The
Secrets
of
Government
,
AND
Misteries
of
State
,
Plainly
laid
open
.
CHAP.
I.
The
Definition
and
Division
of
Publick
Weales
and
Sovereign
States
,
according
to
their
several
Species
or
Kinds
.
A
Common-wealth
is
a
certain
Sovereign
Govornment
of
many
Families
,
with
those
things
that
are
common
among
them
.
All
Common-wealths
are
either
-
Monarchies
,
-
Aristocraties
,
or
-
Democraties
.
A
Monarchy
is
that
State
where
the
Sovereignty
resteth
in
the
Person
of
one
only
Prince
.
An
Aristocraty
,
is
where
some
small
part
of
the
People
have
in
them
as
a
Body
corporate
,
the
Sovereignty
and
Supreme
Power
of
the
whole
State.
A
Democraty
,
is
where
all
the
People
have
Power
and
Authority
Sovereign
.
So
doth
it
appear
,
that
the
Place
and
Person
where
the
Sovereignty
resteth
,
doth
cause
the
State
to
be
either
a
Monarchy
,
an
Aristocraty
,
or
Popular
Government
.
CHAP.
II.
Of
Sovereign
of
Monarchick
Government
,
with
its
Essential
Marks
,
and
Specifical
Differences
.
SOvereignty
is
an
absolute
and
perpetual
Power
in
every
publick
State
,
and
he
is
properly
and
only
a
Sovereign
,
that
acknowledgeth
no
Superior
or
Equal
,
nor
holdeth
of
any
other
Prince
,
Person
or
Power
,
but
God
and
his
own
Sword.
The
first
Mark
of
Sovereignty
,
is
absolute
Power
and
Authority
to
command
all
Subjects
in
general
,
and
every
of
them
in
particular
,
without
consent
of
any
other
Person
or
Persons
,
either
greater
or
inferior
to
himself
.
The
second
Mark
of
Majesty
is
Authority
to
make
War
,
and
conclude
Peace
at
his
pleasure
.
The
third
is
Power
to
beslow
all
Honors
and
chief
Offices
at
his
pleasure
.
The
Fourth
Mark
of
Sovereignty
is
Appellation
.
The
Fifth
Mark
and
last
,
is
power
to
pardon
all
Subjects
by
rigor
of
Law
or
otherwise
,
condemned
in
Life
,
Lands
,
Goods
or
Honors
.
These
Powers
are
not
to
be
imparted
to
any
Officer
,
Deputy
or
other
Magistrate
,
but
in
the
Prince's
absence
,
and
for
some
urgent
occasion
.
Monarchies
are
of
three
Sorts
,
-
Signioril
,
-
Royal
and
-
Tyrannical
.
The
Diversity
of
Monarchies
doth
not
proceed
from
the
Nature
of
the
State
,
but
the
diverse
proceedings
of
those
Princes
that
govern
;
for
great
difference
there
may
be
between
the
nature
of
the
Commonwealth
and
the
Government
thereof
.
That
Prince
that
giveth
the
Magistracies
Honors
and
Offices
without
respect
of
Nobility
,
Riches
or
Vertue
,
may
be
said
to
govern
popularly
.
And
that
Monarchy
may
be
said
to
be
governed
Aristocratically
,
when
the
Monarch
imparteth
the
principal
Honors
and
Offices
to
the
Noble
and
Rich
Men
only
.
The
same
difference
there
is
to
be
sound
in
States
Aristocratical
and
Popular
;
for
the
one
and
the
other
may
be
both
Signioril
or
Tyrannical
.
A
Monarch
Signioril
is
he
who
by
force
of
Arms
and
just
War
,
is
made
Owner
of
Mens
Bodies
and
Goods
,
and
governeth
them
as
a
Master
of
a
Family
governeth
base
Servants
and
Slaves
.
A
Monarch
Royal
,
is
he
whose
Subjects
are
obedient
unto
his
Laws
,
of
God
and
Nature
,
suffering
every
Subject
to
enjoy
Liberty
natural
,
with
Property
in
Lands
and
Goods
,
governing
as
a
Father
governeth
his
Children
.
A
Monarch
Tyrannical
,
is
he
who
without
regard
to
the
Law
of
God
or
Nature
,
commandeth
Free-men
as
Slaves
and
useth
their
Lands
and
Goods
as
his
own
.
CHAP.
III.
of
Monarchy
Signioril
,
Exemplisied
in
the
Turkisn
and
West-Indian
Empire
.
ALL
People
subject
to
Princes
,
are
governed
as
Free-men
by
their
Prince
,
and
certain
other
particular
Lords
of
Lands
and
Liberties
;
who
not
by
the
Princes
Commission
,
but
by
Ancient
〈◊〉
or
Custom
,
have
Inheritance
and
Tenements
;
or
else
they
are
by
one
Prince
and
his
Ministers
commanded
,
which
Ministers
have
not
by
Law
or
Ordinance
,
any
Authority
or
Interest
of
themselves
,
but
being
like
to
the
People
(
base
Men
and
Slaves
)
they
command
only
by
Commission
in
the
Princes
name
;
and
the
Authority
of
those
Ministers
doth
cease
at
the
Princes
pleasure
,
so
that
the
People
do
not
acknowledge
any
Superior
but
the
Prince
,
nor
owe
any
Service
to
other
mean
Lords
:
So
as
all
the
People
stand
without
Property
in
Lands
or
Goods
;
for
example
,
the
Empire
of
Turky
and
the
West-Indies
.
The
Provinces
of
this
Monarchy
are
allotted
to
sundry
Magistrates
or
Ministers
,
and
they
altered
and
removed
at
the
Princes
pleasure
;
but
it
is
otherwise
in
a
Monarchy
Royal
,
because
the
Monarch
is
there
accompanied
with
many
mean
Lords
.
And
albeit
those
mean
Lords
are
Subjects
unto
the
Prince
,
yet
have
they
particular
Tenants
,
who
may
not
,
without
just
cause
,
be
dispossessed
by
the
Prince
;
and
those
People
having
had
dependency
of
their
Lords
and
their
Ancestors
,
do
ever
beare
unto
them
a
certain
natural
Love
and
dutiful
Respect
;
whoso
therefore
compareth
these
Principalities
,
shall
perceive
,
that
to
Conquer
a
State
Signioril
there
is
great
difficulty
,
but
being
conquered
,
it
may
easily
be
maintained
;
for
the
difficulty
to
conquer
such
a
State
,
proceedeth
from
the
lack
of
mean
Lords
to
call
in
and
assist
the
Prince
that
doth
invade
:
Who
therefore
desireth
to
subdue
a
Nation
thus
governed
,
must
of
force
assault
all
the
People
,
and
rather
trust
in
his
own
Strength
than
the
Aid
of
the
Country
.
But
if
he
can
prevail
,
then
one
only
Fear
remaineth
,
which
is
the
Prince's
Posterity
,
which
necessarily
must
be
extinguished
,
because
the
Prince's
Race
only
hath
Interest
both
in
the
People
and
Soldiers
.
But
to
enter
a
Monarchy
Royal
,
is
an
Enterprise
of
no
great
Difficulty
,
when
he
that
doth
enter
,
hath
the
Friendship
and
Aid
of
some
mean
Lords
to
take
his
part
,
and
prepare
the
place
where
he
is
to
arrive
.
CHAP.
IV.
Of
Monarchies
Royal
,
with
the
Means
to
maintain
them
.
MOnarchies
Royal
are
for
the
most
part
Ancient
and
Hereditary
,
and
consequently
easie
to
be
governed
.
For
it
is
sufficient
for
the
Prince
to
maintain
the
old
Laws
,
and
on
occasion
temporize
with
those
Accidents
that
happen
:
Such
a
State
cannot
be
taken
from
the
Prince
without
excessive
Force
,
and
if
it
be
,
it
shall
be
soon
recovered
.
Example
,
England
and
France
.
But
if
a
Monarchy
newly
conquered
,
be
annexed
unto
an
old
,
and
not
properly
Ancient
,
then
it
is
with
much
more
difficulty
maintained
.
First
,
For
that
Men
naturally
inclined
to
Variation
,
are
easily
induced
to
take
Arms
against
him
that
newly
governeth
.
Secondly
,
Every
new
Prince
is
forced
to
exact
as
well
upon
those
Subjects
that
joyned
with
him
,
as
those
that
did
resist
him
,
and
therefore
shall
offend
both
.
Example
,
Ireland
annexed
to
the
Crown
of
England
,
Sicilia
and
Naples
to
Spain
.
The
means
to
maintain
such
a
Monarchy
,
is
,
First
,
To
extinguish
the
Race
of
him
that
was
anciently
Prince
.
Secondly
,
To
continue
all
Laws
and
Customs
in
the
former
Force
;
for
so
shall
the
Subject
find
nothing
altered
but
the
Prince
,
and
therefore
will
soon
rest
contented
;
and
the
rather
if
that
new
Monarchy
,
and
the
ancient
Dominion
of
the
Prince
,
be
of
one
Language
:
But
if
the
People
be
of
a
contrary
Language
and
Humor
,
then
to
hold
it
,
there
needeth
great
Industry
and
Fortune
;
in
that
case
the
best
way
is
,
that
the
Prince
should
inhabit
there
,
as
well
to
incounter
all
Inconveniences
proceeding
from
the
Subject
,
as
to
preserve
the
People
from
Oppression
of
his
own
Ministers
.
Another
way
is
,
to
send
thither
certain
Colonies
,
and
plant
them
in
fit
places
,
or
else
to
settle
some
Garisons
both
of
Horse
and
Foot
;
but
Colonies
are
less
chargeable
to
the
Prince
.
As
for
the
People
inhabitant
(
who
must
necessarily
remove
,
they
being
a
small
number
and
dispossessed
)
they
cannot
have
power
to
offend
;
for
in
that
case
,
this
Rule
or
Maxim
shall
be
found
true
,
that
Men
must
be
either
kindly
intreated
,
or
with
all
Extremity
oppressed
;
because
of
light
Injuries
they
may
be
revenged
,
but
of
utter
Oppression
they
cannot
.
A
third
way
to
hold
a
conquered
Dominion
,
is
,
to
cherish
and
defend
the
Neighbors
of
little
Power
,
and
oppress
or
keep
under
those
that
are
most
Potent
;
and
above
all
,
to
take
order
that
no
Forreign
Prince
or
Power
do
enter
;
for
it
is
ever
to
be
looked
for
,
that
so
many
of
the
Nation
as
are
discontented
,
either
for
Ambition
or
Fear
,
will
be
ever
ready
to
bring
in
Strangers
:
And
to
conclude
this
matter
of
Principality
annexed
,
I
say
it
behoveth
every
Prince
possessed
of
such
a
State
,
never
to
increase
the
Power
of
any
Potent
Nighbor
,
never
to
oppress
those
that
are
of
small
Power
,
never
to
permit
any
Forreign
Potentate
to
enter
,
but
ever
to
plant
Colonies
and
Garisons
,
or
else
to
make
that
Dominion
his
chief
Habitation
.
CHAP.
V.
Of
Monarchies
Tyrannical
.
TYrannical
Princes
are
not
advanced
by
Favor
,
neither
do
they
trust
unto
Fortune
,
but
by
degrees
of
War
,
or
else
by
some
other
indirect
means
do
aspire
unto
Greatness
;
and
therein
do
maintain
themselves
by
all
ways
either
Honest
or
Dishonest
,
without
respect
of
Justice
,
Conscience
or
Law
either
of
Nations
or
Nature
:
A
Prince
by
such
impious
means
aspired
,
and
desiring
to
hold
that
he
hath
gained
,
will
take
order
that
the
Cruelties
he
committeth
may
be
done
roundly
,
suddenly
,
and
as
it
were
at
an
instant
;
for
if
they
be
executed
at
leisure
and
by
piece-meal
,
then
will
the
Prince's
Fears
continue
long
,
and
the
Terror
in
Subjects
take
deeper
Impression
,
whose
Nature
is
such
,
that
either
they
must
be
bound
by
Benefits
,
or
by
Cruelty
made
sure
from
offending
:
Example
,
Dionysius
and
Agathocles
.
CHAP.
VI.
Of
new
found
Monarchies
and
Principalities
,
with
the
means
to
perpetuate
them
.
SOme
other
Princes
there
are
,
that
from
private
Estate
have
aspired
to
Sovereignty
,
not
by
unnatural
or
impious
proceedings
as
the
former
,
but
by
Vertue
and
Fortune
,
and
being
aspired
,
have
found
no
great
Difficulty
to
be
maintained
;
for
such
a
Prince
having
no
other
Dominion
,
is
forced
to
settle
himself
where
he
is
become
a
Prince
:
But
here
is
to
be
noted
,
that
albeit
such
a
Man
be
Vertuous
,
yet
wanting
Fortune
,
his
Vertue
proveth
to
small
purpose
,
and
Fortune
without
Vertue
doth
seldom
work
any
great
Effect
.
Howsoever
it
be
,
a
Prince
being
aspired
,
both
by
the
Aid
of
the
one
and
of
the
other
,
shall
notwithstanding
find
some
difficulty
to
hold
what
he
hath
gotten
;
because
he
is
forced
to
introduce
new
Laws
and
new
Orders
of
Government
differing
from
the
old
,
as
well
for
his
own
Security
,
as
confirmation
of
the
Government
;
for
avoiding
of
which
Dangers
,
he
is
to
consider
whether
he
be
of
himself
able
to
compel
his
Subjects
to
obey
,
or
must
pray
in
aid
of
others
:
If
he
can
do
the
first
,
he
needeth
not
doubt
,
but
being
driven
to
the
other
,
his
Greatness
cannot
long
continu
;
for
albeit
a
matter
of
no
difficulty
,
it
is
to
perswade
a
People
;
yet
to
make
them
constant
,
is
a
work
well
near
impossible
.
Example
,
Theseus
,
Cyrus
,
Romulus
.
The
second
sort
of
new
Princes
are
such
as
be
aspired
by
Favor
or
Corruption
,
or
by
the
Vertue
or
Greatness
of
Fortune
or
Friends
:
A
Prince
by
any
or
all
these
means
advanced
,
and
desirous
to
hold
his
Estate
,
must
indeavor
by
his
own
Vertue
to
maintain
himself
without
depending
upon
any
other
;
which
may
be
done
by
this
means
:
First
,
To
assure
all
Enemies
from
offending
.
Secondly
,
To
win
the
Love
and
Friendship
of
so
many
Neighbors
as
possibly
he
may
.
Thirdly
,
To
compass
all
Designs
tending
to
his
Honor
or
Profit
,
and
bring
them
to
pass
either
by
Fraud
or
Force
.
Fourthly
,
To
make
himself
honored
and
followed
of
Captains
and
Soldiers
.
Fifthly
,
To
oppress
all
those
that
would
or
can
offend
.
Sixthly
,
To
be
obsequious
and
liberal
to
Friends
,
magnanimous
and
terrible
to
Foes
.
Seventhly
,
To
cass
all
old
and
unfaithful
Bands
,
and
entertain
new
.
Eighthly
,
To
hold
such
Amity
with
Kings
and
Princes
,
as
they
ought
reasonably
to
favor
him
,
or
else
they
would
offend
;
easily
they
cannot
.
Example
,
Giovannio
,
Torrigiani
,
Caesar
,
Borgi
.
The
third
and
last
means
whereby
private
Persons
do
aspire
to
Principalities
,
is
not
Force
and
Violence
,
but
meer
good
Will
and
Favor
of
Men.
The
cause
or
occasion
thereof
,
is
only
Vertue
or
Fortune
,
or
at
least
a
certain
Fortunate
Craft
and
Wittiness
,
because
he
aspireth
either
by
Favor
of
the
People
,
or
by
Favor
of
the
Nobility
;
for
these
contrary
Humors
are
in
all
Common-wealths
to
be
found
.
And
the
reason
thereof
is
,
that
the
great
Men
do
ever
endeavor
to
oppress
the
People
,
and
the
People
do
labor
not
to
be
oppressed
by
them
.
Of
these
divers
Appetites
one
of
these
three
Effects
do
proceed
,
viz.
Principality
,
Liberty
,
or
Licentious
Life
.
Principality
may
come
either
by
love
of
the
Multitude
,
or
of
the
great
Men
;
for
when
any
of
these
Factions
do
find
it self
oppressed
,
then
do
they
soon
consent
to
make
one
a
Prince
,
hoping
by
his
Vertue
and
Valor
to
be
defended
.
Example
,
Francesco
Sforza
,
Alessandro
de
Medici
.
A
Prince
in
this
sort
aspired
,
to
maintain
his
Estate
,
must
first
consider
well
by
which
of
these
Factions
aforesaid
he
is
advanced
;
for
if
by
Favor
of
great
Men
he
be
aspired
,
then
must
he
meet
with
many
Difficulties
;
for
having
about
him
divers
Persons
of
great
Quality
,
and
such
as
were
but
lately
his
Equals
,
hardly
shall
he
command
them
in
such
sort
as
it
behoveth
:
But
if
the
Prince
be
advanced
by
the
People
,
few
or
none
shall
hardly
disobey
him
.
So
it
appeareth
that
a
Prince
made
by
the
Multitude
,
is
much
more
secure
than
he
whom
the
Nobility
preferreth
;
for
common
People
do
not
desire
to
enjoy
more
than
their
own
,
and
to
be
defended
from
Oppression
;
but
great
Men
do
study
not
only
to
hold
their
own
,
but
also
to
command
and
insult
upon
Inferiors
.
Note
that
all
Monarchies
are
Principalities
.
But
all
Principalities
are
not
Monarchies
.
CHAP.
VII
.
Of
Councils
,
and
Counsellors
in
general
.
A
Senate
or
Council
is
a
certain
lawful
Assembly
of
Counsellors
,
to
give
advice
to
him
or
them
that
have
in
the
Commonweale
Power
Sovereign
.
A
Counsellor
is
called
in
the
Latine
Senator
;
which
Word
signifieth
in
effect
an
old
Man
:
The
Grecians
and
Romans
also
most
commonly
composed
their
Councils
of
ancient
and
expert
Persons
;
for
if
they
,
or
the
greater
part
of
them
had
been
Young
Men
,
then
might
the
Council
have
more
properly
been
called
a
Juvenate
than
a
Senate
.
The
chief
and
most
necessary
Note
required
in
a
Counsellor
is
to
have
no
dependence
of
any
other
Prince
or
Commonweale
;
either
Oath
,
Homage
,
Natural
Obligation
,
Pention
,
or
Reward
:
In
this
Point
the
Venetians
have
been
ever
most
precise
,
and
for
that
reason
,
do
not
admit
any
Cardinal
or
other
Clergy-man
to
be
either
of
or
at
their
Councils
,
therefore
when
the
Venetian
Senate
is
Assembled
,
the
Usher
being
ready
to
shut
the
Door
,
cryeth
aloud
,
Fuora
Preti
,
Depart
Priest.
Note
also
that
in
every
State
,
of
what
Quality
soever
,
a
Secret
or
Cabinet-Council
is
mainly
necessary
.
CHAP.
VIII
.
Of
Councils
in
some
particular
Monarchies
,
Aristocraties
,
and
Democraties
.
THE
King
of
Spain
,
for
the
Government
of
his
Dominions
hath
Seven
Councils
,
(
viz.
)
the
Council
of
the
Indies
,
the
Council
of
Spain
,
the
Council
of
Italy
and
the
Low
Countries
,
the
Council
of
War
,
the
Council
of
Orders
,
the
Council
of
Inquisition
,
and
the
Council
Royal.
In
France
are
Three
Councils
,
(
viz.
)
the
Council
srivy
,
the
Council
of
Judges
,
which
they
call
Presidents
et
Conceliers
de
Parlament
,
and
the
great
Council
,
which
they
call
Assemblies
du
troys
Estates
.
Of
Councils
in
Aristocraties
.
In
Venice
,
beside
the
Senate
and
great
Council
,
are
Four
Councils
,
(
viz.
)
the
Sages
of
the
Sea
,
the
Sages
of
the
Land
,
the
Council
of
Tenn
,
the
Three
Presidents
of
Quarantia
,
and
the
Senate
:
All
which
Councils
do
amount
to
One
hundred
and
twenty
Persons
,
with
the
Magistrates
.
The
Great
Council
of
Ragusa
consisteth
of
Sixty
Persons
,
and
hath
another
Privy
Council
of
Twelve
.
Of
Councils
in
Democraties
.
Genoua
hath
Three
Councils
:
the
Great
Council
of
Two
hundred
,
the
Senate
which
consisteth
of
Sixty
,
and
the
Privy
Council
which
hath
Twenty
six
Counsellors
:
So
it
doth
appear
that
in
all
Commonwealths
,
be
they
Monarchies
,
Aristocracies
,
or
Popular
States
.
The
Council-Privy
is
most
necessary
,
and
often
used
;
Also
this
difference
is
to
be
noted
between
the
Councils
in
Monarchies
,
and
the
Councils
in
Aristocracies
and
States
Popular
;
that
is
to
say
,
that
all
Deliberations
fit
to
be
published
,
are
in
a
Monarchy
consulted
and
resolved
upon
in
the
Council
Privy
,
and
after
ratified
by
Common
Council
;
But
in
Optimacies
or
Popular
Government
the
Custom
is
contrary
.
Here
also
is
to
be
noted
,
that
albeit
the
Use
and
Authority
of
every
Senate
a
Privy
Council
is
most
needful
,
yet
hath
it
no
Authority
to
command
but
in
the
name
of
those
in
whom
the
Sovereignty
resteth
:
For
if
Counsellors
had
power
to
command
absolutely
,
then
should
they
be
Sovereigns
,
and
consequently
all
Execution
at
their
Pleasure
;
which
may
not
be
without
detracting
from
Majesty
,
which
is
a
thing
so
Sovereign
and
Sacred
,
as
no
Citizen
or
Subject
of
what
quality
soever
,
may
touch
or
approach
thereunto
.
CHAP.
IX
.
Of
Officers
and
Commissioners
with
their
respective
Distinctions
.
AN
Officer
is
a
Person
publick
,
that
hath
Charge
ordinary
and
limited
by
Law.
A
Commissioner
is
also
a
Person
publick
,
but
his
Charge
is
extraordinary
and
limited
by
Commission
.
Officers
are
of
two
sorts
,
and
so
be
Commissioners
;
the
one
hath
power
to
command
,
and
are
called
Magistrates
:
the
other
hath
Authority
to
execute
:
so
the
one
and
the
other
are
Persons
publick
:
yet
are
not
all
publick
Persons
either
Officers
or
Commissioners
.
Commissioners
are
ordained
to
govern
in
Provinces
,
in
War
,
in
Justice
,
in
disposing
the
Treasure
,
or
some
other
Function
concerning
the
State
;
but
all
Commissions
do
spring
and
proceed
from
the
Sovereign
,
Magistrates
and
Commissioners
.
And
here
is
to
be
noted
,
that
every
Commission
ceaseth
if
he
that
granted
the
commission
doth
dye
,
or
revoke
it
,
or
if
the
Commissioners
during
his
Commission
shall
aspire
to
Office
and
Authority
equal
to
his
that
made
it
.
CHAP.
X.
Of
Magistrates
,
their
Qualifications
and
Elections
.
A
Magistrate
is
an
Officer
having
power
to
command
in
the
State
;
and
albeit
that
every
Magistrate
be
an
Officer
,
yet
every
Officer
is
not
a
Magistrate
,
but
they
only
that
have
power
to
command
.
Also
in
making
Officers
of
and
Magistrates
in
every
Commonweale
,
Three
things
are
specially
to
be
observed
(
viz.
)
who
doth
make
them
,
what
Men
they
are
that
should
be
made
,
and
the
form
and
manner
how
they
are
made
.
The
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
to
him
or
them
in
whom
the
Sovereignty
resteth
;
the
second
also
belongeth
to
Majesty
;
yet
therein
the
Laws
are
commonly
followed
,
especially
in
Aristocracies
and
States
Popular
;
In
the
one
the
Magistrates
are
chosen
out
of
the
most
Wealthy
or
most
Noble
:
In
the
other
,
elected
out
of
the
whole
Multitude
.
The
form
and
manner
of
choosing
Magistrates
in
Aristocracies
and
States
Popular
,
is
either
by
Election
,
by
Lot
,
or
by
both
,
and
their
Office
is
to
compel
those
that
do
not
Obey
what
Sovereignty
commandeth
:
For
all
force
of
Commandment
lieth
in
Compulsion
.
Commandment
likewise
is
of
two
sorts
;
the
one
may
be
called
Sovereign
and
Absolute
,
above
Laws
,
above
Magistrates
,
and
above
People
.
In
Monarchies
such
Command
is
proper
to
the
Prince
only
;
in
Aristocracies
it
resteth
in
the
Nobility
:
And
in
Democracies
the
People
have
that
power
.
The
second
Commandments
are
Subject
both
to
Sovereignty
and
Law.
Here
is
to
be
noted
,
that
every
Magistrate
may
recall
his
own
Commandment
,
and
forbid
what
he
did
Command
,
yet
cannot
revoke
that
which
he
hath
Judged
.
[*](A57590-e2540-b)
Also
in
the
presence
of
the
Sovereign
,
all
Authority
of
Magistrates
ceaseth
;
and
in
presence
of
great
Magistrates
the
inferior
have
no
power
;
and
Magistrates
equal
cannot
do
any
thing
but
by
Consent
,
if
his
Colleagues
or
Fellow-Magistrates
be
present
.
CHAP.
XI
.
Observations
intrinsically
concerning
every
Publick
State
in
points
of
Justice
,
Treasure
and
War.
THE
First
concern
matter
Intrinsick
.
The
Second
touch
matter
Extrinsick
.
Matters
Intrinsick
are
Three
.
The
Administration
of
Justice
.
The
Managing
of
the
Treasure
.
The
disposing
of
things
appertaining
to
War.
Matters
Extrinsick
are
also
Three
.
The
Skill
how
to
deal
with
Neighbors
.
The
Diligence
to
vent
their
Designs
.
The
way
how
to
win
so
much
Confidence
with
some
of
them
,
as
to
be
made
partaker
of
whatsoever
they
mean
to
enterprise
.
Touching
Administration
of
Justice
.
The
good
and
direct
Administration
of
Justice
,
is
in
all
Places
a
principal
part
of
Government
;
for
seldom
or
never
shall
we
see
any
People
discontented
and
desirous
of
Alteration
,
where
Justice
is
equally
administred
without
respect
of
Persons
;
and
in
every
State
this
Consideration
is
required
,
but
most
of
all
in
Countries
that
do
front
upon
other
Princes
,
or
were
lately
〈◊〉
Hereunto
the
Princes
Vigilancy
and
the
Magistrates
Uprightness
are
especially
required
;
for
oft-tentimes
the
Prince
is
deceived
,
and
the
Magistrates
corrupted
;
it
behoveth
also
the
Prince
to
maintain
the
Judges
and
Ministers
of
Justice
in
their
Reputation
,
and
yet
to
have
a
vigilant
Eye
upon
their
Proceedings
,
and
the
rather
if
their
Authority
do
include
Equity
,
and
from
their
Censure
be
no
Appeal
;
and
if
their
Office
be
during
Life
,
and
they
are
Men
born
and
dwelling
in
the
same
Country
;
all
these
things
are
duly
to
be
considered
of
the
rince
;
for
as
to
call
the
Judges
into
question
,
is
as
it
were
to
disgrace
the
Judicial
Seat
;
so
to
wink
at
their
Corruptions
were
matter
of
just
discontent
to
the
Subject
:
in
this
case
therefore
the
Prince
cannot
do
more
than
by
his
Wisdom
to
make
choice
of
Good
Men
;
and
being
chosen
,
to
hold
them
in
good
Reputation
so
as
the
ordinary
course
of
Justice
may
proceed
;
for
otherwise
great
Disorder
,
Contempt
,
and
general
Confusion
will
ensue
thereof
.
Secondly
,
he
is
to
keep
his
Eye
open
upon
their
Proceedings
;
and
lastly
to
reserve
unto
himself
a
Supreme
Power
of
Appellation
.
Touching
the
Treasure
.
The
want
of
Money
is
in
all
States
very
perilous
,
and
most
of
all
in
those
which
are
of
least
Strength
,
and
do
confine
upon
Nations
with
whom
they
have
commonly
War
,
or
unassured
Peace
,
but
most
perilous
of
all
to
those
Governments
which
are
remote
from
the
Prince
,
or
Place
where
they
are
to
be
relieved
.
The
means
to
Levy
Treasure
are
Four.
First
,
The
Customs
and
Impositions
upon
all
forts
of
Merchandize
and
Traffick
is
to
be
looked
unto
and
advanced
.
Secondly
,
The
excessive
eating
of
Usury
must
be
suppressed
.
Thirdly
,
All
supersluous
Charges
and
Expences
are
to
be
taken
away
.
Lastly
,
The
doings
and
accounts
of
Ministers
are
severally
to
be
exammed
.
Touching
the
matter
of
Custom
and
Impost
thereof
,
assuredly
a
great
Prosit
is
in
every
State
to
be
raised
;
chiefly
where
Peace
hath
long
continued
,
and
where
the
Country
affordeth
much
plenty
of
Commodities
to
be
carried
out
,
and
where
Ports
are
to
receive
Shipping
.
The
moderating
of
Interest
is
ever
necessary
,
and
chiefly
in
this
Age
,
by
reason
that
Money
aboundeth
in
Europe
;
since
the
Traffick
into
the
Indies
;
for
such
Men
as
have
Money
in
their
Hands
great
plenty
,
would
in
no
wise
imploy
the
same
in
Merchandize
,
if
lawful
it
were
to
receive
the
utmost
Usury
,
being
a
Course
of
most
Profit
and
greatest
Security
.
The
taking
away
of
superfluous
Expences
is
no
other
thing
than
a
certain
wise
and
laudable
Parsimony
;
which
the
Romans
and
other
well
governed
States
did
use
.
These
Expences
consist
in
Fees
,
Allowances
,
and
Wages
granted
to
Ministers
of
little
or
no
Necessity
;
also
in
Pensions
,
Rewards
,
Entertainments
and
Donaries
,
with
small
Difficulty
to
be
moderated
,
or
easily
to
be
suppressed
.
[*](A57590-e2890-b)
By
abridging
or
taking
away
of
these
needless
Expences
a
marvelous
Profit
will
be
saved
for
the
Prince
;
but
if
he
continue
them
,
and
by
imposing
upon
the
People
do
think
to
increase
his
Treasure
or
Revenue
,
besides
the
loss
of
their
Love
,
he
may
also
hazard
their
Obedience
,
with
many
other
Inconveniences
.
Touching
War.
Whatsoever
Prince
or
Common-weale
is
Neighbour
to
any
People
which
can
,
will
,
or
were
wont
to
offend
,
it
is
necessary
to
have
not
only
all
things
prepared
for
defence
of
his
Person
and
Country
,
but
also
to
forecast
and
use
every
caution
and
other
diligence
:
For
the
Inconveniencies
which
happen
to
Government
,
are
sudden
and
unlook'd
for
;
yea
,
the
Providence
and
Provision
required
in
this
Case
ought
to
be
such
as
the
Expences
all
other
ways
imployed
must
stay
to
supply
the
Necessity
of
War.
CHAP
XII
.
Extrinsick
Observation
,
shewing
how
to
deal
with
Neighbor
Princes
and
Provinces
respectively
,
how
to
prevent
their
Designs
,
and
decipher
their
Intendments
.
THIS
first
Point
of
matter
Extrinsick
is
of
such
quality
as
being
well
handled
procureth
great
good
,
but
otherwise
becometh
dangerous
;
for
the
Proceeding
must
be
divers
according
to
the
diversity
of
the
Ends
which
the
Prince
or
Governor
intendeth
;
for
if
he
desire
to
continue
Peace
with
his
Neighbors
,
one
way
is
to
be
taken
;
but
otherwise
he
is
to
work
that
seeketh
occasion
to
break
,
and
to
become
an
Enemy
to
one
or
more
of
his
Neighbors
.
Is
he
do
desire
to
live
peaceably
withal
,
then
he
is
to
observe
these
Rules
(
viz
)
First
,
To
hold
and
continue
firmly
all
Contracts
and
Capitulations
.
Secondly
,
To
shew
himself
resolved
neither
to
offer
nor
take
the
least
touch
of
Wrong
or
Injury
.
Thirdly
,
With
all
care
and
favor
to
further
Commerce
and
reciproke
Traffick
for
the
profit
of
the
Subject
,
and
increase
of
the
Princes
Revenue
.
Fourthly
,
Covertly
to
win
so
great
Confidence
with
Neighbors
,
as
in
all
actions
of
unkindness
among
them
he
may
be
made
Umpire
.
Fifthly
,
To
become
so
well
believed
with
them
as
he
may
remove
such
Diffidences
as
grow
to
his
own
disadvantage
.
Sixthly
,
Not
to
deny
Protection
or
Aid
to
them
that
are
the
weakest
,
and
chiefly
such
as
do
and
will
endure
his
Fortune
.
Lastly
,
In
Favouring
,
Aiding
and
Protecting
(
unless
necessity
shall
otherwise
so
require
)
to
do
it
moderately
,
so
as
they
who
are
to
be
aided
,
become
not
Jealous
,
and
consequently
seek
Adherency
elsewhere
,
which
oft-times
hath
opened
way
to
other
Neighbors
that
desire
a
like
occasion
.
How
to
prevent
their
Designs
.
This
Point
in
time
of
War
is
with
great
diligence
to
be
looked
unto
;
also
in
time
of
Peace
to
prevent
all
occasions
that
may
kindle
War
is
behoveful
;
for
to
foresee
what
may
happen
to
the
Prejudice
of
a
Princes
Profit
or
Reputation
,
is
a
part
of
great
Wisdom
.
The
means
to
attain
the
Intelligence
of
these
things
are
two
.
The
First
is
by
friends
,
the
next
by
Espials
;
the
one
for
the
most
part
faithful
,
the
other
not
so
assured
.
These
matters
are
well
to
be
considered
;
for
albeit
the
Nature
of
Man
desireth
nothing
more
than
curiously
to
know
the
doings
of
others
,
yet
are
those
things
to
be
handled
with
so
great
Secrecy
and
Dissimulation
as
the
Princes
Intent
be
not
in
any
wise
suspected
,
nor
the
Ministers
made
odious
;
for
these
sometimes
to
win
themselves
reputation
,
do
devise
causes
of
Difference
where
no
need
is
,
divining
of
things
Future
which
prove
to
the
Prejudice
of
their
own
Prince
.
To
win
Confidence
with
Neighbors
.
This
is
chiefly
attained
unto
by
being
Loved
and
Honored
;
for
these
things
do
work
so
many
good
Effects
,
as
daily
Experience
sufficeth
without
any
express
Example
to
prove
them
of
great
Force
.
The
ways
to
win
Love
and
Trust
,
is
in
all
Actions
to
proceed
Justly
,
and
sometimes
to
wink
at
Wrongs
,
or
set
aside
unnecessary
Revenges
;
and
if
any
thing
be
done
not
justifiable
,
or
unfit
to
be
allowed
,
as
oftentimes
it
happeneth
,
there
to
lay
the
Blame
upon
the
Minister
,
which
must
be
performed
with
so
great
show
of
Revenge
and
Dissimulation
,
by
reproving
and
punishing
the
Minister
,
as
the
Princes
offended
may
be
satisfied
,
and
believe
that
the
cause
of
Unkindness
proceeded
from
thence
.
Now
only
it
resteth
that
somewhat
should
be
said
touching
Provision
,
to
the
end
the
People
may
not
be
drawn
into
despair
by
Famine
,
or
extream
Dearth
of
Victual
,
chiefly
for
want
of
Corn
,
which
is
one
principal
Consideration
to
be
regarded
,
according
to
the
Italian
Proverb
,
Pane
in
Piazza
,
Giustitia
in
Palazzo
,
siverezza
per
tutto
:
Whereunto
I
could
wish
every
Prince
or
Supreme
Governor
to
be
thus
qualified
(
viz.
)
Facile
de
audienza
:
non
facilede
credenza
,
desioso
de
spedition
,
essemplare
in
costunii
proprii
,
&
inquei
de
sua
casa
tale
che
vorra
governare
,
e
non
esser
governato
da
altro
;
he
della
raggione
.
CHAP.
XIII
.
Observations
confirmed
by
Authorities
of
Princes
and
Principalities
,
Charactering
an
excellent
Prince
or
Governor
.
EVery
good
and
lawful
Principality
is
either
Elective
or
Successive
Of
them
Election
seemeth
the
more
Ancient
;
but
Succession
in
divers
respects
the
better
:
Minore
discrimine
sumitur
Princeps
quam
quaeritur
.
Tac.
The
chief
and
only
Endeavour
of
every
good
Prince
,
ought
to
be
the
Commodity
and
Security
of
the
Subjects
,
as
contrariwise
the
Tyrant
seeketh
his
own
private
Profit
with
the
Oppression
of
his
People
:
Civium
non
servitus
sed
tutela
tradita
est
.
Sal.
To
the
Perfection
of
every
good
Prince
,
two
things
are
necessarily
required
(
viz.
)
Prudence
and
Vertue
;
the
one
to
direct
his
Doings
,
the
other
to
govern
his
Life
:
Rex
eris
si
recte
feceris
.
Hor.
The
second
care
which
appertaineth
to
a
good
Prince
,
is
to
make
his
Subjects
like
unto
himself
;
for
thereby
he
is
not
only
honored
,
but
they
also
the
better
governed
:
Facile
imperium
in
bonos
.
Plaut
.
Subjects
are
made
good
by
two
means
(
viz.
)
by
constraint
of
Law
,
and
the
Princes
Example
;
for
in
all
Estates
,
the
People
do
imitate
those
Conditions
whereunto
they
see
the
Prince
enclined
:
Quicquid
faciunt
principes
,
praecipere
videantur
.
Quintil.
All
Vertues
be
required
in
a
Prince
,
but
Justice
and
Clemency
are
most
necessary
;
for
Justice
is
a
Habit
of
doing
things
Justly
,
as
well
to
himself
as
others
,
and
giving
to
every
one
so
much
as
to
him
appertaineth
:
This
is
that
Vertue
that
preserveth
Concord
among
Men
,
and
whereof
they
be
called
good
:
Jus
&
aequit
as
vincula
civitatum
.
Cic.
[*](A57590-e3370-b)
It
is
the
Quality
of
this
Vertue
also
,
to
proceed
equally
and
temperately
;
it
informeth
the
Prince
not
to
surcharge
the
Subjects
with
infinite
Laws
;
for
thereof
proceedeth
the
Impoverishment
of
the
Subjects
and
the
Inriching
of
Lawyers
,
a
kind
of
Men
which
in
Ages
more
Ancient
,
did
seem
of
no
Necessity
:
Sine
causidicis
satis
foelices
olim
fuere
futuraeque
sunt
urbes
.
Sal.
The
next
Vertue
required
in
Princes
is
Clemency
,
being
an
Inclination
of
the
Mind
to
Lenity
and
Compassion
,
yet
tempered
with
Severity
and
Judgment
;
this
Quality
is
fit
for
all
great
Personages
,
but
chiefly
Princes
,
because
their
occasion
to
use
it
is
most
;
by
it
also
the
Love
of
Men
is
gained
:
Qui
vult
regnare
,
languida
regnet
manu
.
Sen.
After
Clemency
,
Fidelity
is
expected
in
all
good
Princes
,
which
is
a
certain
Performance
and
Observation
of
Word
and
Promise
;
this
Vertue
seemeth
to
accompany
Justice
,
or
is
as
it
were
the
same
,
and
therefore
most
fit
for
Princes
:
Sanctissimum
generis
humani
bonum
.
Liv.
As
Fidelity
followeth
Justice
,
so
doth
Modesty
accompany
Clemency
;
Modesty
is
a
Temperature
of
Reason
,
whereby
the
Mind
of
Man
is
so
governed
,
as
neither
in
Action
or
Opinion
he
over-deemeth
of
himself
,
or
any
thing
that
is
his
;
a
Quality
not
common
in
Fortunate
Folk
,
and
most
rare
in
Princes
:
Superbia
commune
nobilitatis
malum
.
Sal.
This
Vertue
doth
also
moderate
all
External
Demonstration
of
Insolence
,
Pride
and
Arrogance
,
and
therefore
necessary
to
be
known
of
Princes
,
and
all
others
whom
Favor
or
Fortune
have
advanced
:
Impone
faelicitati
tua
fraenos
,
facilius
illam
reges
.
Curt.
But
as
Princes
are
to
observe
the
Bounds
of
Modesty
,
so
may
they
not
forget
the
Majesty
appertaining
to
their
Supreme
Honor
,
being
a
certain
Reverend
Greatness
due
to
Princely
Vertue
and
Royal
State
;
a
Grace
and
Gravity
no
less
beseeming
a
Prince
than
Vertue
it self
;
for
neither
over-much
Famili-arity
,
nor
too
great
Austerity
,
ought
to
be
used
by
Princes
:
Facilit
as
autoritatem
,
severit
as
amorem
minuit
.
Tac.
To
these
Vertues
we
may
apply
Liberality
,
which
doth
not
only
Adorn
,
but
highly
Advance
the
Honor
due
to
Princes
;
thereby
also
the
good
Will
of
Men
is
gained
;
for
nothing
is
more
fitting
a
Prince's
Nature
than
Bounty
,
the
same
being
accompanied
with
Judgment
,
and
performed
according
to
the
Laws
of
Liberality
:
Perdere
multi
sciunt
,
donare
nesciunt
.
Tac.
It
seemeth
also
that
Prudence
is
not
only
fit
,
but
also
,
among
other
Vertues
,
necessary
in
a
Prince
;
for
the
daily
use
thereof
is
in
all
Humane
Actions
required
,
and
chiesly
in
Matters
of
State
and
Government
:
Prudentia
imperant
is
propria
&
unica
virtus
.
Arist.
The
Success
of
all
Worldly
Proceedings
,
doth
shew
that
Prudence
hath
compassed
the
Prosperous
Event
of
Humane
Actions
,
more
than
Force
of
Arms
or
other
Power
:
Mens
una
〈◊〉
plurium
vincit
manus
.
Eurip.
Prudence
is
either
natural
,
or
received
from
others
;
for
whoso
can
Counsel
himself
what
is
fit
to
be
done
,
needeth
not
the
Advice
of
others
;
but
they
that
want
such
Perfection
,
and
are
nevertheless
capable
,
and
are
willing
to
know
what
others
inform
,
ought
to
be
accounted
wise
enough
:
Laudatissimus
est
qui
cuncta
videbit
,
sed
laudandus
est
is
qui
paret
recte
monenti
Hesiod
.
CHAP.
XIV
.
Of
the
Princes
intimate
Counsellors
and
Ministers
of
State
,
with
their
several
Requisites
.
ALbeit
the
excellent
Spirit
of
some
Princes
be
such
as
doth
justly
deserve
the
highest
Commendation
;
yet
for
that
every
Course
of
Life
needeth
the
Aid
of
Men
,
and
the
Mind
of
one
cannot
comprehend
the
infinite
Care
appertaining
to
publick
Affairs
;
it
behoveth
Princes
to
be
assisted
:
Magna
negotia
,
adjutoribus
egent
.
Tac.
The
Assistants
may
be
properly
divided
into
Counsellors
and
Ministers
;
the
one
to
Advise
,
the
other
to
Execute
:
Without
Counsel
,
no
Kingdom
,
no
State
,
no
private
House
can
stand
;
for
Experience
hath
proved
,
that
Common-weales
have
prospered
so
long
as
good
Counsel
did
govern
,
but
when
Favor
,
Fear
or
Voluptuousness
entered
,
those
Nations
became
disordered
;
and
in
the
end
subject
to
Slavery
:
Quiddam
sacrum
profecto
est
Consultatio
.
Plato
.
Counsellors
are
Men
specially
selected
to
give
Advice
to
Princes
or
Common-wealths
,
as
well
in
Peace
as
in
War
;
the
chief
Qualities
required
in
such
Men
,
are
Fidelity
and
Knowledge
;
which
two
concurring
do
make
them
both
Good
and
Wise
,
and
consequently
fit
for
Counsel
:
Prudentis
proprium
munus
recte
consulere
.
Arist.
The
Election
of
Counsellors
is
and
ought
to
be
chiefly
among
Men
of
long
Experience
and
grave
Years
;
for
as
Youth
is
fittest
for
Action
in
respect
of
Corporal
Strength
;
so
elder
Folk
having
felt
the
Force
of
every
Fortune
,
and
observed
the
Course
of
Worldly
Proceedings
do
seem
most
meet
for
Consultation
:
Consilia
senum
,
facta
juvenum
.
Plato
.
Albeit
we
say
that
the
Excellency
of
Wisdom
should
be
in
Counsellors
;
yet
do
we
not
require
so
quick
and
fiery
a
Conceit
as
is
more
apt
for
Innovation
than
orderly
Government
:
Hebetiores
quam
acutiores
melius
Remp.
administrant
.
Thucyd.
To
Fidelity
and
Experience
we
wish
that
our
Counsellors
should
be
endued
with
Piety
,
Liberty
,
Constancy
,
Modesty
and
Silence
;
for
as
the
Aid
and
Assistance
of
God
is
that
which
governeth
all
good
Counsels
,
so
liberty
of
Speech
,
and
magnanimous
uttering
of
what
is
good
and
fit
,
is
necessary
in
Counsellors
.
Likewise
to
be
constant
and
not
to
vary
in
opinion
,
either
for
Fear
or
Favor
,
is
very
commendable
:
Also
as
Modesty
in
giving
Counsel
escheweth
all
Offences
,
and
gaineth
good
Will
,
so
Secresie
is
the
best
and
most
secure
means
to
govern
all
publick
Affairs
:
Res
magnae
sustineri
non
possunt
ab
eo
qui
tacere
nequit
.
Curt.
The
first
Obstacle
to
good
Counsel
is
Pertinacy
or
Opiniativeness
;
a
Condition
far
unfit
for
Counsellors
;
yet
some
Men
are
so
far
in
love
with
their
own
Opiniastre
Conceits
,
as
that
they
cannot
patiently
endure
Opposition
.
Secondly
,
Discord
must
from
Counsellors
be
removed
,
because
private
Offence
many
times
impeacheth
publick
Proceedings
.
Thirdly
,
Affection
is
an
Enemy
to
Counsel
,
the
same
being
commonly
accompanied
with
Anger
,
wherewith
nothing
can
be
〈◊〉
or
considerately
done
.
Lastly
,
〈◊〉
seemeth
a
Vice
worthy
to
be
〈◊〉
of
all
Counsellors
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
away
both
Fidelity
and
〈◊〉
the
principal
Pillars
of
all
good
Counsel
:
Pessimum
veri
affectus
&
judicii
venenum
,
utilitas
.
Tac.
To
good
Counsel
other
Impediments
there
are
,
which
square
not
with
Wisdom
;
for
all
Crafty
and
Hazarding
Counsels
do
seem
in
the
beginning
likely
to
succeed
;
but
afterwards
and
chiefly
in
the
end
do
prove
hard
and
of
evil
Event
.
It
therefore
seemeth
behoveful
to
be
wary
in
resolving
,
and
bold
in
executing
:
Animus
vereri
qui
scit
,
scit
tuto
aggredi
.
Pub.
Another
Lett
to
good
Consultation
is
immoderate
Desire
,
which
every
wise
Man
must
endeavor
to
restrain
:
〈◊〉
pauca
recte
siunt
,
circumspectione
plurima
.
Thucyd.
Thirdly
,
Haste
is
an
Enemy
to
good
Deliberation
;
for
whoso
greedily
desireth
any
thing
,
proceedeth
rashly
;
and
rash
proceeding
endeth
ever
in
Repentance
:
Scelera
impetu
,
bona
consilia
mora
valescunt
.
Tac.
Of
Ministers
of
State.
Having
already
spoken
of
Counsellors
,
somewhat
is
to
be
spoken
of
Ministers
;
I
mean
those
that
either
publickly
or
privately
serve
the
Prince
in
any
Function
;
in
choice
of
which
Men
,
care
must
be
had
;
First
,
That
they
be
Persons
honestly
born
;
for
no
Man
descended
of
base
Parentage
may
be
admitted
,
unless
in
him
be
found
some
noble
and
excellent
Vertue
:
Optimus
quisque
Nobilissimus
.
Plato
.
Secondly
,
They
ought
to
be
of
honest
Condition
,
and
of
good
Fame
;
for
that
Common-weale
is
better
and
more
secure
,
where
the
Prince
is
not
good
,
than
is
that
where
his
Ministers
are
Evil.
It
seemeth
therefore
that
Ministers
should
be
Men
of
good
Quality
and
Blameless
:
Emitur
sola
virtute
potestas
.
Claud.
Thirdly
,
Consideration
is
to
be
had
of
their
Capacity
and
Fitness
,
for
that
Function
wherein
they
are
to
be
used
;
for
as
some
Men
are
apt
for
Learning
,
so
others
are
naturally
disposed
to
Arms.
Also
it
is
necessary
that
every
one
Square
with
the
Office
whereunto
he
is
appointed
,
in
which
matter
some
Princes
have
used
great
Caution
;
for
as
they
little
liked
of
Men
Excellent
,
so
they
utterly
detested
the
Vitious
;
the
one
they
doubted
to
trust
in
regard
of
themselves
,
the
other
were
thought
a
publick
Indignity
to
the
State.
Wise
Men
have
therefore
resolved
,
that
those
Wits
which
are
neither
over-haughty
and
singular
,
nor
they
which
be
base
or
dull
,
are
fittest
for
Princes
Secrets
and
Services
;
howsoever
we
may
hereof
say
with
Tacitus
:
Nescio
quomodo
Aulica
haec
comitia
affectus
dirigit
,
&
fato
quodam
ac
sorte
nascendi
,
ut
caetera
,
ita
principum
inclinatio
in
hos
,
offensio
in
illos
est
.
Tac.
And
because
the
Course
and
Quality
of
Mens
Lives
serving
in
Court
,
is
of
all
other
the
most
uncertain
and
dangerous
,
great
Heed
and
Circumspection
ought
therein
to
be
used
;
for
whoso
serveth
negligently
,
forgetting
the
dutiful
Endeavors
appertaining
to
the
place
,
seemeth
to
take
a
way
of
no
good
speed
:
Quanto
quis
obsequio
promptior
,
tanto
honoribus
&
opibus
extollitur
.
Tac.
It
shall
also
become
such
a
Man
to
look
well
unto
his
own
Profit
,
and
behave
himself
rather
Boldly
than
Bashfully
:
Malus
minister
Regii
imperii
pudor
.
Sen.
To
be
Modest
,
and
closely
to
handle
all
Actions
,
is
also
a
course
well
beseeming
a
Courtier
;
neither
shall
he
do
well
to
attribute
any
good
Success
to
his
own
Vertue
or
Merit
,
but
acknowledge
all
to
proceed
from
the
Prince's
Bounty
and
Goodness
,
by
which
means
Envy
is
eschewed
,
and
the
Prince
not
robbed
of
his
Honor
:
Haec
est
conditio
Regum
,
casus
tantum
adversos
hominibus
tribuant
,
secundos
virtuti
suae
.
Prov.
Emped
.
And
to
conclude
these
Precepts
Summarily
,
I
say
it
behoveth
all
Ministers
and
Servants
in
Court
to
be
Patient
,
Wary
and
of
sew
words
:
Fraudum
sedes
Aula
.
Sen.
CHAP.
XV.
The
Art
of
Ruling
,
or
Mystery
of
Regiment
.
TO
Govern
,
is
a
certain
Skill
how
to
command
and
continue
Subjects
in
due
Obedience
,
so
as
offend
they
ought
not
,
or
if
they
will
they
cannot
;
wherein
two
special
things
are
to
be
considered
(
viz.
)
the
Nature
of
Men
,
and
the
Nature
of
the
State
;
but
first
the
Condition
of
the
Vulgar
must
be
well
conceived
:
Noscenda
natura
vulgi
,
&
quibus
modis
temperanter
habeatur
.
Tac.
The
Disposition
of
Men
is
divers
;
some
are
apt
to
Anger
,
some
are
Hardy
,
some
Fearful
;
it
therefore
behoveth
the
Prince
to
accommodate
his
Government
to
the
Humor
of
People
whom
he
governeth
:
Principis
est
virtus
maxima
nosse
suos
.
Mart.
Likewise
the
Nature
of
Commonweals
is
mutable
and
subject
to
change
,
and
Kings
are
not
only
accompanied
with
Fortune
,
but
also
followed
with
Hate
,
which
breedeth
a
continual
Diffidence
,
chiefly
towards
those
that
are
nearest
to
Majesty
:
Suspectus
semper
invisusque
dominantibus
quisquis
proximus
destinatur
.
Tac.
Moreover
the
Vulgar
sort
is
generally
variable
,
Rash
,
Hardy
,
and
void
of
Judgment
;
Ex
opinione
multa
,
ex
veritate
pauca
judicat
.
Cic.
To
confirm
a
Government
,
Force
and
Arms
are
of
greatest
necessity
;
by
force
I
mean
the
Guards
and
Arms
which
Princes
use
for
their
Defence
or
Ornament
;
Miles
in
foro
,
Miles
in
curia
principem
comitari
debet
.
Tac.
To
this
may
be
added
Fortisication
and
strong
Buildings
,
in
these
days
much
used
by
new
Princes
,
and
others
also
to
whom
People
yield
,
not
willing
Obedience
.
In
ancient
times
Princes
planted
Colonies
as
well
to
suppress
Rebellion
in
Conquered
Countries
,
as
to
front
suspected
Neighbours
:
Coloniae
vera
sedes
servitutis
.
Tac.
The
Government
of
Princes
is
also
greatly
increased
by
a
Virtue
,
which
I
call
a
commendable
Affection
in
Subjects
,
proceeding
of
Love
and
Authority
:
These
effects
do
grow
from
the
Princes
own
Merit
,
but
their
being
liveth
in
the
mind
of
the
People
;
this
Love
is
gained
by
Lenity
,
Liberality
,
and
Mercy
;
yet
is
every
of
them
to
be
tempered
:
Nec
aut
reverentiam
terrore
,
aut
amorem
humilitate
captibis
.
Plin.
Affection
is
also
no
way
sooner
won
then
by
Liberality
,
the
same
being
used
with
Judgment
and
Moderation
.
Bellorum
sociis
,
periculorum
consortibus
,
sivi
de
te
bene
ac
fortiter
—
—
meritis
.
Sen.
By
Indulgence
likewise
,
and
Pricely
Affability
,
the
love
of
Men
is
gain'd
;
for
the
Multitude
desire
no
more
than
necessary
Food
and
Liberty
,
to
use
ordinary
Recreations
:
Vulgo
,
sicut
pueris
,
omne
ludicrum
in
pretio
est
.
Sen.
CHAP.
XVI
.
Of
Princely
Authority
;
Wherein
it
consists
,
and
how
far
to
be
extended
and
delegated
.
AUthority
is
a
certain
reverent
Impression
in
the
Minds
of
Subjects
and
others
touching
the
Princes
Virtue
and
Government
;
it
resteth
chiefly
in
Admiration
and
Fear
:
Ingenita
quibusdam
gentibus
erga
reges
suos
veneratio
.
Curt.
Authority
consisteth
in
three
things
:
(
viz.
)
the
Form
of
Government
,
the
Strength
of
the
Kingdom
,
and
the
Condition
of
the
Prince
;
for
in
them
all
Reputation
and
Security
resteth
:
Majest
as
Imperii
,
salutis
tutela
.
Curt.
Whoso
desireth
to
govern
well
,
it
behoveth
him
to
use
Severity
,
Constancy
and
Restraint
;
for
over
much
Lenity
introduceth
Contempt
,
and
certain
hope
of
Impunity
;
the
Condition
of
Men
being
such
as
cannot
be
restrained
by
Shame
,
yet
it
is
to
be
commanded
by
Fear
:
Salutaris
〈◊〉
as
vinicit
inanem
speciem
〈◊〉
Cic.
Yet
ought
Severity
to
be
used
with
great
respect
and
sparingly
,
because
over
great
Terror
breedeth
Desparation
:
Paena
ad
paucos
,
metus
ad
omnes
〈◊〉
Cic.
To
govern
constantly
is
nothing
else
but
to
continue
the
old
and
ancient
Laws
in
force
without
Change
or
Innovation
unless
exceeding
great
Commodity
or
urgent
Necessity
shall
so
require
:
for
where
extream
Punishments
are
used
,
Reformation
is
always
needful
:
Nocet
interdum
prisucs
rigor
&
nimia
severitas
.
Tac.
Also
to
restrain
Authority
is
a
matter
of
great
Necessity
and
worthy
a
Wise
Prince
;
else
he
maketh
others
partakers
of
the
Honor
and
Power
to
himself
only
due
,
the
same
being
also
dangerous
:
Periculosum
privati
hominis
nomen
supra
(
immo
&
juxta
)
principes
extolli
.
Tac.
It
seemeth
also
perilous
that
great
Authority
given
to
private
Men
should
belong
;
for
thereby
oft-tentimes
they
are
made
Insolent
and
apt
to
Innovation
:
Libertatis
sive
principatus
magna
custodia
est
,
si
magna
imperio
〈◊〉
esse
non
sinas
.
Liv.
Authority
is
also
reinforced
and
enlarged
by
Power
,
without
which
no
Prince
can
either
take
from
others
or
defend
his
own
:
Parum
tuta
sine
viribus
Majestas
.
Liv.
CHAP.
XVII
.
Of
Power
and
Force
;
and
how
to
be
raised
and
maintained
.
POwer
and
Strength
is
attained
by
these
five
ways
,
Money
,
Arms
,
Counsel
,
Friends
and
Fortune
:
but
of
these
the
first
and
most
sorcible
is
Money
:
Nihil
tam
〈◊〉
quod
non
expugnari
pecunia
possit
.
Cic.
Next
to
Money
Arms
are
of
most
use
as
well
to
defend
as
to
offend
;
to
keep
,
and
to
conquer
;
for
oft-tentimes
occasion
is
to
be
offered
as
well
to
take
from
others
,
as
to
hold
what
is
our
own
:
Sua
retinere
private
est
domus
,
de
〈◊〉
certare
Regia
laus
est
.
Tac.
Also
of
great
and
necessary
use
is
Counsel
,
to
devise
how
Arms
ought
to
be
employed
or
enforced
:
Arma
concilio
temperanda
.
Tac.
Likewise
Friends
and
Consederates
do
greatly
increase
the
Virtue
of
Power
,
the
same
being
such
as
have
both
wit
and
ability
to
aid
:
In
caducum
parietem
ne
inclina
.
Adri.
The
last
,
yet
not
the
least
part
of
Power
consisteth
in
Fortune
;
whereof
daily
Experience
may
be
seen
;
for
the
Success
of
all
humane
Actions
seem
rather
to
proceed
from
Fortune
than
Virtue
:
Omni
ratione
potentior
fortuna
.
Curt.
To
these
Particularities
concerning
Power
,
we
may
add
the
Qualities
of
the
Prince
,
which
greatly
Grace
his
Authority
;
these
are
partly
internal
,
and
partly
extenal
:
by
the
one
I
mean
the
Virtues
of
the
Mind
,
by
the
other
a
certain
seemly
Behavior
and
comely
gesture
of
the
Body
;
of
the
first
kind
I
do
suppose
Piety
and
Providence
to
be
the
chief
,
for
Piety
maketh
a
Prince
Venerable
,
and
like
unto
God
:
Oportet
principem
res
divinas
videri
curare
serio
&
ante
omnia
.
Arist.
Providence
is
a
Forecast
and
likely
conjectures
of
things
to
come
,
supposed
to
be
in
those
Princes
that
in
their
Actions
proceed
slowly
and
circumspectly
,
it
seemeth
also
a
course
of
Princely
Discretion
to
be
retired
aud
not
ordinarily
to
converse
with
many
:
Autoritatem
absentia
tueare
.
Suet.
CHAP.
XVIII
.
Of
Conspiracy
and
Treason
,
with
the
Causes
and
ways
of
Prevention
or
Discovery
.
COnspiracy
is
commonly
addressed
to
the
Princes
Person
;
Treasons
are
addressed
against
his
Government
,
Authority
,
Country
,
Subjects
,
or
Places
of
Srength
.
These
Mischiefs
are
easily
feared
,
but
hardly
eschewed
;
for
albeit
open
Enemies
are
openly
encountred
,
yet
Fraud
and
Subtilty
are
secret
Foes
,
and
consequently
not
to
be
avoided
:
Occulta
pericula
neque
praevidere
neque
vitare
in
promptu
est
.
Salust
.
The
danger
of
Conspiracy
proceedeth
of
divers
Causes
,
as
Avarice
,
Infidelity
of
Subjects
,
Ambition
in
Servants
,
and
Corruption
in
Soldiers
,
therefore
with
great
difficulty
to
be
avoided
:
Vitae
tuae
dominus
est
,
quisquis
suam
contempsit
.
Sen.
Notwithstanding
it
seemeth
that
either
by
Inquisition
,
Punishment
,
Innocency
,
or
Destiny
,
the
evil
Affection
of
Men
may
be
oft-tentimes
discovered
:
1.
For
whoso
will
curiously
inquire
and
consider
the
Actions
and
ordinary
Speechees
of
Men
(
I
mean
those
that
be
Persons
of
Honor
and
Reputation
)
may
oft-tentimes
vent
the
Myne
that
lurketh
in
the
Minds
:
Quoniam
rarò
nisi
male
loqunti
mali
faciunt
.
Lips.
2.
Punishment
is
likewise
a
thing
so
terrible
that
the
Consideration
thereof
with
the
hope
of
Reward
doth
often
discover
those
dangerous
Intentions
:
Cruciatu
aut
praemio
cuncta
pervia
sunt
.
Tac.
But
as
it
is
Wisdom
in
Princes
to
give
ear
to
Informers
,
so
are
they
not
always
to
be
believed
;
for
Hope
,
Envy
,
Hate
,
or
some
other
Passion
oft-tentimes
draws
them
to
speak
untruly
:
Quis
innocens
esse
potest
si
accusare
sufficit
?
Tac.
3.
The
third
and
likeliest
Desence
against
Conspiracy
is
the
Princes
own
Innocency
;
sor
never
having
injured
any
Man
,
it
cannot
be
thought
there
liveth
any
Subject
so
lewd
as
will
endeauor
to
hurt
him
:
Fidelissima
custodia
principis
ipsius
innocentia
.
Plin.
4.
The
last
and
best
Bulward
to
withstand
the
force
of
this
Mischief
we
call
Destiny
;
which
proceeding
from
the
Fountain
of
Divine
Providence
,
may
be
truly
called
the
Will
of
God
;
in
whose
only
Power
it
resteth
to
protect
and
defend
good
Princes
:
Ille
erit
a
latere
tuo
,
&
custodiet
pedem
tuum
ne
capiaris
.
Salo.
Treasons
are
most
commonly
enterprized
by
covetous
Persons
,
who
preferring
private
Prosit
before
Fame
or
Fidelity
,
do
not
fear
to
enter
into
any
impious
Action
:
To
this
humor
ambitious
Men
dissentious
,
and
all
such
as
be
desirous
of
Innovation
,
are
inclined
:
Pulcra
loquentes
iidem
in
pectore
prava
struentes
.
Hom.
To
these
Offenders
no
Punishment
is
equal
to
their
impious
Merit
,
can
be
devised
,
being
Persons
odious
as
well
to
Friends
as
Foes
:
Proditores
etiam
in
quos
anteponunt
,
invisi
sunt
.
Tac.
CHAP.
XIX
.
Of
Publick
Hate
and
Contempt
,
with
the
Occasions
and
Means
to
redress
and
avoid
it
.
HAving
briefly
touched
the
Virtues
and
Means
whereby
Princes
are
maintained
in
Authority
and
Honor
,
let
something
be
said
of
the
Causes
from
whence
their
Ruine
doth
proceed
;
the
chief
whereof
seemeth
to
be
Hate
and
Contempt
:
Hate
cometh
of
Fear
,
which
the
more
Common
it
is
,
the
more
Dangerous
:
Nulla
vis
imperii
tanta
est
,
quae
premente
metu
possit
esse
diuturna
.
Cic.
The
causes
of
Fear
are
Punishments
,
Impositions
and
Rigor
;
and
therefore
it
behoveth
a
Prince
not
only
to
shun
them
,
but
to
eschew
those
Actions
whereby
he
may
reasonable
incur
their
Suspision
:
Sentias
enim
homines
ut
metuant
aut
oderint
,
non
minus
opinione
&
fama
,
quam
certa
aliqua
ratione
moveri
.
Cic.
Yet
Punishment
,
Imposition
and
Censure
are
in
all
States
necessary
,
although
they
shew
and
seem
terrible
,
and
consequently
breed
a
certain
Desperation
in
Subjects
,
unless
they
be
discreetly
and
modesty
used
;
for
extream
and
frequent
Punishments
taste
of
Cruelty
;
great
and
many
Imposts
favor
of
Covetousness
;
Censure
of
Manners
when
it
exceedeth
the
quality
of
Offences
,
doth
seem
Rigour
in
these
matters
;
therefore
it
behoveth
the
Prince
to
be
moderate
and
〈◊〉
chiefly
in
Capital
Punishment
,
which
must
be
confined
within
the
Bounds
of
Justice
:
Sit
apud
〈◊〉
parsimonia
etiam
viliffimi
sanguinis
.
Sen.
But
if
for
Security
sake
the
Prince
be
forced
to
〈◊〉
let
the
same
be
done
with
shew
of
great
Sorrow
and
Lothness
:
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
&
〈◊〉
nocum
tormento
ad
castigandum
veniat
.
Sen.
Let
all
Punishments
also
be
slowly
executed
;
for
they
that
are
hastily
punished
do
seem
to
have
been
willingly
condemned
;
neither
ought
any
Capital
Punishment
to
be
inflicted
but
only
that
which
is
profitable
to
the
Commonweale
,
and
for
Example
sake
:
Non
tam
ut
ipsi
pareant
,
quam
ut
alios
pereundo
deterreant
.
Sen.
In
punishing
also
a
specil
respect
must
be
had
,
that
no
shew
of
content
or
pleasure
be
taken
therein
:
Forma
rabiei
est
sanguine
&
vulneribus
gaudere
.
Sen.
Also
in
Punishing
,
equality
must
be
observed
,
and
the
nature
of
the
Punishment
according
to
the
Custom
:
Nec
eisdem
de
causis
alii
plectantur
,
alii
ne
appellentur
quidem
.
Cic.
But
in
punishing
publick
Offences
wherein
a
Multitude
have
part
,
the
Execution
ought
to
be
otherwise
,
and
as
it
were
at
an
instant
,
which
may
haply
seem
terrible
,
but
in
effect
is
not
:
Frequens
vindicta
paucorum
odium
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
at
.
Sen.
Another
means
to
satisfie
a
People
offended
is
to
punish
the
Ministers
of
Cruelty
,
and
with
their
Blood
to
wash
away
the
common
hatred
.
Piaculares
publici
odii
victimae
.
Plin.
By
this
King
David
did
appease
the
Gibeonites
.
The
next
cause
of
Discontent
cometh
of
Impositions
,
under
which
word
is
comprehended
all
Levies
of
Money
,
a
matter
nothing
pleasing
to
People
,
as
that
which
they
esteem
equal
to
their
own
Lives
:
Pecunia
anima
&
sanguis
est
mortalibus
.
Plaut
.
First
,
to
remove
Hate
conceived
of
this
cause
,
there
is
nothing
better
then
publick
Expostulation
of
Necessity
:
for
what
Commonwealth
or
Kingdom
can
be
without
Tributes
?
Nulla
quies
gentium
sine
armis
,
nec
arma
sine
stipendiis
,
nec
stipendia
sine
Tributis
haberi
queunt
.
Tac.
The
second
Remedy
against
Hate
for
Impositions
is
to
make
moderate
Levies
and
rare
.
For
as
Tiberius
the
Emperor
was
wont
to
say
,
a
Sheep
should
be
sleeced
not
slead
:
Qui
nimis
emungit
,
elicit
〈◊〉
.
Tac.
Thirdly
,
also
to
eschew
the
Offence
of
People
,
it
behoveth
the
Prince
to
have
a
vigilant
Eye
on
Informers
,
Promoters
,
and
such
fiscal
Ministers
,
whose
Cruelty
and
covetous
Proceedings
do
oft-tentimes
occasion
great
Hate
;
but
this
mischief
may
be
,
though
hardly
,
encountred
,
either
by
choosing
honest
Officers
,
or
(
proving
otherwise
)
not
only
to
remain
them
but
to
use
them
as
Spunges
:
Exprimendi
post
quam
biberint
.
Suet.
In
all
Impositions
or
Taxations
,
no
Cruelty
or
Force
ought
to
be
used
,
the
second
cause
to
kindle
Hate
:
and
to
meet
with
that
mischief
,
nothing
is
better
than
to
proceed
moderately
,
and
without
Extremity
:
Ne
Boves
ipsos
,
mox
agros
,
postremo
corpora
servitio
aut
poenae
tradant
.
Tac.
The
fourth
Remedy
is
the
Princes
own
Parsimony
,
not
giving
so
largely
to
private
Persons
as
thereby
to
be
forced
to
take
from
the
Multitude
:
Magnae
opes
non
tam
multa
capiendo
,
quam
haud
multa
perdendo
,
quaeruntur
.
Maecaenas
.
The
last
help
against
Hate
is
in
Taxation
to
proceed
equally
,
indifferently
,
and
without
Favor
or
Respect
;
and
that
the
Assessors
of
Taxes
may
be
elected
of
the
meaner
sort
of
People
:
Populis
maximam
fidem
rerum
suarum
habet
.
Tac.
Touching
Censure
,
which
we
numbred
amongst
the
causes
whereof
Hate
is
conceived
,
much
needeth
not
to
be
spoken
,
because
the
same
is
discontinued
,
or
rather
utterly
forgotten
;
yet
doth
it
seem
a
thing
necessary
,
being
a
certain
Observation
and
Controlement
of
such
evil
Manners
and
Disorders
,
as
were
not
by
Law
corrigible
;
these
Officers
were
of
the
Romans
called
Magistri
pudoris
&
modestiae
.
Livi.
To
the
Function
of
Censures
these
two
things
are
anciently
subject
Manners
,
and
Excess
;
under
Manners
I
comprehend
Wantonness
,
Drunkenness
,
Dicing
,
Brawling
,
Perjury
,
and
all
such
Lawdness
as
Modesty
condemneth
.
These
Disorders
were
anciently
punished
by
the
discretion
of
Censors
in
all
Ages
and
Sexes
,
to
the
end
that
Idleness
might
be
generally
avoided
.
Universa
plebs
habeat
negotia
sua
,
quibus
a
malo
publico
detineatur
.
Salust
.
Excess
includeth
Riotousness
,
expence
of
Money
,
Prodigal
House-keeping
,
Banquetting
and
Superfluity
in
Apparel
,
which
things
are
the
Mothers
of
many
Mischiefs
.
It
also
seemeth
in
some
sort
perilous
to
the
Prince
that
the
Subject
should
exceed
either
in
Covetize
or
Consuming
:
Nemo
nimis
excedat
,
sive
amicorum
copia
,
sine
opum
.
Arist.
The
Punishment
inflicted
upon
these
sorts
of
Offenders
,
were
either
〈◊〉
or
Pecuniary
Punishments
:
Censoris
judicium
damnato
nihil
affert
nisi
ruborem
.
Tac.
The
first
and
chiefest
means
to
remove
these
Inconveniences
,
is
the
Princes
own
Example
,
whose
Life
being
well
censured
,
easily
reduceth
others
to
order
.
Vit
〈◊〉
principis
censura
perpetua
.
Plin.
Secondly
,
Those
Disorders
may
be
taken
away
without
danger
,
if
the
Censures
do
proceed
by
degrees
and
leasurely
;
for
the
Nature
of
Man
may
not
suddenly
be
altered
.
Vitia
quaedam
tollit
facilius
princeps
,
si
eorum
sit
patiens
.
Sen.
These
are
the
chiefest
Rules
whereby
to
esehew
Hate
;
but
impossible
it
is
for
any
Prince
or
Minister
utterly
to
avoid
it
;
for
being
himself
good
,
he
incurreth
the
Offence
of
all
bad
Folk
,
if
he
be
Evil
,
Good
Men
will
hate
him
;
this
Danger
therefore
Wise
and
Vertuous
Princes
have
little
regarded
;
because
Hate
may
be
gained
as
well
by
good
as
evil
Doing
:
Odia
qui
nimium
timet
,
regnare
nescit
.
Sen.
One
other
means
to
remove
this
Error
,
is
,
to
reward
the
good
and
well
deserving
Subjects
;
for
no
Man
can
think
him
Cruel
,
that
for
love
to
Vertue
useth
Austerity
;
which
will
appear
,
when
he
bestoweth
Bountifully
on
the
Good
:
Praemio
&
poena
Respublica
continetur
.
Solon
.
The
other
Vice
which
indangereth
the
State
of
Princes
,
we
call
Contempt
,
being
a
certain
base
and
vile
Conceit
,
which
entereth
into
the
Subjects
,
Strangers
or
Servants
,
of
the
Prince
and
his
Proccedings
;
for
the
Authority
of
a
King
may
be
resembled
to
the
Powers
of
Mans
Mind
,
whereunto
the
Pland
,
the
Feet
,
the
Eyes
,
do
by
〈◊〉
obey
:
Vires
imperii
in
consensu
obedientium
sunt
.
Livi.
The
Causes
of
Contempt
do
proceed
chiefly
from
the
Form
of
Government
,
Fortune
,
or
the
Prince's
Manners
;
the
Form
of
Government
becometh
Contemptible
,
when
the
Prince
,
desiring
to
be
thought
Merciful
,
ruleth
rather
Pitifully
than
Justly
;
which
manner
of
Proceeding
taketh
away
all
Reverence
in
the
People
,
and
in
lieu
thereof
,
entereth
Liberty
,
or
at
least
a
certain
Boldness
to
offend
:
Facultas
faciendi
quod
euilibet
visum
,
non
potest
comprimere
ingenitam
singulis
hominibus
pravitatem
.
Tac.
Also
to
be
Mutable
,
Irresolute
,
Light
and
Inconsiderate
in
bestowing
the
Honors
and
Offices
of
State
,
maketh
the
Prince
Contemptible
:
Qui
praesentibus
fruitur
,
nec
in
longius
consultat
.
Arist.
But
if
Contempt
be
caused
by
Fortune
,
or
as
may
be
said
more
reasonably
,
by
Destiny
,
and
that
those
Friends
do
fail
,
who
ought
in
Duty
to
defend
the
Prince
and
his
Authority
,
then
is
there
small
hope
to
esehew
Contempt
:
Fato
obnoxia
virius
.
Plaut
.
The
Prince's
Manners
do
breed
Contempt
,
when
he
yieldeth
his
Affections
to
Sensuality
and
Sloth
,
or
if
he
incur
the
Suspition
of
Simplicity
,
Cowardise
,
or
any
such
Vice
,
unworthy
the
Dignity
he
beareth
:
Common
People
do
sometimes
also
disesteem
the
Prince
for
external
and
light
causes
,
as
Deformity
of
Person
,
Sickness
or
such
like
:
Mos
vulgi
est
,
fortuita
&
externa
ad
culpam
trahere
.
Tac.
CHAP.
XX.
Of
Dissidence
and
Dissimulation
in
the
Management
of
State
Assairs
.
ALbeit
roundness
and
plain
dealing
be
most
worthy
Praise
,
chiesly
in
private
Persons
;
yet
because
all
Men
in
their
Actions
do
not
so
proceed
,
it
behoveth
Wise
Men
and
Princes
,
above
others
,
at
occasions
to
Semble
and
Dissemble
;
for
as
in
all
Actions
a
Prince
ought
to
be
Slow
and
Advised
;
so
in
Consent
and
Believing
,
Haste
and
Facility
is
most
dangerous
;
and
though
Credulity
be
rather
an
Error
than
a
Fault
,
yet
for
Princes
it
is
both
Unfit
and
Perilous
.
Wherefore
it
importeth
them
to
be
desended
with
this
Caution
,
Nihil
credendo
,
atque
omnia
cavendo
.
Cic.
Notwithstanding
he
must
not
shew
himself
Diffident
or
Distrustful
utterly
;
but
as
I
wish
he
should
not
over-slightly
believe
all
Men
,
so
ought
he
not
for
small
causes
distrust
every
Man
:
Multi
fallere
docuerunt
,
dum
timent
falli
.
Sen.
Dissimulation
is
as
it
were
begotten
by
Dissidence
,
a
Quality
in
Princes
of
so
great
Necessity
,
as
moved
the
Emperor
Tiberius
to
say
,
Nescit
regnare
,
qui
nescit
dissimulare
The
Necessity
of
Dissimulation
is
chiefly
to
be
used
with
Strangers
and
Enemies
;
it
also
sheweth
a
certain
Discretion
in
Magistrates
,
sometimes
to
disguise
with
Friends
when
no
Offence
doth
thereof
follow
:
Doli
non
sunt
doli
,
nisi
astu
colas
.
Plaut
.
This
kind
of
Craft
,
albeit
in
every
Mans
Conceit
not
praisable
,
is
nevertheless
tolerable
,
and
for
Princes
and
Maglstrates
(
the
same
being
used
to
good
ends
)
very
necessary
.
But
those
Cunnings
which
are
contrary
to
Vertue
,
ought
not
of
Honest
Men
to
be
used
;
neither
dare
I
commend
Adulation
and
Corruption
,
though
they
be
often
used
in
Court
,
and
are
of
some
Learned
Writers
allowed
:
Decipere
pro
moribus
temporum
,
prudentia
est
.
Plin.
By
great
Subtilty
and
Frauds
,
contrary
to
Vertue
and
Piety
,
I
mean
Perjury
and
Injustice
,
which
though
all
Men
in
Words
detest
,
yet
in
Deeds
are
used
of
many
,
perswading
themselves
,
by
Cavillations
and
Sophistications
,
to
excuse
the
Impiety
of
their
False
Oaths
;
as
it
is
written
of
Lysander
,
〈◊〉
talis
,
viros
jurament
is
circumvenire
〈◊〉
Plut.
CHAP.
XXI
.
Of
War
Defensive
and
Invasive
;
with
Instructions
touching
Laws
of
Arms
,
Soldiers
and
Military
Discipline
.
THE
Art
Military
is
of
all
other
Qualities
most
necessary
for
Princes
,
for
without
it
they
cannot
be
defended
;
force
of
Men
only
sufficeth
not
,
unless
the
same
be
governed
by
Council
,
and
Martial
Wisdom
:
Duo
sunt
quibus
resp
.
servatur
;
in
hostes
sortitudo
,
&
domi
〈◊〉
.
Tac.
Military
knowledge
concerneth
War
,
and
every
War
is
either
Forreign
or
Domestical
.
Touching
Forreign
,
it
must
be
considered
when
it
must
be
begun
,
how
to
continue
it
,
and
when
to
be
ended
;
to
begin
War
,
a
Prince
is
to
take
heed
that
the
Cause
be
Just
,
and
the
Enterprise
advisedly
entred
into
:
Sunt
enim
&
belli
〈◊〉
pacis
jura
,
justeque
ea
non
〈◊〉
ac
〈◊〉
gerere
debes
.
Livi.
The
Laws
of
Arms
are
in
all
Common-weales
to
be
duly
observed
;
for
to
enter
fight
rashly
and
without
respect
to
Reason
,
were
Beastly
;
also
to
Kill
or
Slay
would
work
no
better
Effect
,
than
that
all
Nations
should
without
Mercy
Murder
one
another
:
Barbaro
ritu
coedem
coede
,
&
sanguinem
sanguine
expiare
.
Sal.
No
War
therefore
is
to
be
made
,
but
such
as
is
Just
;
and
in
every
Just
War
these
three
things
are
to
be
looked
into
(
viz.
)
That
the
Author
be
of
Authority
,
That
the
Cause
be
Good
,
and
the
End
Just
;
for
in
all
States
,
the
Prince
,
or
they
in
whom
the
Sovereignty
resteth
,
are
the
Just
Authors
of
War
;
others
have
no
such
Authority
:
Si
quis
privatim
sine
publico
scito
,
pacem
bejumve
fecerit
,
capitale
esto
.
Plato
.
Wars
are
of
two
sortt
;
Defensive
and
Offensive
;
the
one
to
Resist
,
the
other
to
Invade
;
against
Desence
nothing
can
be
said
,
because
it
is
Natural
and
Necessary
.
Est
non
modo
justum
sed
〈◊〉
necessariam
cum
vi
vis
illat
a
desenditur
.
Cic.
Defensive
War
is
of
two
sorts
,
either
to
defend
thine
own
,
or
thy
Friends
;
for
it
is
reason
that
every
one
should
keep
securely
that
which
to
him
appertaineth
;
and
therewith
also
by
Arms
to
defend
the
Liberty
of
Country
,
Parents
and
Friends
:
Nullum
bellum
a
civitate
suscipitur
nisi
aut
pro
side
aut
pro
salute
.
Cic.
The
like
reason
leadeth
us
to
assist
and
protect
Friends
;
for
the
common
Obligation
of
Humanc
Society
doth
so
require
:
Qui
enim
non
obsistit
si
potest
,
injuriae
,
tam
est
in
vitio
,
quam
si
parentes
aut
patriam
,
aut
socios
deserat
.
Cic.
Invasion
is
also
just
and
allowable
,
but
not
ever
;
for
whoso
hath
been
robbed
,
or
spoiled
of
his
Lands
or
Goods
,
may
lawfully
seek
Repossession
by
Force
;
yet
so
as
before
any
Force
be
used
,
he
first
civilly
seek
Restitution
,
wherein
is
Justice
be
denied
,
then
is
the
use
of
Arms
necessary
:
Justum
bellum
quibus
necessarium
;
&
pia
arma
quibus
nulla
nisi
in
armis
relinquitur
spes
.
Liv.
Likewise
Invasion
is
lawsul
against
Barbarians
,
whose
Religion
and
Impiety
ought
to
be
abhorred
,
chiesly
if
they
be
Potent
and
apt
to
offend
;
for
the
cause
of
such
War
is
Compulsion
and
Suppression
of
Evil
:
Cui
licentia
iniquitatis
eripitur
,
utiliter
vincitur
.
August
.
Finally
,
To
conclude
this
matter
of
Invasion
,
I
say
,
That
no
Revenge
,
no
desire
of
Honor
or
Empire
,
are
any
lawful
Causes
of
War
;
but
the
intent
thereof
ought
to
be
directed
only
to
Defence
and
Security
:
For
Wise
Men
do
take
Arms
to
win
Peace
,
and
in
hope
of
Rest
they
endure
Travel
:
It
a
bellum
suscipiatur
ut
nihil
aliud
quam
pax
quaesita
videatur
.
Cic.
Having
said
somewhat
against
unjust
War
,
let
us
speak
of
Temerity
and
unadvised
War
,
an
Enterprise
worthy
discommendation
:
Omnes
bellum
sumunt
facile
,
oegerrime
desinunt
;
nec
in
ejusdem
potestate
initium
&
sinis
est
.
Sal.
A
wise
〈◊〉
rince
theresore
ought
neither
to
undertake
any
unlawful
Invasion
,
nor
without
sober
and
mature
Deliberation
enter
into
any
War
,
as
he
that
is
unwilling
to
oftend
,
yet
of
Courage
enough
to
desend
:
Nec
provoces
bellum
,
nec
timeas
.
Plin.
To
make
War
three
things
are
required
,
Money
,
Men
and
Arms
;
and
to
maintain
a
War
,
Provision
and
Council
,
are
needsul
:
Theresore
a
wise
Prince
,
before
he
begins
a
War
,
doth
carefully
consider
what
Forces
and
charge
thereunto
belongeth
:
Diu
apparandum
est
bellum
,
ut
vincas
melius
.
Pub.
Above
all
other
Provisions
,
care
must
be
had
,
that
Bread
be
not
wanting
;
for
without
it
neither
Victory
nor
Life
can
be
looked
for
:
Qui
frumentum
necessariumque
commeatum
non
praeparat
,
vincitur
sine
ferro
.
Vegetius
.
Lastly
,
It
behoveth
a
Prince
always
to
have
Arms
in
readiness
,
I
mean
,
Harness
,
Horses
,
Weapons
,
Artillery
,
Engines
,
Powder
,
and
every
other
thing
necessary
either
for
Service
on
Horse
or
Foot
:
We
may
add
hereunto
Ships
,
and
Shipping
of
all
sorts
,
with
every
Furniture
of
Offence
or
Defence
;
for
these
Preparations
make
a
Prince
sormidable
,
because
no
Man
dare
do
or
attempt
Injury
to
that
King
or
People
,
where
Preparation
is
ever
ready
to
revenge
:
Que
desider
at
pacem
,
praeparat
bellum
.
Cass.
By
Men
we
mean
a
Multitude
of
Subjects
armed
,
trained
to
desend
or
offend
:
These
are
of
two
sorts
,
Captains
and
Soldiers
;
and
Soldiers
are
either
Footmen
or
Horse-men
;
the
one
of
great
use
in
the
Champion
,
the
other
in
Mountainous
places
;
also
for
defence
or
assault
of
Towns
or
Grounds
fortisied
most
necessary
,
and
consequently
meet
for
Service
in
all
places
,
which
moved
Tacitus
to
say
,
Omne
in
pedite
robur
.
Tac.
For
sudden
Service
,
Horses
do
seem
most
meet
,
and
the
Execution
of
any
Enterprise
is
by
them
most
speedily
performed
:
Nevertheless
the
Actions
of
Foot-men
do
seem
most
certainly
executed
,
chiesly
if
they
be
well
armed
,
and
skilfully
lead
;
for
so
Experience
hath
of
late
time
proved
;
besides
,
that
they
are
of
less
Expence
and
of
greater
number
:
In
universum
aestimanti
plus
in
pedite
robur
.
Tac.
Having
thus
proved
,
that
both
Horse
and
Foot
be
necessary
,
let
us
remember
,
that
unless
they
be
serviceable
,
great
Numbers
are
to
small
purpose
:
Manibus
opus
est
bello
,
non
mult
is
nominibus
.
Livi.
To
make
Soldiers
serviceable
,
consisteth
in
good
Choice
and
good
Discipline
;
the
one
at
this
day
little
regarded
:
Emunt
militem
,
non
legunt
.
Livi.
Soldiers
ought
to
be
elected
out
of
the
most
honest
and
able
Number
of
Bodies
,
and
every
Company
composed
of
Men
known
one
to
the
other
;
for
thereby
they
are
made
the
more
Confident
:
But
hereof
is
small
heed
taken
,
for
commonly
they
are
Purgamenta
urbium
suarum
.
Curt.
Touching
Discipline
,
it
seemeth
that
thereof
the
external
Form
,
and
not
the
certain
Substance
,
is
observed
:
For
as
in
former
Ages
Soldiers
endeavored
to
be
Vertuous
and
Modest
,
so
now
they
rather
study
to
excel
in
Riot
than
in
Martial
Knowledge
:
Exercitus
lingua
quam
manu
promptior
,
praedator
est
sociis
,
&
ipsa
praeda
hostiam
.
Sal.
For
as
much
as
Soldiers
are
made
good
by
Election
and
Choice
,
it
seemeth
that
the
Foundation
and
Ground
of
Service
consisteth
in
the
Discretion
and
Judgment
of
those
that
have
Authority
to
make
Election
;
yet
will
we
add
,
that
they
must
be
chosen
of
Natural
Subjects
,
for
Strangers
are
Covetous
,
and
consequently
Corruptible
;
they
are
also
Mutinous
and
Cowardly
:
Their
Custom
likewise
is
to
Rob
,
Burn
and
Spoil
both
Friends
and
Foes
,
and
to
consume
the
Princes
Treasure
:
Ossa
vides
regum
vacuis
exsuct
a
medullis
.
Juven
.
But
the
Native
Soldier
is
Faithful
and
Obedient
,
Resolute
in
Fight
,
Loving
to
his
Country
,
and
Loyal
to
his
Prince
:
Gentes
quae
sub
regibus
sunt
,
pro
Deo
colunt
.
Curt.
Native
Soldiers
are
of
two
sorts
,
(
viz.
)
They
that
be
in
continual
Pay
,
and
they
that
are
trained
ready
to
serve
,
but
do
not
withstanding
attend
their
own
private
Affairs
,
until
they
be
called
:
The
first
are
for
all
Princes
necessary
:
In
pace
decus
,
in
bello
praesidium
.
Tac.
Of
this
sort
no
great
number
ought
to
be
,
as
well
to
eschew
Disordor
,
as
also
to
save
Expences
.
The
second
kind
of
Foot
Soldiers
are
to
be
levied
in
Villages
,
as
People
more
patient
of
Pains
,
and
fit
for
the
Wars
;
yet
so
judiciously
disposed
as
the
Citizens
:
Odio
praesentium
&
non
cupidine
mut
ationis
.
Tac.
Touching
the
number
of
these
extraordinary
Soldiers
,
that
must
be
referred
to
Discretion
:
Bellum
parare
,
simul
&
aerario
parcere
.
To
conclude
,
I
say
these
numbers
of
ordinary
and
extraordinary
Foot
ought
to
be
according
to
the
number
of
the
People
,
not
inserting
any
Gentlemen
;
for
Service
on
Horse-back
is
to
them
only
proper
:
Alas
rusticis
non
tribuo
;
in
nobilitatem
&
in
divites
haec
a
pauperibus
oner
a
inclines
.
Livi.
The
most
certain
Notes
whereby
to
conceive
the
Disposition
of
Men
fit
to
become
Soldiers
,
are
these
Five
,
The
Country
where
they
are
Born
,
their
Age
,
Proportion
of
Body
,
their
Quality
of
Mind
,
and
their
Faculty
.
Touching
,
First
,
Their
Country
,
it
is
a
thing
apparently
proved
,
that
Mountainous
Regions
,
or
Barren
places
,
and
Northern
Habitations
,
do
breed
Wits
well
disposed
to
the
War
:
Locorum
asperitas
hominum
quoque
ingenia
durat
.
Curt.
Secondly
,
The
Age
most
apt
for
the
War
,
was
anciently
observed
to
be
about
eighteen
Years
,
and
so
the
Romans
used
:
Facilius
est
ad
virtutem
inslraere
novos
milites
,
quaem
revocare
praeteritos
.
Veget.
Thirdly
,
The
Stature
of
a
Soldier
ought
to
be
observed
:
Marius
liked
best
the
longest
Bodies
;
Pyrrhus
preferred
large
and
well
proportioned
Men
;
but
Vegetius
in
his
Choice
,
rather
esteems
Strength
than
Stature
:
〈◊〉
est
fortes
milites
esse
quam
grandes
.
Veget.
Fourthly
,
The
Mind
or
Spirit
of
a
Soldier
ought
to
be
considered
,
for
that
Mind
which
is
quick
,
nimble
,
bold
and
confident
,
seemeth
apt
for
War
:
He
is
also
of
good
Hope
,
that
loveth
Honor
more
than
Ease
or
Profit
:
In
brief
,
Is
qui
nihil
metuit
nisi
turpem
famam
.
Sal.
Lastly
,
It
is
to
be
marked
in
what
Art
or
Faculty
a
Man
hath
been
bred
;
for
it
may
be
presumed
that
Fishers
,
Fowlers
,
Cooks
,
and
orthers
trained
up
in
Esseminate
Arts
,
are
unfit
for
Martial
Endeavor
:
And
as
these
Men
were
,
in
respect
of
their
Trade
,
thought
unmeet
,
so
in
old
time
,
Slaves
and
Masterless-Men
were
repulsed
from
Arms
,
as
Persons
Infamous
:
Sed
nunc
tales
sociantur
armis
quales
Domini
habere
fastidiunt
.
Veget.
How
Soldiers
ought
to
be
chosen
,
these
few
words
we
have
spoken
,
may
suffice
.
Let
us
therefore
say
somewhat
of
Discipline
.
Choice
findeth
out
Soldiers
,
but
Discipline
doth
make
and
continue
them
fit
for
Service
:
Paucos
viros
fortes
natura
procrear
,
bona
institutione
plures
reddat
industria
.
Veget.
Discipline
is
a
certain
severe
Confirmation
of
Soldiers
in
Order
consisteth
in
dividing
,
disposing
,
and
placing
of
Men
aptly
on
all
Occasions
to
be
commanded
,
as
the
Leaders
shall
direct
:
This
matter
requireth
a
large
Discourse
,
and
therefore
I
refer
it
to
skilful
Captains
and
Writers
,
as
Polybius
,
Vegetius
,
Dela
Nonne
,
and
others
.
Compulsion
and
Correction
,
is
that
which
bridleth
and
governeth
the
Manners
of
Soldiers
;
for
no
Order
can
be
observed
amongst
them
,
unless
they
be
Continent
,
Modest
and
Abstinent
;
for
Continency
is
chiesly
to
be
shewed
in
their
Diet
,
and
moderate
Desires
:
Degenerat
a
robore
ac
virtute
miles
assuetudine
voluptatum
.
Tac.
The
Modesty
of
a
Soldier
is
perceived
by
his
Words
,
Apparel
and
Actions
:
For
to
be
a
Vaunter
,
or
Vam-glorious
Boaster
,
is
far
unfit
in
him
that
professeth
Honor
or
Arms
,
seeing
true
Vertue
is
silent
:
Viri
militiae
nati
,
factis
magni
,
ad
verborum
linguaeque
certamina
,
rudes
.
Tac.
The
Apparel
of
a
Soldier
sheweth
Modesty
,
if
therein
he
do
not
exceed
;
for
albeit
it
fitteth
well
the
Profession
of
Arms
,
to
be
well
armed
and
decently
apparelled
;
yet
all
Superfluity
savoreth
of
Ignorance
or
Vanity
:
Horridum
militem
esse
decet
,
non
coelatum
auro
argentoque
sed
ferro
.
Livi.
Abstincnce
is
also
fit
for
all
Soldiers
;
for
thereby
guided
,
they
refrain
from
Violence
and
Insolency
;
by
that
Rule
also
they
are
informed
to
govern
themselves
civilly
in
the
Country
where
they
ferve
,
and
likewise
in
their
Lodgings
:
Never
taking
any
thing
from
the
Owner
,
nor
committing
any
Outrage
:
Vivaut
cum
provincialibus
jure
civili
,
nec
insolescat
animus
qui
se
sensit
armatum
.
The
last
mark
of
Discipline
we
called
〈◊〉
under
which
word
is
comprehended
Reward
and
Punishment
:
For
Men
are
rewarded
whensoever
they
receive
for
any
excellent
or
singular
Service
,
Honor
or
Riches
:
And
for
Evil
,
they
have
their
due
when
they
taste
the
Punishment
thereunto
belonging
:
Necessarium
est
acrius
ille
dimicet
,
quem
ad
opes
&
dignitates
ordo
militiae
&
imperatoris
judicium
consuevit
evehere
.
Veget.
Likewise
as
Gold
and
Glory
belongeth
to
good
and
well
deserving
Soldiers
;
so
Pumshment
is
due
to
those
that
be
Vitious
and
Cowardly
;
for
nothing
holdeth
Soldiers
in
Obedience
so
much
as
the
Severity
of
Discipline
:
Milites
imperatorum
potius
quam
hostem
metuere
debent
.
Veg.
CHAP.
XXII
.
Of
Generals
and
Commanders
,
and
their
requisite
Abilities
in
Martial
Enterprises
and
Expeditions
.
OF
Soldiers
let
this
little
suffice
,
we
will
now
speak
of
what
Quality
Chieftains
and
Leaders
ought
to
be
,
for
upon
them
dependeth
the
Welfare
of
whole
Armies
:
Militaris
turba
sine
duce
,
corpus
sine
spiritu
.
Curt.
A
Chief
or
General
in
War
,
is
either
of
his
own
Authority
Chief
,
or
a
General
that
commandeth
in
the
Name
of
another
.
Of
the
first
sort
are
Emperors
,
Kings
and
Princes
;
of
the
other
,
be
their
Deputies
,
Lieutenants
,
Colonels
,
and
indeed
all
general
Commanders
in
the
War
:
Now
whether
it
be
more
Expedient
that
the
Prince
should
command
in
Person
or
by
Deputy
,
divers
wise
Men
have
diversly
thought
,
therefore
it
may
be
thus
distinguished
;
if
the
War
do
then
only
concern
some
particular
Part
or
Province
,
then
may
the
same
be
performed
by
a
Lieutenant
;
but
if
the
whole
Fortune
of
a
Prince
do
thereupon
depend
,
then
is
he
to
command
in
his
own
Person
and
not
otherwise
:
Dubiis
bellorum
exemplis
summae
rerum
&
imperii
seipsum
reservat
.
Tac.
It
therefore
importeth
the
Prince
sometimes
by
his
own
Presence
,
sometimes
by
his
Deputation
to
perform
that
Office
;
but
however
occasion
shall
require
,
it
ever
behoveth
that
one
only
Commander
ought
to
be
,
(
for
Plurality
of
Chieftains
doth
rarely
or
never
work
any
good
Effect
)
yet
with
this
Caution
that
he
be
of
Experience
,
and
Wise
:
In
bellica
praesectura
major
〈◊〉
habendus
peritiae
quam
virtutis
aut
morum
.
Arist.
The
Qualities
required
in
a
Chieftain
are
these
,
Skill
,
Vertue
,
Providence
,
Authority
and
Fortune
:
By
Skill
we
mean
he
should
be
of
great
Knowledge
,
and
long
Experience
,
or
to
make
a
suffieient
Captain
;
the
Information
of
others
,
or
his
own
reading
is
not
enough
:
Qui
norit
quis
ordo
agminis
,
quae
cura
exploandi
,
quantus
urgendo
trahendove
bello
modus
.
Cic.
Military
Vertue
is
a
certain
Vigor
or
Force
both
of
Body
and
Mind
to
exercise
Soldiers
as
well
in
fained
War
as
to
sight
with
the
Enemy
;
and
summarily
a
Captain
ought
to
be
Laboriosus
in
negotio
,
fortis
in
periculo
,
industrius
in
agendo
,
celeris
in
conficiendo
.
Cic.
Next
to
Vertue
we
placed
Providence
as
necessary
in
great
Captains
;
for
being
of
such
Wisdom
,
they
will
not
hazard
nor
commit
more
to
Fortune
than
necessity
shall
inforce
;
yet
true
it
is
,
Fools
and
vulgar
Folks
,
that
commend
or
discommend
Actions
according
to
Success
,
were
wont
to
say
,
Cunctatio
servilis
,
statim
exequi
,
Regium
est
.
But
advised
and
provident
Captains
do
think
,
Temerit
as
praeterquam
quod
stulta
,
est
etiam
infelix
.
Livi.
Albeit
Providence
be
the
best
mean
of
good
Speed
,
yet
some
Captains
of
that
Quality
and
in
Skill
excelling
,
have
been
in
their
Actions
unlucky
,
when
others
of
less
Sufficiency
have
marvellously
prevailed
;
we
may
therefore
reasonably
say
with
Cic.
Quod
olim
Maximo
,
Marcello
,
Scipioni
,
Mario
&
ceteris
magnis
Imperatoribus
non
solum
propter
virtutem
,
sed
etiam
propter
fortunam
soepius
imperia
mandata
,
atque
exercitus
esse
commissos
.
Cic.
Lastly
,
We
wished
Authority
to
be
in
Chieftains
,
for
it
greatly
importeth
what
Opinion
or
Conceit
the
Enemy
hath
of
such
a
Governor
,
and
likewise
how
much
his
Friends
and
Confederates
do
esteem
him
;
but
the
chief
and
only
means
to
maintain
Authority
,
is
Austerity
and
Terror
:
Dux
Authoritatem
maximam
severitate
sumat
,
omnes
culpas
militares
legibus
〈◊〉
nulli
errantium
credatur
ignoscere
.
Veget.
Also
Experience
hath
proved
,
that
such
Chieftains
as
were
affable
and
kind
to
their
Soldiers
,
were
much
loved
,
yet
did
they
incur
a
Contempt
;
but
on
the
other
side
,
those
that
commanded
severely
and
terribly
,
although
they
gained
no
good
Will
,
yet
were
they
ever
obeyed
:
Dux
sacilis
inutilis
.
App.
CHAP.
XXIII
.
Of
Councils
in
War
,
and
Directions
Tactick
and
Stratagematick
,
with
Advice
how
to
make
an
honorable
Peace
.
AFter
Men
found
and
framed
sit
for
the
War
,
to
small
or
no
purpose
shall
they
serve
,
unles
,
they
be
〈◊〉
by
Wisdom
or
good
Council
:
Mon
minus
est
Imperatoris
consilio
quam
vi
persicere
.
Tac.
Council
in
War
is
of
two
sorts
,
direct
Council
and
indirect
;
the
first
sheweth
a
plain
and
orderly
course
for
proceeding
,
as
to
lay
hold
on
occasion
;
for
as
in
all
other
Humane
Actions
occasion
〈◊〉
of
great
Force
:
Occasio
in
bello
solet
amplius
juvare
quam
virtus
.
Veget.
As
Occasions
presented
are
means
of
good
Success
,
so
Fame
worketh
〈◊〉
Effects
in
the
Wars
,
therefore
it
〈◊〉
a
Captain
to
be
Constant
,
and
not
〈◊〉
to
believe
the
vain
Rumors
and
Report
,
of
Men
:
Male
imperatur
,
cum
regit
vulgus
〈◊〉
suos
.
Sen.
Confidence
is
also
to
be
eschewed
,
for
no
Man
is
sooner
surprised
,
than
he
who
feareth
least
;
also
Contempt
of
the
Enemy
hath
been
occasion
of
great
Discomfitures
,
therefore
as
a
Captain
ought
not
to
fear
,
so
should
he
not
contemn
his
Enemy
:
Nimia
fiducia
semper
obnoxia
.
AEmyl
.
As
Security
,
and
overmuch
Estimation
of
our
own
Vertue
or
Valor
is
hurtful
,
so
doth
it
import
every
good
Captain
to
be
well
informed
,
not
only
of
his
own
Forces
but
also
of
what
Strength
the
Enemy
is
;
likewise
it
behoveth
him
to
know
the
Situation
of
the
Country
,
and
the
Quality
of
the
People
,
with
every
other
Circumstance
.
Moreover
,
the
Generals
Honor
and
Capacity
ought
to
be
known
,
with
the
Condition
and
Nature
of
the
Enemy
:
Impetus
acres
cunctatione
languescunt
,
aut
in
persidiam
mutantur
.
Tac.
Temerity
in
War
is
also
dangerous
,
sor
wise
Captains
were
wont
not
to
Enterprise
any
thing
without
Deliberation
and
good
Opportunity
,
unless
they
were
thereunto
by
Necessity
inforced
:
In
rebus
asperis
&
tenui
spe
,
fortissima
quaque
consilia
tulissima
sunt
.
Livi.
Some
wise
Men
,
not
Superstitiously
but
Discreetly
,
do
think
prodigious
Signs
from
Heaven
,
or
on
Earth
,
are
not
to
be
neglected
,
neither
are
Dreams
in
time
of
War
to
be
contemned
:
Nam
amat
benignit
as
numinis
,
seu
quod
merentur
homines
,
seu
quod
tangitur
eorum
affectione
,
his
quoque
rationibus
prodere
quae
impendent
.
AEmi
.
A
wise
Captain
will
also
wait
Opportunities
,
and
spy
out
fit
times
when
the
Enemy
is
wearied
,
or
pretending
fear
,
draw
him
into
danger
;
which
Advantages
,
with
many
other
,
are
gained
chiesly
by
observing
of
time
:
Quia
si
in
occasionis
momento
,
cujus
〈◊〉
opportunit
as
,
cunct
at
us
paulum
fueris
,
nequicquam
mox
omissam
querare
.
Livi.
Next
the
Observation
of
Time
,
the
Place
is
to
be
well
considered
,
whether
it
be
for
thine
Advantage
or
thine
Enemies
:
Amplius
prodest
locus
saepe
quam
virtus
.
Veget.
Thirdly
,
It
importeth
much
,
that
Men
be
well
ordered
,
trained
,
and
prepared
for
the
Fight
;
for
the
want
of
Art
is
cause
of
many
Disadvantages
,
and
many
times
a
small
Supply
of
choice
Soldiers
on
Horse-back
or
Foot
,
doth
seem
to
the
Enemy
very
Terrible
;
likewise
a
sudden
Shout
or
Conceit
hath
amazed
a
whole
Army
:
Milites
vanis
&
inanibus
,
magis
quam
justis
formidinis
causis
moventur
.
Curt.
Fourthly
,
It
were
to
good
purpose
,
that
in
ordering
of
Men
for
Fight
,
Soldiers
of
one
Country
or
Nations
,
should
be
ranged
together
,
and
above
all
,
to
foresee
that
the
least
loss
of
Blood
be
among
the
Natural
Subjects
,
and
so
handle
the
Matter
,
that
the
chief
Slaughter
light
upon
Strangers
and
Mercenaries
:
Ingens
victoriae
decus
,
citra
domesticum
sanguinem
bellanti
.
Tac.
The
Generals
own
Courage
and
lively
Disposition
to
Fight
,
will
greatly
animate
the
Multitude
of
Soldiers
,
as
a
contrary
〈◊〉
or
Appearance
of
Fear
,
will
exceedingly
Amaze
and
Daunt
:
Necesse
estad
fugam
parati
sint
,
qui
ducem
suum
sentiunt
desperare
.
Veget.
It
were
also
for
thy
great
Advantage
,
that
the
Forces
should
be
ordered
for
the
Fight
,
before
the
Enemy
be
prepared
.
First
,
For
that
thou
maist
the
better
perform
,
what
thou
thinkest
fit
to
be
done
.
Secondly
,
That
thereby
thine
own
Forces
will
thereof
receive
great
Courage
,
being
readiest
to
assail
the
Enemy
,
and
to
begin
the
Fight
:
Plus
animi
est
inferenti
periculum
,
quam
propulsanti
.
Livi.
After
Victory
it
is
not
the
best
Policy
to
execute
the
Enemies
with
extream
Cruelty
,
but
proceed
Moderately
,
for
it
shall
suffice
the
Victory
is
thine
:
Clausis
ex
desperatione
crescit
audacia
,
&
cum
spei
nihil
est
,
sumit
arma
fermido
.
Veget.
Lastly
,
I
would
advise
that
the
General
should
be
wary
in
his
Actions
,
and
in
every
Enterprise
to
frustrate
the
Soldiers
from
Spoils
and
Pillage
:
Saepe
obstitit
vincentibus
pravum
inter
ipsos
certamen
,
〈◊〉
hoste
spolia
consectanda
.
Tac.
Of
direct
Councils
,
let
that
we
have
said
suffice
.
We
will
now
speak
of
Councils
Indirect
,
commonly
called
by
the
Greek
Word
,
Stratagems
or
Subtile
Practices
:
Which
manner
of
Proceeding
,
hath
been
,
in
times
past
,
of
divers
Grave
Writers
condemned
:
Vir
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
&
clanculum
velit
oscidere
hoslem
.
Eurip.
Notwithstanding
the
Opinion
of
this
,
and
divers
other
Writers
worthy
Credit
,
it
seemeth
reasonable
,
and
in
Piety
allowable
,
that
Stratagems
and
Subtilties
may
be
used
in
the
War
,
yet
with
such
Caution
,
as
the
same
may
stand
with
Fidelity
and
Honor
;
for
Fraud
being
used
,
contrary
to
Contracts
and
Agreements
made
with
the
Enemy
,
is
mere
Treachery
:
As
to
Poyson
him
or
her
,
a
Murtherer
to
kill
him
,
were
plain
Impiety
:
Faederatum
injuste
fallere
,
impium
.
Livi.
Also
out
of
the
War
covertly
to
kill
a
particular
Enemy
by
secret
Assault
or
Practice
,
is
not
warrantable
,
either
by
Faith
or
Honor
;
yet
to
use
all
Crast
,
Cunning
and
Subtilty
in
open
War
,
is
both
allowable
and
praisable
;
and
so
is
thought
by
Christian
Writers
:
Cum
justum
〈◊〉
suscipitur
,
ut
aperte
pugnet
quis
aut
ex
insidiis
,
nihil
ad
justitiam
interest
.
Aug.
The
same
is
also
approved
by
divers
Authors
of
good
Credit
:
Consice
sive
dolo
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
cominus
euse
.
The
same
is
also
〈◊〉
by
Xenophon
,
Reipsa
nihil
utilius
in
bello
dolis
.
Thus
having
briefly
touched
what
Counsels
are
required
in
War
,
let
us
consider
how
Victory
is
to
be
used
,
for
the
end
of
every
good
War
is
Peace
;
to
the
enjoying
whereof
,
three
things
are
required
,
Wariness
,
Mercy
and
Modesty
;
because
over-great
Confidence
may
happily
impeach
the
end
of
good
Success
:
Res
secundae
negligentiam
creant
.
Livi.
I
also
wish
the
Victory
to
be
handled
Mercifully
,
because
all
Conquests
are
in
their
own
Nature
cruel
enough
:
And
the
Ire
of
Insolent
Soldiers
,
forces
the
Conquered
to
become
Desperate
:
Gravissime
morsus
irritate
necessitatis
.
Curt.
To
proceed
Modestly
,
is
also
and
honorable
Quality
in
him
that
conquereth
;
for
in
prosperous
Fortunes
,
Men
do
hardly
refrain
covetous
and
proud
Doings
;
yea
,
some
good
and
great
Captains
have
in
like
cases
forgotten
what
did
best
become
them
:
In
rebus
secundis
etiam
〈◊〉
Duces
insolescunt
.
Tac.
After
Victory
followeth
Peace
:
For
if
War
did
ever
continue
,
no
State
or
Government
could
stand
:
Therefore
how
great
,
or
how
long
soever
the
War
be
,
the
end
must
be
Peace
;
the
name
whereof
is
not
only
Sweet
,
but
also
Comfortable
:
Pax
una
triumphis
innumeris
potior
.
Peace
is
not
only
good
and
profitable
to
him
that
is
Victorious
,
but
also
to
those
that
are
victored
:
Pacem
reduci
velle
victori
,
expedit
,
victo
necesse
est
.
Tac.
Nevertheless
until
good
and
honorable
Peace
be
offered
,
Arms
may
not
be
laid
aside
:
Wherein
I
wish
Tully's
Advice
to
be
followed
:
Bellum
gerendum
est
;
si
bellum
omittemus
,
pace
nunquam
fruemur
.
Livi.
In
Treaty
of
Peace
,
two
things
must
be
considered
:
First
,
That
the
Conditions
be
Honorable
.
To
condescend
to
any
Base
Conditions
,
is
unto
a
Princely
Mind
not
only
great
Indignity
,
but
also
Intolerable
:
Cum
dignitate
potius
cadendum
,
quam
cum
ignominia
serviendum
.
Plut.
It
also
importeth
,
the
Peace
should
be
simple
,
true
and
unseigned
;
for
all
seigned
and
dissembling
Amity
is
to
be
doubted
:
Pace
suspecta
tutius
est
bellum
.
Mithrid
.
The
fittest
Season
to
speak
of
Peace
,
is
either
when
the
War
beginneth
,
or
during
the
time
that
the
Enemies
be
of
equal
Force
;
for
if
the
War
continueth
,
it
must
behove
the
Weaker
to
yield
to
Necessity
:
Not
unlike
the
Ship-master
,
who
to
save
himself
doth
cast
the
greatest
part
of
his
Loading
into
the
Sea
:
Necessitati
pare
,
quam
ne
dil
quidem
superant
.
Livi.
Finally
,
Having
generously
defended
thy self
,
and
performed
all
things
required
in
a
magnanimous
Captain
,
and
finding
nevertheless
thy
Force
insufficient
,
it
cannot
be
dishonorable
to
accept
Peace
.
Wherefore
laying
aside
Hatred
and
Hope
,
which
are
but
weak
Supporters
,
thou
maist
recommend
thee
and
thine
to
the
approved
Discretion
of
an
honorable
Enemy
:
Victores
secundae
res
in
miserationem
ex
ira
vertunt
.
Livi.
Now
for
as
as
much
as
every
Peace
promiseth
Rest
and
Quiet
,
as
well
to
the
Victorious
as
to
the
Victored
;
we
may
add
thereunto
,
that
the
Prince
Victorious
receiveth
thereby
Honor
,
Profit
and
Security
.
For
although
his
Happiness
may
occasion
Hope
of
great
Success
,
yet
in
respect
of
Fortunes
Mutability
,
it
shall
be
Good
and
Glorious
to
listen
to
Peace
:
Decorum
principi
est
cum
victoriam
prope
in
manibus
habeat
,
pacem
non
abnuere
,
ut
sciant
omnes
te
&
suscipere
juste
bellum
,
&
finire
.
Livi.
It
seemeth
also
the
more
Honorable
;
for
who
so
is
Victorious
,
doth
give
Peace
and
not
take
it
:
He
also
sheweth
himself
Discreet
by
using
a
Moderation
in
Victory
,
and
no
Extremity
in
Spoiling
,
which
our
Wise
and
Godly
Writers
have
commended
:
Pacem
contemnentes
,
&
gloriam
appetentes
,
pacem
perdunt
&
gloriam
.
Bern.
Peace
is
also
Profitable
for
the
Victorious
,
because
continual
War
breedeth
Weariness
,
and
of
violent
Proceeding
Desparation
and
Peril
cometh
:
Maximi
&
mortiferi
morsus
esse
solent
morientium
Bestiarum
.
Sen.
Likewise
Peace
is
more
assured
than
any
Victory
.
Hope
of
the
one
is
in
thine
own
Power
;
the
other
in
the
Hand
of
God
:
Add
thereunto
the
force
of
Fortune
,
which
hath
great
power
in
all
Humane
Actions
:
In
rebus
secundis
nihil
in
quenquam
superbe
ac
violenter
consulere
decet
,
nec
praesenti
credere
Fortunae
,
cum
quid
vesper
seral
,
incertus
sis
.
Sen.
Also
Conditions
of
Peace
ought
to
be
reasonably
and
freely
bestowed
:
For
no
People
can
live
contented
under
such
a
Law
as
forceth
them
to
loath
the
State
wherein
they
are
.
Misera
pax
bello
bene
mutatur
.
Sen.
CHAP.
XXIV
.
Of
Civil
War
,
with
the
Causes
and
Remedies
thereof
.
THE
greatest
and
most
grievous
Calamity
that
can
come
to
any
State
is
Civil
War
;
for
therein
Subjects
take
Arms
against
their
Prince
or
among
themselves
,
whereof
followeth
a
Misery
more
Lamentable
than
can
be
described
.
Non
aet
as
,
non
dignit
as
quenquam
protegit
,
quo
minus
stupra
caedibus
,
&
caedes
stupris
misceantur
.
Tac.
The
first
Cause
of
Civil
War
proceedeth
of
Destiny
,
for
God
in
his
own
Divine
Providence
foreseeth
many
Years
before
,
that
great
and
mighty
Empires
shall
be
ruined
.
In
se
magna
〈◊〉
laetis
hinc
numinarebus
Crescendi
posuere
modum
/
s
-
/
Lucan
.
The
second
Cause
is
,
Excess
,
Riot
,
and
Dissolute
Life
;
for
nothing
breedeth
Civil
Fury
so
soon
as
over
great
Happiness
;
also
pompous
Apparel
,
Banquetting
and
prodigal
Spending
consumeth
Riches
,
and
Plenty
is
turned
into
Poverty
;
for
by
these
means
are
Men
brought
into
Desperation
.
Rapacissimo
cuique
ac
perditiffimo
,
non
agri
aut
〈◊〉
sed
sola
instrumenta
vitiorum
manebunt
.
Tac.
Now
to
consider
how
Destiny
might
be
eschewed
,
were
in
vain
:
For
such
a
Remedy
no
Wit
or
Wisdom
can
devise
,
being
the
Decree
of
God
,
no
doubt
it
is
inevitable
.
Ita
fato
placuit
,
nullius
rei
eodem
semper
loco
stare
fortunam
.
Sen.
There
is
nothing
exempt
from
the
peril
of
Mutation
;
the
Earth
,
Heavens
,
and
whole
World
is
thereunto
Subject
.
〈◊〉
eunt
cuncta
temporibus
;
nasci
debent
,
crescere
,
extingui
.
Sen.
Touching
the
second
Causes
of
Civil
War
some
Remedies
may
be
used
,
because
it
proceedeth
of
Faction
,
Sedition
or
Tyranny
.
I
call
Faction
a
certain
Association
of
divers
Persons
combined
to
the
Offence
of
others
.
It
proceedeth
often
of
private
or
publick
Displeasure
,
and
more
often
of
Ambition
.
Nemo
eorum
qui
in
Rep.
versantur
,
quos
vincat
,
sed
a
quibus
vincatur
,
aspicis
.
Sen.
1.
Factions
are
of
two
sorts
;
for
either
they
consist
of
many
or
of
few
Persons
:
both
be
dangerous
,
but
the
former
more
apt
to
take
Arms
;
and
that
Party
which
proveth
weakest
,
prayeth
Arms
of
Foreign
Forces
.
2.
The
other
Faction
wherein
are
fewer
partakers
,
be
commonly
great
Personages
or
Men
of
more
Importance
than
ordinary
People
;
and
that
proveth
most
Perilous
and
Bloody
.
Nobilium
factiones
trahunt
ad
se
,
&
In
partes
,
universum
etiam
populum
.
Arist.
Albeit
some
wise
Men
have
held
Opinion
that
Factions
are
necessary
,
yet
cannot
that
conceipt
be
reasonably
maintained
,
unless
it
be
upon
Consines
,
and
in
such
places
where
Conspiracy
is
feared
,
which
Cato
in
his
private
Family
used
.
Semper
contentiunculas
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
inter
servos
callide
serebat
,
suspectum
habens
nimiam
concordiam
orum
,
metuensque
.
Plut.
Factions
against
the
Nobility
,
are
sometimes
suppressed
by
forbidding
Colors
,
or
unknown
Bagdes
to
be
worn
,
also
to
inhibit
Names
or
Watch-words
of
Mutinies
is
necessary
,
which
was
Mecaenas
Counsel
to
Augustus
;
and
Aristotle
thinketh
it
fit
that
Laws
should
be
made
against
the
Factions
of
Noblemen
.
Nobilium
contentiones
&
partes
etiam
legibus
oportet
prohibere
conari
.
Arist.
Another
Cause
of
Civil
War
,
we
call
Sedition
,
which
is
a
sudden
Commotion
or
Assembly
of
Common
People
against
their
Prince
or
his
Magistrates
:
the
Original
of
which
Disorders
may
proceed
of
divers
Causes
,
but
chiefly
of
Oppression
.
Imminentium
periculocum
remedium
,
ipsa
pericula
arbitrari
.
Arist.
Again
,
Fear
may
be
the
occasion
of
Sedition
,
as
well
in
him
that
hath
done
Injury
,
as
in
him
that
looketh
to
be
injured
,
and
is
desirous
to
prevent
it
before
it
cometh
.
It
may
proceed
also
of
over
great
Mildness
in
Government
.
Non
miseriis
licentia
sed
licentia
,
tantum
concitum
turbarum
,
lascivire
magis
plebem
quam
saevire
.
Livi.
Sedition
many
times
ariseth
of
Poverty
,
or
of
the
Artificers
,
whose
Arts
are
grown
out
of
Use
,
and
consequently
no
means
whereof
they
can
live
.
Semper
in
civitate
,
quibus
opes
nullae
sunt
,
bonis
invidem
,
vetera
odere
,
nova
expetunt
,
odio
rerum
suarum
mutari
omnia
student
.
Sab.
Lastly
,
Sedition
cometh
of
Tyranny
,
Insolency
,
or
Mutinous
Disposition
of
certain
Captains
,
Cavaliers
,
or
Ring-leaders
of
the
People
;
for
albeit
the
Multitude
is
apt
to
Innovation
,
yet
doth
it
stand
firm
,
until
some
first
Mover
taketh
the
matter
in
hand
.
Multitudo
omnis
,
sicut
mare
,
per
se
immobilis
.
Livi.
Of
these
Movers
some
are
Ambitious
,
who
wanting
other
means
to
Aspire
,
hope
by
practice
of
Sedition
,
to
compass
their
Designs
;
or
else
they
are
Unthrifts
,
who
having
consumed
their
own
,
seek
by
Violence
to
possess
themselves
of
other
Mens
:
Or
else
they
are
vain
and
light
Persons
,
that
without
Cause
or
Reason
,
attempt
Innovation
,
themselves
know
not
for
what
.
Non
tam
praemiis
periculorum
,
quam
ipsis
periculis
loeti
,
pro
certis
&
olim
partis
,
nova
,
ambiguae
ancipitia
maelunt
.
Thus
having
told
the
Causes
of
Sedition
,
I
wish
the
Remedies
were
prepared
.
Omne
malum
nascens
facile
opprimitur
,
inveteratum
fit
plerumque
robustius
.
Cic.
The
first
way
to
suppress
Sedition
,
is
Eloquence
and
excellent
Perswasion
,
which
oft-tentimes
worketh
great
Effects
among
the
Multitude
;
chiesly
when
it
proceedeth
from
some
Reverend
and
grave
Person
,
for
his
Wisdom
and
Integrity
of
Life
honored
:
For
the
Prince
himself
is
not
to
take
Office
in
hand
,
unless
necessity
so
inforce
:
Integra
autorit
as
principis
majoribus
remediis
servetur
.
Tac.
If
Perswasion
cannot
prevail
,
then
Force
must
compel
:
But
before
such
violent
Proceedings
,
Use
,
Art
and
Cunning
,
either
to
appease
the
People
,
or
at
least
to
disunite
them
;
and
rather
if
the
Prince
do
offer
fair
and
promise
plausibly
.
Verba
apud
populum
plurimum
valent
.
Tac.
It
is
lawful
also
in
such
Cases
for
Princes
to
use
Subtilty
;
and
the
same
not
prevailing
,
to
wash
away
the
Stain
thereof
with
Clemency
:
For
when
Arms
laid
down
,
and
every
one
yielded
,
general
Punishment
were
needless
.
Omnium
culpa
fuit
,
paucorum
sit
poena
.
Tac.
The
last
Cause
of
Sedition
we
named
Tyranny
,
which
is
a
certain
violent
Government
,
exceediug
the
Laws
of
God
and
Nature
.
The
difference
between
Kings
and
Tyrants
is
this
;
the
one
imployeth
Arms
in
defence
of
Peace
,
the
other
useth
them
to
terrific
those
of
whom
his
Cruelty
hath
deserved
Hate
.
Auferre
,
trucidare
,
rapere
,
falsis
nominibus
imperium
,
atque
ubi
solitudinem
fecerint
,
pacem
appellant
.
Tac.
The
quality
of
Tyrants
is
to
esteem
Promoters
more
then
good
Ministers
,
because
those
Men
are
the
Scourge
of
infinite
others
.
They
are
also
Protectors
of
impious
Persons
,
and
stand
in
daily
doubt
of
Noble
and
Virtuous
Men.
Nobilitas
,
opes
,
amissi
gestique
honores
,
pro
crimine
:
Et
ob
virtutes
certissimum
exitium
.
Tac.
Tyrants
do
also
endeavor
to
suppress
the
knowledge
of
Letters
and
Civil
Life
,
to
the
end
all
Arts
should
be
exiled
,
and
Barbarism
introduced
.
Pellunt
sapientiae
professores
,
&
omnes
bonas
artes
in
exilium
agant
.
Tac.
These
and
such
like
,
be
the
Conditions
of
Tyrants
,
who
for
the
most
part
are
deposed
and
slain
;
for
as
Kings
live
long
and
deliver
their
Doininions
to
their
Children
and
Postority
:
So
Tyrants
being
feared
and
hated
of
all
Men
,
cannot
continue
in
their
Estate
.
Adgenerum
Cereris
sine
coede
&
vulnere
pauci
Descendunt
reges
&
sicca
morte
Tyranni
.
Juvin
.
The
Remedies
of
these
Mischiefs
which
proceed
from
the
Violence
of
sach
a
Prince
,
are
Persecution
or
Patience
.
Many
generous
Spirits
have
used
the
first
;
perswading
themselves
rather
to
dye
,
than
endure
the
sight
of
a
Tyrant
.
Also
the
Grecians
did
think
it
a
Service
acceptable
to
Murther
the
Person
of
such
an
impious
Prince
.
Graeci
homines
deorum
honores
tribuebant
iis
qui
Tyrannos
necaverunt
.
Cic.
Nevertheless
,
in
Christian
Consideration
,
the
other
Course
is
to
be
taken
:
Let
Patience
therefore
incounter
this
mischief
;
for
seeing
all
Kings
,
as
well
the
bad
as
the
good
be
sent
by
God
,
they
must
be
indured
.
Res
est
gravis
occidere
regalem
stirpem
.
Homer
.
Persecution
is
not
only
perilous
,
but
for
the
most
part
infortunate
:
For
therefore
present
Revenge
is
taken
by
that
Prince
that
succeedeth
.
Facinotis
ejus
ultor
est
,
quisquis
successerit
.
Tac.
The
Murther
of
Tyrants
is
also
followed
with
many
inconveniences
worse
than
Civil
War
it self
.
Principes
bont
,
votis
expetendi
,
qualescunque
tolerandi
.
Tac.
For
as
Fire
,
Floods
,
and
other
inevitable
Plagues
are
necessarily
to
be
suffered
:
So
evil
Princes
in
their
Covetousness
and
Cruelty
ought
to
be
patiently
indured
,
because
their
Office
is
to
command
,
and
Subjects
must
Obey
.
Indigna
,
digna
habenda
sunt
,
Rex
quae
facit
.
Sen.
And
as
it
is
the
use
of
vulgar
People
to
find
Faults
in
the
long
Reign
of
Princes
;
so
the
Ambition
of
great
Subjects
is
desirous
of
Novelty
.
Proesens
imperium
subditis
semper
grave
.
Thucyd.
To
conclude
,
we
say
that
the
best
Remedy
against
Tyranny
,
is
Patience
:
For
so
long
as
Men
are
,
so
long
will
Vices
be
.
Regum
ingenia
toleranda
,
neque
usui
crebrae
mutationes
.
Tac.
CHAP.
XXV
.
A
Collection
of
Political
Observations
(
confirmed
by
Reason
and
Experience
)
advertising
Princes
,
Statesmen
and
private
Persons
how
to
demean
themselves
in
all
Fortunes
and
Events
.
TO
the
Perfections
of
Men
,
Three
things
are
necessarily
required
;
Nature
,
Nurture
and
Use
:
The
first
giveth
Capacity
,
Aptness
and
Understanding
;
which
are
Graces
from
Above
.
Nurture
,
is
Learning
,
Knowledge
,
Art
,
or
Order
.
Use
,
is
Practice
,
Experience
,
and
orderly
Observation
;
whereof
may
be
conceived
,
that
Nature
alone
susficeth
not
;
nor
can
Nurture
work
any
good
effect
,
where
natural
Aptness
wanteth
;
and
they
can
frame
no
Perfection
,
unless
Experience
be
also
conjoined
.
Nemo
nascitur
sapiens
,
sed
fit
.
Sen.
Ambassadors
,
Negotiants
,
and
generally
all
other
Ministers
of
mean
Fortune
,
in
Conversation
with
Princes
and
Superiors
,
must
use
great
respect
,
shewing
themselves
rather
Ceremonious
than
Presumptuous
,
and
acknowledge
their
Obligation
great
,
for
the
Favor
and
Grace
,
they
find
in
those
which
might
command
them
.
It
is
no
wisdom
ever
to
commend
or
discommend
the
Actions
of
Men
by
their
Success
;
for
oft-tentimes
some
Enterprises
attempted
by
good
Counsel
,
end
unsortnately
;
and
others
unadvisedly
taken
in
hand
,
have
happy
Success
.
Who
so
then
commendeth
inconsiderate
Counsels
for
their
fortunate
Event
,
thereby
encourageth
Men
to
jar
and
discomfort
the
wiser
sort
to
speak
what
they
know
,
and
by
Experience
have
proved
.
In
Actions
publick
,
and
every
other
matter
of
great
moment
,
the
beginning
is
well
to
be
considered
:
For
afterwards
it
lieth
not
in
our
power
,
without
dishonor
to
abandon
what
was
begun
.
The
time
doth
not
always
serve
,
nor
is
apt
occasion
always
offered
to
Enterprise
what
would
;
yer
who
so
doth
expect
every
Opportunity
,
shall
either
attempt
nothing
at
all
,
or
if
he
do
,
the
same
for
the
most
part
turneth
to
his
own
disadvantage
.
When
any
Resolution
is
taken
,
either
with
over
great
haste
,
or
too
much
Affection
,
seldom
it
receiveth
good
success
:
For
he
that
doth
the
one
,
hath
no
leisure
to
consider
;
the
other
transporteth
the
Mind
so
as
it
cannot
conceive
more
than
that
which
presently
presseth
.
To
these
we
add
others
,
I
mean
some
of
them
that
have
leisure
,
and
are
void
of
Affection
,
yet
for
want
of
natural
Capacity
,
or
for
continual
Negligence
in
their
doings
,
never
bring
any
thing
well
to
pass
.
Who
so
desireth
to
be
beloved
in
a
Commonwealth
,
must
rest
content
with
that
which
Men
do
give
,
and
the
Laws
allow
him
to
take
:
So
shall
he
neither
incur
Danger
nor
Envy
:
for
indeed
,
that
which
is
taken
or
extorted
from
others
,
and
not
that
which
is
given
,
doth
make
Men
hated
.
Arms
,
Laws
and
Religion
,
may
not
in
any
well
governed
State
be
disjoined
;
every
one
of
them
in
particular
maintaineth
them
all
united
.
In
Actions
of
War
,
Courage
and
Conduct
are
of
great
Necessity
;
yet
all
good
Government
consisteth
in
using
the
Virtues
Moral
;
and
in
handling
the
matter
of
Martial
Policy
,
it
is
fit
to
imitate
the
Proceedings
of
ancient
and
approved
Captains
.
Among
Mortal
Men
,
there
is
nothing
more
common
than
to
believe
the
Estate
of
one
Man
to
be
better
than
another
;
for
hereof
it
cometh
,
that
every
one
endeavoreth
rather
to
take
from
others
with
travel
,
than
to
enjoy
his
own
with
rest
.
The
state
of
Princes
is
good
,
being
well
used
;
so
is
the
Fortune
of
private
Men
,
if
therewith
they
be
contented
.
The
rich
Man
liveth
happily
,
so
long
as
he
useth
his
Riches
temperately
;
and
the
poor
Man
that
patiently
endureth
his
Wants
,
is
Rich
enough
.
Whensoever
a
Man
is
so
dangerously
distressed
,
as
either
proceeding
or
standing
,
he
liveth
in
like
peril
,
then
doth
it
behove
him
in
any
wise
,
to
resolve
upon
Action
.
The
reason
is
,
that
so
long
as
nothing
is
done
,
the
same
Accidents
that
caused
his
Dangers
,
do
still
remain
in
their
former
force
;
but
if
he
endeavor
to
enterprise
somewhat
,
either
he
may
meet
with
means
to
make
him
secure
,
or
at
the
hardest
,
shew
himself
of
so
great
Courage
and
Wit
,
as
he
dare
and
can
attempt
a
way
to
do
it
.
It
seemeth
a
thing
of
great
difficulty
,
or
rather
impossible
for
any
Prince
or
Magistrate
to
eschew
the
evil
speech
and
bad
report
of
Men
;
for
if
they
be
good
and
virtuous
,
then
they
incur
the
backbiting
of
lewd
Persons
;
if
evil
,
then
will
all
good
Men
exclaim
against
them
.
All
Commonwealths
ought
to
desire
Peace
,
yet
it
is
necessary
ever
to
be
prepared
for
the
War
;
because
Peace
disarmed
is
weak
,
and
without
Reputation
:
Therefore
the
Poets
feign
,
that
Pallas
the
Goddess
of
Wisdom
did
always
appear
armed
.
Every
Prince
(
well
advised
)
ought
to
govern
his
Subjects
and
Servants
in
such
sort
,
that
by
his
Affability
and
Virtue
they
may
be
induced
rather
to
serve
voluntarily
,
then
for
Pay
or
hope
of
Preferment
.
For
otherwise
doing
,
whensoever
the
Prince
shall
want
means
to
pay
,
the
Subjects
likewise
will
fail
of
good
will
to
serve
.
But
he
that
faithfully
loveth
,
doth
neither
in
Prosperity
become
Arrogant
,
nor
in
contrary
Fortune
retire
,
or
complain
of
the
small
favor
he
findeth
:
For
(
till
death
)
Love
and
Life
remain
at
the
Princes
Commandment
.
Where
poor
Men
find
Justice
,
evil
Men
are
punish'd
,
Measures
and
Weights
be
just
,
Youth
well
nurtured
,
and
old
Folk
free
from
Avarice
,
there
is
the
Commonwealth
good
and
perfect
.
In
War
between
Neighbors
,
Neutrality
is
commendable
;
for
by
that
means
we
eschew
many
Troubles
and
great
Expences
,
so
long
as
the
Forces
of
either
side
be
so
equal
in
strength
,
as
we
need
not
to
fear
the
Victory
of
any
:
For
so
long
their
Discord
is
our
Security
,
and
oft-tentimes
offereth
us
means
to
increase
our
own
State
and
Reputation
.
The
chief
Reasons
to
move
War
,
are
,
the
sustice
of
the
Cause
,
the
Facillity
of
Success
and
the
Profit
of
the
Victory
.
In
all
Humane
Actions
it
behoveth
to
accommodate
the
Council
of
Men
unto
present
Necessity
,
and
never
to
expose
Security
to
manifest
Peril
,
nor
hope
of
that
which
without
great
Difficulty
or
Impossibility
cannot
be
obtained
.
It
is
the
Nature
of
Men
,
having
escaped
one
Extreme
,
which
by
force
they
were
constrained
long
to
endure
,
to
run
Headlong
into
the
other
Extreme
,
forgetting
that
Vertue
doth
always
consist
in
the
mean.
The
Multitude
is
inclined
to
Innovation
,
and
easily
induced
by
false
Perswasion
,
and
consequently
easily
transported
by
Seditious
Leaders
.
Men
are
naturally
disposed
to
fear
those
things
which
threaten
Danger
and
Terror
;
yet
unless
these
Perils
,
by
some
new
Accident
,
be
daily
revived
,
that
Fear
by
little
and
little
vanisheth
,
and
Security
recovereth
the
place
.
Whoso
findeth
himself
contemned
,
or
not
respected
,
becometh
Discontent
;
which
Humor
in
generous
Minds
,
breedeth
oftentimes
Adventerous
Imaginations
,
whereof
Audacious
Attempts
have
followed
,
chiefly
in
Persons
of
Authority
and
Reputation
;
for
he
that
hopeth
no
Good
,
feareth
no
Evil
:
Yet
true
it
is
,
that
dangerous
Enterprises
,
the
more
they
be
thought
upon
,
the
less
Hope
they
give
of
good
Success
,
for
which
reason
Conspiracies
not
suddenly
executed
,
are
for
the
most
part
revealed
or
abandoned
.
All
People
do
naturally
imitate
the
Manners
of
their
Prince
,
and
observing
his
Proceedings
,
resolve
to
Hate
or
Love
him
:
But
if
they
happen
once
to
Hate
the
Prince
,
then
his
Doings
,
Good
or
Evil
,
are
afterwards
not
Good
;
but
if
at
the
beginning
he
gained
the
Love
of
the
People
,
then
every
bad
Action
is
reputed
a
Vertue
;
as
though
he
could
not
be
induced
to
do
amiss
without
good
Cause
or
Reason
.
Greatly
are
Princes
deceived
,
if
in
the
Election
of
Ministers
,
they
more
respect
their
own
particular
Affection
,
than
the
Sufficiency
of
the
Person
elected
.
A
Prince
having
conquered
any
new
Dominion
,
is
thereby
rather
incumbered
than
strengthened
,
unless
the
same
be
after
well
governed
;
and
seldom
is
it
seen
,
that
a
Principality
,
by
ill
means
gotten
,
hath
been
long
enjoyed
.
As
to
the
Perfection
of
the
whole
Body
,
soundness
of
Head
only
sufficeth
not
,
unless
the
other
Members
also
do
their
Office
;
even
so
it
is
not
enough
that
a
Prince
be
Faultless
,
but
it
behoveth
also
that
the
Magistrates
and
Ministers
should
perform
their
Duty
.
Great
Princes
rarely
resist
their
Appetites
,
as
for
the
most
part
private
Men
can
;
for
they
being
always
honored
and
obeyed
,
do
seldom
with
Patience
indure
the
want
of
any
thing
reasonable
,
as
being
perswaded
that
what
they
desire
is
Just
,
and
that
their
Commandment
hath
power
to
remove
all
Difficulties
.
All
Men
are
naturally
A
Tyrant
indeavoreth
to
maintain
his
Estate
by
three
means
.
First
,
He
practiseth
to
hold
all
Subjects
in
extreme
Awe
,
and
to
be
basely
minded
,
to
the
end
they
should
want
Courage
to
take
Arms
against
him
.
Secondly
,
He
kindleth
Diffidence
and
Discord
among
the
Great
Men
;
thereby
to
remove
occasion
of
Conspiracy
and
Combination
.
Lastly
,
He
holdeth
them
Disarmed
and
Idle
,
so
as
they
neither
know
nor
can
attempt
any
thing
against
him
.
To
govern
,
is
nothing
else
but
to
hold
Subjects
in
Love
and
Obedience
;
for
in
respect
of
the
end
,
they
ought
not
,
and
in
regard
of
the
other
they
cannot
attempt
any
thing
contrary
to
the
Governor's
Will
and
their
Duty
.
The
Laws
and
Ordinances
of
a
Common-weale
made
at
the
beginning
thereof
when
Men
were
good
,
do
often
prove
unprofitable
when
they
are
become
evil
;
and
therefore
new
Laws
are
made
according
to
the
Accidents
which
happen
.
The
Discontent
and
Disorder
of
People
is
ever
occasioned
by
the
Inequality
of
their
Goods
,
because
the
Poorer
sort
would
be
made
equal
to
the
Rich
;
but
the
Offence
that
grows
among
great
Men
is
the
desire
of
Honor
;
for
they
being
equal
,
do
endeavor
to
aspire
to
equal
Authority
.
A
Prince
that
desireth
,
by
means
of
his
Ambassador
,
to
deceive
any
other
Price
,
must
first
abuse
his
own
Ambassador
,
to
the
end
he
should
do
and
speak
with
more
Earnestenss
,
being
indeed
perswaded
that
the
Intent
and
Meaning
of
his
Master
is
Simple
,
which
happily
would
not
,
were
he
privy
that
his
Prince's
Meaning
were
to
Dissemble
.
This
course
is
also
commonly
holden
by
those
,
that
by
Imployment
of
a
third
Person
,
would
perswade
any
thing
Feigned
or
False
.
For
the
Performance
of
Conditions
of
Treaty
of
Peace
,
or
League
of
Amity
,
the
Promises
,
Vows
and
Oaths
of
Princes
are
of
great
Effect
;
and
because
Fidelity
in
a
Man
is
not
ever
certain
,
and
time
doth
daily
offer
Occasions
of
Variation
,
there
is
no
Assurance
so
Secure
and
Good
,
as
to
stand
so
prepared
,
as
the
Enemy
may
want
able
means
how
to
offend
.
To
resolve
in
Matters
Doubtful
,
or
answer
Requests
which
we
are
not
willing
to
grant
,
the
least
offensive
way
is
not
to
use
direct
Denial
,
but
by
delays
prolong
the
time
,
and
so
in
effect
,
afford
good
Expectation
.
The
old
Proverb
faith
,
Magistratus
virum
ostendit
;
which
is
no
less
true
than
Ancient
;
for
Men
in
such
Fortune
,
are
occasioned
not
only
to
make
proof
of
their
Sufficiency
,
but
also
to
discover
their
Affections
;
and
the
more
their
Greatness
is
,
the
less
respect
they
have
to
contain
those
Passions
which
are
natural
.
Albeit
great
Troubles
and
continual
Adversity
seem
Insupportable
,
yet
is
there
nothing
more
Dangerous
,
than
overmuch
Prosperity
;
and
being
pressed
by
new
Appetites
,
they
disturb
their
own
Security
.
In
speaking
of
Occurrents
doubtful
,
it
is
always
Wisdom
to
feign
Ignorance
,
or
at
least
alledge
that
we
believe
them
not
;
for
most
commonly
they
are
utterly
untrue
,
or
far
other
than
vulgarly
is
believed
.
The
Actions
of
Men
are
commonly
liked
or
disallowed
according
to
the
bad
or
good
Success
;
attributing
that
to
Council
which
sometimes
is
due
to
Fortune
.
The
Multitude
of
Men
were
wont
to
be
more
pleased
with
sudden
than
slow
Resolutions
;
and
many
times
account
those
Enterprises
Generous
,
which
are
rashly
and
inconsiderately
attempted
.
Great
Difference
there
is
between
Subjects
Desperate
,
and
others
which
are
only
Discontented
;
for
the
one
desire
nothing
but
present
Alteration
,
which
they
endeavor
with
all
Hazard
;
the
other
wish
for
Innovation
,
inciting
any
Motion
or
Practice
,
because
their
Intent
is
to
attend
time
,
and
that
occasion
may
present
it self
.
A
Benefit
bestowed
on
him
who
thinketh
himself
greatly
injured
,
doth
not
suffice
to
raze
the
same
out
of
his
Memory
,
chiefly
if
the
Benefit
be
given
at
such
time
as
no
mere
Motion
,
but
Necessity
may
seem
the
occasion
thereof
.
That
Peace
ought
to
be
desired
,
which
removed
Suspition
,
which
assureth
us
from
Peril
,
which
bringeth
Quiet
certain
,
and
acquitteth
us
of
Expences
;
but
when
it
worketh
contrary
Effects
,
it
may
be
called
a
dangerous
War
,
covered
with
the
name
of
Deceitful
Trust
,
not
unlike
a
perilous
Poyson
ministred
in
lieu
of
a
wholsome
Medicine
.
The
Effect
of
things
,
and
not
External
show
,
or
seeming
,
ought
to
be
regarded
;
yet
it
is
credible
what
great
Grace
is
gained
by
courteous
Speech
and
Affability
;
the
reason
whereof
is
,
as
I
suppose
,
that
every
Man
believeth
he
doth
merit
more
than
indeed
he
is
worthy
,
and
consequently
holdeth
himself
injured
,
whensoever
he
findeth
Men
not
to
afford
him
like
Estimation
.
Men
ought
in
any
wise
,
to
refrain
to
do
or
say
any
thing
which
may
offend
,
for
which
respect
it
were
great
Folly
,
either
in
presence
or
absence
,
to
utter
displeasing
Speech
,
unless
necessity
inforceth
.
The
Matters
whereof
Counsellors
are
chiesly
to
consider
,
are
five
,
The
Prince's
Revenue
,
Peace
and
War
,
Defence
,
Traffick
,
and
what
Laws
are
to
be
made
.
In
giving
Council
divers
things
are
to
be
observed
;
but
amongst
them
are
two
of
most
Importance
:
First
,
It
behoveth
,
that
he
who
is
counselled
should
be
Wise
;
for
seeing
Counsel
is
nothing
else
but
a
certain
considerate
Discourse
of
things
to
be
done
or
not
done
,
if
he
who
is
to
take
Counsel
be
not
of
Discretion
,
then
will
he
refuse
all
good
Advice
offered
,
and
rather
incline
to
that
which
his
own
Fancy
affecteth
,
because
the
want
of
Judgment
draweth
him
to
take
I
leasure
in
vain
things
;
and
as
one
incapable
of
what
is
good
and
true
,
will
follow
that
which
is
Evil
and
False
:
So
on
the
other
side
,
if
he
that
giveth
Counsel
be
not
Faithful
,
then
will
he
a
Thousand
ways
disguise
and
dissemble
the
Truth
,
and
consequently
miscarry
the
Mind
of
him
that
is
Counselled
;
yea
in
the
end
utterly
abuse
him
.
The
Affairs
and
Proceedings
of
the
World
,
are
so
variable
,
and
accompanied
with
so
many
Chances
and
Changes
,
as
impossible
it
seemeth
to
judge
what
is
best
;
therefore
Experience
informeth
,
that
the
Conjectures
of
the
most
Wise
,
prove
vain
and
uncertain
.
I
therefore
mislike
the
Judgment
of
those
Men
,
that
will
let
slip
Opportunity
of
present
Good
(
though
it
be
small
)
for
fear
of
a
future
Evil
,
notwithstanding
it
be
greater
unless
the
Evil
be
very
near
at
hand
,
or
certain
.
For
if
that
do
not
follow
which
is
feared
,
then
wilt
thou
repent
to
have
omitted
that
which
was
desired
.
Whensoever
a
general
Opinion
is
conceived
,
of
the
singular
Vertue
and
Knowledge
of
any
Man
,
although
he
be
indeed
Ignorant
,
and
far
unworthy
that
Account
,
yet
it
is
hard
to
remove
such
a
settled
Conceit
:
The
Reason
is
,
That
Men
having
at
the
first
given
Credit
to
common
Report
,
do
make
thereof
so
deep
an
Impression
,
as
afterwards
,
without
great
Difficulty
,
cannot
be
removed
.
The
Bodies
of
Men
,
Munition
and
Money
,
may
justly
be
called
the
Sinews
of
War
,
yet
of
them
the
two
first
are
more
necessary
,
for
Men
and
Arms
have
means
to
find
Money
and
Meat
;
but
Money
and
Meat
cannot
so
easily
find
Soldiers
and
Swords
.
One
wise
General
having
but
a
Thousand
Men
,
is
more
to
be
feared
and
esteemed
,
than
twenty
Commanders
of
equal
Authority
;
for
they
being
commonly
of
divers
Humors
,
or
judging
diversly
,
do
never
,
or
very
rarely
,
what
is
to
be
done
,
and
consequently
lose
much
time
before
any
Resolution
can
be
taken
.
A
Prince
of
mean
Force
,
ought
not
in
any
wise
to
adventure
his
Estate
upon
one
days
Fight
;
for
if
he
be
Victorious
he
gaineth
nothing
but
Glory
;
but
if
he
lose
,
he
is
utterly
ruined
.
The
most
part
of
Men
are
delighted
with
Histories
,
for
the
Variety
of
Accidents
therein
contained
;
yet
are
there
few
that
will
imitate
what
they
read
,
and
find
done
by
others
;
being
perswaded
that
Imitation
is
not
only
hard
but
impossible
,
as
though
the
Heavens
and
Men
were
changed
in
their
Motion
,
or
Order
and
Power
,
which
they
anciently
had
.
The
Nature
of
Men
is
such
,
as
will
not
endeavor
any
thing
Good
,
unless
they
be
forced
thereunto
;
for
where
Liberty
aboundeth
,
there
Confusion
and
Disorder
follow
.
It
is
therefore
supposed
,
that
Hunger
and
Poverty
make
Men
Industrious
;
but
good
Laws
inforce
them
to
be
Honest
;
for
if
Men
were
of
themselves
good
,
then
Laws
were
needless
.
There
are
two
kinds
of
Adulation
:
The
first
proceedeth
from
a
Subtle
Malice
:
The
second
cometh
by
an
ordinary
use
of
Conversation
;
the
one
tendeth
to
Profit
and
Deceiving
;
the
other
hath
no
farther
Design
,
than
a
Respect
or
Fear
to
offend
;
whereunto
the
most
Honest
are
in
some
sort
bound
.
Whoso
bindeth
himself
to
Flattery
,
doth
thereby
bewray
his
Intent
,
either
to
gain
,
or
not
to
lose
that
he
hath
.
For
the
Person
slattered
,
is
always
superior
to
him
that
doth
Flatter
,
or
at
least
one
as
may
in
some
sort
stand
him
in
stead
.
It
may
therefore
be
inferred
,
that
only
Men
of
base
and
miserable
Condition
,
and
such
as
cannot
help
or
hurt
,
be
free
from
Flatterers
.
And
contrariwise
,
Magnanimous
and
Fortunate
Folk
,
proud
Men
,
and
such
as
content
themselves
with
their
present
Estate
,
are
seldom
found
to
be
Flatterers
.
Every
wise
Prince
doth
presuppose
,
that
Times
of
Trouble
may
come
,
and
that
all
such
Occasions
he
shall
be
forced
to
use
the
Service
of
Men
diversly
qualified
.
His
Study
therefore
is
,
in
the
mean
time
so
to
entertain
them
,
as
when
those
Storms
arise
,
he
may
rest
assured
to
command
them
;
for
whosoever
perswades
himself
,
by
present
Benefits
,
to
gain
the
good
Will
of
Men
,
when
Perils
are
at
hand
,
shall
be
deceived
.
In
ancient
times
Princes
and
Governors
were
wont
,
when
Peace
and
Security
were
most
like
to
continue
,
to
find
or
feign
Occasions
to
draw
their
Subjects
to
Fear
,
to
the
end
that
Doubt
might
move
them
to
be
more
careful
of
their
own
well-doing
;
for
well
they
knew
it
a
general
Defect
in
Men
,
to
be
reachless
,
and
never
willing
to
use
Industry
;
unless
by
necessity
they
were
constrained
.
All
Histories
do
shew
,
and
wise
Politicians
do
hold
it
necessary
,
that
for
the
well
governing
of
every
Common-weal
,
it
behoveth
to
presuppose
that
all
Men
are
Evil
,
and
will
declare
themselves
so
to
be
,
when
occasion
is
offered
;
for
albeit
some
Inconvenience
doth
lye
hid
for
a
time
,
it
proceedeth
from
a
covert
occasion
,
which
for
want
of
Experience
,
was
not
found
,
until
Time
the
Mother
of
Truth
discover
it
.
Neutrality
is
always
a
thing
Dangerous
and
Disallowable
,
because
it
offendeth
all
Parties
:
He
that
is
Strong
looketh
to
be
assisted
in
his
Greatness
;
and
he
that
is
Weak
,
not
being
defended
,
holdeth
himself
offended
;
the
one
is
not
assured
from
Foes
,
and
the
other
holdeth
no
Friends
.
Albeit
Neutrality
procure
present
Quiet
and
Security
,
during
the
Troubles
of
others
;
yet
after
the
same
falleth
out
a
Disadvantage
,
because
it
entertaineth
a
certain
Falseness
,
and
so
in
short
space
will
be
perceived
;
not
unlike
those
Men
that
borrow
upon
Usury
;
for
albeit
they
enjoy
a
certain
time
,
without
Trouble
or
Charge
,
yet
the
same
being
〈◊〉
and
the
day
of
Payment
come
,
they
then
feel
the
great
Danger
which
their
short
Pleasure
hath
purchased
.
Whoso
examineth
all
Humane
Actions
shall
find
,
that
in
eschewing
one
Inconvenience
,
we
presently
incur
another
.
As
for
Example
,
if
we
endeavor
to
make
our
Dominions
Mighty
,
it
behoveth
to
have
the
same
fully
replenished
with
People
,
and
well
armed
,
and
so
being
,
they
are
not
easily
governed
.
On
the
other
side
,
if
our
Country
be
not
well
Peopled
,
or
Disarmed
,
then
it
is
easily
holden
in
Obedience
;
yet
therewith
so
Weak
,
that
it
can
neither
increase
the
Bounds
thereof
,
nor
defend
it self
.
It
is
therefore
necessary
,
in
all
our
Deliberations
,
to
consider
what
Inconvenience
is
least
,
and
choose
that
as
the
best
;
for
to
find
all
Perfect
,
Void
and
Secure
of
Suspect
or
Imperfection
,
is
impossible
.
A
Prince
being
instantly
required
to
take
part
with
other
Princes
,
the
one
being
in
Arms
against
the
other
,
is
he
deny
both
,
incurreth
Suspicion
of
both
,
and
may
be
thought
to
have
Secret
Intelligences
with
one
or
both
of
them
;
so
as
either
of
them
shall
account
him
an
Enemy
,
and
consequently
he
that
proves
Victorious
will
be
revenged
;
and
the
other
holding
him
suspected
,
will
not
acknowledge
his
Friendship
.
It
is
the
use
of
Men
to
presume
much
upon
their
own
Merit
,
and
seeing
the
Success
of
some
others
to
be
such
,
as
without
Cause
or
Desert
,
are
aspired
to
Dignity
thereby
encouraged
,
they
promised
to
themselves
the
like
:
Nevertheless
being
entred
into
the
course
of
their
Design
,
and
finding
many
Crosses
and
Impeachments
they
do
not
a
little
repent
their
Overweening
and
Presumption
,
but
also
many
times
utterly
abandon
their
rash
and
unadvised
Enterprize
;
neither
can
I
think
,
that
the
Vertue
or
Sufficiency
of
any
Man
without
the
Favor
of
the
Heavens
,
can
advance
him
;
for
as
the
Poet
saith
,
Nec
velle
juvat
,
potiusve
nocet
,
si
fat
a
repugnant
.
Whoso
serveth
a
Prince
far
from
his
Presence
,
shall
with
great
Difficulty
content
him
.
For
if
he
commit
any
Error
,
it
shall
be
aggravated
:
Besides
that
,
the
Instructions
sent
unto
him
cannot
be
particularly
conceived
,
because
the
State
of
wordly
things
doth
daily
alter
.
Also
to
serve
aloof
,
is
a
thing
full
of
Danger
and
far
from
Reward
;
which
Inconvenience
may
for
the
most
part
be
avoided
by
him
that
attendeth
near
to
his
Prince's
Person
.
Let
no
Man
that
cometh
to
serve
in
Court
,
assure
himself
by
his
Wisdom
to
be
advanced
or
eschew
all
Encounters
.
Neither
is
he
to
bear
himself
so
careless
as
to
commit
all
to
Fortune
,
but
be
perswaded
that
this
worldly
Life
is
like
to
a
Voiage
by
Sea
;
wherein
albeit
Art
with
the
favor
of
the
Wind
may
do
much
,
yet
can
we
not
assure
our selves
to
arrive
safe
in
the
Haven
appointed
;
for
daily
Experience
doth
shew
,
that
some
strange
Ships
in
the
calmest
Weather
,
are
drowned
or
impeached
by
the
way
,
when
others
much
weaker
and
disarmed
pass
securely
.
Among
Men
worthy
of
Commendations
,
those
have
merited
best
that
first
planted
true
Religion
:
next
they
that
framed
Kingdoms
and
Commonwealths
;
the
third
place
is
due
to
such
as
have
augmented
or
enlarged
their
Dominions
;
lastly
,
Learned
Men
deserve
Fame
and
Memory
:
and
as
every
of
these
are
worthy
of
Fame
and
Honor
;
so
ought
they
to
be
accompted
Infamous
that
introduce
Atheism
,
or
the
Subversion
of
Kingdoms
,
or
are
become
Enemies
to
Learning
and
Virtue
.
Whosoever
taketh
in
hand
to
govern
a
Multitude
either
by
way
of
Liberty
,
or
Principality
,
and
cannot
assure
himself
of
those
Persons
that
are
Enimies
to
that
Enterprise
,
doth
frame
a
State
of
short
Perseverance
:
yet
true
it
is
that
such
Princes
be
infortunate
,
as
for
their
own
security
are
inforced
to
hold
a
course
extraordinary
,
and
have
the
Multitude
their
Enemy
;
for
he
that
hath
few
Foes
may
with
small
dishonor
be
assured
;
but
he
that
is
generally
hated
can
by
no
means
live
assured
;
and
the
more
Cruelty
he
useth
,
the
weaker
his
Principality
proveth
.
In
commending
another
Man
,
great
Moderation
is
to
be
used
;
for
as
contumely
offendeth
him
against
whom
,
it
is
used
;
so
great
praise
,
besides
that
it
is
uttered
with
danger
to
his
Judgment
that
speaketh
it
,
the
same
doth
oft-tentimes
offend
him
that
heareth
it
.
For
Self-love
which
commonly
possesseth
Men
,
causes
the
Good
or
Evil
we
hear
,
to
be
measured
with
our
own
.
And
consequently
every
Man
that
is
touched
with
like
deserts
and
defects
,
doth
grow
offended
that
his
Commendation
is
not
set
forth
,
and
feareth
lest
his
Imperfection
should
be
discovered
.
It
is
often
,
or
rather
ever
seen
,
that
the
force
of
Leagues
not
used
in
their
first
heat
,
becomes
cold
;
because
Suspition
soon
entereth
,
which
in
short
space
will
destroy
whatsoever
was
concluded
,
and
may
not
without
long
time
be
rejoined
.
The
power
of
Ambition
which
possesseth
the
Minds
of
Men
,
is
such
,
as
rarely
or
never
suffereth
them
to
rest
:
The
reason
thereof
is
,
That
Nature
hath
framed
in
them
a
certain
Disposition
to
desire
all
things
,
but
not
to
obtain
them
;
so
as
our
Desires
being
greater
than
our
Power
,
therefore
following
Discontenr
and
evil
Satisfaction
.
Hereof
also
proceedeth
the
Variation
of
Fortune
;
for
some
Men
desiring
to
get
,
and
others
fearing
to
lose
that
they
had
gotten
,
do
occasion
one
Man
to
injure
another
,
and
consequently
Publick
Wars
do
follow
;
by
means
whereof
,
one
Country
is
ruined
,
and
another
inlarged
.
Princes
of
great
Power
,
and
chiesly
those
that
are
Inhabitants
of
the
North
,
having
many
Children
,
were
wont
to
be
much
inclined
to
the
Wars
,
as
well
to
win
unto
themselves
Honor
,
as
also
to
get
Possessions
for
their
Sons
;
which
manner
of
Proceedings
did
oft-tentimes
remove
such
Disturbance
as
the
Plurality
of
Brethren
bringeth
.
These
and
other
reasons
induced
Princes
to
attempt
War
against
those
Kingdoms
,
which
in
cheir
opinion
seemed
easily
conquered
,
or
whereunto
they
can
pretend
little
;
for
by
colour
thereof
they
may
the
rather
justifie
their
Proceedings
.
When
a
Prince
deferreth
to
answer
an
Ambassador
,
it
proceedeth
from
some
of
these
Respects
;
either
because
he
will
take
time
to
resolve
himself
of
somewhat
whereof
he
doubteth
,
or
that
he
intendeth
covertly
to
deny
that
which
is
demanded
,
or
that
he
esteemeth
not
the
Prince
that
doth
demand
,
or
that
he
disdaineth
the
Person
by
whom
the
demand
is
made
,
or
else
that
he
intendeth
to
hear
from
his
own
Ministers
to
be
better
resolved
:
Wherefore
a
discreet
Negotiator
ought
in
such
cases
to
consider
which
of
these
Reasons
move
the
Prince
where
he
is
employed
,
to
entertain
him
with
delays
,
and
make
his
dispatch
accordingly
.
The
sufficiency
of
good
Counsellors
consistetd
in
fonr
things
.
First
,
They
ought
to
be
wise
and
skilful
how
to
handle
their
Affairs
,
directing
all
doings
to
publick
Commodity
.
Secondly
,
To
be
just
in
their
Proceedings
,
giving
to
every
one
that
which
to
him
appertaineth
.
Thirdly
,
To
be
stout
,
and
void
both
of
partial
respects
and
fear
.
And
lastly
,
To
be
temperate
and
moderate
in
their
Desires
.
Whoso
desireth
to
govern
well
and
securely
,
it
behoveth
him
to
have
a
vigilant
Eye
to
the
Proceedings
of
great
Princes
,
and
to
consider
seriously
of
their
Designs
:
For
it
is
matter
of
small
difficulty
to
live
in
Peace
with
him
who
desireth
our
Amity
,
and
provideth
for
others
that
endeavor
to
offend
us
.
The
Intelligences
that
Princes
study
to
attain
,
are
procured
by
divers
means
:
Some
are
brought
by
report
,
some
vented
by
Conversation
and
Sounding
,
some
by
means
of
Espials
;
but
the
most
sure
and
credibe
Occurrents
,
are
those
which
come
from
Ambassadors
,
chiesly
those
that
either
for
the
Greatness
of
their
Prince
,
or
their
own
Virtue
,
be
of
most
Reputation
.
For
those
Men
conversing
daily
with
great
Personages
,
and
pondering
diligently
their
Manners
,
Words
,
Wisdom
,
and
the
order
of
each
Man's
Troceedings
,
yea
,
of
the
Prince
himself
,
may
with
Commodity
attain
unto
matters
of
great
Importance
sooner
than
they
that
are
Writers
of
Rumors
,
or
that
take
upon
them
to
Conjecture
of
things
to
come
.
Whensoever
a
People
is
induced
to
commit
so
great
an
Error
,
as
to
give
Reputation
to
one
only
Man
,
to
the
end
he
should
oppress
all
those
great
Men
whom
they
hate
,
they
thereby
give
him
opportunity
to
become
their
Prince
;
and
so
being
assisted
with
their
Favor
and
Aid
,
he
may
likewise
extinguish
all
the
rest
of
the
Nobility
;
and
they
being
extirpated
,
he
will
also
endeavor
to
tyrannize
over
the
People
,
by
whose
help
he
aspired
.
So
many
as
are
not
consenting
to
the
Tyranny
,
rest
Enemies
to
the
Person
of
the
Tyrant
,
who
can
by
no
means
gain
the
Love
of
all
.
For
impossible
it
is
,
that
the
Riches
of
any
Tyrant
should
be
so
great
,
and
the
Honors
he
can
give
so
many
as
may
satisfie
all
.
Hereof
it
cometh
,
that
those
Tyrants
that
are
favored
of
the
People
,
and
disfavored
of
the
Nobles
,
are
most
secure
;
because
their
Tyranny
is
supported
with
a
greater
Strength
(
having
the
Multitude
their
Friends
)
then
is
the
Tyrant
whom
the
Humor
of
the
Nobles
only
hath
advanced
.
A
dangerous
thing
it
is
in
all
Commonwealths
by
continual
punishing
,
to
hold
the
Minds
of
Subjects
in
Suspition
;
for
Men
ever
fearing
their
Ruine
,
will
(
without
respect
)
determine
to
save
them selves
,
and
as
Men
desperate
,
attempt
Innovation
.
All
Capital
Executions
ought
therefore
to
be
executed
suddenly
,
and
as
it
were
at
one
Instant
,
so
to
assure
the
Minds
of
Men
from
furher
Molestations
.
The
Intent
of
every
Wise
Prince
that
maketh
War
,
either
by
Election
or
Ambition
,
is
to
gain
and
hold
what
is
gotten
:
Also
to
use
the
matter
so
as
thereby
he
may
inrich
himself
,
and
not
impoverish
his
own
People
or
Country
.
He
that
inlargeth
his
Dominions
,
doth
not
always
increase
his
Power
;
but
he
that
increaseth
in
force
as
well
as
in
Dominion
,
shall
thereby
grow
great
;
otherwise
he
gained
no
more
than
is
shortly
to
be
lost
,
and
consequently
he
ruineth
himself
:
For
who
spends
more
in
the
War
,
than
he
gains
by
Victory
,
loseth
both
Labor
and
Cost
.
Every
Prince
and
Commonwealth
must
above
all
things
take
heed
,
that
no
Necessity
how
great
soever
,
do
perswade
him
to
bring
into
his
Dominion
any
Auxiliary
Soldiers
;
because
the
hardest
Conditions
the
Enemy
can
offer
,
are
more
easie
than
is
such
a
Resolution
.
A
Prince
sheweth
his
Ruine
at
hand
,
whensoever
he
beginneth
to
break
the
,
Laws
and
Customs
,
which
are
〈◊〉
have
been
long
time
obeyed
by
the
to
People
of
his
Dominion
.
That
Prince
which
careth
to
keep
himself
secure
from
Conspiracy
,
ought
rather
to
fear
those
to
whom
he
hath
done
over-great
Favors
,
than
them
whom
he
hath
much
injured
:
For
these
want
Opportunities
,
the
other
do
not
;
and
both
their
Desires
are
as
one
;
because
the
Appetite
of
Commanding
,
is
always
as
much
or
more
than
the
desire
of
Revenge
.
Whensoever
a
Prince
discovers
a
Conspiracy
,
he
must
well
consider
the
quality
thereof
,
measuring
the
Force
of
the
Conspirators
with
his
own
;
and
finding
them
many
and
mighty
,
the
knowledge
thereof
is
to
be
dissembled
,
until
the
Princes
Power
be
prepared
to
oppose
them
;
otherwise
he
hazardeth
his
own
security
.
It
hath
been
by
long
Experience
found
better
to
send
one
General
to
an
Army
,
though
he
be
of
mean
Sufficiency
,
than
to
give
the
same
Authority
to
two
or
more
Excellent
Personages
with
equal
Commission
.
He
that
coveteth
to
be
over-much
loved
,
oft-tentimes
becomes
contemptible
;
and
he
that
endeavoreth
to
be
over-much
feared
,
is
ever
hated
:
And
to
hold
the
mean
between
them
,
cannot
be
exactly
done
,
because
Nature
will
not
so
permit
.
Whoso
aspireth
to
any
Dignity
,
must
resolve
himself
to
endure
the
Envy
of
Men
,
and
never
to
be
moved
for
any
Offence
conceived
against
him
,
though
they
that
be
offended
,
be
his
dear
Friends
:
Neither
shall
he
for
the
first
affront
or
encounter
,
relinquish
his
hope
;
for
he
that
constantly
maketh
head
against
the
assault
of
Fortune
,
shall
after
with
Facility
arrive
where
he
designed
.
In
giving
Council
to
a
Prince
or
Commonwealth
,
and
therefore
desiring
to
eschew
Danger
and
Offence
,
no
other
mean
is
to
be
taken
than
that
the
Counsellor
shall
without
Passion
or
Perswasion
pronounce
his
Opinion
,
and
never
to
affirm
any
thing
as
a
Resolution
,
but
with
modesty
to
defend
that
he
speaketh
;
so
as
the
Prince
which
follows
his
Advice
,
may
seem
to
do
it
voluntarily
,
and
not
forced
by
the
importunity
of
him
that
gave
the
Counsel
.
A
discreet
Captain
being
in
the
Field
against
the
Enemy
,
of
whose
Virtue
he
hath
had
no
Proof
,
ought
first
by
light
Skirmishes
to
feel
of
what
Virtue
he
is
;
and
not
to
Enterprise
any
general
Adventnre
,
to
the
end
that
Terror
or
Fame
should
not
daunt
nor
discourage
his
own
Soldiers
.
Albeit
Fraud
be
in
all
Actions
detested
,
yet
is
the
same
in
Martial
Enter
prises
commendible
and
glorious
:
For
that
Captain
who
compasseth
his
Designs
by
Wit
or
Stratagem
,
is
no
less
commended
than
he
that
Vanquisheth
the
Enemy
by
Violence
and
Force
.
In
times
of
Extremity
,
when
Resolution
must
be
taken
for
the
having
or
utter
Loss
of
the
State
,
then
no
regard
is
to
be
had
of
Justice
or
Injustice
,
Mercy
or
Cruelty
,
Honor
or
Ignominy
,
but
rather
setting
aside
all
Respects
,
that
course
is
to
be
followed
which
defended
the
Lives
and
Liberties
of
Men.
Whoso
desireth
to
know
what
will
be
hereafter
,
let
him
think
of
that
is
past
;
for
the
World
hath
ever
been
in
a
circular
Revolution
:
Whatsoever
is
now
,
was
heretofore
,
and
things
past
or
present
are
no
other
than
such
as
shall
be
again
:
Redit
orbis
in
orbem
.
A
Prince
that
desireth
to
obtain
any
thing
at
the
hand
of
another
,
must
if
it
be
possible
urge
a
sudden
Answer
,
and
lay
before
him
that
is
moved
,
a
Necessity
to
resolve
presently
,
giving
him
to
understand
that
denial
or
delays
may
breed
a
perilous
and
sudden
Indignation
.
There
is
nothing
more
difficult
,
doubtful
and
dangerous
than
to
attempt
Innovation
:
For
he
that
taketh
in
hand
an
Enterprize
of
such
quality
,
maketh
all
those
his
Enemies
which
lived
well
under
the
old
Order
,
and
findeth
them
cold
Defenders
that
affect
his
Novelties
,
which
coldness
proceedeth
chiefly
of
Incredulity
;
for
Men
are
not
easily
induced
to
believe
a
new
thing
till
Experience
hath
proved
it
to
be
good
.
There
is
no
Art
nor
Knowledge
so
seemly
and
necessary
for
a
Prince
as
the
Art
Military
with
theOrdinances
and
Discipline
thereof
:
For
that
is
the
only
Skill
required
in
him
that
commandeth
,
and
such
a
Virtue
as
doth
not
only
maintain
them
that
are
born
Princes
,
but
often
advanceth
private
Men
to
that
Dignity
.
The
deep
Impressions
which
old
Injuries
make
in
the
Minds
of
great
Men
cannot
with
new
Benefits
be
razed
out
;
it
is
also
to
be
remembred
that
Injuries
be
done
all
together
:
For
they
offend
the
less
,
and
will
be
forgotten
the
sooner
;
but
Benefits
should
by
little
and
little
be
bestowed
,
so
shall
the
Memory
of
them
long
continue
.
A
small
pleasure
or
displeasure
presently
done
,
doth
move
more
than
a
great
good
turn
bestowed
in
times
past
;
for
the
taste
of
things
present
doth
make
a
deeper
impression
in
the
Minds
of
Men
,
than
doth
the
Memory
of
things
past
,
or
expectation
of
things
to
come
.
It
is
a
matter
of
small
difficulty
to
sound
the
discontentment
of
other
Men.
For
every
one
doth
willingly
tell
the
well
and
ill
deserving
of
Friends
,
and
likewise
how
much
or
how
little
Foes
can
do
,
if
we
have
Patience
to
hear
,
which
Patience
is
the
beginning
of
all
good
Speed
;
but
he
that
delighteth
to
speak
much
,
and
hear
little
,
shall
ever
inform
others
more
than
himself
can
learn.
Among
other
dangers
which
a
Prince
incurreth
by
being
disarmed
,
the
greatest
is
,
that
thereby
he
becometh
contemptible
;
for
no
comparison
there
is
between
Men
armed
and
them
that
are
disarmed
:
and
no
reason
there
is
that
he
that
is
armed
should
yield
Obedience
to
him
that
is
disarmed
,
neither
is
it
like
that
a
Prince
disarmed
can
be
secure
from
his
own
Subjects
armed
.
A
Prince
Ignorant
of
Martial
knowledge
,
among
other
Misfortunes
cannot
be
esteemed
or
trusted
of
his
own
Soldiers
;
it
behoveth
him
therefore
as
well
in
time
of
Peace
as
War
to
exercise
Arms
,
which
may
be
done
by
two
means
;
the
one
by
Action
of
Body
,
the
other
by
Contemplation
of
Mind
.
The
Body
may
be
exercised
in
Hunting
,
Hawking
,
and
such
like
Pastimes
;
thereby
to
be
made
apt
to
endure
Travel
:
his
Mind
likewise
may
be
informed
by
Reading
of
Histories
,
and
the
Consideration
of
Actions
performed
by
excellent
Captains
,
observing
the
occasion
of
their
Victories
or
Losses
,
to
the
end
he
may
imitate
the
one
,
and
eschew
the
other
.
He
that
doth
not
as
other
Men
do
,
but
endeavoureth
that
which
ought
to
be
done
,
shall
thereby
rather
incur
Peril
than
Preservation
;
for
whoso
laboureth
to
be
sincerely
Perfect
and
Good
,
shall
necessarily
Perish
,
living
among
Men
that
are
generally
Evil.
A
Prince
that
useth
Liberality
to
his
prejudice
,
ought
not
to
regard
the
Infamy
of
Miserable
,
because
his
Parsimony
will
in
time
enable
him
to
be
Liberal
,
and
so
may
declare
himself
to
be
,
having
by
Parsimony
increased
his
Power
,
and
therefore
without
imposing
upon
the
People
,
may
defend
himself
from
all
such
as
will
make
War
;
so
shall
he
use
Liberality
to
all
them
from
whom
he
taketh
nothing
,
who
are
infinite
;
and
use
Miserliness
to
those
only
to
whom
he
giveth
,
who
are
but
few
.
There
is
nothing
that
consumeth
it self
like
to
Librality
;
for
if
it
be
long
used
,
it
taketh
away
the
means
to
continue
it
,
and
consequently
doth
make
Men
poor
and
basely
minded
:
Or
else
to
eschew
Poverty
,
they
shall
be
forced
to
Extortion
and
become
Odious
.
It
is
better
to
incur
the
name
of
Covetous
(
which
is
a
Scandal
without
hate
)
then
with
desire
to
be
accounted
Liberal
,
deserve
the
Infamy
of
Opperession
(
an
Ignominy
accompanied
with
hatred
.
)
A
Prince
ought
to
be
slow
in
believing
,
and
advised
in
proceeding
;
he
should
also
beware
not
to
make
himself
over
much
feared
,
but
in
all
his
Actions
shew
great
Wisdom
tempered
with
Curtesie
;
so
shall
not
over
much
Considence
induce
him
to
be
careless
,
nor
over
much
diffidence
render
him
intolerable
.
Whoso
observeth
,
shall
see
that
Man
offended
,
less
respect
him
whom
they
Love
,
than
him
whom
they
fear
.
For
Love
is
maintained
by
a
certain
reciproque
Obligation
,
which
because
Men
are
Evil
,
useth
to
be
by
every
occasion
of
Profit
broken
.
But
Fear
is
continued
by
a
certain
dread
of
Punishment
which
never
faileth
.
A
Prince
that
holdeth
in
the
Field
an
Army
wherein
are
great
numbers
of
Soldiers
,
ought
not
to
care
though
he
be
accompted
Cruel
:
For
without
such
an
Opinion
conceived
,
he
cannot
keep
his
Forces
united
,
nor
apt
to
attempt
any
Enterprize
.
Men
for
the
most
,
do
use
rather
to
judge
by
their
Eyes
,
than
by
their
Hands
,
for
every
one
may
see
,
but
few
can
certainly
know
.
Every
one
seeth
what
thou
seemest
to
be
,
but
few
can
understand
what
thou
art
indeed
;
and
these
few
dare
not
oppose
themselves
to
the
Opinion
of
many
which
have
the
Majesty
of
Estate
to
defend
them
.
Also
in
the
Actions
of
all
Men
,
and
chiefly
Princes
,
from
whom
is
no
Appellation
,
the
End
is
ever
observed
.
Machiavel
.
A
Prince
being
forced
to
use
the
Condition
of
Beasts
,
must
among
them
make
Choice
of
the
Fox
and
the
Lyon
;
for
the
Lyon
cannot
take
heed
of
Snares
,
and
the
Fox
is
easily
overcome
by
the
Wolves
:
It
behoveth
him
therefore
to
be
a
Fox
to
discover
the
Snares
,
and
a
Lyon
to
terrifie
the
Wolves
.
A
Prince
newly
advanced
cannot
observe
those
Rules
,
which
are
the
Cause
that
Men
be
accounted
Good
;
be
being
many
Times
constrained
for
defence
of
his
State
to
proceed
contrary
to
Promise
,
contrary
to
Charity
,
and
all
Vertue
;
and
consequently
it
behoveth
him
to
have
a
Mind
apt
to
Alteration
,
as
the
Wind
and
Variation
of
Fortune
shall
direct
;
yet
ought
he
not
to
abandon
the
Good
,
if
so
he
can
,
but
be
ready
to
use
what
is
Evil
,
if
so
he
shall
be
inforced
.
Every
Prince
ought
to
have
two
Ears
,
the
one
Intrinsick
,
in
respect
of
Subjects
;
the
other
Extrinsick
,
in
respect
of
Forreign
Potentates
,
from
whom
he
may
be
defended
with
Good
Arms
,
and
Good
Friends
:
Also
Matters
Intrinsick
will
ever
stand
well
,
so
long
as
all
things
abroad
rest
firm
.
A
Prince
that
is
favoured
of
the
Multitude
,
need
not
to
doubt
Conspiracy
;
but
contrary
wise
,
where
the
People
is
generally
Discontented
and
Hareth
the
Prince
,
then
may
he
reasonably
doubt
every
Thing
,
and
every
Person
;
for
no
Man
is
so
Poor
,
that
wanteth
a
Weapon
wherewith
to
offend
.
When
any
Occasion
is
presented
to
have
that
thou
desirest
,
fail
not
to
lay
hold
thereof
;
for
these
Worldly
Things
do
vary
,
and
that
so
suddenly
,
as
hard
it
is
to
assure
our selves
of
any
thing
,
unless
the
same
be
already
in
Hand
:
On
the
other
Side
,
if
any
Trouble
threaten
thee
,
defer
it
so
long
as
thou
mayest
;
for
Time
may
occasion
some
Accident
to
remove
all
Dangers
.
The
Prince
that
doubteth
the
Fidelity
of
his
Subjects
,
must
of
Force
build
Fortresses
;
but
he
that
feareth
Foreign
Force
more
than
his
own
People
,
were
better
to
leave
them
unbuilt
.
Howsoever
it
be
,
that
Prince
that
desireth
generally
to
be
Respected
and
Esteemed
,
must
perform
some
notable
Enterprise
,
and
give
Testimony
of
great
Vertue
and
Valour
.
A
Prince
shall
do
well
at
all
Times
to
be
counselled
so
as
no
Man
do
presume
to
give
Counsel
but
when
the
Prince
doth
ask
it
.
It
is
also
to
be
noted
,
That
he
who
is
not
of
himself
Wise
,
cannot
be
well
counselled
of
others
,
unless
happily
he
yield
to
some
Wise
Men
the
Government
of
his
whole
Affairs
.
For
Good
Counsels
from
whomsoever
they
proceed
,
shall
be
thought
to
come
from
the
Prince
,
and
not
the
Wisdom
of
the
Prince
to
proceed
from
the
Counsel
of
others
.
He
that
taketh
Delight
to
be
Employed
in
Publick
Affairs
,
must
by
all
Means
endeavour
to
continue
in
such
Services
:
For
oft
one
Business
dependeth
on
another
,
whereunto
the
Florentine
Proverb
may
be
applied
,
Di
cosa
,
nasae
cosa
,
&
it
tempole
governa
.
Some
Men
have
not
only
desired
,
but
also
compassed
Honour
and
Profit
;
yet
being
in
Possession
of
both
,
were
not
therewith
so
satisfied
,
as
they
hoped
to
be
;
which
being
believed
,
would
happily
extinguish
the
immeasurable
Ambition
wherewith
many
Men
are
possessed
.
By
Experience
I
have
learned
,
That
great
Folly
it
is
to
account
That
Ours
which
we
have
not
,
or
spend
presently
in
Hope
of
suture
Gain
.
Therefore
Merchants
,
during
the
Adventure
of
their
Goods
,
do
not
increase
Domestical
Expences
,
but
Fearing
the
Worst
Assure
what
is
in
Hand
.
For
such
Men
as
have
gained
unto
themselves
Reputation
and
are
accounted
vertuous
,
to
maintain
that
Conceit
,
and
〈◊〉
Envy
,
there
is
nothing
better
than
a
Life
retired
from
daily
Conversation
,
and
chiefly
of
the
Multitude
.
Fugiat
sapiens
commercia
〈◊〉
The
End
that
moveth
a
Prince
to
make
War
,
is
to
Enrich
Himself
,
and
Impoverish
the
Euemy
:
Neither
is
Victory
desired
for
other
Purpose
than
thereby
to
become
the
more
Mighty
,
and
make
the
Enemy
Weak
:
Consequently
wheresoever
thy
Victory
doth
Impoverish
thee
,
or
thy
Gain
therein
doth
Weaken
thee
,
it
followeth
that
either
thou
pass
or
undergo
that
〈◊〉
whereunto
the
Intention
of
War
was
directed
.
And
that
Prince
is
by
Victory
〈◊〉
that
can
〈◊〉
the
Enemies
Power
,
and
become
Master
of
his
Goods
and
Possessions
.
And
that
Prince
is
by
Victory
Impoverished
when
the
Enemy
,
notwithstanding
he
be
Victored
,
can
still
Maintain
himself
,
and
the
Spolis
and
Possessions
are
not
taken
to
the
Use
of
the
Prince
Victorious
,
but
imparted
unto
his
Soldiers
.
For
then
may
he
be
thought
in
his
own
Losing
Infortunate
,
and
in
Victory
Unhappy
;
for
if
he
be
Vanquished
,
then
must
he
endure
the
Osfence
by
Foes
:
And
being
Victorious
shall
be
〈◊〉
to
abide
the
Wrong
offered
by
Friends
;
which
as
they
be
less
Reasonable
,
so
are
they
also
less
supportable
,
because
he
is
still
by
Impositions
forced
to
burthen
the
Subjects
,
whereof
may
be
inferred
.
That
the
Prince
,
having
in
him
any
Generosity
,
cannot
justly
rejoyce
at
that
Victory
which
causeth
the
Subject
to
lament
.
Who
so
desireth
to
obtain
any
thing
,
hopeth
to
compass
his
Desire
,
either
by
Intreaty
,
Presents
,
or
Threatning
;
for
so
shall
he
,
to
whom
the
Request
is
made
,
be
moved
either
with
Compassion
,
Profit
,
or
Fear
:
Nevertheless
,
with
Covetous
and
Cruel
Men
,
and
such
as
are
in
their
Opinion
Mighty
,
none
of
these
can
prevail
.
And
consequently
in
vain
do
they
labour
,
that
go
about
by
Suit
to
stir
them
to
Pity
,
by
Gifts
to
gain
them
,
or
by
Threats
to
fear
them
.
Who
so
is
persuaded
that
any
Common-weal
can
continue
disunited
,
doth
greatly
deceive
himself
:
True
it
is
,
That
some
Divisions
do
maintain
the
Estate
,
but
other
do
indamage
the
same
.
They
which
do
Harm
,
are
such
as
with
Sects
and
Partakings
be
accompanied
;
they
which
help
without
Sects
and
Partakings
,
be
maintained
.
A
wise
Governour
therefore
,
albeit
he
cannot
so
exactly
foresee
but
some
Enemies
will
arise
in
the
State
,
yet
may
he
take
Order
that
no
Factions
may
thereby
grow
.
It
is
therefore
to
be
noted
,
that
the
Citizens
of
every
Estate
,
may
aspire
to
Reputation
,
either
by
Private
or
Publick
Means
.
Reputation
by
Publick
Means
,
is
gained
chiefly
in
the
War
,
either
by
obtaining
Victory
in
some
Battle
,
or
surprising
of
some
City
;
or
else
by
performing
some
Ambassage
deligently
,
prosperously
:
But
Private
Reputation
is
gotten
by
doing
Favour
to
this
or
that
Man
,
and
protecting
them
from
Magistrates
,
giving
them
Mony
,
advancing
them
unworthily
to
Honour
and
Office
;
and
by
great
Feasts
,
entertaining
the
Multitude
;
of
which
manner
of
Proceeding
,
Sects
,
Factions
and
Partakings
do
grow
:
And
as
Reputation
thus
gained
is
dangerous
,
so
the
other
without
Faction
is
profitable
;
because
the
same
is
founded
on
Common
Welfare
,
and
no
private
Profit
:
And
albeit
among
Citizens
of
this
sort
,
will
oft
arise
great
Hate
,
yet
wanting
Followers
for
their
particular
Profit
,
the
State
shall
not
be
indangered
,
but
rather
strengthned
;
for
every
Man
endeavouring
to
deserve
well
,
will
hold
himself
within
the
Bounds
of
Civil
Life
,
and
by
Vertuous
Merits
labout
to
be
advanced
.
To
persuade
or
dissuade
particular
Persons
,
is
a
Matter
of
no
Difficulty
:
For
if
Words
suffice
not
,
yet
Authority
will
prevail
:
But
hard
and
perilous
it
is
to
remove
a
False
Opinion
conceived
by
a
whole
Multitude
,
for
therein
fair
Speech
and
no
Compulsion
must
be
used
.
The
best
means
which
wise
Captains
can
use
to
make
their
Soldiers
resolute
,
is
to
take
from
them
all
Hope
;
which
Resolution
may
also
be
increased
with
the
Love
of
our
Country
and
Confidence
in
the
Captain
:
For
Confidence
groweth
by
the
Valour
of
Men
,
and
Discipline
in
former
Victories
,
and
Trust
reposed
in
the
Leader
.
The
Love
of
our
Country
is
Natural
,
but
the
Affection
we
bear
to
the
Captain
,
proceedeth
rather
from
his
Vertue
,
than
the
Benefits
he
hath
bestowed
.
Necessity
also
may
do
much
,
and
chiefly
that
where
no
Choice
is
left
,
but
either
overcome
by
Arms
or
dye
in
Desperation
.
There
is
nothing
of
so
great
Force
to
hold
an
Army
united
,
as
the
Reputation
os
the
Captain
,
which
proceedeth
only
from
his
Vertue
;
for
neither
Dignity
nor
Authority
without
Valour
can
work
that
Effect
.
The
first
Care
that
a
Captain
must
have
,
is
to
hold
his
Soldiers
well
punished
and
paid
;
for
where
Payment
faileth
,
Punishment
ought
not
to
be
inflicted
:
And
consequently
no
Reason
it
is
to
punish
him
for
Robbery
,
whom
want
of
Pay
enforceth
to
shift
;
but
where
the
Soldier
is
paid
,
and
not
punished
(
offending
)
then
will
he
,
without
Respect
,
become
Insolent
towards
his
Captain
;
whereof
ensue
Mutinies
,
Discord
,
and
utter
Ruin.
It
is
a
Custom
,
very
honourable
,
not
to
promise
more
than
thou
wilt
assuredly
perform
:
Yet
true
it
is
,
that
whosoever
is
denied
(
though
justly
)
doth
rest
ill-contented
;
for
Men
indeed
are
.
not
governed
by
Reason
:
Otherwise
it
is
for
him
that
promiseth
;
and
so
good
Promises
shall
stand
in
stead
of
Performance
:
Besides
that
,
he
may
find
Excuse
enough
,
because
the
most
part
of
Men
are
so
simple
,
that
fair
Words
alone
have
Power
to
abuse
them
,
chiefly
when
they
proceed
from
a
Person
of
Reputation
and
Authority
.
The
best
way
,
therefore
,
is
not
to
promise
precisely
,
but
entertain
the
Suitors
with
Answers
.
general
,
and
full
of
good
Hope
:
Yet
not
such
as
shall
directly
and
absolutely
bind
.
The
greatest
and
most
material
Displeasures
that
use
to
arise
between
the
Nobility
and
People
,
are
caused
by
the
diversity
of
Humours
,
the
one
labouring
to
command
,
the
other
endeavouring
not
to
obey
;
so
as
all
Troubles
and
Disorders
in
every
Common-weal
,
do
thereof
receive
Nutriment
.
The
City
which
is
maintained
rather
by
Factions
than
Laws
,
so
soon
as
one
Faction
is
become
strong
,
and
without
Opposition
,
the
same
of
necessity
must
be
divided
in
it self
:
for
those
particular
Causes
which
were
at
the
first
taken
,
are
not
of
Force
enough
to
maintain
it
.
It
is
the
nature
of
Men
not
to
endure
any
Discommodity
,
unless
Necessity
do
thereunto
enforce
them
:
Which
may
apparently
be
perceived
by
their
Habitations
;
for
as
the
Fear
of
War
draweth
them
to
Places
of
Strength
(
for
their
Defence
)
so
that
Peril
being
past
,
they
do
for
the
most
part
remove
themselves
to
inhabit
Countries
of
more
Commodity
and
Profit
.
It
may
seem
strange
,
and
no
even
Measure
(
yet
approved
by
Experience
)
that
where
many
offend
,
few
are
punished
.
Also
petty
Errors
are
severely
corrected
,
but
great
and
grievous
Crimes
be
rewarded
.
In
like
manner
,
where
many
receive
Wrong
,
few
seek
Revenge
.
For
Injurics
universal
,
are
with
more
Patience
than
particular
Offences
endured
.
All
,
or
the
greatest
part
of
Men
that
have
aspired
to
Riches
or
Power
,
have
attained
thereunto
either
by
Force
or
Fraud
:
And
without
they
have
by
Craft
or
Cruelty
gained
,
to
cover
the
foulness
of
their
Fact
,
they
call
Purchase
as
a
Name
more
honest
.
Howsoever
he
,
that
for
want
of
Will
or
Wit
useth
not
those
Means
,
must
rest
in
Servitude
and
Poverty
.
The
Reason
thereof
is
,
That
as
Nature
hath
laid
before
Men
the
chief
of
all
Fortunes
,
so
she
disposes
them
rather
to
Rapine
than
honest
Industry
,
and
more
subject
to
bad
than
good
Endeavours
:
Hereof
it
cometh
,
that
one
Man
eateth
another
,
and
he
that
is
weakest
must
always
go
to
the
worst
.
Where
Necessity
forceth
,
Boldness
is
reputed
Wisdom
,
and
in
great
Enterprises
Peril
is
not
to
be
made
accompt
of
.
For
those
Attempts
that
begin
with
Danger
,
always
end
with
Honour
,
or
Reward
;
also
from
one
Peril
there
is
no
way
to
escape
,
but
by
entring
into
another
.
A
wise
Man
ought
not
to
desire
to
inhabit
that
Country
where
Men
have
more
Authority
than
Laws
:
For
indeed
that
Country
deserves
to
be
desired
where
every
one
may
securely
enjoy
his
own
;
not
that
,
where
with
facility
it
may
be
taken
away
;
and
that
Friends
for
fear
to
lose
their
own
,
are
inforced
to
forsake
them
.
Some
Magistrates
either
by
over
great
Zeal
or
Ignorance
take
a
Course
of
Rigour
,
which
being
for
the
present
favoured
,
they
are
ever
the
more
imployed
,
as
Men
meet
to
extirpate
Inconveniences
.
But
thereby
the
Subjects
are
often
drawn
into
Desperation
,
and
consequently
have
recourse
unto
Arms
,
as
their
uttermost
Refuge
.
In
this
case
a
Wise
Prince
for
appeasing
the
People
is
sorc'd
to
disallow
his
Ministers
,
and
sometimes
also
to
inflict
publick
Punishment
.
A
Prince
naturally
suspicious
,
and
having
about
him
Persons
inclined
to
Envy
,
is
easily
induced
to
mistrust
those
Men
that
have
served
him
with
most
sufficiency
:
Which
Danger
they
cannot
eschew
,
because
they
who
are
worthiest
Commendation
are
oftentimes
envied
by
such
Persons
as
have
access
unto
the
Prince
.
Who
so
cannot
endure
both
Envy
and
Hate
,
must
refrain
to
enterprise
great
Matters
:
For
great
Honours
being
desired
of
many
,
it
behoveth
him
that
aspireth
unto
them
,
to
be
for
his
Dignity
envied
,
and
for
his
Authority
hated
;
which
Authority
,
albeit
the
same
be
well
used
,
yet
they
who
hate
or
envy
(
persuading
themselves
it
might
be
better
handled
)
endeavour
to
oppress
that
Power
,
as
fearing
it
will
be
worse
.
Among
other
things
which
worketh
the
Inconveniences
of
Common
weals
,
Ambition
and
Desperation
are
chief
;
of
both
,
Desperation
is
worst
:
For
Ambition
may
attend
Occasion
,
Desperation
will
not
,
as
that
cannot
endure
Delays
.
Historians
desiring
to
write
the
Actions
of
Men
,
onght
to
set
down
the
simple
Truth
,
and
not
say
any
thing
for
Love
or
Hatred
:
Also
to
chuse
such
an
Opportunity
for
writing
as
it
may
be
lawful
to
think
what
they
will
,
and
write
what
they
think
,
which
is
a
rare
Happiness
of
the
Time.
In
commending
or
disallowing
the
Actions
of
Men
,
it
is
a
course
very
requisite
to
consider
the
Beginning
,
the
Proceeding
,
and
End
:
So
shall
we
see
the
Reasons
and
Causes
of
things
,
and
not
their
bare
Events
only
;
which
for
the
most
part
are
governed
by
Fortune
.
It
is
a
matter
of
much
Necessity
,
that
every
Man
,
and
chiefly
a
Prince
should
in
his
first
Actions
,
give
some
Testimony
of
Vertue
;
for
falling
at
first
into
obloquie
,
do
he
well
or
ill
,
all
isill-taken
.
The
Custom
of
the
Common
People
is
to
judge
rather
by
their
Eyes
than
by
their
Ears
:
Which
is
the
cause
they
allow
more
of
external
Shew
than
inward
Vertue
:
And
true
it
is
,
where
excellency
of
Mind
,
and
Beauty
of
Body
concur
,
the
Commendation
due
to
such
a
Person
is
far
the
greater
.
Gratior
est
pulchro
veniens
e
corpore
virtus
.
A
Prince
or
great
Personage
that
constantly
endureth
Adversity
,
deserveth
great
Praise
:
Yet
greater
Commendation
is
due
to
him
that
beareth
himself
modestly
in
his
Happiness
.
For
Miseries
are
ost
born
with
Patience
,
but
Felicity
corrupteth
.
To
be
descended
of
Princes
,
or
great
Personages
,
is
a
matter
of
meer
Fortune
,
and
so
to
be
esteemed
:
But
Adoption
proceedeth
from
the
Judgment
of
Men
,
therefore
seemeth
incorrupt
,
and
seldom
abused
.
It
hath
been
long
observed
,
and
is
a
Rule
which
rarely
faileth
,
that
he
shall
be
ever
suspected
of
the
Prince
in
possession
,
whom
Men
account
worthy
to
be
a
Prince
in
Reversion
.
It
hath
been
a
Use
very
ancient
to
give
Credit
to
Astrologers
,
and
other
such
Persons
,
who
by
their
Star-Learning
or
Blind
Divination
,
take
upon
them
to
tell
of
things
to
come
.
The
Reason
thereof
is
,
That
the
most
part
of
Men
believe
that
soonest
which
they
least
understand
;
and
if
they
see
the
Event
of
a
Prediction
,
though
it
happeneth
by
meer
Chance
to
fall
out
according
to
that
was
premised
,
thereupon
they
settle
so
firm
an
Impression
,
as
albeit
many
other
fail
,
yet
the
good
Conceipt
of
their
Cunning
cannot
be
removed
.
Liberality
is
a
Vertue
which
gaineth
Love
,
but
much
are
they
deceived
whom
Riot
in
lieu
thereof
abuseth
.
To
cast
away
and
consume
is
soon
learned
,
but
to
give
in
good
Order
few
have
the
Skill
.
In
Time
of
sudden
Mutiny
,
Conspiracy
,
and
Offence
of
People
,
the
wisest
Resolution
is
not
to
oppose
Force
to
prevent
Fury
,
but
rather
give
Space
for
the
Bad
to
amend
,
and
the
Good
to
consent
:
For
Treasons
prevail
on
the
sudden
,
but
good
Council
gathers
Forces
by
Leisure
.
Mature
Deliberation
ought
ever
to
be
used
;
but
when
Arms
are
to
determine
,
speedy
Execution
is
the
best
:
Because
no
Delay
in
that
Euterprise
is
sit
which
cannot
be
commended
before
it
be
ended
.
Who
so
is
pleased
to
observe
the
proceedings
of
Men
in
Authority
,
shall
observe
that
some
of
them
hold
a
plain
course
without
respect
;
others
projecting
for
time
to
come
,
do
forecast
how
to
hold
their
present
good
fortune
or
at
least
to
escape
danger
:
For
they
mistrusting
present
Prosperity
and
fearing
a
change
,
prepare
beforehand
some
private
Friends
to
oppose
against
publick
hatred
:
Whereof
may
be
inferred
,
that
no
care
is
taken
of
Innocency
,
but
every
one
studieth
how
to
pass
without
punishment
.
In
Captains
and
all
Military
Commanders
,
three
things
are
required
,
Vertue
,
Discipline
,
and
Authority
;
but
in
private
Soldiers
Obedience
and
Courage
only
sufficeth
;
for
by
due
obeying
,
and
no
curious
scanning
the
Leaders
directions
are
maintained
;
and
the
Army
in
danger
is
alwaies
most
valiant
,
which
before
the
danger
is
most
quiet
.
Let
the
Soldier
therefore
be
well
armed
and
valiantly
minded
.
To
advise
and
direct
must
be
the
Captains
care
.
It
is
a
matter
of
no
great
moment
,
yet
always
worthy
the
noting
,
that
any
exterior
Behaviour
,
or
Garment
presenting
Pride
or
Greatness
,
chiefly
in
Persons
lately
advanced
,
though
no
Man
be
thereby
interessed
or
injured
,
doth
move
in
others
a
certain
offence
:
For
the
nature
of
Man
is
such
,
as
beholdeth
the
new
prosperity
of
others
with
an
envious
Eye
,
and
wisheth
a
moderation
of
Fortune
no
where
so
much
as
in
those
we
have
known
in
equal
degree
with
our selves
.
In
all
Enterprises
of
War
(
if
present
necessity
doth
not
otherwise
require
)
Leisure
and
Deliberation
ought
to
be
used
;
for
often
it
sufficeth
in
lieu
of
Wisdom
,
to
take
the
advantage
of
other
Mens
solly
.
All
Men
that
are
to
consider
of
great
Actions
,
ought
to
be
informed
whether
that
which
is
undertaken
be
profitable
for
the
Commonweal
,
honourable
to
themselves
,
and
easie
to
be
effected
;
or
at
least
not
greatly
difficult
.
Also
he
that
persuadeth
,
is
to
be
examined
whether
besides
bare
Words
and
Counsel
,
he
will
〈◊〉
his
own
Peril
;
and
if
Fortune
favour
the
attempt
,
to
whom
the
principal
Glory
shall
redound
.
The
Perils
which
accompany
private
Enterprises
,
are
far
unlike
to
those
which
he
doth
enter
that
aspireth
to
Principality
.
For
in
private
attempts
a
Man
may
pause
or
proceed
as
he
will
:
But
to
him
that
aspires
to
Empire
there
remains
no
middle
course
,
but
either
by
Victory
to
triumph
as
a
Prince
;
or
being
vanquished
to
endure
death
as
a
Traytor
.
Let
no
Man
in
his
Prosperity
,
give
much
credit
to
common
Applause
or
Service
,
assured
by
any
of
whom
in
meaner
Fortune
he
hath
had
no
experience
;
for
the
base
People
are
learned
in
no
Lesson
,
only
without
difference
of
Truth
or
Falshood
to
slatter
Men
in
Authority
,
and
with
Shouts
and
Words
of
great
rejoycing
make
shew
of
great
Affection
.
As
overmuch
haste
is
dangerous
,
so
too
great
delay
oftentimes
proveth
disadvantagious
;
for
albeit
consultation
ought
to
forego
action
,
yet
to
Dispute
long
and
in
the
end
reject
the
advice
of
either
side
,
or
take
a
middle
course
(
which
in
cases
of
doubt
and
danger
is
worst
)
was
ever
accompted
great
diseretion
.
There
is
no
course
more
comely
,
nor
any
resolution
so
well
beseeming
a
wise
Man
,
having
made
prcos
of
his
own
Vertue
(
and
finding
in
Age
no
Fortune
due
to
such
effect
)
as
to
retire
himself
from
the
Court
and
Company
;
for
so
shall
he
shun
the
Inconveniences
of
Contempt
and
the
Discommodity
of
Travel
(
Jucunda
senectuti
otia
)
yet
true
it
is
,
that
whoso
hath
lived
a
Prince
or
governed
as
a
publick
Person
,
cannot
expect
security
in
a
private
Estate
.
Whensoever
danger
draweth
near
,
and
terror
is
at
hand
,
all
Men
look
about
,
but
none
willingly
adventure
:
For
in
such
Cases
every
Man
will
give
Council
,
but
few
will
take
part
of
the
peril
.
In
Common-wealths
where
Sects
or
Partialities
be
,
the
Leader
of
any
side
is
able
to
kindle
Civil
War
;
yet
is
he
unable
to
moderate
the
Victory
:
For
to
stir
up
dissentions
and
troubles
,
the
worst
Man
most
commonly
bears
the
stroke
;
but
peace
and
quietness
are
not
established
but
by
Men
of
rare
Gifts
and
excellent
Vertue
.
It
may
seem
strange
and
contrary
both
to
courtesie
and
Christian
profession
,
that
Men
are
far
more
mindful
of
Injuries
done
unto
them
,
than
of
benefits
received
by
them
.
The
reason
thereof
is
,
that
Thankfulness
is
accompted
a
burden
,
but
Revenge
is
sweet
,
and
reckoned
a
great
gain
.
Of
reconciled
Foes
,
and
such
as
know
that
our
harms
were
caused
by
their
means
,
we
oft-times
expect
favour
,
as
persuaded
that
new
Friendship
will
repair
the
loss
of
old
displeasure
:
But
the
matter
doth
seldom
so
fall
out
;
for
the
quality
of
Man's
nature
is
ever
to
hate
those
whom
he
hath
hurt
,
and
love
them
whom
he
hath
made
beholding
.
Quos
laeserunt
oderunt
.
Tac.
To
common
Persons
and
such
as
are
ignorant
in
Matters
of
State
,
every
Taxation
and
Imposition
seemeth
heavy
or
superfluous
;
yet
the
wiser
sort
know
,
that
the
end
of
all
publick
endeavour
is
to
confirm
People
in
Peace
,
and
Peace
cannot
be
maintained
without
Arms
,
nor
Arms
without
Pay
,
nor
Pay
without
Impositions
.
As
fortunate
Folk
are
envied
,
so
are
the
poor
contemned
;
which
Rule
reacheth
also
to
Princes
:
The
one
lives
in
Plenty
with
War
,
the
other
in
Poverty
with
Peace
.
For
〈◊〉
is
it
seen
,
that
those
People
are
assaulted
where
nothing
is
to
be
gained
,
and
whose
base
Beings
afford
no
other
spoils
than
Blood
and
Beggery
.
Wisemen
have
observed
that
in
matter
of
State
,
and
the
managing
thereof
,
three
Things
are
especially
to
be
looked
unto
:
The.
first
is
,
Occasion
;
the
second
,
the
Intentions
of
other
Men
;
the
third
,
our
own
Affection
.
For
there
is
nothing
that
slippeth
away
so
soon
as
Occasion
,
nothing
so
difficult
as
to
judge
what
an
other
Man
intendeth
;
nor
any
thing
more
〈◊〉
than
our
own
immoderate
〈◊〉
It
hath
been
ever
a
course
observed
by
wise
Princes
,
but
much
more
by
Arislocracies
and
Popular
States
,
against
Force
and
Fury
of
the
Multitude
,
to
desend
themselves
with
Silver
and
Gold.
How
much
more
it
importeth
all
Princes
to
lead
a
vertuous
Life
,
and
give
daily
example
of
Piety
and
Justice
,
appears
apparently
in
the
Proceedings
of
the
Roman
Bishops
;
who
by
the
well-doing
of
some
few
of
them
at
the
first
,
became
greatly
honoured
;
but
afterwards
they
became
contemptible
:
For
the
Reverence
which
Men
did
bear
to
the
sanctity
of
their
Lives
failing
,
it
was
impossible
of
so
contrary
Manners
and
Examples
to
look
for
like
effects
.
The
success
of
the
War
chiefly
dependeth
on
the
Reputation
of
the
Prince
,
which
declining
,
the
vertue
also
of
the
Soldiers
faileth
:
Likewise
the
sidelity
of
the
People
decayeth
,
and
their
Mony
to
maintain
the
War
,
ceaseth
;
contrarywise
,
the
Courage
of
the
Enemy
is
increased
,
they
that
stood
doubtful
become
resolved
,
and
every
difficulty
augmenteth
.
The
Authority
which
Princes
give
,
is
chiefly
in
respect
of
Wisdom
and
Valour
:
Yet
true
it
is
,
that
for
the
most
part
they
account
them
the
wisest
Men
that
can
best
accommodate
themselves
to
their
Humour
.
The
greatest
Distress
and
Difficulty
which
can
come
to
any
Army
,
doth
proceed
of
these
Causes
:
Want
of
Mony
,
scarcity
of
Victuals
,
hatred
of
People
,
discord
of
Captains
,
disobedience
of
Soldiers
,
and
their
flying
to
the
Enemy
,
either
of
necessity
or
free-will
.
A
Prince
or
great
Magistrate
having
long
maintained
the
reputation
of
Wisdom
and
Vertue
,
must
take
heed
that
no
rash
or
dangerous
Resolution
do
taint
the
Honourable
Fame
of
his
former
Life
:
For
to
be
transported
with
Anger
against
his
own
Profit
,
is
lightness
;
and
to
esteem
small
dangers
more
than
great
,
is
want
of
Judgment
.
A
Prince
or
Person
of
great
Estate
,
must
be
wary
not
to
inure
the
conceit
of
double
dealing
:
For
little
Sincerity
and
Trust
is
looked
in
his
Actions
,
of
whom
there
is
an
opinion
of
Crast
and
Falshood
conceived
.
Experience
hath
always
proved
,
that
whatsoever
the
most
part
of
men
desire
,
rarely
cometh
to
pass
:
The
reason
hereof
is
,
that
the
effects
of
Human
Actions
commonly
depend
on
the
will
of
a
few
;
and
their
Intentions
ever
differing
from
the
greater
number
,
the
end
and
success
cannot
be
other
than
as
pleaseth
the
few
that
are
to
direct
them
.
There
is
nothing
more
dangerous
than
to
enterprise
a
War
,
or
other
Actions
of
Importance
upon
popular
persuasion
;
for
such
expectations
are
vain
,
and
such
designs
fallible
:
Also
the
Fury
of
the
Multitude
is
great
,
when
danger
is
little
or
far
off
;
but
Perils
growing
great
and
near
,
their
Courage
quaileth
,
as
they
whose
Passions
have
no
Rule
or
Measure
.
It
is
strange
to
see
how
apt
Men
are
to
doubt
displeasure
threatned
by
Enemies
,
chiefly
when
they
draw
near
;
for
the
People
do
naturally
over-much
fear
Dangers
at
hand
,
and
esteem
less
than
is
fit
of
things
present
:
Also
to
make
small
account
of
those
that
are
far
from
them
,
because
divers
Remedies
may
be
hoped
as
well
by
time
,
as
other
accidents
.
The
offensive
Words
or
Answers
of
Indignation
,
proceeding
from
great
Princes
,
ought
never
to
admit
displeasure
into
the
Minds
of
them
against
whom
they
are
spoken
:
For
having
by
Speech
uttered
a
great
part
of
Choler
,
the
edge
of
their
Deeds
becomes
the
calmer
,
and
more
easily
appeased
:
Such
is
the
condition
of
noble
and
generous
Spirits
.
To
judge
right
of
other
Mens
merit
,
seems
of
great
difficulty
;
for
time
and
tryal
is
thereto
required
:
Also
it
is
not
easie
to
answer
the
expectation
of
Men
,
but
ost-times
inconsiderate
,
and
not
measured
in
due
proportion
.
It
is
a
part
of
great
discretion
to
divide
the
seasons
of
Affairs
and
Vacations
:
For
as
it
sitteth
well
a
Prince
or
Person
of
Dignity
in
times
of
Audience
and
Judgment
,
to
be
grave
,
heedsul
,
and
austere
:
So
those
Offices
performed
,
all
shew
of
Authority
and
sad
looks
ought
to
be
set
apart
;
for
by
that
means
,
neither
courteous
Behaviour
shall
detract
from
the
Reverence
due
to
his
place
,
nor
severity
diminish
the
Love
which
to
his
Behaviour
appertaineth
.
Magistrates
must
look
into
all
things
,
but
not
exact
all
things
to
rigor
.
Light
Faults
may
be
pardoned
,
but
great
Offences
severely
〈◊〉
yet
not
always
proceeding
to
punishing
,
but
ost
contented
with
Repentance
.
To
be
bitter
in
rebuking
is
also
fit
for
a
Magistrate
,
shewing
himself
sowre
to
the
bad
,
and
sweet
to
the
good
;
framing
both
Countenance
and
Condition
according
to
the
Merit
of
Men
,
and
be
persuaded
that
it
is
more
honest
to
offend
,
than
to
hate
.
Soldiers
must
be
encouraged
in
all
Fortunes
to
stand
resolved
,
and
not
to
be
daunted
with
any
passed
misadvantage
;
ever
attending
a
Time
and
Opportunity
of
Revenge
;
which
commonly
cometh
to
pass
where
Mens
Minds
are
united
:
For
common
Danger
must
be
repelled
with
Union
and
Concord
.
Among
other
Reasons
wherewith
Soldiers
are
encouraged
,
Necessity
and
Distress
doth
oft
inforce
them
:
For
as
Men
of
Vertue
perform
the
Actions
of
Arms
for
Honour
,
so
the
Coward
must
do
them
for
his
Security
.
All
Enterprises
attempted
by
Arms
,
are
Honourable
;
but
those
that
are
done
in
Countries
remote
,
are
more
praiseable
:
For
the
less
they
be
in
Knowledge
,
the
greater
is
the
Glory
to
Atchieve
them
.
To
be
truly
and
faithfully
loved
,
is
a
thing
greatly
to
be
desired
;
for
Terror
and
Fear
are
weak
Works
of
Affection
:
For
they
being
taken
away
,
he
that
ceaseth
to
fear
,
will
soon
begin
to
hate
;
and
as
they
that
by
Force
are
kept
under
,
obey
with
ill
Will
;
so
they
that
govern
without
Line
justly
,
rule
against
Right
.
Some
Men
either
deserving
to
be
accounted
of
excellent
Wisdom
,
or
singular
in
that
Skill
whereof
they
make
Profession
,
do
ordinarily
love
the
Proceedings
of
others
;
taking
that
Advantage
of
their
ill
Success
:
Yet
sure
it
is
,
that
Disaster
and
unhappy
Event
of
some
Actions
,
proceed
not
of
Disorder
,
for
Human
Imperfection
,
but
from
a
certain
Fatal
Fury
,
which
neither
Counsel
nor
Constancy
of
Men
can
withstand
.
It
is
a
matter
of
much
difficulty
,
or
rather
impossible
for
any
Prince
to
maintain
the
Law
,
Civil
or
Military
,
without
Severity
:
For
where
Men
hope
to
be
easily
pardoned
,
there
are
they
apt
to
offend
.
Contrarily
,
where
Mens
Actions
are
precisely
sitted
,
there
do
they
live
in
over-great
Aw
,
and
Hatred
doth
always
accompany
such
Severity
.
The
best
course
therefore
is
to
punish
Offences
severely
,
and
reward
vertuous
Merits
liberally
;
so
shall
Fear
be
converted
to
reverend
Respect
,
and
none
have
cause
to
complain
:
For
as
it
lies
in
each
Man's
Power
to
shun
offending
,
so
is
it
in
their
Power
also
to
deserve
well
,
and
merit
Reward
.
Whosoever
,
aster
mature
deliberation
,
hath
resolved
what
Course
to
hold
in
the
Action
he
hath
in
hand
,
must
not
after
repent
,
or
fear
any
Difficulty
:
For
such
Thoughts
would
break
the
Vigour
of
the
Mind
,
and
impeach
the
Proceedings
of
that
which
was
resolved
.
And
albeit
some
Differences
do
happily
arise
,
yet
must
he
believe
that
every
other
course
would
have
been
accompanied
with
the
same
or
greater
Impediments
.
Young
Men
for
the
warmness
of
their
Blood
,
and
for
not
having
before-time
been
deceived
by
Fortune
,
more
willingly
enterprise
Actions
rather
honourable
than
severe
.
But
Old
Men
as
well
for
that
their
Heat
is
cooled
,
as
also
for
having
attempted
many
things
in
vain
,
make
choice
of
Enterprises
severe
,
rather
than
those
that
are
followed
with
Fame
and
Glory
.
The
greatness
of
one
Prince
is
nothing
else
but
the
Ruin
and
Distress
of
another
:
Likewise
his
Strength
is
the
Weakness
and
Oppression
of
others
.
Some
Conquests
are
of
such
Quality
,
as
albeit
a
victorious
Captain
merit
triumphal
Honour
;
yet
a
modest
resusal
becomes
his
greater
Glory
.
The
Dignity
of
Magistrates
is
not
assured
without
Arms
;
for
when
Obedience
faileth
,
no
other
means
is
left
to
continue
a
People
united
.
As
willing
Obedience
in
Subjects
is
the
Prince's
Strength
,
so
is
the
same
their
own
Security
:
For
as
by
the
Princes
Authority
the
People
are
governed
,
so
by
their
Consent
he
is
maintained
.
Three
things
Men
covet
with
immoderate
Desire
,
Lands
,
Riches
,
and
Honours
;
but
as
seldom
they
compass
their
full
Content
,
so
are
they
for
the
most
part
to
endure
a
Destiny
far
other
than
they
wished
.
Strange
it
is
,
yet
by
Experience
proved
true
,
That
in
Time
of
Danger
,
Fortune
(
or
rather
Destiny
)
so
much
amazeth
the
Judgment
of
Wise
Men
,
as
seldom
they
conceive
what
Resolution
is
best
to
be
taken
.
No
great
Free-City
can
long
continue
quiet
,
unless
the
same
be
used
to
foreign
Assaults
:
For
wanting
Foes
without
,
some
inward
Enmity
will
arise
,
not
unlike
to
strange
Bodies
of
Men
,
which
being
secure
from
external
Injury
,
are
nevertheless
by
their
own
Poise
oppressed
.
As
every
Pilot
of
ordinary
Skill
knoweth
in
calm
and
quiet
Seas
to
direct
the
Course
of
his
Ship
;
so
every
Governor
of
Capacity
doth
understand
how
the
Affairs
of
State
are
in
peaceable
Times
to
be
handled
:
But
when
Tempests
are
,
and
Subjects
bent
to
Sedition
;
the
one
requires
an
excellent
Sailer
,
the
other
the
Aid
of
some
excellent
Wisdom
.
It
oft
happens
,
that
Publick
Duty
is
opposite
to
private
Friendship
;
so
as
we
are
either
forced
to
omit
the
Offices
due
to
our
Country
,
or
draw
our
dearest
Friends
into
Danger
:
In
which
case
we
are
to
prefer
publick
Respect
,
before
particular
Obligation
.
The
nature
of
base
People
is
such
,
as
either
they
obey
slavishly
,
or
command
insolently
:
For
Liberty
being
the
Mark
whereat
they
aim
,
is
by
them
of
that
Quality
,
neither
moderately
desired
nor
discreetly
continued
;
and
always
there
are
some
seditious
Leaders
to
be
found
,
who
of
Disorder
are
inclined
to
kindle
the
Ire
and
Offence
of
Ignorant
People
.
Dux
rebus
motis
,
facile
invenitur
.
Salust
.
Experience
hath
oft
proved
,
That
Men
in
best
Fortune
,
and
such
as
esteem
themselves
most
secure
,
even
then
fall
soonest
into
Disadventure
,
because
those
Dangers
unfeared
be
as
it
were
contemned
,
and
not
regarded
.
To
enter
needless
Dangers
,
was
ever
accounted
Madness
;
yet
in
Times
of
extream
Peril
and
apparent
Distress
,
Bold
and
Hazardous
Attempts
are
greatest
Security
.
The
divers
Adventures
which
happen
to
Men
,
may
well
inform
,
That
much
better
it
is
,
chiefly
in
Arms
,
to
be
governed
by
Reason
than
by
Fortune
.
A
certain
Peace
is
ever
accounted
better
Security
than
Victory
hoped
or
expected
Melior
tutiorque
certa
pax
quam
sperata
victoria
.
Liv.
If
to
our
Prosperity
God
were
pleased
to
add
the
Grace
of
〈◊〉
we
should
thereby
judge
not
only
of
what
is
past
,
but
also
of
all
that
can
succeed
hereafter
.
Rarely
or
never
can
we
consider
truly
of
worldly
proceedings
,
unless
first
we
have
felt
the
deceits
of
Fortune
.
Discord
or
Dissention
in
any
State
or
City
,
offers
opportunity
to
such
men
as
are
ambitious
to
work
their
will
:
For
the
humor
of
Sects
and
Partialities
is
such
,
as
the
weaker
Faction
doth
ever
chuse
〈◊〉
to
call
for
aid
of
Strangers
,
than
yield
to
the
Dominion
of
an
adverse
Party
.
Ancient
Customs
may
not
violently
and
suddenly
be
taken
away
.
Fortune
which
altereth
all
things
,
will
by
little
and
little
wear
them
out
of
use
.
To
be
oft
in
fight
,
and
converse
much
with
men
,
breedeth
a
kinde
of
Satiery
:
therefore
it
behoveth
persons
of
great
Estate
and
Authority
to
be
retired
,
lest
over-much
familiarity
should
detract
from
the
reverence
due
to
honorable
Estate
.
The
natures
of
men
not
content
to
live
according
to
their
Fortune
and
Birth
,
are
of
all
others
most
prone
to
Envy
;
because
they
hate
the
vertue
and
welfare
of
all
such
as
are
in
estimation
above
them
.
Great
heed
is
to
be
taken
,
that
no
Citizen
or
Subject
,
be
suffered
to
aspire
to
such
greatness
,
as
cannot
be
forced
to
obey
the
Laws
;
and
no
order
there
is
of
more
necessity
,
than
that
every
man
of
what
quality
soever
,
may
be
without
respect
accused
and
judged
.
For
conservation
of
particular
Greatness
and
Dignity
,
there
is
nothing
more
noble
and
glorious
,
than
to
have
felt
the
force
of
every
Fortune
.
It
is
the
quality
of
wise
men
only
,
to
know
how
to
use
Prosperity
,
and
never
to
trust
too
much
to
the
favors
of
present
Happiness
.
A
man
well
advised
in
his
Prosperity
,
beareth
not
himself
towards
others
either
proud
or
violent
;
nor
must
he
believe
in
his
own
present
felicity
,
for
the
Day
knows
not
what
the
Night
bringeth
:
He
only
is
to
be
reputed
a
man
,
whose
mind
cannot
be
puft
up
by
prosperity
,
nor
dejected
by
any
adverse
Fortune
.
Men
of
Cholerick
humor
are
easily
moved
with
insolent
Speeches
,
but
wise
men
laugh
them
to
scorn
.
The
way
whereby
a
Prince
eschues
the
hate
of
Subjects
,
is
,
not
to
take
from
them
their
Lands
or
Goods
;
yet
albeit
the
blood
of
some
few
be
tainted
,
unless
the
same
be
accompanied
with
Confiscation
(
which
a
Prince
is
rarely
forced
to
use
)
it
seldom
causeth
him
to
become
odious
.
A
Rule
most
cerain
it
is
that
he
who
commands
any
thing
unpleasing
,
must
by
severe
means
cause
it
to
be
observed
;
and
who
desireth
to
be
obeyed
,
must
know
how
to
command
:
And
he
only
knows
how
to
command
,
that
doth
compare
his
own
force
with
those
that
are
to
obey
;
wherein
finding
a
proportion
,
then
he
may
boldly
proceed
,
otherwise
forbear
.
In
Actions
of
difficulty
great
courage
is
to
be
used
,
and
who
so
compasseth
any
thing
by
violence
,
cannot
maintain
it
by
mildness
,
nor
command
by
affability
:
He
therefore
that
is
of
nature
soft
,
should
do
best
to
refrain
all
extraordinary
commands
.
and
in
matters
ordinary
imploy
the
vertue
of
his
mild
spirit
;
because
ordinary
punishments
are
not
imputed
to
the
Prince
or
his
Magistrates
,
but
to
the
Laws
and
Ordinances
of
State.
When
Necessity
presseth
,
desperation
is
deemed
Wisdom
,
and
generous
Minds
do
not
account
of
danger
,
because
those
Attempts
which
begin
with
Peril
,
do
for
the
most
part
end
with
Glory
.
He
that
endeavours
to
be
good
among
many
that
are
evil
,
or
will
uphold
that
which
those
labour
to
pull
down
of
Force
,
worketh
his
own
undoing
.
All
Common-wealths
alter
from
order
to
disorder
,
from
disorder
to
order
again
;
for
Nature
having
made
all
worldly
Things
variable
,
so
soon
as
they
have
attained
their
utmost
perfection
and
height
,
they
must
descend
;
so
from
good
they
fall
back
to
evil
;
and
from
evil
they
return
to
good
.
War
begets
Quiet
,
Quiet
Idleness
,
Idleness
Disorder
,
Disorder
Ruin
;
likewise
Ruin
Order
,
Order
Vertue
,
Vertue
Glory
and
good
Fortune
.
Wise
Men
have
observed
that
Arms
were
before
Learning
,
and
Captains
before
Philosophers
;
for
good
and
well
regulated
Armies
having
gained
Victory
,
established
Rest
and
Security
,
whereof
the
Study
of
Letters
and
Liberal
Sciences
ensued
.
That
Country
deserveth
to
be
loved
of
all
Men
,
which
loves
all
Men
indifferently
,
and
not
that
Country
which
respecting
the
best
part
,
advanceth
a
few
:
No
Man
therefore
is
to
be
blamed
,
if
for
such
cause
he
desire
rather
to
abandon
than
embrace
his
Country
.
Common
wealths
are
Bodies
mixt
,
yet
have
they
of
Bodies
simple
some
resemblance
:
And
as
in
these
,
many
Infirmities
grow
,
which
without
violent
Medicines
cannot
be
cured
;
so
in
the
other
many
Mischiefs
arise
,
which
a
good
and
godly
Patient
should
offend
to
leave
uncured
,
though
therein
he
use
both
force
and
fire
.
Those
Wars
be
most
just
which
are
most
necessary
;
and
those
Arms
are
most
merciful
where
no
hope
of
help
remains
but
in
them
only
.
In
Actions
which
promise
either
publick
Glory
,
or
private
Honour
,
Men
may
be
reasonably
persuaded
to
adventure
life
and
living
,
because
great
hope
there
is
to
die
with
Reputation
,
or
live
to
recover
that
Peace
which
War
hath
consumed
:
But
where
Men
are
no
less
oppressed
by
insolency
of
Commanders
,
than
by
insolency
of
Foes
,
there
is
the
Calamity
doubled
,
and
of
two
evils
the
danger
of
War
seemeth
least
;
for
that
hath
end
,
the
other
is
infinite
.
Who
so
persuades
himself
to
be
no
less
esteemed
in
evil
than
good
Fortune
,
is
deceived
:
For
promises
made
,
during
distress
,
are
rarely
persormed
,
unless
the
same
necessity
continue
.
The
intent
of
every
Prince
,
or
other
State
that
makes
War
,
is
to
enrich
himself
,
and
impoverish
the
Enemy
:
Neither
is
Victory
for
other
occasions
sought
,
nor
the
possessions
of
the
Enemy
to
other
end
desir'd
,
than
to
make
themselves
mighty
,
and
their
Enemy
weak
.
It
sollows
then
,
that
so
oft
as
the
Victory
impoverishes
them
,
or
the
gains
weaken
them
,
either
they
pass
or
come
short
of
that
Mark
whereat
the
War
was
aimed
.
Ancient
and
well-governed
Common-wealths
were
wont
by
their
Conquests
to
fill
the
Treasuries
with
Gold
and
Silver
,
to
give
reward
to
Soldiers
,
to
spare
the
People
from
Tributes
,
to
make
Triumphs
and
Publick
Feasts
:
But
in
later
times
the
Wars
have
used
,
first
,
to
consume
the
Treasure
,
and
after
impoverish
the
People
without
assuring
them
from
their
Enemies
.
A
Prince
or
State
that
leaves
promises
unperformed
,
by
reason
of
unexpected
Impediments
,
and
for
no
ill
intent
,
ought
not
to
be
blamed
:
Neither
are
such
accidents
any
just
cause
or
colour
why
Friends
should
abandon
their
Confederates
.
Where
Magistrates
govern
justly
,
Subjects
obey
dutifully
;
where
private
Persons
grow
rich
,
and
Princes
enlarge
their
Empire
;
there
is
the
Common-wealth
blessed
,
and
the
People
fortunate
.
CHAP.
XXVI
.
Maxims
of
State
,
or
Prudential
Grounds
and
Polemical
Precepts
,
concerning
all
Estates
,
and
Forms
of
Policy
in
Times
of
Peace
or
War
,
&c.
confirmed
by
Select
Narrations
and
Historical
Parallels
.
ALL
Cities
and
Towns
of
State
are
builded
either
by
People
dwelling
in
or
about
the
Place
where
they
are
builded
,
or
else
they
are
made
by
Strangers
:
Of
the
first
are
Athens
and
Venice
,
of
the
other
Alexandria
and
Florence
.
The
Fortune
of
every
City
builded
,
and
Vertue
of
the
Builder
,
appeareth
by
Choice
of
the
Place
,
and
Quality
of
Laws
:
For
as
fertile
Places
occasion
Men
to
be
slothful
,
unless
by
good
Laws
they
be
forced
to
labour
,
so
Barrenness
compels
them
to
Industry
;
which
Reason
induceth
Wise
Men
to
plant
Habitations
in
either
:
Examples
of
the
first
are
Ferrara
and
Rome
,
of
the
second
Ragusa
and
Genoa
.
All
Laws
whereby
Commonwealths
are
governed
were
either
made
by
some
one
excellent
Man
,
and
at
an
instant
;
or
else
they
were
ordained
at
sundry
Times
,
according
to
such
Accidents
as
befel
.
Example
,
The
Laws
of
Sparta
made
at
the
beginnig
by
Lycurgus
,
the
Laws
of
Rome
at
sundry
Times
.
The
Government
of
every
City
in
Time
becomes
corrupt
;
Principality
changeth
into
Tyranny
:
The
Optimacy
is
made
the
Government
of
the
People
;
and
the
Popular
Estate
turns
to
licentious
Disorder
;
which
Instability
or
Alteration
moved
some
Law-makers
to
take
Order
that
in
the
Government
of
their
City
there
should
be
a
Mixture
of
all
three
,
and
was
the
Cause
that
the
Policy
of
Sparta
continued
800
Years
,
when
the
Popular
State
of
Athens
endured
not
one
hundred
.
Example
,
The
Laws
of
Sparta
made
by
Lycurgus
,
and
the
Laws
of
Athens
by
Solon
.
Whoso
taketh
in
hand
to
frame
any
State
or
Government
,
ought
to
presuppose
that
all
Men
are
Evil
,
and
at
occasions
will
shew
themselves
so
to
be
.
Example
,
The
Envy
of
the
People
of
Rome
to
the
Nobles
,
and
their
Insolency
towards
them
appeared
not
so
long
as
the
Kings
governed
;
but
the
Tarquins
being
Banished
,
Opportunity
was
thereby
offered
,
that
the
Malice
of
the
one
and
the
other
became
discovered
.
The
divers
Honours
of
the
Nobility
and
People
,
the
one
desiring
to
command
,
the
other
not
to
obey
,
are
the
Cause
of
continual
Troubles
,
unless
some
third
Mean
there
be
of
more
Authority
than
either
,
to
bridle
the
Force
of
both
.
Example
,
The
Kings
in
Rome
expulsed
,
forthwith
arose
much
Mutiny
,
and
could
not
be
suppress'd
till
the
Tribum
Plebis
were
created
;
whose
Authority
wrought
the
same
effect
which
the
Kings
had
done
.
Some
States
endeavour
to
enlarge
their
Dominions
,
and
some
others
labor
only
to
maintain
that
Estate
they
antiently
possessed
.
Example
of
the
first
was
the
City
of
Rome
,
of
the
second
Sparta
.
All
States
desiring
to
live
at
Liberty
,
think
fit
that
every
Man
should
be
permitted
to
accuse
any
Citizen
that
offendeth
,
which
manner
of
proceeding
works
two
excellent
Effects
:
First
,
That
the
People
should
not
dare
for
Fear
of
accusing
to
attempt
ought
against
the
State
;
or
if
they
do
,
they
shall
be
presently
and
without
Respect
punished
.
Secondly
,
by
Liberty
of
accusing
,
every
Man
hath
Means
to
utter
the
Offence
wherewith
he
can
charge
others
,
which
he
could
not
;
unless
it
were
lawful
to
take
such
an
ordinary
Course
,
and
consequently
be
driven
to
ways
extraordinary
,
particular
Revenge
,
or
calling
in
Foreign
Forces
.
Example
,
Coriolanus
and
Appius
,
Claudius
at
Rome
,
Lucanncve
at
Chinsi
,
Francisco
Valeri
in
Florence
.
As
Accusations
are
in
every
State
necessary
,
so
Slanders
are
dangerous
,
and
worthy
of
Punishment
;
the
Difference
betwixt
Accusations
and
Slanders
,
is
,
that
the
one
is
publickly
performed
before
Magistrates
,
with
good
Proofs
and
Witnesles
to
maintain
the
Truth
of
the
Accusation
;
but
Slanders
are
as
well
publickly
performed
as
dispersed
in
secret
,
and
Places
of
Repair
,
without
Witness
and
Justification
,
so
as
every
Man
may
be
slandered
,
but
few
are
orderly
accused
.
Example
,
Appius
Claudius
accused
by
L.
Virginius
;
Furius
Camillus
,
slandered
by
Manlius
Capitolinus
.
The
only
means
to
suppress
Slander
is
,
to
give
Authority
to
some
Persons
of
Repute
,
to
compel
every
Slanderer
to
become
an
Accuser
;
and
if
the
Accusation
prove
true
,
then
to
reward
the
Accuser
,
or
at
least
not
to
punish
him
.
Example
,
Manlius
the
Slanderer
of
Camillus
for
his
untrue
Information
punished
.
A
Rule
most
certain
and
assured
it
is
,
That
every
Kingdom
and
State
at
the
first
well
framed
,
or
after
well
informed
,
doth
take
the
Perfection
thereof
from
the
Wisdom
of
some
excellent
Man
,
who
ought
not
to
be
blind
though
in
a
Matter
of
great
Moment
he
happily
useth
some
extraordinary
Violence
or
Proceedings
;
for
he
that
employeth
Force
to
mend
and
not
to
mar
,
deserves
Commendation
.
Example
,
Romulus
,
Lycurgus
,
Cleomenes
.
There
lives
no
Man
so
simple
or
wise
,
so
wicked
or
well-disposed
,
but
prefers
those
Persons
that
are
praiseable
before
those
that
are
blameable
:
Not
withstanding
for
that
well-near
all
Men
are
beguil'd
in
discerning
what
indeed
is
Good
,
deeming
that
Honourable
which
in
Truth
is
otherwise
;
they
suffer
themselves
either
willingly
or
ignorantly
to
be
carried
into
a
Course
which
merits
rather
Infamy
than
Commendation
.
Example
,
Every
Man
wisheth
himself
Timoleon
,
or
Agesilaus
,
rather
than
Dionysius
or
Phalaris
;
rather
a
Titus
or
Trajan
,
than
Caligula
or
Vitellius
.
Who
reads
Histories
treating
of
great
Actions
shall
perceive
that
good
Princes
indeed
are
more
secure
and
better
defended
by
the
Love
of
the
People
,
and
Fidelity
of
Counsellors
,
than
were
they
that
entertained
many
Legions
and
Men
of
War.
Example
,
Of
all
those
Emperours
which
reigned
after
Caesar
until
Maximiinus
,
the
greatest
number
were
for
their
Vices
taken
and
slain
,
only
Galba
and
Pertinax
excepted
,
who
were
good
Emperours
.
A
Prince
of
great
Knowledge
both
in
Arms
and
Wisdom
,
so
firmly
setleth
the
Foundation
of
Government
,
as
albeit
his
Successor
be
of
the
less
Vertue
,
yet
may
he
be
maintained
even
by
the
Memory
of
his
Predecessor
:
But
if
it
happen
that
the
third
Prince
prove
not
more
like
the
first
than
the
second
,
then
all
that
is
past
goeth
to
Ruine
.
Example
,
The
Martial
Valour
of
Romulus
was
the
cause
that
Numa
might
govern
safely
in
Peace
:
Which
Tullus
could
not
have
done
,
had
he
been
unlike
to
Romulus
;
nor
should
Bajazet
Emperour
of
Turky
have
enjoyed
the
State
of
his
Father
Mahomet
,
and
left
the
same
to
his
Posterity
,
if
Selim
his
Son
had
not
been
more
like
to
his
Grand
-
father
than
to
Bajazet
his
Father
.
The
Succession
of
two
excellent
Princes
,
chiefly
if
they
be
of
long
life
,
works
wondrous
Effects
:
The
like
is
seen
in
Optimacies
and
Popular
States
,
where
the
Governours
successively
elected
be
Men
of
great
Vertue
and
Understanding
.
Example
,
The
first
appeared
in
Philip
of
Macedon
,
and
Alexander
his
Son
,
the
second
in
the
Consuls
of
Rome
.
In
every
State
,
where
Soldiers
are
not
,
the
Fault
thereof
proceeds
from
the
Governours
.
Wise
Princes
were
therefore
wont
even
in
Times
of
Peace
to
cause
Warlike
Exercises
to
be
used
;
for
without
them
the
most
Warlike
Nations
become
not
only
Ignorant
in
Martial
Knowledge
,
but
also
effeminate
.
Example
,
Pelopidas
&
Epaminondas
in
Thebes
,
and
King
Tullus
in
Rome
as
well
in
Peaceable
as
Troublesome
Times
used
the
exercise
of
Arms.
No
Prince
or
State
well
advised
,
hazards
his
whole
Estate
upon
the
Valour
of
some
few
Persons
,
nor
ought
to
Strength
of
strait
Places
,
where
the
Enemy
is
to
pass
.
Example
,
Tully
King
of
Rome
,
and
Metius
King
of
Alba
,
condescended
that
three
of
their
Nobility
for
either
side
,
chosen
should
enter
Combate
,
and
that
Nation
which
was
Victorious
should
command
the
other
.
Francis
the
French
King
going
to
recover
Lombardy
,
was
by
the
Switzers
attended
into
two
or
three
Places
in
the
Mountains
,
hoping
there
to
repulse
him
,
but
the
King
taking
another
way
,
passed
securely
and
prevailed
.
Every
State
well
governed
doth
reward
Men
of
good
Merit
,
and
punish
all
Offenders
;
and
if
any
Person
of
good
Desert
shall
wilfully
be
a
Delinquent
,
the
same
Man
ought
not
withstanding
his
former
service
,
be
punisht
.
Example
,
The
same
Horatto
that
in
Combat
gained
the
Victory
against
the
Albani
,
having
insolently
slain
his
own
Sister
,
was
notwithstanding
his
egregious
Act
and
the
fresh
memory
thereof
,
called
into
trial
of
his
life
,
and
with
great
difficulty
obtained
Pardon
:
And
Manlius
who
had
with
great
Glory
saved
the
Capitol
,
for
moving
Sedition
in
Rome
,
was
after
from
the
same
cast
down
headlong
.
Every
wise
Man
having
performed
any
great
service
to
his
Prince
or
Country
,
ought
to
be
content
with
such
recompence
as
it
shall
please
the
Prince
or
Country
to
bestow
:
Measuring
the
same
according
to
the
Power
of
the
giver
,
and
not
the
merit
of
him
that
receiveth
.
Example
,
Horatius
Cocles
for
having
lost
his
Hand
in
defence
of
the
Bridge
of
Rome
,
and
Mutius
Scaevola
suffering
his
Hand
to
be
burnt
for
his
attempt
to
kill
King
Porsenna
,
were
rewarded
with
a
small
Portion
of
Land
;
and
Manlius
that
defended
the
Capitol
from
the
Galleys
,
had
no
greater
reward
than
a
little
measure
of
Meal
.
Ingratitude
is
a
Vice
so
natural
and
common
,
as
not
only
private
Persons
,
but
Princes
and
States
also
either
through
Covetousness
or
Suspition
are
there
with
infected
.
Example
,
Vespasian
proclaimed
Emperor
,
was
chiefly
aided
by
Antonius
Primus
,
and
by
his
help
prevailed
against
Vitellius
,
in
Reward
of
which
Service
Vespasian
removed
him
from
the
Command
of
his
Army
,
and
gave
that
honour
to
Mutianus
.
Consalvo
Ferranoe
having
taken
the
Kingdom
of
Naples
from
the
French
,
was
first
removed
from
his
Command
of
the
Castles
and
Soldiers
,
and
in
the
end
brought
into
Spain
,
where
in
disgrace
he
ended
his
Life
.
Collatinus
Tarquinius
who
with
the
aid
of
Brutus
suppressed
the
Tarquins
of
Rome
,
and
with
him
Pub.
Valerius
were
banish'd
for
no
other
cause
but
for
being
of
the
name
of
Tarquin
,
the
other
because
he
〈◊〉
a
House
upon
Mount
Caelio
.
All
Errors
that
great
Captains
commit
,
are
either
wilful
or
ignorant
,
towards
the
one
and
the
other
of
which
Offenders
to
use
greater
lenity
than
the
quality
of
their
Offences
deserves
,
Seemeth
necessary
:
For
Men
of
Honour
suffer
nought
by
the
Infamy
which
evil
Service
doth
bring
.
It
is
also
to
be
considered
that
a
great
Captain
being
cumbred
with
many
cares
,
cannot
proceed
in
his
Actions
couragiously
,
if
he
stand
in
daily
doubt
to
be
punish'd
for
every
error
that
hapneth
.
Example
,
Sergius
and
Virginius
were
before
Veio
,
the
one
part
of
the
Army
on
the
one
side
of
the
City
,
the
other
not
far
from
the
place
.
Sergius
being
assaulted
by
the
Falisci
was
not
aided
by
Virginius
,
neither
would
he
require
his
help
,
such
was
the
envy
the
one
bare
to
the
other
;
and
consequently
their
Offence
is
wilful
and
worthy
of
capital
punishment
.
Likewise
when
Varro
by
his
Ignorance
,
received
an
overthrow
by
Hannibal
at
Cannae
,
he
was
nevertheless
pardoned
and
honourably
welcomed
home
by
the
whole
Senate
.
Whensoever
an
Inconvenience
ariseth
within
or
without
the
State
,
it
seems
a
Resolution
more
sure
to
dissemble
the
knowing
thereof
,
than
to
seek
by
sudden
violence
to
suppress
it
.
Example
,
Cosmo
de
Medioes
having
gained
extraordinary
Reputation
in
Florence
,
the
Citizens
imagined
,
that
to
suffer
the
same
to
increase
was
dangerous
,
and
therefore
they
Banished
him
:
Which
extream
Proceeding
,
so
offended
the
Friends
of
Cosme
,
being
the
stronger
,
as
they
sorced
the
Citizens
to
revoke
him
,
and
make
him
Prince
of
that
City
.
The
like
hapned
in
Rome
,
where
Caesar
for
his
Vertue
,
much
admired
and
followed
,
became
afterwards
to
be
feared
;
and
they
that
feared
,
not
considering
their
force
to
be
inferior
to
the
power
of
Caesar
,
endeavouring
to
oppress
him
,
were
the
occasion
of
his
greater
Glory
.
In
every
Republick
,
an
excessive
Authority
given
to
one
or
two
Persons
for
long
time
,
proveth
dangerous
,
chiefly
when
the
same
is
not
restrained
.
Example
,
The
Dictatorship
given
to
Caesar
for
life
,
was
an
occasion
to
oppress
the
Liberties
of
the
Romans
.
The
same
effect
was
before
that
time
like
to
follow
the
Decemvirate
,
by
suffering
Appius
Claudius
to
prolong
the
time
of
his
Dignity
.
The
Ambition
of
Men
is
such
,
as
rarely
they
will
obey
when
formerly
they
have
commanded
;
neither
do
they
willingly
accept
of
mean
Office
,
having
before
sate
in
higher
place
:
Yet
the
Citizens
of
well-governed
States
,
did
not
refuse
as
well
to
obey
as
command
.
Example
,
The
Victory
the
Romans
obtained
against
the
Veienti
,
Q.
Fabius
was
slain
,
having
the
year
before
been
Consul
:
Nevertheless
he
then
served
in
meaner
place
under
C.
Manilius
,
and
M.
Fabius
his
own
Brother
then
Consul
.
There
is
nothing
more
strange
,
yet
by
experience
proved
true
,
That
Men
in
adverse
Fortune
be
much
grieved
,
and
in
Prosperity
also
discontented
;
which
is
the
reason
,
that
not
being
forced
to
fight
for
necessity
,
they
will
nevertheless
contend
for
Ambition
;
and
that
Humour
doth
as
well
possess
those
that
live
aloft
,
as
others
whom
Fortune
holdeth
down
.
Example
,
The
People
of
Rome
having
by
the
Authority
of
the
Tribunes
obtained
to
make
themselves
secure
from
oppression
of
the
Nobility
,
forthwith
required
,
That
the
Honour
and
Office
of
State
might
be
also
imparted
unto
them
.
The
like
Ambition
moved
them
to
have
their
part
of
Lands
by
force
of
Lex
Agaria
,
which
was
at
last
the
overthrow
of
the
Roman
Liberty
.
It
seemeth
that
People
displeased
with
some
Innovations
hapned
in
the
State
,
do
sometime
without
just
Reasons
complain
of
those
that
govern
:
Not
unlike
to
a
sick
Man
,
who
deemeth
that
the
Physician
,
not
the
Fever
,
is
the
cause
of
his
Grief
.
Example
,
The
People
of
Rome
were
persuaded
that
the
Ambition
of
Consuls
was
the
cause
of
continual
War
,
therefore
required
that
no
more
Consuls
should
be
;
yet
they
were
content
that
certain
Tribunes
should
command
with
like
Authority
;
so
was
nothing
altered
in
the
Government
,
but
the
Governors
Title
,
which
alone
did
courent
them
.
Nothing
can
corrupt
and
alter
the
nature
of
Man
so
much
,
or
so
soon
as
the
immoderate
desire
of
Honour
;
in
so
much
as
Men
of
honest
Minds
and
vertuous
Inclinations
are
sometimes
by
Ambition
,
drawn
to
abuse
that
Goodness
whereunto
they
are
inclined
.
Example
,
Appius
Claudius
having
lived
long
an
Enemy
to
the
Multitude
,
hoping
by
their
aid
to
continue
his
Authority
of
the
Decemviri
in
Rome
,
became
their
Friend
,
and
disfavoured
the
Factions
of
great
Men.
Likewise
Q.
Fabius
a
Man
of
singular
vertue
,
being
also
called
to
that
dignity
by
Appius's
self
,
adulterated
his
nature
and
became
like
unto
him
.
Seldom
or
never
is
any
People
discontented
without
just
cause
;
yet
if
happily
they
be
asked
whereof
their
offence
proceedeth
,
many
times
for
want
of
some
fit
Man
to
pronounce
their
grief
,
they
stand
silent
.
Example
,
The
Romans
at
the
death
of
Virginia
,
were
gathered
together
armed
upon
Mount
Sacro
,
and
being
asked
by
the
Senate
,
for
what
cause
they
so
did
?
No
Answer
was
made
;
until
Virginio
Father
of
the
Virgin
had
procured
,
that
twenty
of
the
Tribunes
might
be
made
to
be
as
Head
of
the
People
,
and
confer
with
the
Senate
.
A
great
Folly
or
rather
meer
Madness
it
seemeth
to
desire
any
thing
,
and
tell
before-hand
that
the
end
purpose
of
the
desire
is
evil
;
for
thereby
he
sheweth
Reason
why
it
ought
not
to
be
granted
.
Example
,
The
Romans
required
of
the
Senate
that
Appius
and
the
rest
of
the
Decemviri
should
be
delivered
into
their
Hands
,
being
determined
to
burn
them
all
alive
.
The
first
part
of
their
Request
seemed
reasonable
,
but
the
end
thereof
unreasonable
.
A
course
very
dangerons
it
is
in
all
States
,
by
continual
accusing
and
punishing
,
to
hold
the
Subject
in
doubt
and
daily
fear
:
For
he
that
stands
always
looking
for
some
trouble
,
becometh
careless
and
apt
to
attempt
Innovation
.
Example
,
The
Decemviri
being
opprest
,
the
Tribunes
authorized
in
their
place
,
endeavoured
daily
to
call
in
question
the
most
part
of
the
Decemviri
,
and
many
other
Citizens
also
,
whereof
great
Inconveniences
arose
,
and
much
danger
would
have
ensued
,
had
not
a
Decree
propounded
by
M.
Duillius
been
made
,
that
for
one
year
no
Roman
Citizen
should
be
accused
.
Strange
it
is
to
see
how
Men
in
seeking
their
own
security
,
lay
the
Injuries
which
they
fear
,
upon
other
Men
;
as
though
it
were
necessary
,
either
to
offend
or
to
be
offended
.
Example
,
The
Romans
among
themselves
,
united
and
strong
,
always
endeavoured
to
offend
the
Nobles
;
and
the
Nobles
likewise
being
persuaded
they
were
strong
,
laboured
to
oppress
the
People
:
Which
Humours
were
the
cause
of
continual
Troubles
.
To
make
estimation
and
choice
of
Men
fit
to
govern
,
the
best
course
is
to
consider
in
particular
;
otherwise
it
might
be
imagined
,
that
among
the
Multitude
or
meaner
People
,
they
being
the
greatest
numbers
,
might
be
found
some
Persons
of
more
perfection
.
Example
,
The
People
of
Rome
desiring
that
the
Consulship
might
be
given
among
them
as
Men
of
most
Merit
,
did
by
all
means
endeavour
to
obtain
that
Honour
;
but
being
come
to
Election
,
and
every
Mans
Vertue
particularly
considered
,
there
could
not
be
among
the
Multitude
only
one
found
fit
for
so
great
a
place
;
and
therefore
the
People
themselves
consented
,
that
the
Dignity
should
still
remain
as
it
was
.
To
persuade
a
Multitude
to
any
Enterprise
,
is
easie
,
if
that
which
is
persuaded
,
doth
promise
either
Profit
or
Honour
;
yet
oft
under
that
external
apparence
lies
hid
loss
or
disadvantage
.
Example
,
The
Romans
persuading
themselves
that
the
slow
Proceeding
of
Fabius
Maximus
in
the
War
,
was
both
chargeable
and
cowardly
,
required
,
That
the
General
of
the
Horse
might
direct
the
War
;
which
course
had
ruined
Rome
,
if
the
Wisdom
of
Fabius
had
not
been
.
Likewise
,
when
Hannibal
had
divers
years
reigned
in
Italy
,
one
M.
Centenius
Penuta
,
a
Man
of
base
Birth
,
yet
a
Soldier
of
some
Repute
,
undertook
that
if
he
with
such
Voluntiers
as
would
follow
him
,
might
have
Authority
to
Fight
,
he
would
within
few
days
deliver
Hannibal
either
alive
or
dead
:
Which
Offer
was
by
the
Senate
accounted
rash
,
yet
for
fear
to
offend
the
People
,
granted
;
and
Penula
with
his
Soldiers
was
cut
in
pieces
.
To
appease
a
Mutiny
or
Tumult
in
any
Camp
or
City
,
there
is
no
means
more
speedy
or
successful
,
than
if
some
Person
of
great
Quality
and
Respect
,
present
himself
to
the
People
,
and
by
his
Wisdom
lay
before
them
the
damage
of
their
Discords
,
persuading
them
to
Peace
and
Patience
.
Example
,
The
Faction
of
the
Frateschi
and
Arratiati
in
Florence
;
the
one
ready
to
assault
the
other
.
Franciso
Soderini
,
Bishop
of
Voterra
,
in
his
Episcopal
Habit
,
went
between
the
Parties
and
appeased
them
:
Also
Count
Egremont
,
by
the
Authority
of
his
Wisdom
and
Presence
,
supprest
a
great
Mutiny
in
Autwerp
,
between
the
Martinists
and
Papists
.
A
People
corrupted
,
do
rarely
or
never
observe
any
Order
or
Ordinance
,
unless
by
Force
of
some
Prince's
Power
they
be
thereto
inforced
;
but
where
the
Multitude
is
Incorrupt
and
Religious
,
all
things
are
done
justly
,
and
without
Compulsion
.
Example
,
Camillus
at
the
Victory
against
the
Vrienti
,
vowed
that
the
tenth
part
of
the
Pillage
should
be
offered
to
Apollo
;
but
the
Senate
supposing
that
the
People
would
not
consent
to
so
great
a
Contribution
,
studied
to
dispense
with
that
Vow
,
and
to
please
Apollo
and
the
People
also
by
some
other
Means
:
Whereat
the
People
shewed
themselves
openly
offended
,
and
willingly
gave
no
less
than
the
Sum
formerly
decreed
.
When
the
Free-Cities
of
Germany
are
occasioned
to
make
Mony
for
any
Publick
Service
,
the
Magistrates
impose
one
or
two
in
the
hundred
on
every
City
,
which
done
,
every
one
is
sworn
to
lay
down
so
much
as
in
his
own
Conscience
he
is
able
;
and
he
with
his
own
Hand
,
no
other
Witness
being
present
,
casteth
the
Mony
into
a
Coffer
prepared
for
the
purpose
;
which
he
would
not
,
if
his
own
Conscience
did
not
inforce
him
.
When
any
extraordinary
occasion
happens
to
a
City
or
Province
,
some
prodigious
Voice
is
heard
,
or
some
marvelous
Sights
are
seen
.
Before
T.
Gracchus
General
of
the
Roman
Army
was
betraid
by
Flavius
Lucanus
,
the
Aruspices
discovered
two
Serpents
eating
the
Entrails
of
the
Beasts
sacrificed
;
which
done
,
they
vanish'd
:
Which
Vision
,
as
they
divined
,
prognosticated
the
General
's
Death
:
Likewise
F.
Savanarola
foretold
the
coming
of
King
Charles
VIII
.
into
Italy
:
And
M.
Sedigitus
,
when
the
Gauls
first
came
towards
Rome
,
informed
the
Senate
he
heard
a
Voice
much
louder
than
any
Man's
,
crying
aloud
,
Galli
veniunt
.
The
multitude
of
base
People
is
naturally
audacious
and
apt
to
Innovation
;
yet
unless
they
be
directed
by
some
Persons
of
Reputation
and
Wisdom
,
rarely
do
they
joyn
in
any
Action
of
great
import
.
Example
,
The
Romans
,
when
their
City
was
taken
and
sack'd
by
the
Gauls
,
went
to
Veio
with
determination
to
dwell
there
:
The
Senate
informed
thereof
,
commanded
,
That
upon
great
Pain
every
Citizen
should
return
to
Rome
,
whereat
the
People
at
first
mocked
;
but
when
every
Man
particularly
within
himself
considered
his
own
Peril
,
all
in
general
determined
to
obey
the
Magistrates
.
In
the
Employment
of
Men
for
Service
,
neither
Age
nor
Fortune
ought
so
much
to
be
regarded
as
Vertue
;
for
young
Men
having
made
trial
of
their
Valour
,
soon
become
aged
,
and
thereby
either
unapt
or
unable
to
serve
:
Therefore
well
governed
Commonwealths
,
preferred
Military
Vertue
before
any
other
respect
.
Example
,
Valerius
Corvinus
,
with
others
,
made
Consul
the
three
and
twentieth
Year
of
his
Age
,
and
Pompey
triumphed
in
his
Youth
.
No
wise
or
well-advised
Prince
or
other
State
will
undertake
without
excessive
Forces
to
invade
the
Dominions
of
any
other
Prince
,
unless
he
assure
himself
of
some
Friends
there
to
be
a
Mean
,
and
as
it
were
a
Gate
to
prepare
his
Passage
.
Example
,
The
Romans
by
Aid
of
the
Saguntines
.
entred
Spain
,
the
AEtoli
called
them
into
Greece
,
the
Hediai
into
France
:
Likewise
the
Palaeologi
incited
the
Turk
to
come
into
Thrace
;
and
Ludovicus
〈◊〉
occasioned
Charles
the
French
King
to
come
into
Italy
.
A
Republick
desirous
to
extend
the
Bounds
thereof
,
must
endeavour
to
be
fully
furnish'd
with
Inhabitants
,
which
may
be
done
both
by
Love
and
Force
:
Love
is
gained
by
suffering
Strangers
to
inhabit
the
City
securely
;
and
Force
compels
People
to
come
thither
,
when
other
Cities
and
Towns
near
at
hand
be
demolished
or
desaced
:
And
impossible
it
is
without
this
Order
of
proceeding
.
to
enlarge
any
City
or
make
the
same
of
greater
Power
.
Example
,
The
Romans
to
enlarge
their
City
demolished
Alba
,
and
many
other
Towns
,
and
therewith
also
entertained
all
Strangers
courtcously
:
So
as
Rome
grew
to
such
greatness
,
that
the
City
only
could
arm
six
hundred
and
forty
thousand
Men
;
but
Sparta
or
Athens
could
never
exceed
twenty
thousand
,
for
that
Lycurgus
had
inhibited
the
access
of
Strangers
.
A
Commonwealth
that
consumes
more
Treasure
in
the
War
,
than
it
profits
in
Victory
,
seems
to
have
rather
hindred
than
honoured
or
inriched
the
State.
A
wise
Captain
therefore
in
his
Actions
,
ought
as
well
to
profit
the
Republick
,
as
to
gain
to
himself
Glory
.
Example
,
The
Consuls
of
Rome
did
seldom
desire
Triumph
,
unless
they
returned
from
the
War
loaden
with
Gold
,
Silver
and
other
rich
Spoils
fit
to
be
delivered
into
the
Common
Treasury
.
All
Foreign
War
's
with
Princes
or
other
States
taken
in
hand
,
be
either
for
Ambition
or
Desire
of
Glory
,
or
else
for
Necessity
.
Example
,
The
Romans
for
their
Ambition
conquered
many
Nations
,
with
intent
only
to
have
the
Obedience
of
the
People
;
yet
did
they
suffer
them
to
hold
Possession
of
their
Houses
,
and
sometimes
they
were
permitted
to
live
only
with
their
old
Laws
.
Likewise
Alexander
the
Great
endeavoured
to
suppress
many
Princes
for
his
Glory
,
but
did
not
dispossess
the
People
,
nor
kill
them
.
Otherwise
it
is
where
a
whole
Nation
inforced
by
Famine
or
Fury
of
War
,
abandon
their
own
Dwellings
,
and
are
forced
to
inhabit
elswhere
.
Example
,
The
Goths
and
other
People
of
the
North
invaded
the
Roman
Empire
,
and
many
other
Provinces
,
whereof
their
Alteration
of
Names
did
ensue
;
as
Illyria
,
now
called
Slavonia
,
England
formerly
named
Britain
.
A
common
Conceit
and
Saying
it
is
,
That
Mony
makes
the
War
strong
,
and
is
the
Force
and
Sinews
thereof
;
as
though
he
who
hath
most
Treasure
,
be
also
most
mighty
;
but
Experience
hath
apparently
shewed
the
contrary
.
Example
,
After
the
Death
of
Alexander
King
of
Macedon
,
a
multitude
of
Gauls
went
into
Greece
,
and
being
there
arrived
,
sent
certain
Ambassadors
to
the
King
,
who
supposing
to
make
them
afraid
of
his
Power
,
shewed
them
his
Treasure
,
which
wrought
a
contrary
effect
;
for
the
Gauls
,
before
desirous
of
Peace
,
resolved
then
to
continue
the
War
,
in
hope
to
win
that
mighty
mass
of
Mony.
Likewise
Darius
should
have
vanquished
Alexander
,
and
the
Greeks
might
have
conquered
the
Romans
,
if
the
richer
Prince
might
ever
by
his
Mony
have
prevailed
.
Every
League
made
with
a
Prince
or
Republick
remote
,
is
weak
and
rather
aideth
us
with
Fame
than
Effect
,
and
consequently
deceiveth
all
those
that
in
such
amity
repose
Confidence
.
Example
,
The
Florentines
being
assaulted
by
the
King
of
Naples
and
the
Pope
,
prayed
Aid
of
the
French
King
;
who
being
far
distant
,
could
not
in
Time
Succour
them
:
And
the
Cedicini
desiring
Aid
of
the
Capuani
against
the
Samnites
,
a
People
of
no
Force
,
were
deceived
.
A
Prince
whose
People
is
well
arm'd
and
train'd
,
shall
do
better
to
attend
his
Enemy
at
Home
,
than
by
Invasion
to
assault
his
Country
:
But
such
Princes
whose
Subjects
are
disarmed
,
had
need
to
hold
the
Enemy
aloof
.
Example
,
The
Romans
,
and
in
this
Age
the
Swisses
,
being
well
armed
,
may
attend
the
War
at
Home
;
but
the
Carthaginians
and
Italians
being
not
so
well
furnished
,
did
ever
use
to
seek
the
Enemy
.
The
Plurality
of
Commanders
in
equal
Authority
,
is
for
the
most
part
occasion
of
slow
Proceeding
in
the
War.
Example
,
There
was
at
one
Time
in
Rome
created
four
Tribuni
Militares
with
Authority
of
Consuls
,
viz.
T.
Quintus
after
his
Consulship
,
Cajus
Furius
,
M.
Posthumus
,
and
A.
Cornelius
Cassius
,
amongst
whom
arose
so
much
Diversity
and
Contrariety
of
Opinion
,
as
nothing
could
be
done
till
their
Authority
ceased
,
and
M.
AEmylius
made
Dictator
.
A
Victory
obtained
by
any
great
Captain
with
the
Authority
of
his
Prince's
Commission
,
〈◊〉
and
Directions
,
ought
ever
to
be
imputed
rather
to
the
Wisdom
of
the
Prince
,
than
the
Valour
of
the
Captain
:
Which
made
the
Emperors
of
Rome
to
permit
no
Captains
(
how
great
soever
his
Victories
were
)
to
Triumph
,
as
before
that
time
the
Consuls
had
done
;
and
even
in
those
Days
a
modest
Refusal
of
Triumph
was
commended
.
Example
,
M.
Fulvius
having
gained
a
great
Victory
against
the
Tuscans
,
was
both
by
the
Consent
of
the
Senate
and
People
of
Rome
,
admitted
to
Triumph
;
but
the
〈◊〉
of
that
Honour
proved
his
great
Glory
.
All
they
that
from
private
Estate
have
aspired
to
Principality
,
either
by
Force
or
Fraud
be
come
thereunto
,
unless
the
same
be
given
,
or
by
Inheritance
descended
:
Yet
it
is
rarely
seen
,
that
Force
alone
prevaileth
,
but
Fraud
without
Force
oft-times
sufficeth
.
Example
,
Agathocles
by
such
means
became
Prince
of
〈◊〉
John
Galeazzo
by
abusing
his
Uncle
Barnabas
,
gained
the
Dominion
of
Lombardy
;
and
Cyrus
circumvented
Cyaxares
his
Mothers
Brother
,
and
by
that
Craft
aspired
to
Greatness
.
Sudden
Resolutions
are
always
dangerous
;
and
no
less
Peril
ensueth
of
slow
and
doubtful
Delays
.
Example
,
When
Hieron
Prince
of
Syracuse
died
,
the
War
even
then
being
in
great
Heat
between
the
Romans
and
Carthaginians
,
they
of
Syracusa
consulted
,
whether
it
were
better
to
follow
the
Fortune
of
Rome
or
Carthage
.
In
which
Doubt
they
continued
until
Apollonides
,
a
chief
Captain
of
Syracusa
,
laid
before
them
,
That
so
long
Delay
would
make
them
hated
both
of
Romans
and
Carthaginians
.
Likewise
the
Florentines
being
by
Lewis
the
Twelfth
required
to
give
his
Army
Passage
towards
Naples
,
mused
so
long
upon
an
Answer
,
that
he
became
their
Enemy
,
and
they
forced
to
recover
his
Favour
full
dearly
.
To
govern
a
State
is
nothing
else
but
to
take
such
Order
as
the
Subjects
may
not
,
or
ought
not
to
offend
;
which
may
be
done
,
either
by
removing
from
them
all
means
to
disobey
,
or
by
affording
them
so
great
Favours
,
as
reasonably
they
ought
not
to
change
their
Fortune
;
for
the
mean
Course
proveth
Dangerous
.
Example
,
The
Latins
being
by
the
Valour
of
Camillus
overcome
,
yielded
themselves
to
endure
what
Punishment
it
pleased
the
Romans
to
inflict
.
An
Ingenious
and
Magnanimous
Answer
being
made
unto
Wise
Magistrates
,
doth
oft
obtain
both
Pardon
and
Grace
.
Example
,
When
the
Privernates
had
rebelled
,
and
were
by
Force
constrained
to
return
to
the
Obedience
of
the
Romans
,
they
sent
certain
of
the
City
unto
Rome
,
to
desire
pardon
;
who
being
brought
before
the
Senate
,
one
of
the
Senators
asked
the
Privernates
,
what
punishment
themselves
did
think
they
had
deserved
:
The
same
,
quoth
they
,
which
Men
living
in
Freedom
,
think
they
are
worthy
of
.
Whereto
the
Consul
thus
replied
,
Quid
si
poenam
remittimus
?
Qualem
nos
pacem
vobiscum
habituros
speremus
?
The
Privernates
answered
,
Si
bonam
dederitis
,
&
fidelem
&
perpetuam
:
Si
malam
,
haud
diuturnam
.
Which
Answer
was
thought
to
proceed
from
generous
Men
,
and
therefore
they
were
not
only
pardoned
,
but
also
honoured
and
received
into
the
number
of
the
Roman
Citizens
.
All
Castles
,
Forcresses
,
and
Places
of
Strength
,
be
made
for
Defence
,
either
against
the
Enemy
or
Subject
:
In
the
first
Case
they
are
not
necessary
,
in
the
second
dangerous
.
For
thereby
the
Prince
may
at
his
Pleasure
take
occasion
to
insult
upon
the
Subject
,
when
much
more
seemly
he
might
settle
his
Estate
upon
the
Love
and
good
Affection
of
Men.
Example
,
The
Castle
of
Millan
made
by
Duke
Francisco
Sforza
,
incited
his
Heirs
to
become
insolent
;
and
consequently
they
became
odious
;
which
was
also
the
cause
that
so
soon
as
that
City
was
assaulted
,
the
Enemy
with
facility
did
possess
it
.
That
Prince
or
Potentate
which
builds
his
Severity
rather
upon
the
Trust
he
hath
in
Fortresses
,
than
the
Love
of
Men
,
shall
be
deceived
:
For
no
Place
is
so
strong
,
as
can
long
defend
it self
,
unless
by
the
Love
and
Aid
of
Men
it
be
in
time
of
Necessity
succoured
.
Example
,
Pope
Julio
having
drawn
the
Bentivoli
out
of
Bologm
,
built
there
a
strong
Castle
;
the
Governor
thereof
robbed
the
People
,
and
they
there
with
grieved
,
in
a
short
Time
took
the
Castle
from
him
.
So
after
the
Revolt
of
Genoa
,
Lewis
the
Twelsth
came
to
the
Recovery
thereof
,
and
builded
there
the
strongest
Fortification
of
Italy
,
as
well
for
Sight
as
the
Circumstances
inexpugnable
.
Nevertheless
the
Citizens
rebelled
,
and
within
sixteen
Months
the
French
were
sorced
to
yield
the
Castle
and
Government
to
Octavio
Fragosa
.
To
build
Forts
upon
Places
of
Strength
,
either
for
defence
of
our
own
,
or
to
hold
that
which
is
taken
from
others
,
hath
ever
proved
to
small
purpose
.
Example
,
The
Romans
having
supprest
the
Rebellion
of
the
Latins
and
Privernates
,
albeit
they
were
People
Warlike
,
and
lovers
of
Liberty
;
yet
to
keep
them
Subject
,
built
there
no
Castle
,
nor
other
Places
fortified
:
And
the
Lacedemonians
did
not
only
forbear
to
fortifie
the
Towns
they
conquered
,
but
also
left
their
chief
City
of
Sparta
unwalled
.
The
Necessity
or
Use
of
Fortification
is
only
upon
Frontiers
,
or
such
principal
places
where
Princes
make
their
Habitation
;
to
the
end
the
Fury
of
sudden
Assaults
may
be
staid
,
and
Time
for
Succor
entertained
:
Otherwise
,
Example
,
the
Castle
of
Millan
being
made
to
hold
the
State
in
Obedience
,
could
not
so
do
either
for
the
House
of
Sforza
or
France
.
Guido
Ubaldo
,
Duke
of
Velin
,
driven
from
his
Dominion
by
Caesar
Borgia
,
so
soon
as
he
recovered
his
Country
,
caused
all
the
Forts
to
be
demolished
:
For
by
Experience
be
found
the
Love
of
Men
was
the
surest
Defence
,
and
that
Fortifications
prevailed
no
less
against
him
than
for
him
.
The
Causes
of
Division
and
Faction
in
every
Commonweal
proceed
most
commonly
of
Idleness
and
Peace
,
and
that
which
unieth
,
is
Fear
War.
Example
,
The
〈◊〉
and
Elinsci
having
Intelligence
of
great
Contention
between
the
Nobility
and
People
of
Rome
,
thought
that
a
sit
Opportunity
to
oppress
the
one
and
the
other
:
But
the
Romans
informed
of
such
an
Intention
,
appeased
all
Do
mestick
Anger
,
and
by
the
Valour
of
their
Arms
,
conducted
by
Gn.
Manlius
and
M.
Fabius
defeated
the
Enemies
Forces
.
The
means
to
usurp
an
Estate
〈◊〉
is
,
first
before
Arms
be
taken
,
to
become
,
as
it
were
,
an
Arbitrator
or
a
Friend
indifferent
;
and
after
Arms
be
taken
,
then
to
send
moderate
Aid
to
the
weak
Side
,
as
well
to
entertain
the
War
between
the
Factions
,
as
also
to
consume
the
Strength
both
of
the
one
,
and
the
other
;
yet
in
no
wise
to
employ
any
great
Forces
,
for
thereby
either
party
may
discover
the
Intents
to
suppress
them
.
Example
,
The
City
of
Pistoia
fallen
into
Division
,
the
Florentines
took
occasion
sometimes
to
favor
the
one
,
and
sometimes
the
other
,
that
in
the
end
both
sides
weary
of
the
War
,
voluntarily
yielded
to
their
Devotion
.
Philippo
Viscount
,
hoping
sundry
times
by
occasion
of
Faction
to
oppress
the
Florentines
,
did
often
assault
them
with
great
Forces
,
which
was
the
Cause
that
they
became
reunited
;
and
consequently
the
Duke
deceived
of
his
Expectation
.
A
great
Wisdom
it
is
to
resrain
Opprobrious
and
Injurious
Speech
:
For
as
neither
the
one
nor
the
other
can
any
whit
decrease
the
Enemies
Force
,
so
doth
it
move
him
to
greater
Hate
,
and
more
desire
to
offend
.
Example
,
Gabides
,
a
General
of
the
Persians
having
long
besieged
Amida
,
became
weary
,
and
preparing
to
abandon
the
enterprise
,
raised
his
Camp
,
which
they
of
the
City
beholding
,
began
to
revile
the
Persians
,
and
from
the
Walls
reproved
them
of
Cowardise
;
which
undiscreet
Words
so
highly
〈◊〉
Gabides
,
as
thereupon
he
resolved
to
continue
the
Siege
,
and
within
〈◊〉
days
won
the
City
.
Tiberius
Gracchus
appointed
Captain
of
certain
Bands
of
Men
,
whom
for
want
of
other
Soldiers
the
Romans
entertained
,
proclaimed
in
his
Camp
,
That
no
Man
,
upon
Pain
of
Death
,
should
contumeliously
call
any
Soldier
Slave
,
either
in
Earnest
or
Jest.
Nam
facetiae
asperae
quando
nimium
ex
vero
traxere
,
acrem
suimem
riam
〈◊〉
Likewise
Alexander
the
Great
having
conquered
well
near
all
the
East
,
brought
his
Forces
before
Tyre
,
they
fearing
Alexander's
Fury
,
offered
upon
honourable
Considerations
to
yeild
him
Obedience
,
only
requiring
,
that
neither
he
nor
any
of
his
Forces
should
enter
the
City
,
which
motion
after
four
Months
Alexander
accepted
,
and
so
signified
by
his
Ambassador
,
who
arriving
at
Tyre
was
by
the
proud
Citizens
slain
,
whereat
Alexander
grew
into
Choler
,
and
being
ready
to
forsake
the
Siege
,
staid
his
Forces
,
and
in
the
end
sacked
the
City
and
put
the
People
to
the
Sword.
A
Prince
or
any
other
State
being
assaulted
by
an
Enemy
of
far
more
puissance
than
himself
,
ought
not
to
refuse
any
honourable
Compositions
,
chiefly
when
they
are
offered
;
for
no
Conditions
can
be
so
base
,
but
shall
in
some
〈◊〉
turn
to
Advantage
and
Honour
of
him
that
accepts
them
.
Example
,
〈◊〉
1512.
certain
Florentines
procured
great
Forces
of
Spaniards
to
come
thither
,
as
well
to
reposess
the
Medici
then
banish'd
,
as
also
to
sack
the
City
;
promising
that
so
soon
as
the
Army
of
Spain
did
come
into
the
Florentine
Dominion
,
the
Faction
of
Medici
would
be
ready
armed
to
receive
them
.
But
the
Spaniards
being
come
,
found
no
Forces
at
all
to
joyn
with
them
;
and
therefore
wanting
Victual
,
offered
Composition
.
The
Florentines
finding
the
Enemy
distressed
grew
insolent
and
refused
Peace
,
whereof
followed
the
loss
of
Prato
,
and
many
other
Inconveniences
.
The
like
happened
to
them
of
Tyre
,
as
before
.
The
denial
or
delay
of
Justice
desired
in
revenge
of
Injuries
either
publick
or
privately
offered
,
is
a
thing
very
dangerous
to
every
Prince
or
other
State
;
for
that
the
Party
injured
doth
oft
by
indirect
means
,
though
with
hazard
of
his
Country
and
himself
,
seek
satisfaction
:
Example
,
The
Complaint
which
the
Galli
made
against
the
Fabii
who
sent
Ambassadors
in
favour
of
the
Tossani
,
not
being
heard
,
nor
any
punishment
inflicted
upon
them
for
Fighting
against
the
Law
of
Nations
,
was
the
cause
that
the
Galli
were
offended
with
the
States
,
whereof
followed
the
sack
of
Rome
;
and
the
delay
of
Justice
in
Philip
of
Macedon
,
for
not
revenging
the
incestuous
oppression
of
Attalus
to
Pausanias
,
was
the
Motive
to
murther
that
King.
Whoso
endeavours
the
alteration
of
any
State
must
of
necessity
proceed
with
all
severity
,
and
leave
some
memorable
Example
to
those
that
shall
impugn
the
Ordinance
of
Government
newly
setled
.
Example
,
When
Junius
Brutus
had
by
his
great
Valour
banish'd
the
Traquins
,
and
sworn
the
People
that
no
King
should
ever
reign
in
Rome
;
within
short
time
after
,
many
young
Nobles
,
among
whom
was
Brutus's
Son
,
impatient
of
the
equality
of
the
new
Government
,
conspired
to
recall
the
Tarquins
;
but
Brutus
thereof
informed
,
caused
his
own
Son
not
only
to
be
condemned
to
death
,
but
was
himself
present
at
the
Execution
.
As
Health
and
soundness
of
the
Hands
.
Legs
,
and
other
outward
Members
cannot
continue
Life
,
unless
the
Heart
and
vital
Spirits
within
be
strong
and
sirm
;
so
Fortifications
and
Frontier-desences
do
not
prevail
,
unless
the
whole
Corps
of
the
Kingdom
and
People
be
well
armed
:
Example
,
When
the
Emperor
came
into
Italy
,
and
had
with
some
difficulty
past
the
confines
of
the
Venetians
well
near
without
resistance
;
his
Army
march'd
to
Venice
,
and
might
doubtless
have
possest
the
City
,
had
it
not
been
defended
with
Water
.
Likewise
the
English
in
their
assault
of
France
,
excepting
a
few
Encounters
on
the
Frontiers
,
found
no
puissant
resistance
within
the
Realm
.
And
Anno
1513.
they
forced
all
that
State
,
and
the
King
himself
to
tremble
,
as
ost
before
they
had
done
;
but
contrariwise
the
Romans
knowing
that
Life
lay
in
the
Heart
,
ever
held
the
Body
of
their
State
strongest
:
For
the
nearer
the
Enemy
approach'd
Rome
,
the
better
they
found
the
Country
armed
and
defended
.
The
desire
to
command
sovereignly
is
of
so
great
Force
,
as
doth
not
only
work
in
those
that
are
in
expectation
of
Principality
,
but
also
in
them
that
have
no
Title
at
all
.
Example
,
this
Appetite
moved
the
Wife
of
Tarquinius
Priscus
contrary
to
all
natural
Duty
to
incite
her
Husband
to
murder
her
own
Father
Servius
,
and
possess
his
Kingdom
,
as
being
persuaded
it
were
much
more
honourable
to
be
a
Queen
than
to
be
the
Daughter
of
a
King.
The
violation
of
ancient
Laws
,
Orders
and
Customs
,
under
which
People
have
long
time
lived
,
is
the
chief
and
only
cause
whereby
Princes
hazard
their
Estate
and
Royal
Dignity
.
Example
,
Albeit
the
deflowring
of
Lucrece
was
the
occasion
,
yet
was
it
not
the
cause
that
moved
the
Romans
to
take
Arms
against
Tarquin
;
for
he
having
before
that
fact
of
Sextus
his
Son
,
governed
Tyrannically
,
and
taken
from
the
Senate
all
Authority
,
was
become
odious
both
to
the
Senate
,
Nobility
and
People
,
who
finding
themselves
well-governed
,
never
seek
or
wish
any
other
liberty
or
alteration
.
A
Prince
that
desires
to
live
secure
from
Conspiracy
,
hath
cause
rather
to
fear
those
on
whom
he
hath
bestowed
over-great
Riches
and
Honors
,
than
those
whom
he
hath
greatly
injured
;
because
they
want
Means
to
offend
;
the
other
have
many
opportunities
to
do
it
:
Example
,
Perrenius
the
prime
Favorite
of
Commodus
the
Emperor
,
conspired
his
Death
.
Plautianus
did
the
like
to
Severus
,
and
Sejanus
to
Tiberius
;
for
being
advanced
to
so
great
Honors
,
Riches
and
Offices
,
as
nothing
remained
desirable
but
the
Imperial
Title
,
they
conspired
against
the
Persons
of
their
Sovereigns
in
hope
of
the
Dignity
;
but
in
the
end
they
endured
that
Punishment
which
to
such
Disloyalty
and
Ingratitude
appertaineth
.
An
Army
which
wants
Experience
,
albeit
the
Captain
be
expert
,
is
not
greatly
to
be
feared
;
neither
ought
an
Army
of
well-train'd
Soldiers
to
be
much
esteemed
,
whose
Captain
is
ignorant
.
Example
,
Caesar
going
into
Africa
against
Afranius
and
Petraeus
whose
Army
was
full
of
old
Soldiers
,
said
he
feared
them
little
,
Quia
〈◊〉
ad
exercitum
sine
duce
.
Contrariwise
,
when
he
went
to
Pharsalia
to
encounter
Pompey
,
he
said
,
Ibo
ad
ducem
sine
exercitu
.
A
Captain
General
commanding
an
Army
ought
rather
to
govern
with
Curtesie
and
Mildness
,
than
with
over-much
Austerity
and
Severity
.
Example
,
Q.
and
Appius
Claudius
being
Consuls
,
were
appointed
to
govern
the
War.
To
Q.
was
allotted
one
Army
which
served
very
dutifully
;
but
Appius
commanding
the
other
with
great
Cruelty
,
was
by
his
Soldiers
unwillingly
obeyed
.
Nevertheless
Tacitus
seems
of
contrary
Opinion
,
saying
,
Plus
Poena
quam
obsequium
valet
.
Therefore
to
reconcile
these
different
Conceits
,
I
say
,
that
a
General
having
power
to
command
Men
,
either
they
are
Confederates
or
Subjects
:
If
Confederates
or
Voluntaries
,
he
may
not
proceed
to
extream
punishment
;
if
Subjects
,
and
his
power
absolute
,
they
may
be
governed
otherwise
;
yet
with
such
respect
,
as
the
insolence
of
the
General
inforce
not
the
Soldiers
to
hate
him
.
Honour
may
sometime
be
got
as
well
by
the
loss
as
gaining
of
Victory
.
Every
Man
knoweth
Glory
is
due
to
the
Victor
,
and
we
deny
not
the
same
Priviledge
to
the
vanquished
,
being
able
to
make
proof
that
the
Loss
proceeded
not
from
his
Default
.
Neither
is
it
dishonourable
to
violate
those
Promises
whereto
the
necessity
or
disadvantage
of
War
inforceth
.
And
forced
Promises
which
concern
a
whole
State
,
are
not
binding
,
and
rarely
or
ever
kept
,
nor
is
the
Breaker
thereby
to
receive
Disgrace
.
Example
,
Posthumus
the
Consul
having
made
a
dishonourable
Peace
with
the
Samnites
,
was
by
them
with
his
whole
Army
sent
home
disarmed
.
Being
arrived
at
Rome
,
the
Consul
informed
the
People
they
were
not
bound
to
perform
the
base
Conditions
he
was
compelled
to
yield
unto
;
albeit
,
he
and
those
few
that
promised
,
were
bound
to
perform
them
.
The
Senate
thereupon
concluded
to
send
him
Prisoner
to
Samno
,
where
he
constantly
protested
the
Fault
to
be
only
his
own
;
wherefore
the
People
by
that
Peace
incurred
no
Dishonour
at
all
:
And
Fortune
so
much
favoured
Posthumus
,
as
the
Samnites
were
content
presently
to
return
him
to
Rome
;
where
he
became
more
glorious
for
losing
the
Victory
,
than
was
Pontius
at
Samno
for
having
won
the
Victory
.
Wise
Men
have
long
observed
,
That
who
so
will
know
what
shall
be
,
must
consider
what
is
past
;
for
all
worldly
Things
hold
the
same
course
they
had
at
first
.
The
Reason
is
,
that
as
long
as
Men
are
possest
with
the
same
Passions
with
former
Ages
,
consequently
of
these
doings
the
same
effects
ensue
.
Example
,
The
Almains
and
French
have
ever
been
noted
for
their
Avarice
,
Pride
,
Fury
and
Infidelity
,
and
so
in
divers
Ages
,
experience
hath
proved
even
to
this
present
:
For
perfidious
Dealing
the
French
have
given
sufficient
proof
,
not
only
in
ancient
times
,
but
also
in
the
time
of
Charles
VIII
.
who
promised
to
render
to
the
Florentines
the
Forts
of
Pisa
,
but
having
divers
times
received
Mony
,
held
them
not
with
standing
in
possession
.
The
Florentines
found
the
like
in
the
Almains
;
for
in
the
Wars
of
the
Visconti
,
Dukes
of
Milan
,
they
prayed
aid
of
the
Emperor
,
who
promised
them
great
Forces
;
in
consideration
whereof
,
he
was
to
receive
of
the
Florentines
one
hundred
thousand
Crowns
in
Hand
,
and
as
much
more
when
his
Army
was
arrived
in
Italy
,
both
which
Payments
were
performed
;
but
as
soon
as
the
Emperor
came
to
Verona
he
devised
Cavillations
of
Unkindness
whereupon
he
returned
home
.
A
Prince
desirous
to
obtain
any
thing
of
another
,
must
if
occasion
so
permit
,
urge
his
Demand
so
earnestly
and
press
for
so
sudden
and
present
Answer
,
as
he
who
is
prest
may
not
have
leisure
to
consider
how
to
excuse
himself
in
denial
.
Example
,
Pope
Julio
endeavoured
to
drive
out
of
Bologna
all
the
Bentivoli
,
in
which
Action
he
thought
the
aid
of
the
French
recessary
,
and
that
the
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
neutial
;
and
by
divers
〈◊〉
did
〈◊〉
them
to
that
〈◊〉
but
not
〈◊〉
any
resolute
An
〈◊〉
he
though
〈◊〉
with
those
sew
〈◊〉
he
had
to
take
his
Journey
to
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
on
the
Venetians
〈◊〉
him
they
would
remain
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
the
French
King
forthwith
sent
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
as
searing
the
Popes
〈◊〉
likewise
the
Tuscans
having
for
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
aid
of
the
Samnites
against
the
Romens
,
took
Arms
suddenly
and
〈◊〉
their
request
which
the
Samnites
〈◊〉
before
denied
.
When
a
Multitude
〈◊〉
all
may
not
be
〈◊〉
because
they
are
too
many
:
To
punish
part
and
leave
the
rest
〈◊〉
were
Injury
to
the
Suflerers
;
and
to
those
that
escape
,
an
Encouragement
to
offend
again
;
therefore
to
eshew
all
extremity
,
mean
Courses
have
been
anciently
used
.
Example
,
When
all
the
Wives
of
the
Romans
conspired
to
Poyson
their
Husbands
,
a
convenient
number
of
them
wero
punisht
,
and
the
rest
suffered
to
pass
Likewise
at
the
conspiracy
of
the
Bacchanals
in
the
time
of
the
Macedonian
War
,
wherein
many
thousands
Men
and
Women
had
part
,
every
tenth
person
only
was
put
to
death
by
lot
,
although
the
ossence
were
general
;
by
which
manner
of
punishing
,
he
that
suffered
,
complain'd
on
his
fortune
;
and
he
that
escaped
,
was
put
in
fear
,
that
offending
again
,
the
same
punishment
might
light
upon
himself
,
and
therefore
would
no
more
offend
.
A
Battel
or
great
action
in
Arms
ought
not
to
be
enterprised
without
special
Commission
or
Command
from
the
Prince
;
otherwise
the
General
incurs
great
danger
.
Example
,
〈◊〉
the
Dictator
punisht
the
General
of
the
Horse
in
the
Roman
Army
,
for
having
sought
without
his
〈◊〉
adthough
he
had
in
battle
slain
20000
Enemies
without
loss
of
200
of
his
own
:
and
Caesar
commended
his
Captain
〈◊〉
for
having
refrain'd
to
fight
,
though
with
great
advantage
he
might
.
Also
count
Egmont
hazarded
the
favor
of
the
King
his
Master
for
giving
battel
to
Marshall
de
Thermes
,
albeit
he
were
victorious
:
for
upon
the
success
of
that
action
the
loss
or
safety
of
all
the
Low
Countries
depended
.
To
govern
without
Council
is
not
only
dangerous
in
Aristocracies
and
Popular
States
,
but
unto
independent
Princes
an
occasion
of
utter
ruin
.
Example
,
Hieron
the
first
King
of
Sicily
in
all
his
proceedings
used
the
advice
of
Counsels
,
and
lived
fifty
years
prosperously
in
Peace
;
but
his
grand-child
succeeding
,
refusing
all
Counsel
lost
his
Kingdom
,
and
was
with
all
his
Kinsfolk
and
Friends
cruelly
slain
.
In
all
Monarchies
the
Senate
or
privy-Council
is
or
ought
to
be
composed
of
persons
of
great
dignity
,
or
Men
of
approved
wisdom
and
understanding
.
Example
,
In
Polonia
no
Man
is
Counsellor
unless
he
be
a
Palatine
,
a
Bishop
,
a
Castellan
,
a
Captain
,
or
such
a
one
as
hath
been
Ambassador
:
and
in
Turky
the
title
of
Counsellor
is
not
given
but
only
to
the
four
Bassaes.
The
two
Cadelesquires
,
the
twelve
Beglerbegs
,
and
Kings
Son
,
who
in
his
Fathers
absence
,
is
as
it
were
a
President
of
the
Divano
or
Senate
.
Many
Princes
Ancient
and
Modern
have
used
to
select
out
of
their
Council
,
two
or
three
,
or
four
at
most
,
to
whom
only
they
did
impart
their
affairs
.
Example
,
The
Emperor
Augustus
had
Maecenas
and
Agrippa
;
Julius
Caesar
,
Q.
Paedius
and
Cor.
Balbus
,
whom
he
only
trusted
with
his
Cipher
and
secrets
,
being
Counsellors
of
the
Cabinet
(
as
we
now
call
them
.
)
The
alteration
of
old
Laws
,
or
introduction
of
new
,
are
in
all
States
very
dangerous
,
notwithstanding
any
appearance
of
profit
or
publick
utility
,
which
moved
wise
Governours
to
decree
,
that
ancient
Laws
once
established
might
never
be
called
in
question
.
Example
,
The
Athenians
decreed
that
no
Law
should
be
propounded
to
the
People
without
the
consent
of
the
Senate
:
the
like
use
is
observed
in
Venice
,
where
no
Petition
is
preferred
to
the
Senate
but
by
advice
of
the
Sages
;
and
among
the
Loerians
the
Custom
was
,
that
whosoever
presented
any
new
Law
to
be
confirmed
,
should
come
with
a
Halter
about
his
Neck
,
and
be
therewith
hanged
if
his
request
were
rejected
;
also
Lycurgus
to
prevent
the
alteration
of
his
Laws
,
did
swear
the
People
of
Sparta
to
observe
them
untilhis
return
,
and
thereupon
retired
himself
into
voluntary
exile
,
with
intent
never
to
return
.
When
necessity
or
good
reason
moves
Innovation
or
Abolition
of
Laws
,
a
course
more
secure
it
is
to
do
it
rather
by
degrees
than
suddenly
.
Example
,
The
Romans
finding
the
Laws
of
the
twelve
Tables
unprofitable
,
suffered
them
to
be
observed
or
neglected
at
discretion
,
but
would
not
publickly
suppress
them
for
fear
of
calling
other
Laws
into
contempt
:
so
did
they
continue
700
years
,
and
were
then
cassed
by
Ebutius
the
Tribune
.
But
Agis
King
of
Lacedemon
desirous
to
revive
the
Laws
of
Lycurgus
,
long
discontinued
,
〈◊〉
all
Men
to
bring
in
their
evidence
and
writings
to
be
cancelled
,
to
the
end
a
new
partition
of
Lands
and
Goods
might
be
made
;
which
suddain
and
violent
proceeding
proved
so
〈◊〉
that
it
moved
a
dangerous
sedition
,
wherein
he
was
disposed
and
with
his
Mother
and
Friends
put
to
death
;
which
Example
haply
moved
the
〈◊〉
not
to
attempt
any
thing
against
the
Authority
of
Augustino
Barberino
their
Duke
.
but
after
his
death
,
and
〈◊〉
the
Election
of
〈◊〉
the
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
new
Ordinances
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
the
Ducal
Authority
.
Whoso
hath
won
to
himself
so
great
Love
and
Affection
,
as
thereby
to
become
master
of
the
forces
,
and
at
his
pleasure
commands
the
Subjects
apt
for
Arms
,
may
also
without
right
or
title
assure
himself
of
the
whole
Estate
.
Example
,
Hugh
Capat
a
Subject
to
the
Crown
of
France
,
being
greatly
honoured
by
the
Soldiers
,
sound
means
thereby
to
prevent
Charles
Duke
of
Lorrain
of
the
Crown
,
being
right
Heir
by
descent
from
Charlemain
.
And
albeit
the
Families
of
the
Paleologi
,
Ebrami
and
Turcan
.
be
of
the
blood
Royal
and
Right
〈◊〉
to
the
〈◊〉
Empire
,
when
the
〈◊〉
Line
shall
fail
;
yet
it
is
like
that
〈◊〉
chief
Bassa
having
the
love
of
the
〈◊〉
will
usurp
the
State
,
because
the
Paleologi
and
other
Competitors
be
far
from
the
Turks
person
,
poor
and
without
means
to
purchase
the
Soldiers
favor
.
A
Commander
General
in
Arms
,
ought
upon
pain
of
great
punishment
be
enjoyned
,
not
to
imploy
or
retain
any
forces
longer
than
the
time
of
his
Commission
.
Example
,
The
Dictators
of
Rome
were
in
this
point
so
precise
,
as
never
any
of
them
dared
to
transgress
the
time
prefixed
,
till
Caesar
obtained
that
dignity
should
continue
in
him
for
life
;
which
was
the
cause
of
his
usurpation
of
the
State.
Also
the
Thebans
commanded
,
that
if
the
General
of
their
Army
did
hold
his
forces
one
day
longer
than
the
time
prefixt
,
he
should
thereby
incur
danger
of
death
:
which
Justice
was
executed
upon
Epaminondas
and
Pelopidas
.
Banishment
of
great
Lords
,
or
Citizens
of
great
Reputation
,
hath
been
in
divers
places
diversly
used
:
for
in
the
one
,
they
were
inforced
only
to
absent
themselves
without
further
infliction
;
in
the
other
,
Banishment
was
accompanied
with
Consiscation
,
a
course
of
great
danger
.
Example
,
In
Argos
,
Athens
,
Ephesus
,
and
other
Cities
of
Greece
,
the
Citizens
puissant
in
Friends
,
Vertue
or
Riches
,
were
many
times
banish'd
for
Envy
or
Fear
,
but
never
or
very
rarely
forced
to
absent
themselves
longer
than
ten
Years
;
and
that
without
loss
of
Goods
,
which
was
the
cause
that
never
any
of
them
Warred
against
the
Country
:
But
Dion
being
banish'd
Syracusa
by
Dionysius
Junior
,
and
Coriolanus
from
Rome
,
did
make
mighty
Wars
against
their
own
Country
.
The
like
was
done
by
the
Medici
in
Florence
.
Honourable
and
Magnanimous
Men
were
wont
not
only
to
enterprise
great
Acts
,
but
also
to
suffer
patiently
all
Injuries
which
Foes
or
Fortune
could
expose
them
to
:
As
resolved
,
that
no
Calamity
was
so
great
as
to
make
their
Minds
abject
,
or
to
forget
the
Dignity
appertaining
to
Persons
vertuous
:
Example
,
After
the
defeat
of
the
Roman
Army
upon
the
River
Allia
,
the
〈◊〉
persued
the
Victory
even
to
〈◊〉
Walls
:
Whither
being
come
,
and
finding
the
Gates
open
,
without
any
sign
of
Resistance
they
entred
the
Streets
,
where
all
Honourable
Palaces
were
also
unshut
,
which
caused
the
Galli
greatly
to
doubt
.
Nevertheless
looking
into
the
Houses
,
they
found
in
every
of
them
a
Senator
set
in
a
Chair
of
State
,
and
in
his
Hand
a
Rod
of
Ivory
;
his
Person
was
also
vested
with
Robes
of
Dignity
,
which
Majestick
spectacle
did
marvelously
amate
the
Galli
,
not
having
before
that
time
seen
any
such
Reverend
Sight
;
and
therefore
did
not
only
refrain
to
osfer
Violence
,
but
highly
admired
the
Roman
Courage
,
chiesly
in
that
Fortune
.
Nevertheless
at
length
a
rude
Gall
hapned
with
his
Hand
to
touch
the
white
Beard
of
M.
Papyrius
,
whereat
he
taking
〈◊〉
disdain
struck
him
with
his
Rod
,
in
requital
whereof
the
Barbarian
slew
Papyrius
,
and
by
that
example
all
the
other
Senators
and
persons
of
dignity
were
also
slain
.
Albeit
the
knowledge
and
study
of
Letters
be
both
commendable
and
necesssary
in
all
well
regulated
States
;
yet
if
under
so
honest
pretence
,
Idleness
enter
,
such
Abuses
most
seasonably
be
soreseen
and
rernoved
.
Example
,
When
Deognis
and
〈◊〉
two
excellent
Philosophers
,
were
sent
Ambassadors
from
Athens
to
the
Rommans
,
many
of
the
Nobility
that
besore
disposed
themselves
to
Arms
,
allured
with
their
Eloquence
and
marvelous
Wisdom
,
began
with
great
Admiration
to
follow
them
:
And
in
lieu
of
Arms
,
turned
their
endeavours
to
the
study
of
Letters
,
which
the
wise
Cato
discerning
,
procured
the
Senate
to
decree
that
(
to
eschew
all
Inconveniences
which
so
honest
Idleness
might
breed
)
no
Philosophers
should
from
thenceforth
be
received
into
Rome
.
The
Honour
due
to
Magistrates
was
anciently
much
regarded
,
and
contrariwise
all
irreverent
and
undutisul
Behaviour
with
great
Severity
punish'd
.
Example
,
The
Censors
of
Rome
degraded
a
Citizen
only
for
having
yawned
loud
in
their
Presence
:
And
another
called
Vectius
was
slain
in
the
Field
,
for
not
doing
due
reverence
to
a
Tribune
when
he
past
by
him
.
It
is
also
observed
,
that
the
Son
of
Fab.
Maximus
when
he
was
Censor
,
meeting
his
Father
on
Horseback
,
and
seeing
the
Sarjeans
assraid
to
speak
to
him
to
dismount
,
did
himself
Command
him
so
to
do
,
which
Command
the
Father
cheerfully
and
willingly
obeyed
,
saying
,
Domestick
Power
must
give
place
to
Publick
Authority
.
Tyrannous
Princes
having
incurred
the
universal
Hate
of
People
,
sound
no
means
so
meet
to
preserve
them
from
Popular
Fury
,
as
to
execute
or
deliver
into
their
Hands
their
own
chief
Minions
and
intimate
Counsellors
.
Example
,
Tiberius
delivered
to
the
People
his
Favourite
Seianus
:
Nero
,
Tigellinus
.
Henry
King
of
Swede
committed
to
their
Fury
his
best
beloved
Servant
George
〈◊〉
Caracalla
caused
all
his
Flatterers
to
be
slain
that
had
persuaded
him
to
kill
his
Brother
.
The
like
was
done
by
Caligula
,
whereby
he
escaped
himself
.
A
Prince
that
rewards
or
pardons
a
Person
that
kills
another
Prince
,
albeit
by
that
means
he
is
aspired
to
Soveraignty
,
shall
thereby
both
incur
great
Danger
and
Hate
,
and
encourage
Men
therein
to
attempt
the
like
against
〈◊〉
Therefore
wise
Princes
have
not
only
lest
such
Services
quite
〈◊〉
but
also
most
severely
punished
them
.
Example
,
The
Emperor
Severus
put
all
those
to
death
that
consented
to
the
Murder
of
Pertinax
;
and
Alexander
the
Great
executed
him
that
slew
Darius
,
as
abhorring
that
Subject
that
would
lay
violent
Hands
on
his
Prince
,
not
withstanding
he
were
an
Enemy
.
Likewise
Vitellius
put
to
death
all
the
Murderers
and
Conspirators
against
Galba
;
and
Domitian
Executed
his
Secretary
Epaphroditus
for
the
Murder
of
Nero
,
although
he
instantly
desired
his
aid
.
The
vertuous
and
vitious
Examples
of
Princes
incite
Subjects
to
imitate
the
same
Qualities
;
which
Rule
never
or
very
rarely
fails
.
Example
,
Francis
the
First
King
of
France
,
and
other
Princes
in
divers
Ages
and
Places
,
had
great
esteem
of
Learned
Men
;
and
forthwith
all
the
Princes
,
Nobles
,
Nobility
and
Clergy
,
disposed
themselves
so
earnestly
to
study
,
as
before
that
time
had
not
been
seen
so
many
and
so
great
a
number
of
Learned
Men
,
as
well
in
Tongues
as
Sciences
.
Contrariwise
,
Alexander
the
Great
,
otherwise
a
Prince
of
great
Vertue
,
by
his
immoderate
use
of
Drinking
,
did
draw
the
greatest
number
of
his
Court
and
People
also
to
delight
in
Drunkenness
The
like
effect
followed
the
excessive
Intemperance
of
Mithridates
,
King
of
Amasia
.
The
last
and
not
the
least
considerable
,
is
,
to
observe
how
great
effects
Devotion
and
Contempt
of
Human
Glory
worketh
in
the
Minds
not
only
of
private
Persons
,
but
of
Kings
and
Princes
also
,
who
have
oft
abandoned
worldly
Profit
,
Honour
and
Pleasure
,
to
embrace
the
con
templative
retired
Life
.
Example
,
Ramirus
King
of
Aragon
,
Verecundus
King
of
Spain
,
Charlemain
Son
of
Carolus
Martellus
,
Matilda
Queen
of
France
,
Amurath
King
of
Turbay
,
with
many
others
.
Imperio
Maximus
,
exemplo
Major
.
FINIS
.