OF GOVERNMENT .

GOVERNMENT is of two sorts . 1. P rivate , of himself . Sobriety . Of his Family ; called Oeconomy .

2. Publick , of the Common-wealth , called P●licy A man must first Govern himself , ere he be fit to Govern a Family : And his Family , e're he be fit to bear the Government in the Common-wealth .

Of Policie .

Policie is an Art of Government of a Common-wealth , and some part of it according to that State , o● form of Government , wherein it is setled for the publick good .

State , is the frame or set order of Common-wealth , or of the Governours that rule the same , especially o● the chief and Sovereign Governour that commandeth the rest .

The State of Sovereignty consisteth in five points .

1. Making or anulling of Laws . 2. Creating and disposing of Magistrates . 3. Power over life and death . 4. Making of War , or Peace . 5. Highest or last appeal .

Where these five are , either in one or in more , there is the State.

These five points of State , rest either in , 1. One Monarchie or Kingdom . 2. Some few chief men for virtue and wisdom , called an Aristocracie . 3. Many , called a Free-State , or Popular State.

These three sorts of Government have respect to the common good , and therefore are just , and Lawfull States .

These 3. degenerate into 3. other Governments viz. 1. Monarchie into 1. Tyrrannie . 2. Aristocracie , into 2. Oligarchie . 3. Popular state , into 3. Common-wealth or Government of all the common and baser sort , and therefore called a Common-wealth by an usurped Nick-name .

These all respect their own , and not the publick good , and therefore are called Bastard Governments .

I Monarchie .

A Monarchie , or Kingdom , is the Government of a State by one head , or chief , tending to the common benefit of all .

Monarchie , or Kingdoms , are of three sorts touching the right or possession of them , viz. 1. Hereditary , by descent , as the English French , &c. 2. Elective , by suffrage of the other Orders , of some of them , as the P●loni●● 3. 〈◊〉 , or of both kinds , viz. descent , yet not tied to the next bloud , as the ancient Jewish State.

Monarchies are of two sorts touching their power , or Authority , viz. 1. Int●re . Where the whole power of ordering all State matters , both peace and war , doth by law & cust●● appertain to the Prince , as in the ●●●gest Kingdom , where the Prince hat● power to make Laws League , & Wa● To create Magistrates ; to pardon life Of appeal , &c. Though to give a contentment to the other degrees , th●● have a suffrage in making Laws , y●● ever subject to the Princes pleasure nor Negative will. 2. 〈◊〉 or restrained , that ha●● no full power in all the points or matters of State , as the Military King that hath not the Sovereignty in time peace , as the making of Laws , & But in War only , as the P●loni●● Kings .

II. Aristocracy , or Senatory State.

AN Aristocracie is the Government of a Common-wealth by some ●ompetent number of the better sort , ●referred for wisdom and other virtues ●f the publick good .

1. Aristocracie are of three sorts , viz. There the Senatours are chosen , for Virtu , Riches , and the common good , as the Venetian .

2. Virtue , and the publick good without respect of wealth , as sometimes the Roman , when some of the ●enatours were fetched from the ●ough , and some from the Schools

3. Vir●ue and wealth more respecting their private , than their publick good , which inclineth towards an Oligarchie , or the Government of the Richer or Nobler sort , as in Rome towards the end .

III. Free-State , or Popular State.

THe Popular State is the Government of a State by the choisest sort of people , tending to the publick good of all sorts , viz. w th due respect of the better , Nobler , and Richer sort

In every Just State , some part of the Government is , or ought to be imparted to the people ; As in a Kingdom , a voice or suffrage in making Laws ; and somtimes also , in levying of Arms ( if the charge be great , and the Prince forced to borrow help of his Subjects ) the matter rightly may be propounded to a Parliament , that the tax may seem to have proceeded from themselves . So consultations , and some proceedings in Iudicial matters , may in part be referred to them . The reason , least seeing themselves to be in no number , nor of reckoning , they mislike the state , or kind of Government : And where the multitude is discontented , there must needs be many Enemies to the present State. For which cause , Tyrants , which allow the people , no manner of ●ealing in State matters ) are forced to bereave them of their wits and wea●ons , and all other means whereby they may resist , or amend themselves , ●● in Rushland , Turkey , &c.

IV. Tyrannie .

A Tyrannie is the swerving , or distorting of a Monarchie , or the Government of one , tending not the publick good , but the private benefit of himself , & his followers . As in the Russ & Turkish Government , where the State and Wealth of other orders , are employed onely to the upholding of the greatness of the King or Emperour . This is the worst of all the ●astard States because it is the pervering of the best Regiment , to wit , of a Monarchie , which resembleth the Sovereign Government of God himself .

V. Oligarchie , or the Government of a few .

AN Oligarchie is the swerving , or the corruption of an Aristocracie ; or the Government of some few , that are of the Wealthier or Nobler sort , without any respect of the publick good . The chief end of these Governours , is their own greatness and enriching . And therefore their manner is , to prepare fit means to uphold their Estate . This State is not wholly so bad , as if the Tyrannie , and yet worse than the Common wealth , because it respecteth the good of a few .

VI. Common wealth .

A Common-wealth is the swerving of depravation of a Free , or popular State , or the Government of the whole multitude of the ba●e and poorer sort , without respect of the other Orders .

These two States , to wit ; The Oligarchie , and Common-wealth , are very adverse the one to the other , and have many bickerings between them . For that the Richer or Nobler sort , suppose a right or superiority to appertain unto them in every respect , because they are superiour , but in some respects onely to wit , in Riches , Birth , Parentage , &c. On the other side , the Common people suppose , there ought to be an equality in all other things , and some State matters ; because they are equall with the Rich or Noble , touching their Libertie , whereas indeed neither the one nor the other are simply equall or superiour , as touching Government and fitness thereunto , because they are such , to wit , because they are Rich , Noble , Free , &c. But because they are Wise , Virtuous , Va●ant , &c. and so have fit parts to Govern a State.

The severall States are sometimes mixed , and inter-wrought one with the other , yet ever so , as that the one hath the preheminent predomination over the other , as in the humours and complexions of the body . So in the Roman State , the people had their Plebescita , and gave the suffrage in the election of Magistrates : Yet the Senate ( as the State stood ) for the most part swayed the State , and bare the chief rule . So in the Venetian State , the Duke seemeth to represent a Monarch , and the Senate to be his Councell : Yet the Duke hath no power in State matters , but is like a head set on by art , that beareth no brain . And so that State is Senatorica●l or Aristocraticall .

Causes of States and Common-wealths in general . Causes of States , or of Common-wealths are of 3. sorts , viz. 1. Founding , or setling a State where to be considered . 1. Measure . 2. Parts , and their Qualities . 2. Preserving a State. 3. Changing , and altering a State.

Founding a State. In founding a State are to be considered 2. things . 1. Proportion . 2. Parts .

PRoportion , is a just measure or Mediocritie of the State , whereby it is framed & kept in that Order , as that neither it exceed nor be defective in his kind , to wit , so that a Monarch be not too Monarchical , nor strict , or absolute , as the Russe Kings ; nor Aristocratical , that is over●mated or eclipsed by the Nobilitie , as the Scottish Kingdom , but ever respective to the other degrees . That Aristocracie be not to magnificent nor intire to it self , but communicate with the people some commodities of State or Government , the Venetians and sometimes the Ro●● allowed the people to elect certain Magistrates out of themselves , to have a Tribune , to make Plebiscita , &c. So a Free State or Common-wealth that it is not over popular , viz. That it depress not too much the richer , wiser , nor leaneder sort ; but admit them to offices with a Caution out of the rules and masteries of that State. That they seek no alteration of the present State. The reason , because the moderate States in their several kinds ( as all other things that observe the mean ) are best framed for their continuance , because they give less cause or grudge , envy , and affecting the Wealth , Honour , and 〈◊〉 , which they see in others that 〈◊〉 the State ; and so are less subject to stirs and commotions , and easiest kept in their present State wherein they are set .

Parts .

THe parts of the State , or those Magistrates that bear place or sway in the publick Government .

Parts or partakers of Publick Government , are 1. Councel or Senate , which consulteth of all matters pertaining to War and Peace , Magistrates , &c. in admi●ting of whom there ought to be a mo●● special care , that they may be men expert in matter of Policie , because it i● their Trade and Vo●ation , as men use to chuse Pilots , and Masters of Ships , such as know the Art of Navigation , and no● Husband men , &c. And so the contrarie . 2. Magistrates and Officers , which are to be executioners of that which consulted , and found to be expedient for the Common-wealth , wherein are to be observed , the kinds of Magistrate than they be such as fit that kind of Government ; The time of their continuance , and the manner of their election or appointing , by whom , out t● whom , and in what manner they be chosen . 3. Judges ; To determine in Civil and Criminal matters , where are to be observed , out of whom they are to be chosen ; what kinds are necessary , and the manner of Judgement and Judicial proceeding .

In Magistrates are to be observed . 1. Kinds of Magistrates . 1. Civil .

1. Superiour , which are to be such & of that kind as agree with the State , as Consuls for a year , and not perpetual Dictatours in a Senatorie State. Praetors & Censors , that over-see manners & orders of the people .

For a Kingdom Lieutenant of Shires , Marshals , Masters of Horse , Admirals , &c.

Inferiour , as conservatours of Peace , Constables , &c.

Overseers of youth that take care for their education for civil and warlike exercise .

Clarks of the Market that provide for the quantity , and price of victual .

Ed●●es for Buildings , Streets , Bounds .

Questours , or Treasurers , to keep and dispence the publick Treasury .

A●u●●ies , or Recorders , which keep the publick Record .

Goalers to keep prison and Prisoners .

Surveyours of woods and fields , &c. 1. As Bishops or Pastours , Elders , Wardens . 2. Time of Magistrates , whereof some are perpetual , some for a time , viz. for more years , a year , half a year , according to the necessity of the Common-wealth , and not perpetual ; or at least not Heredetary in a Kingdom . Yearly in an Aristocracie , or half yearly in a Free-State . 3. Manner of choice , by whom and how to be chosen , where especially they are to be chosen by suffrage , and not by Lot.

2. Eclesiastical .

Causes preserving a State , or Common-wealth . In preserving of States a things required . 1 Mysteries , or Sophisms 1. General to all States . 2. Particular for every several State. 2. Rules , or Actions . 1. General , for all States . 2. Particular , for every State.

Mysteries , or Sophisms .

MYsteries , or Sophisms of State , are certain secret practices , either for the avoiding of danger , or averting such effects as tend to the preservation of the prefent State , as it is set or founded .

State Mysteries are of two sorts .

1. Generall : That pertain to all States ; as first to provide by all means , that the same degree , or part of the Common-wealth , do not exceed both in Quantity and Quality . In Quantity , as that the number of the Nobility , or of great persons , be not more , than the State or Common-wealth can bear . In Quality , as that none grow in wealth , Liberty , Honours , &c. more than it is meet for that degree ; For as in weights , the heavier weights bear down he Scale : So in Common-wealths , that part of degree that excelleth the rest in Quality and Quantity , overswayeth the rest after it , whereof follow alterations , and conversions of ●tate . Secondly , to provide by all means , that the middle sort of people exceed both the extreams , ( viz. ) of Nobility and Gentry , and the base rascal , and beggarly sort . For this maketh the State constant and firm , when both the Extreams are tied together by a middle sort , as it were with a band , as for any conspiracie of the rich and beggarly sort together , it is not to be feared . To these two points , the Particular rules in Sophisms of every Common-wealth , are to be applied . 2. Particular : That serve for preservation of every Common wealth , in that form of State wherein it is setled as in a Kingdom . That the Nobility may be accustomed to bear the Government of the Prince , especially such as have their dwelling in remote places from the Princes eye , it is expedient to call them up at certain times to the Princes Court , under presence of doing them honour , or being desirous to see , and enjoy their presence ; and to have their children , especially their eldest , to be attendant upon the Prince , as of special favour towards them and theirs , that so they may be trained up in duty and obedience towards the Prince , and be as Hostages for the good hehaviour , and faithfull dealing of their Parents , especially , if they be of any suspected note . To that end serves the Persian practice , in having a Band , or Train of the Satrapa's children , and other Nobles to attend the Court ; which was well imitated by our Train of He●●●●●r , if they were of the Nobler sort . Again , sometimes to borrow small sums of his Subjects and to pay them again , that he may after borrow greater sums and never pay : So in an Oligarchie , least it decline to a Popular State , they deceive the people with this and the like Sophisms , ( viz. They compel their own sort , to wit , the rich men , by great penalties , to frequent their Assemblie , for choosing of Magistrates , for provision of Armour , warlike Exercises , making an Execution of Laws , & . By that means seemin ; to bear a hard hand over the richer , but to suffer the poorer , and meaner sort to be absent , and to neglect those Assemblies under pretence , that they will not draw them from their business , and private earnings : Yet withall to cite thither some few of them , ( viz. ) so many as are casily over-matched by the richer sort , to make a shew , that they would have the people or poorer sort , partakers likewise of those matters , yet terrifying those that come to their Assemblies , with the tendiousnesse of consultations , greatnesse of Fines , if they should mis-do , to the end , to make them unwilling to come again , or to have to do with those Consultations , by which means , the richer sort do still , govern the State , with the peoples liking , and good contentment .

Aixoms .

Axioms or Rules of preserving the State are , 1. General , that serve for all Common-wealths . 2. Particular , that serve for every several State.

General Rules .

1. THe first and principal Rule of Policie to be observed in all States , is to profess , & practise , & maintain the true worship & Religio of Almighty God prescribed unto us in his word , which is the chief end of all Government . The Axiom , That God be obeyed simply without exception , though he command that which seemeth unreasonable , and absurb to Humane policy ; as in the Jews Common-wealth : That all the men should repair yearly to one place to worship God four times , leaving none to defend their coast , though being beset with many Enemies . Not to sow the seventh year , but to suffer the ground to rest untilled without respect or fear of famine , &c.

2. To avoid the causes of Conversion , whereby States are over thrown , that are set down in the Title of conversions ; For that Common wealth ( as naturall bodies ) are preserved by avoiding that which hurteth the health and State thereof , and are so cured by contrary medicines .

3. To take heed , that no Magistrate be created or continued , contrarie to the Laws and policie of that State. As that in a Se●at● , there be not created a perpetual Dictaetor , as Caesar in Rome . In a Kingdom , that there be no Senate , or Convention of equall power with the Prince in State matters , as in Poland .

4. To create such Magistrates as love the State as it is setled , and take heed of the contrarie practise , as to advance Popular persons in a Kingdom , or Aristocracie . And secondly , to advance such as have skill to discern what doth preserve , and what hurreth or altereth the present State.

5. To that end to have certain Officers to pay abroad , and to observe such as do not live and behave themselves in fit sort , agreeable to the present State , but desire rather to bee under some other form , or kind of Government .

6. To take heed that Magistracies be not sold for money , nor bribe in their Offices , which especially to be observed in that Common wealth , which is governed by a few of the richer sort ; For if the Magistrate gain nothing but his Common Fees , the common sort , and such as want honour , take in good part that they be not preferred , and are glad rather that themselves are suffered to intend private business . But if the Magistrate buy and sell matters , the common people are doubly grieved , both because they are debat'd of those preferments , and of that gain they see to grow by them , which is the cause that the German Oligarchies continue to firm for both they suffer the poorer sort to grow into wealth , and the richer sort are by that means freed , and secured from being under the poor .

7. To take heed that the State , as it is setled and maintained , be not over-strict , nor exceed in his kind ; ( viz. ) That a Kingdom be not too Monarchicall , nor a P●●ul● State too P●●u●ar : For which cause it is good , that the Magistrates sometimes ) yield of his right touching honour , and bahave themselves familiarly with those that are equall unto them in other parts , though inferiour for place and office ; And sometimes popularly with the common people , which is the cause that some Common wealths , though they be very simply , and un kilfully set , yet continue firm , because the Magistrates behave themselves wisely , and with due respect toward , the rest that are without honour ; and therefore some kind of Moderate Popularity is to be used in every Common-wealth .

8. To take heed of small beginnings , and to meet with them even at the first , as well touching the breaking and altering of Laws , as of other rules which concern the continuance of every severall State. For the desease and a teration of a Common-wealth , doth not happen all at once , but grows by degrees , which every common wit cannot discern , but men expert in POLICIE .

9. To provide , that that part be ever the greater in number and power , which favours the State as now it stands . This is to be observed as a very Oracle in all Common-wealths .

10. To observe a mean in all the degrees , and to suffer no part to exceed , or decay overmuch . As first for preferments , to provide that they be rather small and short , than great and long ; and if any be grown to overmuch greatness , to withdraw or diminish some part of his honour . Where these Sophisms are to be practised ( viz. ) to do it by parts and degrees ; to do it by occasion , or colour of law , and not all at once . And it that way serve not , to advance some other , of whose virtue and faithfulness , we are fully assined , to as high a degree , or to a greater honour ; and to be the friends and followers of him that excelleth , above that which is meet . As touching wealth , to provide , that those of the middle sort ( as before was said ) be more in number ; and if any grow high , and over charged with wealth , to use the Sophisms of a Popular State , viz to send him on Embassages , and Forreign Negotiations , or imploy him in some Office that hath great charges , and little honour , &c. To which end , the F●●●●ful served in some Common-wealths .

11 To Suppress the Factions , and quarrels of the Nobles , and to keep other that are yet free from joyning with them in their partakings and Factions .

12. To increase or remit the Common Taxes and Contributions ; according to the wealth , or want of the People and Commonwealth . If the people be increased in Wealth , the Taxes and Subsidies may be increased . If they be poor , and their Wealth diminish , specially by dearth , want of Traffick , &c. to forbear Taxes and Impositions , or to take little . Otherwise grudge and discontentments must needs follow . The Sophisms that serve for impositions , are these , and other of like sort , To pretend business of great charge , as War , building of Ships making of Havens , Castles , Fortifications , &c. for the common defence ; sometimes by Lotteries and like devises , wherein some part may be bestowed , the rest reserved for other expences ; but Princely dealings needs no pretences .

13. To Provide that the Discipline & Training of youth of the better sort to such as agreeth with that Common-wealth : As that in a Kingdom , the sons of Noble men to be attendant at the Court , that they may be accustomed to obedience towards the Prince . In the Senatory State , that the sons o● the Senatours be not idly , nor over daintily brought up , but well instructed and trained up in Learning , Langues , and nartiall exercise that they may be able to bear that place in the Common-wealth , which their Father held , and c●nt any wise , in a Popular State.

14. To take heed , least their Sophisms , or secret practises for the continuance and maintenance of that State , be not discovered ; least by that means they refuse and disappoint themselves , but wisely used , and be with great secrecie .

Particular Rules .

Rules and Axioms , for preserving of a Kingdom . Hereditary . Conquered .

Kingdoms Hereditary , are preserved at home by the ordering .

1. HImself , viz. By the tempering and moderation of the Princes Answer and Prerogative . For the less and more Temperate their Power and State is the more firm , and stable is their Kingdom and Government ; because they seem to be further off from a Master like , and Tyrannte all Empire ; and lesse unequall in condition to the next degree , to wit , the Nobility , and so lesse subject to grudge and envy .

2. Nobility , &c. By keeping that degree and due proportion , that neither they exceed in number more than the Realm , or State can bear , as the Scottish Kingdom , and sometime the English , when the Realm was overcharged with the number of Dukes , Earls , and other Noble ; whereby the Authority of the Prince was eclipsed , and the Realm troubled with their Factions and Ambitions . Nor that any one excel in Honour , power , or wealth , as that he resemble another King within the Kingdom , as the house of Lancaster within this Realm . To that end , not to load any with too much Honour or preferment , because it is hard even for the best , and worthiest men , to bear their greatnesse , and high Fortune temperately , as appeareth by infinit examples in all States . The Sophisms for preventing , or reforming this inconvenience , are to be used with great caution and wisdom . If any great person be to be abated , not do real with him by calumniation or forged ●atter , and so to cut him off without desert , especially if he be gratious among the people , after the ●●chiav●an Place , which besides the injustice , an occasion many times of greater danger towards the Prince . Not to withdraw their Honour all at once , which maketh a desperate 〈◊〉 in the party , and a commiseration in the people , and so greater love , he be gracious for his virtue , and publick service . Not to banish him into Forreign Countries , where he may have opportunity of practising with Forreign States , whereof great danger may ●n●e , as in the example of ●ortulanus , Henry the fourth , and such like . But to use these , and the like Sophisms , viz. To abate their greatnesse by degrees , as David Joabs , fa●●●●a Bellisarius , &c. To advance some other men to as great , or greater Honour , to shadow , ●● over-mate the greatnesse of the other . To draw from him by degrees his friends , and followers by ●●vefer●●● , rewards , and other good and lawfull means ; especially , to be provided that these great men be not imployed in great or powerfull affairs of the Common wealth , whereby they may have more opportunity to sway the State.

3. People , viz. So to order and behave himself that he be loved , and reverenced of the People . For that the Prince need not greatly fear home conspirac●es , or forreign Invation , she be firmly loved of this own people . That reason , for that the Rebel can neither hope for any forces for so great enterprise , not any refuge , being discovered & put to flight , ●t the multitude affect their Prince : But the common people being once offended , hath cause to fear every moving , both at home and abroad . This may be affected by the Prince , the use means and art of getting the favour of the people , and avoid those things that breed have and contempt ; viz. if he seem as Tutor , or a Father to love the people and to protect them , if he maintain the peace of his Kingdom ; For that nothing is more popular , nor more pleasing to the people than is peace .

4. If he shew himself oftentime graciously , yet with State and Majestie to his people , and receive complaint of his suppliants , and such like .

5. If he sit himself sometimes in Open Courts , and place of ●ustice that he may seem to have a care of I●●stice among his people . If he bestow many benefits and graces upon that Citie , which he maketh the seat of his L●●●● , and to make it sure and faithfull unto him , which is fit to be in the middle of his Kingdom , as the heart in the middle of the body , or the Sun in the middle of Heaven , both to divide himself more easily into all the parts of his Dominions ; and least the furthest parts at one end move , whilest the Prince is in the other . If he go in progress many times to see his Provinces , especially , those that are remite .

6 If he gratifie his Cou●tiers and ●●●●ians in that sort , and by such means , as that he may seem not to pleasure them with the hurt & injury of his people , as with M●n●●ol●es , and such like .

7 If he commit the handling of such things as procure envy , or seem grievous to his Ministers , but reserve those things which are gratefull , and well pleasing to himself , as the French Kings , who for that purpose , as may seem , have erected their Court at Paris , which acquitteth the Prince from grudge and envy , both with the Nobles and the scope .

8. If he borrows sometimes sums of money of his people , though he have no need , and pay the same justly without defalcation of any part by his Exchequer , or other Officer .

9. If he avoid all such things as may breed h●tre● or contempt of his person which may be done , if he shew himself not too light , unconstant , hard , cruel , esteminate , fearfull , and ●asterdly , &c. But contrariwise Religious , Grave , Just Valiant , &c. Whereby appeareth the false doctrine of the Machiavilian Policie , with far the better means to keep the people in obedience , than love , and reverence of the people towards the Prince .

10. If the Prince be well furnished with Warlike provision , which is to be rumoured , and made known abroad : if it be known , that he is reverenced , and obeyed by his peoples at home .

11. If he provide so much as lieth in him , that his neighbour Kingdoms grow not over much in power and Dominior ; which if it happen , he is to joyn speedily with other Princes , which are in like danger to abate that greatness , and to strengthen himself and the rest against it . An oversight of the Christian Princes towards the King of Spain .

12 If he get him Intelligencers by reward , or other means , to detect or hinder the designs of that Prince , with whom he hath differences , if any thing be intended against his State. Or at least have some of his own Lydging abroad about that Princes Court , under colour of Embassage , or some other pretence ; which must be men of skill and Dexterity to serve for that turn .

13. To observe the Laws of his Country , and not to encounter them with his Prerogate , nor to use it at all where there is a Law , for that it maketh a secret and just grudge in the peoples hearts , especially if it tender to take from them their comm●d●t●es , and to bestow them upon other of his COURTIERS and Ministers .

14. To provide especially , That that part , which favoureth the State as it standeth , be more potent , than the other which favoureth it not or desireth a change .

15. To make speciall choise of good and sound men to bear the place of Magistrates , especially of such as assist the Pr●●●●● on Cou●sels , and Policie● , and not to lean overmuch to his own advise , contrarie to the rule of Ma●li●● who teacheth , That a Prince can have no good ●●●●sul , except it be in himself ; his reason , ●● use if he use the 〈…〉 is in dang●r to be over w 〈…〉 d by him ; and if he counsel with more , then he shall be 〈…〉 in opi●i●●s . As if a Prince of great , or mean wisdom , could not take the Judgement of all his c●nc●llours in any point of Po●●●● , or of so many as he himself thinke he good , and to take it either by word , or in writing ; and himself then in private peruse them all , and so after good and mature deliberation , make choise of the best , without any distraction of binding himself to the direction of one . For the Proverb is true . that two eyes see more than one ; and therefore the advises , and Consultations of a Senatory State is compared by some to a Feast , or dinner , where many contribute towards the ●●●t , by which means they have more variety of dishes , and so better fare : and yet every mean may make choice of that dish that serveth him best for his 〈…〉 e.

16. The Prince himself is to sit sometimes in place of publick justice , and to give an experiment of his wisdom and equity , whereby great reverence and estimation is gotten , as in the example of Sol●man , which may seem the reason , why our Kings of England had their Kings Bench in Place of publick justice , after the manner of the ancient Kings that sate in the Gate ; where for better performing of this Princely duty , some speciall causes may be selected , which may throughly be debated and considered upon by the Prince in Private , with the help and advice o● his learned Councell , and so be decided publickly , as before is said , by the Prince himself ; At least , the Prince is to take accompt of every Minister of publick Justice , that it may be known , that he hath a care of justice , and doing right to his people , which makes the Iusticers also to be more carefull in performing of their duties .

17. To be moderate in his Taxes , and in positions ; and when need doth require to use the Subjects purse , to do it by Parliament , and with their consents , making the cause apparent unto them , and shewing his unwillingnesse in charging them Finally , so to use it , that it may seem rather an offer from his Subjects , than an exaction by him .

18. To stop small beginnings ; unto this end to compound the dissentions that rise amongst the Nobles , with caution , that such as are free be not drawn into parts , whereby many times the Prince is endangered , and the whose Common-wealth set in a combustion ; as in the example of the Barons , War , and the late Wars of France , which grew from a quarrel betwixt the ●●●●o● Faction , and the other Nobility .

19. To stir up the people , if they grow secure , and negligent of Armour , and other provision for the Common-wealth , by some rumour or fear of danger at home , to make more ready when occasion requireth . But this seldom to be used , least it be supposed a false Alarm , when there is need indeed .

20 To have speciall care , that his children , especially , the heir apparent , have such bringing up as is meet for a King , viz. in learning , specially of matters pertaining to State , and in Martiall exercise , contrary to the practise of many Princes , who suffer their children to be brought up in pleasure , and to spend their time in hunting , &c. which by reason of their defects , afterwards is a cause of mis-government and alteration of State.