
day
come
to
pass
,
that
Men
will
,
as
heretofore
they
did
,
give
Money
to
have
Wives
;
whereas
at
present
,
Women
do
so
to
purchase
Husbands
.
I
have
spoken
here
of
Marriages
occasionally
;
I
am
well
aware
,
that
the
Matter
ought
to
be
reserved
for
another
Chapter
.
To
conclude
,
it
s
a
great
ingredient
of
the
Glory
of
a
King
,
to
honour
the
Holy
See
;
to
love
and
protect
the
Bishops
,
to
maintain
the
Gallican
Church
in
its
Liberties
;
never
suffer
that
any
propositions
be
advanced
any
way
,
that
may
wound
the
Authority
of
the
Canons
;
and
employ
all
the
rigor
of
his
Ordinances
a
gainst
persons
,
who
shall
have
the
rashness
to
publish
a
suspected
or
erroneous
Doctrine
.
Additions
to
CHAP.
IV.
1.
That
Bishops
ought
to
be
near
the
King.
2.
Of
the
Pension
to
be
paid
the
Order
for
a
Monk
enter'd
.
3.
Monasticks
cannot
Alienate
;
therefore
neither
sell
a
Rent-charge
.
4.
They
shall
not
have
power
to
purchase
.
I
Have
affirmed
Chap.
4.
That
Bishops
are
obliged
by
Command
of
GOD
,
unto
residence
.
This
is
true
:
yet
forasmuch
as
they
are
also
the
Kings
Subjects
,
and
Royal
Dignity
requireth
,
that
his
Majesty
have
Bishops
about
him
,
as
the
Roman
Emperors
after
Constantine
had
;
it
is
fit
to
ordain
,
That
each
Bishop
be
at
Court
Three
Months
every
year
,
attending
His
Majesty
,
to
Honour
Him
;
during
which
time
they
may
negotiote
their
Affairs
;
and
the
rest
of
the
year
abide
fix'd
in
their
Diocesses
;
the
King
assigning
to
each
of
them
the
Months
in
which
their
presence
will
be
needful
.
In
the
same
Chapter
,
I
have
said
,
That
to
prevent
the
vast
number
of
Monks
it
should
be
ordained
,
that
the
Parents
of
such
as
enter
into
an
Order
,
should
pay
an
annual
Pension
to
that
Order
during
the
persons
Lives
.
The
effect
of
this
Law
would
be
,
that
such
a
Pension
being
a
Monachal
Right
in
form
of
Clericature
given
by
Act
of
State
;
they
that
would
have
Revenue
enough
to
be
Monasticks
,
would
have
enough
to
be
Secular
Priests
.
And
so
persons
,
whose
Devotion
should
incline
them
to
take
Orders
,
and
Consecrate
themselves
unto
GOD
,
would
rather
chuse
to
remain
Seculars
,
than
shut
themselves
up
in
a
Cloister
all
the
remainder
of
their
Lives
.
Now
the
more
to
fortifie
this
Law
,
it
should
be
added
,
That
Bishops
make
no
more
Priests
upon
the
Title
of
Poverty
,
upon
Penalty
of
maintaining
them
:
The
reason
against
it
,
as
to
Secular
Priests
,
being
as
strong
in
reference
to
Regulars
;
because
it
is
no
less
a
disparagement
to
the
Clergy
,
that
a
Priest
Monk
do
beg
,
and
fall
into
extream
poverty
,
(
which
may
happen
)
than
that
one
of
the
other
rank
do
so
.
It
is
manifest
,
that
Monastick
communities
have
no
power
to
Alienate
any
thing
;
and
that
Monks
do
daily
re-enter
into
their
Estates
,
which
they
possessed
heretofore
.
Hence
it
follows
,
that
neither
can
they
charge
them
with
any
Rents
for
Money
taken
up
:
Forasmuch
as
by
these
kind
of
Contracts
,
they
Mortgage
their
Lands
:
but
to
engage
an
Estate
in
such
a
manner
,
is
to
make
a
kind
of
Alienation
.
'T
is
a
fetch
of
the
Benedictine
Monks
to
take
up
Money
for
Rent
to
be
paid
by
them
;
that
so
they
may
appear
always
poor
,
and
have
pretexts
to
solicite
the
liberality
of
devout
People
:
also
that
they
may
have
Protectors
,
for
the
greater
number
of
their
Creditors
is
,
the
greater
is
the
number
of
persons
interessed
in
their
conservation
.
Yet
there
is
nothing
more
unjust
than
this
Custom
:
For
there
are
Monastick
Communities
that
owe
more
than
all
their
Goods
,
moveable
and
immoveable
are
worth
.
The
Monks
care
not
though
their
House
be
ruin'd
,
nor
though
they
ruine
some
of
their
Creditors
,
provided
themselves
subsist
.
For
by
passing
from
one
Convent
to
another
,
they
are
quitted
of
all
the
Debts
they
have
created
.
It
greatly
concerns
the
Publick
to
Prohibit
these
kind
of
Contracts
,
that
Monasticks
may
be
kept
from
defrauding
any
Man
for
the
future
;
and
to
decree
,
that
the
Contractor
shall
pay
the
Rents
Contracted
for
,
and
they
bound
to
do
it
,
both
all
in
common
,
and
each
of
them
in
particular
:
then
,
that
the
Notaries
be
Fined
and
Declared
incapable
of
bearing
any
Office
:
Or
if
insolvent
,
condemned
to
the
Gallies
for
101
years
:
Moreover
,
that
the
Purchasers
of
such
Rents
shall
,
for
their
part
,
pay
a
Mulct
of
3000
Livres
to
His
Majesty
,
and
the
principal
Money
be
converted
to
His
use
.
Besides
,
it
would
be
very
fit
to
require
all
Notaries
,
all
Creditors
of
Monasticks
and
the
Monasticks
themselves
to
make
Declaration
of
the
Sums
and
Rents
charged
upon
them
,
bring
in
the
Contracts
for
the
same
before
Commissioners
nominated
by
the
King
to
be
Registred
,
and
this
within
a
time
expresly
limited
:
which
being
once
pass'd
,
no
more
shall
be
received
;
and
all
Contracts
not
Registred
,
remain
null
,
and
as
if
they
were
cleared
.
This
course
would
be
very
severe
,
but
excellent
to
reduce
the
folk
of
the
Cloister
to
Reason
.
There
is
an
important
Observation
to
be
made
too
,
namely
,
That
all
the
Contracts
which
Church
men
have
made
,
are
utterly
null
,
unless
their
Creditors
can
make
it
appear
,
that
the
Money
they
lent
did
turn
to
the
profit
of
the
Church
,
and
that
there
was
an
authentick
permission
to
make
such
Contracts
.
This
Doctrine
is
a
point
of
Law
;
for
the
Church
is
ever
a
Minor
,
and
all
that
it
possesseth
hath
come
from
the
liberality
of
particular
persons
;
without
whose
consent
,
or
at
least
the
Magistrates
,
and
such
as
are
capable
of
it
,
the
Ecclesiasticks
can
make
no
alterations
in
the
Estates
they
have
received
.
So
that
the
King
may
not
only
forbid
Contracts
for
the
future
;
but
also
Declare
those
to
be
dissolved
,
which
have
been
made
heretofore
,
and
discharge
the
Monasteries
of
them
.
Debts
have
been
annulled
for
less
reasons
often
.
It
must
likewise
be
prohibited
to
Monks
,
and
to
the
Church
,
to
purchase
any
Estate
in
Land
,
or
High-rents
,
upon
pain
of
such
Contracts
being
null
and
void
in
Law
;
and
the
Sellers
and
Notaries
incurring
the
forementioned
penalties
.
Our
Lords
the
Prelates
have
lately
bethought
them
,
and
resolved
to
compell
such
Gentlemen
as
have
Chappels
in
their
Houses
,
where
the
Sacrifice
of
the
Mass
hath
been
at
any
time
performed
,
to
profane
the
said
Chappels
,
or
endow
them
with
Land
for
the
maintenance
of
a
Priest
.
This
would
be
a
means
to
gain
the
Church
more
than
Two
hundred
thousand
Livres
of
Rent
at
one
blow
;
wherefore
it
will
be
fit
to
Ordain
,
that
this
enterprize
of
the
Bishops
do
not
take
effect
;
except
in
case
of
Chapels
built
hereafter
,
and
built
for
other
persons
.
CHAP.
V.
1.
Of
the
Hugonots
;
and
whether
it
be
for
the
good
of
the
State
to
put
them
out
of
France
.
2.
Politick
means
to
extirpate
their
Heresie
.
3.
Of
their
ancient
Confession
of
Faith.
A
King
cannot
have
a
more
Illustrious
Object
of
his
Cares
and
Application
,
than
the
preserving
of
that
Religion
which
he
hath
received
from
his
Ancestors
in
the
States
he
governs
:
because
diversity
of
Belief
of
Divine
Service
,
and
of
Ceremony
,
doth
divide
his
Subjects
,
and
breeds
Animosities
among
them
:
Whence
arise
Contentions
,
War
,
and
in
the
end
an
universal
defiance
.
Unity
of
belief
,
on
the
contrary
,
knits
Men
together
;
and
't
is
seldom
seen
,
but
that
Fellow-subjects
who
call
upon
GOD
in
one
and
the
same
Temple
,
and
offer
at
the
same
Altars
,
do
also
fight
with
the
same
Arms
,
or
under
the
same
Banners
.
If
this
Maxim
be
generally
true
in
Christian
Politicks
,
and
the
Religion
we
profess
the
only
one
,
as
it
is
,
that
we
can
savingly
embrace
,
the
Princes
are
obliged
to
maintain
it
with
all
their
Might
,
and
employ
that
Soveraign
Power
for
the
Glory
of
the
true
GOD
,
which
they
hold
of
his
Goodness
.
The
Pagans
,
whose
particular
conduct
was
so
prudent
and
just
,
and
who
have
left
us
so
many
Examples
of
wisdom
and
virtue
,
made
it
their
principle
,
not
to
suffer
in
their
Republicks
any
novelty
that
thwarted
the
common
and
popular
belief
;
and
they
adher'd
so
peremptorily
unto
it
,
that
they
would
not
so
much
as
permit
any
man
to
undeceive
them
of
their
Errors
.
The
Books
of
Numa
Pompilius
,
which
had
been
found
near
his
Grave
,
and
contained
the
ancient
Religion
of
Rome
,
the
Senate
caused
to
be
burnt
;
because
the
Praetor
Rutilius
,
who
had
been
commission'd
to
read
them
,
affirmed
upon
Oath
,
That
the
Contents
of
e'm
tended
to
subvert
the
Religion
which
the
People
observed
at
that
time
.
They
refus'd
,
even
to
open
their
eyes
unto
the
light
of
truth
,
though
known
to
them
,
when
they
apprehended
it
would
be
novel
to
the
people
.
They
rather
chose
to
stick
to
Fables
,
which
length
of
years
had
consecrated
among
them
,
and
the
multitude
was
through
custom
addicted
to
.
Thus
too
the
Athenians
thought
they
did
an
act
of
necessary
Justice
in
condemning
Socrates
to
death
,
for
having
taken
on
him
to
persuade
the
people
that
there
was
but
one
only
GOD.
They
knew
however
,
that
in
truth
this
Philosopher
was
the
Wonder
of
his
time
,
the
Honour
of
the
City
,
and
of
all
Greece
:
the
discerning
men
amongst
them
were
convinc'd
of
the
solidity
of
this
Doctrine
,
and
the
Sect
of
the
Stoicks
made
profession
of
it
;
so
that
it
must
be
confess'd
,
the
fall
of
Gentilism
,
and
subversion
of
Idols
,
is
an
effect
of
the
hand
of
GOD
,
who
alone
can
work
miracles
of
Grace
and
Omnipotence
.
The
Kings
,
His
Majesties
Predecessors
,
have
set
themselves
with
unwearied
diligence
to
preserve
the
Catholick
Religion
inviolable
:
They
have
never
failed
to
be
Protectors
of
the
Apostolick
See
,
and
the
Church
.
They
expelled
the
Arrians
;
they
turned
their
Arms
,
and
exposed
their
lives
against
the
Albigenses
;
they
vanquish'd
e'm
;
they
destroy'd
e'm
;
they
punish'd
the
Poor
men
of
Lions
:
In
fine
,
they
have
provided
that
Christianity
receive
no
harm
in
any
places
unto
which
their
Authority
extended
.
The
last
Age
produced
a
new
Monster
to
oppose
the
Church
.
France
saw
him
born
in
her
bosom
,
and
unhappily
bred
him
up
,
with
several
complices
of
his
Impiety
and
Revolt
.
History
will
tell
Posterity
how
much
Blood
was
shed
during
the
course
of
well
nigh
Fourscore
years
to
quell
this
dangerous
Sect
:
and
the
world
well
know
,
that
the
Zeal
there
was
to
reduce
Hereticks
to
their
duty
,
did
take
up
the
Reigns
of
Six
of
our
Kings
;
the
glory
of
cutting
off
the
last
head
of
this
Hydra
,
being
reserved
for
his
present
Majesty
.
But
it
is
expedient
to
see
what
weapons
must
be
used
for
an
execution
so
long
expected
.
There
is
no
cause
to
doubt
,
but
that
upon
the
Principles
of
Christianity
,
and
Maxims
of
Policy
,
its
necessary
to
reduce
all
the
Kings
Subjects
to
one
and
the
same
Belief
:
And
though
they
that
make
Profession
of
the
pretended
Reformed
Religion
,
be
now
without
Arms
,
without
Strong-holds
,
without
Treasure
,
without
an
Head
,
and
without
Allies
;
yet
they
are
not
out
of
case
to
be
feared
.
They
still
retain
a
remembrance
of
their
boldness
,
and
by-pass'd
Rebellions
:
they
look
back
on
the
Towns
they
once
seized
,
and
out
of
which
they
could
not
be
driven
but
by
force
of
Arms
,
as
if
they
were
their
proper
Inheritance
,
and
had
been
unjustly
pluck'd
out
of
their
hands
;
they
bear
in
their
hearts
the
same
aversion
for
Order
and
Discipline
,
that
they
ever
had
;
and
their
minds
are
always
inclining
to
revolt
,
and
to
Confusion
and
Anarchy
▪
It
disquiets
them
not
to
think
who
shall
head
them
;
they
have
Soldiers
of
their
own
number
,
whom
they
can
advance
to
be
Captains
by
giving
them
Authority
to
command
e'm
.
They
persuade
themselves
,
that
if
they
were
in
Arms
,
they
should
want
neither
Money
nor
Friends
.
They
believe
,
that
the
Glory
of
the
King
attracts
as
much
Envy
on
him
as
Admiration
;
and
that
his
Virtue
raiseth
in
his
Neighbours
no
less
Anger
than
Terrour
.
In
short
,
there
is
ground
to
think
,
that
he
will
have
more
than
an
Hundred
Thousand
Men
of
his
Enemies
in
the
heart
of
his
State
,
while
there
are
Huguenots
in
France
;
they
too
,
perhaps
,
do
but
wait
an
occasion
to
make
their
Musters
.
Thus
they
are
perpetual
Obstacles
to
the
Designs
that
might
be
formed
;
and
though
weak
,
may
nothwithstanding
be
dreaded
.
'T
is
true
,
the
honest
men
of
their
Communion
do
well
know
,
that
they
cannot
be
in
a
calmer
repose
than
they
now
enjoy
by
the
Grace
of
the
King
,
and
under
the
security
of
his
Edicts
▪
but
in
these
matters
the
multitude
carries
it
.
These
are
a
Torrent
,
that
by
its
Rapidity
,
overturns
Rocks
which
seems
unmoveable
.
It
will
be
said
,
that
the
good
treatment
which
the
Huguenots
receive
,
doth
preserve
the
friendship
of
the
German
Princes
for
France
;
and
if
favourable
Justice
should
be
no
longer
done
them
,
the
King
would
lose
the
most
potent
and
most
considerable
of
his
Allies
.
This
discourse
is
but
a
found
,
and
void
of
all
substance
of
reason
:
for
,
beside
that
the
Princes
of
Germany
are
not
of
the
Religion
of
our
Hereticks
;
They
need
not
the
Kings
Protection
for
maintaining
the
Huguenots
in
their
pretended
liberty
of
Conscience
:
but
the
French
Arms
securing
them
against
the
power
of
Austria
,
and
principally
of
the
Emperor
,
who
hath
divers
pretensions
upon
them
;
they
cannot
recede
from
the
Alliance
they
have
made
with
his
Majesty
;
nor
will
they
do
it
,
though
the
last
man
of
the
Huguenots
was
brought
to
the
Scaffold
:
nay
,
forasmuch
as
the
Kings
Forces
are
so
useful
to
all
those
Protestants
,
it
will
would
be
their
interest
not
at
all
to
Arm
themselves
for
the
Huguenots
preservation
,
but
far
otherwise
,
even
to
promote
their
expulsion
out
of
France
:
and
the
reason
is
,
because
if
this
party
were
in
a
condition
to
raise
stirs
,
the
King
would
have
his
hands
full
of
work
to
repress
them
:
and
so
his
Forces
being
dissipated
,
the
Emperor
might
take
his
time
to
enlarge
his
Domination
:
the
thing
that
Charles
the
Fifth
did
,
when
Francis
the
First
was
not
in
a
possibility
to
succour
the
Princes
.
It
being
therefore
certain
,
that
the
Liberty
of
Germany
hath
its
support
and
prop
in
the
Arms
of
the
King
;
they
are
not
sollicitous
there
for
the
affairs
of
the
Huguenots
in
France
:
and
since
the
Protestants
▪
of
the
Empire
are
knit
to
his
Majesty
by
other
engagements
than
those
of
Religion
,
they
will
continue
the
same
Deportment
;
and
his
Majesty
on
his
part
,
will
always
have
the
same
reasons
to
succour
them
,
though
the
time
should
come
that
he
should
have
no
more
Huguenots
in
his
Kingdom
.
No
succour
neither
may
they
hope
for
from
England
;
that
's
a
State
too
weak
to
make
any
trial
of
strength
against
France
:
all
the
English
there
are
must
pass
the
Sea
;
and
the
Isle
be
disfurnish'd
of
Soldiers
and
Provisions
;
yet
this
all
would
be
nothing
to
purpose
:
mean
time
their
affairs
would
lie
expos'd
to
the
Levity
and
Lunacy
of
the
people
.
Holland
and
Swedeland
are
of
like
consideration
;
and
they
both
have
other
Interests
to
Negotiate
with
the
King
,
than
those
of
the
Huguenots
.
Denmark
is
defective
in
power
.
The
Calvinists
mount
unto
a
strain
of
Policy
above
ordinary
,
when
they
would
have
us
believe
,
That
whatever
is
not
of
the
Roman
Communion
is
of
the
Opinion
of
Charenton
:
the
Lutherans
of
Germany
,
notwithstanding
,
sympathize
with
them
less
than
with
us
.
Thus
the
King
hath
nothing
to
be
afraid
of
from
the
pretended
Allies
of
the
Huguenots
.
Yet
these
men
,
as
I
have
already
said
,
are
to
be
feared
;
and
they
would
be
seen
stoutly
to
bestir
themselves
,
if
some
extraordinary
Commotion
should
happen
in
France
,
as
a
Civil
War
,
or
some
great
Invasion
by
Foreign
Enemies
;
in
such
a
Juncture
they
would
do
as
they
did
in
the
War
of
Paris
:
they
took
up
Arms
,
and
respectively
protested
they
were
for
the
Kings
Service
;
but
if
the
Peace
had
not
been
soon
made
,
they
would
not
have
forborn
to
think
themselves
necessary
;
and
to
make
all
the
Propositions
that
they
could
imagine
advantageous
to
their
party
.
They
would
have
re-demanded
their
places
of
Security
;
they
would
have
press'd
for
a
restoring
of
their
Temples
,
for
an
augmentation
of
their
pretended
Priviledges
,
and
for
a
free
exercise
of
their
Religion
:
and
,
according
to
their
good
old
custom
,
have
uttered
Complaints
and
Menaces
.
But
if
by
ill
chance
a
Victorious
Army
of
Strangers
,
whether
Catholicks
or
Religionaries
,
should
enter
the
Kingdom
,
the
King
must
resolve
to
see
the
Hereticks
declare
against
him
,
or
else
content
them
in
all
their
pretensions
,
which
would
prove
an
engaging
of
his
State
in
like
Calamities
,
as
our
Fathers
in
their
time
saw
.
It
ought
to
be
ordained
,
that
they
shall
exactly
follow
their
ancient
Confession
of
Faith
which
was
permitted
them
in
France
;
and
that
such
as
vary
from
it
,
shall
be
no
longer
reckon'd
in
the
number
of
those
of
the
Protestant
Reformed
Religion
,
who
have
Liberty
of
Conscience
given
them
.
These
Huguenots
have
no
ground
at
all
to
plead
the
Edict
of
Nantes
so
loudly
and
bravingly
as
they
do
:
they
extorted
it
by
violence
,
and
with
Sword
in
hand
:
yet
was
it
but
an
Interim
,
an
Order
taken
,
until
they
should
inform
themselves
of
the
truth
;
which
they
have
had
time
enough
to
do
.
But
did
they
not
violate
it
themselves
by
the
War
of
Languedock
,
that
other
of
Sevennes
;
and
again
by
that
of
Rochelle
?
nay
,
they
call'd
the
Enemies
of
the
State
unto
their
Succour
,
and
took
a
course
to
bring
Fire
and
Sword
into
all
parts
of
the
Kingdom
.
Shortly
,
in
matter
of
Government
,
that
which
is
good
at
one
time
,
is
frequently
not
so
at
another
;
all
things
must
be
accommodated
to
the
general
rule
of
Policy
,
which
is
,
that
the
good
of
States
be
incessantly
procured
.
When
the
Edict
of
Pacification
was
accorded
,
there
was
provision
made
for
the
welfare
of
France
:
if
that
welfare
does
now
require
that
the
Edict
be
revoked
,
there
is
no
remedy
,
revoked
it
must
be
,
or
neglected
.
From
all
this
which
I
have
said
it
follows
,
that
the
King
hath
most
just
cause
to
secure
himself
from
the
Professors
of
the
Protestant
Reformed
Religion
,
and
put
them
into
such
a
state
,
as
he
may
have
nothing
to
apprehend
from
their
particular
.
Perhaps
it
will
be
said
,
that
't
is
expedient
there
be
Huguenots
in
France
,
because
they
oblige
the
Church-men
to
study
,
and
to
live
with
the
greater
circumspection
,
and
a
more
exact
observance
of
the
rules
of
their
Profession
.
But
this
consideration
is
not
worth
the
considering
.
The
Church
of
GOD
will
never
be
supported
by
these
humane
means
.
He
is
in
the
midst
of
it
,
and
governs
it
Himself
by
His
Holy
Spirit
,
which
animateth
and
filleth
it
.
At
whatever
time
there
shall
be
no
more
Huguenots
in
France
,
there
will
be
fewer
bad
,
and
a
greater
number
of
good
men
;
which
the
King
should
particularly
desire
;
since
States
are
always
sustained
by
people
that
love
Virtue
,
&c.
It
passeth
therefore
for
certain
,
that
it
is
fit
the
King
do
disable
the
Religionaties
,
as
to
their
doing
any
harm
,
and
as
to
their
giving
cause
of
suspicion
.
It
remaineth
to
examine
what
way
may
most
readily
and
most
commodiously
lead
unto
this
end
.
I
would
not
advise
that
these
People
of
the
other
Religion
should
be
compell'd
to
depart
out
of
France
,
as
the
Moors
were
out
of
Spain
;
which
proved
in
the
sequel
,
so
prejudicial
to
the
whole
Country
.
'T
would
be
a
piece
of
inhumanity
to
drive
the
Huguenots
in
that
manner
:
they
are
Christians
,
though
separated
from
the
Body
of
the
Church
:
besides
,
this
course
would
deprive
the
State
of
not
a
few
good
Families
,
and
put
the
unhappy
numbers
of
e'm
out
of
all
hope
of
Conversion
and
Salvation
:
so
that
the
King
,
in
this
concern
,
should
do
well
as
seems
to
me
,
to
imitate
the
Church
,
the
common
parent
of
all
Christians
;
who
,
in
the
Remedies
She
prepareth
,
ever
mingleth
mildness
and
Mercy
,
with
Justice
,
and
Compassion
with
Correction
.
The
first
means
then
which
the
King
might
employ
,
should
be
to
provide
,
that
the
Huguenots
might
frequent
the
coversation
of
the
Catholicks
with
more
familiarity
than
they
do
.
For
by
this
coversation
they
would
,
in
time
,
be
undeceiv'd
of
the
Opinion
with
which
they
are
pre-possess'd
,
that
we
hate
them
;
they
would
put
off
the
Aversion
they
have
for
us
;
they
would
know
our
Deportment
;
and
be
informed
of
our
Doctrine
in
the
points
that
offend
them
;
because
they
understand
not
the
Mysteries
of
them
;
which
would
induce
them
to
confess
,
as
St.
Augustin
did
on
the
like
occasion
,
That
the
Church
does
not
teach
things
as
they
once
thought
it
did
.
Nothing
is
to
my
Understanding
,
or
can
be
,
more
effectual
for
the
Conversion
of
the
Hereticks
,
than
this
frequent
Conversation
;
it
is
not
possible
,
but
that
at
length
,
the
spirit
of
Men
should
yield
unto
impression
;
the
plumage
of
the
Eagle
,
't
is
said
,
consumes
that
of
other
Birds
;
Light
dissipates
Darkness
,
Truth
triumphs
over
Falshood
.
The
second
means
should
be
,
to
confer
a
recompence
of
Honour
upon
Converts
;
and
to
make
a
Stock
for
this
purpose
,
which
might
never
fail
.
I
should
think
it
would
be
none
of
the
best
course
to
exclude
the
Huguenots
from
all
Employments
;
they
must
enter
into
lesser
Offices
,
though
not
at
all
into
the
greater
.
The
reason
is
,
because
if
they
be
put
off
from
all
kind
of
publick
business
,
they
will
accustom
themselves
to
tarry
at
home
idle
,
and
their
ambition
will
be
extinguish'd
in
such
sort
,
as
perhaps
they
will
make
it
a
point
of
Religion
to
do
nothing
;
whereas
being
taken
to
ordinary
Offices
,
they
will
habituate
themselves
to
a
living
among
Catholicks
,
and
their
Ambition
will
awaken
,
when
they
shall
compare
themselves
with
their
Superiours
.
The
third
means
I
offer
is
,
to
select
some
particular
Men
,
and
create
them
such
business
referring
to
Religion
,
as
may
constrain
them
to
attend
the
Council
,
and
keep
following
the
Court.
Business
of
that
kind
may
be
started
to
Gentlemen
,
upon
the
Exercise
they
have
in
their
Houses
.
There
is
not
one
of
them
but
is
obnoxious
to
a
Process
in
that
case
;
and
the
Bishops
will
,
with
joy
,
be
the
Prosecutors
.
Besides
,
the
King's
Procureur
(
or
Attorney
)
General
is
concern'd
to
know
,
whether
Marriages
,
Baptisms
,
and
Burials
,
be
solemniz'd
with
due
accurateness
in
these
private
houses
;
and
whether
good
and
faithful
Registers
of
them
be
kept
or
no
:
Great
defects
herein
being
easily
supposeable
,
the
same
will
be
just
matter
of
complaint
against
the
Owners
,
as
negligent
in
observing
the
concession
made
them
,
of
having
Exercise
in
their
Castles
.
The
like
may
be
done
,
if
others
,
contrary
to
the
Edict
,
be
admitted
to
these
Preachings
beside
the
Domesticks
.
A
Fourth
means
would
be
,
to
oblige
the
Religionists
to
put
again
in
due
state
the
ancient
Chappels
of
their
Houses
,
which
they
have
demolish'd
or
prophan'd
;
the
pursuance
whereof
ought
to
be
by
the
diligence
of
each
Bishop
in
his
Diocess
.
There
must
not
be
made
a
common
affair
of
it
to
all
the
Huguenots
in
general
,
but
divers
particulars
only
be
fix'd
upon
.
And
the
thing
it self
is
as
reasonable
as
any
.
For
they
had
no
right
to
destroy
Temples
that
had
been
all
along
destin'd
to
Divine
Service
,
according
to
the
Religion
of
the
King
,
receiv'd
by
all
the
Kingdom
,
and
also
profess'd
by
our
Progenitors
.
The
Fifth
means
is
,
that
when
an
Affair
of
such
quality
as
I
mention'd
,
comes
before
the
Council
,
the
Deputies
which
the
Huguenots
have
at
Court
in
the
name
of
them
all
,
be
not
permitted
to
intervene
in
it
.
There
are
3
Reasons
for
the
putting
by
of
these
interventions
:
The
First
is
,
that
the
Huguenots
cannot
constitute
a
Body
in
France
,
nor
assemble
without
the
Kings
express
permission
.
The
Second
,
that
Private
and
Particular
affairs
ought
not
to
be
set
up
in
the
rank
of
those
that
are
general
and
publick
.
The
Third
,
that
the
King
will
do
Justice
without
their
intervention
.
The
Deputation
should
not
be
all
at
once
abrogated
out-right
;
but
no
regard
must
be
had
to
what
the
Deputies
represent
in
the
name
of
all
the
party
.
The
sixth
means
should
be
,
that
the
King
do
take
effectual
order
the
Huguenots
may
no
longer
have
their
dwellings
,
nor
their
Exercise
in
places
not
Royal
;
at
least
such
as
have
any
Lords
of
the
Protestant
Reformed
Religion
for
Proprietors
.
As
for
Example
,
Vitrey
in
Bretannie
,
belongs
to
Monsieur
the
Prince
de
Tarante
,
who
is
of
that
Religion
;
and
it
belongs
to
him
by
a
Demise
made
him
of
it
by
Monsieur
de
la
Tremouille
.
The
Huguenots
have
there
a
Temple
and
a
Religious
Exercise
:
this
Town
they
must
exchange
,
and
have
another
for
it
given
them
;
reasons
will
not
be
wanting
to
colour
such
permutations
:
there
is
nothing
that
may
contribute
more
to
their
Conversion
.
For
it
will
be
an
incredible
displeasure
to
them
to
live
among
people
with
whom
they
have
no
Acquaintance
,
nor
any
Union
,
either
by
Interest
or
Blood.
A
Seventh
means
is
,
to
suppress
by
natural
death
,
all
Huguenot
Counsellors
.
The
Chambers
of
the
Edict
are
now
of
no
more
use
.
The
Eighth
is
,
to
give
them
for
their
Synods
Catholick
Commissaries
;
such
as
are
somewhat
vers'd
in
the
Controversies
,
and
have
the
skill
to
favour
the
Wranglings
that
are
continually
among
them
.
These
Commissaries
were
heretofore
all
of
them
Catholicks
.
Particular
Synods
,
when
Petition'd
for
,
must
not
be
deny'd
them
;
but
National
ones
should
never
be
granted
:
and
at
the
close
of
all
their
Sydonal
Assemblies
,
Money
should
be
demanded
of
the
Ministers
for
the
King's
Affairs
,
by
way
of
Loan
or
of
Tenths
,
or
under
some
other
pretexts
.
The
Ninth
means
is
,
to
get
them
prosecuted
for
their
common
Debts
,
and
so
cause
them
to
sell
,
by
Decree
,
some
of
their
Temples
,
which
sure
cannot
be
judged
to
be
in
Mortmain
,
or
Un-alienable
.
A
Tenth
is
,
to
Prohibit
that
any
Subject
go
out
of
the
Kingdom
without
the
King's
Permission
.
For
the
Huguenots
must
not
depart
out
of
France
;
and
they
will
be
compris'd
under
a
general
Prohibition
.
The
Eleventh
is
,
to
take
order
the
Confessors
may
intimate
to
the
poorer
sort
of
Catholicks
,
that
it
is
a
point
of
Conscience
to
serve
Huguenots
.
The
Twelfth
is
,
to
oblige
them
on
a
Political
account
,
unto
an
Abstinence
from
Flesh
,
upon
those
days
which
the
Catholicks
do
so
observe
,
in
like
manner
as
they
are
already
obliged
to
heed
the
Festivals
,
out
of
respect
to
the
Publick
Religion
:
then
hereupon
,
severely
punish
such
as
shall
transgress
in
the
one
or
the
other
of
these
two
things
.
The
Thirteenth
means
is
,
to
endeavour
the
Marrying
of
Catholicks
to
the
Huguenots
,
and
cause
the
Children
issuing
from
such
Marriages
,
to
be
Educated
in
the
Roman
Religion
.
A
Fourteenth
may
be
,
to
hinder
the
Huguenots
from
selling
any
Estate
they
have
in
Land
:
for
this
kind
of
possession
does
tye
them
to
the
Interests
of
the
State.
The
Fifteenth
and
last
,
is
,
to
change
the
place
of
that
Academy
which
they
have
at
Saumur
,
and
fix
it
in
some
other
Town
,
as
Vange
,
or
Beaufort
.
There
is
a
President
for
such
a
change
in
the
Translation
of
the
like
Academy
from
Montauban
to
Pullaurens
.
The
pretext
for
drawing
them
out
of
Saumur
is
,
that
this
Town
being
a
Pass
on
the
Loire
,
and
maintaining
the
Communication
of
divers
great
Provinces
,
the
King
cannot
be
too
well
secured
of
it
:
beside
,
this
planting
an
Academy
at
Saumur
,
is
an
Usurpation
;
the
Huguenots
having
never
had
a
Patent
for
it
.
It
would
signifie
nothing
,
should
the
Huguenots
alledge
,
that
they
have
it
for
a
place
of
security
:
For
they
are
now
as
the
King
's
other
Subjects
be
,
who
do
not
at
all
demand
any
.
What
would
come
of
it
,
if
all
Collective
Bodies
should
demand
places
of
Security
?
'T
is
a
madness
.
Further
yet
,
it
might
be
declared
,
That
Proponents
,
who
aspire
to
the
Office
of
Ministers
,
should
be
obliged
to
teach
a
course
of
Philosophy
,
or
two
years
in
Theology
.
Thus
there
would
be
fewer
Ministers
than
there
are
;
and
at
length
,
their
number
being
diminished
,
the
number
of
Huguenots
would
infallibly
diminish
also
.
The
King
might
likewise
ordain
,
That
the
Proponents
should
be
examin'd
in
presence
of
such
Commissioners
as
he
should
please
to
appoint
;
to
the
end
they
might
undergo
a
rigorous
Trial.
For
His
Majesty
is
concern'd
,
that
these
Ministers
be
perfectly
well
studied
,
left
they
prove
promoters
of
Sedition
,
and
not
Pastors
.
At
the
time
of
their
Examination
,
the
same
Proponents
should
be
oblig'd
to
answer
all
the
Catholick
Doctors
in
any
controversial
questions
they
should
think
fit
to
move
.
The
Huguenots
cannot
refuse
this
Proposition
;
because
their
Proponents
ought
to
be
prepared
in
all
matters
:
and
since
the
Huguenots
affirm
,
that
their
Ministers
are
their
Bishops
,
there
must
no
person
be
a
Minister
who
hath
not
attained
to
the
Age
of
Twenty
seven
years
at
least
.
These
are
summarily
the
humane
means
that
seem
to
me
most
conducible
to
the
Conversion
of
the
Professors
of
the
Protestant
Reformed
Religion
.
CHAP.
VI.
1.
What
Nobility
is
.
2.
Of
the
Nobles
of
France
,
of
their
Degrees
,
and
the
Ranks
of
Gentlemen
.
3.
Of
the
Orders
of
Knighthood
.
4.
In
what
respects
Gentlemen
may
be
useful
to
the
King.
HAving
examined
what
relates
to
the
Clergy
,
the
First
of
the
Three
Orders
that
compose
the
Body
Politick
of
France
;
it
is
time
to
speak
of
the
Second
,
which
is
that
of
the
Nobility
:
Nobility
is
a
Quality
that
renders
the
Possessors
of
it
Generous
,
and
secretly
disly
disposeth
their
Soul
unto
an
affection
for
Honourable
things
.
The
Virtue
of
Ancestors
does
make
this
excellent
impression
of
Nobility
upon
persons
;
and
there
is
in
seminal
matter
,
I
know
not
what
spirituous
and
energetical
Principle
,
that
transmitteth
and
propagateth
the
inclinations
of
Parents
unto
their
descendants
:
as
is
obvious
to
remark
;
not
only
in
Men
,
and
in
all
the
Animals
,
which
have
a
natural
Generation
;
but
also
in
Plants
,
and
in
things
evidently
most
inanimate
.
This
Ancestral
Virtue
,
verily
,
gives
us
the
first
tincture
in
order
to
a
right
Noble
Accomplishment
;
and
every
Man
issued
from
great
and
illustrious
Bersonages
,
does
continually
feel
a
kind
of
elastick
impulse
in
the
secret
recesses
of
his
Heart
,
which
thrusts
him
on
to
imitate
them
▪
and
their
Memory
spurs
him
on
to
Glory
,
and
brave
Actions
:
but
if
through
negligence
,
or
the
degeneracy
of
an
ill
nature
,
it
so
comes
to
pass
,
that
he
answers
not
the
hope
which
the
Grandeur
of
his
Progenitors
gave
ground
to
conceive
of
his
Deportment
;
in
this
case
,
all
the
Lustre
of
their
Ancient
Reputation
which
environ'd
him
from
the
instant
of
his
Birth
,
and
whether
he
will
or
no
,
accompany'd
him
all
along
the
course
of
his
life
,
it
does
,
I
say
,
by
making
him
be
noted
,
for
(
Nobilitas
a
noscendo
dicitur
)
but
promote
his
shame
,
and
the
more
conspicuously
shew
his
defects
unto
the
augmenting
and
justifying
a
contempt
of
his
Person
.
Thus
an
actual
Virtue
is
necessary
for
Gentlemen
,
that
they
may
be
able
to
bear
up
the
weight
of
their
condition
,
which
otherwise
presseth
them
quite
down
.
The
greater
the
Rank
and
Honor
of
their
House
is
,
the
greater
their
Dishonor
;
and
so
much
the
deeper
that
Precipice
into
which
their
dissoluteness
doth
cast
them
.
There
are
usually
noted
three
kinds
of
Nobility
.
The
First
is
a
Nobleness
of
Blood
:
when
the
source
of
a
great
extraction
is
hidden
in
the
obscurity
of
a
long
succession
of
years
,
and
cannot
now
be
discovered
.
This
kind
is
in
greatest
esteem
among
Men
:
and
indeed
we
call
things
that
are
left
us
of
this
quality
,
Venerable
,
and
do
bear
a
sort
of
Religious
Respect
to
them
:
we
are
generally
possess'd
too
with
a
perswasion
,
that
whatever
is
unknown
,
is
full
full
of
Mysteries
;
hence
Objects
of
such
a
nature
are
apt
to
surprise
us
;
and
we
hereupon
are
awed
at
them
,
and
do
admire
them
.
Such
effects
,
the
greatness
of
an
unsearchable
high-descending
Pedigree
does
produce
.
Nor
need
we
much
scruple
to
affirm
,
that
this
kind
is
the
only
proper
and
genuine
Nobility
;
and
that
the
Two
others
are
only
Nobilitations
.
What
difference
is
made
between
a
person
Noble
,
and
one
Ennobled
,
is
familiarly
known
.
This
first
kind
of
Nobility
is
thought
to
require
a
possession
of
the
Virtue
of
Ancestors
,
and
withal
,
a
possession
of
their
wealth
;
this
too
in
so
essential
a
manner
,
that
if
each
of
them
be
not
joyntly
possess'd
,
the
Nobility
is
extinct
.
We
daily
see
proofs
that
evince
the
Justice
and
the
Truth
of
this
Notion
.
Be
it
intimated
by
the
way
,
that
the
Virtue
here
mention'd
is
the
Military
Art.
The
Second
kind
of
Nobility
,
is
that
which
takes
its
rise
from
Offices
and
eminent
Employments
,
unto
which
the
Laws
have
annexed
this
mark
of
Honour
.
The
Third
is
acquir'd
by
the
Prince's
Letters
,
which
are
called
Letters
of
Nobilitation
.
It
is
a
right
peculiar
to
the
Kind
to
give
such
Letters
;
as
the
Roman
Panegyrist
once
said
to
the
Emperor
Trajan
.
It
belongs
not
but
to
Caesar
to
create
a
Nobility
.
It
is
for
none
but
the
King
to
Honour
brave
aud
valiant
Subjects
with
this
Quality
.
This
Third
and
last
kind
is
least
considered
:
because
the
Person
who
acquires
it
,
hath
not
the
Virtue
of
Ancestors
for
a
foundation
and
caution
of
his
own
.
Yet
it
is
sometimes
more
considerable
than
either
of
the
two
others
;
and
Marius
in
Salust
had
great
reason
to
tell
the
Gentlemen
of
Rome
;
that
he
had
rather
begin
the
Nobility
of
his
Race
,
than
faintly
continue
it
,
or
unworthily
lose
it
;
and
that
it
was
more
Glorious
for
him
to
transmit
to
his
Posterity
a
sparkling
Virtue
,
hard
to
be
follow'd
,
than
plod
slowly
on
upon
the
slight
,
and
almost
effaced
tracks
of
a
common
Virtue
which
his
Ancestors
had
left
him
.
In
all
these
three
kinds
of
Nobility
,
there
must
be
the
personal
Virtue
of
the
Person
invested
with
'em
:
for
when
all
is
done
,
it
is
but
Virtue
that
confers
effective
worth
.
All
Nations
have
had
a
particular
esteem
for
Nobility
,
nor
can
any
well-order'd
Common-wealth
be
named
,
which
hath
not
invented
some
singular
mark
of
Honour
to
make
it
conspicuous
.
The
French
in
this
point
,
have
surpass'd
and
out-done
all
People
upon
Earth
;
as
for
the
first
,
Antiquity
,
Caesar
observes
,
that
the
Nobles
,
that
is
,
the
Gentlemen
,
had
among
the
Gauls
,
as
much
power
over
the
Plebeians
,
as
Masters
at
Rome
had
over
their
Slaves
.
After
Gaul
was
reduced
to
the
State
of
a
Province
,
Nobility
preserved
its
ancient
Prerogatives
;
and
the
Emperors
knowing
,
that
the
Nobles
loved
Glory
,
and
sought
it
above
all
things
,
stiled
them
Honorati
,
and
gave
them
an
absolute
precedency
in
all
Assemblies
of
the
Gauls
.
For
the
Romans
had
thought
it
necessary
to
weaken
the
Authority
of
the
Druids
.
In
the
time
of
Christianity
the
same
Order
was
continued
;
and
the
Nobility
gave
their
Suffrage
apart
in
the
Election
of
Bishops
,
expresly
before
the
People
;
yea
,
even
before
the
Clergy
themselves
.
Upon
the
declining
of
the
Empire
,
the
Gentlemen
did
,
in
France
,
judge
the
Causes
of
their
equals
;
and
hence
,
without
doubt
,
came
into
use
the
Parliaments
,
Courts
and
Assemblies
,
which
our
Kings
held
of
their
Peers
and
Barons
;
that
is
,
of
the
qualify'd
Gentlemen
of
their
Kingdom
,
when
a
Case
of
some
Peer
or
Grandee
of
the
State
was
to
be
Tried
.
The
Nobles
were
distinguish'd
anciently
from
Plebeians
,
by
their
Hair
,
which
they
wore
long
,
for
a
mark
of
their
ancient
Liberty
;
and
when
any
one
of
them
committed
a
fault
that
was
unbeseeming
his
Birth
,
the
rest
Sentenc'd
him
to
depart
the
Country
,
or
cut
off
his
Hair
;
This
was
therefore
a
no
less
punishment
than
Exile
.
In
Hereupon
it
was
necessary
to
put
a
gradual
difference
between
Gentlemen
themselves
:
nor
is
it
indeed
sufficient
that
they
all
have
so
many
excellent
Prerogatives
above
the
vulgar
,
or
common
sort
,
as
we
call
them
.
For
Nature
is
alike
in
every
Man
,
and
all
Men
are
Born
equal
.
Fortune
on
the
contrary
,
and
Virtue
,
distinguish
one
from
another
.
But
natural
Reason
requires
there
be
Order
in
all
things
.
'T
is
Order
that
makes
the
Beauty
and
Symmetry
of
the
Universe
.
Now
as
a
Musical
Consort
doth
not
make
a
perfect
harmony
,
but
by
a
diversity
of
Notes
;
so
a
Political
State
can
be
neither
comely
nor
compleat
,
unless
there
be
a
difference
between
the
parts
that
compose
it
.
I
know
that
Nobility
,
being
as
Philosophers
call
it
,
an
Inherent
Quality
,
does
lodge
with
its
whole
Essence
,
in
each
of
its
Subjects
:
As
the
quality
of
a
Soldier
is
,
for
its
Essence
,
in
the
person
of
a
Corporal
,
as
well
as
of
a
Captain
or
General
Officer
.
Yet
there
is
a
great
distance
,
and
many
intervening
degrees
,
between
a
General
and
the
meanest
Musquetier
in
an
Army
.
Thus
the
meanest
Gentleman
in
the
Kingdom
is
Noble
;
and
to
speak
after
the
common
Proverb
,
is
Noble
as
well
as
the
King
;
but
the
one
is
severed
from
the
other
by
an
immense
graduation
.
So
,
though
all
Gentlemen
be
equal
in
Nobility
,
yet
they
are
not
so
in
Riches
,
in
Lands
,
in
Alliance
,
in
Friends
,
in
Offices
,
in
Authority
,
in
Age
,
and
in
Reputation
.
Again
,
they
are
not
equal
in
Spirit
,
in
Knowledge
,
in
Experience
,
nor
in
Wisdom
;
therefore
it
hath
been
with
much
prudence
ordered
,
that
they
should
have
some
external
marks
of
these
differences
;
and
for
this
end
,
there
have
been
created
Princes
,
Dukes
,
Counts
,
Marquesses
,
Barons
,
Knights
,
Batchelers
,
Esquires
;
leave
hath
been
given
them
to
bear
Helmets
and
Crowns
upon
their
Armories
:
In
short
,
no
pains
have
been
spared
to
find
out
things
that
might
any
way
adorn
their
Quality
;
and
their
Valour
hath
been
publickly
rewarded
,
for
an
excitement
of
others
to
a
generous
emulation
.
Here
,
I
cannot
forbear
to
blame
those
Gentlemen
who
give
themselves
the
Title
of
Knights
,
of
Marquesses
,
or
of
Counts
,
by
their
own
private
Authority
.
This
is
a
shameful
Usurpation
;
and
so
far
from
heightening
the
Luster
of
Nobility
,
that
it
injures
them
.
For
a
Gentleman
who
takes
upon
him
the
quality
of
a
Marquess
,
and
well
knows
he
is
none
,
makes
a
perpetual
Lye
,
a
thing
directly
contrary
to
his
Honour
,
and
to
the
profession
he
makes
,
of
being
a
devoted
constant
defender
of
Truth
.
Beside
,
this
huge
number
of
Marquesses
,
Lords
and
Knights
,
does
bring
those
Qualities
into
contempt
;
and
is
a
cause
,
that
true
Marquesses
are
not
considered
now
,
as
they
of
right
ought
to
be
.
'T
is
therefore
extreamly
important
,
that
provision
be
speedily
made
in
the
case
.
For
this
confusion
destroys
the
usefulness
of
those
Dignities
,
they
being
such
as
his
Majesty
should
keep
in
his
own
hand
,
and
Husband
them
with
deliberation
and
frugality
;
that
they
might
be
distributed
on
occasion
,
to
Men
of
Honour
,
and
such
as
have
evidenced
a
Zeal
for
his
Service
,
and
for
the
good
of
his
Kingdom
;
that
the
persons
also
to
whom
they
are
Granted
,
might
fully
enjoy
them
,
with
all
the
advantages
and
Prerogatives
that
are
by
custom
annexed
to
them
.
I
will
not
omit
,
that
it
is
necessary
to
give
the
Nolity
the
greatest
respect
that
may
be
;
to
the
end
,
that
Citizens
may
conceive
the
greater
desire
to
become
Gentlemen
;
which
should
be
granted
them
,
when
they
have
rais'd
themselves
to
a
Worthiness
of
it
,
either
by
just
acquiring
a
remarkable
Estate
,
or
doing
some
illustrious
exploit
in
War.
The
whole
Constitution
of
the
Nobility
is
Military
:
Nevertheless
there
have
been
instituted
in
France
,
particular
Orders
of
Knighthood
,
of
which
,
the
King
is
Grand
Master
Himself
;
and
into
which
He
admitteth
such
Gentlemen
as
He
accounts
most
worthy
of
it
.
Such
are
the
Orders
of
the
Holy
Ghost
,
and
of
St.
Michael
.
There
are
others
,
of
which
the
King
is
barely
Protector
;
The
Order
of
S.
Lazarus
is
of
that
nature
.
But
this
is
of
no
great
advantage
to
the
State
:
Because
all
Beneficences
,
all
Favours
,
all
Honours
and
Employments
,
should
come
directly
and
immediately
from
the
Hand
and
Bounty
of
the
King.
For
the
continuation
therefore
of
this
Order
of
S.
Lazarus
,
His
Majesty
might
unite
the
Grand
Mastership
of
it
to
the
Regality
,
as
the
King
of
Spain
does
.
CHAP.
VII
.
1.
Of
the
Third
Estate
.
2.
Of
the
Husbandmen
.
3.
Of
Artificers
.
4.
Of
Merchants
.
MY
beginning
to
Treat
of
the
Three
Orders
of
the
Body
Politick
of
France
,
as
the
Clergy
and
the
Nobility
,
leaving
the
Third
Estate
to
be
last
spoken
of
,
is
a
method
like
theirs
,
who
having
some
Edifice
to
examine
,
do
begin
at
the
top
;
and
settle
to
consider
the
upper
Stories
,
before
they
look
on
the
Foundations
.
In
truth
,
the
People
are
the
Basis
upon
which
all
Republiques
have
their
standing
.
'T
is
they
that
manure
the
Ground
,
and
cause
it
to
bear
Fruit.
'T
is
they
that
pay
the
Subsidies
;
that
breed
Workmen
,
and
furnish
the
Merchants
.
Yet
that
which
we
call
the
Third
Estate
,
does
not
consist
of
Peasants
,
or
the
meer
rural
sort
;
'T
is
principally
the
Freemen
,
and
Communalties
of
Towns
,
and
Officers
of
Justice
,
that
compose
it
.
This
Third
Estate
was
not
called
to
the
General
Assemblies
of
the
Gauls
,
either
in
the
time
of
the
Romans
,
or
during
the
First
and
Second
Race
of
our
Kings
;
it
was
well
forward
in
the
Third
before
they
had
that
priviledge
.
I
believe
,
not
until
the
Reign
of
Philip
the
Fair.
But
it
is
not
upon
this
matter
that
I
am
now
to
insist
.
However
,
in
speaking
of
the
Third
Estate
,
the
whole
Popular
body
is
to
be
consider'd
;
and
it
may
be
divided
into
three
parties
of
men
;
namely
,
Husbandmen
,
Artificers
,
and
Merchants
.
Of
the
Officers
of
Justice
we
will
speak
in
the
next
Chapter
.
The
least-infected
,
and
best
party
of
the
People
,
is
the
Husband-men
that
daily
labour
;
which
takes
up
their
Heads
and
Hands
,
all
the
year
long
without
intermission
,
keeps
them
in
simplicity
and
obedience
.
There
cannot
be
too
great
a
number
of
'em
;
especially
not
in
France
,
by
reason
of
the
Fertility
of
the
Country
;
and
our
Corn
being
Transported
into
Foreign
parts
,
we
ought
to
make
great
Stores
of
it
,
and
have
as
much
as
may
be
in
a
readiness
.
Exact
care
must
be
taken
,
that
these
Men
may
always
be
in
a
condition
to
take
pains
:
and
that
they
have
but
little
converse
with
Townsmen
,
whose
little
labour
,
and
other
manners
,
might
corrupt
their
innocence
.
And
,
that
Ease
and
Plenty
do
not
render
them
insolent
.
For
there
is
nothing
more
dangerous
and
insufferable
,
than
a
sort
of
rich
Peasants
.
No
less
care
must
be
taken
,
that
an
extream
penury
do
not
reduce
them
to
extream
misery
.
For
too
great
Poverty
lying
on
them
,
they
no
longer
have
either
Men
or
Cattle
:
they
are
ty'd
up
to
ill
Diet
,
lodge
on
the
ground
:
suffer
Hunger
and
Cold
:
their
Children
perish
for
want
of
Food
;
there
are
Epidemical
Diseases
bred
among
them
;
they
are
not
succour'd
;
they
dye
away
:
by
this
means
the
Country
is
dispeopled
;
and
being
void
of
Inhabitants
,
the
Grounds
are
unhusbanded
,
and
abandoned
.
When
I
shall
come
to
discourse
of
the
Finances
▪
I
will
point
out
a
way
to
preserve
Country-people
in
a
moderately-commodious
Estate
:
at
present
I
will
only
say
,
that
it
would
be
to
very
good
purpose
to
create
a
Superintendant
of
Husbandry
;
who
should
have
his
Eye
on
those
affairs
,
and
see
,
that
the
Grounds
be
cultivated
,
Vineyards
well
kept
,
and
Meadows
fitly
ordered
:
in
like
manner
as
there
are
Masters
of
Waters
,
and
Forests
,
who
take
care
that
the
Woods
be
not
damnifi'd
;
and
Surveyors
for
the
High-ways
;
and
in
fine
,
Jurats
for
every
Craft
.
The
Second
party
of
the
Popular
order
,
is
the
Handicrafts-men
,
or
Artificers
;
these
are
no
less
useful
to
the
State
than
any
other
.
For
,
besides
that
Manufactures
do
keep
men
at
work
,
and
engage
them
;
they
are
the
cause
that
the
Silk
,
the
Wool
,
the
Skins
,
the
Flax
,
the
Timber
,
and
the
other
Commodities
that
grow
in
France
,
are
made
use
of
;
and
that
Country
People
have
the
means
to
barter
these
things
,
and
put
them
off
;
especially
being
wrought
into
Wares
not
made
in
Foreign
parts
,
we
shall
grow
to
be
further
principal
Manufacturers
,
as
we
already
are
of
Hats
for
Spain
,
and
Stuffs
for
all
Europe
:
which
is
a
matter
of
exceeding
great
consequence
:
and
in
process
of
time
,
when
the
work
is
once
on
foot
,
things
will
pass
from
hand
to
hand
,
and
oft-times
go
out
of
the
Kingdom
.
All
this
quickens
Trade
,
and
makes
Money
pass
to
and
fro
:
which
promoteth
the
Publick
,
and
therewithall
at
once
,
every
ones
private
welfare
.
'T
is
not
enough
to
have
Husband-men
and
Artificers
in
a
Kingdom
▪
there
must
of
necessity
be
Merchants
also
:
for
without
their
Industry
,
the
Artificers
Shops
would
be
Stores
never
emptied
;
the
Granaries
would
remain
full
of
Corn
;
and
the
Cellars
,
of
Wines
;
and
nothing
be
gone
.
We
will
more
largely
treat
of
this
,
when
we
come
to
the
Article
of
Commerce
.
CHAP.
VIII
.
1.
Of
Officers
of
Justice
.
2.
Of
Parliments
,
and
other
Supreme
Courts
.
3.
Of
Presidial
Courts
.
4.
Of
the
King's
Council
.
5.
Vseful
means
for
the
good
of
the
State
,
in
relation
to
Officers
of
Justice
.
6.
Of
Sollicitations
.
IF
men
were
entirely
just
to
one
another
,
and
each
of
'em
(
in
the
phrase
of
one
of
the
greatest
Greek
Philosophers
)
a
Law
unto
himself
;
there
would
need
neither
Law
nor
Magistrate
to
keep
them
in
perfect
tranquility
.
But
Nature
being
corrupted
,
we
no
longer
consult
that
Original
Righteousness
,
which
is
inseparable
from
reason
,
and
which
without
intermission
,
inwardly
presseth
us
to
render
to
all
their
due
,
as
exactly
,
as
we
would
should
be
done
to
ourselves
.
Always
self-love
,
often
necessity
,
sometimes
hatred
,
avarice
,
or
one
passion
or
other
,
does
blind
us
,
and
induce
us
to
violate
this
eminently
holy
and
equitable
Law
;
in
such
sort
also
,
that
we
suffer
ourselves
to
be
transported
unto
excesses
hard
to
be
believed
.
We
equally
use
fraud
and
force
to
content
our
injustice
and
irregular
desires
.
Whereupon
it
hath
been
commodiously
done
by
wise
Men
,
to
form
,
as
may
be
said
,
a
new
reason
,
which
they
called
Law.
But
because
Laws
are
of
no
use
,
except
they
be
armed
with
Correction
to
punish
such
as
despise
them
;
and
have
some
soul
,
and
living
principle
;
therefore
Magistrates
have
been
created
▪
who
are
to
pronounce
the
Oracles
which
those
Laws
inspire
,
to
put
the
Laws
in
Execution
,
and
maintain
the
Authority
of
them
.
These
Officers
are
chosen
of
the
best
and
most
intelligent
Men
in
a
State
;
and
if
Common-wealths
be
duly
regulated
;
ordinarily
the
Rich
are
preferred
before
the
Poor
,
and
Nobles
before
Plebeians
;
because
't
is
supposed
they
have
a
greater
measure
of
knowledge
and
virtue
;
and
by
consequence
are
less
capable
of
certain
mean
things
,
in
which
a
necessitous
condition
,
and
a
mean
extraction
,
might
engage
them
.
Thus
Ministers
of
Justice
in
France
,
call'd
Men
of
the
Robe
,
are
in
truth
necessary
in
Publick
Society
.
For
if
there
was
no
evil-doer
,
Laws
and
Magistrates
would
be
of
no
more
use
,
than
Joyners
,
and
the
Doors
they
make
for
the
security
of
Houses
,
if
there
were
no
Thieves
:
whereas
,
should
not
a
Man
in
a
whole
Kingdom
ever
swerve
from
right
reason
and
pure
equity
;
there
must
nevertheless
be
Priests
for
Religion
;
Soldiers
for
defence
against
Foreign
Invasions
that
might
happen
;
and
People
who
may
some
of
'em
Till
the
Ground
;
others
apply
themselves
to
Trades
and
Manufactures
,
that
Men
cannot
be
without
.
So
that
these
three
sorts
of
Persons
are
inseparable
from
a
Common-wealth
;
and
they
make
up
the
Three
Estates
we
have
spoken
of
,
which
have
been
receiv'd
without
any
contest
.
Yet
it
seems
,
that
of
late
,
the
Parliaments
have
sought
to
infuse
into
some
green
heads
,
that
they
compos'd
a
Fourth
Order
in
the
Kingdom
;
and
the
same
,
not
only
distinct
from
the
other
Three
,
but
altogether
superiour
to
them
,
by
reason
of
their
Sovereignty
,
and
of
the
Power
they
have
to
deliberate
upon
the
pleasure
and
Edicts
of
the
King.
If
they
should
not
be
brought
off
from
this
opinion
,
perhaps
they
would
draw
the
other
Sovereign
Courts
and
Officers
of
Judicature
into
the
same
Error
;
an
Union
of
them
all
not
being
deniable
:
because
otherwise
the
affair
of
Justice
would
in
France
,
form
two
bodies
;
which
may
not
be
.
But
from
allowing
this
Fourth
Body
in
the
State
,
namely
that
of
Justice
,
a
ridiculous
inconvenience
would
follow
;
to
wit
,
that
a
Sergeant
(
or
Catchpole
)
of
a
Village
,
would
be
a
member
of
a
body
superior
to
that
of
the
Nobility
;
and
by
consequence
,
in
some
sort
,
superior
to
a
Marquis
.
For
in
matter
of
Hierarchy
,
the
last
of
a
more
excellent
Order
,
is
greater
than
the
first
of
a
less
excellent
one
:
as
the
lowest
of
the
Arch-Angels
,
is
greater
than
the
highest
of
the
Angels
.
But
to
clear
the
difficulty
before
us
,
it
must
be
remembred
,
that
heretofore
in
France
,
the
Estates
which
were
called
Parliaments
,
did
assemble
twice
a
year
for
two
considerations
:
one
was
,
to
judge
of
Appeals
,
that
were
made
from
judgments
pass'd
by
inferior
Officers
.
The
other
,
to
give
the
King
Counsel
when
He
demanded
their
Opinion
about
Government
of
the
State.
For
alway
,
during
the
first
and
second
Race
,
the
King
's
did
dispose
of
Publick
Affairs
,
as
of
Peace
and
War
;
and
this
is
so
much
a
truth
,
that
if
those
ancient
Parliaments
had
had
the
disposing
of
the
State
,
they
would
never
have
suffered
,
that
the
Children
of
Lewis
,
when
they
had
divided
the
Kingdom
among
them
,
should
have
fallen
to
make
War
one
upon
another
;
which
could
tend
to
nothing
but
a
publick
desolation
.
They
would
as
little
have
permitted
the
enmities
of
Brize
,
Haudet
,
and
Fredegonde
.
In
like
manner
under
the
Second
Race
,
they
would
not
have
endured
that
the
Sons
of
Lewis
the
Mild
,
should
act
such
outrages
on
their
Father
,
that
Charles
the
Bald
should
have
given
Neustria
to
the
Normans
.
In
the
Third
Race
,
that
Lewis
the
Gross
should
have
ruin'd
so
many
great
Lords
;
who
made
up
the
greatest-part
of
the
Parliaments
:
that
Lewis
the
Younger
should
have
yielded
up
Guienne
by
the
Divorce
of
Eleanore
:
that
the
Count
of
Burgundy
,
and
the
Duke
of
Britannie
,
and
some
others
,
should
have
leagu'd
together
against
Queen
Blanche
.
In
fine
,
there
are
thousand
and
a
thousand
examples
in
History
,
which
▪
do
evidence
that
these
Kings
always
had
the
free
and
Sovereign
administration
of
their
State
:
nor
will
there
one
be
found
to
prove
,
that
the
Parliaments
ever
contradicted
them
.
They
presented
themselves
at
the
feet
of
their
Princes
,
with
Petitions
,
and
humble
Remonstrances
:
they
made
no
resistance
,
nor
exercis'd
Authority
.
So
that
our
King
's
have
been
King's
indeed
,
always
absolute
Masters
▪
and
for
proof
hereof
,
it
will
be
sufficient
to
look
into
all
the
Statutes
;
there
it
may
be
seen
how
they
spake
,
and
what
part
the
Estates
had
in
them
.
The
principal
end
of
Parliaments
therefore
was
,
to
the
end
the
Law-suits
of
particular
Persons
;
and
people
perceiving
that
Appeals
brought
to
them
were
received
,
and
sentences
invalidated
;
many
,
to
try
Opinions
in
their
cases
once
again
,
became
Appellants
:
by
this
means
affairs
were
multiply'd
;
and
that
contesting
parties
might
not
have
the
trouble
to
come
up
from
the
remotest
parts
of
the
Kingdom
,
Deputies
of
the
General
Parliament
were
appointed
,
they
also
stiled
Parliaments
,
and
to
be
ambulatory
.
The
Commission
they
had
,
was
sometimes
for
three
Months
,
sometimes
for
six
,
according
to
exigence
of
State
;
but
alway
by
the
Command
and
Letters
of
the
King.
These
Parliaments
went
into
the
Provinces
,
to
judge
the
causes
that
were
brought
them
;
almost
in
like
manner
as
we
now
see
done
at
the
Extraordinary
Sessions
:
which
instead
of
diminishing
the
number
of
Causes
to
be
dispatch'd
,
as
had
been
conceiv'd
,
really
augmented
them
.
Philip
the
Fair
saw
cause
to
make
such
a
Parliament
sedentary
at
Paris
,
another
at
Rouen
,
a
third
at
Thoulouse
;
and
succeeding
Kings
establish'd
others
in
other
Cities
,
as
they
are
at
present
.
From
this
faithful
account
it
resulteth
,
that
the
Parliaments
are
not
a
Fourth
Body
in
the
State
;
but
be
extracted
out
of
the
Three
ancient
Orders
;
at
first
they
were
taken
out
of
the
Clergy
and
Nobility
only
:
because
the
Commons
at
that
time
were
not
considerable
afterwards
,
These
also
were
received
in
.
Other
Sovereign
Societies
are
but
Images
of
these
Parliaments
.
As
to
the
Sovereignty
of
the
Parliaments
themselves
,
it
neither
is
,
nor
ever
was
other
,
than
an
emination
of
the
Sovereignty
of
the
King
,
in
whom
that
Quality
is
natural
,
and
indivisible
.
The
Parliaments
can
pretend
to
no
more
than
His
Majesty
may
please
to
impart
to
them
.
The
Sale
of
Offices
of
Judicature
having
been
introduc'd
,
there
follow'd
divers
creations
of
new
Officers
,
both
in
matter
of
the
Revenue
,
and
also
in
that
of
Justice
:
among
others
,
those
of
Presidial
Courts
were
instituted
:
which
perhaps
was
done
,
only
out
of
a
pecuniary
interest
;
a
needless
degree
of
Jarisdiction
being
thereby
set
up
,
and
such
a
one
as
tendeth
to
the
involving
and
oppression
of
the
Kings
Subjects
.
These
Courts
are
so
many
petty
Parliaments
,
in
judging
supreamly
,
and
finally
in
some
cases
:
yet
by
the
trick
of
Petty-fogging
Practice
,
ways
are
found
to
get
Appeals
from
judgment
pass'd
,
to
be
received
,
and
new
processes
begun
,
to
the
vexation
and
undoing
of
the
parties
concern'd
.
There
have
been
in
all
times
,
chief
Judges
in
Towns
;
as
Bailiffs
and
Seneschals
;
a
thing
of
indispensible
necessity
for
keeping
the
People
in
order
:
all
the
fault
that
can
be
found
in
it
,
is
by
reason
of
their
number
,
which
certainly
is
excessive
.
'T
is
not
enough
that
the
King
hath
Parliaments
and
other
Officers
to
determinate
differenamong
His
Subjects
:
there
must
also
be
a
Counsel
about
His
Majesty
;
by
whose
Advice
,
He
may
correct
all
ill
Administration
of
Justice
;
may
reverse
all
Sentences
given
against
the
Mind
and
Intention
of
the
Statutes
;
and
maintain
Order
through
the
whole
extent
of
His
State.
This
Counsel
is
the
Sacrarium
of
the
Monarchy
:
and
the
persons
admitted
into
it
,
who
may
justly
be
stiled
the
Eyes
,
the
Ears
and
Hands
of
the
Prince
)
ought
to
have
a
profound
Knowledge
in
Affairs
,
acquired
by
long
and
approved
Experiences
:
They
must
love
the
Kingdom
,
the
Kingly
Power
,
and
the
King's
Person
.
They
are
the
Seminary
,
whence
are
taken
Intendants
of
Provinces
,
Ambassadors
and
Ministers
for
Negotiations
with
Strangers
.
The
Counsel
is
compos'd
at
present
of
Gownmen
only
.
It
would
not
be
much
amiss
,
nay
,
on
the
contrary
,
it
would
be
very
well
done
:
if
the
King
pleased
to
communicate
this
Honour
unto
other
Professions
,
when
there
were
found
Persons
capable
of
it
:
Because
this
Preference
gives
the
Gentlemen
of
the
Long
Robe
too
much
Authority
;
whereas
there
is
need
of
retrenching
what
they
have
already
;
much
rather
,
than
of
conferring
any
new
advantage
upon
them
,
as
we
shall
shew
hereafter
.
As
for
the
Royal
Privy
Council
,
in
which
Secret
Affairs
are
debated
,
and
which
ought
to
be
of
very
few
Persons
,
that
Matters
may
be
kept
in
silence
,
and
not
untimously
divulged
;
I
will
not
speak
of
it
in
this
place
;
nor
say
,
in
what
manner
it
ought
to
be
composed
:
because
this
depends
upon
the
pleasure
of
the
Master
of
it
;
and
each
King
takes
a
different
course
in
it
.
There
have
been
Princes
who
committed
the
principal
Care
of
all
Affairs
to
one
single
person
:
and
France
hath
seen
,
for
instance
,
the
Cardinals
of
Amboise
and
Richlieu
.
Others
have
parted
Employments
,
and
shared
them
among
as
many
persons
as
there
were
different
Affairs
.
So
did
King
Henry
the
Fourth
.
This
,
in
my
Opinion
,
was
the
more
wisely
done
;
for
that
in
matter
of
Government
,
the
great
Secret
is
to
divide
Authority
,
and
hold
the
ballance
even
between
a
plurality
of
Persons
.
History
teacheth
us
of
what
consequence
it
was
to
our
Kings
of
the
first
Race
;
that
they
had
but
one
Maire
of
the
Palace
;
and
how
dear
it
cost
their
Posterity
.
Upon
a
like
reason
of
State
the
Roman
Emperors
divided
the
charge
of
the
Praetorian
Prefect
.
But
Ministers
,
whatever
for
number
,
must
for
qualification
,
be
Men
of
Virtue
and
approved
sufficiency
:
They
likewise
,
after
the
manner
of
the
Aegyptians
,
ought
to
be
reprehended
and
punish'd
for
all
that
the
King
does
amiss
,
and
contrary
to
Law.
The
incredible
number
of
the
Ministers
of
Justices
in
France
,
is
in
truth
,
somewhat
monstrous
;
Neither
is
there
any
disorder
in
the
State
,
more
pressing
,
or
requiring
a
more
speedy
Application
of
the
Royal
Authority
.
The
truth
is
,
if
a
Man
consider
this
multitude
of
Magistrates
,
will
he
not
have
ground
to
say
,
that
the
French
are
extream
hard
to
be
governed
,
seeing
so
many
great
Personages
are
employed
in
Governing
them
?
Again
,
it
may
be
said
,
That
this
Nation
,
so
▪
Illustrious
by
the
Glory
of
its
Actions
,
and
by
so
many
Victories
wherewith
its
Arms
have
been
honoured
,
is
yet
incapable
of
virtuous
Inclinations
;
since
there
is
need
of
force
to
reduce
them
to
the
rule
of
the
Laws
:
though
GOD
never
gave
Men
a
more
precious
Present
.
On
the
other
hand
,
can
it
be
affirmed
,
that
our
Legislators
wanted
Wisdom
,
or
did
not
sufficiently
shew
it
in
making
the
Laws
?
Yet
if
reflection
be
made
upon
the
multitude
of
Law-suits
,
whereof
the
vexation
is
a
grievance
to
the
Kingdom
,
may
not
a
Man
perswade
himself
,
that
Equity
is
banish'd
thence
,
and
Upright
dealing
utterly
discarded
?
Should
it
then
hereupon
be
taken
for
granted
,
that
the
private
sort
in
France
are
not
good
condition'd
People
;
can
it
be
imagin'd
that
the
Publick
Government
is
any
thing
reasonable
and
proper
for
its
due
ends
?
But
if
a
Man
proceed
to
penetrate
further
into
the
Internals
of
the
State
,
and
there
behold
what
a
desolation
the
corrupting
of
Justice
hath
made
,
loosning
and
breaking
the
most
Sacred
ties
of
Friendship
;
in
fine
,
if
he
observe
how
the
Monarchy
hath
often
been
in
danger
of
subversion
,
will
he
not
wonder
that
the
Publick
Fortune
hath
held
out
,
and
Families
been
born
up
in
the
Storms
that
have
so
many
times
turmoild
them
?
The
excessively
great
multitude
of
Officers
,
being
the
principal
cause
whence
so
many
mischiefs
take
their
rise
;
the
remedy
must
be
first
apply'd
thereto
.
And
this
remedy
is
nothing
else
,
but
such
a
retrenchment
as
is
expedient
,
or
,
to
say
better
,
necessary
to
be
made
.
The
fewer
Officers
of
Justice
there
are
,
the
more
Soldiers
and
Artificers
,
and
Merchants
,
and
the
fewer
litigious
Actions
will
be
.
For
it
is
manifest
that
business
of
that
kind
has
ever
multiply'd
,
as
the
number
of
Officers
hath
been
augmented
:
in
like
manner
,
as
the
more
Physicians
,
the
more
Patients
.
To
arrive
at
the
end
propos'd
,
it
would
be
convenient
,
that
after
mature
deliberation
upon
the
estate
of
France
,
the
number
of
its
Inhabitants
,
and
the
quantity
of
Law-business
,
it
be
advisedly
stated
in
the
King's
Council
,
what
number
of
Officers
were
fit
to
be
reserved
,
and
of
what
quality
they
should
be
;
then
that
the
rest
be
suppress'd
gradually
,
as
the
persons
dye
away
,
or
at
once
by
a
Declaration
.
What
,
in
my
opinion
,
might
particularly
be
done
,
is
as
follows
.
First
,
The
Presidial
Courts
being
compos'd
of
Officers
that
are
needless
to
the
State
,
a
charge
unto
the
People
;
having
also
but
a
novel
interloping
Jurisdiction
,
the
fruit
of
an
evil
Counsel
given
to
King
Henry
II.
and
a
mere
invention
to
get
Money
;
the
extinction
of
them
is
not
to
be
doubted
of
;
but
effected
by
a
substraction
of
the
Officers
Annuities
.
By
this
means
the
King
will
save
that
Pay
,
which
amounts
unto
a
Sum
considerable
to
the
State
;
and
the
Royal
Jurisdictions
,
each
in
its
Precinct
,
may
do
what
those
Presidials
,
upon
which
they
depend
,
are
wont
to
do
.
The
Presidial
Clerks
place
,
its
being
engaged
,
(
or
bound
for
security
to
one
or
other
)
as
is
usual
,
should
not
hinder
the
execution
of
this
.
Aflair
:
And
when
by
decease
there
are
no
more
Officers
left
,
care
shall
be
taken
of
the
concern
of
those
to
whom
the
places
were
engaged
,
the
regulating
whereof
will
by
that
time
have
no
difficulty
in
it
.
Secondly
,
Of
Sergeants
,
Two
Thirds
wholly
must
be
suppress'd
.
In
the
Third
place
,
all
Proctors
,
that
are
not
Advocates
;
and
a
certain
number
of
Advocates
should
be
appointed
in
each
Parliament
and
Jurisdiction
,
who
might
do
the
Office
of
Proctors
.
This
is
not
incompatible
.
For
the
thing
is
already
in
use
many
parts
of
France
.
The
benefit
of
this
regulation
is
manifest
;
in
that
the
Proctors
are
very
ignorant
that
have
but
a
slight
tincture
of
practice
;
yet
out
of
Covetousness
they
often
draw
up
Writings
for
their
Clients
,
and
make
them
pay
as
dear
for
'em
,
as
if
the
best
Advocate
had
taken
the
pains
.
Mean
time
these
Writings
,
for
the
most
part
,
are
nothing
worth
;
and
the
poor
Suitors
frequently
lose
good
Causes
,
through
the
naughtiness
of
their
Proctors
,
and
for
want
of
being
well
defended
.
Again
,
such
an
order
taken
,
another
advantage
would
accrue
,
namely
,
that
Advocates
being
Proctors
,
they
will
be
obliged
to
follow
what
the
Judges
shall
prescribe
them
;
whereas
at
present
they
make
a
jest
of
it
,
and
will
not
Plead
but
when
they
please
.
There
cannot
be
a
regulation
made
in
France
more
profitable
in
matter
of
Justice
;
and
if
the
King
,
in
a
necessity
of
State
,
would
make
a
Money
matter
of
it
,
which
might
at
any
time
be
done
,
there
would
be
rais'd
out
of
it
,
for
all
France
,
more
than
20
Millions
.
But
it
had
need
be
gone
about
with
a
great
deal
of
Address
.
A
Third
advantage
by
this
regulation
is
,
That
all
Advocates
being
Proctors
,
there
would
no
more
slip
into
the
Court
a
sort
of
young
Men
,
who
shelter
their
Ignorance
and
Idleness
under
a
Lawyers
Gown
and
a
square
Cap.
In
the
Fourth
place
,
All
the
Masters
of
Requests
belonging
to
the
Palace
,
or
Court
(
of
Justice
)
of
France
,
should
be
supprest
.
And
the
Truth
is
,
it
seems
to
me
a
contradiction
,
that
these
Officers
should
be
Counsellors
of
Supreme
Courts
,
yet
not
impowred
to
judge
any
thing
supreamly
.
But
that
the
Commoners
of
the
King's
Houshold
and
other
priviledged
persons
,
may
not
be
depriv'd
of
the
benefit
of
the
Committimus
,
Power
must
be
given
them
by
special
priviledge
,
to
commence
their
Actions
,
and
prosecute
them
in
a
Chamber
of
Enquests
.
I
say
,
by
special
priviledge
,
because
I
know
the
Parliaments
take
no
cognizance
ordinarily
,
save
of
Appeals
:
but
in
the
case
now
expres'd
,
this
special
priviledge
shall
superadd
to
them
this
new
kind
of
Jurisdiction
.
And
it
will
be
highly
advantageous
to
those
Commoners
and
Priviledg'd
persons
;
for
by
this
▪
Expedient
they
would
get
a
decree
speedily
upon
one
Trial
,
and
finally
end
their
business
.
It
is
to
be
noted
here
,
that
the
first
stating
of
Cases
,
in
order
to
an
Hearing
,
is
not
so
incompetent
to
Parliaments
,
but
that
they
do
the
thing
for
substance
,
upon
demands
incidentally
made
.
Yet
this
is
meant
only
in
behalf
of
priviledged
persons
,
and
all
such
as
claim
the
right
of
a
Committimus
.
Fifthly
,
The
Judges
Provosts
of
Towns
are
to
be
suppress'd
,
and
they
laid
to
the
Seneschalsies
and
Bayliwicks
.
For
,
what
are
so
many
different
Officers
in
one
and
the
same
Town
good
for
?
In
a
Sixth
place
,
All
the
Courts
of
the
Aids
should
be
united
to
the
Parliaments
;
and
this
done
,
when
the
Officers
of
the
Supream
Court
in
each
kind
,
have
been
reduc'd
to
the
number
which
it
s
judged
meet
to
retain
.
I
will
say
more
of
this
in
the
Chapter
of
the
Finances
.
Seventhly
,
All
the
Elections
are
to
be
suppress'd
,
and
the
Assessing
of
Parishes
,
done
by
the
Treasurers
of
France
;
of
the
Seneschalsies
,
by
the
Lieutenant
of
the
Province
.
I
shall
speak
more
plainly
of
it
in
the
Chapter
of
the
Finances
and
Taxes
.
Where
also
the
Suppression
of
Store-houses
of
Salt
,
and
of
the
Gabells
,
shall
be
treated
of
in
the
Article
of
Gabells
.
Besides
,
the
Chamber
of
the
Treasury
,
and
the
Court
of
Moneys
,
should
be
joyned
to
the
Chamber
of
Accompts
;
and
half
of
all
the
Chambers
be
suppress'd
likewise
.
For
thirty
Officers
may
do
all
that
the
Chamber
of
Accompts
,
the
Treasury
,
and
the
Court
of
Monies
now
do
,
In
fine
,
it
is
for
the
King's
Service
,
and
the
good
of
the
State
,
that
all
the
Presidents
Places
be
suppress'd
,
as
well
those
of
Superior
Courts
,
as
of
others
:
and
the
Office
of
Presidents
be
discharged
by
Commission
.
'T
is
to
be
consider'd
▪
that
this
new
Order
would
much
augment
the
King's
Authority
.
For
what
will
not
Counsellors
do
to
obtain
a
Commission
to
preside
?
and
having
obtained
it
,
what
will
they
not
further
do
to
keep
and
confirm
themselves
in
it
?
'T
is
pertinent
to
recall
to
mind
here
,
that
the
Mighty
Prince
Philip
the
Fair
,
at
his
making
the
Parliament
Sedentary
,
made
the
Count
of
Burgundy
first
President
of
it
.
And
that
anciently
,
the
first
President
of
the
Chamber
of
Accompts
was
the
chief
Butler
of
France
:
Likewise
,
that
at
that
time
,
and
long
after
,
the
Chancellors
of
France
were
of
the
Church
,
or
of
the
Sword
;
and
great
Dignities
not
given
to
Men
of
the
Robe
privatively
.
Which
being
done
since
,
without
doubt
gives
them
too
much
credit
,
and
leaves
the
Nobility
too
little
.
It
is
important
that
the
thing
be
not
continued
,
but
on
the
contrary
,
all
restored
to
Primitive
Order
.
As
for
Country
Courts
,
't
is
fit
they
be
narrowly
limited
,
and
brought
to
be
meerly
predial
and
dominial
;
that
is
,
for
Rents
and
the
Fealties
of
Lordships
:
not
capable
of
determining
an
Inventory
,
or
receiving
a
suit
between
parties
,
for
more
than
three
Livres
.
To
conclude
,
the
shortning
of
proceedings
in
Law
,
would
much
conduce
to
the
reduction
of
Officers
.
Let
it
not
be
objected
,
that
this
reduction
of
Officers
,
and
such
a
multitude
of
Suppressions
,
will
ruin
a
multitude
of
Families
.
For
though
it
were
so
,
yet
should
not
the
thing
be
stuck
at
;
the
Reformation
of
a
State
being
concern'd
:
nor
is
the
ill
of
particular
persons
to
be
put
to
accompt
,
when
the
Weal
of
the
Publick
is
in
question
,
GOD
Himself
,
who
is
King
of
Kings
,
and
Eternally
Just
,
how
many
men
did
He
destroy
by
that
universal
deluge
for
the
Reformation
of
the
Universe
?
How
many
Isralites
did
He
cut
off
in
the
Wilderness
,
to
save
the
gross
of
the
People
?
There
is
plenty
of
examples
in
this
kind
,
and
Soveraigns
have
a
right
to
do
like
things
with
like
Justice
,
when
the
general
welfare
of
their
Subjects
is
concern'd
.
Kings
are
Eagles
,
to
whom
GOD
gives
His
Thunder-bolts
to
carry
:
the
strokes
that
come
from
their
hands
do
come
from
the
hand
of
GOD
,
whose
Images
and
Instruments
they
are
.
To
conclude
,
it
's
a
thing
which
cannot
be
dissembled
,
that
the
Parliaments
,
constituting
an
Aristocratick
Government
in
part
,
as
they
do
,
are
quite
contrary
to
Monarchick
Government
.
Aristocracy
is
adverse
to
Regality
;
because
of
all
Governments
it
comes
nearest
to
it
.
As
,
to
use
the
very
terms
of
Hesiod
,
a
Potter
envies
,
and
is
against
a
Potter
.
Be
it
remembred
here
briefly
,
that
Theopompus
King
of
Sparta
having
created
the
Ephori
,
at
last
after
a
great
deal
of
time
,
Cleomenes
was
fain
to
put
them
to
death
;
when
they
had
slain
King
Agis
.
The
Senate
becoming
too
potent
,
overthrew
the
first
Roman
Monarchy
,
and
in
one
word
,
what
hath
our
Age
seen
in
the
trial
of
Chenailles
?
and
what
did
a
former
in
that
of
Chancellor
Poyet
?
A
second
source
from
which
the
Evils
of
litigious
suits
do
arise
,
is
the
sale
of
Magistracies
.
The
Emperor
Alexander
Severus
sound
this
mischief
in
his
Empire
;
it
having
been
introduced
by
Domician
.
S.
Lewis
saw
cause
to
weed
the
abuse
out
of
His
Kingdom
;
it
having
got
in
through
the
confusion
and
trouble
of
some
precedent
Reigns
.
It
will
be
glorious
for
the
King
to
do
in
His
State
what
the
Emperour
Severus
and
S.
Lewis
did
in
theirs
,
with
greatest
glory
to
their
Memory
.
But
as
Policy
requires
,
that
in
such
enterprises
,
way
be
made
by
degrees
,
and
greatest
events
brought
on
by
small
beginnings
:
so
it
is
necessary
here
,
to
proceed
leisurely
,
and
with
measured
steps
.
The
fixation
of
Offices
hath
been
much
advanced
already
:
for
though
what
hath
been
done
seemed
to
signifie
an
authorizing
the
sale
of
them
:
yet
in
truth
,
there
hath
been
ground
gotten
.
To
continue
the
work
,
and
bring
it
to
perfection
,
there
must
a
Decree
pass
,
or
a
Declaration
be
made
,
and
publish'd
at
the
Seal
,
by
which
the
King
declares
,
that
he
purposeth
no
longer
to
admit
any
opposition
in
matter
of
Title
to
Offices
.
This
is
just
;
for
the
King
ought
to
be
ever
Master
,
and
have
the
liberty
to
bestow
the
charges
of
His
Kingdom
on
whom
he
pleaseth
,
and
thinks
worthy
of
'
em
.
Thus
no
one
will
be
alarm'd
:
but
this
Declaration
will
extend
unto
the
price
it self
,
by
a
consequence
easily
deducible
;
namely
,
since
the
principal
and
essential
right
to
Offices
consisteth
in
the
Title
,
and
the
price
is
but
an
accessory
,
as
they
term
it
:
't
is
reasonable
,
that
the
price
alway
follow
the
Law
of
the
Title
:
as
the
Title
to
a
Benefice
brings
in
the
Revenue
of
it
;
And
as
in
Marriage
,
the
Validity
of
the
Sacrament
makes
the
Validity
of
the
Contract
,
and
of
the
civil
effects
.
Thus
receiving
no
more
opposition
at
the
Seal
for
the
Title
;
there
neither
will
be
any
in
reference
to
the
price
:
and
hence
it
will
come
to
pass
,
in
tract
of
time
,
that
Offices
will
be
no
longer
security
for
Money
;
which
will
diminish
the
price
of
them
,
and
insensibly
bring
it
to
nothing
.
But
it
is
very
just
too
,
that
the
Mortgaging
of
Offices
,
as
hath
been
done
hitherto
,
be
obstructed
for
the
future
.
For
the
Officer
may
dye
before
he
hath
paid
the
Paulette
;
whereby
his
Office
is
extinct
;
or
if
of
Grace
the
King
revives
it
,
the
value
of
what
ariseth
from
the
casualty
,
is
much
less
than
the
sum
for
which
the
thing
was
engag'd
:
so
that
there
must
loss
certainly
accrue
.
But
if
the
King
make
a
new
creation
of
an
Officer
,
all
engagements
are
gone
:
for
't
is
then
no
longer
the
Office
that
formerly
it
was
.
Let
it
not
be
said
,
that
without
the
Sale
of
Offices
,
the
Casualties
will
be
worth
the
King
nothing
.
For
the
contrary
is
true
:
and
if
the
Casualties
be
worth
Him
Two
Millions
,
by
reason
of
that
sale
of
them
,
His
Majesty
will
make
Four
Millions
of
'em
,
if
they
be
no
longer
saleable
.
Forasmuch
as
in
this
Case
,
they
will
be
no
longer
Hereditary
;
and
being
no
more
Hereditary
,
they
will
revert
to
the
King
upon
the
decease
of
every
Titulary
:
and
so
the
King
may
dispose
of
'em
in
favour
of
the
Person
that
is
most
acceptable
to
Him
,
and
if
it
please
His
Majesty
,
the
new
admitted
Officer
may
fine
to
the
Coffers
of
His
Treasury
Royal
,
as
the
Officers
of
Gentlemen
do
to
the
profit
of
the
Monasticks
.
As
to
the
Objection
,
that
by
such
suppression
of
Officers
and
Jurisdictions
,
and
taking
away
the
sale
of
Offices
,
the
King
will
lose
the
Revenue
of
many
of
His
Clerks
places
,
and
of
the
Paulette
;
The
Answer
is
easie
;
for
as
to
the
Clerks
places
suppress'd
,
the
King
will
be
recompenc'd
by
the
greater
value
of
those
that
shall
remain
;
and
as
for
the
Paulette
,
the
retrenchment
of
the
wages
of
the
Officers
suppress'd
,
will
be
much
more
considerable
.
A
third
cause
of
vexatious
Law-driving
is
,
that
Offices
of
Judicature
are
gainful
to
those
that
execute
them
.
An
evil
this
,
the
dangerousest
of
any
that
can
affect
a
State
;
for
all
becomes
suspected
,
all
becomes
corrupt
where
profit
is
to
be
made
;
Avarice
and
Ambition
creep
in
;
Justice
,
Uprightness
,
and
Truth
,
depart
:
whereupon
we
may
conclude
with
the
ancient
Proverb
,
That
Money
doth
many
things
which
the
Devil
cannot
do
.
For
an
entrance
upon
a
Reformation
in
this
matter
,
it
would
be
good
to
ordain
,
First
,
That
Judges
not
the
Kings
,
should
take
no
more
Spices
.
Secondly
,
That
Judges
in
the
Royal
Courts
should
not
decree
Executions
for
their
attendance
against
the
parties
that
are
in
contest
.
Thirdly
,
That
if
Spices
,
(
or
Fees
upon
sentence
obtained
)
be
allowed
,
the
parties
shall
give
what
they
will
,
as
the
former
custom
was
,
and
not
be
compelled
.
Fourthly
,
That
there
be
no
more
transacting
by
Commissaries
in
Sovereign
Courts
.
Judges
should
be
forbidden
to
admit
any
sollicitation
from
parties
at
Law
,
even
though
it
be
but
to
let
them
know
the
difficulties
of
their
Affairs
,
and
put
them
in
a
way
to
clear
the
same
.
For
a
Judge
ought
not
to
be
prayed
to
do
his
Office
,
in
favour
of
a
man
whose
case
is
good
,
much
less
of
one
whose
case
is
bad
.
CHAP.
IX
.
1.
Of
some
general
Orders
in
Government
.
2.
Of
punishment
and
recompence
.
3.
Of
Royal
Virtues
.
IN
the
Chapters
now
dispatch'd
,
I
have
inserted
many
things
which
may
be
of
use
for
the
Kings
service
,
for
the
general
good
of
His
State
,
and
of
every
of
His
Subjects
in
particular
.
In
the
Chapters
that
are
to
follow
,
others
very
considerable
shall
be
added
.
However
,
I
judge
it
not
amiss
to
make
here
a
distinct
Chapter
of
some
important
points
,
which
I
cannot
easily
rank
any
other
where
.
It
hath
been
long
in
dispute
,
whether
it
be
good
to
alter
Publick
Laws
?
and
upon
debate
of
the
Question
to
and
fro
,
't
is
concluded
,
that
there
is
oft-times
so
pressing
a
necessity
,
that
it
cannot
be
forborn
:
but
withal
,
that
such
alterations
must
be
insensible
to
the
People
,
who
hardly
come
off
from
old
Customs
;
and
cannot
be
brought
to
any
new
observance
,
but
by
a
long
circumference
,
and
ways
to
them
unknown
.
Legislators
are
Physicians
of
Common-wealths
,
and
in
this
case
ought
to
imitate
the
ordinary
Artists
of
that
Profession
,
who
seeing
the
whole
habit
of
a
body
out
of
order
,
and
that
to
preserve
the
Patient
from
Perishing
,
't
is
necessary
to
change
it
,
do
prescribe
remedies
,
which
the
more
slowly
they
operate
,
the
surer
their
effect
.
Now
the
first
Law
,
which
in
my
Opinion
might
be
made
,
or
rather
renewed
in
France
,
is
to
banish
thence
all
Usuries
,
of
whatever
quality
,
except
among
Merchants
;
and
those
should
be
expresly
prohibited
,
which
arise
from
personal
Obligations
,
under
pretence
of
damages
and
interests
;
even
interests
adjudged
by
sentence
not
excluded
;
this
pretence
being
but
a
means
to
authorize
Usury
,
and
defraud
the
Law
,
which
forbids
it
.
Usury
was
strictly
prohibited
among
the
ancient
Inhabitants
of
Candie
:
but
the
coveting
of
Riches
,
to
elude
the
severity
of
this
Statute
,
disposed
the
borrower
,
that
he
should
seem
to
have
stollen
the
Money
he
had
need
of
,
and
which
in
reality
was
lent
him
.
By
this
Artifice
the
Debtor
was
constrained
to
pay
the
Interests
;
which
were
not
adjudged
to
the
Creditor
on
the
account
of
any
Loan
,
but
in
hatred
of
Robbery
,
which
he
said
had
been
committed
upon
him
.
This
means
cannot
be
used
in
France
;
for
that
Theft
is
there
a
capital
Crime
,
both
in
Religion
and
in
Policy
.
But
the
Spirit
of
Man
being
unbounded
,
and
having
more
craft
when
bent
to
transgress
,
than
the
Law
hath
prudence
to
hinder
evil
doing
,
the
taking
of
damages
and
interests
hath
been
introduced
amongst
us
;
which
is
an
equivalent
to
the
Cretan
expedient
.
For
the
feigning
a
detension
of
Money
against
the
owners
will
,
as
is
done
in
France
,
and
the
Debtor
thereupon
condemn'd
to
pay
the
Interests
,
can
be
no
other
thing
for
substance
,
than
the
feigning
a
Robbery
,
as
was
done
in
Candie
.
There
is
not
any
Nation
of
note
,
in
which
Usurious
Contracts
have
not
been
prohibited
among
the
Subjects
.
'T
is
known
what
the
Law
of
the
Church
in
this
behalf
is
,
and
what
that
of
the
Old
Testament
,
so
often
repeated
in
Scripture
,
was
.
Usury
sure
,
hath
caused
the
greatest
disorders
that
have
hitherto
troubled
the
tranquility
of
States
.
The
Athenians
,
the
Spartans
,
and
the
Romans
,
did
not
forbid
it
only
;
but
were
also
forced
to
abolish
Debts
contracted
;
and
for
publick
benefit
,
rescin'd
the
compacts
and
promises
that
private
Men
had
made
,
though
they
seemed
inviolable
,
as
having
been
made
under
the
Authority
of
the
Laws
,
and
upon
the
security
of
general
custom
,
which
they
were
not
wont
to
over-rule
.
An
act
of
very
particular
consequence
All
Usurious
Contracts
should
be
annulled
,
yea
the
culpable
and
complices
as
to
the
crime
of
Usury
,
put
to
death
;
the
Usurer
in
The
second
Law
should
be
,
to
permit
Contracts
for
annual
Rent
out
of
Land
:
yet
with
charge
,
that
they
be
publish'd
for
publick
security
;
as
I
have
said
elsewhere
,
when
I
treated
of
the
shortning
of
Law-suits
.
Withall
,
regulating
to
a
denier
,
the
Arrearages
,
which
are
a
kind
of
Usury
,
but
the
most
tolerable
of
any
seeing
there
is
an
Alienation
of
the
Land
;
and
it
is
a
fiction
prudently
hit
upon
by
the
Popes
Calixtus
the
Third
,
and
Martin
the
Fifth
.
As
for
the
Declaration
in
form
of
an
Edict
which
is
to
be
made
herein
;
Contracts
,
even
the
formerly
made
,
should
be
reduced
to
the
Thirtieth
denier
.
The
Romans
limited
Use
to
the
hundredth
,
afterwards
to
the
Two
hundredth
,
and
at
length
abolish'd
it
altogether
.
A
third
Law
should
be
,
that
no
sum
lent
to
any
Son
of
a
Family
,
or
to
others
under
25
years
of
age
,
without
the
consent
and
authority
of
their
Relations
,
do
produce
any
action
;
no
not
thought
the
Contracts
be
ratified
by
the
Debtors
,
after
they
come
of
age
.
Vespasian
made
a
like
Ordinance
;
and
there
is
nothing
more
effectual
to
repress
the
greediness
of
Usurers
,
or
the
debauch
of
young
people
:
whereupon
they
would
set
themselves
to
labour
,
to
exercises
and
study
.
The
profit
which
these
Laws
would
yield
the
State
,
beside
their
stopping
the
course
of
great
Evils
,
would
be
,
that
persons
who
are
alway
concern'd
,
and
impatient
to
be
getting
,
seeing
they
could
not
put
out
their
Money
at
Interest
easily
,
and
that
the
Interest
of
their
Contracts
would
be
at
too
low
a
rate
,
must
of
force
apply
themselves
to
two
things
,
each
of
which
is
eminently
advantageous
to
the
Kingdom
.
For
they
would
addict
themselves
to
Trades
and
Husbandry
▪
or
put
their
Money
in
the
hands
of
Merchants
to
make
benefit
of
it
,
if
not
enter
into
partnership
with
them
,
which
they
should
be
permitted
to
do
.
For
Usury
in
matter
of
Commerce
,
was
never
forbidden
,
and
is
the
Secret
that
the
Hollanders
have
found
,
to
make
all
their
people
Merchants
.
On
the
other
hand
,
the
Genoeses
have
engaged
themselves
in
Traffick
,
upon
observing
the
profit
it
yielded
.
The
fourth
Law
might
be
,
that
Gentlemen
be
disabled
to
sell
their
Fiefs
or
Inheritances
,
until
they
have
made
declaration
of
their
Poverty
in
open
Court.
Among
the
Israelites
,
Lands
engaged
reverted
to
their
ancient
owners
at
the
Jubilee
.
The
Spartans
Lands
were
not
divided
at
all
;
I
mean
those
7000
portions
which
Lycurgus
had
lotted
out
.
The
Locrians
in
like
manner
sold
not
their
Estates
:
the
same
is
observed
in
Flanders
.
The
Fiefs
of
the
great
Houses
of
Bretanie
are
never
parted
out
.
Substitution
of
Heirs
in
France
doth
hinder
the
Alienation
of
Lands
.
In
Spain
Gentlemen
cannor
sell
their
Estates
:
And
Lastly
,
the
Demesne
of
the
Crown
in
France
,
is
in-alienable
,
which
may
prescribe
a
Law
for
all
Noble
Families
.
This
Ordinance
would
make
Gentlemen
good
Husbands
.
When
the
Jews
,
the
Lacedemonians
,
the
Syracusians
,
the
Romans
,
and
all
civilized-People
,
made
a
partition
of
their
Lands
,
they
consider'd
the
benefit
that
might
thence
redound
to
their
States
,
and
very
wisely
provided
,
that
all
such
as
possess'd
Inheritances
should
fix
in
the
Country
:
having
an
Estate
there
which
they
could
not
carry
away
,
they
would
love
the
places
where
they
had
their
subsistance
;
and
every
one
defending
his
own
Possession
,
all
would
jointly
defend
the
Common-wealth
,
and
fight
for
the
Publick
Interests
.
The
Fifth
Law
should
be
,
that
a
Gentleman
being
ruin'd
,
and
having
acknowledged
his
Poverty
in
Court
,
should
be
no
longer
Noble
;
there
being
no
Estate
so
shameful
,
as
that
of
a
Man
of
Quality
reduc'd
to
an
extream
Misery
.
On
the
contrary
,
that
a
Plebeian
,
when
he
hath
rais'd
himself
an
advantageous
Fortune
,
which
might
be
limited
at
50000
Crowns
,
should
be
ennobled
;
provided
always
,
that
the
profit
had
been
made
by
laudable
and
lawful
means
.
A
sixth
Law
should
be
,
to
hinder
the
publick
begging
of
the
Poor
,
by
appointing
the
greatest
penalties
upon
it
;
and
ordain
,
for
that
end
,
that
every
Parish
both
in
Town
and
Country
,
do
maintain
their
own
Poor
,
not
suffering
them
to
wander
;
punish
all
that
make
a
Trade
of
it
;
send
the
stoutest
of
them
to
the
Gallies
,
and
set
all
the
rest
on
work
according
to
their
ability
.
This
is
a
means
to
fetch
out
that
idleness
which
is
among
the
meaner
sort
.
The
seventh
Law
might
be
,
to
render
Fathers
responsible
,
as
to
Civil
Interests
,
for
all
the
Faults
and
Crimes
their
Children
should
commit
while
they
depend
on
them
,
and
under
25
years
of
age
;
or
,
however
,
whilst
they
dwell
in
their
Fathers
House
.
The
Mulct
to
be
allowed
for
afterwards
in
the
Patrimony
of
those
faulty
Children
;
This
Law
is
in
force
in
Bretanie
,
and
was
so
at
Rome
.
Masters
,
in
like
manner
,
for
the
faults
of
their
Houshold-servants
;
and
paying
an
Arbitrary
Fine
besides
,
because
they
ought
to
correct
them
.
In
the
Third
place
,
Provost
Marshals
and
their
Officers
,
for
all
Robberies
and
Murthers
committed
on
the
High-ways
,
Burglaries
,
Counterfeit
Coin
,
and
other
the
like
Crimes
within
their
district
,
if
they
took
not
up
the
Malefactors
,
and
brought
them
to
their
Trial.
This
Law
would
hinder
well-nigh
all
mischiefs
of
this
nature
;
it
being
,
as
may
be
said
,
of
publick
Notoriety
,
that
Provosts
hold
Intelligence
with
all
persons
of
ill
Life
.
Again
,
all
Lieutenants
criminal
and
Judges
,
for
the
Crimes
committed
in
their
Towns
,
by
the
same
reason
.
Masters
of
Inns
,
and
Houses
of
Entertainment
,
for
the
Crimes
committed
by
their
Guests
,
while
they
are
in
their
Houses
.
Owners
of
Houses
,
for
the
Crimes
committed
by
their
Tenants
during
their
term
;
because
they
ought
to
know
,
and
answer
for
the
good
abearing
of
such
as
they
entertain
.
Captains
and
Officers
for
the
Crimes
of
their
Soldiers
;
the
Inhabitants
of
an
House
for
those
committed
in
it
.
This
is
done
in
Spain
.
In
the
Turkish
Towns
,
the
Townsmen
of
each
Street
are
responsible
for
what
is
done
there
;
And
if
a
Man
be
slain
,
the
Townsman
before
whose
door
he
falls
,
is
sentenced
to
pay
for
his
Blood.
This
Order
is
excellent
.
For
assoon
as
there
is
a
noise
in
the
Street
,
all
run
thither
,
and
the
Authors
of
the
Fact
,
whatever
it
be
,
are
seized
,
brought
before
the
Judge
,
and
forthwith
punish'd
according
to
the
quality
of
the
Crime
.
In
paralel
to
this
Rule
of
Government
in
Turkie
,
severest
penalties
must
be
imposed
upon
such
as
transgress
the
Laws
,
and
especially
the
Laws
that
relate
to
Publick
Order
and
Policy
;
those
Penalties
also
speedily
inflicted
;
otherwise
the
said
Laws
will
be
of
no
use
.
For
example
,
'T
is
ordained
in
France
,
that
no
Lackey
wear
a
Sword
;
that
no
Towns-man
have
Arms
;
or
that
Bakers
make
their
Bread
of
a
certain
Weight
,
or
other
things
of
like
nature
.
They
that
obey
not
,
must
be
instantly
punished
,
the
Rich
by
pecuniary
Fines
,
the
Poor
by
Corporal
Penalties
.
The
Turks
cause
Offenders
who
have
not
Money
to
pay
their
Fines
,
to
be
beaten
with
a
Lath.
An
Eighth
Law
,
All
Printers
and
Booksellers
must
be
forbidden
,
and
that
upon
pain
of
death
,
to
Print
,
Sell
,
Disperse
,
set
to
Sale
,
or
keep
any
Book
of
what
Quality
or
Subject
soever
,
without
its
having
been
Approved
,
and
Licence
given
them
under
Seal
in
due
manner
;
after
which
may
nothing
be
added
to
the
Book
.
But
as
it
is
just
to
punish
bad
Subjects
,
so
it
is
reasonable
to
reward
the
good
:
and
them
that
out
of
love
to
their
Country
,
employ
themselves
in
advancing
its
Reputation
and
Glory
.
The
King
ought
to
be
the
sole
Master
and
Arbiter
of
all
Rewards
;
and
confer
them
himself
,
so
as
they
that
receive
any
Beneficence
of
His
,
may
be
convinc'd
they
owe
it
to
His
Bounty
.
This
would
be
an
infallible
means
to
attract
to
Him
the
hope
of
His
Subjects
,
and
together
with
it
,
their
Respect
,
whereupon
every
one
would
strive
to
please
Him
,
in
doing
of
his
Duty
,
and
no
body
promise
himself
any
Grace
or
Advantage
,
but
by
his
Merit
,
his
Services
and
Diligence
.
There
are
several
kinds
of
Rewards
with
which
His
Majesty
may
Honour
His
Subjects
;
I
say
,
Honour
them
;
because
a
Subject
,
in
receiving
a
benefit
from
the
hand
of
the
King
,
receives
withal
,
a
mark
of
the
Esteem
which
is
had
of
his
Person
,
and
of
the
satisfaction
he
hath
given
in
his
Conduct
.
Nothing
can
be
more
glorious
to
a
Man
of
Worth
;
nothing
can
yield
him
a
truer
Contentment
.
A
Gift
from
an
ordinary
hand
is
many
times
somewhat
shameful
to
him
that
takes
it
;
and
hence
comes
the
adage
,
That
it
is
better
to
Give
than
to
Receive
.
But
when
a
King
is
the
Donor
,
the
Dignity
of
the
Royal
Hand
doth
add
to
the
Gift
a
new
quality
,
which
augmenteth
the
Worth
and
Excellency
of
it
:
whence
it
is
,
in
such
a
case
no
less
praise
to
receive
than
to
give
.
This
now
which
I
have
affirmed
,
cannot
be
doubted
of
:
yet
it
may
be
taken
for
evident
,
that
of
these
rewards
,
there
are
some
purely
Honourable
,
others
only
Profitable
;
and
a
last
sort
,
both
Honourable
and
Profitable
too
.
The
reward
purely
Honorary
is
,
when
the
King
confers
upon
a
Subject
some
Dignity
which
he
had
not
afore
;
as
upon
a
Plebeian
,
the
quality
of
Gentleman
,
upon
a
Gentleman
that
of
Knight
,
or
Marquess
,
&c.
and
permits
him
to
carry
Fleurdelizes
in
his
Coat
of
Arms
,
or
some
other
▪
Memorial
of
a
great
Action
:
Or
grants
him
the
privilege
to
wear
a
Crown
in
his
Crest
,
or
the
like
.
This
kind
of
reward
is
unlimited
,
because
Sovereignty
is
a
source
from
whence
new
Honours
and
Dignities
incessantly
flow
;
as
projections
of
Light
do
every
moment
issue
from
the
Sun
,
without
exhausting
its
secondity
;
and
on
the
contrary
,
the
more
rays
that
it
emitteth
,
the
more
resplendent
is
it
in
it self
;
so
the
more
Honours
a
King
confers
,
the
greater
Lustre
He
adds
to
His
own
Royal
Majesty
.
The
Romans
,
of
any
People
upon
Earth
,
did
most
abound
in
conferring
rewards
of
this
nature
:
and
on
that
account
,
brought
into
use
Crowns
,
Triumphs
,
Statues
,
Rings
,
Inscriptions
,
Publick
Praises
;
and
stuck
not
to
grant
Deifications
,
Temples
and
Sacrifices
:
such
a
love
they
had
for
Virtue
;
and
so
ingenious
were
they
to
inhance
the
merit
of
their
Fellow-Citizens
:
thus
inciting
them
to
worthy
Persormances
,
and
principally
to
an
advancing
the
power
of
the
Common-wealth
.
For
any
man
that
hath
a
Noble
Spirit
,
and
is
Virtuously
dispos'd
,
does
more
to
merit
a
just
reward
,
than
he
would
to
gain
the
Empire
of
the
World
:
because
in
the
issue
,
't
is
always
Virtue
that
triumphs
;
and
oft-times
but
Fortune
that
rules
.
In
conformity
to
this
example
,
which
both
Antiquity
,
and
the
Authors
of
it
,
and
Experience
,
do
render
Illustrious
,
the
King
may
Honour
such
as
serve
Him
best
,
with
Honourable
Titles
;
but
ought
to
punish
all
those
,
who
,
without
His
Permission
,
dare
assume
and
usurp
them
.
'T
is
necessary
that
there
be
a
difference
of
rank
between
Persons
;
and
the
distinguishing
of
them
by
their
merit
,
is
to
be
preferr'd
far
before
all
discrimination
made
by
their
Wealth
.
It
would
also
be
very
commodious
,
that
as
the
Honour
of
Knighthood
is
purely
Personal
,
so
the
King
should
make
the
Dignity
of
Baron
,
of
Marquess
,
of
Count
,
&c.
Personal
likewise
;
not
real
,
or
annexed
to
Estates
;
the
said
Dignities
to
become
extinct
by
decease
of
the
persons
invested
with
them
.
This
Expedient
,
to
recompence
Men
of
worth
,
being
well
managed
,
would
produce
a
marvellous
effect
;
and
an
whole
race
,
thereby
become
Men
of
Merit
.
For
,
what
would
not
the
Son
of
one
of
these
personal
Marquesses
do
,
to
prevent
falling
from
that
degree
of
Honour
which
his
Father
had
?
and
how
could
he
choose
but
press
vigorously
on
in
the
Court
of
Honour
that
has
been
thus
mark'd
out
to
him
?
But
in
this
case
,
there
is
one
thing
to
be
further
done
,
which
might
much
profit
the
State
,
by
laying
a
more
Express
Obligation
on
the
Nobility
to
serve
the
King
:
and
that
is
,
that
the
King
do
give
His
Letters
for
personal
Marquessates
,
in
such
form
as
they
may
be
verified
in
the
Parisian
Chamber
of
Accompts
,
and
the
Persons
Honoured
with
them
,
do
homage
to
His
Majesty
thereupon
.
Such
kind
of
Homages
have
been
done
heretofore
for
Officers
,
and
even
for
Pensions
,
though
but
of
two
hundred
Livres
.
The
Emperour
in
Germany
hath
,
in
this
manner
,
made
Gentlemen
,
and
Counts
of
the
Empire
,
as
for
example
,
the
late
Count
de
Guimene
;
who
had
not
a
foot
of
Land
within
the
Emperours
Jurisdiction
.
The
King
of
England
creates
a
Gentleman
,
Baron
,
and
Earl
of
a
Barony
,
or
County
,
in
which
the
Gentleman
possesseth
Nothing
.
The
second
kind
of
Gratifications
and
Rewards
,
is
of
those
that
are
purely
gainful
and
pecuniary
;
as
Pensions
,
Tickets
for
Money
,
Acquittances
by
Patent
,
Ransoms
,
Confiscations
of
deceasing
Strangers
goods
,
and
the
like
.
These
however
,
carry
a
great
deal
of
honour
with
them
,
as
I
said
afore
.
The
third
kind
,
is
of
those
that
are
at
once
both
gainful
an
honourable
,
as
Great
Offices
,
Governments
,
&c.
Upon
this
matter
of
Rewards
,
there
is
this
further
Reflection
to
be
made
;
namely
,
that
a
King
never
be
inform'd
of
a
good
Action
,
but
He
gratifie
the
Actor
,
either
with
Praises
,
or
with
Benefits
.
In
fine
,
all
these
favours
must
be
regulated
by
consideration
of
His
Service
,
and
the
welfare
of
His
State.
GOD
,
in
giving
Princes
a
Sovereign
Power
,
inspires
into
them
Affection
for
their
People
.
But
His
will
is
,
that
it
be
a
Paternal
Affection
;
that
a
King
do
open
His
Bosom
to
His
Subjects
,
as
His
very
Children
;
and
that
all
His
Counsels
and
Designs
be
levell'd
at
their
Felicity
;
without
which
,
Himself
cannot
be
happy
.
'T
is
principally
for
this
great
and
glorious
effect
,
that
Kings
are
Images
of
GOD
,
and
be
fortified
with
His
Spirit
.
I
have
said
,
that
Monarchs
are
in
their
Kingdoms
,
what
the
Soul
is
in
the
Body
of
Man
,
that
external
Goods
cannot
enrich
them
;
that
Virtue
alone
is
their
proper
Portion
,
as
it
is
of
GOD
Himself
.
It
now
remaineth
I
should
say
what
kind
of
Virtue
it
ought
to
be
.
'T
is
necessary
that
a
Great
Prince
have
Piety
,
to
give
His
Subjects
an
Example
of
it
;
and
bettering
of
them
in
this
,
is
the
security
of
His
State.
He
must
be
just
to
govern
them
.
A
Government
never
is
of
long
duration
without
Justice
.
This
Queen
of
Virtues
comprehends
,
(
as
Aristotle
judiciously
noted
)
all
the
rest
.
A
King
I
say
must
be
Just
,
to
render
unto
every
one
,
and
unto
Himself
,
what
is
respectively
due
.
The
third
Virtue
of
a
Prince
,
is
Prudence
,
to
foresee
of
Himself
what
may
betide
His
States
.
Thus
a
wise
Pilot
hath
the
skill
to
foresee
Calms
and
Storms
:
he
knows
by
secret
notices
,
whether
the
Winds
will
be
favourable
,
or
contrary
to
his
Voyage
.
The
fourth
Virtue
is
Magnanimity
;
a
weight
this
,
that
keeps
the
Soul
always
in
the
same
position
,
and
gives
it
so
setled
a
firmness
,
that
neither
good
nor
bad
successes
can
put
it
out
of
place
;
and
a
King
appears
unalterable
:
He
thus
bears
up
the
hope
of
His
Subjects
;
they
look
upon
Him
as
an
assured
succour
against
Fortune
,
and
persuade
themselves
,
there
is
somewhat
of
Divine
Quality
in
His
Person
.
Of
Royal
Virtues
,
a
fifth
is
Clemency
;
It
pertains
to
the
greatness
of
a
King
,
that
He
be
benign
,
and
do
commiserate
the
weaknesses
of
His
Subjects
;
who
are
Men
as
He
is
.
Mischances
are
pardonable
,
and
it
seems
to
me
,
't
is
too
much
rigor
to
punish
a
poor
wretch
for
a
Crime
committed
out
of
imprudence
,
or
by
necessity
;
and
of
which
he
is
less
guilty
,
if
I
may
say
it
,
than
his
ill
destiny
,
'T
is
to
Criminals
of
this
kind
,
that
Grace
should
not
be
deny'd
:
and
when
a
King
gives
one
of
His
Subjects
his
Life
,
who
hath
been
condemn'd
to
death
,
he
should
rejoyce
more
at
the
feeling
in
the
Secret
of
his
Heart
a
Will
to
Pardon
:
than
at
the
having
in
His
hand
the
power
to
punish
.
To
give
a
Man
his
Life
,
is
in
some
sort
to
create
him
;
and
the
preserving
of
his
Being
,
is
a
giving
of
it
.
It
would
be
,
't
is
true
,
a
great
fault
,
to
stop
the
course
of
Justice
,
in
case
of
publick
Crimes
,
and
such
as
have
disturb'd
the
Peoples
Peace
:
Yet
in
sum
it
is
Noble
,
that
a
King
be
inclin'd
to
compassion
and
Mercy
.
'T
is
an
action
appropriated
unto
GOD
,
to
disarm
His
Anger
:
Upon
this
ground
the
Roman
Poet
said
,
That
those
Thunderbolts
which
Jupiter
throws
,
might
be
diverted
.
The
sixth
Royal
Virtue
is
Liberality
.
One
of
the
Ancients
pronounced
,
that
it
was
less
disadvantageous
for
a
King
to
be
overcome
by
Arms
,
than
by
Liberality
.
A
Poet
introduceth
Mark
Anthony
excellently
saying
,
That
he
had
nothing
left
him
but
the
Benefits
he
had
conferred
.
And
to
say
true
,
A
Great
Prince
never
enjoys
His
Wealth
,
but
when
He
hath
given
it
.
Liberality
enricheth
Him
,
and
makes
Him
Purchases
of
inestimable
value
.
For
thereby
't
is
,
that
He
wins
the
love
of
his
own
People
,
and
becomes
admired
of
all
others
.
When
I
say
Liberality
,
I
mean
a
judicious
Liberality
,
such
as
is
a
Virtue
,
not
an
exorbitant
profuseness
;
a
Liberality
alway
exercis'd
with
Advantage
,
and
with
Glory
.
To
conclude
in
short
;
when
I
consider
other
Virtues
,
I
do
not
find
any
one
of
them
all
improper
for
a
King
;
but
it
is
impossible
a
King
should
have
those
which
I
have
mention'd
,
without
having
every
one
of
the
rest
;
since
they
are
inseparable
Companions
,
and
must
be
united
to
make
a
Virtuous
Man.
CHAP.
X.
1.
Of
Finances
,
or
a
Princes
Treasure
.
2.
Means
to
make
the
Subjects
more
numerous
.
3.
Of
the
Officers
that
manage
the
King's
Treasure
.
4.
Of
the
King's
Demesnes
.
5.
Means
to
recover
the
Demesnes
.
6.
Of
Taxes
.
7.
Means
to
ease
the
People
.
8.
Of
the
Free
Cities
.
9.
Of
the
Gabells
.
10.
Means
to
augment
the
Receipt
of
the
Gabells
,
and
ease
the
People
.
11.
Of
the
Salt-free
Country
.
12.
Of
the
Countries
of
State
,
and
Free
Gifts
.
13.
Of
the
expending
of
Money
.
14.
Of
the
reserving
it
.
THE
Art
of
Finances
,
or
the
Treasury
,
is
a
principal
part
of
the
Politicks
;
and
so
much
the
more
necessary
in
a
State
,
in
that
Money
is
the
Soul
of
all
Affairs
.
A
Common-wealth
is
no
further
powerful
,
than
proportionably
to
the
richness
of
its
publick
Treasury
,
and
the
greatness
of
the
yearly
Income
that
maintain
it
.
This
the
French
Name
plainly
importeth
;
for
Finance
is
an
old
Word
,
signifying
Power
,
and
comes
from
the
ancient
Verb
Finer
,
which
is
to
be
able
,
to
may
or
can
.
Three
particulars
are
here
to
be
considered
.
First
,
Just
and
easie
means
to
make
Money
.
Secondly
,
the
prudent
expending
it
.
Thirdly
,
the
keeping
it
in
,
and
laying
it
up
for
necessities
that
may
happen
;
as
Famine
,
Pestilence
,
War
,
Fire
,
Shipwrack
,
and
such
like
.
We
have
in
France
three
general
means
to
make
Money
;
The
King's
Demesnes
.
Impositions
on
the
People
,
Merchandises
,
&c.
Of
this
last
I
will
speak
in
the
Chapter
of
Commerce
.
I
will
say
nothing
here
of
Conquests
;
which
may
come
in
for
a
Fourth
means
of
Getting
;
I
will
treat
of
them
elsewhere
.
Before
any
further
advance
into
this
matter
,
it
will
be
pertinent
to
observe
,
that
the
fundamental
Wealth
of
a
State
consists
in
the
Multitude
and
Plenty
of
Subjects
.
For
't
is
Men
that
Till
the
Ground
;
that
produce
Manufactures
;
that
manage
Trade
;
that
go
to
War
;
that
People
Colonies
;
and
in
one
word
,
that
bring
in
Money
.
To
make
way
in
France
for
multiplying
of
Men
,
and
oblige
them
to
Marry
,
the
King
may
at
once
do
two
things
,
after
the
example
of
the
Emperor
Augustus
.
First
,
He
may
decree
Priviledges
and
Advantages
in
favour
of
such
as
shall
have
divers
Children
;
exempting
them
from
Guardianships
,
from
being
Collectors
,
from
Commissions
to
look
to
the
Fruits
of
Sequestred
Lands
,
and
other
burthensom
Offices
:
He
may
discharge
them
from
Subsidies
,
and
even
give
them
some
Estate
.
Secondly
,
He
might
impose
penalties
upon
those
that
Marry
not
before
a
certain
Age
:
and
take
part
in
the
Successions
of
all
sorts
of
persons
,
who
in
contempt
of
Law
and
Wedlock
,
live
single
,
not
having
impediment
by
any
natural
infirmity
.
'T
is
upon
a
like
consideration
,
that
I
said
in
a
former
Chapter
,
the
King
,
to
restrain
Parents
from
compelling
their
Daughters
into
Cloisters
,
might
Declare
,
that
the
right
of
all
Recluses
in
any
Succession
,
was
vested
in
Himself
:
And
't
is
for
the
very
same
reason
that
the
Ancient
Earls
of
Flanders
were
Heirs
to
all
the
Priests
that
were
their
Subjects
.
Now
to
that
which
Augustus
did
for
the
inducing
of
his
Subjects
to
Marry
,
the
King
might
add
Two
particulars
:
One
is
,
That
the
First
Year
a
Man
Taxable
did
Marry
the
first
time
,
being
under
26
years
of
age
,
he
should
be
exempt
from
all
Subsidies
and
Impositions
,
and
publick
Charges
,
even
quartering
of
Soldiers
,
in
case
he
kept
House
apart
,
and
was
setled
in
a
Dwelling
of
his
own
.
If
the
newly
Married
be
the
King's
Officer
,
his
Office
should
not
fall
into
the
King's
hand
,
if
he
died
within
the
year
.
Commanders
also
,
and
Soldiers
should
be
dispens'd
with
,
as
to
their
serving
for
that
time
,
unless
on
urgent
necessity
,
or
some
important
occasion
.
The
other
partilar
which
in
France
had
need
to
be
added
to
A
strange
abuse
in
this
matter
of
separation
hath
crept
in
of
late
,
nor
know
I
how
the
Officials
have
become
so
favourable
in
it
,
or
how
the
Parliaments
have
suffer'd
it
.
Now-a-days
,
a
Woman
that
would
have
,
as
they
say
,
her
swing
,
and
without
controul
,
practice
all
that
her
giddy
,
witless
,
and
oft
times
wanton
humour
prompts
her
to
,
raiseth
stirs
in
the
House
,
at
length
tires
out
her
Husbands
patience
;
hereupon
,
she
complains
of
his
Vices
,
hath
Servants
suborned
for
her
purpose
;
a
Divorce
comes
to
be
adjudged
upon
their
Depositions
,
the
Husband
is
sentenced
to
yield
her
up
her
Goods
,
and
not
only
do
that
,
but
also
to
let
her
have
possession
of
her
Dower
,
or
of
a
good
part
of
it
;
at
least
to
allow
her
a
great
Pension
.
Then
this
Woman
reties
,
takes
an
House
,
and
lives
after
her
own
fashion
,
which
is
not
alway
the
most
commendable
in
the
World
;
her
Husband
the
while
,
sinking
under
the
whole
weight
of
his
Houshold
Affairs
.
Had
she
counted
upon
nothing
else
,
but
that
of
necessity
she
must
live
with
her
Husband
,
and
in
his
House
,
she
would
have
formed
her self
to
it
,
and
not
have
play'd
her
vexatious
pranks
;
so
she
had
promoted
the
happiness
of
her
Husband
,
and
of
the
Children
,
and
together
with
it
,
her
own
.
For
application
therfore
of
a
remedy
in
this
case
,
it
must
be
a
Law
That
a
Wife
shall
not
sue
for
a
Separation
'
as
to
Person
or
Habitation
,
but
by
the
advice
'
of
four
of
her
nearest
Kindred
;
Men
of
known
Integrity
:
and
that
a
Separation
being
ordered
,
either
by
Sentence
in
Court
,
or
by
Accommodation
between
the
parties
,
she
shall
be
bound
to
enter
a
Monastery
,
without
egress
again
;
nor
suffered
to
admit
a
visit
from
any
man
there
;
it
being
contrary
to
Publick
decency
,
that
a
Woman
who
hath
lost
her
Husband
,
(
for
to
be
separated
from
him
,
is
to
lose
him
)
should
appear
openly
,
and
maintain
commerce
with
other
Men.
On
the
other
hand
,
her
Sex
,
and
all
seemliness
requiring
,
that
in
this
estate
she
hide
her self
,
and
hide
withal
her
ill
fortune
,
and
her
grief
for
it
.
I
would
too
that
a
very
slender
Pension
be
adjudged
her
.
And
since
Husbands
will
be
found
in
fault
on
their
part
likewise
,
and
discover
their
ill
husbandry
,
it
would
be
very
just
,
that
the
disposal
of
their
Estates
be
not
left
to
them
,
nor
the
possession
of
more
than
a
part
of
'em
:
as
is
the
case
of
Wives
:
and
that
supposing
they
have
Children
,
the
Money
arising
from
the
remainder
,
should
be
received
,
employed
,
and
administred
by
a
Guardian
:
He
to
accompt
for
it
to
the
said
Children
in
due
time
.
If
there
be
none
,
the
Revenue
exceeding
the
Pension
should
be
laid
out
on
Hospitals
,
and
other
necessities
of
the
State.
This
Law
should
extend
to
Separations
already
made
.
And
such
rigour
being
practis'd
in
matter
of
Divorces
,
there
would
be
no
more
of
'
em
.
Husbands
and
Wives
would
be
under
a
reciprocal
Obligation
,
to
live
together
,
and
to
live
together
discreetly
:
so
they
would
breed
up
a
Family
that
might
prove
the
contentment
of
their
Life
,
the
comfort
of
their
elder
years
;
and
be
beneficial
to
the
whole
Kingdom
.
There
is
a
further
consideration
to
be
made
in
the
matter
of
the
Finances
;
and
it
is
this
,
namely
,
that
it
is
expedient
the
King
should
declare
,
that
for
the
future
He
will
be
Creditor
,
and
Donotary
to
His
Receivers
and
accomptable
Officers
,
fot
their
Wives
dotal
Money
,
and
Marriage
settlements
,
and
for
their
Childrens
Portions
and
Donatives
:
then
explaining
the
late
Ordinances
to
take
away
all
difficulty
,
declare
further
,
the
crime
of
misemploying
the
publick
Money
to
be
punishable
by
death
;
and
ordain
,
that
the
Interests
,
Amends
,
and
civil
Reparations
adjudged
against
Criminals
of
that
kind
,
should
fall
upon
their
Heirs
or
Legatees
.
This
Law
is
rigorous
;
yet
it
is
just
and
necessary
:
forasmuch
as
it
will
strike
terror
on
the
Financiers
:
who
having
no
hope
to
escape
Justice
,
could
not
entertain
a
Thought
of
committing
a
fault
that
would
ruine
all
that
is
dearest
to
them
.
Beside
,
the
Romans
punish'd
even
with
death
,
the
very
friends
of
those
whom
they
condemn'd
for
Crimes
against
the
State
;
the
History
of
Sejanus
affords
unquestionable
proof
of
it
.
That
which
we
call
the
Demesne
of
the
King
,
and
of
the
Crown
,
cannot
be
Alienated
,
nor
is
it
liable
to
any
charge
or
encumbrance
.
This
Law
is
Fundamental
in
all
kind
of
Common-wealths
,
as
well
as
in
France
.
But
here
things
are
judged
to
belong
to
the
Crown
three
manner
of
ways
from
all
Antiquity
:
As
the
Soveraignty
,
the
power
of
War
,
Subsidies
,
and
the
like
.
By
Declaration
;
when
the
King
,
by
His
Letters
,
declares
some
particular
united
to
the
Crown
.
By
Confession
,
when
for
the
continued
space
of
ten
years
,
the
Receivers
have
accompted
for
it
to
the
Chamber
.
There
are
many
questions
proposable
in
reference
to
the
Demesne
;
but
it
is
not
our
business
to
State
them
.
Chopin
may
be
consulted
,
who
hath
learnedly
written
of
this
Subject
.
In
necessities
of
the
State
,
divers
things
have
been
engaged
by
the
King
to
the
use
of
private
private
persons
,
who
have
paid
in
Sums
thereupon
.
Yet
these
persons
cannot
hinder
,
but
that
the
things
may
be
recovered
.
And
there
are
two
equitable
ways
to
effect
this
.
The
First
is
,
by
making
a
Principal
of
what
is
due
to
those
Creditors
,
and
assigning
them
Rents
upon
the
Town
Hall
of
Paris
,
or
some
other
place
;
of
which
there
are
examples
.
For
when
the
King
had
Sold
,
or
rather
engaged
some
Rights
of
His
unto
particular
Men
,
they
have
been
resum'd
by
Contracts
for
a
Rent-charge
.
Now
those
Rights
were
Demesne
,
upon
which
,
to
recover
the
Demesne
,
Rents
were
charged
.
The
same
course
then
may
be
taken
again
.
Nor
could
the
Engagees
have
any
cause
to
complain
;
for
the
engagements
made
to
'em
,
are
but
to
secure
their
due
,
and
give
them
not
any
propriety
:
their
security
therefore
will
be
as
great
when
they
have
Contracts
for
Rent
.
For
the
one
and
the
other
pertains
to
the
Demesne
still
.
And
such
kind
of
Impositions
in
like
manner
,
the
power
to
impose
them
being
Royal
and
Dominical
,
the
Engagees
concerned
will
by
this
means
have
security
for
security
,
and
Rent
for
Rent
.
But
that
the
King
may
reap
advantage
from
this
exchange
,
it
is
necessary
to
settle
a
Stock
for
the
raising
of
these
new
Rents
;
and
to
that
end
,
a
new
Imposition
must
be
laid
upon
the
Clergy
,
the
Countries
of
State
,
Cities
,
Commonalties
,
Companies
,
Colledges
,
Merchants
,
and
other
Members
of
the
Kingdom
,
the
Engagees
themselves
paying
their
proportions
.
There
is
in
this
no
inconvenience
at
all
:
because
the
Demesne
having
been
engaged
for
the
preservation
and
defence
of
all
the
Corporations
in
the
Kingdom
,
it
is
natural
,
that
they
all
contribute
to
free
it
again
.
The
second
way
to
disengage
the
Demesne
,
would
be
,
by
giving
ready
Money
instead
of
Rents
,
and
making
an
Imposition
for
this
end
,
which
might
be
more
easie
.
A
reimbursement
should
be
compleated
in
five
or
six
years
.
Mean
time
,
and
before
all
things
,
the
Engagees
must
be
put
out
of
Possession
,
and
order
given
,
that
the
Receivers
of
the
Demesne
do
take
up
the
profits
.
For
if
any
condition
be
propos'd
while
the
said
Engagees
are
in
possession
,
they
will
make
a
thousand
difficulties
at
it
;
and
on
the
contrary
,
if
they
no
longer
possess
,
they
will
readily
consent
.
But
that
the
matter
may
be
transacted
with
less
noise
,
it
ought
to
be
expedited
in
each
Parliament
apart
:
or
at
least
the
Receivers
commanded
,
by
virtue
of
a
Decree
of
the
Kings
Council
,
to
receive
all
the
profits
,
and
even
those
of
the
engaged
Demesnes
.
If
there
be
not
made
a
new
imposition
,
in
order
to
recover
those
Demesnes
,
the
affair
will
not
be
of
advantage
to
the
King
;
and
there
may
one
be
very
justly
made
for
the
reasons
now
alledged
,
and
for
the
putting
of
things
again
in
order
,
Let
us
pass
unto
the
art
of
the
Tallies
.
The
Imposition
of
the
Tallies
[
or
Taxes
]
is
a
kind
of
Subsidy
or
Aid
laid
upon
the
people
.
Under
it
,
(
in
France
)
are
comprehended
the
Tallion
,
and
the
Subsistance
;
as
they
term
them
.
The
Tallie
is
hugely
equitable
;
it
is
ancient
;
it
is
necessary
;
and
in
use
all
the
world
over
.
For
there
never
was
People
that
paid
not
to
defray
the
publick
Expences
.
In
France
it
is
so
moderate
,
and
may
be
so
easily
paid
,
that
it
hath
been
known
to
be
higher
than
now
it
is
:
because
the
sums
that
make
it
up
are
receiv'd
without
much
trouble
:
Yet
at
present
,
though
it
be
considerably
diminish'd
,
the
People
are
scarce
able
to
pay
it
,
and
the
Country
extreamly
incommodated
by
it
.
The
prime
cause
of
this
is
,
that
the
ratable
persons
considered
,
the
rates
are
not
duely
proportion'd
;
the
rich
Peasants
,
the
Justicers
of
the
Villages
,
the
Gentlemens
Farmers
,
the
Eleus
,
and
other
Persons
of
Power
,
are
so
eased
,
that
they
pay
almost
nothing
,
and
the
poorest
of
all
do
bear
all
.
A
second
cause
of
the
mischief
is
,
that
they
who
are
Commission'd
to
receive
the
Tallies
,
do
so
run
up
the
charges
,
that
they
far
exceed
the
principal
,
and
thus
draw
Money
out
of
the
Peoples
hands
,
which
they
can
part
with
but
once
.
When
the
Sergeants
of
Villages
need
a
Cow
,
or
Corn
,
or
some
piece
of
Houshould-stuff
,
they
go
to
the
Peasants
houses
where
they
know
the
same
is
to
be
had
;
there
they
make
Seizures
,
and
then
Sales
at
what
price
they
please
.
They
seize
and
sell
whatever
they
find
,
to
the
very
Household-loaf
of
Bread
that
hath
been
cut
,
and
is
in
use
:
upon
this
,
the
poor
Rustick
hath
nothing
left
to
help
himself
,
but
is
utterly
distressed
,
and
can
no
longer
do
his
work
.
The
greatest
part
of
these
Officers
must
be
suppress'd
;
the
more
there
are
of
them
in
the
matter
of
the
Finances
,
the
more
disorder
and
oppression
there
is
.
For
all
of
them
look
for
profit
;
and
they
spoil
all
by
their
avarice
and
ignorance
.
To
remedy
the
two
Evils
that
have
been
mention'd
,
effectual
order
must
be
taken
that
the
Peasants
may
pay
equally
;
that
is
,
in
proportion
to
the
estate
they
have
;
and
pay
without
charges
superadded
.
First
,
all
the
Taxes
should
be
made
real
,
as
they
are
in
Languedoc
,
that
every
one
may
pay
.
Secondly
,
The
Tax
should
be
levied
in
kind
of
the
fruits
that
are
receiv'd
from
the
Lands
and
Tenements
,
as
Wine
,
Sider
,
Beer
,
Corn
,
Cattle
,
and
the
like
;
the
quantity
that
is
to
be
taken
being
stinted
and
fix'd
,
for
example
,
to
a
Tenth
part
.
A
Peasant
that
might
have
ten
Bushels
of
Corn
,
would
very
willingly
pay
one
to
the
King
,
and
might
do
it
without
inconvenience
.
But
when
for
payment
of
Forty
Sous
in
Money
,
which
he
hath
not
,
the
Sergeants
and
Collectors
seize
upon
,
and
sell
the
ten
Bushels
of
Corn
,
which
too
are
priz'd
at
an
extream
low
rate
,
and
all
is
spent
in
charges
,
doth
he
not
really
,
instead
of
Forty
Sous
,
pay
Twenty
Livres
?
This
turns
not
at
all
to
the
profit
of
the
King
,
and
tends
to
the
undoing
of
his
People
.
Under
the
name
of
Lands
and
Tenements
this
Tenth
might
be
extended
unto
Houses
in
Cities
,
Towns
and
Villages
,
and
they
ordered
to
pay
a
Tenth
part
of
the
Money
they
might
be
let
out
for
;
which
should
be
very
low
rated
.
In
like
manner
a
Tenth
or
Twentieth
part
might
be
taken
upon
Contracts
for
a
Rent-charge
.
For
these
are
stocks
,
and
a
real
Estate
.
The
Ecclesiasticks
,
who
have
sure
been
wary
men
,
have
taken
their
Rents
in
kind
,
and
these
sorts
of
Rents
are
now
infinitely
augmented
.
The
greatest
part
of
the
Revenues
of
the
Romans
and
Aegyptians
themselves
,
was
paid
in
Fruits
.
They
paid
their
Armies
and
Officers
with
them
.
Many
Kings
have
taken
a
Tenth
of
Estates
,
oft-times
a
Fifth
,
sometimes
a
Third
.
It
is
not
necessary
that
the
People
have
Money
;
but
they
must
have
Fruits
for
sustenance
of
life
.
The
King
might
have
Farmers
of
this
Tenth
in
each
Parish
,
or
in
each
Election
,
who
might
let
out
under
▪
Farms
of
it
to
the
Peasants
,
as
is
done
in
the
Tyths
of
the
Church
.
If
it
be
thought
fit
to
take
things
in
kind
,
there
must
be
Magazines
in
Cities
,
as
there
are
Store-houses
for
Salt
:
in
them
the
Receivers
should
sell
the
Fruits
,
or
reserve
them
,
as
Joseph
did
in
Aegypt
.
The
King
will
need
them
for
Armies
,
for
Fleets
,
for
Victualling
places
of
strength
,
for
Transportation
into
Foreign
parts
;
especially
in
case
of
a
Famine
.
This
is
practis'd
in
many
Countries
abroad
,
and
particularly
in
Italy
.
What
is
done
in
a
petty
State
,
may
be
done
in
a
great
Kingdom
.
It
is
not
to
be
doubted
,
but
that
if
the
Tallie
were
thus
rais'd
,
it
would
go
further
than
it
does
,
and
the
People
suffer
no
incommodity
by
it
at
all
.
But
one
thing
which
presseth
more
at
present
,
is
,
the
putting
of
the
Country
in
case
again
.
For
this
end
,
the
rich
must
be
permitted
to
give
Cows
,
Sheep
,
and
other
Cattle
,
upon
terms
,
to
the
poor
Peasants
.
This
is
done
in
very
many
places
,
yea
,
in
the
greatest
part
of
the
Kingdom
.
The
too
severe
,
and
over-scrupulous
Parish
Priests
prohibit
it
;
but
they
will
not
any
longer
be
able
to
do
so
,
when
the
thing
is
publickly
permitted
.
It
seems
unreasonable
,
that
some
certain
Cities
should
,
upon
imaginary
Privileges
,
be
for
ever
exempted
from
the
charges
of
the
State
;
and
mean
time
,
the
Country
bear
the
whole
weight
of
them
.
The
pretext
of
these
Franchises
hath
induced
divers
of
the
Peasants
to
retire
to
these
places
.
Order
must
be
taken
in
the
case
,
and
all
these
Cities
obliged
to
contribute
to
the
expences
of
the
Kingdom
,
which
they
are
so
considerable
a
part
of
.
They
may
then
be
brought
to
pay
,
under
colour
of
Subsistance
or
Loan
.
There
should
be
Garisons
sent
them
,
or
Soldiers
quartered
upon
them
▪
that
all
the
Beams
of
the
State
may
bear
their
part
in
publick
affairs
,
and
so
the
weight
be
more
easie
to
them
,
whereas
one
alone
would
be
over-charg'd
,
and
break
under
it
.
The
third
means
the
King
hath
to
bring
Him
in
Money
,
consists
in
the
Gabells
.
Some
have
said
,
that
the
Gabells
are
not
of
the
nature
of
the
Kings
Demesne
:
and
their
reason
is
,
because
the
Ordinances
for
the
first
imposition
of
them
do
import
,
that
it
was
not
the
Kings
intention
they
should
so
be
.
The
contrary
might
be
true
.
For
,
beside
that
the
Salt-pits
did
heretofore
belong
to
the
Emperour
,
as
goods
of
the
Empire
,
the
sums
that
are
raised
out
of
them
▪
are
raised
by
publick
Authority
,
and
turn
to
the
profit
of
the
whole
Kingdom
:
as
hath
been
done
for
many
Ages
.
But
however
that
be
▪
not
to
enter
into
a
dispute
,
which
can
be
of
no
consequence
here
,
I
will
consider
the
Gabells
according
to
the
present
state
of
things
.
I
will
not
say
when
this
kind
of
Imposition
did
commence
in
France
;
nor
upon
what
examples
of
Antiquity
our
Kings
did
ground
themselves
.
Not
will
I
explain
,
how
,
beside
the
Gabells
of
France
,
which
are
call'd
The
grand
party
,
there
are
the
Gabells
of
Provence
,
Dauphine
,
Languedoc
,
and
Lionnois
;
because
the
thing
is
known
,
and
makes
not
to
our
purpose
.
The
Gabells
are
paid
in
France
by
two
different
means
.
First
by
Impositions
;
so
in
places
neighbouring
on
the
Salt-free
Countries
.
There
,
for
fear
the
Subjects
would
not
take
Salt
at
the
Kings
Garners
,
the
Officers
see
how
many
Minots
each
Parish
ought
to
take
:
then
a
rate
is
made
in
the
Parishes
,
for
it
,
as
for
the
Tallie
.
The
second
means
is
without
Imposition
:
this
is
the
use
in
places
remote
from
the
Salt-free
Countries
.
There
,
because
prohibited
Salt
cannot
be
brought
in
,
every
one
fetcheth
from
the
Garners
at
the
price
currant
.
The
King
receives
a
great
deal
of
Money
from
these
Gaballs
;
but
the
People
pay
excessively
beyond
what
comes
into
His
Coffers
.
The
infinite
number
of
Officers
belonging
to
a
Store-house
,
the
Receivers
,
the
Commissioners
,
the
Archers
,
the
Charges
,
the
Portage
,
the
Fees
of
Officers
,
to
whom
Presents
are
also
made
,
do
swallow
up
huge
sums
,
which
the
King
fingers
not
,
and
the
People
do
pay
.
For
there
is
not
a
petty
Gabeller
but
lives
handsomely
by
his
Employment
:
not
a
Commissioner
but
makes
him
a
Fortune
,
and
grows
rich
upon
it
,
making
good
chear
,
and
great
expences
.
'T
is
of
very
much
importance
that
a
remedy
be
apply'd
to
the
malady
;
and
in
truth
,
the
vexations
which
the
King's
Subjects
do
suffer
under
pretext
of
the
Gabelle
,
are
not
to
be
comprehended
.
The
Archers
enter
into
Houses
,
to
search
(
they
say
)
for
concealed
Salt
:
in
obedience
to
Authority
the
doors
are
open'd
to
them
;
mean
time
themselves
covertly
convey
in
some
Bags
:
hereupon
they
form
a
Process
;
and
the
Master
of
the
House
is
excessively
fin'd
:
nor
do
they
depart
till
they
have
pillag'd
all
they
can
lay
hands
on
.
If
entrance
be
deny'd
them
,
they
force
the
House
,
and
act
all
Hostilities
:
nor
dares
any
one
complain
;
all
are
at
their
Mercy
;
and
thus
they
ruine
the
poor
Persons
whom
they
single
out
.
This
is
no
way
beneficial
to
the
King's
affairs
,
nor
is
it
His
intention
,
that
His
Subjects
should
be
so
ill
treated
.
But
it
is
easie
to
break
them
of
this
course
.
First
of
all
,
it
must
be
debated
in
the
Kings
Council
of
the
Finances
,
what
sum
is
fit
to
be
taken
for
the
Salt
;
this
sum
being
determin'd
at
ten
or
twelve
Millions
;
for
example
,
two
several
parts
of
it
shall
be
set
out
,
to
be
yearly
paid
:
one
for
the
Country-Parishes
,
another
for
the
Cities
.
Each
of
these
allotted
parts
shall
be
sent
into
each
Generality
,
and
thence
to
the
places
where
there
is
a
Store-house
of
Salt.
The
allotment
for
the
Country
shall
be
divided
by
the
Parishes
,
as
is
now
done
for
the
Tallie
,
the
Subjects
among
themselves
rating
every
one's
proportion
.
The
Gentlemen
,
the
Church
▪
men
,
the
Monasticks
,
and
others
,
must
be
engaged
in
it
,
and
bear
their
part
:
because
they
are
charged
by
reason
Salt
is
so
dear
as
now
it
is
;
and
by
consequence
,
the
King
making
a
change
to
the
profit
of
all
,
all
ought
to
be
taxed
,
to
recompence
the
diminution
that
will
follow
in
the
Finances
.
The
second
Sum
allotted
for
the
Cities
,
shall
in
like
manner
be
sent
to
the
Generalties
,
and
Salt-Garners
,
that
such
Rents
as
the
Towns
are
to
pay
the
King
may
be
divided
;
The
houses
may
be
measured
by
the
Perch
,
and
the
Rents
assessed
accordingly
;
much
like
to
what
is
done
for
cleansing
the
Strrets
at
Paris
.
The
Cities
that
claim
a
Freedom
,
as
Anger
's
,
Orleans
,
and
Paris
,
shall
enter
into
this
contribution
,
for
the
same
reason
that
the
Ecclesiasticks
and
Gentlemen
do
;
inasmuch
as
they
will
notably
profit
by
the
suppression
of
the
Gabells
,
and
abatement
of
the
price
of
Salt.
For
it
is
to
be
observed
,
that
that
measure
which
now
costs
at
Paris
five
and
forty
Livres
,
might
amount
not
to
two
Crowns
,
and
so
proportionably
in
other
Cities
.
Now
the
number
of
Perches
in
each
City
being
known
,
(
having
been
taken
by
Commissioners
of
the
Kings
,
who
might
be
Citizens
)
it
will
be
very
easie
,
on
any
necessity
,
toraise
an
aid
from
the
City
,
upon
the
proportion
of
the
said
Perches
,
by
way
of
Loan
or
Subvention
,
or
under
some
other
title
.
And
that
the
Citizens
may
not
oppose
the
Kings
intentions
in
the
matter
,
permission
must
be
given
to
each
City
,
to
treat
every
year
with
what
Merchants
they
please
;
and
agree
a
price
for
the
Salt
that
shall
be
there
sold
through
the
whole
year
;
He
to
sell
it
,
who
will
oblige
himself
to
afford
it
best
cheap
;
(
except
the
Citizens
had
rather
leave
it
free
for
all
Merchants
that
would
,
to
bring
in
,
)
always
understood
,
that
there
be
no
power
to
compell
any
one
to
buy
.
The
like
may
be
done
in
every
Village
;
the
Gentleman
causing
Salt
to
be
Sold
in
a
Servant's
name
,
and
making
the
profit
of
it
.
This
course
,
will
,
without
doubt
,
be
gain
to
the
People
;
and
Salt
being
sold
in
such
manner
,
it
may
be
brought
to
pass
,
that
the
Commodity
it self
shall
pay
the
Rents
which
shall
be
due
to
the
King
,
and
they
the
while
,
buy
it
at
much
a
lower
rate
than
they
do
.
So
that
clearly
,
all
sorts
will
receive
such
a
proposal
with
applause
.
To
augment
the
cheapness
of
Salt
,
it
should
be
ordained
,
that
it
be
free
from
paying
to
Lordships
,
and
by
the
Load
,
and
from
Imposts
.
The
thing
being
resolved
in
the
Council
,
the
King
shall
make
a
Declaration
in
form
of
an
Edict
,
by
which
His
Majesty
shall
take
off
the
Impositions
upon
Salt
,
on
condition
the
Towns
and
Parishes
will
pay
Him
yearly
the
Sums
He
shall
resolve
upon
in
His
Council
:
and
that
until
the
Declaration
be
executed
,
the
Gabell
shall
continue
its
course
.
It
would
be
needful
to
ordain
,
that
these
Sums
be
paid
into
the
hands
of
the
Receivers
of
the
Tallies
.
For
there
would
be
no
more
need
of
a
Receiver
of
a
Salt-garner
.
What
are
so
many
Receivers
good
for
,
but
to
consume
all
?
In
this
case
,
the
Receivers
of
Salt
must
be
otherwise
dispos'd
of
.
This
Declaration
would
include
a
suppression
of
all
the
Officers
of
the
Gabells
;
for
when
Salt
should
be
freely
Sold
,
the
King
would
have
no
more
use
of
'
em
.
As
for
their
re-imbursement
,
provision
might
be
made
,
either
by
continuing
their
wages
during
their
Lives
,
or
by
assigning
them
Rents
,
which
might
be
redeemed
for
little
and
little
;
or
by
giving
them
ready
Money
.
The
People
too
might
be
charged
with
this
re-imbursement
,
in
favour
of
the
suppression
of
the
Gabells
.
This
Affair
might
be
worth
the
King
a
great
deal
,
and
can
never
fail
of
being
beneficial
:
the
People
will
gain
six
Millions
by
it
,
beside
the
quiet
it
will
yield
them
.
It
being
put
in
execution
,
the
King
may
purchase
the
Salt-pits
,
upon
the
greatest
part
of
which
,
He
would-previously
have
the
Tenth
part
of
the
Salt
,
if
He
took
the
Tenth
of
all
Revenues
,
as
I
said
afore
.
Again
,
in
doing
as
hath
been
shewed
,
He
would
have
an
Army
ready
raised
:
for
all
the
Gabellers
must
be
led
into
the
Field
.
There
are
in
their
Companies
notable
stout
Men
,
who
also
have
been
in
action
.
As
for
the
Salt-free
Countries
which
have
bought
out
their
freedom
,
no
one
durst
touch
them
hitherto
,
by
reason
of
the
strength
of
the
Huguenots
,
the
Civil
and
Forraign
Wars
,
and
other
Considerations
,
as
the
Minority
of
Kings
,
&c.
But
now
that
the
King
is
Master
,
and
in
a
condition
to
make
Himself
be
obeyed
;
't
is
reasonable
,
that
he
do
oblige
so
many
great
and
rich
Provinces
to
bear
a
part
of
the
burthens
of
the
State
,
in
proportion
to
their
ability
,
for
the
easing
the
rest
of
France
.
And
to
this
end
,
one
of
the
three
following
Propositions
may
be
made
them
.
First
,
to
take
a
reimbursement
of
the
Sums
paid
by
them
;
which
re-imbursement
shall
be
made
,
by
granting
them
a
diminution
of
the
Tallies
,
without
putting
hand
in
Purse
other
ways
.
Hereto
may
be
subjoyn'd
,
that
the
King
may
not
wholly
discharge
them
:
because
such
a
discharge
tendeth
to
the
oppressing
of
his
other
Subjects
:
that
a
King
may
indeed
augment
and
diminish
Subsidies
,
as
seemeth
him
good
,
but
not
extinguish
them
;
it
not
being
possible
,
that
a
Kingdom
should
subsist
without
publick
Incoms
:
that
it
must
be
remembred
on
this
occasion
,
how
Nero
proposing
to
take
off
all
the
Imposts
that
were
paid
at
Rome
,
the
Senate
oppos'd
it
,
as
a
thing
that
would
be
the
ruine
of
the
Empire
.
The
Second
Proposition
might
be
,
that
these
Provinces
be
obliged
to
pay
the
King
a
yearly
Rent
,
by
way
of
Supplement
,
and
in
confirmation
of
their
ancient
Treaty
.
The
Third
,
that
the
Tallie
,
and
other
Impositions
on
them
,
be
augmented
,
to
even
the
ballance
,
which
cannot
be
done
any
other
way
.
There
are
certain
means
to
maintain
the
Finances
;
among
others
,
the
Free
Gifts
that
are
presented
to
the
King
by
the
People
of
those
Provinces
,
which
are
called
Countries
of
State.
No
other
Order
need
be
taken
with
them
,
but
to
hinder
as
much
as
may
be
,
that
the
principal
Members
of
these
States
be
not
in
the
Offices
they
bear
,
unjust
at
the
Publick
cost
.
Yet
they
must
make
their
advantages
in
them
,
otherwise
the
States
would
come
to
nothing
;
which
would
occasion
no
small
confusion
,
and
a
retardment
of
the
King's
Affairs
.
His
Majesty
might
make
Himself
Master
of
the
Deputations
,
and
gainful
Commissions
,
which
are
given
to
the
States
:
As
for
example
,
in
Bretannie
,
Monsieur
the
late
Mareschal
de
la
Milleray
,
nominated
alone
,
or
rather
,
caus'd
to
be
nominated
whom
he
pleas'd
,
and
there
was
no
more
deliberating
after
he
had
given
order
;
't
was
one
way
he
had
to
gratifie
his
Friends
.
Monsieur
the
Duke
Mazarin
,
does
the
same
still
;
which
may
,
in
His
person
,
succeed
well
:
but
the
King
may
cause
whom
he
will
to
be
nominated
,
and
the
liberty
of
the
States
will
not
suffer
by
it
any
prejudice
,
or
innovation
at
all
:
for
such
is
the
condition
of
things
in
these
places
.
I
will
not
speak
here
of
the
Farms
of
Iron
,
nor
of
others
of
like
value
.
These
things
run
in
ordinary
course
.
But
having
spoken
of
the
bringing
in
of
Money
,
I
must
speak
of
a
due
laying
out
,
and
a
like
due
laying
up
thereof
.
The
advantage
of
an
Exchequer
doth
not
consist
in
the
bare
getting
in
of
Money
;
but
also
in
a
meet
expending
of
it
:
and
there
is
no
less
profit
in
giving
of
it
forth
,
than
in
receiving
of
it
.
'T
is
necessary
the
King
should
spend
to
maintain
his
Revenues
.
For
if
all
the
Sums
that
come
into
His
Coffers
should
not
issue
thence
again
,
no
one
,
in
the
end
,
would
be
able
to
pay
Him
any
thing
.
The
Kings
of
Aegypt
,
who
took
a
third
part
of
their
Subjects
Estates
,
caus'd
the
Labyrinth
to
be
built
,
the
Pyramids
to
be
erected
,
the
Lake
of
Meotis
to
be
dug
up
,
and
other
Fabricks
raised
,
which
are
incredible
to
Posterity
.
Their
design
was
to
disperse
among
People
,
the
Treasure
they
received
from
them
;
and
withal
,
banish
sloth
and
idleness
out
of
their
States
.
These
two
Vices
,
so
dangerous
in
Kingdoms
,
the
Aegyptian
Laws
did
so
strictly
provide
against
,
that
there
were
particular
Magistrates
appointed
,
unto
whom
every
private
Man
was
obliged
to
give
an
account
every
year
of
all
that
he
had
done
throughout
the
year
;
which
was
executed
with
so
much
exactness
and
rigor
,
that
if
any
one
had
taken
an
ill
course
to
live
,
or
not
preserv'd
his
Estate
,
he
was
severely
punish'd
for
it
.
The
same
thing
was
done
at
Athens
,
and
the
Romans
had
Censors
,
who
took
the
like
care
;
they
had
it
in
charge
,
to
make
a
review
of
all
the
People
every
fisth
year
,
and
inform
the
Senate
of
all
that
was
amiss
in
the
Commonwealth
.
I
have
often
wondred
,
that
there
is
no
such
Officer
in
France
:
and
that
each
ones
Estate
is
not
precisely
known
,
which
'tis
hugely
important
,
it
should
be
;
because
in
difficult
times
,
when
the
Kingdom
perceives
it
▪
self
involv'd
in
urgent
necessities
,
succor
must
be
drawn
from
every
one
in
proportion
to
his
Interest
in
the
Publick
Fortune
,
that
is
,
in
proportion
to
what
he
possesseth
in
the
Kingdom
.
Expence
must
be
made
with
good
Husbandry
;
and
a
judicious
parcimony
observed
in
it
;
that
it
run
not
out
to
a
profusion
on
one
hand
,
nor
sink
into
a
sordid
avarice
on
the
other
:
If
Measure
and
Rule
be
not
kept
in
the
issuing
out
of
Money
,
all
the
Gold
of
Asia
will
be
but
a
small
matter
.
Caligula
found
the
way
to
consume
in
his
debauches
in
one
year
,
the
immense
Treasures
which
his
Predecessor
had
been
heaping
up
all
along
the
whole
course
of
his
Empire
.
Thus
it
is
expedient
,
that
a
King
do
cause
the
sums
to
be
paid
which
are
charged
upon
the
Receipt
of
his
Finances
;
and
also
that
He
give
liberally
;
but
always
so
order
the
matter
by
his
Prudence
,
that
nothing
go
out
of
,
or
be
kept
in
his
hand
,
but
for
the
preservation
and
prosperity
of
His
Subjects
.
I
said
in
a
former
Chapter
,
that
there
were
too
many
Officers
in
France
;
that
the
wages
they
draw
from
the
King
were
unprofitable
,
nay
,
prejudicial
to
the
State.
Since
the
Sale
of
Offices
was
introduced
,
divers
new
Creations
have
been
made
.
All
these
Edicts
were
meerly
to
get
Money
in
some
pressing
Occurrences
;
and
nothing
but
the
conjunctures
of
the
time
rendred
them
tolerable
.
Now
that
those
occurrences
are
over
,
and
the
conjunctures
pass'd
,
things
must
be
reduc'd
to
due
order
,
by
suppressing
all
those
new
Officers
.
I
noted
,
that
wherever
Magistracy
brought
gain
,
disorders
would
creep
in
;
the
reason
of
which
is
very
clear
,
and
very
natural
.
For
it
is
infallibly
certain
,
that
Judges
will
augment
the
number
of
Suits
,
while
those
Suits
will
bring
them
in
profit
.
Consequently
,
useless
Officers
being
suppress'd
,
and
provision
made
in
the
case
by
a
due
reduction
,
sufficient
Salaries
must
be
allowed
them
,
and
they
forbidden
to
take
any
thing
of
the
Plaintiff
or
Defendant
,
upon
the
Penalties
express'd
in
the
ancient
Statutes
.
And
that
the
King
might
make
a
stock
to
raise
those
Salaries
,
without
charging
His
Finances
,
it
should
be
ordained
,
that
such
as
go
to
Law
shall
,
when
they
commence
their
Suit
,
deposite
a
certain
sum
into
the
hands
of
the
Clerks
:
this
,
to
be
done
in
all
the
Royal
Jurisdictions
.
As
for
other
Judges
,
they
ought
to
take
nothing
at
all
:
the
proprietary
Lords
must
defray
the
charge
of
their
Courts
,
if
they
will
keep
up
the
Power
to
hold
them
:
they
having
it
of
the
King
upon
this
condition
,
from
the
first
Grant
of
the
Fiefs
.
In
matter
of
the
Finances
,
it
is
not
sufficient
to
have
the
Secret
of
getting
Money
,
and
the
skill
of
duly
expending
it
:
but
there
must
be
also
a
right
course
taken
to
make
reserves
of
it
.
The
Romans
had
a
publick
Treasury
,
where
every
year
they
laid
up
certain
sums
for
the
necessities
of
the
Commonwealth
.
Other
Nations
were
no
less
provident
.
History
tells
us
of
the
Stores
of
David
,
of
Croesus
,
of
Midas
,
and
many
others
.
The
King
having
setled
an
Order
in
His
Finances
,
both
as
to
Expences
and
Receipt
,
it
will
be
very
prudently
done
of
Him
,
to
limit
what
he
shall
think
fit
to
reserve
:
and
this
reservation
should
make
the
first
Article
in
his
Finances
,
and
be
continued
until
he
hath
in
his
Coffers
,
in
some
secret
place
,
the
fourth
part
at
least
of
all
the
Coin
in
the
Kingdom
:
the
rest
(
if
well
us'd
)
may
be
sufficent
for
all
the
People
to
maintain
Commerce
,
and
pay
the
King's
Revenues
I
say
,
this
reserve
should
be
in
a
secret
place
,
and
known
only
to
persons
of
approved
Fidelity
.
For
if
many
had
notice
of
it
,
such
a
store
might
occasion
Seditions
,
and
Civil
Wars
.
Now
a
fourth
part
of
the
Money
being
once
laid
up
apart
in
the
King's
Coffers
,
some
addition
to
it
shall
be
made
continually
from
year
to
year
,
in
proportion
to
what
comes
in
anew
.
Yet
liberty
must
be
left
to
Persons
,
for
some
time
,
to
have
Gold
and
Silver
Plate
:
yea
,
it
would
do
well
,
to
augment
the
use
and
mode
of
having
it
,
if
it
may
be
;
and
that
for
three
reasons
.
First
,
because
the
Goldsmiths
perceiving
hope
of
gain
,
will
not
want
inventions
and
industries
to
get
into
France
as
much
Mettal
as
possibly
they
may
,
either
in
ingots
,
or
barrs
,
or
coyned
pieces
.
Secondly
,
because
by
this
means
Riches
will
be
kept
in
the
Kingdom
,
and
when
a
season
for
it
comes
,
all
they
that
are
owners
of
such
Plate
,
may
be
commanded
to
carry
it
to
the
Mint
,
and
there
receive
the
price
of
it
.
The
third
reason
is
,
because
the
Goldsmiths
having
wrought
up
,
and
made
Plate
,
contrary
to
the
direction
of
the
Statute
,
(
which
undoubtedly
they
will
do
)
a
search
may
be
made
in
the
case
,
if
affairs
require
;
a
search
highly
just
,
and
no
less
advantageous
.
Two
regulations
must
be
made
for
the
Goldsmiths
,
and
they
enjoyned
to
observe
them
,
upon
pain
of
forfeiting
Life
and
Goods
;
and
so
strict
an
hand
held
over
them
,
that
of
all
who
trangress
,
not
a
Man
be
pardoned
.
The
first
is
,
to
prohibit
their
working
upon
any
piece
of
Gold
,
or
Silver
Coyn.
The
second
,
that
they
do
not
change
the
form
of
any
prohibited
Plate
:
rectifie
and
mend
it
they
may
.
At
the
same
time
,
all
Persons
that
have
any
such
and
would
put
it
off
,
must
be
commanded
upon
great
penalties
,
to
carry
it
to
the
Mint
,
where
ready
Money
shall
be
paid
them
for
it
,
at
the
currant
price
;
they
making
proof
that
they
are
the
true
owners
;
and
this
to
avoid
Thieveries
which
may
have
been
committed
.
These
two
regulations
will
oblige
the
Goldsmiths
to
make
use
of
new
Silver
,
or
Foreign
Coyns
,
and
thus
they
would
cause
a
very
considerable
quantity
of
either
to
enter
into
France
.
The
State
would
receive
no
small
profit
by
taking
a
due
order
in
matter
of
Coyn.
It
should
be
ordained
therefore
in
the
first
place
;
that
no
more
be
made
any
where
but
at
Paris
;
and
all
other
Mints
,
and
their
Officers
,
suppress'd
as
Useless
.
The
Romans
,
who
had
so
much
Money
,
had
but
one
place
to
make
it
in
,
which
was
a
Temple
of
Rome
.
Charlemain
forbad
any
Money
to
be
made
otherwhere
than
in
His
Palace
.
And
the
truth
is
,
should
all
the
Money
of
France
pass
through
Paris
,
the
King
would
much
better
know
what
quantity
of
it
was
in
His
Kingdom
.
Secondly
,
the
Court
des
Monnoyes
must
be
suppress'd
,
and
united
to
the
Chamber
of
Accompts
,
as
I
have
said
heretofore
.
In
the
third
place
,
the
value
of
Brass
Money
must
be
abated
;
this
kind
of
Coyn
being
the
ruine
of
the
State.
It
cannot
be
believ'd
how
many
Liarts
and
Sous
the
Hollanders
have
brought
into
France
.
It
would
be
convenient
to
set
the
Sous
at
two
Liarts
a-piece
,
the
Liarts
at
a
Denier
,
and
the
Doubles
at
an
Obole
,
(
half
a
Denier
:
)
but
this
should
be
done
by
little
and
little
,
and
the
fall
made
by
degrees
,
that
the
people
be
not
ruin'd
:
mean
time
,
Silver
pieces
of
six
blanks
,
others
of
a
Sous
in
value
,
and
of
twelve
Deniers
,
are
to
be
stamped
.
Brasiers
,
and
workers
in
Mettal
,
must
be
forbidden
to
melt
up
any
Sous
,
Liarts
,
or
Doubles
;
or
otherwise
use
them
in
work
.
For
after
the
Reduction
,
a
Sous
,
a
Liart
,
and
a
Double
,
would
be
worth
more
in
work
than
in
Money
;
and
that
quantity
of
them
which
is
in
the
Kingdom
being
preserv'd
,
would
suffice
for
Commerce
in
small
wares
;
they
also
being
less
▪
worth
in
Money
than
otherwise
,
Foreigners
would
bring
in
no
more
of
them
.
In
the
fourth
place
,
't
is
fit
that
a
Gold-coyn
be
made
of
the
value
of
the
Ludovicus
XIV
.
Franciae
Rex
:
on
the
reverse
,
a
Cross
with
Fleurdelizes
,
and
the
ordinary
Inscription
.
Of
these
pieces
there
must
be
some
of
twelve
Deniers
,
others
of
two
Sous
,
six
Deniers
:
others
of
five
Sous
,
of
ten
Sous
,
of
twenty
,
of
forty
.
And
to
have
matter
for
them
,
all
Loueses
of
sixty
must
be
forthwith
prohibited
:
because
a
multitude
of
false
ones
go
abroad
.
Afterward
,
the
Loueses
of
thirty
Sous
,
made
any
where
but
at
Paris
,
shall
be
call'd
in
;
and
there
must
the
new
Coyns
be
also
made
.
They
will
be
well
received
by
the
People
;
for
that
every
one
hath
an
extream
affection
for
the
King
;
and
because
in
France
we
account
by
Livres
,
or
Franks
,
and
have
no
such
Money
;
the
Quardecues
being
no
longer
current
.
This
new
Coyning
of
Money
is
likely
to
bring
a
great
deal
into
the
Kings
Coffers
.
Gold
and
Silver
must
be
held
in
France
at
an
higher
rate
than
they
bear
among
Strangers
;
that
we
may
draw
it
hither
▪
nothing
hath
brought
us
so
much
Gold
from
Spain
,
Italy
,
and
other
Countries
,
as
the
permission
sometime
grantéd
,
that
light
pieces
should
pass
.
The
same
thing
should
be
done
awhile
,
for
once
again
:
it
would
cause
all
Foreigners
to
come
and
take
off
our
Wines
,
our
Linnen
,
and
our
Corn.
I
should
not
forget
to
say
,
as
I
put
an
end
to
this
Chapter
,
that
the
Masters
of
Accompts
,
the
Correctors
and
Auditors
,
having
wages
of
the
King
,
ought
not
to
take
any
other
Salary
for
any
thing
they
do
,
that
directly
refers
to
His
Majesties
service
;
I
mean
,
for
the
Accompts
of
the
Treasurers
of
the
Reserve
,
and
other
Accomptable
Officers
:
for
they
are
paid
for
this
by
their
wages
:
practising
in
the
manner
they
do
,
they
take
,
as
the
saying
is
,
two
Tolls
of
one
grist
.
I
said
,
that
it
was
not
at
all
just
,
that
the
Masters
of
Accounts
,
Auditors
,
and
Correctors
,
take
Fees
for
the
Accounts
they
examine
,
forasmuch
as
they
receive
Wages
and
Privileges
from
the
King
:
also
this
Custom
was
anciently
practis'd
,
and
this
would
be
to
reduce
things
to
the
primitive
State.
I
well
know
,
that
the
pretence
of
these
Fees
is
founded
upon
the
creation
of
some
Chamber
of
Accouuts
,
where
those
payments
are
made
that
never
go
to
the
Chamber
;
but
this
pretext
is
frivolous
;
for
the
Chambers
of
Accompts
in
Montpellier
,
and
elsewhere
,
ought
not
in
like
mauner
to
take
any
Money
for
examining
the
Accounts
of
the
King
:
so
these
new
Chambers
take
away
no
Money
from
that
at
Paris
,
that
peradventure
takes
from
them
the
homages
,
and
the
verification
of
gifts
;
but
in
this
the
Clerks
only
are
the
loosers
,
and
the
Master
Auditors
and
Correctors
are
not
concern'd
.
Addition
.
Of
the
fine
gross
Farms
.
I
said
but
a
word
by
the
way
of
fine
gross
Farms
,
which
is
one
of
the
projects
to
raise
Money
by
;
the
fine
gross
Farms
are
let
upon
the
Merchandise
,
and
upon
the
receipt
of
the
Kings
Rights
;
to
avoid
the
charge
of
all
these
,
an
agreement
might
be
concluded
with
all
the
Merchants
,
to
pay
every
year
a
certain
sum
to
the
King
at
Paris
;
and
upon
their
doing
this
,
they
should
not
be
molested
in
their
passage
on
the
Rivers
,
or
by
Land
,
for
any
Toll
or
Custom
.
CHAP.
XI
.
1.
Of
Peace
and
War.
Of
Sciences
,
of
Arts
,
of
Laws
,
of
Publick
Edifices
,
and
Shews
.
2.
Of
Arms
,
of
Arsenals
,
Artilleries
,
of
Fortified
places
and
Governors
.
3.
Of
Armies
,
of
Conquests
;
how
a
Conquered
Country
should
be
preserved
.
EIther
Calm
or
Storm
,
if
perpetual
,
would
alike
unfit
the
Sea
for
Navigation
.
The
Waves
must
not
rage
,
and
swallow
up
the
Vessels
they
should
bear
:
but
there
must
be
Wind
enough
to
fill
the
Sails
,
and
give
convenient
motion
;
nay
some
little
Tempests
are
of
use
to
quicken
the
Pilots
skill
;
whom
continual
fair
weather
would
entice
into
a
dangerous
idleness
.
Just
so
is
it
necessary
,
that
there
still
be
,
in
a
great
State
,
especially
in
Nations
of
the
French
temper
,
some
moderate
agitation
,
and
that
the
noise
of
Arms
produce
an
effect
upon
them
,
like
that
of
the
Winds
upon
the
Sea.
Peace
,
by
general
consent
,
is
that
at
which
all
Politicians
do
aim
;
nor
can
it
be
deny'd
to
be
preferrable
to
War
,
being
natural
,
as
Liberty
is
.
Yet
War
hath
its
peculiar
advantages
;
and
those
to
such
a
degree
,
that
we
may
account
it
to
be
of
Divine
Right
.
To
say
true
,
what
other
right
did
GOD
give
His
People
against
the
Kings
of
Canaan
?
In
short
,
War
makes
the
Peace
of
Kingdoms
the
more
firm
,
as
a
Storm
causeth
the
Air
to
resume
a
more
setled
serenity
.
The
prudence
of
Laws
therefore
should
have
provided
Expedients
for
the
preservation
of
States
in
each
of
these
seasons
:
and
the
Wisdom
of
Legislators
hath
been
justly
taxed
,
in
that
they
have
not
sufficiently
thought
upon
this
provision
.
The
Poet
,
upon
this
ground
,
gives
his
Vlysses
all
along
,
the
company
of
Minerva
,
and
disguiseth
her
a
great
many
ways
,
that
she
might
not
be
parted
from
him
.
In
sum
,
the
Mythologists
representing
this
Goddess
armed
,
and
bearing
both
the
Shield
and
Thunder-bolt
of
Jupiter
her
Father
,
do
therein
let
us
know
,
that
the
Wisdom
of
a
good
King
ought
to
serve
Him
both
for
Peace
and
War.
And
such
was
the
manner
of
teaching
,
in
deepest
and
most
remote
Antiquity
:
Philosophy
then
but
growing
up
,
and
bashful
,
durst
not
shew
her
full
lustre
unto
deprav'd
and
ignorant
men
,
to
whom
She
was
yet
very
much
a
Stranger
.
She
accosted
them
veiled
with
the
shadows
of
Fable
;
and
went
softly
and
secretly
about
the
preparing
of
their
reason
to
receive
her
illuminations
and
instructions
.
But
to
return
to
our
similitude
;
A
Storm
doth
not
reach
to
the
whole
extent
of
the
Ocean
;
and
whatever
Tumults
be
in
some
part
of
a
Kingdom
,
yet
the
whole
doth
not
so
feel
the
shock
of
War
,
but
that
in
others
,
Peace
subsists
;
so
as
the
Glory
of
Arms
,
and
the
Contentments
of
a
full
Tranquility
,
may
be
had
together
.
Nevertheless
,
since
these
two
different
times
do
require
like
different
cares
;
each
of
which
were
enough
to
take
up
the
whole
application
of
an
excellent
King
;
it
is
expedient
to
consider
them
severally
.
Peace
is
undoubtedly
proper
for
the
Cultivation
of
Arts
and
Sciences
.
Knowing
Men
there
must
be
in
a
Common-wealth
;
it
being
necessary
that
there
should
be
good
Men.
For
knowledge
't
is
that
enlightens
our
Soul
,
shews
us
Virtue
,
and
inflames
us
with
desire
to
possess
it
.
I
joyn
Sciences
here
and
Arts
;
it
being
impossible
that
Men
should
have
the
one
without
the
other
.
For
as
they
are
Images
of
GOD
,
they
are
mov'd
by
a
natural
propension
,
to
produce
one
thing
or
other
;
so
that
having
acquired
general
Speculative
Principles
,
they
necessarily
descend
to
Practical
operations
,
which
are
perform'd
by
particular
Rules
,
from
whence
Arts
take
their
rise
.
This
is
done
during
a
Calm
;
then
the
Soul
,
not
interrupted
by
any
violent
agitation
,
enjoys
,
and
by
reflections
,
which
by
its
leisure
and
repose
permit
it
to
make
,
views
its
self
.
'T
is
in
these
precious
hours
that
it
may
come
to
know
the
Dignity
of
its
Original
,
and
be
assured
of
its
Immortality
.
At
such
a
time
,
having
and
keeping
its
faculties
united
,
it
gathers
the
fruit
of
a
solid
Wisdom
;
which
is
unto
the
Soul
,
as
the
Sun
is
to
the
Eyes
of
the
body
;
and
being
of
all
goods
the
greatest
,
communicates
its
self
in
precepts
;
whereof
Law
is
the
abstract
and
consummation
,
giving
the
same
spirit
to
all
the
People
.
To
proceed
:
it
is
important
,
that
Cities
be
enrich'd
with
publick
Buildings
,
as
Temples
,
Palaces
,
and
other
sumptuous
Edifices
;
because
People
have
,
by
that
means
,
the
more
affection
for
their
Country
.
The
Trojans
regretting
their
defeat
,
were
griev'd
more
for
the
ruine
of
Troy
,
than
the
subversion
of
its
Empire
.
And
the
Jews
in
Babylon
lamented
the
demolishing
of
the
Temple
,
where
they
had
offered
their
sacrifices
,
more
than
they
did
the
loss
of
their
Liberty
.
This
affection
of
People
for
their
Country
,
is
likewise
augmented
by
the
contentment
they
receive
in
it
;
and
this
Maxim
was
a
principal
reason
why
the
Greeks
and
Romans
exhibited
to
their
Subjects
publick
shews
.
'T
is
in
a
time
of
Peace
that
a
Prince
should
prepare
His
Forces
for
War
:
yea
,
He
ought
to
be
always
in
Arms
,
they
being
the
Ornament
of
His
Royal
Majesty
,
and
support
of
the
Laws
.
A
People
not
armed
does
degenerate
;
and
we
see
,
that
Nations
heretofore
eminently
redoubtable
,
are
now
bankrupt
as
to
Valour
and
Reputation
.
Croesus
after
his
defeat
,
counselled
Cyrus
His
Conqueror
,
in
recompence
for
the
Favour
which
had
been
shewed
him
,
to
disarm
the
Lydians
,
and
promote
among
them
Musick
,
good
Cheer
,
and
Pleasures
:
so
they
would
never
revolt
,
nor
fail
of
obeying
His
Command
.
This
Counsel
of
Croesus
was
really
good
:
For
by
that
means
the
Inhabitants
of
Lydia
lost
their
former
love
for
War
,
and
forgat
their
ancient
virtue
.
Yet
it
is
not
expedient
that
Arms
,
which
are
the
Kings
,
(
for
He
hath
the
power
of
the
Sword
)
should
be
in
the
hands
of
all
private
Persons
alike
:
and
the
difference
between
a
Citizen
and
a
Gentleman
,
a
Soldier
and
a
Country-Labourer
,
not
be
discern'd
:
Arms
therefore
must
be
in
their
hands
whom
the
King
intends
for
that
employment
:
and
He
being
every
ones
Protector
,
securing
all
by
His
Authority
,
all
others
must
be
expresly
forbidden
to
bear
any
,
without
His
permission
,
upon
pretence
of
Hunting
,
or
Journey
,
or
Enemies
:
and
this
upon
pain
of
being
Fined
,
and
in
case
of
reiterated
Offence
,
sent
to
the
Gallies
.
These
Penalties
too
must
not
be
meerly
comminatory
,
but
as
they
term
it
,
Legal
,
and
of
indispensible
necessity
.
Not
that
Gentlemen
should
all
be
depriv'd
of
the
liberty
to
wear
a
Sword
:
on
the
contrary
,
't
is
fit
to
be
injoyn'd
them
,
that
they
never
neglect
to
do
it
;
because
it
is
the
mark
of
their
Quality
,
and
continually
minds
them
of
the
Virtue
of
their
Ancestors
.
It
may
be
prohibited
them
to
carry
Fire-arms
;
yet
't
is
convenient
to
permit
them
to
keep
in
their
Houses
Musquers
,
Fire-locks
,
Pistols
,
and
other
Arms
;
for
that
they
naturally
are
Defenders
of
the
State
,
and
by
consequence
ought
to
be
furnish'd
for
any
occasion
that
may
be
offered
.
For
the
same
reason
't
is
meet
that
Gentlemen
be
enjoyn'd
to
keep
their
Stables
stor'd
with
good
Horses
,
to
breed
up
and
manage
a
number
of
them
for
their
Service
in
War.
But
to
this
end
,
the
use
of
German
Horses
for
the
Coach
,
must
be
forbidden
,
and
none
of
them
suffered
to
come
into
France
:
but
Mares
only
for
breed
.
Lawyers
,
Ecclesiasticks
,
Citizens
,
Merchants
,
Artificers
,
Husbandmen
,
should
never
wear
a
Sword
,
because
't
is
not
their
Profession
;
and
I
would
as
much
approve
a
Gentleman's
fancying
to
wear
a
Lawyers
Gown
,
or
a
Priests
Cassock
.
But
that
no
such
person
do
abuse
this
Honourable
mark
,
it
must
be
ordained
as
a
fundamental
Law
of
Honour
,
that
whoever
strikes
with
a
Sword
,
a
Man
,
who
,
(
not
being
of
such
profession
)
has
none
,
shall
be
declared
actually
fallen
from
all
Honour
,
and
as
a
very
Plebeian
,
yea
Villain
,
(
to
use
the
old
word
)
deprav'd
from
all
Gentility
,
and
reduc'd
to
the
rank
of
a
Labourer
.
Since
Arms
are
the
Kings
,
as
I
said
,
it
is
expedient
that
there
be
Magazines
in
divers
parts
of
the
Kingdom
:
they
,
committed
to
the
custody
of
safe
Hands
,
and
persons
of
unquestionable
Fidelity
:
in
them
a
store
of
all
sorts
of
Arms
Offensive
and
Defensive
;
ready
fix'd
,
to
Arm
40000
Men.
There
should
be
Equipage
for
Horses
,
Boots
,
Spurrs
;
One
of
these
Magazines
should
be
plac'd
at
Paris
,
to
cover
Picardy
,
Champagne
and
Normandy
.
One
at
Lion
,
for
any
occasion
that
might
happen
on
the
side
of
the
Mediterranean
of
Italy
,
of
Swisserland
,
or
the
Franche
Comte
.
One
at
Tholouse
,
or
some
other
City
of
Languedoc
,
for
all
that
might
be
apprehended
from
Spain
,
or
the
Sea
of
Guyenne
.
And
one
at
Anger
's
,
to
secure
the
Coasts
of
Bretagne
,
and
Poictou
.
There
need
be
beside
these
,
two
Arsenals
for
the
Sea
;
which
I
shall
speak
of
in
their
place
.
It
will
be
necessary
to
have
in
the
Magazines
a
good
number
of
Cannon
for
Battery
,
and
of
Field-pieces
ready
mounted
with
Powder
,
Ball
,
and
Equipage
for
the
Horses
of
the
Train
.
The
King
should
have
,
for
the
security
of
his
State
,
several
Fortified
Places
in
his
Kingdom
.
'T
is
an
ill
piece
of
Policy
to
neglect
them
;
and
good
heed
had
need
be
taken
,
that
he
that
may
chance
to
win
a
Battel
,
and
become
Master
of
the
Field
,
do
not
at
the
same
time
become
Master
of
the
Cities
also
.
It
is
known
what
Revolutions
England
hath
suffer'd
by
it
.
And
on
the
contrary
,
Flanders
clearly
shews
what
a
Countrey
thick
set
with
Fortresses
is
.
Yet
Excess
being
every
where
vicious-I
would
observe
a
mediocrity
here
.
But
,
above
all
,
there
must
be
left
no
Fortifications
in
Towns
or
Castles
,
which
belong
to
particular
Lords
:
except
the
King
places
in
them
other
Governors
than
the
Proprietors
.
These
kind
of
Places
embolden
Persons
of
Quality
that
possess
them
,
to
Declare
themselves
,
and
make
Parties
in
a
time
of
Civil
War
:
what
pass'd
at
Tailebourg
in
the
last
Troubles
,
is
an
example
fully
authorizing
what
I
have
propos'd
.
I
will
say
more
of
strong
Places
and
Garisons
in
the
Chapter
of
the
Education
of
Children
.
It
is
not
sufficient
to
have
such
strong
places
,
and
them
well
furnished
with
Garisons
and
brave
Soldiers
;
unless
there
be
given
them
Captains
fit
to
Command
them
,
and
to
be
their
Governors
.
In
each
place
then
there
must
be
four
sorts
of
Officers
.
The
Governor
,
the
King's
Lieutenant
,
the
Governor's
Lieutenant
,
and
the
Major
.
These
all
having
their
Commissions
from
His
Majesty
,
it
is
expedient
,
that
,
as
far
as
is
possible
,
their
bearing
Office
be
limited
to
a
certain
time
;
to
the
end
,
that
the
continuing
of
'em
longer
may
be
in
nature
of
a
recompence
for
their
Services
.
And
they
thus
attending
with
the
greater
diligence
to
their
Duty
;
I
should
also
wish
,
that
being
continued
in
employment
,
they
should
change
place
.
As
for
example
,
That
a
person
who
hath
been
the
King's
Lieutenant
three
years
at
Dunkirk
,
should
go
serve
as
Lieutenant-Governor
at
Peronne
,
or
elsewhere
.
Not
that
such
a
Change
were
fit
to
pass
upon
all
the
Officers
of
a
place
at
the
same
time
.
But
let
their
Commissions
last
three
Years
,
and
every
Year
one
be
changed
,
that
they
may
serve
together
one
Year
only
.
It
is
meet
to
,
after
the
manner
of
the
Turks
,
that
their
Commissions
expired
,
they
be
kept
a
Year
without
employment
,
to
see
whether
there
be
any
complaint
against
them
.
These
alterations
would
work
two
effects
equally
advantagious
to
the
King's
Service
.
The
First
is
,
that
every
one
would
stick
to
his
Duty
.
The
Second
,
that
the
King
always
having
such
kind
of
Employments
to
give
,
there
would
be
more
persons
to
hope
for
them
;
which
would
much
more
strongly
engage
them
to
well-doing
.
The
same
usage
should
be
introduc'd
,
if
it
be
possible
,
in
reference
to
Governors
,
the
King's
Lieutenants
.
There
is
a
concluding
observation
to
be
made
;
namely
,
that
it
being
the
Custom
for
Governors
to
have
some
Companies
of
Carabines
,
which
they
call
their
Guards
;
they
give
them
Cassocks
of
their
own
Livery
.
I
would
have
this
Order
changed
;
and
that
the
King
should
every
year
send
each
Governor
a
Troop
of
Horse
to
serve
about
him
for
a
Guard
;
they
having
the
King's
Cassocks
as
a
Badge
of
their
Commission
;
and
their
Officers
carrying
the
Staff
in
presence
of
their
Governor
during
their
year
of
service
.
This
would
be
a
means
to
augment
the
Authority
of
the
King
,
and
not
diminish
that
of
the
Governors
.
As
to
Armies
,
it
cannot
be
precisely
said
of
what
number
of
Men
they
should
consist
;
nor
whether
they
ought
to
be
strongest
in
Horse
or
in
Foot.
This
wholly
depends
upon
the
enterprizes
that
are
made
,
upon
the
quality
of
the
Country
,
and
nature
of
the
Enemy
.
I
should
advise
,
that
a
Great
King
do
keep
Troops
on
foot
,
even
during
Peace
,
nothing
is
so
necessary
to
a
State
as
old
Soldiers
.
Augustus
,
after
his
Victories
,
did
not
cashier
the
Forty
Roman
Legions
;
which
prov'd
to
be
the
safety
of
the
Empire
.
Constantine
,
on
the
contrary
,
disbanded
them
;
and
thence
came
,
in
the
issue
,
the
dissolution
of
the
Power
of
the
Romans
Augustus
however
,
and
the
other
Caesars
,
committed
a
great
fault
in
keeping
the
Pretorians
in
a
Body
,
for
the
Grandeur
of
their
Persons
;
and
History
tells
us
what
lamentable
changes
they
made
in
the
succession
of
the
Emperors
.
The
Turks
have
fallen
into
like
disasters
by
following
the
like
usage
.
I
should
therefore
judge
it
expedient
to
divide
the
Troops
into
several
Quarters
,
and
keep
them
in
far
distant
Garisons
.
The
ancient
Kings
of
Aegypt
had
a
great
many
Soldiers
perpetually
in
Pay
,
and
were
always
apprehensive
of
their
Instructions
:
but
found
a
way
to
secure
themselves
from
all
such
Seditions
of
their
Armies
.
Dividing
them
into
Bodies
,
according
to
the
diversity
of
Nations
,
they
gave
them
different
Ensigns
;
as
for
instance
,
to
some
a
Crocodile
;
to
others
a
Dog
;
to
a
third
sort
a
Cat
;
and
so
the
rest
.
Now
the
Aegyptians
being
hugely
Superstitious
,
they
were
easily
induced
to
believe
,
that
their
Tutelary
Deities
were
included
in
the
figure
of
those
Beasts
which
were
given
them
for
Ensigns
;
and
that
they
had
the
same
Antipathies
among
them
in
Heaven
,
which
those
Beasts
that
represented
them
,
had
to
one
another
upon
Earth
.
Thus
under
a
Veil
of
Religion
,
those
People
were
possess'd
with
an
aversion
for
each
other
,
like
those
Animals
which
they
had
been
ordered
to
carry
in
their
Banners
;
yet
all
were
close
united
,
and
perfectly
at
accord
for
the
common
defence
of
the
State
:
so
nothing
could
be
executed
against
the
intentions
of
the
Prince
;
because
as
soon
as
any
should
begin
to
stir
,
the
rest
would
immediately
have
opposed
them
.
Upon
this
example
the
King
might
divide
all
his
Troops
by
Provinces
;
and
though
there
should
be
no
engaging
of
Religion
in
the
case
,
yet
much
advantage
would
,
without
fail
,
be
drawn
from
thence
.
For
the
Nations
would
strive
to
out-vie
one
another
,
with
more
zeal
and
ardor
than
the
Regiments
now
do
.
These
Regiments
themselves
might
have
names
given
them
from
the
Arms
of
their
Provinces
;
as
that
of
the
Bretons
might
be
called
the
Regiment
of
the
Ermine
;
that
of
the
Normans
the
Regiment
of
the
Leopards
,
&c.
Jutius
Caesar
raised
a
new
Legion
among
the
Gauls
,
and
gave
it
the
name
of
the
Lark
.
But
what
I
say
in
this
particular
,
is
but
the
giving
my
Opinion
.
For
I
am
not
of
the
mind
,
that
the
order
of
the
Militia
should
be
changed
,
or
Regiments
disbanded
,
which
consist
of
the
best
and
most
War-like
Troops
that
are
in
the
World.
'T
is
ordinarily
a
great
question
;
of
what
Soldiers
an
Army
should
be
composed
.
We
have
Subjects
and
Forreigners
.
The
Subjects
are
Gentlemen
and
Plebeians
.
The
Plebeians
are
Citizens
and
Rusticks
.
On
the
other
hand
,
of
Forreigners
,
some
are
the
Auxiliary
Troops
of
Allies
,
which
serve
at
the
cost
of
their
own
Princes
:
as
when
the
King
sent
succors
into
Germany
,
and
unto
the
Hollanders
:
Others
are
Troops
that
serve
at
the
cost
of
the
State
which
employs
them
.
The
Ancients
termed
them
Mercinaries
.
Such
at
this
time
are
the
Suissers
,
and
not
a
few
Germans
.
All
these
different
sorts
of
Soldiers
may
be
used
,
as
necessity
and
the
conjuncture
of
Affairs
requires
.
The
Romans
did
so
.
It
is
true
,
by
their
Treaties
of
Alliance
they
always
obliged
their
Allies
to
send
them
a
certain
number
of
Soldiers
;
but
these
were
not
incorporated
with
their
Legions
;
and
it
is
clear
,
that
Subjects
are
ever
best
;
of
Subjects
,
Gentlemen
have
ordinarily
more
courage
than
others
.
Of
Plebeians
,
those
of
the
Country
are
to
be
preferred
before
the
Inhabitants
of
Cities
;
because
Peasants
are
more
accustomed
to
Labour
and
Hardship
than
Townsmen
are
.
Auxiliary
Troops
serve
but
for
a
time
;
and
often
,
when
some
continuation
of
service
is
demanded
of
them
,
they
impose
hard
conditions
.
Mercenaries
will
have
Money
,
and
care
not
if
a
State
be
ruin'd
,
so
themselves
are
paid
.
In
fine
,
Strangers
may
on
the
suddain
change
Interests
and
Party
;
so
of
Friends
becoming
Enemies
;
and
that
in
occasions
of
greatest
importance
.
Mercenaries
above
all
,
do
serve
without
affection
,
and
seldom
stand
it
out
in
Fight
unto
the
utmost
.
They
push
on
a
Victory
indeed
,
but
scarce
ever
win
a
Battel
.
In
short
,
Strangers
should
be
as
little
made
use
of
as
possible
:
and
scarce
for
any
other
cause
,
but
that
Enemies
might
be
deprived
of
their
Aid
.
When
Strangers
only
are
taken
into
Service
,
the
Subjects
grow
less
War-like
,
and
the
most
considerable
of
them
despise
War
,
as
is
done
in
Spain
;
and
extreamly
ill
done
.
The
Carthaginians
were
ruined
principally
by
the
fault
they
committed
in
employing
Numidian
Troops
and
other
Strangers
;
and
not
sending
out
their
own
Citizens
in
their
Armies
.
I
will
not
here
speak
of
the
Art
of
War
;
't
is
a
matter
that
deserves
a
Chapter
apart
.
Yet
I
will
say
cursorily
,
that
the
Rules
of
it
change
as
Time
and
Seasons
do
.
We
neither
attack
Places
nor
defend
them
,
in
the
very
manner
that
the
Ancients
did
.
There
is
also
a
great
deal
of
difference
between
their
way
of
fighting
and
ours
;
so
that
they
had
not
the
Arms
which
we
now
use
.
All
of
precept
for
the
leading
of
an
Army
,
that
faileth
not
nor
changeth
,
is
,
that
Discipline
be
exercised
;
wherein
Commanders
should
never
be
remiss
.
The
only
School
of
War
,
is
War
it self
:
and
twenty
Years
experience
will
better
make
a
great
Captain
than
an
hundred
Years
Reading
.
Not
but
that
we
have
examples
of
General
Command
given
to
persons
,
who
never
were
in
Armies
afore
.
There
are
elevated
Spirits
,
to
whom
nothing
is
impossible
;
but
the
instances
are
rare
;
and
't
is
too
too
hazardous
a
course
to
rely
upon
them
.
For
a
Captain
must
have
,
not
only
spirit
and
courage
,
but
also
credit
with
his
Soldiers
;
which
cannot
be
gotten
but
by
service
.
In
fine
,
it
is
necessary
for
a
great
State
to
keep
War
on
foot
,
and
Men
of
Quality
must
be
employed
in
it
:
to
the
end
there
may
always
be
a
stock
of
good
Soldiers
,
and
a
breed
of
Generals
.
These
two
things
give
a
Nation
marvellous
advantages
and
esteem
among
Foreigners
.
Though
France
now
be
a
most
powerful
Monarchy
,
by
means
of
its
Extent
,
of
its
Scituation
,
the
Fruitfulness
of
the
Soil
,
the
Number
of
its
Inhabitants
;
and
though
greatest
States
have
not
always
most
strength
,
as
biggest
Men
are
not
always
stoutest
;
yet
were
it
to
be
wish'd
,
that
the
King
did
add
unto
his
Kingdom
,
First
all
the
Low
Countrys
to
the
Rhyne
.
This
Conquest
would
re-settle
Him
in
possession
of
the
ancient
demain
of
His
Predecessors
,
giving
France
gain
its
primitive
limits
.
It
would
make
him
Master
of
the
Northern
Seas
,
and
by
consequence
,
Arbitrator
between
the
Crowns
of
Sweden
and
Denmark
,
Poland
,
&c.
Conquest
must
be
aspired
to
out
of
a
thirst
of
Empire
,
being
an
unjust
thing
,
(
if
we
believe
Aristotle
:
for
I
would
not
determine
,
but
that
the
right
of
War
were
a
very
lawful
right
,
consonant
to
what
I
have
said
in
the
beginning
of
this
Chapter
;
)
but
the
desire
of
Conquest
should
principally
be
for
the
doing
of
good
to
all
Men
;
which
is
the
end
why
GOD
gave
them
Laws
.
The
more
Subjects
and
Power
a
just
Prince
hath
,
the
better
will
it
be
for
the
World.
Secondly
,
It
were
convenient
that
the
King
had
Strasbourg
,
to
keep
all
Germany
quiet
.
In
the
third
place
,
He
need
have
the
Franche
County
,
to
lay
a
restraint
upon
the
Suisses
,
least
dividing
themselves
between
the
Empire
and
France
,
or
serving
Spain
in
a
War
there
,
they
strengthen
his
Enemies
.
In
the
fourth
place
,
Milan
is
necessary
in
respect
of
Italy
,
to
give
the
lesser
Sovereigns
and
Republiques
protection
,
and
ballance
the
Power
which
the
King
of
Spain
hath
usurp'd
there
.
In
the
fifth
place
,
Genoa
and
all
its
Territory
,
pertains
to
the
King
:
nor
would
the
Genoese
have
revolted
,
had
it
not
been
for
the
bad
counsel
given
to
Francis
the
First
,
to
discontent
Doria.
Genoa
would
make
the
King
Master
of
the
Mediteranean
Sea
;
beside
,
those
two
Acquisitions
would
keep
the
Duke
of
Savoy
lock'd
up
within
French
Territories
:
So
he
would
never
depart
from
the
King's
Service
,
being
entirely
His
dependant
.
We
must
re-enter
the
Isle
of
Elba
,
and
into
Portolongone
,
and
Piombino
,
on
the
continent
,
to
drive
the
Spaniards
out
of
Italy
.
Here
our
nearness
would
keep
the
Duke
of
Florence
,
the
Dukes
of
Parma
,
of
Modena
,
and
of
Mantua
,
and
even
the
State
of
the
Pope
,
in
a
submission
for
France
.
Corsica
would
not
stand
out
after
the
reduction
of
Genoa
;
and
then
Sardinia
would
be
no
difficult
Conquest
.
This
would
strongly
favour
any
stirs
on
the
account
of
Liberty
or
Discontent
that
might
be
raised
in
the
Kingdoms
of
Sicily
and
Naples
:
nor
would
it
be
an
hard
matter
to
raise
them
in
time
.
On
the
Coast
of
Bayonne
there
would
be
need
of
Fuentaravia
;
and
those
parts
of
the
Kingdom
of
Navarr
which
the
Spaniards
have
in
possession
,
might
be
justly
re-demanded
.
The
King
might
also
carry
His
Arms
into
Catalonia
:
we
have
ancient
pretensions
there
;
and
the
Conquests
of
it
would
be
no
less
easily
atchieved
than
it
was
in
the
time
of
the
last
War.
Majorca
and
Minorca
would
follow
without
trouble
.
Thus
the
King
would
be
absolute
Umpire
of
the
Mediterranean
,
and
of
all
the
fortune
of
the
Spaniards
.
If
it
should
happen
one
day
that
the
Queen
,
or
Her
Descendants
,
should
have
an
Hereditary
Right
there
,
the
King
would
be
in
a
condition
to
do
Himself
reason
in
these
matters
.
The
means
of
making
these
Conquests
severally
,
cannot
be
shewed
without
particular
discourses
.
Mean
time
,
what
I
have
said
is
not
,
in
truth
,
to
be
done
in
a
day
:
it
would
be
an
enterprise
of
many
years
.
Yet
there
is
nothing
of
meer
fancy
it
it
.
I
propose
no
Conquest
to
be
made
but
what
hath
really
been
made
,
except
that
of
the
Isles
of
the
Mediterranean
,
which
our
Kings
never
minded
;
for
that
before
Charles
the
Eighth
they
never
were
in
case
to
strengthen
themselves
at
Sea.
Bretagnie
was
separted
from
the
Kingdom
,
the
Wars
of
Italy
took
up
every
Reign
unto
Henry
the
Second
.
Then
follow'd
the
affairs
of
Religion
,
which
put
a
stop
to
all
the
designs
that
might
have
been
formed
in
this
behalf
.
Here
one
thing
I
suggested
in
the
precedent
Chapter
,
is
to
be
remembred
;
namely
,
That
Conquests
do
afford
a
State
one
expedient
to
get
Money
.
In
this
the
Roman
Captains
are
to
be
imitated
;
who
made
it
a
point
of
Glory
to
lay
up
extraordinary
sums
in
the
Publick
Treasury
;
and
their
Triumphs
were
as
illustrious
by
the
wealth
they
brought
home
with
them
,
as
by
the
Enemies
they
had
defeated
in
their
Expeditions
.
It
would
be
very
material
therefore
,
that
Generals
should
account
it
a
Glory
to
them
,
to
bring
the
Spoils
of
their
Enemies
unto
the
profit
of
the
King
and
Kingdom
;
or
at
least
make
the
Conquered
Countrys
maintain
and
pay
their
Armies
.
But
the
difficulty
is
not
to
make
Conquests
;
the
Arms
of
the
French
will
be
Victorious
wherever
they
appear
.
All
the
trouble
is
to
find
out
the
secret
how
to
keep
what
hath
been
gotten
.
It
is
fit
to
say
something
on
this
particular
.
The
means
to
preserve
Conquer'd
Countrys
which
the
Ancients
used
,
and
that
with
good
success
,
are
in
a
manner
these
.
Transportations
,
and
shiftings
of
the
People
.
As
when
the
Chaldeans
led
away
the
Jews
to
Babylon
.
The
taking
away
of
their
Money
,
of
their
richest
Goods
,
their
Antiquities
,
their
Holy
Things
and
things
of
Religion
;
as
was
done
with
the
ancient
Idol-gods
,
and
as
the
Ark
of
the
Covenant
,
the
Tables
of
Moses
,
and
the
Israelites
holy
Writings
,
were
dealt
withall
.
The
same
for
substance
might
be
done
among
us
,
by
shifting
of
Saints
Reliques
and
Consecrated
Images
.
The
leading
away
of
the
ablest
Men
,
and
such
as
have
greatest
credit
with
the
People
.
So
did
the
Romans
when
they
carried
some
of
the
Greeks
out
of
their
Country
to
Rome
,
and
treated
them
there
with
all
possible
kindness
and
civility
.
In
like
manner
as
to
Artificers
:
the
Turks
drew
at
one
time
30000
Work-men
out
of
Persia
.
The
Romans
,
out
of
their
Enemies
whom
they
had
vanquish'd
and
taken
in
War
,
reserved
those
whom
they
thought
stoutest
,
and
made
them
fight
on
the
Theatre
,
the
People
being
Spectators
,
destroying
them
by
that
means
.
Christianity
suffers
not
such
inhumanity
.
Slavery
was
alway
practis'd
in
the
case
of
Prisoners
of
War
,
and
the
ransom
we
make
them
pay
,
is
an
Image
of
that
old
Custom
.
Some
People
to
this
day
stay
their
Prisoners
,
or
send
them
away
to
punishment
,
after
the
fashion
of
the
Ancients
.
To
proceed
,
other
means
in
reference
to
conquer'd
Countrys
are
,
the
mixing
of
the
old
and
new
Subjects
by
Marriage
,
the
Conquerors
accommodating
themselves
to
the
manners
of
the
Conquered
,
taking
up
their
modes
,
eating
with
them
,
as
Alexander
demeaned
himself
towards
the
Persians
.
Then
again
,
the
ruining
the
Fortifications
of
their
Towns
;
the
taking
Hostages
of
them
:
the
taking
away
their
Arms
,
and
keeping
them
weak
;
the
abstaining
from
their
Wives
;
the
giving
them
no
jealousie
in
matter
of
Love.
To
have
little
converse
with
them
,
especially
in
their
Houses
;
and
when
any
is
,
to
see
it
be
with
seriousness
and
decency
;
to
honour
them
;
to
do
them
a
pleasure
on
occasion
;
not
play
with
them
;
not
pick
any
quarrel
with
them
:
not
touch
their
Liberty
,
nor
the
Goods
that
have
been
left
them
:
not
disquiet
them
for
matters
of
Religion
.
To
do
them
Justice
,
maintain
them
in
their
Laws
and
Customs
,
and
in
their
manner
of
Government
,
as
the
Romans
did
;
who
permitted
the
People
whom
they
had
subdued
,
to
have
their
accustomed
Laws
To
be
diffedent
of
them
,
and
shew
a
confiderde
in
them
.
To
appear
not
desirous
of
their
secrets
:
not
interrupt
them
in
their
pleasures
:
make
them
pay
the
Tribute
agreed
upon
with
them
exactly
,
not
at
all
augmenting
it
.
To
keep
word
with
them
in
all
things
,
seldom
meddle
in
their
affairs
,
except
it
be
to
accord
them
:
to
lend
them
no
Money
;
but
owe
them
some
,
and
punctually
pay
the
Interests
of
it
:
not
let
them
know
the
true
State
of
affairs
;
not
give
them
entrance
into
strong
holds
;
which
must
always
be
well
furnish'd
with
Men
and
Provisions
▪
That
the
Governor
never
come
among
them
without
being
strongest
,
or
having
Hostages
.
To
prevent
their
assembling
,
and
hinder
as
much
as
may
be
their
having
Commerce
with
Neighbours
that
are
under
another
Prince's
Dominion
:
to
keep
off
all
kind
Strangers
from
Houses
,
and
severely
punish
such
of
'em
as
shall
cause
the
least
trouble
,
or
any
motion
that
may
tend
to
Sedition
.
If
our
Conquerors
had
practis'd
in
this
manner
,
Italy
and
Sicily
would
have
been
French
to
this
day
.
CHAP.
XII
.
Of
the
Sea
,
and
its
usefulness
.
2.
Means
to
augment
the
Kings
Power
there
.
3.
Of
Commerce
.
4.
Of
Colonies
.
THE
Water
of
the
Sea
are
wholly
obnoxious
to
the
humorousness
of
Fortune
;
and
the
Wind
that
governs
them
turneth
and
changeth
with
as
much
inconstancy
as
that
blind
Goddess
.
Yet
it
is
certain
,
that
those
States
whose
renown
is
greatest
in
Story
,
did
not
establish
their
supreme
Dominion
,
but
upon
the
power
they
attained
to
at
Sea
:
as
if
Virtue
,
stout
and
undaunted
,
had
resolv'd
to
Combat
and
Conquer
her
Enemy
in
the
very
seat
of
her
Empire
.
The
Romans
are
one
instance
,
(
whose
example
is
ever
to
be
follow'd
with
as
peculiar
a
diligence
,
as
their
conduct
of
matters
was
with
singular
wisdom
,
and
hard
to
be
imitated
:
)
They
imposed
not
upon
the
World
their
Laws
,
till
they
had
forced
the
Seas
to
receive
and
acknowledge
them
.
Had
they
not
set
out
War-like
Fleets
,
they
had
never
accomplished
their
glorious
Designs
;
they
had
never
extended
their
Frontier
beyond
Italy
;
never
brought
down
the
Pride
of
Carthage
;
nor
Triumphed
over
all
the
Crowns
on
Earth
.
The
Aegyptians
,
the
Persians
,
and
the
Grecians
,
considered
the
Sea
as
the
principal
support
of
their
Domination
.
Xerxes
having
caus'd
the
H●li●spout
to
be
to
punish'd
(
as
he
termed
it
)
with
Stripes
,
accounted
his
Vanity
satisfy'd
in
the
sight
of
all
Asia
,
which
he
drew
after
him
into
Greece
,
with
so
much
Magnificence
and
Pomp
,
that
it
seemed
as
if
Jupiter
Himself
was
come
down
from
Heaven
.
The
Venetians
still
renew
every
year
their
Alliance
with
this
Element
,
by
an
old
fond
superstitious
Custom
,
casting
into
the
Sea
a
Ring
,
as
if
they
espoused
it
:
perhaps
by
this
use
they
would
inform
all
the
particular
Subjects
of
their
Common
wealth
,
that
they
should
be
content
with
the
inconstancy
and
infidelity
of
their
Women
,
since
the
State
of
espousing
the
Sea
,
espouseth
inconstancy
and
infidelity
it self
.
The
Riches
of
Tunis
,
of
Algier
,
of
Holland
,
and
England
,
plainly
prove
the
necessity
there
is
for
Princes
to
be
Strong
at
Sea
,
and
do
shew
the
Profit
which
does
thence
accrue
.
These
are
petty
States
,
yet
dare
measure
their
Forces
with
those
of
the
Greatest
Monarchs
.
The
former
of
them
are
Turkish
Slaves
,
the
others
revolted
Burghers
;
and
how
insolent
soever
the
English
are
,
they
must
confess
,
that
all
the
Brittish
Isles
laid
together
,
do
not
equal
the
half
of
our
Continent
,
either
in
Extent
,
or
in
Fruitfulness
of
Ground
,
or
for
Commodiousness
of
Scituation
,
or
in
number
of
Men
;
in
Wealth
,
in
Valour
,
Industry
,
and
Understanding
;
yet
they
fear
not
to
affirm
themselves
Sovereigns
of
the
Sea.
Had
they
cast
up
the
Wracks
they
have
suffered
,
and
the
Battles
they
have
lost
;
had
they
well
examin'd
our
Ports
and
Havens
:
in
fine
,
had
they
compar'd
the
Coasts
of
France
with
those
of
England
,
they
would
condemn
their
Vanity
,
as
Canutus
,
one
of
their
ancient
Kings
,
did
.
'T
is
true
,
all
States
are
not
disposed
unto
Navigation
:
either
because
they
are
too
far
up
in
Midland
Countries
,
or
because
the
temper
of
the
People
suits
not
with
it
;
or
because
they
want
Subjects
:
but
't
is
so
far
,
that
any
of
these
Obstacles
should
hinder
the
French
from
addicting
themselves
unto
it
;
that
on
the
contrary
,
all
things
conspire
to
raise
desire
of
it
in
them
;
and
to
give
them
hope
of
advantageous
success
.
The
work
however
is
such
as
must
be
leisurably
carried
on
,
and
perfected
by
little
and
little
;
so
great
a
design
continually
allarming
Europe
,
Asia
,
Africa
,
and
America
,
Friends
and
Foes
.
A
precipitation
of
it
would
be
its
ruine
.
I
say
not
what
number
of
Vessels
would
be
fit
for
France
to
put
to
Sea.
But
I
affirm
that
the
King
may
keep
an
hundred
Gallies
,
and
an
hundred
Ships
on
the
Mediterranean
;
and
a
Fleet
of
Two
hundred
Sail
upon
the
Ocean
.
The
more
Vessels
He
shall
have
,
the
more
enabled
He
will
be
to
recover
the
expence
made
about
'
em
.
As
to
the
building
of
such
numbers
six
or
ten
years
of
time
may
be
allotted
for
it
:
and
there
is
Timber
in
France
,
there
is
Cordage
,
there
are
Sails
;
there
is
Iron
and
Brass
;
there
are
Victuals
and
Workmen
;
so
that
the
King's
Subjects
will
gain
the
Money
which
is
laid
out
in
'
em
.
Is
it
not
far
better
for
the
King
of
France
to
build
Ships
for
the
employing
and
enriching
of
His
Subjects
,
than
it
was
for
the
Kings
of
Aegypt
to
build
their
useless
Pyramids
?
There
need
be
no
anxious
enquiry
whence
a
Stock
should
rise
for
this
advance
;
every
year
will
bring
in
Money
;
and
the
Vessels
once
made
,
and
their
Guns
mounted
,
it
will
not
cost
the
King
a
Quardecu
for
other
Equippings
.
'T
will
be
but
to
give
the
Captains
Places
in
the
Ships
and
Gallies
,
on
condition
to
fit
them
out
;
and
there
will
more
persons
come
to
take
them
,
than
there
will
be
Offices
and
Places
to
be
bestowed
.
'T
is
true
,
Fleets
being
out
,
there
will
need
vast
Sums
to
maintain
them
:
but
the
Sea
will
yield
a
maintenance
for
the
Sea
,
either
by
Commerce
or
by
War.
Neither
will
it
be
always
proper
to
keep
so
many
Vessels
in
service
.
On
the
other
hand
,
it
will
not
be
necessary
to
have
so
many
Troops
at
Land
as
are
at
present
.
For
Spain
or
Italy
will
not
dare
to
disfurnish
themselves
of
their
Men
;
so
there
will
be
no
need
of
a
Land-Army
but
towards
Germany
.
The
number
of
Rowers
will
be
made
up
by
bringing
Men
from
Canada
,
and
the
American
Islands
:
or
by
buying
Negroes
at
Cape
Verde
:
or
by
sending
all
Malefactors
to
the
Gallies
.
And
when
things
have
taken
their
course
,
Seamen
will
be
had
;
time
,
and
the
profit
that
will
accrue
,
will
afford
store
,
and
bring
them
in
from
all
parts
of
the
World.
Hereupon
the
Corsairs
of
Algiers
,
Tunis
and
Tripoli
;
will
not
be
able
to
keep
at
Sea
;
and
the
French
being
continually
on
their
Coasts
,
they
will
be
constrain'd
to
tarry
at
home
for
the
guarding
of
their
Towns
:
so
not
in
a
condition
to
send
out
Troops
for
collecting
the
Tribute
which
they
exact
of
the
Arabs
,
and
Princes
who
lye
further
up
in
Africa
;
the
Tributaries
will
,
without
fail
,
revolt
:
and
the
King
may
in
the
sequel
,
Treat
with
them
for
their
recovering
their
Liberty
,
and
take
them
into
his
Protection
,
There
is
no
cause
to
fear
the
Power
of
the
Ottoman
Port
in
this
particular
.
For
beside
that
the
Turks
are
no
good
Seamen
,
the
Grand
Signior
doth
make
no
such
account
of
the
Pyrats
of
Algier
,
as
that
their
fortune
is
considerable
to
Him.
The
Friendship
of
the
French
is
more
necessary
for
Him
,
both
in
point
of
Commerce
,
and
in
reference
to
other
Interests
.
The
Fleets
which
the
King
might
keep
upon
the
Ocean
,
would
make
Him
Master
of
all
the
Powers
and
Trade
of
the
North.
Yea
,
though
the
English
and
Hollanders
should
unite
against
France
,
they
could
not
avoid
their
ruin
in
the
end
.
For
how
should
the
one
and
the
other
make
good
their
Commerce
,
which
is
all
they
have
to
trust
to
,
if
they
were
forced
to
maintain
great
Armada's
to
continue
it
?
The
point
of
Bretannie
is
the
Gate
to
enter
into
,
and
go
out
of
the
Channel
.
Fifty
Ships
of
War
at
Brest
would
keep
this
Gate
fast
shut
;
and
they
should
not
open
it
but
by
the
King's
Command
.
Spain
and
Portugal
would
not
be
able
to
attempt
any
thing
but
by
His
permission
,
if
there
were
kept
a
Fleet
on
the
Coast
of
Guyenne
.
Thus
there
would
need
no
War
almost
to
be
made
for
all
these
things
;
nor
His
Majesties
Forces
hazarded
.
It
would
be
sufficient
to
give
his
Order
to
Forreiners
.
Nor
will
it
be
difficult
to
cut
them
out
work
in
their
own
Countries
,
and
by
this
means
stay
their
Arms
at
home
,
and
make
them
spend
their
strength
there
.
I
shall
something
of
this
in
its
place
hereafter
.
There
is
one
further
excellent
means
to
strengthen
the
King
at
Sea
:
and
it
is
the
taking
Order
that
no
more
of
His
Subjects
go
to
Malta
.
To
do
this
,
there
must
be
given
in
Fee
to
the
French
Knights
of
St.
John
of
Jerusalem
,
some
Isle
in
the
Mediterranean
,
as
for
Instance
,
the
Isle
du
Levant
,
for
which
they
should
pay
an
acknowledgment
to
the
King
,
as
they
do
for
Malta
to
the
King
of
Spain
.
There
might
be
given
them
too
on
the
same
condition
,
an
Isle
in
the
Ocean
,
as
Besle-Isle
,
l'Isle-Dieu
,
or
the
Isle
of
Ree
:
so
that
the
French
Knights
fighting
not
but
against
the
Enemies
of
their
Country
,
they
would
make
War
upon
the
English
as
upon
Turks
;
and
keep
the
Islands
at
their
own
charge
,
whereas
the
King
is
fain
to
keep
great
Garisons
,
and
be
at
vast
expence
to
do
it
.
There
is
no
cause
to
fear
that
they
will
ever
give
the
King
any
trouble
:
for
being
French
,
they
cannot
fail
of
Affection
or
Obedience
:
and
their
Kindred
,
together
with
the
Wealth
they
have
in
France
,
will
be
perpetual
Hostages
to
the
King
,
and
caution
for
their
Fidelity
.
This
Project
is
just
:
for
of
ten
parts
of
the
Knights
of
Malta
,
no
less
than
eight
do
come
from
the
Commanderies
of
France
;
and
it
is
easie
to
be
put
in
execution
;
for
there
need
be
only
a
stopping
the
income
of
the
Commanderies
to
effect
it
.
The
Order
in
general
will
find
its
advantages
in
it
;
both
in
that
there
will
be
an
addition
made
it
of
two
considerable
Islands
:
and
that
the
King
will
receive
the
Knights
into
a
more
particular
Protection
than
he
hath
done
hitherto
.
The
number
of
Commanderies
may
also
be
augmented
,
by
giving
them
some
Maladeries
,
(
or
Hospitals
for
the
diseased
)
which
are
always
usurped
by
People
that
have
no
right
to
them
at
all
.
Be
it
observed
in
the
last
place
,
that
it
is
very
requisite
the
Office
of
Admiral
,
and
Powers
of
the
Admiralty
,
should
be
united
to
the
Crown
.
It
hath
been
an
ill
Policy
in
France
,
and
a
Diminution
of
the
King's
Authority
,
to
communicate
unto
a
Subject
so
much
of
His
Soveraignty
at
Sea
as
hath
been
done
.
He
must
resume
it
to
Himself
,
and
be
every
way
Supreme
alone
:
Then
He
may
appoint
a
select
number
,
whose
charge
may
be
to
give
Him
advice
of
the
State
of
Maritime
concerns
;
and
hold
a
Council
from
time
to
time
upon
them
in
His
Majesties
Presence
,
if
He
please
to
assist
.
These
Officers
shall
in
this
Council
judge
of
Prizes
,
and
other
Sea-affairs
;
and
when
its
necessary
,
be
Commission'd
,
some
of
them
,
to
visit
the
Ships
,
and
make
report
,
or
send
their
acts
in
Writing
concerning
them
.
Other
Officers
for
the
Marine
shall
be
Military
:
they
,
to
execute
the
King's
Orders
,
and
have
the
conduct
of
Designs
and
Enterprizes
in
the
usual
manner
.
It
is
important
to
the
King's
Service
,
that
the
Captains
of
Ships
and
Gallies
,
be
honoured
with
Dignities
and
Rewards
.
There
may
be
created
Mareschals
of
France
for
Armies
at
Sea
:
as
there
are
for
those
at
Land
,
with
the
same
Honours
and
Prerogatives
.
The
Romans
decreed
a
Triumph
for
Captains
who
had
been
victorious
at
Sea
,
and
called
it
a
Naval
Triumph
.
They
gave
also
Naval
Crowns
,
as
well
as
Mural
and
Civical
.
These
Honours
would
eminently
promote
the
King's
intention
as
to
the
Marine
.
There
must
be
two
Arsenals
erected
:
One
in
Provence
,
in
some
Town
upon
the
Rhosen
,
for
what
relates
to
Naval
Expeditions
on
the
Mediterranean
:
another
upon
the
River
Loire
,
for
all
occasions
on
the
Ocean
.
By
means
of
these
two
Rivers
,
it
will
be
easie
to
bring
out
to
Sea
all
the
Vessels
that
are
builded
:
and
all
necessary
Provisions
and
Tackling
whatever
.
Nor
need
it
be
feared
that
any
Enemy
should
get
up
these
Rivers
:
they
too
may
be
shut
up
by
Bridges
,
or
by
Chains
,
or
by
Forts
.
His
Majesties
Power
thus
strongly
setled
on
each
Sea
,
it
will
be
easie
to
secure
Commerce
in
France
,
and
even
draw
the
Merchants
thither
from
all
parts
.
I
say
secure
Commerce
:
for
till
all
this
be
done
,
it
will
ever
be
uncertain
and
dangerous
.
Now
't
is
unnecessary
to
expatiate
here
,
in
proving
what
profit
Commerce
brings
in
to
most
potent
States
;
the
thing
is
generally
known
,
and
all
Men
convinc'd
of
it
.
Again
,
I
know
not
why
it
hath
been
said
,
that
Trading
is
contrary
to
Virtue
;
except
it
be
,
for
that
Merchants
are
incessantly
busied
in
studying
inventions
to
get
Money
,
and
be
in
a
sort
,
Servants
to
the
Publick
.
The
Romans
,
the
Thebans
,
and
the
Spartans
admitted
not
any
Citizen
of
theirs
unto
the
administration
of
Affairs
,
unless
he
had
for
Ten
whole
years
sorborn
Merchandizing
:
because
they
would
not
have
their
principal
Magistrates
accustomed
to
Gain
,
and
expert
in
the
means
to
do
it
.
These
kind
of
inclinations
being
blameable
in
persons
,
who
being
destined
to
great
Employments
,
ought
to
be
above
all
Considerations
of
private
Interest
.
Commerce
in
every
Common-wealth
ought
to
take
its
measure
from
the
temper
of
the
People
,
from
their
strength
,
their
wealth
,
the
fertility
of
their
Grounds
,
and
the
situation
of
their
Country
.
Therefore
Order
must
be
taken
,
that
things
traded
in
be
useful
,
and
in
a
manner
,
necessary
.
For
it
is
a
rule
in
Oeconomie
,
that
a
Man
spend
not
his
Money
in
what
is
pleasing
,
though
he
needs
it
,
but
only
in
what
is
absolutely
necessary
.
But
necessity
is
stated
by
the
Birth
,
the
Dignity
,
and
the
Estate
of
Persons
;
as
for
example
,
noble
Furniture
is
necessary
for
a
great
Lord
;
not
so
,
for
every
meaner
Gentleman
:
and
thus
in
othes
cases
,
proportionably
still
to
the
rank
and
fortune
of
Men.
It
must
be
studiously
prevented
,
that
Commerce
introduce
not
into
a
State
,
Superfluity
,
Excess
and
Luxury
;
which
are
often
followed
with
Ambition
,
Avarice
,
and
a
dangerous
corruption
of
Manners
.
And
forasmuch
as
it
is
not
sufficient
to
Commerce
,
that
there
be
people
to
Sell
,
but
Merchants
must
be
had
to
buy
,
otherwise
no
Wares
can
go
off
;
in
which
all
the
advantage
of
Trade
doth
consist
:
it
is
meet
,
that
Traders
furnish
themselve
,
with
necessaries
,
rather
than
with
things
that
meerly
tend
to
Ease
,
or
Magnificence
.
Among
necessaries
,
those
make
up
the
first
rank
,
which
do
sustain
Life
it self
;
the
second
is
of
them
that
are
for
convenience
;
others
are
also
necessary
to
preservation
from
Diseases
,
the
injuries
of
Time
and
violence
of
Enemies
,
as
Medicinals
,
Dwelling
,
Arms.
There
is
every
where
a
twofold
Commerce
,
which
is
visible
in
France
,
more
than
in
any
other
part
of
the
World.
The
First
is
for
things
ordinarily
found
in
the
Country
,
some
of
which
are
spent
by
the
Inhabitants
themselves
,
and
others
transported
.
The
Second
,
for
Foreign
Merchandises
.
We
have
in
France
,
Wines
,
Corn
,
Linnen
and
Salt
,
in
so
great
a
quantity
,
that
we
send
them
into
the
neighbor
Kingdoms
;
and
the
quality
of
them
is
so
excellent
,
that
strangers
cannot
forbear
to
come
and
carry
them
out
of
our
Ports
.
We
have
Cattle
,
Skins
,
Wooll
,
Tallow
,
Oils
,
and
other
things
necessary
for
Man
,
of
which
Foreiners
export
very
little
,
but
our selves
do
in
a
manner
spend
them
all
:
and
this
is
the
great
wealthiness
of
France
,
that
we
have
enough
to
serve
our
turn
without
Foreign
Merchandises
;
but
Forreigners
cannot
do
well
without
ours
.
We
receive
from
other
Countries
,
Minerals
,
Pearls
,
Precious
Stones
,
Silks
,
Spices
,
and
what
seems
to
be
matter
of
Luxury
.
Order
should
be
given
,
that
in
France
,
the
Commodities
we
have
be
made
use
of
,
before
any
Foreign
Merchandises
be
employed
:
because
this
Order
followed
would
bring
in
the
people
Money
,
and
take
off
their
Commodities
;
which
would
incline
every
one
to
fall
to
the
work
of
his
Calling
,
and
the
whole
Kingdom
be
thereby
hugely
benefited
.
It
hath
been
a
question
offer'd
to
debate
,
Whether
Traffique
in
France
should
be
managed
by
the
Subjects
,
or
by
Forreigners
?
Many
Reasons
might
be
produced
in
the
case
,
upon
each
hand
:
but
to
make
a
short
decision
;
't
is
evident
,
that
Foreigners
must
be
allowed
to
gain
by
our
Merchandises
,
if
we
would
have
them
take
them
off
.
For
if
we
carry
them
home
into
their
Ports
,
we
shall
make
less
sales
,
and
be
at
greater
cost
,
than
if
they
came
to
fetch
them
.
Yet
that
our
Merchants
may
share
in
the
profit
,
they
may
enter
into
Partnership
with
them
,
or
be
their
Commissioners
here
,
or
freight
them
themselves
,
provided
,
they
sell
at
somewhat
cheaper
rates
,
and
so
be
content
with
moderate
gain
;
or
take
in
payment
,
and
exchange
,
the
Foreign
Commodities
.
By
means
of
Commerce
,
as
well
as
by
War
,
there
may
be
French
Colonies
planted
abroad
,
and
so
the
dominion
of
the
King
extended
,
even
to
far
distant
Countries
.
All
the
Nations
of
the
Earth
are
intermix'd
,
and
may
be
termed
Colonies
,
some
of
one
People
,
some
of
another
:
Of
as
many
as
are
known
,
few
can
be
affirmed
to
be
originally
of
the
places
they
inhabit
.
But
to
plant
Colonies
out
of
danger
,
they
must
be
seated
in
as
much
nearness
still
as
is
possible
:
For
if
they
be
separated
at
too
great
a
distance
,
it
will
be
difficult
to
relieve
them
:
and
perhaps
they
may
revolt
,
or
some
one
or
other
make
himself
Master
of
them
;
and
so
the
State
will
be
in
danger
to
lose
its
Subjects
.
Secondly
,
it
is
necessary
,
that
Colonies
be
placed
in
such
Countrys
as
are
able
to
maintain
the
Families
,
that
are
design'd
to
make
them
up
:
otherwise
Provisions
,
and
Money
it self
,
must
be
carried
to
them
,
which
would
cause
loss
and
damage
to
the
Common
wealths
that
send
'
em
.
In
the
third
place
,
the
Country
should
bear
things
that
may
yield
profit
to
the
State
,
which
erects
the
Colony
.
Fourthly
,
the
Scituation
should
be
such
,
as
the
State
may
have
succour
,
and
forces
from
them
,
both
for
War
,
and
for
Commerce
.
In
the
fifth
place
,
the
Country
should
not
be
so
Fertile
,
and
so
much
profit
to
be
there
made
,
that
the
ancient
Subjects
should
be
drawn
thither
,
and
the
State
drein'd
of
People
,
as
hath
happen'd
to
Spain
,
by
means
of
the
West-Indies
.
In
fine
,
for
prevention
of
the
inconveniences
,
I
have
mention'd
,
means
must
be
used
to
have
always
Hostages
from
those
of
the
Colonies
,
that
they
may
be
kept
in
their
duty
,
and
in
the
greater
adherence
to
the
interest
of
the
State.
CHAP.
XIII
.
1.
Of
the
Education
of
Children
.
2.
At
what
age
it
is
expedient
to
Marry
them
.
NAture
gives
us
the
first
fundamental
dispositions
for
Arts
,
and
all
sorts
of
Prosessions
;
and
we
feel
a
certain
propension
leading
us
to
one
kind
of
life
,
rather
than
another
.
Some
say
,
this
impression
comes
from
the
Power
of
the
Stars
,
which
by
secret
,
influences
from
our
temper
;
others
affirm
,
that
we
derive
our
inclinations
from
our
Ancestors
.
However
it
be
,
't
is
certain
,
we
have
movings
,
the
Principles
whereof
are
in
our selves
;
we
bring
them
into
the
World
with
us
,
and
cannot
quit
them
:
't
is
true
,
rules
may
be
applied
to
them
,
and
they
corrected
,
when
faulty
,
but
to
change
the
quality
of
them
,
is
impossible
This
regulation
,
or
amendment
,
is
effected
by
discipline
;
which
can
only
give
an
after
perfection
to
the
works
of
Nature
,
keeping
to
her
foregoing
draughts
,
and
designs
,
and
compleating
what
she
hath
begun
.
A
principal
point
then
,
in
reference
to
Children
,
is
to
know
their
Genius
,
that
they
may
not
be
put
out
of
their
natural
order
,
but
employ'd
in
things
to
which
they
are
Originally
bent
.
The
Philosophers
,
to
make
known
the
difference
of
capacities
,
have
told
us
,
that
as
for
Souls
,
some
are
of
Gold
,
others
of
Silver
,
other
of
Iron
;
and
that
as
a
good
Essayor
must
not
mistake
himself
,
in
distinguishing
these
three
Metals
;
so
a
good
Politician
should
not
fail
,
in
the
judgment
he
makes
,
of
the
Children
that
are
in
the
State
:
it
's
a
piece
of
his
profession
to
discern
,
what
each
of
them
will
be
proper
for
,
that
the
intentions
of
nature
may
be
sortify'd
,
and
polished
by
precepts
.
There
are
no
Common-wealths
,
but
have
in
them
Priests
,
Judges
,
Counsellors
of
State
,
Soldiers
,
Sea
men
,
Merchants
,
Artificers
,
Husbandmen
;
Children
must
be
educated
for
these
different
Professions
,
and
timely
enabled
to
discharge
them
.
'T
is
fit
,
that
in
the
case
of
the
younger
sort
,
Three
Ages
be
distinguished
.
The
First
,
from
their
Birth
,
to
the
end
of
the
Seventh
year
.
The
Second
,
from
that
Seventh
year
to
the
Fourteenth
.
The
Third
,
from
Fourteen
unto
one
and
twenty
.
Childrens
first
Five
years
should
be
spent
in
their
Nursing
up
;
and
they
not
disquieted
with
any
higher
documents
.
'T
is
good
,
to
put
them
upon
some
gentle
exercise
,
as
they
are
growing
,
and
cause
them
to
endure
cold
;
they
will
have
the
more
Vigour
,
by
that
means
.
There
are
some
Nations
,
that
plunge
their
Children
into
running
Water
,
and
give
them
slight
Clothing
in
the
midst
of
Winter
:
so
the
ancient
Gauls
are
noted-to
have
done
.
The
bodies
of
Children
must
be
plyed
to
the
acting
of
all
kind
of
Postures
,
and
Motions
;
this
will
get
them
a
facility
and
dexterousness
for
any
thing
.
After
the
age
of
Five
years
,
unto
Seven
,
't
is
convenient
to
tell
them
stories
,
that
may
raise
in
them
a
desire
to
do
well
in
that
profession
to
which
they
shall
be
destinated
.
From
Seven
years
,
unto
Fourteen
,
those
that
are
intended
to
be
given
to
the
Church
,
or
to
the
affairs
of
Justice
,
or
those
of
the
State
,
should
learn
Latin
,
and
Greek
,
because
in
those
Languages
,
they
have
the
source
of
all
the
Doctrine
they
will
be
obliged
to
profess
:
as
likewise
after
Fourteen
,
unto
One
and
Twenty
,
they
shall
be
taught
Rhetorique
,
Philosophy
,
Theology
,
Law
,
or
Politicks
:
which
must
be
continued
also
,
after
that
Age
in
the
usual
manner
.
It
is
very
necessary
that
Seminaries
for
Priests
be
erected
in
every
Diocess
,
and
our
Lords
the
Bishops
ought
to
take
all
possible
care
in
it
.
The
young
Persons
,
that
are
intended
for
the
Wars
,
may
be
taught
Italian
,
Spanish
,
and
High
Dutch
:
they
that
are
design'd
for
Trade
,
should
know
somewhat
in
those
three
Languages
:
but
such
as
are
thought
on
for
Commerce
,
in
further
distant
Countrys
,
ought
to
Learn
the
Arabic
,
or
the
Sclavonian
▪
or
some
other
of
the
general
Tongues
that
are
current
in
Asia
,
or
in
Africa
,
as
the
Latin
is
in
Europe
.
There
must
be
publick
Professors
for
these
Languages
,
as
there
are
for
Latin
,
and
Masters
places
endowed
at
the
Publick
charge
.
After
fourteen
or
sixteen
years
of
Age
,
the
Youths
should
be
dispos'd
of
unto
places
,
where
they
may
learn
the
Art
of
Traffick
.
As
for
those
that
are
destin'd
to
the
Wars
,
whether
Gentlemen
,
or
Plebeians
,
they
should
be
sent
at
fifteen
or
sixteen
years
unto
Garisons
,
and
the
skill
of
serving
on
Horseback
or
on
Foot
,
there
taught
them
;
and
they
exercised
once
a
weak
constantly
;
which
would
most
conveniently
be
done
on
Sundays
and
Holy-days
.
They
shall
be
taught
to
handle
the
Pike
and
the
Musket
,
the
use
of
the
Sword
,
the
Halbard
,
Partisan
,
Broad-sword
,
and
other
Arms
;
they
shall
be
put
to
Run
,
and
Leap
,
and
Wrestle
.
The
Lacedemonians
ordinarily
exercis'd
their
young
People
;
which
was
very
providently
done
of
them
.
For
Strength
and
Expertness
is
not
attained
but
by
long
and
daily
exercise
.
In
the
Garisons
shall
be
taught
Fortification
,
the
Mathematicks
,
Dancing
,
Vaulting
,
Ridiug
;
and
it
would
do
well
,
to
take
away
Academies
and
Masters
of
Exercise
,
from
places
not
Garison'd
,
that
the
Garisons
may
be
the
Academies
,
as
I
may
term
them
,
where
these
things
are
learnt
.
Yea
,
to
the
end
,
that
all
sorts
of
Persons
might
betake
themselves
to
the
Garisons
,
it
should
be
ordained
,
that
no
private
Masters
shall
take
any
Apprentices
,
but
in
Garison'd
places
;
and
that
no
one
keep
a
Shop
,
or
exercise
any
Trade
,
in
any
City
of
the
Kingdom
,
without
a
Testimonial
from
the
Governor
,
that
he
hath
serv'd
his
Apprentiship
in
a
Garison
Town
:
as
we
see
,
that
no
Physicians
,
or
Advocates
,
are
admitted
to
practise
,
but
such
as
have
studied
in
some
University
.
Order
must
be
given
,
that
Masters
cause
their
Lacquies
to
learn
a
Trade
,
and
that
for
this
,
they
give
them
,
after
four
years
service
,
200
Livres
,
and
a
suit
of
Cloaths
:
or
if
they
serve
less
time
,
a
sum
proportionable
after
that
rate
.
Nor
must
it
be
suffered
,
that
Lacquies
have
wages
given
them
as
is
done
;
because
they
are
ill
husbands
,
and
lay
up
nothing
.
Their
Reward-money
must
be
put
in
a
Publick
purse
,
or
into
some
Merchant's
hands
,
who
will
be
responsible
for
it
.
The
share
of
Lacquies
that
die
,
will
serve
for
other
Youths
that
shall
be
chosen
.
This
would
prove
an
excellent
means
,
for
the
having
of
Soldiers
:
For
the
Apprentices
would
serve
in
their
turn
,
on
Military
occasions
:
they
would
go
upon
the
Guard
,
&c.
nor
would
this
take
them
off
from
perfecting
their
skill
in
the
Calling
they
had
chosen
.
It
would
too
,
be
profitable
,
that
poor
Soldiers
have
skill
in
one
handicraft
or
other
,
and
be
made
to
work
at
it
,
whenever
they
are
not
on
the
Guard
;
by
this
means
,
they
would
avoid
idling
,
and
get
Money
for
a
subsistance
.
The
Parishes
both
in
Town
,
and
Country
,
might
be
obliged
to
set
forth
and
maintain
each
of
them
a
Soldier
or
two
in
Garison
,
giving
also
a
sum
for
their
being
taught
a
Trade
at
the
same
time
.
There
would
be
Parishes
able
to
maintain
a
Man
and
half
,
others
half
a
Man
,
the
rest
in
proportion
to
the
number
of
communicants
in
each
of
them
.
So
the
King
would
have
50000
Men
well-nigh
in
Garison
,
and
a
Nursery
of
Soldiers
,
without
its
costing
Him
a
Quardecu
;
for
none
must
have
pay
,
but
old
Soldiers
:
it
s
by
taking
this
course
,
that
the
Turks
raise
their
Janizaries
,
and
they
become
their
best
Men
,
and
most
Warlike
.
When
the
young
Men
have
been
a
while
in
Garison
,
that
is
,
two
or
three
years
,
they
shall
be
sent
to
the
Army
,
if
there
be
War
on
foot
:
and
all
recruits
shall
be
rais'd
out
of
the
Garisons
:
by
this
means
they
will
be
rais'd
without
any
expence
at
all
:
for
instance
,
if
there
need
a
recruit
of
4000
Men
,
each
of
the
Governors
shall
be
ordered
to
send
,
one
an
hundred
,
another
two
hundred
:
and
the
Men
being
drawn
out
of
the
Garisons
,
new
supplies
shall
be
put
in
,
taken
out
of
the
Parishes
,
which
sent
the
former
.
Thus
the
Armies
would
be
alway
compos'd
of
none
,
but
expert
Soldiers
;
which
is
a
matter
of
exceeding
great
consequence
.
I
will
not
prescribe
,
in
what
Towns
,
or
in
how
many
places
,
it
is
fit
to
settle
Garisons
;
because
this
depends
on
the
Kings
Will
and
Pleasure
:
and
Towns
,
to
be
chosen
for
this
purpose
,
need
not
be
nominated
;
the
most
commodious
,
and
best
scituated
are
known
.
As
to
those
that
should
be
destin'd
for
Sea-service
,
they
might
be
taken
out
of
the
same
Garisons
;
and
should
be
taught
principally
Navigation
:
but
it
would
be
better
,
to
breed
them
up
in
the
Ships
themselves
,
that
they
might
be
accustomed
to
the
Sea.
It
is
fit
that
they
should
understand
all
the
practise
of
Mariners
;
and
also
be
Handicrafts
men
,
as
well
as
Soldiers
:
it
would
be
very
good
,
that
some
of
the
number
were
Carpenters
,
or
at
least
each
of
them
somewhat
skilled
in
use
of
the
Axe
and
Adice
.
If
Soldiers
both
at
Sea
and
on
Land
were
Artificers
,
their
Captains
,
or
others
might
cause
them
to
work
.
They
should
be
paid
for
what
they
made
,
and
the
Person
that
employed
them
might
fell
their
work
,
either
in
gross
or
by
retail
:
as
Garments
,
Shooes
,
Cloth
,
Hatts
,
Gloves
;
and
this
would
prove
hugely
beneficial
;
all
the
Soldiers
would
find
content
in
it
,
&
hardly
one
of
them
fall
into
debauch
.
When
the
Youngsters
have
been
some
time
in
Garison
,
and
are
not
needed
for
recruits
,
they
should
be
sent
home
with
their
Discharge
and
Certificate
.
Hereupon
they
may
set
up
the
Trade
they
have
learned
,
or
addict
themselves
to
Husbandry
,
as
they
should
think
most
commodious
for
them
.
The
Country
Youth
,
not
chosen
by
the
King's
Commissioners
for
the
Garisons
,
should
abide
in
their
Parishes
,
to
learn
the
Art
of
Husbandry
,
and
be
exercised
in
it
.
A
like
course
,
as
is
to
be
taken
with
young
Men
,
should
also
be
taken
with
young
Women
.
There
must
be
School-Mistresses
in
every
City
,
publickly
pay'd
,
who
may
teach
them
all
kind
of
works
:
the
Maids
giving
them
too
,
something
for
a
reward
.
It
would
do
well
to
use
means
,
that
Women
,
and
even
those
of
highest
rank
,
might
count
it
a
shame
to
be
unskilfull
:
work
would
notably
fix
their
thoughts
,
and
busy
them
to
excellent
good
purpose
.
Of
Women
I
had
not
yet
spoken
;
nor
will
I
say
,
of
them
,
ought
more
:
herein
I
shall
Imitate
Lycurgus
,
and
besides
him
Aristotle
;
who
both
conceiv'd
it
not
possible
,
to
give
them
any
Rules
,
and
that
their
temper
was
so
imperious
,
that
they
could
not
endure
to
be
restrained
by
Law
:
this
is
more
to
be
excused
in
French
Women
than
in
others
:
't
is
their
due
to
be
Mistresses
;
since
they
may
Glory
,
upon
better
Title
than
the
Lacedemonian
Dames
,
that
they
give
birth
to
Men
,
who
are
capable
of
rendring
themselves
,
by
their
Valour
,
Conquerors
of
all
the
Earth
It
seems
to
me
a
fault
,
that
Maids
should
be
suffer'd
to
Marry
at
Twelve
,
and
Males
at
Fourteen
,
at
which
Ages
the
too
too
indulgent
Laws
have
fixed
the
Puberty
of
the
Sexes
.
For
,
as
to
Nature
,
it
is
not
possible
but
persons
of
those
years
only
must
extremely
prejudice
their
Health
by
Marriage
,
and
spend
their
strength
before
they
have
attain'd
it
.
'T
is
the
making
of
young
Trees
bear
Fruit
before
the
time
:
the
Children
are
without
doubt
the
less
vigorous
for
it
.
How
can
the
Parents
give
them
,
what
they
as
yet
have
not
themselves
?
Again
,
Morality
and
the
Laws
are
concerned
in
the
case
:
the
truth
is
,
when
a
Girl
is
put
so
young
into
the
possession
of
a
Husband
,
she
hath
the
less
of
bashfulness
and
Modesty
;
nor
is
Virtue
so
well
secured
for
her
.
Besides
,
at
this
age
,
neither
Man
nor
Woman
is
of
understanding
to
know
their
Duty
:
and
hence
it
comes
,
that
the
Marriages
of
persons
so
young
are
ordinarily
attended
with
no
very
sure
Felicity
and
Success
.
Finally
,
how
can
the
one
or
the
other
,
take
care
of
the
Affairs
of
an
House
,
being
altogether
unexperienced
?
or
duly
govern
their
Children
,
needing
Government
themselves
,
and
having
not
,
by
allowance
of
the
Laws
,
power
to
dispose
of
any
thing
?
So
that
it
must
be
ordained
,
they
shall
not
be
capable
of
making
a
valid
contract
of
Marriage
till
they
have
attained
,
Females
,
the
age
of
Eighteen
years
compleat
,
and
Males
of
Twenty
.
CHAP.
XIV
.
1.
How
France
should
act
with
Forreign
Princes
,
and
First
with
the
King
of
Spain
,
and
King
of
Portugal
.
2.
With
the
Pope
,
with
Venice
,
with
the
Princes
of
Italy
.
3.
With
the
Swisses
,
with
England
.
4.
With
the
Emperor
and
Princes
of
Germany
.
5.
With
the
Hollanders
,
the
Crowns
of
Denmark
,
Sweden
and
Poland
.
6.
With
the
Turks
,
and
King
of
Persia
.
7.
With
the
Kings
of
the
Coast
of
Barbary
,
and
the
King
of
Morocco
.
8.
With
all
remote
Princes
;
as
the
Emperor
of
the
Negroes
,
Prestor
John
,
the
Great
Mogul
.
The
other
Kings
of
the
Indies
,
of
China
,
and
of
Tartary
.
HAving
treated
in
the
precedent
Ceapters
,
of
things
Internal
to
the
State
:
I
think
it
reasonable
to
speak
of
Externals
and
what
course
is
to
be
taken
in
them
.
For
to
promote
the
happiness
of
People
,
and
govern
them
discreetly
,
't
is
not
enough
,
that
you
regulate
their
Lives
,
and
their
comportment
at
home
,
but
their
ease
and
well-being
must
be
secur'd
against
strangers
abroad
,
and
principally
against
their
Neighbors
.
Now
Interest
being
the
prime
motive
unto
all
States
,
we
ought
to
consider
other
Nations
,
either
in
quality
of
Friends
,
or
in
that
of
Enemies
;
ever
accounting
of
them
,
according
to
the
advantage
we
may
receive
from
them
,
or
the
damage
they
may
do
us
.
As
they
on
their
part
take
no
thought
of
us
,
but
in
proportion
to
what
they
fear
,
or
to
what
they
hope
for
from
our
Arms.
Besides
,
to
treat
safely
with
Forreigners
,
it
is
necessary
that
we
know
their
Designs
,
their
Strength
,
their
Alliances
,
their
Temper
,
and
their
Country
.
Forasmuch
then
as
Spain
shareth
with
us
,
at
this
time
,
the
Concerns
of
all
Europe
;
and
there
is
not
a
Power
in
Christendom
,
but
hath
Alliance
with
the
one
or
the
other
of
these
two
Crowns
,
it
is
meet
we
examine
in
the
first
place
,
what
measures
we
are
to
observe
with
the
Spaniards
.
The
Council
of
Spain
proceeds
with
a
great
deal
of
slowness
;
but
always
with
a
great
deal
of
Evenness
:
and
since
the
House
of
Austria
put
it
in
their
head
to
get
the
Dominion
over
all
Europe
:
the
said
Council
hath
continually
steered
the
same
course
.
The
end
which
these
States-men
have
propos'd
to
themselves
,
has
been
Tyrannical
and
Unjust
;
and
the
means
they
have
made
use
of
to
attain
it
,
bad
,
destrustive
,
and
ill-adjusted
,
which
the
declining
of
their
Affairs
doth
evidently
demonstrate
.
Our
Enemies
are
always
Allies
of
theirs
,
either
covertly
,
or
openly
and
declared
;
just
in
like
manner
,
as
they
who
chuse
the
King's
Protection
,
and
to
be
interessed
with
France
,
will
be
Enemies
of
Spain
.
The
Emperor
is
Leagu'd
with
the
Catholick
King
by
Consanguinity
,
and
moreover
,
by
reasons
of
State.
For
We
are
cause
of
fear
to
the
Empire
on
the
North
,
and
towards
Germany
,
as
We
are
to
Spain
on
the
South
,
and
towards
Italy
.
Of
all
the
other
Princes
,
the
Duke
of
Bavaria
,
seems
fastest
knit
to
the
House
of
Austria
;
and
the
Pope
would
,
perhaps
,
be
of
the
Party
,
did
not
his
Dignity
,
of
being
the
common
Father
of
Christians
,
withhold
Him
;
and
if
He
,
as
a
Temporal
Prince
,
did
not
also
apprehend
some
Irruption
on
our
part
.
Spain
is
a
Country
yielding
little
increase
;
either
for
that
the
Ground
is
barren
;
or
because
the
Inhabitants
neglect
to
cultivate
it
.
The
discovery
of
the
West-Indies
,
and
the
expulsion
of
the
Moors
have
dispeopled
it
.
Flanders
,
and
the
places
in
Italy
are
a
charge
to
Spain
,
in
time
of
War
:
and
what
is
rais'd
there
doth
scarce
suffice
to
maintain
the
Armies
and
Garisons
.
Their
Government
is
hard
,
and
ill
to
be
endured
;
because
they
are
inflexibly
severe
;
and
the
Monks
,
(
whose
depravation
is
there
at
the
highest
pitch
)
and
Inquisitors
,
do
under
pretext
of
Religion
,
exercise
incredible
grievances
.
The
Spaniards
are
valiant
for
their
Persons
:
but
Men
of
Quality
despise
the
Military
Profession
,
as
heretofore
the
Carthaginians
did
:
and
the
name
of
Soldier
is
,
in
a
manner
,
ignominious
with
them
.
They
are
Idlers
,
and
prefer
Pleasure
,
and
a
Gallantry
,
before
any
thing
,
be
it
ever
so
important
,
or
of
greatest
consequence
.
The
King
of
Spain
hath
little
Money
,
and
much
expense
to
defray
.
The
vanity
of
the
Viceroys
and
Governors
of
His
places
,
doth
spend
Him
above
measure
.
The
Spaniards
are
presumptuous
,
haughty
,
and
provided
there
be
Honour
done
them
,
you
may
treat
advantageously
with
them
.
Charles
V.
had
reason
to
say
,
that
the
Spaniards
seem
to
be
wise
;
but
are
not
.
Their
Forces
are
not
at
all
to
be
feared
;
we
ruin'd
them
in
the
late
War
;
and
the
Affairs
of
Portugal
have
hindred
their
recovering
them
.
The
Minority
of
their
King
,
the
Discontent
of
Don
John
,
and
the
pretensions
of
some
Lords
upon
the
particular
Kingdoms
,
which
compose
the
Spanish
Monarchy
,
augment
its
weakness
.
Sicily
might
easily
make
Insurrection
.
The
Neapolitans
upon
a
pretext
of
Liberty
,
such
a
darling
in
Italy
,
would
set
up
for
themselves
,
if
they
had
succors
;
and
perhaps
a
new
Pope
would
favour
our
designs
there
,
if
he
were
made
to
see
,
that
it
would
be
no
impossibility
for
him
to
make
some
person
of
his
Family
King
of
Naples
,
or
joyn
that
Kingdom
to
the
State
of
the
Church
,
of
which
he
is
possess'd
already
.
If
ever
the
Spaniards
be
attacked
,
it
must
be
done
with
force
,
and
all
at
once
,
in
Flanders
,
in
Italy
,
in
Spain
it self
,
on
the
Sea
,
and
on
the
Coast
of
Portugal
.
This
is
the
best
method
for
the
French.
Such
a
general
effort
would
produce
two
effects
.
The
First
is
,
that
the
Spanish
Partisans
would
be
astonish'd
,
having
no
Forces
ready
to
make
resistance
.
The
Second
,
that
all
their
Enemies
would
resume
Vigor
,
and
might
set
on
foot
again
their
pretensions
against
them
.
If
a
through
Conquest
be
intended
,
we
must
not
do
as
was
done
in
the
last
War
:
must
not
make
it
our
business
to
take
all
their
fortifi'd
places
,
one
after
another
,
or
to
keep
them
when
taken
.
But
this
is
a
matter
fit
to
be
discours'd
of
by
it self
.
As
for
Portugal
,
it
's
a
State
,
yet
under
age
,
and
not
throughly
setled
:
to
us
,
a
perpetual
instrument
for
weakning
the
Spaniard
.
France
hath
nothing
to
fear
on
that
side
.
It
would
do
well
,
to
convey
covertly
some
Troops
,
or
sums
into
the
Country
:
and
above
all
,
give
secretly
great
hopes
unto
the
French
,
that
are
in
service
there
,
if
they
made
any
important
enterprises
upon
Spain
,
which
would
divert
their
Forces
.
It
would
,
I
say
,
do
very
well
to
order
some
Soldiers
thither
,
and
't
were
to
be
wish'd
,
there
were
so
many
French
in
Portugal
,
that
the
Partisans
might
not
dare
to
make
a
Peace
with
Spain
,
for
fear
of
having
those
same
French
for
Enemies
.
The
Queen
of
Portugal
,
who
is
French
,
both
by
Birth
,
and
by
Affection
,
may
bear
up
this
Interest
;
and
She
may
be
told
,
that
there
is
a
necessity
of
it
on
Her
part
,
and
that
Her
Fortune
depends
upon
it
.
It
must
be
accounted
on
in
all
Treating
with
the
Spaniards
,
that
they
are
every
whit
as
foolish
as
they
seem
to
be
.
The
Pope
,
the
Venetians
,
and
all
the
Princes
of
Italy
,
are
of
one
and
the
same
temper
.
The
Italians
are
wise
and
circumspect
:
nor
should
we
,
but
very
seldom
,
enter
into
Negotiation
with
them
.
To
reduce
them
to
our
intentions
,
we
must
work
by
down-right
force
,
they
are
weak
,
and
(
as
I
have
said
)
Wise
:
they
are
people
for
Pleasure
;
their
Country
is
the
beautifullest
,
and
best
in
the
World
;
consequently
they
love
it
,
and
know
their
Interest
;
they
are
able
to
foresee
,
and
fear
the
ill
that
may
betide
them
.
The
Pope
will
ever
consider
France
,
by
reason
of
the
County
of
Avignon
,
of
the
consequences
of
the
Concordat
of
1618.
and
because
of
the
Jansenists
.
The
Venetians
are
weakned
by
their
War
with
the
Turk
;
the
Dukes
of
Mantua
,
of
Modena
,
and
of
Florence
,
and
the
Genoese
can
do
nothing
that
's
considerable
.
The
Duke
of
Savoy
must
never
separate
from
France
.
We
have
the
entrance
into
his
Estates
:
and
a
War
with
us
,
but
of
3
Months
,
would
utterly
ruin
him
:
He
may
be
induc'd
to
hope
,
that
he
shall
be
reinstated
in
the
Principality
of
Geneva
.
If
War
be
made
in
Italy
,
the
Italians
must
not
have
time
given
them
to
look
about
them
.
As
they
are
the
Wisest
,
so
when
inur'd
to
War
,
they
are
the
bravest
upon
Earth
.
In
one
word
,
they
are
the
Masters
of
the
Universe
.
The
Swisses
are
Mercenaries
,
who
will
alway
serve
the
King
for
his
Money
.
As
for
matter
of
the
English
,
they
have
not
any
Friends
:
themselves
be
a
sort
of
People
without
Faith
,
without
Religion
,
without
Honesty
,
without
any
Justice
at
all
,
of
the
greatest
levity
that
can
be
,
Cruel
,
Impatient
,
Gluttonous
,
Proud
,
Audacious
,
Covetous
,
fit
for
Handy
strokes
,
and
a
sudden
execution
;
but
unable
to
carry
on
a
War
with
judgment
.
Their
Country
is
good
enough
for
sustenance
of
Life
,
but
not
rich
enough
to
afford
them
means
for
issuing
forth
and
making
any
Conquest
:
accordingly
,
they
never
conquered
any
thing
but
Ireland
,
whose
Inhabitants
are
weak
,
and
ill
Soldiers
.
On
the
contrary
,
the
Romans
conquer'd
them
;
then
the
Danes
,
and
the
Normans
;
in
such
a
manner
too
,
that
their
present
Kings
are
the
Heirs
of
a
Conqueror
.
They
hate
one
another
,
and
are
in
continual
Division
,
either
about
Religion
,
or
about
the
Government
.
A
War
of
France
for
three
or
four
years
upon
them
,
would
totally
ruin
them
.
So
,
it
seems
reasonable
that
we
should
make
no
Peace
with
them
,
but
upon
conditions
of
greatest
advantage
for
us
;
unless
the
King
think
meet
to
defer
the
execution
of
this
Project
to
another
time
;
or
that
His
Majesty
,
press'd
with
the
love
He
hath
for
His
own
People
,
do
incline
to
prefer
their
ease
,
before
so
fair
hopes
.
One
had
need
be
a
Monarch
,
to
know
what
it
is
to
love
Subjects
;
as
be
a
Father
,
to
know
how
Children
are
loved
.
In
fine
,
if
we
had
a
mind
to
ruin
the
English
,
we
need
but
oblige
them
to
keep
an
Army
on
foot
:
and
there
is
no
fear
that
they
should
make
any
invasion
upon
France
;
that
would
be
their
undoubted
ruin
,
if
they
be
not
call'd
in
by
some
Rebels
.
Now
if
they
have
an
Army
,
they
will
infallibly
make
War
upon
one
another
,
and
so
ruin
themselves
.
You
must
put
them
upon
making
great
expences
;
and
for
this
end
,
raise
a
jealousie
in
them
for
the
Isles
of
Jersey
and
Guernsey
,
of
Wight
and
Man
,
for
the
Cinque-Ports
,
and
Ireland
:
and
by
that
means
,
oblige
them
to
keep
strong
Garisons
in
all
those
places
:
this
will
create
a
belief
in
the
people
that
the
King
formeth
great
Projects
against
their
pretended
Liberty
;
and
while
He
is
in
Arms
,
His
Subjects
will
hate
Him.
They
must
be
wrought
to
distrusts
of
one
another
,
by
writing
Letters
in
Cypher
to
some
particular
persons
,
and
causing
them
to
be
intercepted
.
For
(
being
suspicious
and
imprudent
)
they
will
soon
be
perswaded
,
that
the
Letters
were
seriously
written
.
Some
Forces
should
be
landed
in
Ireland
,
and
in
other
parts
.
The
Irish
may
be
induced
to
revolt
,
as
having
a
mortal
hatred
for
the
English
.
The
Scots
also
will
not
neglect
to
set
themselves
at
liberty
.
Factions
must
be
rais'd
,
and
the
Sects
favoured
against
one
another
;
especially
the
Catholicks
,
among
whom
,
the
Benedictine
Monks
in
particular
,
should
be
secretly
promis'd
,
on
the
King
of
On
the
other
hand
,
our
League
with
the
Hollanders
should
be
renew'd
,
and
they
put
into
a
belief
,
that
we
will
give
them
all
the
Trade
still
:
because
they
have
a
through
Knowledge
of
it
,
and
are
proper
for
it
;
whereas
the
French
have
no
inclination
that
way
,
and
Nature
cannot
be
forced
.
They
must
be
told
,
that
now
they
are
come
to
the
happy
time
for
advancing
their
affairs
,
and
ruining
their
Competitors
in
the
Sovereignty
of
the
Northen
Seas
.
Beside
these
particulars
,
if
the
King
give
Belle-Isle
,
or
L'Isle
Dieu
,
or
the
Isle
of
Ree
,
to
the
Knights
of
Malta
,
as
I
have
said
before
,
these
Knights
will
make
irreconcilable
War
upon
the
English
,
redemand
the
Commanderies
of
their
Order
,
and
by
their
courses
,
and
Piracies
,
oblige
them
to
keep
great
Fleets
at
Sea
;
which
will
ruine
them
,
by
ruining
the
profit
of
their
Trade
.
Mean
time
,
the
King
shall
increase
His
Strength
at
Sea
;
and
then
finding
His
Enemies
weakned
,
consummate
their
Depression
,
and
Subversion
.
It
is
not
difficult
,
to
make
defence
against
any
enterprises
of
the
Emperor
;
for
He
cannot
make
War
upon
France
,
though
He
would
:
such
a
War
would
be
too
costly
for
Him
;
and
and
to
make
any
progress
in
it
,
He
must
needs
bring
into
the
Field
excessive
great
Armies
.
But
if
He
armed
Him
so
potently
,
the
Princes
of
Germany
would
grow
jealous
of
Him
,
and
make
Levies
to
oppose
Him
,
and
to
hinder
His
passage
through
their
Territories
:
beside
,
His
Hereditary
Countrys
would
be
disfurnish'd
of
Men
,
and
so
expos'd
to
the
inroads
of
the
Turks
:
so
that
there
is
no
cause
to
apprehend
any
thing
on
the
part
of
the
Emperor
.
On
the
contrary
,
He
hath
intentions
to
give
the
King
content
;
because
He
may
receive
great
succors
from
Him
,
in
Wars
with
the
Turk
,
as
happen'd
of
late
Years
.
The
Princes
of
Germany
,
whether
Catholicks
or
Protestants
,
have
an
equal
interest
to
keep
themselves
in
the
King's
Protection
:
for
the
reasons
I
noted
afore
in
the
Chapter
of
the
Huguenots
;
so
that
they
will
always
oppose
the
Emperors
growing
greater
,
on
the
side
of
France
:
as
it
may
be
,
they
would
oppose
the
designs
of
the
King
;
if
He
should
carry
His
Arms
too
far
up
into
Germany
.
'T
is
the
interest
of
lesser
States
,
that
the
Kings
their
Neighbours
be
equal
in
Power
,
that
the
one
may
maintain
them
against
the
others
.
To
conclude
:
the
King
hath
no
Allies
,
whom
He
should
so
highly
esteem
,
as
the
Germans
;
there
is
not
a
braver
Nation
,
a
Nation
more
open
,
more
honest
.
Their
Original
is
also
ours
;
They
have
no
Vices
;
are
Just
and
Faithfull
:
there
is
among
them
an
inexhaustible
Seminary
of
good
Soldiers
:
their
generosity
put
Alexander
the
Great
into
admiration
for
'em
;
and
wrought
affection
and
confidence
in
'em
,
in
the
first
Caesars
;
who
by
committin●
their
Persons
to
the
virtue
of
these
People
entrusted
them
with
the
quiet
of
the
Universe
.
The
Hollanders
will
never
attempt
any
thing
against
France
;
but
keep
themselves
in
our
Alliance
,
as
much
as
possibly
they
may
.
They
are
Rich
,
and
interessed
as
Merchants
commonly
are
.
If
the
King
had
relinquish'd
them
,
the●…
State
would
have
sunk
.
(
which
yet
by
the
rules
of
Policy
,
cannot
last
long
;
Democracie●
being
subject
to
changes
.
)
It
would
be
expedient
,
that
the
King
do
interpose
in
their
Affairs
and
some
division
be
raised
among
them
.
We
can
hope
for
little
from
their
Armies
;
and
they
would
always
be
a
charge
,
and
expence
to
us
.
The
King
of
Denmark
is
a
Prince
,
whose
State
is
but
of
small
extent
;
His
whole
Strength
consists
in
the
King's
Protection
,
who
upholds
Him
against
the
Suedes
his
Enemies
.
Sueden
will
never
break
off
from
the
Interest
of
France
.
It
's
a
Country
unfertile
except
in
Soldiers
;
but
there
being
little
Money
in
Sueden
,
and
they
far
of
,
they
can
of
themselves
make
no
considerable
War
:
they
are
feared
and
hated
in
Germany
.
So
,
we
ought
to
consider
them
,
as
Instruments
,
which
for
our
Money
,
we
may
make
use
of
,
to
avenge
our
Quarrels
,
either
against
the
Emperor
,
or
the
German
Princes
;
or
to
divert
the
English
and
the
Holland
Forces
,
when
His
Majesty
makes
any
enterprise
which
pleaseth
them
not
.
Poland
and
Muscovy
are
of
almost
no
use
to
〈…〉
,
except
it
be
to
serve
us
in
stopping
the
en●erprises
of
the
Emperour
.
Furs
may
be
had
●om
them
;
and
Cloth
,
and
Silk-stuffs
sent
●hem
.
The
Friendship
of
the
Turks
is
good
for
●rance
,
to
be
made
use
of
on
occasion
against
●he
Emperor
;
and
that
of
the
King
of
Persia
,
to
●e
made
use
of
against
the
Turks
.
The
one
and
●he
other
may
favour
our
Commerce
.
There
must
be
no
reliance
upon
the
promises
of
the
Kings
of
Tripoly
,
Tunis
,
and
Algier
;
they
●re
Pirates
,
that
take
a
Pride
in
breaking
their
Words
,
and
have
no
Faith
at
all
.
Whenever
●ccasion
serves
,
War
must
be
made
upon
them
,
●nd
they
attacqued
home
to
their
own
doors
in
●heir
Harbours
,
but
with
considerable
Forces
▪
They
may
be
ruin'd
in
time
,
by
hindring
their
courses
at
Sea
,
and
by
causing
the
Tributary
Princes
to
rise
against
them
by
Land
:
as
I
have
observed
asore
.
Upon
this
,
the
King
,
as
the
Carthaginians
did
,
might
employ
the
Numidian
Troops
,
so
much
magnified
by
the
Ancients
.
The
Emperor
of
Fez
and
Morocco
is
a
Potent
Prince
,
who
's
Alliance
may
be
useful
to
the
King
against
the
Spaniards
,
and
for
Commerce
.
He
is
a
Mahometan
;
and
I
would
not
have
too
much
trust
put
in
His
Oaths
.
In
fine
,
when
occasions
for
it
are
offered
,
we
must
not
fail
to
compliment
the
African
Kings
,
as
the
Emperors
of
the
Negros
,
and
of
the
Abyssins
,
then
the
Great
Mogol
,
and
the
other
Kings
of
the
Indies
,
of
China
,
of
Tartary
and
Japan
▪
letting
them
know
by
Presents
,
the
Virtue
,
the
Greatness
and
Magnificence
of
the
King.
The
Conclusion
.
Such
are
the
Political
Maxims
,
by
which
I
have
judged
,
that
the
Subjects
of
this
(
French
)
Monarchy
might
attain
to
the
possession
of
a
true
,
and
stable
felicity
;
and
so
,
the
Heroick
labours
of
the
King
be
Crowned
with
immortal
Glory
,
and
France
enjoy
in
all
its
parts
the
highly
beneficial
Virtue
of
its
incomparable
Monarch
.
FINIS
.