past and present; in other words, true knowledge is not that of the soothsayer but of the p
e to maintain, nicias, that any kind of knowledge is not to be learned; for all knowledge ap
qualities? socrates: why, you know that knowledge is the first qualification of any teacher?
ich is profitable and may be used. what knowledge is there which has such a nature? not the 
 surely, in the manufacture of vessels, knowledge is that which gives the right way of makin
ry possession and every use of a thing, knowledge is that which gives a man not only good-fo
-(4) is doing good. still an element of knowledge is wanting which critias is readily induce
wledge of what we do not know? besides, knowledge is an abstraction only, and will not infor
rance in which an element of science or knowledge is not included; (6) the beginning of meta
e, whether, if perfectly possible, such knowledge is of any use. that is what we have to con
ut wisdom will not show him of what the knowledge is ? plainly not. neither will he be able t
doctrine that he who lives according to knowledge is happy, for these live according to know
 me the fact that the life according to knowledge is not that which makes men act rightly an
knowledge. the existence of this latent knowledge is further proved by the interrogation of 
ledge, and of the association of ideas. knowledge is prior to any particular knowledge, and 
priests and priestesses:' (1) that true knowledge is a knowledge of causes (compare aristotl
uiry are laid deeper, and the nature of knowledge is more distinctly explained. there is a p
each. we seem to find that the ideal of knowledge is irreconcilable with experience. in huma
do; the distinction between opinion and knowledge is more fully developed in the theaetetus.
ignored, and the certainty of objective knowledge is transferred to the subject; while absol
re you so slow of heart to believe that knowledge is virtue? socrates: i will try and tell y
lace, they are abiding. and this is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true
s he agree with the common opinion that knowledge is overcome by passion? or does he hold th
ercome by passion? or does he hold that knowledge is power? protagoras agrees that knowledge
wledge is power? protagoras agrees that knowledge is certainly a governing power. this, howe
mensuration is a kind of knowledge, and knowledge is thus proved once more to be the governi
his question the identity of virtue and knowledge is found to be involved. but if virtue and
s the food of the soul? surely, i said, knowledge is the food of the soul; and we must take 
e rest of the world are of opinion that knowledge is a principle not of strength, or of rule
is that your view? or do you think that knowledge is a noble and commanding thing, which can
at the erring act which is done without knowledge is done in ignorance. this, therefore, is 
?' 'i think we must admit that absolute knowledge is the most exact knowledge, which we must
 ours.' 'yet, surely, to deprive god of knowledge is monstrous.'--'these are some of the dif
urely, said socrates, to deprive god of knowledge is monstrous. these, socrates, said parmen
e abides the very being with which true knowledge is concerned; the colourless, formless, in
nsible to their subjects. not power but knowledge is the characteristic of a king or royal p
d, without idealism, we may remark that knowledge is a great part of power. plato does not t
s in the letter only and in custom, and knowledge is divorced from action, can we wonder, so
edge, one of two things follows--either knowledge is not to be attained at all, or, if at al
 your favorite doctrine, socrates, that knowledge is simply recollection, if true, also nece
you are still incredulous as to whether knowledge is recollection. incredulous, i am not, sa
, he said, in the two propositions that knowledge is recollection, and that the soul is a ha
swer is only unsatisfactory because our knowledge is defective. in the passage from the worl
e beginning of the modern view that all knowledge is of relations; it also anticipates the d
her incline to think that the method of knowledge is inseparable from actual knowledge, and 
out nature. to a certain extent all our knowledge is conditional upon what may be known in f
e substance, and the like. the world of knowledge is always dividing more and more; every tr
of good. the comparison of pleasure and knowledge is really a comparison of two elements, wh
one, socrates may retort by saying that knowledge is one, but the result will be that such m
on of hearing that neither pleasure nor knowledge is the highest good, for the good should b
ou are right in saying that the loss of knowledge is not attended with pain. socrates: these
 has gone on to ask whether one sort of knowledge is purer than another, as one pleasure is 
ence of clearness in different kinds of knowledge is enormous. socrates: then the answer wil
re the images of things; and the higher knowledge is of things, and is not to be derived fro
 them. lastly, we may remember that all knowledge is valuable for its own sake; and we may a
ich gives belief without knowledge; and knowledge is always true, but belief may be either t
nswers. the enquiry about the nature of knowledge is not new to him; long ago he has felt th
e attempt to discover the definition of knowledge is in accordance with the character of soc
 definition which theaetetus proposes: ' knowledge is sensible perception.' this is speedily 
n again interrogated, replies (2) that ' knowledge is true opinion.' but how is false opinion
ion before we have found knowledge? and knowledge is not true opinion; for the athenian dica
re of all things,' with the other, 'all knowledge is sensible perception'? (b) would he have
tage of youth. theaetetus replies, that knowledge is what he learns of theodorus, i.e. geome
iscover an answer.' 'my answer is, that knowledge is perception.' 'that is the theory of pro
 of madmen are real at the time. but if knowledge is perception, how can we distinguish betw
ings," the doctrine of theaetetus that " knowledge is perception," have all the same meaning.
tio ad absurdum" of the hypothesis that knowledge is sensible perception? yet perhaps we are
d protagoras, by asserting further that knowledge is and is not sensation; and of everything
rrogate him further. when he says that ' knowledge is in perception,' with what does he perce
e has no share in knowledge. but if so, knowledge is not perception. what then is knowledge?
aid to have opinion--shall we say that ' knowledge is true opinion'? but still an old difficu
' 'understand,' yet we do not know what knowledge is . 'why, socrates, how can you argue at a
n is knowledge? theaetetus repeats that knowledge is true opinion. but this seems to be refu
offers a definition which he has heard: knowledge is true opinion accompanied by definition 
ask the meaning of the statement, that ' knowledge is right opinion, accompanied by explanati
edge of difference. and so, theaetetus, knowledge is neither perception nor true opinion, no
 ... i. the saying of theaetetus, that ' knowledge is sensible perception,' may be assumed to
 are conscious or not. the theory that ' knowledge is sensible perception' is the antithesis 
ures (republic). thus the doctrine that knowledge is perception supplies or seems to supply 
 often repeats the parallel axiom, 'all knowledge is experience.' he means to say that the o
ery few facts. ii. the saying that 'all knowledge is sensation' is identified by plato with 
m the category of relation. but because knowledge is subjective or relative to the mind, we 
appearance and truth. the relativity of knowledge is a truism to us, but was a great psychol
e arguments there remains a truth, that knowledge is something more than sensible perception
. v. having rejected the doctrine that ' knowledge is perception,' we now proceed to look for
e measure of all things,' and that 'all knowledge is perception.' this was the subjective wh
 a power of thought, or affirm that all knowledge is derived from experience without implyin
t implying that this first principle of knowledge is prior to experience. the truth seems to
onsidered: why should the doctrine that knowledge is sensation, in ancient times, or of sens
bove them: the one maintaining that all knowledge is sensation; the other basing the virtues
he truest which is nearest to sense. as knowledge is reduced to sensation, so virtue is redu
o the question, why the theory that all knowledge is sensation is allied to the lower rather
then, and nobly say what you think that knowledge is . theaetetus: well, socrates, i will ans
en he who does not know what science or knowledge is , has no knowledge of the art or science
and when a man is asked what science or knowledge is , to give in answer the name of some art
s, and, as far as i can see at present, knowledge is perception. socrates: bravely said, boy
birth or a mere wind-egg:--you say that knowledge is perception? theaetetus: yes. socrates: 
ays of existence, and being the same as knowledge is unerring? theaetetus: clearly. socrates
n, my boy, how can any one contend that knowledge is perception, or that to every man what a
 you were quite right in affirming that knowledge is only perception; and the meaning turns 
ht, and yours also, who maintained that knowledge is the same as perception. theaetetus: tru
is a measure; neither can we allow that knowledge is perception, certainly not on the hypoth
 view of the subject: you answered that knowledge is perception? theaetetus: i did. socrates
 discussion was to find out rather what knowledge is than what it is not; at the same time w
ion; but i will venture to assert, that knowledge is true opinion: let this then be my reply
 not shameless when we do not know what knowledge is , to be explaining the verb 'to know'? t
the doves, and say that the chase after knowledge is of two kinds? one kind is prior to poss
 have determined that the possession of knowledge is not the having or using it, we do asser
ng for false opinion until we know what knowledge is ; that must be first ascertained; then, 
then, once more, what shall we say that knowledge is ?--for we are not going to lose heart as
e fancied to be a perfect definition of knowledge is a dream only. but perhaps we had better
nce or of anything! and so, theaetetus, knowledge is neither sensation nor true opinion, nor
n the other hand, we are conscious that knowledge is independent of time, that truth is not 
s careful to observe that although such knowledge is given to the inferior parts of man, it 
combine, and he is of opinion that such knowledge is granted to the gods only. to have seen 
and out, and recollection flows in when knowledge is failing. let no man either laugh or gri
mpatriots that not to possess necessary knowledge is a disgrace, though to possess such know
e is a disgrace, though to possess such knowledge is nothing very grand. 'certainly.' the di
aves him no time for any other pursuit. knowledge is valued by him only as it tends to the a
fragmentary. the sources from which our knowledge is derived are chiefly the following:-(1)