Of Policy .

POlicy is an Art of Government of a Common-wealth , and some part of it according to that State , or form● of Government wherein it is setled for the publique good .

State , is the frame or set order of a Common-wealth , or of the Governours that rule the same , specially of the chiefe and Soveraigne Governour that commands the rest .

The State or Soveraignty consisteth in 5. points .

1. Making or annulling of Lawes . 2. Creating and disposing of Magistrates . 3. Power over life and death . 4. Making of Warre , or Peace . 5. Highest or last appeale . Where these 5. a●e , either in one or in more , there is the State .

These 5. points of State rest either in ; 1. One Monarchy or Kingdome . 2. Some few chiefe of men for vertue and wisedome , called an Aristocra●y . 3. Many , called a Free State or a Popular State . These three sorts of Government have respect to the Common good , and therefore are Iust and Lawfull States .

These 3. degenerate into 3. other Governements . 1. Monarchy . 2. Aristocraty . 3. Popular Estate . Into 1. Tyrany . 2. Oligarchy , or Government of a few , rich or able . 3. Common-wealth or Government of all the common & baser sort , and therefore called a Common wealth , by an vsurped Nickname .

These all respect there owne , and not the publique good , and therefore are called Bastard Governements .

1. Monarchy .

A Monarchy , or Kingdome , is the Governement of a State by one head , or Chiefe , tending to the Common benefit of all .

Monarchies or Kingdomes are of 3. sorts touching the right or possession of them ; viz.

1. Hereditary , by discent , as the English , French , &c. 2. Elective , by suffrage of the other Orders , or some of them , as the P●l●nian . 3. Mixt , or of both kinds ; viz , by Discent yet not tyed to the next of bloud , as the ancient Jewish State .

Monarchies are of 2. sorts touching their power or ●uthority : viz.

1. Intier . Where the whole power of ordering all State matters , both in peace and warre , doth by law and custome appertaine to the Prince , as in the English Kingdome , where the Prince hath power to make Lawes , League and Warre , to create Magistrates ; To pardon life : Of appeale , &c. Though to give a contentment to the other degrees , they have a sufferage in making Lawes ; yet ever subject to the Princes pleasure , nor negative will .

2. Limited , or restrained that hath no full power in all the points or matters of State , as the Military King that hath not the Soveraignty in time of peace , as the making of Lawes &c. But in Warre onely as the Poloni●● Kings .

2. Aristocraty or Senatory State .

AN Aristocraty is the Government of a Common-wealth by some competent number of the better sort , preferred for wisedome and other vertues for the publique good .

Aristocraties are of 3. sorts , viz , where the Senators are chosen , for 1. Vertue , Riches , and the Common good , as the Venetian .

2. Vertue and the publique good without respect of wealth , as sometimes the Roman when some of the Senatours , were fetched from the plough , and some from the Schooles .

3. Vertue and Wealth , more respecting their private , then the publique good which inclineth towards an Oligarchy , or the Government of the Richer or Nobler sort , as in Rome towards the end .

3. Free State or Popular State .

THe Popular State is the Government of a State by the Choiser sort of people , tending to the publique good of all sorts ; viz. with due respect of the better , nobler , and richer sort .

In every Iust State , some part of the Government is , or ought to bee imparted to the people ; As in a Kingdome , a voice or sufferage in making Lawes ; and sometimes also , in levying of Armes ( if the charge bee great , and the Prince forced to borrow helpe of his Subjects ) the matter rightly may bee propounded to a Parliament , that the taxe may seeme to have proceeded from themselves . So consultations , and some proceedings in Judiciall matters may in part bee referred to them . The reason , least seeing themselves to be in no number , nor of reckoning , they mislike the state or kind of Government : And where the Multitude is discontented , there must needs bee many Enemies to the present state . For which cause , Tyrants ( which allow the people , no manner of dealing in State matters ) are forced to bereave them of their wits and weapons , and all other meanes , whereby they may resist , or amend themselves , as in Rusheland , Turkey , &c.

4. Tyranny .

A Tyranny is the swarving , or distorting of a Monarchy , or the Government of one tending not to the publique good , but the private benefit of himselfe , and his followers . As in the Russe and Turkish Government , where the State and Wealth of other orders are employed onely to the uphoulding of the greatnesse of the King , or Emperour . This is the worst of all the Bastard States , because it is the perverting of the best Regiment , to wit , of a Monarchy , which resembleth the Soveraigne Government of God himselfe .

5. Obligarchy , or the Government of a few .

AN Oligarchy is the swarving , or the corruption of an Aristocraty ; or the Government of some few that are of the Wealthier or Nobler sort , without any respect of the publique good . The chiefe end of these Governours is their owne greatnesse and enriching . And therefore there manner is to prepare fit meanes to uphold their Estates . This State is not wholly so bad , as is the Tyra●nny , and yet worse then the Common-wealth , because it respecteth the good of a few .

6. Common-wealth .

A Common-wealth is the swarving or depravation of a Free or Popular State , or the Government of the whole Multitude of the base and poorer sort , without respect of the other orders .

These two States , to wit ; The Oligarchy and Common-wealth , are very adverse the one to the other , and have many bickerings and dissentions betweene them . For that the Richer or Nober sort suppose a right of superiority to appertaine unto them in every respect , because they are superiour , but in some respects onely , to wit , in riches , birth , parentage , &c. On the other side , the Common people suppose , there ought to bee an equality in all other things , and some State matters ; because they are equall with the rich or noble , touching their Liberty , whereas indeed neither the one nor the other are simply equall or superiour as touching Government and fitnes thereunto , because they are such , to wit , because they are Rich● Noble , Free , &c. But because they are wise , vertuous valiant &c. and so have fit parts to governe a State .

These severall States are sometimes mixed and interwrought one with the other , yet ever so , as that the one hath the preheminent predomination over the other , as in the humours and complections of the body . So in the Roman State , the people had their Plaebiscita , and gave the sufferage in the election of Magistrates : Yet the Senate ( as the State stood ) for the most part swayed the State , and bare the chiefe rule . So in the Venetian State , the Duke seemeth to represent a Monarch , and , the Senate to bee his Councell : Yet the Duke hath no power in State matters , but is like a head set on by art that beareth no braine . And so that State is Senatoricall or , Aristocraticall .

Causes of States and Common-wealths in generall .

Causes of States or of Common-wealths are of 3. sorts , viz. 1. Founding or setling a State where to bee considered . 2. Preserving a State . 3. Changing and alltering a State . 1. Measure . 2. Parts and their Qualities .

Founding a State . In founding a State are to bee considered 2. things . 1. Proportion . 2. Parts .

PRoportion is a Just Measure or Mediocrity of the State , whereby it is framed and kept in that order , as that neither it exceed nor bee defective in his kind ; to wit , so that a Monarch bee not to Monarchicall , nor strict , or absolute , as the Russe Kings ; nor Aristocraticall , that is over-mated ; or ecclipsed by the Nobility , as the Scottish Kingdome ; but ever respective to the other degrees . That an Aristocraty bee not to magnificent nor intier to it selfe , but communicate with the people some commodities of State or Government as the Venetian , and sometimes the Roman allowed the people to elect certaine Magistrates out of themselves , to have a Tribune , to make Plaebiscita &c. So a free State or Common-wealth that it bee not over popular , viz. That it depresse not to much the richer , wiser , nor learneder sort ; but admit them to offices with a Caution out of the rules and misteries of that State . That they seeke no alteration of the present State . The reason , because the moderate States in their severall kindes ( as all other things that observe the meane ) are best framed for their continuance , because they give lesse cause of grudge , envy , and affecting the wealth , honour , and liberty which they see in others , that governe the State ; And so are lesse subject to stirres , and commotions , and easiest kept in their present State wherein they are set .

Parts .

THe Parts of the State , or those Magistrates that beare place or sway in the publique Government .

Parts or Partakers of publique Government , are 1. Counsell or Senate , which consulteth of all matters pertaining to Warre and Peace , Magistrates , &c. in admitting of whom there ought to bee a more speciall care that they bee men expect in matter of Policy , because it is their trade and vocation , as men use to choose Pilots and Masters of shippes such as know the Art of Navigation , and not Husbandmen &c. And so the contrary .

2. Magistrates and Officers which are to bee executioners of that which is consulted and found to bee expedient for the Common-wealth , wherein are to bee observed the kinds of Magistrates , that they bee such as fit that kind of Government ; The time of their continuance , and the manner of their election or appointing , by whom , out of whom , and in what manner they be choosen .

3. Iudges ; To determine in civill and criminall matters , where are to bee observed , out of whom they are to bee chosen ; what kinds are necessary , and the manner of Judgement and Judiciall proceeding .

I● Magistrates are to be observed , 1. Kindes of Magistrates , as 1. Civill . 2. Ecclesiasticall .

1. Superiour , which are to bee such and of that kind as agree with the State ; as Consuls for a yeare , and not Perpetuall Dictatours in a Senatory State . Preators and Censors that oversee manners and orders of the people .

For a Kingdome Lieutenants of Shires , Marshals , Masters of Horse , Admirals , &c.

Inferiour , as Conservatours of Peace , Constables , &c.

Overseers of Youth , that take care of their education for civill and warlike exercise .

Clarkes of the Market that provide for the quantity and prize of victuall .

Ediles for Buildings , Streets , Bounds .

Quaestours or Treasurours to keepe and despence the publique treasury .

Actuaries or Recorders , which keepe the publique records .

Gaolers , to keepe Prisons , and Prisoners .

Surveyours of Woods and Fields , &c.

As Bishops , or Pastours , Elders , Wardens .

2. Time of Magistrates , whereof some are perpetuall , some for a time , viz. , for more yeares ; a yeare , halfe a yeare , according to the necessity of the Common-wealth , and not perpetuall ; or at least not hereditary in a Kingdome . Yearely in an Aristocracy , or halfe yearely in a free State . 3. Manner of choise , by whom and how to bee chosen , where especially they are to bee chosen by sufferage , and not by Lot .

CausespreservingaStateorCommon-wealth. In preserving of States , two things required . 1. Misteries or Sophis●es . 1. Generall to all States . 2. Particular for every severall State . 2. Rules or Actioms . 1. Generall for all States . 2. Particular for every State .

Mysteries or Sophismes .

MYsteries or Sophismes of State , are certain● secret practizes , either for the avoiding of danger ; or averting such effects as tend to the preservation of the present State , as it is set or founded .

State Mysteries are of 2. sorts . 1. Generall : That pertaine to all States ; as first , to provide by all meanes , that the same degree or part of the Common-wealth doe not exceed both in quantity and quality . In quantity as that the number of the Nobility , or of great persons , be not more then the State or Common-wealth can-beare . In quality , as that none grow in wealth , liberty , honours , &c. more then that is meet for that degree ; For as in weights , the heavier weights beare downe the Skale ; So in Common-wealths , that part or degree that excelleth the rest in Qu●lity and Quantity , overswayeth the rest after it , whereof follow alterations and conversions of State . Secondly , to provide by all meanes , that the middle sort of people exceed both the extreames ( viz. ) of Nobility and Gentry , and the Base , Rascall and beggerly sort . For this maketh the State constant and firme , when both the Extreames are tied together by a middle sort , as it were with a band , as for any conspiracy of the rich and beggerly sort together , it is not to bee feared . To these two points , the Particular Rules or Sophismes of every Common-wealth are to bee applied .

2. Particular : That serve for preservation of every Common-wealth in that forme of State , wherein it is setled as in a Kingdome . That the Nobility may bee accustomed to beare the Government of the Prince , especially such as have their dwelling in remote places from the Princes eye , it is expedient to call them up at certaine times to the Princes Court under pretence of doing them honour , or being desirous to see and enjoy their presence ; and to have their children , especially their eldest , to bee attendant upon the Prince , as of speciall favour towards them and theirs , that so they may bee trained up in duty and obedience towards the Prince , and bee as Hostages for the good behaviour and faithfull dealing of their Parents , especially if they bee of any suspected note . To that end , serves the Persian practize in having a band or traine of the Satrapaes children ; and other Nobles to attend the Court which was well imited by our traine of Henchm●n , if they were of the Nobler sort . Againe , sometimes to borrow smale summes of his Subjects , and to pay them againe , that hee may after borrow greater summes and never pay : So in an Oligarchy , least it decline to a Popular State , they deceive the people with this and the like Sophismes ( viz. ) They compell their owne sort , to wit , the rich men by great penalties to frequent their assemblies for choosing of Magistrates , for provision of Armour , warlike Exercise , making an Execution of lawes , &c. By that meanes seeming to beare a hard hand over the richer ; but to suffer the poorer and meaner sort to bee absent , and to neglect those assemblies under pretence , that they will no● draw them from their businesse and private earnings : Yet withall to cite thither some few of them ( viz. ) so many as are easily over-matched by the richer sort , to make a shew , that they would have the people , or poorer sort partakers likewise of those matters , yet terrifying those that come to their Assemblies with the tediousnesse of consultations , greatnesse of fines , if they should mi●doc . To the end to make them unwilling to come againe , or to have to doe with those consultations ; by which meanes the Richer sort doe still governe the State with the people● liking and good contentment .

Axioms . Axioms or Rules of preserving the State , are 1. Generall , that serve for all Common-wealths . 2. Particular , that serve for every severall State .

Generall Rules .

1. THe first and principall Rule of Policy to bee observed in all States is to professe , and practize , and maintaine the true worship and religion of Almighty God , prescribed unto us in his word , which is the chiefe end of all Government . The Axiom , that God bee obeyed simply without exception , though hee command that which seemeth unreasonable , and absurd to humane Policy , as in the Iewes Common-wealth , That all the men should repaire yearely to one place to worship God foure times , leaving none to defend their coast ; though being beset with many Enemies . Not to sow the seventh yeare , but to suffer the ground to rest untilled without respect or feare of famine , &c.

2. To avoid the causes of conversions , whereby States are overthrowne that are set downe in the title of conversions ; For that Common-wealths ( as naturall bodies ) are preserved by avoiding that which hurteth the health and State thereof , and are so cured by contrary Medicines .

3. To take heed , that no Magistrate bee created or continued contrary to the Lawes and Policy of that State . As that in a Senate , there bee not created a perpetuall Dictator , as Caesar in Rome . In a Kingdome , that there bee no Senate or convention of equall power with the Prince , in State matters ; as in Poland .

4. To create such Magistrates as love the State as it is setled , and take heed of the contrary practize , as to advance Popular persons in a Kingdome , or Aristocraty . And secondly , to advance such as have skill to discerne what doth preserve , and what hurteth or altereth the present State .

5. To that end to have certaine Officers to pry abroad , and to observe such as doe not live and behave ●hemselves in fit sort , agreeable to the present State ; but desire rather to bee under some other forme or kind of Government .

6. To take heed that Magistracies bee not sold for money , nor bribe in their Offices , which is specially to bee observed in that Common-wealth which is governed by a few of the Richer sort : For if the Magistrate gaine nothing but his Common Fees , the Common sort and such as want honour take in good part , that they bee not preferred , and are glad rather that themselves are suffered to intend private businesse . But if the Magistrate ●uy and sell matters , the Common people are do●bly grieved , both because they are debarred of those preferments and of that gaine which they see to grow by them , which is the cause that the Germaine Olygarchies continue ●o firme , for both they suffer the poorer sort to grow into wealth , and the Richer sort are by that meanes freed , and secured from being under the poore .

7. To take heed that the State as it is setled and maintained bee not over strict , nor exceed in his kind ; ( viz. ) That a Kingdome be not too Monarchicall ; Nor a Popular State bee too Popular : For which cause it is good , that the Magistrates sometimes yeeld of his right touching honour , and behave themselves familiarly with those that are equall unto them in other parts , though inferiour for place and office ; And sometimes popularly with the Common people , which is the cause that some Common-wealths , though they bee very simply and unskilfully set ; yet continue firme , because the Magistrates behave themselves wisely , and with due respect towards the rest that are without honour ; And therefore , some kind of Moderate popularity , is to bee used in every Common-wealth .

8. To take heed of small beginnings , and to meet with them even at the first , as well touching the breaking and altering of Lawes , as of other Rules which concerne the continuance of every severall State . For the disease and alteration of a Common-wealth doth not happen all at once but growes by degrees , which every Common wit cannot discerne , but men expert in Policy .

9. To provide , that that part bee ever the greater in number and power which favours the State , as now it stands . This is to bee observed as a very Oracle in all Common-wealths .

10. To observe a meane in all the degrees , and to suffer no part to exceed ; or decay overmuch . As first for pre●erments , to provide that they bee rather small and short , then great and long ; And if any bee growne to overmuch greatnesse , to withdraw or diminish some part of his honour . Where the Sophismes are to bee practized ( viz. ) to doe it by parts and degrees ; to doe it by occasion or colour of Law , and not all at once . And if that way serve not , to advance some other , of whose vertue and faithfulnesse , wee are fully assured , to as high a degree , or to greater honour : and to bee the friends and followers of him that excelleth , above that which is meet . As touching wealth , to provide , that tho●e of the middle sort ( as before was said ) bee more in number ; and if any grow high , and overcharged with wealth , to use the Sophismes of a Popular State ; ( viz. ) to send him on Embās●ages , and forram● Negotiations , or employ him in some office that hath great charges and litle honour , &c. To which end the Edelishi● served in some Common-wealths .

11. To suppresse the factions and quarrels of the Nobles , and to keepe other that are yet free from joyning with them in their partakings and factions .

12. To encrease or remit the Common taxes and contributions , according to the wealth , or want of the people and Common-wealth . If the people bee increased in wealth , the taxes and subsidies may bee increased . If they bee poore , and their wealth diminish , specially by dearth , want of traffique , &c. to forbeare taxes and impositions , or to take litle . Otherwise grudge and discontentments must needs follow . The Sophismes that serve for impositions are these , and other of like sort , to pretend businesse of great charge , as Warre , building of Ships , making of Havens , Castles , Fortifications , &c. for the Common defence ; sometimes by Lotteries and like devises , wherein some part may bee bestowed , the rest reserved for other expences ; but Princely dealing needs no pretences .

13. To provide that the Discipline and training of Youth of the better sort bee such as agreeth with that Common-wealth : As that in a Kingdome , the Sonnes of Noble-men to bee attendant at the Court , that they may bee accustomed to obedience towards the Prince : In the Senatory State , that the Sonnes of the Senatours bee not idly , no● over daintily brought up , but well instructed and trained up in learning tongues and Martiall exercise ; that they may bee able to beare that place in the Common-wealth , which their Father held , and contrary wise in a Popular State .

14. To take heed , least their Sophismes , or secret practizes for the continuance and maintenance of that State bee not discovered , least by that means they refuse and disappoint themselves , but wisely used and with great secreflie .

Particuler Rules . Rules and Axiomes for preserving of a Kingdome ; Hereditary . Conquered .

Kingdomes Hereditary are preserved at home by the ordering .

1. HImselfe ; ( viz. ) By the tempering and moderation of the Princes power , and prerogative . For the lesse and more temperate , their power and state is ; the more firme , and stable is their Kingdome and Government , because they seeme to be further off from a Master-like and Tyrannicall Empire ; and lesse unequall in condition to the next degree ; to wit , the Nobility , and so lesse subject to grudge and envy .

2. Nobility ; ( viz. ) By keeping that degree and due proportion , that neither they exceed not in number more then the Realme or State can beare , as the Scottish Kingdome , and sometime the English , when the Realme was overcharged with the numbers of Dukes , Earles , and other Nobles ; whereby the Authority of the Prince was ecclipsed , and the Realme troubled with their factions and ambitions . Nor that any one excell in honour , power or wealth , as that hee resemble another King within the Kingdome ; as the House of Lancaster within this Realme . To that end not to load any with too much honour or preferrement , because it is hard even for the best and worthiest Men to beare their greatnesse and high fortune temperately , as appeareth by infinite examples in all States . The Sophismes for preventing or reforming this inconvenience , are to bee used with great caution and wisedome . If any great person bee to bee abated , not to deale with him by calumniation , or forged matter , and so to cut him off without desert , especially if hee bee gratious among the people after the Machivilian policy , which besides the Injustice , is an occasion many times of greater danger towards the Prince . Nor to withdraw their honour all at once , which maketh a desperate discontentment in the party , and a commiseration in the people , and so greater love , if hee bee gratious for his vertue and publique service . Nor to banish him into forraine Countries , where hee may have oportunity of practizing with forraine States , whereof great danger may ensue , as in the Examples of Coriolanus , Henry the fourth , and such like . But to use these , and the like Sophismes : ( viz. ) To abate their greatnesse by degrees , as David , Ioabs , Iustinian , Bellisarius , &c. To advance some other Men to as great or greater honour , to shadow or over-mate the greatnesse of the other . To draw from him by degrees his friends and followers , by preferrements , rewards , and other good and lawfull meanes ; especially , to bee provided that these great men bee not employed in great or powerfull affaires of the Common-wealth , whereby they may have more oportunity , to sway the State .

3. People : ( viz. ) so to order and behave himselfe , that hee bee loved and reverenced of the people . For that the Prince need not greatly feare home-conspiracies , or forraine invasion , if hee bee firmely loved of his owne people . The reason , for that the Rebell can neither hope for any forces for so great enterprise ; no● any refuge being discovered and put to flight , if the multitude affect their Prince : But the Common people being once offended hath cause to feare every moving , both at home and abroad . This may bee effected by the Prince , if hee use meanes and art of getting the favour of the people , and avoid those things that breed hatred and contempt : ( viz. ) if hee s●●me as a ●utor , or a Father to love the people and to protect them , if hee maintaine the Peace of his Kingdome ; For that nothing is more Popular , nor more pleasing to the people then is peace .

4. If hee shew himselfe oftentimes gratiously , yet with State , and Majesty to his people , and receive complaints of his suppliants , and such like .

5. If hee sit himselfe sometimes in open Courts and place of Justice , that hee may seeme to have a 〈◊〉 of Justice among his people . If hee bestow many benefits and graces upon that City which hee maketh the seat of his Empire , and so make it sure and faithfull unto him , which is fit to bee in the middle of his Kingdome , as the heart in the middle of the body , or the Sunne in the middle of Heaven , both to divide himselfe more easily into all the parts of his Dominions ; and least the furthest parts at one end move , whilest the Prince is in the other . If hee goe in progresse many times to see his Provinces , especially those that are remote .

6. If hee gratifie his Courtiers and Attendants in that sort , and by such meanes as that hee may seeme not to pleasure them with the hurt and injury of his people , as with Monopolies , and such like .

7. If hee commit the handling of such thing● as procure envy , or seeme grievous to his Ministers , but reserve those things which are gratefull and well pleasing to himselfe , as the French Kings , who for that purpose● as may seeme , have erected their Court at Paris , which 〈◊〉 the Prince from grudge and envy , both with the Nobles and the people .

8. If hee borrowes sometimes summes of money of his people , though hee have no need , and pay the same 〈◊〉 without defalcation of any part by his Exchequer or other Officers .

9. If hee avoid all such things as may breed hatred or contempt of his person , which may bee done , if hee shew himselfe not too light , inconstant , hard , cruell , e●●eminate , fearefull , and dastardly , &c. But contrariwise , Religious grave , just , valiant , &c. Whereby appeareth the false Doctrine of the Machivilian Policy ; with feare , the better meanes , to keepe the people in obedience , then love , and reverence of the people towards the Prince .

9. If the Prince bee well furnished with Warlike Provision , which is to bee rumored and made knowne abroad : If it bee knowne , that hee is revereneed and obeyed by his people at home .

10. If hee provide so much as lieth in him , that his Neighbour Kingdomes grow not overmuch in power and Dominion ; which if it happen , hee is to joyne speedily with other Princes , which are in like danger to abare that greatnesse , and to strengthen himselfe and the rest against it . An overfight of the Christian Princes towards the King of Spaine .

11. If hee get him Intelligencers by Reward , or other meanes , to detect or hinder the de●ignes of that Prince , with whom hee hath differences , if any thing bee intent●ed against his State . Or at least have some of his owne Lydging abroad about that Princes Court , under colour of Embassage , or some other pretence ; which must bee Men of skill and Dexterity to serve for that turne .

12. To observe the Lawes of his Conntrey and not to encounter them with his Prerogative , nor to use it at all where there is a Law , for that it maketh a secret and just grudge in the peoples hearts , especially if it tender to take from them their commodities , and to bestow them upon other of his Courtiers and Ministers .

13. To provide especially that that part which favoureth the State as it standeth● bee more potent , then the other that favoureth it not , or desireth a change .

14. To make specially choyce of good and sound men to beare the place of Magistrates , especiall of such as assist the Prince in his Councels , and Policies , and not to leane overmuch to his owne advise , contrary to the rule of Machivill , who teacheth that a Prince can have no good Councell except it bee in himselfe ; his reason , because if hee use the Councell of some one ; hee is in danger to bee overwrought and supplanted by him : And if hee Councell with more , then hee shall bee distracted with the differences in opinion . As if a Prince of great , or meane wisedome could not take the judgement of all his Counsellours in any point of Policy , or of so many as himselfe thinketh good , and to take it either by word or in wr●ting ; and himselfe then in private peruse them all , and so after good 〈◊〉 mature deliberation make choice of the best , without any destraction or binding himselfe to the direction of one . For the Proverbe is true , that two eyes see more then one ; and therefore , the advises and consultations of a Senatory State is compared by some to a feast , or dinner , where many contribute towards the Shot , by which meanes they have more variety of dishes , and so better fare : And yet every man may make choice of that dish that serveth him best for his health and appetite .

15. The Prince himselfe is to sit sometimes in place of publique justice , and to give an experiment of his wisedome and equity , whereby great reverence and estimation is gotten , as in the example of Solomen ; which may seeme the reason , why our Kings of England had their Kings bench in place of publique Iustice , after the manner of the ancient Kings that sate in the Gate ; where for better performing of this Princely duty , some speciall causes may bee selected , which may throughly bee debated and considered upon by the Prince in private , with the helpe and advise of his learned Counsell , and so bee decided publiquely , as before is said , by the Prince himselfe ; At least the Prince is to take accompt of every Minister of publique Iustice , that it may bee knowne , that hee hath a care of Iustice , and doing right to his people , which makes the Iusticers also to bee more carefull in performing of their d●ties .

16. To bee moderate in his taxes , and impositions ; and when need doth require to use the Subjects purse , to doe it by Parliaments , and with their consents , making the cause apparant unto them , and shewing his unwillingnesse in charging them . Finally , ●o to use it , that it may seeme rather an offer from his Subjects , then an exaction by him .

17. To stop small beginnings , unto this end to compound the dissentious that arise amongst the Nobles , with Caution that such as are free , bee not drawne into parts , whereby many times the Prince is endangered , and the whole Common-wealth set in a combustion ; as in the example of the Barons Warres , and the late Warres of France , which grew from a quarrell betwixt the Guision faction and the other Nobility .

18. To stirre up the people , if they grow secure and negligent of armour and other provision for the Common-wealth , by some rumour or feare of danger at-home , to make them more ready when occasion requireth . But this seldome to bee used least it bee supposed a false Alarme , when there is need indeed .

19. To have speciall care , that his children , especially the heire apparent , have such bringing up as is meet for a King ( viz. ) in learning , specially of matters pertaining to State , and in Marshall exercise , contrary to the practize of many Princes , who suffer their children to bee brought up in pleasure , and to spend their time in hunting &c. which by reason o● their defects afterwards is a cause of mis-government and alteration of State .

2. Kingdomes new gotten , or purchased by force , are preserved by these meanes .

1. FIrst , if they have beene Subjects before to his Ancestours , or have the same tongue , manners , or fashions as have his owne Countrey , it is an easie matter to retaine such Countries within their obedience , in case the Princes bloud of the said Countrey bee wholly extinct . For men of the same quality , tongue , and condition , doe easily shole and combine themselves together , so much the rather if the people of that Countrey have served before and were not accustomed to their owne liberty , wherein specially is to bee observed , that the lawes and customes of that purchased Countrey bee not altered nor innovated , or at least it bee done by litle and litle . So the Burgundians and Acquitaines were annexed to France . The rea●on● because partly they have bin accustomed to serve ; and partly , for that they will not easily agree about any other to bee their Prince , if the blo●d Royall bee once extinguished . As for the invasion of a forraine Countrey , whereunto the Prince hath no right , or whereof the right heir is living ; It is not the part of a ju●t Civill Prince , much lesse a Prince Christian to enforce such a Countrey ; and therefore , the Machivilian practizes in this case to make sure worke by extinguishing wholly the bloud Royall i● le●d , and impertinent : The like is to bee said , of murthering the natives , or the greatest part of them , to the end hee may hold the rest in sure possession . A thing not onely against Christian Religion : but inhumane Iustice , cruell , and barbarous .

2. The safest way is , ( supposing a right ) that some good part of the Natives bee transplanted into some other place , and our Colonies consisting of so many as shall bee thought meet be planted there in some part of the Province , Castles , Forts , and Havens , seised upon , and more provided in fit places , as the manner was of the Babylonian Monarch which transplanted 10. tribes of the Iewes : And of the Romans in France , Germany , Britany , and other places . The reason : 1. For that otherwise forces of horse and foote , are to bee maintained within the Province which cannot bee done without great charge . 2. For that the whole Province is troubled and grieved , with removing and supplying the Army with victuals , carriages , &c. 3. For that Collonies are more sure and faithfull then the rest . As for the Natives that are removed from their former seates , they have no meanes to hurt , and the rest of the Natives being free from the inconvenience , and fearing that themselves may bee so served , if they attempt any thing rashly , are content to bee quiet . The Turkes practize in Asia , where the chiefe grounds and dwellings are possessed by the Souldiours , whom they call Timariotae . That the Prince have his seat and his residence in his new purchase , especially for a time , till things bee well setled ; especially if the Province bee great and large , as the Turke in Greece . The reasons : 1. Because the presence of the Prince availeth much to keepe things in order , and get the good will of his new Subjects . 2. They conceive that they have ref●ge by the Princes presence , if they bee oppressed by the Lieutenants and inferiour Governours : Where it will bee convenient for the winning the peoples hearts , that some examples bee made of punishing of such as have committed any violence or oppression . 3. Because being present hee seeth and heareth what is thought and attempted ; and so may quickly give remedy to it , which being absent , hee cannot doe , or not doe in time .

3. If the Prince himselfe cannot bee present to reside , then , to take heed that the charge of Governing , on new purchases bee committed to such as bee sure men , and of other meet quality , that depend wholly upon the Princes favour ; And not to Natives , or other of their owne Subjects , that are gratious there for their Nobility , or vertue ; especially if the Province bee great , and somewhat farre distant , which may soone seduce the unsetled affections of those new Subjects . As for such Governours as depend wholly upon the Princes favour being not bor●● , but created Noble , they will not so easily suffer themselves to bee wonne from their du●y ; and in case they would revolt , yet they are not able to make any great strength , for that the people obey them but as Instruments and Ministers to keepe them in subjection , and not for any good will .

4. To have the children of the chiefe Noble men , and of greatest authority , Hostages with them in safe keeping ; the more the better : For that no Bound is stronger , then that of Nature to containe the Parents and Allies in obedience , and they the rest .

5. To alter the Lawes , but by degrees one after another , and to make other that are more behovefull for the establishing of the present Government .

6. To keepe the people quiet and peaceable and well affected so much as may bee , that they may seeme , by being conquered , to have gotten a Protectour , rather then a Tyrant ; For the Common-people if they enjoy peace , and bee not distracted , nor drawne from their businesse , nor exacted upon beyond measure are easily contained under obedience● Yet notwithstanding , they are to bee dis-used from the practise of Armes , and other Exercises which encrease conrage , and bee weakened of Armour , that they have neither Spirit nor will to rebell .

7. If there bee any faction in the Countrey , to take to him the defence of the better , and stronger part , and to combine with it , as Caesar in France .

8. To looke well to the Borders and confining Provinces , and if any rule there of great , or equall power to himselfe , to joyne league with some other Borderers , though of lesse strength to hinder the attempts ( if any should bee ) by such Neighbour Prince . For it happeneth often , that a Countrey insested by one Neighbour Prince calleth in another of as great or greater power to assist , and rescue it from the other that invadeth it ; So the Romans were called into Greece by the AEt●lians ; The Saxons by the Britaines , the Danes by the Saxons .

9. To leave their Titles and Dignities to the Natives , but the command and authority wholly to his owne .

10. Not to put much trust , nor to practise to often the Sophisimes of Policy , especially those that appertaine to a Tyrannicall State , which are soone detected by men of Judgement , and so bring discredit to the Prince , and his Policy among the wiser and better sort of his Subjects , whereof must needs follow very evill effects .

The Sophisimes of Tyrants , are rather to bee knowne , then practized , ( which are for the supporting of their Tyrannicall States , ) by wise and good Princes , and are these , and such like as follow .