THE
GROUNDS
OF
OBEDIENCE
And
GOVERNMENT
.
The
first
GROUND
.
Wherein
consists
the
Perfection
of
Government
.
XEnophon
,
in
his
excellent
Booke
of
the
instruction
of
Cyrus
,
moves
this
Question
,
Why
,
of
all
other
living
Creatures
,
which
are
of
different
Natures
from
Man
,
wee
easily
attaine
to
the
mastery
and
rule
;
but
few
men
are
so
intelligent
as
to
be
fit
to
governe
Men
;
and
those
few
are
the
highest
and
worthiest
part
of
Mankind
?
But
,
to
me
,
the
very
Question
seems
to
beare
the
solution
in
its
owne
bowells
.
For
,
when
one
asks
,
why
Man
is
hard
to
be
govern'd
since
he
governes
other
Creatures
;
hee
asks
,
why
one
,
who
hath
the
power
to
rule
others
,
is
himselfe
so
difficult
to
be
master'd
:
and
the
answer
is
,
because
the
powers
,
by
which
he
reduceth
others
to
his
obedience
,
makes
him
apter
to
resist
them
who
seeke
the
conquest
of
himself
;
and
so
renders
it
a
higher
taske
to
weild
and
manage
him
,
then
those
Creatures
which
he
hath
power
over
.
For
,
we
need
not
looke
into
Philosophy
,
nor
study
learned
Bookes
,
to
know
that
the
nature
of
Man
is
inclin'd
to
have
its
owne
will
,
and
casteth
all
things
which
are
under
his
consideration
to
compasse
and
effect
it
:
as
also
,
that
every
ordinary
mans
knowledge
and
consideration
is
farre
beyond
any
we
find
in
other
living
Creatures
;
and
,
by
consequence
,
is
farre
lesse
easily
masterable
then
any
of
them
.
Whence
we
may
plainly
collect
,
that
were
it
possible
for
a
Governour
to
make
every
single
person
in
his
Dominion
particularly
understand
,
that
what
was
ordered
by
the
Governement
was
his
owne
truest
interest
;
such
an
one
would
be
the
most
absolute
and
perfect
Governour
;
and
infallibly
would
find
the
charge
of
governing
most
easie
and
sweet
,
as
well
to
himselfe
as
to
his
Subjects
.
This
Case
is
cleare
both
in
Reason
and
in
Experience
.
Reason
sheweth
us
,
that
to
draw
any
thing
to
Action
,
according
to
its
owne
fitnesse
and
inclination
,
is
both
easier
to
the
attempter
,
and
makes
the
action
it selfe
more
efficaciously
and
throughly
performed
.
He
that
will
drive
a
wedge
into
a
hard
piece
of
wood
,
strives
,
as
far
as
the
scituation
gives
him
leave
,
to
make
his
hammer
fall
downewards
,
because
a
weight
hath
,
of
it selfe
,
an
inclination
that
way
,
and
so
both
the
impression
is
stronger
and
the
arme
lesse
strain'd
,
knocking
and
the
very
fall
of
a
weight
encreasing
by
motion
downewards
:
Therefore
Black-smithes
,
whose
continuall
labour
is
to
use
the
hammer
,
lay
their
iron
upon
their
anvile
,
that
is
,
in
such
a
scituation
below
their
heads
,
as
is
most
fitting
to
gaine
the
best
advantage
of
the
descent
of
their
hammers
,
which
they
first
raise
to
give
them
scope
of
a
descent
.
Upon
this
principle
it
is
,
That
they
who
tutour
Dogges
,
Horses
,
Elephants
and
Hawks
,
knowing
the
ordinary
attractive
of
Beasts
to
be
meat
and
some
kind
of
Flattery
,
make
them
understand
,
to
the
proportion
of
their
capacity
,
that
to
do
the
action
they
breed
them
for
,
gaines
them
food
;
to
which
they
joine
also
certaine
motions
of
stroking
and
gentle
words
,
that
make
an
impression
in
the
Beast
of
its
owne
excellency
,
and
that
it
pleaseth
its
master
.
In
like
manner
,
to
deterre
them
from
certain
actions
,
cudgels
,
whips
,
and
harsh
words
are
used
;
which
have
a
notabler
efficacy
then
one
would
easily
imagine
,
if
he
saw
it
not
by
experience
.
This
,
now
,
being
apply'd
to
Mankind
,
drives
the
effect
home
.
For
Man
,
being
a
rationall
creature
,
(
whose
inclination
it
is
to
worke
according
to
knowledge
)
desires
to
know
that
the
worke
prescribed
him
is
good
,
that
is
,
good
for
him
,
or
his
good
.
And
because
if
two
actions
be
proposed
,
whereof
the
one
is
better
for
him
then
the
other
,
the
lesse
good
action
deprives
him
of
some
good
which
the
more
good
had
brought
him
;
his
inclination
leads
him
to
do
the
better
,
and
by
consequence
to
know
and
dispute
which
is
the
better
;
which
is
as
much
as
to
chuse
betwixt
them
;
and
this
we
call
being
free
,
or
having
naturall
Liberty
to
do
one
and
not
the
other
.
So
that
,
the
Nature
of
Man
is
to
be
free
;
and
to
act
what
ever
he
does
,
because
it
seems
to
him
the
best
.
Whence
it
is
evidently
concluded
,
that
the
perfectest
way
and
most
connaturall
for
governing
men
is
,
by
making
them
determine
themselves
to
their
actions
,
and
to
proceed
freely
,
and
act
,
as
it
were
,
by
their
owne
inclinations
.
This
if
the
Governour
can
effect
,
hee
shall
finde
both
his
intent
generally
performed
,
because
the
Subject
proceedeth
with
much
affection
and
courage
;
and
seldome
or
never
will
his
Commands
be
resisted
,
or
their
obedience
repented
:
For
,
men
are
not
wont
to
repine
often
at
what
themselves
chuse
and
judge
best
for
themselves
;
especially
if
,
even
after
the
action
performed
and
peradventure
the
attempt
failed
,
yet
the
Subject
remaines
satisfied
,
that
it
was
best
for
him
,
in
those
circumstances
,
to
do
what
he
did
:
Now
,
if
the
reasons
were
solid
when
the
Governour
proposed
them
,
such
must
of
necessity
be
,
for
the
most
part
,
the
sequell
.
Experience
maketh
this
same
as
manifest
as
Reason
concludeth
it
.
What
Mother
or
Nurse
doth
not
seeke
to
perswade
and
win
the
yet
sucking
childe
with
gay
things
,
with
Flattery
and
such
demonstrations
of
Love
(
that
is
,
of
the
childs
good
)
as
the
child
is
capable
of
?
What
Master
or
Father
draweth
not
his
Boyes
to
schoole
and
sitting
exercises
,
by
promises
and
proposalls
of
good
,
as
play
,
goodcheere
,
fine
cloathes
,
and
any
other
toyes
suitable
to
their
tempers
?
The
stronger
ages
have
stronger
Motives
;
as
,
of
Honour
,
Lands
,
Offices
,
and
the
like
:
by
which
we
see
the
most
part
of
men
led
,
not
onely
to
Labour
,
but
even
to
hazard
their
lives
and
those
very
goods
which
are
proposed
them
for
motives
of
their
actions
.
On
the
contrary
side
,
how
ill
do
those
enterprises
thrive
,
where
the
Actors
conceive
themselvs
either
not
concern'd
or
wrong'd
?
How
diligently
are
excuses
sought
out
and
easily
found
,
and
every
cause
of
delay
judged
sufficient
?
How
readily
(
if
the
Actours
be
in
great
multitudes
(
as
Soldiers
or
Schollars
)
do
seditions
and
mutinies
spring
up
,
and
all
disorders
grow
bold
and
spread
themselves
,
the
Commander
of
the
action
hated
and
esteemed
an
oppressour
and
a
Tyrant
,
his
Officers
scorned
and
disobeyed
?
This
then
is
,
of
all
hands
,
concluded
,
that
the
proper
and
naturall
way
of
Governement
is
,
by
making
the
obeyer
understand
that
it
is
his
owne
profit
which
the
action
aimes
at
;
so
to
make
him
work
out
of
the
inclination
of
his
owne
will
,
and
the
dictamen
of
his
owne
understanding
.
The
Second
GROUND
.
That
the
Nature
of
Man
reacheth
not
to
the
perfection
of
Governement
.
NOtwithstanding
this
inclination
be
so
naturall
to
us
,
yet
Nature
is
not
able
to
make
it
perfect
in
most
both
persons
and
actions
.
Children
are
not
come
to
the
ability
of
judgeing
;
some
others
are
so
grosse
of
capacity
,
they
cannot
bee
brought
to
understand
their
owne
good
,
at
least
in
that
time
and
circumstances
which
Nature
hath
provided
them
;
Most
spend
so
much
of
their
day
in
some
one
Businesse
,
which
they
have
chosen
either
for
their
Livelyhood
or
pastime
,
that
they
have
not
sufficient
Leasure
to
attaine
the
Knowledge
necessary
for
other
occurrences
of
their
life
:
Even
the
greatest
Wits
are
not
capable
to
understand
the
nature
of
all
things
necessary
to
their
owne
private
conditions
.
The
Prince
himself
must
trust
the
Physician
,
the
Lawyer
,
the
Mariner
,
the
Soldier
,
the
Merchant
,
the
Cook
,
the
Brewer
,
the
Baker
,
and
divers
other
Trades
and
Knowledges
,
which
he
hath
no
possibility
to
understand
so
perfectly
as
to
be
a
Master
in
them
.
Neverthelesse
,
Nature
doth
not
recede
wholly
from
her
Principle
,
in
thus
subjecting
one
mans
understanding
to
anothers
,
and
the
greater
most
times
to
the
lesser
.
For
it
doth
not
this
,
otherwise
then
by
making
the
party
subjected
see
,
it
is
his
owne
good
to
trust
another's
skill
.
Wherefore
,
it
is
true
,
that
he
followes
his
owne
inclination
,
and
is
ruled
by
his
owne
understanding
;
and
so
governes
himselfe
;
onely
,
hee
is
a
degree
higher
,
not
busying
his
thoughts
about
the
particular
worke
,
but
onely
about
chusing
the
master
of
the
worke
,
or
about
his
own
submission
,
that
is
,
his
owne
action
,
as
he
is
a
man
,
and
his
action
as
that
of
a
man
,
and
not
of
a
Physician
or
Pilot
,
or
such
other
particular
discipline
or
Quality
.
It
remaines
therefore
still
that
hee
is
free
,
and
Master
of
his
owne
action
and
the
commanding
part
of
it
.
The
Third
GROUND
.
That
a
Rationall
beliefe
is
necessary
to
Humane
Action
.
OF
those
things
to
whose
knowledge
wee
cannot
our selves
arrive
,
but
must
rely
on
the
credit
of
others
,
there
are
two
kinds
;
some
purely
to
be
believed
,
others
to
be
also
acted
.
As
,
when
we
informe
our selves
of
what
passed
in
some
forreigne
Country
,
or
of
the
nature
of
Trees
or
Beasts
wee
never
have
use
of
;
wee
are
barely
to
assent
to
what
is
delivered
:
But
,
when
a
Physician
telleth
us
wee
must
take
a
Purge
or
keepe
such
a
Dyet
;
wee
doe
not
onely
believe
him
but
act
according
to
our
beliefe
.
Now
,
though
in
truth
this
second
sort
belongeth
properly
to
our
discourse
apart
,
because
the
nature
of
pure
beliefe
is
intrinsecally
included
in
it
,
as
a
part
in
the
whole
;
yet
wee
must
first
note
the
Errours
to
bee
avoided
in
a
meere
speculative
assent
:
And
these
are
two
;
one
of
defect
,
and
one
of
excesse
.
The
vice
by
defect
,
warnes
you
to
believe
no
thing
but
what
your selfe
understand
,
that
is
,
indeed
to
believe
nothing
at
all
.
But
,
were
these
men
bound
to
their
own
Law
,
that
they
should
take
no
Physick
till
they
knew
it
would
doe
them
good
,
at
least
as
well
as
the
Physician
doth
;
nor
trust
their
cause
to
a
Lawyer
till
they
understood
the
subtleties
as
perfectly
as
hee
;
and
so
in
other
vocations
;
I
doubt
they
would
have
neither
health
nor
wealth
for
Physician
or
Lawyer
to
worke
upon
.
But
,
because
those
who
advance
this
proposition
are
persons
of
wit
,
I
must
not
think
they
stumble
at
so
notorious
a
block
:
Therefore
,
their
meaning
is
onely
,
that
wee
ought
not
to
beleeve
,
but
what
we
are
able
to
understand
if
wee
had
will
and
leisure
to
study
.
But
,
even
so
explicated
,
it
is
a
most
wilfull
proposition
,
reason
being
quite
on
the
opposite
side
:
For
,
let
the
Authority
which
denounceth
me
a
Truth
,
be
sufficient
to
make
it
credible
,
and
overvalue
the
mysteriousnesse
of
the
object
;
and
the
higher
it
is
above
my
knowledge
,
the
more
necessity
there
is
of
believing
it
.
What
is
but
a
little
above
me
,
I
may
easily
come
to
know
;
and
so
need
not
believe
but
take
paines
and
see
it
:
Beliefe
is
ordained
for
Truths
whose
direct
and
immediate
evidence
wee
cannot
compasse
;
and
therefore
is
more
proper
,
more
due
,
more
requisite
for
such
as
are
above
our
knowledge
.
But
,
peradventure
these
smart
persons
do
suppose
that
all
things
which
have
a
possibility
to
be
knowne
,
are
the
subject
of
mans
wit
;
and
so
take
these
two
to
signifie
the
same
sence
,
that
the
object
is
such
as
we
are
able
to
understand
,
and
that
it
is
understandable
,
or
doth
not
couch
a
contradiction
in
its
termes
:
and
peradventure
conceive
themselves
able
to
shew
contradiction
in
whatever
they
refuse
to
believe
.
If
this
be
their
meaning
,
the
maxime
they
goe
upon
is
safe
;
but
they
must
be
very
carefull
not
to
subsume
or
apply
it
to
particular
instances
without
much
consideration
:
For
,
ordinarily
,
the
authority
is
very
great
which
by
understanding
men
,
is
alledged
for
remote
and
high
truths
;
and
so
is
dangerously
neglected
,
without
an
exact
perusal
and
anatomy
of
the
truths
maintained
by
it
.
There
are
others
soe
prodigall
of
our
naturall
endowments
,
that
they
will
teach
us
a
kinde
of
contempt
of
reason
and
understanding
.
In
a
word
,
their
position
is
,
That
,
though
you
be
certaine
the
proposition
made
(
for
ought
you
know
)
is
false
,
neverthelesse
,
you
may
and
ought
to
think
it
true
:
which
how
to
excuse
,
from
being
an
irrationall
act
and
a
pure
folly
,
is
beyond
my
skill
;
at
the
same
time
to
be
assured
it
is
uncertaine
,
and
to
hold
it
for
certaine
is
,
to
mee
,
an
impossibility
.
Doe
I
not
hold
that
which
I
am
certaine
of
?
that
is
,
that
this
truth
is
uncertaine
?
How
then
can
I
hold
it
is
certaine
?
Put
this
in
the
mouth
of
a
witnesse
in
any
Court
of
Justice
,
and
teach
him
that
,
though
hee
know
certainly
hee
doth
not
perfectly
remember
whether
hee
saw
the
man
killed
,
yet
hee
may
sweare
hee
saw
it
;
what
Justice
will
remain
uncorrupted
?
Passion
and
Precipitation
may
prevail
with
us
,
to
judge
that
cleare
and
evident
which
is
not
so
,
and
carry
us
to
believe
and
affirm
it
;
but
that
reason
should
make
us
believe
what
it
telleth
us
it
seeth
no
ground
for
,
or
not
sufficient
,
is
to
me
,
an
assertion
the
most
unworthy
,
the
most
contrary
to
reason
,
and
the
most
biassed
by
interest
that
can
be
imagined
.
If
our
nature
be
rationall
,
if
all
our
actions
should
be
conformable
to
our
nature
,
and
governed
by
reason
;
there
cannot
bee
a
more
pernicious
proposition
,
then
to
tell
us
we
must
assent
,
when
there
is
no
proportioned
motive
think
wee
ought
to
assent
.
Thus
much
I
thought
fit
to
say
concerning
the
errours
of
belief
in
speculation
;
because
beliefe
in
practicall
things
,
and
which
concernes
our
actions
,
depends
of
it
,
and
includes
it
,
and
is
,
in
part
,
regulated
by
the
same
rules
.
The
believing
of
practical
things
begins
to
trench
upon
the
subject
of
our
main
discourse
:
for
it
is
the
first
and
most
simple
or
uncomposed
degree
of
government
and
obedience
,
and
so
the
very
roots
of
both
are
dependent
from
and
to
be
discovered
out
of
it
.
For
,
wee
experience
by
our
ordinary
apprehensions
,
that
wee
esteeme
a
Physician
,
a
Lawyer
,
a
Schoole-master
ought
to
bee
obeyed
,
though
wee
doe
not
acknowledge
in
them
the
power
of
a
Lord
or
Magistrate
.
And
so
wee
say
,
the
Scholler
will
never
profit
,
because
he
will
not
doe
what
his
Master
would
have
him
:
The
client
loseth
his
cause
,
because
he
would
not
obey
his
Counsell
:
The
Patient
recovers
not
,
because
he
followeth
not
the
advice
of
his
Physician
.
And
though
we
doe
not
say
the
Doctour
or
Counsellour
commands
his
Patient
or
Client
,
yet
,
if
we
look
into
it
,
he
both
rewardeth
and
punisheth
,
which
are
the
concomitants
of
commanding
.
For
who
obeyeth
is
rewarded
with
learning
,
health
,
and
prosperity
,
and
who
disobeyeth
is
punished
with
Ignorance
,
sicknesse
,
and
losses
.
The
Fourth
GROUND
.
Of
the
vertue
of
obedience
,
and
wherein
it
consists
.
OUt
of
this
we
may
easily
understand
what
nature
intends
by
the
vertue
of
obedience
,
and
what
are
the
limits
and
Lawes
of
it
.
For
it
is
plaine
,
the
immediate
end
is
that
our
workes
and
all
that
concernes
us
may
be
well
done
,
even
as
to
those
things
wherein
our selves
have
no
skill
,
or
not
enough
,
and
the
more
remote
end
to
bee
atchieved
by
this
is
,
that
our
life
may
bee
good
and
happy
,
and
the
end
of
Nature
arrived
to
by
us
.
The
conditions
likewise
are
cleere
:
First
,
that
the
matter
of
our
action
bee
such
as
our selves
are
not
sufficiently
skilfull
in
;
the
second
,
that
our
Commander
bee
a
master
in
that
art
;
the
third
,
that
hee
bee
a
good
and
honourable
person
,
in
whom
wee
may
rest
confidently
he
will
deale
with
us
conformably
to
his
skill
,
and
not
wilfully
or
for
his
own
pleasure
,
or
interest
,
doe
any
thing
against
our
good
and
profit
.
If
the
first
bee
wanting
,
wee
also
our selves
are
wanting
to
our selves
;
for
Nature
hath
endowed
us
with
reason
to
provide
for
our
owne
good
by
this
power
:
againe
,
it
is
non-sence
and
folly
to
expect
another
man
should
be
more
carefull
of
our
good
,
then
our selves
:
And
suppose
it
were
so
,
it
were
either
our
fault
or
his
,
and
for
ought
to
bee
mended
on
one
side
;
our
fault
if
wee
bee
not
so
sollicitous
as
wee
ought
to
bee
,
that
is
,
as
much
as
the
weight
of
the
affaire
requires
;
His
if
he
be
more
sollicitous
of
our
good
then
the
same
demandeth
,
and
soe
hee
who
professeth
such
a
care
may
bee
feared
to
bee
a
busie
fellow
,
and
one
who
aimes
at
his
owne
profit
under
colour
of
love
,
unlesse
it
bee
in
an
evident
neglect
of
ours
,
which
cannot
well
be
imagined
of
one
who
is
ready
to
obey
another
.
If
the
second
condition
bee
wanting
,
there
can
be
no
vertue
in
obedience
,
since
it
will
nothing
mend
but
rather
impaire
our
life
,
and
to
the
import
of
that
action
,
destroy
our
pretence
to
happinesse
,
to
submit
our selves
to
one
who
hath
no
more
skill
then
wee
,
nor
can
bee
rationally
supposed
to
bear
us
more
love
and
care
,
or
that
hee
will
or
ought
to
imploy
himselfe
in
our
particular
businesse
more
attentively
then
we
our selves
.
As
for
the
last
condition
,
without
it
obedience
is
a
plaine
precipitation
of
our selves
into
misguidance
and
absolute
ruine
,
and
therefore
a
pernicious
&
wicked
practice
.
By
this
discourse
wee
may
understand
,
it
is
a
fallacious
principle
,
though
maintained
by
many
,
that
obedience
is
one
of
the
most
eminent
vertues
,
and
that
it
is
the
greatest
sacrifice
we
can
offer
to
God
,
to
renounce
our
owne
wills
,
because
our
will
is
the
chiefest
good
wee
have
.
For
,
not
denying
that
obedience
is
a
great
vertue
;
it
being
,
truly
in
it selfe
,
the
affection
to
moderate
the
pride
of
our
understanding
,
which
is
subject
to
make
us
think
too
well
of
our
owne
opinions
without
having
evidence
of
the
truth
of
them
,
and
so
hinder
us
from
candidly
seeing
and
acknowledging
the
truth
(
an
inclination
of
all
others
most
deeply
rooted
in
our
nature
,
and
both
most
hard
to
bee
conquered
,
and
most
pernicious
to
be
followed
)
and
therefore
,
the
vertue
which
tempers
and
moderates
this
passion
must
needs
be
very
excellent
:
yet
I
cannot
give
it
so
high
a
rank
,
as
to
preferre
it
before
all
.
For
,
I
see
it
is
only
a
vertue
in
case
of
imperfection
,
as
Penance
and
some
others
are
;
it
being
grounded
on
this
,
that
a
man
is
ignorant
in
those
matters
wherein
hee
ought
to
bee
obedient
.
But
,
the
reason
displeases
mee
more
then
the
conclusion
:
For
what
signifieth
this
,
that
it
is
the
greatest
good
we
have
and
can
renounce
for
Gods
sake
?
If
it
bee
a
great
good
,
it
is
no
vice
,
no
excesse
,
but
a
naturall
power
or
exercise
of
a
power
given
us
by
Almighty
God
;
and
then
would
I
know
,
why
to
renounce
such
a
thing
is
pleasing
to
him
.
Can
we
think
it
were
pleasing
to
God
for
any
one
to
binde
up
his
armes
or
legges
,
or
cut
off
his
hands
,
pretending
to
doe
it
for
his
sake
?
Hee
that
made
them
gave
them
us
to
use
;
and
there
by
commanded
us
to
use
them
according
to
the
manner
intended
by
nature
;
and
,
if
wee
doe
not
so
,
wee
offend
him
.
There
is
a
story
of
Origen
,
that
he
exsected
his
virility
,
thinking
to
Please
God
;
but
the
same
story
saith
,
hee
was
reproved
by
the
whole
Church
,
and
excommunicated
for
the
fact
:
Simeon
Styletes
is
reported
to
have
chained
himself
upon
a
hill
,
that
he
might
not
goe
thence
;
but
he
was
taught
that
such
impotency
was
fit
for
beasts
,
not
men
.
So
that
,
to
renounce
any
natural
faculty
or
the
legitimate
and
fitting
use
of
it
,
under
pretence
of
pleasing
God
,
is
a
folly
,
not
a
vertue
.
But
,
let
us
see
what
power
it
is
that
wee
must
renounce
;
our
Will
:
and
this
word
doth
not
,
in
this
place
,
signifie
any
interessed
affection
or
malicious
resolution
;
but
that
will
which
followeth
and
is
guided
by
our
understanding
,
and
that
truth
which
God
hath
made
us
capable
of
:
Therefore
the
renouncing
of
this
will
,
is
,
withall
,
the
renouncing
of
our
understanding
;
that
is
,
of
our
wits
and
manhood
;
so
that
it
is
in
effect
to
renounce
our
rationality
,
and
that
by
which
we
are
the
image
of
God
.
If
any
man
should
take
a
fancy
to
goe
upon
all
foure
like
a
beast
,
or
subject
himself
to
bee
led
in
a
string
like
a
Beare
about
the
Countrey
;
would
not
all
wise
men
cry
out
on
him
for
bestiality
,
and
thinke
him
unworthy
the
conversation
of
men
?
How
much
greater
is
the
indignity
of
him
who
permitteth
himselfe
to
bee
carried
in
his
whole
course
of
life
,
and
those
actions
that
most
concerne
him
without
using
that
wit
or
understanding
which
hee
hath
,
and
by
the
sole
direction
of
another
?
Hee
can
bee
accounted
so
farre
no
better
then
a
clock
or
watch
,
which
tells
the
houre
by
the
wit
and
industry
of
the
maker
,
not
by
any
sence
or
worth
of
its
owne
.
If
therefore
,
to
renounce
our
wills
for
Gods
sake
bee
to
bee
accounted
a
sacrifice
;
as
farre
as
my
understanding
reacheth
,
it
is
no
other
then
that
the
Scripture
expresseth
upon
another
occasion
,
to
wit
,
one
by
which
the
sons
are
sacrificed
to
the
father
,
the
image
of
God
defaced
to
the
glory
of
him
whose
image
he
is
.
The
Fifth
GROUND
.
That
Fidelity
is
different
from
Obedience
;
and
in
what
it
consisteth
.
BUt
leaving
this
mistake
of
simple
devotion
;
of
which
wee
needed
not
have
spoken
so
much
,
had
there
not
depended
on
it
some
matter
of
greater
consequence
(
as
the
following
discourse
will
manifest
in
its
due
place
:
)
wee
are
to
take
notice
of
an
equivocation
which
may
draw
on
some
errour
if
not
prevented
.
Wee
use
to
say
serving-men
and
waiting-maids
ought
to
bee
obedient
to
their
Masters
and
Mistresses
,
whereas
indeed
,
the
vertue
by
which
they
serve
is
not
that
of
obedience
,
but
of
fidelity
and
truth
,
which
is
manifest
to
him
that
looks
into
the
nature
of
hirelings
.
For
,
none
thinke
a
husbandman
,
who
is
hired
to
till
or
fence
a
piece
of
ground
,
obeyeth
the
hirer
more
then
hee
that
selleth
a
piece
of
cloth
or
other
merchandize
obeyeth
the
buyer
,
because
he
taketh
his
moneys
;
but
they
are
said
to
contract
and
performe
their
part
of
the
bargaine
faithfully
and
truly
.
So
servants
pay
their
duties
,
performe
their
bargains
:
and
Fidelity
is
their
proper
vertue
;
to
doe
it
carefully
,
and
uprightly
;
not
Obedience
.
For
,
Obedience
is
in
such
actions
as
are
the
proper
actions
of
the
obeyer
,
which
concerne
his
life
,
and
by
which
hee
may
derive
good
if
well
done
,
and
harme
if
amisse
.
Now
in
servants
the
good
successe
pertaineth
to
the
Master
,
the
servant
hath
his
livelyhood
and
wages
,
whether
the
event
goe
right
or
wrong
,
so
hee
doe
what
his
Master
commandeth
.
And
hence
it
followeth
,
that
neither
ought
hee
bee
ignorant
in
the
action
hee
doeth
,
nor
sollicitous
whether
his
Master
bee
either
skilfull
or
honest
:
For
,
since
what
is
done
concerneth
not
him
but
his
Master
,
his
duty
is
to
seek
to
doe
what
hee
is
commanded
in
the
best
way
he
can
,
without
interessing
himself
about
the
successe
.
This
I
say
,
as
farre
as
he
is
a
serving-man
;
but
as
hee
is
also
an
honest
man
,
it
may
belong
to
him
to
suggest
to
his
Master
what
hee
thinks
best
;
and
,
sometimes
,
when
it
lieth
happily
in
his
way
,
to
help
such
errours
of
his
Master
as
he
can
:
without
trenching
on
his
Masters
credit
;
still
providing
for
his
own
indempnity
:
that
hee
bee
not
involved
in
his
Masters
either
imprudence
or
iniquity
;
for
by
his
bargaine
with
his
Master
,
he
did
not
renounce
the
care
of
his
own
preservation
.
The
reason
of
this
equivocation
is
because
wee
ordinarily
call
obeying
the
doeing
another
mans
will
:
and
distinguish
not
how
,
sometimes
,
this
is
done
with
renouncing
our
own
wills
,
which
is
in
those
actions
whereof
wee
are
Masters
,
that
is
,
our
owne
actions
;
and
,
sometimes
,
without
such
renunciation
,
as
in
the
actions
which
belong
to
others
,
in
which
wee
have
no
will
to
renounce
.
Now
Obedience
as
it
is
a
vertue
especially
attending
on
the
renouncing
of
our
wills
,
is
properly
confined
to
the
former
sence
,
not
to
the
other
;
with
which
it
onely
hath
an
alliance
in
the
name
,
and
which
truly
is
Fidelity
,
as
we
have
already
declared
.
But
,
although
Fidelity
bee
a
distinct
vertue
from
Obedience
,
yet
is
it
not
such
a
stranger
as
not
to
demand
a
place
in
this
Treatise
:
especially
because
the
kinde
of
Obedience
wee
desire
to
look
into
,
which
is
that
by
which
Common-wealths
and
Communities
subsist
,
is
founded
generally
on
Fidelity
or
the
matter
thereof
which
wee
call
promise
,
and
in
that
vertue
it
bindes
to
observance
.
After
which
discourse
wee
shall
bee
prepared
to
venture
on
the
matter
it self
of
Governement
,
and
to
our
power
,
declare
the
force
of
it
amongst
men
.
Man
therefore
being
by
his
nature
and
definition
a
reasonable
,
that
is
,
an
understanding
Creature
,
or
one
whose
primary
and
principall
inclination
is
to
truth
or
true
knowledge
;
and
the
outward
carriage
and
action
of
man
being
naturally
proportionable
to
his
inward
substance
;
it
is
cleere
his
chief
property
,
by
which
he
behaves
himself
outwardly
like
a
man
,
is
to
speak
truth
,
and
to
doe
as
hee
sayeth
,
when
his
words
have
action
following
them
.
Hence
it
is
,
that
though
honesty
(
which
in
a
Courtlyer
terme
is
called
Honour
,
when
applyed
to
a
rationall
carriage
,
and
in
a
more
spirituall
language
,
Conscience
)
bee
extended
to
many
other
qualities
,
yet
it
is
most
frequently
and
principally
expected
in
his
keeping
his
word
;
in
so
much
that
though
hee
have
other
faults
,
either
spirituall
or
carnall
,
yet
if
he
be
true
of
his
word
,
he
,
often
and
in
ordinary
conversation
,
passeth
for
an
honest
man
.
Againe
,
this
vertue
of
Truth
is
the
principall
and
first
engine
of
humane
conversation
,
and
he
that
hath
it
not
is
unfit
to
be
admitted
to
treate
amongst
men
,
but
is
to
be
rejected
and
banished
from
all
Negotiation
.
Thus
you
see
what
engagement
every
one
hath
,
both
by
nature
and
necessity
of
conversation
,
to
stand
upon
his
word
or
fidelity
:
For
so
we
call
the
vertue
by
which
we
speake
our
mind
in
reference
to
action
,
and
are
constant
to
performe
what
wee
say
.
Yet
,
since
malice
is
growne
to
such
a
height
,
all
nations
,
who
pretend
to
the
fear
of
any
Deity
,
have
used
to
make
men
confirme
their
faith
and
promise
by
the
invocation
of
the
Deity
they
worship
;
hoping
Religion
may
worke
in
them
what
Nature
is
not
strong
enough
to
effect
.
This
confirmation
is
performed
in
two
sorts
:
One
,
when
we
onely
call
God
to
witnesse
;
as
when
we
say
,
God
,
who
sees
my
heart
,
knowes
this
to
be
truth
,
or
that
I
meane
as
I
speake
:
The
other
,
when
we
pledge
our
trust
in
God
for
a
security
;
as
when
wee
wish
God
may
punish
us
,
or
never
doe
us
good
,
if
we
break
our
promise
.
And
this
is
properly
an
execration
,
as
the
other
an
oath
;
yet
both
called
oaths
,
and
agree
in
this
,
that
we
pledge
our
beliefe
and
feare
of
God
,
to
another
,
for
his
security
.
By
which
it
is
evident
,
that
men
generally
esteem
Religion
the
thing
which
should
pierce
deepest
into
a
mans
heart
and
affection
;
and
the
strongest
Bond
and
tye
of
Faith
and
honesty
;
and
that
he
,
who
setteth
little
by
his
Religion
,
hath
neither
honour
nor
honesty
in
him
;
or
at
least
wanteth
the
greatest
and
strongest
part
of
them
,
and
that
which
ought
to
rivet
in
and
fixe
the
naturall
inclination
which
we
have
to
truth
and
fidelity
.
The
Sixth
GROUND
.
In
what
consists
Right
or
Due
.
THE
next
consideration
may
appear
too
Metaphysicall
a
subtlety
for
a
Morall
treatise
:
yet
such
it
is
,
that
the
ignorance
of
it
is
mother
of
many
mistakes
and
quarrells
.
We
ought
therefore
,
to
know
that
a
man
,
considered
in
pure
Nature
,
lookes
on
all
other
things
,
Men
and
Beasts
,
and
insensible
creatures
,
as
his
subjects
to
worke
on
;
his
onely
rule
being
Reason
,
which
takes
nothing
to
bee
good
but
what
is
good
to
himself
;
and
makes
the
rule
of
his
actions
,
to
do
what
is
fitting
for
him
or
conformable
to
his
,
that
is
,
to
a
rationall
nature
.
By
this
rule
he
treats
another
Man
,
otherwise
then
a
horse
or
a
dog
,
and
them
otherwise
then
a
tree
or
stone
:
For
Reason
is
a
faculty
to
use
every
thing
suitably
to
their
natures
;
as
,
to
take
a
knife
to
cut
,
a
horse
to
ride
on
,
a
man
to
read
or
write
or
be
his
Counsellour
.
And
this
runs
through
all
his
actions
.
But
as
,
though
a
Taylor
or
Mariner
governe
himselfe
by
this
rule
,
even
when
he
playeth
the
Taylor
or
Pilot
,
yet
none
can
doubt
but
the
rules
of
Taylorship
or
Steerage
are
different
from
this
seeking
his
owne
good
and
applying
all
things
to
that
end
:
So
,
neither
can
any
justly
doubt
but
the
art
of
a
Lawyer
or
Counsellour
is
different
from
this
principle
which
belongeth
to
all
men
.
And
to
find
out
the
difference
,
wee
are
to
reflect
,
that
he
who
maketh
a
promise
to
another
,
so
it
be
a
perfect
one
(
which
we
adde
to
decline
the
question
of
what
promises
oblige
,
what
not
)
puts
himselfe
and
his
Promissary
into
a
rank
of
agency
and
patiency
,
on
a
new
score
,
to
wit
,
that
of
fidelity
and
negotiating
:
So
that
now
,
not
the
nature
of
the
two
men
,
but
their
words
,
and
what
followeth
out
of
them
,
ground
their
being
active
and
passive
.
This
power
of
activity
is
,
in
Latine
,
called
Jus
or
Justum
,
in
English
,
Right
or
Due
.
The
difference
of
these
two
Arts
is
,
One
considers
onely
what
is
noble
,
and
manly
,
and
Conscience
;
the
other
,
what
is
according
to
promise
and
consent
of
parties
.
Whence
we
finde
,
by
the
vertue
of
a
promise
,
a
new
order
growne
amongst
men
following
out
of
promise
:
Wherein
three
things
are
to
be
considered
;
The
engagement
of
nature
and
honesty
;
The
confirmation
by
oath
;
and
lastly
,
This
right
and
duty
which
ariseth
from
the
promise
:
For
,
whoever
promiseth
,
submits
himselfe
to
his
promissary
,
and
becomes
his
Subject
,
as
far
as
the
contract
reaches
.
The
first
mistake
that
springs
from
the
ignorance
of
this
difference
is
,
the
great
noise
we
heare
of
the
Law
of
Nature
and
the
Law
of
Nations
.
For
,
we
are
made
imagine
that
Nature
hath
bound
us
to
certaine
Lawes
,
and
not
left
us
to
the
Liberty
of
Reason
,
where
no
pacts
or
agreements
intervene
:
As
,
that
men
ought
to
give
free
Trade
to
leave
the
Seas
open
,
to
give
immunities
to
Ambassadours
,
and
the
like
:
For
these
either
depend
on
Custome
and
Consent
,
or
are
free
for
every
man
to
dispose
of
,
according
to
his
owne
profit
,
necessity
,
or
convenience
of
his
affaires
.
It
is
true
,
there
is
an
inclination
in
man
,
from
reason
,
to
do
another
any
good
I
can
without
my
owne
prejudice
,
and
to
have
a
desire
to
keepe
peace
with
all
men
:
But
if
I
do
not
,
it
followes
not
that
I
wrong
him
,
even
though
I
do
him
harme
or
seeke
his
ruine
;
But
I
wrong
my selfe
,
nature
binding
me
to
make
my
carriage
to
every
one
rationall
and
becoming
a
man
:
For
he
is
no
otherwise
to
me
then
a
piece
of
cloath
or
wood
,
which
I
cut
and
shape
after
my
owne
will
,
fittingly
for
my
use
.
And
,
on
the
contrary
side
,
the
party
prejudiced
or
refused
a
Courtesy
,
gets
no
right
over
me
to
revenge
himselfe
:
But
Nature
and
Reason
teaches
him
,
peradventure
,
that
it
is
good
and
prudent
for
him
to
hurt
me
,
to
prevent
a
greater
mischiefe
to
himselfe
;
and
he
doth
right
to
himselfe
in
harming
me
,
because
he
doth
an
action
rationall
and
suitable
to
manhood
.
The
different
consequents
of
the
two
positions
,
will
appeare
in
this
:
That
,
if
there
be
,
in
nature
,
radicated
such
an
order
of
right
and
naturally
just
or
due
(
as
many
hold
)
it
is
a
thing
that
reason
can
never
infringe
nor
can
any
thing
justifie
what
God
hath
shewed
us
by
example
,
and
we
see
wise
Politicians
practise
sometimes
,
when
,
without
crime
or
offence
offered
,
they
make
themselves
Masters
of
convenient
places
:
But
,
if
there
bee
no
such
right
by
Nature
,
then
Reason
is
left
Mistresse
to
judge
whether
it
be
conformable
to
the
nobility
of
man
to
do
such
an
action
or
no
.
The
Seventh
GROUND
.
Why
men
desire
to
live
in
Community
;
and
of
the
necessity
of
Governement
.
NOt
to
make
the
foundations
or
under-ground
workes
bigger
then
our
building
;
It
is
time
to
enter
upon
our
pretended
subject
of
Governement
and
Obedience
,
and
examine
what
it
is
maketh
Governement
necessary
to
Mankind
.
And
,
because
the
Governement
we
looke
upon
is
that
of
a
multitude
;
first
it
is
fit
to
understand
why
men
desire
to
live
in
flocks
or
multitudes
.
Neither
can
any
who
hath
never
so
little
skill
in
nature
doubt
,
but
,
as
pleasure
masters
and
heads
all
our
actions
,
so
likewise
doth
it
this
of
living
in
society
.
The
first
community
is
of
Man
and
Wife
.
Who
seeth
not
the
power
of
pleasure
in
their
mutuall
society
?
Aristotle
,
out
of
experience
,
teacheth
us
that
we
take
pleasure
in
conversing
with
handsome
persons
.
And
if
wee
consider
pleasure
to
be
nothing
but
the
knowledge
or
sence
of
our
being
well
or
receiving
some
good
;
and
,
that
the
immediate
cause
of
pleasure
is
the
impression
which
some
naturall
or
apprehended
good
maketh
of
its
owne
presence
;
and
that
good
signifieth
connaturall
or
fitting
for
us
;
wee
shall
perceive
that
Handsomenesse
in
our
owne
kinde
must
of
necessity
cause
pleasure
in
us
;
the
impression
it
makes
by
our
eyes
being
of
the
features
and
colour
due
to
the
perfection
of
our
Nature
;
a
gracefulnesse
,
not
onely
of
gesture
and
voice
,
but
even
of
wit
and
discourse
being
regularly
the
ground
of
the
outward
beauty
.
So
that
(
if
Nature
hath
not
miscarried
)
all
the
parts
and
actions
of
a
beautifull
body
are
gracefull
to
nature
,
and
breed
pleasure
in
others
who
injoy
them
by
conversation
and
,
as
it
were
,
communication
.
This
then
is
the
first
origine
of
meeting
and
living
together
;
as
,
whosoever
lookes
into
experience
will
easily
discover
:
For
,
he
will
finde
most
men
burthensome
to
themselves
when
they
are
alone
,
and
to
seeke
company
to
divert
themselves
,
so
to
elude
the
length
of
time
.
I
remember
to
have
heard
a
Country
fellow
complaine
of
the
losse
of
a
Dog
which
was
stollen
from
him
;
and
gave
for
his
reason
,
that
he
was
to
travell
a
whole
night
alone
,
and
the
Dog
would
have
beene
an
excellent
companion
to
him
.
Bees
also
,
wee
know
,
love
company
.
Horses
not
onely
labour
,
but
even
eate
better
amongst
their
fellowes
:
and
we
often
heare
sickly
stomachs
thank
those
that
visit
them
for
the
good
meale
they
have
made
,
as
if
the
company
helped
downe
their
meat
.
Pleasure
therefore
and
Love
is
the
first
combiner
of
men
into
Society
.
The
next
is
,
that
God
and
Nature
have
so
managed
mankind
,
that
no
one
hath
of
himself
,
as
much
as
he
desireth
;
but
regularly
aboundeth
in
one
kinde
of
goods
and
wants
some
other
which
his
neighbour
hath
:
Hence
,
they
mutually
affect
Society
;
to
bee
accommodated
with
such
necessaries
,
as
they
cannot
have
but
by
communication
one
with
another
.
In
the
third
place
comes
Feare
:
for
hee
that
findeth
himselfe
stored
with
those
things
which
hee
and
others
love
,
is
subject
to
feare
those
whom
hee
suspecteth
able
to
bereave
him
of
them
;
and
so
seeketh
company
of
friends
for
protection
.
Nor
doth
any
one
feare
to
lose
but
what
he
affecteth
to
have
;
so
that
first
love
marcheth
in
the
van
,
and
feare
followeth
in
the
reare
.
Besides
,
it
is
against
all
generosity
,
and
embases
Nature
it selfe
,
to
set
the
Throne
of
Feare
above
that
of
Love
;
and
agreeth
neither
with
Philosophy
nor
Morality
.
To
make
a
step
farther
:
Granting
once
men
to
be
desirous
to
live
together
,
and
taking
notice
of
the
passions
they
are
subject
to
,
and
how
self-love
corrupteth
the
judgement
of
almost
all
in
their
own
case
;
it
is
evident
they
can
never
live
in
quiet
and
content
,
unlesse
there
bee
some
way
contrived
of
agreement
,
when
passion
stirreth
contention
.
They
must
therefore
,
necessarily
,
give
consent
,
to
end
their
controversies
by
some
means
.
And
since
reason
is
our
nature
;
and
every
ones
reason
freer
to
see
the
truth
in
anothers
case
then
in
his
owne
;
and
a
wise
and
good
man
fitter
then
a
fool
or
knave
,
the
most
naturall
way
for
a
multitude
to
live
in
peace
is
to
have
some
man
or
men
,
accounted
wise
and
good
,
chosen
,
to
whose
arbitrement
all
the
rest
ought
to
stand
;
the
stronger
part
combining
to
force
the
weaker
,
in
case
of
resistance
;
that
is
,
the
disinteressed
part
,
which
is
the
multitude
,
to
force
the
interessed
,
which
generally
are
but
particulars
if
compared
to
the
body
of
the
people
.
Here
you
see
the
nature
of
Governement
begin
to
appeare
.
But
,
to
make
it
perfect
,
wee
must
farther
consider
,
That
many
commodities
are
necessary
to
a
multitude
,
which
are
to
be
furnished
by
common
consent
:
That
likewise
there
are
many
forraigne
enviers
to
a
multitude
which
liveth
handsomely
and
happily
:
And
in
conclusion
,
that
to
provide
for
goods
and
prevent
evils
in
common
,
is
a
matter
of
so
great
weight
and
difficulty
,
that
it
takethup
the
whole
life
of
one
or
more
men
;
and
by
consequence
,
these
businesses
cannot
be
carried
on
by
the
whole
body
of
the
community
,
whose
worke
and
aime
is
to
enjoy
themselves
to
their
proportion
,
in
getting
by
their
labour
,
those
accommodations
of
humane
life
,
which
they
esteem
necessary
or
conducing
to
their
happinesse
.
It
solloweth
therefore
,
they
must
entrust
some
more
or
fewer
to
take
care
of
the
common
concernements
.
Such
Trustees
are
called
Governours
,
and
the
commnnity
is
said
to
obey
them
;
and
according
to
the
principles
forelaid
,
you
see
the
people
are
supposed
ignorant
of
what
ought
to
bee
done
for
the
publike
,
this
being
a
businesse
requiring
a
mans
whole
time
;
which
they
neither
can
spare
,
nor
doe
desire
to
employ
in
this
:
way
:
You
see
they
entrust
others
in
whose
prudence
and
goodnesse
they
confide
;
and
themselves
execute
what
their
Trustees
think
fitting
,
either
by
practising
when
they
are
commanded
,
or
giving
a
sufficient
force
to
their
Governours
to
master
such
restif
parties
as
will
not
obey
:
In
conclusion
,
you
see
Governement
is
,
naturally
,
a
power
or
right
of
directing
the
common
affaires
of
a
multitude
,
by
a
voluntary
submission
of
the
communities
wills
to
the
will
of
the
Governours
;
whom
they
trust
,
upon
opinion
that
they
are
understanding
and
honest
,
and
will
administer
the
Commonalty
by
the
rules
of
wisedome
and
goodnesse
,
as
is
most
convenient
and
advantageous
for
the
people
.
It
seems
to
mee
no
moderate
and
discreet
person
can
doubt
but
a
Governement
so
ordered
is
both
necessary
and
connaturall
to
a
rationall
multitude
,
and
,
in
a
word
,
such
as
humane
nature
requires
;
and
is
the
best
,
if
not
the
onely
,
that
sutes
to
the
disposition
of
free
men
and
prudent
.
The
eighth
GROUND
.
Of
the
Authority
given
to
an
absolute
Governour
;
and
of
under-sorts
of
Governement
.
BY
this
resignation
of
the
Peoples
will
,
it
is
also
evident
,
the
Magistracy
receives
such
an
activity
and
power
as
,
wee
have
explicated
before
,
did
arise
out
of
a
mans
promise
to
his
neighbour
:
and
by
consequence
,
that
the
people
as
farre
as
they
have
renounced
their
owne
will
,
so
farre
they
have
no
power
left
in
them
to
contradict
or
resist
the
orders
of
the
Magistracy
.
I
say
,
as
farre
as
the
People
have
submitted
their
wills
:
for
since
this
power
is
in
the
Magistrate
in
vertue
of
their
wills
,
it
cannot
extend
farther
then
the
peoples
promise
:
So
that
if
the
people
binde
their
Magistrates
to
certaine
Lawes
and
Limits
;
hee
hath
no
right
to
transgresse
such
Lawes
,
or
extend
himselfe
beyond
the
prefixed
limits
by
his
installment
,
and
the
original
power
given
him
:
but
above
all
,
he
cannot
dispose
of
one
chip
or
dispense
in
one
the
least
law
;
farther
then
he
apprehends
it
as
fit
and
necessary
to
the
good
of
the
Common-wealth
:
and
,
if
hee
doth
,
hee
exceedeth
his
Patent
and
power
.
True
it
is
,
there
is
a
great
discretion
to
bee
used
in
such
limits
,
and
the
prudent
Governour
will
see
that
the
good
of
the
Community
requireth
many
of
those
dispensations
,
which
carelesse
Governours
use
out
of
an
overweening
of
their
owne
height
and
power
.
Having
thus
declared
the
nature
and
conditions
of
naturall
Governement
;
it
is
not
amisse
to
see
whether
there
bee
any
other
Governement
;
and
wherein
distinguished
from
this
.
And
casting
our
eyes
round
about
us
wee
quickly
perceive
certaine
communities
which
pretend
to
a
defective
Governement
:
as
Companies
of
Merchants
or
Trades-men
;
Universities
and
Colledges
of
Schollers
;
and
Cloysters
of
men
and
women
,
who
pretend
to
employ
themselves
wholly
to
perfect
their
soules
towards
eternall
beatitude
.
All
these
have
a
participation
of
Governement
;
but
have
not
the
universall
administration
of
humane
goods
and
evills
:
For
,
power
of
life
and
death
,
generally
,
they
have
none
;
and
are
subject
,
for
the
most
part
,
to
appeals
from
their
judgements
,
in
matters
of
great
consequence
:
neither
have
they
any
power
of
peace
and
warre
:
And
if
sometimes
any
of
these
royalties
belong
to
them
;
it
is
not
as
they
are
heads
of
such
Communities
,
but
as
they
participate
of
Soveraignty
by
priviledge
,
or
accident
.
These
therefore
are
distinguished
from
the
Governement
wee
pretend
to
declare
;
as
being
slight
imitations
of
it
,
and
certaine
likenesses
,
not
the
power
it self
;
or
as
some
Art
or
Trade
is
different
from
Morall
Philosophy
,
which
is
Mistresse
of
the
will
,
and
all
her
actions
;
the
others
being
but
Ushers
to
the
particular
,
as
it
were
formes
or
rankes
in
which
petty
things
are
taught
.
In
fine
,
these
others
are
to
our
Governement
,
as
particulars
to
the
universall
.
The
Governement
therefore
which
wee
explicate
is
that
which
hath
power
,
either
of
all
things
belonging
to
the
people
it
governeth
;
or
at
least
,
of
all
comprehensible
by
Nature
and
falling
under
Sence
and
Experience
.
The
first
of
these
wee
see
in
the
Pope
and
such
Bishops
as
are
withall
Secular
Princes
;
the
second
,
in
other
Christian
Governements
either
of
Princes
or
Common-wealths
,
where
the
Spiritual
jurisdiction
is
acknowledged
to
be
higher
and
greater
,
though
not
commander
of
the
Temporall
.
But
wee
seeke
farther
,
whether
there
bee
any
supreme
Governement
different
from
this
wee
explicate
,
or
no
:
And
the
occasion
is
from
what
wee
see
in
certaine
instances
,
that
there
is
a
kinde
of
command
or
rather
subjection
,
which
wee
call
Slavery
,
exercised
,
not
onely
amongst
Heathens
,
but
even
Christians
,
who
have
more
conformity
to
nature
.
The
Ninth
GROUND
.
Of
Slavery
and
the
lawfulnesse
of
it
.
ANd
first
,
wee
must
looke
into
the
notion
of
Slavery
;
which
signifies
a
subjection
to
command
in
all
things
;
and
that
meerely
for
the
Masters
profit
.
This
all
things
may
either
reach
to
the
hindring
him
from
those
actions
which
are
necessary
to
obtaine
Beatitude
;
or
onely
to
corporall
services
,
with
that
moderation
,
that
the
Master
hinders
him
not
from
such
exercises
as
concerne
the
procurement
of
future
happinesse
.
And
clearly
,
it
is
against
nature
for
any
to
submit
his
will
so
farre
as
to
renounce
eternall
blisse
.
There
cannot
,
then
,
bee
any
Obedience
due
to
such
an
extremity
;
and
,
by
consequence
,
there
cannot
be
any
power
of
commanding
such
enormities
in
the
compasse
of
nature
.
The
like
I
conceive
of
a
subjection
to
be
killed
or
maimed
causlessely
and
without
desert
,
or
even
tormented
;
nay
,
or
so
penuriously
abused
as
to
have
no
content
in
life
;
but
perpetually
to
suffer
sicknesse
,
hunger
,
cold
,
or
any
other
notably
afflictive
condition
,
so
that
his
life
is
rather
a
punishment
then
a
content
to
him
.
For
since
life
is
our
beeing
,
and
since
beeing
is
the
thing
most
deeply
recommended
to
us
by
nature
;
it
is
evidently
against
the
inclination
of
nature
,
to
consent
to
the
losse
either
of
life
or
of
the
profit
of
life
,
which
is
,
either
to
be
well
in
this
world
or
in
the
next
:
therefore
it
cannot
be
conformable
to
nature
to
renounce
either
;
especially
,
the
Quiet
in
this
world
being
the
meanes
to
gaine
blisse
in
the
other
.
Neither
doth
it
scare
me
to
cast
my
eyes
upon
so
many
holy
men
and
women
,
as
have
put
themselves
,
voluntarily
,
upon
penurious
and
painfull
lives
.
For
,
I
can
easily
answer
,
that
they
had
not
displeasing
lives
;
enjoying
the
fruit
of
contemplation
,
and
the
sweetnesse
of
Conscience
in
expecting
a
great
reward
for
what
they
did
:
So
that
,
they
onely
refused
the
pleasures
of
this
world
,
to
gaine
those
of
the
next
;
which
is
very
rationall
.
But
,
for
a
man
to
renounce
the
content
of
this
world
,
who
either
thinke
not
of
another
,
or
,
at
least
,
hopeth
nothing
out
of
his
renunciation
:
this
must
of
necessity
be
extremely
irrationall
and
against
Nature
;
whose
universall
aimes
are
,
to
be
well
,
either
in
the
next
or
this
present
life
.
But
if
there
be
no
su●h
subjection
naturall
,
there
can
as
little
be
any
power
of
command
gotten
either
by
promise
and
submission
of
the
subject
,
or
violence
of
the
Commander
;
who
may
perforce
do
what
he
list
,
but
can
never
make
it
conformable
to
nature
,
to
use
an
other
with
such
inhumane
severity
.
There
followes
yet
another
kinde
of
Slavery
;
which
consisteth
in
being
bound
to
do
what
his
Master
commandeth
,
while
his
Master
affordeth
him
a
convenient
livelyhood
;
and
being
subject
to
due
punishment
,
without
farther
appeal
,
when
he
deserveth
it
.
And
this
hath
no
apparent
opposition
to
Nature
;
why
,
in
circumstances
,
a
man
may
not
binde
himselfe
to
it
,
and
be
obliged
to
maintaine
and
make
good
his
word
to
his
dying
day
.
And
,
of
such
a
kind
of
Slavery
,
we
may
question
,
Whether
nature
alloweth
a
whole
people
to
be
involved
in
it
,
or
it
be
a
thing
that
onely
can
happen
accidentally
in
nature
.
And
Aristotle
is
the
first
man
whom
wee
are
engaged
to
offend
in
this
matter
;
who
sayes
or
seemes
to
say
,
That
some
Nations
are
naturally
Masters
and
Commanders
,
others
,
Slaves
and
Subjects
:
To
which
conceit
Virgil
seemes
also
to
incline
;
Tu
regere
imperio
populos
Romane
memento
&c.
Hae
tibi
erunt
artes
—
As
if
it
were
proper
to
that
Countrey
to
command
.
Neither
doe
I
thinke
Aristotle's
meaning
was
any
more
,
then
that
there
was
a
greater
fitnesse
in
some
Nations
to
command
,
then
in
others
:
for
,
himselfe
teacheth
,
the
Barbarous
prisoners
,
whose
education
had
been
noble
,
should
not
be
put
to
servile
offices
.
So
that
,
it
was
but
a
little
selfe-pleasing
in
these
two
great
Authours
,
and
affection
towards
their
Countries
,
which
made
them
fall
into
this
extremity
,
of
thinking
it
fit
that
other
nations
should
submit
to
theirs
:
Whereas
,
had
they
lived
in
our
dayes
,
long
experience
would
have
taught
them
that
,
in
every
nation
,
there
are
men
fit
to
Governe
,
if
Education
and
Discipline
be
not
wanting
;
And
againe
,
any
nation
may
prove
a
Slave
,
even
through
too
much
wit
,
if
they
have
not
goodnesse
to
temper
it
.
But
we
must
not
be
angry
,
even
with
great
ones
,
if
they
flatter
a
little
their
Countrey
:
but
take
warning
it
be
not
our
owne
case
,
either
for
our
Countrey
,
or
,
which
is
more
absurd
,
for
our selves
.
Leaving
then
this
question
,
Whether
any
nation
be
,
by
nature
,
borne
and
designed
to
slavery
?
let
us
see
whether
,
within
the
Latitude
of
Nature
,
it
consists
that
any
nation
can
enslave
it selfe
in
the
sence
propounded
.
I
do
not
here
intend
to
engage
in
that
question
;
Whether
one
nation
may
oppresse
another
,
and
,
by
force
of
Garrisons
and
Armies
,
keepe
them
quiet
in
a
Legitimate
course
of
Governement
and
Subjection
?
a
question
much
different
from
ours
,
which
is
onely
,
Whether
a
whole
Nation
may
voluntarily
submit
it selfe
to
a
Government
,
by
which
it
shall
have
nothing
of
its
owne
,
nor
be
able
to
deserve
or
get
any
thing
;
but
bee
entirely
at
the
disposition
of
the
Magistrate
it
chuseth
,
without
right
or
property
?
That
we
may
not
walk
too
much
in
the
dark
,
the
holy
Scripture
holdeth
us
out
a
Lanthorne
,
in
the
example
of
Joseph
;
who
bought
up
the
whole
nation
of
AEgypt
for
Pharaoh
their
King
,
so
that
he
rendred
him
not
onely
the
Governour
as
before
,
but
also
absolute
Lord
and
Master
,
and
them
his
slaves
;
and
this
by
their
consent
.
Neverthelesse
,
I
am
not
able
to
understand
reason
in
it
.
To
put
therefore
the
case
clearly
,
the
meaning
is
;
Whether
a
whole
nation
can
ty
it selfe
so
by
any
promise
to
one
Magistrate
,
as
afterward
to
be
bound
,
they
and
their
Children
,
in
force
of
their
words
,
not
to
have
or
dispose
of
their
Labours
and
goods
of
fortune
but
at
the
pleasure
of
the
Magistrate
;
and
that
he
hath
power
,
arbitrarily
and
without
any
farther
reason
then
his
owne
will
,
to
give
what
one
man
possesseth
to
another
,
and
make
any
one
worke
and
obey
another
,
meerly
because
such
is
his
pleasure
.
That
which
induceth
me
to
declare
for
the
Negative
is
the
Nature
of
man
;
whose
first
and
maine
operation
,
is
judgement
and
choice
;
and
the
matter
of
this
is
his
outward
action
:
So
that
,
who
univer●ally
renounceth
his
judgement
in
externe
action
,
truely
renounceth
nature
it selfe
,
in
renouncing
the
end
and
action
for
which
it
was
made
.
Now
,
that
a
single
man
may
be
forced
to
this
,
I
make
no
difficulty
:
For
,
if
force
can
take
away
a
single
mans
life
,
much
more
may
it
take
away
his
outward
action
.
But
,
when
I
speake
of
a
Nation
,
me thinks
I
speake
of
Nature
it selfe
:
For
,
I
understand
a
Nation
to
signifie
a
thing
in
nothing
different
from
humane
Nature
,
except
in
greatnesse
;
as
a
bit
of
bread
from
a
loafe
or
a
paile
of
water
from
the
pond
out
of
which
it
was
taken
;
and
so
,
Reason
cannot
teach
us
to
do
that
to
a
nation
,
which
ought
not
bee
done
to
all
humane
kinde
.
Now
,
who
abhorres
not
to
thinke
that
the
use
of
judgement
and
will
should
bee
banished
out
of
Mankinde
?
Were
not
that
quite
to
unman
us
and
be-beast
our
whole
nature
?
On
the
other
side
,
it
being
the
property
of
reason
to
use
every
thing
it
knoweth
,
according
as
it
is
fitting
to
the
respective
nature
of
the
thing
;
and
nothing
being
more
fitting
for
man
in
common
and
every
one
in
particular
,
then
to
judge
and
governe
in
his
little
spheare
of
activity
;
reason
can
never
demand
or
approve
of
the
contrary
to
be
practised
universally
;
as
is
implyed
in
this
Position
,
that
it
may
be
done
to
a
whole
nation
.
I
looke
not
into
the
inconvenience
of
such
proceeding
:
How
base
and
unworthy
it
renders
the
subjects
;
how
unfit
for
the
service
of
the
Magistrate
;
how
ready
to
accept
of
any
occasion
to
better
themselves
;
and
the
like
;
which
are
sufficient
to
dehort
any
wise
Governour
from
attempting
or
desiring
it
:
Because
my
Theame
is
onely
upon
the
contracting
an
obligation
of
obedience
,
out
of
the
force
of
their
promise
;
and
extends
no
further
.
And
,
I
suppose
,
the
shewing
that
such
a
promise
invalidateth
the
principle
upon
which
a
promise
grounds
its
constancy
,
is
enough
,
to
shew
that
no
promise
so
made
can
be
constant
and
firme
;
since
a
man
stands
to
his
word
,
because
he
is
a
man
and
hath
a
principle
of
judgement
or
choice
upon
judgement
,
by
which
and
according
to
which
he
is
and
ought
to
be
governed
:
Now
then
,
such
a
promise
being
a
renouncing
and
bereaving
him
of
this
his
manlinesse
;
it
cannot
assuredly
bee
maintained
by
manlinesse
which
is
the
onely
or
chiefe
strength
of
a
promise
.
But
,
what
must
we
reply
to
Joseph
?
what
to
many
thousands
of
eminent
Christians
,
who
seeme
to
professe
and
observe
,
in
vertue
of
a
vow
,
this
very
kinde
of
subjection
?
As
for
Joseph
,
he
justifies
himselfe
,
in
renouncing
the
Vassalage
of
his
People
for
one
fifth
part
of
their
lands
and
fruits
.
1.
And
,
not
to
make
an
estimate
,
how
proportionable
the
fifth
of
a
Kingdome
is
to
the
furnishing
of
necessaries
for
governing
;
so
much
at
least
is
plain
that
,
by
his
remission
of
foure
parts
absolutely
,
that
is
,
for
ever
,
he
did
not
execute
what
he
pretended
by
the
bargaine
;
but
,
by
the
formality
of
acquiring
all
,
he
obtained
what
he
aimed
at
,
That
the
People
should
willingly
contribute
the
fifth
part
of
their
Labour
and
goods
generally
,
and
,
in
case
of
necessity
,
willingly
obey
their
Governour
.
As
for
the
speciall
obedience
vowed
by
some
Christians
of
exemplary
life
,
it
is
professedly
only
,
concerning
spirituall
instruction
or
exercise
,
even
then
when
it
is
applyed
to
the
Knights
champions
of
Christendome
:
And
this
is
expressed
by
the
greatest
Divine
the
Schoole
ever
had
,
in
his
22●
.
Qu.
104.
Art.
5.
ad
tertium
.
So
that
,
neither
of
these
objections
prejudice
the
conclusion
we
have
setled
;
However
the
outward
undiscerned
shew
may
make
an
appearance
to
the
contrary
.
Out
of
this
conclusion
it
is
easily
seene
,
that
the
Turkish
,
Moscoviticall
,
Tartarian
and
other
whatsoever
Governements
,
setled
upon
this
principle
,
that
the
Goods
and
Lives
of
the
Subjects
are
the
Princes
,
not
to
defend
(
as
our
Lawes
go
)
but
to
dispose
of
at
will
,
without
contradiction
or
limitation
,
more
then
of
his
pleasure
;
neither
do
nor
can
ever
breed
any
obligation
of
Obedience
in
the
Subject
,
farther
then
out
of
feare
or
present
utility
.
It
is
not
amisse
to
adde
this
consideration
,
that
those
Tyrannicall
Governours
exact
of
their
Subjects
no
lesse
then
to
forgoe
all
that
is
deare
in
this
world
,
at
their
pleasures
,
life
and
meanes
,
wife
and
children
,
and
whatsoever
hath
made
impression
upon
them
:
So
that
,
truely
,
there
is
no
protection
or
security
from
them
;
and
if
they
rob
you
not
,
it
is
because
they
have
no
occasion
,
not
because
they
conceive
any
unworthinesse
in
it
.
Whence
,
no
good
nor
profit
doth
,
regularly
and
according
to
the
intention
of
the
pact
and
agreement
,
result
to
the
particular
;
but
all
is
the
high
Masters
,
and
the
Subjects
portion
is
onely
to
share
those
scraps
he
shall
cast
down
to
him
,
as
to
a
Dog
,
to
make
him
fit
to
hunt
for
his
master
.
The
tenth
GROUND
.
Why
a
man
is
to
hazard
himselfe
for
the
common
good
.
IT
is
true
,
this
debt
in
the
subject
,
of
hazarding
life
and
limbs
and
all
that
is
estimable
in
this
world
,
is
exacted
,
as
well
in
just
and
legitimate
Governements
as
in
those
hideous
Tyrannies
;
But
,
there
is
a
recompence
for
it
,
and
the
good
of
the
whole
reflecteth
on
the
part
;
and
if
one
lose
his
life
,
his
children
and
relations
at
last
feele
the
sweetnesse
of
it
;
and
this
makes
men
hazard
with
courage
,
and
die
with
comfort
.
And
cleerly
,
were
there
not
this
obligation
,
no
Common-wealth
could
stand
.
What
City
could
be
defended
,
if
the
Citizens
would
not
venture
their
lives
upon
the
walls
?
What
Army
could
bee
managed
,
if
the
Souldier
would
never
be
brought
into
the
danger
of
death
,
or
would
fly
as
soon
as
the
bullets
began
to
play
about
his
ears
?
all
wrongs
must
be
suffered
at
their
hands
who
would
expose
their
own
lives
to
hurt
others
;
and
no
justice
maintained
,
or
innocency
defended
.
Nature
therefore
makes
it
most
cleer
that
such
an
obligation
is
unavoidable
,
and
the
daily
necessity
of
it
beateth
it
out
so
flat
and
plaine
,
that
wee
can
no
way
escape
so
manifest
an
evidence
.
But
if
it
bee
by
the
direction
of
nature
,
certainly
it
is
also
rationall
,
and
hath
some
principles
of
its
truth
and
reasonablenesse
.
Now
,
in
Morality
the
reason
of
all
action
is
the
good
obtaineable
by
it
;
which
if
lesse
or
not
greater
then
what
wee
hazard
and
,
peradventure
,
lose
in
the
attempt
,
it
is
no
good
nor
can
bee
a
rationall
motive
of
such
an
action
.
We
ought
therefore
to
seeke
out
this
great
good
.
Aristotle
proceeds
as
cunningly
in
this
businesse
as
became
so
wise
a
Master
;
and
,
according
to
his
fashion
,
where
his
skill
reached
not
to
explicate
the
particulars
,
remained
in
common
termes
:
telling
us
,
that
Bonum
commune
divinius
est
quàm
particulare
:
But
,
in
what
this
Divinity
consists
,
hee
no where
expresses
.
Truly
,
if
there
were
a
Platonick
Idea
of
the
particular's
goods
,
which
might
bee
termed
the
common
good
,
I
could
understand
that
there
were
a
Divinity
in
it
;
but
himselfe
hath
extinguished
that
flash
of
Plato's
,
beyond
reviving
.
I
understand
also
,
that
the
notion
of
common
,
compared
to
the
notion
of
individuall
,
hath
a
kinde
of
excellency
by
its
universality
,
which
rendreth
it
very
august
and
lustrous
,
and
of
a
higher
degree
then
the
particular
.
I
know
again
the
perpetuity
a
Common-wealth
pretendeth
to
,
compared
to
the
mortality
of
a
single
person
,
vesteth
it selfe
with
a
kinde
of
infinity
,
which
giveth
it
a
glorious
appearance
.
Nay
,
when
I
see
the
same
man
work
for
a
Common-wealth
,
in
a
free
way
of
doing
it
good
;
and
againe
,
for
a
private
friend
:
I
see
a
vast
distance
between
his
pretended
ends
;
and
an
eminent
generosity
in
one
over
the
other
:
Whence
,
I
believe
,
it
cometh
that
Heroës
and
heroicall
vertues
are
chiefly
taken
in
respect
of
doing
good
to
whole
Countreys
or
Cities
.
But
when
,
on
the
other
side
,
I
see
the
same
great
Master
teach
us
,
that
Good
is
the
same
with
Desireable
;
and
every
ones
good
,
what
is
desireable
to
him
;
I
finde
it
is
an
intricate
labyrinth
of
equivocation
wherein
wee
endlessely
erre
,
while
wee
think
that
Good
taken
in
common
,
should
bee
accounted
Good
,
truly
and
properly
.
As
,
who
would
bee
so
wilde
as
to
bend
any
strong
labour
here
in
England
to
profit
the
King
of
Persia
or
Siam
,
if
hee
expected
no
good
to
reflect
on
himselfe
by
it
?
Much
lesse
would
any
account
it
good
to
bee
robbed
or
maimed
,
because
it
was
good
to
another
who
possessed
his
money
or
was
afraid
of
him
:
and
yet
if
wee
stick
upon
the
common
Notion
of
good
,
without
determining
to
whom
it
is
good
,
●oth
these
must
bee
esteemed
not
onely
goods
but
great
ones
;
for
,
so
they
are
to
some
body
,
though
nothing
or
harme
to
the
esteemer
.
Then
,
to
cry
,
The
Common
good
,
is
a
meere
deceit
and
flattery
of
words
;
unlesse
wee
can
shew
that
the
common
good
is
as
great
to
us
as
wee
make
it
sound
.
Neither
can
the
authority
of
learned
Nations
and
the
many
endevours
of
worthy
men
perswade
us
the
contrary
.
For
these
Nations
generally
were
of
Popular
governements
,
where
plainly
the
common
good
was
the
good
of
them
who
were
to
reward
the
causes
of
it
:
so
that
,
it
was
no
wonder
the
Common
good
should
be
so
highly
exalted
and
cryed
up
;
where
it
was
the
particular
good
,
both
to
them
to
whom
it
was
commended
,
as
also
the
commenders
themselves
were
to
arrive
to
their
own
private
pretences
through
that
notion
of
the
common
good
.
The
like
is
of
all
Princes
and
Governours
;
who
if
they
bee
wise
,
conceive
the
common
good
in
most
circumstances
,
to
bee
compared
to
them
as
their
own
proper
good
.
It
remaines
therefore
,
to
see
what
may
bee
the
ground
on
which
an
understanding
man
ought
to
value
so
highly
the
common
good
;
and
expose
his
life
and
all
that
is
deare
to
him
,
upon
the
score
of
the
Publicke
.
Cleare
it
is
,
that
hee
who
ventures
his
life
,
ventures
all
this
world
:
For
if
hee
dies
,
what
reward
remaines
there
in
this
world
?
Fame
is
a
slender
recompence
,
when
the
fruit
of
it
(
which
chiefly
consists
in
being
respected
in
company
,
and
having
a
power
amongst
his
associates
)
is
once
passed
.
The
good
of
his
wife
and
children
;
that
may
rejoyce
a
dying
man
;
but
if
there
rest
nothing
after
death
,
it
is
a
comfort
which
soon
expires
;
being
indeed
nothing
but
a
flash
.
It
is
then
past
dispute
,
that
for
him
,
who
expects
nothing
in
the
next
world
,
there
can
bee
no
rationall
motive
of
voluntarily
endangering
his
life
for
the
common
cause
;
if
himselfe
bee
not
particularly
interessed
in
it
.
I
know
Philosophers
reply
,
that
there
is
no
harme
in
death
,
nor
pain
after
it
,
and
wee
are
but
as
if
wee
never
had
been
;
so
they
dispute
to
take
away
the
feare
of
death
.
But
first
,
I
would
ask
them
,
why
,
even
in
such
a
case
,
the
fear
of
death
should
be
taken
away
?
What
signifieth
this
to
a
sound
Philosopher
,
to
take
away
the
love
of
his
Summum
Bonum
?
of
the
end
for
which
hee
is
to
doe
all
his
actions
?
Againe
if
hee
must
embrace
death
,
upon
what
motive
must
he
make
his
onset
?
shall
hee
propose
to
himselfe
none
?
or
a
lesse
good
then
hee
loses
?
or
entertaine
frantick
apprehensions
of
glory
after
hee
is
nothing
?
These
are
not
answers
for
Philosophers
and
considerate
persons
;
but
for
some
hare-brained
fool-hardy
flashes
or
doating
Oratours
,
who
,
with
a
multitude
of
fine
words
,
can
plausibly
dresse
up
contradictions
and
non-sence
.
This
therefore
remaines
certain
,
that
there
is
no
good
to
bee
expected
here
equivalent
to
the
hazard
of
death
;
and
consequently
,
none
can
bee
rationally
valiant
,
who
sets
not
his
hopes
upon
the
next
world
:
And
as
,
before
,
wee
made
it
apparent
,
that
hee
who
was
not
constant
to
his
Religion
,
could
have
no
rooted
Honour
or
Honesty
in
him
;
so
,
now
it
is
likewise
evident
,
hee
cannot
rationally
bee
either
valiant
himselfe
or
trusted
by
others
in
danger
,
farther
then
hee
is
a
foole
.
Since
then
,
on
the
contrary
side
,
the
nature
of
Common-wealths
makes
it
beyond
dispute
that
hazarding
is
necessary
;
it
is
both
evident
there
is
another
life
to
bee
expected
,
and
that
it
imports
good
Government
to
plant
deeply
in
the
breast
of
the
subjects
a
rationall
apprehension
of
it
.
The
cause
therefore
,
and
solid
reason
why
men
ought
to
bee
valiant
,
is
the
hope
of
reward
hereafter
for
doeing
good
to
our
neighbour
here
:
and
the
Common-wealth
beeing
our
neerest
and
greatest
Neighbour
,
as
including
our
Friends
,
Parents
,
Acquaintance
,
and
all
of
Mankinde
that
our
knowledge
reacheth
to
;
to
performe
service
to
It
is
,
certainly
,
the
greatest
act
of
charity
towards
our
Neighbour
;
that
is
the
highest
externe
act
which
God
hath
granted
to
us
,
and
,
consequently
,
to
bee
preferred
before
all
others
;
and
,
as
such
,
to
expect
a
profit
and
recompence
in
the
next
life
.
I
know
,
it
may
bee
objected
,
that
in
beasts
also
is
to
bee
found
a
kinde
of
valour
,
even
to
the
hazard
of
their
lives
for
their
Mates
and
little
ones
,
and
yet
no
reward
of
the
next
world
can
be
pretended
for
them
.
But
,
wee
are
to
reflect
,
that
beasts
are
not
governed
by
any
reason
given
them
to
governe
themselves
by
;
but
like
Clocks
and
other
Engines
,
by
the
wit
of
their
Makers
:
and
therefore
it
ought
not
to
bee
expected
they
should
bee
addressed
to
that
which
is
their
individuall
greatest
good
,
as
Man
is
by
his
Reason
;
but
onely
to
what
is
fittest
for
their
Creators
intention
;
which
being
onely
to
continue
them
for
the
use
of
Man
;
and
this
passion
of
audacity
which
wee
see
in
them
,
being
fit
for
that
,
wee
are
not
to
seeke
a
further
reason
for
them
to
hazard
their
lives
,
nor
to
draw
any
consequence
from
them
to
Mankinde
,
whose
propriety
is
to
governe
himselfe
by
the
knowledge
of
his
owne
good
,
and
not
to
bee
forced
out
of
that
for
the
good
of
any
other
,
so
the
notion
of
good
bee
rightly
taken
.
By
this
wee
,
in
part
,
understand
wherein
consists
the
worth
and
excellency
of
a
Magistrate
and
his
Office
:
to
wit
,
that
all
others
ends
being
purely
for
the
good
of
their
private
persons
or
family
;
the
Magistrates
aime
is
at
the
universall
good
of
the
whole
eternall
body
of
the
Common-wealth
,
the
extent
of
the
persons
,
the
long
and
farre-sighted
care
,
and
the
abstraction
from
his
private
good
,
manifestly
exalt
this
function
,
beyond
comparison
,
above
that
of
private
men
and
their
intentions
;
and
placeth
it
,
as
it
were
,
in
an
orb
of
honour
proper
to
its
dignity
.
The
eleventh
GROUND
.
The
Quality
and
Rationall
power
of
a
supreme
Governour
.
THus
is
our
supreme
Magistrate
or
Governour
mounted
on
his
Throne
of
Justice
and
Soveraignty
.
Hee
hath
for
his
strength
,
that
right
the
People
have
bestowed
on
him
;
devesting
themselves
,
by
this
submission
,
from
interposing
in
Common
affaires
.
He
hath
besides
,
the
strength
of
the
People
;
both
their
Wealth
and
Swords
being
delivered
up
to
him
;
so
that
,
if
he
bee
wise
,
he
can
make
himselfe
and
his
Lawes
obeyed
.
But
chiefely
he
hath
his
owne
Prudence
and
Goodnesse
,
which
is
supposed
to
be
the
choicest
that
could
bee
found
in
that
people
;
and
the
Credit
of
it
to
be
his
strength
and
support
.
For
,
if
we
looke
into
it
;
As
we
see
that
,
in
the
naturall
generation
of
Governement
,
the
people
truely
intend
to
be
governed
by
one
whom
they
esteeme
the
Wisest
and
Best
amongst
them
:
so
afterward
,
when
they
apprehend
their
Magistrate
no
Solomon
,
yet
they
still
conceive
he
is
the
best
they
can
obtaine
or
prudently
aime
at
;
That
is
,
if
they
should
attempt
to
change
,
it
would
bring
greater
inconveniences
then
their
continuance
under
this
weaker
Magistrate
.
So
that
,
as
it
were
,
the
Essence
and
Forme
of
his
power
to
governe
,
is
Wisdome
and
Goodnesse
;
at
least
,
such
a
degree
of
both
as
is
supposed
and
apprehended
the
greatest
possible
,
according
to
the
circumstances
wherein
they
are
.
His
End
wee
finde
to
bee
The
common
good
:
and
to
that
is
he
wholly
and
adequately
bound
,
by
his
owne
Goodnesse
,
by
the
peoples
Intention
,
by
his
owne
Acceptance
,
by
the
nature
of
the
Charge
it selfe
,
and
by
the
very
forme
of
his
life
and
Profession
:
In
so
much
that
,
he
faileth
from
his
Duty
,
from
the
expectation
of
his
Subjects
,
and
his
owne
Goodnesse
,
if
he
doth
the
least
action
for
his
private
interest
,
or
otherwise
then
out
of
his
esteeme
that
it
is
for
the
greatest
good
of
the
Common-wealth
.
And
truely
,
if
it
bee
duely
considered
,
we
may
plainely
see
that
his
private
interest
is
not
distinguished
from
the
publick
.
For
,
how
can
it
be
?
First
for
Honour
,
't
is
plaine
,
the
welfare
of
his
Subjects
is
his
highest
honour
;
Their
knowing
they
are
well
by
him
,
and
so
their
love
to
him
,
his
strongest
security
;
Their
expressing
still
on
all
occasions
content
with
his
actions
,
and
esteeme
of
his
person
,
his
greatest
pleasure
;
and
in
fine
,
the
more
wealth
they
have
,
the
greater
Commander
is
he
:
so
that
really
,
this
private
interest
(
if
he
be
indeed
a
good
Governour
)
is
the
true
felicity
of
his
People
.
I
doe
not
,
by
this
,
intend
to
cut
off
from
Supreame
Magistrates
that
promise
and
magnificence
wee
see
usually
in
persons
of
that
quality
:
But
,
whereas
it
may
be
practised
either
for
pride
and
vanity
,
that
is
,
to
procure
an
esteem
of
the
private
merit
of
the
Magistrate
,
or
else
,
to
facilitate
the
governement
by
the
awe
and
reverence
it
printeth
in
the
Subject
;
I
expect
the
supreame
Magistrate
to
be
so
discreet
,
as
to
understand
the
former
is
meerly
a
shadow
or
faint
and
fading
colour
,
the
other
a
reall
profit
and
necessary
instrument
,
and
so
to
be
embraced
for
the
good
of
the
people
.
Neither
must
wee
leave
our
Magistrate
here
,
but
transplant
our
discourse
into
a
new
consideration
.
For
,
if
he
hath
gotten
a
Commission
,
he
hath
not
,
by
that
,
lost
the
quality
of
a
rationall
,
wise
,
and
good
man
;
but
joined
to
that
a
new
obligation
of
being
new
fixt
upon
the
Common
good
,
as
the
effect
and
scope
of
the
actions
of
his
whole
life
:
Insomuch
that
,
to
determine
the
quality
of
his
action
,
we
must
make
one
complexe
of
the
whole
person
;
and
aske
,
What
a
wise
and
noble
minde
,
haveing
such
limitations
upon
him
,
by
word
or
oath
engaged
in
his
installment
,
may
or
ought
to
do
concerning
the
limitations
?
And
first
,
it
is
undoubted
on
both
sides
,
that
neither
may
he
,
without
great
cause
,
make
a
breach
in
those
hedges
his
way
is
fenced
with
;
nor
,
if
he
make
some
small
and
inconsiderable
breaches
,
that
hee
violates
therefore
his
oath
.
For
,
the
nature
of
humane
action
is
such
,
as
not
to
consist
in
an
indivisible
;
but
,
of
it selfe
,
to
have
a
morall
Latitude
▪
our
understandings
not
being
able
to
reach
to
such
small
and
petty
differences
as
nature
maketh
and
our
operations
containe
,
as
far
as
they
depend
from
nature
.
But
,
the
Question
cometh
,
When
some
great
fault
discovers
it selfe
in
the
limitations
,
and
the
end
of
Governement
is
prejudiced
by
such
a
defect
;
and
neverthelesse
it
is
no
doubt
but
't
is
the
intention
of
the
people
or
the
Trustees
of
the
people
to
binde
their
Magistrate
to
such
conditions
;
Whether
,
in
such
a
case
,
he
be
bound
to
his
orders
and
oath
,
or
whether
the
duty
of
a
wise
and
good
man
doth
enfranchise
him
to
doe
what
is
truely
best
for
the
people
,
though
it
be
against
their
wills
?
The
question
seemeth
hard
:
and
therefore
it
is
not
amisse
to
note
,
that
truely
best
signifieth
that
it
be
not
onely
best
,
if
it
had
been
fore-ordered
or
if
it
were
in
practise
;
but
that
it
be
best
to
be
brought
into
practise
;
and
that
,
notwithstanding
all
dammages
and
dangers
which
are
to
be
incurred
in
the
setling
of
it
;
Otherwise
,
it
is
clear
,
he
ought
to
stand
to
his
oath
.
Another
caution
is
,
that
the
Magistrate
doe
not
onely
think
it
so
best
,
but
know
it
by
certainty
and
science
;
otherwise
,
hee
proceedeth
not
wisely
,
to
hazard
a
disturbance
of
the
Common-wealth
upon
slight
and
weak
appearances
.
These
two
suppositions
premised
,
wee
are
to
consider
what
it
is
that
engageth
the
Magistrate
on
both
sides
.
And
,
for
his
promise
,
it
is
above
declared
,
that
hee
is
engaged
to
it
by
the
connaturality
and
beauty
of
Truth
in
Mans
nature
:
Now
not
Truth
onely
is
conformable
to
mans
nature
,
but
also
that
Noblenesse
and
Goodnesse
that
bindeth
man
to
man
;
which
in
its
highest
pitch
,
that
is
,
as
it
looketh
upon
a
Common-wealth
or
a
little
Mankinde
,
is
the
beauty
and
vertue
of
a
Governour
.
Againe
,
I
see
a
Governour
hath
in
himselfe
,
as
it
were
,
two
Truths
,
or
degrees
of
truth
belonging
to
his
person
:
One
,
which
is
the
publicke
Honesty
,
either
considered
betwixt
him
and
his
subject
or
some
aliens
;
and
this
forfeited
maketh
his
publick
credit
weak
and
unfit
for
the
use
of
Governement
:
the
other
is
but
a
splendour
reflecting
on
his
own
person
,
by
which
hee
appeareth
in
the
face
of
honour
and
a
man
of
his
word
.
For
this
latter
it
is
very
evident
,
the
affection
to
the
publicke
ought
to
oversway
it
;
because
being
but
a
private
good
it
should
doe
homage
to
those
vertues
which
carry
a
man
to
the
common
interest
.
For
the
former
,
the
dammage
ensueing
is
to
bee
esteemed
and
poised
against
the
profit
or
necessity
of
the
Common-wealth
:
For
,
if
it
bee
evident
,
that
the
good
of
the
change
openly
and
vastly
exceeds
the
dammage
proceeding
from
the
discredit
;
cleerly
hee
is
bound
to
admit
of
the
discredit
,
to
purchase
the
advantage
accrewing
by
the
change
:
But
,
where
there
is
none
or
little
difference
,
there
the
ballance
hangs
upon
quietnesse
side
,
and
change
is
not
to
bee
ventured
on
.
This
seemeth
so
plainly
and
evidently
concluded
,
that
a
rationall
man
cannot
resist
it
.
But
,
to
those
who
are
used
to
maintaine
their
credit
by
custome
more
then
by
reason
,
it
is
a
bolus
of
hard
digestion
,
to
tell
them
they
must
break
their
word
for
the
common
good
:
and
seemeth
to
bee
of
the
same
nature
,
with
that
famous
definition
of
an
Ambassadour
,
witty
in
England
,
harsh
in
other
Nations
,
that
Hee
is
sent
ad
peregrè
mentiendum
pro
patriâ
,
which
where
the
equivocation
of
lying
abroad
is
not
understood
,
is
,
in
verity
,
a
scandall
to
Statesmen
,
whose
negotiation
hangs
so
tenderly
on
their
credit
,
that
,
it
once
being
broken
,
they
have
lost
a
principall
instrument
to
penetrate
the
hearts
on
which
they
are
to
work
.
Therefore
,
let
us
see
whether
the
high
Magistrate
(
in
proceeding
as
wee
have
declared
)
does
truly
force
the
rampart
of
veracity
so
necessary
for
a
Governement
.
Let
us
first
begin
with
his
promise
,
and
consider
what
it
is
.
Hee
is
entrusted
to
doe
for
the
common
good
:
and
the
reason
why
hee
is
entrusted
is
,
because
the
entrusters
conceive
themselves
either
through
their
incapacity
or
attendance
to
other
imployments
,
ignorant
of
what
is
truly
the
common
good
.
They
entrust
him
,
therefore
,
with
more
then
they
understand
;
and
so
his
power
is
to
proceed
,
according
to
his
understanding
,
though
it
crosse
theirs
:
Hee
then
of
necessity
,
must
bee
false
to
his
Oath
,
if
hee
doe
not
,
according
to
his
trust
,
act
for
the
common
good
what
hee
evidently
sees
in
a
high
degree
to
import
it
.
Further
,
because
wee
know
,
in
morall
businesses
,
the
end
aimed
at
,
is
more
principall
then
the
means
ordered
to
it
,
and
hath
such
a
command
over
them
that
they
are
to
bee
or
not
to
bee
,
according
as
is
fitting
for
the
end
:
And
in
the
Oath
or
Promise
of
our
high
Magistrate
,
if
hee
observe
his
limitations
,
he
destroyeth
the
end
for
which
they
were
put
:
Hee
offends
against
both
his
Oath
and
Fidelity
to
his
people
,
if
hee
maintain
such
limitations
,
when
hee
is
obliged
,
for
the
publick
good
,
that
is
,
when
hee
ought
to
break
them
.
Yes
but
(
replieth
the
man
who
thinketh
himselfe
wedded
to
an
outward
and
seeming
honesty
in
this
cause
)
howsoever
,
at
least
hee
breaketh
that
part
of
his
Oath
,
in
which
hee
swore
directly
,
to
those
limitations
.
Let
us
therefore
see
even
that
point
,
and
ask
,
what
was
the
peoples
will
in
exacting
his
Oath
or
Promise
?
Doeth
any
one
will
what
hee
understandeth
and
knoweth
not
?
If
one
should
say
to
another
,
I
give
thee
what
is
in
that
trunk
;
in
which
himselfe
had
put
a
suit
of
apparell
,
and
,
without
his
knowledge
,
his
servant
had
taken
that
out
and
put
in
bags
of
gold
to
the
same
bulk
;
would
any
Divine
,
or
Chancery
Judge
,
or
prudent
person
assert
he
were
bound
to
bestow
on
that
promissary
all
his
gold
,
which
was
in
the
trunke
?
I
thinke
not
;
and
the
reason
is
,
because
it
is
the
will
and
understanding
which
hath
the
power
to
give
strength
to
a
promise
or
contract
;
and
here
the
will
is
wanting
;
for
hee
knew
not
what
he
said
,
nor
intended
to
give
any
thing
but
a
suit
of
clothes
.
How
many
promises
doe
Divines
and
Lawyers
pronounce
null
,
though
they
were
good
and
valid
when
they
were
made
,
by
reason
of
the
change
of
accidents
following
,
which
could
not
be
foreseene
?
If
one
promise
his
Daughter
in
marriage
to
his
neighbour
,
and
shee
dyeth
;
is
he
bound
to
fulfill
his
engagement
,
or
seeke
his
neighbour
another
wife
?
Nay
,
if
the
neighbour
be
discovered
not
to
be
the
man
he
was
taken
for
;
not
to
have
a
competent
estate
and
such
like
conditions
;
he
may
justifie
the
disperformance
of
his
promise
;
nor
shall
he
forfeit
his
credit
if
he
doeth
not
keepe
his
word
,
but
rather
,
if
he
do
,
be
accounted
a
weak
man
.
Now
,
to
come
to
our
purpose
,
let
it
bee
supposed
the
people
were
made
understand
,
when
they
exact
the
promise
from
their
Magistrate
,
that
such
limitations
would
destroy
their
peace
,
and
contentment
:
doth
any
one
think
they
would
binde
their
Governour
to
maintaine
them
?
If
they
would
not
,
t
is
evident
,
howsoever
their
mouthes
pronounced
the
words
,
their
hearts
were
ignorant
and
inculpable
of
such
an
exaction
;
for
they
knew
not
what
they
did
,
they
understood
not
nor
meant
what
they
spake
.
But
suppose
that
truely
they
knew
the
incommodities
that
were
to
follow
,
and
yet
they
would
have
them
observed
:
For
,
this
happeneth
often
in
this
our
subject
,
that
some
(
especially
great
men
,
and
sometimes
the
populace
)
understand
the
inconvenience
of
a
Law
,
and
yet
for
private
interest
will
have
it
maintained
:
What
then
is
the
duty
of
the
supreame
Magistrate
,
who
is
sworne
to
maintaine
the
said
Lawes
?
The
question
is
clearely
answered
by
the
condemnation
of
Jephthe
;
who
,
when
he
had
rashly
vowed
to
sacrifice
the
first
thing
that
met
him
from
home
,
did
impiously
murther
his
daughter
.
All
understanding
men
know
,
a
wicked
oath
is
not
to
be
observed
.
He
that
should
give
a
mad
mana
sword
,
because
he
had
vowed
or
sworne
it
,
deserved
to
be
hanged
for
the
murthers
by
him
committed
:
Now
,
an
ignorant
and
wilfull
man
,
what
is
he
but
a
mad
man
?
Or
what
is
madnesse
but
a
wilfulnesse
in
doing
evill
?
If
the
action
be
naught
and
such
as
the
exactor
cannot
,
with
reason
,
desire
,
he
cannot
by
any
oath
bind
a
swearer
to
it
:
Now
to
observe
conditions
which
shall
ruine
the
Governement
and
destroy
the
end
for
which
they
were
instituted
,
is
an
action
contrary
to
all
reason
,
and
to
which
the
promissary
cannot
binde
the
promiser
,
in
any
wisdome
and
goodnesse
:
He
is
therefore
bound
,
rather
to
the
destroying
then
fulfilling
such
conditions
;
neither
is
he
therefore
perjured
,
but
were
rather
unjust
and
wicked
,
if
he
observed
them
.
This
so
resolved
,
it
appeareth
plainly
,
that
no
supreame
Magistrate
can
bee
bound
to
any
Lawes
contrary
to
good
Governement
;
farther
then
either
the
danger
of
changing
them
,
or
the
not
cleerly
seeing
them
to
be
such
,
may
hold
his
hand
.
The
Twelfth
GROUND
.
Who
is
such
a
Governour
,
and
the
Subjects
duty
towards
him
.
WEE
have
long
talked
of
a
Supreame
Governour
;
it
is
time
we
should
point
him
out
,
that
he
may
bee
knowne
.
And
,
since
all
agree
that
there
are
three
sorts
of
Governement
,
Monarchy
,
Aristocracy
,
and
Democracy
;
when
they
are
simple
,
there
can
bee
no
doubt
who
is
the
supreame
magistrate
.
Now
,
mingled
they
may
bee
,
all
together
,
or
some
two
of
them
:
And
againe
,
their
mixing
may
bee
either
continually
,
as
when
all
parts
mixed
are
so
often
engaged
that
their
Authorities
run
jointly
,
or
else
some
are
continuall
,
others
but
at
certaine
termes
.
If
Monarchy
bee
mixed
,
either
with
Aristocracy
or
Democracy
,
so
that
they
be
continually
joint
actors
;
the
Monarch
is
but
a
Servant
,
and
the
other
part
the
Master
:
as
is
to
be
seen
i●
the
Italian
Doges
,
and
the
Lacedaemonian
Kings
;
for
his
force
is
nothing
,
compared
to
his
consort
.
If
Democracy
and
Aristocracy
be
so
mixed
,
the
quarrell
is
more
ballanced
;
and
because
it
is
a
Governement
divided
in
it selfe
,
and
therefore
dangerous
;
no
doubt
but
,
if
the
Aristocracy
get
power
enough
,
she
is
in
the
posture
of
supreame
Authority
.
The
example
of
this
wee
have
in
the
Roman
Common-wealth
,
in
the
time
,
specially
,
of
Sylla's
conquest
;
when
,
if
he
had
setled
the
State
in
the
Senate
,
there
had
been
no
feare
of
Caesar
and
Pompeyes
mangling
that
Common-wealth
,
as
afterwards
fell
out
.
Monarchy
and
Democracy
can
hardly
be
so
mixed
,
that
Democracy
be
perpetuall
,
and
Monarchy
by
spurts
:
For
that
is
not
Monarchy
;
the
said
Monarch
being
not
long
enough
in
power
to
be
accounted
a
setled
Magistrate
;
as
wee
see
in
the
Decemvirs
,
Tribunes
and
Dictators
amongst
the
Romans
:
So
that
,
the
Monarch
hath
not
the
power
in
his
hand
to
change
any
thing
,
which
is
the
case
we
aime
at
.
And
the
like
is
of
Aristocracy
;
when
its
employment
is
the
ordinary
and
continuall
,
and
Monarchy
onely
by
turnes
and
seasons
.
There
remaineth
onely
Monarchy
in
continuance
,
compared
to
Aristocracy
and
Democracy
at
certaine
turnes
.
And
in
both
,
it
is
cleare
,
the
Monarch
is
the
supreame
Governour
in
ordinary
;
and
so
the
Magistrate
of
whom
we
speake
,
who
may
alter
the
inconveniences
,
if
occasion
serve
.
As
for
the
People
,
they
are
but
a
weake
part
,
if
the
Governour
be
wise
:
So
that
he
is
,
by
this
posture
,
in
the
state
of
doing
that
good
to
the
Commonwealth
which
his
judgement
and
conscience
dictate
to
him
to
be
necessary
.
The
comparison
to
Aristocracy
is
much
harder
;
every
one
of
the
Aristocracy
being
,
generally
and
regularly
speaking
,
a
petty
Monarch
;
and
the
whole
of
them
easily
assembled
;
and
,
when
so
,
having
the
power
in
their
hands
:
So
that
the
Monarch
is
not
(
by
vertue
of
his
ordinary
condition
)
in
a
posture
to
bee
able
to
rectifie
what
he
seeth
necessary
to
be
altered
;
therefore
he
is
not
the
man
wee
call
the
supreame
Magistrate
,
but
the
assembly
of
the
Nobility
,
whereof
he
is
but
an
eminent
and
considerable
one
.
The
Subject
,
being
correlative
to
the
Magistrate
,
requireth
upon
that
title
,
to
be
reflected
on
;
but
much
more
because
the
nature
of
the
Magistrate
cannot
be
well
understood
,
unlesse
the
duty
of
the
Subject
bee
joyntly
declared
.
We
must
therefore
declare
,
or
seeke
out
at
least
,
what
Honour
and
Conscience
obligeth
the
Subject
to
:
and
,
to
performe
this
,
wee
must
reflect
upon
his
motive
of
Obedience
;
which
,
as
is
before
insinuated
,
was
grounded
on
the
love
and
necessity
of
living
in
Community
,
that
,
from
it
,
he
may
receive
good
,
and
,
by
its
protection
,
secure
himselfe
against
evill
.
To
this
end
he
entrusteth
the
charge
of
the
common
administration
to
the
Magistrate
;
taking
himselfe
as
one
unskilfull
or
unable
for
such
employment
.
Wee
see
therefore
,
the
end
of
the
Subject
in
his
obedience
,
immediately
,
is
the
publick
good
or
the
good
of
the
Commonwealth
:
a
farther
though
more
cordiall
and
deep
in
the
subject
,
is
the
good
he
is
to
receive
out
of
the
Commonwealth
being
well
;
which
is
nothing
else
but
that
the
particulars
of
the
Commonwealth
be
so
.
Evident
then
it
is
,
that
the
immediate
motive
which
the
Subject
is
to
propose
before
his
eyes
,
in
his
obedience
,
is
the
good
of
the
Commonwealth
;
that
is
,
the
very
same
motive
the
Magistrate
ought
to
have
in
administring
,
and
which
hee
had
when
first
,
in
his
owne
person
or
in
his
forefathers
,
he
submitted
himselfe
to
this
rule
.
Wee
know
,
by
consequence
,
how
excellent
a
virtue
this
act
of
Obedience
is
;
having
a
motive
of
so
great
a
price
and
high
elevation
above
other
ordinary
employments
,
which
reach
no
farther
then
to
his
private
good
.
But
,
herein
the
same
vertue
is
lesse
in
the
Subject
then
in
the
Commander
;
that
,
because
the
common
good
is
the
very
private
good
of
the
Commander
,
therefore
it
is
not
related
to
any
private
good
of
the
same
nature
;
and
so
not
commanded
or
limited
by
any
other
,
as
in
the
subject
it
is
by
the
end
of
his
idioticall
good
.
The
next
thing
that
occurreth
is
the
Subjects
fact
by
making
this
trust
;
and
that
is
,
that
he
hath
made
away
all
power
of
judgeing
and
caring
for
the
common
good
,
farther
then
by
the
eyes
and
hands
of
the
Magistrate
,
his
Trustee
,
otherwise
they
have
not
made
him
Supreame
Governour
:
So
that
,
if
he
thinketh
or
judgeth
any
thing
to
goe
amisse
,
or
interpose
his
opinion
,
in
any
reall
and
effective
way
,
even
so
farre
as
to
disgust
himselfe
or
any
other
against
the
Governement
;
he
breaketh
his
promise
and
engagement
to
his
Governour
:
Much
lesse
is
it
in
his
power
to
recall
the
trust
and
seeke
any
way
to
take
it
out
of
the
hands
of
his
Soveraigne
.
As
for
his
oath
of
Allegiance
,
I
believe
every
man
sees
,
it
takes
its
strength
from
these
two
;
and
,
by
consequence
,
is
to
be
understood
to
reach
whither
they
carry
it
,
and
strengthen
the
obligation
that
they
ground
:
but
,
not
to
extend
it selfe
to
what
they
doe
not
;
onely
what
they
begin
and
,
as
it
were
,
make
,
the
oath
doth
,
by
Religion
and
reverence
to
God
,
enholy
and
consecrate
,
and
so
give
it
the
greatest
strength
that
falleth
upon
humane
Liberty
.
By
this
discourse
,
we
learn
,
that
the
Magistrates
security
,
from
honesty
and
conscience
,
is
the
greatest
that
humane
nature
can
frame
;
being
grounded
upon
the
noblest
vertue
,
fortified
by
the
vertue
of
veracity
so
naturall
and
principall
as
is
above
signified
;
the
subject
having
made
as
great
an
alienation
of
his
propriety
to
Governement
as
will
can
ratifie
;
and
lastly
,
elevated
it
above
his
cwne
soule
by
the
invocation
of
him
who
is
master
both
of
soule
and
body
,
of
time
and
eternity
.
Whence
,
nothing
but
the
frailty
of
humane
condition
can
prejudice
a
Governour
once
estated
legitimately
in
his
seat
of
Justice
;
nothing
can
make
a
Subject
more
delinquent
,
then
to
work
against
this
duty
of
obedience
;
no
wonder
,
therefore
,
if
Rebellion
be
connumerated
with
Soothsaying
and
Idolatry
.
and
Obedience
preferred
before
sacrifice
,
even
in
the
sight
of
God
.
The
thirteenth
GROUND
.
Of
the
Qualities
of
Lawes
and
Commands
,
in
respect
to
Obedience
.
OUt
of
what
hath
been
said
concerning
the
Subject's
Obligation
to
Obedience
,
wee
may
understand
a
distinction
made
by
many
,
of
the
validity
and
lawfulnesse
of
commands
.
For
,
the
lawfulnesse
to
a
Soveraigne
Commander
,
is
no
other
then
that
hee
truly
thinketh
it
to
bee
for
the
good
of
the
common
;
that
is
,
for
the
greatest
good
,
all
things
considered
:
which
if
hee
doth
,
it
is
,
by
the
former
discourse
,
lawfull
for
him
to
command
,
what
he
pleases
,
without
reproach
of
conscience
or
honour
to
him
;
and
on
the
other
side
,
if
hee
swerve
never
so
little
,
hee
so
farre
breaketh
his
trust
:
and
the
greater
the
abuse
is
,
the
greater
also
his
fault
and
shame
.
But
,
the
subject
is
to
remember
that
hee
hath
put
his
confidence
in
his
Governour
;
as
beeing
himselfe
ignorant
and
not
having
leasure
to
look
into
the
depth
of
the
policy
:
and
therefore
hee
is
to
think
and
judge
well
of
his
Magistrates
counsells
,
and
make
account
hee
doeth
not
understand
the
bottome
of
them
;
and
so
bee
prompt
and
forward
to
obey
.
The
validity
of
the
command
consists
in
the
obligation
the
subject
hath
to
performe
it
:
And
this
may
faile
in
two
degrees
;
One
to
the
not
fulfilling
the
command
,
by
avoiding
it
;
the
other
,
by
resisting
it
.
This
latter
is
no
waies
in
the
Subjects
hands
,
unless
it
be
in
such
a
case
as
his
oath
of
Allegiance
and
Obligation
to
the
good
of
the
Community
,
cease
or
bind
not
:
The
former
can
never
happen
as
long
as
it
can
be
presumed
to
be
the
Commanders
will
this
Subject
,
in
these
circumstances
,
should
perform
this
command
;
For
,
so
long
,
his
trust
obligeth
him
not
to
faile
.
But
,
because
a
Governour
many
times
is
not
rightly
informed
,
nor
can
a
Law
reach
home
to
all
particular
accidents
;
it
is
very
incident
that
;
in
some
speciall
cases
,
the
Subject
may
presume
it
is
not
the
Magistrates
will
he
should
be
bound
to
this
particular
service
.
And
this
is
so
ordinary
that
,
among
us
,
there
is
a
particular
and
highest
Court
,
to
declare
when
wee
are
not
bound
to
the
written
lawes
.
Yet
is
it
necessary
to
believe
that
even
that
Court
is
able
to
satisfie
all
cases
,
or
that
private
men
are
bound
not
to
avoid
a
law
without
having
recourse
to
that
Court
,
or
to
obey
all
decrees
of
that
Court
if
they
can
prudently
avoid
it
:
because
no
Court
(
especially
amongst
refined
pleaders
)
can
bee
without
many
formalities
;
which
are
not
the
substance
of
Justice
,
and
therefore
may
prudently
bee
declined
,
neither
honour
nor
conscience
obliging
to
such
proceedings
.
But
they
must
ever
have
for
their
rule
,
that
the
Lawmaker
intended
not
to
include
them
,
in
these
circumstances
,
within
the
compasse
of
his
Law
.
Some
make
us
a
threefold
division
of
Lawes
;
the
first
absolute
or
commanding
;
the
second
permissive
;
the
third
they
call
penall
Lawes
:
The
first
they
averre
to
bee
obligatory
,
because
directly
intended
by
the
Law-giver
;
and
of
this
sort
is
verified
what
wee
have
newly
discoursed
.
The
second
(
were
it
expressely
the
sense
of
the
Law
to
permit
a
thing
)
is
also
of
the
former
kinde
and
onely
distinguished
in
the
matter
:
For
it
would
make
the
thing
permitted
truly
lawfull
.
But
this
is
not
the
Writers
meaning
:
For
they
doe
not
conceive
it
was
the
Law-makers
intention
to
allow
of
the
practice
;
but
onely
not
to
punish
it
,
or
to
ordaine
somewhat
in
supposition
of
the
case
.
As
when
usury
is
limited
to
such
a
rate
,
that
greater
is
forbidden
;
but
to
such
a
rate
is
so
permitted
,
that
he
that
hath
borrowed
is
bound
and
compellable
to
pay
so
many
in
the
hundred
;
but
no
man
is
bound
to
borrow
;
nor
as
they
say
,
allowed
to
take
Interest
,
though
the
Law
constraine
the
borrower
to
pay
.
But
,
how
the
Law
can
forc●
the
one
to
give
,
and
yet
not
allow
the
other
to
take
,
is
to
mee
,
a
hard
proposition
and
like
a
riddle
;
and
therefore
,
I
believe
,
the
law
it selfe
is
to
bee
condemned
or
the
practice
to
bee
justified
;
and
that
truly
there
neither
is
nor
can
bee
such
a
kinde
of
Law
,
as
shall
compell
a
thing
to
bee
done
and
not
approve
of
the
doeing
.
The
third
sort
also
seemeth
to
mee
no
lesse
contradictory
:
for
though
I
confesse
there
are
penall
Lawes
unquestionably
,
that
is
,
such
as
constitute
punishments
for
offences
;
yet
these
Masters
meane
not
such
,
but
under
the
cloake
of
the
name
,
teach
disobedience
to
certaine
Lawes
,
perswading
us
the
Law-givers
intention
is
indefinite
,
that
either
a
man
should
doe
such
a
thing
,
or
suffer
such
a
punishment
if
hee
bee
discovered
to
have
committed
the
fault
:
which
is
directly
against
all
goodnesse
.
For
first
wee
are
to
consider
whether
the
thing
commanded
bee
usefull
to
the
Common-wealth
;
if
so
,
it
cleerly
argues
it
is
the
direct
will
of
the
Lawmaker
.
Againe
,
it
is
to
be
looked
into
,
if
it
be
universally
neglected
,
what
dammage
accreweth
to
the
Common
;
and
this
also
will
assure
us
,
by
the
necessity
of
it
,
that
it
is
intended
for
the
common
good
,
and
therefore
to
be
executed
to
the
possibility
of
the
Subject
.
Againe
,
how
unworthy
a
thing
is
it
of
a
Governour
,
who
is
sapposed
to
be
all
equity
and
goodnesse
,
to
ly
at
the
catch
with
his
Subjects
,
to
entrap
them
for
a
thing
he
doth
not
aime
to
have
done
?
Besides
,
the
name
of
punishment
supposeth
a
fault
;
so
that
,
the
law
must
be
supposed
to
speake
improperly
;
which
,
in
its
dogmaticall
way
of
proceeding
,
is
absurd
.
Yet
doe
I
not
deny
but
Lawes
may
bee
made
indefinitely
;
as
,
to
command
every
Townesman
to
march
or
pay
so
much
monies
,
leaving
it
to
his
Liberty
to
do
which
hee
listeth
:
But
this
is
no
penall
Law
,
nor
hath
it
any
likely
hood
of
one
;
but
is
meerly
a
disjunctive
Command
.
Neither
likewise
do
I
entrench
upon
such
orders
in
Communities
,
which
being
almost
impossible
to
bee
rigorously
observed
,
have
some
other
obligation
annexed
to
the
failing
;
to
be
performed
by
the
conscience
of
the
Delinquent
,
whether
discovered
or
no
.
For
,
this
clearely
remaineth
voluntary
,
and
is
ordered
to
make
the
failing
rare
,
and
to
acknowledge
a
defect
and
fault
in
the
not
observing
;
and
so
hath
not
that
crossing
of
the
will
,
and
that
force
which
one
feeleth
when
he
is
discovered
and
,
by
authority
,
chastised
.
So
that
,
in
conclusion
,
there
is
but
one
sort
of
Law
in
all
these
;
and
that
binding
the
Subject
,
in
force
of
his
promise
and
oath
,
to
the
proportion
of
his
concurrence
to
the
Common
good
,
by
his
act
of
Obedience
.
The
Fourteenth
GROUND
.
In
what
conditions
the
Subject
may
resist
Governement
.
NOw
,
to
returne
to
the
former
part
;
it
is
evident
,
if
it
be
rationall
to
resist
the
Governement
,
it
will
be
lawfull
also
to
break
and
remove
it
:
For
,
these
two
actions
are
of
the
same
nature
;
and
,
in
truth
,
pure
resistance
and
disobedience
is
the
annulling
it
.
For
,
Governement
,
consisting
in
the
power
of
commanding
,
that
is
,
of
having
no
resistance
;
to
resist
is
not
to
acknowledge
it
,
but
maintaine
there
is
no
such
power
,
at
least
,
in
this
case
;
that
is
,
to
take
it
away
in
this
case
;
that
is
,
to
set
another
Judge
or
knower
when
obedience
is
due
and
when
not
;
that
is
,
not
to
keepe
the
Subject
in
the
nature
of
ignorance
,
in
which
is
grounded
his
being
a
Subject
.
This
being
the
nature
of
this
disobedience
or
resisting
,
the
Magistrate
is
bound
with
all
his
strength
to
crush
and
breake
it
;
and
,
by
consequence
,
it
draweth
along
the
concussion
of
the
whole
state
,
if
the
Subject
bee
able
to
make
good
his
resistance
.
Out
of
this
it
is
cleare
,
that
a
Subject
may
not
use
this
resistance
;
but
in
case
when
it
is
fitting
to
attempt
the
dissolving
of
the
Governement
.
It
followes
first
,
that
it
cannot
be
done
,
but
when
the
occass●on
is
greater
then
the
value
of
the
publick
peace
and
good
of
the
Common-wealth
.
No
man
therefore
can
justly
attempt
such
a
disobedience
,
to
save
his
owne
life
and
goods
,
or
the
life
and
goods
of
his
owne
family
,
how
great
soever
,
if
contained
within
the
bounds
of
a
private
family
,
or
but
a
part
of
the
Common-wealth
.
Now
,
how
farre
this
extendeth
,
I
dare
not
subtilize
;
it
being
a
kinde
of
morall
consideration
and
a
prudentiall
esteeme
to
weigh
it
in
particular
;
the
common
notion
reaching
no
farther
,
then
that
it
be
not
so
notorious
a
part
of
the
Common-wealth
,
that
it
bee
a
homogeneall
part
of
it
,
such
as
is
fit
to
make
a
Common-wealth
of
it selfe
,
to
determine
whose
nature
,
is
not
the
intent
of
our
present
embarquement
.
The
next
consideration
is
,
that
neither
an
universall
harme
,
if
moderate
and
such
as
may
bee
supported
with
lesse
dammage
then
followes
out
of
the
State
,
is
a
sufficient
cause
of
resistance
to
the
Soveraigne
Magistrates
command
.
As
for
example
,
an
enormous
Taxe
(
such
as
was
thought
to
be
that
which
revolted
Guienne
from
Edward
the
third
of
England
,
or
the
Low
Countries
from
Philip
the
second
of
Spain
:
)
as
both
their
wars
may
well
testifie
;
in
which
the
taking
of
any
one
Towne
was
of
more
consequence
then
all
such
a
Taxe
would
have
been
.
How
farre
this
also
reaches
is
not
for
mee
to
esteeme
;
Who
should
aske
me
,
if
the
Governour
exacted
for
one
time
all
the
Subject
had
,
so
there
remained
a
ground
to
worke
upon
of
new
,
and
within
a
little
time
to
live
contentedly
;
I
should
be
troubled
to
confesse
it
were
a
sufficient
injury
to
take
up
armes
against
him
,
because
I
cannot
judge
which
were
the
greater
mischief
to
the
Subject
.
Thirdly
,
if
the
wrong
be
of
that
nature
as
to
ruine
the
whole
Common-wealth
,
yet
not
suddenly
but
after
many
yeers
,
if
often
repeated
;
I
cannot
allow
it
a
sufficient
cause
of
open
resistance
.
The
reason
is
cleere
;
for
,
on
the
one
side
there
is
no
inconvenience
so
small
but
(
in
processe
of
time
)
may
grow
to
bee
the
ruine
of
the
Common-wealth
,
if
it
bee
often
repeated
and
so
excessively
multiplied
;
and
on
the
other
side
,
long
time
breeds
so
great
changes
or
,
at
least
,
is
subject
to
them
,
that
the
pure
nature
of
the
offence
is
not
able
to
justifie
a
rebellion
and
breach
of
unity
in
a
Common-wealth
,
and
so
,
not
the
resistance
to
the
Governour
.
How
much
the
time
in
which
the
ruine
would
follow
should
bee
,
to
make
it
a
sufficient
cause
,
who
can
judge
?
Onely
this
wee
see
,
that
what
will
not
ruine
in
a
set
time
,
wil
never
doe
it
;
and
I
have
seen
people
live
happily
,
where
it
was
said
,
they
paid
the
value
of
their
whole
subsistance
to
their
Magistrate
once
in
seven
yeers
.
Nor
doe
I
pretend
,
by
these
instances
,
to
set
any
rule
for
enfranchising
the
subject
;
more
then
this
,
When
evidently
the
tyranny
of
the
Governour
is
greater
then
the
mischiefe
hazarded
.
When
ever
this
happeneth
,
bee
the
materiall
conditions
what
they
will
,
the
subject
is
free
:
And
if
this
bee
not
,
whatsoever
the
circumstances
bee
,
the
subject
ought
not
to
stirre
.
For
,
this
and
this
onely
is
the
finall
cause
measuring
all
attempts
,
What
is
best
for
the
People
;
and
knowne
it
is
that
,
if
it
bee
not
evident
to
bee
better
to
stirre
,
it
is
evidently
better
to
remaine
quiet
:
for
,
not-a-cause
is
sufficient
for
not
changing
;
but
,
for
a
change
and
such
a
change
,
it
ought
to
bee
a
cleer
and
evident
abbetterment
.
There
is
further
to
be
looked
into
what
part
of
the
Common-wealth
it
ought
to
bee
that
is
sufficient
to
justifie
such
a
quarrell
.
For
,
as
there
is
no
doubt
,
but
the
whole
Common-wealth
,
that
is
,
such
a
portion
of
it
as
makes
the
Governours
party
inconsiderable
,
is
sufficient
:
so
,
there
will
bee
lesse
doubt
on
the
other
extreme
,
if
the
number
resisting
bee
a
pure
single
part
,
it
is
not
sufficient
to
proceed
to
this
extremity
.
The
question
then
is
,
whether
the
party
rising
ought
to
bee
the
major
or
equall
or
,
at
least
,
inconsiderably
lesse
then
those
who
side
with
the
Magistrate
.
But
here
wee
must
observe
the
greatnesse
of
the
Common-wealth
divided
.
For
if
such
parts
bee
of
themselves
,
fit
to
make
Common-wealths
,
nothing
considered
but
the
quantity
or
the
number
;
it
cannot
bee
doubted
but
that
will
susfice
:
now
what
that
quantity
is
,
belongeth
to
another
science
.
Besides
all
these
considerations
,
there
remaineth
another
;
that
it
can
bee
effected
:
For
who
is
to
attempt
an
action
,
ought
as
well
to
weigh
the
cost
of
compassing
,
as
the
worth
and
recompence
when
it
is
compassed
:
so
that
,
unlesse
the
hazard
of
missing
and
the
labour
of
obtaining
,
beeing
both
added
into
the
ballance
with
the
present
quiet
,
bee
all
overswayed
;
it
cannot
bee
prudently
done
to
engage
for
a
change
.
Some
will
tell
mee
,
never
did
people
expect
with
so
much
patience
as
I
require
:
And
your
Gallants
,
who
pretend
to
generosity
,
will
exclaime
,
it
is
better
to
dye
in
the
field
then
suffer
such
indignities
:
Nay
,
some
will
think
or
,
at
least
,
vaunt
it
fitter
to
lye
in
prison
or
rot
in
a
dungeon
,
or
seeke
his
fortune
in
Barbary
,
then
to
be
under
such
a
slavery
.
My
answer
to
these
last
Gallants
is
,
that
they
should
first
try
what
it
is
to
rot
in
a
Dungeon
,
or
to
wander
amongst
Barbarians
;
before
they
engage
themselves
and
other
ignorant
persons
in
such
adventures
.
To
the
second
,
that
I
understand
not
those
spurgalls
of
honour
,
which
disquiet
their
fiery
humours
:
I
onely
discourse
of
what
is
fitting
to
make
a
sweet
and
contented
life
,
to
them
who
thinke
it
consists
in
enjoying
naturall
goods
of
Science
and
Vertue
for
our
mindes
,
and
the
accommodation
of
our
sences
for
our
bodies
:
Those
high
and
aereall
goods
of
honour
,
and
vapouring
words
I
esteeme
as
Ajax
(
when
his
eyes
were
open
)
at
his
death
;
Vertue
(
said
hee
,
meaning
honour
)
I
followed
thee
as
a
thing
,
but
I
finde
thou
art
but
words
.
To
the
formost
,
I
answer
,
I
doe
not
averre
men
either
have
been
wise
or
will
bee
so
wise
;
onely
endevour
to
lay
before
them
what
it
is
to
bee
so
;
let
them
look
to
the
exercise
.
Neither
on
the
other
side
doe
I
justifie
the
Prince
who
putteth
his
subject
to
such
extremities
,
or
think
it
prudence
in
him
to
doe
it
,
or
that
he
doeth
not
deserve
all
the
mischiefe
which
may
light
upon
him
for
it
:
I
leave
both
to
the
force
of
nature
,
to
their
wit
or
folly
,
and
to
the
force
of
reason
or
passion
which
governes
in
persons
and
present
circumstances
;
keeping
my self
in
the
common
notions
which
belong
to
Science
.
Still
there
remaines
one
difficulty
,
which
may
breed
great
variety
in
the
resolution
;
and
it
is
,
who
is
to
bee
Judge
,
Whether
the
neglect
of
the
Magistrate
bee
so
great
,
as
to
deserve
resistance
?
For
,
if
the
Magistrate
himselfe
bee
endowed
with
that
power
,
it
is
a
folly
to
thinke
that
circumstance
will
ever
come
;
and
,
if
it
belong
to
the
people
,
such
hot-spurres
,
as
wee
spake
of
,
will
make
it
come
long
before
the
season
bee
ripe
for
it
.
But
,
the
truth
is
,
this
question
seemeth
in
a
manner
superfluous
:
For
it
supposes
,
there
is
a
question
and
ambiquity
to
bee
decided
;
and
by
the
conditions
put
,
it
is
cleer
there
can
bee
no
question
of
the
necessity
of
the
resistance
;
for
they
are
such
as
to
put
the
question
beyond
all
ambiguity
in
the
very
conscience
of
the
Magistrate
,
the
objects
beating
on
the
subject
in
every
ones
particular
beyond
denyall
and
dispute
.
And
besides
,
as
long
as
truly
there
is
any
disputablenesse
,
the
trust
reposed
in
the
Magistrate
makes
him
Judge
;
For
,
beeing
entrusted
as
a
man
both
knowing
and
good
,
and
the
people
taking
themselves
as
ignorant
in
what
they
trust
him
;
cleerly
hee
remains
sole
Judge
,
as
long
as
there
remains
a
case
to
be
judged
.
And
therefore
his
either
ignorance
,
or
carelessenesse
,
or
Tyranny
ought
to
bee
so
evident
,
that
it
bee
beyond
all
question
;
or
else
the
subject
must
have
patience
for
his
owne
good
,
which
is
his
aime
in
putting
himselfe
under
governement
.
The
Fifteenth
GROUND
.
Wherein
consists
the
power
and
liberty
of
the
Subject
.
YEt
may
some
think
,
on
the
other
side
,
that
the
doctrine
delivered
contradicts
it selfe
.
For
,
it
beeing
before
determined
,
that
the
people
hath
alienated
all
right
of
judging
or
medling
in
governement
;
how
can
it
ever
happen
that
they
should
have
a
right
to
interpose
againe
,
or
that
such
circumstances
can
possibly
fall
out
in
which
they
may
resist
the
Magistrate
?
And
this
objection
is
so
much
the
stronger
,
by
acknowledging
so
great
a
power
in
the
Magistrate
of
breaking
all
Lawes
and
limitations
of
Governement
,
by
the
force
of
reason
placed
in
the
circumstances
of
power
and
authority
,
as
hath
been
declared
:
whence
it
seemes
,
since
that
authority
in
the
Magistrate
cannot
consist
with
an
opposite
authority
in
the
subject
,
to
bridle
and
curb
him
;
they
can
never
have
this
power
to
resist
.
And
the
truth
is
,
the
people
acteth
not
what
it
doeth
in
such
a
case
,
by
any
authority
acquired
,
but
by
the
force
of
nature
;
that
same
force
by
which
the
Magistrate
overswayes
the
Lawes
,
but
in
other
circumstances
.
And
first
that
the
people
hath
no
authority
to
oppose
their
superiour
is
manifest
:
For
,
authority
is
a
thing
instituted
by
consent
and
depending
on
promise
;
but
here
is
no
need
of
consent
nor
any
thought
of
it
;
here
is
no
publicke
meetings
or
Ligues
;
and
if
there
were
,
they
would
bee
of
no
value
against
a
former
tradition
of
their
wills
to
their
Magistrate
:
It
cannot
bee
therefore
,
that
the
people
proceed
by
any
such
contract
.
Whence
is
it
then
that
the
people
come
to
any
such
power
?
The
answer
is
,
As
,
when
they
first
instituted
Government
,
they
did
it
in
the
force
of
Nature
;
without
having
any
other
Power
then
the
pure
force
of
Rationality
:
so
,
if
,
by
any
circumstance
they
be
devolved
into
the
same
state
of
Anarchy
that
their
promise
made
bindes
no
more
;
then
Rationality
teacheth
them
and
giveth
them
,
by
force
of
nature
,
to
institute
another
Governement
.
Now
,
the
excessive
disorders
,
expressed
in
the
forementioned
conditions
,
make
it
evident
they
are
not
in
a
Governement
,
that
is
,
in
a
conspiracy
to
the
common
good
,
which
is
the
offence
of
Governement
;
but
in
an
Anarchy
,
and
therefore
remitted
,
by
the
evill
managing
or
insufficiency
of
their
Governour
,
to
the
force
of
nature
to
provide
for
themselves
,
and
not
bound
by
any
promise
made
to
their
Governour
:
the
whole
end
and
intention
of
their
promise
being
,
purely
,
to
submit
to
Governement
,
that
is
,
conduce
to
the
common
good
&
safety
;
which
having
failed
,
there
is
no
more
obligation
in
their
oath
or
promise
,
then
if
they
had
never
made
them
.
This
is
,
therefore
,
the
ground
of
the
peoples
opposition
,
and
onely
circumstance
to
justifie
their
breaking
their
oath
and
promise
:
so
that
,
in
truth
,
the
Magistrate
,
first
,
by
his
miscarriages
,
abdicateth
himself
from
being
a
Magistrate
,
and
proveth
a
Brigand
and
robber
in
stead
of
a
Defender
;
and
the
people
,
in
the
way
of
naturall
preservation
of
themselves
,
make
resistance
against
him
.
I
should
passe
farther
to
the
change
of
Governement
,
did
not
the
loud
and
universall
cry
of
all
common
people
,
especially
of
our
Northerne
Countries
,
diverting
my
pen
,
force
me
to
attend
their
importunity
.
They
say
,
this
Doctrine
deliver'd
ruineth
their
Liberty
;
and
people
are
but
a
knot
of
slaves
and
Galley-birds
,
if
this
be
the
course
of
Governement
.
They
must
be
satisfied
,
or
,
at
least
,
their
courage
allay'd
,
by
reason
,
if
it
be
possible
.
For
this
word
Liberty
prints
it selfe
in
such
a
letter
,
that
it
leaves
unstudied
no
man
,
as
one
speaketh
.
The
Pelagian
thinkes
he
hath
lost
his
naturall
liberty
,
if
it
may
be
commanded
by
Gods
omnipotency
.
The
worldly
man
accounts
himselfe
a
slave
,
if
rationall
governement
be
conserved
:
he
must
have
license
to
commit
wickednesse
and
ruine
Governement
,
or
else
he
is
in
chaines
.
Let
us
then
repeat
the
nature
of
Governement
,
and
see
wherein
consisteth
the
Liberty
of
the
Subject
,
that
we
may
know
when
he
hath
it
,
and
what
belongeth
to
it
.
The
people
(
we
said
)
to
fall
to
their
owne
businesse
,
and
the
improving
of
nature
,
choose
one
or
more
to
manage
the
common
interests
;
holding
them
wise
and
capable
,
and
themselves
unskilfull
;
and
this
with
a
great
deale
of
reason
:
for
nothing
but
experience
,
and
much
debating
is
able
to
beget
a
sufficient
art
or
knowledge
,
in
such
subtle
points
and
turnings
.
Besides
,
they
esteemed
a
few
fitter
for
resolution
,
and
easier
to
agree
then
their
owne
multitude
;
where
so
many
private
aimes
are
hard
to
be
avoided
,
and
if
not
prejudiciall
to
the
common
.
Upon
these
grounds
,
it
is
plaine
,
out
of
the
very
nature
of
Governement
,
that
they
reserve
no
power
in
themselves
to
consult
of
common
businesses
.
For
,
how
absurd
is
it
that
he
who
hath
no
skill
shall
give
counsell
,
or
sway
the
resolutions
of
those
whose
art
and
profession
it
is
?
Or
,
what
wise
man
could
undertake
a
Governement
with
truth
and
honour
,
if
,
in
his
greatest
difficulties
,
he
must
depend
on
the
advice
,
or
rather
wilfulnesse
of
an
ignorant
rabble
?
Let
us
look
now
what
is
left
for
the
obeying
party
;
and
we
shall
finde
,
it
is
to
governe
their
private
affaires
,
as
farre
forth
as
they
fall
not
within
the
verge
of
the
common
good
or
harme
.
But
,
once
put
that
the
private
mans
business
either
hinders
,
or
is
necessary
to
help
the
common
designes
:
and
,
as
evident
as
it
is
that
the
common
is
to
be
preferred
before
the
particular
;
so
evident
it
is
,
that
even
his
proper
businesse
is
not
to
be
managed
,
so
far
,
by
his
private
understanding
and
liberty
.
If
the
Souldier
,
when
he
is
commanded
to
stand
Perdue
,
should
have
his
private
considerations
allow'd
him
,
what
could
the
Army
doe
?
If
the
Citizen
,
being
commanded
to
watch
his
turne
upon
the
walls
,
might
bring
an
excuse
that
he
had
no body
to
look
to
his
shop
,
the
City
would
soone
fall
to
the
enemies
prey
.
Private
interest
,
then
,
must
yeeld
,
when
the
publick
is
concerned
,
or
else
no
Governement
can
be
hoped
for
:
and
,
he
that
will
leave
matters
of
great
consequence
to
the
resolution
of
the
govern'd
party
,
must
make
them
the
Governours
.
Wherein
then
consists
the
Liberty
of
every
Subject
?
In
not
being
controll'd
in
his
private
affaires
.
If
there
be
not
justice
administred
both
against
Robbers
and
Riotous
oppressors
,
the
Citizen
is
not
free
:
if
he
be
molested
in
his
domestick
manage
,
otherwise
Men
when
the
common
demandeth
his
assistance
,
he
is
not
free
.
But
,
for
serving
the
common
,
it
is
the
freest
act
he
hath
:
It
was
his
choice
to
elect
it
,
it
is
his
good
to
conserve
it
,
and
will
be
his
destruction
to
infringe
it
.
As
it
is
no
liberty
to
have
an
immunity
to
hang
or
maime
himselfe
,
or
his
wife
and
children
,
or
to
commit
any
other
unnaturall
act
;
no
more
is
it
to
be
esteem'd
Liberty
,
to
have
the
priviledge
to
substract
himselfe
from
the
service
of
the
Common-wealth
.
They
are
therefore
seditious
spirits
,
who
,
using
the
name
of
Liberty
,
provoke
the
Subject
against
the
Magistrate
;
and
in
themselves
,
ordinarily
,
it
is
either
ignorance
or
faction
,
which
is
the
true
Mistresse
of
such
attempts
.
Nor
can
it
be
feared
,
that
Governement
,
carried
connaturally
and
as
it
ought
to
be
,
doth
any
way
prejudice
the
Liberty
of
the
Subject
,
what
seisures
soever
it
makes
either
upon
goods
or
persons
.
Yes
,
but
Governours
will
exceed
the
moderation
of
the
true
Lawes
of
Governement
.
First
,
the
Commonwealth
hath
a
presumption
of
their
goodness
to
the
contrary
.
Secondly
,
admit
they
doe
,
must
we
seek
to
remedy
it
by
a
greater
wound
which
is
,
by
taking
away
the
life
and
soule
of
Governement
?
Againe
,
the
oppression
is
either
in
common
upon
all
,
or
in
particular
upon
some
few
:
If
in
common
,
it
is
almost
impossible
to
be
heavy
upon
every
one
;
for
,
many
little
summes
easily
rise
to
a
great
one
,
and
many
hands
make
light
worke
:
If
the
wrong
be
done
to
particulars
,
wee
ought
to
consider
that
accidentall
harmes
cannot
be
prevented
neither
in
nature
nor
in
humane
affaires
;
and
so
are
objects
of
pity
rather
then
of
hope
to
be
amended
,
and
to
be
tolerated
rather
,
in
respect
of
the
great
good
which
is
in
the
common
peace
,
then
expose
all
to
such
confusion
as
must
be
,
and
ever
hath
beene
where
the
Governement
is
,
in
part
,
placed
in
unexperient
hands
.
This
,
therefore
,
is
resolved
,
that
the
plenitude
of
power
in
the
Governour
hinders
not
the
liberty
of
the
Subject
:
which
is
to
bee
contained
within
an
inferiour
sphere
,
and
the
sphere
it selfe
within
the
sphere
of
Governement
;
and
to
be
carried
by
it
,
as
the
private
good
by
the
common
,
when
the
necessity
of
the
publick
requires
.
Likewise
,
the
propriety
of
right
of
the
Subject
is
to
bee
taken
,
not
against
the
Governour
or
common
right
,
but
against
the
encroaching
of
another
party
:
as
,
whoever
understands
what
common
and
particular
signifie
,
easily
understands
that
the
common
and
particular
are
not
two
;
as
the
part
and
the
whole
make
not
two
,
because
the
part
is
included
in
the
whole
;
but
part
and
part
make
two
,
because
one
hath
no
community
with
the
other
.
Therefore
,
it
stands
not
with
reason
,
that
any
private
person
should
claim
a
right
against
the
Common-wealth
,
or
the
Governour
,
which
is
all
one
;
for
,
so
he
makes
the
Common-wealth
a
part
distinguished
from
himselfe
.
The
Sixteenth
GROUND
.
Of
the
dispossession
of
a
supreme
former
Governour
,
and
of
his
right
.
THis
rubb
being
taken
away
,
our
march
is
free
to
consider
the
action
of
the
change
of
Governement
;
by
what
it
is
effected
that
the
former
Governour
remaineth
no
longer
in
his
authority
,
and
the
new
one
beginneth
to
have
the
power
.
For
,
we
speake
of
a
supreme
Governour
whose
power
is
sworne
to
;
and
so
fortified
,
by
an
allegiance
due
from
the
people
,
and
a
right
obtained
by
himselfe
.
And
,
we
may
presently
reflect
,
that
our
former
discourse
,
Of
the
Peoples
resistance
to
a
Soveraign
Magistrate
,
reached
not
to
the
resolution
of
this
.
For
,
there
we
supposed
the
Magistrate
to
have
behav'd
himself
so
unworthily
,
that
he
was
truely
no
Governour
but
a
Tyrant
and
Robber
;
and
so
had
really
depos'd
himselfe
,
and
disannull'd
the
Subjects
oath
and
obligation
by
renouncing
,
in
deeds
and
practice
,
the
nature
of
a
Governour
.
Now
,
our
Question
supposeth
the
Governour
not
to
have
come
to
that
extremity
:
but
,
either
to
have
been
good
or
innocent
:
or
that
it
is
doubtfull
whether
his
excesses
deserved
expulsion
:
or
,
at
least
,
if
they
did
deserve
it
of
themselves
,
yet
the
circumstances
were
not
fitting
for
it
;
but
the
expulsion
happened
either
by
the
invasion
of
a
stranger
,
or
the
ambition
of
a
Subject
,
or
some
popular
headlesse
tumult
;
for
,
these
three
wayes
a
Magistrate
comes
,
forcibly
and
unjustly
,
to
be
outed
of
his
power
.
And
first
,
if
the
Magistrate
have
truely
deserved
to
be
dispossessed
;
or
it
be
rationally
doubted
that
he
hath
deserved
it
,
and
hee
bee
actually
out
of
possession
:
In
the
former
case
,
it
is
certaine
,
the
subject
hath
no
obligation
to
hazard
for
his
restitution
,
but
rather
to
hinder
it
:
For
,
since
it
is
the
common
good
that
both
the
Magistrate
and
the
Subject
are
to
aime
at
;
and
clearly
,
out
of
what
is
expressed
,
it
is
the
common
harme
,
to
admit
againe
of
such
a
Magistrate
;
every
one
,
to
his
power
,
is
bound
to
resist
him
.
If
you
say
,
he
may
or
will
repent
and
amend
,
that
importeth
not
our
Question
,
or
Whether
he
be
to
be
restor'd
?
but
,
Whether
he
be
to
be
chosen
of
new
?
For
,
since
it
was
meerely
his
possession
and
the
interest
of
not
changing
or
troubling
the
Common-wealth
which
oblig'd
the
Subject
to
maintaine
him
;
it
being
supposed
his
owne
desert
did
condemne
him
,
this
change
and
trouble
of
the
Common-wealth
being
now
turned
on
the
other
side
and
another
in
possession
,
clearly
neither
he
hath
any
right
left
,
nor
the
Subject
any
obligation
to
maintaine
but
rather
oppose
him
.
Now
,
if
his
desert
be
doubtfull
,
then
is
it
also
doubtfull
whether
he
hath
right
or
no
:
and
certaine
,
that
the
common
good
is
not
to
be
disturbed
for
it
;
Nature
teaching
that
wee
need
no
reason
to
be
quiet
and
remaine
where
we
are
,
but
that
to
make
a
change
we
must
see
a
strong
cause
and
motive
.
The
next
case
is
,
if
he
be
innocent
and
wrongfully
depos'd
,
nay
,
let
us
adde
,
One
who
had
governed
well
and
deserved
much
of
the
Common-wealth
:
yet
he
is
totally
dispossess'd
;
and
so
,
that
,
it
is
plaine
,
in
these
circumstances
,
it
were
better
for
the
common
good
to
stay
as
they
are
,
then
to
venture
the
restoring
him
,
because
of
the
publicke
hazard
.
It
is
cleare
,
in
this
case
,
there
is
a
comparison
betweene
the
generall
good
of
the
Common-wealth
,
on
the
one
side
,
and
the
particular
of
this
man
or
family
on
the
other
.
Let
us
,
then
,
put
the
case
on
his
part
;
and
see
,
If
he
be
generous
,
if
he
hath
setled
in
his
heart
that
every
single
man
ought
to
preferre
the
common
Interest
before
his
particular
safety
,
profit
,
or
honour
;
if
hee
bee
fit
for
a
Governour
,
that
is
,
one
that
is
to
espouse
the
common
good
as
his
owne
individuall
;
what
he
will
,
in
honour
and
conscience
,
resolve
:
whether
hee
bee
not
obliged
absolutely
to
renounce
all
right
and
claime
to
Governement
;
and
,
if
he
does
not
,
hee
bee
not
worse
then
an
Infidell
:
For
,
if
he
that
hath
no
care
of
his
Domesticks
,
be
reputed
so
;
with
how
much
more
reason
,
he
that
is
ready
to
plunge
a
whole
Nation
in
blood
,
for
his
owne
Interest
?
Let
us
cast
the
accompts
on
the
other
side
;
and
see
,
that
the
Subjects
aime
ought
to
be
the
publicke
peace
,
and
quiet
enjoyment
of
their
lives
and
interests
:
It
will
appeare
that
,
if
hee
bee
bound
to
renounce
his
claime
,
they
cannot
be
oblig'd
to
maintaine
it
:
and
besides
,
that
they
are
wilfully
blinde
,
if
,
where
the
whole
concernements
of
themselves
,
their
wives
and
children
lie
at
the
stake
,
they
will
venture
all
for
an
aereall
fancy
,
without
regard
to
the
end
of
Governement
,
publicke
peace
;
meerely
for
the
meanes
,
this
mans
Governement
,
without
whom
the
end
may
be
obtain'd
.
It
cannot
,
therefore
,
be
rationall
on
either
side
,
for
a
dispossess'd
Governour
to
be
restor'd
with
hazard
:
unlesse
it
be
certaine
the
succeeding
Governement
be
a
pure
Tyranny
,
and
so
the
dispossess'd
person
necessary
for
the
quiet
and
peace
of
the
Common-wealth
;
and
therefore
,
that
both
sides
pretend
the
good
of
the
Common-wealth
,
as
well
hee
that
is
to
be
restor'd
,
as
those
who
seek
to
restore
him
.
But
some
cry
,
he
had
right
;
he
hath
not
deserv'd
to
lose
it
;
Justice
must
be
done
whatever
follows
on
it
;
happy
they
that
are
unfortunate
in
so
good
a
Cause
,
they
shall
not
lose
their
reward
,
however
it
fares
with
them
now
.
Well
for
them
,
if
this
plea
will
serve
them
in
the
next
world
;
nor
will
I
dispute
whether
the
evidence
of
what
I
deliver
be
so
great
as
that
ignorance
may
not
excuse
them
:
That
question
belongs
to
the
Tribunall
of
God
onely
:
I
must
say
that
,
before
men
,
who
are
clad
with
flesh
,
and
whole
hearts
cannot
be
pierced
by
other
mens
guesses
,
the
Law
is
,
that
not
onely
the
intention
bee
good
,
but
also
the
action
be
intelligent
and
prudent
;
otherwise
,
we
are
subject
to
believe
,
that
some
vanity
or
secret
hopes
doe
byass
the
actor
and
make
his
proceeding
irrationall
.
I
must
also
tell
them
,
that
this
principle
,
Fiat
Justitia
&
ruat
coelum
,
is
seldome
practised
amongst
the
wise
;
who
all
agree
that
Charity
and
Prudence
ought
still
to
moderate
the
rigour
of
Justice
.
It
is
also
too
metaphysicall
for
a
morall
way
,
to
thinke
that
Justice
is
a
Platonick
Idea
in
the
concave
of
the
Moone
;
no
waies
to
be
changed
by
circumstantiall
occurrences
:
Whereas
,
the
truth
is
,
Justice
is
but
a
partiall
and
commanded
vertue
;
and
that
which
governes
in
man
,
is
reason
or
his
owne
nature
and
inclination
to
make
all
his
actions
connaturall
and
fit
for
a
rationall
Creature
;
and
so
may
consult
whether
Justice
be
in
some
to
bee
administred
,
and
pronounce
that
Summum
jus
est
summa
injuria
.
But
,
the
capitall
in
this
matter
is
,
that
truely
there
is
no
justice
on
either
the
Magistrates
or
Peoples
side
,
to
binde
to
the
restoring
him
:
both
these
depending
on
the
promise
made
,
and
the
force
of
the
promise
being
none
,
since
the
ground
of
it
is
changed
.
For
,
the
substance
of
the
promise
made
to
a
Magistrate
,
is
,
To
obey
him
as
a
Magistrate
,
that
is
,
as
farre
as
is
fitting
for
the
Common-wealth
and
peace
;
he
being
nothing
but
the
instrument
of
the
common
good
:
Now
,
take
away
that
fitnesse
for
the
Common-wealth
,
and
that
which
gave
strength
to
the
promise
is
gone
,
and
the
promise
it selfe
is
no
more
a
promise
,
nor
can
any
obligation
arise
from
it
.
Who
knows
not
,
that
the
promise
of
any
man
depends
on
his
intention
,
his
intention
on
his
knowledge
,
his
knowledge
reacheth
no
farther
then
his
consideration
and
present
memory
when
he
maketh
the
promise
?
So
that
,
in
nature
,
a
promise
reacheth
onely
to
presupposed
and
thought
on
circumstances
:
and
who
,
when
he
sweareth
to
a
Magistrate
,
expecteth
to
see
him
dispossessed
and
turned
off
?
Nature
annulleth
promises
:
as
,
when
we
promise
to
come
such
a
day
,
and
either
die
or
are
imprisoned
before
.
Morality
annulleth
them
:
as
if
we
promise
to
run
such
a
horse
against
another
a
month
hence
,
and
the
horse
in
the
meane
time
falleth
lame
;
who
will
condemne
the
master
for
not
venturing
on
such
a
race
?
Is
not
the
man
better
then
his
word
?
If
then
the
man
himselfe
bee
lesse
then
the
common
good
,
which
he
must
violate
by
keeping
his
word
;
can
his
word
be
greater
?
But
a
promise
must
many
times
bee
kept
even
with
losse
of
life
?
I
deny
it
not
:
But
,
first
,
I
must
bee
assured
it
is
a
promise
;
which
before
I
have
declared
to
bee
none
:
For
,
our
case
is
case
of
Nature
not
of
Law
,
we
admit
no
presumptions
;
nothing
what
he
meant
to
doe
or
should
have
done
,
wee
onely
regard
what
was
done
.
Secondly
,
if
it
were
intended
to
be
so
promised
,
it
was
wicked
and
irrationall
;
for
,
to
promise
to
regard
a
private
mans
good
against
the
common
,
is
unnaturall
and
wicked
;
therefore
,
it
never
was
a
promise
,
can
never
binde
as
such
,
nor
be
professed
with
honour
,
either
to
be
made
,
or
,
if
made
,
to
bee
kept
.
I
need
not
insist
upon
the
confirmation
by
oath
:
for
,
every
one
understands
,
if
the
Oath
be
but
a
confirmation
of
a
precedent
promise
,
and
there
were
no
promise
,
there
can
be
no
oath
,
to
have
the
nature
and
force
of
an
oath
.
So
that
,
this
is
manifest
,
a
Magistrate
actually
dispossessed
hath
no
right
to
be
restored
,
nor
the
Subject
any
obligation
to
seek
to
restore
,
but
oppose
him
.
For
,
what
is
man
,
or
rather
mankinde
(
for
,
so
we
have
styled
a
nation
)
better
then
a
herd
of
sheepe
or
oxen
,
if
it
bee
to
bee
owned
,
like
them
,
by
masters
?
What
difference
is
there
betweene
their
Masters
selling
them
to
the
Butcher
,
and
obliging
them
to
venture
their
lives
and
livelihoods
for
his
private
Interest
?
Wee
know
it
is
naturall
,
that
the
part
should
venture
for
the
whole
;
but
that
the
whole
should
venture
the
losse
of
it selfe
to
save
the
part
,
I
cannot
understand
.
The
Governour
is
the
highest
and
noblest
part
,
yet
but
a
part
;
the
People
is
the
whole
,
the
End
,
(
though
not
by
office
,
yet
by
worth
and
dignity
)
the
Master
and
Lord
,
for
whom
those
who
are
Lords
by
office
are
to
be
vested
and
devested
in
Lordship
,
when
it
is
necessary
for
the
common
good
:
who
thinks
otherwise
,
deserves
not
the
name
of
a
man
.
The
Seventeenth
GROUND
.
Of
a
supreme
Governour
dispossessed
.
BUt
one
will
object
,
if
hee
were
wrongfully
dispossessed
,
hee
suffered
wrong
;
it
cannot
then
but
bee
reason
hee
should
have
reparation
.
And
this
cannot
bee
denied
.
But
beside
the
Governement
taken
from
him
,
hee
was
peradventure
injured
in
his
reputation
and
spoiled
of
such
aliments
as
are
fit
to
maintaine
him
according
to
the
quality
of
his
birth
and
education
:
And
,
for
these
,
hee
may
,
as
a
private
man
,
demand
reparation
;
but
so
,
as
still
to
remember
he
is
a
Denizen
of
that
Countrey
,
a
member
of
that
people
,
and
compared
to
it
as
a
particular
to
its
universall
;
and
may
demand
his
share
,
yet
so
that
if
it
cannot
bee
obtained
without
the
concussion
of
the
publicke
,
hee
is
to
renounce
it
and
sacrifice
that
interest
to
the
good
of
his
Countrey
.
Likewise
,
on
the
opposite
side
,
the
Common-wealth
may
demand
reparations
against
the
dispossessed
Magistrate
,
who
abused
it
or
his
subjects
during
his
governement
:
Not
touching
any
thing
hee
did
upon
intention
of
the
publick
good
,
though
it
were
breaking
of
known
Laws
or
any
injurious
violence
offered
,
with
pretence
of
serving
the
Common-wealth
;
For
,
the
trust
put
in
his
hands
vindicates
him
from
all
such
actions
,
as
long
as
they
beare
the
face
of
any
intention
of
the
Common
good
.
But
,
if
,
for
private
mens
satisfaction
,
or
his
owne
lust
,
or
covetousnesse
hee
did
any
wrong
,
of
that
hee
may
bee
asked
an
account
:
not
while
hee
is
in
Governement
but
after
the
dispossession
,
when
now
the
common
distemper
followeth
not
the
prosecution
of
such
riots
,
and
so
,
his
publicke
protection
beeing
gone
,
hee
is
but
a
private
man
,
and
consequently
,
by
the
force
of
nature
,
subject
to
a
stronger
;
obligations
of
common
good
and
former
promises
beeing
now
faded
away
,
and
hee
left
in
the
condition
of
a
stranger
,
saving
that
his
demerits
follow
and
pursue
him
,
if
other
merits
doe
not
counterballance
them
and
exempt
him
.
Againe
,
when
hee
is
to
bee
judged
,
he
cannot
bee
proceeded
against
by
Law
;
which
can
judge
none
but
the
offenders
against
it
.
Now
wee
have
had
often
occasion
to
declare
that
the
chiefe
Magistrate
is
not
under
the
Law
;
the
common
good
for
which
the
Lawes
themselves
were
made
,
beeing
committed
to
his
trust
,
and
the
end
hee
is
to
look
after
beeing
higher
then
the
Lawes
,
which
are
but
a
part
of
the
meanes
to
arrive
at
that
end
,
and
therefore
inferiour
and
subordinate
to
it
.
But
those
who
could
put
their
owne
agreements
,
that
is
,
the
Lawes
under
his
feet
,
could
not
put
Nature
under
them
,
nor
authorise
him
to
doe
any
irrationall
or
unhandsome
action
:
Therefore
,
when
the
structure
of
the
Common-wealth
is
dissolved
,
that
is
,
disjointed
from
him
,
then
any
who
hath
suffered
wrong
in
the
fore-declared
manner
may
bee
party
against
him
and
proceed
as
if
there
were
no
Common-weath
;
by
the
Law
which
,
in
a
Wildernesse
,
warranteth
us
to
kill
a
Tyger
or
Robber
that
seeketh
to
kill
us
,
not
pretending
Law
for
our
action
,
but
that
it
is
manlike
&
rational
.
Neither
ought
it
bee
called
punishment
that
is
done
against
a
dispossessed
Magistrate
,
but
rather
revenge
,
or
some
other
name
that
includeth
no
order
to
Law
.
By
this
wee
understand
the
truth
of
that
famous
question
;
Whether
a
Soveraigne
bee
under
the
Lawes
?
to
which
is
ordinarily
answered
,
that
hee
is
,
as
farre
as
his
example
and
direction
is
necessary
to
his
subjects
;
but
not
so
,
that
the
Law
,
as
such
,
hath
any
superiority
or
force
upon
him
.
To
declare
this
more
plainly
,
wee
must
remember
,
the
Rule
of
his
actions
is
,
To
doe
what
reason
teaches
a
man
in
his
posture
ought
to
doe
,
that
is
,
what
is
fitting
for
the
publicke
:
Now
generally
speaking
,
the
common
good
requireth
that
the
Lawes
bee
observed
betwixt
fellowes
of
the
same
Common-wealth
;
wherefore
Nature
teacheth
him
to
give
example
of
that
observance
,
as
farre
as
his
publick
office
permits
.
Besides
,
in
the
very
person
of
the
Soveraigne
are
to
bee
distinguished
,
his
beeing
one
of
the
Common-wealth
,
and
beeing
the
head
or
Magistrate
:
So
that
,
though
his
beeing
a
Magistrate
exempts
his
publicke
actions
and
also
his
person
and
private
actions
from
the
inquisition
of
the
Law
;
yet
it
doth
not
exempt
his
private
actions
from
the
proportion
to
those
of
the
subjects
,
that
is
,
from
being
good
or
bad
,
because
like
or
dislike
to
the
actions
which
the
Law
commandeth
or
forbiddeth
.
So
that
,
he
is
not
,
even
in
his
private
actions
,
subject
to
the
Lawes
at
his
rule
;
for
that
is
onely
reason
;
but
,
as
they
are
a
kinde
of
way
chalked
out
to
him
for
the
materiall
part
of
his
action
;
as
the
Architect
frames
his
house
for
him
;
or
the
Gardiner
his
walkes
:
That
is
,
the
Lawes
are
to
him
as
an
art
under
him
,
an
art
to
shew
him
what
is
to
bee
done
,
not
to
command
or
punish
him
for
not
doing
;
nay
,
not
so
much
as
necessitating
him
to
doe
,
at
least
,
universally
,
whether
the
businesse
be
purely
betwixt
subjects
,
or
betwixt
himselfe
as
a
private
person
,
and
his
subjects
.
For
,
the
principle
of
common
good
beeing
higher
then
the
art
of
making
Lawes
,
may
,
nay
ought
in
some
cases
,
differ
from
the
prescriptions
of
the
Law
.
Yet
this
must
not
authorize
him
to
dispense
frequently
with
the
Law
;
the
Governement
beeing
not
possible
to
bee
good
in
which
there
is
no
constancy
:
But
,
if
the
circumstances
require
any
Law
to
bee
often
forced
;
the
Law
it selfe
ought
to
bee
limited
,
that
the
practice
of
the
subject
may
bee
firme
and
customary
,
which
is
that
maketh
the
Lawe-please
.
Thus
in
conclusion
,
though
the
Magistrate
bee
not
commanded
by
the
Lawes
,
nor
personally
subject
to
them
,
yet
reason
(
which
is
his
rule
)
bindeth
him
to
observe
them
as
the
good
of
his
people
;
and
(
ordinarily
speaking
)
essentiall
to
his
end
,
which
is
the
common
good
.
The
Lawes
therefore
are
his
matter
to
work
on
,
or
instruments
necessary
to
work
by
,
not
his
rule
or
Mastering
directions
.
There
remaines
yet
untouched
the
question
that
seemeth
most
troublesome
to
many
,
When
the
change
of
the
Governement
is
valid
,
and
such
as
the
subjects
obedience
is
due
to
the
new
Magistrate
and
to
bee
substracted
from
the
old
,
how
unjustly
soever
hee
were
bereaved
of
it
.
And
,
others
have
sought
by
terme
of
yeers
to
decide
the
difficulty
:
among
whom
,
one
was
Pope
Vrban
the
eight
,
an
intelligent
and
generous
Prince
and
well
versed
in
politick
Governement
.
Hee
published
a
decision
that
after
five
yeers
quiet
possession
of
an
estate
,
the
Church
was
not
bound
to
take
notice
whether
the
title
were
lawfull
or
no
;
but
acknowledge
the
possessour
,
in
Ecclesiasticall
businesses
.
So
much
hee
said
for
aimes
sake
.
But
,
wee
must
proceed
upon
other
principles
,
that
is
,
the
forelaid
and
main
basis
of
our
discourse
,
that
the
common
good
ought
to
bee
the
rule
of
the
Magistrates
title
,
and
the
subjects
obedience
.
Out
of
which
this
followeth
,
that
when
ever
(
considering
all
things
)
the
common
good
is
cleerly
on
the
possessors
side
,
then
the
dispossessed
hath
no
claime
.
Neither
ought
wee
expect
till
wee
have
assurance
,
that
it
will
not
bee
better
for
the
subject
if
the
late
owner
(
after
great
dangers
,
gaineth
his
former
power
:
For
,
first
,
this
it selfe
is
uncertaine
;
secondly
,
the
successe
of
endevours
to
restore
him
must
bee
hazardous
;
thirdly
,
many
and
great
mischiefs
,
during
the
time
of
the
attempt
,
are
altogether
unavoidable
;
and
all
this
to
bee
ballanced
against
those
uncertaine
hopes
.
Nor
,
againe
,
must
wee
expect
that
the
wills
of
all
the
subjects
concurre
,
actually
,
to
the
acceptance
of
the
new
Governour
:
For
that
is
either
impossible
or
of
so
long
expectation
,
as
to
ruine
all
dissensions
and
jealousies
in
the
meane
time
:
Nay
,
the
vulgar
sort
are
so
easily
led
by
fancy
,
that
they
understand
not
the
common
good
,
nor
what
they
should
wish
.
But
you
may
demand
,
How
shall
it
bee
knowne
when
the
common
good
holdeth
it selfe
on
the
possessour's
hand
?
I
answer
,
wee
must
first
see
who
are
the
common
,
whose
welfare
is
to
bee
preferred
before
private
interests
.
And
presently
it
appeareth
that
,
dividing
the
whole
people
into
Governours
and
governed
;
the
governed
part
is
the
Publicke
to
whose
good
the
Governours
are
to
direct
their
paines
:
And
that
these
are
they
that
spend
their
lives
in
seeking
their
owne
profits
,
either
by
improving
the
Land
,
or
in
Arts
and
Handicrafts
:
Whence
,
it
followes
,
when
their
good
stands
on
the
possessours
side
,
then
cleerly
hee
begins
to
gaine
right
and
power
;
and
this
is
plaine
to
bee
,
when
the
Merchant
,
the
Husbandman
,
and
Tradesman
,
with
their
appendices
,
are
in
an
undisturbed
practice
of
their
functions
,
and
begin
to
bee
afraid
of
change
upon
the
noise
of
an
invasion
.
This
resolution
could
not
bee
doubted
,
were
it
not
that
one
might
object
,
that
what
is
said
seemes
true
,
abstracting
from
circumstances
;
but
it
ought
to
bee
considered
,
that
such
men
see
nothing
but
the
outward
appearances
of
what
passes
in
humane
negotiations
,
and
so
there
may
many
circumstances
lie
hidden
from
them
,
which
would
make
them
thinke
or
wish
otherwise
if
they
knew
them
:
As
,
for
example
,
home-discontents
,
and
forraigne
conspiracies
;
which
if
understood
,
would
make
these
honest
men
preferre
a
warre
,
after
which
there
is
to
follow
a
peace
farre
exceeding
the
present
quiet
and
such
a
one
as
deserves
the
intervening
disturbance
and
dammages
.
And
indeed
,
I
allow
these
men
understand
not
such
mysteries
of
State
,
nor
penetrate
the
value
of
the
hazard
:
But
,
if
they
doe
not
,
why
are
they
not
also
exempted
from
engaging
on
those
motives
?
and
then
the
rest
of
the
Common-wealth
will
bee
but
so
many
private
men
,
who
must
follow
the
common
▪
Againe
,
if
they
think
themselves
well
,
they
manifestly
consent
to
the
present
Governement
,
and
therefore
cut
off
the
title
of
the
dispossessed
Governour
.
Besides
,
who
can
answer
they
shall
be
better
by
the
returne
of
the
dispossessed
party
?
surely
,
by
common
presumption
,
the
gainer
is
like
to
defend
them
better
then
he
who
lost
it
.
But
,
let
us
overslip
this
opportunity
and
end
of
the
common
Good
:
how
long
must
we
expect
,
till
it
shall
be
suppos'd
the
right
of
the
former
Magistrate
is
extinct
?
Some
Ages
?
as
wee
kept
our
title
to
France
,
and
France
did
to
Sicily
and
Naples
:
Or
at
least
some
generations
?
as
the
durance
of
the
Spaniards
warres
upon
Holland
:
Or
,
till
the
former
Magistrate
declares
the
relinquishment
of
his
right
?
Or
,
till
his
followers
are
weary
of
inventing
new
devices
,
to
blind
,
&
ruine
their
unwary
friends
?
All
these
are
soone
discern'd
to
bee
meere
uncertainties
;
and
rather
nets
to
catch
fools
and
bring
them
to
the
ambitious
desires
of
some
few
men
,
then
any
grounded
reason
.
But
,
what
if
an
open
Enemy
should
come
,
could
or
ought
the
Subjects
joine
against
him
with
their
new
Magistrate
?
If
not
,
the
whole
publick
must
perish
:
If
they
may
,
then
the
case
is
the
same
against
their
old
Magistrate
;
since
his
right
stood
upon
the
common
peace
,
and
that
is
transferr'd
from
him
to
his
rivall
by
the
title
of
quiet
possession
.
The
Eighteenth
GROUND
:
The
Objection
of
Divines
answered
.
REason
hath
plaid
its
part
;
but
Authority
cannot
be
silenc'd
unheard
.
Let
us
therefore
hearken
to
what
it
saith
.
And
,
first
steps
up
the
Divine
to
preach
us
,
out
of
Scripture
,
the
duty
wee
owe
to
Priests
and
Kings
;
no
lesse
then
death
and
damnation
beeing
the
guerdons
of
rebellion
and
disobedience
.
The
Lawyers
come
yoaked
from
the
Popes
and
Emperours
Court
,
taking
for
maxime
,
Tempus
non
occurrit
Ecclesiae
&
Regi
.
The
practice
seems
to
confirme
the
same
;
wee
seeing
both
some
Noble
men
and
divers
Cities
make
protestations
against
the
possession
of
others
for
many
years
and
ages
.
But
,
which
is
more
,
they
will
speak
reason
too
at
least
,
by
the
Divines
mouth
;
who
telleth
us
,
that
God
,
by
nature
,
is
high
Lord
and
Master
of
all
;
That
whoever
is
in
power
receiveth
his
right
from
him
;
That
Obedience
consists
in
doing
the
will
of
him
who
commandeth
;
and
concludeth
that
this
will
ought
to
bee
obeyed
till
God
taketh
away
the
obligation
,
that
is
,
till
hee
who
is
to
be
obeyed
himselfe
releaseth
his
right
.
The
Authorities
they
cite
out
of
Holy
Writ
are
,
for
the
most
part
,
meere
commands
to
obey
where
obedience
is
due
,
without
specifying
what
or
when
it
is
due
.
This
command
is
extended
to
wicked
and
evill
Governours
as
well
as
good
.
One
place
there
is
,
where
Samuel
denounceth
to
the
people
the
evills
that
will
come
to
them
by
the
power
of
the
King
;
and
calleth
them
Jus
Regis
,
or
,
as
the
Hebrew
text
,
Judicium
Regis
,
or
,
Legem
Regis
,
and
afterward
,
Regni
.
And
these
words
are
,
in
two
sences
,
true
;
one
,
that
the
King
would
do
the
wrongs
there
mentioned
,
by
force
;
the
other
,
that
the
people
,
since
they
would
have
a
King
,
ought
not
to
resist
him
when
hee
did
such
things
.
Yet
doe
I
not
deny
but
,
if
the
particulars
there
mentioned
,
bee
interpreted
gently
,
all
that
is
there
recited
might
,
with
justice
,
bee
practised
by
a
King
:
As
,
when
it
is
said
hee
should
take
away
their
Vineyards
and
Olive-gardens
;
it
may
bee
understood
,
upon
confiscation
and
by
other
lawfull
wayes
.
Besides
,
they
may
peradventure
alledge
that
God
,
by
his
speciall
command
,
transferred
the
Kingdome
from
Saul
to
David
,
from
Roboam
to
Jeroboam
,
and
some
others
.
But
,
they
should
also
let
us
know
,
what
they
deduce
from
hence
:
For
in
such
changes
,
God
gave
no
new
Authority
or
Power
to
such
Kings
,
but
the
same
their
predecessors
had
:
So
that
,
in
fine
,
all
that
is
brought
out
of
Scripture
falleth
short
of
proving
that
no
time
can
make
void
the
right
of
a
King
once
given
him
from
the
hand
of
God
.
The
reason
of
this
weak
way
of
alleadging
Scripture
is
,
that
when
they
read
that
God
commandeth
or
doth
this
,
they
look
not
into
nature
to
know
what
this
commanding
or
doing
is
;
but
presently
imagine
God
commandeth
it
by
expresse
and
direct
words
,
and
doeth
it
by
an
immediate
position
of
the
things
said
to
bee
done
;
whereas
in
nature
the
commands
are
nothing
but
the
naturall
light
God
hath
bestowed
on
mankinde
,
and
which
is
therefore
frequently
called
the
Law
of
nature
.
Likewise
,
Gods
doing
a
thing
is
many
times
onely
the
course
of
naturall
second
causes
,
to
which
because
God
gives
the
direction
and
motion
,
hee
both
doeth
and
is
said
to
doe
all
that
is
done
by
them
;
as
truly
as
the
weight
of
a
Jack
turnes
the
meat
upon
the
spit
,
and
the
spring
of
a
Watch
makes
the
clock
of
it
strike
:
A
notion
not
onely
of
a
large
extent
and
usefulnesse
in
it selfe
,
but
,
which
gives
mee
just
occasion
of
complaining
against
these
verball
and
winde-blowne
Divines
,
as
the
bane
of
Christendome
and
Christian
doctrine
.
For
,
whereas
the
Scripture
is
a
book
enriched
with
all
Science
and
depth
of
learning
;
this
sort
of
Grammar
Divines
,
without
either
Logick
,
Philosophy
,
or
Morality
,
meerly
by
the
vertue
of
their
Dictionary
,
and
such
like
lip-learning
,
undertake
to
bee
interpreters
of
the
sacred
Bible
,
and
in
stead
of
the
sence
of
the
letter
,
obtrude
to
the
Readers
their
owne
low
and
many
times
phreneticall
fancies
.
Let
us
instance
in
our
present
question
.
The
first
position
they
take
is
,
That
God
is
Lord
and
Master
of
all
things
.
What
seems
,
nay
truly
is
more
conformable
to
Scripture
and
Reason
then
this
assertion
,
as
it
lies
in
words
?
And
yet
many
not
looking
into
the
nature
of
God
and
rationall
and
intelligent
substances
,
make
a
shift
to
pervert
it
into
a
meer
blasphemy
:
For
,
if
the
sence
bee
onely
this
,
that
God
is
omnipotent
and
no
resistance
possible
in
any
creature
to
his
absolute
will
;
nothing
is
more
certaine
,
nothing
more
holy
.
But
,
this
is
not
the
meaning
of
the
Divines
;
but
,
that
there
is
an
Attribute
or
notion
in
God
of
being
Lord
and
Master
,
to
which
they
do
not
say
we
cannot
,
but
,
ought
not
resist
,
and
rather
admit
that
wee
can
.
And
herein
is
the
first
faltring
,
that
,
in
effect
,
they
deny
the
Omnipotency
,
and
reduce
that
which
is
a
true
physicall
power
to
a
Morall
obligation
.
But
this
is
not
all
.
The
next
point
is
,
that
,
if
even
this
Morality
were
founded
in
that
great
nature
of
Beeing
,
and
beeing
intelligent
,
which
is
in
God
almighty
;
and
that
they
also
held
his
commands
were
to
bee
obeyed
,
because
they
proceed
from
an
understanding
which
cannot
erre
,
and
which
is
essentially
the
very
order
and
well
beeing
of
all
creatures
;
the
former
would
seeme
pardonable
:
But
,
they
will
have
it
quite
contrary
,
that
therefore
things
amongst
creatures
goe
well
,
because
not
reason
,
not
the
eminentiall
beeing
of
themselves
in
God
is
their
off-spring
,
but
because
a
high
and
overpowering
will
or
voice
commandeth
it
so
.
A
position
in
respect
of
God
,
absolutely
blasphemous
;
as
far
as
it
makes
him
worke
without
the
guidance
of
his
understanding
,
that
is
,
like
the
lowest
order
of
creatures
,
as
stockes
and
stones
&c.
It
is
againe
afflictive
and
vexatious
to
Mankinde
;
taking
away
that
sweetnesse
of
obeying
,
which
consists
in
the
perswasion
that
because
creatures
are
the
participation
of
Gods
owne
nature
,
every
one
in
its
degree
and
mankind
in
the
first
and
highest
place
,
therefore
all
Gods
command
and
governement
,
are
most
conformable
to
their
good
,
as
it
were
salves
to
their
sores
,
and
allurements
to
the
bringing
them
to
their
final
end
and
perfection
.
But
,
that
which
is
more
to
our
purpose
is
,
that
,
upon
this
blasphemy
against
God
,
they
build
the
greatest
inconvenience
that
,
peradventure
,
is
to
bee
found
in
man's
nature
;
to
wit
,
That
God
gives
to
all
in
Power
the
likeness
and
participation
of
this
irrationall
Dominion
which
they
conceive
in
him
;
and
that
truly
there
is
in
Superiours
a
kinde
of
dote
or
free
gift
of
Mastery
derived
from
God
,
in
vertue
whereof
hee
is
Master
of
the
inferiours
and
what
belongs
to
them
,
either
wholly
or
in
a
certaine
measure
,
according
to
the
extent
of
the
power
given
;
that
,
lawfully
and
validly
,
he
may
dispose
of
all
or
a
certain
part
of
the
things
under
his
charge
,
meerly
because
such
is
his
will
and
pleasure
,
&
that
the
subject
ought
to
be
content
to
let
him
doe
his
will
,
upon
this
score
,
Because
it
is
Gods
will
that
this
mans
will
should
be
fulfilled
.
Which
doctrine
,
though
it
bee
manifestly
against
Christs
directions
left
to
his
disciples
,
and
the
practice
of
all
good
men
;
yet
,
because
this
Treatise
doth
not
pretend
to
Divinity
,
I
will
onely
insist
upon
its
naturall
inconveniences
.
As
first
,
that
it
is
not
connaturall
to
Mankinde
:
which
,
consisting
,
for
its
better
part
,
in
understanding
,
is
not
governed
conformably
to
its
disposition
,
unlesse
it
be
so
guided
that
the
understanding
be
principall
and
satisfied
in
it selfe
and
leader
to
the
will
and
action
;
which
course
of
proceeding
when
it
is
observed
,
then
is
a
man
truely
a
man
and
his
action
goes
on
with
sweetnesse
,
as
is
before
declared
.
Againe
,
it
maketh
the
Governour
proud
,
insolent
,
and
carelesse
.
Proud
,
because
hee
taketh
himselfe
to
bee
of
another
orbe
then
his
Subjects
;
that
they
are
all
slaves
and
beasts
,
himselfe
onely
Master
,
himselfe
onely
intelligent
and
a
man
.
Infolent
,
because
fully
perswaded
,
by
this
doctrine
,
that
he
can
doe
them
no
wrong
;
that
they
are
bound
to
suffer
what
he
layes
on
them
;
that
his
pleasure
is
and
must
be
their
content
and
rule
.
Carelesse
,
because
he
thinks
he
hath
no
account
to
make
,
either
to
God
or
Man
:
not
to
God
,
since
he
hath
submitted
the
people
to
his
will
and
disposition
;
and
therefore
he
being
incapable
of
doing
them
any
wrong
,
cannot
bee
charged
with
any
crime
:
Much
lesse
is
he
sollicitous
to
content
his
Subjects
,
in
whom
he
taketh
it
for
an
insolency
to
repine
at
any
thing
,
and
esteemes
it
their
duty
to
commend
all
he
does
,
and
to
have
his
authority
for
their
rule
to
judge
all
things
by
.
On
the
other
side
,
the
Subject
becomes
base
,
restive
,
ambitious
.
For
,
the
worth
and
dignity
of
man
,
which
is
his
Liberty
or
guidance
of
himselfe
,
being
taken
away
,
it
followes
,
he
must
be
servile
and
flattering
,
a
slave
,
a
body
without
soule
and
understanding
.
The
more
worldly
and
rustick
part
must
,
of
necessity
,
grumble
and
feele
it
harsh
to
see
their
labours
disposed
on
to
people
,
of
whom
they
have
opinion
that
they
are
idle
,
vicious
,
and
unworthy
:
and
therefore
,
desire
liberty
from
such
a
yoke
,
and
to
become
masters
of
their
owne
goods
and
labours
;
and
are
easily
susceptible
of
propositions
tending
to
that
purpose
,
when
they
come
from
faire
tongues
.
Lastly
,
the
higher
Spirits
have
Governement
in
admiration
,
and
take
it
for
the
onely
happinesse
;
and
therefore
have
their
hearts
wholly
bent
,
how
,
by
flattery
,
by
cunning
,
by
force
,
to
arrive
to
this
power
to
depose
him
that
is
in
possession
,
and
sit
downe
themselves
in
his
seat
of
glory
.
If
their
hopes
mount
not
so
high
,
for
the
impossibility
of
the
fact
and
the
remotenesse
of
their
quality
;
then
their
aime
is
,
by
adulation
and
compliances
,
to
come
neere
the
highest
,
to
bee
participant
of
his
authority
,
and
have
the
like
power
to
rob
and
oppresse
,
which
they
esteeme
vertuous
and
glorious
in
him
,
and
not
unjust
but
fitting
in
themselves
,
as
farre
as
they
can
doe
it
by
the
participation
of
that
dote
which
God
hath
bestowed
upon
the
highest
Magistrate
.
Lastly
,
we
must
looke
into
the
lame
proceeding
of
the
common
good
and
publicke
actions
of
such
a
Governement
;
where
the
Subject
,
by
the
consequence
of
this
doctrine
,
is
set
eagerly
upon
his
owne
interest
,
thinkes
all
lost
that
is
done
for
his
,
not
Governour
or
Protector
,
but
Lord
and
Master
,
and
therefore
alienated
from
him
.
Whence
,
it
must
come
to
passe
that
,
what
he
can
cousen
,
what
hee
can
excuse
,
what
hee
can
delay
,
hee
is
still
forward
to
;
and
,
by
a
secret
instinct
of
nature
which
abhorreth
such
a
Governement
,
thinketh
it
well
done
,
though
he
cannot
give
an
account
to
justifie
his
action
.
In
a
word
,
who
sees
not
this
Common-wealth
to
be
a
Kingdome
divided
in
it selfe
alwayes
in
affection
,
and
very
neere
in
outward
action
;
wanting
thereunto
nothing
but
an
occasion
,
and
some
head
to
manage
the
sedition
?
who
sees
not
that
the
whole
Governement
is
violent
;
and
so
may
indeed
continue
whilst
actuall
force
hangeth
over
it
,
but
hath
not
the
possibility
of
a
naturall
duration
and
length
.
The
nineteenth
GROUND
.
The
Authority
of
Lawyers
insufficient
in
this
Question
.
THE
Divines
errour
being
thus
discovered
,
our
plea
against
the
Lawyers
will
be
of
lesse
either
debate
or
consequence
:
for
,
this
question
belongeth
not
to
their
science
or
employment
.
The
maximes
,
the
rule
,
the
highest
Tribunall
of
their
Judgements
is
the
text
of
the
Law
,
the
agreements
of
men
,
and
,
at
most
,
to
declare
the
Law-makers
intention
:
But
,
to
judge
whether
the
Law-makers
intention
be
conformable
to
nature
and
such
as
it
ought
,
whether
he
exceedeth
his
power
,
whether
hee
bee
Master
of
the
Lawes
,
and
the
like
,
is
beyond
the
verge
of
their
jurisdiction
.
Therefore
,
nothing
is
more
absurd
,
then
to
demand
that
Lawyers
should
plead
cases
betweene
the
Soveraigne
Magistrate
and
the
Subject
,
where
the
common
good
and
Governement
is
interessed
:
For
,
there
,
things
are
not
to
be
carried
by
the
Dictates
of
Justinian
or
Lancelotus
,
or
the
command
of
Caesar
or
Peter's
Successours
,
but
either
by
the
Science
of
Politicks
,
or
the
certitude
of
Faith
and
Tradition
;
which
are
the
onely
two
rules
a
high
Governour
hath
.
If
the
Divine
findeth
any
thing
contrary
to
the
knowne
Law
of
God
,
he
may
speake
:
If
the
Philosopher
finde
any
thing
against
the
Nature
of
Man
,
his
mouth
is
not
to
bee
stopped
:
The
Lawyer
,
what
can
he
say
?
It
is
against
the
agreement
heretofore
made
by
the
Governement
of
the
Countrey
?
The
Governour
may
reply
,
Yes
;
but
what
you
say
is
against
the
present
good
of
the
Countrey
,
with
which
I
am
entrusted
.
Is
the
Countrey
made
for
the
Lawes
,
or
the
Lawes
for
the
Countrey
?
The
Lawes
therefore
must
give
place
,
where
the
good
of
the
People
is
against
the
former
Resolutions
.
If
any
Law
be
repealed
by
the
Authority
which
made
it
,
or
by
another
equal
;
is
it
the
Lawyers
part
to
plead
what
was
Law
before
,
or
what
is
now
?
when
a
supreme
Governour
speaketh
as
such
,
as
declaring
what
the
present
necessity
requires
;
if
any
former
Law
bee
against
it
,
it
is
by
his
declaration
annulled
;
it
was
Law
before
,
but
it
is
not
now
.
But
the
Lawyer
will
reply
,
There
is
no
Law
in
the
Land
which
giveth
such
authority
:
It
is
easily
answered
;
it
is
not
a
case
for
which
a
Law
is
to
bee
made
.
See
the
Romane
Governement
:
when
there
came
an
exigence
of
desperation
,
all
their
Magistrates
,
all
their
formes
ceased
;
a
Dictatour
was
made
,
whose
word
was
Law
,
nor
could
any
man
appeale
to
Law
.
Such
is
the
Case
when
the
high
Governour
pronounceth
against
the
Law
:
for
hee
ought
not
to
doe
it
,
but
when
the
Law
standeth
not
with
the
good
and
safety
of
the
Subject
;
and
when
hee
doth
,
Law
is
not
to
be
pleaded
against
him
.
Againe
can
any
Law
be
enacted
of
what
shall
bee
done
in
case
of
a
conversion
of
the
Governement
?
It
is
clearely
a
folly
to
pretend
it
.
The
ordering
of
the
Common-wealth
is
,
then
,
in
new
hands
:
The
former's
power
is
expired
:
and
to
prescribe
rules
to
them
who
will
assuredly
be
their
owne
Judges
,
is
a
piece
of
great
simplicity
.
The
Lawyer
may
peradventure
reply
,
There
is
no
power
in
the
Land
to
repeale
the
former
Lawes
or
to
oppose
them
.
I
thinke
hee
will
bee
wiser
;
yet
,
if
hee
doth
say
it
,
I
aske
him
,
Who
made
the
former
Lawes
?
was
it
not
the
People
,
by
themselves
or
their
deputies
?
and
which
is
the
stronger
,
if
they
make
them
by
their
deputies
,
or
by
themselves
?
Certainely
,
it
will
be
answered
,
By
themselves
;
for
the
deputies
have
no
power
but
what
they
impart
to
them
.
Is
it
then
possible
to
put
a
Case
,
in
which
there
is
no
power
in
a
Countrey
to
repeale
Lawes
?
Evidently
,
who
sayes
so
must
say
there
is
no
People
in
the
Countrey
?
For
,
if
there
be
People
,
there
is
in
them
a
power
to
dispose
of
themselves
,
more
strong
then
in
Deputies
.
But
the
Lawyer
may
say
,
the
People
cannot
speake
their
mindes
freely
.
I
answer
,
certainely
,
they
not
onely
can
,
but
cannot
choose
but
speake
their
mindes
,
in
the
case
we
put
.
Who
knoweth
not
that
Liberty
and
speaking
of
ones
minde
belo●geth
to
all
circumstances
a
man
can
be
put
in
?
The
Merchant
that
,
in
a
Tempest
,
throweth
the
precious
fruits
of
his
venture
and
labour
into
the
Sea
,
doth
not
he
doe
it
freely
and
willingly
?
The
Hollanders
of
late
made
a
peace
with
the
Spaniard
;
wee
,
both
with
the
Hollander
and
the
Dane
,
and
are
pretending
to
others
:
In
any
of
these
,
were
all
parts
pleased
?
Did
no
party
agree
to
somewhat
which
hee
would
not
have
done
,
but
in
consideration
of
his
present
circumstances
?
Or
,
was
there
ever
peace
made
after
a
warre
,
but
one
part
grudged
at
somewhat
?
must
none
of
these
be
accounted
freely
done
?
must
none
of
these
promises
binde
,
and
be
kept
,
upon
Honour
and
Veracity
?
This
is
to
destroy
all
commerce
of
mankinde
;
nay
,
not
to
allow
man
so
much
wit
as
to
know
what
is
fit
for
him
to
doe
in
time
of
necessity
.
If
then
the
People
speake
,
in
one
circumstance
,
something
that
they
would
not
in
another
;
it
is
not
to
be
said
they
speake
not
their
mindes
,
but
that
,
according
to
circumstances
,
they
alter
their
mindes
,
as
all
wife
men
doe
.
They
agree
and
submit
to
the
present
conjunctures
,
not
because
they
are
not
free
,
now
as
before
,
but
because
circumstances
are
changed
,
and
now
render
it
fitting
.
But
,
I
said
that
,
in
the
case
I
put
,
they
could
not
choose
but
speake
.
My
case
was
,
that
Then
a
Governour
is
acknowledged
,
when
the
People
casting
off
the
care
and
thoughts
of
innovation
,
fall
to
their
trades
and
manufactures
:
Can
it
be
deny'd
that
by
so
doing
they
acquiesce
to
the
present
Governement
?
which
if
they
doe
,
can
it
be
questioned
whether
they
consent
or
not
to
the
repealing
of
all
such
Lawes
as
cannot
stand
with
the
present
Governement
?
Such
Lawes
therefore
are
repealed
,
not
by
deputies
,
but
by
the
Deputants
and
Masters
of
the
Deputies
.
The
Lawyer
,
therefore
,
must
either
proclaime
the
present
Governement
none
,
or
not
plead
Law
against
it
:
for
it
is
pure
folly
to
admit
both
,
that
is
,
faire
and
full
contradiction
.
In
a
new
Governement
,
all
Lawes
prejudiciall
to
it
are
annulled
,
by
the
pure
admission
of
it
:
Other
indifferent
Lawes
so
goe
on
,
as
to
bee
subject
to
its
judgement
,
whether
and
how
farre
to
stand
;
but
a
wise
Governour
will
continue
them
as
farre
as
hee
can
with
prudence
,
because
innovation
is
contrary
to
the
sweetnesse
which
is
in
custome
,
as
in
a
kinde
of
nature
.
The
Conclusion
.
BEE
this
then
so
resolved
,
That
God
himselfe
hath
no
irrationall
and
dead
title
of
Lordship
over
his
Creatures
,
but
onely
his
all-right-setled
Understanding
,
and
irresistible
Omnipotency
.
And
,
as
hee
hath
none
in
himselfe
,
so
likewise
not
given
any
to
those
hee
hath
put
in
Authority
;
but
,
that
their
power
is
either
in
the
submission
of
the
Subject
by
promise
and
agreement
,
or
in
the
rationall
disposition
of
the
Magistrate
,
which
maketh
him
work
what
is
conformable
to
humane
nature
;
and
the
obedience
or
obligation
to
obey
in
the
Subject
is
out
of
this
,
That
hee
hath
entrusted
the
Magistrate
with
the
Governement
,
and
is
,
by
that
,
to
suppose
he
doth
regularly
what
is
best
(
all
things
considered
)
for
the
common
good
.
That
,
by
consequence
,
the
title
of
the
Magistrate
begins
and
dies
with
the
good
of
the
Common-wealth
;
and
holdeth
purely
so
long
as
it
is
good
for
the
people
.
That
,
no
Lawes
made
by
the
power
or
agreement
of
men
,
can
judge
betwixt
Subject
and
Soveraigne
,
in
dispute
of
the
common
good
and
Governement
;
but
onely
the
Tribunalls
of
God
and
Nature
,
or
Divinity
and
the
science
of
Politicks
:
And
therefore
,
the
maximes
of
Law
have
no
force
in
these
questions
;
Now
,
if
Princes
lose
their
pretences
by
the
force
of
Nature
,
it
is
ridiculous
for
private
men
to
build
hopes
,
upon
rotten
titles
of
ages
long
passed
,
upon
weake
maximes
of
Law
,
after
Nature
,
by
her
revolutions
,
hath
cast
all
Law
and
mortall
acts
and
agreements
.
And
so
is
finished
this
small
Treatise
,
to
the
profit
of
them
who
are
able
and
willing
to
make
use
of
it
.
Some
,
by
the
method
I
have
used
,
something
new
in
morall
discourses
,
may
imagine
the
Doctrine
I
deliver
,
to
bee
more
subtle
in
explication
then
solid
in
practice
:
But
,
let
them
either
looke
into
the
Causes
of
Governements
,
or
the
Effects
;
they
will
see
nature
and
practise
both
conspire
to
give
testimony
to
the
truth
.
The
cause
of
all
morall
effects
,
if
morally
carried
,
are
the
end
and
intention
for
which
they
are
sought
and
endeavoured
after
;
This
is
manifest
to
bee
the
well-being
of
particulars
under
a
Governement
.
The
practises
,
which
are
the
Effects
,
will
shew
,
That
Governements
breake
when
it
is
not
well
with
the
Subjects
,
but
they
are
oppressed
by
the
Governour
;
That
wise
and
good
Governours
are
forced
sometimes
to
breake
disordered
rules
which
hinder
their
free
administration
;
That
people
,
as
it
were
,
forced
by
naturall
changes
,
violate
the
promises
made
to
their
Governours
,
cast
them
off
when
they
think
them
pernicious
,
and
proceed
against
them
,
per
viam
facti
,
as
they
speake
in
the
Schooles
,
not
by
Lawes
,
which
cannot
bee
made
for
such
matters
.
These
are
,
in
a
manner
,
the
whole
subject
of
the
precedent
Discourse
.
FINIS
.