Maxims of state written by Sir Walter Raleigh ; whereunto is added his Instructions to his sonne, and The son's advice to his aged father.

MAXIMS OF STATE .

OF GOVERNMENT .

GOVERNMENT is of two sorts . 1. Private , of himself . Sobrietie . Of his Family ; called O●●onomie . 2. Publick , of the Common-wealth ; called Poli●ie . A man must first Govern himself , e're he be fit to govern a Family : And his Family , e're he be fit to bear the Government in the Common-wealth .

Of Policie .

POlicie is an Art of Government of a Common-wealth , and some part of it according to that State , or form of Government wherein it is setled for the publick good .

State , is the frame or set order of a Common-wealth , or of the Governours that rule the same , specially of the chief and Sovereign Governour that commandeth the rest .

The State or Sovereignty consisteth in 5. points .

1. Making or anulling of Laws . 2. Creating and disposing of Magistrates . 3. Power over life and death . 4. Making of War , or Peace . 5. Highest o● last appeal .

Where these five are , either in one or in more , there is the State .

These five points of State , rest either in , 1. One Monarchie or Kingdom . 2. Some few chief men for virtue and wisdom , called an Aristocracie . 3. Many , called a Fr●e-State , or Popular State .

These three sorts of Government have respect to the common good , and therefore are just , and lawful States .

These 3. degenerate into 3. other Governments . viz. 1. Monarchie , 2. Aristo●racie , 3. Popular Est●t , into 1. Tyrannie . 2. Oligarchie . 3. Common-wealth o● Government of all the common and baser sort , and therefore called a Common-wealth by an usurped Nick-name .

These all respect their own , and not the publick good , and therefore are ●ailed Bastard Governments .

I. Monarchie .

A Monarchie , or Kingdom , is the Government of a State by one Head , or chief , tending to the common benefit of all .

Monarchie , or Kingdoms , are of three sorts touching the right , or possession of them ; viz.

1. Hereditarie , by de●cent , as the English , French , &c. 2. Elective , by suffrage of the other Orders , or some of them , as the Polonian . 3. Mixt , or of both kinds ; viz. by Descent , yet not tyed to the next of bloud , as the ancient Iewish State .

Monarchies are of two sorts touching their power or authority ; viz.

1. Intire . Where the whole power of ordering all State matters , both in peace and war , doth by law and custom appertain to the Prince , as in the English Kingdom , where the Prince hath power to make Laws , League , and W●r ; To create Magistrates ; to pardon life : Of appeal , &c. Though to give a contentment to the other degrees , they have a suffrage in making Laws , yet ever subject to the Princes pleasure , nor Negative will . 2. Limit●d or restrained , that hath no full power in all the points o● matters of State , as the Military King that hath not the Sovereignty in time of peace , as the making of Laws , &c. But in War onely , as the Polonian Kings .

II. Aristocracie , or Senatorie State .

AN Aristocracie is the Government of a Common-wealth by some competent number of the better sort , preferred for wisdom and other virtues for the publick good .

Aristocracies are of three sorts , viz. Where the Senatours are chosen , for 1. Virtue , Riches , and the Common good , as the Venetian . 2. Virtue and the publick good without respect of wealth , as sometimes the Roman , when some of the Senatours were fetched from the plough , and some from the Schools . 3. Virtue and wealth , more respecting their private , than their publick good , which inclineth towards an Oligarchie , or the Government of the Richer or nobler sort , as in Rome towards the end .

III. Free-State , or Popular Sta●e .

THe Popular State is the Government of a State by the choiser sort of people , tending to the publick good of all sorts ; viz. with due respect of the better , nobler , and richer sort .

In every Iust State , some part of the Government is , or ought to be imparted to the People ; As in a Kingdom , a voice or suffrage in making Lawes ; and sometimes also , in levying of Arms ( if the charge be great , and the Prince forced to borrow help of his Subjects ) the matter rightly may be propounded to a Parliament , that the tax may seem to have proceeded from themselves . So consultations , and some proceedings in Judicial matters , may in part be referred to them . The reason , least seeing themselves to be in no number , nor of reckoning , they mislike the state , or kind of Government : And where the multitude is discontented , there must needs be many enemies to the present State . For which cause , Tyrants , ( which allow the people , no manner of dealing in State matters ) are forced to bereave them of their wits and weapons , and all other means whereby they may resist , or amend themselves , as in A●shland , ●urk●y , &c.

IV. Tyranny .

A Tyranny is the swerving , or distort●g of a Monarc●ie , or the Governm●●● of one , tending not to the publick good , but the private benefit of himself , and his followers . As in the Russe and Turkish Government , where the State and Wealth of other o●●ers , are employed onely to the upholding of the greatness of the King or Emperour . This is the worst of all the Basta●d States , because it is the perverting of the best Regiment , to wit , of a Monarchie , which resembleth the Sovereign Government of God himself .

V. Oligarchie , or the Government of a few .

AN Oligarchie is the swerving , or the corruption of an Aristocracie ; or the Gov●●nment of some few , that are of the Wealthier or Nobler sort , without a●y respect of the publick good . The chief end of these Gover●●●●s , is , their own greatness and enriching . And therefore their manner is , to prepare fi● mean● to uphold their Esta●es . This St●te is not wholly so bad , as is the Tyrannie , and yet worse than the Commo●-wealth , because it respecteth the good of a few .

VI . Common-wealth .

A Common-wealth is the swerving or depravation of a F●ee , or popular State , or the Government of the whole multitude of the base and poorer sort , without respect of the other Orders .

These two States , to wit ; The Olig●●chie , and Common-wealth , are very adve●se the one to the other , and have many b●ckerings between them . For that the richer or nobler sort , suppose a right or superiority to appertain unto them in every respect , because they are superiour , but in some re●pects onely , to wit , in Riches , Birth , Parentage , &c. On the other side , the Common-people suppose , there ought to be an equality in all other things , and some State matters ; because they are equal● with the Rich or Noble , touching their Lib●●tie , whereas indeed neither the one nor the other are simply equal or superiour , as touching Government and fitness thereunto , because they are such , to wit , because they are Rich , Noble , Free , &c. But because they are Wise , Virtuous , Valiant , &c. and so have fit parts to Govern a State .

These several States are sometimes mixed , and inter wrought one with the other , yet ever so , as that the one hath the preheminent predomination over the other , as in the humours and complexions of the body . So in the Rom●n State , the people had their Plehis●●ta , and gave the suffrage in the election of Magistrates : Yet the Senate ( as the State stood ) for the most part swayed the State , and bare the chief rule . So in the Ven●tian State , the Duke seemeth to represe●● a Mon●rch , and the S●nate to be his Counc●l : Yet the Duke hath no power in State matt●rs , but is like a head set on by art , that heareth no brain . And so that State is S●natorical or Aristocratical .

Causes of States & Common-wealths in general .

Causes of States or of Commō-wealths are of 3. sorts , viz. 1. Founding , or setling a State where to be considered . 1. Measure . 2. Parts , & their Qualities . 2. Preserving a State . 3. Changing , and altering a State .

Founding a State .

In founding a State are to be considered 2. things .

1. Proportion . 2. Parts .

PRoportion , is a Just Measure or Mediocritie of the State , whereby it is framed and kept in that Order , as that neither it exceed nor be defective in his kind , to wit , so that a Monarch b● not too Monarchical , nor strict , or absolute , as the ●usse Kings ; nor Aristocratical , that is over-mated or eclipsed by the Nobility , as the Scottish Kingdom , but ever respective to the other degrees . That Aristocratie be not to magnificent nor intire to it self , but communicate with the people some commodities of State or Government , as the V●netian , and sometimes the Roman allowed the people to elect certain Magistrates out of themselves , to have a Tribune , to make Plebiscita , &c. So a Free-State or Common-wealth that it be not over popular , viz. That it depress not to much the richer , wiser , nor learneder sort ; but admit them to offices with a Caution out of the rules and mysteries of that State . That they seek no alteration of the present State . The reason , because the moderate States in their several kinds ( as all other things that observe the mean ) are best framed for their continuance , because they give less cause of grudge , envy , and affecting the Wealth , Honour , and Libertie which they see in others that govern the State ; And so are less subject to stirs and commotions , and easiest kept in their present State wherein they are set .

Parts .

THe Parts of the State , or those Magistrates that bear place or sway in the publick Government .

Parts or Partakers of Publick Government , are 1. Councel or Senate , which consul●eth of all matters pertaining to War and Peace , Magistrates , &c. in admitting of whom there ought to be a more special care , that they may be men expert in matter of Policie , because it is their Trade and Vocation , as men use to chuse Pilots , and Masters of Ships , such as know the Art of Navigation , and not Husband-men , &c. And so the contrary . 2. Magistrates and Officers , which are to be executioners of that which is consulted , and found to be expedient for the Common-vvealth , wherein are to be observed , the kinds of Magistrates , that they be such as fit that kind of Government ; The time of their continuance , and the manner of their election or appointing , by whom , out of whom , and in what manner they be chosen . 3. Iudges ; To determine in Civil , and Criminal matters , where are to be observed , out of whom they are to be chosen ; what kinds are necessary , and the manner o●Iudgement , and Iudicial proceeding .

In Magistrates are to be observed .

1. Kinds of Magistrats as ,

1. Civil

1. Superiour , which are to be such & of that kind as agree with the State , as Consuls for a year , and not perpetual Dictatours in a Senatorie State . Praetors , & Censors , that oversee manners & orders of the people .

For a Kingdom Lieutenant of Shires , Marshals , Masters of Horse , Admirals , &c.

Inferiour , as conservatous of Peace , Constables , &c.

Overseers of youth , that take care for their education for civil & warlike exercise .

Clarks of the Market that provide for the quantity , and price of victual .

Ediles for Buildings , Streets , Bounds .

Questours , or Treasurers , to keep and dispence the publick Treasury .

A●●uaries , or Reco●ders , which keep the publick Records .

Ga●l●rs , to keep prisons and Prisoners .

Surveyours of woods and fields , &c.

2. Ecclesiastical .

1. As Bishops or Pastours , Elders , Wardens .

2. Time of Magistrates , whereof some are perpetual , some for a time , viz. for more years , a year , half a year , according to the necessity of the Common-wealth , and not perpetual ; or at least not Hereditary in a Kingdom . Yearly in an Aristocracie , or half yearly in a Free-state .

3. Manner of choise , by whom and how to be chosen , where especially they are to be chosen by suffrage , and not by Lot .

Causes preserving a State , or Common-wealth .

In preserving of States , 2. things required .

1. Mysteries , or Sophisms . 1. General to all States . 2. Particular , for every several State . 2. Rules , or Actions . 1. General , for all States . 2. Particular , for every State .

Mysteries , or Sophisms .

MYsteries , or Sophisms of State , are certain secret practises , either for the avoyding of danger , or averting such effects as tend to the preservation of the present State , as it is set or founded .

State Mysteries are of two sorts .

1. General : That pertain to all States ; as first , to provide by all means , that the same degree , or part of the Common-wealth , do not exceed both in Quantity and Q●ality . In Quantity , as that the number of the Nobility , or of great persons , be not more , than the State or Common-wealth can beare . In Quality , as that none grow in wealth , liberty , honours , &c. more than it is meet for that degree ; For as in weights , the heavier weights bear down the Scale : So in Common-wealths , that part or degree that excelleth the rest in Quality , and Quantity , overswayeth the rest after it , whereof follow alterations , and conversions of State . Secondly , to provide by all means , that the middle sort of people exceed both the extreams , ( viz. ) of Nobility and Ge●t●y , and the base rascal , and begarly sort . For this maketh the State constant and firm , when both the Extreams are tied together by a middle sort , as it were with a band , as for any conspiracy of the rich and beggarly sort together , it is not to be feared . To these two points , the Particular rules or Sophisms of every Common-wealth , are to be applied . 2. Particular : That serve ●or preservation of every Common-wealth , in that form of State wherein it is setled as in a Kingdom . That the Nobility may be accustomed to bear the government of the Prince , especially such as have their dwelling in remote places from the Princes eye , it is expedient to call them up at certain times to the Princes Court , under pretence of doing them honour , or being desirous to see , and enjoy their prese●ce ; and to have their children , especially their eldest , to be attendant upon the Prince , as of special favour towards them and theirs , that so they may be trained up in duty and obedience towards the Prince , and be as Hostages for the good behaviour , and faithfull dealing of their Parents , especially , if they be of any suspected note . To that end serves the Pe●si●● practise , in having a Band , or Train of the S●trapa's children , and other Nobles to attend the Court ; which was well imitated by our Train of H●n●●men , if they were of the Nobler sort . Again , sometimes to borrow small sums of his Subjects , and to pay them again , that he may after borrow greater sums and never pay : So in an Oligarchy , least it decline to a Popular State , they deceive the people with this and the like Sophisms , ( viz. ) They compel their own sort , to wit , the rich men , by great penalties , to frequent their Assemblies for choosing of Magistrates , for provision of Armour , warlike Exercises , making an Execution of Laws , &c. By that means seeming to bear a hard hand over the richer , but to suffer the poorer , and meaner sor● to be absent , and to neglect those Assemblies und●r pretence , that they will not draw them from their business , and private earnings , : Yet withall to cite thither some few of them , ( viz. ) so many as are easily over matched by the ●icher sort , to make a shew , that they would have the people or poorer sort , partakers likewise of those matters , yet terrifying those that come to their Assemblies , with the tediousness of consultations , greatness of Fines , if they should mis-do , to the end , to make them unwilling to come again , or to have to do with those Consultations ; by which means , the richer sort do still govern the State , with the peoples liking , and good contentment .

Axioms .

Axioms or Rules of preserving the state are , 1. G●neral , that serve for all Common-wealths . 2. Particular , that serve for every several State .

General Rules .

1. THe first and principal Rule of Policie to be observed in all States , is to profess , and practise , and maintain the true worship and Religion of Almighty God prescribed unto us in his word , which is the chief end of all government . The Axio● , That God be obeyed simply without exception , though he command that which seemeth unreasonable , and absurd to Humane policy ; as in the Iews Common-wealth , That all the men should repair yearly to one place to worship God four times , leaving none to defend their coast , though being beset with many Enemies . Not to sow the seventh year , but to suffer the ground to rest untilled without respect or fear of famine , &c.

2. To avoid the causes of Conversions , whereby States are over-thrown , that are set down in the Title of conversions ; For that Common-vvealths ( as natural bodies ) are preserved by avoiding that which hurteth the health and State thereof , a●d are so cured by contrary medicines .

3. To take heed , that no Magistrate be created or continued contrary to the Laws and policy of that Stat● . As that in a S●nate , there be no● created a perpetual Dict●tor , as Caesar in Rome . In a Kingdom , that there be no Senate , or Convention of equal power with the Prince in State matters , as in Poland .

4. To create such Magistrates as love the State as it is setled , and take heed of the contrary practise , as to advance Popular persons in a Kingdom , or A●istocracie . And secondly , to advance such as have skill to discern what doth preserve , and what hurteth or altereth the present Stat● .

5. To that end to have certain Of●icers to p●y abroad , and to observe such as do not live and behave themselves in sit sort , agreeable to the present State , but de●●e rather to be under some other form , or kind of government .

6. To take heed that Magistracies be not sold for money , nor bribe in their Offices , which is specially to be observed in that Common-wealth which is governed by a few of the richer sort ; For if the Magistrate gain nothing but his Common Fees , the common sort , and such as want honour , take in good part that they be not preferred , and are glad rather that themselves are suffered to intend private business . But if the Magistrate buy and sell matters , the common people are doubly grieved , both because they are debar'd of those preferments , and of that gain they see to grow by them , which is the cause that the Germ●in Oligarchi●s continue so firm ; for both they suffer the poorer sort to grow into wealth , and the richer sort are by that means freed , and secured from being under the poor .

7. To take heed that the State , as it is setled and maintained , be not overstuct , nor exceed in his kind ; ( viz. ) That a Kingdom be not too Monarchical , nor a Popular State too Popular : For which cause it is good , that the Magistrates sometimes yield of his right touching honour , and behave themselves familiarly with those that are equal unto them in other parts , though inferiour for place and Office ; And sometimes popula●ly with the common people , which is the cause that some Common-wealths , though they be very simply , and unskilfully set , yet conti●●e ●●rm , because the Magistrates behave thems●lves wi●ely , and with due re●pect towards the r●st that are without honour ; and therefore ●ome kind of Modera●● Popularity is to be used in every ●ommon-wealth .

8. To take heed of small beginnings , and to meet with them even at the first , as well touching the breaki●g and altering of Lawes , as of other rules which concern the continuance of every several State . For the disease and alteration of a Common-wealth , doth not happen all at once , but grows by degrees , which every common wit cannot discern , but men expert in POLICIE .

9. To provide , that that part be ever the grea●er in number and power , which favours the S●ate as now ●t sta●ds . This is to be observed as a ve●y Oracle in all Common-weal●hs .

10 To observe a mean in all the degrees , and to suffer no pa●t to exceed , or decay over much . As first for p●efe●ments , to provide that they be rather small and short , than great and long ; and if a●y be grown to overmuch greatness , to withdraw or diminish some part of his honour . Where the Sophisms are to be practised ( viz. ) to do it by parts and degrees ; to do it by occasion , or colour of law , and not all at once . And if that way serve not , to advance some other , of whose virtu● and faithfulness , we are fully assur●d , to as high a degree , or to a greater honour ; and to be the friends and followe●s of him that excelleth , above that which is meet . As touching wealth , to provide , that those of the middle sort ( as before was said ) be more in number ; and if any grow high , and overcharged with wealth , to use the So●●isms of a Po●ula● State , viz. to send him on Embassages , and Forreign Negotiations , or imploy him in some Office that hath g●●at charges , and little honour , &c. To which end , the Edil●ship served in some Common-wealths .

11. To suppress the Factions , and quarrels of the Nobles , and to keep other that are y●● free from joyni●g with them in their partakings and Factions .

12 To increase or remit the common Taxes and Contributions , according to the wealth , or want of the People and Common-wealt● . If the people be increased in Wealth , the Taxes and Subsidies may be increased . If they be poor , and their Wealth diminish , specially by dearth , want of Traffick , &c. to forbear Taxes and Impositions , or to take little . Otherwise grudge and discontentments must needs follow . The Sophisms that serve for Imposi●itions , are these , and other of like sort , to pretend business of great charge , as War , building of Ships , making of Havens , Castles , Fortifications , &c. for the Common defence ; sometimes by Lotteries and like devises , wherein some part may be bestowed , the rest reserved for other expences ; but Princely dealings needs no pretences .

13 To Provide that the Discipline & Training of youth of the better sort be such as agreeth with that Common-wealth : As that in a Kingdom , the sons of Noble men to be attendant at the Court , that they may be accustomed to obedience towards the Prince : In the Senatory State , that the sons of the Senatours be not idly , nor over daintily brought up , but well instructed and trained up in Le●rning , Tongues , and Martial Exercise ; that they may be able to bear that place in the Common-wealth , which their Father held , and contrariewise , in a Popular State ,

14. To take heed , least their Sophisms , or secret practises for the continuance and maintenance of that State , be not discovered ; least by that means they refuse and disappoint themselves , but wisely used , and with great secrecie .

Particular Rules .

Rules and Axioms , for preserving of a Kingdom .

Hereditary . Conquered .

Kingdoms Hereditary , are preserved at home by the ordering , 1. HImself , viz. By the tempering and moderation of the Princes Povver and Prerogative . For the less and more temperate their Povver and State is , the more firm , and stable is their Kingdom and Governm●nt ; because they seem to be further off from a Master-like , and Tyrannical Empire ; and less unequal in condition to the next degree , to wit , the Nobility , and so less subject to grudge and envy . 2. Nobility ; viz. By keeping that degree and due proportion , that neither they exceed in number more than the Realm , or State can bear , as the Scottish Kingdom , and sometime the English , when the Realm was overcharged with the number of Dukes , Earls , and other Nobles ; whereby the Authori●y of the Prince was eclipsed , and the Realm troubled with their Factions and Ambitions . Nor that any one excel in Hono●r , Power , or wealth , as that he resemble another King within the Kingdom , as the house of Lancaster within this Realm , To that end , not to load any with too much Hono●r or preferment , because it is hard even for the best , and worthiest men , to bear their greatness , and high Fortune tempera●ely , as appeareth by infinite examples in all States . The Sophism for preventing , or reforming this inconvenience , are to be used with great caution and wisdom . If any great person be to be abated , not to deal with him by calumniation , or forg●d matter , & so to cut him off without desert , especially if he be gratious among the people , after the Machiavilian Policie , which besides the injustice , is an occasion many times of greater danger towards the Prince . Nor to withdraw their Honour all at once , which maketh a desperate Discontentment in the party , and a commiseration in the peole , and so greater love , if he be gracious for his virtue , and publick service . Nor to banish him into forreign Countries , where he may have opportunity of practising with Forr●ign States , whereof great danger may ensue , as in the example of Coriolanus , Henry the fourth , and such like . But to use these , and the like Sophisms , viz. To abate their greatness by degrees , as David Ioabs , Iustinian Bellisarius , &c. To advance some other Men to as great , or greater Honour , to shadow , or over-mate the greatness of the other . To draw from him by degrees his friends , and followers by prefe●ments , rewa●ds , and other good and lawfull means ; especially , to be pr●vided that these great men be not imployed in great or powerfull affairs of the Common-wealth , whereby they may have more opportunity to sway the State . 3. People , viz. So to order and behave himself , that he be loved , and reverenced of the People . For that the Prince need not greatly fear home-conspiracies , o● forreign Invasion , if he be firmly loved of his own people . The reason , for that the Rebel can neither hope for any forces for so great enterprise , nor any refuge , being discovered and put to flight , if the multitude affect their Prince : But the Common people being once offended , hath cause to fear every moving , both at home and abroad . This may be effected by the Prince , if he use means and art of getting the favour of the people , and avoid those things that breed hatred & contempt ; viz. if he seem as a Tutor , or a Father to love the people , and to protect them , if he maintain the peace of his Kingdom ; For that nothing is more popular , nor more pleasing to the people , than is peace . 4. If he shew himself oftentimes graciously , yet with State and Majesty to his people , and receive complaints of his suppliants , and such like . 5. If he sit himself sometimes in open Courts , and place of Iustic● , that he may seem to have a care of justice among his people . If he bestow many benefits and graces upon that City , which he maketh the seat of his Empire , and so make it sure and faithfull unto him , which is fit to be in the middle of his Kingdom , as the hear● in the middle of the body , or the Sun in the middle of Heaven , both to divide himself more easily into all the parts of his Dominions ; and least the furthest parts● at one end move , whilest the Prince is in the other . I● he go in progress many times to see his Provinces , especially , those that are remote . 6. If he gratifie his Courtiers and Att●n●ants in that ●ort , and by such means , as that he may seem not to pleasure them with the hurt and injury of his people , as with Monopolies , and such like . 7. If he commit the handling of such things as procure envy , or seem grievous to his Ministers , but reserve those things which are gratefull , and well pleasing to himself , as the French Kings , who for th●t purpose , as may seem , have erected their Court at Paris , which acquitteh the Prince from grudge and ●nvy , both with the Nobles and the P●ople . 8. If he borrows sometimes sums of money of his people , though he have no need , and pay the same justly without defalca●ion of any part by his Exchequer , or other Officer . 9. If he avoid all such things as may breed ●atred , or contempt of his person , which may be done , if he shew himself not too light , inconstant , hard , cruel , ●sfeminate , fearfull , and dastardly , &c. But contrarywise , Religious , Grave , Iust Valiant , &c. Whereby appeareth the false doctrine of the Machiavilian Policie , with far the betmeans to keep the people in obedience , than love , and reverence of the people towards the Prince . 10 If the Prince be well furnished with Warlike provision , which is to be rumoured , and made known abroad : if it be known , that he is reverenced , and obeyed by his peoples at home . 11. If he provide so much as lyeth in him , that his neighbour Kingdoms grow not over much in power and Dominion ; which if it happen , he is to joyn speedily with other Princes , which are in like danger to abate that greatness , and to strengthen himself and the rest against it . An oversight of the Christian Princes towards the King of Spain . 12. If he get him Intelligencers by Reward , or other means , to detect or hinder the designs of that Prince , with whom he hath differences , if any thing be intended against his State . Or at least have some of his own Lydging abroad , about that Princes Court , under colour of Embassage , or some other p●etence ; which must be men of skill and Dexterity to serve for that turn . 13. To observe the Laws of his Countrey , and not to encounter them with his Pr●rogative , nor to use it at all where there is a Law , for that it maketh a secret and just grudge in the peoples hearts , especially if it tender to take from them ●●●ir commodities , and to bestow them upon other of his COURTIERS and Ministers . 14. To provide especially , That that part , which favoureth the State as it standeth , be more potent , than the other which favoureth it not , or desireth a change . 15. To make special choice of good and sound men to bear the place of Magistrates , especially , of such as assist the Prince in his Counsels , and Policies , and not to lean over much to his own advise , contrarie to the rule of Machiavil , who teacheth , That a Prince can have no good counsel , except it be in himself ; his reason , because if he use the counsel of some one , he is in danger to be over-wrought , and supplanted by him ; & if he counsel with more , Then he shall be distracted with the differences in opinions . As if a Prince of great , or mean wisdom , could not take the Iudgement of all his Counsellorurs in any point of Policie , or of so many as the himself thinketh good , and to take it either by word , or in writing ; and himself then in private peruse them all , and so after good and mature deliberation , make choice of the best , without any distraction or binding himself to the direction of one . For the Proverb is true , that two eyes see more than one ; and therefore the advises , and Consultations of a Senatory State , is compared by some to a Feast , or dinner , where many contribute towards the shot , by which means they have more variety of dishes , and so better fare ; and yet every man may make choice of that dish , that serveth him best ●or his health and appeti●e . 16. The Prince himself is to sit sometimes in place of publique justice , and to give an experiment of his wisdom and equity , whereby great reverence and estimation is gotten , as in the example of Solomon , which may seem the reason , why our Kings of England had their Kings Bench in place of publick Justice , after the manner of the ancient Kings that ●ate in the Gate ; where for better performing of this Princely duty , some special causes may be selected , which may throughly be deba●ed and considered upon by the Prince in private , with the help and advise of his learned Councel , and so be decided publickly , as before is said , by the Prince himself ; At least , the Prince is to ●ake accomp● of every Minister of publick Justice , that it may be known , that he hath a care of Justice , and doing right to his people , which makes the Justic●rs also to ●e more ●●reful in performing of their duties . 17. To be moderate in his Taxes , and impositions ; and when need doth require to use the Subjects purse , ●o do it by Parliaments , and with their consents , making the cause apparent unto them , and shewing his unwillingness in charging them . Finally , so to use it , that it may seem rather an offer from his Subjects , than an exaction by him . 18. To stop small beginnings ; unto ●his end to compound the dissentions ●hat arise amongst the Nobles , with caution , that such as are free be not drawn into parts , whereby many times the Prince is endangered , and the whole Common-wealth set in a combustion ; as in the example of the Barons Wars , and the late Wars of France , which grew from a quarrel betwixt the Guision Faction , and the other Nobility . 19. To stir up the people , if they grow secure , and negl●gent of A●mour , and other provision for the Common-wealth , by some rumour or fear of danger at home , to make more ready when occasion requireth . But this seldom to be used , least it be supposed a false Alarm , when there is need indeed . 20. To have special care , that his children , especially , the heir apparent , have such bringing up as is meet for a King , viz. in learning , specially of matters pertaining to State , and in Martial exercise , contrary to the practise of many Princes , who suffer their children to be brought up in pleasure , and to spend their time in hunting , &c. which by reason of their defects , afterwards is a cause of mis-government and alteration of State .

II. Kingdoms new gotten , or purchased by force , are preserved by these means .

1. FIrst , if they have been Subjects before to his Ancestours , or have the same tongue , manners , or fashions , as have his own Countrey , it is an eas●● matter to retain such Countries within their obedience , in case the Princes bloud of the said countrey be wholly extinct . For men of the same quality , tongue , and condi●ion , do easily shole , and combine thems●lves together , so much the rather , if the people of that countrey have served before , and were not accustomed to their own Lib●r●y , wherein specially is to be observed , that the laws and customs o● that purchased Countrey be not altered nor innovated , or at least it be done by little and little . So the ●urgundians and Acquitains were annexed to France . The reason , because partly they have been accustomed to serve , and partly , for that th●y will not ●asily agree about any other to be their Prince , if the Bloud Royall be once extinguished . As for the invasion of a forreign Coutrey , whereunto the Prince hath no right , or whereof the right heir is living , ; It is not the part of a just Civil Prince , much less a Prince Christian to enforce such a countrey ; and therefore , the Machiavilian practises in this case , to make sure work by extinguishing wholly the Bloud Royal , is lewd and imper●inent : The like is to be said of murthering the Natives , or the greatest part of them , to the end he may hold the rest in sure posession . A thing not onely against Christian Religion , but it is inhumane injustice , cruel , and barbarous .

2. The safest way is , ( supposing a right ) that some good part of the Natives be transplanted into some other place , and our Colonies , consisting of so many as shall be thought meet , be planted there in some part of the Province , Castles , Forts , and Havens , seized upon and more provided in fit places , as the manner was of the Babylonian Monarch , which Transplanted 10. Iews : And of the Romans in France , Tribes of the Germany , Br●tany , and other places . The reason : 1. For that otherwise Forces of Horse and Foot , are to be maintained within the Province , which cannot be done without great charge . 2. For that the whole Province is ●roubled and grieved with removing and supplying the Army with victuals , carriages , &c.

3. For that Colonies are more sure and faith●ul , than the rest .

As for the Natives that are removed from their former ●ears , they have no means to hurt , and the rest of the Natives being free from the inconvenience , and fearing that themselves may be so served if they attempt any thing rashly , are content to be quiet .

The Turks practise in Asia , where the chief grounds and dwellings are posessed by the Souldiers , whom they call , Timariotae .

That the Prince have his seat and his residence , in his new purchase , especially , for a time , till things be well setled ; especially , if the Province be great and large , as the Turks in Greece : The reason ; 1. Because the presence of the Prince availeth much to keep things in order , and get the good will of his new Subjects . 2. They conceive that they have refuge by the Princes presence , if they be oppressed by the Lieutenants , and inferiour Governours : Where it will be convenient for the winning the peoples hearts , that some example be made of punishing of such as have committed any violence or oppression . 3. Because being present , he seeth and heareth what is thought and attempted ; and so may quickly give remedy to it , which being absent , he cannot do , or not do in time . 4. If the Prince himself cannot be present to reside , then , to take heed that the charge of Governing , or new purchases be committed to such as be sure men , and of other meet quality , that depend wholly upon the Princes favour , and not to Natives , or other of their own Subjects , that are gracious ●or their Nobil●●y , or Virtue ; especially , if the Province be great , and somewhat far distant , which may soon seduce the unsetled affections of those new subjects . As for such Governours , as depend wholly upon the Princes favour , being not born , but created Noble , they will not so easily suffer themselves to be won from their duty , and in case they would revolt , yet they are not able to make any great strength , for that the people obey them but as instruments and ministers , to keep them in Subjection , and not for any ill will .

4. To have the children of the ch●e● Noble men , and of greatest Authority , Hostages with them in safe keeping , the more the better : For that no bound is stronger , than that of nature , to contain the Parents and Alies in obedience , and they the rest . 5. To alter the laws but by degrees one after another , and to make other that are more behovefull for the establishing of the present Govern●ment . 6. To keep the people quiet and peaceable , and well affected so much as may be , that they may seem by being conquered , to have gotten a protectour , rather than a Tyrant ; For the Common-People , if they enjoy peace , and ●e not distracted nor drawn from their business , nor exacted upon beyond measure , are easily con●ained under obedience ; Yet notwithstanding , they are to be dis●used from the practise of Arms , and other Exercises which increase courage , and ●e weakened of Armour , that they have neither spi●it , ●or will to rebel . 7. If the●e be any ●action in the Countrey , to take to him the defence of the better and stronger part , and to combine with it , ●as Caesar in Fra●●e . 8. To look well to the Borders , and confining Provinces , and if any rule there of great , or equal power to him●elf , to joyn league with some other Borderers , though of less strength , to hinder the attempts ( if any should be ) by such neighbour Prince . For it happeneth often , tha● a Countrey in●e●ted by one neighbour P●ince , ●calleth in another , of as great , o● greater power , to assist , and rescue it from the other that invadeth it ; So the Romans were called into Greece , by the AEtolians ; the Saxons , by the Britains , the Danes , by the Saxons . 9. To leave their Ti●les and dignities to the Natives , but the command and Authority , wholly to his own . 10. Not to put much trust , nor to practise to often the Sophisms of Policy , especially those that appertain to a Tyrannical State , which are soon de●ected by men of Judgement , and so bring discredit to the Prince , and his Policy among the wiser , and better sort of his subjects , whereof must needs follow very ill effects .

The Sophisms of Tyrants , are rather to be known , than practised , ( which are for the supporting of their Tyrannical States , ) by wise and good Princes , and are these , and such like as follow .

Rules Politick of Tyrants .

RVles practised by Tyrants are of 2. sorts . viz. 1. Barbarous , and Pro●essed , which is proper to those that have got head , and have power sufficient of themselves , without others help , as in the Tu●kish , and Russe Government . 2. So●histical , and Dissembl●d ; As in some States that are repu●ed for good and lawfull Monarchies , but inclining to Tyrannies , proper to those which are not yet ●●tled , nor have power sufficient of themselves ; but must use the power and help of others , and so are forced to be Politick Soph●st●●s .

I. Sophisms of a Barbarous and professed Tyranny .

TO expel and banish ou● of his countrey all ho●est means , whereby his people may a●tain to learning , wisdom , valour , and other virtues , that they might be fit for that estate , and ●ervile condition . For that these two , learning , and martial exercise , effect two things most dangerous to a Tyranny : viz. Wisdom , and Valour . For that men of spirit and understanding , can hardly endure a Servile State . To this end , to forbid learning of li●eral Arts , and Martial exercise ; As in the Rus●e Government , so Iulian the Apo●tata dealt with the Christians . Contrarywise , to use his people to base occup●tions , and Mechanical Arts , to keep them from idleness , and to put away from them all high thoughts , and manly conceits , and to give them a liberty of drinking drunk , and of other base and lewd conditions that they may be sotted , and so made unfit for great enterprises . So the Egyptian Kings dealt with the Heb●ews ; So the Russe Emperour with his Russe people : And Charles the fifth with the Neth●rlanders , when he purposed to enclose their Priviledges , and to bring them under his absolute Government .

2. To make sure to him , and his State , his Military men by reward , liberty , and other means , especially , his Guard , or Praetorian ●and ; That being partakers of the spoil and benefit , they make like that State , and continue firm to it ; as the Turk , his Ianizaries ; the Russe , his Boyarens , &c.

3. To unarm his people of weapons , money , and all means , whereby they may resist his power ; And to that end , to have his set and ordinary exactions , viz. Once in two , three , or four years , and sometimes yearly , as the Turk and Russe ; who is wont to say , That his people must be used as his flock of sheep , viz. Their fle●c● taken from them , least it overlade them , and grow too heavy ; That t●ey are like to his beard , that the more it was shaven , the thicker it would grow . And if there be any of extraordinary wealth , to borrow of them in the mean while , till the Tax come about , or upon some devised matter , to confiscate their goods , as the common practise is of the Russe and Tu●k .

4. To be still in Wars , to the end , his people may need a Captain ; and that his Forces may be kept in practise , as the Russe doth yearly against the Tartar , Pol●nian , and Sweden , &c.

5. To cut off such as excel the rest in wealth , favour , or nobil●ty ; or be of a pregnant , or a spiring wit , & so are fearfull to a Tyrant , and to suffer none to hold Office , or any honour , but onely of him ; as the Turk , his Bas●●●s ; and the Russe , his ●u●zzes .

6. To forbid Guild● , Brotherhoods , Feastings , and other Assemblies among the people , that they have no means or oportunity to conspire , or confer together of publick matters , or to maintain love amongst themselves , which is very dangerous to a Tyrant , the Russes practise .

7. To have their Beagles , or listeners in every corner , and parts of the Realm ; especially , in places that are more suspect , to learn what every man saith , or thinketh , that they may prevent all attempts , & take away such as mislike their State .

8. To make Schism , and Division among his Subjects , viz. To set one Noble man , against another , and one Rich man against another , that through Faction & disagreement among themselves , they may be weakened , and attempt nothing against him , and by this means entertaining whisperings , and complaints , he may know the secrets of both parts , and have matter against them both , when need requireth . So the Russe made the Faction of the Ze●●ky , and the Oppress●nie .

9. To have strangers for his Guard , and to entertain Parasites , and other base and servile fellows , not too wise , and yet subtile , that will be ready for reward to do and execute what he commandeth , though never so wicked and unjust . For that good men cannot flatter , and wise men cannot serve a Tyrant .

All these practises , and such like , may be contracted into one or two , viz. To bereave his subjects of will and power to do him hurt , or to alter the present State . The use is Caution , not Imitation .

II. Sophisms of the Sophistical , or subtile Tyrant , to hold up his State .

1. TO make shew of a good King , by observing a temper and mediocritie in his Government , and whole course of life ; To which end , it is necessary , That this subtile Tyrant , be a cunning Polititian , or a Machiavilian at the least , and that he be taken so to be , for that it maketh him more to be feared and regarded , and is thought thereby , not unworthy for to Govern others .

2. To make shew not of severity , but of gravity , by seeming reverent , and not terrible in his speech , and gesture , and habite , and other demeanour .

3. To pretend care of the Common-wealth ; And to that end , to seem loath to exact Tributes , and other Charges ; and yet to make necessity of it , where none is : To that end , to procure such War as can bring no danger toward his State , and that might easily be compounded , or some other chargeable business ; and to continue it on , that he may continue his exaction and contribution so long as he list . And thereof to imploy some in his publick Service , the rest to hoord up in his Treasury , which is sometimes practised even by lawfull Princes , as Edward the fourth in his Wars against France , when having levied a great sum of Money throughout his ●ealm , especially of the Londoners , he went over Seas , and returned without any thing doing .

4. Sometimes to give an account by open speech , and publick writing , of the expence of such Taxes and Impositions , as he hath rec●ived of his ●ubjects , that he may so seem to be a good Husband , and frugal , and not a robber of the Common-wealth .

5. To that end , to bestow● some cost upon publick buildings , or some other work for the Common good , especially upon the Ports , Forts , and chief Cities of his Realm , that so he may seem a benenefactour , and have a delight in the adorning of his Countrey , or doing some good for it .

6. To forbid feastings , and other meetings , which increase love , and give opportunity to confer together of publick matters , under pretence of sparing cost for better uses , To that end , the Curfieu Bell was first ordained by William the● Conquerour , to give men warning to repair home at a certain hour .

7. To take heed that no one grow to be over-great , but rather , many equally great , that they may envy , and contend one with another ; and if he resolve to weaken any of this sort , to do it warily , and by degrees ; If quite to wreck him , and to have his life , yet to give him a lawfull tryal , after the manner of his Countrey ; And if he proceed so far with any of great power and estimation , as to do him contumely , or disgrace , not to suffer him to escape , because contumely and disgrace , are things contrary unto Honour , which great spirits do most desire , and so are moved rather to a revenge for their disgrace , than to any thankfulness , or acknowledging the Princes favour for their pardon or dismistion ; True in Atheists , but not in true Christian Nobilitie .

8. To unarm his people , and store up their weapons , under pretence of keeping them safe , and having them ready when service requireth , and then to arm with them , such and so many as he shall think meet , and to commit them to such as are sure men .

9. To make schism or division under hand among his Nobility , and betwixt the Nobility and the people , and to set one Rich man against another , that they combine no● together , and that himself by hearing the grieff and complaints , may know the secrets of both parts , and so have matter a●ainst them both , when it listeth him to call them to an account .

10. To offer no man any contumely or wrong , specially , about womens mat●ers , by attempting the chastity of their Wives or Daughters , which hath been he ruin of many Tyrants , and conversion of their States . As of ●arquinius , by Brutus , Appius , by Virginius , Pisistratus , by Harmodius , Alexander Medices , Duke of Florence , Aloisus of Placentia , Rodericus , King of Spain , &c.

11. To that end , to be moderate in his pleasures , or to use them closely , that he be not seen ; For that men sober , or watchfull , or such as seem so , are not lightly subject to contempt , or conspiracies of their own .

12. To reward such as atchieve some great or commendable enterprize ; or do any special action ●or the Common-wealth , in that manner as it may seem , they could not be better regarded , in case they lived in a Free-state .

13. All rewards and things gratefull , to come from himself , but all punishments , exactions , and things ungratefull , to come from his Officers , & publick Ministers ; And when he hath effected what he would by them , if he see his people discontented withall , to make them a Sacrifice to pacifie his Subjects .

14. To pretend great care of Religion , and of serving God , ( which hath been the manner of the wickedest Tyrants ) for that people do less fear any hurt from those , whom they think Virtuous and Religious , nor attempt likely to do them hurt , for that they think that God protects them .

15. To have a strong & sure Guard of forreign Souldiers , and to bind them by good turns , that they having at least profit , may depend upon him , and the present State ; As C●ligula , the German Guard , where the Nobility are many and mighty . The like is practised by Lawfull Kings , as by the French King .

16. To procure that other great persons bee in the same fault , or case with them , that for that cause they be forced to defend the TYRANT , for their own safetie

17. To take part , and to joyn himself with the stronger part ; if the Common people , and mean degree be the stronger , to joyn with them ; if the Rich and Noble , to joyn with them . For so that part with his own strength , will be ever able to overmatch the other .

18. So to frame his manners & whole behaviour , as that he may seem , if not perfectly good , yet tolerably evil , or somewhat good , somewhat bad .

These Rules of Hypocritical Tyrants , are to bee known , that they may be avoyded , and met withall , and not drawn into imimitation .

Preservation of an Aristocracie .

RUles to preserve a Senatory State , are partly taken from the common Axioms , and partly from those that preserve a Kingdom .

Preservation of an Oligarchie , by Sophisms . Rules .

1. IN Consultations and Assemblies , about publick affairs , to order the matter , that all may have liberty to frequent their Common Assemblies , and Councels , ; But to impose a Fine upon the richer sort , if they omit that duty . On the other side , to pardon the people , if they absent themselves , and to bear with them under pretence , that they may the better intend their Occupations , , and not be hindered in their Trades , and earnings .

2. In Election of Magistrates , and Officers : To suffer the poorer sort to vow , and abjure the bearing of Office , under colour of sparing them , or to enjoyn some great charge , as incident to the Office , which the poor cannot bear . But to impose some great Fine upon those , that be Rich , if they refuse to bear Office , being Elect unto it .

3. In judicial matters : In like manner to order , that the people may be absent from publick Trials , under pretence of following their business . But the Richer to be present , and to compel them by Fines , to frequent the Court .

4. In Warlike exercise and Arms : That the poor be not forced to have Armour , Horse , &c. under pretence of sparing their cost , nor to be drawn from their Trades by Martial Exercises ; but to compel the Richer sort to keep their proportion of Armor , Horse , &c. by excessive Fines , and to exercise themselves in War-like matters , &c.

5. To have special care of instructing their Children in liberal Arts , Policie , and Warlike exercise , and to observe good order and discipline . For as Popular States are preserved by the frequencie , and Liberty of the People , so this Government of the Richer , is preserved by discipline , and good o●der of Governours .

6. To provide good store of War-like furniture , especially of Horse , and Horse-men , and of Armed men , viz. Pike , &c. which are proper to the gentry , as shot , and light furniture , are for a Popular Companie .

7. To put in practise some points of a Popular state ; viz. To lade no one man with too much preferment ; To make yearly , or half years Magistrates , &c. For that the People are pleased with such things , and they are better secured by this means from the Rule of one . And if any grow to too much greatness , to abate him by the Sophisms fit for this State .

8. To commit the Offices and Magistracies , to those that are best able to bear the greatest charges for publick matters , which both tendeth to the conservation of this State , and pleaseth the people , for that they reap some relief , and benefit by it .

9. To the same end , To contract marriages among themselves , the rich with the rich , &c.

10. In some things which concern not the Points , and matters of State , as Electing Magistrates , making Laws , &c. to giv● an equality , or sometimes a preferment to the Common People , and not to do , as in some Oligarchies they were wont ; viz. To swear against the People , to suppress and bridle them ; but rather contrary ; To minister an Oath at their admission , That they shall do no wrong to any of the People ; and if any of the richer offer wrong to any of the Commons , to shew some example of severe punishment .

For other Axioms that preserve this State , they are to be borrowed from those other rules that tend to the preserving of a Popular , and Tyrannical State ; for the strict kind of Oligarchie , is kin to a Tyranny .

Preservation of a popular State ; Sophisms . Rules or Axioms .

1. IN publick Assemblies and Consultations about matters of State , creating of Magistrates , publick Justice , and Exercise of arms , to practise the contrary to the former kind of Government , to wit , an Oligarc●ie . For in Popular States , the Commons and meaner sort are to be drawn to those Assemblies , Magistrates , Offices , War-like Exercises , &c. by mulcts and rewards , and the richer sort are to be spared , and not to be forced by fine , or otherwise , to frequent these Exercises .

2. To make shew of honouring and reverencing the richer men , and not to swear against them , as the manner hath been in some Popular States ; but rather to preferre them in all other matters , that concern not the State and publick Government .

3. To elect Magistrates from among the Common● by Lot , or Ballating , and not to choose any for their wealths sake .

4. To take heed , that no mā bear office twice , except it be Military , where the pay , and salary , &c. is to be reserved in their own hands , to be disposed of by a Common-Councel , &c. And to see that no man be too highly preferred .

5. That no Magistracy be perpetual , but as short as may be , to wit , for a a year , half year , &c.

6. To compel Magistrates when their time expireth , to give an accompt of their behaviour and government , and that publickly before the Commons .

7. To have publick Salaries and allowance for their Magistrates , Judges , &c. And yearly dividents for the common people , and such as have most need among them .

8. To make Judges of all matters out of all sorts , so they have some aptness to perform that duty .

9. To provide that publick Judgements and Trials be not frequent ; and to that end to inflict great Fines and other punishments upon Pettifoggers and Dilators , as the law of requital , &c. Because for the most part the richer and nobler , and not the Commons are indited and accused in this Common-wealth , which causeth the rich to conspire against the State ; whereby many times the popular State is turned into an Oligarchie , or some other Government . Hereto tendeth that Art of Civil Law , made against Accusers and Calumniatours : Ad S●natus-consultum Turpilianum , l. 1. de Calumniatoribus .

10. In such free States as are popular , and have no revenue , to provide that publick Assemblies be not after : because they want salary for Pleaders and Oratours ; And if they be rich ; yet to be wary , that all the revenue be not divided amongst the Commons . For , that this distribution of the Common revenue among the multitude , is like a purse or barrel without a bottom . But to provide , that a sufficient part of the revenue be stored up for the publick affairs .

11. If the number of the poor encrease too much in this kind of State , to send some abroad out of the Cities into the next Countrey places , and to provide above all , that none do live idly , but be set to their trades . To this end , to provide that the richer men place in their Farms and Coppiholds , such decayed Citizens .

12. To be well advised what is good for this State , and not to suppose that to be fit for a popular State , that seemeth most popular ; but that which is ●est for the continuance thereof : And to that end , not to lay into the Exchequer , or Common-Treasurie , such goods as are confiscate , but to store them up as holy and consecrate things , which except it be practised , confiscations , and fines of the Common people would be frequent , and so this State would decay by weakening the people .

Conversion of States in general .

COnversion of a State , is the declining of the Common-wealth , either to some other form of Government , or to his full and last period appointed by God .

Causes of conversions of States are of two sorts : General and Particular .

GEneral , ( viz. ) 1. Want of Religion : viz. of the true knowledge and worship of God , prescribed in his word ; and notable sins that proceed from thence in Prince and people , as in the examples of Saul , Uzziah , the Jewish State ; the four Monarchies●●nd all other .

2. Want of wisdom and good Councel to keep the State , the Prince , Nobles , and people in good temper , and due proportion , according to thei● several orders and decrees .

3. Want of Justice , either in administration ( as ill Lawes , or ill Magistrates ) or in the execution , as rewards not given where they should be , or there ●estowed where they should not be , or punishments not inflicted where they should be .

4. Want of power and sufficiency to maintain and defend it self ; viz. Of provision , as Armour , Money , Captains , Souldiers , &c. Execution , when the means or provision is not used , or ill used .

2. Particular : To be noted and collected out of the contraries of those rules , that are prescribed for the preservation of the Common-wealths .

Particular causes of Conversion of States , are of two sorts . 1. FOrreign : By the over-greatness of invasion of some forreign Kingdom , or other State of meaner power , having a part within our own , which are to ●e prevented by the providence of the chief , and rules of policy for the preserving of every State . This ●alleth out very seldom for the great diff●cul●y to overthrow a forreign State . 2. Domestick : Sedition or open violence by the stronger part . Alteration without violence .

Sedition .

SEdition is a power of inferiours opposing it self with force of Arms against the superiour power , Quasi ditio secedens .

Causes of Sedition are of two sorts .

1. General .

Liberty

Richer

WHen they , that are of equal quality in a Commō-wealth , or do take themselves so to be , are not regarded equally in all , or in any of these three .

Or , when they are so unequal in quality , or take themselves so to be , are regarded but equally , or with less respect than those that be of less de●ect in these three things , or in any of them .

Honour

1. IN the Chief : Covetousness or oppression , by the Magistrate or higher Power , ( viz. ) when the Magistrates , especially the Chief , encreaseth his substance and revenue beyond measure , either with the publick or ( private calamity , whereby the Governours grow to quarrel among themselves as in Olygarchies ) or the other degrees conspire together , and make quarrel against the Chief , as in Kingdoms : The examples of Wat Tyler , Iack Straw , &c.

2. In the Chief : Injury , when great Spirits , and of great power , are greatly wronged and dishonoured , or take themselves so to be , as Coriolanus , Cyrus minor , Earl of Warwick . In which cases the best way is to decide the wrong .

3. Preferment , or want of preferment ; wherein some have over-much , and so wax proud and aspire higher : or have more or less , than they deserve as they suppose ; & so in envy and disda● , seek Innovation by open faction , so Caesar , &c.

4. Some great nec●ssity or calamity ; So Xerxes after the ●oil of his great Army . And Sena●harib after the loss of 185. in one night .

2. Particular .

1. ENvie , when the chief exceed the mediocri●y before mentioned , and so provoketh the Nobility , and other degrees , to conspire against him ; as Brutus Cassius , &c. against Caesar . 2. Fear , viz. Of danger , when one or more dispatch the Prince , by secret practice or force , to prevent his own danger , as Artab●nus did Xerxes . 3. Lust or Lecherie , as Tarquinius Superbus , by Brutus ; Pisistratindae , by Armodius ; Appius by Virginius . 4. Contempt ; For vile quality & base behaviour , as Sardanapalus by Arbaces ; Dionysius the younger by Dion . 5. Contumely ; When some great disgrace is done to some of great Spirit , who standeth upon his honour and reputation , as Caligula by Chaereas . 6. Hope of Advancement , or some great profit , as Mituridates , Anobarsanes .

Chief .

Other d●gr●es .

Other degrees .

Alteration without violence .

CAuses of alteration without violence are ; 1. Excess of the State ; when by degrees the State groweth from that temper and mediocrity wherein it was , or should have been setled , and exceedeth in power , riches , and absoluteness in his kind , by the ambition and covetousness of the Chiefs immoderate taxes , and impositions , &c. applying all to his own benefi● , without respect of other degrees , and so in the end changeth it self into another State or form of Government , as a Kingdom into a Tyranny , an Oligarch●● into an Aristocraci● .

2. Excess , of some one or more in the Common-wealth ; viz. When some one or more in a Common-wealth grow to an excellency or excess above the rest , either in honour , wealth , or virtu● ; and so by permission and popular favour , are advanced to the Sovereignty : By which means , popular States grow into Oliga●chies ; and Oligarchi●s and Aristocracies into Monarchi●s . For which cause the Athenians and some other free States , made their Laws of Ostrocismos , to banish any for a time that should excel , though it were in virtue , to prevent the alteration of their State ; which because it is an unjust Law , 't is better to take heed at the beginning to prevent the means , that none should grow to that heigth and excellency , than to use so sharp and unjust a remedy .

FINIS .