








uccession of Euro-
pean nations to import (guestworkers) for the n nomic boom (Castles 1986' first to arrive were worker Spain, and Portugal; others slavia, Greece, and Turkey itially imported as temper; the 1970s many of these had brought or started fami] permanently settled in Gem 1985). Today, the Turks ar of these guestworker group 1.8 million. Furthermore, si 1980s increasing numbers refugees from around the taken advantage of Germa policy, the most liberal in a to contribute to the exponc of the foreigner population
Actively recruited and k ted by the German state, i have been accepted by mucl man citizenry, but contir have prevented their full i in German society. These 1 included widespread cross-i understanding, social di< and residential segregation, ers to full integration take myriad governmental laws that regulate entry and legal and economic opportunities tion and social benefits (O  By the mid-1970s the Gen ment reacted to a dramatic number of all foreigners by ing a program for encourag mg Turks and other gues return to their homelands Mehrlander 1986; Penninx remigration policy generally population has worked, sett families in Germany, with t and third-generation childre little knowledge of or exp< Turkey (Komer and Mehrk But by the end of the 1981 man mood towards immi) soured.... Guestworkers in 1989, particularly Turks, [wi ject of widespread hostility ing anti-immigrant polit (Tomasi, Tomasi, and Miller was just before the fall ol Wall. Now Germany s pre global economic competitio integration and, since 1990, unification all have aggr; more ethnic group tension ; toward foreigners.
Germany apparently has erably less experience wit
42. Resurgence of Ethnic Nationalism
manic ethnic groups, in contrast with the United States, whose experience with racial and ethnic diversity was underway for two centuries before its existence as a nation. So, are today s observations simply a modem resurgence of the Nazi era, which is often explained away as an aberration in German history, as  Hitler s doing ? Or does a longer historical view perhaps help explain both that era and the present?
The German case reveals a set of assumptions and beliefs that crystallized in the nation-building era of 19th-century Europe. One strand in this thought derived from German Romanticism, a genre exemplified by Goethe, Schiller, and other philosophers and writers of the 18th and 19th centuries. A key part of the Romantic vision was the idealization of the natural domain: the cosmos, the natural environment, and humanity. This view pointed to nature for both practical teachings and moral guidance in human affairs. Then Darwin, with his theory of biological evolution, arrived by the middle of the 19th century. The idea of a natural hierarchy of the species in which Homo sapiens ruled superior, while controversial among the general populace (it challenged creation theories of the universe), provided the spark for a social darwin-ism built upon both Darwin s science and the idea of essential nature from German Romanticism.
German writers, thinkers, and social critics quickly attributed an ethical qual-tty to nature. For instance, the idea that the more developed, superior species supersede and dominate the less evolved, urferior forms was evidence of the wisdom of nature to ensure the  survival of the fittest.  By extension, human races also were judged to have evolved in a hierarchy, as evidenced in each group s achievements and the domination of one superior group over all others.
Thus Darwinism provided a scientific rationale for a number of assumptions hat were incorporated into a romantic vision of a German race by not only the but also the social thinkers of the th-century nation-building era:
The aesthetic and socio-historical idiom of German Romanticism was perfectly suited to the elaboration of the ethnocultural conception of nationhood. The celebration of individuality as Einzigkeit or uniqueness  .. of unconscious, organic
growth ... of the vitality and integrity of traditional, rooted folk cultures:... all of these themes were easily transported from the domain of aesthetics and cultural criticism to that of social philosophy. [Brubaker 1990:391]
German Romanticism and its philosophy had peaked at a critical time of historical transformation, and its seductive images were appropriated for the political task of nation building:
In the social and political thought of Romanticism ... nations are conceived as historically rooted, organically developed individualities, united by a distinctive Volkgeist and by its infinitely ramifying expression in language, custom, law, culture and the state. (Brubaker 1990:391]
Thus a number of related concepts, including German organic kinship, racial purity, and cultural superiority were first introduced into the German social consciousness and contributed a racial element to Germany s national ideology.
Within this historically constructed ideology, racial assumptions have defined who is and who is not German. A racial group is biologically related; thus kinship or blood ties determine who is German. The idea of racial and ethnic boundaries was extended to political boundaries and membership:  What is specific about the concept of the German nation... lies in the fact that it is constructed biologically. German nationals are defined by their origin; one can only be bom a German  (Rathzel 1990:41).
Since 1913 until only recently, German citizenship has been legally based in the principle of jus sanguinis, or blood-kinship (Brubaker 1990). For decades, an explicit racial ideology formed part of the dominant group s social philosophy, politics, and institutional treatment of ethnic groups defined as not belonging to the German nation. The semantic category Auslander (foreigners) separates those who do not  belong  from the dominant, majority German ethnic group. It was this very principle Germany for Germans only that supported the takeover by the National Socialists (Nazis) before World War II, as they justified ethnic cleansing as a solution to broader economic, political, and international crises (Burleigh 1991).
Today we see in Germany the resurgence of ethnic hostilities not seen since the 1940s. A reactionary social climate and the popularity of nationalistic, antiforeigner politics have resulted in physical violence toward German residents in guestworker or refugee statuses. While only a very small minority of Germans is actually involved in these actions, historically minded observers cannot help but see these current hostilitiy toward Turks and other ethnic groups as a resurgence of old, stable patterns of German thinking and behavior (O Brien 1988). Many Germans agree with this view, as they openly debate this crisis and ask themselves what kind of folk and society they want to be.
The Schooling of Foreigners, the Reeducation of Germans
Some indications are that many Germans have decided to redirect their nation s history to become a more inclusive society. For instance, large public demonstrations against racism and xenophobia have been organized in Berlin, Frankfurt, and other German cities. The Green Party and other political organizations also are working against blatant anti-foreigner politics, while the national leadership has recently taken an aggressive stance against the proliferation of extremist, neo-Nazi groups. In settings ranging from neighborhood and workplace to family, many other Germans have assumed personal responsibility for speaking out and acting concretely on these critical issues.
In all of this, education, schools, and educators appear to be key actors resisting the past and working for progressive change. This was not always the case, because German education has been marked by systematic neglect, discrimination, and exclusion of Turks and other foreigners, even into the 1980s. Turkish-German bilingualism has undergone intensive study, but no systematic initiatives have begun to address the critical issues inherent in language transition and loss, and their impact on school achievement (Pfaff 1981, 1991). Structural barriers to schooling remain, while research has documented the segregation of educational opportunity for foreigner children who, by the secondary level, cluster  at the lowest level the Hauptschule md remain there  (Baker
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8. ETHNIC FACTOR: INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES
et. al. 1985:219) to receive preparation for unskilled and semiskilled jobs (Git-mez and Wilpert 1987). The last set of issues to gain notice have been the personal experiences of students living between two worlds: the dilemma of choosing between two sets of cultural values and beliefs, the crisis of identity, or the decision whether to wear traditional or modem clothes (Saydam 1990; Springer 1992). But in Berlin and Hamburg, I interviewed and observed administrators and teachers who felt a responsibility to address issues of diversity and inclusion in their professional roles. High in the educational hierarchy are administrators such as Herr Schmidt, a Hamburg School Board administrator and also the German national representative to the education task force of the European Community. In response to the shortcomings of the past, state educational agencies now have offices to oversee policy and programs addressing the education of foreigners. The reality, says Schmidt, is that Germany is an immigration country responsible for the integration of children and youth through education. Since the late 1970s, states have responded variably through programs for newcomers, bilingual instruction, German as a second language, and vocational education.
Schmidt shared a vignette that captures the tension inherent in these attempts to reform the past. He explained that the multikulturelle Gesellschaft (multicultural society) is now  in  but that some theories about the multicultural society and intercultural education can be extreme. Then Schmidt told of one community in which multicultural enthusiasts insisted that Germans learn Turkish, and noted that these extreme supporters of intercultural education actually stimulated a right-wing reaction among those who countered,  We want this to be a German school. 
But more successful attempts to initiate educational change can be found in progressive communities. The Hamburg suburb of Wilhelmsburg is known as a Sozialsbrennpunkte (social flashpoint). This is jargon for communities of both German and foreigner, working, or welfare families, who live in public housing located in areas with high levels of poverty, substance abuse, and crime. According to one teacher, families are typically afraid to let children out of their massive, impersonal high-rise apartments. At the same time, Wilhelmsburg
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is an historically  Red  workers  community with a population mixed along class and ethnicity, and a record of progressive action.
This progressive bent is often expressed in the attitudes and behaviors of administrators and teachers of the local Grundschule (elementary school). In an interview, the school principal indicated that integration is the main goal of education for the foreign students, who make up about 35 percent of her school s population. This is not a straightforward matter for Turks and other groups who suffer from stigma, discrimination, relative poverty, and related social disadvantages in Germany. The Turkish community s strong fear of losing its culture further points to the crucial role of education in providing an accepting and effective experience for Turkish students and their families.
The staff of this school explained that most of their students have grown up in Germany, unlike many newcomers at higher grade levels who are likely to have had formative experiences in Turkey or other countries of origin. But children come to school typically  not ready to learn,  as the bleak neighborhood provides few stimulating environments,
