Politick maxims and observations written by the most learned Hugo Grotius translated for the ease and benefit of the English states-men. By H.C. S.T.B. Grotius, Hugo, 1583-1645. This text is an enriched version of the TCP digital transcription A85748 of text R202255 in the English Short Title Catalog (Thomason E1527_2). Textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. The text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with MorphAdorner. The annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). Textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish.This text has not been fully proofread Approx. 114 KB of XML-encoded text transcribed from 77 1-bit group-IV TIFF page images. EarlyPrint Project Evanston,IL, Notre Dame, IN, St. Louis, MO 2017 A85748 Wing G2123 Thomason E1527_2 ESTC R202255 99862609 99862609 114773

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Early English books online. (EEBO-TCP ; phase 1, no. A85748) Transcribed from: (Early English Books Online ; image set 114773) Images scanned from microfilm: (Thomason Tracts ; 194:E1527[2]) Politick maxims and observations written by the most learned Hugo Grotius translated for the ease and benefit of the English states-men. By H.C. S.T.B. Grotius, Hugo, 1583-1645. Campanella, Tommaso, 1568-1639. H.C., S.T.B. [10], 142 [i.e. 143], [1] p. Printed for Humphrey Moseley, and are to be sold at his shop at the Princes Armes in Saint Paul's Church-yard., London, : 1654:. Original title not traced. Based on: Campanella, Tommaso. Realis philosophiæ epilogisticae partes quatuor. P. 142, 143 misnumbered 143, 142. Annotation on Thomason copy: "Decemb. 5". Reproduction of the original in the British Library. eng Political science -- Early works to 1800. A85748 R202255 (Thomason E1527_2). civilwarnoPolitick maxims and observations: written by the most learned Hugo Grotius translated for the ease and benefit of the English states-men. BGrotius, Hugo165419106515000010C The rate of 10 defects per 10,000 words puts this text in the C category of texts with between 10 and 35 defects per 10,000 words. 2007-12 Assigned for keying and markup 2008-07 Keyed and coded from ProQuest page images 2008-09 Sampled and proofread 2008-09 Text and markup reviewed and edited 2009-02 Batch review (QC) and XML conversion

POLITICK MAXIMS AND OBSERVATIONS Written by the most learned HVGO GROTIVS Translated for the ease and benefit of the English STATES-MEN .

BY H.C. S.T.B.

LONDON , Printed for Humphrey Moseley , and are to be sold at his Shop at the Princes Armes in Saint Paul's Church-yard , 1654 ;

To the Reader .

I Shall not beg pardon for this Addresse to the English Readers . What is here presented to view , is the Digest of the immortal HUGO GROTIUS . The Subject matter was first lent by that learned Frier CAMPANELLA but hee was rather the Occasion than the Author . For CAMPANELLA'S share of this work , was onely a piece of his Philosophia realis , which had slept forgotten , had not GROTIUS ' wak'd it by these admirable Observations . And these speak the Author so fully , that you 'l confesse he travail'd farther , while he sate stil , then ever Vlysses was feign'd to do ; and ( without the Encounters of Circe and the Sirens ) not onely {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} , but {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}

Now if you suspect the English falls short of GROTIUS own Latine , I would gladly know who it is that can reach it ? but if you look for the sense faithfully renderd ( and-reasonably you can expect no more ) I assure you 't is done ; and that on his word who hath chosen rather to lose his livelyhood , than to subscribe to a Lye .

Farewell .
To the most learned HUGO GROTIUS the Author . OUr Ages Wonder , by thy Birth the Fame Of Belgia , by thy Banishment the Shame : Who to more knowledge younger didst arrive Than forward Glaucius , yet art still alive : Whose Masters oft ( for suddenly you grew To equall and passe those , and need no new ; To see how soon , how far thy Wit could reach ) Sat down to wonder , when they came to teach : Oft then would Scaliger contented be , To leave to mend all times to polish thee , And of that paines effect did highlyer boast , Than had he gain'd all that his Fathers lost : When thy Capella read ( which till thy hand Had clear'd , grave and learned did under stand , Though well thou might'st , at such a tender age Have made ten lessons of the plainest page ) That King of Criticks stood amaz'd to see A work so like his own set forth by thee : Nor with lesse wonder on that Work did look , Than if the Bridgroom had begot the book , To whome thy age and act seem'd to unite , At once the Youth of Phoebus and the Light . Thence lov'd thee with a never dying flame , As the adopted heir to all his Fame . For which care , wonder , love , the riper daies Paid him with just and with eternall praise ; Who gain'd more honour from one verse of thine , Than all the Canës of his Princely line . In that he joy'd , and that oppos'd to all , To Titius spright , to hungry Schoppius gall . To what ( with cause disguised ) Bonarcius writes , To Delrio's rage , and all his Loyolites But though to thee , each tongue , each art be known , As all thy time that had imploy'd alone , Though truth do naked to thy sight appear , And scarce can we doubt more , then thou canst cleer , Though thou at once do'st different glories joyne , A lofty Poet and a deep Divine , Canst in the purest phrase cloath solid sence , Scaevola's Law in Tulli's eloquence . Though thy imployments have excel'd thy pen , Shew'd thee much skil'd in Books , but more in men . And prov'd thou canst at the same easie rate . Correct an Author and uphold a State . Though rare praise , do a full truth appear To Spain and Germany , who more do fear ( Since thou thy aid didst to that State afford ) The Swedish counsels then the Swedish sword . All this yet of thy worth makes but a part , And we admire thy head lesse then thy heart ; Which when in want was yet too grave to close ( Though woo'd ) with thy ungratefull countries foes . When their chief Ministers strove to entice , And would have bought thee , at what ever price : Since all our praise and wonder is too small , For each of these , what shall we give for all ? Above the reach or stroke of Fortune live , Not valuing what she can take or give ; For low desires oppresse the loftiest state , And who lookes down on vice , looks down on Fate . FALKLAND .
MANIPVLVS POLITICVS OR , Politique Maxim's and Cautions .
PART I.
CHAP. I. Of Politique Communities .

1. THE Sense and Apprehension of Mans self-insufficiency , was the first thing that link'd men into communities . For Man finding himselfe unable to stand alone , was compell'd by Necessity to betake himselfe to the support of others .

2. Dominion therefore requires the Union of many into one Body , which is called thence a Community , a Policy or Body ; because no Man can Politically be his owne Lord nor the Lord of any one singular person .

3. Dominion is two fold .

1. Naturall , or 2. Violent .

By the Naturall , the Soule rules the Body , Parts , and Affections .

By the Uiolent , the Affections sometimes Lord it over the Reason .

4. Man is borne to hold Society with All Men : an evident signe whereof is , his Speech , and naturall tender affections , if they be not corrupted by Education .

5. 6. There is a threefold Community 1. Of Soules or Mindes . 2. Of Bodies . 3. Of Fortunes .

First , the Community of Minds , which is call'd RELIGION , and that is the chiefe community , which is the very Soule of Policy , & the shield of Naturall Justice : and it is the great Tye that links man to God , and man to man , whence Religion hath its name , à Religando .

Observat.

This Religious Union , is evident amongst the Jewes , but more amongst True Christians : amongst Mahumetans very little : amongst Pagans none at all : unlesse we rather regard the bare sound of the Name , then any Morall effect .

2. The Community of Bodies . This stands in the second ranck of Tye's or Combinations . By this the Great Turk rules over Mahumetans , Iewes and Christians , which under his Empire are united in Body , although in Soule and Religion far differing .

3. Community of Fortunes or Goods , obtaines the third place . By this the Turk rules over the Turks , and Ragusians too , and the King of Spaine over the Genoese , Neapolitane and Spaniard : for the Geneoese have estates lying in that Kings Territories , and traffique there .

Some Communities there are mixt of all these three .

CHAP. II. Of the Function and Degrees of Lords and Rulers , whence flowes the divers kinds of Republiques and regiments , &c. Of their Circulations , &c.

HEe Naturally Rules , that excells in vertue . He naturally serves that is Inferiour in vertue , or has none at all . Where the contrary is , there the dominion is violent .

2. Politique Excellency consists either in the 1. Mind , or 2. Body , or 3. Both .

3. He rules best that excells in both , as CAESAR did .

He Rules next-best that excells in Mind , as Vlysses .

Thirdly , He that excells in Body , that is , in strength and activity , as Ajax .

But being it is Naturall for the Soule to excell the Body : He that by strength of body over-rules them that excell in mind , rules violently : as of old the Giants , and afterwards Brennus , and Attila , and many more .

4. The first thing that gained Dominion amongst Men , was 1. POWER . 2. WISEDOME . 3. LOVE .

The mixture of all three is rare , and admirable . Power without wisdom is Brutishand Barbarous . Tyranny , this is Lyon-like Dominion . Wisedome without Love , is but a Cheating Hypocritical Dommion . This is Fox-like . Hence Lewis the II. of France , gain'd the title of Lewis the Fox . But Love cements all , and makes Dominion durable .

Hence Poets say that Cupid ( or Love ) is the Antientest of all the Gods , for indeed Love made the World and Harmony preserves it .

5. The Supreme Power is the Power of the Sword , that is the Power of Life and Death , which resides in them to whom the last appeale in Criminalls is referred .

6. Dominion of one Good man is called Monarchy

Dominion of one Evill men , Tyranny .

The Dominion of many Good ones , Aristocracy .

The Dominion of many Bad ones , Oligarchy .

The Dominion of all Good ones , Policy .

The Dominion of all Bad ones , Democracy .

It is the Office ( or Duty ) of those that Rule

1. To teach and instiruct Their subjects 2. Defend Their subjects 3. Nourish or Feede Their subjects 4. To maintaine the rights of Their subjects

Which seeing no King can undergoe of himselfe alone , he does the 1. By Priests , Doctors , and Lawes . 2. By Souldiers . 3. By Husband-men , Merchants and Artificers . 4. By Judges , that judge according to Law .

On the other side , the people owe to their Prince two things 1. Reverence & . 2. Obedience .

8. Those are called Kings which preferre the publique before their own private good : but Tyrants which doe the contrary .

9. A Kingly Government , does very rarely degenerate ( except by degrees ) into a Democratique , yet in Athens it did so : which Originally was a Monarchy .

10. When a Popular State , by Mis-government , is corrupted ; there springs up in lieu of it , either a Tyrant , as Pisistratus , at Athens , or a * King : as Cosmo Medices , at Florence . Or Vassalage under strangers , those of Pisa , by this meanes , became slaves to the Florentines . Common-wealths by Luxury and Pride , shrink and contract themselves into an Oligarchy . So Some fell into the hands of a Decemvirate or Government by Ten-Men : which lasted not long , but was quelled ( observe it ! ) by the People Rising under the conduct of Virginius : so the Athenians , under the conduct of Thrasybulus , cut off and suppressed the Thirtie Tyrants .

11. Strife betwixt Commons and Nobles , encreaseth a Common-wealth : but if the Commons bee Conquerour , so as To draw the Nobles to their Bent : The Republique goes to wrack : as it hapned in Florence : a state of all others most subject to changes . But if the Noblest win the day , Tyranny forthwith steps in : as heretofore in Genoa : and the Republique falls to ground . But Contentions about the Change of Religion , or the Sharing of State ( which by a new Name , we call Levelling ) is ever the utter undoing of all , especially where the Conquerors are but few . Yet in Flanders , Holland , and Friesland ; they are not so much wasted by varieties of Religion , as the French , Polack , and English are : because they are compell'd into Union by the common enemy the Spaniard .

The strife of Peares and people , so long as they keepe from down-right blowes , may be reckoned in the number of those which Herod calles , Good and advant ageous contentions : but when by Ambition and Avarice the Sedition of the Apuleij and the Gracchi , and after them the warrs of Sylla and Marius crept in , the Republique of Rome began to look Monarchish : which as Jul. Caesar ! invaded upon a Popular Accompt : so would Pompey have probably done , upon the SENATES .

In some places , such is the Education of divers that are called Noble-men ; that you may expect Vertue from any men , sooner then from Them .

Strifes about Religion are there most Pernicious and Destructive , where Provision is not made * , for Dissenters :

That they may live secure : and the Supreme Magistrate makes not their security good to them in good Earnest , whereupon Tumults and jarrs about Religion have risen that have vexed Germany , but almost quite destroyed both France and the Netherlands .

So much for Internal changes .

Externall follow . Such are Forraign Invasion , Plagues , Inundations , and Conflagrations Uuniversall .

Which Disasters oft-times so change the face of things , that Inhabitants are glad to begin the world again .

These we may not ( as the Author here seemes to do ) impute to any Magicall Fatality , in the Numbers of 7. or 9. ( which yet he laies , have been Experimentally found ominous ) nor yet to the ill-complexion of starrs , that ( as I may say ) attend the Horoscope of such and such Kingdomes and Commomvealths : ( though I will not deny , but God ( the great Demiurgus ) brings many Plagues upon men , and Cities , by the Ministry of the Planets ) but ascribe these Calamities to the FINGER of GOD : which writ the PERIOD of the ASSYRIAN EMPIRE upon the Wall . Dan , 5. and levell'd Sodom and Gomorrah , with the plain wheron they stood . Gen. 19.25 .

Cities and Countries are sometimes destroyed by Naturall Causes , but yet the hand of God may set them on work : as if AEtna ( by its Eruptions ) should destroy Sicily , or Vesevo , Campania : ( as it has sometimes done ) Earthquakes in Italy are Naturally frequent : by reason of the many hollow Grots and Mountaines in that Country , but if they bring destruction to whole Countries , or Cities , ( as they have not long since done ) vere Digitus Dei — firy sins of that Sodom , &c.

The City of Venice is subject to Oblimation : or the casting up of Mud , and Sands ; which may in time choake her up , and be her ruine : which of her self is so admirably complexion'd , that she can never Perish .

Some remedies for this disease ( though perhaps not strong enough ) shee has already invented : and may devise more and better : Yet this advantage her Seas bring , that they are her Bulwark against strangers : upon confidence whereof , shee has no Militia of her own ; yet fears a Tyranny from her own strength : and hence perhaps it may fall out , that by hyring of forreign Commanders , she may at last come to ruine .

CHAP. III. Of the Essence , Constitution , and Division &c. Princedome and Dominion , &c.

THE Romans , upon the suddain Emergencies of danger , by War , or seditions , did chuse themselves an extemporarie Monarch : which they called a Dictatour :

whence at last ( by the Authors leave ) we may inferre thus much : That a Monarch is the best & safestengine for any People , in time of War or Danger . Hence Homer makes his wise-man , [ Ilysses vote clearly for that ; to carry on the Grecian Warre

— It is not good to have many heads ( say's he ) let there be one Chief , one King ! For

1. The Dominion of one good man , is alwaies better then the Dominion of many , nay , of all good ones . Yea ,

2. The Male-administration of One , is much to be desired , rather then that of Many , or of all in a Princedome , or Rule .

3. Simply and naturally , God is the Sole Lord Paramount : as having Power-Absolute over all : whose Will ( as most wise ) is a law to it self , and transcends the whole Scale and Predicament of things . But

4. Man is onely Lord in Degree and Measure : because his Will cannot be a Law ; unlesse Regulated and bound up by the Law of God , either Naturall , or Positive .

5. Hee knows not how to rule a Kingdome , that cannot manage a Province nor can he wield a Province , that cannot order a City ; Nor he order a City , that knows not how to Regulate a Village : nor hee a Village , that cannot guide a Family : Nor can that man Govern well a Family that knowes not how to Governe himselfe : neither can any Govern himselfe unlesse his reason be Lord , Will &c. and Appetite her Vassalls : Nor can Reason rule , unlesse her selfe be ruled by God , and [ wholy ] be obedient to him .

Without the Divine Rule , no Man is truely a King , or Prince , according to Nature , but rather to be counted , a Scourge of God , &c. Executioner of men .

But neither , according to the Divine Rule , is any Prince simply a LORD : but a RULER and PASTOR of his People : * and the Vice-gerent of the LORD GOD by whom Kings Reign .

6. Therefore ought a good Prince so farre to Excell his Subjects in Vertue , as the Shepheard does his Flock : who is of a Superiour species to them : Now seeing all men are equall as to the Species , it must here follow that Princes ( as such ) must have somewhat of God , &c. peculiar Impresses of Elohim , the Deity in them . Therefore

7. Wisdome alone Rules best of all : not Sophisticall , but Philosophicall [ yet ] not the wisdome of the Cloister , or the * Cell , but Civil Wisdome , not opposite , but Subservient to God .

8. The Dominion of The The 1. Male Over 1. The Female is Naturall . 2. Father 2. His Children 3. Oldmen 3. Young men 4. Strong 4. The weake 5. Schollars 5. Master
Nature doth bring forth men . 1. Of strong Intellectuals , though weake in constitution of Bodies to be Priests , Philosophers , Councellors . 2. Active and strong bodies , with couragious minds to be — Souldiers . 3. Gross braines and rude hands to be husbandmen . 4. Heavy and robustuous for the Cavalry or Horsemen . 5. Laborious and nimble-handed to weaving , and other Manufactures . 6. Ready tongues , and learned , for Embassies , and Orations . 7. Other sharp wits for Merchandize . 8. Just men for the Bench , or Tribunall . 9. Weak in Body and mind , for * service , and to be instruments for their betters . 10. Men of abilities both of body and mind , to be Commanders , Kings , and Masters of the Militia .

10. That therefore there is the best Republique , where every man bends himselfe to those duties and imployments which Nature hath fitted him for : For then Reason and Wisdom bear sway : and that the worst , where men are put upon imployments , which are contrary to thein grain , and Genius : for then Fortune , and Chance , ( that is the force of Ignorance ) rule the rost .

11. Whence Magistrates are chosen , because they are the Sons of Nobles , or Sons of ☞ friends of such as are in present power , or for their Wealth , or bought Honour , and not because they are good , or wise men ; There the Republique falls to ground .

12. A Common-wealth goes to wrack soonest , when the Portion makes marriages , and Equality of Wealth , and not an equall * strength of body and mind , whence ( according to the Pythagorean ) the best Issue is to be expected : * though Plato think ( more rightly ) the best breed to be of strong bodies , and good wits : or on the contrary .

13. All mischiefs sway , where women have the Liberty to do , and say what they please , &c.

14. These wee count CITIZENS who not onely are capable and partakers of dignities and honors , in the Republique , but such , as by any Function , be it never so mean ( as the members of the body ) contribute to the use and advantage of the whole . The rest wee count strangers , Excrements of a Common-wealth : such as are many Noble-men now adaies .

15. The [ true ] Office of the Noblenesse or Peereage [ in any Republique ] is to defend that , and private persons .

The Office of the Commons to seed , and sustaine it .

The Office of the Wiser sort , to rule and Instruct it .

He that takes no prosession , or calling at all upon him is to be look'd upon , as an Excrement , or Drone : But they that mediate betwixt God and Man , are to be esteemed as the Diviner part of a Common-wealth : Such are the Legitimate Priest-hood .

CHAP. IV. Of Laws and Customes , and that which is called the Reason of State .

1. THat * Good Men may be borne , and imployed in those Offices and Functions , to which they were born , every Community stands ever in need of a Law .

2. As Virtue is the Private Law , of Individualls [ or singular Persons ] so Law is the Publique Vertue of a Community . Therefore being Virtue is the rule of Actions , and Affections in a particular Person , ordained by the Decree of a Potent and * pliant Reason , for a chief private good : so Law is the Rule of affections , and Actions Publique : Constituted and published from the Dictates of Common Reason , which respect the chiefest common good .

3. The chief good is Preservation : & that either Private or Publique . which is ( as far as may be gathered ) from Conservatives [ simply ] or Expulsives of Destructives . Simply to Coserve is to Enternize [ or perpetuate ] Therfore simply , both the Private & Publique chief good is from [ GOD ] that Eternall chief Entity . But partiall from other things : as namely , Instrumentally and Dispositively from the Rules of Reason .

4. Wherefore — No Republiques ☞ can make Laws , where there is not common Reason and common consent ; unlesse where by common Reason ( and consent ) The Matter is put into the hands of the Wise-men ; Such as were Solon , Lycurgus , and Numa .

Or unto one whom God has Delegated [ for his Vicegeret ] as Moyses , &c.

As for Minos and Mahomet , either Craft or the the Devill led them on , to be Apes of the true messengers from God , as Moses was .

Here the Observator steps in and saies , I see no reason why the Edicts of one or many Rulers may not deserve the name of Lawes , not at all awaiting the Peoples Consents : For neither in prescribing medicines , do Physicians require the consent of their Patients .

5. 1 The Eternall and first Law is that , whereby God did Fashion , Create , Govern , and change all things and bring them about to his own ends : Even changable things , unchangably .

2 From this is derived the Law Naturall planted in the minds of men , and in the whole Volum of nature which is * Gods Art , and Natures Directory : Neither can it be violated but by God : [ and that by him ] as a Lord , not as a Legislator .

3 From the Law Naturall is is derived the Law of Nations , Common to all men .

4 From the Law of Nations , the Positive Civill Law is derived , and so farre as it is agreeable to Nature , it is invariable : but as it serves present necessities , it may , and sometimes ought , to be altered .

God himselfe also gave a Positive Law — which is immutable , where it containes the Law of Nature , where our necessities [ onely ] mutable , as the Law of Moses in the Decalogue , remains [ in full force ] for ever , but not in the forbidding of Swines-flesh : which was made on purpose to * avoid Leprosie . Yet ,

☞ No man can alter Lawes , but he that made them , or he that is Created his substitute , for that very purpose .

Nature is the work of Reason without us .

Humane Reason , is the work of Nature within us

.

The will [ of man ] is ( of its own Nature ) mutable : but Reason Immutable , except improperly : namely , when the matter about which which she is conversant is mutable .

6. Politique Reason , which some call the Reason of State : and of old , was the same with Equity , does transgresse the [ strict ] Letter of the Law , but not the sence and scope of it : becauses it does not abrogate or interpret , &c. any thing but for a greater good : as in the case of Fabius Vitulanus : to whom the Roman Senate granted his life which was forfeited to the Law : and Horace that slew the three Curatis , * in the quarrell of the Roman Empire .

But the Reason of State , as it is now adaies , is nothing else but a devise of Tyrants , that carries the face of Equity , supposing it lawfull for them to transgresse , not onely their owne , but even the Lawes of God , either to gaine or maintain their petty Dominions . But ,

The difference between Reason of State , and Equity is this . For Equity respects the Publique Good and Truth : but Reason of State looks upon [ onely ] the private and seeming good of the Power in being .

Now since Machiavel was found to play Achitophel , the name being confessedly impious , Princes began , ( that they might cover the shame of it ) to call it the Reason of good Government . Which names though given by a knavish Godfather , may bear an honest meaning . As for example .

Cleonymus put to death the Ephori of Lacedamon by a right reason of State : but so does not the [ Great ] Turk his Brethren : because although he seem to do it for the Common good ; yet being it is against the Law of God , and some other way might bee found out to prevent their aspiring to the Throne , the fact is [ Barbarous and ] unreasonable .

7. A good Prince wants not this Reason of State , because his owne goodnesse is a perpetuall shield unto him : and if any rise up against him : all the People stand for him : as for David : whom his rebellious Son had deprived of his Kingdom .

But a thousand thousand Machiavillian Arts cannot protect a wicked Prince : because , cause , he is [ both ] Odious to the People , and to God the King of all [ the World ]

Now , hee that jarrs with [ God ] the Prime Cause , does foolishly depend upon second causes : as it happen'd to Caesar * Borgia : who under themost wary , and provident [ Discipline and ] Mastership of Machiavell , lost , both his life , and Fortune .

Thus are Machiavillians alwaies taken in their owne snare : for want of Divine and Heavenly Knowledge , and by conceiting that by their owne Wisdome they can Fathome , and foresee , all things .

10. Those Lawes are best , which are 1. short . 2. easie . 3. few . and 4. fitted to the Manners [ or Genius ] of the People and the Publique good . Tyrannical Lawes 02 are Many , and [ those ] obscure , difficult , like so many snares : that serve the turnes of some one , or few , but not at all accommodated , either to the Manners , or advantage of the Publique .

9. Where Lawes are often changed : they are the forerunners of the instant raine of a Republique : as Florence found it therefore [ by sad experience .

Lawes belonging to Governments , ought not to be alter'd unlesse necessity compell : nor yet others , but where the profit is [ very ] evident , and [ very ] Great .

10. Where there are more Laws to * punish , then to direct or instruct , it is a sign of an ill tempered Government .

11. The Acts of Laws are : to command what is good : to restrain what is evill : and to tollerate things indifferent .

12. Reward , and Punishment are the two [ 2 ] spurrs of the Law [ to prick men forward to observation ] of them .

No Law can stand without punishment [ of the transgressors of ] and where no punishment is expressed , there it is Arbitrary : otherwise it were rather a Counsellthen a Law : but whether a Reason ought to be annexed to every Law , it cannot universally be defined : Saleucus , and Charondas , and Plato too , follow'd this course ; being to make Laws for Free People , they thought good to use perswasions . Where as Seneca ( having an eye upon his * own Times ) affirmes : A Law with a Preface to be a foolish thing : being a Law should command and not perswade : and Dio Chrysostome compares Custome , to a King , but Law to a Tyrant : in that Custome gives Law to men willing [ to receive it ] but Law binds the unwilling also .

13. The three Guardians or Keepers of Laws are , 1. Honour . 2. Love . 3. Fear .

Hee that secures not his Law by these three , is either a weak or Ignorant Lawgiver , or elsea Tyrant &c.

14. Where a thing which once was good , becomes hurtfull , it is to be forbidden : Where an Evill thing does prosit [ the Publique ] if it be Evill of Punishment , and not Evill of Offence , it is to be Commanded . Where in its own Nature indifferent as it falls out , Good or Evill to the Republique , it is to be [ according ] Commanded or Forbidden .

15. The Laws of men make rather good Citizens , then simply good men . Yet Princes [ and Rulers ] ought to be simply good , because they are the * Light and the Law of others .

16. The Law ought to make and ordain Equality as the Nurse of the Common-wealth , but not a Levelling ; for as the Observator saies excellently , such strings make no Harmony but an Equality opposite to that destructive * consiming inequality , which is fatall to Common-wealths . For example : Extrem Poverty makes Theeves , Insidious , Perjur'd , Ignorant , and Instruments , of Rich wicked men . On the contrary , very Rich men are Proud , Luxurious , Unlearn'd , Contumelious , [ and I may adde out of * Aristotle , Injurious too ]

Very crasty men are [ commonly ] given to change . Very stupid , are voluntarily servants [ or slaves ] Onely moderatemen are Stable in their place , and stations where they live .

The Florentine Republique was ever the most unstable , by reason of the subtlety of their wits : The Venetian , the most firm and stable of all , by reason of a Mediocrity : and allay of Dullnesse .

17. A good Custome is a second Law : which does more preserve a Common-wealth , then the Law it self .

Five Customes , made Rome , the Princesse of Republiques : as Cato in Salust witnesseth . 1. Publique Wealth . 2. Private Poverty . 3. Just Government abroad . 4. Freedome of speech at home . 5. Unliablenesse to fears , or designes .

All these [ Customes ] the Commonwealth of Venice observes as a Law : Except onely that shee lies open to Fear : yet not in her Counsels : but from Forraigners , through want of a Militia of her own .

For want of the first [ Publique Wealth ] the Genoesse , are not Lords of the Sea : nor of the new world , &c.

For want of the fifth [ that is unliablenesse to feare , and desire ] the Genoesse are as it were servants to Forraign Princes .

For want of the Third [ vix , Just Government abroad ] the French could never fix their Dominion , without the Verge of France . In which the Spaniard is peccant too : Every where severely and ceremoniously Lording it ; not at all regarding the manners , [ and Temper ] of the People [ they rule over . ]

For want of the Fourth [ Custome ] [ that is freedom of speech ] the Florentine Republique went to wrack .

Manners doubtlesse ( i.e. Customes ) can do more then Laws : and either add vigour to the , or take it from them .

Customs have brought Laws under their subjection .

Customs are either from 1. Disposition of People or 2. Institution and Education .

1. For disposition : The French now have much of the old Gaules in them : Humanity and Ficklenesse saies the Observator : give me leave to adde Feaverish Valour in Warre : ( which L. Florus observes in their Progenitors the Gaules ) * In their first onsets they are more then Men , in their second , lesse then Women .

2. For Education : what power that has over Nature , consult Xenophon , about the Persians and Lacedomonians .

18. Good governors bring in good customes , ill men and women ill customes . Ergo , neither ill men , nor [ any ] woman are fit to rule : the law of Nations is the custome of the whole species . ( 1 ) All mankind .

19. Not a Rigid but easie government fit the N●rthern Nations , ☞ as being by nature a fierce people , and will hardly brook the Fetters of a Republique ; as Tartars , Muscovites , Suedes , Germans , Switzers , &c.

Where they have Kings by succession , the people have much liberty , and the Prince little power ; yet after the Roman Culture , they began to live more severely [ and regularly , then before . ] But

For Southern People , especially those that live under the Tropiques , no Dominion fits them but the Despotique ( 1 ) Lordly Rule : and the severest Lawes : because they are weak in strength : but strong in subtlety . For which Reason they were ever [ very much ] addicted to Ceremonies , Superstitions , &c.

The Muscovite and Tartar are * Slavishly Governed : for there the North bears Easterly . The King dome of Swethland is become Hereditary , by occasion of Religion : but under such Lawes , as are observed in Elective Kingdomes .

20. Eastern People incline much to the disposition of the Southern : as the Western to the Northern , by reason of the Sea adjoyning to them : and for other Causes : but the Spaniard is like in conditions to the African by his Vicinity , or Neighbourhood .

CHAP. V. Of Legislators .

1. A Legislator is he , who Foundeth a New Empire : commonly upon new Laws , Religion and Armes , Rites , and Fortunate Essayes , or Enterprises : as Moyses , a good Legislator , Mahomet a * wicked one .

A Lawgiver therefore is either a God , as Christ : or the messenger of God as Moses : or a subtle Politician , ☞ that can counterfeit the good ones : as Minos , Osiris , Jupiter , Mahomet , Zamolxis , and the like : who to gain belief and love from the People , feigned themselves to be sent from God . For

☞ A Lawgiver should be most renowned , most wise , most Divine , and most Reverend .

To pretend the Commands of God might perhaps bring some successe to a * skillfull man , amongst a rude and ignorant People : as Sertorius amongst the Spaniards : or to the Spaniard ( now * grown civill , and learned too ) amongst the Americans : by the help of Naturall Philosophie , Physick , and Astronomic : But in a learned age , and place , This Plot and Artifice , is cold [ and ridiculous . ]

2. Every Artist , because is wise , is a King in his owne Art : for a Physician , hee 's Lord and Ruler over a sicke King : and so a Mariner , in a Tempest , saies to the Priests and Captaines , and the principall men , Sit you here ; stand thou there , &c. Therefore must the Lawgiver be versed in all these Arts : at least understand their ends : how they conduce either to the prosit , or prejudice of the Republique — to purge out the superfluous and retain the necessary . Hence it was Plato banish'd Poets out of his Republique : because they were full of lies , and Ribaldry : and by crying up wicked men , cry'd down goodnesse , and discouraged vertue . Hence Moyses expell'd false Prophets and Painters ( that pictured the Deity ) and Hucksters , and whoremongers , &c.

A Legislator must bee throughly skill'd , in the Temperament and manners of Countries , by the * Air and the Earth : as likewise happy or unhappy accidents that usually befall such and such a place , &c. as Inundations , Fires , Leprosies , Famines , &c.

3. Legislators ought to reform and purifie , not Exth pate Religion .

4. The Noblest Profession in Mountainous Countries , are , 1. Shepheards , as in Switzerland , and Scythia .

In plain Conutries 2. Husbandmen : as in AEgypt .

In Maritime Countries 3. Seamen and Merchants : who for the profit they bring in ; the monies that they returne [ and exchange ] and arts and Trades they bring from Forraigne Countries : have ever been held in highest place and esteem . But Where other ( especially superfluous ) Arts are preferred before these , Imminent , both losse and ruine must needs follow after .

5. A Divine Legislator hath the Idea of his own Repubque in the Court of Heaven .

The Humane [ Lawgiven ] in the Government of the Universe : and mans Body .

6. Man ( Male and Female ) are the Elements of a Republique : who consists of 1. Soul. 2. Body , and External . 3. Goods .

1. The Soul of a Republique , is Wisdome and Religion .

2. The Body , a Senate or [ Grand ] Councell : or whoever bear any Office advantagious to the Publique .

3. For Externall good [ the Republique hath ] Souldiers , Mercenary , and Auxiliary : and Forraign Merchants and Artificers .

For spirits , she hath Lawes .

For Eyes , the searchers into Arts , and Sciences .

For ears , Spies and Merchants .

For a Tongue , Preachers , and Doctors , and Embassadors .

For hands , her own Militia :

For feet , Husbandmen and Tradesmen .

7. As naturally the Soul rules the * Spirits Policically , but the Body Despotically [ ( 1. ) by an Imverious , and arbitrary way ] and the Body rules the Estate as the Soule dictates to it : so Religion has a Politique Dominion over Lawes , and the Senate : but over Souldiers , Tradesman , & such like , both * Senate , Law , and Religion , rule proportionably .

8. Goods of the Mind are first to be look'd after : next , those of the Body . Those of Fortune , in the third place .

The Lawes of friendship , have a stricter tie then those of Civill society .

Here endeth the first part of Politique Maxims and Cautions .
MANIPVLVS POLITICVS OR , Politique Maxim's and Cautions . PART II.
CHAP. VI . Of Colonies and Cities .

THey that Rule over Countries lying under several Climes , must either govern them by distinct Laws , or make exchanges of Inhabitants , by mutuall transplantations . So the Romans ( to secure their Empire ) carried Colonies over into Germany , that by their example , the Germanes , ( unaccustomed to Romane Lawes , ) might be the better acquainted with , and subject to them :

The Trans-Rhine ( which are the true , and proper ) Germanes , for the much greatest part , were never Conquer'd by the Romans : but retain'd ( sans mixture ) their own Language , and Manners , till , under Lotharius , they ●oluntarily submitted to the Romane Yoak . You shall find more Germane Families in Italy , then Roman Families in Germany .

2. Colonies are best made up of Citizens bred up in the Metropolis of the Kingdome : or in the Neighbouring Towns : for example either of Romans or Latines ; and because so many be planted , as will be able to defend the Province [ and any Enemy whatever ]

3. If Colonies be sent from a Free-State , it is good to build their Cities on the tops of the Hills , for defence of their Liberty : if from a Monarch , better in the Plain .

4. That Cities may wax great , 't is expedient they be Situate [ either ] upon the Banks of Rivers , or [ neare ] the Sea-shore , and in a Plain ; Where necessaries for life are easiest to be had : & commerce with strangers is most convenient : But , for the Defence of Liberty and Lawes , and the Non-impayring of Valour , they are more commodiously seated upon Mountaines and Rocks . Withall great respect is to be had to the wholesomnesse of Water and Air , and Winds , and the Prospect to the severall Quarters of the Heavens .

5. Planters of Colonies are to be divided — into 1. Governors : as Priests , and Judges . 2. Protectors : as Soul-diers and Commanders . 3. Artizans : and such as * feed the Republique .

As Husbandmen , Shepherds , and the like .

Nothing hinders but he that Vses Husbandry , may also follow a Trade , either by himselfe , or his Wife

Rules that prescribe exact proportions of allowances for every person in a Plantation , do often faile in the Practique .

Plaines bear most Corn , Mountaines most Wool , Hence &c. came Chaffering , and Exchanging and Merchandizing , and stamping of Goynes , &c. and for want of Souldery [ hereupon ] were Forts , and Guns invented .

CHAP. VII . Of the instruments to gain & keep Kingdomes , &c.

TO gain , keep and govern Kingdomes , there are three [ principal l ] instruments : The 1. Tongue , 2. Sword , 3. Treasure .

1. For the Tongue ; t is the instrument of Religion , and Prudence . That is , of the Goods of the Minde .

2. The sword is the [ proper ] Instrument of the Body and its Goods .

3. Treasure is more [ the Instrument ] of Fortunes , and Estates : which serves the Body and Minde [ onely ] Secondarily : but the true Instruments are the Tongue and the Sword .

2. They that use the sword only , founding their power upon that , those quickly lose their dominion ; as Tamberlaine , Attila , and Brennus , and most of the Northern nations .

The Jesuites in Japan gaine [ first ] soules , then Kingdomes to Spaine and the Papacy , by their tongues .

There be that gaine Dominion by crying up some new sect , built upon some specious colour of truth , by sowing discord betwixt the old Religion , & the new Sect , which shall be attempted and fitted to the gust and palate of the multitude : But such Dominion is of it selfe not very long liv'd .

Ring-leaders of Heresies , although [ commonly ] they gain much , they keep little : as for example , John of Leydon , Dulcinus & Theudas .

John of Leydon was an ignorant fellow , a person of of no worth at all , who through the hatred against the Priests of his time ( whose lives were abominable in the eyes of all men ) gathered together a rabble of the basest people .

They that use well the sword and tongue , do lay the foundations of durable Dominion ; but then the sword must be just , and the tongue veracious . Thus did Moses build the Empire of the Jews , [ namely , in veracity and justice , ] which impious Machiavell never took into consideration . p. 147.

The Law of Moises survived the Empire of the Jews , but Mahomets Laws shall sink with his Empire : Thus fell the laws of Alexander with his person and power ; Thus Numa's , Belus , and Minos , Pythagoras , and Zamolxis his lawes are extinct , even for want of justice and veracity . He , that knows not how to give lawes to those he conquers , doth quickly lose the Kingdome he has gain'd . Thus Charles the fifth lost Tunis and Germany which he had wonne , for want of skill to secure his conquest by the addition of Lawes and Colonies . This misfortune often befell King Pirrhus ; but not so the Romans .

He had need be a very wise man , that can give lawes to men of a different Religion , that shal be lasting and fitted to the disposition of them that receive them , as it appears by the Romans in Jewry , who did the utmost of their endeavour , & with all their skill strived , to establish the state and tranquility of that untractable people , by lawes , conforme to their tempers and humors , as the excellent orations of King Agrippa , and Josephus made to their Countrymen , [ the Jews ] do witnesse .

5. he that defends his Dominions by sword and tongue , preserves them better and more safely , then he that makes use but of onely one . For

6. Men of Arts are [ usually ] oppressed by Men of Armes . Thus Saturn ( being a Priest , as antient Kings were ) left his Kingdome to Jupiter ; and Perseus the Warriour , dethron'd Atlas the [ Scholler and ] Astrologer : Thus was Pythagoras supported by souldiers ; * and the Pope , till such time as he felt the use of his weapons , was often made a prey to his enemies , and many times ( good man ) to his friends .

Here the thrice worthy Grotius , notes well upon this late passage , concerning the Bishop of Rome ; that the benigne aspects of opportunity , made way for that power which the Pope now enjoyes : as for instance , the Christian World split into many petty Kingdomes , Italy torn in pieces , and sluggish withall : an age too dull to apprehend the meaning of that Artifice in due time , and diverse other causes , which you may find in Guicciardin , and Machiavell .

7. He that uses only Armes for the defence of his Empire , and neglects witt and eloquence , makes but a paper building , rules but weakly : and this is the reason why the Emperor of Germany prevailes no more , having a people of different perswasions in Religion to rule over : and usually such Princes become a prey to those that make the best use of their witts . Hence came it that the Popes did so frequently make and un-make Emperors at their pleasure . Therefore ( as Salust observes ) did the Romans [ wisely ] ever exercise both mind and body together . For ,

He that exerciseth both , makes his Empire last longest , as the King of the Turkes , and Abassines , and the Dake of Muscovy . Fabulous Philosophy affirms as much , whiles it gives Pallas ( the Goddesse of wisdome ) a Book and a Spear to make her invincible ; but to Mars only Arnour , who ( as the Poets sings ) was therefore often Conquered . Hence was it that

9. The Northern Nations that fell like swarms of Bees upon the Southern Regions , who excell'd them in religion and Policy , received Laws from them they had conquered : So the Tartars and the Turks a Northern people , had lawes from the conquered Arabians , and Religion too ; and the Hunns , Vandals , Lombards , and Goths , from the Romans , whose Territories they had invaded .

Here the observator justly gives a check to the Author , and saies that , Both the Goths that rul'd in Italy and Spain , and the Vandals in Asrick , to alienate and estrange the minds of their own people from the Romans , Jeroboam-like , end : avoured with barbarous cruelties to promote the Arian Heresia , by all possible means they could .

10. God that he might plant Religion and Learning among the Northern people , and Armes and Numbers amongst the Southern , did often make an enterchange , and engrafted them one into an other , like Plants to make them the more generous ; but in both destroyed the degenerous Plants from the sonnes of Japhet : Empires descended from Sem , Priesthood and Laws from Cham , Servants , and as the Author ( but mistakingly ) affirms , Tyrants ; for ( as the observator notes ) the greatest Tyrants that ever were , came rather out of Asia , then Africa , which was Chams portion .

CHAP. VIII . Of the causes of policies , and first of the first cause , God , and Religion .

THere are three causes ( if we speak politically ) which found and govern Empires , that is 1. God . 2. Prudence . 3. Occasion .

But in some , one is more evident then the other . As

In the Kingdome of the Jews , God was most evident ; in that of the Romans Prudence ; in that of the Spaniard occasion : albeit ( to speak Physically ) God is the cause of all causes .

2. All Dominations ( except impious Machiavels ) have confessed , that prudence hath not power sufficient to foresee the good and evill , which all waies and in all things do await them : Therefore did all Nations fly to God , some by a straight , others by a crooked way . Therefore ,

The Assyrian , AEgyptian , and Persian Kings , consulted the will and pleasure of God , and implored his ayde , by Astrology in the starres : The Greeks by Oracles of the Sibylls : The Romans by sooth-saying and Auguries , whom the Brasilians do but a little recede from : but the Christians in a direct path [ seek God ] and fly to the spirit of God in his Prophets , * and councellors , and his Ministry .

3. Every Princedome is protected by its own proper Angell , and every Law as it is good is from God , neither can their be any Law established which is void of all good ; as Divines and Nature teach us .

4. The Priesthood supplies the place of God in every Dominion , and therefore no Common-wealth , no assembly of men , either was , or can be , without a Priesthood , because not without God .

5. Priests ought to be wise , but rather in contemplatives then practicalls ; Valiant , but most in suffering ; sober , liberall , ingenious , true , not lying so much as in jeast , faithfull , cheerfull , but enclining more to austerity , then scurrillity ; gentle , prone rather to meeknesse then Rusticity , whose Character should be Piety , Wisdome , Charitie , and tender-heartednesse , without hypocrisie .

Priests consult what is to be done , Rulers command that to be done , which is contemplated or cousidered , and souldiers and artificers put commands and consultations in execution .

6. Religion ever ought to be had in high esteem and veneration , not in vulgar and mean account .

7. The Priesthood ought not to be prostitute to the people , lest it lose its honour and reverence .

Therefore Aristotle , no less ignorantly then impiously , would make old Souldiers Priests . Here the Author puts the foole upon the Calvinists ( under which notion he comprehends the worst of Schismaticks ) who ( saith he ) both all and some , count themselves Priests , which the famous Observator here seems to prove , to defend , out of places ( with reverence be it spoken ) mis-urged both out of the Scripture and Fathers , in defence of common or universall Unction . and ( by an injurious Concession ) makes the Calvinist guilty of the Schismatiques Phrensies : whereas 't is most evident , both out of Calvin , and Beza , in their severall discourses , and conflicts with the Antiministeriall Enthusiasts , that they were quite of an other temper , and opinion ; ever bearing high for an Ordinate Ministry : though they brought not clean , or Primitive hands , to that great Work .

8. That Religion which contradicts Naturall Policy , ought not to be retained . Therefore the Maccabees in time of necessity taught , that Warre might be piously made on the Sabbath day , when the Jewes under Pompey and Antiochus ( being that day assailed ) not defending themselves , perished . God gives no Law to his People , [ whereby his People should be destroyed ] which is opposite to their own being .

Rituall Lawes , do easily give place to Occasions , and Times : whence comes the Hebrew Proverb : The life endanger'd , violates the Sabbath : and that [ other ] The Sabbath was given into the hands of man , and not man into the Hands of the Sabbath : Yet the foolish gloss of some Jewes was such , that some of them kept themselves in the self same Posture , both night and day : and therefore paid dear for their Superstition ; being not onely by Pompey , but by Nebuchadnezzar , Sossius , and Titus , taken Captives upon the Sabbath day .

9. The Doctrine of fatall Necessity is pernicious , in , and to Commonwealths : for it makes Subjects seditious , and Princes Tyrannous : both pleading Necessity for the Mischief they Act : and thus much Cicero acknowledged . But

10. This Doctrine of Necessity does no hurt among the Turks , because they are rude , and illiterate , and are kept within compasse by force , not by Law . But in Italy , where they are a sharp witted People , it would make them stark mad , and all turne Libertines , and lay all their sinns upon Gods score , as the Author of all Evill : but above all , it would make their Princes Tyrants , in Imitation ( forsooth ! ) of God , craftily imputing their own offences to their subjects , that they might [ God-like ] Torment them , to their owne glory : Then which , what can bee more destructive to a Commonwealth ?

11. Sophisticall Sciences that thwart Religion , ought to be Banish'd the Common-wealth : as Plato teacheth .

Aristotle his School , did the Jewes much mischiefe , under Antiochus ; and now to Christians : as Averroes did too , both to us , and his own Saracens . See S. Vincentius [ Lirinensis , ]

What is spoken here of Aristotle does very well agree with the opinion of the antient Christians . In whose Iudgement Aristotle was accounted Impious . In the judgement of all the Greeks , and ( amongst the Latines ) Saint Austin , Plato's Philosophy is more consonant to Christianity : Aristotle coming but very lately into esteeme , and reputation , with the World .

What the Fryer , or Grotius affirme of Aristotle is onely true , Accidentally , & Vitio Utentis : and so all the Sect of Philosophers fall ( as well as Aristotle ) under Tertullians Character , that they are PATRIARCHS of HERETIQUES : but I am clearly of opinion , that Plato's Idea's in the head of an ENTHUSIAST , or NATIONAL THEOLOGUE , have done much more hurt to Christianity , then Aristotles subtleties ever did : who being ( as himself justly boasts ) the Father of Syllogisme , and the first discoverer of Fallacy , might advance all Truths ( both Natural , Morall , and Sacred ) more , ( did not men abuse him to Sophisticall ends ) then all the whole RACE of Philosophers ever did , or will do .

12. Religion that is repugnant to common Policy , although it be beneficiall to one particular City or Province , is subject to a change , or Reformation : and therefore cannot last long , as the decree of Moyses , about the choise meates : and the Apostles , of abstaining from Idols , and things strangled . 1. There are therefore some Lawes , convenient for time , and Place , [ and Person ] as abstinence from swines flesh , for the Jewes , subject to Leprosie . 2. Other Lawes are eternall , profitable for all Nations : as to Honour our Parents . 3. Some againe are pernicious to all places , and times : as that a man doth sin by destiny , and does profit in any thing without liberty [ in some degree ] of his own Wil.

Here Grotius affirmes that the Law of not eating Swines flesh is of so long continuance , that it not onely remaines in use amongst the Jewes at this day , but with the Mahometan Arabians , and Abassin Christians : and not without good cause : for that food in those Regions begets the Scab .

As for that antient custom of abstaining from blood and strangled things , it was a long time observed by the Christians , either out of hope to gaine the Jewes , or out of Reverence to Antiquity : and that it has nothing in it contrary to Republiques , or Communities , the continued observation of it , through Christian Greece , and all the East , and the Edict of Leo the Emperor , make evident .

13. All Religions and Sects have their proper Circles and Revolutions ; as Republiques have from Monarchy into Tyranny : thence into Aristocracy , thence into Oligarchy , from that into a Polity , and so into a Democracy ; and then revert back again into Monarchy at last : either by the same , or some other Track .

So , when Sects arrive at Atheisme , the very Extremes of all mischiefe fall upon the Peoples head : and the fiercenesse of Gods wrath breaks in upon them : upon which , ( but through many affections ) they return to their Pristine good Condition .

☞ But when once they come to that passe , that they deny the Providence of God , and the Immortality of the soule , they must needs suffer either an [ absolute ] change , or a Reformation : because the Curb of Conscience is taken out of the peoples mouth : and so being themselves wicked , they become a prey to no lesse wicked Princes : and thereupon , tyred with evils past , they gladly embrace any Lawgiver , whether hee be good or bad .

14. The Sects of Philosophers , passed not from one opinion to an other , ☞ any further then Epicurus : and there they stopt : who denying God , and Providence , all their Sects were utterly destroy'd , as Laertius [ excellently ] observes .

The Religion established by Moyses , when once the Sadduces crept in , that denyed the Immortality of the Soul , suffer'd a Reformation by our Lord CHRIST * who brought immortality to all our soules .

When the Gentiles fell into down-right Atheism , they fell into a world of miseries : as appears under the Romane Emperors : whose lawlesse Licentiousnesse marr'd all : as Cato in Salust , and Lucan , the Poet , observe .

The Sect of the Libertines , that held sin to be no sin , spring out of the Calvinists , as the Author ( but most slanderously ) affirmes .

Most of the Transylvanians , deny the Immortality of the Soul , and the Holy Trinity .

That most impious Book of the three Impostors , the Fryer would gladly fasten also upon the Reformed Churches : But , as Grotius notes , it was Father'd long since upon the Emperor Frederick the second : but adds withall , that hee never saw the man , that saw that Book .

15. The Author ( as it becomes a Fryer to do , Ex Officio ) Pleados high for the Temporall sword of the Pope , and an armed Priesthood : affirming that the great Turk , the King of Persia , Tartarie , Moors , and the King of Fez , living all under an unarmed , naked Priesthood , are , by that meanes , split into so many Hereticall opinions : whereas the Kings of France , Spain , Germany , and the Republique of Venice , and [ many ] other potent Princes united in one Religion under an armed Priest , the Pope , have no Heresies started amongst them , but with manifest hazard of their Crownes and Kingdomes .

The Sophie [ of Persia ] after many years , began to innovate some thing in the rites of Prayer and Fasting : & made white hats ( or Turbants ) for the Cognizance of his Faction : — But at long running , the Posterity of this Sophy , by pretences of Sanctity , so bewitch'd the people , that in the end , they Translated the Crown of Persia from the Assumbetan Kings , to their own .

16. & 17. These two Paragraphs , savour altogether of the Cell , and the Cowle : asserting the necessity , ( at conveniency ) of the Papall Power , in Temporalls , over Christian Princes .

Because ( saies he ) The Pope 1. Poyzes the differences of Christendome , being Umpire of Peace and War . 2. That he [ alwaies ] takes part with those that suffer wrong : neither permits he any King to invade an other Christian Kings Dominion . 3. Hee links and unites Christian Princes , against the [ Common ] Enemies of the Christian faith . And , 4. By his * Crusado's and Indulgences and Excommunications , for good , and against evill Rulers , he does erect and defend the Christian Commonwealth .

So that without that Pope ( to speak as a man , and Politiquely ) Christianity had , ere this , gone to utter ruine . And the Author adds his opinion ( in fine ) That all Christian Princes , would be as one : secure from one an other , and from strangers too , and bee alwaies Victorious : would they but once make one Grand Senate at Rome . And , that the reason why never any one Prince could attain an Universall Monarchy , over the rest of Christian Princes , was no other , then the Temporall Power of his Holinesse ; which was a Curb in their months . But ( saies hee in the close of all ) 'T is likely that the Monarchy of Christendom , will by little , and little , fall totally into the Popes hands .

The Observator answers thus , to these two Paragraphs .

He that , with care and diligence , will look into story , shall find that [ farre ] more Warrs have been raised amongst Christians by the Popes of Rome , then have been composed . But so farr is it from them , that they either could or would oppose themselves against the Spaniard ( that glutton of Empires ) that , on the contrary , the Papall Authority [ alwaies ] gave colour and countenance to the Spanish avarice ; as Navarre can [ sadly ] witnesse : and France , in the times of Henry the third . And lately , with most notorious injustice , Armes were raised against the Duke of Mantua ; yet would h●e receive no Assistance at all from the Pope , although no bad man . The Papall [ Bulls and ] Edicts if they availe any thing at all , it is with such as are not able to resist them . They catch poor flyes , but Eagles break through them . That Christendom fell not long since into the hands of an Universall Monarch , it was no thanks to the Papall Power , that hindred it : but the Germanes were hindred by their own Discords , and Germany hindred France , and France Spain , just as the Persian and Tartar keep the Turk [ from being Emperor of the World . ]

18. Charles the great , and Constantine declared themselves Defenders of the Pope ; but Henry and Frederick enemies : for under Frederick those pernicious factions of Guelfes & Gibellines ( that is , Imperialists , and Pontificians ) arose in Italy .

Julian [ the Apostat ] endeavoured to make Gentilisme and Judaisme aemulate one the other , and vie for the Mastery , but perished under the attempt .

The Mahometan Sect has many defects in it .

First , because if their armes faile , they fall .

2. Because it admitts not of divers Princes . 3. Because in many things it opposes God . And. 4. Because it is as a place of torture to all its enemics .

The Duke of Muscovy ( a Country assailed by no man ) defends himselfeby his scituation and schisme ; and stands rather by the discords of Christendome , then upon his own bottom , as indeed the Turk himselfe partly doth .

Charles the fifth , was a man that bid fairest for the Universall Monarchy . When Constantius countenunced the Arians , and Julian Paganisme , the Pope was not a man in power , had no dominion then . Here therefore then is an error [ or fallacy ] of no cause , put for a cause .

Here in this Paragraph , the fryar seems to dream of the return of a Golden age , of Innocence , under one ( I know not what ) Monarch of all , as Adam was at first , and seems to point at the Spaniard for the man : the Observator suspects some poison here ; but I think there is much more vanity then venome .

20. That the world may be governed by one man , the Empire of Augustus does partly prove it .

That the Spaniard does rule the 2 Hemisphears by Religion , which is the very soule of an Empire , and Dominion , being all in the whole , and wholly in every part .

21. If the World were governed by one man , as Alexander said by one Sun , warres would cease , and Pestilence , by communication of Arts and Medicines , and by transmigration from infected into wholesome ayre : By the same transmigrations might Inundations and fire be avoided ; so famine likewise might be averted , by transportation of provision from plentifull into needy Countries , &c.

These are but the fumes & fancies of an idle braine , doting upon the Spanish interest , and the Papall ; and so I dismisse them proceeding to

CHAP. IX . Of the second cause of gaining and governing Kingdomes , which is prudence .

A Monarchy is fitter to gain a Common-wealth then to conserve Dominion .

Monarchy is sooner depraved then many Rulers . Grotius confesses then a few ( as Oligarchy ) which I undèrstand not ; neither of them gives their reason , nor I my assent . The Observator adds .

For duration , no Common-wealth in the world is worth the naming , but the Venetian : and yet the Egyptian , Assyrian , and French Kingdomes have lasted longer then that .

Some are Kings 1. By Nature Rationall [ as it were Kings of wisdome ] as Socrates and Cato . 2. By Fortitude , as Domitian and Vitcllius . 3. By both , as Alexander . Augustus . and David . 4. More by Nature then Fortune , as Scipio , and Hannibal 5. More by Fortune then Nature , as Tiberius & Galba .

3. Prudence ( the second cause of Dominion ) does properly belong to those that are truely Kings ; and to such next under God , is Dominion due which prudence is directly opposite to Craft or Subtlety , which is proper only to Machiavels Tyrant .

Prudence is consonant to God , that is to eternall wisdome .

Craft agrees to nothing but a mans own will and pleasure : that is , acts all Arbitrarily .

Prudence is magnanimous , Craft base , yet proud .

Prudence [ alwaies ] advances wise and valiant men , and puts them in place of power and trust . Craft depresses and destroyes them , that she may rule over Bastard-Subjects , when the Legitimate are cut off .

Prudence treasures up riches for the good of mens souls and that their numbers may encrease : Craft aymes at money and strong holds , and rejoyces in the Diminution and lessening of her subjects .

Prudence even in losing conquers , Craft by conquering is a loser .

Prudence is mercifull , Craft is cruell .

Prudence is that of principall men and Chieftaines , such as Cesar , craft belongs to servile persons , such as Davus .

Prudence has an eye to the Stern , but Craft to the Oare .

Prudence makes Lawes for every mans good , but Craft only for her own .

Prudence punishes , and gains good-will by it , and makes subjects the better ; Craft punishes and becomes odious , and the people the worse for 't . It is proper to magnanimity and valour , to gain Dominions , as to Cesar , and Charles the fifth ; but to justice and temperance to preserve them , as to the Venetians : and he that is adorned with all vertues , is fit for both , as Augustus .

5. He that acquires Dominions , must have such a Prudence as is magnanimous , stout , liberall , just , &c. but somewhat inclining to pride , boldnesse , prodigality ; but severity mixt with it , &c.

He that keepes and preserves Dominions , must have the same prudence , but inclining to Pusillanimity , to fear , Tenacity , and [ some ] Licentiousnesse , &c.

6. Hee that gaines a Kingdome , different from him in Religion : must either Translate the Seat of his Empire thither : as the Turk did into Constantinople : or else Translate the Inhabitants into an other Region , as Nebuchadnezzar did the Jewes , into Babylon : and plant new Colonies , in the Metropolitane Cities of the Conquer'd Province ; which shall be of thine own Religion , and Laws ; place [ new ] Preachers there , change Laws , and bring down the chief of the People ; as Cyrus did in Lydia , and the Spaniniard in America : But if they will buckle to thy Religion : thou maist make them Artists , and Mechanicks , serviceable to thy Colony : if not , doom them to slavery , and Transplant them farre enough [ be sure ] from thy seat Imperiall .

But if they embrace the same Religion with thee ( as the Neapolitanes with the Spaniards ) treat them gently , receive them into Common friendship , and change not their Customes , nor Polirie , but by degrees : let the Supreme Judges be made out of thine own men ; the inferiour out of theirs . If they did violently oppose thine entrance , Levell the Peers , with the People : but if they did receive the as friends : Transplant them out of their Native soyle , and drill them with Honors , Rewards , and Promotions ; but be sure let not the chief heads be left behind : for they will either grow insolent , upon Familiarity , and render thee odious to the People , or else they will rebell . By these defects , Pyrrhus and Charles the fifth , lost all the Provinces they had gain'd , on a suddain . But beware , lest by Calumnies , and fraud , you depresse any man ; for by that meanes you [ only ] prepare Ruine and Conspiracies against your self , and so alienate their Affections , that upon the least occasion , they will rebell against you .

7. He that invades an others Kingdome , must not stick at the mischiefs following . viz. To strike at the Head , change Lawes , pull down Forts , and Castles ; Extinguish the Blood-Royall , or Translate it .

This savours of Machiavel : whom the Fryer so much detests : or ( which is worse ) of the Jesuit .

8. A Prince should be known to do no evill , except that of punishment : and that too , such as the People wish : as to Fleece Usurers , and ravenous Magistrates , to banish Superfluous , and effeminate Arts : doom the sluggish to the Oare : to punish Adultery , Pride , and all Enormous sins and sinners .

9. The People are kept in obedience , by [ plenty of ] Provisions , Souldiers by good Pay : Nobles by Honors .

10. For the advance , and encrease of Republiques , and Kingdomes ; these Rules following are to be observed .

1. All persons must take upon them those Functions and callings , for which Nature has fitted them . 2. Magistrates are to be chosen , rather by Nature then Fortune . 3. The greater good is ever to be preferred before the lesse , and the Common before the Private . 4. Let there be a free Community of Goods , of Knowledge , and of Religion . 5. Foment the Emulations of aspiring to Honors , by Vertue . 6. Preferre ever Divine things before Humane . 7. Let every man learn this Logick . viz. That God is : Ergo , He is wise , and good : Ergo , He has a tender care over us : Ergo , he is just : And we are his Children , and therefore after death , will reward or punish us . If this be not so , Ergo , God is not just , not good , Ergo , neither is he God : The contrary whereof ; All Nature , the Fabrick of the Universe , and its severall Parts , and the use . Order and function of cach Particle of it , do wonderfully [ and loudly ] proclaim . As also his revealing himselfe to his Saints [ on Earth ] Angells , and Devills , and Policies , and all Sciences in the World , [ confessing it . ]
CHAP. X. Of the third Cause , &c. viz. Occasion .

THE occasions of acquiring Dominion , are innumerable . But the chief are , I. Thine own Valour , and Numbers ; and the Imbecillity of thine Enemies , and their Associates . 2. The Division of the Province to be surprized , into petty Kings , or jarring . Republiques ; but especially into various Seots , and Schisms . 3. But most of all , if any man call thee in , for his Protectour . 4. If the Rulers Son be in his Minority . 5. If the Ruler be hated of his People . 6. If the People be covetous of change . 7. If the Nobles [ or Patricians ] may be bought and sold [ as those of Rome were , in Jugurths daies . ] 8. If there be any Interregnum , &c. 9. All grosse and Enormous sins , and Vices , are so many Inlets , and doors for a Conqueror , to come in by : as Idolatry , and Anthropophagie above the rest .

CHAP. XI . Of the Decay , Downfall , and Change of Monarchies : and the cause and remedies thereof .

ALL Monarchy dies , or sinks [ at least ] either

1. Through want of Vertue in him that succeeds in it : so the Assyrian Monarchy ended in Sardanapalus . Or

2. For want of a Successor ; which evill Augustus prevented , by adopting Sons , to succeed him .

3. By Division , or Discord of many successors : so the Romane Monarchy under Constantius , became a Dyarchy under Constantine , and Constance , and afterwards , in Arcadius and Honorius , and the Spanish Monarchy was Rivall'd by Alonzo , Ferdinand , and Sanctius .

The Turk prevents this mischief by killing his Brethren : but the King of China by banishing them into some Mountain : which the King of the Abassines does likewise .

4. Because the Kings Son is young and contemptible , as the Son of Scanderbeg , and Antiochus , and Alexander the Great : and the last Duke save one , of the line of Sforza Duke of Millaine : who all being Minors and Pupills , were commited to Guardian Kinsmen , or Tutors , or strangers , and so , were either murther'd or deposed .

5. The Election of a King , if it be made by Souldiers , is dangerous , and Schismaticall ; because they are [ easily ] carried from one to another , in their affections . For ,

Souldiers are naturally a dull kind of People : and value them most , who pay them best , at present : not at all considering , the Publique good : as it happen'd in the times of Galba , Vitellius , Vespasian , and Otho in the Romane state ; and under Omri in Israel : with very much dammage [ to the Publique . ]

6. Election also made by all the People , is dangerous : for they understand not the deep designes , of hidden , and disguised Tyrants : but are distracted , and carried away with smooth Orators , whithersoever they please to lead them . Besides , the People are ever at odds , with one another , and alwaies changing opinions . Hereupon Florence by such Popular Elections , sustained a world of dammage , and prejudice . Neither does the Populacy confide in their Nobles , but call in strangers to pacifie their Tunmults ; So the Florentines call'd in the Commander of Athens : by whom , they were more devour'd then before .

The remedy is : if onely the heads of Families be summon'd to Election : but this is a weak one .

7. Elections are best made by a prudent Senate : out of the body of the Senate it self ; as the Pope , out of the Conclave of Cardinalls .

8. If an Election suffer a Schism in it , or Fracture , viz. an Interregnum ( or as they cal it ) a Vacant See ; the Empire may go to wrack ; and therefore the Germane Emperor doth make choice of his Successor before his death ; as also the King of Fez , before he dies , advances one of his own Sons into his Throne .

It often falls out otherwise : for the Romane Emperour of time dies and appoints no Successor : and the Polack cannot endure any such thing should be done in that Kingdom .

9. The best is not alwaies elected : but he whom the dying King loves best : as Solomon chose Rehoboam .

The odd number over does best in Elections : and therfore the King of Bohemia was superadded to the six old Electors of Germany .

10. A Monarchy may bee ruin'd likewise , by the insolency and pravity of a mans Children [ as in Tarquin the proud ] or of his wife : who often hates the best deserving men : as Sophia , the Wife of Justinian the Emperor , hated Narses [ the Gallant Eunuch ] who therefore call'd in the Lombards into Italy , to the hazard of the whole Empire .

☞ 11. Monarchy may be in danger also , and be ruin'd by the Authority of some Prophet , or [ bold Popular ] Preacher : that dares cry it down . The instance here is made in Samuel , and the Pope : which is an handsome comparison indeed . Here the Fryer draws the Curtain , and laies open the whole scene of the Popes Encroachments upon Temporall Princes : which part I leave the Fryer to Act by himself , and thither referre the Reader : only he tells us ( pag. 198. ) that never any Prince prosper'd that opposed his Holinesse , but fell at last ; as Frederick of Swevia , Roger Guiscand , &c. Yet

Some Princes call'd a councell against Julius the second , and Pope Eugenius the fourth .

All Clergy-men ( under the Papacy ) love the Pope in their heart , Princes only for preferment . Armed Religion was alwaies Invincible , Vid. animad supr.

It is better for a Prince to yeeld to the Priest , as Theodosius did to Ambrose , then to treat him ill , as Eudoxa did Chrysoctome ; For he was confirmed in his Throne , whereas she dyed an infamous death .

12. Division in Religion , albeit Monarchy be not preached downe , does destroy ☞ it , as it appears in France , Germany , and Poland , &c. for it divides mens minds ; and therefore both their bodies , and fortunes , and armes , and both parties hate the King : The evill , because he favours the good , and the good , because he does not extinguish the evill .

Here Grotius ( the great est advocate and favouror of toleration that lived in our age ) opposes the Fryar , and affirms , That there does not upon difference in opinions , seem so much hazard of divulsion ( as he calls it ) of minds , or animosity amongst men , if the Magistrate would compell the Ministry to forbear mutuall and publique railings , and resutations one of another , and if by a publique Law of State , every man might be secure in the use and exercise of his own religion , as it is in Japan and Poland ; which liberty the reformed Churches of France being abridged of , Tumults and Warrs , were occasioned by it .

13. A Monarchy also failes by its own vastnesse and bulk , for which reason it cannot [ well ] be governed by One , and he is therefore faine to call to his assistance some to lend their shoulders to this great burthen , who afterwards will admitt no superiours , and so share the government ; as we have often seen it fall out in the Roman Empire .

The Remedy for this is , to keep an Empire within its own bounds , lest the commanders and governors , being at too great a distance , usurpe the Dominion : As the Monarch of Japan [ is a great example of this ] who never sets foot beyond his sixty six Kingdomes ; and the King of China can * claime nothing beyond those bounds which he hath set himselfe , by walls and Rocks , Woods , and Seas . Another remedy for this disease is , for a Prince to keep the Wives and Children of Governors and Provincialls [ abroad ] at home with him [ as pledges ] and engage them by Oath to Fidelity and Allegiance , &c. which in part the King of Spain observes .

14. Sometimes a Kingdom 's lost for want of provisions , because it has no fruitfull soyle about it : This is the condition of Genoa , and Venice , and therefore they provide against this [ mischief ] by Merchants and Factors , and exchangers of commodities , by Granaries , Munitions , &c.

15. A Monarchy may also fall by Pestilence ; against which , * the King of the Abassines has provided a movable City , and so removes his Seat at pleasure for the benefit of wholesomer Ayre ; which thing the Tartars [ now ] and heretofore the Veientes observed ; nay the very Birds do the same : But with us there be Officers for health purposely appointed , which the Author calls Magistratus Sanitatis , like our Masters of the Pest houses

16. A Monarchy likewise is ruined by invasion of forraign Princes , that over-power the right owner ; as the King of Persia was by Alexander of Macedon ; and the Sultan of AEgypt by Selemus the great Turk .

The best remedy against this , is the love of the subjects to their Prince , & their gallantry on his behalfe ; next is , to procure a strong & ready Militia , and to enter into league with many Princes , that may over-power the Rivall of his Crown : as the Macchabees did with the Romans , being affraid of Antiochus , and the Venetian with the French when they fear'd the Spaniard . Neither is it amisse to sow seeds of discord and hatred amongst the powers you stand in fear of ; as the Spaniard does betwixt the Turk and Persian , ths Abassine and Muscovite , Polack and Transilvanian , all around , &c. and amongst the Nobles of France , which is his Rivall .

When the Nobility grow too rich and potent , as the Nobles of Iapan , and often those of Naples , and the French likewise and the German Peers , they have destroyed the Monarchy under which they lived , defining every one to live for himselfe . The remedy for this is , to cut off Entailes of Land & Honours ; The Author means in the words , Ne feuda transeant ad Haeredes that they be not established , as the Turk does . Next is to levell their Forts and strong holds with the ground , or garrison them with the Princes own souldiery , and then under pretence of advancing , to humble the Nobles .

18. A Kingdome may be lost too , by the treachery of a Kings owne Souldiers , as it happened to Antiochus .

The remedy against this is , to keep them in their dutie by art and cunning , and divide them ; and to fortifie thy selfe with a strong guard of thy best friends , whom thou must oblige with perpetuall favours , and benefits , as the Turk does his Janizaries .

19. A Crown may be lost by the suddain incu●sion of Barbarous people .

The remedy against this is , to oppose wisdome and religion to barbarous folly : So Pope Leo opposed Attilla , and Jaddus the high Priest in Hierusalom , clad in his Priestly Robes , met , and adored , and so pacified Alexander the great .

20. A man may lose his Kingdome too for want of Souldiery of his owne , and by entertaining too many Auxiliaries and Mercenary men ; which was the ruine of Lodovick Sforza , Duke of Millaine , &c.

The Remedy of this is to have a choice Militia of thine owne alwaies in readinesse ; to arme and unite thine own men , but to disarme and dissipate the strangers . For this reason also it is expedient , that none [ of any Family ] but the first-born inherit any estate , and let the rest be made Souldiers ; or else do as the Turk does , keep Schooles or Colledges of Cloistered boyes , to be trained up in Military Discipline , which shall know no other Father but the Monarch .

21. Sometimes a Kingdome is lost after a Victory , by the insolency of the Conquering Army ; or after a truce [ or league ] as it happened to Carthage after the first punick warre , under Hamilcar .

The remedy for this is , on a sudden to divide the Army into distant quarters : and not to be embodyed till the Generall commands .

22. A Kingdome may bet lost for want of present pay for the Souldiery , when the Warre is on foot , as it fell out to Maximilian of Austria .

Publique treasuries are the best remedy against this . Besides the Rich ( at such a pinch ) are to be compeli'd by Religion ] be meanes sure Anathema's and Terrors of Ecommunication ] and other Penalties , to throw all their Money and Plate into the Publique Treasury : For so , neither can they rebell , and hereby is the Kingdome confirm'd , and Established : which was usuall at Rome , and Venice . And it is lawfull too , in extreamity , to melt down Consecrate Church Plate : and to make the very Souldiers themselves part with their Gold to this publique purpose : but to sweeten them with fair hopes , and the Pillage of the Field . Thus did Caeser , in the beginning of the Civill Warre : and thus did Henry ( the third I take it ) King of France the Frer advises too : to make leaden Coin ( if need be ) to be currant as long as the War shall last , as the Venetians have done .

23. Kingdomes are lost too , by the Luxury of the conquering Army , that does breake and effeminate it self : by the spoiles , and delicates of Conquer'd Provinces : as it fell out , to the Lombards , Goths , Huns , and Gaules ; who possessing themselves of Southern Kingdomes , full of delights and pleasures . They [ quickly ] lost , both their strength and Empire : Which happen'd also to all Kings of Naples ; by reason of the soft delicacies of Air , and Soyle . Josuah found out a good remedy for this ; who would not quite extinguish all the Natives , [ of Canaan ] that his People might [ still ] have some body , whereon to whet , and exercise their Valour . So [ Scipio ] Nasica advis'd [ the Romanes ] not quite to destroy Carthage , lest Rome should grow effeminate [ by losing her Rivall . ]

24. By joyning in Commerce and Traffique , &c. with two potent Princes . Thus came the Raguscan to serve the Turk , and thus the Genoesse , to be under the Spaniard : But the [ Wise ] Venetian prevented this . For he would never put to Sea with the Spaniard ; neither would he ever Traffique with him , nor hold any thing by way of Tenure or Homage , in the King of S'pains Dominions , [ as the Genoesse and others do ]

25. Heavy Taxes , and Impositions , often lose Kingdomes , and enrage the People into Mutinies , and Rebellion ; as it hapned in Israel under Rehoboam ; and the Duke of Alva in Flanders .

26. The Cruelty of Provincialls : may be the losse of a Kingdom : which rule by pride and Avarice . This the Axe must cure , as Goesar Borgia did by Orcus of Cesena .

Punishments must ever be exacted by the sword , Tributes by the tongue ; the Militia by both .

27. A Crown gain'd , may be lost , if the Issue Royall find friends to help them to their right : as in the case of Ioas : who was establish'd in his Throne by the high Priest : against Athaliah and her usurpation , &c.

28. A Kingdome may be lost by the conspiracy of strong and Potent men ; as the Tarquins were Erected by Brutus , and Lucretius , and the Magi of Persia by Darius and his Complices .

Hidden Vertue in any man is a dangerous thing , especially if it be afraid of the Prince that rules : for it will at last break out to the Princes loss , if not Ruine : as it did in Brutus and his confederate . Valour and Light must be ever set high on a Candlestick . Smother'd Fire may do , and indeed ever does , most mischief .

How dangerous it was for Tiberius to advance Seianus [ himselfe a well born Person ] to so great Honor : the Frince perceived and remedied : but not without hazard . Therefore both hee from that time forward and others , took a course to cast Honors upon meaner Persons : and those but Temporary .

This observation becomes a man born in a popular state : But God himself seems to make it a curse : when the Honorable person is overtop'd by mean fellowes . Isa. 3.1 , 2. & 3.

The conspiracy of one man with himselfe to murder a King , &c. is Inevitable , as that of Adad against the * King of Edom : and Pausanias against Philip of Macedon : and Frier Clement against Henry the third of France .

A conspiracy of many is hardly to be avoided : Therefore Probity and the Peoples love [ when all is done ] is the strongest Guard a Prince can have .

26. Lastly , a Kingdome may be lost , when the Subject are wasted by Warre : and so through want of Defendants , it lies open to Invasion ; as now ( saies the Author ) Spaine does .

Enfranchizing , or Endenization , is the onely cure for this disease : by admitting Forreigners into your Freedome : as the Romans did the Latines : and so fill up your number .

CHAP. XII . Of the fall and change of Republiques where many Govern , &c.

1. TO take off the dissentions , between Peers , and People , the Author would have them all participate of Honors : as , at this time , it is amongst the Biscainers : Or , as amongst the Jewes , that one Family chosen out of all the rest should rule .

'T is expedient , that betwixt the Peers , and the Plebeians , there should be a middle sort , and degree of Persons , as a Seminary of Nobility : such as were the Knights and Gentlemen of Rome : for this degree is a kinde of tye , or Ligament of both the other .

2. The Peeres contend with the people [ usually ] about honours , Offices , Tributes , and Matrymonie , and Lands , and the like : and if the Nobility get the day , the Republique is ruin'd ; for it is necessary for them to keep under a jealous and suspicious people , and thence comes their downfall . But if the people gain the day , the matter 's worse then before , for either the Nobles are driven into banishment , or else they call in strangers , and so the people become a prey to every crafty Citizen , or forreign potentate , or valiant Commander .

If once the Nobles mix and couple themselves with the Plebians , to the end they may partake of the government with them ; they grow vile and despicable both together , and so the common-wealth falls to ground ; as it alwaies happened in the Florentine republique , and divers times in that of Genoa .

The remedy is , if the People ( of a middle Size betwixt the Nobles and the pelting Plebeian ) get the upper hand , and share Magistracies and honours now and then , and Lands and Provinces also , By such contentions Rome flourished and grew great , and yet granted the honour of Victories , and the credit of them , to the Commons : but Florence perished under them .

3. A republique is often destroyed , when Lawes are made to the advantage of great ones , and pressure of the people .

4. When the Powers in being , usurpe Anthority [ over the people ] and keep guards for their defence ; as the Decemviri did at Rome , and the Thirty Tyrants at Athens .

5. The Luxury of the Nobles , and their neglect of Armes [ and Arts ] makes them vile and cheap in the peoples eyes ; and so makes a republique sink into a base Democracy .

6. When a Patrician grows too rich or potent , and Emulations grow rife about priority , then the republique 's lost : So Sylla when he had subdued Marius , and Cesar when Crassus was slaine , and Pompey conquered ( who were then Rivalls in the Empire ) carried all before them , and were Tyrants at pleasure .

7. Correspondency with some forraign Prince , of any person in power , may ruine a republique .

8. When any fawning Poplicola , in a time of Famin , or other occasion , endeavours to gain the people by opportunity and advantage , and by such arts , gets the power into his own clutches ; these must be lookt to , and suppressed , as Metius was in Rome , &c. and Manlius &c. which King David neglecting in Absosom , run the hazard [ of his life and Crown . ]

9. A Republique falls : to ground oft-times , because it wants a Militia ; when the people & Patritians mutually fear one another , and thereupon call in forraign Commanders , which is usuall in Venice .

Which commanders after some signal Victory obtained , either themselves seize upon the common wealth ( as Sforza did at Millain , * and Bartholomew Coline might have done at Venice ) or else they betray it to forraign Princes , as Malatesta did Florence .

10. The faction of Citizens , that bear affection to some faction of strangers , ruine a republique ; so all the republiques of Italy split themselves into Guelfes and Gibellins , or ( which was worst of all ) into Neuters ; whereupon dire and dismall slaughters and times ensued .

A Republique must never be Neutrall , because it must necessarily be a prey to the Conqueror , not being supported either by friends or enemies [ Nec amicis nec inimicis fota Lat. ]

11. A Republique falls , when the People confide not in the Nobility , nor the Nobility in them ; and therefore they call in a forraign Umpire , that will devour them both : as Florence call'd in King Robert , & * , the Duke of Athens .

The remedy is , to commit the Vmpirage of the quarrell ( not to strangers , but ) to religious men , Priests that are Natives ; as Moises did by Gods command , and as the Observator well notes , The old Gauls did to the Druides , and oft times both they and the Germans , to [ godly and ] grave Matrons . But this latter is a crude observation .

12. Changes of Republique are innumerable , as their causes are . Read the Florentine History ( for that City ran through all varieties of change ) and in opposition to that the Roman .

CHAP. XIII . Of the Fate and change of Popular , or Democratique state , &c.

1. A Democracy , or Popular State assuredly goes to wrack , when Ignorant Plebeians rule , that canno agree amongst themselves , and determine all things ☞ by chance or affection .

2. Popular elections are ever attended with jarring , and noise of the multitude , and obstreperous rabble .

3. In the Senate or Parliaments of Popular States , he that has the smoothest tongue , is likeliest to cheat the people , and make himselfe be elected , [ rules in chief ] though he be the veriest Knave in the Pack

4. It marres a Popular State , when the poorest of the people endeavour to grow rich by publique Offices , and the wealthier sort grow Tyrannous by their riches .

It is dangerous to call in a stranger to the administration of justice , as the Florentines used to do ; for this is a symptome of dissention amongst the Natives , and oft brings ruine with it , [ yet has it been practised else-where of late , but with like successe . ]

5. This Paragraph about provisions and supplying the publick necessities by Corn , &c. is treated of in the precedent Chapter .

6. The next Barre of a Democratique State is , the Generall that fights their Battails abroad , and returnes home a King as well as a Conqueror ; as Sforza returned to Millain , and Cesar to Rome , &c.

The Romans provided excellently against this mischief , they had ever at hand good store of sitt and able men for the conduct of any Warre , and ever and anone changed their Commanders , whereby they both secured their liberty , and by emulation provok'd them to vertue and valour .

7. An other Engine to batter down Democracy , is a Publique Benefactor : that has got Power into his hands : and pretends himself in hazard of his life by Conspirators : and thereupon desires a kind of Life Guard for the safety of his Person , against his accusers & those he would accuse , and so being thus well provided , hee invades the Throne , ( if I may so say ) and dubbs himself King ; so did Pisistratus at Athens .

To prevent this : The People must commit themselves , to the care and Providence of wise and religious men : reposing all trust , and confidence in them : For by not believing Solon the Philosopher , who discover'd to them the design of Pisistratus , the Athenians lost their Liberty .

8. A Common wealth may fall , by the approach of suddain [ and unexpected ] dangers : the Common people being dull & heavy in deliberations . So the Romanes lost Saguntum whilst they [ slowly ] consulted , how to get it : and the Venetians Cyprus , whilst they coldly deliberate how to relieve it .

In this case a Dictator must must speedily be pitch'd upon : to Rule , and dispatch every thing as himself sees most Expedient , without Counsell or controll of any man . Necessity it self will compell the people to pitch upon none , but the best and ablest man for that service : as the Practice of the Romanes [ in that case ] does witnesse .

9. A Popular State may miscarry too by some wealthy Citizen : who does favour and foster Poets and Oratours , and Preachers , & Grammarians , and all sorts of men , that have Eloquence or wit , and by his riches , keeps an Academy in his own house : of men that can Blazon , & Trumpet forth his praises and worth to the People &c. Thus became Cosmo Medices Dake of Florence .

Let no man , that sets his wits and tongue to sale , have any pare in any Senate or Parliament . Greece quite lost her self , by the Liberty of Orations : so did Germany and France [ by sermons ] and the Switzers too late provided a remedy against this disease .

The Last Paragraph concerning the danger of change .

All Change ( be it never so little ) of the Antient state of things , in a Commonwealth , or Kingdome is either , a Sign , or Cause , or Con-Cause , or Preparation , to an Universall change of minds : and ( by consequence ) of all the Republique , or Princedome revolting from its own Principles . As new meates , and new Exercise , beget a new habit of Body . So

Darius by affecting to wear a Macedonian sword , did foretell that his Kingdome should be ruin'd by the armes of Macedon . Therefore the change even of old Fashions in Apparell , of Banquets and Marriages , and of womens behaviour , and of old Discipline , and the Pravity and corruption of youth ( as Censorinus notes ) new Lawes and Tributes ought ever to be avoided : for they either suddenly , or totally , destroy a Kingdom : Whereupon the Venetian will not change so much as his old Originall Garbe in his cloths for ( as Solomon saies ) Hee that failes in the least things , shall by degrees come to nought .

The COROLLARIE , and Conclusion .

It is Probitie , and Pietie , that preserves a King and People : and not the unlearned Craft , and subtlety of Machiavell : For all Vertue , and Power , derives its Originall from Hun : who is the Essentiall Power , and Wisdom of his Father that Governs all things . To whom be all Glory .

FINIS .
Notes, typically marginal, from the original text
Notes for div A85748e-1830 Aphor. 1. Max. 1. Addit . * He was a Dubs equall to a King . {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} * Grotius favours Toleration Corruptions Externall . Add. Venice subject to Oblimation . Addit . An Excellent Gradation . Conclusion thereupon . * Victrii Domini De , &c. * Animadvers. They are like to make but sorrie servants and instruments : that are weak bath in body and mind . * Valor Lat. * Observator . * Lat. Optimis nascuntur . * Volentis . 1 Yhe Divine Law . 2 Law Naturall . Qua est Ars Dei : Ejusdemque Directrix . 3 Law of Nations . 4 Positive Law . * Lepram non ] alendam . Lat. * In the behalf of ] or rather for the Empire . * Casar , Valentine Borgia , Lat. ] * Punitive quam Instructive . * Under Nero . * Aliorum Lux & Lex . * Inequalitas Consumptrix . Lat. * Rhetor . * Primus Impetus Major quam Virorum ; Secundus minor quam Paeminarum . Flor. * Addictè Despoticè . * Perversus . L. ] * Perito . Cunning ] * Iam Eruditis . A body Politique how actuteda . * Spiritus . ] sing , I at . Pro rata . * Nutritios ] Reip. L. * Of Croton● . Dux . Lat. * Vicarium , &c. Papam . * The Lat. is ambiguous . Add. Cruciatus Lat. Franceruns Franks . Condemnationes Lat. * or possess * Civitatem portat idem . L. * He means . Ehud & Eglon. lud. 3.6.20.21 . * or Colion . * or Generall Dux .