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   Advancements in Agricultural Development 
  Volume 4, Issue 2, 2023 
  agdevresearch.org 

 

1. Taylor K. Ruth, Assistant Professor, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, PO Box 830947, Lincoln, NE 68583-0947, 

taylor.ruth@unl.edu,  https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5269-9154 
2. Blake C. Colclasure, Assistant Professor, Doane University, 1014 Boswell Ave, Crete, NE 68333, 

blake.colclasure@doane.edu,  https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8375-286X 
20 

 

Cable News Media’s Influence on Climate Change Beliefs: A 
Partisan Comparison 

T. K. Ruth1, B. C. Colclasure2 
 

 
Article History 
Received: September 15, 2022 
Accepted: April 3, 2023 
Published: April 17, 2023 
 
 
Keywords 
media effects; selective media 
exposure; source credibility; media 
credibility; trust in science 
  

Abstract 
The current, fragmented media landscape coupled with partisan views 
toward scientific issues has made it difficult for members of the public to 
achieve mutual understanding toward critical issues like climate change. 
Selective media exposure, media’s credibility in reporting science and 
reporting climate change, trust in science, along with demographic 
characteristics of consumers are all expected to influence the public’s 
belief in climate change. However, effects may differ across partisan lines. 
The purpose of this study was to understand how cable news media 
influences Illinois residents’ beliefs in climate change across political 
ideological groups. An online survey was completed by 506 respondents, 
and respondents were categorized as conservative, moderate, or liberal 
based on a political ideology question. Differences were noted between 
political groups for variables of interest. Most notably, liberals believed 
more in climate change compared to conservatives or moderates. Cable 
news use also followed party lines, and regression analyses found the 
media influenced climate change beliefs disproportionately across the 
political groups; conservatives were influenced the most. Trust in science 
was a positive predictor for all three groups; however, only conservatives 
and moderates were directly influenced by cable news media use.  

 



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Introduction and Problem Statement 
 
The media landscape has evolved over the past 30 years, and, rather than seeing opposing 
opinions in the news, consumers gained the ability to choose from a variety of programs and 
select sources that presented information that already supported their views (Iyengar & Hahn, 
2009; Mullainathan & Schleifer, 2005; Prior, 2007). The 24/7 cable news cycle, with programs 
like Fox News and CNN, can present politically polarized information that scholars believe shape 
and reinforce partisan opinions (de Zúñiga et al., 2012; Grieco, 2020; Iyengar & Hahn, 2009). 
One of these polarized issues in the media is climate change, and, despite scientific consensus 
that climate change is happening (Cook et al., 2013), there is a stark divide in U.S. opinions 
between the Democratic (liberal) and Republican (conservative) parties when concerning 
climate change (Abeles et al., 2019; Antonio & Brulle, 2011). In the 1990s, Republican party 
campaigns against climate science and policy emerged, infiltrating conservative media channels 
and challenging the scientific consensus, which eventually led to the belief that there was 
scientific controversy over climate change amongst most Republicans (Dunlap & McCright, 
2008). By 2019, only 21% of Republicans believed climate change should be a top priority for 
U.S. policy compared to 67% of Democrats (Oliphant, 2019). Despite climate change posing a 
major threat to agricultural development (Food and Agricultural Organization [FAO], 2023), 
public skepticism may thwart any successful efforts related to mitigation and adaptation 
strategies. In order to lessen the effects of climate change on agricultural development, public 
information campaigns related to climate change adaptation and mitigation practices will need 
to overcome media bias and resonate with target audiences. Therefore, the purpose of this 
study was to understand cable news media’s influence on Illinois residents’ belief in climate 
change across political ideological groups. 
 

Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
 
Media effects theories, including selective exposure theory (Freedman & Sears, 1965) and 
source credibility (Perloff, 2008), provided the conceptual framework for this research. 
Freedman and Sears (1965) hypothesized that people selectively exposed themselves to 
information in the media that supported their current attitudes, beliefs, and political 
predispositions. The concern associated with selective media exposure was the media would 
have polarizing effects on their audiences (Stroud, 2011). As a result, it would be difficult for 
the public, along with policy makers, to achieve mutual understanding related to critical issues 
facing the nation (Feldman et al., 2014). Past research has supported the hypothesis that 
political ideology drives partisan selection of media sources. Conservatives have typically 
preferred Fox News compared to CNN, while liberals prefer channels like CNN and MSNBC over 
Fox News (Grieco, 2020; Iyangar & Hahn, 2009; Stroud, 2007). Additionally, Republicans are 
more likely to list Fox News as their main political news source while Democrats tend to use 
multiple news sources (Grieco, 2020). 
 
Feldman et al. (2012) determined that Fox News typically presented climate change in a 
dismissive tone compared to CNN, with the latter presenting the issue as both human-caused 



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and urgent. In further support of the selective exposure theory, researchers have concluded 
increased exposure to Fox News was associated with a weaker belief in climate change and 
watching CNN was associated with greater acceptance related to the scientific consensus 
around climate change (Feldman et al., 2012). Interestingly though, Feldman et al. (2012) also 
found that Republicans’ beliefs in climate change were strongly linked to cable news channel 
use compared to Democrats. The authors concluded that Republicans, while skeptical of 
climate change in general, were less skeptical when viewing media that supported the urgency 
of climate change (Feldman et al., 2012).  
 
While selective media use has been linked to polarized beliefs in climate change (Feldman et al., 
2012; Feldman et al., 2014), the media’s credibility in presenting information about science in 
general and climate change specifically may have an influence on beliefs. Positive perceptions 
of source credibility have been found to have strong effects on attitude when knowledge 
around a topic is limited (Hovland & Weiss, 1951), and credibility is often linked to the honesty, 
expertise, and goodwill of the source (Perloff, 2008). However, there has been a decline in 
media trust in the U.S. over recent years, resulting in only 35% of Republicans trusting national 
news media in 2021 compared to 78% of Democrats (Gottfried & Liedke, 2021). This decline in 
trust has likely influenced the media’s credibility in reporting topics related to science and 
climate change. 
 
Socio-Structural Variables and Belief in Climate Change 
Interactions between political affiliation and other socio-structural variables have been 
associated with belief in climate change as well. In a sample of New Zealanders, Milfont et al. 
(2015) found that belief of climate change was higher among individuals who were younger, 
female, liberal, educated, and belonging to minority groups. While in the U.S., conservative 
white males are more likely to be climate change skeptics (McCright & Dunlap, 2011). Past 
studies have explored the role of partisan media on consumers’ beliefs in climate change 
(Feldman et al., 2012; Feldman et al., 2014); however, there is evidence that media credibility 
and socio-structural variables are also important to consider when trying to understand the 
media’s effects on consumers’ climate change beliefs. Because Americans have divided 
attitudes toward climate change despite high levels of trust in science (Funk et al., 2019), trust 
in science was also included in this framework to provide a holistic understanding of how 
people across political ideologies form beliefs toward climate change. 
 

Purpose 
 
The purpose of this study was to understand cable news media’s influence on Illinois residents’ 
belief in climate change across political ideological groups. The following objectives guided this 
research: (a) Describe the demographic characteristics of liberals, moderates, and 
conservatives; (b) Describe the differences in trust in science between political ideological 
groups; (c) Describe the difference in climate change beliefs between political ideological 
groups; (d) Describe the differences in cable news media use between political ideological 



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groups; and (e) Determine how demographics, trust in science, cable news use, and media 
credibility predict Illinois residents’ beliefs in climate change across political ideological groups. 
 

Methods 
 
We used a quantitative survey design to fulfill the purpose of this survey. The population for 
our study was Illinois residents 18 years or older. We distributed an online survey via a Qualtrics 
panel to Illinois residents in April of 2019. While this data was collected prior to the 2020 
COVID-19 pandemic, it still presents meaningful findings related to how the media can 
influence public opinion when accounting for political ideology. Additionally, trust in science 
has only slightly decreased since the time of this study (Kennedy et al., 2022), and trust in the 
media already differed across political groups, although the difference has widened (Gottfried 
& Liedke, 2021). We used quota sampling to help increase the generalizability of the sample by 
matching respondents’ demographics to the 2017 Illinois Census demographics for gender, 
race, income, and education. We received a total of 506 responses that met the criteria for our 
quota. The demographics are presented in further detail in Objective 1. 
 
Our study examined six questions along with demographic questions from a 29-question 
instrument. These questions asked about respondents’ trust in science, media use, belief in 
climate change, perceived credibility of climate change in the news, perceived credibility of 
science in the news, and political ideology. The sample had 176 liberals, 185 moderates, and 
145 conservatives. We measured cable news use with a check-all-that-apply question that 
asked respondents what news organizations they received news from in an average week. 
There were a total of 30 options (including “Other”) for respondents to choose from. For the 
purpose of this study, only three cable news sources were used for analysis and selected to 
represent a conservative-leaning source (Fox News), a liberal-leaning source (CNN), and a 
moderate source (ABC News; Grieco, 2020; Mitchell et al., 2014). Fox News and CNN were 
specifically selected due to their historical polarized presentation of climate change (Feldman et 
al., 2012). In the sample, 35.0% used ABC News, 31.6% used CNN, and 30.6% used Fox News. 
 
We measured media’s credibility (Cronbach’s a = .81) when reporting science with a 5-item, 5-
point, bipolar semantic differential scale adapted from Frewer et al. (1996). Respondents were 
asked to mark the appropriate answer from a set of adjectives to complete the phrase, “I 
believe the information presented in the media about science is…” We used the same scale to 
measure media’s credibility (Cronbach’s a = .90) when reporting climate change, but the 
prompt was altered to say, “I believe the information presented in the media about climate 
change is…” Both constructs were created by calculating the average for the items. We 
measured belief in climate change (Cronbach’s a = .95) with a 7-item, 5-point Likert-type scale. 
The scale ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree, with a neutral middle. This 
scale was adapted from Langer Research Associates (2018) and Milfont et al. (2015). Trust in 
science (Cronbach’s a = .81) was adapted from the National Science Board’s (2018) Science and 
Engineering Indicators Report and was measured with 10 items on a 5-point Likert-type scale 
with the same labels as belief in climate change. Demographic questions were also included.  



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The questionnaire was reviewed by a panel of experts to assess the face validity of the 
instrument, and we conducted a pilot study to ensure the online instrument was working and 
the constructs were reliable. All data were analyzed in SPSS Statistics version 25. We used 
descriptive statistics and ANOVAs to answer Objectives 1 through 3. A multilinear regression 
was used to fulfill Objective 5. The data file was split so separate regressions were run for 
liberal, moderate, and conservative groups to understand how the conceptual framework 
predicted climate change belief across the groups. Assumptions for the multilinear regression 
and ANOVAs were met prior to analysis. 
 

Findings 
 
Objective 1: Describe the Demographic Characteristics of Liberals, Moderates, and 
Conservatives 
The demographic characteristics for the sample along with the respondent groups of liberals, 
moderates, and conservatives can be found in Table 1. Conservatives were mostly white 
(90.3%) males (53.8%) with an average age of 49.38 (SD = 15.00). Approximately, one-third 
(31.3%) of the conservatives’ highest level of education was high school, nearly 40% earned at 
least $75,000 a year, and a quarter of the conservative respondents lived in a rural county 
(25.5%). Moderate respondents were mostly female (54.6%) with an average age of 42.27 (SD = 
17.43), and their demographic characteristics reflected the demographics for the sample. 
Approximately one-third of the moderate respondents’ highest level of education was high 
school (31.3%). More than half of the moderate respondents made less than $50,000 a year 
(54%). Liberal respondents were mostly female (56.3%) and had the largest representation of 
African American or Black (22.7%) or Hispanic (13.1%) respondents out of the three groups. This 
was the youngest group at 39.22 (SD = 14.31), and the majority of liberal respondents had 
earned at least a 4-year degree (47.8%). Only 11.4% of the liberal respondents lived in a rural 
area. 
 
  



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Table 1 
 
Description of Respondents Across Political Ideological Groups 
 Sample 

(n = 506) 
Liberals 

(n = 176) 
Moderates 
(n = 185) 

Conservatives 
(n = 145) 

 % % % % 
Gender     
Male 47.2 43.8 45.4 53.8 
Female 52.8 56.3 54.6 46.2 
Race/Ethnicity     
White 76.5 67.0 74.6 90.3 
Black or African 

American 15.2 22.7 15.1 6.2 

Hispanic 10.3 13.1 12.4 4.1 
Asian, Native Hawaiian, 

or Pacific Islander 5.7 8.0 5.9 2.8 

American Indian or 
Alaskan Native 0.4 0.0 1.1 0.0 

Two or More Races 1.2 1.7 1.6 0.0 
Other 1.0 0.6 1.6 0.7 
Education     
High School Degree or 

Less 28.9 23.0 31.3 31.3 

Some College, No 
Degree 23.1 19.9 26.5 22.8 

2-Year Degree 9.3 8.5 9.7 9.7 
4-Year Degree 23.7 29.0 20.0 22.1 
Graduate School or 

Professional School 15.0 18.8 12.4 13.7 

Household Income     
Less than $25,000 21.7 22.2 25.9 15.9 
$25,000 -$49,999 24.1 21.0 28.1 22.8 
$50,000 - $74,999 19.0 20.5 15.1 22.1 
$75,000 - $149,999 26.9 25.0 23.8 33.1 
$150,000 or more 8.2 11.4 7.1 6.2 
Children Living at Home 38.9 40.9 40.0 35.9 
Rural County 16.0 11.4 13.0 25.5 

 
Objective 2: Describe the Differences in Trust in Science Between Political Ideological Groups 
Liberals (M = 3.83, SD = 0.73), moderates (M = 3.70, SD = 0.60), and conservatives (M = 3.58, SD 
= 0.57) agreed they trusted science. An ANOVA determined there was a significant association 
between political ideology and trust in science (F(2,503) = 5.65, p < .01); however, the effect 
size was small (h2 = 0.02; Cohen, 1988). Follow-up tests indicated that liberals had a higher trust 



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in science compared to conservatives (p < .01, Table 2). There were no differences between 
moderates and liberals or moderates and conservatives. 
 
Table 2 
 
Follow-up Bonferroni Tests Between Groups and Trust in Science 

J I 
Mean Diff 
(J-I) SE p-value 

Liberal Moderate 0.13 0.07 0.16 
 Conservative 0.24 0.07 0.00** 

Note. **p<.01 
 
Objective 3: Describe the Difference in Climate Change Beliefs Between Political Ideological 
Groups 
When broken down by group, liberals (M = 4.23, SD = 0.73) and moderates (M = 3.83, SD = 
0.80) agreed that climate change was happening while conservatives neither agreed nor 
disagreed that they believed in climate change (M = 3.00, SD = 1.20). An ANOVA determined 
there was a statistically significant association between political ideology and climate change 
belief (F(2,501) = 78.16, p < .01, h2 = 0.24). Liberals believed more in climate change compared 
to moderates or conservatives (p < .01) and moderates believed more in climate change 
compared to conservatives (p < .01; Table 3). 
 
Table 3 
 
Follow-up Bonferroni Tests Between Groups and Climate Change Beliefs 

J I 
Mean Diff 
(J-I) SE p-value 

Liberal Moderate 0.43 0.10 0.00** 
 Conservative 1.27 0.10 0.00** 
Moderate Liberal -0.43 0.10 0.00** 
 Conservative 0.84 0.10 0.00** 
Conservative Liberal -1.27 0.10 0.00** 
 Moderate -0.84 0.10 0.00** 

Note. **p<.01 
 
Objective 4: Describe the Differences in Cable News Media Use Between Political Ideological 
Groups 
The respondents’ cable news use is reported in Table 4. The largest percentage of liberals 
watched CNN (40.9%), while moderates watched ABC News (41.6%) and conservatives watched 
Fox News (42.1%). Chi-square analyses determined there were significant differences across 
political ideological groups for watching Fox News (c2(2) = 21.10, p < 0.01, Cramer’s V = .20) and 
watching CNN (c2(2) = 17.24, p < 0.01, Cramer’s V = .20). There was a larger percentage of 
liberals or moderates watching CNN compared to conservatives. Additionally, there was a 



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smaller percentage of liberals watching Fox News compared to moderates or conservatives. 
There were no differences in the percentage of each group for watching ABC News (c2(2) = 
5.66, p = .06). 
 
Table 4  
 
Political Ideological Groups’ Cable News Media Use 
 Liberals 

(n = 176) 
Moderate 
(n = 185) 

Conservative 
(n = 145) 

Total 
(n = 506) 

 %(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) 
Fox News 18.8(33)a 33.0(61)b 42.1(61)b 30.6(155) 
ABC News 31.3(55)a 41.6(77)a 31.0(45)a 35.0(177) 
CNN 40.9(72)a 32.4(60)a 19.3(28)b 31.6(160) 

Note. A letter key was assigned to each column category. Subscripts of the same letter denote 
frequencies that are not statistically different from one another between the corresponding 
categories at an alpha level of 0.05.  
 
Liberals (M = 3.40, SD = 0.85), moderates (M = 3.19, SD = 0.82), and conservatives (M = 2.89, SD 
= 0.86) believed the media was somewhat credible when reporting science. However, an 
ANOVA determined there was a statistically significant association between political ideological 
group and the media’s credibility for reporting science (F(2,503) = 9.90, p < .01, h2 = .03). 
Similarly, liberals (M = 3.40, SD = 1.05), moderates (M = 3.17, SD = 0.96), and conservatives (M = 
2.60, SD = 1.14) believed the media was somewhat credible when reporting climate change. An 
ANOVA was statistically significant for an association between political ideology and the 
media’s credibility for reporting climate change (F(2,503) = 24.08, p < .01, h2 = .09).  
 
The follow-up tests for both ANOVAs are reported in Table 5. There was a significant difference 
between liberals’ and conservatives’ perceptions of the media’s credibility in reporting science 
(p < .01); liberals believed the media to be more credible. There were no differences between 
liberals’ and moderates’ perceptions of the media’s credibility in reporting climate change, but 
conservatives perceived the media to be less credible than both moderates and liberals (p < 
.01). 
 
Table 5 
 
Follow-up Bonferroni Tests Between Groups and Media’s Credibility 
Media’s Credibility 
in reporting… I J 

Mean Diff 
(I-J) p-value 

Science Liberal Moderate 0.20 0.07 
  Conservative 0.42 0.00** 
Climate Change Conservative Liberal -0.80 0.00** 
  Moderate -0.57 0.00** 

Note. **p<.01 



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Objective 5: Determine how Demographics, Trust in Science, Cable News Use, and Media 
Credibility Predict Illinois Residents’ Beliefs in Climate Change Across Political Ideological 
Groups 
 
The findings for Objective 5 can be found in Table 6. The model was statistically significant 
across all three political ideological groups. The model was able to explain 29% of the variance 
in climate change belief for liberals (R2 = .29, F(16,157) = 3.98, p < .01), 30% for moderates (R2 = 
.40, F(16,168) = 4.54, p < .01), and 45% for conservatives (R2 = .45, F(16,128) = 6.47, p < .01). 
 
For liberals, the only significant predictors were having a graduate/professional degree and 
trust in science. Liberal respondents with a graduate or professional degree had a stronger 
belief in climate change compared to those with a high school education or less (b = 0.59, p < 
.01). Additionally, as trust in science increased for liberal respondents, belief in climate change 
increased as well (b = 0.39, p < .01). The predictors in the model for moderate respondents 
differed from the liberal respondents. Watching Fox News, trust in science, and the media’s 
credibility in presenting climate change information were significant predictors. Moderate 
respondents who watched Fox News were less likely to believe in climate change compared to 
those who did not watch Fox News (b = -0.31, p = .01). Additionally, as trust in science (b = 0.37, 
p < .01) or credibility of climate change information (b = 0.18, p = .02) increased, belief in 
climate change increased. 
 
Predictors for conservatives’ beliefs in climate change included watching ABC News, credibility 
of climate change information, and trust in science. Conservatives who watched ABC News 
were more likely to believe in climate change compared to those who did not watch (b = 0.42, p 
= .03). Positive perceptions of the media’s credibility in reporting climate change were 
associated with increased beliefs in climate change (b = 0.54, p < .01), and as trust in science 
increased, so did beliefs in climate change (b = 0.31, p = .04). 
 
  



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Table 6 
 
Predictors for Liberals’, Moderates’, and Conservatives’ Beliefs in Climate Change 
 Liberals Moderates Conservatives 
 b p b p b p 
Constant 2.35 0.00 1.71 0.00 0.43 0.48 
Children 0.06 0.57 0.01 0.91 0.18 0.31 
Education             
Some College 0.30 0.06 0.05 0.72 0.01 0.96 
2-Year Degree 0.08 0.72 0.18 0.37 0.17 0.59 
4-Year Degree 0.28 0.09 -0.07 0.69 -0.24 0.34 
Graduate School or 

Professional Degree 0.59 0.00** 0.27 0.17 0.28 0.32 

Income             
$25,000 - $49,999 -0.09 0.60 0.25 0.10 -0.19 0.51 
$50,000- $74,000 -0.13 0.45 -0.16 0.39 -0.03 0.93 
$75,000 or more -0.14 0.43 0.25 0.13 0.06 0.82 
Males 0.09 0.40 -0.17 0.12 -0.20 0.27 
Rural County -0.30 0.08 -0.09 0.58 -0.23 0.22 
CNN 0.13 0.25 0.13 0.28 0.22 0.31 
ABC News -0.02 0.85 0.01 0.95 0.42 0.03* 
Fox News -0.14 0.33 -0.31 0.01** -0.32 0.06 
Climate Change News 

Credibility 0.05 0.43 0.18 0.02* 0.54 0.00** 

Science News Credibility 0.01 0.88 0.05 0.55 0.05 0.70 
Trust in Science 0.39 0.00** 0.37 0.00** 0.31 0.04* 
R2 0.29  .30  .45  
F 3.98 0.00** 4.53 0.00** 6.46 0.00** 

Note. *p < .05, ** p < .01 
 

Conclusions, Discussion, and Recommendations 
 
The results from this study illustrated an asymmetrical influence of cable news media effects on 
climate change beliefs across political ideology groups. When considering trust in science, 
liberals possessed a higher trust in science compared to conservatives; however, the small 
effect size makes this difference almost negligible (Cohen, 1988). Similarly, liberals believed 
more in climate change compared to moderates or conservatives. These findings were 
consistent with previous research that political affiliation was associated with climate change 
beliefs (Abeles et al., 2019; Antonio & Brulle, 2011). There appeared to be political affiliation 
related to cable news media use as well. As expected, the largest percentage of conservatives 
watched Fox News, while moderates watched ABC News, and liberals watched CNN, which 
supported the theory of selective media exposure (Freedman & Sears, 1965). Additionally, 



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conservatives were found to believe the media was less credible when reporting science or 
climate change compared to liberals, which was consistent with relevant literature (Gottfried & 
Liedke, 2021). Overall, respondents’ trust in science, belief in climate change, perceptions of 
credibility, and media use diverged across party lines, most notably between liberals and 
conservatives. 
 
Interestingly, the conceptual model did not have equal effects across the political ideological 
groups and could account for approximately 30% of the variance in climate change beliefs for 
liberals and moderates and 45% of the variance for conservatives, which were large effect sizes 
(Cohen, 1988). This finding supported Feldman et al.’s (2012) conclusion that Republicans’ 
views of climate change were strongly linked to media use compared to Democrats. However, it 
should be noted that liberals typically receive news from multiple news outlets (Grieco, 2020), 
which may have influenced these results. Despite past literature concluding that Fox News 
influenced audiences’ beliefs in climate change (Feldman et al., 2012; Feldman et al., 2014), 
watching it was not a predictor for conservatives’ beliefs. However, watching ABC News was a 
positive predictor of climate change belief for this group. ABC News was considered a 
“moderate” channel (Mitchell et al., 2014) and is assumed to have reported climate change 
with limited bias. This finding reflected Feldman et al.’s (2012) conclusion that conservatives 
were more accepting of climate change when exposed to media that reported its urgency. Trust 
in science and source credibility were also found to positively influence belief in climate change, 
but credibility questions only asked about media in general and did not specify cable news 
media, which may have also influenced these findings.  
 
It has been well documented that climate change is a leading threat facing the future of global 
food production (Nhemachena et al., 2020; Praveen & Sharma, 2019). To help lessen the effects 
of climate change on agricultural development (FAO, 2023), there will need to be public 
support for policy and practice related to adaptation and mitigation strategies. Agricultural 
development practitioners will need to develop targeted public information campaigns to 
inform attitudes and behaviors related to climate change and should consider segmenting their 
audiences by political ideology. While it can be difficult to overcome the effects of selective 
media exposure, working with reporters at “neutral” news organizations to share scientific 
information can help reach potentially polarized audiences when communicating about climate 
change. However, practitioners will also need to address trust in science and perceptions of the 
media’s credibility when communicating about climate change to see shifts in climate change 
beliefs. Therefore, public information campaigns should not only focus on the severity of 
climate change but also provide information about how the research was conducted and what 
news sources provide accurate and unbiased information around the topic. Inviting researchers 
and reporters to hold discussions at community events could be one way to begin to foster 
trust between the public, scientists, and the media. In an effort to expand this research, 
qualitative interviews or focus groups with individuals from each political ideological group 
should be conducted to better understand how they utilize cable news media and how media 
effects influence their climate change beliefs. Expanding this research to explore news media 
sources more broadly, including talk radio, podcasts, and newspapers, would also provide a 
greater understanding for the influence of news media on climate change beliefs. Conducting 



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content analyses for how these news media sources present climate change would also provide 
greater context for future research. Additionally, replicating this study on a national scale and in 
other countries would also help to build a more holistic framework for developing audience-
centered public information campaigns related to climate change. 
 

Acknowledgements 
 
This study was funded through the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign’s College of 
College of Agricultural, Consumer, and Environmental Science Teaching Enhancement Grant.  
 
T. Ruth – investigation, formal analysis, writing original draft. B. Colclasure – draft introduction 
and discussion. 
 

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