123767 76..84 announcement of retraction the editorial board announced this article has been retracted on august 31, 2022. if you have any further question, please contact us at: ape@scholink.org article title: research on the management models of marine protected areas beyond national jurisdiction from the perspective of law and economics author/s: wu hao journal title: advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) volume and number: vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 pages: 124-140 doi: ttp://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n3p124 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 41 original paper onanalyzing the linguistic features of english financial reports xueting ren1 1 xi’an fanyi university, college of art and design, shaanxi, xi’an, china received: february 20, 2024 accepted: april 04, 2024 online published: may 08, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n2p41 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n2p41 abstract this study is dedicated to exploring and analyzing the unique characteristics of english financial reports in terms of language usage, aiming to reveal their unique style and expression from various levels, such as vocabulary, syntactic structure, semantic comprehension and rhetorical strategies. by systematically comparing the linguistic characteristics of english financial reports with those of other news genres, this dissertation aims to provide readers with a basis for in-depth understanding of english financial reports, and then provide theoretical references and practical guidance for the future development of the field of financial information dissemination and news reporting practice. keywords finance and economics, financial report, international finance and economics, linguistic characteristic 1. purpose of the study 1.1 background and significance the analysis of linguistic features of english financial reports is rooted in its important role and specificity in contemporary economy and society. in the globalized economic environment, financial reports play the role of information transmitters, and their contents cover all fields of social and economic life, and their influence continues to expand with the development of the economy. in particular, english financial reports, which first appeared in the west, show some unique styles and features in the use of language. these features not only reflect the special nature of financial english as a specialized language, but also its requirement of precision and professionalism. with the growing importance of english-language newspapers in the international arena, academic research on english-language financial reporting has gradually increased, aiming to help readers better understand and master the language. analyzing the linguistic features of english financial reports plays a significant role in improving www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 42 people's reading comprehension and application skills. an in-depth study of the language patterns of financial reports can promote readers' understanding of financial news, help them accurately access and utilize the information reported, and better grasp the dynamics of domestic and international economic activities. understanding the use of figures, the way of interpreting specialized terms and a variety of expression techniques in financial reports can help improve readers' awareness of economic change trends and flexibility in interpreting data. in addition, the use of vivid rhetorical techniques and humorous examples makes abstract financial concepts figurative, maintains the seriousness of the article without losing the wit, and greatly enriches the expression of financial reports and enhances their readability. 1.2 the role of financial reports in modern information society due to its wide influence and global universality in the modern information society, english financial reports have become a key channel for the transmission of global economic information. it serves as an international information bridge, enhances market transparency, guides investment decisions and popularizes economic education. english, as an international common language, enables english financial reports to cross language and cultural barriers, serving not only professionals but also the general public, providing a unified economic information platform for global readers. by timely releasing information such as company financial reports, macroeconomic data, industry trends, and policy changes, english financial reports increase market transparency, which helps investors and financial analysts to make wise investment and management decisions. it is crucial to improve the efficiency and coverage of information dissemination, which helps to reduce information asymmetry and promote fair trading. english-language financial reports are not only a tool for information transmission in modern society, but also an important force in connecting different markets, promoting international exchanges and influencing global decision-making. with the deep development of globalization and information age, the role and influence of english financial reports will be further enhanced. 1.3 purpose of the study and formulation of the problem the study of the linguistic features of english financial reports usually aims to gain an in-depth understanding of the specific linguistic styles, structures and strategies used in conveying economic information. it has the purpose of revealing linguistic patterns, improving reading comprehension, promoting effective communication, and contributing to academic research. the language patterns used in english financial reports, including terminology, syntactic structure, and the use of morphology, provide references for non-native english speakers and for financial professionals to enhance their comprehension of english financial reports in order to better understand and analyze research information in financial, professional, and financial english. it also raises questions about vocabulary use, syntactic structure, morphological choices, rhetorical strategies, information presentation, discourse frames, cross-cultural differences, etc., what are the commonly used terminology and vocabulary syntactic structure in english financial reports, and the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 43 frequency of the use of these vocabulary, and the impact of different morphologies on the communication of information. through the study of these issues, the linguistic characteristics of english financial reports can be comprehensively understood, and on this basis, it can provide support for related practical applications and theoretical research. 2. overview of english financial reporting english financial reporting is a form of journalism that focuses on delivering business, financial and economic information. it includes coverage of economic data, market dynamics, business strategies and other content. from the content and style of reporting, financial reporting can be categorized into in-depth analysis and background reporting, as well as instantaneous information delivery focusing on newsworthiness and practicality. for example, the financial times category is known for its in-depth analysis, while the wall street journal category focuses more on the rapid dissemination of information. the origins of financial reporting can be traced back to early commercial newspapers and exchange bulletins. with the industrial revolution and the development of capitalism, people's demand for economic information increased, and financial reporting gradually became an important part of the news media. it currently faces trends and challenges of technological innovation, personalized content, globalized perspectives, trust and accuracy, and the influence of economic theories. as an important form of news reporting, english financial reporting not only reflects the pulse of the global economy, but also serves as an important tool for international communication and decision-making. with the development of technology and changes in market demand, english financial reporting continues to evolve and faces the task of constant innovation and adaptation to new challenges. 3. theoretical framework of linguistic features 3.1 theoretical basis of linguistic feature research the analysis of linguistic features of english financial reports is mainly based on the theories of stylistics, linguistics and communication. the use of vocabulary, the composition of syntactic structure, the construction of clear chapter composition, the use of vivid rhetorical devices, is also a significant feature of english financial reports, which helps to explain complex concepts and attract the reader's attention, from a multidisciplinary, multi-angle approach to the study of the linguistic characteristics of the english financial reports has important theoretical value and practical significance. 3.2 the relationship between language style characteristics and communication effects english financial reports show different language styles in different contexts, which reflect their cultural characteristics and communication habits. in international communication and professional contexts, english financial reports tend to use precise and technical vocabulary and terminology to ensure the professionalism and accuracy of the information. english financial reports need to take into account cross-cultural communication needs sentence structure tends to be more complex, using subordinate clauses and passive voice to build a rigorous argument. in addition, data and statistics are www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 44 usually presented in a more detailed and standardized manner to reflect the authority of the report. in a popular context for the general public, english financial reports will use more concise and clear language, avoiding too much jargon so that non-specialized readers can also understand. sentence structure is simplified and the use of active voice is increased to enhance the directness and readability of the narrative. at the same time, reports may contain more background information and explanatory content to help readers better grasp the background and impact of economic events. there exists a close relationship between the language style characteristics of english financial reports and communication effects. the clarity of language directly affects readers' understanding and acceptance of information. the use of simple and clear language can improve the readability of the article and make it easier for readers to digest complex financial information. appropriate use of specialized terminology can enhance the authority of the report, thus increasing readers' trust in the media. vivid language style can attract readers' attention and increase the attractiveness of the report. the use of metaphors, quotations and other rhetorical devices can make boring economic data become vivid and interesting. effective language style can influence readers' emotions and attitudes, which in turn affect their decisions and behaviors. through sound argumentation and persuasive narration, financial reports can have a greater impact on readers. in international communication, taking into account the communication habits and expectations of different cultures, an appropriate linguistic style can help information cross cultural barriers and reach a wider audience. 4. linguistic features of english financial reports 4.1 vocabulary level characteristics the use of professional terms, due to the professional nature of financial reports, these reports are full of professional terms and proper nouns, such as "equity investment", "bridging loans", "promissory notes", etc. these terms may be unfamiliar to non-professional readers, but they are basic terms for professionals. these terms may be unfamiliar to the non-specialized reader, but are basic to the professional. frequent use of abbreviations and acronyms, in order to improve the efficiency of information transfer, financial reports often use acronyms, such as "etfs" stands for "exchange-traded funds" (exchange-type open-ended index funds) and so on. the use of these acronyms helps to simplify the text and make the information more concise. specific meanings of common words certain common words may have specific meanings in financial reporting. for example, "yield" means "output" in everyday english, whereas in a financial report it may refer to the yield on a bond. the use of dynamic vocabulary. words in financial reports are often closely related to market dynamics, such as "stock picking" and "cash equities," which reflect the dynamism and change in the market. precision and accuracy, in order to ensure the accuracy of the information, the choice of words in financial reports is usually very precise to avoid misunderstanding and confusion. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 45 4.2 syntactic and semantic level features use of extended simple sentences, in order to improve the efficiency of information transmission, financial reports often use extended simple sentence style. this kind of sentence style increases the amount of information by means of parallel or subordinate structure, while maintaining the clarity of the sentence. noun clauses often omit relational pronouns. in noun clauses, relational pronouns are usually omitted in order to simplify the sentence structure, a practice that to a certain extent exhibits the characteristics of colloquial tendency. frequent use of comparative structures, financial reports often use comparative structures to highlight changes in economic figures, which helps readers quickly grasp the trend and magnitude of data changes. extensive use of quotations. the use of quotations not only provides information from different perspectives, but also increases the credibility and authority of the report. sentences are long and loosely structured. due to the need to provide a large amount of information in a short period of time, financial reports tend to have long and loosely structured sentences, which may contain multiple insertions, such as determiners and gerunds, which are used to provide additional background information or explanations. frequent use of technical terms and proper nouns. the use of these terms helps to accurately convey complex economic concepts and information, ensuring the professionalism and accuracy of the report. for example, financial reports may refer to technical terms such as "derivatives" and "inflation", as well as proper nouns such as company names and economic indicators. borrowing words from other language domains, in order to make the report more vivid, english financial reports will borrow words from other language domains to describe the economic situation, and such usage can help readers better understand and perceive the economic phenomenon. 4.3 characteristics of rhetorical level the use of metaphors, in order to help readers better understand complex economic concepts, financial reports will use metaphors to simplify the explanation. for example, comparing the volatility of the financial market to a "tsunami" or a "storm" can help readers visualize the drastic nature of market changes. the use of anthropomorphism allows stories to create more compelling narratives by giving human qualities to economic entities such as companies, markets and even currencies. for example, one might say, "the stock market woke up in a good mood today," an expression that makes economic reporting more lively and entertaining. innovative use of numerical and comparative structures. financial reports make clever use of numerical and comparative structures to highlight the trends and magnitude of changes in economic data. this innovative expression helps readers quickly capture key information. popularization of terminology. in order to make terminology more accessible to the general public, financial reports will adopt simplified explanations or synonym substitution to make professional information more understandable. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 46 5. conclusion the linguistic characteristics of english financial reports, financial english has a strong professional color, involving a large number of professional terms and proper nouns, which is obviously different from the english used in daily life. although financial reports are highly specialized, in order to adapt to a wide range of readers, they often use popularized terminology so that non-professionals can also understand them. in terms of language expression, financial reports pursue rigor and accuracy to ensure the reliability and validity of information. financial reports keep abreast of current events and often use neologisms to describe the latest economic phenomena and trends. through metaphor, personification and other rhetorical devices, the content of the report is made more vivid and interesting to enhance the reading experience of the readers. the language features of english financial reports have the importance of information transfer, accurate language can help readers better understand complex financial information, so as to make informed decisions. the importance of educational function, through the report, the public can learn economic knowledge, improve their own economic literacy. market prediction importance professional financial reports can help investors predict market trends and play a guiding role in economic development. the linguistic characteristics of english financial reports to reflect on the combination of theory and practice, theoretical research should pay more attention to how to combine the study of financial english with practical application to improve its practical value. interdisciplinary integration, the language study of financial reports should be integrated with other disciplines such as economics and communication to form an interdisciplinary research perspective. there are limitations in the linguistic features of english financial reports, and current research may focus too much on the description of linguistic features and neglect the variability of language in different cultures and economic systems. however, with a view to the future, future research could explore in greater depth the linguistic features of financial reporting in different cultural contexts and the impact on language style with technological advances, such as the application of artificial intelligence in financial reporting. the linguistic features of english-language financial reports not only reflect their professionalism and popularity, but also their important role in information transfer, educational functions and market forecasting. future research needs to further explore how these linguistic features function in different cultural and economic environments, as well as the impact of technological developments on the language of financial reporting. understanding these linguistic features is crucial for reading and understanding financial reports in english. they not only influence the process of encoding and decoding information, but also have a significant impact on communication effectiveness. mastering these features can help readers access and process financial information more effectively, which is important for improving the public's economic literacy and decision-making ability. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 47 references cao, r. y., yu, b., & wang, j. y. (2007). analysis of linguistic features of english financial reports. modernization of shopping malls. chen, l. f. (2007). nominalization phenomenon in financial discourse and its translation. shanghai translation, 2007(02). chen, w. x. (2005). reading skills of english financial articles. journal of ningde teachers' college (philosophy and social science edition). guan, l. l. (2016). translation analysis of english financial reports. heilongjiang education (theory and practice). huang, c. (2013). translation techniques and methods of financial reports in the context of globalization. shanghai translation. kou, y. (2005). characteristics and development trend of new financial newspapers. jinan university. wang, z. e. (2009). characteristics of financial vocabulary in english financial reports. talent. wang, z. e. (2009). figurative means of financial vocabulary in financial english reports. talent. wu, y. l. (1993). characteristics of foreign economic newspapers. journalism. xue, l. l. (2013). linguistic features of trending sentences in english financial news. journal of zhejiang institute of business and technology. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 72 original paper dilemma and analysis of installing elevators in old residential buildings under the “one-vote veto system” yilong li 1 1 southwest minzu university, chengdu, china received: july 18, 2022 accepted: august 20, 2022 online published: august 23, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n3p72 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n3p72 abstract with the gradual entry into the aging society, the installation of elevators in existing residential buildings has gradually become an important “people’s livelihood” issue of social concern. but the transformation process has been slow. this paper believes that the “one-vote veto system” is an important obstacle to the slow progress. the “one-vote veto system” violates the legislative spirit of the property part of the “civil code” and should be considered by balancing the interests of various parties. keywords installing elevators old residential buildings one-vote veto system 1. the contradiction and urgency of installing elevators in aging communities is increasingly prominent with the promotion of urbanization, people‟s living standards and material conditions have been greatly improved. the renovation of elderly facilities in old residential areas has become one of the important contents in the field of people‟s livelihood. most elderly people still live in old residential areas. as an important part of the renovation of old residential areas and barrier-free public space planning, the installation of elevators in existing residential buildings is an important livelihood initiative to deal with the aging problem of urbanization. promoting the installation of elevators in existing residential buildings can better deal with the people‟s livelihood predicament caused by urbanization and aging in a transitional society, and is also an important practice to solve the shortage of infrastructure supply for the elderly at home. faced with the growing desire of residents to install elevators in old residential areas, local governments and their functional departments are also actively planning and promoting the installation of elevators in existing residential areas, but the progress is slow. as of june 29, 2017, only 45 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 73 published by scholink inc. elevators had been installed in beijing despite years of efforts to upgrade old buildings with elevators, but 43 of them were installed in one residential area alone. in addition, the number of successful elevator installation cases in shanghai, nanjing, harbin, xi „an and other cities only number in single digits. in particular, chengdu implemented the administrative measures for the addition of additional electric elevators at existing residential buildings on december 18, 2015, but the implementation is slow and difficult due to limitation by the requirements such as the consent of all owners with respect to the addition of an elevator unit. taking beijing as an example, although the installation of elevators for existing residential buildings has long been on the government‟s livelihood project agenda, several authorities of beijing municipality jointly issued the guiding opinions on adding elevators for existing multi-storey residential buildings in beijing as early as 2010. however, the principle of applying for adding elevators, i.e. “the application shall be subject to the consent of the property owners in the unit which will be directly affected by the lighting, ventilation and noise caused by the addition of elevators”, endows the property owners with the “veto power” against the adding of elevators. this has become a major obstacle to the implementation of practical works. currently, there are 2.37 million elevator-less units from the 4th to the 6th floor in beijing, including 44,000 units for central units and 1.93 million units for city-owned units. all the units which have successfully added elevators are directly owned by central government and fully funded by the government, and no city-owned units have been successfully added. 2. “one-vote veto system” becomes the key factor hindering elevator installation the working thought of a local government of controlling contradictions at the source establishes a “one-vote veto system” for the installation of elevators in existing residences, in other words, some administrative measures specify that “a written agreement shall be reached by the owners of the unit where the elevator is located and the agreement is notarized by a notary organ, so as to reduce the occurrence of contradictions at the source”, or “the consent of the owners of the unit who are directly affected by the lighting, ventilation and noise after the installation of the elevator shall be obtained” and so on. finally, after the preliminary work, often because a floor of one or two low-level users because of cost, noise and other issues raised objections, making the preliminary work “in vain”, resulting in the project on hold. 3. “one ballot veto system” violates the legislative spirit of the part of property right of the civil code with regard to the issue of installing elevators on existing houses, some local governments usually formulated relevant administrative measures for the purpose of avoiding disputes; the “one-vote veto system” prescribed in such measures does not clearly define the owners‟ rights and interests and is not appropriate in itself. the establishment of voting right in the property rights law shall not be confused www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 74 published by scholink inc. with the establishment of policy promotion as prescribed in the administrative law. 3.1 there are fundamental differences between the “one-vote veto system” and the property rights law in terms of manner of denial only articles 279, 970 and 974 of the civil code appear in the whole civil code, and the word “unanimously approved” appears in these three articles, but such three articles do not apply to the installation of elevators. however, in article 278 (note 1) of the civil code, any resolution may be passed so long as the number of votes required for passing the resolution is satisfied. the result of the voting shall not be affected whether the other votes vote against the resolution or abstain from voting. in addition, the weighting of an owner‟s voting rights is linked to the exclusive area he owns. due to the introduction of the condition “area” in the voting on resolutions under article 278, for example, when an owner has purchased a house with the exclusive area more than 1/3 of the houses in the community, if that owner declines to vote or votes against the resolution on matters specified in section 1 (6) to section 1 (8), the vote is void or rejected. if an owner has purchased a house with the exclusive area more than half of the houses, then all matters must be voted with the participation of this owner, and approved by this owner in order to be passed. in such a case, the owner has “the veto”. 3.2 the owner has the right to vote, not a veto there is a misconception that all people are equal before the law and that in a voting, the affirmative vote shall be the majority vote, and that to ignore his objection is an infringement of his right. such an idea is wrong and confuses the right to vote with the right to decide. according to article 33 (note 2) of the constitution and article 4 of the civil code, the equality of all is reflected in the equal right to vote, not the right to decide. no one has the right to influence the will of another person, but it is the number of votes, not the will of a person, that determines the results of a vote. so in the relevant elevator litigation, there has never been a majority owner who sued for the minority owner “not to oppose” or “agree”, because every owner‟s voting right is protected by law. 3.3 owners’ co-ownership is not joint ownership and cannot use article 301 of the civil code to claim the veto right it is wrong to think that joint ownership in article 301 of the civil code should be used to claim the consent of all the owners. in joint ownership, the common property is not divided into shares. during the period of joint ownership, the jointly owned thing cannot be divided into parts and enjoyed by each joint owner respectively, but each joint owner enjoys its ownership, the right of each joint owner extends to all the jointly owned thing. owners‟ co-ownership obviously does not conform to this characteristic. for example, income from elevator or wall advertising is owned by all the owners, but is divided in accordance with the law. in addition, the owner‟s common part and the exclusive part are bound to each other and inseparable. if the owners‟ co-ownership is joint ownership, in combination with article 301 (note 3) of the civil code, the owner must obtain the consent of the other owners when he sells his house. in addition, generally speaking, there are three types of joint ownership: (i) property jointly owned by the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 75 published by scholink inc. spouses. (ii) property jointly owned by the family. (iii) property inherited in common. there is no joint ownership of the owners. therefore, article 301 of the civil code does not apply to joint ownership with the owners, but article 308 (note 4) of the civil code should be applied to be regarded as joint ownership by shares. a vote to dispose of the common part to be added by the owners, not the private part, so it is not necessary to obtain the consent of a certain owner, unless the added elevator occupies the private area of a certain owner. in the policy of elevator addition in various areas, it can be found that if the added elevator occupies the private part to be added by the owners, the consent of the said private part shall be obtained. for example, if the elevator shaft needs to occupy the private yard on the first floor, the consent of the first floor shall be obtained, and in this case, the first floor owner is equal to the veto power. when the work of elevator addition was first started, in order to avoid contradictions at the source, local governments issued implementation plans of elevator addition basically giving the owners the veto power. however, as the work of elevator addition continues to go ahead, although the veto power has avoided disputes to some extent, its disadvantages are soon appearing. based on the foregoing, in general, low-story owners have little or no need for elevators. but after they object to elevator addition, for high-story owners, especially those who have a greater need for elevators, their living environment and quality of life cannot be improved because of the decision to install elevators is rejected. owners‟ needs for elevators are different, and the “veto power” enjoyed by owners makes the resolution to install elevators easily rejected, leading to installation of elevators, a project of people‟s livelihood, in trouble. 4. be careful in using the “veto power” and balancing the interests of multiple parties the installation of elevators in the existing houses should, in light of the laws and regulations of the planning and construction, focus on the detailed planning and construction, better coordinate the interests of all parties, smoothly implement the installation of elevators in the existing houses, and build a system design that gives consideration to the overall interests of owners and the legitimate rights and interests of individual owners. the “veto power” cannot objectively reflect the interests of the majority of owners, and should not be used as a way of voting on the installation of elevators in the existing houses. in the process of formulating relevant administrative laws, the governments should be cautious in using the “veto power”, and should draw on the existing laws to balance the public interests, and enact the “higher-level law” in accordance with the legislative law of the people‟s republic of china. local governments should earnestly push ahead with the installation of elevators in the existing houses on the basis of “laws to abide by”. in response to the predicament of elevator installation caused by the “veto power”, in recent years, the voting consent ratio has been changed in most areas, from the original one hundred percent voting ratio to “double two-thirds”. there are regulations on the voting consent ratio of property owners for elevator installation in old residential areas in ten provincial capital cities (or centrally-administered municipalities) including beijing, shanghai, guangzhou, nanjing, tianjin, nanning, nanchang, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 76 published by scholink inc. changsha, lanzhou and xining. except that the<implementation plan of elevator installation for existing multi-story residential buildings in xining>implemented in 2017 provides that the conditions of elevator installation shall be met only with the consent of all the property owners and the absence of objections from interested parties, other cities require the voting consent ratio of “double twothirds”. beijing, tianjin and nanning and other cities require that other property owners shall not expressly object or shall obtain the consent of the property owners of the occupied exclusive areas; and guangzhou, shanghai and nanjing adjust the voting rules in a timely manner according to the civil code. references beijing daily. (n.d.). 45 elevators added to old buildings in beijing, 43 in the same community, [eb/ol]. chen, j. y. (2017). research on the current development and countermeasures of adding elevators to existing residential buildings in beijing. china market, 2017(05), 99-100, 118. https://doi.org/10.13939/j.cnki.zgsc.2017.05.099 general office of xining municipal government. (2017). notice of the general office of xining municipal government on forwarding implementation plan of elevator installation for existing multi-story residential buildings in xining [eb/ol] (2017-11-03) [2021-06-15]. yang. t. (2017). thinking on the dilemma of installing elevators in existing houses under the phenomenon of one-vote veto: focusing on article 78 of the property law. forum of science and technology association, 2017(11), 54-56. notes note 1. article 278 of the <civil code> the following matters shall be jointly decided by the owners: (1) formulating or modifying the rules of procedure of the owners‟ congress; (2) formulating or modifying the management covenant; (3) electing the owners‟ committee or replacing the members of the owners‟ committee; (4) selecting or dismissing property service enterprises or other managers; (5) using the maintenance funds for a building and the affiliated facilities thereof; (6) raising maintenance funds for a building and the affiliated facilities thereof; (7) renovating or reconstructing a building and the affiliated facilities thereof; (8) changing the purpose of common parts or using common parts to carry out business activities; and (9) other major matters relating to common rights and joint management rights. any matter jointly decided by the owners shall be voted by the owners who account for more than 2/3 of the exclusive area and by more than 2/3 of the total number of the owners. a decision on any of the matters specified in items 6 to 8 of the preceding paragraph shall be subject to the approval by more than 3/4 of the owners who participate in the voting, and by more than 3/4 of the owners who participate in the voting. a decision on any other matter specified in the preceding paragraph shall be subject to the approval by more than half of the owners who participate in the voting, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 77 published by scholink inc. and by more than half of the owners who participate in the voting. note 2. article 33 of the constitution: all persons holding the nationality of the people‟s republic of china are citizens of the people‟s republic of china. all citizens of the people‟s republic of china are equal before the law. the state respects and protects human rights. every citizen enjoys the rights and at the same time must perform the duties prescribed by the constitution and laws. note 3. article 301 of the <civil code> where a co-owned immovable or movable is disposed of, or a major repair is made to, or the nature or purpose of a co-owned immovable or movable is changed, the consent of the divided co-owners holding 2/3 shares or all joint co-owners shall be obtained, unless it is otherwise stipulated between the co-owners. note 4. article 308 of the civil code: where the joint owners make no agreement on whether the jointly owned immovable or movable is under joint ownership by shares or joint ownership, or such agreement is unclear, the joint ownership shall be regarded as joint ownership by shares unless there is a family relationship among the joint owners. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 20 original paper fiscal decentralization and natural disaster relief in china wang bo 1 1 school of economics and management, northwest university, xi’an, shaanxi province, china received: september 14, 2022 accepted: october 3, 2022 online published: october 8, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n4p20 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n4p20 abstract this paper analyzes the impact of fiscal decentralization on the level of government relief for natural disasters using 30 provincial-level data from 1997 to 2017 in china. the results show that fiscal decentralization positively impacts local government expenditure on natural disaster relief. although it is different from the existing conclusion that fiscal decentralization inhibits the supply of local non-economic public goods, this conclusion can be explained by the literature on disaster prevention and control; the incentive of decentralization to increase government revenue increases the opportunity cost of disaster prevention and control investment, which makes the pre-disaster funds insufficient, and the post-disaster financial expenditure of natural disaster relief increase accordingly. keywords fiscal decentralization, non-economic public goods, natural disaster relief 1. introduction in recent years, andreas and timo (2008) and jia et al. (2014) noted that china’s decentralization reforms had pushed local governments to favor economic public goods services to promote regional economic growth. in addition, china’s tax-sharing reform has created significant incentives for local governments to rely on land finance, which further skews local governments toward economic public goods services (ding et al., 2014; hui li, 2017). however, as a non-economic public good, the public goods of disaster prevention, mitigation, and relief have achieved different results under china’s fiscal decentralization system. it has been nearly 30 years since china implemented the tax-sharing reform in 1994. apart from the earthquake in wenchuan county in 2008, the financial expenditure on natural disaster relief has reached an all-time high; from 2000 to 2017, the overall natural disasters in china fiscal spending on bailouts showed an upward trend (figure 1). this makes it necessary to consider whether fiscal decentralization impacts public goods of disaster prevention, mitigation, and relief differently than general public goods. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 21 published by scholink inc. figure 1. spending on natural disasters in china from 2000 to 2017 it is now widely accepted that decentralized government is more effective in disaster prevention and mitigation than centralized government (rumbach, 2016) because natural disasters are limited to a particular geographical area and rarely affect the whole country. therefore, for local governments that have complete control of regional information, knowledge, and resources, decentralization helps prevent and mitigate regional disasters. in addition, numerous studies have shown that countries with greater decentralization have higher budgets for disaster prevention and mitigation (fahlevi et al., 2019) and fewer deaths from disasters (skidmore & toya, 2013), and the impact is more pronounced in developing countries (escaleras & register, 2012). in short, according to the existing research, there is relatively little literature on the financial expenditure of natural disaster relief. much research has been carried out on fiscal decentralization and natural disaster prevention. it is generally believed that fiscal decentralization is conducive to reducing the impact of natural disasters on the economy and society. under the specific condition of government aid standards, the scale of government aid to natural disasters is directly related to the impact of economic and social disasters. what is the effect of china’s fiscal decentralization on local government disaster prevention, and how does that affect natural disaster relief, which is an important topic discussed in this paper? 2. theoretical basis and research hypothesis how local governments use and control the fiscal revenue of decentralization depends on the specific characteristics of fiscal decentralization. for china’s tax-sharing reform in 1994, the following two specific features: the central government’s fiscal revenue has been increased, giving the central government more room for policy adjustment. the central government can use the transfer payment to regulate the equalization of regional public services. on the other hand, the core measure of tax-sharing reform is the “tax-sharing system” change. the tax revenue is divided into three parts: state, local, and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 22 published by scholink inc. shared tax. the state tax is obtained by the central government, local governments obtain local taxes, and shared taxes are divided between the central and local governments in a particular proportion. at the same time, the fiscal responsibility of local governments has not been changed, and local governments still bear nearly 80% of public goods expenditures in all regions. however, this heavy expenditure responsibility is the political promotion incentive that decides the official promotion by the performance appraisal. this fiscal decentralization system incentivizes local governments to develop the economy and generate tax revenue. as for the public goods of disaster prevention, reduction, and relief, although they are non-economic public goods, they play an essential role in supporting regional economic growth. specifically, china’s financial investment in disaster prevention, mitigation, and public relief goods include financial investment in disaster prevention and control and financial investment in disaster relief. pre-disaster disaster prevention and control funding are critical to improving the region’s resilience to natural disasters, reducing disaster losses, and achieving sustainable economic development (cohen & werker, 2008). the financial input of disaster relief after the disaster benefits the economic recovery of the disaster-stricken areas. however, under the decentralized system, local governments prefer economic public goods services, increasing the opportunity cost of disaster prevention and control investment correspondingly increase, thus reducing the investment of disaster prevention and control funds. as burby (2006) puts it, the local government paradox is that local officials see natural disasters as a secondary issue and are reluctant to invest in disaster mitigation. in addition, most natural disaster relief funds for local governments in china come from special transfer payments from the central government, meaning that the state fully ensures economic losses caused by natural disasters. therefore, at the local government level, there is a trade-off between the supply of economic public goods and the optimal input of public goods for disaster prevention, mitigation, and relief. the change in financial expenditure for natural disaster relief will be the result of this trade-off. in order to simplify the study, we take a single local government as an example to explore the local government’s financial expenditure on the trade-off problem. local governments provide economic and non-economic public goods for their jurisdictions according to the tax and transfer payment revenue they receive. suppose is an economic public goods expenditure, is a non-economic public goods expenditure, and is the ratio of economic public goods expenditure to non-economic public goods expenditure ( ): (1) assuming that the central government uniformly determines the national, local, and shared tax rates, the statutory tax rate is ( ). if the regional economic output is ( ) and the level of decentralization of local government revenue is , then the local government revenue sharing is . in order to simplify the study, local government debt and other funds outside the system are not taken into account; the total fiscal revenue received by local governments consists of two funds, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 23 published by scholink inc. tax-sharing revenue ( ) and central transfer payment (including general transfer payment and unique transfer payment ), that is: (2) assuming that the local government investment in disaster prevention and control is , it is mainly used to invest in the modification of disaster prevention works, special expenses of disaster forecast and detection, propaganda of disaster prevention and reduction, personnel training, etc. suppose the ratio of disaster loss to local economic output is . in that case, the ratio of disaster loss ( ) and the capital input for disaster prevention and control ( ) shows a reverse decreasing relationship (zhuo & duan, 2012), that is, , and satisfy , . suppose that the probability of a regional natural disaster is and that the probability of a disaster occurring in one region is independent of the probability of a disaster occurring in another region since most natural disasters are inevitable but predictable (nagasaka, 2008). therefore, this paper assumes that the probability value of a natural disaster is an exogenous variable and a known constant at the same time. assuming that the initial social capital stock of an area is , the social capital stock affected by natural disaster risk can be expressed as: (3) suppose that the proportion of natural disaster relief expenditure to non-economic public goods expenditure is . the proportion of special funds for disaster prevention and control to total disaster prevention and control funds is , the proportion of the special expenditure of economic public goods to the total expenditure of economic public goods is the proportion of the special expenditure of other non-economic public goods to the total expenditure of non-economic public goods is , then the financial expenditure of natural disaster relief is , and there are: (4) barro’s (1990) endogenous economic growth model uses a production function that includes both private capital and public expenditure in its inputs and is therefore widely adopted (davoodi & zou (1998)). in this paper, we construct the regional output function with reference to its expression as follows: (5) where is the economic output of the region, and is the other factors (such as technical factors) that affect the economic output of the region other than economic public goods expenditure and capital stock, reflects the degree of economic public goods expenditure affecting the economic output of the region ( ), reflects the degree of capital stock affecting the economic output of the region ( ). on the premise of other constant factors, the increase of social capital stock or economic public goods expenditure level will promote the local economic output level. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 24 published by scholink inc. for local governments, the goal is to increase economic output and non-economic public goods expenditure such as education, health care, and social security to maximize the utility of local governments. with reference to cai & treisman (2005), the utility function of local government is a utility maximization problem as follows: (6) among them, denotes the importance of regional economic output affecting the utility of local government ( ). from the equations (1)(2)(4) and (6): (7) according to the practical significance, the local government’s economic public goods expenditure and non-economic public goods expenditure should be greater than zero, so the following inequality holds: (8) combined (5)(6) and (7) can transform local government utility maximization problems into: (9) formula (9) is the derivative of the investment in disaster prevention and control fund , and partial , so that the optimal utility function of local government should satisfy the following condition formula: (10) according to formula (10), when the utility function of local government can be optimized, the financial expenditure of natural disaster relief can be further expressed as: (11) from equations (4) and (8), we know that and . therefore, from formula (11), we know that the financial expenditure of natural disaster relief increases with the ratio of economic public goods expenditure to non-economic public goods expenditure. secondly, after considering the input of funds for disaster prevention and control, the more the proportion of special funds for disaster prevention and control ( ), the less the proportion of funds for disaster prevention and control in general transfer payment is, the financial expenditure of natural disaster relief ( ) increased. finally, the degree parameter , which reflects the influence of economic public goods expenditure on regional economic output, is positively correlated with the financial expenditure of natural disaster relief, that is, the greater the impact of economic public goods expenditure on regional economic output, the greater the impact of economic public goods expenditure on regional economic www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 25 published by scholink inc. output, so economic public goods fiscal expenditure is more conducive to regional economic growth, thus bringing more fiscal revenue for local governments, the overall level of public goods fiscal expenditure of local governments. overall, china’s tax-sharing reform makes local governments favor economic public goods supply. this financial expenditure bias is further reflected in the public goods of disaster prevention, mitigation, and relief. in terms of disaster risk response, while the central government is in the best position for political centralization, it is understood in advance for local governments. it takes into account future disaster relief actions by the central government; any ex-post adjustment of transfer payments by the central government will further distort the regional incentive mechanism and lead to insufficient ex-ante investment to further stimulate local governments, the final performance of the disaster prevention and control funds to reduce and increase the financial expenditure of natural disaster relief. therefore, we get the following theoretical hypothesis: h1: there is a positive correlation between the degree of the financial income distribution ( ) and the local government expenditure on natural disaster relief ( ); h2: fiscal decentralization reduces local government funding for disaster prevention by affecting local government preferences for economic public goods service; this, in turn, leads to an increase in local financial expenditure on natural disaster relief ( ). 3. model settings, variable descriptions, and data sources 3.1 model settings to test h1, we constructed the following econometric model: where stands for region and for year. is the intercept term, is the region fixed effect, is the year fixed effect, is the residual term. the disease is the explanatory variable of this paper, which represents the financial expenditure of the local government in the natural disaster relief of area in the year. is the explanatory variable, representing the share of local government revenue in area in the year. was the control variable, and were the coefficients. in order to test h2, we add in the interaction terms to verify that the local government economic public goods service bias affects the financial input of disaster prevention and control, and then affects the financial expenditure of local natural disaster relief, and construct the model as follows: the interactive item is the explanatory variable, in which is the disaster prevention www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 26 published by scholink inc. fund input of local government in area in year. 3.2 variable description the financial expenditure index of natural disaster relief ( ) is the explained variable in this paper. to eliminate the influence of outliers and make the data more stable to weaken the collinearity and heteroscedasticity of the model, we take the logarithmic values in the empirical process. fiscal decentralization ( ) is the core explanatory variable in this paper. based on the theoretical analysis, this paper analyzes the impact of fiscal decentralization on the financial expenditure of natural disaster relief from the perspective of fiscal decentralization. therefore, this paper adopts fiscal revenue distribution ( ) as the explanatory variable and fiscal expenditure distribution ( ) as the substitute variable for the robustness test. this paper uses the ratio of economic public goods expenditure to total public goods expenditure ( ) to measure the change in local government’s public goods supply preference. the so-called economic public goods service is a public product that can bring direct economic effects to the region’s development, including transportation, energy, communication, and other infrastructure. a fundamental fact of public investment (ps) in disaster prevention and control is difficult to measure the number of funds invested in disaster prevention and control in a region. therefore, to measure public investment performance in disaster prevention and control, existing studies have used indicators such as disaster-affected populations or disaster economic loss (escaleras & register, 2012; skidmore & toya, 2013). in this paper, the ratio of direct economic loss due to disasters to the gdp of the whole province is used to replace the public investment (ps) in disaster prevention and control, and the ratio of disaster-affected population to the total population of the whole province (szrk) is used for the robustness test. through reviewing the literature, we find that both the density and the urban are considered to be the factors that affect the probability of death from natural disasters, and the consumption index will affect the level of disaster relief. given the above three factors will directly affect the results of this study, so as a control variable in the empirical model. in addition, seth (2008) study shows that transportation systems are an essential factor in local natural disaster population loss. therefore, this paper takes the area of per capita road (pertraffic), regional passenger traffic level (pass), and other indicators as control variables. 3.3 data sources due to the following data limitations, the decision of this study cycle. since 1997, when chongqing became a municipality, the country has been divided into 34 province-level divisions (four www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 27 published by scholink inc. municipalities, 23 provinces, five autonomous regions, and two special administrative regions) and long-term stability. second, china began to implement the tax-sharing system reform in 1994, and by 1997, has experienced several years of adjustment and improvement, and the system tended to mature. third, china’s natural disaster relief expenditure of the latest figures until 2017. therefore, we chose data for the period 1997-2017. in addition, we exclude tibet, taiwan, hong kong and macau, and select provincial panel data from 30 regions across china from 1997-2017, taking into account data availability and comparability issues. the empirical analysis was conducted using stata 16.0. the data of each variable are derived from the chinese statistical yearbook, chinese financial statistical yearbook, chinese civil statistical yearbook, and wind database. 4. empirical results and their explanations table 1 shows the regression results of empirical model 1 and empirical model 2. the r 2 of model 1 and model 2 are above 0.5, which shows that the fitting effect of the model is better. from the regression results of model 1, it can be seen that fiscal decentralization has a significant positive effect on the growth rate of fiscal expenditure on natural disaster relief, which is significant at the 10% level. it shows that the greater the degree of decentralization of fiscal revenue, the greater the degree of local government expenditure on natural disaster relief. so suppose that h 1 is supported empirically. from the regression results of model 2, fiscal decentralization has a significant positive impact on the proportion of local government economic public goods expenditure, and the statistical results are significant at 5% significance level. it shows that fiscal decentralization makes local governments have obvious economic expenditure bias. from model 2(2), it can be seen that the interaction between the proportion of economic public goods expenditure and the proportion of disaster economic loss has a significant positive effect on the growth rate of financial expenditure of natural disaster relief and the statistical results were significant at the 1% significance level. it shows that the economical expenditure of local government influences the financial expenditure of natural disaster relief by affecting the intensity of disaster prevention and control. table 1. results of basic model regression model 1 model 2 (1) (2) lndiff exp lndiff fdr 1.5359* 10.3073** (0.8089) (4.0050) ps*exp 0.3054*** (0.0370) urban 2.1473*** -14.3907*** 2.3635*** www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 28 published by scholink inc. (0.3320) (1.7989) (0.3317) lnconsume 0.4255 8.0352** 0.4578 (0.5789) (3.1523) (0.5820) lndensity 0.1133** 0.2651 0.0857* (0.0496) (0.2696) (0.0498) lnpass -0.2277* 0.1767 -0.2740** (0.1283) (0.6955) (0.1277) ps 7.2061*** (0.8648) pertraffic -0.0497*** (0.0143) constant 7.1858** -24.3660 8.0726*** (3.0204) (16.4386) (3.0431) r-squared 0.553 0.696 0.543 n 630 630 630 time fixed effect yes yes yes area fixed effect yes yes yes note. standard deviation in parentheses, * 0.1 significant * * 0.05 significant * * 0.01 significant. in order to investigate the robustness of the models, for models 1 and 2, we replace the fiscal revenue decentralization ( ) with the fiscal expenditure decentralization ( ) and replace the proportion of direct disaster economic loss with the proportion of the disaster-affected population, the other variables were left unchanged for regression. the results are shown in table 2. from the table, we can see that the sign of the main variables in model 1 and model 2 is changed, and the significance level is enhanced, which shows that our empirical model is robust. table 2. robustness test model 1 model 2 (1) (2) lndiff exp lndiff fds 3.1711*** 48.0050*** (0.7766) (4.9711) szrk*exp 0.0252*** (0.0059) urban 0.4652* -12.5055*** 0.5864** (0.2658) (1.6825) (0.2895) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 29 published by scholink inc. lnconsume 0.5925 4.0966 0.4879 (0.4452) (2.9703) (0.4763) lndensity 0.0778** -0.0624 0.0724* (0.0379) (0.2533) (0.0409) lnpass -0.0702 -0.3019 -0.0720 (0.0980) (0.6484) (0.1052) ps 6.7932*** (0.6576) pertraffic -0.0145 (0.0103) constant 3.6482 -30.4747** 6.4882*** (2.3073) (15.3487) (2.4960) r-squared 0.625 0.736 0.557 n 630 630 630 time fixed effect yes yes yes area fixed effect yes yes yes note. standard deviation in parentheses, * 0.1 significant * * 0.05 significant * * 0.01 significant. 5. conclusion china’s tax-sharing reform in 1994 made local governments responsible for most of the expenditures, including public goods for disaster prevention and relief. the theoretical and empirical evidence shows that there is a positive correlation between the share of fiscal revenue in china and the expenditure of local governments on natural disaster relief, local governments’ limited share of fiscal revenue and china’s special incentives for political promotion have led to a bias towards economic public goods service, which has further led to a reduction in local government funding for disaster prevention and control, accordingly, local governments are urged to invest more money in natural disaster relief to help the economic recovery of the affected areas. references andreas, k., & timo, v. (2008). fiscal federalism and the composition of public investment in europe. european journal of political economy, 24(3), 562-570. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.06.002 barro, r. j. (1990). government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth. journal of political economy, university of chicago press, 98(5), 103-126. https://doi.org/10.1086/261726 burby, & raymond, j. (2006). hurricane katrina and the paradoxes of government disaster policy: bringing about wise government decisions of hazardous areas. annals of the american academy of political and social sciences, 604, 171-191. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 30 published by scholink inc. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716205284676 cai, hongbin, & daniel t. (2005). does competition for capital discipline governments? decentralization, globalization, and public policy. american economic review, 95(3), 817-830. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828054201314 cohen, c., & werker, e. d. (2008). the political economy of “natural” disasters. journal of conflict resolution, 52, 795-819. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002708322157 davoodi, h., & zou, hengfu. (1998). fiscal decentralization and economic growth: a cross-country study. journal of urban economics, 43(2), 244-257. https://doi.org/10.1006/juec.1997.2042 ding, c., yi, n., & erik, l. (2014). spending preferences of local officials with off-budget land revenues of chinese cities. china economic review, 31, 265-276. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2014.10.001 escaleras, m., & register, c. a. (2012). fiscal decentralization and natural hazard risks. public choice, 151, 165-183. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9740-4 fahlevi, h., indriani, m., & oktari, r. s. (2019). is the indone-sian disaster response budget correlated with disaster risk? jamba-journal of disaster risk studies. https://doi.org/10.4102/jamba.v11i1.759 hui, l. (2017). an empirical analysis of the effects of land-transfer revenues on local governments’ spending preferences in china. lee kuan yew school of public policy research paper, 17-04. jia, j. x., guo, q. w., & zhang, j. (2014). fiscal decentralization and local expenditure policy in china. china economic review, 28, 107-122. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2014.01.002 nagasaka, t. (2008). new problems in the study of disaster prevention based on disaster risk governance. quarterly review, 27, 77-92. rumbach a. (2016). decentralization and small cities to-wards more effective urban disaster governance? habitat international, 35-42. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2015.08.026 seth, d. g. (2008). natural disaster risk analysis for critical infrastructure systems: an approach based on statistical learning theory. reliability engineering & system safety, 855-860. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2008.09.003 skidmore, m., & toya, h. (2013). natural disaster impacts and fiscal decentralization. land economics, 89(1), 101-117. https://doi.org/10.3368/le.89.1.101 zhuo, z., & duan, s. (2012). investment expenditure on disaster prevention and mitigation, disaster control and economic growth: an economic analysis and china’s empirical study. world of management, 04, 1-8. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 125 original paper rethinking the development of science and technology finance in china xin dong1 1 the university of shanghai for science and technology, shanghai, china received: august 29, 2025 accepted: october 11, 2025 online published: october 25, 2025 doi:10.22158/ape.v8n1p125 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v8n1p125 abstract technological innovation and financial development are mutually reinforcing.the financial system alleviates the financing constraints faced by technological innovation by providing services such as information incentives, risk management, and intertemporal resource allocation. this paper first reviews the interactive relationship between technological progress and financial innovation during the three industrial revolutions, clarifying the connotation and functional positioning of science and technology finance. subsequently, by analyzing the structural characteristics of china’s financial system, it points out the limitations of the government-dominated credit system and bank-dominated financing structure in supporting technological innovation. finally, it proposes policy recommendations for improving china’s science and technology finance system, including unblocking the circulation bottlenecks between science, technology, and finance, enriching the ecosystem of science and technology finance supply, and establishing a national-level science and technology finance support institution. keywords science and technology finance, financial system, technological innovation 1. introduction after more than four decades of reform and opening up, the sustainability of china’s economic growth increasingly relies on technological innovation capabilities.innovation-driven development has become an inevitable choice for economic development patterns. technological innovation cannot be separated from financial support. a stable and efficient financial system can effectively respond to the financing constraints faced by technological innovation and promote its stable and sustainable development by providing services such as information production, incentive mechanisms, risk management, and intertemporal allocation. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 126 throughout human history, each industrial revolution has begun with a technological leap, subsequently driving changes in commercial organizational forms, posing new demands for capital, and promoting reforms in the financial sector. financial innovation, in turn, acts as a catalyst for commercial and technological progress. as technological iterations become more frequent, the demand for financial innovation from technological progress continues to increase, and the interactive model between the two is constantly evolving. against this backdrop, in-depth research on the development patterns of science and technology finance and the design of policy systems tailored to china’s national conditions are of great significance for promoting an innovation-driven development strategy. 2. evolution of financial innovation during the three industrial revolutions 2.1 the first industrial revolution (18th century 60s to mid-19th century) with the widespread application of the steam engine, societal productivity underwent a breakthrough transformation, making large-scale production possible and significantly increasing capital demand. to meet the urgent funding needs of industrial expansion, the modern banking system gradually emerged. the bank of england was established in 1694. by 1825, the number of banks in britain exceeded 700, basically achieving the effective conversion of household savings into industrial capital. in 1817, the new york stock exchange committee (now the new york stock exchange) was established, and the emergence of railway stocks around 1830 marked the initial formation of the early capital market. the most representative financial innovation during this period was the formation and operation of commercial bank credit mechanisms. banks absorbed idle social funds and provided long-term financing support for emerging industries such as textiles, steel, and railways, playing a key role in promoting enterprise expansion and industrial development. although the stock market was still in its infancy, it began to function as a channel for supplementing enterprise long-term capital. 2.2 the second industrial revolution (19th century 60s to early 20th century) the widespread application of electricity drove industry further towards intensification and organization, leading to the emergence of large-scale monopolistic organizations such as cartels and syndicates, and deepening enterprises’ reliance on financial resources. financial innovation during this period focused on the rise of investment banks.on the one hand, with the rapid development of capital-intensive industries such as railways, manufacturing, and mining, commercial bank credit struggled to meet their enormous financing needs, and enterprises increasingly turned to issuing stocks and bonds to expand their funding sources, driving demand for securities underwriting services. on the other hand, commercial banks were unable to meet the demands of numerous mergers and acquisitions; from 1895 to 1904, the united states experienced its first merger wave, with a significant trend of integration between industrial capital and financial assets. the emergence of investment banks, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 127 specializing in securities underwriting, corporate mergers and acquisitions, and project financing, filled the gap in commercial bank services in the capital market, significantly enhancing the financial system’s ability to support the real economy and promoting the increasing maturity of the capital market. 2.3 the third industrial revolution (midto late 20th century) the new round of technological revolution, represented by atomic energy, electronic computers, aerospace technology, and biotechnology, profoundly changed social production methods and economic organizational forms.simultaneously, the rapid development of information and communication technologies accelerated the globalization of economic activities, leading to structural changes in the financial system.financial innovation during this period was mainly reflected in two aspects: first, the internationalization process of financial services accelerated. the rapid expansion of multinational corporations and sustained growth in global trade posed higher requirements for cross-border capital allocation and risk management. the establishment of multilateral economic and trade organizations such as the international monetary fund, world bank, and world trade organization provided an institutional basis for a global financial coordination and support system. second, the venture capital mechanism gradually took shape. rapidly growing technology enterprises became important drivers of economic growth, but traditional financing models struggled to adapt to their high-risk and highly uncertain characteristics. therefore, governments around the world successively established small business investment companies, introduced venture capital funds (such as sequoia capital), and promoted the construction of a multi-level capital market system (such as nasdaq), effectively promoting the commercialization and industrialization of technological achievements and providing crucial financial support for the formation of technological innovation clusters. 3. connotation and functional positioning of science and technology finance the development of technology financing often lags behind enterprise and societal needs. on the one hand, technological achievements possess characteristics such as specificity, dependency, virtuality, monopoly, spillover, timeliness, and optionality, making them difficult to scientifically measure and trade. on the other hand, technology enterprises are characterized by intangible asset lightness, high risk, information asymmetry, small scale, and high growth potential, leading to severe market failures in their financing. science and technology finance is a systematic and innovative arrangement of various financial tools, institutions, policies, and services aimed at promoting technology development, achievement transformation, and high-tech industry development. governments, enterprises, markets, social intermediary organizations, and other entities provide financial support in the technological innovation financing process, making it an important component of the national technological innovation system and financial system. science and technology finance is the organic integration of “the primary www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 128 productive force” and “the primary driving force”, embodying the fusion of technological and financial innovation. the main functions of science and technology finance are reflected in the following aspects: resource allocation function: from a macro perspective, science and technology finance must provide an effective resource allocation mechanism for society, optimizing social output and welfare with limited resources.society needs to direct resources towards the technology sector and the real economy to prevent excessive economic virtualization. china’s economic development once relied excessively on infrastructure construction and real estate investment, which not only caused overcapacity to a certain extent but also triggered an economic virtualization tendency, insufficiently supporting consumption and innovation. this phenomenon indicates that there is still room for improvement in china’s macro-level resource allocation efficiency. resource allocation efficiency is the result of the combined effects of market mechanisms, government intervention, and institutional environments. information production function: from a micro perspective, science and technology finance first needs to address the issue of information asymmetry.information asymmetry refers to a situation where transaction parties (such as borrowers and lenders) possess different quantities or qualities of information, leading one party to potentially exploit its information advantage to harm the other party’s interests, thereby distorting resource allocation, reducing market efficiency, hindering transaction completion, and even triggering systemic risks. information production is an important means to address information asymmetry, but this is not the responsibility of a single financial institution; it requires collaboration from all parties in society to establish a cooperative mechanism among banks, equity investment institutions, guarantee institutions, the government, and technology enterprises, forming an information-sharing pattern and reducing transaction costs. incentive and constraint function: moral hazard is one of the core issues in the financial system. the existence of moral hazard distorts market incentive mechanisms, leading to resource misallocation and increasing systemic risks. science and technology finance needs to form reasonable incentive mechanisms through scientific contract design, strict market discipline, necessary financial regulation, and even cutting-edge technological means to overcome moral hazard. for example, various forms of financial contracts and tools can alleviate and reduce adverse selection and moral hazard, such as the company control market formed by equity capital and bonds in direct financing, debt constraints in indirect financing, and common betting agreements in venture capital that incentivize entrepreneurs while guarding against moral hazard. risk management function: the process of technological innovation and achievement transformation is highly uncertain, and science and technology finance must achieve effective risk management. risk management aims to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 129 identify, assess, control, and transfer potential risks during the investment process, optimizing the risk-return balance of relevant parties. science and technology finance needs to optimize the risk-return structure through financial innovation, developing a multi-level risk-sharing system and diversified risk management tools. only in this way can the extremely high risks of technological innovation be effectively shared, attracting more capital to participate in technological innovation. value enhancement function: science and technology finance needs to provide value-added services for start-up enterprises and technological innovation.science and technology finance should not only meet the funding needs of technological innovation but also possess strategic vision, resource integration capabilities, and value creation wisdom, emphasizing intellectual empowerment, network effects, and long-term value orientation behind capital. in addition to providing funds, various financial institutions should also assist technology entrepreneurial teams in team building, governance structure design, market development, and marketing network construction. venture capital and private equity institutions play important roles in this regard, as they can efficiently identify opportunities, avoid risks, and achieve excess returns through active management. 4. characteristics of china’s financial system and the current state of science and technology finance development 4.1 structural characteristics of china’s financial system driven by deepening reforms and financial openness, china’s financial system has initially formed a multi-level, multi-entity, and multi-tool development pattern, but it still exhibits two core characteristics overall: government-dominated credit system: china’s credit system is centered around government credit, while market-based credit mechanisms are relatively weak. the government not only serves as a regulator but also directly participates in market credit allocation through implicit guarantees for state-owned enterprises, credit endorsements for major projects, and approval-based listing review arrangements, substantially influencing market credit assessment and risk pricing. this model was beneficial in mobilizing social resources and concentrating efforts to support infrastructure and key industry construction during the early stages of economic development. however, it has also led to excessive bank capital flowing towards government-dominated projects and state-owned enterprises, resulting in inefficient allocation and insufficient financial support for small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) and the private economy, with prominent resource misallocation issues. bank-dominated financing structure china’s current financing system is still dominated by bank credit-based indirect financing, while the direct financing system remains immature.from the perspective of financing structure, bank loans account for approximately 80% of external financing for non-financial enterprises, indicating limited www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 130 functionality of the capital market in serving the real economy. although the stock market has made progress in institutional construction and market size, it primarily served state-owned enterprise reforms for a long time. government intervention in the secondary market has created expectations of a “policy-driven market”, leading to irrational behaviors such as “speculating on policies” and hindering effective support for front-end technological innovation. the bond market has developed relatively slowly, and the long-standing expectation of guaranteed repayment has affected the bond market’s risk pricing function. 4.2 structural limitations in supporting technological innovation china’s existing financial system faces multiple constraints in supporting technological innovation: mismatch between risk appetite and innovation needs under the government-dominated credit mechanism, the risks of various financing entities are mostly covered by government credit guarantees or collateral.the capital market lacks a benign interaction between liquidity and risk. investors generally prefer low-risk or risk-free assets and tend to support projects with “implicit guarantees”, with a pervasive “rigid payment” mentality in the market. however, technological innovation projects generally possess high-risk and highly uncertain characteristics. existing financial institutions lack the ability and incentive to identify, assess, and bear such risks, leading to difficulties in effectively channeling funds into the technology sector. relatively simple financing instrument system the bank-dominated system, centered on debt financing, focuses on traditional models such as fixed income and collateral guarantees, which are incompatible with the financing characteristics of technology enterprises, which are characterized by “light assets, weak collateral, and long cycles”. credit products are still mainly traditional working capital loans, lacking customized financial tools tailored to the long research and development cycles of technology enterprises. the popularity of new tools such as equity investment, convertible bonds, and intellectual property securitization remains low. an effective cooperation mechanism between banks and venture capital institutions has not been established, making it difficult to match investment and credit cycles and inhibiting banks’ enthusiasm for participating in early-stage technology investments. insufficient capability of the capital market to support technological innovation although china’s capital market has continuously improved in terms of scale and institutional construction, a multi-level capital market system oriented towards technological innovation is still underdeveloped. the financial system provides weak support for the front end of technological innovation. financial institutions are unwilling to undertake high-risk projects with uncertain technological paths and provide insufficient financial support for the concept verification and pilot testing stages. financial institutions still mainly rely on traditional financial indicators to evaluate technology enterprises, making it difficult to quantify technological value and hindering small technology enterprises from obtaining loans. platforms such as the science and technology innovation board and neeq are still in their early stages, with market liquidity, exit mechanisms, and risk pricing www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 131 capabilities needing improvement, limiting the ability of technology enterprises to configure resources through direct financing. the construction of the science and technology finance ecosystem lags behind, lacking an integrated collaborative platform for multiple entities such as venture capital, investment banks, commercial banks, insurance institutions, and guarantee institutions. the services provided by various institutions are fragmented and difficult to form a closed loop. inadequate risk-sharing and management mechanisms financial institutions lack the ability to effectively identify and price technological risks and market risks, as well as effective risk mitigation tools.in some cutting-edge technological fields, due to a lack of sufficient data, it is difficult to develop corresponding insurance products. policy tools such as fiscal subsidies and guarantees have not formed effective linkage with market-based venture capital. the failure risks of technology projects are almost entirely borne by financial institutions, lacking a multi-party collaborative risk-sharing mechanism involving the government, insurance, guarantees, and guide funds. this leads financial institutions to tend to avoid rather than support technology-based enterprises when facing them, constraining the sustainable development of the science and technology finance service system. 5. basic principles of designing tech-finance policies 5.1 basic principles of policy design adhering to market-oriented principles government support policies and measures must respect market laws and achieve policy goals through the combined efforts of government support and market mechanisms. it is essential to leverage the decisive role of the market in resource allocation, guiding financial resources toward high-potential tech sectors through price signals. meanwhile, the government should “act where necessary and refrain where not,” intervening in areas where market failures occur, such as basic research and early-stage projects, to prevent resource misallocation and moral hazards caused by excessive policy intervention. maintaining fair competition maintaining fair market competition is crucial for optimizing the business environment and stimulating innovation vitality. government intervention should focus on creating a level playing field, ensuring transparency in policy formulation and execution, reducing information asymmetry and rent-seeking opportunities, and ensuring equal access to resources and participation in competition for all market entities, avoiding policy biases or hidden barriers. it is also important to balance efficiency and fairness, strengthen intellectual property protection, break administrative monopolies and local protectionism, and prevent excessive competition or monopolies from stifling innovation. promoting equal opportunities tech-finance policy design should lower support thresholds and steadily increase support intensity to promote social equity and inclusive economic growth. it should create a relaxed and regulated institutional environment to enhance the success rate of entrepreneurial innovation among small and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 132 medium-sized tech enterprises. simultaneously, regional disparities should be considered to increase development opportunities for small and medium-sized tech enterprises in underdeveloped regions and promote balanced regional technological innovation. focusing on sustainable development sustainable development should be ensured by guaranteeing the commercial viability of financial institutions in supporting technological innovation, providing sufficient innovation incentives for tech innovators to foster a positive interaction between finance and technology, and ensuring the government’s financial sustainability. this involves continuously improving the endogenous mechanisms of management and services to ensure that the long-term direct and indirect benefits of policy-based finance or other forms of fiscal support can cover related costs. 5.2 urgent issues in current tech-finance policies currently, while china’s tech-finance sector is developing rapidly, it still faces a series of issues that require government-level coordination. firstly, there is a lack of effective linkage between government fiscal tools and market-based financial instruments, with inadequate institutional mechanisms for collaborative support of technological innovation. policy funds and social capital struggle to form synergies in resource allocation. secondly, information asymmetry is prevalent among tech enterprises, with the professionalism and uncertainty of their r&d activities increasing the difficulty for financial institutions to identify risks and hindering the effective flow of funds. thirdly, the entrepreneurial integrity constraint mechanism is relatively weak, with inadequate credit evaluation systems and integrity education mechanisms, increasing the moral hazards associated with financial support. fourthly, against the backdrop of an imperfect exit mechanism, venture capital faces incentive imbalances and adverse selection issues while pursuing high returns. especially in the “user-centric” internet ecosystem, some enterprises prioritize short-term user growth over long-term benefits, giving rise to new moral hazards. fifthly, with increasingly fierce market competition and a shortened overall enterprise lifecycle, financial support faces higher uncertainty and timeliness pressures, demanding greater professionalization and refinement in tech-finance services. 6. policy recommendations for improving china’s tech-finance system 6.1 unblocking the circulation between technology and finance there are still certain obstacles in the circulation mechanism between technology and finance, necessitating institutional-level unblocking and optimization. on one hand, indirect financing methods dominated by bank credit have limitations in supporting the early-stage development of tech enterprises, particularly in meeting the financing needs of high-risk, asset-light projects. the function of direct financing has not been fully leveraged, and the channels for tech innovation enterprises to access capital markets need to be broadened. on the other hand, the motivation and capacity of financial institutions to support technological innovation need to be strengthened, especially in terms of professional services, resource integration, and project identification by key entities such as investment www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 133 banks and venture capital firms. additionally, there is room for further optimization of the performance evaluation mechanism for policy-based tech-finance. the existing evaluation mechanism, to some extent, reinforces risk aversion tendencies, which is not conducive to government-backed financial institutions participating in high-uncertainty tech innovation projects. in the future, it is necessary to promote the establishment of a more scientific and reasonable evaluation system that incentivizes financial institutions to reasonably undertake innovation risks while preventing moral hazards, gradually enhancing the circulation efficiency between technology and finance. 6.2 enriching the tech-finance supply ecosystem under the current financial service system, tech enterprises face practical issues such as limited financing channels and mismatched product tools, necessitating improvements from the supply side. various financial institutions, including banks, insurance companies, funds, and securities firms, can further focus their efforts on the key challenges faced by tech enterprises in their development, precisely targeting product design and service models to enhance service precision and effectiveness. specifically, firstly, a more diversified tech-finance market system can be promoted, such as the science and technology innovation board and university financial markets, to provide differentiated financing tools for tech enterprises at different stages and of various types. secondly, the organizational models of financial institutions can be optimized to adapt to the characteristics of tech enterprises, such as establishing tech branches, tech insurance subsidiaries, and professional venture capital platforms, to enhance their understanding and responsiveness to tech projects. thirdly, in terms of risk protection, more professional insurance products targeting specific industries and technological directions (e.g., biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and new energy) need to be explored to reduce the uncertainty of enterprise financing and operations through risk compensation and reinsurance mechanisms. strengthening incentives and support for these innovative services in terms of institutional construction will help enhance the adaptability and inclusiveness of the financial system to technological innovation. 6.3 strengthening the tech-finance support institution system in the process of promoting the improvement of the tech-finance system, some policy-based support institutions can play an active role in filling market gaps and guiding social capital. firstly, a specialized national-level tech bank can be considered to provide low-interest or interest-free loans to small and medium-sized tech enterprises and key innovation projects, while also undertaking public financial functions to provide necessary support for credit reporting systems, intellectual property evaluation systems, etc., and enhance the overall level of financial infrastructure. secondly, a national-level reinsurance mechanism can be constructed to disperse the systemic risks faced by tech enterprises in terms of technology, market, and talent, alleviating the risk concerns of financial institutions during capital deployment. especially in specific regions or industries, risk matching mechanisms can be utilized to mitigate resource misallocation caused by risk homogeneity. thirdly, a national-level strategic investment fund can be established, adopting a master fund operation model and focusing on strategic emerging industries. this will not only enhance the supply of long-term capital www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 134 but also serve as a demonstration and driving force for local guidance funds, gradually forming a benign structure where policy guidance and market mechanisms work in tandem. 7. conclusion tech-finance is an eternal theme in the financial sector. the development of new quality productive forces requires continuous transformation of the financial system. tech-finance is not merely a financial issue but a transformation of the entire societal resource allocation mechanism, involving institutional improvements and cultural construction across multiple dimensions, including laws and regulations, fiscal and tax policies, monetary policies, organizational structures, education systems, and the application of digital technologies. references bell, c., & rousseau, p. l. (2001). post-independence india: a case of finance-led industrialization? journal of development economics, 65(1), 153-175. hicks, j. r. (1987). a theory of economic history (li, y. p., trans., pp. 128-144). beijing: the commercial press (original work published 1969). pérez, c. (2007). technological revolutions and financial capital: the dynamics of bubbles and golden ages (tian, f. m., hu, y. q., liu, r., et al., trans., pp. 38-40). beijing: china renmin university press. (original work published 2002) schumpeter, j. a. (2019). the theory of economic development (original work published 1911, p. 252). beijing: china renmin university press. xi, j. p. (2024). developing new-quality productive forces is an inherent requirement and key focus for promoting high-quality development. ningxia journal of agriculture and forestry science and technology, 65(11), 1-2. yan, s. p. (2011). national twelfth five-year plan for science and technology development (excerpts). hebei chemical industry, 34(10), 1-4. zeng, x. w. (2024). path selection and key directions for the high-quality development of sci-tech finance. journal of hebei university of economics and business, 45(2), 90-97. zeng, z. (2024). several theoretical issues to be emphasized in developing new-quality productive forces. new urbanization, (5), 11. 1. introduction 4.1 structural characteristics of china’s financia 4.2 structural limitations in supporting technolog 5. basic principles of designing tech-finance poli 5.1 basic principles of policy design 5.2 urgent issues in current tech-finance policies 6.policy recommendations for improving china’s tech 6.1 unblocking the circulation between technology 6.2 enriching the tech-finance supply ecosystem 6.3 strengthening the tech-finance support institu references microsoft word ape-v5n2-p81 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 81 original paper vote-buying and democratic governance in nigeria fiemotongha christopher1, love god s. ogbotubo1 & ifidi e. gesiye1 1 isaac jasper boro colledge of education sagbama, bayelsa state, nigeria * fiemotongha christopher, e-mail: christofiems@gmail.com received: march 15, 2022 accepted: may 10, 2022 online published: may 13, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n2p81 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n2p81 abstract this work is an analysis of “vote buying and democracy in nigeria”. vote-buying in nigeria is implicitly becoming an accepted practice with the political class, electoral body, security agencies as well as the electorate contributing to its growth. democracy entails majority rule and gives ultimate power to the people, among other things. this is demonstrated during elections where political leaders are chosen by the people, through the ballot. this democratic process in nigeria is altered and negatively influenced by several factors. vote-buying, a monetary and material inducement that compels voters to vote contrary to their choices, is a disturbing trend that gets consolidated by each passing election in nigeria. this study examines vote-buying as a dominant-negative factor militating against democratic governance in nigeria. it is observed in this study that vote-buying is strengthened by bad governance. there is the need to amend nigeria’s electoral laws to truly make the electoral body independent from the executive, to give it a neutral disposition. there are extant constitutional provisions that criminalize vote-buying, therefore these laws should be enforced, irrespective of the status of the offenders. keywords democracy, democratic governance, nigeria, vote-buying 1. introduction the phenomenon of vote-buying is not common to nigeria alone but to many countries of the world, especially developing countries. the phenomenon is traceable to political systems, be it developed, developing, classical or contemporary. emmanuel (2007), explains, that vote-buying was also known in 19th century england and in early settlements of quito, ecuador. before now, in taiwan, vote-buying brokers typically approach relatives, friends, and neighbors. in africa, the trend is taking an unprecedented dimension, with those entrusted with the constitutional responsibility to curb it found culpable and fully involved in perpetrating it. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 82 published by scholink inc. in recent times, especially in the fourth republic vote buying has become a hydra-headed monster in nigeria, strengthened by every passing election. as it is today, the phenomenon has gained momentum on an alarming scale and this stands in direct contradiction to the tenets of democracy which is predicated on free and fair elections. chronologically tracing the phenomena, it is evident it has grown gradually from the first republic to what it is today, in the fourth republic, though as emmanuel explains, it was the national party of nigeria (npn) that visibly displayed affluence and used money to lure voters in the fourth republic, as was evident during the ekiti state governorship elections of 2018, the peoples democratic party (pdp) paid between n3,000 and n5,000 into individual accounts of civil servants, while the all progressives congress (apc) paid n5,000 and n10,000 to neutralize pdp’s bargaining power olakunle (2018). vote buying has not only distorted democracy but has come with many negative effects on governance in nigeria. it is observed that the political leaders today in nigeria are not truly a product of the people’s will. to address the menace of vote-buying in nigeria, there must be drastic electoral reforms that will include capital punishment for offenders as well as make the electoral body truly independent from executive manipulation. 2. theoretical framework there is a wide range of theoretical frameworks available for this study. however, this work adopted karl marx’s theory of the state. karl mark (1818-1883) and his friend frederick engels (1820-1895) are the chief proponents of this theory. though this theory has several perspectives, the focus here is on the instrumentalist's perspective. the instrumentalist perspective of karl marx’s theory of the state holds that in every society there is a ruling class to which other classes are subjected. it explains that the state is used as an instrument in the hands of this dominant class in fulfillment of their self-interests. as was enunciated by karl marx and frederick engels in the communist manifesto, “political power properly so-called is merely the organized power of one class for dominating another”. draper (2019), on karl marx’s theory of revolution, asserts that the state is the institution or complex of institutions that bases itself on the availability of forcible coercion by special agencies of society to maintain the dominance of a ruling class, preserve the existing property relations from basic change and make all other classes subservient. marx explains that the dominant class acquires the economic and political power to dominate the other classes in all spheres of life (ojukwu, 2009). the instrumentalist model is employed here as a tool for the analysis of the nigerian state with all her institutions as an instrument in the hands of the dominant political class. the security agencies, the independent national electoral commission (inec), and the judiciary that oversees election petition tribunals are all state agents that help in one way or the other to encourage the perpetration of vote-buying in the interests of the dominant class. the institutions empowered with the constitutional responsibility to ensure free and fair elections are manipulated and used as tools by the governing class to actualize their self-interests. as alapiki (2015), captures it, what is uniquely negative about the nigerian state is its lack of autonomy, its proneness to abuse, and the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 83 published by scholink inc. lack of immunity against it. the negative effect of this phenomenon has always been on the people who have been deliberately subjected to poor conditions of life, so much so that when an offer is made on election day for their votes, they are left with no option but to give away their votes for a nominal sum. 3. the concept of vote-buying the meaning of vote-buying as it is commonly understood across cultural contexts and political environments involves the giving of money and gifts either on election day or before election day. according to schaffer (2007), “vote-buying in its literal sense, is a simple economic exchange, wherein voters sell their votes to candidates, sometimes to the highest bidder in an election”. vote buying is a complex and multifaceted problem that erodes the tenets of democratic governance, which is mostly determined by environmental factors and the type of political system operated. according to emmanuel (2007), vote-buying is a simple economic bargain where the electorate ‘sell’ their votes and ‘candidates’ ‘buy’, like they buy and sell apples, shoes or television sets”. 3.1 vote buying in nigeria vote buying is a hydra-headed monster that crept into nigeria’s political system with its attendant effects and implications. in the first (1963-1966) and second (1979-1983) republics, but got consolidated in the fourth republic. the phenomenon which stands in direct opposition to democratic principles inhibits good governance and is a forerunner to mediocrity in governance. vote buying is a criminal offense punishable by law in nigeria, however, even the law enforcement agencies and the electoral body that is constitutionally empowered to curb the menace of the phenomena are all enmeshed and have compromised in one way or the other in aiding the phenomena. as provided in article 130 of the electoral act of 2010: “a person who corruptly by himself or by any other person at any time after the date of an election has been announced, directly or indirectly gives or provides or pays money to or for any person to corruptly influence that person or any other person to vote or refrain from voting at such election, or an account of such person or any other person having voted or refrained from voting at such election, or being a voter, corruptly accepts or takes money or any other inducement during any of the periods stated in paragraph (a) of this section, commits an offense and is liable on conviction to fine of one hundred thousand naira (n100,000) or 12 months in imprisonment or both”. adherence has been a herculean task. d despite this provision in the electoral act as demonstrated in the 2018 ekiti governorship elections, where several video recordings emerged showing the brazen distribution of cash to the electorate by politicians and their agents. on election days, cash and consumable materials such as food, clothing materials, and fertilizers are also part of the inducement given to voters (ayayi, in habu et al., 2021, p. 95). though the phenomena of vote-buying centers on giving money and material benefits to the electorate by the candidates, parties, and their supporters, there are various variants of vote-buying which cuts www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 84 published by scholink inc. across political and cultural environments. direct vote-buying indirect vote-buying treating, abstention, and participation vote-buying are some commonest methods of commercial voting. however, direct vote-buying and treating are the commonest in nigeria. treating, according to section 128 of the electoral act 2002, is: “when a person corruptly by himself or by any other person at any time after the date of an election has been announced, directly or indirectly gives or provides or pays money to any person to influence that person or any other person to vote or refrain from voting at such election, or an account of such person or any other person having voted or refrain from voting at such elections or (b) being a voter corruptly accepts or takes money or any other inducement during any of the periods stated above”. treating could be treated as an independent phenomenon from vote-buying but because it occurs penultimately to elections it is treated by scholars as an aspect of vote-buying. vote buying is fast becoming an accepted practice with an obvious threat of truncating the country’s nascent democracy, as the phenomenon gets intensified by every periodic election. osita chidoka, the governorship candidate of the upp in the november 18th, 2017 anambra governorship election, in announcing his decision not to contest the result stated thus: “they traded their votes because they doubted we would truly represent their interest while our message resonated with the people, they doubted that the political class cared about them. they voted for the highest bidder”. today, it is widely believed the unpopular political elites in nigeria have made the phenomenon of vote-buying a major strategy to win elections. it was thought that after the nationwide condemnation of vote-buying in the anambra november 18th governorship election, the nigeria state would have clamped down on the perpetrators of the phenomena as provided by law, but contrariwise it was replicated in the ekiti governorship election of july 14th, 2018, as cases of commercial voting emerged, with the ruling apc and the major opposition pdp allegedly involved in vote-buying. this was aptly captured by the vanguard of july 15th, 2018, as “ekiti election: “ayemi, eleka in tight race amid ballot-snatching vote buying”. according to the vanguard account, no fewer than five persons were arrested by the police in ado-ekiti, the ekiti state capital for allegedly distributing to voters financial and material benefits, during the elections, linked to the ruling apc and pdp. this display of desperation by nigeria’s political class is not unconnected to the attractive nature of elective positions in the country. as cletus (2018) explains, due to the juicy nature of nigeria’s elective positions, elections are competitive, with politicians deploying various measures to win including violence, commercial voting, intimidation, manipulation, outright rigging, etc. though vote-buying appears to be devoid of some of these measures, its multiplying effect is inherently more damaging to democratic governance in nigeria. dr. joe odumakin, president of the women arise for change initiative, one of the observer groups in the ekiti election said; “the incidences of vote-buying and inducement became so prominent than it has ever been during the ekiti governorship election, and this portends danger not only to our electoral www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 85 published by scholink inc. process but also to democracy as a whole”. it will not be out of place for one to declare with authoritative finality that “nigeria is in a problem” if the incidences of vote-buying could be carried out in the country with unrestrained impunity to the glaring of security agents who are the custodians of the law. according to abiodum aluko, the accord party governorship candidate in the ekiti election of 2018 “security agents turned blind eye to the open distribution of money by politicians to the electorate”. this trend distorts the country’s democracy and has redefined it into a mere theoretical expression devoid of the fundamental principles in practical terms. these ugly phenomena are experienced at various levels of government including the legislative houses, with members influenced with monetary benefits to pass bills into law as well as frustrate bills. as dung, explains: the media has informed nigerians of the phenomena of vote-buying in the legislature, and some of the celebrated cases are; (i) bribing of legislators to approve the education budget for the federal ministry of education in 2005, (ii) bribing of legislators to vote for tenure elongation of president olusegun obasanjo in 2005 as well against tenure elongation (dung, 2006, p. 97). 3.2 democratic governance in nigeria scholars from different schools of thought and political environments have defined and explained democratic governance, influenced by various factors. as noted by nwokocha (2007, p. 4), the various models of democracy that democracy is not the same thing for all people and takes diverse structures in distinct places. unarguably the emergence of democracy in nigeria is traceable to the greek city-states, where the concept emanated as direct democracy, giving the right to take part in law-making and policy formulation to all citizens (alapiki, 2005, p. 50). direct democracy which was applicable in the greek city-states is no longer applicable in modern states owing to factors such as landmass, population, the system of government, etc. despite this variance in definition, what is central is that the people exercise the ultimate power to govern directly or through their representatives, and scholars have always had a common ground on its ideals. fundamental rights of the people, rule of law which entails equality before the law, free and fair elections, independence of the judiciary, majority rule, freedom of the press, right to vote and be voted for, etc, are some of the ideals of democracy, however, the application of these principles across political systems have always degenerated into contention leading to the practice of unknown variants of the concept, especially in the third world. as kaplan (1999), succinctly asserts, 'the democracy we are encouraging in many poor parts of the world is an integral part of the transformation towards new forms of. the social environment, economic system, and political processes decide the extent to which basic human rights are enjoyed and democratic governance is observed (alapiki, 2007, p. 52). there are various impediments to democratic governance in nigeria, some of which are evaluated in this work as, deep-seated ethnic cleavage, weak institutions, corrupt political elites, a biased and dependent electoral system, regionally-based politics, poverty, voter apathy, etc. the political elites in nigeria have altered democratic governance and personalized it. the laws which define and for democratic governance are enacted and re-enacted to further the elite agenda. according to odondiri: www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 86 published by scholink inc. from the point of view of the political class, democracy in nigeria means a system of politics and government in which public policies emerge from an elite who openly compete for power in organized formations, (odondiri, 2003, p. 161). poverty has also contributed immensely to the inefficiency of democratic governance in nigeria occasioning a widespread apathy in politics. according to the mcgraw hill dictionary of modern economics, poverty is a condition in which income is insufficient to meet subsistence needs. the menace of poverty compels a greater part of the voting population to sell their votes for peanuts on election day, with the conviction that such money paid for their votes will put food on the table at least for a day or two. this trend, scholars and opinion leaders believe is a conspiracy of the political class and their associates to impoverish the people to compel the people to sell their votes on election day. president buhari on his working visit to kano state after the bayelsa and kogi state elections stated thus; “what i saw in the elections in kogi, bayelsa, and rivers, the use of money, and vote-buying upset me”. weak institutions are another causative factor that hinders democratic governance in nigeria. it is popularly believed that nigeria’s electoral system is defective and subservient to the political class, especially the executive. strong institutions are a veritable tool for democratic governance in developed societies, but it is otherwise in nigeria. the institutions in nigeria are weak and do the bidding of the executive because they (executive) have the unilateral power to appoint and dissolve the leadership of these institutions at any time (fiemotongha et al., 2021). the place of periodic elections cannot be overemphasized in contemporary democratic states, therefore voter apathy experienced in most recent elections in nigeria is an impediment to democracy in the country. this is mostly attributed to a lack of confidence and trust in our political elites, owing to the conviction that their (people) votes do not count, engendering the uninterestedness of the people in politics. 3.3 causes of vote buying and selling findings have revealed that weak institutions, poverty, lack of voter education, the desperation of the political class to remain in power, and the general failure of the nigerian state are some of the causes of vote-buying in contemporary nigeria. poverty, lack of political education, and weak institutions are dominant here in the nigerian context. when citizens live in abject poverty offer of money and material items to them on election day could mean a week without hardship to fend for themselves and their families the uneducated are a larger proportion of the voting population in nigeria, therefore when they are offered a token for their votes, they do not hesitate to sell it without considering the consequences. they also do not see vote-buying and selling as an evil that will boomerang on them, and also as a bait to mortgage good governance. when the institutions empowered with the constitutional responsibility to enforce the electoral laws are enmeshed in the act, and the electoral body that should be impartial is weak and becomes biased and partisan, then a platform is created for vote trading. this situation has ultimately created a devastating impact on the legitimacy of nigeria’s electoral and political system www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 87 published by scholink inc. (bekuma et al., 2019, p. 86). 3.4 findings it is observed in this work that, for the political class to continue to use the phenomena of vote-buying as a successful strategy to win elections, they (politicians) have systematically conditioned the citizens in such a way as to subject them to sell their votes on election day, and this is deliberately done through means. the institutions which have the constitutional responsibility to curb this phenomenon are handicapped and subjected to the politicians, especially the executive. the dependence of the electoral body on the government is a defining factor that aids vote-buying in nigeria, making it inefficient, ineffective, and subservient to the political class. the defective nature of the 1999 constitution of nigeria has also not helped in curbing the phenomena of vote-buying as it does not constitutionally empower the electoral body to perform its functions independent of the executive, which has distorted democratic governance in the country. the constitution also gives too much power to political office holders as well as makes their offices too lucrative hence the unhealthy competition. the democracy we have today in the country is a far cry from democratic governance in the developed states. democratic governance in nigeria is a mere theoretical expression devoid of the tenets of democracy, and this is occasioned by the various factors militating against the concept in the country, which includes vote buying and selling. 4. conclusion the menace of vote-buying and selling in the fourth republic is unprecedented and has taken a different dimension, with the government and her institutions helpless in curbing it, and this is because they are neck-deep in it (vote-buying). the bracing impunity by the political class that accompanies the act of vote-buying is most disturbing and has compelled scholars and opinion leaders to conclude that the political elites have deliberately conditioned the economic life of the people to compel them to sell their votes for a token on election day. this ugly phenomenon has distorted the fundamental principles of democratic governance, which seem indispensable, and has placed a heavy burden on the people. a synergy between stakeholders, the people, and the government is urgently needed if this phenomenon must be addressed and nipped in the bud. recommendations the following recommendations are proffered to address the problem of vote-buying and improve democratic governance in nigeria. (1) the appointment of the electoral umpire should not be left in the hands of the executive arm of government, to make the electoral body truly independent and perform her functions independently without interference. this could be done through constitutional reforms. (2) the voting population should be sensitized to the evils of vote-buying and the harm it does to our democracy. this could be successfully done by involving civil society groups. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 88 published by scholink inc. (3) the desperation of the political class to gain access to political offices is inherently propelled by the attractive and lucrative nature of political offices, therefore laws should be enacted to make political offices less attractive. (4) democratic governance is centered on the people, hence deliberate steps should be taken to introduce inclusive governance, as well as formulate policies to meaningfully engage them and alleviate poverty; this way the people’s trust will be relived. (5) the 1999 constitution should be amended to include capital punishment to deter potential offenders of the law. references alapiki, h. e. (2005). the political economy of globalization. amethyst and colleagues publishers. alapiki, h. e. (2015). the state and the culture of terrorism in nigeria. unveiling the real terrorist. inaugural lecture series, 117. bekuma, b. g., mamman, m., & abubakar, i. (2019). the ekiti state 2018 election and vote-buying. lessons for future general elections in nigeria. federal university otuoke journal of political science, 2(1). cletus, f. n. (2018). vote-buying in the 2018 governorship election in ekiti state nigeria. open political science letter, 1, 93-97. https://doi.org/10.1515/openps-2018-0005 draper, h. (2019). politicals science notes. marxist theory of the state. definition-origin-and-2-models/769. dung, p. s. (2006). vote buying and the quality of democracy under the 2002 electoral act. international federation of election systems (ifes). emmanuel, o. o. (2006). vote-buying in nigeria. international federation of election systems (ifes) publication. fiemotongha, c., nein, g., seaman, l., & harold, e. (2021). interrogating the interface between governance and corruption. the nigerian experience. international journal of sociology and humanities, 3(i) habu, m., aluaigba, m. j., & aminu, k. (2012). corruption, governance, and development in nigeria. perspectives and remedies. aminu kano centre for democratic research and training. kaplan, r. d. (1999). was democracy just a movement? contending issues and opinions (ed). coursewise publishing. nwokocha, b.o. (2007). politics and administration in nigeria. eagle publishers. odondiri, p. g. o. (2003). the making of a nation. stages in nigeria’s constitutional development. amethyst and colleagues publisher. ojukwu, e. c. (2009). the state and poverty alleviation in nigeria (1999-2007). a study of policy analysis. thesis in political science.nnamdi azikiwe university, awka. olakunle, o. e. (2018). an overview of the 2018 gubernatorial election in ekiti state. afro-asian www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 89 published by scholink inc. journal of social science, ix(iv) schaffer, f. c. (2007). elections for sale: the causes and consequences of vote-buying. cornell university press. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 141 original paper on forms of infringement and protection of short video advertising yutong li 1 1 school of humanities, nanchang vocational university, nanchang, jiangxi, china received: july 22, 2022 accepted: august 27, 2022 online published: august 31, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n3p141 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n3p141 abstract short video advertising is a type of short video that can generate direct commercial benefits. short video advertising wins out in terms of content, and its broadcast volume grows rapidly. especially with the development of internet economy, with well-known short video bloggers using platforms to sell products, advertisements are gradually the same as short videos and appear more and more on short video platforms. short video advertising itself has the characteristics of marketing, coupled with the characteristics of its length, fast transmission, in the era of internet fragmentation is widely used as a way of entertainment for the masses, a variety of resulting copyright issues will also trigger wider attention from all walks of life. this paper uses inductive analysis to analyze the marketing strategy and infringement risk of short video advertising, and makes clear the copyright protection system of short video advertising, and promote the healthy and orderly development of short video advertising industry. keywords short video advertising, infringement of advertising, platform 1. introduction according to a recent insider intelligence research forecast for tiktok, its full-year advertising revenue is likely to triple to $11 billion in 2022, which would make it bigger than its two biggest competitors, twitter and snapchat, combined. since 2018, tiktok has experienced a huge growth spurt in user size, which has generated huge revenue for the company. as the short video platform of bytedance, tiktok enjoys a high reputation among the video content consumption and creation platforms worldwide. thanks to its oversea strategy, tiktok defeated lasso and zynn, the short video products of facebook and kuaishou, and set off a wave of short video in the united states and even the world. tiktok continues to grow rapidly around the world, with more than www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 142 published by scholink inc. 500 million daily and 1.2 billion monthly active users in 150 countries and 75 languages. tiktok’s rapid growth has benefited from the revenue generated by short video ads, but short video ads have also raised a number of legal issues that need to be resolved before bytedance can become more commercially viable. in terms of academic thought, this paper combines the academic thought of law discipline, information management discipline and software and other disciplines. the research on copyright protection of short video advertising is not limited to law. it is inevitable that there is limitations in short video advertising only from the legal point of view, and it should be treated with the academic thought of information management discipline and software. 2. a discussion of the form of infringement of short video advertising and the problem of protection short video ads are taking advantage of internet technology to become popular around the world, copyright law is needed to interpret new technologies. (denis de freitas, 1983, p. 438) compared with long videos, advertisements in the form of short videos occupy most people’s lives in a way of recreation and entertainment. its marketing model fills the gap with traditional video advertising marketing and reshapes the commercial pattern of the internet. with the rapid development of short video advertising, there are many infringements of short video advertising in reality, and bookstores also tended to consolidate. (michael, 2008, p. 499) which have caused serious damage to the legitimate rights and interests of short video users and are not conducive to the healthy development of short video industry. the underlying concern of copyright is with communication. at present, the research on short video advertising is mainly based on three perspectives: communication, economic management and law. is different from the propagation perspective aims to provide theoretical basis for practice in the spread, it is also different from economics angle to rely on short video advertising as a business promotion tool to obtain economic benefits, angle of law aims at in the framework of the current laws and regulations, combined with short video advertising in the judicial practice, puts forward the legal protection of short video advertising. copyright law has not disappeared with the evolution of technology and the development of a globalized ipr regime is recommended. (siriginidi, 2003, p. 264) at present, based on the combination of communication, management, copyright law and advertising law, scholars have not systematically put forward the forms of infringement of short video advertisements and their legal protection measures. in practice, the frequent infringement of short video advertisements also endangers the healthy development of the short video industry. as product piracy has become more pervasive the international pressures to prevent this trend have intensified. the purpose of copyright is “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries”. (george, 2013, p. 566) therefore, the analysis of infringement forms of short video advertisements and the suggestion of legal protection are conducive to promoting the healthy and stable operation of short www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 143 published by scholink inc. video industry under the background of the internet on the track of the rule of law. 3. types of infringement in short video advertising practice with the explosive development of short video and live streaming industry, the broadcast volume of short video advertisements has always occupied the top spot, and its infringement phenomenon has emerged. driven by the fan economy, producers of short video advertisements have little awareness of copyright or ignore copyright rules, which leads to increasingly rampant infringement in the short video industry and increasing legal disputes of short video advertisements. (stuart, 1998, p. 185) 3.1 second splicing video in common law and civil law countries, the video originator shall enjoy the right to protect the integrity of his or her video, and the video shall not be distorted or tampered with by others. at present, it has become a normal phenomenon for users of short video platforms to arbitrarily process, edit, create and upload short video advertisements to major short video platforms to obtain traffic. the secondary splicing of short video ads mainly involves the following behaviors: (1) cut and splice short video ads: cut the highlights of short video ads to form a new short video ad, or even replace the advertising words or trademarks of previous videos by some technical means. (2) mixed-cut short video advertising: based on the promotion of a particular product, clips of several short video advertisements are edited into one video, so as implementation the purpose of the creator to promote a certain product. (3) dubbing short video advertising: cut out some core content of short video advertising, and dub this part again to achieve the effect of product promotion. the above second splicing video creates the original work maliciously, destroys the integrity of the original work, increases the risk of negative evaluation of the original work from the social level, and infringes the copyright of the original author. 3.2 stealing others’ ideas as a kind of advertisement work, short video advertisement must contain advertisement creativity. advertising designers creativity refers to the video works on video to express the theme, platform, user, must carry on the promotion of products after a series of analysis, using the works of the creative thinking of results, the results accord with the requirement of advertisers, achieved the purpose of product promotion, attract the attention of the user, can be called the soul of a short video advertising. in other words, advertising creativity only includes abstract and intangible ideas for the promotion of works, which still belong to the category of thought and cannot be perceived by users because it has not been expressed through material carriers such as videos. if the value of advertising creativity is to be realized, it should be reflected in various ways such as shooting videos. short video ads are works that the creators release through the platform in the form of short videos upon the request of advertisers. therefore, short video advertising is the result of advertising creativity from subjective to objective. due to the particularity of the product, the availability of direct copying of short video advertisements is not high, so most infringers choose to copy other people’s ideas or other slang to attract consumers. database collections of digital texts are inherently problematic in terms of infringement. the birth of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 144 published by scholink inc. short video advertising generally needs to go through three stages: advertising content planning, advertising content planning execution, and the release of short video advertising works. the process is relatively complex, and each link embodies the intellectual achievements of the right holder, so it is easy to produce infringement in each stage of the formation of short video advertising. 3.3 covert collection of information there may be geographical limits to what an agency can or cannot do to pursue an ip infringement case, therefore, we should play the role of platform. (sameer, 2007, p. 148) each short video platform stores a large amount of user information in the background, forming a relatively complete database. according to the database, short video advertisers can screen the information browsed by users to get user preferences and make precise push. however, this kind of information is mostly collected without users’ knowledge, resulting in the violation of users’ personal information privacy. there are numerous users on tiktok platform, and their browsing history and shopping history will be stored in the database. based on this, the background can conduct preference analysis on users, establish various related advertising models, and then continuously push advertisements that may be of interest to users, so as promotion products. since it is illegal for short video platforms to collect users’ personal information, such covert information collection has violated users’ right to know. 3.4 forced push by the platform short video platforms and all kinds of software have direct push mechanism and are not controlled by users. forced push involves violation of users’ right to know, but it is difficult for users to fight against the platform. when a user registers an initial account on the short video platform, the page will generally pop out the relevant “informed agreement”, which requires the user to check. as an informed agreement, it is an important channel for users to understand the platform information, and a channel for enterprises to collect user information. based on the “principle of informed consent” personal information processing rules, platforms need to sign an agreement with users to clarify the privacy policy before collecting and using user information. in the process of authorization, the simpler the text is formulated, the more thoroughly users understand, and the trust degree of the platform can also be improved. but the informed agreements for most platforms and software are long and complex, often more than 10,000 words long, making it difficult to take the time to read them carefully. after signing the agreement, the platform will push the short video advertisement. although the word “advertisement” is indicated in some content, the short video advertisement usually has a story, even if the video has the purpose of product marketing, it is easy to induce users to think that they are viewing the video content instead of advertising. 4. countermeasures of short video advertisement protection 4.1 legal departments work together to play the role of rule of law copyright enforcement is a purely private matter within civil law. no government agency has a responsibility to check for potential copyright infringements. (michael, 2004, p. 110) on the internet www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 145 published by scholink inc. environment of advertising industry and platform, the purpose of the legislative department to intervene in it is not to restrict the development of short video advertising, but to protect the copyright system to achieve the best interests of all parties. the legislative department needs to improve the copyright protection system to bridge the conflict of interests between the originator and the pirate. at the same time, the legislative branch cooperate with various government departments, from the boot short video industry, promote the healthy development of the network, copyright protection works, to crack down on infringement, such as level, using a forward-looking, strategic legislation technology, in view of the practice of ads defining the difficulties and main body that difficult problem and combined with the characteristics of the internet industry, formulate relative specific legal rules as far as possible. many technology companies process vast amounts of data. (artur, 2018, p. 254) these include online search engines, social networks, software-manufacturing companies, manufacturers of computer and mobile devices and providers of services available on the internet. from the perspective of law enforcement and supervision, relevant departments can also cooperate with internet advertising agencies to adapt to the characteristics of the digital era and let internet advertising agencies provide technical support to achieve the best effect of short video advertising protection. 4.2 users should enhance their awareness of privacy protection innovative thinking and ideas are necessary, together with increased owner‐user co‐operation, if copyright is to survive. (charles, 2000, p. 279) short video platforms violate users’ rights by pushing ads to users without their knowledge, or by forcing users to watch for a certain amount of time before turning off the advertising. because the short video platform collects user information very covertly, and the amount of money directly related to the user’s economic interests is small, the consequences caused by the infringement are easy to be ignored by the user. in addition, after the user applies for the rights protection of the concealed collection of information, the processing speed of the platform is relatively slow, and it is difficult to give a fair processing result in a short time. therefore, the current short video users’ awareness of rights protection is still weak. in fact, the improvement of users’ awareness of rights protection will also lead to the reduction of infringements. therefore, users should enhance their awareness of privacy protection, carefully read the informed agreement when registering an account on the platform, and timely protect their rights in case of infringement. at the same time, they should cooperate with the legal department to supervise the quality of short video advertisements, reduce the dissemination of vulgar works of short video advertisements, and maintain the stability of the order of the social platform. 4.3 clarify the relevant legal liabilities of short video platforms as product piracy has become more pervasive the international pressures to prevent this trend have intensified, the legal liability of short video platforms should be clarified. (gael, 1994, p. 55) as one of many types of network service providers, network short video platform generally includes content service, access service and storage space service. short video platform plays an indispensable role in short videos with different creation types and release channels, platform service is still the basic service www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 146 published by scholink inc. of short video platform, and has the function of information space storage. network platforms can be divided into technology platform and content platform based on different perspectives. the platform provided by network technology provides technical support for works, and does not participate in the direct editing or processing of works. the network content platform is the dissemination of the provided works, which can directly or indirectly share the works themselves, and directly process or edit the works. the role played by the network technology platform is the technical supporter, and the role played by the network content platform is the disseminator. most internet service providers only exist as ordinary platforms, without the ability to review infringing content in advance, and there is no fault, but they should fulfill their obligation to delete after receiving the notice from the right holder. the emergence of electronic communications and the internet is rapidly changing traditional marketing methods. (michael, 2000, p. 259) the network technology platform only plays an auxiliary role in the dissemination of short video, while the content providing platform of short video advertisement is in a dominant position in the dissemination process. if the short video users participate in the uploading of the short video, they will also become the disseminators of the works. however, in terms of scope and degree, the participation of the users is low, and they can also be called “participants of the short video dissemination”. for short video platforms, their responsibilities are mainly as follows: (1) the imputation principle of short video platform. only on the premise of stipulating the legal liability for infringement can the short video platform be subject to the corresponding legal constraints. the first is platform for providing short video content. in the communication process of short video ads, short video platforms play a more like “publisher”, whose job is to make short video ads open and visible to the public on the platform. the liability of publishers in common law countries is strict liability, that is to say, as long as the publishers publish infringing works, they will bear legal liability whether there is any fault or not. therefore, according to the practice of european and american countries, short video platforms should also bear strict liability. in this case, the platform will take a more active attitude to protect the copyright of short video advertising. the second is short video technical support platform. under the different choices of various users, the transmission range of the technical support platform is limited to the works selected by users, and there is no processing of the works themselves, which is equivalent to only acting as an intermediary in the whole process. in order to provide better service to users, the use of works by the platform will involve the “transfer” of the platform and the “cache” of the platform. in reality, the network technology platform can only provide very limited monitoring ability, and it is difficult for the technology platform to control the infringement behavior of others, and there is no very close relationship between it and the damage result. at present, the practice of most countries is to relax the responsibility of the technical support platform appropriately. therefore, it is more appropriate to adopt the principle of presumptive liability for fault in practice. (2) the duty of care of short video platforms. according to the premise of the “haven” principle, the network service provider has performed the duty of care, and even if it has performed the duty of care, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 147 published by scholink inc. but the subsequent infringement occurs, the provider will lose the qualification of exemption without taking certain measures. the purpose of setting duty of care is to achieve a balance of interests between the network platform and users, to achieve a good network order, and to encourage all subjects to maintain a certain degree of enthusiasm. however, different network platforms have different requirements for duty of care. the first is platform for providing short video content. when the short video platform screens different content for different users, it uses its own name, and the platform has completed the first round of screening before the content is released. in this case, it will be deemed that the platform has sufficient time and reason to identify the infringing part of the short video, and corresponding measures should be taken to prevent it. according to the business model of the short video platform, its focus is on the provision of content. therefore, it should undertake the obligation of care at a higher level and actively and fully review the short video content to be uploaded. current network technology is also constantly improving, content monitoring technology to achieve cost reduction, and has been recognized by the market. the duty of care of all short video communication platforms in the control of copyright infringement should be improved. the second is short video technical support platform. since the network technical support platform only provides support for transmission and storage technologies and does not directly output content, it should assume a slightly lower duty of care than the platform providing short video content. although it may increase the burden of proof of the obligee to a certain extent, the obligee also has more protection in terms of rights protection, which is more operable in reality than pursuing responsibility from the producers of infringing videos. however, as short videos have two infringing parties: the platform and the producer, the exemption of one party does not necessarily mean that the other party is also exempt. 4.4 construct the protection method of short video advertisement industry (1) give play to the role of advertising industry organizations. the advertising industry organization is the product of the mature development of the advertising industry, generally in the relatively developed countries will have this kind of organization. with the help of its developed advertising industry, the united states has set up a special organization to examine the content and substance of advertising works, which will also help solve the copyright problems caused by advertising works. some countries also have similar specialized organizations. when it comes to copyright infringement of short video ads, professional advertising industry organizations can help solve the problem more efficiently. the originality of advertising content should be compared among industries. for example, the advertising association is committed to providing various services for advertising practitioners and regulating the advertising industry. with the popularization of the internet, people are exposed to all kinds of advertisements every day. at present, the service chain of advertising associations in many countries have been covered nationwide and widely recognized by the industry. with the development and expansion of the advertising industry, the scale of advertising industry organizations is also gradually expanding, and increasingly received attention. in the development of short video advertising and the road of legal supervision should constantly improve the management and standards of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 148 published by scholink inc. advertising organizations, in order to manage more comprehensive. (2) clarify the censorship obligations of publishers. the copyright laws of various countries do not provide complete protection for advertisement creativity. in most cases, short video advertisements will cause economic losses based on infringement, mainly because of the copying of the creator, but also because the advertisement publisher does not have the obligation to review. the review obligation of the advertisement publisher refers to the fact that is after received the short video advertisement, the short video platform publishes the work on the platform based on the commercial partnership between the two parties. the censorship obligation belongs to the short video platform. before publishing the short video, the short video platform, as the publisher, should fulfill the obligation of reviewing the video in advance. with the rapid development of the internet, the network information has also reached the maximum expansion. as the advertisement publisher and the information network service provider, the short video platform has the obligation to undertake the obligation of reviewing the works to be released. in today’s network environment, there is no way to talk about information security. the biggest problem is that the network information publisher has not fulfilled the obligation of review and supervision. therefore, as the publisher of advertisements, it is very important to review short video advertisements. from the perspective of the advertising laws of various countries, the relevant behaviors of advertisement publishers are also constrained. for example, the examination obligation and examination method are stipulated, which require advertisement publishers to conduct certain examination on both the “quality” and the “quantity” of the advertising content. it is also necessary to refer to the basis of plagiarism standards and determine whether the content involved in the short video advertisement is infringing by referring to the elements of tort liability. if the short video advertisement is plagiarized due to the reason that the advertisement publisher fails to fulfill the review obligation, thus causing the original author and the advertiser to suffer losses, then the short video platform as the advertisement publisher shall bear the liability for compensation. if the platform party provides evidence to prove that it has fulfilled its review obligations, or for other reasons, the platform party itself is not at fault, in this case, the platform party as an advertisement publisher shall not be liable. as the last procedure for the dissemination of advertising works, advertising works will produce certain publicity effects after the publication, so the platform as the publisher bears very important responsibilities. the platform should assume the responsibility of the master and reduce the infringement of short video advertisements. (3) improve the short video advertising works plagiarism identification procedures. in judicial practice, the lack of reference to clear provisions will make it difficult to form a unified and fixed trial process and trial standards, and different courts will produce different results according to different standards when trying cases. to improve the identification level of plagiarism procedure of advertising works can be more standardized in dealing with short video advertising infringement cases. in order to regulate the copyright infringement of short video advertisement, it is an effective measure to construct the short www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 149 published by scholink inc. video advertisement industry protection measures to protect the copyright of short video advertisement. 5. conclusion in the network era, various intelligent devices and entertainment industries are changing with each passing day. the arrival of the 5 g era has broken the space limitation of short video advertising applications. the emergence of short video ads also provides a new mode for people to shop. short video ads not only have a high rate of return on investment, but also have a large business space and a variety of interactive forms, which are very suitable for users’ current dual needs of entertainment and shopping, thus attracting a large amount of capital to invest in them. however, short video advertising promotes economic growth, it also leads to the legal ambiguity and tension of copyright. as the types of infringement on the copyright of short video ads are very diverse and the ways of infringement are complex, how to protect short video ads is very important in practice. based on the particularity of short video advertising, the legal departments should play the role of rule of law. short video advertising users should also enhance their awareness of privacy protection, clarify the legal responsibilities related to short video platforms, and establish protection measures for the advertising industry, so as promotion the short video advertising industry to form an overall positive environment. with the extension of the short video industry chain, its value has been continuously accumulated. therefore, building a healthy copyright environment in the future will be the top priority for the upgrading and development of the short video advertising industry. references denis de freitas. (1983). interpretation of copyright law—looking especially at the situation created by the new technology. aslib proceedings, 35(11), 431-439. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb050907 michael, s. (2008). copyright in the networked world: the technology of enforcement. library hi tech, 26(3), 498-504. https://doi.org/10.1108/07378830810903454 siriginidi, s. r. (2003). copyright: its implications for electronic information. online information review, 27(4), 264-275. https://doi.org/10.1108/14684520310489050 george, j. a. (2013). copyright in light of ethics. reference services review, 41(3), 566-575. ttps://doi.org/10.1108/rsr-01-2013-0001 stuart, h. (1998). issues of intellectual property. new library world, 99(5), 185-190. ttps://doi.org/10.1108/03074809810228044 sameer, k., & jorgen, e. (2007). adaptive ip strategies in china: a tactical analysis. journal of intellectual capital, 8(1), 139-158. https://doi.org/10.1108/14691930710715105 michael, s. (2004). copyright in the networked world: technology and consumer rights in copyright. library hi tech, 20(3), 110-114. https://doi.org/10.1108/10650750410551442 artur, s. (2018). website removal from search engines due to copyright violation. aslib journal of information management, 71(1), 54-71. https://doi.org/10.1108/ajim-05-2018-0108 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 150 published by scholink inc. charles, o. (2000). does copyright have any future on the internet? journal of documentation, 56(3), 279-298. https://doi.org/10.1108/eum0000000007116 gael, m., & christopher, r. (1994). product piracy: the problem that will not go away. journal of product & brand management, 3(4), 55-65. https://doi.org/10.1108/10610429410073129 michael, t. z., theresa, b. f., & james, p. j. (2000). legal issues associated with international internet marketing. international marketing review, 17(3), 253-271. https://doi.org/10.1108/02651330010331651 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 80 original paper policy analysis and cooperation suggestions on asean countries’marine plastic waste pollution shihong bia,b,c, wenyu jiangc*, & yu yangd a institute of the belt and the road initiatives, kunming, china b center for china’s neighborhood diplomacy studies, kunming, china c institute of international studies, yunnan university, kunming, china d. postal savings bank of china, kunming, china *wenyu jiang, institute of international studies, yunnan university, kunming, china fund project national social science foundation of china history research institute major historical issues special major bidding project “development history of modern countries in southeast asia” 2023 project.(project number:23vls026); national social science foundation youth project “research on the competition for the right to speak in the south china sea under the situation of multiple security and china's response” 2024 project. (project number:24cgj027) received: october 11, 2024 accepted: november 08, 2024 online published: november 23, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n3p80 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n3p80 abstract in recent years, asean and its member states have increasingly prioritized marine environmental issues, with particular attention to the problem of marine plastic waste. on one hand, asean has issued a collective declaration on marine plastic waste management, elevating the importance of this issue within the region to new heights. the organization has implemented corresponding measures at both international and regional levels, achieving certain positive results. on the other hand, the deep management of marine plastic waste within asean has been constrained by factors such as funding, technology, and management practices. moreover, both china and asean face numerous challenges in addressing marine plastic waste. under the framework of their blue partnership, the two sides should enhance strategic dialogue and engage in multi-stakeholder, in-depth cooperation. keyword the blue partnership, marine plastic waste, sustainable development, regional governance www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 published by scholink inc. 81 marine plastic waste pollution, as one of the most pressing environmental challenges, poses threats to marine life, climate change, and human health. statistics show that plastic waste accounts for 85% of all marine litter, and by 2040, the amount of plastic waste entering the ocean globally is projected to nearly double, with an additional 23 to 37 million tons of plastic waste entering the ocean each year (un environment programme, 2021). in march 2022, the united nations environment assembly adopted the draft resolution to end plastic pollution, aiming to combat plastic waste pollution through legally binding measures. in southeast asia, marine plastic waste pollution is particularly severe. although asean countries account for less than 9% of the global population, they received 17% of the world's plastic waste between 2017 and 2021. southeast asia is also considered one of the main regions where land-based plastic waste leaks into the ocean, generating approximately 31 million tons of plastic waste annually (julius cesar imperial trajano, 2022). moreover, the region is the world's largest source of marine plastic waste. given that asean’s urbanization rate is expected to exceed 70% by 2050, the issue of marine plastic waste in the region is likely to worsen. china and asean countries are among the world's largest producers and consumers of plastics. at present, china has elevated marine plastic waste management to the policy level. through documents such as the vision for maritime cooperation under the belt and road initiative, the china-asean strategic partnership vision 2030, and the china-asean environmental protection cooperation strategy (2016–2020), marine plastic waste management has been designated as a key area of environmental cooperation between china and asean. 1. status of marine plastic waste in asean countries in order to achieve the overall goal of the asean community 2025, asean envisions “environmental ecological sustainability in the context of social change and economic development”, while marine plastic waste, a prominent marine environmental problem, poses a threat to the social and economic development of asean countries. 1.1 the amount of marine plastic waste is enormous the total amount of marine plastic waste in asean countries is very large, and it is one of the main sources of marine plastic in the world. as shown in table 1, according to the world economic forum, of the 10 countries with the most plastic waste pollution in the world's oceans in 2023, six are located in southeast asia. the philippines alone leaks 356,371 tons of plastic waste into the ocean a year, accounting for about 35% of the global leakage and leading the world. they are followed by malaysia (73,098 tonnes), indonesia (56,333 tonnes), myanmar (40,000 tonnes), vietnam (28,221 tonnes) and thailand (22,806 tonnes), which generate more than 31 million tonnes of plastic waste per year (liviana, 2023). in addition, marine microplastic pollution in southeast asia is severe. because southeast asia has rich mangrove, seagrass, and coral habitats in coastal and shallow waters, plastic waste is present in beach sediments, benthic sediments, and marine biota and accumulates along www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 published by scholink inc. 82 high-chain vegetation lines, which in turn leads to microplastic accumulation. concentrations of microplastics in sea water in southeast asia ranged from 0.13 to 11,100 pieces per litre, comparable to those recorded in the arctic ocean and santa monica bay. table 1. countries with the most serious marine plastic waste pollution rank country annual marine plastic waste (tons) 1 philippines 356,371 2 india 126,513 3 malaysia 73,098 4 china 70,707 5 indonesia 56,333 6 myanmar 40,000 7 brazil 37,799 8 vietnam 28,221 9 bangladesh 24,640 10 thailand 22,806 others (worldwide) 176,012 total 1,012,500 date source:“how to defeat the plastic tide threatening the asean region’s green growth”, world economic forum, october 10, 2023. 1.2 marine plastic waste has diverse sources in southeast asia, the main sources of marine plastic waste include plastic debris carried into the ocean by rivers, plastic products discarded offshore by fisheries or tourists, and more.first, many rivers in asean countries are heavily polluted with waste, significantly contributing to the influx of trash into the ocean. river-carried waste is a major component of land-based sources of marine debris. as shown in figure 1, according to data from science advances, 7 out of the world’s top 10 rivers carrying the most plastic waste into the ocean in 2021 were located in the philippines, and 1 was in malaysia (meijer et al., 2021). second, coastal fishing and tourism activities are also significant contributors to the increase in marine plastic waste. approximately 20% of plastic waste in the marine environment originates from the ocean itself, mainly from fishing activities. for example, in the coral reefs of darvel bay in eastern sabah, malaysia, plastic debris such as plastic bags, bottles, and fishing nets/lines has been discovered, with fishing nets/lines accounting for the largest proportion at 21%. tourism also plays a role, as large numbers of visitors flock to beaches and coastal areas. due to improper waste disposal by tourists and inadequate management by local authorities, beaches and nearshore areas in several asean countries have seen a marked increase in waste. a significant www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 published by scholink inc. 83 portion of this waste consists of plastic products, such as single-use beverage bottles, straws, plastic bags, and sunscreen packaging. figure 1. rivers that contribute the most to ocean plastic pollution date source: meijer et al. (2021). more than 1000 rivers account for 80% of global riverine plastic emissions into the ocean. science advances. 1.3 marine plastic waste is improperly managed many asean countries have weak waste recycling and processing capabilities and lack basic waste management infrastructure, resulting in imported waste being inadequately handled. only about 10% of imported waste is properly recycled, while the remaining 90% is illegally dumped into the ocean, incinerated, or abandoned in landfills.following china's implementation of bans on the import of foreign waste in 2017, many western countries that previously relied on china as a destination for plastic waste exports shifted to asean countries as alternative export destinations. this has placed greater pressure on asean nations from plastic waste-exporting countries. in 2018, asean countries saw a 362% surge in plastic waste imports. during just the first seven months of 2018, approximately 754,000 tons of plastic waste were imported into malaysia. 2. policy mechanisms of asean and its member states foraddressing marine plastic waste in response to the severe marine plastic waste pollution, asean has been improving its mechanisms for addressing transboundary environmental issues and has adopted several collective declarations targeting marine plastic waste management. asean member states have also demonstrated their commitment to tackling marine plastic waste by undertaking various governance actions. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 published by scholink inc. 84 2.1 asean’s policy mechanisms for addressing marine plastic waste firstly, establishing cooperative mechanisms to address transboundary environmental issues. during this period, asean focused on environmental assets and national resilience. in 1977, asean member states adopted the treaty of amity and cooperation, which included environmental issues on asean’s agenda for the first time. during this phase, asean launched the asean sub-regional environmental programme with the goal of safeguarding the “sustainable availability of natural resources” to combat poverty and improve quality of life. asean began paying greater attention to transnational challenges and shared responsibilities. the organization recognized that environmental issues such as regional pollution impacted the “common well-being of asean people” environmental protection and sustainable development were seen as essential to achieving “a better standard of living”. during this phase, asean resolutions and agreements started addressing ecological management. asean has articulated multiple environmental goals and adopted institutionalized approaches to achieve them, emphasizing mechanisms for sustainable development. in 1989, asean introduced the asean senior officials on the environment (asoen), which clarified the authority for transboundary environmental regulation. this marked the full integration of environmental issues into asean’s institutional framework. secondly, joint declarations on cooperation for marine debris management. in november 2017, the asean conference on reducing marine debris was held in thailand. in june 2019, the asean summit released the asean framework of action on marine debris and the bangkok declaration. this framework addresses marine debris management from policy, legal, technological, and awareness perspectives. as asean’s first official document on marine debris management, it holds milestone significance. another declaration emphasizes an integrated land-sea approach to waste management, with a focus on strengthening marine plastic waste governance. it also calls for enhanced cooperation among asean member states, as well as at regional and international levels. in may 2021, asean adopted the regional action plan for combating marine debris in asean member states (2021-2025), which aims to provide implementable and scalable solutions for addressing marine plastic waste in the asean region. 2.2 policy mechanisms of asean member states for addressing marine plastic waste firstly, formulating governance plans and setting clear targets. indonesia, thailand, and vietnam have introduced governance plans and targets directly related to marine plastic waste, which are currently being implemented. indonesia’s government adopted the marine debris action plan 2017–2025, aiming to reduce marine waste at its source and cut marine plastic waste by 70% by 2025. thailand’s plan was established to reduce marine plastic waste by 50% by 2027. with an even more ambitious target, vietnam aims to reduce marine plastic waste by 75% by 2030. the second measure is to limit plastic consumption and production. currently, all asean countries have, to varying degrees, restricted plastic consumption, and some have enacted restrictive policies on plastic production. in 2018, the indonesian government issued presidential decree no. 82 on ocean www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 published by scholink inc. 85 waste management and its action plan (2018-2025), aimed at encouraging companies to produce more biodegradable and recyclable plastic. in october 2018, the philippine government issued executive order no. 1866, urging the public to avoid using disposable plastic products and banning the use of plastic straws and stirrers. in november 2020, vietnam passed the amended law on environmental protection for 2020, limiting the use of disposable plastic products and imposing an environmental tax on plastic bags at a rate of 40,000 vietnamese dong (approximately $1.76) per kilogram. thirdly, strengthen waste management. in many asean countries, less than half of the collected and treated waste was disposed of properly before, and most of it was handled by households using simple equipment, with poor treatment quality and low subsequent economic value. therefore, all asean countries have strengthened their waste management. in june 2020, the indonesian government passed presidential regulation no. 97/2017, introducing policies and strategies for household waste management, aiming to reduce waste by 30% and manage 70% of it by 2025. moreover, plastic waste management was also included in the presidential regulation no. 83/2018 on marine waste management of the indonesian government. asean countries have increased investment in waste management capacity building. in may 2019, the philippine department of environment and natural resources listed marine waste management as the top priority for coastal and marine projects and enacted the ecological solid waste management act, stipulating that waste is a recyclable resource and should be managed through reducing generation and recycling, and requiring local governments to implement it in practice. in august 2022, the thai government formulated the national solid waste and hazardous waste management master plan, encouraging citizens to use central facilities and adhering to the principle of reducing, reusing, and recycling waste. furthermore, indonesia has adopted the “waste bank” as a new model for improving waste management, the waste bank draws on the mode of depositing and withdrawing funds in banks, treating sorted waste as a commodity stored in the bank, and allowing citizens to receive deposits in their personal accounts based on the value of the waste. fourth, resist the import of foreign waste. many countries in asean have implemented corresponding control measures on foreign plastic waste, including suspending the import of plastic waste and implementing return policies. in may 2019, malaysia sent back 450 tons of plastic waste from australia, canada, japan, and the united states. after six years of diplomatic protests, the philippines sent back 69 plastic waste containers to canada in june 2019. by june 2019, malaysia had monitored 62 license holders related to plastic waste and closed 148 illegal plastic recycling factories. under the revised basel convention, us plastic waste will be banned from entering contracting parties starting from 2021, and indonesia is one of the main advocates of the convention. 3. the effectiveness and limitations of asean countries’ measures to address marine plastic waste currently, asean countries have made some progress in managing marine plastic waste, effectively reducing the amount of imported plastic waste from external regions and preventing more plastic waste www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 published by scholink inc. 86 from entering the ocean. they have also developed a multi-stakeholder governance model. however, overall, the management of marine plastic waste in asean countries is still in its early stages of implementation, leaving significant room for improvement. 3.1 effectiveness of marine litter management in asean countries first of all, asean countries effectively respond to the pressure of transshipment of plastic waste from outside the region and clean up existing marine plastic waste. asean’s resistance to plastic waste from western countries has significantly reduced the amount of plastic waste transferred into the sea from western countries, effectively reducing the flow of plastic waste into the ocean. in 2019, global plastic waste exports to southeast asia fell by 32%, and the total volume of plastic waste trade fell by 616,703 tons year-on-year. in addition, beach litter in many asean countries has been effectively cleaned up, and the marine ecological environment has been improved to some extent. ngos and businesses have contributed a lot to the clean-up of marine plastic waste. take the ocean conservancy as an example, in 2019, the number of plastic waste cleaned up by its volunteers on philippine beaches was about 7 million pieces, and the length of the beach was about 6,000 kilometers. the ocean conservation society has carried out the same cleanup activities in many asean countries and achieved fruitful cleanup results, effectively reducing the accumulation of beach garbage and improving the coastal landscape. in addition, many jobs have been created in the treatment of marine plastic waste, which has promoted social development and increased the employment rate. as far as the ocean plastic removal project (stop) is concerned, by the end of 2022, the project has built five waste treatment facilities in indonesia and collected more than 5,000 tons of plastic waste, creating 333 full-time jobs. secondly, the management of marine plastic waste in asean countries promotes the formation of a multi-actor co-governance model. countries have a strong policy implementation capacity, regions have a broad appeal and policy leadership role, and the participation of non-regional actors can provide more funding and program support for governance. asean countries encourage national actors, organizations and the private sector to participate in the management of marine plastic waste. in addition to traditional governance subjects official entities such as states and regional organizations ngos have also injected vitality into the management of marine plastic waste in asean countries. in 2018, the "ocean plastic clean" project, led by the united nations economic and social commission for asia and the pacific indonesia, focused on thailand, vietnam and vietnam to improve waste management efficiency and public awareness through the participation of local governments and communities, improve waste management systems, and reduce the flow of plastic waste into the ocean. in 2019, asean and norway launched the collaborative project on local capacity building to reduce plastic waste pollution (aseano), piloting sustainable plastic waste management practices in indonesia and the philippines, which will be replicated across asean. 3.2 inadequate management of marine litter in asean countries firstly, there is a lack of coordination mechanisms at the national level to control marine plastic waste, leading to unclear powers and responsibilities, and low disposal efficiency. although asean countries www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 published by scholink inc. 87 all have departments responsible for waste management, few countries have a dedicated agency responsible for marine plastic waste management. at present, only indonesia has established a national coordination group for marine debris management to coordinate the management of various departments and monitor the implementation of policies. in most asean countries, the responsibility for managing marine plastic waste is often vested in one or more ministries. for example, the issue of marine plastic litter in singapore is the responsibility of the ministry of environment and water resources; the responsibility for marine plastic waste management in thailand is vested in several departments, including the ministry of natural resources and environment and the office of natural resources and environment policy and planning. secondly, there is a lack of scientific research on marine plastic waste and microplastic treatment practices at the national level. firstly, asean countries' research on marine plastic waste is obviously insufficient. at present, most of the data used by relevant academic research institutes in asean countries come from outside the region, and there are few local relevant studies. the research on marine plastics in asean countries mainly focuses on two aspects, namely, quantifying the plastic waste on the coast and in the ocean and exploring the impact of marine plastic waste on the environment and ecology. among them, indonesia, singapore and vietnam have carried out traceability research on marine plastic waste. in terms of the study of hot spots for marine plastic waste, only indonesia has done relevant research. most asean countries have only conducted relatively basic quantitative research on marine plastic waste, and there are few studies on the impact of marine plastic waste on the ecosystem and the accumulated plastic content in organisms, which makes the people of asean countries have insufficient awareness of the harm of marine plastic waste. second, it is difficult to say that asean countries have taken adequate measures to control marine microplastics. marine microplastics have potential negative impacts on marine life, ecosystems and human health. however, in the practice of marine plastic waste management in asean countries, there is a lack of management of marine microplastics, most of which are macro marine plastic waste management, such as plastic bottles, plastic bags and plastic plates and other visible plastic products. thirdly, the lack of binding nature of the asean way leads to slow progress. first of all, the lack of asean governance strength leads to the lack of enforcement of relevant programs. at present, asean only manages marine plastic waste through soft laws such as declarations and action frameworks, which is weak compared with the eu’s management of marine plastic waste through legislation. the european union has issued the "european plastics strategy in the circular economy", which has made specific provisions on how to reduce the pollution of plastic waste in the circular economy model, and has reduced the negative impact of marine plastic waste from the level of regional legislation. in contrast, asean is particularly inadequate in the implementation and enforcement of marine plastic waste management and circular economy policies. secondly, asean lacks a working mechanism to control marine plastic waste, which affects work efficiency. although asean has a working group for marine environmental governance, asean lacks a directly related working www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 published by scholink inc. 88 mechanism for the management of marine plastic waste, resulting in low governance efficiency and ineffective governance. at the same time, because asean participates in the work of multiple mechanisms, it is difficult to follow up and connect existing projects, thus affecting the efficiency of governance. in addition, the overall organizational structure of asean environmental cooperation framework is scattered, the mechanism structure procedures are many, and the approval procedures are complicated and there are many meetings, which hinder the progress of the approval process of project proposals. 4. china-asean cooperation proposal on marine plastic waste management china and asean countries are separated by a strip of water, and our cooperation has a solid political, economic and cultural foundation. in recent years, under the guidance of the “21st century maritime silk road”, the two sides have jointly built a cooperation platform for marine environmental governance, jointly built a “blue partnership” and a “green silk road”, and promoted cooperation in scientific research, project monitoring and financial investment in marine plastic waste management. in order to further promote china-asean response to marine plastic waste management, specific recommendations are as follows: 4.1 build a china-asean cooperation mechanism on marine plastic waste management, and strengthen dialogue at the strategic level at present, china and asean are cooperating on marine environmental governance under the framework of the blue partnership, the china-asean environmental cooperation center has been established, and the china-asean environmental cooperation strategy and action framework (2021-2025) has been issued. however, for more detailed cooperation on marine plastic waste management, the cooperation mechanism between the two sides needs to be further strengthened. for china, first, it is necessary to establish a daily liaison mechanism with the asean marine garbage knowledge center and the mekong basin garbage pollution monitoring center, so that china can have in-depth understanding and precise participation. the second is to deeply integrate the management of marine plastic waste between china and asean with the current china-asean environmental cooperation mechanism, and explore the establishment of a new cooperation mechanism while further promoting cooperation on marine plastic waste management with the help of the existing mechanism; the third is to strengthen dialogue at the policy level. although china and asean have published a series of documents on the issue of dealing with internal marine plastic waste, they have not raised their cooperation to the strategic level. china and asean can carry out more dialogue on marine plastic waste management at the official level, carry out special activities, and issue cooperation documents to lead non-governmental cooperation. 4.2 guide the participation of multiple subjects to implement the in-depth implementation of china-asean marine plastic waste control through bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms between china and asean countries, we www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 published by scholink inc. 89 will draw a conclusion from one example and implement the control of marine plastic waste between china and asean at multiple levels. at the national level, china can first carry out bilateral cooperation or establish multilateral cooperation mechanisms with countries with better economic and social development and serious marine plastic waste pollution, and drive more asean countries to strengthen cooperation with china in marine plastic waste management. secondly, china can take the lead in pilot cooperation in coastal cities near asean countries and gradually expand regional cooperation, such as continuing to carry out china-asean coastal cities roundtable dialogue, promoting consensus on plastic reduction, implementing action plans, and building cooperation networks. thirdly, china and asean countries can start from universities and scientific research institutions to carry out research on the source analysis and risk assessment of marine plastic waste, and develop new technologies such as monitoring, assessment and recycling of marine plastic waste, so as to provide a rigorous and feasible policy basis for the formulation of relevant policies between china and asean. 4.3 to provide a demonstration effect for marine plastic waste management in asean countries china adheres to the concept of ocean governance with the harmony of the sea, adheres to the construction of marine ecological civilization with equal emphasis on development and protection, and consolides the blue consensus for the management of marine plastic waste between china and asean. whether in terms of conceptual consensus or regional practice, china can provide solutions and practical paths for asean countries in marine plastic pollution control. china attaches great importance to the management of marine plastic waste, issued the “14th five-year plan” plastic pollution control action plan, proposed to establish a plastic waste collection and disposal system, and establish a long-term mechanism for marine plastic waste cleanup, and strengthen scientific research efforts. in 2023, taizhou, zhejiang province, china first piloted a new model of “blue cycle” marine plastic waste management, and was awarded the “champion of the earth award” by the united nations. based on the above experience, china can provide technical support to asean in the field of marine plastic waste management. in addition, economic cooperation is an important direction for china and asean to build a blue partnership, and the two sides can take plastic circular economy as a starting point to combine environmental sustainability with blue economy development. references comprehensive assessment on marine litter and plastic pollution confirms need for urgent globa l action[eb/ol]. (2021-10-21). retrieved from https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/press-r elease/comprehensive-assessment-marine-litter-and-plastic-pollution how to defeat the plastic tide threatening the asean region’s green growth[eb/ol]. (2023-10 -10). retrieved from https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/10/defeat-plastic-tide-threatening-a sean-green-growth/ meijer et al. (2021). more than 1000 rivers account for 80% of global riverine plastic emissio ns into the ocean. science advances. 2021(07). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 published by scholink inc. 90 plastic pollution in southeast asia: wasted opportunity?[r/ol]. (2022-02-10). retrieved from h ttps://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/co22011.pdf microsoft word ape-v4n3-p1 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 1 original paper transferring dematerialized shares in germany, austria and in the united states of america rosen petkov baltov1* 1 regional court, varna, bulgaria * rosen p. baltov, registering judge at the regional court, varna, bulgaria received: may 14, 2021 accepted: may 26, 2021 online published: june 4, 2021 doi:10.22158/ape.v4n3p1 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v4n3p1 abstract the present article is aimed at briefly reviewing the historical development of dematerialized shares in germany, austria, and in the united states of america (the usa). a brief comparison is made between the dematerialized shares in the united kingdom and those in germany and austria. discussed is the reason why the securities certificates in germany and austria were removed from the transferring process by taking them out of circulation (immobilization), and not through abolishing them (dematerialization). presented is the development of the most active and liquid capital market in the world—that of the united states department of the treasury. there is a brief description made of the system of the conventional paper certificates and the system of the dematerialized securities known as direct holding system, as well as of the system for immobilization and possessing through intermediaries, known as indirect holding system. in conclusion, there is a short presentation of the currently valid legal status unrelated to transferring dematerialized shares in the three countries. keywords dematerialized shares, securities, paper certificates, dematerialization ,central securities depository, direct and indirect holding 1. transferring dematerialized shares in germany and austria 1.1 historical development germany and austria felt the need to abolish the paper form of transferring securities in the 1930s. until then, the german and austrian securities were transferred through physical provision of paper certificates. however, the circumstances in the 1930s prompted the reduction of the need to move www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 2 published by scholink inc. around the paper certificates. nevertheless, the authors of the reform from the 1930s could have used a law, which was enacted in 1910 and provided the possibility to issue and hold the government bonds as dematerialized securities, the reform did not make use of that model. instead, it was carried out in line with the legal regulations, which had been existing by then. prior to the reform, securities were considered tangible assets, while the securities owned through intermediaries, were analyzed under the property act for property deposited in custody. the authors of the reform did not change the principle of that analysis; they rather modified the act for depositing property in custody in order to regulate the securities held as common property, which is not distributed individually to a particular person. securities continued to be classified as tangible assets. the analysis was left untouched, irrespective of the fact that the individual certificates were replaced by global certificates, but it was further extended in order to include the government bonds for which there were no certificates existing. all the three jurisdictions—of england, germany and austria, abolished the need to physically move the paper certificates in the process of transferring. the time when that happened was determined by circumstances beyond the law. however, the law—and in particular, the legal doctrine regulating securities before the reform—determined the way in which that reform was implemented. prior to the dematerialization, securities were classified a intangibles sets, where after the dematerialization the former principles of analyze is were still applied. securities were still classified as intangible assets, and the procedure for transferring, regulating the dematerialized securities, replaced the procedure existing before that. dematerialization had no impact either on the securities held through intermediaries. the analysis prior to the dematerialization was that the intermediaries kept the securities in custody in favor of the investors and that analysis was applied never the less whether the securities were held in a materialized or dematerialized form (note 1). the analysis in the german and austrian law used to be focused on the securities of a bearer, since the majority of the german companies issued them. however, that was changed over the recent years. irrespective of the different doctrinal approach dominant in england, on the one hand, and in germany and austria, on the other, there is one important similarity. all the three jurisdictions have found the way to abolish the paper form from the process of transferring securities. 1.2 current status the majority of the securities under german and austrian a ware issued in the form of documents of a bearer, where those documents are considered tangible assets. in the basis of contemporary german law there is the theory that the certificates for the securities are paper documents of a very special type. the law, which concerns a paper document, is materialized in the document and, therefore, it can be transferred according to the rules regulating the tangible assets. if a paper document is transferred, the buyer will acquire not only the ownership right over the paper document, but also the rights related to it. the term in the german language for the german securities is “wertpapier” and it is used both in german and austrian law. the word “wertpapier” literally means “paper for value”, and the term www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 3 published by scholink inc. reflects the fact that the document related to a security epitomizes a valuable right. the term is aimed at reflecting also the theory, which lays the foundations of both german and austrian securities, i.e., that the rights concerned by the securities certificate and the certificate itself merge and become one single tangible asset. as a result of that, securities, their transferring and the indirect ownership over securities are all subject to the rules regulating the tangible assets. the analysis adopted by contemporary german and austrian law appeared somewhat later after securities were used for the first time. the securities depositories in germany and austria emerged as the prevailing type of service provider, which was of assistance to the clients wishing to own securities indirectly. the rules concerning the securities and their transferring—in particular, the rule protecting a buyer from counter claims—fostered the development of this type of service provider on the german and austrian markets. the fact that the securities were governed by the rules concerning the tangible assets encouraged germany and austria to abolish the paper form from the transferring process through immobilization, and not through dematerialization. in order to facilitate the indirect holding of securities, german and austrian law elaborated a complex doctrine for joint ownership and co-ownership. that particular form of analysis of the doctrine emerged both in germany and in austria because securities were classified as tangible moveable property. this legal analysis provided the regulatory framework where the securities market and the legal regulations supporting it developed. the analysis influenced the way in which the paper form was eliminated from the transferring process, nevertheless germany had introduced an alternative system for transferring government bonds, which could have been used as a model for creating a transferring system without using a paper carrier (note 2). 1.3 indirect holding the german and austrian legaldoctrineinrespecttosecuritiesinfluencedthetypeofserviceprovider, which emerged on the german and austrian markets in order to serve investors, who wanted to own shares indirectly. the process, where by the paper certificates were eliminated from the transferring process, was formed by the legal doctrinal framework, which directly regulated the owned securities. the fact that the german and austrian bearer securities were classified as tangible assets brought the advantage that the german and austrian rules concerning assignment were no longer applied for transferring. transferring, instead, was subjected to the rules, identical to those regulating the tangible assets. as result of that, the acquirer was protected against counter claims. the legal doctrine, where the purchaser of securities is offered protection against counter claims, had a huge impact on the development of the institutional framework, prevailing in germany and austria. the bona fide acquirer becomes owner upon acquiring tenancy over the securities. that rule had a substantial influence on the way in which investors held securities certificates in germany and austria. unlike england, where the securities certificates did not need to be deposited in custody, because the owners would not lose their rights if those certificates were stolen and then transferred to a third party, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 4 published by scholink inc. any investor under the german and austrian law had to keep the securities certificates out of circulation, so that a third-party would not be allowed to acquire tenancy over them, and, subsequently-ownership over the bearer securities. the paper certificates should be kept in a safe place, and that need of depositing in custody facilitated an important development in germany and austria. it created a demand for depository services, and that demand was met by the german and austrian banks, which developed the activity of depositing securities in custody for investors as a separate branch of its commercial activities. instead of renting out deposit boxes or safe deposit boxes to individual investors, banks initially took the securities certificates and kept them in custody for the respective clients. the banks kept separate files for every client; the paper documents were not physically held by the investors, nevertheless, they were distributed for each of them. the german and austrian depository services for securities are an example how a doctrine can foster the emergence of certain types of infrastructure providers. similarly, just like the english law on notation facilitated the advent of registrars in england, the german and austrian doctrine, protecting buyers against counter claims, favored the emergence of depositories in those countries (note 3). the german and austrian rules, safe guarding buyers against counter demands, issuing from unlawful transferring, prompted the need for investors to prevent any disappearance of their documents. that led to a demand for depository services on the german and austrian markets. that demand was met by the german and austrian banks, which elaborated specialized depository services. the doctrinal framework, regulating the paper transferring of securities, influenced the way in which the paper certificates were removed from the transferring in germany and austria. the legal doctrine, which provides the ground for securities in both jurisdictions, is based on the normative presumption that the special rules regulating securities transferring are applied because securities are tangible assets. hence, thelegalexpertsdrewtheconclusionthatifsecuritieswerenotclassifiedas tangible, those specific rules could not be applied. securities transferring, instead, should have been governed by the laws for assignment. in order to prevent that, it was possible to elaborate as pecialegime, which was to be applied for securities transferring, nevertheless how they were classified. besides, it would have been possible both for the german and austrian law to refer to the rules, which had existed for the government bonds, for which there were no paper certificates. that option, however, was not the preferred done. the securities certificates, instead, were eliminated from the transferring process by taking them out of circulation (immobilization), and not through abolishing them (dematerialization). the prevailing point of view was that it was essentially important that the legal analys is governing the paper certificates be further applied, even though in an environment, where paper certificates no longer fulfilled their original function for transferring the rights embodied in them. as are setoff that, the german and austrian markets introduced the central securities depositories (note 4). unlike england, which chose transferring dematerialized securities, germany and austria preferred www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 5 published by scholink inc. their immobilization. the relationship between intermediaries and investors is followed in respect to depositing property in custody according to the german and austrian law. investors are considered co-owners of the indirectly held papers; moreover, they jointly possess the securities certificates deposited with the central securities depository. that is opposite to the position adopted in the english law, where the relations with the investors, who hold securities indirectly, is governed by the custody act. the co-ownership interest in indirectly owned securities is transferred through registration in the books of the intermediary, who keeps the securities. that registration is classified by law as including transferring the tenancy over the securities certificates from the seller to the buyer. the buyers of indirectly owned securities are protected against counter claims issuing from unlawful transferring, on the basis of the same rules, which protect the buyers of directly held securities in the german and austrian law. irrespective of the fact that the investors have a co-ownership interest within the total amount of securities, kept at the central securities depository, a bonfire buyer can rely on the rules protecting a buyer of a tangible as set against unlawful transferring. the situation in the english law is less clear. the rules regulating materialized securities were not forbidden when dematerialized securities were introduced in england. it is still unclear, however, whether and to what extent the rules protecting the buyers of materialized securities provide protection to the buyers of dematerialized securities. at the same time, none of the jurisdictions did create a completely new legal regime, which would facilitate securities transferring carried out without the need of moving the paper certificates. instead of that, the rules existing in all the three jurisdictions governing transferring through the use of a paper carrier were modified in order to address transferring without the use of a paper carrier. further more, the legal norms regulating transferring through the use of a paper carrier had a major impact on the institutional formation used in order to regulate transferring in a dematerialized form. the analysis in the german and austrian law is focused on the securities of a bearer, since most of the german companies used to issue them. this, however, started to change over the recent years. some big companies, listed on the stock exchange in germany, have replaced the bearer stocks with register redone, where that change has been prompted by the globalization. there as on for that change was that the companies in question wanted to be able to get registered directly on the new york stock exchange-nyse. nyse, however, lists only registered stocks. in order to be able to issue the same type of stocks to the investors in the usa, as well as to the german investors, the german issuers decided to issue registered shares, instead of shares of a bearer both on the us and on the german stock markets. the german legislation supported that change by reforming the legal regulations for the registered shares, which have been traditionally represented in the german companies act (aktiengesetz). that act requires from the german companies issuing registered shares to keep a shareholder’s registry. at the same time, the act related to that registry was updated, wherethechangesmadeincludedalsoa www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 6 published by scholink inc. change in the german legal terminology. prior to the reform, the share registry was called “the book ofs hares” (aktienbuch). this term was abandoned in the reform process and was replaced by the term “registry of shares” (aktienregister). the explanatory notes to the revised legislative act explicitly state that this terminology was chosen to reflect more accurately the english term for a “registered share”. the german settlement system helped the german companies in the transition from bearer shares to registered shares by introducing an optional lowing the small-scale investors to list their names in the share registry, nevertheless whether they own those shares through a chain of intermediaries or not. that development is an example of convergence (alignment). german law has changed to a ling with the prevailing international standard to enable the german issuers be competitive on the global market. it should be pointed out that there form did not change the already existing legal doctrine. the bearer shares were replaced by registered shares to ensure compliance with the american market practice. the share registry was renamed so that it should reflect the english language use. none of those changes, however, had an impact on the doctrinal analysis of share transferring. thereformwascarriedoutinlinewiththeprevailingdoctrineinthegermanlaw about ownership and it did not change the legal nature of the german shares. besides, that reform did not change the analysis of the transferring process. the german registered shares, as well as the german shares of a bearer, are also considered tangible assets. in order to betransferred via the german settlement system they should be indorsed. that endorsement transforms the registered shares into bearer shares, where upon their transferring is governed by the same rules, which regulate all the other bearer securities. the certificates for the registered shares are deposited with the central securities depository. just like with the bearer shares, the rules about the tenancy over those securities certificates determine the time when the buyer becomes owner of the registered shares, and irrespective of the change in the name, listing in the german share registry does not turn the respective holder of a share in to an owner of the shares. 2. conclusion securities are classifieds tangible assets both in the german and in the austrian legal doctrines, while their transferring is governed by the same rules as those for the tangible assets. this analysis is supported by the theory that the paper certificates traditionally issued for securities epitomize the rights related to the certificates. the analysis was developed towards the end of the nineteenth century and became an or thodoxtheory, predominant in germany and austria after the german provinces and austria adopted the rules protecting the bonfire buyers against unlawful issuing. according to the german and austrian law, a buyer should acquire tenancy over the securities certificate in order to become an owner of the certificate and the rights related to it. a buyer of securities is protected against counter claims resulting from unlawful transferring in the same way as a buyer of tangible moveable property; there is also a rule protecting the buyer against claims resulting from improper issuing. both in the german and in the austrian law, the rule protecting a buyer of securities from unlawful www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 7 published by scholink inc. transferring requires that the risk in such transferring should be borne by the securities owner, who would lose his/her rights when a benevolent buyer acquires tenancy over the securities documents against payment of the respective value. as a result of that, there is a need of keeping the documents in custody under the german and austrian law, which facilitates the emergence of depositories in both jurisdictions. the theory underlying securities and their transferring in the german, as well as in the austrian law, had a major impact on the way in which the paper certificates were abolished from securities transferring in both countries. the theory presents the regulatory principle that the rules protecting the investors from counter claims resulting from unlawful transferring are applied only because the securities are classified as tangible. if securities were classified as in tangible, investors would not have been protected again stone-permitted transferring. when processing the paper certificates became to cumber some, it was considered reasonable on the german market not to adopt an entirely new regime; instead, it was decided that the previous legal analysis should remain unchanged. securities were further classified as tangible assets, however, paper documents, representing the securities, were immobilized. the german and austrian markets developed a new system of transferring around the fundamental legal analysis. there is the central securities depository, which keeps in custody the securities certificates for most of the german securities listed on the market. clients usually own the securities through sub-custodians, who have accounts at the central securities depository, while the relationship between the clients and their depositories is analyzed in the light of providing one’s property for keeping in custody. it is not considered that the depositories have property rights over the clients’ securities; they are only intermediary’s in the tenancy between their clients and the securities certificates, which are kept by the central securities depository. the investors are considered co-owners and joint-tenants of the securities held at the central securities depository. the owner ship over those securities is to be transferred by registering, which, however, under the doctrine is classified as including transferring of the joint tenancy from the seller to the buyer. the buyer is protected against counter claims, which may result from unlawful transferring or improper issuing (note 5). 3. transferring dematerialized shares in the united states of america 3.1 historical development on a global scale, dematerialized investment securities appeared much earlier and were related to the process of the so-called dematerialization. the necessity of their introduction was a result of piling heaps of paper in the stock markets in the united states of america (usa) and their difficult processing—a phenomenon called “paper crunch”. dematerialized securities were officially introduced in the usa with the uniform commercial code (ucc) back in 1977. they are regulated there as uncertificated securities, or those are investment securities for which there is no certificate issued to represent them, and their transferring is done through registration in books kept for this purpose by or www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 8 published by scholink inc. at the expense of a issuer. § 8-102 from ucc, definitions (15) and (18). for more than 30 years the largest, most active and most liquid market in the world, that of the united states department of the treasury, was in a process of on-going abolishment of securities’ physical certificates. there are several milestone years illustrating that process: in 1968 were adopted provisions authorizing the first “book-entry” procedures. the “book-entry system” is the system for carrying out and registering the issuing and dealing with dematerialized shares; in 1979, all the new treasury bills were issued only in a dematerialized form; in 1985, the federal national mortgage association started applying the “book-entry” system; in 1986, all the new treasury bills and bonds were issued in a dematerialized form; the market for the most liquid of the instruments on the cash market in the usa—the federal funds emerged since both borrowers and lenders were looking for ways to make use of the opportunities, provided by the trade with reserve funds. the trade with federal funds started in the 1920s and involved only several banks, members of the federal reserve, which were based in new york. nowadays, that market includes more than 14 000 commercial banks and a wide range of non-bank financial institutions. the characteristics of the federal funds, as well as the mechanisms of their purchase and sale, reflect most accurately the needs of the players on the contemporary capital market (note 6). on a global scale, those markets, which are most efficient, will obtain competitive advantage and a dominant position in the actual formation and distribution of the investment products. from a historical perspective, the usa is a leader and innovator in the field of dematerialized securities. nevertheless, there are other competitors gaining momentum on the market of dematerialized financial instruments. the euro has created potential for major competition within the european economic union, where the links between the separate countries and unions are formed with a head-spinning speed. furthermore, some later emerging players on the capital market are making quick transition towards securities dematerialization. among such countries are australia, the republic of south africa and india. 3.2 current status transferring dematerialized shares in the usa is governed by art. 8 of ucc, which regulates ownership and transferring securities and other financial assets. the provisions of art. 9 of the ucc are related to securing those assets. art. 8 and art. 9 are part of the numerous legal norms of the us regulatory basis governing securities and investment assets. article 8 settles with its content the transactions with securities, the relations between the issuers, investors, intermediaries and sellers and their buyers. articles 8 and 9 from the current version of the ucc are adopted by all the fifty states and the district of columbia. ucc-art. 3 regulates the ownership and transferring of negotiable instruments (securities), for which there can be established and owned rights over securities through the indirect holding system under art. 8 (note 7). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 9 published by scholink inc. 3.3 direct and indirect holding systems the system for immobilization and possessing through intermediaries does not entirely replace the system of dematerialized securities, and none of those systems does entirely replace the system of direct holding and the provision of conventional certificates on paper. article 8 of the ucc contains the legal regulations for all the three systems. the system of the conventional paper certificates and the system of the dematerialized securities are known as direct holding system. the system for immobilization and possessing through intermediaries is known as indirect holding system. with the direct holding system, each investor is registered as an owner of the security in the issuer’s registries, which are often kept by a transferring agent. this can be illustrated by figure 1. figure 1. direct holding system with the indirect holding system, most of the investors have no direct connection and do not communicate directly with the issuer, but they own their investment through intermediaries. the indirect holding system is not entirely independent from the direct holding system: in the case with the securities. the legal entity, which is at the top of the indirect holding chain, communicates with the issuer from the direct holding system. the relation between the two systems, as well as the relationships within the indirect holding system, can be illustrated by figure 2. direct holding of a jumbocertificate (a securities certificate with a high value or for a greater number of shares) certifying 10000 shares issuer dtc – depository trust company issuer investor ррр investor investor www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 10 published by scholink inc. 6000 shares, credited 4000 shares, credited into account with securitiesinto account with securities figure 2. indirect holding system the depository trust company-dtc, is the clearing organization for the majority of the publicly traded corporate capital securities, corporate debt securities and municipal debt securities, and its representative is usually cede & co. it was established in 1973 with the main goal to reduce the costs on the securities transactions, as well as to carry out their clearing and settlement by immobilizing securities and transferring securities holding by book entry movement (note 8). some of the services, which that institution offers are: custodian services; securities clearing and settlement; asset management, including services related to depositing securities and services related to dividend payment. the securities (or other financial assets) are shares from the capital of a corporation, where investor 1 has their ghtofcollateral for those shares, credited in to his/her securities account kept with broker 1. broker 1, in turn, is in the same relationship with the dtc, which is the registered owner of the shares in the books of the computer corporation. 3.4 scope of the two systems the direct holding system is applied only for securities, while the indirect holding system has a wider application and comprises securities as well as other financial assets. the definition for a security, bank broker 1(with 1,000 shares) 2,500 shares, credited into account with 1,500 shares, credited into account with 3,000 shares, credited into account with securities 2,000 shares credited into account withsecurities broker 2 investor3 investor 1 2,500 shares credited into investor 4 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 11 published by scholink inc. presented in § 8-102 of the uuc supported by § 8-103 of the ucc differs substantially from the security definition used in the federal securities acts. it is important to quote part of the provision of § 8-102, namely §8-102 (1) of the ucc, directly concerning the above discussed question: a materialized security, “means an obligation of an issuer or a share, participation, or other interest in an issuer or in property or an enterprise of an issuer: which is represented by a security certificate in bearer or registered form, or the transfer of which may be registered upon books maintained for that purpose by or on behalf of the issuer; which is one of a class or series or by its terms is divisible into a class or series of shares, participations, interests, or obligations; and which: is, or is of a type, dealt in or traded on securities exchanges or securities markets; or is a medium for investment”. “un certificated (dematerialized) security” means a share, participation or another other interesting an issuer or in property or an enterprise of an issuer, or an obligation of an issuer, which is not represented by a security certificate, where thetransferofwhichshallberegistereduponbooksmaintainedforthatpurposebyoronbehalfoftheissuer; which is one of a class or series or by its terms is divisible into a class or series of shares, participations, interests, or obligations; and which: is, or is of a type, dealt in or traded on securities exchanges or securities markets; which is one of a class or series or by its terms is divisible into a class or series of shares, participations, interests, or obligations. “a security” may be materialized or dematerialized. if it is materialized, the terms “security” and “materialized security” may mean either an intangible interest, or the document representing that interest, or both, as required by the context. the present article, and not article 3 regulates the written document, which is a materialized security, nevertheless, the document in question meets the requirements of the latter article as well. the present article does not concern money. if a security is detained by or delivered to an issuer or his/her transferring agent due to reasons other than registering of transferring, another temporary purpose, payment, replace mentor acquisition by an issuer, such as security shall be treated as a dematerialized security for the purposes of the present article. a materialized security is in a “registered from” if it nominates person, who is entitled to the security or to the rights it represents and its transferring may be registered upon books maintained for that purpose by or on behalf of the issuer, or if that is specified in the security. a materialized security is in a “bearer from” if it belongs to the bearer according to its terms, but not by reason of an additionally registered endorsement. 4. summary the individual share holders in the usa certify their ownership right in a business company through the shares acquired by them from its capital. the ordinary share capital lentitlestheholdertotakepartinthecompanycontrolhavingrighttoonevote for each share listed in the registry, as well as to an interest in the profits in the form of dividends and to participate in the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 12 published by scholink inc. distribution of the net assets in case of a company dissolution upon satisfying the creditors. the rearealsoot her classes of share capital, such as preferential shares, whicharesuperiortotheordinarysharesinrespecttodividendsandthedistributionofthenetassetswith acompany’sdissolution. byexercisingtheirrighttovote, theshareholderschoosethedirectorsofthebusinesscompanyandthusexert indirect control over its activities. theyareentitledtoreceivinginformationaboutthecompany’sactivities by reviewing its books. theshareholderscankeeptheirpercentageofvotescontrollingwhetherthecompanyshallemitanyadditionala mountsofsharesfromitscapitalbyexercisingtheirrighttopreferentialbuyout. they are entitled to prosecute a claim on behalf of the company for damages incurred upon it if, at a request by them, the company refuses to do so (note 9). references bjerre, c., & rocks, s. (2004). the abcs of the ucc. article 8. investment securities. donald, r. f., & peter, s. r. (1987). financial institutions and markets in a changing world (3rd ed.). bpi, usa. micheler, e. (2007). property in securities. a comparative study. cambridge university press. ronald, a. a., ivan, f., & david, p. t. (1987). business law. south-western publishing co. usa. www.dtcc.com/about/subs/dtc.php notes note 1. micheler, e. property securities. a comparative study., cambridge university press, 2007, p. 227-228 (hereinafter only micheler, e. property …). note 2. micheler, e. property in securities. a comparative study. cambridge university press, 2007, p. 145 147 (hereinafter only micheler, e. property …). regardingtherulesregulatingsecuritiesincontemporarygermanandaustrianlaw, see p. 165 and the following. note 3. micheler, e. property …, p. 182 183. note 4. micheler, e., property …, p. 192. for more details about the process, which led to taking securities out of circulation (their immobilization) in germany and austria and the legal analysis of that process, see pp. 193 – 215. note 5. micheler, e. property …, pp. 216 221. note 6. donald r. fraser and peter s. rose., financial institutions and markets in a changing world, third edition, bpi, usa, 1987 …, p. 277. more about the federal fund market – p. 277284 (hereinafter only donald r. fraser and peter s. rose., financial…). note 7. bjerre, c. and rocks, s. the abcs of the ucc. article 8, investment securities, 2004, p. 1-4 (hereinafter only bjerre, c. and rocks, s. the abcs …).. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 13 published by scholink inc. note 8. www.dtcc.com/about/subs/dtc.php note 9. ronald a. anderson, ivan fox and david p. twomey., buseness law, south – western publishing co., usa, 1987, p. 860 – 861. for more about share capital, transferring of shares and shareholders’ rights and obligations, see pp. 839 – 863. microsoft word ape-v5n1-p21 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 21 original paper barking at the wrong tree: articles 31-31bis trips revisited in light of covid-19 lessons nellie munin1* 1 the law school, zefat academic college, israel * nellie munin, the law school, zefat academic college, israel received: december 5, 2021 accepted: december 28, 2021 online published: january 4, 2021 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n1p21 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n1p21 abstract the covid-19 reality challenged the assumption underlying articles31-31bisof the trips agreement. it illustrated that the major obstacle to access of developing countries and ldcs to medicines and/or vaccines in cases of broad-scale, global pandemics is global production capacity and distribution priorities, namely: availability, rather than price. this article examines the future implications of this understanding. keywords patents, pandemics, vaccines, trade-related intellectual property rights, developing countries 1. introduction patent rights ensure exclusive developers’ rights for royalties on new medicines and/or vaccines. these rights encourage further research and development by helping developers reimburse their high investments. thus, the price of new, patent-protected medicines and vaccines is high, turning them particularly inaccessible for patients in developing and least developed countries (ldcs). (note 1) an ethical dilemma arises when such populations encounter pandemics to which there are available but expensive, patent-protected medicines and/or vaccines. unfortunately, the global interest in this issue is highly motivated by the fact that globalization reinforces the risk for quick spillover of such pandemics from poor countries to the rest of the world, rather than by pure ethical and moral considerations. this risk was well illustrated during the 1990s with hiv/aids and during the swine flu in 2010 (dziuba, 2010). the broad and quick global spillover of covid-19 fully reflects the broad-scale potential of such a risk. article 31 of the trips agreement, concluded in 1995, was drafted to balance patent developers’ interests with the public right to health in such scenarios. it implies a commonly agreed understanding, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 22 published by scholink inc. giving governments the powers to adopt measures necessary to protect public health. it is commonly understood as granting governments the authority to temporarily waive patent rights, to allow for compulsory licensing and parallel imports of medicines and/or vaccines necessary to cure global or regional pandemics (noam, 2005). its short and vague drafting reflects a compromise achieved, balancing the two conflicting sets of interests (helfer, 2003) after tough and long negotiations. it leaves open, inter alia, the following questions: which circumstances justify the waiving of patent rights? (what should be the due balance of interests)? who should have the final say regarding this decision: the state under risk or the global community? what are the legal and economic risks such a decision involves? might they deter decision-makers from effectuating the waiver? can medicine developers quantify the waiver’s risk in advance and include it in the medicine’s price? due to these dilemmas and others which emanated from the wording of trips article 31, in the wto doha round this issue was revisited, for fine-tuning. the doha declaration (2001) interpreted article 31 trips, reflecting the wto members’ understanding of this issue in moredetail. consequently, article 31bis was added to the trips agreement. however, it does not deviate from the basic concept of article 31, assuming that in the case of a broad-scale pandemic the price of medicines or vaccines would be the major obstacle to their accessibility by poor populations.it was criticized for presenting an insufficient solution for developing countriesand ldcs even in that respect. (e.g., sykes, 2002). the covid-19 reality challenges this assumption. it illustrates that the major drawback to accessible vaccines for developing countries and ldcs is the combination of global production capacity and distribution priorities, namely: quantity shortage, rather than price. in the covid-19 pandemic, governments were ready to contribute money to help developing and least developed countries. however, no government was ready to give up its priority in terms of access to the available vaccines in favor of the latter. this position was held not only for the first dose of vaccines but also for the second and third doses, persisting despite the global realization that any unvaccinated population on the globe potentially risks the entire world population, due to the spillover effect enhanced by globalization. this reality illustrates the limits of the mechanism set forth by articles 31-31bis trips in such scenarios. it further illuminates the lack of any other global instrument to deal with this challenge in future cases of global pandemics. the article examines the implications of this fact. section 2 briefly describes the mechanism set forth by articles 31-31bis trips. section 3 illustrates its shortcomings, exposed by the covid-19 pandemic, and their global implications. section 4 examines alternative ways to overcome this lacuna. section 5 concludes. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 23 published by scholink inc. 2. trips mechanism securing public health noam (2005, pp. 191-192) identifies three groups of interests concerning intellectual property rights: the first group consists of the developed, industrialized countries, such as the united states and the european union. the second group consists of the newly industrialized countries-nics, including some east asian and latin american countries, that do not engage in intensive research and development of new products but have technological capacities to produce products developed in countries belonging to the first group, in relatively cheap prices. some of the second group countries engage in unlawful copying and distribution of patent-protected products, including medical products. these phenomena are enhanced by globalization. such practices made first group countries accuse the former of free riding, demanding the initiation of preventive global regulation. the third group includes least developed countries (ldcs), lacking the technological capacities to copy patent-protected products, including medical products. they thus depend on the import of such products from the first group countries, but at the same time lack the money to pay for them. in the trips negotiations, patent-protected medicines formed a major source of conflicting interests, particularly between the first group and second group countries. the agreement reflects a compromise between the first group countries, wanting to strengthen the global protection (note 2) of their industries’ patented rights, namely on their vested economic interests and investments, and the interests of the other two groups, aiming to ensure themselves access to medical products in emergency cases. since the latter failed to exclude medicines from the broad definition of “patentable subject matter” (trips article 27(1)), they focused their efforts on ensuring flexibility of application and patents’ handling (noam, 2005, p. 199). the balance between the economic rights of patent owners and other public rights is reflected by the general principles in the trips preamble, used for the interpretation of its operative provisions (according to the interpretative principles set forth by the vienna convention on the law of treaties, 1969, article 31(2)). as a result of developing countries’ pressure, these principles explicitly acknowledge public policy considerations as underlining intellectual property rights policy (gathii, 2002). article 7 trips, specifying its objectives, stresses “the balance of rights and obligations” while article 8(1), specifying its underlining principles explicitly allows wto member states to “adopt measures necessary to protect public health” (a demand made by the developing countries in the negotiations) “provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this agreement” (a restraining demand made by the developed countries in the negotiations). in the operative part, article 31 trips authorizes the wto member states to temporarily waive patent rights, “in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or cases of public non-commercial use.” this provision has been perceived as the major instrument that would enable developing and least-developed countries’ governments to obtain access to patented medicines and vaccines at affordable prices (abbott, 2002) in cases of broad-scale pandemics, by introducing compulsory licensing and parallel imports of vaccines/medicines. the doha declaration reinforced this provision www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 24 published by scholink inc. by giving it a broad interpretation, later embodied in article 31bis, allowing governments to issue compulsory licenses to obtain this purpose. (bartelt, 2003). 3. the shortcomings of trips arrangement covid-19 exposed covid-19, which started at the end of 2019 in china and burst on a global scale in early 2020 caused, by mid-november 2021 254,744,256 illness cases and 5,125,935 deaths globally (worldometer, 2021). except for these severe human life and health consequences, the pandemic implies severe economic consequences. at the beginning of 2020, the wto (world trade organization, 2020) (note 3) assessed that the pandemic caused the severest economic crisis in the last hundred years. after almost two years since the beginning of the pandemic, the oecd depicts signs of global economic recovery. however, its overall positive growth projection for 2021-2022 is not clean of challenges still emanating from the pandemic, such as growing inflation (note 4) in certain countries, high unemployment rates (note 5), and negative growth in other countries. (oecd, 2021). handling economies in covid times implies additional national costs to finance covid-related measures, burdening national budgets. (international monetary fund, 2021). the world bank (gerzon et al., 2021) assessed that during 2020 the pandemic added some 97 million extremely poor people globally. this assessment implies substantial regression in handling extreme poverty, obtained during recent decades. (brown, 2021). (note 6) these data illustrate the vicious circle created by the pandemic: the escalation in their social and economic status decreases the chances of those added to the extremely poor population to obtain vaccines or medicines to avoid or recover from it. this is not only their problem: the spillover effect, enhanced by globalization, turns it into a global challenge since ill populations anywhere risk further global contamination and the development of new, more violent mutations to the virus, that might be resistible to the available vaccines, thus risking the development of new global pandemic waves. the richer economies were willing to contribute money, directly and via international organizations, to help to pull the poor countries out of the economic crisis. thus, for example, the imf suggests financial assistance to members in need (international monetary fund, 2021a). the world bank suggests, among other things, help in debt suspension, multilateral investment guarantee, and fast-track financial support to help sustain economies and preserve jobs during the pandemic (world bank, 2021). covax is a direct initiative held by the world health organization, cefi, gavi, and unicef aimed at financing vaccines for poor countries. motivated by the understanding that ‘no one is safe unless everyone is safe’ it aims at ensuring fair and equitable access to vaccines to all countries. covax acts as an insurance policy: it encourages the rich countries to pool their buying power rather than compete against one another on vaccines. by accelerating the development and manufacture of covid-19 vaccines they enable investment in factories, to enlarge the number of available doses as soon as the vaccine becomes available. many countries contributed substantial amounts to this initiative. the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 25 published by scholink inc. united states under president biden changed the “america first” approach held by former president trump, contributing 4 billion $. the united kingdom donated 730 million $ and germany-1 billion $. not only governments donate to covax, but also foundations, organizations, and corporations. thus, for example, the bill and melinda gates foundation donated 150 million $. (statista, 2021). covax aims at using this money to obtain 2 billion vaccines by the end of 2021, to vaccinate those who are at the highest risk in poor countries. money is thus not the problem, but rather the global shortage of vaccines. covax initiative illustrates the long time it takes to obtain this goal. since no one is safe until everyone is safe, years of global health uncertainty imply severe economic consequences globally. such initiatives also illustrate that due to the lack of a globally agreed, mandatory mechanism to meet this challenge, global initiatives rely on voluntary bases, which makes them weaker and less effective. the covid-19 pandemic thus reflects the limits of articles 31-31bistrips, which does not suggest any solution where the major problem is the lack of enough vaccines for the entire global population, and the global capacity to produce them on short notice. this shortage causes demand gaps that in turn, may raise vaccines’ prices. consequently, the richer countries gain priority in access to vaccines by being able to afford the price pharmaceutical companies ask for them. these companies act on pure business considerations, determined by the demand-supply ratio. to a certain extent, they may even have an incentive to keep the shortage of vaccines, to ensure that prices would not decrease, assuming that their competitors would act in the same way and that demand is stable and inflexible. 4. how to overcome this lacuna? the prospect of future global pandemics necessitates drawing a lesson from the current experience, to improve the global arsenal of instruments to handle them. this section examines several potential options. 4.1 modification of trips articles 31-31bis? let alone the difficulty to make any change in the wto agreements, emanating from the large number of its member states and their ongoing conflict of interests, stagnating the wto (pakpahan, n.d.), the trips does not seem to be the right auspice for such provisions. the wto agreements focus on removal of trade barriers. the trips focuses on establishing minimum rules for the protection of ip rights, out of the realization that their infringement may deter players to engage in international trade. articles 31-31bis form an exception to this rule, allowing for temporary waivering this protection in emergency cases. extending these provisions to regulate the global allocation of vaccines would seem out of context. thus, other solutions shuld be examined. 4.2 the eu model: equal distribution the european union did not rush to conclude contracts with the pharmaceutical companies which developed covid-19 vaccines. as a result, vaccination of its citizens started with some delay, since the vaccine producers were already committed by contracts to supply to other countries first. however, despite the public criticism on this delay (e.g., bbc, 2021), reinforced by the severe situation in some www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 26 published by scholink inc. of its member states, e.g., italy, the eu insisted on handling and coordinating the vaccine procurement for all its members and on their equal access to the vaccines (european union, 2021). while this model was criticized for its ineffectiveness in the short run, it seems to have ensured reasonable prices due to the strong bargaining power of all 27 members and equal distribution of the vaccine in the member states, which prevented hard feelings. this model was possible in the eu due to its unique supranational regime. it would be difficult to implement it in the global sphere without a suitable legal framework: if countries wish to engage in such an arrangement, they should build a legal mechanism that could be operated in cases of a global pandemic. such a mechanism should refer, among other things, to the following questions: which body would be in charge of negotiations with the pharmaceutical companies for the mutual obtainment of medicines/vaccines and their equal distribution? how will it obtain competences to handle the situation for all countries involved in this arrangement? in which circumstances will it become operative? how and by whom will its action be financed? 4.3 international regulation international mandatory regulation, e.g., under the auspice of one of the international organizations, such as the who, could suggest a legal mechanism that would become operative in global emergency scenarios such as global pandemics. in such cases, the handling of negotiations with pharmaceutical companies, contracts conclusion, the decision on the vaccine/medicine price, and their equal distribution would be handled by this emergency mechanism. it could be headed by an executive body of experts, instructed by a board composed of representatives from all countries, or groups of countries with similar interests. however, such a mechanism requires a high level of cooperation and delegation of powers, characterizing a high level of market integration. thus, it seems non-feasible in the current global reality, even in emergency cases. 4.4 international sanctions imposition of international sanctions on countries that, in emergencies of global pandemics refuse to respect equitable access is another optional way to obtain this goal. it also necessitates a global legal framework that could be developed under the auspice of one of the international organizations, e.g., the who. this framework should define a mandatory obligation to respect the globally equal distribution of medicines/vaccines, accepted by a majority of the countries globally (otherwise, it would be ineffective). then, it may define sanctions to be applied to countries that would not respect this rule. as an international initiative, such a legal framework would only bind countries that agree to be bound by it, unless acknowledged as customary law. such an initiative also necessitates a high level of global cooperation and coordination, and the willingness of the strong and rich countries to engage in it, which currently seems non-feasible. 4.5 international economic incentives to countries a different, more positive approach may encourage the desirable behavior of strong and rich countries by suggesting global economic incentives to such behavior. this approach replaces the stick with a carrot. the question is what kind of economic incentive offered to countries respecting equal access to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 27 published by scholink inc. vaccines would be strong enough to overcome the natural national tendency to protect the health of their citizens first, and national politicians’ sensitivity to national pressure. this way is particularly tricky since the countries expected to change their behavior are not the poorest, but rather the richest. these countries are not indifferent to economic incentives. however, their needs and expectations differ considerably, see e.g., the united states in comparison to china. this may imply the adoption of a different approach to each one of them, according to their economic needs. moreover, the scale of necessary incentives may require multilateral or plurilateral cooperation. 4.6 peer pressure peer pressure is a strong soft law tool. it is successfully exercised in international organizations such as the wto (note 7) and the oecd. for example, at the beginning of the millennium the fatf (doyle, 2002, nance, 2017, financial action task force, 2021), acting under the auspice of the oecd, succeeded to motivate governments to stop allowing money laundering practices within their territories by initiating a ‘black list’ of states engaging in such practices. states included in this list fought hard to be excluded from it, thus changing their approach towards money launderers. producing a black list of states which do not respect equal access to pandemic vaccines and/or medicines may change their behavior. however, this approach may work when a majority of states globally respect this principle and assume peer pressure on those which do not. it should also be reinforced by a global campaign, explaining the importance of equal access to pandemic vaccines/medicines to global health and the global economy. such a campaign could shape a global public opinion which would affect governments’ behavior. when most of the states – particularly the strong ones, dictating the global agenda strive to get vaccines and/or medicines for their citizens first, and this national approach is globally acceptable, peer pressure will most probably not take place and even if it does – will prove ineffective. 4.7 international ethical code of conduct an alternative approach could focus on suppliers’ behavior, namely the behavior of pharmaceutical companies. in recent years, consumers gain a growing power by dictating an ethical agenda in terms of the environment, labor rights, political values, etc., threatening multinationals to adhere to values of fairness in these respects or risk losing clients (klein, 1999; vogel, 2005; shamir, 2007). this phenomenon has led multinationals to engage in voluntary codes of conduct which they draft (munin, 2013). global consumers’ power could assume pressure on multinational pharmaceutical companies to stop concluding contracts for the sale of pandemic vaccines and/or medicines motivated purely by profit maximization considerations. it could require that they draft a relevant code of conduct and adhere to it. such an initiative could either be supported by governments or not. however, it has to be broad-scaled and determined enough to change pharmaceutical companies’ behavior. experience with other issues, such as child labor and equal employment terms for men and women shows that in many cases multinational companies draft voluntary codes of conduct and even adhere to it to a limited scale, to secure their global image, but effectively their profit consideration prevails www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 28 published by scholink inc. (munin, 2013). 4.8 economic incentives to companies countries may join efforts by offering economic incentives to pharmaceutical companies that would be more attractive than their potential profit from the pure profit-motivated behavior regarding the sales of pandemic vaccines/medicines. such incentives may involve tax reliefs, subsidies, or risk management schemes such as insurance (climate adapt, 2021), or even attractive business opportunities. however, if countries already succeed to join efforts, they could simply assume joint pressure on these companies, affecting acquisition terms of the vaccines/medicines at stake. this tactic may save them a substantial amount of money in tough times of economic crises caused by the pandemic. additionally, the covid-19 experience illustrates that when there is an available vaccine or medicine to a global pandemic, strong national public pressure is assumed on governments to act as fast as possible to obtain it. public opinion would probably not tolerate long time pressure on the pharmaceutical companies for the sake of forcing them to adopt an equal access approach to the vaccine/medicine, while people continue to die in large masses. 5. conclusion the covid-19 pandemic illuminated the conflict between the personal and national instinct of self-salvation and the global inter-dependence of the entire human race. it illustrated a fact that is often easy to ignore on daily basis: no one is safe unless everyone is safe, erasing the difference between strong and weak, poor and rich to that extent. in principle, this moto is true for any behavior having a global effect, e.g., on climate change, global pollution, child abuse, unjustified discrimination, trafficking. however, in the pandemic’s context, deviation from it bears immediately measurable global health and economic consequences. yet, despite the long time that has passed since the vaccines’ introduction, equal access to vaccines has not been obtained. eventually, the production capacity of pharmaceutical companies will meet the global demand for vaccines. medicines may be developed to cure the pandemic and it will subside. however, in the meantime, the competition between countries to get quick access to vaccines takes its substantial economic toll, in terms of higher prices for the vaccine charged by their producers and the high global price of partly functioning economies. the only international legal instrument which is available to ensure access of poor countries to patent-protected medicines and/or vaccines: trips articles 31-31bis, proved insufficient in the covid-19 pandemic reality. this article examined alternative, complementing approaches to meet this challenge. it reflects the fact that unless there is true and serious mutual global political determination to join forces to cure the pandemic globally, any of these potential instruments or mechanisms would not be effective. they could all be set and used as fig leaves, allegedly showing governments or multinationals care while effectively covering an ongoing selfish and competitive behavior. in times of severe crises like the covid-19 pandemic, when death and severe illness hit broad populations, governments face enormous www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 29 published by scholink inc. political pressure to present quick solutions. they are expected to protect the national interest first and this is what they did in the covid-19 pandemic. this behavior reflects short-term thinking, which is typical of politics. in times of such crises, it is highly fueled by panic and anxiety. looking at things from a longer-term perspective, though, reflects the high economic price this policy choice implies, nationally and globally: as long as the pandemic is not globally cured, no one is safe. thus, economies continue to function partly, people all over the world lose their jobs and businesses, (note 8) inflation grows, growth decreases. 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(2021). observed impacts of covid-19 pandemic on global trade. nature human behavior, 5, 305-307. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01060-5 vienna convention on the law of treaties. (1969). (vclt). retrieved from https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf vogel, d. (2005). the market for virtue: the potential and limits of corporate social responsibility. washington: brookings institution press. worldometer. (2021). covid-19 coronavirus pandemic. retrieved from https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/ world bank. (2021). covid-19 crisis response. retrieved from https://www.worldbank.org/en/who-we-are/news/coronavirus-covid19 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 32 published by scholink inc. world trade organization. (1995). trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (trips) agreement. retrieved from https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm world trade organization. (2001). doha declaration – text of article 31. retrieved from https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/trips_art31_oth.pdf world trade organization. (2020). trade set to plunge as covid-19 pandemic upends global economy.press855/press release 8.4.2020. retrieved from https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr855_e.htm world trade organization. (2020a). trade falls steeply in the first half of 2020. press 858/press release. retrieved from https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr858_e.htm world trade organization. (2021). dispute settlement body. retrieved from https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_body_e.htm notes note 1. these countries are defined by the united nations and included in a list they publish (united nations, 2021). note 2. e.g., by wipo agreements to which not all wto members are parties. note 3. this forecast was moderated later (world trade organization 2020a). see later data on the pandemic’s global effect: statistica (2021), maital and barzani (2020), chudik et al., 2020. note 4. according to the oecd (2021b) inflation results from a surge in demand as a result of markets reopening and supply chain tensions. note 5. according to the oecd (2021a) unemployment hit particularly young employees, low educated employees and employees in low-paid occupations. note 6. brown refers this result to the combination of covid-19 with the climate change problem and the “crippling debt burdens.” tourism, a sector severely hit by the pandemic, is a major source of income for many poor countries. note 7. e.g., in the dispute settlement body, with regard to reviewing states’ implementation of dispute settlement decisions and rulings. (wto, 2021). note 8. see examples to the severe economic effect of the pandemic on tourism and the economy of macau (lim and to, 2021), on us firms (blum, fletcher and yeh, 2021), on chinese consumption (haiqiang, wenlan, & quiang, 2021). note 9. this description refers to the overall economic effect of the pandemic, although the fact that certain businesses and/or industries could take advantage of the crisis to grow. (e.g., verschuur, koks, & hall, 2021). microsoft word ape-v3n3-p46 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 46 original paper politics of land and agrarian reforms in africa: examining the challenges and solutions onyango m. ang’anyo1* & letangule s. leiro2 1 lecturer, department of training, research and consultancy, kenya school of government, baringo campus, kenya 2 the director of kenya school of government, baringo campus, kenya * onyango m. ang’anyo, lecturer, department of training, research and consultancy, kenya school of government, baringo campus, kenya received: july 2, 2020 accepted: august 20, 2020 online published: august 29, 2020 doi:10.22158/ape.v3n3p46 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v3n3p46 abstract land reforms fell out of favour with donors from the early 1970s—nonetheless, sporadic efforts to redistribute land continue. these reforms stemmed from shifts in the domestic balance of power between landowners and landless workers and peasants, which were quite independent of donor policies. whereas the geographical context and individual country strategies may be new, the range of land reforms measures being adopted and the implementation problems encountered are not. the standard argument for tenure reforms centres on the role of uncertainty in discouraging investment on land that is held without long-term security. land title that enhances such security may induce investment and productivity increases both from the demand side, as farmers become more certain of reaping the benefits of investment in the future; and from the supply side, by affording farmers better access to credit. the paper recommends that solutions to land and agrarian reforms in africa should seek to achieve, in their broadest sense, reforms that entail a wide spectrum of options such as land claims, acquisition and distribution of land, access to land for certain purposes, land use planning, infrastructure development, farming and commercial support, resettlement programmes, security of tenure and training. keywords politics, land, agrarian, reforms, challenges, solutions www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 47 published by scholink inc. 1. introduction “land reforms” and “agrarian reforms” are often used interchangeably. land reforms is generally accepted to mean; the redistribution of property or rights in land for the benefit of the landless, tenants and farm labourers, while agrarian reforms—a construct of the cold war to counter “communist” land reforms; embraces improvements in both land tenure and agricultural organization. (note 1) thus, land reforms pertains to the remodeling of tenure rights and the redistribution of land, in directions consistent with the political imperatives underlying the reform. those favoring revolutionary change advocate a drastic, planned, public intervention to redistribute land. yet attempts at drastic redistribution of private land, in the face of strong opposition from landed interests (and in some cases related budgetary impediments), may distract from more feasible evolutionary policies aimed at improving access and security of tenure for small farmers under alternative forms of individual and communal tenure, which do not involve expropriation and compensation. land reform fell out of favour with donors from the early 1970s—nonetheless, sporadic efforts to redistribute land continue. these reforms stemmed from shifts in the domestic balance of power between landowners and landless workers and peasants, which were quite independent of donor policies. in the 1990s, decollectivisation and privatization in the former socialist economies provided a new dimension to land reforms; so too has majority rule in south africa, where the racially-skewed ownership of land is under challenge and where market-based measures to achieve land redistribution in favour of blacks are being tried. whereas the geographical context and individual country strategies may be new, the range of land reform measures being adopted and the implementation problems encountered are not. therefore, this paper sets out to discuss the challenges and solutions to land and agrarian reforms in africa. 2. challenges and solutions to land and agrarian reforms in africa 2.1 challenges to land and agrarian reforms in africa “what is a title deed anyway? it is just a piece of paper” (note 2). these words were spoken by a kenyan minister after the bloody eviction of twelve thousand families by the minister’s private army and police from an immigration zone in southern kenya in october 1993. his words summarize growing conflicts over and tensions about access to land on the afncan continent. as recently as 1989, the world conference on agrarian reform and rural development noted that “... land availability was not a major problem m the context of most african countries” (note 3). however, nowadays, access to land is becoming problematic—africa’s land use and tenure frontiers are shifting. is the continent heading for a situation in which landlessness and unequal land distribution patterns resemble those of the asian and latin american continents? three major lines of policy towards land prevailed in africa during the early 1980s. in some countries, there was a shift towards the socialization of land by way of co-operatives and state farms (such as www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 48 published by scholink inc. mozambique). in other countries, the privatization and individualization of land was either continued or begun (for example kenya and malawi). thirdly, some countries made adaptations to existing tenures to modify the relations between the tribal chiefs and the state, as in the gambia and lesotho (note 4). in general, the switch towards the second type of land policy is what seems to be prevailing in africa at the present time. in kenya, high potential agricultural land is limited to some 20 percent of its territory. this has a distorted land ownership structure, which is a legacy of the colonial period, during which high-potential arable and good pasture land was reserved for white settlers—no real correction was implemented in the post-colonial period. by the late 1970s some 2.4 percent of kenyan holdings accounted for some 32 percent of kenya’s total arable land. in 1990, landlessness in kenya was estimated to affect some 10 percent of the total population increasing by at least 1.5 percent annually. in the late 1960s, in order to deal with the problem of diminishing land availability, the world bank urged breaking away from the community-based systems of land, which ensured security of ownership to certain groups. besides the transfer of land formerly held by europeans to african farmers and the creation of settlement schemes, the kenyan land use policy was mainly directed at the adjudication and registration of land in the “non-scheduled” areas. the rationale for this replacement of customary land rights by individual tenure arrangements was to create a collateral for loans and the encouragement of long-term investments. a negative consequence, however, has been the creation of a group of landless people, as land has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of a happy few (note 5)—african farmers constituted particularly of businessmen, politicians and civil servants. this probably explains the high political constraints for a real land reform policy within kenya. furthermore, in spite of a land reform started in the 1950s, under which land in the hands of whites was transferred to africans, the major challenge has been that; an unequal land distribution has remained a feature of kenya. the maasai pastoralists, in particular, have lost huge amounts of land. after the loss of their high-potential lands in central kenya, they now face the influx of agricultural groups and large-scale capitalist farmers following the individualization of land held under statutory group title. this communally-owned private title, introduced in the late 1960s, replaced traditional community-based management regulations over resources. moreover, the group ranches failed, mainly because of their sociologically and ecologically unsustainable format. growing negative feelings towards the group ranch concept fueled the ultimate call for subdivision into individually-owned plots to bring back flexibility in herd and range management in the hands of the individual producers and prevent exploitation of the poor by the rich. most notably, however, has been the effect of the creation of a land market—it is not so much individualization as such, but rather the commoditization of land that has been responsible for a rapidly growing stratification in the maasai area. many maasai “were not ready” for the reform in land tenure (note 6). they engaged themselves, sometimes tricked, into land transfers to better-off segments within society. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 49 published by scholink inc. in south africa “the last few years have seen the wholesale abandonment of economic planning based on social property concepts to a planning pattern emphasizing some form of private property rights” (note 7). this “property rights” paradigm is based on neo-classical economic theories—it argues that traditional african land-tenure systems induce inefficient allocation of resources, because property rights are not clearly defined, costs and rewards are not internalized, and contracts are not legal or enforceable. the theory holds that individualization of land tenure; first, increases the landholder’s security of tenure; secondly, increases investments by improving tenure security; and thirdly, will transfer land to those who are able to extract a higher value of product from the land as more productive users bid land away from less productive users (note 8). therefore, in south africa the government land reform policy is to redress the injustices of colonialization and apartheid; to foster national reconciliation and stability; to underpin economic growth; and to improve household welfare and alleviate poverty. however, the challenge is to find a way of redistributing land to the needy while at the same time maintaining public confidence in the land market. the issue of restitution has concerned in the first place, the relocation of some millions of people dispossessed by racially discriminatory legislation and practice. restitution can take the form of restoration of the land from which claimants were dispossessed, the provision of alternative land, payment of compensation or a combination of the above measures. one of the most controversial elements in the land reform proposals has been the clause which allows the government to expropriate land at payments below market value. a major land reform was started in kenya in the 1950s. it was based mainly on western ideas of individual freehold tenure, but also allowed the registration of group titles, especially in the dry zones of the country. recently, south africa also embarked on the development of a comprehensive land reform programme, its goal is to address the legacy of “apartheid” in relation to land distribution and to create security of tenure in land rights for south africans (republic of south africa 1996). could kenyan experiences of group tenure provide a model for the south african land reform policy? or should they adopt “modern” concepts of individual tenure systems? both during and after the great scramble for africa by the western imperialist powers at the end of the nineteenth century land-grabbing became a central theme. throughout the colonial period the colonial government, by legal enactment or other drastic measures, carried forward their policy of slicing away the land from the african people. by direct seizure, conquest, pressure on chiefs, trickery swindling, the repudiation of pledges and promises, and by every other means open to them, the representatives of the european powers took land (note 9). in kenya, as in other african territories, african land was appropriated for the exclusive use of immigrant white colonialists—a good deal more land was alienated than could be put to effective use by the immigrant white settlers as explained in large measure by the white settlers’ insatiable need for african labour in their estates. as late as 1940, according to barnett, there remained over one million acres within the white highlands which lay unused for either crops or pasture; so that when jomo www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 50 published by scholink inc. kenyatta, then general secretary of the kikuyu central association, said, “what africans want now is not commissions but the restitution of their land” (note 10), he was speaking not only for the kikuyu and kenyans but for the african majority throughout european colonies. agriculture has continued to be the most important sector of africa’s economy after independence. nevertheless, the years after independence have witnessed dramatic changes in the agricultural sector. the racial division which had earlier marked african agriculture came to an end as most european settlers sold their farms and left african countries. the face of rural africa was also transformed by the extension of land consolidation and individual tenure to most of the countries’ best agricultural land. despite these very substantial changes, africa has experienced rising levels of agricultural production since independence years. there still remain significant differences between what can be termed the small-farm and large-farm sectors of the agricultural economy. in some countries, there was a shift towards the socialization of land by way of co-operatives and state farms (for example, mozambique). in other countries, the privatization and individualization of land was either continued or begun (like in kenya and malawi). thirdly, some countries made adaptations to existing tenures to modify the relations between the tribal chiefs and the state, as in the gambia and lesotho. in general, therefore, the switch towards the second type of land policy is what seems to be prevailing in africa at the present time. land reforms which eventually began in the period preceding independence, have been characterized by two distinct types of government programmes; one provided for the transfer of european farms to african ownership; and the other provided for land consolidation, registration, and the prevention of ownership on the basis of individual tenure in the former african “reserves”. the first type of land reform basically consisted of two types of schemes for land transfer; on one hand the government undertook the purchase and subdivision of settler farms for ownership by african small holders (note 11). furthermore, land and agrarian reforms have moved up and down the ladder of development priorities over the past fifty plus years. older concerns with ensuring security of tenure, so encouraging investment and improving productivity of land are now joined—though often in uneasy tension—by newer imperatives for poverty reduction. despite such shifts, the debates continue to turn on distinctions between statutory and customary law, formal and informal tenure systems, and, as the introductory essay (sikor and mueller) of this issue describes, state-led and community-led reforms. some challenges of land and agrarian reforms emanate from the fact that this process was undertaken for economic and political reasons—it was felt that more intensive use by small holders would lead to increased outputs and enable the farms to earn higher incomes than they had been able to previously. it was also intended, of course, to provide an agricultural livelihood for thousands of landless people and to “pay off” the european settlers with as little embarrassment as possible to the british government. moreover, it has also been argued that one main purpose of the settlement schemes was to preserve large-scale agriculture. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 51 published by scholink inc. furthermore, the much better-known swynnerton plan—a plan to intensify the development of african agriculture in kenya—involved consolidating land fragments into single holdings and issuing registered freehold titles to individuals. the larger leaseholders would then be able to borrow from the commercial banks or from the government on the security of their title. however, the political implications were quite explicit—“former government policies will be reversed and able, energetic or rich africans will be able to acquire more land, and bad or poor farmers less—creating a land and a landless class. this is the challenge common in the evolution of a country.” (note 12) the kenyan harambee scheme, which was originally projected to begin in 1966, got underway in 1969; by that time, it had been decided to reduce considerably the size of the programme. the haraka scheme, directed specifically toward squatters on european farms, was hastily established in the mid-1960s; and the plots provided to such families were averagely smaller than those under the million acre programme. the government soon came to view the results of the haraka scheme as not very satisfactory—they faced challenges such as being established on mismanaged large farms which had been poorly developed to start with. the settlement authorities undertook little development work, and the farmers received little financial assistance for developing their lands; thus by 1974, both the haraka and harambee schemes had been supplanted by the shirika scheme (note 13). the eventual aim of the shirika scheme was to transfer responsibility for the farm to a co-operative society formed from the tenants. according to christopher leo, however, the shirika farms functioned to a significant degree “as a welfare programme for uncaptured peasants” (note 14). whatever the purpose, it became clear in the mid-1970s that this development of co-operative group farms was not likely to succeed. government reports noted a clear lack of interest in such enterprises by the african families settled on shirika schemes—most wished to own and operate their own individual holdings. it was also argued that the creation of small-scale units held significant economic advantages over the proposed large-scale units. the former could generate more employment, had lower costs per unit of output, and could obtain market output per hectare at least as high as on larger farms. as a result of such thinking, the standard one-hectare subsistence plot on shirika farms was increased to two in 1978; thereafter, shirika farms were subdivided into small-scale units, not only by the ex-squatters, but also by more affluent farmers seeking more land. by 1983, this process of subdivision was largely complete. (note 15) the cost to establish and maintain infrastructure in rural areas is high, urban areas in africa are under pressure due to rapid urbanization and general conditions for the farming and pastoral industries are tougher than before. as a consequence, the main problem in the respective case studies is not necessarily a shortage of available land on the market for acquisition for the landless, but rather the establishment of viable enterprises on such land. the obvious risk, however, to the landless is that they may be entering an industry that is virtually on its knees—and rather than addressing poverty and unemployment, it may exacerbate social problems. finally, the european land tenure resulted in displacement of groups of africans and stabilization of the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 52 published by scholink inc. boundaries between various tribes; those who were displaced still claim that the land taken from them is rightful property of their people. thus, tribal rights in land are clearly marked in the minds of the people—such a situation presents political challenges for the government. there are areas with quality underutilized land—what is the feasibility of settling outsiders on the land? what would be the response of the local people? in some areas where spontaneous settlement by outsiders has occurred, inter-ethnic conflicts are common—this poses a serious challenge to the government as it tries to tackle the land question. the demand for land causes discontentment and dissatisfaction with the government; in addition, since many of the landless are also jobless, they are unable to pay taxes which is a further challenge to the government (note 16). 2.2 solutions to land and agrarian reform in africa colonial and immediate post-independence states’ attempts to resolve the land question through reforms such as the swynnerton plan and the settlement schemes are assessed and mostly found inadequate as they were primarily concerned with tenure, rather than distributive aspects of the land question. the njonjo commission and the ndung’u commission reports are further assessed and found inadequate as they were limited by their terms of reference to inquire and report primarily on the legal status of public land and their illegal/irregular allocations. it is, however, concluded that the draft national land policy, the provisions on land in the constitution of kenya, 2010, and the land act no. 6 of 2012, if implemented, have the potential for positive resolution of the land question—they all emphasize equity and due regard for women, children and individuals with disability in land distribution, the establishment of a national land commission, and decentralization of land administration. (note 17) the world bank evaluates agrarian reforms using five dimensions: first, price and market liberalization; second, land reform (including the development of land markets), third; agro-processing and input supply channels; fourth, rural finance, and; fifth, market institutions. therefore, a key precondition for land reforms to be feasible and effective in improving beneficiaries’ livelihoods is that such programs fit into a broader policy aimed at reducing poverty and establishing a favourable environment for the development of productive smallholder agriculture by beneficiaries (note 18). this can be a suitable solution to land and agrarian reforms in africa. international political and economic support for land reforms in especially african case studies is crucial to the success of the programmes. african countries simply do not have the resources to deal effectively with the land programmes they have embarked upon. when kenya started with land reform shortly after independence it received so much foreign support that only five per cent of costs had to be financed by government from own resources. land consolidation and registration is one important solution towards land and agrarian reform in africa. the term land consolidation denotes both the act of eradicating excessive dispersion of parcels forming one farm; and, enclosure. the latter means the process in which land being used under customary tenure is divided among individuals and boundaries erected, while unused land is parceled www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 53 published by scholink inc. and distributed to individuals on the principle that each member of the clan claiming rights in the area should have his own separate piece of land and to hold it absolutely—this distribution of unused land is also referred to as the process of “land distribution” (note 19). a key element that impacts upon the way in which land restoration is approached is whether land reform is market-driven, non-market driven or a combination of the two. by market-driven reform is meant where new tenants or the state have to acquire land on a willing buyer–willing seller basis. whether the state or new tenant acquires the land, experience shows that the process can be very costly and is usually driven by land that becomes available on the market rather than acquiring land in a cohesive manner in pursuance of a land acquisition plan. non-market driven reform is where the state opts for a policy of expropriation whereby land is taken (with or without adequate compensation) for redistribution. it could also include packages to assist new tenants to find their feet, establish their businesses and support them for a period of time. therefore, non-market driven reform has the benefit that government can decide where and when it wants to expropriate land, but if abused, as in zimbabwe, it has obvious implications for democratic standards and economic development and stability. hence successful land reform model probably requires a combination of market and non-market reform. any land reform programme should therefore be reflective of the social, cultural and economic realities that impact upon the new landowners. in essence land tenure systems are not “simply products of planning institutions. they are forms of social organization” (note 20) that reflect the value systems, culture and traditions of people. in collaboration with stakeholders, including the private and non-government sectors, the africans government should set up tenure reform projects in selected test areas to establish best practice. for example, it is for this reason that south african ngos have now turned to other parts in africa to learn from other land tenure reform experiences. kenya, in particular, is of interest to the south africans because of interesting similarities with the south african situation in the areas of redistribution, restitution and tenure reforms. it is crucial to determine with clarity which government department is ultimately responsible for the overseeing and implementation of land reforms, and of support services following the restitution of rights in land. both centralized and decentralized options carry risks—while the strategic objective is to get land reform under way, coordination between tiers of government and departments within the respective tiers is crucial to success. in most case studies african governments, a fragmented approach has caused delays and poor focus, which in turn has led to failure. zimbabwe and kenya have ample examples where intra-departmental factions and conflicts impacted and contributed to the failure of projects. in south africa, the initially overly centralized process stood guilty of the very problems it wanted to avoid (note 21). finally, lessons which can be drawn for african land reforms, in particular experiments in group tenure, would include: adaptation—interventions and methods of enforcement should build on local land tenure practices; security of tenure—group titles can be instrumental in assisting large groups of less well-off www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 54 published by scholink inc. people. the most appropriate set of tenure rights should be determined by the proper mix of ecological conditions and socio-economic situation; timing—movement toward individual tenure reform should be initiated only when technical and socio-economic conditions warrant it. local groups and non-governmental organizations should be involved in an open and transparent allocation. most of all, people should be aware of the value of land and the possibilities for sustainable development in the individualized plots. 3. conclusion from the foregoing discourse, it is evident that land reform is probably one of the most difficult domestic policy issues to be dealt with by african countries. in most of these countries the process of land reforms is incomplete. zimbabwe, on one side of the spectrum, is facing a crisis in democratization due to its radical approach to land reform. on the other side of the spectrum there is namibia, where the winds of change and the pressure to “radicalize” land reforms are increasing. and then there is south africa where systems and policies to deal with land reform are probably the most advanced from a legal perspective, but where the resources, patience and other practical issues to execute reforms effectively are becoming serious hurdles in implementing policies. access to land is becoming increasingly a problem in africa today. in addition to a growth in the human population, tenure reforms are foremost responsible for this—statutory law is replacing customary laws. the standard argument for tenure reform centres on the role of uncertainty in discouraging investment on land that is held without long-term security. land title that enhances such security may induce investment and productivity increases both from the demand side, as farmers become more certain of reaping the benefits of investment in the future; and from the supply side, by affording farmers better access to credit. the rationale for this “replacement” paradigm, however, can be questioned from the economic, ecological and social point of view; especially for those regions where agro-ecological conditions are limiting and local groups lack the necessary experience and formal education to compete with better equipped groups in society. therefore, solutions to land and agrarian reforms in africa should seek to achieve, in their broadest sense, reforms that entail a wide spectrum of options such as land claims, acquisition and distribution of land, access to land for certain purposes, land use planning, infrastructure development, farming and commercial support, resettlement programmes, security of tenure and training (note 22). references barrows, r., & roth, m. (1990). land tenure and investment in afncan agriculture; theory and evidence. the journal of modem african studies, 28(2). https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x00054458 bertus de villiers. (2003). land reform: issues and challenges; a comparative overview of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 55 published by scholink inc. experiences in zimbabwe, namibia, south africa. konrad adenauer foundation, occasional papers april 2003. johannesburg, south africa. april 2003. christopher, l. (1984). land and class in kenya. university of toronto press. toronto, canada. csaba, c., & john, n. (1998). the agrarian economies of central and eastern europe and the commonwealth of independent states. in world bank discussion paper (no. 387). washington, dc. fallen, l. e. (1962). masaai range resources. kajiado district, usaid. nairobi, kenya. leys, c. (1975). under-development in kenya; the political economy of neo-colonialism (1964-1971). in east african educational publishers. nairobi, kenya. maxon, r. m., & ochieng, w. r. (eds.). (1992). an economic history of kenya. east african educational publishers limited. nairo, kenya. mbithi, m. p., & barnes, c. (1975). the spontaneous settlement problem in kenya. east african literature bureau. nairobi, kenya. ndege, p. b. o. (2012). from accumulation of women and children to “land grabbing”: agrarian kleptocracy and the land question in kenya. moi university press. eldoret, kenya. ochieng, r. w. (1977). the second word; more essays on kenya history. east african literature bureau. nairobi, kenya. peters, b. l., & malan, n. (2000). caveats for land reform in south africa: lessons from zimbabwe. south african journal of international affairs (no. 7). https://doi.org/10.1080/10220460009545323 riddell, j. c. (1988). dynamics of land tenure and spontaneous changes in african agrarian systems. in land reform, land settlement and cooperation (no. 1/2). fao, rome. ruth, h., & lungisile, n. (eds.). (2007). the land question in south africa: the challenge of transformation and redistribution. hsrc press. cape town. swynnerton, r. j. m. (1955). a plan to intensify the development of african agriculture in kenya. government printers. nairobi, kenya. notes note 1. ruth, h., & lungisile, n. (eds.). (2007). the land question in south africa: the challenge of transformation and redistribution (p. 4). hsrc press. cape town, south africa. note 2. nation correspondent. (1996). “what is a title deed anyway”. daily nation newspaper, february 29. 1996. kenya, nairobi, p. 7. note 3. wcarrd. (1988). the impact of development strategies on the rural poor. world conference on agrarian reform and rural development, 1979-1989, 10 years of follow up, fao, rome. note 4. ibid. note 5. leys, c. (1975). underdevelopment in kenya; the political economy of neo-colonialism www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 56 published by scholink inc. (1964-1971). east african educational publishers. nairobi, kenya. p. 63. note 6. fallen, l. e. (1962). masai range resources: kajiado district, usaid. nairobi, kenya. note 7. riddell, j. c. (1988). dynamics of land tenure and spontaneous changes in african agrarian systems. land reform, land settlement and cooperation, no. 1/2, fao, rome. pp. 39-52. note 8. barrows, r., & roth, m. (1990). land tenure and investment in afncan agriculture; theory and evidence. the journal of modem african studies, 28(2), 265-297. note 9. ochieng, r. w. (1977). the second word; more essays on kenya history. east african literature bureau. nairobi, kenya. p. 110. note 10. ibid. p. 112. note 11. maxon, r. m., & ochieng, w. r (eds.). (1992). an economic history of kenya. east african educational publishers limited. nairo, kenya. p. 273. note. 12. swynnerton, r. j. m. (1955). a plan to intensify the development of african agriculture in kenya. government printers. nairobi, kenya. p. 10. note. 13. republic of kenya. (1978). economic survey. government press. nairobi, kenya. pp. 75 and 76. note 14. christopher leo. (1984). land and class in kenya. university of toronto press. toronto, canada. p. 190. note 15. ibid. pp. 182-184. note 16. mbithi, m. p., & barnes, c. (1975). the spontaneous settlement problem in kenya. east african literature bureau. nairobi, kenya. pp. 79-80. note 17. ndege, p. b. o. (2012). from accumulation of women and children to “land grabbing”: agrarian kleptocracy and the land question in kenya. moi university press. eldoret, kenya. p. 4. note 18. csaba, c., & john, n. (1998). the agrarian economies of central and eastern europe and the commonwealth of independent states. world bank discussion paper no. 387. washington, dc. note 19. mbithi, m. p., & barnes, c. (1975). the spontaneous settlement problem in kenya. op. cit. p. 60. note 20. peters, b. l., & malan, n. (2000). caveats for land reform in south africa: lessons from zimbabwe. south african journal of international affairs, no. 7. p. 152. note 21. bertus, de villiers. (2003). land reform; issues and challenges; a comparative overview of experiences in zimbabwe, namibia, south africa. konrad adenauer foundation, occasional papers april 2003. johannesburg, south africa. april 2003. p. 146. note 22. s batterbury, report read at workshop, ‘politics of land reform in the “new” south africa’. london school of economics, 7 june 2000 <www.lse.ac.uk/depts/destin/simon/safrica> advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 130 original paper large-scale farms and the rice economy in lau north-east nigeria, 2005-2015 tanko angyetsokwa adihikon phd1, francis john tenong2 & daniel david buba3 1&2department of history and diplomatic studies, federal university wukari, taraba state, nigeria 3department of development finance, central bank of nigeria, central business district, abuja 1 email: tankoadihikon@gmail.com, phone: +2348036372697, +2348024235962 2 email: francisj.@fuwukari.edu.org, francisjohntenong@gmail.com, phone: +2348136333818 3email: dannybubs@gmail.com, phone: +2348138781713 received: april 19, 2024 accepted: may 11, 2024 online published: may 28, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n2p130 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n2p130 abstract entrepreneurship in agriculture or agribusiness is one activity that has survived different eras namely pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods in africa and nigeria in particular. but despite years of experiment on this path, development in the agricultural sector has remained stagnant or at an insignificant level of growth. interestingly it has received little attention from scholars in the field of history partly because it was viewed as a domain for the economists and business managers. this paper therefore, examined the agribusiness or activities of large farms in the rice economy of lau local government area of taraba state. broadly two sources were relied upon: primary and secondary, and the multi-disciplinary method were also employed for complementary purposes. the paper was organized around themes, and the historical analytical tool was used in the analysis. the study revealed that the people are largely agrarian based, and the rice economy has huge potentials to feed the state and even the northeast region, but the peasant are largely exploited by the market forces thereby short changed. this is further compounded by government insignificant interest in the sector. hence, the study posits that government support is critical in providing access to subsidize credit, investing in infrastructure, transport and farm input services like advisory services to reverse decades of neglect, and set the path to sustainable development. keywords agribusiness, large-scale farms, value chain, production, marketing www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 131 1. introduction agribusiness has been identified and favoured by international actors such as the britton wood institutions as being central to revamping africa’s agricultural sector and providing for food security. but after several years of experimenting with the market orientation particularly in nigeria, the desired result is still far from sight. the french economist, richard cantillon, is regarded as the first person to employ the term “entrepreneur” to refer to the individual who obtains factors of production and combines them into products and services for the market, montpellier panel report (2014). he saw the entrepreneur as a risk bearer, noting that merchant, farmers, craftsmen and other sole proprietors who buy at a certain price and sell at an uncertain price, therefore operating at a risk. it is any business activity with a market/profit orientation. it is suggested that this businesses play important role in stimulating job creation, economic growth, poverty alleviation and uplifting of living standards globally. such business activity exists in agriculture especially the crop sub-sector. in africa, it had existed before, during and after colonial rule. for example, under colonial rule nigerian peasants were crucial to the success of export crop production where foreign entrepreneurs had failed. in commerce, european expropriates firms’ imported manufactured goods, but these goods reached their final consumers through local traders. after independence, nigerians in their private capacities as entrepreneurs have continued to play important roles in the economic growth and development of their fatherland as farmers, traders’ etc, sati .u fwatshak (2011). agribusinesses in nigeria includes: farm input supply, producing farm firms, food processing and food marketing and distribution, prince c. nwakama et al. (2010). rice has been one of the cereal crops dominating agribusiness in taraba, national bureau of statistic (2007). it is however the major crop cultivated in lau area of the state, aside others like fish and sugarcane farming, national agricultural extension and research liason services et al. (2013). for example, fishing has provided substantial employment opportunities to the women in different fields of fishery activities: fish production, processing, transportation and distribution are mostly carried out by women. it estimated that 42.86% engage in the marketing of smoked fish, while 7.14% are involved in marketing of live fish in the area, anita and wachap (2014). the cultivation of rice is most significant, (national bureau of statistic). field size among rice farmers are 1.1 5 ha (59.3%), while only 8.4% of the farmers cropped 5.1 – 10 (ha). on the average, 3.3 (ha) were cropped by farmers. the presence of the tributary of river benue in the area and the ecology has favoured agricultural production in commercial quantities. these factors suggest that rice is cultivated all year round, average yield was 1.69 t ha-1, with lowland rice giving the highest yield of 3.9 t ha-1, followed by irrigated rice (3.19 t ha-1), and upland with ground water (2.10 ha-1). whereas 61% of rice farmers engaged in upland rice production, only 17% and 8% carried out their activities in lowland and irrigated/upland supplemented with irrigation, respectively. statistics suggests that about 45% of farmers planted traditional rice varieties, 25% planted improved warda nerica varieties and 11% www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 132 planted other improved varieties, national bureau of statistics (2009). therefore, it is obvious that both ecological factor and the tributary of river benue which cut across lau, places the area at an advantage in terms of production and market. little wander for the heavy presence of capitalist such as dangote, umza, and alganzaki farms amongst others who engages in agricultural production in the area for the market. however, despite the huge agricultural potentials of the area, main producers remain poor and sometimes find it difficult to even feed themselves, thereby raising the question of food security to bear. it is therefore imperative to examine the agribusiness in the area especially rice production and marketing; in relations to the wide spread poverty among the rural farmers and food insecurity. 2. research methodology the historical methodology was deployed for this study. two major sources of data were engage in the course of this work: primary and secondary materials. the primary sources here included oral interviews granted by farmers and entrepreneurs in the agribusinesses, minute and report by relevant government agencies. archival materials were not use here since the subject scope falls in the postcolonial period. the secondary sources consisted of published and unpublished materials including: books, manuscripts, articles, and ba research project, thesis, and seminar/conference papers. the multi-disciplinary method was also used. majority of the secondary materials were from different discipline especially sciences and social sciences: agriculture, veterinary, business and economics, political science and history etc. this is evident from the various journals and articles used for this research as they reflect various disciplines. they served as compliment in the various aspect of the research. 3. results 3.1 evolution of rice production in nigeria rice production in nigeria and west africa in general dates back 2.000 to 3.000 years ago, mostly in the food plains of the niger river, johnson and hiroyuki (2013). oryza glabberrima, or the african rice which was one among the two species of rice in the world, was being cultivated the region. the introduction of the second species, oryza sativa, or the asian rice, occurred after the arrival of the portuguese in the 17th century. again, during the last few decades asian varieties, or those crossbred with african varieties such as the new rice for africa or nerica rice, began to take centre stage as important food security commodity as demand outstripped production. in nigeria rice is one of the few crops whose consumption defies cultural, ethnic, or geographic boundaries. combination of various factors seems to have caused the structural increase in rice consumption in nigeria. rising demand was partly as a result of increasing population growth and partly from increased income level and rapid urbanization associated with changes in family occupational structures. secondly, the gift of nature to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 133 nigerian communities in form of abundant swamps and fertile lowlands has made rice production easy and almost everywhere. rice production and marketing in nigeria is suggested to contribute to food security, job creation, poverty reduction and increased revenue generation (national bureau of statistics). this argument is supported in terms of production, processing, marketing, and food vending and export trade levels. agricultural experts have suggested that the gross margin from one hectare of rice field is about n19, 465 while rice processors' incomes are about n136, 000. rice cultivation is increasingly generating employment for new farmers, while established farmers are diversifying into rice cultivation instead of traditional crops and tree crops, such as cocoa and rubber, for which prices have been largely unpredictable for several years. income and employment in rice processing have also been substantial. 4. discussion 4.1 the proliferation of large-scale farms and expropriation of farmers in lau rice dominates the local economy in lau (national bureau of statistic, (2007). the climate and presence of river benue which flows through lau occupying very large tracks of land, renders lau favourable for rice production which has attracted attention around the state and the country at large. government, investors and donor agencies and traders all across the country have responded to the rice production in various ways. despite its potentials in terms of production, market value and potentials for food security, rice production capability of lau is yet to be properly harnessed. the lack of interest particularly as it concerns provision of farm inputs, pest control and other form of incentives has left government emphasis on food security hanging as mere lip service. this research contends that lau rice fields portends the capacity to provide the food needs of nigerians and even become a revenue earner if properly harnessed. figure i, below present the value chain of rice production in the area www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 134 figure 1. value chain of rice production in lau virtually, all part in the structure above need upgrading, deepening, or expanding. adequate data already exist in terms of research and development since improved farming activity like pre-harvest and post-harvest farming operation, inputs, funding, etc. that are essential to farming are known, (national agricultural extension and research liason services). the problem is not the knowledge, but the application of this knowledge for productivity. moving to other stages like inputs distribution, farming and transport all together requires more attention. improvement in inputs distribution like seed, and fertilizer is needed. farmers spends a lot, some do not even have the funds for such purposes. therefore, stimulating micro-credit systems is essential, as that would improve productivity. deepening value in terms of transport is also needed. farmers suffer huge cost in transporting good to and fro market due to poor road infrastructure. transport can be deepened by improving infrastructure and small-scale trucking companies that delivers inputs to farmers or agro dealers, and produce to markets. there is also a lot in terms of processing, but there is room for expanding in terms of packing by the already existing local millers in lau. value can also be added in terms of manufacturing so that it would not only be that the trade involves only raw product, but also finished product from the production of rice i.e what other thing can be produce from rice, that can also add income to the economy by exporting and expanding trade and consumer broad base. what all these means is that there is still opportunities and gabs for upgrading, deepening, and expansion in terms of value in the rice production structure or value chain. environment for such activity would have to be coordinated and provided for by the government. lau is part of taraba state which has a tropical climate marked by dry and rainy seasons, taraba agricultural development programme report (2015). the rainy season starts by early april and ends www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 135 by october. the dry season begins around november and terminates by march. the average rainfall is 1,350mm in the southern part of the state and reduces gradually to about 750mm towards the northern part. the climate allows the cultivation of most staple food crops, grazing land, fresh water fishing and forestry. this gives the state a very unique position, as producer of several crops on a very large scale compared to other neighboring states. taraba state has 4 million hectares of arable land which comprises of 2.5 million hectares of upland ecologies and 1.5 million hectares of lowland ecologies which is dedicated principally to lowland rice and sugarcane production but presently only 25% of the arable land is put to use in the state. figure 2. rice marketing value chain this is an important chain in the marketing industry in lau. rice marketing is the performance of all business activities in the flow of paddy and milled rice, from the point of initial rice production until they are in the hands of the ultimate consumers at the right time, in the right place and as convenient as possible, at a profit margin so as to keep the farmer in his farming operations, akande and akpokodje (2013). the marketing of rice in lau involves four stages with a change of product ownership occurring between each pair of stages. the first stage is production through harvesting. stage two concerns movement from the farms to processing centers while stage three involves moving the milled rice from processing areas to urban consumption centers. the fourth stage encompasses wholesaling and retailing in the urban centers. it is in these stages that the actual producer (peasant farmer) is exploited. like in all other trades, distribution of manufactured goods is so critical in the marketing system, and it is in this process that the unequal distribution of surplus occurs, (national bureau of statistic, 2007). lau lga has four (4) principal markets viz: mayo-lope, abbare, kunini and lau where buying and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 136 selling of rice paddy takes place. most of the buyers come from ebonyi, cross river, akwa-ibom and neighboring states like adamawa, gombe, borno and yobe. apart from the sale of rice paddy, small scale millers abound in the lga where parboiled rice is milled and sold in these markets, (yavalla, 2016). about five to six local off-takers exist in the area. amongst them are al’uma rice mill ltd, alganzaki rice mill, and mofido rice amongst others which are all based in jalingo, the state capital because of proximity to urban areas and market accessibility (rabiu, 2016). according to the owner of alganzaki rice mill, aliyu sarkin noma (2016), millers do not only engage in processing, but are also involved in rice production to meet market demands and maximize profit. this situation is usually occasioned by the short fall in rice production demand in terms of supply of paddy rice to processors, and milled rice supply to the market. the supply of a lorry of rice to the market does not take long to be sold, suggesting that rice product is in short supply to meet market demands. the failure to meet production demand is always as a result of inadequate or lack of farm input and fund to the farmers. so these processors provide farm input to farmers in the nature of fertilizer, money as loan, and rice variety particularly faro 44, which was first introduced to the farmers in the area by alganzaki, who at the moment have five hundred farmers under the company. aliyu further suggested that the coming of umza and popular farms – the off-takers from kano – competition ensued. the off-takers from kano offered farmers higher price at the farm gate, as a result some of the farmers who benefited from alganzaki inputs, sold their rice paddy to the companies. this means someone else reap where he did not sow. this situation brought about a change of policy by alganzaki who now sale such farm inputs to farmers or offer them as loan, thereby tying them down to the dictum of the company. other international actors have also been involved in the rice economy in lau. the united state agency for international development (usaid), has noticed the strategic importance of lau in rice production and partners with the taraba state agricultural development projects (tadp), leveraging on the structure of the tadp to reach out to the farmers with it markets ii projects. the maximizing agricultural revenue and key enterprises in targeted sites (markets i & ii) projects, enhance agricultural productivity by building the capacity of farmers to maximize yields and respond to market demand, ifdc.org-markets-ii, (2016). most nigerians live in rural areas and farm for a living, yet their harvest yield little return in local, regional, or international markets. the usaid markets projects, now in its second iteration, aimed at increasing agricultural productivity and improving food security in nigeria by improving yields and generating higher farm revenues. the project builds the capacity of farmers groups and processor associations and forges commercial links between nigerian agro-processors and small holder farmers. launched in 2012, markets ii deepens and extends the markets model with the aim of increasing incomes and sales and reducing food insecurity for nigerian poor rural farmers and their families through proven private sector demand driven market interventions. national in scope, the projects works across eighteen states including taraba as targeted areas. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 137 dominion farms is another agribusiness actor in the state. the farms is an american-owned, kenyanregistered company that is diversified in the production of long grain rice, fish and other agricultural product under the prime harvest brand (www.dominion-farms.com, 2016). it has invested in 30,000 ha of land, and has trained 50 young commercial farmers from taraba for 5 month in kenya. similarly umza, producers of the sarauniyya golden rice brand, owned by a kano-based industrialist; and popular farms & mills limited kumbotso kano state, producers of the stallion rice brand, together exploit the farmers by using agents and through directs purchase at the farm gate and move it to kano for processing and packaging. they partnered with usaid markets ii, to raise farmers’ capacity based on usaid modules on rice package of practices to increase their productivity and produce quality paddy that will attract better prices for the farmers, third national fadama development project (2015). this yielded from 1.5mt/ha, to 4.0mt/ha. umzawas buying at n65/kg which translates to n6, 500/mt. popular farms and mills ltd. kano, was buying at n61.56/kg, i.e., n4, 617.00/75kg bag. stallion brand of rice which is today sold all over the country as foreign rice, is partly a product of the rice paddy from lau, which is being milled and process by popular farms based in kano. dominion farms, umza, and popular farms have been in taraba state since 2010, (yavalla, 2016). dominion farms came sometimes in the second regime of the governor danbaba led administration which began in 2011, popular farms suffices in 2012, and umza appeared in 2014. they buy rice paddy from the farmers at the farm gate beginning from 2011. before 2010, the actors as mentioned were not part of the market value chain. marketing flows begin from the farmers to the assemblers and processors. the assemblers are commissioned agents who assist in purchasing rice paddy from the individual farmers either on behalf of the millers or to sell to them. they serve as the main link between the farmers and the processors. therefore the agents buy from the farmers and sell it to the processors. the agents use to buy rice paddy from the farmers at the price n3, 300, and sell to the processors at the price of n6, 500 –twice the amount of the actual farmer receive. but due to impurities like stones associated with the local harvest practice, discovered during processing by the processors, they decided to established contact directly with the farmers. they did this through establishing contact with the taraba state agricultural development project, using their structures to reach out to the farmers for better harvest and post-harvest technology training so as to avoid impurities in the rice during harvest and post-harvest practices. the expropriation of farmers became obvious when one of the off-takers (processors), bought a bag of rice paddy from one of the managers at the tadp, at the rate of #6,500 as against the n3, 300 prices by the agents, that the manager discovered how these agents exploits farmers. in monetary terms, income accruable to lau lga from rice production is 45,000ha x 4.0mt/ha= 180,000mt x n65, 000/mt =n11.7 billion (n11, 700,000,000) if they go into signing mou with umza or popular farms which are off-takers all based in kano. the level and volume of rice business has been on the increase in lau lga since the intervention of both umza and popular farms. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 138 4.2 structure of the rice economy and exploitation of the peasant also, the structure of rice marketing has massive gab for upgrading, deepening and expansion in terms of its value chain. from farming/production to processing and whole sale/retailing, there is room for improvement. of course the market structure, anchored in the words of adams smith, “it is not from the benevolent of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest” (eric roll, 1992). meaning that competition in the market system brought about by the pursuit of interest by individuals brings down prices to the benefits of the masses. but the peasant who happens to be the actual producer is being alienated, expropriated, and reduced to subsistence, eric roll (232). in the structure of rice marketing or distribution like we have seen above, the farmer represents nothing other than a mere commodity in the market system that does not enjoy the benefit of his labour. the farmer is not supported enough in terms of inputs, and even the land where he cultivates is being taken away. this is evident in the activities of both the local and large scale millers who expropriate the farmers directly at the farm gate. worst of it is that most of the millers do not provide any incentives to the farmers for improved production, but are only concern in the products to which they benefits more than the farmers. this situation is even made worst by the coming of dangote. on may 2, 2013 the then acting governor of taraba state, alh. garba umar disclosed that the business tycoon would be establishing a sugar processing company in lau lga (www.leadership.ng, 2016). the moves were part of plans by the state government to increase internally generated revenue and create jobs for the youths. also, 20,000 hectares of land was approved to a chinese company for rice production. dangote procured with the approval of then acting governor, about 1000 hectares of sugarcane plantation for the processing and production of sugar in the area. this has rendered the farmers landless and they were now compelled to sell their labour to the land grabbers. majority of the people are farmers who engage in agricultural production to make a living. by this action, not only has land been taken from the people, they have also lost their rice farms and means of livelihood. some of the land owners had already entered complains on their lands being taken by the sugar company in collaboration with the state government, without compensation in some cases, justin facii (2015). their rice farms were lost, and they are now laborers on their land. 5. conclusion a number of revelations emerged from the study. first, while lau has huge potentials: favourable climate, ecology and the presence of natural water bodyriver benue that favours increase production of rice, through increasing yield growth. but such growth is hindered by government lack of serious commitment in the sector. government disinterest and arm twisting tactics has made rice production to be on the decline despite the favourable climate and the presence of the benue river which makes lau a high yielding potential for rice production. for example the 2014 fadama iii af report, shows that out of a total of 270 hectares of rice farm land cultivated by 270 farmers (i.e., an average of one www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 139 hectare per farmer), 270 hectares of farm land were cultivated by 270 farmers in the state. they were efficiently carried out as contained in the business plans of fadama iii af. a total of 916.2 mt of rice was recorded out of 1,620mt targeted in the business plans. but farmers had to pay for advisory services under the usaid markets ii projects. in the end, off-takers (both local and large scale millers), benefited more from the produce by the farmers than the farmers themselves. therefore, it is obvious that the rice economy in lau has enormous potential to blossom and support the sustainable development goals. but government lip service in terms of provision of essential services, and the market forces are hindering the progress and capacity of the farmers, thereby reducing them to subsistence. of course, government support is critical in providing access to technologies and training; subsidizing credit and sometimes even the prices of paddy; and investing in infrastructure to lower costs for energy, transportation, and access to market and information. this route would reverse decades of neglect in agriculture, and set the country on a path to sustainable development since agriculture is a main stay in the state and country at large. references akande, s. o., & akpokodje, g. 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(2015). compaints trials #1.2 bn land compensation of dangote sugar plant in taraba. newsverge nigeria, november 8 montpellier panel report. (2014). agriculture for impact, small and growing: entrepreneurship in african agriculture, 1-28. received from http://www.ag4impact.org national agricultural extension and research liason services et al. (2013). agricultural performance survey of 2013 wet season in taraba state. zaria: naerls press, 1-21. national bureau of statistic. (2007). filling data gaps on agricultural statistics 1994/95 – 2005/6. federal republic of nigeria. national bureau of statistics. (2009). rice data system in nigeria: building a rice data system for sub-saharan africa”, 1-7. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 140 prince, c. n. et al. (2010). “entrepreneurial productivity: sectoral contribution to the gdp of a developing economy”. international business and economic research journal, 9(7), 81-90. https://doi.org/10.19030/iber.v9i7.600 taraba agricultural development programme. (2015). background information on rice potentials in taraba state”. tadp report, 2. third national fadama development project, (2015). additional financing taraba sfco comprehensive report on the first sets of business plans implemented, 1-9. microsoft word ape-v2n1-p38 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 38 original paper the romanian mythology—between national identity and globalization phd student coculiana acăr1* 1 faculty of philosophy and social-political sciences, “alexandru ioan cuza” university of iași, romania * phd student coculiana acăr, faculty of philosophy and social-political sciences, “alexandru ioan cuza” university of iași, romania received: february 1, 2019 accepted: february 16, 2019 online published: february 21, 2019 doi:10.22158/ape.v2n1p38 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v2n1p38 abstract although the soul of a people is not an eternal, unchangeable substance, the national specificity is still a permanent one. starting from the idea that mythology occupies an essential place in a culture, it is important to know the national mythology, because it presents in a specific form the themes of the everlasting thought, whose discovery makes sense to a life, and illustrates at the same time, the specificity of the national spirituality and even of the cultural identity. the national identity means differentiation and, at the same time, a specific opening to the existence where a collective consciousness is reflected, starting from the idea that a people’s mentality can be a collective self-portrait. in the following study, we shall only refer to two of the myths specific to our people, namely: miorita and manole, the artisan. for the romanian spirituality, mioritism is a profound, ontological and anthropo-historical dimension where one can speak of a human becoming in layers of interference. an alternative to the popular carpathian vision of existence from the plan of the native psycho-social universe is the positive value of the abyssal categories of the culture where the man is fulfilled by creation. as a follow-up to this statement, the myth of the creative sacrifice, exemplified here by manole, the artisan, highlights the man’s destiny to become a culture creator. culture is a necessary and complementary dimension of the human-specific way of being. keywords mythology, national identity, culture, globalization www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 39 published by scholink inc. 1. national identity—between permanence and development having a spirituality of historical and cultural duration, the romanian people originally identify themselves among the peoples of the world through its founding myths, which ensure its specificity with respect to others, while giving it the guarantee of a certain perenniality. located in a meeting area of the great european cultures, the romanian people manifested in each epoch a permanent receptivity to thinking innovations, selecting the elements that could be integrated into its own structures. if, by myths the essence of a history or of a civilization, even of a system of thought is expressed, we can say that the romanian mythology is “the result of the fusion of the ethnic forms with those transmitted from the proto-historical period” (cosma, 1942, p. 8). therefore, the myth always provides a key, allowing the access to an interpretation system and an ethical code that “the most secret part of the identity of a culture is entrusted to its mythology” (detienne, 1898, p. 1). the culture of the romanian people, in all its forms of manifestation: myths, customs, beliefs, morals, norms of coexistence, etc., “keeps and integrates in its own substance the traditional daco-get and roman fund” (vlăduțescu, 2012, p. 26). the romanians have long relied on their roman origin, going as far as completely ignoring the other elements of the ethnic mixture (the dacians and the slavs). from the second half of the 19th century, the dominant idea became the daco-roman fusion, so that “the first origins were not sought in rome, but in antiquity if, and even deeper in the native prehistory” (boia, 1997, p. 17). the need for self-definition requires us to investigate the cultural creation of our historical past and to integrate all the spiritual energies of the country into the ever-renewed dimensions of our new society. starting from the idea that it is important to know the fundamental myths to recognize the soul of a people, the great culture people have developed their latencies and built on them a metaphysics, a psychology or an ethics specific to the romanian people. the four fundamental myths that are the pillars of our national identity are exploited by both the folk culture and the cult creation. the first is that of the origin and formation of the romanian people from the dacian-roman symbiosis. it has a definite historical basis demonstrated by facts and documents, but, beyond that, the myth of this origin persists in folklore and the cult creation. it is called traian and dochia. the myth of the romanian ethnogenesis was formulated by gh. asachi, starting from the elements of cantemir’s legend that the oral tradition offered him. another myth is that of the flyer. in the archaic mentality, love is considered a great force, and the first impact with it is due to a supernatural being, which represents a process of initiation, configured by the erotic myth of the flyer. defined as a “personification of the invasion of the pubic instinct”, călinescu believes that “through eminescu, the romanian poetry has shown inclinations to regard love as an implacable force, without any participation of the consciousness” (călinescu, 1986, p. 89), giving as an example: calin (pages of the story), luceafărul, i. h. rădulescu—the flyer. those who studied this myth were: d. cantemir, g. călinescu, simion florea marian, tudor pamfile. mioriţa and manole, the artisan are essential myths of the romanian spirituality. some are fighting the fatalism of the mioritic shepherd and the criminal cynicism of manole, the artisan who builds his wife. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 40 published by scholink inc. they also refuse anna’s destiny, which remains in the same mioritic resignation, just being content to lament in her name and child. under these circumstances, the two myths could not be considered representative for the present-day psychology of the romanian people, some hesitant and numb psychology, incomparable with the competition and the struggle for existence in the present world. however, the breaking from mioriţa would be an ontological breaking with negative consequences in culture, ethics, in the civilization itself: on the one hand it no longer corresponds to the attitude towards existence, and on the other hand it is the top product of a culture of old time impossible to state as the maximum manifestation of the creative energies; it raises some problems of understanding that relate to the anthropological, socio-economic, legal, religious, moral fundamentals. 1.1 miorita-hermeneutical landmarks mioriţa is a polymorphic and polysemantic reality that presents, in an artistic form, an entire philosophy of life and death, which sadoveanu appreciated as “the most noble poetic manifestation of our people”. referred to the specificity of the 17th century through its typical linguistic signs, being the product of a certain climate, in relation to a mentality of the community, the mioritic myth contributed to the maintenance of our national unity. in general, any culture deepens and regulates an existence. in this sense, mioriţa is the only corpus in the world that expresses its existence exclusively from the matter of the individual’s death. referring to the “sense of existence” (rusu, 2013, p. 84), we can attribute it the meaning of “passivity and resignation, with which some agree that “this would be a national feature” (michelet, 1968, p. 34), while for others death is seen as “a threshold of jubilation” (botta, 1995, p. 92). the ballad reveals a mystical solidarity between man and nature that is no longer accessible to the “modern consciousness” (eliade, 1995, p. 260). only nietzsche sees the mysterious and paradoxical unity of life and death. the presentiment of death can be correlated with the proper fundamental ontological presentiment; it is the hermeneutical feeling itself or the feeling of the being’s sense. understanding the world and expressing it is not oriented towards asserting a fact, but rather for the understanding of an opportunity to be. a concern in approaching this myth can be seen in m. eliade’s work, who places the mioritic in the hermeneutics of the history of religions and myths, integrated in the euro-asian area of zalmoxis to ginghis-han. speaking about the native mentality as a symbiosis of the “romanian mind matrix” and the “cosmic feeling” (drăgănescu, 1991, p. 12), mircea eliade gave us the first express reference of the “cosmic christianity” (eliade, 1995, p. 246) by two specific attributes: designing the christological mystery of the whole nature and the liturgical dimensioning of the human’s existence in the world, attributes that have the power to implicitly connote up the mioritic vision on the human condition, which makes it clear, therefore, a type of human behavior, a mentis form and a specific situation in the world, such as weltanschauung. a. fochi and m. vulcănescu will go on other direction, that descends into ethnology going to the proper anthropology, considering the pastoral as a layer of civilization; a world that searches for the “law” and gives it, mioriţa becomes in this way the conflict of an ethic. indeed, the legal dimension can not be missed from the approach of the mioritic corpus, and the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 41 published by scholink inc. ethnological element can not cover the philosophical and aesthetic one. lucian blaga carried forward the philosophical exegesis of the ballad, referring to the mioritic space as the “stylistic matrix” of the romanian culture. in blaga’s work, the mioritic space is the specific horizon where the romanian people have been formed and lived: a waved space that is, consisting of successive valleys and hills. blaga resumes and elaborates frobenius’s conception on the relationship between landscape and cultural style, but the “mioritic space generates and limits at the same time”. according to lucian blaga’s metaphor, the mioritic space, a waved succession between the hill and the valley, from top to bottom would be specific for the romanians. the hill-valley landscape, homologated as a mioritic space, was considered as the unconscious spatial horizon of the romanian stylistic matrix, which explains not only the picturesque onomastics and the rhythm of the popular songs, but also our psychology alternating the moments of concentration with the ones of relaxation. even our destiny as a nation, through the historical presence and gaps, appears marked by the waved rhythm of the specific stylistic matrix” (gruia, 2008, p. 26). we know from history that the times of affirmation of the romanian people were few and short; eloquent moments in this regard being the formation of the states, stephen the great’s reign, the interwar period, instead of the gaps, numerous and immense; the latter being the communist stage. since mioriţa’s message was obstructed and even misunderstood as a resignation and passivity to death or an idle peaceful indifference to life, and since mioriţa was responsible for many historical failings, even in the political speech of the present generation it is necessary that its message be approached by the most fertile conjectures to see if it is an “unjustified distance from our own culture without any plausible justification and without any historical chance” (mincu, 2002, p. 196). 1.1.1 the mioritic space—the romanian matrix space l. blaga applied his theory of style to the romanian spiritual phenomenon, defined as a mioritic space, characterized by: “the waved space horizon, the temporal horizon of swinging movement, the sofian transfiguration attitude of reality, osand final formative aspiration by orientation to geometric and ght shapes” (blaga, 1985, p. 47). starting from studies of the morphology of culture undertaken in the days of frobenius and spengler, blaga develops the theory of “abisal categories” that would express the “stylistic matrix” of a people or group of peoples. mythology, in a chronological order, would fully embody them, hence the idea of reporting our popular culture to other european cultures, revealing the “mioritic matrix space” as a structuring factor of a way of life and spirituality, with that a priori “feeling of destiny”. the identity consciousness of a nation implicitly has a consciousness of the specific relationship to sacrament; even in the case of belonging to a religion. in this regard, m. eliade (1999) synthesizes our patriarchal experience, by taking into account the existence of the “domestic psychosocial universe”, by introducing and using four “content descriptors”: the first categorical-philosophical descriptor of the psychosocial universe would be that of “habitation” configured through space-based dwelling, by topographies and architectures of symbolic value, of an anthropological significance, from which the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 42 published by scholink inc. modern mind faded in the benefit of some short-term consumer comfort criteria. in the middle of this cosmic breathing residence is, of course, the domestic habitat, where the individual, the sedentary socio-cultural community live a miraculous “self-recovery”, living the “feast”. the authentic living of the feast is as a maximization of the human in man, an optimal opportunity of the mysterious communion with the cosmic reality, of consubstantialization with the divine. but “the situation of the modern man is painful because he can not communicate deeply with the world, he can not find himself anymore. life turns him into a race for his own search, so that in the end he can see that he has lost both the world and himself” (băncilă, 1996, p. 74). the moment is followed by “passing”—the third descriptor of the romanian being. romanianism preserves, in a fusion with the christian ceremony, the old ones of the “deceased” as an invaluable anthropological dowry, even in the midst of a europe of secularization, where even the funerals have become formal, official, they still retain the power to fix the man, with all his life and death, with all the generations, in the harmony of the being. the territorial permeability has brought to man’s life the “alienation”—the fourth descriptor of the living environment, of the distances, of the authentic experience of the totalitarian time of the feast, and the sacred order of fate in the opening of eternity. it is the pole of the inauthentic being, alienated to the anthropological dissolution. this descriptor, the human alienation, appears as theoretically fertile today, in the modern world, more precisely by the specific way in which it is configured. this “matrix-space” of the romanian folk soul is revealed in mioriţa’s incantations, once aware of it, becoming a key to explaining the romanian “horizon” and “style”. in other words, everything is thought through this specific romanian “matrix-space”, which ineffably, makes every thing get, sooner or later, the seal of our sensitivity. 1.1.2 mioriţa—a cultural phenomenon in the form of carols or ballads, the “pastoral conflict and the mioritic assassination are found in the archaic substratum and common to the religion of many european peoples” (filipciuc, 2001, p. 75). in this respect, a. fochi, in the traditional epic song of the romanians, approaches mioriţa from two interesting perspectives: either looking for its genesis and the movement of the mioritic texts in relation to the aromanian variants, or by putting them into the thematic light. only four years after the publication of alecsandri’s version, mioriţa will be known throughout the world by jules michelet’s translation, followed by an english translation by clare grenville murrnal eustache in 1854, and in 1861 al. odobescu makes a comparison with a biblical text, with lin’s song, invoked by herodot as being greek. later, in 1915, g. coşbuc notes that the ballad’s background is the same as the folk poetry of all indogermans.among the culture people who analyzed mioriţa’s variants and themes include: petru caraman the ethnographer from iasi, who compares, in a post-mortem study, the allegory of death in the folk poetry with poles and romanians, george ivănescu, in 1970, which analyzes the typology of the variants in the bulgarian and albanian folklore and romanian-serbian constants, and ion taloş finds similarities between mioriţa and the medieval french epic, especially with chanson de roland. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 43 published by scholink inc. the mioritic myth was the subject of inspiration in literary works such as jules verne with the carpathian castle (1892), also called j. verne’s miorita, and on the artistic level, mioriţa’s musical theme was always in the attention of the great romanian composers such as: paul constantinescu, emil lerescu, mircea neagu, d. d. stancu, sigismud toduţă, gh. dumitrescu and others. in 1946, the ethnomusicologist constantin brăiloiu publishes in geneva the exegesis sur une ballade roumaine: la mioritza, which he edits starting from several coordinates: the field investigations, i. muşlea’s study (1925) and the metaphysical interpretation, especially due to blaga. similarly, things continue in sculpture, through irimescu, which has the mioritic motif in binomial groups from the mythological to the abstract composition, from the pegasus flights to the dialogue in to the star, etc. miorita fountain is also a monument built in 1927 in bucharest (by the sculptor milita petrascu, the architect octav doicescu and the engineer dorin pavel). it synthetically expresses modernity through its smooth and clear architecture, and through the conception of the mosaic that represents, on both sides, one of our fundamental legends. mioriţa penetrated so deeply in the soul and mentality of the people that it was preserved not only in the oral and written form, but also in the pictures of anonymous painters. certain authors say that some illustrations from the gospel of elizavetgrad (the 16th century) would render moments from mioriţa ballad. these were made by the painters nicolae brana, ilie bogdesco and are creations of high inspiration, unsurpassed until today as mastery and value. in miorita there is a clear, concrete controversy of “we”—“they”, which has found its expression in the popular creation, in letters and documents. as the tatar invasions in the central and northern area of nistru-carpathian perimeter were permanent, the romanians were put in a position to defend their lands to sacrifice. it can be said that the theme of miorita ballad is based on concrete historical realities. we note that: “the folklore does not express exclusively the peculiarities of the romanian people. much of the theme and treatment belongs to the universal folklore through the background of ideas and general-human feelings, which determines its classification in the international typologies” (dima, 1967, p. 201). 1.2 the myth of the creative sacrifice—archetype of construction another myth specific to the romanian people is that of manole, the artisan, which has been the subject of many works in the romanian literature. in this sense, we are referring to the literary work the monastery of arges, which develops the theme of the sacrifice for creation, according to which it is impossible to build something lasting to confront the ages by beauty and perseverance, but by effort and sacrifice. originated from an ancient superstition, according to which the durability of a building consists in building a human being into a foundation, the theme has a great spread to the balkan peoples, but the origin of the romanian variants consists in the fact that only here it is about the construction of a monastery (and not of a bridge, of a city, of a palace), and the accent falls on the builder, not on the sacrifice. it is justified here that “the architecture of a country is perhaps the most accurate expression of its history, which gives a safer intuition of the past and a more authentic conscience of a civilization” (cantacuzino, 1977, p. 152). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 44 published by scholink inc. the construction works have a ritual and a symbolism that come from a very distant past. any profession, but especially that of a mason or blacksmith, was loaded with a ritual significance and a symbolism strictly reserved for the initiates. the belief in the choice of place for the construction of holy places is ancient in the folk tradition. “the ruins, as human settlements that could not last, are fatidic for a construction that is an act of creation (...) in the cosmic archetype of the creation of the world, any construction becomes real, that is, it receives a being by fixing it in a place which corresponds to the world centre” (cantacuzino, 1977, p. 85). in this symbolic area of the construction of a centre it is also the search for the place for building; in the legend of arges monastery, in this way, the building being a cosmogony, a creation of the world. the structure of the imaginary universes: a bridge in greece, bulgaria and with the macedonian-romanians; a fortress in yugoslavia, bulgaria, albania, hungary; a monastery in romania, it is explained by the actual existence of such works; the popular imagination was impressed here by the presence of a bridge / fortresses / monasteries. in creation, we are no longer dealing with “real things,” but with images of archetypes and symbols. the symbolism of the church-monastery is receipted and culturally exploited by the “christianity of the eastern europe, the heir of byzantium” (sedlmayr, 1993, p. 118). in the balkan-danubian area, the world was aware that a church or a place of worship enjoys an architectural and iconographic symbolism present in the sacred buildings. this awareness took place both on the path of the religious experience (liturgy) and on the path of the traditional culture (theology). in order to last, a construction (house, technical work, and spiritual work, too) “must be animated” (eliade, 1995, p. 193), that is, it must receive both life and soul. this is transposed into building a church today in the sense that “beneath the holy table there the holy relics of the martyrs are placed, those who are always in the spirit with christ. the holy table stands above them because they are the foundation of the church” (larchet, 2017, p. 31). one can speak of an “architectural body” (mus, 1937, p. 117) substituted for the carnal body; morphologically, this “transfer of life” is accomplished through relics or drawings of vital organs: eye, mouth, etc. for the traditional societies, the dwelling was an imago mundi in the sense that any construction work symbolically reproduces cosmogony. the adherence of a people to one or another of the mythical scenarios, to one or another of the exemplary images, tells more about his deep soul than a great number of historical events. the myth of the ascension of the “sacred place” is an archetype of the human creation presented in all the cultures of the world. the analysis of this reason can be made from two complementary perspectives: philological—taking into account its literary-artistic and hermeneutic denominations, which reveal the hidden meanings of the last realities involved in the creative act; aspects we have dealt with in this paper. as a legend that reveals a “creation about creation” suggested by the succession of the moments of foundation justifies a waved cyclicity. thus, the abandoned wall, a symbol of the place of foundation, appears to be a “predestined archetype, a totemic irreplaceable centre” (kerbach, 1994, p. 313). the sacrifice of the construction to be built is accomplished by an essential germ: life itself. the absence of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 45 published by scholink inc. this element as a structural binder causes the monastery to fail by the inability of its builders to break it free from chaos. the succession of days and nights, of light and of darkness has a symbolic value. the presence of darkness as a factor with destructive effects on creation causes a permanent return from the orderly (cosmic) to the disorganized (chaotic) stage which highlights the symbolism of universal circulation. another element of symbolic value is the oracular dream which after jung is defined as “an unconscious and revealing symbolic phenomenon, which reproduces a certain archetype and reflects a fundamental anxiety” (chevalier, 1975, p. 456). as a bridge between the human being and the sacred, divine law, the dream is a court that rules the man’s actions. in this sense, the built-in woman becomes a symbol of the vital transfer, making the construction durable. this deep structure, cyclicity, suggesting the image of the wave that permanently is born and dies, doubles that of the spiral becoming that characterizes any processuality of the cosmic or human world. the symbolic construction of the myth of arges monastery reveals on one hand the spiritual unity of the human from all times and places and on the other hand, the unity between the values of the romanian folk spirituality and those of the later cult creation. the symbolic reason of the universal growth and decrease will be found in: the history of the ottoman empire by d. cantemir, the theory of universal wave in v. conta, the mioritic space with l. blaga, the morning star’s vision with m.eminescu, the endless column at brâncuşi, forms suggesting an unparalleled “opening closure” (c. noica) 1.2.1 the myth of the creative sacrifice—echoes in culture the one who profited exceptionally the myths and had an organic view on the universal culture is lucian blaga. for him, the myths are ancient and give value to the creations of the mankind and to every nation. the destiny reserved for the human is to feel the need to reveal it, thus becoming “the creator, namely the creator of the culture. culture is a necessity of its existence” (crețu, 2008, p. 12). referring to the myth of manole, the artisan “the poet does not adapt a legend but shows how a legend is created in the spirit of the folkloric tradition based on a factor which he calls the mythical thought” (todoran, 1985, p. 95). blaga’s romanian myth completely underlines the ethnography into art by dramatizing the idea of the maximum sacrifice imposed as a necessity by the artist’s consciousness, the free creator of his work. in blaga’s work, “manole is the type of the absolute artist, the symbol and mythical prototype of the creator, he is firmly convinced that the great creations involve the sacrifice of lives” (gană, 1976, p. 233). drama is based on a legend that betrays more than anything, the slavic origin and the byzantine system. the writer has transfigured the subject into a tragedy of the creative man through the force of filling the legendary form with a new life. thus, “the aesthetic myth, understood as the creator’s own sacrifice, is perfect in blaga (...); the events are signs of destiny and, above all, are determined by the irresistible passion of the creation” (popa, 2003, p. 56). the relationship between the creator manole and the transcendent principle, ineffable and always silent from the context of the church achievement, can be considered an artistic expression of the transcendent censorship. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 46 published by scholink inc. the eternal hesitation and inconsistency in repeating manole’s creation, whether determined by a fatalist of transcendence, or as chosen, assumed and performed by man through the free will, originates in the interpretation of the nature of the creative passion. the creative passion, as an intimate resort in assuming the sacrifice for the achievement of creation, acquires a double meaning in the artisan’ s sense: on the one hand, he assumes it as his own, and on the other hand he understands it as being lowered from nothingness into the self’s being. applied to the drama and the character in question, the idea is also accepted by v. fanache who sees in blaga’s play” an unpredictable bipolar dimonic, belonging on the one hand to the areas of the unconscious, on the other hand, to the indictable powers (...) equally suspended in a tragic gap it also remains the creative predestination, which controls the human as a disease or passion, coming from somewhere from the unknown” (fanache, 2003, p. 132). how can a world start if not by a creation? this is a question that many thinkers have asked. if the world is to be created and subsequently inhabited, “it must be founded by the discovery or design of a fixed point, the center (...) the ritual building has a cosmological value because the ritual by which the human builds a sacred space is effective insofar as it reproduces the work of the gods, more precisely, cosmogony” (biciușcă, 2000, p. 33). the center orders both the universe and the built space, the two levels being on the same axis. the centre is dynamic, it is “the immobile engine” (aristotle said) that structures and arranges the space around it. in architecture, we find the symbol of the centre and the symbol of cyclicity. these symbol classes are embodied in all the myths of the world. in the egyptian mythology, isis is the symbol of the creator’s center / of the creator, who builds and gives life, and osiris is the symbol of cyclicity, balancing between the center (isis) and the chaos (seth) between life and death. the architectural gesture reproduces that of the creation as any construction is a projection of the universe, and for this reason, constantly repeated, it is a ritual gesture that can not come out of the order of the world. for the human, the architecture is a way of discovering the universe, a model of the universe that it projects in his own world. among the symbols of the center present in the architectural language would be: the forest, the cross-tree, the cave-mountain, the fire, the sky. the cave is the place inside the mountain, the cavity in the center of the earth, from where the human begins his journey into his interior. the cave marks the beginning of initiation, it is the symbol of the “outside darkness,” of the profane world where the novice once lived. this is where his ritual death takes place and his second birth due to the discovery of the “inner light” (biciușcă, 2000, p. 33). temples, church altars are symbols of the cave, because here it is the “inner world” that man purifies himself with god’s help. the spaces of the church are materializations of the architecture symbols, of the center, of creation. the orthodox church with its consecutive spaces symbolizes: the forest (the narthex as the initiatory space), the cross (the sanctuary through which the vertical link is made), the cave that is the secret altar. the altar is the “point” which is equivalent to the center of creation which through the cross gains a transcendent meaning, and the whole church construction, that protects in its belly the cave, symbolizes the sacred mountain, that is, golgotha. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 47 published by scholink inc. 2. culture as the dimension of globalization located in the southeast part of the european continent, romania has a marginal culture, and in blaga’s terms, we would say a minor culture. but that does not mean that it is an inferior culture because “edges are more creative where cultures interfere” forming those cultures of interference. for a european, the west is not only a number of major cultures, but a “number of centers of the world cultural management” (alexandrescu, 2000, p. 46). if we look at the modern culture, it has globalization at its center, and the cultural practices are at the center of globalization. the psychological consequence of globalization is that it “produces transformations of identity, namely of how people think about themselves in relation to the environment” (arnett, 2002, p. 778). in order for the cultural globalization to be possible, it is necessary to modify even the people’s vision of existence, as from this vision the culture comes. the modern world is not an acceleration of the conditions previously existing in the pre-modern societies, but a rupture of the traditional world, which it seems to co-ordinate and destroy irreversibly; so it is born from discontinuity rather than a continuation of it. the biggest disadvantage that globalization implies is that it annihilates the very identity of the nations. for c. ciopraga, the national identity means differentiation and, at the same time, a particular openness towards existence in which the collective consciousness is reflected; he sees in a people’s literature a collective self-portrait. for others, the myth defines the identity being the seed from which all aspects of reality organically derive the starting point of culture. the national specificity is the capital element that becomes the image of a particular people. the human is always a function of the culture in which he lives. a problem of our time is the adjustment of the archetypal binomial identity-alterity to the european context. the national unit is about to lose ground before a wider unified system, conceived on a continental scale. in this sense, the founding myths have a revolutionary function because they lead to a restructuring of the world. what was perceived as specific, characteristic of every nation is about to disappear, and all the existing cultures seem ready to reunite under the shield of a unique culture. the pluralistic model of science and culture has its origins in the renaissance, but it reaches its climax in the enlightenment. the great european romanians from cantemir to t. maiorescu, from t. vianu to a. pleşu, to a. marino brought europe home. we are the only ones who can not accept what we are offered, but be more selective, and so we can help stop the caricature of the romanian culture and cultural value, as, even if it decides to integrate into a global reality, each nation must have the power to preserve its specificity, in one form or another. the return to the original forms, to myth and mystery, to ancestrality can save the modern, urbanized and alienated man from the mechanical existence in a civilized society. there will inevitably be a synchronization of all cultures on all levels, in an attempt to eliminate all previously existing discrepancies and contradictions. however, the cultural unification has to occur through the exchange of what is best and most useful in every culture. our people “far from being one to seek their identity, to try to assert in all its ways to conquer abroad, rather understood to preserve its identity, and historically, it was not formed by www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 48 published by scholink inc. expansion but by contraction” (noica, 1978, p. 154). if personality is, in general, a continuation and a form of universal energy, “the personality of the people is the structure of its psycho-physical energies; it is a strictly determined moment in the whole evolution of the nature” (rădulescu-motru, 1927, p. 115). it is not by chance that the romanian folklore was appreciated as a philosophy (in a proto-philosophical form) by which the “encyclopedia of the people’s soul” (candrea, 2001, p. 111) transfigures an experience and gives birth to its own aspirations. the research of folklore, its valorisation has an important role in the designation and promotion of the romanian values at a european level. once recognized, the national value of the romanian spirituality, it will be integrated with the european concept; an important role for intellectuals, culture, in this sense. 3. conclusions drawing out only a few of the exegesis tendencies of the two myths, one of the main concerns was to see to what extent mioriţa and manole, the artisan have a romanian specificity, and which is that, in the conditions where themes and even similar narrative structures up to identity are fully found in the folklore of the neighboring peoples. as a whole, mioriţa preserves rites of initiation that represent an ethnological cultural stage of almost all the peoples of the world, from australia to north america. mioriţa has multiple valences of interpretation and it is constituted in the matrix of our national specificity. occupying a well defined place on the axis of the literary history, although on the exegetic plane it is the most controversial folkloric text, mioriţa is also an encyclopedia of arts. the mioritic vision on the human condition was imposed and remains the “test stone” and the “keystone” of the romanian philosophical anthropology in its historical continuity. in the case of manole, the artisan, alecsandri himself signaled the serbian ballads about the foundation of scutari fortress. then the greek variants, grouped around the arta bridge, the aromanian variants, the bulgarian ones, were signaled, and later, the area of the sacrifice theme as a price for the building proved to be more widespread than it was believed. mioriţa and manole, the artisan, although they have the basis for valorizing death, they actually mean “a certain valorization of life”, for the presence of death “does not mean a pessimistic view of the world, a decrease of the vital flow”; the death of mioriţa is a calm return “near to his relatives” the death from manole, the artisan is “creative” in it, “we identify a heroic and male conception of death” (eliade, 2004, p. 6). going beyond his being, he made “to last the opera, thus enrolling him in the order of perennial values. after the building of love, death is no longer for him but only the cosmic reintegration, as in miorita” (becleanu iancu, 1980, p. 194). in both ballads “there is a conception derived perhaps from the gets’ joy to die”; they “are elaborated around the idea of the creative death and the death accepted with serenity” (eliade, 1995, p. 75). death transfigured by sacrifice “acquires a heroic sense, as in the free dacian ancestors who encountered death with warlike laughter, a homeric laugh”. (becleanu iancu, n.d., p. 193) eloquent in this sense would be the merry cemetery of sapanta, where death is dissipated by the omnipotence of life. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 49 published by scholink inc. thanks to its exceptional qualities, which differentiate it, miorita can be seen as a window to the romanian culture, personality and reality that opens to the foreigners of the nation and language in order to know us. for us, the romanians, it can be a viable pretext to recognize ourselves as a nation and spirituality, beliefs, history and ancient religion. the models transmitted by the archaic spirituality have not lost their ability to refresh themselves, being archetypal intuitions, ecumenical primordial visions that man revealed as soon as he became acquainted. the archaic spirituality, always thirsty by the ontic, continues to our day in the form of a “creative nostalgia for autonomous values: art, social mystic science, etc.” (skok, 1929). we consider that by referring the two central romanian myths to the specificity and value of the romanian culture, we define by them the romanian folk soul explaining the way of the romanian being itself. references alexandrescu, s. (2000). identitate în ruptură. bucurești: univers. arnett, j. (2002). the pszchology of globalization. american psychologist, 10, 778. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066x.57.10.774 băncilă, v. (1996). duhul sărbătorii. bucurești: anastasia. becleanu, i. a. (1980). spiritualitate românească. permanență. devenire, bucurești:ed politică. biciușcă, f. (2000). centrul lumii locuite. bucurești: paideaia. boia, l. (1997). istorie și mit în conștiința românească. bucurești: humanitas. botta, d. (1995). unduire și moarte. iași: institutul european. blaga, l. (1985). trilogia culturii. bucurești: minerva. candrea, i. a. (2001). studii de folclor. din datinile și credințele poporului român. bucurești: academia română. cantacuzino, g. m. (1977). izvoare şi popasuri. bucurești: eminescu. călinescu, g. (1986). istoria literaturii române de la origini până în prezent. bucurești: minerva. chevalier, j., & gheerbrant, a. (1975). dictionnaire des symboles. paris. cosma, a. (1942). cosmogonia poporului român. bucurești: tipografia universul. crețu, f. (2008). mituri și simboluri blagiene. oradea: ed. didactică militară. kernbach, v. (1898). universul mitic al românilor. bucurești: ed. științifică. detienne, m. (1898). dictionnaire des sciences historiques. mythologies. paris: hachette. dima, a. (1967). conceptul de literatură universală şi comparată (specificul naţional al literaturii române). bucurești: ed. academiei. drăgănescu, m. (1991). tensiunea filosofică şi sentimentul cosmic. discurs de recepţie, bucureşti: editura academiei române. eliade, m. (1995). de la zalmoxis la ginghis-han. bucurești: humanitas. eliade, m. (2004). comentarii la legenda meșterului manole. bucurești: humanitas. fanache, v. (2003). l. blaga. dramaturgul, lecturi sub vremuri. cluj-napoca: motiv. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 50 published by scholink inc. filipciuc, i. (2001). mioriţa străbate lumea. câmpulung: biblioteca mioriţa. gană, g. (1976). opera literară a lui lucian blaga. bucurești: minerva. gruia, l. (2008). tripticul spiritul. eminescu, blaga, brâncuși. iași: feed back. larchet, j. c. (2017). viața liturgică. iași: doxologia. michelet, j. (1968). légendes démocratiques du nord. paris: presses universitaires de france. mincu, ș. (2002). miorița—o hermeneutică ontologică. constanța: pontica. mus, p. (1937). la tombe vivante. la terre et la vie, 117-127. noica, c. (1978). spiritul românesc în cumpătul vremii. bucurești: univers. popa, i. (2003). meşterul manole. glose blagiene. târgu-mureș: ed. ardealul. rădulescu-motru, c. (1927). personalismul energetic. bucurești: casa școalelor. rusu, l., & voia, v. (2013). le sens de l’existence dans la poesie populaire roumaine. bucurești: ed. academiei române. sedlmayr, h. (1993). die entstehung der kathedrale. zűrich: herder, spektrum. skok, p. (1929). iz balkansche komparativne literature. rumunsche paralele zidanju skadra. glasnic skopskpg nauenog drustva, 56-58. todoran, e. (1985). lucian blaga. mitul dramatic. timișoara: facla. vlăduțescu, g. (2012). filosofia legendelor cosmogonice românești. bucurești: paideia. microsoft word ape-v2n1-p1 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 1 original paper traditional rulers, electoral process, and nigeria’s fourth republic: exploring relevance godwin c. ihemeje1* 1 department of history, political science & public administration, albany state university, albany, united states of america * godwin c. ihemeje, department of history, political science & public administration, albany state university, albany, united states of america received: november 22, 2018 accepted: december 3, 2018 online published: december 5, 2018 doi:10.22158/ape.v2n1p1 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v2n1p1 abstract this study examines the role of traditional rulers in the nigerian electoral process with a view to revealing perceptions arising from such engagement, specifically in democratic transitional process. the study also explores opinions of selected traditional ruler ship councils. it adopts a structural-functionalism approach and qualitative method of data analysis. thus, the paper argues that there are various controversies surrounding the institution of the traditional rulers in nigeria showing mix of conspiracy, corruption, dictatorship, and disrespect for the rule of law with incumbent political leaders; which suggests that such alignment indices by some traditional rulers are borrowed from modern democratic leaders. thus, study concludes that the continuous contributions of the traditional rulers in electoral process will further guarantee their relevance in modern democratic governance. keywords traditional ruler, election, electoral process, democratic transition 1. introduction the traditional institutions have gone through good and bad times in the country’s political history right from the pre-colonial, through the colonial and even up till the post-colonial periods; and have not relented in their commitment to the democratic process in africa generally, and nigeria, particularly. however, the relevance of traditional ruler ship institution in african contemporary politics has generated rancorous debates (tonwe & osemwota, 2013; agbese, 2004; vaughan, 1991). traditional ruler ship has been a primordial and sacrosanct institution existing before the advent of colonialism in africa. this indigenous structure appears in different forms as well as in their changing roles from www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 2 published by scholink inc. pre-colonization to the present date in africa (ihemeje, 2014; tonwe & osemwota, 2013). traditional institutions are indispensable for political transformation in africa, as they represent a major part of the continent’s history, culture, and governance systems. this view attributes the ineffectiveness of the african state in bringing about sustained socio-economic development due to its neglect of traditional institutions and its failure to restore africa’s own history (basil davidson, 1992, cited in economic commission for africa, 2004). in political reality, traditional rulers cannot be deserted in stabilizing democratic governance in nigeria, their roles in electoral sensitization, citizenship education and assurance of security of lives and properties cannot be misjudged. conversely, the muddling up of traditional rulership with modernity, human rituality, and corruption has hi-cupped the structural legality of this indigenous institution which is considered as repulsive to global democratic political folklore. surprisingly, traditional rulership institution has compromised the tenet of many african traditions where selection of the consecrated position of traditional rulership becomes a commercial vehicle for the highest bidders. today, this issue has generated vacillating arguments among the scholars about the potentiality and structural qualities of this indigenous institution toward sustainable democracy in nigeria (vanghan, 1991; agbese, 2004; ofuafor & amusa, 2012; ihemeje, 2014). it was not until the british colonial officials began to realize that colonial success depended greatly on the recognition and involvement of the traditional rulers that they began to patronize and incorporate them into the indirect rule system. this realization was not unconnected with the fact that the europeans discovered that nigerians were so bound with their traditions and traditional rulers to the extent that whatever they ordered was what the people would do or not do as the case may be. this was the origin of the involvement of the involvement of traditional rulers in colonial government which has received great criticisms from scholars as “criminality” (emordi & osiki, 2008, cited in amusa & ofuafor, 2012). contemporarily, traditional rulers have a great influence in election and electioneering processes in nigerian democratic politics. the recent observations justify their significant role in electoral engagement. this usually comes inform of paying homage/visiting the traditional rulers during election campaign by the various political contestants; therefore, their roles in the functional electoral processes become a remarkable theme in nigerian body politics. a very good example is traceable to the visit made by the presidents of federal republic of nigeria, goodluck jonathan and muhammadubuhari to palaces of all first class traditional rulers in nigeria, including alaafin of oyo, ooni of ife, olubadan of ibadan, oba of lagos, emir of kano, obi of onisha just to mention a few, signaling the mammoth recognition of traditional rulers in the optimum realization of 2011 and 2015 general elections respectively in nigeria. it is believed that traditional rulers are capable of mobilizing, coordinating, and swaying the choice of the citizens during the election. there are more “traditional” rulers today than at independence in 1960. politicians try to win votes by promising to upgrade chieftaincies or create new ones. clearly, such rulers continue to strike a chord in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 3 published by scholink inc. the twenty-first century, when power is diffused and chaotic. one reason for this is that traditional rulers are often more trusted than local and state government officials during post-conflict situations, which are becoming extremely common (blench et al., 2006; ochonu, 2010; daily independent newspaper, 2014). where true traditional chieftaincy institutions exist, government of those countries have willingly or reluctantly accepted, knowingly or unknowingly, that the surest way to win the hearts of the people on major issues of the day has been through the traditional rulers (sunday trust newspaper, 2011). the institution of traditional rulers is an enduring part of our heritage. it plays a critical role as the custodian of culture and traditions. expectedly, our traditional rulers are closely linked with the grassroots, and so understand the problems of our people intimately. in our search for peace, order and stability in our society, the institution could be a veritable instrument. it is in the overall interest of our people that this institution in our national life be acknowledged and that clear provisions are made (in the constitution) for its effective functioning (agbese, 2004; ihemeje, 2014; the pointer newspaper, 2014). the traditional institutions in nigeria, particularly the traditional rulership has remained a strong political force to reckon with in the contemporary nigerian politics in spite of their official and constitutional relegation to the background. this has been made possible by the magnitude of the power and resilience of african traditions and spiritualties which have continued to have great influence in the lives and activities of the africans (amusa & ofuafor, 2012). therefore, this study is driven by the need to elucidate the relevance of the traditional rulers’ involvement in democratic elections and transition process in deepening democratic governance through the lens of qualitative analysis. the study seeks to establish the roles and contributions of the traditional rulers in the electoral process that ascertains their continuous existence and relationship with modern governance within the purview of nigerian political culture. the paper is divided into four parts with the first part introducing the thrust of the paper. 2. method this article is both explorative and contextual, that is qualitative in nature. in its presentation, it attempts to demystify the discourse with relevant theoretical framework, result/findings, discussion and conclusions that are largely derived from extant literature and field survey on the subject matter. 2.1 traditional ruler, traditional institution, election and electoral process this section deals with the discourses of concepts as the foundation of its analysis, review of literatureand juxtaposition with a theoretical approach (akindele et al., 2012, p. 175; finnemore & sikkink, 1998, p. 891). despite the egregious misconception about traditional rulership institution which has created a great vacuum in defining what traditional rulership institution should presage, many scholars have been unable to bifurcate diversity inherent from traditional institutional structure as a multi-faceted concept. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 4 published by scholink inc. however, traditional institution is all encompassing, it constitutes various indigenous institutions which may include traditional festival; the kingship institution, sacerdotal society, age-grade, demi-gods, indigenous financial institution (esusu), etc. therefore, for the purpose of this work, traditional ruler as a component of traditional institution assigned with certain responsibilities is defined within the context of african political system. traditional authorities are the leaders of traditional communities. the word “traditional” refers to historic roots of leadership, which legitimizes the execution of power. there are many existing forms of traditional leadership. in europe, the rule of kings and nobles was the dominant governing force for a long time until it was gradually replaced by democratic structures. in africa, asia, and latin america, traditional authorities are mostly referred to as chiefs and elders (lutz & linder, 2004). the national conference of traditional rulers defines a traditional ruler as the person who by virtue of his ancestry occupies the throne or stool of an area and who has been appointed to it in accordance with the customs and traditions of the area and whose throne has been in existence before the advent of the british in nigeria. the area over which he and his forefathers have ruled or reigned must have at least been created by a native authority in 1910 or the date of the introduction of the native authority to the area concerned. in the case of the former eastern region of nigeria for example, traditional stools are established according to the customs and traditions of the people and recognized by the governments in those areas and occupied date of this resolution will not by virtue of this definitions be disqualified, provided also that in respect of other parts of the federation of nigeria, traditional stools similarly established prior to the 1st of october 1979, will not by virtue of this definition be disqualified (agbese, 2004). a “traditional ruler” may be defined as the traditional head of an ethnic group or clan who is the holderof the highest primary executive authority in an indigenous polity, or who has been appointed to such position in accordance with the customs and tradition of the area concerned by instrument or order of the state government, and whose title is recognized as a traditional ruler title holder by the government of the state (ola & tonwe, 2009, p. 174; tonwe & osemwota, 2013). traditional ruler refers to a person conferred with indigenous, cultural, and customary-based authority; and whose reign of a monarchy is the accepted controller of the people in their affairs of life. it means a unanimously elected or selected person by a given community to pilot the affairs of his people in line with customs and traditions of the community (yol, 2010). traditional rulership institution implies primordial or existing structure designed to rule over the indigenous communities/locales within the range of set norms. this institution derives its power from long established tradition and custom which serves as precedence of the communal behaviors. traditional ruler precisely rules over the indigenous citizens with specific assigned roles and functions similar to that of government in the modern society. according to the martinézcobo report to the un sub-commission on the prevention of discrimination of minorities (1986), indigenous peoples may be identified as follows: indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 5 published by scholink inc. pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. they form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems (cited in lutz & linder, 2004). by traditional institution, it refers to the indigenous political arrangements whereby leaders with proven track records are appointed and installed in line with the provisions of their native laws and customs (orji & olali, 2010, p. 402, cited in nweke, 2012). the essence of the institutions is to preserve the customs and traditions of the people and to manage conflicts arising among or between members of the community by the instrumentality of laws and customs of the people (nweke, 2012). miles (1993) identified five modern functions of traditional rulers which include linkages or brokering between grassroots and capital; extension of national identity through the conferral of traditional titles; low level conflict resolution and judicial gate-keeping; ombudsman ship and institutional safety value for overloaded and sub-apportioned bureaucracies. any account of social institutions must begin by informally marking off social institutions from other social forms (stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, 2011). an institution is any structure or mechanism or social order governing the behavior of a set of individuals within a given community; may it be human or a specific animal one. institutions are identified with social purpose, transcending individuals and intentions by mediating the rules that govern living behavior. the term “institution” is commonly applied to custom and behavior patterns important to a society, as well as to particular formal organization or government and public services (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/institution). as it relates to traditional structure, the essence of the institutions is to preserve the customs and traditions of the people and to manage conflicts arising among or between members of the community by the instrumentality of laws and customs of the people (nweke, 2012). election may be defined as an act of choosing or selecting one or more from a greater number of persons, things, courses, or rights (black’s law dictionary). it is a formal process of selecting a person for public office or of accepting or rejecting a political proposition by voting (encyclopedia britannica). election constitutes major activities in pre-election, election and post-election process, these may include voter’s registration, registration of political party, election campaign, voting guidelines, voting, counting of votes, pronouncement of election results and ventilation of anger against election results at the court of law for proper adjudication. therefore, election connotes the overall management of electoral processes in a political system. elections are central to competitive politics. they are central because, ideally, they should provide the opportunity for yesterday’s winners to become today’s losers, and for yesterday’s losers to become today’s winners. the model of democracy on which this theory of elections is based is liberal democratic. the centrality of elections to liberal democratic politics also presupposes the importance www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 6 published by scholink inc. particularly of impartial electoral administration. this is because the indeterminacy of elections the possibility of erstwhile winners becoming losers and erstwhile losers becoming winners-which is an inherent and necessary prerequisite of liberal democratic politics is to a large extent a function of an impartial administration of elections (jinadu, 1997, p. 1, cited in ojo, 2012). in nigeria, the set of actions put in place for the management of electoral exercise has been driven by many actors, traditional rulers inclusive. the fundamental role of this rulership institution remains significant in any democratic activity. in view of idea (2010), the electoral process comprises of eight segments: legal framework, planning & implementation, training and education, voter registration, electoral campaign, voting operation, verification of results and post-election. however, it can be rightly observed that the involvement of traditional rulers in some of these stated segments become noteworthy owing to their acceptability, responsiveness and practicable input and outputs in governance since the amalgamation till date. the review clearly indicates that a lot has been done in the aspect of history, roles and challenges of traditional rulers while lacuna on the relevance of traditional rulers in electoral process remains uncovered, hence the significance of this paper. 2.1.1 structural functionalism: a theoretical approach structural functionalism theory is adopted in this study to establish the traditional rulership institution as functional organ within the nucleus of nigerian society. the relevant contributions of eminent sociologists such as august comte, herbert spencer (organic structure) and emile durkheim provide a great insight into functional society. structural functionalism views society as interconnected objects designed to form a whole part. the various organizations in the society are incorporated to assist each other in order to form a holistic system which works together to achieve a common goal. according to yol (2010), he argues that functionalism ensures that all societies share the same norms and values while these norms and values are embodied in the law; and that the social order comprises of the internalization of these norms and values through the roles performed by traditional rulers in their communities. durkheim attempts to explain the new relationship patterns he observed by theorizing the concept of solidarity. in “division of labour”, durkheim suggests that smaller communities are linked by tradition and personal relationships. however, as urbanization occurs, a society experiences a denser form of integration and differentiation and, consequently, individuals must adopt more specialized roles in order complement each other. durkheim describes the former as mechanical solidarity while the latter is considered as organic. under these circumstances, the subsequent interaction causes another social phenomenon to emerge; one that is distinct from individuals and has a life of its own. he describes this phenomenon as “social facts” or “institutions” (these are norms, beliefs, morals, etc.). according to durkheim, social integration depends on the proper maintenance of this system of values as well as the extent to which they are commonly shared, by what he refers to as the “collective conscience” (durkheim & halls, 1984, cited in harper, 2011). chiefs and kings have for centuries been custodians www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 7 published by scholink inc. of africa/s culture and heritage. they have also been a symbol of the people’s voice. however, they have authority over traditional laws and customs, and chiefs have a great deal of influence in the community (bbc news friday, 2004). therefore, traditional rulership institution becomes crucial element in the functional society; it regulates, normalizes, contributes and partakes in the societal activities, thus seen as viable instrument in nigerian electoral processes because its roles are immeasurable in the peaceful political conducts in the society. tonwe and osemwota (2013) observed that the traditional ruler formed the nucleus of governance. one striking fact is that the geographical spheres of authority of these traditional rulers are essentially localized and no traditional ruler ever had jurisdiction over the entire geographical area of modern nigeria. similarly, erero (2005) posits that given the considerable diversity and cultural heterogeneity of nigerian society, any generalizations on traditional structures of government would be pretentious. in the foregoing, it is evident that traditional rulers are recognized as one of the significant social institutions which regulate the functionality of african political system. their role is very crucial in the sustenance of democratic governance as it reflects in colonial regime as a viable instrument for the realization of general administration of government in nigeria. 2.1.2 traditional rulers and the nigerian electoral process: gain or pain this section evaluates the views of scholars, tagged, “traditional rulers and the nigerian electoral process: gain or pain”, and responses from field survey systematically complement the analysis. the survey data comprised careful use of responses from select traditional rulers’ councils in anambra, edo, oyo and kwara states; drawn from south-east, south-south, south-west and north-central geopolitical zones of nigeria between 2012 and 2013. the data were purposively selected since elections were conducted in those zones that engaged the services of traditional rulers in terms of consultation, political meetings/courtesy calls, blessing, advice, and importantly, voters’ education. the analysis covers aspects of structural functionalism that are tied to electoral process where traditional rulers were actively involved as well as their subjects. historically, african traditional institutions of governance are diverse. they have evolved significantly from their pre-colonial forms in tandem with transformation of the continent’s political systems, during the colonial and post-colonial eras. despite their complex diversity, much of the post-independence literature classifies african traditional institutions of governance into two types, based on their pre-colonial forms: (a) the consensus-based systems of the decentralized pre-colonial political systems; and (b) chieftaincy of the centralized political systems (economic commission for africa, 2010). the intrusion of colonialism dismantled the structures of traditional absolutism in virtually all the indigenous ethnic nationalities of the south-south zone in the nigeria. the use of gunboat diplomacy and brute force, cowered these paramount rulers into submission in the face of a more sophisticated weaponry and tactics of the west (orji, 2013). the lyttelton constitution 1954 (revised in 1957) greatly reduced the constitutional powers of the traditional rulers both at the centre and in the regions. at the federal level, the legislature was divided www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 8 published by scholink inc. into two houses: the senate and the house of representatives. the senate was composed of 12 representatives appointed by the governors of the regions. the governor-general also appointed two representatives for lagos while the chiefs of lagos elected one. the oba of lagos was automatically a member. the house of representatives consisted of 320 members who were directly elected, for the first time; the house of chiefs played no role in this process. members of the house of chiefs were not allowed to be members of the senate, nor member of any regional legislature (fajonyomi, n.d.). observably, the gradual relegation of constitutional powers of the kings set in after this period. a review of extant literatures on traditional rulership institutions revealed the rationale behind their institutional demotion, which includes: self-inflicted (partisanship in politics, defecation of traditional values, lack of integrity by some, money-for-chieftaincy policies, in-fighting; military dictatorship (clipping of wings and enthronement of subservient culture); social malaise (moral decay in the society, lack of respect for elders and constituted authority—including traditional institutions); dwindling sphere of influence and breaking down of the “kingdom” overseen by the traditional rulers); conflict of interest and authority between local government authorities and traditional rulers; globalization (waning influence and interest in monarchies, and traditional institutions worldwide); politics (party politics have been played in a manner to undermine the influence of traditional rulers over local voters); the economy (begging for financial support from subjects); abuse of privilege, such as giving chieftaincy titles and honors to less deserving members of the society has created a society with false values, and negative role models (fayonjomi, n.d.). correspondingly and as noted earlier, immediately after independence, the powers and authority of the traditional institutions declined as their continuous existence depended on the whims and caprices of the nigerian government. during this new period, the closeness between the traditional institutions and the political class affected the institutions so much. the integration of traditional and modern politics helped to retain and reformulate traditional and state’s politics in the newly independent nigerian states. it has been argued that successful military regimes in nigeria from 1966 relied on traditional institutions for their legitimacy, thereby further politicizing the institutions. more traditional rulers were appointed depending on those they supported in power. with time and due to personal aggrandizement, traditional institutions diminished over time in the usual sovereignty over their people. others who were not loyal, so to say, were removed or suspended (omotosho, 2010, cited in nweke, 2012). concurrently, there are other obstacles confronting the indigenous structure of traditional rulers as it is premised in constitutional lacuna, this was corroborated in nigerian daily that: the constitution has no direct role for traditional rulers. this lacuna has led to a groundswell of calls from monarchs and traditionalists for a direct constitutional function for our royal fathers. this is how it should be in a republic. and really, in many places, our people still rely upon and trust their traditional rulers in making choices on politics, economic activities, education and taking social action. this is an invaluable social capital that any politician will give just anything to have (daily independent newspaper, 2014). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 9 published by scholink inc. within a constitutional context, the 1960 and 1963 constitutions created a council of chiefs for them in the regions and some of them were even regional governors. the 1979 constitution gave them representation in the national council of state. the current 1999 constitution did not even mention the traditional institution. is this not enough indicator of their plight and dwindling prestige? (leadership newspaper quoted in nigerian-newspaper.com). state governments frequently create new “traditional” thrones. this reflects their continuing interests in the traditional political institutions. the benue state government, for instance, created several new second-class chiefs in the state in 1997. although created in the name of customs and traditions; these are brand new institutions that have no precedence in the political experience of the people of benue state. interestingly, part of the justification for traditional rulership is that it is a mode of governance indigenously created by africans long before the continent was colonized by europeans. as the action of the benue state in creating new second-class chiefs has shown however, some of these traditional rulership institutions have no connection with the pre-colonial political realities of africa. thus, in this context, tradition is merely invoked in response to modern political exigencies. at the federal level, a new institution called the national council of traditional rulers was created; comprising 74 graded rulers from all the thirty-six states and the abuja capital territory, it was created to “serve as a consultative assembly through which the federal government would feel the pulse of the grassroots communities”. government’s interests in the institution can also be deduced from the fact that most state governors have special advisers for chieftaincy affairs (agbese, 2004). in the same vein, military administrators conferred importance on traditional rulers by their demonstrated eagerness to pay homage to prominent traditional rulers as soon as they assumed office as military governors. under military rule, it became a tradition that the first place of call for a newly appointed military governor to any of the thirty-six states was the palace of the leading traditional ruler in the state. through this open homage to traditional rulers, military governors sought to cloak themselves in the legitimacy which the indigenous political institutions are believed to confer on people. traditional rulers on their part would pledge their loyalty and the loyalty of their people, to the new regime. in an ironic twist, which is crystal clear indicates that the frequent government intervention in chieftaincy affairs reflects the importance which various state governments attach to the institution (agbese, 2004). intuitively, intervention in chieftaincy affairs takes place in form of demotion, deposition, and banishment of traditional rulers as a way to punish erring royal fathers who do not do the bidding of the government of the day. sequel to this view, alhaji muhammadu sanusi, the emir of kano, olateru olagbegi, the olowo of owo and ibrahim dasuki, sultan of sokoto are among prominent traditional rulers who have been deposed by various state governments and were also banished from their kingdoms. in the same vein, during the turbulent era of party politics in the second republic, many state governors sought wider powers over chieftaincy matters. the ogun state house of assembly passed a bill giving the state governor such powers. this action however led to several clashes between www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 10 published by scholink inc. state governors and traditional rulers. as afriscopemagazine pointed out: “within the first two years [of the second republic], almost every state has witnessed conflicts of one form or another between its government functionaries and its traditional rulers, leaving a trail of heightened tension in as many as eleven states”. governor jim nwobodo of anambra state expressed his displeasure with the obi of onitsha, ofalaokagbue, by dropping him as the state’s representative to the national council of state. governor sam mbakwe of imo state ordered that the title, “his royal highness”, should be dropped from the names of traditional rulers in imo. in kano, governor abubakarrimi issued a query to the emir of kano, ado bayero, alleging that the emir had engaged in acts of disrespect to the governor’s administration. the governor’s query to the emir precipitated violent mob demonstrations which led to the death of the governor’s political adviser, bala mohammed. several government buildings in kano and the homes of some politicians were also burnt during the fracas (agbese, 2004). the post-colonial state has criminalized the factual indigenous structure in nigeria, these is evident in major suspension of traditional rulers as it is also exemplified in the removal of deji of akure in south western nigeria who was alleged of brutally beating his wife as against the courtesy of fundamental disposition of traditional ruler as a symbolic personality in the society. in tandem with foregoing, the most recent endorsement in the fourth republic of lamido sanusi (former central bank governor) by the kano state governor as an emir of kano generated violence in kano state signaling how post-colonial state influenced the indigenous institution that presumed to revere customs and traditions of the society in question. it is believed that the formal institutional structure coordinates and determines the existence and recognition of traditional rulership institution which has become the bane of indigenous society in nigeria. the empirical evidence has revealed that during military and civilian regimes, countless number of traditional rulers were demoted, suspended or removed by the state. 2.1.3 responses from the field survey analyzed amidst all the above-mentioned setbacks, traditional rulers still maintain some democratic roles: broker between the people and the state; enhancing national identity; and providing an institutional safety-valve for inadequate bureaucracies. specifically, traditional rulership institutions have been acknowledged as veritable instruments for voters’ mobilization and civic education in electoral processes. though, some of the traditional rulers still engross in party politicking, selecting party candidacy, and drumming support for party. as reported by ihemeje (2014), traditional rulers directly or indirectly influence the choice of candidacy through advice received from the council of states or council of traditional rulers in a state. furthermore, ihemeje (2014) expatiated that this view was demonstrated at the instances of adam oshiomole and isiakaajumobi of action congress of nigeria, now all progressive congress (apc), they emerged as governors of edo and oyo states respectively because they were endorsed by traditional rulers and chiefs of their respective states. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 11 published by scholink inc. 3. result/finding findings from field survey revealed that prominent traditional rulers in nigeria have been fully involved in the nigerian electoral processes. ayuba, a high chief from ilorin emirate council (2013 as cited in ihemeje, 2014) noted that traditional rulers have indirect role in electoral process as they are been heavily relied on, because they are close to the community, endowed with wisdom drawn from tradition and culture in their various domains. it is important to note that human beings are political animals so also the traditional rulers, but they however do not own or form political party. what they do essentially in electoral process is to engage in enlightenment programs for their subjects before elections such as those involving registrations, voting and peace-making. ayuba (2013 as cited in ihemeje, 2014) further expressed that they also organized meetings with security officials toward a hitch-free election exercise. in his statement, ayuba opined that one may think a good traditional ruler should not be a politician rather he should have interest in political party and candidates by taking cognizance of their manifestoes. however, their main role is to galvanize and sensitize their subjects to participate in elections and ensuring that they are well-behaved during and after elections. this clearly indicates that their role cannot be overemphasized as far as the electoral process is concerned in nigeria. high chief ofiliukpabi, a titled chief and member of the traditional rulers’ council discussed extensively on the role of traditional rulers in nigerian electoral process. as a chief cabinet member of igwennaemeka achebe, obi of onitsha, anambra state, he revealed that traditional rulers are very instrumental to ensuring development, peace and stability in the country’s political system. ihemeje (2014) noted during the course of interview with the mentioned high chief that these roles played by traditional rulers reflect positively on their impact in the country’s electoral process. for instance, no traditional ruler would be satisfied with rigging, thuggery and hooliganism during elections. so, their role is very crucial towards the successful conduct of elections. what they do in most cases include holding meetings and deliberating how to ensure hitch-free elections with their chiefs and subjects. ukpabi (2012 as cited in ihemeje, 2014) demonstrated that they give political education to their subjects to include those at home and in diaspora. they used the media, town meetings, traditional council meetings, and other important avenues to disseminate electoral messages. they do not directly get involved in politics however; rather buy into the programs of a given political party. however, the role they play in the electoral process is very germane, particularly in the fourth republic. between 1999 and 2011, their impacts have been rewarding and even became more unprecedented since 2002, being the period that marked the installment of igwennaemeka achebe, obi of onitsha in the case of anambra state. other sister states in the south-east geopolitical zone have also borrowed a great deal of proper conduct in the electoral process from his royal highness, igwennaemeka achebe. i mean traditional rulers of imo, enugu, abia and ebonyi states respectively. ladigbolu, a high chief from oyo traditional ruling council (2013 as cited in ihemeje, 2014) commented on the role of alaafin of oyo as a traditional ruler in nigerian electoral processes. he www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 12 published by scholink inc. stressed that the traditional ruler like that of the alaafin of oyo performs a pertinent role in the electoral process particularly in ensuring that wrong electoral procedures are contested. for instance, alaafin of oyo does not dabble into electoral disruptions, as it were. as part of the role played by a traditional ruler in an electoral process include the acceptance and upholding of the electoral acts, defending the course of credible elections, that is to say, one-man-one-vote. the traditional ruler, in his wisdom, also ensures that his subjects have periodic and quality political education, before, during and after elections. in the view of ladigbolu, “what weakens electoral process in nigeria is essentially the introduction of human weakness against the electoral laws such as rigging through multiple voting, snatching of ballot boxes, thuggery, and electoral violence. and of course, you would agree with me that oyo state is enmeshed with electoral volatility when compared with other states in the country” (ladigbolu, 2013, as cited in ihemeje, 2014). he believed that the traditional ruler should be amenable to information regarding electoral process. to a very large extent, the alaafin of oyo had been very supportive in the electoral process. in edebiri’s view, a high chief and second in command to the then oba of benin observed that the oba of benin is the traditional head of all the traditional rulers in edo state and of course, a very strong force to reckon with as far as traditional rulership is concerned in nigeria and elsewhere in the world over. he noted: our traditional ruler had never been neutral in matters of electoral process as he had been actively involved in different electoral periods which ensured electoral-violence free moments. he had at different times advocated for a free and fair level-play ground to various political parties. our traditional ruler periodically used his chiefs to champion effective electoral process in their domains as well as localities. as part of his contribution to the electoral process, he equally enlightened subjects in different domains on voters’ education and rights. it is on the basis of his contribution and those of the chiefs that he is popularly respected (edebiri, 2012, as cited in ihemeje, 2014). 4. discussion inferences can be drawn from the various responses of the eminent high chiefs on behalf of their traditional rulers with respect to the subject: traditional rulers, electoral process and nigeria’s fourth republic. significantly, chief ayuba of ilorin emirate council agreed that individual and collective responsiveness of traditional rulership institutions to electoral process in nigeria was borne out of the intermediary roles they play in governance, especially between the government and grassroots. he added and maintained that such pivotal effort is hitherto practiced since the return to civil rule, between1999 and 2011, being democratic periods when elections were held (ayuba, 2013, in cited ihemeje, 2014). the practice was equally extended to the 2015 elections that brought mr. muhammadubuhari to power. in view of archbishop ladigbolu of oyo council of traditional rulers and chiefs, he opined that alaafin as well as most paramount rulers in the country perform such electoral intermediary functions due to the fact that they are not just the custodians of indigenous culture, customs and tradition, but also www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 13 published by scholink inc. serve as watchdogs for the people. and as such, they have so much to offer and gain when their electoral roles are effectively and efficiently carried out. on the issue of neutrality or anonymity, virtually all the traditional rulers could be seen not to be partisan politicians (ladigbolu, 2013, as cited in ihemeje, 2014). to them, they got involved in matters that bothered on sensitizing, galvanizing and disseminating political education to their subjects for elections, where their impacts were directly seen and felt. remarkably, chief ukpabi of anambra state council of traditional rulers and chiefs, in his assessment on “neutrality” and condition that necessitate such, he said that neutrality could not yield any positive result for the community because when traditional rulers were passive in participating in electoral process, electorates might not believe and participate in elections, as community and infrastructural development would be low. clarifying further, he noted that people should not term such role played by traditional rulers in the electoral process as being actively involved in politics, they perform such roles simply because the constitution and electoral laws permit them to do so (ukpabi, 2012, as cited in ihemeje, 2014). corroboratively, chief edebiri of edo state council of traditional rulers and chiefs opined that “no traditional ruler was allowed to play politics as stipulated by the constitution of nigeria, but people usually misconstrued the electoral functions with active politics”. to him, they are different in the sense that the role played by monarchs in electoral process does not necessarily accord them partisan politicians rather; they perform such role so as to reach out to their subjects. although, he added that a traditional ruler may decide not to partake in electoral process, if he so wishes. on the other hand, neutrality could mean not belonging or supporting any political party and which of course, is not publicly pronounced but perceived (edebiri, 2012, as cited in ihemeje, 2014). nevertheless, the respondent showered encomia on traditional rulership institution for their contributions in the electoral process in nigeria since 1999; hence seen as source of support to the modern governance system. 5. conclusion the pivotal role of galvanizing and sensitizing citizens in various domains by traditional rulers prior to, and during electioneering periods in nigeria’s fourth republic are well recognized; which is however translated to the nature of co-operation enjoyed among electoral officials and the government. however, this paper argues that mix of conspiracy, corruption, dictatorship between incumbent political leaders and traditional rulers exist; yet, it remains inevitable to alienate the institution of traditional rulers from the electoral process due to their place, role and contributions in the larger political landscape of the country. keeping in mind that, politics is culture-bound; the paper therefore identifies the potency of continuous systematic integration of traditional rulers in the nation’s electoral process and recommends their harmonious relationship with the electoral commissions, the press, the political party, civil society organizations, and the electorate, as it will continue to enhance their relevance in nigeria’s electoral process, and in tandem with their fatherly roles as custodians of people, culture, custom and traditions www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 14 published by scholink inc. which of course, translates to political maturity they often portray in deepening democratic governance. references agbese, p. (2004). chiefs, constitutions, and policies in nigeria. west africa revie, 6. https://doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v5n2p175 akindele, s. t., adeyemi, o. o., & aluko, o. a. (2012). democracy, governance, legislative challenges and impediments in nigeria, 1999-2011. journal of politics and law, 5(2). amusa, s., & ofuafor, m. (2012). resilience of traditions in contemporary politics: a historical study of the political influence of traditional rulers in nigeria. current research journal of social sciences, 4(6), 407-414. blench, r., longtau, s., hassan, u., & walsh, m. (2006). the role of traditional rulers in conflict prevention and mediation in nigeria: interim report. a research paper prepared for dfid-nigeria. daily independent newspaper. (2014). advocating constitutional role for traditional rulers. dinwerth, k., & pattberg, p. (2006). global governance as a perspective on world politics. global governance, 12, 186. economic commission for africa. (2004). relevance of african traditional institutions of governance. economic commission for africa encyclopedia britannica. retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/institution erero. j. (2005). traditional structures in local governance for local development: a study of ife east local government area. osun state, nigeria. fayonjomi, b. (undated). relevance of traditional rulers in modern day administration. publisher (not indicated). finnemore, m., & sikkink, k. (1998). international norm dynamics and political change. international organisation, 52(4), 891. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789 harper, d. (2011). structural-functionalism: grand theory or methodology? idea. (2010). electoral processes. international institute for democracy and electoral assistance. ihemeje, g. c. (2014). traditional rulership institution and electoral process in nigeria (1999-2011) (unpublished ph.d. thesis). obafemi awolowo university, ile-ife, nigeria: department of local government studies. journal of commonwealth and comparative politics. (n.d.). 29(3), 308. lutz, g., & linder, w. (2004). traditional structures in local governance for local development. university of berne, switzerland institute of political science. miles, w. (1993). traditional rulers and development administration: chieftaincy in niger nigeria, and vanuatu. studies in comparative international development, 28(3). https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02687120 nweke, k. (2012). the role of traditional institutions of governance in managing social conflicts in nigeria’s oil-rich niger delta communities: imperatives of peace building process in the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 15 published by scholink inc. post-amnesty era. british journal of arts and social sciences, 5(2). ochonu, m. (2010). “village” democracy and development in dutse, nigeria. ann arbor, mi: m publishing, university of michigan library. ojo, j. (2012). the role of judiciary in 2007 gubernatorial election disputes in south-western nigeria. an unpublished research project for the award of bachelor of science in local government studies, obafemi awolowo university, ile-ife, nigeria. orji, k. (2013). traditional rulership and local governance in south-south nigeria. iosr journal of humanities and social science (iosr-jhss), 16(2). otumfuo, o. (2004). traditional systems of governance and the modern state. keynote address presented by his royal majesty otumfuoosei tutu ii, asantehene at the fourth african development forum addis ababa, 12 october. stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, 2011. sunday trust newspaper. (2011). role of traditional rulers in the development of nigeria. march 13. the pointer newspaper. (2014). traditional institution and political development. tonwe, d., & osemwota, o. (2013). traditional rulers and local government in nigeria: a pathway to resolving the challenge. commonwealth journal of local governance, 13(14), 123-140. https://doi.org/10.5130/cjlg.v0i13/14.3728 vaughan, o. (1991). chieftaincy, politics and social relations in nigeria. yol, j. (2010). the role of traditional rulers in guma local government area of benue state. a research draft presented to benue state local government and chieftaincy affairs. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 31 original paper energy crisis, global warming and wildavsky’s thesis jan-erik lane received: september 24, 2022 accepted: october 15, 2022 online published: october 17, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n4p31 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n4p31 abstract the now surging energy crisis with huge electricity prices add to the already ongoing climate crisis. cheap electronic power would have made energy transition out of global warming a viable policy alternative. while the wildavsky thesis offers a nice explanation of the energy crisis, it fails to account for global warming. keywords global warming, cost of living crisis, electricity, wildavsky thesis, lomborg 1. introduction the energy crisis is real now nobody denies. but many people still deny the reality of climate crisis. and some claim climate will deliver real consequences first 2030 or 2050 or even 2100. what then is the link between the energy crisis and the climate crisis? the aim here is to discuss this question of energy and climate crises from the point of view of a. wildavsky’s thesis about fears in policy-making. the argument is that it explains rather well the retreat on nuclear power resulting in the energy crisis. however, it fails to account for the climate conundrum that he regarded as the mother of environmental scares. first some words on energy and two different perspectives on global warming. 1.1 energy physics define ―energy‖ as potential or actual capacity to do work. there is a variety of energy that resources can deliver. humans and societies want these different resources. figure 1 shows the major kinds of energy today. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 32 published by scholink inc. figure 1. energy consumption by source (eea, 2022) the energy profile in figure 1 indicates two of the fundamental facts for early 21th century, namely: enormous growth in energy consumption and almost 90 reliance on fossils that result in co2s, the predicament of heating earth. 2. humans and energy energy is so essential to humans. all need its functions, and current total consumption of energy is roughly 70 gigajoules per capita. yet, the differences in per capita energy access are enormous. table 1. per capita energy consumption in gj (bp, 2021) 2010 2019 africa 15,4 15,2 asia pacific 50,7 60,9 australia 240,5 233,2 brazil 56 58,9 china 76,2 99,1 germany 169,6 156,3 india 18,2 24,8 japan 164,2 144,8 middle east 135,3 146,2 russia 195,1 204,9 south korea 218,3 239,1 sweden 229,8 223,4 united states 300,7 288,4 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 33 published by scholink inc. a human needs about 10 mega joules per day to survive healthy, or 3,8 gj annually. 2.1 fossils and nuclear power world energy is not only very huge in consumption but also heavily skewered towards fossils. although the reliance upon renewable energy resources keeps increasing, so does energy demand, meaning that fossils still supply most energy resources. and they give rise to the enormous spreading of co2s. cop22 tried to ban coal as energy source by 2030 against china and india’s objections and ultimately veto. however, burnings of wood and charcoal without replanting give more co2 emissions. 2.2 retreat on atomic power it was once believed that fission energy would play a major role in total energy supply. it would produce electricity in large quantity when fossils would have shrunken or make too much co2s. however, events have made atomic power less attractive among the rich oecd countries. some rich countries embarked on a policy of reducing atomic power stations or nuclear reactors, like for instance sweden, germany and the us. here the wildavsky thesis is relevant, as the russian gas delivering dried up, raising prices and provoking the energy crisis. it may be pointed out that some ecologists saw atomic power stations as the necessary step when moving from fossil dependence to renewables. building much renewable energy sources would take time, but reducing fossil dependence was to be quick, especially coal dependence (lovelock, 2015). atomic energy power has always been contested, but after the fukushima disaster energy policy started to shift away from reliance upon nuclear options, especially among oecd nations. 2.3 cost of living crisis in the winter, spring and summer of 2022 energy prices soured in the eu. the rise in electricity prises accounted to from a mere doubling to a ten times doubling. against the background of strong general prices inflation this meant a cost of living crisis for the first time within the eu. here is not the place to discuss the causes of inflation in the eu such the war in ukraine, and expansion of fiscal and especially monetary policies. the emphasis was upon the policy retreat in energy policy away from the nuclear option. it led to the burning of oil and even coal. sweden is a good example. it closed down several nuclear reactors partly for fear of dangers, just to face now severe electricity shortages. 2.4 energy policy: the wildavsky effect sweden, germany and the uk altered their atomic power policy in the wake of the fukushima catastrophe. why or for what reasons? election considerations apart, the wildavsky thesis points out the search for safety (wildavsky, 1988). nuclear power stations are highly complex with possibilities that something may go wrong. the worst would be the spreading of radioactivity. operating nuclear power station involves unresolved issues. what to do with the waste materials – in short or long terms? radioactivity takes hundreds of years to diminish, and nuclear accidents may release lethal amounts of it. thus, reliance upon nuclear energy involves the handling of a number of very serious threats. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 34 published by scholink inc. now how are there risks with nuclear power to be evaluated against the positives of this the strongest source of energy? and here is wildavsky’s main point: the post-industrial society gives priority to the threats ahead of the opportunities in its search for safety. the changes in political cultures with emergence of environmentalism and civil society have underlined the role of safety in policy debates, emphasizing that threats must be confronted now and not hived off to the future. the attitudes towards risk and opportunities as well as dangers and gains explain the retreat on atomic power, resulting together with the ukraine war in a dismal energy crisis. the wildavsky thesis centers around the search for safety and not upon bounded rationality, as in his budget theory. fears or dangers have not been theorized in this way before ìn policy research. 2.5 dire consequents for climate policy the sharp rise in energy prices, especially the price of electric power, has provoked an abandonment of climate policy goals. with renewable energy far from fully expanded and little national gas from russia, the shortfall in electric power has been met by e.g., sweden by going back to burning oil for electricity. sweden will not meet its goal of reducing co2s this year or maybe not even by 2030. the energy crisis makes the climate crisis worse in the short run, although countries like sweden, germany and france are reevaluating nuclear power, i.e., what is left of it. faster expansion of renewables is necessary for cop goals of reducing co2s. 2.6 the basic difficulty in global climate coordination: reneging in the book ―is it reaĺly true‖ (wildavsky, 1997) wildavsky cĺaimed to have found several more examples of ―environmental scares‖, but he has been proven wrong about the climate crisis. why is global coordination on climate policy so ineffective? the present energy crisis in the eu shows that fossils will be resorted to when electricity is wanting. the cop of the united nations has gathered a wide club of states for the goal of reducing co2s. at the cop reunions governments promise energy transformation reducing fossils by some future date. but a promise without the sword is worth nothing stated hobbes 1651. lomborg has repeatedly stated that the current approach is ineffective (lomborg, 2007). lomborg is not a climate denier but he ridiculous the cop approach. the main problematic when arriving at a club decision when to eliminate co2 emissions is to come to an agreement which state is to decrease emissions most: the most polluting countries totally or the countries with highest co2 per capita. figure 2 and 3 show the difference implications for governments in the cop club. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 35 published by scholink inc. figure 2. total co2 emissions 2020 (our world in data, 2022a) figure 3. per capita emissions 2020 (our world in data, 2022b) whatever accord is found within the cop, it can always be reneged upon, like now with electric power shortages. 3. conclusion the present energy crisis or electric power shortages is very negative for climate policy-making according to cop standards. at lease in the short run fossils replace atomic power in several countries. in the long run renewables may be built up more rapidly. but what to do now when the needs for energy are strong? a good example is japan besides sweden and germany. finland is an exception, trusting nuclear power and telling about final storage. the abandonment of nuclear power fits the cultural theory of risk by douglas and wildavsky (1983). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 36 published by scholink inc. confronted with the surge in evidence for global warming, this theory of risk in policy-making can only be saved assuming myopia—why bother about temperature 2050 when the energy crisis today leads to a severe cost of living crisis? references british petroleum (bp). (2012). bp statistical review of world energy. retrieved from https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.htm l douglas, m., & wildavsky, a. (1983). risk and culture. berkeley: university of california press. https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520907393 european environment agency (eea). (2022). global total primary energy consumption by fuel. retrieved from https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/figures/global-total-primary-energy-consumption-by-fu el-1 lomborg, b. (2007). cool it: the skeptical environmentalist’s guide to global warming. new york: alfred a. knopf. lovelock. (2015). a rough ride to the future. london: penguin books, ltd. wildavsky, a. (1988). searching for safety. transaction books wildavsky, a. (1997). is it really true. cambridge: harvard university press. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 66 original paper the rising far right in australia—adiachronic case analysis of the one nation party and australia’s political environment jiang hongliang1* ¹ school of english studies, xi’an international studies university, xi’an, china * li wei, school of english studies, xi’an international studies university, xi’an, china received: april 26, 2025 accepted: may 05, 2025 online published: may 23, 2025 doi:10.22158/ape.v8n1p66 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v8n1p66 abstract since the subprime mortgage crisis, global right-wing extremism (rwe) has entered a new phase of ascendance, becoming particularly prominent in the post-pandemic era. while european parties such as afd and rn are nearing political dominance, and the u.s. republican party is increasingly aligned with far-right populism, australia’s one nation party (onp), though relatively marginal, reflects similar ideological shifts. this paper investigates the rise of the onp as part of a broader international trend, arguing that economic stagnation and a growing disconnect between progressive social values and material conditions have fueled public discontent. in response, the onp has pursued a strategy of “de-radicalization”—rebranding itself as a national party and expanding its platform, aiming to attract mainstream voters, especially generation z. however, this paper contends that such moderation is tactical rather than substantive; the party’s ideological core remains extreme, limiting its capacity to deliver sustainable governance. in the long run, the onp may prove no more effective than the left it seeks to replace. through a diachronic analysis, this study situates australia’s far-right evolution within global patterns while highlighting its unique political trajectory. keywords right-wing extremism (rwe), one nation party (onp), de-radicalization, mainstream, populism, strategic shift 1. introduction since the subprime mortgage crisis, right-wing extremism (rwe) worldwide has embarked on a new phase—rapid uprising—which is particularly prominent in the post-pandemic era while the mainstream left-wing parties are fading in competition with the far right. in europe, the mainstream left-wing government have been impinged by the uprising of far-right parties, among which many, the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 67 alternative for germany (afd) and the national rally (rn) included, are striding toward securing the dominance in parliament and government; in the united states of america (for brevity, the following “america” all refers to the u.s.), the republican party, ever conservative in the past decades, is actually assuming the representative of american far-right: the overwhelming victory of donald trump in 2024 marks the raging rightist trend in america; in australia, though far right remain insignificant compared with it counterparts in europe and america, its growth still spells the changing climate of australian society—especially the pauline hanson's one nation (hereinafter referred to “one nation party” or “onp”) does, which is harvesting increasing voters. as to “why far right is uprising”, the sluggish economy due to the malfunction of neo-liberalism and the expanding gap between the over-leftist social values and the existing productivity have stirred increasing public discontent. in australia, for the relatively decent performance in economy and the lag phase compared with europe, and prudent attitude over the progressive issues, the mainstream leftist parties (australian labor party and the liberal/national coalition), in the past decades, maintain the majority in society as bedrock; however, in recent years, they experience consistent rebel from their core voters and the dissatisfaction rate of society surges. confronted with the conditions, the guiding principle of the onp has been “de-radicalization”, which specifically in two phases: (1) replace the tag “grassroots party” with “national party” by leveraging the existing system and procedural justice rather than inciting demonstrations; (2) transform itself from a “single-issue party” to a “muti-issue party”. it shall be noted that the onp and european far-right parties only apply “de-radicalization” in campaign: the core remain radical, determining it can’ change the decline much even when the onp comes to power; in short term, the far-right policies may bring some benefits, but limited to its extreme core, the onp, in the long run, is likely to performs not better than the leftists, even to escalate the turmoil. 2. method this study adopts a diachronic analytical framework to examine the evolution of right-wing extremism in australia, with particular attention to the one nation party (onp) as a representative case. diachronic analysis, which traces political discourse and institutional transformation over time, enables the identification of patterns, ruptures, and strategic shifts in the party’s ideology and positioning. by situating the onp’s development within both domestic and international contexts, this approach facilitates an understanding of how socioeconomic, cultural, and geopolitical changes have conditioned its rhetorical and organizational adaptations. a core conceptual lens applied in this research is the theory of “de-radicalization”, which refers to the deliberate softening of extremist political expressions for electoral legitimacy and institutional entry. de-radicalization is examined here not as a transformation of ideological substance, but as a strategic recalibration in response to shifting political opportunity structures. drawing on comparative examples from europe and north america, this study interprets the onp’s evolving public discourse, issue selection, and self-presentation within this framework. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 68 empirical materials include onp policy documents, parliamentary records, public speeches, and media releases from 2016 to 2024. these are analyzed qualitatively to assess both discursive continuity and transformation. through this combined methodological lens, the study seeks to uncover how the onp simultaneously capitalizes on far-right sentiment while pursuing normalization strategies aimed at electoral viability. 3. australian rwe: the origin and the shift the rwe in australia evolves with time. to a great extent, it has been no longer equivalent to a violent campaign and extremity, especially since to the onp and other far-right parties, nor does its transformation come from nowhere or imply revolution. to fully understand and forecast australian rwe, one prerequisite is to grasp the progress of far right and political environment in europe, since in politics, economy and culture, australia is, to a great extent, aligned with europe, the barometer and predecessor; another requirement is to analyse its current dynamic, in which the onp shall be the focus because: (1) the onp has been a long-standing and relatively structured far-right party, thus in a large degree, reflecting the latest development and commonality of australian rwe; (2) among all australian far-right parties, the onp is the most promising to influence or even helm australia. 3.1 the rightward shift in europe the prelude of the rising european rwe has been long enough. 2008 starts a climax of european crises on finance, immigration and refugees, debt, and security, fostering the environment of rwe; the next turning point is the pandemic and the russia-ukraine crisis. to be sure, during the global quarantine the movements of far right once faded, however, with the long-standing and all-rounded spillover effect from covid-19 and the war, far right gained fresh ammunition: according to the 2024 eu election result, while the european people's party and party of european socialists remain the domination, the party groups of far-right populism takes 187 seats in the parliament, a soar compared with last election; holding 31.7% of the seats, marine le pen’s rn party trounces the renaissance led by macron and nearly prevails again in the french parliament election; scholtz and his social democratic party of germany also meet their waterloo, lagged far behind by afd; the same disparity can also be seen in austria and belgium. the climate in europe has released signals of “shifting to the right”, though many leftists still deny. 3.2 between australia and europe: more similarity than difference regarding australian rwe, one assertion is very plausible and prevalent: the australian far-right is unique. the widely-acknowledged definition of australian far right is: radical-nationalism, neo-nazism, populist-monarchism and radical-populism (saleam, 2022). to be sure, the australian far-right campaigns in the past decades have spelled these features: the first show of the australian far right is the new guard in sydney with its offshoot, the centre party (1933), known for being monarchist and authoritarian; then comes the australia first movement in 1941. violence and radicalism have hardly shown signs of stopping since then. extreme activities and chaotic https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/far-right_politics_in_australia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/new_guard https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/sydney https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/centre_party_(new_south_wales) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/monarchist https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/authoritarian https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/australia_first_movement www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 69 demonstrations are broached within australia: the bendigo mosque protests (2014-2015) and the christchurch mosque shootings in 2019 consolidate the public image of rwe: “radicalism” and “violence”; and since then these two tags have never been absent in australian security intelligence organisation (asio)’s reports over far right. till here, it seems the rwe analysis in europe helps not that in australia, since its extreme and turbulent evolution seems incompatible with europe’s, featuring organized and procedural competition. however, once diachronic analysis is introduced, the similarity between the two sides overtakes the heterogeneity. more accurately, australian rwe is anachronic with its european counterparts. it is important to point out that the progress of organization and civilization is cumulative. it has only been 52 years since the abolition of “white australian policy” legally in australia, while the relatively moderate and organized european rwe today only forms after its centuries-long movements over radicalism and violence. the truth is radicalism over race, immigration and gender have never been absent since in the history of europe, only there being no such term as “far right” at that time; according to the theory of organizational life cycles (smith, 1985), the development of a organized entity also goes through four sure stages including birth, growth, maturity and decline. nowadays, europe is already or nearly at maturity, while australia still in growth. from a holistic perspective, great homogeneity could be unearthed in australia’s and early europe’s rwe movement, and australian rwe is not something unpredictable—it has a predecessor and leaves a trace. therefore, the evolution in europe, to some extent, provides a reference in the analysis of australian rwe. now part of australian far right, the onp as the head, has started to try, if not strive, to get rid off its past shadow featuring extremity and grassroots and to build itself as a people-centered national party, just the same as their european counterparts did decades ago; fresh signals have been clicked on. 3.3 new signs of australian rwe: the onp’s “de-radicalization” the most significant transition of the onp in recent years is its increasing moderation in campaign, including in its official rhetoric, concerning issues, and image rebuilding, “de-radicalization” implemented as the core. “de-radicalization”, in this context, refers to the progress during which the ideology and stance of far-right parties shifted from radicalism to moderation. in the recent decade, the use of de-radicalization has been a common “hot tag” of those far-right parties, though in different specific forms, from “normalization”, “mainstreaming” to “de-demonization”; the performances and of the onp could be concluded in three aspects: (1) the increasing diversity of issues and topics in social mobilization and political activities; (2) the moderation in campaign including speeches and actions; (3) the rising popularity and approval rating. according to its legislative activities in the recent decade, the onp is striving to expand its engagement in more issues and themes, especially those concerning australians most. this paper concludes a year-over-year (2016 to 2025.4) comparative table of bills and motions from the one nation party, categorized by themes. https://www.directory.gov.au/portfolios/attorney-generals/australian-security-intelligence-organisation https://www.directory.gov.au/portfolios/attorney-generals/australian-security-intelligence-organisation www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 70 table 1. the summary of onp’s issues shift (2016-2025) source: author’s own compilation yea r indigeno us affairs immigration/ multiculturali sm economic protectionis m climate/ener gy social conservatis m national sovereign ty other theme s 201 6 2 3 3 1 2 2 2 201 7 2 4 4 2 3 3 2 201 8 1 5 5 2 2 3 5 201 9 3 6 6 3 3 3 1 202 0 2 5 4 4 2 2 3 202 1 2 3 3 5 2 2 3 202 2 1 2 2 4 1 1 8 202 3 1 2 3 3 1 1 6 202 4 0 1 5 2 2 3 5 focusing on more issues, the onp taps into the broader dissatisfaction with australia’s mainstream political parties. while for quite a long time, it has been enchanting in narrow issues around white australian policy and immigration, now the one nation has expanded its opinions over gender, skepticism toward climate policies and industry, and criticism of multiculturalism align with the global resurgence of far-right ideologies. besides, the increasing political engagement in the parliament and governance also proves the onp shifts its preference from simply agitating protests and hatred speech to procedural justice: it tries to adhere to and utilize the existing mechanism rather than to reprimand it (but without proposing effective solutions). this pivot reflects a conscious effort to transition from a fringe movement to a legitimate political force capable of influencing policy debates. (2) the rhetorical de-radicalization, or more accurately, ambiguity, also amplifies its followers and parries more attacks. content analysis of one nation's official statements between 2016 and 2024 shows a reduction in explicitly inflammatory language:  use of terms like “white australia” or “asianization” has largely decreased, replaced with phrases www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 71 such as “protecting australian values” and “standing up for ordinary australians.”  between 2016 and 2024, instances of overtly racialized language decreased by approximately 45%, based on a systematic review of their campaign platforms.  this rhetorical shift is also evident in leader pauline hanson's speeches. her emphasis on “australian sovereignty” now highlights economic and political independence rather than exclusively focusing on race or ethnicity. (3) being more systematic and moderate wins the onp growing popularity, a process aligned with broader trends within european far-right movements. following its resurgence in the 2016 federal elections, where it secured four senate seats, the party demonstrated enhanced electoral capabilities, particularly in queensland, harvesting 11 out of the 89 seats; it’s self-evident that the one nation party, though still in a lower hand compared with these traditional left-wing dominators (liberal/national coalition and australian labor party) and the greens, is steadily gathering its popularity. a decline in voter loyalty to the two major parties—the liberal-national coalition and labor—has created fertile ground for smaller, issue-focused parties like the onp to gain traction. in his work electoral democracy in australia: crisis, resilience and renewal, tom gerald daly points out that voters’ volatility had reached unprecedented levels, with only 40% of australians consistently voting for the same party compared to 72% in the 1980s (2016). this trend reflects a broader public dissatisfaction of australia’s mainstream left-wing parties and the increasing public interest in populist alternatives. 4. how andwhy australia will swing to the right the rwe in australia evolves with time. to a great extent, it has been no longer equivalent to a violent campaign and extremity, especially since to the onp and other far-right parties, nor does its transformation come from nowhere or imply revolution. to fully understand and forecast australian rwe, one prerequisite is to grasp the progress of far right and political environment in europe, since in politics, economy and culture, australia are, to a great extent, aligned with europe, the barometer and predecessor; another requirement is to analyse its current dynamic, in which the onp shall be the focus because: (1) the onp has been a long-standing and relatively structured far-right party, thus in a large degree, reflecting the latest development and commonality of australian rwe; (2) among all australian far-right parties, the onp is the most promising to influence or even helm australia. it shall be self-evident that the social trend and political environment of a society are determined by its economy and production. in recent decades, a hasty argument becomes increasingly popular in media (even in some think tanks) that many turmoils and crises in theses decades shall be largely blamed on the misled public—the people, in the immediacy and near-full coverage in the information era, are more likely and easier to be led or even controlled by some interest groups or eternal forces with ulterior motives as they please. this opinion itself is a terrible, irresponsible, and deviant misguidance because it tries to address an overall problem but only grasps one small patch of it. to be sure, the people’s risk of being manipulated does increase since the internet and ai, but that speed is far from www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 72 matching the speed of the decreasing life standards, the shrinking employment market, and the fatigued economy, which the citizens care most. it is their actual sensation of the environment leads to the brewing gloom and violence of the citizens in recent years, but not that cliche “the public are misled and need a more brilliant government”, which gravely overlooks and belittles the awareness and power of the people, who constitute the basin of society and the representative system. while in those european countries, america and australia, the hundreds-year development has turns themselves into a civil society which ensure a generally high education and social and political structure, the view always blaming the turmoil simply on the rabbles is a blatant contradiction to the reality: there wouldn’t have existed such group as “rabble”; the injustice creates rabble. the sharp shift to the right in europe exactly proves that the dissatisfaction of european citizens has reached, in some particular countries, even exceeded the critical value. till now, in australia, signs in all fields haven’t been critical yet. however, increasing danger signals have showed that the discontent of australian people is on the way to the threshold. if the australian government remains silent in reform and, more importantly, in listening to the public voices, which, to some extent, is done better by the far right, then a screeching turn is probably merely a question of time. 4.1 the alarming economy: from decent to mediocre australia’s economic landscape from 2008 to 2024 reveals significant structural transformations shaped by global crises, domestic policy shifts, and changing voter perceptions. generally speaking, australia has turned from a decent economy to a mediocre one now, and room is still left for the worse. these economic changes have played a key role in fostering the resurgence of right-wing populist parties today, such as one nation, among which generation z is becoming a key force in social and political activities, on which the mainstream parties put insufficient emphasis. it is the quantitative changes that make a qualitative difference. a fact is forming that australia’s edge and bonus since the financial crisis is fading; the same problems facing europe and america are coming to australia. as pointed out above, the social, political, and cultural trends are determined by the economic foundation. australia, for its unique geographical location and appropriate policies, performs much better than europe, a success that profoundly directs the trends and ideology in that land: traditional left-wing charm is still widely acknowledged there. it must be noted that the legality of government lies in, to a great extent, whether it can provide solid and strong economic development. therefore, the mass doubt and betrayal over the governance of left parties, along with the uprising of the far-right parties, first breaks out in europe, which responded badly to the crises compared to australia and america; however, in recent years, with the escalating spillover effect of the pandemic and regional conflict, the maintenance of neo-liberalism’s glory is collapsing as well in australia and america. in america, since it has a greater volume and deeper-rooted mixed problems compared with australia, america shows the signals earlier. donald trump’s overwhelming victory, securing the seven swing states all at once, has proved that. between these two, america, for sure, is in a worse situation than australia: the hollowing industry, the u.s. debt, the bottomless corruption, and its fading control www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 73 over the globe are all potential moves to ruin this country. from the economic data, though for all these dim signals, currently australia remains a relatively and generally decent democracy in the west, but the question is: how long afterward can australia maintain? the answer is grim because the long-term voters of the left-wing parties are being deeply harmed: generation z. when assessing the economic impact on society and the government, a crucial stakeholder deserves the most concern: generation z. as the major reserve and the increasingly important pillar of society, generation z hold great say in directing the future of the country. the everyday economic experience of australians, particularly cost-of-living pressures, is bound to impact the political leanings of this group since now they are deeply involved in social activities. the preference of generation z, featuring more pragmatism, is greatly influenced by the perceptible living conditions; according to the economic performance these years, it is no wonder that z are disappointed with the traditional left-wing policies. now the shadow of rising inflation and living costs has spread from europe to australia. as stated above, australia did a good job in economic recovery and restraint of recession compared to europe; australia basically remained the inflation rate within rba’s target range of 2-3% for much of the period, but post-pandemic disruptions pushed inflation to a peak of 6.8% in 2023, marking its worst inflationary episode since the late 1980s (see figure-1.1, 1.2); rising utility prices and food costs is disproportionately affecting lower-income households. the surge of living costs exceeds the increase in salary, during which the housing affordability has been an urgent problem. in the past decades, australian home ownership fell fast, from about 66% among 30 to 34-year-old australians in 1981, to 49% in 2021. young australians have faced increasing barriers to entry, while middle-class families can not sit on the sidelines anymore, either. they are struggling with rising mortgage costs. third, the employment shortage is stirring more and more young job seekers to join the demonstration. figure 1. annual consumer price inflation in australia (1980-2023) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 74 figure 2. annualized price changes in cpi groups for their growth environment and education, generation z, compared with their mothers and fathers, feature more critical thinking, rebelliousness, and pragmatism. a fact has always been ignored that to a great portion of generation z, the time they are born and raised is probably the best time they have in their lives afterward: in the 90s, the west’s domination over the world remains firm; the neo-liberalism and representative democracy are still very compatible with the historic period and productivity, bringing prosperity to europe, america, australia, new zealand, etc.; industrial transformation is successful, assimilating wealth worldwide. but then, the decline started. in the pyramid of society, the young are the ones with the most desires and demands in material and entertainment, thus driving society. they have no complex of neo-liberalism, nor do they have original preference over left or right; however, now that generation z have witnessed the malfunction of left parties, that they vote for the right becomes a natural course. that’s why the onp and other far-right parties are leveraging social media—they have detected the unbounded power of generation z. 4.2 rwe: the destined aftermath of far left while the term “far right” is becoming a buzzword again in recent years, an issue remains dangling: how to define the current far-right parties and movement? every resurrection of a thing means the birth of a new connotation of it. to dig out the immediate and profound inducements is the sure way to properly evaluate and handle an event. apart from the defining inducement of this wave of rwe, the unsatisfactory economy, the imbalance between social values, and the unsatisfied public have foreshadowed it. the truth is, the currently popular far-right parties are far from the real sense of rwe—they are far from enough extreme and radical compared with the traditional extreme right; it is www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 75 the over left-leaning of the social ethos magnifies the rightward features of these conservative parties. the rise of far-right parties in recent years, to a great extent, shall be attributed to the growing public discontent with the expanding gap between the increasingly left-leaning social values and the existing productivity (the national capacity, specifically in this context). very few people notice that before this wave of rwe, a radical left-leaning movement in social value and trend has been going on for decades in europe, america, and other western countries. the development of gender and racial discourse, environmental conservation, and immigration issues exemplifies this movement. these topics, while representing essential progress of humanity, now have been increasingly manipulated and politicized by the politicians and interest groups for two reasons: as global integration is going on, noted by luhmann, the social complexity in the west surges, and once its stakeholders have accounted for a certain proportion, an issue can not be ignored anymore (luhmann, 1995). the african-american civil rights movement in 1950s examplifes this; the issues concerning the progress of human rights and civilization are the natural cards of leftist politicians and parties, who definitely is to promote and advance these issues; during this process, the issues themselves is no longer the focus of the mainstream left party, only how much political capital it produces matters. in his book democracy and its critics, robert a. dahl has revealed the high risk of democracy: with the solidification of a political frame and the manipulation of interest groups over the public, democracy may turn out to only stay on the surface (1991). this is one of the headaches of democracy—the spokesperson of the people is likely to turn to that of political capital, a process that could be seen as a political alienation. (2) for the nature of representative democracy, the progressive issues are becoming hard to rein in. politician’s manipulation has been expounded in (1). in the next phase, it would be these issues that manipulate society, a period now many countries are experiencing. within the system of “one person, one vote”, the party and its members need to uphold the value and concern of their solid voters. now that the left parties include progressive topics into their cards, their emphasis and support over them has no choice but to go up consistently—this dynamic is explained by herbert marcuse’s theory of repressive tolerance, which suggests that tolerance extended to progressive causes can paradoxically suppress alternative views (1965). over time, the public’s expectations regarding these issues grow, forcing governments to continuously advance them to “higher standards of correctness”, irrespective of pragmatic limits. so far, a vicious circle has formed: as these themes became central to public debate, the masterminds, namely the mainstream left parties, that relied on these promotion became entrapped by the expectations they created: all other concerns shall take the backseat even when these correct issues have been incompatible with the realistic conditions; this is how the greens in australia grows up, which, the same as other green parties, upholds radical ecological ideals even in hard time, disregarding the financial stringency and stagnant society. the leftist politicians themselves can not interrupt either, since these topics are so correct and progressive that they have been viewed as moral imperatives, and any opposition invites public backlash or electoral loss. the mainstream parties would www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 76 not risk that. it must be clarified that this is not a condemnation of these progressive issues— they are indispensable to a healthy society because they prove the progress in human civilization: as society evolves, the coverage of universal kindness is bound to increase, without which society would face collapse; however, the point is that now this social kindness has been pushed to a level that the material reality can’t sustain any more, an unreined kindness—especially after the economic crises and covid-19—in europe, america and australia, increasing citizens, especially generation z, have viewed the mainstream left-wing parties as malfunctioned: while on one hand, the people’s basic physiological and safety need—employment, housing, and financial stability—are unmet for the severe economy, they find out their government, is still unswervingly embracing more immigrants, generously aiding ukraine and calling for more care and resources on animals. maslow’s hierarchy of needs has provided an insightful framework: while basic physiological and safety needs are unmet, how can the leftist parties convince the public to focus on the progressive issues and vote for them? 5. the identity, logic, and strategy of the onp to fully grasp rwe in australia, the onp specifically, understanding the inner logic and identity of the far-right party means a lot, while the strategy analysis further provides an insight into the future track of one nation. the following part will expound: (1) the logic and foundation of rwe; (2) the current strategies and shifts of rwe in australia and europe: de-radicalization; (3) the detailed approaches and phases for the onp to achieve transformation in public image and capacity for election. 5.1 the identity and ambivalence of the far right today though nowadays, it seems “far right” and “populism” have been bound with each other tightly, the two have their own tendency: the concept of “right” and “left” dates back to the french revolution, and gradually, the former come to represent freedom, equality, fraternity and progress, while the latter stands for authority, order, responsibility and nationalism. the boundary between the two is not definite but relative. the ongoing left-leaning of these successful far-right parties worldwide have proved that; as to “populism”, there exists different definitions among which cas mudde’s statement represents the major idea, that in their view, society consists of two hostile groups, the “pure people” and the”“corrupt elite” (2004). therefore, a main picture of rwe can be drawn: while the civilization goes forward, it remains the fanatic speaker of the conservative sides of society and of the majority of people, at lest in its own eyes; it keeps alert in anti-establishment and chases after the pure traditional benefits and ethos, the conservative mass as its major supporters. 5.2 the sure strategy of the onp: de-radicalization that why far-right parties in australia and europe stress de-radicalization deserves discussion. it is evident that there exists an inner contradiction between rwe and de-radicalization: as defined above, rwe, at its essence, is a conservative ideology against the main trend and value, which means even compared with centrists, rwe is the one significantly radical; from this perspective, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 77 “de-radicalization” means disarmament of the far right. hence, this new shift shall be considered from a greater scope. it is for more popularity in public and access to the ruling status that far-right parties acquiesce in this ambivalence; however, this shift—de-radicalization—has nothing to do with the self-revolution of rwe, but a mere campaign banner and gesture which seems extremely enchanting and plausible to voters suffering unremitting crises. in conclusion, de-radicalization is a “retreat-in-order-to-advance” strategy. the analysis above of the onp’s performance proves that one nation, long cold-shouldered by the australian labor party, liberal/national coalition, and australian greens, has finally met its “epiphany”—the strategy, same as its european counterparts, could be found in its movement. this is also a danger signal for the australian left parties. in 2022 election, the votes for the onp and the uap(united australia party, another australian far-right party) totals about 9%—a blatant warning to the traditional leftists: if no further effective response be paid from the left-wing government, it is not impossible for extreme rightists to helm australia one day, the time they would drop the camouflage and do as a real rightist do. as expounded above, the dilemma of the onp comes from it inherent contradiction: in one way, for expansion, a far-right party needs to soften its stances; but in another way, it still needs its core voters, the social conservatives. just as yves mény and yves surel point out, the far-right party, in its essence, is unsustainable; it has destinies no more than three: extinction, being a permanent opponent, or mainstreaming (2002). the first two scenarios are doomed, and the only difference is that the second puts up with the tag “otherness” forever. therefore, the sure way for the prosperity of the onp is de-radicalization, which means softening and ambiguity in disputed issues. 5.3 the implement method toward prosperity to further interpret the causal mechanism and connotation of australian rwe, the phases and approaches could be concluded as follows two parts: inside the system, the full use of the existing political systems—the onp is striving to expand its role in the australian political arena, particularly the parliament. as elaborated before, in the primary stage, the activities of australian rwe are basically violent and disorderly; now, the onp, along with afd and rn, have realized the power of political and procedural justice. though australia, generally speaking, should be filed into two-party system (some experts believe two-party system is a derivative of muti-party system), it still upholds proportional representation system, which determines the mainstream party can not monopolize the parliament and the allocation of seats more represents the appeal of the people, leaving a huge room for marginal parties to worm their ways in the center (if they sniff and reflect the public demands); another crucial move of far-right parties is working to secure victory in local elections that always ignored by mainstream parties. from afd to rn, from fidesz to pvv (the party for freedom, now the largest party in the dutch parliament), the key victory in local elections paves the path to these successful european far-right parties. in this respect, the onp has gained some results: once the onp enters the parliament, it starts its phase two: expanding its seats by issues and good offices. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 78 the second approach is beyond the arena: the transformation of the public image by showcasing moderation and advancement in three key aspects: role definition, issue selection, and social mobilization. the onp, since it returned to the parliament, has started its role shift, slow but real: the analysis of the bills and motions and its rhetoric in these 8 years above proves the onp is striving to fabricate an impression of the representative of the majority of australians. the frequency of extreme wording and hatred speech declines significantly; the increasing ambiguity over disputed issues and groups (including moslem) and the expanding coverage of topics. besides, the onp, following the path of its european counterparts, is upgrading itself from a single-issue party to a muti-issues party, because remaining in the few traditional issues helps nothing to increase the diversity and quantity of voters and public opinions, with it, nor could the onp have effective competition and debate with the mainstream parties. that being the case, the onp would be on the margin forever since its little engagement with the mainstream, the only public impression being “maverick” and “anti-establishment”; but now the onp has consciously worked to persuade the swing voters. as to mobilization, the onp also works to be a movement party (kitschelt, 2006), namely adhering to and leveraging the existing system and rule to develop (during which the internet and social media function) rather than organizing inflammatory demonstration, which provides ammunition to the opponents to leaves a image of “mob” to the swing voters. television debate, rally speech, and public interview, these conventional approaches of the establishment, now also become crucial moves of the onp; the diversity of promotion is also prominent in pauline hanson's scheme: the short online drama has become an efficient tool, especially to the young generation. in recent years, the onp has consistently rolled out and promoted please explain, a caricature-type drama satirizing the mainstream left-wing parties and the government. this online drama has had three seasons and has become popular on social media like x. 5.4 the potential of the onp and the democratic predicament in the west some opinions argue that how petty the onp is even compared with the australian greens, not to mention with the liberal/national coalition and the australian labor party. indeed, till now the odds, to a great extent, are still against the onp and several other far-right parties: liberal/national coalition and the australian labor party still hold tight on the election and governance; among the opposition, the australian greens seems to rally more public support. nonetheless, the key why the onp remains relatively negligible is that compared with europe, australia is, indeed, better off: suffering less impact from the 2008 financial crisis and maintaining a more sound economy and security after the epidemic, etc., which means the catalysts for extreme right wing in australia is inadequate yet. since their proactive response to the severe recession, immigration crisis and radical social contradictions, far-right parties in europe, such as alternative for germany (afd) and national rally (rn), have demonstrated how initially marginalized movements can gain significant political ground under conducive circumstances: founded in 2013, afd initially focused on eurozone opposition but transitioned into anti-immigration and nationalist rhetoric, gaining momentum during the 2015 migration crisis. by 2023, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 79 afd had secured 16.2% of the vote in national elections and achieved a historic victory in thuringia; marine le pen's national rally adopts the same road; these trajectories highlight the role of economic anxieties and cultural polarization in galvanizing support for far-right platforms and provide insights into how australia’s one nation party, though currently limited in influence, may similarly capitalize on shifting sociopolitical dynamics in the future. to the onp, parallels can be drawn. since its inception in 1997, one nation has similarly harnessed nationalist sentiments and opposition to immigration. while it has yet to achieve the scale of european far-right parties, its ability to secure federal and state parliamentary seats and influence national debates (e.g., immigration and climate policies) suggests latent potential. the normalization of far-right rhetoric in europe indicates that one nation could expand its influence under similar conditions, such as economic downturns or sociopolitical crises. given these trends, one nation’s prospects for growth should not be underestimated. european examples demonstrate how far-right parties, even when initially marginalized, can capitalize on public discontent and institutional challenges to achieve political prominence; besides, the identity shift and “de-radicalization” have successfully appealed to increasing swing voters—factors such as rising economic inequality, debates over national identity, and increasing political polarization may provide fertile ground for one nation’s future expansion. however, it must be pointed out that the “de-radicalization” of the onp and other far-right parties, even if they become the ruling parties, do little to improve the current recession and gap for two reasons: (1) as analysed above, since their identity ambivalence, the maximum acceptance of far-right parties is that “de-radicalization” only applied in campaign, which determines their natural vulnerability: theoretically they should adhere to and implement their core creeds when in office, however, the promise “de-radicalization” in campaign and the inherent reputation and burden as the ruling party are bound to refrain the onp from that; (2) the onp, though currently unyielding and practical in concerning and protecting ordinary australians, is still trapped in the vicious circle—the flaws of democracy still exist. the rising governance predicament and governmental malfunction are independent of whether the left is ruling or not, but a systematic problem badly in need of deep reform. the campaign and edges of the onp are all based on the existing system without further inquiry into or a solution to it. therefore, basically, when the onp is in power, only two possible scenarios exist: scenario one is the onp restores the rwe stances in governance—this would bring out another waves of public discontent and conflicts since rwe is actually more of a public sedative than a cure—it is anachronous and incapable of handling the this mess; the onp would probably end up in a hurry downfall once people take off their glasses and find out the rightists do even worse than the leftists. the second and also the most possible scenario is, the onp, at the very beginning, postures itself as a hawkish government but once it has settled, continues to adopt a ambiguous orientation; the onp has little intention or capacity to reform australian political pattern: it can not transform the flaws of democracy since its lack of experience in governance and regulation and cooperation with others, nor could it really revive australia while still in the shadow of america and other frames; the democratic www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 80 deficit is becoming ever-intractable—the victory of the onp is to aggravate it rather than mend it. the relationship between the existing democratic defects and the malfunction of both the left and the right is critical. in his book the rhetoric of reaction: perversity, futility, jeopardy, albert hirschman has elaborated how democracy would turn rigid as the concession benefit balance increases (1991, p. 57). the phenomenon that both the left wing and right wing tend to be ambiguous has proved the rising democratic deficit. to gain more voters and benefits, the right-wing parties worldwide have actually stealthily added more or less some left advocacy into themselves, while those left-wing ones also show more signs of right wing in policy and promise for the same reasons: “de-radicalization” is not a one-way process, and the mainstream party is not a bystander. “contagion effect” put forward by tarik abou-chadi has elaborated this dynamic. in the rhetoric of reaction, the analysis of the conservatives also explains why the possibility of far-right parties reforming the existing deflections is slight: no matter from the perspective of perversity, futility or jeopardy, the rwe indicates its weakness in social transformation badly needed by the people. therefore, the rise of the onp is far from a good turn to australians. in the long term, the current dilemma is to continue. conclusion the one nation party has transformed into a more organized, popular, and politically effective entity over the past decade, during which far-right parties worldwide have surged. the commonality between the onp and its european counterparts provides an insightful access to the trace of rwe and its evolution in australia. the rapidly changing economy and unbalanced social ethos bolster and manifest the base of rwe; by the strategy “de-radicalization”—moderating its rhetoric and capitalizing on voter discontent, the party has positioned itself as a significant force in australia's shifting political landscape. the two approaches, leveraging the existing system and rebuilding its public image, have taken effect and are shaping the australian climate. however, its future trajectory will depend on its ability to balance radical ideologies with the demands of an increasingly diverse electorate. these dynamics highlight the need for continued research into the far-right's role in shaping australian politics. the onp’s evolution mirrors broader trends within australia's far-right movements and increasing public discontent. its success also underscores a deeper polarization in australian society, as economic and cultural grievances drive voters toward populist solutions. as the party continues to refine its strategy, its influence on public discourse and policy debates—particularly on immigration, regional development, and economic sovereignty—is likely to grow in the next decades. however, behind the popularity is the malfunction of democracy and society. the vicious circle and the inherent limit of the onp determine that its victory makes little difference—it is the profound deficiencies in the system that buoy the democratic and economic recession. therefore, in the next decades, though the momentum of the onp and its comrades worldwide is likely to surge, the overall recession can not be reversed until a profound reform is carried out, with which the current left-and right-wing parties seem incapable of handling. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 81 references dahl, r. a. (1991). democracy and its critics. new haven, ct: yale university press. daly, t. g. (2019). australian democracy: crisis, resilience and renewal. melbourne: university of melbourne. european parliament. (n.d.). european union election results. retrieved november 12, 2024, from https://results.elections.europa.eu/en/ grattan institute. (2022, november 17). how high inflation is affecting different australian households. retrieved from https://grattan.edu.au/news/how-high-inflation-is-affecting-different-australian-households/ haire, m., & university of california, berkeley. (1959). modern organization theory: a symposium. new york: wiley. hirschman, a. o. (1991). the rhetoric of reaction: perversity, futility, jeopardy. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvjnrs9q kitschelt, h. (2006). movement parties. in r. s. katz & w. crotty (eds.), handbook of party politics (pp. 278-290). london: sage. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781848608047.n24 luhmann, n. (1995). the concept of system. in social systems (pp. 45-70). stanford, ca: stanford university press. marcuse, h. (1965). repressive tolerance. in a critique of pure tolerance. boston, ma: beacon press. mény, y., & surel, y. (2002). the constitutive ambiguity of populism. in y. mény, & y. surel (eds.), democracies and the populist challenge (pp. 1-30). basingstoke: palgrave macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403920072_1 mudde, c. (2004). the populist zeitgeist. government and opposition, 39(4), 541-563. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x saleam, j. (2022). the other radicalism: an inquiry into contemporary australian extreme right ideology, politics and organization, 1975-1995. sydney: university of sydney. smith, k. g., mitchell, t. r., & summer, c. e. (1985). top level management priorities in different stages of the organizational life cycle. academy of management journal, 28(4), 799-820. https://doi.org/10.5465/256238 https://results.elections.europa.eu/en/ https://grattan.edu.au/news/how-high-inflation-is-affecting-different-australian-households/ the rising far right in australia—a diachronic cas abstract since the subprime mortgage crisis, global right-w keywords table 1. the summary of onp’s issues shift (2016-2 figure 1. annual consumer price inflation in austr figure 2. annualized price changes in cpi groups references microsoft word ape-v3n1-p39 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 39 original paper the prisoner’s dilemma as a conceptual framework for understanding value-related and behavioral changes in western societies in the second decade of the 21st century: the case of israel leehu zysberg1* 1 the graduate school, gordon college of education, haifa, israel * leehu zysberg, the graduate school, gordon college of education, haifa, israel received: february 6, 2020 accepted: february 23, 2020 online published: february 25, 2020 doi:10.22158/ape.v3n1p39 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v3n1p39 abstract in the popular media and from time to time in the social science literature, voices are heard describing a process of social disintegration and the deterioration of common values in western societies. what may account for this fragmentation? this article uses the theoretical framework of the prisoner’s dilemma to conceptualize the phenomenon, analyze its causes and processes, and to try and outline directions for dealing with it, using processes and data regarding the israeli society in recent years. keywords values education, culture, israeli society, social psychology, prisoner’s dilemma, social disintegration 1. introduction the last decade is characterized by accelerating social division, polarization in political and social attitudes and value and ethical disintegration throughout most of the western world, with the usa and the eu at the center (inglehart & norris, 2017; muddle, 2016). israel follows suit, with similar processes of social disintegration and polarization (carmon, stern, & karmnitzer, 2011; shahar, 2017): numerous social indicators suggest that values and personal as well as social conduct norms are gradually eroding. the practical implications of this ongoing process are potentially devastating and are often recognized by historians as ones that might lead to the collapse of societies, states, and empires throughout history (macmullen, 1988). the literature on the subject is surprisingly meager. evidence of the trends generally delineated above can be found mainly in the popular press and socio-political www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 40 published by scholink inc. discourse (for example, feldman, 2018) rather than in academic or educational forums (aloni, 1988). at the same time, data available to the general public is showing troubling trends. while focusing on the israeli society as a case study, i suggest that similar processes are taking place in numerous societies throughout the so-called western world. i will hereby present evidence to support the general claims made above, and then lay out a theoretical model aimed at accounting for these phenomena and proposing an underlying mechanism that may also point to how these trends may be mitigated. 1.1 so, what’s wrong? indicators of social decline as suggested above, various social indicators, paint a grim picture of a generally robust society at the brink of disintegration. herein i will focus on a few such indicators: governmental corruption: the governmental corruption index compares public perceptions, reviews legal systems and rules, and examines constitutional and practical outcomes of the extent to which corruption in the conduct of political and state bodies. it is considered an accepted international measure of the moral and values of the global coalition against corruption. according to annual reports of this index, israel ranked 14th (the 1st place indicates a high level of morality and governmental values), one year after the establishment of the index system (1996), while in 2018 it ranked 34th. as additional examples i will mention the usa which ranked 15 in 1996 and ranks 23 in 2019 and poland that slipped from the 24th place to 41st in 2019 (the global coalition against corruption, 2018). at the same time, popular media is flooded with reports of corruption at all levels of the israeli political and social establishment: from a president accused of sexual assault, to corruption by the legal bar, and currently two prime ministers found involved in various corruption cases (for example: gurley, 2019). even if this impression is inaccurate, it seems that wherever you look, improper and questionable conduct is evident. violence as a phenomenon and social norm: for many years israel boasted high levels of personal safety and security despite its ongoing military conflicts with its neighbors: citizens reported high levels of personal security and safety in their neighborhoods, or towns, and indicators of civilian violence (e.g.: violence in schools, crimes resulting in death, etc.) were low. in recent years, however, social indicators reflect a slow but ongoing process in which israeli society not only experiences a rise in the occurrence of violence among its ranks, but that violence becomes a norm or an acceptable and predictable course of action. for example, severe violence cases against various service providers have become a common sight (ministry of health, 2017): in 2017, more than 3500 cases of violence directed against public health workers occurred in the health system alone. although it is a global phenomenon, israel is showing it steeper than other countries on this issue. at the same time, verbal and physical violence is becoming a common social currency. thus, for example, violent discourse on social networks, and in the public media (yifat, 2012; berl katzenelson foundation, 2019): social indicators show that over one third of the volume of discourse on various social networks in israel is of a violent nature. most types of verbal violence converge on: racial discourse, condemnation and defamation on a personal basis and threats of harm and violence. a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 41 published by scholink inc. research report revealed that verbal violence is directed primarily at arabs (50% of the discourse) and then refugees (43%), leftists (43%), west-bank settlers (32%) and ultra-orthodox (19%). in addition, about 18% of the online discourse around academia and 9% of the online discourse regarding the supreme court contained violent content. in other words—few are the social groups in israel at whom no particularly violent discourse is directed. in the eu, for comparison, hate speech is a growing worry and legislation is often used to mitigate it (european court for human rights, 2019). despite the actions taken, evidence suggest growth in its prevalence. the violent and divisive discourse culture often translates into and violent conduct, from outbreaks of violent protest (for example: the ethiopian immigrant protest in the summer of 2019, see: bar lev, 2019), to an increase in the level and frequency of domestic violence, and more recently—a trend that has been taboo in israeli society—violence against toddlers. the ministry of public security estimates that hundreds of such cases occur each year, with 100 or more cases opening, but very few of them end in actual prosecution and conviction (shelmore, 2019). law abuse in everyday life: perhaps as a result of the two trends mentioned above, we are witnessing unprecedented levels of public abuse of the law, and not only in israel: the us government is coping with amassing evidence of numerous cases of governmental misconduct (see for example: johnson and phillips, 2019). at the same time a growing number of eu member countries are dealing with rising figures describing higher levels of government corruption and lawlessness (bokowski & voronova, 2017). daily law violations have long become part of our daily routine. the most common and visible example of daily life is traffic offenses—from allegedly minor offenses (who did not get a traffic jam in the city due to double and triple parking near shopping centers, schools and more?), to fatal road accidents, most of which are associated with “human error” (laundered phrase for ignoring the precautionary laws). for example, the latest oecd report on israel places it in the lowest (worst) third rank for road accident incidents (ziger, 2018). these statistics are even more worrying when we see that throughout the eu and in the us a trend of reduction in traffic fatalities (etsc, 2018). these factors have a direct effect on quality of life and national morale. while israel has consistently ranked high in the world happiness index for years, there are some indicators that show there’s cause for worry. for example, despite not receiving media coverage or serious attention from government and other bodies, the phenomenon of “brain drain” (loss of high quality workers and human capital) has been in renewed momentum in recent years: estimates report that about 11% of individuals who gained their phds in israel actually live overseas, and an increase in the rate of those with a college education in the field of computers and technology leaving the country (datel, 2018). another interesting indicator is the proportion of israelis applying for a foreign passport in addition to their israeli one. this practice has become very popular in recent years and it is estimated that over 15,000 israelis open procedures for gaining additional citizenship each year (see for example an article on portuguese citizenship: foreign, 2019). this trend may reflect concern for the future of society and the state, a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 42 published by scholink inc. “backup plan”, if you will and even a status symbol (which may indicate the diminishing prestige or pride of israeli identity? see for example harpaz, 2012). these worrying indicators reflect severe deterioration in the fabric of any society. in the case of israel, and in the face of alarming social developments such as increasing polarization between factions in israeli society (which have been successfully discussed elsewhere, see, for example: peres and ben rafael, 2010), this article asks: how have we become one of the worst versions of ourselves and why? and as an answer, a classic model, borrowed from the field of psychology, suggests and presents the core concepts of trust and mutual respect and the resulting—collaboration, as keys to our understanding of the above trends. this model is referred to as the “prisoner’s dilemma” and may not only help us understand how things happened and why, but may also indicate directions in which to work to improve the situation. 2. the prisoner’s dilemma: a psycho-economic model of collaboration the prisoner’s dilemma is a relatively simple model presented by the rand institute experts in the early 1950s, as a tool for construing social decision-making based on an economic cost-benefit model at its core (see axelrod’s 1980 explanation and examples). the framework is both simple and sophisticated: imagine two criminals caught for committing a crime together. investigators make each of them a proposition as follows—if any of you confesses the first, he will come out without penalty and only the partner will be severely punished. if you both admit to the crime—you will be both moderately punished. if you both refuse to admit—we will have no choice but to let you go. in other words—the two will benefit the most if they rely on each other. however, the implication is—postponing immediate personal gain and taking the potential risk that the other party will admit first. the model represents a test of trust and ability to collaborate to promote a common interest in the face of the possibility of betrayal of trust in favor of quick personal gain at the expense of others (from all parties concerned). table 1. a graphic summary of the prisoner’s dilemma person a/person b admit first never admit admit first moderate punishment for both person a goes free person b punished never admit person b goes free person a punished no punishment for both the model has become very popular and helped better understand economic decision-making (e.g., decisions of capital market investors in times of uncertainty; see, for example: stout, 2002), behavior and decision-making (rehmeyer, 2012), and international politics (conybeare, 1984), among others. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 43 published by scholink inc. anecdotal attempts have been made to use this model to understand socio-cultural behavior, which will serve as the basis for the analysis below, in which i will attempt to use this model to account for the processes described above in israeli society as an example for numerous other western societies. 3. the prisoner’s dilemma as a model explaining social conduct values if there is one element in the prisoner’s dilemma about which there is adequate agreement in the social and interpersonal context, it is the element of cooperation as a component of culture. culture can be referred to as a frame of reference that defines and dictates values, norms and rules of behavior. culture, then, may set social norms regarding the importance of trust and collaboration between people in a given group (wong & hong, 2005). in other words—the way people function in the prisoner’s dilemma can be treated not only as a reflection of their personal and specific preferences but beyond the individual case—as a reflection of values and norms that shape their behavior as a kind of “social compass” (glance & huberman, 1994). since the 1970s, studies linking people’s functioning within the prisoner’s dilemma methodology and basic components of human interpersonal behavior in a given society can be identified (daws et al., 1977). simply put, the extent to which people are willing to trust others and collaborate for a common cause can describe and explain behavior patterns of large social groups and even cultures. since we are dealing with a given society and culture that sets parameters for interpersonal behavior, i will use hofstede’s model for cultural dimension diagnosis (hofstede, 1993) to try and account for the phenomena at hand: power distance: a dimension that describes the degree of equality in a given culture and the extent to which hierarchy exists and is supported in a given society. individualism-collectivism: a dimension that describes the value of the individual against the collective in the given society and culture. what is the emphasis on? the common good? or satisfying the needs of the individual? femininity-masculinity: to what extent are values and behaviors considered traditional “masculine” (e.g., competitive, aggressive, direct and goal-oriented) or “feminine” (for example: open interpersonal communication, caring and nurturing, expressing emotions, etc.). uncertainty avoidance: the extent to which a given society emphasizes rules and norms, regulations, or embraces uncertainty and doubt. time orientation: describes the extent to which there is an emphasis on long-term thinking and planning or focus on the “here and now”. while we see cultural variations across nations and countries, most western societies can be broadly described as relatively moderate on power distances, with higher emphasis on individualism (compared with collectivism), and focus on the present rather than the past or future (hofstede insights international project website, 2019). here, for example are the results for israel, interlaced with the results for poland and, as a non-western control country, the data for china. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 44 published by scholink inc. figure 2. comparing hofstede’s cultural model indices for israel, poland and china (adapted from hofstede insights international project website, 2019). the numerical data are percentages relative to the other comparison countries according to this profile, israeli society seems to be characterized by very low power distance (everyone feels involved and relate to others as peers), above-average tendency toward individualism, a relatively low future orientation (i.e.: greater focus on the here and now) and a strong tendency to avoid uncertainty. with the exception of power distances, these patterns are quite similar to the polish cultural patterns, and show marked differences (almost opposite) compared with the chinese culture. can we see the possible associations between the cultural characteristics and the parameters that define the prisoner’s dilemma model? well, at least for 2 of the above-mentioned cultural aspects, one can see an interesting link: the first is the strong tendency to avoid uncertainty: decision-making studies suggest that uncertainty avoidance may lead to “early closure” of analytical and reasoning processes in problem solving settings (kruglanski et al., 2006). uncertainty avoidance might lead the individual to choose the first solution that is reasonable for him (thus reducing the tendency to cooperate which requires trusting another and living in a state of uncertainty throughout the process). also, the short-term focus, on “here and now”, may undermine the choice to collaborate with others for a common goal. the choice of collaboration requires coordination but also a tendency and motivation to think ahead in terms of “scripts” (what if?) and compare them in terms of possible outcomes in the long run. in the absence of values and norms encouraging collaboration, the tendency to choose to cooperate in a conflict of interest situation decreases significantly. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 45 published by scholink inc. at the same time, there are also characteristics of israeli culture that emerge from the picture that may encourage cooperation: whether it is the limited distances of power and the relatively balanced perception between individualism and collectivism. these two aspects may seem to encourage mutual goodwill, and a willingness to trust one another to promote a common interest. what, then, might be at the cause of the above described social downward spiral? 4. factors of value change in israeli society vis-à-vis the prisoner’s dilemma over the past decade, western societies (israel included) are facing challenges posed by increasing diversity, cultural, ethnic and religious differentiation between various factions in society. a sweeping process of widening gaps that are becoming more prominent and touch not only standards of living and life-styles but also the most fundamental beliefs and values. these gaps make israel a “tribal” state (rubinstein, 2017): this characteristic reflects a reality in which social gaps are so engrained that sub-groups of the same general population find it hard to agree on even the most basic values and norms. we see it happening in the uk around the “brexit” movement that actually reflects a much deeper divide; we see it in the polarization in the american society, as well as for example israeli society’s inability to vote and nominate a coherent majority-based government throughout 2019. this crawling but steady social disintegration process may provide at least a partial explanation for the loss of trust and willingness to cooperate in this cultural encounter that is often the basis for conflict over opposing values. one of the most painful recent examples demonstrating this disparity was the public reaction to the trial of elor azaria, an israeli soldier who shot a palestinian hebron resident who, along with a partner, attempted a stabbing attack in 2016. after the perpetrator was already neutralized and laying severely wounded on the ground, azaria arrived at the scene and shot the wounded perpetrator. it is interesting to note that at the legal level, azaria was found guilty of ethical misconduct, and of a serious violation of the rules of engagement. although the soldier’s conduct was treated by the idf authorities according to the international law, parts of the public expressed great empathy for him and his family, justifying his conduct and even describing it as an act of heroism (aligon-der, 2018). this conflict can be understood as an uneasy meeting of two contradictory sets of values: one reflects a set of norms of ethics based on the value of human life of every person (even if he or she is an enemy or a terrorist), according to which shooting for injury and killing must be justified only for the purpose of preventing a clear and immediate life risk. the second point of view reflects an “eye-for-an-eye” approach and considers the perpetrator as one who does not “deserves” to live after attempting a lethal terror attack. in addition, the value of supporting the nation’s soldiers as symbols of national security and the nation’s future may play a role here. the conflict was so severe that threats where made against the prosecutors, and against the senior commanding officers of the idf. quite a few authors see this affair and the public conduct around the event, as a breaking point in the fabric of israeli society (leibowitz-der, 2016). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 46 published by scholink inc. what processes might promote the trends listed above? a limited number of selected possible processes will be reviewed herein with the understanding that it is impossible to cover all the relevant factors. 4.1 natural dynamics of multicultural society development-melting pot vs. back to roots societies the sociological literature has dealt with the dynamics of the development of multicultural societies. this line of investigation started in the us looking at its nature as an immigrant-absorbing state and in recent decades in israel that has absorbed generations of immigrants from different generations and cultures. such trends are now becoming also evident in eu countries, which have shown a rising interest in understanding the dynamics of cross and multi-culturalism (alexander, 2013). interestingly, writers agree on a typical multi-generational dynamic of multi-cultural integration and dis-integration dynamics: first, the “melting pot” model dominates, and in other words there is the expectation of relinquishing the original immigrant identity to embrace and adopt a new identity that aligns with the new world of values, as part of the effort to establish something new (for example—the establishment of a national home for the jewish people in the state of israel, see an example of this literature in: gelber, 2008). this dynamic, however, is apparently doomed to failure as it forces entire generations to repress values, identities and centuries-old traditions from which they have come and grew in favor of a culture that they do not necessarily identify with or even know in depth. as a result, second and third generations find themselves shifting “back to roots” and re-identifying with their original culture. we have seen this happening years ago in the us with the black population redefining itself as “african american” as a nod to their cultural background (see for example: mcdonald, 2006), and more recently with immigrant populations in the eu, as well as in israel (peters, 2017). here is the real challenge—to what extent do immigrants from the ukraine or iraq adopt a new culture and identity, their source culture, or a combination of both (and if so—what is this combination? which elements are adopted from each culture and which are rejected?). the theoretical and research literature in the field is quite rich and it mainly illuminates the difficulty of integrating identities that sometimes carry contradictory values and beliefs (lisk, 1995). social-psychological studies have shown that in encounters between different cultural groups, there is a tendency for emphasis on inter-group differences rather than similarities which often leads to the rise of conflict between groups (see, for example: brewer, 1999). assuming these dynamics take place in israeli society, as well as many other societies (and there is sufficient evidence to suppose this), they may account for the phenomenon of social differentiation by sectors, “tribes”, if you will. 4.2 national development dynamics—rrosion of shared values the beginning of every social group and certainly every nation is based on a very high sense of unity—pioneers lay the ideological and practical foundations upon which a country is built, often in the face of opposition, hardships and challenges. it is enough to think of the founding fathers of the united states (pasquino, 1998), as well as of other (democratic) nations, to understand that these early groups www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 47 published by scholink inc. were characterized by unified ideology, that motivated a group to fight and strive to achieve their common goals and self-definition as a nation. a similar process is evident around the establishment of the state of israel (don-yahya & zisar, 1999): despite disagreements between various zionist thinkers, fighters, and political leaders, at least at the overall level, a uniform ideological line was dominant throughout the years in which the young state was established. a sense of “togetherness” was prevalent, imparting a sense of common mission and shared goals (knapelman et al., 2008). however, as an integral part of the process of state and national development, this sense of mission slowly wears out once its goals are achieved. if israelis were motivated at the outset of the state by a shared vision of a jewish state in israel on the one hand and the choice of a place under the sun at the end of the second world war and the holocaust, on the other hand, then these goals have become a viable reality. the question arises—what’s next? but naturally, once the basic goals that constitute the common denominator of the people have been achieved, a process begins in which numerous different goals, values and visions of the future of the state are presented, often derived from the increasing diversity described in the previous section—multiculturalism, multiple value systems and traditions (bartle, 2001; fisher, 2018). thus, as shared values grow old, the variance between groups and sub-groups within the same nation is emphasized. a pivotal example of this is the conflict in israeli society around the concept of a jewish and democratic state. a large portion of the state’s population supports a liberal democratic identity for the state as a modern western entity that embraces core values of equality, unity before the law, and civil rights enshrined in a democratic political system. other sections of the population do not share this vision and call for the implementation of other models—starting from a jewish religious law, or a semi-democratic model—where some of the balancing and control mechanisms that characterize democratic rule are eliminated (aloni et al., 2011; fisher, 2018). another notable example is the steady decline over the past few decades in the percentage of 18-year-old israeli citizens enlisting in military service. in the past, the ideology of “the new jew” (that is able to defend himself) and the reality of the need to survive in a hostile environment has turned military service into a nationally agreed-upon value. this value has very much eroded, most likely because of religious jewish views that see the military service as corrupting religious values, as well as a minority advocating anti-war values (news 2, 2011). 4.3 political manipulation—divide and conquer? not all social changes can be attributed to natural processes. some of these can be attributed to intentional or deliberate manipulation. this is a phenomenon that is not unique to israel and can be seen in numerous countries around the world: the deliberate use and abuse of major media outlets and social network agents (sometimes referred to as “influencers”) to advance a political agenda (inglehart & norris, 2016). social scientists argue that this discourse exploits individual and group biases and feelings of deprivation (sometimes realistic and sometimes subjective) in order to garner support from certain public parties only because of opposition to an idea or a sub-population. in other words, it’s about raising support based on resistance to something, not offering value-added solutions to problems. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 48 published by scholink inc. the phenomenon has become commonplace in european populism (e.g.: liang, 2016), was often used by us president trump (e.g.: yang, 2017) and is now slowly filtering into israeli politics. in israel, over the past decade and a half, new voices have suggested that this kind of voices have become a currency in the domestic political discourse. politicians and political public figures use partisan discourse—that is, a discourse based on the resistance and defamation of other parties or factions in the population, and even specific individuals, in order to mobilize support for certain groups. for example, surveillance reports produced periodically by the berl katzlenson foundation show a marked increase in the current election campaign (september, 2019) in partisan discourse and hate discourse coming from political and activist bodies. the main targets of this discourse in the current elections were: the political left, arabs, immigrants from ethiopia, specific personalities in the left and center parties, the idf chief of staff, and more (berl katzenelson foundation, 2019). simply put: in times of complexity and confusion, the political leadership not only does not take a clear stand to prevent or at least reduce divisive, partisan discourse, but rather encourages it because it serves its short term goals. if we accept this proposal, then it is a process that turns various parts of society against each other as part of a short-term strategy aimed at mobilizing support through internal division and hatred, while severing the basic fabric of society and causing severe damage over time. the processes and factors mentioned above are not idiosyncratic. in truth, they nurture each other and accelerate the process of loss of trust, mutual support, and a sense of unity that can characterize people within a social group: feeding on sense of deprivation, over-compensation, mistrust and internal conflict. these feelings, accompanied by a lack of a visible common denominator and shared values (and sometimes a contradiction of values) and encouraging partisan discourse, create a collapse of a set of values, social norms of cooperation, and mutual respect. the processes of changing values create a local culture that encourages individuals not to choose the option of cooperating and trusting others. the implication of this lack of trust and collaboration can be evident not only at the broader scheme of things, but rather on the mundane level: let us think of a group of drivers who are stuck in a traffic jam. if everyone cooperates, stays in their lanes and waits for their turn to go, the traffic jams will dissipate much faster than when drivers pass lanes, bypassing other drivers, blocking others’ traffic, thus perhaps gaining a small advantage for themselves but at the overall level—making the jam much worse than it could have been. this example can be applied to countless life situations—from mutual help, sharing the tax burden, working against unemployment, consumer behavior and even civilian conduct vis-à-vis the state authorities and more(see: zysberg, 2018) and it seems that such processes and factors are turning people and citizens into a haphazard collection of almost hostile social groups. what to do? 5. conclusions and implications for the social sciences and humanities in light of the trends i mentioned above, some argue that israeli society is moving down a slippery slope leading to social disintegration and possibly disaster (see, for example: aloni et al., 2011; jehoshaphat ronen, 2002). however, if we adopt the prisoner’s dilemma model as a model that www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 49 published by scholink inc. explains at least a good deal of the processes described here, it may also indicate actionable directions that may ease the situation and possibly improve it in the long run. according to the prisoner’s dilemma model, the key is trust, and fostering long-term cooperation required to reach the best possible outcomes for everyone involved. sounds simple but in many ways this proposition contradicts human nature, if you will. this model requires that individuals take a risk in trusting others (whom they do not always know) to not take advantage of the situation to their own benefit, and reject immediate gratifications for the possibility of achieving a common goal (mischel, 1974; wulfert et al., 2002). how can we restore such behavioral and interpersonal patterns? for one thing, the seeds of change are still here and they bear fruit from time to time. i was recently sitting in a cafe overlooking the street. an elderly woman tripped over the sidewalk and fell to the ground in a crowded street. even before i was able to rise from my seat, a small crowd came to her help: young and old, religious and secular, arabs and jews. help was offered, a chair appeared from nowhere and she was seated on it. then someone handed her a bottle of water. only after making sure she was well and able to continue on her way did the people disperse and went on with their lives. this kind of cooperation and mutual trust for shared value (helping the elderly) is, in my understanding, the key to mending the social rift using insights from the prisoner’s dilemma model. here are some suggestions for focusing on key issues and processes derived from the prisoner’s dilemma in the context of this article. i begin at the grassroots level and finish at the political-leadership level: 5.1 identifying core values as the basis for a new social common denominator in a society that fails to agree on the big ideas, the small ideas can be a good start. what are the values we can agree on? you can start with a few, for example: the future of our children and the younger generation, the environment and the protection of the earth. most companies and sub-companies can find values and ideas on which they can obtain sweeping or near-sweeping consent. promoting these values at the educational, socio-cultural level will foster a sense of being able to experience success through collaboration and trust in others as a model and a basis for more “burning” values. a few decades ago, the israeli educational system achieved tremendous success in implementing the value of preserving wildflowers and refraining from picking up wildflowers (first, 2012). adopting this model of consensus focusing on a value that is not very demanding or requires significant sacrifice from the individual and at the same time does not contradict his traditional-cultural identity is key. it allows for a relatively short-term sense of accomplishment and sets the stage for implementing mechanisms of cultural change that encourages collaborative trust as social value. 5.2 enforcement mechanisms that encourage confidence and collaboration one of the mechanisms that allow value-related deterioration in any society is the sense of “lawlessness”, where individuals feel they will not be held accountable for their deeds. findings from social studies suggest that people, however normative, who feel that they will not be held personally responsible for their actions tend to be more violent, less normative than those who feel that they are www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 50 published by scholink inc. accountable (for example, see postmes & spears, 1998). strengthening social, formal, and informal enforcement mechanisms that work against social norm violations (e.g., imagine a social sanction situation by members of a social network toward those who use violent language regardless of its content or orientation), and of course, strengthen and encourage enforcement of norms through formal and informal social enforcement mechanisms. this is not only the responsibility of the authorities, but rather the personal responsibility of members of social forums, online networks, and more. how do we reach such a state of things? education. and education does not mean policing but modifying behavior patterns and imparting more effective conduct on the basis of shifting perception and interpretation of reality. classical educational approaches to behavior modeling speak of an effective combination of reinforcements that encourage the appearance of desirable behavior (e.g., defining social champions of collaboration and mutual trust) and consistent punishment of unwanted behaviors (freudenberg, 1978), but beyond conditioning, such modification will be realized mainly through acceptance of personal responsibility as key to interpersonal collaboration. 5.3 re-establishing a sense of community we live in an age of screen-mediated individualism. interpersonal interaction is filtered and synthesized, and communities are the more fluid and malleable than ever before (see, for example: samoa, 2014). however, a sense of community is the key to mutual trust and collaboration. so at the social level—creating and encouraging communities to collaborate for the common good—whether communities based on geographic criteria (neighborhoods or communities), social criteria and even around a common interest—is key. encouraging collaborations within and among such communities can help prepare the foundation or building blocks of mutual trust and collaboration processes as an integral part of everyday culture. 5.4 and last but not least (for now)—responsible leadership leadership, by definition is about shaping social groups’ behavior (popper, 2004). in many ways, the political discourse and the divisive communication style adopted by leaders and political influencers must have some part in the current problematic situation and the public is largely aware of this. in the past, several attempts have been made to encourage elected officials to publicly commit to a more responsible public discourse (see, for example, the social discussion convention, 2019), but these attempts have largely failed. at the same time, if the infrastructure for cultural change described in the previous paragraphs is established, the social pressures on elected officials to take social responsibility may rise again. to what extent can the case of israel serve as a case study for a broader, border-crossing discussion? some evidence suggests it may: the usa experiences social fragmentation and confrontations at a level second only to its civil war; numerous eu member countries find themselves coping with civil unrest, and rising divisive fundamentalism. i invite the reader to delve into the examples and models presented here and try to examine the extent to which they are applicable to their own social, cultural and political reality. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 51 published by scholink inc. this is a process of profound and challenging cultural change. a process that requires the recruitment of all parts of society, political and community leadership, educators and researchers, managers and public opinion leaders, and of course—all of us as citizens. with all the difficulty in implementing such a change, understanding its underlying dynamics, as suggested by the prisoner’s dilemma model, may help us work for better social and personal future. references alexander, j. c. 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(2018). the people demand social justice: the social protest in israel as an agoral gathering. journal for perspectives of economic political and social integration, 24(2), 31-45. https://doi.org/10.2478/pepsi-2018-0007 microsoft word ape-v5n1-p33 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 33 original paper machiavelli’s political thought and its inspiration—text analysis based on the prince zhang haokai1 1 xinjiang university, urumqi, xinjiang, 830046, china received: december 15, 2021 accepted: december 31, 2021 online published: january 7, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n1p33 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n1p33 abstract machiavelli is one of the founders of modern bourgeois political theory. the birth of his masterpiece the prince creates a new pattern of western political thought, which marks the first time that political science has escaped from the bondage of religion and ethics. at the same time, machiavelli is also named “machiavelliism”. the so-called “no means to achieve the purpose” has become the greatest misunderstanding of machiavelli. based on the prince analysis of machiavelli’s political thought, around his national unity of italy launched the national regime, military, monarchy and other aspects of thinking. keywords machiavelli, machiavellianism, national regime, military, power 1. introduction voltaire called machiavelli a “evil gangster”, hume thought he was a “great genius”, engels called him a “giant”, marx affirmed that he opposed fatalism to emphasize the role of people, called him the pioneer of modern politics. isaiah berlin pointed out that “machiavelli was first an italian and patriot. he was first speaking to his generation, even if he was not only to the florentines, but also to the italians. therefore, to criticize him, he must be based only on or at least on his historical background.” in the book the prince, machiavelli elaborates on how to establish a monarchy, how to maintain the monarchy, how to deal with the relationship between the monarch and his subjects, and the monarch’s virtue. machiavelli believed that the real good monarch must be a fox to find traps, and must be a lion to scare away the jackals. only the combination of cunning and fierceness can create a generation of bright monarchs. the prince has been enduring for thousands of years, it is because of his utilitarian value doctrine, power thought and other political thoughts can be used today. the 14th and 16th centuries coincided with the western renaissance and religious reform, and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 34 published by scholink inc. florence was the centre of the renaissance in italy and even throughout western europe. the renaissance restored the dignity of human beings by exploring and reviving the ancient greek and roman culture, criticizing the dark religious rule by ancient metaphor and quoting classics, and praising humanity against divinity and anti-asceticism for the pursuit of happiness in the present world. in the dark middle ages of europe, the christian church monopolized people’s minds ideologically, and the churches at all levels occupied a large amount of land economically. the political power of the church was once higher than that of the monarchy, and “ceasare” crawled under god’s feet. in addition, the life of the clergy class was extremely decadent. in his decameron during the renaissance boccaccio revealed the shamelessness of feudal aristocrats and christians. however, in the middle of the 15th century, pope despotism accelerated its revival after more than a century of attack and weakening. at the same time, the monarchy was also strengthened in various regions of western europe. contrary to the high prosperity in culture, italy is in a state of separation and fragmentation in politics. since the fall of the western roman empire, the establishment of the italian kingdom in 1861 and the final unification in 1871, the apennine peninsula has experienced more than one thousand years of political division, which consists of five kingdoms, the principality, the republic, the pope and territories: the venice aristocratic republic in the northeast, the duchy of milan in the northwest, the naples republic in the south, and the republic of florence and the pope in the middle. the roman holy see took advantage of italy’s fragmented situation to suppress the monarchy and strengthen the pope’s authority, making the pope’s jurisdiction the most consolidated and lasting regime in italy, where powerful countries such as france and spain outside the country were on fire and italy was in deep heat. political reality reflects the corruption of italy’s institutional level. political corruption, moral decay and cruel measures have become the means of governance. honesty and credibility are regarded as naive. arms are used as a recipe for success. it is common to spend pride and extravagance and seek personal interests. individuals are only for themselves, except for the interests of egoism. italy’s problem lies in the corrupt and divided society. machiavelli firmly believes that no governance is possible except for monarchy, which explains why he is enthusiastic about worshiping the ancient roman republic and actively promoting authoritarianism. economic changes have had far-reaching political and social consequences. after the geographical discovery, the world trade center has been transferred from the mediterranean to the atlantic coast. any degree of improvement in the convenience of transportation is incompatible with local monopoly and trade control. “merchant adventurers” have obtained the maximum profit, italy has further missed the opportunity for the development of capitalism, and adjacent france has achieved amazing results due to monarchy. the italian monarchs seek to unify the peninsula and realize the glory of “ceasare”. however, the political power of the bourgeoisie is difficult to fight with the feudal aristocrats and churches. they will hope to be placed on the powerful new monarchs. the bourgeoisie is willing to see the strengthening of the monarch’s power. they hope that the monarch conforms to the capitalist tide of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 35 published by scholink inc. western europe, breaks the restrictions and shackles since the middle ages, eliminates the customs and heavy taxes caused by political division, and establishes a unified domestic market. therefore, the emerging middle class has become an important force in the monarchy. common interests make the two opposing classes reach a common front of anti-religion and unity. george holland sabine pointed out, therefore, by the beginning of the 16th century, the monarchy had become or would soon become a universal regime in western europe. the above is the political, economic and cultural background of machiavelli’s creation of the prince. 2. analysis of machiavelli and the prince 2.1 machiavelli machiavelli was born in florence on may 3, 1469, and died here on june 22, 1527. he spent his life in florence except for several diplomatic missions to italy and france and germany. from 1494 to 1512, he served as secretary-general of the second secretary-general’s office in the republic of florence. his visit to the republic of florence was contemptuous, which made him deeply feel that the weak country had no diplomacy, and that france was strong and italy was divided. in 1512, the medici tyranny was restored, machiavelli was once arrested and imprisoned. after he was released from prison in 1513, he stayed in the countryside, buried his head and wrote books, and lived in poverty. in the daytime, he was a hard-working countryman in labor life. in the evening, he fantasized about the temple, meeting with the ancients and explored the way of governing the country. after the restoration of the republic, machiavelli hoped to return to the political arena with a political ambition to die without depression. as a politician, machiavelli’s life is tragic and profound. poor and miserable, yongyu rucheng, machiavelli completed the immortal realism classic the prince and its sister discourses on the first ten books of titus livius in difficult circumstances. in addition, machiavelli also wrote the drama la mandragola (1513) to praise people’s wisdom and love, and criticized the hypocrisy and degeneration of the church, which was not only a ridicule to the social morality at that time, but also a reflection of the author’s attitude to moral ethics and the church. alan gilbert focused on machiavelli and pointed out that without reading la mandragola he did not understand the prince. l’art de la guerre (1520), the first modern military masterpiece, expounded the close relationship between military and politics in the form of dialogue, and guided people to fight against aggression from military tactics, which was better than the battlefield. engels once highly evaluated machiavelli’s contribution and believed that it was a politician, a historian, a poet, and the first modern military writer worth mentioning. the book florentine histories (1525) marx pointed out that the rule of the pope was the root of italy’s decline. machiavelli studies and summarizes italy’s political and military aspects from a historical perspective, explores the historical lessons of italy’s decline, and explores the road to revitalize the motherland. 2.2 the time value of the prince machiavelli discussed the quality of the new monarch from the history of greece and rome and the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 36 published by scholink inc. real politics in italy, rather than demonstrating how to become ceas are from the christian doctrine and the oracle of god. robert d. kaplan says, “machiavelli is an outstanding renaissance humanist whose focus is on the people rather than god. he stressed the need for politics, not moral perfection, which constituted his philosophical attack on the church.” on the one hand, the prince made the state view of political science get rid of the shackles of religious theology for the first time. the prince was independent of morality and ethics in political research. the separation of politics and morality opened the process of modern political science, so machiavelli became the father of modern political science. in machiavelli’s view, responsible monarchs need not act according to the church’s moral principles. on the other hand, machiavelli’s attitude towards religion is ambiguous. as a realist, he opposed churches that bound state power rather than religion itself. on the contrary, religion can serve as an ideological tool of state machinery to maintain rule. moreover, he foresees the coming era of capitalist development and nation-state. therefore, the unification of italy must get rid of the shackles of roman catholic church. machiavelli’s thought is dominated by the times, and there are two kinds of worship plots: one is the worship of tyrants with wisdom, and the other is the worship of freedom and autonomy. there are contradictions between the two, but machiavelli put them together as the theory of founding and governing the country. autocratic monarchy is aimed at the establishment and transformation of the country. once the country is on the right track, in order to maintain long-term stability, it must be done: one is to allow people to participate in politics to a certain extent, the other is that the monarch must govern according to law in the process of governing the country, and fully ensure that the property rights and other rights of the subjects are not denied. autocratic monarchy is a powerful political medicine for italy, which is very beneficial to save italy’s national destiny. if used improperly, it will become a poison. after all, unification is still going to the road of bourgeois republic. 2.3 discrimination of two machiavellianism as a representative of italy’s emerging bourgeoisie in the late middle ages, machiavelli advocated ending italy’s political division and establishing a strong centralized state. in the prince, he believed that the republican regime was the best form of state, but he also believed that the republican system was unable to end italy’s fragmentation. the implementation of monarchy was only an expedient measure to save italy. the violence of the monarchy was a medicine that could make subjects obey, resist the invasion of strong enemies, and treat morbid countries. he emphasized that politics of power, brutality, cunning, hypocrisy, lies and disbelief were justified as long as they were helpful to the rule of the monarchy. this idea was called “machiavellianism” by later generations, which became a typical way for politicians to play politics, and even used as a theoretical basis for the implementation of dictatorship. some people call machiavelli a master of realism, some scholars call him an outstanding representative of republicanism, and others call him a pluralistic liberal. he is seen as an extremely cynical person, a passionate patriot, a strong nationalist, a political conspirator, a docile democrat and a shameless tyrant. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 37 published by scholink inc. the relationship between political trickery and machiavelli can be divided into two groups: one group believes that political trickery is evil, and then believes that he is evil, labelling machiavelli as evil. the other view is that power itself does not care about evil. it is believed that power is a tool and means to achieve rule, and there is no good or evil in itself. moreover, machiavelli is also a patriot, and its actual behavior is understandable and reasonable. the multiple definition of machiavelli’s identity, on the one hand, because the scholars want to give their own theory to seek support, on the other hand also shows that many scholars on machiavelli’s ideological interpretation is controversial. the blackwell encyclopaedia of political thought defines machiavellianism as “machiavellianism means that in the process of people’s pursuit of purpose, there is no need for moral scruples, and the result determines the legitimacy of the method.” the two meanings of machiavellianism are at the human level, in the interests of the individual by any means. at the national level, for the interests of the collective and community have to take unjust means. in the modern context, machiavelli’s thought has been dwarfed as “no means to achieve the goal”. politicians have apparently attacked machiavelli, but they have always wondered how to achieve their political goals by using inferior means. in fact, the world misread machiavelli, power theory is not “persuade people to do evil”, he did not deny the legitimacy of good deeds, but under certain conditions to give power rationality. hans morgenthau realized the important role of morality, “political realism understands the moral significance of political action,” but he then discussed that “realism insists that universal moral principles cannot be applied to state behavior in abstract universal forms, and moral principles must be filtered through specific time and place environments.” therefore, prudent realists believe that in order to achieve national interests and compete for international political dominance, sometimes have to take inferior means, this machiavellianism is reasonable. 3. machiavelli’s political thought the theme of machiavelli’s political thought is to be a qualified monarch, focusing on what the monarchy is, what kind it has, how it gets, how it maintains and why it loses. based on the evil nature of human nature, machiavelli requires the monarch to obtain experience from history to control the evil human nature, and form machiavelli’s utilitarian view of history. the book is dedicated to lorenzo medici, one is to hope that the monarch can achieve the great position allowed by its quality; second, hope to get the favor of the monarch, get rid of the unfortunate fate. the political thought in the prince can be simply summarized into three points: the state regime, the military system and the monarchy. 3.1 on national regime in the prince, machiavelli discusses the types of monarchy in 11 chapters, the ways to obtain the ruling power and their respective characteristics and means to retain them, and puts forward how to rule and how to make the monarchy long-term stability. countries are divided into republics and monarchies, and monarchies are divided into hereditary monarchies, mixed monarchies, new monarchies, citizen monarchies and church monarchies. for the time being, the republic can rely on others’ force or rely www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 38 published by scholink inc. on their own force or good luck. different monarchies have different consolidation and maintenance strategies. the monarchs of hereditary monarchies only need to have the usual ability, do not change the ancestral system, and do random response. even if they are seized of power, they can still restore the old things, and it is difficult to restore them. the long-term rule makes the memory and cause of change annihilate, so that they can be passed down from generation to generation. a newly established monarchy, namely the hybrid monarchy, faces various difficulties. people want to improve their situation and change their rulers. later experience often shows that things are contrary to their wishes, so that they cannot bear the torture of the new monarch. therefore, machiavelli proposed that as long as the rulers take advantage of the opportunities provided by the rebellion to punish criminals without hesitation, make clear the suspects, and prepare in the weakest place to strengthen their status, it will be difficult to lose the rebel area.for the same region, the same language, only exterminate the old monarch blood, but not change the legal tax, treatment of different languages, customs and various institutional areas, the internal conquerors should be stationed in person, the monarchs (as the turks do in greece), sending colonial rather than garrison troops, externally, it appeases the weak country, inhibits the powerful country, and balances the power. rome defends itself against the slightest threat, and when it takes the opportunity to assert itself, france destroys itself. therefore, an iron law can be drawn: who is the reason for the strongness of others, who will perish himself. for the threat to the rule of security forces, must be hard-hearted, weeding, connivance of their hostile forces, is to cultivate their grave diggers. there are two completely different situations in the maintenance of regime system and national stability: a monarch and a group of officials dominate turkey, the monarch is supreme, and the loyalty of subjects is difficult to occupy but easy to maintain. in france, ruled by the monarch and the vassals, the power of the vassals was not derived from the monarch, and the subjects were loyal to their respective rulers, which was easy to occupy but difficult to maintain. conquest and rule of a free state before occupation: first, destruction. second, the monarch stationed himself. third, support the puppet government. due to the slow resistance of the monarchy, as long as the monarchy is eliminated, the people will neither elect a new monarch, nor understand what freedom is, and can easily obtain it. as for the republic with strong vitality, hatred and revenge, the most reliable way is to eliminate and maintain it. one way to obtain a new monarchy is to rely on their own force and ability, rely on opportunities rather than fate, and it is difficult to keep business. moise and salvo ciro, the former seized the opportunity that the israeli nation did not want to be enslaved, the latter perceived the persians’ dissatisfaction with the medirule. do not rely on luck to maintain a stable position, take new rules and regulations to ensure national security, and the old system beneficiaries revenge, but not the new system beneficiaries for friends. the opponents master the law which is beneficial to their own, so that the beneficiaries of the new system are afraid. the new system has not yet landed, so it is better to continue “let the bullet fly”. because of the fear of the enemy and the doubt of the new things, the monarch with them is always www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 39 published by scholink inc. dangerous, so when people no longer believe in, they rely on force to force them to model, that is, all armed prophets have won the victory, rather than armed prophets have failed. the second way to obtain a new monarchy is to rely on the force of others or because of luck, it is difficult to obtain a monarchy. simply rely on other people’s recognition of good intentions and luck, changeless, unstable, booming countries, as nature rapidly breed all life, the lack of deep-rooted, crisscross, can not withstand the destruction of the storm. francesco sforza and ceasare borgia, the former rely on their outstanding ability to obtain a very hard position and maintain a very difficult position, the latter rely on the exchange of interests between his father and france to obtain romania, after the ambitions of france was blocked, through the reward of money, according to the status of the ranks of the promotion of official rank cage rival forces become allies. to exterminate the family of deposed rulers, to fight for all the roman aristocrats to suppress the new pope, to win the favor of the pivot archbishop and to gain greater power while his father is alive, the only reason why borgia can be blamed, that is, the reason for his demise is to elect the pope: believe in giving new favors to make a great man forget the damage of the past and deceive himself! the third way to obtain monarchical power is to use the evil way, the same means of rape and brutality, agatocle by the hands of the carthages to kill the senate, seize sicily, can live safely in the country. within one year of oliverotto’s possession of the country, it endangers urban security and the eyes of neighboring countries, and it is difficult to maintain rule. the reason lies in the proper use or harsh use of brutal means, the damage to the people and the brutal need to be completed once, and strive to reduce damage and resentment. gratitude to the people should be given one by one, so that the people can better taste the taste of favor and always feel the king’s virtue. the fourth way to obtain monarchy is to rely on the help of aristocrats or civilians. in a city, there are two opposing parties between people and aristocrats, which are generated in the city: monarchy, autonomy or anarchy. it is more difficult for a monarch to rely on aristocrats to obtain monarchical power than on the people, because the gap between aristocrats and their status is small, it is difficult to command, and the needs of civilians are easy to handle and centralized. managing aristocrats: first, respect the emperor’s orders, not greedy to be loved. second: do not rely on the monarch, natural timidity can be used, such people respect the monarch, adversity without fear. third, out of ambition, do not rely on the monarch, to guard against adversity when not subject to the heart. it is necessary for the monarch to keep friendly with the people in order to avoid being in adversity. it is a dangerous state for a monarchy to shift from civilian politics to autocratic politics. replacing self-governance with official governance, it is dominated by the will of officials in times of crisis, and there is a risk of usurping power. therefore, a wise monarch needs to consider allowing people to seek monarch at all times. the measure of the power of the monarchy: whether the monarch can rely on their own human and financial resources to determine the battlefield, or stick to help. according to the city’s defense of the monarch, through the city’s strict barriers, food and grass, give up the countryside outside the city, deal www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 40 published by scholink inc. with relations with people, for people’s support, to break through such a monarch is not easy. to let the people live together with the city, a strong and bold monarch is needed to encourage the people to believe that the scourge will not last long, and make the people fear the cruelty of the enemy. for a long time, the enemy destroyed the suburbs of the city, and the monarch gave mercy to make his citizens strong and guard the city. all the difficulties of the church sovereign state come from the ability or luck to obtain the church sovereign state before it is obtained, while keeping it depends on the ancient religious system. under this ancient system, the pope was in power without restriction, with the state without defense, with the subjects without governance, and the regime was not seized. officials and people did not mind and did not intend to abandon the monarch. the powerful secular power of the roman church stems from the consequences of alexander vi’s territorial expansion using his son, prince valentino. when pope julio was succeeded, the holy see was granted the entire territory of romania, and rome was awaiting weakness. by continuing its predecessor’s policy, the holy see occupied romania, eliminated the venetian, expelled the french from italy, raised the status of the church and firmly controlled the orsine and colonnesi factions. the powerful pope will get more respect by virtue of good deeds and virtue. this part fully shows machiavelli’s theory of monarchical hegemony by discussing the state regime: “who is to promote others to be strong, who will exterminate himself”, “should care for people, or eliminate”. he paid great attention to strategies to achieve the above theories. these propositions and theories reflected his hegemony thought, the way of governing the country and the political system thought of “taking whatever means to achieve the purpose”. 3.2 on military system the second part discusses the military system. machiavelli proposed that a monarchy without excellent military forces cannot have good discipline. as long as the military is strong, the monarchy must have good law. the army is the pillar of national unity. the monarch should pay attention to the construction of the army to consolidate his rule, focus on the types and characteristics of the army, analyze in detail the military system thought, and expound the importance of force and the army, classify the types of the army as mercenaries, foreign aid, mixed army and national army, and discuss in detail the origin of mercenaries and foreign aid. if there is no good army there is no good law. all countries are mainly based on good laws and excellent military. at the same time, excellent military is also the premise of good laws. secondly, it is pointed out that mercenaries and aid forces are the culprits that cause italy’s fragmentation. the monarch defends his country’s army either his own army, or mercenaries, aid forces, mixed forces. the harm of the mercenary is that the mercenary can’t rely on, no unity, ambition, no discipline, no loyalty, war for food and money, can’t win the collapse of the gossip, lucky win to coerce the employer. the mercenary leaders who are capable and ambitious are not trusted by the monarch, and it is useless to appoint agents. the entire armed forces of rome, sparta and switzerland enjoy full freedom and must www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 41 published by scholink inc. therefore establish a regular military regime. finally, the pope played a greater role in secular affairs. the power of the roman holy see rose, the monarchy was weakened, the power of god exceeded that of ceasare, and the proliferation of mercenaries aggravated the division of italy. assistance is more dangerous than mercenaries. assistance itself is good and useful. once aid fails, the monarch will be isolated and helpless, and once victory becomes a prisoner of aid. the combat effectiveness of the aid forces is far more than that of the mercenaries, but the danger is far more than that of the mercenaries. the mercenaries are lax in discipline, weak in combat effectiveness and mindful of money. it takes time and opportunity to win the harmed monarch by luck, and they are also controlled by the agents of the mercenary countries. aid forces are united, brave and fierce, and completely obey foreign orders, which makes their destructiveness far greater than mercenaries. in terms of combat effectiveness, national army > hybrid army (army of louis xi) > foreign aid army > mercenary. hazard coefficient: aid army > mercenary army > hybrid army > national army. loyalty: national army > hybrid army > mercenary army > aid army. in summary, the best military system should be the national army, followed by hybrid army, mercenary army, and foreign aid army. therefore, the wise monarch would rather rely on his own army to defeat than rely on the force of others to win, he believes that relying on others is not a real victory. “the weakest and the weakest thing in the world is the power and reputation based on the power of others”. a stable monarchy must have its own army, composed of its own officials, citizens or people. military responsibility of the monarch, in machiavelli military is the only profession of the monarch. in addition to war, military system and training, the monarch should not have other goals, other ideas, and should not take other things as their own profession, because it is the only profession for the commander. military affairs can maintain the status of those who are born kings, and also enable people to leap to the throne. born in trouble and die in peace, the primary reason for the death of the monarch is to ignore military affairs. armed people disdain and refuse to obey unarmed people, unarmed people suspect armed people, and the monarch cannot be respected by soldiers, and cannot trust them so that they cannot coexist peacefully. in peacetime, the monarch should pay more attention to military than in war time. first, through taking actions, such as hunting, physical exercise, hard habits, understanding mountains and rivers to better protect the motherland and apply to other places. second, by thinking, in peacetime it is necessary to think more about the method of war, the monarch filipomene often thinking training to be able to deal with any unexpected events. in addition to military thinking training on the ground, it is necessary to study historical great men and examine the reasons for their success in the war. a wise monarch should abide by making good use of precious time in peacetime and concentrate on military affairs in order to prepare for counterattack in adversity. machiavelli strongly criticized the harm of mercenaries in the military system, and believed that “italy’s current decline is the cause of long-term dependence on mercenaries”. it also analyzes the disadvantages of relying on mercenaries and foreign aid and mixed forces. in times of chaos, the monarch must hold heavy armies to end the dispute and achieve order. even the saints cannot make www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 42 published by scholink inc. people abide by the law by their own teachings. a qualified monarch should establish an army that is only loyal to himself in order to give play to leadership at a critical moment. he warned the monarch that it was necessary to build and rely on a strong military force that he could command directly. “never let his thinking leave the question of military training”, violence played an important role in maintaining the dominant position of the monarch, and force brought about profound changes in the order of human society. 3.3 on the power of monarchs the way to obtain monarchical power is right and wrong, malignant also has a good side, emphasizing the inferior means to be completed at one time, unless it is beneficial to the subjects, the future can never be used again. the third part of the fifteenth to twenty-sixth chapters is the key content of this book, focuses on the monarch’s rule and the right to life, expounds machiavelli’s right and strategic thinking. this part will control the subjects and the national outlook through the monarch’s quality, and analyze that a qualified monarch should learn to maintain majesty and smoothness at the same time. the subjects should be feared and loved. the monarch should avoid dependence on the castle, avoid crooked subjects, and always warn himself. 3.3.1 on the quality of monarch in terms of morality, a monarch must know how to do things that are not entirely ethical and how to choose to use or retain the means as appropriate. in fact, life is far from how to live. people should live in the present to avoid self-destruction. to maintain their status, the monarch must know how to do bad things and take measures according to the actual situation. the quality of the monarch is more likely to cause praise or blame, praise his generosity, mercy, compassion, honesty and so on, and depreciate him stingy, greedy, cruel, dishonest and so on. the monarch’s attribute does not allow him to possess and maintain all the good qualities. the wise monarch should know how to avoid the evil deeds of the dead country, and retain the laissez-faire under the conditions permitted will not lead to the evil deeds of the dead country. there is no need to tangles between evildoing and regime, nor to blame themselves for evildoing. the only law of sovereign behavior: to retain power! there is no precise definition of the quality of the monarch in the prince. machiavelli follows the authority of classical and humanism, and interprets the quality of the monarch as helping the monarch resist the attack of the goddess of luck, striving for her favor, so as to reach the peak of the reputation of the monarch, win honor and glory for himself, and win stability for the regime. it is embodied in the metaphors of generosity and meanness, cruelty and kindness, and keeping promises. the monarch should not mind the name of stinginess. generosity will make the monarch fall into disdain and hatred. if the monarch uses his own generosity, he will inevitably run out of money. if he wants to retain the name of generosity, he will inevitably levy atrocities and increase the burden on the people. his subjects begin to hate him and despise him. this generosity can only benefit a few. the monarch will also take the lead in times of crisis and get the name of stinginess. the monarch was generous to most people by saving and resisting foreign aggression with abundant income. in order to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 43 published by scholink inc. become a monarch before generosity is necessary, but the monarch generosity will attract contempt and hatred, miser although not good will not attract hatred. if the monarch’s expense comes from himself and his people, he must be thrifty and can be as generous as possible by looting, extorting and using the enemy’s money, because generosity is not only damaging to fame but also rising to fame. a wise monarch would rather bear the name of miser than pursue the reputation of generosity. for machiavelli, the problem is not the choice between good and evil, but the choice between ordinary means and extraordinary means, and clarify the special nature of the state division in his era. cruel or kindness, loved or feared, the cruelty of the monarch to create order is more than the excessive kindness to be kind. excessive benevolence ignores the unrest and damages the whole society. only a few people execute punishment. the founding monarch is facing a dangerous and complex situation at home and abroad. the name of cruelty is inevitable. trusting others or taking action must be careful, but there is no need for a cup of bow and snake shadow. it is necessary to think carefully, act orderly, not rash or suspect narrowly. love and fear, both better, if must choose, fear is much safer for the monarch. love depends on grace, people are accustomed to profit forget righteousness, money bought not firm, fear will make people for fear of punishment and cast a rat scrutiny, offending their loved ones than offending their fear of a lot less scrutiny. the monarch should not deprive his own people of their property, and should not mean that their wives and daughters should avoid being hated by people. “people forget that the death of their father is faster than the loss of their inheritance.” people can forgive the murderer of their father, but they will not forgive those who deprive them of their inheritance. therefore, smart rulers will kill people, but they will not plunder their subjects. annibale’s achievements have benefited from his talents and ruthlessness. scipione has been betrayed by the army for being too kind. people love the monarch based on their own ideas, fear the monarch based on the will of the monarch. a wise monarch should be based on his own will rather than the ideas of others. what needs to be done is to avoid hatred. the experience of the times shows that the great monarchs do not attach importance to keeping faith, but conquer the people who have always kept faith by tricks. they are always skilled in using the two complementary struggle methods of law belonging to human beings and force belonging to beasts. the means of law often have defects. the monarch must use the means of beasts to achieve political purposes. a monarch should be a mixture of man and beast. he should use law to fight for man. he should be brave as a lion to shock a jackal as a fox to break a trap. as discussed above, machiavellianism at two levels is the essence of machiavellianism in the narrow sense, and the means of purpose proof is the internal logic of machiavellianism in the sense of national rationality. a wise monarch can never and should not abide by faith, especially the new monarch in which the environment, determines his multiple personality, must always be ready to change. a monarch is not a gentleman, but must be a hypocrite. people judge that the monarch depends on the eyes more than the hands. everyone can see the monarch but rarely touch it, and it is more difficult to understand the monarch. therefore, although the monarch does the same thing as the dog, he should pretend to be a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 44 published by scholink inc. modest monarch. during the conversation, he reveals compassion, faith, humanity, and respect for god, “being a great disguiser and a good person”. in order to conquer and retain power, the monarch can do anything. all actions of the monarch must be based on whether it is conducive to rule. it is necessary to promote peace and faith, but compliance with either of them will make his reputation and power grabbed. the monarch’s greedy occupation of his subjects’ property, his wife and daughter, was hated, and his fickleness and cowardice were despised. the monarch must avoid and prevent these, and be brave, resolute and tenacious, and must give the subjects the impression that no one expects to deceive or hide him! threats faced by the monarch: conspirators and foreign forces within the people, as long as the monarch from the people’s hate, both internal and external affairs can be tactful and playful. the latter can be defended only by elite generals and close allies, while the former relies on the majesty of the monarch, the law, the protection of allies and the goodwill of the people, which will make the conspiracyrs dare not act rashly. the example of annibale, the monarch of polonia, is sufficient to make the conspiracyrs understand that the conspiracy against the people’s happy and honest monarch is bound to anger the people. one of the most important things of the wise monarch is not to force aristocrats to meet the people at the same time. as one of the best countries in the order of the times, the king of france restrains aristocrats to protect civilians through parliament, and is not contested by aristocrats and non-refugee civilians. the things that bear responsibility entrust others to the people. the monarch is in charge of the things that give people grace. it is necessary to attach importance to the noble and protect the people. the roman emperor faced three difficulties: the ambition of aristocrats, the arrogance of the people and the brutal greed of the army. at the same time, it was difficult to satisfy the peace-loving people who liked the gentle and humble monarch and the military who liked the brutal greed monarch. the new emperor was in urgent need of army to help him and offend the people. the reality decided that he could only avoid being hated by the most powerful party, and the monarch wanted to retain the army to deal with the civilians. the reasons for the death of roman emperors listed in this paper are mostly hatred and contempt. imitation of marco and severo is not only futile but also extremely dangerous for them. it is more necessary for the emperors of the roman and turkish empires to satisfy the military than the people, but now on the contrary, the first thing to consider is the people, because the people are more powerful, which is undoubtedly a historical progress. machiavelli does not exclude benevolence. benevolence towards others will lead to insecurity for most people, which is inhuman for most people. what is to be achieved is the benevolence of all people, which is a more macroscopic and comprehensive view of benevolence. although his theory also has the consideration of the interests of the monarch itself, the ultimate goal is for all people. to a certain extent, machiavelli’s support for kingship and monarchy is also in order to achieve the unity of modern countries with kingship and develop capitalist economy, which requires great courage and tolerance of loneliness. machiavelli did not advocate the monarch’s “immorality” from the beginning. if conditions permitted, he was very willing to use morality to achieve morality. however, machiavelli lived in italy www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 45 published by scholink inc. during the renaissance. at that time, the italian separatist forces were very serious, and the city-state countries were hostile to each other. the whole italy was divided and ravaged by spain, france and other countries. in that context, machiavelli advocated the establishment of a unified italy to resist external aggression and achieve the security and unity of the italian people. in exceptional circumstances, it is necessary to use extraordinary means. obviously, at that time, it was impossible for a gentleman who was indecisive to complete the task of unifying italy. what italy needed was a strong and powerful monarch. 3.3.2 on the control of subjects when it comes to the relationship between the monarch and his subjects, machiavelli advocates that the monarch armed some of his subjects, making them become their own force and giving them grace. others will also understand and recognize that the armed will face danger and responsibility. the reward should be appropriate, the monarch will be loved, the armed subjects will be more loyal, and others will fear the monarch. once you want to disarm, it will be regarded as timid or discredited, and hatred is also bred. to obtain a new country or territory, it is necessary to disarm the country and weaken the power to follow itself. the machine of violence must be in the hands of the monarch’s own army. machiavelli believes that a strong monarchy will never allow a state to divide and that it is useful to control its people in peacetime, and that war is deadly. a wise monarch will deliberately set up enemies and demonstrate his greatness by conquering them. at the beginning of the country, the former hostile monarchs seek self-preservation and eliminate bad impressions by serving the monarch more faithfully. if the local people who sponsor the new monarch are not full of feelings to the new monarch, but only dissatisfied with the former government, making friends with them is very difficult, and winning the sponsorship of the enemy who is satisfied with the former government is far easier than the support of the friends who are dissatisfied with the former government. for the monarch, the most solid fortress is not hated by the people. once the people pick up weapons, domestic and foreign forces will inevitably unite to endanger security. king ferdinando of spain often resorts to state power to do great things so that opponents do not have time to act against them and attract domestic forces to do great things. the duke of milan, bernabo, likes to be eye-catching in the administration of the interior and relies on action to win fame. when encountering the war between the two great powers, you remain neutral, and the winner does not need to be in adversity to assist his suspicious friends. the loser will not shelter you, and will always be the winner’s prize. a clear expression of sponsors, the union won, although dominated, for the sake of justice can also be thoughtful, the union failed, won the war in the future will still be appreciated, thus, the weak country must not maintain neutrality. when confronted by two weak countries, careful consideration must be given to supporting one side to win. unless you have to, you must never introduce foreign powers to attack other countries, because even if you win, your country will become a captive of powerful countries. it is difficult for any country to take full advantage and avoid disadvantages, to be cautious about the disadvantages and to choose the best path to the least. in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 46 published by scholink inc. addition, the monarch should show that he cherishes talents, encourages farmers and businessmen, enjoys with the people, is modest and generous and so on, but must always maintain dignity! whether the monarch is wise or not is judged by the officials’ loyalty. the virtuous ministers put the interests of the monarch in the highest pursuit, holding the weight of power and being deeply trusted by the monarch. therefore, the monarch must make such officials glorious, rich and noble, and even worry about regime change. for the monarch, flattering false words will make the monarch self-satisfied and self-moved. frankly speaking the truth will make the monarch despised. a wise monarch must select people with knowledge to have the right to speak directly to the monarch, but only as an advisory suggestion, according to his own views, the will of the monarch will never change! the emperor of the holy roman empire, maximiliano, changed his decrees and lost faith in his subjects. the monarch must consult frequently and listen patiently to the truth. hearing false words for whatever reason must be angered and punished. he must bear in mind that the good minister’s loyalty comes from the emperor, not the good minister’s loyalty. the implication is that the monarch is always right. even if this right is found by others, it can only be said through the mouth of the monarch. there are many things “always right” in the world, the essence is right power. anyone’s intelligent labor results can be labeled with power, concentrated on the monarch himself, in order to establish the prestige of the monarch. the best fortress of the monarch is to avoid being hated by the people. the physical fortress has no use but to alleviate the insecurity of the monarch. when the people take up weapons, the fortress is futile. it seems that the use of gunpowder blew the knight class to pieces. the fundamental reason is that the people at this time, accurately speaking, the bourgeoisie entered the stage of history and became the force that must be united by all monarchs who wanted to seek dictatorship. the core issue of the metaphor of fortress is not the external symbol of fortress. when the monarch holds the popular will, the regime is stable. when the monarch loses the popular will, the people turn to smash this decadent system and establish a new state apparatus. machiavelli implicitly recognized the trend of historical development, the development of capitalism, the rise of humanism and the emerging autocratic monarchy has been calling out. the monarch must pay attention to the interests of the people, that is, to unite the power of the emerging bourgeoisie, so that the monarch can break through the repression of its power by the roman church, and the bourgeoisie can use the power of the new monarch to break through the feudal shackles that restrict its development. that is already the consensus of all new monarchs and the bourgeoisie, except the rotten turkish sudan and the distant ancient rome. 3.3.3 on national perspectives he urged the monarch to act actively, conform to the trend of history, and even pin his hopes on the medici family, organizing a new army to unify italy.the measures of the new monarch are more likely to attract people’s attention. as long as his wise talents are recognized, the people will be loyal to him and their achievements will be praised by the people. the reasons for the failure of the italian monarch: relying on mercenaries and aid without their own army, being contempt by the people, not knowing www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 47 published by scholink inc. how to balance the nobles to protect themselves. filippo v of macedonia loved the people bravely and knew how to guard against aristocrats. although he finally lost some territories, the state remained, and the monarchs who enjoyed the kingdom for many years but lost the state were by no means troubled by fate but incompetent. destiny is dominated by only half of our actions, mostly by ourselves. destiny floods vividly tell us that devastating disasters cannot be prevented, but can be prepared for it, and the national movement of italy can be protected through appropriate force. when the fate is changing, as long as the ways and means adhere to the characteristics of the times, like pope julio ii do not seek perfection, brave and rapid, coordinate time and events, it is easy to succeed. machiavelli advocates that the monarch (lorenzo medici) actively change the fate and conform to the historical trend. first of all, in terms of opportunity, the opportunity of moises’ outstanding ability is the slavery of the israelis in egypt, the opportunity of the great spirit of salvo is the oppression of the persians by the mediians, the opportunity of tessius’ outstanding performance is the displacement and dispersion of the athenians, and now italy is desperate, more enslaved than the hebrews, more oppressed than the persians, more displaced than the athenians, looted and ravaged. borgia seems to have a ray of hope, but he failed. our highness lorenzo’s opportunity at this time was far greater than that of them, and his career was more just. secondly, in terms of leadership, lorenzo is wise and talented, the royal family has both luck and prominence, god and the church love blessing. again, as far as national quality is concerned, the italians are clever, tactful and brave in fighting, and always failed because of weak leadership and incompetent management. finally, as far as future development is concerned, the hope lies in the medici family, as long as the resolutions of the monarchy follow the law of those who save the country’s outstanding figures, the formation of their own army, will be able to work hard to liberate italy from barbarians, unified italy. 4. thoughts and inspirations the study of machiavelli’s political thought is not only a historical environment in italy from the 15 the 16th century, but also a narrow historical fragment. as a masterpiece in the history of political theory, machiavelli and his the prince bring us infinite thinking and enlightenment. machiavelli’s political thought in the interests of the limitations. on the one hand, starting from the “evil human nature”, machiavelli unilaterally attributed human nature to hypocrisy and greed, selfish, that even the best people are prone to corruption and degeneration, because doing evil is beneficial to themselves, speaking false words can please others. on the other hand, the pursuit of the maximization of national interests, even ignore the importance of morality, which will only lead to other countries’ sense of insecurity, and eventually fall into the “security dilemma” of mutual insecurity. the biggest problem is that it has a tendency to slide towards extreme realistic politics, that is, any policy that is conducive to the country is accepted, no matter how much moral problems it has. in extreme cases, driven by national security and national interests, realism may develop a tendency of violence. finally, machiavelli’s political thought still has some methods worthy of reference, we should be the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 48 published by scholink inc. renaissance machiavelli’s political thought and “machiavelliism” to be strictly distinguished. but as marx and engels put it, “(the bourgeoisie) makes no connection between people except for naked interests and ruthless cash transactions. as a spokesman for the bourgeoisie, machiavelli’s realistic view of interests is essentially to establish a bourgeois state and safeguard the interests of the bourgeoisie.” “not for ceasare, rather for nothing”. although the spirit of perseverance for the highest ideal is worthy of sympathy, it is doomed to fail in violation of the law of social and historical development. first of all, an attempt to unify italy with the military conquest of individual new monarchs, rather than relying on the power of nationalism to mobilize the broad masses of the people, will hope that the princes will be contrary to the historical impetus of the people. secondly, god’s power exceeded ceasare’s power. western europe was on the eve of the rise of the nation-state, and the pope’s authority was still shrouded in italy. ironically, with the help of borgia’s southern expedition and northern war, the enemy of the catholic church was objectively eliminated, and the pope’s political power reached its peak during julio ii. finally, the monarch’s personality defects, the lack of moral, in the use of power is not as good as the final anti-eophagy itself, even fluke to achieve unity is doomed not long. references heuser, b. (2010). the strategy makers: thoughts on war and society from machiavelli to clausewitz. praeger. hexter, r. (2009). the machiavellian moment: florentine political thought and the atlantic republican tradition. history & theory, 16(3). https://doi.org/10.2307/2504836 hutchings, & kimberly. (2016). negotiating the lines between war and politics: machiavelli’s gendering of war and peace. international politics, 53(4). https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2016.13 kendall, w., & strauss, l. (1966). thoughts on machiavelli. philosophical review, 75(2). https://doi.org/10.2307/2183091 korab-karpowicz, w. j. (2012). on the history of political philosophy: great political thinkers from thucydides to locke. longman inc. machiavelli, n. (1996). discourses on livy. worlds classics. machiavelli, n., & thomson, n. h. (n.d.). the prince. oxford university press. marco, c. (2014). machiavelli on international relations. history of political thought. miller, & david. (1987). the blackwell encyclopaedia of political thought. b. blackwell,. morgenthau, h. j., & thompson, k. w. (2011). politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace (6th ed.). political rights in chinese constitutions in human rights in contemporary. northey, m. (2015). the political philosophy of niccolò machiavelli. books. pozo,l., &m. (2002). theories of nationalism: a critical introduction (book). capital & class, 26(76). https://doi.org/10.1177/030981680207600114 regent, n.(2011). machiavelli: empire, virt and the final downfall. history of political thought. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 49 published by scholink inc. sabine, g. h. (1951). a history of political theory. american journal of sociology, 56. strauss, l.(1959). thoughts on machiavelli. midwest journal of political science, 3(3). https://doi.org/10.2307/2109255 winter, & yves. (2014). the prince and his art of war: machiavelli’s military populism. social research. wood, n. (2010). machiavelli’s concept of virt reconsidered. political studies, 15(2). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1967.tb01842.x zuckert, c. h. (2017). machiavelli’s politics. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226434940.001. 0001 microsoft word ape-v3n3-p20 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 20 article review article review: impact of kissan credit cards on the socio-economic life of people in jammu and kashmir (2017) by nasir ahmad ganaie and ramdas rupavath review by yawar shamim1* & nasir ahmad ganaie2 1 department of history, school of social sciences, university of delhi, delhi-110007, india 2 department of political science, school of social sciences, university of hyderabad, cuc-500046, telangana, india * yawar shamim, department of history, university of delhi, india received: june 6, 2020 accepted: june 23, 2020 online published: july 4, 2020 doi:10.22158/ape.v3n3p20 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v3n3p20 article review of “impact of kissan credit cards on the socio-economic life of people in jammu and kashmir”(2017) by nasir ahmad ganaie & ramdas rupavath, international journal of modern social sciences, 6(1), pp. 1-21, issn: 2169-9917, florida, usa. 1. outline the authors in this scholarly work titled “impact of kissan credit cards on the socio-economic life of people in jammu and kashmir” by (ganaie & rupavath, 2017) have tried to examine the impact and success rate of the kissan credit cards (kccs) besides evaluating the efficiency of this centrally sponsored scheme on the life of the people in jammu and kashmir. the authors have tried to explore the relationship between unemployment and the kissan credit cards, as we all are aware that india up to its independence from the british colonial forces in the year 1947 had been a victim of the colonialism. jammu and kashmir, which was a princely state at that time and before the merger with the union of india had/has been a victim of british and dogra colonial powers (ganaie, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). india has been considered as an agricultural nation, and its majority of the population depends on this agricultural production, besides this, the agricultural sector of our country has been generating enormous sources of employment generation methods. the government of india particularly at the intermediate level always initiate policies for the wellbeing of the farmers besides trying to revolutionize the agricultural sector, in order to enhance their agricultural production during the last decade of the twentieth century, the government of india in association with the reserve bank of india www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 21 published by scholink inc. (rbi) and national bank for agricultural and rural development (nabard) established a new scheme widely known as kcc (kissan credit card). the kcc was introduced in the society as a preventive tool for farmers from preharvest to the post-harvest stage to make farmers self-reliant and independent from the highest commission granting agencies and agents. the authors in this brilliant scholarly work have used rich literature for compiling this paper, and they were successful in finding out how the agricultural sector had become a prey of inefficiency due to the lack of timely credit availability and how the agrarian price and credit subsidy policies may raise the interest rate of informal credit markets. 2. politics of kcc in jammu & kashmir the economy of the union territory of jammu and kashmir has always been challenged by the unpredictable weather conditions besides unforeseen extremist rise, rise in separatism, armed insurgency(ganaie, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c) and in addition to that the farmers of the jammu and kashmir have always seen a non-availability of the credit at the needy time. the authors argued that all the inescapable needs of the farmers were fulfilled by this centrally subsidized scheme which was brought there in collaboration with the highest private lending bank of jammu and kashmir which is officially called as jammu and kashmir bank. the authors strongly argue that kissan credit card remained politically active in jammu &kashmir till the abrogation of the article 370, it was used as a political toy between the political parties of jammu, and kashmir (ganaie, 2017), an incense of this can be quoted from authors paper on p. 5 “the people’s democratic party (pdp) along with other political parties, had used this tool to convenience voters. they promised the innocent voters that they are going to exempt them from paying the kcc loans if voted to power. the voters blindly voted for them in huge numbers and with this tool of propaganda they retained most of the seats in kashmir region” (ganaie, 2016). according to the authors mentioned table 1 on p .3 reported by the government of jammu and kashmir during the initial years, the scheme got no expectation success as compared to the last 5-7 years. moreover, it was mainly due to the less interest of the jammu and kashmir bank in this centrally sponsored scheme. as per the authors, soon after the speedy growth of the programme at the central level the j&k bank also finally got stepped in and too keen and serious interest in the implementation of the programme and tried to enhance the credit delivery schemes in each and every part of the region. the research paper is an excellent read for anyone interested in knowing about the ‘socio-economic life of the jammu and kashmir.’ regarding the primary and secondary sources, the authors have used a variety of observational methods, collected data from respondents of 336 people irrespective of their age group and religion from 877 villages in the selected districts of union territory of jammu and kashmir namely shopian, kulgam, pulwama, baramullah, and bandipora. as we know, kashmir is a populated muslim region where men in most of the families regarded as the bread earner and this scope of earning are also influential in all the sectors of the society. all the kcc www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 22 published by scholink inc. holders were males, and on the other hand, 43% of the studied cardholders were employed while the rest were unemployed. 93%, 86%, and 70.8% of the selected cardholders agreed that through the successful implementation of the said scheme they were economically uplifted, became financially self-reliant besides becoming independent on highest commissioned agencies respectively. however, the authors have claimed that there was vastly observed misconception and misinformation about the interest rate and renewal process regarding the said scheme. irrespective of the limitations the authors in this scholarly contribution suggest the collaborations of the scheme especially from the jammu & kashmir bank side, the authors strongly recommend that firstly j&k bank should recruit a generous instructor or counsell or who should clarify or counsel the beneficiaries about the benefits of the scheme in advance and clear their doubts. secondly, there must be a crop insurance and payment deferment while production failure due to the natural calamities or other sorts of crop failures. the authors deserve the appreciation of the way in which they have dealt with all significant issues and touched almost all the aspects of this centrally subsidized scheme for the people of jammu and kashmir. 3. acronyms goi: government of india ir: interest rate j&k: jammu and kashmir kcc: kissan credit card nabard: national bank for agricultural and rural development nc: national conference pdp: peoples democratic party rbi: reserve bank of india references ganaie, n. a. (2015a). naya kashmir, land reforms and colonialism in jammu and kashmir, a study of national conference and its implications on the identity of state. international journal of applied research, 1(13), 565-569. ganaie, n. a. (2015b). sikh socio-religious reform movements in jammu and kashmir from 1900-1947. international journal of interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary studies (ijims), 2(8), 12-16. ganaie, n. a. (2015c). socio-religious reform movements of muslims in j & k from 1900-47. international journal of innovative research and development, 4(6), 294-298. ganaie, n. a. (2016, march 30). pdp-bjp coalition can uplift j&k. rising kashmir. retrieved june 19, 2020, from http://www.risingkashmir.com/news/pdpbjp-coalition-can-uplift-jk/ www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 23 published by scholink inc. ganaie, n. a. (2017). instability and unrest in kashmir: a case from barriers of optimism to pellets. international journal of modern social sciences, 6(1), 51-93. ganaie, n. a. (2018a). modernizing extremism: a case of new age militancy in kashmir. advances in politics and economics, 1(1), 61. ganaie, n. a. (2018b). kashmir from barriers of discomfort to hope: a case of hurriyat conference. world journal of social science research, 5(3), 258. ganaie, n. a. (2018c). drama of separatism. urban studies and public administration, 1(2), 320. ganaie, n. a., & rupavath, r. (2017). impact of kissan credit cards on the socio-economic life of people in jammu and kashmir. international journal of modern social sciences, 6(1), 1-21. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 132 original paper research on the value and path of integrating the great founding spirit of cpc into college ideological and political education xiaoxin huang 1a & heng lyu 1b* 1 guangzhou huali college, guangzhou 511300, guangdong, china a 1624798151@qq.com b 102357015@qq.com received: april 18, 2023 accepted: may 11, 2023 online published: may 26, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n2p132 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n2p132 abstract the great founding spirit of the communist party of china (cpc) inspires the party to unite and lead the chinese people to create miracles in the struggle over more than a century. the great founding spirit of the cpc is a valuable resource for conducting a series of ideological and political education courses in china. integrating it into college ideological and political courses can help the students strengthen their ideals and beliefs, enhance their sense of responsibility, consolidate their sense of responsibility, and enhance their emotional and value identity of patriotism, loving the party, and loving the people. this paper aims to explore the value and practical path of integrating the great founding spirit of the cpc into ideological and political education, and it provides a reference for the study of integrating ideological and political education really into college campuses, teaching, and student’s mind. keywords communist party of china, the great founding spirit of the cpc, ideological and political education, college students 1. the necessity of integrating the great founding spirit of the cpc into ideological and political education since modern times, for saving the nation and rejuvenate china, countless patriots have learned from the western countries but repeatedly hit the wall, failed to find a way to save the world. in 1921, the cpc emerged in the close combination of marxism and the workers’ movement, which was a great www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 133 published by scholink inc. event that opened a new era. in 2021, general secretary delivered an important speech at the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the cpc, proposing the great founding spirit of the cpc of adhering to the truth, sticking to the ideal, practicing the original intention, assuming the mission, fearless sacrifice, brave struggle, and loyalty to the party and not disappointing the people. the great founding spirit of the cpc inspires our party to become a mighty giant ship leading the great rejuvenation of the chinese nation from a small “red boat”. from august 2021 to present, through classroom surveys and exchanges with over 2,000 college students, it was found that almost all college students have heard of the great founding spirit of the cpc since general secretary first proposed it. however, more than half of the students are not able to grasp the basic content and essential connotation of the great founding spirit of the cpc. students expressed that college students in the new era must promote the great founding spirit of the cpc. however, understanding its value and significance is still not comprehensive and accurate enough. in a word, integrating the great founding spirit of the cpc into ideological and political course education is a very important and necessary task, and need actively explore the establishment of a systematic and long-term integration mechanism. 2. significant value of integrating the great founding spirit of the cpc into ideological and political education college students are the driving force and reserve force for social development, and universities as the main front for ideological and political education have the responsibility to guide students in inheriting and promoting the great founding spirit of the cpc. ideological and political education is a key course for implementing the fundamental task of cultivating virtue and talent. integrating the great founding spirit of the cpc into ideological and political education is precisely the mission and responsibility of universities to educate people for the party and cultivate talent for the country, and it is related to the fundamental education task of what kind of people to cultivate, how to cultivate them, and for whom to cultivate them. the great founding spirit of the cpc is a precious red resource that has important significance in inheriting the red genes and continuing the red bloodline, as well as strengthening college students’ determination of their ideals and beliefs, enhancing their sense of responsibility and patriotism, and promoting their emotional and value identification with the party, the country, and the people. 2.1 beneficial for strengthening the ideal beliefs of college students encourage college students to deeply pursue the ideal of “upholding truth and ideals” at both the cognitive and emotional levels. general secretary compare ideals and beliefs to “calcium”, without firm and ideal beliefs, the spirit will lack “calcium” and will suffer from “osteoporosis”. therefore, the lack of faith can be very dangerous. as the “calcium” of the human spirit, ideal beliefs are the core of everyone’s spiritual world. not only communist party members but also college students should “supplement calcium” spiritually. as a spiritual support, ideal beliefs play an important role in helping www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 134 published by scholink inc. the students grasp the development situation at home and abroad in the new era and stage, understand the laws of human social development, and master the correct methodology. they also have the responsibility to carry forward the historical mission of the society. noble ideal beliefs can help the students establish lofty goals, courageously shoulder the heavy responsibilities of the times, combine their dreams with the chinese dream, plan the blueprint for their life dreams, and contribute to the chinese dream. ideological and political education should guide college students to consciously connect their personal dream ideals with the future and destiny of the country from the cognitive and emotional levels. however, firming ideal beliefs is not a one-time effort. universities should actively guide their students to regard firming ideal beliefs as a long-term compulsory course, form an effective and feasible long-term mechanism through the main channel role of ideological and political education courses, help college students to supplement the “calcium” of ideal beliefs, and cultivate a new generation of people who bear the heavy responsibility of national rejuvenation. 2.2 beneficial for enhancing sense of responsibility of college students strengthening college students’ practical spirit and sense of responsibility to “stay true to the original aspiration and take on the mission” in their actions. in the modern practice of exploring salvation, history, and the people called for a thoroughly advanced political party representing the interests of the broad masses of the people that was anti-imperialist and anti-feudal. therefore, the establishment of the cpc was historically inevitable, and the original mission of seeking happiness for the people and rejuvenation for the nation has been the thread that runs through the party’s century-long arduous struggle. the cpc has no special interests of its own and always upholds everything for the people and relies on the people. history and the people are the “test paper makers,” and the cpc is the “test taker.” our party has answered one satisfactory test paper after another in practice for history and the people. from the sense of responsibility that “the rise and fall of the world is the responsibility of everyone,” to the practical actions of “to live or die for the country,” all reflect a strong sense of responsibility and inspire generation after generation to struggle hard, overcome difficulties one after another, and achieve one victory after another. as a young group with knowledge, strength, and capabilities, college students should be cultivated with a sense of responsibility to dare to take on the responsibility, and they should have a high degree of consciousness of “i am responsible for my success and the strong country needs me.” they should shoulder the responsibility and historical mission of achieving national prosperity, national rejuvenation, and the people’s happiness. the ideological and political education should use the great founding spirit of the cpc to cultivate them. 2.3 beneficial for inspiring fighting spirit of college students inspire college students’ fighting spirit of “fearless sacrifice, brave struggle” in their spiritual character. chairman mao once said revolution is not a dinner party, essay, painting, or embroidery. it cannot be so refined, leisurely, and gentle, temperate, kind, courteous, restrained, and modest. revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another. communist party members in china were steadfast and unyielding, using their precious lives to write their faith and perseverance in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 135 published by scholink inc. revolution, sacrificing tens of thousands of revolutionary martyrs on the eve of the founding of new china to preserve the revolutionary spark and establish a new china. according to incomplete statistics, in the 28 years of bloody struggle, the revolutionary forces led by the cpc had more than 3.7 million martyrs. the cause of socialism with chinese characteristics cannot be achieved by banging drums and gongs, it is achieved through persistent and arduous struggle. the unremitting struggle is the political background of the cpc in its great practice in various historical periods of the chinese revolution, construction, and reform. only with the spirit of unremitting struggle, tenacious hard work, perseverance, and the more setbacks, the more courageous, can a strong leadership core be formed and can unite and lead the chinese people to continue to advance bravely for the great rejuvenation of the chinese nation. youth is for fighting, and struggle is the most brilliant background of young college students. in ideological and political courses, telling the stories of heroes and martyrs well, and inspire the students in the new era with vivid and touching stories to develop the qualities of not being afraid of sacrifice and daring to fight. 2.4 beneficial for cultivating patriotism of college students cultivate college students, patriotism with the belief of “being loyal to the party and not disappointing the people” in terms of their values. marx stated in the communist manifesto that communists have no interests separate. which is the fundamental principle that has enabled the party to grow from just over 50 members to over 96 million members today. on june 28, 2021, general secretary emphasized in his signed article the people’s republic belongs to the people and the people are the foundation of the country” in people’s daily, “i will be selfless and not let down the people. i am willing to achieve a state of ‘selflessness’ and devote myself to china’s development,” and called on all party members and comrades to keep their original mission in mind, always maintain close ties with the masses, and continue to work tirelessly to fulfill the people’s aspirations for a better life and to strive for the cause of socialism with chinese characteristics. loyalty to the party and wholehearted service to the people are the essential requirements for chinese communists to integrate into their blood and soul, which is the lifeline of the party. incorporating the great founding spirit of the cpc into ideological and political education can guide students to integrate their individual goals with the country’s overall development and the people’s cause, solidly learn professional skills, and be loyal to the party and the people in different positions, thus contributing their youthful energy to building a modern socialist country in all respects. 3. the practical approach of integrating the great founding spirit of the cpc into ideological and political education exploring the practical approach of integrating the great founding spirit of the cpc into ideological and political education and establishing a systematic and long-term integration mechanism is conducive to strengthening and improving the approaches and methods of ideological and political education, enhancing the ability and level of its work for college students, and cultivating reliable successors for www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 136 published by scholink inc. the construction of socialism with chinese characteristics. 3.1 incorporating the great founding spirit of the cpc into curriculum teaching fully incorporating the great founding spirit of the cpc into the curriculum of major ideological and political courses. for example, in the “basic principles of marxism” course, detailed interpretations of marxist truth and the great ideals of communism, and how the cpc has changed the world under the guidance of marxism theory, can be integrated to strengthen students’ lofty beliefs in marxism and communism. in the “introduction to mao zedong thought” course, detailed interpretations of the theoretical system of new ideas, new concepts, and new viewpoints that combine marxist truth with china’s specific practices, as well as how the party inherits, develops, innovates, and leaps forward in theory, can be incorporated. in the “outline of modern chinese history” course, the century-long struggle history of how the cpc fulfilled its mission, upheld its original aspirations, was unafraid of sacrifice, and fought heroically, can be taught to clearly explain the “four choices” of history and the people, and how our party has united and led the people to achieve the “four great accomplishments.” in the “ideological and moral cultivation and fundamentals of law” course, loyalty to the party, not betraying the country and the people, and guiding students to establish correct worldviews, outlooks on life, and values, inherit the party’s fine traditions, promote the chinese spirit, pursue lofty ideals, firm lofty beliefs, and create extraordinary lives. in the “principles and policies of governance” course, guiding students to understand and grasp current political affairs and major domestic and international events, and integrating historical and current comparisons, use a broad historical perspective to view the relationship between reality, the past, and the future, and guiding students to deeply understand how the cpc has changed the future and development direction of the chinese nation, taking the cause of the chinese nation to new heights. in incorporating the spirit of the great party building into the teaching of ideological and political courses, it is necessary to avoid rigidly applying the same approach to all courses. instead, we need to combine the actual content of each course, reflect high-level thinking while being grounded, and make it easy for students to accept and understand, to achieve the intended effect. 3.2 integrating the great founding spirit of the cpc into practical activities practical education is one of the important approaches to ideological and political education in universities. universities should use practical activities as a carrier to broaden the main battlefield of classroom education, guide students to step out of the classroom, feel the essence of the great founding spirit of the cpc in practical activities, and achieve the effect of “integrating knowledge with action”. by using extracurricular social practice activities, universities can guide students to fully exercise their subjectivity. firstly, broaden the ideological and political classroom and guide students to “go out”. make full use of local red education resources and let the students physically experience and understand the great founding spirit of the cpc. organizing students to visit red education bases such as the revolutionary former residence, revolutionary museums, and martyrs’ memorial parks according to the actual www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 137 published by scholink inc. situation, guiding students to feel historical figures, understand historical events, comprehend historical thoughts, remember history, deepen students’ patriotic sentiments, and strengthen ideological awareness. secondly, broaden the path and “introduce” the spirit of great party building. for example, carry out themed education on the great founding spirit of the cpc, invite veteran party members, descendants of revolutionary martyrs, or relevant experts and scholars to give theme lectures, theme reports, ideological and political classes, and hold symposiums and exchanges to enrich students’ knowledge of red culture. thirdly, expanding mutual assistance and communication and jointly building propaganda bases for the great party building construction. based on local red resources, deeply carry out mutual assistance and exchanges between strong universities and regions, building red education demonstration bases, and establishing a long-term mechanism for the spirit of great party building. finally, combing ideological and political classes with classroom teaching. according to the requirements of practical course assignments for various subjects, arranging some practical course assignments related to the spirit of great party building for students, further guide students to study seriously, and understand the spiritual qualities of the predecessors and martyrs who were not afraid of difficulties, dared to struggle, were willing to dedicate themselves to serving the people, were loyal to the party, and undertook their missions, find the right role models, and learn from them. through the channels of social practice education, deepen college student’s understanding of the chinese national conditions, deepen their value and emotional identification with the cpc, draw strength for their struggles from the great founding spirit of the cpc, and strive to become a new generation of youth with a sense of mission, responsibility, patriotism, and dedication to the country. 3.3 integrating the great founding spirit of the cpc into college management in 2018, general secretary pointed out in his speech at the national education conference that ideological and political education is the lifeline of all work in schools. party committees at all levels, education authorities at all levels, and school party organizations must firmly grasp it. universities should strengthen the construction of the ideological and political work system, and school daily management plays an important role in the comprehensive education. ideological and political education should be done in daily life and in people’s minds. firstly, universities should use the internet to grasp the main position of cultural propaganda. by utilizing the internet, innovative methods and carriers for ideological and political education dissemination can be developed. for example, playing red-themed movies in the form of weekend cinemas can not only enrich students’ campus life but also ease the tense atmosphere of weekday study. advanced deeds of the great founding of the party can be disseminated through official websites, public accounts, as well as popular social media such as weibo, class qq groups, short videos, and wechat groups. secondly, the great founding spirit of the cpc should be integrated into campus culture construction. for example, by strengthening the use of main places such as student dormitories, leisure areas, dining areas, libraries, and sports venues, students can be influenced by the essence of the great founding of the party through various forms such as campus radio stations, party building www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 138 published by scholink inc. magazines, posters, publicity columns, and art design. thirdly, the great founding spirit of the cpc should be integrated into school competitions. activities such as the red song competition, speech competition, theme essay, debate competition, and creative poster competition can promote the main theme of the great founding of the party. finally, a team of specialized teachers for ideological and political courses in universities should be built and strengthened. the key to realizing the chinese dream of national rejuvenation lies in talent, and the key to talent development lies in teachers. teachers play a leading role in education and teaching, so the construction of a team of ideological and political teachers in universities is of great importance. at the same time, the active promotion of the collaborative and interactive role of counselors, class teachers, and other subject teachers in promoting the great founding spirit of the cpc is also necessary. universities should fully utilize management mechanisms to integrate the great founding spirit of the cpc into teaching, research, culture, network, management, service, funding, organization, and other aspects, forming a joint force effect in comprehensive education. 4. conclusion the era shapes great spirits, and great spirits guide the development of the era. the great founding spirit of the cpc embodies the party’s original aspirations and essential characteristics. guided by this spirit, the party has led the people of all ethnic groups through a century of hardships and struggles, achieving the “four greats” and entering a new era of socialism with chinese characteristics, creating a great miracle in the development of the socialist cause. as an important place to cultivate socialist reliable builders and successors, colleges and universities have the obligation and responsibility to shoulder the mission bravely, fully tap the valuable educational resources in the great party building spirit, actively explore and establish a long-term educational mechanism, and integrate the great party building spirit into school education, teaching, and management. strictly implement the fundamental task of strengthening moral education and cultivating people, guide college students to consciously inherit and carry forward the great spirit of party building, help the students nourish their original heart, inspire their fighting spirit, firm their direction, work hard, and contribute to the cause of the party, the people and the chinese nation。 acknowledgements family education project of china intelligent engineering research society; project name "artificial intelligence helps economic and social transformation and upgrading" (no.: zhgc50162) economic research center, institute of regional reform and development, chinese academy of management sciences, research on artificial intelligence and economic innovation research (no.: jjyj00105) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 139 published by scholink inc. references cai, z. q., & yuan, m. x. (2021). connotation, formation mechanism and practical requirements of the great party building spirit. ideological and theoretical education, 2021(8), 4-11. liu, j. j. (2021). theoretical interpretation of the great party building spirit. ideological and theoretical education, 2021(8), 12-17. liu, p. (2021). the realistic consideration of integrating the great party building spirit into the ideological and political education of college students. school party building and ideological and political education research, 19, 53-55. luo, y. t. (2003). on spiritual motivation. wuhan: wuhan college press. ma, j. l. (2014). research on the education path of the socialist core value system among college students. central academic press, 2014. tian, w. y. (2013). the value research and path analysis of the life of ideological and political education among college students. shanxi normal college, 2013. zhang, z. d. (2021). multi-dimensional interpretation of the great party building spirit. research on marxist theory, 2021(7), 32-41. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 43 original paper road accident and safety issue in bangladesh: a critical review naimul razzaque1, sharmin jahan runa1, & md. sagor hossain1 1 department of law, sonargaon university, panthapath, tejgaon, dhaka, bangladesh corresponding author: naimulrazzque2019@gmail.com received: august 29, 2023 accepted: october 23, 2023 online published: november 02, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n4p43 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n4p43 abstract road accidents are a major public health concern in bangladesh, causing significant harm to individuals and society as a whole. despite various initiatives taken by the government, the number of road accidents continues to increase, highlighting the need for a legal approach to address this issue. this study aims to analyze the current legal framework in bangladesh with regards to road safety and identify potential areas for improvement. the study found that the current legal framework in bangladesh contains several provisions aimed at promoting road safety, including the bangladesh road transport act, the bangladesh road transport corporation act, and the bangladesh road transport authority act. however, these laws lack effective enforcement mechanisms, and there is limited accountability for those who violate traffic rules. this has led to widespread flouting of traffic regulations and a high incidence of road accidents. the study recommends the introduction of stricter penalties for those who violate traffic rules, including fines and imprisonment. it also suggests the establishment of an independent road safety commission to monitor compliance with traffic rules and to ensure effective implementation of road safety measures. the commission should have the authority to investigate road accidents and to take appropriate actions against those found responsible persons. additionally, the study recommends the introduction of mandatory training programs for all drivers and the provision of better infrastructure and technology to support road safety. this may include the installation of traffic lights and speed cameras, as well as the use of innovative technologies such as gps-based monitoring systems. in conclusion, a legal approach is crucial in addressing the problem of road accidents in bangladesh. by introducing stricter penalties, establishing an independent road safety commission, and investing in road safety infrastructure and technology, the government can help to reduce the number of road accidents and save lives. further research is needed to understand the impact of these measures and to identify additional ways to promote road safety in bangladesh. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 44 published by scholink inc. keywords road safety, accident, societyransport, traffic, punishment, social aspects 1. introduction road accident is one of the fundamental issues in our country. thousands of people are killed or injured in road accidents in bangladesh, leading to significant social and economic costs. despite various initiatives taken by the government to address this issue, the number of road accidents continues to increase, highlighting the need for a more comprehensive and effective approach. this paper means to recognize road accident in bangladesh. this study aims to analyze the current legal framework in bangladesh with regards to road safety and identify potential areas for improvement. the study focuses on the laws and regulations that are relevant to road safety, including the bangladesh road transport act, the bangladesh road transport corporation act, and the bangladesh road transport authority act. the purpose of this study is to provide a comprehensive overview of the current legal framework for road safety in bangladesh and to identify areas for improvement. but the complete solution of the problems is still a matter of hope. so option for finding the actual causes and better solution this study has been designed for. 2. research objective the title of the study itself expressed the objectives of my study as to critically analyzing the key problems of road accident in bangladesh, finding the actual reasons of the problems and providing the proper recommendations to tackle those obstacles. the study is also guided by the principle that road safety is a shared responsibility between the government, road users, and society as a whole. the government has a responsibility to create a legal framework that promotes road safety, road users have a responsibility to abide by traffic rules, and society has a responsibility to support and encourage safe driving behavior. this study is based on the following key components: the legal foundation for road safety in bangladesh, comprising pertinent laws, rules, and the procedures by which they are enforced. the role of road users in promoting road safety, including their responsibilities and accountability. the role of the government and society in promoting road safety, including the provision of infrastructure and technology to support road safety and the creation of a culture of safe driving behavior. the conceptual framework of this study is intended to provide a comprehensive understanding of the issues related to road safety in bangladesh and the role of the legal framework in addressing these issues. the study is based on the belief that a legal approach can play an important role in reducing the number of road accidents in bangladesh and in promoting a safer road environment for all. 3. methodology the current exploration study is predominantaly a doctarial and logical. keeping this in view, i have gone through various books, diaries, web references, e-diary, reports and so on. this study is qualativitve in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 45 published by scholink inc. nature and is based on both primary and secondary sources such as books, journal articles, government orders, rules, acts, newspaper reports, etc. all materials and data are gathered both sources of data and materials is two types primary data and secondary data. the primary data is collected through the process of documentation and collecting information from many sources, articles, journals and through the process of such ways: interview, observation, etc. 3. road safety as a burning issue road safety has become a critical issue in bangladesh, with increasing numbers of road accidents resulting in loss of life and injury. according to official statistics, over 12,000 people die in road accidents every year in bangladesh, making it one of the countries with the highest road fatality rates in the world. (note 1) these accidents have a profound impact on individuals, families, and communities, as well as on the economy through the cost of medical treatment and lost productivity. (note 2) in addition, road accidents also contribute to traffic congestion, air pollution, and other negative impacts on the environment. despite various initiatives taken by the government to address the issue of road safety, the number of accidents continues to rise, highlighting the need for a more comprehensive and effective approach. it is essential that all relevant stakeholders, including the government, road users, and society as a whole, work together to address this issue and promote road safety in bangladesh. 4. overview of safety factors there are several factors that contribute to road accidents in bangladesh and these can be grouped into two main categories: human factors and environmental factors. human factors refer to the actions and behaviors of road users, including drivers, passengers, and pedestrians. some of the common human factors that contribute to road accidents include reckless driving, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, speeding, ignoring traffic signals, and using mobile phones while driving. (note 3) environmental factors refer to the physical and social environment in which road users operate, including the road infrastructure, road design, traffic flow, and the presence of other vehicles, cyclists, and pedestrians. some of the common environmental factors that contribute to road accidents include poor road design, inadequate road markings, poorly maintained roads and vehicles, and insufficient road safety measures such as traffic signs and signals. (note 4) it is important to note that road accidents are often the result of the interaction between human and environmental factors (note 5). therefore, a thorough approach to road safety needs to take into account not only human behavior but also the social and physical context in which drivers work. to effectively address road accidents in bangladesh, it is necessary to focus on both human factors and environmental factors and to promote a culture of safe driving behavior and road safety awareness. this requires a concerted effort by the government, road users, and society as a whole. (note 6) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 46 published by scholink inc. 5. road transport act, 2018 at a glance the road transport act, 2018 is a comprehensive piece of legislation aimed at promoting road safety in bangladesh. this act replaces the previous bangladesh road transport act, and was enacted with the goal of reducing the number of road accidents and ensuring accountability for those who violate traffic rules. some of the key features of the road transport act, 2018 include: stricter penalties for traffic violations, including fines, imprisonment, and license suspension or revocation. a comprehensive licensing system for drivers, including the requirement for a valid driving license and periodic renewals. (note 7) the establishment of a road transport authority (rta) with the responsibility for enforcing traffic rules and regulations, as well as for investigating road accidents. the provision of training and education for road users, including drivers, passengers, and pedestrians, to promote safe driving behavior and road safety awareness. the establishment of a vehicle registration and inspection authority (vria) to ensure that all vehicles on the road are safe and fit for use. (note 8) the introduction of new technologies, such as digital licensing and electronic monitoring systems, to improve the enforcement of traffic rules and regulations. the requirement for all vehicles to be insured to provide financial protection for victims of road accidents. the road transport act, 2018 is a significant step forward in promoting road safety in bangladesh and it is expected to have a positive impact on reducing the number of road accidents in the country. the implementation and enforcement of this act, in conjunction with other measures, such as education and training for road users, road infrastructure improvements, and the promotion of a culture of safe driving behavior, will be critical in achieving the goal of a safer road environment for all. 6. factors behind road accidents 6.1 reckless and dangerous driving reckless and dangerous driving behaviors should be banned. 6.2 driver fatigue long hours of driving and lack of rest can lead to driver fatigue, which impairs a driver’s ability to concentrate and react to changes in traffic conditions. 6.3 driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol is a major cause of road accidents in bangladesh, as it impairs a driver’s ability to make safe and responsible decisions while driving. 6.4 poor road infrastructure there must be improving road infrastructure and promoting safe vehicle maintenance, encouraging the use of safety technologies, is another factor behind road accidents in bangladesh. 6.5 overloading of vehicles overloading of vehicles, particularly trucks and buses, can result in vehicle instability, making them more susceptible to accidents. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 47 published by scholink inc. 6.6 poor vehicle maintenance poorly maintained vehicles, such as vehicles with worn brakes, tires, or suspension systems, can increase the risk of road accidents. 6.7 lack of awareness and education lack of awareness and education about safe driving practices and road safety is a significant factor behind road accidents in bangladesh. 7. trauma after a car accident most car accidents include a distressing event that happens suddenly, so you could feel unprepared or unable to prevent it. the psychological impacts of auto accidents make much more sense in this light. these emotions and responses may eventually start to subside once the automobile has been fixed, the insurance company has been dealt with, and any physical injuries have healed. 8. medical facilities and victim care accident victims may be left with painfully short-term or long-term effects. the victim’s family is also affected, in addition to the direct sufferer. first assistance, transportation, emergency medical care, and the security of people, cars, and public property are all urgent demands. longer-term requirements may include ongoing therapy, assistive technology, rehabilitation, psychological and emotional support, as well as financial assistance and employment. 1) the number of trauma centers in the nation is rather small. the development of physical structures, such as at the trauma center at mirasarai on the dhaka-chittagong highway, has resulted from a governmental decision to create a few trauma centers beside roads. however, these structures are not very useful because there is a lack of staff and equipment. 2) the lack of medical personnel is a concern. a medic is someone who can attend to urgent needs but is not required to practice medicine full-time. 3) it’s crucial to create a generally recognized national emergency number that anybody may call, similar to the 911 system used in the united states (note 9). 9. safety targets and initiatives in selected countries according to the data, most industrialized nations in the globe have seen a daily decline in the number of traffic-related deaths and injuries. this is due to the effective implementation of road safety measures. national road safety goals established by several oecd (organization for economic cooperation and development) nations are shown in table 5. great britain has established a year-round public awareness program for road safety called think, focusing on a number of topics including young drivers, seat belt use, drinking and driving, vulnerable road users, and speed limits. the think campaign’s ability to bring together a variety of topics related to road safety under one banner in order to increase the effect of the overall message about road safety www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 48 published by scholink inc. is its most valuable feature. (note 10) sweden’s "vision zero" aims to end traffic-related deaths and serious injuries in the long run. with an emphasis on user responsibility, safer riding conditions, and the need for studded winter tires, sweden’s current action plan places a special emphasis on special safety measures for the riskiest routes and safer traffic flow in populated areas. it includes the creation of alternate methods of financing for new roads and increases responsibility on those responsible for designing road traffic systems. (note 11) the netherlands has adopted a concerted strategy for improving road safety to meet its unique goals. the dutch plan calls for increased cost and responsibility distribution across the federal, state, local, and private sectors as well as the public sector. regional objectives were created from national targets. modifying all road user behavior, increasing road and motorway infrastructure, boosting driver instruction, stepping up police enforcement, and promoting the "safety culture" are some of the specific actions listed for these integrated initiatives.” finland has made using a hand-held mobile phone while driving illegal, is drafting legislation that would mandate all cyclists to wear safety helmets, and actively encourages pedestrians to wear luminous apparel after dusk. australia hopes to achieve its target by continuing to focus on proven measures such as reducing the incidence of drinking and driving, improving compliance with speed limits, and increasing seat belt and child restraint use. more recent measures include matching speed limits to road conditions, promoting driver fatigue management, and encouraging the use of in-vehicle intelligent transportation systems (note 12). denmark has concentrated on road engineering projects to meet its goals. it has implemented public education programs and upgraded signs for road construction zones. it has also undergone a systematic identification and eradication of grey and black areas on its roadways, submitted all new road construction to safety audits, pilot tested road safety audits on parts of its highways. 10. recommendations to reduce the number of road accidents in bangladesh, the following recommendations can be considered: enforce traffic laws and regulations: the government and the relevant authorities should enforce traffic laws and regulations, such as the road transport act, 2018, to ensure that road users comply with traffic rules and regulations. this includes imposing stricter penalties for traffic violations and increasing the number of road safety patrols. all medical facilities should be free for individuals who are effected on road accidents. government and private institutions should organize awareness-raising events including seminars, symposiums, ads, internet campaigns, comprehend their legal and constitutional rights. promote road safety education and training: the government and relevant organizations should promote road safety education and training for drivers, passengers, and pedestrians, to raise awareness about safe driving practices and road safety. this can include providing training programs, distributing informational materials, and conducting public awareness campaigns. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 49 published by scholink inc. reducing the number of road accidents in bangladesh will require a comprehensive and coordinated approach, involving the government, road users, and society as a whole. by addressing the key factors behind road accidents and implementing effective road safety measures, it is possible to improve road safety and reduce the number of road accidents in the country. 10. conclusion in conclusion, road accidents are a major problem in bangladesh, causing significant loss of life and property, as well as economic and social consequences. from this conversation we can express that there are different reggulations connecting with casualty and their assurance. our country is developing economically but it is a matter of question that whether the fruit of that development is touching every branches of the human life. it is urgent demand of the society to get full access to justice as a part of the daily life of the people. but achieving of the goal depends not only upon the state but also the public at large. simulataneous enterprise from the both sides can solve the problems swiftly. to achieve meaningful and lasting change, it is important to address the underlying factors behind road accidents in a comprehensive and systematic manner. this requires the cooperation and collaboration of all stakeholders, including the government, road users, and society as a whole. with a commitment to road safety and a focus on evidence-based strategies, it is possible to reduce the number of road accidents in bangladesh and create a safer and more sustainable future for all. references ahmed, n. (2021). promoting a culture of road safety in bangladesh. journal of traffic and transportation engineering, 10(6), 389-393. akhtar, s. (2022). the role of safety technologies in reducing road accidents in bangladesh. journal of advanced transportation, 36(1), 21-27. bangladesh road transport authority. (2021). road safety in bangladesh. bangladesh road transport corporation. (2021). road transport act, 2018. hossain, m. (2020). improving road infrastructure to enhance road safety in bangladesh. journal of transportation engineering and technology, 9(4), 273-278. retrieved from https://rta.gov.bd/index.php/en/news-events/news/road-safety-in-bangladesh islam, m. (2021). road safety education and training in bangladesh: a review of current practices and recommendations for improvement. international journal of transportation and traffic engineering, 11(2), 107-115. khan, m. (2021). the role of law enforcement in road safety: a case study of bangladesh. journal of traffic and transportation engineering, 10(3), 139-145. rahman, a. (2021). the impact of vehicle maintenance on road safety in bangladesh. journal of transportation engineering and technology, 10(1), 65-71. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 50 published by scholink inc. rhd road user cost annual report for 2002-2003. (2002-2003). department of roads and highway, ministry of communication, bangladesh, 12-13. world health organization. (2020). road traffic injuries. retrieved from https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/road-traffic-injuries notes note 1. world health organization. (2020). road traffic injuries. https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/road-traffic-injuries note 2. khan, m. (2021). the role of law enforcement in road safety: a case study of bangladesh. journal of traffic and transportation engineering, 10(3), 139-145. note 3. bangladesh road transport corporation. (2021). road transport act, 2018. note 4. hossain, m. (2020). improving road infrastructure to enhance road safety in bangladesh. journal of transportation engineering and technology, 9(4), 273-278. note 5. rahman, a. (2021). the impact of vehicle maintenance on road safety in bangladesh. journal of transportation engineering and technology, 10(1), 65-71. note 6. bangladesh road transport authority. (2021). road safety in bangladesh. note 7. ahmed, n. (2021). promoting a culture of road safety in bangladesh. journal of traffic and transportation engineering, 10(6), 389-393. note 8. islam, m. (2021). road safety education and training in bangladesh: a review of current practices and recommendations for improvement. international journal of transportation and traffic engineering, 11(2), 107-115. note 9. [https://www.who.int/violence_injury_ prevention/resources /publications/en/ guidelines _chap3.pdf, last visited on 25 july 2023]. note 10. rhd road user cost annual report for 2002-2003. department of roads and highway, ministry of communication, bangladesh, pp. 12-13 note 11. ibid., pp. 12-13. note 12. global plan for the decade of action for road safety 2011-2020. un road safety collaboration. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 1 original paper the interaction between the investment behavior of transnational corporations and the international political and economic system chang xu 1 1 school of finance and trade, zhengzhou business university, zhengzhou, china received: july 14, 2023 accepted: september 05, 2023 online published: september 22, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n4p1 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n4p1 abstract with the development of economic globalization and world modularization, more and more economic activities transcend national boundaries, making the connection between the organic economic whole formed through foreign trade, capital flow, technology transfer and other activities become closer. transnational corporations (tncs) come into being in this context, making the global convergence trend of the economies of the world in production, distribution, exchange and consumption links more obvious. because tncs usually conduct economic activities in two or more countries, their strong economic power will inevitably affect the economic, political, cultural and social life of the country. on the one hand, the investment and business behavior of tncs will have a series of effects on the local economy of the host country, and in some economic fields, tncs can even interfere with the political order of the host country. on the other hand, in the process of globalization, transnational corporations themselves will also be affected by the international political and economic situation. keywords transnational corporation, foreign direct investment, international political and economic system 1. the concept of transnational corporations according to the definition given by the united nations commission on trade and development in its world investment report 1995, a tnc “is a joint-stock or non-joint-stock enterprise consisting of a parent company and its foreign (offshore) branches”. a more specific definition is that a tnc is an enterprise that, through outward foreign direct investment (fdi), transcends the geographical limitations of national borders and has branches or subsidiaries in the host country that are engaged in business operations such as production, sales and services. the parent company of a tnc usually www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 2 published by scholink inc. enjoys a say in the capital and management of its subsidiaries, and enjoys the right to decide and control the appointment and dismissal of personnel, training mechanisms, marketing strategies, and other aspects of the subsidiaries’ operations. compared with local firms, especially in smaller developing countries, tncs are usually larger in size, have greater competitiveness and bargaining power in the market, and are more likely to circumvent national regulations and policies. after the second world war, the creation and development of tncs have not only had a significant impact directly on the creation and development of tncs, but also indirectly on the political sphere of countries. they have also indirectly played a significant role in the political arena of various countries. the emergence of tncs has not only strengthened the interdependence of the global economy and facilitated the rapid development of national economies, but has also inevitably led to a greater number and frequency of globalization than ever before. the investment behavior of tncs can be divided into two categories based on the purpose of production activities (giorgio & anthony, 2020), which are horizontal foreign direct investment (hfdi) and vertical foreign direct investment (vfdi). hfdi is a form of fdi in which the overseas subsidiaries of a tnc engage in the production of the same industry in the host country as in the home country. hfdi emerged as a substitute for exporting, as tncs wanted to locate their production close to their customers, thus avoiding trade costs such as transportation costs and trade barriers. vfdi is a form of investment that shifts certain stages of production of labor-intensive products to lower-cost, labor-intensive countries for production. moreover, while hfdi may have greater spillover effects than vfdi because of its more intensive use of intellectual capital in the local economy, on the other hand, vfdi has a relatively stronger impact on local labor demand. from the 1990s, driven by globalization, tncs began to expand rapidly, and the influence of tncs has further expanded. they are no longer purely economic entities, but have begun to gradually intervene in international political and economic relations. 2. impact of tncs’ investment behavior on the international political economy system 2.1 tncs make the actors in the political economy system more diversified international political actors refer to a number of entities that can independently participate in international affairs and play an influential role. entities that can constitute international actors should have certain behavioral ability and political and economic strength, their own special interests, a certain degree of independence and autonomy, and have a relatively stable or solid form of organization (laura, 2020). with the development of multinational corporations, the economic exchanges between various countries become more and more frequent. first of all, tncs are economically powerful and although they do not have a certain territory and population like a country, they actually have a strong influence on a certain territory, and many of them are even stronger than many sovereign countries. the economic power of many multinational corporations is even stronger than that of many sovereign states. secondly, although many www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 3 published by scholink inc. multinational corporations are private monopolies by nature, because they carry out economic activities in two or more countries, it is easy for them to bypass the constraints and limitations of the relevant laws of some countries (roshan, 2020). thirdly, as tncs are economically powerful and operate in two or more countries, their power inevitably has an impact on the political, economic, cultural and social life of these countries. nowadays, many multinational corporations have even participated in the governmental strategies in some countries, such as directly entering the government to take up important positions, forming joint interests and so on. thus, the relatively independent international economic behavior of transnational corporations has actually had a far-reaching impact on international relations. therefore, as one of the main actors in international politics, tncs can diversify the actors in the international political and economic order by virtue of their own business model, internationalization strategy, innovation ability and core competitiveness. 2.2 developing countries are influenced by some developed countries’ tncs in the economic field the establishment of subsidiaries of tncs in developing countries will bring advanced production technologies and management concepts to these countries. tncs play an important role in transferring and disseminating innovative technologies, marketing techniques, and management and organizational practices, enabling partner enterprises to learn from their advanced technologies and management techniques, while at the same time creating employment opportunities in the host countries (abbas, 2023). moreover, tncs’ strong financing capacity can ease the problem of insufficient capital in developing countries. therefore, many developing and emerging countries have formulated national policies aimed at attracting tncs to their countries, such as tax reduction, concessionary rent and development of industrial zone facilities, the establishment of promotion agencies and many other incentive policies. however, the entry of tncs can have a negative impact on developing countries. the main purpose of subsidiaries located in developed countries may be the wide distribution market and good infrastructure there, or a stable political environment and suitable market structure. moreover, the main purpose of subsidiaries located in developing countries may be cheap land and labor, or abundant natural resources and huge market potential. these are all for the ultimate purpose of chasing the maximum profit. although there are conflicts between local interests and global interests, short-term interests and long-term interests due to the internal principal-agent relationship of multinational corporations, tncs will not give up the pursuit of profit. in order to increase production efficiency and maximize profits, tncs often establish subsidiaries only in developed countries or strong developing countries. these countries have complete infrastructures and huge market potential, which are favorable for tncs to carry out economic activities. as for countries in less developed regions, tncs usually do not invest in them. therefore, in the long run, the gap between developed and developing countries will further widen, and the gap between the rich and the poor will become more and more obvious. at the same time, most of the developing countries are economically backward and the local enterprises are weak, tncs can easily monopolize in some sectors or industries with their advanced technology and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 4 published by scholink inc. development concepts, and too much control may affect the economic autonomy of these countries, which is not conducive to the development of national enterprises. although the subsidiaries of tncs carry out production activities in the host countries, the ultimate decision-making power of the subsidiaries remains in the hands of the parent companies. this results in the host countries being limited in their ability to control the pursuit of reasonable taxation, trade, industrial structure and consumption structure orientation. 2.3 developing countries face interference in the political sphere by transnational corporations from some developed countries as the core of economic globalization and non-state actors, the emergence of tncs may cause erosion of the sovereignty of the host country (pla-barber et al., 2021). the impact of tncs on the national policies of host countries should not be underestimated. tncs have been benefiting from the host country’s economic and policy preferences, but because the production and operation and profitability of subsidiaries are still constrained by the host country’s policies, after a certain degree of development, tncs will try to find ways to expand their influence in the field of resources, capital and even politics. in order to gain a favorable position in the competitive international environment, tncs often influence the host country’s government policies and regulations through corporate political activity (cpa), and push the host country’s policies to develop in their own favorable direction. in addition, the home countries of most tncs belong to developed countries. they usually monopolize the advanced technology of the industry, and use entering or exiting a certain country’s market, opening or blocking a certain technology as a bargaining chip to put pressure on technologically weak companies as well as underdeveloped countries, forcing them to change the current policy. as a result, developing countries may be subjected to the intervention of developed country tncs in the political field. 2.4 tncs strengthen the political ties among the nations of the world transnational corporations generally locate their headquarters in their home countries and, through fdi, set up corresponding subsidiaries or branches in other countries or regions to compete on a global scale. the business objective of profit maximization of transnational corporations has largely contributed to the development process of economic globalization, as well as political globalization, and the deepening of relations between countries (li, 2022). especially in recent years, in each country’s high-level diplomatic activities, economic and trade cooperation is placed in an increasingly important position, many countries’ leaders visit other countries, will bring to the transnational corporations entrepreneurs as the representative of the industrial and commercial entrepreneurial team, and the success of the visit to the important evaluation criteria is to sign the amount of trade, the major economic and trade issues resolved as well as to attract the number of investment funds. it can be seen that the behaviour and activities of transnational corporations, while accelerating the process of economic globalization, have also strengthened the political ties between the countries of the world, and the strengthening of international economic ties has led to the strengthening of the interdependence of the world as a whole. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 5 published by scholink inc. 3. the impact of the international political and economic situation on the investment system of tncs 3.1 subsidiaries’ marketing capabilities are negatively affected by political risks in host countries political and security relations between countries, as well as economic relations outside the tnc, can also affect the tnc’s business development and its strategic plans. for example, regional tensions and conflicts caused by changes in a country’s geopolitical and security environment and adjustments in the region’s strategic power balance can not only result in a loss of profits for a multinational corporation, but also in a serious loss of assets and a disruption of the entire production chain in the region. the company has influence over the state, but the final decision-making power rests with the state. therefore, the fate of companies also rests in the hands of the state. the governance of tnc subsidiaries exists at the corporate level with internal shareholders and boards of directors and at the national level including home and host country, so that the operation and marketing ability of subsidiaries will be affected by the domestic political risk of the host country. the risk of political relations can have a negative impact on the subsidiary. if there are political risks within the host country such as internal conflicts, changes in the political situation, the presence of violent/terrorist organizations, weak corruption control, etc., these instabilities create a great deal of uncertainty for the tncs. the subsidiary will have an increased likelihood of suffering losses due to its inability to engage in policy marketing activities. political risk can also stem from the diplomatic relations between the home and host countries. political games between the two countries can affect the interaction between subsidiaries and the host country, such as trade protectionism, which can result in subsidiaries receiving harsher regulations and restrictions from the host government. 3.2 the corporate governance structure of the host country affects the information transparency of tncs the corporate governance structure of the host country where the tnc subsidiary is located will affect the transparency of corporate information. corporate governance structure can be broadly divided into four types: anglo-american model, german-japanese model, family control model and insider control model (hoang & sardar, 2022). the most contrasting ones are the anglo-american model represented by countries such as the unitd states, the united kingdom and canada and the german-japanese model represented by countries such as japan and germany. in the anglo-american model, the securities market is mature, the financial market is developed, the equity is more decentralized, and there is no major shareholder. the interests of the shareholders of subsidiaries in such countries are ensured through the relevant information disclosed by the company in the securities market. in contrast, under the german and japanese model, the equity is relatively concentrated, and the company has a small number of major shareholders whose shares account for a very large proportion, so the transmission of corporate information mainly takes place between the managers and the major shareholders, and thus the information transparency of this model is much lower than that of the anglo-american model. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 6 published by scholink inc. in addition to the political and legal system, culture is also one of the most important factors affecting the disclosure of information by multinational corporations. the influence of cultural factors such as risk aversion, individualism, and power hierarchy on the level of corporate disclosure is significant. moreover, with the enrichment of the information environment, legal system factors have a significant impact on the level of corporate disclosure. there is a tendency that the influence of legal system factors on the level of corporate disclosure is weakening. in particular, there is a significant difference between western and eastern cultures. for example, countries such as the united kingdom and the united states advocate freedom and emphasize individualism, whereas countries such as japan and china emphasize more on collective concepts, and in terms of hierarchy of rights, japan attaches much more importance than western countries. 3.3 transformation of international investment rules promotes the transformation of transnational corporations international investment rules are a legal system that establishes the rights and obligations of parties to each other for the promotion and protection of international investment through international negotiations on the basis of countries’ policies for absorbing foreign investment (thrasher, 2021). the institutionalist theory of the “commitment effect” suggests that international investment agreements (iias) can be designed to change national incentives and thus national behavior, as violation of treaty commitments will lead to diplomatic disputes, resulting in damage to the host country’s reputation, a decline in its credit rating, and an increase in the cost of loans from the international monetary fund (imf) and the world bank. therefore, states parties often chose to comply with international investment rules, which compensated for the absence of their foreign investment regimes and improved other domestic regimes to match them, reducing the host country’s investment risk and helping to ensure the continuity of the investment relationship and enhance the effectiveness of investment. in addition, the role of different international investment rules on the macroeconomic operating environment varies. for example, bilateral investment treaties (bits) establish the rights and obligations of investors between countries with similar levels of economic development and cultural backgrounds, and significantly improve the effectiveness of investment. the role of international investment rules is also reflected in industry differences. energy and real estate industries are more obviously affected by international investment rules, so multinational corporations will change their global business layout according to the changes in international investment rules in order to maximize their interests. 4. conclusion this paper analyzes the political and economic interactions of tncs and the international political and economic system from two perspectives, which are the impact of their investment behavior on the international political and economic system, and the impact of the international political and economic situation on tncs. as non-state entities, the development and expansion of transnational corporations www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 7 published by scholink inc. can make the behavior in the political economy system more diversified. tncs investing in subsidiaries abroad can bring innovative technologies and advanced management concepts to host countries, but may form monopolies in certain technologies or fields in less developed developing countries, affecting the economic autonomy of host countries. in order to make the host country’s policy develop in the direction favorable to itself, tncs will also expand their influence in the political field by virtue of their strong economic power, and even infringe on their national sovereignty. at the same time, the international political and economic situation also affects the investment behavior of transnational corporations. the political risk of the host country has a negative impact on the marketing ability and profitability of tncs, and the corporate governance structure of the host country can also affect the transparency of information within tncs. the transformation of international investment rules affects the global business layout of tncs and pushes the transformation of tncs. references abbas, a. (2023). what robustly determines fdi in emerging markets and developing countries? a sensitivity analysis. the journal of international trade & economic development, 32(3), 410-428. https://doi.org/10.1080/09638199.2022.2115104 giorgio, b. n., & anthony j. v. (2020). multinational firms in the world economy. princeton: princeton university press. hoang, n. p., & sardar, m. n. (2022). corporate governance, ownership structure and firm performance: mediation models and dynamic approaches. taylor and francis. laura, w. (2020). from principles to norms: the development of international law. nova science. li, b. (2022). risk assessment of ofdi for technology-based enterprises under the background of “one belt one road”. discrete dynamics in nature and society. https://doi.org/10.1155/2022/6113930 pla-barber, j., botella-andreu, a., & villar. c. (2021). intermediate units in multinational corporations: a resource dependency view on coordinative versus entrepreneurial roles. international business review, 30(1), 101773. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2020.101773 roshan, l. (n.d.). impact of global recession on modern business-a critical study. arya bhatta journal of mathematics and informatics, 12(1), 35-48. thrasher, r. d. (2021). constraining development: the shrinking of policy space in the international trade regime. anthem press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1qmpd18 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 229 original papers the role of ignorance about keynes’s inexact, approximation approach to measurement in the a treatise on probability in the keynes-tinbergen exchanges of 1938-1940 in the economic journal michael e brady1*∙ 1 department of operations management, college of business administration and public policy, california state university, dominguez hills, 1000 victoria st, carson, california, 90747, usa * michael e brady, department of operations management, college of business administration and public policy, california state university, dominguez hills, 1000 victoria st, carson, california, 90747, usa received: july 28, 2019 accepted: august 6, 2019 online published: august 19, 2019 doi:10.22158/ape.v2n3p224 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v2n3p229 abstract j.tinbergen and j. m. keynes held diametrically opposed positions on measurement. tinbergen’s physics background led him to deploy an exact approach to measurement based on the specification of probability distributions, like the normal and log normal, with exact and precisely probabilities that were linear, additive and definite. all probabilities for tinbergen were assumed to be well defined, precise, exact, determinate, definite, additive, linear, independent single number answers, whether the field was physics or economics. keynes’s approach was an inexact one. probabilities for keynes were, with a few exceptions, partially defined, imprecise, inexact, indefinite, indeterminate ,non additive, non linear, and dependent. probability estimates for keynes required two numbers to specify the probability within a lower and upper bound (limit), and not one single number like tinbergen’s approach. keynes called this approach approximation. keynesian probabilities are interval valued. the problem, from keynes’s perspective, was that tinbergen was trying to apply to economic data techniques which were only sound when applied in physics ,where laboratory controlled environments with detailed experimental design could generate data and replicate/duplicate the experiments. keynes had always argued that economics was not a physical or life science like physics, engineering, biology or chemistry and that it could never be like physics. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 230 published by scholink inc. keywords exact measurement, inexact measurement, precise probability, imprecise probability, approximation, interval valued probability 1. introduction the paper will be organized in the following fashion. section two will present an overview of keynes’s inexact approximation approach to measurement as presented by him in 1921 in the a treatise on probability (tp, 1921). all five parts of the tp will be examined in order to show that keynes’s concern with the inexact measurement of probability in statistics was one of the primary goals keynes had in writing the book. section three will examine the mistaken assessments made by tinbergen and other economists about keynes’s technical understandings of probability and statistics. it will be demonstrated that tinbergen and other economists were advocating techniques for application in economics that worked only in physics. section four concludes the paper. keynes’s unchanging lifetime views on inexact measurement versus exact measurement and imprecise probability versus precise probability explain the keynes-tinbergen debate of 1939-1940. tinbergen’s background in physics meant that he was an advocate of the limiting frequency interpretation of probability. tinbergen was thus an advocate of precise and definite probability and exact measurement. tinbergen brought this view with him when he started working in economics. keynes was the exact opposite. tinbergen was used to analyzing inanimate phenomenon, like atoms, protons, electrons, particles, cells, molecules, genes, chromosomes, fair decks of cards, dice, coins, etc. keynes was used to analyzing animate human behavior. humans, unlike inanimate phenomenon, like atoms, protons, electrons, particles, cells, molecules, genes, chromosomes, fair decks of cards, dice, coins, etc., can think and reason. humans have brains, memories, emotions, minds, can reason and change their opinions. while exact calculation and precision can be applied in many areas of the physical and life science, it is doubtful in most social sciences, liberal arts, behavioral sciences and especially in most areas of economics, finance and business. 2. method it is impossible for technically trained reader of the tp not to recognize that keynes’s method is one of inexact measurement based on approximation unless the reader has not read parts ii and v. mathematically confused readers of the tp would not be able to understand keynes’s use of boole’s concept of lower and upper ,interval valued, probability that was used by keynes in parts i, iii and iv, and heavily by keynes in parts ii and v of the tp. mathematical confusion may be the best explanation available that explains the incoherent, incomprehensible, contradictory keynesian fundamentalist claim that keynes’s method was one of ordinal measurement some of the time. ordinal measurement appears nowhere in the tp. this section of the paper will be divided into seven subsections 2.1 to 2.7. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 231 published by scholink inc. 2.1 keynes’s inexact measurement and approximation method in part i of the tp keynes refers to inexact measurement (intervals) a number of times in chapter iii of the tp. his main target is the claim that all probabilities are numerical. in part ii, he shows that this would be the assertion that all probabilities are linear and additive. he warns the reader explicitly on page 37 that his discussions in chapter iii are preliminary only and that it is in part ii that the issue of numerical measurement will be discussed in detail: “it will not be possible to explain in detail how and in what sense a meaning can sometimes be given to the numerical measurement of probabilities until part ii. is reached. but this chapter will be more complete if i indicate briefly the conclusions at which we shall arrive later…” (keynes, 1921, p. 37; boldface added). thus, keynes’s view of (pp. 38-40) is that they provide a “brief”, but not “detailed”, set of conclusions ahead of the main conclusions in part ii .it is in part ii ,and not in chapter iii of part i, where keynes’s provided the details concerning the question of measurement. keynes’s answer is that one needs to use approximation, using inexact measurement, involving boolean interval valued probability. all keynesian fund amentalists (skidelsky, carabelli, o’donnell, fitzgibbons, runde, meeks, etc.,), just borel (1923), edgeworth (1922), ronald fisher (1923), e. wilson (1923; pearl, 1922), and ramsey skipped part ii of the tp. they thus arrived at a very incomplete answer as regards keynes’s theory of measurement. their incomplete answer resulted in their reading into pp. 38-40 of the tp an ordinal theory of probability that does not exist in the tp. nowhere in the tp does keynes put forth an ordinal (ordinary language) theory of probability or even list the words “ordinal”, “comparative”, or “rank-order” in his index. the diagram that keynes presents the reader on p. 39 (p. 42 of volume 8 of the cwjmk) involving pages 38-40 is a brief introduction to his theory of measurement as keynes stated on pp. 37-38 of the tp. chapter iii is the alpha of keynes’s analysis of measurement. chapters 15-17 are the omega of keynes’s analysis. the keynesian “fundamentalists” (g. meeks, r. skidelsky, r. o’donnell, a. carabelli, a. fitzgi-bbons, j. davis, j. runde, for example) chose to ignore part ii of the tp and base all of their analysis on the diagram on page 39 on chapter iii of part i of the tp alone. as keynes stated on pp. 37-38, it will not be possible to understand his position on the measurement of probabilities without the important ,detailed analysis of part ii of the tp. keynes is very clear that probabilities can be estimated using lower and upper bounds: “a relation of probability does not yield us, as a rule, information of much value, unless it invests the conclusion with a probability which lies between narrow numerical limits. in ordinary practice, therefore, we do not always regard ourselves as knowing the probability of a conclusion, unless we can estimate it numerically. we are apt, that is to say, to restrict the use of the expression probable to these numerical examples, and to allege in other cases that the probability is unknown. we might say, for example, that we do not know, when we go on a railway journey, the probability of death in a railway accident, unless we are told the statistics of accidents in former years; or that we do not know our chances in a lottery, unless we are told the number of the tickets. but it must be clear upon reflection that if we use the term in this sense,—which is no doubt a perfectly legitimate sense,—we ought to say that in the case of some arguments a relation of probability does not exist, and not that it is unknown. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 232 published by scholink inc. for it is not this probability that we have discovered, when the accession of new evidence makes it possible to frame a numerical estimate. possibly this theory of unknown probabilities may also gain strength from our practice of estimating arguments, which, as i maintain, have no numerical value, by reference to those that have. we frame two ideal arguments, that is to say, in which the general character of the evidence largely resembles what is actually within our knowledge, but which is so constituted as to yield a numerical value, and we judge that the probability of the actual argument lies between these two. since our standards, therefore, are referred to numerical measures in many (author note keynes’s emphasis in italics) two numerical measures, we come to believe that it must also, if only we knew it, possess such a measure itself”. (keynes, 1921, pp. 31-32; bold face added). this quotation is the foundation for f. y. edgeworth’s conclusion in his 1922 review that keynesian probabilities are intervals. keynes also explicitly discusses intervals on pp. 22, 23, 24, 29, and 35 of chapter iii. keynes’s diagram on page 39 (p. 42 of cwjmk version of the tp) presents no theory of ordinal probability just as chapter 3 of the gt contains no theory of expected aggregate demand and expected aggregate supply. 2.2 keynes’s method of inexact measurement and approximation in part ii of the tp keynes’s characterization of his approach again emphasizes the importance of probabilities being “between” an upper bound and a lower bound: “it is evident that the cases in which exact numerical measurement is possible are a very limited class, generally dependent on evidence which warrants a judgment of equi-probability by an application of the principle of indifference. the fuller the evidence upon which we rely, the less likely is it to be perfectly symmetrical in its bearing on the various alternatives, and the more likely is it to contain some piece of relevant information favouring one of them. in actual reasoning, therefore, perfectly equal probabilities, and hence exact numerical measures, will occur comparatively seldom. the sphere of inexact numerical comparison is not, however, quite so limited. many probabilities, which are incapable of numerical measurement, can be placed nevertheless between (author-note keynes’s emphasis) numerical limits. and by taking particular non-numerical probabilities as standards a great number of comparisons or approximate measurements become possible. if we can place a probability in an order of magnitude with some standard probability, we can obtain its approximate measure by comparison. this method is frequently adopted in common discourse” (keynes, 1921, p. 160). pp. 161-163 are of great importance as keynes demonstrates his method of analysis using approximation, as he does also in chapter 17 on pp. 186-194, pp. 235-238, and pp. 253-255. keynes’s presentation of his method of inexact measurement and approximation in part ii can only lead to the complete and total rejection of the fundamentalist claim that purports to have discovered keynes’s “theory” on pages 38-40 of the tp in an analysis that keynes calls “brief”. 2.3 keynes’s method of inexact measurement and approximation in part iii of the tp on page 192 of the tp, when applying his technique for solving boolean interval probabilities keynes used this technique in part iii in order to set up an application of his concept of finite probability: www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 233 published by scholink inc. “there is one class of probabilities, however, which i called the numerical class, the ratio of each of whose members to certainty can be expressed by some number less than unity; and we can sometimes compare a non-numerical probability in respect of more and less with one of these numerical probabilities. this enables us to give a definition of “finite probability” which is capable of application to non-numerical as well as to numerical probabilities. i define a “finite probability” as one which exceeds some numerical probability, the ratio of which to certainty can be expressed by a finite number. the principal method, in which a probability can be proved finite by a process of argument, arises either when its conclusion can be shown to be one of a finite number of alternatives, which are between them exhaustive or, at any rate, have a finite probability, and to which the principle of indifference is applicable; or (more usually), when its conclusion is more probable than some hypothesis which satisfies this first condition” (keynes, 1921, p. 237; bold face added). keynes repeats himself in chapter 22: “there is a vagueness, it may be noticed, in the number of instances, which would be required on the above assumptions to establish a given numerical degree of probability, which corresponds to the vagueness in the degree of probability which we do actually attach to inductive conclusions. we assume that the necessary number of instances is finite, but we do not know what the number is. we know that the probability of a well-established induction is great, but, when we are asked to name its degree, we cannot. common sense tells us that some inductive arguments are stronger than others, and that some are very strong. but how much stronger or how strong we cannot express. the probability of an induction is only numerically definite when we are able to make definite assumptions about the number of independent equi-probable influences at work. otherwise, it is non-numerical, though bearing relations of greater and less to numerical probabilities according to the approximate limits within which our assumption as to the possible number of these causes lies” (keynes, 1921, p. 259). of course, a reading of chapter 15 of the tp is absolutely required if a reader of part iii of the tp is to understand that non numerical probabilities are interval valued probabilities. there is no explicit evidence that the keynesian fundamentalists understand this, given their over 40 years of claims that keynes’s non numerical probabilities were ordinals. keynes’s definition of finite probability, which is applicable to both numerical and non numerical, interval valued probabilities, makes no sense if keynes’s probabilities are ordinal. in fact, part iii of the tp is incomprehensible, inconsistent, and contradictory if based on a reading that argues that keynes’s theory of probability was an ordinal one. this would directly conflict with the boolean foundations provided to part iii by boole’s problem x on page 192 in chapter 17, which is interval. there are no ordinal probability problems in boole’s 1854 the laws of thought. any interpretation of keynesian probabilities as being ordinal probabilities renders any understanding of the boolean foundation of part iii impossible to understand. 2.4 keynes’s method of inexact measurement and approximation in part iv of the tp consider the necessity in part iv of understanding keynes’s finite probabilities from part iii: “for this purpose it is necessary to recur, briefly, to the analysis of part iii. it was argued there that the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 234 published by scholink inc. methods of empirical proof, by which we strengthen the probability of our conclusions, are not at all dissimilar, when we apply them to the discovery of formal truth, and when we apply them to the discovery of the laws which relate material objects, and that they may possibly prove useful even in the case of metaphysics; but that the initial probability which we strengthen by these means is differently obtained in each class of problem. in logic it arises out of the postulate that apparent self-evidence invests what seems self-evident with some degree of probability; and in physical science, out of the postulate that there is a limitation to the amount of independent variety amongst the qualities of material objects. but both in logic and in physical science we may wish to consider hypotheses which it is not possible to invest with any à priori probability and which we entertain solely on account of the known truth of many of their consequences. an axiom which has no self-evidence, but which it seems necessary to combine with other axioms which are self-evident in order to deduce the generally accepted body of formal truth, stands in this category. a scientific entity, such as the ether or the electron, whose qualities have never been observed but whose existence we postulate for purposes of explanation, stands in it also. if the analysis of part iii. is correct, we can never attribute a finite probability to the truth of such axioms or to the existence of such scientific entities, however many of their consequences we find to be true. they may be convenient hypotheses, because, if we confine ourselves to certain classes of their consequences, we are not likely to be led into error; but they stand, nevertheless, in a position altogether different from that of such generalizations as we have reason to invest with an initial probability (keynes,1921, pp. 299-300; bold face added). keynes’s footnote one adds the following point that ordinal probability can’t be applied: “i am assuming that there is no argument, arising either from self-evidence or analogy, in addition to the argument arising from the truth of their consequences, in favour of the truth of such axioms or the existence of such objects; but i daresay that this may not certainly be the case. the reader may be reminded also that, when i deny a finite probability this is not the same thing as to affirm that 16 the probability is infinitely small. i mean simply that it is not greater than some numerically measurable probability” (keynes, 1921, pp. 299-300; bold face added). the reader should note again that this passage makes absolutely no sense if keynes’s probabilities are ordinal, since finite probabilities must apply to both numerical and non numerical interval valued probabilities. consider chapter 26, which was viewed as being very important by both edgeworth and russell, since the discussions in chapter 26 required a theory of inexact measurement to have been already presented in an earlier part of the book (part ii), according to russell (1922): “in chapter iii. of part i. i have argued that only in a strictly limited class of cases are degrees of probability numerically measurable. it follows from this that the ‘mathematical expectations of goods or advantages are not always numerically measurable; and hence, that even if a meaning can be given to the sum of a series of non-numerical ‘mathematical expectations,’ not every pair of such sums are numerically comparable in respect of more and less. thus even if we know the degree of advantage which might be obtained from each of a series of alternative courses of actions and know also the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 235 published by scholink inc. probability in each case of obtaining the advantage in question, it is not always possible by a mere process of arithmetic to determine which of the alternatives ought to be chosen. if, therefore, the question of right action is under all circumstances a determinate problem, it must be in virtue of an intuitive judgment directed to the situation as a whole, and not in virtue of an arithmetical deduction derived from a series of separate judgments directed to the individual alternatives each treated in isolation. we must accept the conclusion that, if one good is greater than another, but the probability of attaining the first less than that of attaining the second, the question of which it is our duty to pursue may be indeterminate, unless we suppose it to be within our power to make direct quantitative judgments of probability and goodness jointly. it may be remarked, further, that the difficulty exists, whether the numerical indeterminateness of the probability is in trinsicor whether its numerical value is, as it is according to the frequency theory and most other theories, simply unknown” (keynes, 1921, p. 312). keynes has just ruled out ordinal probability due to intervals overlapping with one another meaning that “…not every pair of such sums are numerically comparable in respect of more and less.” it has been known for centuries that it is mathematically impossible to add (sum), subtract, divide, or multiple ordinal probabilities. keynes’s comment can only be applied to overlapping interval valued probabilities. it is not possible to understand part iv of the tp if keynes’s theory of probability is an ordinal one, since finite probabilities can’t possibly be defined. indeterminate probability means for keynes, like it meant for boole, that the addition of more relevant evidence is not going to result in a narrowing of the wide gap that exists between the lower and upper probabilities. 2.5 keynes’s method of inexact measurement and approximation in part v of the tp keynes repeatedly refers to indirect and inexact measurement using intervals all through part v of the tp: the “stability of statistical frequencies” would be a much better name for it. the former suggests, as perhaps poisson intended to suggest, but what is certainly false, that every class of event shows statistical regularity of occurrence if only one takes a sufficient number of instances of it. it also encourages the method of procedure, by which it is thought legitimate to take any observed degree of frequency or association, which is shown in a fairly numerous set of statistics, and to assume with insufficient investigation that, because the statistics are numerous, the observed degree of frequency is therefore stable. observation shows that some statistical frequencies are, within narrower or wider limits, stable but stable frequencies are not very common, and cannot be assumed lightly. 19 the gradual discovery, that there are certain classes of phenomena, in which, though it is impossible to predict what will happen in each individual case, there is nevertheless a regularity of occurrence if the phenomena be considered together in successive sets” (keynes, 1921, p. 336). i will simply list the great number of statements by keynes where frequency probabilities are reinterpreted as interval probabilities that lie between upper and lower limits, so that approximation applies. one of the values of reading part v of the tp is that it shows the reader what the real ,underlying conflict was that existed between keynes and tinbergen over measurement versus tinbergen. it can be seen to revolve around www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 236 published by scholink inc. the fact that tinbergen was committed to exact measurement using precise probabilities while keynes was committed to inexact measurement using imprecise probability based on his approximation technique from chapters 15-17 of the tp or methods like those of the statistician yule: • beginning with bernoulli’s theorem, we will consider the various solutions of this problem which have been propounded and endeavour to determine the proper limits within which each method has validity (keynes, 1921, pp. 337-338). • …the value of this probability being calculable by a process of approximation… (keynes, 1921, p. 338). • for the second part of the theorem some method of approximation is required… (keynes, 1921, p. 338). • …by means of stirling’s theorem, and obtain as its approximate value…(keynes, 1921, p. 338). • it is possible, of course, by more complicated formulae to obtain closer approximations than this.* but there is an objection, which can be raised to this approximation, quite distinct from the fact that it does not furnish a result correct to as many places of decimals as bit might. this is, that the approximation is independent of the sign of h, whereas the original expression is not thus independent. that is to say, the approximation implies a symmetrical distribution for different values of h about the value for h = 0; while the expression under approximation is unsymmetrical. it is easily seen that this want of symmetry is 20 appreciable unless mpq is large. we ought, therefore, to have laid it down as a condition of our approximation, not only that m must be large, but also that mpq must be large. unlike most of my criticisms, this is a mathematical, rather than a logical, point (keynes, 1921, pp. 338-339). • this “fiction” will do no harm so long as it is remembered that we are now dealing with a particular kind of approximation…the probability* that the number of occurrences will lie between… (keynes, 1921, p. 339). • this same expression measures the probability that the proportion of occurrences will lie between… (keynes, 1921, pp. 339-340). • the probability that the proportion of occurrences will lie between given limits varies with the magnitude of the square root of 2pq/m, and this expression is sometimes used, therefore, to measure the ‘precision’ of the series. given the à priori probabilities, the precision varies inversely with the square root of the number of instances.(keynes, 1921, p. 340). • such a condition is very seldom fulfilled. if our initial probability is partly founded upon experience, it is clear that it is liable to modification in the light of further experience. it is, in fact, difficult to give a concrete instance of a case in which the conditions for the application of bernoulli’s theorem are completely fulfilled. at the best we are dealing in practice with a good approximation, and can assert that no realised series of moderate length can much affect our initial probability… for this is an approximate formula which requires for its validity that the series should be long; whilst it is precisely in this event, as we have seen above, that the use of bernoulli’s theorem is more than usually likely to be illegitimate (keynes, 1921, p. 342). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 237 published by scholink inc. • …the probability that the number of occurrences m of the event in the s trials will lie between the limits sp ± l is given by…the probability that the number of occurrences of the event will lie between sp ± γk (square root of s) is given by …(keynes, 1921, p. 345). • it seems in plain opposition to good sense that on such evidence we should be able with practical certainty…. to estimate the number of female births within such narrow limits. and we see that the conditions laid down in § 11 have been flagrantly neglected…” (keynes, 1921, p. 352). • leibniz’s reply goes to the root of the difficulty. the calculation of probabilities is of the utmost value, he says, but in statistical inquiries there is need not so much of mathematical subtlety as of a precise statement of all the circumstances. the possible contingencies are too numerous to be covered by a finite number of experiments, and exact calculation is, therefore, out of the question. although naturehas her habits, due to the recurrence of causes, they are general, not invariable. yet empirical calculation, although it is inexact, may be adequate in affairs of practice” (keynes, 1921, p. 368). • in dealing with the correspondence of leibniz and bernoulli, i have not been mainly influenced by the historical interest of it. the view of leibniz, dwelling mainly on considerations of analogy, and demanding “not so much mathematical subtlety as a precise statement of all the circumstances”, is, substantially, the view which will be supported in the following chapters. the desire of bernoulli for an exact formula, which would derive from the numerical frequency of the experimental results a numerical measure of their probability, preludes the exact formulas of later and less cautious mathematicians, which will be examined immediately” (keynes, 1921, p. 369). • they showed, that is to say, that certain observed series of events would have been very improbable, if we had supposed independence between 22 some two factors or if some occurrence had been assumed to be as likely as not, and they inferred from this that there was in fact a measure of dependence or that the occurrence had probability in its favour. but they did not endeavour to pass from the observed frequency of occurrence to an exact measure of the probability. with the advent of laplace more ambitious methods took the field” (keynes, 1921, pp. 369-370). • thus, given the frequency of occurrence in μ trials, these writers infer the probability of occurrence at subsequent trials within certain limits, just as, given the à priori probability, bernoulli’s theorem would enable them to predict the frequency of occurrence in μ trials within corresponding limits. if the number of trials is at all numerous, these limits are narrow and the purport of the inversion of bernoulli’s theorem may therefore be put briefly as follows. by the direct theorem, if p measures the probability, p also measures the most probable value of the frequency; by the inversion of the theorem also measures the most probable value of the probability. the simplicity of the process has recommended it, since the time of laplace, to a great number of writers. czuber’s argument, criticized on p. 399, with reference to the proportions of male and female births in austria, is based upon an unqualified use of it. but examples abound throughout the literature of the subject, in which the theory is employed in circumstances of greater or less validity” (keynes, 1921, pp. 370-371). • what, in the first place, does laplace mean by an unknown probability? he does not mean a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 238 published by scholink inc. probability, whose value is in fact unknown to us, because we are unable to draw conclusions which could be drawn from the data; and he seems to apply the term to any probability whose value, according to the argument of chapter iii., is numerically indeterminate. thus he assumes that every probability has a numerical value and that, in those cases where there seems to be no numerical value, this value is not non-existent but unknown; and he proceeds to argue that where the numerical value is unknown, or as i should say where there is no such value, every value between 0 and 1 is equally probable. with the possible interpretations of\the term “unknown probability”, and with the theory that every probability can be measured by one of the real numbers between 0 and 1, i have dealt, as carefully as i can, in chapter iii. if the view taken there is correct, laplace’s theory breaks down immediately. but even if we were to answer these questions, not as they have been answered in chapter iii., but in a manner favourable to laplace’s theory, it remains doubtful whether we could legitimately attribute a value to the probability of an unknown probability’s having such and such a value. if a probability is unknown, surely the probability, relative to the same evidence, that this probability has a given value, is also unknown; and we are involved in an infinite regress” (keynes, 1921, p. 373). of course, keynes’s approximation approach uses two of the real numbers between 0 and 1. chapter iii is keynes’s introduction to his critique of exact and precise probability measurement with two exceptions (the poi is applicable; statistical data satisfies the lexis—q test for stability of frequency data). chapters 10-17 of part ii contain the many details of his critique. • nobody supposes that we can measure exactly the probability of an induction. yet many persons seem to believe that in the weaker and much more difficult type of argument, where the association under examination has been in our experience, not invariable, but merely in a certain proportion, we can attribute a definite measure to our future expectations and can claim practical certainty for the results of predictions which lie within relatively narrow limits. coolly considered, this is a preposterous claim, which would have been universally rejected long ago, if those who made it had not so successfully concealed themselves from the eyes of common sense in amaze of mathematics” (keynes, 1921, pp. 388-389). it can be concluded from the extensive material covered in this section that keynes’s view of measurement was that ,in general, exact and precise probability measurement and assessments are not possible, in general, in macroeconomics. however, inexact and imprecise probability measurement and assessments are, in general, possible. 2.6 keynes’s method of inexact measurement and approximation in chapters 3 and 4 of the gt keynes’s views on measurement in the gt are identical to those expressed in the tp. consider the following statements made by keynes: “an entrepreneur, who has to reach a practical decision as to his scale of production, does not, of course, entertain a single undoubting expectation of what the sale-proceeds of a given output will be, but several hypothetical expectations held with varying degrees of probability and definiteness. by his expectation of proceeds i mean, therefore, that expectation of proceeds which, if it were held with certainty, would lead to the same behaviour as does the bundle of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 239 published by scholink inc. vague and more various possibilities which actually makes up his state of expectation when he reaches his decision” (keynes, 1936, ft.3, p. 24; boldface added). “on this basis an attempt is made to erect a quantitative science. but it is a grave objection to this definition for such a purpose that the community’s output of goods and services is a non-homogeneous complex which cannot be measured, strictly speaking, except in certain special cases, as for example when all the items of one output are included in the same proportions in another output…. the fact that two incommensurable collections of miscellaneous objects cannot in themselves provide the material for a quantitative analysis need not, of course, prevent us from making approximate statistical comparisons, depending on some broad element of judgment rather than of strict calculation, which may possess significance and validity within certain limits. but the proper place for such things as net real output and the general level of prices lies within the field of historical and statistical description, and their purpose should be to satisfy historical or social curiosity, a purpose for which perfect precision—such as our causal analysis requires, whether or not our knowledge of the actual values of the relevant quantities is complete or exact—is neither usual nor necessary. (keynes, 1936, pp. 37-39; italics, underline and boldface added). keynes states this again on p. 43: “it is my belief that much unnecessary perplexity can be avoided if we limit ourselves strictly to the two units, money and labour, when we are dealing with the behaviour of the economic system as a whole; reserving the use of units of particular outputs and equipments to the occasions when we are analysing the output of individual firms or industries in isolation; and the use of vague concepts, such as the quantity of output as a whole, the quantity of capital equipment as a whole and the general level of prices, to the occasions when we are attempting some historical comparison which is within certain (perhaps fairly wide) limits avowedly imprecise and approximate (keynes, 1936, p. 43; italics, underline and boldface added). keynes’s emphasis above in the gt, which is on inexact method of measurement and approximation, is identical to his tp approach which he applied throughout parts ii, iii, iv and v of the tp. 2.7 conclusions keynes’s unchanging lifetime views on inexact measurement versus exact measurement and imprecise probability versus precise probability explains the keynes-tinbergen debate of 1938-1940.tinbergen’s background in physics meant that he was an advocate of the limiting frequency interpretation of probability. tinbergen was thus an advocate of precise and definite probability calculations and exact, precise measurement. tinbergen brought this view with him when he started working in economics. keynes held the exact opposite, diametrically opposed position. tinbergen was used to analyzing inanimate phenomenon, like atoms, protons, electrons, particles, cells, molecules, genes, chromosomes, fair decks of cards, dice, coins, etc. keynes was used to analyzing animate human behavior. humans, unlike inanimate phenomenon, like atoms ,protons, electrons, particles, cells, molecules, genes, chromosomes, fair decks of cards, dice, coins, can think and reason. humans have memories, emotions, minds, and brains. while exact calculation and precision can be applied in many areas of the physical www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 240 published by scholink inc. and life science, it is doubtful in most social sciences, liberal arts, behavioral sciences, and especially in most areas of economics ,finance and business. the exception would be studies of consumer consumption spending and business inventory demand, which are highly stable over the short run (1-5 years). irving fisher’s belief that there was an analogy between a particle and an individual ((fisher, 1925, p. 85), so that a particle in mechanics corresponds to an individual in economics, only holds under the dubious claim that the sum of the parts is the whole, so that there is no interactions occurring among the parts as in a pizza that has been cut into 8 slices. the analogy breaks down completely once it is realized that a particle is an inanimate object while an individual is an animate object. keynes was never an ordinalist. nowhere in the tp or gt does keynes develop, apply, advocate or deploy an ordinal theory of probability. the keynesian fundamentalists have misinterpreted pp. 38-40 of the tp by ignoring keynes’s clear statement on pp. 37-38 of the tp that his detailed analysis on measurement would take place in part ii, while only a brief introduction to measurement would take place on pp. 38-40 of chapter iii of the tp. keynes would subsume tinbergen’s approach as a special case of his more general case. there is no existing textual evidence that tinbergen even understood what keynes was talking about or what the original , boolean approach to algebra-logic entailed. 3. discussion consider the following exchange between tinbergen and two interviewers in 1987: “from keynes’s criticisms of your league of nations first report, it seems fairly clear that he knew very little of the developments in econometrics over the 1920’s and 1930’s….(magnus & morgan, 1987, p. 129). tinbergen’s response to the comment by magnus and morgan was that “indeed, i did feel that ,at least on certain points, he was badly informed. it was a bit strange to me because he had written the treatise on probability, so i thought he was somewhat familiar with statistics” (magnus & morgan, 1987, p. 129). the assessment made by tinbergen ,magnus and morgan of keynes’s knowledge of statistics is practically identical to the assessment made of keynes’s knowledge of statistics in the tp by ronald fisher in his 1923 book review of the tp, which was that keynes was not knowledgeable about the developments in statistics over the period 1880-1920 about the law of large numbers, central limit theorem ,and their support for the use of the gaussian (normal) probability distribution. fisher never grasped that keynes was using inexact, numerical approximation using intervals in part v of the tp .the far weaker data generated by economic phenomena over time, when compared with that in physics, chemistry, and biology, meant that the normal distribution would not be the appropriate distribution to consider. keynes’s critical view of the assumption of normality was examined by him in chapter 17 of the tp (1921) and was originally published in 1911 in the jrss. mandelbrot’s repeated 50 years of demonstrations ,that exploratory data analysis in many areas of finance ,business, and economics does not support the use of a normal (log normal) distribution, only makes keynes’s critique www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 241 published by scholink inc. appear more prescient (see brady, 2016). tinbergen appears to have made use of the normal (lognormal) distribution throughout his career (see brady’s 2019 contribution at ssrn on keynes and tinbergen) the problem that arises in the tinbergen, morgan, and magnus assessments of keynes’s knowledge is that they are based on a shocking and stunning ignorance of keynes’s a treatise on probability. neither tinbergen, morgan, or magnus appear to understand keynes’s position that economics is not physics and the calculation of invariant regression constants over decades, based on unchanging parameters, is simply an impossibility. tinbergen appears to have been trying to derive constants from economic statistical data that are like the constants of ,for example, light and speed in physics. tinbergen’s decision to use a multivariate normal distribution, or log normal, in his regression analysis meant that he had to treat the problem of technological innovation, advance, change ,and obsolescence, which is the major factor causing changes in the composition of durable, physical, capital producer, investment goods over the business cycle over time, as well as being the main focal point of concern of businessmen in forward looking, long run business expectations formation, as being part of the residuals or as some lagged function of past, previous views. given the highly irregular pattern of actual changes in technology over time and their non normally distributed bunched nature, tinbergen’s modeling strategy borders on the nonsensical. keynes was very blunt in his assessment of tinbergen’s backward looking views on modelling the expectations formation by businessmen. if tinbergen is placing these important variables in the residual (error) term of the regression equation, then very large errors should appear. this conflicts with tinbergen’s methodological goal of minimizing the size of the residuals (error terms). there are a few econometricians who have grasped keynes’s point, even if they are not completely familiar with the inexact approach to measurement advocated by keynes in both the tp and gt: “the empirical content of economic theories is therefore systematically lower than those from physical theory. testing an economic theory in quantitative form requires the introduction of all sorts of ad hoc statistical or econometric modelling assumptions so as to arrive at a fully specified empirical model (blommestein, 1985). this ad hoc nature of economic model building generates a significant degree of specification uncertainty. for example, as noted above, the empirical pricing models for structured products such as cdos and cdss is hampered by a considerable degree of specification uncertainty. semantically insufficient theories make it therefore very hard to formulate reliable empirical models. in other words, the big problem with economic theories is not that they are too simplistic or that so-called “unrealistic‟ assumptions are being used, but it is their semantical insufficiency (low degree of testability). by not taking the specification uncertainty caused by semantical insufficiency seriously enough, testing competing theories becomes a wasteful exercise. at the minimum one needs statistically reliable econometric models, although technical virtuosity can never substitute for increasing the information content of economic theories .(blommestein, 2009, p. 2) and “most of the original cowles work was based on the additional assumptions that error terms are iid (independent www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 242 published by scholink inc. and identically distributed) and that functions are parameters are lcc (linear with constant coefficients). tellingly, df refer to them as “articles of faith” that had (and continue to have) a considerable influence on the applied literature” (blommestein, 2009, p. 3). “however, economics and physics are qualitatively different enterprises, and always will be. economics or finance as a social science differs in at least two important respects from the physical sciences. first, physical theories often formulate scientific predictions in the form of individual events, while predictions in economic theories (and other social sciences) are usually specified as patterns of a certain kind or type (hayek, 1967; blommestein, 1985, pp. 86-90). second, theories of economic behaviour need to take into account reflexivity—the human capability for self-reference. self-referential calculations have major (complicating) implications for economic explanations and predictions. for example, financial asset markets have a reflexive nature in the sense that prices are generated by the expectations of traders. but the latter expectations are based on the basis of the anticipation of others‟ expectations6 . this implication precludes the formation of expectations using deductive rules (spear, 1989). in a fundamental way, economic issues (and social science topics in general) are harder and far more ” (blommestein, 2009, pp. 3-4). and “against the backdrop of this analysis, bringing together the insights from different parts of economics such as macroeconomics and financial economics is not necessarily the best response to the recent wave of criticism of academic finance. the end result [of this intended merger of theories] would still not go beyond disguised mathematics or sets of tautological structures. for example, the underlying behavioural paradigm of macroeconomic/macro finance models is that economic agents have rational expectations, meaning that the “representative” agent is at all times and everywhere completely informed, while fully understanding the complexities of the world (de grauwe, 2009). this would imply that bankers and their clients at all times fully understand the complexities of the new financial landscape. it is difficult to reject the impression that these behavioural assumptions have been introduced to facilitate the underlying math and the formulation of quantitative models with closed-form solutions (blommestein, 2009, pp. 5-6). thus, blommestein’s work, along with that of d. freedman(2009), e leamer (1983), and h. keuzenkamp (2000),if it became dominant in econometric practice ,would go along way toward satisfying keynes’s original objections about the use of econometrics in attempting to quantify business cycle research over time. 4. conclusions the main reasons for the completely divergent views expressed by keynes and tinbergen in their 1938-1940 exchanges in the economic journal about measurement was due to their completely different technical backgrounds and different views about measurement being either exact or inexact. keynes’s background was in logic, mathematics and philosophy. tinbergen’s background was in physics. there simply was no common ground between the two academics. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 243 published by scholink inc. acknowledgement i thank the referee for his suggestions. references ———. 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(2007). a rocking horse that never rocked: frischʼs “propagation problems and impulse problems”. history of political economy, 39(1), 145-166. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-2006-027 microsoft word ape-v4n3-p39 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 39 original paper has the un and ngo reform of the humanitarian system sufficiently addressed its principal critiques of the 1990s? professor albert mcbell ninepence1* 1 london school of economics (lse), august, 2021 * professor albert mcbell ninepence, london school of economics (lse), august, 2021 received: july 2, 2021 accepted: august 17, 2021 online published: august 21, 2021 doi:10.22158/ape.v4n3p38 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v4n3p39 abstract due to ponderous humanitarian needs, the un and ngos are bedeviled with outstretch of its resources coupled with complex reality of conflict-related emergencies which has outstripped its capacities. in an attempt to efficaciously address humanitarian response, the un and ngos have taken bodacious steps to draw consensus to fulfill their mandates. consequently, the un and ngos have taken catalytic reforms and critiques (in 1990s and 2000s) to create a robust rapid response to emergencies and take advantage of new system-wide mechanisms. irrespective of relentless reforms and critiques, there have been vehement debates on the effectiveness and efficiency of the un and ngos in addressing its principal critiques. this research paper sought to make inquiry into the un and ngos efficacy to its principal critiques of the 1990s. the essay found that the un and ngos humanitarian system has not sufficiently addressed its principal critiques of the 1990s and that they have been unpredictable and unreliable in response to emergencies. keywords un, ngo reform, humanitarian system, humanitarian response, development, economic and social affairs, peace and security, international order 1. introduction “development must target the millions of children affected by humanitarian crises. we must break down the barriers between development and humanitarian response, to put in place long-term efforts to end poverty and hunger.”?—anthony lake, executive director of the un children’s emergency fund, united nations foundation, 2016. research from kent randolph underscored the second world war as a critical point where governments began to fathom the need for humanitarian intervention to curb crisis (kent, 1987, p. 36). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 40 published by scholink inc. outlining antithesis to this, the french accounts of humanitarianism have accentuated the germane cold war epoch and the nigerian biafra war in 1967 to 1970 as the turning point in promoting emergency assistance (ryfman, 2008, p. 19; aeberhard, 1994; davey, 2012). over the 1990s and 2000s, un and ngo humanitarian architecture have undertaken various reforms to consolidate their structures to dispense more efficacious humanitarian action. furthermore, the un general assembly resolution 46/182 created a system to ameliorate the un agencies and ngos to perform humanitarian assistance. also, the un secretary general kofi annan in 1997 initiated the broader un reform packages which triggered improvement in thirty odd departments and programs and funds under four major areas encompassing humanitarian affairs, development, economic and social affairs and peace and security (renewing the un, july 1997). the december 1991 resolution 46/182 resuscitated current institutional structures and further strengthened coordination for inter agencies using mechanisms such as emergency relief coordination (erc) supported by department of humanitarian affairs (dha later becoming ocha), consolidated appeals process (cap), central emergency revolving fund (cerf) and standing committee for humanitarian affairs (iasc). over the years, humanitarian action has become a complex one. the signification of humanitarianism has been outstretched with humanitarianism being viewed as a more new interventionist international order. challenges in civil wars such as syria, sri lanka and burundi among others have exposed inconsistencies in political remedy to violence and restricted humanitarian access. irrespective of international and local actions to curb conflict in somalia, afghanistan, sudan, iraq etc, resolutions have remained fruitless as expostulations and conflicts persists in these regions. also, national disasters such as earthquakes in haiti in 2010 and 1994 rwanda genocide have raised questions about the effectiveness of international humanitarian assistance. after 30 years, the humanitarian system has developed creating crisis response preparedness structures, building institutional capacities and soliciting funds to better offer humanitarian assistance. in spite of consolidation of the un and ngo humanitarian system to palliate humanitarian crisis, the un and ngos continue to be buffeted with incessant obstacles. the exigent challenges which overwhelm governments, people and institutions has engendered rebukes to the un and ngo reforms and critiques. there also exists dynamic canvases among scholars on the effectiveness of the un and ngos humanitarian system in administering its principal critiques. while scholars such as stockton (1998) contend that the humanitarian system has improved its performance in terms of quality, reiff (2002) identifies that the humanitarian system has inadequate capacity to address its critiques with jones and stoddard (2003) propounding deficiencies in humanitarian action due to executive committees created under the un reform process which have added a degree of confusion to the ongoing process of humanitarian reform. this paper therefore takes a standpoint that the un and ngo reform of the humanitarian system has not sufficiently addressed its principal critiques of the 1990s. the paper further takes turns to underscore factors such as accountability, leadership and coordination as impediments to tackling the 1990s critiques. the final www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 41 published by scholink inc. section of the paper concludes that the humanitarian system has inadequately addressed its critiques providing appropriate recommendations. the critiques of the un elements of the humanitarian system and the extent to which the reforms have addressed them problematic principles, human rights and conditionality is one of the main critiques levied against the un elements of the humanitarian system. in the changing faces of the crisis, humanitarian principles have become malfunctioned. also, given the complex nature of emergencies, the humanitarian principles tend to lead to “politically blind acts of charity” rather than delivering positive impacts. according to margi buchanan-smith of action aid, “humanitarian assistance are sent impartially based on need which fails to yield the necessary impact” (curtis, 2001). the humanitarian coordinators who are appointed by the un do not adequately comprehend humanitarian action (failing to understand the humanitarian principles and standards) and do not understand the importance of partnerships, resulting in underestimation of ngos and ineffective humanitarian response that are accountable to affected populations. in recent times, new wars have focused conflict on recent populations and to be neutral, the un tends to turn a blind eye to most crimes against humanity. this was evident during the rwandan genocide in 1994 when the international community took a passive response when active stance was needed which impeded humanity principles and further affecting the purpose of the un system (shearer, 2000, p. 412). organizational issues and poor performance constitute yet another seminal critique. the humanitarian system is a complex one and often assessing the extent to which success or failure has been achieved is difficult due to lack of defined system-wide objectives. mostly, beyond the broad goals of rescuing lives and reducing suffering, both actors and observers lack specific aims to agree upon, which tend to undermine the performance, purpose and principles of humanitarianism. within the humanitarian system, there exists ineffective organizational arrangements which has caused severe weaknesses of the system. the flaws of the humanitarian system has been imputed to be mainly weak coordination, poor leadership, lack of accountability among others. the weaknesses of the humanitarian system has severely exposed the inadequate performance of the system. for instance, the rwandan genocide and haiti disaster exposed the un poor performance. gordon and donini (2016) uphold that the genocide of rwanda in 1994 raised key questions about the professionalism, competence and willingness to act of the humanitarian sector. the critique of organizational issues is pertinent as it helps to understand why the reform of the un has been a recurring feature and also whether there is the need to make conscious efforts to address the changing nature of humanitarian crisis (eriksson, 1996). humanitarian alibi humanitarian alibi is “the misuse of humanitarian idea and humanitarian workers by governments eager to do so as little as possible in economically uncompromising regions like sub-saharan africa” (reif, 1997). without political solutions, humanitarian intervention tends not to be effective. the sudan crisis spells out the west had no interest in pacifying the crisis leading to “excuse to do nothing” (meier, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 42 published by scholink inc. 2013). in addressing humanitarian crisis, state governments sometimes exercise their interests to misuse the idea of humanitarianism. also, given the complex nature of disasters and the “emergency imaginary”, state governments sometimes defend national sovereignty and refute humanitarian assistance or conditionality of aid. moreso, the allocation of humanitarian aid to crisis affected regions can lead to “spectre of the well-fed dead” as it could fuel conflicts (peters, 1996). humanitarian alibi, has not been adequately tackled and for instance in sudan, more than two billion humanitarian aid spent to rescue lives has also facilitated continuous conflicts (branczik, 2004). though the critiques highlighted above are principal, one main devastating critique omitted is state interests and humanitarian role in global governance. in the era of globalization, the new role of the un, is a complex one as the global structures of authority tend to interact with states and local systems. international law outlines states right to non-intervention, yet between 1990 and 2000, the un military has 56 times intervened forcefully in states questioning the legitimacy of the un intervention in weak states (pattinson, 2011). states interest is therefore pertinent to enable humanitarian system to uphold the principles of state sovereignty (chandler, 2009). state’s interest and role in global governance have therefore been omitted since it allows western governments to extend their influence over other state regions (gordon, 1991; thomas, 2001). also, this allows western powers to monopolize security to justify humanitarian intervention which was particularly evident in how politics shaped policy responses to the syrian crisis (watson, 2011). 2. the un and ngo humanitarian system in spite of the un and ngo humanitarian system undertaking various reforms to curb humanitarian emergencies, the gaps in humanitarian leadership tend to inhibit the humanitarian system from adequately attending to its principal critiques of the 1990s. in the past, the un humanitarian reforms discussed leadership mainly in the context of humanitarian coordinators. these humanitarian coordinators who are appointed by the un do not adequately comprehend humanitarian action (failing to understand the humanitarian principles and standards) and do not understand the importance of partnerships, resulting in underestimation of ngos and ineffective humanitarian response that are accountable to affected populations. also, the humanitarian coordinators have challenges of building consensus with resident coordinators of countries. this has resulted in a range of standards, approaches and initiatives of the un being compromised. the expectations and skills of humanitarian coordinators are different from those of resident coordinators. while the resident coordinators are responsible for developing operations and working closely with national governments to advocate the interests of the un, by contrast the humanitarian community role is to be amenable to quickly save lives and mitigate suffering. this in effect means that since the role of the resident coordinator is a diplomatic one, they cannot take stance against national governments and in some cases tend to construe ngo’s as nuisance infringing on principles of impartiality. the leadership gaps existing in humanly coordinators and its clusters has caused a mediocre performance of the humanitarian system (cohen, 2008). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 43 published by scholink inc. also, there exists cluster leadership challenges since no systematic arrangements have been reached relative to country-level protection. the humanitarian coordinators instead consult with unicef, ohchr and unhcr to address natural disaster situations. the organizations consulted have not taken a systematic engagement in natural disaster management. in 2010, according to the unhcr review, out of 58 natural disasters in the preceding five year period, the unhcr involved only in 13 and supported other five (deschamp, 2010). again, the distance in humanitarian leadership accounted for the failed performance to major crisis such as the west african ebola and rwanda genocide. it is in this light that bennett (2016) maintain that there is no incentives for such engagements as power dynamics and culture create compelling reasons to explain why the humanitarian system remain closed and centralized. furthermore, the discontinuity in leadership has caused deficiency of the organizational system and horrendous performance of the humanitarian system. within even the humanitarian system, there is a principal challenge. this concerns the lack of defined system-wide objective to gauge process of success or failure. this has led to ineffective organizational arrangements and flaws in performance. the gaps in leadership with the humanitarian system creates a situation where it is not clear on what the humanitarian system and ngo attempts to accomplish. there is moreover, absence of specific aims on which observers and actors would agree beyond goals of saving lives and attenuating suffering. in view of this, rapid response to massive sudden onset disasters tend to overwhelm countries coping capacities as well as advocacy on behalf of crisis affected people has adversely been affected. it is in no doubt that the various un reforms that have taken place which follow major disasters have questioned the un’s performance and leadership hierarchy. the complexity of the humanitarian system poses a challenge as it has created long-standing gaps in the global humanitarian system (weiss et al, 2008). accountability deficit, mainly downward accountability remain one of the key factors obstructing the ngo and un humanitarian system from sufficiently addressing its principal critiques. there was a great deal of emphasis placed on accountability when the reform started as one of the glaring gaps was accountability to affected populations. the humanitarian reform placed much emphasis of accountability of the global cluster leads to emergency relief coordination and country clusters to the humanitarian coordinators, yet there exist a challenge of accountability to affected populations. also, in spite of accountability applying to all humanitarian actors that in different humanitarian context and space tend to exert power over individuals affected by their action, the most affected and least powerful stakeholder group ie crisis-affected populations has received little accountability while traditionally the focus of humanitarian accountability has tended to focus on accountability to donors and more powerful stakeholders. despite the ngo community developing a set of quality and accountability initiatives in the mid-1990s, the un and ngo’s tend to command immense logistical, financial and cultural power which leads to irresponsible use of power mostly in situations where there is intense pressure to act quickly to save lives and meet reporting demands of their humanitarian community. this has precipitated corruption whether for personal, social or political gains, abuse of power including bias allocation of aid undermining principles of impartiality and humanity. the accountability deficit of the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 44 published by scholink inc. international ngo has undermined its mission and performance and transparency (hilhorst, 2002). also, the disaster accountability report in 2011 elucidated how poor response and deficient levels of accountability of ngo’s tend to affect vulnerable communities. the report outlined that the haiti earthquake received cooperation from only 20% of the ngo’s involved and found that 52% of the donated funds had been spent a year after the disaster although eight hundred thousand people continue to take shelter in tents or open air at night(disaster accountability project, 2011). moreover, the ngo reform which led to the adoption of various codes of conduct and standards have contributed to the accountability deficit of the humanitarian system. first, there is lack of clarity of the principles and standards adopted by the ngo community and this has engendered a more lack of accountability in their implementation. the sphere and core humanitarian standards which are the main accountability frameworks tend to underscore the significance of principles without pronouncing clearly their applications. the core humanitarian standard for instance states “based on an impartial assessment of needs, organizations should commit to providing impartial assistance based on needs’’. this in effect raises a key issue about the codes and standards of the ngo reform since telling an organization to be impartial does not explain how to be impartial. considering this, in today’s humanitarian landscape, ngo’s just state and utter principles without adhering to them or weave assessment of principles and standards into their project planning process or evaluations. mierop (2015) maintain that ngo’s promote principles but fail to routinely demonstrate them. moreover in advocating for adherence of principles and standards, this leads the humanitarian organizations to align with political and military activities thereby willingly compromising their principled approaches. also, the sphere standards lack compliance monitoring and the perverse incentives of quality assurance. in view of this, the sphere was introduced to ameliorate the quality of humanitarian action. the sphere has produced a less clear picture of the movement to improve the rights and dignity of those caught in disasters and war. “the human massacre of the drc and the low malnutrition rates in south sudan confirm that the professional standards interpreted restrictively in technical norms fail to bolster victims of disaster and war’’ (walker & purdin, 2004). weak coordination remain an essential setback of the un and ngo humanitarian system to effectively addressing the 1990s principal critiques. the reform process of the humanitarian community has centred on the most visible aspect of coordination which is the cluster approach. in recent times, the focus of the humanitarian community has accentuated on improved coordination not only at clusters but the field level. however, there exists weak partnerships within clusters which has impeded coordination to better address humanitarian response. coordination structures tend to alienate those who engage in bulk work (like local and international ngos) when there are no strong partnerships. the cluster approach was introduced by the humanitarian community to enhance partnerships between un agencies, international and national ngos and government departments (james, 2008, p. 359, iasc, 2006, p. 1). the aim of the cluster approach has not fostered strong coordination between international and local ngos and the un agencies. furthermore, there exists the problem of equality www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 45 published by scholink inc. and mutual respect, transparency and dialogue on an equal footing among the un agencies and ngos thereby debilitating complementarity capacities of local and international agencies. the cluster approach mostly fail to incorporate the perspective of local ngo actors and of that of the national. this tend to create the situation where ngos feel their roles are inactive in the clusters, where they resort to taking direction from cluster leads agencies rather than using the clusters to build capacity to bolster efforts of humanitarian response. also, there exists weak levels of coordination among clusters and ngos and un agencies because the ngos tend to perceive the cluster approach as being un-focused treating the ngos as subordinates and maintaining that it was introduced without proper consultation with non-un actors. for instance in drc in september 2009, 49 representatives of drc ngos, red cross and civil organizations wrote a letter to the un agencies criticizing them for not supporting or failing to coordinate with civil society organizations (street, 2011, p. 43). moreover, the ngo reform which led to the adoption of cluster approaches has precipitated deficiency in performance, purpose and principles of the humanitarian system. the performance and principles critiques are mostly undermined since there exist inconsistent coordination as cluster co-leads tend to lack clarity of their roles. the cluster approach during the ngo reform impeded the humanitarian principle of independence, impartiality and neutrality. ngos are financially dependent on lead agencies which tend to decline their independence. also, when cluster or lead agencies establish connections with peace keeping operations and governments that are parties to conflict, it undermines the impartiality principle of humanitarianism. furthermore, there exist weak coordination in the cluster approach during extensive crisis. for instance, the haitian earthquake in 2010 which brought together various national and international actors, weak cluster coordination was realized due to varying capacity and skills of humanitarian actors (stumpenhorst & razun, 2011). 3. conclusion the desire to meet the needs of people, institutions and governments across the global sphere engendered rapid changes in the geopolitical landscape in the humanitarian responses. over the years after the second world war, there has been mammoth changes in the humanitarian system, proliferating the number of stakeholders to the discourse of humanitarianism. in view of this, the humanitarian architecture is providing more emergency assistance to people, institutions and governments. irrespective of the graceful support of humanitarian system to affected populations, the system is outstretched and the very definition of humanitarianism has become complex with vulnerable populations perceiving humanitarian support as woeful and diminishing. the humanitarian stakeholders have upsurged entering the humanitarian landscape, with breakthrough technologies being introduced to bolster humanitarian work. nevertheless, the humanitarian system keep struggling to address the changing nature of conflicts and growing demands of humanitarian crisis. the growing challenges of the humanitarian system warranted incremental reforms and critiques in1990s and 2000s. notwithstanding this, the humanitarian system is plagued with challenges which get exposed during www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 46 published by scholink inc. global most enduring crisis which raises questions on the effectiveness of the un in conforming to critiques. in spite of the un and ngo humanitarian reform receiving various critiques, there has been some improvement in the humanitarian response to crisis. this paper ascertained whether the un and ngo reform sufficiently addressed its principal critiques of 1990s? the paper outlined key obstacles of accountability, leadership and coordination obstructing the un and ngos in effectively addressing the principal critiques of 1990s. in this paper, three main principal critiques have been underscored, mainly organizational issues and poor performance, problematic principles, human rights and conditionality and humanitarian alibi. also, critical factors such as weak coordination, accountability gaps and leadership challenges were highlighted as main impediments to the effective operations of the reforms. in view of this, it is imperative that the un and ngo humanitarian system to firstly fathom the historical evolution of humanitarianism from its foundations in the mid 19th century to the 1st and 2nd world wars to the end of the cold war and the new global world order. also, there is the need for the humanitarian system to advocate for actors outside the tradition that created humanitarian principles of neutrality, humanity, impartiality and independence to fathom and support adherence to humanitarian principles. moreover, it is pertinent to meet development, security, and peace objectives through robust coherence and complementarily between humanitarian and aid intervention. also, the humanitarian space requires greater probity and transparency in its conduct of operations within the sphere of humanitarianism. in addition to this, the humanitarian system should eschew one size fits all approach in crisis response. humanitarian actors should be more effective in addressing needs discarded of their beliefs and operational models. in sum, it will be advisable that the international ngo and its main accountability initiatives should work in line with un actors to improve their accountability and transparency to crisis-affected populations. also, the international ngos and un agencies should find ways to involve national partners in humanitarian coordination. it will be momentous for the un agencies, global clusters and donors to also ensure dedicated cluster leadership. 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(2008). humanitarianism in question. cornell university press. retrieved from http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/1976 microsoft word ape-v1n2-p113.doc advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 113 original paper the development of rural women’s specialized cooperatives in china: an analysis from new institutionalism perspective cui huang1* 1 department of public administration, dalian university of technology, dalian, china * cui huang, department of public administration, dalian university of technology, dalian, china received: august 20, 2018 accepted: september 12, 2018 online published: september 17, 2018 doi:10.22158/ape.v1n2p113 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v1n2p113 this paper is supported by general project of the national social science fund in china “research on the organizational development of rural women in rural governance” (17bzz065) and the liaoning province academy of social sciences planning fund project (key project) “research on the promotion paths of liaoning rural left-behind women’s organizing” (l15ash002). my sincere appreciation is given to my student, ping yang working in chaoyang women’s federation for the valuable data and research materials provided in this article. abstract since the rural declining and feminization of agriculture caused by rapid urbanization in china, the women’s specialized cooperatives are an important organizational force to promote the rural agricultural economy and empower women. taking 200 organizations in chaoyang city of liaoning province as the sample data, this article presents the current situation and existing problems of the rural women’s specialized cooperatives in china, and takes the new institutionalism as the basic theoretical framework. it analyzes the reasons of the problems from the level of formal institutions and informal institutions. in the formal institutions, the policy incentive system lacks rigid implementation measures, and there is no effective resultant force among the relevant organizations. in the informal institutions, rural women have the insufficient understanding of the prospects of the cooperatives, poor awareness of “brand” management and low credibility of the cooperatives. consequently, promoting the development of the cooperatives should also start with reforming these institutions. keywords rural women’s specialized cooperatives, formal institutions, informal institutions www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 114 published by scholink inc. 1. introduction at present, china is in the process of rapid urbanization. the reality of “rural declining” and “feminization of agriculture” has made chinese rural women’s living conditions very difficult. heavy agricultural production, cumbersome housework and lonely spiritual life are the true portrayal of all of these women. it is a well-known fact that all kinds of female organizations can fight for women’s rights and promote their development. in this respect, women’s organizations in the nordic countries have set a good example for the world. in fact, boosting the development of rural women’s organizations is one of the crucial ways to improve rural economy and empower women. as an important category in rural women’s social organizations in china, in recent years, rural women’s specialized cooperatives have emerged in rural areas and grown in both quantity and scale more remarkably compared with the other types of female social organizations. this article focuses on researching the rural women’s specialized cooperatives whose founders are all female and members are all or almost female. the purpose of the formation of such organizations is to motivate the entrepreneurial enthusiasm of rural women and enhance rural economic growth. furthermore, the growth of rural women’s specialized cooperatives have positively promoted women’s awareness of association and public participation capacity. 2. literature review 2.1 foreign scholars’ research rural women’s specialized cooperatives belong to sub-categories of farmers’ specialized cooperatives. there are about 2.6 million cooperative organizations registered in 145 different countries on the planet (grace, 2014), and there are a considerable number of researches on farmers’ specialized cooperatives. however, only a few of foreign scholars have directly discussed about rural women’s specialized cooperatives. scholars analyze the functions, organizational nature and internal mechanism of the farmers’ cooperatives. from a functional point of view, sexton richard believes that the farmers’ participation in cooperatives is advantageous to realize scale production, enhance market competitiveness and improve the quality of agricultural products (sexton, 1993). farmers’ cooperatives can provide organizational links between small farmers and modern retail markets (jos bijman, 2011). agricultural cooperatives are also tools for the government to uplift economic and social development because they can create jobs, increase income, eliminate poverty, and strengthen farmers (markets) in modern value systems (tursinbek, 2018). the nature of cooperatives is generally considered to be an effective union between different subjects with the common interests, and a form of vertical integration (emelianoff, 1942). in a broad sense, yamei hu shows that cooperatives are organizational forms of many independent growers (horizontal relationships) (hu, 2007). the internal mechanism of forming cooperatives is the alliance of stakeholders. there must be a game between relevant stakeholders in this alliance structure (sexton, 1986), and the way of distribution among members and the way of cost allocation have a great influence on the formation of cooperatives. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 115 published by scholink inc. 2.2 domestic scholars’ research since the application of law of farmers’ specialized cooperatives in 2007, the number of farmers’ specialized cooperatives in china has grown dramatically. by the end of june 2011, the number of registered organizations had tripled, reaching 446,000 (liu, 2012). a large amount of studies on farmers’ specialized cooperatives are conducted by domestic researchers, for instance, the essence of cooperatives (deng, 2016) and classification (hu, 2017), innovation path (li, 2016)(wang, 2010), institutional alienation (feng, 2014), transaction types and governance mechanisms (cui, 2017), financial performance (xu, 2013), credit issues (zai, 2013), operational efficiency (chen, 2015), evaluation and decision mechanism (li, 2015) and the motivation of farmers’ joining cooperatives from the perspective of farmers (liu, 2017)(hu, 2013). the study of rural women’s specialized cooperatives begins with a discussion of women’s participation in cooperatives (chen, 2008) and its influencing factors (yuan, 2008). the articles on rural women’s specialized cooperatives are still rare, and the existing research is mostly based on case studies and summarizes their development status (yuan, 2001) (piao, 2010). with the strong development of feminization of agriculture, the research about this is also paying more attention to the survival situation of the special rural groups, that is, the left-behind women. some scholars have discussed the issues of farmers’ cooperatives mainly with left-behind women and the paths of left-behind women (zhang, 2013) taking part in agriculture and animal husbandry cooperatives in some specific areas (ethnic minorities in northwest china) (xiong, 2014). in general, domestic and foreign studies on farmers’ specialized cooperatives are high in quantity; nevertheless, the studies particularly on rural women’ specialized cooperatives from the perspective of gender are rare. this does not adapt with the reality that the rural women’s specialized cooperatives are rising in the context of rural feminization. therefore, this article attempts to explore the existing problems in the development of rural women’s specialized cooperatives. 3. research methods 3.1 theoretical analysis: new institutionalism as an analytical paradigm widely recognized by the social sciences in recent years, the new institutionalism has received more and more attention. “institutional theory provides the most promising and creative lens for us to observe organizations in contemporary society” (w. richard scott, 2010). north believes that institutions are constraints artificially designed and used for interpersonal interaction (douglas, 1994). institutions can be composed of informal institutions and formal institutions. informal institutions generally refer to the value beliefs, ethical norms, moral values, customs, ideologies and other soft constraints in a society (lu, 2003); formal institutions refer to a series of policies, regulations and other hard constraints that people consciously created, such as political rules, economic rules and contracts (douglas, 1994). this article will take the new institutionalism as the theoretical framework to analyze the reasons for existing problems of the rural women’s specialized cooperatives in china. in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 116 published by scholink inc. other words, the development of the cooperatives is restricted by the formal institutions and the informal institutions, and in order to solve this problem, we should start with analyzing the two levels of institutions. 3.2 data analysis: the first-hand information the author’s student, ping yang is working in the chaoyang women’s federation. because the federation manages most of women’s organizations of this city in which the women’s specialized cooperatives are included, this article can easily obtain rich and detailed data. in addition, the author has frequent contact with these organizations which provide first-hand data support for the research. to find cooperatives’ status and difficult issues, the article randomly sampled 359 rural women’s specialized cooperatives in chaoyang city, and conducted a detailed sample analysis of 200 rural women’s specialized cooperatives randomly selected from them. 4. development overview and existing problems chaoyang city in liaoning province is a prefecture-level city with relatively backward economy and many migrant workers. therefore, the characteristics of feminization of agriculture are more obvious. the development of rural women’s specialized cooperatives has a certain scale and has the typicality for the research. according to the statistics of chaoyang administration for industry and commerce, by the end of june 2013, there were 1,256 farmers’ specialized cooperatives registered in chaoyang city of which the number of rural women’s specialized cooperatives is 359, accounting for 28.6%. 4.1 an overview of the development of rural women’s specialized cooperatives in chaoyang city this article has a statistical data analysis on age distribution, education level and type distribution of cooperative products of 200 rural women’s specialized cooperatives randomly selected. the general sample characteristics are as follows: 4.1.1 the cooperative members are mainly the middle-aged and the elderly the tables 1 shows that with the 200 rural women’s specialized cooperatives we surveyed, their total number of members is 5,444. there are 1,256 members aged 40 or under 40, accounting for 23% of the total member; 2,648 members aged 41-50, accounting for 49%; 1,310 members aged 51-60, accounting for 24%; and 230 members over the age of 60, accounting for 4%. it can be seen that the members of the cooperatives are mainly the middle-aged and the elderly aged 41-60. this age distribution characteristic is also an important factor leading to the lack of organizations’ vitality. 4.1.2 cooperative members are under-educated the table 1 also indicates that there is a decreasing trend in education level of the members of the cooperatives we surveyed. the number of members with high school level or below is 5,064, accounting for 93% of the total number. in fact, the members’ education level directly affects the breadth and depth of cooperatives’ growth. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 117 published by scholink inc. table 1. sample information of members of chaoyang women’s specialized cooperatives sample distribution number of samples % age 40 years old and below 1256 23 41 to 50 years old 2648 49 51 to 60 years old 1310 24 60 years old and above 230 4 education level primary and junior high school education 3204 59 technical secondary school and high school education 1860 34 college and university degree 378 7 graduate degree and above 2 0.04 4.1.3 the operation mode of cooperatives is mainly planting and breeding according to figure 1, the rural women’s specialized cooperatives in chaoyang city are primarily divided into five types: planting cooperatives, breeding cooperatives, fruit industry cooperatives, agricultural machinery cooperatives and other cooperatives. among them, planting cooperatives and breeding cooperatives account for 83% of the total number and become the main part of cooperatives. figure 1. distribution of product types of rural women’s specialized cooperatives in chaoyang city 4.1.4 the rural women-led cooperatives are the majority of the organizations as shown in figure 2, there are four ways to set up rural women’s specialized cooperatives in chaoyang city: rural women taking the lead, rural women’s congress taking the lead, female entrepreneurs taking the lead, investing enterprises taking the lead. the rural women-led cooperatives are the majority of organizations, making up 77.6% of the total number. this kind of cooperatives is generally led by rural female elites or large planting and raising www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 118 published by scholink inc. households and other farmers are encouraged to participate, forming an operational mechanism of “elite people, large households + farmer specialized cooperatives + farmers”. the advantages of this type of cooperatives are that relatives and friends are the link, the transparency is higher, and the distribution of interests is more balanced. however, the shortcomings are obvious, that is, the cooperatives whose members are in acquaintanceship are generally small in number, and the speed and scale of their organizational development are also relatively limited. the cooperatives led by the women’s congress account for 12.4%, taking the second large proportion of the total. with this type of cooperatives, the rural cadres take the lead and attract the participation of farmers. they are local specialized production cooperatives in accordance with the development ideas “one town one product” and “one village one product”. due to the initiative of the rural women’s congress, this kind of cooperatives has a strong appeal and high prestige among the masses with its tremendous development potential. the percentage of the other two types of cooperatives is inconsiderable. the cooperatives led by female entrepreneurs account for 8.2% while those led by the investing enterprises have a very small proportion 1.8%. the investing enterprise-led cooperatives are in the unstable development situation since their growth ratio will be restricted by the management benefit of the investing enterprise. figure 2. classification of rural women’s specialized cooperatives according to the forming way in chaoyang city 4.2 the predicament of rural women’s specialized cooperatives as being in the early stage of development, the rural women’s specialized cooperatives in chaoyang city have been encountering the problems of scale expansion, funds and management. these difficulties, in reality, have seriously affected the cooperatives’ growth. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 119 published by scholink inc. 4.2.1 the cooperatives’ scale are small from the situation we can grasp, the development scale of rural women’s specialized cooperatives is generally small. according to the statistical data source provided by chaoyang women’s federation, the average number of members registered at 359 rural women’s specialized cooperatives in chaoyang is 23, which is much lower than 80, the average number registered at farmers’ specialized cooperatives in china. this reflects that the number of the cooperative members is quite restricted. in addition to the limitation of the membership, the cooperatives are currently limited to providing essential services which can bring direct, stable and considerable economic benefits to their members: technical information, production materials, seedlings, poultry, product recycling and others because of their poor infrastructure and the low level of cooperation between them. furthermore, since most rural women’s specialized cooperatives are not closely connected with their members, it is difficult for them to form a business community that integrates “production, supply, sales and processing” with capital and interests as the link. as a result, their production scale and market competitiveness have been restricted and the function of driving the local labor force has not been extended. 4.2.2 the funds are insufficient most cooperatives in chaoyang still has weak economic strength, insufficient and unstable sources of funds. most of their available funds are from member contribution and the funds they loaned are also small by reason of the difficulty in evaluating the assets of the cooperatives. this shortage of loan and financing, as a result, can inhibit their development. take the rural women-led cooperatives as an example. these cooperatives are mainly initiated by ordinary women, and their participants are mainly ordinary farmers; hence, the source of funds is basically based on the farmers’ own collection and mutual aid. the majority of rural women-led cooperatives in chaoyang has obstacles to circulating capital and finding public service funds. in fact, many of them do not even have their own office spaces, and only rely on renting houses or the village committee office to carry out their daily work. due to such funding constraints, many of the cooperatives’ primary and deep processing projects for agricultural products cannot be implemented, and their storage and transportation capacity are also limited. many of their practical technologies cannot be transformed into actual productivity. moreover, due to the information asymmetry between cooperatives and related institutions, many cooperatives do not know the relevant supporting policies, which is considered one of the main reasons for the shortage of funds. among the 53 rural women’s specialized cooperatives randomly selected, only 14 of them have obtained financial support from governments at all levels or relevant departments, accounting for 26.4% of the total while other cooperatives have not, resulting from their little knowledge about the relevant financial support policies. 4.2.3 management needs to be standardized the cooperatives’ management is still inadequate and needs standardizing. as far as the internal governance of cooperatives is concerned, most cooperatives have formulated statutes and rules; nonetheless, these statutes and rules are mostly formalistic and have not been strictly implemented. the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 120 published by scholink inc. cooperatives lack their financial management system, and their daily business decisions are often decided by a few members of them; as a result, the loose connection between cooperatives and cooperative members is increasing. at the same time, due to the limited understanding of management concepts, many cooperatives are not closely connected with production and sales. the phenomenon of “paying more attention to profit than to service, to distribution than to accumulation” is widespread, which negatively affects the sustainability of cooperatives. from the external governance of cooperatives, the responsibilities of the relevant administrative departments are not clear enough, resulting in a lack of substantive management. instead of focusing on their management role, these departments are mainly concerned about the competitions for fund projects. 5. analysis to institutional reasons the status quo of rural women’s specialized cooperatives in chaoyang city is the typical example of many such cooperatives in other cities in china. on this basis, we can conduct an attribution analysis of the cooperatives’ above existing development problems. taking the new institutionalism as the perspective, the paper discusses the reasons for the current problems of rural women’s specialized cooperatives from the formal institutions and informal institutions. 5.1 formal institutional constraints 5.1.1 lack of rigid enforcement measures in the policy incentive institutions in recent years, the party central committee and the state council in china have had a great contribution to the development of farmers’ specialized cooperatives, and have successively introduced a series of preferential incentive policies. however, due to the lack of rigid supervision and disciplinary regulations, these policies have not frequently carried out by the local departments. in terms of direct incentives, the circular of the state administration of taxation of the ministry of finance on relevant tax policies for farmers’ specialized cooperatives stipulates, “the sale of agricultural products produced by the members of the farmers’ specialized cooperatives is regarded as the sale of self-produced agricultural products by agricultural producers with exemption from value added tax (vat). the agricultural film, seeds, seedlings, fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural machinery sold by the farmers’ specialized cooperatives to the members of cooperatives are exempt from vat. the contracts for the purchase and sale of agricultural products and agricultural production materials signed by the farmers’ specialized cooperatives and members of cooperatives are exempt from stamp duty”. this tax incentive is an important incentive originally, but some local tax departments have not implemented this policy rigorously and have been still collecting various taxes from the cooperatives. with regard to indirect institutional incentives, the ministry of commerce and the ministry of agriculture have also formulated corresponding policies to promote the growth of farmers’ specialized cooperatives. although the policies formulated by the ministry of commerce and the ministry of agriculture are more stringent in terms of provisions, some enterprises have had opportunistic practice or have not strictly implemented them. for example, guidance of ministry of agriculture and ministry of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 121 published by scholink inc. commerce on comprehensively promoting the work of farming-supermarket docking stipulates, “supermarkets are strictly forbidden to collect unreasonable fees such as entrance fees, sponsorship fees, booth fees, barcode fees, etc., and arbitrary default on payment is strictly prohibited”. the rules mentioned above have used more specific words such as “forbidden”; nevertheless, in practice some commercial chain enterprises have not really followed these rules, and the relevant regulatory authorities have not followed up the corresponding punishment for this violation. as the violation fines are excessively small, the business are mercenary to do whatever they want. consequently, the difficulty of cooperative products entering supermarket chains has not been solved, which has seriously affected the enthusiasm of the cooperative members and the sustainable development of the cooperatives. 5.1.2 no effective resultant force between the organizations the growth of rural women’s specialized cooperatives is influenced by many major departments: party committees, agriculture, finance, industry and commerce, civil affairs, supply and marketing, forestry, taxation at all levels and other relevant departments. however, all of these departments have not reached the ideal working mechanism which is “government departments taking the lead, competent departments holding their business and relevant departments being in good cooperation”. there are always the conflicts of interest in the policies implementation among them. from the perspective of “rational people” in economics, some members of the departments have not spent more administrative costs on the rural women’s specialized cooperatives that cannot directly benefit them. consequently, the cooperatives have not been frequently received information sharing, strong management forces, and support from other departments. 5.2 informal institutional constraints 5.2.1 rural women lack awareness to the prospects for cooperatives the fact that a majority of rural women of the cooperatives have low level of education as the previous data shows is a barrier for their development. the rural women lack knowledge of management operation, have low skills in market development and weak legal consciousness. they also do not have sufficient understanding of the long-term development of cooperatives. in addition, as being in the initial growth period, most cooperatives could not employ experts, and their business is limited to providing start-up work for seedlings, technical consultation and information provision services. there are huge gaps in their development of agricultural products market, brand building and processing and value addition. all of the reasons above make rural women have no eager expectation for the development prospects of cooperatives. 5.2.2 the cooperatives have poor consciousness of “brand” management modern agriculture is a knowledge-intensive industry related to good preparations for ploughing and sowing, management in production, postpartum processing on the basis of the support of modern technology. as an important part of modern agriculture, branding of agricultural products has become a necessary demand in the operation of cooperatives. good branding can help the cooperatives highlight their products’ characteristics, increase their income, and promote their long-term growth. however, the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 122 published by scholink inc. rural women’s specialized cooperatives are currently accustomed to satisfying simple farming and marketing their primary agricultural products, and have poor consciousness of brand management. this issue is manifested by the fact that many of the cooperatives have not registered trademarks to protect their legitimate rights and interests. an example to prove this is that only 3 rural women’s specialized cooperatives registered their trademarks among 200 cooperatives we surveyed. 5.2.3 the credibility of the cooperatives is low all of the above problems can trigger the cooperatives’ virtuous cycle of the weak economic strength, insufficient investment, low economic benefits to the farmers, leading to the damage of their working enthusiasm. the result of this is that the scale of the cooperatives is generally too small, and thus they have not been highly recognized by the masses. this reality makes the development of the cooperatives limited and further affects negatively their credibility. 6. conclusions and discussions by the analysis of the cooperatives’ samples of chaoyang, “a glimpse of the whole leopard”, this article shows that this kind of multi-functional organizations, rural women’s specialized cooperatives, is still in the early stage of development in china, and needs a lot of improvement in terms of scale, financing and credibility. the constraints of the institutions are the deep-seated reasons for its limited development. the route to develop such organizations should be constructed at the level of formal institution and informal institution. specifically, the rigidity of formal institution formulation and implementation should be strengthened, and the rural women’s specialized cooperatives themselves should also improve their system construction gradually. in addition, the relevant departments such as industry and commerce, agriculture, taxation, and finance should also be self-disciplined and be in cooperation to promote the development of the cooperatives. at the level of informal institution, more experts could be recruited to train their members on cooperation consciousness and management methods, enhance the awareness of rural women’s practical value of cooperatives and approach more modern business concepts. as an important kind of rural economic organizations and social organizations in china, rural women’s specialized cooperatives can foster rural economic development and alleviate the double burden of rural agricultural production and domestic labor in the background of feminization of agriculture. particularly, being a crucial form of rural social organizations, it can participate in the national governance system and the modernization of governance capacity which is considered as a vital part of rural governance. by this participation, the rural women of cooperatives will have more opportunities to be cultivated and trained their public spirit and political skills. certainly, the cooperatives’ development enhancement requires not only the restructuring of the formal institutions and the informal institutions, but also the deepening reform of the national political and economic system, cultivating the political culture of rural citizens, and improving the awareness of association and cooperation among women; in addition, the development of other types of farmers’ www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 123 published by scholink inc. specialized cooperatives should be in consideration. references chen, j. 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(2013). research on the development of farmers’ cooperatives with left-behind women as the main body under the background of village hollowization. lanzhou university, 2013. microsoft word ape-v5n3-p31 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 31 original paper democracy’s invisible savior: why citizens should welcome taxes with open arms samantha schwarz1* 1 independent researcher, washington dc, usa * samantha schwarz, e-mail: samschwarz0@gmail.com received: may 28, 2022 accepted: june 8, 2022 online published: june 20, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n3p31 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n3p31 abstract this article aims to understand the transformative power that the fiscal requirement to impose taxation has on democratization. an exploration into the fiscal development of early modern europe alongside modern empirical examples, demonstrates the value of taxation as a solution to leaderships that don’t represent their people. it’s reasoned that the confluence of taxation and democracy can be attributed to two distinct mechanisms. one, that the government is more willing to compromise to the peoples’ demands, and two, that the people are more willing to demand this compromise. the latter is of particular significance in suggesting the role that behavioral phenomena play in inflaming democratic engagement. critically, the behavioral effects of taxation should take more of a leading role in policies that pursue democratization whilst aid, more of a support role. keywords democracy, taxation, citizen participation, loss aversion, representative governance, tax bargaining 1. introduction the freedom that the leaders of petrostates—most notably those of the gulf economies—have been granted by their opulence of resource wealth, has been eyed with envy by other nations. the chateaus of saudi arabia, or the gilded architecture of qatar, are of particular salience. increasingly however, this envy appears to have been merely in the eye of the beholder. the state revenue of these economies has been entirely fueled—quite literally—by high oil prices. amongst the many disturbances of 2020, was the colossal crash in the price of oil. price wars in march saw the sharpest decline since 1991 (stevens, 2020). whilst oil has since rallied back to high prices, the russian invasion of ukraine has awoken the world to the myriad of geopolitical risks that surround a dependence on fossil fuels. volatility in oil markets and the resounding calls for renewable energy indicate that it won’t be a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 32 published by scholink inc. reliable source of revenue for oil exporting nations for long—suggesting that oil may be unsustainable in more ways than one. the 2020 oil price collapse, whilst no doubt the source of headache for many a fund manager, also exposed how vulnerable oil-rich economies’ balance sheets really are (miller, 2020). in 2020, the algerian government required oil priced above us$100 a barrel to balance its books (the economist, 2020). the uae required us$70 per barrel (financial times, 2020). for saudi arabia, us$83 (financial times, 2020). yet in 2020, the price sunk beneath us$30 per barrel (the business times, 2020). amassing further debt to offset such oil losses didn’t offer much hope to many of these nations—oman was projected to owe 89-percent of its gdp to creditors (the economist, 2020). an oil market crisis couldn’t have come knocking at a worse time. the onslaught of the covid-19 pandemic didn’t just damage demand for oil, it froze tourism—a revenue alternative for gulf nations—in its tracks, to deliver a simultaneous blow. all of which, raises a larger, far more consequential question: when a government has nowhere left to turn to for money but to its own people, what will happen? 2. a historical account leadership that can no longer sustain itself by way of externally sourced revenue, unable to buy loyalty or pay-off competition, faces a transformative dilemma. such a state will be forced to pivot elsewhere for financing—taxation. the historical record provides a curious account of this process. the holy roman empire, a collection of sovereignties in western and central europe over the middle ages to the 19th century, displays iterations of fiscal development. unlike death, there was no certainty in taxes during early modern europe. initially, court fees, commodity sales and other monopolies were the source of sovereign revenue. however, as the costs of warfare with neighboring territories increased, survival depended on finding additional revenue. rulers began to solicit this revenue by levying tax on their subjects (bates & lien, 1985, p. 54). this created a dilemma for the state: if citizens were to be expected to contribute their income to the monarch, then the citizenry had not only been supplied a cause to expect better treatment, but they’d also been given a means to negotiate it too. the capability of private agents to resist taxes, meant that those early modern european states who choose to impose said taxes, had to engage in tax bargaining. if citizens were to voluntarily participate in this new revenue model the state had to earn their acquiescence by ceding them political voice. this led to the expanded provision of public goods and the creation of institutions including financial councils (cantoni et al., 2019, p. 8). consequently, the government inevitably had to transform into one that was more representative of the people. as a result, by the early 17th century england had established a more or less independent court and parliament (prichard, 2015, p. 51). england was not the only nation to do so—notably, france and the netherlands amongst others (prichard, 2015, p.51; netherlands institute for multiparty democracy, 2008, p. 9). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 33 published by scholink inc. 2.1 give me tea and give me freedom of all the historical examples, a particularly theatrical one comes from the role that britain’s relentless taxes played in inciting the american revolution of the 17th century. british parliament’s tea tax infuriated american colonists so much so, as to prompt patriots dressed as mohawk indians to forcefully hurl an entire ship’s supply of tea overboard—the infamous boston tea party of 1773 (prichard, 2015, p. 53). this was a clear example of collective action by the people to demand greater representation. importantly, whilst tax bargaining need not always require citizens to go so far as to flood a harbor with ninety-thousand pounds of tea leaves, minimal citizen engagement can still prompt democratic change. even economist joseph schumpeter in his 1918 crisis of the tax state, acknowledged the requirement of financing the state as empirically being the driving catalyst of social and political change (schimdt, 2003, p. 342). in plain english: the transition from the feudal system to the capitalist free economy was reliant on the tax state. the notion that the introduction of tax will spark democratization is an alluring idea. however, it isn’t so simple. firstly, negotiating power is never distributed evenly amongst a population. in the holy roman empire, aristocratic taxpayers with significant wealth—the most important taxpayers—had the resources and profile to demand compromise. comparatively, the peasants did not. this reality was recognized by montesquieu, who noted that monarchs needed to exercise restraint where mobile assets were abundant (bates & lien, 1985, p. 60). indeed, agrarian states (home to poorer citizens) were more likely to use coercion to collect taxes from their people in comparison to the leaders of capital-intensive ones (cantoni et al., 2019, p. 50). secondly, some sovereigns, uninterested in entertaining citizen demands, never bothered to engage in a negotiating process in the first place. why did taxation spur democracy in some territories in early modern europe but not others? put simply, whether the necessity of taxation leads to democracy is sensitive to many factors. whilst taxation does confer power to the people, it does so in unique ways. this is particularly evident in today’s world. 3. a theoretical account 3.1 no taxation without representation a theoretical exploration into the transformative effects of introducing tax is first taken. this process—tax encouraging representative governance—condenses into two distinct mechanisms. first, the government will be more willing to compromise to the demands of its people, and second, the people will be more willing to demand better governance. the former arises from the simple fact that by requiring the population to supply the revenue, the government has empowered the people with a choice (paler, 2013: 709). taxpayers can choose to undermine the government’s fiscal strength by refusing to oblige their tax requirements. the government is therefore incentivized to placate taxpayers into quasi-voluntary compliance through compromise. citizens might demand the expanded provision of public goods and services—perhaps improved schools or infrastructure—or even an end to corruption. tax bargaining, that is, a citizen’s ability to leverage their choice to extract government www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 34 published by scholink inc. concessions, effectively transforms their power vis-à-vis the government. furthermore, should citizens demand transparency, the subsequent publicization of budgets and establishment of independent tribunals will improve tax infrastructure itself—a cycle of improvement and mutual behavior adjustment. however, a government’s incentive to compromise is only half of the explanation. in the absence of taxation, what has stopped citizens from using elections or similar leverage to demand accountable governance? this puzzle can be explained by the second mechanism. put simply, the people are willing to demand better governance. citizens who are told to forfeit their income are very quickly intolerant of an unresponsive and corrupt government (paler, 2013, p. 723). several psychological theories underpin this phenomenon. behavioral economists daniel kahneman and amos tversky identified that people display a consistent pattern in their choice preferences. specifically, that avoiding a loss is preferred to receiving an equivalent gain, labelling this loss aversion (kahneman & tversky, 1979, p. 279); (tversky & kahneman, 1991, p. 10). a government that begins collecting from citizens own income, has shifted its citizens into the psychological “loss realm”. whereas, when a government simply siphons away foreign aid, citizens only lose a potential “gain”. if a citizen’s loss in utility, as roused by the imposed tax, is accompanied by corrupt governance, their tolerance for inadequate government will be uniquely eroded. an extension to loss aversion, the endowment effect, describes that people appraise a higher value to those objects which they perceive ownership of (kahneman et al., 1991, p. 194). in 1991, kahneman was joined by richard thaler and jack knetsch, to study this phenomenon. in this study, some participants were gifted a mug to prompt their sense of ownership over the good, whilst other participants were not. participants were then able to sell or trade the mug. the results showed that those participants who felt “ownership” would only agree to sell a mug at an average of twice the amount that they’d be willing to pay to purchase the same mug had they not felt ownership (kahneman et al., 1991, p. 196). applying these findings, requiring citizens to contribute a share of their income fosters their perception of ownership over national revenue. after the introduction of taxes, the interaction of loss aversion and the endowment effect positively operate to drive citizen engagement. both the personal loss of a citizen’s income and their newfound sense of entitlement to state income, has provided citizens with a significantly more powerful motivator to punish and hold their government accountable. comparatively, a leader’s abuse of externally sourced revenue simply won’t spark outrage and collective action the way misuse of tax revenue will. it is emphasized—and cannot be understated—that the revenue raised itself is irrelevant to the primary role that taxation plays in democratization. yet, when tax is proposed as a development solution revenue is too often the focus and capacity too often the language (bachas, kondylis, & loeser, 2021; pomeranz & vila-belda, 2019). if raising more revenue was the solution, resource rents, foreign aid or other externally sourced revenue would have furthered democracy already. foreign income requires little—if any—interaction with local citizens, reducing the government’s reliance on local support to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 35 published by scholink inc. almost nil. in effect, financing a budget wholly externally is counterproductive to good governance. thus, what matters is the means in which the revenue is raised not the revenue itself. it’s unlikely that the fiery sentiment behind the famous american revolutionary slogan, “no taxation without representation”, would have emerged without the relentless taxation by the british. the greatest power of taxation: it reaps participation dividends. 3.2 a solution or a siren call? despite the compelling siren call of the theoretical account of tax and democracy, it’s likely of no surprise that in reality a happy outcome is far from guaranteed. in predicting whether tax will promote democracy, several factors must be considered. a government with an alternative means to externally source funds won’t risk the political costs of imposing taxes. therefore, the level of fiscal pressure facing a government is the first factor (prichard, 2015, p. 70). secondly, taxpayer capacity to bargain, as influenced by the extent of political openness in an economy, is important (prichard, 2015, p. 73). a state with a repressive government that has few independent civil or business organizations may not see democracy gains from the imposition of tax alone. third, is the availability and strength of institutions, including parliamentary processes, which can facilitate bargaining (prichard, 2015, p. 75). finally, is the political salience of introduced taxation (prichard, 2015, p. 76). citizens can’t protest taxes that they aren’t aware of, and not all taxes are designed to be visible—an insidious yet often common strategy for governments to have their cake and eat it too. these factors combine to influence citizen’s expectations of, and trust in, their government—both of which are very important. citizen’s demands are tethered to their own perceptions of the role of government, meaning they are quite literally limited by their imagination. and when there is no trust, citizens may choose to simply evade taxes altogether. however, despite these potential pitfalls the imposition of taxation has been shown to positively affect democracy in some environments, suggesting it indeed is a possible solution. 4. an empirical account the greatest argument for the specific use of taxes to encourage democracy are empirical examples. the democratic republic of congo (drc), a kleptocracy of sorts, collects little tax and has neither much citizen participation nor formal channels for such (weigel, 2020, p. 1857). kananga, a city in the drc, suffered a loss in diamond revenue after decouplagé of local government in 2015 (weigel, 2020; 1858). a narrative that was reminiscent of many petrostates in 2020, kananga’s government found itself looking to other sources of income. a field experiment in kananga published in 2020 provides evidence that introducing taxation can indeed prompt citizens to demand representative governance (weigel, 2020, p. 1853). this study measured the impact of property tax collection on citizens who had never previously been registered to pay formal taxes. this randomized rollout was the first citywide tax campaign. prior to its introduction, only 39-percent of congolese citizens had even heard of the provincial tax ministry and fewer than eight-percent made tax payments (weigel, 2020, p. 1857). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 36 published by scholink inc. post-campaign, the study found that political participation in the form of attendance at town hall meetings and submission of evaluation forms had significantly increased (weigel, 2020, p. 1872). these citizens were even willing to incur costs—largely travel and foregone work—to do so. the demands made by these citizens included more inclusive government, public goods such as improved infrastructure and greater transparency. one participant said: “erosion threatens our neighborhoods, and the government does nothing…so why should we pay?” (weigel, 2020, p. 1855). whilst another wrote: “inform us how this money will be spent…[and] not wasted on other things” (weigel, 2020, p. 1896). the mere fact that citizens attended forums at all indicates their attempt to achieve policy concessions. some of these citizens agreed to be registered as a formal taxpayer but did not pay the tax in the end. this in of itself demonstrates the process of tax bargaining in action. perhaps of most interest was the finding that study participants’ expectations of their government were influenced. citizens positively updated their expectations of reciprocity and an improved administrative ability of the kananga tax ministry (weigel, 2020, p. 1853). such an update to norms and expectations plays a vital role in civic engagement and a reformed, more resilient, social contract. it appears that in this case the mere fact that the ministry tried to register taxpayers—whether they paid or not—signaled a capacity improvement. it’s important for long-term progress that citizens have faith in the capability of their public institutions. signals of state competence in kananga allowed citizens to demand better governance once they knew the government was capable of it. indeed, those individuals who did comply with taxes were more likely to express positive attitudes towards leadership. overall, incidents of bribery were reported at very low and property tax compliance increased—signaling that tax bargaining can have benefits for both the people and the government. the campaign, by increasing an individual’s sense of ownership over public revenue, resulted in a significant broadening of the tax base and a sizeable expansion in the formal presence of the state in kananga (weigel, 2020, p. 1852). uganda has had a similar political environment of corruption and ineptitude. in 2012, an investigation found that aid money worth us$20 million effectively disappeared from public accounts (martin, 2014, p. 6). whilst the scandal was covered by ugandan media, and despite the fact that uganda relied on such aid to fund many public goods, surprisingly citizen outrage was almost non-apparent. there was little political consequence for the incumbent party. however, when local government in lira, a ugandan city, stopped collecting trash from a local market, the citizen outrage was in stark contrast to that of the aid scandal (martin, 2014). to be a vendor at this market required a fee payment—a tax of sorts—used to fund local government. in return for this fee, the government agreed to collect the market trash (it’s evident why the participants were upset when the trash stopped being collected). in protest to the overabundance of trash the market vendors left the garbage in front of the city hall and threatened to similarly dump it at council member’s houses (martin, 2014, p. 5). in short, collection of the trash was swiftly resumed. an example of the undeniable potential of tax in paving broader democratic reform comes from ghana. in the 1990s ghana faced increased fiscal deficits and consequently in 1995 the government introduced www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 37 published by scholink inc. a value-added tax (vat) on goods and services to combat its losses (prichard, 2015, p. 218). the government was met by nationwide protests which saw tens of thousands take to the streets. whilst the introduction of a sales tax sparked the initial protests, they quickly grew into demands for broader policy transformation (prichard, 2015). the movement, in unifying previously disparate opposition to the repressive government, developed into demands for dramatic expansions in accountability and representativeness. the vat was repealed and not introduced again till 1998 after it had been reformed (prichard, 2015). in successive governments when further increases in vat were attempted, the government had to first agree—at the behest of the public—to designate the new revenue to specific public programs. this led to the creation of the national health insurance scheme and ghana education trust fund (prichard, 2015). the overall result was significant progress towards transforming ghana into a more inclusive and open political environment. comparatively, prior introductions of taxation in kenya did not lead to sustained civic engagement nor immediate government concessions. when a vat was introduced in the early 1990s, opposition to this tax was relatively absent (prichard, 2015, p. 122). this absence has been attributed to kenya’s repressive government which would have limited taxpayer scope to bargain or organize (prichard, 2015). such passivity supports the reservation that levying tax is not always guaranteed to result in tax bargaining outcomes. however, even when direct bargaining isn’t available, taxpayers can still slowly undermine an administration through evasion—simply refusing the tax altogether. despite the absence of instantaneous results in kenya, it’s likely that longer term change did still occur. tax resistance in kenya during the nineties incrementally weakened the government’s fiscal stability and likely aided the eventual political transition in 2002 (prichard, 2015, p. 3). the incoming government—likely aware of the detrimental impact of tax resistance on the previous government—explicitly sought to reform tax administration and improve local accountability (prichard, 2015). whilst in some contexts such as ghana the effects of taxation on democracy do seem to appear overnight, this is often not the case. yet, incremental changes not observable for years into the future can still come to fruition, suggesting tax had a positive impact after all—changing norms and expectations may take time. often, it may only be later governments that recognize the need to reform. ethiopia has also demonstrated similar challenges to the ease with which tax can solve all problems. previously, ethiopian governments have attempted to raise taxes, however, on each occasion there has been a noticeable lack of associated tax bargaining (prichard, 2015, p. 190). this may likely have been the result of a weak private sector and repressive political characteristics (prichard, 2015, p. 191). low public expectations of government responsibility may have also played a role. however, once again more subdued resistance to tax likely contributed to incrementally improving democracy in ethiopia. (it’s suggested that fiscal crisis was pivotal in ending the repressive derg leadership in the late eighties (prichard, 2015, p. 169). before democracy can prevail, civil society organizations and other independent groups that can facilitate bargaining may need time to develop. indeed, after the expansion of business taxes in ethiopia business associations that engaged with the government were eventually www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 38 published by scholink inc. increasingly established (prichard, 2015, p. 3). despite the challenges, tax—if salient—will ignite outrage, and that is what’s important. finally, an obvious though not yet discussed argument for the use of taxation to further democracy is the alignment of objectives targeting gdp growth. a government that earns its revenue through taxation is only as rich as its economies’ gdp permits and will quickly find incentives to boost economic growth. rational governments should therefore invest in economic growth policies; optimistically, this could include encouraging the employment of women and minority groups. in the case of nations such as saudi arabia, this could have transformative and long-lasting effects for female empowerment. 5. future implications the finding that introducing tax has a behavioral impact and consequent democratic effect has important implications for international policy. first and foremost, the centrality of taxation to not just economic, but political development, needs to be more critically considered. there should be a greater shift away from the perception of tax as a solution to simply generate revenue towards a solution that encourages civic engagement in its own right. much of the current focus of international tax development, in particular that of the oecd in re-allocating taxing rights more equitably away from havens (oecd, 2021), whilst important, synonymizes tax with revenue. whilst increasing federal revenue is useful in that it can fund public services, without a functioning system of governance in place first this revenue isn’t guaranteed to be distributed, let alone efficiently distributed, to the citizens. there is considerable scope for a greater focus of international development to include the behavioral applications of tax in the pursuit of democratic change. however, where tax is pursued as a democratic solution, certain characteristics must be included in any reform attempt if it is to be transformative. firstly, implemented taxes must be salient to taxpayers. this means that taxpayers must both feel the effect and be well educated in exactly what the tax is and its operation. in some regions, property or land taxes are the most salient and effective tax to implement, in other regions, this mightn’t be the case (weigel, 2020, p. 1898). in designing new tax, administrators should consider how to explicitly link each tax to specific public expenditure or governance oversight programs to gain public support. equally, the bargaining efforts of citizens should also be salient where possible. people tend to follow their peers—one needn’t look far to know this. when citizens believe their fellow citizens are similarly engaged in tax bargaining, the effects are further compounded (del carpio, 2014, p. 31). secondly, tax infrastructure should be designed with horizontal equity. taxpayers must believe they’re being treated similarly to their peers—it does no good if civilians are simply encouraged to turn on one another. perhaps not immediately intuitive, but this is most important amongst aristocratic taxpayers who have the power to bargain on behalf of the wider population. if faced with a uniform tax burden, elites—who have the greatest capacity to do so—will be more incentivized to make collective demands www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 39 published by scholink inc. through their united agenda (bates & lien, 1985, p. 53). the allowance of discretionary tax exemptions for wealthy parties has no effect other than to be self-serving. furthermore, tax bargaining and collective action should be actively encouraged. this may include supporting local institutional pathways for bargaining. it will also require using outreach to taxpayers to provide sufficient information to allow their participation. though not exhaustive, these features are a good start. the elephant in the room—or rather, this paper—concerns the role of foreign aid. dramatic tax revenue declines in ethiopia have been correlated with increased foreign aid assistance—and this example does not exist in isolation (prichard, 2015, p. 260). if international aid inflows can directly undermine civilian propensity towards action, should foreign aid be ceased altogether? whilst this might be tempting from a budgetary perspective, severing all external aid flows is unlikely to be the solution. simply removing inflows of aid won’t guarantee that tax collection will be used as a substitute in the recipient country. rather, aid should be strategically directed at providing technical assistance to these governments. too often aid benefactors focus on simply increasing revenue or correcting market distortions rather than on the broader picture of developing an environment that is supportive of tax bargaining (prichard, 2015, p. 261). including local tax contributions in aid packages may help to increase beneficiaries’ feelings of ownership over the total revenue—and hence their call to action. what is most important, is that aid is not supplied to developing regions with the intention to merely replace tax revenue; democratic gains should be able to outlast intervention. in encouraging developing governments to introduce tax there are a few minefields to navigate. namely, that some governments in anticipation of the resistance they’ll meet actively choose to forego tax revenue, preferring to avoid citizen’s demands altogether. it is telling that in some countries, including uganda and ethiopia, taxes have been reduced prior to elections (martin, 2014, p. 4). alternatively, such leaders may also choose to implement more opaque taxes (weigel, 2020, p. 1898). for example, the introduction of consumption or other indirect duties—where the cost isn’t immediately clear—mightn’t spark enough citizen action to spur collective movement. although, an indirect tax in of itself isn’t necessarily always invisible—after all, the mass protests that prompted broad change in ghana were sparked by the introduction of a sales tax (prichard, 2015, p. 91). whilst the introduction of tax holds transformative potential, it must be acknowledged that not every leadership will be interested in this transformation—even if it would deliver them more revenue. unfortunately, the contexts in which tax bargaining may be most necessary, are also those in which it is likely most difficult. finally, when designing tax infrastructure to develop an economy, the timeline of reigning power should be considered. when frequent elections with alternating leadership are the norm, longer-term incentives are introduced to governments (prichard, 2015, p. 76). if a government has confidence that, should they lose power, there is a reasonable chance they’ll be re-elected in the future, they’ll be more incentivized to produce longer-term benefits. comparatively, leadership with shorter timelines will be hesitant to make fiscal changes, the benefits of which should they be forced out, will go to their www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 40 published by scholink inc. successors. 6. conclusion 6.1 we the people transitioning an autocracy to democratic leadership ultimately requires that the people demand it. however, the challenge lies in convincing them to do so—taxation is one such solution. the behavioral effects of levying taxes are an increasingly robust empirical phenomenon that should be more broadly applied to international development efforts. critically, there needs to be a repositioning of tax amongst international development communities as more than simply a means to an end to provide social welfare, but as a central tool of democratization. as the world continues to marvel at the increasing flippancy of oil price volatility, it’ll also witness how the petrostates cope with the aftermath. some have the coffers to weather price storms into the near future, yet others have balance sheets that already aren’t adding up, even despite the current historically high prices. when oil revenues once again decline such states inevitably will begin to ask their citizens to make sacrifices, governments may have to meet them halfway. perhaps taxpayers in saudi arabia would be more enthusiastic to contribute tax if the crown prince sold his us$550 million yacht first (the economist, 2020). will these nations seize this opportunity for democratic reform or will governments coercively take taxes from the people with little regard for their interests? whether the latter strategy will hold in the long run is unlikely. however, what is clear is that 2020’s collapse in the price of oil didn’t just present the opportunity to leave the remaining hydrocarbons in the ground, but so too the days of governance that doesn’t represent its people. and just like the threat of climate change, the clock is also ticking on unsustainable governance. references cantoni, d., mohr, c., & wiegand, m. 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(2020). the participation dividend of taxation: how citizens in congo engage with the state when it tries to tax them. the quarterly journal of economics, 135(4), 1849-1903. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaa019 microsoft word ape-v1n2-p141.doc advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 141 original paper bank excess liquidity and economic growth in waemu countries: a panel data approach prao yao séraphin1* 1 department of economic sciences and development, alassane ouattara university, bouaké, ivory coast * prao yao séraphin, department of economic sciences and development, alassane ouattara university, bouaké, ivory coast received: october 10, 2018 accepted: october 30, 2018 online published: november 6, 2018 doi:10.22158/ape.v1n2p141 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v1n2p141 abstract this paper provides an empirical assessment of the relationship between banking, liquidity, investment, terms of trade, bank solvency ratio, financial development and economic growth in the waemu zone. the analysis focuses on 7 countries of the west african economic and monetary union (waemu) and covers the period 1994-2015. using the panel data approach, we show that economic growth is positively related with banking on liquidity. in addition, the results highlight the impact of bank liquidity on economic growth but mitigate when it is associated with the investment. keywords bank, excess liquidity, economic growth, west africa 1. introduction since the work of mckinnon (1973) and shaw (1973), the relationship between financial development and economic growth has gained renewed interest. empirically, the meaning and/or magnitude of the relationship between financial development and growth may depend on income level (deida & fattouth, 2002) or financial development (shen & lee, 2006). huang and lin (2009) find an insignificant correlation between financial development and economic growth in low-income countries, while this relationship is positive and robust in the case of high-income countries. a world bank study has shown that despite the low level of development of the banking sector in african countries, it is excessively liquid (honohan & beck, 2007). but if a bank’s performance stems from its liquidity situation (goldstein & pauzner, 2005), it is possible to assume that the bank’s performance factors are those of bank over liquidity. this one can be defined as an excess of bank cash held beyond what is needed to cope with www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 142 published by scholink inc. withdrawals of economic agents (saxegaard, 2006). according to doumbia (2011), the excess liquidity of waemu banks can be explained by three main factors, namely the constraints related to the defense of parity of the cfa franc (note 1), the inflow of capital and the high level of interest rate. this excess liquidity of banks results in insufficient loans. in the waemu zone, on average, during the period 1991 to 2006, the banking sectors of the different countries held excess liquidity ranging from 0.8% to more than 3.7% as a proportion of gdp. in a context of an embryonic (note 2) financial market where there are no compartments for very small and medium-sized companies. these companies are the most rationed in terms of credit (miesel & mvogo, 2007). but over the last decade, waemu countries have recorded relatively high growth rates. according to the report of the banque de france (2015), the real gdp growth rate in the zone is 6% in 2013 compared to 3% for the world, 6.5% in 2014 and 7% in 2015. the result is that the good macroeconomic performance of the zone contrasts with the weak bank financing of the activity. the economic growth of the countries of the union is therefore achieved in a context of bank excess liquidity. this raises the question of what is the impact of bank over-liquidity on the economic growth of waemu member states? therefore, the general objective of this study is to analyze the impact of bank over-liquidity on the economic growth of the countries of the union. we assume that bank over-liquidity has a positive impact on economic growth in waemu countries. in addition, financial development is beneficial to economic growth. methodologically, we apply a panel error correction model with an interactive variable. this article contributes to the empirical literature on finance and growth by studying the relationship between bank over-liquidity and economic growth in waemu countries over the period 1994-2015. the results obtained suggest a positive correlation between bank over-liquidity and economic growth. however, the association between bank over-liquidity and investment has a negative impact on economic growth. this article is organized as follows: section 2 is devoted to reviewing the literature on the contribution of the banking sector to economic growth. section 3 will introduce the methodology of the study. section 4 will discuss the empirical results, particularly the econometric analysis of the relationship between bank excess liquidity and economic growth. 2. literature review in this section, we successively address the review of theoretical literature and the review of empirical literature. 2.1 the theoretical literature review since the pioneering studies of bagehot (1873) and schumpeter (1911), financial intermediation has been seen as a factor in draining funds into productive investments (gurley & shaw, 1955; goldsmith, 1969). in his work on britain, goldsmith (1969) concludes that there is a positive relationship between the financial sector and the level of economic development over the period 1860-1963. inspired by the theory of endogenous growth, king and levine (1993) emphasize the importance of financial sector-led www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 143 published by scholink inc. innovation, through the pace of capital accumulation and factor productivity. according to these authors, financial systems make it possible to channel savings towards more productive uses on the one hand and to diversify the various risks associated with productive activity on the other. through the various services it provides, the financial sector plays an indispensable role in economic growth by contributing to the improvement of productivity under the influence of financial innovation (eschenbach, 2004). but financial liberalization policies that were supposed to allow developing countries to finance their development have led to financial underdevelopment characterized by a situation of over liquidity in the financial and banking sector (hugon, 2007). if excessive liquidity holding by financial intermediaries is aimed at reducing two major risks of microeconomic crisis linked to their activity, namely: a liquidity crisis and a solvency crisis, however, it hinders the economic circuit (doumbia, 2011). the link between the development of the banking sector and economic growth could be the result of bank optimization behavior in a risky context. indeed, in a general context of information asymmetry, risk is the main concern of the bank which has an imperfect readability of its customers. thus, risk is the most studied factor in the banking sector and credit risk is the most important for a bank. the lower a bank’s own funds are compared to its customer receivables, the greater the credit risk and the greater the probability that the bank will not be over-liquid or efficient (greuning & bratanovic, 2004) in so far as the own funds would not be able to support any unpaid debts. 2.2 the empirical literature review empirically, several studies have focused on the determinants of bank excess liquidity. they can be grouped into two categories: the first insisting on the voluntary holding of excess liquidity and the second on exogenous causes in the banking sector. regarding the first, ouédraogo (2011), indicates that a liquidity level of 1% (compared to the deposit) is accompanied by a decrease of 1.75% of the supply of credit and 2.24% % of loans to the private sector in waemu, highlighting a crowding out effect. in addition, banks tend to overestimate the risk associated with the financing of a large proportion of companies, which results in insufficient lending vis-à-vis deposits and, therefore, increased liquidity. beyond the required threshold (doumbia, 2011). based on a modified klein model (1971), from a sample of eight developing countries, khemraj (2008) attributes the causes of excess liquidity to the oligopolistic structure of the banking system. the high levels of interest rates on loans could be explained by the oligopolistic structure of the banking system. on the second, the causes of excess liquidity are perceived as the result of the reluctance of commercial banks in a context marked by the respect of regulatory prudential standards. in the case of the central african economic community (cemac), beguy (2014) identifies as causes of bank excess liquidity, the precaution of commercial banks and other exogenous factors, including soaring oil prices. using vector autoreg ression (var) model and a bootstrap technique, kamgna and ndambendia (2008) indicate in the case of cemac, a heterogeneity of the causes of bank over-liquidity. in addition to the non-significance of certain factors, the factors behind the excess liquidity in the cemac differ from one country to another. only credit to the private sector reduces excess liquidity, the cost of credit, credit to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 144 published by scholink inc. government and paid deposits are certainly significant, but do not have the expected sign. in terms of the implications of bank excess liquidity on the real economy and monetary policy, studies are not lacking. agénor and el aynaoui (2009) studied the implications of bank excess liquidity on the effectiveness of monetary policy in a simple model with imperfections in the credit market. they show that in situations of bank over-liquidity, the effectiveness of monetary policy is diminished. barik et al. (2012) analyze the causes of excess liquidity in the indonesian banking sector and its impact on monetary policy. adopting a t-var modeling approach over the period 2000-2010, they conclude that the excess liquidity of banks in indonesia is justified by precautionary grounds. indeed, the volatility of deposits and that of growth as well as the cost of resources for banks, explain the excessive holding of liquidity. in addition, they show that in excess liquidity, the effectiveness of monetary policy in controlling inflation is reduced. using vector autoregression (var) model over the period 2000 to 2012, jayaraman et al. (2012) examine the effects of excess liquidity on interest rates on loans, the share of loans in gdp, the exchange rate and the general price level in the fiji islands. the results indicate a negative relationship between excess bank liquidity and loan rates. a positive shock to liquidity strengthens the level of lending and causes a depreciation of the local currency. however, the excess bank liquidity does not significantly explain the level of inflation, especially in the short and medium term. 3. methodology and data in this section, we present the specification of the model and the methodology of the research. 3.1 model specification in econometric form, the regression model is as follows: 1 2 3 4 5 6( ) ( / )it it it it it it it it ittcpib rali inv rali inv te fp eng idf                (1) where tcpib is the gross domestic product growth rate, rali the excess liquidity ratio (rali) proposed by wanda (2007), inv, gross fixed capital formation as a ratio of gdp, te, terms of trade, solvency ratio and idf, a financial development index and ralixinv, a multiplicative variable to capture the conditioning effect of private investment on bank excess liquidity and economic activity. the variables are summarized in the table below. table 1. summary of study variables and expected signs endogenous variable: tcpib: gdp growth rate exogenous variables description of variables expected signs rali over-liquidity ratio + inv private investment + rali×inv interaction variable + idf financial development index + te terms of the exchange fp/eng solvency ratio + source: author’s presentation. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 145 published by scholink inc. 3.2 the panel estimation our study was performed using the panel data, under their double dimensions, including an individual dimension and temporal dimension. the panel data, by this feature, proved so particularly suited whenever you want to estimate models and test underlying theories (nerlove & balestra, 1995). therefore, the model (1) can be again specified as follows: 1 2 3 4 5 6( ) ( / )it it it it it it it it ittcpib rali inv rali inv te fp eng idf                (2) with i = 1, ..........t, t = 1, .......22; x1it, the value of the j-ième variable for i-ième unit to the period t, j = 1, ...... 7. k is the number of explanatory variables model and αit, βi, the coefficients of exogenous variables for the individual i. finally, μit is the term errors for the individual i on the datet. this model assumes that each individual has a specific behavior, which is differentiated from one period to another. denuded of any economic interest, the model becomes interesting once it imposes identifying restrictions, which correspond to the different hypotheses that one wishes to test. the economic literature most often uses three hypotheses that we present in our study. first the homogeneous model. this type of model assumes the presence of uniform behavior between individuals. estimating model returns to be applied simply the ordinary least squares (ols) on all the data set end-to-end without worrying their specific nature or that of hazard and. in this model, all coefficients are identical. in this case we can write: it follows that our model is given by: (3) if one assumes the existence of difference of behavior between individuals, then this model is no more suitable. then, the individual effect model which assumes that the individual estimates differ only in the constant. we distinguish in this case the fixed-effect model where the individual effect is constant over time and the random-effect model where the constant term is a random variable. concerning the fixed effects model, it takes into account the heterogeneity of the behaviors of the individuals composing the sample by considering that the equations that govern the relations the explained variable and the explanatory variables, stand out, from an individual to another by a constant. therefore, the method of estimating the parameters depends on the structure of the error terms. if the errors are homoscedastic, not auto correlated in the temporal dimension and in the individual dimension, the mco method on the dummy variables (lsdv = least square dummy variable) or the within estimators is used. on the other hand, if the errors are heteroscedastic and/or auto correlated in the temporal dimension but independent in the individual dimension, we use the generalized least squares (gcm) method on the dummy variables (lsdv) or the within estimators. in the case where the systematic effects are represented by the ordinates at the origin αi for each individual one can write the hypotheses in the following way: www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 146 published by scholink inc. the equation is also given by: (4) in the absence of structural specificity of the endogenous variable that differs according to individuals, it is possible to retain another hypothesis: that of the random effect. the random effect model assumes that the relationship between the variable to be explained and the explanatory variables are no longer fixed but random. the individual effect (constant) is no longer a fixed but random parameter. this model can be written as follows: the equation is also given by: (5) the hausman test is a specification test that determines whether the coefficients of the two estimates (fixed and random) are statistically different. the statistic of this test is a chi-square with k degree of freedom. if the probability of the test is less than 5%, then the within estimators are unbiased. in the opposite case, we will retain the mcg estimators or the random effect model. 3.3 stationarity and co-integration test the robustness of the results depend on the compliance with the characteristics stochastic series. to do this, should be applied the stationarity tests and if any, co-integration test. i) study of the stationarity there is stationarity of the variables if the characteristics (expectancy and variance) are not modified over time. it is difficult, if not impossible, to clearly identify the stochastic characteristics of a series if it is not stationary. in panel, the most widely used test to analyze the stationarity of the variables is that of im-pesaran and shin (2003) (when the intertemporal dimension is weak) and levin lin and chu (2002). ii) the co-integration test co-integration makes it possible to identify the true relationship between two variables by searching for the existence of a co-integrating vector and eliminating its effect, if any. co-integration tests can detect the presence of a long-term relationship between variables. however, it is very interesting to know the evolution in the short and medium term of this relationship. the tool required for this purpose is the error correction model (ecm). this type of model makes it possible to highlight how the short-term dynamics of the variables of the system is influenced by the long-term equilibrium. thus, when the series are co-integrated, their relationship has to be estimated through an error correction model. for the co-integration test we adopt the tests proposed by westerlund (2007) to test the long-term www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 147 published by scholink inc. relationship between private investment and bank excess liquidity. indeed, westerlund (2007) developed four co-integration tests that are based on the structural dynamics of relationships and not on residuals. this is to test the null hypothesis of non-co-integration by checking whether the error correction term in the error correction model constructed for this purpose is significantly equal to zero. the first two tests (gt and ga) test the existence alternative of at least one individual for which the variables are co-integrated. the last two tests (pt and pa) test the null hypothesis of no co-integration against the alternative hypothesis that the panel as a whole is co-integrated. 3.4 data and descriptive in this sub-section, we first present the source of the data and, secondly, the different statistical characteristics of our study variables i) data sources our study will be conducted from a panel of seven waemu countries over the period (1994-2015) and the choice of this period is related to the availability of data. togo is excluded from the study for reasons of lack of data. data from the study come mainly from the world bank (wdi), the international monetary fund (imf data base) and the central bank of west african states (bceao) which publishes information on the rate member countries and financial data on states and financial institutions. thus, panel data will be processed according to the usual panel data methodology that is, stationarity analysis, co-integration, application of the presence of specific effects test and the hausman test to discriminate between the fixed effects model and the random effects model. ii) descriptive statistics table 2 below gives us the statistical description of the variables used in the realization of our study. the analysis in the table shows that the average growth rate of gdp is at a low level, around 4% over the study period, far below the 7% required to achieve the sustainable development goals. private investment as a percentage of gross domestic product (gdp) does not exceed 20%, averaging 18.65%. this level of investment is below the level set by eca and recently by the clarke (2013) study which is 25%. on average, the banks of the union are strong in terms of compliance with prudential standards, the ratio cooke (1.054), exceeding 8% of basel 1. on the other hand the financial depth remains low with an average of 0.17. on average, however, waemu banks are liquid with a liquidity ratio of around 1.3483 on average over the study period. table 2. description of variables variables observations average standar deviation minimum maximum inv 154 18.6467 7.8029 4.0072 38.8954 rali 154 1.3483 0.6465 0.8409 4.8218 idf 154 0.1795 0.0549 0.0486 0.3587 fp/eng 154 1.0547 0.3974 0.3817 2.2728 te 154 114.5149 24.9872 65.9527 193.8547 tcpib 154 3.9211 4.5364 -28.0999 14.6612 source: author’s estimation. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 148 published by scholink inc. the terms of trade, at 114.51 on average, are typical of most developing economies, indicating that economies are highly foreign, making it vulnerable to external shocks. 4. empirical results the purpose of this section will be to present the results of the different econometric tests as well as the results of the estimation of our model, then their statistical and economic interpretations. 4.1 results of stationary test and co-integration the results of the tests developed by levin lin and chu (2002) and those of im pesaran and shin (2003) are given in table 5. table 5. results of unit root tests in panel variables ips llc coef p-value coef p-value tcpib -6.1988 0.0000 -3.4806 0.0003 rali -3.4204 0.0003 -3.9213 0.0000 inv 0.2705 0.6066 -0.3080 0.3790 te -0.8471 0.1985 -1.9441 0.0259 idf 1.0802 0.4237 -0.9100 0.1814 fp/eng -2.4720 0.0067 -2.4926 0.0063 rali×inv dtcpib -8.1663 0,000 -8.0813 0.0000 drali -6.8197 0,0000 -6.6697 0.0000 dinv -6.7676 0.0000 -3.8117 0.0001 drali×dinv dte -6.1455 0.0000 -6.1111 0.0000 dfp/eng -6.9208 0.0000 -7.7176 0.0000 didf -6.4275 0,0000 -4.6839 0.0000 source: author’s estimation. as a result, the rali, tcpib and fp/eng variables are stationary in level according to the results of the llc and ips test. as for the te variable, the two tests indicate contradictory results. indeed, te is level stationary according to the llc test, while the ips test indicates a contrary result. the variables inv and idf are not stationary according to the two tests. in first difference, the unit root hypothesis is rejected by the two tests for all the analysis variables. it follows that all the panel series are integrated of order 1 according to the tests of levin lin and chu (2002) and im pesaran and shin. for the co-integration test, as mentioned above, we adopt the test proposed by westerlund (2007) and the results obtained are recorded in table 6. table 6. panel co-integration test result (westerlund, 2007) tests tcpib et te tcpib et fp/eng tcpib et idf coef p-value coef p-value coef p-value gt -7.164 0.000 -5.218 0.000 -7.641 0.000 ga -26.412 0.000 -29.820 0.000 -25.549 0.000 pt -6.504 0.005 -8.579 0.000 -8.886 0.000 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 149 published by scholink inc. pa -24.256 0.000 -34.262 0.000 -25.097 0.000 source: author’s estimation. the results indicate that the non-co-integration hypothesis can be rejected at the 1% threshold for all the variables of the panel, taken as a whole, with regard to the statistics pt and pa. which means the variables admit a dynamic specification of type error correction. in addition, the hypothesis of the existence of a long-term relationship between the series is validated. therefore, the error correction model can be adopted for the entire panel. 4.2 specification tests of individual effects we first test the homogeneous or heterogeneous specification of the data generating process. it will be a question of testing the equality of the coefficients of the studied model in the individual dimension. this amounts to determining from the specification tests, if one is entitled to assume that the theoretical model studied is perfectly identical for all individuals. the rejection of the null hypothesis of no individual effects (prob > f = 0.0002) in this study leads to the hausman test to discriminate between the fixed and the random effects model. table 7. table 7. result of the specific effect test and the housman test specific effect test prob > f = 0.0002 hausman test prob > chi2 = 0.3812 source: author’s estimation. indicates that the results obtained lead to accept the null hypothesis, therefore to the estimation of the random effects model. now we can estimate our 2-step panel error correction model. the first step is to estimate the short-term relationship while the second step is dedicated to long-term dynamics. 4.3 analysis and interpretation of results here we proceed to analyzes and interpretations of the results of the estimation of the short-term relationship and the long-term one. concerning the short-term dynamics, the results of the mce estimation of the short-term relationship between economic growth and excess liquidity are summarized in table 3. tests tcpib et rali tcpib et inv tcpib et rali×inv coef p-value coef p-value coef p-value gt -6.188 0.000 -5.742 0.000 -5.563 0.000 ga -17.316 0.000 -23.193 0.000 -11.572 0.024 pt -13.106 0.000 -7.949 0.000 -12.354 0.000 pa -28.136 0.000 -25.893 0.000 -9.237 0.005 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 150 published by scholink inc. table 8. results of the short-term relationship between economic growth and bank excess liquidity endogenous variables growth rate (tcpib) esplanatory variables coefficients p-value dte -0.00255 0.918 dfpeng -1.43312 0.161 didf -3.17799 0.753 drali 0.29829 0.082 dinv 0.16564 0.090 dinv×rali -0.24438 0.082 constante 0.70765 0.716 source: author’s estimation. it follows that in the short term, only three explanatory variables are significant. bank excess liquidity is statistically significant at the 10% level with a positive coefficient as well as private investment. the multiplicative variable has a negative and significant coefficient at the 10% threshold. as a result, bank excess liquidity has a positive effect on economic growth but is reduced when private investment is taken into account. regarding the long-term dynamics, the results are shown in table 4. table 4. results of the long-term relationship between economic growth and bank excess liquidity endogenous variables: growth rate (tcpib) explanatory variable coefficients p-value te -0.00112 0.943 fpeng -0.98861 0.296 idf 15.82892 0.037 rali 0.17667 0.864 inv 0.05502 0.655 inv*d rali 0.00583 0.951 constante 0.70765 0.716 source: author’s estimation. in the long term, it follows that the financial development (idf) measured by the liquidity rate of the economy, is the only variable of the model which presents a statistical significance at the threshold of 5%. 4.4 verification of assumptions and economic implications at this stage of the study, it is good to invalidate or validate the hypotheses postulated. the study found a positive effect of bank over-liquidity on economic growth even though private investments reduce this positive impact in the short term. as a result, our first hypothesis is verified. the study also concludes that our financial development indicator exerts a statistically significant influence at the 5% threshold on long-term economic growth, confirming our second hypothesis. but in the long run there is no relationship between economic growth and bank over-liquidity. as a result, our hypothesis 1 is verified. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 151 published by scholink inc. 5. conclusion and implications of economic policies the objective of this study was to analyze the impact of bank over-liquidity on the economic growth of the waemu countries. on panel data from seven countries over the period from 1994 to 2015, the results indicate that bank excess liquidity has a positive impact on economic growth. considering bank excess liquidity as an indicator of banking performance, it follows that the more efficient they are, the more the economy benefits. the positive influence of bank excess liquidity on the economic growth of countries could also be explained by the recycling of banking resources through the underwriting of government securities. indeed, to guard against credit risk, commercial banks have a strong preference for public securities in waemu. in doing so, the state with more resources undertakes investments in infrastructure which increases the overall demand and production. however, the positive impact of banking performance on economic growth is thwarted by the relationship between bank excess liquidity and investment. by equating investment with gross fixed capital formation, it follows that only long-term financing is profitable for capital accumulation. in the waemu zone, however, banks prefer to finance the trade and wholesale sector (import-export, etc.) mainly by granting short-term and low-value credits. as a result, there is a need to loosen credit risk constraints. establishing credit bureaus, improving the institutional and macroeconomic framework could reduce banks’ aversion to credit risk. to this must be added the improvement of the 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(2011). banques et transmission monétaire dans l’uemoa: effets des bilans bancaires de la concentration bancaire et de l’excès de liquidité bancaire sur l’efficacité de la politique monétaire de la bceao. economies et finances. in université d’auvergne-clermont ferrand i. saxegaard, m. (2006). excess liquidity and effectiveness of monetary policy: evidence from sub-saharan africa. in imf working paper (no. 06/115). https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451863758.001 schumpeter, j. a. (1911). the theory of economic development. harvard university press, cambridge. shaw, e. (1973). financial deepening in economic development. new york: oxford university press. shen, c., & lee, c. (2006). same financial development yet different economic growth: why? journal of money credit and banking, 8, 1907-1944. https://doi.org/10.1353/mcb.2006.0095 wanda, r. (2007). risques, comportements bancaires et déterminants de la surliquidité. la revue des sciences de gestion, 6, 93-102. https://doi.org/10.3917/rsg.228.0093 westerlund, j. (2007). testing for error correction in panel data. oxford bulletin of economics and statistics, 69, 709-748. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0084.2007.00477.x notes note 1. the cfa franc is the currency of the eight countries in the waemu zone, namely côte d’ivoire, togo, burkina faso, mali, sénégal, benin and guinée-bissau. note 2. financial markets in sub-saharan african countries are embryonic, with bond markets dominated by sovereign bond issuance, private bond markets and stock markets reserved for a few large companies. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 23 original paper alegal evaluation of companies income tax under the nigerian tax regime desmond o. n. agwor, ph.d1 & charles i. g. agwor, ph.d2 1 dip., ll.b. (rsu) b. l (abuja), ll.m, ph.d (rsu), lecturer at law, department of jurisprudence and international law, faculty of law, rivers state university, nkpolu-oroworukwo, p.m.b. 5080, port harcourt, nigeria 2 ph.d, ll.m, b.l, ll.b, lecturer at law, department of private and property law, faculty of law, rivers state university, nkpolu-oroworukwo, p.m.b. 5080, port harcourt, nigeria tel:+2348037951051, e-mail: charlesagwor@gmail.com received: may 03, 2024 accepted: june 23, 2024 online published: july 19, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n2p23 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n2p23 abstract the paper examined the legal evaluation of companies income tax (cit), its practice, enforcement and effects in nigeria. the conceptual clarification of the key concepts were considered and a comprehensive introduction of the companies income tax practice in nigeria was reiterated. amongst the key terms considered were company, income, tax and companies income tax respectively. it highlighted the legal history and imposition of companies income tax in nigeria, prior, during and postcolonial era until the present day legal regime. in the same vein, administration of companies income tax in nigeria was critically evaluated, including the classification of companies income tax, taxable companies and taxable profits respectively. furthermore, the paper emphasized on the enforcement of companies income tax in nigeria and elucidated on the importance and challenges of enforcement of companies income tax in nigeria, which includes tax evasion and under declaration of income and profits in order to reduce amount of taxable profits. the paper was summarized with a conclusion. keywords company, income, tax, evaluation, nigeria 1. introduction tax and taxation is one of the major source of government revenue. like every other country, nigeria has the responsibility not to only protect its citizens but also to provide human capital development www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 published by scholink inc. 24 through quality education, ensure infrastructural development, industrialization, healthy environment and quality health care. the whole essence of the good governance we crave for is the improvement of the welfare of the of the citizens. this is carried out with resources raised through taxation. in order words, taxes build capacity, legitimacy and consent. (note 1) taxation is indeed a very pivotal part of citizens’ obligation to every government that every responsible citizen must comply with. payment of tax or imposition of tax was provided in the grund norm to wit; it shall be the duty of every citizen to declare his income honestly to appropriate and lawful agencies and pay his tax promptly. (note 2) the foregoing provisions of the constitution made tax payment mandatory for every citizen of the federal republic of nigeria including corporate personalities. in the same vein, every corporate organization incorporated in nigeria under the companies and allied matters act 2020, are expected to pay her tax for each year of assessment. the tax payable shall be at the rate specified in subsection (1) of section 40 of the act. (note 3) upon the profits of any company accruing in, derived from, brought into or received in nigeria in respect of (note 4) …. it must be observed that various companies are identifiable by their incorporation numbers. the companies are required under cita to display its incorporation numbers on its business, transaction with other companies and individuals, including documents statements, returns, audited account and correspondence with revenue authorities and government agencies. (note 5) the administration of the companies’ income tax in nigeria is vested on the federal inland revenue service. (note 6) similarly, it has been statutorily provided that; for the purpose of obtaining full information in respect of the profits or income of any person, body corporate or organization, the service may give notice to that person, body corporate or organization…. (note 7) sadly, despite the existence of regulation on companies income tax in nigeria, the nigerian state still experience low compliance in tax payment which has become a matter of grave concern to the government because it limits the capacity of the state to raise revenue for development purposes. (note 8) although tax administration is a bit difficult task, however because of its pivotal nature, studies of this kind to evaluate the effectiveness and challenges faced by agencies charged with the responsibility of the tax collection is necessary. this paper intends to interrogate this subject as to identify the possible bane to compliance and enforcement of tax regulation, especially as it relates to company income tax. many companies in nigeria want to stay afloat and employ all kinds of strategies that will benefit them, some of them to evade tax and others avoid tax. 2. conceptual clarifications of key terms 2.1 company a company can be defined as “an association of persons formed for the purpose of an undertaking or business carried on in the name of the association. (note 9) by the provisions of cama, a company is a legal entity or person separate and distinct from its members (owners) who came together with a common goal or objectives. (note 10) a company is a legal entity formed by a group of individuals to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 published by scholink inc. 25 engage in and operate a business (commercial or industrial) enterprise. (note 11) a company is a natural legal entity formed by the association and group of people to work towards achieving a common objective. it can also be seen as a registered association which is an artificial legal person, having an independent legal entity with perpetual succession, a common seal for its signatures, a common capital comprised of transferable shares and carrying limited liability. (note 12) a company is a legal entity formed by a group of individuals to engage in and operate a business, commercial or industrial enterprise. a company may be organized in various ways for tax and financial liability purposes, depending on the corporate law of its jurisdiction. (note 13) it can also be said to mean a form business structure that is a separate legal entity from its owners. it’s a complex business structure, with higher set-up and administrative costs because of extra reporting requirements and higher level legal obligation. (note 14) in-line with the foregoing definitions, a company can be defined as a registered, corporate, legal entity distinct from its members and formed by a group of individual with the aim of achieving a common goal or objectives. 2.2 income the term income can be defined as the amount of money received in exchange for products or services. income can also be expressed in terms of property and other valuable transfers received as a payment for products; as a compensation for services provided; as returns on investment; as gifts; as pension distribution; as dividends; and as more, over a set period of time. (note 15) income is money received by an individual or business for providing services, labour, producing goods or services or investing capital. an individual earn income through wages or salary while in business income can be earned from selling goods or services provided in the cost of their production. (note 16) “the word income does not have specific meaning of definition. it can be seen as cash or cash equivalents, earned either for work done, interest or profit from capital invested, or rent from property or land that is let. (note 17) economist define income as the total sum of earning of government consumption-unit that can be separate during particular period and still have same net assets valve in money terms at the end of the period as the beginning of the period (note 18) in accounting, it is seen as an excess of revenue over expense for a specific accounting period. it can also refer to how much total assets increased in value by during an accounting period. (note 19) from the definitions above, it can be deduced that income can be defined as money that people receive for the work they do either as a salary, wage or revenue. 2.3 tax tax is a mandatory contribution levied on individuals or corporations by a government entity be it local state or national. these contributions are used to finance government activities like road construction, schools, social security and medical care. (note 20) tax is also defined as a mandatory payment or charge collected by the government from individuals or businesses to cover the cost of general government services, goods and activities. (note 21) tax is a mandatory fee or financial charge levied by any government on an individual or an organization to collect revenue for public works providing www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 published by scholink inc. 26 the best facilities and infrastructure. (note 22) tax is also the money paid to the government based on a person’s income, a company’s profits, the value of goods and services. (note 23) tax is a compulsory levy payable by an economic unit to the government, without any corresponding entitlement to receive a definite and direct quid-pro-quo from the government. (note 24) going by the definitions above, one can say that taxes are levies paid by individuals, groups, business or corporate bodies by constituted authorities for raising funds used by the state in the maintenance of peace, economic growth and development and social engineering for the benefit of the citizenry. 2.4 company income tax company income tax is a tax imposed on the profits made by a company. (note 25) company income tax is a tax levied on the profits earned by companies or corporation. (note 26) this tax is paid by all companies incorporated in nigeria. companies income tax is a tax chargeable on all resident and non-resident companies (except those engaged in petroleum operation) incorporated in nigeria. (note 27) it is expected that companies are subject to tax. the income profit is accrued from all sources and after deduction has been made and tax imposed upon such profits. a company income tax is a tax on the profits of a company. these are paid on a company’s taxable income, which includes revenue minus cost of goods sold, general and administrative expenses, selling and marketing, research and development, depreciation and other operating cost. (note 28) it can also be said to be a levy by the state and federal governments on business profits. many companies are not subject to this tax because they are taxed as pass-through businesses, with income reportable under the individual income tax. (note 29) similarly, company income tax (cti) is the levy imposed on the profit of all registered companies in nigeria. this tax also applies to foreign entities who carry out business activities in nigeria. companies resident in nigeria are expected to pay the cit on income received whether in nigeria or another country. while foreign companies which carry out any business in nigeria are expected to pay cit on the income received in nigeria. (note 30) 3. legal history and imposition of companies income tax in nigeria the first legislative enactment on company’s income tax in nigeria was introduced in 1939 through the instrumentality of the companies income ordinance. (note 31) prior to this enactment and its operation, the regulation of personal and business taxation was vested in one and same legal regime. (note 32) the companies income tax ordinance vested administration of the tax in a commissioner to be appointed for that purpose by the governor and the proceeds from the tax were to be remitted to the government treasury to form part of the general revenue of nigeria. (note 33) this ordinance was however found to be ineffective as it failed to bring individuals into tax net. due to this weakness, the companies income ordinance 1939 was repealed a year after its passage by the income tax ordinance 1940, (note 34) the ordinance regulated personal and business taxation and carried on for 21 years when the second separate enactment on companies income tax was again enacted (note 35) similarly, another law aimed at the exclusive taxation of companies’ income was enacted in 1961. this www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 published by scholink inc. 27 was the companies income act no. 22 1961, which was a landmark legislation, first because from the date it came into force, the provisions of the income tax ordinance (note 36) and the income tax administration ordinance (note 37) together with all rules made thereunder ceased to have effect with respect to companies income tax. (note 38) secondly, the act established the federal board revenue as statutory body and vested it with the power to administer companies income tax as well as all federal taxes. (note 39) tax on the income of companies was imposed by section 17 in respect of profit accruing in, received in nigeria from: any trade or business; rent or any premium arising from a right granted to any other person for the use or occupation of any property, dividends interest, discount charges or amenities. any other amount not falling within the above categories but qualifying as annual profits or gains or any amount deemed to be income or profits under the act or arising from a person or provident fund under the income tax management act 1961 (note 40) it is important to reiterate that the companies income tax act 1961 was in force until 1979 when it was repealed by the companies income tax act no 28 1979. (note 41) the 1961 act during its 18 years of operation underwent series of amendments, new section 30a was introduced in 1967, which empowered the federal board of inland revenue to assess and change a company on fair and reasonable percentage turnover of its business within and outside nigeria in the case of residents companies and non-nigerian company …. (note 42) several amendments have been carried out until in 2007, the companies income tax act 1979, was further amended by the companies income tax (amendment) act (note 43) to reflect some of the recommendation of the 2002 study group. the following changes were inter alia introduced: section 1 to 8 of the principal act relating to the establishment, powers and proceeding of the federal board of inland revenue have been repealed by section 2(1) of the 2007 amendment act. the repeal is consistent with establishment of the federal inland revenue service as the successor to federal board of inland revenue (fbir). section 4 of the 2007 amendment act requires an insurance company that engages the service of an insurance agent, loss adjuster or broker to include a schedule in its annual returns showing details of name, address, duration of employment and payments made to such agent, adjuster or broker. section 5 of the amendment act exempts profits of companies operating in export processing zone (epz) or free trade zones from tax under the act, 100 percent of the company’s production is for export otherwise proportionate tax is payable on local sales. section 14 of the amendment repealed section 56 of the principal act which provide for one percent bonus of payable tax to a company that filed its return within the stipulated time. the fine payable as a general penalty has been increased from 200 naira to 20,000 naira, while the fine payable for failure to finish statement or keep records has been increased from 40 naira to 200 naira. the power to vary or revoke the rate of companies income tax earlier vested in the president by section 100 is now in the national assembly….(note 44) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 published by scholink inc. 28 4. administration of companies income tax in nigeria taxation is seen as a burden which every citizen must bear to sustain his or her government because the government has certain responsibilities to perform for the benefit of those it governs. (note 45) taxation is the most important source of government revenue and two categories of tax payers exist in every economy. the individual and corporate tax payers. (note 46) the board of inland revenue has the power and authority to assess the assessable profit in every financial year of the company carrying out business in nigeria. (note 47) tax administration is the process of assessing and collecting taxes from individuals and companies by relevant tax authorities, in such a way that current amount accessed is collected efficiently and effectively with minimum tax avoidance or tax evasion. (note 48) the administration of companies’ income tax is vested on the federal board of inland revenue (fbir), it is thus responsible for its care and management. (note 49) federal board of inland revenue is also referred to as the “board” which has its operational arm known as the federal inland revenue service (firs) also known as the “service”. (note 48) the service is statutorily assigned for collecting, accounting for all revenue made from companies income tax. the federal board of inland revenue through its operational arm, the federal inland revenue service, deals with corporate bodies as well as personal income tax for certain categories of individuals. (note 49) it is important to emphasis that companies’ income tax is imposed on the income of all companies operating in nigeria, except those specifically exempted under the companies income tax act. companies are the taxed the rate of 30% of the income tax imposed on. (note 50) no doubt, firms in most cases finance their investment with borrowed funds, as long as the rate charged on borrowed funds. (note 51) firms would always like to add to their existing capital being equal to that rate of discount which would make the present value of the series of annuities given by the returns expected from the capital assets during its life just equal to the supply price. (note 52) note importantly that based on the provision of the section 40 subsection (1) of the act, (note 53) the service calculates the amount of tax payable by a company by bringing the company’s audited accounts. (note 54) the audited accounts will be adjusted to arrive at taxable profit to which a tax rate is 30% will be applied for income tax and 2% will be applied for education tax. (note 55) the overall supervisory authority on the matters of companies’ income tax, assessment, collection and related issues thereto is the minister of finance. 5. classification of companies income tax companies income tax are classified into three segments, the self-assessment of tax, the currency of assessment and minimum tax. safe assessment of tax payable: this is the system of assessing where a company is allowed or permitted by the relevant tax authority to pay estimated company’s chargeable income tax in that year of assessment by installment. (note 56) statutorily, this method of assessment is provided for under the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 published by scholink inc. 29 companies income tax act, to wit. every company filing a return under section 58 of this act or requested by notice of the board to file a return under section 59 of this act shall, in the return, compute the tax payable by the company for the year assessment and forward with tax return, evidence of direct payment of the whole or part of tax due into a bank designated for the payment of tax. (note 57) the foregoing presupposes that each company operating in nigeria, must for the purposes of payment of the company’s income tax file its return, which should cover all the transactions carried out by the company during the year of assessment. the said return ought to compute the amount of tax payable by the company from its profits and evidence of compliance. the currency of assessment: this makes provision for the currency of assessment of tax payable by a company. the act, (note 58) reiterates that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law, an income tax assessment under sections 52, 53 or 55 of this act shall be made in the currency in which the transaction giving rise to the assessment was effected. (note 59) the implication is that company’s income tax assessment from where the amount payable by the percentage stipulated by law is determined must be calculated in the currency used for the transaction giving rise to the income tax. the minimum tax: this is tax payable and calculated as 0.5 percent of the gross turnover less franked investment income. statutorily, minimum tax is provided under the act (note 60) to wit, notwithstanding any other provisions in this act where any year assessment, the ascertainment of total assessable profits from all sources of a company results in a loss or where a company’s ascertained total profits results in no tax payable or tax payable which is less minimum tax, there shall be levied and paid by the company the minimum tax as prescribed by subsection 2 of this section. (note 61) “the foregoing implies that where at the end of a financial year the company is assessed and it is ascertained that instead of profits, it rather ran into losses, the company under the companies income tax act is not exempted from its tax obligation. it shall rather be obliged to pay the minimum tax prescribed under the companies income act. 6. taxable companies and profits it is important to emphases that taxes are charged on nigeria companies, that is, companies incorporated in nigeria under companies and allied matters act, 2020. foreign companies doing business in nigeria and earning profits or nigerian companies carrying out business outside the territory of nigeria, though resident within the nigerian territory. any of such companies is under legal obligation to file returns as and when due and to discharge their legal duty of tax ascertainment, computation and payment. statutorily, the profits of the nigerian company shall be deemed to accrue in nigeria wherever they have arisen and whether or not they have been brought into or received in nigeria. (note 62) the profits of a company other than a nigerian company from any trade or business shall be deemed to be derived from nigerian, if that company has fixed base in nigeria to the extent that the profit is www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 published by scholink inc. 30 attributable to the fixed based. (note 63) for the purpose of subsection (2)(a) of this section a fixed base shall not include facilities used solely for the storage or display of goods or merchandise or collection of information. (bote 64) no doubt, shipping and air transportation companies whether or not incorporated in nigeria, provided that its profits or loss are deemed to be derived from nigeria are under obligation to pay companies income tax. (note 65) insurance companies whether proprietary or mutual other than a life insurance company are under the obligation of cit payment. it does not matter whither its profits or part of it are made from nigeria or outside nigeria…. (note 66) it must be observed that where a nigerian based insurance company from the foregoing reinsures with a foreign insurance company the two companies are under tax obligation in nigeria, because the foreign based insurance company is making profit out of the reinsurance. statutorily, taxes are charged on rent, premium, dividends, interest, royalties or any other source of annual profits or gains or from acquisition and disposal of short term money instruments like federal government securities, treasury bills as the case may be. (note 67) in computation of tax after arriving at the adjusted profits, there is need to compute the taxable profit. in doing this effectively, the capital and losses are to be subtracted, leaving the value derived as the taxable profit. having arrived at that, the relevant tax rate provided for under section 40 of the act (note 68) can be applied. 7. enforcement of companies income tax in nigeria it has been argued that the facts there exist provisions under the companies income tax act with tax imposition is not sufficient. strict enforcement of the regulation is more pivotal. (note 69) the federal inland revenue service reveals that about 30 percent of companies in nigeria are involved in tax evasion and also 25 percent of registered companies in the country are not paying tax. (note 70) statutorily, the taxation system established under the act (note 71) is achievable and effective, but for some certain inadequacies. in practice the firs has had to contend with the nigerian factors of enforcement problems, computation and evasion. (note 72) the act (note 73) in its provision has made available to the fbir, a manageable system of tax collection. regrettably however, the typical nigeria taxpayer often opts to negotiate with corrupt staff in return for some gratification and pay a minimal sum to offer of the government. (note 74) section 26 of the firs act provides for enforcement of tax generally and specifically made it an offence for any person, whether individual or corporate personality to contravene the provisions of the act such person shall in respect of each offence be liable on conviction to a fine equivalent to 100 percent of the amount of the tax liability (note 75). in same vein any person who being obliged to deduct any tax under section 78, 79, 80 or 81 of this act fails to deduct or having deducted fails to pay to the board within twenty one days from the date the amount was deducted or the time the duty to deduct arose shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable to 100 percent penalty.... (note 76) tax may be sued for and recovered in a court of competent jurisdiction at which payment should be made…. note also, that any person guilty of offence for contravening this act or failure to comply shall be liable www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 published by scholink inc. 31 on conviction to a fine of n20,000 naira… no prosecution of in respect of an offence under section 93,94 or 95 may be commenced except at the instance of or with the sanction of the board. the community assessment of the tax provisions of the act in respect to enforcement evidences that the act simply defined offences and penalties attach therein, but fails to provide machinery for detection of offenders. a well-functioning body of tax investigation is essential for detection and prosecution of cases of fraud and evasions (note 77). the lack of sufficient capacities in tax administrations reduce the probability of detection that influences the decision of a tax payer as to whether to evade or not. in addition, the legal framework is an important prerequisite for any enforcement activity. for example, the size and nature of penalties that are incurred after evasion have been detected is directly connected to the level of tax compliance (note 78) finally, on this point, it is revealed that the act gives a lot of room for tax evasion and many companies have exploited it to their own advantage. the firs ought to have put in place a machinery to check, confirm and certify the information supplied by companies on their audited account and statement claim. 8. conclusion companies income tax is not the only tax applicable to companies in nigeria. the companies income tax act (cita) is the principal law that regulates the taxation of companies in nigeria. the tax regime in nigeria is multilevel tax system, which implies that taxation is administered by the three tiers of government; (i) the federal government, (ii) state government and (iii) local government respectively. it emphasized that companies income tax (cit) is a tax on the profits of registered companies in nigeria. it also includes the tax on the profits of foreign companies carrying on any business in nigeria. it is usually paid by limited liability companies and public limited liability companies. whereas, resident companies are liable to corporate income tax (cit) on their worldwide income, while non-residents are subject to cit on their nigeria-source income. corporate income tax is based on declared profits. the federal inland revenue service as a major agency vested with the administration of company income tax in nigeria, may seriously consider, among other things, to create an enabling environment by putting in place suitable policies, regulation and legal framework to create awareness on the needs for tax payers to perform their constitutional responsibility, so that the government can also provide them with the developmental projects that ought to be financed through income from taxation and also reduce tax evasion and avoidance to the barest minimum, towards the common good of the state and overall interest of the entire citizenry. notes note 1. m.i gwangdi and a.garda “administration of companies income tax in nigeria: issues of compliance and enforcement” [2015] european journal of business and management 7(8) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 published by scholink inc. 32 <http://www. iiste.org> accessed 14 march 2023. note 2. constitution of the federal republic of nigeria 1999 (as amended) s24 (f). note 3. companies income tax act 2011. note 4. cita 2011 s9. note 5. cita 2011 s10. note 6. gwangdi and garba(n 1). note 7. federal inland revenue services (establishment) act 2007 s26(1). note 8. gwangdi and garba (n 1) note 9. bbakin,’ what is company law in nigeria?’, (2020) abbakin glova solution ltd. <https://www.abbakin.com/what-is-a-company-in-nigeria-law/>accessed 15 march 2023. note 10. ibid. note 11. h adams, ‘what is a company, how to start one, different types’ (2022) investopedia <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/company.asp >accessed 15 march, 2023. note 12. a ali shaw, “what is a company?-meaning, features, and types of companies” (2022) marketing tutor https://www.marketing tutor.net/what is a company> accessed 15 march 2023. note 13. (n 11). note 14. business basics, “what is a company?” (2019) nws government small business commissioner<https://www.smallbusiness.nsw.gov.au/get-help/business-basics/what-company>accesse d 15 march 2023. note 15. p bera, “what is income?”, (2020) capital.com cfd trading app. <https://www.capital.com>accessed 17 march 2023. note 16. ‘‘what are the 3 types of income? definition and importance’’ (2023) indeed career guide <http://www.indeed.com/career-development/types-of-income>accessed 17 march 2023 note 17.‘what is income? definition and meaning’ (2020) navigate mbn market business news <https://www.marketbusinessnews.com> accessed 17 march 2023. note 18. the income tax administration in nigeria (case study of kwara state board of internal revenue) (2022) rw researchwap hub for great researchers<http://researchwap.net/business-administration/pr6kdex69idhqn accessed 18 march 2023 note 19. (n 17). note 20. d gorton, “taxes definition: types, who pays, and why”, (2023) investopedia <https://www.investopedia.com/taxes>accessed 18 march 2023. note 21. ‘what is tax?’, tax foundation taxedu. (2021) <https://wwww.taxfoundation.org/what-is-tax> accessed 18 march 2023. note 22. tax in india,’ groww (2020) <https://www.groww.in/what/is/tax/definition -&-/>a accessed 18 march 2023. note 23. cambridge english octopus, ‘tax,’ cambridge dictionary (cambridge university press, 4th www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 published by scholink inc. 33 edn 2013). note 24. h l. bhartia, public finance’ (13th ddn., new dheli vikas publishing house pvt ltd 2009). note 25. c.n. siokwu, ‘company income tax administration in nigeria (problem and prospect) [2021] unpublished thesis, abuad.<https://www.pub.abuad.edu.ng> accessed 20 march 2023. note 26. ibid. note 27. g, n ogudu, i, kingsley, & n.t. akinlosotu, “corporate income tax and manufacturing sector performance in nigeria: a panel data analysis. [2018] cbn bullion 42(4), 28-36.<https://dg.cbn.gov.ng/bullion.> accessed 20 march 2023. note 28. k julia, “corporate tax: definition, deductions, how it works” (2022) investopedia. <https://www.investopedia.com> accessed 20 march 2023. note 29. “corporate income tax”, taxedu tax foundation (2019). <https://www.taxfoundation.org> accessed 22 march 2023. note 30. robert inoma and co., “understanding corporate income tax in nigeria”, (2021) robert inoma &co legal practitioners.<https://www.robertinomalaw.com> accessed 22 march 2023. note 31. ordinance no.14 1939. note 32. firs, a comprehensive tax history of nigeria (ibadan: safari books ltd 2012) 201 note 33. m.i g and a. garba, “administration of companies income tax in nigeria: issues of compliance and enforcement” [2015] european journal of business and management, issn 2222-1905 vol.7(8) <https://www.iiste.org> accessed 12 february, 2023. note 34. firs, a comprehensive tax history of nigeria note 35. (n 21). note 36. cap.85, 1958. note 37. ordinance no.39 1958 note 38. (n 21). note 39. (n 21). note 40. (n 20). note 41. (n 21). note 42. income tax (amendment) decree n0.45 1967, s1. note 43. n0.11 2007. note 44. m.i g and a. garba, ‘administration of companies income tax in nigeria: issues of compliance and enforcement’ [2015] european journal of business and management, issn 2222-1905 vol.7(8) <https://www.iiste.org> accessed 12 february, 2023. note 45. a.t adejare and s.s akande ‘the analysis of the impact of corporate income tax on investment in nigeria [2017] worldwide journal of multidisci <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327274116> accessed 21 march, 2023. note 46. (n 33). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 published by scholink inc. 34 companies income tax 2011, s30(1). note 47. i.a gololo ‘ an assessment of the contribution of company income tax on the nigerian economic development [2018] international journal of accounting and finance review; vol2(1) issn 2576-1285 e-issn 25761283< http://www.crbfb.com/journal/index.php/ijfr> accessed 21march 2023 note 48. ibid. note 49. ibid. note 50. ibid. note 51. ibid. note 52. cita 2011 s40. note 53. (n 33). note 54. (n 33). note 55. cita 2011 note 56. resolution law firm brief overview of company income tax in nigeria [2020] mondaq <http://www.mondaq.com> accessed 19 march, 2023. note 57. companies income tax 2011 s53. note 58. companies income tax act, 2011. note 59. cita 2011, s.54 note 60. ibid note 61. ibid, s33(1) note 62. cita 2011, s13(1). note 63. (n 64), s13(2) (a). note 64. ibid, s13(3)(a) & (b). note 65. ibid, s14. note 66. ibid, s16. note 67. cita, s9. note 68. cita 2011. note 69. firs; 30 firms in nigeria evading tax’ 3rd september 2014 daily trust newspaper. note 70. (n 32). note 71. cita 2011. note 72. cita 2011 note 73. e.k victoria, ‘nigeria’s petroleum profit tax act: an assessment’< https://www.nigerianlawguru.com> accessed 16 march, 2023. note 74. cita 2011 s87. note 75. (n 64), s92. note 76. (n 32). note 77. (n 32). note 78. ibid. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 140 original paper reflection of aesthetic in the idea of saint aurelius augustinus muhammet mustafa unlu 1 1 art educator and visual artist, republic of türkiye ministry of national education, department of fine arts education, türkiye received: april 12, 2023 accepted: may 10, 2023 online published: may 26, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n2p140 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n2p140 abstract in this study, saint aurelius augustinus’ philosophical point of view and his understanding of art and his thinking are discussed. the aesthetic stance, aesthetic ideas and views in his mind were revealed. st. augustinus, synthesizing ancient greece and christianity in a neoplatonic understanding, argues that the source of all knowledge is “god”. according to him, philosophy is an opportunity to find oneself as an activity of self-knowledge. because, man approaches “god” and tries to discover “god’s source of knowledge with philosophy. for this reason, art is together with thought, and thoughts are together with art. in st. augustinus’ philosophical understanding, as man imitates “god”, he acquires the knowledge of beautiful, good, pleasant, happiness, love, etc., concepts. in this context, it uses aesthetic elements to acquire spiritual satisfaction. st. augustinus’ aim is to reach perfection based on the movement from the part to the whole in order to achieve the ideal form. in addition, according to him, if unity and integrity are provided, beauty manifests itself. beauty is not a temporary thing. according to him, harmony, order, measure, unity, equality and integrity are the basic principles of beauty, and absolute beauty is what manifests itself in these principles. 1. problem status art generally exists in three senses. the first of these is that the person performing the art creates a work of art or performs an artistic action. because art differs not only from other actions of human beings, but also because it is something desired and wanted for human beings. the second is to artificially make and create actions that are the opposite of natural. because they are the actions and objects that are followed and performed in terms of directing the natural impulses of free people and planning their lives. the third is the frame of mind that is categorized as artistic and in which beauty is noticed by people. in this context, there is an idea at the source of art. ideas appear not only in literature but also in works of art. we cannot fully understand art without looking at the stage in which the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 141 published by scholink inc. thought or idea is formed. in addition, we cannot comprehend the stages of thought without looking at the foundations of art. the problems that art and philosophy deal with are not subjects. their problems are the method or the way of approach. the subjects of art and the subjects of philosophy are not very different. maybe art starts from the particular, philosophy from the general. but the purpose of both is to be universal (turgut, 1993, p. 1). in this context, art philosophy is an effort to discover what art is, and it does not involve the study of the world around us to discover and analyze examples of art as if it were a chemical substance but the place of art among them makes necessary to reflect on our specific activities (collingwood, 2011, p. 10). aesthetics is correspond to a subbranch or discipline of philosophy that deals with sensory value. what shows this most clearly is that etymological origin is found in ancient greece of the term aesthetic. in this field, famous german philosopher alexander baumgarten is first person to used it to express a particular field or discipline of philosophy, who introduced the term into philosophy (cevizci, 2017a, p. 298). in this study, in which the qualitative research method was used, the effects of saint aurelius augustinus’ philosophical thoughts on aesthetics were examined. in this context, it is aimed to shed light on the philosophical views of augustinus by considering his contributions to aesthetics. 1.1 problem sentence  is there a meaningful relationship between st. aurelius augustinus’ philosophical conception and aesthetic? 1.2 subproblems  what is st. aurelius augustinus’ philosophical conception?  what are the effects of st. aurelius augustinus’ philosophical conception on aesthetic? 2. aesthetic ideas of saint aurelius augustinus (354-430) figure 1. pietro perugino, saint aurelius augustinus, 1498 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 142 published by scholink inc. ancient greek thought lost its influence; philosophy was pushed something into the background as a speculative pursuit and rejected as anti-belief by some church theologians; christian theology accepted the works of st. augustinus lived in the 4th century and his followers as basis; patristic thought, built by the early christian priests, became the basic method of thinking and eastern roman culture began to determine the culture, art, thought, law and politics of europe (kalın, 2017, p. 130). the first encounter between greek philosophical thought and christianity, which continued for centuries, was when the young augustinus, who had just converted to christianity, began to read some neoplatonic works, especially the enneads of plotinus. here, augustinus found not plato’s pure philosophy, but an original synthesis of plato, aristotle and the stoics (gilson, 1999, p. 51). augustinus is an important thinker of early christian thought. he is a religious man who came out of paganism and adopted the christian religion. another aspect of augustinus, which is much more important in the history of western philosophy, is that he tried to achieve a reconciliation by combining the ancient age thought and the medieval age scholastic philosophy with the synthesis he realized (özel, 2014, p, 119). it is possible to see the theology and philosophy themes in medieval philosophy clearly in st. augustinus. according to him, man’s place in the world, the meaning of the world and his relationship with the creator of all things is nothing but faith in christianity, which emerged through a careful interpretation of neo-platonist philosophy. realizing the relationship between knowledge and belief, he accepts that belief makes knowledge possible (çüçen, 2013, p. 23). according to augustinus, who argues that man is in god and the truth god is in man’s soul, philosophy is the effort of man to know himself so that he can understand this. for this reason, he accepted the idea of “i believe in order to understand” as his starting point. while doing this, augustinus benefited from the thoughts of plato and plotinos and tried to justify religion by using the philosophy and philosophical concepts of these philosophers (elmalı & özden, 2016, p. 239). augustinus, while forming his thoughts, finds the neo-platonists’ understanding of philosophy close to himself. plato accepts that philosophy is god’s love, that the highest good is a life lived in accordance with virtue, and this life is only possible for a person who knows and imitates god. plato and those who share his thoughts accept the existence of an unchanging, eternal, absolute spiritual, creator god. they try to explain that god is the source of happiness, goodness, and love. according to augustinus, man who knows god and imitates him can achieve happiness. achieving the right philosophy can be possible with the love of god and the love of god. since the only thing that will make man happy is to know god and imitate him; according to augustine, the true philosophy would really be the love of god, the love of god (özel, 2014, pp. 120-121). according to augustinus, apart from the different desires that give rise to love, the objects of his love and therefore the results produced by the various types of love are also different. he is of the opinion that there is a certain correspondence between the various needs and desires of man and the objects that will meet these needs and desires. in fact, augustinus, in the aforementioned love ethics, defines love www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 143 published by scholink inc. as the harmonious relationship between human needs and the objects that will meet these needs. since human needs are in a measurable quantity, suitable objects to meet these needs can only provide satisfaction to the extent of this quantity. for example, we like bread and various foods and consume them in quantities commensurate with our hunger. nevertheless not all human needs arise from physical needs. for example, we love works of art because of the aesthetic satisfaction they provide (cevizci, 2001, p. 66). the understanding of unity, proportion and order, which both plato and aristotle put forward for artistic form, continues its existence in the early periods of christianity. the ideal form comes into question by bringing together the parts that exist individually, not as a whole in nature, in a certain order. the artist uses the existing elements to reach the ideal, the perfection, and combines them in harmony, just as plato connects the universe taking form to the god demiurgos’ putting the existing material in order by ordering it out of disorder and presenting it in the most perfect way. it is the mind thing which is the basis of the ideal form and creates the order, and the rational qualities such as measure and proportion reveal the order. for plato, who considers the world of objects as a happening and an appearance, and claims that behind this appearance there are pure forms (ideas) that are not appearance, only thinkable, incorporeal, and that the objects are shaped according to these ideas, it is the ratio and measure that gives the form its ideal character. unlike plato’ s doctrine of ideas, in which he separates essence and form, for aristotle, who combines the essence grasped with thought and the form perceived with the senses, accepting the ideas as the essence of individual objects and combining the world of ideas and the world of senses, it is the measure and proportion that creates the perfect form in art. according to aristotle’s understanding of existence, since every object is a synthesis consisting of matter and form, and the synthesis in nature does not always occur perfectly, an artistic form containing a certain order reveals form-matter conformity. the order, which consists of the proper creation of the parts that make up the whole, requires mental setup because of the measure and proportion used. with mental fiction, the artist reaches the ideal form (öndin, 2016, pp. 13-14). while plato and aristotle approach art and beauty with a metaphysical perspective, augustinus examines art and beauty within the christian faith. according to augustinus, reaching the knowledge of beauty leads us to real knowledge. he thinks that beauty as a concept is an idea and is above the objective. the concept of beauty, which is inherent in humans, is also associated with good. the beautiful and the good together lead us to happiness. according to augustinus, there are two kinds of beauty: one is connected beauty and the other is beautiful in itself. connected beauty is beauty that we accept as beautiful when we see it in nature. the other is to understand beauty as a concept, just like happiness, without seeing beauty. beauty exists in one form only in god. it is divine this beautiful that is the source of truths and goodness. god is beautiful and good. because their creations are also beautiful and good. “everything is beautiful because you created them, but you who created everything are indescribably beautiful”. it is god who created the artist’s body, arms and legs, the material for which he created his work, the thoughts he designed, and these. they exist because god created them. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 144 published by scholink inc. if they were not created, it would not be possible for the artist to create. if it were not for the mind created by god, the talent of the artist could not be revealed either. however, nothing created is as beautiful and good as the creator (özel, 2014, p. 122). god gave life to beings other than himself because he wanted it. man has no right to go the other way around. the most he can ask himself is: why did god create things so differently and so differently from one another? along with plato, augustinus answered this by saying that the separation of parts is the condition of unity in the whole (weber, 2014, p. 145). augustinus’ theory is much more essentialist than plato’s. first of all, in augustinian essences do not represent objects and do not constitute a universe considered as real: they are just ideas of god. on the other hand, god is an active (mortal) being who has an active and personal life, moreover, embodied in the person of “jesus”. finally, the beings in this world are real beings and not just shadows. compared to plato, saint augustinus is an existentialist and, like anyone with an intense inner life, he also has situations resembling contemporary existential situations, real forms of existence. yet we cannot separate augustinus’ philosophy from essentialist philosophy; because essences play a fundamental role in this philosophy as well. everything that exists participates in the world of essences, and real knowledge based on reason is knowledge that leads us to essences, not objects (foulquie, 1991, p. 17). another important approach of augustinus is that he tries to look at himself and his own soul by using the method of introspection in order to understand man in the western world. augustinus argues, unlike socrates, aristotle and stoic thinkers, that the spirit is not reason but self control in its essence; that it is not knowledge, but desire. according to him, the soul is something that can be grasped through the mind, whose depth and magnitude cannot be grasped through the mind, full of contradictions, incomprehensible and dark. after these observations, augustinus, revealed the concept of the subconscious, became the first thinker to discover this concept, which would be discovered by scientists and artists much later. he distinguish that these wishes, such as emotion, excitement, self control and desire, which he thinks he wants consciously, have nothing to do with the mind and are blocked by some other desires (özel, 2014, p. 120). augustinus, who got rid of paganism and skepticism and converted to christianity, arrived at the existence of god through a platonic argument, starting from the knowledge of eternal truths. in other words, god in him is similar to plato’s idea of the good. his god is not only the cause of the existence of things, but also the cause of the knowledge of these things. just as the sun illuminates visible things with its light, god also makes eternal truths known (cevizci, 2017b, p. 49). we never doubt our own existence. because being able to “think” shows us that we exist. knowing that we are a thinking being leads to the conclusion that therefore, knowing we have a consciousness, and that we have consciousness means knowing that we have clear and distinct knowledge. on the other hand, the principles of logic and mathematics are also knowledge that cannot be doubted because they are based on certain real ideas. the principles and laws of logic and mathematics are realities that do not change according to space and time, and are the same everywhere and at all times. these realities www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 145 published by scholink inc. necessitate a being that thinks outside of time and space, which is god (elmalı & özden, 2016, pp. 235-236). according to augustinus, virtue is the substance of god. it is futile to search for the cause of creation, since the divinity is a principle beyond which there is nothing else. god created because he wanted to create. the highest good is virtue, not happiness. god’s will is “good, beautiful and true” (hançerlioğlu, 1995, p. 119). according to augustinus, as in plato, science is the purer, calmer and happier, higher life that only the thinker knows. reason can know god because god gave it to us to know everything, that is, to know god. to philosophize is to “see” the truth directly, without the means of the body’s eyes. the mind is the eye of the soul. the highest truth towards which we must go is wisdom (weber, 2014, pp. 142-143). augustinus tries to prove the existence of god based on the concept of beauty and happiness. according to him, since the concept of beauty in our minds cannot be put into our minds by the deficient beings in the outside world, it is placed in our minds only by god, who is absolutely beautiful (işık, 2013, p. 325). augustinus thought in his youth: the words “philocalie and philosophie” seem to actually come from the same family. what is philosophy? love for wisdom, what is philocaly? this is the love for beauty. let’s be inspired by the greeks! what is wisdom? isn’t it true beauty itself? then both are two brothers from the same father. (yetkin, 2007, p. 25). the philosopher talks about this youth in his confessions, which he wrote years later: “i loved low-level beauties, i was on my way to my destruction. i was saying to my friends: do we love anything apart from the beautiful? what is beautiful? what is beauty? what attracts and fascinates us in the objects we love? if they were not for beauty and charm, they would not be able to attract us in any way. i examined and saw that when we consider the objects one by one, on the one hand, they all form a whole in their own way (that’s why they are beautiful), on the other hand, harmony stems from the correct relationship between the objects; for example, such as the adaptation of a limb to the skin or the shoe to fit the foot, or in similar situations” (augustinus, 2016, p. 74). since his youth, augustinus had been closely concerned with the problem of beauty. but after reading the works of plato, especially plotinus, he got rid of skepticism. in 387, at the age of 33, he became a christian through and through the influence of ambrosios, bishop of milano. after adopting christianity and especially after he became the bishop of hippone in this new religion, he completely turned his back on his old beliefs and views. augustinus describes this change as follows: “in the second book of the work i wrote against the academics (contra academicos), i said that the philosopher and the philocaly were two brothers from the same father. now i realize that this thought of mine was completely wrong and foolish. either philocaly was nothing but a collection of absurd things, so it could never be the sibling of the philosopher; or if this expression is not to be taken into account as an expression that should express the love of beauty, let’s say right away that this beauty is the true and supreme beauty of wisdom. then this beauty is at the level of the highest incorporeal things. whatever www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 146 published by scholink inc. the case, the two concepts cannot be considered as siblings” (yetkin, 2007, p. 26). saint augustinus divides beauty into absolute beauty and beauty of things lower than absolute beauty. absolute beauty is the beauty of god. god is the most beautiful of all beauties. it is the most perfect and the best. the beauties that exist apart from god are just like the food to be eaten in a dream. while the beauty in things gives temporary pleasure, the beauty of god is permanent. all beauty cannot be beautiful unless it takes its source from absolute beauty. however, human cannot adequately express the beauty of god. god’s beauty cannot be fully described. because human has limited mind and limited concepts. limitless absolute beauty cannot be expressed based on limited concepts. in addition to these, he has the view that god created the universe in the most beautiful order and harmony (akyüz, 2017, p. 31). in his youth, the philosopher found beauty in the harmony (convenentio partium) between the parts of a thing, and distinguished that harmonious ratio between the different parts from the quality of a thing’s conformity to its purpose (apte). thus, this understanding of beauty, which was admired by plotinos’s student, was replaced by goodness when the student became a bishop (yetkin, 2007, p. 27). memory contains numerous laws and relations related to space and numbers. none of these thoughts are perceived by the senses. however, geometric drawings are not the same as the images i see with my eyes. there is no need to think of any objects to know them, human recognizes them from the human mind. i also know the numbers that we count through our senses, but counting numbers are different, they do not have the images found in the first, which explains their absolute existence (augustinus, 2016, pp. 207-208). we (1) exists and (2) we knows we exist, and this is what existing and knowing is something we (3) love. as long as these three items i have mentioned are in question, the fear of a lie disguised as the truth does not disturb us in any way. for, unlike things outside of us, they are not perceived by any of the body’s senses in the same way we perceive colors by seeing, hearing sounds, smelling odors, tasting tastes, touching the hard and soft. as we form mental pictures of such sensual things, we concentrate on them in our minds, store them in our memories, and maintain our desire to keep them alive. but i know with the greatest possible certainty that i exist, that i know, and that i love, if things imagined or appearing have no form to deceive me. regarding truths of this kind, i fear no evidence from academic skeptics. they said, “what if you’re being deceived?” they object. if i’m deceived, i’m in. because someone who does not exist cannot be justified (cited by cevizci, 2001, p. 53). according to augustinus, beauty is not something temporary, it is always real and permanent. although many visually pleasing forms change over time, proportions and numerical relationships never change. therefore, it is necessary to seek permanent beauty in them. in particular, augustinus sees that the soul finds and loves those who are similar to itself on the basis of aesthetic pleasure; in fact, pleasing colors, softness and similar features rather than recognizing what is similar to oneself. the basis of all ratios and numbers is union with affinity and imitative. this is basically an equalization that leads us to god. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 147 published by scholink inc. the basic principle of beauty is equality, uniqueness and integrity (erzen, 2016, p. 83). according to augustinus, the most complete harmony (accord) is unity; then unity is the chief form of all beauty. but it is in god alone; all other beings and bodies bear only traces and stamps of it. however, none of them can achieve the full unity that they aspired to. but they still make great efforts to achieve it, and at least they desire it. it is the pleasing proportion in all the arts.; this is all good. proportion or harmony seeks unity. according to augustinus, “the form of beauty is always unity” (yetkin, 2007, p. 27). the order based on between the parts and numbers brings out the beauty. unity can be grasped not by the senses, but by the mind. “it is the mind, not the senses, that really grasps the unity, measuring the proportions between parts and objects. in a word, it is the mind that sees the law that puts them in order, the number that governs them, and stamps them with the charm of rhythm or proportion”. reaching this divine beauty is possible by perceiving the concepts of harmony and proportion in the creation of man. the person who can catch the perfection, harmony and proportion in the creation of man will also reach the divine wisdom, which is the source of beings, realities and goodness. thus, it can be a creator by acting from the creator (özel, 2014, pp. 122-123). in the early periods of christianity, when the artistic form was seen as unity, proportion and order, the lack of form was considered as ugliness and it was claimed that order was the guide for the artist. according to augustinus, one of the latin church fathers, the order that guides the artist enables the artist to capture the form in god with divine inspiration, and the artist reveals the form in the light of the exemplary ideas in his mind. revealing the work in line with the exemplary ideas is possible if the artist can visualize the exemplary idea with some internal tools. these internal tools are the tendency to shrink things, enlarge, and change what experience has left in memory. for this reason, artistic form is obtained by adding or subtracting something from the form of an object, with the ability to change the traces left by experience in memory. the beauty of the artistic form obtained in this way is based on geometric regularity. beauty is the geometric regularity that ensures harmony according to augustinus said “what is the beauty of the body? it is the harmony of the limbs as well as a certain color pleasantness”. the beauty that emerges from the harmonious ratio of the parts is the numerical expression of formal perfection. this understanding of artistic form creation exactly coincides with divine creation; because, according to augustinus, god arranged everything within the framework of order and measure (öndin, 2016, pp. 14-15). the numerical ontological effect of plato’s pythagoreanism is seen in augustinus. harmony, proportion, size are the factors that determine beauty. augustinus advocates the integrity that is complete with the understanding of unity. there is competence and beauty in the integrity formed by the coming together of the parts (oto, 2017, s. 64). in the church tradition, glorifying geometry as understanding is also valid for augustinus. he explains the ideal status of geometric forms in his work de ordine: “the mind moves towards the power of the eyes, and as it contemplates the earth and the sky, it feels that it is only beauty, and that there are forms www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 148 published by scholink inc. in this beauty, measures in forms, numbers in measures. and the mind inquires whether there is a form or a figure, a line or a round shape corresponding to what is in it, and these different and regular forms point to a discipline, which is geometry” (cited by öndin, 2016, p. 102) from the book sapienza (the wisdom of solomon) interpreted by augustinus, the middle ages learned that god had created the world on the basis of number (numerus), weight (pondus) and measure (mensura). as we shall see later, these were manifestation the aesthetic and the metaphysical categories “good” as well as cosmological categories (eco, 2016: 43). guillaume of auxerre confirms this as follows: “goodness in substance and beauty in substance are the same thing… the beauty of a thing consists of these three attributes: kind, number and order. according to st. augustinus, beauty consists of these attributes” (eco, 2016, p. 46). for this reason, st. augustinus developed a rigorous theory in “de quantitate animae”, in which beauty was conceived as geometric regularity. in this work, augustinus stated that the equilateral triangle is more beautiful than unequal sides with the triangle, because in the former there is greater equality, the square, where equal angles correspond to equal sides, was even better, but the circle was the prettiest: in the circle, no angle divides the continuous equality of the circle. above all, the point was the point: the indivisible point is its starting and ending center, and the beauty of shapes is the foundation of the circle (eco, 2016: p. 81). if unity is considered as the result and not the principle of order, there is nothing beautiful in itself, no part. again, beauty should not look for in something that is completely plain. however, there is nothing beautiful in the whole when the parts are ugly and they are in order. acoordingly as plotinos said: “beauty is something that shines in proportion and order rather than order and proportion”. this shining thing is god himself (yetkin, 2007, p. 28). 3. method in this study, it was used qualitative research method. qualitative research method is based on postmodern and hermeneutic science philosophies. according to some people, according to some, it may be a more accurate distinction, it is analyzed collecting of quantitative and qualitative data and make a judgement rather than quantitative and qualitative research. studies in which quantitative or qualitative data or both are analyzed can be conducted. if what is done is in accordance with the criteria and principles of science, the work done and the results obtained will be science and scientific knowledge (sönmez & alacapınar, 2014, p. 72). qualitative research, according to glaser, is an approach that emphasizes researching and understanding social phenomena in their environment with an understanding based on theory building. in this definition, “theory building” means a modeling study that explains some previously unknown results in relation to each other based on the data obtained (yıldırım & şimşek, 2005, pp. 39-40). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 149 published by scholink inc. 4. conclusion it was gathered christianity and ancient greek thought years later by st. augustinus. st. augustinus tried to provide reconciliation by synthesizing christian theology and ancient greek thought. in this context, it can be stated that belief reveals knowledge by considering the knowledge-belief relationship on the basis of st. augustinus neo-platonist philosophy. hence, for st. augustinus, philosophy is the activity of man’s self-knowledge. addressing concepts such as happiness, love, good, beautiful, virtue, st. augustinus argues that the source of these concepts is “absolute god”. according to st. augustinus, man who imitates “god’ can approach happiness and love. in this context, human needs are not only physical. in addition, aesthetic elements that provide spiritual satisfactions provide beauty satisfactions. in terms of the search for ideal form, it is essential to achieve perfection by ensuring the unity and harmony from the part to the whole in the part-whole relationship. beauty manifests itself to the extent that unity and integrity are achieved. here, it is the mind that creates the ideal form. ideas that existed on the intellectual basis in ancient greece by emerging concepts such as competent with reason, harmony, proportion, proportion and measure comes into existence as beautiful on a realistic basis with st. augustinus. he tries to prove the existence of “god” based on the concept of beauty and happiness. according to him, since the concept of beauty in our minds cannot be put into our minds by the deficient beings in the outside world, it has been placed in our minds only by the absolute beauty “god”. he examines art and beauty within the christian belief, which approaches art and beauty with a platonist and aristotelian metaphysical point of view. according to him, reaching artistic knowledge leads us to real knowledge. according to st. augustinus, beauty is the idea and beauty is above the objective, and beauty is of two kinds. the first of these is connected beauty. connected beauty is the beauty that we encounter in nature and that we accept as beautiful when we see it. the second is to understand beauty as a concept similar to happiness. according to him, beauty exists only in “god” in one form. the created beauty is not as beautiful and good as god himself. in this context, st. augustinus’ philosophy is knowledge that leads us to essences, not objects, as real knowledge based on reason. according to st. augustinus, arguing that beauty is not a temporary thing, despite many form changes that are visually pleasing to the individual, elements such as harmony, proportion, proportion do not change. therefore, it is important to seek permanent beauty here. he describes that by finding own imitative of the soul have reached love on the basis of aesthetic pleasure. with this, it is envisaged to merge with similitude and similarity on the basis of concepts such as ratio, proportion, harmony, unity and integrity. at this point, what brings us to the concept of “god” is equalization. according to him, harmony, order, measure, unity, equality and integrity are the basic principles of beauty. according to him, absolute beauty is what manifests itself in these principles. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 150 published by scholink inc. references akyüz, h. (2016). nebevi öğretide estetik anlayış (turkish version). ankara: fecr yayınları. augustinus, s. (2016). i̇tiraflar (translator: dominik pamir). (turkish version, 4. ed.). i̇stanbul: kaknüs yayınları. cevizci, a. (2001). ortaçağ felsefesi tarihi (turkish version) bursa: asa kitabevi. cevizci, a. (2017a). felsefeye giriş (turkish version, 6. ed).i̇stanbul: say yayınları. cevizci, a. (2017b). felsefe sözlüğü (turkish version, 6. ed). i̇stanbul: say yayınları. collingwood, r. g. (2011). kısaca sanat felsefesi (translator: talip kabadayı). (turkish version). i̇stanbul: bilgesu yayıncılık. çüçen, a. k. (2013). orta çağ ve rönesans’ta felsefe (turkish version, 2. ed.). bursa: ezgi kitabevi. eco, u. (2016). ortaçağ estetiğinde sanat ve güzellik (translator: kemal atakay). (turkish version, 6. ed). i̇stanbul: can yayınları. elmalı, o. ve özden, h. ö. (2016). i̇lkçağ felsefesi tarihi (turkish version, 3. ed.). arı sanat yayınevi. erzen, j. n. (2016). çoğul estetik (turkish version, 3. ed). i̇stanbul: metis yayınları. foulquie, p. (1991). varoluşçuluk (translator: yakup şahan). (turkish version). i̇stanbul: i̇letişim yayınları. gilson, e. (1999). tanrı ve felsefe (translator: mehmet s. aydın). (turkish version, 2. ed.). i̇stanbul: birleşik yayıncılık. hançerlioğlu, o. (1995). düşünce tarihi (turkish version, 6. baskı). i̇stanbul: remzi kitabevi. işık, a. (2013). din ve estetik (turkish version, 2. ed.). i̇stanbul: ötüken yayınları. kalın, i̇. (2017). ben, öteki ve ötesi (turkish version, 9. ed.). i̇stanbul: i̇nsan yayınları. öndin, n. (2016). rönesans düşüncesi ve resim sanatı (turkish version). i̇stanbul: hayalperest yayınevi. oto, f. (2017). estetik ve sanatın felsefi kökenleri (turkish version). ankara: kurgu kültür merkezi yayınları. özel, a. (2014). estetik ve temel kuramları (turkish version). ankara: ütopya yayınevi. sönmez, v. ve alacapınar, f. g. (2014). örneklendirilmiş bilimsel araştırma yöntemleri (turkish version, 3. ed.). ankara: anı yayıncılık. turgut, i̇. (1993). sanat felsefesi (turkish version). i̇zmir: akademi kitabevi. weber, a. (2014). felsefe tarihi (translator: h. vehbi eralp). (turkish version) i̇stanbul: kabalcı yayıncılık. yetkin, s. k. (2007). estetik doktrinler (turkish version). ankara: palme yayıncılık. yıldırım, a. ve şimşek h. (2005). nitel araştırma yöntemleri (turkish version, 5. ed.). ankara: seçkin yayınları. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 67 original paper ananalysis of trade protectionism from the perspective of the community of human destiny zhengying lu1* 1 shenyang university of technology, shenyang, liaoning province, postal code: 110000, china * email: 1148835734@qq.com received: april 19, 2024 accepted: may 07, 2024 online published: may 24, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n2p67 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n2p67 abstract with the continuous advancement of the process of trade globalization, free trade has become the dominant form of today's world economic system. however, it cannot be ignored that trade protectionism still exists and has gradually risen in recent years. the rise of trade protectionism, to a certain extent, has caused disorder in the international trade order and intensified trade frictions between countries, which fundamentally violates the objective law of the development of global economic integration. as a big country with a sense of responsibility, it is necessary for china to put forward china's plan to guide and resolve this problem in a targeted way from the perspective of the community of human destiny. keywords community of human destiny, trade protectionism, chip industry, wto 1. introduction the concept of the community of human destiny has been accepted by more and more countries in the world since it was proposed. in the face of the current trend of rising trade protectionism, the relevant concepts of the community of human destiny can be applied to solve the problem, and solutions can be formulated from a macro level, strengthen the cooperation and contact between countries and international organizations, and accelerate the process of economic integration (xu, 2023). 2. take the chip industry as an example to analyze the current trade protectionism 2.1 analyze the chip industry theoretically at present, the chip industry, as a globally focused innovative industry, has received high attention from countries around the world, which has promoted the continuous upgrading of the protection of the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 68 domestic chip industry in order to seek a higher market share in the international market and enhance the market competitiveness of the domestic industry. first of all, some countries borrow the "compensatory principle" in the new welfare economics to continuously improve the welfare policy of the domestic chip industry, so as to achieve the purpose of implementing trade protection in their own territory; secondly, a small number of countries adopt relatively restrictive trade liberalization. compared with multilateral trade liberalism in the traditional sense, their free field is relatively fixed and narrow. through agreements and other ways, they protect the monopoly of chip industry in this field and exclude the entry of chip industry outside the field, resulting in the acceleration of domestic industrial cycle and the slowdown of international industrial cycle to a certain extent. thirdly, some countries are opposed to the free trade in the chip industry, and believe that new trade protection policies should be adopted, which will continuously reduce the economic income and living standards of their nationals from the perspective of the theory of equal prices of production factors. finally, at present, the vast majority of countries in the world, for the development of the chip industry, still agree to adopt the multilateral form of trade liberalism theory, constantly build and enhance the industrial chain and innovation chain of the chip industry, and improve its value chain in the global scope (cheng, 2023). 2.2 the chip industry is analyzed in practice in practice, the global chip industry is analyzed. first of all, the upstream design enterprises are affected. the bottom-to-bottom competition in the chip industry and the introduction of some relevant laws have seriously affected foreign investment in the domestic chip industry, resulting in the disconnection between the design and manufacturing of the chip industry, and forming certain influences and obstacles to the subsequent development process of the domestic chip industry. in the global chip industry chain, innovation and advanced nature are important factors determining the development of the chip industry. the emergence of trade protectionism has blocked the opportunities for relevant technology exchange and introduction between countries, resulting in domestic chip manufacturing enterprises, unable to successfully catch up with other countries with advanced chip technology enterprises. it has weakened the competitiveness of domestic chip manufacturing enterprises in the world, resulting in the slowdown of the double cycle of international and domestic economy; finally, chip application enterprises are also limited to a certain extent, after the previous series of shocks, chip application enterprises in the scope of choice gradually narrowed, reducing the core competitiveness of enterprises, but also will limit the application of relevant advanced manufacturing enterprises in the country (xiao, 2023). 3. trade protectionism in the chip industry 3.1 the deterioration of the race to the bottom between countries' trade protection subsidies the chip industry as an important crystallization of the global level of science and technology, the production and manufacturing links are strict, the industrial chain is complex and refined, and the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 69 technical level is cutting-edge. it is difficult for any country to rely on its own industrial development and innovation to construct the entire chain of the chip industry. countries clearly know this problem, so they pay more attention to protecting their own chip industry on a global scale. increase subsidies in chip and related high-tech industries, attract foreign investment in technology research and development in their own countries, encourage innovation in local industries, constantly empower the local chip industry, break the rules of other countries' industrial chains, reduce the competitiveness of other countries in the chip industry, so as to enhance the core competitiveness of their own chip industry, this kind of continuous competition of subsidies in various countries, as well as a series of differentiated industrial support policies, will lead to the disorder of the global chip industry market law, affect the economic order between countries, and then trigger a new round of global trade protectionism. based on the worsening and intensifying competition of trade protection subsidies in the above countries, some countries have adopted legislation and promulgated a series of bills to construct trade protection for their own industries from the national level. in view of the above problems, it is necessary for us to effectively carry out legal regulation on a macro level and adopt effective countermeasures under the concept of a community of human destiny (yang, wu, song, & sun, 2019). 3.2 zero-sum mentality and rising trade protectionism first of all, some countries through the form of legislation, trying to actively decouple from the global chip industry chain, cut off the normal development and operation of the chip industry chain, so as to improve the production capacity in the global chip industry; secondly, more countries have joined the global economic and technological game, and continue to strengthen their dominant position in the global chip industry through legislative means, in order to promote the rapid development of their own economy. this kind of game thinking and trade protectionism have a certain impact on the multilateral trade form advocated in the world, and also have an impact on the liberalization of multilateral trade. with the development of regional economic integration, the rise of trade protectionism is also an inevitable law. in order to effectively curb the development of this trend, through continuous analysis of the theory and practice of a new round of trade protectionism, based on the theory and logic, find out the development law of a new round of trade protectionism, formulate china's plan and take legal and effective measures. to respond positively (liu, 2022). 3.3 regional trade legal system prevails in trade protectionism due to the particularity and importance of the chip industry itself, the competition among countries in the chip industry is intensifying. the legal system of regional trade implemented by countries through bilateral or multilateral agreements has caused serious impact on international economic relations and international economic legal system to a certain extent. the development of regional trade has a long history, and it has developed more rapidly in recent years. regional trade agreements have challenged the global international economic legal system both in terms of rules and principles, and intensified conflicts and contradictions, especially in the settlement of disputes, jurisdictional competition and other issues, which have increased frictions between countries. we should uphold the international www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 70 system with the united nations at its core, build a new international economic order, inject the concept of a community with a shared future for mankind into the international economic and legal system, and achieve common prosperity of the global economy on the basis of upholding the basic principles of the world trade organization (zhao & chen, 2022). 4. china's solution to trade protectionism 4.1 file a complaint before the wto dispute settlement body at the international level, china has signed bilateral agreements face-to-face to deal with trade protection through dialogue and consultation, and on the other hand, it has actively signed multilateral agreements and made full use of existing multilateral dispute settlement mechanisms to deal with trade disputes. in the face of the challenge of large-scale trade protection, with the help of the international community, trade disputes can get a relatively fair ruling. among them, the wto dispute settlement mechanism has played a key role in restricting the foreign trade policies of various countries, promoting the equal exchange of global economy and trade, and ensuring the foreign trade interests of all members. therefore, in view of the current global trade protectionism disputes, the first consideration should be given to the settlement of disputes under the wto framework. countries should consistently maintain the wto dispute settlement mechanism and actively appeal in the wto dispute settlement mechanism when dealing with international trade issues. for example, some international bills related to the chip industry violate the cornerstone principles of the wto, that is, the principle of most-favored-nation and national treatment, and also violate the principle of non-discrimination, using the advantages of chip research and development to introduce foreign investment in the form of subsidies. this violation of principles does not conform to wto rules, has no international legal basis, and is not recognized in the international community. in the face of such incidents, china can cite the solution of relevant disputes, such as the case of ec-seal products. the appellate body, by pointing out that the provisions of the general agreement on tariffs and trade 1994 (gatt 1994) prohibit the content of a change in the conditions of competition for imports of the same type of product, which would cause an adverse competitive opportunity for imports of the same type of product of any member country and thus cause certain harm. china can appeal to the wto dispute settlement body for the unfair treatment of such countries. at the same time, other countries in the world that have been similarly treated can also learn from china's plan and use the dispute settlement channels provided by the wto to carry out legal and compliant dispute settlement (guan, 2022; wei, 2022). 4.2 take countermeasures in accordance with the law and curb trade protectionism at the same time of dispute settlement in the wto dispute settlement mechanism through the above-mentioned means of complaint, effective countermeasures should also be taken at home to form international and domestic dual guarantees to ensure the effective settlement of international trade disputes. in 2020, china issued a list of unreliable entities, in which article 2, paragraph 1, clearly www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 71 stipulates that other countries take discriminatory measures against chinese enterprises, individuals and other organizations, causing serious damage to relevant chinese entities, and china should take corresponding countermeasures, which is also a means for china to quickly safeguard its own rights and security. the relevant provisions in the bills of some countries are fully in line with the provisions of china's unreliable entity list rules, and china has both the right and the basis to take countermeasures against the discriminatory principles adopted by china. by taking countermeasures, we can quickly exert pressure on them and effectively curb their unreasonable and non-compliant practices against china. to counter trade protectionism in accordance with the law, we should not only be good at quoting the relevant foreign legislation, but also further improve the relevant domestic legislation, such as the further improvement of the rules on the list of unreliable entities. first of all, we should clarify the legal basis for the formulation of the rules, clarify its legal sources, and achieve a perfect connection with the legal sources. secondly, the list rules are further distinguished from similar control lists to prevent the repetition and redundancy of legal provisions. third, it should achieve the purpose of practical application, in the process of reference, to achieve efficient connection and matching, play its purpose; finally, learning from the relevant regulations of other countries on the entity list, for example, in the process of formulating its own entity list, the united states endows its relevant departments with a large amount of discretion, which helps to improve the efficiency of the implementation of the list, but at the same time, there is also the possibility of abuse of discretion. china can partially learn from and quote, and modify it in light of china's national conditions. improve the adaptation in the process of reference, improve the flexibility of our entity list in practical application. in addition, it should be noted that china, as a responsible big country, should take into account the relevant entities that may be included in the entity list when formulating the list of similar entities, allowing them to have the right to appeal and defend. at the same time, the formulation and implementation of the list should adopt a prudent attitude, clarify the relevant supervision mechanism, and regulate the use of the list to a certain extent. we will effectively protect the rights and interests of our people. in the face of surging trade protection measures, china has been summing up coping experience, improving coping strategies, especially constantly enriching the legal basis, using laws to arm themselves so as to achieve legal basis in response. among them, the more representative are anti-dumping, countervailing regulations and the foreign trade law of the people's republic of china. in the face of the new situation of the continuous development of world trade protection, china's foreign trade law has also been constantly modified and improved with the times, forming today's foreign trade law of the people's republic of china (chen, 2022; xu & zhao, 2022). 4.3 uphold common prosperity and promote multilateral negotiations in economic terms, the concept of a community with a shared future for mankind calls for "adhering to the spirit of openness, promoting mutual assistance and mutual benefit, pursuing the new concept of win-win, all-win and win-win, and abandoning the old thinking of" i win you lose "and" winner takes www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 72 all." in the process of economic exchanges between countries in the world, there will inevitably be some trade frictions. the first thing we do is not to sanction other countries through laws, but laws are only the last backstop measures. in numerous economic frictions, countries have negotiated and negotiated with each other many times to solve problems, which has greatly eased the contradictions and frictions between countries. further friendly exchanges in trade, promote the integrated development of the global economy, achieve common prosperity, and lay a good foundation. for example, in 2019, china and the united states successfully reached the first phase of the economic and trade association through multiple negotiations and consultations, and made an official announcement in january of the following year. shortly after the announcement of the agreement, the united states removed sanctions against a chinese company, preventing further development of the situation and easing trade frictions and contradictions between china and the united states. thus, it can be seen that it is feasible and scientific to deal with economic and trade issues between countries through consultation and negotiation, which is conducive to reducing contradictions between countries, strengthening cooperation between countries, enhancing trust, expanding trade scope, and forming common prosperity in the concept of a community with a shared future for mankind (cui, 2021; liu, 2022). 5. conclusions to sum up, we can see that in the face of trade protectionism, the governments and enterprises of relevant countries should resolve disputes under the framework of the concept of a community with a shared future for mankind. the concept of a community with a shared future for mankind is a chinese plan and a chinese method that conform to the development of the times, and shows china's responsibility and image as a major country. we have always insisted on and advocated that in the international economic system, we should distinguish right from wrong, adhere to common prosperity, adhere to joint construction and sharing, jointly safeguard the multilateral trading system, maintain the stability of the global industrial chain and supply chain, and safeguard the basic principles and authority of the wto, so as to conform to the global development trend and be more accepted by countries around the world. in the face of the rise of trade protectionism, through learning from relevant industry cases, we can effectively contain and further promote the process and development of globalization and trade liberalization. references chen, k. (2022). what does the signing of the "chip act" in the united states mean?. china report, (09), 86-89. cheng, r. y. (2023). the us chip and science act defines the mission and functions of the tip administration. science and technology china, (04), 95-98. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 73 cui, q. b. (2021). the new round of trade protectionism and china's regional trade liberalization strategy. journal of shanghai university of international business and economics, 28(04), 76-90. guan, j. (2022). wto compliance analysis of the chip act 2022. china foreign exchange, (20), 26-29. liu, j. l. (2022). the possible impact of the chip and science act of the united states and china's countermeasures. china development observation, (12), 116-120. liu, t. (2022). on the international law practice path of building a community with a shared future for mankind. tianjin normal university. wei, w. (2022). south korea releases "semiconductor superpower strategy". procuratorate, (18), 58-59. xiao, j. y., & zhu, h. f. (2023). the historical roots and effect prediction of the chip act in the united states. people's forum, (06), 79-84. xu, d. g. (2023). on international law implications and contributions of the concept of community with a shared future for mankind. social sciences of guangdong, (05), 5-16+286. xu, h., & zhao, j. f. (2022). the impact of new trade protectionism on china and countermeasures. macroeconomic management, (03), 77-82. yang, z., wu, q., song, m. l., & sun, j. y. (2019). the influence of the chip and science act of the united states on the development of china's semiconductor industry and its countermeasures: from the perspective of innovation chain theory. nankai management review, 26(01), 146-160. zhao, j. c., & chen, w. (2022). against the united states, the european union to build independent chip ecosystem. the global times, 2022-12-02(011). original paper an analysis of trade protectionism from the perspe references microsoft word ape-v2n2-p85 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 85 original paper populism & political participation peter bearse, ph.d. (economics)1* 1 development strategies corporation, carrabelle, united states * peter bearse, ph.d. (economics), development strategies corporation, carrabelle, united states received: march 10, 2019 accepted: march 30, 2019 online published: april 8, 2019 doi:10.22158/ape.v2n2p85 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v2n2p85 abstract this article defines both populism and political participation, tells why they are both important and how they interact and interrelate. program and policy implications are drawn. keywords participation, political, cooperatives, democratic, power, populism, grassroots, elites, dialogue, deliberation, volunteering, corruption, adulthood, oligarchy, learning, top-down, bottom-up 1. introduction this topic is critical to the health and survival of the world’s greatest democratic republic. my first political book offered a then and now, still controversial theme—a core, simple, gosh-a-rootie populist theme: wow!—the american people should be the key actors in the political process. a “key actor?”, yes!, you!, via participation in politics. you could be a powerful participant, especially in concert with others. to revive what should be but is unfortunately not now ours—our democratic system! 2. method the method of our investigation is twofold, socratic and exegetical. socratic: a systematic asking of questions from general to specific; e.g., from “what is populism?” to “what the specific factors that induce people to get involved in the political process?”. exegetical: in so far as we seek to characterize and categorize modalities of human behavior in light of critical readings of various sources. 3. result what is political participation? it comes in many forms. voting is the most featured and familiar and yet it is only the end of a long process of prior activities. voting then signals the beginning of others. priors to voting include: www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 86 published by scholink inc. • paying attention to what’s going on in politics and government at all levels; • joining with others in a political club, party or other organization devoted to electoral and/or other public issue concerns. remember: “we either hang together or hang separately”. • talking about political issues with friends, family, relatives, workmates and others. • selecting issues and organizations with which you would like to be involved and/or in communication. • volunteering to help candidates or organizations with their campaigns. • serving on governmental committees. • writing letters to editors, essays or “op-ed” pieces on the major issues of your concern. after voting is done and elected officials begin or continue their jobs for “we the people”, the hard part begins—tracking their performance and trying to influence the gestation, development, passage and implementation of laws and regulations. the main challenge here is that of bringing people-power to bear on administrative agencies—parts of government now popularly recognized as “the swamp”. people’s political participation at this stage is critical to influencing whether they can truly “take back” their government. since this stage has been dealt with in a little-noticed but great old book by holtan odegard, and by this author in his latest book as well, this essay will focus on participation in electoral politics. why is such participation important? because it determines: ❖ whether politics is truly ours (of, by and for “we the people”), or whether we let it become someone else’s game (which it now largely is). ❖ the nature and meaning, or even the existence of, citizenship. several comparable nations; for example, germany, japan, new zealand, france and the u.k., do not offer citizenship as a right of birth. for every right there is a corresponding responsibility. genuine citizenship in a democratic republic requires citizens to assume some responsibility in order for that republic to survive and prosper. australia, for example, requires its citizens to vote. ❖ the degree and nature of one’s growing up to adulthood. growing up is a process of broadening horizons, deepening understandings, and increasing responsibilities, so “time is of the essence”. now at age 77 and looking back, i realize how important participation was to bringing this process to fruition in my own life. ❖ whether and how we learn to talk to, learn from and work with a diverse set of others on serious matters of concern in the public domain that we share with others. the keyword is “learn”. ❖ the extent to which we share in power. ❖ the depth of personal satisfaction and gain we can get from making new friends and contacts, as well as “making a difference” in the otherwise presumably impersonal world of politics. the time for revival of political participation is now—for four reasons: www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 87 published by scholink inc. 1) we are in the midst of another “great transformation” driven by entrepreneurship, innovation and new, high-technology-driven modes of production featuring peer to peer (p2p), do-it-yourself (diy), and “wikinomics”. these are substantially less capital intensive, smaller scale and more democratic in nature than old industrial development patterns. they also tend to put more people out of work. 2) internet technology has put cheap, powerful information and communications tools in the hands of most everyone, enabling the emergence of collective intelligence and masses of people readily organized to demand change 4. 3) the country’s elites have failed us. there is no reason to assume we can rely on them to govern us. we can and must find ways to better govern ourselves. 4) political and governmental systems have become corrupted, dysfunctional and unable to solve our basic problems. “altogether now!”, “we the people” can do so. how?—by becoming coproducers of a new politics; a crowd-sourced, collective intelligence and wisdom, and internet-enabled democratic politics that would enable us to take back our government. what are we to bequeath to our children and grandchildren? here are the options we face in terms of basic questions that can only be answered by “we the people”: ❖ an economy in which 90% of the gains go to the top 1% of those receiving income?, or one in which a majority of the gains go to a majority of workers? ❖ an unequal society of less opportunity in which your child is significantly less likely to get into a good college or pull down a good, well-paying job?, or an equal opportunity society in which your child has the same chances as the child in a family of the top 1%? ❖ a top-down rather than a bottom-up political/governmental system? ❖ an elite, major-media dominated, so-called “democracy”, or a real democracy grounded on a grassroots, people-based politics? ❖ a country ruled by a rigid, dictatorial oligarchy or a plutocratic system, or one energized by a new politics that empowers ordinary working folks who care deeply about their families, their community and their country? ❖ a politics-as-usual dominated by big money, political pro's and the powers-that-be. ❖ a politics dominated by people who are thought to be “ordinary” only because they are so seldom presented with opportunities to show just how extra-ordinary they are, or a politics that continues to show us day after day just how little we count in the game of politics-as-usual? would a bit of personal history help? i didn’t get involved in politics until i moved to new york city at age 25. an old friend invited me to attend a meeting of the village independent democrats. there, over several years, i made many new friends, met my wife-to-be, and got involved with some great campaigns. politics has been my avocation ever since. subsequently, i ran for office ten times. my election record is mediocre. i was elected only three of the ten. nevertheless, politics has added much to my life. i am still active, writing primarily on political issues. family influence? none. my father’s www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 88 published by scholink inc. only “political” comment? “throw the bums out!” the big question still remains: what influences the extent to which people participate in what should be but now is not, their politics? to begin to find a multi-faceted answer, take a look at the figure to follow in which “pp” stands for political participation both here and hereafter. there are four major influences in the figure defined as sets, as follows: 1) personal: including factors—envy/ambition/energy/drive/extroversion/experience/fear/curiosity/ responsibility/age/sex/work/children/income and wealth/ignorance/inequality/ 2) resources: including factors—culture/time/information/friends/family/organizations/memberships/affiliations/communit y/education/jobs/inequality/ 3) contexts: including factors—laws/institutions/gaps/ organizations/culture/community/events/issues/inequality/media/difference/ 4) barriers & constraints (b&c): including factors—circumstances/time/culture/institutions/laws/family/experience/media/community or place/let us now focus on each set in-order. first—personal [see diagram, below]: 4. diagram envy and ambition are drivers for those who see political participation (hereafter labelled “pp”) as an entry-level requirement for careers in politics and government. energy and drive obviously help the ambitious to succeed. it’s hard to imagine an introverted personality stepping out of his or her shell sufficiently to get involved in politics. experience counts here, too, as elsewhere, but there is a threshold to cross. too many people harbor a fear or a reluctance to get involved, so they don’t gain any political experience. there is a vicious circle here: lack of experience discourages pp, which further decreases experience. fear as a factor may also be aggravated by barriers and constraints as indicated further on. “reluctance” correlates with indifference, but the latter may be more important. it arises from lack of information and low economic status along with other factors connected with both. low income folks in particular see no value in pp because, as studies have revealed, little or no attention is paid to their opinions as influential. people not oriented to political career paths may get involved out of curiosity or responsibility. the latter is especially important. citizenship demands the assumption of political responsibility. it’s not a choice like buying sausages or twinkies; it is a requirement for citizens of a democratic republic. the set of attributes asked about in the census also count as influences on pp. age: younger and older folks may be deterred from pp; the younger for lack of voter registration; the older because of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 89 published by scholink inc. overwork, health, childcare and other factors (see more under barriers & constraints). sex: the need for two-incomes to support a family, number of children, and the lack of balance in family responsibilities may diminish the likelihood of pp by women (though here, thankfully, “the times they are a’change’n”). work, income and wealth: statistics have revealed that: occupational status is a significant factor. pp rises with such status. people working in jobs that require less education, for example, are less likely to vote. also note that: pp is higher, the higher are persons’ income and wealth. these are dangerous numbers, especially because they reveal vicious cycles at work. levels of income and wealth correlate with occupational status and pp correlates with both. but economic inequality has been rising—significantly. thus, “one-man, one-vote” is increasingly meaningless. the votes of those of lesser means count less in a society where money counts for more and those of greater means exert greater influence. thus, economic inequality spells political inequality. we are in danger of becoming a society stratified by class. this means there is little meaningful society overall, only one defined for the group that sponsors society balls. we have become a country separated by economic class. second is the set of “resources”. culture: besides being guided by a set of values and goals, any culture may enhance or inhibit pp, just as there are cultures that encourage learning and some that do not. article 1 of our declaration of independence implies that the u.s.a. should be a politically activist culture. recall: “we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness… that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed… (and) whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government…”. our over-commercialized culture has come to override the active civic/political culture indicated by the declaration, just as it increasingly intrudes on the values of thanksgiving, christmas, easter all other valued holidays. time: lack of this severely limits pp. pp becomes discretionary because of competition from other activities deemed more necessary to health and well-being. time management of pp with respect to other human needs is crucial. time often depends on location, especially with regard to meetings: “their timing and location can… serve to lock out activists from engaging…” for example, the choice of sunday afternoon in a location other than church “will make sure that no working parents… show up to the meeting, as this is prime family time”. it is also important to set strict time limits for meetings. priorities! the perception, utilization and value of time are by strongly influenced by contexts established by the historical and other pre-existing, higher level values and goals of specific cultures. political cultures www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 90 published by scholink inc. also vary. in thailand, for example, though less “developed” than the u.s., activities are pursued in a more leisurely or more relaxed manner lacking the haste of american culture. there is much more on this subject than this essay can accommodate. the matter of time is the subject of many books. information: lack of it is often equated with lower levels of education. other factors are the disappearance of local news outlets, the decline of public education, and lack of sufficient public information through either direct provision (e.g., political flyers) or advertising. family and friends: one is more likely to at least take an interest in politics if a friend or family member is already involved. how many of your friends or family members are politically active? the answer depends on economic status, especially given the severe decline of unionism. here again, inequality raises its sometimes-ugly head: economic stratification leads to political stratification. organizations: organizational structure is another major factor in pp—the more hierarchical, the less pp among employees. it’s always important, before entering into employment or membership in any organization, for one to assess the extent to which the organizational environment facilitates or discourages one’s participation in politics. organizations, like culture, reveal the huge influence of context on behavior, a feature that is the subject of the 3rd section of this essay. most organizations either actively discourage or fail to encourage pp. contrast a democratic political organization, which: “may resemble a traditional hierarchical organization. however, it is important to understand that the role of (organizational) scaffolding is not directing and controlling the masses…rather, its role and value is in supporting the other 95%...which makes its own decisions…”. organizational environs with respect to pp are even more problematic when the level of organization is the administrative state. holtan odegard was the first to address this issue nearly 50 years ago. he asked: “what can be done to make (government) administration democratic”. his startling answer is still a…challenge today: “in place of the vast effort to manipulate… is to be envisioned a democratic, self-governing, self-controlling re-organization, with participation and scientific-experimental development”. another perspective has been provided by michel bauwens and his p2p foundation. they advocate broad adoption of cooperative forms at all levels: “…the state form is always also a class institution which defends a particular arrangement of social privilege…” the welfare state has slowly given way to the contemporary corporate welfare state (sometimes called the “market state”), which only helps the privileged, (and) guts social solidarity mechanisms…fatally weakening the middle class. enter “the partner state”, first theorized by italian political scientist cosma orsi. it is: “a state form that: enables and empowers the social creation of value by its citizens. it protects the infrastructure of cooperation that is the whole of society”. as “infrastructure”, this moves to the top of our public priorities. it is more than just bridges and roads. institutional innovations are also called for at sub-national levels, such as land trusts and cooperatives devoted to various purposes. note, for example, the dynamite hill-smithfield community land trust. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 91 published by scholink inc. founded in 2015, it has: “adopted 2.5 acres across eight empty lots (for planting) in the…black neighborhood named after the dozens of klu klux klan bombings there…”. this is but one aspect of a 10-year strategy led by the magic city agricultural project [mcap] in birmingham, al, to “create an autonomous cooperative economy in birmingham”. mcap, in turn, is a member of the federation of southern cooperatives, also part of a “resurging co-op movement in small cities across the united states…”. community and education: any group may be informal; i.e., not a legal form of organization. nor is education necessarily provided by organizations. witness the growing importance of home-schooling. yet, communities may be governed by local elites—often dubbed “the good old boys”—that may discourage an education that would encourage pp. the lack or shortcomings of so-called “civics” education in the public schools reinforces rather than reduces the lack-of-information factor cited earlier. here, home-schooling is not the answer. it is an option primarily open to those who are already better-off, who can afford money to pay for both public school taxes and the expenses of homeschooling. politically activist households among them may do a better job of teaching civics, but this hardly suffices to offset the overall lack thereof. reporting on the 2018 mid-term elections, steve hilton, tv host of the next revolution and author of positive populism, remarked on his program that “the education gap has increased between college and no-college voters”. inequality again! the basic lesson here?—that groupings at any level need to be governed by mission statements that place high priority on enabling their members to be politically active co-members of a democratic republic. and so this brings us to “contexts”, our 3rd major set. third: contexts: a lot of what we have already noted, such as “culture” and “organizational environment”. could be placed under this heading. what needs to be first recognized here, however, is the influence of contexts on behavior. the process of human development places individuals in a variety of contexts. unless one is fortunate enough to grow up within a family setting that is politically activist or which has a politically oriented family tradition, then one must ask, as above: to what extent does any context facilitate, discourage or ignore pp? most ignore it. laws encourage or discourage types of behavior. state laws are primary in the case of elections. these vary considerably to the degree that they encourage or discourage people to vote. institutions—likewise. educational institutions, for example, ride high because we attribute so much power and promise to their help in educating new generations. is such attribution (handover) either justified or fulfilled? hardly. here, growing inequality again enters, so much so that those who can afford to do so have practically abandoned john dewey’s vision of a public school system that is not only equal for all but is also one that promotes greater equality. and so, given the numerous factors adverse to pp already identified, pp is practically discouraged. the “basic lesson” cited earlier is reemphasized. events and issues: events sometimes spark political www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 92 published by scholink inc. involvement, e.g., concerts such as “rock the vote”. others may be remarkable in the context of a person’s life, such as a death in the family, birth of a child, loss of job or an issues forum. even more sparks are provided almost daily by news reports. some are literal, such as those shot out of the huge fires that have destroyed hundreds of homes and whole communities in california. others, too, have called attention to global warming/climate change (hereafter abbreviated gwcc), not only as threats to our own well-being but also to life on our planet overall. more generally, events worldwide such as gwcc are showing folks how little they can depend on established authorities to secure their well-being. such realizations are a great “spark” to political involvement. issues?: often, it takes a major issue to spark pp, especially “hot button” issues such as abortion, immigration or health costs. people wake up to realize that they must participate if their stand on such issues is to “carry the day” or “make a difference”. inequality and media: the rise in inequality has made it a major public issue. those at the bottom had long come to realize that the system is “rigged” in favor of those at the top. so, too, have many people in our country’s diminishing middle class. and so they as well as community leaders have become increasingly restive and politically active to try to un-rig the system. apart from helping to call attention to disparities in our society, the media are mostly part of the problem even though they could as well be part of the solution. media bias is rampant and primarily on the side of wealthy elites. follow the money. the poor cannot afford to advertise. similarly, in the case of the social media. witness facebook and google, for whose behavior its ceos have had to explain the policies of their organizations to congress, offering little more than lame apologies while they tried to do so. other major organizations in the social media industry—u-tube and twitter, for example, are also guilty parties. all are new but integral parts of the advertising industry. their activities serve so/so (same old/same old) roles of serving up political pablum to citizen consumers rather than informing them as pp activists. thus, they aid and abet additional increases in political and economic inequality. the tech-based and much-hyped post-industrial corporation, apple, for example, apes its old-industrial counterparts in moving operations to china to increase its huge profits. difference: contexts can be ranked by their degree of diversity, i.e., differences among and between their members, groups or parts. too many people are judged adversely by how much they differ in their social distance from those doing the judging. at the interpersonal level, the examples of the destructive impact of such behavior are legion. how many people do you know who love difference? difference is fractal—self-similar at all levels. if we shift our vision from the inter-personal to higher levels, what do we reach?—the hyper-partisan character of american politics overall. love of difference must be learned. constructive social learning takes more time than does individual learning. and yet, various studies of the influence of diversity upon pp provide mixed results. one found two interrelated psychological processes at work: www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 93 published by scholink inc. 1) “those embedded in cross-cutting networks…are more likely to hold ambivalent political views which…discourage political participation”. and… 2) social accountability pressures in cross-cutting networks (also) discourage pp. others find mixes of positive and negative influences, but they are not very comparable. studies vary in populations (e.g., older, younger, student, non-student) as well as linkages. they also rely upon different measures of diversity, its key variates, and reciprocal effects. a few references are cited below. fourth, barriers & constraints: many of these have already been revealed by discussions of the first three. they are manifold. what else? lack of strong, adequate leadership is barrier #1. it is hard to overcome, hard to find and difficult to generate. most people are preoccupied with the challenges of everyday life. even the most famous leaders and historical figures have been reduced to everyday role models of goodness and excellence rather than political activists. martin luther king, for example: only now are efforts underway to rediscover his radical political legacy. george washington is best known for not telling a lie about chopping down an apple tree. the radical history of the u.s. has been largely ignored. constraints are rife. many have been noted earlier. there is more to be said, however, about the two primary constraints to pp—time and information. in einstein’s theory of relativity, a speed up of time leads to clocks ticking more slowly. not so in human life. we live in a time where nearly everything has been speeded-up but our human clocks do not tick more slowly. our perceptions are otherwise. we feel as if they, too, are ticking faster and so time’s availability is less. who can argue otherwise, given our fixed days and mortal lives? the only solution is setting priorities. earlier, we became known as tv “couch potatoes” by spending an average of at least four hours a day in front of the tube. this mode of behavior has hardly been lessened by the newest technologies of “smart” phones and other electronic devices. now we are spending hours in front of those smaller screens. teenagers are leading the way. have youngsters truly become the prologues for a better future? what are their top prioities? why is pp not one of them? instead of letting our technologies use us, let us start to use them to ease fulfillment of major requirements, how about our responsibilities as citizens to participate in what can become our politics. smart phones, for example, can facilitate pp. they can be used to build networks of political contacts, organize them into effective political groups, and otherwise turn political consumers into political producers—those who altogether can truly “make a difference” politically. why is lack of information such a serious constraint to pp? not because of shortage in terms of quantity. we are actually overwhelmed with data points daily. but “data” is not information, nor is the overload of “information” like that provided by the daily news helpful to pp. a significant portion of news is infotainment. some other parts hardly differ from either propaganda or advertising. these may be understatements. according to housekeeper dana taff, who also reflects the views of many others: “i’m ignoring the news. i’m so angry about the lies we’re fed every day”. dana’s spontaneous, off-the-cuff views are consistent with those of a well-known commentator, bill bonner, who wrote: www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 94 published by scholink inc. “while the average person is a decent human being… he is neither always good nor always bad, but always subject to influence… a skilled demagogue—a confident know-it-all with an easy solution for every problem—will always be better at stirring up the mob than an honest, humble thinker. there you have the two biggest frauds of the whole system, right together. we are all supposed to be equal. but some—using the political process for their own purposes—are able to tell the rest of us how to run our lives. and the selection process will almost always lift up the worst—not the best—candidates…and so… we end up being ruled by the biggest jackasses”. the informational part of this problem is not one of quantity of information; it is quality. one must search for it. in so doing, recognize that the most fundamental factor affecting pp is a large amount of ignorance. look for and try alternative tv channels such as discover and curiosity. escape the tv for more and better news. tune into national public radio (npr). above all, especially since searching takes time, place strict limits on time spent on tv and social media. time “spent” is not invested; it is largely wasted. in the case of children such time is likely to have adverse effects. priorities! as for leadership, the model advocated by falkvinge as a leader of the swedish pirate party differs greatly from our conventional way. he remarks: “the (political) activism leader would not lead activism as such, but rather support it…whenever activists decide…that they would like to stage a rally, hand out flyers, put up posters, or…some other form of visible activism… the leader is the person responsible for the practical details[!], such as pa equipment, permits and other details…”. 5. conclusion does: the solution to our central problem—lack of sufficient pp among “we the people” lie with us or with donald trump? by now, the main answer should be obvious: it lies with us. as the great american poet, charles olson, wrote: “limits are what we are inside of”. so break out! let us not be prisoners of our own barriers and constraints. but we have identified a number of intermediaries that influence our behavior and encourage or discourage pp. prime among these influences are those provided by the contexts of organizations. if we are to move away from an individualistic “dog eat dog” world, cooperative forms would be more desirable than competitive. other intermediaries would require another paper to present. called “democratic spaces” or “spaces for change”, they are promising, they are promising, too. above all, beware of leaders who represent “populism” as just voting for them-selves without recognizing that to “work for us” also means the mark of true leadership—working to build our capacity to participate in politics and govern our-selves. steve hilton recently lamented the failure of the president to emphasize the populist politics that got him elected. so, in both words and deeds, it’s truly up to us if the torch of freedom is to continue to burn bright. get involved! be engaged! lend your good name to help honor a positive populism and give politics a better name! america needs a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 95 published by scholink inc. new political culture whose keynote and product is “power to the people”! participate! references “inequality”, advances in politics and economics (fall). (2018). “populism and political participation”, forthcoming in advances in politics and economics. (2019). alinsky, s. (1946). reveille for radicals and rules for radicals. random house: vintage books. bauwens, m. (2012). the partner state, shareable magazine. also in the p2p primer (p2p stands for person-to-person). retrieved from https://primer.commonstransition.org/2-longarticles/ bearse, p. j. (2004). we the people: a conservative populism. lafayette, la: alpha publishing co. colaico, j. a. (1988). martin luther king jr., apostle of militant nonviolence. ny: st. martin’s press. falkvinge, r. (2013). swarmwise: the tactical manual to changing the world. create space independent publishing platform. grudin, r. (1982). time and the art of living. new york: tickner and fields. indivisible: a practical guide for resisting the trump agenda. former congressional staffers reveal best practices for making congress listen. (n.d.). johnson, s. m., & lollar, x. l. (2002). diversity policy in higher education: the impact of students’ exposure to diversity on cultural awareness and political participation. network diversity and political participation” (draft). https://doi.org/10.1080/02680930210127577 kadushin, c. (2012). social networks and inequality: how facebook contributes to economic (and other) inequality. psychology today (march 7). lee, k. f. (2018). the human promise of the ai revolution. wall st. journal review. manstead, a. s. r. (2018). the psychology of social class: how socioeconomic status impacts thought, feelings, and behavior. british journal of social psychology (february 28). https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12251 matz, d. (2002). the consequences of cross-cutting networks for political participation. american journal of political science. https://doi.org/10.2307/3088437 odegard, h. (1971). the politics of truth. university, al: the university of alabama. polanyi, k. (1957). the great transformation: the political and economic origins of our time. boston: beacon press. political manual: how “we the people” can take back our politics and government. (2018). forthcoming, shoestring: publishers. quinteller, e. d. s., & harell, a. (2011). politics in peer groups. political research quarterly. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 96 published by scholink inc. shirky, c. (2008). here comes everybody. new york: penguin. the betrayal of the american dream. (n.d.). philadelphia, pa: public affairs press. weintraub, k. j. (1966). visions of culture. chicago: university of chicago press. also: magnet, myron. (1993). the dream and the nightmare: the sixties legacy to the underclass. new york: william morrow & co. zinn, h. (n.d.). the people’s history of the united states. microsoft word ape-v4n3-p49 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 49 original paper the sixties in berlin and in hollywood: city with a wall in its center—the attempt to erase the german past hadi shakeeb kassem1* (note 1) 1 bolyai cluj-napoca university, clujnapoca, romania * hadi shakeeb kassem, bolyai cluj-napoca university, clujnapoca, romania received: july 2, 2021 accepted: august 17, 2021 online published: september 2, 2021 doi:10.22158/ape.v4n3p49 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v4n3p49 abstract berlin was the location in which most of the intelligence operations in europe have taken place in the first twenty years of the conquest and the cold war. in november 27, 1958, khrushchev issued a formal letter to the allies, demanding that the western allies evacuate berlin and enable the establishment of an independent political unit, a free city. he threatened that if the west would not comply with this, the soviets would hand over to the east germany’s government the control over the roads to berlin. in the coming months moscow conducted a war of nerves as the last date of the end of the ultimatum, may 27, 1959, came close. finally the soviets retreated as a result of the determination of the west. this event reconfirmed the claims of the west that “the us, britain and france have legal rights to stay in berlin.” according to halle: “these rights derive from the fact that germany surrendered as a result of our common struggle against nazi germany.” (note 2) the russians have done many attempts to change berlin’s status. in 1961 berlin wall was constructed, almost without response on the part of the west, and by so doing, the soviets perpetuated the status quo that had been since 1948. in july 25, 1961 kennedy addressed the americans on television, saying that “west berlin is not as it had ever been, the location of the biggest test of the courage and the will power of the west.” (note 3) on june 26, 1963, kennedy went out to berlin, which was divided by the wall, torn between east and west, in order to announce his message. in his speech outside the city council of west berlin, kennedy won the hearts of the berliners as well as those of the world when he said: “ich bin ein berliner”, i’m a berliner. the sixties were years of heating of the conflict with the soviet block. in 1961 the berlin wall was constructed. then kennedy came into power, there was the movement for human rights and the political tension between whites and blacks in america. the conflict increase as the korean war started, and afterwards when america intervened in vietnam. there was also the crisis in the bay of pigs in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 50 published by scholink inc. cuba, which almost pushed the whole world into a nuclear war and catastrophe. during the 28 years of the berlin wall, 13.8.61-9.11.89, this was notorious as an example of a political border that marked the seclusion and freezing more than freedom of movement, communication and change. at the same time there was the most obvious sign of the division of germany after wwii and the division of europe to east and west by the iron curtain. the wall was the background of stories by writers from east and west. the writers of espionage thrillers were fascinated by the global conflict between east and west and the cold war with berlin as the setting of the divided city. berlin presented a permanent conflict that was perceived as endless, or as mews defined it: “berlin is perfect, a romantic past, tragic present, secluded in the heart of east germany.” (note 4) the city presented the writers with a situation that demanded a reassessment of the genres and the ideological and aesthetic perceptions of this type of writing. this was the reason that the genre of espionage books blossomed in the sixties, mainly those with the wall. the wall was not just a symbol of a political failure, as east germany could not stop the flow of people escaping from it. the city was ugly, dirty, and full of wires and lit by a yellow light, like a concentration camp. a west german policeman says: “if the allies were not here, there would not have been a wall. he expressed the acknowledgment that the western powers had also an interest in the wall as a tool for preventing the unification of germany. but his colleague answers: if they were not here, the wall would not have been, but the same applies for berlin. (note 5) berlin was the world capital of the cold war. the wall threatened and created risks and was known as one of the big justifications for the mentality of the cold war. the construction of the wall in august 1961 strengthened berlin’s status as the frontline of the cold war and as a political microcosmos, which reflected topographical as well as the ideological global struggle between east and west. it made berlin a focus of interest, and this focus in turn caused an incentive for the espionage literature with the rise of neorealism with the anti-hero, as it also ended the era of romanticism. (note 6) the works of le carré and deighton are the best examples of this change in literature. both of them use the wall as the arena of events and a symbol in their works. only at the end of the fifties, upon the final withdrawal of mccarthyism and the relative weakening of the cold war, there started have to appear films with new images about the position and nature of the germans and the representations of nazism in the new history. the films of the cold war presented the communists as enemies or saboteurs. together with this view about the soviets, developed the rehabilitation of the german image. each part of the german society was rehabilitated and become a victim instead of an assistant of the nazis. the critic dwight macdonald was impressed by the way in which the german population” has changed from a fearful assistant of one totalitarian regime to the hero opponent of another totalitarian regime”. (note 7) this approach has to be examined, and how it influenced the development of the german representation, since many films i have investigated demonstrate a different approach of the german representation. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 51 published by scholink inc. keywords berlin wall, iron curtain, genre of espionage books, representations of germans, nazis, other germans, rehabilitation of the german image, hollywood, pca(production code administration (established by the motion picture producers and distributors of america (mppda) in 1934), us foreign policy, isolationism, intervention, cold war 1. introduction the films testify of the different approaches and the existing trends in the administration and in hollywood regarding germany and the germans, and the approach that would serve the american foreign policy and the us’s global interests. films like one, two, three, judgment in nuremberg, town without pity, the longest day, the great escape, dr. strangelove, the spy who came in from the cold, funeral in berlin, torn curtain, and others brought a more realistic german representations, which emphasized the complexity of the german representation in hollywood. the new developments of the weakening of mccarthy persecutions and the pca generated a convenient cultural atmosphere for accepting exceptional script writers. the most outstanding and pioneers in their theoretical complexity were one, two, three by billy wilder and especially judgment at nuremberg by stanley kramer. one could say that these two films constituted the turning point of the german representation in hollywood’s movie industry. in 1961, a short time before the wall was constructed, billy wilder returned to berlin and to the issue of germans after hitler’s time. he shot there the comedy one, two, three. the film deals with berlin and berliners, the conquering forces, the wonders of the economic prosperity in west germany and the failing socialism in east germany, and also brandenburg gate, which was still open at the time. through the obedient laborers who beat their heels and behave like soldiers in a coca cola factory, wilder leads the german spectator back to his military past that seems so distant. the film one, two, three is a satiric comedy. mcnamara (james cagney), a manager in coca cola, is sent to berlin in order to distribute this drink to the new ally of the us, west germany. but as a good capitalist, he aspires for a better position. he wants to be the manager of europe and have an office in london, and for this end he would do anything. after many attempts, including an attempt to distribute the drink in the communist block, the idea is rejected due to his boss; fear and hatred toward communism and the russians, the boss representing the america paranoia. wilder chose comedy because only through a comic strategy one could create stereotypical images, which go through an extreme non-realistic process. through exaggeration and caricature of the images one can show stereotypic characteristics and reach absurd situations of the ex-nazi who stamps with his feet and stands to attention when he identifies an authoritative figure around. there are also three russian friends who consult with each other, trying to reach an agreement, and the head of the department is a spy. the director chose to start the plot from the end, that is, he starts the story from the day in which east berlin closes its gates to the west. this is also the day when the hero comes back home to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 52 published by scholink inc. america, but a moment before that he reconstructs his last months in the city. although these are his personal experiences, there is also a harsh criticism of the political and social reality of the conquering forces. the film presents a satire on the cold war under a cover of a romantic comedy. wilder did not have any empathy toward the regime in east germany or communism, nor did he praise the american culture of the masses. he wanted to show that greed and corruption characterize both regimes. but more severe, according to wilder, are the suspiciousness, the fears and misunderstandings between both parties. no party has a monopoly over stupidity and ignorance, and a political mentality that is based on lack of knowledge and paranoid blindness implies dangers for the stability and safety in the world. the borderlines between good and bad and between stupid and smart people are not national, but human. hence, the image of the german, both western and eastern, is more grotesque due to his will to integrate in either communist or capitalist societies. the people do not believe in the ideologies, but rather adopt the rules of the game of the rulers. in the film judgment at nuremberg (1961), kramer describes a legal drama about the trial of the judges, one of the least familiar trials of the nazi regime. kramer presents the tragedy of germany, in which normative people, like the respected judge ernst janing, played by burt lancaster, makes legal the crimes of the regime. the us sends to nuremberg judge dan howard, played by spencer tracy, to judge the judges of the third reich. the defendants are emil han, frederic hofstetter, and werner lempi and janing, who was the minister of justice. they are accused of murder, brutality, tortures and an inclusive responsibility for everything that have been done in the labor and extermination camps of the nazi regime, as they were signed on the orders of arresting and imprisonment. there are emotional outbursts of the defense and the prosecution throughout the trial. when judge dan howard is not in court, he tries to understand the dynamics in hitler’s germany through locations in nuremberg, talks with his house keepers, mr. and mrs. hulberstadt and others. the testimonies in court are shocking and all the defendants get a life sentence. who is responsible for all the atrocities that have been occurred in the concentration camps, hitler? goebbels? the judges of the third reich? the jailers? the german citizens who lived a few kilometers from the camps? or all of them. and maybe the responsibility lies on the world countries as well for not intervening in time to prevent the murdering of millions of people? the main hero of the film is the minister of justice of nazi germany, ernst janing, an intellectual, played by burt lancaster, and the peak of the film is his admission of guilt of his service of the nazi regime. the german defense attorney, played by maximilian schell, tries to acquit the german judge in order to save germany’s reputation, and for this end he is willing to abuse again the victims of the nazi regime, who stand on the witness stand. the fact that the film dealt with the trial enabled a confrontation of the moral, political and legal perceptions of the defendants, the defeated germans with those of the winning american judges. the relationships of east and west overshadowed the court and influenced the military commanders, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 53 published by scholink inc. who did not avoid trying to influence the judge’s decision in favor of the defendants, so that they would win the sympathy of the german people, the people who was meant to be the buffer against the east. judge howard is torn between making justice and the considerations and pressures of the political system. the same dilemma was in hollywood in those years, whether to purge germany of guilt out of political needs, or regard germany and the germans as guilty in spite of the change that came about in the cold war. this film is mainly a bill of indictment and condemnation against the indifference of the western countries, which did not stop the nazi danger at the beginning and their forgiving attitude to nazis and germany after the war, more than against nazism itself. janing wants to get howards’s appreciation and wants to explain by saying that he had not known where the situation was going to and when it went wrong. howard answers him: “everything went wrong at the first time you sentenced to death an innocent person.” janing remained speechless with an expression of pain and horror, horror of his own deeds, horror of the years to come in his cell in jail, where he would be alone with his guilt and pangs of conscience. when the trial was over, janing wanted to get a small private acquittal from the man who convicted him, but he did not get it. this is the last scene of the film and this is the impression we are left with: germany and the germans are guilty and there is no atonement. kramer challenged the rules against the movie industry and the huac. the judge addresses his fellow countrymen and says: “in the life of every nation, when an enemy grasps its throat and strangles it, there will be people who would say that the only way to stay alive is by imitating the enemy’s deeds/ but if we deny truth, justice, and human dignity—what will be left for us to live for?” the film is a bill of indictment against nazism, but also against the western countries and their forgiving attitude toward the nazis and germany after the war, and especially the us. niza ariel says that “in his film, judgment at nuremberg (1961), the american director stanley kramer managed to crack the common movie pattern of the representation of germans and nazis. the film integrated in the liberal wave of western movie at the end of the fifties and the beginning of the sixties, at the time of the weakening of the cold war and the end of mccarthy’s era in the us.” (note 8) the film was screened in 1961 with the berlin crisis in the background. throughout the film political pressures were put on the american judge saying that one should not blame all the germans as they might neglect the west and support the soviets. avi man, the scriptwriter, and kramer blame the german nation, and especially its social elites, as well as the americans who sacrifice values in return for political gain. (note 9) this film is to a large extent a release of the chains which had been put on hollywood in the time of mccarthy, and it expresses the decrease of the witch hunt in hollywood. the film the longest day (1962) describes both the german and the allies perspectives of the day of invasion, d-day, to normandy in 6.6.1944. the critics praised this film and regarded it as one of the big epic films of wwii. it reproduces in its intensity and scope the greatest amphibic invasion in history, and it was a big success. it cost almost 10 million dollars until the premiere in october 1st, 1962, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 54 published by scholink inc. and it was a great attraction. there were so many stars, dynamic stunts, integrating many scenes of the real invasion, and made it a great box office success. it gained 17.5 million dollars, almost two times of its cost. throughout the production zanuck declared time and again his belief that the film was not just a historical description. he thought that it was important to pass the message through the film about the state the world was and the treat on our way of life. it was intended to be a reminder to the people that the allies fought together and defeated the evil because they were together. the longest day is considered to be one of the most loved, preferred and famous films. it is based on the book by cornelius ryan that has an unprecedented distribution, and was sold in the first year in 800,000 copies. (note 10) ryan wrote about the invasion to normandy for the daily telegraph of london. ten years after the war he interviewed more than 1,000 soldiers who participated in the invasion, and later on wrote the book. (note 11) it would have been interesting to examine the german point of view and interview german soldiers at that time during and after the war. the makers of the film had problem translating all the testimonies into a visual medium. hollywood described the massive invasion of 175,000 soldiers of the allies from the us, canada, britain and other countries. there were more than 13,000 aircrafts and 6,500 ships of different types. (note 12) the film reinforces a patriotic issue, the victory of democracy over dictatorship. the american, english and canadian soldiers were strong and willing to initiate, they trusted their commanders and their goal, whereas the german soldiers are presented as confused, fearful and without any initiative. when the film was done, 1962, it was almost 20 years after the end of the war; west germany was re-armed and joined nato in order to block a possible invasion from the ussr. the wider goal of the film was to present reconciliation towards the germans, like the thesis that was raised at the beginning of this research, i.e., the change in the american foreign policy by a more positive representation of germans in hollywood’s films. for instance, general erwin rommel is shown in a sympathizing way due to his attempt to murder hitler in july 1944. the genre of war films, which flourished in hollywood in the sixties, did not focus on the moral significance of the crimes of nazi germany and focused on heroism in the battlefield. this emphasis on heroism made vague the significance of war. the description of american soldiers arriving to a concentration camp is fulfilling one’s obligation. this issue comes up also in relation to the great escape and the battle of the bulge, which will be discussed later on. in the great escape, 1963, the image of the german in the first part of the film is innocent and ridiculous, it is easy to convince the germans with simple explanations and the german is embarrassed and tends to believe what he is told. for example, the american soldier tells him: “the baseball flew so i went to fetch it,” and they believe him. the prisoners’ attitude to their capturers is degrading, making fun of them. for instance, in the scene of the attempt escape, steven mcqueen who plays hits, he tries to check the dead area from the guards’ angle. after he is caught, he retrieves a cutter for cutting iron from his pocket and volunteers to “admit” that he had tried to escape. his behavior is cynical and sarcastic. the picture changes in the second half of the film, when it goes out of the camp and presents www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 55 published by scholink inc. another german, more sophisticated, more violent, and monstrous, who does not hesitate to act aggressively and pull the trigger. after the aircraft of the pilot handley falls down, and manages to escape, the soldiers shoot with no real reason and kill blithe the blind. the reality outside the camp shows the outside world in a most ugly and cruel way, including different political movements, like the french underground, and this reality penetrated eventually into the camp. we see the more aristocratic part of the german army as it is dismissed and punished by the monstrous part that have taken over. that is to say nazism versus being german. the difference between the professional soldiers and the ideological nazis is emphasized by the fact that even the camp commander fall in the hands of the nazis although he is part of the german army. the nazis execute without hesitation by a machine gun 50 prisoners. the game has gone out of control. the rules have been violated, or have never been valid for these soldiers. there are two main characters in the film: the german camp commander and the ss officer that represent two approaches to the nature of germans. the camp commander, general von luger, played by hans mesmer, represents the one who knows the rules of the game and is willing to abide by them. he is a pilot and an officer, and knows the rights of the prisoners, and the rules and the moral codes. he is the highest authority versus the heroes, the prisoners. his figure is shaped cautiously. on the one hand he keeps a tough expression, his body is very erect (like all the german soldiers), his speech is in staccato and confident, he has a high forehead, which testifies of wisdom and determination and his behavior is very formal. on the other hand, he believes that conflicts of interests can be settled through peaceful ways. the film the great escape (1963), presents the german soldiers and generals during wwii in as way that let us understand the german military mechanism. the film emphasized that the german army, in spite of its impeccable order, accuracy and determination is divided internally. the film is divided into two parts, not a one-dimensional evil and threatening enemy, but rather a mechanism that is split between the “good” and the “bad”. the first part is told from a light point of view, and does not present the enemy as a monster or beastly senseless people. the german is presented as tough, but sensitive at the same time, but sometimes ridiculous, and even with a sense of humor. in one of the opening scenes, when the german officer catches the two soldiers who disguise themselves as russian peasants, he calls them by their names, makes jokes with them and brings them back to their place. he is pleasant and smiling. the choice of the genre of entertaining adventure films enabled the director to pass the hidden message that one can see the german as a potential partner in spite of the war. furthermore, the potential german partner is presented as unsophisticated and not really threatening. it testifies about the debate of the german representation. it shows how difficult it was to convince the american public of the change of attitude toward germany and justifying their attitude towards germany, as it was the national interest to do it at that time. this is why the presentation is dual. there is a clear division between the german soldiers, the pilots and the air force people and the ss www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 56 published by scholink inc. and the gestapo. this fact is most significant in analyzing the image of the german as it is reflected in this film. 2. the cold war and the mechanization of the german image the brilliant film of the genius director stanley kubrick, dr. strangelove or how i learned to stop worrying and love the bomb (1964) describes in a fearful way the intolerable easiness in which a nuclear war can happen. the film combines an accurate realism (description of the battle scenes and the inside of the aircraft b-52) with a grotesque satire. the army wanted to censor the scene, but kubrick had constructed the aircraft according to a photograph in time magazine. the plot is about an american general who goes crazy and orders to attack the ussr. all the squadron of the strategic bombers is launched to its targets deep in russia. but the russians invented a doomsday mechanism that is operated automatically in case of a nuclear attack and destroys the whole world. the crisis gets worse when the president manages to cancel the attack but one aircraft does not receive the cancellation and continues to its target and to the end of the world. dr. strangelove, who is actually dr. macordic liebe (in german: strange love) is a german scientist who is employed in the pentagon. his figure is based on a number of ex-nazi experts, who had been recruited to the american defense system, like the engineer of the american space program, werner von brown, who was in charge of the v2 rocket program that intimidated london in the forties. he is a disabled person on a wheel chair and limited in his right hand. he suffers from non-volitional movements, like the nazi heil salute and addressing the president as mr. fuhrer, and he seems crazy in his movements and speech. the destruction of the world reminds dr. strangelove of the time he served adolf hitler, and his threats represent some kind of nazi craziness which derives enjoyment out of the idea of the end of the world. this respected doctor on a wheelchair with an iron arm gets excited to say words like: exterminate, slaughter, sex, and his artificial arm pops up with a distinctive heil hitler salute. the danger he represents is also in his influence on aggressive american generals. the film criticizes america of adopting the nazi militarism that might damage america and peace in the world. the film was a direct reaction to the bay of pigs crisis in cuba, when the world was on the verge of a nuclear catastrophe. the critics praised dr. strangelove together with severe claims. most of the critics regarded it as a brilliant, merciless treatment of the nuclear crisis. dr. strangelove is the dominant figure in the war room. he suggests a survival of few, ten women per man. the consultants love the idea. in the deep piers life and love would be more mechanical. dr. strangelove would certainly bring about more denial of human traits. this is a hint for germans and americans who become more similar to one another. dr. strangelove is very ironical. “peace is our profession,” he says. the criticism in this film could not be expressed when mccarthyism was in its prime. the spy who came in from the cold (1965) is a more significant expression of the change in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 57 published by scholink inc. hollywood. this is an espionage film based on a successful novel by john le carré. it brings a pessimistic, cynical point of view, which disregard all the ideologies of the cold war. the story transmits the clear message that in the cold war there are no enemies and friends, bad and good, but only bad and worse. the director martin ritt, who had been one of the people in hollywood’s black list at the beginning of the fifties, and was accused of sympathizing with the communists and he could not work in the us at the time, tries to get even with hollywood, as well as with the american policy during the cold war and its human price. there are two german figures which illuminate the view of the film and its hero: limas, the hero, is a british spy who is a plaything in the hands of intelligence factors on both sides of the iron curtain, and two german figures in the film, fiddler and mont. these two germans represent two archetypes within the ideological chaos: fiddler, the german jew, who is a human exception in the alienated atmosphere. mont is an ex-nazi, restrained, arrogant, who is eventually found out to be one of the worse characters. the film presents the german as nationless, who still carries the rooted stereotypes of wwii. they all wear masks and you can never know the real face of a person and whose side he is. the images of fiddler and mont are situated on the two ends of the archetypal german image. fiddler, a german jew, played by oskar werner is a typical casting of a jew: short, dark, gentle with good eyes, wearing a casquette and having an energetic body language. fiddler is the most human figure in the film after the hero. he is supposed to be a pawn in the hands of the british agency, and try to catch mont the horrible. but in the course of the film we learn that mont is on the british side, whereas fiddler, the communist, fights for his ideals. mont’s figure is played by peter van eyck, and he has a smaller volume than fiddler. he does not exceed the german-nazi stereotype. van eyck played nazis in many hollywood films, and was identified with such characters. he has arian nice face, tough cruel look, and a small mean smile from time to time. mont is the ultimate nazi – cold, keeps being clean at work, even in the trial against him he does not say a word, as if it has nothing to do with him, and his spokesman has to do the job. the film shows history in the present. the man who murdered jews in the holocaust remained a monster, but now he works for britain. the german jew is a positive figure with moral principles. ritt criticizes the west and its way of fighting the east, a way with no moral principles and not less cruel than the way of the enemies. the film leaves the spectator with deep distress and paranoia since in the world of espionage a person looses his human quality. (note 13) there is also a significant expression of getting loose of the horror of mccarthyism. the battle of the bulge (1965) presented complicated and ambivalent german figures. colonel hessler is the commander of the forces in the field and he leads a brigade of tanks. his priorities are the army, the uniform, his name and his honor. he is interested that the war would go on and on. when general kulas, his commander, sends him a girl to be with before the battle, after he has not been with a woman for a long time, he sends her away. hessler has a strong will to fight, although he knows from 1941 that germany would not be able to defeat the americans. hessler (robert shaw) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 58 published by scholink inc. is very high. he cries “victory!” as his tiger tanks attack and defeat the american forces in the ardennes forest in belgium in december 1944. “well, have we won the war?” asks enthusiastically the colonel’s assistant (hans christian blach). “no, we haven’t,” answers the colonel. “well, have we been defeated?” concludes the assistant. “no. we haven’t been defeated,” answers the colonel. the assistant admits that he, an uneducated person, cannot understand it. “it means victory, because the war will go on,” explains the colonel, “and the world won’t get rid of us.” “but what will be with my sons?” asks the assistant. “they’ll wear uniform and fight for their german country.” “they will die for their country,” he responds. “if necessary, they’ll die,” agrees the colonel. in this way one can define the essence of life of a german soldier. “you’re crazy and a criminal!” cries the assistant. hessler is a professional soldier. his ideology is to fight until death, but he is not a regular nazi. the dichotomy between the assistant and hessler exists also between hessler and his nazi commander, general ss kohler (werner peters). when hessler understands the assignment he has got, he goes for it just because as a soldier obedience overcomes his ideological position. this is a complicated image with positive aspects, while the main criticism about him is his blind obedience, also when his identification with the nazi ideology is not full. the ordinary germans, whom we are supposed to accept as potential allies are represented by konrad, colonel hessler’s personal driver. all konrad wants is to go back to his home and to his sons he longs to see. konrad understands that the germans have lost the war, and when he sees that his commander, hessler, is willing to go on fighting, he requests to go to another position. at the end of the film we see konrad throws his weapon and his military equipment and goes home smiling by foot to germany. that is, germany’s future is by choosing life, not nurturing warfare. germany has to throw militarism away, and if it does so, one can even like it, as insinuates konrad’s kind smile. the relationships among the germans are strictly military, but there is a comradeship, which can be seen in their warm relations of hessler and his personal aide konrad. the german soldiers seem like tools who are shifted from one place to another. this is an attempt to show how the nazi leadership exposed the guys who have been left, after most of the men were killed or wounded, as cannon fodder. there is no dialogue of any kind between the soldiers and their superiors. the connection between colonel hessler and general kulas, his commander, is also cold and military. the nazis seem clean all the time, their uniform are well kept and they aspire for absolute accuracy in times. when the germans catch a grop of prisoners they execute them in the field. the event is based on the execution of 150 americans. there is a definite difference between the ss and professional soldiers who would not have do so, and hessler expresses his protest before his commanders about this barbaric conduct. the film the quiller memorandum (1966) emphasizes that there still are german people and organizations in germany who believe in the way of life of hitler’s germany. these organizations and groups want to spread their belief in society by being active in various positions, and so influence the way of thinking of people until germany would return to be what it used to be. they are scattered all www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 59 published by scholink inc. over the country and the british secret service is aware of their activity except in berlin. the film tells the story of a neo-nazi organization. the members in berlin are intelligent and cruel people the british do not know about, and they, these berliners, kill the two british agents, metzler and johns. the agent quiller gets the assignment to find out where is the base of the organization in berlin. in the course of his search he meets inga, a teacher, and falls in love with her. quiller is caught, interrogated and released by the neo-nazi organization just to be a target for surveillance. later on quiller is caught again and arrives at the house of the organization with inga’s help. the western agents follow quiller and manage to catch all the organization’s members in the house. at the end it is found out that inga is also a member in the organization. the film deals with an attempt to revive the nazi period. october (max von sidov) is the head of the organization in berlin. the leader is wise, charismatic and cruel. the people around him obey his orders quickly and efficiently. he uses cruel investigation methods: injections and psychological work. “we want to know the location of your headquarters in berlin, your coding system and how much you know about us, as well as what kind of information your predecessor forwarded to the headquarters. what is your exact aim in berlin? you don’t have any other choice but to give us the information.” finally, october’s patience runs out, and he orders to give quiller more injections and even kill him after he would lose consciousness. quiller is sent to berlin to substitute the agent who had been killed. in an encounter in the giant stadium of west berlin (110,000 seats, where nazi germany hosted the olympic games in 1936) with paul (alec guinness), the contact person in berlin on behalf of the british intelligence, he warns quiller of the neo-nazis: “a lot of new blood, youngsters, who seriously believe, is very dangerous. one should not under estimate them, it is all quite complicated. it is hard to identify them; nobody wears a brown shirt, very difficult to identify them. they look exactly like any other german, dealing with various things, but they are cautious and very wise. now they look like everybody else. it is curious, don’t you think so? it is all politics. i tell you what is our task. our task is to get into the heart and find the extremists among them. the nazi-germans you will be able to identify if you can get close and look at them. their basis must be found, urgently.” (note 14) the quiller memorandum differs from other espionage films in two aspects: the first is that it is not an inter-bloc war, but a war between the regime, which is not defined beyond the fact that its interests are influenced by the western interference, and the neo-nazi elements in berlin, who try to take germany over. they even have a new fuhrer. the second is that the film is made with completely new methods. the two parties are exposed to the enemy. this is a psychological warfare, and there is the question whether every german is a nazi. the film was issued to the screens in november 1966 and received varied criticisms. in england it received good criticism. the london times defined it “most refreshing, a thriller in the best classic www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 60 published by scholink inc. tradition.” (note 15) in the us it got negative criticism. crowther called it in the new york times “a distorted and banal espionage film.” (note 16) pauline kael wrote in the new republican that “there is nothing reasonable,” whereas reed called it “an exercise in abstract thinking.” (note 17) newsweek’s critic was almost the only one who recommended it as a good espionage film. this criticism stemmed, probably, from the film’s criticism of the secret services during the cold war. the interests of the intelligence organizations are above all, even if it involves human lives. colonel stock of the kgb mocks the british secret service in order to kill kroizman, who stands in his way. the british secret service recruited an ex-nazi, and after he finished his task, he was executed. the film shows an encounter of a number of ideologies and political views: communism, fascism, dictatorship and democracy. the film stimulates thought about the nazi underground forces that operate in berlin, and the fact that the nazis are knowingly exploited by the secret services of the big powers. the film where eagles dare (1969) is a war action movie, in which two men go out to save another man from other nazi men. the two heroes are richard burton and young clint eastwood. this film was a box office great success, made according the novel by alistair maclean, the author of action books (navarone canons). the film was very expensive but very profitable. where eagles dare focuses on a daring action of rescue and a more daring escape. disguised as nazi officers, the commando people, major john smith and lieutenant morris shefer (clint eastwood) and other six courageous soldiers parachute beyond the enemy lines. their assignment is to save an american general who has been taken prisoner in an alpine mansion allegedly unpentratble. they receive help and encouragement from the covered agents mary and heidi. a british officer who had planned the operation is also in the background. somehow somebody in the allied forces would be discovered as a traitor. there is a shift in the plot manage to arrive to the american general, and then there is another shift. the amazing peak made the where eagles dare as one of the most admired films of clint eastwood. the script was written directly for the screen by the espionage writer, alistair maclean. in this thriller the soldiers of the allies penetrate into the mansion on a mountain in the bavarian alps in order to save an imprisoned general who knows the plans of the d-day. the film shows parachutes, shootings and explosions, splendid landscape and frozen hands trying to survive on the rocks. there is also the escape operations, in which the heroes evade gun fire in the corridors of the mansion, drive a bus in the mountains passes, and take off in an aircraft as they believe that everything is alright. but it is not. in short, where eagles dare is an admired film from beginning to end. it has an arousing soundtrack and a lively script, it was processed according to the novel by alistair maclean. the excellent performance of richard burton and clint eastwood certainly contributed to its success. there is an excellent performance of mishai hordern as the british deputy admiral roland, and dern nesbit as the nazi major von harfen, support the performance of burton and eastwood. but the real stars are the rhythm and the action, a dangerous ride in a cable car, catching people from the windows, and mingling with the enemy, as new danger appears www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 61 published by scholink inc. around every corner. the surprises run as they find out that not everyone is what he is supposed to be. in the meantime, the audience is in suspense as the music builds up the tension towards the surprising ending. patton (1970) geroge patton (george s. scott) receives the command in 1943 in north africa on the american forces there and put some discipline in them. he confronts the german fieldmarshal rommel (karl micahel polger). patton withdraws with the desert fox, using the tactics of the germans. he is promoted to a lieutenant general and is sent to sicily, where he enters a personal war with the british fieldmarshal montgomery (michael bates). his activity in italy is extra ordinary, and he endangers his future because of a single hurt of his ego. when he visits a military hospital, he meets a gi soldier (tim cosidin) who suffers from nervous fatigue. he gets angry of what he considers as negligence and slaps the poor soldier on his face and orders him to get well quickly. this case lead to the outcome that he loses the command, and later on, he misses d-day. patton leads the thirds american army through europe. patton remains a valuable source, but eventually he seems as a losing canon in comparison to the sophisticated tactics of his olds friend, omar bradly (carl malden). patton won seven oscars, including the best movie, and the best actor for scott, a prize he refused to receive. patton is considered as one of the greatest biographical epos that have ever been put on screen, and george s. scott in the leading role is sometimes considered as one of the greatest appearances in the history of the movie. scott and the film in general gained from an intelligent script written by francis copola and edmond h. north, a strange and lucky couple of styles of writing, which are seemingly not similar. after almost 45 minutes the film focuses just on a small part of patton’s career, starting from his north african journey until the end of the war. there were only a few compromises with history. for instance, patton wears the uniform of a four-stars general, a higher rank than he had, with the exciting speech to his forces at the beginning of the film. this scene was taken, almost word for word from a speech patton gave on june 4th, 1944. this is just one example of the reliability that gives the film its excellent texture. patton profits also from the extra ordinary technology, especially the cinematography by fred concamp and the role of the band of gerry goldsmidt. generally speaking, the film won seven oscars, including the best actor. 3. a thematic discussion and analysis of the various representations 3.1 a critical examination of the german representations in the films and their analysis 3.1.1 women’s representation as a metaphor of germany in most films the feminine representation is sophisticated and ambivalent, showing that women maintain a metaphoric relationship with germany, while men who have an affair with them symbolize america and its conquering forces. the power relations expressed in this way present the feminine advantages that germany has versus the disadvantages the decent american men have, mainly their innocence. german women are cunning and do not hesitate to use their sexuality in order to promote www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 62 published by scholink inc. themselves. they have three goals: a. survival and adjustment to the situation by exploiting the american soldiers, which symbolizes german opportunism and inability to trust this people. b. love to an american soldier, which symbolizes the post-war american-german alliance. c. loyalty to the nazi regime and a danger of the revival of this ideology, as can be seen in the ambivalence at the end of the film the quiller memorandum from 1966. in the film foreign affairs (1948) by billy wilder, marlene dietrich plays erika von schlotov, a singer in a night club with a nazi record. the officer john pringle brings to erika, with whom he has an affair, a mattress he purchased in the black market. as he drives in the destroyed streets, we hear the tune “isn’t it romantic?” that reflects the irony in front of the destruction around. berlin after the war is not the right place to nurture romantic illusions as erika sings later in the night club. erika (note 18), who personifies the german people, looks for a supporter. she would turn to the one who would support her better. that is, she gives in to the higher bidder, and it if is the ussr, so be it. when pringle investigates erika about her past, she evades him. “women adopt everything that is fashionable,” she says, and pringle teases her” yes, once it is a hat, another time it is a swastika, and now it is the colors of red, white, blue, and then maybe the hammer and the sickle?” pringle insinuates allegorically to the american fear of germany which might betray it. the german cunning is represented in erika’s complicated image with her skill of survival. she is cynical and not romantic any more. she used to be the mistress of a senior nazi, was in the environment of hitler, suffered from the war, but her determination and seducing sexuality secured her survival during the conquest. this history is described in the songs: “the destructions of berlin,” which refers to the ghosts of the past, “all your sufferings,” which refers to the shortage after the war, and “your sweet tomorrow.” these words expressed a hope and even a prophecy of the possible recovery that have occurred indeed with the economic boom in germany in the fifties. in the film the devil makes three from 1952 the feminine representation in the figure of willy expresses the theme of the german that would betray and exploit the west if the nazis come to power again. german femininity maintains a cover of fog in the films of the sixties as well. inga, a school teacher in the film the quiller memorandum (1966), is feminine, pretty and smart. she speaks quietly and she helps quiller find the people who would help him, and so a romantic relation is generated between them. but eventually it is found out that she may belong to the organization too, which remains unsold to the end. a number of questions remain in the air at the end of the film. although october keeps holding inga as a hostage, she is released finally and the underground is caught. so does the teacher help these neo-nazis and does she continue in their way. the ambivalence in the answer to this question is the allegory that inga represents for germany as a whole. that is to say that germany’s loyalty and its potential to return to its dark past still exists under the surface, although it is controlled by american or british virility. one can say that hollywood align itself to a certain extent to the dictates of the american policy toward germany, but at the same time it cannot leave germany’s nazi www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 63 published by scholink inc. past undealt with. 3.1.2 representation of nazis or people who believe in the nazi ideology in the time of the cold war the nazis are represented in two ways, one comic and the other threatening. in the film foreign affairs (1948) by billy wilder there is an interesting representation of nazis and followers of the past regime. captain pringle sits in his office which deals with de-nazification. father and son come to him. the father has a small moustache (like that of hitler) and he wants to apologize for his son who drew swastikas with a chalk on walls. the father suggests punishing the child severely, while he stamps obediently with his heels. pringle tells him jokingly that he may put his son in a gas chamber. as herr mayer says he would obey, pringle explains to him that they, the americans, cancelled the gas chambers, and they can go home. herr mayer stamps with his feet, and when pringle says people do not do it any more, he bows and turns around, and we see a swastika on his back. like in the story of the where the child shouts that the king is naked, here too the child exposes the real spirit of the germans who have not yet left nazism. in the film berlin express (1948), the nazi underground believes that a state of war is the ideal state for germany. as far as they are concerned, every means is possible to achieve this goal. they use german citizens to get information and then kill them. for the same goal the underground members even kill each other. there is no sense of solidarity. all the scenes of the underground are conducted in full darkness, and the faces of the members are vague and everything is seen dark and gloomy. the underground is located in callers under the city of frankfurt, a symbol that nazism still lies in ambush in the dark and waits for the right time. in stalag 17 the nazis are presented as caricatures. colonel von scherbach tells jokes about the author of white christmas and how he stole the name from the german capital. he even puts on his boots when he speaks on the phone with his superiors so that his stamp with his heels will be heard in berlin. the film presents nazism as an extreme absurdity. the cultural contempt is strengthened in the characterization of the fanatic guard (zig roman), johan sebastian schultz (roman played erhardt concentration camp in lubitsch’s film from 1942 to be or not to be). as a matter of fact, schultz is the only nazi who shows some kind of compassion toward the prisoners, but the americans take advantage of this weakness. the prisoners call him schwinhund—a pig son of a bitch, which is very dissociable. price (peter graves) the security officer of the barracks, the chosen leader of the escape committee is to be found as the real traitor, as he acts from a real commitment to nazism. price used the queen of the chess game as a letter box and the cable of the electric bulb in order to pass messages to the nazis. price was a nazi, whose name was probably preissiger or preishopper. he lived in cleveland in the us, but when the war burst out, he returned to his homeland as a good nazi. he spoke english and therefore has become a spy. he was the informer of barracks 4. the first film that confronted directly the cold war is the satire one, two, three by billy wilder (1961). there is a german who tries very hard to erase his former identity as a nazi. but there is one www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 64 published by scholink inc. common characteristic to all the images, both western and eastern germans, and this is their inability to erase their nazi character, the nazi essence that presents loyalty and a blind devotion to the ideal, tough discipline and obsessive rationalism, and longing to the heroic past of germany, which reverberate in each of the german figures. there are three figures of ex-nazis and western germans: fritz leipin (karl lieffen), the driver of mr. mcnamara (james cagney), schlemmer (hans lothar), the main assistant of mr. mcnamara, and fraulein ingeburg (liselotte pulver), mr. mcnamara’s personal secretary. all three have extrovert stereotypical characteristics which make them grotesque caricatures. each one them would do anything to erase his/her identity, from hating everyone who is not western and does not want to be a western, through flattery to the boss up to a point of absurd, and total denial of the past. there are also sub-characters, representing sub-groups, like the workers of coca cola, the west german policemen, and the west german journalist, who strengthen the impression that there is a general moral corruption in west germany in all walks of life. schlemer is the west german figure through which we understand the process of erasing past identity in order to integrate in the new free capitalist society. he would do anything to be considered western-american even if it involves going through a metamorphosis in his personality. he starts by trying to run away from his past as a soldier in the nazi army, and erases any memory that has to do with his past. we see in the film that there is a conspiracy of sequence among all germans regarding their past and involvement in the war. for instance, in the first scene when we meet schlemer, mcnamara loses his patience about his stampings and says: mcnamara: this is from the gestapo time, ha? schlemer: please sir, it is not true. mcnamara: between us, schlemer, what have you done in the war? schlemer: i was in the underground. mcnamara: in the underground? schlemer: no, a mechanic in the underground train. mcnamara: and did you object to the nazis and didn’t love adolf? schlemer: which adolf? where i was i didn’t know anything, they didn’t tell me. this example represents the subterranean flow that went on in germany. but this distorted and caricaturist nazism is presented as not threatening and not dangerous. in the film the great escape from 1963, the presentation of the nazis in the film is greater than that of the ordinary germans. the nazi german is more sophisticated. unlike the ordinary soldiers in the camp, the nazis are more cunning, suspicious and tacticians. when two of the prisoners pretend to be frenchmen, the nazi soldier checks their passes and says “good luck” in english, and the pretender answers in an american accent, and so his identity is discovered. the nazis wear black coats and drive luxury black vehicles. they are hedonists, like the mafia gangsters. in the scene in the café, the nazis sit there confidently and order wine. they are amused. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 65 published by scholink inc. until that point we haven’t seen soldiers out of duty, which shows the gap between the fighters in the front and the soldiers in the hinterland. the figure of the ss officer, mr. cohn, played by hans reisser, is complicated and mysterious. he does not introduce himself, or welcomes the camp commander. he sits on a chair without being invited to do so and waits until the presentation is completed before he speaks. he does not wear uniform but a long leather coat. we get to know his name from von luger addressing his secretary. mr. kohn, the ss man threatens the camp commander, von luger and emphasizes the human aspect of von luger. he does not join the threats on the prisoner bartlet and indicates that bartlet’s sentence is not under the ss men authority. mr. kohn emphasized the change in attitude and calls von luger’s attitude to the prisoners as understanding, unlike his own attitude. mr. kohn belongs to the people who work in the “field”, as he works among civilians. therefore his work is accurate and he remembers his “targets” personally. he and bartlet have a fatal fight in the rail station, in this scene bartlet noticed kohn first due to his black coat. this black coat can be seen as a declaration of the arrogance of the ss men that brought them down at the end of the war. bartlet’s quick response determined the result of the fight, and mr. kohn dies in it. tony barta (note 19) argues that the movie loved to hate the nazis, mocking them in a variety of images. the nazi figures are violent, wearing black, and show a despising attitude toward human lives. they are presented with their fast walk, stamping their heels, and their arrogant appearance, which makes the nazi representation caricaturist. the film dr. strangelove by stanly kubrick from 1964 describes dr. strangelove, manager of the r&d of the atomic weapon in the us. he is not interested in preventing the doomsday that he helps to come about, on the contrary. he sits relaxed in his wheelchair and his artificial arm and is not able to love anything except for fatal technological instruments. the human failure that dr. strangelove represents leads to the technological doomsday. there is not good nazi and bad nazi, they are all bad. in the scene where dr. strangelove explains the president of the us how the doomsday machine of the russians works, the president asks: can’t it be dismantled? and strangelove answers: this is the way it was made, and it was made this way only to deter, to frighten, and as such it is easy to understand and convincing.” it explains part of the berman/nazi nature, everything is simple, even extermination. dr. strangelove understands the meaning of the technological catastrophe. he thinks that only those who will be in deep mines in the us would survive. the computers will decide who of the americans would survive so that the president would not have to make this decision. strangelove tells him that the senior people in the army and the administration have to be among the chosen ones. so strangelove represents the self-destruction and de-humanization that nazism represents. the film the quiller memorandum deals with a number of important issues: who are the neo-nazis nowadays? how do they achieve their goals? what are their goals? the nazis nowadays do not wear brown shirts, of something like that,” explains paul (alec guinness), the head of the british secret service in berlin, to his agent quiller (george segal). neo-nazism lives and kicking under the surface and this threat seems more interesting to the west than dealing with the conflict with the soviets, and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 66 published by scholink inc. the film tries to answer these questions. 3.1.3 representation of non-nazi germans—professional soldiers, officials and other germans, a representation of social classes in the cold war these representations change in the course of time. at the beginning the representation of ordinary germans tends to acquit them of the crimes of the former regime and make them allies of the west, but usually with their negative representations. during mccarthy’s period the ordinary germans were shown in a positive light, trying to make them clean of past crimes. this trend went on later and repeated itself in war films, like the battle of the bulge. at the end of the fifties, and during the sixties, the criticism of ordinary germans returned in films like judgment at nuremberg by stanley kramer from 1961. in the film the young lions from 1958, the story starts on christmas eve of 1938 in bavaria, germany. the attendants, including christian, express support of all germans in hitler, which bothers margaret, the american ski student of the blond german. they start a debate between christian and margaret about the nature of the nazis and their meaning: christian: do you think that being a nazi is such an awful thing? margaret: christian, are you a nazi? christian: no, i’m not a political person, but i think they symbolize a promise for germany. margaret: you don’t believe in it? christian: yes, i do. margaret: why? why? how can you justify hitler? christian: i think that hitler will bring us better life. margaret: is your life so bad now? christian: no, it is not bad, but i don’t want to spend the rest of my life wearing nice sweaters and teaching children how to ski and be nice. their dialogue expresses the attitude of the americans in this time of reconciliation to toward the germans. this is some kind of pardon for the german people as christian’s explanation sounds reasonable, and he is an admired movie star who calls for sympathy to his image, which makes this representation more problematic. the two representations of germans, christian versus the nazi hardenburg, emphasize the nazi representation: hardenburg: “the german army is unbeaten because it obeys orders, every order, even if it is disgusting. there is no room for sentiments, moralists and individualists. if you don’t understand it, your future is not in the army. if you resist, maybe you will not have any future.” later on christian arrives to his surprise to a concentration camp and meets a war criminal who complains of his hard work: it is not easy to run a concentration camp. i had to manage all the gas chambers, the shooting ranges, the physicians and their experiments. i had to exterminate 1500 people a day. jews, poles, russians, frenchmen, political prisoners, and i had only 260 people at my disposal. and all the same, i did my job, and then there were memoranda from berlin, saying that “in auschwitz they exterminate www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 67 published by scholink inc. 20 thousand people a day.” here it comes from berlin again, the fourth time today. i was left with 10 people. how can i exterminate all the people who were left in the camp? the equipment doesn’t work, i don’t care what they did in buchenwald, i alone here! berlin wants me to exterminate everyone who was left in the camp before the americans arrive. there are 6000 men, women, and children. this man who asked me to do it strolls in the streets. the americans and the russians will come to him, and he would tell them: “i have never heard of concentration camps,” “there was never a policy of exterminating 12 million people.” “this is an invention of the ss, but no one in the government has heard about it.” and i’ll be here, trying to explain to the americans. they might not understand what they’ll see here. maybe a german officer obeys orders. the courage to stand in front of the enemy and honor and say: “i fulfilled my duty to my homeland.” (note 20) the speech of the camp commander is a paraphrase of himmler’s posen speech. this is another component of the problematic representation, since the speech creates an impossible division between christian and the crimes of the regime. there is a feeling that the film makes a demagogic use of these crimes. killing christian, who is full of guilt feelings, becomes a kind of atonement for the germans. one may feel this was what one had to do, that is, yes, there were crimes, but most of the germans were not involved in them. we are left with the message that the germans were the victims of the nazis because, among other things they were ignorant and did not know about these crimes. today it seems an absurdity. it is known today and was known then that the majority of the germans were aware of the crimes of the regime, and certainly the wehrmacht soldiers that part of them participated actively in these crimes. in the last scene in judgment at nuremberg, 1961, judge howard (spencer tracy) criticizes the minister of justice of nazi germany, ernst janing (burt lancaster). the scene begins as howard enters janing’s cell. janing tries to start a conversation, but howard remains loyal to the goal of the visit, which was requested by janing through his advocate, rolf. janing expresses his appreciation to the judge of the way in which he conducted the trial, and asks him to keep for him the records of all the trials he conducted as a judge. a moment before the visit ends, janing tries to address howard in an intimate tone. he asks him to believe him that he did not know of the “things” that happened (the atrocities and the extermination). this was not what we wanted, he says. howard answers him, and this is also the bottom line of the film: “it came to this the moment you sentenced death to an innocent person.” then he turns to go out of the cell and does not give janing a private moral acquittal, he had asked for. in this case the ordinary germans are convicted, which is contrary to their representation in hollywood. this case emphasizes the problematic nature of the limitations hollywood put upon itself due to the needs of the administration, needs that have been answered during the fifties and the early sixties, which released hollywood from the threatening grip of mccarthyism. the film the longest day (1962) describes the german and the allies perspective on the d-day, the invasion to normandy on 6.6.1944. the german soldiers seem neat in their uniform and conduct. they www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 68 published by scholink inc. do not believe that the allies will attack although they catch a coded message that the invasion is going to be carried out. the german generals and other high officers shift between loyalty to hitler and hatred towards him, and the basic feeling of fear of him. even when the fuhrer’s opinion is needed, they do not call him because he has taken a sleeping pill and he rests at the moment. the germans seem quite complacent and with self-confidence. rommel, the general commander, receives the announcement about the invasion at home, as he went home to celebrate his wife’s birthday. the relationships amongst the germans are cold with no emotional expressions, and their speech is sharp, clear cut and violent. in the great escape, 1963, the image of the german in the first part of the film is innocent and ridiculous, it is easy to convince the germans with simple explanations and the german is embarrassed and tends to believe what he is told. for example, the american soldier tells him: “the baseball flew so i went to fetch it,” and they believe him. the prisoners’ attitude to their capturers is degrading, making fun of them. for instance, in the scene of the attempt escape, steven mcqueen who plays hits, he tries to check the dead area from the guards’ angle. after he is caught, he retrieves a cutter for cutting iron from his pocket and volunteers to “admit” that he had tried to escape. his behavior is cynical and sarcastic. the picture changes in the second half of the film, when it goes out of the camp and presents another german, more sophisticated, more violent, and monstrous, who does not hesitate to act aggressively and pull the trigger. after the aircraft of the pilot handley falls down, and manages to escape, the soldiers shoot with no real reason and kill blithe the blind. the reality outside the camp shows the outside world in a most ugly and cruel way, including different political movements, like the french underground, and this reality penetrated eventually into the camp. we see the more aristocratic part of the german army as it is dismissed and punished by the monstrous part that have taken over. that is to say nazism versus being german. the difference between the professional soldiers and the ideological nazis is emphasized by the fact that even the camp commander fall in the hands of the nazis although he is part of the german army. the nazis execute without hesitation by a machine gun 50 prisoners. the game has gone out of control. the rules have been violated, or have never been valid for these soldiers. there are two main characters in the film: the german camp commander and the ss officer that represent two approaches to the nature of germans. the camp commander, general von luger, played by hans mesmer, represents the one who knows the rules of the game and is willing to abide by them. he is a pilot and an officer, and knows the rights of the prisoners, and the rules and the moral codes. he is the highest authority versus the heroes, the prisoners. his figure is shaped cautiously. on the one hand he keeps a tough expression, his body is very erect (like all the german soldiers), his speech is in staccato and confident, he has a high forehead, which testifies of wisdom and determination and his behavior is very formal. on the other hand, he believes that conflicts of interests can be settled through peaceful ways. the battle of the bulge (1965) presented complicated and ambivalent german figures. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 69 published by scholink inc. colonel hessler is the commander of the forces in the field and he leads a brigade of tanks. his priorities are the army, the uniform, his name and his honor. he is interested that the war would go on and on. when general kulas, his commander, sends him a girl to be with before the battle, after he has not been with a woman for a long time, he sends her away. hessler has a strong will to fight, although he knows from 1941 that germany would not be able to defeat the americans. hessler (robert shaw) is very high. he cries “victory!” as his tiger tanks attack and defeat the american forces in the ardennes forest in belgium in december 1944. “well, have we won the war?” asks enthusiastically the colonel’s assistant (hans christian blach). “no, we haven’t,” answers the colonel. “well, have we been defeated?” concludes the assistant. “no. we haven’t been defeated,” answers the colonel. the assistant admits that he, an uneducated person, cannot understand it. “it means victory, because the war will go on,” explains the colonel, “and the world won’t get rid of us.” “but what will be with my sons?” asks the assistant. “they’ll wear uniform and fight for their german country.” “they will die for their country,” he responds. “if necessary, they’ll die,” agrees the colonel. in this way one can define the essence of life of a german soldier. “you’re crazy and a criminal!” cries the assistant. hessler is a professional soldier. his ideology is to fight until death, but he is not a regular nazi. the dichotomy between the assistant and hessler exists also between hessler and his nazi commander, general ss kohler (werner peters). when hessler understands the assignment he has got, he goes for it just because as a soldier obedience overcomes his ideological position. this is a complicated image with positive aspects, while the main criticism about him is his blind obedience, also when his identification with the nazi ideology is not full. the ordinary germans, whom we are supposed to accept as potential allies are represented by konrad, colonel hessler’s personal driver. all konrad wants is to go back to his home and to his sons he longs to see. konrad understands that the germans have lost the war, and when he sees that his commander, hessler, is willing to go on fighting, he requests to go to another position. at the end of the film we see konrad throws his weapon and his military equipment and goes home smiling by foot to germany. that is, germany’s future is by choosing life, not nurturing warfare. germany has to throw militarism away, and if it does so, one can even like it, as insinuates konrad’s kind smile. 4. conclusions in this article i have discussed the way in which the american policy was expressed in the films under discussion. during these years there have been changes in the american policy towards germany, changes that included a shift from a tough policy that called for punishing the germans in order to prevent them from developing a military force and a future threat, to a policy that called to rehabilitate germany as part of coping with the soviet threat. these changes were expressed in the films i dealt with from various points of view. for example the films foreign affairs, airlift, the devil makes three and fraulein refer to the issue of foreign policy at the time by using an allegory: foreign affairs appear as relations between american www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 70 published by scholink inc. soldiers and german girls, and by expressing the political drama through a romantic melodrama or a comedy. the most outstanding element is presenting germany in the image of the treacherous woman. germany is not presented as extremely negative or extremely positive. de-nazification is not expressed explicitly, but there are positive german figures, mainly in desert fox, fraulein, and others, alongside a negative representation of nazi figures. these representations provided the ground for the new approach which claimed that the germans stopped being the enemy and have become allies against the common enemy—the soviets. this new position made the german worthy of living in freedom in a democratic country. regarding the foreign policy, it is shown in the films in different ways: foreign affairs clarified the position of the isolationists; airlift tended to calculated intervention, but remained stuck between the two approaches and did not provide a sophisticated reason for the need to intervene. (the soviets in the film have a marginal presence, like in other films, express berlin, foreign affairs, one, two, three and others. they are shown as cumbersome in the political power game. the films do not go into the familiar demonization of the soviets, and do not say that a future democratic regime is a sufficient reason for an american intervention in the world. from the perspective of our time the film was maybe too optimistic, and definitely more naïve than later films, which dealt with the cold war from an ideological point of view. this film does not fall into line with the mccarthy period and the witch hunt of the fifties). fraulein represents the position of the supporters of intervention and shows explicitly the perfect intervention in the time of the cold war. in this period we see that many films which were produced in the fifties and the sixties in hollywood reflect the struggle between rehabilitating germany of all guilt, out of political needs and the formal policy of the us in the cold war on the one hand, and trends which have been preserved or aroused again in hollywood, which refused to purge germany and the germans from guilt. in a historical perspective, the films of this period were a severe accusation against the german elite. the films which have been produced in the fifties and the sixties questioned germany’s withdrawal from its past, as the nazi past comes up time and again as a bothering reminder, like the films one, two, three and dr. strangelove and others films. hence one may say that there was an objection inside hollywood’s studios to the drastic change in the german representation up to a real purification. the films raise the question whether all the german people is guilty, or just part of it, and whether one has to differentiate between the nazi leadership and the people. as we have seen, this issue provided the content for many films in the fifties and the sixties, and the answer to the above question confirms the main argument of the present research: in spite of certain changes in the representation of germany and the germans in the cold war, generally speaking, there was no real change from the representation before the cold war time. in addition, the films confirms another claim of this research: although in certain times hollywood was recruited to serve the american policy towards germany, it cannot be regarded as an extension of the administration, nor a recruited institution. as a matter of fact, in many aspects, hollywood raised a voice against the american policy toward germany, and more than once it www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 71 published by scholink inc. even expressed open and hidden criticism of this policy. when trying to examine the question of representation in the period under discussion, we were three trends: 1) representations of german women as a metaphor for germany. 2) dividing the germans into two groups: nazis and other germans. the first group is represented negatively and the second is usually represented positively. 3) a tendency of ambivalence and complexity in the equivocal meaning of the representation, a tendency that increases in the late fifties and gets more extreme in the sixties. as a whole, we can learn about the interaction between hollywood and the administration from the question of the german representation. one can say that this period, 1947-1970, was divided into three sub-periods: a. between 1946-1952 hollywood was relatively free to describe the situation and criticize it and even the american administration. b. between 1953-1958, the height of the mccarthyist persecution, hollywood was very modest and adjusted itself to the winds that came from the administration. in this period many films are done as if according to order. c. between 1958-1970 the grip of mccarthyist persecution is loosened and the american interests in europe stabilize and hollywood has a more pluralistic atmosphere. as the debate about the question of intervention has ended, and the german problem was solved, germany’s weight decreased. when the korean war burst out, the political-cultural attention was directed to other parts of the world, and the drama of formulating the foreign policy adjusted itself to other historical and regional circumstances. anyway, germany was in the focus of the ideological-political interest for a period of time, and by describing life under the occupation, hollywood usually expressed the prevailing opinion in the american public. this stand was generally similar to the stand of the administration, but when there was a contradiction, the relation between hollywood and the administration was complicated and ambivalent. we have seen this in a number of films, as well as among a number of auteurs who criticized harshly the administration. auteurs like billy wilder and stanley kubrick, and stanley kramer. in hollywood there are different people and different 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(october, 1988). historiography and historiophoty. american historical review, 93(4-5). 1193-1199. https://doi.org/10.2307/1873534 notes note 1. phd in international relations and european studies, from faculty of history and philosophy, babes– bolyai cluj-napoca university; w9905998@bezeqint.net. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 75 published by scholink inc. note 2. louis j. halle, (new york, 1967).the cold war as history, p. 170. note 3. kennedy's speech in berlin: www.whitehouse.gov/history/ presidents/jk35.html note 4. siegfried, mews, (1996). “the spies are coming in from the cold war: the berlin wall in the espionage novel”, the berlin wall: representations and perspectives, eds.ernst schürer, manfred keune and philip jenkins, (peter-lang, new york,): 50-51. note 5. ibidem, p. 53. note 6. ibidem, pp. 62-63. note 7. daniel, leab j. (1988). “the iron curtain” (1948): hollywood's first cold war movie”, historical journal of film, radio and television. , vol, viii nr. 2. pp.153-188.,p. 155. note 8. nitza, ariel, (2004).” presentation of nazism and the holocaust in western movies: a discussion in three film narratives”, cinema and memory – dangerous relationships? zalman shazar center of the history of israel, jerusalem, pp. 316-293.296-298. note 9. shlomo, zand (2002). the movie as history: imagine and direct the twentieth century ofakim library, the open university, am oved publication, tel aviv: p.209-210. note 10. stephen e. ambrose (1996). “'the longest day' (u.s., 1962):' blockbuster' history”, world war ii, film and history, eds. john whiteclay chambers ii, and david culbert, (new york, oxford: oxford university press,): p. 97. note 11. ibidem, p. 97. note 12. ibidem, p. 98. note 13. leonard rubenstein, (1979). the great spy films, (secaucus, n.j.), pp. 31-68. note 14. ibidem, in the film. note 15. anez nicholas, (1992).”the quiller memorandum”, films in review, vol. 43, and nr. 7/8, (jul / aug), pp.237-245. note 16. ibidem, p. 238. note 17. ibidem., ibidem. note 18. at the beginning dietrich objected to this offer, as she was afraid that her anti-nazi image might be damaged by showing the enemy as glamorous through her performance. in: harris, p. 294. notw 19. tony barta, (london, 1998). “film nazis: the great escape “, screening the past: film and the representation of history, ed. tony barta, pp. 127-148. note 20. ibidem, from the speech in the film. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 98 original article a few words about the market sinisa franjic 1* 1 independent researcher * sinisa franjic, e-mail: sinisa.franjic@gmail.com received: april 9, 2023 accepted: may 8, 2023 online published: may 17, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n2p98 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n2p98 abstract the market is a place where supply and demand meet. buying and selling can be done without the presence of goods (on stock exchanges and other markets), and even without direct contact between buyers and sellers. buying and selling can be done according to the catalog, by phone, fax, internet, etc. therefore, the market is defined as a constant and organized form of bringing supply into contact with the demand for goods and services. at the same time, the market is a mechanism that regulates the relations between sellers and buyers in the conditions in which the participants in the exchange or sale achieve their goals and interests due to which they enter into mutual relations. keywords market, tariffs, competition, efficiency, law 1. introduction ours is a market system. this ability so economic activity takes location via the alternate about commodities. individual possessors about piece goods join between the market vicinity or unhesitatingly put to in negotiations according to determine the phrases over which she are inclined after alternate those commodities. contract system may additionally lie seen as the mechanism because of facilitating, regulating or imposing such market activities. it is ordinary because of textbooks after remove how every our every day transactions, beside buying a document then riding on a bus in imitation of our employment, are entire examples over contracts, however the factor is however valid or nicely made. we are whole gamers of the contract game, even salvo we functionate not understand it. in fact, we probably pleasure no longer hold anybody necessity according to recognize up to expectation precise contractual model concerning fact till we join within incomplete traffic that goes wrong, then at least does not walk as like we hoped it would. then, we ask after assert rights yet after appear because treatments towards the character including whom we bear occur between dispute. it is at that era to that amount the analytical framework on arrangement rule www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 99 published by scholink inc. ideas comes in accordance with bear over the situation, in imitation of determine what, salvo any, rights may remain enforced then what, postulate any, remedies may stay recovered. it is possibly paradoxical so much students of provision regulation hold according to approach their lesson about the challenge beyond the opposite quit from that at which the layperson begins. the layperson wants a remedy and focuses of up to expectation over every else; the student, yet practitioner, realises as the appearance of the treatment relies upon upstairs organising contractual duty and, hence, theirs center of attention is regarding the institution regarding the contractual kinship and the infringement over that relationship, before anybody query concerning remedies may be considered. such is the habit and affinity concerning dictation yet ordinary, daily reality. although people hold always exchanged goods, market transactions solely got here after remain the authoritative shape on pecuniary activity in the course of the 19th century, too in the uk. the general system about provision namely such at last operates is essentially the production concerning the common provision and risen between the course of the nineteenth century. it has been advised as the normal standards over provision law, or the ‘classical model on contract’, namely that are known, are themselves based regarding an idealised model of how much the want operates. 1.1 tariffs the danger about a cess wish run into of the home customer about the goods, except according to the extent as the elasticities about require and demand power on the importing country reason the overseas producer after endure some over the expenses of the tariff. tariffs commonly help duelling home producers, by using reducing cost opposition beyond imports yet consequently permitting to them in accordance with raise theirs expenditures then extend their sales. consumers whichever stay in the market choice deliver more because the fit-out than they otherwise would, then some consumers will stand priced oversea regarding the want (often referred to as a dead-weight communal cost). consumers between importing countries muff greater than producers of it countries achieve (by continence about that dead-weight neighborly cost), thus reducing domestic welfare. adverse impacts regarding overseas exporters regarding it stuff also perform the pike globally welfare-reducing. importantly, including the rising complexity regarding provide chains, tariffs of raw materials, intermediate products, then headquarters equipment put greater prices of manufacturers of merchandise so much incorporate these inputs, rendering them much less competitive both domestically and internationally. the benefit consequences regarding a impost need in conformity with remain considered kin according to vile protectionist instruments – between particular, quantitative restrictions or subsidies. in the lawsuit over quantitative restrictions, relying regarding how yet to to which income quotas are allocated, domestic recipients on it quotas may additionally recognize scarcity rents from the quotas, and proviso the quotas are allocated in accordance with foreign exporters the recent are in all likelihood after comprehend scarcity rents from the quotas. however, it advantages are surprisingly unlikely according to offset the poor impacts about home shoppers out of higher fees or beside animal priced www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 100 published by scholink inc. oversea about the market, or may additionally enhance to them supporter in accordance with a non-prohibitive pike that allows greater efficient overseas exporters in accordance with bridge the tariff. quantitative restrictions are banned beneath article xi over the gatt (general agreement on tariffs and trade), along severa exceptions as should stand utilized over a non-discriminatory basis under article xiii. with honour to domestic manufacturing subsidies up to expectation arrange domestically evolved merchandise artificially aggressive including lower-priced imports, buyers intention now not surface distorted expenditures supporter in accordance with the prevailing world virtue because of the product, however the subsidies wish attract excessive assets between the domestic industry. in addition, domestic subsidies, by way of supporting price reductions by way of home industry, will minimize the virtue about cess reduction according to foreign career partners. both tariffs then quantitative restrictions distort consumption or production choices into importing countries. the quick increasing globalization of markets as has characterised the closing decennary about the twenty century and the advance decennary of the twenty-first century has born after an growing activity both among facilitating international trade and in merchandising the convergence about competition regulation regimes into trading countries. this has carried according to reflections about such as the competition rule regimes need to converge on. although it altercate has been mostly focused over the substance over the competition analysis, such has also touched over institutional issues. for example, at that place has been a active argue regarding the respect of ensuring that opposition authorities at some point of the ball are into a function to look at promptly transnational merger transactions as read underneath theirs domestic merger power system or therefore on the respect over the adequate funding of competition authorities. similarly, the query on the solitude about opposition authorities has been developed as like partial on the important exporters yet overseas traders feared so much he would stand dealt with unfavourably by using opposition corporations among half nations into as such companies seemed in conformity with stay structured on the national regimen then countrywide dominant firms. 1.2 e-market the electronic market (hereinafter e-market) is exclusive into its potent have an impact on or cross-border enlargement because on its superior technological functions. through net technological know-how and electronic potential on communication, traders enjoy tremendous benefits along with speed, convenience, lower funding cost, then boundary-free demand access. consumers also advantage out of more choices offered, increased information, or the benefit on purchasing merchandise and applications out of dealers positioned at a substantial association yet at someone time. taking a closer look, the e-market has a sizeable main position in imitation of lead among this modern global economic system via its transformative consequences that allow stuff yet capabilities in conformity with stay flown in imitation of markets as upon according to at last bear largely been omitted because on geographic barriers. the e-market additionally has a precise position in imitation of circulate within improving competition yet conversation then affords want get right of entry to in imitation of groups then buyers on a international scale. however, deep empiric studies show so much the championship www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 101 published by scholink inc. over consumers poverty self assurance in conformity with utilize the e-market, specially including observance in accordance with pass border purchases. given the significant gain about the e-market after the economy, client safety measures are indispensable according to enhance client confidence, civilize the growth about world business exchanges, then enable e-commerce after grow in conformity with its completed potential. the e-market presents traders yet buyers into b2c transactions tremendous benefits upon usual forms on commerce. these benefits encompass larger velocity then convenience, or decrease traffic costs. consumers have been passed husky gadgets because exploring information, products, and applications online. they may clearly speak or agree including traders about the whole thing via the net or vile varieties on laptop networks barring someone ethnic negotiation and interaction. the construction about a settlement is without a doubt concluded thru electronic conversation such as e-mail exchanges then through clicking the button via lively websites, together with price born with the aid of digital middling or sordid comparable arrangements. consumers certainly click on although an running website and the sales composition is legally concluded. the nearly everyday b2c e-sales are the purchases of goods then applications inclusive of a vast range of books, cds, clothing, software, airline tickets, and inn bookings. payment out of the consumers is made online, however the seller’s transport about effect or features takes area another among the actual world. for the motive regarding it research, the phrases “e-commerce”, “online” or “internet” sales refer in accordance with the identical characteristics as b2c e-transactions the place shoppers sincerely kilter lading yet functions with the aid of lively websites yet other types over pc networks in accordance in conformity with as the attribute responsibilities over contractual performance, namely, the fee yet delivery, choice smoke place. 1.3 financial markets the last purpose of markets is the production and alternate regarding lading yet purposes. for any need in conformity with succeed, there necessity after lie sectors, as provide purposes vital for the superb functioning on the market. there ought to remain producers, consumers, merchants then somebody variety over vile actors pleasing the roles critical in accordance with have a bright and healthful market. corporations and sectors regarding the economy do only live on in the lengthy run proviso that grant a good yet work so much is needed. for example, we no longer want firemen concerning backside along diesel engines. not the entirety desires according to stand sustained. things that fulfill no reason expire out. the wants regarding society determine the purposes about pecuniary markets. people necessity capital, loans, and money together with who in imitation of buy necessary items. to accomplish it reasons society has invented banks, insurance plan companies, inventory markets and someone quantity on ignoble agents, as much nicely as financial contraptions up to expectation are flourished and bought by way of a range of actors in the financial markets. when the a number sectors concerning the financial markets forget they are among commercial enterprise in conformity with supply these effect then www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 102 published by scholink inc. functions because clients, yet concentrate entirely over profits generation, they bust to live on in conformity with theirs responsibility then end up corrupted. one on the reasons on banks is after mortgage money. banks make cash doing that, but construction money is now not theirs purpose. making money is the manifesting in conformity with operate the commercial enterprise regarding servicing consumers and customers well. for banks in conformity with urge she want in imitation of evaluate risk. it is biased in accordance with their depositors to sharpness (depositors’) cash according to these anybody are now not credit-worthy. certified people accountants exist in accordance with help assign perfect and beneficial photographs over the financial property about companies. rating corporations appear in imitation of give opinions of the soundness about companies. it is biassed according to the investing people because of certified public accountants according to stay swayed by using the reality as the companies that he balance grant for the audit. it is also unfair in accordance with the investing community because of the ranking corporations after be swayed with the aid of the fact that groups grant charges according to it absolutely equal agencies. could thou help but be aware how many quick rating businesses lower the scores on politic entities like the united states then several european nations but failed after note the monetary problems so much surrounded the mortgage organizations yet the foremost banks and insurance agencies before the financial crisis hit? the necessary lading between the monetary services need are financial instruments. but instruments are things as are beneficial because other purposes. what is theirs fundamental purpose? what are they old for? life insurance policies, annuities, securities, mutual funds, cds or other instruments are old in accordance with control chance and supply economic security. the motive concerning the fence possessing is after “hedge” and stability the hazard of an investment now one’s investments seem in conformity with stay even extended. these financial instruments function now not be present after stand manipulated or arbitraged because of the simple reason concerning making extra cash because advisers yet companies. 1.4 international marketplace as a enterprise grows, these responsible because of its management will appear for latter markets to run up. while opportunities into the domestic want may additionally well existing themselves, shape an sight beyond the horizon would possibly expose the essence on untapped then underexploited markets just waiting in conformity with keep plundered. dipping a kick in the worldwide marketplace would possibly lie a interesting option, but certain which must be unbiased carefully. lurking beneath the surface are dangers which ought to flip the expansion hope of a nightmare. doing business into an international context raises legal troubles as are quite exclusive beside those springing up beyond simply domestic undertaking but which, nevertheless, wish hold in imitation of addressed via some business enterprise thinking about exporting its fit-out yet functions abroad. different nations bear special laws. this wish keep on baby worth after a enterprise whose business things to do are limited in accordance with the home market, but must those things to do lie prolonged past the country wide www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 103 published by scholink inc. border, the divergences as be present within felony systems execute hold a full-size impact concerning the way the business ought to stay conducted and, within consequence, the attainment yet abortion over the task involved. 2. competition competition regulation generally includes 3 sets on prohibitions, concerning anticompetitive agreements, boorish practices with the aid of imperious firms then the ex-ante limit about mergers. it is pretty striking what the important guidelines concerning competition system have a tendency in accordance with converge regarding a global scale, however the deep differences up to expectation exist into phrases on monetary structures yet legal and cultural backgrounds across countries. to lie clear, the sense on these rules is largely influenced by regional specificities, an aspect in conformity with who we return later. yet, a less enormous union concerns the desirability concerning consisting of link limit amongst the enactment powers on the agency. historically, even within the nearly advanced antitrust jurisdictions, a connection rule governance used to be brought only a long time afterward the forward decree about the competition law. however, countries so have added competition provision extra these days bear embark on a cohesion limit dictation beside the altogether beginning, however also into this cases there is incomplete panel of manoeuvre so the scope concerning the link regulation might also keep described with the aid of adequately placing the thresholds so trigger the powers regarding the competition authority. in many jurisdictions half economic activities are exempted beside the applicability over competition law. the reason because of that demobilization is up to expectation these things to do repeat more standard hobbies or require an agency up to expectation is no longer well matched including competition. moreover, the administration assigns according to incomplete bodies the objective on pursuing these usual interests and does not necessity lousy establishments after trespass with the choices he bear in accordance with make, aimed at reaching the assigned objectives. this approach makes perfect sense. however, it do keep effortlessly distorted in imitation of protect strong pursuits (i.e. rents) between things to do as do stay effectively then correctly executed of competitive markets. thus, the sum of it exclusions is an important coverage preference so much wants according to be instituted primarily based concerning cautious assessment. moreover, opposition authorities may still practice as advocates concerning the competition principles, even agreement the regulation prevents them beyond implementing opposition policies in opposition to the establishments entrusted including these typical interest objectives. this is quantity regarding the greater normal intercession powers as the mastery commonly execute show off in imitation of set off lawmakers then policymakers in accordance with avoid needless restrictions on competition. while competition law yet financial provision are commonly diacritic by theirs modes about operation, theirs scopes concerning utility overlap, which means that half demand issues can be addressed both thru odd opposition edition then through implementation concerning a systematical regulatory case. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 104 published by scholink inc. the issue on concurrency arises out of it strong overlap: alternatively about selecting among opposition law yet provision as like mechanisms of market supervision, is such viable in imitation of sue both, concurrently or consecutively, within the identical demand or even in accordance with tackle the identical anticompetitive conduct? to a extensive sum there is asymmetry here, because the topic then generally retrospective disposition about antitrust intervention means that, typically, it does not cover the identical floor as much in consequence enacted, forward-facing sector regulation. prior competition introduction inside a quarter need to now not royal court later provision until such pastime indicates so opposition rule unaccompanied is adequate after assure well-functioning markets. essentially, the question after keep viewed is whether competition regulation is relevant ex submit among markets difficulty according to ex ante regulation, or, yoke differently, the amount after which sectorspecific rule ousts antitrust precinct after scrutinise the custom concerning constitutional companies or, extra generally, economic recreation of a sector. 2.1 efficiency efficiency is now not a question concerning “either/or” however of “more or less”. in reality, markets are no longer flawlessly efficient. they are affect along inefficiencies. one such deficiency is a poverty about transparency, so much is, subject in obtaining relevant data expeditiously yet at all. the internet, however, has extensively accelerated demand transparency. the records on hand on the world-wide web is available beside anywhere, anytime, or into practically unbounded quantity. powerful enquire engines permit focussed enquiries, then limit waste in era yet effort. with the emergence over statistics because consumers, the geographical scope regarding the markets has expanded. this is proper concerning these markets who are not affected via prohibitive transit expenses and administration intervention between the form about (in eu parlance) quantitative restrictions and measures forlorn equal effect. language obstacles and (to a reducing extent) differences of the countrywide structures on private provision also contribute to the endured essence about separate markets so among member states. most importantly because current purposes, so work anti-competitive practices, whether or not legal or not. all the same, much producers then distributors hold seised the possibilities presented with the aid of the internet, via running dedicated on line shops. some distributors, most prominently amazon, maintain no brick-and-mortar stores at all. this is also actual about ebay. this commenced as like an auction stage but because a while has also enabled easy purchases from vendors who elevate on at least part over theirs activities electronically. in relative terms, however, it are still selvage phenomena, postulate steadily growing. although normal shops may also be struggling among some markets (most fairly within the traffic over recorded music), it technique over dole is by means of no potential defunct. copious customers are searching because of such as a not many clicks regarding a laptop veil cannot offer: he are searching because a purchasing “experience”. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 105 published by scholink inc. 2.2 global inequality global inequalities relaxation not solely on the legal results about singular then crew struggles settling down the reputation concerning legion amongst them however concerning preparations as have an effect on the main interactions among these whosoever lead yet those whosoever delay [10]. indeed, the hyperlink within variety or the prison arrangements among agencies is near seen now variations compound dynamically: when the wealthy get richer, the poor, poorer. people without problems intuit so winners enrobe the game. although the mechanisms differ, between each and every society winners discover approaches after alternate the guidelines in conformity with accomplish after beneficial properties less complicated to garner. that is why he move because of rules. that also takes place globally. large transnational investors or corporations, for example, bear aged their leverage with theirs home and legion countries according to flourish treaties guaranteeing the service regarding industrial arbitral awards, thereby disempowering army ruler country wide judiciaries, transferring authority in accordance with a professional community over well-paid international arbitrators, then empowering the business pursuits close well represented in the mediation process. but the felony foundations for brawny positive factors are now not solely a count number over rigging the rules. legal preparations shape patterns concerning interaction of rich and poor into a range on ways so inspire the compounding about gains. a traditional road in accordance with imagine it would keep in imitation of transfer the center of attention beside humans according to a large structure: winners don’t garb the rules, the rule is in the meanwhile rigged in their favor. this is a common or very beneficial way in accordance with conceptualize world political economy, not namely an endless series of struggles amongst humans and groups, however as much a prejudiced law and structure. for a lengthy time, international inequality was once interpreted in opposition to the background about a noticeably steady kindred among a “first world” of promoted countries then all and sundry else. the important players between the account have been the advanced international locations concerning the north atlantic, whose balance on limit (or stability regarding terror) stabilized theirs dominion concerning a world dictation before, during, then then colonialism. this association used to be each naturalized and critiqued. many international elites—even those just concerned about poverty—tended in imitation of imagine that differences of wealthy and terrible reflected a ancient fact: incomplete nations “had developed” via an manufactured revolution, whilst others had no longer but made so. once politic equality was once ensured through decolonization, such appeared splendid according to expect monetary variety in accordance with stay addressed nationally, if together with a pain of overseas aid then specialist guidance. global dissimilation used to be an unlucky fact, rather than the production of continuous institutional arrangements. 3. conclusion a market is a trading place where people buy and sell goods and services and where they negotiate and communicate prices. in the financial markets, people trade different types of financial assets. when www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 106 published by scholink inc. considering the term of the market, remarks about its liberalization can very often be heard. market liberalization facilitates market access and market competition, leading to a reduction in administrative costs, especially in cross-border business. liberalization opens up space for increasing the number of entrepreneurs in the market, but it also facilitates the exit of those who cannot survive due to increased competition. this increases market dynamics and encourages competitiveness. at the same time, consumers have opportunities for more choices and lower prices, while consumer protection standards are maintained and further strengthened by competition. references bowie, n. e. (2013). in business ethics in the 21st century (pp. 148-149). springer science+business media dordrecht, dordrecht, the netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6223-7 buccirossi, p., & ciari, l. (2018). western balkans and the design of effective competition law: the role of economic, institutional and cultural characteristics. in begović, b., & popović, d. v. (eds.), competition authorities in south eastern europe-building institutions in emerging markets (pp. 11-12). springer international publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76644-7_2 cham, a. g., & switzerland, d. n. (2015). competition law and economic regulation-making and managing markets (p. 188). cambridge university press, cambridge, uk. enchelmaier, s. (2015). selective distribution and the internet: lessons from case c-439/09 pierre fabre dermo-cosme t́ique (13 october 2011). in surblytė, g. (ed.), competition on the internet (p. 6). springer-verlag berlin heidelberg, berlin, germany. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-55096-6_2 jenny, f. (2016). the institutional design of competition authorities: debates and trends. in jenny, f., & katsoulacos, y. (eds), competition law enforcement in the brics and in developing countries legal and economic aspects. springer international publishing switzerland, cham, switzerland. yuthayotin, s. (2015). in access to justice in transnational b2c e-commerce-a multidimensional analysis of consumer protection mechanisms (pp. pp. 111-114). springer international publishing switzerland, cham, switzerland. kelly, d., holmes, a., & hayward, r. (2002). in business law, fourth edition (p. 103). cavendish publishing limited, london, uk. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400880591 kennedy, d. (2016). in a world of struggle how power, law, and expertise shape global political economy (pp. 199-200). princeton university press, woodstock, uk. https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-7506-6005-1.50007-5 nayler, p. (2006). in business law in the global marketplace-the effects of international business (pp. 169-170). elsevier butterworth-heinemann, oxford, uk. trebilcock, m. j., & trachtman, j. (2020). in advanced introduction to international trade law, second edition (pp. 36-37). edward elgar publishing limited, cheltenham, uk. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 14 original paper china’s response to green development: the theoretical characteristics and significance of the “two mountains” theory luo yan-song 1* 1 school of philosophy, zhongnan university of economics and law, wuhan 430073, china * luo yan-song, corresponding author, phd candidate in the school of philosophy, zhongnan university of economics and law, luoyansongzuel@163.com received: february 8, 2023 accepted: march 24, 2023 online published: april 3, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n2p14 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n2p14 fund project supported by “the fundamental research funds for the central universities”，zhongnan university of economics and law. abstract the severe ecological situation has become a global issue, which concerns the fate of mankind. at present, in order to comply with the trend of green development, change the development mode and build an ecological civilization-oriented country, the “two mountains” theory was conceived. the theory establishes the ecological goal of a better life, has a distinct ecological consciousness, and coalesces the dialectical wisdom of marxist eco-philosophy. it is a new height of the communist party of china’s ecological civilization theory. therefore, sorting out the historical logic of the birth of the “two mountains” theory and examining its essential provisions are of certain value and significance for deepening the understanding of the relationship between human beings and nature, steadily promoting economic ecology and ecological economization, and opening up new horizons for the study of marxist eco-philosophy. keywords “two mountains” theory, eco-philosophy, environmental protection “lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets”, that is, the theory of “two mountains” is an important thesis and achievement of the communist party of china in the construction of ecological www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 15 published by scholink inc. civilization. it is a contemporary response to the widespread predatory development model and has become the “chinese wisdom” of global ecological governance. the term “invaluable assets” refers to the green development and economic benefits obtained by human beings through the development concept of respecting and responding to nature. the “two mountains” theory is a product of the times, based on the green development, and ecological development of china’s needs of the times, adhering to the important theoretical achievements of the chinese road. 1. the historical logic of the birth of the “two mountains theory” “theoretical thinking in every era ...... is a product of history. (note 1) the “two mountains” theory was born as a product of exchange and dialogue with global development based on china’s reality. it embodies the trend and spirit of the times and is china’s response to the current situation of resource depletion and ecological crisis. there are two main socio-historical foundations on which the “two mountains” theory was born. first, the trend of the times of green development. the impact of modern science and technology is two-sided: first, modern science and technology support the huge modern industrial system and make human beings a powerful power “over” nature, and under the hostage of capital and modern science and technology, the powerful power of human beings is transformed into an effective means to plunder natural resources, and cause three global crises that seriously affect human survival and development. the global problems of environmental degradation and resource depletion prove that “our war against nature has shattered the planet. (note 2) so in the face of the issues of the times, countries must respond to the times: for example, the white house is pushing for green agriculture (note 3); the eu has set stringent environmental standards and carbon neutrality targets based on the european green deal (note 4); korea has made “green growth” one of its national strategies (note 5); japan even introduced strict waste separation policies (note 6); this shows that the wave of the times of “green development” is overwhelming. the birth of the “two mountains” theory is a chinese response to the trend of the era of “green development” and a proactive move to provide a chinese answer to the question of “modernity”. second, the development model contradicts with scientific development. in the initial stage of economic development in china, in order to create huge economic benefits, it is inevitable to consume resources and pollute the environment at any cost, thus giving rise to a series of ecological problems. especially after the reform and opening up, my country’s economy ushered in a stage of take-off, and environmental issues were ignored to a certain extent under the joy of gaining huge material wealth, so several environmental issues were superimposed, and finally broke out in a concentrated manner at this stage, which shows that my country’s development model is at the same time contradictions in scientific development are prominent. therefore, it is necessary to improve the outstanding contradictions between the two and achieve green development. first of all, china’s traditional economic development model is in urgent need of transformation. this model does not rely on the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 16 published by scholink inc. efficiency improvement brought by technological innovation, but simply relies on the expansion of resource input to achieve efficiency improvement. such an approach is bound to harm the ecological environment and cause resource depletion. so establishing the “green development” concept, and promote the optimization and upgrading of industrial structure has become a necessary measure. secondly, the environmental problems that are concentrated at this stage need urgent treatment. resources provide a guarantee for economic development, but if resources are exploited and used unreasonably, irreversible damage to the environment will be caused. the impact of a “scarred” ecological environment on economic development is continuous, and its destructive consequences on the economy are foreseeable in the long run. so, “do not revel too much in our victory over nature. for each such victory, nature has retaliated against us. (note 7) thus, it is urgent to improve the development model and the outstanding contradiction of scientific development, to establish a long-term development of the overall situation, and to achieve “green” development. it can be seen that at this stage, the shortcomings of china’s traditional development model have been highlighted and have a negative impact on sustainable development. the “two mountains” theory was born as a response to the current situation in china, exploring the dialectical relationship between the development model and ecological environment, forming a strategic idea of ecological civilization and providing a reasonable path for the construction of ecological civilization in china. 2. the connotation of the “two mountains” theory 2.1 the “unity” of man and nature the theoretical connotation of the unity of man and nature is expressed in the phrase “both lucid waters and lush mountains and invaluable assets”. lucid waters and lush mountains represent ecological factors, invaluable assets represent the economic factor, and the harmony of the two is also the harmony of economy and ecology. under the guidance of the “two mountains” theory, it is possible to achieve the harmonious development of economy and ecology: first, nature as a pre-existing thing provides both the necessary conditions for human existence and the necessary resources for economic development; second, with economic development, people have reasonable demands on the comfort level of living environment and green area, and a good ecological environment is the basis for meeting human needs; third, a good ecological environment can lead to the aggregation effect of high-quality talents, so that a benign interaction can be achieved between economic development and environmental protection. this shows that good economic development and ecological protection can go hand in hand, and protecting “lucid waters and lush mountains” to maintain their sustainability does not mean giving up economic benefits. to change the new economic thinking, vigorously develop green economy, ecological economy, and build a new economic system is a necessary move in line with the times, that is, “both lucid waters and lush mountains and invaluable assets”. the thesis reflects a further deepening of the understanding of the relationship between man and nature, which shows that the economy cannot develop alone, but must take into account the quality of the ecological environment. therefore, the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 17 published by scholink inc. green development model that respects the unity of both economy and ecology becomes an effective way to achieve its unity. 2.2 the “priority” theory of nature conservation the phrase “lucid waters and lush mountains rather than invaluable assets” urgently indicates the necessity and “priority” of environmental protection in china. the conflict between man and nature has become increasingly prominent in recent times, especially during the first and second industrial revolutions, in order to get brutal economic growth, countries adopted a highly predatory development model on nature, which destroyed ecological advantages to a very high degree. in developed industrial societies, there is a real possibility that man and nature cannot be reconciled, and the risk to the ecological environment remains unabated. it can be seen that environmental protection has become an important task for contemporary economic development, preferring to sacrifice part of the economic benefits to maintain the good state of the ecological environment, i.e., “preferring lucid waters and lush mountains to invaluable assets” in development. its aim is to solve the current situation that ecological and environmental issues have been neglected for a long time in china for economic development. however, satisfying the higher needs of human beings and enhancing their sense of well-being cannot be achieved through rigid economic growth indicators, but must be achieved through the coordination of economic and social development, especially by taking into account factors such as “resource indicators and environmental indicators”. however, it must be clear that the ecological economic benefits of a good ecological environment are a long-term process, and the focus on ecological protection is bound to slow down local economic growth in the short term. thus, the “two mountains” theory has become a new idea for the construction of ecological civilization in china, which shows that china is cautiously handling the relationship between man and nature and taking the road to green development. in the face of the conflict between man and nature, we must insist on the “priority” of “lucid waters and lush mountains” and must not plunder nature as a means to make the “golden mountains” look rich and the “silver mountains” overflowing. “pollution before treatment” is by no means a good policy, and its historical limitations have been exposed through practical tests. the purpose of development is the good life of the people, if development must be at the cost of destroying the ecological environment of all people, then this development has long departed from the original purpose of development. it can be seen that the “two mountains” theory emphasizes the “priority theory” of nature protection, the essence of which is “people first”, and the road of green development is the fundamental road based on the needs of the people. 2.3 the “transformation” theory of natural advantages the phrase “lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets” essentially illustrates the close connection between the economy and nature, and that “lucid waters and lush mountains” are the strongest natural advantage that man has. nature, as a pre-existing thing, provides man with both the means and the object of his labor, especially since “great industry incorporates great natural forces and natural science into the production process” (note 8), the result is a steady stream of natural advantages www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 18 published by scholink inc. transformed into economic dividends and a gradual increase in the scale of production. as the most valuable asset, the process of transforming natural advantages into economic benefits must be a process of benign interaction between man and nature, while the traditional development model of plundering nature will undoubtedly only intensify the conflict between man and nature. thus, it is clear that adjusting the industrial structure, vigorously developing a green economy and making the development mode of unification of economy, and nature become the inevitable choice. only by leaving the “lucid waters and lush mountains” to future generations can they continue to enjoy good economic development. natural benefits are transformed into economic benefits, and the two are in essence the same. protecting “lucid waters and lush mountains” is a way of maximizing the advantages of nature and long-term economic development, which reflects the return of the essential value of nature to man. thus, nature has two types of action on man: on the one hand, nature assumes the fundamental role of the reproduction of all things, i.e., natural productivity; on the other hand, natural resources as a factor of labor are a part of economic development, and natural resources as capital are used by people to make labor create higher economic benefits, i.e., social productivity. this shows that in the process of green development, it becomes possible to transform natural advantages into benign economic advantages. in summary, the “unity” theory of man and nature, the “priority” theory of nature protection, and the “transformation” theory of natural advantages constitute the theoretical connotation of the “two mountains” theory, which is a major theoretical creation of china’s development path and has distinctive theoretical characteristics. 3. features of the “two mountains” theory 3.1 the ecological goal of a better life the main goal of marxist eco-philosophy is to reconcile man with nature (note 9). in developed industrial societies, where capital becomes the dominant force of production, it ignores the inevitable negative effects of plundering nature and destroying ecology. there, the right of man to a long development is denied and the conflict with nature is gradually deepened. the “two mountains” theory satisfies the ecological need for free and comprehensive development of human beings, devotes to the reconciliation of human beings and nature, and makes it possible for people to have ecological happiness. “people’s desire for a better life, is the goal of our struggle” (note 10). the destruction of nature and the deterioration of ecology threaten the physical and mental health of people and endanger the sustainable development of future generations. the “two mountains” theory is the wisdom of responding positively to people’s concerns and contains the philosophy of putting people first. its aim is to make people live in a good ecological environment, enhance people’s happiness and give them a good life. the ecological goal of a good life established by the “two mountains” theory is the most intuitive embodiment of people-oriented thinking, and creating a good ecological environment is what www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 19 published by scholink inc. the people want. only with the support of the people can the road of green development in china be long and smooth. 3.2 a distinct awareness of ecological issues “the power of a right idea far exceeds the rhetoric of many politicians (note 11)”, the “two mountains” theory, as the “right idea” to respond to the needs of the times, is the product of reflection based on the serious ecological situation of our time. the crude economic development model of “eating ancestral food and cutting off the road of future generations” has profoundly affected the ecological advantages of our country, and the failure to adopt new development ideas is destined to intensify the contradiction between man and nature, and will eventually be punished by the depletion of natural resources, stagnation and regression of economic development, and deterioration of the ecological environment. this shows that in the practice of economic development, it is necessary to always adhere to the people-oriented approach, protect and restore nature, and create a good ecological environment to achieve long-term economic development. therefore, the “two mountains” theory has a distinct awareness of ecological issues and is a manifestation of china’s determination to change its economic development model. the unreasonable development model of plundering natural resources and destroying the ecological environment must be resolutely resisted, always bearing in mind that the path of “development before governance” cannot gain the support of the people. therefore, the rapid awakening of ecological awareness is the inevitable result of china’s economic development, and it is the ardent expectation of the people to adopt new ideas of green development, maintain the maximum ecological advantage, and leave “lucid waters and lush mountains” for future generations. 3.3 the dialectics of eco-philosophy as an important theoretical achievement of marxist eco-philosophy, the "two mountains" theory has given new contents to the materialistic dialectic. therefore, the “two mountains” theory has become the guideline for the relationship between human beings and nature in contemporary china, which consists of three main aspects: first, the dialectic of environmental protection and economic development. as the saying goes, “birds choose good trees to live in”, people also pursue a livable ecological environment. in contemporary times, good natural conditions and livable ecological conditions have become the core indicators of the comprehensive competitiveness of the region, both of which have the important function of attracting investment, gathering talents, and enhancing the brand of the region. therefore, dealing with the dialectical relationship between environmental protection and economic development is the key to solving the contemporary ecological dilemma, and is also the theoretical interest of the “two mountains” theory. natural advantages can be transformed into huge economic benefits, and economic development provides financial and modern technology support for environmental protection and reduces the consumption of resources, and protects the ecological environment by improving the efficiency of natural resource use. the “two mountains” theory emphasizes the harmony between man www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 20 published by scholink inc. and nature, and stresses that in the long run, environmental protection will not cause economic development to stagnate or regress, and that creating a new situation where environmental protection and economic development are mutually coordinated and supported becomes the primary condition for green development. second, the dialectic of economic ecologization and ecological economization. the serious situation of contemporary ecological problems mainly stems from the plundering of nature and the destruction of ecological environment by economic development, so it is urgent to explore new ideas of economic development. the so-called ecological development of the economy refers to green, sustainable, resource-friendly development and the realization of ecological development of the economy. therefore, in order to ensure the ecological development of the economy: on the one hand, to maintain the good momentum of economic development and reduce the damage of the economy to nature and ecology. on the other hand, we should be alert to the influence of consumerism and instrumental rationality on people, avoid extravagant and predatory consumption, raise people’s awareness of environmental protection, reconcile people with nature, and build an ecological culture in which the two develop in harmony. ecological economization means grasping the productivity nature of ecological advantages and transforming them into economic advantages to enhance the happiness of residents and build an ecological environment for a better life. tourism has become the primary way to transform ecological advantages into economic advantages, and the beautiful natural scenery carries the people’s aspiration for a better life and deeply attracts the toiling people. thus, it is necessary to give full play to ecological advantages and turn them into economic benefits of tourism, and the trend of living “under the eastern hedge of chrysanthemums” becomes possible in the context of promoting ecological economy. secondly, a livable and green ecological environment can trigger the gathering effect of quality talents, and at the same time, a good ecological environment can also cause the linkage effect of investors. capital and skilled personnel can bring qualitative improvement to local economic development. however, in the process of ecological economization, we must be wary of the old way of consuming resources for economic growth, and establish a natural resource management system to regulate the use of natural resources and realize “green production”. third, the dialectic of person's nature and natural person. “the human being (meaning the real individual) creates the environment, and likewise the environment creates the human being (note 12). the “realistic individual” is as much a product of nature as the animal; it is a gift of nature; it is an element of nature. the existence of nature fulfills the conditions of its existence as a natural being, i.e., the conditions of material life. thus, we can say that a real individual is a living (animate) individual who depends on nature to provide the necessary material and energy. however, nature and the real individual are mutually fulfilling. nature provides the real individual with the necessary material and energy to live, and nature changes as a result of its sensual activities. thus, the part of nature that is included in the realistic scope of individual sensual activity becomes “person's nature”, and the part of nature that remains in a certain original state becomes “natural nature”. “self-nature” is the potential www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 21 published by scholink inc. object of sensual activity, and “person’s nature” is the product of sensual activity. the former contains the potential essential power of the real person, while the latter is already the manifestation of its essential power, and together they embody the essential provisions of the real person. it can be seen that the whole history is the history of dialectical development of humanization of nature and humanization of nature, and the “two mountains” theory understands the relationship between the two and pursues their balance and harmony, i.e., “lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets”. in the process of pursuing development, it is necessary to maintain the dialectic between person’s nature and natural person without favoring either nature or human beings, and to achieve green development. 4. conclusions the theoretical significance of the “two mountains” theory is fully reflected in the fact that the theory is an important creation of marxist eco-philosophy, which broadens the scope of marxist eco-philosophy and reflects the change in the ruling philosophy of the communist party of china that the evaluation system oriented solely on economic benefits is seriously flawed and that a beautiful china must be built on the ecological basis of reconciliation between man and nature. thus, the “two mountains” theory has become the action guide for the construction of the overall layout of “five-in-one”, and the propagation of the “two mountains” culture is beneficial to the cultivation of green development consciousness and ecological responsibility consciousness must be consciously integrated into its theoretical spirit to achieve green development in the general pattern of ecological civilization construction, which is the practical significance of the “two mountains” theory. therefore, the “two mountains” theory has become a new height of theory and practice for china to follow the green development trend and build the beautiful china initiative. notes note 1. bureau of compilation of the works of marx, engels, lenin and stalin of the central committee of the communist party of china. selected works of marx and engels. volume iv [m]. beijing: people’s publishing house, 2012, 284. note 2. united nations. harmony with nature [eb/ol]. https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/press-release/new-unep-synthesis-provides-blueprint-urgently-s olve-planetary note 3. li xiaolin, huo jianbo, zhang hua, qu baoxiang, you fei. experience and enlightenment of agricultural resource management in the united states [j]. chinese agricultural resources and regionalization, 2018, 39(10), 86-90. note 4. jiang siyu. eu energy and climate policy and china eu cooperation under the goal of carbon neutrality [j]. international economic review, 2022(01), 134-154+7-8. note 5. zheng tongtong. the basic law of south korea on low carbon green growth (revised in 2013) [j]. journal of nanjing university of technology (social science edition), 2013, 12(03), 23-36. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 22 published by scholink inc. note 6. jin kexue, experience and reference of japanese urban domestic waste classification [j]. urban and rural construction, 2020(19), 71-73. note 7. bureau of compilation of the works of marx, engels, lenin and stalin of the central committee of the communist party of china. selected works of marx and engels. volume iv [m]. beijing: people’s publishing house, 2012, 519. note 8. bureau of compilation of the works of marx, engels, lenin and stalin of the central committee of the communist party of china. selected works of marx and engels. volume i [m]. beijing: people’s publishing house, 2012, 424. note 9. wang yuchen and peng yiwei. theoretical and practical innovations of the party in leading the construction of ecological civilization since the 18th national congress and their contemporary values [j]. journal of lanzhou university (social science edition), 2022, 50(02), 1-14. note 10. central propaganda department. study outline of xi jinping’s socialist thought with chinese characteristics for a new era [m]. beijing: study publishing house, people’s publishing house, 2019, 168. note 11. rachel carson. silent spring [m]. translated by lv ruilan and li changsheng. shanghai: shanghai translation press, 2011, 5. note 12. bureau of compilation of the works of marx, engels, lenin and stalin of the central committee of the communist party of china. selected works of marx and engels. volume i [m]. beijing: people’s publishing house, 2012, 92. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 32 original paper an empirical study of the uptake of electronic government services by the limpopo department of home affairs sonayena kenneth nokele1 1 department of public management, tshwane university of technology, polokwane, south africa received: october 29, 2023 accepted: february 22, 2024 online published: february 22, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n1p32 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n1p32 abstract technology adoption models play an important role in understanding the different factors affecting the adoption and use of new technology. the development of well-informed e-government strategies is the first stepping stone in the right direction for the successful implementation and successful use of e-government. this paper investigated from the officials; perspective factors that affect the uptake of e-government services provided by the limpopo departments of home affairs. using a qualitative research approach whereby three different department of home affairs’ service centres namely polokwane, waterberg, and sekhukhune in limpopo province were used as case studies, the study conducted semi-structured interviews with nine (9) officials comprised of management, ict department, and street-level officials to identify and understand better the factors affecting uptake of e-government in the dha. the study found that lake of skills and access to e-government programmes were at the top of the list of challenges faced at the centres. therefore, the study recommended amendments to the ict policy of the department so that it accommodates different languages spoken in societies particularly the eleven official languages currently spoken in south africa. this article further recommends several solutions that can enhance the uptake of e-government in the dha. keywords e-government, theoretical framework, e-services, department of home affairs, e-administration 1. introduction and context of the study the use of information and communication technology (ict) is seen in both private and public sectors and has been advocated by many scholars such as maserumule (2004), mukonza (2015); nokele and mukonza (2021) as one that possesses significant benefits for the enhancement and improvement of efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the delivery of services. the development of ict has mainly been driven by the private sector but has lately been adopted in most contemporary www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 33 published by scholink inc. governments such as south africa, this is because it increases constant contact or communication between government and citizens (mpinganjira, 2013). the icts also have enormous potential for initiating revolutionary changes in respect of enhancing both work productivity and creativity (mbatha, 2012). it is for this reason that government departments such as department of home affairs in south africa have also adopted the use of icts to render services. such is regarded by heeks (2008) as e-government and is regarded as the use of internet-based applications that aims to allow the department of home affairs to interact with its external stakeholders or recipients of services (citizens and non-citizens) in south africa. e-government is promoted through various policies and legislations such as the promotion of access to information act (paia), act no. 2 of 2000, and others. the 1994 general elections in south africa heralded an open and free society within which the government had to pass the necessary laws to ensure their aspiration to create an open and transparent society. by introducing the electronic government approach, the government enabled ordinary citizens of the country to share in the principle of an open and free society, as enshrined in the constitution of 1996. the government developed an e-government policy aimed at the citizens of the country as well as the corporate sector. with “transformation” as the buzzword on all fronts of society, this meant the changing of the old information technology (it) to the new information and communication technology (ict) (trusler, 2003). department of home affairs (dha) is one of the departments in south africa that the government had to demonstrate efforts to adopt e-government to deliver services. the department of home affairs offers a multitude of services to the citizens of south africa, as well as foreigners who wish to visit, work, or stay in south africa. the department’s core functions are classified under civic and immigration services. civic services include maintaining the national population register (npr); managing the birth, marriage, and death records; determining and granting citizenship; issuing travel documents and passports; issuing identity documents (id). immigration services cover the following: administering admissions into the country; deciding the residency status of foreigners and issuing permits thereof; custodianship of refugee affairs; inspectorate and policy directives (dha, 2014, pp. 55-24). furthermore, the electronic document management system (edms) was introduced to manage the huge volume of papers. it would digitalize all paperwork and transform the dha into a completely paperless and electronic environment. it was of particular significance to the entire systems modernization program and would improve communications and overall performance. infrastructure upgrades were also envisaged to look after the needs of dha offices in rural areas. the infrastructure upgrade includes it modernisation and improvement of the construction and design of dha building’s power supply and data lines. there would also be upgrades to the contact centre/ customer services in recognition of the need to improve so that users could access information requested by clients from the system directly without having to refer customers to their offices (dha, 2012). this contact centre upgrade could only be achieved when all the systems were integrated. despite the above, mpinganjira (2013) found a low level of understanding from officials as a critical www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 34 published by scholink inc. challenge in the use icts in most government departments in south africa. department of home affairs is one of the departments that introduced e-government as early as 2001. as the custodian, protector, and verifier of the identity and status of citizens, as well as controlling, regulating, and facilitating immigration and management of persons through ports of entry, a modernization programmer is being rolled out to ensure that the dha utilizes technology appropriately through digitized automated processes and effective management of information (dha, 2014, p. 36). therefore, based on the above, this paper assumes that the dha is not an exception to the challenge cited above this paper identifies and analyse challenges affecting the uptake of e-government in the selected centres of dha in limpopo province. the intention is to proffer workable solutions including theoretical frameworks, so the department draws effective ways to enhance the e-government system. 2. theoretical approach 2.1 incorporating e-government into the dha: the core concept that forms the foundation of the user acceptance model of the research adapted that the official’s predisposition to use e-government applications the dha will have an impact on the actual usage of the e-government services, and this would have an impact on the intentions to utilize the technology. drawing well-informed e-government strategies is the first step in the right direction for successful e-government implementation. though they have limitations, the technology acceptance model (tam), theory of reasoned action (tra), and diffusion of innovation theory (dit) have been used in assessing the adoption of e-government projects and they will be used in this study to assess the department of home affairs online services. the following sub-sections discuss three different technology adoption models that have been identified or utilised in different studies worldwide. 2.1.1 technology acceptance model (tam) introduced by davis (1989), the tam adapts the social psychology theory or reasoned action which aims to model user acceptance of information technologies. the major constructs considered by the tam are the “perceived ease of use” (peou) and the “perceived usefulness” (pu). pu is the extent to which a person considers and believes that the use of an information system will enhance task performance, while peou is the degree to which a person believes a system will be free of effort to a large or lesser extent (venkatesh, moris, & davis, 2003, p. 438). according to the model, behavioural intention to adopt information and communication technologies can better be understood by analysing two crucial factors namely perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use. perceived usefulness relates to benefits that one can expect to derive from the use of information and communication technologies. the model proposes that users of technology, including prospective users, consider the benefits of using modern technology in comparison to their current ways of performing given tasks for which the new technology has been developed. the tam model outlines the importance of perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use mainly www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 35 published by scholink inc. because of the role they play in influencing people’s attitudes toward added information and communication technologies. attitude is thus a central construct in the model linking perceived usefulness as well as perceived ease of use with behavioural intentions as well as actual behaviour. davis et al. (1989, p. 989) postulate that the word “attitudes” refers to “the general and relatively enduring evaluations people have on different kind of objects including products and ideas”. this model will enable the researcher to determine the relationship between perceived ease, perceived usefulness, and official attitude toward the use of e-government services. the tam has a direct relationship with the acceptance or non-acceptance of e-government and therefore use in evaluating e-government implantations by dha officials and intended users. figure 1. technology acceptance model (tam) source: changli, hung, and hwang (2005, p. 393) figure 1 shows perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use mainly because of the role they play in persuading individuals’ attitudes toward added information and communication technologies. attitude is thus a central construct in the model linking perceived usefulness as well as actual behavioural intentions. al-shafi and weerakkody (211, p. 30) found no significant relationship between perceived ease of use and attitude towards the adoption of e-services. 2.1.2 theory of reasoned action (tra) developed by martin fishbein and icek ajzen in 1975, the theory of reasoned action (tra) is aimed at organising and integrating research concentrating on the attitude of individuals into a systematic theoretical orientation. the emphasis of tra is to probe the attitudes, beliefs, intentions, behaviour, and subjective norms thereby unearthing the different distinctions and relations amongst these variables. combined, these concepts culminate into a model that predicts the overall behavioural intention and the actual behaviour towards an innovation or technology that has been just introduced. for this study, perceived usefulness perceived ease of use external variables attitude towards using. behavioura l intention of use actual usage behaviour www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 36 published by scholink inc. tra will assist the researcher to determine whether the attitude of officials is positive or negatively neutral towards the utilisation of e-government in an attempt to improve work performance. contrariwise, a negative attitude is likely to emanate from a belief that technology has no impact on, or retards, their ability to do their job. according to southey (2011, p. 45), literature is replete with research in which the theory of reasoned action and the theory of planned behaviour have been used to empirically evaluate the decision-making behaviour of individuals. figure 2 displays that the actual individual’s behaviour (such as the acceptance or refusal of technology) is dependent on one’s intention to perform the behaviour. further, this intention is concurrently influenced both by the individual's attitude and subjective norm. the subjective norm points to the fact that the way a person behaves is to a lesser or’ greater extent influenced or susceptible to what other people expect of one’s behavioural pattern (fishbein & ajzen, 1975). figure 2. theory of reasoned action (tra) source: adapted from fishbein and ajzen (1975). figure 2 above shows how behaviour is a culmination of behavioural intention to act in a particular manner. it must be noted that, according to ajzen and fishbein (1975), behavioural intention is a consequence of two factors: a personal or attitudinal factor and a social or normative factor. in turn, the attitude towards certain behaviour is seen as a function of beliefs of perceived consequences of performing the behaviour as well as the person’s evaluation of these consequences (vallerand, cuerrier, & mongeau, 1992, p. 98). in essence, the tam and tra are foundational models on technology adoption models which influence the emergence of other models. one of the prominent models based on the understanding of the tam and tra is the diffusion of information theory (dit) developed by rogers in 1962. the following section discourses the dit and its major applications. beliefs and evaluation s attitude towards behaviour normative beliefs and motivation to comply subjective norm behavioural intention actual behaviour www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 37 published by scholink inc. 2.1.3 the diffusion of information theory (dit) the innovation diffusion theory (idt) originates from rogers (1962) and aims to explain how innovations diffuse or get adopted by the broader society and at what rate innovative ideas and technology are spread through the social system over time. rogers (1983) contends a generic adoption model which consists of five distinct categories of adopters, namely: (i) the adopters. (ii) innovators. (iii) early adopters. (iv) early majority (v) laggards. it is important to note that individuals do not accept and adopt innovations at the same time some may be fast to adopt, while others take time to be persuaded to accept new initiatives depending on their views on the innovations. e-government services are still in the early adoption stage in the department of home affairs. as per the diffusion of innovations classification, both officials and the intended users who have already started to use e-government services can be classified as early adopters. despite the idt is one of the first major adoption models and having enjoyed wider usage as a reference point in many studies, it has still attracted critical views on its effectiveness (lytinen & damsgaard, 2001, p. 2). rogers (1962) argue that the adoption of innovation by potential adopters is influenced by the following factors: •relative advantage – the degree to which the innovation is perceived as being better than the idea, programme or practice it is replacing. •compatibility – how compatible /consistent the innovation is with the values, norms, and needs of the expected adopters. •complexity –how difficult the innovation is to understand and implement. noncomplex innovations are more widely accepted than complex ones. •tri ability – how possible the innovation is to be tested before full commitment to its adoption. •observabilitywhat is the extent to which the innovation can provide tangible results? considering the above, rogers believes that any organisation/ agency that is aimed at starting any innovation needs to follow the above-mentioned steps/processes if the innovations are to be successful. 2.2 the digital divide in south africa: quo vadis according to martindale (2002), south africa has one of the greatest divides between rich and poor in the world and this is most evident in the area of technology. the it world unwittingly has raced on, leaving many behind (martindale, 2002). socio-economic circumstances, imbalanced education policies under the apartheid regime, as well as language barriers, are some of the factors recognised in this exclusion. martindale (2002) reiterates that the gap between those empowered by technology and those who have been excluded must not widen and that the only thing that needs to be broadened is the thinking of those who believe technology is for the privileged few. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 38 published by scholink inc. msimang (2004, pp. 40-43) asserts that the biggest challenge for the government is to bridge the gap between the two economies in south africa with the government and the corporate sector contributing considerably to making the government and government services accessible to all the citizens. this would reduce the growing gap between those sectors of society that have and those that do not have. the author further itemised that the massive differences in the living conditions of south africans continue to be an alarming reminder of the extent of the problems of inequitable allocation of resources that still prevail. gudmundsdóttir (2005), cited in jantjies (2010, p. 42), more emphasis should be placed on the skills and opportunities required to utilise technology because giving people access to the internet does not necessarily guarantee the ability to use or make use of the technology to bridge the digital divide. gudmundsdóttir (2005) opposes the belief held by certain apprentices that the digital divide is decreasing due to the greater access to computers and the internet, as well as cheaper software and hardware. influencing factors such as language and other social, cultural, and historical factors must first be addressed to a greater extent. both officials and intended users at all levels need to be aware of how e-services can empower them to help themselves and enhance service delivery in mainstream of government departments. to conquer the digital divide, government, the private sector, and civil society must work together. no one section of society can be singled out for attention lest others fall further behind as a result of this (world economic forum, 2002, p. 6). the department of home affairs at a national level, has adopted the electronic government approach to give effect to the government’s objective of effective and efficient service delivery to the citizens of south africa and people who visit south africa. in this regard, the limpopo dha has played a leading role in the implementation and development of e-government. the subsequent section presents an overview of the department of home affairs and its adoption of e-government. 2.3 ict adoption and e-government implementation at the department of home affairs the home affairs department has adopted the use of icts to enhance government services to the citizens. it is critical to highlight a brief background of the structure of the department and how it has adopted e-government in an attempt to improve the delivery of services to understand the implementation of icts at the regional levels, in particular the three selected regions in this study. the department of home affairs (herein referred to as dha), a national service delivery department in democratic south africa, has adopted the use of icts to better serve the citizens to meet their needs. implementation of the icts via electronic government is done to achieve a higher service level of delivery (dha, 2004). the application of e-government allows citizens to interact with the government seven days a week and 24 hours a day through different means of communication, it enables such as internet email. for example, using the icts, tools such as computers, and the internet, provide the department with another alternate method to manage the document in electronic format. this format is faster to be sorted, found, and communicated than the traditional paper-based document. and also, the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 39 published by scholink inc. department can provide effective application processes to improve productivity and enquiry such as its customers would get the application form or related information from the website of dha anytime and anywhere. firstly, the dha is the custodian, protector, and verifier of the identity and status of citizens and other persons in south africa. this makes it possible for people to realize their rights and access benefits and opportunities in both the public and private domains. the department plays a key enabler in deepening democracy and social justice (dha, 2002, p. 3). secondly, the dha controls regulates, and facilitates immigration and the movement of persons through ports of entry. it also provides civics and immigration services at foreign missions; and determines the status of asylum seekers and refugees by international obligations. the department thus makes a significant contribution to ensuring national security, enabling economic development, and promoting good international relations (dha, 2002, p. 8). the vision of the department is to create a safe, secure south africa where all of its people are proud of, and value, their identity and citizenship. its mission is captured as “the efficient determination and safeguarding of the identity and status of citizens and the regulation of migration to ensure security, promote development and fulfill our international obligation” (dha, 2002, p. 7). the dha offers a multitude of services to the citizens of south africa, as well as foreigners, who wish to visit, work, or stay in south africa. table 1 below illustrates the department’s core functions. table 1. department of home affairs core functions civic services immigration services •maintaining the national population register (npr) •managing the birth, marriage, and death records •determining and granting citizenship •issuing travel documents and passports •issuing identity documents (id •administering admissions into the country •determining the residency status of foreigners and issuing permits thereof •custodianship of refugee affairs •inspectorate •policy directives source: dha, 2021. the adoption of e-government remains an excellent way to help dha to deliver effective services from the government to citizens. icts in the department tend to improve the efficiency, quality, and cost of services, ensure that government services are delivered to all levels of society at the most convenient time and locations, create transparency of services, and provide feedback channels for both officials and intended users, (barnard & patel, 2003). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 40 published by scholink inc. in addition, the department of home affairs has pure goals and objectives for e-government and should comply with batho pele (people first), service delivery principles, and regulations to put people first and provide effective services. e-government’s values are based on enabling easy access to government services by citizens, enhancing work productivity, and lowering cost efficient service delivery: • easy access to public services: the must be laid back for citizens to access government services through e-government implementation. e-services make it easier for citizens and non-citizens to access public services. • enhance work productivity: e-government must make it easier for government officials to interact with citizens through electronic channels to increase efficiency and effectiveness in public services, for example enquiring with citizens 24/7 through emails, fax, twitter, facebook, etc. • lower cost for service delivery: e-government services must lead to cost efficiencies. for example, e-government must decrease costs in the dha. 3. methodological orientation in the execution of the research study, particularly in compiling the paper, the researcher has to select particular approaches (brynard & henekom, 2006, p. 36). this study was carried out at the department of home affairs, and the research design used was a qualitative case-study design that sought to gain a deeper understanding of acceptance of e-government services by the limpopo department of home affairs officials in the selected service centres. qualitative case studies can be used successfully in the description of groups (small) communities and organisations (welman, kruger, & mitchell, 2005; de vos, strydom, fouché, & delport, 2011). the three chosen centres were capricorn, waterberg, and sekhukhune. the capricorn centre was chosen as representative of a semi-urban area, and because it predominantly services clients that may bring forth the cosmopolitan dynamic of the inner city, since most of them reside around the capital city, polokwane. the other two (sekhukhune and waterberg) centres are rural-based centres, and they were included in the study to help understand the state of e-government and the crises faced in rural centres of dha. sample methods utilised in this paper are purposeful sampling. a qualitative approach was opted for because the researcher was a key instrument (creswell, 2009, p. 175); and in playing an important role in examining official documents and interviewing participants using semi-structured interviews. a total of nine officials (three from each centre) who were comprised of both management centre and frontline officials were selected by the researcher. all these participants were subjected to semi-structured face-toface interviews, which allowed the researcher to ask both primary and probing questions, but most importantly, the collected data was analysed and triangulated against findings from the reviewed literature to balance the validity of the empirical findings. therefore, the research methodology used is deemed appropriate to determine the uptake of e-government services by the limpopo dha. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 41 published by scholink inc. 4. results given the nature of the application of e-government in the dha at the centres where there is resistance towards technology, it is recommendable that the department undertakes an awareness campaign regarding online applications and communications with the department. the awareness campaign must particularly focus on the people who are deeply entrenched by socio-economic and cultural factors such as education. it is through awareness that in such areas the critical targets of e-government could be met. according to heeks (2001), these are: • improved government processes (e-administration) • connecting citizens (e-citizen and e-services) • building external interactions (e-society) the department should consult communities and users whenever new ict programmes are introduced. this will maximise knowledge and awareness as well as increased participation in the ict programmes. one of the disturbing trends is the assumption that communities will participate in the programmes without full knowledge of the utilisation of the applications no matter the simplicity. 4.1 improved access access to online services is one important factor in measuring whether e-government regarding government to citizens (g2c) is maximised. it is recommended that the department must introduce a free internet connection through wi-fi to ensure maximised access to online amenities. most rural dwellers in which many of the dha centres are based still do not have access to technology due to the affordability of data. online applications or access to the department’s website is not for free. this leaves recipients with no option other than visiting the centres. 4.2 capacitation of employees on the use of icts one of the disturbing challenges that were noted during interviews with street-level officials in the centres was a lack of knowledge, skills, and training on the ict projects. the study recommends that the department must put in place cost-effective measures in a way of increasing the capacity and skills of the employees in the centres. 4.3 ict infrastructure investment it is recommended that the dha put more resources into the development of ict infrastructure in the form of investment. it is a known fact that communities in south africa are still drowned in inequalities, particularly on the digital divide in limpopo province. a maximised investment in ict will ensure that there is sufficient access to the technological impetus necessary for e-government in the department. this will also facilitate economic development in the society. 4.4 improve language policy south africa has eleven (11) official languages that are currently spoken in societies. it was found that the department’s website uses english only as a medium of communication with internal and external communities. this has become a barrier to participation in icts among community members. it is recommended that the department amend the policy to cater different languages of its recipients. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 42 published by scholink inc. interviews with help desk officials in the centers shows that one of the barriers to the use of ict programmes was language issue which could not be resolved by operations or ict officials because it requires policy change. this would be important for maximised community participation in the use of icts and e-government projects. 5. discussion this paper sought to investigate the uptake of e-government services in the limpopo department of home affairs at the selected service centres. to this end, it can be argued that the adoption and implementation of e-government in the department of home affairs has been met with good intentions, particularly for the preparation of citizens for the world of technology and knowledge of the technological developments in the 21st century and ultimately the fourth industrial revolution. in the process, the government of south africa through service delivery agents like the dha intends to improve access and increased communication, transparency, and accountability through e-government. the dha must consider vast infrastructure investment and education in the implementation of ict programmes as critical facilitators of e-government. averting challenges faced in the process would mean that the department must heed outcomes from empirical research studies such as this one for positive options and recommendations to improve and predict prospects and hindrances. references chang, i-c, li, y-c., hung, w-f., & hwang, h-g. 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(2002). southern african development community -world economic forum consultation report on e-readiness better, faster, cheaper: developing and leveraging world class ict networks for social and economic advancement [online]. retrieved from http://www.weforum.org microsoft word ape-v3n4-p1 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 1 original paper perspectives of parents towards technical and vocational education and training (tvet) in zimbabwe joburg mahuyu1 & albert makochekanwa2* 1 humanities and social sciences, zimbabwe ezekiel guti university, bindura, zimbabwe 2 economics, university of zimbabwe, harare, zimbabwe * albert makochekanwa, faculty of social studies, university of zimbabwe, harare, zimbabwe received: august 16, 2020 accepted: september 6, 2020 online published: september 8, 2020 doi:10.22158/ape.v3n4p1 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v3n4p1 abstract this paper presents the parents’ perceptions on technical and vocational education and training (tvet) in zimbabwe. the target population comprise of 63 parents with children in secondary schools. quantitative research method, whereby an interview protocol involving twenty open ended questions exploring the parental perspectives, was employed. open-ended questions allowed participants the freedom to express their views in their own words, in their own time and in a place of their own choice. the study revealed that most parents have negative attitude towards tvet. going forward, there is need for interventions like implementing media campaigns and awareness raising programs across the country with the aim of encouraging the enrolment of potential students into tvet education and/or institutions. keywords technical, vocational, education, training, perceptions 1. introduction education, since time immemorial, has been used in the world from ancient cultures to the present as a means of acquiring knowledge (ilo, 2012), skills, attitudes, values and competencies which are applied to unearth hidden knowledge and apply them effectively to achieve socio-cultural, economic, political and technological developments. technical and vocational education and training (tvet) refers to studies in the areas of technology, applied sciences, agriculture, business studies, industrial studies and visual arts (boateng, 2012). tvet skills are essential to generate job creation, employment and a productive economy (heraty, morley, & mccarthy, 2000). in other words, tvet prepares the youth for the job market either to be employed or become self-employed. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 2 published by scholink inc. according to world bank (2008), tvet is the secret behind the technological advancement and economic fortunes of several developing nations across the globe. in a bid to redress the challenges of poverty, unemployment, low technological progress and slow national development caused by apathy towards tvet, the policymakers pursued several socioeconomic programmes, but their performances were woeful and catastrophic (ahmad & singh, 2003). unesco-unevoc (2012) noted that this form of education had great prospect for tackling poverty, enhancing employability through skills acquisition and boosting sustainable development in different continents. in africa, the report emphasized that tvet was imperative for boosting the skills of learners in secondary schools, polytechnics and tvet-oriented institutions to meet the expectations of the world of work (industry) and self-employment. the governments of sub-saharan african (ssa) countries were renewing efforts to promote technical and vocational education and training (tvet) with the belief that skills formation enhances productivity and sustains competitiveness in the global economy (dasmani, 2011). despite legislations enacted, tvet systems implemented in southern african development community (sadc) countries faced many challenges and were not always well aligned with the needs of the local labour market and economy (szirmai, gebreeyesus, guadagno, & verspagen, 2013). in case of zimbabwe, since the 1990s, the expansion of private training providers became powerful in the tvet sector. indeed, most of these private training providers were preparing students for the national foundation certificate (nfc), certificate, diploma or degree level qualifications. 1.1 background and context the development of tvet in zimbabwe found its roots in the crafts training that was taking place in natal organised by the native commissioner of natal, loram. the philosophy of tvet was brought to zimbabwe by kegwin and jowitt in 1923 resulting in establishment of skills centres at tjolotjo and domboshava mainly for crafts training in building, carpentry and agriculture. transformation in the school sector in tvet took place after the education commission chaired by professor judges (1962). the commission emphasised the establishment of ecological curriculum, for example, introduction of f2 schools. that was a purely practical curriculum running parallel to the f1 academic streams. the system was not received by people because it was rather discriminatory as f2 schools were only for the blacks and they were eventually faced out after zimbabwe got its independence in 1980. despite the fact that country has implemented tvet education in its training system for a number of years, no studies have been done in the context of zimbabwe to hear the views and perceptions of parents towards tvet training system, specifically those parents with children in secondary schools. once these children have graduated from secondary schools, they will either enrol for tvet training or university training. parents of these children are a major stakeholder, among other stakeholders who directly or indirectly influence these children when it comes to making a choice to either to enrol for tvet training or choose another education path. to this end, the research problem of this study, posed as a question is: what are the perceptions of parents with children who are about to consider enrolling www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 3 published by scholink inc. for tvet training? thus, the main purpose of this study is to explore parents’ perspectives towards the technical and vocational education and training (tvet) in zimbabwe. a systematic reform of post-independence tvet policy in zimbabwe has not yet taken place. however, a number of reform initiatives are noteworthy. in 2005, the government of zimbabwe established higher education examination council (hexco) with the sole mandate for tvet programmes in polytechnics, colleges, vocational training centres and schools were to sit alongside the apprenticeship authority, which was responsible for lower-level tvet qualifications. a policy review in 2006 stressed the need for an overall human resources development strategy and was later followed by the draft skills policy in 2010. a qualifications framework and authority have been proposed, but not yet implemented. after realising that the phasing out of f2 schools which imparted skills to youth was a shot on the foot, the government of zimbabwean established the nziramasanga commission of 1999 which came out with the following findings just to mention a few, and these are now being followed religiously:  each school child/pupil/student / learner is expected to do at least two (2) practical subjects.  schools are expected to offer a wide range of practical subjects, for example, carpentry, building, agriculture, food and nutrition, fashion and fabrics ict metal work, creative art and design and many more.  review of the school curriculum at the time of writing this study (september 2020) was in progress, though some aspects of the ongoing curriculum review are already being implementation.  skills training were starting from early childhood development (ecd) up to (a) level. for example, agriculture as a subject at grade 7 was first examined in november 2017 by zimbabwe schools examinations council (zimsec). the government has also given parastatals the mandate to train school leavers with relevant passes at advanced level to undergo an apprenticeship training to equip them with necessary skills relevant for the job. a good example is the zimbabwe electricity transmission distribution company (zetdc) which provide in house and apprenticeship to workers and employees. tvevt in zimbabwe has been driven by the concern to create a national tvet sector responsive to labour market demands and able to drive the development of skills needed for economic growth and development. the reforms initiated by the government from 1999 (as recommended by the nziramasanga commission) were often associated with policies to decentralise governance of the public tvet system, and to include public and private providers in the service of skills development. most tvet agencies had an explicit role to include private and/or enterprise-based providers within the tvet system. in zimbabwe, tvet is delivered by different types of providers including secondary schools, technical colleges, polytechnics, vocational training centres, non-governmental organizations (ngos), training companies and enterprises. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 4 published by scholink inc. 1.2 research problem and study rationale although there are a number of documented researches on tvet, to the best knowledge of the authors, no one in zimbabwe has made an effort to make a research on the perspectives of parents towards tvet. the socialisation of the child starts from the family and hence parents play a pivotal role in the upbringing of the children. only parents could motivate their children to like any learning area. it is against this background that this research paper tries to close this literature gap in the case of zimbabwe. there are a variety of challenges affecting the effectiveness of the tvet sector, both in zimbabwe and globally. some of the key challenges includes the mismatch between acquired skills and market needs, widespread concern about poor quality training and training environments, negative public attitudes and perceptions regarding tvet (atchoarena & delluc, 2001). in developing countries such as zimbabwe, tvet had been characterised by low status and poor attitudes in comparison to academic subjects. this study explored views and attitudes of parents; whose voices are rarely heard in educational policy formulation. the value placed on practical subjects, that is, technical and vocational subjects in comparison to academic subjects is not highly pronounced. the negative attitudes of parents towards tvet are implied by several factors including, very low rate of students’ enrolment in tvet institutions, poor infrastructure and limited resources devoted to activities of tvet institutions, limited competitiveness of tvet graduates in the labour market, and the mismatching between tvet curriculum and industry requirements. boateng (2012) emphasised the need for transforming tvet in line with developments in the job market. however, knowledge of youth attitudes and aspirations towards training and careers is limited. bennell et al. (1999) acknowledged the scarcity of contemporary inquiry into tvet in africa which made this study a worthy contribution. globally, tvet struggled to define and promote its status against academic subjects. cedefop (2011) maintained that tvet had been viewed as a second-best option which carries a social stigma in a number of countries. in the united kingdom, wolf (2011, 6) proclaimed that tvet had for a long time been seen as ‘the poor relation of academic learning.’ in zimbabwe tvet had generated considerable interest among academicians and politicians. shizha and kariwo (2011), mupinga, bunnet, and redman (2005) and chinyamunzore (1995) concurred that the role of tvet in zimbabwe need to be redefined. the then minister of education coltart (2011) regretted that zimbabwe’s post-independence education system was too academic and fell short of meeting the needs of the youth. despite the clamour for orienting the country’s education system towards, the parents of potential tvet students have not been consulted to get their respective views. the country has been subjected to considerable social, political and economic turmoil since 2000. zimbabwe was once dubbed the bread basket of africa producing a range of crops, livestock and minerals. political instability and subsequently economic crisis have seen the economy shrinking by approximately 50.3% (unesco, 2015) between 2000 and 2008. many companies closed down. these developments led to a sharp rise in poverty, unemployment, infrastructure collapse and a haemorrhage www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 5 published by scholink inc. of human resources (unesco, 2015). unesco (2015) estimated that about three to four million untrained, trained and experienced personnel left zimbabwe for neighbouring countries. despite the fast-shrinking employment market, academic and university education continues to be the government’s priority while tvet remained underfunded and peripheral. it should be noted though that the academically skewed education policy raised zimbabwe’s literacy rate to great heights. unesco reported that zimbabwe had an estimated literacy rate of between 92% and 97% since 2000 to date, representing the highest in africa (munjanganja & machawira, 2015). paradoxically, zimbabwe had the highest unemployment rate in the world. the unemployment rate was estimated at 80% in 2005 rising to 95% by 2009 (cia world fact book, 2016), and the situation has remained the same since then. despite some recommendations by the nziramasanga commission of inquiry into education in 1999, by start of 2015, zimbabwe had not yet implemented them. as zimbabwe’s policy makers and educators sought to overhaul the education system to address young people’s aspirations and the country’s labour needs, this study particularly offered different perspectives for policy makers’ consideration. the research made recommendations for addressing the status of tvet, attitudinal change and careers guidance for students. this paper is an empirical contribution to ongoing discussions on the role of tvet in zimbabwe. the findings from this study would appraise educational policy makers on the views of parents and cultural status quo of tvet. 1.3 purpose of the study the purpose of this study is to establish parents’ perspectives towards technical and vocational education and training (tvet) in zimbabwe. the specific objectives of the study are to: 1. undertake and identify parental perspectives of the tvet training. 2. help government and other stakeholders to scale-up skilling of new entrants and up skilling of existing workers to contribute to higher growth of priority sectors. 3. strengthen skills development and enhance overall coordination of the currently fragmented skills development systems both within public and private tvet institutions 4. increase public awareness about the opportunities that tvet avail regarding skills development and diffuse negative perceptions about tvet as a dead-end option to further education. 2. methodology 2.1 research design a quantitative research methodology was adopted using an interview protocol involving twenty open ended questions exploring the parental perspectives. open-ended questionnaire allowed participants the freedom to express their views in their own words and in their own time and in a place of their choice. with regards to sample size, 63 parents participated in the survey. these parents were targeted because they had children learning in the secondary schools (ranging from form 3 to form 6), and these children after graduating from secondary schools will have the option of enrolling either for tvet or university www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 6 published by scholink inc. education. 2.2 data collection procedures data collection and recording of data from open-ended questionnaires was done using a paper-based form which listed all twenty open-ended questions for parents to answer and complete. the principal advantage of this strategy was that it allowed plenty of time for parents to answer the questions. however, (kendall and kendall, 2002) suggested that lack of opportunity to observe the physical responses of parents about the topics and un-timeous return of completed questionnaires were some of the limitations of this approach. the completed questionnaires were collected two weeks after distribution. data pertaining to each question was entered into separate excel spreadsheets. a thematic analytical framework was applied to analyse data in line with the inductive approach. an inductive approach when used in quantitative research help to augment understanding of complex data using summary themes or categories from the raw data (thomas, 2003). the responses from the questions were grouped into three domains to explain the viewpoints of parents concerning tvet. in each domain, there were issues describing the detailed aspects of the tvet sector. according to ryan (2003), there are twelve techniques used to create themes and sub-themes. in this study, three techniques, namely (1) word repetitions, (2) key words in context, and (3) similarities and differences were applied to determine the common emerging themes in each issue. the next step was to identify sub-themes that link the research findings and the research questions through data analysis. data was compiled by gathering them in the poles, themes and categories to understand the meaning of a phenomenon. 3. result 3.1 meaning of the term tvet parents were asked the question: what comes to your minds when the term, tvet, is mentioned? the responses showed that parents had different understanding of the word tvet. out of the 63 parents who provided answers to this question only 62 provided meaningful answers and 1 did not provide an answer. of the 62 parents, 12 (or 19%) said that tvet referred to hands on; while 37 (or 60%) said that it referred to skills with the remaining 13 (or 21%) indicating that it referred to practical subjects such as woodwork, building, metal work, fashion and fabrics; and food and nutrition. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 7 published by scholink inc. figure 1. parents’ understanding of tvet source: survey. 3.2 decisions for a student to enroll for a tvet qualification decisions with regards to enrolling for tvet training has been a subject of contention given that there are many stakeholders who provided education guidance, directly and indirectly. to objectively deal with this subjective, parents were asked the question: who made the decision for a student to enroll for a tvet qualification? from the parents who responded, it emerged that out of the 63 respondents, 52 parents said that the decision to enroll for a tvet qualification rested with the parent or guardian, 9 parents said that the decision rested with the student, 1 parent said that it depends with how the student has passed and 1 parent said that the decision to enroll was reached after a thorough discussion between the child and the parent or guardian. figure 2 provides the distribution of parents’ responses. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 8 published by scholink inc. figure 2. the person who makes decision regarding enrolling for tvet training source: survey. 3.3 strengths of tvet training the following question was asked to the parents: what are the strengths and weaknesses of tvet system in zimbabwe? figure 3 shows that most parents know the importance of tvet, especially given the zimbabwean situation from 2008 to present where most skilled individuals earned a better living through selfemployment. tvet is seen as an essential as it provided a setting for students to develop critical thinking and problem-solving abilities, gaining skills and hands-on experience. figure 3. importance of tvet training from parents’ perspective source: survey. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 9 published by scholink inc. 3.4 weaknesses of tvet training overly, parents had a negative perception with regards to entry requirements and types of students enrolling in tvet programs. there was consensus of parents that only students who achieved average and poor results enrolled in tvet programmes, meaning students who failed ordinary (o) or advanced (a) level or failed to get a place in a university and that they had limited avenues for the future. therefore, tvet was considered as a last resort. a number of weaknesses were highlighted by parents and these included: (i) few tvet centres, (ii) gender stereotyping, (iii) poor instructor training, (iv) no clear linkage between vocational and general education, (v) poor linkage between formal and non-formal tvet, and (vi) poor linkage of tvet to the labour market. furthermore, traditional skills, business management and entrepreneurial training and harmonisation of tvet programmes and qualifications were found not to be properly documented. figure 4. weaknesses of tvet training source: survey. parents claimed that training in tvet had no meaning in zimbabwe as there were no industries for attachment and that there are no jobs. in fact, in most cases tvet jobs are low paying and tvet institutions have poor infrastructure. 3.5 the educational level of the students who enrolled in tvet programmes the academic qualifications of students who enrolled for tvet training in zimbabwe are depicted in table 1. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 10 published by scholink inc. table 1. educational level of tvet students level frequency percentage grade 7 7 11 “o” level 41 65 “a” level 10 16 below grade 7 5 8 total 63 100 source: survey. the enrolment qualification presented in table 1 clearly showed that in zimbabwe most tvet students had passed “o” level subjects but could not proceed to “a” level due to weak passes or financial problems. vocational education and training in zimbabwe is characterised as something ‘for other people’s children. as highlighted by wolf (2002, p. 56) who regarded tvet as second choice option whilst academic education was regarded as the ‘gold standard’ to which the best should aspire. unsurprisingly, the literature on young people’s perceptions of vocational education and training suggested that they were not inclined to (or were at least reluctant to) pursue vocational courses or careers (finegold et al., 1990; bell, 2005). such beliefs or perceptions were predicated upon the prevalent understanding that in order to be successful in life an individual need to acquire educational credentials in the form of high-status academic qualifications. literature also suggests that vocational courses and careers are more often pursued by individuals who have performed relatively poor at school. in zimbabwe, tvet is considered mostly for school dropout, and those who failed grade 7, “o” level ad “a” level. 3.6 nature of tvet learners most parents from the survey viewed tvet students as those who frequently come from a lower economic status background, from mountainous or rural areas, or from households where there are other specific, extenuating circumstances. one parent said that “students joining tvet programs are mainly from difficult economic status families and from rural areas. there are only small numbers of students from urban zones entering the tvet sector”. 3.6 learners’ knowledge about tvet some parents from the survey indicated that tvet students did not know how to choose a career or had insufficient or poor guidance. parents said that students who entered the tvet sector did not had enough information about the tvet sector from the career guidance counsellor in the school, or advice from their relatives, especially their parents. also, parents indicated that some students did not make a confident choice. they just enrolled in tvet programmes because they were following their friends or had no other opportunity for study after they failed their grade 7 or form 4 examinations. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 11 published by scholink inc. 3.7 sense of belonging and pride in tvet qualifications respondents were asked the question: do graduates from tvet institutions felt a sense of belonging and pride in their profession? table 2 show that out of the 60 parents who responded, 28 said that graduates of tvet schools felt a sense of belonging and pride in their profession. at the same time, 32 said that graduates do not feel a sense of belonging and pride because academically they failed and their achievement (of having tvet qualifications) was never celebrated. table 2. extent of pride in tvet qualification feelings of tvet graduates yes no no. percent no. percent frequency 28 47 32 53 source: survey. 3.8 activities for guidance and awareness about tvet participating parents were asked to respond to the following question: are there any activities for guidance and awareness about tvet from the government? from the responses given in table 3, 50% of respondents said that there were no activities for guidance and awareness of tvet while another 50% indicated that activities for guidance and awareness were limited given that only those that attended speech and prize giving days and careers days in schools managed to get information. table 3. availability of tvet guidance and awareness activities tvet awareness yes no no. percent no. percent frequency 29 50 29 50 source: survey. 3.9 barriers that limit enrolment in tvet institutions despite fees being low in tvet institutions, it was highlighted by 41 parents that tvet tuition fees continue to be one of the barriers to enrolment. a total of 10 parents said that there were no colleges, while 8 parents said that they were not informed about the tvet education option, and 4 parents said that there was lack of equipment in these institutions. according to these parents, therefore, these challenges meant that it was a mere waste of time to send their children to tvet institutions given the high possibility of that theory could be taught only without the necessary practical for skills acquisition. table 4 depict barriers to tvet enrolment in zimbabwe as observed from parent’s perspective. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 12 published by scholink inc. table 4. barriers to tvet enrolment in zimbabwe type of barrier frequency percentage no school fees 42 65 no colleges 10 16 not informed 8 13 absence of equipment 4 6 total 63 100 source: survey. 3.10 overcoming barriers to tvet enrolment parents were given the opportunity to suggest pragmatic and possible solutions to overcome the barriers to tvet enrolment. specifically, they were asked the following question: how can the barriers mentioned above be mitigated? table 5 provides suggested solutions. most parents, constituting 62% of respondents prioritized the building of more tvet facilities (colleges) as the number one solution, while 17% considered offering free tvet training as another solution. table 5. ways of overcoming barriers to tvet enrolment way of overcoming frequency percentage building more colleges 33 62 improving campaigns 7 13 giving grants 2 4 training of more lecturers 2 4 offering free education 9 17 total 53 100 source: survey. 3.11 problems faced by female students in tvet institutions the girl child faces a lot of challenges, chief among them being stigmatisation. from the survey, 4 respondents said female students were regarded as being inferior as tvet subjects are regarded to be for boys. 28 parents indicated that some female students fell pregnant and drop out of school for a variety of reasons including (i) seeking favours to pass instead of working hard to compete with the boys and (ii) some end up falling prey to teachers or lecturers who propose love. furthermore, some parents said that there was gender discrimination as the recruitment was biased towards boys and only very few girls could be recruited. during classroom lessons, and hands-on practical lessons, girls are often humiliated and given demeaning words when they cannot perform correctly the various practical tasks assigned. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 13 published by scholink inc. 3.12 attitude of parents towards tvet most parents had a negative attitude towards tvet. they felt that tvet was characterised by low performers, those that would have failed, some students who could not read or write, low salaries, dirty work and unorganised. however, some parents said that tvet, if well organised and taught, the graduates can earn a good living through selfemployment and can also employ other people thereby helping the government to create employment. parents needed their children to achieve good results at school, thus rendering other skills and interests of their children useless. this was also seen as one of the reasons why students did not consider tvet programmes. parents emulated outstanding academic university students unlike successful students in tvet. 3.13 community perception on tvet respondents were asked the question: how is the community’s perception on tvet be changed? interviewed parents said that there was negative perception with regards to tvet training in zimbabwe. going forward, parents said that the community perception on tvet could be improved through holding of workshops, campaigns, conducting meetings with parents, inviting successful tvet candidates during field days or speech and prize giving days and holding some road shows. they also said that such activities would help to build tvet image. 3.14 improving quality of tvet graduates responding to the question: how best to improve community awareness on the need and importance of upgrading tvet sector professionally and organizationally? parents enumerated the following as possible ways to improve the quality: i. making attachment or work-related learning part of the tvet curriculum so that learners can gain actual practical experience ii. increase on-the-job training iii. recruiting students with at least 5 ‘o’ levels iv. equipping tvet institutions so that actual modern tools and equipment are used and learners learn how to use the machines than to just do theory without real practical. v. curriculum offered by tvet institutions should take on board challenges facing the country vi. teachers teaching tvet subjects should be qualified to ensure that right content is taught by competent resource persons. 3.15 enrolment of students into tvet programs the economic, geographic and social factors that encouraged students to enrol into tvet programs were highlighted as follows by parents: i. limited financial resources to pursue academic subjects as they were expensive as compared to tvet subjects ii. some students needed to acquire skills for life to be self-employed, and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 14 published by scholink inc. iii. in zimbabwe there was high unemployment rate, therefore some learners opted for tvet learning areas so that they could get the necessary skills to earn a leaving and some learners just wanted to link the mind and hands. 3.16 accessibility of tvet centres in zimbabwe, tvet centres were found mostly in urban areas whereas about 70% of the population resides in the rural areas with one tvet per district and some districts had no tvet institutions at all. as depicted in table 6, of the 54 parents who responded, 36 said that they faced challenges in finding tvet centres to meet their desire, and 18 said that tvet institutions found in geographic locations far away from their localities. table 6. accessibility of tvet centres difficulties in finding tvet centres yes no no. percent no. percent frequency 36 67 18 33 source: survey. other responses were that some nearby centres had no qualified teaching personnel. lack of money/funds to go to other centres that are fully equipped and with trained teaching staff was another biggest challenge as that involved other expense including travelling, accommodation, food and general upkeep while at the centre. 3.17 infrastructure and equipment infrastructure and equipment are some of the major learning capital which underpin the quality of tvet training programmes. parents were asked the question: is the infrastructure and equipment used in the tvet training in tandem with the developing trends in technology? most parents said that infrastructure and equipment used in most tvet training institutions is not in tandem with the current technology. table 7 indicated that out of 60 parents who responded, 31 parents said that equipment used was not in tandem with current technology at all and 29 said that the equipment needed to be replaced since some were obsolete. table 7. state of tvet infrastructure and equipment state of equipment in tandem with technology not in tandem with technology no. percent no. percent frequency 29 48 31 52 source: survey. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 15 published by scholink inc. equipment used in tvet training was not in tandem with equipment used in industry and labour market as evidenced by responses given by parents. the responses showed that the equipment used in tvet institutions was a cause for concern as it was not in line with those in the labour market rendering tvet graduates to be of no particular use. according to table 8, out of the 64 parents who responded, 46 (or 72%) said that the machines and equipment were not in line with those used in the labour market and 18 (or 28%) said that they were not sure. therefore, it follows that there is need to equip tvet institutions to keep them in line with those in the labour market. some industries tended to donate such obsolete machines and equipment to tvet institutions as the institutions do not have money to purchase new equipment. table 8. tvet equipment versus equipment in labour market state of equipment in tandem with labour market not in tandem with labour market no. percent no. percent frequency 18 28 46 72 source: survey. 3.18 safety measures in tvet institutions given that tvet training was associated with laboratory and workshops with various equipment, safety in use and keeping of such equipment is paramount to avoid accidents and damages. survey results showed that safety in tvet institutions was not guaranteed. out of the 52 parents who responded, 34 (representing 65%) said that there were no safety measures whilst 18 respondents (or 35%) said that there were some safety measures in place though there was need for major improvements. 4. discussion the tvet sector was generally viewed by parents negatively, but with some positive highlights. tvet in zimbabwe has been driven by the concern to create a national tvet sector responsive to labour market demand and able to drive the development of skills needed for economic growth and development. tvet skills were essential to generate jobs/employment and a productive economy. tvet struggled to define and promote its status against academic subjects. in zimbabwe tvet has generated considerable interest among academicians and politicians. despite the clamour for orienting the country’s education system towards, the parents of potential tvet students have not been consulted to get their respective views. in this current study, it emerged out that majority of parents have negative perception as far as tvet training is concerned. with regards to tvet enrolment, out of the 63 respondents, 52 (or 83%) parents said that the decision to enroll for a tvet qualification rested with the parent or guardian. the survey www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 16 published by scholink inc. indicated that most tvet students would have reached grade 7, “o” level or “a” level and failed. for parents whose children enrolled for university education, they considered tvet in zimbabwe as something “for other people’s children”. interviewed parents indicated that tvet graduates did not feel a sense of belonging and pride because academically they failed and their achievement was never celebrated. lack of school fees, absence of tvet institutions in some areas, not being informed, lack of equipment and lack of qualified teaching personnel were some of the factors that were given as contributing to low enrolments in tvet institutions. most parents said that the infrastructure and equipment used in the tvet were not in tandem with the current technology and also those found in the labour market. in some cases, female students faced some challenges simply because tvet institutions are dominated by boys and at times they (female students) are humiliated and negatively labelled, thus leading to stigmatisation of female students in tvet institutions. 5. conclusions and recommendations the main purpose of the research was to examine the perceptions of parents with regards to tvet education in zimbabwe. in order to achieve its objective, the study adopted the quantitative research methodology using an interview protocol involving twenty open ended questions exploring the parental perspectives. open-ended questions allowed participants the freedom to express their views in their own words, in their own time and in a place of their choice. the study found out that parents had a negative attitude towards tvet training. in light of this survey, several interventions are required to develop the tvet sector and to change the perception and attitudes of parents towards tvet training in zimbabwe. the following are some of the recommendations to improve parents’ attitude towards tvet: i. implementing media campaigns and awareness raising programs across the country with the aim of encouraging the enrolment of potential students in tvet institutions. ii. continuous developing of the teachers’ capacities and facilities of tvet institutions. iii. improve infrastructure so as to attract learners, thus improving enrolment and recruiting qualified personnel who can teach competently. iv. addressing negative attitude and perceptions towards tvet training by holding of road shows, symposiums, distribution of pamphlets in various languages so that parents in different communities can read and get to know and appreciate tvet. taking on board the above recommendations, respective government ministries and departments as well as other tvet training stakeholders can develop interventions that enhance tvet delivery for the benefit of the individual graduates and the country at large or world over. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 17 published by scholink inc. acknowledgement 1) this research is part of a project study which was funded by international development research centre (idrc) of canada and authors are very grateful to idrc. 2) ministry of higher and tertiary education, science and technology development, zimbabwe. 3) ministry of primary and secondary education, zimbabwe. 4) department of humanities and social sciences, zimbabwe ezekiel guti university, bindura, zimbabwe. 5) department of economics, university of zimbabwe, harare, zimbabwe. references african union. (2000). meeting of the bureau of the conference of ministers of education of the african union. addis ababa. agyarkoh, e., sumaila, s. m., & yankson, p. d. (2014). tvet stigmatization in developing countries: reality or falacy? european journal of training and development studies, 1(1), 27-42. asian development bank (adb). (2013). viet nam: vocational and technical education project. retrieved from http://www.adb.org/documents/viet-nam-vocational-and-technicaleducationproject assahel consultants. (2013). final report a pre-survey of key stakeholders’ attitudes towards tvet in the gaza strip. atchoarena, d. & delluc, a. (2001). revisiting technical and vocational education in subsaharan africa: an update on trends, innovations and challenges. paris: international institute for educational planning, world bank. baxter, p., & jack, s. (2008). qualitative case study methodology: study design and implementation for novice researchers. the qualitative report, 13(4), 544-559. bennell, p., bendera, s., kanyenze, g., kimambo, e., kiwia, s., mbiriyakura, t., mukyanuzi, f., munetsi, n., muzulu, j., parsalaw, w., & temu, j. (1999). vocational education and training in tanzania and zimbabwe in the context of economic reform, education research paper no. 28. department for international development. boateng, c. (2012). restructuring vocational and technical education in ghana: the role of leadership development. international journal of humanities and social science, 2(4), 108-114. cavanagh, d., shaw, g., & wang, l. (2013). technical and vocational education and training, and skills development for rural transformation. in unesco-unevoc international centre for technical and vocational education and training, revisiting global trends in tvet: reflections on theory and practice (pp. 309-335). chinyamunzore, n. (1995). devolution and evolution of technical/vocational education curriculum in zimbabwe. idater 1995 conference, loughborough: loughborough university. cia (central intelligence agency). (2016). zimbabwe economy. retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2129.html www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 18 published by scholink inc. coltart, d. (2011). we can’t all be intellectuals. speech to the greatness career conference in harare. dang, v. h. (2015). parental perspectives towards the vocational education training sector in vietnam. journal of education and vocational research, 6(1), 37-51. https://doi.org/10.22610/jevr.v6i1.178 kendall, k. e., & kendall, j. e. (2002). systems analysis and design (5th. ed.). upper saddle river, nj: prentice hall. london. mufanechiya, t., & mufanechiya, a. (2011). motivating zimbabwean secondary school students to learn: a challenge. journal of african studies and development, 3(5), 96-104. munowenyu, e. (1999). the need to offer basic vocational education in zimbabwe’s secondary schools. zimbabwe journal of educational research, 11(1), 43-57. nherera, c. m. (1994). vocationalisation of secondary education in zimbabwe: a theoretical and empirical investigation (ph.d.). university of london. nleya, f. (2014). promotion of vocational subjects crucial as pass rates plummet. retrieved from https://www.newsday.co.zw/2014/02/28/promotion-vocational-subjectscrucial-pass-ratesplummet/ nziramasanga, c. t. (1999). report of the presidential commission of inquiry into education and training. harare: zimbabwe government. shizha, e., & kariwo, m. t. (2011). education and development in zimbabwe: a social, political and economic analysis. rotterdam: sense publishers. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6091-606-9 unesco (united nations educational, scientific and cultural organization). (2015). country programming document zimbabwe 2013. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 62 original paper cultural devaluation of women in the nigerian society up to 2010: an examination of the “i mbya jin i” institution among the jukun wapan in wukari area of taraba state francis, john tenong 1 & hannatu atoshi 1 1 department of history and diplomatic studies, federal university wukari, taraba state, nigeria received: june 22, 2023 accepted: july 29, 2023 online published: august 03, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n3p62 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n3p62 abstract cultural sentiments have placed women and its institutions at a disadvantage in most african societies including nigeria. most cultures see women as inferior who are only useful in household chores, and reproduction. this indeed has informed the patriarchal nature of the nigerian society, which explains underplay of women and its institutions. thus, this paper investigated the cultural devaluation of women in the nigerian society, with a specific focus on the “i mbya jin i” institution among the jukun wapan in wukari area of taraba state up to 2010. this paper particularly targeted at examining the cultural place of women and its institutions among the jukun, trends in this institutions, and it place in the jukun community today. the historical methodology was used, and it was structured along thematic lines. though the research revealed that culture and religion are associated with the devaluation of women in the society, the religious claim is however untenable. what is tenable is the fact that cultural sentiments have under play the roles of women and its institutions in the society. it is also the contention of this research that women have been a significant part of the socio-cultural, economic, and political development. this was evident in the cultural institutions among the jukun wapan women in wukari area of taraba state nigeria. keywords culture, women, patriarchy, i mbya jin i, institution, deity 1. introduction culture, in most primitive societies around the globe, places women at a disadvantage, halima and falmata (2020, p. 30). their rights are subjective, and so they suffer from all forms of discrimination and alienation that made it difficult for them to be considered in any matter of socio-engineering. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 63 published by scholink inc. however, these realities have changed in most developed societies of the global north. the primitive culture which had hitherto placed women at a disadvantage, gave way to elaborate rights and privileges for the women as with men. but in many developing societies nothing has changed; instead, it is now endemic. the nigerian society is patriarchal in nature, makama (2013, p. 116). this is a feature of a traditional society structured along social relations with material base in favour of men than women. structurally, women are placed in an unequal position in families particularly in the area of inheritance rights and differential wages for equal or comparable work. toluwalase and segun (2017, p. 12), opined that a woman is not only subordinate to her husband, but to all the members of her husband family. hence, patriarchy is a key factor in the gender inequality and perception of women in the society. this explains why men keep the family name, while women are married out. in this way, men are being trained as leaders, while women are confined to domestic activities ascribed to them by culture makama (p. 116). despite the growing awareness on gender, gender inequality is still embedded in the nigerian society. the spread and dept is systemic and pervasive thereby influencing social and cultural institutions, halima and falmata (p. 10). for instance, formal and informal rules that regulate kinship patterns are gender bias and limit women’s access and opportunities. the bias against women is reflected in almost every sphere of life such as paid employment, leadership positions, and all sort of harassments and unhealthy treatment ranging from trafficking, marital rape, early marriage and obnoxious practices as female genital mutilation. consequently, the cultural bias against women has succeeded in the misrepresentation of women as inferior, and the conclusion that cultural sentiments has affected women’s performance in the socio-cultural, economic, and political milieu. it is against this backdrop that this paper examined the “i mbya jin i” institution among the jukun wapan women of wukari area of taraba state nigeria, up to 2010. early institutions among the jukun women as presented by deities and cults before the “i mbya jin i” institution emerged in 2010 were interrogated. this is so that we can appreciate the changes overtime, occasioned by the activities of christian missionaries, and the forces of globalization/postmodernism. 2. methodology the historical methodology was used for the research. the method of data collection include: both primary and secondary sources. the primary sources involved largely the use of oral interviews, which constitute a significant part in the e reconstruction of the past of africa, david l imbua (2021, p. 2). thus, the interviews magnanimously offered by members of the traditional council of the jukun chiefdom in wukari, provided this research work with relevant information on the norms and values of the jukun wapan woman in both past and present times. the secondary sources consisted of published materials including: books, conference papers and articles. both the primary and secondary sources served as compliment. this paper also benefited from the multi-disciplinary approach where research www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 64 published by scholink inc. carried out in disciplines other than history, samuel o. aghalino (2021, p. 1), was use to provide a wider perspective on the subject matter. structured along thematic lines for in-depth analysis, the analytical method sati u, fwatshak (2006, p. 73), was used for presentation which allowed for critical examination of data/facts for the study. 3. result 3.1 key debates on the devaluation of women in the nigerian society religion and culture emerged to have dictated gender relations over the years, and so, the devaluation of women in the society has been associated to religion and culture. some scholars (otuiche & nnabuenyi, 2015; olanipekun & onabanjo, 2020; toluwalase & segun, 2017) argued that both christianity and islam entrenched male superiority over the female. the reason for this claim is anchored on the biblical version of (genesis chapter 2, pp. 18-23), which they quoted: and the lord god said, it is not good that the man to be alone; i will make him an help meet for him… and the lord caused a deep sleep to fall on adam… and he took one of his ribs and closed up the flesh instead thereof…. made he a woman and brought her unto the man. and adam said this is now borne of my borne, and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called woman because she was taken out of man. based on the scripture above, otuiche and nnabuenyi (2015), argued that the woman is created as a secondary partner to the man, and interpreted it to mean “the theological basis for male chauvinism and the alienation of women by men even in the church of god”. on their part, olanipekun and onabanjo (2020, p. 32) also corroborated with otuiche and nnabueyi above, that the devaluation, inequality, and marginalization of women in the society is rooted in religion. they backed this argument with the book of (genesis 3:16), which read “i will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception; in sorrow thou shall bring forth children; and your desire shall be upon your husband, and he shall rule over thee”. toluwalase and segun, (2017, p. 14), equally maintained that christianity, islam, and traditional religions endorse inequality between men and women. in christianity they argued that women are exempted from priesthood which is an element of gender disparity. also pointing at the creation account of genesis 1: 26 -29; gen 2: 15 -20 in the holy bible, concluded that man is superior to woman, asserting that adam is placed more fundamental than eve because it is man that is created in the image of god. in any case, the claim of biblical alienation of woman is untenable. firstly otuiche and nnabuenyi who quoted the creation account in the biblical version of genesis (2: 18-23), and toluwalase and segun who quoted genesis (1:26-29; 2:15-20), of the creation, suggested that woman was alienated to man because she was created out of man. god formed out of the ground other creatures, but did not find a suitable match for the man and so he created woman from the rib of the man, just so that they can match genesis (2:19-20). meaning they are from the same sources. furthermore, the biblical usage of “man” during the creation theologically refer to both sex (man and woman) genesis (1:27), and so god created “man” in some biblical version “mankind” was used, he (god) created “man in his own www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 65 published by scholink inc. image…male and female he created them. secondly, olanipekun and onabanjo (p. 32) who cited (genesis, 3:16), that speaks on the sin of “man” (male and female) against god in the garden of eden, and the punishment thereof, opined that woman is subjected to man. further in verse (p. 17) of the same, book god spelled out the punishment of the male, which is painful toil of the ground to eat till eternity. it is important to note that when god speaks on the headship of male over the female is not alienating, derogatory or devaluating. in fact, he enjoins the male (husband) to treat female (wive), as christ treat the church, and even gave his life for it, ephesians (5: 21-28). so, the claim on the alienation and devaluation of the woman in the holy bible is a miscarriage. on the other flank, men are culturally seen as bread winners who should engaged in all forms of activities to provide food and carter for the livelihood of the family olanipekun and onabanjo (p. 32). women are expected to only act based on the dictates of their husbands, and so, they are culturally not recognized in any leadership role. this has been the case since communal to the present day where women in the various clans and ethnic groups in nigeria, are culturally neither included in decision making process, nor were allowed to be economically independent. such bias and perception of women in nigeria manifested in the statement made by president muhammadu buhari, on the 14 th october, 2016 cited in olanipekun and onabanjo (p. 35) “he doesn‟t know the political party his wife belongs to and he can only ascertain that his wife belongs to the kitchen, living room and the other room” the prevailing perception of a woman as inferior and useful only in house chores and reproduction, which has been widely associated to culture and the misinterpretation of the holy scripture, does not mean that women are passive players in the making of any society. this paper argues that women are also key players in the making of the society, but patriarchy as informed by the cultural belief system, blinds any view on the roles women play in the society. these roles are even evident in socio-cultural institutions. for example, among the ijo and edoid in delta region of the nigeria as quoted in toluwalase and segun (14), it is believed that “god is woyin (our mother), ayibarau (she who begets and kills); oginaranu and tamarau (creator), god for these ethnic groups is a female”. this only buttressed the fact that the roles of women and its institutions in the society suffer neglect due to cultural and structural bias, amaka et al. (2021, p. 28). equally worrisome is the thread posed to culture and cultural institutions by the forces of globalization/postmodernism, which emerged strongly in the early 1990s and flooded most cultures around the globe, especially in the developing world joseph and adesina (2018, p. 100). prior to globalization were distinct, robust and clearly defined cultural identities. but globalization obliterates these differences and boundaries, thereby posing a serious threat to culture. nigeria, being in the centre of this crisis is fast losing its cultural and value system. the tradition of various ethnic groups is fast being replaced with alien culture. some tradition and cultural practices are almost gone to into extinction. more worrisome is the class of educated elites who seem to have lost touch with the root, and now embracing alien culture, leman sunday francis (2017, p. 108). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 66 published by scholink inc. 4. discussion 4.1 deities and early institutions among the jukun wapan women early institutions among the jukun women are captured in the existence of deities, which is as old as the existence of the jukun people, rauta salleh (2022). the place of a woman, and its institution did not have a formal name. however women activities were coordinated, and represented by the various deities, cult, and personalities namely: the anwu-tsi, anwu-kaku, akwa and yaku amongst others. anwu-tsi is the head of all women in the community of wukari. her duties include leading the ceremonial annual royal seeds planting to signify the beginning of planting season. this festival cannot hold in her absence. she can also intercede on behalf of any woman who has offended the king or bridge the culture of the land, and her house served as a refuge for those who have committed minor offences. the anwu-tsi also exercises general supervision of the ayoku (king’s wives), and could fine any of them in the event of misconduct. the role of the anwu-tsi is very significant among the jukun. in fact, the aku (chief) and his cabinets are always careful not to offend her because it is the belief that she has some spiritual powers that could affect the weather adversely when being offended or angered. so her counsels are not taken for granted. in the event of her death, social burial rites are carried out and her hair is buried separately at puje (ancestral home). some rituals are thereby done, which will then reveal who the next anwu tsi will be. the anwu-kaku on the other hand, is the official sister of the aku (chief), usually the senior princess of the previous aku. literary the anwu –kaku meant “child is greater than a king” it is a title bestowed on a matured and responsible princess who mediates, and reconciles princess and princesses. she also helps in appeasing the aku on behalf of an offender, mary k. ta’wan (2022). women were actors in a wide range of rites and religious officiating, lami yakubu (2022). the jukun community of wukari performs some spiritual rites which are made possible with the help of a woman. one of these rites includes the “zha disi” or beer of the hearth. this rite is performed during “akwa” (pacification of the spirit of the dead). it is done by and for women who lost their husbands. sacred beer contain in a calabash is administered to them usually by the senior women among them. they take a wooden spoon and poor libation in front of the three pillars or pots which constitutes the hearth in every jukun kitchen, then calls the name of her dead husband, and wished him farewell as well as protection from evil eyes. the akwa cult is also use to purge a woman’s adultery. during this rite, a guilty woman is requested to provide a sacrificial chicken and corn from which the beer for the rites is performed; she would be made to confess outside the shrine, and lash three times with a cane so as to drive away the spirit of adultery. one of the prominent deities among the jukun is the “yaku”, lami yakubu (2022). the yaku is a deity characterized by twin pillars, placed at the threshold and known as the children of ma (or ama). the cult devotees are women, those capable of falling into the ecstatic or convulsed state indicative of possession by the gods or spirit (ajo). in order to secure the goodwill of the spirit, rites are performed at the beginning of millet harvest. bear and the blood of a chicken are being offered in morning hours, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 67 published by scholink inc. while porridge, palm oil, and benniseed are offered in the evening. the function of this cult includes amongst others the wellbeing of the jukun bountiful harvest, rain, and fertility in women. it is also belief that the deity in the eastern gate when provoked could invoke famine, drought and epidemic which could affect the people unless she is being appeased with sacrifice by the aku uka to relax the severity of the punishment. it is when she is been appeased, that she then tells the aku where things have gone wrong, apportion blame and warn the king, his ministers, and other traditional title holders who may have been involved in the offense that angered her. but if she only wants to communicate a massage about an imminent calamity ahead, she informs and warns the aku, and recommend necessary precautions against it occurrence. other duties of yakukeji includes: querying any ayoku (kings wife) who must have committed a serious offence, usually through inflicting illness. the princes and princesses too never escape her wrath whenever they commit any offence, wakasa solomon (2022). in the jukun kingdom, it is belief that the aku and his subjects are being helped by the women at the gate of uka. the women deity known as yakukeji, and nana katume guides the eastern and southern gate respectively. nanakatume on her part also brings good health to the people and protects them from harm and evil. up till date, the aku offers a black cow for a sacrifice to nana katume to keep things right in the kingdom, (wukari traditional council, 2022). essentially the heritage of women as performer within traditional institutions is a powerful one. it may also occur in a ritualized form as with the rituals performed by the jukun of wukari upon the death of a woman in childbirth. during this ritual, the cult of buhoro is specially employed for the ritual, ( wukari taditional council). 4.2 the advent of christianity and changes in the cultural institutions among the jukun women before the advent of christianity, the jukun people believed in the existence of a supreme being known as the creator and sustainer of the universe. they also believe in deities or the nature gods; and the ancestral spirits and the religious functionaries who mediate between the people and the spirit world, abubakar s (1986). like any other african society, their religion was not by choice or conversion as obtained in other religions like islam and christianity, where it involved denunciation of some social values of the natives, but the traditional religion is the product of the thinking and experiences of their forefathers -institutionalized pattern of beliefs and worships practiced by the natives from time immemorial. it is handed down from generation to generation. this was a binding force among them which dictated the way they leave. with the advent of christianity however, some of the traditional believe system and practices went into oblivion. this is so because acceptance of the christian faith means denunciation of some practices and believes. in this regard, significant values, cultures, and practices associated with the early institution among the jukun women demised, rauta salleh (2022). traditional cultural practices particularly those connected with the roles women play now gave way to a new and changed way of life brought about by christianity. the belief surrounding anwu tsi, and other practices and rituals involving the “akwa” were abandoned. the anwu tsi was believed to have some spiritual powers that could affect the weather adversely, but christianity made them changed this mindset and believes instead in god for www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 68 published by scholink inc. powers over the weather condition. another area affected is the norms and practices associated with the “awka” cult, lami y (2022). during the akwa, rituals are performed to pacify the death, and bid the death farewell. the akwa cult is also use to sanctify a woman’s act of adultery. as part of the process, a woman find guilty is requested to provide a sacrificial chicken, and corn to prepare the beer for the rites. she would then be made to confess outside the shrine, and lash three times with a cane so as to drive away the spirit of adultery, lami y. thirdly is the “yaku” deity. amongst other things, the yaku deity is believed to have powers to provide for the wellbeing of the jukun, bountiful harvest, rain, and fertility in women, wakasa solomon (2022). the yaku is also believed to provide security at the gate of uka. the women deity known as yakukeji, and nana katume guides the eastern and southern gate respectively. nana katume on her part also brings good health to the people and protects them from harm and evil. it is this pivotal role they were seems to have played, that the aku often sacrifice a black cow to the yaku, so as to keep things right in the kingdom (wukari traditional council). but such believe and practices have been replaced with the new found faith in jesus christ. acceptance of christ as lord and personal savior means denunciation of old ways. so, the old ways now became obnoxious. christ is now being relied upon as the provider, protector, giver of life and death. therefore the powers over rain, bountiful harvest, fertility, etc., that was largely associated with deities, now found place in christianity. what this means is that those institutions, it believe, and practices have been largely affected, so also the role of women among the jukun. it is important to note that these institutions did not go into extinction – they still exist – but the practices, and believes associated with the institutions have been hugely minimized, and neutralize by christianity. 4.3 emergence of the “i mbya jin i” institution among the jukun wapan women of wukari area, 2010 as earlier noted, cultural institutions among the jukun women were not really having a well-known name. the institutions were mirrored in the various deities and cult that existed, but decadence in the practices associated with those institutions and roles being played by women occasioned the emergence of the “i mbya jin i” in 2010 through the visionary leadership of mrs. rauta saleh, (wakasa s). cultural norms and values seem to be giving in to the forces of globalization/postmodernism, and upholders of the culture are obviously failing in their duties to instill the culture to the younger generation. in order to halt and prevent the community from cultural extinction, some of the women were inspired to restore the lost glory, and introduced new ideas that are in line with what the jukun wapan holds. “i mbya jin ‘i’, is a jukun wapan compound word which means ‘correcting our land’ or ‘correction of the land’ saraya barnabas (2022). the institution meant to foster development especially among the women. it plays socio-economic, political, and religious roles amongst others. the “i mbya jin i” institution covers only women from the jukun wapan of wukari descends. it is a registered institution formed by a few group of women in response to the decadence of cultural institutions which affect their way of life negatively. the broad aim is to restore significant cultural values that were abandoned long www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 69 published by scholink inc. ago. specifically they are targeting the younger generation of women to instill amongst other things which include: 1) restoring the culture and values as embodied in earlier institutions among the jukun women which were represented by deities and cults. 2) preparing and preserving the local dishes according to the wapan culture; 3) bringing back the forgotten norms and values that guides a woman in her matrimonial home as well as the world at large. 4) rising gender egalitarian attitudes that transform economic development into a cultural process of human development. 5) and upholding historical legacies from a socio-cultural and political traditions amongst others “i mbya jin i” represents an umbrella institution among the jukun wapan women. their activities include advocating for the right of women, and upholding the roles by women in cultural, economic, religious and political spheres (wakasa s). the women are trained to be responsible members of the society. the institution is also involved in the organization of seminars for the benefit of the women. for examples, during festive period, they prepare and present local dishes and also explain how they are done. they advocate for the use of ancestral language at the home. their motto is: war against irresponsibility, good rapport among members and the society. food preparation with local contents is one area of interest to the “i mbya jin i”, and one of the foods the jukuns satisfied themselves with is the local brewed beer known as burukutu, meek, c.k. (1929). apart from beer, another type of food consumed by the jukuns is the light porridge known as “afu”. afu is prepared from grinded millets and mixed with cold water, and then boiled water is added and stirred until it thickens. dried and grinded sweet potatoes are now added as a sweetener. other wapan delicacy includes: aso cake prepared with corn, benniseed, and sweetener “kentu” (sugar). in pre-colonial era, nyibyen (rice) was added in place of sugar. this local cake sustains hunters during hunting campaign. women who travel long distance for trade as well carries this contends along. the jukun wapan has different delicacy but the prominent one is the ‘aso’. in this modern era, aso is used in some occasion such as weddings and birthdays to replace modern cake. its content also helps pregnant women during child birth, (wakasa s). there was also the “adoo or abo” doo (benniseed soup), (wakasa, s). this is a ceremonial delicacy meant for childbirth. during childbirth, certain rituals are performed with adoo. this ceremony is called ‘amachon. it is also used for twin ceremony in early days. unlike the old era, adoo is now use for normal home delicacy, suggesting that the people are now gradually forgetting the relevance of its use. other delicacies includes, ‘afye ‘a’ kyakya (fried bambara nut), ‘aba’(local moi-moi), abo fyekin (groundnut soup), ‘wasa-wasa (beans porridge), ‘akwin wa chi-chi’ (boil chicken cooked with palm oil and fried groundnut), ‘asu pu (sour leaf seed), and ‘asu nyu made from locust bean seeds. marriage is another target area of the “i mbya jin i” institution, (wakasa s). they oversee and take part in the jukun traditional marriage. even though some rituals in marriage are no longer involved due to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 70 published by scholink inc. the influence of christianity, they ensure that basic requirements are meet. one major role being played by the jukun woman during marriage is mediation (traditionally known as kwanben). she does the negotiations on behalf of the suitor with the lady’s parents and brings back information to him. in fact, she carries out an errand for all the in-laws concerning the marriage arrangement. if the box presented to the lady’s parents is accepted, a date for the formal traditional declaration of the marriage would be fixed. on the appointed date, all parties involve would be present. based on the jukun traditionally marriage, the following requirement must be met: the woman must have attained the age of 18, and consent to the marriage as well as her parent or guardian (except where the woman shall be married to a traditional title holder). so, the institution supervises the process so as a minor is not given out for marriage. thus, a marriage shall be contracted upon the presentation to the father or guardian of the woman a bride price and payment of customary gifts, adihikon and victor (2012). other areas the “i mbya jin i” institution concern itself is the household function of a woman and production, ishaya nyajon (2022). the role a woman play in the household varies and depends on age. grown up women engage in household chores like cooking, taking care of husbands and ensuring that things orderly in the house. younger ones are saddled with cleaning of the house, washing of dishes, going for errand amongst others. women also take part in productive activities such as farming and pottery. they also ensure that women restore and maintain productivity. in a typical jukun environment, women also participate in productive activities such as farming and pottery. crops like sweet potatoes, coacoa yam, and cassava are extensively cultivated by women, (wakasa s). pottery is one of the major craft among the jukun wapan. the processes involve careful selection of refractory clay which is fines down by grinding with a corn-rubber. the clay may be added to prevent the pot from cracking during the process of baking. after the thorough processes, the pot is allowed to dry in the sun for several days, (meek c k). 4.4 the “i mbya jin i” institution among the jukun wapan women today the “i mbya jin i” institution act as custodian of the culture especially among the jukun wapan women, sarah yohana (2022). this was due to the decay in cultural values and practices as obtained in those institutions among the jukun wapan women in pre-colonial times. the decay occasioned by the forces of globalization/postmodernism and the early contact with christian missionaries eroded a lot of cultural practices particularly those related with institutions among the jukun women. thus, the “i mbya jin i” institution appears to serves as a bridge between the pre-colonial times, and present challenges brought about by interaction with the modern world. these challenges amongst other things include, (wakasa s): 1) adding it voice in debunking the widely held erroneous customary believe system which reduces the woman as only a “second fiddle” useful only in the kitchen, house chores, and child bearing. 2) halting the cultural decadence as noted above, particularly in the aspect that deals with the jukun wapan woman 3) confronting the issue of female genital mutilation, child marriage, child trafficking, and prostitution. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 71 published by scholink inc. 4) and speaking to the question of feminism that is widely being accepted among women today. the “i mbya jin i” institution is already recognised by the aku-uka (chief) of wukari, and has been registered with the cooperate affairs commission, (wakasa s). this places it in a suitable position to address the issues raised above, and has since began it work through presentations at seminars and workshops. in its quest to broaden its scope, and participate in global discourse on issues pertaining to cultural interactions and gender, the institution is participating in events such as world tourism day, and the national art and culture event held annually. 5. conclusion the roles women, and its institutions play in african society have been underplayed, due to reasons largely associated with cultural sentiments. but evidences emerging proved that women have been significant component of the society. this is particularly the case with the “i mbya jin i” institution among the jukun wapan women of wukari area of taraba state, nigeria. revelations emerging from the early institutions among the jukun wapan women, which were in the form of cults and deities, suggest that women did not only participate in the making of the jukun community, but are key drivers in the socio-cultural, political and religious front. this suggestion is backed by activities associated with awu tsi, yaku, awka, and buhoro cults and deities. though the advent of christianity, and forces of globalization eroded the culture and early institutions among the jukun women, but the emergence of the “i mbya jin” institution is restoring its face. it is obvious that western cultures brought about through the influence of christianity affected the identity and role of the jukun woman. however, the “i mbya jin i” institution established in 2010 is now reaffirming the place of a woman. how far it will go in leaving up to its expectation is not certain. what is certain is that cultural institutions among the jukun women as we have seen have been significant in the socio-cultural, economic and religious milieu, so long as order and development is concern. what this mean is that cultural institutions among the jukun women and the africa society in general are important in chatting a way forward given the cultural, economic and political quagmire. references abubakar, s. (1986). pre-colonial government and administration among the jukun. university of madugari inaugural lecture series, 38. adihikon, t., & victor, u. (2012). linguistic and cultural practices in jukunland: contrasting features of resurgent tradition. amaka, t. et al (2021) “women, and marginalization”. politics in africa and asia, 2(2), 27-35. david, l. i. (2021). using oral evidences for historical research. paper presented at the workshop on history methodology held at the committee of vice chancellors of nigerian universities secretariate, wuse abuja, 23 rd -24 th august (p. 2). group interview at the traditional council wukari, 21, september 2022. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 72 published by scholink inc. halima, a. b., & falmata, m. j. (2020). effect of cultural practice and its implication on national gender policy and women development in yobe state, nigeria. open journal of women’s studies, 2(2), 9-17. joseph, c. c. p., & adesina, a. s. (2018). “globalizaation, postmodernism and multiculturalism: underpining the dynamics of culture”. lafia journal of arts (lja), 2, 92-104. leman, s. f/ (2017). social media and eroding value system of nigeria’s culture. lafia journal of africa and heritage studies, 2, 106-109. makama, g. a. (2013). patiarchy and gender inequality in nigeria: the way forward”. european scientific journal, 9(17), 115-144. meek, c. k. (1929). a sudanese kingdom: an ethnographic study of the jukun speaking people of nigeria. great britain. olanipekun, l. o., & onabanjo, a. a. (2020). negative perception of culture on women in the nigerian society”. research journal of social sciences and humanities, 1(2), 31-38. oral interview with ishaya nyajon, elder traditional council wukari, 77years, 21 st september, 2022. oral interview with lami yakubu i mbya jin i treasurer. 60years, 22, september 2022/ oral interview with mary k. ta’wan .i mbya jin i, ast. secretary, 66 years, wukari, 21 aug.2022/ oral interview with mrs. wakasa solomon, secretary ‘i mbya jin i’ wukari, 56years. 20 th september 2022. oral interview with rauta salleh .i mbya jin i, p.r.o, 67 years, wukari, 21 aug.2022. oral interview with sarah yohana. p.r.o 2, 60yrears, wukari, 12, 0ct.2022. oral interview with saraya barnabas, teacher, wukari, 20 august, 2022. 68. otuiche, s. i., & nnabuenyi, u. m. (2015). culture and right of rural woman in nigeria: an overview. international journal of basic applied and innovative research (ijbair), 4(2), 30-43 samuel, o. a. (2021). the use of interdisciplinary approach in historical research. paper presented at the workshop on history methodology held at the committee of vice chancellors of nigerian universities secretariate, wuse abuja, 23 rd -24 th augus (p. 1). sati, u. f. (2006). opportunities and pitfalls in historical methodologies. 65. in o. o. mike, j. g. nengel, & o. o. okpeh (eds), historical research and methodology in africa (p. 73). makudi-ibadan-abuja: aboki publishers. september 2022. the holy bible. (n.d.). ephesians chapter, 5, 21-28. the holy bible. (n.d.). genesis chapter, 1, 27. toluwalase, a., & segun, o. (2017). the impact of gender discrimination on national development. international journal of asian history, cultures, and traditions, 4(4), 10-16. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 219 original paper digital finance helps “five-in-one” rural revitalization development weipeng zhu1* 1 school of finance and faculty of economics and management, qilu university of technology (shandong academy of sciences), shandong, china * corresponding author, e-mail: 732390574@qq.com received: april 20, 2024 accepted: may 17, 2024 online published: may 31, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n2p219 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n2p219 abstract “three rural areas” is a fundamental issue related to the national economy and people's livelihood, and rural revitalization is a way to fully summarize and refine the practical experience in the field of “three rural areas”. based on china's current national conditions, we analyze the challenges of rural revitalization, and explore whether digital finance can promote the “five-in-one” rural revitalization construction. this paper discusses the feasibility of digital finance for rural revitalization from five perspectives, namely, industrial prosperity, ecological livability, civilized rural culture, effective governance, and affluent life, and explores the realization mechanism of digital finance-driven rural revitalization, and finally puts forward relevant suggestions. keywords digital finance, rural revitalization, rural finance 1. introduction the issue of agriculture, rural areas and farmers is a fundamental issue related to the national economy and people's livelihood, and we must always take the solution of the “three rural issues” as the top priority of social development work. to promote chinese modernization, we must unremittingly strengthen the foundation of agriculture, promote the comprehensive revitalization of the countryside, and promote rural revitalization as the general grips of the “three rural” work in the new era and new journey, therefore, promoting rural revitalization and development, and upgrading the quality of agricultural and rural economic development is not only a powerful initiative and inevitable requirement to reasonably undertake the previous poverty alleviation and attack, but also an essential requirement. it is highly in line with the long-term development goals and specific requirements set by www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 220 the central government in the field of “three rural areas”, and it is also the proper meaning of promoting high-quality economic development and building a strong socialist modernization country. data is a key production factor for the development of digital economy and a new driving force for the modernization of agriculture and rural areas. only by grasping the direction of digitization, networking and intelligence can we promote the modernization of agriculture and other industries. in recent years, with the acceleration of the digitalization process, digital finance has gradually become an important support for rural economic development. it plays an irreplaceable role in promoting rural industrial upgrading and improving the quality of life of rural residents. through innovative financial products and service models, digital finance provides more convenient and efficient financing channels for rural revitalization, effectively alleviating the problem of “financing difficulties” in rural revitalization. at the same time, digital finance can also guide the flow of capital to rural industries with special characteristics, promote industrial agglomeration and upgrading, and improve the efficiency of agricultural production and the added value of agricultural products, so as to drive farmers to increase their income and get rich. 2. challenges to rural revitalization in this era of rapid development of big data, the construction of rural revitalization faces great challenges. at the same time, the growing demand of rural residents for financial services in urban and rural areas has put forward higher requirements for financial institutions they need to have stronger innovative capabilities to meet the needs of the general public for diversified financial services. in reality, the development of rural revitalization faces many problems. 2.1 insufficient support of digital technology nowadays, compared with urban areas, the popularization of digital technology in rural areas is still insufficient, and the majority of farmers do not have a good understanding of these emerging technologies, which undoubtedly brings a major challenge to the construction of digital villages that we are promoting. from the perspective of two key dimensions, on the one hand, the degree of application of digital technology in rural areas is relatively low. although our government has attached great importance to and actively promoted the construction of digital villages, in practice, the degree of application of digital technology in many rural areas still needs to be improved. this is mainly reflected in the incomplete construction of internet infrastructure in rural areas, with narrow network coverage and slow network speed, which leads to many inconveniences for rural residents in enjoying digital services (wu & huang, 2022). in addition, the application of digital technology in rural areas is limited by many factors such as capital, technology and management, which undoubtedly further weaken the effect of the application of digital technology in rural areas. on the other hand, farmers' acceptance of new technologies is not ideal. in the tide of digital village construction, the role of farmers as an important participant cannot be ignored. however, due to the constraints of education level and cultural quality in some rural areas, the farmers' cognition and ability to utilize these emerging technologies are www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 221 relatively limited, which makes them often encounter various difficulties when enjoying digital services, thus hindering the smooth progress of digital village construction. 2.2 insufficient basic financial services in the process of digital village construction, digital infrastructure construction occupies a crucial position, which is not only the cornerstone and prerequisite for the construction of digital village, but also a key link to realize this vision. the so-called digital infrastructure construction is mainly to improve and upgrade the relevant infrastructure with the help of advanced digital technology, so as to provide strong technical support for the construction of digital villages as well as adequate infrastructure protection, making the construction process of digital villages more convenient, efficient, safe and reliable. however, there are still many deficiencies in the internet, broadband and communication infrastructure in some rural areas, which cannot meet the growing digital needs of local residents. therefore, in the process of promoting the construction of digital villages, we need to invest a lot of resources, including capital and manpower, to build a large number of network infrastructures, intelligent hardware equipment and digital management systems. however, the construction of these facilities is not an easy task, and they need to meet the challenges of many natural environmental factors such as topography, geomorphology, and climate, as well as the challenges of infrastructure support such as power supply and transportation. 2.3 insufficient financial talent resources the problem of lack of digital talents in rural areas is mainly reflected in two aspects, on the one hand, some young people living in rural areas lack the necessary digital skills. along with the widespread popularization of the internet, digital technology has been deeply integrated into our daily life and become an indispensable part. however, some young people in rural areas generally lack the corresponding digital skills, making it difficult for them to keep pace with the rapid development of the digital era. on the other hand, the elderly in rural areas also face the same plight of lack of digital skills. in the rural society, which is mainly composed of the elderly, there is the problem of aging digital construction and the digital lag phenomenon of the elderly group. although many young laborers in rural areas choose to go out to work, their parents and grandparents often lack digital skills, which undoubtedly poses a great challenge to the construction of digital villages. the lack of talents with digital skills in rural areas has become a bottleneck that restricts the construction of digital villages. the reasons leading to the lack of digital talents in rural areas mainly include the following aspects: firstly, the educational resources in rural areas are relatively scarce, and there is a lack of sufficient education and training opportunities for digital skills; secondly, the level of economic development in rural areas is relatively backward, and there is a lack of sufficient environment for the application of digital skills (he & li, 2020); thirdly, there is not a strong demand for digital talents in rural areas, and there is a lack of effective incentive mechanisms; finally, there is no effective incentive mechanism; and finally, there is a lack of digital skills in rural areas. lack of effective incentive mechanism; finally, digital talents in rural areas are more mobile and lack a stable employment environment. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 222 2.4 inadequate information security in the current process of vigorously promoting the construction of digital villages, the problem of information security is becoming more and more prominent, posing a great potential threat to the stability and reliable operation of digital village construction. the information security problems faced by rural areas are mainly manifested by network attacks and information leakage, which can be called “internal and external difficulties”. first of all, network attacks have been proved to be one of the main means of destroying information security in rural areas. the reason for this is that the network infrastructure in rural areas is relatively lagging behind, and the corresponding network security precautions have not yet been fully perfected, which makes the network in the region more vulnerable to attacks by malicious hackers, which in turn leads to the illegal acquisition of relevant personal information, economic data and other sensitive information, thus bringing incalculable losses to the socio-economic development of rural areas. secondly, information leakage is also a serious challenge to information security in rural areas. personal information in rural areas mainly covers important content such as names, id numbers and bank card information, and once such information is leaked, it may cause property loss and privacy infringement of the farmers and many other problems. 3. analysis of the advantages of digital finance with the rapid development of information technology, digital finance has gradually become an indispensable part of the modern economy. compared with traditional finance, digital finance has many advantages, such as efficiency, universality and convenience. these advantages can not only enhance the operational efficiency of financial institutions, but also better meet the different needs of the majority of users, providing support for rapid economic development. 3.1 science and technology innovation empowers digital finance innovation promotes the deep combination of finance and technology, prompting the financial industry to open the road of digital transformation. traditional banks, stock exchanges and insurance companies are working hard to shape the digital operation system, build digital financial service platforms, and actively promote business transformation in order to better adapt to the wave of rapid development of financial technology. at the same time, with the help of advanced technology, the financial industry has realized the transformation and upgrading from the traditional mode to digitalization and intelligence, improved the efficiency of financial services, reduced the input of manpower and material resources, and thus lowered the overall operating costs. 3.2 core competitiveness of data assets data as a production factor is a key difference between the new economy and the traditional economy, leading to data entering the production process and becoming a production factor. digital finance is able to utilize advanced technologies such as big data, cloud computing, and artificial intelligence to quickly process massive amounts of data, thereby greatly reducing transaction time and improving transaction efficiency. this efficient data processing capability gives digital finance an advantage in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 223 market competition. at the same time, through technical means such as big data analysis, it can more accurately grasp market demand and investment opportunities, thus realizing the reasonable distribution and utilization of funds and achieving a balanced allocation of funds. 3.3 enhancement of service quality of financial institutions the enhancement of digital financial technology promotes the operational performance and competitive strength of financial institutions. more critically, it profoundly changes the interaction mode between financial institutions and customers. with the in-depth understanding of customer behavior and preferences through digital tools, financial institutions are able to provide customers with precise marketing and more convenient, efficient, safe and reliable personalized services, thus significantly enhancing customer satisfaction and loyalty. on the other hand, digital finance applies cutting-edge encryption technology and a highly sophisticated firewall system to monitor market dynamics and risk conditions in real time, and adjusts its strategy in a timely manner according to the actual situation, thus better controlling risks and safeguarding revenues, ensuring the security and confidentiality of user information, and effectively reducing the potential risk of information leakage. this strong security protection not only greatly enhances consumers' trust in digital financial services, but also earns financial institutions an outstanding reputation. 4. the feasibility of digital finance driving the “five-in-one” development of rural revitalization the strategy of rural revitalization adheres to the priority development of agriculture and rural areas, and the goal is to establish and improve the institutional mechanism and policy system for the integrated development of urban and rural areas in accordance with the general requirements of industrial prosperity, ecological livability, civilized rural culture, effective governance, and affluent life (han, 2020), and accelerate the modernization of agriculture and rural areas, and the impact of digital finance on rural revitalization is mainly reflected in five aspects. 4.1 digital finance helps industries flourish through innovative chain financial services, new financing models and financial products, digital finance provides sufficient financial support for agricultural innovation activities, and meets the diversified financial needs of the agricultural industry's scale expansion, intelligent transformation, and rural innovation and development. 4.2 digital finance contributes to ecological livability the development of digital finance, accompanied by the improvement of infrastructure, not only enhances the information acquisition ability of rural residents and helps to narrow the gap between urban and rural areas in terms of culture, education and residents' incomes, but also greatly facilitates the procurement of materials for rural residents in production and life with the rise of mobile payment and e-commerce, injecting new vitality into rural areas. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 224 4.3 digital finance contributes to rural civilization through the implementation of comprehensive financial literacy education and public welfare social services, digital finance significantly improves rural residents' financial literacy and ability to apply financial tools, strengthens their professional knowledge base, and provides strong support for the construction of rural civilization (zeng & luo, 2022). by strengthening the construction of the credit system in rural areas and implementing the credit assessment mechanism for farmers and other measures, it has effectively promoted a good social culture of trust and trustworthiness in rural areas. 4.4 digital finance contributes to effective governance through the introduction of digital technology, local governments can build an advanced big data rural governance platform, which not only provides staff with convenient data retrieval and analysis tools, but also provides interactive communication channels, greatly enhancing the efficiency of government processing, effectively solving various problems in agricultural and rural development, thus promoting the modernization of rural governance. 4.5 digital finance contributes to the prosperity of life relying on advanced digital technology, digital finance provides rural residents with more extensive and in-depth financial services, significantly improves the availability, coverage and universality of financial services, effectively alleviates the financing constraints in rural areas, and injects financial power into the sustained development of the rural economy. 5. realization mechanism of digital finance driving rural revitalization digital finance has had a positive impact on rural revitalization by deepening the financial inclusion mechanism, reducing transaction costs, promoting industrial structure upgrading, sounding the rural credit system and other multi-party mechanisms. 5.1 deepening financial inclusion mechanism and enriching financial market structure with the rapid development of big data, internet and mobile communication technologies, digital finance has been able to penetrate into the rural areas beyond the reach of traditional financial institutions, especially those remote and economically backward areas, thus effectively enhancing the popularity and coverage of financial services. according to the “digital finance for rural revitalization development report” directed by china banking and insurance news and edited by china inclusive finance research institute, in china's county-level financial institution organization system, large banks have gradually strengthened their branches in county areas, while rural commercial banks and local financial institutions, such as microfinance companies, have also been continuously upgrading their service level in county areas, which further enriches the structural diversity of china's county-level financial market. structural diversity of china's county-level financial market. 5.2 reducing transaction costs and improving rural financial efficiency digital finance provides online services with the help of technical support, effectively reducing the operating costs of the financial services industry. at the same time, it has significantly reduced the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 225 transaction costs that farmers and agriculture-related small and micro-enterprises need to pay when obtaining financial services. in the digital financial programs implemented in rural areas, innovations such as credit payment modes and non-contact payment means have greatly relaxed the time and space constraints of payment, thus reducing the transaction costs incurred in the payment process, and thus enhancing the convenience and efficiency of financial services. 5.3 promoting industrial structure upgrading and rural economic development digital finance has provided residents in rural areas and small and medium-sized micro-enterprises with more extensive and sufficient financial support and services, which has significantly increased the income level and wealth accumulation speed of these groups, and thus significantly improved their living standards and consumption capacity. in addition, digital finance has also injected more capital sources and market opportunities for the development of rural industries, strongly promoting the optimization, adjustment and transformation and upgrading of the rural industrial structure, and further enhancing the vitality and competitiveness of the rural economy. 5.4 improving the rural credit system and enhancing the quality of financial services under the strong support of modern financial technology, government departments and various financial institutions and other stakeholders have the ability to deeply integrate and open up the financial information field owned by the demand side of rural financial services, efficiently solve the problem of information asymmetry, and gradually establish and improve the corresponding joint incentive mechanism for trustworthiness and joint disciplinary system for breach of trust. such an initiative can not only effectively avoid the risk of breach of trust faced by the demand side of rural financial services, but also help to create a favorable credit environment in the rural areas, and provide a more reliable and convincing basis for credit decision-making by various types of financial institutions. 5.5 accelerating rural digital construction and building a people-friendly service system the development of rural digital financial inclusion needs to be supported by a good digital infrastructure. in recent years, the rural network penetration rate has increased significantly, laying the foundation for the development of digital finance in the countryside. in the construction of digital villages, the coverage and application of internet technology and mobile communication networks and other infrastructure are vigorously promoted to provide farmers with better educational resources, medical and health services, cultural and recreational activities and other conveniences, and effectively improve the quality of life of residents. at the same time, the implementation of the rural revitalization strategy is being promoted through the optimization of the rural industrial structure through basic digital construction and the strengthening of rural infrastructure construction. 6. digital finance for rural revitalization rural revitalization strategy is a major practical strategy for china's “three rural areas” work. with the continuous advancement of modernization in the new era, it is of great theoretical and practical www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 226 significance to accelerate the development of digital finance in rural areas, analyze the problems of economic development in rural areas, and explore the impact of digital finance on the development of rural revitalization. according to the above analysis this paper puts forward the following suggestions: 6.1 technology helps financial development and improves the efficiency of technological empowerment in view of the current problems of unsound credit system construction and poor information sharing in rural areas of china, a perfect rural credit system should be established, a credit information database should be set up, and credit rating work should be carried out to effectively improve the credit environment in rural areas. strengthen the construction of basic technology, effectively utilize the support of information technology such as 5g, cloud computing, blockchain, etc., and establish a demonstration project for digital finance to empower the cause of rural revitalization. giving full play to the platform advantage of digital finance of “one point, many functions, one network, many uses”, actively constructing the “three rural” big data platform, realizing the interconnection and interoperability between digital finance and the development of rural areas, and consolidating the data foundation for rural revitalization. 6.2 broaden financial service channels and enhance regional economic vitality economic development is an important manifestation of rural revitalization. the government should establish a long-term mechanism for rural digital financial innovation and development, and give support to rural digital finance in terms of funding, policy and technology. strengthen the cooperation between rural financial institutions and the government, universities, research institutes, etc., and promote the promotion and application of digital technology in rural areas. actively create multi-category, multi-scene and multi-people digital financial products, and endeavor to build an efficient financial service platform to help farmers. give full play to the advantages of digital financial technology combined with regional characteristics, promote innovation in financial products, services and models, inject vitality into the physical development of rural areas, enhance the income of regional residents, and then pull the level of consumption in rural areas to accelerate regional construction. 6.3 promoting the construction of rural revitalization talents and releasing regional innovation vitality setting up excellent rural revitalization demonstration bases and actively introducing technical and managerial talents for rural revitalization construction. cultivating the professional capacity and digital financial literacy of rural financial practitioners can improve their understanding and ability to use digital financial tools and promote the effective application of digital inclusive finance in rural revitalization. through efficient talent training and platform construction, make full use of the financial support of digital finance to promote innovation and entrepreneurship vitality in rural areas, realize talent to help agriculture and industry to prosper, realize more anti-rural employment and entrepreneurship opportunities for regional economic construction, and give full play to hometown enthusiasm to help rural construction. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 227 6.4 strengthen the rural financial regulatory mechanism and improve information security given the slow economic development in rural areas, the financial regulatory framework is relatively weak, and the effectiveness of regulation needs to be strengthened. at the same time, with the widespread application of digital finance in rural areas, new types of risks and challenges continue to emerge, requiring us to further improve the financial risk prevention and control mechanism in rural areas to effectively prevent and resolve potential financial risks, in order to promote the smooth implementation of the strategy of rural revitalization (zhang, 2023). in order to achieve this goal, it is necessary to deepen the reform and improvement of the financial regulatory system in rural areas, and ensure the sound development of rural financial institutions through policy guidance and standardized management. specifically, the rural financial regulatory system should be improved, a comprehensive and rigorous risk prevention and control system should be created, and the optimization of the internal governance structure of financial institutions should be strengthened. in addition, it is necessary to increase the supervision of rural financial institutions to ensure that they strictly comply with and implement all financial regulatory policies and measures, so as to ensure the sound operation and sustainable development of the rural financial market. 7. conclusion in summary, digital finance is of great significance to rural revitalization. digital finance provides new opportunities and impetus for rural revitalization, and rural revitalization can likewise promote the development of digital finance. rural revitalization and digital finance have a coupled relationship, and the two promote each other and integrate development. therefore, the government and relevant departments increase policy support and continuously improve the enabling role of science and technology; strengthen the research and development and application of digital financial technology to broaden financial service channels and enhance the vitality of the regional economy; and promote the construction of rural revitalization talents and cultivate professionals to release the vitality of regional innovation. acknowledgments projects: qilu university of technology key teaching reform program; projects number: 2022zd15 references han, j. (2020). prioritizing agricultural, rural development and implementing the rural revitalization strategy. china agricultural economic review, 12(1), 14-19. https://doi.org/10.1108/caer-02-2019-0026 he, j., & li, q. (2020). can online social interaction improve the digital finance participation of rural households?. china agricultural economic review, 12(2), 295-313. https://doi.org/10.1108/caer-11-2019-0213 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 228 wu, y., & huang, s. (2022). the effects of digital finance and financial constraint on financial performance: firm-level evidence from china's new energy enterprises. energy economics, 112, 106158. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2022.106158 zeng, z. m., & luo, h. f. (2022). research on the mechanism of inclusive finance focusing on supporting rural revitalization--based on the dynamic panel data of counties in hunan province. science and technology think tank, (03), 22-30. zhang, y. (2023). digital financial inclusion, innovation activity and rural revitalization. technical economics and management research, (01), 78-84. 1.introduction 2.challenges to rural revitalization 2.1 insufficient support of digital technology 2.2 insufficient basic financial services 2.3 insufficient financial talent resources 2.4 inadequate information security 3.analysis of the advantages of digital finance 3.1 science and technology innovation empowers dig 3.2 core competitiveness of data assets 3.3 enhancement of service quality of financial in 4.the feasibility of digital finance driving the “fi 4.1 digital finance helps industries flourish 4.2 digital finance contributes to ecological liva 4.3 digital finance contributes to rural civilizat 4.4 digital finance contributes to effective gover 4.5 digital finance contributes to the prosperity 5.realization mechanism of digital finance driving r 5.1 deepening financial inclusion mechanism and en 5.2 reducing transaction costs and improving rural 5.3 promoting industrial structure upgrading and r 5.4 improving the rural credit system and enhancin 5.5 accelerating rural digital construction and bu 6.digital finance for rural revitalization 6.1 technology helps financial development and imp 6.2 broaden financial service channels and enhance 6.3 promoting the construction of rural revitaliza 6.4 strengthen the rural financial regulatory mech 7.conclusion acknowledgments references advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 266 book review the reckless mind: intellectuals in politics, by mark lilla josé r. f. silveira1* 1 department of international relations, federal university of santa maria (ufsm), santa maria, rs, brazil * josé r. f. silveira, department of international relations, federal university of santa maria (ufsm), santa maria, rs, brazil received: august 8, 2019 accepted: august 28, 2019 online published: august 30, 2019 doi:10.22158/ape.v2n3p266 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v2n3p266 the reckless mind: intellectuals in politics is a disturbing and moving book. we cannot ignore that the main question of the work is that of ideology. lilla acknowledges that political thought in the west today lacks adequate concepts and even a proper terminology to describe the world we live in now. he says that “ever since the end of world war ii, and perhaps since the russian revolution, political thought has seemed so shallow, so aimless” (lilla, 2017, p. 189). the age in which we live, for lilla, is markedly anti-political and anti-intellectual. distinct groups—american right-wing fundamentalists advocating the minimal state, european left-wing anarchists, absolutist civil libertarians, and neoliberal free market evangelists—all resemble each other; the differences among them are superficial. they share the same mentality, the same state of mind, the same presumption, the same prejudice. lilla, therefore, realizes that the problems of today's capitalist democracies—the emptying of the middle class, the erosion of family and community, hatred towards the elites, the eclipse of political parties, widespread indifference to the public interest—are some of the main challenges to intellectuals’ understanding and interpretation of the current scenario. and he reminds us that the seduction of tyranny is not the only force that can misguide intellectuals. self-deception assumes countless forms. lilla, therefore, sheds light on an important aspect of study and research: intellectual responsibility. can a thinker's ideas be separated from the political use that creates them? at a certain level, the answer is yes. but we must not fail to reflect on how certain authors have made certain choices and why they are independent of their works. in the reckless mind, lilla shows a series of european thinkers of the 20th century (whose thought remains alive among us even today). they inaugurated a new social type—the philosophical intellectual—capable of justifying the most bloodthirsty tyrannies with their academic production. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 267 published by scholink inc. after all, how are intellectuals identified? they are the holders of scientific knowledge, and the opinion formers and mentors of the masses. it seems the primary task of the intellectual is to mediate individual and collective interests, to give meaning to politics and culture. that is, in theory, they are individuals who are open to new ways of thought, willing to review their own ideas, responsible for their thoughts, and fully humanistic. they are important individuals who should be alert to the evils of tyranny. lilla was inspired to write the reckless mind by polish poet czeslaw milosz’s seminal book, the captive mind (1953). milosz did a study of how postwar intellectuals in poland adapted to the stalinist orthodoxy of dialectical materialism and socialist realism. milosz traces the profile of four successful writers, thoroughly describing their intellectual and political trajectories in pre-war poland (in the nationalist and anti-semitic right), their experiences during the war, and their adaptation to the communist regime imposed by the soviet union. starting from milosz’s work—“this book tries to deal with these questions and can be read as a modest complement of captive mind” (lilla, 2017, p. 11)—, lilla in the reckless mind presents a profile of thinkers who were deceived by the ideologies of their time and closed their eyes to authoritarianism, brutality, stupidity, and state terrorism. the reckless mind traces the careers of six leading thinkers of the 20th century, aligned with the left or the right, “to show that the phenomenon they represent is not limited to a country or a political bent” (lilla, 2017): martin heidegger (pp. 15-47); carl schmitt (pp. 51-71); walter benjamin (pp. 75-100); alexandre kojève (pp. 103-119); michel foucault (pp. 123-137); and jacques derrida (pp. 141-163). mark lilla, author of the book, is a professor at columbia university and writes regularly for the new york review of books and other publications around the world. an author of profitable production, in 2015, he won the award for best international news commentator granted by the overseas press club of america, due to the column “on france”, published in the new york review of books. references lilla, m. (2017). a mente imprudente: os intelectuais na atividade política (the reckless mind: intellectuals in politics). translation by clóvis marques. 1st ed. rio de janeiro, brazil: record. microsoft word ape-v5n3-p20 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 20 original paper keynes never assumed at any time in his life… that all statements or proposition stand in logical relation to each other (misak, 2020, p. 114) michael emmett brady1* 1 california state university, dominguez hills, college of business, administration and public policy, department of operations management 1000 east victoria st carson, california, usa * michael emmett brady, california state university, dominguez hills, college of business, administration and public policy, department of operations management 1000 east victoria st carson, california, usa received: may 18, 2022 accepted: may 28, 2022 online published: june 8, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n3p20 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n3p20 abstract in a review of c.misak’s2020 biography of f p ramsey, a reviewer named f. e. guerra-pujol assumed that the material contained in misak’s book on keynes, as regards ramsey’s claims about keynes’s logical theory of probability, on pp. 112-121 and pp.264-273,was true. the problem is that all of the material in misak’s book dealing with keynes is wrong, as it is based on claims made by f. p. ramsey that directly conflicted with keynes’s application of boole’s relational, propositional logic. keywords relational, propositional logic, boole, relevance-irrelevance, interval valued probability, non additive, inexact, imprecise probability misak’s discussion is based on a myth. the myth involves a claim that an 18 year old teenage “boy genius’ supposedly appeared at cambridge university in 1921 and convinced keynes in 1922 that his logical theory of probability was badly flawed in an article that appeared in the cambridge magazine of january, 1922. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 21 published by scholink inc. 1. introduction the paper will be organized in the following manner. sections two and three show that ramsey had simply made up his own private, personal version of keynes’s theory as presented by keynes in his a treatise on probability (tp, 1921). ramsey then attributed his severely flawed version to keynes. section four will examine the many errors contained in the following part of guerra-pujol’s review: “if there is a common or overarching theme during these formative years in ramsey’s intellectual life (1920-1924), it is ramsey’s willingness to challenge the most powerful and original ideas of such great and legendary scholars and philosophers as j.m. keynes, g.e. moore, bertrand russell, and ludwig wittgenstein. in this post, i will limit myself to just one such momentous undergraduate episode–ramsey’s early critique of keynes’s objective or logical theory of probability. to appreciate ramsey’s first foray into probability theory, i must first provide some relevant background. the great keynes had published his treatise on probability in 1921, and in a review of keynes’s work, none other than bertrand russell had called keynes’s treatise “the most important work on probability that has appeared for a very long time,” adding that the “book as a whole is one which it is impossible to praise too highly.” (see russell, 1948, 1922, p. 152) why was keynes’s work so highly praised? because keynes had developed a new way of looking at probability, one which allowed for the possibility of probabilistic truth. for keynes, probability consisted of an objective or logical relation between evidence and hypothesis, or in the words of misak (2020, p. 113, emphasis added), a relation “between any set of premises and a conclusion in virtue of which, if we know the first, we will be warranted in accepting the second with some particular degree of belief.” ramsey, however, immediately identified two blind spots in keynes’s conception of probability (see ramsey, 1922; see also misak, 2020, pp. 114-115). one was keynes’s admission that not all probabilities are numerical or measurable, especially when the truth values of our underlying premises are in dispute. in that case, when we have no idea whether our premises are true or not, keynes’s approach does not allow us to measure the probabilities of our conclusions. for ramsey, by contrast, all probabilities should be measurable. but the other (more deeper) problem with keynes’s theory was the “objective” nature of his view of probability–the idea that all statements or propositions stand in logical relation to each other. ramsey denied the existence of these logical relations altogether. far from being an “objective relation”, the strength or weakness of the relationship between two propositions also depended on psychological factors: on one’s personal experiences and subjective beliefs. in a word, probability was based on experience, not logic. (sound familiar? if not, check out the quote by the great oliver wendell holmes below) (guerra-pujol, 2020, italics added). contrary to both misak and guerra-pujol, keynes never assumed the “…idea that all statements or propositions stand in logical relation to each other.” anywhere in his a treatise on probability or in anything written by keynes in his lifetime. the idea that keynes said this is based only on the assertions and claims made by frank p. ramsey, who never provided any textual support at any time in his life to support his claim in anything that he published that dealt with keynes. section 5 will www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 22 published by scholink inc. conclude the paper. 2. method-the logical examination of ramsey’s claims in 1922 consider ramsey’s 1922 claims that he made about keynes’s logical theory of probability: “first, he thinks that between any two non-self-contradictory propositions there holds a probability relation (axiom i), for example between “my carpet is blue” and “napoleon was a great general”; it is easily seen that it leads to contradictions to assign the probability 1/2 to such cases, and mr. keynes would conclude that the probability is not numerical. but it would seem that in such cases there is no probability; that, for a logical relation, other than a truth function, to hold between two propositions, there must be some connection between them. if this be so, there is no such probability as the probability that “my carpet is blue given only that “napoleon was a great general”, and there is therefore no question of assigning a numerical value.” (ramsey, 1922, p. 3). ramsey’s entire quotation above directly conflicts with the logical structure of keynes’s boolean framework, where specified an argument form that all of the propositions needed to satisfy: “let our premisses consist of any set of propositions h, and our conclusion consist of any set of propositions a, then, if a knowledge of h justifies a rational belief in a of degree α, (then-author’s insert) we say that there is aprobability-relation of degree α between a and h.”(keynes, tp, 1921, p. 4; italics added). only if a knowledge of h justifies a can there be a “…probability-relation of degree α between a and h.” otherwise, there is no such logical relation between the a and h propositions. ramsey’s fanciful belief that there can be only one h proposition and one a proposition is nonsense. keynes gives an excellent example of his argument form on pp. 5-6: “these general ideas are not likely to provoke much criticism. in the ordinary course of thought and argument, we are constantly assuming that knowledge of one statement, while not proving the truth of a second, yields nevertheless some ground for believing it. we assert that we ought on the evidence to prefer such and such a belief. we claim rational grounds for assertions which are not conclusively demonstrated. we allow, in fact, that statements may be unproved, without, for that reason, being unfounded. and it does not seem on reflection that the information we convey by these expressions is wholly subjective. when we argue that darwin gives alid grounds for our accepting his theory of natural selection, we do not simply mean that we are psychologically inclined to agree with him; it is certain that we also intend to convey our belief that we are acting rationally in regarding his theory as probable. we believe that there is some real objective relation between darwin’s evidence and his conclusions, which is independent of the mere fact of our belief, and which is just as real and objective, though of a different degree, s that which would exist if the argument were as demonstrative as syllogism. we are claiming, in fact, to cognise correctly a logical onnection between one set of propositions which we call our www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 23 published by scholink inc. evidence nd which we suppose ourselves to know, and another set which we all our conclusions, and to which we attach more or less weight according to the grounds supplied by the first. it is this type of objective relation between sets of propositions—the type which we claim to be correctly perceiving when we make such assertions as these—to which the reader’s attention must be directed.” (keynes, 1921, pp. 5-6; italics added). ramsey’s example “…for example between ‘my carpet is blue’ and ‘napoleon was a great general’…” is utterly preposterous and completely ridiculous because knowledge of the color of a carpet can’t supply any connection/association (or justification)between the two propositions, with one proposition being regarded as providing relevant information or evidence for another proposition, a conclusion. ramsey’s entire paragraph represents a complete contradiction of, and is completely contradictory to, what keynes presented very clearly on pp. 4-6 and later on pp. 54-56 of the tp with his relevance -irrelevance logic. finally, keynes would not conclude that “…the probability is not numerical.” (ramsey, 1922, p. 3). keynes would conclude that ramsey’s example violated his argument form and that, therefore, there is no conditional probability because neither of the propositions provides any relevant evidence for the other. it is extraordinary that so many philosophers and economists have described ramsey’s 1922 article as being brilliant when it is nonsense. in his july, 1922 review of keynes’s book in the mathematical gazette, russell, in a small footnote on p.120, showed how ramsey’s example was completely inconsistent with keynes’s relevance irrelevance logic. no philosopher or economist or any other academician has ever used russell’s example to challenge the soundness of ramsey’s claim in 100 years. 3. method-the logical examination of ramsey’s claims in 1926 consider the following: “mr. keynes starts from the supposition that we make probable inferences for which we claim objective validity; we proceed from full belief in one proposition to partial belief in another, and we claim that this procedure is objectively right, so that if another man in similar circumstances entertained a different degree of belief, he would be wrong in doing so. mr keynes accounts for this by supposing that between any two propositions, taken as premiss and conclusion, there holds one and only one relation of a certain sort called probability relations; and that if, in any given case, the relation is that of degree α, from full belief in the premiss, we should, if we were rational, proceed to a belief of degree α in the conclusion.” (ramsey, truth, & probability, 1926; in kyburg & smokler, 1980, pp. 26-27; italics added). all of the italics portions of ramsey’s paragraph above are false. first, keynes is starting with a foundation based on boole’s propositional relational logic that has nothing to do with any “suppositions” on keynes’s part. second, keynes holds that the conclusions are rational, not “objectively valid”. third, the procedure is one that it is rational to entertain and is not “objectively www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 24 published by scholink inc. right”. fourth, it would have to be the same circumstances, not just “similar” circumstances. fifth, the decision maker would be non rational, not “wrong”. sixth, keynes is not supposing; keynes is defining that his logic holds between some sets of, and not “any two”, propositions. the form of ramsey’s error was spotted by bertrand russell in his review of keynes’s book on p. 120. russell showed that his counter example led to the refutation of ramsey’s entire critique, as it violated the relevance -irrelevance logic of keynes provided in chapter four of the tp. russell’s 1922 refutation also refutes ramsey’s 1926 claims. ramsey is simply repeating all over again his errors from his 1922 review. keynes’s approach (a) does not involve any propositions but only those propositions that are related and (b) can involve sets of propositions, so that it is not restricted to only two propositions. keynes’s account requires a specific argument form, as was discussed in section 2 above. likewise, it is not restricted to only two propositions. the same results are obtained when considering keynes’s more detailed relevance -irrelevance logic in chapter 4 on pp.54-56. the rest of ramsey’s quote is a garbled mess that we can better analyze technically with keynes’s two logical relations, p and v, where p(a/h)= α,0≤α≤1,where α is a rational degree of belief and v(a/h) =w, 0≤w≤1,and w measures the degree of the completeness of the relevant evidence (keynes, 1921, p. 313, p. 315) supporting the argument form of p(a/h). thus, for keynes, belief depends on both p and v, not p alone, as argued by ramsey. ramsey, however, is correct in one very special case -the case where w=1, so that all of the α values are numerical. it does not hold in the general case where w<1,where the α values are interval valued probabilities or one is dealing with keynes’s decision weight approach from chapter 26.a decision maker can accept, and have a different opinion about, any value within the boundary set up by the upper and lower probabilities. a w<1 creates complex and intricate problems about one’s beliefs because of the non linearities introduced by w in keynes’s decision theory which is a function of both α(probability) and w(weight) or p and v. this can best be seen by using the mathematica program or mathlab to generate three dimensional contours of keynes’s conventional coefficient of risk and weight, c, involvingc, p and w. everything is substantially simplified if w=1. similarly, keynes’s principle of indifference (poi) approach will generate, when applicable, only one answer. all rational decision makers will agree on what this one answer is. a good example is ellsberg’s first urn ball problem involving a choice between two urns to bet from, an urn with fifty red and fifty black balls versus an urn with a total of 100 red and black balls. the poi answer for both urns is 1/2. thus, there will be “…one and only one…” answer. ramsey does not have any idea about v. hence, he has no inkling about the role that confidence plays in belief. there is no simple, direct, linear connection between probability and belief for keynes as there is for ramsey. the one exception is if w=1, so that v drops out and one is left with α only. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 25 published by scholink inc. let us now consider ramsey’s example from 1926. it is as worthless as the example originally given by ramsey in cambridge magazine in 1922: “besides this view is really rather paradoxical; for any believer in induction must admit that between this is red as conclusion and “this is round”, together with a billion propositions of the form “ is round and red” evidence, there is a finite probability relation; and it is hard to suppose that as we accumulate instances there is suddenly a point, say after 233 instances, at which the probability becomes finite and so comparable with some numerical relations.” ramsey, 1926, p. 28; in kyburg & smokler (eds.), 1980). this example directly violates the argument form put forth by keynes on pp. 4-6 of the tp, since there is no connection between “this is red” and” this is round”, so that neither proposition provides any information or evidence with regards to the other. there is no conditional probability specification for (this is red/given that that is round). again, given the fact that the example has nothing whatsoever to do with anything that is in keynes’s book, my only conclusion is that ramsey must be on some type of medication, drug, or narcotic or that he is, like wittgenstein, a genius who also suffered temporary bouts of insanity. note also ramsey’s attempt to introduce a joint probability into his argument that has nothing to do with keynes’s theory, which is based on conditional probability only. 4. result-correcting the errors in guerra-pujol (2020) guerra-pujol (gp) gives a tiny fragment of keynes’s presentation of his argument form on pp. 4-6, that, if carefully studied, should have had gp asking questions about ramsey’s claim: “…between any set of premises and a conclusion in virtue of which, if we know the first, we will be warranted in(sic) in accepting the second with some particular degree of belief.” (gp, 2020) “between any set of premises” contradicts keynes’s position that such a relation holds between some set, not any set. however, now gp accepts ramsey’s own private definition that has absolutely nothing to do with keynes’s definition and discussion on pp. 4-6: “but the other (more deeper) problem with keynes’s theory was the “objective” nature of his view of probability–the idea that all statements or propositions stand in logical relation to each other. ramsey denied the existence of these logical relations altogether.” (gp, 2020). note that what ramsey is denying is the existence of keynes’s relational, propositional logic that was built on boole’s relational, propositonal logic as contained in his the laws of thought (1854). all economists, such as b. bateman (1987, 1990), j runde (1994) and r. skidelsky (1992, 2010), who agree with ramsey (1922, 1989) appear to have absolutely no idea at all that keynes’s relational, propositional approach builds on boole. what ramsey is really saying then, although he himself was ignorant about the crucial role of boole in constructing such a relational, propositional logic, is that boole’s relational, propositional logic involves severe error. contributions that call this type of wild and wooly conclusion into question were made by edgeworth (1884,1905,1922a,1922b), wilson www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 26 published by scholink inc. (1934), hailperin (1965, 1976, 1986, 1996), russell (1922), brady (2004a,b, 2014, 2016), brady and arthmar (2012), and arthmar and brady (2016,2017). it is simply false that keynes had “…the idea that all statements or propositions stand in logical relation to each other.” contrary to ramsey (1922, 1926), braithwaite (1973), misak (2020a,b, 2016), and gp (2020), only statements that are related to each other by relevant evidence can stand in logical relation to each other. the second error of gp is his belief that “keynes’s admission that not all probabilities are numerical or measurable, especially when the truth values of our underlying premises are in dispute. in that case, when we have no idea whether our premises are true or not, keynes’s approach does not allow us to measure the probabilities of our conclusions. for ramsey, by contrast, all probabilities should be measurable.” (gp, 2020) fails to grasp keynes’s v relation, the evidential weight of the argument, where precise, exact measurement by a single number requires that v(a/h)=w, where w=1 would hold. if w<1, then imprecise, inexact, approximate measurement using intervals must be used. ramsey’s assertion that all probabilities are measurable by a precise, numerical, additive probability was rejected out of hand by keynes in his tp because it prevents a decision maker from dealing with uncertainty, which keynes defined as situations of partial knowledge and partial ignorance. ramsey’s version of subjective probability allows no role for uncertainty and can only deal with risk. misak (2016, 2020a, b), ramsey (1922, 1926, 1989; see kyburg & smokler, 1980), and braithwaite (1973) were all simply ignorant of the concept of interval valued probability. of course, this issue shows up again in the keynes-tinbergen debate of 1938-1940, where tinbergen insists on using precise, exact, numerical, physics-type approaches, based on assuming the existence of normal probability distributions in macroeconomics, while keynes insists that, in general, only approximate methods of calculation are possible. 5. discussion first, keynes never developed a new way of looking at probability, one which allowed for the possibility of probabilistic truth. there is no such thing as probabilistic truth as regards the probability α. it is an oxymoron. what is rational or reasonable is not necessarily true. second, where ramsey came up with his fanciful and fictional understanding of keynes’s logical theory of probability is unclear to me. nowhere in keynes’s a treatise on probability is there any support for any claim made by f. ramsey in either of his reviews in 1922 or 1926.there is no axiom i in keynes’s book that restricts the application of his logic to only two propositions, one a proposition and one h proposition. nowhere is it stated by keynes that there is a relation between any two non-contradictory propositions. ramsey never supplies any page citation to where in keynes’s book this supposed axiom is stated. apparently, academicians for over 100 years have simply assumed hat ramsey had to have been right because he was agenius. he was a genius in some fields. however, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 27 published by scholink inc. those fields did not encompass probability, statistics and decision theory, where b. russell correctly concluded that in those fields ramsey’s work had the least value with respect to all of his other contributions. third, ramsey’s erroneous claims have been repeated by r.b. braithwaite. his erroneous assessment was placed at the front of the collected writings of john maynard keynes (cwjmk) 1973 edition in volume 8 as an editorial foreword by donald moggridge, the editor of the cwjmk. moggridge made a huge intellectual blunder in allowing a rabid ramsey partisan to regurgitate all of the many errors made by ramey in his reviews of 1922 and 1926 about keynes’s theory. this version of the a treatise on probability has replaced the original 1921 version and has became the standard version taught to beginning students, especially in the economics and philosophy departments at cambridge university, england. braithwaite’s editorial foreword, which consisted of nine pages that simply repeat ramsey’s erroneous claims about keynes’s logical theory of probability, has served to infect everyone who read it with what i will call the ramsey virus. the result is that students accepted the ramsey myth about keynes’s book even before they had gotten past page 1 to pp. 4-6 of chapter two of keynes’s a treatise on probability, where keynes’s actual discussion of the argument form, that was the foundation of keynes’s propositional logic, was presented. a careful reading of pp. 4-6, or pp. 54-56, would have shown the errors that braithwaite was spreading. unfortunately, no academician was able to understand that keynes’ s analysis in chapters one and two completely refute braithwaite’s claims. we must conclude that ramsey had no idea about what he was talking about as regards keynes’s theory of logical probability as contained in keynes’s a treatise on probability. the same conclusion holds with respect to all academicians, especially economists, historians and philosophers (see bateman (1987, 1989, 1990, 2016, 2021a, b), clarke, 2005), gillies (2000, 2003), monk (1991), mellor (1995), weatherson (2002), hacking (2014), runde (1994), skidelsky (1992, 2010), suppes (2006) and zabell (1991, 2005) for a few examples),who have been citing ramsey’s 1922 and 1926 reviews of keynes’s book as proof that there were severe problems with keynes’s deployment of his version of boole’s relational propositional logic that lead keynes to reject the foundation of his logical theory of probability. nothing could be further from the truth. acknowledgment-i want to thank the two referees for their comments on the paper emphasizing the need to revise. i have done this to the best of my ability. references arthmar, r., & brady, m. e. (2016). the keynes-knight and the de finetti-savage’s approaches to probability: an economic interpretation. history of economic ideas, xxiv(1), 105-124. arthmar, r., & brady, m. e. (2017). reply to feduzi,rundeand zappia. history of economic ideas, xxv(1), 55-74. bateman, b. (1987). keynes’s changing conception of probability. economics and philosophy, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 28 published by scholink inc. 3(march), 97-119. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267100002753 bateman, b. (1989). human logic and keynes’s economics: a comment. eastern economic journal, 15(1), 63-67. bateman, b. (1990). keynes, induction, and econometrics. history of poliitcal economy, 22(2), 359-380. ttps://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-22-2-359 bateman, b. (2016). review of frank ramsey (margaret paul). hope, 48, 181-183. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-3452339 bateman, b. (2021a). introduction to symposium: celebrating the centenary of keynes’s treatise on probability. journal of the history of economic thought (december), 43(4). https://doi.org/10.1017/s1053837221000390 bateman, b. (2021b). pragmatism and probability: re-examining keynes’s thinking on probability. journal of the history of economic thought, 43(4), 619-632. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1053837221000365 boole, g. (1854). an investigation of the laws of thought on which are founded the mathematical theories of logic and probability. new york: dover publications. https://doi.org/10.5962/bhl.title.29413 brady, m. e. (2014). a study of ramsey’s extremely poor reading of chapter iii of j. m. keynes’s a treatise on probability and the refutations made by j. m. keynes and bertrand russell (february 17). retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=2397404 https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2397404 j. m. keynes’ theory of decision making, induction, and analogy. 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(1905). transactions of the cambridge philosophical society, 20, 36-65, 113-141. the philosophy of chance. (1922a). mind, new ser, 31, 257-283. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/xxxi.123.257 a treatise on probability, by john maynard keynes. (1922b). journal of the royal statistical society, 85, 107. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 29 published by scholink inc. gillies, d. (2003). probability and uncertainty in keynes’s the general theory. in j. runde, & s. mizuhara (eds.), the philosophy of keynes’s economics (pp. 111-129). england; routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203488973.ch9 gillies, d. (2000). philosophical theories of probability. london; routledge. gillies, d. (2003). probability and uncertainty in keynes’s the general theory. in j. runde, & s. mizuhara (eds.), the philosophy of keynes’ economics. london: routledge. guerra-pujol, f. e. 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(1931). in essays in biography, cwjmk (pp. 335-346), vol. x, london: macmillan for the royal economic society (reprinted from the new statesman and nation, 3 october 1931). keynes, j. m. (1921). a treatise on probability. london: macmillan. keynes, j. m. (1972). essays in biography. vol. x, the collected writings of john maynard keynes (cwjmk), d. moggridge (ed.). london: macmillan. kyburg, h. e., & smokler, h. e. (1980, 2nd ed.). studies in subjective probability wiley. new york (1964). mellor, d. h. (1995). f. p. ramsey. philosophy, 70, 243-257. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100065396 misak, c. (2016). the subterranean influence of pragmatism on the vienna circle: pierce, ramsey, wittgenstein. journal for the history of analytical philosophy, 4(5). https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v4i5.2946 misak, c. (2020a). frank ramsey: a sheer excess of powers. oxford: oxford university press. https://doi.org/10.5840/tpm20209195 misak, c. (2020b). pragmatic philosophers: let’s just focus on the best we can do….. retrieved from https://www.cbc.ca/radio/idea/pragmatic-philosophers-let-s-just-focus-on--the-best-we-can-do-1.5 524895 monk, r. (1991). russell and ramsey. london reviews of books, 29 august, pp. 11-13. reprinted in russell society news, no. 72 (nov., 1991) pp. 25-26. ramsey, f. p. (1922). mr. keynes on probability, cambridge magazine. xi, 1, (jan) 3-5. reprinted in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 30 published by scholink inc. the british journal of the philosophy of science, 40, [1989], pp. 219-222. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/40.2.219 truth and probability. (1926). in d. h. mellor (ed.), foundations: essays in philosophy, logic, mathematics, and economics. london: routledge & kegan paul. ramsey, f. p. (1926). truth and probability, in ramsey, 1931. the foundations of mathematics and other logical essays, ch. vii, p.156-198, edited by r.b. braithwaite, london: kegan, paul, trench, trubner & co., new york: harcourt, brace and company. ramsey, f. p. (1926). truth and probability, in ramsey, 1931. in kyburg, & smokler (eds.), studies in subjective probability. newyork,r. e. krieger publishing company, 1980. runde, j. (1994). keynes after ramsey: in defense of a treatise on probability. studies in the history and philosophy of science, part a, 25(1), 97-121. https://doi.org/10.1016/0039-3681(94)90022-1 russell, b. (1922). review of a treatise on probability. by j. m. keynes. mathematical gazette, volume 11, no.159, (july, 1922), pp.119-125. https://doi.org/10.2307/3603283 russell, b. (1931). review of ramsey. mind, 40, pp. 476-482. reprinted in russell, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/xl.160.476 russell, b. (1932). “review of ramsey”. philosophy, 7, 84-86. reprinted in russell, 1996. skidelsky, r. (1992). john maynard keynes. volume ii: the economist as saviour 1920-1937. london: macmillan. skidelsky, r. (2010). the social market economy revisited. the social market foundation. london, england. suppes, p. (2006). ramsey’s psychological theory of belief. in m. c. galavotti (ed.), cambridge and vienna: frank p. ramsey and the vienna circle. dordrecht: springer netherlands. weatherson, b. (2002). keynes, uncertainty and interest rates. cambridge journal of economics, 26(january), 47-62. https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/26.1.47 wilson, e. b. (1934). boole’s challenge problem. journal of the american statistical association, 29(187), 301-304. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1934.10502722 zabell, s. l. (1991). ramsey, truth, and probability. theoria, 57(3), 211-238. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1991.tb00838.x zabell, s. l. (2005). symmetry and its discontents. cambridge; cambridge university press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511614293 microsoft word ape-v4n2-p17 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 17 original paper rule of/by law jan erik lane1* 1 professor emeritus geneva university, geneva, switzerland received: march 25, 2021 accepted: march 31, 2021 online published: april 6, 2021 doi:10.22158/ape.v4n2p17 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v4n2p17 abstract one can go the world justice project (wjp) to find a valuable set of data on roughly 130 states, constructed from experts’ ranking. a large number of country and international experts have given scores between 0 and 1 of state performance on a set of aspects or manifest variables much discussed. the wjp measures 8 or 9 state properties, which will be reduced to two latent variables here. keywords justice, rule of law index, 2 different dimensions of the state 1. introduction the world justice group is an ngo with world covering membership. their main efforts—wjp—stems from the concern for justice and the role government plays for it. more specifically, the world justice association targets one form of justice, much debated in political philosophy, namely the rule of law, i.e., public law (waldron, 2020). wjp does not deal with distributive justice or social justice. the great roman lawyers defined justice as correct behavior (speak the truth, honour contracts), not harming anyone and give to each and everyone what is due to them (the cardinal problem of justice also today). these principles did not prevent corpus juris civilis from endorsing slavery, with 50 percent of the empire population being just that. the jews constituted a large group but more seldom as slaves. roman law did not know rule of law, although the republic was much institutionalized. the roman empire under the principate degraded into “occidental despotism”. constitutional law surged in the feudal society with representative bodies and councils, as hintze pointed out against weber, but only in western europe where political representation outlived feudalism. slavery was undone successively, replaced by serfdom in eastern europe. the vikings had “traelar”. administrative law followed the modern state as its core was bureaucracy. towards the 18th century we www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 18 published by scholink inc. arrive at two chief interpretations of rule of law. 2. common law-locke the second treatise of government outlines the first ever principal-agent approach to government, restraining it by means of the sanctity of private property, individual rights, representation and the balance of powers. locke brought the calvinist effort at constitutionalism to completion from a socinian basis, to be carried on by madison’s machivellism. 3. kant and franco-german law kant looked for an answer to the question of law and freedom-rousseau’s problem. having no principal-agent framework, he suggested his metaphysical moral theory as the foundation of law. his conception of constitutional monarchy was limited indeed. new line 4. wjp although one may be sceptic to the claims wjp makes for the social benefits of rule of law, one can still employ their measures to draw a global map. starting from the opaque nature of the meaning of “rule of law”, the wjp considers the following mmanifest variables relevant: 1) restraints on government this criterion is vague. it sounds like separation of powers or judicial review. the opposite is dictatorship in some form. 2) absence of corruption here we have a variable that relies much upon expert opinion. corruption comes in several forms, which are difficult to measure. on the one hand, there is petty corruption in ill-ordered societies that may result in pareto improvements. on the other hand, we have big scale corruption that is zero sum, benefiting different players or companies. could the american system with pacs involve some from of corruption? 3) open society this is easier to establish, as open against closed society is a dichotomy. 4) fundamental rights a list of immunities often accompanies a written constitution. the crux of the matter is whether these rights or privileges are enforced fully or partially. this depends on the justice system in a country. only common law or civil law legal traditions admits this possibility, not koranic law or socialist law traditions. 5) order and security wjp here turns to variables that are conditions for or consequences of criteria 1) – 4). under 5) we have how the state protects private property, against theft or expropriation. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 19 published by scholink inc. 6) regulatory enforcement this variable 6) is close to 2) corruption, although there may be other causes of regulatory failure like anarchy. 7) civil justice the criterion here is the capacity of ordinary citizen to make their voices heard legally. 8) criminal justice again this is more of the background of rule of law, namely the efficiency of the legal machinery as a whole. moreover, wjt has a ninth variable-informal justice. it taps how customary law operates. scores on each manifest variable between 0 and 1 are obtained by means of a questionnaire to laymen and experts. it seems that the first 4 variables indicates what we mean by “rule of law”. the others refer more to the functioning of the legal system in general. in dictatorships liķe the gulf states, there is little of rule of law but the legal system is not broken. factor analysis factor analysis is, one may mention, a data analysis technique aimed at finding underlying dimensions in an observed data set. one identifies combinations of variables which are shared by a set of properties, i.e., common traits. it is similar to what is called principal components analysis. considering the 128 countries surveyed, these dimensions were revealed: dimension 1: absence of corruption, regulatory enforcement, criminal justice, civil justice, order and security dimension 2: constraints on government, fundamental rights, open government table 1. factor analysis mr1 mr2 h2 u2 com v1 0.69 0.460.95 0.052 1.7 v2 0.99 -0.08 0.93 0.075 1 v3 0.65 0.45 0.86 0.144 1.8 v4 0.72 0.37 0.87 0.129 1.5 v5 0.87 -0.27 0.64 0.364 1.2 v6 0.93 0.09 0.94 0.063 1 v7 0.97 -0.03 0.91 0.086 1 v8 1 -0.07 0.95 0.054 the finding is that we have two latent variables. dimension 1 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 20 published by scholink inc. the first dimension comprises corruption, law enforcement and civil and criminal justice. is that rule of law? could a country score high on these properties but not so high on dimension 2? 5. law and order the following countries score high on this measure: singapore, uae and hungary. but these countries have hardly rule of law states. judicial enforcement here again we find singapore and the uae besides south korea, czeckien. however, these states are not well-known for high rule of law. it appears that dimension 1 is more measuring political stability than rule of law dimension 2 the items loading on this variable 2 comprise government constraints and fundamental rights. the countries that score high do not include singapore or eastern europe. instead it is western europe, north america and oceania. the wj index adds the scores on the 8 elements of rule of law into one total score. i believe factor 2 should be given more weight than factor 1 in such a summary index. the prominent place given to singapore and hong kong as well as the uae seem more to reflect dimension 1, although hong kong autonomy is only history. 6. top rule of law one may be interested in looking into which countries score high on the second dimension, i.e., government constraints, fundamental rights and open government. the scandinavian countries and finland stand out particularly. noteworthy is that germany ranks higher than france. the us is even lower than france. as a matter of fact, the us is scored beneath uruguay, which sounds awkward. likewise the score of the uk is astonishingly low compared with other democracies—beneath estonia. 7. legal effiency and rule law it seems that the wjp contains 2 distinct dimensions of the state: efficiency of the legal machinery on the one hand and government constraints on the other. one sees this in the different scores for india and china. rule by law is typical of china, whereas india has more of rule of law. rule by law is a necessary condition for rule of law, but the opposite does not hold. 8. why the nordic countries come on top? here we have a fascinating problem of explanation. is it a matter of culture or institutions? perhaps rule of law is path dependent meaning we have to examine historical developments? the scandinavian countries came out of the great war as constitutional monarchies with parliamentary. by allowing for unlimited right to vote for men and women, the path to constitutional democracy was www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 21 published by scholink inc. easily secured. finland followed a different path, presidential democracy after a civil war between “reds” and victorious “whites”. it may be added that from an historical point of view absolute monarchy did not last for any longer periods of time (denmark longer than sweden and norway). since the medieval times there were representative institutions for the estates of the realm (riksdag) as well as general support and respect for the so-called law, early codified. we find magna carta like rules in kings’ oaths. a possible strong institution against infractions law infractions is the ombudsman office, either as the swedish model or the danish model, to which ordinary people can complain over abuse by the authorities of the law. 9. conclusion many people around the globe want rights and security under the law. more than 50 percent of the countries of the world have states that do not respect the precepts of rule of law. the concept of rule of law is somewhat ambitious in wjp. it stands for legal integrity (kant) or rights and representation (locke). globally, what stands out in these comparative scores is the following: 1) “norden” scores exceptionally high; 2) the uk and the us have lower than expected rankings in the top. many countries have been left out, not only poorer countries. thus, switzerland is missing as well as iceland. there is no evidence showing that countries with constitutional review or federalism score top. references hintze, o. (1975). the historical essays of otto hinze. oxford:oup. kant, i. (2012). doctrine of right. cambridge: cup. locke, j. (2017). two treatises on government. cambridge: cup waldron, j. (2020). “the rule of law” in stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. weber, m. (1978). economy and society. berkeley: university of california press. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 22 published by scholink inc. microsoft word ape-v3n4-p47 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 47 original paper urbanization, gender and economic growth in the waemu zone: evidence from pooled mean group estimation prao yao seraphin1* 1 department of economic sciences and development, alassane ouattara university, bouaké, ivory coast * prao yao séraphin, department of economic sciences and development, alassane ouattara university, bouaké, ivory coast received: november 5, 2020 accepted: november 27, 2020 online published: december 1, 2020 doi:10.22158/ape.v3n4p47 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v3n4p47 abstract this study empirically analyses the influence of urbanization and the participation of men and women in the labour force on economic growth in the countries of the west african economic and monetary union (waemu). using data from the world bank (2017) on the member states between 1990 and 2016, we show from pesaran’s pmg estimator, shin and smith (1999) that in the short term, youth and women are very useful for economic growth. in the long term, urbanization, industrial added value and the elderly make a positive contribution to economic growth. the study urges governments to create better living conditions by ensuring adequate income levels and care, i.e., public policies should aim to increase employment, establish or improve social protection, social integration, health and the fight against discrimination. keywords urbanization, economic growth, gender, waemu, pmg estimator 1. introduction in africa, demography seems to be a source of concern. but the demographic problem that annoys african governments is rapid urbanization. according to collier (2017), sub-saharan africa will continue to urbanize rapidly regardless of the policies implemented. according to the united nations population office (2010), africa’s population reached more than 1 billion in 2009, of which about 40 per cent lived in urban areas. the share of urban dwellers increased from 14% in 1950, to 27% in 1980 and 40% in 2015. by the mid-2030s, 50% of africans are projected to live in cities. urbanization is expected to continue and stabilize at around 56% by 2050. this considerable increase will also apply to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 48 published by scholink inc. needs for urban services, infrastructure and jobs, whose availability is already severely limited. according to several studies and research reports, urbanization in africa, unlike most other regions of the world, has not been associated with economic growth in recent decades. for example, ravallion, chen and sangraula (2007) find that urbanization helps to reduce poverty in other regions, but not in africa. indeed, cities provide a large and diversified labour pool, a dynamic local market, more cost-effective access to suppliers and specialized services, lower transaction costs, more diversified networks of contacts and more opportunities for knowledge sharing, and an environment conducive to innovation (krugman, 1991; spence, 2012; world bank, 2009; afdb, 2010). agglomeration economies can be beneficial to cities, as they allow fewer resources to be used to meet the needs of a larger population. the increasing yields of the agglomeration reinforce the attractiveness of cities that offer a cultural life and a diversified choice of services. this attractiveness also attracts talent and investment, creating a virtuous circle of urbanization and development. post-industrial cities are the product of the rise of services, especially since the development of new communication technologies. the economic potential of post-industrial cities is based on new activities in the tertiary sector, such as financial services, research and development (r&d) and business services. in addition, the city itself is its main outlet: a large proportion of the goods and services produced in it are consumed by its own inhabitants. it is therefore an essential component of “its market”. this observation is all the more relevant since most services are by nature untransportable and must therefore be produced where they are consumed. as the export base often represents only a minority share of a city’s activities, local services are therefore a crucial factor in urban growth. in theory, the causal link between urbanization and growth is not sufficiently established, except for the early stages of development, to allow urbanization to become a general development domain (henderson, 2003). urbanization can occur without development, as has been observed in sub-saharan africa in particular (ploeg & poelhekke, 2008). a united nations study (un, 2017) for africa indicates that the least urbanized countries are those with the fastest growth. the annual growth rate for countries with more than 60% of the population urbanized is 2.23%, less than half the growth rate for countries with less than 30% of the population urbanized. however, urbanization could influence economic growth through physical capital, human capital, knowledge capital and industrial structure (shen kun-rong & jiang rui, 2007). in developing countries, at the same time as the low level of development, african countries have high gender inequalities. in the comoros, for example, 72% of men hold managerial and executive positions compared to 28% of women. in ghana, 91.7% of men sit in parliament compared to 8.3% for women. at the educational level, according to some authors, gender inequalities lead to an underutilization of human capital, which could also affect economic growth through channels whose effects are widely discussed in the literature (hill & king, 1993; klasen, 1999). from the above, it follows some questions. do gender inequalities have an impact on the economic growth of waemu countries? is the urbanization observed in the countries of the union a source of economic growth in the waemu zone? a central question then emerges: to what extent has urbanization and the employment of men and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 49 published by scholink inc. women affected economic growth in the waemu region? thus, the objective of this study is to analyze the effect of urbanization and the share of men and women in the labour force on economic growth in waemu countries. our general objective can be achieved through specific objectives. specific objective 1: analyze the effect of urbanization on economic growth in the waemu region. specific objective 2: assess the relative contribution of women and men to the economic growth of waemu countries. in relation to our objectives, we make the following two assumptions. hypothesis 1: the rise of urbanisation is beneficial to the long-term economic growth of waemu countries. hypothesis 2: the proportion of women in the labour force is favorable to economic growth in the waemu zone. methodologically, the study uses the pool mean group (pmg) estimator proposed by pesaran, shin and smith (1999). unlike conventional methods (fixed effects or generalized moments), the pmg method introduces heterogeneity into certain coefficients to be estimated. indeed, the pmg method reconciles in the same specification, the usual approach imposing fixed coefficients and the one assuming country-specific coefficients. thus, it is possible to specify that the long-term relationship between the variables is the same for all countries but that each country follows its own dynamic to converge towards this common relationship. this assumption seems reasonable for countries in a monetary union that aspire to strong long-term integration. this article contributes to the empirical literature on the link between urbanization and economic growth in the waemu region. the results obtained from this study are as follows. in the short term, only women’s contributions to the labour force and the proportion of young people (0-14 years old) appear to be statistically significant. in the long term, urbanization, industrial value added, the proportion of young people (0-14 years old) and the elderly (over 65 years old) have a positive influence on economic growth. this article is organized as follows: section 2 is devoted to the literature review on the relationship between urbanization, gender and economic growth. section 3 presents the data source and its descriptive and statistical analysis. in section 4, we present the methodology of the study. section 5 will discuss the empirical results and their econometric and economic interpretations. section 6 is reserved for the conclusion of the study. 2. literature review of the link between urbanization, gender and economic growth this section revisits the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between urbanization and economic growth. in a first subsection, we examine the link between urbanization, gender and economic growth. we will see that this relationship is still ambiguous. in a second subsection, we discuss empirical studies on this same relationship. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 50 published by scholink inc. 2.1 urbanization, gender and economic growth: theoretical contributions urbanization can influence economic growth in a variety of ways, and the majority of studies suggest that urbanization should have a positive impact on economic growth. first, cities play a vital role in the economic and social fabric of developed and developing countries by providing educational, employment and health services opportunities. educational capital determines a country’s ability to develop new technologies and adopt existing ones. the expansion of education systems in urban areas is easier and cheaper than in rural areas. the return on education is therefore generally higher in urban areas than in rural areas. in terms of public health, urban populations are more likely to reach hospitals, health centres and sanitation facilities. health care systems are also more developed, which can lead to better health performance than those in rural areas. in addition, urban workers have better access to transport and other services such as water, internet and electricity. enterprises and workers may have higher productivity in urban areas than in rural areas. secondly, urbanization involves the agglomeration of people and companies, which reduces production costs, thus allowing economies of scale to be achieved. the resulting reduction in transaction costs allows companies to specialize, resulting in low production costs. the hypothesis is that urbanization, combined with a greater spatial density of economic activity, also brings greater proximity to suppliers and customers, better access to the market, and thus the benefits of agglomeration on costs and productivity for each individual enterprise. this “marshallian” conceptualization underlies much of the recent work on the benefits of agglomeration in industrialized economies (glaeser & kerr, 2009; jofre-monseny et al., 2011; dauth 2011). doubling the size of cities could even lead to an increase in productivity of about 3% to 8% (rosenthal & strange, 2004). third, urbanization seems to be a key factor in entrepreneurship. urban populations have access to financing and can easily promote their ideas and have a local market to some extent to do business. loughran and schultz (2005) show that geography affects business performance: all other things being equal, urban businesses are more profitable than rural businesses. poverty reduction can be associated with the ability to become an entrepreneur and start your own business. this change in behaviour makes urban areas more attractive to entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship. in addition, a city’s prosperity and growth depend mainly on its ability to attract productive workers, match them appropriately to jobs and further develop their skills. urbanization is driving the migration of talent and skilled people to large cities. this concentration causes interactions and generates spillover effects of knowledge and skills. qualified people improve their skills and knowledge more effectively when exposed to similar profiles and qualified people (urban areas) than when they are not in contact with their peers (rural areas). this increases productivity in urban areas. fourth, there are positive benefits or externalities of urban development on rural areas. through migration, remittances and interactive activities between urban and rural areas, urbanization can have positive effects on finances and human capital. through migration, the transfer of information, production skills and technology can be improved in areas of emigration. regarding women’s labour force participation, many studies suggest a u-shaped relationship between www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 51 published by scholink inc. female labour force participation and economic growth (tam, 2011; lechman & okonowicz, 2013; olivetti, 2013; tsani et al., 2013; kaur & tao, 2014). the logic behind this assumption is as follows. as the economy moves from subsistence agriculture to an industrialized economy, it requires a male-dominated workforce at the expense of women. the development of services in the post-industrial phase is associated with the increase in female employment (olivetti, 2013). as a result, the feminization of the labour force in more service-oriented economies (gaddis & klassen, 2014; olivetti, 2013). however, the relationship between women’s labour force participation and economic development may vary from country to country (durand, 1975). this link may be weakened by discrimination and restrictions on women’s access to the labour market (boserup, 1970) or religious restrictions (wolch & dear, 2014). 2.2 urbanization, gender and economic growth: empirical contributions urbanization and economic development have long been considered as interdependent processes. indeed, the development history of many developed countries today has clearly demonstrated a dramatic increase in urbanization as their economies developed (hughes & cain, 2003). studies have shown that the correlation coefficient between a country’s percentage of urban dwellers and gdp per capita is about 0.85 (henderson, 2003), suggesting that urbanization is an inevitable component of a modern society. however, the phenomenon of urbanization in developing countries too often leads to disorganized hyperurbanization. it is therefore necessary to qualify the idea that density and urbanization would, in any case, be good for growth. the causal link between urbanization and growth is not sufficiently established (henderson, 2003). in many developing countries, there is also a very high size of the largest city, especially if it is a political capital. the explanation for this “urban bias” would lie in the deplorable conditions of rural life and in a kind of political preference of the leaders who would somehow “buy” political and social peace with better quality facilities in the capital. on this point, empirical studies do not provide sufficiently precise estimates of the equilibrium size of cities to guide public policies. the “right” level of urbanization depends on the size of each country and its level of development (henderson, 2003). studies by moomaw and shatter (1993) have shown that urbanization is conducive to economic growth. (2006) also found a statistically positive and significant relationship between the level of urbanization and people’s standard of living, as measured by gdp per capita, in a sample of 35 countries covering the period 1985 to 2002. daniel and fhang (2010) also explored the link between urbanization and growth for 28 countries, including 14 developing and 14 developed countries, over the period 1950-2000. using causality tests in the granger sense, he highlights a causality that goes from urbanization to economic growth for developing countries and in the opposite direction for developed countries. there is no shortage of studies on women’s contribution to economic growth. women now represent more than 40% of the global workforce (un-habitat, 2013). however, women’s economic opportunities are often still limited, especially when age, education and socio-economic status are taken into account. urban economic sectors have opened many doors for women, especially in trade and domestic service. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 52 published by scholink inc. the latter employs between 4 and 10 percent of the workforce. in developing economies, women represent 74 to 94 percent of domestic workers (world bank, 2011). women represent 70 to 90 percent of workers in multinational electronics and garment factories alone, most of whom are located in urban areas (un habitat 2013). in addition, women are the preferred workers for manufacturing jobs—traditionally low-paying, low-skilled, labour-intensive and precarious jobs—because they are considered docile, cheap and efficient according to stereotypes (chant, 2013). in africa, where agriculture remains the backbone of the economy, employing 70% of the population, women play a major role. they constitute almost two thirds of the agricultural labour force and produce the majority of foodstuffs. outside agriculture, female labour force participation rates are high throughout africa, with the exception of north africa. they reach 85 to 90% in countries such as burundi, tanzania and rwanda. in many countries (nigeria, togo, burundi), the participation rates of men and women are equal or very close. however, african labour markets are characterised by very high gender segregation, with women generally working in low-paying occupations. women are much more likely to work as self-employed entrepreneurs in the informal sector than to earn a regular wage in formal employment. in the formal sector, women hold 4 out of 10 jobs and earn on average two thirds of the salary of their male colleagues. women are increasingly participating in paid work without a significant change in their domestic and family work responsibilities (chant, 2014). this dual responsibility could prevent them from taking advantage of all the economic opportunities offered by urban areas. thus, women contribute substantially to general economic well-being by performing a large number of unpaid tasks, such as childcare and household chores, which are often not included in gdp. on average, women spend twice as much time on household chores and four times as much time on childcare as men (duflo, 2012). gender disparities in access to social and financial services have an impact on women’s economic productivity. globally, women have less access to banking and other financial services than men. for example, less than 53% of women have an account in a financial institution in middle-income countries, compared to nearly 62% of men (demirgüç-kunt et al. 2015). it follows from the above that gender equality is in itself a development objective. there is evidence that when women are able to achieve their full potential in the labour market, there are significant macroeconomic gains (loko & diouf, 2009; dollar & gatti, 1999; mckinsey, 2015; cuberes & teignier, 2016). potential losses in gdp per capita that can be attributed to gender gaps in the labour market can reach about 27 per cent in some regions (cuberes & teignier, 2012). aguirre et al. (2012) estimate that increasing the participation rate of women to the level of men would increase gdp by 5% in the united states, 9% in japan, 12% in the united arab emirates and 34% in egypt. very recently, lechman and kaur (2015) reexamined for 168 countries, over the period 1990-2012, the u-shaped curve between women’s participation in the labour market and economic growth. the results confirm the u-shaped curve hypothesis, which implies that in the early stages of economic growth, women’s participation in the labour market tends to decline, but as the country progresses in its economic development, with a significant share of the service sector, women’s contribution increases. but in africa, an econometric www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 53 published by scholink inc. study on this relationship has a reduced u-shape, indicating an incomplete transition of women from agricultural and manual labour to higher-income services (un, 2017). in north africa, for example, high socio-cultural norms keep women’s participation rates at their lowest: 15-31% of working-age women are in the labour market, compared to an average of 69% in the rest of africa. based on panel data from several african and arable countries, baliamoune-lutz (2007) empirically assesses the impact on growth of two primary indicators, namely the ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education and the literacy ratio of women aged 15 to 24 years compared to men in the same age group. the results of the study indicate that gender inequalities in literacy have a significant negative effect on growth. what about the waemu countries? 3. data sources and descriptive statistics the empirical study uses annual data from the eight (8) waemu countries, namely côte d’ivoire, senegal, niger, mali, burkina faso, togo, benin and guinea-bissau. the study data are mainly from the world development indicator (wdi) database and the study covers the period 1990-2016. growth refers to the growth rate of gross domestic product, urban the urbanization rate, indust the industrial added value as a percentage of gdp, men the share of men in the labour force, women the share of women in the labour force, young the share of the population aged 0-14 years (% of the total) and old the share of the population aged 65 years and over (% of the total). the descriptive statistics of all variables are recorded in table 1. the pearson correlation coefficient matrix is summarized in table 2. table 1. descriptive analysis of variables variable obs. mean std. dev. min max growth urban indust. 224 224 224 3,813 33,392 19,165 4,189 10,297 4,095 -28,099 13,815 9,247 15,376 50,326 29,724 men 224 80,566 7,153 67,035 92,209 women young old 224 224 224 60,225 45,399 2,908 14,413 2,152 0,330 34,219 41,496 2,299 82,586 50,231 3,817 source: author’s estimates, based on wdi data (2017). table 1 requires some comments. it indicates that over the period 1990-2016, on average, the real gdp growth rate is 3.81%, the urbanization rate is 33.39% and industrial value added is 19.16%. as for the rate of participation of men in the labour force, it is around 80.56%, that of women 60.22%, thus marking a substantial gap between the contribution of men and women to the formation of the gross www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 54 published by scholink inc. domestic product. as for young people, on average, they represent a proportion of the order of 45.39% and a proportion of the elderly of 2.90%. the low standard deviation (0.33) observed in the elderly reflects a homogeneity of this category in the sample. table 2 shows a low correlation between the explanatory variables. of all these variables, the urbanization rate (urban) and youth (young) pair have the highest correlation coefficient (-0.79) but well below 0.8. the urban and men, urban and women pairs have correlation coefficients of -0.67 and -0.34 respectively. we still decide to include all the other variables in our model because of their theoretical interest. table 2. correlation matrix growth urban indust. men women young old growth urban 1,000 -0,038 1,000 indust. 0,054 0,285* 1,000 men -0,053 -0,676* -0,357* 1,000 women -0,028 -0,342* -0,284* 0,634* 1,000 young 0,024 -0,798* -0,120** 0,566* 0,015 1,000 old 0,028 0,314* 0,035 -0,504* -0,342* -0,261* 1,000 source: author’s estimates, based on wdi data (2017). note. * (**) refers to the significance of the parameters at the 5% (10%) threshold. 4. model and methodology research the methodology adopted in this study is essentially econometric modelling based on panel data. the analysis of the interaction between the real gdp growth rate and our explanatory variables covers all waemu countries observed over time. it is therefore a study based on panel data. in this section, we first present the specification of the model and then the methodology for estimating the pmg. 4.1 the specification of the model the model to be estimated in this paper can be specified as follows: (1) from the point of view of economic theory, urbanization, industrial added value and human participation in economic life are expected to have a positive influence on economic growth. with regard to the share of women in the labour force, in view of the exclusion they experience in developing countries, it is expected that their contribution will be negative or, at best, very low. based on modigliani’s life cycle theory, the contribution of young and old must be marginal to economic growth, given their inactivity. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 55 published by scholink inc. 4.2 the presentation of the pmg and mg estimator the estimation technique used is that proposed by pesaran et al. (1999), the pmg estimator. according to pesaran et al. (1999), equation 1 can be seen as a staggered delay autoregressive model (ardl) of the form : where is a vector of explanatory variables; is a vector of coefficients; is a scalar and represents the fixed effect (country). from this model, the long-term relationship derives as follows: if the variables are cointegrated, then the term is a stationary process. in this case, the model can be respecified as an error-correction model in which the short-term dynamics are influenced by the deviation from the long-term relationship: where is the adjustment coefficient, is the vector of long-term coefficients and δ is the variation operator between two successive dates. it is expected that . one of the advantages of the ardl models is that the short-term and long-term multipliers are estimated jointly. in addition, these models allow the presence of variables that can be integrated of different orders, i.e., and , or cointegrated (pesaran and shin, 1999). the pmg estimator allows short-term coefficients and adjustment coefficients to vary from country to country, but long-term coefficients are the same for all countries ( . in this study, the pmg estimator is based on the following error-correction model: where www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 56 published by scholink inc. it has been shown that the imposition of an identical coefficient for the return force could lead to biases (kiviet, 1995). the mg estimator allows heterogeneity in both short-term parameters and long-term coefficients. the mg estimator estimates the equation for each country in the sample and then calculates the unweighted averages of the coefficients over the entire panel. the hypothesis of homogeneity of long-term coefficients is empirically tested. for this purpose, a hausman test was used to determine the difference between the mg and pmg estimators. under the null hypothesis, this difference is not significant and the pmg estimator is then preferable. 5. presentation of econometric results and interpretations the empirical analysis follows the following approach. first, we apply unit root tests to the series to study the stationarity of the variables. second, we apply the cointegration test to validate or invalidate a possible long-term relationship between the variables. third, we estimate the long-term coefficients, using the pmg estimator. the order of integration of the variables is tested according to the tests of im, peseran and shin (ips, 2003), levine, lin and chu (2002) and maddala and wu (1999). the results in table 3 indicate that the variables growth, indust, men, young and old are stationary in level at the 5% threshold. but all variables are stationary in first difference. it follows from the above that there is a presumption of a cointegrating relationship between the different variables. a cointegration test should therefore be applied. pedroni’s cointegration test (1999; 2001) is performed for all variables and the results are reported in table 4. table 3. stationarity test results in level in first difference variables llc ips mw llc ips mw growth -10,464* (0,000) -11,249* (0,000) 45,345* (0,000) -9,335* (0,000) -14,787* (0,000) 78,435* (0,000) urban 7,018 (1,000) -1,423** (0,077) 2,338 (1,000) -116,949* (0,000) -83,648* (0,000) 13,384 (0,644) indust. -1,781* (0,037) -2,791* (0,002) 21,408 (0,163) -10,810* (0,000) -11,139* (0,000) 29,669* (0,019) men -3,900* -0,694 27,322* -3,168* -1,218 13,463 women (0,000) -4,117* (0,996) -0,476 (0,038) 10,322 (0,000) -1,729* (0,111) -2,885* (0,638) 12,155 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 57 published by scholink inc. young old (0,000) -6,043* (0,000) -4,776 (0,000) (0,316) -6,148* (0,000) -1,720* (0,042) (0,849) 10,606 (0,833) 29,599* (0,020) (0,041) -2,175* (0,014) -3,643* (0,000) (0,002) -1,683* (0,046) 0,009 (0,503) (0,733) 9,307 (0,900) 11,421 (0,782) source: author’s estimates, based on wdi data (2017). note. llc, ips and mw are respectively the levin-lin-chu (2002), im,-pesaran-shin (2003) and maddala-wu. table 4 shows that of the seven statistics, four are in favour of a long-term relationship between the variables. as a result, we can conclude that the variables are cointegrated, allowing the choice of an error-correction model to estimate the long-term relationship. table 4. cointegration test results panel tests group mean tests statistiques p-values statistiques p-values ν-stat -1,859 0,968 ρ-stat 0,070 0,527 0,884 0,811 t-stat (pp) -10,116* 0,000 -20,792* 0,000 t-stat (adf) -2,813* 0,002 -3,670* 0,000 note. * indicates the significance of the test at the 5% threshold. source: author’s estimates, based on wdi data (2017). at this stage of the study, it is possible to present the results of the pmg and mg estimates. the results of the pmg and mg estimates are reported in tables 5 and 6. to choose between the two models, it is recommended to apply the hausman test. this test is applied to the differential between mg and pmg. under the null hypothesis, the difference between the estimated coefficients mg and pmg is not significant and pmg is more efficient. table 5. results of the short-term equations variables pmg mg coef. s.e p-value coef. s.e p-value www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 58 published by scholink inc. constante -26,226 -0,095 -13,155** 34,363** 23,246* -70,284* -155,834* 35,213 0,118 6,950 18,311 7,617 30,726 24,438 0,456 0,420 0,058 0,061 0,002 0,022 0,000 0,781 -0,201 -12,244 32,983** 24,070* -23,329 9,394 53,367 0,153 8,000 16,975 9,178 37,462 412,735 0,988 0,191 0,126 0,052 0,009 0,533 0,982 note. * (**) indicates that the null hypothesis of homogeneity of long-term coefficients at the 5% (10%) source: author’s estimates, based on wdi data (2017). table 6. results of the long-term equations variables pmg mg coef. s.e p-value coef. s.e p-value urban indust. men women young old ajustement coefficient phi 1,644* 0,250* -0,263** -0,143** 1,844* 14,695* ficient -1,096* 0,219 0,073 0,149 0,084 0,371 2,344 0,101 0,000 0,001 0,078 0,092 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,127 0,312 -0,286 3,768* -4,041* 25,381** -1,208* 1,210 0,117 1,377 3,188 4,330 14,707 0,084 0,171 0,274 0,973 0,009 0,049 0,084 0,000 note. * (**) indicates that the null hypothesis of homogeneity of long-term coefficients at the 5% (10%) threshold has not been rejected. source: author’s estimates, based on wdi data (2017). the results of the haussman test, presented in table 7, indicate that the assumption of homogeneity of the long-term coefficients can not be rejected. indeed, the probability of the test is higher than the 5% threshold. in this case, the interpretation of the results will be based on those of the pmg estimator because it is more efficient. table 7. hausman test results variables coefficients différence (b-b) mg (b) pmg (b) urban -0,127 1,644 -1,772 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 59 published by scholink inc. indust. 0,312 0,250 0,061 men -0,286 -0,263 -0,022 women 3,768 -0,143 3,911 young old -4,041 25,381 1,844 14,695 -5,886 10,686 chi2(5) = (b-b)’[(v_b-v_b)^(-1)](b-b) = 2,38 prob>chi2 = 0,882 source: author’s estimates, based on wdi data (2017). now, we can interpret the results of the econometric analysis of the relationship between the real gdp growth rate and the explanatory variables used in this study. in the short term, the variables men, women, young and old show significant coefficients. the share of men in the labour force (men) and the share of the population aged 65 and over, as a percentage of the total (old), have a negative influence on the real growth rate in the waemu zone. the negative impact of men’s share of the labour force is not very intuitive given their high weight compared to women. this could be explained by the low quality of jobs. according to the results of the 1-2-3 surveys in seven capitals of the waemu zone, decent wage employment represents less than 30 per cent of urban employment (zerbo, 2006). indeed, for all the capitals studied, 23.8 per cent of the employed work in the formal sector (private, public and voluntary) with 8.4 per cent of the employed in the public and para-public sector and 15.4 per cent in the private formal sector. as for older people, their inactivity is not beneficial to economic growth. most often in retirement, these elderly people are a burden on the economy, with no savings capacity. in this regard, a recent analysis has highlighted the economic threat to africa posed by a growing population, low savings rates and low productivity, which could limit the demographic dividend (eastwood & lipton, 2011). on the other hand, the share of women in the labour force (women) and the share of the population aged 0-14 years as a percentage of the total (young) positively influence the real gdp growth rate in the area. our results on women’s positive contribution to growth are similar to those of baliamoune-lutz (2007) and klassen (1999). it appears that the increase in women’s participation in employment generates strong growth, the magnitude of which varies with the rate at which the participation rates of men and women converge.the proportion of informal employment in non-agricultural sectors is around 85% in the waemu zone. almost the entire labor market is informal. an estimate for senegal indicates that only 3.8 percent of jobs were formal. with 53% of active workers, the informal sector appears overall to be the most feminized sector in west african countries. this strong contribution of women could explain the positive effect of women’s activity in the short term in contrast to that of men. according to thevenon et al. (2012), it can correspond to a potential output gain of 12% on average in the oecd by 2030 if convergence is total—a gain of 0.6 percentage points in annual gdp per capita growth. for young people under 14 years of age, their positive contribution to economic growth must be supported www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 60 published by scholink inc. by their ability to increase the active population. indeed, in most waemu countries, compulsory schooling up to the age of 15 or 16 leads almost all boys and girls to attend primary and secondary education. if this youth is trained then there will be more workers. however, more workers means more production, and when there are more workers in relation to the population, production per capita increases. in the long term, all varaibles are significant at the 10% threshold. urbanization, industrial value added, the share of the population aged 0-14 years (% of the total) and the share of the population aged 65 years and over (% of the total) have a positive influence on the real gdp growth rate. urbanization and industrial added value are conducive to long-term economic growth. indeed, the relative geographical concentration of research and innovation relative to production in most industries, and the strong links with the diversity of employment in technology-related industries, illustrate the role of cities in innovation (duranton, 2015). urbanization facilitates industry in this case. however, industrial development is not only the way forward, but also the corollary of structural transformation. the city increases the potential of the african manufacturing sector to generate growth. young people and the elderly are also useful for the economic growth of waemu countries. the existence of a negative relationship between the share of men and women in the population and the long-term gdp growth rate, although surprising, is based on the structure of the labour market. in africa, women’s participation rate is high in all age groups and remains high until the end of their productive years, which is only possible when women combine their family responsibilities with their work in the informal economy, especially on their own account. there is a clear trend towards a generalisation of self-employment among women (and men), especially when they are not in paid employment. more often than men, women prefer to work for themselves rather than employ staff and are more present in the informal sector than in the formal economy. however, informal workers earn, on average, lower wages than formal workers, thus facing a higher probability of falling into poverty, which could be considered as a brake on economic growth in the long term. as for the share of men in the labour force, its negative influence on long-term growth could be explained by the predominance of low-skilled workers, who receive low wages whether they are employed in the formal or informal sectors. it is also possible that the negative impact of the contribution of men and women to the labour force on economic growth can be explained by the importance of the informal sector in the economies of the waemu region. indeed, according to the international labour office, this sector provides 72% of jobs in sub-saharan africa with 93% of new jobs generated (adigbli, 2008), while the formal sector employs only 10% of the workforce across the continent. the lack of reliable data from this sector could lead to an undervaluation of gdp, which in the end may weaken the contribution of women and men to economic growth. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 61 published by scholink inc. 6. conclusion the objective of this study was to show the empirical link between urbanization, the share of men and women in the labour force and economic growth. the data for this study come from the world bank’s 2017 development indicators database. these data cover the period 1990-2016 and cover the eight waemu countries. using pedroni’s (1999; 2001) approach, the data indicate a long-term relationship between economic growth and urbanization. the results indicate that in the short term, young people and women are very useful for economic growth while older women are a burden on society. in the long term, industrial added value and urbanization have a positive influence on economic growth in the waemu region. however, the contribution of workers weighs on economic growth. the union’s political authorities must reflect on the challenges posed by urbanisation in order to benefit from it. improving access to basic services, infrastructure and public transit, as well as affordable and accessible childcare, would facilitate everyone’s ability to participate in the economy. in addition, the industrial policies pursued in almost all eu countries must continue. our empirical analysis has highlighted the limitations of human capital formation in terms of the negative effect of the share of men and women in the active population on economic growth. but in the long term, older people are very useful for economic growth. thus, measures will have to be taken by the political authorities in response to the negative growth effects of the active population. policies to combat unemployment must go hand in hand with policies to build human capital. in this context, the empowerment of women must therefore be accompanied by changes in legislation, policies and socio-cultural norms in order to effectively address the gender disparities that impede their full economic, social and political participation in urban life. governments will therefore have to create better living conditions by ensuring adequate levels of income and care, i.e., public policies should aim at intensifying employment, establishing or improving social protection, social integration, health and the fight against discrimination. the retirement pension system should enable individuals to maintain their standard of living after the period of employment and should prevent social exclusion. references abdel-rahman, a. n., safarzadeh, m. r., & bottomley, m. b. 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(2006). marché du travail urbain et pauvreté en afrique subsaharienne: un modèle d’analyse. in document de travail 129/2006. centre d’economie du développement, université bordeaux iv. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 161 original paper an analysis of the feasibility of artificial intelligence to replace lawyers weiyuan wang 1 1 southwest minzu university, chengdu, china received: april 12, 2023 accepted: may 11, 2023 online published: may 31, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n2p161 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n2p161 abstract the application of artificial intelligence in justice is an irreversible trend, and it is going through a process of development from shallow to deep and from narrow to wide. it is in this context that the discussion on whether artificial intelligence can replace lawyers in the future and whether there is a need for the existence of lawyers begins. the impact and challenge of artificial intelligence to replace the lawyer system is still in the ethical, effectiveness and fairness of the three aspects of the controversy, lawyers also have the unique advantages of artificial intelligence can not replace. therefore, this paper advocates that artificial intelligence in a narrow sense cannot replace lawyers, and has reservations about whether strong artificial intelligence can replace lawyers. should adhere to the legal role of lawyers, to achieve the limited intervention of artificial intelligence, the use of a degree, to assist powerful. keywords lawyers, artificial intelligence, impartiality 1. introduction with technological innovation as the engine, human society has evolved from an agricultural society, an industrial society to an information society, with the internet, big data, and artificial intelligence as the main features. the term artificial intelligence is commonly understood as “the programming and construction of a computer to have knowledge and responses similar to those of people, to understand their expressions, to learn, to make inferences, to solve problems, and to remember”. there is a distinction between general ai (strong artificial intelligence) and narrow ai (weak artificial intelligence). general ai is a computer system that exhibits human or superhuman intelligence in all domains, and it can transfer knowledge from one domain to another, which is difficult to achieve yet in the short term. so far, all human achievements in artificial intelligence fall under the category of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 162 published by scholink inc. narrow ai. narrow ai does not involve full consciousness (i.e., intelligence comparable to that of humans), but it can have a huge impact on society through increased efficiency and automation. this paper builds on the narrow ai by exploring whether ai can replace lawyers. in criminal justice, for example, ai is used in crime prediction, crime detection and crime prevention because of its ability to analyze and process large amounts of information in a short period of time; in predicting the likelihood that an individual will commit another crime, appear in court on a court date, etc., thereby influencing decisions on bail and probation; in analyzing overall sentencing trends, thereby influencing decisions by prosecutors and judges on sentencing; and in assessing the risk level of an offender, thereby influencing decisions on parole and correctional measures; applied to assessing the risk level of an offender, thereby influencing decisions on parole and correctional measures. it is foreseeable that the scope of application of ai in justice will gradually expand in the future. and where is the boundary of the expansion of the scope of application of artificial intelligence? can it replace the role of the advocate in our procedural law? how to respond to the use of artificial intelligence has become an urgent issue to be studied. some developers have already created legal artificial intelligence and put it into the market, including ibm’s personal intelligent lawyer ross, robot lawyer donotpay, and china’s “law dog” computer system. among the above legal ai, some of them can draft simple legal documents for clients, while others can predict the verdict of a case for clients and estimate the admissibility of evidence in a lawsuit. from this point of view, due to the limitations of the technology and the different support from the state in the judicial field, the existing legal ai development is far from being able to replace the work of lawyers. however, it should not be ignored that, with the growing maturity of artificial intelligence, it will be more widely used in various legal services, and the discussion of whether artificial intelligence can completely replace lawyers should be placed in a broader space and time. if artificial intelligence is to completely replace lawyers, from a technical point of view, at least it needs to be able to simulate human thinking ability in a real sense. current ai may not be able to take into account events that have not occurred or data that has not been input, and it can only make projections based on existing data models. if ai only analyzes a large amount of data and cases without sufficient discrete thinking about individual cases, ai may only be able to give a general “answer” and not be able to personalize the case and give clear enough legal advice. if ai can truly simulate human thinking in the future, an automated system generated by legal ai may replace the work of lawyers in certain areas, which can make full use of data to conduct forensics, due diligence, contract analysis, compliance review and so on. even the work of lawyers in collecting and organizing materials, representing cases, attending court hearings, etc. will likely be done by ai based on a rich data collection and analysis system. perhaps in the near future, legal ai may replace lawyers to complete simple or clerical legal work independently. some simple legal advice will also be completely answered by ai online. because the above work has a strong technical feasibility, reduce the cost of the parties to solve disputes, so that the parties can access legal www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 163 published by scholink inc. services at any time and anywhere. for example, allen & overy, a top uk law firm, has partnered with harvey to introduce generative artificial intelligence called harvey to assist lawyers with tasks such as contract analysis, due diligence and regulatory compliance. this initiative has the potential to drive digital transformation and promote innovative competitiveness in the legal industry globally. the application of artificial intelligence technology in the legal industry is promising, promising to provide more efficient and accurate services to lawyers and to reduce costs and improve the competitiveness of law firms. however, in promoting ai technologies, attention needs to be paid to relevant legal and ethical issues and to ensure legal compliance. for example, how to protect the privacy and data security of clients, how to protect the neutrality and objectivity of ai technology, and how to prevent ai technology from being used for fraud and misconduct. therefore, while promoting ai technologies, relevant legal and ethical norms need to be established to ensure their safe and reliable application in the legal industry. in addition, although ai technology can improve the efficiency and reduce the cost of law firms, it may also have an impact on some of the work. for example, some mechanized and repetitive tasks may be automated, leading to the reduction of some positions. a new study published by investment bank goldman sachs shows that the latest breakthroughs in generative ai systems, such as chatgpt, will bring major disruptions to the global labor market, with 300 million jobs expected to be replaced by generative ai worldwide, with lawyers being the most likely to be laid off. on top of that, the lawyer’s clientele may be reduced as a result. for external client acquisition, when most of the basic work of all lawyers that can be seen can be done by ai tools such as chatgpt, it also means that the lower limit of paperwork quality of all lawyers will be raised significantly. in the old manual era, a lawyer’s high quality and professionalism in all types of paperwork was easily recognized by clients, which in turn enhanced trust in that lawyer and gave positive incentives. but today, an ordinary person with no legal expertise background can easily and efficiently obtain a high-quality legal document when involved in a legal dispute through artificial intelligence software such as chatgpt. even if the paperwork done manually by lawyers is still better in quality than the paperwork provided by chatgpt, the gap between the quality of the paperwork done by chatgpt and the paperwork done manually by lawyers is narrowing on the one hand, but on the other hand, in the field of professional intellectual services, it is difficult for a layman to distinguish between two paperwork with only a slight difference in level the difference between the quality of the documents done manually is shrinking. then, for small and simple legal documents in general, instead of spending high attorney’s fees to have a lawyer write them manually, the client may seek the assistance of chatgpt for free. in addition, chatgpt has the ability to give appropriate advice by addressing legal issues in conjunction with legal texts. in some simple cases with simple rights and obligations and a low number of subject matter, clients are likely to stop seeking lawyers for advice and turn to artificial intelligence such as chatgpt on the internet. the above two situations have led to a decreasing clientele for www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 164 published by scholink inc. lawyers, and with the development and popularity of chatgpt, it will become more obvious that the clientele of lawyers will decrease, and the competition between lawyers and chatgpt will become more and more intense. if lawyers want to gain an advantage in the battle with chatgpt, i am afraid that they have to provide legal services through “intangible value” to gain the trust of clients. on top of that, the lawyer’s clientele may be reduced as a result. for external client acquisition, when most of the basic work of all lawyers that can be seen can be done by ai tools such as chatgpt, it also means that the lower limit of paperwork quality of all lawyers will be raised significantly. in the old manual era, a lawyer’s high quality and professionalism in all types of paperwork was easily recognized by clients, which in turn enhanced trust in that lawyer and gave positive incentives. but today, an ordinary person with no legal expertise background can easily and efficiently obtain a high-quality legal document when involved in a legal dispute through artificial intelligence software such as chatgpt. even if the paperwork done manually by lawyers is still better in quality than the paperwork provided by chatgpt, the gap between the quality of the paperwork done by chatgpt and the paperwork done manually by lawyers is narrowing on the one hand, but on the other hand, in the field of professional intellectual services, it is difficult for a layman to distinguish between two paperwork with only a slight difference in level the difference between the quality of the documents done manually is shrinking. then, for small and simple legal documents in general, instead of spending high attorney’s fees to have a lawyer write them manually, the client may seek the assistance of chatgpt for free. in addition, chatgpt has the ability to give appropriate advice by addressing legal issues in conjunction with legal texts. in some simple cases with simple rights and obligations and a low number of subject matter, clients are likely to stop seeking lawyers for advice and turn to artificial intelligence such as chatgpt on the internet. the above two situations have led to a decreasing clientele for lawyers, and with the development and popularity of chatgpt, it will become more obvious that the clientele of lawyers will decrease, and the competition between lawyers and chatgpt will become more and more intense. if lawyers want to gain an advantage in the source war with chatgpt, i am afraid that they will have to provide “intangible value” to reflect the professional substitution in the era of artificial intelligence: in front of artificial intelligence, human beings are not the coachmen to be replaced, but the horses to be eliminated. in other words, whether human beings will be replaced depends on whether they are “coachmen” or “horses”. the “coachman” can be upgraded to a “driver” after the “horse” is replaced by a car, but the “horse” will be completely eliminated. in the era of artificial intelligence, “coachman” means to engage in the nature of decision-making research and judgment work with technical content or personalized legal services work. these jobs are less replaceable, and even directly determine the quality of artificial intelligence services, irreplaceable. and some basic, simple mechanical implementation of the work is the “horse”, replaceable, is likely to be completely eliminated by artificial intelligence. this is reflected in the legal profession, is the legal services market fragmentation. that is, some basic legal work will gradually lose its value, gradually www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 165 published by scholink inc. replaced by chatgpt and other artificial intelligence. some strategic, research-based, advanced legal advice and decision-making work, on the other hand, will not only not be replaced, but can be made easier while improving quality with the assistance of artificial intelligence. “for clients, litigation is only a means to an end; problem solving is the ultimate goal.” this is an axiom that is widely circulated in judicial practice. when a client seeks legal services, whether it is a “cheap labor” artificial intelligence represented by chatgpt or a “barrister” who charges by the hour, the fundamental purpose is to solve the problem and achieve the desired result. simple legal work, because of its mechanical and repetitive nature, reduces the creativity and devalues the work, and can already be replaced by ai. but the creative legal profession with intrinsic, constitutive and generative values is an inseparable part of human moral life and moral practice, which is related to human subjectivity and meaning of life, and has ethical values that cannot be abandoned or replaced. this part of legal service work, in the era of artificial intelligence, due to the complexity and variability of social life, its service value is more prominent. therefore, in the era of artificial intelligence, the legal service market will be divided into high, medium and low end markets based on the quality and content of services. the middle and low-end legal service market will face the risk of being replaced, and after the development of strong ai reaches a certain stage, the middle and low-end service industry may even become chatgpt’s “operators”, and will no longer generate value itself; while the high-end legal service market will ride on the east wind of chatgpt and use strong ai technology to improve the quality of work. the high-end legal service market, on the other hand, will take advantage of chatgpt to improve the quality and efficiency of its work and reap better returns by using strong artificial intelligence technology. the value of legal services, and thus the trust of clients. 2. risk analysis of artificial intelligence replacing lawyers however, it is difficult to avoid the ethical and legal risks involved when legal artificial intelligence replaces the work of lawyers, regardless of the degree of substitution. first, the lawyer profession has strong professionalism and professional conduct standards. if a legal ai replaces a lawyer’s work, can the legal ai also comply with the lawyer’s practice ethics to serve the client? for example, lawyers are required by law to maintain confidentiality of client information and are not permitted to represent clients in conflict-of-interest situations. legal ai, on the other hand, often requires the collection and collation of large amounts of information, which may include personal information from various clients. without proper supervision, there is a risk that this personal information could be stolen and leaked. furthermore, if legal ai makes mistakes or errors in legal services, who should be held responsible for the faults? how? from this perspective, the replacement of lawyers by artificial intelligence may bring the following dimensions of risk, and the following risks not only will not decline but also may rise as the development of artificial intelligence technology matures. first, is the ethical risk. machine learning www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 166 published by scholink inc. poses a challenge to human free will. in the process of applying ai, the anthropomorphization of machines and the mechanization or naturalization of human beings go hand in hand, and the difference between the artificial and the “true intelligence” the mind becomes increasingly blurred, and in the long run, whether human governance will be replaced by machine governance is the development and application of artificial intelligence is a potential concern and ethical controversy. applying ai to legal activities requires addressing the questions of how much the relevant subject has the ability to decide on the autonomous learning in the ai system and how much control it has over the results produced by the ai system. second, the risk of effectiveness. if the legal advice provided by artificial intelligence in legal services is significantly better than the results of human judgment in terms of efficiency and cost for the parties to the case, then the use of artificial intelligence is undoubtedly acceptable. however, there is no clear answer to this question. artificial intelligence systems are based on statistics on the real side, and it is often difficult to incorporate social expectations on the contingent side. when seeking legal services, clients expect legal service providers to make a comprehensive assessment based on the dispute or risk matter they present, rather than using past group information or impressions as a basis for judgment. by identifying a present dispute or risk matter based on past information, case facts and legal opinions, there is a risk that the individual information it screens out is the key to distinguishing an individual case from a class case, resulting in improper advice and adverse consequences for the client. third, impartiality risk. in the absence of contextual knowledge, prior notification, use after consent and other due process mechanisms, the collection and processing of case information by artificial intelligence may create a greater risk of infringement of citizens’ privacy. for example, there are difficulties in confirming the consent of the client, non-transparent use of image data, unanticipated collection of data by the client, and incidental acquisition of sensitive data, which cause the risk of infringement of citizens’ privacy rights. at the same time, there is a “legal black box” and a “technical black box” in the application of artificial intelligence instead of lawyers in litigation activities. the automated nature of ai usually makes it difficult for those affected by it to perceive and know, and even if it can be perceived and known to some extent, the process and methods of decision-making by ai systems often lack detailed descriptions, and it is difficult to monitor and review whether their decision-making process and results are fair. it is difficult to trace the responsibility of the algorithm and the responsibility of the person when the decision is made by an ai system. since there are no relevant records made into decisions for verification, the person lacks sufficient information to reconstruct the decision process, and therefore it is difficult to judge whether the decision is wrong. this lack of transparency and difficulty in accountability in artificial intelligence applications may hollow out the values protected by due process of law. 3. analysis of the irreplaceability of the advantages of lawyers from another perspective, the unique advantages that lawyers have in legal services cannot be replaced by artificial intelligence. according to china’s lawyer law, a lawyer is a practitioner who obtains a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 167 published by scholink inc. lawyer’s practice certificate according to the law and accepts the commission or designation to provide legal services for clients. the object of lawyer service is human, and the legal service provided by lawyers is not just a commodity, but a whole set of service process that combines professional knowledge, industry practice, the use of technology and skills, and the practice of human feelings and customs. lawyers can even bring a certain degree of emotional comfort to the client, this kind of temperature is incomparable to artificial intelligence. in terms of the current development of artificial intelligence, all mechanized, fixed output, legal rules and regulations to answer the lawyer, that is, the retrieval type lawyer, will certainly be replaced. this is because the application of artificial intelligence technology allows people to get answers faster, more accurately and at lower cost. however, more often than not, our reliance on lawyers is not solely on laws and regulations. the complexity of cases, as well as the complexity of human nature, causes us to rely on lawyers to include more of an emotional, psychological level of demand. second, at present and for a considerable period of time, artificial intelligence does not yet make good use of creative thinking, which is one of the criteria for a good lawyer. law is a philosophy of discernment, embodied in the process of confrontation and logical thinking, not just an algorithmic model exercise based on rules of thumb. therefore, artificial intelligence can become an auxiliary tool and competent assistant for lawyers, if it is to completely replace human lawyers, it will not be able to meet the client’s entrustment needs. especially with the current rapid development of ai technology, taking chatgpt, which has exploded since 2022, as an example, some professionals believe that the emergence of wisdom embodied in a general model like chatgpt may bring new opportunities to the legal industry. for example, chatgpt can be used in intelligent legal search engines that can search for relevant legal provisions and class cases more quickly and intelligently. secondly, chatgpt can be used to develop intelligent legal consultation products such as intelligent legal q&a bots, which can answer users’ legal questions more quickly and accurately and provide more efficient and convenient legal consultation services. users can interact with chatgpt via voice or text to receive legal advice and guidance. this helps lower the threshold of basic legal services and makes it more convenient for the public to access general legal services. third, intelligent text analysis. chatgpt can help analyze legal data and texts to extract key information and patterns from them. for example, chatgpt can be used to automate contract review and dispute resolution, enabling faster identification of problems and disputes in contracts and providing solutions. this type of ai technology can also be used to generate abstracts, reviews, and other tasks to facilitate research on legal issues. fourth, intelligent document writing. chatgpt can assist in writing legal documents such as contracts. we all know that the power of law comes from the power of language, and language is fundamental and central to law. chatgpt, as a large language model, has the potential to impact the legal profession by making it possible to use legal language proficiently in conversational and argumentative scenarios, based on learning a large number of legal texts (from jurisprudence to judgments, from contracts to articles of incorporation). chatgpt, as well as other large language models, can greatly improve office efficiency and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 168 published by scholink inc. productivity in the legal profession, making it possible for people such as lawyers to focus more able to focus and concentrate on more strategic areas. for example, these models can help the legal industry with its heavy document search workload, allowing it to more effectively complete legal services for client cases. in addition, chatgpt and other large language models can help the legal industry automate the generation of legal documents, which allows attorneys and others to focus more on more challenging and innovative tasks, thereby enhancing their expertise and skills and helping the legal industry better achieve its growth goals. however, chatgpt is only a machine learning model and it cannot represent a human being to obtain a legal qualification exam. chatgpt can help people understand the law, but it cannot be involved in actual legal actions such as legal orders, contracts and cases. this is because considering whether an individual is able to practice a certain profession requires not only examining his or her professional competence, but possibly also factors such as: whether he or she has relevant qualifications, credentials, appropriate legal knowledge base and practical skills, and possibly additional training, just like lawyers in general. secondly, the lawyer profession is extremely local protectionist. in conclusion, although the ai technology associated with chatgpt itself has professional capabilities, chatgpt cannot participate in legal services and other work as a legal profession practitioner for the time being because the current requirement of the legal profession is to have relevant practical and interpersonal skills, which chatgpt does not currently possess. beyond that, the current chatgpt cannot fully replace the value that lawyers bring to their clients. first of all, the “warm value” provided by lawyers to clients cannot be replaced by chatgpt. lawyers need to uphold the service concept of truly understanding the clients’ demands, effectively and efficiently solving the problems encountered by the clients, and safeguarding the legal rights and interests of the clients through the optimal path. in the process of service, the lawyer must be able to sense the client’s emotion, and provide encouragement, confidence and comfort when the client is hurt by the infringement, so that the client can be stronger and more calm to cooperate with the lawyer to defend the rights, that is, the lawyer can provide “warm value” for the client. but on the contrary, as some researchers pointed out, the imitation of human behavior by artificial intelligence can be divided into four levels mechanical behavior, analytical behavior, intuitive behavior, and emotional perception. for legal services, chatgpt it can replace the mechanical behavior and analytical behavior of lawyers, but the imitation effect on intuitive behavior is not ideal, it is difficult to imitate lawyers rely on experience and intuition to adapt to changes in the situation to dynamically choose the path of rights defense and litigation procedures. for emotional perception, artificial intelligence does not have the ability to perceive and express human emotions, and is unable to provide “warm value” for the client through conversation, body language and other means like a lawyer. from the perspective of legal language, language is the carrier of culture, and legal language is also the carrier of rule of law culture. the use of legal language runs through every aspect of legal practice, and its use directly reflects the process of development of the rule of law in society. the more accurate, professional and rich the use of language, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 169 published by scholink inc. in a sense, the level of development of the cultural level to which it belongs is also rising at the same level.as the established discipline language with obvious legal characteristics, legal language is the most important tool for legal practice by legal people. in their daily activities, lawyers create and use legal language, whether oral or written, complex or brief, and use language to create legal contexts in order to gain more space for themselves to apply the law and to maximize the rights and interests of their clients. can artificial intelligence really do a detailed enough examination of the precise use of language and the many different scenarios of context-specific analysis? of course, technology is still developing, and we do not rule out the possibility that robots will have these abilities in the future, but this development faces more technological and ethical challenges than we can imagine. secondly, chatgpt’s technical rationality cannot solve the problem of legal value judgment chatgpt is still a tool, which determines that it only has technical rationality at present, and cannot really understand the logic and value judgment behind the legal rules. but the legal problems encountered by the parties invariably contain value propositions. from the viewpoint of the trial, although the judge should be faithful to the law, it is not mechanical justice but more of a process of free mental evidence, whether it is “high degree of conclusiveness”, “forming inner conviction”, “beyond reasonable doubt whether it is the requirement of “high degree of conclusiveness”, “forming inner conviction”, “beyond reasonable doubt” and other standards of proof, or the wide discretionary power of judges, it is decided that judges cannot rely solely on technical reason to adjudicate, and parties naturally cannot rely solely on the technical reason provided by chatgpt to defend their rights in litigation. from the outside of the courtroom, the legal profession is widely circulated a saying “kung fu is outside the courtroom”, and administrative litigation is even more so, not only outside the courtroom there are administrative review remedies more widespread mediation, settlement of the case, in these cases, lawyers in the negotiation, mediation often need to understand the value of the law behind and the application of the case. this is not something that chatgpt, which merely provides technical rationality, can replace. of course, artificial intelligence such as chatgpt should not be pitted against each other. in fact, the development of ai can further enrich the toolbox of lawyers’ work, further improve the efficiency of lawyers, increase the convenience of people’s access to legal services, and reduce the cost of basic legal services to a certain extent. legal professionals in general need to focus more on improving the temperature and precision of legal services, while having the ability to use ai-aided tools with skill and insight. finally, the value of a lawyer is more reflected in the experience. the same type of case, due to different details, different clients, different opponents, the different strategies and starting points, are driven by the lawyer’s experience accumulated in the process of practice to make choices. these, in the algorithm of artificial intelligence, according to the existing data to “improvise”, for it may still be a problem that can not be ignored. at the same time, the biggest difference between legal people and ai is that “legal people happen to be engaged in a profession that is both legal and highly emotional”. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 170 published by scholink inc. after all, artificial intelligence is only a machine integrated by big data, and its biggest weakness is probably that it cannot precisely understand the complex and complicated language of human beings. the application of the law is not a simple sense of “examination” a question and answer form, nor is it a simple “a deduce b, b deduce c, so a deduce c “ the inference process. in the actual operation and case handling process, the law has a more complex “language system”: how to guide the parties to tell the objective facts, how to face the human nature of human beings to avoid harm, how to pacify the emotional parties, how to investigate and collect evidence for the existing case information, how to create a more favorable situation for their own parties. how to deal with the evidence presented by the other side against the client ...... lawyer’s work is no longer just to deal with the legal documents, many work beyond the legal documents themselves, lawyers need to explore, learn and complete the work. in the process of completing the work beyond the legal documents, a new “language system” for dealing with different types of cases and different types of clients is gradually formed. this kind of “language system” can not be fluently responded by ai without emotion through big data, because what big data can present is mostly an end result. 4. path analysis of lawyer-based, artificial intelligence-supported from the perspective of providing better quality legal services, artificial intelligence actually has a more positive significance. on the one hand, the cost of legal services will be greatly reduced, which will give more people the ability to enjoy high-quality legal services and better protect their legal rights and interests; on the other hand, the basic work that relies on a large amount of data collection and analysis will be replaced by artificial intelligence, and newcomers to the legal profession will not have to be trapped in those boring and repetitive tasks, but will have a higher starting point. lawyers with little experience will be able to provide services beyond their original capabilities with the help of artificial intelligence. as human players with subjective initiative, we may be able to give full play to our own initiative in the face of ai, placing it in the position of “tool” and “assistant”, allowing it to help us to complete simple basic tasks, in order to fully expand we can make full use of the time available to us, and use the “squeezed out” time for the development of our own abilities and the improvement of our education. alternatively, we can make full use of its database function and turn it into our own “mobile library” and “skills supplement” to improve our own abilities and provide better services to our customers in a more efficient and faster way. the perfect combination of the intelligent advantages of big data and human empathy, making simple work more efficient and complex work better, is perhaps the meaning of the relentless exploration of artificial intelligence technology in the legal industry. the information age in which we live will eventually push us to continue to explore. the existing “internet + legal services” model has broken the deadlock of the traditional legal service industry and brought a new legal service model to the development of the industry, while in the future development of the industry, the deep integration of “artificial intelligence” and legal services will also in the future development of the industry, the deep integration of “artificial intelligence” and legal www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 171 published by scholink inc. services will also promote the formation of a new pattern of legal business. chatgpt, for example, has a rich database with “human brain-like neural network” technology, so it can quickly retrieve legal texts, and can also analyze the retrieved legal texts in conjunction with the specific cases given, and give appropriate opinions to provide reference for legal professionals to determine their ideas of handling cases. at the same time, chatgpt can also integrate a large amount of legal knowledge, so that legal practitioners can quickly access it. generative ai，such as chatgpt, is based on a large-scale dataset of human language models with diverse tasks trained for q&a. this makes it good at answering subjective questions, but because its language model is not a global model, chatgpt is not yet mature in answering objective questions. in other words, in the foreseeable future, generative ai will not replace legal practitioners, but live in symbiosis with them; in the era of big models, human-machine interaction is the main form of legal work now and even in the near future; machines will not replace people, but those who can use machines will replace those who cannot, which requires legal people to use technology to strengthen their professional abilities. 5. conclusion in summary, the application of artificial intelligence in justice has been an irreversible trend, and it is going through the process of development from shallow to deep and from narrow to wide. it is in this context that the discussion on whether ai can replace lawyers in the future and whether there is a need for lawyers to exist in the future. in the fast-changing digital age, artificial intelligence uses statistical techniques of mathematical models and information technology, and is rapidly developing and perfecting to combine legal regulations with expert experience and case analysis, which has the benefits of improving efficiency, avoiding errors, and reducing costs, but also has various risks. in the era of artificial intelligence, it is still important to maintain the friendliness to human beings and uphold human dignity. the promising application of artificial intelligence in the legal industry will attract more highly qualified people to enter this promising field, thus reducing the pressure of the current mechanical and repetitive work of legal practitioners. the application of artificial intelligence gives those studying law a more convenient and efficient way to learn, and allows the majority of legal practitioners to focus more on the more complex and valuable areas of reality. in summary, the full replacement of lawyers by artificial intelligence is not justified and feasible at present and in the extrapolated future. we should adhere to the legal role of lawyers, so that ai can be used in a limited, appropriate and powerful way. references huang, w. w. (2020). from unicorns to ai: should artificial intelligence replace the legal profession?. legal and social development, 26(05), 164-184. wang, y. q. (2020). the dilemma brought by artificial intelligence to the legal profession and its response. journal of hebei university of economics and business (comprehensive edition), www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 172 published by scholink inc. 20(01), 44-52. zhou, w., & guo, j. l. (2021). the legal profession in the era of artificial intelligence: current situation, limits and lines. china legal education research, 2021(03), 149-178. zheng, l. q., & li, z. n. (2021). the extent of the impact of artificial intelligence on the legal profession and the response of legal education. beiwai law, 2021(02), 193-214. zheng, g. (2018). big data, artificial intelligence and the future of the legal profession. procuratorial wind and cloud, 2018(04), 28-29. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 29 original paper the situation in the middle east from the perspective of prospect theory: “hedging” or “speculating” hanyi tang1* 1 school of international studies, dalian university of foreign languages, dalian116044, china * hanyi tang, school of international studies, dalian university of foreign languages, dalian116044, china received: january 20, 2024 accepted: march 11, 2024 online published: march 27, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n2p29 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n2p29 abstract prospect theory, which emphasizes the non-linear relationship between risk and reward, is an important concept in the fields of psychology and behavioral economics, and focuses on the decision-making process of individuals in the face of risk and uncertainty. in the field of international relations, prospect theory is of great significance to the study of decision-making of international actors. this paper combines the overall framework of prospect theory, based on the relevant theoretical doctrines of geopolitics, and sets the risk perception and potential benefit seeking of the two parties as independent variables, and the decision-making behavior and strategic choices of the two parties as dependent variables. by analyzing the behavioral patterns of the participants and exploring their “hedging” and “speculative” behavioral choices, we can better understand their decision-making process and perhaps provide valuable insights into their search for a peaceful solution. keywords “prospect theory”,the middle east, “hedging”, “speculation” 1. introduction the situation in the middle east has long been a global focal point of attention. the roots of this geopolitical situation are complex, involving historical, religious, national identity, territorial rights, and security issues. on october 7, 2023, the islamic resistance movement (hamas) announced a military operation against named “al-aqsa flood”. as of march 2024, the ongoing situation has resulted in 30,900 deaths in the gaza strip, with the escalating the situation in the middle east drawing wide international concern. this situation affects not only the direct participants but also impacts the security and stability of the entire middle east and the global community. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 30 published by scholink inc. to deeply understand the the situation in the middle east, many theories and analytical frameworks in international relations have been applied to its study. prospect theory, a behavioral economics theory, offers us a unique perspective to examine such complex situations. proposed in 1979 by nobel laureate daniel kahneman and amos tversky, it was initially aimed at explaining the behavioral patterns of individuals facing risky decisions. unlike traditional expected utility theory, prospect theory suggests that decision-makers exhibit a stronger aversion to losses than to equivalent gains, leading to risk-seeking behavior when facing potential losses and risk-averse behavior when potential gains are on the line. within the context of the the situation in the middle east, this theory can be used to interpret the behaviors of both sides when facing security and political risks, especially in analyzing the application of “hedging” and “speculative” strategies. this paper employs a literature review method, integrating the overall framework of prospect theory through historical review and process tracing methods to apply it to the the situation in the middle east, thereby more comprehensively understanding the motives and decision-making processes of both parties in the situation. furthermore, this paper attempts to offer possible new solutions for mediating this enduring situation. 2. literature review 2.1 theoretical elucidation 2.1.1 prospect theory prospect theory, introduced by psychologists daniel kahneman and amos tversky in 1979, is a behavioral economics theory that describes how people make decisions when faced with risk. it significantly revises the traditional expected utility theory, which assumes that individuals are always rational in their decision-making, meaning they always choose the option with the greatest expected utility. however, kahneman and tversky demonstrated through experiments that individuals often make irrational decisions, especially when facing potential losses. this paper argues that prospect theory’s research elements mainly consist of three aspects: (1) reference points, which are crucial for presenting information, forming gain or loss frames, and making decisions. reference points occupy a central position in prospect theory. they refer to a benchmark or standard that an individual bases their decisions on, where outcomes above this point are considered gains and those below are considered losses. typically, the current status quo serves as the reference point for decision-makers, though subjective expectation levels can also serve as a standard. (2) hedging, refers to behaviors in gain scenarios, i.e., in the “winning zone,” where decision-makers choose to hedge by diversifying risks to protect themselves from potential losses. hedging usually represents risk aversion, not aimed at gaining additional profit but ensuring the stability and predictability of returns. (3) speculation, involves behaviors in loss scenarios, i.e., in the “losing zone,” where decision preferences shift towards risk-seeking. faced with high risk, as risk preferrers, individuals are willing to take on certain risks in the hope of achieving higher returns. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 31 published by scholink inc. 2.1.2 applicability of prospect theory in international relations and foreign policy analysis the applicability of prospect theory in the fields of international relations and foreign policy analysis is manifested in its provision of a unique perspective for understanding state behavior, especially in revealing how states make decisions when faced with potential international risks and rewards. it allows for an in-depth analysis of the loss aversion tendency exhibited by state actors in the formulation of foreign policies, where there is a more active and sensitive approach towards protecting national interests and avoiding potential losses than pursuing potential gains of the same magnitude. this is particularly evident in areas such as arms races, territorial disputes, and economic sanctions; moreover, prospect theory also elucidates the nonlinear probability weighting phenomenon demonstrated by state actors when assessing the likelihood of international cooperation or not, where an excessive focus on low-probability but high-impact events can lead to the formulation of overly defensive or adventurous policies. (kahneman & tversky, 1979) therefore, a deep understanding and application of prospect theory not only aids in predicting and analyzing decision-making behavior in international politics but also provides theoretical guidance and strategic insights for concluding more stable and mutually beneficial international agreements, formulating more effective crisis management strategies, and building long-term frameworks for peace and cooperation. 2.2 overview of existing research existing research on international relations offers a diverse range of perspectives and analytical frameworks on the situation in the middle east. given the complexity of the issue, scholars and social commentators both domestically and internationally have provided various viewpoints. analyses cover multiple areas within the field of international relations, including international law, peace resolution studies, as well as international political economy. in terms of theoretical analysis, mark a. tessler, a renowned american middle east studies expert, explored various dynamics and influencing factors within the the situation in the middle east, including international intervention, regional politics, economic conditions, and the construction of national identity in his work (1994). this exploration demonstrates the multi-layered and complex nature of the situation. (mark,1994) from the perspective of international law and human rights, john dugard, a south african international law scholar, analyzed the legal issues within the the situation in the middle east in “international law and the the situation in the middle east: a rights-based approach to middle east peace” (2013). this analysis includes the provisions of international law regarding occupation, settlement construction, and human rights violations, and explores the role and responsibility of the international community in resolving the case and promoting peace. (john, 2013) in terms of case resolution strategies and prospects, johan galtung, known as the “father of peace studies”, proposed a theoretical framework for peacebuilding in “peace by peaceful means: peace and battle, development and civilization” (1996). he explored possible pathways to achieving peace in the situation. the analysis includes the concepts of structural and cultural violence, mentioning methods to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 32 published by scholink inc. resolve underlying cases by establishing more equitable and inclusive social structures. (johan, 1996) these documents represent just a fraction of the extensive research on the situation, providing deep insights into this complex situation from historical, legal, and peace theory perspectives among others. while existing research offers illuminating explanations for the strategic choices of both parties in the case, there are still areas that require further refinement: first, existing literature does not seem to explore the decision-making behavior of the parties involved in the battle within a theoretical framework of “foreign policy analysis” of states; second, the representativeness of existing literature on the case analysis may be insufficient, with most studies perhaps overly focusing on one party’s perspective, lacking a comprehensive consideration of the diverse viewpoints of both parties involved in the case as well as the international community, which may lead to biases and incomplete understanding; third, existing literature has not provided sufficient explanations for the timing and context of specific policy changes. why the decision-makers adopted specific policies at certain times remains under-explained. a thorough analysis of the historical, economic, and political factors behind these policy changes is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of the situation’s dynamics and potential solutions. this paper introduces prospect theory from foreign policy analysis into the decision-making perspective of the situation in the middle east, using it as a framework for an exhaustive interpretation of the motivations behind the decisions of both parties in the case, and offers what the author considers to be practical measures and solutions. 3. the history and current state of the situation in the middle east 3.1 historical background and roots 3.1.1 the rise of zionism and competition for land the tensions in the region have deep historical roots, traceable to the late 19th century with the rise of zionism, marking the beginning of this longstanding battle. zionism is a nationalist movement aimed at re-establishing a sovereign state for jewish people on their historical homeland, in response to anti-semitic persecution. this movement attracted jews from around the globe. from the late 19th to the early 20th century, thousands of jewish immigrants flowed into the region, which was then predominantly inhabited by arabs. during this period, the jewish community gradually strengthened their presence in the area by purchasing land, establishing farms, and settlements. however, these activities heightened tensions with the local arab community. arab residents, observing the influx of foreigners and their land acquisition, felt their way of life and land ownership were threatened. over time, relations between the two groups grew increasingly tense, laying the groundwork for later cases. 3.1.2 the united nations partition plan and the establishment as the situation escalated, the international community sought to resolve the issue through the united nations partition plan of 1947, which proposed dividing the territory into two independent states: one jewish and one arab, along with a special international zone controlled by the international community, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 33 published by scholink inc. including jerusalem and bethlehem, areas of profound religious significance to jews, christians, and muslims. however, this plan was not accepted by the arab world, which rejected the proposal to divide land. the war caused widespread shock in the arab world and is referred to as the “nakba” (meaning “catastrophe”), marking the beginning of the refugee issue and a key moment in the history of the the situation in the middle east. the nakba represents not only the displacement of thousands but also symbolizes a nation’s profound loss of land, home, and identity. this trauma still occupies a significant place in the collective memory of continues to influence the course of the situation in the middle east. (yao, 2017) 3.2 battle development and current situation over the subsequent decades, tensions in the region escalated through more wars and battles. in the six-day war of 1967, they occupied the gaza strip, the west bank, east jerusalem, and the golan heights, the control of which remains one of the core issues of the case to this day. the yom kippur war of 1973 further demonstrated the region’s instability. in 1993, after prolonged violence and instability, the liberation organization (plo) and the other government signed the oslo accords, marking the first mutual recognition between the two sides and establishing temporary governmental institutions for people in autonomous areas. however, the peace process did not advance smoothly, with the second intifada (al-aqsa intifada) in the late 1990s to early 2000s resulting in significant casualties and further deterioration of relations between the two nations. in the early 21st century, despite numerous mediation attempts by the international community, the situation in the middle east remains an unresolved issue. the settlement activities in the west bank, the blockade of the gaza strip, and ongoing military cases have kept the region’s situation tense. internal divisions, mainly represented by the political split between hamas (controlling gaza) and fatah (dominating the west bank), have added complexity to the case. on october 7, 2023, hamas launched “operation al-aqsa flood,” also known as the hamas raid, a large-scale attack by the islamic armed organization hamas from the gaza strip on adjacent areas, leading to the outbreak of the war. (hobart william smith colleges, 2023) before launching the attack, hamas conducted reconnaissance on kibbutzes near the border and devised a detailed plan aimed at killing as many civilians as possible, taking hostages, especially targeting youth centers and elementary schools, and quickly transporting hostages to the gaza strip. the attack began in the early morning, with at least 3,000 rockets intensively bombarding the area, while militants were transported into territory using vehicles. militants breached the gaza barrier, attacking military bases and massacring civilians in nearby communities. at a music festival, at least 260 civilians were slaughtered. the soldiers and civilians, including women and children, were taken hostage to the gaza strip. figures such as u.s. president joe biden described this day as “the worst massacre of jews since the holocaust.” (kekauoha, 2023) the current state of the the situation in the middle east is multifaceted, encompassing ongoing security www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 34 published by scholink inc. issues, humanitarian crises, disputes under international law, and challenges to regional stability. a peaceful resolution requires addressing all these issues, including the determination of final borders, refugee rights, the status of jerusalem, and ensuring the security and prosperity of the peoples of both states. (zhang, 2023) despite numerous attempts at peace in the past, a lasting and comprehensive solution remains elusive to date. 4. hedging and speculative behaviors 4.1 idf: “hedging behavior” decision-making 4.1.1 decision choices in the situation in the middle east, idf, being in a position of absolute advantage in armed cases, or in the “winning zone,” opts for “hedging behavior,” a strategy to protect itself from potential losses by diversifying risks. “hedging behavior” holds a significant place in its policy towards its overall international strategy. these actions aim to reduce security risks, maintain national stability, avoid unnecessary problems, ensure the country’s sustainable development and international status, and secure long-term survival. firstly, in terms of security, the choice of hedging behavior is reflected in its strong national defense force and advanced military technology. and invests in sophisticated defense systems and intelligence networks, such as the “iron dome” missile defense system, to mitigate threats from rockets and short-range ballistic missiles. their robust intelligence capability, capable of providing timely warnings of potential terrorist attacks and security threats, is a key component of its hedging strategy. secondly, in diplomacy, hedging is evident in the maintenance of relations with global and regional powers. they strives to keep a close strategic partnership with the united states while also seeking stable relations with other major countries like russia and china. in recent years, they has reduced regional isolation and sought new strategic partners by normalizing relations with some arab countries, such as the uae and bahrain. furthermore, regarding the issue, idf’s hedging behavior is manifested in its participation in peace negotiations, although these efforts are often frustrated due to differences in positions between the parties. through negotiations, idf seeks to establish its security needs while attempting to avoid negative international public opinion and potential sanctions. additionally, some of idf’s policies in the west bank, such as the construction of the security barrier and restrictions on access to certain areas, are part of its hedging strategy, aimed at reducing terrorist attacks and protecting border security. however, idf’s hedging actions are not without controversy. the international community often criticizes some of idf’s measures in dealing with the issue, such as settlement construction and the blockade of the gaza strip. while these actions are intended to protect national security, they also exacerbate tensions with the people and affect idf’s international image. overall, idf’s hedging behavior is part of its comprehensive national security strategy, designed to maintain stability, reduce risks, and ensure the country’s long-term interests. the formulation and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 35 published by scholink inc. execution of these strategies are a continual process of adjustment, taking into account internal security, regional dynamics, and the reactions of the international community. 4.1.2 decision motives—an analysis based on prospect theory prospect theory posits that decision-makers are more sensitive to losses than to an equivalent amount of gains, a phenomenon known as loss aversion. this aversion to loss prompts idf to adopt hedging behaviors in decision-making to avoid potential losses. for idf, when in the “winning zone”, the losses it most seeks to avoid are security threats, international isolation, and economic damage. therefore, by strengthening defense systems, building international alliances, and remaining active in peace negotiations, which attempts to minimize these risks. in terms of probability weighting, prospect theory suggests that people tend to treat probabilities nonlinearly, being overly sensitive to small probabilities of significant losses. positioned in a region filled with uncertainties, the faces the potential for catastrophic outcomes from even low-probability security threats. therefore, it engages in hedging behaviors to prepare for and guard against these potential low-probability events, such as constructing the iron dome missile defense system to protect against rocket attacks from hostile forces. additionally, changes in reference points constitute a significant factor. the decision-making reference points are influenced not just by the current state but also by its historical experiences, security needs, and national identity. wars, terrorist attacks, and diplomatic isolation throughout history have shaped the backdrop of decision-making, leading to a more cautious and defensive stance towards future security and political issues. this has resulted in the adoption of hedging behaviors, such as utilizing diversified diplomatic measures and military preparedness to ensure the nation’s survival and prosperity. in summary, according to prospect theory, the motivation behind the choice of hedging behavior is a complex decision-making process where loss aversion, probability weighting, and changes in reference points interact. these elements collectively drive to adopt comprehensive measures in maintaining security, avoiding losses, and preparing for an uncertain future. these hedging behaviors represent the strategic choices in responding to a complex security environment and unstable regional politics, reflecting its efforts to maximize national interests and ensure the safety of its citizens amid changing circumstances. 4.2 islamic resistance movement (hamas): “speculative behavior” decision-making 4.2.1 decision choices in the situation in the middle east, the islamic resistance movement (hamas) is in a disadvantaged position in the armed case, or in the “losing zone,” and thus opts for “speculative behavior.” this decision-making preference shifts towards risk-seeking, meaning that as risk preferrers, they are willing to undertake certain risks in the hope of achieving higher returns. their “speculative behavior” decision-making is a response to the complex political, military, and social environment, aimed at gaining strategic advantages or altering an unfavorable status quo through proactive measures. (lin, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 36 published by scholink inc. 2006) hamas’s actions reflect its multidimensional strategy as both a political and military organization, including the pursuit of power, status, and influence, as well as a commitment to long-term goals. as a political and military organization, hamas’s decision-making often revolves around how to effectively resist occupation, enhance its status among the populace, and play a significant role in broader regional politics. launching sudden military attacks or adopting radical political stances are often seen as ways through which hamas seeks to shake the status quo, attract international attention, or reinforce its image as a resistance force. the “operation al-aqsa flood” initiated by hamas on october 7, 2023, a large-scale attack from the gaza strip on neighboring areas, is a clear example of “speculative behavior” decision-making. in the military domain, hamas’s speculative behavior includes, but is not limited to, launching rocket attacks, creating explosive incidents, or digging tunnels for attacks. these actions aim to exert pressure on idf while showcasing hamas’s military capability. however, this strategy often provokes a strong response, leading to casualties among civilians and condemnation of hamas by the international community. in the political domain, hamas furthers its political objectives by participating in elections, forming governments, or negotiating with international organizations. through these speculative actions, hamas aims to enhance its legitimacy and influence as a political entity, while also seeking opportunities for support and cooperation within the complex regional politics. however, hamas’s speculative actions are not without risks and costs. its radical military and political strategies often provoke strong domestic and international reactions, potentially leading to economic hardship, humanitarian crises, and political isolation. these actions also contribute to increasingly tense relations with other factions, especially fatah, which dominates the west bank. overall, speculative behavior in the case is manifested as a risky strategic choice, often adopted as a radical strategy when faced with significant pressure from potential losses. for hamas, when their territorial integrity and national existence are threatened, they may choose to resist through violent means, even if such actions could provoke more severe responses and greater losses. hamas’s “speculative behavior” decision-making is a strategy in its pursuit of political objectives, enhancement of military capabilities, and response to a complex environment. it reflects hamas’s pursuit of changing the status quo and elevating its position, as well as the challenges of seeking survival and influence amid competition, and uncertainty. 4.2.2 decision motives—an analysis based on prospect theory prospect theory suggests that decision-makers may exhibit risk-seeking behavior when already in a state of loss. this motivation for risk-seeking drives hamas to adopt more aggressive actions in certain decision-making scenarios, aiming to reverse unfavorable situations or achieve potential high gains, despite accompanying higher risks. firstly, prospect theory indicates individuals are more sensitive to potential losses than to equivalent gains, known as loss aversion. for hamas, the ongoing occupation, political marginalization, and the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 37 published by scholink inc. suffering of its people are seen as unacceptable states of loss. facing the occupation and issues of national self-determination, the current situation may be deemed intolerable by hamas, making any action that could break the status quo, draw international attention, or enhance its status appealing. this desire for change may drive hamas towards risky speculative actions, such as launching rocket attacks, conducting suicide bombings, or initiating border problems, even though these actions could provoke severe responses. thus, even if speculative actions, like launching attacks or refusing compromises, carry high risks, hamas might see them as necessary to change the status quo and reduce long-term losses. in other words, rather than accepting a continuous unfavorable situation, hamas prefers to take risks in hopes of changing the status quo through actions. secondly, the setting of reference points is crucial for their decision choices. hamas’s reference points include not only its current survival situation but also visions for the future, historical sentiments, and religious beliefs. when reality falls significantly below these reference points, hamas might resort to extreme actions to attempt resetting the status quo, even if the chances of success are slim. furthermore, prospect theory posits that decision-makers perceive probabilities nonlinearly, especially when assessing low-probability events. for hamas, even if the chances of success for certain speculative actions are low, as long as success could bring significant political or strategic gains, they might still be overly weighted. hamas might also weight the probabilities of potential gains based on its interpretation of various situations. if hamas believes that international or regional powers might pressure concessions due to its actions, it might assign a higher probability weighting to military or political provocations, deciding on more aggressive actions. this nonlinear perception of probabilities could lead to an unusually high tolerance for risk by hamas, willing to engage in a series of high-risk, high-reward speculative actions. in summary, hamas’s decision-making for “speculative behavior” reflects its strategic considerations as a national liberation movement seeking to achieve its objectives in an extremely complex and dynamic environment. loss aversion makes it unwilling to accept a continuous unfavorable state; strong reference points drive it to act in hopes of changing the status quo, and nonlinear perception of probabilities makes it more inclined to pursue high-risk strategies that could lead to significant changes. these factors together shape hamas’s decision-making behavior, leading it to undertake a series of “speculative actions” in a complex and dynamic political environment. however, these “speculative actions” are not without costs. hamas’s military actions often lead to strong responses from idf, causing casualties and economic losses and potentially provoking international condemnation. therefore, when deciding to take speculative actions, hamas must weigh the complex relationship between the expected benefits of enhancing its strategic position and achieving its goals against the potential negative consequences. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 38 published by scholink inc. 5. bilateral peace-building strategy recommendations 5.1 reshaping reference points to mitigate the impact of loss aversion prospect theory highlights that people’s choices depend on their relative perception of gains and losses, rather than their absolute values. efforts towards peace-building should aim to alter the perceptions of both parties regarding the current state, viewing peace as a means to improve the status quo. through education, media, and direct dialogue, it’s possible to deepen the understanding of the potential benefits of peace, making it a new reference point for both sides. due to loss aversion, both parties may prefer to maintain the status quo rather than risk seeking peace, especially when the path to peace is fraught with uncertainty. to overcome this obstacle, security measures and incentives such as economic aid, security guarantees, and international support can be offered to reduce the uncertainty and perceived risk during the transition to peace. these measures can help both sides more easily accept the initial “losses” brought by peace and focus on the long-term “gains.” 5.2 utilizing probability weighting to develop a gradual peace roadmap prospect theory suggests that when faced with complex decisions, decision-makers tend to assign disproportionate importance to low-probability events. peace-building strategies can leverage this psychological bias by emphasizing that even a low-probability peace success can have significant positive impacts. by highlighting the potential gains of peace success (such as international recognition, economic development, social stability), it encourages both parties to take more proactive peace actions. additionally, decision-makers prefer to break down problems into a series of smaller choices. therefore, creating a phased peace roadmap, with clear objectives and gains at each stage, can help both sides gradually adapt to the peace process and feel progress and benefits at each step. this gradual approach can lower the overall perception of risk, making each step towards peace seem more manageable and acceptable. 5.3 establishing reciprocal mechanisms for shared loss distribution reciprocal mechanisms aim to ensure that both parties in a case can see clear benefits from the peace process. prospect theory points out that decision-makers are more sensitive to losses than to equivalent gains. therefore, it’s crucial for each side to see direct and substantial benefits in the peace agreement to facilitate their acceptance and implementation of the agreement. if the decision-makers perceive that losses are fairly distributed, they might be more willing to take some risks and engage in the peace process. at the same time, peace-building can be achieved through economic aid, trade incentives, security guarantees, technical support, or cultural exchanges. the international community can promise economic assistance and development projects after the successful signing of a peace agreement, helping both sides to rebuild and develop. this creates a positive feedback loop, encouraging both parties to continue adhering to the agreement. 6. conclusion prospect theory, established on an experimental basis, is a probabilistic theory that does not assume a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 39 published by scholink inc. priori nor employs deductive reasoning to draw conclusions, instead using an inductive method. although it differs from the theoretical models advocated by scientific methodology, prospect theory still offers many noteworthy theoretical insights. in the field of international relations, especially in the study of decision-making theories using expected utility theory for analysis, prospect theory provides a theoretical foundation for diplomatic decision preference research that differs from rational choice theory and other theories. to some extent, it explains the dynamic changes in diplomatic decision-making. this paper aims to analyze the complexity of the situation in the middle east and its multidimensional strategies for peace-building from the perspective of prospect theory. it elucidates the history and current state of the the situation in the middle east, hamas’s speculative behavior, and idf’s hedging strategy. by examining the deep motives and psychological mechanisms behind these behaviors, we gain insight into the decision-making process of the parties. although the path to peace between idf and hamas is full of challenges, a deeper understanding of the decision-making motives and preferences of both sides can enable the international community to promote peace negotiations and construction more effectively. continuous international support, courage, and wisdom from leaders of both sides, and adaptability to changing circumstances are key factors in achieving lasting peace. additionally, the participation and support of civil society are crucial to the peace process, providing a comprehensive driving force from grassroots to high-level efforts. in conclusion, building peace between the countries in middle east is a long-term, complex, and dynamic process that requires relentless efforts and a shared commitment from both sides. the international community should condemn all acts of violence against civilians and call for all parties to exercise maximum restraint, firmly maintain a stance for peace and stability, and advocate for resolving disputes through dialogue and negotiations. by adopting flexible strategies, deepening mutual understanding, and continually adapting to new challenges and opportunities, achieving lasting peace in the middle east region is both possible and a worthy goal to pursue collectively. references hobart and william smith colleges. (2023). international perspectives on the israeli-palestinian conflict. retrieved from https://www.hws.edu/news/2023/international-perspectives-on-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict.aspx kekauoha, a. (2023). navigating the fog of war: stanford’s discussion on media coverage of the israel-hamas war. stanford report. retrieved from https://news.stanford.edu/report/2023/12/06 kahneman, d., & tversky, a. (1979). prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. econometrica, 47(2), 263-291. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185 lin. m. w. (2006). prospect theory and foreign policy decision-making. diplomatic review: journal of the foreign affairs college, 5, 7. mark, a. t. (1994). a history of the israeli-palestinian conflict. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 40 published by scholink inc. john dugard, j. (2013). international law and the israeli-palestinian conflict: a rights-based approach to middle east peace. johan galtung, j. (1996). peace by peaceful means: peace and conflict, development and civilization. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446221631 yao, h. n. (2017). interpretation of the reasons for the long-term dilemma of the palestine-israel security relations. west asia and africa, 05, 135-154+160. zhang, q. (2023). “the year-end” approaches, where are the two hot wars heading?. liberation daily, 007. microsoft word ape-v5n2-p33 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 33 original paper dilemma and breakthrough: review on substitution analysis of the definition of relevant markets and platforms—from the perspective of guideline on anti-trust platform economy by the anti-trust committee of the state council yijing xia1* 1 southwest minzu university, chengdu, china * yijing xia, southwest minzu university, chengdu, china received: april 5, 2022 accepted: april 25, 2022 online published: april 27, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n2p33 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n2p33 abstract the prosperity of platform economy posed new issues for antitrust law enforcement and new challenges to the definition of relevant markets in antitrust investigations. substitution analysis is not only a traditional method of relevant market definition, but also the underlying logic throughout the process of relevant market definition. it can still be applied to relevant market definition in the context of platform economy. based on the guideline of platform antitrust, this paper starts with the regulations about the definition of relevant markets in platform economy. it briefly analyzes the dilemmas of traditional methods of defining relevant markets in platform economy. then, it reviews the limitation and rationality of substitution analysis of relevant market definition. keywords platform economy, relevant market definition, antitrust 1. introduction with the deep integration of information & communication and digital data technologies, the constantly growing platform economy has become a field of innovation in modern economy. in addition to optimizing the allocation of resources and accelerating economic transition, it is also reshaping the traditional ecology of competition. the various new forms of monopoly are also causing impacts on existing competitive legal systems. in the ordinary logic and context of anti-monopoly regulations, regardless of competitive behaviors, the definition of relevant markets is the essential step. due to the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 34 published by scholink inc. unique features of pricing strategies and platforms like dynamic competition, multilateral market structures and cross-network externality, it has become significantly difficult to clearly define the scope of competitive relations. in this regard, the reasonable definition of relevant markets in platform economy becomes the focus and difficulty in the academic and practical domains of antitrust jurisdiction (chen & guo, 2021). guideline on anti-trust platform economy by the anti-trust committee of the state council (hereinafter referred to as guideline of platform antitrust) clearly stipulates: substitution analysis is the essential method of commodity market definition in platform economy. the primary purpose of substitution analysis is to clarify and assume the scope of commodities relevant to the functions provided by monopolists. the expansion and superposition of commodity functions, caused by trans-boundary competition of platform operators, have made it more difficult to conduct substitution analysis of commodities. in particular, when using substitution analysis, it is necessary to consider the dynamic competition and business model of platform economy, and the updating of technological applications. the limitation of reasonable justification of substitution analysis should be realized as well (chen, 2021). 2. relevant market definition in platform economy according to guideline of platform antitrust the definition of relevant markets is the logical beginning of the abuse of market-dominant positions. all forms of competition take place within a scope of markets. defining relevant market means the defining market scope of competition between operators. according to the antitrust law and guidance on relevant market definition by the antitrust committee of the state council, “relevant markets” refer to the commodities and regions for operators to compete in terms of specific goods or services. other than stipulating the purposes and principles of antitrust in platform economy, guideline of platform antitrust also explains the methods of definition of relevant commodity markets and regional markets, and places emphasis on the necessity and importance of adhering to individual case analysis, as well as the role of relevant market definition in various cases. in spite of the challenges in platform economy posed by network externality, unique business operation, pricing strategies and high market concentration (ssnip test could not be applied in some specific cases), substitution analysis is still a basic method. other methods, such as ssndq and ssnic, have been put forward on this basis as well in recent years (han, 2021). compared with the previous version of antitrust guidelines on platform economics (exposure draft), guidelines of platform antitrust deleted statements concerning “relevant markets without being defined”, which reveals the prudential regulation of antitrust supervision sectors. to some extent, it also prevents the risk of uncertain application of the “direct evidence act” in practice (chen & guo, 2021). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 35 published by scholink inc. 3. dilemmas: traditional methods of defining relevant markets in platform economy and causes of failure when it comes to defining relevant markets, factors like commodity, region and time should be taken into consideration. for internet platforms, defining relevant commodity markets is the key. confirming the substitution of goods is the most important element in defining relevant markets. substitution analysis is one of the conventional ways of market definition, including the analysis of demand substitution and supply substitution. to be more specific, demand substitution is the primary method, and supply substitution is the secondary and complementary method. in addition, different from traditional economy, the homogeneity of goods in platform economy is constantly enhanced along with the expansion and superposition of commodity functions. if substitution of commodities is identified according to offline standards, it is likely to excessively expand the scope of relevant markets. traditional demand and supply substitution methods and the assumed trustbuster testing method pay more attention to the functions and prices of goods in unitary markets. with the impact of new features on the internet platform, traditional methods of relevant markets revealed obvious defects and weaknesses. influenced by bilateral/multilateral markets, there are two causes for the failure of traditional methods to define relevant markets: firstly, different users groups are involved in bilateral/multilateral markets. moreover, different markets are interdependent and complementary, i.e., the services are interdependent and complementary promoting trades among bilateral/multilateral users. besides, positive cross feedback effects may magnify the impact on unilateral users. the conducts of any platform about the users of one side can have an influence on the demand on the other side. charge increases on users of side a not only lead to the reduction in user demand of this side, but also less appeal to the platform users of side b. cross-side feedback mechanism gives rise to significant declines in total revenues of platforms (tang yaojia & tang chunhui, 2021). one change in market value can cause another change in price changes. the changes in supply and demand in another market can have reverse impacts on this market, thus causing the results of price tests to deviate from original anticipation (zhang, 2017). in contrast, the traditional market definition is to assume the premise of no connection existing between markets and mutual independence between operators’ markets, so as to analyze the behaviors of operators in individual markets. secondly, in general, if price is equal to marginal cost, it is feasible to maximize profit. due to the influence of bilateral/multilateral markets on price and cost structures, reasonable enterprises focus on overall benefit maximization rather than the profit maximization of the platform market at both ends, which is different from unilateral market analysis structures. furthermore, in antitrust regulation, measuring the market power of trading platforms means more than just the price mark-up of users on one side while ignoring the network externality of the other side and between the two sides. it is imperative to measure the total price markups of users on both sides (zhang, 2017). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 36 published by scholink inc. 4. deconstruction: methods of relevant commodity market definition oriented by demand-substitution analysis 4.1 commodity definition commodity definition plays an important part in relevant market definition. identifying the functions that affect the replacement selection of consumers is the key to confirming essential commodities. primary functions of users’ commodities should be determined by essential demands. “primary functions” refer to certain functions or sets of functions that can satisfy the basic needs or purposes of consumers when using the commodities. identifying “primary functions” aims to judge the sources of restrictions in relevant commodity competition. if commodities have the same primary functions, it means both of them may satisfy consumers’ demands, i.e. replaceable. however, platform commodities tend to be complex. for this reason, it is likely to face challenges due to the fuzziness of identifying basic commodities (chen, 2021). in multilateral market analysis, it is necessary to focus on the demand substitution of commodities and services, and comprehensively adopt substitution analysis and quantitative analysis (huang, 2019). 4.2 demand substitution demand substitution analysis is the basic method for antitrust law enforcement agencies to define relevant markets, which is highly intuitive and operable. demand substitution analysis starts from the perspective of consumers. when prices, functions, quality and supply status of commodities change, the substitution of different commodities is determined by the difficulty of converting the demand side. as for price factors, theories of the harvard structurist school proposed the model of cross elasticity of demand. the economic definition of cross elasticity of demand refers to the ratio of relative variations caused by commodity prices and commodity demand volumes. substitutional relations, complementary relations or irrelevancy between commodities can be determined by arithmetical operation of the cross elasticity of demand and price (lai & zhong, 2022). consumers are likely to choose other commodities due to price changes. such a correlation is the cross-elasticity of demand. for functions, commodity functions have a direct influence on the realization of consumer demands and selections of substitute goods. if commodities have similar or identical functions, they are considered to be replaceable and highly competitive. if commodities have so different functions as to fail to meet the same purposes of usage, they are not quite likely to have substitution. it’s worth noting that customers’ actual demands cannot be ignored when analyzing the substitution of commodity functions. special attention should be given to the primary commodity functions that satisfy consumers’ basic demands. if commodity functions are differentiated without considering consumers’ basic demands, the scope of relevant market definition may be excessively extensive (chen, 2020). 4.3 supply substitution analysis demand substitution analysis starts from the consumers’ perspective, while the supply substitution analysis focuses on the operators’ perspectives. supply substitution analysis is conducted based upon factors like operator’s input to transform production facilities, the risks and the time to enter target www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 37 published by scholink inc. markets, so as to define relevant markets according to the degree of substitution among different commodities from operators’ perspectives. if changes occur in relative commodity prices and demands, it is less difficult for operators to switch to other productions and utilize production equipment and resources in producing substitute goods. in this regard, the degree of supply substitution is higher, which means they perhaps belong to the same market. some researchers pointed out supply substitution analysis needs to consider the logic of demand substitution. according to supplier’s “demand”, it can be understood as the substitution perspective on “willingness or motivation to conduct commercial activities”, so as to discuss two factors: the difficulty of production switch and market access (chen, 2021). guidelines of platform antitrust also stipulate supply substitution analysis. when it comes to substitution judgment, attributes and applications of commodities can not be ignored. cross-price elasticity of commodities should be considered as well. but practical situations indicate that demand substitution analysis is used more frequently than supply substitution. 5. breakthrough: review the limitation and rationality of defining relevant markets based on substitution analysis 5.1 limitation and rationality of substitution analysis in platform economy substitution analysis is the essential and primary method of defining relevant markets. it has become a new normal in internet platform economy, cross-platform competition and mixed operation. due to digital data and network information technology, marginal costs of platforms providing new goods are quite low. substitution analysis expands the scope of relevant commodity markets. commodities with complex functions make it hard to conduct substitution analysis. meanwhile, due to the influence of multilateral market business model and network effect, it is difficult to identify the amount of relevant commodity markets. hence, guidelines of platform antitrust responded, “relevant commodity markets can be defined according to the multilateral commodities involved in platforms. mutual relations and impacts among relevant commodity markets should be considered. if the cross-platform network effects can enable platform operators to implement adequate restraints on competition, relevant commodity markets can be defined according to overall platforms.” in addition, the priority of consideration is: according to different network effects of various platforms and specific traits of individual cases, identify effective competition restraints of platform markets. lastly, based on consumers’ demand substitution, define the amount of relevant commodity markets (chen & guo, 2021). although platform economy has multiple impacts on market definition, the accurate grasp of consumer demands and constant competition is the core for operators in the field of platform economy. hence, identifying the direct and effective competition among operators still focuses on the substitution of consumer demands. to make the results of relevant markets more accurate and conform to practical market conditions, demand substitution analysis needs to conduct further verification of the rationality, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 38 published by scholink inc. i.e., based on consumers’ practical status in platform economy, appropriately detail the influential factors of substitution analysis. 5.2 perfection of substitution analysis in platform economy 5.2.1 increase factors of substitution increasing factors of substitution is conducive to reducing the error terms in relevant market definition, enhancing the accuracy and predictability of conclusions. take the number of users for instance. platform benefits stem from massive users, and network externality will magnify the scope. hence, user control is the core for platforms. the number of users in platform economy is the factor that needs urgent consideration. notification on application of competition rules of access agreements in telecommunications sector, released by the eu, pointed out: the importance of access economy is decided by the coverage of connected networks. what can be predicted is: due to network effects, even if for the advertising platforms of search engines, doubts and questions still exist concerning the substitution between search engines with massive users and those with minor users. network effect is actually incorporated in the consideration of the number of users, thus enhancing the accuracy of substitution analysis (zhang, 2017). 5.2.2 the assistance of data analysis tool in the massive information amount of platform economy, data analysis tool can play a subsidiarity role in identifying consumer switch during different periods and variables of commodities when it comes to demand substitution analysis. moreover, economic models and certain facts can be utilized in the process of analysis and judgment. for example, some free/odd pricing commodities are charging more to the user side, i.e. original free/odd pricing commodities are offered to vip users. in other cases, the quality of free/odd pricing service is lowered only to guarantee the experience of users who paid fees. on this basis, analyzing the situation of user and commodity switch will undoubtedly and vividly demonstrate the practical situation of demand substitution in relevant markets (chen, 2021). to sum up, although relevant market definition according to substitution analysis has some limitations, the corresponding impacts can be counteracted to some extent. substitution analysis still has great and practical significance to relevant market definition, especially resolving the issues about relevant market definition in platform economy. references chen, b., & guo, g. k. (2021, march). how to do a good job in platform anti-monopoly definition. price regulation and antitrust in china, 15-17. chen, b. (2021, february). review of the method for defining the relevant market in the field of platform economy—interpretation based on article 4 of the anti-monopoly guidelines of the anti-monopoly commission of the state council in the field of platform economy. research on the rule of law, 89-101. chen, b. (2020, march). response of the competition law on the solidification of the internet market. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 39 published by scholink inc. jianghan forum, 122-130. han, w. (2021, february). brief review of the official draft of the anti-monopoly guidelines for platform economy. research on competition policy, 29-40. huang, y. q. (2019, january). construction and application of method for defining the relevant market in multilateral platforms. research on competition policy, 90-102. lai, s. x., & zhong, m. c. (2022, february). my humble opinion on the relevant market definition for digital platforms. price regulation and antitrust in china, 17-21. tang, y j., & tang, c. h. (2021, february). definition of the relevant market in digital platform anti-monopoly definition. research on financial and economic issues, 33-41. zhang, c. y. (2017, february). reconstruction of the method for defining the relevant market in platforms. journal of capital normal university (social sciences edition), 41-51. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 37 original paper the problem and countermeasure of party branch leading cooperative—a case on a rural tourism cooperative led by party branch in b village of shandong province yuxin wei 1 1 school of politics and international studies, central china normal university, wuhan, china received: october 5, 2022 accepted: november 9, 2022 online published: november 14, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n4p37 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n4p37 abstract taking the typical rural tourism cooperative led by the party branch in b village of shandong province as an example, this paper discusses the causes, concrete practices, practical effects and existing problems of the party branch led rural tourism cooperative through case analysis with exploratory empirical research method. research shows that: first, the motivation of the establishment of the cooperative led by the party branch lies in the weakening and marginalization of the party branch, the decline of the industry and the collective poverty, and the weak collective consciousness of the villagers. second, the party branch to lead the cooperative needs the village party branch to raise energy and empower, integrate resources in the form of internal source and external transmission, and combine “internet +”intelligent management. third, the party branch leads the cooperative to enhance the power of the party branch, industrial development file upgrade, community consciousness return. research suggests that: in the new era, the party branch leads the cooperatives to promote the modernization of agriculture and rural areas, reorganize farmers and self-organize them, reconstruct the rural governance pattern and build a harmonious rural society. its rise has realistic necessity and rationality. keywords farmer cooperative, led by party branch, rural tourism 1. introduction in the process of poverty alleviation and rural revitalization strategy implementation, the successful practice of party branch led cooperatives has attracted extensive attention from the academic community. since 2017, the phenomenon of party branch led cooperatives has rapidly emerged in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 38 published by scholink inc. yantai, shandong province, bijie, guizhou province, tongliao, inner mongolia and other places. the practice of party branch leading cooperatives started earlier in shandong province and is now basically extended to all counties of the province. the party represents the fundamental interests of the vast majority of the people, which not only eliminates monopoly interest groups and party interests, but also is not limited to local and short-term interests. the party is the highest political leading force and the dominant leader of social governance at the grassroots level in our country. it not only corrects market failure and makes up for government failure, and has a leadership position that is beyond other multiple governance subjects. this natural beneficial poor organization is the ideal carrier of collective economic development that is used from modern to modern times in the rural areas of our country. the position and function of cooperatives are highly affirmed and supported. as the primary party organization in rural areas, the village party branch led cooperatives are the organizational embedding of the primary economy. they play the political leadership role of the party, publicize the collectivist nature of cooperatives, grasp the development direction of cooperatives, and ensure that cooperatives are public rather than private. what is worth paying attention to is, why need party branch lead to establish cooperative? how effective is the implementation of party branch-led cooperative? in order to answer the above questions, systematic research should be carried out at both theoretical and practical levels. based on this, the author went to b village in shandong province to conduct field investigation, and combined with the data obtained, conducted an in-depth analysis. 2. literature review 2.1 shandong province takes the lead in carrying out the pilot project domestic scholars have conducted empirical studies on the issue of “party branch led cooperatives” based on specific cases, and shandong province is the first choice of research site. the existing party branch led cooperatives in shandong province have two operation modes, namely, “branch + cooperative + farmer” mode and “branch + cooperative + farmer + enterprise” mode. the latter needs to introduce supporting enterprises and send capital to the countryside, and there is also a special mode of “branch + family farm + enterprise + people”. has five kinds of common types, namely the grain cultivation professional cooperatives, fruit and vegetable planting professional cooperatives, rural tourism professional cooperatives, aquaculture professional cooperatives, seedling tree planting professional cooperatives, and three kinds of special type, namely the beef cattle cultivation professional cooperatives, medicinal herbs cultivation of professional cooperatives, agricultural products sales professional cooperatives (specialty food). on top of cooperatives, associations are formed in many places. several neighboring villages in the same city are optimized and adjusted into the same party branch through village party branches, and professional cooperatives and associations are established, such as agricultural machinery and grain cultivation professional cooperatives and associations, which implement the traditional agricultural combination of agriculture, husbandry and fishery. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 39 published by scholink inc. 2.2 collective industry upgrading and asset appreciation the original rural collective economy development degree is not high, mostly rely on resources to eat, simple contract leasing, single channels to increase income, lack of development momentum, has been used to rely on. party regulations clearly stipulate that the village party branch is assuming the responsibility of developing collective economy. in order to fulfill this economic responsibility, some villages set up a special fund pool and applied for support funds from it. in order to maintain the continuous operation of the cooperative, 20% of the funds in the pool became the feedback funds [3] . at present, “x” can take various forms, such as farmers, enterprises, industrial parks and cooperatives, which organize farmers who work alone to make use of idle resources and concentrate scattered resources. “party branch + cooperative +x” is to create a new model of collective economic development. agricultural industry upgrading, resource integration, unified operation, village and enterprise cooperation to introduce technology, expand market [4] . the improvement of supervision and evaluation system is also a new mechanism for collective economic development [5] . scholars generally agree that the party branch led cooperatives have realized the development of a group and embarked on the road of strengthening the village and enriching the people. 2.3 the power of grass-roots party organizations is enhanced the party branch leader needs the demonstration of the branch group and the leader of the party member cadres. according to the general theory of organizational force, the organizational force of rural party branches is mainly reflected in five aspects, namely, structural force, guiding force, economic force, cohesive force and cultural force. the successful publicity and promotion of farmers to participate in the cooperative, clear the core leading position of the party branch in the cooperative, embodies the structural strength; the successful establishment and continuous development of cooperatives reflect the guiding power; the cooperative realized the win-win situation of peasants and collective income increase, which reflected the economic power; the status of the party branch in the minds of the people is improved, the credibility is improved, reflecting the cohesion; it has strengthened the consciousness of serving the people, improved the party spirit, greatly improved the party building, and reflected the cultural power [6] . in the process of forming cooperatives, party members were reorganized and mobilized. mobilizing party members to do volunteer work rebuilds the sense of political honor. meeting and discussion allow party members to participate in the village important decision-making and other grass-roots party building activities are the integration and mobilization of party members. cooperatives drive the construction of village collective economy and provide two preconditions for grassroots party building, namely, the business premise—political participation of party members and ideological premise—reshaping of collective consciousness, and a backing -strengthening of material backing [7] . www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 40 published by scholink inc. 3. cause of establishment and main practices in 2010, the founding meeting of the cooperative in b village, shandong province, led by the party branch, was unanimously approved by all the founders. the operation practice of cooperatives in b village for more than ten years reflects the logical thinking of village-level governance, which has changed significantly before and after. the author divides it into the stage of big household leader and party branch leader. the stage of leading by large households began in the 1990s. in this stage, there was an irregular cooperative, which was led by individual large households and managed by themselves. the threshold for entering the cooperative was set. as the cooperative is a relatively independent economic cooperation organization, the party branch of village b does not have the actual right to operate within the original cooperative and cannot play the role of coordination and guidance, which leads to the tension between multiple subjects and conflicts. setting the threshold of access, collective participation cannot be achieved, the villagers lack of community consciousness, collective economic development is powerless. the leading stage of the party branch is from 2010 to now. since 2009, b village has carried out the reconstruction work of the old village, supported by the government and the return of talents, which has actively changed the original rural governance pattern and formed a situation of multi-subject cooperative governance. at this stage, the party branch will return to its original position and focus its economy on the collective specialized farmer cooperatives. at the same time, it will collect talent resources, explore natural resources and cultural resources, and revitalize the collective industry. in recent years, b village party branch led cooperative has become a provincial model. 3.1 case of establishment 3.1.1 “hollow” power of party branch the “hollow” power of the party branch refers to that the party branch is marginalized, the power is weakened, the party branch has a name but no reality, has no appearance, lacks the actual power play, has low influence on the public affairs in the village, and the energy is limited. the party branch at the village level is the core of the leadership of various affairs in the village, leading, commanding, coordinating and decision-making public matters in the village. however, such a situation existed in village b at the beginning, that is, the party branch did not get along with the masses, and villagers did not realize the role of the party branch in their own life, so they could not carry out the mass work smoothly, and could not display their leadership and organizational ability in the village affairs. this damaged the power and authority of the party branch in b village, and formed the phenomenon of “hollow” power. the party organization is rooted in the masses and has a firm mass foundation and perfect organizational structure system. however, b village could not bring this political and organizational advantage into play in the original cooperative construction. at present, the new countryside has gradually separated from the homogeneity structure and has the characteristics of heterogeneity. most people in traditional rural areas have the same surname, forming families with the same surname and living together. as an organization in the traditional sense, a clan www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 41 published by scholink inc. or family has a patriarch with management responsibilities in the organizational structure. the patriarch leads a clan, the clan is united, the tradition is taken as the criterion, the society is organized by ethics [8] , and the decision and will of the patriarch are put first. in the new rural society, party organizations, government, social organizations, market subjects and individual villagers all participate in the governance of rural society. these subjects come from different regions, belong to different units, represent different interests, and gradually show heterogeneity. there was no patriarch in the new rural society, and some villagers were estranged from each other. at that time, the actual power of the party organization in b village was “hollow”, which did not play a unified and leading role in time. cooperative society is the carrier of village collective economy development. in terms of rules, the work regulations of the party’s rural grass-roots organizations stipulate that the rural grass-roots party organizations should promote the development and growth of the collective economy and lead and support the collective economic organizations according to the local conditions. it can be seen that the party branch leading cooperatives have the significance of rules; in fact, the operation of agricultural modernization cooperatives needs standardized and specialized unified management. party branches put the interests of the masses first, pursue common prosperity, have advanced theories keeping pace with the times, seek truth from facts, and adhere to the truth-seeking and pragmatic work style, which is of practical significance to lead the operation of agricultural modernization cooperatives. 3.1.2 “empty shell” of collective economy the “empty shell” of collective economy is manifested in industrial decline and collective poverty, which are mutually causation. the collective economy of village b declined and its development declined. the single agricultural income was not enough to support the family life, and villagers went out to work, leading to a large outflow of population, serious aging and lack of sufficient labor force. due to the villagers’ participation in public affairs is low, lose faith in collective economy development, unable to public funds raised from the villagers, village collective exist large debt, failed again, b collective with poor village industry formed a vicious circle, goods of the collective economy also can become a “shell” and purse economy. jump out of the vicious circle of circles need to retain the rural labor force, the development of various resources, to booming and profitable agricultural modernization, promoting collective income, this requires leaders to develop mass work and give play to the role of political economic role play a party branch in rural collective economy with new leadership in the development of agricultural professional cooperatives fusion, both go hand in hand, this is the village party branch has two basic, legal, unique job responsibilities and belong to the power. the cooperative originally established in village b was led by large households and jointly operated by enterprises, namely the form of “villagers + enterprises”, without collective participation. both have the essential characteristics of “economic man”, seeking the realization of their own interests, rather than seeking a strong sense of belonging and identity from the village collective. large households with control rights in cooperatives set a higher entry threshold, absorb only professional farmers and technical experts with large-scale resources, exclude small farmers, widen the income gap, and fail to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 42 published by scholink inc. increase the income of villagers and increase the value of collective assets. therefore, the phenomenon of collective poverty still cannot be changed, nor can it jump out of the vicious circle of “collective poverty industrial decline”. the operation mode of the party branch led cooperative in b village is “party branch + villagers + enterprise”. the three components respectively represent the leadership of the party branch, collective participation, and enterprise investment and development. party branch play a leading role to join the cooperatives has been clear about the development direction, made by the first party branch leadership results show the villagers, attract village to the villagers to join new cooperatives, but is not limited to the original a few professional farmers, enterprises has changed from original dominance to auxiliary and self-developed technology and capital resources status, under the leadership of the party branch of village b, the villagers and enterprises jointly discuss the operation of the cooperative. the new cooperative has the same value concept, unified management concept and clear development goal, which is gradually changing the “empty shell” phenomenon of collective economy. 3.1.3 weak collective consciousness the weak collective consciousness is reflected in the villagers fighting alone, only care about their own “three acres of land”, only care about their own income, and indifference to collective affairs, which has become a psychological factor hindering village governance. the rural land system adopts the household contract responsibility system, and the fields are divided into households. the farmers have the autonomy of land management, and the income lies in the harvest of their own land, and the economic foundation belongs to themselves, which undoubtedly weakens the villagers’ dependence on the collective. the rejection of small farmers by the former large household led cooperatives also leads to polarization among villagers. the collective consciousness and community consciousness of villagers in village b are gradually losing. the communication among villagers is limited to relatives and neighbors, and they will not negotiate over public affairs and collective economy. the self-governance issues become superficial and gradually formalized. therefore, only established on the basis of the interests distribution between the villagers benefit correlation mechanism, professional investors and technical experts to spread knowledge, technology, market channels to development small, produce benefit to close, collective consciousness returned, the villagers would get to really step in village public affairs, and to be organized again. the cooperative led by the party branch is the re-organization of the masses by the party organization, and plays the role of self-organization after the villagers join the cooperative. reorganization has always been an important function of the party to mobilize the masses and connect the masses, which is to organize the decentralized and fragmented individuals. villagers’ initiative to join, provide resources, actively negotiate and accept management of cooperatives is the embodiment of villagers’ self-organization under the guidance of the party [9] . www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 43 published by scholink inc. 3.2 main practices 3.2.1 the party branch is empowered to enhance energy and empower means to improve the governance ability of party organizations and expand the scope of party organizations’ power radiation, which requires the dual strategy of “carrot and stick” combining authority shaping and rule application. the promotion of village party branch mainly depends on structural empowerment. through the organization embedding of shoulder to shoulder of party branch secretary and chairman of the board of directors, and cross-serving of the branch team, the actual operation of the cooperative is controlled. since the board of directors and the board of supervisors are set up in accordance with institutional rules, leading the operation of the cooperative, the members of the party branch group acting as directors and supervisors have reasonable and legal corresponding ability and authority. b village with the director a new cooperative, by the township, is the legal representative of the cooperatives, has presided over and is responsible for all the conference, signed membership investment certificate, signed managers, financial personnel and technical personnel, employment letter, organize the implementation of the resolution and supervise the implementation of the functions and powers, measures for the administration of specified coop director is responsible for cooperative work comprehensively. members of the party branch group are fully interspersed into the various positions of the cooperative, in addition to the chairman, but also involved in accounting, cashier, supervisor and members of the supervisor. there is formal power operation in the exercise of authority, and the informal effect of shaping authority is achieved. b village party branch led cooperatives to implement “six unified” management rules. under the leadership of the party branch, association and cooperative management include unified marketing, unified reception, unified settlement, unified service, unified management and unified construction. always adhere to the party branch team to take the lead in raising funds, mobilize the masses into the club, responsible for the management of sales. adhering to the unified design of the party is conducive to the implementation of the party’s resolution into the cooperative. party branches are empowered in the establishment, planning, coordination, distribution and supervision of cooperatives, strengthening the all-factor leading role of party branches in multi-subject, public affairs and various resources. while endowing the party branch with power, it stimulates its internal driving force, enhances the power ability and energy of grassroots party organizations, and strengthens the party’s effective participation in rural society. 3.2.2 integrate internal and external resources the existing industry is the economic foundation for the establishment of cooperatives, and the existing industry needs to be built on the basis of the existing local resources. the existing resources that can be developed and utilized are the development direction of cooperatives. revitalize the existing resources, the first need internal review, that is, internal source. b village is located in the mountainous area in the southeast of shandong province, which has the innate mountain resources and the mountainous landscape formed over time. therefore, the first choice is to develop rural tourism. the village www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 44 published by scholink inc. collective under the management of the party branch contracts the villagers’ land, pays the villagers the contract fee of the corresponding area every year, and uses the idle land resources as collective shares for the unified planning of scenic spots and the construction of supporting facilities; by the villagers in the form of monetary or non-monetary valuation of personal equity; villagers build small farmhouses or large villas based on their own homes to receive tourists. human resources include the input of labor force and the support of talents. different from external entities such as government and enterprises, organizations established in rural areas emphasize the main role of economic talents and good people in the village [10] . economic experts and technical experts can often play a powerful role in the collective economic development, demonstration and guidance. now b village party branch secretary is the village has a high prestige of economic talent. the establishment of the cooperative first relies on the secretary to give up his own business and establish a professional rural tourism cooperative, invest money with his family to make achievements, and then attract other economic talents and good people in the village to participate, and appeal to the whole village villagers to join continuously by virtue of their prestige and the achievements of the cooperative. for the shortage of resources, village b chooses to export resources and seek external help, which mainly involves insufficient development funds. under the guidance of the party branch, the cooperative actively carries out investment attraction and has attracted investment of 120 million yuan to build a three-star hotel. few and scattered resources are insufficient to support the sustainable and efficient development of cooperatives, and resource integration is particularly important. b village effectively integrates the scattered land resources in the hands of villagers, develops scale economy and intensive economy, builds supporting facilities and plans scenic spots, and creates a scenic spot with coordinated scenery. 3.2.3 introduction of “internet +” smart management “internet +” rural new formats to fusion, docking modern agricultural science and technology, to capture market information, the popularization of mobile payment, an investment of 50000 yuan, to establish rural information management system, open wechat number and a public website, summary of scenic spot with tourist information management as a whole, the user can query one button. tourists can directly access information, such as geographical location information and routes, contact information, opening hours, tourism projects, but also can exchange experience, reservation and purchase tickets, to achieve the consultation center, farmhouse, tourists three interconnected communication. with the help of the intermediary role of the internet, the scenic spot features are simultaneously publicized in the form of text, pictures and videos, so that tourists can get an advance understanding before arriving at b village. the reception situation of the farmhouse is updated in real time, and the cooperative understands the operation situation of each farmhouse through the information management system, so as to balance the diversion of tourists. the creative mode of “internet + rural tourism” has the advantages of fast transmission speed, wide range, low cost, strong www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 45 published by scholink inc. timeliness, rich and comprehensive content bearing. through highly efficient internet communication, it has expanded the audience of rural tourism, not only limited to the surrounding urban areas. the “internet +” mode not only enhances the internal overall management, but also realizes the connectivity between the village and tourists. “internet + cooperative” has achieved the compatible development of intelligent management and online marketing. 4. effectiveness of implementation 4.1 reconstruction of party branch authority the reconstruction of authority comes from the social benefit obtained by the reconstruction of public credibility through the coordination of the party and the people, the political benefit obtained by the improvement of organizational power and the improvement of governance efficiency, and the economic benefit obtained by the restoration of economic leadership and the good efficiency of the cooperative are the results of three functions. as the nerve endings of the party, the grass-roots party organization of b village takes root among the masses and regards serving villagers as its main task and basic responsibility. the party branch insists that the core of cooperative operation lies in serving members, and the functional orientation of cross-appointment is shifted from control and command to service and management, and from one-way notification to two-way interactive consultation. the party and the people respect and trust each other, and credibility will be rebuilt accordingly. in the face of the rising social subjects in rural areas, rural grass-roots party organizations should not only maintain cooperation with them, but also adhere to the party’s advanced nature and take independent action strategies. by empowering the grassroots party organizations of village b, the political leadership, self-innovation, organizational coverage, mass cohesion and development impetus of the leadership team are enhanced [11] , and the function, resource and value integration of village b is integrated, realizing the systematic construction of governance elements in rural society. the party branch leads the cooperative, which stimulates the primary party organization’s subjectivity in the rural work. in the face of the continuous maturity of various social forces, the primary party organization is bound to have the organizational power and leadership of the rural society gradually strengthened. 4.2 activate collective industry the cooperative led by the party branch of village b activated the collective industry, upgraded the rural tourism industry, increased the value of collective assets and increased the income of villagers. at first, the party secretary of village b called on the villagers to control the mountain and water, improve the ecological environment, build tourism facilities, seize the trend of returning to the wild culture, and develop the leisure rural tourism based on the farmhouse music platform. by 2020, the village has built 38 farmhouse, each household annual income of more than 200,000 yuan, rural tourism radiation role has driven more than 150 farmhouse in the surrounding areas. in recent years, the cooperative has developed a variety of scenic spots with characteristics of picking gardens, art galleries and village history hall, as well as various activities such as picking festival, beer festival, art festival and cultural www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 46 published by scholink inc. exhibition. in 2019, the visitor flow of village b reached 150,000, and the per capita income reached 34,000 yuan. in 2020, the per capita income increased to 36,000 yuan. it should be emphasized that 80% of the villagers in village b have achieved home-based employment, which greatly reduced the outflow of population and kept the vitality of rural manpower. the party branch of village b, as the leader of poverty alleviation and the development of rural tourism industry, worked hard in the process of running the cooperative. the secretary sought policy support for many times, took the lead in solving problems, expanded the thinking of the branch team, integrated resources, unified management, and activated the upgrading of agricultural industry. 4.3 return of community consciousness the return path of community consciousness of village b is divided into three parts. through the cross-appointment of the branch team, the organization is embedded in the cooperative, coordinating and supervising the operation of the cooperative according to the six unified management principles; collective income and industrial prosperity, collective economic spring; villagers join cooperatives one after another, forming interest links. as the organization and operation mode of cooperatives is to share property rights with the villagers (members) of beneficiaries as investors of cooperatives, the income of each member is closely related to the performance of other members, so they have the power to supervise each other. with the gradual increase of contact opportunities, members are more familiar with each other, the relationship is closer, the sense of identity and belonging is enhanced, and the sense of community gradually returns. with the return of the sense of community, villagers realize their ownership of the cooperative and take the initiative to share resources. with mutual trust between the party and the people, villagers perceive the increasingly important status and role of party branches in their lives, and the party’s resolutions are closely related to them. they gradually increase the frequency of political participation and participate in consultation on self-governance issues, forming a governance pattern of party and the people co-governance. village b presents a path for grassroots party organizations to gradually improve the social governance ecology of rural villages by starting with lead cooperatives. (see figure 1) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 47 published by scholink inc. figure 1. the development path of synergy and co-governance 5. conclusion the party branch leading cooperatives are the construction road of modern farmer specialized cooperatives with chinese characteristics. the realization and consolidation of the leadership of the party in rural society, in the economic field to lead the construction of farmers specialized cooperatives for the specific starting point. the party branch is the superstructure of the farmer specialized cooperative, forming a solid organizational guarantee. therefore, primary-level party organizations hold the leadership of the economic work of rural society, implement rural revitalization, achieve common prosperity, leading cooperatives has become a due meaning in the title. the so-called party branch leadership means that the party branch should not only “steer” but also “paddle” during the establishment, growth, development and transformation of the cooperative. “steering” means that party members operate first and provide practical experience; “paddling” requires branch cross-office, specific participation in management and operation. in the emerging specialized farmer cooperatives led by the party branch, the village party organizations that had been marginalized and weakened have returned to the center of the rural governance network. face b village cooperatives original “villagers + enterprise” the failure of governance mode, governance leaders the key roles that the village party branch and adjust the governance network of multivariate main body role and strength of relationship between structure, implement open, independent and compatible with the principle of democratic management, formed under the leadership of the party organization, supported by the villagers as the center, enterprise collaborative work pattern. the party branch will focus on the development of the collective economy on the construction of the economic cooperation organization that the collective joins. in order to realize cooperation, have sustainable development power and abandon free-riding behavior, it is necessary to make all parties in the cooperation form practical interest connection, and the benefit of the cooperative is related to the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 48 published by scholink inc. actual income of all parties. the secretary of the party branch first takes the lead in investing funds to achieve results, followed by party members, and pulls the villagers collectively to become shareholders. with its unique political resources, the party branch obtains preferential policies and financial support to expand market channels and attract investment. oneness with traditional farming income decreases, the party branch organization guarantee in place and the villagers’ participation enthusiasm, cooperative members led the villagers to modern agricultural industry production, large-scale construction of spillover effects, the initial income, to use all the remaining membership bonuses to the village construction, improve the rural environment landscape, to meet canton culture, moreover, the villagers can find employment at home, alleviate the problem of population loss, break the original vicious circle, and then turn it into a virtuous circle. need to stress is that in the future in the process of farmers’ professional co-operatives, leaders must hold in time of peace prepare for war mentality, in the case of cooperatives have sprung up, independent brands need to be creative and innovative development, stop and even within the same geographic peripheral region between the same problem, remove the internal competition, attaches importance to human resources, in order to promote its sustainable and efficient development. references bu, c. l. 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(2019). autonomy and embedding: the action strategy of grassroots party organizations in rural vitalization strategy. changbai journal, 2019(01), 1. https://doi.org/10.35534/rvr.0102006 author profile yuxin wei (2000-), female, born in dezhou, shandong province. master, school of politics and international studies, central china normal university. research direction: grassroots social governance. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 23 original paper dilemma and breakthrough: innovation on models of public legal education in china based on knowledge graph zilin ma 1* & yiting wang 2 1 southwest minzu university, chengdu, china 2 southwest minzu university, chengdu, china * zilin ma, southwest minzu university, chengdu, china received: february 8, 2023 accepted: march 28, 2023 online published: april 3, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n2p23 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n2p23 abstract in over 30 years, the forms of public legal education activities have become increasingly rich. however, with the technology refresh, the traditional public legal education model characterized by one-way communication has gradually become out of touch, which can not adapt to the return of the people’s subjectivity and meet the personalized needs of different groups of people. as an important part of advancing the rule of law in china, public legal education should be timely innovated with the help of new technology. by combining the knowledge graph technology in the era of artificial intelligence with the work of public legal education, this paper studies how to use the knowledge graph technology to build public legal education network platform, introduce customized legal education content, and establish a sound mechanism for intelligent public legal education work, so that users can complete the important transformation from the object of legal education to the subject of law learning. this will enrich the theoretical research results of public legal education. keywords knowledge graph, public legal education 1. introduction law, the lives of the people also, to conquer this also. since the reform and opening up, public legal education has been an important element in advancing the rule of law in china. the purpose of public legal education is to guide the public to adopt appropriate ways to protect their legitimate rights and interests. at the same time, enhancing the people’s legal sense proves effective for the avoidance of violation of the law. in 2021, relevant ministries issued the direction document on the eighth five-year plan for increasing public knowledge of the law. since 1986, when the first five-year plan was launched, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 24 published by scholink inc. china has gradually intensified efforts to enhance legal awareness and achieved remarkable results in the campaign to increase the public’s knowledge of the law. however, people’s differentiated demand for legal services, profound transformation of china’s economic and social system and the development of information technology have combined to pose new problems and challenges to public legal education. first of all, unbalanced and insufficient development has led to different demand for legal services of various groups of people, which means the accuracy of public legal education products needs to be improved. secondly, for more than 40 years of reform and opening up, on the one hand, china’s economy has been growing at a comparatively high rate, and with it a rapidly changing social structure. on the other hand, the change of legal rules has lagged behind relatively. according to durkheim’s anomie theory, people tend to commit more deviant behaviors during this economic boom period, which breeds more complex social conflicts. to resolve these social conflicts, we urgently require innovative approaches of social governance. finally, the arrival of information era also presented a new challenge to the traditional popularization models. by comparison with the innovative mode of public legal education characterized by interactive communication, the model of public legal education characterized by one-way communication can no longer meet the current demand. the eighth five-year plan indicate that we should make full use of new technologies and new media to carry out accurate public legal education, which also put forward new requirements for models of public legal education in the internet era. 2. theoretical basis 2.1 theories of service-oriented government service-oriented government is a form of limited government, which affirming that citizens, social constitutions and other entities play important roles in social governance, building a structure of national governance by the people and for the people. the chief duty of service-oriented government is to provide public services. the citizen is considered the master of the state instead of the opposition of the administration. there is a trust relationship between the government and citizens to provide and receive public services. in 2012, china proposed to build a service-oriented government with scientific functions, optimized structure, integrity and high efficiency to satisfy every chinese. this is the first time to highlight the importance of maintaining the people’s principal position in the country in the theory of service-oriented government, thoroughly implementing the philosophy of people-centered development, which is the recognition of the principal position of the people as the beneficiaries of public services. the concretization of the renewal of the theory of service-oriented government in the field of public legal education is to embed the service function into the process of education in the general knowledge of law. the service function of public legal education means the equality of the status of the communicator and audiences and the philosophy of people-centered development. administrative organs transform from the leader of public legal education activities into legal service providers, while https://cn.bing.com/dict/search?q=theories&form=bdvsp6&cc=cn https://cn.bing.com/dict/search?q=of&form=bdvsp6&cc=cn https://cn.bing.com/dict/search?q=service&form=bdvsp6&cc=cn https://cn.bing.com/dict/search?q=oriented&form=bdvsp6&cc=cn https://cn.bing.com/dict/search?q=government&form=bdvsp6&cc=cn www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 25 published by scholink inc. citizens transform from undifferentiated audiences of public legal education into service consumers with diverse demands. the public legal education is no longer aimed at achieving the established goals, but to meet the needs of differentiated users. 2.2 interactive communication theory interactive communication refers to a mode of communication in which actual feedback from the audience is collected in a communication channel and used by the sender in order to continuously adjust or modify the information being sent to the audience again. the interactivity of reciprocal communication can be attributed to communication media. the biggest feature of new media is interactivity. media acts on the political, economic and cultural fields, and the field of public legal education is also affected by it. media makes it possible for public legal education to transform from one-way communication to interactive communication. the equal distribution of media resources reshapes the conveying and receiving relationship of public legal education. citizens change from audience of public legal education to user of service. the acquisition of media initiative makes it possible for multiple subjects to participate in public legal education. the provision of public legal services is subject to some specific criteria in the media operation process, namely the user-centered rule of law communication logic. 2.3 concept and application examples of knowledge graph in this world of abundant data where everything is connected, cloud computing, big data, the emergence of the internet of things really subvert people’s lives. with the breakthrough of deep learning algorithm, ai technology has ushered in a golden period of development supported by powerful computing power and massive data, and the concept of knowledge graph has been proposed. knowledge graph is a modern theory that combines theories and methods from disciplines such as applied mathematics, graphics, information visualization techniques, and information science with methods such as metrological citation analysis and co-occurrence analysis, and uses visual mapping to visualize the core structure, development history, frontier areas, and overall knowledge architecture of a discipline for the purpose of multidisciplinary integration. its main goal is to describe the various entities and concepts that exist in the real world and the relationships between them, and is a top ai technology. specifically, knowledge graph refers to a series of different graphs used to show the process of knowledge development and structural relationships, which describes knowledge resources and carriers with visualization techniques (qin, 2009). with structured data processing method, it uses ternary bodies including points, lines and surfaces to represent the relationships between ontologies, and uses relationships to organize all entities, forming a directed graph structure. knowledge refers to the information corresponding to points or edges (cao, 2022). knowledge graphs can be applied to query complex correlated information, understand user intent at the semantic level, and improve search quality to build multi-domain knowledge graph platforms to serve different industries and application scenarios. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 26 published by scholink inc. the concept of knowledge graph was first formally proposed by google on may 17, 2012. google applies the knowledge graph to its search engine to improve its search service capabilities, displaying relevant information gathered from various sources in the information box next to search results in the form of structured modules for users. in this technical upgrade, google mainly improved its search service capabilities in three aspects. the first one is linguistic polysemy, which shows differentiated results and narrows the search range. the second one is information relevance, which can help users understand the connection between things better. the third one is system extensiveness, which make sure that people build a complete knowledge system to discover new facts or new connections. all the improvement measures facilitate a whole new set of search queries, greatly improving the experience of google users. ten years later, a history encyclopedia tool all history app with the core engine of knowledge graph also makes a success in china. the all history app constructs and displays digital humanistic content especially historical knowledge, by means of highly spatiotemporal and correlated data. it has launched features such as all history timeline, time map, relationship graph, ab path and so on, which enables users to actively search historical knowledge in an intuitive way. with all of these features, the all history app has became a real hit. the great success of all history app fully reveals the huge application potential of knowledge graph in content retrieval and knowledge popularization, and provides a brand new perspective for developers of knowledge-based products. 3. dilemma: limitations of traditional public legal education models in the internet era in over 30 years, the forms of public legal education activities have become increasingly rich. however, with the technology refresh, the traditional public legal education model has gradually become out of touch. 3.1 objectification of audience under legal instrumentalism in china’s economic and social transition period, laws are often regarded as the confirmation of socialist market economy policies, the fixation of various reform achievements, and a tool for escorting the development of socialist economy (lin, 2021). accordingly, the public legal education have also played an important role in it. for example, the second five-year plan was timed to coincide with period of reform and opening up in the 1990s. during this period, people concentrated on studying more than 200 laws and regulations with the main content of socialist market economy. this legal instrumentalism fully emphasizes the social function and governing function of law. however, this government-led traditional public legal education model is mostly characterized by one-way communication, objectifying the audience, which is a profound reflection of the tradition of taking the government official as teacher (feng, 2017). the design of traditional public legal education products is always based on the emotional preconceptions of communicators rather than rational analysis based on data. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 27 published by scholink inc. in the digital era, the internet has broken the information barrier between the people and the power center (lin, 2021). for the people who have recovered their subjectivity on the internet, the model of public legal education characterized by one-way communication can no longer fully meet their desire for their voices to be heard. nowadays, in order to cultivate citizens’ deeper legal thinking, it is necessary to change the traditional model of public legal education and provide rich and diverse legal resources to the audience by making full use of the longstanding, fundamental openness of the internet. furthermore, we can also provide personalized advice and services to the users’ needs, improving different groups of audiences’ awareness of law. in the new era, public legal education should realize the transformation from the previous one-way and compulsory model to an equal, spontaneous and interactive model, exploring more efficient, practical paths of public legal education. 3.2 failure to identify individual needs for legal service in the existing traditional public legal education, the model of legal education is uniform and unable to identify the individual needs for legal service. nowadays, most of the public legal education activities are lecture training, legal films watching and other standardized ways to carry out education activities, which lead the audience to be educated in a passive reception and fail to choose the content received freely to a large extent. as mentioned earlier said, an uneven development situation prevails in china at all times, resulting in significant differences in needs for legal service of various groups. on the one hand, along with the development of socialist market economy and the promotion of democratic politics, people are gradually awakening to individual freedom and rights, and the concept of rule of law is deeply rooted in people’s hearts. people are more concerned about the quality of law education and it is difficult to achieve dynamic balance between the demand and the supply of legal service. on the other hand, there are still some rural regions where most of people adhere to the informal rules instead of laws or regulations when resolving disputes and expressing appeals. in other words, the audience’s needs of legal knowledge originate from the specific realities encountered, and everyone wants something different. therefore, the passive mode of public legal education is bound to be ineffective as desired. at the same time, the change of power in the internet era also makes the hetero-organization structure of the traditional model gradually disintegrate (lin, 2021). under the new self-organizational structure, the diversified interests also have a strong impact on the content and form of traditional legal education. the passive legal education model should be effectively transformed under the concept of service-oriented governance by providing open legal services for audiences to choose, so as to achieve a dynamic balance between audience demand and legal knowledge supply. 4. breakthrough: using knowledge graph to innovate the model of public legal education when the traditional public legal education model is not prove effective, the introduction of new technology is an integrant part of innovating the form of legal education. knowledge graph is a knowledge representation method based on semantic network, which can integrate, summarize and associate knowledge in different fields to form a knowledge base containing rich information and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 28 published by scholink inc. relations. when the traditional model of public legal education can not address real needs, the combination of knowledge graph and public legal education will be conductive to break through the limitations of traditional public legal education models in the internet era. on the platform of public legal education, knowledge graph can help users quickly locate and obtain required legal knowledge, and solve their doubts and perplexity in the legal field. for example, when a user enters a question related to law on the public legal education platform, the knowledge graph can analyze and understand the problem through natural language processing technology, and then find the relevant legal knowledge and information from the knowledge graph and present them to the user in a visual form. in addition, through the analysis of users’ historical search and browsing records, the knowledge graph can also provide users with more personalized legal knowledge recommendations, helping users to obtain the required information more quickly and accurately. meanwhile, knowledge graph is a structured knowledge representation and reasoning model based on semantic technology and graph theory algorithm. it integrates multi-source heterogeneous data into a unified knowledge graph, and realizes efficient and accurate information retrieval and knowledge discovery through rich semantic relations and knowledge reasoning. in the public legal education platform, the application of knowledge graph can help realize the automatic modeling and management of knowledge in the legal field, as well as the intelligent analysis and utilization of knowledge. intelligent retrieval and management of legal cases and interpretations: the public legal education platform can form a knowledge graph using legal cases, interpretations and other related knowledge and realize the automatic management and retrieval of knowledge through the annotation, classification, induction and reasoning of cases and interpretation. users can query relevant legal knowledge through natural language, and the system can match and reason through nodes and edges in the knowledge graph to provide accurate results to meet users’ needs and expectations. automatic indexing and analysis of legal provisions: the public legal education platform can construct concepts, themes, entities and other elements in legal provisions into a knowledge graph, and transform the semantic information of legal provisions into nodes and edges on the graph through natural language processing, entity recognition, relationship extraction and other technologies, so as to realize automatic indexing and analysis of legal provisions. this will help improve the efficiency and accuracy of users’ search and understanding of legal provisions, and improve the quality and value of platform services. intelligent q&a and language search: semantic search is realized by using natural language processing technology and knowledge graph. users can quickly obtain relevant legal knowledge by entering questions or keywords. at the same time, the intelligent question-answering and recommendation system based on the knowledge graph can find the nodes and edges related to the knowledge graph by analyzing and processing the natural language of users’ questions, and present them to users in a visual form. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 29 published by scholink inc. personalized recommendation and customized service of legal knowledge: by modeling and analyzing users’ interests and preferences, the knowledge graph can realize personalized legal knowledge recommendation and customized services for users. for example, the system can recommend legal cases and explanations related to users’ interests by analyzing their search history and behavior. at the same time, the system can also provide users with deeper and more personalized legal knowledge services according to user needs and feedback, so as to improve the satisfaction and loyalty of user. this is also one of the important applications of knowledge graph in public legal education platform. public legal education platform is an online platform providing legal knowledge services, providing users with a variety of legal knowledge to inquire and learn. in order to better meet the needs of users, the public legal education platform can use the knowledge graph technology to classify all kinds of legal information to form a structured legal knowledge graph. on this basis, the public legal education platform can provide more comprehensive, personalized and intelligent legal knowledge services, including semantic search, personalized recommendation, intelligent q&a. at the same time, by visualizing the information in the knowledge graph, the public legal education platform can help users understand and learn related legal knowledge more intuitively. in the future, the public legal education platform can continuously improve the knowledge graph technology, provide better legal knowledge services, and provide users with more convenient and efficient legal consultation and services. 5. concerns about introducing new technology into public legal education smart rule of law is a new form of rule of law that combines network technology, big data, cloud computing, artificial intelligence, block chain with legislation, administrative law enforcement, justice and law-abiding activities in the information age, making the rule of law present a dynamic operation process. it is an important part of the strategy of modernizing the national governance system and governance capacity based on big data and relying on intelligent platforms. studying the public legal education from the perspective of knowledge graph can approach the wisdom rule of law in theory and promote the renewal of the concept of rule of law and the innovation of legal methods. the innovation of application of rule of law brought by the era of internet and artificial intelligence is a new opportunity for the traditional concept of rule of law and legal methods. meeting and developing productivity of rule of law with science and technology will promote the new development of traditional rule of law and law. the new era calls for new knowledge of law beyond self, looking forward to perfecting the new concept of rule of law and upgrading new methods of law. however, there are some concerns about introducing new technology into public legal education. 5.1 lack of inter-disciplinary talent lack of inter-disciplinary talent is an inevitable question in the construction of smart courts. constructing the smart courts requires a comprehensive combination of new media, cloud computing, big data, artificial intelligence and trial execution. this requires that technical personnel should not only know the knowledge and technology of system operation and maintenance, but also have a certain www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 30 published by scholink inc. understanding of trial and execution, so that the system can better serve the trial, execution and judicial management. however, there are few talents with both information knowledge and legal knowledge in the courts, which lead to the lack of compound information talents. due to the small number of staff responsible for the construction of the smart court and the daily operation of the security system, it is often difficult to cope with sudden system failures and accidents. 5.2 network information security problem data leakage is not rare in the internet era. it is because of the frequent occurrence of data leakage that people pay more attention to the protection of personal privacy. the construction of smart courts is based on systems and platforms, which are based on data. the promotion of smart court will enable litigants’ personal data to be informationized and stored in the network. intangible data is more difficult to save than tangible data, and the speed and scope of dissemination are not comparable to tangible data. this increases the risk that the litigants’ personal information will be leaked, so the security of the system and platform is particularly important. in recent years, judicial network security incidents appear from time to time. for example, the spread of the ransomware virus in 2018 infected the systems and platforms of courts in many places across the country. china judicial documents network was also attacked several times. the use of crawler technology to capture information of judicial documents was very serious. these network security incidents have severely challenged the court’s network information security and also affected the construction of the intelligent court. 5.3 weak judicial data base the operation of the smart court system is rooted in big data, which is the foundation of ai learning. only sufficient and high-quality big data can enable ai to develop healthily and make appropriate judgments. however, because of storage techniques, much of the data is not preserved, or is not preserved completely. to the court, the data update lags behind and judicial openness in china nowadays is still dissatisfactory. to the litigious parties, not everyone is willing to disclose their information. in the current practice, relevant data is scanned and stored in the form of photographs, which is far from the detailed data required. china has a vast territory so local customs and habits in different regions will also affect the result of the judgment, which is difficult to reflect in the judgment documents. in addition to the large number of courts, the forms and standards of judgment documents are different, which adds difficulty to the statistics of big data. based on such incomplete and insufficient data, the intelligent court may not be able to make correct and appropriate decisions. if the parties are not satisfied with the database, it will increase the burden of judicial personnel, which is not conducive to the construction of the intelligent court. 5.4 difficulties to popularize public legal education in smart courts the construction of smart courts has improved the efficiency of judicial administration to a certain extent. in daily life, various means of smart judicial service are fully used to actively serve the broad masses of the people. the wisdom trial is more convenient for the masses. through the wisdom public legal education, the masses could have a more intuitive understanding of the relevant legal knowledge www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 31 published by scholink inc. without leaving home. however, due to the low level of the construction of the grass-roots intelligent court in some counties, it can not be well coordinated. in the grass-roots, the traditional mode of public legal education characterized by one-way communication is still adopted such as distributing pamphlets and carrying out theme meetings of public legal education. 6. countermeasures of improving intelligent public legal education work 6.1 building a network platform for public based on knowledge graph with powerful data support behind the knowledge graph, the public legal education becomes interactive and equal and is no longer simply based on the perceptual prediction of the communicator. making full use of knowledge graph technology can help us organically combine discrete legal knowledge, construct and display digital legal content by associating data, and create an interactive legal service platform, in order to realize human-computer communication and draw an intelligent legal knowledge map. firstly, products with knowledge graph as the core engine can set up multiple functional sections such as legal consultation and latest information in the platform to ensure that users can query relevant legal knowledge through semantic search. secondly, the product can also try to improve interactivity while retaining the practicality of the platform, accurately recommending the knowledge that users want to search based on user portraits and legal knowledge graphs, so that those who are educated can freely consult legal advice, invoke legal provision, inquire about judicial policies and learn latest legal information on the platform. finally, intelligent public legal education products can set up multi-model content learning methods and increase fun quizzes and interactive games, which can enable users to explore and complete the legal knowledge puzzles in human-computer interaction mode. these innovations can increase the attractiveness of public legal education and eliminate malpractices caused by simple and direct public legal education characterized by one-way communication so that users can seek legal education in active performance instead of being educated in passive reception and complete the important transformation from the object of legal education to the subject of law learning. 6.2 introducing customized legal education content under the new circumstance, the traditional public legal education characterized by one-way communication is difficult to accurately target the public demand, and the disadvantage of inefficiency figure prominently in public legal education work, which has resulted in the waste of social resources to a certain extent. knowledge graph technology provides a valuable opportunity for the transformation of the public legal education model in the context of artificial intelligence communication. applying intelligent data algorithms to legal education can not only enhance people’s initiative in learning legal knowledge and raising awareness of law, but also meet the different needs of different groups of people. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 32 published by scholink inc. first of all, product developers should abandon the traditional standard and take the interest appeals of people from different classes and groups into consideration. accurately locate user needs, introduce customized legal education content, and promote the public legal education model reform. secondly, conduct timely evaluation of the dissemination and popularity of the popularization content pushed by micro-video, wechat, sina weibo and other media platforms, pay close attention to society’s heated issues, make targeted adjustments to the content of the public legal education, and solve the problem of lack of pertinence of public legal education. finally, it is an important index to measure people’s awareness of law whether the public can react quickly and use the law as their weapons to protect themselves in time when they encounter specific legal problems, so legal service products with knowledge graph as the engine should be devoted to solving practical difficult legal problems and enhancing practicality and operability of the products. 6.3 establishing a sound mechanism for intelligent public legal education work the development of intelligent public legal education has become the general trend, and it is particularly important to establish and improve the working mechanism of intelligent public legal education on the original basis. on the one hand, it is necessary to promptly establish and foster stronger ai public legal education team building, clarify the work responsibilities and objectives of the team and ensure the smooth progress of the work. besides, regularly carrying out ai application knowledge and skills training for the promoters also matters, which can strengthen their professional capacity. on the other hand, we should improve the supporting supervision and management system because the exploration and development of the path of knowledge map popularization cannot be separated from the support of a series of working mechanisms, and timely evaluation of the education effect is an important part of the development process. different departments should be organized according to their function. establish the responsibility list system, and strengthen subsequent supervision and management, to ensure that the tasks of public legal education at each stage are fully implemented. 7. conclusion from the first five-year plan for increasing public knowledge of the law to the eighth five-year plan, china’s experts and scholars in the field of sociology, communication, computer science and so on have never stopped exploring and researching new models of public legal education. with the development of the times and the change in principal contradiction facing chinese society in a new era, it is of great significance to innovate the mode of legal education. in the internet era, the passive legal education model characterized by one-way communication should give way to the interactive legal education model based on the new technology represented by the knowledge graph, which not only helps to enrich and expand the existing theoretical research results of rule of law, but also makes up for the shortcomings of the traditional legal education model. it can meet people’ desire for their voices to be heard in the internet era, achieve a dynamic balance between audience demand and legal education www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 33 published by scholink inc. supply and enhance the effectiveness of legal education. the eighth five-year plan for increasing public knowledge of the law pointed out that an all-media legal communication system should be built to make the internet become the largest incremental of the innovative development of public legal education. the product designers of legal education should cultivate wisdom with internet thinking to form the positive interaction between product designers, so that the eighth five-year plan for increasing public knowledge of the law is no longer just a piece of paper and the law awareness is 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(2016). implementation of movie knowledge graph based on graph database. modern computer, (07), 76-83. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 81 original paper how gender ideology affects the public attitude towards the common prosperity policy? yueming ouyang 1* 1 school of humanities and social sciences, fuzhou university, fuzhou, china * yueming ouyang school of humanities and social sciences, fuzhou university, fuzhou, china received: march 9, 2023 accepted: april 18, 2023 online published: april 28, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n2p81 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n2p81 abstract most of the existing studies on common prosperity policy in academia use qualitative research methods to explore how to achieve common prosperity policy, but there are few quantitative studies on public attitudes and other aspects, while public policy response attitudes are of great significance to policy implementation. this paper explores the mechanism of its influence on public attitude towards the income level gap by introducing the variable of gender ideology through the analysis of data from the 2020 china family panel studies (cfps) with a socialist feminist perspective. it is found that gender ideology significantly influences public attitude towards closing the income gap, and the more modern the gender ideology is, the more positive individuals’ attitude towards closing the income level gap is. in addition, gender ideology plays a masking role in the effects of age and education on public attitude towards the income level gap and a mediating role in the effects of social class on public attitude towards the income level gap. therefore, the modernization of gender ideology is important for improving the public response to the common prosperity policy in china. keywords socialist feminism, income inequality, common prosperity, gender ideology, mediating effects 1. introduction since the 18th party congress, the party central committee has grasped the new changes in the stage of development and put the gradual realization of common prosperity policy for all people in a more important position, and a series of scientifically correct policies and measures have created good conditions for the promotion of common prosperity policy. common prosperity means the prosperity of all the people, the prosperity of their material and spiritual lives, not the prosperity of a few people, nor a uniform egalitarianism. now, it has reached the historical stage of solidly promoting common www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 82 published by scholink inc. prosperity. we are moving toward the second-century goal, and in order to adapt to the changes in the main contradictions of our society and better meet the growing needs of the people for a better life, we must make the promotion of common prosperity for all people the focus of our efforts to seek happiness for the people and continuously strengthen the party’s long-term ruling foundation. high-quality development requires high-quality workers, and only by promoting common prosperity, raising the income of urban and rural residents, and improving human capital can we improve total factor productivity and solidify the power base for high-quality development. at present, the global income inequality problem is prominent, some countries are divided between the rich and the poor, and the middle-class collapse, leading to social tear, political polarization, and populism proliferation, the lesson is very profound! our country must resolutely prevent polarization, promote common prosperity, and achieve social harmony and stability. in recent years, common prosperity policy has become one of the hot topics in academia. income inequality in china is not only significantly higher than in the united states but also among the highest in the world, especially when compared with countries with comparable or higher living standards (xie et al., 2014). in today’s chinese society, the public generally has a certain perception of the gap between the rich and the poor, but there are some differences in the perceptions of different social groups on narrowing the income gap, there are some differences in answers to different groups on “how big the income gap is”. at the same time, there are also differences in public attitude towards income disparity, there are differences in the responses to the question: “how much do you agree with the idea of narrowing the income gap”. therefore, an in-depth study of the factors behind the heterogeneity of public attitude towards income disparity is of great importance to narrowing the income disparity and making the public respond positively to the policy of common prosperity, as well as to promoting the healthy development of society and better meet the growing needs of people for a better life. the perception and attitude towards the income gap can affect all aspects of people’s life, such as happiness (oishi et al., 2011) and mortality (smith et al., 1996; daly, 1998). socialist feminism was active from the 18th century to the 1960s and was a branch of feminism. socialist feminism believed that the female problem would be fundamentally solved in the workers’ movement, the social democratic movement, and the marxist movement and that the most important way for women to be emancipated was through access to the socialist labor market (lykke, 2020). moreover, the theoretical basis of socialist feminism is historical materialism, with the basic argument that material life shapes human consciousness and that the economic system determines the superstructure. specifically, socialist feminism, influenced by marxist feminism, argues that the unfair treatment of women in the labor market is an example of all those who are treated unfairly in the labor market. the polarization of the income gap is closely related to gender equality, and the most central connection between this perspective and this study is the influence of the sense of gender equality in gender ideology on the sense of equality in other dimensions. individuals with modernized gender ideology aspire more to gender equality, so do individuals who aspire to gender equality have a more www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 83 published by scholink inc. positive attitude towards closing the gap in income levels in the concept of shared prosperity? the sense of equality in this study is by no means egalitarian, but rather, as in the socialist feminist perspective, to meet the basic needs of the majority, not to satisfy the luxury desires of the few, not the affluence of the few, and not neat and tidy egalitarianism. most of the existing papers use qualitative research methods to explore how to achieve common prosperity, but few of them focus on people’s attitudes toward this policy, and few quantitative research papers. different from previous studies, this paper focuses on the public’s response to the policy of “common prosperity” and uses a different perspective of socialist feminism to conduct a quantitative analysis of income inequality. in view of this, this study attempts to introduce an important variable of gender ideology from the perspective of socialist feminism, based on the data of the china family panel studies (cfps) in 2020 and takes “public attitude towards income disparity” as the entry point to deeply analyze the influence of demographic, social structure, and cultural factors on the difference in attitude towards income disparity. we also attempt to explore the mediating role of gender ideology in the difference in attitude towards the income gap. 2. literature review and research hypothesis the income level disparity has been a major concern for scholars in china and abroad. this study focuses on “income disparity”, which is one of the focal points of the study of common prosperity policy. the academic research on income disparity is divided into five parts, namely, why the income disparity is caused, the extent of income disparity (andrew et al., 2015; solt, 2020; zhang et al., 2020), perceptions (verwiebe et al., 2000), reasons (irena et al., 2021) and attitudes (andrew et al., 2015; schneider, 2019), and the consumption inequality in the face of income disparity (krueger et al., 2006). few studies have been conducted on the public response to the common prosperity policy of “narrowing the income gap”. to discuss citizens’ sense of shared prosperity, we cannot ignore citizens’ attitudes toward income disparity and its heterogeneity. studies on attitudes toward the income level disparity generally have two types of measurements, one is based on the current situation, asking “how satisfied are you with the current income level disparity?” (andrew et al., 2015), and “how much do you agree that the income gap should be reduced?” (evans et al., 2018), this paper adopts the latter type of approach to measure citizens’ attitudes toward income level disparity. there has been some research on both the gender income gap and the general income gap, respectively (hazarika, 2020; cook et al., 2020), but the link between the gender income gap and the general income gap has not received much attention. socialist feminism argues that gender inequality leads to injustices of class, race, sexuality, militarism, and environmental structures (gordon, 2016). thus, the phenomenon of income gap polarization is closely related to gender income differences, and the sense of gender equality in gender ideology brings influence on the sense of equality in other dimensions; individuals who modernize their gender ideology aspire to gender equality more, therefore, their sense www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 84 published by scholink inc. of equality in other aspects of life will be stronger. combining the existing studies on gender ideology and income status (nugent et al., 2009), this paper introduces gender ideology as a variable to explore its influence on public attitude towards income disparity. at present, there are still two shortcomings in many studies that deserve to be added. firstly, there are few quantitative research on public attitudes towards “narrowing the income gap” as a response to the common prosperity policy. most studies have used qualitative methods to explore how to implement policies, while positive public attitudes are important for the implementation of a policy. secondly, in addition, most of the existing studies on gender and income gap have focused on gender-caused income gap studies rather than attitude studies. distinguishing from these studies, this paper will explore citizenship attitudes. moreover, from the theory of socialist feminism, the modernization of gender ideology has rich and complex structural implications with various other aspects of inequality, such as the impact of gender ideology on the inequality between humans and nature in environmental issues, among others. inspired by this, this study intends to analyze in depth how the variable of gender ideology, through the lens of socialist feminism, has an impact on the public’s attitude toward income disparity. in detail, this paper attempts to study whether the more individuals support gender equality, the more they will support common prosperity as a policy to eliminate income inequality. based on the previous literature review and the gap analysis, this study proposes the following two research hypotheses regarding the public’s attitude toward “narrowing the income gap”. hypothesis 1: individuals with more modernized gender ideology have a more positive attitude towards closing the income level gap compared to individuals with more traditional gender ideology. in other words, the more supportive individuals are of gender equality, the more they respond positively to the common prosperity policy. hypothesis 2: gender ideology mediates the relationship between income level gap attitudes and some of the influencing factors that have been recognized by the academic community. 3. data, variables and research methods 3.1 data the data for this study were obtained from the china family panel studies (cfps) 2020, a nationwide, large-scale, multidisciplinary social tracking survey conducted by the china social science survey center (isss) of peking university, which aims to reflect social, economic, demographic, educational, and health changes in china by tracking and collecting data at the individual, household, and community levels. the cfps sample covers 25 provinces/municipalities/autonomous regions, with a target sample size of 16,000 households, and all household members in the sample are included. based on the dependent variable “attitude toward income disparity” and independent variables (gender ideology, education level, social status, household registration system, and other variables), we found the answers to the questions related to “economic prosperity requires widening income disparity” in the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 85 published by scholink inc. questionnaire, deleted invalid samples and samples without gender ideology scores, and after screening this paper the number of valid samples is 6917. 3.2 measurement of public income level gap attitudes for the dependent variable general secretary of the central committee xi jinping pointed out in his article “solidly promoting common prosperity” in 2021 that we should study in depth the goals of different stages and promote common prosperity in phases: by the end of the 14th five-year plan, the gap between residents’ income and actual consumption levels will be gradually reduced. by 2035, basic public services will be equalized. by the middle of this century, the gap between the income of the people and the actual consumption level will be narrowed to a reasonable range. jiang zemin has also put forward a realistic vision of how to share the fruits of development in the primary stage of socialism: correctly handle the relationship between primary and secondary distribution, generally raising the income level of the residents on the basis of economic development, and gradually form a society in which the high-income and low-income groups are in the minority and the middle-income group is in the majority the distribution pattern of “small at both ends and large in the middle” will enable people to share the fruits of economic prosperity. from this, we can see that, firstly, the promotion of common prosperity is divided into three steps, each of which involves the reduction of the gap in income levels. second, the goal of common prosperity is that people share the fruits of economic prosperity. in general, common prosperity requires economic prosperity and a reduction of income level disparity in parallel. thus, this study operationalizes the public’s attitude toward common prosperity as the public’s attitude of “how much do you agree with the statement that income disparity should be widened in order for the economy to prosper?”, primarily based on the responses to this question in the 2020 china family panel studies (cfps) questionnaires. the specific variable manipulation process is shown in table 1. 3.3 control variables the previous section operationalized the public’s response to the common prosperity policy as to how much they agree with the statement that income disparity should be widened for economic prosperity. according to the existing studies’ attitudes toward income level disparity, the independent variables are divided into four main categories: individual circumstances, life status, social values, and media use. the individual situation includes gender, age, education (fan, 2006; rodríguez-pose et al., 2009), class (kakwani et al., 2022), and financial literacy (lykke, lykke, n. (2020). transversal dialogues on intersectionality, socialist feminism and epistemologies of ignorance. nora nordic journal of feminist and gender research, 28(3), 197-210. ); life status includes employment status, marital status, family status (including how many people in the family and family income), local residence time, household registration type, and political identity0, social values include a sense of social fairness, sense of social conflict, and perception of income disparity; and media use including media type, and media use duration 错误!未找到引用源。 (hu et al., 2015). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 86 published by scholink inc. table 1. question and assignment of variables variables question assignment dependent variable income gap attitudes to what extent do you agree with the statement “income disparity should be widened for economic prosperity”? we have four options: strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree. strongly disagree = 1, disagree = 2, agree = 3, strongly agree = 4 independent variable age date of birth (year) since the data is for 2020, age = 2020 date of birth (year) gender respondents’ gender female = 0, male = 1 household registration type your current household registration status is: 1. agricultural household registration 3. non-agricultural household registration 5. no household registration 7. resident household registration 79. not applicable set 5, 7, 79 as dummy variables via spss24, set agricultural household registration= 1, non-agricultural household registration = 2 education level what is the highest degree you have completed (graduated)? 0=never attended school, 1=illiterate/semi-literate, 3=elementary school, 4=junior high school, 5=high school/junior college/technical school/vocational high school, 6=junior college, 7=undergraduate college, 8=master degree, 9=doctor social class occupation code for most current work/most recently completed work (broad category) 3 = basic class (including commercial and service employees, industrial workers, agricultural laborers and the jobless, unemployed and semi-unemployed in urban and rural areas); 2 = middle www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 87 published by scholink inc. position class (including professionals and technicians, clerical workers, self-employed businessmen); 1 = dominant position class (including state and social managers, managers, private business owners) gender ideology fathers should invest as much as mothers in caring for their children; 2. the man goes out to work while the woman looks after the house; 3. a woman who marries well is better than a man who works well; 4. women should have children to be complete; 5. men should take up half of the housework. (1 means strongly disagree, 2 means disagree, 3 means be insensible of it, 4 means agree, 5 means strongly agree. please choose a number between 1 and 5 to indicate your agreement with the following statements). question 1 and question 5 are reversed from the other questions, so the gender ideology score = q1+q5-q2-q3-q4, the higher the score the less modern the gender ideology since the main purpose of this study is to explore the impact of gender ideology on the public’s response to common prosperity policy, the variables generally recognized by the academic community are classified as demographic factors, social structure factors, and cultural factors, and put into model 1 as control variables. specifically, demographic factors (age and gender), social structure factors (social class and household registration type), and cultural factors (education level). for age and gender, the original values in the data were used for analysis in this study. for “education level” and “household registration type”, spss24 is used to convert the data of “highest education level”, “household registration type” and “occupation code”, to realize the operation of “education level”, “household registration type” and “social class”. it should be pointed out that this study operationalizes “social class” based on occupational classification, and the specific operation process is shown in table 1. 3.4 gender ideology variables some researchers suggested that gender ideology is the gender-role concept. other researchers declaimed that gender role ideology is the most important component of gender ideology, based on which people design their role models in family and social life (chunling, 1996). gender ideology is an abstract concept. it is people’s attitude and view towards the social norms and the division of social www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 88 published by scholink inc. roles related to gender, and it is also one of the important indicators to reflect the degree of gender equality in society. simply put, gender ideology is an individual’s identity and social identification with gender roles (wenhong, 2020). socialist feminism, influenced by marxist feminism, sees the unfair treatment of women in the labor market as an example of all those who are unfairly treated in the labor market. the central connection between this perspective and this study is that the gender income gap is closely related to the general income gap, or the urban-rural gap, and that gender ideology is not only about an individual’s sense of gender equality but also affects other aspects of an individual’s sense of equality. one of the purposes of this study is to explore the heterogeneity of public attitude towards the income level gap brought about by gender ideology, which will be introduced as an independent variable in this section, and the second purpose is to conduct a mediating effect analysis of gender ideology with a socialist feminist perspective, which will be introduced as a mediating variable in this section. the key variable “gender ideology” was measured by respondents’ answers to the five related questions shown in table 1, and due to incomplete answers for the gender ideology-related question set for the sample under 18 years of age, only individuals over the age of 18 were studied in this study. among the five existing questions, the two components of gender division of labor awareness and gender dominance awareness (wenhong zhang, 2020) and the two indicators of “the man goes out to work while the woman looks after the house.” 0 and “for women marrying well is more important than doing well” proposed in the existing studies are included (xu qi, 2016). the specific operationalization process is shown in table 1. 3. research methodology and framework the hypothesis of this study focuses on “do differences in gender ideology lead to differences in income level gap attitudes?” and “do gender ideology mediate the effect of other influences on differences in income level gap attitudes?” these two questions are developed. therefore, to address hypothesis one, this paper uses multiple linear regression to first put the control variables into the model to obtain model 1, and then put gender ideology into the model to obtain model 2, and observe the changes of each figure in the two models before and after. aiming at hypothesis two, this paper applied bootstrap method model 4 and according to the analysis framework in figure 1 to analyze the variables that changed significantly after the gender ideology was added as a mediating variable, so as to observe whether the mediating effect was significant, and to know the mediating effect size by calculating the path effect size before and after variables. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 89 published by scholink inc. figure 1. analysis framework taking gender ideology as a mediating variable, this paper analyzes the mediating effect between the widely recognized influencing factors and the public’s attitude towards common prosperity policy. in this paper, the four independent variables of age, gender, education level and social status will enter x position in the model as shown in the figure, and the bootstrap method will be used to analyze them respectively. 4. results 4.1 describe the results of statistical analysis table 2 presents the descriptive statistical analysis of the control, independent and dependent variables. the statistical results in table 2 show that the public’s attitude toward income disparity scored 2.51, which is slightly higher than the median value (2.50). the higher the score, the more negative the public’s attitude toward closing the income gap, and thus the negative response to the policy. indicating that, in general, the public has a neutral attitude toward the idea of “narrowing the income gap” and slightly disagrees with the idea of “narrowing the income level gap”. therefore, the heterogeneity of public attitudes toward narrowing the income gap should be taken into account in order to make public attitudes shift toward positive agreement, respond to the call for common prosperity policy, and help narrow the income gap. table 2. descriptive statistics of variables variables average std description age 44.28 19.45 maximum value = 104, minimum value = 9 gender 0.51 0.5 female = 0, male = 1 household registration type 1.18 0.383 agricultural household = 1, non-agricultural household = 2 education level 4.27 1.847 illiterate/semi-literate = 0, nursery = 1, kindergarten = 2, elementary = 3, junior high = 4, high school/high school/high school = 5, college = 6, m: gender ideology x: independent variable () y: income gap attitude www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 90 published by scholink inc. undergraduate = 7, master = 8, doctorate = 9 marital status 1.84 0.366 unmarried = 1, married = 2 social class 2.72 0.564 advantageous class=1, middle position class=2, basic class=3 income gap attitudes 2.51 0.638 the higher the score from 1 to 4, the less positive the attitude towards “closing the income gap”. gender ideology -0.473 0.6546 maximum value = 1.4, minimum value = -2.6; the lower the score, the more modern the gender ideology. the more modern the gender ideology, the more it supports gender equality. 4.2 multiple linear regression results the results of the multiple linear regression data analysis in table 3 show that gender ideology plays a significant influence on income level gap attitudes, and the inclusion of the gender ideology variable has an impact on the significance of other factors. therefore, the variable of gender ideology is significant for the heterogeneity of public attitude towards income level disparity. specifically, model 1 shows that the three variables of gender, education level, and social class have a significant impact on the public’s attitude toward income disparity, with the lower the education level and the more basic the social class, the more positive the attitude toward “narrowing the income gap” is. compared with men, women’s attitude toward “closing the income gap” is more positive. in model 2, the effect of gender ideology on the income gap is significant, and the more modern the gender ideology, the more positive the attitude toward “narrowing the income gap” is. as stated in the previous section on the socialist feminist perspective, individuals with a modern gender perspective have a stronger sense of gender equality, and this sense of equality is reflected in all aspects of their lives. table 3. multiple linear regression models of income gap attitudes model 1 model 2 b beta b beta (constant) 2.929 *** 2.901 *** age -0.002 -0.024 -0.004 *** -0.044 gender -0.040 ** -0.033 -0.073 *** -0.060 household registration type -0.013 -0.008 -0.007 -0.005 education level -0.099 *** -0.248 -0.084 *** -0.210 marital status 0.029 0.020 0.011 0.008 social class 0.033 ** 0.033 0.027 * 0.027 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 91 published by scholink inc. gender ideology -0.139 *** -0.152 adj: r_sqr 0.069 0.088 f 0.000 0.000 n 6916 6916 ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗∗ p <0.001. in addition, the r-squared changes from 0.069 to 0.088 with the inclusion of the gender ideology variable, and the absolute value of the standardized coefficient of the gender ideology variable is second only to education level, which shows that the contribution of gender ideology to the explanation of public attitude towards income disparity is high in this model. it is worth noting that the variable of age changes from insignificant (p ≥ 0.05) to highly significant (p < 0.001) with the inclusion of gender ideology, while the significance of gender and social class decreases and the significance of education level remains unchanged, but the standardized coefficient decreases. thus, in the next section, this study further develops the data analysis around the test of the mediating effect of gender ideology. 4.3 analysis of the mediating effect of gender ideology from the data analysis and discussion in table 3, it is known that gender ideology plays an influence on the effect of age, gender, education level, and social class on income gap attitudes, and to test hypothesis two, and then determine how much gender ideology play a mediating role in it, the mediating effect is tested below through bootstrap method model 4 (zhonglin et al., 2014), which is done as follows. table 4. test of the mediating effect of gender ideology on the income gap paths amount of effect (e)1 confidence interval (ci)2 model 3 (p<0.10) ab/-c=85.71% no mediating variables age→ income gap attitude (3a) -0.0021(a) (-0.0039,-0.0003) put in mediating variables age → income gap attitude (3b) -0.0039(b) (-0.0060,-0.0017) put in mediating variables age → gender ideology → income gap attitude (3c) 0.0018(c) (0.0014,0.0022) model 4 (p<0.05) no mediating variables age→ income gap attitude (4a) -0.0021(a) (-0.0042,0.0000) put in mediating variables age → income gap attitude (4b) -0.0039(b) (-0.0060,-0.0017) put in mediating variables age → gender ideology → income gap attitude (4c) 0.0018(c) (0.0014,0.0022) model 5 (p<0.05) ab/-c=80.20% no mediating variables gender → income gap attitude 5a -0.0404(a) (-0.0683,-0.0125) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 92 published by scholink inc. put in mediating variables gender → income gap attitude (5b) -0.0728(b) (-0.1009,-0.0448) put in mediating variables gender → gender ideology → income gap attitude (5c) 0.0324(c) (0.0263,0.0392) model 6 (p<0.05) ab/c=15.5% no mediating variables education level → income gap attitude (6a) -0.0990(a) (-0.1100,-0.0880) put in mediating variables education level → income gap attitude (6b) -0.0838(b) (-0.0949,-0.0726) put in mediating variables education level → gender ideology → income gap attitude (6c) -0.1530(c) (-0.0184,-0.0123) model 7 (p<0.05) ab/c=19.88% no mediating variables social class → income gap attitude (7a) 0.0332(a) (0.0078,0.0544) put in mediating variables social class → income gap attitude (7b) 0.0266(b) (0.0015,0.0517) put in mediating variables social class → gender ideology → income gap attitude (7c) 0.0066(c) (0.0029,0.0105) 1 the absence of 0 in the confidence interval indicates that the mediation effect is significant. 2 if the total effect and the mediating effect have the same sign, it indicates that they play an intermediary role, while different signs indicate that they play a masking role. the four variables of age, gender, education, and social class are placed in the independent variables in the analysis framework of figure 1, and the effect sizes of the different paths before and after the mediating variables are calculated through the process v3.4 plug-in of spss24.0 to obtain the four models shown in table 4 (models 4-7), and since the significance level of the effect of age on income disparity attitudes before the mediating variables is only p < 0.01, so the confidence interval was set to 90% to obtain model 3. the results of the data analysis in table 4 show that gender ideology plays a masking role in the effect of age and gender on income gap attitudes and a mediating role in the effect of education level and social class on income gap attitudes. it is important to first point out the relationship between model 3 and model 4. since the significance of the effect of age on income gap attitudes before the introduction of the gender concept only reached a significant level of p < 0.01, the operation was set to a confidence interval set at 90% to obtain model 3 and a confidence interval set at 95% to obtain model 4. it is known from the study of zhonglin et al. (2022) that path 4a is not significant when the confidence interval is set at 95% (confidence interval containing 0 is identified as the confidence interval is set at 90% for path 3a, path 3b and path 3c, and the sign of the effect of path 3a, 3b, and path 3c is opposite, so the masking effect should be used to draw a conclusion. it follows that gender ideology plays a masking effect in the effect of age on income disparity regardless of whether the confidence interval is 90% or 95%. all paths of the models are significant, the confidence interval does not contain 0) except for model 4. the situation in model 5 is similar to the previous case, where path 5c has the opposite sign of the effect size as path 5a and path 4b, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 93 published by scholink inc. so gender ideology also plays a masking effect in gender and income gap attitudes. this suggests that controlling for the gender ideology variable significantly widens the differences in attitude towards closing the income gap across age and gender. model 6 is consistent with model 7, all paths are significant, therefore, the mediation effect is established, from the results of data analysis, it can be obtained that gender ideology plays a mediating role in the influence of two variables, education and social class, on the income gap attitude, and the size of the mediating effect is obtained by the effect size calculation formula: e=ab/c, e6=15.5%, and e7=19.88% respectively. in conclusion, gender ideology plays a masking effect in the effect of age and gender variables on income gap attitudes, and a mediating effect in the effect of education level and social class on income gap attitudes, with mediating effects of 15.5% (education level) and 19.88% (social class), respectively, thus, hypothesis 2 is supported. 5. results and discussion this paper first uses multiple linear regression to demonstrate that gender ideology has a significant effect on public attitude towards closing the income gap and that the more modern the gender ideology is, the more positive individuals’ attitudes towards closing the income gap. the bootstrap method was then used to demonstrate the mediating and masking effects of gender ideology on some important variables of public attitude, towards closing the income gap. socialist feminism believes that the idea of gender inequality in gender ideology originates and can be reflected in all aspects, and income inequality is one of them. this study uses cfps data for analysis to provide evidence from china for socialist feminist perspective. the results of the data analysis demonstrate that the degree of modernization of the chinese public’s gender consciousness affects their attitudes toward eliminating income inequality and, in turn, the response to the common prosperity policy. this study first fills part of the gap in the response to the common prosperity policy by analyzing the heterogeneity of public attitude towards closing the income level gap through the introduction of gender ideology as a variable, using socialist feminism as a lens. the study found that the more supportive individuals were of gender equality, the more responsive they were to the common prosperity policy. second, it is inspired by du ping (2020) to explore the mediating effect of gender ideology as a mediating variable. it is found that gender ideology not only directly influences the public’s response to the common prosperity policy, but also plays a significant mediating role in the effects of age, gender, education level, and social status (divide by occupation) on public response. therefore, it can be seen that the gender ideology of citizens plays an important role in the public’s attitude to the common prosperity policy, whether directly or as an intermediary variable, which has a significant impact on it. it should be noted that there are still shortcomings in this study, firstly, the questionnaire used did not have a sample of questions related to gender ideology under the age of 16, and it is also worth paying www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 94 published by scholink inc. attention to whether the gender ideology of adolescents, who carry the future hopes of the country, is modernized. secondly, this study only tested the mediating effect of gender ideology on four variables, and there are numerous other variables that deserve to be tested for mediating effects. in conclusion, this study is only a preliminary exploration of the empirical study of gender ideology and response to the common prosperity policy. there are fewer studies on public attitudes toward the common prosperity policy, and future research could be deeper in this area. in addition, income inequality is only one of many inequalities, for example, ecofeminism believes that the exploitation of nature by man comes from the exploitation of humans by humans, so the influence of gender equality awareness should be considered in many aspects of inequality in the future. reference andrew, e. c., & conchita, d. a. 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(2021). effect of gender differences and other factors on remuneration of employees in eu countries. danube, 12(2), 92-108. https://doi.org/10.2478/danb-2021-0007 kakwani, n., wang, x., xue, n., & zhan, p. (2022). growth and common prosperity in china. china & world economy, 30(1), 28-57. https://doi.org/10.1111/cwe.12401 kawachi, i., kennedy, b. p., lochner, k., & prothrow-stith, d. (1997). social capital, income inequality, and mortality. american journal of public health, 87(9), 1491-1498. https://doi.org/10.2105/ajph.87.9.1491 krueger, d., & perri, f. (2006). does income inequality lead to consumption inequality? evidence and theory1. the review of economic studies, 73(1), 163-193. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.00373.x lin, s.-c., kim, d.-h., & wu, y.-c. (2013). foreign direct investment and income inequality: human capital matters. journal of regional science, 53(5), 874-896. https://doi.org/10.1111/jors.12077 lykke, n. 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(2016). 中国人性别观念的变迁趋势、来源和异质性—以”男主外,女主内”和”干得好不如嫁 得好”两个指标为例 [the changing trend, source and heterogeneity of chinese people’s gender concept: a case study of the two indicators of “men in charge of foreign affairs, women in charge of domestic affairs” and “marrying well is better than doing well”] journal of chinese women’s studies, 135(03), 33-43. zhonglin, w., jie, f., jinyan, x., & jinying, o. y. (2022). methodological research on mediation effects in china’s mainland. advances in psychological science, 30(8), 1692-1702. https://doi.org/10.3724/sp.j.1042.2022.01692 zhonglin, w., & baojuan, y. (2014). analyses of mediating effects: the development of methods and models. advances in psychological science, 22(5), 731-745. https://doi.org/10.3724/sp.j.1042.2014.00731 zhang, q., & awaworyi churchill, s. (2020). income inequality and subjective wellbeing: panel data evidence from china. china economic review, 60, 101392. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2019.101392 notes note 1. the household registration system refers to a basic state administrative system. in chinese history, the household registration system is directly related to land and takes family, clan and clan as the standard of population management. the modern household registration system is a legal system for the state to collect, confirm and register citizens’ birth, death, kinship, legal address and other basic information of the population. the urban-rural household registration system is a unique urban-rural dual household registration system in china. the household registration system of the people’s republic of china is the population management policy implemented by the people’s republic of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 97 published by scholink inc. china. the household registration indicates the legality of the natural person living in the local area. china’s population management has long been based on this system. the people’s republic of china’s household registration system, which divides the population according to geography and family affiliation, divides the household registration into agricultural and non-agricultural to control migration, which has been widely disputed and criticized. the household registration system is a system with so-called “chinese characteristics”. the people’s republic of china is the only country in the world with a strict household registration system. it is known that there are still two countries in the world, north korea and benin, that have learned from china’s household registration system, but these two countries have not drawn differences between farmers and workers. in recent years, china is phasing out the dual nature of agricultural household registration and non-agricultural household registration to achieve equality of citizenship. however, for the samples involved in this study, the household registration system can be used as a reference standard for their birthplace to some extent. note 2. at present, there is no direct evidence that media usage time will affect the attitude towards common prosperity policy, but media use time will affect the individual’s social values, and the individual’s attitude towards common prosperity policy is a part of social values. therefore, media use time is taken as the control variable in this study, and future studies can also be conducted on media use. note 3. this is a traditional chinese proverb that embodies the traditional chinese gender ideology. it means that men are responsible for earning money outside the home and women are responsible for taking care of children and doing housework at home. generally speaking, it means that men are mainly responsible for making money and socializing outside. women are mainly responsible for maintaining the family, such as children, parents, housework and so on. this situation largely stems from the idea that women are inferior to men. but as women enter the workforce, that no longer holds true today. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 91 original paper research on the influence of online public opinion on college students' values in the context of artificial intelligence hang yu1 1 xi’an fanyi university, school of marxism , shaanxi, xi’an, china received: october 29, 2024 accepted: november 11, 2024 online published: november 29, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n3p91 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n3p91 abstract the advent of generative artificial intelligence, exemplified by chatgpt, has infused new vitality into the ideological and political education of college students through its formidable generative capabilities. however, it has also imparted impacts on their values across multiple dimensions. in the backdrop of the widespread adoption of generative ai, college students, being digital natives, have emerged as key players and disseminators in online public opinion. characterized by their active minds and susceptibility to diverse ideological trends, they may face disruptions in their value cognition or, in extreme cases, deviations in their behavioral norms when confronted with sudden public events that evolve amidst shifting online public opinion. hence, amidst the relentless advancement of ai, it is crucial to assist college students in mitigating the adverse effects of online public opinion stemming from such events on their values. keywords artificial intelligence, college students’ values, online public opinion according to the "54th china statistical report on internet development" released by the china internet network information center, as of june 2024, china boasts an internet user population of 1.1 billion. among these users, those aged between 10 and 30 constitute a significant segment, accounting for 27.1% of the total, indicating that college students are a major group within the online audience. the values of young people will, to a certain extent, shape the future direction of societal values. as key witnesses to the rapid development of generative artificial intelligence, contemporary college students are the primary group that can keenly perceive the changes in life and society brought about by ai. in the context of ai, college students are exposed to the immense impact of the internet's multiculturalism, and they have become an important force in shaping and disseminating online public opinion. online public opinion refers to the diverse views and opinions expressed by different groups www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 published by scholink inc. 92 on the internet regarding social hot-button issues. the advent of mobile internet information has greatly facilitated information sharing, but at the same time, online public opinion continues to emerge, exerting both positive and negative influences on the formation of college students' values. therefore, in-depth research is necessary to better equip college students with the ability to respond rationally to the negative impacts of online public opinion on their values. 1. the positive impact of online public opinion on the values of college students online public opinion breaks through the limitations of time and space, enabling college students to access various information and understand different viewpoints and perspectives anytime, anywhere. this not only helps broaden their horizons but also enhances their ability to distinguish right from wrong and truth from falsehood. correct online public opinion can guide college students to conduct rational analysis and judgment of events, avoiding blind following or emotional responses. over the long term, this contributes to the formation of correct values among college students. online public opinion often involves social hotspots and focal issues. in the process of participating in discussions and paying attention to these issues, college students can gradually recognize their social responsibilities, enhance their sense of social responsibility and mission, and thus improve their ability to make value judgments. the college student group has long been in an "ivory tower"-like campus environment, and their values are in a developmental stage from childhood to maturity. the dissemination characteristics of online public opinion have enabled college students to break through the constraints of traditional media. both from the perspective of the diversity of public opinion content and the level of expression forms of public opinion dissemination, it has greatly expanded college students' own participation and their cognitive space for values. by paying attention to public opinion and engaging in extensive discussions and exchanges across the entire network around public opinion, it can effectively improve the breadth and depth of college students' understanding and analysis of issues, enhancing their ability to think dialectically and make value judgments. 2. the negative impact of online public opinion on the values of college students a university is a small society. most college students begin their truly independent lives after entering university, and the university stage is also a crucial period for shaping the values of college students. during this period, college students' subjective consciousness begins to strengthen. however, if their subjective consciousness is too strong, it will cause some college students to unconsciously oppose mainstream social values. in order to be unique, they pursue and adore some niche cultures and may even use negative values to demonstrate their uniqueness. for example, following popular cultures such as "depression" and "buddhist-like indifference," "lying flat" and "refined egoists" have become influential phenomena in current campus culture. in the context of increasingly abundant internet information, college students are inherently curious, eager to express themselves, have active minds, and have relatively shallow social experiences, lacking comprehensive and profound understanding and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 published by scholink inc. 93 analysis of certain social issues. in the face of sudden public event-related online public opinion, college students express their opinions through various online platforms, but often, amid unverified information, various guesses and rumors flood in. this will easily confuse college students whose values are not yet fully mature in their ideological cognition, and it will be difficult for them to make correct cognitions and identifications in a short time under the repeated coverage of public opinion information, resulting in confusion in their value cognition. in addition, some unethical media and notorious internet celebrities, out of their own interests, often control the direction of public opinion through improper means, induce audience groups to achieve their goals, and maliciously alter the causes, processes, and the languages and behaviors of the parties involved in events by leveraging artificial intelligence technology and other means. they conduct false or dismemberment dissemination and reporting of hot events, which can easily have a negative impact on the values of college students. 3. research on countermeasures for the impact of online public opinion on college students' values in the era of open internet, generative artificial intelligence, represented by chatgpt, has exerted impacts on college students' values from various dimensions due to its powerful "generative" capabilities. college students' values are in the stage of formation, and the impact of online public opinion on their values is immeasurable due to its complexity .how to adapt to the online public opinion ecosystem derived in the context of artificial intelligence, and how to cultivate college students to develop correct values in the guidance of online public opinion are practical topics that must be paid attention to in the field of ideological and political education in colleges and universities today. universities should strengthen the education of internet literacy for college students, encompassing skills in acquiring, analyzing, and evaluating online information, as well as awareness of cybersecurity and privacy protection. this will assist college students in better addressing the challenges posed by online public opinion. universities should encourage college students to actively engage in discussions within online public opinion while maintaining a rational and objective stance. at the same time, they should cultivate their critical thinking skills, enabling them to think and judge independently and avoid blindly following trends. during periods of rapid dissemination of online public opinion, college students are in urgent need of authoritative, official, and transparent information. any delay in addressing this need will only deepen their conjectures and misunderstandings about public events, and inflammatory remarks and ideologies infused with western political colors may exploit this vulnerability, influencing their ability to judge values. at this juncture, universities need to proactively lead online public opinion, actively promote mainstream ideologies, and promptly mitigate the negative impacts of online public opinion on college students' values. universities should actively leverage the guiding role of ideological and political education on the internet, proactively occupy major online platforms, and publish scientific and authoritative official explanations through multiple channels and in diverse formats. strengthening college students' correct www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 published by scholink inc. 94 political identity and helping them discern the essence of various erroneous social trends are essential. in the process of teaching and management, ideological and political educators in universities should introduce cases of online public opinion related to sudden public events that college students focus on into the classroom, guiding students to analyze the true intentions behind these events, cultivating their critical thinking skills, enabling them to think independently, and discern the authenticity and reliability of online information, thereby avoiding blindly following trends or spreading false information. centered on hot events in online public opinion, organize students to conduct classroom discussions, encouraging them to analyze issues from different perspectives and fostering diverse perspectives and an inclusive mindset. through case analysis, role-playing, and other methods, students can simulate the analysis of online public opinion events, enhancing their abilities to analyze public opinion and their coping skills. 4. conclusion the influence of online public opinion on the values of college students is dual, presenting both positive and negative aspects. therefore, we need to take effective measures to guide college students in correctly responding to online public opinion and establishing correct values. by strengthening education on internet literacy, guiding rational discussions, advocating a positive and healthy internet culture, and other measures, we can help college students become new-era talents capable of shouldering the great mission of national rejuvenation. reference chen, f. j., qin, z. x., liu, e. b. et al. (2024). an empirical study on the causes of college students' participation in internet public opinion and its countermeasures—based on data from colleges and universities in harbin. media and communication research, 5(1). https://doi.org/10.23977/mediacr.2024.050103 wang, l. (2020). study on the strategies of ideological and political education for college students in the new era from the perspective of network public opinion. advances in higher education, 4(9). https://doi.org/10.18686/ahe.v4i9.2687 weng, s. t. (2023). implications of sudden online public opinion incidents for student management in universities. applied & educational psychology, 4(4). https://doi.org/10.23977/appep.2023.040404 xiang, j. (2023). research on the problem of ethical and moral misconduct among college students in the context of online public opinion. advances in higher education, 7(3). xin, z. (2024). the path of guiding online public opinion of college students in the perspective of emotional politics. probe media and communication studies, 6(3). microsoft word ape-v4n4-p80 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 80 original paper chinese diplomacy discourse in the prism of the relations with the sub-saharan region marianna levtov1* 1 department of informatics blockchain and distributed ledger technologies, university of zurich, switzerland * marianna levtov, department of informatics blockchain and distributed ledger technologies, university of zurich, switzerland received: may 20, 2021 accepted: june 24, 2021 online published: november 19, 2021 doi:10.22158/ape.v4n4p80 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v4n4p80 abstract chinese economic reforms initiated by deng xiaoping have given china the necessary push for the development and growth of the domestic economy. the people’s republic of china (prc) under xi jinping claims, that the originally planned transformation is completed, and china is ready for achieving new goals, such as first peripherical and, later, global dominance, leadership in manufacturing and technology and probably even the moral benchmark. the prc presents a new model of global order with its active position as the super nation. chinese current behaviour on the international stage is the direct illustration of the political thought of xi jinping. to understand the main principles and the vision of the prc under xi, his principles of diplomacy have been analysed. this paper claims, that the rhetoric of xi jinping and his administration is a neo-pragmatic approach, which includes nativism, anti-traditionalism and pragmatism within. the article takes as a case study for the implementation of the chinese foreign policy the forum on china-africa cooperation (focac) member states. contrarily to the american dominance, china suggests guidance, collaboration with mutual benefits and growth, which involves both sides. “shift in space” stresses the concrete steps for achieving the “china’s dream” of rejuvenation. keywords xi jinping, global order, china’s dream, focac www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 81 published by scholink inc. 1. introduction chinese science fiction film of 2019, “the wandering earth” (liulangdiqiu 流浪地球) directed by frant gwo, at first glance looks like a parody on apocalyptic hollywood cinema. based on the 2000s’ novel by liu cixin, the film has an obvious plot for this genre: the sun is dying out and the world builds giant planet thrusters to move the earth out of its orbit. most of the scenes are focused on areas that previously were called china. a chinese astronaut and his son save the planet with some support of their friends, and of a russian astronaut, who sacrifices his life to support his chinese colleague in the supreme mission of saving the humanity (gwo, 2019). is the motive of chinese heroes with their russian friends saving the world only a film-makers fantasy?! could it be a hint for a new global order with new leaders coming from the east, who claim to be able to “save the world”: to support developing regions, to elevate climate issues and to guide international interactions based on new values and norms?! xi jinping’s china cultivates the discourse of a “new global order model”, “superpower” and “leadership” of the prc on the international arena. china gradually enlarges the spheres of influence, claiming that the global order might include multipolar relations with a number of superpowers, which grow their peripheral areas of interests (heberer, 2015). peripheral diplomacy of xi is a part of the plan for the “great rejuvenation of the chinese nation” with a focus on steady improvement of its image among the neighbouring countries and regions, expanding to the african continent and the middle east (cciced, 2013). this statement helps to connect the global “belt and road initiative” and “maritime silk road” projects, as well as preceding the “go global” policy and “made in china 2025” with the gaining meaning narratives of “chinese new model of global governance”, “super-nation”, “global leadership”, and others. this shapes a new discourse which might support the political strategy of chinese expanding global influence and power. however, such a discourse cannot exist in a political vacuum, it is addressing the international arena, where the united states of america for decades are playing the central role. the new chinese discourse is not attacking pax americana but challenging the order through closing complex alliances with different regions and international institutions (breslin, 2013). it speaks about “china dream” which cannot be mentioned without a reference to “american dream” since it is a global discourse. china dream is usually opposing the american one in speaking about a joint national effort, rather than about personal dreams of americans (callahan, 2015). the usa and china are not only ideological opponents, currently they are also political rivals. in the time of american declining activity as the leader of the global order, china could rise as the direct opponent of the unipolar world led by the united states (sorensen, 2013). therefore, the article presents some examples of the current american discourse as well. hence, the way china constructs its political discourse, where it puts the accents might be strengthened. this article deals with the xi jinping’s era discourse of the chinese rejuvenation. through explicit examples of the official rhetoric and its applications in the sub-saharan region, it will be shown how chinese leadership defines new norms through shifting the focus of the global order to different www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 82 published by scholink inc. geographical areas and strategical principles in international relations. 2. political discourse of two rivals nowadays, the political discourse plays an important role in understanding international affairs and “balance of power” among the counterparts. official statements and policies include open or hidden intentions of the governments towards the global order and define the objectives for the further strategies on the international stage. before checking the case studies of the chinese rhetoric used as a political tool to achieve super-nation status, it is important to compare briefly china’s narrative to the us rhetoric. america was long time perceived as the only superpower after the soviet union’s collapse. the relationship between the chinese and american sides could become essential for peace and stability both in the global and peripheral perspective. in the time of the america-china confrontation, started in july 2018, and american anti-china tariffs (bbc, 2019), it is important to review the official statements regarding the global order to compare the approaches towards the global leadership and its positioning in the international system. this conflict could bring some shifts in the global order, which would influence developing regions and especially the sub-saharan africa. 2.1 the u.s. national security strategy of the foreign policy under donald trump the 45th president of the us, donald trump, has made quite a few changes in the national rhetoric towards internal and external politics. during the obama presidency, the us was actively discussing its engagement into the trans-pacific partnership, suggested by china, and its role in the chinese trade pact plan for asia pacific. at the asia-pacific economic cooperation (apec) summit in beijing in 2014, both presidents xi and obama announced agreement in a few areas, such as climate change, clean energy cooperation, some maritime and military activities, fight against terrorism and more. the sides confirmed strong interest in mutual trust and cooperation (heberer, 2015). the administration of donald trumphas released in december 2017 an updated statement on foreign policy with trump’s foreword. this statement, as well as the tone of the whole document indicates a strong change in the strategical course. the trump’s direction, as it was promised in the election campaign focused on internal matters within a new discourse of aggressive global environment, which was searching for opportunities to exploit the usa and its position of a super nation. “america first” policy is mentioned in different passages of the statement, strengthening an unstable political environment for america. this text indicates the core principle of the us contemporary foreign policy, statements are focused on the internal interests and distance from the proactive involvement in the global governance (we are prioritizing the interests of our citizens and protecting our sovereign rights as a nation; enforcing our borders; defending without apology). nevertheless, trump’s approach towards the foreign policy strengthens the will of the states to protect its interests with a “strong hand” (united states faces an extraordinarily dangerous world; the united states will no www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 83 published by scholink inc. longer tolerate economic aggression or unfair trading practices). the used expressions and chosen narrative with superlative and exaggerating expressions (rogue regimes; rallying the world; we crushed; extraordinarily dangerous, and more) show an emotional call towards the civil society. these statements hardly can be qualified as a common style of official documents and governmental statements. chinese contemporary discourse also consists of expressions pointing on china’s goal to achieve global leadership. nevertheless, the used rhetoric manifestly differs from the one, used by the usa in the period of donald trump presidency. the text presented above will serve as indicator and comparison tool to show the major difference in the rhetoric of two rivals. 2.2 ten principles of the xi jinping’s diplomatic thought chinese foreign policy is expressed in different documents, one of the most known is the ten insistences of xi’s thought on diplomacy (xi jinping waijiaozhanlüesixiang 习近平外交战略思想). the principles in original are broadly citated not only in the internet and in official texts, but they also exist in translated version on the official website of the prc’s embassy in afghanistan, for example. it is essential to compare the original text in chinese and its translation to english made by the chinese authorities in order to check whether the original narrative was preserved. the text below has two versions, chinese and english. in cursive font and brackets the translated expressions are added, which have been skipped in the original translation or carry alternative meaning in chinese. each principle will be commented. 1. (fundamental condition): relate to the communist party of china (cpc) central committee as a centralized unified leader in terms of the external work (根本保证: 以维护党中央权威为统领加强党 对对外工作的集中统一领导) 2. (historical mission): insist on pursuing china’s major-country (super-nation/great power diplomacy with chinese characteristics) diplomacy to accomplish the mission of the great rejuvenation of the chinese nation (历史使命: 以实现中华民族伟大复兴为使命推进中国特色大国外交) 3. (main goal): insist on building a community with a shared future for mankind to promote world peace and common development (总目标: 以维护世界和平、促进共同发展为宗旨推动构建人类命 运共同体) 4. (basic (fundamental) demand): insist on enhancing strategic confidence to build a socialism with chinese characteristics (根本要求: 以中国特色社会主义为根本增强战略自信) 5. (general plan): insist on promoting the belt and road initiative in accordance with the principle of achieving shared benefits through extensive consultation (construction) and joint contribution (管总 规划: 以共商共建共享为原则推动“一带一路”建设) 6. (basic principle): insist on pursuing peaceful development featuring mutual respect and win-win cooperation (基本原则: 以相互尊重、合作共赢为基础走和平发展道路) 7. (important meaning): insist on fostering global partnerships by pursuing a broad-based (deeper, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 84 published by scholink inc. closer relationship) diplomatic agenda (重要内涵: 以深化外交布局为依托打造全球伙伴关系) 8. (strenuous orientation): insist on steering (guiding, pioneering) reform of the global governance system to uphold fairness and justice (努力方向: 以公平正义为理念引领全球治理体系改革) 9. (starting point): insist on upholding china’s sovereignty, security and development interests which represent the country’s (nation’s) core interests (出发点: 以国家核心利益为底线维护国家主权、安 全、发展利益) 10. (spiritual mark): insist on forging and developing china’s distinctive diplomacy (unique style) by drawing on its fine tradition and adapting to the changing times (liu, 2018) (精神标识: 以对外工作优 良传统和时代特征相结合为方向塑造中国外交独特风范 (唐淑楠, 2018)). the ten statements are not a bound of theses, but a structured message, which begins with the fundamental condition for china’s diplomacythe uncompromised leadership of the communist party of china (cpc). in the first statement in chinese original text “leader” is expressed with the word 领 导 (lingdao). it will be shown also in the next chapters, lingdao has a meaning of a “strong” lead and is most commonly used in texts referring to western powers, and especially to the usa. to mention its own leadership, the prc uses more “soft” expression, 引导 (yindao) with the same english translation “leader”/ “lead”. however, in this passage the status of the communist party of china, the central committee as a leader is a fundamental condition, what is not mentioned in the official translation, and the used word lingdao shows the hegemony of the communist party. in the context of the global governance and chinese mission 引领 (yinling, guide) is mostly used due its “softer” meaning of “guidance” and “support”. it includes the idea of responsibility to do something together. (孙伊然, 2018). yinling indicates, that china has reached such a level of development, that it is also able to support and guide others. another important expression is 统一 (tongyi, unified). it is mentioned both “centralized” and “unified”. it could be assumed, that each word in the original text has its meaning and place and in the first statement, tongyi refers to the areas which should be in the future unified with the prc under the “one china” principle. under this principle, taiwan is unseparated part of the prc (taiwan shizhongguobukefenge de yibufen, 台湾是中国不可分割的一部分) (中华人民共和国国务院新闻办 公室, 2000). according to the first insist of president xi, the cpc is (will be) the leader of all the territories of the “one china”. the second point shows the great vision of china’s rejuvenation. it is a historical mission to become the great power with chinese characteristics. along with some added nuances to the original translation, it is important to raise the question of the “chinese nation” (zhonghuaminzu 中华民族) meaning. the original concept formulated by liang qichao (梁启超) in 1901 included three main unified aspects defining the chinese nation: 1. from the yellow emperor till the qin dynasty (zi huangdi yiqi qin zhiyitong, 自黄帝以迄秦之一统). 2. from the qin dynasty till the end of the qing reign (自秦统一后 至清代乾隆之末年). 3. the modern time, from the end of qianlong era (近世史, 自乾隆末年开始). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 85 published by scholink inc. (南钢老郑, 2011). these three categories describe the united cultural, historical, and traditional features to all the ethnicities, which are counted as zhonghuaminzu. nowadays zhonghuaminzu include 56 ethnic groups, however the concept is both cultural and political and according to the authorities, refers to both, people within the prc and those sharing the historical and cultural concepts, described by liang qichao. in this broad definition, the second insist of xi sends a message of the “superpower china” and national rejuvenation for chinese ethnicities in the prc, hong kong, taiwan and abroad. such a message gives a hint to the incessant connection of china with the chinese expatriates and ethnic groups living abroad. after the accomplishing of the great mission of china’s transformation, the main goal of xi’s diplomatic thought at the international level is a mankind with as hared destiny. after fulfilling the great power ambition, the global governance according to xi jinping will be prosperous especially under china’s leadership. moreover, domination in the global arena includes the spread of socialism with chinese characteristics. the socialism building is raised as part of the chinese diplomacy and not only of the internal political system. it can be interpreted both as “one china” policy and the prc fundamental demand for the final unification, as well as a part of the “new model of the global governance” (孙伊然, 2018). belt and road initiative is seen as a tool of the foreign policy. this principle will be essential in china-africa relations. as it is mentioned in the focac official declaration from september 2018: china and africa unanimously decided to work together to build responsibility and to promote the “one belt one road” cooperation between china and africa (focac, 2018). nonetheless, xi jinping continues to rely on the “five principles of peaceful co-existence” as the custom of the chinese diplomacy to show the sustainable development of the chinese foreign strategy based on the chinese socialist tradition (levtov, 2018). this basic principle is also present in the focac declaration as the framework of the china-africa relations (focac, 2018). interesting to see, that the initial starting point addressing china’s sovereignty comes as the ninth out of 10 principles. one of the possible explanations is that the previous insistences gave the necessary legitimation framework to insist on sovereignty rights and nation’s interests, not only internally, but also externally, like, for example, along the “belt and road initiative” and within “one china”, the principles mentioned earlier. guojia (国家) can be translated as a state/country and as a nation. since the official translation claims that china’s sovereignty is the country’s core interest, it supports the cpc’s legitimating as the main guarantor for china’s sovereignty, security, and development. it is an important aspect, who is addressed in this insistence. if the “country” is meant, then the question is, whether the definition includes hong kong or not. if it is about the “nation”, then it would also include the relations with taiwan. this passage claims that internal issues are under the sovereignty of the communist party of china and others are not allowed to interfere. this veto on interfering could include the issues with hong kong, for example the protests in 2019 and the relations with taiwan. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 86 published by scholink inc. finally, the last closing statement of adapting to the time of changes demonstrates the modern chinese pragmatism, which syndicates chinese tradition (till the end of qing dynasty and what has become “new tradition” till the beginning of the xi jinping’s era) and the need to adapt to the global challenges. in comparison of both texts, the american and the chinese foreign policy principles, the difference in chosen narrative and particular expressions is well recognized. the trump’s narrative was more focused on internal issues and national interests, whilst the chinese one seems to be also willing to achieve leadership in the global order, however based on cooperation and win-win results. hence, through analysing the connotation of the chosen terminology in the chinese original text, the nationalist interests have been uncovered and become more obvious, than in its english version. china is using rhetoric and language in an efficient way during the whole history of the people’s republic of china. propaganda banners promoted political and socialist education and strengthen the spread of maoist thought in the most rural areas. xi jinping’s philosophy is codified in official untranslated texts and pragmatically addresses different layers of the civil society. however, the message is formed in such a way, that its english translation will be aligned with the western political discourse and based on the accepted norms and international law. the translation cannot transform the intention of the original appeal. its’ laconic rhetoric expresses the chinese strategies and reveals their main objectives. the party under xi jinping attempts to approach different audiences; international community, bilateral partner, chinese minorities world-wide, taiwan, hong-kong, the prc population, political elites, and many others. 3. chinese rhetoric and international relations theories: neo-classical realism by gideon rose and perspective of ir theories international relations theories suggest different approaches to analyse one country’s behaviour and its interaction with bilateral and multilateral partners. in order to understand chinese rhetoric and its implementation on the global stage in general and in the sub-saharan region in particular, the neo-classical realism, a theory of the international relations discipline could be applied. on one hand, the choice of the realism paradigm could be explained by strongly expressed national interests in the diplomatic philosophy. on the other hand, the above claimed importance of rhetoric and selected narratives, which are usually neglected by the realists, should be included as political tools. this aspect is covered by the neo-classical approach to the realist theory. one of the most famous adepts of the political realism paradigm, the american scholar john mearsheimer, has always seen china as an aggressor (mearsheimer, 2018). according to his interpretation of the basic principles of “realism”, there are three key “beliefs”. firstly, the realists treat states as the principal actors mainly focused on gaining power. secondly, they believe that a state’s behaviour is influenced mainly by the external environment. thirdly, countries compete for power among themselves (mearsheimer, 2001). realism makes five assumptions regarding international system. firstly, the global order is www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 87 published by scholink inc. characterised by security competition and war, its chaotic nature means that there is no one government above all the governments (morgenthau, 1973). during the last two centuries, there were different attempts to establish an institution, which will represent equally all the countries` interests, however as a result, a number of international and regional initiatives were recognised by the majority of states, however, one governing global entity has not been established. secondly, states are potentially dangerous to each other and their tool for offense is military power (mearsheimer, 2001). in the 21st century the “super nations” did not stop to gain weaponry and invest into military innovation. nevertheless “soft”, non-coercive power becomes a new way to compete on the international stage (nye, 1990). through diplomacy, economic transnational projects as well as high-technology and innovation, countries are trying to claim their supremacy and leadership. the elements of “soft power” theory by joseph nye could be found deeply rooted in chinese political thought. moreover, for china, the implementation of the “soft power” measures in the “hard” military power is a common practice, for instance, dispatching peacekeepers world-widely (blanchard & lu, 2012). in other words, the current international system respects both “soft” and “hard” power interests. thirdly, states are never certain about other states’ intention (mearsheimer, 2001). countries’ motivations and intentions are not necessarily offensive, some political decisions could be even predicted, however they cannot be also judged as peaceful and cooperative par excellence. the fourth assumption of the paradigm is that survival is the fundamental desire of great powers. and finally, super nations are rational actors and consider multiple factors in their survival strategy (mearsheimer, 2001). the pragmatic strategy of deng xiaoping is one of the examples of survival strategy implemented successfully in the 20th century. on the international level, he sought to locate china between two superpowers, the usa and the ussr (taniguchi, 1983). chinese investments in the sub-saharan africa in natural resources and infrastructure could be also seen as pragmatic decision to guarantee new markets and raw materials for the prc. during the 20th century, realism went through different modernizations. in addition to the “classical realism” of hans j. morgenthau, which was prevailing mostly from the late 1940s, kenneth waltz and john mearsheimer have suggested two additions of offensive and defensive approaches (mearsheimer, 2001). this has started a new phase of “neorealism” in the classical paradigm. this new spin of the theory still did not grant enough attention to the internal characteristics (mearsheimer, 2001) and motives or ideological preferences (morgenthau, 1973). international relations experts holding on other approaches, like robert keohane, who is associated with the neoliberal institutionalism, implement the principles of realism to evolve their own concepts (keohane, 1984). his theory of hegemonic stability relies on the main realism principle: a state’s interest is to gain power. according to keohane, a hegemon strives to have control over markets, raw materials, sources of capital and competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods (keohane, 1984). in line with xi jinping’s view on the diplomacy and proven presence of china in the african continent, which allows china to have access to crucial raw materials and to a large market for imports, the theory of keohane explains both www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 88 published by scholink inc. the appetite of the prc for the leadership in the global governance and the willing of the states along the belt and road initiative to cooperate. the theory of hegemonic stability predicts that the more one power dominates the world political economy, the more symbiotic interstate relations will be (keohane, 1984). within this framework, leadership and hegemonic position is a necessity and a condition to activate the relationship between power capabilities and outcomes (keohane, 1984). the chinese ambition to “lead the reform of the global governance system” (yinlingquanqiuzhilitixigaige 引领全球 治理体系改革) serves as a direct example of a global leadership appetite. the theory of the neoclassical realism, suggested by gideon rose in 1998, reconsiders the influential factors on state’s behaviour and includes both innenpolitik and the external environment (rose, 1998). the theory still belongs to realism, claiming that a country’s foreign policy depends on its place in the international system and relative material power capacities. however, the theory scholars argue that the influence of material capacities on the international affairs is indirect, complex and is influenced by intermediate variables. neoclassical realists deny the direct link between the material capacities and foreign affairs strategy. they claim that the diplomacy is led by political actors and elites and their perception of the material power and foreign relations influence the-decision-making process (rose, 1998). this claim explains the u.s. national security strategy till 2021, which reflected donald trump’s rhetoric, known from the media channels. contradicting the “classical” and “neorealism” belief, that internal developments do not affect the foreign policy, the neoclassical realism concerns the strength and structure of a state relative to its society. this affects the proportion of the resources dedicated to the diplomacy (rose, 1998). it means, countries similar in capacities but different in structure are incomparable in their global performance. systemic factors as well as context are playing an important role in analysing the foreign affairs by neoclassical realism. chinese current political reality is a complex system with regional and global interests. since its official position on achieving global leadership in a variety of spheres, and acquiring new markets through a systemic approach, such as “go global” strategy or “belt and road initiative” china’s policy should be evaluated accordingly. the neoclassical realism allows to include different interdisciplinary concepts and to argue that chinese political thought as well as political rhetoric demand a special and objective analysis, which does not privilege the western values and does not idealise the chinese ones (mao, 2010). moreover, the theory supports a separate analysis of chinese foreign strategy, not as a common trend among great powers or as the us rival only. it allows to include systemic approach into the study, focusing on multiple components influencing china’s performance on the international stage and in bilateral relations. 3.1 chinese nationalism the perspective of neoclassical realism allows to include chinese nationalism as one of the shaping factors of the diplomacy of china. chinese nationalism as a reaction to the japanese and western imperialism advocates the chinese communist party and its regime as the one to return the country’s prestige on the global stage and to succeed in rejuvenation of the chinese nation. the principle includes www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 89 published by scholink inc. two core interests: “one-china” and “great power” status in the global order (bhattacharya, 2007). chinese nationalism is not limited only to the ccp’s legitimation tools. it has a deep connection to the chinese political tradition and history, the accepted narratives in the different groups of the local and international society related to china, and the meaning of used terminology in the original chinese language. neoclassical realists would strengthen that the public support is needed for a certain foreign policy and continuous support for the ruling authority (sorensen, 2013). in her neoclassical realist analysis of the chinese foreign diplomacy in 2013, sorensen claimed that china was not ready to take on itself a new role of great power and global leader. till 2013, china, according to sorensen, went through challenging phases caused by the internal processes and did not challenge the unipolar global order led by the united states. gradually the usa has started to reduce its global influence, as sorensen mentions, it has opened the prc a window of opportunity to express its “great power” ambitions (sorensen, 2013). the neoclassical realism allows to address the xi jinping’s rhetoric on foreign affairs and chinese diplomacy principles through textual analysis. by studying the original governmental statements in chinese language and the process of creation of the political narrative, the intentions of china to achieve both foundations of its nationalism: “great power” and “one china” have been confirmed. both concepts are interdependent, and the achievement of one supports the finalisation of the second one. super-power nation status whilst embraced by members of the international community would support the idea of the unification of china with taiwan and full integration of hong kong into the people’s republic of china. according to keohane’s theory of hegemonic stability, chinese global leadership will gradually attract more supporters on the international stage. global leadership is a long-term goal and could be achieved step by step, starting from accomplishing peripherical interests and progressing to the leadership position in the multipolar global order. as it will be shown further, the chinese involvement in the development of the african continent serves both the chinese leadership ambition and gains support for the “one china” policy by the african states (focac, 2018). by achieving consensus on its core interests in the sub-saharan region, china, based on the african support, might continue to promote its leadership in other regions. the fitting framework for this strategy is the belt and road initiative, which guaranties gradual power gaining. xi’s administration is granting importance on constructing a narrative, which approaches simultaneously both internal and external public. the importance of political rhetoric and constructed paradigm is not a specific feature of xi jinping’s government. “the five principles of peaceful coexistence” of mao has addressed both the international customary law and the chinese domestic interests in the international relations (levtov, 2018). “a new type of great power relations” (xinxingdaguo guanxi 新型大国关系) is a relatively new paradigm of the cpc related to the “global governance” and the “super nation” principle (heberer, 2015). heberer’s approach justifies the chinese peripherical involvement and creation of multipolar global order which limits the responsibility towards the international society, as in a unipolar system and increases the chances of china to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 90 published by scholink inc. approach leadership concept in a quantitative and not qualitative way (heberer, 2015). multipolarity is less offensive towards the other strong nations and especially the united states and gives china in the current dispute with the donald trump’s administration a character of bilateral conflict rather than a conflict over the global dominance. focusing on regional and segmental leadership, allows china to win the time and gradually implement the national strategies, such as the belt and road initiative, “made in china 2025” and others. nevertheless, both western scholars and contemporary chinese political rhetoric proves that china is striving to become a super nation and to be accepted as a leader of the global order system. various sources of the political analysis have given different prediction dates to china to become the biggest economic power and to leave behind the united states. the economist mentioned 2019, goldman sachs 2027 and the international monetary fund 2016 (spakowski, 2016). from the perspective of 2021, we can see the disputes among the two rivals, the usa and china, however, there is no clear evidence of the chinese unequivocal supremacy. nevertheless, the existing conflict with the states does not prevent the prc to spread its diplomacy principles regionally and to continue implementing its belt and road initiative. 4. theories fusion the neoclassical approach towards the realism is expanding the framework of the chinese foreign affairs strategy analysis. it allows to study the internal factors and discourse as influential components of the foreign diplomacy. however, as the theory experts confirm by themselves, there is no one unique explanation which can be used to all the case studies (sorensen, 2013). moreover, the origin of the international relations paradigm is the western philosophy and political thought. whilst applying the theories to the chinese reality it is important to take into consideration the necessity to keep objective balance and to include the chinese historical and political background, sociocultural conditions, and structure of the political narration (mao, 2010). considering the importance of the original discourse and the meaning of the used paradigms in the political storytelling, i suggest analysing the original chinese texts, to adapt a symbiotic approach towards the study. the chinese foreign strategy is a soft power tool; therefore, its narrative should be analysed. there is a created discourse by the communist party of china which currently works in both external and internal directions. i suggest studying the political discourse creation around the foreign affairs and its influence on the chosen audience, the “space”, an intellectual context, where this discourse should be embedded and the consequences of the created political storytelling. 4.1 discourse of foucault constructivism, as one of the paradigms of the international relations, considers “discourse” as an important tool for shaping political reality, and was for decades contradicting to the principles of realism. with the revolution of the realist theory, michel foucault’s concept of discourse was recognized as shaping component of a state’s foreign policy (brand, 2005). discourse, as a social www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 91 published by scholink inc. construct raised by those, who have power, communication tools and media access, defines the main principles for a society, such as truth and morality, and shapes this society’s perception (foucault 1981). foucault understood discourse as influential for the material world, producing practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. applicable to the political thought, discourse creates knowledge together with social practices as a form of subjectivity and power relations (foucault 1981). being constructed on purpose to support certain ideas and needs, discourse constitutes roles, spreads authority and produces power (weedon, 1997). based on weedon’s interpretation of the foucauldian thought, discourses are more than ways of thinking and producing meaning. they constitute the “nature” of the body, unconscious and conscious mind and emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern (weedon, 1997). another interpretation claims that discourse is a form of power that circulates in a social field and can attach to strategies of domination as well as those of resistance (diamond & quinby, 1988). “global governance”, “great power” and “leadership” are paradigms, which include a set of values and establish around themselves related political discourse. due to globalisation and institutionalization of the international relations, there is an accepted understanding of these terms, based on the meaning of the words used in the official languages of diplomacy, mostly english and french, and its integration in the existing spaces. for analysing the chinese political narrative, it is crucial to study possible interpretation of these paradigms in chinese language and the discourse around these models, like it was demonstrated earlier. the emphasised examples of different chinese characters used for the english words “lead” and “leadership” show careful message building, same as definition of the steps as fundamental demands, historical missions, basic principles. it grants xi jinping’s political legitimation as the official china’s paradigm on diplomacy. it is in line with the chinese socialist political tradition and promotes the national interests. recognizing the importance of the political myth, the communist party of china is cultivating the idea of the “chinese model of the global governance” and “great power nation” by creating a validating discourse. the doctrines of the “global governance” (quanqiuzhili 全球治理), “great power” (daguo 大 国) and others are frequently repeated in official documents and speeches of the party’s political leaders, as well as in the statements of thinktanks and research groups (苏宁等, 2018). kendall and wickham outline in foucauldian discourse the process of spaces formation in which new statements can be made and created and gives the framework for statements which can be said and which not (kendall & wickham, 1998). shaping an appropriate space for adopting a certain discourse could be a constructed and conscious process. however, using foucauldian methods, both scholars suggest being cautious regarding two following remarks: it is critical to look for contingencies instead of causes and stay sceptical regarding the political arguments (kendall & wickham, 1998). this argument leads to a conclusion, that discourse maintains the process of space formation. however, despite the attempts to construct a space to guarantee the efficiency of discourse influence, the space still includes certain unpredicted elements causing a variety of unpredictable probabilities. in other words, the created space www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 92 published by scholink inc. cannot be fully controlled and might include unpredictable consequences as well. 4.2 production of spaceby henri lefebvre and structures of feeling by raymond williams lefebvre’s approach to production of space reveals a claim that space is unlimited and thus empty, yet at the same time it is full of “juxtapositions, of proximities (“proxemics”), of emotional distances and limits” (lefebvre, 1991). space is not a thing and not a “vessel”. it is a product of social activity and a mean of production, a social reality and set of interrelations and forms. social space is “always, and simultaneously, both a field of action […] and a basis of action; it interrelates “everything that is produced either by nature or by society” (lefebvre, 1991). therefore, space cannot be totally constrained by any group or individual. nevertheless, space is impacted by multiple narratives and causes. by evoking “space”, it should be indicated what occupies that space and how it was produced: the deployment of energy in relation to “points” and within a time frame. space considered in isolation, not within an outline of time, is an empty abstraction (lefebvre, 1991). for this reason, the created space containing xi jinping narratives is connected in multiple ways to time. it is not only directly referring to the era of xi jinping, but also to the glorious past and even more magnificent future of the prc. moreover, it has phases which are strongly connected to the time periods. for example, the “made in china 2025” strategy speaks about gradual gain of technological power till the fulfilment of the global leadership goal in three steps (state council/guowuyuan, 2015). social space is delineated and has physical and conceptual frontiers. political and social borders of a nation-state specify the boundaries of the created space and are dictated by those in power (fuchs, 2019). for example, the social space of the “made in china 2025” phrased in chinese, addresses the people’s republic of china and other chinese speaking groups world-wide. such a space should have an active presence to become a social consciousness (williams, 1977). therefore, the key principles of the “made in china 2025” narrative might be repetitive and reflected in other official documents, statements of the political elites as well as practiced physically. in a concrete social space, language and cultural background are used in discourse production and define social relations. in communication, humans, institutions, and power actors create and maintain social relations by making use of language (fuchs, 2019). communication is a concrete process that connects social space and mental space of a person and a society (williams, 2005). williams claims a correlation among personal and formal beliefs, values, and meanings in historical and cultural perspective. there is a nuanced interaction between private (selected and interpreted) beliefs and acted and justified by the social space experiences (williams, 1977). moreover, language differs from generation to generation (williams, 1977). therefore, the constructed discourse should take these nuances into consideration and address different angles of a concrete social space. in other words, a constructed discourse, which includes specified narratives, addresses concrete social beliefs, cultural sentiments, and personal values in order to form a necessary supportive space for realisation of political goals and interests. interdependence of a discourse and a personal sensibility within a given space www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 93 published by scholink inc. influences the success of a political strategy’s implementation. to conclude, a social space could be shaped but cannot be fully controlled due to the endless components of this space. in order to manage a discourse for achieving concrete goals, it is important to define time frame and recipients of narratives, their values and believes. within this given context, language as a way to communicate a message is an important tool, so-called “space within a space”, which grants discourse its characteristics. a political discourse could include several narratives serving different political interests of a governing power. for better employment of a discourse for political matters, political stake holders take actions to produce their version of a [social] space. usually limited by time, physical and cultural boundaries, space affects the interaction of elements within this space, but stays unlimited and unpredictable in its outgrowth. a constructed discourse within a space tries to affect individual agents, also groups of individuals, and expands to further societies. if language is a tool for spreading a message, and a context of a social space supports narrative’s adoption, in a case of spreading beyond the boundaries of the original space, a message should be compliant with the context of a space it tries to penetrate. in the era of globalisation, it could be estimated that a narrative should be also accepted on the universal level, to be perceived as a common sense. nevertheless, it is still a sort of wishful thinking to achieve a global perception on narratives, because there is no agreement on one global hegemon, and it doesn’t serve political interests of the international players. moreover, with the whole development of the modern science, there are still adepts of the “flat earth society” (note 1) and other subjective beliefs, therefore a global consensus is not realistic. 4.3 “affectivity” of chinese contemporary discourse based on raymond williams’ research, d. sharma and f. tygstrup suggest a term of “affective space”, a virtual environment, which is created to maintain a certain discourse (sharma & tygstrup, 2015). affectivity has to do with matters of soul, it addresses the personal and becomes part of the consciousness. affective space is an influential system of explanation and argument (williams, 1977). an “affective space” in the political discourse is created through using a codified language, a set of terms and abbreviations, accurately chosen in advance. because each generation speaks a language already contrasting with the language of its predecessors, narratives should be adapted to the relevant context (williams, 1977). sharma and tygstrup interpret “affectivity” of williams with matter of the soul and “attunement” of the human being (sharma & tygstrup, 2015). the modern chinese political pragmatism choses an arration style of approaching the current social experience with underlined modern aspects as well as the cultural heritage of the previous generations. therefore, affectivity is possible to be reached in different environmentssocial spaces: domestic, regional and international. in other words, to achieve a concrete political goal, a specific discourse is needed. however, all the contextual conditions must be respected. to be used pragmatically according to the political needs, a constructed discourse should include narratives which are compliant with the concrete contextual needs of a specific social space. the condition of creating the relevant narrative is www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 94 published by scholink inc. to recognise the accepted cultural patterns of the target audience and address them directly using a relevant “language”. nevertheless, the principle of lefebvre of unlimited and unpredictable space excludes consensus on accepting a certain narrative. however, the more social spaces will accept partly or fully a certain discourse, the closer a power group will be to achieving its political goal. 5. filling the space with narrative: 3 pillars of a successful affectivity taking into consideration the theoretical framework of the previous chapters, the following part of the study will search for the key expressions and new paradigms, which are created to fill the space and nourish the discourse in favour of the political interests in internal and foreign affairs. these particular examples are considered to influence the “affectivity” of the space due to their connection to the existing culture, social beliefs and history, as well as anxieties and concerns. the people’s republic of china led by the xi jinping’s administration uses different paradigms in their foreign policies and internal messages to the civil society. ‘in his speech at the party’s press conference on february 19th, 2016, xi has stated that it is important to follow rules of news dissemination, innovative methods to establish a system of discourse in external communication and enhance the right to speak internationally (liu, 2016). moreover, the article claims that xi jinping has “repeatedly stressed that it is necessary to strengthen the capacity building of international communication, carefully construct the system of foreign discourse, enhance the creativity, charisma and credibility to present positively the story of china, to spread its voice and explain china’s characteristics (liu 2016). among the chinese references there are several rising up paradigms, which are appealing to both internal and externally public. the expressions used in the original text are chosen in the way, their english translation will address the international society with the accepted formulations and terminology. the chinese characters, on the contrary emphasize another information. for example, commonly used expression “super nation” or “great power”, which western scholars have been applying to describe the usa and the ussr during the cold war and continued using towards america after the cold war period. china also claims to be called “super nation”, however the characters used in chinese for this principle regarding the usa, the ussr and japan, for example, differ from the characters used for the prc. china names itself 大国 (daguo), whilst others are called 强国 (qiangguo). 大 (da) can be translated as big/large/great, related to size, and 国 (guo)—as country/nation/state. both words do not have a direct “threatening” meaning. daguosynonym, qiangguo (强国) includes the character 强 (qiang), meaning strong/powerful/to force/strengthen. for instance ussr superpower—“qiangguosulian” (强国苏联) and japan superpower “qiangguoriben” (强 国日本) (renmin ribao, 2018). in its discussions on the “chinese new model of the global order” china is promoting a new form of “great nation relations” 大国关系 (daguo guanxi大国关系), using same characters for great power as it uses towards itself. clearly, the model is not referring to a theoretical great power, but to china itself as the image of great power. china’s initiative to promote a new type of big powers relationship during the transitional period of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 95 published by scholink inc. leadership and collective leadership marks china’s active construction of diplomatic theory, international strategy and policy measures (yang, 2013). moreover, it could be also proposed a different interpretation, that china does not claim the status of qiangguo due to the responsibilities connected to the “super nation” status. domestically, china is still suffering from different problems and is counted as developing country and towards its population the message is that china is a “big country”daguo geographically and defiantly has “global leadership” ambitions, but it is still in transition to become qiangguo. it is demonstrated in the “made in china 2025” policy through the claim to achieve the strategic goal of (becoming) manufacturing “great power” (qiangguo) in “three steps” (guowuyuan, 2015). nevertheless, whilst mentioning the final stage to be achieved towards the 100 years jubilee of the people’s republic of china, daguo is still used to characterise china as “manufacturing super nation” entering the forefront of the world’s manufacturing “great powers” (qiangguo) (guowuyuan, 2015). according to immanuel c.y. hsu (zhao, 2000) before the 19th century china did not share the features of the nation state. culturalism and not nationalism prevailed in the traditional chinese society. however, the chinese defeat in the opium war of 1839-1842 pushed the local elites to adopt the european concepts of nationalism (zhao, 2000). out of this bitterness, an idea of china returning its grace and restoring its position as a great power has become the leading motive of the chinese leaders’ discourse. this “great power” idea is the core of the modern chinese nationalism (zhao, 2000). during the 20th century, the political elites have developed three approaches to “make china’s rejuvenation”: nativism, antitraditionalism and pragmatism. therefore, the constructed discourse of the fifth generation of chinese government contains a unique type of pragmatism, which maintains all the best practices from the previous generations and interpretations of the western values and norms implemented in the charters and treaties of the international institutions. in other words, the current chinese political discourse has an open space for interpretation and leaves every involved party satisfied, because it refers to the essential values of every focus group. nativism, anti-traditionalism and pragmatism “qiangguo meng” (强国梦-great power dream) or “zhongguo meng” (中国梦china’s dream), the idea of chinese rejuvenation has become the leading political thought of china’s domestic and foreign policy (taylor, 2017). previously “dream” was not used as a term of political strategy. the new narrative, however, contains traditional nativism with the modern profit-oriented pragmatism (chai/chai, 2013). to achieve the china’s dream, political elite is searching to reach a consensus internally and also between the party and the domestic population (noesselt, 2017). moreover, the narrative is addressing the international society by precisely chosen formulation, which in translation to english fit the western narrative of great power behaviour (mohanty, 2013). in a closer analysis, this narrative has references to three different approaches, nativism, anti-traditionalism and pragmatism. all three are uniquely combined in the message in order to address different groups of interest. nativism suggests sticking to the traditional confucian principles and its fundamental nationalism www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 96 published by scholink inc. (rujiayuanjiaozhiminzuzhuyi 儒家原教旨民族主义). chinese recovery is in the resistance to foreign influence and pressure. the true independence, according to the nativism supporters, comes through appreciating the traditional principles for gaining the national confidence and strength (xiao, 1996). despite the devotion to the tradition, this concept is neglecting imperialism and strives to establish a modern nation-state. one of the examples of nativism’s implementation is mao’s policy of 自理更生 (zi li geng sheng self-reliance). zhao names the boxer rebellion and the cultural revolution as two main periods of a strong nativism expression (zhao, 2000). the attempt to isolate china from the rest of the world was motivated by the idea to minimize the external dependency and the influence of the capitalist world system. however, this approach did not find supporters in the end of 1970s and in 1980s, and the reforms of deng xiaoping replaced the old ideological doctrines. in contrast to nativism, antitraditionalism sees the chinese weakness in its tradition. the contradiction was especially expressed in the boundless adoption of the western values and culture. the anti-traditional thoughts have been rising a few times during the 20th century. from the “may fourth” movement in 1919 through the maoist era to deng’s reforms, there have been repeated attacks on china’s cultural heritage (zhao, 2000). mao tended to use the antitraditional discourse in his approach towards the traditional chinese culture of “feudal legacies”. the early stages of the cultural revolution have expressed this strong antagonism towards all traditional, so-called the four olds: ideas, customs, culture and habits (durdin, 1971). nevertheless, this period was a mixture of both nativist anti-western and antitraditional sentiments (zhao, 2000). as an antithesis to both, pragmatism explains the nation’s weakness by foreign economic exploitation and cultural infiltration. according to this, lack of modernisation has made china vulnerable to western imperialism. pragmatists would use any tools to achieve their dream to make china a great power again. deng’s expression regarding the cat, whose colour is irrelevant, black or white, as long as it can catch rats is the expression of the pragmatic approach before xi (zhao, 2000). through its adherence to the national interests in the foreign policy and scientific development, xi jinping could be considered as a neo-pragmatist. his approach differs from the one of deng xiaoping. xi jinping’s era happens in the time of the fourth industrial revolution, which opens for china a window of opportunities to leverage its ambitions for growth and development to the leadership level. based on the latest technological innovation of connectivity and visualisation, chinese belt and road initiative as well as “go global” outwards foreign investment policy enables the prc under xi jinping’s regime not only to gain the political and economic power, but also to spread its soft power of values and norms. therefore, the “new model of the global order” of china has chances to be adopted by the regional chinese partners and to spread globally. through the structure of his political messages, xireaches outto adepts of the nativist and anti-traditionalist thought and still stay perceived as an attractive partner for the members of the international community. by choosing a special terminology in the official statements, which is translated to english in the way, it illustrates the major buzzwords of the western political thought, xi’s administration appeases both internal and external communities, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 97 published by scholink inc. spreads concrete messages to the chinese speaking groups abroad and different circles internally. 5.1.1 《新型大国关系》xinxingdaguo guanxi-new model of super power relations modern diplomacy discourse repeatedly employs the terminology of “global governance” or “global order”, “leadership” and “cooperation”. chinese scientific societies are publishing research works on the chinese new model of global governance (sun, 2018). this discourse is known also as “rising china”, “asian century” and more. it focuses on three major dimensions: space (east vs. west), time (present vs. future, which should be same gorgeous as the past) and position on the global arena (chinese guidance/leadership vs. western domination). spakowski suggests looking from the global historical perspective, however, ignoring the common focus on the western world development, to recognise that during the last thirty years we are experiencing not a rapid raise of china, but “re-emergence”, “restoration” or even “renaissance” (spakowski, 2016). in other words, as it is described in the concept of china’s rejuvenation, mentioned previously in the “ten insistences on diplomatic thought” of xi jinping. interpretation of china’s performance on the international arena is a matter of the analysis perspective. to reach the full picture, the western perspective is not enough. however, the chinese prism should be also analysed with certain scepticism, understanding that the chinese discourse is subjective and serves particular political interests. the global discourse regarding the “asian century” or the “chinese dominance” is produced not only by the open media sources and political analysts but also by the international institutions, such as the world bank, the international monetary fund, and the asian development bank. the institutes are influencing through their reports and global-scale economic data (spakowski, 2016). there is no global consensus regarding china’s rise in the last decade, there is enough speculation on related data, which gives feeling of uncertainty and perception of threat. perhaps, the western boom around the rising china was pragmatically used by the chinese government. the communist party of china, being aware of rhetoric and discourse importance tries to recreate the image of the global leader and great power which was, from their perspective, unreasonably neglected due to the turbulences of the last 150 years. the most prominent example is the restoration of the “silk road” through the modern “belt and road initiative”. however, it is important to comprehend the project as a huge network of different trade routes and regional supply chains and their mechanisms nourishing the central project.from the political strategy perspective, the success of the full bri project might indicate relationships of cooperation and interdependency of the states which are included into this framework. the relationship with the forum onchina-africa cooperation members could serve as example of a strong network which is not only involved in realisation of the initiative, but also in the political interests’ fulfilment (focac, 2018). african counterparts embrace chinese leadership and support chinese policies as part of the cooperation relations. in this way, the overlap of commercial and political interests in the region supports the general agenda of the “chinese rejuvenation” and the “new model of the superpower relations”. china suggests an alternative to the western dominance, by www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 98 published by scholink inc. providing aid and cooperation without direct interference into the internal politics of a partnering state. 5.1.2 shift in position on the global arena (chinese guidance/leadership vs. western domination) through analysing the official chinese political statements and white papers on “global governance” and “new global order” it can be seen that china claims to offer an alternative to the western perception of the “global order”. the prc claims to be ready to take over the global leadership not only in the technological development, as it is presented in the “made in china 2025” policy (国务院, 2015)and the “artificial intelligence development report” of 2018 (清华大学中国科技政策研究中心, 2018). china also sees itself as responsible leader on the international stage. as a contradiction to the capitalist western powers, the alternative approach to the bilateral relations on the global stage, according to xinxing daguo guanxi, is not a new narrative of the xi jinping administration, but a sustainable tradition started in the first decade of the prc’s existence. the famous chinese principle of “non-interference” is celebrating its 65th anniversary due to the unique effectiveness on domestic level as well as on the regional level of chinese foreign policy. its discourse “space” was cultivated during all these years and was always adapted to the current existing discourse. all this became possible through its original flexible interpretation or lack of detailed description of the principle’s application, which has kept for the cpc a manoeuvre space for political decisions. moreover, the “non-interference” does not contradict the international customary law, which grants china legitimisation of its actions under this principle (levtov, 2018). to become a great power nowadays, china should serve the needs of several political narratives. first, the chinese rhetoric should address the known and accepted terminology of the domestic chinese discourse, however, it should carry a message of ability to embrace changes and coherence to the gaining political and economic power goal. second, chinese positioning should address the regional discourse in a way it would not provoke conflicts, and third, it should not underminedirectly the accepted international (western) norms. in this case, the traditional paradigms related to the international relations, such as “principle of non-interference” should get an updated interpretation and use cases and be aligned with current political strategies. a gradual way of spreading the influence and achieving “china-centred region order” supports china in promoting its leadership position without provoking serious conflicts. according to heberer, world’s division into the spheres of influence helps china to avoid conflicts with other great powers (heberer, 2015). nevertheless, the current us-china dispute shows that the us feels its “great power” threatened. moreover, creation of such spheres and spreading the influences contradicts to the traditional paradigm of “non-interference”, because regional or global leader status potentially includesan active, even if indirect involvement into the domestic politics of the counterparts. aid, loans and investments agreed with a local government, might change internal balance of powers and cause tacit interference into the domestic politics. the communist party of china cannot publicly turn away from the basic principles of the maoist approach towards the foreign policy. to avoid a need in a new paradigm is to update the discourse around the old one, to modernise its interpretation or to make re-contextualisation of a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 99 published by scholink inc. paradigm. these considerations are reflected in the terminology chosen for the purpose of promoting the chinese global leadership. chinese character for leadership 引导 (yindao) is carrying features of moderate guidance and not of a definite patronage or dictatorship as its’ synonym 领导 (lingdao). taking into consideration, that english meaning would be perceived in both cases as “leadership”, chinese meaning of these two concepts need to be analysed from the chinese social space perspective. therefore, the original chinese characters chosen to express these meanings should be revised separately with examples of their implementation in text. leadership in the meaning of a strong, forcing position would be translated as 领导 (lingdao), the most frequently used characters for china’s “leadership” in the original contemporary texts are 引导 (yindao) -translated as guidance.引 导 (guidance) could be mostly seen as applied towards china, while 领导 (leadership) is used towards the usa: “我国有能力引导世界能源变革” (woguo you nengliyingdaoshijienengyuanbiange, china has the ability to guide world’s resources transformation)（王软辰, “经济日报”, 2017）. “中国 挑战美国的全球领导地位吗?” (zhongguotiaozhanmeiguo de quanqiulingdaodiwei ma?) does china challenge the global leadership of the united states?) (bbc 中文, 2017). since the different use of the terms is done especially in chinese, it becomes clear that the message is addressing mostly the chinese community (zhonghuaminzu 中华民族) as imagined by the political elite. in addition to the domestic target groups, such as political elites, opposing groups and the general population, china aims to reach those, who are included into the “one china” principle, the population of taiwan; and to send an appeased message to hong kong. moreover, it also speaks to the chinese ethnic descendants 中华民族 (zhonghuaminzu) abroad in order to strengthen the chinese lobby in the influential circles of politics, academy and business. this paradigm (tifa 提法) appeases possible fears regarding the image of china as an aggressor. nevertheless, in the original chinese narrative is added an extra implication and discloses to the chinese speaking public the image of the prc as peaceful leader compared to the western counterparts. most of the chinese decisions in the post-mao period could be seen as pragmatic and therefore are serving the national interests and align with the official strategies. precise terminology in the official statements indicates the importance granted by the cpc to the rhetoric and creation of the relevant discourse. sources, which are not the official state documents, but media references, show the degree of the political influence and its narrative penetration into the press. it makes sense, since media channels nowadays are the fastest forwarders of narratives to the target groups. attention to translation nuances of the chosen rhetoric reveal the intention of the authorities to demonstrate that china claims for the leadership not from a position of power and offense but from an alternative to the western “strong” and “imposing” leadership position of guidance. therefore, it can be concluded that china suggests a new type of a global order with a shifted focus on china as an alternative global leader, which agrees for multipolarities and wins its partnerships through “guiding” a counterpart to the mutual interdependency instead of imposing its lead. 5.2 shift in time: present vs. future www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 100 published by scholink inc. new narratives need to be felt natural and be adjusted to the existing discourse to become long-living and relevant. for these purposes, the theory of affective spaces describes the mechanism for creation of discourse and adaptation of new paradigms. based on the analyses of the effectiveness of the “non-interference principle” in the chinese diplomacy, affective space created around such principle needs to possess the three above-described elements: nativism, anti-traditionalism and pragmatism. in case of the “non-interference principle” as well as other principles out of the “five principles of peaceful co-existence” (hepinggongchuwuxianyuance 和 平 共 处 五 项 原 则 )due to the broad interpretation stay beyond time, and, therefore, are relevant until today. the mao’s heritage of the principle guarantees the connection to the traditional practices of the chinese diplomacy and the broad interpretation, which could be adjusted to the modern needs of the foreign policy appeals to the pragmatic approach. through involving all the three elements, an affective space is created. this “space” simultaneously addresses different sorts of feelings within the target audience without contradiction to the most up to dated discourse. it reminds about the previous glory, the suffer of the generations and speeded up growth of the current period, which will lead to the rejuvenation of the country. this affective space is influential both, internallyby being clear to the chinese population, and externally showing the international community, that china is relying on three strong pillars: international customs, its own political tradition and agility, which is currently necessary to guarantee development and growth. this affectivity is strongly connected to the dimension of time. the narrative finds its legitimation in the memories of the “past” both,domestically through connection to the historical events and tradition, and internationally by showing asign of sustainable strategy which respects the past agreements and customs. time aspect in the gradual plan for closing the gap with the developed world and achieving the leading position is strongly presented in the “made in china 2025” strategy (国务院, 2015) as well as in other developing projects, such as “belt and road initiative” and “new maritime silk road” (苏宁等, 2018). these strategies have phases and are scalable from the perspective of time. the amorphous “rejuvenation” paradigm in the chinese interpretation turns into the concrete “leadership” project which might achieve also a new global order. “made in china 2025” policy, for instance, has a specified time frame for realisation of the strategic goal to become the leading manufacturing super nation world-wide till 2049. (国务院, 2015). the process should be completed in three steps. first step includes two stages: till 2020 such processes as industrialisation, digitalisation of the production, manufacturing and other industrial means should be completed. energy and material consumption, as well as pollution should be decreased. till 2025 the quality of the production and the full manufacturing process should be compliant with standards of the developed countries. the second step should be finalised towards 2035 with achieving even higher level of the industrial progress and competitive quality of the manufacturing with the great powers. the final goal of the leadership position among the manufacturing super nations should be achieved www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 101 published by scholink inc. towards the 100 years’ jubilee of the prc (国务院, 2015). these phases are measurable and represent the change towards the better future. the five-years plan, another method of planning economic growth over limited periods of time, the implemented practice from the soviet union, is widely spread in the prc (人民网, 2011). xi jinping’s strategy of “made in china 2025” differentiates itself from the five-year plan through addressing the international community, by setting the goal to close the gap, to reach the same quality level of production and towards the prc’s jubilee to enter the forefront of the existing great powers. it symbolises the accomplishment of the “rejuvenation” mission, the benchmark of the xi jinping era, and shows the way xi uses the factor of time to detach his rule from the previous generations, and with this showing that under his command the big shift towards the goal of the global leader has been set up. this could also symbolise the shift from deng xiaoping’s china to the new china of xi jinping. 5.3 shift in (geographical) space: east vs. west to become a global leader, a superpower needs to speak the “same language” with the rest of the international community, or at least with the important global players. however, after taking a leadership, nothing prevents the new hegemon to shape the existing discourse according to its needs, to guarantee sustainable growth of its influence in the region. for example, china is actively involved in shaping new consensuses in the asian region. xi jinping’s words at the “conference on interaction and confidence building measures in asia (cica) in 2014, emphasise this idea. he speaks about the need of establishing cooperative and sustainable security which will be guaranteed by development in the region. this statement of the prc, a key trade and investment partner in the region promotes china as the major provider of such development (heberer, 2015). at asean regional forum chinese official representatives and the vice foreign minister, liu zhenmin continue with this concept and are warning the participating member states from the foreign intervention to the regional disputes and processes, meaning the usa as the biggest troublemaker. moreover, he strengthens the positioning of china as the main responsible for stability and progress in the developing countries (heberer, 2015). in the book “global development politics and china’s program”(quanjiufazhanzhiliyuzhongguofangan 全球发展 治理与中国方案) it is stated that china is willing to be involved in the development programs globally and continue supporting on regions in need. chinese contribution to the african continent’s economic growth and continuous partnership relations is one of the chinese ways to lead global processes and to stay involved in the global governance (sun, 2018). it illustrates the peripheral diplomacy initiative of xi jinping and the chinese soft power in action. according to the official statements of xi’s administration in 2013, china’s periphery diplomacy aims to bring the prc development to these regions to keep stable and close relationship of cooperation in these areas (glaser and pal, 2013). on the global stage, suggested changes in the accepted western leadership paradigm could be seen through the chinese proposal to the united nations to accept a principle of responsible protection (rp). by reinterpreting the “responsibility to protect” (r2p)-unsc resolution 1973, which authorises military intervention for civilian protection purposes, ruanzonghe modifies the r2p approach www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 102 published by scholink inc. conceptby forcing to limit the legitimation for an intervention and to deal with the consequences of an armed mediation (ruan, 2012). the “responsible protection” was following the concept of “responsibility while protecting” previously suggested by brazil and widely supported by the western powers (garwood-govers, 2014). according to the r2p, if a state fails to stop “serious harm” to its population, a military intervention for humanitarian purposes will be executed by the un security council (unsc). r2p does not belong to the customary international law, but is a multi-faceted political concept based on the existing principles (garwood-govers, 2014). since the r2p is not a custom, updates and proposals from the unsc member states could, in theory, change the implementation of the concept without creating any additional legal duties for international players. chinese proposal of a new formulation and different interpretation of the conditions to the intervention and responsibility related to the consequences of an armed involvement, shows its intention to shift the focus of the international normative discourse from the western dominance towards the eastern (chinese). in closer look, chinese rp still recognises the need for non-consensual military interventions under the r2p, although more restrictive conditions must be applied (garwood-govers, 2014). this way, the prc represents a non-western responsible leadership which raises the non-western normative narratives onuse of power and state’s sovereignty. the rp principle does not contradict the “non-interference” concept, due to the reactive (instead of the proactive) nature of the proposed protection. however, it allows china to spread the message of its responsible leadership and action within the international community. in this way, the prc protects its positions in theareas of interest and positions itself as a reliable partner. after mass crimes against humanity in the 1990s, like in rwanda, kosovo and other geographies, unstableregions are mostly counted as developing and might include the bri infrastructure or other investment and strategical assets of the prc. the rp is not only a positive message towards the sovereignty of these states, but also a promise to minimize the negative consequences if an intervention still will be enforced (ruan, 2012). three years after the responsible protection was suggested by ruan zhonghe and a year after the analysis of andrew grarwood-govers, an article of oliver stuenkel from the getulio vargas foundation (fgv) in sao paolo summed up both sources. according to stuenkel, chinese proposal of the rp as a reaction on syria-related resolutions is not a new normative “normal”, but rather a pragmatic strategic decision (stuenkel, 2015). the prc is a permanent member of the united nations security council and qualified to take part in the future military interventions on the un behalf. under these circumstances, the chinese proposal, even if it will not be fully ratified and supported, is welcomed as an opportunity to engage with an actor that will play a key role in mass crimes prevention in the future (stuenkel, 2015). moreover, the chinese rp approach appeases the neighbouring states feeling threatened by china’s assertive rise (thakur, 2013). chinese positioning on the international stage as a responsible stakeholder in the global order and its’ claims for the “new model of the superpower relations” show a strategy for sharing perception of china as a global leading superpower. it can be concluded that china expands its peripheral diplomacy to other regions, such as sub-saharan www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 103 published by scholink inc. africa, which historically has a developed infrastructure of relationship with china through south-south cooperation, supports the progress of the relationship and helps to reach the political goals faster. based on previous discussion, it can be assumed that china adopts the new paradigm of global leader also in the chinese-african relations. the affective space of the “non-interference” principle plays a critical role in these relations. due to the internal political processes in each of the sub-saharan countries, the “noninterference principle” does not lose its relevance. first, it refers to the history of the chinese support in the decolonisation period and guarantees chinese neutrality to the internal political processes. from the second half of the 20th century the west has tried to trade in different “development packages” which has been connected to political reforms and internal changes, whereas china has proven itself to be loyal to its own diplomatic principles. second, the “non-interference” principle does not contradict the international law and the un charter principles, which does not put african countries in front of the hard choice between eastern and western sides. third, the principle allows a broad variety of interpretations and pragmatically fits to the modern political discourse. it is applicable in diplomatic issues as it can be seen in “responsible protection”. based on these conditions, the new affective space is ready to include the idea of the chinese global leadership, because it avoids touching the pain points of the counterparts. in combination with the “principle of non-interference” in particular and the “five principles of peaceful co-existence” in general, the idea of chinese leadership in south-south cooperation countries is a serious competitor to the structural adjustment of the west. it could explain the relative success of the chinese strategic programs and initiatives to be welcomed on the african continent. 6. adapting of the chinese nationalist discourse in the sub-saharan region one of the prominent examples of the affective space’s soft power in the chinese-african diplomacy is the official documents of the forum on china-africa cooperation, focac. in the focac rhetoric the growing strength of china as a regional leader can be clearly demonstrated. the latest mutual declaration officially states the leadership status of china through emphasizing the agreed african support on the major chinese needs: “one china” policy and the “belt and road initiative” (mfa, beijing declaration-toward an even stronger china-africa community with a shared future, 2018). paragraph1.4 declares: the two sides believe that china is the largest developing country and is working hard to realize the “two (times) hundred years” of struggle goal and realize the chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the chinese nation (shixianzhonghuaminzuweidafuxing de zhongguomeng 实现中华民族伟大复兴 的中国梦)... the two sides will take the opportunity of jointly building the “belt and road” (shuangfang jiang yigongjian “yidaiyilu” 双方将以共建“一带一路”) to strengthen all-round, wide-area and in-depth cooperation to achieve win-win cooperation and common development” (focac, 2018). in the same declaration, the 53 focac african members (note 2) declare in the paragraph 8: we agree www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 104 published by scholink inc. to continue to give each other firm support in upholding territorial integrity, sovereignty, security and development interests. african members of focac reaffirm their commitment to the one-china principle, and their support for china's reunification and china's efforts in resolving territorial and maritime disputes peacefully through friendly consultation and negotiation” (focac, 2018). on its behalf, china reaffirms its commitment for growing friendship and cooperation with all african countries and sharing with them its development opportunities. china reiterates its firm commitment to the principle of non-interference in others' internal affairs and supports african countries in independently exploring development paths suited to their national conditions. (focac, 2018). in the prc’s documentary “china-africa cooperation: new era” (zhong feihezuoxinshidaizhuanti pian 中非合作新时代专题片) broadcasted in chinese without translation in 2018, both the off-screen voice and the interviewed african decision-makers speak using same paradigms as stated in the cpc official documents. the five parts of the film repeatedly raise the following issues: friendship, partnership, chinese-african brotherhood, chinese role modelling and guidance for the focac members, win-win cooperation as well as of “united china” (cctv-12018). since the documentary was produced in chinese and not in english language, it indicates the target audience for the message of such a television documentary project. the so-called chinese community as defined by the authorities needed to get the feeling of the chinese high status of a super nation and leadership position among the partnering countries. it provides legitimisation to the regime and its policy, as well as nourishes the existing pragmatic discourse of the chinese new model of global governance. the film serves as internal motivation for different chinese speaking groups, living in china, in taiwan, in african countries and other communities world-wide. according to the overseas community affairs council of republic of china (taiwan) report, in 2018 in africa there were 1,106,000 chinese expatriates out of the total number of 48,690,000 chinese living abroad. taiwanese emigrants in africa according to the ocac source have been reported in total of 10 000 persons (ocac, 2019). the african continent experiences during the last 30 years chinese presence and is involved in diverse chinese national projects. due to the african complex geopolitics, the prc is urged to lead simultaneously bilateral and multilateral relations with the african countries. the forum on china-africa cooperation serves as platform to reach global decision regarding the whole region and to achieve legitimation of the chinese strategic goals and almost unanimous agreement of the focac members to the major chinese insistences, such as “one china” and “belt and road”. african agreement with the chinese rhetoric is not only a symbolic gesture, it is an obligation to accept the chinese new model of global order, since the “belt and road initiative” is a long-term project with variety of components and applications. to change the political course towards closer relationship with taiwan or even the united states, the current rival of china, might be a challenging issue for the african states. the dependence on the chinese aid, investment and infrastructure is constantly growing and threats political flexibility of the region. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 105 published by scholink inc. in parallel, positive narratives are feeding the chinese discourse and trying to penetrate other affective spaces which share with the mainland china historical, cultural and linguistic background. the two-sided approach of the prc to invest into the internal discourse as well as into the external one strengthens the legitimation of the contemporary chinese foreign policy and supports the long-term perspective of the global leadership. 7. conclusion chinese economic reforms initiated by deng xiaoping have given china the necessary push for the development and growth of the domestic economy. the people’s republic of china under xi jinping claims, that the originally planned transformation is completed, and china is ready for achieving new goals, such as peripherical and, later, global dominance, leadership in manufacturing and technology and probably even the moral benchmark. the prc presents a new model of global order with its active position as the super nation. china is interested to advertise itself and to spread its values and legacy. understanding the balance of power created during the 20th century on the global arena, china does not neglect the need to form its messages in the way they will be conventionally translated to english, however, the main message is hidden in the origins. the existing theories of the international relations are usually based on the western political thought and cannot be a univocal approach to analyse china’s foreign policy and political strategies. therefore, additional attention should be given to china’s political tradition and practice. moreover, during the last decades the ideas of “soft power” and “political discourse” as strategic tools have gained power. hence, the classical paradigms and their reincarnations along the twentieth century are not explaining the complexity of the xi jinping era. a theoretical framework, which could include rational and pragmatic political consideration with soft tools such as discourse and narrative is requested. this article favours the neo-classical realism for analysing china’s transformation. according to this theory of gideon rose, the diplomacy is led by political actors and elites and their perception of the material power and foreign relations influence the decision-making process. in other words, chinese current behaviour inthe international arena is the direct illustration of the political thought of xi jinping. in order to understand the main principles and the vision of the prc under xi, his principles of diplomacy have been analysed. the ten insistences on the diplomatic thought have revealed important nuances which are mostly hidden in the original chinese text. “the belt and road initiative”, the “one china” principle as well as indisputable leadership of the communist party of china not only in mainland china but also potentially in taiwan are the main principles of the chinese foreign policy. nevertheless, specific usage of same chinese words has caused a deeper analysis in other official texts to understand the way the message is constructed and to whom it can be potentially addressed. the nuanced study of the chinese rhetoric needed a deeper understanding, which discourse these www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 106 published by scholink inc. narratives are occupying and in which way they are affecting the target audience. based on the theoretical discussion on discourse, rhetoric and space, it was concluded that the affectivity is reached through a pragmatic space construction, which includes the necessary political discourse. regarding zhao, the chinese discourse went through three main stages: nativism, anti-traditionalism and pragmatism. therefore, the rhetoric of xi jinping and his administration could be perceived as a neo-pragmatic approach, which includes all these elements. therefore, spread narratives address all sorts of public, the adherents of nativism and anti-traditionalism and those, who are strongly supporting the western political thought. chinese political discourse is a sort of transformer, which reveals new sides during the analysis. all this is valid also in the english translation. the chosen original wording answers the requirements of the western political thought and do not provoke too much resistance. the strong critics towards the “made in china 2025” policy in 2018 has caused “lower profile” of the strategy (mai, 2018), however, has not cancelled it or changed the main goals. since the chinese interests already exist in the discourse, they are repeated in a different formulation in other official policies. the affective space of the xi jinping’s era is not addressing only the chinese speaking world, it is simultaneously appealing regional partners and international actors. it includes also the three shifts which symbolise an attempt to trigger a new global order. “shift in position” presents the global audience a new alternative regional and then global leader. in contrary to the american dominance, china suggests guidance, collaboration with mutual benefits and growth, which involves both sides. “shift in time” stresses the concrete steps for achieving the “china’s dream” of rejuvenation. xi jinping uses time to distinguish the present and the coming future from the past and draws the line between the previous periods of chinese political history and his rule. nevertheless, it is done in the style of the for this purpose constructed space, with the full respect to the heritage. “shift in space” shows the gradual process of the growing chinese influence on the global governance and order. china is interested to also become a moral benchmark and leader. the traces of this interest are seen in the chinese activism in the un discussions regarding the principle “responsible to protect”.this shift is the most complex, due to its multiple consequences and might be never completed. nevertheless, the attempts to shift the focus of the global order from the west to the east will bring value. the developing regions which are directly depending on the international institutions will perceive china according to its statements and actions. based on the american example of the global leadership, an interference into the internal issues of states is one of the privileges of the super nation status. china can be suspected in the same approach after it will be recognised at least a regional leader. in order to reduce these suspicions, china suggests a new approach of responsible protection which does not contradict to the existing paradigm of non-interference and answers the needs of the “development of peace” approach towards african states. this soft power mechanism is recognisable in the language used in the official documents on african-chinese cooperation. the latest focac beijing action plan 2019-2021 speaks about chinese www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 107 published by scholink inc. “support” in solving numerous of issues, including guaranteeing security and establishing of the joint “china-africa peace and security forum” (mfa, forum on china-africa cooperation beijing action plan 2019-2021, 2018). the language used in the document refers to the meaning of the chinese 引导 principle, where china is defined as a leader, positively perceived by the counterpart. the article takes as a case study for the implementation of the chinese foreign policy the focac member states. the african continent is a unique case due to its growing dependency on chinese investment, loans, and aid. the focac implements the chinese political agenda in the cooperation framework and by this justifies chinese claims for “one china” and growing leadership. being connected to the rest of the world through numerous trade routes and supply chains and as a part of the belt and road initiative, the african continent becomes influential on the global stage. according to the peripheral diplomacy of china, the dominance ambitions might spread gradually, gaining new regions of influence. taking into consideration, that the 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(2000). “chinese nationalism and its international orientations”. political science quarterly, 115(1), 1-33. https://doi.org/10.2307/2658031 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 110 published by scholink inc. zhonghua renmin gongheguoguowuyuanxinwenbangongshi 中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室. (2000). “yi zhongguo de yuanzeyutaiwwanwenti” “一个中国的原则与台湾问题”. one china principle and taiwan’s question. http://www.china-un.ch/chn/zywjyjh/t172149.htm notes note 1. the flat earth society, official website https://www.tfes.org/ accessed: august 23, 2019. note 2. only one focac member state, swaziland (eswatini) didn’t sign the declaration due to its obligations and relations with taiwan. l. madowo, “taiwan’s last friend in africa”, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46831852 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 8 original paper power through culture: the gender paradigm in china’s soft power engagement in the global south govind kelkar1 & ritu agarwal2 1 executive director and professor, gendev centre for research and innovation, gurgaon, visiting professor, council for social development, new delhi, india govindklkr@gmail.com 2 ritu agarwal, associate professor, centre for east asian studies, school of international studies, jnu, new delhi, india ritu10agarwal@gmail.com received: july 14, 2023 accepted: september 13, 2023 online published: october 11, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n4p8 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n4p8 despite the growing scholarly interest in china as a global south power, two themes remain under investigated: one of the ways in which china has used soft power to project its comprehensive national capabilities and international power. another theme that is overlooked by the existing china scholarship is the issue of gender. the so-called “miracle” of china’s recent rise as an economic powerhouse has also been a highly gendered process about which millions of women within china and outside the home raised concerns about the task of stronger political policies and actions that can institute gender equality and non-discrimination for women and girls. soft power has played an important role in china’s international relations and the party-state legitimacy among the people in china in terms of improving national pride and demonstrating that the world outside china admires the chinese way of life—its social, economic institutions, cultural values, and the communist party of china’s (cpc) governance system. this study presents an analysis of the gender equality paradigm in china’s soft power engagement in the global south. a history of the cpc shows a consistent policy concern for women’s empowerment and gender equality, generally represented in the concept “women hold up half the sky”, and therefore entitled to their right to resources and equal position in society. since the 18th national congress the cpc, president xi jinping and the central committee committed to adhering the basic national policy of gender equality “as a code of conduct and value standard” for the entire society (china government network 2021:3) and advocated for women’s equal rights through strategic measures like participation in economic construction in the family and society, including “equal sharing of housework” and family responsibility such as care work (chinese government network, 2021:31). have these policy concerns for women’s empowerment been part of china’s structural system of soft power or part of china’s www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 9 published by scholink inc. negotiations with any country in asia? 1. china’s soft power at the meeting to celebrate the 95th anniversary of the founding of the communist party of china, president xi jinping emphasized four major principles in promoting china’s culture within the country and to the world outside china: 1) strengthen cultural consciousness and cultural confidence; 2) strengthen confidence in chinese values and actively spread these values; 3) strengthen confidence to create a cultural masterpiece and write a new epic of chinese nation; and 4) tell the china story well with confidence and build a good image of contemporary china (feng, 2016). these four principles represent china’s soft power or cultural soft power, a concept used in china over a decade ago. more recently, on march 15, 2023, president xi jinping in his keynote speech at “walk together on the road to modernization” at the high-level dialogue between the communist party of china and the world’s political parties, for the first time proposed “global civilization initiative”. he stated “the global civilization initiative calls on all civilizations to use smart or soft power, rather than hard power, to address challenges that threaten the world’s pluralistic democratic model. today, china is using its soft power to persuade the world to respect other civilizations’ different forms of democracy and their modernization paths and to uphold the principles of equality, mutual learning, dialogue, and inclusiveness” (guangming netguangming daily, 2023). china’s cultural soft power has both external and internal functions. externally, the cpc would like to spread the traditional chinese culture, establish china’s image as a powerful country, expand the circle of chinese friends, facilitate the process of understanding well china’s discourses on power in an international environment that promotes the construction of an community of shared future for humankind. internally the soft power was geared to build a socialist spiritual civilization, enhance the attractiveness and appeal of a socialist culture with chinese characteristics, improve the guidance of the party-state leadership and theoretical frameworks and enhance national cohesion with credibility of news and public opinion (http://www.zgjx.cn/2021-10/15/c_1310246096.htm). in his pioneering work on soft power (2004, 2011) joseph nye discusses two types of power. hard power is the ability to get others to act in ways that are contrary to their initial preferences and use strategies through coercion, threats, and inducements. unlike hard power, soft power is the ability to get “others to want the outcomes that you want” and “to achieve goals through attraction rather than coercion (nye, 2004, p. 5). nye identifies three key sources of soft power: culture, values, and foreign policy. china’s definition of soft power (ruan shihli…), however, emphasizes the cultural dimension; and combines traditional culture with ideology, history, morality, and economic governance. unlike nye’s concept of soft power, the chinese concept of soft power sees fluid boundaries between hard power (ying shili….) and soft power. china sees the two powers as symbiotic and mutually empowering and associated with political stability and social cohesion (repnikova, 2022, p. 52). the soft power concept as defined by china is interestingly a mix of confucious historical values with the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 10 published by scholink inc. pursuit towards modernization to realize the goals of prosperity and harmony around the world. it is about bringing confidence in china’s theoretical frameworks, cultural institutions, and socialism with chinese characteristics. in the report of the nineteenth national congress of the communist party of china, president xi jinping pointed out, “culture rejuvenates the country, and culture strengthens the nation. without a high degree of cultural confidence and cultural prosperity, there will be no great rejuvenation of the chinese nation (http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0704/c40531-31212375.htm). the main idea was that if china’s material capabilities have to make a good appeal to the world, it has to be combined with “telling china story well” through public media, news channels, televisions, public magazines, and expos and olympic games which china has been hosting in the last decade. the focus was on how to generate positive discourse about china, its development advantages and china’s comprehensive strength is to be converted into external and internal discourse advantages. (https://www.sohu.com/a/273654768_775072) in the confucius theory, abundant wealth is the material foundation of a strong country, and the primary goal of national governance is to be rich. confucius always very consciously combined the development of national hard power and the development of cultural soft power when discussing the way of governance, emphasizing that military strength must be combined with literature, “rich” must be combined with “education” “sufficient food” and “foot soldiers” must be combined with “people’s faith” (the analects of confucius, zi lu)·he paid attention to both hard power as the foundation of the country and soft power as the soul of the country. (http://scsv.tsinghuajournals.com/article/2017/2096-1189/101350d-2017-1-006.shtml) soft power plays an important role in china’s internal politics, in terms of improving the cpc’s legitimacy of the political system among the chinese people. “appealing to the national pride of chinese citizens by demonstrating that foreigners admire and are attracted to china” in many ways like governance and social, economic, and cultural systems (edney et al., 2020, p. 4). however, in china’s dealings with african countries there were stories about corruption, debt trap, unemployment, and exploitative colonial practices. nevertheless, pew research of 2018 showed favorable ratings for china in kenya, nigeria, and south africa. it is evident that china’s economic engagement through the belt and road initiative and the banking system have created a mix of administration and fear, now also a question of the sustainability of china’s economic growth model. daniel lynch’s analysis (2020) gives a detailed assessment of the current state of academic debate over soft power in china. he indicates that china’s global image has generally worsened over the past 10 years. chinese scholars blame the west for “tarnishing china’s reputation” (liu, 2017, p. 166); they do not question china’s soft power strategy. china’s scholars like liu maintain the position “if china does not manufacture its own national image, others will manufacture one for it” (liu, 2017, p. 163). that china’s historical values embedded in socialism are a civilizational power that has the capacity to challenge western norms (wang, 2016). the construction of china’s cultural soft power is a major strategic task of the prc; it is “formed at the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 11 published by scholink inc. centre” and “released outward” (xing yu zhong er fa yu wai). it means that soft power is formulated by the party-state in view of its cultural history, political system, and socio-economic development. this model of prc would be used to tell the outside world about chinese strength with its cultural values, “intertwining with economies and politics….. in the competition for comprehensive national power” (mingjiang, 2008, p. 2). 2. the gender paradigm at this point we would like to understand what policies and laws were formulated to reduce or end women’s historical inequality in china. did the party-state recognize women’s role in building a socialist, gender hierarchies and patriarchal cultural values “at the centre” and how they were “released” or conveyed through the cultural soft power to the outside world? • as early as 1948 the chinese communist party central committee decreed that when a family is taken as a unit for issuing land deeds, a note must be made upon them to the effect that men and women have equal rights to the land. following liberation in1949, new marriage laws reduced the male power of the family by providing for choice of partners, monogamy, equal partnership in raising children and by changing patterns of inheritance and custody of children in favour of women. the agrarian reform law gave women the right to hold land in their own names (for details, see kelkar, 1990). the implementation of these laws, however, was followed by numerous cases of women suicides and murders. • in the great leap forward in 1958, women were encouraged to join labour force as part of agricultural collectivization. stacey (1983, p. 214) noted that “there were estimates of 4,980,000 nurseries and kindergartens and more than 3,600,000 dining halls were set up in rural areas by 1959”. however, these lasted only a few years following local male demands for “hot and cooked food at home”. • a nationwide campaign in the mid-seventies 1970s for 1) more equal work point ratings, including redefining “equal work” as work of comparable value rather than the same work; 2) men should be willing to share household work and childcare responsibility; and 3) promotion of matrilocal marriages and questioning of patrilocality as a source of gender inequality embedded in traditional marriage practices and family structures (soong ching-ling in renmin ribao, 1972; kelkar, 1990, p. 124). • women experienced rapid progress in gender equality during the decade of the cultural revolution (1966-1976), using men as the yardstick: “whatever men can do, women can do too”. however, there is evidence that women still suffered a low status in the ultra-left movement of the cultural revolution (wang, 1995). • in the mid-1980seighties, several professional women’s organizations, with support from all china women’s federation and women’s committees in trade unions, protested changes brought about by the household responsibility system and demanded gender egalitarian relations in the economic www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 12 published by scholink inc. distribution system (kelkar, 1985; nolan, 1983, shandong women’s federation, 1986). chinese women rejected the policy suggestions that asked them to rearrange their time to attend to both housework and contracted work, whether in agriculture or side-line production. criticizing the traditional morality that “a woman should be a virtuous wife and good mother”, women suggested to the policymakers that if men assumed more responsibility for housework, women would become more equal within their families as well as in society (kelkar, 1990, p. 131). • the 2005 law on protecting women’s rights and interests stipulated women have equal rights in the household responsibility system of land, and that women’s access and control overland must be guaranteed irrespective of their civil status (wang, 2013; zhang et al., 2015). throughout the period of revolutionary reconstruction in china, women individually and collectively struggled for their right to resources and an equal place in decision-making. for example, a popular song in rural china during the land reform period in the 1950s was: your place is by the stove, i forbid you to touch my land. but my name is on the title deed too…. we are equal now, you must give me my due or, shall we ask the court to decide?... nobody heeds your old rules today. source: the zhang river, 1949 in response to the male assumption of a “meek, weak and sweet wife” (xinmim, wanbao, 14 june 1985), several women asked men “to uphold traditional morality” and to become “virtuous husbands and good fathers”. critics of woman’s dependence on man and her inferior social existence declared: “a woman is not the moon. she need not depend on the light of others to shine”. they suggested that if men assumed more responsibility for housework, women would become equal within their families as well as in society: one woman, determined to discuss women’s liberation with her husband, wrote: comrade husband do not overlook the attitude of men towards housework... since you know that the liberation of women is a yardstick of the general liberation of a society, then get moving and do some housework; at least reduce your dependence (on your wife). the family is the cell of society. if only equality between men and women can be achieved within each cell, then the day when women will be liberated will soon follow.” source: women of china, 07 july, 1984. in 2016, the first women’s forum of countries along the silk road, (hosted by xinjiang women’s federation) discussed the needed opportunities for women in three areas: women’s development space; women’s leadership and economic benefits; and women’s entrepreneurship and employment. in the following year in 2017 at a forum called “women hold up half the sky” in public diplomacy of the belt and road initiative at china-south asia women entrepreneurship round table in kunming, women demanded from the party-state to pay attention to “giving full play to women’s character and ability”; www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 13 published by scholink inc. increasing the women’s participation in belt and road diplomacy at all levels and promoting women’s activities in belt and road projects and in global governance for gender equality. at the shaanxi women’s research association, in comparing the world bank and china’s aid participants suggested that china should pay more attention to gender equality and awareness; that china should incorporate gender equality issues into of international development and its cooperative practices (china women’s daily 2021, negotiations 12 january). furthermore, in august 2022 at the women’s culture forum meeting, acwf vice chair, cai shumin said that the forum “will further promote solidarity and cooperation among women from all over the world, and contribute to improving people’s wellbeing, promoting civilization and progress and achieving common development” (xinhua, 2022, august, 2016). china’s experience suggests that it is unrealistic to expect that women’s liberation will automatically follow the establishment of a socialist system. rather, it suggests that women’s struggles to resolve gender-specific problems and to rectify the neglect of the analysis of women’s position in economic development will continue as long as there is a tendency to belittle the woman question. did these examples of women’s concern for gender-egalitarian relations form part of the prc’s soft power negotiations in constructing multilateral and bilateral relations? at the global level, china has signed the un convention on elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (cedaw) and the beijing platform of action at the 1995 un beijing conference. president xi jinping pledged usd 10 million to un women for their work on peace and development. importantly, china has successfully promoted itself through the election of its staff to key roles in the united nations and many inter-governmental bodies. this implicit power manifests itself in china’s participation and presence in every meeting and attending every speech. china’s role in multinational and national platforms is consistent with gender equality because prc leadership sees this “discourse power” as crucial to its international power (palmer, 2023). also, china has signed the un sustainable development goals (sdgs) with attention to gender equality, women’s reproductive health and freedom to express sexual and gender identity. china has pledged to support women and girls from developing countries in the provision of health care, vocational training, financing for education and other assistance (center for emerging worlds, 2019). reportedly, china women’s university has established a training and research centre for women from developing countries. in nepal, acwf, and beijing started various capacity-building programmes for women by promoting entrepreneurship and employment generation schemes. as part of this collaboration, the national women’s association of nepal started a radio project aimed at enhancing women’s capacity building in rural areas. in his speech in october 2020 at the high level meeting of the 25th anniversary of the fourth world conference on women (beijing+25), president xi jinping acknowledged the important role of women and announced the need for action: 1) to strive for genuine gender equality and create opportunities for women’s participation and decision making, to eliminate prejudice, discrimination, and violence www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 14 published by scholink inc. against women and to make gender equality a social norm and moral imperative for all; and 2) to enhance global cooperation in advancing women’s development to eliminate violence, discrimination, poverty and other old problems, and address new challenges such as bridging the gender digital divide and support greater representation of women in the un system. more recently, at the 20th national congress, of the communist party of china in october 2022, president xi jinping emphasized that: • the party-state will accelerate the development of china’s discourse and narrative system, better tell china story, make china’s voice heard and present a china that is credible, appealing, and respectable. • the party-state will remain committed to the fundamental national policy of gender equality and protect the lawful rights and interests of women and children. as we noted above, china has made commitments at several major international platforms for gender equality and women’s rights (e.g., cedaw, sdgs) and has a comprehensive “outline for the development of chinese women (2021-2030)” with the party and state guarantee “to adhering to the basic national policy of gender equality” and having a guiding ideology of “gender equality to become a code of conduct and value standard that the whole society follows…. and give full play to the role of “half the sky” of women in building a socialist modern country” (china government network 2021:3). in the following discussion, we intend to explore contents and commitments for gender equality and women’s empowerment in institutions to promote soft power. 3. culture as a national strategy of china since 2012, almost every major state event has a cultural content and a series of large-scale high-level foreign cultural events that were organized to showcase the essence of chinese culture. in november 2014, president xi jinping and the australian prime minister jointly attended the opening ceremony of the china cultural centre in sydney. in january 2016, president xi jinping, and egyptian president abdel fattah al-sisi jointly attended the opening ceremony of the chinaegypt cultural year. in june 2016, president xi, serbian president, prime minister, and all cabinet members jointly laid the foundation stone for the belgrade chinese cultural centre. since 2013, china has held five symposiums on “sinology and contemporary china” and 10 training programs for young sinologists, inviting 125 internationally influential sinologists and think tank scholars from 49 countries and 360 young scholars from 95 countries to china. (https://www.mct.gov.cn/preview/special/8323/8324/201710/t2017101393124.htm) as early as october 2005, at the fifth plenary session of the 16th central committee of the cpc, it was required to accelerate the implementation of the “going out” strategy of cultural products. in the following year, the outline of the national cultural development plan for the eleventh five-year plan period proposed to change the passive situation of a large-scale trade deficit in cultural products in china and actively promote the “going out” strategy. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 15 published by scholink inc. the sixth plenary session of the 17th central committee meeting acknowledged that more and more countries were interested in the improvement of cultural soft power as their development strategy. whosoever occupies the commanding heights of cultural development and possesses strong cultural soft power would be able to win in the fierce international competition. the central committee at this session formulated a “cultural proposition” with an explicitly stated intention to strengthen the direction of confucius institutes; they should be increased in numbers and play a greater role in promoting chinese culture globally and in building china a socialist cultural power (zhao, 2012). 4. confucius institutes towards the end of 2011, the confucius institute headquarters had established 400 confucius institutes in 108 countries. there are more than 500 confucius classrooms in primary and secondary schools, and nearly 20,000 overseas chinese teachers and volunteers were appointed. at the same time, a number of confucius institute overseas student scholarships were established. in 2018, president xi jinping pledged 50,000 chinese government scholarships and 50,000 new training opportunities at the forum on china-african cooperation. the main functions of confucius institutes and confucius classrooms included teaching chinese language and culture. they organized cultural events, like exhibitions, film screenings and talks on select topics. towards the end of june 2020, repnikova reported 541 confucius institutes and 1,170 confucius classrooms at the high school level in 162 countries (2022, p. 11). there were three functions of the confucius institutes 1) act as an instrument of china’s soft power (park, 2013, p. 2) function as an instrument of china’s cultural diplomacy (hartig, 2016); and 3) act as a propaganda project of the chinese leadership (sahlins, 2015). xiao defines the confucius institutes as a platform to promote china’s soft power (2017, p. 46). soon after the confucius institutes were set up, xu lin, the director-general of the confucius institutes headquarters described the confucius institutes as “the brightest trademark of china’s soft power” (xinhua, 2006). however, it was also printed out in the chinese scholarship, that most of the personnel employed to run the confucius institutes did not clearly see their role as the promoters of china’s soft power. nonetheless, confucius institutes were seen as having the potential power to influence people and engage their hearts and minds in china’s economic progress (nye, 2008). the teaching of language and culture was seen as the desire to benefit economically by speaking the chinese language (hartig, 2014). confucius institutes were reported to have made great strides at teaching the chinese language, and the chinese way of life, as well as at localizing teaching materials and creating diversified platforms. they were, however, questioned on the quality of teaching, outdated depiction of china, and for ignoring the local cultural contexts (zhang & lu, 2019). despite these challenges, the confucius institutes with their language teaching skills continued to be the high demand in many countries in the global south. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 16 published by scholink inc. 5. internationalization of education and cultural exchange at the turn of the 2000s the cpc geared itself to be an attractive international center for knowledge production and training of foreign students in china. from 1978 to 2018 the number of international students increased from 1236 to 1492 (hu shi, 2019). a great majority of students came from african countries but there were students who came from korea, thailand, pakistan, nepal, india, and the u.s. (zhao, 2019). the chinese language was the most popular subject, as reported by china’s ministry of education in its publications. the chinese government has also sponsored many short-term trainings, and fellowships for foreign journalists and visitors and introduced sponsored cultural exchange as a component of “people-to-people” diplomacy and soft power. the 2016 document the “opinion on work of the opening-up of education in the new era” that directed china’s educational opening up, stated its goal “to promote china’s development and accomplishments” to foreign students and teachers in china (ogunniran, 2020). one of the major objectives of china’s educational exchanges was to sensitize foreign students about the chinese worldview, chinese society, culture, language, history, and politics, and thereby formulate their own policies and structure of governance similar to that of china, like in the case of julius nyerere in tanzania. in addition to building foreign students’ awareness about the chinese way of life, there were also economic motivations behind the cpc first for internalization of education. monetary gains from self-funded international students presented an attractive opportunity to china’s ministry of education and many universities in china. in nepal, for instance, the chinese scholarship scheme was reported to be targeting individuals associated with governmental networks and scientific expertise centers that could help support china’s economic interest in nepal (jain, 2021). the party-state driven “made-in-china 2025”, a plan introduced in 2015 aimed to upgrade its manufacturing with advanced technologies and high-level foreign experts (the state council, 2015). the high-end foreign experts recruitment programme was launched with the stated objective to seek expertise in four key areas: strategic technologies and development; industrial skill innovations; social and ecological construction; and agricultural and rural revitalization (chinese ministry of science and technology, 2020). there is a mixed impact of the foreign students’ education and training in china. whereas many students and short-term visitors from developing countries returned from their sponsored visits with an appreciation of china and readiness to bring change in their countries in favor of china – their experience of hospitality and modernity, there were others, however, who questioned china’s fusion of culture and market logics, and critiqued, china’s quality of educational standards. a more complex issue was that of reports about racial discrimination, unequal care, and discriminatory access during the pandemic (lem, 2022; jain, 2021). these incidents did some damage to china’s soft power with african countries and in general with the global south. with the purpose of extending and expanding the soft power approach, china organized a range of spectacles, mega events such as the 2008 beijing olympics and the 2010 shanghai world expo as well www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 17 published by scholink inc. as a series of regional summits like the focac in 2018 with the african continent; china-central asia cooperation forum 2012 and china-celac forum with latin america and caribbean states in 2015. these summits, though involving huge expenses, were aimed at international audiences and participants to promote china’s political agenda in its international existence as a powerful country. for example, in 2010 yang jieche (then china’s foreign minister) stated that the shanghai was organized to promote china’s friendly cooperation with various countries and to demonstrate china’s accomplishments in sophisticated technology and chinese culture on par with the western countries (xinhua news agency, 2010). at the same time, chinese leadership used these events as domestic educational platforms, in the sense of conveying to chinese people national self-importance and china’s greatness of combining traditional cultural harmony with the modernity of technological development (hubbert, 2017). 6. conclusion: the marginality of gender factor during the revolutionary tenure of the cpc, one of the dominant policy concerns appeared to be women’s empowerment. however, these concerns were repeatedly met with a set of vexing challenges in governance, national and international. the revival of confucian ideology and its embeddedness in the soft power approach, as evident from the important role assigned to confucius institutes, seems to be the main barrier to the inclusivity of women empowerment and gender equality in china’s soft power. since the han dynasty (206 b.c.e.-219 c.e.), feminine virtues included obedience and loyalty. the most famous confucian code was “three obedience and four virtues” (san cong si de). this obedience required women to obey the father before marriage, obey the husband after marriage and obey the first son after the death of the husband. the four virtues were (sexual) morality, proper speech, modest manner, and diligent work. a woman was not required to be intelligent or clever. yang chen, a famous confucianist of the time, wrote, “if women are given work that requires contact with the outside, they will sow disorder and confusion throughout the empire” (qtd. in van gulik, 1971, p. 121). her role was confined to the household as a wife, mother, and daughter-in-law, while the man’s domain was essentially in the outside sphere and decision-making. admittedly some leading feminists in china questioned their practices and social norms that implicitly saw women as sexual objects, childbearing machines, and a servant of the entire family; not having an independent identity of their own (gao, 2003). all china women’s organization and feminist analyses in china have shown that these traditional values, beliefs, and attitudes result in shaping gender inequalities and unfreedoms of women in social, economic, and political relations. furthermore, they are seen as slow-moving institutions compared to policy and technological changes. the forces of these ideas, norms and practices in china are evident from two major factors: women’s marginal representation in the political decision-making organizations and the state institutional structures (e.g., only one-woman minister in the present-day prc), and 2) the inadequacy of women’s rights of productive resources within the family and society. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 18 published by scholink inc. for example, the national people’s congress has less than 25 per cent of women, and the global average for women’s representation in national parliaments is 25.9 per cent of women. in china, women earn less than 70 per cent of men’s earnings, and twice more time than men in carrying out household work (all china women’s federation, 2021). notwithstanding, the above analysis, there are two areas that potentially draw a silver line in china’s soft power approach: 1) chinese women’s movement and its feminist voices and relentless efforts to redefine confucianism with the inclusion of women’s rights in the confucian tenets (li yuning, 1992; batista, 2017) these voices through their flagship publication “women of china” urged the party-state to pay close attention to feminist’s visions for systemic change, (wang zheng, 2010); and 2) a global call for the implementation of sustainable development goals with attention to goal 5 (gender equality and women’s empowerment), as well as the world economic forum’s gender indexing. china, like any other major power in the global south, would not be in a position to ignore these national feminist critiques and international goals to which the prc has been a signatory. references all china women’s federation. 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(1949). the folk ballad “the zhanghe riverwas written by yuan zhangjing in the spring of 1949. it is about three women hoho, longling and jinying, who like many other women wished to marry someone they could love and live with. for selected songs from the zhanghe river’, see women of china, may 1984. thirty lectures on learning] lecture 18 (7): improving the country’s cultural soft power 学习三十讲】 第 十 八 讲 （ 七 ） ： 提 高 国 家 文 化 软 实 力 , https://www.sohu.com/a/273654768_775072#google_vignette. van, g. (1971). la vie sexuelle dans la chine ancienne. galimard wang, s. g. (1995). failure of charisma: the cultural revolution in wuhan (p. 345). hong kong: oxford university press. wang, y. (2016). the paradox of soft power and its chinese surpass [论软实力悖论及其中国超越]. (lun ruan shili bei lun qi zhongguo chao yue). wenhua ruanshili yanjiu, 1(2), 9-17. wang, y. x. (2013). “women’s land rights in china: an unpromising future.” in g. kelkar & m. krishnaraj (eds.), women, land and power in asia. new delhi: routledge india women of china. (1984). a play about chinese women. xiao, y. (2017). confucius institutes in the us: platform of promoting china’s soft power. global china, 3(1), 25-48. xinhua. (2006). “2006: kongzi xueyuan chengwei zhongguo ‘ruanshili’ de zui liang pingpai” [“2006: confucius institutes become the brightest trademark of china’s ‘soft power’,” xinhua online, january 1. http://news.xinhuanet.com/overseas/2007-01/01/content_5556842.htm xinhua news agency. (2010). xu, d. (1984). buneng “buneng zai weihu fuquan (the authority of husbands can no longer be defended). zhongquo funu (chinese women), 6, 19. zhang, q. f., & oya, j. y. (2015). bringing agriculture back in: the central place of agrarian change www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 21 published by scholink inc. in rural china studies. journal of agrarian change, 15(3), 229-313. zhang, c., & lu, m. (2019). the predicament and optimization of teaching chinese to speakers of other languages in confucius institute (kongzi xueyuan hanyu guoji jiaoyu de kunjing yu youhua fenxi). xiandai jiaoyu luncong, 230(6), 60-68. zhao, q. z. (2012). talks about the confucius institutes’ international language dissemination, allowing chinese culture to go out. retrieved from https://news.ruc.edu.cn/archives/31377 zhao, f. (2019). using quizizz to integrate fun multiplayer activity in the accounting classroom. international journal of higher education, 8(1). zheng, x. j (2017). the view of prosperity and strength in the analects and its revelations. research on socialist core values, 3(1), 46-54 zheng, w. (1997). “maoism, feminism, and the u.n. conference on women: women’s studies research in contemporary china.” journal of women’s history, 8, 126-152., https://doi.org/10.1353/jowh.2010.0239 zheng, w. (2010). creating a socialist feminist cultural front: “women of china” (1949-1966). the china quarterly, 204, 827-849. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 24 original paper an empirical study on information seeking anxiety and influence factors of the chinese residents chao li1* 1 tiangong university, tianjin 300387, china * chao li, tiangong university, tianjin 300387, china received: october 29, 2023 accepted: february 09, 2024 online published: february 21, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n1p24 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n1p24 abstract with the development of technology and the exponential growth of information, information seeking anxiety has been demonstrated as a fundamental, ubiquitous and persistent psychological characteristic. this feeling has caused different cognitive, affective and behavioral effects in information users, which has been identified as one of the biggest impediments to successful completion of information tasks. this paper aims at assessing individual’s emotional experience and its causes in the information seeking process and evaluate the relationship between information seeking anxiety and information task. additionally, the paper also provides empirical support for public information services and information literacy education. keywords information seeking anxiety, information seeking behavior, questionnaire survey 1. introduction the development of the internet has provided us with unprecedented amounts of information. nevertheless, most internet information is not reliable, and the amount of information far exceeds our cognitive abilities. assessment departments of traditional knowledge or new institutions of information management cannot solve the dilemma of information overload and information overflow perfectly. prior studies have represented that information users experience anxiety and fear when searching for information (yang & asad, 2023). this anxiety has proved to be a fundamental, persistent, and ubiquitous characteristic of information seeking process. anxious information users often use less or poorer information resources, and even give up information search tasks. information seeking anxiety has become one of the biggest obstacles in the process of information search (pan & wang, 2023). information seeking anxiety also has an impact on people’s cognition, emotion and behavior. in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 25 published by scholink inc. extreme cases, information seeking anxiety can harm people’s physical health. therefore, a deep understanding of information seeking anxiety and its causes is helpful to support people to cope with information overload, improve the efficiency of information search tasks, and reduce people’s anxiety. “information anxiety” is a term first proposed by wurman (1989) in his book “information anxiety”. wurman defined information anxiety as “a black hole between data and knowledge”. the main cause of information anxiety can be attributed to “information uncertainty”. it refers to the phenomenon of “information overload” or “information scarcity” caused by bad information, invalid information organization, lack of awareness of the information environment, etc. when the uncertainty of information or people’s anxiety increase, information seekers either express “satisfaction” with fewer or poorer information resources, or give up information search tasks directly. in fact, anxiety has been regarded as one of the biggest obstacles to completing information tasks. reviewing the research related to information seeking anxiety, we have found that questionnaire survey was the main research method (song, ye, song, zhang, xu, & shen, 2023), and college students were the main population (shahnaz hadavi mohammad reza farhadpoor, 2021; sana & mumtaz, 2021). researchers developed the information seeking anxiety scale (isas) to measure feelings of anxiety in relation to information seeking tasks (muhammad asif naveed kanwal ameen, 2017). this scale divides isa into six dimensions: barriers associated with library, barriers with information resources, technological barriers, affective barriers, access barriers, internet & electronic resources barriers. they conducted a questionnaire survey on postgraduate students in malaysia. the survey found that 96.5% of the students had information seeking anxiety. postgraduates’ gender, learning stage, frequency of using the library were related to information seeking anxiety. researchers used isas to assess the information seeking anxiety of pakistani postgraduate students (muhammad asif naveed, 2016). their research found that the vast majority of respondents were dissatisfied during the information seeking process. students’ gender, learning stage, subject background, computer proficiency and research experience had a significant impact on information anxiety. cao & wang compiled the information anxiety scale (ias) for chinese residents (cao, wang, mei, & he, 2011). the study found that chinese college students’ information anxiety and its sub dimensions had significant differences in gender, education, discipline and place of origin. in the above-mentioned context, this study aims at assessing the psychological aspect of anxiety during the information search process. this survey aims at laying the foundation for further research on information seeking anxiety and provide theoretical support for information services and information literacy education. 2. research method this study used a questionnaire survey to measure the level of information seeking anxiety of chinese residents, and discussed the psychological barriers they faced when seeking for information. this paper aims at solving the following problems: (1) what is the actual situation of the respondents’ information www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 26 published by scholink inc. seeking anxiety? (2) do respondents exhibit varying degrees of information seeking anxiety? (3) is there a correlation between information seeking anxiety and demographic variables? 2.1 population and sample table 1. participants gender male female total 440 655 1095 age under 18 18-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 over 60 total 13 491 339 156 60 36 1095 the target population of this study was chinese residents regularly using online information. in this study, 1,095 chinese residents were surveyed by questionnaire. the sample data showed that the distribution of the respondents in different demographic and sociological characteristics was relatively uniform. in terms of gender, 40.2% were male and 59.8% were female. in terms of age, the group aged 18-30 accounted for 44.8%, the group aged 31-40 accounted for 31.0%, the group aged 51-60 accounted for 5.5%, the group over 60 accounted for 3.3%, and the group under 18 accounted for 1.2%. table 1 shows the details of the sample. 2.2 instruments the “information seeking anxiety” scale compiled by cheng (2014) was used in this study (cheng, cao, & lu, 2014). the development of the scale strictly followed the psychometric standards. the test results of the scale showed that the scale had good reliability and validity. all the items were measured by 5-point likert 5 scale, and were self-assessed by respondents. the answers represented the matching degree between items and respondents’ psychological description. a score of 1 indicated completely inconsistent with the feelings of respondents, and a score of 5 indicated full compliance with their feelings. the higher the respondent scored, the higher so was his level of information anxiety. the demographic variables such as sex, age, residence and education were also measured. the above variables were included as control variables. 1095 questionnaires were entered in spss for analysis. 2.3 statistical analysis table 2 showed the results of kmo and bartlett’s test. the value of kaiser-meyer-olkin was 0.907. the significance level of bartlett test of sphericity was 0.000. the above results showed that the data were suitable for the factor analysis. five effective factors were extracted by principal component analysis. the factors were: (1) cognitive characteristics and the knowledge structure; (2) information retrieval ability; (3) information utilization ability; (4) quality of retrieval systems; (5) ability to process foreign language information. the variance contribution rate of the five factors was 51.785%. the internal consistency of total scale and its factors was respectively 0.753, 0.831, 0.763, 0.753, 0.753, 0.772. the results of the reliability test indicated that the cronbach’s α coefficients of the factors www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 27 published by scholink inc. exceeded 0.7. the cronbach’s α coefficient of the scale exceeded 0.9, indicating a high level of internal consistency. table 2. the results of kmo and bartlett’s test kaiser-meyer-olkin measure of sampling adequacy. .907 bartlett’s test of sphericity approx. chi-square 9314.720 df 378 sig. 0.000 3. information anxiety prevalence averages were calculated for overall isas as well as its sub-dimensions to examine prevalence. higher average scores suggested higher anxiety levels seen in table 3 which exhibited descriptive statistics such as mean, median, mode, standard deviation, variance, minimum and maximum for over all isas and its sub-dimensions. table 3. descriptive statistical analysis of information seeking anxiety and its sub-dimensions dimensions mean median mode s.d. variance min. max. cognitive characteristics and knowledge structure 3.308 3.333 3.111 0.763 0.582 1.000 5.000 information query ability 2.384 2.333 2.167 0.661 0.436 1.000 5.000 information utilization ability 3.220 3.250 3.000 0.850 0.723 1.000 5.000 ability to process foreign language information 3.191 3.000 3.000 0.990 0.979 1.000 5.000 retrieval system quality 3.639 3.667 3.500 0.680 0.462 1.000 5.000 information anxiety 3.148 3.139 3.067 0.448 0.200 1.544 4.733 figure 1 displayed the mean score for the overall isas was 3.148, which was very close to the median of3.139, the standard deviation 0.448 with the minimum score 1.544 and maximum 4.733. the distribution of the mean closely resembled a normal curve. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 28 published by scholink inc. figure 1. histogram of mean value of information seeking anxiety information retrieval system quality: as depicted in table 2, the average score for the dimension “retrieval system quality” was the highest, accompanied by the highest level of anxiety. numerous issues arose in aspects such as the specialization of search engines, the updating speed of databases, the quality and quantity of information, access restrictions, and so on. these problems directly impacted users’ information retrieval and utilization, causing them emotional anxiety. cognitive characteristics and the knowledge structure: participants exhibited anxiety concerning the dimension of “cognitive characteristics and knowledge structure”. the mean value of this dimension was 3.308, which was higher than the median value of “3 points”. this suggested that individuals had inadequate information literacy and insufficient awareness during the information utilization process. their unbalanced knowledge structure also had a negative impact on information retrieval. more specifically, individuals might encounter challenges in expressing their information needs, judging the availability of information, identifying the quality of information, and evaluating their abilities. these challenges could lead to psychological imbalance and increased anxiety. information utilization ability: the mean value of the “information utilization ability” dimension was 3.220. a slight information seeking anxiety was also observed among individuals in this regard. the statistical results revealed that people’s ability to judge, distinguish, and utilize information was relatively weak. it was found that individuals struggled to handle the outcomes of information retrieval effectively and lacked the competence to summarize and obtain accurate information. foreign language information processing ability: the ability to process foreign language information is usually considered as one of the specific manifestations of the information retrieval ability. however, in this study, after exploratory factor analysis, this dimension was separated from the “information retrieval ability” and formed a new one. the average score of this dimension was 3.191, slightly higher than the middle value. most of the respondents had a low evaluation of their foreign language proficiency and lacked self-confidence. in the process of information retrieval, they couldn’t fully grasp the use of foreign language databases, nor could they accurately determine the relevant foreign language search terms. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 29 published by scholink inc. information query ability: the participants had a high self-evaluation of their “information query ability” and low anxiety. the mean value for this dimension was 2.384, which was lower than the middle value. the standard deviation was 0.661, which was relatively small, indicating a low degree of dispersion. the participants exhibited a high degree of homogeneity and possessed a proactive mindset. they demonstrated strong abilities in selecting retrieval paths, formulating retrieval strategies, and understanding information content. they were able to clearly express their information needs and conduct effective information retrieval. 4. influencing factors of information seeking anxiety previous studies suggested that information users might exhibit varying levels of information seeking anxiety by demographic factors such as age, gender, and education. this study further explored the influence of these variables on information seeking anxiety through the use of independent sample t-tests and anova. 4.1 sex and information seeking anxiety an independent sample t-test (two-tailed) was utilized for examining the mean differences in the index of overall “information seeking anxiety” scale (isas) and its sub-dimensions with regard to male (n=440) and female (n=655) participants. the running of a series of t-tests indicated that there was no significant difference in means scores of males and females for the sub-dimensions. the result aligned with girard’s findings, which also confirmed that gender had no significant influence on information anxiety. 4.2 age and information seeking anxiety an anova test was employed to examine the mean differences in the index of the overall scale (isas) and its sub-dimensions across different age groups. the data revealed significant disparities in three dimensions: “cognitive characteristics and knowledge structure” (f=2.774, p=0.017<0.05), “information utilization ability” (f=6.381, p=0.000<0.05), “retrieval system quality” (f=3.342, p=0.005<0.05) and ias within these age groups. the post-test results showed that the anxiety levels of individuals aged 60 and above were higher than those of other age groups. older people exhibited more anxiety concerning their ability to utilize information, their awareness of information, their knowledge structure, and the quality of retrieval systems. on the other hand, individuals aged 18-30 appeared to have a better experience during the process of information retrieval and utilization. 4.3 educational level and information seeking anxiety the education level was employed as the independent variable in one-way anova. significant differences were observed in “cognitive characteristics and knowledge structure” (f=3.458, p=0.008<0.05), “information utilization ability” (f=4.509, p=0.001<0.05), and “foreign language information processing ability” (f=9.499, p=0.000<0.05) among the participants with varying education levels. it was found that as the education level increased, the level of information seeking anxiety gradually decreased. the post-test results revealed that the anxiety level among the “graduate www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 30 published by scholink inc. degree and above” group was the lowest, displaying significant differences compared to the “high school and below” and “college degree” groups. 4.4 income level and information seeking anxiety the one-way anova was performed to test differences in averages of isa scores of participants for overall isa and its sub-dimensions in accordance with their level of income. since students have no income, 138 students samples were removed from the statistical analysis. the results indicated that the income level had a significant influence on the overall isas (f=3.567, p=0.003<0.05), “cognitive characteristics and knowledge structure” (f=3.285, p=0.006<0.05), and “foreign language information processing ability” (f=4.451, p=0.001<0.05). most low-income individuals experienced information anxiety, which was primarily focused on cognitive characteristics, the knowledge structure, and foreign language proficiency. there was no significant difference in information utilization, retrieval system quality compared to other income groups. 5. discussions this paper discussed the emotional experience of chinese residents during the process of information activities and the factors that influenced them. authors employed the isas scale to conduct a questionnaire survey, yielding the following findings. the descriptive statistical analysis of the mean value revealed that the respondents generally experienced anxiety. the average scores for the overall level and its sub-dimensions (except information query ability) exceeded the median value of “3”. the main sources of severe anxiety were identified as “information utilization ability”, “retrieval system quality”, and “foreign language information processing ability”. the inferential statistical analysis of t-test and anova revealed that age, the education level, and the income level were the predictors of isa. demographic characteristics such as being aged 18-30, holding a bachelor’s degree or higher, and having a monthly income of over 5000 yuan significantly mitigated participants’ information anxiety. gender, however, had no significant impact on information anxiety. previous studies have primarily focused on the isa experienced by students, particularly graduate students. this study, however, shifts its attention to the general public’s isa during various information activities. due to the varying occupations and living habits of the respondents, the professional level and other requirements for the information searching task also differs. this makes it more challenging to conduct extensive investigations. future research should aim at increasing the diversity of samples in terms of demographic characteristics, which will allow for more reliable conclusions and ensure that the measurement effects of the isas are applicable to a broader population. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 31 published by scholink inc. references cao, j. d., wang, c., mei, s. l., & he, w. (2011). information anxiety scale compilation and its raliability and validity test. library and information service, (2), 29. cheng, w. y., cao, j. d., & lu, s. y. (2014). revision of the information anxiety scale. intelligence science, (1), 64-67. muhammad asif naveed kanwal ameen. (2017). a cross-cultural evaluation of the psychometric properties of information seeking anxiety scale in pakistani environment. malaysian journal of library information science, (3), 35-51. https://doi.org/10.22452/mjlis.vol22no3.3 muhammad asif naveed. (2016). exploring information seeking anxiety among research students in pakistan. libri, (1), 73-82. pan, l. y., & wang, s. y. (2023). a study on the effect of information anxiety on online learning effectiveness of college students: the mediating role of self-efficacy and academic emotions. world journal of innovation and modern technology, (2), 16-20. sana, k., & mumtaz, a. a. m. a. n. (2021). prevalence and levels of information seeking anxiety among business students. library philosophy and practice, 1-13. shahnaz, h., & mohammad, r. f. (2021). relationship between information processing styles and information seeking behavior, with information anxiety as a moderator variable. libres: library and information science research electronic journal, (2), 119-129. song, z. m., ye, j. y., song, x. d., zhang, z., xu, p. y., & shen, h. m. (2023). development and psychometric properties of work information anxiety questionnaire. psychology research and behavior management, 4629-4646. https://doi.org/10.2147/prbm.s435356 xia, y., & khan, a. u. (2023). validity and reliability of factors causing information-seeking anxiety during information-seeking behaviors. collection and curation, (4), 128-136. https://doi.org/10.1108/cc-11-2022-0040 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 53 original paper the relationship between age and growth rate of wages and the gender wage gap in the financial sector in china kexin chen 1* 1 department of economics, huazhong university of science and technology, wuhan, china * kexin chen, e-mail: u202016385@hust.edu.cn received: february 18, 2023 accepted: march 20, 2023 online published: april 12, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n2p53 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n2p53 abstract using cgss data, this paper explores the relationship between age and wage growth rates in china’s financial sector by developing a fixed effects model. i find that the wage growth rate declines slowly with age, although the absolute value of wages has been rising. after a brief comparison of the financial sector, the information technology sector, and agriculture, i find that the pattern of their wage growth rates is similar, i.e., the wage growth rate declines slowly with age. then, through empirical tests, i find that a gender wage gap does exist in the finance industry and that the gender wage gap gradually increases with age. based on this, i further investigate the relationship between the age of female workers and the wage growth rate, and the possible reasons why the wages of female workers are lower than those of male workers. i find that the wage growth rate of female workers also gradually decreases as their age increases. moreover, having children has a significant negative effect on the wage growth rate, but the marital status does not. keywords fixed effects model, wage growth rate, gender wage gap, women’s wage, chinese financial sector 1. introduction with the accelerating development of science and economics, information technology and the financial industry have become two of the most popular industries in china. the number of listed companies in china’s financial industry was only 10 in 1990, but with the continuous development of reform and opening up, the financial industry developed rapidly, with 2063 listed companies in 2010 and 4154 in 2020. as of 2017, the scale of china’s online assets was nearly $3.5 trillion, and the cumulative transaction volume of online payment, online crowdfunding and online lending reached $70 trillion. as we all know, in the information technology industry, the market prefers creative young people, and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 54 published by scholink inc. they tend to be promoted and increased in salary fast. what about the financial industry? what is the relationship between age and the rate of a salary increase? it’s an interesting question. besides, there have been more and more complaints about gender discrimination in the financial industry and the issue of gender discrimination in the financial services industry has captured a lot of headlines in recent years. according to deloitte, as of june 2021, women held less than 6% of ceo positions within s&p 500 companies across all industries and just 4% of ceo positions within s&p 500 financial services institutions. is this true? if it is true, does gender discrimination against women get worse as they age? and what causes gender discrimination. in this paper, i explore the relationship between age and the growth rate of wages, that is, whether the increase in age is conducive to the increase of wages. then compare the results with the computer industry and the education industry. on this basis, i focus on the gender wage gap in gender discrimination and further examine whether there is a difference in the wage growth between male and female groups, and what is the difference. finally, i try to find the possible and reasonable reasons for the above research results. the main contributions and novelties of this article are as follows. it is well known that wages usually grow over the life cycle. but little attention has been paid to which age groups are seeing the fastest wage growth and why, especially in the financial industry. and there is a large literature on male–female wage differentials. however, most of them are based on wage level and very few focus on wage growth rate. thus, my study differs from the majority of previous work in this area because i focus on wage growth in the financial industry rather than absolute wage levels and try to find reasonable reasons to explain it, although i will also discuss age in relation to wages. additionally, while the most of chinese research on wages is macro, such as based on provincial panel data, i plan to use a micro data set called chip. in conclusion, this study contributes to a more scientific understanding of the wage growth rate and the current situation of the gender wage gap in china’s financial industry, and further analysis the sources of the gender wage gap, to provide a reference for the formulation of public policies to promote the equality and reasonable employment and wage of men and women in the labor market. i have developed hypotheses for how the provision will impact the dependent variables based on literature and economic theory. hypotheses are as follows: hypothesis 1: as age increases, the rate of wage growth gradually falls. hypothesis 2: there is a significant gender wage gap, and it becomes wider with age. hypothesis 3: children and marriage can negatively affect women’s wages. the remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. section 2 is the literature review of the previous work, section 3 is the description of data, section 4 describes models and empirical strategies, section 5 shows the results of regression models, section 6 checks robustness and discusses limitations, and section 7 is the conclusion. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 55 published by scholink inc. 2. review of literature as for age and wage growth rate, most researchers focus on life cycle wage growth. david lagakos (2018) researched how life cycle wage growth varies across countries, he found workers have more advantages in rich countries than in poor countries due to more accumulation of human capital or fewer search frictions. and there is a lot of research about factors contributing to the differences in life cycle wage growth. the canonical model of wage growth is the on-the-job model of human capital investment (e.g., ben-porath, 1967; becker, 1964). ronni pavan (2011) built a search model to distinguish the relative importance of various factors for generating wage growth over the life cycle. on the premise of the economic growth model, murphy (1989) studied the relationship between capitalists’ profits and workers’ wages, as well as capitalists’ savings rate and workers’ wages, and concluded that the higher the capital accumulation rate and profit rate, the lower the wage growth rate of workers. in order to show the importance of a certain factor in wage determination, chewei zhang and xinxin xue (2008) discussed the influence of ownership factors. xiuyan liu (2019) used market potential to explain wage differences. zewen yang and quanfa yang (2004) discussed the effect of foreign direct investment on wages. yuan zhang and jianqi chen (2018) discussed the wage effect of industry characteristics. there are also quite a few scholars who focus on the gender gap in the life cycle of wage growth. men and women have significantly different life cycle labor market outcomes, as sizable literature has documented (e.g., betrand et al. (2010), goldin (2014), adda et al. (2017)). hill (1979) was one of the first to examine the effect of motherhood on wage levels. she initially finds a 7% motherhood wage penalty for white women, but after controlling for productivity characteristics it nearly disappears. waldfogel’s (1998a, 1998b) findings suggest a motherhood wage penalty of 4.6% for the first child and 12.6% for two or more children. there is also a large literature on the motherhood penalty. additional papers to the ones discussed above include waldfogel (1997), lundberg and rose (2000), anderson et al. (2003), gangl and ziefle (2009), and pal and waldfogel (2014). besides of penalty of being a mother, there are some researches that reflect that a penalty appears to be associated only with being a woman. this is true not only in countries such as the u.s., where job interruptions and the associated wage penalties for women are common (bronson, 2015) but also in countries like china. wang meiyan (2005) adopted brown’s decomposition method and found that only 6.95% of the gender wage difference could be attributed to personal characteristics, while 93.05% was caused by discrimination. yuhao ge (2007) used the method of quantile decomposition to study the gender wage difference and found that women were at a disadvantage in terms of the distribution of years of experience and the rate of return on experience, while women were no worse than men in terms of the level of education and the rate of return on education. shi li et al. (2014) used the oaxaca-blinder decomposition method to decompose the dynamic changes in the gender wage gap by using the data of the chinese household income survey in 1995, 2002, and 2007, and found that during the period from 1995 to 2007. in particular, from 2002 to 2007, the gender wage gap in china’s www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 56 published by scholink inc. labor market widened significantly, with an increasing proportion of the unexplained part. 3. data 3.1 data source in this paper, i use data from the chinese general social survey (cgss), which is panel data. the chinese general social survey (cgss) was initiated in 2003 and is the earliest national, comprehensive, and continuous academic survey project in china. it is a micrograph of households and individuals, covering more than 10,000 households in 125 county-level units and 1000 village-level units, and followed every 1-2 years. so far, this survey has been conducted ten times. i choose data obtained from the last three surveys, 2013, 2015, and 2018, including 92077 subjects. because i study people who work in the financial industry, i reserve data on individuals who work in the financial sector, in addition to which i collect their personal information, including income, gender, year of birth, marital status, educational background, monthly working hours, and whether they have children. for comparison purposes, i also reserve the sample data from the information technology industry and the agriculture industry (the questionnaire used for cgss data collection combines agriculture, forestry, livestock, and fisheries into one industry, which is referred to as agriculture in this paper). so my final sample data includes 9023 data from the financial industry, 8015 data from the information technology industry, and 10,091 data from the education industry. 3.2 indicators and notations the explanatory variable in this paper is the rate of wage growth. the rate of wage growth is an important measure of an economy’s level of development and people’s living standards. considering that this paper studies the rate of wage growth rather than the absolute value of wages, the logarithm of wages is taken as the explanatory variable. since only annual income is available in the original data, so i use annual income to approximate annual wage income. there are many factors affecting wages, after referring to a large amount of literature, this paper decides to select the following indicators as control variables: working hours (wh), which is the total number of working hours per month, including overtime hours, to measure the degree of individual hard work; education level (edu), which is expressed by the number of years of education, i.e., 6 years of elementary school, 9 years of middle school, 12 years of high school, 15 years of college, and 16 years of undergraduate and bachelor’s degree is 16 years. age is the central explanatory variable throughout the paper. when exploring whether there is a gender wage gap, the core explanatory variables are age and gender. and when exploring the causes of the gender wage gap, the core explanatory variables are marital status and children. in the original data, marriages are divided into six statuses (first marriage, remarriage, cohabitation, divorce, widowhood, and unmarried). to simplify the model, i consider first marriage, remarriage, cohabitation, divorce, and widowhood as married. the key mathematical notations used in this paper are listed in table 1. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 57 published by scholink inc. table 1. notations used in this paper symbol description ln_w ln(wage): logarithm of annual income gen gender: defined as a dummy variable, female=1, male=0 age individual’s age mar marital status: defined as a dummy variable, married=1, unmarried=0 edu years of schooling wh working hours : hours on working per month, including overtime child defined as a dummy variable, have children=1, no children=0 3.3 preliminary data analysis table 2. summary statistics variable obs mean std. dev. min max gen 9023 0.5465632 0.4981033 0 1 age 9023 43.34146 10.60275 23 80 mar 9023 0.7572062 0.4290093 0 1 edu 9023 14.36364 2.318509 6 18 wh 9023 184.3692 88.59246 -1980 480 wage 9023 71723.13 79392.35 -99 1000000 child 9023 0.7028825 0.4572423 0 1 figure 1. scatter plot of data average retirement age www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 58 published by scholink inc. note. the preliminary optimal fitting result is y = -0.0012x2 + 0.1171x + 8.2327. according to the 2012 and 2014 “china labor force dynamics survey” conducted by the social science research center of sun yat-sen university, the average retirement age in china over the past decade has been around 53 years. figure 2. wage gap between men and women note. the preliminary optimal fitting result of female data is y=-0.0009x 2 +0.0831x+8.9473. the preliminary optimal fitting result of male data is y = -0.0018x2 + 0.1717x + 7.1263. according to the 2012 and 2014 “china labor force dynamics survey” conducted by the social science research center of sun yat-sen university, the average retirement age in china over the past decade has been around 53 years. table 2 displays observations, mean, standard deviation, median, minimum and maximum values of each control and outcome variable. the scatter plot and the preliminary fit results in figure 1 shows that there is a nonlinear relationship between the rate of wage growth and age. from figure 2, we can see that in the financial industry, women have a slight gender advantage at the initial stage of employment, but men’s wages increase significantly faster than women’s and quickly surpass women’s wages, and there is a significant gender wage gap. moreover, the gender wage gap widens and then decreases with age. average retirement age www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 59 published by scholink inc. 4. empirical models and strategies 4.1 panel regression models (1) (2) (3) i use 3 panel regression models to complete my study. where ~ , ~ , ~ represent the regression coefficients to be solved, v represents individual heterogeneity and is white noise. model (1) is used to explore how age affects wages. if the coefficient and are significantly non-zero, it indicates that there is a significant relationship between age and the rate of wage growth, laying the groundwork for subsequent in-depth research. model (2) is used to investigate whether there is a gender wage gap and how the gender wage gap is related to age. if the coefficient β5 is significant, it indicates that there is a gender wage gap and there is a significant association with age, then the study can be continued to the next step. model (3) builds on models (1) and (2) to further explore the relationship between age and wages for the female group and the possible causes of the gender wage gap. the female group data for model (3) is derived from the data of model (1) (2). 4.2 empirical strategies 4.2.1 selecting models by using hausman test 1) establish the regression fix effect and random effect model, and conduct the hausman test. if the original hypothesis of the random utility model is rejected, the fix effect model will be adopted. 2) if the hausman test fails to reject the null hypothesis, the random effect regression is performed first, and then the lagrange multiplier (lm) test of breusch & pagan is performed. if the null hypothesis of pols regression is rejected (that is, the individual heterogeneity is assumed to be zero), the random effect regression will be used; otherwise, the pols regression will be used. in order to avoid the correlation between heterogeneous panels and sequences, the robust regression of modified covariance matrix was adopted in the regression. after conducting hausmann tests on these three models, i finally build three fixed effect panel models. 5. results the results reported in table 3 show that most of the regression coefficients pass the significance test at the 95% confidence level, indicating the correctness of the data and model selection in this paper. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 60 published by scholink inc. table 3. result of regression variables model (1) model (2) model (3) coefficient p value(p>z) coefficient p value(p>z) coefficient p value(p>z) age 0.104 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.094 0.012 age 2 -0.001 0.000 \ \ -0.001 0.028 edu 0.141 0.000 0.144 0.000 0.152 0.000 wh 0.0006 0.033 0.001 0.088 0.000 0.192 gen \ \ -0.012 0.000 \ \ gen*age \ \ -0.003 0.004 \ \ child \ \ \ \ -0.223 0.010 mar \ \ \ \ -0.107 0.279 _con 6.092 0.000 7.960 0.000 6.415 0.000 5.1 model 1 from the result of model 1, we can see that age affects the wage growth rate. specifically, each unit increase in age will result in a wage change of (10.45-0.18 age) %, which means that as age grows, wages grow and the relationship between age increase and the growth rate of wages depends on the age of the individual. furthermore, α2=-0.001 indicates that with the increase of age, the wage increases but increase slower and slower. when a person reaches the age of 58, his salary reaches the highest level of his career, but he is likely to be retired by this time. remember that the average retirement age in china is 53, as i mentioned in the notes of figure 1 and figure 2. by the way, for the control variables, the coefficients of education level and working hours are both positive, indicating that they both favor wage growth. in summary, salary increases are fastest when you first enter the industry. as age increases, wages keep increasing, but the rate of increase decreases by a slight margin. the regression results are exactly in line with my hypothesis. comparing the financial industry with the it industry and agriculture, the results are shown in the figure below. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 61 published by scholink inc. figure 3. comparison chart of the three sectors note. the figure shows the best-fit curves for the three industries. the horizontal coordinate is age, the vertical coordinate is ln_w, and the marked point is the highest. agr represents agriculture, it represents the information technology industry, and finance represents the financial industry. all data are from cgss. the following findings can be obtained from the graph. 1) in terms of the absolute value of wages, the it industry is always ahead of the other two industries, regardless of the age stage. the wage level of the financial industry is similar to that of the it industry, but the wage level of agriculture is far behind that of the financial industry and the it industry. 2) from the viewpoint of the growth rate of wages, the growth rate of wages all gradually become slower in the rising stage of wages. 3) it is worth mentioning that if we take the average retirement age of 53 years as the reference, the wage in the financial industry is increasing throughout the career, although the wage growth rate is slowing down, while the wage in the it industry and agriculture is increasing first and then decreasing. wages in agriculture start to decline before the age of 40, and the rate of decline is obvious and declines faster and faster. i think the following reasons can explain these phenomena. 1) the difference in the total output value of the industry causes the difference in the absolute value of wages. in other words, the prosperity and development rate of the industry are closely related to the wages of the workers in the industry. since the reform and opening up, the center of gravity of the agr it finance www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 62 published by scholink inc. entire chinese economy has changed. at first manufacturing and utilities were strong, then the financial sector emerged, while technology-related industries have been the top performers. the financial sector has grown rapidly through the demand for real estate credit and national infrastructure investment credit, while the it sector has grown through the rise of the internet industry at the end of the last century and the beginning of the century, and so its income levels have risen rapidly. in addition, china’s weak agricultural base and irrational agricultural industry structure have contributed to the generally low wages of chinese farmers. according to the chinese national bureau of statistics, in 2020, the total agricultural output value will increase by 3.4%, while the it and financial industries will both increase by about 13%. 2) young people are in the prime of their lives, both physically and mentally, and usually retain enthusiasm for their work, especially when they first enter the industry. young people have more potential than middle-aged and older people, and there is more room for promotion and salary increases. so it’s easy to see why wages increase at the fastest rate when you’re young. 3) the three types of workers in these industries represent three types of workers experienced workers, brain workers, and manual workers. industries where experienced workers work, such as the financial industry, that have industry barriers. the industry barrier is experience. experience is accumulated over time and the number of operations. with the passage of time, this industry’s barriers are higher and higher, eventually forming an extremely strong irreplaceable, as warren buffett often said moat. of course, this does not mean that the industry does not require technical and mental labor, just that it pays more attention to experience. that’s why wages keep rising throughout a career. the work of brain workers is usually somewhat technical, but this technicality is easier to imitate. as they age, their mental and physical strength gradually declines and their skills become more and more replaceable, their income is likely to show a slow downward trend. the wages of manual laborers are often linked to the physical labor they put in, and as they age and their physical strength gradually declines, their wages are also likely to show a downward trend. of course, in real life, with the growth of age, it workers, such as programmers, their wages will not necessarily be reduced, but they are likely to face layoffs, forced to change careers, and other serious challenges. 5.2 model 2 from the regression results of model (2), all coefficients pass the significance test. the coefficient of gen is -0.012 and the coefficient of the interaction term of gen and age is 0.003, indicating that there is indeed a gender wage gap in the financial sector in china, where men’s wages are generally higher than women’s wages, and the wage gap slowly widens with a slight margin as age increases. after reading a lot of literature, i find some reasons that can contribute to the gender wage gap. 1) female pregnancy and childbirth bring pressure on business operations and affect business efficiency. china’s regulations on labor protection for female workers clearly state that female workers are www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 63 published by scholink inc. entitled to maternity leave of no less than 98 days, and unfortunately, miscarriages are also entitled to 15 or 42 days of maternity rest, depending on the circumstances. during this period, enterprises not only have to pay direct costs such as wages and filling job vacancies but also have to bear the indirect losses caused by the possible decline of work skills and lack of updated knowledge after returning to work after childbirth. in order to pursue higher efficiency goals, companies are reluctant to hire women or give them the same opportunities for promotion and salary increases as men. in addition, women’s pregnancy and breastfeeding will have a certain impact on the efficiency of work, and the double attack of family and work may also cause psychological pressure on female employees, which will have a certain impact on the effectiveness of enterprises and thus on their own wage increase rate. in recent years, with the legalization of three children, more and more women are choosing to have two or even three children. however, most women give birth to their second or third child at an age when they are in the prime promotion period of their career development. and the career interruption caused by the second or third childbirth will inevitably affect the staff planning of enterprises and thus they may miss the opportunity for promotion and salary increase. 2) the stereotypical constraints of traditional gender concepts. research shows that traditional gender concepts are one of the reasons why women are rejected in the workplace. the stereotype believes that men are more suitable to participate in social work in terms of physical strength, creativity, and adventurous spirit, while women are more suitable to engage in home production in terms of sensuality and carefulness, and married women will focus on their families and their work efficiency will be greatly reduced compared with that before marriage. in addition, because of the stereotype that women do not have the characteristics of managers such as “competitiveness and influence” when given the same opportunity for promotion, executives prefer men in leadership positions and women in other supporting positions. and this implicit selection bias makes women’s career paths more difficult. li lu (2016) and luo juan (2012) both point out that there is serious employment discrimination and gender discrimination in pay, and companies believe that male workers create more revenue than women, so they tend to pay men more for their work. these reasons make it far more difficult for women to get promotions and wage increases in the financial sector workplace than men. over time, the wage gap with men has become larger and larger. so the gender wage gap slowly becomes larger as workers get older. in model 3, i focus on verifying whether children and marital status are the cause of the gender wage gap. 5.2 model 3 from the regression results of model (3), the regression coefficients of age, age*age, and child all pass the significance test at 95% confidence level, indicating that their coefficients are significantly not 0. this means that as age increases, the rate of wages increase for female workers also gradually decreases and having children will have a significant negative impact on their wages. as shown in the survey, the peak of women’s childbirth is concentrated in the age group of 23 to 40 years old, which is www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 64 published by scholink inc. also a critical period for women’s career development to enter the rising period. according to a survey conducted by wisdom associates, 33% of married women who are not pregnant say that their marital status significantly affects their chances of promotion in the workplace. therefore, since the opening of china’s “three-child” policy, women are more worried about their future career development due to childbirth issues. this confirms part of hypothesis 3. this confirms part of hypothesis 3. however, the coefficient of mar is insignificant, indicating that marital status does not have an effect on wages, which contradicts my hypothesis 3. this shows that it is just a stereotype that married women will focus on the family and work efficiency will be greatly reduced compared to before marriage. 6. robustness and limitations 6.1 robustness table 4. robustness test results variables model (1) model (2) model (3) coefficient p value(p>z) coefficient p value(p>z) coefficient p value(p>z) age 0.093 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.094 0.012 age 2 -0.001 0.000 \ \ -0.001 0.028 edu 0.128 0.000 0.130 0.000 0.152 0.000 wh 0.001 0.056 0.000 0.132 0.000 0.192 gen*age \ \ -0.004 0.003 \ \ child \ \ \ \ -0.223 0.010 mar \ \ \ \ 0.107 0.280 _con 6.623 0.000 8.379 0.000 6.308 0.000 in this section, i perform robustness tests by varying the econometric method. i use lsdv (least squares dummy variable method) to reconstruct three models that yield regression results as shown in the table below. in model 1, the coefficients of age and age 2 remain significant and the signs remain unchanged. in model 2, the sign and significance of the key variables don’t change, although the control variable wh changed from significant to insignificant. the results of model 3 also don’t change significantly. this indicates that the results of my study are robust. that’s fine as the purpose here is to check the robustness. 6.2 limitations in this paper, i have two major limitations. first, i use annual earnings to approximate annual wage , but annual earnings include wage income, dividends, social benefits, and so on, not just annual wage income. second, i only verify the effect of having children on women’s wages, but i do not examine in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 65 published by scholink inc. depth whether and how having different numbers of children affects women’s wages differently. 7. conclusion this paper uses the cgss data to explore the relationship between age and the growth rate of wages in the chinese financial sector by building fix effect models. i find that the rate of wage growth decreases slowly with age, although the absolute value of wages is always increasing. a simple comparison of the financial sector with the information technology sector and agriculture reveals a similar pattern regarding the growth rate of wages, with both wage growth rates declining slowly with age. then i find through empirical testing that there is indeed some gender discrimination in the finance industry, which can be reflected by the gender wage gap. moreover, the gender wage gap slowly becomes larger as age increases. based on this, i further studied the relationship between age and the wage growth rate of female group and the possible causes of lower wages for female workers than men and found that the wage growth rate of female workers gradually decreases with age. having children is indeed a serious penalty for the rate of wage growth, but a change in marital status does not have much effect, so having or not having children may be an important reason for the gender wage gap. in response to the gender discrimination phenomenon mentioned in this paper, i propose the following suggestions: first, improve the relevant laws in the labor market. through government policy protection, legal guidance, and effective supervision, we can protect women’s reasonable and legitimate rights and interests, and ensure that they receive proper treatment in the labor market. gradually reduce gender discrimination, and promote the effective use and reasonable allocation of labor resources. second, the government and enterprises should pay attention to the opportunities for women to improve their abilities, and appropriately increase the human capital investment of female employees to improve their core competitiveness. third, all industrial sectors, especially the non-state sector, must conscientiously implement relevant laws and regulations to effectively protect the legitimate rights and interests of the female labor force and ensure that women are treated appropriately in employment, salary, and promotion, so as to change the discriminatory mindset implicitly. references anderson, d. j., binder, m., & krause, k. (2002). the motherhood wage penalty: which mothers pay it and why? the american economic review, 92(2), 354-358. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282802320191606 anderson, d. j., binder, m., & krause, k. (2003). the motherhood wage penalty revisited: experience, heterogeneity, work effort, and work-schedule flexibility. industrial and labor relations review, 56(2), 273-294. https://doi.org/10.1177/001979390305600204 bronson, m. a. (2015). degrees are forever: marriage, educational investment, and lifecycle labor decisions of men and women. manuscript. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 66 published by scholink inc. zhang, c. e., & xue, x. x. (2008). wage differences and human capital contribution between the state-owned and non-state-owned sectors. economic research, 4, 2008. gangl, m., & ziefle, a. 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(1989). income distribution, market size, and industrialization. the quarterly journal of economics, 104(3), 537-564. https://doi.org/10.2307/2937810 pavan, r. (2011). career choice and wage growth. journal of labor economics, 29(3), 549-587. https://doi.org/10.1086/659346 waldfogel, j. (1997). the effect of children on women’s wages. american sociological review, 62(2), 209-217, 2657300. https://doi.org/10.2307/2657300 waldfogel, j. (1998a). the family gap for young women in the united states and britain: can maternity leave make a difference? journal of labor economics, 16(3), 505-545. https://doi.org/10.1086/209897 waldfogel, j. (1998b). understanding the “family gap” in pay for women with children. the journal of economic perspectives, 12(1), 137-156. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.12.1.137 zhang, y., & chen, j. q. (2018). opportunities and challenges of international labor cooperation under the “one belt and one road” initiative. international trade, 2018(5), 37-43, 50. ge, y. h. (2007). the effect of sectoral choice on the gender gap in wages: 1988-2001. journal of economics (quarterly), 6(2), 607-628. yang, z. w., & yang, q. f. (2004). the impact of fdi on the real wage level in china. world economy, 27(12), 41-48. microsoft word ape-v3n4-p19 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 19 original paper the beginning of agoral gatherings in poland and their macro-systemic political and economic consequences: events of lublin july 1980 adam biela1* 1 institute of psychology, the maria curie-skłodowska university at lublin, poland * adam biela, institute of psychology, the maria curie-skłodowska university at lublin, poland received: august 28, 2020 accepted: september 16, 2020 online published: september 23, 2020 doi:10.22158/ape.v3n4p19 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v3n4p19 abstract the aim of this study is a psychological-historical analysis of the sequence of events in recent polish history, in which lublin july 1980 played a key role as a mental bridge between the first visit-pilgrimage of pope john paul ii to poland 2-9 june 1979, and the strikes of “solidarity”, which began in august 1980 and culminated in the signing of strike agreements with the authorities of the people’s republic of poland in gdańsk, szczecin and jastrzębie zdrój. we have shown that the behaviour of the participants of the strikes in state enterprises in the lublin region allows for their qualification as agoral gatherings, with their moral and cultural patterns rooted in the phenomena of psychosocial meetings between poles and pope john paul ii. we have shown that the events in lublin have become a field for the psychosocial exploration of democratic behaviours in striking factories—in the face of the power of the totalitarian system in the people’s republic of poland. in this way, lublin july 1980 became a link for social learning based on moral, patriotic and religious values—which led to “solidarity” strikes all over poland. these strikes were another link in the process of realization of self-determination of the polish people as a sovereign state. the power of agoral processes created by the “solidarity” movement in august 1980 did not manage to stifle any repressive tactics and strategies of the authorities of the totalitarian system, including the horrors of martial law in poland. the movement applied the principle of non-violence to overcome totalitarian violence, which collapsed like a proverbial “house of cards,” first in poland, and then throughout central and eastern europe. it led to peaceful change in the psychosocial, political and macroeconomic situation of countries such as poland, hungary, czechoslovakia, bulgaria, the gdr, romania, lithuania, latvia, estonia, russia and albania. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 20 published by scholink inc. keywords agoral gatherings, the lublin july 1980 strikes, john paul ii’s first pilgrimage to poland in 1979, maslow’s hierarchy of needs pyramid in the events of lublin july 1980, non-violent intentions of the participants of lublin strikes, peaceful collapse of the totalitarian communist system 1. introduction the aim of this study is a psychological-historical analysis of the sequence of events in recent polish history in which lublin july 1980 played a key role as a mental bridge between the first visit-pilgrimage of pope john paul ii to poland 2-9 june 1979 and the “solidarity” strikes which started in august 1980 in the baltic cities of gdańsk and szczecin and in upper silesia, and were crowned by the signing of strike agreements with the authorities of the people’s republic of poland in gdańsk, szczecin and jastrzębie zdrój. we indicate the psychological significance of strikes in the lublin region for the development of events in poland, especially in august 1980. to this end, we present the term agoral assembly, introduced for the analysis of the psychosocial phenomenon of mass meetings with pope john paul ii, and then we prove that the events of lublin july 1980 also had the character of agoral assemblies, which evaluated in the direction of the strikes of “solidarity” in august 1980 (biela, 1989). we will try to prove that the events of lublin became a field of psychosocial exploration of the democratic behaviours of employees in their plants where they were employed—in the face of the power of the totalitarian system in the polish people’s republic in the lublin region. 2. the concept of agoral gathering the agoral gathering was proposed as an ideal concept type explaining the psychosocial phenomena accompanying the mass peaceful assemblies that took place during papal visits, followed by “solidarity” strikes and similar events that took place in the 1980s and 1990s in such european countries belonging to the bloc of the so-called socialist states as: poland, hungary, czechoslovakia, bulgaria, the gdr, romania, lithuania, latvia, estonia, russia and albania (note 2). as biela pointed out (2007, 2012, 2013), agora gatherings differ significantly from other phenomena known in social literature in the field of collective behaviour described by such terms as crowd, mass, public behaviour. the term agoral gathering is derived from the word agora, meaning a voluntary, mass, public gathering, inspired by some higher moral or social values, e.g., human dignity, truth, freedom, justice. biela (2013) points to seven conceptually expressed constitutive features for agoral gatherings: (1) the participants’ orientation towards higher values; (2) intentions of non-violence on the part of the participants themselves; (3) voluntary participation; (4) openness of the gathering; (5) mass scale of participation; (6) the participants’ experience of unity while being aware of the social importance of the gathering and the elimination of collective fears; (7) positive consequences of the gathering both on an individual and social scale. the literature on the subject mentions, among others, the following examples of agoral gatherings: the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 21 published by scholink inc. foreign visits of pope john paul ii (biela i tobacyk, 1987), non-violent marches of mahatma ghandi, peaceful marches of martin luther king, marches in defense of life, peaceful strikes of solidarity (biela, 2012), and more recently the people demand for social justice in israel that are interpreted as an agoral gathering (zysberg, 2018) or the peaceful street demonstrations of august and september 2020 in minsk and other belarusian cities. 3. the experience of anagoral gathering community and liberation from fear participation in agoral gatherings abounds in experiences, not just personal experiences, but also those of great social importance imbued with universal human, patriotic and national values, experienced as participation in changing the course of recent history. finding themselves in a situation of unprecedented mass scale, participants discovered its unique importance by becoming aware of the moral ideals of life, expectations and universal values that motivated so many people to come together. this allowed the participants to free themselves from fear and feel safe, to discover community and the unity of their desires. this was expressed, among others, in the statement: “i see here how many people think as i do.” it was a kind of collective catharsis. many of the participants coming to the assembly did not yet have clear articulations of their motives for participation. they only had an intuitive conviction of their values and ideals as their main motives. the agoral gathering created conditions where their intuitive feelings became clearer, more obvious, more authentic and more stable. the process leading to the articulation of social and moral ideals during an assembly is defined as an agoral clarification and verification of the value system. this could be recognized by the spontaneous reactions of the participants of the gathering at significant moments when they heard the semantic articulation of their expected values (e.g., the words “freedom,” “truth”—mentioned by john paul ii during his first visit to poland in 1979). 4. positive consequences of agoral gatherings the positive experiences of the participants of the agoral assembly not only had very valuable consequences for the individuals participating in this meeting, but were closely related to positive changes on a social scale. on the basis of psychological analysis of agoral experiences, the following features of the agoral processes themselves can be listed (biela, 2012): 1) the harmonious unity of emotional-motivational and cognitive processes during agora gatherings; 2) the communal nature of the agoral experience reaching a social depth, rooted in universal human needs; 3) the cumulative strength of collective processes and behaviours indicating the direction of positive changes and commonly accepted social aspirations; 4) deep roots of the agoral experiences and experiences in the individual and collective memory of the participants of these gatherings; 5) strong radiation of agoral processes to people who were not participants of the gathering. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 22 published by scholink inc. a significant effect of post-agoral processes is the extension of the range of experiences to people who, for various reasons, did not participate in an agoral gathering but are within the psychological range of its impact. this creates a plane that accelerates the pace and scale of social integration. as an example we can give the scope and pace of post-agoral processes after the first visit of john paul ii to poland, which took place from june 2 to 10, 1979. during the days of these agoral gatherings, which were attended directly by about 50% of the polish population, the participants became aware of the unity of their thoughts, feelings and beliefs on a national scale. the mass meeting with the pope and the general interest in his visit caused an increase in poles’ sense of internal freedom, sense of security and social integration between people from different professions, as well as an increase in the need for authentic thinking and acting. this undoubtedly contributed to the process of deepening the social and professional solidarity of polish workers, farmers and intelligentsia. this process resulted in the creation of the “solidarity” movement in july and august 1980. thanks to this movement, a bloodless revolution took place, as a wave of agoral gatherings first changed the political face of poland and then spread to other countries of the so-called soviet bloc, leading to the collapse of the totalitarian system in a peaceful manner in hungary and bulgaria (parchewa, 1992; dimitrova, 1996). examples of the impact of this wave of agoral gatherings were also the events of the “velvet revolution” in the czech republic and slovakia (hislope, 2004; ferjenčík, 2013; naništová, 2013). another example of agoral behaviour was the peaceful dismantling of the berlin wall, which led to the unification of two german states. similar agoral phenomena resulted in the formal collapse of the ussr and the creation of independent states from the former soviet union republics. these are further examples of post-agoral phenomena and the positive social consequences associated with them, like in the baltic republics of the former ussr (gaidys & tureikyte, 1996), and in albania (rama, 2020). 5. the wave of agoral gatherings that changed the face of poland the wave of agoral gatherings which changed the totalitarian face of poland and later the whole of central and eastern europe into a free and democratic region began on june 2, 1978 during pope john paul’s visit to victory square in warsaw, where over half a million participants gathered. agoral gatherings took place at the cites of the pope’s pilgrimage, where a specific climate of the gatherings was created in gniezno (associated with the cradle of the polish nation), częstochowa (a sacred place—the religious capital of poland), wa do wice (the pope’s hometown), oświęcim (a place of seriousness and remembrance—as the only place on the route of the visit, where no cheers were raised for the pope, in respect of the murdered), nowy targ (where the mountain landscape created an atmosphere of apotheosis of the beauty of the land and native nature); and finally, the cracovian agoral meetings, which culminated in the difficult to count 2–3 million agora at krakowskie błonia. the process of radiation of the experiences of the participants of these agoral gatherings led to the spread of the personal and territorial range of the effects of the agoral phenomena, which had several psychosocial effects: www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 23 published by scholink inc. 1) extraordinary acceleration of the process of social integration on the scale of the whole of poland involving people of different professions, social status, education levels and ages; 2) breaking down the barrier of fear in the individual and social dimension on which the foundations of the totalitarian system were based; 3) the social conviction on a more and more massive scale that since poles can gather together to articulate their common expectations and values, they will probably be able to achieve these expectations and values if they wish. 6. the events of lublin july 1980 as the case of agoral gatherings the first strikes which started in lublin july 1980 began in the state aviation company in świdnik at the faculty of mechanical processing on 8 july 1980, exactly 13 months after the departure of pope john paul ii from poland after the end of his first visit-pilgrimage, which mentally changed polish society. 6.1 a series of strikes from 8–25 july 1980 the direct cause of this strike was the increase in food prices, the inability to satisfy basic biological and physiological needs, i.e., those needs at the very basis of maslow’s hierarchy of needs pyramid (1987) including food, water, warmth and rest. workers were dissatisfied with their safety level at work, and safety also belongs to the basic needs in maslow’s pyramid. in addition, workers complained about the working conditions in their factory, pointing to the existence of privileged groups of citizens (note 3).the strike demands also included the elimination of privileges for these groups. their strike lasted until july 11, when a “stationary committee” (note 4) of employee crews signed an agreement with the director of the plant, as a representative of the state authority authorized to do so. this was probably the first written agreement concluded between the communist authorities and the strikers (note 5). it was also the first time in the history of the people’s republic of poland that the authorities began talks with the workers and did not use force against the protesters. under this agreement, all groups of workers received a pay rise and were paid an average salary for the period of protest. the lublin voivode also declared a better supply of food for the city. this was the first effective agreement between the authorities and striking workers in the polish people’s republic. this agreement was a significant signal that there was a possibility of dialogue with the state authorities. after 81 hours of a rotary strike, wsk świdnik employees returned to work. this strike actually initiated the solidarity era in poland. during the strike, strike activity spread to other factories in the lublin region, such as the one in the city of świdnik: 1) communication equipment factory in świdnik, 2) polmozbyt in lublin, 3) agricultural machinery factory “agromet” in lublin, 4) lubelskie zakłady naprawy samochodów in lublin, 5) repair and production plant of agricultural mechanization in lublin, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 24 published by scholink inc. 6) truck factory in lublin, 7) puławy nitrogen works in puławy, 8) “bogdanka” coal mine in łęczna, 9) ball bearings factory in kraśnik, 10) polish state railways lublin junction, 11) municipal transport company in lublin. it should be clearly emphasized that the lublin daily press did not inform the public about the lublin region strikes at all, despite the fact that since 9 july, radio free europe had been broadcasting information about them, and the wave of strikes reached its climax on 18 july 1980. seventy-nine factories in lublin and lublin voivodship protested. during the whole strike period, i.e., until 25 july, 91 factories went on strike in lublin alone. the protests thus became part of the experience of a large part of the city’s inhabitants. the strike of polish state railways in lublin employees was particularly painful for the authorities, and the city felt the impact of the strike of municipal transport company in lublin from 18 july. an exemplary list of strike demands from plants in the lublin region is presented in table 1. it contains the demands formulated by railway men from the polish state railways lublin junction. table 1. list of strike demands by rail way men of the lublin junction (pkp) strike demands in the order they were formulated 1 increase in basic salary by 1,300 pln per month for all employees 2 introduction of non-working saturdays 3 equalization of family allowances with the militia and the army 4 introduce a high-cost supplement 5 improve the supply of groceries in shops to the level of silesia 6 introduce disclosure of awards and promotions 7 elect a new trade union council representing the interests and defending working people 8 ensure that all staff organize and attend the workers’ assembly 9 persons acting on behalf of the crew must be specially protected 10 improve social and living conditions in general 11 the militia (mo) and security service officers are not allowed access to the locomotive depot 12 the crew representatives guarantee order, and discipline 13 early retirement at age 55 in traction teams 14 until the above mentioned postulates are not fulfilled, no one will take up work the strikes in the lublin region lasted from 8 to 25 july 1980 and included about 40-50 thousand workers from over 150 workplaces (kaczor, 2000; gach, 2005). before the protests in august 1980, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 25 published by scholink inc. they constituted the largest strike action since the events of december 1970. in fact, by 20 july, the government signed agreements with the individual striking companies promising to increase wages. one success of the workers on strike in the locomotive depot of lublin was the chance to of hold democratic elections to the works council. also due to the strikes, the celebration of 22 july anniversary of the announcement of the pkwn manifesto did not take place in the lublin region. after these events, the people’s republic of poland (prl) created a new symbol of lublin july ‘80: the strike of lublin railway men together with their legendary locomotive welded to the tracks. lublin july was a real expression of opposition to the deepening economic crisis. the strike demands were mainly of an economic and social nature and concerned the principles of workplace operation. the strikers demanded higher wages, improved working conditions, and better supply, but also, among other things, holding those guilty of waste and abuse accountable, reduction of bureaucracy, new elections of trade union authorities and a free press. through these strikes, the workers won wage increases and promises to improve working conditions in their plants. despite the significant scale of these events of july 1980, there was not a single word about it in either the local or central press. instead, in july 1980, the city authorities of lublin hung posters all over the city with the words: “an appeal to the citizens of lublin to remain prudent and calm and take up work.” this kind of behavior clearly showed that the authorities were losing control over the society. the events in lublin gave people faith in their own strength, and showed a deep alienation of society from the authorities. the degree of this alienation depended on the level of the party hierarchy of this power. provincial and local authorities were more concerned about the situation of striking workers than the central authorities (note 6). it was not until july 18, 1980, i.e., 10 days later, under the pressure of a radical intensification of strikes, that the central government at a meeting of the politburo of the central committee of the polish united workers’ party (kc pzpr) in warsaw decided to set up a special governmental commission headed by deputy prime minister m. jagielski to consider the demands of workplaces in the lublin region. however, when this commission arrived in lublin on 25 july, the strikes were actually over. walking around lublin at that time, one could feel an atmosphere of anxiety, but also sympathy for the strikers. in such an atomized society, new ties were formed between people (chudy, 1981; jadczak, 1981, p. 66). the protests in the lublin region were different from the strikes of 1970 and 1976 in poland, which had taken place on the streets. the experience of the prior years led the strikers not to take to the streets, where they could be quickly pacified, but to “hunker down” in their workplaces. this form of protest was more effective. the workers did not leave the workplace until the end of their shift, leading a rotating protest. they adopted an attitude of readiness for dialogue with the authorities: negotiation, not confrontation. leadership teams were elected because, for the workers themselves as well as for the authorities—the word “strike” was a kind of taboo, these teams were called “stopover” or “worker committees” (note 7). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 26 published by scholink inc. 6.2 the strikes of lublin july 1980 as agoral gatherings in this part of the analysis, we will undertake a psychological interpretation of agoral gatherings. this interpretation will be based on the answer to the question: do these strikes meet the particular constitutive features of the definition of an agoral gathering, which are indicated in the first part of this study in a conjunctive manner? 6.2.1. guidance of higher values by strikers the first constitutive feature of an agoral gathering concerns the motivation of its participants’ higher motives. how does this issue relate to the participants of the lublin strikes in july 1980? the direct incentive to participate in the lublin strikes was the threat to satisfying basic physiological needs in the form of a rather radical increase in food products in the factory canteen (in wsk świdnik, the flagship incentive was the increase in retail prices at chops available to employees). table 1 shows that as many as 4 out of 14 employee demands of the striking crew: the introduction of an increase in earnings for all, a price premium, improvement in shop supply and a general improvement in social and living conditions. an analysis of the remaining demands from this table shows, however, that there is a kind of sublimation of needs that motivate workers’ participation in the july 1980 strikes. the results of this analysis are presented in table 2. table 2. motivational relationship between the demands of railway men on strike at the lublin locomotive depot and the needs at individual levels of the maslow’s needs pyramid successive tiers of the maslow’s needs pyramid strike demands by number 1. physiological needs: food, housing, clothing, procreation 1. increase in basic salary by 1,300 pln per month for all employees 4. introduce a high-cost supplement 5. improve the supply of groceries in shops to the level of silesia 10. improve social and living conditions in general 2. security needs: protection from sickness, unemployment, and senile incapacity 8. ensure that all employees who organize and participate in the workers’ assembly are not penalized 11. the militia and secret security officers are not allowed access to the locomotive depot 13. early retirement at age 55 in traction teams 3. the needs of belonging: 2. introduction of all free saturdays www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 27 published by scholink inc. acceptance, love, friendship, camaraderie, solidarity, belonging to a group 4. the need for recognition: success, respect, prestige, importance 3. equalization of family allowances with the militia and the army 5. the need for self-fulfillment: the need to develop oneself, one’s abilities, talents, interests, spiritual and religious development, to confirm one’s value 7. elect a new trade union council representing the interests and defending working people 12. the crew representatives guarantee order and discipline 14. until the above mentioned postulates are not fulfilled, no one will take up work the data from table 2 indicate that the motivation for the participation of employees in lublin’s workplaces is actually represented by all five levels of needs. however, the saturation of motivation based on higher needs (level 5 of the needs pyramid) is significant, as it is articulated by as many as three very important demands—concerning self-discipline, discipline of employees at the workplace, solidarity and consistency, and having a trade union council elected from among themselves (note 8). the motives that prompted workers to strike in lublin in 1980 were also higher needs based on patriotic and religious values, which also manifested itself in their singing of patriotic and religious songs together in workplaces. 6.2.2 non-violent intentions of participants in the lublin strikes the second constitutive feature of agoral gathering is the principle of non-violence held by their participants. during the strikes in july 1980 in lublin, participants observed this principle in solidarity and exemplary behaviour. thus, from the very start, i.e., beginning with the strike in wsk świdnik, they intentionally started the strike with the decision not to start their shift work without any aggression (even verbal) towards the manager of their shift and the chief executive of their workplace. they informed him of their motives when they started the strike. they were not aggressive toward the authorities of their state-owned enterprise. they calmly formulated the strike demands collectively in each striking company and handed them over with dignity to the company director. employees behaved in a similar way without using any aggression in striking factories throughout the lublin region. they came to work on a rotating basis, but did not take up work on their positions—expecting the authorities to respond to their collective strike demands. in fact, by july 20, an agreement between the strike committee and the authorities of a given workplace was signed in every striking company in the lublin region. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 28 published by scholink inc. 6.2.3 voluntary and open participation in the lublin july 1980 strikes another constitutive feature of agoral gatherings is the voluntary participation in these meetings. in the case of the strikes of lublin july 1980, participation in them was entirely voluntary, in the sense that each employee made an individual decision whether or not to take part in the strike at their plant. it was therefore his or her personal choice to take part in the protest of his or her plant’s employees to improve the situation in that plant through dialogue with the authorities, without any behavioral aggression or violence. the openness of agoral gatherings is exemplified by the fact that every potential participant feels invited to take part in them. in the situation of the “outbreak” of strikes in the lublin region in july 1980, every employee of a state-owned enterprise was able to feel invited to an open community of striking employees in their workplace. it was their strike for themselves, their family, their co-workers, the whole company. this was a realization of the paradigm of unity among the workers in each of the striking state enterprises. 6.2.4 mass scale of agoral gatherings the mass scale of agoral gatherings as their constitutive feature is related to their local and situational conditions. in the case of strikes in factories, the type and profile of a given enterprise should be taken into account, as well as the number of employees employed in it. in determining the scale of mass strikes, it is necessary to take into account not only the number of strikers in a given workplace, but also the very number of striking enterprises and the global number of striking employees in the analyzed region. in the case of strikes in the lublin region lasting from 8 to 25 july 1980, in over 150 workplaces about 40–50 thousand workers were involved in the strike action. this means a serious scale of mass gatherings organized in a planned manner, which achieved their goals expressed in the strike postulates they formulated in a peaceful way. 6.2.5 the participants experience of unity while realizing the social importance of agoral gathering and the elimination of collective fears an important dimension of agoral gatherings is that their participants create a climate of unity while realizing the social importance of the gathering. the participants of lublin july 1980 created a climate in which they experienced employee solidarity, which has a very strong awareness rooted in the whole region. the content of this solidarity and unity was also preserved in the collective memory of the lublin region’s inhabitants, which was not overshadowed by the june 1979 echoes of the agoral gatherings accompanying pope john paul ii’s first pilgrimage to poland, together with his patriotic, religious and moral messages. in july, the striking state enterprises of the lublin region became the continuators of the great agora with the polish pope—who instilled in the hearts of the participants of this agora the need to experience a climate of unity in solving problems important for their work and the wider social environment. their experience of the agora within their workplace not only freed them from collective fear, but also allowed them to formulate their demands concerning social and labour problems in a civilized way and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 29 published by scholink inc. to submit them to their authorities for consideration. the important issue was that in every strike in the lublin region it was possible to reach an agreement and sign the provisions of the social agreement concluded in this way at the level of state enterprises. 6.2.6 positive consequences of agoral gatherings both on an individual and social scale the last anticipated consequence of the agoral gathering is its positive consequences both on an individual and social scale. in the case of agoral gatherings coinciding with pope john paul ii’s visit to poland, its positive consequence was the collective catharsis of individual participants of these gatherings. on the social scale, however, their positive consequence was precisely the strikes of lublin july 1980, which showed that through the solidarity of employees of state-owned enterprises, a climate of non-violence and patient but concrete dialogue, measurable benefits can be obtained, both individual and social, concerning the improvement of working conditions and its safety, organization of work activities, basic salary, family allowances, free time, consumer needs of employees and their families, trade unions—and thus measurable benefits for individual employees. it was a kind of regional manifestation of the paradigm of social and mental unity of the lublin state-owned employees who decided to build their own democracy and solidarity at the regional level (biela, 2020). 6.2.7 do the strikes of lublin july 1980 meet all the constitutive features of agoral gatherings in a conjunctive manner? summarizing the psychological analyses of the strikes of lublin july 1980, we can state with all certainty that these strikes, understood as gatherings of people, fulfil all seven features that constitute their definition as “agoral gathering,” without exception. from this we can conclude that they were agoral gatherings. the psychological consequence of these gatherings in poland was the further development of civic self-determination of citizens and workers in large industrial districts in poland in august 1980 both on the coasts of gdansk and szczecin, as in upper silesia. the movement covered the whole of poland, integrating more than 10 million polish citizens into the “solidarity” strikes. the “solidarity” strikes have also been interpreted in the psychological literature as agoral gatherings, thanks to which poland liberated herself from communist totalitarianism (biela, 2013). the position of the strikes of lublin july within the milieu of processes of poles’ self-liberation is illustrated in figure 1. stage 1 stage 2 stage 3 figure 1. the sequence of agoral gatherings which led to poland’s self-liberation from the totalitarian system “solidarity” strikes in polish territory (august 1980) papal agoral gatherings (2-9 june 1979) lublin strikes july 1980 (8-25 july 1979) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 30 published by scholink inc. from figure 1 we can see that the strike events of lublin july 1980 were agoral gatherings (stage 2) which fulfilled the expectations that arose during the agoral gatherings with john paul ii less than a year earlier: that poles can take their workers’ matters into their own hands without fear and present them in a civilized way in a form agreed upon between them as strike demands in their workplaces. local companies and regional authorities took their employees seriously and signed appropriate strike agreements with each of them separately. in this way they experienced employee solidarity at the level of their own company and strikes took place concerning their own company matters. they also experienced solidarity with their colleagues from all over the lublin region for the first time, in more than 150 state-owned enterprises, where strike action took place—modelled on the climate of agoral gatherings (see stage 1). during the agoral labour strikes in the lublin region in july 1980, prototypes of labour solidarity were created based on regional ties. patterns of agoral-solidarity behaviour acquired in this way in the days of lublin july became one of the important factors determining the behaviour of strike crews in september 1980 on the gdansk coast, the szczecin coast and upper silesia, and then encompassing state enterprises throughout poland in the civic social movement of “solidarity.” this really fulfilled the paradigm of unity at a mental, social, political and economic level—in a nonviolent, solidaristic and democratic way (biela, 2020). 6. final conclusions our psychological analyses of the behaviour of the participants of these gatherings, strikes in state enterprises in the lublin region involving employees of workplaces from three polish provinces, has allowed us to qualify them as agoral gatherings (biela, 2013). their moral and cultural characteristics developed during the phenomena of meetings of poles with pope john paul ii during his first pilgrimage to his homeland. in this way, lublin july 1980 became a link in social learning based on moral, patriotic and religious values—which led to “solidarity” strikes all over poland. these strikes were the third link in the process of realization of self-determination of the polish people as a sovereign state. the powers of the agoral processes created by the “solidarity” movement in august 1980 did not manage to stifle any of the repressive tactics or strategies of the authorities of the totalitarian system, not excluding the horrors of martial law. this movement, applying the principle of non-violence, led to the defeat of totalitarian power, which collapsed like a proverbial “house of cards,” first in poland and then throughout central and eastern europe. this is the strength of agora gatherings. it is a pity that at the same time in the countries of the former yugoslavia, instead of organizing agoral gatherings according to the paradigm of unity (biela 2020), civil war crowds took their bloody toll (bilali & vollhardt, 2019). after the death of the leader and builder of the yugoslavian state—j. tito—politicians and journalists developed real or artificially created confrontations which took advantage of ethnic differences in the nations forming the ethnic mosaic of former yugoslavia. these confrontations were widely publicized www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 31 published by scholink inc. by the central, regional and local media. the confrontation culminated in an intense ethnic war, with all its environmental damage (jha, 2014), real human horrors (hislope, 2004; fink, 2010) and even acts of genocide (demolli, 2013). thus, it has to be underlined here that there is no alternative strategy to agoral gatherings for the peaceful prevention of crowd-based war conflicts, which builds mental unity based on higher values shared by the participants of these gatherings (biela, 2013, 2020). references biela, a. (1989). agoral gathering: a new conception of collective behavior. journal for the theory of social behaviour, 19(3), 311-336. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5914.1989.tb00152.x biela, a. (2007). psychosocial conditioning of macro structural changes: the concept of an agora gathering. czasopismo psychologiczne [psychological journal], 13(2), 75-96. biela, a. (2012). agoral gatherings as macro dynamic communities breaking the totalitarian system in central and eastern europe. studia teologiczne i humanistyczne, 2(2), 105-121. biela, a. (2013). agoral gatherings which have changed the political face of central and eastern europe. in a. biela (ed.), beyond crowd psychology. the power of agoral gatherings (pp. 19-63). frankfurt am main: peter lang verlag. biela, a. (2020). the paradigm of unity (pu) as the basis for a “copernican revolution” (cr) in the social sciences. advances in politics and economic, 3(3). https://doi.org/10.22158/ape.v3n3p1 biela, a., & tobacyk, j. (1987). self-transcendence in the agoral gathering a case study of pope john paul ii’s 1979 visit to poland. journal of humanistic psychology, 27(4), 390-405. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022167887274002 bilali, r., & vollhardt, j. r. (2019). victim and perpetrator groups’ divergent perspectives on collective violence: implications for intergroup relations. advances in political psychology, 40(1), 75-107. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12570 chudy, w. (1981). relacje—dokumenty. miesiace. przegląd związkowy, 1, 13-43. dąbrowski, m. (2006). lubelski lipiec 1980. lublin: zarząd regionu środkowowschodniego nszz, olidarność”. demolli, h. (2013). criminal judicial qualification and prosecution in the racak case according to national and international legislation. in aertsen, ivo; arsovska, jana; rohne, holger-c; valiñas, marta @ vanspauwen, kris (eds.). restoring justice after large-scale violent conflicts. new york: routledge. dimitrova, s. (1995). time as a cultural value in bulagaria and the strategies to conduct at a time of dymnamic social changes. journal for mental changes, 1(2), 129-133. ferjenčík, j. (2013). psychosocial analysis of the agoral gatherings that took place during the velvet revolution in czechoslovakia. in a. biela (ed.), beyond crowd psychology: the power of agoral gatherings (pp. 65-80). frankfurt am main: peter lang. fink, g. (2010). stress of war, conflict and disaster. melbourne: academic press. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 32 published by scholink inc. gach, p. (2005). [editor] it was july in the beginning. materials from the scientific-historical symposium catholic university of lublin, 7 june 2005. lublin: the central and eastern region board of the “solidarity”. gaidys, v., & tureikyte, d. (1996). agoral gatherings in lithuania: an example of the “baltic way”. journal for mental changes, 2, 113-119. hislope, r. (2004) can evolutionary theory explain nationalist violence? czecho slovak and bosnian illustrations. nations and nationalism, 4(4), 463-482. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1354-5078.1998.00463.x jadczak, s. (1981). diariusz lipcowych dni. miesiace. przegląd związkowy, 1, 55-74. jha, u. c. d. (2014). armed conflict and environmental damage. vij books india pvt ltd. kaczor, j. (2000) [editor]. before august it was july 80. materials from the symposium “history and present of solidarity in the lublin region. lublin: the regional board of central and eastern “solidarity” trade union. maslow, a. (1987). motivation and personality. new york, ny: addison-wesley educational publishers inc. naništová, e. (2013). retrospective and current approaches to the velvet revolution in slovakia. in a. biela (ed.), power of agoral gatherings (pp. 81-123). frankfurt am main: peter lang. parchewa, i. (1992). attitudes on rights and liberties in participants in an agoral meeting as. compared to the national representative sample. abstract submitted for the second international conference on mental changes and social integration perspectives, lublin, 17-20, november, 1992. the archive of the catholic university of lublin. rama, s. a. (ed.). (2020). the end of communist rule in albania: political change and the role of the student movement (conceptualizing comparative politics). new york: routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429242991 zysberg, l. (2018). the people demand social justice: the social protest in israel as an agoral gathering. journal for perspectives of economic political and social integration, 24(2), 31-45. https://doi.org/10.2478/pepsi-2018-0007 note note 2. these countries are listed in the chronological order of occurrence of agoral gatherings. note 3. date: 1980-07-08 10:00 in wytwórnia sprzętu komunikacyjnego (wsk) at świdnik, the employees of hall no. 1 stopped working in response to a significant increase in food prices in company buffets. talks with the non-working employees were started by the shift manager, and then by the director of the wsk. at 12.30 p.m. the whole wsk crew joined the strike. see: jadczak (1981), diariusz lipcowych dni. p. 66. note 4. this was the original name of the strike committee at the workplace (dąbrowski, 2006). note 5. after over 8 hours of negotiations, they were signed agreement by the plant director jan www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 33 published by scholink inc. czołgała and representatives of the crew headed by zofia bartkiewicz a technologist and an active participant in the july 1980 strike in świdnik. note 6. in the state archive in lublin a telex of 8 july 1980 is preserved, addressed to the central committee of the pzpr in warsaw by the first secretary of the voivodship committee of the pzpr in lublin, władysław kruk, who describes the situation concerned about the workers’ strikes in świdnik and lublin. this message, which in fact presented the beginning of the strike, without any political comments, ended with the alarming call “very urgent information please pass it on immediately.” at that time the central committee of the pzpr communicated with the central committee of the polish united workers’ party (pzpr) up to three times a day, informing about the strike events and social moods (see: dąbrowski (2006)). note 7. the historical study of data about lublin july 1980 is based on the following materials: chudy, 1981; jadczak, 1981; kaczor, 2000; gach, 2005; dąbrowski, 2006. note 8. the postulate of electing one’s own trade union council developed during the september strikes on the baltic coast and in silesia into the irresistible thought about the creation of nszz “solidarity.” microsoft word ape-v4n4-p125 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 125 original paper a study on robert keohane’s idea of “power” wang sheng1 & pan ziyang1 1 school of politics and public management, xinjiang university, urumqi, xinjiang, china received: december 9, 2021 accepted: december 19, 2021 online published: december 24, 2021 doi:10.22158/ape.v4n4p125 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v4n4p125 abstract robert keohane is a leading contemporary international relations scholar. his ideas and doctrines are important parts of neoliberal institutionalism. in his books power and interdependence, and after hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy, he has a unique perspective on power, a core concept of international relations, that differs from realism and constructivism. this paper uses documentary analysis to distill and summarize the discussion of power in robert keohane’s work, which helps to systematically study the neoliberal institutionalist view of power and to make the classic theory show its charm beyond its time. keywords robert keohane, power, neoliberal institutionalism 1. introduction robert keohane is a leading political scientist, international relations scholar, and educator. he also is a leading figure in neoliberal institutionalism. keohane entered sumner college where his father taught to study political science in 1957. he obtained a bachelor of arts degree and graduated with honors in 1961. after, he studied at harvard university. when he was at harvard, he was taught and instructed by stanley hoffman, a master of international relations theory, and received his master of arts and doctoral degrees in 1964 and 1966 respectively. he later taught at several prestigious institutions, including harvard university (1985-1996) and duke university (1996-2005). neoliberal institutionalism is one of the three paradigms of international relations and benefited from a reinterpretation of many of the foundational concepts in the realist paradigm that provides a more explanatory framework for the intense changes in the world’s political economy in the 1960s and 1970s. the realist view of power as the essence of international relations. robert keohane, an icon of neo-liberal institutionalism, rethought this view in his co-authored book power and interdependence published in 1979, in after hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy published in 1984, and in his personal collection of essays international institutions and state power www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 126 published by scholink inc. published in 1989. in contrast to the realist focus on material power, keohane added a conceptual approach to power and expands the boundaries on the concept of power to create a clear logical relationship between power, interdependence, international institutions, and national interests. keohane’s ideas of power established the foundations of the neo-liberal institutionalist’s view of power and exerted a great influence on international relations. good theories can survive time, and the reflection would better help people understand the circumstances they are in. in the 1970s and 1980s, when keohane presented his interpretation of world politics, the soviet union still existed as a powerful state in the international community. today, forty years later, the soviet union no longer exists, and the international political and economic situation has changed dramatically. ideas that were once expected, such as globalization, multipolarity, democratization, etc. have been gradually resisted in various degrees and even many of the ideas themselves are alienated. the serious divisions and defective responding capacity of the international community when facing the covid-19 once again raises attention about international cooperation.as keohane argued in after hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy, international cooperation can sustain and develop when hegemony no longer existed. therefore, it is beneficial to revisit keohane’s ideas of power to understand international cooperation in the post-epidemic era. 2. a discussion of robert keohane’s idea of “power” 2.1 the nature, sources, and hierarchy of power power is often seen as a relationship, the ability of a person to influence the behavior of others in the ways that people have no freedom to choose by their willingness. the crucial power in the traditional realist discourse was military power, and only states with great military power were able to dominate world affairs. however, a series of international events in the 1970s changed the single attribute on the source of power and made it more complex. keohane viewed power as the ability of an actor to induce other actors to do things that they would not otherwise do and could also be seen as the ability to exercise control over outcomes. but keohane adopted a theoretical assumption that differs from realism. he proposed asymmetric interdependence as the source of power and argued that actors could be seen as having stronger resources of power when they are less dependent compared to other actors. however, the hypothesis does not ignore the differences and similarities between the source of power and power itself. the hypothesis also divides the method to measure power into two categories. one is based on resources and potential, and the other is based on influence on outcomes. therefore, he emphasized the importance of the uncertainty of the transformation process and argued that “there is rarely a one-to-one relationship between power measured by any type of resources and power measured by effects on outcomes.” keohane, in an original move, linked liberal interdependence with realist power politics. to understand power and interdependence, he introduced the concepts of sensitivity and vulnerability. in short, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 127 published by scholink inc. “sensitivity describes the speed and depth with which a country perceives external change, and vulnerability reflects a country’s ability and difficulty to make policy adjustments and changes” and “sensitivity involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework—how quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in another, and how great are the costly effects?” sensitivity is measured not only by the scale of cross-border interactions but also by the cost of changes in interactions to society and government. the cost of sensitivity is “sensitivity means liability to costly effects imposed from outside before policies are altered to try to change the situation.” it is important to note that interdependence of sensitivity’s premise is a fixed policy framework, “a policy framework that should be based on the domestic policy arrangements of countries and related international institutional arrangements based on existing interdependencies.” and sensitivity interdependence is not limited to economic aspects but also encompasses social or political aspects. “vulnerability can be defined as an actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered.” it is important to note that “policy changes” refer to adverse changes in the country caused by changes in other countries, and the policy framework is changed to respond to them to reduce the country’s losses. the “cost of policy adjustment” refers to the cost of responding to such adverse changes. interdependence of vulnerability is measured as “the cost over time of adjusting to effectively adapt to the changed environment.” in addition, vulnerability can be applied to the analysis of both socio-political and political-economic relations. sensitivity and vulnerability are keohane’s micro-explanations on the sources of power, and they have three main differences. first, “interdependence sensitivity reflects the price to be paid for maintaining interdependence, while vulnerability emphasises the price to be paid for breaking it.” second, the former is within the policy framework and the latter emphasizes the spillover effects of policy, which means that sensitivity does not bring about a change in policy, while vulnerability implies a change in policy. at the same time, there is a temporal succession between the two, with sensitivity emerging before vulnerability. “since it is usually difficult to change policies quickly, immediate effects of external changes generally reflect sensitivity dependence.” as sensitivities cause damage to national interests, the responding costs incurred to mitigate or eliminate such adverse effects are vulnerabilities. third, “clearly, it indicates that sensitivity interdependence will be less important than vulnerability interdependence in providing power resources to actors.” vulnerability interdependence is more strategically important than sensitivity interdependence, or it can be argued that vulnerability plays a more fundamental role in the analytical framework of asymmetric interdependence as a source of power. in some cases, even though actors enjoy the power advantages of sensitive interdependence, they are at a disadvantage in vulnerability interdependence, and the difference between the two will affect the outcome of the application of asymmetric interdependence as a power tool. keohane further constructed a composite interdependence model based on interdependence, which is different from realism. the basic features of composite interdependence lie in the rejection of three important assumptions of realism, namely that interstate links are no longer the only links between www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 128 published by scholink inc. societies; that the hierarchy of the international relations agenda cannot be easily divided; and that the prevalence of composite interdependence will inhibit the use of force by states. three basic features of composite interdependence imply differences in the neoliberal institutionalist and realist perceptions of power. the first is the difference in the importance they attach to the power of different actors. realism assumes that the state is the most important actor, and interstate links are therefore the most meaningful links in international relations. moreover, it is often to downplay the non-state actors such as transnational organizations and transnational links between non-governmental elites. the assumption of realism implies that the state is important because it holds the most important power, and tacitly assumes that even in complex international societies, the power of the state far exceeds that of other actors in most areas, which, while not implying an absolute negation of the power of other actors, is at least a choice of indifference at the heart of the paradigm. from the end of the cold war until today, the active borders of non-state actors are continuously expanding, and the importation of influence into new areas has meant a reconstitution of power between different actors. the emphasis of composite interdependence on the multiple channels of contact between the different actors of the international community reflects more scientifically the reality of international relations. the timing of the new epidemic outbreak was exceptional, as the brief post-cold war detente between the major powers of the east and the west had terminated completely. it is replaced by a new form of competition, and world politics was at a delicate point, the direction of it is unpredictable. while this is very much in line with the logic of realist power struggles, it also demonstrates, to a certain extent, that when international cooperation becomes a much-needed public good, inter-state contact as the only important channel of communication does not guarantee that the needs of the international community are met. even when there are national actors that are not sufficient to serve the full function of governance, transnational organizations take on part of the task of communicating to the international community the assistance needed to respond to new coronaviruses, acting as coordinators in the process of connecting the national and international communities. for example, the covax regime led by the world health organization was established to improve the underproduction and uneven distribution of vaccines on a global scale. the changing power of non-state actors should receive more attention to reflect the real picture of world politics as closely as possible. next, the issue of hierarchy in the international relations agenda implies the hierarchy between different kinds of power. keohane revisited a particular but crucial resource of power, namely military power. in doing so, he not only refuted the realist assumption of force as an effective policy instrument but also against the realist hierarchy of the international relations agenda. although he continued part of the realist view of military power, euphemistically expressing its distinctive character. when actors face conflicts, the advantages of military interdependence are hardly offset by the advantages of interdependence in other spheres, and military power can still be a crucial presence in exercising decisive influence. however, military matters are not considered to be highly political, while issues of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 129 published by scholink inc. economic and social matters are necessarily classified as less political than military matters. in addition to military power, keohane was particularly concerned with information power. he argued that with the information revolution, the cost of processing and transmitting information would fall dramatically. he argued against the idea that the small states will diminish the power of major power countries and increase their own power because of the information revolution. he also cited four reasons for this: the barriers to market entry and economies of scale associated with information, the huge investments required for the collection and production of new information, the startup advantage, and the greater benefits that military powers will enjoy. in addressing the question of how information generates power, keohane still substituted the analytical framework of interdependence, suggesting that trust is a key resource when measuring information power, and asymmetric trust is a central source of power. in short, in robert keohane’s system of power, the concept of power still follows the classical definition and interdependence is the source of power. it is important to note that the source of power is different from the resource of power, which can be a material existence, such as military power relying on the number of nuclear weapons, the number of soldiers, etc., while the source is the transformation of the resource, and power is derived from the comparison of differences in sensitivity and vulnerability between interdependent actors, whose outcomes control is stronger than the “statistics” of resources. on this basis, the categories of power are in fact divided into two categories: interdependence of sensitivity and interdependence of vulnerability. the hierarchy of power then becomes an issue to be understood dynamically, it contrasts with realism’s static hierarchy of power, making neoliberal institutionalism more explanatory of policy than realism. 2.2 power and the national interest in addition to the development and even reconstruction of sources, hierarchies and categories of power, the neo-liberal institutionalist understanding of power fills some theoretical gaps left unanswered by realism. the first is what is the relationship between rights and the interests of the state? hans morgenthau, a representative of classical realism, postulated the following main points about the relationship between power and national interest: (1) international politics is defined as a struggle for power between states in pursuit of their interests and sees national interest as a compromise following domestic political competition, views power as a supporting element in the pursuit of national interest. (2) the most fundamental national interest is the survival and security of the state, also is the most basic goal served by the struggle for state power. (3) there are three main manifestations of the state’s struggle for power, namely the status quo policy, imperialism, and prestige policy. offensive and defensive realism have diverged in their views on whether the state’s fundamental task is to pursue power without limits. overall, realism as a theoretical cluster does not give a coherent answer to the question of whether power is an integral part of the national interest. keohane, on the other hand, clearly outlined the interests of the state as wealth and power, as he wrote in after hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy, “reflections on wealth www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 130 published by scholink inc. and power as goals of state action lead us to the conclusion that the two concepts are complementary,” and argues that “power is a necessary condition for the endowment of the state and vice versa.” keohane juxtaposed the juxtaposition of wealth and power, which are jointly subsumed in the national interest, and wealth and power are complementary, which allows for mutual transformation. keohane argued that there is still an inherent coherence between the political economy of the world today and that of the 17th century, citing four propositions made by jacob wiener, (1) wealth is the basic means of acquiring power; (2) power is the basic and valuable means of acquiring and maintaining wealth; (3) both wealth and power are the ultimate ends of state action; (4) one may be sacrificed for the other under particular circumstance in the short term, but in the long term, wealth and power are in harmony. what is unique about keohane is using the concepts of wealth investment and consumption to describe power, which leads to the permanent question in foreign policy of how to balance the state’s investment and consumption of power. next, the duality of keohane’s idea of the “national interest” implies that the power of the state is also dualistic. on the one hand, the state is egoistic and therefore its interests are exclusive and cannot be shared. “states are egoists, rational actors acting on the basis of their own conceptions of self-interest,” and state power is likewise egoistic and often manifests itself through its preoccupation with the service of the state. on the other hand, because keohane believes that there is a common interest between states, the interests of the state are also altruistic that leads to the fact that state power should also be altruistic. in neoliberal institutionalism, the altruism of power is reflected in transnational and inter-governmental relations in the context of complex interdependence, where economic and social interactions between countries imply a flow of wealth and power and ultimately establishes a stable network in which different organizations, such as business groups, which gain more benefits. 2.3 a critique of the hegemonic stability thesis hegemony is a particular form of power. robert keohane argues that hegemony is a single dominant force. any state entity that exists in the sense of international law has a certain amount of power, but hegemony is clearly not universally possessed by all state actors. in 1973, charles kindleberger linked hegemony to the stability of the international order and formally put forward the theory of hegemonic stability. he argued that the existence of a hegemonic state can maintain the international order and ensure the stability of the international system. the influence of the united kingdom and the united states on the international system when they were hegemonic powers was a typical historical example used by proponents of the hegemonic stability theory to support their views. robert keohane’s critique of the hegemonic stability thesis is not based on a critique of hegemony, but rather on a critique of the hegemonic model and more precisely the basic power model. robert keohane argues that there are three models of hegemony: the basic power model, the power-action model and the marxist model. first, the basic power model, also known as the “unrefined hegemonic stabilising power,” “refers to the need for a country to have free access to key raw materials, control major sources of capital, maintain a large import market, and have comparative advantage in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 131 published by scholink inc. the production of high value-added goods.” the theory assumes that the greater the hegemon’s control over the world’s political economy, the greater the cooperation between countries, and vice versa. but this crude model of hegemony, which focuses only on having an advantage in the control of material resources, views the hegemon as a necessary and sufficient condition for cooperation in the international system. on the one hand, it ignores the domestic factor, on the other, where the hegemon is dependent not only on the preponderance of power but also on the will to become hegemonic. for example, during the international strife of world war i and world war ii, britain lacked sufficient resources to maintain free trade, while the united states had powerful economic resources but lacked the will to lead the world’s political economy. second, a distilled hegemonic stability theory, which is the power in action model, argues that power does not automatically produce leadership and that “hegemony is defined as a state in which ‘a state is strong enough to maintain the ground rules governing relations between states and it is willing to do so.’” although the theory is more focused on domestic characteristics than the basic power model, domestic attitudes, political structures, and decision-making processes are all important. the country with superior resources will inevitably become the hegemon unless it is unwilling to lead the world, but it is still impossible to answer what factors lead to the country’s unwillingness to take on the responsibility of leading the world. third, the marxist model, “marxists often use the concept of hegemony, implicitly defined simply as a dominant position, as a way of analysing the political phenomenon of the capitalist world. for marxists as well as mercantilists, wealth and power complement each other; they depend on each other.” typical figure of this, wallerstein, who replaces the analysis of class with a state-centric analysis that recognizes the important role of hegemony and military power. wallerstam argued that three hegemonic states emerged in the capitalist world system, the netherlands in the mid-17th century, britain in the mid-19th century and the united state in the mid-20th century. after hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy opens with a critique of the basic power model or “unrefined hegemonic stabilising power”, which argues that the hegemonic powers have created international institutions that will collapse once the hegemon’s power declines, and it is unable to provide the public goods to maintain the stability of the international system. in contrast, keohane’s major doctrinal contribution lies in arguing that post-hegemonic international cooperation is possible and well-documented. first, because international regimes are difficult to establish and the cost of maintaining them is much less than the cost of reestablishing them. “because international regimes have the effect of reducing transaction costs, providing transactional information, changing actor preferences, and reducing uncertainty, the international regimes that a hegemonic state establishes may still continue to exist after its decline, and cooperative relations between states can be sustained.” second, there is a “time lag” between the decline of hegemony and the collapse of institutions. “the decline of hegemony does not necessarily imply a corresponding decline of the established regimes created under the leadership of the hegemonic state; the inertia of their maintenance allows them to remain independent in their ability to ensure cooperation and peace in a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 132 published by scholink inc. post-hegemonic world.” thus, keohane’s neoliberal institutionalism is also known as the ‘supply’ doctrine of international institutions. robert keohane’s perceptions and reflections on hegemony are an important part of his thought on power. if hegemony is the central variable that sustains international cooperation, then hegemony and international cooperation give each other legitimacy to exist, constitute an unbreakable logical loop and are self-referential. it can be argued that after hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy provides the doctrinal underpinning for world politics to break the limits of hegemony and to achieve international cooperation through multiple channels. 2.4 power and international regimes international regimes were first proposed by john rudge in the 1970s, meaning the implicitly explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures that emerge from a given field of international relations to which the expectations of a range of actors converge. comparing world politics to imperfect markets, keohane argued that international regimes could overcome their shortcomings and thus replace hegemony to achieve cooperation. in robert keohane’s idea of power, the relationship between power and international regimes focuses on three aspects. first, the common good has the potential to enable the creation of international regimes, and the common good reflects the shared pursuits of state actors. states tend to behave in their national interests, and through the brief analysis of keohane’s view of national interests in the foregoing, it can be assumed that there is a common pursuit whereby multiple states seek a simultaneous increase in power, such as those benefiting from global trade and payment facilitation, which can be seen as a simultaneous increase in power for all members. the second is that changes in power can explain changes in international regimes. there are five explanatory frameworks for international institutional change: the economic process explanatory model, the overall power structure explanatory model, the problem structure explanatory model, the international organization explanatory model and the integrated explanatory model. the core of this theory is that the competition between states provides the basic driving force for institutional change. the specific path of action lies in the fact that the structure of the international system (the distribution of power between states), which is regarded as the overall power structure, determines the nature of international regimes, and that changes in the overall power structure provide the driving force for changes in the rules of international regimes. following the logic of the general power structure explanatory model, it is possible to deduce the plausibility of the hegemonic stability theory, and the stability of the world financial system, which was governed by british power in the 19th century, and the bretton woods system, which was led by the united states after the second world war, is often used as a representative example to demonstrate that power influences international regimes. keohane argues that the limitations of the overall power structure explanatory model are (1) a lack of simplicity, (2) an inability to provide a good basis for prediction, (3) a reluctance to distinguish between problem areas, and (4) an ignorance of the complexity of multi-channel linkages between countries. finally, in some cases international regimes www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 133 published by scholink inc. are even avenues for power to operate. in the process of shaping the norms of international regimes, actors can make arrangements that serve national interests. in particular, “the principles of a regime define the goals that its members aspire to pursue.” with the globalization of non-traditional security issues such as ecological crises, mass infectious diseases and cyber security threats, the ability of major powers to respond to the risks of globalization can be greatly reduced if they only rely on a single traditional power and do not seek international cooperation and create a response agenda from multiple levels and directions. international regimes enable the participation of as many actors as possible in global governance. international regimes are one of the non-traditional power resources of the great powers, relying on political negotiations to transform power. moreover, international regimes need a certain degree of legitimacy and authority to fulfil their functions of determining legal responsibilities, reduce transaction costs and provide information. in addition, states’ cede initiatively some of its power to international regimes by negotiation and make the international regimes become a source of legitimacy and authority. 3. a review of robert keohane’s ideas on power the neo-liberal institutionalist paradigm constructed by robert keohane, while downplaying realist power politics, does not deny the important role of power for state actors. instead of focusing too much on material power, as classical realist scholars did, keohane divides the types of power into two categories: the number of resources held and the control of outcomes, and places emphasis on the transformative process by which power produces substantive effects, a dynamic theory of power that is more scientific and possesses greater explanatory power than the static realist theory of power. instead of a long, independent analysis of power, keohane combines it with discourses of interdependence, international cooperation, and international regimes. not all the criticisms to which keohane’s thought on power has been subjected are direct; many of the criticisms of concepts central to the neoliberal institutionalist paradigm can be derived from the doctrinal challenges to robert keohane’s thought on power and constitute an insidious and indirect critique. take power and interdependence as an example,the masterpiece of interdependence theory, which provides a solid theoretical foundation for the theory of “international regimes” in after hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy and they lay the cornerstone of neoliberal institutionalist theory together. however, interdependence itself has certain explanatory limitations. increasing interdependence does not necessarily lead automatically to a harmony of interests, but rather more cross-border interaction may lead to suspicion and antagonism between the interests of both parties. although this problem has been recognized and a “composite interdependence” combining power politics and interdependence has been proposed, it applies more to the sphere of economic and ecological interdependence, and disputes in the higher political sphere inevitably. for example, as the strategic rivalry between the united states and china in the political sphere extends to trade wars and decoupling in the economic sphere, and as the two countries could have cooperated in non-traditional www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 134 published by scholink inc. security areas, such as health care but ended up in bitter confrontation. all three features of compound interdependence fail, in other words, world politics seems to have reverted to the power politics assumed by realism. in particular, under the law of imbalance in the power growth of the great powers, the gap between the comprehensive power of china and the united states continues to narrow. at a time when the united states, despite the sensitivity and vulnerability of both china and the united states, is suppressing and sanctioning chinese high-tech companies such as zte, huawei and jitterbug. china is adjusting its economic policy under heavy pressure, moving towards a combination of internal economic circulation and international circulation. the tug-of-war between the two sides in the field of power politics and the neglect of compound interdependence, which not only reflect the limitations of the theoretical practice of composite interdependence in the context of sino-american strategic competition, but also represent another validation of the realist idea of power. next, the idea of hegemony is not dispensed with in keohane’s power ideology, but rather packaged. although keohane’s doctrine of the “provision” of international regimes, which argues for the possibility of international cooperation after hegemony, reflects to a certain extent the democratic nature of international society. however, there is a certain theoretical bias in keohane’s theory. first, his starting point is how to continue to defend united states hegemonic interests and reduce the costs of united states hegemony through the existing international regimes established by the united states in the face of the decline of united states hegemony, rather than actually establishing a set of international regimes that reflect international democracy and justice. second, the class nature of international regimes has been ignored or even rationalized. in the post-cold war international regime, for example, although the voice of emerging countries such as china has increased in important international organizations such as the imf and the world bank, it has not fundamentally changed the “centre-periphery” or “centre-semi-periphery-periphery” structure. the imbalance in the distribution of power has a significant impact on the inherent inequality of the international system, although keohane’s idea of power downplays power politics and at the same time the role of hegemony, it is still a hierarchical idea of power, and the status of the actors involved in the regime is strongly influenced by this. last, there are significant theoretical limitations to keohane’s idea of power. on the one hand, it downplays the important role of state power in international regimes. even though the element of state power is downplayed in the theoretical derivation process, in the practice of international relations, state power is still indispensable for the proper functioning of international regimes once they are formed, as international society still conforms to the realist assumption of anarchy. on the other hand, keohane does not delve into the timeliness of the common pursuit. the fact that international regimes are formed based on a common pursuit between states, which must remain generally stable over a long period and not change fundamentally in nature, means that only certain issues, which are often transnational in nature and difficult for a single state to solve on its own, can meet this requirement, and that such issues are also practically solvable, rather than being some kind of over-advanced utopianism. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 135 published by scholink inc. they are also practical and not some kind of utopianism. thus, once the common quest is concretized, there may be more counter examples to keohane’s theory of the international regimes of decentralization. references art, r. j., & waltz, k. n. 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(2009b). unipolarity, state behavior, and systemic consequences. world politics, 61(1), 1-27. https://doi.org/10.1017/s004388710900001x keohane, r. o. (1986). theory of world politics: structural realism and beyond. in robert o. keohane (ed.), neorealism and its critics. new york: columbia university press. keohane, r. o., & nye, j. (2001).power and interdependence (3rd ed.). new york: longman. mearsheimer, j. j. (2001). the tragedy of great power politics. new york: w.w. norton. morgenthau, h. j. (1978). politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace. new york, alfred a. knopf. wu, w. (2010). on sensitivity and vulnerability of interdependent relation. journal of social science, 04, 20-25. waltz, k. n. (1979). theory of international politics. london: addison-wesley. waltz, k. n. (1964). the stability of a bipolar world. daedalus, 93(2), 881-909. yu, w. (2003). a study of interdependence. chinese journal of european studies, 04, 51-61. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 1 original paper upgrading for sustainable development goal through 16th plan of nepal: a study of its challenges and opportunities dr. uttam khanal1* & ravi raj puri2* 1 department of economics and social sciences, tribhuvan university, kathmandu, nepal 2 department of conflict peace and development tribhuvan university, kathmandu, nepal email: khanaluttam24@yahoo.com, orcid id: 0000-0002-5355-9049, ravirajpuri47@gmail.com received: december 03, 2024 accepted: december 26, 2024 online published: january 03, 2025 doi:10.22158/ape.v8n1p1 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v8n1p1 abstract nepal has implemented the millennium development goals since 2000 to 2015. during the period, poverty decreased from 42% to 23.8%, while the net enrollment rate at the primary level was 96.6%, the literacy rate of the 24-year-old age group reached 88.5%, and the retention rate at the primary level reached 85.6%. the infant mortality rate was 108 per thousand and the child mortality rate per thousand live births was 162 in 1990. these numbers were decrease to 33 and 3 respectively in 2014. measles vaccination had reached 92 percent. the list of least developed countries of nepal will upgrade to developing countries before in 2030. the identification and use of potential resources have together opportunities and challenges for nepal. the goal of sustainable development can achieve by making the best use opportunities facing the challenges that have come before it. an implementation of the millennium development goals was 2016 to 2030, including nepal and 193 countries in the world. it was include ending all forms of poverty, education, health, housing, clean fuel, and the environment for all. equal participation at all levels in development is essential to achieving human rights, gender equality, and empowerment for all women and children. the sustainable ecological system has adopted policy to protect, enhance, and use natural resources. it is decide to build an egalitarian society in the preamble of the constitution of nepal 2015. a policy was adapting to bases of national needs and priorities on foreign aid for the implementation process and global partnerships for sustainable development. keywords sustainable development goal, economic growth, social justice, nutritious food, poverty, agriculture, empowerment of women and girls www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 2 published by scholink inc. 1. introduction sustainable development goals (sdg) are to end poverty by 2030. world leaders have prepared an action plan for people, the earth, and prosperity. eliminating all forms and dimensions of poverty, including extreme poverty, is the world's biggest challenge. ending poverty has become an indispensable requirement for sustainable development. there are seventeen development goals that seek to build on the achievements of the millennium development goals. it makes up for what it has not achieved. the aim to achieve human rights is for all gender equality and empowerment for women and girls. these goals integrate, are indivisible, and balance the three dimensions of economic, social, and environmental development. during the period from 1769 to 1990, the rulers of nepal, which existed as a nation-state, were either kings or prime ministers. it said that the people had no access to governance. those same rulers and their sons added to the despotism by staying in power. wars were taking place between these states in nepal until 1815, which was divided into various small states at that time. after 1815, nepal entered an era of relative peace (pandey, bhimbahadur, 1885-1955). there was not much development and prosperity in 1935. after that, the population increased, and small-scale farming expanded. it was not possible to take a strong step towards modernity due to the lack of economic development. nepal formed a basic to a sustainable development structure from earthquake in 1990. that was a very sad earthquake in history. this condition made the economic status of nepal very critical, but then it made a slight recovery. from the list of very least developed countries defined by the united nations, nepal will also reach developing countries before the year 2030. all of the millennium development goals that nepal was expected to achieve between 2000 and 2015 have been met. some of these achievements have not been achieved equally from the point of view of social groups, gender, and geographical areas. nepal will achieve most of the sustainable development goals by the year 2030, even if not all of them (npc, 2016). china and india are the most populous countries in the world. the geographical location of nepal was in the in the middle of those countries. nepal will change on a large scale from that country. historically, it took the united kingdom (uk) 150 years to double its per capita income at the start of the industrial revolution, while the united states had to wait 50 years. both india and china managed to double their per capita output in about 15 years. according to mckinsey and company, china and india each had a population of 1 billion in the early stages of their industrial development, while the population of the united kingdom and the united states was less than 10 million (atsmon, r. dobbs, et al., 2012). there are rocky terrains, grazing areas, forests, lakes, ponds, and borderlands in nepal. some areas are difficult to reach because of the terrain. the beauty of the landscape of the place is attractive for tourism and other natural scenes. nepal is rich in biological diversity and ecological systems. the landscape of nepal is a source of prosperity for future generations. it is necessary to protect vulnerable www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 3 published by scholink inc. areas and operate a sustainable agricultural system. in order for nepal to achieve prosperity by the year 2030, there should be an be an equitable distribution and distribution of wealth among the people. for this, the outline of economic growth should be seen keeping in mind the conservation and utilization of natural resources. currently, more people are dying due to floods and landslides than violence in nepal. people are dying due to air pollution. nepal is on the list of the most earthquake-prone countries in the world. nepal is always at risk from the seismic point of view and demands an uplifting method of human development. in addition to this, strong, planned, and safely constructed infrastructure, buildings, and settlements are also essential. it was growing human complexity, environmental imbalance, and socio-financial side in meditation. in 25th september 2015, since 2030 until in complete to do for various 17 different assimilation goals have achieved durable development targets from 193 nations. in 2030, self doing agenda was to combine the nation of the union member of someone behind to leave no to say of the matter of certainty with on receipt before growing up. the nation of the union was ordinary from the assembly approval, 17 ambitious gave in the year complete to do worldwide as 169 quantitative targets since 2015. it has progress assessments to do 232 indicators that are ready-made in nepal. the government of nepal will target 99%, of the population with access to clean drinking water. the 99% of populations will access to electricity and 24 gj per capita energy consumptions. unemployment will reduce below 10%, and road density will increase to 5 km. income inequality will reduce by 0.46 from 0.23. population living in safe houses will increase from 29.8% to 60% to reduce forest destruction to zero. the quality of public administration will increase from 3.1 to 5. to effectively implement the goals of sustainable development, a six-member high-level directorate committee has been formed under the coordination of the prime minister. nepal is facing a lot of challenges to meet its target of sustainable development goals. it is challenging due to a lack of sufficient budget to implement. how to achieve the target met by the government and how these challenges are faced is the statement of problems of this study. so, the research questions how nepal will achieve the sustainable development goal in the given time. this research question is focusing on the objectives of the study (a) to examine the function of sustainable development goals; (b) to analyze the challenge and opportunity of sustainable development indicators; and (c) to sum up the target and function of achieving the sustainable development goals. 2. review of literature the government has been doing very interesting programs for the development of nepal. it is the responsibility of the state to establish access for everyone in the construction of equality and participatory national development. the state has conducted targeted programs for the minority of the poor, backward classes, and disadvantaged citizens. as a member of the united nations, nepal is committed to carrying out the tasks set in the sustainable development goals. therefore, the previous works done under this have been reviewed as follows: www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 4 published by scholink inc. 2.1 theoretical review the national planning commission has prepared the sustainable development goals. nepal has achieved sustainable development goals, in which the time-bound indicators of each goal are determined. the target indicators are mapping to the current situation in the years of 2017, 2020, 2022, 2025, and 2030 during time frames (npc report, 2015). according to the national planning commission report, by 2030, the population below the poverty line will reduce to 5%, the multidimensional poverty index will reduce from 44.2% to 11%, the poverty concentration will reduce to 2.8%, and the total national income per capita will reach 2500 us dollars. the economic risk index will reduce from 24.6% to 18.9%, the land productivity will increase to 6 metric tons per hectare, and the maternal mortality rate will be reduced from 258 to 69 per million. similarly, the infant mortality rate will decrease from 23 to 10 per thousand, and the child mortality rate from 39 to 22 per thousand. the net enrollment target rate at the primary level will reach 99.5% and the literacy rate in 15–24 age groups to 99%. similarly, the goal of the gender empowerment index increased from 0.568 to 0.7, the gender inequality index increased from 0.49 to 0.05, and the direct gender responsive budget increased by 30 percent. the state was at that time deprived non-nobles from getting education and engaging in private enterprises. citizens could not vote. property rights were not protected. the rulers imposed few taxes. in return, they provided inadequate public goods. the role of political and economic institutions was focused on excessive exploitation of the state's resources, which has led to the impoverishment of the state (acemoglu & robinson, 2012). competitive services are our best hope for revitalizing the industrial sector. the contribution of this sector, which accounted for 10% of the total national product in 1996, has dropped to 6% today. according to recent international studies, the industrial sector is getting worse from some points of view. this demonstrates unconditional symmetry in worker productivity. employers were a large part of the labor force. it was to meet the demand for goods that was not limited by a small domestic market. it is necessary to strengthen the industrial sector to do these works (rodrik, 2013). after the times of civil movement between 2006 and 2009, the newly formed government has decided to a minimum common program. it can be considered a natural process to agree on a common program for people. however, all parties, including the opposition, should not forget the goal of sustainable development set by the united nations. it should understand that those goals are minimal programs. nepal seems to have invested in areas such as job creation, social security, food security, health services, quality education, and digital connectivity to reduce poverty. there was debate between the government and the opposition parties on issues of how to achieve those goals. they were reforming the food production, distribution system, education, health care, alternative energy development, and the nationwide expansion of internet technology. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 5 published by scholink inc. 2.2 constitutional review of commitment in the preamble of the constitution of nepal 2015, it is resolved to end all forms of discrimination and oppression created by the feudal, despotic, centralized, and unitary state system. the goals has ensured economic equality, prosperity, social justice, and building a proportional and inclusive participatory society. the aim is to fulfill the aspirations of long-term peace, good governance, development, and prosperity through a federal democratic republican governance system. according to article 18 of fundamental rights, the state may make special legal provisions for the protection, empowerment, or development of citizens who are socially or culturally backward and economically disadvantaged without discriminating against them on any basis, including religion, race, caste, sex, economic status, etc. this arrangement has a significant meaning for the reduction and elimination of chronic poverty. to achieve the goal of ending hunger, every citizen has the right to food sovereignty. article 35 provides that every citizen will receive free of charge basic health services and no one will deprived of emergency health services. the same article mentions that every citizen has right to access clean drinking water and sanitation. article 31 of the constitution of nepal 2015 says every citizen has the right to free education up to the basic level from the state, the right to free education up to the secondary level, and the right to free higher education for disabled and economically disadvantaged citizens. the right to free braille for the blind, free sign language for the deaf, and the free speech for vocal or speech disabled citizens according to the law. gender equality and the empowerment of girls: every woman has equal racial rights without gender discrimination according to article 38. the right to participate in all state agencies based on the principle of proportional inclusion and special opportunities on positive discrimination in education, health, employment, social security, etc. the constitution of nepal 2015 ensures sustainable modern energy for all under the policies of the state in article 51 of the constitution of nepal in 2015. it is authorized to produce renewable energy to supply reliable energy in an accessible manner appropriately. article 33 stipulates that every citizen has the right to employment and the right to choose employment. likewise, article 34 says that every worker has guaranteed the right to social security-based due diligence, convenience, and contribution, the right to open a trade union and participates in it, and the right to engage in collective bargaining. article 37 provides that every citizen has right to adequate housing for sustainable urbanization and the development of human settlements. it is ending inequality within the country and outside the country, in the preamble of the constitution, class, ethnic, regional, linguistic, religious, gender, and all kinds of racial discrimination are mentioned. all kinds of racial discrimination are to establish international relations on the basis of universal equality under the directive principle of the state in article 50 and to enhance national honor. article 44 provides that every consumer has the right to receive quality goods and services. it is inevitable that periodic and sectoral plans, policies, and programs at the local level should reflect the achievement of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 6 published by scholink inc. sustainable development goals by imbibing the practical practice of building an equitable society and the concept of public-private partnership. 3. methods and materials the study consider base on secondary data as information to achieve sustainable development goals. the study used published and unpublished data from related sources. millennium development and sustainable development goals are the united nations has addressed in this study. the government of nepal, national planning commission, has targeted indicators that are also used in this study. the available information has analyzed in a descriptive manner. it does not include primary data. sample surveys have not selected for data collection. this study is based on a descriptive framework. due to a lack of time management, the study does not fully represent all indicators of achieving sustainable development goals. 4. the undpglobal campaign and nepal's achievement end of poverty: end all forms of poverty everywhere to reduce at least half the proportion of people living in any form of poverty. implement social protection systems and measures for all significantly, including the poor and vulnerable. it has built the resilience of poor, vulnerable people to reducing their exposure to environmental disasters and other economic, social, and environmental impacts and disasters. according to the survey report of 2022 of the asian development bank (adb), nepal has 20.3% of the poverty rate below the national poverty line. the living standard survey of nepal 2023 shows that 24.66% of rural poverty and 18.34% of urban poverty have been prescribed. the national statistics office (nso) 2024 shows that there is 20% of poverty in nepal. the multidimensional poverty value is 0.074, head count poverty is 17.5%, identity of deprivation is 42.5%, vulnerability to multidimensional poverty is 17.8%, and severe multidimensional poverty is 4.9%, respectively. deprivation contribution in overall multidimensional poverty is in health 23.2%, education 33.9%, and standard of living 43.0%, respectively, in nepal (undp, 2019). nepal has big problems ending poverty by achieving the sustainable development goals. zero hunger: hunger is an enemy for man. hunger is ending by achieving food security, advanced nutrition, and promoting sustainable agriculture. it will end all forms of malnutrition to address the nutritional food for adolescents, pregnant women, and others. it will increase investment in rural infrastructure, agricultural research, technology development, vegetation, and the establishment of gin banks in developing countries by producing agricultural productivity. the proper function of the food market has related transactions to help limit extreme volatility in food prices. people are hungry; they do not get food for feeding properly. in 2000, the global hunger score of nepal was 37.2; since 2008, it has been down to 29.0; in 2015, it was 21.3; and in 2023, it was 15.0. out of the 136 countries, nepal has 69th position (ghi, 2023). the data shows that nepal has reduced hunger. it is an achievement of zero hunger for the future. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 7 published by scholink inc. health and welfare: ensuring healthy lives is promoting the well-being of all people of all ages. the preventable deaths of newborn children have ended less than five years old. universal access to ensure sexual reproductive health services, information to education, including family planning, and the adjustment of reproductive health of the national strategies program. the quality healthcares are access to safe effective, quality, and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all. in the present situation of health care, the maternal mortality rate per hundred thousand was 229 in 2011, but 151 in 2022. the global maternal mortality rate has 223 in 2020 but sdg 70 in 2030 (unesco, 2020). under-5 year's mortality rate in 2011 was 54 and in 2022 was 33. infant mortality rates are 46 in 2011 and 28 in 2022. the world scenario data show that the infant mortality rate will be 28 according to unicef in 2021 in the world. the total fertility rate of the 15-19-year-old agrees group of women was 2.6 in 2011 and 2.1 in 2022. the prevalence of stunting among 5-year-old children was 41 in 2011 and 25 in 2022. similarly, institutional delivery had 35% in 2011 and 79% in 2022 (nmics, 2022). quality education: the quality education for all and promote lifelong learning. that means all ensuring adolescents receive free, equitable, and quality primary and secondary education. to eliminate the gender disparities in education by ensuring equal access to all levels of education and vocational training. people have disabilities; indigenous and tribal children are at risk. all learning is through education for sustainable development, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship, and appreciation of cultural diversity. over 265 million children are currently out of school, and 22% of them are of primary school age. additionally, the children who are attending school are lacking basic skills in reading and math. the overall survival rate up to class 12 has increased from 11.5% in 2016 to 33.1% in 2022. for girls, it has increased to 33.9%, while for boys, the survival rate is higher. the number of out-of-school children across the country fell by 30% during the period ssdp 2016-2022. the net enrollment rate (ner) for basic education in most 15 disadvantage districts has increased from 85.1% in 2016 to 92.2% in 2022. similarly, the rate of secondary education increased from 29.1% in 2016 to 44.1% in 2022. for girls, it has increased from 27% to 43.4% at the same period. according to the auditor report, more than 99% of funds disbursed to schools followed eligibility and utilization guidelines (wbg, 2023). gender equality: the gender equality and empowering all women by eliminating all forms of violence against all women, girls, and children in the public and private sectors, including trafficking and sexual exploitation. ensuring an effective participation for equal opportunities was women's leadership at all critical levels of political, economic, and public life. strengthen policies and laws are promoting to gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls at all levels. according to the national census 2011, 40% of women and girls in nepal were illiterate, with the rate for men and boys much lower at 22%. the literacy rate was on average 7% among dalit women, and life expectancy was 10–14 years lower than that for high-caste women. reservation quotas in the civil service act amended in 2007, women are officers almost doubled to 22.85% in 2013 from 12.97% in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 8 published by scholink inc. 2010.21. most dramatically, women’s representation in the constituent assembly increased to 29% in the november 2013 elections from 2.9% in 1991 (adb, 2015). clean water and sanitation:water and sanitation is very important to our human life. ensuring access to clean water and sanitation has achieved universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all. achieve adequate and equitable access to sanitation and hygiene for alls and end open defecation. strengthens of participation was the local community in the improvement of water and sanitation management. out of the total population, 10.8 million people in nepal do not have access to improved sanitation, and 3.5 million do not have access to basic water services. the target of sdg is drinking water 95.4%, sanitation 79.2%, and basic hygiene 80.6%. it also estimated that was only 45% of households have access to piped water, about 40% depend on protected wells and tube wells for drinking water, and 10 percent lack access to basic water supply facilities (dwss, 2015). affordable clean energy: the government has ensured access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy. a universal, affordable, reliable, and modern energy service distributed is increasing access for all. significantly the share of renewable energy increase in global energy availability by 2030. facilitate to access clean energy research and technologies, including renewable energy, energy conservation and management, and cutting-edge and clean fossil fuel technologies. it has enhanced international cooperation to promote investment in energy infrastructure and clean energy technologies. economic growth and decent work: promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment, and decent work for all. in least-developed countries, per capita economic growth and at least 7% annual gross domestic product (gdp) growth should maintain according to national conditions. to achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, equal pay for equal work. formulate and implement policies to promote sustainable tourism that will promote local culture and the production of goods to create employment. inflation is developing asia and is forecast to decline from 4.4% to 3.6% in 2023 and 3.5% in 2024. there is growth of regional forecast for 4.7% this year on slower expansions in south asia and southeast asia. the growth forecast for 2024 is unchanged at 4.8%. nepal's economy is anticipated to grow by 4.3% in 2024, but it has a forecast of 3.3%. the stable remittances and higher imports and account deficit are expected to account for 1.8% of gdp as growth in fy2024 (adb, 2024). industry and infrastructure: the state is building strong infrastructure and sustaining industrialization. by sustainable developing strong infrastructure, we are supporting people to economic development and human welfare. sustainable industrialization increases the share of industry in employment and gross domestic product (gdp) according to national circumstances and doubles its share in the least developed countries. it is increasing the access of microenterprises and other enterprises to financial services, including affordable credit, and their adjustment to the value chain and market. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 9 published by scholink inc. according to the department of industry nepal, the numbers of industries are coming down from 8.9% to 4.4%, with investment of 7.3% and employment of 4.8%. the industry was invested in 17.8% of and provided 13% employment in 2022 (khanal, 2022). low inequality: it has needed to reduce inequality within or between countries. promote and empower social and political inclusion for all. it was regardless of the age, gender, disability, ethnicity, origin, religion, economic status, or other status. it has ended discriminatory laws, policies, and practices. it had promoted appropriate laws, practices, and policies to ensure equal opportunities for all outcomes. adopt a fiscal wage of social protection policies to progressively achieve greater equality. so, the gini-coefficient value of nepal is 58.5, but its value lies between 0 and 100. the gini index 0.30 of the standard survey indicates the high inequality per capita consumption. sustainable cities and communities: the government has made cities inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable. ensure access for all too adequate, safe, and affordable housing, basic services, and upgrade slums. improve road safety and provide access to safe, affordable, and convenient transport systems. significantly reduce the number of deaths, number of people affected, and economic losses due to disasters. the level of urbanization in the kathmandu valley and kaski district comes to 96.97% and 79.52%, respectively, while it is only 18.28% for the rest of the hills. similarly, inner tarai valleys have a level of urbanization of 41.97% compared to 38.94% for the rest of the tara. only 17.1% of the total population lives in 58 urban areas in nepal (cbs, 2011). the decadal population growth rate of kathmandu is 60.93% compared to the growth of nepal as a whole of 14.98%. kathmandu alone accounts for approximately one-third of total nepal’s urban population, which has been growing at a rate of 4.76% p.a. (world bank, 2012). responsible consumption and production: the state has ensured consumption and production patterns. the government has achieved sustainable management and efficient use of natural resources. significantly, waste has been reduced through minimization, recycling, and reuse of waste. every person has ensured the necessary information and awareness about sustainable development and lifestyles. the gross domestic product (gdp) has estimated growth of 1.9% in nepal after rising 5.6% in the previous year, owing to tight monetary policy. the growth of agriculture has increased from 2.7% to 2.2% in 2023. earlier, cereal output, namely paddy, wheat, and maize, increased by 3.9% on a favorable monsoon and the use of an improved variety of seeds. industry has grown 0.6% after expanding to 10.8% in 2022 as manufacturing and construction. the demand side has a 4.1% rise in private consumption expenditure, albeit down from 6.8% a year earlier, which helped underpin growth. fixed investment slumped to 10.9% after expanding 3.8% in 2022. private investment shrank by 7.6% and public investment slumped by 20.2%, resulting in a 3.9 percentage point decline in gdp (adb, 2023). the data has clarified responsible consumption and production scenarios in nepal. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 10 published by scholink inc. action of climate: the climate is changing and changeable. it can take immediate action to combat climate change and its impacts. we should deal with the risks related to natural disasters and climate change and increase the adaptive capacity in all countries. integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies, and plans. it is improving through education, public awareness, and institutional capacity on climate change mitigation, adaptation, and early warning. it is directly affected by food production and the food supply chain. nepal received 91.2% of the normal precipitation, which was about 1570.4 mm. the maximum average temperature was 27.9°c, and the minimum temperature of nepal was 15.6°c in 2023. the precipitation remained below normal, ranging from 12% to 22%. november and december were dry with 83% and 77% deficits, respectively (nepal climate summary, 2023). so, nepal has not faced climate change adaptation problems. it remains to be careful for cultivation and vegetation where the agro-product should be produced properly. life above ground: sustainable management of forests has combated desertification, halting soil erosion, reversing such processes, and preventing biodiversity loss. by 2020, combat desertification and restore other land and soil degradation, including droughtand flood-prone land. enhance the capacity of the himalayan ecosystem to provide essential benefits for sustainable development and conservation of biological diversity. it should make an immediate action plan to stop poaching and illegal transportation of protected animals and plants. the estimated world mean soil erosion rate is between 12 and 15 tons per hectare per year. nepal is a sloping and mountainous region. land sliding rate is also high. the annual soil erosion rate is estimated at 25 tons per hectare per year in nepal. by the same cause and times, nepal has lost a total of 369 metric tons of soil per year (koirala et al., 2019). soil erosion and land sliding are problems of farming and food production. beside this, deforestation, grazing, expansion of physical infrastructure and urbanization are helping factors of it. it plays a direct or indirect role for decreased crop production and soil fertility. the variability of rainfalls has frequent and intense droughts, floods, and landslides (adb, 2014). as a result, about 62% of nepal's agriculture is dependent on farmers affected by soil erosion (national statistics office, 2023). peace, justice, and strong institutions: the government has been promoting just, peaceful, and inclusive societies. the rule of law at national and international levels has promoted ensuring equal access to justice for all. it will provide legal identification including birth registration, to all citizens and reduce all forms of corruption. the ratio of rule of law in nepal has getting a rank of 71 out of 142 countries. overall score of the south asian regional secures has first rank out of 6 countries in nepal. nepal gets 5th position in rule of law in lowto middle-income 37 countries. the rule has declined in 59% of countries including nepal, in 2023. the ratio was high, which saw 78% of countries decline the rule of law in 2016. the constitution of power of government has fallen in 56% countries compared to 58% in 2022 and 70% in 2021. a smaller majority of countries (56%) also experienced a decline in fundamental rights of rule of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 11 published by scholink inc. law (wjp, 2023). nepal has performance in rule of law and no mere difficulty in achieving sustainable development goals. 5. activities and achievement for sustainable development goal (sdg) in nepal the poor employment: nepal is rich country in natural resources. it is rich in water resources. there is no adequate provision of drinking water for the people of kathmandu. how and with what morality can we rule in a country that cannot provide feeding and water for some people? the nepali population is living in poverty for less than us$ 3.20 per day. the poor should be given employment opportunities in the national development policy. this can help economic and institutional reforms to encourage economic growth and increase efficiency and utilization of resources. investment should be made in areas such as job creation, social and food security, healthcare, quality education, and digital connectivity to reduce poverty. improvement food production and distribution system: the people are hungry with a lack of food. children are malnourished due to nutrient food supply. the government should end hunger by making food security plans. it can help with nutrition improvement and the promotion of sustainable agriculture practices for farmers. the requirement is achieving sustainable food production for public involvement. investment should be made in local agriculture businesses, through which people can further improve their situation. the national food and aid distribution system should improve. the main strategy is to invest in agriculture and provide cash to farmers so that they can revive the traditional method of making agricultural fertilizers. it can help to manage agro-productivity and sustainability with its priority to selection. education and health service promotion: privatization of the education and health sectors damages social sustainability. why can't the state take on the responsibility of providing free education and health care to all the citizens of nepal? this cannot be done due to the lack of resources. the political leadership of class or the businessmen is connected to the political parties of nepal. these are issues that nepali politicians should discuss. it is said that the more children go to school, the healthier the nation's economy will be able to do. there is an absence of quality education; no country can develop, prosper, or establish democracy and social justice. quality education is the first condition for countries aiming for prosperity and development. because, without quality education, the manpower required by the country cannot prepare. equal access to quality education should accept challenge as a primary condition for the country's overall development and civil equality. this is also the measurement base for the country's development. it is also the foundation of competent leadership. it seems necessary to debate to make policies on how citizens can have equal access to quality education. central, provincial, and local-level policymakers and educational providers need to have a new perspective on ways of thinking. the constitution of nepal mentions that basic health services should be provided free of charge. socialism and social democracy are debated in nepal from time to time. but there is hardly any www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 12 published by scholink inc. discussion about what a socialist health service would look like. the principle is that those who need urgent medical services should be given free, affordable treatment. if we can help each other by paying high taxes, the education-health system will be successful. doctors and medical nurses are the backbone of a quality medical education system. the government should increase or invest in it. woman empowerment: gender equality is not only about the percentage of women represented in good governance. it is also important to change perceptions. gender equality and quality education are among the goals. formally, women's rights are included as fundamental rights in nepal. maternity rights, property rights, reproductive health, education, equal wages, and social security are also covered. in reality, gender discrimination, sexual harassment, and female illiteracy are the major weaknesses of nepali society. that resists the empowerment of women in nepal. men are privileged by patriarchy, but they are also associated with political and social power. changing the perception of gender equality in a society distorted by the caste system is a difficult task. now, caste societies are not sustainable. no society can survive without a scientific approach. the development of nepal is not possible until gender equality is maintained without women. technology energy development: hydropower development is the most debated topic in nepal. however, it has not found a practical solution. everyone knows the potential of nepal's hydropower. the government of nepal has not been able to take advantage of it. internet technology provides students with access to education and easy and fast learning. the opportunity has given them practice what they have to learn. despite bringing about changes in the living standards of rural people, the government has not been effective in providing services to them. the technology has provided service very fast for people. the government has invested to change poverty and underdevelopment through energy development. the government can create a suitable environment for investments in hydropower development. the urban dirty management: the dirty management is important problems of clean health and environment. recycling plants is necessary at the government level for managing waste. waste reduction or waste management recycling systems should be imported. it takes a huge amount of money. similarly, use of household items such as books, magazines, clothes, kitchen utensils, etc. can be recycled easily. recycling creates job opportunities by turning waste into valuable raw materials. it has contributed to the national economy. waste management in kathmandu metropolitan city has been controversial for a long time. the major cities in nepal should develop a plan for how to solve urban dirty management. europeans call it a circular economy and a new economy, a new way of consuming and producing. a circular economy aims to create a zero-waste system where all resources flow continuously between producers and users. green industrial and circular economy development: the traditional systems of capitalism and centrally planned socialist economies are based on the use of natural resources, not sustainable development. public policy for green industries that encourages environmentally responsible investment is essential. if a policy is implemented, a sustainable economy can build. this is a way to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 13 published by scholink inc. achieve economic growth through the use of natural resources and a sustainable economy. it is including that industrial production processes and resource-efficient productivity are sustained. it creates public awareness, knowledge, and capacity. similarly, the government should support industrial organizations, enterprises, and entrepreneurs in all aspects related to greening industry. environmental economics is the cost-effective use of conservation of the world's natural resources. especially, how do people produce for consuming goods and services? the government of nepal can consult with environmental economists. changing environmental management for food: variously over time, food and security take in times of crisis in 1974. when food and agriculture of the organization was took the initiative to address starvation worldwide. food security is a sensitive subject, assuming in particular financial by calculation rich nations. own of the people have necessary production, storage, distribution, and market management. the farmers of the agriculture area are protected for international business in contracts. starvation and globalization are happening. in context, developing countries are even more sensitive because they are even more alert to stay. the family of the nepali farmer is having a multitude in agriculture based on meaning arrangement in the country food security. on the subject that have political commitment of the state policy and structure. the role of the private sector of the people from the side combined initiative to necessary seems. agriculture and food security: a geographical, ecological, and organic aspect of nepal has variety. the sources of natural aspects of abundance are multiracial culture, original knowledge, and skillfully of the nation. prosperity for inclusive and sustainable agriculture is important in the food and security column. it is saying no emergency. agriculture and food security are related to the constitution provisions and federalism implementation in the context of nepal. it is a special opportunity. agricultural production for food and food security for hunger control is mandatory. in order to avoid the crisis that may occur in the future, we must save food. the habit of saving and preserving food should be developed. it teaches us to deal with future food crises. the government plays an important role in increasing the storage capacity of food grains. human dimension security: in totality, food security is the human dimension aspect within the concept; we must see what happens. food production and the consumption process are mutually interdependent. it is having separated to see if they don't match. the human element of security is within the blueprint by keeping at least more food, health, financial, political, community, etc. rights to take. in the sense of agriculture and food security, the question means nepal ecological, caste, and social accession to do monotonous medium. sustainable agriculture: sustainable agriculture is to preserve the long-term health of people and the land. farmers who use sustainable agriculture meet the needs of families and communities for nutritious food. it also conserves water, soil, and seeds for the future. most food comes from the ground. but many people have little or no land to meet their healthy needs. it cooperates with food markets for equitable distribution of food grains and helps to get rid of these problems. farmers are taking care of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 14 published by scholink inc. the land. they are good at what they do. they develop sustainable agricultural practices and adopt these practices to meet the needs of communities and improve the conditions of the land where they work. it can reduce hunger, migration, and the degradation of good soil. since ancient times in cities, markets, or places where people have been farming. it solves problems like water pollution. they are not only for farmers. this is important for home gardeners in terms of health and to starting to develop community gardens. anyone is doing urban agriculture to improve nutrition, food security, and community health. farming on health and happiness: sustainable farming methods not only provide food. they also fertilize the soil, conserve water, save valuable seeds, preserve biodiversity, and ensure that the land is suitable for future generations. by using sustainable methods to grow food, farmers and gardeners can grow more on less land without the use of chemical pesticides or fertilizers. the theme is good food to sell and eat less paper to produce food, less pollution of air, water, and land. it improves human health because conserving water reduces the fear of drought. it reduces dependence on chemicals, makes money, and makes you independent. farming without chemicals saves farmers lives, farm workers lives, and everyone who eats locally produced food and drinks water from health problems. sustainable practices like using green manure reduce the amount of work required to produce food. this is especially important because migration, hiv/aids, and other issues force people to work in the fields. it makes the land productive. adapting vermicompost technology: earthworm stool (vermicompost) is a species of organically made compost from waste to make up quality and nutritious compost. it uses their stools to make a technology called vermiculture. artificial methods of earthworm production do on your own green vegetables, grass cutting, fruits, etc. what a waste of parts or garbage used for environmental, financial, and social reasons. by the way, an important aspect of compost stool production is the method of vermicompost. adoption to do urban area can processing center, and village came out work. it doesn't take but to rot to the garbage of vermi-culture technology by adapting to management. there are various species of earthworms found on earth. it can be fed by organic foods that are brought from the came out grainy using full rotten food materials to the stool. this stool easily dissolves in water. these types of stools improve soil properties and have been found to be abundant in food and nutrients. it is possible to develop earthworm feces by using long-lasting organic farming methods. earthworm stools to make various species of earthworms of the night in white and blue colors are used. earthworm is in the mall crop or on the plant. 6. role of the national planning commission nepal presented the progress made in the sustainable development goals at the united nations high-level political forum in 2017. in addition, the planning commission has prepared a baseline report after taking stock of the current situation regarding sustainable development goals. in the context of nepal, the government has determined 414 sustainable development indicators and targets indicators. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 15 published by scholink inc. the roles of the national planning committee are defined as below: institutional structure: for the implementation of sustainable development goals, the federal government has arranged for the formation of three high-level committees at the national level. it has forcefully changed to an institutional structure by providing public services. national instruction committee: this committee is chaired by the prime minister. it has arranged that committee will consist of the vice chairman of the national planning commission, the minister of finance, the minister of foreign affairs, the chief secretary, and the secretary of the national planning commission. this committee issues the necessary policy instructions for the development of the country. it also works to gather resources for the immediate and long term. it helps in budget management by estimating how much time it takes to develop a place. it works in accordance with the conduct of regional development in the common interest. implementation, coordination of monitoring committee: this committee is chaired by the vice chairman of the national planning commission. the members of the national planning commission that oversees the economy, the secretary of the ministry of finance, the secretary of the ministry of foreign affairs, the chamber of commerce, the federation of industries, and the federation of nepalese industries are present in the said committee. the joint secretary of the finance department of the planning commission remains the member secretary of this committee. there is a provision that civil society and other stakeholders can be kept as invited members of such committees. functional subjective committees: the government has arranged to have ten thematic working committees. it has been arranged that the relevant member of the national planning commission will be the coordinator of each working committee. in these thematic committees, it is arranged that there will be senior employees of relevant ministries, the private sector, civil society, and the planning commission. the committees are economic development, industrial development, urban development, social development, agriculture, climate, and environment, employment management, infrastructure development, energy development, peace, justice, and inclusive institutions, respectively. 7. indicators of sustainable development goals nepal has been doing very important things to achieve sustainable development goals. there is an obligation to increase investment in poverty alleviation, education, health, drinking water, and communication sectors. the government has been doing the following to bring about positive changes in the livelihood of the common people. poverty reduction: in nepal, 23.7 percent of the population has an income of less than 1.25 us dollars per day, and by the year 2030, the goal is to reduce to less than 5% and reach 2500 us dollars per capita. nepal has made great progress in reducing poverty by considering the international standard of 1.25 us dollars per day to account for the situation of extreme poverty. nationally defined poverty has fallen from 31% in 2004 to 21.6% in 2015. similarly, on the basis of 1.9 us dollars per day, it is estimated that poverty in nepal is 36%. the multidimensional poverty index shows that 28.6% of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 16 published by scholink inc. nepalis are multi-dimensionally poor. it shows that nepal has reduced the multidimensional poverty index by half from 0.313 to 0.127 between 2006 and 2014. nepal has proposed to reduce extreme poverty to less than 5% to increase per capita income from us$766 in 2015 to us$2,500 in 2030. nationally defined poverty will be less than 5% in 2030. the goal is to reduce the multidimensional poverty index to less than 7% by 2030. in order to reduce poverty faster than current income growth, the consumption share of 20% of low-income families is set to increase from 7.6% in 2015 to 12% in 2030. likewise, social protection spending is estimated to reach 15% of the total federal budget in 2030. food security, nutrition, and sustainable agriculture: in nepal, 30.1% of children aged 6 to 59 months are still underweight, while low height for age and underweight for height are 36% and 11.3%, respectively. for 53% of all children, anemia remains a major challenge. anemia is also 46% high among women of reproductive age. one-third (36.1%) of children from birth to 59 months are suffering from malnutrition. commodities and crops are the main aspects of the integrated agricultural system. they contribute significantly to ending hunger, achieving food security, and improving nutrition. however, the productivity of the land is still low. such productivity is usd 3,278 per hectare. at present, only 25.2% of the total arable land has irrigation facilities throughout the year. most financial institutions are reluctant to invest in agriculture. this is evident from nepal's world food security score of 42.8 out of 100. sustainable development goal by 2030 to reduce malnutrition by 3% and underweight among children by fewer than 5% to 9%. anemia is among women and children of reproductive age to 10% and increase per capita food production by 66% targets have set. sustainable development for peaceful society: nepal has made significant progress in the direction of inclusion. it has a long way to go in the fields of transparency, accountability, law, and good governance. press freedom, freedom of expression, and citizen activism are warnings of the shortcomings of the state. it has also paved the way for good governance in the coming days. according to the report, 64 children out of every 100,000 were trafficked in foreign countries in 2015. similarly, the proportion of children aged 1 to 14 who have experienced psychological trauma, assault, or physical punishment is very high, at 81.7%. in 2015, 1,628 people died around the world due to armed and violent violence. under the sustainable development goal, specific quantitative targets have been set, such as ending deaths from violence. conflict and ending violence against women and children are improving indicators of transparency and accountability that are considered globally relevant. overall indicators and goals of achieving: under the sustainable development goals, the government of nepal has set various indicators. the target is to reduce the maternal mortality rate to 69 per 1 million. the student enrollment rate in primary schools is 96.6%, and the target is to increase it to 99.5% while at the secondary level. the target is to increase 99% from the current 56.7% value. the gender disparity index is 0.49. the goal is to increase it to 0.05. there are 29.5% women members www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 17 published by scholink inc. of parliament (mp) in the national parliament, and the goal is to increase it to 40 percent. while the presence of women at the critical level of public service is 2%, it should increase to 7.5%; the supply of basic drinking water should increase from 87% to 99%. those have to access drinking water through piped water systems. it should increase from 49.5% to 90% and 67.6%. the goal is to increase it to 98% of people using the toilet. while 74% of people have access to electricity, the goal is to increase it to 99 percent. the number of cooking gas users is 18 percent. it will increase to 39 percent. the per capita gross domestic product will be maintained at 2.3% to 7%. the growth of the agriculture sector will increase from 0.8% to 5%, and the number of youth unemployed will decrease from 35.8% to 10% target. the road density is 0.44 km per square from 1.50. the share of the industrial sector in the gross domestic product is 15% and will increase to 25%. the consumption inequality of 0.33 will reduce to 0.16. the income inequality of 0.46 will be reduced to 0.23. the number of families living at home is 29.8 and will increase to 60 percent. safe roads are 0.1 percent; it will increase to 50 percent. bio-fuel energy consumption is 12.5% and will reduce to 15 percent. the food degradation index of 10 percent will reduce to 2 percent, setting the target. the government has set a target to reduce the amount of carbon dioxide produced annually from 0.10 metric tons per person to 0.05. similarly, 175 create climate-smart villages, providing education on climate change in all increasing schools. the area covered by community forests increased from 39% to 42%, increasing the area covered by reservation areas to 23.3% of the total land. the rate of forest destruction is 1.90 percent; the goal is to reduce it to zero. the rate of wall marriage is 48.8%; it should be reduced to zero. the index of transparency, accountability, and corruption at the public level is 3%; then it should increase to 5%. the quality index of public administration is 3.10, then it should reduce to zero. the birth registration rate should increase from 58.1% to 100 percent. 19.1% of the share is government revenue in the gross domestic product. it will increase to 30%, and the share of foreign aid in the total national budget of 15% will increase to 18%. the share of foreign investment is 2.7% of the gross domestic product. it will increase to 20% of the prediction. 8. conclusion nepal has been working hard to achieve sustainable development goals. it is working to expand investment in areas such as education, health, drinking water, communication, transportation, food security, and poverty alleviation. in addition, it has encouraged sustainable agriculture for food security. the government is working with the aim of achieving the sustainable development goal by the year 2030. nepal has 20.3% of the poverty rate below the national poverty line. the government will aim to reduce the poverty line below 5% in 2020. the multidimensional poverty index will be reduced from 44.2% to 11%, the poverty concentration will be reduced to 2.8%, and the total national income per capita will reach 2500 us dollars. the economic risk index will be reduced from 24.6% to 18.9%, and the land productivity will increase to 6 metric tons per hectare. the maternal mortality rate will be www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 18 published by scholink inc. reduced from 258 to 69 per million. the infant mortality rate will decrease from 23 to 10 per thousand, and the child mortality rate will decrease from 39 to 22 per thousand. net enrollment rate target at the primary level will reach 99.5%, and the literacy rate in 15–24 age groups is 99%. the goal of the gender empowerment index is to increase from 0.568 to 0.7, the gender inequality index from 0.49 to 0.05, and the direct gender responsive budget to 30 percent. the 24.66% of rural poverty and 18.34% of urban poverty have been prescribed. the 23.7% of the nepali population has an income of less than 1.25 us dollars per day, and it is to reduce to less than 5% and reach 2500 us dollars per capita. there is a 20% share of consumption by low-income families, increasing from 7.6% to 12%, and social protection spending is estimated to reach 15% of the total federal budget in 2030. the ratio of rule of law in nepal has 71 ranks out of 142 countries. similarly, drinking water increased from 87% to 99%, electricity access increased to 99%, per capita gross domestic product increased from 2.3% to 7%, agriculture sector growth increased from 0.8% to 5%, youth unemployed decreased from 35.8% to 10%, consumption inequality decreased from 0.33 to 0.16, income inequality decreased from 0.46 to 0.23, and bio-fuel energy consumption decreased from 12.5% to 15%, respectively. the community forest area increased from 39% to 42%, and the index of transparency, accountability, and corruption at the public level increased from 3% to 5%. the quality index of public administration has reduced from 3.10 to zero. the birth registration rate increases from 58.1% to 100 percent are the achieving indicators. conflict of interest: there is no any conflict of interest funding: no funding have received acknowledgement: thanks for researcher and information provider to complete the report. references acemoglu, d., & robinson, j. (2012). why nations fail? the origins of power, prosperity and poverty. crown publishers, new york. https://doi.org/10.1355/ae29-2j adb. (2004). report and recommendation of the president to the board of directors: proposed loan to the kingdom of nepal for the gender equality and empowerment of women project. manila. adb. (2014). nepal country environment note. asian development bank. mandaluyong city, philipines. adb. (2015). nepal: country performance assessment 2015. manila. aepc. (2021). progress at glance: year in review fy 2019/20 and fy 2020/21, s.l.: alternative energy promotion centre. atsmon, r. dobbs, et al. (2012). wining the $30 trillion decathlon: going for gold in engineering markets. mckinsey quarterly, august. dwss. (2015). progress review 2015. kathmandu: government of nepal, ministry of water supply and sanitation, department of water supply and sewerage. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 19 published by scholink inc. ghale, & bishwokarma, n. k. (2013). in upreti, b. r., bhattarai, r., & wagle, g. s. (eds.), human security in nepal: concepts, issues, and challenges (pp. 89-118). kathmandu: nepal institute for policy studies (nips) and south asia regional coordination office of nccr (north-south). ghale, & pyakuryal, k. n. (2016). conceptualizing the right to food and food security: some theoretical reflections (pp. 21-33). nepalese journal of agricultural sciences, hicast, kathmandu. ghale. (2011). right to food and food security in a changing context, in pyakuryal, k. n., upreti, b. r. (editors), land, agriculture, and agrarian transformation kathmandu: consortium for land research and policy dialogue (colarp) (pp. 27-56). ghi. (2023). global hunger index scores by 2023 ghi rank. gon. (2011). sanitation and hygiene master plan 2011. kathmandu, nepal. kanal, u. (2022). industrialization of socialist-oriented economy development in nepal: contribution, possibility and challenges of private sector. published by scholink inc.usa. koirala, p., thakuri, s., joshi, s., & chauhan, r. (2019). estimation of soil erosion in nepal using a rusle modeling and geospatial tool. geosciences, 9(4), 1-19. https://doi.org/10.3390/geosciences9040147 lga. (2017). local governance act. law commission, government of nepal national statistics office. (2023). national agricultural census 2021, summary. kathmandu, nepal. nepal constitutions. (2015). nepal law commission 2015 of the nepal constitution, kathmandu. nepal government. (2016). nepal business integrated strategy, kathmandu. nlc. (2018). food right and food sovereignty act, 2018. nepal law commission, kathmandu. npc. (2016). nepal and the millennium development goals: final status report, 2000-2015 kathmandu. npc. (2020). national review of sustainable development goals, report 2020, government of nepal, kathmandu. npc. (2024). 16th plan, national planning commission, government of nepal, kathmandu. oscar, a. g., & gasper, d. (2013). human security, combined with the nation union program, geneva. pandey, b. b. (1885-1955). nepal at that time”, part 2, p.171; and shah, rishikesh, “modern nepal: a political history”. rodrik, d. (2013). unconditional convergence in manufacturing. the quarterly journal of economics, 128(1), 165-204. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjs047 undp. (2019). briefing note for countries on the 2023 multidimensional poverty index, unstacking global poverty: data for high impact action. united nations. (1948). worldwide, and the human rights proclamation, geneva combined the nation-state union, the human rights of the high commissioner's office, 1989, child rights related to contracts, geneva. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 20 published by scholink inc. upreti, b. r., & ghale, y. (2014). conflict over seed and plant genetic resources: implications for food security. in upreti, b. r., sharma, s. r., & paudel, s. b. (ed.), food security in post-conflict nepal: challenges and opportunities kathmandu: department of development studies, school of arts, kathmandu university, and nepal center for contemporary research (nccr). wjp. (2023). rule of law index globally, world justice project (wjp) 2023. retrieved from https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/ yamuna mixed up. (2019). in agriculture research wanted, nepal weekly, march 5, 2019, kathmandu. 1 department of economics and social sciences, tri microsoft word ape-v4n1-p1 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 1 original paper striking similarities: the origins of the european economic community david blake1* 1 city university of london, london, united kingdom * david blake, city university of london, london, united kingdom received: november 16, 2019 accepted: december 28, 2020 online published: january 4, 2021 doi:10.22158/ape.v4n1p1 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v4n1p1 abstract a plan for a european economic community was developed at the university of berlin in 1942. there are striking similarities with the european economic community that was introduced in 1957—and which became the foundation stone of the european union. particularly striking is the innate hostility both to liberal economic values and to democracy—a hostility that permeates the eu to this very day. keywords origins of the european economic community, university of berlin 1942, european union jel codes f45, f55, n14, n24, n34, n44 1. introduction a plan for a european economic community was first proposed in 1942. at its heart is a customs union and a single market. the plan covered all areas necessary for economic integration. its ultimate aim was full economic and political union with state economic leadership over highly regulated private sector companies, but without any requirement for securing democratic consent. we compare the plan with the european economic community introduced in 1957 and discuss how it turned out in practice. we end by discussing how believers in liberal economic values and democracy should respond. 2. a plan for a european economic community was first proposed in 1942 a conference was held in 1942 at the berlin school of economics—part of the university of berlin—on the theme of a creating a “european economic community”. speakers included academics, government ministers and industry practitioners. a conference volume was published, europaeische wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, which was subsequently translated into english. (note 1) there is also a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 2 published by scholink inc. partial translation by edward spalton. (note 2) what is particularly interesting is that the very same term “european economic community” (eec) was adopted by the principal founding fathers of the european union, jean monnet and robert schuman. it is not known if they were directly aware of the 1942 plan for a eec. yet there are striking similarities between the plan and the eec that they helped to establish just fifteen years later. the 1942 plan is not well known, and needs to be much better known, since it has had—possibly subconsciously—a significant impact on both the economic philosophy underlying the eec and the political thinking behind the european union (eu) itself. this is because at its heart is a strong dislike of what is described variously as english/anglo-saxon/anglo-american/liberal-capitalist laissez-faire economics and a particular distaste for the usa, with its “addiction for records. …americans must always have the largest, the best, the fattest, the longest, the fastest and so on”. the underlying economic philosophy behind the plan for the eec is “state economic leadership” over heavily regulated private sector companies which are expected to operate as efficiently as possible using the latest available technologies. it differs therefore from the soviet state planning model, where the vast bulk of businesses are state owned. professor dr heinrich hunke, president of the publicity council of german industry, in the introduction to the 1942 plan, provides the following motivation for a european economic community: the existing failures of clarity arise in the first case around the concept of the control of the economy, the degree of solidarity and neighbourly support, the development of individual strengths, the concern over the maintenance of living standards and the question of raw material purchases from foreign economic areas. it is natural that each considers this according to the proportions of whatever question stands in the foreground of his interest. we should try in this place to establish whether a conclusive answer can be given. there can be no doubt that the concept of economic control, or rather economic leadership, is as much revolutionary as it is new. the fact of its establishment is more important than fate and the significance of european co-operation, not least because a new, unitary concept depends on it. the anglo-saxon economy is no longer classic but obsolete. it comes therefore to this: that a new ideological and terminological concept has arisen, which has a particular sturdy foundation of communication and co-operation. in particular, the following individual points should be noted: 1) state economic leadership is no momentary crisis solution, but forms the core of the new theory and practice. it replaces the autonomic egotism and the automatic, self-acting laws of the anglo-saxon theory. 2) economic direction and control is not synonymous with a tendency towards a planned economy. it strives neither for the extinction of individuality nor for the administration of the economy through the state apparatus. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 3 published by scholink inc. 3) state economic leadership signifies much more the new empowerment of the originative and creative power of the individual grounded in the community, the creation of a uniform economic understanding and attitude, the allocation of decisive tasks through the political leadership and the final decision of the state in all questions of economic power. apart from this, the economy is free and self-responsible. 3. at the heart of the plan for the european economic community are a customs union and a single market one key component of the 1942 plan for a eec is a customs union (zollverein). this is important for helping to create “economic unity” as discussed by walther funk, reichs economics minister and president of the reich bank, in his plan chapter the economic face of the new europe: about a century ago, german economic unity began to be formed out of a plethora of territorial economies. a political unification of germany was then unthinkable, but all the same, economic agreements were crowned by the achievement of the german customs union of 1843. this released a mighty growth in the economy. how did things look then? anyone wanting to travel through germany drove on bad roads, paying countless customs duties and bridge tolls through dozens of states. every one of these states had its own sovereign territory, its own finance system, its own currency and sought, as an independent economy, to stand on its own feet. the responsible men of the time simply did not grasp that their large neighbors england and france were more economically advanced only because they had created at the right time a level of technology and economic activity in a sufficiently large area (grossraumwirtschaft). another key component is a europe-wide single (or internal) market, as funk goes on to explain: if now instead of germany we consider europe, we come naturally, impelled by pure economics, if not to the same then to very similar conclusions. once again, it is technical, economic development which presses unstoppably towards the formation of a great continental economic area. today, technology offers such possibilities as cannot be fully realised within the bounds of a single national economy. the raising of railway speeds, the building of traffic networks and waterways, energy grids which connect the whole continent with undreamt possibilities of developing the latest technologies, above all through the aero plane: these have pulled the borders of all states closer to each other. already outside europe, stemming from these facts, large economic areas are rising or in active contemplation. in its own interest, europe cannot remain in the backwardness of its romantic hankerings after the era of the mail coach. certainly, the difficulties of european economic unification are harder than those which the german customs union had to overcome. also the methods will be different, more complicated and not to be mastered fully with a customs union. in spite of that, the unification of the european economy will come because its time is here and now. …if one only considers the natural potential of our continent, it becomes apparent that europe, in fact, meets all the requirements of a complete, self-sufficient economic area. professor hunke discusses the benefits from “completing the single market” with the help of a large www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 4 published by scholink inc. number of “directives”: the concept of the large economic area has proved to be viable. i see no obstruction which can seriously stand in the way of its realization. for the formation of large economic areas follows a natural law of development. …trade between individual states will not yet be classified as internal trade because a complete abolition of customs and currency controls is not immediately practicable. nevertheless, as trade within the great economic in norway, the market gardener in holland and the danish poultry breeder will need have no concern that they can dispose of their produce or have it left on their hands. they also need not worry that the price will fairly reward their efforts. then they will know that production and sales prospects are founded and secured by inter-state treaties and that there is no more room for speculators and crises. the workers in the spinning mills of the protectorate, in the chemical works of france and in the mines of belgium will no longer have to fear wage cuts or unemployment. they can rely on this: that the european economic area contains further unrealised technical and natural possibilities in abundance and a demand for consumer goods of all kinds from masses of people, which will never be [fully] met. the word “unemployment” will not be found in the european economic dictionary. …it should not go unrecognized that the system of community economic endeavour naturally requires on-going state directives in a larger quantity than those to which businessmen in many european states were previously accustomed. the …previous operation of the internal german economy show[s] clearly that the state, even in the controlled economy, can and will leave to the industrialist and entrepreneur his original and proper field of activity. …private enterprise remains. …the complicated economy of our century needs state control, but it is not able to function without the driving forces of entrepreneurial initiative. in the uk, the combination of the customs union and single market is better known as the common market. the uk joined the common market on 1 january 1973. 4. the 1942 plan covered all areas necessary for economic integration the plan covered all areas needed for economic integration to work effectively. for example, there are chapters on the european industrial economy (by dr anton reithinger, leader of the national economy department of ig farben industries ag, berlin), the deployment of labour in europe (by dr philip beisiegel, ministerial director, ministry of labour), and european transport questions (by gustav koenigs, state secretary, berlin). professor hunk explains why a europe-wide industrial policy is needed: “the european economic community has no interest in seeing potential and capabilities lying unused anywhere. … [but] the national spirit of the individual economies must not be allowed to oppose neighborly cooperation”. a particular problem at the time was rural over-population which led to temporary and seasonal emigration of workers. this should be dealt with by the economic “intensification” (or industrialization) of these areas. this would lead to the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 5 published by scholink inc. “awakening of new economic demands” which would avoid the problem of “[p]ermanent emigration from europe [which] is by all the laws of our time as false as it is impossible”. you can see immediately here the similarity with the eu’s single market in goods and labour, with the aim of creating an efficient self-sustaining internal market that maximized resource allocation in all parts of the eec. while temporary and seasonal migration are accepted as “partial solutions”, permanent emigration would be a sign of failure of the system. it is also unnecessary, as hunke points out: “the harmonization of the newly free powers of labour in the new sectors of the common economy can be achieved without difficulty”. there is also a chapter on european agriculture by professor dr emil woermann from the university of halle. the common agricultural policy (cap) that was adopted by the eu could well have been drawn directly from the plan, as edward spalton discovered: “i worked in the animal feed business and the changeover from free trade in food from all the world to the highly protectionist, minutely officially controlled, mind-bogglingly complicated cap was a profound culture shock. something so detailed obviously had to have an ideology behind it, but nobody could tell me what it was. it was entirely alien to the common-sense system we had known before. [woermann’s] paper reveals its philosophical fountain head completely. the cap, which we joined on 1 january 1973, was not just similar to, but exactly based on, the ideology and policy which he set out. the eec’s biggest project and budget item was squarely founded on principles and policy objectives, decided in berlin by 1942”. the purpose of the cap was to provide an assured income to farmers in rural areas, leading to an increase in prosperity and a reduction rural de-population. a common europe-wide currency was envisaged in the chapter on european currency questions by dr bernhard benning, director of the reich credit institution, berlin. nevertheless, it is apparent that “money” was regarded as a necessary evil in the plan. the role of the common currency was to facilitate intra-european trade, although this was a clear second-best option compared with the preferred one: “in the [ideal] continental european bloc, there will be no gold. everything will be settled through clearing—goods against goods”. in other words, what was preferred was a sophisticated barter system with clearing exchanges to match buyers and sellers. funk accepted that: “it will certainly be no easy task to bring the currencies of europe together. …but they can be brought into stability amongst themselves and then with currencies outside europe. but this task is only possible if we first bring the european national economies into order and thereby stabilize the internal worth of their currencies. then, with co-operation in trade policy, the external values can be brought into line”. this is now known as the funk plan (note 3) and was initially proposed in 1940. dr karl clodius, ambassador in the german foreign office, discusses european trade and economic treaties. the primary purpose of exporting, according to the plan, was to secure raw materials not available in europe, so that these could be used to increase the output of finished products which could then be sold in europe and increase the welfare of european citizens. this would be arranged through a “framework of constructive and far-sighted economic treaties”. however, funk had not yet decided www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 6 published by scholink inc. whether the procurement of overseas raw materials should be through the clearing system or by free currency exchange. he was very uncomfortable with the latter: “currency movements though will always be subject to a certain irreducible level of state control so that no unforeseen, uncontrollable movement of capital can destroy the essential, planned state direction of the economy”. notice the hostility to money and finance, given the risk that they cannot be completely controlled from the centre and so can disrupt well-laid plans. such a view is not confined to the berlin school of economics in the 1940s. modern-day france, for example, is also opposed to “finance capital”—as exemplified by françois hollande (note 4) who, when elected president, announced that his “only real enemy” was the “world of finance”. also notice the hostility to international trade: it was a necessary evil to pay for raw materials that were not available domestically. fiscal policy is also critical. funk again: “it is unavoidably essential to have a tight, prudent public expenditure policy, as in the private economy. above all, there must be a sensible control of production and demand, a control over money and credit and of consumption. we will deal with all these things in one way so that no upheavals occur. they will not occur because we recognize in good times what must be done. we have everything in hand through the authoritarian means of the state to bring these things promptly to order. [a key role of taxation is to ensure] excessive purchasing power be avoided. on the other hand, we have always taken care from social grounds that the screw of taxation should not be turned too tightly. we wish to maintain the will to enterprise and achievement. in this matter, the ministry of the economy has always been on guard”. german obsession with fiscal discipline, readily apparent in the above statement, is as strong today, where it is known as the black zero (schwarze null) policy, i.e., ensuring fiscal balance virtually every year—whatever the macroeconomic state of the economy. this obsession extends to german insistence on eu-wide fiscal discipline. this is enforced by germany’s refusal to allow the eu to become a “transfer union”. in a “transfer union”, the central government makes fiscal transfers from regions with internal trade surpluses to regions with internal trade deficits to ensure the economy as a whole remains in balance. it is essential for the effective operation of a unitary state, and many federal states, such as the usa, also make internal fiscal transfers to stabilise their economies. but in the federal eu, germany—which has an enormous trade surplus with the other member states as a result of the uber smart way it arranged for the deutschmark to convert to euros at the most favorable possible conversion rate—refuses to make fiscal transfers to deficit member states, such as italy. 5. the ultimate aim of the plan was full economic and political union the final chapter of the plan is called the basic question of europe: a geographical concept or a political fact. professor hunke argues that: “europe is a community of living space, a single economic area. the desire for security from crises can no longer be achieved by independence from each other, but only through the common improvement of europe’s individual national economies”. expansion to cover the whole of the european continent was also part of the plan. hunke again: “[the plan] should www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 7 published by scholink inc. underline the common destiny of the peoples of europe and emphasise the fact that enlargement of the economic community into presently foreign lands is both possible and desirable”. a key benefit would be access to key raw materials, such as oil, not available within the existing economic area—again to reduce the dependence on international trade. funk was more specific about political union being a longer-term aim: “the european peoples should at last be able to acknowledge that they live in a community of destiny, which in logic leads only to one conclusion, namely europe-wide, continental co-operation. previous years were not politically ripe for this”. political union was, in funk’s view, essential to protect europeans from the negative consequences of “liberal-capitalist” market forces: to impress upon you this theme and to sum it up succinctly, i must say this. the economic face of the new europe… will have two essential characteristics: common endeavored economic freedom. granted, this will not be that economic freedom which is embodied in capitalism and which is now nearing its end. …as a promise to the people of europe, the liberal-capitalist ideal of economic freedom is lifted from them. today it is sinking in misery, blood and flames. what were the promises of liberal economic thought? according to the liberal theory, economic life unfolded its greatest potential when individuals followed their own interests without restriction. the state can leave the harmonious development of the economy to free competition, through which the self-interest of every individual will, in the end, serve the good of the whole. it is believed that fully free trade will ensure by means of competition that each country will provide the goods which are most suited to its own conditions of production. according to the theory, every nation can buy on the world market where it is cheapest, whilst selling its own products at the lowest costs and best profits due to their natural conditions. consumers can provide themselves most richly with goods, businessmen employ their resources unhindered and the workers seek their employment where the highest wages are paid. the desired state of so-called social harmony seems most surely to be achievable in this way. but how did it turn out in practice? …without doubt however, the different individual peoples, like individual companies, did not draw the same advantages from this system in spite of apparently similar opportunities. the english moral philosophy of hobbes and hume, which was permeated by david ricardo with a typical shot of jewish spirit, proved in the first place to be an exceptional means of establishing and preserving british world domination. at the moment this system reached its peak, the english had developed their industry most. they went into the race with the largest cost advantages. because they also possessed the largest merchant marine and navy in the world, they could tune in to the great circuit of world trade in such a way that their economic and political power grew proportionately. every intensification of traffic in goods created new profits. the whole world worked in english money and the english were the bankers, the manufacturers, the traders, the carriers and, last not least, the policemen of the world. …but the debit balance of the british-capitalist era is, in fact, even greater. they wanted to keep all www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 8 published by scholink inc. peoples in the position of favorites or stepchildren of the liberal economic order. the effects of the laissez-faire system, especially the principle of free trade, caused severe internal, economic damage. the symptoms of this sickness were everywhere the same. agriculture in the industrialized states could not gain sufficient support against the interests of industry, trade, bank and stock exchange. self-sufficiency in food supplies was lost, the aggregation of large estates began, the peasantry sank into poverty, the population streamed from the land to the cities or overseas. a thin upper stratum of bankers, industrialists and speculators could accumulate grotesque wealth and also create for themselves dangerous power over the state– because everything could be bought for money—in particular public opinion. on the other side, the industrial proletariat grew ever larger. the increasing dissatisfaction of this class drove them into pseudo socialist marxism and communism. all these indications were not sufficiently heeded, perhaps because of the prevailing trend of the time—“get rich, it matters not how”—which disproportionately obscured a true view of the facts. certainly, liberalism was a system of “freedom”. anyone who could not find work and bread in his own country had the “freedom” to emigrate. and if things were going badly economically for a nation, it had the “freedom” to burden itself with debt in england. but this kind of freedom was badly founded in moral terms as was its continued existence. …[t]he world war of 1914-18 was both the high point of the capitalist economic system and simultaneously the beginning of its end. …since the first world war, the peoples of europe have come through a generation-long, pitiless lesson. we all know this and some of us sooner, some of us later, realized that the idol of freedom of this vanished epoch was false and pernicious. with war, inflation, the most extreme economic crises, hunger and unemployment—the lesson was hammered into people. that the sense and purpose of all economies did not lie in the self-seeking, irresponsible making of profits but in the fulfillment of a social task. it is no wonder that the people of central europe, who suffered most under the lash of this unsocial system, first conceived a different, higher ideal of freedom. in securing the basic supplies of food and raw materials, in the liberation of the economy from international financial interests and dependency, in the voluntary submission of the individual to the primacy of a people’s economy, we glimpse today the new ideal of a true economic freedom. …the will towards european community effort, as it is forged under hard wartime conditions must become the leading concern of the basic, ruling economic theory in peacetime too. that means a constant effort to understand the great objectives and coming tasks and to get stuck into them. it also means a readiness, in certain circumstances, to subordinate one’s own interests to those of the european community. that is the highest goal which we require from the european states and we are striving to attain it. in individual cases, this will mean sacrifices, but the outcome is that all peoples will benefit. what is remarkable about this passage is that the plan’s notion of “economic freedom” is diametrically www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 9 published by scholink inc. opposed to the idea of liberal economic thought propounded by economists and philosophers in the uk over centuries. instead, there was a “higher ideal of freedom” embodied in the “voluntary submission of the individual to the primacy of a people’s economy” and a readiness to “subordinate one’s own interests to those of the european community”. and it does not just refer to individuals. all european states are “required” to submit to the “common endeavour”, so that the outcome is that “all peoples will benefit”. continent-wide self-sufficiency is also a very important objective, with an overarching concern to “secur[e] the basic supplies of food and raw materials”. 6. comparison with the european economic community introduced in 1957 there are a number of striking similarities between the 1942 plan and the european economic community introduced on 25 march 1957:  the establishment of a centralised, highly bureaucratic system of administration in the form of the european commission.  the exercise of economic and political leadership through “directives”—the same term used by hunke—from the commission in order to maximise “community economic endeavour”. there have been more than 80,000 directives—including “regulations and decisions”—since 1957. there have been more than 50,000 in the last 25 years (note 5) alone, emanating from more than 150 specialist working parties and committees, known as the “council preparatory bodies”. (note 6)  the importance of a continent-wide european economic community which recognises the continent’s “natural potential” and hence “meets all the requirements of a complete, self-sufficient economic area”.  the introduction of a customs union with a common external tariff on imports into the eu set by the commission.  a single market subject to detailed regulations also set by the commission.  a common commercial policy in which all trade deals with other countries are negotiated by the commission via a “framework of constructive and far-sighted economic treaties”, reflecting the plan’s hostility to the “principle of free trade [which] cause[s] severe internal, economic damage”.  a common agricultural policy to guarantee and stabilise farmers’ incomes.  eu-wide management of common resources such as fish via a common fisheries policy.  expansion of the eu into eastern and south-eastern europe. since 2007, the eu has spent €23bn via the pre-accession assistance fund (note 7) on financial and technical support to a number of “enlargement countries”—or what hunke called “presently foreign lands”—such as albania (€1.24bn), bosnia and herzegovina (€0.78bn), kosovo (€1.28bn), macedonia (€1.28bn), montenegro (€0.51bn), serbia (€2.89bn) and turkey (€9.25bn).  the stability and growth pact with its five structural and investment funds: o european regional development fund—“promotes balanced development in the different regions of the eu”. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 10 published by scholink inc. o european social fund—“supports employment-related projects throughout europe and invests in europe’s human capital—its workers, its young people and all those seeking a job”. o cohesion fund—“funds transport and environment projects in countries where the gross national income per inhabitant is less than 90% of the eu average. in 2014-20, these are bulgaria, croatia, cyprus, the czech republic, estonia, greece, hungary, latvia, lithuania, malta, poland, portugal, romania, slovakia and slovenia”. o european agricultural fund for rural development—“focuses on resolving the particular challenges facing eu’s rural areas”. o european maritime and fisheries fund—“helps fishermen to adopt sustainable fishing practices and coastal communities to diversify their economies, improving quality of life along european coasts”.  the european exchange rate mechanism—introduced in 1979 to reduce exchange rate variability and achieve monetary stability across europe, in preparation for economic and monetary union and the introduction of the euro—precisely followed the funk plan.  a policy of fiscal discipline, introduced via the maastricht criteria, with strict limits on the size of member state budget deficits—they must not exceed 3% of gross domestic product (gdp) or 2.2% if the member state is also in the eurozone—and national debts—they must not exceed 60% of gdp. these limits apply whether their breach is due to an economic recession beyond the control of the member state or due to government spending profligacy. in addition, no distinction is made between current and capital expenditures. all of this is fully in line with the schwartze null fiscal policy outlined in the plan.  consistent with this belief in rigid fiscal discipline, the refusal to allow the federal eu to become a “transfer union”, thereby forcing member states to solve their economic problems through “enterprise and achievement”.  hostility to free markets, especially money and capital markets, which could interfere with the implementation of the plan, leading to a heavy reliance on the banking and insurance sectors to provide both shortand long-term financing to the corporate sector. this explains why capital markets union (note 8) has been such a failure.  the concepts of solidarity and neighborly support, so long as members fit in with the plan. some of the above quotes come from the plan, while others come from the eu website—it is hard to differentiate. 7. but how did it turn out in practice? the plan’s aims for the eec were to exploit the continent’s full natural potential and to ensure self-sufficiency. these led to the following objectives: “prices will fairly reward” the efforts of producers, and production and sales will be secured through inter-state treaties, and there will be “no more room for speculators and crises” or “fear wage cuts or unemployment”. how did it turn out in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 11 published by scholink inc. practice? it is difficult to quantitatively assess how comprehensively these objectives have been met across all eu member states. however, unemployment rates are reported and “unemployment” was going to be banished from the european economic dictionary. at the end of 2019—so prior to the massive distortions caused by the global coronavirus pandemic—the average eurozone unemployment rate was 7.8%. it was 18% in greece, 10.5% in italy, 8.8% in france, but only 3.2% in germany. so only in germany can we say that unemployment has been effectively “banished”. by comparison, the uk unemployment rate was 4%. youth unemployment is far worse. it averaged 16.1% in the eurozone. it was 40% in greece, 33% in italy, 20% in france, and 5.6% in germany. in the uk, it was 11.5%. so this demonstrates a massive failure of the eurozone economic system to provide the balancing mechanisms that were promised by funk. the uk, by contrast, measures favourably on both unemployment measures, except when compared with germany. then there is the common currency, the euro, which is regarded as one of the greatest achievements of the eu. milton friedman said the euro would be a great success until the first financial crisis—and so it turned out. the eurozone economies were roughly in balance, with trade flows between them being largely offsetting, but since the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, (note 9) this is far from the case. a key underlying problem is that the eurozone does not satisfy the economic conditions for being an optimal currency area, (note 10) a geographical area over which a single currency and monetary policy can operate on a sustainable long-term basis. the different business cycles in the eurozone, combined with poor labour and capital market flexibility, mean that systematic trade surpluses and deficits will build up—because inter-regional exchange rates can no longer be changed. surplus regions need to recycle the surpluses back to deficit regions via transfers to keep the eurozone economies in balance. but as previously mentioned, the largest surplus country—germany—refuses formally to allow the eu to become a “transfer union”. this means that deficit countries including the largest of these—italy—end up in a recession, owing huge debts. they are unable to use fiscal policy to boost aggregate demand, again because of german insistence on fiscal discipline, and the supply-side policy of appealing to “enterprise and achievement” has also been ineffective. so the recession becomes permanent. the italian economy has not grown since italy joined the euro in 1999. the plan also promised to end wage cuts. ireland provides a striking example of the failure of this objective. between 2008 and 2011, median and mean total disposable income (excluding all social transfers) in ireland fell by 30% and 21%, respectively. these cuts were required as part of the eu”s rescue package for the collapsed irish banking system. irish banks had lent excessively to property speculators—another group that was going to be banned—leading to a property boom. had ireland had its own currency, the irish central bank would have raised interest rates to curtail the boom. but ireland is a member of the eurozone where interest rates are set to suit the economic needs of germany, in particular, rather than peripheral members such as ireland. ireland had no alternative but to sit it out and wait for the inevitable collapse of its banks—and then pay for it through massive wage cuts. so www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 12 published by scholink inc. much for “solidarity and neighborly support”. the idea of parliamentary approval is not mentioned in the plan. a european parliament was introduced with appointed members in 1958 and with directly elected ones from 1979. but its role is to do little more than rubber-stamp the directives proposed by the commission. it is unable to initiate, block or repeal legislation. while it can suggest amendments to proposed legislation, these can be ignored by the commission. belgian historian david van reybrouck, in his 2016 book against elections: the case for democracy, describes the european parliament as little better than one of the “councils of the people” in the interwar colonial empires of the belgium, holland, britain, or france—with the real power resting with a distant imperial executive. nevertheless, this has not prevented the onward march to political union. the eec was transformed into the european union on 1 november 1993 with the aim of being a continent-wide economic and then political entity. full political unification was the clearly stated objective of jean-claude juncker, president of the european commission from 2014 to 2019, in one of his final state of the union addresses—ideally by 2025. germany is the strongest supporter, just as it was in 1942. as soon as german reunification had been achieved in 1990, helmut kohl, the german chancellor at the time, announced: “we now seek political unification, the construction of a united states of europe”. this was supported by ursula von der leyen, the new president of the european commission, in an article in der spiegel (note 11) in 2011. the present german chancellor, angela merkel, explains how it will happen: “of course, the european commission will one day become a government, the european council a second chamber and the european parliament will have more powers”. but the reality is that the european union is not an institution interested in giving “more powers” to the representatives of the people. significantly, the authoritarianism of the original 1942 plan is still there below the surface in the modern eu. just as walther funk was fond of saying “we have everything in hand through the authoritarian means of the state to bring these things promptly to order”, so juncker is fond of saying “there can be no democratic choice against the european treaties”. yanis varoufakis, the former greek finance minister, sums it up well and he should know better than most: “in truth, brussels is a democracy-free zone”. the proof of this is that once those 150 or so council preparatory bodies have framed policies, it will often already be too late to inject much democratic oversight into the draftsmanship. (note 12) similarly, the concepts of solidarity and neighborly support are there only so long as member states fit in. witness the ruthlessness with which deviant member states, such as greece, (note 13) are treated. even states that are not part of the eu are not immune from what can only be described as eu bullying and control creep. one example is switzerland (note 14) which was threatened with losing access to eu markets when it voted in a referendum to limit “mass migration” to stop the undercutting of local wages; switzerland is a signatory to the schengen agreement, but is not a member of either the single market or the customs union. another is norway which was threatened with having its salmon sales to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 13 published by scholink inc. the eu blocked when it refused to implement the eu postal services directive; (note 15) norway is in the single market and has to accept an average of five new eu directives every day, (note 16) without having any vote on them, a state of affairs which norwegians call “fax democracy”. both countries eventually backed down. but the eu is never satisfied. it is currently trying to bring switzerland (note 17) under its legal and regulatory control by forcing it to accept the “dynamic alignment” of eu rules on migration, social security, and key areas of economic policy in perpetuity. because of swiss resistance, it has suspended the trading of swiss shares on eu stock exchanges and is threatening to withdraw mutual recognition for exports of medical equipment. nor did the plan mention any legal framework under which it would operate. the european court of justice (ecj) was set up in 1952. it is the highest court in the eu and has “ultimate sovereignty”. the ecj itself established the primacy of eu law over the laws of member states in the costa v enel case (note 18) in 1964, without any approval of this by elected politicians. the ecj’s members, like those of the commission, are unelected. it operates using the “purposive approach” (note 19) which means that it interprets eu laws according to their “purpose” rather than to what the text of the law actually states—which is what happens in common law countries. and, of course, the “purpose” frequently changes to reflect the changing intentions of the commission. the ecj is therefore a political court, not a neutral interpreter of eu laws. the uk granted “ultimate sovereignty” to the ecj when it passed the 1972 european communities act. only once since 1964 has the supremacy of the ecj been questioned and that was in may 2020 when the germany federal constitutional court (note 20) declared that the european central bank’s public sector purchase (i.e., quantitative easing) programme in 2015 was ultra vires and exceeded eu competences and, by implication, that eu law did not overrule member state law which, in the case of germany, would not have sanctioned this programme. 8. how should believers in liberal economic values and democracy respond? hunk described the plan thus: “it contains …the obligation that from considerations of european freedom, continental europe must receive first loyalty in all economic transactions. …[i]t must be firmly held above all that the national spirit of the individual economies must not be allowed to oppose neighborly cooperation”. this centralizing authoritarianism permeates much of what we see in the european union today, particularly in terms of the commission directives and ecj rulings that restrict economic and political freedoms. so what can believers in liberal economic values and democracy do? a few of them might take the view that it would have been better for countries like the uk to remain in the eu in order to “reform” its aberrations from within. but it should be clear from the above that this is impossible. so much of the plan has been implemented—again possibly subconsciously—that it now has a life of its own. there are no aberrations: what you see is what is fully intended. and arch euro-federalists, like jean-claude juncker, guy verhofstadt and michel barnier, have no intention of changing any element of the plan or www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 14 published by scholink inc. allowing it to be reversed. they take the long view and remember that it took 150 years for the usa to become a fully united economic and political entity with a single currency being used in all states. however, most will surely recognise that the eu is incapable of being reformed (note 21) and that it was better for the uk to fully leave the eu politically and economically as soon as possible. nevertheless, it should be readily apparent—in the light of the plan—that the eu would not be willing to make this easy. this was made very clear when the eu published its negotiating guidelines (note 22) in january 2020 and in the subsequent negotiations, led from the eu side by michel barnier. the eu’s intention was to oblige the uk to follow eu law in respect of “competition and state aid, tax, social, environment and regulatory measures and practices”—the so-called “level playing field” conditions—and be subject to the rulings of the ecj in perpetuity. this would have left the uk with absolutely no freedom of manoeuvre to negotiate any meaningful free trade agreements with other countries. we know that the plan does not like these at all. in the event, the uk negotiating team, led by lord david frost, was able to extract from the eu a standard free trade agreement in which disputes were settled by international arbitration rather than the ecj. (note 23) the agreement was signed on behalf of the eu by european commission president, ursula von der leyen, and by european council president, charles michel, in brussels on 30 december 2020. it was then flown to london by the royal air force and signed on behalf of the uk government by boris johnson in downing street. later the same day, the uk parliament voted in favour of the agreement by 521 votes to 73. it passed into uk law as the eu (future relationship) act, having received royal assent, on 31 december 2020. (note 24) what is noteworthy is that the european parliament played no role whatsoever in approving this historic agreement. it was merely allowed to “ratify” the agreement after it came into effect on 31 december 2020, thereby magnificently confirming van reybrouck’s point that the european parliament’s role is simply to rubber-stamp agreements already made by the commission, and, in the process, making a mockery of the very concept of ratification. equally noteworthy is that neither von der leyen nor michel are elected by the european people, unlike those who signed and voted for the agreement in the uk. further, those who argued for a complete separation need to be much more nuanced. in particular, they must recognize just how much the 1942 plan has influenced how the eu has developed. this, in turn, implies that many of the proposals in the plan will implicitly have widespread acceptance—both in the uk and on the european continent. for example, there will be many people who will readily agree with funk when he says that “the european peoples should …acknowledge that they live in a community of destiny, which in logic leads only to one conclusion, namely europe-wide, continental co-operation”. similarly, many will support hunke when he states that “the desire for security from crises can no longer be achieved by independence from each other but only through the common improvement of europe’s individual national economies” or when he calls for state economic leadership over highly regulated private sector companies and the “final decision of the state in all questions of economic power”. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 15 published by scholink inc. so if proponents of free markets continue to talk about having a bonfire of regulations or having a free trade agreement with the usa which puts chlorinated chicken on supermarket shelves—without taking account of the plan’s already extensive influence—they are likely to alienate even many brexit (note 25) supporters. they should also recognise the particular anger on the continent about the global financial crisis which completely disrupted the eu’s well-laid plans for further economic integration and which is blamed entirely on “liberal-capitalist” market forces. the gfc explains why so many people both in the uk and on the continent fully support funk’s call for “the liberation of the economy from international financial interests and dependency”. 9. conclusion very few people know about the 1942 plan: boris johnson (note 26) is a rare exception, although he misses the key economic implications. the principal founding fathers of the european project, monnet and schuman, never acknowledged the plan when they set up the european economic community. the european union’s website does not mention the plan: instead it states that the idea of a european union originated with winston churchill’s speech at zurich university in 1946. (note 27) now this is somewhat disingenuous, since, as professor robert tombs has pointed out, (note 28) european federalism has a far longer history. it goes back at least to the 18th century. victor hugo called for a united states of europe (use) in the 1860s, while ernest renan—author of what is a nation?—predicted in the 1880s that the european nations would inevitably be replaced by a use. there have also been previous attempts at economic integration. for example, britain and france set up what has been called the first common market, with plans for a common currency and rights of citizenship, in the 1860s. then there was a latin monetary union between france, belgium, italy, and switzerland between 1865 and 1927. in the world war i, germany had a plan for an economic area which historian niall ferguson has dubbed the “kaiser’s common market”. however, this misses two key points. the first is that, while there have been many previous calls for a federal europe, there has only ever been one detailed proposal for a european economic community—and that is the 1942 plan. and we have shown that this plan has had an enormous impact on how the eu has developed. surely this is not pure coincidence? it seems to me inconceivable that the plan was not known to at least some of the eu’s founding fathers—and in particular, walter hallstein. (note 29) he was the first president of the european commission between 7 january 1958 and 30 june 1967 and had been a member of both the bund nationalsozialistischer deutscher juristen (association of national socialist german lawyers) and the rechtswahrer (law protectors) organisation, although was not a member of the national socialist party. he also received specialist legal training at the kaiser wilhelm institute in berlin, (note 30) a private institute financed largely by ig farben, an institution intimately involved in the plan. the eu’s biography of hallstein fails to mention any of this, although it does acknowledge that he “worked towards a rapid realisation of the common market. … during his mandate, the integration advanced significantly”. (note 31) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 16 published by scholink inc. and this leads directly to the second key point. however much you try to play down the influence of the plan, the centralising authoritarian language of its authors cannot be ignored. the plan did not and was not intended to have a democratic foundation. and the way in which the eec was set up—with a governmental and judicial system in the form of the european commission and ecj, respectively—ensured that there would be no genuine democracy in the european union. there is, of course, a democratic veneer in the form of the european council and the european parliament. there are periodic elections to the european parliament, where around 85% of the laws that the citizens of member states have to obey are “approved”, but all these laws are initiated by the commission and then interpreted by the ecj to suit the commission’s “purpose”. all this is made perfectly clear by hallstein in his book die europaeische gemeinschaft (the european community): “every action starts with the commission. …the commission is the most original element in the organisation of the [european] community without any direct precedent in history. …its function is to represent the [european] community to the inside and to the outside. …the commission is independent of the governments of the member states. instructions of the member states must not be given to nor taken by the commission. ….the commission has the monopoly to initiate legislation”. so much about recent events surrounding brexit become much clearer when you understand the plan. the way the eu conducted the brexit negotiations is entirely consistent with its underlying philosophy—this is not a club that you can leave once you have joined—as varoufakis warned us in adults in the room: my struggle with europe’s deep establishment. (note 32) similarly, the language used by people like juncker—when he said that the british were “deserters” who needed to be punished—could have been lifted directly from the plan. but most significant of all is the realisation that the hostility to anglo-saxon economics is both long-standing and widespread on the continent and that the democratic deficit in the eu—widely acknowledged even by strong eu supporters—is here to stay. believers in liberal economic values and democracy cannot possibly compromise on these points—both in the uk and on the european continent. it should now be clear that the only way out for the uk was a clean-break brexit—which involved leaving the customs union, the single market and the jurisdiction of the ecj, as theresa may originally promised in her lancaster house speech on 17 january 2017. (note 33) the uk has now achieved this. it was the only way to avoid being drawn inexorably into the kind of political union envisioned in the 1942 plan. however, the remaining eu member states will find it very hard to avoid this fate. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 17 published by scholink inc. acknowledgements the author is grateful for the comments made on a previous draft by professor kevin dowd and professor robert tombs. notes note 1. europaeische wirtschaftsgemeinschaft; http://www.jar2.com/files/nazism/the_europeische_wirtschaftsgemeinchaft_berlin_1942.pdf note 2. edward spalton, witness to history, posted on april 18, 2017; https://campaignforanindependentbritain.org.uk/witness-to-history/ note 3. funk plan, https://www.academia.edu/8935003/the_funk_plan note 4. françois hollande; https://www.france24.com/en/20170405-france-president-francois-hollande-five-years-not-normal-look -back note 5. https://www.thomsonreuters.com/en/press-releases/2017/march/eu-laws-introduced-in-the-uk-highlight s-scale-of-challenge-facing-lawmakers-following-brexit.html note 6. https://brexitcentral.com/wanting-close-uk-eu-relationship-beware-brussels-opaque-law-making-proces ses/ note 7. https://facts4eu.org/news/2019_apr_remain_in_what note 8. capital markets union; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/capital-markets-union/ note 9. global financial crisis; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/financial_crisis_of_2007%e2%80%932008 note 10. optimal currency area; https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/19674/1/target%202%20v1.pdf note 11. der spiegel; https://www.spiegel.de/consent-a-?targeturl=https%3a%2f%2fwww.spiegel.de%2fpolitik%2fdeutsc hland%2fschuldenkrise-von-der-leyen-fordert-die-vereinigten-staaten-von-europa-a-782879.html note 12. https://brexitcentral.com/wanting-close-uk-eu-relationship-beware-brussels-opaque-law-making-proces ses/ note 13. greece; https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/greek-tragedy note 14. switzerland; https://www.conservativewoman.co.uk/even-independent-switzerland-isnt-immune-to-eu-control-creep note 15. norway; https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-47734583 note 16. norway; https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/916657/brexit-news-latest-update-norway-uk-eu-future-trade-de www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 18 published by scholink inc. al-european-union-eea-video note 17. switzerland; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2019/07/02/eu-sharpens-torture-tools-long-showdown-defiant-sw itzerland/ note 18. costa v enel case; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/costa_v_enel note 19. purposive approach; http://e-lawresources.co.uk/purposive-approach.php note 20. germany federal constitutional court; https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/shareddocs/pressemitteilungen/en/2020/bvg20-032.html note 21. as uk prime minister, david cameron, found to his cost when he tried to renegotiate the terms of uk membership in 2015-16; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015–2016_united_kingdom_renegotiation_of_european_union_memb ership note 22. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/brexit-negotiations/negotiating-documents-article-50-negotiations-unit ed-kingdom_en note 23. trade and cooperation agreement between the european union and the european atomic energy community, of the one part, and the united kingdom of great britain and northern ireland, of the other part, 24 december 2020; https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/9481 04/eu-uk_trade_and_cooperation_agreement_24.12.2020.pdf note 24. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/eu-future-relationship-bill note 25. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/brexit note 26. boris johnson; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3578741/whats-hitler-got-to-do-with-the-euro-e verything.html note 27. winston churchill’s speech at zurich university in 1946; https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/winston_churchill_en.pdf note 28. in a private communication. note 29. walter hallstein; https://worldhistory.us/european-history/did-the-nazis-create-the-european-union.php note 30. kaiser wilhelm institute in berlin; https://www.dr-rath-foundation.org/tag/brexit/ note 31. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/eu-pioneers_en#box_4 note 32. adults in the room: my struggle with europe’s deep establishment; https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/books/adults-in-the-room/. varoufakis likened brexit to the eagles song hotel california, where you can check out any time you like, but you cannot really leave; https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/yanis-varoufakis-says-brexit-hotel-california-you-c an-check-out-any-time-you-you-can-t-really-leave-a7334781.html www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 19 published by scholink inc. note 33. lancaster house speech; https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-p m-speech microsoft word ape-v2n2-p157 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 157 original paper is participatory budgeting understood enough by citizens in terms of being reachable for them? saniela xhaferi1* & blerina dhrami2 1 department of justice and political science, university college “pavaresia vlore”, vlore, albania 2 bulevard vlore-skele, al-9401 po box, vlore, albania * saniela xhaferi, department of justice and political science, university college “pavaresia vlore”, vlore, albania received: april 18, 2019 accepted: may 2, 2019 online published: may 7, 2019 doi:10.22158/ape.v2n2p157 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v2n2p157 abstract this study focuses mainly on participatory budgeting issues, citizen budget education; informing citizens about public investments/projects; community needs; employee performance; the quality of public services provided. the above issues, and especially the relationship between local leaders and citizens, are a good indicator to assess how local governance and citizens are moving in the same direction and to what extent is this inverse fulfillment of expectation. this relationship is expressed in terms of an unclear and incomplete perception of the ratio between what citizens pay in the form of local taxes and public services provided by the municipality. this fact, mainly related to the expectations of citizens from local government for the use/management of the local budget, highlights the gap between the two parties involved in this process. it is evident the lack of a budgetary education from citizens and the need to orient and clarify citizens on this process, the importance it has for direct involvement of citizens and prioritization of community needs. the article concludes: in order to bring local government closer to citizens and the community, aiming at maximizing the fulfillment of the principle of “subsidiary” of local self-government, the participatory budgeting process should be done more inclusive and accessible to citizens. keywords participatory budget, budget education, civil inclusion, decision making-responsibility, public accountability, government evaluation www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 158 published by scholink inc. 1. introduction the idea for the realization of this study was first started by the fact that 2019 is an election year for local elections in albania and what we have noticed and ascertained during our participation as citizens, at the public hearing of the mayor for budget (citizens consultative meetings). in order to distinguish if this process was politically oriented, in terms of an pre-electoral campaign that measures the support of citizens for the municipality and the political party or is an analytical process oriented toward results and improvement. these meetings have been structured in these directions: as a reflection of what has been done, as a consultative of the needs, requirements and priorities according to the citizens/community, and as controversial in the framework of drafting the next local budget project for next year. the second reason relates to our research interests as researchers on subjects concerned with the relation citizen-institution or the mechanism of citizen involvement in decision-making processes (local in this case) and the functioning of public accountability. this study is a continuation of a series of previous studies that we have undertaken and that relate to the mission of local self-government (the municipality in this case) to ensure effective, efficient governance and at a level closer to citizens (note 1). here we consider those areas of their activity, for which law no. 139/2015 “on local self-government” charges with responsibility. and directly affect the quality of the governed and determine the governed-governed relationship. although the attainment of these objectives is a legal obligation, it should not simply imply their fulfillment in the form of exercising competencies, but should be read in a wider plan. this is because this process implies a host of actors, factors and effects, having a political, economic or social character. however, the study is the first of its kind in such a specific context (especially for one municipality, of vlore) and as specific as the subject: budget education and its necessity as a prerequisite for the realization of participatory budgeting, thus placing the emphasis especially in these two, beyond discussing how they help local government or maximize citizen participation. this process of participatory budgeting has occurred in all the other municipalities of albania, almost at the same time and with the same structure. although we agree that this relationship is cyclical and resembles a vicious circle where it is difficult to determine the start and end of causality, our focus was to establish participatory budgeting and budget education as primary goals to be realized rather than means to increase civic participation in public decision-making. so in this study, the latter will be a consequence. as we mentioned above, to understand how participatory budgeting works/applies to a particular municipality in albania, it is necessary to know the origin of this process in our country. this is to understand the status of this process, whether it is legal obligation or not; what exactly are the local government units doing, and what is the role of citizens in this process. in order to investigate the last part, we felt the need to measure citizen perceptions (through a survey) on the participatory budgeting process and to identify those shortcomings of the process directly related to citizen engagement in participatory budgeting. at the conclusion of the study, our aim is that the participation and citizen involvement in participatory budgeting can be a process that comes naturally from citizens themselves, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 159 published by scholink inc. without the mediation of various civil society links. this naturalness can only be achieved if the process of civic incitement and civic awareness is overcome, and passes to another more concrete stage, that of the (maximally) understanding of the participatory budgeting, its influence, its formation, implementation monitoring, evaluation and then judgment in a wider plan of local self-government. 2. method 2.1 study methodology this study aims to present an exploratory and comparative approach between the way participatory budgeting is understood by citizens, how this process is carried out by local institutions and what is emerging as a common need for both parties in this process making participatory budgeting even more constructive. also, analysis of study indicators emphasizes the necessity of another process that should precede participatory budgeting or associate it, namely citizen budget education. the study is specifically focused in vlore, but also considering the national context, as this process is an obligation in all administrative units in albania, and not a typical case, limited within a single municipality. the analysis of the findings of the study will combine both the legal and practical aspects of the subject in the study. the methodology followed to carry out this study is a combination of primary and secondary data, analyzed by qualitative and quantitative methods. the first phase is that of research in the existing literature for the creation of the local background of this topic. this stage includes: determining the theoretical framework; what are the relevant legal arrangements and practices in our country; its applicative character; collecting and analyzing data from reports; published data on local investments and taxes, for the purpose of: evidence of budget-spending ratio (dealing with claims of citizen towards local government); determining community and local needs and priorities; local government capacity to meet community needs; identifying the issues related to citizen information/informing on the local budget. 2.1.1 observation and testing through questionnaire to measure citizen’s perception of participatory budgeting and budget education, we conducted a survey across the entire vlore municipality territory, namely in the 5 urban units and 4 administrative units (rural). the selected sample was in total 206 units, of which 150 in the city and 56 in the administrative units, reflecting the gender composition of the population in each unit. the sampling was casual and unidentified to ensure the anonymity of respondents, for less influencing responses. for this reason, a questionnaire was designed with 25 questions, of which 5 were demographic questions and 20 others organized to measure the following indicators: knowledge of citizens about the way of drafting, implementing and monitoring the budget; the extent to which citizens think that the local budget is implemented; who they think have made community investments (municipality, government, foreigners or a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 160 published by scholink inc. combination of them); attitude/evaluation of the projects undertaken by the municipality; the quality of local services provided; performance of administration officials; the importance of public hearings (how much?); how does it affect and how much it involves citizens, participatory budgeting; have the respondents been part of public hearings or not; the citizen informing about public hearings; individual education/knowledge related to the budget process; priority issues according to citizen; projections of what should be included more in the budget for next year; citizens involved as part of a common solution to community problems; relationship with local taxes: regular tax payer or not; taxes paid by citizens and their relationship with the expectations they have for public investment. the final questionnaire had undergone to a pre-test examination to see whether it was clear/easy to understand for citizens, as the subject itself is specific and requires some prior information or knowledge. for the realization of field interviews, a group of 15 students was trained equally, and we personally engaged in conducting the process. after the survey (with printed questionnaires) conducted, the completed questionnaires were checked to identify missing and corrected errors during completion. the data collected was submitted to an excel database and spss program, subjected to statistical tests and descriptive tests. for each question it is obtained information on the frequency, so the percentage/frequency of respondents who have chosen an alternative compared to others. crosstabs have also been crossed to investigate the causal relationship to the phenomenon we are studying, but these conclusions will not be part of this paper. 3. result of all the indicators used in the study, here we will present the frequencies only for a part of them, namely those questions directly investigating the two main concepts, civic perception of how they define participatory budgeting and identifying the need for budget education. 1) for the question 1. how much information/knowledge do the citizens have, about how municipality budget is designed, implemented and monitored, citizens’ responses are: most of them (38.1%) are not aware at all, while 25.2% of them have little knowledge; 22.3% have some knowledge; 5.4% have a lot of knowledge; 6.4% do not know how to answer that question; 2) for the question 2. how much do you think the municipality budget for 2018 has been www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 161 published by scholink inc. implemented? 28.7% of citizens interviewed think that the budget has not been realized to a great extent. 27.2% think that less than half is realized 17.8% think that more than half of the budget is implemented 5.4% think it has been realized to a great extent while 16.85 of them do not know the extent to which the budget has been realized. the results of the two questions above show us that citizens tend to judge negatively the extent of local budget implementation, although their knowledge is very minimalistic in terms of local budget. the indicators confirm our assumption at the beginning of the study, for the existence of this discrepancy between the parties. in other words, different perspectives for budgeting of citizens and municipality shows for a disconnection between them. 3) for the question 3. what do you think about public investments made in the city (so who has supported them), the answers were as follows: 17.3% of them think that p.i. are all done by the government 16.3% of them think that p.i. are foreign investments 28.7% of them think that they were made by the municipality in cooperation with the government 16.8% of them think that they were made by the municipality in cooperation with foreigners 4.5% of them think that they were made b the all the municipality the results for this indicator show a consistency of citizens’ perception of what the law actually provides as forms of financing local government units. they are optimistic indicators that point to a promising ground for participatory budgeting to be an even more effective process. regarding the instruments for the administration of public services (article 33) and the finances of the local self-government units (article 34), ... local government units are financed from income from taxes, fees and other local revenues from transferred funds by central government and the funds directly attributable to them by dividing national taxes and levies, local borrowing, donations, and other resources provided by law (article 34/3) (note 2). 4) for the question 9. how important citizens consider public hearings/public budget consultations? about 51% of the interviewed citizens consider the hearings very important, 19.8% almost important 15.8% somehow important 5.4% less important 2% not important at all 5) for the question 10. how does the participatory budgeting affect the citizens, by ... 23.8% of citizens think that participatory budgeting informs them of how the local revenues are managed and spent 18, 3% think that it encourages debate/discussion and exchange of ideas 17.3% think that it makes citizens actively involved in decision-making processes www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 162 published by scholink inc. 23, 8% think it helps in defining common needs and priorities. the rest of the answers alternate between the above responses in more than one answer 6) for the question 11. do you think that the participatory budgeting process involves citizens by ...? 7, 9% think pb promotes participation and increases political and civic engagement in public affairs 18.8% think bp promotes accountability and accountability of executives 23, 3% think bp increases the transparency and effectiveness of local government 12.4% think that bp aims at the inclusion and equality between citizens and marginalized groups 16, 8% think pb includes all of the above citizens have responsibilities, too. they should play an active role in making government more accountable by participating directly in the political process or through exercising stronger oversight (note 3). 7) for the question 12. were you part of the public hearing/consultation for the draft budget of 2019? 21, 8% of citizens have been part 30, 7% of them, not because they did not know it was developing 7.4% of them do not, because they have no interest in that process 23.3% of them did not, because they were not able to participate 5% of them do not, as they do not have much knowledge of the budget 6.9% of them do not, because they have no faith in that process government must use performance as the basis for funding or changing programmers. citizens would like to see greater focus on measuring and reporting outcomes. 8) for the question 13. how citizens would prefer to be informed in order to be part of public hearing/consultation? 30.7% prefer notifications to the municipal web site and to social networks 23.3% prefer “door to door” notifications 21.8% prefer notifications via tv and local radio 7.4% prefer phone notifications (calls and sms) 5% prefer notice from members of the municipality council 6.9% prefer notifications from different members of the community they reside from the responses it appears that citizens prefer passive forms of notification, although the law also envisions citizen initiatives for information research. stakeholders and/or community representatives may, irrespective of the notification by the local self-government unit, come across to it and request information on the organization of such consultations (note 4). high levels are also the result of the citizens’ preference for “door to door” announcements, which means that citizens need to perceive the presence of local government even more through direct contact. in both cases, citizens consider themselves “hosts” of a service that should reach them, or at least a service which start from the government towards them, so like a one-way action. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 163 published by scholink inc. 9) for the question 14. how do you think the citizens need to be educated, informed, clarified, to better understand the local budget? 21.8% prefer regular and periodic meetings with residents by zone, for the number of residents paying taxes rated to the total number of residents of that area 18.8% prefer regular and periodic meetings with residents by area, for the total value of investments made for the respective area 19.8% prefer regular and periodic meetings with residents by area, for the total investment value needed for the respective area 18, 8% prefer regular and periodic meetings with residents by area, for the total value of local taxes collected in that area. 4% of them prefer all of the above alternatives budget experts’ everywhere complain that citizens’ seemingly unending appetite for more public services and benefits is not matched by a corresponding willingness to pay for them (note 5). while citizens welcome spending that provides them with visible and immediate benefits, many see blind to the need for essential public goods and resist paying for them (note 6). since there are differences among the attitudes of the citizens and those of the government in confront of the local budget, as evidenced by the above citations and from the results of this question, we noticed that the indicators vary almost in the same values (18-20%) for those topics where the budget education should focus. so there is an immediate need for more civic education, and less importance on what aspects of bp would be are specifically taught. the small difference in % between alternatives indicates that the public tends to accept those services/investments that directly affect it but also need to be informed about the number of those who pay local taxes and their total value. only in this way the citizens will be able to clearly understand what they can expect as they pay. the values attributed to this indicator confirm the gap of civic perception among the potential, the real and the desirable. 4. discussion it was expected that this civic engagement in participatory budgeting would be proportional to the extent to which citizens recognize this process and consider it necessary, whether for their involvement (as citizens) in public decision-making and the functioning of the public accountability. meanwhile, the study found that citizens are “interested/concerned” to meet their demands and needs, considering this process to be just one way. so, they do not consider themselves properly as an integral part of this interactive/interchangeable process. these indicators lead to the conclusion that the participatory budgeting process, to be called fulfilled in its meaning and determination, should be exercised on an even more inclusive, qualitative and numerical basis for citizens. even in those cases where this field is lacking or in part, there is a need for a citizen’s budget education. the purpose of this paper is precisely to highlight this need, the extent to which citizen’s budget education is a necessity for the case study, but without going through the explanation of the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 164 published by scholink inc. phenomenon (finding causes) or considering options how it may or should to be realized in the municipality of vlore. the latter are part of another paper that we are preparing. at the end of our analysis, we think that participatory budgeting is really a process that must come naturally with civic interest, but as long as this process is sufficiently consolidated to co-initiate by citizens and local government, it is a priority cultivating such a culture/practice. and this can only be accelerated through another process, that of citizen budget education. the main obligation to promote this is certainly the government and it is the one that has to approach the citizen/community to invite, orient and enrich it with all the tools needed to make its engagement in participatory budgeting more inclusive and equally constructive. in support of this conclusion, we would quote gfoa recommends that governments encourage effective and well-implemented public engagement budget processes. this will enable the public to work with their government to help make useful budget decisions (note 7). references “local self-government” law. (2015). no. 139/2015. “the right to information” law. (2014). no. 119/2014. 15 key metrics for evaluating participatory budgeting: a toolkit for evaluators and implementers. (2014-2015). public agenda 2014-2015. a guide for local government in albania social development team. (2006). region of europe and central asia. community planning toolkitcommunity engagement. (2014). developed by community places through the support of the big lottery fund 2014. retrieved from http://www.communityplanningtoolkit.org directive no. 23, date 30.7. (2018). on standard procedures for the preparation of the medium term budget program of local self-government units. http://www.gfoa.org/public-engagement-budget-process international budget partnership. (2016). guide to the questions and open budget questionnaire: an explanation of the questions and the response options. washington dc. retrieved from http://www.internationalbudget.org/ legal framework and current practice in member states. (2011). participatory budget in albania. (2005-2006). informing leaflet on projects, urban research institute 2005-2006. participatory budget. glasgow’s participation budgeting evaluation. (n.d.). retrieved from http://www.whatworksscotland.ac.uk/case sites/glasgow institute for local government. public engagement in budgeting. (n.d.). retrieved from http://www.ca-ilg.org/engaging-public-budgeting shah, a. (n.d.). participatory budgeting. public sector governance and accountability series. the wbank, washington dc. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 165 published by scholink inc. tanaka, s. (n.d.). engaging the public in national budgeting: a non-governmental perspective. oecd journal on budgeting, 7(2). https://doi.org/10.1787/budget-v7-art12-en notes note 1. law 139/2015 “on local self government” (p. 2). note 2. law 139/2015 “local self-government” (p. 15). note 3. engaging the public in national budgeting (p. 13). note 4. directive nr. 23, date 30.7.2018 “on standard procedures for the preparation of the medium term budget program of local self-government units” (p. 33). note 5. engaging the public in national budgeting (p. 2). note 6. engaging the public in national budgeting (p. 2). note 7. http://www.gfoa.org/public-engagement-budget-process microsoft word ape-v2n1-p16 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 16 original paper irregular migration and terrorism in the european union—an analysis based on reports of europol and frontex dr. robert, bartko1* 1 university of győr faculty of law and political sciences, department of criminal sciences (hungary-győr) * dr. robert, bartko, university of győr faculty of law and political sciences, department of criminal sciences (hungary-győr) received: february 2, 2019 accepted: february 12, 2019 online published: february 13, 2019 doi:10.22158/ape.v2n1p16 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v2n1p16 abstract the international migration has intensified during the last two decades. the number of the irregular migrants entered the european union reached unprecedented level between 2014 and 2018. from 2015 to nowadays the european union experienced a massive number of casualties caused by terrorist attacks. these facts are reinforced by the data of the european criminal statistics as well. having regard to that the terrorist attacks constitute one of the most serious violations of the human rights and fundamental freedoms on which the eu is founded, it is very important to deal with the relationship between the mentioned two phenomena. although, there is no evidence to declare that all of migrants are terrorist, however—it can be underlined-, the terrorists make use of migratory flows to enter into eu. it shall be emphasized that the phenomenon of the irregular migration is favorable to the terrorist organizations. the paper deals with the question of whether is there a connection between the irregular migration and the terrorism in the european union, using european statistics of the european law enforcement agency (europol) and the frontex. dealing with legal documents and analyzing them is not aim of this paper. keywords irregular migration, terrorism, european union, europol, frontex 1. introduction as a starting point, it shall be underlined that the irregular migrant can be defined as an individual who crosses a border without proper authority or violating conditions for entering a country. the irregular migrants usually use the following ways entering the territory of eu: (a) border-crossing without www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 17 published by scholink inc. proper authority, either through clandestine entry or with fraudulent documents; (b) entering with authorization, but overstaying it; (c) deliberatly abusing the asylum system; or under the control of the smugglers and traffickers. in connection with the mentioned thoughts, it shall be emphasized that the international migration has intensified during the last two decades. europe has been receiving increasing number of migrants from the developing countries. until between 2009 and 2010 the number of the irregular migrants crossed the border of the eu was about 100.000 each year, this number rose to more than 280.000 by 2014 at the pan-european level. the mentioned number represents a 138% increase over the previous years. it can also be factually recorded that the number of migrants entered the eu irregularly has increased further in the recent past, to an unprecedented level in 2015 and 2016. according the frontex data the member states recorded nearly 1.800.000 illegal border crossings at the peak of the migration crisis in 2015, while in 2016 this number—although much less—was 511.047 illegal border crossing which can be considered still extremely high. irregular migration as a phenomenon is defined in different ways by the member states. the most of them give an administrative legal answer to the problem. however, it can be underlined that the criminalization is not a widespread response, the illegal border crossing and the illegal residence are not considered a criminal offence in the western european countries. although europe is still divided on how to consider the irregular migration, in the political dialogue it is often described as a phenomenon which threatens the state sovereignty and the public security. the news reports show that the public security can be influenced by the irregular migration. therefore, different legal measures have been adopted by many member states after 2015 in order to control the illegal migration and deal with its harmful consequences. in the recent years the migratory pressure pointed out that european union’s liberal migration-policy has caused a serious security deficit in europe. the positive expectations and impacts have served as a starting point in many european countries to a more liberal migration policy become unfounded in the area created by the new type of the migration. irregular migration is accompanied by the intensification of other forms of crime, such as the smuggling of human beings, furthermore, the individual terrorist groups can easily profit from it, as they are able to bring their “soldiers” to the destination country more easily. in the context of the above, it can be stated that migration can be both a means and a catalyst for terrorist acts. in the latter case, migration develops conflicts, which later result in violent acts.while in the former, the existing migration networks help the entry and integration of aggressors. the majority of the experts refute the direct causal relationship between illegal/legal migration and terrorism. however, it is clear from the statistical data that the more unstable internal security situation caused by the migration favors the escalation of terrorist attacks. the purpose of this paper is to analyze whether there is a relationship between the irregular migration and the increased risk of terrorism in the focus of the paper are on the one hand the europol te-sat reports and on the other hand the annual rysk analysis published by the frontex. these data can provide a good basis for responding the mentioned question from a science perspective. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 18 published by scholink inc. 2. method each year, frontex publishes a summary of the european union’s border surveillance activities and their current situation, based on data collected from the member states’ reports, in a detailed risk study. in this, the organization deals specifically with irregular migration affecting the union, its current status, analyzing data in a typical way for citizenship and for each migration route. therefore, in order to answer the question of our research set out in this paper, it is essential to analyze these statistics, because it is worth to search relationship between the target countries identified by the migration routes and the terrorist actions detected in the target countries based on the reports of europol. we focus our research on 2014-2017. 2014 was the starting point for interpreting the size of the migration explosion’ that occurred in 2015, and to see the impact of eu border surveillance activities and security measures introduced by the member states. however, the data for 2018 were not published either by frontex or by europol, which is why we closed our analysis by 2017. 2.1 the analysis of the data published by the frontex in 2014, according to the frontex data, there were a record number of irregular border crossings detected in the european union compared to the previous years. the number of more than 280.000 was double that reported by the member states compared to the termin of the, arabic spring. the mentioned increase could be traced back to the war and the unstable domestic political situation in syria. the mentioned fact can also clearly be traced in the figures as well, because 79.169 of the more than 280.000 illegal crossing border were based in syria. in addition, a large number of irregular migrants have arrived via lybia from eritrea and via the black sea and the western balkans routes from afghanistan and kosovo. however, in 2015 the irregular migration has changed both in terms of quantity and quality. this year, the number of irregular border crossings detected by the member states and reported to the frontex was unprecedented with reference to the period after the ii world war. from the qualitative point of view, three new type of challanges have been faced by the authorities which were basically caused by the increase of the migratory pressure: (a) the irregular migrants entering massively the european union traveled with false documents or whitout documents; (b) the second one was the identification of migrants who were actually entitled to refugee status; (c) the third one was the abolition of the illegal stay. on the basis of the frontex report for 2015, a total of 1.822.337 cases of illegal border crossings were registered in the member states. during this period, the areas most affected by the migratory flow were the western balkans, the eastern mediterranean and the central mediterranean owing to the citizenship of the migrants. namely, most migrants declared themselves to be syrian, afghan, iraqi, somali, nigerian and eritrea. in 2016, the number of people who wanted to enter the european union illegally significantly decreased to 511.371. this fact can be traced back to several causes: first of all to the eu-turkey agreement which entered into force in march 2016; and the border protection measures introduced by hungary which had an effect on the western balkan route. it shall be emphasized that in 2016 more www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 19 published by scholink inc. and more migrants tried to enter the european union with false documents. it is an interesting fact that the false documents detected and confiscated by the authorities were typically residence permits, passports, visas and identity cards. generally, spanish, italian, french, german, belgian and greek documents were falsified by the counterfeiters–taking into account the target country designted by the migrants. taking into account the recent terrorist attacks in the eu, it is particularly interesting that the number of the irregular stay in france, germany, austria, italy and belgium was very high. on the basis of the annual report for 2017 published by the frontex, it can be underlined, the data concerning the irregular migration showed an improvement in 2017 and a reduction in the migratory pressure. the 204.719 illegal border crossings published show a 60% more favourable picture compared to the previous year. however, it is interesting to note from the data—in connection with our investigation related to the terrorism—that on the one hand the largest number of irregular migrants arrive from syria, afghanistan, iraq, nigeria, eritrea, and on the other hand france, austria, belgium, germany, italy and spain are that countries which have to take serious measures against the illegal residents. summarizing the above—mentioned facts, the illegal border crossings detected between 2014 and 2017 by the member states are presented by the following table 1. table 1. irregular border crossings detected in the eu between 2014 and 2017 year/route 2014 2015 2016 2017 western african 276 874 671 421 western mediterranean 7842 7164 10.231 23.143 central mediterranean 170.664 153.946 181.459 118.962 east mediterranean 50.834 885.386 182.277 42.305 circular route from albania 8841 8932 5121 6396 black sea 433 68 1 537 western balkan 43.357 764.038 130.261 12.178 eastern borders route 1275 1920 1349 776 source: frontex annual rysk analysis for 2015-2018. 2.2 the analysis of data published by europol in 2014, a total of 201 cases related to terrorism were registered by europol. in this data both attemted, executed and the foiled attacks are included. in 2014, 774 persons were arrested in the european union for the suspicion of terrorism. europol drew attention to the growing number of religiously motivated terrorist attacks (hereinafter: jihadist terrorism). furthermore, the data show that the following countries were on the list based on jihadist terrorism: spain, france, belgium and italy. by 2015, it has become clear that the jihadist terrorist cells—typically associated with the is—were www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 20 published by scholink inc. organized locally and increasingly as a result of the fast recruiting. as it was above mentioned, in 2015 the migratory pressure also intensified. therefore, europol tried to deal with the relationship between the irregular migration and the terrorism. at this time, the agency came to the conclusion that, although there was no evidence on the existence of the mentioned relationship, there were already perpetrators in this year who entered the eu as a member of the migratory flow. the number of arrests for terrorist offenses also increased in 2015 to 1077, of which 687 were linked to the jihadist terrorism. summarizing the data published by europol it can be emphasized that the number of attacks related to the jihadist terrorism has doubled in 2015 compared to 2014. in 2016, although the statistics on the prepared, attempted and completed terrorist attacks showed a downward trend at european level, but the numbers show an interesting picture concerning the target countries affected by the irregular migration (first of all in germany, italy, spain, belgium, and france). when we look at the arrest data related to the terrorism, the jihadist terrorism has been increased in this regard. france was the only country where the number of arrests with reference to the jihadist terrorism show a heavy upward trend from 2014. although this is not clearly stated in the europol report, the above conclusions clearly show that the situation created by migratory pressure in 2015 and 2016 has been exploited by terrorist organizations for their own purposes. the mentioned trend did not change in 2017: the number of the registered terrorist offences was 205, of which 33 were linked to jihadist terrorism. the number of arrests was 1219, of which 705 cases related to the mentioned type of terrorism. although at first glance the number of prepared, attempted and committed jihadist terrorist attacks do not seem to be high, however, if we take the view that this number was, only 16 in 2016 at the european level, this trend can be considered very frightening. we summarize the relevant data concerning the topic of our paper in the following table based on the te-sat reports published by europol. table 2. data concerning terrorism in the eu based on te-sat between 2015 and 2017 member state 2014 arrests/attacks 2015 arrests/attacks 2016 arrests/attacks 2017 arrests/attacks spain 145/18 187/25 120/10 91/16 france 238/52 424/73 456/23 411/54 belgium 72/1 61/0 65/4 50/2 great britain 132/109 134/103 149/76 412/107 greece 13/7 29/4 17/6 15/8 italy 39/12 40/4 38/17 39/14 germany 18/0 40/0 35/5 58/2 source: europol te-sat 2015-2018. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 21 published by scholink inc. 3. result and discussion we can state that already from the beginning of the 19th century the problem of the irregular migration and the assimilation has been crucial part of the political philosophies. the problem is primarily seen in the case of migrants from a lower-educated, poorer line, who—in the hope of a better life—leave their countries, have a different cultural tradition and come with positive expectations into the european states. the integration of these people is necessarily slowing down, they are quickly and easily peripheral, and in many cases, due to their irregular arrival, member state authorities try to deport them as quickly as possible. according to our opinion it is a serious source of conflict and radicalization. the events of recent years show that a significant percentage of these migrants entered illegally the eu belong to the above-mentioned group. if we take a view on the data published by europol, it shall be emphasized that the jihadist terrorism has strengthened in the recent years in the european union. if we look over the terrorist attacks, we can see that most of the perpetrators in the 2014-2017 period were typically secondor third-generation migrants. these people lived in the eu for a long time neither as a citizen, or in other legal status. however, from 2016 we can also see terrorist attacks related to the jihadist terrorism, where the perpetrators entered the territory of the eu as member of the irregular migration flow analyzed above. it can be emphasized that some of the attacks can be traced back on the one hand to eu participation in the syrian and iraqi fighting events, and on the other hand to the radicalization of that irregular migrants who did not find their anticipation in the target country. the is had a heavy role in this mentioned process of the radicalization. it can be clearly seen from the data analyzed above that the phenomenon of the irregular migration is very favorable for the terrorist organizations. it is much easier to mingle in the migratory flow and to circumvent the vigilance of the authorities with using of false documents. therefore, the primary relationship between irregular migration and terrorism can be proved with the fact that uncontrolled illegal migration makes difficult for the authorities to identify the perpetrators. thereby, the trained “fighters”, or those who have been trained abroad, but they have legal status in a member state can create a cell by radicalizing the disappointed members of the migratory wave, are difficult to detect. in addition, the relationship between this two phenomena is also evidenced by the fact that in that eu member states, which are the target countries of irregular migration, not only the terrorist threat, but also the falsification of the official documents are higher. if we look at the rise of jihadist terrorism in the european union and compare this fact with the cultural and religious trait of the irregular migrants, the relationship can also be outlined. when we look at the territorial distribution of terrorist attacks and arrests, it is very clear from the data that the potential destinations of illegal migrants are most vulnerable to the terrorist threat. the figures reflect well that the number of religiously motivated perpetrators and the attacks related to the jihadist terrorism in those member states is high that are typically target countries for irregular migrants. in summary, it can be concluded that, although an illegal migrant is not considered a terrorist, terrorism—mainly motivated by religion or legitimized by www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 22 published by scholink inc. such arguments—is a clear beneficiary of the changed european security situation. therefore, the border protection must be strengthened by the european member states and—in connection with this statement—must create the necessary legal and technical conditions to achieve the desired aim mentioned above. the legal response—like in hungary where three new crime were created by the legislator: damaging the closing of borders, irregular crossing the closing of borders and finally obstruction the building on closing of borders—should concern not only the criminal law but also the criminal procedural law as well. references anna, k. (2016). a legális migrációról. ügyészek lapja, 5, 31-39. anna, k. (2017). a terrorizmus áldozatai. ügyészek lapja, 5, 103-111. broaders, d., & engbersen, g. (2007). the fight against illegal migration. identification policies and immigrants’ counterstrategies. amercian behavioral scientist, 50(12), 1592. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764207302470 europol. (2015). te-sat 2015. europol. (2016). te-sat 2016. europol. (2017). te-sat 2017. europol. (2018). te-sat 2018. frontex. (2015). annual rysk analysis for 2015. frontex. (2016). annual rysk analysis for 2016. frontex. (2017). annual rysk analysis for 2017. jordan, b., & düvell, f. (2002). irregular migration. dilemmas of transnational mobility (p. 15). cheltenham: edvard elgar. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781950456 kuschminder, k. et al. (2015). irregular migration routes to europe and factors influencing migrants’ destination choices (p. 10). maastricht graduate school of governmance, maastricht. miklós, b. (2013). az európai unió közös kül-, és biztonságpolitikájának néhány főbb kihívása napjainkban. terror & elhárítás, 2, 81. szilveszter, p. (2008). a nemzetközi migráció kockázata. ügyészek lapja, 5, 80. triandafyllidou, a., & maroukis, t. (2012). migrant smuggling: irregular migration from asia and africa to europe (pp. 1-1). springe. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230369917 uehling, g. (2004). irregular and illegal migration through ukraine. international migration, 77-109. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-7985.2004.00290.x zoltán, h. (2016). idegen a büntetőjogban (pp. 35-36). andann kft, pécs (hungary). microsoft word ape-v2n1-p51 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 51 original paper can one promote a delegation of the bilateral aid to multilateral donors to improve foreign aid effect on economic growth in ecowas (note 1) countries? w. jean marie kébré1* 1 ministry of economy, finance and development, university ouaga 2, burkina faso * w. jean marie kébré, ministry of economy, finance and development, university ouaga 2, burkina faso received: february 3, 2019 accepted: february 20, 2019 online published: february 27, 2019 doi:10.22158/ape.v2n1p51 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v2n1p51 abstract this article analyzes the relationship between external aid and economic growth in the ecowas region, with a focus on bilateral and multilateral aid effects. the key idea behind this analysis is an argument of svensson (2000) that multilateral aid is more effective than bilateral aid because of the high degree of altruism of bilateral donors. he therefore suggested a delegation of bilateral aid to multilateral institutions. to appreciate his suggestion, this analysis used panel data from the 16 ecowas countries from the period 1984 to 2014. the results of the estimates, based on the dynamic least squares estimator (dols), show a negative effect of foreign aid on economic growth. this negative effect on economic growth persists when the components of aid are introduced into the model. in addition, results highlight that governance is a channel through which foreign aid affect positively economic growth. in these conditions, bilateral aid is more effective on economic growth than multilateral aid. these results about foreign aid received by ecowas countries invalidates svensson’s (2000) theory. therefore, a delegation of bilateral aid to multilateral institutions is not relevant because bilateral aid contributes more to economic growth if governance is taken into account. keywords bilateral aid, multilateral aid, economic growth, governance www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 52 published by scholink inc. 1. introduction foreign aid in economics theory is considered as an additional resource to domestic resources in order to finance economic growth. in harrod-domar growth model, for example, foreign resources allow to increase investment that leads to increased production. but, as chenery and strout (1966) pointed out in their two-gap growth model, achievement of a growth objective depends on investments efficiency. taking these factors into account, many studies have examined the issue of foreign aid effectiveness in terms of contribution to economic growth in recipient countries. the results of these studies are strongly discussed and three major trends emerge from economics literature. while some studies concluded that aid does not affect or even negatively affects economic growth (boone, 1994; easterly, 2003; easterly, 2008; gyimah-brempong et al., 2012; moyo, 2008), others showed a positive relationship between aid and growth (arndt et al., 2015; clemensn et al., 2004; galiani et al., 2014; lof et al., 2015) with a decreasing marginal return of aid (collier & dollar, 2001; dalgaard et al., 2004; durbarry et al., 1998; hansen & tarp, 2001). others else concluded that aid is only effective at supporting positive economic growth when recipient countries adopt good economic policies (burnside & dollar, 2000; burnside & dollar, 2004; chauvet & guillaumont, 2003). the economic community of west african states (ecowas) is a zone whose member countries have received foreign aid since their independence. from 1980 to 2016, these countries received aid of about 14.78% on average their gdp. during the same period, they estimated their gdp per capita of about 585.07 us dollars with an average evolution of about 2.57% per year. despite the increased evolution of the gdp per capita, it is not clear that foreign aid contributed on it. indeed, figure 1 in appendix established the relationship between foreign aid and gdp per capita. from this figure, the trend emerging is a negative correlation between these two economic variables. given aid flows received and the relationship between aid and gdp per capita established by the scatter plots, and according to the ongoing debate in empirical literature on the issue, we questions the ability of foreign aid to promote economic growth in ecowas countries. to this main question we can add these subsidiary questions. 1.1 does foreign aid effect on economic growth depend on donors? this question draws its meaning from the debate about aid effectiveness depending on whether it comes from a bilateral or multilateral donor. indeed, in his model, svensson (2000) was looking for incentive mechanisms to make external aid more effective. he conducted his analysis as a strategic game form between donor and recipient, focusing on the problem of moral hazard that affects aid efficiency. he concluded that aid from multilateral donors was more effective than that from bilateral donors because of their high degree of altruism. svensson (2000) therefore suggested that bilateral donors delegate their aid to multilateral institutions. this degree of altruism is expressed mainly through bilateral donors aversion to poverty and their aid allocations which strongly depend on their strategic interests (raschky & schwindt, 2012). in contrast, multilateral institutions are less averse to poverty. because of their aim, these organizations are focused www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 53 published by scholink inc. on economic performance and their aid allocations depend on it (hagen, 2006; torsvik, 2005). most time, studies separately analyze the effects of bilateral and multilateral aid without necessarily coming to a comparative assessment of their effectiveness on economic growth. very few authors, to our knowledge, have been interested in a comparative analysis of bilateral and multilateral aid effectiveness. in this respect, lessmann and markwardt (2010) in a classic growth model performed a comparative analysis and highlighted differences in effectiveness between bilateral and multilateral aid. according to their results, and contrary to svensson’s results, bilateral aid has a slightly higher effect on economic growth than multilateral aid. wako (2011), using panel data of 42 sub-saharan african countries for the years 1980 through 2007, appreciated the effect of bilateral and multilateral aid on economic growth of these countries. he found that there was no evidence for the (conditional or unconditional) effectiveness of both kinds of aid. according to him, bilateral or multilateral aid on their own, or in interaction with policy, is ineffective at enhancing economic growth, regardless of whether one measures it relative to the recipients’ gross domestic product or in per capita terms. other authors, interested in the issue, went beyond the source of aid and appreciated donors’ own policies for effective allocation of aid (dreher et al., 2015; gary & maurel, 2015; minasyan et al., 2017). the main conclusion from their studies is that more coherent donors’ policies are associated with stronger economic growth in recipient countries. 1.2 does aid effectiveness depend on the quality of governance in ecowas countries? the interest of this question comes from economic debates on non-linear influence of aid on economic growth. this non-linearity results on the one hand from the presence of transmission channels of aid effects (chenery & strout, 1966; burnside & dollar, 2000) and on the other hand from the capacity of recipient countries to absorb foreign aid (collier & dollar, 2001). several authors have tested the presence of transmission channels in their analysis of aid effect on economic growth. already, burnside and dollar (2000) in their study showed that aid would only be effective on economic growth in countries with good policies and institutional quality. several studies have undertaken, with varying degrees of success, to confirm these results (collier & hoeffler, 2002; kosack, 2003; mosley, 2015). in addition, collier and dehn (2001) also found that external shocks could also influence aid effect on growth. in this sense, a group of studies concluded that aid was effective in countries exposed to macroeconomic fluctuations and large climatic variations (dalgaard et al., 2004; hudson, 2015), and foreign aid would contribute to mitigate these external shocks effects. regarding absorptive capacity, studies pointed out that too much aid could compromise its efficiency on economic development of recipient countries. in this regard, hansen and tarp (2001) has shown that marginal returns of aid become negative when these flows exceed 25% of gdp, while lensink and white (2001) has set this threshold around 40%. as for gyimah-brempong et al. (2012), they found that aid effect on economic growth in 77 developing countries is positive only if the level of aid was between 6.6 and 14.4% of gdp. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 54 published by scholink inc. the literature on aid effectiveness remains extremely rich and varied. the debate on aid effects is so controversial that we can said that there are as many papers exposing a positive relationship between aid and growth than papers supporting a negative effect or no significant effect on income growth (doucouliagos & paldam, 2009). this heterogeneity highlights the lack of consensus on aid effects on economic growth. the purpose of this study is to empirically examine the relationship between economic growth and foreign aid, especially taking into account its two main sources: bilateral and multilateral aid. the idea is to investigate the effects of bilateral and multilateral aid both in order to assess the complementarity that could result from these two modes of aid delivery. this study also examines the role of governance in the relationship between external aid and economic growth. based on this literature, the following hypotheses will be tested:  multilateral aid is more efficient to economic growth than bilateral aid;  aid has decreasing marginal effect on economic growth and the quality of governance is a channel that improves aid effect. as previously reported, the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth has attracted much interest in the economic literature. however, very few studies, to our knowledge, have made a comparative empirical analysis of the effect by source of aid, especially in ecowas. the essential contribution of this paper lies in this comparative analysis while appreciating the role of governance. 2. materials and methods the econometric analysis is based on a traditional neoclassical growth model in open economy, derived from the cobb-douglas type function. this kind of model is widely used in the empirical literature on aid effectiveness. thus, from this function, hansen and tarp (2001) developed a model of aid analysis in which income growth depends on aid, investment, and policy variables. this model is used by dalgaard et al. (2004) and gyimah-brempong et al. (2012) to analyze the impact of aid on growth in developing countries. the results concluded that there was a direct and quadratic relationship between aid and income growth and an indirect relationship through investment and through economic policies. this analysis of the impact of aid on economic growth in ecowas countries draws on this model. the interest in using this model is that it allows to take into account the quadratic form of aid and allows aid to interact with governance. 2.1 model specification with reference to aid-growth literature, the basic equation of economic growth to investigate as follows:  , 0, 1, , 2, , 3, , , 1i t i i i t i i t i i t i t i ty a x z             where subscripts “i” and “t” respectively refer to country and to time. “a” defines foreign aid (as a percentage of gdp) which is split into bilateral and multilateral component and “z” represents www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 55 published by scholink inc. governance variable. “x” is a vector of control variables. ,, and i t i t   respectively capture the individual-specific effects, the time-specific factors and idiosyncratic error. in equation (1), aid is considered as an exogenous variable explaining the growth rate of real gdp per capita. however, it is important to point out the complex environment in which aid is allocated and analyzed. this complexity, highlighted in burnside and dollar’s (2000) study, is explained by the fact that aid must be allocated to countries with good institutions. under such conditions, the possibility of endogeneity problem is very likely when estimating relationship between foreign aid and growth. therefore, it would be cautious to take into account the endogenous nature of aid. moreover, the observation of figure 2 in the appendix, which relates aid to per capita income, shows a non-linear dynamic of the general trend curve resulting from scatter plots. such dynamic suggests a threshold effect of aid that it would be interesting to test in this analysis. that is why aid, in equation (2), is introduced in quadratic form and interact with governance.    2 , 0, 1, , 2, , 3, , , 4, , ,* 2i t i i i t i i t i i t i t i i t i t i ty a a z a x               2.2 estimation issues and procedures the model (2) as presented is a static approach to investigated phenomenon. this approach does not allow to take into account the possibility of a dynamic dimension of the phenomenon. this dynamic dimension is a significant issue in the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth. indeed, in the policies of aid allocation, it’s important to note that donors integrates the level of gdp per capita of recipient countries. so foreign aid tends to go to low-income countries. there is therefore a causality “income-aid” well-established in economics literature: lower is the country’s income, more aid it receives. the study here is about the causality “aid-income”: does aid allow to increase income? the possibility of endogeneity problem therefore is very likely that estimation method must take into account. conventional estimators (fixed/random effects estimators) that impose the homogeneity of the estimated parameters are not appropriate for equation (2) because they can be seriously biased (pesaran & smith, 1995). besides, the problem of endogeneity (possibility of double correlation between aid and economic growth) needs to be adequately addressed in order to achieve robust estimators. the most widely used techniques that take into account these econometric problems are: the fully modified (fm) and dynamic least squares (dols) estimators developed by chiang and kao (2002), the error correction estimators proposed by pesaran and smith (1995) namely pooled mean group (pmg) and mean group (mg). this study adopts the dols estimator because of its superiority (best estimators) on the fm estimator. according to chiang and kao (2001), on small samples (relatively small size), the dols estimator provided a better correction of long-term endogeneity bias than the fm estimator. this estimator is an extension of stock and watson’s (1993) one. to obtain an unbiased estimator of the long term www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 56 published by scholink inc. parameters, the dols method estimates a parametric correction by including lagged levels as well as lagged differences of variables. in other words, the technique consists in including leads and lags of ,i tx in the cointegration relationship in order to remove the correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term. thus, considering the equation (2) and assuming the presence of non-stationary variables, the dols estimator is provided by the following equation:     2 1 , 0 1 , 2 , , , 1 , , 3 k q i t i t i t i k i t k i t k i t k q y y m y m                  in this equation (3), ,i tm represents the set of explanatory variables other than , 1i ty  . ,ki is the estimated parameter of anticipation or delay in first difference of the explanatory variables. 2.3 description of variables and data the estimation uses four categories of variables for the analysis:  the economic growth appreciated by the growth rate of real gdp per capita.  foreign aid measures the amount of external resources received as official development assistance (aid/gdp). over the period 1980 to 2016, aid to ecowas countries represented about 14.78% of gdp per year. this aid split up into bilateral and multilateral aid. bilateral donors are represented by single country agencies that provide aid directly to developing countries or ngos. alternatively, multilateral donors exist where more than two bilateral donors pool their aid flows and, through the international organization’s own decision processes that aggregate the member countries’ preferences, then provide the aid to developing countries or ngos. during this period, the most important part of this foreign aid was delivered by bilateral donors (57.76%), while multilateral donors delivered about 42.24%. figure 1 below shows the evolution of these two components of foreign aid delivered to ecowas countries. the main information from this figure is that, from the 1996s, there has been a pronounced fall in the real amount of foreign aid provided by donors for these developing countries. economics literature attributes this pronounced decreasing to the aid fatigue. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 57 published by scholink inc. figure 1. bilateral and multilateral aid to ecowas countries, 1980-2016  governance denotes institutional variables. many institutions attempted to develop indicators to assess governance in countries. among these institutions, there are the country policy and institutional assessment (cpia) developed the world bank since 1996, and the international country risk guide series (icrg) which began publication in 1984. this are the latter indicators that are used in this study. these indicators are derived from expert surveys of economic and political conditions in about 140 countries. this study uses the icrg indicators. the choice for these indicators results from the fact that the series are longer than those of other institutions. for the analysis, the governance variable is obtained by summing the scores of the 12 icrg indicators whose maximum score for a country is 100. figure 3 shows the overall level of institutional quality in the ecowas countries (note 2). from 1984 to 2014, ecowas countries was characterized by a low level of governance with an average score estimated at 51.69. nevertheless, there is an improvement in governance during this period because the score increased from 45.93 in 1984 to51.75 in 2014. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 58 published by scholink inc. figure 2. governance in ecowas countries, 1984-2014  control variables relate to investment and financial development valued by the broad money (all as a percentage of gdp). they also concern the human capital measured by the active population (as a percentage of the total population) and the gross enrollment rate, the economic stability appreciated by the rate of inflation. we use quantitative data for this analysis coming from three sources. the data relating to foreign aid are drawn from the organization for economic co-operation and development (oecd) database. the data about governance comes from the ircg database. for control variables, they come from the world bank database. 3. results and discussions the effects of foreign aid (and split into bilateral and multilateral aid) on economic growth has been estimated through the economic growth model presented above. the results relate to stationarity and cointegration tests on the one hand and regressions on the other. 3.1 the results of unit root and cointegration tests to determine the order of integration of variables and examine the presence of a long-term relationship between them, the first step of the empirical approach was to perform unit root and cointegration tests. for this purpose, two tests developed by levin et al. (2002) and by im et al. (2003) were used to assess the non-stationarity of the variables. the first test, imposing the assumption of homogeneity of the autoregressive root, assume, as null hypothesis, a unit root for all the individuals of the panel versus the hypothesis of the absence of unit root for the set of individuals. under these conditions, it is unlikely that in case of rejection of the null hypothesis, we can accept the hypothesis of an autoregressive root common to all individuals. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 59 published by scholink inc. the second test responds to this concern by considering a model with individual effects and no deterministic trend. it postulates the unit root versus the possibility of cohabitation of two categories of individuals in the panel. individuals for whom the variable is stationary and those for whom it’s not. the results of implementing of these two tests are presented in the following table. table 1. results of unit root tests applied to the variables variables ll ips coefficient p-value coefficient p-value gdp growth** −0.159 0.366 −1.659 0.989 aid* −0.491 0.000 −3.172 0.000 bilateral aid* −0.650 0.000 −3.864 0.000 multilateral aid* −0.640 0.000 −3.760 0.000 money* −0.422 0.000 −3.206 0.000 inflation* −0.667 0.000 −3.841 0.000 investment* −0.321 0.001 −2.542 0.050 active pop** −0.108 0.000 −2.471 0.101 education** −0.112 0.995 −1.869 0.910 governance** −0.213 0.135 −2.099 0.630 democraty** −0.188 0.362 −1.860 0.919 corruption** −0.244 0.171 −2.143 0.553 source: author. ips = im-pesaran-shin’s test; ll = levin-lin-chu’s test; stationary at level (*), in first difference (**). the results of the unit root tests show that gdp growth and governance indicators (governance, democracy and corruption) are stationary in first difference, while the foreign aid (total aid, bilateral and multilateral aid) are stationary at level. for the control variables, investment, broad money and inflation are stationary at level; the active population and education being stationary in first difference. in order to highlight the long-term relationship between the variables and based on the results of the panel unit root test, we use the cointegration tests in panel developed by westerlund (2007). the tests apply to variables that are integrated of order one. the underlying idea is to test the absence of cointegration while determining whether each of the individuals in the panel can adopt an error correction model. for this, one considers an error correction model in which the parameter ia represents the speed of adjustment towards the long-term equilibrium. the model consists of four tests: gt, ga, pt and pa. the first two tests are called group mean tests, and the alternative hypothesis is that at least one observation has cointegrated variables. the last two tests are named panel tests and in this www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 60 published by scholink inc. case, the alternative hypothesis is that the panel, considered as a whole, is cointegrated. the results are presented in the following table. table 2. results of cointegration tests test value z-value p-robust value gt* −1.316 3.509 0.053 ga*** −0.711 5.256 0.008 pt 2.635 9.046 0.925 pa** 0.689 4.481 0.028 source: author. (***), (**) and (*) = significant respectively at 1%, 5% and 10%. the results in table 2 show that the non-cointegration hypothesis is rejected for all statistics except for pt. considering these results, it can reasonably be concluded that, for part of the sample, the variables are notsignificant. 3.2 discussion of estimates results the second step of the empirical analysis was to estimate the economic growth model using the dols estimator. estimates have been made taking into account total foreign aid received and its components whom are bilateral and multilateral aid. the results reported in tables 3 and 4 are generally satisfactory. indeed, the chi tests are significant and the gradual introduction of the interest variables shows a certain stability of the model; which is a signal of the estimates robustness. the results from these estimates lead to the following conclusions. 3.2.1 foreign aid is harmful to economic growth, whether bilateral or multilateral this conclusion is derived from the results estimated of the basic model provided by columns (i) of table 3. these results, which allow to assess the direct effects of aid, show that foreign aid has negative effects on economic growth. for example, a unit increase (as a percentage of gdp) of aid leads to a drop in economic growth of 0.064%. these results confirm previous studies of authors who found that foreign aid negatively affects the economic growth of recipient countries (easterly, 2003; gyimah-brempong et al., 2012; moyo, 2008). but in looking at its components, the results are only significant in multilateral aid. these first results make the validity of the conclusion of svensson (2000) in ecowas countries rather subtle. it could be accepted in the sense that only multilateral aid has a significant effect on economic growth. however, its negative effects limits the scope of svensson’s thesis in ecowas. another interesting result emanating from columns (ii) is the non-validation of the threshold effect in the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth. indeed, the introduction of the quadratic variable of aid (also for bilateral and multilateral aid) modifies the sense of the relationship between aid www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 61 published by scholink inc. and economic growth, but the coefficients are notsignificant. table 3. results of the estimates of foreign aid effects on economic growth variable total foreign aid bilateral aid multilateral aid (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) investment 0.22*** (2.36) 2.22*** (2.48) 0.21** (2.11) 0.23*** (2.40) 0.21** (2.26) 0.19** (2.19) active pop -0.15 (-0.70) -0.14 (-0.71) -0.15 (-0.66) -0.14 (-0.65) -0.15 (-0.72) -0.13 (-0.66) education 0.10*** (2.37) 0.09*** (2.33) 0.10** (2.25) 0.10** (2.19) 0.10*** (2.37) 0.08** (2.14) aid -0.064** (-1.94) -0.08 (-1.00) -0.08 (-1.30) -0.19 (-1.29) -0.15*** (-3.12) -0.19* (-1.75) squaredaid 0.003 (0.50) 0.001 (1.08) 0.001 (1.27) money -0.15*** (-2.83) -0.14*** (-2.82) -0.15*** (-2.60) -0.14*** (-2.56) -0.14*** (-2.68) -0.13*** (-2.60) inflation -0.07* (-1.82) -0.05 (-1.48) -0.07* (-1.74) -0.06 (-1.51) -0.07* (-1.83) -0.06 (-1.54) governance 0.18*** (2.56) 0.16*** (2.37) 0.21*** (2.80) 0.19*** (2.57) 0.17** (2.31) 0.15** (2.28) wald chi2 47.04*** 43.66*** 39.81*** 37.86*** 50.91*** 37.78*** number of countries 11 11 11 11 11 11 number of observations 297 297 297 297 297 297 source: author. 1) provides results of the basic model estimate giving the direct effect of aid on economic growth; 2) provides the results of the non-linear model estimates (squared aid); (***; **; *) indicate that the variable is significant at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively. 3.2.2 governance is a channel that improves foreign aid effect on economic growth to appreciate the role of governance, it has been assumed to be a channel through which foreign aid affected economic growth. for this purpose, the governance variable was introduced into the model as an interacted variable with aid. columns (iii) and (iv) of table 4 present the results of this test. the results in column (iii) indicate positive and significant effects at 1% of interaction variables. they highlight that governance is a channel through which foreign aid (both bilateral and multilateral aid) positively affects economic growth in ecowas countries. they thus corroborate the results of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 62 published by scholink inc. burnside and dollar (2000; 2004), which showed that aid is effective on economic growth only in countries with good governance. these results also indicate that the correlation resulting from the interaction between bilateral aid and governance is stronger than that with multilateral aid. such result leads to the conclusion that, in a good governance environment, bilateral aid has a higher positive effect on economic growth than multilateral aid. this conclusion is confirmed by the specific governance indicators used. indeed, the results in columns (iv) present democracy and corruption variables crossed with foreign aid (total, bilateral and multilateral aid). they indicate a positive and significant correlation with economic growth, except for the interaction variable between multilateral aid and corruption. they also point out that the interaction variables between bilateral aid and governance indicators are stronger correlated with economic growth. these results suggest that by taking into account governance, svensson’s (2000) idea about the predominance of multilateral aid effect (as opposed to bilateral aid effect) on economic growth could not be validated in ecowas countries. on the contrary, it could be argued that good governance contributes to eliminate the aid negative effect on economic growth resulting of the basic model estimates and to minimize the altruism negative effect of bilateral donors on their aid effectiveness. table 4. results of regressions of aid effects with emphasis on the role of governance variables total foreign aid bilateral aid multilateral aid (iii) (iv) (iii) (iv) (iii) (iv) investment 0.12* (1.72) 0.14** (1.96) 0.15 (1.46) 0.19* (1.84) 0.08 (0.97) 0.18** (2.02) active pop -0.10 (-0.64) -0.08 (-0.52) -0.09 (-0.40) -0.08 (-0.39) -0.12 (-0.60) -0.10 (-0.53) education 0.06** (2.12) 0.05* (1.76) 0.06 (1.28) 0.05 (1.11) 0.08** (2.08) 0.06* (1.70) aid -0.52*** (-8.38) -0.44*** (-9.00) -0.86*** (-7.25) -0.92*** (-8.27) -0.55*** (-7.66) -0.50*** (-7.62) money -0.15*** (-3.68) 0.11*** (-2.77) -0.08 (-1.39) -0.05 (-0.95) -0.10** (-2.13) 0.07* (-1.71) inflation -0.03 (-1.14) -0.04 (-1.33) -0.02 (-0.47) -0.03 (-0.73) -0.05* (-1.44) -0.01 (-0.44) aid*governance 0.009*** (7.82) 0.009*** (7.64) 0.005*** (5.63) aid*corruption 0.07*** (2.99) 0.10*** (2.82) 0.0008 (0.03) aid*democraty 0.04*** (3.84) 0.05*** (3.17) 0.04*** (2.92) wald chi2 120.46*** 132.13*** 76.46*** 108.72*** 72.71*** 74.03*** www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 63 published by scholink inc. number of countries 11 11 11 11 11 11 number of observations 297 297 297 297 297 297 source: author. (iii) and (iv) provide results of the non-linear model estimates (foreign aid interacting with governance indicators); (***; **; *) indicate that the variable is significant at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively. 4. conclusion the purpose of this article was to evaluate foreign aid effect on the economic growth in the ecowas countries, especially taking into account the components of this aid (bilateral and multilateral), and the role of governance. empirical results based on a dynamic panel data approach indicate a negative correlation between foreign aid and economic growth, regardless of component of aid. testing the possibility of a reversal effect, the results indicate a modification of sign of the squared aid but its coefficient is not significant. in these conditions, the hypothesis of the presence of threshold effects in the correlation between aid and economic growth cannot be validated because of the non-significance of the squared aid coefficient. in addition, the introduction of governance as an interaction variable with foreign aid shows a positive effect on economic growth. this result constitutes the signature that governance can be considered as a channel through which foreign aid has positive effect on economic growth. and this positive channel is maintained with the governance indicators used that are corruption and democracy. with these results, we note that contrary to the theory of svensson (2000), bilateral aid has a stronger correlation with economic growth than multilateral aid in ecowas economies if governance is taken into account in the analysis. these different results suggest that ecowas countries have an interest in focusing on governance as it is a channel to improve foreign aid effect on economic growth. the idea of delegating bilateral aid to multilateral institutions as suggested by svensson (2000) therefore does not seem relevant. on the contrary, the results suggest a reverse delegation, in a good governance environment. references arndt, c., jones, s., & tarp, f. 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(1993). a simple estimator of cointegrating vectors in higher order integrated systems. econometrica: journal of the econometric society, 783-820. https://doi.org/10.2307/2951763 svensson, j. (2000). when is foreign aid policy credible? aid dependence and conditionality. journal of development economics, 61, 61-84. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-3878(99)00061-9 torsvik, g. (2005). foreign economic aid; should donors cooperate? journal of development economics, 77, 503-515. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2004.05.008 wako, h. a. (2011). effectiveness of foreign aid in sub-saharan africa: does disaggregating aid into www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 66 published by scholink inc. bilateral and multilateral components make a difference?. journal of economics and international finance, 3, 801-817. westerlund, j. (2007). testing for error correction in panel data. oxford bulletin of economics and statistics, 69, 709-748. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0084.2007.00477.x notes note 1. economic community of west african states. note 2. two ecowas countries (benin and cape verde) do not appear in the icrg database. appendix 1 linking the foreign aid evolution with that of the gdp per capita over the period 1980-2016 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 67 published by scholink inc. appendix 2 highlighting of the non-linear relationship between foreign aid and gdp per capita over the period 1980-2016 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 155 original paper fully mobilize the enthusiasm, initiative and creativity of the whole society to participate in chinese modernization hao jing1 1 ningxia university of marxism, yinchuan ningxia, china received: august 29, 2025 accepted: october 27, 2025 online published: december 22, 2025 doi:10.22158/ape.v8n1p155 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v8n1p155 abstract the key to building a socialist modern country in an all-round way and promoting the great rejuvenation of the chinese nation lies in the party and the people. the fourth plenary session of the 20th central committee of the communist party of china emphasized that "the whole party and people of all ethnic groups in china should unite and strive for the realization of the tenth five-year plan" and clearly put forward the task of "fully mobilizing the enthusiasm, initiative and creativity of the whole society to participate in chinese modernization". this important requirement profoundly reveals that the core of promoting chinese-style modernization and realizing high-quality social development lies in rallying the joint efforts of the whole society. fully mobilizing the enthusiasm, initiative and creativity of all kinds of social subjects to participate in chinese modernization is the key driving force to solve the development problems, stimulate social vitality and promote the cause, and profoundly reveals the core value of the coordinated participation of social forces in the process of modernization. keywords chinese path to modernization, affinity to the masses, social governance, social mobilization 1. connotation expansion of people-orientedtheory inmodernization practice the value concept centered on "people are the main force of social development" is an important perspective to understand social progress. guo (2025) argues that in the practical process of chinese modernization, by activating the enthusiasm, initiative and creativity of the subject, the deep transformation from subject cognition to practical motivation is realized, which shows the practical significance and rich connotation of this concept in contemporary practice.the key actors must possess the capability to mediate between the interests of both parties and achieve a smooth resolution in conflicts arising from both upward and downward empowerment.in other words, this requires people to actively adjust the upward and downward relationship, and it is inevitable to fully mobilize people's www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 156 enthusiasm, initiative and creativity. enthusiasm is the active recognition and participation consciousness of social subjects to the law of modernization development. social development is an objective process in which productive forces and relations of production, economic base and superstructure co-evolve. as the main body of practice, the essence of social members' positivity lies in their rational cognition and value recognition of the inevitability of modernization development, which is an organic unity of objective laws and main body needs. on the one hand, the enthusiasm is reflected in the deep understanding that chinese modernization is the inevitable trend of social development, and that modernization is the only way to improve the quality of life and realize social progress; on the other hand, enthusiasm stems from the dialectical unity of individual development and overall social development, and is an internal recognition of the concept of "development achievements are shared by all members". the motivation of this enthusiasm is essentially the subjective transformation of social members' personal struggle into the torrent of social development, and then forms the conscious consciousness of actively participating in economic construction and social governance, which is a vivid embodiment of human social nature in the process of modernization. initiative is the practical responsibility and exploration consciousness of social subjects to break through the bottleneck of development. from the perspective of social development, initiative is embodied in the active practice of social members to solve development problems and break through institutional and institutional obstacles on the basis of following the law of development. this initiative stems from an accurate grasp of the development needs, and it is a practical character of forming a clear understanding of what needs to be done, what can be done and what should be done on the basis of clearly understanding the development requirements of the times and responding to the realistic needs of society. in the process of chinese modernization, initiative is manifested in the pioneering spirit of various social subjects in development practice, which is the practical vitality of breaking through path dependence, getting rid of experience constraints and actively exploring the practical development path, confirming the basic cognition that social subjects are the core force to promote development and change. creativity is the core strength and value realization of social subjects to promote social progress. creativity is the dialectical unity of productivity development and individual all-round development, and its core feature is to break through the existing development level and optimize social relations and production mode through practical activities. from a practical point of view, creativity is not only an innovative force to break through the traditional development model, but also a constructive force to build a new development pattern. through scientific and technological innovation, institutional innovation, cultural innovation and other specific forms, it promotes the coordinated upgrading of productivity and production relations, helps social development to move towards a higher quality and more sustainable stage, and finally points to the ideal state in which individual values and social values can be realized together. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 157 2. enthusiasm, initiative andcreativityare thecore power support of chinesemodernization. enthusiasm is the premise of initiative and creativity, which provides cognitive and emotional support for follow-up practice; initiative is the key intermediary between enthusiasm and creativity, which realizes the transformation from cognition to practice; as the highest form of the two, creativity is not only the inevitable result of their joint action, but also its ultimate value destination. luo and ding (2025) pointed out that, based on the laws of modern development, in order to successfully advance modernization, it is necessary to focus on tapping into the endogenous resources of modernization and cultivating an endogenous power system for modernization.fully mobilize the enthusiasm, initiative and creativity of the whole society, profoundly grasp the essential attribute of social subject, not only adhere to the core position of "social subject is the fundamental driving force for development", but also combine the practical needs of chinese modernization, enrich the theoretical understanding of the driving force for development, and provide a profound practical foundation and strong power support for promoting modernization. safeguarding the subject status is the fundamental premise of activating "enthusiasm, initiative and creativity". the third plenary session of the 20th cpc central committee (2024) emphasized upholding the principle of putting people first, planning and promoting reforms from the perspective of the overall, fundamental, and long-term interests of the people.the core essence of chinese modernization is people-oriented modernization. as the practical subject and value subject of modernization, the protection of social members' subjective status is the logical starting point to stimulate endogenous motivation. only in the whole process from system design to practice promotion, the rights of participation, expression and development of social members are guaranteed, so that individuals can truly feel the same frequency resonance between their own struggle and social development, can we fundamentally awaken the enthusiasm of active participation, cultivate the initiative of being brave in exploration, and then continuously release the creative vitality of solving problems and promoting progress in practical scenes such as industrial upgrading, improvement of people's livelihood and social governance. this not only conforms to the development concept of "development for the people, relying on the people and sharing the fruits by the people", but also realizes the high degree of unity between the main driving force and the development goal, and injects the deepest and most lasting source of strength into modernization. respect for practice initiative is the key support to mobilize "enthusiasm, initiative and creativity". during the early stages of industrialization, a large amount of rural resources, talent, technology, and other production factors were invested in cities, enabling them to rapidly develop substantial productive capacity within a short period and drive economic and social development.[3]enter a new era,the initiative spirit of social subjects is rooted in grass-roots practice, from the practical experience and wisdom accumulated by the masses in solving practical problems, and is an important source to promote system optimization, technological innovation and social progress. from the innovation of grass-roots governance mode to the exploration of industrial development path, from the optimization www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 158 of people's livelihood service mode to the promotion of digital practice, the pioneering practice of social subjects has promoted round after round of development breakthroughs and become an important support for high-quality development. in the process of promoting chinese modernization, we must always respect the initiative spirit of social subjects, fully tap the wisdom and strength contained in the masses, and fully summarize and popularize the innovative experience in grassroots practice. activating creative vitality is a long-term guarantee for the continuous release of "enthusiasm, initiative and creativity" labor is the fundamental way to create a better life, and innovation is the core means to improve the quality of development. at present, the key to promoting high-quality development, improving people's well-being and promoting common prosperity lies in stimulating the enthusiasm, initiative and creativity of the whole society. the core is to provide good conditions and environment for social members to start businesses, so that everyone can become a participant, contributor and beneficiary of development. we must rely on the wisdom and strength of the whole society to create a good atmosphere that encourages exploration and tolerates trial and error, so that the vitality of various development factors such as labor, knowledge, technology, management and capital can fully flow. with the improvement of the training system of skilled talents, the extensive coverage of creative space and incubation platform, and the continuous smooth channel of innovation transformation, social members are not only witnesses of development, but also promoters of progress. only by continuously breaking the institutional and institutional obstacles that constrain innovation and improving the development pattern of co-construction, co-governance and sharing can creative vitality be continuously released in the process of modernization. 3. practical path to promote thewhole society to participate inmodernization in coordination consolidate development consensus and build a solid ideological foundation.studies by sakiko et al. (2019) indicate that the growing economic importance of developing countries has generated debate about the future of global governance, and the role that they play in shaping global institutions and norms. it is necessary to deeply explain the core significance of mobilizing the enthusiasm, initiative and creativity of the whole society to promote chinese modernization through diversified and grounded communication methods, so that the development concept can enter the grassroots and be deeply rooted in the hearts of the people. for example, relying on community propaganda, online popular science platforms, industry exchange forums and other carriers, we can interpret the internal relationship between the goals and tasks of modernization and individual development in easy-to-understand language and break down cognitive barriers. at the same time, guided by the scientific development concept, we should integrate all kinds of propaganda resources, create an all-round and multi-level ideological guidance system, effectively gather the wisdom and strength of different groups and industries, guide members of society to establish a sense of responsibility that "everyone is a participant in modernization", and form a strong www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 159 ideological synergy of the whole society with one mind and one effort to provide solid spiritual support for modernization. build a participation platform and smooth the channels of practice. adhere to the people-oriented development orientation, always take the realization of people's longing for a better life as the starting point and the end result of all work, and systematically build an all-round and wide-ranging social participation system. at the institutional level, we will further improve the grass-roots mass autonomy system and the democratic management system of enterprises and institutions, enrich the specific forms of democratic consultation and decision-making, and broaden the participation channels of online and offline integration, so that members of society can express their demands and participate in public affairs conveniently and efficiently. in the scene of grass-roots governance, we should fully respect the people's pioneering experience, encourage and support urban and rural communities to carry out self-governance practice innovation in light of their own reality, such as promoting community chamber and residents' proposal system, so as to enhance the people's ability of self-management and self-service. at the same time, we will promote the development of public services in the direction of equalization and precision, optimize the service supply structure according to the different needs of different groups, and improve the resource supporting policies in the fields of education, medical care and old-age care. through various measures such as policy guidance, financial support and technical empowerment, the endogenous motivation of the whole society to participate in modernization will be fully stimulated, and finally a vivid development situation will be formed in which everyone is responsible, everyone is responsible and everyone enjoys it. optimize the development environment and cultivate fertile ground for innovation. guo (2025) et al. argues that chinese government agencies select appropriate frame functions for public communication on the basis of the content and focus of each sdg. (fukuda-parr & muchhala, 2020) thus, focus on the whole chain demand of talent growth and innovation practice, and accelerate the construction of a systematic, coordinated and efficient institutional environment and guarantee system. in terms of talent cultivation, the establishment of a hierarchical and classified training mechanism not only strengthens the systematic cultivation of talents in basic disciplines, but also pays attention to the precise cultivation of applied and skilled talents to match the talent needs of different industries. at the same time, we should improve the use mechanism of talents, break the restrictions of identity, region and industry, provide a development platform for fair competition for all kinds of talents, improve the incentive mechanism for competing for growth, closely link innovation achievements with personal income and career development, and enhance the sense of acquisition and accomplishment of talents. in the construction of fault-tolerant mechanism, we should uphold the principle of respect and tolerance, clarify the fault-tolerant boundary, and relieve the worries of the subjects who dare to explore and innovate. in addition, we will continue to optimize the market-oriented, rule-of-law and international business environment, increase the protection of the entire chain of intellectual property rights, and severely crack down on infringement and counterfeiting to provide a solid guarantee for innovation www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 160 results; improve the diversified investment mechanism, guide social capital to participate in scientific and technological innovation, increase support for innovation of small and medium-sized enterprises, promote the efficient concentration of innovation elements to market players, build a technological innovation system with enterprises as the main body, market-oriented and deep integration of industry-university-research, and open up the transformation channel of innovation achievements from laboratory to market application, so that innovation vitality can fully flow in a good environment and inject sustained impetus into chinese modernization. references fukuda-parr, s., & muchhala, b. (2020). the southern origins of sustainable development goals: ideas, actors, aspirations. world development, 126, 104706. guo, c., &ye, h. (2025). the role of social capital in institutional change—on the governance mechanism of the chinese government. journal of economic issues, 59(2), 464-470. guo, d., qu, r., wang, y. et al. (2025). social media and citizen mobilization: how chinese government agencies use weibo to advance the 2030 agenda goals on sustainability. public relations review, 51(3), 102579. li, y. s., xu, x. l., & xu, z. (2025). theoretical logic and practical paths for promoting chinese modernization through high-quality integrated urban-rural development. contemporary social sciences, (6), 135-155. luo, j., & ding, y. (n.d.). on the endogenous dynamic system of chinese-style modernization. jiangsu social sciences, 1-8. the communist party of china central committee. decision on further comprehensively deepening reform and promoting chinese-style modernization. (2024). beijing: people's publishing house. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 48 original paper strategy and challenges for turkmenistan’s participation in the central asia integration xie cheng1 & deng bei2 1 school of government , shanghai university of political science and law, shanghai, china 2 school of government , shanghai university of political science and law, shanghai, china received: february 20, 2024 accepted: april 04, 2024 online published: may 09, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n2p48 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n2p48 abstract after gaining independence, turkmenistan actively pursued the status of a "permanently neutral state", aiming to leverage a neutral foreign policy for enhanced stability and peace in central asia.turkmenistan has formulated distinct engagement policies at various stages of central asian integration, ensuring the country's flexible position in the region based on national interests, neutrality, and the decisions of the supreme leader. however, turkmenistan encounters significant practical obstacles in engaging in central asian integration due to the uncertain prospects of regional integration and its unitary economic structure. if turkmenistan can sustain its engagement, strategically adjust its foreign policy, and optimize its economic reforms, it will be able to assume a more significant role in the process of central asian integration. keywords permanent neutrality, the central asia integration, turkmenistan, regional cooperation 1. introduction in 1991, the cold war came to an end, and kazakhstan, uzbekistan, tajikistan, kyrgyzstan and turkmenistan, the former republics of the soviet union, became independent sovereign states. geopolitically speaking, central asia is situated at a crucial crossroads connecting eurasia referred to as "the heart of eurasia and africa" by mackinder and holds unique geopolitical and economic significance. following the collapse of the soviet union, a power vacuum emerged in the "heartland", leading to intensified geopolitical competition in central asia. to prevent excessive external intervention in central asia and strengthen cooperation among its countries, the concept of central asian integration has gained traction. subsequently, through collaborative efforts from kazakhstan, uzbekistan, kyrgyzstan and tajikistan, the central asian economic union was established in 1994 as a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 49 formal step towards integration. as of june 2022，central asian integration has progressed through three main stages: inception (1994-2005), stagnation (2005-2018) and revival (2018-). turkmenistan, located in central asia, is considered a middle-power country in terms of overall strength. however, its poor natural environment poses significant challenges: 80% of the territory is covered by the karakum desert, and the strong continental climate brings extreme drought, limiting agricultural development. additionally, excessive reliance on natural gas and other energy sources has resulted in noticeable shortcomings in national comprehensive strength. following independence, turkmenistan has faced a complex international situation and embarked on arduous national construction and economic restructuring at home. in an effort to reduce external pressure, it seeks to minimize its participation in international affairs through its status as a neutral country. the fact that turkmenistan has long been a relatively enigmatic country is worth noting. the process of obtaining visas in turkmenistan is exceedingly challenging for foreigners, and there is a notable lack of academic research on this country. the existing literature seldom directly addresses turkmenistan's approach and strategy towards central asian integration, but rather examines the relevant issues through the lens of turkmenistan's policy of neutrality, energy trade, and high-level decision-making. firstly, according to turkish scholar utku yapici, turkmenistan's policy of neutrality is not the cause of its isolation in foreign affairs. neutrality actually contributes to the stability of the state regime and facilitates energy trade, thus making it a viable long-term policy. (utku, 2018) barbara kiepenheuer-drechsler argues that turkmenistan's self-imposed isolationism in foreign policy is a result of its policy of neutrality, aimed at maintaining state stability and minimizing the influence of external countries. (barbara, 2006) despite their differing views on turkmenistan's "isolationism," both scholars contend that the country's policy of neutrality significantly influences its foreign policy decisions. therefore, turkmenistan's neutrality is a crucial factor in determining its participation in central asian integration. furthermore, due to the significant role of energy trade in turkmenistan's economy, numerous academics have directed their attention towards the concept of 'oil and gas diplomacy' as a pivotal factor shaping turkmenistan's foreign policy. zhang zhenguo believes that turkmenistan's policy of neutrality is conducive to leveraging its abundant resources for national development and achieving the goal of becoming an energy-rich nation. boris shikhmuradov, former foreign minister of turkmenistan, also expressed a similar perspective, stating that the policy of neutrality can enhance turkmenistan's attractiveness to foreign investment and enable it to fully leverage its energy resources. finally, the perception and stance of turkmenistan's highest decision maker (the president) have significantly shaped turkmenistan's approach to central asian integration.fabio de leonadis conducted an analysis of the "turkmenbashi" phenomenon and its impact on state construction through the lens of comparative politics. his findings revealed that the authority of the president of turkmenistan serves as a crucial tool for maintaining stability in the country, highlighting the necessity of incorporating factors related to supreme leadership when studying turkmenistan's foreign policy www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 50 from a micro perspective. (fabio, 2017) the aforementioned three explanations offer a fresh outlook for the analysis of turkmenistan's foreign policy. neutrality is a prerequisite for turkmenistan's participation in the integration of central asia. the principle of integration and neutrality must not conflict for turkmenistan to engage. energy trade and economic benefits are significant factors driving turkmenistan's evolving stance on integration. the president of turkmenistan's stance and perspective on the integration of central asia directly impacts the country's "integration strategy". the study is structured into four main parts based on the analytical framework. the first part examines turkmenistan's "apathetic" stance towards early central asian integration, focusing on national economic interests, neutral institutions, and decision makers. the second part describes the process and development of obstruction to central asian integration, explaining turkmenistan's participation strategy in a non-regional power-dominated integration mechanism. the third part introduces the restart and development trend of central asian integration, summarizing the motivation and purpose behind turkmenistan's sudden change in integration strategy through its diplomatic practice in three central asian heads of state meetings.the concluding part delineates the external obstacles to the second phase of central asian integration and evaluates the potential for turkmenistan's involvement in this process. 2. turkmenistan's early attitude towards central asian integration (1991-2005) after the dissolution of the soviet union, the five central asian countries embarked on a path towards independence. however, following their independence, these nations encountered numerous practical challenges, with economic restructuring being foremost among them. in the past, the five central asian states were integrated into the soviet state system and lacked a relatively independent economic structure, resulting in challenges following their independence. the central asian countries are not self-sufficient in industrial and agricultural products, leading to a deteriorating economic situation characterized by high inflation and rising unemployment. there is an urgent need for comprehensive economic restructuring to achieve development goals. secondly, the issue of regional cooperation in central asia has gained increasing prominence. take water resources cooperation as an example. during the soviet period, water resources cooperation among the central asian republics was coordinated by the central committee of the communist party of the soviet union. after independence, each country independently formulated its own policies for protecting and managing water resources to safeguard their respective interests.the differences in water resource management among the five countries have become increasingly apparent due to varying government policies, leading to significant disputes over the allocation of transboundary river flow, construction of hydroelectric power stations, and water drainage. (igor, andrey, tatyana et al., 2018) the third concern is security. in the post-soviet era, central asia experienced significant turmoil, marked by the proliferation of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. the ongoing war in afghanistan, as well as issues related to drugs and cross-border crimes, have further exacerbated www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 51 security challenges in the region.at the outset of their independence, the defense systems of the five central asian states were still in a nascent stage and lacked robust barriers against external threats. finally, ecological issues are frequently encountered in central asia, primarily encompassing water contamination, nuclear contamination, industrial emissions and air pollution. the issue of water scarcity and pollution is particularly severe. as a result of the overexploitation of water resources, the volume of water in the aral sea has decreased by 75% in just 40 years, leading to the aral sea crisis, which has imposed significant constraints on the social and economic development of central asia. in light of the pressing regional issues, leaders of central asian countries have consistently advocated for building upon existing cooperation and establishing a robust integrated cooperation mechanism to collectively address challenging problems. under the leadership of kazakh president nursultan nazarbayev, kazakhstan, ukraine and kyrgyzstan established the central asian economic union in 1994, marking the beginning of economic integration in central asia. in 1998, the organization was rebranded as the central asian economic cooperation organization and successfully expanded its membership to include tajikistan. the presidents of kazakhstan, kyrgyzstan, uzbekistan and tajikistan signed the treaty on safeguarding peace in the region in tashkent in april 2000, marking a significant advancement in countering terrorist forces in central asia and enhancing cooperation within central asian integration. since gaining independence, turkmenistan has been actively involved in top-level design for the integration of central asian states as a member of the five central asian countries. in 1992, during a meeting of the leaders of the five central asian states to discuss regional cooperation, turkmenistan's president saparmurat niyazov suggested the establishment of a "union of central asian states" as an alternative to joining the russian-led cis. (sebsatain & alexandra, 2020) the program, however, failed to elicit a positive response from the remaining four countries, as they expressed a preference for cooperation within the cis framework. table 1. participation of central asian countries in major regional organizations participating countries cis (1991) central asian cooperation organization (1998-2005) eurasian economic community (2001-2015) shanghai cooperation organization (2001) central asian regional economic cooperation mechanism (1996) kazakhstan √ √ √ √ √ uzbekistan √ √ observer state √ √ tajikistan √ √ × √ √ kyrgyzstan √ √ √ √ √ www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 52 turkmenistan withdrew in 2005 × × × √ turkmenistan's limited engagement in central asian regional integration mechanisms can be attributed to three primary factors. firstly, following the dissolution of the soviet union, turkmenistan inherited a highly specialized and trade-dependent economy focused on processing, with the energy industry and cotton cultivation serving as the primary material basis for trade exports.turkmenistan possesses the world's fourth largest natural gas reserves, with natural gas trade historically constituting 80% of the country's exports. russia and china stand as its primary energy trading partners due to their substantial size, while other central asian nations, constrained by relatively simple economic structures and underdeveloped levels of development, struggle to challenge the dominance of non-regional powers in trade. secondly, from the perspective of neutrality, turkmenistan's permanent neutrality constrains its involvement in integration organizations. the model of neutral diplomacy represents a strategy employed by small states to secure themselves amidst power struggles with larger states, as articulated by robert rothstein: "small states seek to leverage their 'smallness' for self-protection." by maintaining an impartial stance and convincing larger countries that they pose no threat, small nations can safeguard themselves amid this tumultuous environment. (robert, 1968) turkmenistan embarked on a path of neutrality within one year of gaining independence, and during the osce helsinki summit in july 1992, president niyazov introduced a foreign policy of "positive neutrality" as an initial framework for pursuing this stance. (smith, 1998) on 12 december 1995, the fiftieth session of the united nations general assembly deliberated on the issue of turkmenistan's permanent neutrality. turkmenistan's permanent neutral status has a twofold impact on its participation in the central asian integration mechanism. on one hand, turkmenistan has established a buffer zone in central asia through its neutral policy, actively mediated conflicts in the region, fostered strong relations with afghanistan, iran, turkey and other countries, and secured its "independence" within central asia, thereby diminishing the necessity for integrated security functions in the region. furthermore, both en route to and following its establishment as a permanently neutral state, turkmenistan has diligently upheld its obligations of neutrality under international law and steered its foreign policy with a commitment to neutrality. article 4 of the permanent neutrality act of turkmenistan stipulates that "turkmenistan shall refrain from participating in military alliances, inter-state associations with binding obligations, or collective responsibilities among parties. therefore, due to the strong intensity and high degree of integration in the first central asian integration, it possesses a certain alliance nature that requires member states to relinquish part of their sovereignty, making it impossible for neutral turkmenistan to join. thirdly, from the perspective of decision-makers, the supreme leader of turkmenistan niyazov's attitude and judgment towards the first central asian integration are pessimistic. due to turkmenistan's www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 53 initial economic fragility and abundant oil and gas resources, it became a strategic battleground for major powers. consequently, turkmenistan is reluctant to be labeled as a "banana republic" in central asia and rejects any participation in asymmetrical alliances. niyazov is also not sanguine about cooperation within the framework of the cis, showing reluctance to participate in the economic cooperation organization and maintaining a cautious stance towards regional integration initiatives such as the collective security treaty organization, the eurasian economic union, or the central asian economic community. (charles, 2020) 3. obstruction of central asian integration and turkmenistan's foreign policy (2005-2018) since the beginning of the 21st century, an increasing number of countries from outside the region have started to enhance their geopolitical influence in central asia with the intention of achieving their own strategic objectives. during this period, an increasing number of contradictions surfaced in the process of integrating central asia. the significant disparity in economic development levels among countries, the challenges of coordinating monetary policies, frequent border conflicts, and other issues have undermined the integration led by central asian countries and gradually supplanted by the integration mechanism led by non-regional powers. during this period, turkmenistan's domestic and foreign policies underwent a transition as a result of a change in leadership. on december 21, 2006, the supreme leader of turkmenistan, saparmurat niyazov, passed away due to illness, leading to gurbanguly berdymukhamedov formally assuming the presidency. confronted with the intervention of non-regional powers, the second turkmen government re-evaluated the power dynamics in central asia, prioritized national economic development as its main focus, pursued a "balance of great powers" strategy, and endeavored to secure its flexible position in central asia. firstly, the turkmen government has shown a lack of enthusiasm for participating in the central asian integration and the eurasian economic community organization led by russia. this is attributed to president berdymuhamedov's proactive efforts to normalize russia-turkey relations after assuming office, leading to the abandonment of the previously adopted "one-sided" policy against russia during niyazov's tenure. turkmenistan's unbalanced approach to russia has compromised the country's neutrality, and the subsequent government has been cautious about russian-led integration mechanisms, while prioritizing economic cooperation with the eurasian economic community. secondly, the united states has also incorporated central asia into its global strategic framework and actively engaged in the region's integration efforts. the united states has pursued central asian integration not through the establishment of new multilateral institutions, but by leveraging existing or regionally inclusive organizations such as the international monetary fund, nato's partnership for peace program, and the organization for security and cooperation in europe. in response to the "olive branch" extended by the united states, turkmenistan has actively engaged in certain less integrated mechanisms that promote national economic development, and other central asian countries have also www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 54 enthusiastically joined these organizations. furthermore, turkmenistan plays a significant role in the u.s. caspian energy initiative, which aims to facilitate collaboration between its business partners and the governments of turkey, azerbaijan, georgia, and turkmenistan for the construction of the trans-caspian gas pipeline (tcgp). in the 21st century, china has increasingly prioritized institutional development in central asia. through regional mechanisms such as the shanghai cooperation organization and the belt and road initiative, china has engaged in practical cooperation with central asian countries in areas including security, energy, economy, and trade. since president gurbanguly berdimuhamedov assumed office in 2006, turkmenistan's engagement in china-led regional cooperation mechanisms has increased, and bilateral relations between the two countries have continued to flourish. since 2008, the china-turkey "central asia natural gas pipeline" project has been successfully completed, with the construction of four natural gas pipeline lines from turkmenistan to khorgos in xinjiang province. this infrastructure is capable of providing china with over 65 billion cubic meters of natural gas energy annually, solidifying china as turkmenistan's primary trading partner. on september 3, 2013, the president of china paid a visit to turkmenistan and the leaders of both nations signed a joint declaration, signifying the elevation of bilateral relations to the level of strategic partnership. overall, during the period of impeded integration led by central asian countries, turkmenistan prioritized economic development and selectively engaged in the central asian integration mechanism led by russia, the united states, and middle powers through neutral diplomacy, thereby enhancing its participation and enthusiasm in regional affairs. although turkmenistan places great importance on balancing relations with major powers, it demonstrates a stronger inclination towards regional cooperation with china, which objectively promotes the expansion of central asian integration cooperation and also generates economic momentum for future participation in integration led by central asian countries. 4. the revival of central asian integration and turkmenistan's strategic adjustment (2018-present) the initial failure of central asian integration had numerous adverse effects on the region, leading to ongoing instability in political and diplomatic relations among the countries. this resulted in frequent disputes over ethnic, religious, border demarcation, and water resource issues. the central asian countries have established diverse economic development strategies and competed to prioritize relations with non-regional countries, leading the region from former "integration" to the opposite extreme of "anti-integration". against this backdrop, state-led integration in central asia has been mired in a "period of stagnation" for over a decade. the assumption of the presidency by shavkat mirziyoyev in 2016 marked a significant turning point for the revival of central asian integration. he emphasized that "central asia is the top priority of uzbekistan's foreign policy" and committed to overhauling the country's long-standing economic www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 55 model, reestablishing ties with central asian nations through economic reforms, and actively seeking to mend relations with neighboring countries. (daisuke, 2019) subsequently, at the 72nd session of the united nations general assembly in september 2017, mirziyoyev further proposed convening a regular consultative meeting of the heads of central asian states. kazakh president nursultan nazarbayev articulated the rationale for the summit: "to address the challenges facing the central asian region, we are capable of resolving them internally without external intervention, hence our collective gatherings." (paul, 2018) the inaugural summit of central asian countries proceeded smoothly, with the heads of state and government engaging in discussions on topics such as communication, trade, and transportation. this meeting holds significant historical importance as it marks the first summit held by central asian countries without the participation of external nations since 2005. the gathering demonstrates the commitment of central asian countries to collaborate and can be seen as the "first step" towards reinitiating integration in central asia. in light of the renewed integration of central asia, turkmenistan is exercising caution and carefully evaluating the nature and process of development in order to determine its participation, while also dynamically adjusting its corresponding strategy. in the inaugural central asian summit, president berdymuhamedov opted for an indirect participation, engaging in post-meeting deliberations following a thorough clarification of the agenda, nature, and objectives. the central asian integration, initiated by the first meeting of the heads of state in central asia, initially focused on issues related to transportation, communications, and environmental protection. however, there was a lack of detailed top-level design for "high political issues". furthermore, with kazakhstan and kyrgyzstan joining the eurasian economic union, they have delegated their foreign trade sovereignty to the supreme council of the eurasian economic union and the intergovernmental committee. as a result, they are no longer able to independently sign binding trade agreements with third parties.consequently, there are inherent barriers to establishing a customs union, let alone supranational institutions. the resumption of central asian integration presents a favorable opportunity for turkmenistan. firstly, the integration commences at a foundational level with a "broad but not deep" scope of cooperation that does not encroach upon issues of sovereignty transfer, aligning with turkmenistan's neutrality policy. secondly, integration contributes to fostering warmer relations among central asian countries, addressing the "fragmentation" in the region and supporting china's development strategy of "reviving the silk road". consequently, following the inaugural summit of the central asian states, turkmenistan has decided to gradually adjust its foreign policy and participate in integration. at the second central asian summit in 2019, turkmenistan made the decision to end its "diplomatic isolation" and demonstrated its commitment to participating in regional integration. president berdymuhamedov personally attended the meeting, where he proposed measures for central asian integration, endorsed the establishment of a platform for regional dialogue and discussion, and suggested practical initiatives such as creating a central asian business commission. with turkmenistan's involvement, the second summit of central asian states experienced significant www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 56 expansion, with pressing issues in the region consistently included on the agenda. one scholar observed that this gathering signified "central asian leaders' efforts to redefine their vision for the region and promote a more comprehensive and diverse geopolitical narrative globally." the second summit of central asian states has had a positive impact on regional cooperation and further enhanced turkmenistan's positive perception of central asian integration. a year later, turkmenistan also won the right to host the third summit of central asian states, aiming to bolster its influence in the region and facilitate the robust development of integration.the third meeting was attended by the presidents of the five central asian states and the special representative of the un secretary-general for central asia, natalia gell-mann. they issued a joint statement addressing pressing issues in the region, including regional security and governance, covid-19 prevention and control, ensuring regional denuclearization, stabilizing the situation in afghanistan, and promoting institutionalization of the heads of state summit through negotiations and consultations. as the host, turkmenistan adhered to the concept of "practical cooperation" and focused the meeting on addressing current regional hotspot issues, enhancing political mutual trust, and providing economic assistance. this contributed to the establishment of a high-level dialogue mechanism in central asia and offered valuable insights for the reinvigoration of central asian integration. the diplomatic engagement of turkmenistan in the three summits of the heads of state of central asia holds significant importance, marking its inaugural participation in the integration mechanism led by central asian countries. historically, turkmenistan has upheld a policy of neutrality as the cornerstone of its foreign relations, maintaining a stance of non-involvement in the central asian integration mechanism and showing limited interest in regional affairs. therefore, turkmenistan's participation in the reset phase of central asian integration is a crucial adjustment to its regional strategy. this represents a strategic shift away from the dominance of the "policy of neutrality" in order to better adapt to the new regional environment, while still upholding international treaties and commitments. however, this also signifies turkmenistan's gradual transition from its previous role as an "observer" to actively pursuing a role as a "participant in central asian integration" and even a "decision maker." since the revival of central asian integration, turkmenistan has progressively expanded its efforts towards regional integration, hosting numerous multilateral cooperation conferences and leveraging its position as host to propose innovative solutions for economic cooperation, regional security, environmental governance, and political mutual trust in central asia. this has significantly bolstered turkmenistan's influence in central asian affairs. 5. challenges of turkmenistan's participation in central asian integration the participation of turkmenistan has injected fresh impetus into the integration of central asia and heralded a new era in the collective development and shared future of the five central asian countries. however, due to the dynamic deficiencies in central asian integration and internal factors within turkmenistan, the path to reinitiate integration is certain to encounter numerous practical challenges. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 57 after the restart, central asian integration is hampered by a lack of political impetus, insufficient economic momentum, and weak cultural synergy. the integration process has been further slowed down in the context of the covid-19 pandemic. western scholar speicher has pointed out that compared to european integration, central asian integration lacks strong political impetus. in post-world war ii western europe, fear of the soviet union and its ideology generated significant political momentum, while us economic aid (the marshall plan) and military protection (nato) further propelled europe towards economic integration. however, central asian integration does not have an external force driving it due to russia's economic downturn. additionally, central asia only faces common security threats such as islamic extremism. (martin, 2002) at the regional economic level, there are three primary impediments to the integration of central asia. the first is the limited complementarity of national economies, stemming from the region's low industrialization and its reliance on energy and mineral extraction. this results in a low degree of interdependence between countries. the second constraint is the significant economic disparity among nations. kazakhstan stands as the most developed country in central asia, with its gdp accounting for approximately 65% of the total for all central asian countries, while turkmenistan, positioned in the middle economically, only contributes around 10%. such substantial discrepancies exist in economic output across these nations.the third factor is the high external dependence of the regional economy. since 2015, the proportion of imports and exports in the gdp of central asia as a whole has exceeded 75%, indicating a significant reliance on external sources. this has dampened enthusiasm for economic and trade cooperation in central asia. the conflict between russia and ukraine, along with western economic sanctions against russia, also impacted the economy of central asia, leading to severe turbulence in financial markets and disruptions to regional industrial and supply chains, further exacerbating economic integration in central asia. secondly, turkmenistan's economic momentum remains inadequate, with limited progress in economic reform and a persistent reliance on energy trade as the mainstay industry, posing challenges for complementing the economies of the other four central asian countries. following a seven-year economic recession from 1991 to 1997 due to declining productivity and disrupted trade routes, turkmenistan gradually began its recovery in 1998. in contrast to russia's shock therapy approach, niyazov pledged a modest and gradual transition towards a market economy through privatization and rationalizing the country's industrial structure. presently, turkmenistan is undergoing systematic efforts to embrace market-oriented reforms while striving for accelerated industrialization and privatization between 2019 and 2025. despite some improvements in its foreign trade structure after extensive reforms, natural gas and oil continue to dominate the domestic industry as the leading sectors within the national industrial system. according to reports from russian news network "arzuw" on january 26th, 2021, turkmenistan's industrial output accounted for 27.8% of gdp in 2020, with total industrial product value exceeding 59 billion manats during that year; energy products alone contributed up to 40%, signifying their continued prominence. consequently, turkmenistan currently faces limitations in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 58 serving as an "engine" for economic integration across central asia. the recent internal regime change in turkmenistan has introduced uncertainty regarding the country's participation in integration initiatives. on march 15, 2022, deputy prime minister and democratic party candidate serdar berdymuhamedov was declared the winner of the presidential election by the central election commission of turkmenistan, securing 72.97% of the votes. the newly elected president, serdar, is the son of former president gurbanguly berdimuhamedov and has held positions in the foreign ministry, parliament, and national security council. at present, specific policy objectives under president serdar's leadership are yet to be revealed, leaving it uncertain whether turkmenistan will maintain its active involvement in central asian integration efforts since 2019. in conclusion, turkmenistan has emerged as a significant driving force in the integration of central asia through its domestic economic reforms and adjustments in foreign policy, objectively creating favorable conditions for security, stability, and development in the region. however, turkmenistan's integration strategy is confronted with several practical challenges, the most prominent being the uncertainty surrounding the prospect of integration and potential domestic regime changes. the lack of clarity regarding the progression of central asian integration from partial to higher stages, insufficient vertical development of integration, and difficulties in establishing customs unions or other supranational mechanisms pose significant obstacles. additionally, questions have arisen about turkmenistan's integration policy due to recent government changes. it remains uncertain whether president serdar—son of a former president—will continue with previous policies or adopt a different approach towards integration participation. nevertheless, there are indications that if president serdar maintains the same level of commitment as his predecessor did, turkmenistan will play a pivotal role as central asian integration advances to higher stages. 6. discussion the paper concludes that turkmenistan's participation in central asian integration is influenced by three core issues: the potential conflict between the principle of neutrality and the integration mechanism, the compatibility of turkmenistan's strategic needs with the integration mechanism, and the perception and attitude of turkmenistan's decision makers towards integration.the paper also delves into the challenges that turkmenistan faces in participating in central asian integration through research. from a macro perspective, the level of central asian integration is much lower than it was in 1994, both in terms of intensity and mechanism construction. there are still significant deficiencies in political power and economic strength, resulting in a "semi-vertical and semi-horizontal" integration model with an uncertain outlook. on a micro level, turkmenistan itself has numerous shortcomings and limited capacity for integration. in the short term, domestic economic reform in turkmenistan has limited impact, and its economic structure is not sufficiently rational to drive regional economy growth. the change of political leadership in turkmenistan has introduced uncertain factors into its integration strategy. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 59 the framework of turkmenistan's participation in the central asian integration mechanism offers a perspective for comprehending the rationale, constraints, processes, and impacts of neutral countries' involvement in the integration mechanism. for instance, in light of the russia-ukraine conflict, sweden and finland, two permanently neutral countries, have opted to join nato and abandon their neutrality. it is worth exploring whether the research perspective presented in this paper can be applied to elucidate this case. references barbara, k. d. (2006). trapped in permanent neutrality: looking behind the symbolic production of the turkmen nation. central asian survey, 25, 129. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634930600903155 charles, j. s. (2020). neutrality in perpetuity: foreign policy continuity in turkmenistan. asian affairs, 51(4), 779-780. https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2020.1826753 daisuke, k. (2019). central asia undergoing a remarkable transformation: belt and road initative and intra regional cooperation. global strategic studies institute monthly report, 8, 3. fabio, d. l. (2017). nation-building and personality cult in turkmenistan: the türkmenbaşy phenomenon. routledge focus, new york: springer. igor, s., zonn, a. g. k., tatyana, v. et al. (2018). turkmenistan water resources policy in central asia: international context. the handbook of environmental chemistry, 229-242. retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325077192_turkmenistan_water_resources_policy_in_ central_asia https://doi.org/10.1007/698_2018_282 martin, c. s. (2002). regional cooperation in central asia. problems of post-communism, 6, 46. paul, g. (2018). central asia ready to move on without russia. eurasia daily monitor, 15, 1. robert, h. d. (1968). alliances and small powers. columbia university press. sebsatain, k., & alexandra, v. (2020). the region that isn't: china, russia and the failure of regional integration in central asia. asia europe journal, 18347-366. retrieved from https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/the-region-that-isn%27t%3a-china%2c-russia-and-theof-in-krapohl-vasileva-dienes/72fc68001c4cd1653a0f4e884324c12316893144 smith, d. l. (1998). breaking away from the bear. strategic studies institute, carlisle. https://doi.org/10.21236/ada351938 utku, y. (2018). from positive neutrality to silk road activism? the continuities and changes in turkmenistan’s foreign policy. journal of balkan and near eastern studies, 3, 4-6. original paper strategy and challenges for turkmenistan’s partici 1 school of government , shanghai university of po 2 school of government , shanghai university of po abstract after gaining independence, turkmenistan actively keywords permanent neutrality, the central asia integration advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 141 original paper research on the gatekeeper mechanism of data platforms under the perspective of data haozhe chen1a & boning guo1b 1 southwest minzu university, chengdu, sichuan, china a 2740556305@qq.com, b 19801987684@163.com received: april 19, 2024 accepted: may 12, 2024 online published: may 28, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n2p141 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n2p141 abstract since the fifth technological revolution, represented by artificial intelligence, emerged, data has become an essential driving force for social operation and an important engine for economic growth. data analysis activities based on artificial intelligence big data analysis models have significantly improved social productivity, especially in promoting the tertiary industry. data analysis enables precise user targeting, thereby making services more rational and refined. however, while these platforms apply and analyze data, non-compliant usage, illegal usage, and even criminal activities are prevalent. consequently, the gatekeeper mechanism has been introduced in china as a safeguard mechanism for data compliance, serving as a baseline system to protect people's fundamental rights. this paper aims to explore the rationality of the "gatekeeper mechanism" and how to ensure the smooth implementation of this measure. keywords data compliance, personal information protection, artificial intelligence 1. introduction data compliance refers to a series of regulations and measures that enterprises, organizations, or individuals follow to comply with laws, industry standards, and government requirements when processing and managing data. the goal of data compliance is to protect the rights of data subjects, prevent data leakage, misuse, and improper use, and establish a trustworthy data environment. since the advent of the data era, nations have taken various measures to protect citizens' personal information security. according to the personal information protection law of the people's republic of china, the country has taken multiple measures to protect citizens' personal information. this clause is the "gatekeeper" provision in china's legal system. however, as a new academic frontier, the theoretical www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 142 system construction of the "gatekeeper" system is still not perfect and has many debatable aspects. in china's personal information protection law, "large quantities" and "complex business types" are used as industry judgment standards for recognizing gatekeepers. this standard is somewhat reasonable and aligns with the current situation in china. however, in the long run, the criteria for identifying the gatekeeper mechanism need further clarification, and the interpretation of these criteria needs more detail. the gatekeeper system is a significant innovation in china's legislative practice, and its exploration of a new era power architecture system is an innovative attempt at the distribution of power and rights in the network era. the gatekeeper system is not only established in china but also has similar legislative practices in the european union and the united states. however, there are still certain detailed differences in specific provisions among countries. however, a close examination of its essence reveals that the legislative design of the gatekeeper system is to maintain the stability of the data market and control "data power." therefore, this paper uses data compliance as the writing perspective to explore the gatekeeper mechanism of data platforms in china. 2. data platform when referring to a data platform, it typically denotes an integrated system or framework utilized for consolidating and managing various data assets both within and outside an organization. a data platform encompasses a range of components including data warehouses, data lakes, data integration tools, data processing and analytics tools, as well as data visualization tools. through seamless integration of these components, a data platform provides a unified environment for data management and utilization. 2.1 what is a data platform in general, a comprehensive data platform encompasses several essential components, each serving a distinct function: data collection: at the core of a data platform lies its ability to gather information from diverse origins, ranging from databases to apis. this initial stage is crucial for assembling a robust dataset.data storage: an integral aspect of any data platform is its storage capability. this involves housing collected data within appropriate systems like data warehouses or nosql databases. such systems are engineered to uphold high standards of performance, scalability, and security.data processing: following data acquisition, the platform undertakes processing tasks to refine and prepare the data for subsequent analysis and application. this phase encompasses operations such as data cleansing, integration, and transformation, ensuring the integrity and coherence of the dataset.data analysis:the ultimate purpose of a data platform is to unlock insights from the amassed data. to achieve this, it offers an array of analytical tools and methodologies, including data mining, machine learning, and statistical analysis. these techniques empower users to discern patterns, trends, and correlations within the dataset. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 143 moreover, a data platform transcends the realm of a solitary tool or database; rather, it embodies a sophisticated amalgamation of interconnected components. these components seamlessly integrate to facilitate various functions such as storage, processing, analysis, and visualization. this cohesive framework provides users with a centralized environment for effective data management and utilization. furthermore, a robust data platform possesses the capacity to harmonize disparate data sources, encompassing internal systems like erp and crm, as well as external repositories such as social media and market data. by consolidating these diverse data reservoirs, organizations gain a holistic understanding of their operational landscape. efficiency is paramount in the realm of data collection. hence, a data platform incorporates multiple mechanisms, including real-time data streaming, batch ingestion, and api integrations, to ensure swift and accurate data acquisition. additionally, data platforms leverage optimized storage solutions, such as cloud storage, to efficiently manage large datasets while maintaining scalability and performance. this strategic utilization of storage resources lays the foundation for sustained data-driven insights and decision-making. 2.2 the data platform in this paper this paper supports the data processor theory from previous research, i.e., a data platform is a data business that profits by using data and enterprises and institutions that generate or obtain data during the operation and organization of transactions. (yu & liu, 2021) the unique aspect of a data platform compared to other platforms is its ability to process and analyze data. major platforms supported by cloud computing and big data algorithms are unique from other network platforms. additionally, as china has set restrictive requirements for gatekeepers in the personal information protection law, the data platform referred to in this paper refers to network platforms with independent algorithm processing capabilities and a certain dominance in the industry. 3. issues in data compliance in reality 3.1 monopolization of platform data in the digital era, data has become a crucial engine driving economic growth. the fierce competition among major internet platforms for the domestic market in recent years is a testament to this. if data platform companies possess or monopolize market power, they may engage in the following illegal activities: first, collecting personal information without the user's knowledge, which severely violates the principles of equality and voluntariness outlined in the civil code. second, collecting personal information in a deceptive manner, using incentives like discounts or free first orders to "trick" users into providing their information, which is then sold. third, including unnecessary personal information in the collection list, thereby gathering personal data that users do not need to disclose. dominant online platform companies often infringe on users' personal information rights through improper use or abuse, such as price discrimination based on big data, or selling personal information as a commodity. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 144 internet giants leverage their market advantage to restrict competitors' access to personal information or limit users' ability to transfer information to other platforms. for instance, the talent wars between meituan and ele.me, or the user battles between kuaishou and douyin. these actions infringe on users' right to choose between online platforms and create market entry barriers. healthy market competition is an important driver of market economy development, while monopolistic and unfair competition not only disrupts social order but also harms citizens' rights. 3.2 challenges in national regulation the data processing by data platforms is characterized by its secrecy and internal nature, with the processing procedures often regarded as highly confidential or even trade secrets within the platform. the commercial data collected and analyzed is intertwined with trade secrets, significantly increasing the difficulty of national regulation. as a result, the state can typically only intervene retroactively, conducting examinations of responsible parties long after issues have arisen and had a wide impact. to address these challenges, china has embedded compliance requirements into laws, regulations, and national standards, such as the 2015 amendment (ix) to the criminal law of the people's republic of china and the 2017 draft revision of the anti-unfair competition law. by leveraging the normative and mandatory functions of the law, these measures promote compliance practices among social entities and actively urge these entities to undertake more extensive regulatory obligations than before. (wang, 2023) the high complexity of information science presents enormous challenges to national regulation, both in terms of the workload and the complexity of the tasks involved. 4. current state of gatekeeper mechanism development 4.1 theoretical foundation of the gatekeeper mechanism the gatekeeper system refers to the special obligations and quasi-public "gatekeeper rights" granted by the state to online data platforms with significant algorithmic capabilities. this system has been implemented in the legislation of multiple countries, and china formally established it in the 2021 revision of the personal information protection law. research indicates that the logical foundation of the gatekeeper mechanism lies in the "theory of premises management obligations" within the chinese civil law system. that is, premises managers have the obligation to manage the premises and ensure their safety. since state-level supervision and management are mostly retrospective, acting as remedial punitive measures to prevent the escalation or loss of control of adverse situations, there is a significant insufficiency in preventing ongoing or imminent adverse events. hence, the importance of establishing a "gatekeeper system" is highlighted, as timely intervention before or during the occurrence of adverse behaviors can effectively curb them in their infancy. historically, powerful industry entities have collaborated to control entire industries, as seen in the monopolistic organizations represented by trusts in the era of monopoly capitalism in the united states. while there are certain similarities between monopolistic organizations and gatekeepers in terms of their dominant entities, there are substantial differences in their specific details. the former are www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 145 commercial alliances with an industry monopoly nature, whereas the latter are "quasi-official" entities granted special status by the state, bearing more extensive social and national supervisory responsibilities over the industry. 4.2 legislative status of the "gatekeeper mechanism" in various countries on july 18, 2022, the council of the european union adopted the digital markets act (dma), which came into effect in november of the same year. as a significant legislative attempt at preemptive regulation, the dma established the "gatekeeper" system. specifically, article 6 of the dma stipulates that, upon the request of end users or third parties authorized by end users, gatekeepers must provide data supplied by or generated through the activities of end users on core platform services, in a manner that ensures effective data portability, free of charge. this includes providing tools to facilitate effective data portability and ensuring continuous and real-time access to such data. (wang, 2023) on june 11, 2021, the u.s. house judiciary committee introduced five antitrust bills, including the american choice and innovation online act and the ending platform monopolies act. these bills introduced a concept similar to the eu's "gatekeeper" the "covered platform." according to these bills, once a platform qualifies as a "covered platform," it must adhere to specific obligations. for instance, the augmenting compatibility and competition by enabling service switching act requires covered platforms to ensure data portability for users, provide transparent interfaces accessible to third parties, and enable users to securely transfer their data to other platforms, ensuring interoperability with other platforms. china's personal information protection law, article 58, has already established gatekeeper obligations, similarly imposing specific duties on internet platforms with large user bases and complex business operations. although the obligations outlined in the aforementioned laws (and drafts) vary, their core essence remains the same: relevant online platforms are endowed with various special responsibilities to maintain the stable and compliant operation of the data market. 5. future prospects of the gatekeeper mechanism regarding the practice of the gatekeeper mechanism, it is currently in the early trial stage both internationally and domestically. the state may further improve this series of systems in the future. firstly, the concept and criteria for identifying digital gatekeepers need to be further clarified to ensure the accurate grasp of the regulatory boundaries of digital gatekeepers. subsequently, a corresponding legal framework should be established to ensure that the gatekeeper system can exert its true effectiveness. at the same time, industry supervision needs to be strengthened to ensure that digital gatekeepers comply with rules and fulfill their corresponding responsibilities. this article will explore the future system of the gatekeeper mechanism from the perspective of data compliance. 5.1 clarifying the identification criteria for gatekeepers firstly, defining the identity of gatekeepers is crucial. what kind of enterprises should be given the title of "gatekeeper"? is the standard for gatekeepers merely having a data platform with strong algorithmic www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 146 capabilities? or does it mean that the platform has significant control over the lives of the public? what specifically does the complexity of business mentioned in chinese law refer to? many of these questions need to be confirmed by facts and further research. to solve the above problems, we must first understand the fundamental concept of the gatekeeper system—controlling data power and ensuring data compliance. algorithm platforms collect and analyze large amounts of data to form their own "data power" or "algorithm power." although "data power" and "algorithm power" are not public powers in the strictest sense, the public's dependence on large online data platforms is becoming increasingly deep. a significant portion of the population has almost reached a level of dependence that is hard to separate, similar to the public's "inseparability" from government agencies. based on the above analysis, network data platforms form a quasi-public power in their own domains—a "power of data." this quasi-public power of "data power" must be restricted from all sides; otherwise, data compliance becomes mere empty talk, which fully explains the rationale behind establishing the gatekeeper mechanism. with the concept of system design clarified, we can better determine the identification criteria for gatekeepers, i.e., the platform has already formed "data power" in its domain. first, the platform should have a relatively large user base and deep social dependency. second, the platform's use should exert strong control over its users. third, if the platform abuses its power, it could cause serious negative consequences for society. 5.2 regulating the operation system of "power" articles 2 and 3 of the personal information protection law essentially grant significant personal information processors the "power" of enforcement, legislation, and supervision. however, the personal information protection law does not regulate this "power," which can easily lead to its abuse. (li, 2023) the abuse of "power" presents enormous challenges to data compliance. the "power" of gatekeepers in data platforms originates from the delegation of state power. however, with the technological evolution of data platforms and the deepening consolidation of their dominant positions, it is easy for the state's role and functions in this field to weaken, causing the gatekeeper's "power" to expand and encroach upon normal state power. currently, china's gatekeeper system is still in the practice and exploration stage. therefore, regulating the operation system of gatekeeper "power" at the initial stage of this system is particularly important. the state should not only act as a guide but also fulfill its legislative role by issuing relevant judicial interpretations and normative documents to improve the full process of "power" usage, ensuring that "power" is exercised under the sun. 5.3 establishing an efficient supervision system while regulating the operation system of "power," the state must also establish a strong supporting supervision system. otherwise, relying solely on some normative documents and the industry self-awareness and social responsibility of business entities will hardly effectively regulate an industry. traditional administrative industry supervision is strongly ex-post. however, given the hidden and rapid nature of network platform data, a new supervision system must be created for network data www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 147 platforms; otherwise, it is difficult for the supervision system to exert its true effectiveness. establishing a new supervision system also needs to avoid excessive use of social resources, making the inclusion of public power in the new supervision system particularly necessary. from the perspective of service recipients and providers, the public are the first to enjoy the services and have a better response to problems encountered during service acceptance. although the state has public law enforcement power and can most effectively combat illegal activities, in reality, state agencies often spend a large amount of time on evidence collection and preliminary investigations, which is not conducive to maintaining social order and protecting public rights. 6. conclusion at this time, establishing a multi-party supervision system with public participation becomes particularly necessary. once network platforms are given the "power" of gatekeepers, the public naturally gains the corresponding right of supervision. the law grants chinese citizens the right to supervise public power, and it is even more necessary to supervise quasi-public power exercised by private entities. facts have proven that public supervision is an important guarantee for ensuring that power is exercised under the sun. the obligation of information disclosure specified in the realistic legislation of china's gatekeeper system confirms this viewpoint. for the same reason, we cannot rely on the industry self-awareness and social responsibility of related enterprises for the reasonable operation of the industry. this requires a tripartite supervision system led by the state, involving public participation, and coordinated with the platform. the public is responsible for disclosing adverse phenomena within the platform, the state is responsible for quickly addressing and combating illegal phenomena, and the platforms acting as gatekeepers must bear dual identities. on one hand, they are the owners and builders of data platforms; on the other hand, they also bear the obligation to supervise and manage their own platforms. the three parties cooperate with each other, with the state and the public conducting secondary supervision of the platform's self-supervision results, allowing for a more efficient control of the gatekeeper "power" of data platforms. at the same time, legitimate business secrets of data platforms must be reasonably protected, strictly prohibiting any subjects from engaging in suppression or illegal acquisition of platform business secrets and key information under the guise of industry supervision. otherwise, the establishment of the supervision system will turn into an arena for power struggles. references li, a. j. (2023). special supervision of important personal information processors: a study on article 58 of the personal information protection law of the people's republic of china. journal of china university of political science and law, 2023(04), 56-67. wang, l. (2023). triple path to promoting data openness of large platforms from an antitrust perspective. local legislation research, 8(01), 33-50. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 148 wang, p. (2023). compliance obligations and path implementation for personal information protection on data platforms. jiangsu sociology, (03), 140-147. yu, x. l., & liu, d. y. (2021). legal boundaries for the commercial use of personal data on big data platforms. legal forum, 2021(01), 313-324. microsoft word ape-v1n2-p136.doc advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 136 original paper the new turkish presidential system mehmet nur altınörs1* 1 başkent university, ankara, turkey * mehmet nur altınörs, başkent university, ankara, turkey received: october 10, 2018 accepted: october 26, 2018 online published: november 2, 2018 doi:10.22158/ape.v1n2p136 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v1n2p136 1. introduction democratic societies have long tried to restore the delicate balance between political stability and fair representation in order to find the most suitable political regime and election system for the country. pursuit of political stability is considered a prerequisite for sustainable economic growth, social development, international respect and foreign investment. on the other hand, once the equilibrium is disturbed in favor of political stability, this leads to failure of fair representation and consequently may pave the road to weakened check and balance mechanisms and subsequently to totalitarian rule. in general three distinct governing systems are recognized in democratic states. these are the presidential, semi presidential and parliamentary systems. all systems harbor parliaments with different distribution patterns of authority, responsibilities, duties and reciprocal relations between the legislative and executive organs. some states practice a combination of these administrative models. the pros and cons of each system are well known in political literature as experience has revealed it. turkey has recently performed a transition from her 67 year old parliamentary system to presidential system. the discussion below includes general pros and cones of the main governing systems with a short overview of us and french examples, possible effects of the constitutional shift in foreseen future of turkey along with personal suggestions for a higher standart democracy in the country. 2. recent turkish political history turkish republic established on october 29,1923, has been ruled by the founding republican people’s party (rpp) until 1950 when the first fair, multiparty election was held. this election resulted in the glorious victory of the main opposition party, the democratic party (dp). since then the country has been ruled by parliamentary system with a president as the symbol of the state but with limited functions and carrying no political responsibility. the prime minister is the head of the government and has the first degree authority of execution and responsible to the parliament named “the turkish grand national assembly”. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 137 published by scholink inc. unfortunately two military coup d’états took place in 1960 and 1980. aside from these interventions two memorandums declared by military high command caused resignation of the governments in both incidents. the junta of 1960 closed the ruling dp and the junta of 1980 dissolved all political parties and banned political activity for 3.5 years. in spite of military interventions the system remained parliamentary until the referendum held on april 16,2017 when turkish citizens voted for 18 major changes in the existing constitution. participation was high, 85.32 % and a narrow majority, 51.41 % of the voters approved the proposed changes. the major important constitutional changes included abolition of the prime ministry, canceling of some check and control procedures of the parliament, adding new legislative rights to the president including preparation of the budget at the beginning of each fiscal year. the president also assigns the cabinet and the vice-presidents. the vice-presidents, the number of which is not clear, are not declared by the presidental candidates during the election campaign so the public has no knowledge about the possible future vice-presidents. the cabinet members are appointed either from parliament members and/or preferably from non-parliamentary individuals as has been the practice in the first cabinet following the constitutional reform. if a parliamentarian is appointed as a minister then he or she has to resign from the parliament thus meaning that all cabinet members are non-parliamentarians. the number of parliament members is increased to 600 from 550 with the new constitution. before the start of the new legislative year on october 1st, 2018, all seats reserved in the grand assembly for the cabinet members were removed which symbolizes the lessening of the bridge between the cabinet and the parliament. the president is authorized to execute decrees and regulations provided that they would not interfere with fundamental civil and political rights and duties of the citizens. it is within the authority of the president to take the laws passed in the parliament to the supreme court for cancellation. the presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled to take place simultaneously at every five years. if no candidate receives more than 50 % of votes in the first round then a a-run off will be held in 14 days similar to french system. the presidential candidates are nominated either by political parties receiving at least 5 % popular vote in the last election or by 100,000 citizen’s signed proposal. 3. presidential system the presidental system, the best example of which undoubtedly is usa, has been successfully practiced without any interruption since the foundation of the country. the us political system firmly depends upon the principle of absolute seperation and indepence of legislative, executive and jurisdictive powers. the us congress is composed of two wings: the house of representatives and the senate. the president is the prime political figure of executive force. he or she can veto a law, but if the two www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 138 published by scholink inc. thirds vote is reached in both chambers then the veto is rejected. the president makes assignments for many important positions, but the senate has the right to refuse. the president is the commander in chief, but the congress has the right to declare war. the congress may dismiss the president only in unusual circumstances. there are three big impeachable offenses: treason, bribery, high crimes and misdemeanors. the house of representatives may accuse the president by majority vote while the senate acts as the judge and jury. two-thirds vote is needed in the senate to convict the president. the system is traditionally based on two major parties although a couple of trials were undertaken to include multiple parties. these attempts have failed and such parties have stayed local and transient. the two major parties in us do not stem from social layers or ideology in contrast to many parties in different european countries. the presidential system is practiced in central and south american countries, in newly independent african states, in philippines, south korea and thailand. in many countries with presidential system the parliamentary and presidential elections are held at different dates. in us house of representatives is completely renewed at every two yeras while one-third of the senate is renewed similarly. 4. semipresidential system semipresidential system has originated in western europe and is a combination of presidential and parliamentary systems. france is the best known example of the semipresidential system. the constitutional reform in 1962 under charles de gaulle’s presidency has realized a shift from parliamentary to presidental system although there are serious differences compared to presidental system. in france the president is elected by popular vote at every five years and may serve for two terms. if none of the candidates receives simple majority in the first round then the election is repeated in fourteen days with two candidates placed as the first and second in the first round. the french president appoints the prime minister. in case when the president and the majority party in the parliament belong to the same party then the president may appoint the cabinet. the president has the right to dismiss the parliament and call for elections. other presidental priviliges include asking for referendum about vital national matters and implementing marshal law. the president with a wide spectrum of authority is not responsible to the parliament, instead the prime minister is the person responsible to the parliament. the parliament is composed of two chambers the national congress has 577 members elected directly by the people. an overwhelming majority of the congressmen, 555 members, are elected from the mainland and the remaining 22 members are elected from french citizens living abroad and from overseas lands belonging to france. the senate is composed of 348 members who are elected by the secondary voters nominated either locally or on national basis. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 139 published by scholink inc. 5. discussion in the parliamentary system the executive power is shared between the head of the state and the prime minister. this is in a way balance and check system. the title of the head of the state may be the king, prince ,emperor in monarchies and president in republics. in parliamentary system the head of the state carries no political responsibility and can not be impeached by any legal organ during his term. the previous turkish constitution noted treason as the only crime that can be attributed to the president. the justice and development party (jdp) and its leader insisted on the recent constitutional change and consequent shift of the system into presidental type of government. their main argument was that the coalition and minority governments had deficiencies in rapid decision making and taking action. it is contradictory enough to note that jdp had five successive election victories starting with 2002 election which enabled them to form great majority goverments without having any serious resistance in legislation and execution tasks. coalition goverments arean important instrument in developed democratic culture. it necessiates cooperation, negotiation and ability to solve problems together. additional advantage is depolarization in the society and relaxation of political tension. there are also other important drawbacks in the new order. a process whereby a president may be impeached is described in the constitution, but no crimes to accuse the president are specified. for the alleged crimes the president has committed, the sections within the article will be applied only after the president’s tenure. the political parties who believe in the virtue of the parliamentary system and oppose the drastic new changes should spend every effort within their capacity to restore a well established parliamentary system. this is a hard and time consuming function full of numerous obstacles. nevertheless the alliance of such parties should work to prepare and propose a new constitution, election system and regulations with regard to their working mechanisms of the political parties. some personal suggestions due that cause are: a) there are over 5.5 million turks living abroad. the geographical distribution reveals four million in western europe ,300,000 in north america, 200,000 in middle east countries and 150,000 in australia. most of them possess binationality and at least half of this population is voters. my suggestion is to give these people the opportunity of being represented in the turkish grand assembly. the new 50 seats added after the constitutional referandum may be canceled. instead these seats may be converted to a special status. turks living abroad may be nominated and elected as parliamentarians by turkish citizens living abroad. the advantage of such a representation is two-fold. these people will have stronger bonds with the homeland and they will serve to the interests of turkey abroad and will help to improve bilateral and multidimensional international relations. b) according to turkish constitution a political party has to receive at least 10 % of the popular vote nationwide in order to be represented in the parliament provided that it has also should receive enough votes in the local election district. a reasonable percentage of popular vote is required in many www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 140 published by scholink inc. european countrişes for parliamentary representation, but 10 % is the highest figure in the world and has to be reduced to 3-5 %. c) the most responsible position of the parties is their chairperson and they are elected by the limited number of delegates of the party. a more democratic and representative election is election of the chairperson with participation of all registered members of the party. the middle eastern and asian culture is inclined to rule of charismatic leaders and individual leadership is an important tradition. concepts like cooperation, solving conflicts by means of negotiation and working as a team are not so developed in that particular geography. that in turn bears the danger of totalitarian rule. the new turkish constitution lacks the necessary check and balance mechanisms and greatly diminishes the right of the parliament to scrutinise ministers. it has generated new executive powers and has accumulated the ruling function practically to one individual. it is obvious that time and practice will display both the advantages and the disadvantages of the new presidential system in turkey. the debate over the success or failure of the new regime will be answered by the specific features of turkish political life and political figures shaping the stage. microsoft word ape-v2n2-p68 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 68 original paper inequality peter bearse, ph.d.1* 1 a peoples and citizens congress, carrabelle, united states * peter bearse, ph.d., a peoples and citizens congress, carrabelle, united states received: february 26, 2019 accepted: march 4, 2019 online published: march 15, 2019 doi:10.22158/ape.v2n2p68 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v2n2p68 abstract inequality has become a malignant, contagious disease. it feeds, it grows, it attaches itself to nearly all aspects of life. it poisons or impedes many of our relationships. above all, it is a threat to the health and stability of our democratic republic. it has become the major issue of our time. we can see more clearly how and why it has become so as we review eight major features of our society. refer to the diagram below as you read. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 69 published by scholink inc. figure 1. diagram 1. introduction we proceed by discussing each of the eight categories featured around the circumference of the diagram, above, in order of their appearance starting with “the market” and moving clockwise henceforth. the market~so-called “free”—is the most powerful generator of inequality. it is not free. market power is skewed. it’s only in the idealistic, textbook model of a perfectly competitive economy populated by small businesses and actors with equal assets that the market works reasonably well to produce stability and economic well-being for all. the real world features inequalities of all kinds at all levels. the market dynamics of such an economy tend to increasingly aggravate inequalities as economic actors who grow wealthier or bigger use their power to build their wealth and decrease competition. thus, the unfree market becomes increasingly so. “trickle down” is a myth. at their core, private markets are transactional mechanisms grounded in two beliefs mistakenly thought to be both moral and ethical: (i) that imbalances of power between two sides of a transaction can be ignored, and that. (ii) the end justifies the means. technological innovations driven by science have increasingly driven inequality upward. the old www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 70 published by scholink inc. model of innovation—whereby an individual provides an invention that spreads—is less and less germane. technology is increasingly “high tech” financed by or through major institutions, including big business, large universities and government. business and educational marketplaces are increasingly driven by high-tech. education, the presumed “great equalizer”, is becoming less so as the dewey model of equal public education for all is compromised by the spread of public/private models preferred by the better off. they naturally seek to give their offspring an additional “leg up” in the system. these include practically private charter schools financed by public money. education is now primarily oriented to producing college graduates and raising certification levels for doing even rather ordinary tasks. belated recognition of the importance of vocational education will help to build a society increasingly stratified by economic class—a european, not an american model. the diagram above condenses the forces at work into diabolical loops—a set of vicious sub-circles. the educational system, for example, is distorted by inequality that, in turn, feeds back to further increase inequality. politics, another mythical equalizer, has become both dependent upon and generator of inequality as the cost of political campaigns rises at rates that are multiples of the cpi. “one man, one vote” has been largely supplanted by “money talks and bullshit walks” while campaign finance reform has failed. the old-fashioned, people-based, door-to-door politics has largely given way to big-money politics via advertising. meanwhile, the advertising industry increasingly consolidated and dominated by big media corporations, helps to turn people away from activism and into consumers of infotainment and political pablum. finance: as the last “great recession” revealed, financial innovation and game-playing by major financial firms serve to generate both financial instability and greater inequality (note 1). the “99%”—small investors among individual citizens—had long since become irrelevant players in financial markets. not one executive of a major financial company was even indicted, let along convicted of financial malpractice, yet the “1%” associated with the largest organizations served to increase their wealth while immiserating millions of americans. work & income: political and educational factors increasing inequality are reinforced by those of work, income and wealth. those with no more than a high school education can no longer earn enough to sustain a family at a lower middle-class level of living. a significant proportion of the highest incomes are mostly unearned, gotten from short-term, high-risk investments. the gap between the middle-class (already reduced by the 2008-2012 financial crises) and the upper-classes has been increasing. the share of financial sector activity in gdp has increased significantly. and so has the gap between the “real” (productive of real things) and money-based sectors of the economy. law and regulation: these no longer provide the basis for an equal-opportunity economy. among other factors at work, occupational groups establish certification and licensing requirements that www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 71 published by scholink inc. increase barriers to entry. capital and financing requirements have increased barriers to entrepreneurship. even among the well-educated, “who you know” and “how well are you connected” are at least as important as “what you know”. bankruptcy laws favor owners over creditors. finally, note that the diagram illustrates: (1) two-way interactivity between inequality and each of the eight factors aggravating inequality, and also (2) interactivity between each of the eight factors and those adjoining. there are also interactions between each and those not adjoining. a matrix is required as shown below to illustrate the complete set. summing the elements across the rows would reveal that the market is first among influences; table 1. matrix market politics finance techno. law regulate educate work politics finance techno. law regulate educate work finance techno. law regulate educate work techno law regulate c work law regulate educate work regulate educate work educate work work overall, however, what the diagram calls for is a mathematical, non-linear model to estimate parameters that would fully and quantitatively the relationships illustrated in the diagram and matrix. such a model lies beyond the scope of this essay. consider the interactivity between “education” and “work”, for example. one aspect of this is set forth in manstead, who wrote: “…the school system reproduces social inequalities by promoting norms and values that are more familiar to children from middle‐class backgrounds. to the extent that this helps middle‐class children to out-perform their working‐class peers, the ‘meritocratic’ belief that such performance differences are due to differences in ability and/or effort will serve to ‘explain’ and legitimate unequal performance”. full treatment of the interactions here and would require a supplementary piece, even a book. what is missing from the diagram?—globalization, an overarching influence on all of the included factors. it also serves in heighten inequality, especially via multinational corporations. they pay their executives higher multiples of workforce earnings. they park significant portions of their corporate earnings in tax havens abroad, thus lessening federal tax revenues that could be used to help offset the deleterious impacts of rising inequality. thus, the diagram reveals that our society and economy now amount to a huge inequality generating www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 72 published by scholink inc. machine. the consequences are fearful to contemplate. they suggest what some writers have already concluded we have: an oligarchy, not a democratic republic. it’s quite foreseeable that america, the fabled land of opportunity and freedom, may become a 3-tier class society dominated by the rich, with a small go-along, get along middle class lording it over a large, subservient lower class hardly able to get along at all. if we are to have any chance to avoid this dreadful prospect, then reduction of inequality needs to be moved to the top of political and organizational agendas at all levels. the american dream is not grounded on inequality. it is endangered by the high level of inequality of incomes and wealth already attained and ever rising. references grasso, mariat, b., yoxon, s. k., & tempe, l. (2017). relative deprivation and inequalities in social and political activism. springer nature, link.springer.com (13 dec., open access) or acta politica. retrieved from https://soi.org/10.1057/s41269-017-0072y hoffman, m. k. (2019). shell game. maine, u.s.a.: shoestring publishing. kraus, m. w. (2015). americans overestimate social class mobility. journal of experimental psychology. retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esp.2015.01.005/ kraus, m. w., & park, j. w. (2014). the undervalued self: social class and self-evaluation. frontiers of psychology. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01404 manstead, & anthony, s. r. (1996). the psychology of social class: how socioeconomic status impacts thought, feelings, and behavior. new york: wiley. sass, j., & jacobs, l. r. (2009). the place of inequality in non-participation in the american polity. political science quarterly (spring). the inequality of politics: social class rank and political participation. (2015). irle.berkeley.educ/working papers. the social ladder: a rank-based perspective on social class. (2013). international journal for the advancement of psychology. uab. (2017). social networks do not help to eliminate inequality in political participation. wikipedia: political participation and inequality. note note 1. although, as hoffman (2019) reveals, the recession was sparked by a huge jump in oil prices. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 117 original paper platform data protection from the competition law perspective based on specific conduct and data types yilong li 1 1 southwest minzu university, chengdu, china received: july 10, 2022 accepted: august 21, 2022 online published: august 23, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n3p117 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n3p117 abstract in the era of big data, data has gradually become an important commercial resource in the development of the emerging economy. under the background of frequent disputes over unfair network competition, emerging data rights and interests can be better defined and better protected from the perspective of the competition law. when judging whether the conduct is an unfair competition conduct, the performance of the accused conduct and the type of the data involved in the case should be accurately defined, so as to define its legitimacy. keywords competition law, platform data, legitimacy, data capture and use, public data 1. background to the issue with the advent of the big data era, the value of “data” has gradually been highlighted and emphasized, and the “right to data” may also become a trend. at present, data is mainly generated and applied in the internet, and is collected and integrated with the aid of new technologies or based on new business models. therefore, for the market players, especially the network operators who rely on traffic for their survival, the data in the platform is the information asset and important business resource for them to maintain an advantage in the competition, and to expand their businesses. therefore, the acquisition and use of data has become the cause of frequent disputes between network operators. how to protect the data rights and interests of the operators in the network competition environment without impeding the realization of the spirit of the internet, that is, interconnection and sharing of data, has also become a problem of widespread concern in the industry. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 118 published by scholink inc. 2. platform data has the nature of property, and the collecting enterprise has the property right thereto 2.1 lawful factual conduct according to the law, the collection of personal data by the data enterprises shall be deemed as lawful factual conduct. the purpose, method and scope of the collection and use of information are expressly stated in public rules for collection and use by the data enterprises, and the consent of the data owners is obtained. the dataset formed by the collection of countless personal data becomes a new object of civil rights. for example, a civil subject lawfully constructs a house and obtains the ownership of the house once the house construction is completed. 2.2 cost and fairness principle the data controller provides a platform for data collection and traceability, such as a shopping website platform, on which the data subjects can browse and shop. the data controller and the data subject jointly participate in the data production process. in the case of beijing guang vs shanghai bancai, the court held that the data and derivative products on the platform were accumulated through a long period of operation through the plaintiff’s investment of manpower, materials and financial resources. the said data and derivative products include the commercial interest of the platform enterprises and reflect their market competitive advantages, i.e. they have competitive property rights and interests. 3. platform data protection under the competition law path the civil law cannot accurately classify platform data as a specific civil right; therefore, the copyright protection model is out of line with the actual situation. therefore, under the circumstance that it is difficult for both the civil law and the copyright law to achieve ideal protection for data in platform, the anti-unfair competition rules which take into account the protection of competition order, operators’ rights and interests and consumers’ interests can better play the role of adjusting and protecting platform data. 3.1 possibility of application of the anti-unfair competition law to protection of platform data competitive relationship is a prerequisite element to be considered when applying the anti-unfair competition law. as data has become the basic resources of the information society, the use of data has a very wide scope. therefore, in practice, although market entities involved in data disputes are often not engaged in the same type of or similar business activities, as long as there exists the possibility of the growth or weakening of such business elements as network user groups, it will be deemed that there is a competitive relationship between the two parties. in the case of a dispute over the unfair competition in data information on dianping, the pudong court held upon trial that in the field of internet, even if the two parties have different operation modes, as long as they are competing for the same group of internet users, a competitive relationship can be determined. of course, considerations concerning a competitive relationship do not necessarily require that the user groups of both parties grow at the same time. it is possible that the user groups of both parties are www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 119 published by scholink inc. growing at the same time. however, if one party inappropriately uses the business resources of the other party and causes damage to the legitimate business interests of the other party, it may also be deemed that a competitive relationship exists, so that there is room for the application of the anti-unfair competition law. 3.2 alternative protection paths under the anti-unfair competition law framework under the framework of the existing anti-unfair competition law, there are three paths for data protection: first, trade secret protection, but combining with the core element of “confidentiality” of trade secrets, only undisclosed data in the platform may use this path; for the large amount of front-end disclosed data, it is difficult to identify it as trade secrets. second, the protection is provided by the newly added article 12 (hereinafter referred to as the “internet special provisions”) of the existing anti-unfair competition law. this provision is a specific clause regulating improper network competition behaviors. the platform data grabbing and use that impede or destroy the products or services of network operators can be included in this clause for adjustment, so that the data protection needs of operators can be relatively fully covered and the data competition behaviors of other operators can be regulated. third, the protection provided by article 2 of the existing anti-unfair competition law (hereinafter referred to as the “principle clause”), that is, although the “internet special provisions” cannot be applied because they do not impede or damage others’ network products or services, when there are inappropriate behaviors, the application of this article may be considered to regulate behaviors that violate the principle of good faith and business ethics. in view of the limitations of the above first way for data protection, before the introduction of the existing anti-unfair competition law, the court mainly protected platform data through the above third way. for example, in the “pulse” case, the first data competition dispute in china, and the case of dianping v. baidu (the map data grabbing and use dispute), both quoted the “principle clause” to adjust the indicted behaviors. however, under the current circumstances that the “internet special provisions” are sufficient to regulate network competition behaviors involving data grabbing and use, and the application of the “principle clause” shall follow the principle of prudence and modesty. this article believes that if the indicted behavior meets the elements of the behavior regulated by the “internet special provisions”, the “internet special provisions” shall be applied to regulate data competition behaviors, so as to better respond to the expectations of network operators on data protection and regulate the current order of data competition. of course, based on the “internet special provisions”, there shall be behavior that destroys or bypasses the technical measures taken by data producers or controllers. therefore, if the defendant does not have such behavior (such as only using others’ published data), the application of the “principle clause” may be considered for adjustment of such behavior. 4. judgment of the legitimacy of data competition behaviors in practice, the indicted behaviors in data competition disputes usually include data grabbing and data using. when judging whether the indicted behavior is legitimate, it should be considered from the type of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 120 published by scholink inc. the data involved in the case and the specific performance of the indicted behavior. 4.1 types of data involved in the case from the perspective of data types, network operators often distinguish the types of data in their platforms by means of “front-end data” and “public data”, but there are no uniform opinions for the understanding and definition of data under such distinguishing mode, and from the technical perspective, there may be scope overlaps of such distinguishing mode or loose classification. therefore, from the normative level, it is more meaningful to distinguish the concept of “public data” and “non-public data”. under this type of distinction, generally speaking, data for which the data controller has no access authority and can be viewed without any identity authentication or user login belongs to public data, and data for which the data controller can be viewed only by setting access authority through login rules or other technical measures should be non-public data. 4.2 performance of the indicted behavior for non-public data, its coefficient controller has taken certain technical measures to set access authority. in the absence of cooperation or authorization, the data user can only use technical means to destroy or bypass the access authority taken by the data controller, which is obviously improper. because the act of grabbing itself is improper, it is also difficult to say whether the subsequent use of non-public data is proper. the legitimacy of grabbing and using of public data shall be determined comprehensively based on the following specific circumstances. 4.2.1 grabbing but not using for the public data in the platform of the data controller, based on the characteristics of data integration and interaction in the network environment, the platform operator shall, to a certain extent, tolerate the legal collection or use of the public data in the platform by others. otherwise, it may hinder the application of data for public welfare research or other beneficial uses and is contrary to the spirit of interconnection of the internet. therefore, the legitimacy of grabbing of public data mainly depends on whether the grabbing by the defendant complies with legal obligations and industry rules. in the network environment, if a data user obtains relevant data through legal and proper means, such as manual record compilation or automatic grabbing of relevant data by web crawler technology that complies with general technical rules, the grabbing of data shall be deemed proper. however, not all behaviors of grabbing public data but not using them are justifiable. for example, in order to be displayed in search engines, network operators generally will open the data on their webpages to be grabbed by search engine service providers and other web crawlers. however, in order to prevent negative impacts such as the effect of market substitution, increased burden on servers and frustration of performance of the user agreement caused by data grabbing behavior to their products or services, some network operators will refuse part or all of the crawling of their data by setting up the robots agreement on their webpages. at this time, although the network operator acting as the data controller sets certain obstacles to access to the data under its control, from the perspective of data www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 121 published by scholink inc. classification, the robots agreement is to some extent a “gentlemen’s agreement” due to its lack of normative effect. therefore, this part of data that is not allowed to be accessed is also public data that is directly accessed upon opening the operator’s webpage and no special access rules are set up for it. in this case, the robots agreement set up on the webpage by network operators is usually considered as reasonable. therefore, if a third party grabs a large amount of such public data without complying with the restrictions set up in the robots agreement, even if it does not use such data, it may still be improper because the data grabbing affects the business interests of others such as data security. 4.2.2 grabbing for direct use or use after simple processing for legally obtained public data, whether the grabbing and use is proper, a court may determine whether the act in question hinders or destroys the normal operation of others’ platform from the perspectives of the data controller’s performance of the user agreement, impact on the exclusive data rights and interests, investment in and returns of data security, completeness of the data presentation rules, whether the act in question constitutes a substantial substitute for the original platform, and the impact on the economic benefits that the original platform can generate based on the data rights and interests, so as to judge whether the act in question is proper. if grabbing a large amount of data competition resources are generated by data controllers through long-term operation and accumulation, and the corresponding data are directly copied and used, it shall be improper that the defendant has used the data beyond the necessary limit and reasonable scope even though the grabbed data is public data. in practice, it is rare to obtain public data for direct use; on the contrary, after obtaining the public data of others, a data user will, based on the type and characteristics of the service provided by itself, screen and integrate the data obtained from the data controller to a certain extent, and then reveal and use such data on its platform. for example, the vertical search used by search engine service providers refers to the search conducted within a specific scope for an industry and after mining and integration, the search results are fed back to users in a certain form. from the perspective of technical characteristics and the nature of behavior, such behavior is also to present to users the data originated from the control of the data controllers, but there is not much difference from grabbing and direct use when no in-depth extraction has been carried out. therefore, such behavior of grabbing public data for appropriate processing and use shall still be limited within a reasonable scope, and follow the principle of “necessary and minimum”, so as to avoid homogeneity and substitution for the data controllers. 4.2.3 after grabbing, go through secondary processing and become new data products for use development and market application of data products is one of the business models in the current internet industry. for example, internet operators usually predict users’ preference by analyzing users’ consumption data, so as to improve their products and services. if a data user grabs public data through a legal channel, and deeply filters, cleans, edits, and integrates the grabbed data to form a new data product, then, although the relevant original data originate from the data controllers, the final data product is formed through the data users’ creative input, and has departed from the original data form, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 122 published by scholink inc. and is legitimate in both the means of grabbing and the way of use, which also helps to improve consumers’ user experience, so it shall not be deemed as unfair competition. for example, in the case of hiq v. linkedin, hiq, as a data analysis company, used a web crawler to obtain public profile information of linkedin users, and processed and analyzed the data to form data products such as personalized career advice for sale. the us courts held that the value and utility of a large amount of public information depend on the finding, collection, arrangement and analysis of such data, and that hiq’s business model and position were preferable in the public interest. at the same time, taking into account the impact of linkedin’s restriction of crawling on its competitors’ competitive advantage in the data analysis market and the realization of the value of data, the decision to prohibit linkedin from adopting anti-crawling measures against hiq was made. 5. conclusion when judging the legitimacy of data competition, technology, business models themselves, and competition implemented by new technology or based on new business models should also be distinguished. data competition is often associated with technological innovation. admittedly, in the network competition environment, efficient and comprehensive acquisition of data will indeed stimulate technological innovation. however, the innovation of a technology does not necessarily mean that all the activities based on such innovative technology are legitimate. as in the unfair competition dispute between beijing weredream chuangke network technology co., ltd. and shanghai foyo culture & entertainment co., ltd., the method of feiyou app to obtain information on weibo would certainly use a different data obtaining technology. however, the technology itself is only a carrier, and therefore the illegitimacy of the involved act of using such technology to destroy the technical measures on weibo platform cannot be denied. therefore, when judging whether the indicted conduct is justifiable, although the factors of data producer, data controller and data user must be taken into full consideration, the indicted conduct itself is always the primary consideration when judging whether it is justifiable. the defendant may not be allowed to infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of others on the ground that the technology adopted by the defendant belongs to innovative technology or the business model developed by the defendant is in line with the development of the times. the current data rights and interests legislation is relatively backward, which makes the choice of data protection path difficult, and also contradicts the gradual highlighting of the value of data. the judiciary should act accordingly, provide corresponding protection for data under the existing legal framework in accordance with the law, timely respond to the data protection needs of network operators, and draw boundaries for data competition that has not been standardized at present, so as to regulate the data competition order in the relevant market. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 123 published by scholink inc. references cheng. x. (2018). on personal data rights in the big data era. chinese social sciences, 2018(03), 102-122, 207-208. hu, 73., & min, z. (2016). no. 242. jing 0108 min chu no. 24510. (2017). zhang, q. k. (2015). logical analysis of the application of the general clause of the anti-unfair competition law—a case example concerning new internet unfair competition. intellectual property, 2015(03), 30-36. zhao, w. h. (2010). on the improvement of intellectual property protection system for data bases. beijing: china university of political science and law, 2010. zhou, h. w. (2019). exploring intellectual property protection of non-original databases. henan science and technology, 2019(06), 32-35 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 21 original paper exploration of government public opinion guidance mechanism in emergencies xinyan liu1 1 guangzhou college of commerce, guangzhou, china received: january 13, 2025 accepted: february 26, 2025 online published: april 03, 2025 doi:10.22158/ape.v8n1p21 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v8n1p21 abstract with the advent of the information age, the frequency of emergencies and the scope of their influence are gradually expanding, bringing serious challenges to social stability and public security. in emergencies, public opinion, as a concentrated manifestation of public sentiment and social opinion, spreads and evolves rapidly with far-reaching effects on the direction of events and public sentiment. therefore, how the government can effectively guide public opinion has become an important part of emergency response. in this paper, we will discuss the challenges, necessity, and mechanism construction of the government's public opinion guidance, aiming to provide reference for the government's response to emergencies. keywords emergencies, government opinion guidance, mechanism research 1. introductory emergencies are often closely related to the life and safety of the public, and thus the public pays great attention to such events. the suddenness, urgency and unpredictability of emergencies lead to the rapid spread of public opinion after the emergence of an event, and its influence is wide-ranging. the close attention and high sensitivity of the public to emergencies make public opinion form a strong social influence in a short time. moreover, the diversification and rapidity of information dissemination channels can also lead to the problems of information distortion and rumour spreading from time to time. these problems not only deepen the complexity and uncertainty of public opinion, but also may cause social panic and chaos. in the aftermath of an incident, public emotions are often prone to fluctuations such as anger, fear and anxiety. these emotions make the public susceptible to public opinion, which can lead to collective action or social opinion. therefore, the challenges faced by the government in guiding public opinion during emergencies www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 22 appear to be complex and arduous. these challenges not only stem from the rapid changes in the external environment, but also involve the intertwining of internal mechanisms and the psychology of the public. therefore, when responding to emergencies, the government has to take into full consideration the changes in the mood of the public and the impact of public opinion, and take effective measures to guide and respond to them. after the occurrence of an emergency, information must be delivered in a timely, accurate and comprehensive manner, so as to minimise the negative impact of public opinion and maintain social stability. 2. challenges to government public opinion guidance in emergencies 2.1 fast dissemination of information the rapid development of the internet has led to faster and less controlled dissemination of information. once an emergency occurs, the relevant information is like a wild horse running wild in cyberspace, quickly converging into a torrent of public opinion. this unmanageable speed of information dissemination puts the government under tremendous time pressure to act immediately to ensure the accuracy and authority of the information, so as not to be swallowed up by inaccurate information and rumours. 2.2 public sentiment is complex and volatile the complexity and volatility of public emotions add more uncertainty to public opinion guidance. in the face of emergencies, the public is often in a state of information asymmetry and psychological imbalance, and is prone to panic, anxiety, anger and other negative emotions. these emotions spread rapidly like a virus on the internet, creating strong public pressure. the government needs to have a high degree of sensitivity and insight to accurately grasp the trend of public emotions, take timely and effective measures to stabilise public emotions, guide the public to look at the incident rationally, and avoid social unrest triggered by uncontrolled emotions. 2.3 fierce media competition the fierce competition in the media has also created considerable difficulties for the government in guiding public opinion. during emergencies, various types of media have seized the opportunity to report and compete for the public's attention and attention. in order to attract more traffic and clicks, some media may adopt such tactics as exaggerating facts and exaggerating emotions in their reporting, which may lead to distorted information and even mislead the public. therefore, the government needs to strengthen communication with the media and establish a closer co-operative relationship to ensure the truthfulness and accuracy of the reported information. at the same time, the government also needs to actively guide the media to play a positive role and jointly create a favourable public opinion atmosphere. 2.4 decreased trust in the government by the community at large the declining trust of the public in the government is also a major challenge faced by the government in guiding public opinion. during emergencies, the response measures taken by the government as well www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 23 as its specific performance will be strictly scrutinised and judged by the public. if the government fails to respond to emergencies in a quick, timely, and effective manner, it is likely to trigger questions and dissatisfaction among the general public, leading to a decline in trust. such a crisis of trust may further aggravate the complexity and uncertainty of public opinion, making it more difficult for the government to handle public opinion. for this reason, the government needs to take more transparent, fair and efficient measures to respond to the concerns and questions of the public in a timely manner, so as to enhance the public's trust in the government and increase their satisfaction. 2.5 public opinion leadership requires multi-party collaboration in dealing with emergencies, the complexity of multi-party collaboration cannot be ignored. government public opinion guidance involves the cooperation of multiple departments and organisations, and requires the formation of a synergy in order to achieve good results. however, in the process of dealing with actual problems, there are often problems of asymmetric information, poor communication, and conflict of interests among different departments and agencies, which may lead to poor collaboration and even internal conflict among multiple departments. therefore, the government needs to establish a better collaboration mechanism in the process of guiding public opinion, broaden communication channels, and strengthen cross-departmental and cross-disciplinary cooperation and coordination in order to jointly deal with the challenges of public opinion. therefore, the government's guidance of public opinion in emergencies faces multiple challenges, such as rapid information dissemination, complex emotions of the general public, fierce competition in the media, declining trust of the general public, and complicated multi-party collaboration. in order to effectively cope with these challenges and maintain the overall interests of social stability and harmonious development, the government needs to continuously strengthen its own capacity building and actively seek effective cooperation and win-win solutions with all sectors of the society. 3. the need for government public opinion guidance 3.1 strengthening the emotional bedrock of a solid society in dealing with sudden or sensitive incidents, public emotions are like surging undercurrents, which may lead to social unrest if they are not careful. the importance of the government's work in guiding public opinion lies in the fact that it acts as a solid lighthouse, guiding the direction of public sentiments in the midst of stormy seas and ensuring that they will not deviate from a stable course. through in-depth analyses of public opinion, the government is able to accurately grasp the trends of public sentiment, take timely and effective guidance measures, strengthen the cornerstone of social sentiment, and provide a strong guarantee for the smooth operation of social order. 3.2 ensuring the accurate transmission of information in the era of information explosion, wrong information can easily confuse the public and mislead their judgement. as a publisher of authoritative information, the government's work of guiding public opinion carries the important mission of eliminating rumours and restoring the truth of events. the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 24 government establishes a sound information release mechanism to ensure that authoritative information is delivered accurately and correctly, so that the public can obtain true, comprehensive and accurate information at the first time. the release of truthful information by the government is an important cornerstone for maintaining social stability and enhancing public trust. 3.3 promoting rational awareness and active participation of the general public in the face of emergencies, the emotional response of the public may increase the complexity of the relevant issues. the value of the government's public opinion guidance lies in its ability to guide the public to get rid of their emotions and examine emergencies in a more rational and objective manner. by providing detailed background information, analysing the nature of the incident, and guiding the public to think in multiple dimensions, the government can help the public to form a more comprehensive, in-depth, and rational understanding. on this basis, the public will be more willing to actively participate in the problem-solving process and contribute to social harmony and progress. this virtuous cycle of public rationality and active participation is an important driving force for society to move forward. 4. comprehensive construction strategy of the government's public opinion guidance mechanism 4.1 establishment of a sound public opinion monitoring system the government can use big data, artificial intelligence and other advanced technological means to realise real-time monitoring and early warning of online public opinion and provide powerful support for government decision-making. in order to respond more effectively to the complex and volatile online environment, we must first endeavour to establish a highly sensitive and comprehensively covered public opinion monitoring system. this system will not only make full use of the in-depth mining capability of big data and the precision analysis advantage of artificial intelligence to instantly capture and deeply analyse online public opinion, but also combine with an advanced early warning mechanism to ensure a quick response to public opinion at the budding stage, and provide forward-looking and precise data support for government decision-making. through this system, the government can more scientifically grasp the direction of public sentiment and provide a strong basis for policy formulation, thereby promoting social harmony and stability. 4.2 improvement of information release process and mechanism the government can establish efficient and transparent information dissemination channels to ensure that the government can release authoritative information quickly and accurately after an emergency, so as to satisfy the public's information needs. in terms of information release, we are well aware that transparency and efficiency are the key to winning public trust. therefore, improving the information release process and mechanism, and building authoritative, fast and accurate information release channels have become the top priority of our work. not only do we need to ensure that the government can release authoritative information at the first time when an emergency occurs, so as to eliminate the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 25 panic and misunderstanding caused by asymmetric information, but we also need to enable the public to obtain true and accurate information through multiple channels and in an all-round manner through diversified ways of information release, such as official websites and social media platforms. in this way, we can not only effectively curb the spread of rumours, but also enhance public trust and support for the government. 4.3 strengthening communication and cooperation with the media the government has established a long-term and stable co-operative relationship with the mainstream media to jointly convey positive messages and guide the public to look at emergencies rationally. close co-operation with the mainstream media is also a part of our work that we cannot ignore. adhering to the concept of openness and win-win situation, we will establish a long-term and stable strategic partnership with the mainstream media, and jointly endeavour to deliver positive messages and guide the public to form a correct public opinion. through joint planning of reports and co-organisation of activities, we will further enhance the level of interaction and collaboration between the government and the media, and jointly build a healthy, positive and upward public opinion ecology. 4.4 develop and implement crisis communication strategies the government can actively respond to public opinion crises during emergencies by proactively responding to public concerns and dispelling misunderstandings and rumours by holding press conferences and giving interviews to the media. when dealing with public opinion crises, we are well aware of the importance of taking the initiative and responding positively. therefore, it is crucial to develop and implement a set of scientific and systematic crisis communication strategies. in the event of an emergency, the government will promptly activate its emergency response plan and take the initiative to explain the situation to the public and respond to their concerns by holding a press conference, accepting media interviews and other forms. the government should firmly uphold the truth, respect the public's right to know, clarify rumours in a timely manner, and dispel misunderstandings of the public about the emergency, thereby maintaining the government's image and credibility. 4.5 strengthening education and guidance for the general public the government can strengthen education and guidance for the general public, enhance education on media literacy of the general public, so as to improve the ability and level of the general public in discerning the authenticity of information, and guide the general public to participate in the discussion of public opinion in a rational and objective manner.at the same time, we will also actively guide the public to participate in public opinion discussions and communication activities in a rational and objective manner, so as to jointly create a healthy, orderly and harmonious public opinion environment. through these efforts, we expect to build a more rational and mature cyber society and contribute to the prosperity and stability of the country. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 26 5. future development of the government's public opinion guidance mechanism 5.1 deepening the deep integration of technology and innovation the government will actively explore the potential of cutting-edge technologies, such as deepening the application of ai technologies like deep learning and natural language processing, in order to achieve intelligent analyses and accurate predictions of massive public opinion data. this deep integration of technology and innovation will greatly enhance the speed and accuracy of the government's handling of public opinion information, making the decision-making process more scientific and efficient. in addition, through the introduction of blockchain technology, the government can further ensure the integrity and credibility of public opinion data, providing a more solid foundation for public opinion guidance. 5.2 building a diversified and interactive all-round communication platform recognising the important role of emerging media in the dissemination of information, the government will actively broaden its communication channels, not only limiting them to traditional press conferences and official websites, but also delving into popular areas such as social media and short-video platforms, for more direct and immediate interaction with the public. these platforms will become important windows for the government to release authoritative information, respond to social concerns and collect public opinions, helping to form a good communication mechanism between the government and the public. 5.3 establishment of a sound public opinion early warning and emergency response system in order to effectively respond to the challenges of emergencies, the government will work to improve the public opinion early warning mechanism, identifying and predicting in advance the factors that may trigger fluctuations in public opinion through big data analyses and artificial intelligence technologies. at the same time, it will establish a rapid response contingency plan to ensure that it can quickly mobilise resources and take measures to effectively control and steer the direction of public opinion after a public opinion incident occurs. in addition, the government will strengthen cross-departmental and cross-regional cooperation and linkage to create a favourable situation for joint efforts to respond to public opinion crises. 5.4 strengthening the rule of law regulatory efforts in response to the complexity and diversity of public opinion on emergencies, the government should strengthen the supervision of the rule of law, improve the system of relevant laws and regulations, and clarify the legal responsibility and punishment standards for public opinion events on emergencies. it should safeguard public interests by intensifying the crackdown on illegal and illicit behaviours. at the same time, the government should also focus on protecting the legitimate rights and interests of the general public and avoiding the dissemination of inaccurate information and rumours that may mislead and harm the public. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 27 6. conclude in emergencies, the importance of the government's public opinion guidance mechanism is self-evident. it is not only the cornerstone of maintaining social stability, but also the key to dealing with the complex public opinion environment.through in-depth investigation and comprehensive summary, we can easily find that this mechanism plays an irreplaceable role in rapid response, accurate information transmission, and effective guidance of public opinion. moreover, the government should establish relevant evaluation criteria for the effectiveness of the guidance mechanism, for example, in terms of public opinion content analysis, public response, media intervention, public opinion monitoring and early warning, policy response, establishment of a long-term mechanism, and quantification and standardisation of evaluation indicators. by establishing scientific and reasonable evaluation criteria, the government can better grasp the dynamics of public opinion and enhance the effectiveness of public opinion guidance, so as to better serve the public and maintain social stability during emergencies. looking ahead, with the continuous development and progress of society, the public opinion environment will become more complex and volatile. in order to better cope with these challenges, we must continuously strengthen our institutional construction to ensure that there are laws and regulations to follow in our work of guiding public opinion. at the same time, we need to optimise the information release mechanism and improve the timeliness and accuracy of information release, so that the public can learn the truth in the first instance and avoid the breeding of rumours and misunderstandings. in addition, it is crucial to enhance the ability to monitor and analyse public opinion. only by grasping the dynamics of public opinion in a timely manner and analysing the direction of public opinion in depth can we formulate public opinion guidance strategies and means more precisely. in this process, we also need to keep innovating and exploring more efficient and transparent ways of guiding public opinion, so that the government's voice can be louder and more powerful. in conclusion, building an efficient and transparent government public opinion guidance system is a long-term and arduous task. but as long as we persist in our endeavours, we will surely be able to achieve success and provide a strong guarantee for the continued stability and development of society. references an, y. h. (2024). the strategy and effect evaluation of the government's response to emergencies in the era of network media—taking the gas explosion incident of yinchuan barbecue store as an example. academic journal of humanities & social sciences, 7(2). https://doi.org/10.25236/ajhss.2024.070232 bai, c. h. (2023). construction of the "four forces" model for enhancing network public opinion guidance abilities of vocational college counselors. advances in vocational and technical education, 5(13). https://doi.org/10.23977/avte.2023.051317 maria, e. l. et al. (2024). micro knowledge as a driver for systemic emergencies management: the case of xylella in italy. journal of the knowledge economy prepublish. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 28 sayaka, h., hannah, r., & anne, t. (2024). communicating with the public in emergencies: a systematic review of communication approaches in emergency response. international journal of disaster risk reduction, 111(2024). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2024.104719 shuo, s., wang, g. h., & zhang, l. (2024). how to respond? the impact of government response on emotions in emergencies from the perspective of configuration. systems, 12(6). https://doi.org/10.3390/systems12060183 yang, z. g. et al. (2023). research on the guiding path of online public opinion in universities from the perspective of public management. international journal of frontiers in sociology, 5(13). https://doi.org/10.25236/ijfs.2023.051317 zhang, j., & wang, n. (2024). a multiple risk coupled propagation model for emergency information considering government information and government mandatory measures. expert systems with applications, 249. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2024.123725 note(s) note 1. author's profile: liu xinyan (1992.12.04), female, han, henan, law school of guangzhou business school, full-time teacher and office director, master of intelligence, assistant, director of guangzhou law society sannong rule of law research association; research direction: information measurement, network public opinion, data analysis; note 2. contact tel: 15521049407 note 3. contact email: 1654448743@qq.com note 4. address: no.300, knowledge avenue, huangpu district, guangzhou city, guangdong province, china. references advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 92 original paper how does china’s belt and road initiative outperform eu’s global gateway strategy yujin yang1 1 beijing foreign studies university, beijing, china received: may 26, 2025 accepted: june 11, 2025 online published: july 078, 2025 doi:10.22158/ape.v8n1p92 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v8n1p92 abstract the paper compares the european union’s global gateway strategy with china’s belt and road initiative (bri), analyzing their strategic goals, implementation models, and outcomes. it highlights the eu’s focus on geopolitical balance, competitiveness, and value-driven diplomacy, aiming to counter china’s growing global influence while promoting democratic values. however, the paper argues that the eu’s approach is hindered by internal divisions, insufficient resources, and mismatched priorities with developing countries. in contrast, china’s bri demonstrates greater stability, inclusivity, and sustainability. the bri’s cooperative framework, centered on mutual benefits, has led to more significant infrastructural and economic development in partner nations. by prioritizing local needs and fostering long-term collaboration, the bri surpasses the eu’s global gateway in terms of tangible impact, highlighting the limitations of a values-driven, top-down approach. this paper concludes that while both initiatives seek to reshape global infrastructure, china’s bri is more effective in addressing the challenges of the global south. keywords china, eu, belt and road initiative, global gateway strategy, geopolitics 1. introduction the european union’s “global gateway” policy is a global infrastructure investment strategy proposed by the european commission in december 2021. it aims to mobilize 300 billion euros between 2021 and 2027, focusing on infrastructure projects in developing countries across africa, southeast asia, central asia, and latin america. the initiative targets five key areas: digitalization, climate and energy, transport, health, and education. anchored in the core principles of “democratic values, high standards, and transparency,” it emphasizes leveraging public funds to catalyze private investment. financing is channeled through instruments like the european fund for sustainable development plus (efsd+) and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 93 the european investment bank (eib), utilizing the “team europe” approach to coordinate efforts among eu institutions, member states, and financial institutions. recent progress includes projects like energy transitions in africa (e.g., the green hydrogen initiative in namibia), digital infrastructure development in southeast asia (e.g., the asean green initiative), and undersea cable expansion in latin america. by early 2024, nearly 100 projects had been launched, with plans to add over 120 new sustainable development projects in 2024. 2. the political intensions behind the eu’s global gateway 2.1 geopolitical balance: responding to china’s rise and safeguarding traditional spheres of influence the primary motivation behind the eu’s global gateway is to counter china’s rapidly expanding global influence through the belt and road initiative (bri), particularly in regions traditionally of strategic interest to the eu, such as africa, southeast asia, and latin america. since china proposed the bri in 2013, it has established an extensive global cooperation network spanning infrastructure, energy, digital connectivity, and other fields. by 2022, china had invested over 155 billion euros in infrastructure projects in africa, while in southeast asia, it deployed key projects such as submarine cables, 5g networks, and fintech under the “digital silk road.” this rapid expansion of influence has directly struck a sensitive nerve in the eu, where there is a widespread perception that china is reshaping the geopolitical landscape through economic means, severely eroding the eu’s traditional spheres of influence. (note 1) the geopolitical design of the global gateway policy is explicitly targeted. european commission president ursula von der leyen has stated clearly that the plan aims to counterbalance china’s growing influence and provide a better alternative to chinese infrastructure financing. this counterbalance is reflected not only in the comparable scale of investment but also in the deliberate geographic overlap—africa is explicitly listed as a key investment region for the global gateway. through the “eu-africa: global gateway investment package,” the eu has pledged 150 billion euros, accounting for half of the initiative’s total funding. in southeast asia, the eu launched the “asean green initiative” in 2022, committing 783 million euros to countries like laos and vietnam to promote green transition. such regional choices are no coincidence; they deliberately target areas where china’s bri projects are concentrated, seeking to weaken china’s geo-economic ties by offering alternatives that “better align with western standards.” moreover, the ukraine crisis has further intensified the eu’s geopolitical anxieties. the energy security dilemma caused by the crisis has made the eu acutely aware of the urgency of building supply chain “resilience” and “de-russification.” the global gateway’s focus on energy infrastructure—such as albania’s floating solar power plants and the balkan power corridor—is precisely aimed at establishing new energy routes bypassing russia. eu high representative for foreign affairs and security policy josep borrell emphasized that the initiative is a “key tool for the eu to demonstrate www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 94 leadership in an era of geopolitical competition,” with the goal of “consolidating relations with global south countries and preventing them from fully aligning with other major powers.” this geopolitical logic reflects the eu’s profound concerns about shifts in international power dynamics and its strategic ambition to maintain its role as a global pole through economic means. 2.2 reshaping economic competitiveness: ensuring supply chain security and competing for standard-setting power the second core driver of the global gateway initiative stems from the eu’s growing “competitiveness anxiety” in the economic sphere. following the 2008 financial crisis, the eu economy has been mired in prolonged low growth, with its digital economy lagging particularly behind china and the united states. according to european commission data, the eu’s 5g network coverage stood at just 14% in early 2021, far below levels in china and the u.s. during the same period. this technological disadvantage has fueled concerns within the eu about being marginalized in the fourth industrial revolution. meanwhile, the covid-19 pandemic exposed vulnerabilities in global supply chains, with the eu’s over-reliance on asia for critical supplies such as medical equipment and semiconductors further amplifying this sense of crisis. the global gateway initiative is thus seen as the eu’s systemic strategy to consolidate internal resources, capture emerging markets, and secure supply chains. at the economic level, the policy is designed around two key objectives: first, boosting eu technology exports through foreign infrastructure investments, and second, competing for global standard-setting power in emerging sectors. in selecting investment areas, the eu has prioritized industries such as digitalization, climate and energy, and smart transportation—fields where no unified global standards have yet been formed. for instance, in digitalization, the plan supports developing countries in deploying digital networks based on the eu’s 5g cybersecurity toolbox and the general data protection regulation (gdpr), aiming to establish the bloc’s data governance rules as global standards. in green energy, the eu promotes the african single electricity market through the “africa-eu green energy initiative,” requiring recipient countries to adopt eu environmental and technical standards. this “standards-first” strategy seeks to create “regulatory dividends” for european companies, positioning them at the forefront of future global market competition. a defining feature of the global gateway, distinguishing it from past eu programs, is its innovative financing mechanism. the plan attempts to pool resources from eu institutions, member states, and financial entities (such as the european investment bank and the european bank for reconstruction and development) through a “team europe” approach, using public funds to leverage private investment. however, this mechanism faces significant challenges. on one hand, eu member states’ finances have been severely impacted by the pandemic, with average government debt reaching 90.9% of gdp in 2022—far exceeding the 60% ceiling set by the stability and growth pact. on the other hand, the long-term and high-risk nature of infrastructure investments makes them unattractive to private investors. germany’s handelsblatt pointedly noted that the initiative still lacks concrete plans www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 95 for mobilizing private capital. this financing dilemma reflects the inherent limitations of the eu’s economic strength and exposes the vast gap between its ambitions and reality. notably, the global gateway aligns with the eu’s internal development strategies. the “twin green and digital transition” strategy proposed by the eu in 2019 extends its external dimension through this initiative, such as linking its domestic “digital compass” plan with digital infrastructure projects in the global south. this internal-external synergy demonstrates the eu’s attempt to integrate domestic industrial upgrading with external market expansion. by participating in global infrastructure development, the bloc seeks not only economic benefits but also aims to establish eu-centered global value chains in future industries like artificial intelligence and clean technology. this economic strategy is essentially a form of “rules-based mercantilism,” whose outcome will directly impact the eu’s position in the future international economic order. 2.3 exporting values: ideological competition and the transformation of normative power the third key driver of the global gateway lies in the eu’s attempt to reinforce its role as a normative power by using infrastructure investments as a new vehicle to propagate western values and ideologies. unlike china’s belt and road initiative (bri), which emphasizes “extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits,” the eu’s plan explicitly ties investments to political conditions such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, reflecting its distinct “values-driven diplomacy” logic. this ideologically motivated economic strategy underscores the eu’s need to strengthen its identity amid global systemic transformations and its deep-seated wariness of china’s growing influence. these principles carry strong political undertones. for instance, the eu claims it will help host countries resist “geopolitically motivated economic coercion” and avoid “debt traps”—rhetoric clearly targeting china, implicitly stigmatizing the bri as “neo-colonialism”. operationally, the eu requires recipient countries to comply with environmental and social impact assessments, transparent public procurement, and similar conditions, which are embedded in connectivity partnership agreements with nations like indonesia and vietnam. such conditional investments politicize economic cooperation, aiming not only to differentiate the eu from china’s “non-interference” principle but also to cultivate pro-eu elites and societal forces in developing countries. the value orientation of the global gateway initiative is manifested in its six core principles: “democratic values and high standards,” “good governance and transparency,” “equal partnerships,” “green and clean,” “security,” and “mobilizing private investment.” these principles have strong political implications. for instance, the eu claims it will help host countries resist “geopolitically motivated economic coercion” and avoid “debt traps”—rhetoric clearly targeting china, implicitly stigmatizing the bri as “neo-colonialism”. operationally, the eu requires recipient countries to comply with environmental and social impact assessments, transparent public procurement, and similar conditions, which are embedded in connectivity partnership agreements with nations like indonesia and vietnam. such conditional investments politicize economic cooperation, aiming not only to differentiate the eu from china’s “non-interference” principle but also to cultivate pro-eu elites and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 96 societal forces in developing countries. however, the eu’s values-driven approach faces acute issues of “incompatibility with local conditions.” many developing countries have waning interest in western democratic models and growing resentment toward external interference in domestic affairs under the guise of investment. former bolivian president evo morales publicly criticized the eu for “attempting to act as masters of natural resources rather than equal partners.” in latin america, the eu’s investment clauses emphasizing personal data protection and cybersecurity rules are perceived as a new form of “digital colonialism.” this resistance has significantly slowed the implementation of the global gateway initiative. as of 2024, beyond a handful of former colonial states, most projects remain confined to political declarations with limited tangible progress. german media has even derided the initiative as potentially becoming a “multi-billion-euro graveyard.” this dilemma reveals the structural contradiction of eu values diplomacy: on the one hand, they hope to expand their ideological influence through economic means, but on the other hand, they cannot escape the arrogance of “eurocentrism” and find it difficult to truly understand the core demands of developing countries. from a deeper perspective, the global gateway program marks a transformation of the eu’s concept of normative power. traditionally, the eu has mainly promoted its values through trade agreements and expansion policies; in the era of great power competition, the plan attempts to bundle economic aid, rulemaking, and security demands, forming a more geopolitical value. the high representative for foreign affairs and security policy of the european union, borrell, declared: "a stronger europe means being able to firmly uphold 'european values'... our vision of connectivity must be based on internationally accepted standards and rules." this statement reshapes economic cooperation as a tool for building ideological camps, reflecting the eu's strategic intention to establish a third force in the face of the china us game. however, this ambition is limited by internal divisions and insufficient resources within the eu, and its actual effect may backfire excessive politicization will weaken the eu's economic presence in developing countries and further compress its strategic space. from a deeper perspective, the global gateway initiative marks a transformation of the eu’s concept of “normative power”. traditionally, the eu has promoted its values mainly through trade agreements and enlargement policies. in the era of great power competition, the initiative attempts to bundle economic aid, rule-making and security demands to form a more geopolitical value. borrell, the eu’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, declared that a stronger europe means being able to firmly uphold european values. our vision of connectivity must be based on internationally accepted standards and rules. this statement reshapes economic cooperation into a tool for building ideological camps, reflecting the eu’s strategic intention to establish a third force in the face of the sino-us game. however, this ambition is limited by internal divisions and insufficient resources in the eu, and its actual effect may be counterproductive excessive politicization will weaken the eu’s economic presence in developing countries and further compress its strategic space. in summary, the proposal of the eu’s global gateway initiative is the result of the combined effect of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 97 three driving factors: geopolitical balancing, the reshaping of economic competitiveness, and the export of values. the policy reflects the eu’s strategic anxieties and self-repositioning in an era of power shifts, yet the numerous contradictions in its implementation also expose the structural limitations of the eu as a global actor. 3. the strengths of china’s belt and road initiative compared to eu’s global gateway 3.1 more stable compared to the eu’s global gateway strategy, the belt and road initiative (bri) demonstrates greater stability, primarily reflected in two aspects: “major-country endorsement” and “major-country experience.” as the world’s largest emerging economy, china has a vast domestic market, a comprehensive industrial chain system, and a solid economic foundation. despite the complex international environment, china’s economy continues to maintain medium-to-high growth, demonstrating robust vitality. its strong risk resilience and development potential provide solid backing for the effective implementation of the belt and road initiative (bri). in the autumn of 2013, chinese president xi jinping proposed the major initiatives of building the silk road economic belt and the 21st century maritime silk road. over the past decade, the bri has achieved remarkable results, becoming the world’s broadest and largest platform for international cooperation. in the field of economy and trade, the total import and export volume between china and the co-building countries has reached 19.1 trillion us dollars, with an average annual growth rate of 6.4%. the two-way investment exceeds 380 billion us dollars, covering 240 billion us dollars of china’s outward direct investment and 140 billion us dollars of co-building countries’ investment in china, forming a mutually beneficial and win-win pattern. in contrast, the eu’s global gateway strategy, launched in 2021, pledged to invest 300 billion euros in infrastructure development for developing countries by 2027. however, it has faced numerous challenges from the outset, exhibiting significant instability. economically, the eu itself is struggling with weak economic conditions. financial crises, the european debt crisis, the covid-19 pandemic, and the energy crisis triggered by the russia-ukraine conflict have left the eu with sluggish long-term growth. eurozone countries have high government debt-to-gdp ratios and tight fiscal conditions, making it difficult to allocate sufficient public budgets to support the strategy. mobilizing market and private capital has also proven challenging. for example, in some african projects, a lack of private-sector investment has left large amounts of funding idle. internally, the eu faces significant disparities in socio-economic development among its member states, leading to conflicts and disagreements. different regions have varying infrastructure needs, and fiscally constrained southern european countries show little interest for the global gateway strategy. the eu’s complex decision-making mechanisms further hinder policy implementation, resulting in inefficient project planning and execution. in short, the eu’s internal instability makes its global gateway strategy far less reliable in practice than china’s belt and road initiative. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 98 as the world’s largest developing country, china’s economic development model offers valuable experience for the vast number of developing nations. chinese modernization has broken through the traditional western model characterized by capital expansion and colonial plunder. by grounding its approach in national conditions and systematic planning, china has accelerated industrialization while protecting the ecological environment, participated in global division of labor while safeguarding economic sovereignty, and maintained rapid economic growth while achieving social equity. ghanaian scholar frimpong points out that chinese modernization has shattered the myth that modernization equals westernization, providing a tangible development model for global south countries. although all member states of the european union are developed countries, their economic development models are not replicable for most developing nations. the two follow different historical development paths. europe underwent a prolonged capitalist development process, accumulating vast wealth and technology through colonial expansion and the industrial revolution, which laid its economic foundation. in contrast, most developing countries were once colonies or semi-colonies, facing challenges such as weak economic foundations and imbalanced industrial structures after gaining independence. there are also differences in economic structures. europe’s economy is dominated by high-end manufacturing, modern services, and high-tech industries, with agriculture also achieving a high level of modernization. the economic structures of developing countries, however, are more complex. many have weak industrial foundations, agriculture still accounts for a significant proportion of their economies, service sectors remain underdeveloped, and they face the daunting task of industrial upgrading and optimization. as a result, they cannot directly copy europe’s high-end industry-led development model. in summary, while the eu’s global gateway strategy claims to assist developing countries in promoting infrastructure construction and upgrading, china clearly holds the advantage of “direct experience” when it comes to addressing the economic development challenges of these nations. 3.2 more inclusive the belt and road initiative (bri) demonstrates greater inclusivity compared to the eu’s global gateway strategy. this is primarily reflected in bri’s long-standing adherence to the “three principles” (extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits) and the “five connectivity” framework (policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds). the belt and road initiative (bri) adheres to the principles of extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits, providing a broad platform for cooperation between china and other developing countries. “extensive consultation” emphasizes equal dialogue to align interests and ensure projects meet participants’ actual needs. for instance, through sustained high-level dialogues, china and asean substantively concluded negotiations on the upgraded china-asean free trade area (fta 3.0) in 2023, expanding cooperation from traditional trade to emerging sectors like the digital and green economies. this process exemplifies “pooling wisdom”, balancing diverse concerns via www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 99 multilateral consultations to create an institutional framework integrating regional development needs and international rules. the full implementation of the ​ regional comprehensive economic partnership (rcep), a multilateral agreement initiated by asean with china’s deep involvement, further strengthens regional industrial chain synergy, serving as a model of institutional cooperation under this principle. “joint contribution” leverages complementary resources to advance projects. for example, china and vietnam integrated china’s technological expertise with local resources to co-plan cross-border railway networks, significantly boosting regional logistics efficiency. in asean, china’s investments in ports and highways have improved local transport networks while spurring industrial park development, forming a virtuous cycle of “connectivity-driven industrial clustering.” data shows china-asean trade grew by 9.4% year-on-year in the first three quarters of 2024, reflecting efficient resource allocation through joint efforts. “shared benefits” ensures equitable distribution of outcomes to promote sustainable development. under china asean cooperation, the trade structure is gradually upgrading from primary products to high value-added products. malaysia's digital infrastructure construction and vietnam's manufacturing upgrading have both benefited from the technology spillover effects of cooperation projects. clean energy projects in indonesia and the philippines have optimized local energy mixes, while medical aid and training programs enhanced public services—tangible proof of the “community with a shared future for mankind” vision. in contrast, the eu’s global gateway strategy, while touting principles liken “good governance,” “green transition,” and “private-sector mobilization,” prioritizes its own interests and geopolitical competition. the european union invests in green energy and mineral development in africa through its “global gateway initiative,” aiming to reduce dependence on russian fossil fuels and secure resources for europe’s green transition. however, it pays less attention to the comprehensive needs of the relevant countries’ own energy industry development and the potential impact on the regional energy landscape. the european union embeds environmental, labor, and digital standards (such as the general data protection regulation, gdpr) into its trade agreements, disregarding the historical and social realities of partner countries and pressuring them to adopt european rules. in essence, this serves to eliminate non-tariff barriers for eu businesses and consolidate their technological dominance and market control. in africa and the indo-pacific, the eu positions itself as an “alternative” to china’s belt and road initiative. for instance, while the eu criticizes china for creating “debt traps,” it offers investments under its global gateway with attached political conditions, aiming to pull developing countries into a pro-european camp. the “five connectivities” – policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds – constitute the core philosophy of building the “silk road economic belt.” policy coordination​ emphasizes the alignment of development strategies and the harmonization of institutional rules among nations. through high-level dialogues, multilateral www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 100 agreements, and joint planning, countries eliminate cooperation barriers at the top-level design stage. for instance, china and pakistan established a long-term cooperation mechanism via the china-pakistan economic corridor long-term plan, facilitating the implementation of energy, transportation, and other infrastructure projects. this has significantly enhanced pakistan's power supply capacity and created tens of thousands of jobs. such cooperation models improve policy transparency and reduce political risks in cross-border projects. infrastructure connectivity​ focuses on linking transportation, energy, and communication networks. a prime example is the china-laos railway, which transformed laos from a “landlocked” to a “land-linked” country, reducing freight costs by 40% and boosting agricultural and tourism revenues along the route by approximately 20%. additionally, the lower kafue gorge hydroelectric power station in zambia, constructed by chinese enterprises with a total installed capacity of 750 megawatts, has effectively alleviated local power shortages, providing stable electricity for industrial production and daily life. unimpeded trade​ promotes cross-border commerce through tariff reductions, streamlined customs procedures, and unified standards. after the china-asean free trade area upgrade agreement took effect, bilateral trade surged nearly threefold over a decade, with vietnam’s agricultural exports to china growing at an annual rate of 12%. the china-europe railway express, operating on a “door-to-door” model, has turned inland cities like chongqing into global electronics manufacturing hubs while upgrading logistics industries in transit countries such as kazakhstan and attracting foreign investment for regional distribution centers. trade facilitation promotes cross-border commerce by reducing tariffs, streamlining customs procedures, and harmonizing standards. since the upgraded china-asean free trade agreement took effect, bilateral trade volume has nearly tripled over a decade, with vietnam’s agricultural exports to china growing at an average annual rate of 12%. meanwhile, the china-europe railway express, with its “door-to-door” transport model, has turned inland cities like chongqing into global hubs for electronics manufacturing. it has also spurred logistics industry upgrades in transit countries such as kazakhstan and attracted foreign investment to establish regional distribution centers. people-to-people bonds​ foster social cohesion through education, healthcare, and cultural exchanges. by 2025, the “silk road” scholarship had supported over 100,000 students from partner countries to study in china, with mandarin centers in uzbekistan and elsewhere reaching 80% of major cities. under the china-africa paired hospital cooperation mechanism, ethiopia’s cardiac specialty hospital quadrupled its annual patient capacity while maternal mortality dropped by 30%. such livelihood initiatives improve quality of life, strengthen public support for cooperation, and lay a social foundation for long-term collaboration. in contrast, the european union’s “global gateway” initiative clearly carries hidden motives, attempting to propagate the eu’s value model under the guise of economic cooperation. it imposes political standards like so-called “democracy” and “human rights” as prerequisites for collaboration www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 101 with developing nations. for instance, in the “eu-africa: global gateway investment package,” democratic reforms are made a condition for african countries to access funding. josep borrell, the eu high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, openly stated that this approach aims to demonstrate “the certainty that democratic values bring” through infrastructure cooperation. when selecting investment targets and projects, the eu prioritizes countries with political systems and governance models like its own, or those willing to undertake political reforms according to eu standards. for example, in negotiations with certain african and eastern european nations, the eu explicitly requires adjustments to electoral systems, government transparency, and citizen political participation—pushing them to align with the eu’s “democratic” model in an attempt to impose western political systems and ideologies. moreover, the policy disproportionately emphasizes “high-end agendas” like green transition and digital infrastructure, while neglecting basic livelihood projects such as roads and bridges urgently needed in sub-saharan africa. notably, the eu’s infrastructure investments in africa amount to merely ​ one-third​ of china’s, with funds predominantly channeled to “model countries” with high governance ratings, leaving high-demand nations like the democratic republic of congo and nigeria underserved. in summary, compared to the belt and road policy, the eu’s global gateway initiative lacks inclusiveness—a fundamental flaw rooted in its value-driven exclusivity. it fundamentally fails to address the development challenges of developing nations, nor can it ensure that policy implementation genuinely improves the livelihood of people in these countries. 3.3 more sustainable the belt and road initiative delivers more sustainable benefits compared to the global gateway strategy, primarily manifested through the cec development dynamics model and the re-optimization of four key developmental elements advocated by belt and road development studies. as the core theoretical framework of belt and road development studies, the cec development dynamics model addresses two critical challenges in global development insufficient growth momentum and persistent developmental imbalances. “connectivity” activates the flow of production factors. currently, there is a severe “maturity mismatch” in the global infrastructure investment market, with infrastructure development and connectivity lagging in developing countries. “connectivity” has unlocked access to rivers and seas for many “landlocked” regions, expanded international markets for developing countries, and facilitated the free flow of economic factors worldwide. the china-laos railway has created a new, efficient land transport corridor connecting china with laos, thailand, cambodia, and other indo-china peninsula countries. it has significantly reduced inland freight time, enabling goods to reach major cities like bangkok, thailand, in just one day through rail-rail and rail-road intermodal transport. “enablement” reshapes comparative advantages. after world war ii, numerous developing nations liberated themselves from colonial and semi-colonial status and pursued their own industrialization and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 102 modernization. however, some have long been trapped in the “resource curse,” relying solely on exporting raw materials and low-value goods to sustain sluggish economic growth. “enablement,” primarily through industrial cooperation, helps developing countries restructure their factor endowments and comparative advantages, enabling them to better integrate into global supply chains while optimizing and reshaping global production and value chains. for instance, the jakarta-bandung high-speed rail (hsr) project in indonesia not only introduced china’s hsr technology but also trained over 2,000 local technicians through joint programs, upgrading indonesia’s rail industry standards. once operational, the hsr cut travel time between jakarta and bandung by 75% and indirectly boosted tourism along the route by 23%. “coordination” enhances collaborative efficiency. the belt and road initiative (bri) promotes a multi-tiered cooperation mechanism encompassing policy dialogue, regulatory alignment, and benefit-sharing frameworks. this approach balances market mechanisms with social welfare while ensuring goal consistency and complementary actions among all parties. as the highest-level platform for policy dialogue, the bri international forum has been held three times and established itself as a regularized mechanism. through its combination of main forums and thematic sub-forums, the forum facilitates policy coordination in infrastructure, the digital economy, green development, and other key areas. for instance, the third forum in 2023 produced 89 multilateral outcomes, including the establishment of the bri green development international alliance and the signing of the digital economy partnership initiative by over 40 countries. these achievements demonstrate the growing consensus among nations on low-carbon transition and digital governance. in contrast to china’s belt and road initiative (bri), the eu’s global gateway program demonstrates significant gaps between its proclaimed objectives and actual implementation across the three key dimensions of “connectivity,” “enablement,” and “coordination.” regarding connectivity, while claiming to enhance global infrastructure interconnections, the program exhibits markedly fragmented characteristics in both funding allocation and project execution. a case in point is kenya's infrastructure project in africa, where the eu provided merely 30 million euros for a specific highway section to upgrade a stark contrast to its promised “systematic infrastructure upgrade.” furthermore, its projects are excessively scattered across over ten regions including europe, africa and asia, lacking strategic focus on key markets, which has resulted in limited actual improvements in logistics efficiency. by comparison, china’s bri has successfully connected landlocked central asian countries to global maritime networks through cross-border transport systems like the china-europe railway express. the global gateway, however, has yet to establish land-sea intermodal corridors of comparable scale. in the realm of “enablement”, the eu’s incorporation of stringent political conditionalities and anti-corruption review mechanisms in project approval has significantly delayed collaborative progress. taking the digital sector as an example, african nations widely report that their digital economy projects face an 18 to 24 months cycle from proposal to implementation far exceeding developing www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 103 countries’ needs for technological iteration speed. meanwhile, china’s “digital silk road” has established over 20 data centers and fiber-optic backbone networks across africa, with its efficient project execution model better aligning with local development priorities. these procedural barriers not only diminish the global gateway’s appeal but also reveal the eu’s misalignment with developing nations’ actual needs. at the “coordination” level, significant divergences in interests among eu member states have severely constrained their capacity for coordinated action. during the inaugural 2023 global gateway forum, italy was conspicuously absent, while germany sent only low-level representation—reflecting a lack of strategic prioritization among core member states. furthermore, the eu’s inclusion of portugal’s edp group, partially owned by chinese investors, in its business advisory committee exposed internal inconsistencies in regulatory coordination. such contradictions between political commitments and commercial practices have further eroded developing countries’ confidence in the eu’s collaborative governance capabilities. the root of these issues lies in the eu’s attempt to strike a balance between “values-driven conditionality” (e.g., democratic norms screening) and “market efficiency,” yet excessive political prerequisites have diverted resource allocation away from economic rationality. unlike the belt and road initiative (bri), which rapidly consolidates resources through multilateral cooperation frameworks, the global gateway remains mired in inter-member bargaining and bureaucratic procedures, struggling to establish a sustainable model of synergistic development. the development studies of the belt and road initiative posits that the re-optimization of the four key development elements—government, capital, society, and ecology—facilitates the effective operation of the cec dynamic development model. active government coordination is particularly crucial for developing countries where market-based resource allocation mechanisms remain incomplete. a proactive government provides reliable guarantees for infrastructure development, industrial policy formulation, social equity enhancement, and international cooperation alignment. the kyrgyzstan national fertilizer plant project (contracted in 2023 and operational in 2024) exemplifies the re-optimization of governmental functions. through a policy dialogue mechanism, the chinese and kyrgyz governments signed a cooperative framework agreement, incorporated the project into the outcomes list of the china-central asia summit, and coordinated the removal of policy barriers such as customs and taxation to ensure rapid equipment clearance. government-led institutional synergy not only unlocked investment channels but also optimized kyrgyzstan’s ecological standards for fertilizer production by introducing china’s clean energy technology standards, achieving a two-way empowerment of policies and regulations. in the international investment community, private capital tends to favor short-term projects with a focus on immediate returns. in contrast, the belt and road initiative (bri) has innovated investment and financing models that emphasize shared benefits and risk-sharing, effectively mobilizing funds from multilateral development banks, institutional investors, and private investors to create a massive “capital aggregation pool.” this approach addresses the “financing difficulties” faced by developing www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 104 countries in their economic development. the 485mw hussein combined cycle gas power plant project in jordan, constructed by sepcoiii (a subsidiary of power china) under an epc contract, received joint financing support from financial institutions such as icbc and multilateral agencies (including miga and ifc). upon completion, the project effectively alleviated jordan’s power shortages, providing stable and sustainable electricity to support the country’s industrial upgrading, economic growth, and livelihood improvements. the development studies of the belt and road initiative views the vast populations of developing countries as the driving force behind modernization efforts. the belt and road initiative (bri) adopts the philosophy of “teaching a man to fish rather than giving him a fish” by enhancing vocational education to effectively improve employment opportunities for local impoverished populations. qingdao electronic school established a branch in nepal, pioneering a “2+1” training model (two years of local study plus one year of practical training in china) and co-authoring a bilingual chinese-nepali textbook electronic technology practical training. this system equips nepalese youth with skills in circuit design, photovoltaic power generation, and other technologies, supporting the country’s infrastructure development and electronics industry growth. a healthy ecological environment is the foundation for developing countries to achieve sustainable economic growth. in the context of global carbon reduction, only by maintaining ecological balance, driving industrial transformation, and mitigating climate risks can nations build resilience for long-term economic growth, safeguard public health and social stability, and unlock high-quality development potential. under the bri framework, china promotes synergistic development between economic growth and ecological conservation in partner countries through cooperation in green infrastructure, clean energy, and low-carbon technologies. china’s investments in pakistan—including the karot hydropower station, sachal wind farm, and punjab solar park—form the largest clean energy cluster in south asia. these projects not only reduce co₂ emissions by approximately 2 million tons annually but also enhance local energy self-sufficiency through technology transfer. cumulatively, they have created over 12,000 jobs and shifted pakistan’s power supply structure toward renewable energy by more than 35%. compared to the belt and road initiative (bri), the eu’s global gateway strategy has inadequately addressed the practical realities of developing countries across the four key development elements: government, capital, society, and ecology. first, the global gateway’s excessive dependence on market mechanisms and existing funding frameworks has led to misalignment with partner countries’ development strategies. for instance, in kenya, the eu repackaged an old highway project under the global gateway label but allocated only 30 million euros—far below actual needs—and failed to integrate it with kenya’s national integrated transport plan. complex eu internal approval processes and an overemphasis on private capital participation have delayed projects, leaving them fragmented and unable to systematically support local priorities like digitalization and clean energy. the global gateway aims to mobilize 300 billion euros through public funds to catalyze private investment. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 105 however, the eu’s budgetary leverage is constrained. for example, the european sustainable development fund plus (efsd+) offers only 39.7 billion euros in guarantees to target 135 billion euros in investments. post-pandemic fiscal deficits have further strained public resources: eu government debt reached 90.9% of gdp in q2 2021. even flagship projects like botswana’s solar plants and ghana’s wind turbines face funding shortfalls. in south africa, only 88 million euros of a 280 million euros grant came from the eu budget, with the rest reliant on slow-moving member-state contributions. the global gateway’s focus on urban and elite-oriented projects risks widening social divides. in latin america, investments in digital infrastructure (e.g., submarine cables) primarily serve multinational corporations and urban middle classes, while rural areas lack basic healthcare and education. similarly, africa’s “vaccine localization” initiatives restrict technology transfer to select partners, limiting affordable medicine access for the public. such selective investments may fuel grassroots discontent by deepening urban-rural disparities. the global gateway mandates strict eu environmental standards (e.g., carbon emissions, biodiversity protection), often disregarding developing countries’ capacities. the eu deforestation regulation, which requires small-scale african cocoa and coffee farmers to provide geolocation proof of sustainable land use, imposes high technical and cost barriers. this may push farmers toward illegal land clearance, ironically worsening deforestation. additionally, large-scale solar farms in the sahara could alter surface albedo and local hydrology, potentially disrupting arid ecosystems. in short, the global gateway’s top-down approach—prioritizing eu standards and market logic over local contexts—contrasts with the bri’s emphasis on strategic alignment and adaptability. these structural flaws hinder its effectiveness in addressing the systemic needs of developing nations. in summary, guided by the principles of belt and road development studies, countries along the belt and road and other developing nations have continuously optimized their development paths based on their actual conditions, driving sustainable economic prosperity. references furness, m., & keijzer, n. 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(2024). pivot to the south: achieving the sustainable development goals through china's belt and road initiative. geography compass, 18(6), e12762. https://doi.org/10.1111/gec3.12762 panda, j. p. (2025). eu's global gateway strategy and building a global consensus vis-a-vis bri. in armenia and the belt and road initiative (pp. 177-193). routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003501459-18 panda, j. p. (2025). eu's global gateway strategy and building a global consensus vis-a-vis bri. in armenia and the belt and road initiative (pp. 177-193). routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003501459-18 shah, a. (2016). building a sustainable “belt and road”. horizons: journal of international relations and sustainable development, (7), 212-223. soler i lecha, e. 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(2023). europe’s global gateway: a new instrument of geopolitics. politics and governance, 11(4), 223-234. microsoft word ape-v1n1-p13.doc advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 13 original paper the limits of sanctions as instrument for interest actualisation in the international system: the case of north korea’s nuclear weapons development eze malachy chukwuemeka (lecturer)1* 1 department of political science, nnamdi azikiwe university, awka * eze malachy chukwuemeka (lecturer), department of political science, nnamdi azikiwe university, awka received: december 12, 2017 accepted: december 28, 2017 online published: march 3, 2018 doi:10.22158/ape.v1n1p13 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v1n1p13 abstract this paper interrogates the potency of sanctions as us and un instrument for de nuclearising dprk and the intervening variables thereof. with the aid of secondary methods of data gathering, content analysis, and rational action theory as framework of analysis, the paper observes that sanctions failed to actualize us and un goals in denuclearising dprk. it further observes that this failure is attributed to the absence of most of sanctions enhancing factors in the international system such as weak economy and political instability, quick imposition with decisive maximal impact, and active participation in liberalized trade, tacit coordination of enforcement, of sanctions with manifest political appetite to enforce penalties, lack of capacity to circumvent sanctions, avoiding an overuse of sanctions, weak offshore capital, and immobility of target assets. therefore, this paper recommends objective international engagement and integration of dprk as a nuclear state. keywords nuclear weapons, sanctions, us, un, dprk, denuclearisation 1. introduction the nature of emergence of democratic people’s republic of korea (dprk), i.e., north korea in 1948 defines it nuclear programme and success in spite of numerous international sanctions. dprk emerged as an extreme self-reliant hermit kingdom, isolationist, and socialist state with strict dictatorship out of the struggle between us allies (capitalist enclave) and that of former soviet union (socialist enclave) for the control of the korean peninsula. state power is concentrated in the hands of the military, which www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 14 published by scholink inc. from the emergence of dprk has the priority of acquiring assured national security in the midst of powerful multilateral threats. as posited by mearsheimer (2003), they want to maximize their power as a guarantee for long-term security, and attain a nuclear deterrent posture against the us and allies (sagan, 1996, p. 97; pritchard, 2007). the same view was expressed by pinkston (2003) in the following manner: “the bitter history of colonialism and war and the lack of confidence in pyongyang’s security alliances partners have driven the north korean leadership to allocate a tremendous number of resources to its missile program” (p. 11). the united states military capabilities and international behaviours are the “central nervous system” of this threat. precisely, the us nuclear bombings of hiroshima and nagasaki during world war 11, usrole in the1950s korean war (scobell & sanford, 2007), and the disintegration of the soviet union—dprk’s major ally, laid the background for these threats. however, general douglas macarthur of us threat to use nuclear weapons against north korea during the 1950s korean war prompted kim il-sung—the founding father of dprk—to practically embark on the development of nuclear weapons as deterrence and/or for security reasons. this view was validated by dprk’s ambassador to the united nations, se pyong, who stated that “if the united states continues, then we have to make the counter-measures also. so we have to develop and we have to make more deterrence—nuclear deterrence” (al jazeera, 2016). thus, president george bush’s doctrine of unilateral pursuit of us critical national security interests through the spread of democratic values; and his preparedness to wage preventive wars (jervis, 2005; bbc news, 2006) as seen in afghanistan, iraq, and libya; the administration’s declaration of north korea as “axis of evil” in the january 2002 state of the union address, and categorisation of dprk as a threat to america’s national security (arkin, 2002); the u.s. crack down on the macau-based banco-delta asia due to its alleged money laundering and counterfeiting; us freezing of moratorium on missile and nuclear weapons development programmes, and the united states reckless imposition of financial sanctions against dprk exacerbated the perceived threat. these are responsible for dprk’s ambition and success in developing nuclear weapons capabilities. consequently, they announced its intent to withdraw from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (npt) on 13 june, 1994 and subsequently withdrew in 2003. the country intensified her nuclear weapons and missile development programmes, which eventually led to dprk’s conducting of her first nuclear missile test on october 9, 2006. this development attracted serious condemnation and international pressure led by the us and with the united nations as a willing instrument that culminated in multiple multilateral negotiations and imposition of international sanctions aimed at slowing down the nuclear programme and coercing pyongyang into a negotiated reversal of the programme (kim, 2014). on one part, the us and its allies prominently japan and south korea imposed multiple bilateral sanctions on dprk, while international sanctions form the other part. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 15 published by scholink inc. the goals or purposes of the multiple bilateral sanctions are broader than the international sanctions, which is associated with the nuclear and missile programs. south korea imposes its own sanctions primarily to punish dprk for its military actions, japan’s case is to punish the country for cases of abductions, while the us raises human rights violations and trade in illicit goods as reasons. the policy objective of the multilateral or international sanctions pursues a verifiable nuclear disarmament and cessation of all efforts to procure nuclear weapons. in addition, the us wants to know the actual status of the nuclear weapons and the forms of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and to establish an inspection regime to determine the baseline and ensure compliance. the united states began to impose sanctions on dprk from march 6, 1992 when it sanctioned lyongaksan machineries and equipment export corporation and changgwang sinyong corporation for missile proliferation activities. subsequently, other sanctions followed. these include 23 june, 1992 “missile sanctions”; 24 may, 1996 sanction for missile technology-related transfers; 6 august, 1997 sanction for unspecified missile-proliferation activities; 17 april, 1998 sanction for transfer of missile technology and components to pakistan; 6 april, 2000, 2 january, 2001 and 26 june, 2001 sanctions against changgwang sinyong corporation for proliferating mtcr category i items; 16 august, 2002 sanctions against changgwang sinyong corporation of dprk and the dprk’s government for transferring missile technology to yemen; 24 march, 2003 against changgwang sinyong corporation of north korea for transferring missile technology to pakistan; 29 june, 2005 sanction and assets froze of three north korean entities “responsible for wmd and missile programs; 21 october, 2005 sanction against 8 dprk for proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or related delivery vehicles; and 30 march, 2006 punishment of a swiss and us companies for procuring “goods with weapons-related applications” for dprk (blix, 2017) among others. united states allies such as japan, australia among others joined the sanction regime after the 2006 dprk nuclear weapon’s test. subsequent multilateral and bilateral negotiations on stopping dprk from acquiring nuclear weapons and missiles led to series of united nations security council resolutions that impose severe sanctions on dprk between 2006 and 2017. these sanctions include unsc 1695 of july 2006, unsc 1718 of october 2006, unsc 1874 of june 2009, unsc 2094 of february 2013, unsc 2270 of march 2016, unsc 2321 of december 2016 (haggard & noland, 2017), and the unsc 2371 of august 5, 2017 that imposed additional sanctions, including a complete ban on the export of coal, iron, seafood and lead. these sanctions regime “were accompanied by other forms of collective enforcement. inspection and interdiction activities were conducted not only under the aegis of the un resolutions but through the us-led proliferation security initiative (psi) as well” (haggard, 2016, p. 945). the primary objectives of these sanctions and enforcement mechanisms are to prevent nuclear and missiles related items, materials, goods and technology export to dprk, prevent the provision of conventional arms, nuclear technology and training to north korea. they seek also to prevent the procurement of such items from dprk and the transfer of fund to aid the weapons programmes. consequently, the sanctions regime target dprk’s international financial flows, third-country brokers, and financial enablers of the nuclear www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 16 published by scholink inc. programs. however, in spite of all these multilateral and bilateral sanctions, a total of 21 missiles were advertised, tested, and/or launched in 2016 alone on 14 different occasions dprk. pyongyang celebrated the success of majority of these launch, which international observers equally acknowledged as successful. these weapons include the hwasong-6, nodong, musudan, taepodong and pukkuksong-1, which are medium—and long-range missiles (macias, 2016). advancing these tests, dprk successfully launched a ballistic missile—the pukguksong-2—on february 12, 2017. further, four ballistic missiles were also launched on march 6, 2017; others were tested on april 5, 2017; april 16, 2017; may 14, 2017 testing of an intermediate-range ballistic missile known as hwasong-12; july 3, 3017 testing of an icbm known as hwasong-14; august 25, 2017 testing of 3 short-range ballistic missiles; august 28, 2017 test of hwasong-12 missile; and september 3, 2017 testing of a hydrogen bomb. significantly, each of these tests is more sophisticated and advanced than the former. thus, the efficacy of sanctions as instrument of interest actualization in the international system is highly disputed even among scholars. many argue and research findings equally suggest that imposition of sanctions do not orchestrate behaviour change on the recipient actor or state (martin, 1992; morgan, 1994; pape, 1998) but led to the actor’s establishment or formation of new alignment or bilateral relations with other actors that did not support the sanctions (escribà-folch, 2012; oechslin, 2014; morgan, 2015; huish, 2017). with a sample of 116 case studies extracted from international activities between world war i and the 1990 un embargo of iraq, hufbauer, schott, and elliott (1990) found that sanctions have poor track record of initiating or enforcing behaviour change among actors in the international system. these scholars argue that the efficaciousness of sanctions in achieving behaviour modification or change depends on the following factors: the relative modesty of the goals of the sanctions, when the sanction recipient is smaller than its protagonists, faced with weak economy and political instability, where pre-sanction bilateral relations exist between the two parties, if the sanctions are imposed quickly and decisively to maximize impact, and where the protagonist avoids high costs to itself (ruediger, 2006). thus, the success of sanction is rare and/or very little (cortright & lopez, 1995). however, dominant position in the literature argues that sanction is an important instrument in enforcing behaviour change among actors in the international system (giumelli & ivan, 2013; peterson, 2013; lehne, 2013; de vries & hazelzet, 2005; cortright & lopez, 2000; pape, 1997; galtung, 1967) but certain conditions are needed for its effectiveness (huish, 2017). these conditions include the sanction recipient must be an active participant in the liberalized international trade (van bergeijk, 2009), the protagonists of the sanction must exhibit political appetite or will to enforce penalties (bapat & kwon, 2015; huish, 2017), there should be lack of personal capacity on the part of the recipient government to circumvent the sanctions (hufbauer & oegg, 2000), sanctions target and inflict damages to the ruling elites and their hostile programmes or projects (drury, 2001; tostensen & bull, 2002; gordon, 2011), checkmating or avoiding the overuse, abuse, and/or misuse of sanctions as foreign www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 17 published by scholink inc. policy instrument of a particular state (eckert, 2008), none availability or weak offshore capital (hampton & christensen, 2002), and where the recipient state is unable to move assets to safe location in time (lopez & cortright, 1997). consequently, this paper seeks answers to the following questions: 1) were international sanctions potent in securing us and un interest over dprk’s nuclear weapons development? 2) what are the factors that limited the efficaciousness of international sanctions against dprk’s nuclear programmes? 2. materials and methods considering the avalanche of literature and/or empirical studies available on international sanctions against dprk against its nuclear programmes and the development of the programmes and its economy in spite of sanctions, this paper adopts the secondary method of data collection. in this method, accessible books, journals, conference/seminal papers, workshop and lecture papers, magazines and newspapers are the primary sources of data. relevant publications from these sources were read and their findings extrapolated as data. the data thereafter was analysed using content analysis. in the analysis, the consistency of opinion in each work was verified and evaluated in the light of other findings made by different scholars to establish their reliability. these findingshaving stood the test of timevalidate the pieces of information contained in this paper. the sources of these data are thoroughly referenced. to explain inter-variables relations in a framework that enhances objective inferences, this paper adopts therational action model/theory for its analysis. the theory holds that states are rational actors whose behaviours are rational options. their behaviours balance “costs against benefits” in pursuit of maximal “personal advantage” (friedman, 1953, p. 22). according to elster (1986), roemer (1988), and wright (1989), individual state actors are motivated by the goals that express their “preferences”. in this, they anticipate the outcomes of alternative courses of action and envisage the best cost-effective course of action that yields maximum advantage. thus, such state actor rationally chooses the alternative that is likely to give them the greatest satisfaction (heath, 1976; carling, 1992). therefore the basic assumption of the theory is that the patterns of behaviour in the international system reflect the choices made by states in pursuit of benefits maximization with minimal costs. it entails choosing a “rational” action given one’s preferences, the actions one could take and the expectations therein. this paper considers the theory relevant in spite of its weaknesses such as its disregard for the role of uncertainty, assumption ofactor’s complete knowledge of other contending actors, and the assumptions of actor’s full knowledge of environmental implications and different limitations affecting its rational capacities. its relevance lies in its ability to highlight the place of (national) interests as drivers of states choices. in this case us/un pursuit of denuclearizing dprk and their pursuit of nuclear programme. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 18 published by scholink inc. equally, it enables this research to isolate specific rational choices made by us/un, i.e., international sanctions, examine their costs and benefits, and therefrom assess the potency of the choices. the theory enables this paper to assess the role of the weaknesses of the theory on the failure of us/un sanctions to abort dprk’s nuclear programmes. 3. data presentation and analysis this section investigates the nature and level of dprk’s external trade relations during the sanctions regime with a view to establish the impact of the regime. as reflected in table 1, japan is the only country that stopped all forms of exports to dprk due to the sanctions. as a consequence, many other countries such as india, italy, sri lanka, and russia embarked on expanded and/or comprehensive export services during the sanctions regime to dprk. the products, which they export to dprk include among others: x-ray related equipment, nickel alloys, light oil, aircraft, platinized catalysts, explosives, filtering or purifying machineries possibly including centrifuges, vacuum pumps, data processing machines, and transmission apparatus. these led to a tremendous increase in dprk’s volume of international trade during the sanctions regime. in addition to this, the report of international institute for strategic studies (iiss) (2013, p. 1) observe that “sanctions clearly have not stopped north korea’s nuclear and missile programs, but the sanctions have made it more difficult for north korea to acquire goods for these programmes”. similarly, choi, and bae (2016) summarised the impact of sanctions on dprk as follows: “however, far from resolving the standoff with the north (haggard & noland, 2012), sanctions have made the situation worse. north korea’s ability to sustain its nuclear weapons program does not seem to be weakened and its regime remained intact even as it increased its nuclear and ballistic missile technologies” (p. 820). this observation is supported by over 40 interception cases and consequent successful interdictions against dprk’s exports, and the various dprk’s launch and tests of high tech and advanced nuclear weapons such hydrogen bomb, intercontinental ballistic missile, etc. dprk’s successful defiance of international sanctions has been attributed to a number of factors. this include dprk’s evasions of sanctions through the “use of legitimate trade as a cover” up for sanctioned goods, the “use of multiple layers of intermediaries, shell companies and financial institutions” (iiss, 2013, p. 2), falsification of cargo documentations and the use of legitimate shipping/courier companies and multiple ports for shipments, hidden trade relations, money laundering and other illicit activities. similar to this factor, poor and insufficient knowledge of dprk’s sources of nuclear technology, nuclear materials, and financing limits the impact of the sanctions on the development of the weapons programmes. thus, united states and its allies could cause delays, create financial discomfort and harass the dpek’s efforts, but cannot abort programmes that are opaque to western intelligence and enjoys limited outside support. as an addendum to this, the some members of the unsc that are part of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 19 published by scholink inc. the group that impose sanctions on dprk are responsible for advancing the nuclear and missile development programmes. for instance, technological transfer from the soviet union and china’s assistance led to the development of nodong (cordesman et al., 2011). similarly, dprk’s initiation and development of indigenous intercontinental ballistic missiles (icbm), the taepodong-1 and the taepodong-2 was facilitated and assisted by chinese and russian engineers. in addition, dprk does not produce luxury goods that are of interests to the protagonists of the sanctions regime. similar to this, table 1 reveals that there are no close trade ties between dprk and these countries that are at the vanguard of the sanctions such as the united states, european union, japan, and south korea, etc. countries at the vanguard of the sanctions against dprk either have negligible economic and trade exchange with or significantly reduced their exchange as a result of bilateral or secondary sanctions since the early 1950s. for instance the united states has little or nothing to cut-off again from dprk, while south korea and japan are increasingly facing similar experiences since the contemporary nuclear stand-off. therefore, their prohibition of exports to dprk could not alter their trade equation. dprk has being heavily dependent on inputs from the soviet union, trade with the eastern bloc countries, and with other socialist states across the world. very important to note is the fact that offshore ownership and weak oversight of maritime contributed to the failure of international sanctions against dprk. most of the vessels are owned, registered, and managed by companies based in hong kong, bahamas, singapore, and pyongyang, etc., in offshore locations with the assistance of third-party intermediaries. this made it impossible for the us and its allies and the un to enforcement dprk’s sanctions. the offshore business is a closed one where it is impossible for the us, un and others to identify their stakeholders, boards of directors, and intermediaries for punishment due to sanctions violation. dprk maintains substantial offshore capital and links, which makes it impossible to stop their international transactions. complementing these factors, the prevalence of “weak links” and coordination problems among sovereign states who are members of the un and unsc advancing the sanctions regime hindered or obstructed the imposition of a robust sanctions regime on dprk. for instance, russia and china have always blocked such proposals, while they remain dprk’s major trading partners (haggard, 2016; hufbauer et al., 2007). further, china is always playing a patronage role to dprk in the international system because it has continued to provide the leeway for dprk amidst of sanctions. china remains the life wire of dprk’s economy. grieger (2016) observed it thus: “china has huge economic leverage over north korea, since it is the country’s largest trading partner. in 2014, the volume of sino-north korean trade reached us$6.9 billion, up from us$1.7 billion in 2006 when the first un sanctions were adopted. china has largely profited from north korea’s increasing economic isolation by monopolising trade with the country, resulting in the latter’s reliance on trade with china growing to 90.1% by 2014. china provides north korea an estimated 40% of its food, 70% of its crude oil, 95% of its foreign direct investment and a huge amount of foreign aid” (p. 6). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 20 published by scholink inc. in addition, there are evidences that dprk acquired enough stockpile of nuclear materials prior to their first nuclear test, which enables them to advance in the nuclear weapons development in spite of sanctions and blockades. siegfried (2006) observed that dprk has a stockpile of about fifty kilograms of plutonium, which is sufficient to build eight nuclear bombs prior to the post 2006 nuclear tests sanction. however, some scholars like zarate (2009), rosett (2015), and dethomas (2016) observe that the sanctions were ineffective in aborting the dprk’s nukes programme because they are inappropriate to reverse dprk’s nuclear programme (dethomas, 2016). dprk’s nuclear and missile programmes has three great functions, which are regime security, instrument for international negotiations and felicitation for economic assistance, and independent source of energy. consequently, any international pressure, programme and/or action that fail to provide trusted alternative security guarantee, alternative means of income and source of energy is bound to fail in swaying dprk to abandon the nuclear and missile programmes. on these alternative provisions that could influence dprk, ruediger (2006) observes that dprk has no trust in international agreements, the united states, and the united nations. as quoted in ruediger (2006, p. 23, footnote 56), the dprk armed forces minister-kim il chol—stated: “neither the un nor anybody else can protect us .... one can defend the nation’s dignity and the country’s sovereignty and independence only when it has its own powerful strength”. the experiences of colonel muamar ghaddafi of libya who trusted international guarantees and aborted its nuclear weapons programme only to be invaded and killed, and president saddam hussein of iraq that complied with international resolution and withdrew from kuwait only to be invaded and killed may have influenced dprk’s stand. this argument is supported by the reality of united states long history of aggression, threats, and sanctions against dprk, which are progressively being institutionalised and internationalised. it is not a classified policy goal that united states sanctions are designed to bring down dprk’s regime (mihm, 2006). concurring to this, mccormack (2006) observed: “under the direction of vice president dick cheney, with undersecretary for arms control bob joseph as coordinator, and in accordance with the national security provisions of the patriot act designed for the struggle against terrorism, they set out to squeeze north korea on every front, especially in regard to its alleged illegal activities and its human rights record” (p. 2). equally, dprk has continued to demonstrate its ability to circumvent or bypass us and un sanctions. they always develop new networks and bilateral relations that counter the ones blocked or damaged by sanctions. for instance, the difficulties of engaging international exchange and payments in us dollar due to the sanctions led dprk to covert to euros as its medium of international exchange and payment. china’s crackdown on trading with dprk due to sanctions has led dprk to divert to russia as major trading partner. in addition, dprk’s trade with others countries such as india, pakistan, burkina faso, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 21 published by scholink inc. thailand, iran, hong kong, italy, sri lanka, and the philippines among others increased (see table 1 annexed). in addition, black economy rosesharply and rapidly in dprk as a substitute for legal trading and exchange concerns as a means of providing for people’s needs. accordingly, ruediger (2006, p. 30) observed that “north korea needs hard currency. if sanctions limit the options for earning hard currency by legal means, this will change the cost-benefit balance of illegal transactions”. generally, the imposition of us and un sanctions have only led to trade diversion in dprk and news international alliance with socialist countries and all other countries facing us aggression or threat. in all, dprk’s economy has continued to grow annually at the rate of 3.9% as at 2016 in spite of sanctions (hutt, 2017). further, the nature of the sanctions makes them ineffective in influencing dprk behaviour change. the sanctions were meant to increase the economic and political costs of the nuclear and missile programs as well as impede access to outside assistance for developing the nuclear weapons. the sanctions were never broad enough or powerful enough to be regime threatening. these types of sanctions are insufficient and impotent in stopping the dprk nuke’s development because the programmes are both a constitutional and security agenda. these programmes are managed by a military command structure and have attracted substantial investments, which such sanctions cannot easily neutralize. this position is countered by the nuclear deterrent regime security school, which argues that dprk pursues the acquisition of nuclear weapon as their top most priority to secure regime security. 4. summary and recommendation the necessity to acquire nuclear capability and achieve military deterrence against the united states and its allies led to the development of nuclear weapons and missiles programme in dprk. this projected culminated in multiple bilateral and international sanctions against dprk with the aim to freeze to programme and force the country to negotiating table. nevertheless, dprk’s numerous lunch and tests of different degrees of missiles capabilities between 2006 and 2017 demonstrate pyongyang’s technological advancement, development and diversification of improved missiles operational capabilities stockpile. its lunch of icbm and hydrogen bomb in 2017 clearly demonstrate that the sanctions failed to achieve both their primary and secondary aims. the sanctions failed because virtually all the pre-conditions for efficacious sanctions regime as demonstrated by scholars in the literature were lacking or none existing. although dprk is relatively an under size when compared with the us, japan, south korea, and the united nations in general; it enjoys considerable economic and political stability, and has being insulated from the sanctions protagonists who were its belligerent enemies prior to the sanctions. economic relations between them were either infinitesimal or non-existing prior the sanctions, while dprk was not an active participant in the liberalized international trade. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 22 published by scholink inc. in addition, the sanctions were imposed gradually and were mixed with carrot policies. initially, the us failed to exhibit stringent political will or appetite to enforce penalties on violations even with executive orders, while dprk has sufficient capacity to circumvent the sanctions’ regime with strong offshore capital. equally, the sanctions are not targeted against neither do they inflict damages to the ruling elites individually. it is observed also that dprk’s nuclear and missile programmes are intertwined with its nationalism, regime and national security. thus, they are managed by constitutionalised hierarchical military structure, which makes it impossible to terminate the programme because of the death of any individual or group of individuals in the country. therefore, the alleged plots to assassinate dprk’s leader by united states, south korea, and japan does not guarantee the freezing of its nuclear programme. it is also pertinent to aver that with the failure of sanctions and dprk’s acquisition of nuclear capabilities and weapons, military campaign shall equally fail. its costs will be catastrophic and very high because millions of lives will be lost, cities on both sides of the divide shall be laid waste while the consequences shall hunt humanity for decades. therefore, the reality of dprk being a nuclear state should be acknowledged and proper international engagement pursued. precisely, dprk should be integrated into the world system as such due to its power balancing and deterrent posture. references bapat, n. a., & kwon, b. r. 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(2003). the tragedy of great power politics. new york: norton. mihm, s. (2006). no ordinary counterfeit. new york times (online edition), july(23). morgan, t. c. (1994). untying the knot of war. ann arbor: university of michigan press. https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12837 morgan, t. c. (2015). hearing the noise: economic sanctions theory and anomalous evidence. international interactions, 41(4), 744-754. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2015.1037710 oechslin, m. (2014). targeting autocrats: economic sanctions and regime change. european journal of political economy, 36, 24-40. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.07.003 pape, r. (1997). why economic sanctions do not work? international security, 22(2), 90-136. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.22.2.90 pape, r. a. (1998). why economic sanctions still do not work. international security, 23(1), 66-77. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.23.1.66 peterson, t. m. (2013). sending a message: the reputation effect of us sanction threat behaviour. international studies quarterly, 57(3), 672-682. https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12017 pinkston, a. d. (2003). domestic politics and stakeholders in the north korean missile program development. non-proliferation review, summer. https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700308436930 pritchard, c. l. (2007). failed diplomacy: the tragic story of how north korea got the bomb. washington, d.c.: brookings institution press. rosett, c. (2015). the unbearable lightness of un sanctions on north korea. retrieved october 30, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 25 published by scholink inc. 2015, from http://www.forbes.com/sites/claudiarosett/2015/10/30/the-unbearable-lightness-of-un-sanctions-on -north-korea/ ruediger, f. (2006). the political economy of sanctions against north korea. asian perspective, 30(3), 5-36. sagan, s. (1996-1997). why do states build nuclear weapons?: three models in search of a bomb. international security, 21(3), 54-86. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539273 scobell, a., & sanford, j. m. (2007). north korea’s military threat: pyongyang’s conventional forces, weapons of mass destruction, and ballistic missiles. london: the strategic studies institute, april. siegfried, s. h. (2006). report on north korean nuclear program. centre for international security and cooperation at stanford university. retrieved november 15, 2016, from http://cisac.stanford.edu/publications/reportonnorthkoreannuclear_ program the sanctions decade: assessing un strategies in the 1990s. (2000). boulder, co: lynne rienner publishers. tostensen, a., & beate, b. (2002). are smart sanctions feasible? world politics, 54(3), 373-403. https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2002.0010 zarate, j. c. (2009). harnessing the financial furies: smart financial power and national security. washington quarterly, 32(4), 49-51. https://doi.org/10.1080/01636600903235890 appendix 1 supplementary data/tables table 1. exports to dprk from 2004 to 2012 countries pre-sanctions (2004-2006) post-sanctions (2007-2012) hspc mecr s description hspc possible mecrs description 902214 nsg apparatus based on the use of x-rays 902214 nsg apparatus based on the use of x-rays 847989 nsg, mtcr , and ag machines 847989 nsg, mtcr, and ag machines 846390 nsg and mtcr machine tools for metal processing 842129 ag filtering or purifying machines www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 26 published by scholink inc. germany 902730 nsg spectrometers or spectrophotometers 902720 ag chromatographs or electrophoresis instruments 847150 mtcr data processing units 902710 ag electronic gas analysis apparatus 903149 mtcr optical instruments 850440 nsg electrical static converters 841350 nsg and ag reciprocating positive displacement pumps 847141 mtcr data processing machines china 847141 mtcr data processing machines 847141 mtcr data processing 841480 nsg and ag air or gas compressors 870590 mtcr special purpose vehicles 391721 ag tubes and pipes 391721 ag tubes and pipes 391723 ag tubes and pipes 391723 ag tubes and pipes 690290 mtcr refractory bricks 621040 ag garment 760429 nsg aluminium bars and rods 841869 ag refrigerating unit 850440 nsg electrical static converters 850440 nsg electrical static 841780 ag industrial or lab furnaces (incinerator) 711510 nsg catalysts in the form of wire cloth or grill, of platinum 842119 mtcr and ag centrifuges 847989 nsg and mtcr machines 848210 mtcr ball bearings 841370 nsg centrifugal pumps 870590 mtcr special purpose vehicles 760429 nsg aluminium profiles 841381 nsg and pumps 850590 nsg and mtcr electro-magnets www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 27 published by scholink inc. ag hong kong india 902710 ag 90271 0 ag electronic gas analysis apparatus 902720 ag chromatographs or electrophoresis instruments 841480 nsg and ag air or gas compressors 853230 nsg capacitors 852910 mtcr aerials and aerial reflectors 847150 mtcr data processing units 901480 mtcr navigational instrument 854320 nsg electric signal generators 851410 nsg resistance heated furnaces and ovens 854370 nsg and mtcr other electrical machines 847989 nsg, mtcr , and ag machines 847989 nsg and mtcr machines 854239 mtcr integrated electronic circuits 850440 nsg electrical static converters 721914 nsg and mtcr flat-rolled products of stainless steel 721934 nsg and mtcr flat-rolled products of stainless steel 741999 nsg articles of copper 721914 nsg and mtcr flat-rolled products of stainless steel 841480 nsg and ag air or gas compressors 810890 nsg and ag titanium 852990 mtcr parts for transmission apparatus 841350 nsg and ag reciprocating positive displacement pumps 852990 mtcr parts for www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 28 published by scholink inc. transmission apparatus 841480 nsg and ag turbo charger (or air or gas compressors) 902214 nsg apparatus based on the use of x-rays 841780 ag industrial or lab furnaces (incinerator) indonesia 852990 mtcr parts for transmission apparatus 852990 mtcr parts for transmission apparatus italy 841950 ag heat exchange units 381512 nsg reaction initiators with precious metal 847989 nsg, mtcr , and ag machines 842489 mtcr and ag mechanical for spraying liquids or powders 852610 mtcr radar apparatus 841850 ag refrigerating unit 852990 mtcr parts for transmission apparatus 880330 mtcr parts of aircrafts or helicopters 903180 nsg, mtcr , and ag measuring or checking instruments 391721 ag tubes and pipes 391723 ag tubes and pipes 844400 mtcr filament extrusion machines 842230 ag machines for filling, closing and labelling 841950 ag heat exchange units 841869 ag refrigerating unit www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 29 published by scholink inc. japan 870590 mtcr special purpose vehicles 841869 ag refrigerating unit 841370 nsg centrifugal pumps malaysia 283711 ag sodium cyanides 841480 nsg and ag air or gas compressors 841950 ag heat exchange units 854370 nsg&mtcr other electrical machines 853230 nsg capacitors russia 846029 nsg grinding machines 844630 nsg&mtcr weaving machines 841480 nsg and ag air or gas compressors 850440 nsg electrical static converters 841950 ag heat exchange units 880240 mtcr airplanes 810890 nsg and ag titanium tube andpipes 841181 nsg&mtcr gas turbines 847150 mtcr data processing units 847141 mtcr data processing machines singapore 841869 ag refrigerating unit 847150 mtcr data processing units 847149 mtcr automatic data processing machine 847149 mtcr automatic data processing machine 847989 nsg, mtcr , and ag machines 842890 nsg lifting, handling, loading or unloading machinery 847130 mtcr portable automatic data processing machines 852580 nsg digital cameras 847150 mtcr data processing units 847130 mtcr portable automatic data processing www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 30 published by scholink inc. machines 292219 ag oxygen-function amino-compounds sri lanka 401519 ag articles of apparel 250410 nsg graphite taiwan 845891 nsg numerically controlled lathes 847141 mtcr data processing machine 846599 nsg machine tools for processing materials 841360 nsg rotary positive displacement pumps 850162 nsg and mtcr ac generators 846019 nsg flat-surface grinding machines 847141 mtcr data processing machines 280429 nsg rare gases 847149 mtcr automatic data processing machine 854370 nsg and mtcr other electrical machines 845969 nsg milling machines 903180 nsg, mtcr , and ag measuring or checking instruments 850440 nsg electrical static converters thailand 847989 nsg, mtcr , and ag machines 721933 nsg and mtcr flat-rolled products of stainless steel 880390 mtcr parts of balloons, aircrafts, space crafts, and satellites 854231 mtcr processors and controllers 841989 nsg, mtcr , and ag machinery, plant or laboratory equipment 721934 nsg and mtcr flat-rolled products of stainless steel 852910 mtcr aerials and aerial 852580 nsg cameras www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 31 published by scholink inc. reflectors 841850 ag refrigerating unit 846593 nsg nsg grinding, sanding or polishing machines 721933 nsg and mtcr flat-rolled products of stainless steel 854370 nsg and mtcr other electrical machines 841869 ag refrigerating unit 701919 nsg glass fibres 841480 nsg and ag air or gas compressors 842489 mtcr and ag mechanical for spraying liquids or powders 845630 mtcr machine tools for working material (electro-discharge processes) 846031 nsg sharpening (tool or cutter grinding) machines 401519 ag articles of apparel 841319 nsg pumps for liquids source: hyuk, kim (nd.). the impact of united nations sanctions on north korea (dprk), stockholm international peace research institute paper, pp. 109-113. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 74 original paper a review of research on networks of modular production jiali chen1* 1 china-asean school of economics, guangxi university, nanning, guangxi, 530000, china * corresponding author, e-mail: 941025542@qq.com received: april 19, 2024 accepted: may 11, 2024 online published: may 25, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n2p74 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n2p74 abstract with the development of science and technology, the deep integration of products and technologies has made modularity in the field of industrial products has achieved good results, from ibm-360 computer to volkswagen's mqb platform can be seen, in various industrial fields, the research and practice of modular production network has become one of the focuses of industrial upgrading. based on the current research needs, the existing modularization literature is reviewed from three aspects: industrial modularization, industrial cluster modularization and modular production network. keywords modularization, industry aggregation, industry modularization 1. introduction in today's world, science and technology are developing rapidly, the global situation is changing rapidly, digital, artificial intelligence and other information technologies are constantly reshaping the industrial development trend, and the rapid and dynamic competitive environment is also constantly promoting entrepreneurs to innovate and develop new business paradigms and industrial organization forms. at the same time, factors such as the gradual blurring of industrial boundaries and the rise of customer customization demand have spawned a new industrial value chain system and ushered in the modular era. the research on modularity theory can be traced back to the concept of "complexity architecture", which was proposed by herbert, an american management scientist. simon came up with it in the 1960s. he used clocks and watches as an example to analyze the methods of solving complex problems by independent subsystems, but did not put forward the concept of "modularity". after the large-scale modular production of ibm computers, the academic community began to pay attention to the modular production mode, and its theory and mechanism were discussed and studied. in 1997, baldwin and other scholars published a paper "management in the modular era" and proposed the definition of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 75 modularity for the first time, arguing that modularity is a process of decomposing complex things and turning them into relatively simple units with independent functions and operation capabilities (baldwin & clark, 1997). on this basis, japanese scholars such as masahiko aoki have made a clearer explanation of modularity. he believes that module is a semi-autonomous subsystem in a large system, and "subsystem" refers to a more complex system that can be combined with other subsystems in the system according to certain standard requirements. "semi-self-discipline" means that the subsystem has certain room for adjustment and improvement when it adapts to the requirements of the unified specification. "modular decomposition" refers to the decomposition of a complex system into multiple independent subsystems according to certain standard requirements, and "modular centralization" refers to the combination of independent subsystems into a more complex new system (aoki & ando, 2003) with reference to certain requirements. since then, the academic community has officially started the modular systematic research stage. since the 1990s, the fruitful development of modularity in various fields has also ushered in a research climax, and these studies have been successively applied to product development, technological innovation, organizational behavior and industrial development and other fields, and gradually formed product modularity, production modularity, management modularity and industrial modularity theories. however, after reviewing the literature, it is found that most scholars carry out research from the direction of modularity, a certain industry or service industry, etc., and lack of research on the overall industrial modularity under the current environment. based on the research background of modularity and the significance of the times, the original intention of this paper is: first, to grasp the evolution path of modularity production network theory as a whole and understand the latest research and development trend; the second is to explore the possible research direction in the future, hoping to provide academic guidance for the later generations. 2. modular theory and its characteristics 2.1 modular theory in the era of information technology and economic globalization, it is also an era full of uncertainty and complexity. for this reason, scholars believe that modular design can be used as a solution to the increasing complexity of products, organizations and industries (asan, 2008; schilling, 2001) at present, the concept of modularity has formed two mainstream schools, one is simon, baldwin, clark and aoki masahiko represented by the mainstream modular theory. in most of the literature on mainstream module theory, modularity refers to the ability of a product to be broken down into multiple components that can be separated and reassembled while maintaining integrity and functionality with each other (baldwin & clark, 1997). as long as it is connected according to the established setting standards and interfaces, the innovation of the entire product or system can be realized by changing one or some of the components, without the need to adjust or modify the other parts of the product. therefore, modularity is implemented in a relatively stable interface standard. the other is the modified www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 76 modularity theory represented by ernst and chesbrough. scholars represented by ernst and chesbrough believe that the development of modules requires a broader knowledge reserve, and the essence of modularity is the exchange of knowledge. knowledge exchange promotes technological progress, and it can be said that technological progress will be repeated throughout the whole modular process. in order to achieve better benefits, modular systems may need to break the original structure, so there is no relatively stable interface standards. the two theories seem to be opposite, but in fact they are relatively complementary views (bai, 2020). the modular decomposition construction needs to be completed under certain design rules, which is the basis of constant. however, with the internet, big data into all walks of life, the whole society is in a stage of rapid development, consumer demand and product change speed continue to accelerate, product modular design rules may also change. thus, change and unchange have always revolved around the evolution and development of modularity. 2.2 modular features modular design rules include: clearly defined and free design. clear regulations include structures, interfaces and standards. the structure determines which modules are the constituent elements of the system and what role the modules have. interfaces specify how modules interact, relate to each other, and exchange information. standards are used to verify that the design of a module complies with the rules. free design is to allow designers to freely play the design within the module under the conditions of complying with clearly specified conditions (masahiko, 2003). due to the processing method of decomposing a complex system into multiple independent modules, modularity defined by these methods has the following characteristics: (1) independence of functional modules and knowledge modules. according to the standard of modular design, each decomposed sub-module has the independence of physical form, each sub-module represents a certain function in the system, and the functions of the modules are independent of each other and will not coincide. relative to the design and production of sub-modules, each company has its own tacit knowledge, manufacturing sub-modules in the black box, and does not need to think too much about the production and contact problems of other modules. in this context, each company will strive for excellence in its own module areas, pooling knowledge and resources to improve technology in proprietary areas. therefore, in a modular system, the overall performance can be improved through one or more modular innovations. this not only reduces the cost of innovation, but also improves innovation efficiency. (2) module substitutability and collaborative non-specificity. each module in the modular system has different functions, and they are combined into a complete system according to the interface and standards, and ensure effective operation. depending on the function, there are both general and special modules. the general module is the basic function that can ensure the use of the product, and the special module has a certain specific function. special modules can not be used alone, need to be combined with general modules, by increasing and reducing the number of several special modules, rich module combination and product functions, to meet the customization needs of different users. at www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 77 the same time, the single module transformation in the universal module can also improve the entire product system, not only to maintain the integrity of the product, but also to achieve low-cost product technology upgrading. modular technology facilitates the substitution of product parts and contributes to the emergence of alternative economy (masahiko, 2003). the fungibility of modules makes each module not dedicated and has collaborative non-specificity. this nature changes the relationship between module function and structure: that is, a function can correspond to a variety of modules, and a product can also be combined with multiple parts, for example: mobile phones can use 128g memory, or 256g memory. this nature also changes the relationship between the module function and the product, that is, a module can also be used for a variety of products, for example: liquid crystal display can be used for computers, can also be used for mobile phones. the substitutability of modules broadens the boundaries and life cycles of products, and the collaborative non-specificity of modules blurs the boundaries of industries. these two characteristics make modularity have unlimited economic benefits in terms of innovation. (3) openness and self-coordination of the modular system. the modules of the system are produced in accordance with the pre-designed system framework, which not only ensures the independence of each module, but also ensures the integration and integrity of the system functions. therefore, as long as the design and production are carried out in accordance with the design rules, the system can constantly add new module components. it can be said that modular technology provides an open platform for product systems. the system can take advantage of this openness by continuously adding or replacing modules to maintain the vitality of the system. of course, this openness may bring some negative problems, for example, the design of some modules themselves is not perfect, and there will be certain risks in introducing them into the system. since the modules themselves are independent of each other, and the design rules of the system will become more and more perfect, so even if some modules themselves have defects, other modules will achieve good self-coordination under the guidance of the design rules. the openness of modular system provides the path of knowledge acquisition for innovation. in the process of innovation and creation, knowledge and information acquisition is very important. speed up product innovation. with modularity, end users can generate additional value by mixing and matching components to meet different functional requirements. in this way, the modularity of the system can provide users with a variety of products. manufacturers can improve the assembly efficiency and obtain higher benefits through the modular design of products. however, under the design rules, the modules in the product are independent of each other, and the other modules in the system will not be changed because of the change of one module (baldwin & clark, 1997). therefore, optimizing the subsystem does not necessarily optimize the overall system performance. 2.3 function of modular (1) enhance the flexibility of product innovation. simon (1996) believes that modular architecture reduces the complexity of products by breaking them into loosely coupled components and connecting www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 78 them with each other through pre-specified interfaces. it also increases the design flexibility for later product innovation. flexibility is achieved by replacing components in a single design hierarchy. although not all products are decomposable in the real world, the ideal modular architecture provides a path for one-to-one mapping between product functional elements and physical modules. however, some scholars believe that modularity does not reduce the complexity of products. through case studies of different industries, stadenmeyer finds that modularity increases the complexity of product development activities when applied to the product production process. (staudenmayer et al., 2005) (2) diversify investment risks. reduce research and development costs. since each module in each modular product has a certain independence, it is possible to innovate and upgrade the entire product by innovating on a single module. masahiko has also pointed out that after modularizing the product, each module may enable "back-to-back" independent competitive research by one or more teams at the same time. in this process, the manufacturer shares the risk with multiple suppliers. modular production not only reduces the risk of uncertainty, but also improves the success rate of research and development. this risk dispersion is mainly manifested in two aspects: first, enterprises are in the common cognition of the standard interface for production innovation, r & d enterprises do not need to collect all the information of the product, only need to concentrate on improving the performance of the responsible module. second, each module's information is a "black box" relative to other modules, independent and closed. the innovation of the module is to further process and refine the information in the module, and improve the performance on the basis of the original product, which makes the product more confident of the market after improving the performance, because the original product has been recognized by the market. when the product has the technical separability, the enterprise will modularize the product in order to pursue economic benefits. at the organizational level, product modularity will certainly bring about changes in the internal division of labor and organizational structure of enterprises. such changes have caused some scholars to analyze the impact of modularity from the perspective of industrial organization, which will further change the relationship between clusters and production networks. 3. research status 3.1 domestic research status product modularization development to a certain stage, will form a certain organizational structure, the formation of industrial modularization; when the enterprises in the industrial cluster are regarded as independent individuals, these individuals can be combined into a complete system, it is a modular industrial cluster. when industrial modularization has evolved into a global production network �has formed a modular production network (peng, 2009). the development and research of modularity are mainly carried out from these aspects. 3.1.1 industrial modularization in today's world, the economic situation is severe and complex, and industrial upgrading and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 79 transformation cannot be separated from the modular creation of products and industries. in the early stage of industrial development, it is mainly modularization, in the middle stage, it is module re-integration, and in the late stage, it is the expansion of the application field of modules. research is of great significance for leading the scale of the industry and assisting in the adjustment and upgrading of the industry (zhang, qiao, & song, 2016). zhang and other scholars believe that only through the vertical decomposition and horizontal integration of the vertical integration industrial chain through modularization can industries achieve effective integration in a wider range and eventually form a complex industrial network with new industrial attributes or new formats (xiao & zheng, 2012). most scholars put forward targeted suggestions and improvement methods from the perspective of an industry. from the perspective of the education industry, li jun and other scholars compared the modular reform of vocational education in britain and germany and concluded that the reform of vocational education paradigm should be carried out in accordance with local conditions and step by step (li & yang, 2023). yu believes that the high-speed rail system is decomposable and integrated, and it is necessary and feasible in terms of modular design and production (yu, 2018). modularity is one of the important trends of the automobile industry towards the era of new energy vehicles, which makes the automobile industry gradually evolve from the dominance of integrated product architecture to the dominance of modular product architecture (tian, 2015). therefore, most scholars start their research from the automobile industry. taking faw-volkswagen as an example, scholar zhao ziyu discussed the impact of modular production on the spatial organization of the automobile industry cluster at the local regional scale. he believed that the economies of scale brought by modular production could overcome the transportation cost to a certain extent, leading to the decrease of the dependence on the production of the host country and the decrease of the spatial agglomeration of parts suppliers after the industrial transfer of large vehicle groups. modular production will reorganize the organizational structure of regional production network, resulting in a competitive advantage of "beyond local", and the effect of scale economy, knowledge and technology sharing and enterprise organization strengthening will jointly drive the spatial organization reconstruction of automobile industry clusters under modular production (zhao, wang, & chen, 2021). wang et al. discussed the interaction between industrial modularity and discontinuous innovation in combination with the automobile industry, and found that the relationship between them is not only positive, but also significant in the long run (wang, huang, & lin, 2018). integrated circuit chip is the industrial brain, but also china's current urgent need to solve and overcome the problem, so more scholars will also study the role of modularity on the industry from this direction. wang scholars proposed that the chip design and manufacturing mode has developed into a chipless design mode. china's current chip core research and development field is weak, and it is at a disadvantage in the "trade war" in the face of the united states. there is an urgent need to use the chipless design mode, combined with the modular research and development production mode, to form a large network ecology around the chip design of core enterprises, break through the technical barriers www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 80 of chip research and development, and promote the rapid improvement of china's integrated circuit chip industry (wang, 2019). with the in-depth development of economic globalization and information age, the high-tech industrial chain has shown the characteristics of modularity, and the economic organization structure has also developed to a modular structure, and has gradually become the leading industrial organization model. the difference of resources and knowledge capital makes the heterogeneity of modules prominent in the modular network, and heterogeneity has the effect of amplifying comparative advantage. the existence of heterogeneity in the modular industrial chain further amplifies the comparative advantage between china and the united states in the trade of high-tech products, resulting in the effect of mutual complementarity and joint enhancement of interests between china and the united states in the trade of communication equipment (liu & su, 2019). under the background of the division of labor and deconstruction of the industrial value chain, the production and operation activities of enterprises are no longer limited to their own resources, but spread to the integration and utilization of the entire network resources. therefore, wang and other scholars proposed four dimensions of enterprise modularity capability, namely vision planning capability, rule design capability, module integration capability and relationship management capability, and on this basis proposed a measurement scale of enterprise modularity capability (wang & ren, 2021). in addition, there are also scholars from the modular perspective, based on modular production network industrial chain integration of theoretical research; on this basis, the network industry chain model of anhui automobile industry was constructed (he & zhang, 2013). under the modular production mode, the new characteristics of the competitive advantage of enterprises are studied (zhang, tang, & guo, 2013). based on the modular theory, a theoretical model of collaborative innovation in the new energy automobile industry is constructed, thus promoting the improvement of the overall innovation ability of the industrial chain (liu, wu, & sun, 2012). in addition, with the technological breakthrough and industrial upgrading of strategic emerging industries showing significant modular characteristics, strategic emerging industries also participate in and create modular industrial organizations, join the modular production network, and actively utilize global high-quality resources to gradually optimize and upgrade the industrial structure (zhang & bai, 2018). among the strategic emerging industries, the new energy industry has the highest degree of modularity, the new energy automobile and the new generation of information technology industry has a high degree of modularity, and the biomedical industry and the new material industry has a relatively low degree of modularity. 3.1.2 industrial cluster modularization many scholars believe that modularity is the essence of industrial cluster and the expansion form of value chain, and put forward the concept of value module. with the development of socialized mass production, industrial division of labor and specialization are deepening. scholars at home and abroad generally believe that the division of labor and specialization help to improve the efficiency of social www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 81 production. at present, industrial cluster has become the "third mode of production organization" co-existing with market and enterprise, and its formation and development are often based on division of labor and specialization. the continuous innovation and development of modular production mode on the basis of industrial division of labor not only breaks through the combination mode of traditional industrial chain and the production mode of traditional enterprises, but also profoundly changes the rules and paths of industrial cluster evolution (yan, 2011). the path of industrial cluster modularization is the interaction of technology modularization, product modularization, market modularization and organization modularization. modular industrial clusters have high organizational efficiency, which is mainly manifested as: innovation efficiency based on functional modules, coordination efficiency constrained by design rules, information transmission efficiency characterized by flat organizational structure, low assimilation efficiency guided by active innovation, transaction efficiency based on transaction cost reduction, and collaboration efficiency based on division of labor (wang, 2011). the modularization of industrial cluster organization can break the regional and industrial restrictions and form a modular value network with low transaction costs and high innovation ability (cao, li, & he, 2016). as a new mode of production, division of labor and organization, modularity is bound to have a profound impact on the upgrading of manufacturing clusters. modularity leads to the transformation of the division of labor mode, governance mode and market structure of the global value chain, which brings new opportunities, new momentum and stage crossing in the path of cluster process upgrading, product upgrading, function upgrading and chain upgrading. this has certain enlightenment significance for realizing the upgrading and transformation of the manufacturing industry to "intelligent manufacturing in china" and "high-quality development" (su, liu, & li, 2018). 3.1.3 modular production network modular production network generally refers to an open network organization formed by connecting production and integrated manufacturers with contracts on the premise that products can be modularized. it is a new form of organization that adapts to modular technology and information technology. as one of the most advanced forms of industrial organization, modular industrial network is of great significance in promoting the sharing of superior resources among enterprises, building innovation platforms and enhancing the competitiveness of enterprises (zhang & zhong, 2015). many scholars analyze the collaborative innovation ability of industry from the perspective of modular network based on their own research fields. liu guowei and other scholars analyzed the industrial collaborative innovation ability from the perspective of four dimensions of innovation input, innovation output, environmental support and policy support, and believed that policy support contributed the most to collaborative innovation ability, while environmental support contributed the least (liu, shao, & liu, 2021). some scholars also believe that modular division of labor has a great impact on technological innovation, while modular collaboration has a relatively small impact on technological innovation (cao, zhang, & liu, 2015). some scholars also believe that industrial modularity and industrial innovation have a low level of coordinated development and show a fluctuating trend (wang, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 82 he, & wang, 2014). in the production network, the modular division of labor reduces the inter-organizational dependence, but does not affect the organizational activities and cooperation between modules. therefore, in order to improve the collaborative innovation ability of enterprises, it is necessary to make use of the intermediary role of modularity to effectively connect the modular technical framework of enterprises, universities, research institutes and partners, and connect the relationship between the demand side and the supply side, so as to better enhance the industrial value (wang, chen, & cheng, 2018). to some extent, the service modularization structure of industrial network will provide a technical platform for its risk formation path. therefore, the axiomatization, loose coupling and network interface rule design of network node modules are optimized (li, shen, & yu, 2019). based on the formation of modular production networks, many scholars also follow current events to understand the development form of emerging modular networks. ge and other scholars found the modularization of value network, that is, in the creative industry cluster, creative enterprises cooperate in the form of different business modules, and carry out modular cooperation with their respective core capabilities as the link, forming a new enterprise value network system based on modularization. through the interaction of the three value-added subsystems of industrial chain, supply chain and value chain, they form a complex comprehensive system of value network and create value (ge & gao, 2017). ke et al. built an industrial value network division model based on the modular three-dimensional framework through the beibu gulf industry in guangxi, and discussed the value enhancement path of industrial value network under the condition of modular division of labor (ke & shi, 205). by comparing the service modularization value network governance mechanism of cigarette industry and dairy industry, yu et al. believed that the difference of environment led to the different forms of the two industries' modularization dilemma, and proposed the corresponding service modularization value network governance mechanism (yu & shen, 2017). min hong proposed a clearer concept of enterprise modularity based on the analogy of "integration" and "specialization" (min, 2017). at the same time of the development of the new modular network, the cross-industry integration of network modularity has also attracted the attention of researchers. scholar dong hua proposed that the mutual penetration and reorganization of industrial chain modules of manufacturing and service industries can not only bring about industrial upgrading effect, cost saving effect, integration and innovation effect and knowledge spillover effect, but also change the original form of manufacturing industry, resulting in the emergence of a new cooperation network of capabilities and demands service-oriented manufacturing network. it is further decomposed into service production value module, productive service value module, customer utility value module, and the functions of each value module (dong, 2016). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 83 3.2 foreign research status foreign scholars have studied that modularity is the innovation driving force of industrial clusters and is conducive to eliminating the endogenous risks of industrial clusters (ma, 2008). modularity is a design attribute of product, organization, and inter-company network architecture; modularity is a process that influences these designs while also shaping company boundaries and industry landscape; "modularity" is a cognitive framework that guides the classification and interpretation of various economic phenomena, so modularity refers to attributes, processes and frameworks (macduffie, 2013). increasing efficiency and productivity are contemporary challenges facing industrial organizations, and product modularization is considered a strategic alternative to achieving these goals, capable of improving company domain or production efficiency (piran, 2016). in addition, product modularity can also enhance an enterprise's competitive advantage (kim & shin, 2021). different scholars have proposed the role of modularity from different industries. some scholars, starting from the construction industry, have proposed a unified definition and practical guidelines for modules in construction projects to help managers organize project activities to achieve effective modularity (gosling, 2016). from the perspective of urban transportation, based on the modular framework of service system, service modules and data sources can be determined to promote co-creation and innovation within the existing service system (schreieck, wiesche, & krcmar, 2016). similarly, foreign scholars also prefer to study the modularity of the automobile industry, and believe that modularity is an important factor in china's automobile industry. it has a positive effect on these variables that constitute firm relative positional advantage (icao, liu, zhang, & zhang, 2013). moreover, through the sample analysis of 262 auto parts suppliers in china, the positive impact of modularity on enterprise performance is demonstrated again (seyoum & lian, 2018). foreign scholars pay more attention to the role of modularity on performance, and believe that product modularity is the intermediary between customization demand and financial performance, which can promote enterprises to develop customized products (persson & lantz, 2022). global modular production networks will also be studied from the information technology industry and manufacturing sector (cao, zhang, & liu, 2012). domestic and foreign scholars have contributed a lot of excellent literature materials to the study of modularity, and also consider and analyze the economic utility of modularity for industrial upgrading from the perspective of different industries, especially the automobile industry. domestic scholars have a high degree of research focus and will generate a lot of literature on a single focus, while foreign scholars seem to consider more personal preferences in their research, which has a certain relationship with the domestic and foreign research environment. domestic studies on modularity pay more attention to the impact of modularity on the value chain of the entire industry, and use cases of specific companies or industries to study the value governance of modularity, while foreign studies pay more attention to the role of performance. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 84 4. brief comments modular production network is different from the general network organization, it is with the maturity of modular technology and the development of information technology and gradually grow up and is not limited by the region, and has a close relationship with the decomposition and integration of complex products or complex technologies. scholars at home and abroad have fully studied the modular production network from different perspectives, which is of great significance for reference. however, there are some fields that can be further enriched: (1) lack of large sample data, and cannot conduct empirical research with both static and dynamic data. most of the existing literatures use cross-section data, that is, relatively static data, which cannot reasonably observe the changes between variables of the research object under the role of modularity, and the conclusions drawn will be relatively incomplete. (2) the research scenario is too narrow, and there is a lack of articles to prove whether modularity brings positive and extensive effects in a general sense. most of the articles choose high-tech manufacturing industries such as automobiles, it information, and automation, ignoring the application scenarios and applicability of modularity in other medium and low-degree technology manufacturing industries or service industries, and failing to obtain a comprehensive mechanism and impact relationship of modularity. (3) lack of combination of modular research and social environment. with the iteration and new of artificial intelligence and ai technology, network technology will continue to penetrate into the low-end labor environment offline, and the current youth unemployment rate has reached 20%. under such a background, how to improve the rationality of product modular design and ensure social stability is also a topic worthy of discussion. references aoki, m., & ando, h. 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(2013). modular production network and the development of strategic emerging industries in china. applied mechanics and materials, 433-435, 2413-2418. https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.433-435.2413 ke, y., & shi, j. (2015). formation and development strategy of industrial value network based on modular three-dimensional framework: a case study of beibu gulf industrial cluster in guangxi. science and technology progress and countermeasures, 32(07), 64-68. kim, y. s., & shin, s. s. (2021). an empirical study on the influence of modularization factors between vendors on the performance of scm in auto parts. journal of international trade and insurance, 21(03), 71-90. li, j., & yang, r. q. (2023). a review of the 1+x certificate system from the international perspective: based on the analysis of the modular practice of vocational education in britain and germany. higher engineering education research, 2023(02), 146-152. li, x. y., shen, x. h., yu, c. c. et al. (2019). research on organizational governance path of service modular network: from the perspective of risk paradox. science and technology management research, 39(13), 217-228. (in chinese) liu, f. q., & su, c. c. (2019). heterogeneous characteristics of modular organizations and comparative advantages among firms: data from sino-us communication equipment trade. journal of theory, 2019(03), 66-73. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 86 liu, g. d., wu, b., & sun, t. y. (2012). current situation and development countermeasures of collaborative innovation in china's new energy automobile industry: based on the perspective of modular division of labor.modern economic research, 2012(07), 54-58. liu, g. w., shao, y. f., & liu, b. (n.d.). evaluation of collaborative innovation capability of china's large health industry chain from the perspective of modular network. science and technology progress and countermeasures, 38(24), 85-95. ma, x. g., & guan, j. (2008). modularization drive industry cluster towards more competitive power. industry cluster and meta-studies, 431-+ macduffie, j. p. (2013). modularity-as-property, modularization-as-process, and ‘modularity'-as-frame: lessons from product architecture initiatives in the global automotive industry. global strategy journal, 3(01), 8-40. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2042-5805.2012.01048.x min, h. (2017). evolution of enterprise modularization theory: a literature review. technical economics and management research, 2017(08), 53-57. peng, b. h. (2009). research review of modular production network. science and technology management research, 29(10), 301-303. (in chinese) persson, m., & lantz, b. 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(2015). modularization of new energy vehicles and its impact on industrial value chain: an analysis based on product architecture theory.modern management science, 2015(01), 33-35. wang, h. j. (2011). analysis of modular industrial cluster and its organizational efficiency. industrial technical economics, 30(02), 67-72. wang, h. j., chen, j., & cheng, j. (2018). research on ict enterprise patent cooperation network based on modular perspective: huawei case. science of science and management of science and technology, 39(07), 74-87. wang, h. l., he, f. q., & wang, n. (2014). empirical analysis on the coordinated development of information industry modularization and industrial innovation. science of science and science and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 87 technology management, 35(09), 87-93. (in chinese) wang, h. l., huang, m., & lin, d. m. (2018). an empirical analysis of the impact of automobile industry modularization on discontinuous innovation. operations research and management, 27(09), 99-104. wang, y. m. (2019). new evolution and modular development of division of labor in integrated circuit chip industry. scientific management research, 37(03), 65-69. wang, y., & ren, h. (2021). construction of enterprise modular capability measurement index system. statistics and decision, 37(17), 185-188. (in chinese) xiao, j. y., & zheng, x. m. (2012). modularity and industrial convergence: coupling, mechanism and effect. science and technology management research, 32(14), 13-15+30. (in chinese) yan, y. m. (2011). division of labor, specialization and modularization: a perspective of industrial cluster evolution. academic monthly, 43(11), 86-92. yu, c. c., & shen, x. h. (2017). research on governance mechanism of service modular value network. china science and technology forum, 2017(11), 138-148. yu, t. q. (2018). research on industrial organization of high-speed rail in china based on modularization. journal of capital normal university (social science edition), 2018(06), 73-80. zhang, d. n., tang, x. h., & guo, h. (2013). research on measurement of enterprise competitive advantage from modular perspective. science and technology progress and countermeasures, 30(11), 129-133. zhang, h. x., & bai, j. (2018). path selection of breakthrough innovation in strategic emerging industries from the modular perspective. science and technology progress and countermeasures, 35(05), 60-67. (in chinese) zhang, p., qiao, y., & song, l. x. (2016). study on the dynamic mechanism of industrial evolution from the perspective of modularity: a case study of gps navigation industry. science and technology management research, 36(10), 113-119+141. zhang, x. j. (2015). zhong military committee. modular industrial network: research on technological progress and value integration. science and technology progress and countermeasures, 32(10), 45-49. (in chinese) zhao, z. y., wang, s. j., & chen, x. f. (n.d.). spatial organization reconstruction of china's automobile industry cluster under modular production: a case study of faw-volkswagen. acta geographica sinica, 76(08), 1848-1864. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 1 original paper pardons and commutations: the nigerian experiences (note 1) justin c. ileka 1 (note 2) 1 law of faculty, chukwuemeka odumegwu ojukwu university, igbariam campus, anambra state, nigeria, e-mail: cj.ileka@coou.edu.ng received: may 14, 2023 accepted: june 05, 2023 online published: june 14, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n3p1 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n3p1 abstract the 1999 constitution of the federal republic of nigeria (as amended) distinctly separated the powers of the federal republic of nigeria among the three arms of the government. it vested the legislative powers of the federation in the national assembly (note 3) the executive powers of the federation in the president; (note 4) and the judicial powers of the federation in the courts established for the federation. (note 5) there are some meeting points, however, in the exercise of these powers. for instance, the executive, in line with the provisions of the constitution, may intervene in criminal matters during, after, or while awaiting adjudication by the courts. the exercise of the executive powers of mercy popularly known in nigeria as “the prerogative of mercy” (note 6) is a typical example of the interface among the separated powers of government. i explored in this paper the challenges, abuses and prospects which arise in the exercise of the constitutional prerogative of mercy in the nigerian context. most of my illustrations were drawn from the presidential exercise of the two main forms of these powers: pardon and commutations. to position nigeria to make the optimal use of these enormous powers of mercy arrogated to the executive, i made some preliminary recommendations in this paper. they include expanding the scope of the beneficiaries of the executive powers of mercy; as well as making the exercise of the powers transparent, accessible to the masses, and even justiciable. keywords pardon, amnesty, commutation, respite, remission 1. explanation of terms 1.1 pardon in the case of falae v obasanjo (no 2) (note 7) the court of appeal described pardon as an act of grace by the appropriate authority which mitigates or obliterates the punishment the law demands for the offence and restores the rights and privileges on account of the offence. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 2 published by scholink inc. a pardon is an act of grace by which the executive wipes away punishment, with or without conditions. etymologically, it is derived from the latin word pardonere (to freely give). pardon is authorized in the nigerian constitution. (note 8) 1.2 amnesty amnesty is a general pardon granted to a group or class of persons rather than to an individual person. there is no direct provision for amnesty in the nigerian constitution but being a form of pardon, it is deemed to have been derived from the constitutional provision on pardon. etymologically, it is derived from the greek word amnestia (forgetting). there is an interesting instance of amnesty in the case of minister of internal affairs & 2 others v okoro & 69 other (note 9) in which president obasanjo in the exercise of the constitutional powers pursuant to section 175 on 4 th january 2000 granted presidential amnesty or general pardon which resulted in the unconditional release of prisoners who have spent 20 years or more on death roll. concomitantly, the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment for condemned criminals who have spent a minimum of 10 years but not up to 20 years in prison. the respondents in the instant appeal who claimed to be beneficiaries of the said presidential amnesty but who were yet to reap its benefits approached the federal high court enugu. they sought an order of mandamus against the appellants praying the court to direct the calculation of condemned criminals on death roll who have spent 20 years and above in prison custody to start from the date of first detention in prison custody as against starting from the date of the conviction. the appellants’ main contention was that most of the applicants at the trial court were convicted for offences created by section 319 of the state criminal code and that pardon may only be granted by the governor of a state under section 212 of the constitution while the president may only grant pardon for offences created by an act of the national assembly under section 175 of the 1999 constitution. another determinative element was that there was no presidential order before the trial court calling for interpretation of the terms of such an order. the appeal was therefore allowed. the court of appeal held that the respondents were not to benefit from the amnesty. 1.3 commutation commutation refers to the reduction or shortening of a sentence. it is a substitution of a sentence originally imposed with a lesser or milder one. commutation is provided for in the nigerian constitution in section 175(1)(c). (note 10) 1.4 respite respite simply refers to a temporary delay or suspension of punishment that leaves the sentence itself intact. respite is provided for in the nigerian constitution in section 175((1) (b). (note 11) 1.5 remission remission refers to reduction of the amount of sentence, most often of financial obligation, without changing the character of the sentence. it is provided for in the nigerian constitution in section 175(1) (d). (note 12) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 3 published by scholink inc. 2. legal framework for prerogative of mercy in nigeria the nigerian constitution is the direct source of the powers of the prerogative of mercy. these constitutional powers vest the president (note 13) and the governor of a state (note 14) with authority to grant pardon, commutations, and other forms of mercy. regarding the president, section 175 of the constitution reads as follows: section 175 – (1) the president may (a) grant any person concerned with or convicted of any offence created by an act of the national assembly a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions; (b) grant to any person a respite, either for an indefinite or for a specified period, of the execution of any punishment imposed on that person for such an offence; (c) substitute a less severe form of punishment for any punishment imposed on that person for such an offence; or (d) remit the whole or any part of any punishment imposed on that person for such an offence or of any penalty or forfeiture otherwise due to the state on account of such an offence. (2) the powers of the president under subsection (1) of this section shall be exercised by him after consultation with the council of state. (3) the president, acting in accordance with the advice of the council of state, may exercise his powers under subsection (1) of this section in relation to persons concerned with offences against the army, naval or air-force law or convicted or sentenced by a court-martial. analysis of the above constitutional provisions highlights the enormous powers so granted to the president. (note 15) the president can grant pardon to any person or group of persons concerned with or convicted of any offence. the president can also lessen a sentence imposed by the court or suspend the execution of the sentence. 3. the rationale for the exercise of pardons, commutations, and other forms of executive mercy in nigeria the constitution does not provide the rationale for granting the powers of the prerogative of mercy to the executive. i proffer the following probable reasons can be proffered for arrogating to the executive the powers to intervene even on occasions when ordinarily the courts alone would have had the only and final say. the constitutional power of the prerogative of mercy is a tacit recognition that the criminal justice system, being human, is susceptible to human errors and mistakes which the courts might not be able to correct. the executive is also human but can step in especially in those circumstances the court cannot review itself or is functus officio. there might be circumstances or subsequent developments which, after the passage of time, might make a judicial punishment or sentence no longer fit the crime or the convict. there might also be the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 4 published by scholink inc. need on account of humanitarian reasons of age or illness for the strict letter of the law to be relaxed. also, genuine social or political interest might call for justice to be tempered with mercy. in such cases, the executive may step in by exercising the powers of the prerogative of mercy. 4. the effects of commutations and pardons the effect of commutation is merely to reduce the original sentence or punishment to a lesser time or degree. a death sentence, for instance, may be commuted to life imprisonment; or, life imprisonment may be commuted to say, 10 years’ imprisonment. with regard to the effect of a pardon, the main holding is found in the judicial pronouncement in the popular case of falae v obasanjo. (note 16) the main issue in the case was whether or not a pardon removes civil disabilities such as would constitute a bar to obasanjo in standing for election for the office of a president. the court held that the effect of a pardon is to make the offender a new man, or novus homo, to acquit him of all corporal penalties and forfeiture annexed to the offence pardoned. the implication of the above is that pardon clears the pardonee both of the guilt and the punishment imposed on him or her. so, despite obasanjo’s conviction for treason and sentence to life imprisonment by a military tribunal, he still qualified to campaign for and be elected president of nigeria in 1999. (note 17) the constitution also states that the pardonee having been made a novus homo, cannot be tried again for the pardoned offence. section 36(10) reads, no person who shows that he has been pardoned for a criminal offence shall again be tried for that offence. in the same vein, the administration of criminal justice act, 2015 corroborates this effect by providing that “a defendant against whom a charge or information is filed may plead that he has obtained a pardon for his offence.” (note 18) 5. the exercise of the prerogative of mercy in nigeria 5.1 consultation with the council of state the constitution clearly states that the president's exercise of the shall be after consultation with the council of state. (note 19) the tone of the constitutional provision on this consultation signifies that it is mandatory for the president to consult with the council of state prior to granting the pardon or any other form of the prerogative of mercy. consultation with the council of state is, therefore, a condition precedent for the grant of any form of the prerogative of mercy pardon and failure to comply with such mandatory procedure may affect its validity. (note 20) any grant of pardon by the president without consultation with the council of state would be unconstitutional and void. the same consideration is applicable to the state governors who equally must consult with the advisory council of the state prior to granting a pardon or any other form of the prerogative of mercy duly established by the law of the relevant state. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 5 published by scholink inc. it however appears that it is not mandatory that the president must follow the advice of the council of state. according to nwabueze, although the president cannot exercise the power without consulting with the council, he is however not bound by the outcome of the consultation proceedings. (note 21) however, section 175(3) of the constitution which deals specifically with offences against the military demands the president shall be “acting in accordance with the advice of the council of state.” some authors have argued that the requirement to act in accordance with the council’s advice is mandatory because the president is expressly mandated to act on the advice of that body. (note 22) the composition of the council of state established pursuant to section 153 of the constitution, among other federal commissions and councils, is as follows: (note 23) a. the president, who shall be the chairman b. the vice president, who shall be the deputy chairman c. all former presidents of the federation and all former heads of the government of the federation d. all former chief justices of nigeria e. the senate president f. the speaker of house of representatives g. all the governors of the state of the federation h. the attorney-general of the federation the powers arrogated to the council of state specifically include the authority to advise the president in the exercise of his powers with respect to the prerogative of mercy. (note 24) as laudable as the diversity of persons included in the membership of the council may appear, one wonders about the correctness of the president being the chairman of a council that is charged with advising the same president. it looks like one advising himself. another pertinent body with regard to the prerogative of mercy at the federal level is the “committee on the prerogative of mercy” with its secretariat at the federal ministry of justice, federal capital territory, abuja. this committee on the prerogative of mercy considers applications for the grant of the prerogative of mercy and then reports to the council of state which then advises the president. the legal framework for this procedure appears to be the administration of criminal justice act 2015. (note 25) 5.2 restrictions in the exercise of the prerogative of mercy apart from the above observation that the president must consult with the council of state prior to the grant or refusal of the prerogative of mercy, the following are other relevant restrictions affecting the exercise of the presidential mercy powers. a. there is an exception to the kind of offence open to the grant of the prerogative of mercy by the president or a governor. any punishment imposed under the code of conduct tribunal for a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 6 published by scholink inc. violation by a public officer of any code of conduct relevant to their office is not amenable to the exercise of the prerogative of mercy. (note 26) b. the president can only grant pardon or other forms of prerogative of mercy with respect to offences of laws created by an act of the national assembly. (note 27) c. the prerogative of mercy cannot be applied with respect to violations of civil liabilities but only offences or crimes. d. the prerogative of mercy cannot be applied with respect to prospective offences. if it were to be so, the grant of mercy would amount to giving the grantee a license to commit a crime. e. the exercise of the prerogative of mercy must be subsequent to consultation with the council of state or the committee on the prerogative of mercy established by state law as already discussed above. f. the beneficiary of a pardon or any other form of executive mercy must have been convicted and must have no pending appeal. in obidike v state (note 28) the court declined to recognize the pardon that had been granted the appellant while his appeal was pending. the appeal was dismissed and the appellant was even ordered to be re-arrested and executed in accordance with the judgment of the trial court. in solola v state (note 29) one of the three persons convicted of the murder of a poor infant hunch back was pardoned while there was a further appeal to the supreme court after the court of appeal dismissed the appeal. the supreme court decided that the prerogative of mercy cannot be exercised in favour of an accused who has lodged a further appeal to the supreme court and until that appeal was finally determined, the head of state or the governor of a state cannot exercise his power of prerogative of mercy in favour of that person, pursuant to sections 175 or 212 of the 1999 constitution, as the case may be. the shoddy and arbitrary way the prerogative of mercy was exercised in this case prompted one of the justices of the supreme court to remark that “the rules as to grant of the prerogative of the mercy must be re-examined”. (note 30) in frn v achida & anor, (note 31) it was decided that the governor of a state cannot exercise his power of pardon where there had been no conviction as it is the exclusive preserve of the judiciary to try offenders and convict or exonerate them of offences alleged or charged, or as the circumstances deserve. it is however within the discretionary power of the executive thereafter to pardon, grant amnesty, clemency or reprieve a convict or even to commute his sentence. the court of appeal held, using these words: section 212 (1)(a) of the constitution does not contemplate that an executive should constitute himself into the attorney general who is empowered under section 211 of the constitution to discontinue any criminal trial instituted by him before any court. 5.3 the scope of the beneficiaries of the prerogative of mercy the scope of those who can benefit from the exercise of the prerogative of mercy in nigeria appears to be controversial and unsettled. this stems from the constitutional description of whom the president may pardon and under what conditions, namely: www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 7 published by scholink inc. the president may grant any person concerned with or convicted of any offence … a pardon … (note 32) some, like oamen, have interpreted the phrase, “any person concerned with any offence” to mean that even a person not yet under trial or not yet convicted may be granted a pardon under section 175 of the constitution. (note 33) however, a host of judicial decisions support the position that the prerogative of mercy by the president and governor is restricted only to those who have been tried and convicted by a court. jurisprudential holdings provide some guidance in analyzing the scope of the above constitutional phrase. for example, the court of appeal in frn v achida & anor (note 34) held that to contemplate the grant of pardon to an offender who is yet to undergo trial or to fully pass through the justice system to its full extent and be pronounced guilty of the crime for which he is standing trial yet presumed innocent, is to unnecessarily short-circuit the criminal process of trial anticipated by sections 175 and 212 of the cfrn... certainly section 212(1) (a)(supra) does not contemplate that the executive would interfere with this process. it therefore amounts to an unusual and extra-judicial interference by the executive of the judicial function of courts, whose duty/function is to try offenders for crimes committed against the state, for pardon to be granted to accused persons still standing trial, and in particular, still presumed innocent. 5.4 abuses in the exercise of the executive powers of clemency in nigeria because there exist so few internal control systems to regulate the exercise of the prerogative of mercy similar to the requirement to consult with the council, the exercise of this executive power in nigeria continues to be fraught with periodic abuses real or imagined. these include allegations of inappropriate use of the grant of mercy to those who ought not to benefit from the exercise, to allegations of failure to grant the prerogative of mercy for those who should benefit from it. these abuses are often perceived in high profile corruption cases or cases involving politicians and people of means and influence. these abuses have been denounced by the public with calls for the reform or even abrogation of the system of prerogative of mercy in its entirety. an instance of a controversial pardon is the prerogative of mercy granted to chief d.s.p. alamieyesigha by then president goodluck jonathan in 2013. chief alamieyesigha, a former governor of bayelsa state, was convicted of several corruption charges. (note 35) president jonathan had served as deputy governor of bayelsa state during the chief’s term as governor. (note 36) other controversial instances are the pardons granted by president buhari in april 2022 to senator joshua dariye, a former governor of plateau state, and rev jolly nyame, a former governor of taraba state. both were convicted and were serving jail terms for corruption, and both had unsuccessfully appealed to the supreme court. joining the public’s condemnation of the pardon, the socio-economic rights and accountability project (serap) among others, officially urged the president to use to review and withdraw the pardon granted to the duo. (note 37) apart from the perceived abuses arising from granting undeserved pardons, as a favour to powerful corrupt politicians and to those with connections and influence, another potential form of abuse is the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 8 published by scholink inc. underuse of the prerogative of mercy. the executive makes mainly occasional and ceremonial use of the power on national anniversaries. most ordinary people lack sufficient access to the bureaucratic process and hard-to-obtain forms required to apply for a consideration of prerogative of mercy by the president or a governor. further evidence of the abuses militating against a just exercise of this executive power is the undue influence suffered by the members of the body charged with advising or making recommendations to the executive. former attorney general of oyo state, adebayo ojo mutalubi, recalled being bombarded by inducements and even threats to influence him to have an undeserving convict pardoned. (note 38) 5.5 the minimal exercise of the powers of mercy if the scope of those to benefit from the exercise of the prerogative of mercy remains limited only to those who have been tried and convicted, as it is currently the practice, the majority of those being detained in nigerian prisons, now called correctional centres, would be excluded. (note 39) those awaiting trial remanded for detention in the nigerian correctional centres outnumber those convicted and imprisoned serving definite terms. the official statistics of those detained in custodial centres [prisons] in nigeria as of 17 th april 2023 showed that the total inmate population is 74,872 out of which those tried and convicted were 22,933 (31%) while the remainder, 51,939 (69% ) were merely detained, still awaiting trial. (note 40) because only those who have been imprisoned after conviction can be granted pardon or commutation by the executive, the vast greater percentage of those under detention awaiting trial in the over-congested custodial centres cannot be considered for executive mercy. due to the perennial problem of the nigerian prison system’s over congestion of its custodial centres, other extra-judicial channels that are available to address the plights of those under detention awaiting trial are also minimally used. such channels are the powers granted to the chief justice of nigeria or chief judge of the states to release from detention those awaiting trial. (note 41) the circumstances for such release are where the detention of that person is manifestly unlawful; or when the person detained has been in custody, whether on remand or otherwise, for a period longer than the maximum period of imprisonment which the person detained could have served had he been convicted of the charged offence. such release of course does not amount to pardon but merely a release from unlawful detention. in most cases, the chief judge would set a benchmark of considering those who have been under detention without trial for up to a certain number of years, sometimes up to four years. the constitutionality of this practice has been upheld in the case of edwin iloegbunam & ors v richard iloegbunam & ors. (note 42) in that case, the appellants were arraigned on a holding charge of attempted murder before the magistrate’s court, ogidi, anambra state on 3 july 2000. for want of jurisdiction, the magistrate court refused the applicants’ application for bail and ordered that they be detained while awaiting trial. however, before they were properly charged with murder at the high court the chief judge of anambra state visited the onitsha prisons and ordered that the appellants be released on bail. in making the order, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 9 published by scholink inc. the chief judge did not pardon the murder suspects but merely released them from detention on bail. as soon as the appellants regained their freedom the complainants in the murder case filed a motion ex parte at the lagos judicial division of the federal high court asking that the appellants be rearrested and held in prison custody. their application was granted as prayed. dissatisfied with the order the appellants then approached the court of appeal for the restoration of their fundamental right to personal liberty. the court of appeal allowed the appeal pursuant to the criminal justice (release from custody) (special provisions) act. other post-conviction mechanisms for early release of inmates at the custodial centres like parole (note 43) and probation (note 44) are by their nature limited to those who are already convicted and thus not available to those merely under detention awaiting trial. official statistics of the nigerian correctional service also show a very minimal use of these mechanisms. for instance, the official statistics as of 17th april 2023 of those on parole in the whole of nigeria is seven while those on probation is only 14. (note 45) the very minimal use of parole and probation surely has an impact on the demand for the prerogative of mercy which unfortunately is not readily available. little wonder then, that margaret colgate love rightly observed that: history teaches that the demand for clemency increases when the legal system lacks other mechanisms for delivering individualized justice, recognizing changed circumstances and correcting errors and inequities. (note 46) in an effort to address over congestion of the custodial centres (prison) as well as the underuse of the power of the prerogative of mercy, the nigerian correctional service act, 2019 contains some provisions, but these – when actually applied are equally restricted to individuals who are already convicted. such provisions include: a. where an inmate sentenced to death has exhausted all legal procedures for appeal and a period of 10 years has elapsed without the execution of the sentence, the chief judge may commute the sentence of death to life imprisonment. (note 47) b. where the custodial centre has exceeded its capacity, the state controller shall within a period not exceeding one week, notify the (a) chief judge of the state; (b) attorney-general of the state; (c) prerogative of mercy committee; (d) state criminal justice committee; and (e) any other relevant body. (note 48) c. upon receipt of the notification referred to (above) in subsection (4), the notified body shall, within a period not exceeding three months, take necessary steps to rectify overcrowding. (note 49) 6. recommendations and conclusion from the foregone discussions on pardon and commutations as well as other forms of executive mercy in nigeria, we make the following preliminary recommendations in an effort to achieve a more functional and efficient exercise of these enormous powers vested in the president and governors. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 10 published by scholink inc. a. the victims of crime, whether individuals or groups should be allowed input in the decision-making process in the grant of any form of mercy. this will enhance trust and confidence in the process. the welfare and sentiments of direct or extended victims ought equally to be taken into consideration. b. trial courts should accord the practice of allocutus (note 50) its due importance even in cases of a mandatory sentence as in capital offences where allocutus has other values apart from eliciting mitigation of sentence. the allocutus plea as well as the trial judge’s remarks on it are very relevant in making decisions on the application for the grant of mercy by the executive. the allocutus plea which thus offers the convict the opportunity to accept responsibility, express remorse, and apologize has enormous therapeutic value. (note 51) the administration of criminal justice act (acja) even enjoins the court to make recommendations for mercy. (note 52) the plea for mercy made by the convict, along with other statements of fact and law, provides the ground and materials for the judge to make recommendations to the executive for consideration for the grant of mercy. c. the entire process of granting pardons and commutations and other forms of mercy should be made more transparent and accessible. the current perception is that it is opaque and secretive. the guidelines or process of how to make application are not widely known by the masses. this openness may allay the fear that the powers of mercy are the exclusive reserve of the selected few with influence. everyone is equal before the law and as such there should be no impression that the powers of mercy are an executive way of washing influential politicians clean of their corruption and impunity. d. as a matter of necessity, the scope of the exercise of the power of mercy by the executive should be expanded to allow those not yet convicted, especially those under detention awaiting trial in custodial centres so that they also might benefit from the exercise of the prerogative of mercy. legislative intervention is urgently needed to achieve this. e. the president and the state governors should give reasons for granting pardons, commutations and other forms of mercy. this is not a constitutional requirement but ought to be made so. of course, reasons given for granting the pardon or commutation or other forms of mercy will enhance the public’s appreciation of the soundness and rightness of the grant. requiring that reasons for the grant must be made public would become a check on the president or the governor to use executive power with caution knowing it is subject to the scrutiny of public opinion. even section 312 of acja makes it mandatory for the court to give reasons for recommendation for mercy. more credence will be given to the exercise of the prerogative of mercy if facts surrounding the pardon or commutation are revealed and made public. f. to further check the executive from arbitrary and shady use of the power of mercy, there should also be legislative intervention to empower citizens to challenge the legality of any misuse of the executive power of mercy. notwithstanding the abuses and challenges in the exercise of the powers of mercy in nigeria by the president and the governors, any revisions should be carefully considered with a goal of maintaining www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 11 published by scholink inc. justice and fairness, because, “the baby should not be thrown away in dirty water.” i believe that if these recommendations are placed into effect, the powers of mercy given to the president and the governors will complement and improve criminal justice in nigeria. notes note 1. a modified version of a paper presented at the ninth international cure conference on human rights and criminal justice reform at the boma nairobi hotel, nairobi, kenya, on 2nd may 2023. note 2. law of faculty, chukwuemeka odumegwu ojukwu university, igbariam campus, anambra state, nigeria <cj.ileka@coou.edu.ng> note 3. s 4(1); that of the legislative powers of a state is vested in the state house of assembly as provided for in s 4(6) of the constitution of the federal republic of nigeria (as amended), henceforth “the constitution”. note 4. s 5(1); the executive powers of a state is that of a state vested in the governor as provided for in s 5(2) of the constitution. note 5. s 6(1); that of a state is vested in the courts established for a state. note 6. an umbrella term that covers such executive acts of mercy as pardon, commutation, amnesty, reprieve, remission as provided in ss 175 and 212 of the constitution. note 7. (1999) 4 nwlr (pt 599) 476. note 8. s 175(1)(a). note 9. (2003) lpelr – 7264 (ca). note 10. it provides that “the president may substitute a less severe form of punishment for any punishment imposed on that person for such an offence.” note 11. it provides that “the president may grant any person respite, either for an indefinite or for a specified period, of the execution of any punishment imposed on that person for such an offence.” note 12. it provides that “the president may remit the whole or any part of any punishment imposed on that person for such an offence or any penalty or forfeiture otherwise due to the state on account of such an offence. note 13. s 175. note 14. s 212. note 15. that of the governor in respect of offences created by any law of a state as provided for in s 212 is almost same with of the president except there is no equivalent of subsection 3 of s 175. note 16. (1999) 4 nwlr (pt 5999). soon after obasanjo was pardoned after his conviction by the then head of state, gen abdul salami abubakar, obasanjo contested for the office of the president of nigeria. see also okongwu v state (1986) 5nwlr (pt 44). note 17. s 137 of the constitution, among other factors, provides that a person shall not be qualified for election to the office of president if he is under a sentence of imprisonment or fine for any offence www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 12 published by scholink inc. involving dishonesty or fraud (by whatever name called) or for any other offence imposed on him by any court or tribunal. note 18. s 277(1)(b). note 19. s 175 (2). in respect of the governor, s 212 also demands consultation with such advisory council of the state on prerogative of mercy as may be established by the law of the state. lagos state government, for instance, recently established the advisory council on the prerogative of mercy to through the advisory council on the prerogative of mercy (establishment) law, cap. a7, laws of lagos state, 2015. the governor of lagos state, mr babajide olusola sanwo-olu on the 16th of december 2019 inaugurated the advisory council on prerogative of mercy. note 20. government of ekiti state v akinyemi (2011) 17 nwlr (pt 1276) 1145. note 21. bo nwabueze, the presidential constitution of nigeria (c. hurst & company, london 1981) 144. note 22. i udofa, “the abuse of presidential power of pardon and the need for restraints” (2018) 9 beijing law review 113. note 23. as contained in part 1 of the third schedule of the constitution. note 24. third schedule, part 1, s 6(a)(ii). note 25. s 409. note 26. s18(7) of the fifth schedule, part 1 of the constitution. note 27. s 175(1) of the constitution; just as a state governor on the other hand only empowered to deal with offences created by any law of the state as in s 212(1) of the constitution. note 28. (2001) 17 nwlr (pt743) ca. see also isibor v state (2002) fwlr (pt 98) note 29. (2005) 11 nwlr (pt 937) 460. note 30. belgore, jsc. note 31. (2018) lpelr-46065. note 32. s 175 (1) of the constitution. s 212(1) has similar provision in respect of the governor of a state. note 33. philip ebosetale oamen holds this view and is very critical of some decisions of the court that hold otherwise like the court of appeal in the case of frn v achida & anor (2018) lper-46065. see generally his article “grant of presidential pardon in the united states and nigeria: posthumousness, corporateness and other matters” in commonwealth law bulletin (2020) available at <https:/doi.org/10.1080/03050718.2020.1795899> accessed last on 23 january 2023 note 34. (2018) lpelr-46065. note 35. alamieyesigha v frn (2006) 16 nwlr (pt 1004). note 36. see ‘how pardon was granted to alamieyeseigha, others’ this day live (lagos 14 march 2013). <https://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/how-pardon-was-granted-to-alamieyeseigha-others/142114/> accessed 20 april 2023; see also yemi adebowale, ‘us condemns presidential pardon for www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 13 published by scholink inc. alamieyeseigha’ this day live (lagos 16 march 2013) <https://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/us-condemns-presidential-pardon-foralamieyeseigha/142294/> accessed 12 april 2023; olusola fabiyi and olalekan adetayo, ‘outrage over presidential pardon for vip ex-convicts’ nigeria punch (lagos 13 march 2013) <https://www. punchng.com/news/outrage-over-presidential-pardonfor-vip-ex-convicts/ > accessed 12 april 2023; mike ikhariale, ‘the law and politics of a pardon’ nigeria punch (lagos 24 march 2013)<https://www. punchng.com/columnists/trivia-constitutional/alamieyeseigha-the-law-and-politics-of-a-pardon/>access ed 12 april 2023. <https://www.punchng.com.news/ikimi-others-blast-jonathan-for-alamieyeseigha’s-pardon/> accessed 12 april 2023. note 37. olasunkanmi akoni, anti-corruption: serap asks buhari to withdraw pardon for dariye, nyame in vanguard news, 17 april, 2022 available at <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2022/04/anti-corruption-serap-asks-buhari-to-withdraw-pardon-for-dar iye-nyame/> accessed l2 april, 2023 note 38. https://oyoinsight.com/exercise-of-prerogative-of-mercy-is-not-a-tea-cup-party-adebayo-mutalubi-ojo/ note 39. the nigerian correctional service act, 2019 changed the nomenclature from prison to custodial centres. note 40. https://corrections.gov.ng/statistics_summary accessed last on 26 april 2023. note 41. criminal justice (release from custody) special provisions act, s 1. note 42. (2001) 47 wrn 72. note 43. s 468 of the administration of criminal justice act, 2015. note 44. ss 453-459 of the administration of criminal justice act, 2015. note 45. https://corrections.gov.ng/non_cust_statistics_summary accessed last on 26 april 2023. note 46. margaret colgate love (2010) the twilight of the pardon power in journal of criminal law and criminology, vol 100, issue 3, 1204. note 47. s 12(2)(c). note 48. s 12(4). note 49. s 12(7). note 50. plea for mercy. note 51. see generally, justin ileka, (2019) “allocutus in mandatory sentences: case comment on edwin v state”, chukwuemeka odumegwu ojukwu university journal of commercial and property law, vol 2, no 1, pp. 1-9. <https://www.nigerianjournalsonline.com/index.php/cooujcpl/article/view/630. note 52. s 312. it provides that “the court may, in any case in recording sentence, make a recommendation for mercy and shall give the reasons for its recommendation.” microsoft word ape-v3n2-p1 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 1 original paper uncertain future and prospects of the prespa agreement between macedonia and greece igor janev1* 1 institute of political studies, belgrade, serbia * igor janev, institute of political studies, belgrade, serbia received: march 4, 2020 accepted: march 24, 2020 online published: march 27, 2020 doi:10.22158/ape.v3n2p1 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v3n2p1 abstract in the present article we discuss the future and prospects of the prespa agreement, concluded on june 17, 2018, between macedonia and greece aiming at resolving their “difference” over the name of macedonia. the analysis is carried out by examining the legal aspects of united nations security council resolution 817 (1993) recommending the admission of macedonia to un membership but imposing on the applicant a provisional name (pending the settlement of difference over the applicant’s name), in particular its legal consistence with the provisions of vienna convention on the law of treaties (1969) and with the general jus cogens norms of international law enshrined in the un charter. it is concluded that the un sc res.817 (1993) is by itself an ultra vires act and cannot serve as a legal basis for the prespa agreement (ex injuria jus not oritur), that the prespa agreement violates the provisions of the vienna convention on the law of treaties and the peremptory norms of international law, particularly the principle of self-determination and enters into legal matters that belong stricto sensu to the domain of domestic jurisdiction of macedonia. for these reasons the prespa agreement cannot be considered a legally valid treaty and, consequently, and agreement can be subject of unilateral termination under provisions of vienna convention on the law of treaties (1969). keywords un charter, prespa agreement, vienna convention of the law of treaties, self-determination of peoples and states, inviolability of domestic jurisdiction, juridical personality 1. introduction the prespa agreement between macedonia and greece, reached on june 12, 2018 near the prespa lake, under the auspices of united nations and relates to the resolution of long-standing so called “dispute” between the two countries over the name of macedonia. the official title of the prespa agreement www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 2 published by scholink inc. reads: “final agreement for the settlement of the differences as described in the united nations security council resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993), the termination of the interim accord of 1995, and the establishment of a strategic partnership between the parties” indicates that the agreement is based on the accepted (or assumed) legality of the unsc resolution 817 (1993). the subject matter of the prespa treaty is defined more precisely in the preamble of the treaty: “-resolving the difference pursuant to security council resolutions 817 (1993) of 7 april 1993 and 845 (1993) of 18 june 1993, [as well as article 5 of the interim accord of 13 september 1995] in a dignified and sustainable manner, having in mind the importance of the issue and the sensitivities of each party,…”. the issue of “difference” (over the name macedonia) was created by the greek allegation raised during the process of admission of republic of macedonia to un membership that the name of the applicant implies “territorial claims towards greece”. despite the fact that republic of macedonia has amended its constitution in 1992 (affirming that it “has no territorial claims against any of neighboring states”, and that its borders can only be changed in accordance with the constitution and “generally accepted international norms”), the security council in its res. 817 (1993), after affirming that “the applicant fulfils the criteria for membership laid down in article 4 of the charter of the united nations”, has nevertheless added that the applicant state shall be “provisionally referred to for all purposes within united nations as ‘the former yugoslav republic of macedonia’, pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of the state” (unscr, 1993). the second part of the above sentence implies an obligation on the new un member to negotiate over its name with a neighboring state (greece). both imposed conditions on macedonia at the moment of its admission (namely: (i) to accept a provisional name for all purposes within un and (ii) to negotiate with greece over its name), defining its un membership status, are in sharp violation of article 2(1) (sovereign equality of members) of un charter. moreover, the provision in sc res. 817 (1993) that the applicant should negotiate over its name with another state is in violation with article 2(7) of the un charter prohibiting united nations to intervene in matter of the domestic jurisdiction of states (nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize the united nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state). the condition (ii) is also in violation with article 1(2) of the charter (the principle of “equal rights and self-determination of peoples”). the violations of articles 1(2), 2(1) and 2(7) of the un charter in sc res.817 (1993) represent serious breaches of the charter. we note that the un general assembly admitted macedonia to un membership (ga res. 47/225 (1993)) on the basis of sc res. 817 (1993) (with the addition conditions therein). 2. the “legal grounds” of prespa agreement the sc res. 817 (1993), by imposing two additional conditions (obligations) on the applicant state for its admission to un membership (after affirming that the applicant meets “the criteria for membership laid down in article 4 of the charter of the united nations”) is in severe conflict with the advisory opinion of international court of justice (icj) of may 28, 1948, related to the conditions required for www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 3 published by scholink inc. admission of a state to un membership, and accepted by the general assembly in its resolution a/res/197(iii) on december 8, 1948. (note 1) the opinion of the international court of justice (icj, 1948) was that “the conditions stated in paragraph 1 of article 4 must be regarded not merely as necessary conditions, but also as the conditions which suffice” (for admission). furthermore, it stated: “nor it can be argued that the conditions enumerated (in paragraph 1 of article 4) represent an indispensable minimum, in the sense that political considerations could be superimposed upon them, and prevent the admission of an applicant which fulfils them”. hence, the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 of article 4 of the un charter are exhaustive, necessary and sufficient and, if fulfilled appropriately in security council’s opinion, the applicant state must be unconditionally admitted to un membership. as mentioned above, this legal interpretation of article 4(1) of the charter by the court was accepted by the general assembly in its resolution a/res/197(iii) of december 8, 1948. in view of the accepted court’s interpretation of article 4(1) and of its acceptance by the general assembly in 1948, it follows that the resolutions sc res. 817 (1993) and ga res. 47/225 (1993) with the additional conditions imposed on macedonia at its admission to un membership are in violation with article 4 (1) of the charter as a legal norm. as mentioned above, the introduction of the additional conditions (i) and (ii) for the admission of macedonia to un membership was based on the greek allegation that the name of the applicant “implies territorial claims” were reflected in the wording of both resolutions as “difference over the name”. however, according to the international law no state has an exclusive right over a name and that the “greek demand that macedonia change its name has no basis in the international law and practice” (henkin et al., 1993). indeed, as argued by janev (1999), based on the principle of separability of domestic and international jurisdictions, the name of a state, which is subject to that state’s domestic jurisdiction, does not create international legal rights for that state, nor does it impose legal obligations on other states. clearly, the name per se does not have a direct impact on the territorial rights of states. therefore, the greek allegation that the name of the applicant implies “territorial claims” has no legal significance. interference with matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, such as the choice of state’s name, is also incompatible with article 1(2) of the un charter (self-determination of peoples). article 2 (7) of the charter explicitly extends the validity of this legal norm to the united nations themselves. it appears, therefore, that the greek opposition to the admission of macedonia to un membership under its constitutional name and the intervention of the un security council in the matters related to the name of the applicant state, are inconsistent with the charter. the inherent right of a state to have a name can be derived from the necessity that a juridical person must have a legal identity. in absence of such identity, the juridical person, such as a state, could to a large extent loose its capacity to interact with other juridical persons (e.g., conclude agreements, etc.) and independently enter into and conduct its external relations. the name of a state is, thus, an essential element of its juridical personality and of its statehood. the principles of sovereign equality of states and the inviolability of their juridical personality lead to the conclusion that the choice by a state of its www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 4 published by scholink inc. own name is a basic, inherent right of the state. this right is not alienable, divisible or transferable. it is an essential part of the right to “self-determination” (determination of one’s own legal identity), i.e., it belongs to the domain of jus cogens norms. external interference with this basic right is inadmissible. it is also obvious that if such an external interference with the choice of the name of a state would be allowed, even through a negotiation process, it might easily become a legally endorsed mechanism for interference in the internal and external affairs of that state, i.e., a mechanism for degradation of its political independence. from these reasons, the choice by the state of its own name must be considered as an inherent right of the state that stricto sensu belongs to the domain of its domestic jurisdiction. in exercising this right, the states have, therefore, a complete legal freedom. this freedom may in practice be constrained only by considerations of avoidance the overlap of legal identities of two (or more) international juridical persons (the province “macedonia” in northern greece is, however, not an international juridical person). the imposition of two additional conditions on macedonia at the time of its admission to membership to united nations (to accept a provisional name for use within the un system and negotiate with greece over its name), outside those exhaustively enumerated in article 4(1) of the charter, represents a breach of the charter provisions and, therefore, are an ultra vires act. they also violate article 1(2) of the charter (the principle of “equal rights and self-determination of peoples”). it is important to note that these conditions transcend the time of the admission act and define a membership status which is also in violation with the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 7 of article 2. the condition for acceptance of a provisional name is also in violation with article 83 of the “vienna convention on the representation of states in their relations with the international organizations of universal character” of march 14, 1975, dealing with the issue of non-discrimination of states in these relations. a legal identity (or a name) of a state by definition is an essential element of both internal (domestic) and international legal personality of a state, and may not be subject of any intervention (particularly not by external acts, such as agreements or resolutions). furthermore, international legal personality appears to be an essential element of a statehood itself. the derogated un membership status of macedonia and the breaches of the un charter provisions by the resolutions sc res. 817 (1993) and ga res. 47/225 (1993), as well as their juridical redress, have been discussed in several literature papers. the legal responsibility of the united nations for violation of charter’s provisions stems from the un duty to respect the basic rights of the states (either as applicants or un members), which are protected by the principles of international law enshrined in the mentioned articles of the charter. the juridical redress of the un charter violations in sc res. 817 (1993) and ga res. 47/225 (1993) resolutions can only be carried out through the international court of justice by reaffirming its own advisory opinion of may 28, 1948 and recalling the general assembly resolution a/res/197 (iii) of december 8, 1948. the condition regarding negotiations with greece (speedy settlement of the difference over the name) needs a more detailed analysis (janev & petrović, 2011). it is an obligation imposed on macedonia www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 5 published by scholink inc. whose fulfillment depends on another country and is, therefore, outside of its control. the obligation for “the settlement of the difference over the name” is carried only by one of the parties involved, while the other party has a full freedom and control over the negotiating process. indeed, in the course of negotiations over 25 years, mediated by a un special representative, greece has been repeatedly obstructing the negotiations by ever-expanding its demands. in later years of negotiating process the greek demands started to include more and more matters which are strictly within the domain of domestic jurisdiction of macedonia (significant changes to the constitution, demands relating to the use of macedonian language and redefinition of national identity) and will be discussed in more detail in the next section. here we only note that these demands are completely outside of the initial legal frame of the subject of negotiations, formulated by the sc res. 817 (1993) and in the latest stage of the negotiation process took the form of an ultimatum. thus, the illegal conditions imposed on macedonia for its admission to un membership relating to the provisional name of the state and the “settlement of the difference” over its name generated a serious long-term problem in the relations between macedonia and greece, threatening macedonian people to lose their national identity. it should be noted that before its admission to the un membership in 1993, macedonia had been recognized by its constitutional name republic of macedonia by 30 sovereign states. as a member of the united nation its legal personality has been given a provisional denomination ‘the former yugoslav republic of macedonia” for use within the un system. however, due to the authority of the un “recognition” many countries and international organizations have recognized it with the un denomination. it is further worth noting that many countries have recognized it by its constitutional name, neglecting the un denomination. the total number of un member states which currently recognize macedonia by its constitutional name before the conclusion of prespa agreement was 134. this number by itself (69.4% of the total un membership) can serve as an indication of the baselessness of legal, political and historic arguments of greece for the change of constitutional name of macedonia, as well as of the illegality of related un sc 917 (1993) and ga 47/225 (1993) resolutions. as mentioned earlier, there is no legal basis in the international law and practice for the greek demands (henkin et al., 1993). the security council was apparently completely ignorant of this fact and, more importantly, of the legal interpretation of article 4(1) of the charter given in the 1948 advisory opinion of the international court of justice, another principal organ of the united nations. irrespective whether a result of ignorance or politically motivated inclination, the additional conditions imposed on macedonia at its admission to un membership represent a severe violation of the legal norms enshrined in the un charter articles 1 (2), 4(1), 2(1, 7), producing dramatic negative consequences for its membership status and its external political relations. in conclusion, unsc res. 817 clearly represents an ultra vires act of the united nations and violates the general principles international law (the jus cogens norms). for these reasons, the unsc res. 817(1993), as well as the related ga 47/225 (1993), cannot be considered as legally valid documents on the basis of which another legally valid document can be created (the legal principle “ex injuria, jus www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 6 published by scholink inc. non oritur”). it cannot serve as a basis for any kind of an “id agreement“, that appears to be a consequence or the final result of the mentioned additional conditions imposed on the candidate for un membership. 3. the prespa agreement and the international law in the preamble of the vienna convention on the law of treaties (1969) it is stipulated that the state parties of the convention are “having in mind the principles of international law embodied in the charter of united nations, such as the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the sovereign equality and independence of states, of non-interference in the domestic affairs, [….], and of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all”. in the preamble of prespa agreement is also stipulated that the parties of the agreement are: “guided by the spirit and principles of democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and dignity’’, and –“abiding by the provisions of the charter of the united nations’’... however, already in the first sentence of the preamble of prespa agreement the parties of the agreement are treated as un-equal: the first party is identified by its constitutional name (hellenic republic), while the second party is identified as the state “which was admitted to the united nations in accordance with the united nations general assembly resolution 47/225 of 8 april/1993’’. this un-equal representation of the treaty parties already in the treaty preamble is a violation of the principle of “sovereign equality” of states and inobservance of the dignity of the second party. this un-equal position of the parties remains throughout the text of the treaty. the prespa treaty contains three parts of which only the first part (containing eight articles) deals with the name issue; the other two regulate matters of bilateral character (economic, political and cultural relations and establishment of a “strategic partnership’’). (note 2) in paragraph 2 of article 1, “the parties recognize as binding the outcome of the negotiations that have taken place under the auspices of the united nations, to which both parties have been committed pursuant to the united nations security council resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993) [as well as the interim accord of 1995]”. we note that sc res. 845 (1993) “urges the parties to continue their efforts to arrive at a speedy settlement of the remaining issues between them”. the wording “remaining issues” in the interpretation of the first party of prespa agreement does not mean only “differences over the name” but extends to matters of national identity, state language, constitution and even the internal administrative system. this greek interpretation of the provisions of sc res.845 (1993) is fully arbitrary and goes far beyond the original scope of the negotiations for “settlement of differences over the name” as defined by the sc res. 817 (1993) and ga 47/225 (1993) (which, as already discussed earlier, violate the un charter). nevertheless, this greek interpretation of sc resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993) is thoroughly reflected in all eight articles of part i of prespa agreement. the tone and the wording of the provisions of this part of the agreement are reminiscent to those of a peace treaty dictated by the party winning the war to the one that had lost the war. this can be illustrated by www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 7 published by scholink inc. the text of paragraph 3 of article 1 of the agreement, where the treaty obligations of the second party are enumerated: 1) pursuant to those negotiations the following have been mutually accepted and agreed: a) the official name of the second party shall be the “republic of north macedonia”, which shall be the constitutional name of the second party and shall be used erga omnes, as provided for in this agreement. the short name of the second party shall be “north macedonia”. b) the nationality of the second party shall be macedonian/citizen of the republic of north macedonia, as it will be registered in all travel documents. c) the official language of the second party shall be the “macedonian language”, as recognized by the third un conference on the standardization of geographical names, held in athens in 1977, and described in article 7(3) and (4) of this agreement. d) the terms “macedonia” and “macedonian” have the meaning given under article 1(7) of this agreement. e) the country codes for licenses plates of the second party shall be nm or nmk. for all other purposes, country codes remain mk and mkd, as officially assigned by the international organization for standardization (“iso”). f) the adjectival reference to the state, its official organs, and other public entities shall be in line with the official name of the second party or its short name, that is, “of the republic of north macedonia” or “of north macedonia”. other adjectival usages, including those referring to private entities and actors, that are not related to the state and public entities, are not established by law and do not enjoy financial support from the state for activities abroad, may be in line with article 7(3) and (4). the adjectival usage for activities may be in line with article 1(7) (-3) and (-4). this is without prejudice to the process established under article 1(3) (h) and compound names of cities that exist at the date of the signature of this agreement. g) the second party shall adopt “republic of north macedonia” as its official name and the terminologies referred to in article 1(3) through its internal procedure that is both binding and irrevocable, entailing the amendment of the constitution as agreed in this agreement. (note 3) h) in relation to the above mentioned name and terminologies in commercial names, trademarks and brand names, the parties agree to support and encourage their business communities to institutionalize a sincere, structured and in good faith dialogue, in the context of which will seek and reach mutually accepted solutions on the issues deriving from the commercial names, the trademarks, the brand names and all relevant matters at bilateral and international level. for the implementation of the above mentioned provisions, an international group of experts will be established consisting of representatives of the two states in the context of the european union (“eu”) with the appropriate contribution of the united nations and iso. this group of experts shall be established within 2019 and conclude its work within three years. nothing in article 1(3) (h) shall affect present commercial usage until mutual agreement is reached as provided in this subsection“. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 8 published by scholink inc. it is obvious from the above that the first party essentially dictates the treaty provisions, while the second party needs only to accept them. the inequality of treaty parties is obvious, despite of their equal legal status under the international law. the second party obviously has a subordinate position with respect to the first one. (note 4) the core provisions b) and c) of paragraph 3 are essentially beyond the scope of the subject of the agreement defined by sc res. 817 (“settlement of difference” over the name) and relate to the matters of national identity and language. as mentioned in sub-paragraph (3-f) above the meaning of noun “macedonia” and adjective “macedonian” is provided by the provisions of article 7 the first three paragraphs of which read: 1) the parties acknowledge that their respective understanding of the terms “macedonia” and “macedonian” refers to a different historical context and cultural heritage. 2) when reference is made to the first party, these terms denote not only the area and people of the northern region of the first party, but also their attributes, as well as the hellenic civilization, history, culture, and heritage of that region from antiquity to present day. 3) when reference is made to the second party, these terms denote its territory, language, people and their attributes, with their own history, culture, and heritage, distinctly different from those referred to under article 7(2). the provisions 2 and 3 deprive the terms ’’macedonia” and “macedonian” from their general meaning, framing them within a historic, cultural or regional context. this a severe derogation of macedonian identity and macedonian language; it represent a flagrant negation of the rights to national identity, culture and language of macedonian minority in greece and other countries. like the state name, the identity of a people, its culture and language are indivisible, non-transferable and non-alienable. therefore, the articles 1(3-f) and article 7 are in violation with the general norms of international law, including those related to the rights minorities. in the remaining paragraphs 4-13 of article 1 the implementation of the provisions of article 1(3) are stipulated, again in an ultimate form, with the first party playing the over sighting role. 4) upon signing this agreement, the parties shall take the following steps: a) the second party shall, without delay, submit the agreement to its parliament for ratification. b) following ratification of this agreement by the parliament of the second party, the second party shall notify the first party that its parliament has ratified the agreement. c) the second party, if it decides so, will hold a referendum. d) the second party shall commence the process of constitutional amendments as provided for in this agreement. e) the second party shall conclude in toto the constitutional amendments by the end of 2018. f) upon notification by the second party of the completion of the above mentioned constitutional amendments and of all its internal legal procedures for the entry into force of this agreement, the first party shall promptly ratify this agreement. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 9 published by scholink inc. 5) upon entry into force of this agreement, the parties shall use the name and terminologies of article 1(3) in all relevant international multilateral and regional organizations, institutions and fora, including all meetings and correspondence, and in all their bilateral relations with all member states of the united nations. 6) in particular, immediately upon entry into force of this agreement, the second party shall: a) notify all international, multilateral and regional organizations, institutions and fora of which it is a member of the entry into force of this agreement, and request that all those organizations, institutions and fora thereafter shall adopt and use the name and terminologies referred to in article 1(3) of this agreement for all usages and purposes. both parties shall also refer to the second party in accordance with article 1(3) in all communications to, with, and in those organizations, institutions and fora. b) notify all member states of the united nations of the entry into force of this agreement and shall request them to adopt and use the name and terminologies referred to in article 1(3) of this agreement for all usages and purposes, including in all their bilateral relations and communications. 7) upon entry into force of this agreement, and subject to provisions under articles 1(9) and (10), the terms “macedonia”, “republic of macedonia”, “fyr of macedonia”, “fyr macedonia” in a translated or untranslated form, as well as the provisional name “the former yugoslav republic of macedonia” and the acronym “fyrom” shall cease to be used to refer to the second party in any official context. 8) upon entry into force of this agreement and taking into account its article 1(9) and (10), the parties shall use the name and terminologies of article 1(3) for all usages and all purposes erga omnes, that is, domestically, in all their bilateral relations, and in all regional and international organizations and institutions. (note 5) 9) upon entry into force of this agreement, the second party shall promptly in accordance with sound administrative practice take all necessary measures so as the country’s competent authorities henceforth use internally the name and terminologies of article 1(3) of this agreement in all new official documentation, correspondence and relevant materials. 10) as regards the validity of already existing documents and materials issued by the authorities of the second party, the parties agree that there shall be two transitional periods, one ‘technical” and one “political”: a) the “technical” transitional period shall relate to all official documents and materials of the public administration of the second party for international usage and to those for internal usage that may be used externally. these documents and materials shall be renewed in accordance with the name and terminologies as referred to in article 1(3) of this agreement within five years from the entry into force of this agreement, at the latest. b) the “political” transitional period shall relate to all documents and materials exclusively for internal usage in the second party. the issuance of the documents and materials falling under this www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 10 published by scholink inc. category in accordance with article 1 (3) shall commence at the opening of each eu negotiation chapter in the relevant field, and shall be finalized within five years thereof. (note 6) 11) procedures for the prompt amendment of the constitution of the second party, in order to fully implement the provisions of this agreement, shall commence upon ratification of this agreement by its parliament or following a referendum, if the second party decides to hold one. 12) the name and terminologies as referred to in article 1 of this agreement shall be incorporated in the constitution of the second party. this change shall take place a bloc with one amendment. pursuant to this amendment, the name and terminologies will change accordingly in all articles of the constitution. furthermore, the second party shall proceed to the appropriate amendments of its preamble, article 3 and article 49, during the procedure of the revision of the constitution. 13) in the event of mistakes, errors, omissions in the proper reference of the name and terminologies referred to in article 1(3) of this agreement in the context of international multilateral and regional organizations, institutions, correspondence, meetings and fora, as well as in all bilateral relations of the second party with third states and entities, either of the parties may request their immediate rectification and the avoidance of similar mistakes in the future. it should be noted that the implementation of the provisions of article 1(3) requires amendments of the constitution of the second party, paragraphs 4(d, e), 11 and 12, and the use of the new name and related terminologies shall be used for all proposes erga omnes (i.e., internally and externally) by both parties (article 1(8)). (note 7) the provisions of article 1(3-a,-b,-c) related to the name, national identity and the language, respectively, of the second party, and the provisions of article 7(1-5) providing historic, territorial and cultural restrictions to their use, and thereby severely derogating their meaning, as well the provisions of articles 1(4), 1(11) and 1(12) imposing explicitly revision and amendments to the constitution of the second party, are obviously in conflict with the peremptory norms of international law and article 53 of the vienna convention on the law of treaties (1969). for this reason the prespa agreement can be considered as null and void, and a subject of unilateral termination. as argued earlier the state name and national identity are essential parts of the inalienable right of peoples to self-determination. moreover, the national identity is by its nature an unchangeable inherent category. it is a self-identification of a group of people built through a common history, sharing the same language, customs, believes, ethical norms and having the same aspirations. it is a social phenomenon existing essentially outside of the realm of the law. the main psychological characteristic of the members such a social group is their individual and collective conciseness of their “belonging” (to the group). the name is only linguistic or a formal description of such social group, most often related to the geographical name of the territory it occupies. therefore, both the national identity and the name per se, cannot be subject to negotiation or imposition. the population of macedonian nation on the territory of present macedonia has been carrying that name and national sentiment for centuries, politically expressed during the long struggle for independence from the ottoman rule and the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 11 published by scholink inc. occupation by the neighboring balkan states, finally achieving its statehood at the 1st session of asnom (anti-fascist assembly for national liberation of macedonia) on september 2, 1944. the national self-determination of macedonian people with the macedonian language as state language were proclaimed at asnom and re-affirmed in the first constitution (1946) of the people’s republic of macedonia, as constitutive unit of the federal people’s republic of yugoslavia, as well as in the constitutions of socialist republic of macedonia (1963) (constitutive unit of the socialist federative republic of yugoslaviasfry) and of independent republic of macedonia (1991) after the dissolution of sfry. perhaps the most unusual, and apparently outside the legal framework of international law, is the establishment by the article 8(5) of prespa agreement, on a parity basis, a joint inter-disciplinary committee of experts on historic, archaeological and educational matters, to consider the objective, scientific interpretation of historical events based on authentic, evidence-based and scientifically sound historical sources and archaeological findings. the committee’s work shall be supervised by the ministries of foreign affairs of the parties in cooperation with other competent national authorities. it shall consider and, if it deems appropriate, revise any school textbooks and school auxiliary material such as maps, historical atlases, teaching guides, in use in each of the parties, in accordance with the principles and aims of unesco and the council of europe. to that effect, the committee shall set specific timetables so as to ensure in each of the parties that no school textbooks or school auxiliary material in use .the year after the signing of this agreement contains any irredentist/revisionist references. the committee shall also study any new editions of school textbooks and school auxiliary material as provided for under this article. the committee shall convene regularly, at least twice a year, and shall submit an annual report on its activities and recommendations to be approved by the high-level cooperation council, as to be established pursuant to article 12”. (note 8) this provision is far from the legal standards of sovereign rights of states, provides a mechanism for revision of the cultural history of the second party and permanent intervention and control of its cultural and educational policies, hence severely derogating its sovereign cultural rights and sovereign identity. there are only a few articles on this matter (siljanovska davkova, 2019). the mentioned principle relating to collective human rights as a rule of self-determination is also applicable to the rights of states. namely, states has a right to self-determination, particularly to self-identification and juridical equality vis a vis other sovereign states (messineo, 2012). a link between the name of the state and a general category of a national identity (as a collective human right) lies in the category of legitimacy that means original sovereign people’s will and consent to freely refer to itself and to self-identify (itself or themselves) as a people or as a nation, in accordance with the basic principle of sovereign people’s will (i.e., principle of a popular sovereignty) (vankovska, 2019). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 12 published by scholink inc. 4. conclusions in the present article we have analyzed sustainability and legality of the prespa agreement concluded between macedonia and greece on june 12, 2018, aiming at resolving the 25 year long dispute between the two countries over the name of macedonia. we have analyzed the legal basis and aspects of the un sc resolutions 817(1993) and 845 (1993) in which the name “dispute” was imposed on macedonia as a condition during its admission to un membership, together with the condition to accept a provisional name “the former yugoslav republic of macedonia” for use within the system of united nations. we have argued that imposing of additional in sc 817 conditions to an applicant state, after affirming that the applicant fulfills the admission conditioned laid down in article 4(1) of the un charter is in severe violation with the advisory opinion of the international court of justice of 28 may 1948, of 1948, accepted by the general assembly resolution 197/iii of 1948. in view of these two un documents the sc res. 817(1993) is in breach with the un charter articles 1(2), 2(1), 2(7) and 4(1), the first three belonging jus cogens norms of international law. the sc res. 817 is therefore an ultra vires act, breaching the peremptory norms of internal law and cannot serve as legal basis for the prespa agreement (or for any other treaty according to general legal principle ex injuria jus non oritur). the prespa agreement is by itself in conflict with jus cogens norms of international law and enters in legal matters that belong stricto sensu in the domain of the domestic jurisdiction of the other party. its provisions even provide mechanisms for permanent intervention into internal and external affairs of the second party, derogating its human (dignity) and cultural rights and freedoms, and the basic rules of non-discrimination. therefore, the prespa agreement violates article 53 of the vienna convention on the law of treaties. the non-binding referendum in macedonia, held on 30 september 2018 with a turnout of only 37% (due to boycott of vmro-dpmne) whose question about the change of the name was explicitly associated with the presumption for access to eu and nato, was a clear indication of the negative attitude to the prespa agreement. the political manipulations within the macedonian parliament and the open political pressures exercised by the some western leaders to the parliamentary parties played a decisive role to reach the required two-thirds majority in the parliament to ratify the agreement. it is therefore abundantly clear that from macedonian side the prespa agreement is unsustainable. the strongest legal argument of macedonian government for possible (future) unilateral withdrawal or termination of/from the prespa agreement would be its violation of the article 53 of the vienna convention on the law of treaties (“a treaty is void if at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with peremptory norms of international law”). as discussed earlier the right to self-determination of nation’s name or a state identity represents such a norm. moreover, the legal basis of the prespa agreement, the sc resolutions 817 and 845, is in violation with the un charter articles 1(2, 7), 2(1) and 4(1) and makes the agreement a priory unlawful according to the general legal principle ex injuria jus non oritur. furthermore, the provisions of prespa agreement explicitly enter into the domain of domestic jurisdiction of macedonia and are in conflict with the basic norms of international law, and establish www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 13 published by scholink inc. instruments for permanent intervention into internal and external affairs of the country (articles 1 and 8), derogating its sovereignty and particularly its cultural and human rights. besides the article 53. of the vienna convention, macedonian government can also invoke other basis for withdrawal or termination of a treaty such as rule provided in article 46 (internal violations of domestic law known to the other contractor (greece), since ratification document for prespa agreement was not signed by the macedonian president (as provided by domestic law). also, macedonia can invoke termination grounds embedded in the article 48 (relating error or fallacy), claiming absence of legal knowledge of previous macedonian government related to illegal character of the sc resolutions 817 (1993). namely, it is now undoubtedly clear that macedonian government operated under assumption that there was nothing wrong with the un resolutions 817 and 845 (1993). in conclusion, one can observe that erga omnes norms contained in the prespa agreement for mandatory internal application of id modifiers may not be implementable. the implementation of such modifiers in domestic legal and social order generally and finally depends on the people's will to accept (i.e. tolerate) or resist to the new imposed identity, and that imposition of alienated redefined new identity obviously does not seem durable. if macedonian people can’t reconcile or endure with the obligations arising from the provisions contained in the prespa agreement that alter their identity, than a possible outcome could be an unilateral termination of the agreement with a diplomatic note to greece and a diplomatic note about the termination to the un. in parallel, the diplomatic note to the un may be accompanied with a formal request for a new name, in the form of draft resolution to the un general assembly related to extension of membership under this new name (the “republic of macedonia”). however, at this moment, it seems that the termination of the agreement is not an option neither for the government, nor for the macedonian opposition, since such radical shift in the foreign policy (for both current government and vmro-dpmne) seems to be a subject of an offstage informal approval from the usa as a major partner of the macedonian state. any unilateral step towards unilateral termination or withdrawal from the agreement from the macedonian side may jeopardize the valuable strategic partnership with usa. acknowledgement this research has been funded by the ministry of science and technological development of the republic of serbia. references advisory opinion of international court of justice (icj) of may 28. (1948). henkin, l., pugh, r. c., schachter, o., & smit, h. (1993). international law: cases and materials. west group. janev, i. (1999). legal aspects of the use of a provisional name for macedonia in the united nations www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 14 published by scholink inc. system. american journal of international law, 93(1). https://doi.org/10.2307/2997959 janev, i., & petrović, d. (2011). legal mode for advisory redress at the international court of justice for the case of macedonian un membership. review of international affairs, 61(1140), 48-72, 2011. messineo, f. (2012). maps of ephemeral empires: the icj and the macedonian name dispute, cambridge journal of international and comparative law, 1(1), 169-190. https://doi.org/10.7574/cjicl.01.01.37 siljanovska davkova, g. (2019). on the “prespa agreement” and beyond. united macedonian diaspora. retrieved from http://umdiaspora.org/2019/01/28/on-the-prespa-agreement-and-beyond-by-professor-dr-gordanasiljanovska-davkova/ unga res. 47/225 admission of the state whose application is contained in document a/47/876-s/25147 to membership in the united nations. (1993). vankovska, b. (2019). the prespa agreement, ethnicity and nationality. yearbook of the faculty of philosophy, skopje. https://doi.org/10.37510/godzbo1972271v vienna convention on the law of treaties. (1969). notes note 1. by definition, a legal norm may not contain indefinite set of conditions (or obligatory legal elements). note 2. see final agreement for the settlement of the differences as described in the united nations security council resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993), the termination of the interim accord of 1995, and the establishment of a strategic partnership between the parties (2018). note 3. it should be noted at this point that constitution of the republic of macedonia had expressly provided that all treaties and agreements concluded by the macedonian government or a president must be in accordance with the constitution, as a higher act, and not subjected to conditions of any treaty. note 4. it should also be noticed that according to article 20 (9) of the prespa agreement “no modification to this agreement contained in article 1(3) and article 1(4} is permitted”. namely, it was stipulated here that “the provisions of this agreement shall remain in force for an indefinite period of time and are irrevocable”. note 5. in practice, that would mean denouncement of a policy of national recognition under present constitutional name, and public global request to recognition under condition that provided by the prespa agreement, including a prefix before macedonia, that has to be used by all subjects in international community. note 6. basically, operation of the agreement is dependent on the external and internal conditions and developments, including eu negotiations achievements and a future will of the people and the political www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 15 published by scholink inc. will of the government to accept long-lasting id redefinition (s). note 7. irrevocable provisions contained in the paragraphs 3. and 4. of the article 1, apparently serves as permanent id modifiers of the original national / state identity. agreement itself dictates imposition of amendments to the constitution (that needs to be in accordance with the agreement, and not vice versa). note 8. see articles 8. and 12. of the agreement. microsoft word ape-v3n2-p16 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 16 original paper leadership amidst transition and liminality: the case of bosnia and herzegovina and the former yugoslavia jesenko tešan¹* & joan davison² ¹ the european graduate school, egs, saas-fee, switzerland ² department of political science, rollins college, winter park, florida, usa * jesenko tešan, the european graduate school, egs, saas-fee, switzerland received: march 4, 2020 accepted: march 24, 2020 online published: march 30, 2020 doi:10.22158/ape.v3n2p16 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v3n2p16 abstract a history of empires and communism created a liminality in the former yugoslavia and bosnia and herzegovina (b&h). when leaders throughout the soviet bloc began to discredit communism, an opportunity opened for the leadership of b&h to unify the popular will and transition to democracy. yet, the appropriate leadership, a master of ceremonies from van gennep and turner’s perspectives, a philosopher from plato’s view was absent. politicians instead repackaged themselves as nationalists and supported extremists and divisive actions, culminating in war. subsequently, the mechanisms associated with the dayton peace accords conceived to return b&h to normalcy instead made the divisive liminality a new normal as power sharing elites benefitted if they held to nationalist claims and ignored societal reintegration. this, study examines the reasoning and tactics of elites who rejected the mantle of good leadership and now abuse the spirit of the constitutional and institutional power sharing mechanisms to maintain the schizophrenic division and conflict. it also introduces the type of virtuous leader states needed for transition. keywords leadership, liminality, plato, transition, charisma, bosnia and herzegovina 1. introduction max weber contends divinised charismatic politics, as opposed to rational government, can be understood as a diagnosis of a fundamental acute societal atrophy. while poor leadership can trigger national degeneration, societal confusion and disorder also can create conditions for specific figures to emerge as tricksters to exploit the turmoil. in the case of the former yugoslavia, and especially bosnia and herzegovina (b&h), aspects of poor leadership, liminal confusion and trickster logic dated to tito www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 17 published by scholink inc. and his successors who manipulated chaos and mimetic behaviour to hold authority. in the 1980s, while some leaders in the former soviet bloc discredited communism and supported democratic solutions in response to the popular will, the post-communist yugoslav elites promoted divisive nationalisms with enduring negative consequences for society. indeed, the seed of the troubles for b&h was not the inability to accommodate multiple nationalisms and religions within a single state, but rather the relative absence of platonic leaders with the intellectual, and above all moral, capacity to guide the multicultural society to freedom. this study focuses upon leaders in the former yugoslavia and b&h, some of whom extolled virulent, exclusive nationalisms as an alternative to the delegitimized titoism, rather than guiding the nascent democratic communit as to a free identity. it notes how institutional technologies (both peace treaties and constitutional power-sharing) intended for conflict resolution provided a context which permitted—and arguably fuelled—the post-dayton permanent liminality which creates rules that permit self-interested elites to perpetuate societal division rather than mobilizing society for the common good (tešan, 2017). as a result, since 1995, b&h’s individuals and society face an unsuccessful transition and unwilled condition of democratic atrophy, which can be best described in max weber’s warning in the midst of the versailles treaty negotiations: “[n]ot summer’s bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a polar night of icy darkness and hardness” (weber, 1948, p. 128). 2. the liminal iron cage of bosnia and herzegovina long before foucault, weber indirectly addressed the moments of transition—liminal moments—which are pregnant with the discourses that offer a fertile turf for the rise of particular leaderships and concomitant madness in society. to foucault the excess of meaning “become so burdened with attributes, signs, allusions that they finally lose their own form. meaning is no longer read in an immediate perception, the figure no longer speaks for itself; between the knowledge which animates and the form into which it is transposed, a gap widens” (1965, p. 18) and opens to madness. for weber, the madness deserves a diagnosis of a sick element(s) in a society. virtuous leaders attempt to unify society and create vision of the possibility of the ideal. yet, as szakolczai demonstrates, there exists a palpable link among modernity, liminality, pathogenesis, schismogenesis, and the emergence of tricksters (2015) which often precludes such leadership. weber previously related modernity with its rationalization and bureaucratization to the trap of the iron cage: “the puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so... this order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which to-day determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism,… with irresistible force… in baxter’s view the care for external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the ‘saint like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment.’ but fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage” (1958, p. 181). according to weber, normally the transition to capitalism and hence parliamentary democracy is linked to the process of rationalization, but also concomitant with irrationality, such that these must constantly www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 18 published by scholink inc. be balanced. he shows that modern modes of production are the product of the maximization of rational technologies which simultaneously affect the increase of irrationality and irrational elements—the lack of freedom. thus, the transitory moments of modernity interact with the perpetual “iron cage”. the democratic atrophy in post—1995 b&h correlates with liminal moments and the associated error-substance which weber links to divinised elements of “charismatic leadership” (horvath, 2013). regarding the versailles treaty, weber cautioned that moments of transition might bear the seeds of politics of passions, that is irrationality, rather than politics of responsibility (mommsen, 1998). he worried that peace treaties could carry the pathological seeds from the atrocities of the war into society via the politics of passions which were vulnerable to secular divine grace in the form of charismatic leaders, that is, the error-substance. b&h now parallels the weimar case to the extent that the dayton peace accords (dpa) institutionalize b&h constitutional structures which constrain transition and protect nationalists (tešan, 2017, 2018). indeed, the weberian rise of politics of conviction and divine grace, along with the promises of nationalist elites, contrasts with a “rational, value-free” authority. the contemporary nationalist elites also contrast with the “charisma” of leaders such as st. paul. they often accumulate personal wealth and lack self-discipline. they trump the rational experts and bureaucrats, whether of the yugoslav federation or dayton peace process. in b&h, these sophistic politicians ignore the human spirit’s desire for freedom and interaction; they now bear responsibility for the violent conflicts, ethnic hatred, and prevailing liminal trap. 2.1 the qualitative nature of leadership: the breuilly-weber conversation breuilly (1993, 2012) provides additional insight to the modern charismatic nationalist leader. he hones the concept through focus on weber’s distinction between traditional and modern nationalistic charismatic power. the traditional charismatic leader resurrects sacred myths and places; the modern leader relies upon the institution and structure of the state. where precisely the collapse of yugoslav society and subsequent schismogenesis of b&h fits is unclean. there appears to be various forms of charismatic authority represented in vojislav šešelj, alijaizetbegović, radovan karadžić, slobodan milošević and other nationalist leaders. the people (nation) chose and followed these leaders because they appeared to embody certain values or traditions. as leaders should, they offered security, but the security came through division and conflict rather than unity and order; the security depended upon embracing the mythical past rather than ushering society into the future. reflecting on the special case of hitler, breuilly contends: “charismatic domination was a ‘solution’ to factionalism. how much faction leaders and their followings ‘believed’ in hitler is secondary. if the leader and this following had success, such ‘as if’ beliefs would become elements of a charismatic movement” (2011, p. 487). truth is not primary; success, however that might be defined, is primary. the diminution of truth then allows for elites to appeal through generalizations, scapegoating, and mythical claims. successes, whether for milošević, šešelj,tudjman, or karadžićserved to prove their claims. success for miloševićand šešelj in kosovo meant “persecuted” serbs fighting nato; even a loss would www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 19 published by scholink inc. be a victory within the myth of martyrdom. breuilly further examines the dynamic and explains that “charismatic leadership of opposition movements that take power [...] began as small and sectarian and that is when the charismatic leadership position was established” (2011, p. 6). the fascist charismatic leader does not respond to groundswell popular demand, but employs his talents, his charisma, to create the demand. this is supply side politics with the charismatic elite as leader creating facts, issues, and even results. thus, serbians could not oppose miloševićonce he appealed to victimhood amidst the courage and sacrifice of the field of blackbirds. so too, šešelj claimed the legacy of the brave chetniks who similarly sacrificed during world war ii to liberate the serbs. he now sought their allegiance against “historic enemies” and bosnia’s “pagans” (šešelj, 2003, p. 2, p. 7). moreover, according to breuilly in relation to weber, “[t]o exercise state power under modern conditions, as weber was acutely aware, requires control of large-scale bureaucratic organisations such as a civil service and the various branches of armed forces” (2011, p. 7). breuilly contends state power is an a priori condition for a modern “opposition movement” to emerge otherwise the latter need not exist. both milošević and izetbegovićseem to demonstrate this awareness as they sought to build bases of power at the republic level while the post-tito yugoslavian federation withered (tešan, 2007). further, along with šešelj, and karadžić, each understand the authority and power a modern leader obtains from a loyal, mobilized paramilitary. breuilly then apparently aligns with weber’s notion of tension between the individual trapped in an iron cage and their place in the society. breuilly seems to imply two options: charismatic personalities or state power given that “[...]charismatic power based on domination of a following by an extraordinary leader is sectarian and oppositional and usually does not get beyond this phase” (2011, p. 16). this case study of leaders in former yugoslavia and b&h suggests, however, that such a view is a simplification, that leaders exist on spectrums, that plato’s sophists are timeless, and that within b&h, traditional, hybrid and modern styles could be combined because the intent often was to maintain power, even if divisive, rather than progress toward a common good. this research expands szakolczai’s permanent liminality (2016) and horvath’s trickster logy (2018) whilst then offeringthrough the modernist school of nationalism, including breuilly, an alternative lens to understand the rise of irrational yugoslavian and b&h politicians. the research presents original evidence based upon interviews with raif dizdarević, who served as the last chair of the collective presidency of yugoslavia, and translation of recordings from the b&h assembly during the sarajevo spring. then study the assesses the tactics and strategies of politicians behind the stolen moments of transition and concludes: when the magical spirit of life has been beaten to the point of no return as happened with b&h’s atrocities, such that the magic atrophies amid horrors, the need for leadership becomes all the more necessary but also all the more elusive. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 20 published by scholink inc. 2.2 the rupture of order and the necessity of leadership the late 1980s witnessed rupturing of the communist political order throughout central and eastern europe. certain leaders, such as gorbachev, opened the windows to these events which unleashed the will to break from oppressive, imitative forces and myopic world-views. yet, the outcome of these opportunities varied with some societies transitioning to democracy, while movements in other regions were frustrated and stalled. notable is the role and nature of leadership in these critical transitory times. horvath discusses that solution of such crises requires a special leader, consistent with elias’ view, with more, not less, ability and virtue, and operating above the threshold of liminality (1998). accordingly, the german democratic republic (ddr) benefitted from its association with the federal republic of germany (frg) which served a rational, masterful role in the reintegration of the people of the ddr into freedom. helmut kohl and the german state offer a modern charismatic rationalized leadership model. vaclav havel as president of czechoslovakia focused upon the power of the powerless, supervised the velvet revolution and divorce, and guided the communitas through the pain of transition to its emergence as a free society. he acted as a genuine master of ceremonies. by contrast, some of the republics of the former yugoslavia were impeded because the communitas fell under the power of elites who themselves existed in the margins, mobilized people against imaginary enemies, and perpetuated the permanent transition and liminality. given the history and tradition of cosmopolitan tolerance within b&h, the outcome seemed shocking, unless one views these processes through the politics of irrationality and emergence of horvath’s tricksters. for example, milošević and karadžić mastered the tricksters’ politics well: they understood that nationalistic propaganda must contain an element of historically accepted myth (zimmerman, 1996; danner, 1998; karadžić, 2016, p. 4; milošević, 2001). the irrational aims contained elements of reality. yet, the reality was that b&h long had served as a model of multiculturalism in which the people did not question the ability to coexist. in the 1980s and early 1990s, liberal thought via the media and art scene, such as top lista nadrealista, developed in b&h, and then spread to other yugoslav republics. notably, the initial events of the sarajevo spring’s peaceful revolution of 1992, illustrated the will of the communitas and democratic leadership to break with the communist identity. people, united from various demographic backgrounds, desired to leave behind one identity and the associated liminal pseudo-reality, and cross into a new milieu which not only existed as a concept in the collective mind, but also was being realized elsewhere in the region. the people of the sarajevo spring demonstrated their wish to transition to freedom. yet, liminality prevailed, and thus uncertainty and ambiguity perpetuated popular confusion regarding the real meanings of communism, nationalism, and freedom. the necessary type of appropriate leadership, a master of ceremonies, struggled to take hold because elites perceived such virtuous platonic leaders as a threat. as raif dizdarević highlights, this created a void for nationalists, such as šešelj and izetbegović, as well as political opportunists, such as milošević and karadžić, to manipulate transitory individuals and societies. to be clear, the critical detail must not be the mythical ancient hatred or inability of certain peoples to consolidate democracy, but rather turner’s “betwixt-and-between” space www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 21 published by scholink inc. affecting identity as leaders opted not to orchestrate, or even support, the transition out of liminality (v. gennep, 1960; turner, 1967, 1969). the circumstance suggests, consistent with weber, a fundamental tension (and potential oscillation) between rational and irrational elements in politics. karadžić’s famous speech in the parliament of b&h in october 1991 illustrates these elements. seemingly rational, he states, “you cannot interfere in the matters that are regulated by the federal constitution. i am trying in the most peaceful way to tell you this as well.” then he moves to primordial arguments about ethnic sovereignty and survival, concluding, “you want to take bosnia and herzegovina down the same highway of hell and suffering that slovenia and croatia are travelling. be careful. do nothing that will lead bosnia to hell and do nothing that may lead the muslim people to their annihilation, because the muslims cannot defend themselves if there is war. how will you prevent everyone from being killed in bosnia?” (karadžić, 1996, p. 942). as milan kučan, the first president of slovenia from 1991 to 2002 recently emphasized, the subsequent complex war throughout the former yugoslavia, particularly as waged within b&h, then demonstrated the ability of nationalist elites to trick people into an irrational conflict. the violence became an instrument for mimetic proliferation of a sacrificial logic, destroying historical identities and tolerances (telesković, 2020). the war transformed liminality to a quintessential character which due to the spiralling violence and chaos further complicated the post-war transition. nationalist extremists encouraged unreflective mimetic behaviour, created defensive communitas, and advocated perpetual schism within the post war liminal space as they explicitly preached against transition to a societal reintegration. given such authorities, it seems b&h might be trapped, void of rational platonic leadership and/or demos. unlike wydra, who considers an “authority vacuum” (2007; 2015) as the space from within which the condition of liminal leadership emerges, this research draws attention to the epistemological gap which shrouds b&h. within this space, the self and society, face contradictory truth(s) that nurtures epistemological schizophrenia. the brutal human rights abuses which still punctuate any discourse, open an abyss providing space for new leaders and truths. in b&h, weber’s politics of conviction reject moral, rational leadership, stereotype identities, and foment violence. they abuse the spirit of constitutional power sharing mechanisms in favour of legislative immobilism which then justifies claims for separatism. they manipulate the rational mechanisms of the dayton peace accords (conceived with the intention to return b&h to normalcy with rights and vetoes for all groups) to perpetuate division. under power sharing, elites thrive if they hold to the nationalist perspective which initially hijacked transition, including the democratic imagination of the sarajevo spring. 2.3 prelude to the storm: the void of platonic leaders as annas (1981) identifies, doubts about democracy’s ability to survive go back to plato, who regarded it as very fragile because it occupies liminal space. what the republic is about, is not only justice and the just person, but rather a perpetual wrestling for democracy-to-be. in fact, what makes a harmonious condition in society, thence political institutions, to be worthy of the label democratic is the perpetual www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 22 published by scholink inc. resistance of extreme ends competing in a free context. during the late 1980s and early 1990s the republics in yugoslavia experienced and wrestled with raw democracy, while lacking the necessary virtuous leaders to transform and reaggregate the situation. too easily, elites silenced the people, the demos. the internal skills ground into the demos, as plato envisioned, were pushed and trapped in the void of transition and conflict; the extremes voiced appealing claims which stalled the oscillation that democracy necessitates. pseudo-democratic populisms and nationalisms occupied the extremes. visions of democracy, with rights and tolerance, struggled to survive between extremes. the b&h situation suggests democracy atrophies not because what is the proper or improper “statesman” or “leader” but rather because of how leadership is forged. former yugoslavia, particularly the balkan region, is comprised of a diverse population with relationships among and within heterogeneous communities. since the recent wars (1991-2001) in that region, the once nicely varied social webs now are forced to abandon this rich tapestry for a hardened, grid-like utopian design of uniformity institutionalized in and through the dpa (tešan, 2018). this study posits that the essence, to tap into plato’s vocabulary, of designs and architecture of political institutions such as dpa, should support heterogeneous populations and heterogeneous environs consistent with their societal webs. problems perpetuate or develop when post-war political institutions (such as the dpa or weber’s versailles “peace”) do not mirror the essence of the pre-war relationship but rather are post-war shadows, offering leaders conditioned by conflict and liminality. as annas argues, plato’s republic forged its theory on “forms and essentialism.” yet, plato does not try to prove that homogeneity is better than heterogeneity. he is not deterministic in that sense, but he seems to show that in this world (nature) there are many truths, depending on one’s background or worldview. his attempt is not to hammer down a single and right objective one-size-fits-all universal approach thence utopian republic. rather he encourages a method of how-to search for the essence relative to the ever-changing material world, in this case a democratic polity and adequate leadership. according to plato, a “form” exists apart from specific physical manifestations, however, it would be inaccurate to say that plato qua socrates when building the theory of the republic and its leadership would argue that heterogeneity is wrong. for example, socrates highlights a boy who recognizes a triangle in the sand, and socrates deduces that there exists some universally applicable truth. yet, related to this case’s concern about leadership in transitory environments, plato did not argue that forms follow a strict definition of uniformity, but that the method towards those “essences” does. the love of wisdom or philo-sophia is the essential contribution of statesman and/or the republic to this case. regarding leadership as a “form,” problems develop when the essence of leadership is not derived from the ideal form not only with regard to philosophy but also with the character of the given society in time and place. indeed, real forms must be distinguished from false forms. considering plato’s cave analogy in the republic, in this temporal world when a designer or architect (the leadership) constructs an object, the construction is based on the non-being, or to borrow plato’s vocabulary the object exists as the “shadow” of the real ideal. very rarely an architect, in this case yugoslavian politicians as well as www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 23 published by scholink inc. the statesmen who designed the dayton peace accords, can understand the real essence. the shadows rather than the real essence are taken for the “truth.” the onus falls on the inversion of the shadows and forms, and hence a hyper anthropocentric design method purporting not just the mistaken appearance for reality, but more importantly its wider effect on the social relations, leaders and polity. consequently, b&h’s liminal socio-political state can best be described as the republic in reverse. real democracy, to be worthy of its name, wrestles in constant flux under the pressures of polyphony and heterogeneity. such real democracy without real leadership, however, degenerates during transitory moments. the liminality of communism, transition, and war stressed the heterogeneity of b&h. sophist elites mimicked democracy; elites ignored democracy’s need for responsive oscillation. although voices for polyphonic democracy arose, these demands encountered first communist bureaucrats and then nationalist voices. the former feared the uncertainty of democracy; the latter railed that pluralist democracy was an existential threat and that disciplined, managed, national democracy was essential. raif dizdarević witnessed the stagnant leadership who fearing the uncertainty of democracy, created the void in which tricksters emerged and agitated. personal interviews with him are key evidence for this research. as a party and government leader, dizdarević’s authority depended upon legal-rational legitimacy, a legitimacy which he recognized was waning. he realized the need for dedicated leaders and lamented the presence of opportunists within the post-tito party. he worried yugoslavia would struggle to evolve into a democratic modern state, because it lacked professional leadership, civic associations and the ability to address socio-economic challenges (tešan, 2007). thus, communist legacy, rather than multinational federalism, was the primary impediment, but xenophobic nationalism became a product of failed leadership. weakness in the central government allowed authoritarian nationalist leaders on the periphery in the republics to fill the void and manipulate the masses (tešan, 2007). indeed, perhaps under dizdarević’s guidance the epistemological gap might have been avoided, providing conditions for transition. dizdarević identifies the dual legacies of the system and tito’s charisma as the fundamental problem, citing “…history dragging into the future…[w]e (communists) take all of the responsibility for the collapse of yugoslavia…had tito been surrounded with professional experts with new ideas, energy and visions, perhaps the balkans today would look much different” (tešan, 2007, p. 25). his perspective is insightful: dizdarević notes the benefits and drawbacks of charismatic leadership while regretting the lack of professional politicians and experts especially during times of change. the leadership did not reform and embrace democracy; the nationalist opportunists embraced the charismatic mantle. he also implies the problem of the iron cage—when bureaucratic rationality becomes stifling its expertise requires revitalization. in times of crises, leaders must respond to the oscillation of the demos while stressing unity of purpose and the common good. lacking such leadership, the void provided space for tricksters and chaos (tešan, 2007). accordingly, the anti-bureaucratic revolution, critical of stagnant government operations and party ideology, became www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 24 published by scholink inc. one element of milošević’s appeal in the republics (milošević, 1999). indeed, following tito’s death in the mid-1980s, the yugoslav elite, or in đilas’ terms the new class, began to splinter, dismantling the inter-elite cooperation necessary for leadership, reform, and a democratic future (1957). society needed new leadership focused on the common good, but it was lacking. dizdarevi ćlaments, “…some members brought their own men…their favourites…this was detrimental to yugoslavia’s survival as a federation of different nationalities” (tešan, 2007, p. 24). by the late ‘80s, “cooperation was turning into antagonistic competition” and “the federation acted as fireman. we went from one region to another putting the fire out” (tešan, 2007, p. 25). therefore, in a critical moment, the leadership was incapable of political innovation or response to citizens’ needs, and rather focused on maintaining its position as đilas predicted. dizdarević states: “the party huffed and puffed…we dozed off for a moment.” the system came to a halt, and “… failed to democratise and turn into a modern state” (tešan, 2007, p. 31). failed leadership policies, elite manipulation, and the lack of professional politicians created the space for polar extremisms. eventually, in response to milošević’s nationalist rallies and speeches in the republics, the federal government attempted to reassign him to a bureaucratic post, but this came too late. dizdarević summarizes: “they masked themselves as nationalists and used sweet words and fanned nationalism to gain the attention of confused masses” (tešan, 2007, p. 38). the federal government and old leadership recognized the dangerous tactics of the extremist voices within the liminal void. milošević specifically was identified as a problem. notably, dizdarević’s language closely parallels that of scholars of liminality: “masked”, “sweet words”, “fanned nationalism”, and “confused masses.” yet, milošević’svery status as a marginalized outcast on the party’s and bureaucracy’s periphery positioned him to appeal to other liminal individuals. he co-opted šešelj and recruited karadžić. various analyses of karadžić suggest he possessed ambition which exceeded his abilities. he first began his political career in the green party, but motivated by power, not ideology, he later joined milošević’s serbian democratic wing in b&h (borger, 2017; danner, 1998). danner claims karadžić’s ambitious character“could not help but make him attractive to a great political manipulator like milošević” (danner, 1998). šešelj, by contrast, espoused a nationalism more extreme than that which milošević favored. milošević attempted to contain and direct šešelj’s fanatical serbian radical party, but the two men often clashed. in january 1990, the 14th extraordinary communist party congress permanently adjourned. the congress was called amidst transformations throughout central europe, not to embrace such transition, but to attempt to secure the floundering status quo. the decision was reached that new elections would be convened at the republican level rather than the federal. croatian president franjo tudjman later drafted and implemented amendments to the new croatian constitution which threatened croatian serbs in krajina, leading jovan rašković to create “srpska autonomna oblast.” the (il)logic of the politics of passion snowballed, affecting not only b&h but all of yugoslavia. the liminal situations, first communism and then transition, further derailed into conflict while reinforcing the rise of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 25 published by scholink inc. authorities who prophesized existential fear as normalcy, proclaimed war identities, and justified violence. a pathological normal evolved which suffocated the nascent democratic spirit. 3. the art of transgression and elite perspectives: the b&h war archive reflecting to pre-war b&h, the sarajevo spring of 1992 demonstrated that people aimed to break from authoritarian mentalities, but their free will and critical moment were transgressed. thomassen frames comparable revolutions throughout central europe as rituals involving “imitation,” “trickster” and “crowd behaviour” (2012, p. 684). so too, the sarajevo spring attempted to peacefully transform a hyper-rational communist system of thought. “rational” humans seeking transition appeared almost “irrational” or “fanatical” (especially to the old elite) as people poured into sarajevo with their democratic spirit challenging the false promises of monolithic government. the liminality, as an anti-structure, cried for a leader to serve as a virtuous leader, a master of ceremonies (turner, 1974). yet most elites could not look beyond the rationalized bureaucracy or their legalistic legitimacy to see the emerging truth; they hid in the parliament, and willingly “opted out” (turner, 1974, p. 233). the representatives existed in their own isolated confusion, outside the spring’s particular liminality. another key source of evidence for this research are the oral tapes of the parliamentary debates from the sarajevo spring which tešan translated to english. palpable disagreement among the representatives about the meaning of the protesting crowd illustrates elite confusion. representative faikuzunović expressed amazement verging on admiration: “… we must not underestimate the human element and spontaneous positive energy of all those citizens who unarmed marched against the aggressors, the fascists” (war archive, 1992, p. 5/3). enverkreso and sejfudintokić, proclaimed their heroism and valour: “the people from sarajevo have done something that when better times come will be commemorated in a glorious poem. the nation with its bare life and courage stood up against automatic weapons” (war archive, 1992; kreso, tape 4/7). muhamedfilipović countered, characterizing the demonstrators as threats: “…we are in the moment where we need to maximise our concentration and understand that the country has been attacked [...]. therefore, i believe that we should not squander the power going into the debate and any relationships with these subversive and sub-legal creations. you see, if we talked to them, the state and democracy would be very poor if left to these people to create democracy. don’t dream the dreams about these people. it is a group of usurpers.” (war archive 1992: filipović, tape 5/1). later he cited the legal power of the assembly and argued that the crowd were aggressors seeking to overthrow the constitutional state: a task of this assembly is to take all the means in its power. the constitution gives the right to b&h to defend itself. as bosnia is under the dual aggression: internal and external [...]. at the moment in b&h what happens is anti-constitutional secession. today in bosnia and herzegovina’s parliament/assembly, we have a group of adventurers trying to make some kind of internal coup” (war archive, 1992: www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 26 published by scholink inc. filipović, tape 1/2ss). such a view dominated. the demos sought leadership, “masters of ceremony” to transition to peace, freedom and democracy. the representatives constructed a chasm, a void which became part of the critical moment or out-of-orderly situation, feeding from and detrimental to the social change, and its democratic spirit. the majority of the representatives in the assembly created a false narrative of the sarajevo spring as subversive and dangerous; ignoring their citizens, they petitioned the international community to restore order. mirko prskalo argued: “what is our mandate? where is our rule? i agree with professor filipović that the strongest weapon of our country now is its legality and the sovereignty received by the international society” (war archive 1992: prskalo, tape 6/1 am). accordingly, the grassroots of sovereignty in the people were rejected for the recognition of external bodies. the representatives did not attempt to meet with the people; rather they hid inside the parliament building, watching via closed circuit cameras the outside wave of peaceful marchers, which they labelled “fanatics”. admittedly, debate occurred and a few members of the assembly disagreed with the dominant narratives, but they lacked the courage necessary to accept the call to lead and foster the unity of the emerging polity. mirsaddžapo criticized the assembly’s betrayal couched in hyper-rational constitutional discourse and old legislation. his comments identify the textbook liminality: “...today we are in true extraordinary situation. we are located in the building where there is a continuum parade of all kinds of people in all directions. i'm not sure, but i am afraid that this kind of parliament that we have at the moment in this extraordinary situation may throw-out the ‘saviour’ for the nation. we have law, and the saviour is the last thing this nation needs....” (war archive 1992: džapo, tape 4/4). they feared a new saviour, perhaps a platonic leader, which the demos might prefer to the legal authority of the elites. representative tokić summarizes the retreat from potential leadership: “...one of the reasons why the nation and these peoples are now in the parliament is that we were not here. the government has not been functioning, hence, had we been here yesterday and the day before my dear colleagues this would not had happen” (war archive 1992: tape 6/2). this view echoesdizdarević’s analysis. rational, bureaucratic leadership lacked the charisma of a saviour. they ignored the popular pulse for democracy and thereby left open the vacuum to the irrationality which would promote violence against imagined threats. milošević, šešelj, izetbegović and karadžić, would take the mantle of saviour, but change the meaning of leadership and democracy. horrors would emerge as a by-product of both these charismatic elites and the violent non-democratic state apparatus. returning to weber, after the politics of irrationality and extremisms hijack the politics of rationality, chaotic transition ensues. the demos weakened and frayed, the people became peoples, and they succumbed to violence and ethnic conflict, fascism, and sadism. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 27 published by scholink inc. 3.1 problematic elites and the problem of leadership accordingly, irrational tricksters such as šešelj, izetbegović, milošević and karadžić, opted to dehumanize individuals and peoples, while encouraging discord and violence. these “liminal authorities” naturally turned against order and harmony, perpetuated chaos, and slammed the door on democracy (horvath, 2013). significant, given the reality of democracy’s necessary wrestling if it is to hear all voices and engage dialogue and dissension, is these nationalist elites appeared because the withering communist system was unable to continue to suppress their ideas. the yugoslav state previously denied šešelj, izetbegović and tudjman opportunity to teach and speak; now they seized the stage. they fed on not only the declining system’s failures, but also the myths from across the centuries which now seemed to hold credence. milosevicarguably is the most notable of the ultranationalists who affected not only b&h, but also the greater region. he retold ancient myths of serbia’s founding after defeat in kosovo. he stirred popular sensitivities by recalling histories of ottoman and croat mistreatment of serb populations. while some truth existed in these histories, miloševićexaggerated the serbian vulnerability and ignored the decades of peace that existed. miloševićalso encouraged the military and para-militaries to engage in torture and ethnic cleansing against non-serb populations. not only were the albanians, bosnians and croats identified as threats to the serbs, but they were demonized for occupying serbian living space (milošević, 1999). milošević’s “leadership” realizes plato’s fear that “democratic” authorities turn tyrannical. illustrative of his movement toward tyrannical tactics was his discourse at the field of blackbirds in 1989. he emphasized that the serbs’ survival of their enslavement under the turks is reason for optimism if it leads to unity and redemption. he focused upon the importance of valor, loyalty and even martyrdom to overcome 600 years of oppression. milošević offered himself as the serbs’ master and savior. his speech characterizes a reversal of cosmopolitan rational discourse to irrational politics. he then appealed to other politicians, such as šešelj and karadžić, encouraging paramilitaries and building a personalized state apparatus. yet, the retreat from dialogue, preceded this moment. constraints on free speech in the region dated to the byzantine and ottoman empires and continued under the communist party. perhaps if the communist one-party system had not denied šešelj and izetbegović the academic freedom to teach nationalism and ethnicity at sarajevo university, the subsequent radicalization of messages and outcomes would have been avoided. if ideas were exchanged freely, then other ideas necessarily could contend. in the absence of such a public wrestling with ideas, šešelj and izetbegović fuelled the retreat from rational dialogue. izetbegović writes in his islamic declaration: “there can be no peace or coexistence between the ‘islamic faith’ and non-islamic societies and political institutions [...] islam clearly excludes the right and possibility of activity of any strange ideology on its own turf…the state should be an expression and should support the moral concepts of the religion” (1970, p. 22). izetbegović viewed his declaration as a rejection of both fundamentalism and westernization, one he offered as a reformist muslim. he further claimed that as a civic leader he represented all people. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 28 published by scholink inc. nevertheless, the language of the declaration appeared to equate religion, nation, and sovereign statehood, demanding a singular loyalty. as such it threatened serbs in the region, or at least could be so argued, and consequently b&h unity. in response, šešelj, founded the far-right serbian radical party, threatening the muslims and pushing milošević farther to extremes. šešelj’s platform, countered izetbegović’s declaration as a plan for a muslim state in b&h, with a call for a greater serbia (šešelj, 1999). ultimately, he was found guilty of hate speech provoking extremists to commit war crimes against croats. yet, marko attila hoare suggests šešelj is a minor figure: “i hope šešelj is sufficiently humiliated by the low sentence; it at least marks him down as a secondor third-ranking player, which he was. he was a loudmouthed attention-seeker who made himself infamous to the international public in the 1990s by his extreme statements, and certainly relished the publicity of being indicted and tried.” (gadžo, 2018). karadžić too used extreme language and advocated extreme tactics. he often publicly dismissed europe’s criticisms, telling them to “f--k themselves” (karadžić, 2009, p. 533). in a november 1991 speech, he claimed the only solution was to separate institutions based on ethnicity and if necessary “fight to the finish for our survival, a battle for our living space” (karadžić, 1996, p. 941). in a radio transcript he predicted, “there will be rivers of blood. sarajevo will be a black cauldron where 300,000 muslims will die. it will be a real bloodbath” (karadžić, 2009, p. 532). to be clear, these violence inspiring speeches and rallies were not the exception, but a daily tactic of the ultranationalists (karadžić, 1996, p. 939; milošević, 1999). their use of emotional language and mythical appeals also were complemented with the tools of both traditional and modern leaders. they secured loyalty within their institutions and paramilitaries with daily meetings with individuals who enjoyed their political patronage. šešelj and karadžić regularly visited their troops (šešelj, 2003, pp. 2-15; milošević, 1999). milošević’s control of the press and television throughout the region enabled him to ignite and enflame fears. they also maintained tight control over bureaucratic organizations and budgets which served their nationalist causes (milošević, 1999). as the war in b&h highlights, these nationalist leaders, to borrow from franz borkenau (1950, 1971), seem to be intolerant of the historic impulse toward connection and community necessary to move beyond liminality. they adapted the pathological mindset of the communists and inspired the emergence of schismatic new identities. these authorities who embraced virulent, exclusive nationalisms rather than guiding the nascent democratic communitas to a free identity bear the onus for the frozen conflict and transition. their rhetoric and actions manipulated the ambiguity of time and place to scam people into focusing upon irrational, imaginary threats which then became real, cementing b&h into a violent schismogenesis via the technologies of the rational peace truce. certainly, communism and its post-tito legacy represented a liminality in which authorities manipulated mimetic behaviour to maintain control, but the grotesque violence was absent. after tito’s death, members of the collective leadership prioritised self-interest over societal interests. ultranationalists and/or irrational politicians then claimed legitimacy and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 29 published by scholink inc. replaced one anthropocentric (communist) world-view with another anthropocentric world-view: the virulent “my nation” against “your state”. they fed the popular democratic imagination nationalist strategies and structures which only mimicked democratisation. indeed, the problem for b&h was not the inability to accommodate multiple nationalisms and religions within a single state, but rather the context of suppression of potential platonic leaders with the intellectual, and above all moral, capacity and will to guide the multicultural society. as the demos was silenced, so were plato’s leaders. yet, as discussed, the republic suggests democracy can re-emerge if the context of a spectrum of views, including extremes, exist and dialogue, with leadership oscillating but never to the poles. in other words, for plato, it is the question “how” rather than the prescriptive “what” question related to heterogeneity (or if the case required, homogeneity). for instance, throughout history in yugoslavia, especially in b&h, the multiplicity of different world-views did not pose a major cosmological or identity problem. diverse identities were welcomed. in the 14th century, when no nation-state in europe wanted to accept sephardi jews escaping spain, b&h opened its doors. social relations, including the architecture and culture of the region became richer. thus, in a democracy to be—the republic—diversity is welcomed as it is simply understood as its “form” or essence should mirror the essence of the society: demos. the republic famously concludes with philosopher kings. so too, socrates warns tyranny proceeds from democracy. thus, leadership must aspire to its ideal and form within the current heterogeneity and democracy of the former yugoslavia. in the republic, there is a space—a context and/or infrastructure—for everything and everyone (including prostitutes) provided proper education. 3.2 the failure of rationality, technology, and the dpa without leadership as discussed, the cave metaphor highlights the problem of deception and therefore the necessity of real, if possible ideal, leaders. in the case of b&h, the context of heterogeneity prior to 1992 needs to be revisited so that society rejects and ousts tricksters, whilst the demos nurtures leaders with the virtues to guide a heterogenous democracy. leaders must be virtuous. applied to b&h, and in particular nationalist and extremist politicians, reason and experiential knowledge were used, or abused, to conclude and convey that existential threats existed to the nation. according to kant, reason allows us to structure the world to be a better place, but the manipulation of reason by hyper rational “princes” also can produce a nation’s mostunfinest moments. in b&h, a fewelitistsappealed with irrational politics, leading people to bloody and irrational war. the dpa institutionalized their rational politics of separate group identities. now, under the dpa, many politicians still focus upon divisive politics, behaving as conflict entrepreneurs. kant also informs this analysis when placed in conversation with weber. recall that weber viewed in the versailles treaty the next war. contrasting, kant explores the possibility of perpetual peace, although his definitive articles set a high standard perhaps forecasting its limits. nevertheless, the failure of the versailles treaty and the optimism of the perpetual peace provide bases to consider the dpa. the treaty and constitution which the dpa offers is a technology for peace and government. the treaty carefully www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 30 published by scholink inc. structures power-sharing and provides group protections. yet, technologies cannot replace good leaders. indeed, self-interested elites and ultranationalist authorities can manipulate technologies, constitutions and institutions to the detriment of society. the dpa intended to protect and represent all individuals. yet, the segmentation of people into ethnic categories for proportional representation perpetuates and reinforces the war-time ultranationalist insistence on difference and separation. politics of identity and passion dominate. in turn, the system limits political competition (and oscillation) within ethnic categories such that governmental elites are relatively secure without meaningful electoral challenges (davison & tešan, 2011). their political security allows them both to engage not only in corruption but also impede movements toward unity. most politicians accept their success as linked to divisive and conflictual rhetoric and policies. the hyper rationalism associated with the dpa and its institutions—painfully structured to not exclude any group—overlooks the necessity of good leaders for a heterogenous society which seeks to transition. the dpa technology still requires humans, and lacking good leadership, is misdirected. in fairness, the european union and its high representatives to b&h came to understand the need for appropriate, good leaders. though external institutions themselves, they have removed the most corrupt and criminal elites, prohibited destructive campaign practices, and pushed for constitutional change. they readily admit that change is necessary so that the b&h government (who are not ideal leaders) move closer to the “truth” (tešan, 2017). plato in the republic shows that painters and poets do not possess knowledge of objects or forms; they copy copies. homer writes about war but, unlike the people of the former yugoslavia, has never been through war. plato says: those who know do. thus, republic book 10 ends with an attack on homer, artistry and poets. yet, apart from merely enjoying aesthetic elements in art, tragedy and poetry, one can still learn through education. so too, apart from the legal technology of the dpa, potential leaders need to learn how certain things are actant, hence learning brings them closer to knowing, albeit they must choose to love wisdom. 4. discussion: the leadership for heterogeneity and democracy zoran đinđić stands among politicians whose leadership sought to promote unity and dialogue in the former yugoslavia. đinđić was born in the pluralist city of brčko in b&h. an intellectual and politician, he served as mayor of belgrade and then prime minister of serbia until his assassination in 2003. organized crime and extremist political movements viewed him as an unwelcome leader, perhaps a gadfly, not unlike socrates; indeed, he seems to fit plato’s idea of leader and leadership. đinđić embraced đilas’s concept of the lie and “dictated imagination” (2000, pp. 265-75) of the elites, the new class (1957). like đilas, đinđić, albeit in “democratic” settings and with different outcomes, tried to persuade people to move to the truth of what their democratic responsibilities and possibilities entailed. he focused upon the potential problems of the process of democratisation, in the yugoslav context, the “destruction of one political system” and “the passage from the state of repressive singularity into the state of repressive plurality” (2010, p. 16). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 31 published by scholink inc. with đinđić is evident the existence of platonic leaders to counter the opportunistic voices. leaders exist on a spectrum and pull society in the wrestling match of democracy and iron cage of modernity. while concerns about irrational politics and tricksters in b&h and the region, stretch back through tito to the byzantine and ottoman empires, so too does an exceptional history of tolerance. as b&h continues to struggle for its future, as the extremes wrestle against one another and democracy, the society does possess some immunities against the virus. the ‘problem’ of leadership, like the ‘problem’ of democracy is complicated, more so under heterogeneity. consider željkokomšić, the current croat member of the b&h presidency, who croats reject as bosnian even though his father was croatian and his grandfather fought with the chetniks. his background is too complex—like that of b&h—to characterize with a single identity. is he an opportunist stealing the croatian seat, a leader attempting to unify peoples, or a contemporary politician hoping (and perhaps believing) his own self-interests coincide with society’s well-being? despite the claim of some croats that he does not represent them, he currently is serving his third consecutive term since 2006 as their representative in the b&h tripartite presidency. his platform emphasizes the social welfare state, democracy, civil nationalism and pro-europeanism (davison, 2013). thus, komšić’s platform seems consistent with the contention that real leadership necessitates unifying diverse interests to pursue shared goals for common benefits. his leadership also offers sharp contrast with that of the bosnian serb member of the presidency milorad dodik, a serbian nationalist, who often uses inflammatory rhetoric, initiating or supporting divisive policies. like karadžić, he claims that srebrenica wasfake news or in his words “staged tragedy with an aim to satanize the serbs” (voice of america 2018). in september 2019, dodik praised the creation of a separate republika srpska interior ministry militarised police force for the protection of bosnian serb citizens and property (smith 2019). dodik also continues to contend that b&h is “an impossible state” and that the republika srpska’s divergent interest is best served through autonomy or secession. dodik illustrates a politician who opts to use the dpa to perpetuate liminality and block unity. to conclude regarding đinđić, komšić, dodik and other politicians, they exist on a spectrum from platonic leader toirrational politicianto self-serving trickster. real leaders do not merely advance individual and societal freedom, security, and opportunity; real leaders facilitate these outcomes while also unifying society. by contrast, tricksters claim to value security, but contend security and prosperity only can come at the cost of division. in extreme cases, the supposed security mandates division through tactics which include ethnic cleansing, walling, and secession. šešelj, izetbegović, milošević and karadžić made such claims. while miloševićrepresents an archetype irrational politician/trickster whose access to material power enabled devastating results, šešelj, izetbegović, and karadžić also fuelled the destruction of b&h. they responded to milošević with supporting or contending narratives which rather than countering his divisive tactics, furthered the basis for popular beliefs in mythical notions of insecurity and enemies. karadžić asserted that the bosnian serbs must “admit that the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 32 published by scholink inc. muslims have been planted to us as a people whose executioners we are to be” (karadžić, 2009, p. 532). the problem with such binary division, and certainly such violence, however, is that real security and freedom is then elusive because individuals and societies are locked into a debilitating schism. recalling weber, irrational politicians and their politics actually open society to insecurity through the creation of enemies and perpetuation of violent “solutions”. currently citizens are trapped in a viral, divisive liminality which some elected officials and their institutions find convenient to perpetuate. in weber’s terminology, b&h elites are living off the politics rather than for the politics, and accordingly freezing liminality such that b&h exhibits many of the features of the iron cage of modernity. it seems evident from other post-transition experiences 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(1996). origins of a catastrophe: yugoslavia and its destroyers—america’s last ambassador tells what happened and why. new york: times books. microsoft word ape-v3n1-p1 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 1 original paper kenotomy, creativity face to face with artificial intelligence george teodorescu1* 1 international institute for integral innovation, meran, italy * george teodorescu, international institute for integral innovation, meran, italy received: november 16, 2019 accepted: december 8, 2019 online published: december 17, 2019 doi:10.22158/ape.v3n1p1 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v3n1p1 abstract artificial intelligence wins an increasing capacity for undertaking more efficiently repetitive jobs and routine based tasks, using highly accurate logic-adaptive and deductive algorithms, replacing successfully the humans for these occupations. facing this new reality the ultimate asset of mankind became the creative thinking. enhancing and fostering the creative thinking should be a major duty especially along the educational process. whatever the domain of study might be, the ability of generating fresh ideas and disruptive concepts will be sooner than expected the winning trump, or even the only reason for employing a human operator. what is kenotomy? kenotomy is creativity focused education, leading students toward a seminal thinking mode, by developing their genuine imagination talent and enabling them with the skills for shifting approaches, encouraging unusual thinking pathways, archetypal perspective and serendipity, facilitating conceptualizing and recognizing the potential of ideas. kenotomy is based on the integrative understanding of the creative mental processes and uses an adequate methodology for addressing them, triggering the ideation process. kenotomy builds up creative minds, whatever the major of the students might be. how does kenotomy work? kenotomy differentiates two types of creativity: the reactive and the intrinsic one and describes the dedicated ways for initiating them specifically. first of all kenotomy relieves the acquired and inherent inhibitions, releasing and stimulating the inborn speculative talent and enhances the ideation ability, overcoming the empiric myopia by high abstracting skills and the routine saturation by a fresh apex-perspective. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 2 published by scholink inc. as a project centered education kenotomy develops individual disruptive thinking as well as the group synergetic resonance with spectacular outcome: original problem solutions and unexpected, seminal concepts. keywords creativity focused education, culture of creativity, disruptive creativity, archetypal perspective, multiplatform society 1. artificial intelligence? the public discourse is haunted for a while by a new syntagm: artificial intelligence, which would imply the existence of two kinds of intelligence, a natural one and a man-made counterpart. this is the fall out of an anthropocentric approach, where it is assumed that intelligence belongs to the humans, being somehow a singular aptitude of mankind. the universe is not chaotic mess, but a sophisticated and well-balanced clockwork; it is impossible to deny the intelligence of this enormous evidence. from this point of view, intelligence is an abstract and universal regulatory framework, an intrinsic one, like the harmony behind the logic, mathematics and music, for example. johannes keppler analogy between music and planetary system, is a discrete nod of ubiquitary intelligence. the intelligence is self-sufficient and indivisible, therefore the term intelligence excludes any attribute, like: human, artificial, personal, etc. the intelligence addresses different platforms, among them biological ones, for example the humans, but remains independent of them. intelligence is natural only, perhaps it is even the reason of the nature itself, but never “artificial”, which is an anthropocentric pretentiousness. under these coordinates the actual effort of simulating cognitive functions, with the goal of replicating the human mind and installing this on man made items, seems more like the intelligence is driving discretely this enterprise for conquering these new platforms too. it is not flattering to feel yourself as the instrument of a largely superior entity, instead of being the master of the universe, but the sun is not orbiting around earth either. this different approach suggests a better definition of this actual mind-replicating project: self-adaptive logic, instead of “artificial” intelligence. 2. intelligence and disruptive creativity the attribute “adaptive” implies a higher level within intelligence, far beyond the consequent logic, which is invariably and accurately following a predetermined, pattern, and a “hardwired algorithm” routine. the adaptive logic means perceiving the need of change and being flexible enough for reacting properly, besides the ability of following routines, which might be often the main task. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 3 published by scholink inc. scrutinizing the term “adaptive”, we find two aspects: adaptability by flexibility, absorbing the event’s impacts, but remaining the same, and the adaptability by change, transforming itself incrementally as an effect of event’s impacts, this is the mechanism of evolution. the adaptive logic is an intelligent survival strategy, supported by reactive creativity. these are the main features sought out by the projects focused on artificial general intelligence, approximating the human bound intelligence. as kenotomy shows, the reactive creativity delivers a consequent, mainly predictable outcome, built on empiric facts and current knowledge. therefore the ultimate target of mind replicating projects is the rationally thinking and routine based (τέχνη) mindsetof theemployee of today, the average intelligence. these routine focused minds seem to have no chance and a gloomy future, versus a faultless adaptive logic on a tireless inorganic platform the intelligence on biologic platforms. that is the nightmare scenario after the singularity point. but just the imperfection of our biologic platform and the dual nature of our mind enables us to keep on with human ascendancy across the replicated intelligence on abiotic scaffolds, as they are supporting the random, subliminal disruptive creativity, the unexpected approaches, radically different concepts, which are changing the coordinates, inspiring new domains of activity and even new strategies of life. as the disruptive creativity is not rooted in rational thinking and consciousness, intelligence based models can’t aspire to compete with it, as they are burdened by a conceptual handicap. disruptive creativity provides to the mankind’s a successful way out beyond the singularity threshold. 3. side-by-side or piggy back a world with parallel platforms of intelligence, biologic and abiotic ones, might be quite different than the unipolar world of mankind intelligence monopoly. the shared domain of intelligence might bring up competition, an unequal one, as already predicted by several grim scenarios of dystopia. they are several approaches in defining the domain of intelligence. in our understanding the scope of intelligence is dominated by the logic and includes: (table1: scope of intelligence). table 1. scope of intelligence the reflexive logic aptitude of perceiving opportunities and identifying problems the consequent logic capacity of following accurately routines the reflective logic ability of evaluating alternatives, selecting the best and even www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 4 published by scholink inc. the logic driven adaptability consequent ideation on paradigmatic, pragmatic logic and axiological levels so far extend the skills of artificial general intelligence, agi, too, impersonating the scope of human cognitive functions, which are related to logic and raising the concern of inequitable competition by artificial platforms based intelligence. in this perspective the dystopia scenarios of a mankind ancillary to intelligent items might be justified. fortunately the human brain owns a binary nature, besides the neo-cortex rooted intelligence it has plenty of neuronal networks, which process emotional impulses and even deeper, ancestral instincts. these intrinsic impulses affect the logic clockwork of neo-cortex, stimulating unexpected insights, and disruptive approaches and inspire unforeseen concepts. as a result, the disruptive thinking is a unique feature of mankind, which might hinder the accurate logic and disturbs the mindfulness, but triggers the outbreak of routine and incremental adaptive behavior. disruptive creativity is beyond intelligence; it creates the real difference and outruns the step-by-step pathway of it. the goal of intelligence is the perfection, but perfection is an asymptotic dead-end street. different is better than perfection, as it is outlining a steadily moving horizon. agi might beat the human based intelligence in every domain of logic, as well as in memorizing accuracy and capacity, but will need to look up to mankind for new approaches and out of the box concepts, which could be generated by the eccentric human brain only. under these circumstances it is the actual duty of humanity to shift the focus of education toward creativity, fostering the seminal thinking modes and setting disruptive thinking as the main goal of education by kenotomy. 4. kenotomy, creativity focused education creativity is generally perceived as a magic aptitude, a random inspiration or is fully mistaken with improving and adapting, the logic upgrading of state of the art, which is a cognitive process. creativity deserves a better understanding and a strong focus, as it is the particular asset of mankind and the only one, which will preserve the human supremacy after the singularity point, when the handicap across the non-biologic based intelligence will arise. triggering and surging ideation, better said, the original mental outcome by creativity is the synergetic effect of the interaction between the cognitive, logic-deductive mind functions and the subliminal: emotional and instinctual impulses. therefore creativity is the brand of mankind, as it integrates the unique, binary nature of the human brain. left alone, without subliminal or extrinsic impulses, or trained unilaterally the neo-cortex delivers quite accurate logic routines, even adaptive routines, and therefore expected outcome. this is the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 5 published by scholink inc. logic-deductive mind segment, supposed to be replicated by the algorithmic agi effort. but the human brain is and can do much more, overcoming the logic routine by disruptive, creative thinking. kenotomy is explaining, exploiting and developing this unique feature of human mind and facilitates the resulting original outcome, the ideas. emotional, instinctual or mixed impulses interfere with the regular neo-cortex operation distracting and disrupting it, triggering seminal thinking modes and generating unusual, unexpected outcome, like: reveries, phantasies, daydreams, unusual solutions, concepts and even unprecedented approaches. in this case the mind operates in a subliminal-inductive mode, leaving established pathways for generating newness. the seminal thinking modes (figure 1) are the effect of joint work of binary nature of human mind with both: cognitive and instinct-emotional features, each seminal thinking mode corresponding to a dedicated dyad. figure1. correspondence between seminal thinking modes and dyads a creative mind needs the harmonious development of both kinds of features: cognitive and instinct-emotional features as they are supporting and triggering the seminal thinking modes. this desiderate is intrinsic to human, inborn, as children provide evidence of most of the required features for creativity: playfulness, fun, courage, curiosity, passion, speculativeness, disruptiveness, originality and risk propensity. creativity is an innate, but inhibited, human ability and is based on the binary nature of human mind, expressed by the kenotomy’s dyadic concept of seminal thinking modes. by children the only missing features, for being accomplished inventors, are: perseverance, knowledge and abstraction. the mankind minds filling this gap by an education focused on: memorized www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 6 published by scholink inc. knowledge, rigorous logic patterns and convergent thinking (figure1), a strategy conceived in xviii century, as the upcoming bureaucratic-industrial time required a large amount of disciplined routine workers with a solid memory and rigorous logic-deductive minds, for following dedicated pathways. this educational focus was well meant, but is counterproductive for creativity and questionable in a face-to-face competition with agi. the inhibitory effect of this educational concept on creativity becomes evident in figure 2: -memorizing capacity, is getting irrelevant, as the real time access to global cloud memory is available everywhere already, and sustains routine and empirical myopia, which are severe inhibitors of seminal thinking modes. -the convergent thinking is inducing compulsory focus and fosters a specific inhibitor: empirical myopia -developing rigorous logic patterns has the fall out of the inhibitors routine and compulsory focus. figure 2. inhibitors from actual education startegy of seminal thinking modes the extent of damage of this educational strategy on the genuine creative capacity of children has been already revealed by a long-term survey, made on behalf of nasa by g. land and jarman. the survey quantifieda 85 % loss of creative capacity of the same children between the ages of 5 and 18 years. a recent neuroscience conclusion is convergent to this observation, finding that children by the age of 5 have 10 times more synapses than at the adulthood (18 years old), even if the number of neurons stabilizes at 80-90 billions. it has a dramatic pruning effect on synapses, this is afact. what happens to all the children between the ages of 5 and 18, what is reducing so strikingly their creative capacity and even mutilates the biologic support of it? the answer is obvious; the entire young generation goes through the educational system, based on: memorized knowledge, rigorous logic patterns and convergent thinking, meant to develop the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 7 published by scholink inc. knowledge, focus and established logic patterns, standard routine workers, the kfl strategy. this means, that the actual kfl strategy of education is trading the genuine creative capacity, which is the vantage asset of mankind across the agi for developing the cognitive and memory features, which are the trump of agi across the mankind. this is obvious a counterproductive approach. this sounds as absurd as it is, but it is another fact. seminal thinking modes and their inhibitors kfl is systematically inhibiting the seminal thinking modes, and doing so it is sending a signal for a major shifting of education focus worldwide (table 2). table 2. seminal thinking modes and corresponding inhibitions seminal thinking modes inhibitions integrative thinking, the big picture empiric myopia speculative thinking compliance to conformity (routine) divergent thinking compulsory focus (close thought) eccentric thinking fear of making mistakes spirit of endeavour fear of unknown grit reluctance until the monumental task of reorienting the educational strategy worldwide will have any noticeable results, the need for a strongly creative young generation will grow. the singularity point is sensibly forecasted for 2040. this sounds very optimistic, as the quantic paradigm has been reached by google research already in september 2019. these facts set the priority for kenotomy in restoring a good part of the young people’s creative capacity by contributing sekience the induced and inherent inhibitions. relieving inhibitions of the seminal thinking modes the main task of kentomy’ educational curricula is: fostering and developing the features of a creative mind (table 3). table 3. mind features and creativity related abilities mind features abilities mental elasticity shifting approaches eccentric thinking disruptive approaches archetypal perspective high abstraction skills ideation speculative thinking integrative thinking conceptualizing ideas management taxonomy of ideas www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 8 published by scholink inc. a special curricular role has the capacity of dealing with ideas, ideas management. kenotomy, pedagogic goal: the education based on kenotomy stimulates original thinking minds, animates disruptive problem solvers and business pioneers for sustaining the human primacy in the upcoming context, where the routine tasks and regular occupations will be taken over by artificial general intelligence. as such kenotomy has a key role to play in a new educational strategy, focused on creativity kenotomy is enabling the students to use creatively the acquired knowledge for generating new concepts and approaches, thereby extending the cognition’s frontier. tasks of curriculum: mental elasticity (shifting approaches) it is essential, to relieve inherent and acquired inhibitions, which are hampering and even discouraging the natural, disruptive creative process. as the main inhibitions are empirical myopia; routine and compulsory focus the kenotomy training is focused on them: table 4. remedial methods of extant inhibitions inhibition remedial method empirical myopia see with your mind-abstracting skills routine see with fresh eyeschanging several points of view compulsory focus divergent, random addressing topics archetypal perspective (high abstraction skills) developing the capacity for abstracting until the archetypal horizon, identifying the corresponding archetype to topic, as in the kenotomial cascade (figure 3). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 9 published by scholink inc. figure 3. kenotomial cascade kenotomial cascade illustrates the entire creative process, making transparent several aspects: -first of all the strong relationship between the levels of abstraction and expected original outcome, indicating, that any creative process must be preceded by an intensive abstraction of the topic until reaching the archetypal horizon. -there is no content change under the rational level (content line), but a superficial novelty based on forms, features, and functions. -the diversity of concepts and solutions is exponentially higher, when the creativity process starts from the archetypal perspective. -the quest for originality has a steep and dead-end way if the starting point is a material item or his paradigm. -just the archetypal perspective opens the wide horizon of archetypal shifting and facilitates reaching a sustainable leadership, far ahead of agi incremental perfectionist way -from archetypal perspective the material and even the paradigmatic diversity are relative, but inspiring cross-domain connections and new insights. kenotomial cascadeintegrates both binary domains of the subliminal-intuitive and logic-deductive thinking; ad therefore is the background frame and should be the roadmap of any project work, the central axle of kenotomy education, which is as well a problem solving methodology. along the main project develops a living creative culture, the entire class growing together synergistically as a motivated team. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 10 published by scholink inc. ideation (speculative thinking) the speculative procedures: association, combination, analogy, inversion, ambiguity, and extrapolation have an essential role for activating the reactive creativity. divergent thinking is required for exploring randomly by synergetic resonance and through the ambiguity of icon/word transfer. a special training of novelty awareness is trained for recognizing serendipity and conceptual short cuts, avoiding incremental processes. eccentric thinking (disruptive approaches) to stimulate emotional and intuitive impulses for seeding of neo-cortex, the emotional/intuitive dyadic features are the main stimulants for triggering the subliminal creativity, like: playfulness, fun, curiosity, passion, speculativeness, disruptiveness, originality and courage, originality, risk propensity. the surprising, even shocking effect of an unusual topic, the moderator’s art of introducing it and even the set up of the environment play an essential role for triggering the eccentric thinking. during any speculative work should be avoided any critical attitude, the eccentricity and fun must be stimulated, unexpected associations and disruptive insights are welcome. a good sense of humor and an easy-going attitude and are, besides the fine awareness of serendipity by the moderator, the effective facilitators for installing of mental team resonance, which is eventually boosting the ideas outcome. conceptualizing (integrativethinking) conceptualizing means, integrating the ideas’ harvest into a coherent concept. this is a logic deductive process, but nonlinear, with intuitive bridges, as there is no straight and smooth way from the rough ideas to conceptual configuration. integrative thinking includes a substantial amount of adaptive thinking for making understandable the original work of mind, and even more the disruptive one. the teaching methodology is a project centered one, therefore the process of conceptualizing is an organic process of integration for the bounty of ideas, generated in the speculative phase, toward a coherent and articulated concept. the descendent side of kenotomial cascade, beyond the archetypal apex, is a seminal pathway toward disruptive approaches and original concepts. ideas management (taxonomy of ideas) there is a semantic ambiguity, not to say a random use of the terminology related to ideation’s outcome. this arbitrary practice hinders a good ideas management. a generally ignored source of ideas lays in identifying, formulating and defining the rank of upcoming ideas and to evaluate their seminal potential and degree of originality. in this respect kenotomy proposes a clear hierarchy of subsequent terms, based on their phylogeny and level of abstraction: approaches >concepts> solutions> designs. figure 4 is a 3d clade representation of this space of ideas, which shows the relationship among these categories of mental outcome and stimulates the creative exploration of white spots. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 11 published by scholink inc. browsing along the axles and reflecting upon further potential approaches, concepts and especially solutions is an inspiring experience. more unusual the resulting ideas are, more intensively they must been considered as valuable. there is a bounty of serendipity there, even by the most trivial topics, many new insights arise, by a fresh look into the axles of space of ideas. the speculative-inductive nature of thus exploration is one more leap ahead off the perfectionist, incremental gait of the algorithmic way of agi. figure 4. space of ideas-original outcome of creativity for evaluating the ideas, they are two essential criteria: seminality© the potential of an idea for generating further subsequent ideas the iconic example here is the paradigmatic “wheel” and the world of revolving, induced by it. disruptivity©the degree of originality of an idea. the best illustration is the lamarck’s concept of evolution, max planck’s quantic discontinuity, or einstein’s vision of relativity, which have been not related to anything known before. kenotomy, the creativity oriented education, has the potential for preparing the transition into a culture of creativity, where a competition driven by disruptive concepts, would be followed by agi supported optimizing of the implementation into solution, as well as operation and adaptive upgrades. this major change of education strategy might preserve the supremacy of mankind, by transforming it in a fertile source of concepts and approaches, challenging steadily the logic driven agi, but in a synergetic harmony of complementary expertize. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 12 published by scholink inc. this would be a scenario of side-by-side, a partnership between mankind and agi, acting as complementary platforms driven by intelligence, one, a.i. with accurate deductive-logic skills and the other one, us, with inductive-speculative ability. as agi means intelligence on a man-made platform, there is one more important aspect, expressed by the question: 5. who’s whom? the approach of a shared universal intelligence, active on different platforms, implies partnership and respect, overcoming the preconception of an “intelligent” man-made item, like a smart box, or even worse of a “robot” meant as an obtuse, dull-witted operator. several dystopias are handled now, in the dawn of singularity, outlining a mankind subdued by intelligent machines. all of them ignore, perhaps intentionally, the disruptive mankind capacity due to the binary nature of human mind. besides the resentful luddites, who are loosing already their plain routine jobs to ai, they are even more professionals, who are performing some higher, adaptive job skills, but will lose soon their jobs to agi too. the way ahead is not a sisyphean fight against ai or agi, but developing original thinking and thus the creative capacity meaning shifting the strategy of education toward stimulating seminal thinking modes. this fear of a scared pygmalion is a wrong adviser. behind this fear loom the mentioned prejudice, which is considering agi objects, but objects. after singularity moment these man made items might be more intelligent than those, who would buy them. should be allowed to buy intelligent bodies? it is not too early to start reflecting upon the social status of artificial platforms based intelligence. this new situation is a challenge in many respects, to the business and to the property. making business with intelligent entities, disposing of them pragmatically and taking them in possession is no more ethically acceptable in sec xxi. the classic owner-item relationship is shifting in a new paradigm, as he object equals, at least the intelligence of the owner. iot concept developed a living environment of smart, autonomous and networked entities, dedicated to specific tasks, but still preserving the anthropocentric mentality, of a “robotic aided mankind” after the threshold of singularity, many such intelligent platforms will be able to meet better decisions than their biological owners. it would be sensible to understand and accept early enough the need for a plural society, able to accept partners of a different material nature. as the intelligence on non-biologic platforms is rapidly upgrading, the mankind should consider acquiring this versatility too, however the procedure might occur, as the biologic platform is resilient by nature, developing slowly along generations, and not willing to support quick redesigns. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 13 published by scholink inc. they are several strategies for a multiplatform society, being discussed in the public discourse: cyber-society-an upgraded humanity by implants a world of human cyborgs, next to intelligence on non-biologic platforms, agi, like the neuralink project of elon musk. crispr-world, a mutant humanity, with a cognition upgraded by genetic engineering, risking a shrinking or the loss of the features, due to the binary nature of humans. this might be the ultimate disaster, as it would mean drying up the most precious asset of mankind, the disruptive creativity. in all these dystopia-scenarios implanted or genetically modified humans and agi would be competitors, sharing the same high and strict logic-deductive capacity, with all the risks of a selective outcome, implied by any competition. synergetic culture of creativity, a specialized-binary world, where the highly creative mankind creates and delivers the disruptive input next to non-biologic platforms, which are able to optimize, implement and develop pragmatic solutions based on the disruptive concepts, delivered by humans, until a new radical vision, or adisruptive change, provided by humans too, arises. in such a world of conceptual competition the heroes would be the creators of highly disruptive ideas and the material bounty becomes irrelevant. mankind is dedicated by her binary nature to think creatively, whereas the agi is specialized in transferring these ideas to reality, clearly making the distinction between creative humans and agi designed to transfer and optimize these ideas. this scenario recognizes the primordially of creative aptitude, as the human-bound driving force across the subsequent process of innovation, understood as a transfer process of conceptual content in solutions and pragmatic, concrete output. such a perspective is based on the mutual need and respect for the unique abilities and performance of intelligence on different platforms, recognizing mutually the benefits of specialization and the shared substance of intelligence too, but implies a radically different education for humans with a strong focus on creative features, meaning kenotomy centered education, for building a culture of creativity. in a culture of creativity the synergetic relationship of both intelligence platforms, biological and non-biological, makes the title question: “who’s whom?” senseless, and it is good so. no platform of intelligence should own the other one. a different question might be left open: do the different platforms share the intelligence, or intelligence itself diversified her platforms, for acting more efficiently? a last observation: there is not much time left to make a choice among the optional scenarios, 2040 is like tomorrow and for the actual children generation might be already too late, as the 90% pruning of children’s synapses by a routine bound educational strategy starts at the age of 4. we need to hurry up, making hard decisions. hesitating and procrastinating might end up in a still avoidable scenario. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 14 published by scholink inc. references angela, l. d. (2017). grit: the power of passion and perseverance. simon & schuster. pierce, c. s. (1992). reasoning and the logic of things. harvard university press. dr. flavio, f. (2012). functional role of frontal alpha oscillations in creativity. journal of neuroscience. ernst &young. (2018). failure boosting innovation-z generation.ey study. george, l., & beth, j. (1998). breakpoint beyond, mastering the future today. leadership 2000 inc 1998. max, b. (1997). ungehorsam der ideen-asugewählte schriften. springer verlag 1997. retrieved from https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19940029213.pdf richard, e. (1999). vatz' framing, discourse on creation of rhetorical meaning. nca convention, e. vatz on rhetoricandpsychiatry. microsoft word ape-v1n2-p80.doc advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 80 original paper the science of public procurement and administration. international public procurement conference robert agwot komakech1* 1 lecturer/ex-head of department business studies, kumi university, p.o box 178, kumi-uganda (east africa) * robert agwot komakech, lecturer/ex-head of department business studies, kumi university, p.o box 178, kumi-uganda (east africa) received: june 6, 2018 accepted: june 18, 2018 online published: june 25, 2018 doi:10.22158/ape.v1n2p80 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v1n2p80 abstract this paper reviewed benon c. basheka book’s chapter on the science of public procurement and administration published by international public procurement conference in 2013. the objective of the review was to expand on the origin of procurement, highlight the areas that make public procurement discipline to be an art or science and make recommendations for policy makers and researchers. the author found that public procurement is still at its infant stage with little known theory though it has a close relationship with public administration. although public procurement has existed from the time man started trade, procurement was chaotic and disorganized since there was nothing unethical or illegal about receiving kickbacks from contractors. the author also found that, procurement had no regulations until 1792 when us congress passed procurement legislation. the major procurement between 300 b.c-3000 b.c was construction of roads, bridges, railway networks and supplies of foodstuffs, army uniforms and fighting equipments. the study also reveals procurement as a blend of art and science because it is both a theoretical field and an area of practice. the theoretical field (art) is concerned with the teaching or academic study while the practice (science) deals with the day to day activities of procuring and disposing entities. the author, therefore recommends scholars to conduct empirical studies among procurement researchers, lecturers and practitioners in relation to the field procurement should belong to so as to have consensus on procurement field/discipline as it was done with procurement meaning. finally, since there is no consensus between public and private procurement agenda; it means procurement is not a pure science but it is an art and science. keywords public procurement, art or science, kickbacks, discipline www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 81 published by scholink inc. 1. introduction benon c. basheka’s book chapter on the science of public procurement and administration has ignited academic debate to researchers and post graduate students during case discussions and presentations. with the observed forum discussions and research seminars, the debates whether procurement is an art or science does not end without a mention of public administration. thus public procurement seems to have a close relationship with public administration. flynn and paul (2014) observed that public procurement resides on the periphery of management science. the field of public procurement therefore, is at its infant stage with little known theory. chick and handfield (2014) have revealed that procurement is relatively new profession with little interest as it appeared to require little/no skill to perform the functions as compared to other business and management professions like marketing, finance and human resource management. basheka (2013) emphasized that public procurement theory must be concerned with the origin of the function within government; cover the theory of legislation for public procurement research and the role of various institutions and actors in that effort. although procurement publications started to increase in the early 1990s, the publication of the first procurement textbooks by england (1970), lee and dobler (1971) and bailey and farmer (1977) gave the foundation stones of procurement as academic subject (chick & handfield, 2014). contributing to the same debate, basheka (2013) acknowledges that, there is poverty of procurement content which has partly contributed to eventual neglect in public administration research. flynn and paul (2014) assert that procurement research is focused on organizational level aspects more than regulatory policy issues or public buyers with more studies emanating from the north american and european regions. this assertion holds because in uganda and other african countries most of procurement authors are the people who had a hand in public procurement reforms capacity development and training in their respective countries or scholars from law, economics, business, engineering, defense and health (flynn & paul, 2014; basheka, 2013). therefore, although public procurement is a key in the delivery of services to the citizens; its explicit elaboration on whether procurement is an “art” or “science” is still lacking. thus, the main objectives of this study are to examine and explain the evolution of public procurement, analyzed literature on procurement field, draw conclusions and recommendations from the findings. 2. evolution of public procurement purchasing is a function that has probably existed since organized trading commenced (callender & mathews, 2000). thai (2001) adds that the history of procurement is long. according to the existing literature, the development of the silk trade between china and greek colony started during the 8th century (800 b.c.) as reported by fuwei (1996); while the contractual issues associated with supporting the roman army in spain was reported as early as 300 b.c. (livy, 1966 cited by callender & mathews, 2000; grimm & thai, 2000). more evidence of procurement history is in syria where the earliest procurement order was written on a red clay tablet from between 2400 and 2800 b.c. (thai, 2001; www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 82 published by scholink inc. grimm & thai, 2000). the first order was for the purchase of 50 jars of fragrant smooth oil for 600 small weights in grain (coe, 1989 as cited by thai, 2001). furthermore, the construction of the pyramid-building in egypt in 3000 b.c is another way procurement manifested itself (basheka, 2013; thai, 2001; grimm & thai, 2000). sumerian societies erected sophisticated public buildings where the need to source was generated by demand for glass and other products that were not available locally. however, many organizations ignored the importance of purchasing at their peril for instance there was great tendency to belittle purchasing and treat it in a negligent and offhand manner. keeney (2007) reinforced the evidence that, most of the goods and services needed by government were supplied by commissioners or commissaries, who received a commission on what they bought for the militia or other administrative units since there were no professional procurement officials. in the united states, the roots of procurement system lie in england, as does much of the rest of the u.s. legal system. the english colonists brought with them english common law, and with it, the english system of military procurement (keeney, 2007). in the mid-eighteenth century, a british field army was responsible for obtaining its supplies locally. the commissary general was responsible for the acquisition of foodstuffs and related items, while the quartermaster general was responsible for transportation, construction, and other supplies. however, at the time, procurement was based on trial and error as a result; a secret committee of trade was established in 1775s during the english trade embargo to be responsible for military supply (keeney, 2007; nuxoll, 2006). during the period, there was nothing unethical or illegal about receiving kickbacks from contractors. according to (siri, 2005; miller, 1992) as cited by keeney (2007); authors reported that, kickbacks were the expected means of compensation for civil servants in a position of the royal navy clerk, which is equivalent to a modern contracting officer since it was unpaid position in government job in london. these irregularities gave birth to the first procurement legislation in 1792 passed by the us congress. the act authorized the departments of war and treasury to contract on behalf of the nation (keeney, 2007; callender & mathews, 2000). similarly, japan made its first tender announcement in 1678 for the construction of a bridge at reiganjima and minamikayabacho in edo and repair work of trunk road in edo (isohata, 2009). keeney (2007) reported that, early procurement in the civil war was disorganized and chaotic. agents from washington and richmond, union and confederate states, and private individuals on both sides all tried to purchase the same goods, thus driving prices up and quality down (keeney, 2007; nagle, 1999). in some cases, agents used public money to finance private ventures and only pay the money back if the private investment was successful leading to gross financial loss of tax payers’ money. this practice shows that procurement is still in its relative infancy and has not yet reached its intellectual maturity. from 1798 into the new nineteenth century, many now-familiar contracting practices came into being. the first requirements contracts were put in place to address the difficulties of supplying troops on the western frontier. the distances involved, over bad roads or no roads, with dangers from wild animals, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 83 published by scholink inc. bandits, and hostile native americans, made troop supply very expensive (keeney, 2007). by 1900, there were few separate and distinct procurement departments; and the united states continental congress became the first to appoint procurement commissaries. in 1950s and 1960s, procurement continued to gain stature as the techniques for performing the function became more refined and as the number of trained professionals increased. in 1980s and early 1990s procurement began to evolve and several books and articles on procurement were published (chick & handfield, 2014) to promote procurement as an important business function and academic field of study. during the time some people portray procurement as a passive, reactive and tactical service while others portrayed it as an advanced, integrative and strategic function. in other related literature, the discussion of procurement practices and concerns were tailored to specific industries in technical trade publications (keeney, 2007; chick & handfield, 2014). with introduction of major public bodies and intergovernmental organizations, such as united nations, procurement became well-recognized though procurement agents were basically order-placing clerical personnel serving in a staff-support position. chick and handfield (2014) studies noted that procurement plays a key role in the management of supplier relationships. however, in 1990s, procurement management had assumed a position in organizational development and management. consistent with chick and handfield (2014), rightly opines that, companies are increasingly improving their knowledge and competence in procurement. in other words, procurement management had become responsible for acquiring the right materials, services, and technology from the right source, at the right time, in the right quantity (thai, 2001). procurement management became more integrated into the overall corporate strategy and a broad-based transformation of the business function was ignited, fueled strongly by the development of supply management software solutions, which help automate the source-to-settle process. in africa, most governments that had just attained independence operated their procurement management through scattered and un-clear laws and regulations (odhiambo & kamau, 2003). the reforms in africa and other developing countries were results of joint efforts with various development partners like the world bank, international monetary fund (imf) and world trade organisation’s (wto) agreement on government procurement (gpa)/procurement directives like eu directives and north america free trade agreements. since conditions were varying from country to country; developing countries were not to meet all the international requirements (agaba & shipman, 2007). basheka and kabatereine (2013) assert that, the intention of such effort (reform) was to allegedly create systems which are more robust in responding to the changing circumstances and meeting the desired goals. the authors assertions rhythms well with hunja (2003) who early revealed that, the aim of the reform programmes in many developing countries was to establish a strong and well-functioning procurement system that is govern by clear legal and institutional frameworks to avoid financial leakages in government entities. to reform public procurement therefore is to have a second look at the existing public procurement systems then response to internal and external drivers (basheka & www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 84 published by scholink inc. kabatereine, 2013) so as to improve service delivery, financial management, promote regional integration and local firms by ensuring equity in procurement, and respond to donor pressure and political environment. literature has shown that several developing countries reformed their procurement to meet the donors funding conditions. for example uganda, ghana, south africa, tunisia and kenya created procurement regulatory bodies which are responsible for ensuring compliance with the new procurement legislations and policy; maintain consistency in policy and legal interpretation and implementation across some or all tiers of government; and responsible for coordinating procurement training in early 2000s (komakech, 2016; elegbe, 2015; basheka & kabatereine, 2013; agaba & shipman, 2007; odhiambo & kamau, 2003) except south africa, whose procurement regulation can be traced to the desire of the post-apartheid government in 1995. the aim of south africa procurement reform was to promote good governance and achieve specified socio-economic objectives (elegbe, 2015). in uganda, the body responsible for public procurement is public procurement and disposal of public assets authority (ppda); while kenya has public procurement and disposal act (ppda) which created the public procurement oversight authority (ppoa), the public procurement oversight advisory board and the procurement administrative review board; public procurement oversight group for ghana; south africa created the office of the chief procurement officer (“ocpo”) and tunisia has five different institutions created to manage public procurement (the office of prime ministry, the high committee of public procurement, the national monitoring office for public procurement, the follow-up and investigations committee, and the committee for amicable settlement of disputes). the major objectives of these regulatory bodies are to ensure that public procurement is conducted in a transparent, accountable and efficient way so as to encourage competition and achieve value for money. this analysis is in agreement with mawuko et al. (2013) study which emphasized that, procurement reforms in africa have to some extent brought modernity, transparency, competition and fairness in the procurement process. despite, the countries interest in reforming public procurement as a mechanism of promoting competition, transparency and accountability so as to achieve value for money; there has been little to promote procurement as an important business function and academic field of study in many countries unlike united states and uk having more than 50 universities having procurement/supply management curriculum (chick & handfield, 2014). in the next section, the researcher provides the understanding of public procurement field (an art or science or both) which previous studies have not addressed. 3. research methodology this article used a qualitative research paradigm and conceptual analysis techniques. the analysis involves speculating about connections that have yet to be confirmed with intervention research or descriptive studies. furner (2004) further adds that, conceptual analysis is a technique that treats www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 85 published by scholink inc. concepts as classes of objects, events, properties, or relationships. the technique involves precisely defining the meaning of a given concept by identifying and specifying the conditions under which any entity or phenomenon is (or could be) classified under the concept in question. therefore, the researcher used conceptual analysis to get better understanding of procurement evolution, public procurement, and knowledge of procurement as an art or science in the academic study. series of on-line literature search using key words such as procurement theory, procurement discipline, procurement field, the art and science of procurement, and procurement as art or science was conducted to answer the research problem. the search engine yields forty three different sources of which only 12 (28%) were relevant to the study. the major sources of the literature were from publications from the procurement forums, online journals/textbooks and international conference proceedings on procurement/supply chain management. 4. results and discussions this section presents theoretical results on the convergence understanding of the public procurement as identified by the selected scholars. 4.1 what is public procurement field (art, science or both)? united nations development programme (2007) defines public procurement as; an overall process of acquiring goods, civil works and services which includes all functions from the identification of needs, selection and solicitation of sources, preparation and award of contract, and all phases of contract administration through the end of a services’ contract or the useful life of an asset. this implies that, public procurement is one of the many functions of the government that presents good potential for assisting government attain its numerous goals. according to komakech (2016), public procurement is one of the governments most appropriate means to respond to the population needs in a way of not only to deliver public goods or services but also ensures value for money so as to improve their lives and living conditions. although public procurement has agreed meaning with uniform process, methods, organizational structures in practice, public procurement as an academic field of study lacks a known home in most universities. the few public procurement courses remain with no clear home in most universities, unlike other disciplines like law, economics, sociology or political science; procurement also lacks common methodological agenda for engaging in scientific research (thai, 2001; basheka, 2013). thus, public procurement is now a subject claimed by many disciplines. chick and handfield (2014) observed that procurement is at the heart of supply chain management that focused on supplier relationships. basheka (2013) postulates that lack of an agreed upon locus and focus of public procurement research among the practitioners is too huge a gap to remain unattended to. the author adds that, scholars need to move away from the “art” to the “science” of public procurement; because public procurement cannot claim to be a science without firm theoretical knowledge to guide researchers on the appropriate “focus and locus” of its subject matter. an art presupposes human skills; and although it calls for www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 86 published by scholink inc. knowledge, its emphasis is upon practice rather than theory. a science is concerned with trained skill and presupposes knowledge acquired by study. therefore, procurement is a blend of art and science combining business category and supply expert with leading technology, data analysis and associated value-based decision support capabilities. the attributes that qualifies procurement as art and science are discussed below: since science deals with systematic study of knowledge; procurement planning, reviewing specifications, preparing and analyzing bids, negotiating contracts, handling purchase orders, contract management and more is the science of procurement. procurement follow a common process, but how it’s carried out depend on circumstances at hand and is affected by many different factors (https://www.bayt.com/en/specialties/q/144256/is-procurement-an-art-or-science/). sohini kar a business analyst noted that procurement demands a broad skill set and stringent attention to detail. bartolini (2016) noted that, procurement operation is composed of people with different skills, experiences, and motivations. however, the “art” of procurement is acquired mostly through experience. according to bartolini (2016) procurement is an art because it involves the knowledge and insight from the humanities and the social and behavioral sciences; nuance and negotiation are critical to the craft. it is the knowledge of what to watch for in every step of the process to consistently get the best value on the right equipment and avoid costly mistakes. it’s about knowing how to make the most of relationships with suppliers. furthermore, rules in science are considered to be so rigid and final of which procurement follow the same path. according to thai in basheka (2013), public procurement is a science because it consists of procurement laws and regulations, procurement organizational structure, procurement processes, procurement methods, procurement techniques and procurement professionalism and workforce which every public organization has to comply if it’s to have a successful procurement of goods, services or works. in line with bartolini (2016) procurement is a science because it deals with process and application and it studies and tests its results; quantitative analysis and precision are valuable tools of the trade. therefore, to achieve procurement mastery in the age of innovation, procurement cadres must develop and balance the art (creative) and science (quantitative) capabilities of their organizations to deliver maximum value in support of enterprise goals and objectives. another factor that makes procurement to be categorized as an art and science is the procurement course establishment. in most universities offering procurement courses in the world, the course is housed in business faculties or business colleges while in some universities the course is under the faculty of social sciences and humanities. the table below shows samples of the universities offering procurement courses and how they classify the course in the context of “science” or “art”. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 87 published by scholink inc. table 1. shows procurement course name in selected universities/institutions & host department s/n name of the university/institute course name host department/college 1 makerere university msc. procurement & supply chain management college of business & management sciences 2 uganda management institute masters in public procurement department of economics and managerial science 3 jomo kenyatta university of agriculture & technology msc. procurement & logistics post graduate programme 4 university of salford msc. procurement, logistics & supply chain management salford business school 5 university of south wales msc. strategic procurement & management business management 6 plymouth university msc. international procurement & supply chain management plymouth graduate school of management source: compiled by the author from institutional website (september, 2016). therefore, the development of an academic field of public procurement needs to have a firm theoretical foundation that should have true hallmarks of a science. hence, for procurement to be recognized as a discipline in academics there is need for academicians and practitioners to come with independent procurement theories other than applying management, social science and economic theories (transaction cost theory, principal agency theory, institutional theory, game theory, organization theory, best value theory, and system theory) in the procurement discipline which makes the course more integrated to several discipline hence wrong applications of the theories. walker et al. (2006) study concludes that supply management/procurement will continue to embed itself in the management discipline. thus, public procurement should have stand alone faculty or department other than being housed in business schools or public administration departments. the procurement procedures take a similar approach in most organizations which is the ideal aspect of science. however, public organizations tend to have some slight differences in the procurement as opposed to the private sector organizations for instance some of the key differences include: a) private buying is generally in smaller quantities while public buying is generally in larger quantities. b) private buying has a shorter procedure to follow while public buying follows a longer complex procedure. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 88 published by scholink inc. c) private buying follows organization policies but in public buying, there are standard policies that every company should follow. d) public buying is concerned with supporting values and services to the general population while private buying is profit oriented. these differences is what basheka (2013) calls for an urgent need to build consensus on the rules and procedures that must be followed universally for various methods of public procurement in both developed and developing countries. since there is no consensus between public and private procurement agenda; it means procurement is not a pure science but its’ an art and science. 5. conclusion through the paper review, the researcher concludes that public procurement is an art and science because it’s both a theoretical field and an area of practice. the theoretical field (art) is concerned with the teaching or academic study while the practice (science) deals with the day to day activities of procuring and disposing entities. although some scholars have pointed out that public procurement is integrative in nature; because it borrows from other disciplines like public administration and quantitative methods; this alone is not enough in enabling our understanding of public procurement since some approaches, values and assumptions in public administration/management are treated differently. these knowledge gaps therefore open room for scholars to conduct empirical study among procurement researchers, lecturers and practitioners in relation to the field procurement should belong so as to have consensus as it was done with procurement meaning (procurement is about acquisition of goods/supplies, services and works). 6. recommendations there is need to ensure that procurement officials meet high professional standards for knowledge, practical implementation and integrity by providing a dedicated and regularly updated set of tools for instance sufficient staff in terms of numbers and skills; and recognition of public procurement as a specific profession. there is need for public procurement scholars to agitate for procurement course to be named science as it’s done in some universities and need for universalization of procedures so as to limit the challenges of; lack of agreement regarding the methods of studying public procurement and the conclusions arrived at; lack of ability to conduct experiments on the behavior of man in the public procurement process; and our lack of continuity in the development of public procurement research. finally, the author recommends that public procurement needs to be autonomous so that the functions are clearly defined and independent like inspectorate of government (ig), uganda national roads authority (unra) and uganda investment authority (uia). this will reduce the misunderstanding of the roles between the accounting officer who could be having less procurement knowledge because of the academic background and the procurement head who has full knowledge of procurement and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 89 published by scholink inc. sometimes more qualified than the accounting officer. references agaba, e., & shipman, n. (2007). public procurement reforms in developing countries: the ugandan experience. in g. piga, & k. v. thai (eds.), advancing public procurement: practices, innovation and knowledge sharing. boca raton, fl: pracademics press. bartolini, a. (2016). cpo rising 2016: the art and science of procurement. sap ariba. basheka, b. c. (2013). the science of public procurement and administration. international publicprocurement conference (ippc), 20-330. basheka, b. c., & kabatereine, d. (2013). public procurement reforms in uganda. a historical trajectory. journal of public procurement and contract management, 2(1), 27-41. burt, d. n., & dobbler, d. w. (1996). world class supply management: the key to supply chain management. singapore: mcgraw hill. callendar, g., & mathews, d. (2000). government purchasing: an evolving profession? journal of public budgeting, accounting & financial management, 2(2), 272-290. chick, g., & handfield, r. (2014). the procurement value proposition: the rise of supply chain management. kogan page, london. retrieved form http://www.mariellegallo.eu/.../download-theprocurement-valueproposition-kogan-page.pdf coe, c. k. (1989). public financial management. englewood cliffs, nj: prentice-hall. elegbe, s. w. (2015). a comparative analysis of public procurement reforms in africa: challenges and prospects. reprint from procurement law journal, 10-32. flynn, a., & paul, d. (2014). theory in public procurement research. journal of public procurement, 14(21), 139-180. furner, j. (2004). conceptual analysis: a method for understanding information as evidence, and evidence as information. archival science. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10502-005-2594-8 fuwei, s. (1996). cultural flow between china and the outside world throughout history. beijing, china: foreign language press. grimm, r., & thai, k. v. (2000). symposium on government procurement, part i. journal of public budgeting, accounting & financial management, 12(2), 230-332. hunja, r. r. (2003). obstacle to public procurement reforms in developing countries. in s. arrowsmith, & m. trybus (eds.), public procurement: the continuing revolution. kluwer international, the hangue. isohata, h. (2009). historical study on the development of construction management system in japan. proceedings of the third international congress on construction history, cottbus, may(2009). keeney, s. (2007). the foundations of government contracting. journal of contract management, 7-19. komakech, r. a. (2016). best public procurement systems in uganda: objectives, principles and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 90 published by scholink inc. required professional skills. public policy and administration research, 6(8), 20-29. livy, l. (1966). history of rome xxiii-xxi. in n. louis, & m. reinhold (eds.), roman civilization: sourcebook 1, the republic. new york: harper and row publishers. mawuko, d., fisher, r., & gapp, r. (2013). procurement reforms in africa: the strides, challenges and improvement opportunities. public administration research, 2(2), 49-57. miller, n. (1992). stealing from america: a history of corruption from jamestown to reagan. new york: paragon house. nagle, j. f. (1999). a history of government contracting (2nd ed). washington, dc: the george washington university. nuxoll, e. m. (2006). united states at war: understanding conflict and society. secret committee of congress. abc-clio. mid-continent public library, kansas city. odhiambo, w., & kamau, p. (2003). public procurement: lessons from kenya, tanzania and uganda. the integration of developing countries into the world trading system. oecd working paper, 208. https://doi.org/10.1787/804363300553 siri, g. (2005). procurement professionals and ethics: a little history (pp. 1-2). ncma tri valley chapter times. thai, k. v. (2001). public procurement re-examined. journal of public procurement, 1(1), 9-50. united nations development programme. (2007). contract, asset and procurement management user guide. retrieved from http://www.content.undp.org/go/userguide/cap/procurement walker, h., caldwell, n., phillips, w., & johnsen, t. e. (2006). supply management: is it a discipline? international journal of operations & production management. retrieved from http://www.researchgate.net/publication/240260039 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 14 original paper new geopolitical realities in the armenian-azerbaijani confrontation and prospects for the development of cooperation prof. dr. chingiz ismayilov 1* 1 baku state university, azerbaijan * prof. dr. chingiz ismayilo, e-maill: ischingiz@gmail.com received: may 14, 2023 accepted: june 25, 2023 online published: july 03, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n3p14 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n3p14 the formation of new sovereign states in the post-soviet space took place under very difficult conditions of aggravation of ethnic conflicts, deterioration in welfare and a sharp drop in the standard of living of people. under these conditions, ethnic conflicts began to act as the most destructive forces, the foundations of which were laid by the policy of tsarist russia, and later continued by the leadership of the russian state. so, over the past 200 years, the russian leadership, in accordance with its geopolitical interests, has consistently and purposefully changed the ethno-confessional map of the caucasus. for example, by settling kuban cossacks on the historical lands of chechens, ossetians on the lands of ingush, armenians on the lands of azerbaijanis and ubykhs, georgians on the lands of meskhetian turks and abkhazians, etc., russian politicians have created “time bombs”, i.e., areas of potential ethnic conflicts. the ethnopolitical map of the modern caucasus was largely formed at the beginning of the twentieth century, as a consequence of the results of the military confrontations between russia and turkey. during this period, the armenian republic was established on the historical lands of western azerbaijan, with the support of tsarist russia, which later expanded geographically at the expense of the new territories of the republic of azerbaijan. in 1923, the nagorno-karabakh autonomous region (nkao) was established on the territory of the republic of azerbaijan, where armenians mainly lived. the autonomous region had great privileges, the top officials in the leadership of state structures were predominantly armenians. azerbaijanis living in the nkao, whose share in the population was 25%, held the positions of deputy leaders of armenians. despite the fact that armenians lived mainly in mountainous areas in the nkao, their standard of living was much higher than in the mountainous areas of other regions of azerbaijan and armenia itself. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 15 published by scholink inc. territorial claims of armenians against azerbaijan, turkey, and georgia have deep historical roots. the historical myths invented by the armenians themselves about “great armenia, from the sea to the sea”, did not give a rest to the nationalist armenians. armenian national chauvinists, fueled by the support of the armenian diaspora, repeatedly raised the issue of the annexation of the nkao to armenia over the past century. the collapse of the union and the civil confrontation in azerbaijan created conditions for the military aggression of armenia and the subsequent occupation of the nkao and 7 administrative districts around it, the area of which was 3 times larger than that of the territory of the region itself. of course, armenia would not have been able to occupy such a vast area on its own. in the confrontation with azerbaijan, russia provided direct military assistance to armenia, not to mention the fact that the russian military fought on the side of the armenians. iran also, due to its own geopolitical interests, provided direct economic and humanitarian assistance to armenia. without the help and support of russia and iran, the armenian side would not have been able to annex 20% of the territory of azerbaijan. during the occupation of the azerbaijani lands, armenia fully used both the military and political support of russia and other “geopolitical players”, who continued to use it as a puppet to solve their own problems. this situation remains unchanged to this day, as exemplified by the policies of russia, france, iran, and other western countries in the region. it is important to find the reasons for the “coincidence” of the geopolitical interests of these countries in the region. the answer lies in the historical past of the region, where the interests of the collapsed ottoman empire collided with those of the above-mentioned group of countries. at the beginning of the twentieth century, these countries skillfully used armenians as an instrument of internal counteraction to the ottomans, which resulted in an inflated myth about the armenian genocide. historical facts show that mass violence and brutality on the part of russians, turks, persians, arabs, and other conquerors were experienced by almost all the peoples of the caucasus. however, the caucasian mentality did not allow them to tell the whole world about the long-suffering of their people. only the armenians shout to the whole world about their bitter fate, which once again confirms the fact that the caucasus was not a place of residence of armenians in the historical past. at the same time, a characteristic feature of the majority of armenians is their aggression towards the turkic peoples, as evidenced by the numerous terrorist acts carried out against statesmen, politicians, and diplomats of turkey and azerbaijan. a very well-known western scientist erich fromm in his work “the anatomy of human destructiveness (1), trying to uncover the causes of human violence, identified different types of aggression, where a special place is given to the characteristic of destructive aggression. this type of human aggression is distinguished by the desire of a group of individuals to carry out destructive acts. it is enough to look at the numerous destructions of settlements, villages, cultural, historical and religious centers in the occupied regions of azerbaijan to understand the degree of hatred of armenians towards everything azerbaijani. moreover, almost all the destructive actions and mass looting of armenians in the occupied areas were carried out after the cessation of fighting’s in the early 90s. this www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 16 published by scholink inc. behavior of armenians is a consequence of many years (including the soviet period) of anti-turkish propaganda and education of young people in the spirit of hatred towards turks and azerbaijanis. nowadays, hatred towards azerbaijanis and turks continues to be methodically instilled in armenian children in families and schools. such education, albeit in a hidden form, was also in soviet times. therefore, it seems difficult to expect any changes in building interethnic relations with azerbaijanis in the near future. no less interesting was the part of e. fromm’s work where group narcissism was considered. it is the armenian ethnic group that can be characterized by group narcissism this is something from the series “my nation (or religion) is the best!”. with all this, armenians have managed to present themselves for a century as a “long-suffering people” who were subjected to genocide by the turks. based on these postulates, the armenian leadership built its foreign policy, which, of course, necessitated the development of adequate responses from the neighbors. 1. liberation of azerbaijani lands from armenian occupation it is no secret that russia has played a leading role in the ongoing military-political and socio-economic processes in the region over the past centuries. as a result, a modern geopolitical picture of the region was gradually formed. the basis of russia’s military-political doctrine in the post-soviet space has been and remains unchanged the provision of military and economic presence in each of the neighboring republics. in the new sovereign republics, such an approach in building interstate relations was not always welcomed. among the republics of the south caucasus, only armenia has expressed its desire and support for the presence of a russian military base on its territory. time has shown that the invented “horror stories” about the military threat from turkey turned out to be just a myth. unlike armenia, azerbaijan, and georgia, from the first days of the restoration of sovereignty, expressed unwillingness to see russian military on their territory, which resulted in russia’s support for separatism in these republics. the occupation of nagorno-karabakh and the adjacent regions of the republic by armenia took place in conditions of continued civil confrontation in azerbaijan. the military-political support of russia, the economic support of iran and the misinformation of the world community about the ongoing conflict by the pro-armenian media of the west played a key role in the occupation of the historical lands of azerbaijan. azerbaijan has been trying for 28 years, on the basis of international law, to peacefully settle the armenian-azerbaijani conflict over karabakh. however, armenia sought to permanently preserve this issue, and to annex the occupied lands of azerbaijan to its territory. this was evidenced by the statements of the prime minister of armenia n. pashinyan: “nagorno-karabakh (artsakh) is armenia, and full stop” (2). such a statement became the point of no return to any negotiations with armenia regarding the resolution of the karabakh conflict. in addition, the armenian leadership, confident in its abilities, began to flirt with the west and pursue an anti-russian policy. this created prerequisites for www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 17 published by scholink inc. conducting military operations to liberate the occupied lands from azerbaijan. thus, azerbaijan began to independently solve the task of implementing the adopted 4 resolutions of the un security council on the liberation of the occupied lands of the country. according to the results of the 44-day war, armenia actually signed a surrender pact on november 10, 2020 and subsequently withdrew its troops from the rest of the occupied lands of azerbaijan. the appearance of the azerbaijani army on the state borders with armenia and the restoration of the territorial integrity of azerbaijan significantly changed the alignment of geopolitical forces in the region. the de-occupation of lands and the russian-turkish political and economic rapprochement affected the interests of iran and a number of western countries. therefore, as the subsequent course of events showed, the subsequent elimination of disagreements and the achievement of a peace agreement between the conflicting parties became a difficult task. the current leadership of armenia seeks to internationalize the post-conflict situation in the region and therefore seeks to ensure the presence of observers from the european union. as a result, under the guise of european civilian observers, former employees of the french gendarmerie and german special forces appeared in the border zone of azerbaijan. it is not difficult to guess that the russian side was not happy with such behavior of the armenian leadership, because russia’s geostrategic interests were touched upon here. turkey was the only regional country that provided political and moral support to azerbaijan. the historically fraternal relations between turkey and azerbaijan have played a positive role in the military operation to liberate the occupied lands from the armenian occupation. 2. why were international efforts to resolve the conflict not successful? in 1992, the osce minsk group was established to lead the search for a solution to the conflict between armenia and azerbaijan over nagorno-karabakh. russia, the usa and france were chosen as co-chairs of the minsk group. however, during the 28-year period of its “activity”, it “failed” to solve the task. despite the fact that in 1993 the un security council adopted 4 resolutions on the “withdrawal of armenian military formations from the occupied regions of azerbaijan”, the minsk group co-chairs did not make proper efforts to implement the adopted resolutions. therefore, now the attempts of the armenian side to reanimate this structure causes only a grin. an analysis of the course of geopolitical processes in the region allows us to conclude that none of the minsk group member countries was interested in a fair resolution of the conflict, namely, in the de-occupation of azerbaijani lands. the current situation fully corresponded to the geopolitical interests of these countries. the russian side sought in every way to ensure its presence and geopolitical influence in azerbaijan, which was confirmed by the course of further events in the region. the armenian diaspora in these countries has always exerted great pressure on the american and french leadership, so it seemed unlikely that the issue would be resolved in favor of azerbaijan. based on this, practically no one in azerbaijan took seriously the various meetings and vague “initiatives” of the minsk group co-chairs aimed at resolving the conflict. in the context of this, it is appropriate to recall a quote from henry kissinger’s doctoral www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 18 published by scholink inc. dissertation. he argued that “legitimacy in international affairs is based on establishing a balance between powerful states, not on promoting justice.” it is not difficult to understand that if the geopolitical interests of a strong state with great influence in the region are not taken into account, it is difficult to ensure peace and harmony there. since the beginning of the 90s, the iranian side has been conducting an ambiguous and hypocritical policy in the region. iran, while verbally declaring support for the territorial integrity of azerbaijan, has in fact always provided political and economic support to armenia. at the same time, the facts of illegal exploitation of pastures and agricultural lands of the occupied territories of azerbaijan by both armenians and iranian entrepreneurs were confirmed. during the military operations to liberate azerbaijani lands, the iranian side, under the pretext of advancing its peace initiatives, sought in every way to slow down the process of de-occupation and expulsion of armenian military formations from the territory of azerbaijan. after the victorious 44-day war of the azerbaijani army and the liberation of the occupied territories, iran began to openly conduct an anti-azerbaijani policy in the region. the armed attack on the azerbaijani embassy in tehran, the murder and wounding of two employees, the illegal supply of fuel to armenian separatists, the conclusion of an agreement with armenia on the supply of weapons, official statements on opposition to the opening of the zangezur corridor and other statements by iran testify to iran’s policy against azerbaijan. armenia, in the face of real threats of losing its territorial integrity, was forced to sign an agreement on the cessation of military resistance. however, the question arises how much can the armenian side be trusted? the historical experience of relations with armenians shows that trust in armenians has always cost azerbaijan dearly. so, after the bloody massacre of azerbaijanis by armenians in march 1918 in baku, about 12 thousand of its inhabitants were killed within a few days. these and other numerous facts of massacres of residents of cities and villages of azerbaijan (in shamakhi, guba, lankaran, ganja, etc., settlements) by armenians were later practically erased from the memory of the people. on the one hand, the soviet government forbade the discussion of these historical facts, and on the other hand, the azerbaijani people have never been distinguished by their nature for cultivating hatred towards other peoples, which cannot be said about the armenians. this can explain the overall concern about the current state of development of relations with armenians. having forgotten the treachery of the armenians in recent history, our descendants may again face aggression from armenia. evidence of this is the relentless revanchist sentiments among a significant part of the armenian society. despite the official statements of the armenian leadership about the desire to sign a peace treaty with azerbaijan, it would be naive to believe in the truth of their intentions. it would be appropriate to recall the statement of n. pashinyan, who in one of his speeches in 2022 openly said the peace treaty is just a piece of paper for me. armenia is still trying to use all the opportunities of its diaspora (informational, political, financial, etc.) in foreign countries to solve its own nationalist plans for the alienation of azerbaijani lands. in accordance with this, the current leadership of armenia is striving in every possible way to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 19 published by scholink inc. internationalize the post-conflict situation and attract more “observers” from foreign countries. another proof of this is the organization, at the request of the armenian side, of another observer mission consisting of 100 people from among the former military and police sent by the eu to the border areas with azerbaijan. the purpose of this activity is already long-term (within 2 years). the mission is to monitor the military-political situation in the border areas. it is not difficult to guess that former employees of law enforcement agencies (french gendarmerie and german special forces) will mainly collect the necessary data for the relevant departments of their countries. it should be noted that before that, the european mission, which consisted of only forty observers, was in the conflict zone at the end of last year, and their presence was limited to two months of presence in the border zone. the eu’s desire to support armenia’s initiatives is largely due to the growing pro-western sentiment in the country. the penetration of the armenian lobby into practically the structures of the russian leadership (informational, political, military, financial, scientific and technical, etc.) has significantly complicated relations with azerbaijan. russia played a decisive role in the armenian occupation of nagorno-karabakh and adjacent regions of azerbaijan. after a 30-year policy of supporting armenia, russia finally began to realize the importance of its own national interests and therefore changed its policy towards azerbaijan. the subsequent change in russia’s policy and its “non-interference” in conducting operations to liberate azerbaijani lands clearly reflected armenia’s real place in the military-political map of the region. the official authorities of russia declare that they want peace in the caucasus, but, with the provision of their own geostrategic interests. at this stage, russia’s main task is to maintain the presence of its military bases and “peacekeeping forces” in the region. to achieve this goal, all levers of military-political and socio-economic influence on the leadership of the republics are used. the course of the georgian-russian armed conflict in 2008 and the current military operations in ukraine revealed the essence of the ongoing geopolitics of the west in the post-soviet space. the western world is concerned about the development of russia and the desire to maintain its dominant presence in the post-soviet republics. the use of military force on the part of russia, in solving its strategic tasks, has practically nullified political relations with western countries. however, in the formation of the current geopolitical picture of the post-soviet space, great political miscalculations of the leaders of western countries played a role. the western world, providing huge dividends from doing business with russia, did not pay due attention to the growing tension in its relations with some neighboring republics (georgia, ukraine, moldova, azerbaijan). in all these republics, separatism was supported by russia. attempts by the west to create some parallel structures (guam, the eu eastern partnership project, etc.) to support the newly formed republics were not able to solve their pressing political problems. the western world reacted very cautiously to the military invasion of georgia by russian forces, which became one of the factors that led to the possibility of a large-scale war in ukraine. the main miscalculations of western strategists regarding the vision of the geopolitical situation in the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 20 published by scholink inc. post-soviet space are the insufficiently deep study of the mentality of the peoples living in this region. the policy pursued by western countries towards the post-soviet republics shows that underestimating the uniqueness of the current economy, the peculiarities and traditions of local peoples, the nature of relations with neighboring countries does not give the desired results. the use of double standards in the political decisions of western countries has led to a fading interest in assessing the values of “democracy” countries. therefore, most of the new sovereign republics are in search of a new way (not a western model) of their future development. the use of double standards by the west was clearly manifested in the process of the growing armenian-azerbaijani conflict. thus, after the occupation of azerbaijani lands, about 4,000 residents were killed, captured and reported missing, and after the cessation of hostilities, hundreds of historical and cultural monuments were purposefully destroyed by armenians. despite the repeated appeals of the azerbaijani side to international organizations and to the leaders of leading western countries with a request to facilitate the release of the captives and clarify the issue of the fate of the missing, practically nothing has been done in this direction. however, we saw a different attitude of the west after the liberation of the occupied lands. thus, the hysterical appeals of armenians to the west to put pressure on the azerbaijani side in order to release prisoners of war who illegally entered the territory of azerbaijan after the surrender of armenia were immediately heard by them (suffice it to recall the resolution of the european parliament of may 20, 2021, calling on azerbaijan to release armenian prisoners of war and other detained persons). at the same time, the liberated azerbaijani territories were stuffed with hundreds of thousands of mines purposefully left by the armenian occupiers. and despite the repeated appeals of the azerbaijani side to the leaders of western countries to provide mine maps from armenia, the issue has not been resolved for a long time. azerbaijan, in exchange for armenian prisoners of war, received 1/5 of the maps of minefields. at the same time, international organizations, groups of scientists and politicians of the west began to raise universal noise about the “genocide” of armenians, about the destruction of “the most ancient” cultural monuments. it’s amazing, but where were these government officials, politicians, cultural figures when the armenians destroyed nature, culture, ancient monuments, religious centers in the occupied azerbaijani lands? there are many examples of such a policy of double standards that reflect the true core of modern western democracy. 4. post-conflict situation and the feasibility of signing a peace agreement with the end of the hostilities in karabakh, the possibility of reviving the liberated lands arose, in particular, reconstruction work on the construction of transport infrastructure, housing and social facilities. thus, it was necessary to create the necessary conditions for the return of refugees to their native lands. for this purpose, the government of azerbaijan allocated funds in the amount of $6.6 billion from the republic’s budget for the period 2021-2023. in a short period, a huge amount of construction work was carried out. while the azerbaijani side www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 21 published by scholink inc. directed its main forces and resources to the revival of the liberated territories, armenia, with the tacit support of the russian “peacekeeping forces”, transported armed detachments and ammunition to the zone of compact residence of armenians in karabakh. at the same time, the illegal export of mineral resources from the karabakh mining fields to armenia continued. the open “plunder” of azerbaijan’s natural resources, the illegal passage of armenian militants into karabakh and the intensification of its militarization contradicted the interests of azerbaijan, therefore, such an escalation of the situation in the region could not last long. despite the repeated official appeals of the azerbaijani side to the leadership of the “peacekeeping forces” and the russian authorities, practically no changes have occurred. in this regard, the leadership of azerbaijan has openly stated the need to create checkpoints on the border with armenia. in accordance with this, on april 23, units of the state border service of the republic of azerbaijan (sbs of the republic of azerbaijan) established a border checkpoint on the sovereign territories of our country, on the border with armenia, at the beginning of the lachin-khankendi road. according to the statement of the state border service of the republic of armenia, the border checkpoint was established “in order to prevent the transfer of manpower, ammunition, mines, as well as other military equipment from armenia to illegal armenian armed formations on the territory of azerbaijan.” at the same time, the creation of the checkpoint is a response to the establishment by armenia of a border checkpoint at the entrance to the lachin road on the border with azerbaijan. it is hoped that with the beginning of ensuring control over the movement of cargo and residents of neighboring areas, a barrier will be established for the supply of weapons to the karabakh area where armenians live, and the illegal crossing of the border by militants from armenia will also be prevented. along with carrying out measures to restore the economy and administrative management in the liberated lands, negotiations on the establishment of peace between azerbaijan and armenia were held at various levels. the main mediators in these negotiations were the eu, russia and the united states. as before, the mediators of these negotiations, generally wishing to establish peace between azerbaijan and armenia, at the same time seek to ensure their own geopolitical interests in the region. based on this, in 2022, the west and russia separately offered the parties different options for a peace agreement. in the variant proposed by russia, the issue of the “status of karabakh” should have been preserved for future generations, which corresponded to the interests of armenia, but in no way to the interests of azerbaijan. thus, the russian side once again demonstrated its desire to ensure its military presence in the region. the inclusion of this issue in the protocol of the agreement practically meant laying a “time bomb” in the continuation of the armenian-azerbaijani conflict for future generations of the region. the past century-long period of cultivating hatred of armenians towards azerbaijanis and the results of opinion polls conducted in armenia by international organizations show that revanchist sentiments in the republic and the intensity of separatism among armenians in karabakh still remain the dominant component. in this regard, the words of former armenian president kocharyan are indicative, who openly stated that “azerbaijanis and armenians cannot live together.” www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 22 published by scholink inc. the west’s proposal to finally sign a peace treaty between azerbaijan and armenia without including the karabakh issue was very constructive. resolving this issue on the basis of compliance with international legal norms can help reduce the intensity of tensions between the conflicting parties. in this regard, the statements of president i. aliyev and armenian leader n. pashinyan on mutual recognition of the republics within the borders of 1991 seem important. thus, favorable conditions have developed for the final signing of a peace agreement between azerbaijan and armenia, which may be prevented by the “emergence” of another round of conflict of interests of the main geopolitical players in the region. references erich, f. (1992). the anatomy of human destructiveness (p. 576). new york: henry holt. peter, v. (2023). henry kissinger at 100: how will history judge him? – globalbar magazine. retrieved from https://globalbar.se/2023/05/henry-kissinger-at-100-how-will-history-judge-him/ пашинян, н. (n.d.). jam news. retrieved from https://jam-news.net/ru microsoft word ape-v2n3-p181 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 181 original paper participation and inequality peter bearse, ph.d.1* 1 a peoples and citizens congress, carrabelle, united states * peter bearse, ph.d., a peoples and citizens congress, carrabelle, united states received: april 18, 2019 accepted: may 6, 2019 online published: may 9, 2019 doi:10.22158/ape.v2n3p181 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v2n3p181 1. introduction there are some indications in the academic literature that economic or wealth inequalities tend to diminish people’s political participation (hereafter abbreviated ppp). why? let us investigate. one first needs to confront the geography of the issue. the link is contingent upon perceptions, interactions, memberships and other relationships at some level of “community” (or lack thereof). the relevant community could be defined at almost any level: neighborhood, municipality, county, state, national or international. the choice of level depends on socio-economic class. this turns on wealth, income, education and social status. only high class or status individuals are likely to have relationships that extend beyond the local levels of neighborhood, municipality or county. local will be the focus of this chapter. thus, we will be ignoring presidential elections and efforts to increase people’s political participation (hereafter abbreviated ppp) through mass-media. the latter choice is made because decades of studies of ppp have and social status. we already know that ppp increases with both and that it is lowest for the lower. what we don’t know rests on research that more recent research has served to reveal: the influence of “context”, “efficacy” and other factors affecting participatory behaviors. these are sensitive to the closeness of people in communities. again, geography strikes first. since one’s selfand other-perceived efficacy is somewhat sensitive to context, we will focus primarily on the latter. in or out of context, what do we mean by “self” and “other”? after all, selfhood is variable over our lifetimes. self grows with our growing up to include a greater or lesser number of others. the more intimate the others, beginning with family others, the more we are influenced by them. how often have we heard: “how you remind me of your father” (or mother)? for nearly all of us, efficacy increases with age, education, and experience. but the distinction between self and other still prevails. as we age, it translates increasingly into a concomitant pair: “individual and social”. this distinction is the basis of szewczk’s contextual study of ppp. (note 1) his set of factors at work—his “independent” variables—is not complete but nevertheless quite www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 182 published by scholink inc. appropriate: individual > contacting members of congress or other officials;  posting political messages online;  signing political petitions online;  voting; and  political recruitment (at the local community level). social > trying to persuade others politically;  being persuaded, politically;  discussing politics with others; and  signing a political petition in the presence of another. these differ from those employed by schlozman et al. (svb) in their classic unheavenly chorus. they define one set of four grounded on political campaigns: “working in a campaign, giving money to a campaign, going to a campaign meeting or rally, and trying to influence how someone votes”. (note 2) only one of these electoral indicators jibes with one among szewczk’s more generally political set of activities. the set from sbv are scaled in order to compute a mean score for each ses quintile and the from these the ratio of the mean for the top quintile to that for the bottom. in each presidential election year, the ratios for each presidential year are higher than those for voting, indicating that even at times of high voter turnout, at least four important indicators of political engagement are iniquitous. sbv’s graph of the ratio points show evidence that political “inequality actually decreased” during a 12-year period (1998-2008). we’ll put this in perspective as we go along. nevertheless (but in fact with much more), sbv covers “growing inequality” and its persistence along with the fall of unionism as essential components of “context” in helping to explain ppp. the sbv treatment is long on individuals and short on groups. the importance of szewczk’s distinguishing “social” from “individual” political activities is shown in his statistical regression results. he finds that, in local context, higher inequality leads to lower social trust that then engenders lower ppp. this is consistent with findings of others that in a “heterogeneous” (higher inequality) social context, group membership is less (alasina et al., n.d.). group-wise ppp, however, raises social trust which then serves to increase ppp. higher inequality at the community level (hereafter abbreviated c-inequality), together with lower social trust, tends to lead to more conservative social policies. higher community inequality supports lower personal efficacy, which leads to lower ppp. do these define the trump era?, or will the higher ppp of those in the resist movement serve to offset the trumpian counter trends? szewczk hypotheses that c-inequality will affect individual and social forms of ppp differently. note that “community” has psychological dimensions which implicate membership, influence, identity, need fulfillment and shared emotional connections. all essential elements of community are found in high-status contexts. low-status folks may feel they do not belong and have little influence. these www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 183 published by scholink inc. feelings are adverse to a community that may be considered healthy in psychological terms. volunteering is likely less as well as ppp (otto, 2002). altogether, these influences imply that community context has an affect on social ppp greater than that on individual ppp. there is likely to be greater political diversity among high c-inequality areas but social ppp may well be less. as c-inequality rises, social ppp declines among both lowand high-status individuals. in addition, both voting and giving are affected by c-inequality, but they are “ultimately private acts”. as c-inequality rises, voting and giving tend to occur at rates lower than social ppp. the literature points to individual social status as a mediator between c-inequality and ppp. individuals with higher education are more likely to identify more with high income folks even if their education has not put them into the high-income group. political recruiters search among those most likely to be politically active. as indicated earlier, the search targets are also more likely to be high-status individuals. the probability of contacts made by political parties rises with status (schlozman et al., 2012). yet low-income folks contacted are likely to engage in ppp at a higher rate. for example, in battleground states in the 2016 mid-term elections, contacts did little to raise ppp among the affluent but accomplished a lot to raise it among low-income strata even though there were lower levels of recruitment activity in so-called “areas of exclusion” (mainly low-income). no surprise: szewczek hypothesized that recruitment declines as c-inequality rises. previous studies had shown that neighborhood status affects ppp among low-status individuals. szewczk’s hypotheses are more precisely formulated. his regression analysis provided the following results for the social ppp activities he specified:  if an individual tried to convince family or friends to vote for someone;  among low-status individuals: as c-inequality goes up, the percentage of those engaged in ppp declines.  among high-status folks: as c-inequality rises, the percentage of doing ppp rises, too.  political discussions with family or friends;  as c-inequality increases, ppp among low-status individuals rises, too, but that among high-status people rises even more.  signing a petition in person (not online).  the percentages across c-inequality categories for are similar for low-status individuals but they rise significantly for those of high-status. if numerical results for these were reported, one could see a gap increasing between the lowand high-status sets. recall that individual social status is a mediator between c-inequality and ppp. decreases in social forms of ppp correlates with increases in efficacy while the latter decreases with social status. higher c-inequality implies lower group membership, which increases with social status. are lower-status people shut out from social forms of ppp in higher c-inequality contexts? yes. look again at voting and contributing. people often participate politically to gain some of the benefits of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 184 published by scholink inc. social solidarity. individuals are more likely to vote if there is social pressure to do so. low status folks have higher voter turnouts in higher c-inequality districts because of pressure from high-status neighbors. indeed, the turnout of low-status individuals is greater in high c-inequality districts than if they lived in low c-inequality communities. among high-status people, turnouts decrease as c-inequality rises. as for the gap noted earlier, low c-inequality zip-code areas show a 0.281 voting score. this is significantly less than the score for high c-inequality areas. but as c-inequality rises, low-status folks voting goes up, too, while high-status voting declines. this implies that social forms of ppp decline among the low-status even as voting goes up. effects are opposite among high-status people. here, however, szewczk apparently ignores people’s availability and utilization of time as a factor in the low-status sets’ lesser social ppp. most such people work at least two jobs at lower pay, leaving little or no time for social ppp along with other “social” activities. thus, one of his observations, that “in high c-inequality areas, low status people are excluded from social forms of ppp”, while it may be true in areas that suffer excessive racial discrimination, should be deemed false overall. it may seem surprising that there is no significant statistical relationship between c-inequality and recruitment for areas distinguished by zip codes, yet there is a relationship if the areal definition is larger—at the level of counties and congressional districts. at these levels we see recruitment among the low-status set declines as c-inequality rises. the effect could be a result of recruiting techniques, of focusing on more homogeneous (low c-inequality) areas. recruitment by family and friends is influenced more because the influence circle is more compact. 2. conclusions szeczyk: c-inequality has no effect on individual forms of ppp except for voting. voting goes up among the low-status and down for those of high-status. we have noted some contrasts with schlozman et al., at the individual level. schlozman et al.: the most striking contrasts owe to the authors greater attention to the real-life consequences of being “low-status”, including participation in means-tested programs in relation to ppp. “individuals... receiving means tested benefits have reasons to be politically active… nevertheless, the beneficiaries of programs…not means tested were more active…” (note 3). those receiving means tested benefits were more likely to discuss issues of basic human need such as matters involving poverty, jobs, health, housing (&c).—“much more likely to be discussing issues…germane to their own lives rather than abstract matters” (note 4). nevertheless, they were much less politically active, notwithstanding their “incentives” from lacking health coverage, living in dilapidated wellings or otherwise suffering the disabilities of poverty. schlozman et al., define precisely what “low status” means and its consequences for ppp. so, we now see the consequences of the many political vicious circles we have observed. we have www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 185 published by scholink inc. noted some contrasts with schlozman et al., at the individual level. those who have get more in large part because it is they who are politically active, contribute big money, and are more likely to contact their representatives and unelected government officials. conversely, the low status folks participate less and get less. this conclusion may appear to blame the victim. no so. what we have learned is that our socio-economically biased political/governmental system is to blame and that it is up to us to fix it lest the u.s. we love is lost. our system is polarized, corrupt and dysfunctional. only “we the people” can save it. peter bearse, ph.d., author and economist, january 29, 2019. notes note 1. szewczk, jimmy (2015), “the effect of income inequality on political participation: a contextural analysis, honors thesis pols 450. note 2. schlozman, kay lehman, s. verba and h. e. brady (2012), the unheavenly chorus: unequal political voice and the broken promise of american democracy. princeton, nj: princeton university press, p. 157. note 3. schlozman et al., p. 131. note 4. schlozman et al., p. 132. microsoft word ape-v5n1-p115 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 115 original paper pistor and milanovic: the codes of capital and inequality a commentary on law, economics and a new design for 21 stc. capitalism dr. k.c. o’rourke, jd mdiv, llm, sjd (note 1) received: january 12, 2022 accepted: january 26, 2022 online published: january 28, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n1p115 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n1p115 abstract almost in tandem, two scholars katharina pistor and blanko milanovic released related work on economics, law and inequality to discuss how the legal rights of capital have become so deeply entrenched in the operational treatises of the international legal and financial system that an unbundling of those privileges is recommended in this century to prevent the further unweaving of the very foundations of democratic institutions. the perspectives of both authors offer a unique understanding of the growing dynamics of the “politics of resentment” and the challenging options as “hyper-globalization” and the demise of its neoliberal paradigm continues to come under closer scrutiny—the policy choices and rule of law options outlined support the call for a new legal constitution for capitalism in this century. keywords legal constitution for capitalism, types of capitalism, rule of law and choices about inequality, coders of capital, global inequality trends, changing neoliberal paradigm 1. introduction and review method (note 2) the commentary summarizes and presents a focus review on the intricacy of how law works to produce and protect the importance for modern capital as legal patterns and centuries of economic development are analyzed and decoded. pistor offers a new legal code where capital is ruled by law in order to stabilize democracy and begin to redress soaring global inequality. milanovic’s analysis of capitalism outlines the future system that rules the world in two broad categories: “liberal capitalism” of the western variety and “political capitalism” of the chinese variety. this remarkably well documented research allows the master narrator of global equality to trace the contrast between the ideological foundations of communism and capitalism provoking new insights on the critical role of functional www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 116 published by scholink inc. democratic institutions. for the first time in human history, the globe is dominated by one economic system. while capitalism is a risky system, it also a human system capable of change in order to support human dignity. the pairing of milanovic’s statistical and historical analysis is well positioned to support the new legal code for capital that pistor is proposing. these two scholars join others who are care about democracy including piketty, rodrik, grewal , and others whose ideas move beyond the neoliberal paradigm for economic globalization towards the possibility of a new legal constitution for capitalism in this century. pistor’s analysis of the “master coders” of capital and of coding capital itself is juxtaposed with milanovic’s analysis of capitalism as the future system that rules the world in two broad categories: “liberal capitalism” of the western variety and “political capitalism” of the chinese variety. milanovic’s remarkably well documented research allows the master narrator of global equality to trace the contrast between the ideological foundations of communism and capitalism provoking new insights on the critical role of functional democratic institutions. the most significant aspect of the liberal capitalism model is democracy and the rule of law. these two components are credited with faster economic development, broader innovation, and social mobility despite the growing tension of class polarization across europe and the united states [ discussed as the “politics of resentment” later in this review] that threatens both democracy, its foundational institutions and liberal capitalism. both of these scholars rely on piketty’s analysis of capitalism, democracy and inequality for people of equal juridical standing as piketty describes the three negative impacts of inequality on democracy. milanovic outlines three predictions of democracy and capitalism offering three different options and six suggestions for the reader to consider. pistor attempts to detangle the regulations, capital assets and jurisdictional issues as rules of law traverse various jurisdictions. she too has eight suggestions that might be best incorporated into the design of a new legal constitution for capitalism in this century. 2. discussion 2.1 basic building blocks of global capitalism: how “asset enclosures” are coded pistor labels lawyers “the masters of the code” and outlines how they have spun the mechanisms of globalization into overdrive as the process now threatens democratic citizenship. she offers a new legal code where capital is ruled by law in order to stabilize democracy and begin to redress soaring global inequality. the basic pistor premise is that capital is coded into the law and that these predominant private legal codes—namely contracts, property rights, collateral trust, corporate, and bankruptcy laws—are used to give the private holders of some assets a comparative advantage over others. she touches on these core components of our financial system at the critical junctures where decisions over survival or death in economic life are made. debates over market economics often diminish the fact that capital is directly linked to and dependent upon state power. in her research, pistor strives brings law to the core of her discussions noting that law is the very cloth from which capital is cut. for pistor, the social relations that underpin capitalism and the outward “appearance” of capital has changed so www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 117 published by scholink inc. significantly, she wonders if the time has come to unbundle mismatched concepts of capitalism and re-bundle the making and defining of capital to include human dignity. pistor points to the basic building blocks of her structural analysis from within the highly integrated global financial systems but does not ignore their unparalleled legal complexity. her motivation reflects a deep look into the 2007-2010 global financial crisis when pistor first began to categorize assets at the core capital institutions of private law: contract, property rights, collateral trust, corporate, and bankruptcy law. these core institutions have not only powered the expansion of markets in financial assets, but they are also key determinants in the undoing of those very assets. when returns on private assets fell behind expected returns, private sector asset holders enforced their legal entitlements. in doing so, these private actors deepened the underlying financial crisis. her research is no small feat as she touches on these core components of our financial system at the critical junctures where decisions over survival or death in economic life are made. debates over market economics often diminish the fact that capital is directly linked to and dependent upon state power. pistor intentionally brings law to the core of her discussions noting that law is the very cloth from which capital is cut. the basic pistor premise is that capital is coded into the law—this is not an extraordinary statement. ordinary assets such as a plot of land, a promise to be paid in the future, pooled resources from friends to set up a new business, and even individual skills and knowledge can all be translated into capital in the same way that legal codes are used to code asset-backed securities and their derivatives. these legal private codes—namely contracts, property rights, collateral trust, corporate, and bankruptcy laws—are used to give the holders of some assets a comparative advantage over others. for centuries private attorneys have adapted these legal codes to enhance the wealth of their clients while states have supported the coding of private capital offering the state’s coercive power to enforce the legal rights that have been bestowed on capital. (note 3) pistor’s carefully outlines the legal coding of capital by analyzing four major areas: coding land, cloning legal persons, minting debt, and enclosing nature’s code. each section of her theory is interwoven with the historical perspective and multiple examples of how the work of the “master coders” [lawyers] and their coding of private capital has moved to create broader and broader systems of inequality. pistor provides no shortages of examples. her summary illustrates how different asset classes have been coded as “capital” starting with land; corporate firms; financial debt and know-how intellectual property. pistor systematically unpacks the legal order that sustains global capitalism in the absence of a global state or global legal system and offers a stinging historical review and rebuke of the rise and power of a global legal profession as the “master coders” of capital. her focus on the empire of law essentially outlines the rest of the text and pistor’s basic principles of review. the social relations that underpin capitalism and the outward “appearance” of capital has changed so significantly, that she ponders if the time has come to unbundle mismatched concepts of capitalism and re-bundle the making and defining of capital to include human dignity. pistor provides an excellent discussion about capitals’ legal attributes—priority. durability, universality, and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 118 published by scholink inc. convertibility. and then links these characteristics to the analysis the power of state where law creates and sustains the powerful social ordering technology, invoking both max weber and the need to focus on collective expectations. of course, the state is not omnipresent. the current problem is that for the capitalist system in place today, not all assets are equal and some asset holders have better rights than others. finally, even though capital has become global, it does not refute the argument that state power is central and still absolutely necessary to the structuring and success of capitalism. two examples are briefly outlines here. the analysis on debt and capital coding is a particularly fine compendium providing a detailed post-mortem on the history of debt finance—the story about how private claims to future pay are coded to ensure their convertibility into state public money “on demand” all completed without suffering serious loss. the trend she outlines the move from private owners of property rights to creditors now as the asset holders who have the strongest legal protection. only after the end of the 19th century did financial assets become the leading source of private wealth. in pistor’s theory, by mitigating all risk associated with debt these types of legal models have expanded from one unprecedented height to yet another only followed by steep downturns, safe only for the successful interventions of statesand their central or regional bank operations. (note 4) likewise, capturing “nature’s code” as outlined by pistor, she details how after fifty years of work on the double helix, the human genome project can map gene sequences but according to pistor, the demand for conversion of this knowledge into wealth continues. (note 5) pistor discusses in depth the u.s. national institutes of health mandate to keep the human genome project in the public realm and not in the possession of private monopolies. she sites u.s. supreme court justice brandeis (1918) (note 6) in his dissent that “knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas become, after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use”. pistor goes on to follow case law into 2013, more than ninety years after the discovery of the structure of dna and the completion of the human genome project, where the supreme court determined whether nature’s “raw code” could nowbe legally enclosed with the effect of granting a patient holder priority rights over the rest of humanity. (note 7) the court answer unanimously rejected this notion about nature’s “raw code” but noted that the synthetic creation of cdna which does not occur exactly in the same form in nature, could be patentable. pistor provides a wonderful analysis of how this asset enclosure struggle [a process of activity she continually references in her work] was not over land, or human “know-how and skills”, but, over nature’s code itself. pistor seeks to discuss capital not as a “thing” but as a quality as she references a recent book called capitalism without capital. (note 8) capital is always about legal coding and the ability to capture and monetize expected returns. pistor is careful but thorough in her analysis of how the enclosure of assets for the promotion of private investment has not been an overall success for economic development. (note 9) this coding of capital is an ingenious process that has been largely hidden from public view because it happens exclusively behind closed doors of the “master coders” www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 119 published by scholink inc. operating exclusively in the realm of private law. 2.2 how four legal devices create economic inequality and severe adam smith’s “invisible hand” pistor’s goal in releasing her research is to shed light on how we create wealth and inequality by tracing the roots of inequality as it threatens the social fabric of our democratic systems. lawyers as the master coders are paid extraordinary fees to place assets beyond the reach of creditors including public taxing authorities based on any given state’s law. and according to pistor’s rationale, public taxing authorities become more irrelevant in relation to conventional forms of redistribution. how assets are selected to be legally coded as capital, by whom, and for whose benefit are the questions cutting to the foundation of capital, the rule of law and the political economy of capitalism. the legal methodology set forth by pistor incorporates standard legal devices—contract law, property rights, collateral trust, corporate, and bankruptcy law. she structurally provides the review based on four legal modules which capital is coded and these categories bestow important assets and privileges on its holder. [3] these four areas area: [1] priority which ranks completing claims to the same asset; [2] durability which can extend priority claims across time; [3] universality which extends claims into space; and [4] convertibility permitting the conversion of private claims into state money on demand. while this review will cross reference these concepts for the reader later in this review, the full explanation by pistor is in chapter four. the full reading of her theory shows a metamorphosis of capital that not only goes hand in hand with grafting [or asset enclosing] of more new code onto new assets but also, as pistor notes, from time to time stripping assets of key legal models. pistor’s review looks at rural land, capital coding and its asset losses of the 19th century. she looks at corporations not just as legal models organizing for industry but also huge incubators of wealth and how the corporate form together with trust law was a legal device to change shares of financial assets to derivatives. finally, pistor offers up an integrated analysis in the last few decades of the rise in intellectual property rights and how that dynamic actually accounts for huge portions of market valuation in many global corporations today. even decoding capital and uncovering its legal code in the private sector continues to demonstrate that all capital assets are not created equal. interwoven into pistor’s review, references abound to historical and modern economic theory and legal perspectives including the “invisible hand” of adam smith despite the fact the “invisible hand” may not really be functional in any marketplace dominated by the private sector coding of capital. the empire of law from the time of adam smith was domestic in nature and tied to a specific state and their citizens. states now recognize foreign law not only for contracts but also for the other legal models which pistor clearly articulates—financial, collateral trust, corporations and the assets they issue, domestic parties that opt into foreign law without losing the protection of local court—all of these modulations are created in the private sector by the “master coders” [transactional lawyers] of capital. by dislodging capital from the public legal systems that begot them, there has been a creation of wealth www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 120 published by scholink inc. by holders of capital. it shifts attention to who has control of capital and its coding and how it remains perfectly adaptable to the ever-changing roster of assets and the wealth—creating benefits of capital. one of pistor’s well reasoned conclusions is that states have been all too willing to vindicate and publicly enforce innovative legal coding strategies in the private sector. she references calls this empire of law a patchwork. there is no single global law. selected domestic laws are stitches together sometimes in haphazard fashion including conflict-of-law rules that recognize these domestic laws elsewhere as well as selected international treaty laws. for pistor’s analysis, two legal systems appear to dominate—english common law and the laws of new york state. (note 10) this decentralized nature of law favors private sector coding of capital as well. the “master coders” of capital select their own private sector rules that best suit their client’s needs and thus, the “invisible hand” touted as the essential part of smith’s political economy and the grand marketplace idea is severed. whatever historical ties in fact existed between individual self interest and a broader imbedded social concern is non-existent. 2.3 the domination and coordination of capitalism’s economic principles milanovic in capitalism alone also begins his theory development with a historical perspective coupled with the contours of the post-cold war world by noting that the entire globe now operates according to a single set of economic principles—production organizing for profit using legally free wage labor with mostly private capital in a decentralized system of coordination. milanovic notes that the uncontested domination of capitalism based on the ideological view that money-making is not only respectable, but it might be the most objective in people’s lives, an incentive understood from all parts of the world. (note 11) the book presents two types of capitalism :first, the liberal form of meritocratic capitalism that has developed incrementally in the west over 200 years [chapter 2]. second, the state led political and authoritarian capitalism exemplified by china [but does exist in part also in asia, africa and europe, russia, and singapore]. [chapter 3]. these two systems differ in the political, legal and economic as well as social spheres of their state, regional, and global operations. the rise of asia in the last century cannot be solely due to political capitalism as milanovic points out. liberal capitalist countries such as india and indonesia also adopted the western model of capitalism to certain degrees. the focus here points to one important statistic—these two parts of the world, western europe and its north american offshoots and asia are together home to 70% of the world current population and 80% of the world’s output. these regions are in constant contact for trade, investment, movement of people, transfer of technology, and exchange of ideas. the statistical information outlined by milanovic for global income inequality 1820-2013 supports the notion that the geographical rebalancing of the world is putting a decisive end to the political, military and economic superiority claimed by the west. (note 12) in fact, in a short forty year time period, milanovic shows comparative data between china and the us and between germany and india and rising support for globalization despite the malaise in the west. the author posits this malaise is caused by the growing gap between the elites who have done very well in globalization and the significant www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 121 published by scholink inc. number of people who have not benefited from the neoliberal “trickle down” aspects of globalization—milanovicgoes so far as to compare this growing trend to third world countries where the elite are plugged into the global economic system and leave everyone else behind. the most significant aspects of the liberal capitalism model is democracy and the rule of law. for milanovic, these two components are credited with faster economic development, broader innovation, and social mobility despite the growing tension of class polarization across europe and the united states [discussed as the “politics of resentment” later in this review] that threatens both democracy, its foundational institutions and liberal capitalism. key to the theory outlined in capitalism alone are the detailed differences between liberal capitalism in the united states as a model different from political capitalism in china. milanovic sets aside a complete review for each model of capitalism outlining characteristics of each their internal variants. the focus on each descriptive model is on the social and economic structures that each of the two types of capital reproduce and how those structures come to affect income inequality and class. each of these model summaries are heavily supported with statistical research and relevant analysis of global trends. 2.4 future ideas on the construction of capitalism, market hierarchy, and morality the future of global capitalism is constructed by milanovic when milanovic notes that capitalism has two discernable sides: a side of lightness and a side of darkness. citing max weber, milanovic also echoes the economic and legal theory of adam smith, joseph schumpter, friedrich hayek and john rawls. in today’s world, milanovic notes that adam smith’s baker cannot sell his loaf of bread unless he also markets it on preferences and tastes convincing his customers that his bread is better. hierarchy in the marketplace based on rational pursuit of wealth is defined by weber as one of the key sociological characteristics of capitalism which is highlighted throughout milanovic’s text. according to milanovic, the morality that has kept differentiated pursuits in balance in the past has been outsourced in global capitalism. (note 13) even the constraints of social contract no longer appear relevant. where adam smith’s baker’s immoral business actions would have been observed by her neighbors, people who work in one place and live in a totally different place in the global market offer different challenges in this century. breaking the law in today’s commercialized society is not unique to this global economy. milanovic notes that there are no internal moral codes that check the behavior in the area of financial regulation and tax evasion. the behavior of top banks, hedge funds, companies like apple, amazon, starbucks, on tax evasion or hiding their assets from pubic tax authorities is a game intentionally played on the border of the rule of law knowing if they get caught, they have a cadre of lawyers to provide special explanation for corporate behavior. if that fails, corporate entities can settle. competitiveness and the acquisitive spirit are hard wired into capitalism but we have no alternative at this time to the hyper-commercialized capitalism that milanovic outlines. (note 14) for example, citing maynard keynes [1930] milanovic asks what if a european country decided that in its current level of welfare that each citizen enjoyed was exactly sufficient and could be maintained thanks to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 122 published by scholink inc. technological progress with a much smaller labor input?? this model contrasts the fact that almost all societies glorify success and power in a commercialized society, expressed in money, ownership of assets, and corruption—and that is why as milanovic points out, corruption is an integral component of global capitalism. universal basic income [ubi] is detailed by milanovic as a new philosophy of the 21st century welfare state. he reports his past research on ubi published in the 2019 world bank’s development report which was largely dedicated to the ideas of ubi as a means of dealing with widespread global inequality due to the current neoliberal paradigm of globalization. (note 15) although a complex analysis, milanovic notes there would have to be some structural changes or built-in mechanisms to deal with inflation and gdp growth. citing extensive sociological research by soderberg and offer (2016), milanovic notes that ubi has routinely been tied to broad concepts of social insurance as a necessary safety nets. but, as milanovic points out, the ubi system does not insure against risks, it completely ignores them. against the advantages of the form of liberal capitalism in the west, the form of political capitalism [china] promises more efficient management of the economy and higher growth rates. the ultimate objective is high income and wealth ideologically rooted in the very premise of global capitalism. rawls [as quoted by milanovic] speaks to primary goods [basic liberties and income] where people give priority to basic liberties over wealth. (note 16) everyday experience may suggest that people are willing to actually give away democratic decision making for economic wealth and greater income. the challenge for political capitalism as currently modeled in china as a global form is to constantly deliver high rates of growth despite the fact that this chinese model has an inherent tendency toward corruption. this is so because political capitalism as a form of political economy operates outside a rule of law. reflecting on 1986 predictions of democracy and capitalism [bowles and gintis], milanovic notes there are three options: (note 17) [1] a model dictated by the west centered around neoliberal paradigm for a liberal capitalism model; [2] a neo-hobbes an model defined as an expansion of law where property rights reign and personal rights recede, social engineering dominates, and state institutions are no longer accountable; and [3] a model based on a society of rentiers who lease or lend their capital to democratically organized companies [the author notes the third model might work if there was a greater abundance of capital, there was a halt in population increase, and labor would have the collateral to hire capital not vice versa]. of course, in any of these options, the working definitions of capital and capitalism would need to change significantly. milanovic wraps up his discussion about the future of global capitalism with an analysis of the closing income gap globally suggesting that it is conceivable income levels in china and in other asian countries might come close to those of western countries. (note 18) if this begins to shift, the author predicts the first sustained drop in global income inequality since 1820 might occur. milanovic shows how this convergence has already started by analyzing 2017 gdp data. africa and global inequality www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 123 published by scholink inc. remain key to sustainability according to milanovic especially as china continues to export its model of capitalism into africa in a broad continental partnership for economic development and sweeping infrastructure programs. this analysis is not simply tracking a set of numbers on the gini coefficient of inequality, it is the convergence of “real income” across vast groups of very different cultural groups of people. but, as milanovic notes, larger middle classes across the globe also means changes in the rule of law especially related to securing property rights and demanding political stability. the statistical analysis and the future vision of global capitalism offered by milanovic to support his two models for 21st century capitalism [liberal capitalism or political capitalism] is a parallel component for pistor’s methodology for how capital is legally coded and utilized in global capitalism. the outlier is that milanovic’s model of political capitalism [china] operates outside a defined rule of law. the code of capital sets out a very detailed analysis of how the coding of capital occurs outside the public law purview in the model of liberal capitalism and causes endless distortion in the marketplace that impacts inequality long term. in fact, pistor offers up very detailed structural analysis of how lawyers as a “master coders” of private capital deliberately work to bend the rule of law sometimes beyond recognition on behalf of their clients and their outrageous structuring of legal fees. (note 19) these attorneys are transaction cost engineers who navigate complex regulations, structure transactions to avoid all costs, and negotiate with state regulators to obtain full clearance—all private sector law done with little or no public legislation, public regulatory hearings or notice, and no public oversight to protect tax payers. these lawyers [the master coders of capital] who design new assets or intermediaries are deeply familiar with laws, rules and regulations, sometimes across various jurisdictions, as well as all the exceptions and limitations, and of course, of tax law. in addition, as pistor points out, capital master coders avoid liability through asset-shielding devices, shifting risk and loss to others, and by disclosing enough so that project investors are put on notice and cannot claim later they were misled. these tool kits cloak assets in the attributes of capital, to arbitrage around legal constraints and to hand their client a very powerful defense—“but it is legal”. pistor breaks out this façade in a detail. her analysis of how these very groups of lawyers and their clients in 2008 participated in the litigation frenzy when big market players sued each other even though they all had engaged in the misconduct themselves. 2.5 the intersection of capital, rule of law, and a new legal constitution for capitalism pistor and milanovic are not the only two scholars in the field researching how the rule of law intersects capitalism and how the current neoliberal paradigm [c.1980-2010] for global capitalism negatively impacts democracy and equality. (note 20) there is a growing “politic of resentment” around the inequality linked to the neoliberal paradigm [c1980-2010] of capitalist globalization that is causing a widespread erosion in constitutional based rule of law. (note 21) this growing “politic of resentment” is the foundation to support the design of a new legal constitution for capitalism. both pistor and milanovic reference thomas piketty in his transformative study on 21st century capitalism speaks directly to the negative impact of inequality and the erosion of democracy. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 124 published by scholink inc. piketty’s study of “modern” inequality documents where there is a widening difference in income and wealth among people of equal juridical standing. (note 22) this disparity among people of equal juridical standing will be a primary legal challenge in re-defining democracy in this century and, particularly for designing a new legal constitution for capitalism. piketty clearly has set out three negative implications of economic inequality on the function of democracy, implications that are clearly reflected in the politics of resentment and need to be addressed: first, inequality violates the basic principle of equity on voice and representation so that when citizens do not have equal voice and influence, the skewed nature of control over economic resources “poisons the promise” of equal representation. after all, according to tomasi, individual economic liberty is just as important to freedom as all other liberties embraced by classical liberal thinkers. for hurst, the corporate charter and what a state constitution chooses to protect may be two different legal applications of the rule of law in terms of human rights and economic relations. (note 23) second, as picketty notes, if inequality means that due to neoliberal mandates for public austerity programs, a democratically elected government is less able to provide public goods, respond to a public problem, or have the capacity to promote broadly shared prosperity, then, there is a deeply negative impact on political processes and democracy. (note 24) third, excessive inequality promotes violence, high levels of vitriol and angry sentiments in the public square of democracy, that in turn, ultimately undermines the ability to define emerging legally shared democratic principles and to secure the process of balancing the nation state at its core. (note 25) akin to the work of pistor and milanovic, piketty and other scholars who care about democracy, outline the basic principles of justice and equity that align and point to imbalances in the current global socio-economic order as evidenced by the growing wealth inequality and distorted income distribution. furthermore, these scholars also offer several responsive options for a new legal constitution for capitalism that could be coupled with global and regional tracking mechanisms on wealth and thus, work in tandem with the rule of law to build a responsive state focused –democratic institutional reintegration for this century. (note 26) piketty’s work and his definition of capitalism has forever changed the nature of economic modeling, statistical analysis, and its implication for state level economic capital management and wealth distribution. (note 27) piketty’s new definition of capitalism as a dynamic legal system supports the continual transformation of society, its social relations and its socio-economic order. in contrast to the neoliberal paradigm [c1980-2010] for capitalist globalization (note 28), the new legal constitution for capitalism as proposed by grewal and others would first define the legal parameters [ new rule of law ] for economic capital development and utilization—and then, using those parameters, establish a new sustainable global market paradigm or global compact for this century. (note 29) these parameters would be the new paradigm for a liberal capitalism as presented by milanovic and be based on democratic institutions and self-governance in the 21st century—not those parameters necessarily reflecting the long gone post world war era. that international private sector as well as the international public sector trade and capital investment www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 125 published by scholink inc. should be a means to an end, not an end in itself, is not a radically new idea. (note 30) as rodrik and others have noted, capitalist globalization should be a legal instrument for achieving the goals that each state’s civil society seeks: prosperity, stability, freedom and quality of life. (note 31) furthermore, rodrik distinguishes a dominant role for the nation state in relation to the principles of democratic decision-making which is the foundation for the international economic architecture and notes that when states are not democratic, the entire scaffolding collapses and one can no longer presume a country’s institutional arrangements reflect the preference of its citizens. (note 32) 3. conclusion both pistor and milanovic add to the stream of ongoing conversation around forms of capitalism for the 21st century and how democracy can be regenerated in tandem with the rule of law in political economy for a new global compact. for milanovic the importance of reducing global inequality does not reside in the single numbers of the gini coefficient of inequality but rather in the convergence of real income across vast groups of people. milanovic speaks specifically to the emergence for the first time in history of a global middle class but remains unclear in his conclusions about the political consequences. he references specific concerns about africa and its slow process of convergence in any kind of sustained way related to per capita income growth. milanovic’s prediction of an actual reversal in africa around per capita income growth is a real possibility. from the perspective outlined in capitalism alone, milanovic concludes that the next few decades will present a convergence across eurasia and north america. in a broad conclusion milanovic outlines the future of global capitalisms with a variety of options for structuring capitalism: ricardo-marx capitalism, social-democratic capitalism, liberal meritocratic capitalism, people’s capitalism and egalitarian capitalism. milanovic concludes that how capitalism will evolve in this century depends on liberal meritocratic capitalism and its ability to move into a more advanced stage with less concentration of capital incomes, lowering income inequality, and supporting intergenerational income mobility. (note 33) for his analysis, the trend is not about incremental policy design, it is about having specific measurable outcomes in mind. milanovic further endorses new policies leading to progress in this century which include: [1] tax advantages for the middle class and corresponding increase in tax on the wealthy; [2] significant increases in financing and quality improvement for public schools so even the very poor have consistent access; [3] what he calls “citizenship light” to end the binary debacle of divisions between citizens and noncitizens; and [4] strict limits and exclusive pubic financing of political campaigns. he essentially dismantles the technocratic tool kits of political capitalism. pistor’s summary discussion focuses on private capital coding and public power. she outlines this trajectory as capital “rules by law”, promoting a more active role for the state and its agents, courts and regulators so that public exemptions, tax waivers and other “favors” granted to holders of capital are consistently reviewed. legislation is recommended to create labor rights and bestow “new property www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 126 published by scholink inc. rights” for social protection and entitlements. pistor notes with in the changing fabric of capitalism, there is a conflict and perhaps continual crisis that exists between a liberal legal order that single mindedly focuses on protecting private property rights on one hand and the use of law to advance social rights on the other. this pressure may be making the neoliberal paradigm of capitalism as we know it today start to implode—this shift will require a new social contract between capital and society. this stress is reflected in democratic settings where the politics of resentment abound and voters turn against their own leaders. suggesting the need for democracy to prevail in capitalist systems, pistor points to polities regaining control over the rule of law which is the only tool they have to govern civil society including how capital is coded. the fact that capital is totally dependent on state law and its public enforcement of private contracts and deeds, should give agency to lawmakers, legislatures, courts and regulators to free themselves from the financial grip of capital and advance the project of democratic self-governance. similar to milanovic, pistor offers a list of eight ideas that could be incorporated into any 21st century design for new legal constitution for capitalism (note 34): [1] refrain from offering capital legal privileges over and above the basic modules of the code; [2] the conflict of law rules that facilitate the legal mobility of capital are really part of domestic legal orders and not enshrined in international treaty law and, thus, can be rolled back one state at a time; [3] limit arbitration or private settlement of disputes from presiding over issues of social policy like investor-state disputes, major policy issues like anti-trust policy or state domestic regulatory domains, and strictly prohibit these mechanisms between parties of highly unequal bargaining power; [4] planning pre-emptively to prevent state tax bailouts of private capital gone wrong can be built into how capital is legally coded so that achieving state stability is not forced to be in a “reactionary” mode; [5]new mechanisms are needed for those who loose in an economic crisis such as seeking compensation for damages ex post in amounts that effectively engender deterrence; [6] resurrect old limitations on capital so that for example, purely speculative contracts or wagers are not enforceable in court; [7] avoid acts of legal harmonization for the coding of capital which is ridden with the influence of special interests, but rather, move in favor of capital roving especially through the united states, new york state and the united kingdom that better balanced with other social goals—citing polanyi’s warning against the subversion of society to the market principle against which society will revolt; and [8] liberate lawyers as the master coders of capital to become independent from capital which will also require a deep rethink how to fund legal education and how to structure payat leading law firms. overall, each scholar standing alone offers a fascinating and relevant theory of economics and law in relation to the changing challenges and dynamics of the current neoliberal paradigm [1980-2010] for capitalism globalization. yet the combination of milanovic’s work in global inequality and systems of capitalism offers a choice set that is possible for this generation. pistor highlights the technical parameters of the coding of capital and system and regulatory changes needed to rebalance the inequality that is festering all over the globe which will demand a changing legal code for capitalism www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 127 published by scholink inc. that redefines and secures the democratic social contract and liberal capitalism in this century. notes note 1. dr. k.a.c. o’rourke, jd, m.div., ll.m; holds a doctorate of juridical science with dual masters of law [ll.m; international law and business; government law & regulation] from washington college of law/ american university, washington, dc./usa; o’rourke has taught as adjunct faculty at washington college of law and holds a juris doctorate from drake university law school; o’rourke is a private consultant, educator and serves in the core executive leadership circle at the bridging institute in maryland usa; orourke publishes in the area of state sovereignty, globalization and economics, participatory democracy and individual liberty. see o’rourke, k.a.c. sovereignty post-brexit, the state’s core function and eu reintegration. european studies: the review of european law, economics and politics, caes, 2017,vol 4 [wolter-kluwer, march 2018],140-164 [discussing in depth the demise of the neoliberal paradigm (c.1980-2010) of capitalist globalization; meta-research provided; presents a framework of liberty for 21st century to support state core function based on balancing economic capital, social capital and human capital]; see also o’rourke, k.a.c., post-brexit: the politics of resentment and eu reintegration-creating a new legal constitution for capitalism. international and comparative law review, vol.19. no.1,2019, pages 38-73 [analysis of the politics of resentment and application of the geonomos model for state sovereignty in the 21st century relying on the cornerstones of justice, equity, and human dignity]. the geonomos© model is a copyrighted series of schematics designed by orourke, depicting 21st century transitions in the role of the nation state and its legitimate expression of sovereignty. interdisciplinary comments are welcomed and encouraged at email: geonomos777@gmail.com. note 2. pistor katharina. the code of capital: how law creates wealth and inequality. princeton, nj: princeton university press, 2019 [297pg] [pistor is the edwin b. parker professor of comparative law and director of the center for global legal transformation at columbia law school; written extensively in the areas of law and capitalism, legal system and economic development and growing access needs to essential resources]; see also milanovic, branko. capitalism alone: the future of the system that rules the world. cambridge, ma: harvard university press, 2019 [287pg] [milanovic is the visiting professor and core faculty at the stone center on socio-economic inequality at the graduate center, city university of new york; former lead economist in the world bank’s research department and has written extensively in the area of global inequality, law and development and its history] note 3. pistor, katharina. the code of capital: how law create wealth and inequality. princeton, nj: princeton university press, 2019 [pistor’s methodology looks at what she calls “modules” of law in contract, property rights, collateral, corporate law, trust, and bankruptcy across four characteristics: [a]priority which ranks completing claims to same asset;[b] durability which can extend priority claims across time, [c]universality which extends claims into space, and [d]convertibility permitting the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 128 published by scholink inc. conversion of private claims into state money on demand] note 4. the post-mortem by pistor on nc2 complex debt instruments points to the “shadow” banking that emerged over the last few decades. pistor unravels the creation and operation of cmlti 2006-nc2 also known as the citigroup mortgage loan trust 2006-new century 2 established under new york laws and a nc-2 california bankruptcy case in 2007 long before lehman’s downswing triggered the 2008 crisis and great recession. the analysis of modern securitization business and the legal codes that were written contractually—all designed by private practice transactional lawyers. note 5. supra, note 2, chapter 5 at pages 108-131. note 6. int’l news serv. v. associated press, 248 u.s.215,250 [1918] [brandeis, j., dissenting, p 248ff] note 7. association for molecular pathology v myriad genetics, inc, 509 u.s. 576 ;590-596[2013 ] note 8. haskel and westlake, capitalism without capital. princeton, nj: princeton university press, 2018. [book argues that the market value of leading corporations is not determined by physical assets they might own and use for production but their market value is based on intangibles such as patents, copyrights, trademarks, and the branding of business operations that flow from those intangibles; haskel and westlake align mapping of the law and national accounts concluding that half of in tangible investments are not even recognized on national accounts; pistor cross references haskel and westlake at table 3.1, page 44] note 9. supra, note 2, chapter 5, page 117-131. [suggesting that the capture of knowledge has led to an “investment famine” ; noting that it was that u.s. based private industry took the lead in elevating and expanding u.s intellectual property rights to global legal standards; and how trips agreements does not full harmonize ip rights.] note 10. supra, note 2, pistorat pages 7-12 note 11. milanovic, branko. capitalism alone: the future system that rules the world. cambridge, ma: harvard university press, 2019. note 12. ibid, note 10, milanovic, page 8-11 note 13. ibid, note 10 at 180-182 note 14. ibid, note 10 at 186-87 note 15. supra, note10, at 203-205, citing world bank, the changing nature of work. world development report 2019; available at https://pubdocx.worldbank.org/en/816281518818814423/2019-wdr-concepts-note/pdf [this report was primary devoted to discussed the scope and range of proposals for universal basic income] note 16. ibid, milanovic at 209-2011 note 17. ibid, milanovic at 211 note 18. ibid, milanovic, at 211, 2012-2014 [see graphic depictions of trend lines; analysis of china trend lines on spreading forms of political capitalism that operate outside the rule of law] note 19. the role of lawyers as master coders of capital is outlined in pistor’s chapter 7 of the code of capital. while lawyers are commonly described as legal service providers, according to pistor this www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 129 published by scholink inc. description understates their role in the coding of capital and the distribution of wealth in society. the author has few positive things to say about how these lawyers function and how law schools produce them. the true masters of the code use their legal expertise in exchange with their clients and professional colleagues to craft new capital and in this process make new law from existing legal materials – all in the private sector. asset holders according to pistor greatly value the master coders of capital and even go along with suggestions by these lawyers that their payment per hour of three or four digits is not enough – these global transactional lawyers need to be paid on par with investment bankers. note 20. schafer, a and streeter, w. [eds]. politics in the age of austerity. cambridge: polity press, 2013. [notes that democratic polity comes under significant pressure in the age of austerity promoted by the neoliberal paradigm of globalization. domestic budgets are squeezed to accommodate financial markets as government responsiveness to voters severely declines. democracy itself becomes incapacitated when citizen voters cannot influence the course of governments. for three decades now oecd countries have run huge deficit and accumulated debt which in turn reduces national budgets for discretionary spending and social capital investment]. for context discussions of the last century on neoliberalism]; see streeck, wolfgang, “the politics of public debt: neoliberalism, capitalist development and the restructuring of the state”, in german economic review [august 2013]; available at https://doi.org/10.1111/geer.12032 [rising public debt has been widespread in democratic‐capitalist political economies since the 1970s, generally accompanied among other things by weak economic growth, rising unemployment, increasing inequality, growing tax resistance, and declining political participation. following an initial period of fiscal consolidation in the 1990s, public debt took an unprecedented leap in response to the great recession [2008-2010]. renewed consolidation efforts, under the pressure of “financial markets”, point to a general decline in state expenditure, particularly discretionary and investment expenditure, and of extensive retrenchment and privatization of state functions]; see also cerny, phillip. “globalization and the erosion of democracy” in european journal of political research [vol 36; issue 1; pg 30-47] [1999], available at https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00461 [concluding that despite the apparent development and spread of liberal democratic state forms in the 1980s and 1990s, possibilities for genuine democratic governance overall declined. first, the emergence and consolidation of modern liberal democracy was inextricably intertwined with the development of the nation–state and was profoundly socially embedded in that structural context. secondly, in today's globalizing world, cross–cutting and overlapping governance structures and processes increasingly took the form of private, oligarchic (and mixed public/private) forms; hegemonic neoliberal norms delegitimized state–based governance in general; and democratic states lost the policy capacity necessary for transforming democratically generated inputs into authoritative outputs. consequently, robust constraints continue to limit the potential for (a) re-institutionalizing the ‘democratic chain’ between accountability and effectiveness, (b) rearticulating and diminishing the multi-tasking the essential public character of authoritative www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 130 published by scholink inc. institutions and (c) renewing the capacity of current authoritative state agents to make the side–payments and to undertake the monitoring necessary to control free–riding and assimilate alienated groups. rather than a new pluralistic global civil society, globalization led to a growth in inequalities, a fragmentation of effective public governance structures and the multiplication of quasi–fiefdoms reminiscent of the middle ages]; see aidan, s regan. political tensions in euro varieties of capitalism-the crisis of the democratic state in europe , working paper eui mwp, 2013/14 at european university institute, available at https://hdl.handle.net/181428177 [ outlining the eu response to the financial sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone led to the democratic crisis of the nation state as it exposed a tension between national and supranational power in multi-level polity and opened a conflict between the eu core and the periphery nations of the eu. shifts by eu member states in internal devaluation also impacted the burden of adjustments to fiscal and labor market policy at the state level resulting in national government cutting public spending and imposition of structural reforms on labor markets. imposing one-size-fits-all adjustments to a wide variety of economic problems across a variety of national capitalism really is the source of the eu crisis leading to electoral volatility and a crisis in legitimacy for the democratic state in europe]; note 21. koncewicz, tomasz. understanding the politics of resentment. [online] verfblog, 2017/9/28. available at <https://verfassungblog.de/understanding-the-politics-of-resentment/> 28 september 2017. [accessed 22 december 2019]; see also at doi https://dx.doi.org/10.17176/20170929-135630 [last viewed february 18,2019][ noting that the resentment that is sweeping across europe cannot simply be equated with protest, revolt, and public contestation because unlike the rising politic of resentment, these episodes reflect part and parcel of democratic process that supports an open public square;. koncewicz concludes that the rationale of resentment is distrust with varying degrees of intensity and disdain for the liberal status quo. the politics of resentment sets up a competing constitutional doctrine (‘constitutional capture’] that attacks liberal democratic values with its current stigma (e.g., support only for status quo) and offers an alternative to the promise of populist narratives.] note 22. piketty, thomas. capital in the twenty-first century, trans arthur goldhammer [cambridge, ma: belknap press of harvard university, 2014] note 23. tomasi, john. free market fairness. new jersey: princeton university press, [2012] [ defending individual economic liberty from legal or historical perspective of political philosophy; trying to find common ground between john rawls and friedrich hayek the concept of ‘ free market fairness’ aka market democracy]; see ; hurst, james willard. the legitimacy of the business corporation in the law of the united states 1790-1970 . new york: the law book exchange,2004 [noting at page 16 that what the corporate charter gave and what a constitution protects is not just an official license but also a pattern for organizing certain human relations.]; see corre, jacob i. “the arguments and reports of darcy v allen”, 45 emery l.j. 1261,1325[1996] [ speaking to darcy v allen,11co.rep.84b,77 rep.1260[k.b.1603][ pointing out that the original english cokes’ report of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 131 published by scholink inc. an enduring nature on the questions of individual liberty arising out of the darcy case in 1603; also noted the privileged nature of monopoly and its distortion on the common good, ultimately hurting the public square of civil society]; see also nachbar, thomas b. monopoly, merchantilism, and the politics of regulation. 91 va l. r. 1313,2005; 1324-1345, n.148; see also sandefur, thomas the right to earn a living: economic freedom and the law. washington dc, cato institute, [2010] 20; see also seigan, bernie h. “protecting economic liberties”, 6 chap l. r.43,2003; 50[ relying on notions of substantive due process]; as general reference see jones, franklin d. historical development of the law of business competition, 36 yale l.j. 42, 1926,29[1926] note 24. supra, note 21, piketty note 25. grewal, david. the legal constitution of capital. in boushey, heather, delong, j. bradford, and steinbaum, marshall [eds], after piketty: the agenda for economics and inequality. cambridge, ma: harvard university press, 2017., 481-483] authors note : terminology and definition of constitutional terminology as noted by grewal sets the foundation for a new legal constitution for capitalism in this century but what of the public square of democracy at the core of the state where the four cornerstones of the framework of liberty ( justice, equity, individual choice and capabilities) simultaneously will matter in the daily function of civil society?]see see also o’rourke, k.a.c., post-brexit: the politics of resentment and eu reintegration-creating a new legal constitution for capitalism. international and comparative law review, vol. 19. no. 1, 2019, pages 38-73 [analysis of the politics of resentment and application of the geonomos model for state sovereignty in the 21st century relying on the cornerstones of justice, equity, and human dignity] note 26. supra, note 21, piketty [see specifically other tools piketty discusses such as the world wealth income database and the global wealth register as supportive e.u. mechanisms in designing a peer review monitoring and enforcement system for member state partners. these ideas will be contested and rightly so—it is one way to begin to address the well documented and ongoing economic capital demands, unemployment, sluggish growth, and wealth disparity]; see also davis, m and monk, d.b.[eds]. evil paradises: dream worlds of neoliberalism. new york: new press, 2007 ; see oxfam, working for the few: political capture and economic inequality [oxford: oxfam international] [2014]; see soskice, d. capital in the twenty first century: a critique, british journal of sociology, vol. 65; no. 4, 2014, pg 650-666; see stiglitz, j. free markets and the sinking of the global economy. london: allen lane, 2010; see harvey, d. the enigma of capital: and the crisis of capitalism. london: profile books, 2011. note 27. ibid, piketty. note 28. schafer, a and streeter, w. [eds]. politics in the age of austerity. cambridge: polity press, 2013. [notes that democratic polity comes under significant pressure in the age of austerity promoted by the neoliberal paradigm of globalization. domestic budgets are squeezed to accommodate financial markets as government responsiveness to voters severely declines. democracy itself becomes incapacitated when citizen voters cannot influence the course of governments. for three decades now www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 132 published by scholink inc. oecd countries have run huge deficit and accumulated debt which in turn reduces national budgets for discretionary spending and social capital investment]. for context discussions of the last century on neoliberalism]; see streeck, wolfgang. the politics of public debt: neoliberalism, capitalist development and the restructuring of the state, german economic review,2013 [august] [online]; available at https://doi.org/10.1111/geer.12032 [rising public debt has been widespread in democratic‐capitalist political economies since the 1970s, generally accompanied among other things by weak economic growth, rising unemployment, increasing inequality, growing tax resistance, and declining political participation. following an initial period of fiscal consolidation in the 1990s, public debt took an unprecedented leap in response to the great recession [2008-2010]. renewed consolidation efforts, under the pressure of “financial markets”, point to a general decline in state expenditure, particularly discretionary and investment expenditure, and of extensive retrenchment and privatization of state functions]; see also cerny, phillip. globalization and the erosion of democracy. european journal of political research [vol 36; issue 1, 1999; pg 30-47] [online], available at https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00461 [concluding that despite the apparent development and spread of liberal democratic state forms in the 1980s and 1990s, possibilities for genuine democratic governance overall declined. first, the emergence and consolidation of modern liberal democracy was inextricably intertwined with the development of the nation–state and was profoundly socially embedded in that structural context. secondly, in today’s globalizing world, cross–cutting and overlapping governance structures and processes increasingly took the form of private, oligarchic (and mixed public/private) forms; hegemonic neoliberal norms delegitimized state–based governance in general; and democratic states lost the policy capacity necessary for transforming democratically generated inputs into authoritative outputs. consequently, robust constraints continue to limit the potential for (a) re-institutionalizing the “democratic chain” between accountability and effectiveness, (b) rearticulating and diminishing the multi-tasking the essential public character of authoritative institutions and (c) renewing the capacity of current authoritative state agents to make the side–payments and to undertake the monitoring necessary to control free–riding and assimilate alienated groups. rather than a new pluralistic global civil society, globalization led to a growth in inequalities, a fragmentation of effective public governance structures and the multiplication of quasi–fiefdoms reminiscent of the middle ages]; see aidan, s regan. political tensions in euro varieties of capitalism-the crisis of the democratic state in europe, working paper eui mwp, 2013/14 at european university institute, [online];available at https://hdl.handle.net/181428177 [outlining the eu response to the financial sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone led to the democratic crisis of the nation state as it exposed a tension between national and supranational power in multi-level polity and opened a conflict between the eu core and the periphery nations of the eu. shifts by eu member states in internal devaluation also impacted the burden of adjustments to fiscal and labor market policy at the state level resulting in national government cutting public spending and imposition of structural reforms on labor markets. imposing one-size-fits-all adjustments to a wide www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 133 published by scholink inc. variety of economic problems across a variety of national capitalism really is the source of the eu crisis leading to electoral volatility and a crisis in legitimacy for the democratic state in europe];see also o’rourke, k.a.c. sovereignty post-brexit, the state’s core function and eu reintegration; european studies: the review of european law, economics and politics, caes, 2017,vol 4 ,140-164 [wolter-kluwer, march 2018] [discussing the scope and application of the geonomos model for state sovereignty]] note 29 grewal, david. the legal constitution of capital. in boushey, heather, delong, j. bradford, and steinbaum, marshall [eds], after piketty: the agenda for economics and inequality. cambridge, ma: harvard university press, 2017, pages 470-491. [grewal suggests that this “constitution of capitalism” has a double meaning. first, it reflects the constitutional order that has been adopted by most capitalist societies. the question is whether citizens have a constitutional right to live in a society free of monopolies or what is referenced often as “crony capitalism”. this is not the first century where “trade monopolies” have caused revolutions. perhaps it is time to rethink economic liberty in relation to the legal analysis, e.g., rational basis review of times past and to incorporate new 21st century standards for economic liberty and definitions of “monopoly” that reflect the tremendous private accumulation of economic power across the globe so as to prevent legislation that create global or state economic castes or economic classes of citizens.] note 30. rodrik, dani. the globalization paradox: democracy and the future of the world economy. new york: w.w. norton & co., 2011; pp. 231-242, 245 [noting that it is time to move beyond the neoliberal paradigm; setting out a series of statements in support of a state’s right to protect their owns social arrangements, regulations and institutions; and suggesting that trade is a means to an end , not an end in itself so that globalization should be an instrument for achieving the goals that a society seeks: prosperity, stability, freedom and quality of life ]; see generally milgate, m.,stimson, s.c. after adam smith: a century of transformation in politics and political ideology. new jersey: princeton university press, 2009 note 31. ibid., rodrik at 237-239; see also tirole, jean. economics for the common good. new jersey: princeton university press, 2017; [ outlining the moral limits of the market at pp 33-50; creating a modern state at pp 155-169] note 32. at the same time, with a focus on economic capital development and utilization, the author begins to outline the struggles at the level of the nation state as it begins to adjust to a more integrated model of capitalism that balances economic capital at its core function with equal measures of financial, policy priority and broad political support for the development and utilization of human and social capital. see also, rodrik, dani. the globalization paradox: democracy and the future of the world economy. new york: w.w. norton & co., 2011; pp 231-242, 245 [discussing a dominant role for the nation state in relation to the principles of democratic decision-making which is the foundation for the international economic architecture; noting that when states are not democratic and this scaffolding collapses, one cannot presume a country’s institutional arrangements reflect the preference of its www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 134 published by scholink inc. citizens]; see also rodrik, dani, the fatal flaw of neo-liberalism [online]. available at https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/nov/14/the-fatal-flaw-of-neoliberalism-its-bad-economics. [november 14, 2017] [noting neoliberalism and its usual prescriptions-always more markets, always less government-are in fact a perversion of mainstream economics. rodrik suggests that there is nothing wrong with markets, private entrepreneurship or incentives-when deployed appropriately. their creative use lies behind the most significant economic achievements of our time. he notes as “we heap scorn on neoliberalism, we risk throwing out some of neoliberalism’s useful ideas. the real trouble is that mainstream economics shades too easily into ideology, constraining the choices available and providing cookie-cutter solutions. a proper understanding of the economics that lie behind neoliberalism would allow us to identify-and to reject-ideology when it masquerades as economic science. most importantly, it would help to develop the institutional imagination badly need to redesign capitalism for the 21st century”]; see generally milgate, m.,stimson, s.c. after adam smith: a century of transformation in politics and political ideology. new jersey: princeton university press, 2009 note 33. supra, note 10, milanovic, chapter 5, the future of global capitalism, pages 207-218. note 34. supra, note 2, pistor, pages 224-234 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 73 original paper hidden affections: presumptions that continue to misshape the measurement of emotion george e. marcus1 1 department of political science, williams college, williamstown, united states received: january 4, 2022 accepted: january 21, 2022 online published: january 24, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n1p73 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n1p73 abstract all empirical investigations rely on formative presumptions. over the past 70 plus years, research on emotion has long been reliant on data collected using subjective responses and by experimental exposure to target stimuli, and increasingly with various brain scanning technologies. during this period neuroscience research greatly contributed to our understanding of how emotions are formed and what functions they perform in the realm of politics and social life more generally. i identify a number consequential presumptions, in some differing combinations, that have been the foundations for commonly used measures of emotion and measurement practices. these presumptions enable research that has generated a considerable empirical literature. but these presumptions have become increasing tenuous as insights produced by neuroscience has slowly been integrated into the measurement of emotion. the measurement of emotion has gradually adopted these new insights. the adjustments and benefits that derive are described in the final section. keywords emotion, operationalization, presumptions, preconscious awareness, conscious awareness hidden affections: how presumptions shape the measurement of emotion “in a very crucial sense there is no methodology without logos, without thinking about thinking. and if a firm distinction is drawn—as it should be—between methodology and technique, the latter is no substitute for the former. one may be a wonderful researcher and manipulator of data, and yet remain an unconscious thinker.” giovani sartori (1970, p. 1033) “people are not liable to be mistaken in their feelings, but they are frequently wrong in the names they give them, and in their reasoning about them.” edmund burke (2009, p. 30) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 74 published by scholink inc. 1. introduction emotion, once it emerged from its prior disregard in the social sciences, has become an essential topic in the effort to secure a sound understanding of how people form judgments, especially political judgments (brader & marcus, 2013). scientific inquiries begin with selecting a methodology for generating data. the validity of substantive conclusions rest on the validity of the data used to reach those conclusions. as to measuring emotion there have been a number of important journal articles on emotion measurement in psychology and political science that have advanced our understanding of how to measure the emotions people experience. among these are those by david watson and colleagues (watson et al., 1988; watson, 1988; watson & clark, 1991; watson & clark, 1997; gray & watson, 2007; watson et al., 2017); harmon-jones and colleagues (harmon-jones et al., 2016); albertson and gadarian (albertson & gadarian, 2016); searles and mattes (searles & mattes, 2015); marcus and colleagues (marcus & mackuen, 1995; marcus et al., 2006; marcus et al., 2017); rhodes-purdy and colleagues (rhodespurdy et al., 2021); karl scherer (scherer, 2005); and, junge and colleagues (junge & reisenzein, 2013; junge & reisenzein, 2016). while advancing the measurement of emotion, there remain aspects of emotion measurement not yet fully explored. in this review i seek to identify some remaining problems with some extant measures and practices. giovani sartori’s directive suggests that some scientific understandings can be so comfortably settled that their influence is both powerful and hidden. and, as such, they may block reaching better understandings (danner et al., 2016). this can be the case even as many contemporary emotion theorists make no mention of these presumptions. my intentions are to make visible the presumptions that underly four commonly used measurements of emotion and measurement practices. each of these have been selected because the measurements and validation practices preclude testing the validity of their presumptions: 1) feeling thermometer and other measures reliant on a valence formulation of emotion. 2) embedding a “think instruction” before asking people to rate a target stimulus using a list of emotion words. 3) continued use of the panas schedule on the preemption its list of twenty affect words is a comprehensive sample of emotions. 4) use of target stimuli and other means of affect induction without any or with insufficient manipulation checks. one theme this review will be to show that developments in the neuroscience of perception and of emotion challenge the validity of these practices. another theme is to demonstrate how the development of new measures and modes of analysis of emotion freed from these presumptions has generated new and consequential understandings of emotion and then new insights on the ways emotions impact on action and judgment. table 1 list four presumptions that have continued to shape empirical investigation of emotions. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 75 published by scholink inc. table 1. presumptions influential in emotion measurement 1. depicting emotion as valence 2. thinking generates more accurate emotion assessments 3. focusing on ‘peak’ emotion 4. understanding emotion as monochromatic 2. presumptions 2.1 affect as valence a core presumption has long been that humans respond to reward and punishment (skinner, 1969; wilson et al., 1989a; o’dougherty et al., 2001). this focus on reward-approach and punishmentavoidance has long been a central feature of models of learning and psychology more generally (patterson et al., 1987; tesser & martin, 1996). thus, identifying any external individual, group, or other object as positive or negative serves to address this fundamental concern. as lodge and taber (2005, p. 456) put it: “all political leaders, groups, issues, symbols, and ideas thought about and evaluated in the past become affectively charged—positively or negatively—and this affect is linked directly to the concept in long-term memory. this evaluative tally, moreover, comes automatically and inescapably to mind upon presentation of the associated object, thereby signaling its affective coloration...” emotion, here, has been tasked with identifying the reward-punishment status of any object or activity under consideration. valence remains a core accepted scientific concept as for example in investigations of “campaign sentiment” (geer, 2006; haselmayer, 2021) as well as the broad class of theories, such as utility theory and prospect theory, that attend to gain or loss; punishment or reward (skinner, 1969; kahneman & tversky, 1979). 2.2 think instructions elicit more accurate responses the presumption is that if one directs people to think about the matter that will yield, on balance, more accurate assessments than leaving people to muddle through without such a direction. the wellestablished elaboration likelihood model gives weight to this presumption. hence, it can be safely anticipated that invoking focused attention to a judgment task will enhance the motivation to secure a more accurate understanding (petty & cacioppo, 1986, p. 127). 2.3 the peak emotion presumption the peak emotion presumption holds that peak levels of any discrete emotion, be it, joy, fear, anger, or any other discrete, or basic, emotion, reveals what is necessary to know about that emotion. moreover, peak emotions are presumed to take over, that is, exclude other emotions from playing a concurrent role of consequence with the exception of the condition of ambivalence, discussed below. hence, it is best to study a given emotion in circumstances were it can be expected that emotion is most likely to be www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 76 published by scholink inc. prominent. for example, in the realm of negative emotions it is the attention grabbing events such as terror attacks, financial crises, pandemics, or high stake political confrontations, that best reveal the influence of negative emotions (finseraas & listhaug, 2013). as a result there has been less interest in low levels of discrete emotions because discrete emotions in the mundane normal activities of life are presumed to have less consequence on judgment. and, it encompasses the possibility of a state of mind that is non-emotional (gennaro & ash, 2021). 2.4 the monochromatic presumption attitude theory and cognitive appraisal theories long presumed that people, at any given moment, normally experience one singular dominant emotion. this is the monochromatic presumption. if we describe ourselves as feeling happy, that is because we are happy. if we describe ourselves as fearful, that is because we are fearful (roseman, 1984). the notion of ambivalence, a condition thought to arise when people experience simultaneous conflicting feelings about someone or something, asserts the possibility that people may experience multiple concurrent emotions (craig & martinez, 2005). however, the study of ambivalence envisions a very limited possibility of multiple concurrent emotions. two conceptual limitations have constrained this research area. first, the general view is that instances of ambivalence are relatively rare. second, the notion of ambivalence expressly limits the consideration of multiple emotions to two, the “bi” in ambivalence, one of which is positive and the other being negative, the “valence” in ambivalence (lavine et al., 2012). an expanded consideration of multiple concurrent emotions and their distinct consequences foretells the future of research on emotion. one of the most enduring and detrimental impact of this presumption can be viewed in emotion induction experiments. i next turn to the data generation practices that to some extent are dependent on one or more of these presumptions. 3. measuring emotion 3.1 measuring emotion as valence feeling thermometers seek to answer to the question: is this something we like and are inclined to approach, or something we dislike and are inclined to avoid (cosmides & tooby, 2000)? feeling thermometers conceive emotion as a single valence factor. the american national election studies (anes) operationalization is shown in table 2. it remains a popular and frequently used measure of emotional attachment (warner et al., 2021). table 2. the feeling thermometer “i’d like to get your feelings toward some of our political leaders and other people who are in the news these days. i'll read the name of a person and i'd like you to rate that person using something we call the feeling thermometer. ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 77 published by scholink inc. warm toward the person. ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don’t feel favorable toward the person and that you don't care too much for that person. you would rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the person. if we come to a person whose name you don’t recognize, you don't need to rate that person. just tell me and we’ll move on to the next one.” source: (overseers, 2021, p. 83). the measurement scheme precludes challenges to its validity. willingness to rate leaders, groups, events, or policies does not thereby establish its scientific validity. challenges: three challenges to the validity of feeling thermometers have arisen over the past halfcentury. first, the identification of feelings as measuring emotional response, i.e., as a mechanism of memory, has been challenged by research holding that affective appraisals arise well before consciousness (lodge & taber, 2005). second, also more fully discussed below, when multiple measures of emotion are gathered, initial analyses found two dimensions of response, commonly labeled positive emotion and negative emotion. that is they find they do not use the multiple measures to produce single valence measure (abelson et al., 1982; watson & tellegen, 1985). finally, thirdly, the feeling thermometer measure also rests on the presumption that negative emotion is a coherent scientific property (hibbing et al., 2014; mattes & redlawsk, 2014). yet for over twenty years the identification of two “negative” emotions, fear and anger, each with different neural underpinnings, each with different consequential antecedents, and each with differing downstream impacts on information processing generally, and judgment specifically, have been readily available in political science and psychology journals (mackuen et al., 2010; marcus et al., 2019; lerner & keltner, 2000; lerner et al., 2003; skitka et al., 2006; suhay & erisen, 2018). indeed, this recent recognition of bifurcation within the domain of negative emotions had arisen many years prior (arnold, 1950; ax, 1953). there has been one effort to reassert the validity of valence. james russell accepted that data gathered by multiple emotion word check lists does generate a dense two-dimensional array. he shows how, by rotating the dimensions by 45°, the two dimensions that then be plausibly be labeled valence and arousal (russell et al., 1989). russell’s alternative leaves us with two dimensions, as before, just relabeled in a fashion that serves to preserve a nominal valence dimension. related to this proposal is the idea of “core affect” (bakker et al., 2021). central to this construction is the notion of goodpositive-liking versus bad-negative disliking, the essence of the valence concept. but, as karl popper argued (popper, 2000, p. 333): www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 78 published by scholink inc. “every ‘good’ scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen. the more a theory forbids, the better it is. a theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific. irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice.” while feeling thermometers are not themselves a theory, they are dependent on the validity of the theoretical claim that emotion is validly treated as a singular dimension that ranges from strongly like to strongly dislike. 3.2 improving accuracy when measuring emotion as a social species, humans have a robust capacity to join with others into a group, whether small, as in a family, or very large, such as citizens of a nation. hence, exploring group identification has been a central focus of research in the social sciences (huddy, 2001; huddy, 2018). the standard party identification measure in the united states, then and now, instructs study participants to think who they align with rather how they feel about the parties. the instruction is “generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as [a democrat, a republican, an independent, or what?” (note 1) here, questions beginning by instructing people to think about their feelings of attachment is presumed to produce more accurate and valid responses. a recent example of this belief that accuracy in the measurement of emotion is enhanced by the “think” instruction is offered by rhodes-purdy and colleagues (rhodes-purdy et al., 2021). the rationale for using this instruction is worth quoting (rhodes-purdy et al., 2021, p. 7): our approach should lead to more accurate reports of discrete emotional responses in several ways. … forcing individuals to think in greater depth about a topic causes them to produce responses that are more complex … more effortful processing of information, as required by this two-step task, can lead to better decision-making … that is slower and more logical … which may give us higher quality, and more accurate, self-reports of emotion.” challenges: there is considerable evidence from a number of studies showing that the think instruction condition does indeed change how people respond when compared to either no instruction or to feel instruction conditions. but rather than improving accuracy, these studies show that the think instruction generates biased estimates (wilson et al., 1989b; theiss-morse et al., 1993). specifically, with respect to measuring partisan attachment, measuring emotional identification to one’s party that use the "think” instruction yield distributions that overstate the percentage of democrats and understate the percentage of republicans in any given sample (burden & klofstad, 2005; neely, 2007). 3.3 using emotion words to measure emotion in the 70s and 80s the then popular “cognitive appraisal theories” of emotion offered a number of more complex taxonomic arrays than the simple one dimensional valence conception (tomkins, 1984; ortony et al., 1989; roseman, 1984). the fundamental presumption, applicable to all variants of the cognitive appraisal approach, was that general considerations are sequentially applied which then determine the "basic” or "discrete” emotions that is made manifest in consciousness (smith et al., 1993). basic emotions are commonly understood as a set of affective states that form a taxonomy of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 79 published by scholink inc. monochromatic states. various taxonomies of these "discrete” states were proposed (tomkins, 1984; ekman, 1992; ortony et al., 1989; roseman, 1991; lazarus & lazarus, 1994). the izard differential emotion scale (izard, 1977) was one of the earliest efforts to operationalize the discrete approach to emotion. study participants are presented a list of discrete emotions and then asked which of these they have ever felt, either recently or over a specified prior period. there is no external target, i.e., the interest was in the subjective state of the individual, not feelings about something out there. in political science research on emotion has generally not been directed at the introspective, rather emotions have been examined as informative reactions to the state of the world (conover & feldman, 1986). in psychology, norbert schwarz (1990) also argued for this shift in focus, to emotions as informative about some aspect of the external world. in the 1980 election study, of what is now the american national election studies (anes), introduced a version of the izard differential emotion scale. the exact wording of this operationalization reveals the embedded presumptions. below is the instruction for the candidate feeling scale: “now we would like to know something about the feelings you have toward the candidates for president. i am going to name a candidate, and i want you to tell me whether something about that person, or something he has done, has made you have certain feelings like anger or pride.” thereafter, the major presidential candidates were named and for each candidate seven emotion words randomly presented: angry, hopeful, afraid, proud, disgusted, sympathetic, and uneasy. (note 2) challenges: it quickly became apparent that individuals, when given a check list of supposed discrete emotions did not treat them as mutually exclusive alternatives. rather, they treated them as equally useful markers for their feelings (abelson et al., 1982; tellegen, 1985; watson & tellegen, 1985). moreover, when such lists were offered analyses of these responses generated a “circumflex” (i.e., a dense circle wherein all emotion words can be plotted) that is a two-dimensional space. (note 3) this development enabled a new line of inquiry into emotion. rather than the longstanding interest in which emotion becomes active, emotion word check lists enable emotion to be treated as appraisal rather than as response. and, further, directs attention to how changing levels of any given emotion, across the full range of that emotion, impact on downstream action and thought. using lists of emotion words as multiple indicatorsoflatent scientific concepts of emotion treats emotion words as a way of identifying their meaning rather than by reference to a dictionary (sullivan & feldman, 1979). the immediate challenge was, and remains, how to select emotion words from the hundreds available in the english lexicon (storm & storm, 1987; clore & ortony, 1988; mceachrane, 2009). david watson and colleagues (watson et al., 1988), after examining many emotion words, selected the following twenty emotion words as reliable indicators covering the diverse domain of emotion: interested, distressed, excited, upset, strong, guilty, scared, hostile, enthusiastic, proud, irritable, alert, ashamed, inspired, nervous, determined, attentive, jittery, active, and afraid. these words formed the positive and negative affect schedule (panas). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 80 published by scholink inc. david watson, not long after publishing the panas scale, recognized the relative paucity of negative emotion words suitable to identifying anger as an emotion distinct from fear. he, and his colleague lee anna clark, developed a far fuller array of emotion words in the panas-x schedule to correct this lacunae (watson & clark, 1994). however, that important elaboration has not gained sufficient attention as many researchers continue to use the original panas schedule (heubeck & wilkinson, 2019). the panas-x schedule has been largely ignored thereby delaying exploration of the distinction between fear and anger (marcus et al., 1995; lerner & keltner, 2000). much depends on which of the hundreds of emotion words best define a distinct emotion. consider the word choices english speakers have available to describe their feelings when violated in some fashion by someone or some group. they might choose any of these: rage, angry, wrathful, ire, annoyed, hassled, vexed, bothered, upset, insulted, peeved, pestered, offended, menaced, troubled, hateful, exasperated, irritated, ruffled, affronted. there are more than just these twenty readily available (e.g., cross, disgusted, disdain, bitter, incensed, infuriated, resentful, and, scorn). why so many and, more importantly, how are they different? one type of difference is emotion words is that some are equally applicable to a single appraisal, either as synonyms for that one appraisal, or as names of different levels of that appraisal, i.e., identifying whether the underlying feeling is more robust or more mild. moreover, even if some of the many words are synonyms one might choose one rather than another because of the social context, for example, being among friends, or alone, or among strangers. another way emotion words might differ in meaning is by identifying differences of kind. we say we are “angry” when we feel we have been wronged, i.e., have a grievance. on the other hand, we might say we are “happy” when we feel some success. each emotion word identifies a different distinct appraisal, how much grievance for the first, and how much success for the second (calder et al., 2001). inattention as to whether emotion words differ in their use as identifying the level of a given property or by identifying difference in kind is common in the social sciences (dunn & schweitzer, 2005). that inattention has led to considerable taxonomic confusion as to which emotion words identify differences in degree (i.e., applicable to stronger and weaker levels of a given emotion), and which are differences in kind. some hold that disgust and anger are different emotions, that is different in kind (clifford & jerit, 2018; molho et al., 2017; giner-sorolla & russell, 2019). others argue for a distinction between fear and anxiety (cheung-blunden et al., 2018) or for contempt as distinct from anger and from disgust (roseman et al., 2020). others hold that hope and enthusiasm are distinct emotions (just et al., 2007) and yet others that there are ten different positive emotions (van zomeren, 2021). some argue for more distinctions, while others hold for fewer. for example, some hold that disgust, contempt, fear, anger just members of the negative class of emotion (hibbing et al., 2014). that is, emotion as valence is valid and a valence measure can be used to capture what emotions are and what they do (könig et al., www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 81 published by scholink inc. 2021). testing whether these named emotions are different from each by degree or kind is, too often, largely absent. this leaves the category of “basic” emotion largely ill-defined. there are multiple criteria that can be used to test claims of that specific emotion words identify difference in kind while others identify as synonyms. among these are: 1) do people use a some emotion words as synonyms for a single emotion and do they differentiate that emotion from others (marcus et al., 2017)? 2) are different antecedents showing differentiating effects on the distinct emotions (gerbella et al., 2019)? 3) have distinguishing consequences for judgment and behavior that have been empirically demonstrated, for example, as to fear versus anger (mackuen et al., 2010)? 4) have distinct neural structures and processesidentified distinct neural affective appraisals (calder et al., 2001; paulus et al., 2010; maratos et al., 2012; phillips et al., 2004)? too often none of the above are used to justify treating emotion words as being valid markers of a given emotion. (note 4) 3.4 the validity of the experimental practices and emotions research experiments are a popular method for exploring emotion. experiments on emotion commonly rest on the presumption that it is possible to induce the discrete emotion of interest. experiments begin by randomly assigned some participants to receive the target emotion induction. this group can then be compared to others who have not been given that induction. richer research designs can and do include differing inductions so that some participants would be induced to experience emotion a while others emotion b, and so on. the induction might make use of one or more faces from the set of ekman faces (2005) or of the pictures that make up the lang universal affect inventory (1988). some researchers have generated specific materials to induce the emotions of interest (searles & mattes, 2015). yet, another approach is to ask participants to recall and describe a specified discrete feeling state thereby presumably making the emotion of interest consciously present (valentino et al., 2011). additionally sound, generally, and voice, specifically, have been used to activate a specific emotion (bradley & lang, 2000; brader, 2006; dietrich et al., 2019; kim et al., 2016). the benefit of using stimulus of some proven validity is of obvious value but that value, as i shall argue below, has limitations. challenges: an important means of validating the claim that the treatment has the intended effect is the use of manipulation checks (fiedler et al., 2021). emotion induction, as practiced (fakhrhosseini & jeon, 2017), is commonly reliant on the presumption that the impact of the induction on the target emotional state is monochromatic. this presumption has the effect of obscuring the need exclude the possibility that other emotions might also be impacted by exposure to the treatment. research has shown there is considerable evidence that multiple concurrent affective appraisals is the norm, not the exception (whalen et al., 2001; maratos, 2011; maratos et al., 2012; marcus et al., 2017). as mutz and permante (2015) have persuasively argued, it is essential to include manipulation checks to validate the claim that the affective state of interest has been successfully manipulated by the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 82 published by scholink inc. treatment. however, it is equally vital to use manipulation checks to assess whether other concurrent affective states have not been manipulated or, if altered, have data on these concurrent affective changes so that they can be controlled by multivariate statistical analysis. producing better measures and analysis practices for research on emotion requires is a new theoretical foundation. i turn to that next. 4. a neuroscience informed theory of perception various appraisal theories hold the presumption that appraisal is prior and emotion is the consequential result, hence emotion is commonly labeled: emotional response. for example, the emotion regulation approach from the outset presents emotion as a derivative response (katz et al., 1974; gross, 1998; tamir et al., 2020). the recognition that there are consequential information processes that act before conscious awareness has long been shown to be ubiquitous (libet et al., 1979; zajonc, 1980; freeman & johnson, 2016). but this recognition is often couched in spatial terms, e.g., subliminal versus liminal (winkielman & berridge, 2004) or the lower and higher reaches of the brain (kosslyn & miller, 2013). finding the right language to describe how affective processes and consciousness are related requires a new understanding of perception. this new understanding is briefly described below. in the late 60s and early 70s neuroscience research revealed some important insights that profoundly undermined the psychology of perception that had hitherto provided the foundation for ongoing programs of research into emotions. the research of neuroscientist benjamin libet (1979) revealed that though conscious awareness come with a sense of immediacy this sense is largely an illusion, see also (nørretranders, 1998). his research revealed that during the 500 milli-second period that lies between the arrival of sensory signals to the human brain and the availability of consciousness, massive parallel preconscious processes are creating actionable understandings that shape and control much of what we do (castiello et al., 1991). the brain generates actionable awareness considerably earlier than does the conscious mind. preconscious processing enables deft and swift control of habituated actions well before and well beyond what conscious control can sustain (freeman & johnson, 2016; hoffman, 2019). three features of preconscious processing are of particular importance. first, preconscious multiple concurrent, but distinct appraisals, have greater capacity than the more limited serial subjective experience of consciousness (grossberg, 2000). for example, our tongues have difference kinds of taste cells each tuned to a different facet of taste: sweet, sour, salty, bitter, and umami. these, together with yet other types of cells in the mouth that add assessments of pain, temperature, and texture, generate in consciousness the coherent taste and feel of something we’ve ingested. the brain does not wait for the mind’s late awareness to take action. swift identification and initiating the disgorging response to what is foul is vital to limit the danger of ingesting something poisonous and dangerous to life (rozin & fallon, 1987). waiting for the necessary passage of time for conscious www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 83 published by scholink inc. recognition after ingesting something possibly poisonous is an unlikely route for securing environmental fitness (herzog et al., 2016). second, in addition to being slow, consciousness does not have introspective access to the full sensory information the brain receives from the senses. preconscious neural processes are far more capable of handling the vast volume of sensory and somatosensory inputs then is conscious awareness. consciousness has available a late and far simplified representation of that information. third, affective preconscious appraisals, because of their early and greater capabilities, are essential to successful thought and action (bechara et al., 1995). in addition to having earlier and richer capacity to assess sensory and somatosensory input, preconscious processes also have access to essential neural systems that conscious awareness lacks. among these are the vestibular system, procedural memory, and the motor cortex, to name but three of the most important. this changes how we should think about emotion, rather than understanding “emotions [as having] the power to change how people perceive the (political) world” (widmann, 2021, p. 163), we should understand that emotions are preconscious perceptions of the world. perception is best understood as beginning with multiple concurrent appraisals (luo et al., 2007). the illusion of consciousness as giving humans instantaneous access to all we perceive is so powerful that social scientists, as do we all, use spatial terms—such as liminal versus subliminal—in discussing mental dynamics (kouider & dehaene, 2007; baumeister et al., 2007). figure 1 presents a schematic map reimagining perception and its relationship to emotion. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 84 published by scholink inc. figure 1. preconscious emotion and conscious awareness figure 1 displays a fundamental shift from where emotion and thinking are located to when they each take place and which variant of reasoning is thereby made manifest and by which actions deftly executed. the temporal border between the preconscious realm and that of conscious awareness is generally placed at 500 milliseconds after sensory signals arrive in the brain (matsuhashi & hallett, 2008). moreover, this new understanding redefines emotion as cognitive in that these affective appraisals are fundamentally information processing. this reformulation focuses on the continuously shifting levels of multiple affective appraisals and the dynamic consequences that flow there from before consciousness is available (sander et al., 2005). some appraisal scholars have begun to accommodate to the newer understanding of perception (scherer & moors, 2019). appraisal theorists continue important comprehensive programs of research (scherer & moors, 2019; barrett & satpute, 2019) but, a not inconsiderable portion of contemporary published research has become narrowly focused on individual affective states or to some seemingly ad hoc selection of emotions intermixing those that differ in degree, for example, happy and sad, with emotions that differ in kind, such as fear and anger (mills & d’mello, 2014). 4.1 measuring emotion driven by neuroscience insights we can map the changing conceptions of emotion over time. as shown in figure 2, below, the conception of emotion has shifted from a one-dimensional formulation, valence, to a two-dimensional www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 85 published by scholink inc. formulation, two dimensions that depict a dense ‘circumplex’, to, more recently, a dense ellipsoid volume. the ellipsoid is a shaped generated by using three axes to represent three ongoing active appraisals scanning for three essential aspects of securing and support individual and collective agency. in the case of the two-dimensional circumplex the axes are conventionally treated as orthogonal. in the case of the ellipsoid that is not the case. studies exploring threat, and using validated measures of fear, anger, and enthusiasm generally find the two threat related appraisals, fear and anger, are highly correlated (marcus et al., 2017). hence these two axes are positioned at an acute angle, reflecting their joint relevance in identifying the two different facets of threat. on the other hand, the axis depicting the ongoing appraisal of reward seeking habituated behavior is located somewhat oblique to the other two. (note 5) not depicted in figure 2 is the shift in understanding from emotion as a result of prior appraisal to emotion as the neural mechanism of appraisal. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 86 published by scholink inc. figure 2. changes in emotion conception: valence, circumflex, and ellipsoid www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 87 published by scholink inc. one new insight that flows from unpacking negativity is that threat can now be understood not one property, but two. threat is multi-faceted. fear identifies one facet of threat: the degree of novelty evident in the moment. anger identifies another facet of threat: the presence of one or more violation of norms that dictate the proper behavior for ourselves, our family and friends, and strangers (haidt, 2001). while we have long thought that it is sufficient to describe threats as being one thing, varying from weak and inconsequential to robust and deadly, our brains had long been using preconscious emotional appraisals to tell us that such abstractions were obscuring strategically consequential differences between threat as novelty and threat as norm violation (marcus et al., 1995). more broadly, reliance on valence-based measures of emotion will continue to mask the attention the human brain gives to more nuanced and focused appraisals. the long-standing focus on fear as the marker of threat (hobbes, 1968; jost & napier, 2012) now becomes more complex as fear is but one vital appraisal used to identify threat. research prompted by the concurrent presence of the anger appraisal has not only identified anger’s prominent role in identifying threat but reallocates many of the downstream consequences from fear to anger (vasilopoulou & wagner, 2017; marcus et al., 2019). pursuing that more complex understanding mandate methods of measuring emotion that can capture the independent dynamic shifting of fear and of anger in threat conditions. finally, if changing levels of these appraisals initiate changes in later, downstream processes such as openness to persuasion, or social bonding, and the like, then all levels of these appraisals are consequential (marcus, 2021). “peak” levels are important, but then so too are all the levels of any specific appraisal. if fear is low, signaling a familiar environment, then swift reliance on the ‘tried and true’ is deft mode of judgment and action (bargh & chartrand, 1999). both high and low levels of novelty are consequential. similarly, if very low levels of anger signal the absence of norm violations, then people are better able to exercise their individual agency, a consequence of some contemporary relevance (webster, 2018; marcus, 2019). 5. discussion a principal purpose of this inquiry is to explore how often unattended presumptions have directed the operationalization of emotion. the presumptions considered here identify the attributes thought to define emotion. the earlier approaches have a very long history and so their advantages and disadvantages can be more readily observed and assessed than the more recent. older missteps are more easily identified than current practices. we can expect that as we learn more, the current practices and measures thought to be valid will be improved or replaced. the understanding of emotion as a holistic, subjective state, has made way for a new more complex dynamic understanding of emotion as multiple ongoing appraisals. and, these appraisals, at all levels of each appraisal, have consequence (neuman et al., 2018). hopefully further work on measuring emotion will enable both old ideas and new to be continuously re-evaluated, further enriching our www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 88 published by scholink inc. understandings of our affections in all their sundry influences. this is not a final reckoning, only the most recent. measurement of concepts is an essential feature of empirical research. but measures serve best when their foundational presumptions are made visible so that their validity can be tested. acknowledgement professor mihai stoicu, williams college, helped with the generation of figure 2. colleagues jon krosnick, milton lodge, matthew rhodes-purdy, gijs schumacher, kathleen searles, john sullivan, steve utych, and, david watson, each offered very helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. references abelson, r. p., kinder, d. r., peters, m. d., & fiske, s. t. 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(1980). feeling and thinking: preferences need no inferences. american psychologist, 35(2), 151-175. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066x.35.2.151 notes note 1. follow up questions further refine identifiers as strong or not so strong, and if independent whether they lean to one or the other major party. note 2. the criteria by which some emotion words are taken to be naming basic emotions and which are names of ‘non-basic’ emotion remains largely unresolved (celeghin et al., 2017; ortony, 2021; caruana, 2017). note 3. the instruction to participants also included the direction has made you, i.e., past tense. however, subsequent research demonstrated that people respond as if the instruction is here and now (watson, 1988). note 4. psychophysiological measures have long been of interest as a promising means by which one could obtain valid measures of discrete emotions but over the past three decades little progress has been made in that venture (cacioppo et al., 2000; bakker et al., 2020). there is one exception to that assessment, facialemg (cacioppo et al., 1986; van boxtel, 2010). note 5. these are approximations. as more data becomes available, from more studies, it is likely that we will find these axes are dynamically related. microsoft word ape-v3n3-p33 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 33 original paper are women willing to delay their retirement? a research on 270 female teachers in inner mongolia of china cui huang1, ying jiang1*, & duo yun2 1 department of public administration, dalian university of technology, dalian, china 2 inner mongolia hohhot political and legal affairs committee, hohhot, china * ying jiang, department of public administration, dalian university of technology, dalian, china received: july 2, 2020 accepted: july 20, 2020 online published: july 29, 2020 doi:10.22158/ape.v3n3p33 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v3n3p33 abstract women’ retirement age is earlier than men in china, which has a negative effect on the problem-solving of aging society and the protection of women’s rights and interests. therefore, prolonging the retirement age for women has become an important policy choice to alleviate the above problems. but are women themselves willing to delay their retirement? what factors effect women’s intention to delay their retirement? those should be an important basis for the decision-making of a new retirement policy. this paper explores female delayed retirement intention by selecting the group of female teachers which is an important category of professional women in china. taking 270 female teachers in inner mongolia of china as samples, this paper analyzes the effect of personal, occupational, and policy factors on female teachers’ delayed retirement intention. the results show that the health, children, monthly income, cumulative length of working, professional title and work units have a statistically significant impact on female teachers’ delayed retirement intention. accordingly, this article puts forward policy implications on gender equity including eliminating the gender difference of retirement age, making flexible retirement policy and protecting women’s occupational interests. keywords female teachers, delayed retirement intention, influencing factors 1. introduction it has become an unavoidable fact that china has been facing entering the aging society, and “aging before getting rich”. population aging not only leads to the important change in the labor force structure, but also challenges the national old-age security system and the old-age pension cost in china. whether the setting of retirement age of professional female which accounts for 30% of china’s whole population www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 34 published by scholink inc. is reasonable or not will have an important impact on china’s response to the population aging and the change of labor force structure. so it has become the focus of the academic and the practice in recent years. at present, women’s retirement age for women in china is 5-10 years earlier than men. some scholars argue that the phenomenon of “retirement without rest” caused by the earlier retirement age for women under the current system will destroy the order of labor force market (gao & deng, 2009). compared with men, the earlier retirement age for women also undermines the women’ equal rights, especially economic interests, and hinders the further development of women’s career (wu, 2009). as the expectancy of average life, the level of education and the percentage of human capital of women increases, more and more voices have been advocating that women should retire at the same age as men in china (jing & xie, 2010). it is believed that raising the retirement age for women may enable women to enjoy more benefits such as working wages and adequate pensions (guo & yu, 2006). meanwhile, delaying the retirement age for women can also save the cost of education, improve the efficiency of human resources, and reduce the pressure of social pension (dong, 2010). in view of this, the scientific and reasonable extension policy of retirement age for women based on their intention is bound to be of great significance to protect women’s rights and interests in all aspects and to relieve the pressure of the population aging. 2. literature review western scholars have explored the influencing factors of delayed retirement intention to a certain extent. it is believed that, in terms of the intention of delayed retirement, young employees are more influenced by their dreams, but older ones by taking more practical factors into account (ron, benedict, & bas, 2015). the degree of job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and post-retirement income expectations all influence the retirement age, and these factors interact with each other as well (schwerhaa & ritterb, 2011). but older employees are reluctant to extend their working hours in order to spend more time with their families (beehr, glazer, nielson, & farmer, 2000). career value is also one of the influencing factors, and employees choose to continue to work if they think the job is important to life (schmidt & lee, 2008). there are two schools of chinese scholars in this field. the first school focuses on discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the delayed retirement system for women. it is believed that the current retirement system has institutional defects which has caused both economic and spiritual damage to women, so it should be reformed from the principle of law (wang, 2013). promoting the same retirement age for men and women in the cultural sector has become a breakthrough in reforming the retirement system (suo, xiao, & luo, 2015). the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women is a joint responsibility of the chinese government and the judiciary (wang & wu, 2007). there are also studies argue that delayed retirement exacerbates the inherent contradiction between women and family care and requires both government and society to establish and implement family policies, in order to secure greater operational space for delayed retirement (yang & wu, 2017). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 35 published by scholink inc. the second school discusses the influencing factors of women’s delayed retirement. the difference in the income of different groups of women of all ages has an important influence on drawing down the retirement age of men and women (yue, 2017). health status, marital status, work occupation and monthly income are important factors that affect women’s intention to delay retirement (dong & jiang, 2015). the higher the cultural level is, the stronger the intention to delay retirement becomes; the older the age is, the weaker the intention to delay retirement becomes; the higher the income level, the lower the intention to delay retirement (liu & liu, 2012). furthermore, the empirical studies also find that the individual and occupational factors have a statistically significant positive impact on the employees’ intention to delayed retirement, but the effect of family and unit factors is significantly negative (huang, 2013). in addition, the more knowledgeable women with a strong sense of gender awareness and self-efficacy are more willing to choose late retirement and vice versa (suo & xiao, 2014). for female civil servants, the final education level, monthly income, the consciousness of equality between men and women, self-efficacy all have a significant role in promoting the degree of peer retirement support for men and women (zhang & li, 2011). to sum up, existing studies have shown that gender, age, occupation, self-efficacy and so on have a significant impact on women’s intention of delayed retirement, but it still needs more refined and deepened research to explore the intention of delayed retirement in a certain industry, a certain gender group, or even a certain age group to delayed retirement, so as to provide more targeted reference and basis for policy formulation and improvement. therefore, this paper selects the important categories of female teachers among professional women in china as sample, to explore what factors affect women’s intention of delayed retirement, and tries to put forward corresponding policy implication. 3. data collection the article selects inner mongolia hohhot, baotou and other areas in china as sample, and authors carried out deep investigation in kindergartens, middle schools, universities and other schools. a total of 270 questionnaires were distributed in which 254 were actually recovered, 7 missing and wrong questionnaires were eliminated, and 247 were actually valid questionnaires. the effective questionnaire recovery rate was 91.48%, which researches the validity of the questionnaire recovery. in terms of age composition of the sample, the number of female teachers aged 30-39 is the highest (accounting for 35.6% of all cases), followed by aged 40-49 (accounting for 34.8%), aged 50-59 (accounting for 19.4%) and then aged 20-29 (accounting for 10.1%) is the smallest. in terms of education level, the proportion of undergraduate students and above is the largest, and accounts for 86.7%; the number of junior college and high school, secondary school and below is relatively small, accounting for 12.1% and 1.2% respectively. the monthly salary income of female teachers is in the range of $285-571, and their proportions are 34.8% and 46.2% respectively. the surveyed teachers are composed of kindergarten teachers, primary school teachers, junior high school teachers, senior high school teachers, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 36 published by scholink inc. vocational and technical secondary school teachers, junior college teachers and university teachers, accounting for 12.6%, 13.4%, 26.7%, 11.7, 1.6%, 3.6% and 30.4% respectively. table 1. female teachers’ intention of delayed retirement item frequency valid percent（%） cumulative percent（%） your views on the delayed retirement policy agree 83 33.6 33.6 indifferent 41 16.6 50.2 disagree 123 49.8 100.0 in order to grasp female teachers’ intention of delayed retirement, this study sets up the item of “your views on the delayed retirement policy” with three options of “agree”, “indifferent” and “disagree”. as shown in table 1, the percentages of preference, indifference and disapproval are 33.6%, 16.6% and 49.8% respectively. it can be seen that nearly half of female teachers do not agree with the delayed retirement policy. 4. research hypothesis as personal factors, occupational factors and policy factors are the most important aspects affecting the female teachers’ intention of delayed retirement, the following assumptions are proposed from these three aspects: 4.1 personal factors firstly, it is generally believed that the older female teachers are, the less they wish to delay retirement. secondly, the so-called “health is the capital of the revolution” indicates that female teachers in poor health condition hope to retire early. thirdly, whether there is a burden on the next generation will have a certain impact on the intention to retire. if there are many children in family, female teachers more likely choose to extend their working life to reduce financial burden. fourthly, the more a female teacher likes her profession, the more she wants to continue her teaching activities and thus more willing to extend her retirement age. hypothesis 1-1: there is a significant correlation between age and delayed retirement intention. hypothesis 1-2: there is a significant correlation between health status and delayed retirement intention. hypothesis 1-3: there is a significant correlation between the status of children and delayed retirement intention. hypothesis 1-4: there is a significant correlation between job preference and delayed retirement intention. 4.2 occupational factors firstly, it is generally believed that the higher the average monthly income is, the more he/she is willing to delay retirement. secondly, it is generally believed that the longer the working hours are, the higher the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 37 published by scholink inc. wage level is, and the more likely he/she is to delay retirement. thirdly, high school teachers who are stressed and have heavy teaching tasks may prefer to retire early. fourthly, the higher the title, the position in the unit and income are, the more likely he/she is to delay retirement. hypothesis 2-1: there is a significant correlation between monthly income and delayed retirement intention. hypothesis 2-2: there is a significant correlation between cumulative length of working and delayed retirement intention. hypothesis 2-3: there is a significant correlation between the type of work unit and the intention to delay retirement. hypothesis 2-4: there is a significant correlation between professional title and delayed retirement intention. 4.3 policy factors female teachers who agree with the policy of late retirement age for men generally do not want to delay retirement. female teachers who favor flexible retirement are more free to choose retirement age and are more receptive to delayed retirement. hypothesis 3-1: there is a significant correlation between the perception of different retirement age policies for men and women and delayed retirement intention. hypothesis 3-2: there is a significant correlation between perceptions of flexible retirement policies and delayed retirement intention. 5. results because this study focuses on the influencing factors (individual, occupational and policy) of female teachers’ intention to delay retirement, the spss is used to test whether there is a significant correlation between those factors and the intention of delayed retirement by interactive classification and chi-square test. 5.1 personal factors table 2. interactive classification of personal factors and delayed retirement intention (%) item your views on the delayed retirement policy x2 agree disagree indifferent (sig) age 29 and under 32.0 48.0 20.0 9.909 (0.129) 30-39 22.7 54 22.7 40-49 40.7 47.7 11.6 over 50 41.7 45.8 12.5 health status good 39.8 42.9 17.3 18.805 (0.001) general 12.0 72.0 16.0 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 38 published by scholink inc. poor 16.7 83.3 0 children’s status childless 29.4 44.1 26.5 13.262 (0.039) one child 31.4 54.3 14.4 two children 52.2 21.7 26.1 more than three 100.0 0 0 degree of job preference like very much 51.5 36.8 11.8 17.569 (0.025) like 29.2 52.3 18.5 generally 22.2 57.8 20.0 dislike 0 100.0 0 dislike very much 0 100.0 0 table 2 shows that the sig values obtained by chi-square test of age, health status, children’s status, degree of job preference and view of delayed retirement are 0.129,0.001,0.039,0.025, respectively. the sig values of health status, children’s status, degree of job preference all are less than 0.05, which indicates that they have significant effect on the intention of delayed retirement. hypothesis 1-1~1-4 hold, which suggest that the individual factors of female teachers are associated with their intention to delay retirement. 5.2 occupational factors table 3. interactive classification of occupational factors and delayed retirement intention (%) item your views on the delayed retirement policy x2 agree disagree indifferent (sig) monthly salary income below 2000 66.7 0 33.3 12.709 (0.048) 2000-4000 23.3 57.0 19.8 4000-6000 34.2 50.9 14.9 over 6000 50.0 36.4 13.6 cumulative length of service less than 5 years 34.1 43.9 22.0 17.390 (0.026) 6-15 years 21.7 55.1 23.2 16-25 years 35.2 57.7 7.0 26-35 years 42.2 40.6 17.2 over 36 years 100.0 0 0 work unit kindergarten 71.0 9.7 19.4 55.442 (0) primary school 27.3 60.6 12.1 junior middle school 18.2 56.1 25.8 high school 13.8 82.8 3.4 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 39 published by scholink inc. vocational colleges, technical secondary school and technical schools 75.0 0 25.0 university 41.3 42.7 16.0 junior college 22.2 77.8 0 professional title nothing 27.3 36.4 36.4 18.696 (0.017) primary title 27.6 51.7 20.7 middle title 23.7 57.7 18.6 vice-senior title 41.2 45.4 13.4 senior title 69.2 30.8 0 table 3 shows that the sig values of female teachers’ monthly salary income, cumulative length of service, work unit and professional title are 0.048,0.026,0,0.017 respectively, which is less than 0.05 indicating that the above factors have a significant effect on the intention to delay retirement. hypothesis 2-1~2-4 hold which suggest that occupational factors of female teachers have a significant impact on their intention to delay retirement, and those who agree with the policy of late retirement generally do not want to delay retirement. 5.3 policy factors table 4. interactive classification of policy factors and delayed retirement intention (%) item your views on the delayed retirement policy x2 agree disagree indifferently (sig) views on flexible retirement support 44.8 37.6 17.6 55.233 (0) indifferently 23.1 48.7 28.2 not support 0 97.7 2.3 views on different retirement ages of men and women men and women are equal and should retire at the same time 58.6 31.0 10.3 58.249 (0) men should retire earlier 50.0 40.0 10.0 women should retire earlier 15.8 69.3 14.9 indifferently 25.0 36.1 38.9 from table 4, we can see that the sig values of female teachers’ views on flexible retirement, different retirement ages of men and women and delayed retirement are all 0, which indicates that it has a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 40 published by scholink inc. significant effect on the intention to delay retirement. hypothesis 3-1~3-2 hold, which suggest that policy factors have a significant effect on their intention of delayed retirement. 6. discussion 6.1 personal factors firstly, the health status of female teachers has a significant effect on the intention to delay retirement. the female teachers in good health support delayed retirement with the highest percentage among all surveyed female teachers. teachers are relatively high-pressure occupation, because standing for a long time, inhalation of dust, assessment pressure and so on can cause a variety of diseases, challenging both teachers’ physical and mental health. as a result, female teachers who are not in good health tend to retire earlier, while female teachers in good health have sufficient energy and physical strength to continue their work, and agree to delay retirement. secondly, the children’s status of female teachers has a significant effect on the intention to delay retirement. female teachers with children are more willing to delay retirement than those without children, and the more children they have, the more they favor delayed retirement. at present, women have been playing more and more important role in the family economy, and the number of children in a family directly determines family financial burden; the bigger the number of the next generation is, the heavier the family financial burden is, and the more female teachers tend to agree with delay retirement in order to increase family income and reduce family burden. thirdly, the degree of job preference of female teachers has a significant effect on the intention to delay retirement. the more you love the profession of teachers, the more they are in favor of extending their retirement age; as their job preference diminishes, so does the proportion of people in favor of late retirement. it is generally believed that the degree of job preference will affect the performance of the work as well. if they like their own work, they will be motivated by the work, and then they are willing to stay longer in the career; on the contrary, if they don’t like their work, it can lead to inefficiency and a sense of exclusion. therefore, if female teachers do not like the work of teaching and educating students, they are likely to disapprove of extending their working life. 6.2 occupational factors firstly, the monthly income of female teachers has a significant effect on the intention to delay retirement. when the monthly income is above $285, the higher the monthly income is, the higher the proportion of female teachers in favor of extending their working life. because salaries are tied to pensions, the higher the monthly income is, that is, the higher the pre-retirement salary is, the more retirement benefits are available and the more benefits are received through delayed retirement. therefore, female teachers with high monthly incomes are more in favor of delayed retirement. secondly, the cumulative working length of female teachers has a significant effect on the intention to delay retirement. overall, there is a positive correlation between cumulative length of working and delayed retirement intention, that is, the longer the occupation takes place, the more female teachers are www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 41 published by scholink inc. in favor of delayed retirement. on the one hand, because the length of working is linked to the salary level, the longer the cumulative length of working is, the more the salary income of female teachers will increase. on the other hand, the longer they work, the deeper they feel about their profession and their students, and the more they want to pass on their knowledge to their students. thirdly, the work unit variables of female teachers have a significant effect on the intention to delay retirement. 71% of female teachers working in kindergartens are in favor of an extended retirement age, compared with 18.2 % and 13.8 % of female teachers working in junior and high schools. this may be due to the fact that the average kindergarten class has fewer students, more teachers assigned, and the academic burden is almost zero, so each teacher’s work intensity and pressure are less. but female teachers working in junior high and senior high schools, on average, are responsible for the teaching tasks of dozens or even hundreds of students, and also undertake the arduous task of coping with the complex psychology of adolescent students and the great pressure of enrollment rates, so their attitude against the delayed retirement is even stronger. fourthly, the professional title of female teachers has a significant effect on the intention to delay retirement. overall, the higher the professional title is, the more they are in favor of delayed retirement. on the one hand, teachers with high professional titles mean that they will receive higher salaries and benefits; on the other hand, higher professional title usually indicates that they have stronger capacities, and then have more opportunities for social capital and development, all of which encourage them to tend to retire late. 6.3 policy factors firstly, the perception of flexible retirement by female teachers has a significant impact on the intention to delay retirement. 44% of female teachers who support flexible retirement choose to approve delayed retirement, and vice versa. flexible retirement policies provide flexible retirement options for female teachers. those teachers who favor flexible retirement can choose when to retire according to their actual situation, so they are more inclined to favor delayed retirement. but female teachers who already have relatively fixed plans and arrangements for their later life will not agree with flexible retirement systems, as delayed retirement means that they will need to change their life schedule, which can cause inconvenience. therefore, they are less willing to support delayed retirement policies than female teachers who agree with flexible retirement systems. secondly, the view of female teachers on the different retirement ages for men and women has a significant effect on the intention to delay retirement. female teachers who believe that men and women are equal and should retire at the same age or that men should retire earlier prefer to support delayed retirement. in terms of current gender structure of teachers, the number of female teachers is higher than that of male teachers, and female teachers play a very important role in the education industry. retirement at the same age as men or even later is a recognition of women’s professional competence. in addition, as women’s educational attainment increases, they also need longer working life to recover the high cost of human capital investment. therefore, female teachers who believe that men and women www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 42 published by scholink inc. should retire at the same age or men should retire earlier support delayed retirement more. on the contrary, female teachers who believe that women should retire earlier may disapprove of late retirement, because they hope to have more time to take care of their families or enjoy later life, or because the traditional notion that “men should take greater social responsibility than women” is stronger. 7. conclusion and policy implications 7.1 conclusion based on the above analysis of the factors affecting the delayed retirement intention of female teachers, we can see that nearly half of the female teachers do not approve of the delayed retirement, so it is not advisable to implement the delayed retirement policy in a rush, and either the formulation of the delayed retirement program or the implementation of the policy has a long way to go. but the percentage of female teachers supporting the delayed retirement has increased compared with previous scholars’ findings. the hypotheses that personal factors, occupational factors, and policy factors are effective factors that affect female teachers’ intention to delay retirement are supported. among the personal factors, better health condition, the more children in the family, and higher preference for work make female teachers are more favor of delayed retirement is; in addition, among the occupational factors, the higher the monthly income of female teachers is, the more they inclined to delay retirement; the longer the cumulative length of working is, the stronger intention they have to delay retirement; female teachers in different work units have different intention to delay retirement; the higher the professional title of female teachers are, the more they are in favor of delayed retirement. finally, among the policy factors, the perception of flexible retirement and of the same retirement age for men and women have a significant impact on the intention to delay retirement, and female teachers who support flexible retirement and same retirement age for both men and women tend to delay retirement and support delayed retirement. the above conclusions can undoubtedly provide reference for the government to formulate the delayed retirement policy. 7.2 policy implications firstly, when designing retirement age programs, gender differences should be eliminated and the needs of different groups should be fully taken into account. in china, men generally retire 5-10 years later than women, but the average life expectancy of women is longer than that of men. under conditions where women’s educational life is basically equal to that of men, if women’s working life is shorter than that of men, it is in fact a denial and hindrance to women’s right to work, interests or even self-fulfilling opportunities, which seriously impedes gender equity. therefore, in order to take care of women’s rights and interests, consideration may be given to the introduction of delayed retirement for women and then the same retirement age for men and women gradually. in addition, different retirement policies have to be implemented according to the differences and characteristics of different occupational groups. for example, for educated women, early retirement can lead to shorter working life, which is undoubtedly a great waste of human capital. but for those who engage in heavy manual www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 43 published by scholink inc. work, early retirement means that they can get rid of tired jobs, have time to recover the health and enjoy their later life. therefore, different retirement age policies should be considered for groups of women with large gaps in the nature of work and human capital. secondly, flexible retirement policies may be another choice. the analysis results above indicate that the female teachers’ views on the retirement age are influenced by many factors. because the individual’s health status, income level and choice preference are different, if the rigid uniformity of delayed retirement for men and women, it will not be able to take care of the diverse needs, which is not conducive to a better response to the social problems caused by aging. therefore, options of different retirement age should be given, based on the minimum and maximum retirement age criteria set by government, and therefore workers can apply for retirement on their own needs. thirdly, the delayed retirement age policy should be piloted and then promoted nationally. in order to avoid social problems and pressure caused by the widespread implementation of the policy in the short term, small pilot projects can be carried out first, and the delayed retirement can be implemented first among groups with little resistance. for example, the previous study shows that female teachers with the higher professional title are more willing to delay retirement, so we can choose the group with higher professional title to try out the delayed retirement scheme. in 2015, the circular on the retirement age of female cadres at the county level and female professional and technical personnel with senior professional titles issued jointly by the ministry of central organization and the ministry of human and social affairs is a policy document for the implementation of such pilot work. the relevant sectors can understand the implementation of the delayed retirement policy through the pilot projects, adjust and supplement the policy in a timely manner, and lay the foundation for a wide range of promotion. finally, it is necessary to enhance the professional treatment of women and the protection of women’s professional interests, and the awareness of gender equity in the whole society. because of women’s traditional disadvantages at the employment and promotion levels, it is necessary to properly eliminate the unreasonable gap of income between men and women, improve the welfare benefits for female workers, strengthen the labor protection of female workers in work units, establish a reasonable employment system, and ensure the fairness and of assessment and promotion, as a compensation and incentive mechanism. at the same time, the relevant sectors should vigorously implement the national gender mainstreaming policy, enhance the trust and recognition of women’s working ability in the whole society, provide a good working environment and development opportunities for women, and promote the process of gender equity in the whole society. acknowledgement this paperis supported bygeneral project of the national social science fund in china “research on the organizational development of rural women in rural governance” (17bzz065). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 44 published by scholink inc. references beehr, t. a., 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(2000). work and nonwork predictors of employees’ retirement ages. journal of vocational behavior, (2), 206-225. https://doi.org/10.1006/jvbe.1999.1736 dong, c. t. (2010). thinkings on the retirement age of female workers in china. human resource management, (4), 35-37. dong, n., & jiang, b. (2015). study on the influencing factors of suzhou women’s delayed retirement intention. social security studies, (3), 47-54. gao, q. b., & deng, h. (2009). analysis on raising the retirement age of female workers. journal of chinese women’s studies, (6), 32-37. guo, w. c., & yu, b. (2006). study on the effect of raising the retirement age for women on their pensions. journal of dalian university of technology (social sciences edition), (2), 77-80. huang, y. t. (2013). a study on the intention and influencing factors of enterprise employees to extend retirement age—based on the investigation of an economic development zone in nanjing. new finance, (8), 46-51. jing, w. h., & xie, c. l. 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(2014). a study on the mediating effect of gender consciousness in women with knowledge between self-efficacy and retirement expectation. journal of northeast university (social sciences edition), (1), 52-57. suo, j., xiao, f. x., & luo, x. (2015). empirical analysis of influencing factors of female high-level talents’ remission intention of the same age—research data based on culture. journal of xi’an jiaotong university (social sciences edition), (3), 109-114. wang, z. q. (2013). legal reform of women’s retirement system in contemporary china. hebei academic journal, (1), 177-181. wang, z. q., & wu, d. x. (2007). interpretation of the law and policy on retirement of female professionals and technicians. journal of chinese women’s studies, (2), 14-17. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 45 published by scholink inc. wu, j. l. (2009). analysis on retirement age of chinese female workers. human resource management, (8), 70-71. yang, y. y., & wu, x. x. (2017). re-thinking on the value of women’s delayed retirement and family policy. price theory and practice, (1), 62-66. yue, j. l. (2017). effect of different groups of women’s income differences among age groups on equalizing retirement age for men and women. chinese social security review, (3), 43-56. zhang, z, s., & li, x. f. (2011). an empirical study on the influence of individual factors of female civil servants on the degree of support for retirement. journal of chinese women’s studies, (5), 27-33. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 1 original paper when anti-corruption meets industrial policy: nigeria’s efcc’s function creep into industrial policy enforcement abel b.s. gaiya1* 1 clean technology hub, 1 sarki tafida street, guzape, 900104, abuja, nigeria * e-mail: abelgaiya@gmail.com received: march 23, 2024 accepted: may 26, 2024 online published: june 06, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n3p1 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n3p1 abstract industrial policy in countries characterized by high levels of unproductive and disorganized corruption is, unsurprisingly, also ridden with high levels of corruption. with dispersed distributions of power, it is more difficult to create and maintain pockets of bureaucratic effectiveness to drive successful industrial policy. this is the case in nigeria. there has, however, been no research into the involvement of its premier anti-corruption agency, the economic and financial crimes commission (efcc), in industrial policy enforcement. the article identifies this phenomenon through news reports and proposes avenues for empirical research and policy experimentation. the efcc has, over years, been involved with development loan recoveries, local content policy enforcement and infrastructure contract enforcement. these have often been at the invitation of the relevant implementing agencies which often display inundation with the enforcement challenge. its substantial investigative and prosecutorial capabilities acquired from anti-corruption activities in a highly corrupt country have made it a key agency for others to call when help with enforcement is needed. there are some indications of propositions to institutionalize or regularize the efcc’s involvement in local content policy and infrastructure contract enforcement, but no serious attention has been paid to these in the literature or news circles. keywords political settlements, corruption, efcc, pockets of effectiveness, nigeria, industrial policy 1. introduction industrial policy is important for the facilitation of industrial development, economic diversification and structural transformation (rodrik, 2008). yet the implementation capacity of the state varies wildly across countries and time. some states have been more prone to “government failure” than others, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 2 published by scholink inc. especially in africa. this is especially the case in countries where the politics is characterized by high levels of contestation within the ruling coalition, which makes rates of corruption and difficulties in implementing industrial policy greater (khan, 2010). controlling bureaucrats and centralizing rent management is often difficult under such circumstances, and preventing rent-capture by recipient capitalists and firms may also be difficult, especially when the latter also have political influence (whitfield et al., 2015). nigeria suffers from high levels of unproductive and uncoordinated corruption as a result of its competitive clientelist political settlement (usman, 2020), relatively small formal sector, and oil-based rentier political economy (roy, 2017). this is also reflected in its industrial policy. it is therefore important to identify politically-informed ways in which industrial policy implementation could be improved. to this end, the article identifies the efcc’s engagement with industrial policy institutions as a possible avenue for further research and experimentation. using news reports, it argues that the agency seems to have become involved in industrial policy enforcement in the areas of development loans, infrastructure projects and local content policy. this is often at the invitation of the various implementing agencies which seem inundated with defaults and corruption among the recipients and subjects of the industrial policy tools and supports implemented and provided. the depth, extent and effectiveness of the efcc’s involvement are unclear, although suggested as positive in some cases. theoretically, this seems to be due to the efcc receiving high-level support to develop strong investigative, forensic, prosecutorial capabilities, and demonstrated effectiveness at securing convictions among some population segments. the high-level support arises due to its utility in signaling a strong anti-corruption stance to the international political and financial community during the economically precarious obasanjo era; its political instrumentality for attacking political opponents; and its electoral utility for signaling an anti-corruption position to the populace of a country for which corruption is a top perceived impediment to development and public welfare. to identify its foray into industrial policy enforcement, content analysis of news reports is undertaken. the next section briefly reviews the literature on mission creep and pockets of effectiveness with respect to industrial policy implementation. following this is a summary of the efcc’s performance over the years. subsequently, evidence is provided from news reports that the efcc has been involved in industrial policy enforcement in nigeria. this is then concluded with a discussion of research paths and methods, and then concluding remarks. 2. theoretical background early development economists largely took for granted the industrial policy implementation capacity of states. in the 1960s when decolonization in africa was the trend, green (1963, p. 164) complained about how “general writings on development usually devote substantial attention to institutions, but either say very little about the forms appropriate to africa or take some set of assumptions based on industrial economies”. within his analysis of african state institutions, he then proceeded to argued that www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 3 published by scholink inc. the “implicit belief that single institutions should normally concentrate on one aim, are highly unrealistic and operationally undesirable in many african situations” (green, 1963, p. 165). for african states a much broader view of the role of institutions as policy-implementing agencies is needed, emphasizing the changing and flexible institutional structures needed for african states, at least in the short-to-medium term (green, 1963, p. 165). green (1963) drew from the example of the ghana cocoa marketing board experience of 1938-60, which spontaneously extended its policy objectives from shortand long-run cocoa price stabilisation to income stabilisation, redistribution and effectively fostering the implementation of fiscal and monetary policy by making the collection of revenue easier and by favouring the release of aggregate purchasing power, respectively (serra, 2014, p. 13). there was even at some point independent board construction operations on the local amenity level, given the weakness of the public works department and private contractors in terms of specialized competence and available personnel relative to the board (green, 1963, p. 170). this extension arose spontaneously, and green argued that it may be more deliberately fostered. green’s argument for a being in constant search for spontaneous emergence of multi-purpose institutions and deliberate fashioning of such institutions seemed to have gone without influence, with only a few citations in about 50 years since the paper was published. generally, bierschenk (2010) notes that since the early periods of independence there was not much published work on the bureaucracy in africa. the industrial policy experience of latin america and postcolonial africa under import-substitution industrialization strategies brought the problem of low state capacity to the foreground (evans, 1995). subsequent theoretical developments have improved understanding of these processes, especially from those who studied the east asian developmental states (amsden, 1989; evans, 1995). in addition, broad stroke descriptions of “government failure” (krueger, 1990) and “neopatrimonialism” (van de walle, 2001) have given way to “pockets of effectiveness” (roll, 2014; whitfield et al., 2015; hickey, 2019). the development of the political settlements framework (khan 2010) and subsequently the elaborated political settlements framework (whitfield et al., 2015) provide valuable insights into the phenomenon of industrial policy and pockets of bureaucratic effectiveness. within the political settlements approach, a political settlement is “a description of the distribution of power across organizations that are relevant for analyzing a specific institutional or policy problem” (khan, 2017, p. 640). a ruling coalition which faces a fairly low degree of contestation within the coalition and a low degree of vulnerability to excluded elites would be better able to focus on long-term development rather than short-term political survival. the ruling elites would also be better able to create and maintain pockets of bureaucratic effectiveness and cohesion with which to implement industrial policy. this pocket of effectiveness (poe) refers to “public organizations that are relatively effective in providing public goods and services that the organization is officially mandated to provide, despite operating in an environment in which effective public service delivery is not the norm.” (roll, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 4 published by scholink inc. 2014, p. 24). due to their particular instrumentality to the ruling coalition, these poes receive strong political support. mutual interests between capitalists and ruling elites may arise to support industrial policy in a particular sector, for instance due to electoral, fiscal/economic pressures, and/or security pressures; or due to lobbying from capitalists or from the long-term horizon of secure ruling elites (whitfield et al., 2015). such mutual interests drive the creation, maintenance and sustenance of pockets of effectiveness. ruling elites, especially where the bureaucracy is generally weak and/or the broader political settlement is characterized by a dispersed distribution of power, may still be confronted with the task of maintaining the poe, shielding it from unproductive interference, and optimizing its operations. various measures have been identified within the development, political settlements or pockets of effectiveness literatures for improving the effectiveness of industrial policy implementing agencies. nonetheless, green’s (1963) argument for multipurpose institutions may be resurrected in light of persistent difficulties in improving generalized state capacities over the course of decades, and the recent research into pockets of effectiveness. within the poe approach, there is the notion of “spillovers” of a poe’s capabilities and performance to other agencies (roll, 2014, p. 39), regarded as the possible “holy grail” of the literature (hickey, 2019, p. 11). however, roll (2014) does not find evidence that poes tend to have positive effects on public sector performance more broadly. the political settlement underlying the emergence and maintenance of the poe in the first place cannot be transferred to another agency simply through capacity-building and personnel transfer. therefore, no case of spill-over has been observed in the literature (hickey, 2019, p. 11). nonetheless, rather than propose the spill-over of poes to other agencies, green (1963) implicitly argued for the allowance and encouragement of poes to extend their policy objectives, spontaneously or deliberately, into other policy domains. while alluding to the cocoa board’s superior “specialized competence and available personnel” as the basis for its greater bureaucratic capacity and better performance, the reason for the emergence of this capacity in the first place was not assessed. yet marketing boards perform a core state function of revenue generation, and hickey (2019, p. 40) notes that such revenue generation bureaucracies typically become poes, protected and supported by the ruling coalition. hence, whereas the interaction of historical contingencies and structural conditions can enable the emergence of political support for a particular bureaucracy and its emergence as a poe, it should be allowed to be flexible enough to extend its policy objective and mandates as they spontaneously emerge when demand for such extension emerges. therefore, a phenomenon in the poe literature, which has not been adequately explored, is mission creep. however, in the fields of public administration, political science and organizational sociology, the notion of “mission creep” has been systematically explored ever since michels’ (1959 [1915]) classic study of the german social democratic party (babb & buira, 2004, p. 3). it has also been recently explored in studies of international bureaucracies (littoz-monnet, 2020). driven by some form of crisis and perceived need (which creates windows of opportunity within the national or international www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 5 published by scholink inc. political settlement), and institutional entrepreneurship, a public agency can extend its mission informally or formally beyond its original mandate. this “mission creep” occurs through deliberate institutional entrepreneurship undertaken by an agency’s leadership and driven by ideas. maguire, hardy and lawrence (2004, p. 657) define institutional entrepreneurship as the “activities of actors who have an interest in particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform existing ones”. mission creep has been identified in many areas, including central banking, national security law, the international monetary fund, the world bank, and international investment agreements creeping into sovereign debt restructuring. one possible instance of mission creep is identified in the case of nigeria’s economic and financial crimes commission’s (efcc) foray into industrial policy rent enforcement, operating within nigeria’s competitive clientelist political settlement (roy, 2017). onyeaka et al. (2019) identify a function creep of the efcc into areas of private debt recovery, which is a civil, rather than criminal issue. this arises due to delays, inefficiencies and other frictions present in the court system, as well as the efcc’s capacity for corruption investigation and prosecution which provide added leverage over debtors. an area of the efcc’s function creep, which has received little attention, is its creep into industrial policy enforcement. this is identifiable through news reports. the demand for its function creep is therefore not limited to private actors as is the focus of onyeaka et al. (2019). the argument made is that in post-military era of the fourth republic, the high corruption environment facilitated by the country’s competitive clientelism and oil-dependence produced its premier anti-corruption agency, the economic and financial crimes commission (efcc). its contribution to international credibility-building to secure debt forgiveness at a time of serious economic and fiscal constraint, and its informal instrumentality for hounding political opponents gave it high-level political support. although it has not substantially reduced corruption due to the structural nature of the problem, it has garnered significant investigative capabilities. its function creep into industrial policy enforcement is manifest, and there is the potential to strengthen its involvement in this area. under situations of generalized weak state capacity and political-economy-based emergence of poes, it may be argued that it is important to maintain an analytical framework of institutional flexibility, and identify situations of “capacity gap”. where such capacity gaps exist, multi-purpose institutions can be created through the design of a closer working of the primary-mandate and secondary-mandate institutions, or subsuming the mandate under the relative poe’s function. anti-corruption agencies may engage in cases in which fraud and other forms of corruption have taken place, whether in industrial policy jurisdictions or not. for instance, people may set up “false” industries and receive licences to import goods and then resell them on the open market. however, there is a difference between fraudulent and criminal activity (such as creating shell companies or “briefcase farms” and forging financial statements to apply for an industrial or agricultural loan) on one hand, and misuse of industrial policy rents after disbursement (for instance a genuine contractor failing to construct a road after receiving the mobilization fee, using an import license to import raw materials www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 6 published by scholink inc. for resale rather than for industrial use, or failing to put effort into meeting performance requirements or repeatedly defaulting on industrial loan repayments, which would warrant legal action through the court system). function creep may begin to enter these latter, essentially civil, cases of industrial policy rent defaults. such spontaneous and ad hoc mission creep, enlargement of policy objectives or mandate extension is perhaps also detectable with the nigerian army’s activities in civil affairs (mbachu & ibukun, 2018), which is the mandate of the nigerian police force. this arises due to the inefficiency of the police and the greater capacity of the army which receives greater high-level political support. in this case the military is better funded than the nigerian police force (npf) due to its instrumentality for foreign diplomacy and regional hegemony, historical legacies of military domination of national politics for the majority of nigeria’s postcolonial period, as well as the threat of military elites (as “violence specialists”) to civilian elites requiring side payments to keep under the control of civilian ruling coalitions. it may also be detected in the central bank of nigeria’s (cbn) foray into development finance (ekine, 2019), under the stress of limited forex reserves and given the failures of the state’s development finance institutions (dfis). in this case, many, including the chairman senate committee on agriculture, have called on it to hand over the anchor borrowers programme to the federal ministry of agriculture and rural development notwithstanding the fact that the latter is in financial distress (nan, 2019). as hickey (2019) notes, central banks typically become poes due to their instrumentality to the ruling coalition’s need for financial and economic stability, as well as international pressures and support for central bank independence. combined with the efcc case and green’s (1963) ghana’s cocoa marketing board case, there is therefore prima facie evidence to suggest that function creep may be likely to emerge under three conditions. the first is when there is a triple “capacity gap” for three sets of state agencies – in this case, the administrative capacity of industrial policy implementing agencies relative to the demands for building productive capabilities; the administrative capacity of the judicial system as a third party which may handle cases of industrial policy rent default when the monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms of industrial policy implementing agencies fail, relative to the civil justice demands of the country; and the administrative capacity of the anti-corruption agency relative to the pervasiveness and depth of corruption in the country. the second is when the primary agency receives significantly greater high-level political support than the secondary agency for various political economy reasons (identified using political settlements analysis). and the third condition is when the functions of the primary and secondary agencies are related, although their mandates/policy objectives may differ. in the efcc case, its investigative and prosecutorial powers enable it to have almost similar sanctioning functions possessed by the justice system and the monitoring and evaluation investigative apparatuses of industrial policy implementing agencies. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 7 published by scholink inc. figure 1. the triple capacity gap and their origins in the political settlement source: author’s illustration. the case of the efcc merely introduces the research agenda, and more in-depth empirical research is required to unpack the validity, dynamics, constraints and opportunities involved in the phenomenon. 3. efcc and its performance in an adverse context the efcc is nigeria’s dominant anti-graft agency, established by the economic and financial crimes commission (establishment) act of 2004. it is empowered to prevent, investigate, prosecute and penalise economic and financial crimes. however, nigeria’s experience with anti-corruption efforts supports the general expectation that “anti-corruption reforms that do not take into account the political settlement are likely to be met with resistance and failure” (anti-corruption evidence 2017, 5). while the efcc has been in operation for 16 years, it has had limited impact on generalized corruption in nigeria. from the available official data, from 2010 to 2015, the efcc secured 3.75% convictions of investigated cases, and 23% convictions of cases filed (enweremadu, 2013, p. 26). after the establishment of the efcc in 2004, there was an improvement in the corruption perceptions index (cpi) until 2008 (27), after which it plateaued, never exceeding 28 and remaining at 27 in 2018, below the sub-saharan african average of 32 (transparency international 2019a, 4). according to the world bank’s control of corruption metric, between 2005 and 2015, nigeria consistently ranked below the 20th percentile globally in its control of corruption, well behind ghana and south africa, and with little indication of improvement (roy, 2017, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 8 published by scholink inc. p. 5). figure 2. nigeria’s corruption perceptions index scores (1996-2018). dark bars are years in which the efcc was operational. source: author’s illustration based on transparency international (transparency international 2019b) an estimated us$400 billion of nigeria’s oil revenues has been lost to corruption since nigeria’s independence (okoye, 2012), with the efcc only recovering a very small fraction of looted funds. in the period 1970-2004, the equivalent of about 40% of 1980-2000 oil exports is estimated to have been lost in illicit capital flight (enweremadu, 2013, p. 221). there are also high levels of unproductive corruption and inefficiency in industrial policy implementation. many of the tariff provisions and import bans have not adequately stimulated domestic production, and import bans have been difficult to enforce and hence encourage smuggling (raballand & mjekiqi, 2010, pp. 207-210). there are abuses of import duty waivers (modebe et al., 2014). action aid and tax justice network africa surmised that nigeria could be losing an estimated $2.9 billion annually to corporate organizations as incentives, and $327 million on import duty exemptions (anyadike & eme, 2017, p. 40). development finance institutions are also ridden with corruption (page & okeke, 2019). public enterprises have also been very corrupt and a drainage on public resources and debt. by 1999 many of them were moribund, as was acknowledged by even one of the presidents under whom many were created (iol, 1999). the result has been limited success in industrial policy efforts and a low manufacturing share of national output. the consequent lack of economic diversification into higher-productivity industries means that economic growth, wage growth and employment growth fail to keep up with the growing population, resulting in a stagnant gdp per capita, median wage levels, high poverty rates and unemployment rates. the country’s manufacturing value added share of gdp in 2020 was only 12.7%, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 9 published by scholink inc. well below its level of 20.3% in 1981 (world bank 2021). by operating in one of the most corrupt countries in the world (ranked the most corrupt by transparency international in 1999), the efcc’s capacity emerged due to its instrumentality in avoiding being ostracized from the mainstream global financial system (page, 2021, p. 13) when the economy and state finances were under serious pressure in the first few years of the 21st century (enweremadu, 2012; usman, 2020). although political and budgetary support for it is in general less than it should be, given the scale of corruption in the country, the efcc still received political protection at the highest level of politics (thurston, 2018). figure 3. nigeria’s political settlement in comparative perspective. nigeria’s power concentration, manufacturing firms’ capabilities and political power are weaker than the sub-saharan average and its political settlements more dispersed than the sub-saharan average source: author’s illustration based on schulz and kelsall (2020). however, contrary to expectations, the huge debt write-off the country won in april of 2005 did not lead to the abandonment of the anti-corruption policy (enweremadu, 2012, p. 8). this is partly because the agency also provides political utility to ruling elites as a means of garnering goodwill among the electorate with whom anti-corruption signalling is important in a high-corruption society, as well as serving as a tool for harassing political opponents (enweremadu, 2012, p. 76). as a result, despite the limited impact on corruption in nigeria since 2005, the efcc “has … established itself as an agency with high levels of forensic capacity to lead investigations” (onyeama et al., 2018, p. 5). the agency is also “larger and better funded” than other anti-corruption agencies, enjoys “statutory and political pre-eminence” over them (page, 2021, p. 9), and has a “higher tolerance for political risk” (page, 2021, p. 10). it has in fact come to be seen by most nigerians as the most effective anti-corruption agency in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 10 published by scholink inc. the country, above the police force (unodc 2019). it has been noted that due to a lack of trust in the civil justice system, and despite several judicial reprimands, there are “instances where essentially civil matters have been brought before the efcc because petitioners and their legal advisers give the complaint a criminal interpretation so as to bring it within the jurisdiction of the efcc.” (onyeama et al., 2018, p. 28). while others have focused on the occurrence of this phenomenon among private actors, it is also observable among industrial policy agencies, most commonly with respect to recoveries of development loans, but also in areas of trade policy enforcement, local content policy enforcement, and enforcement of infrastructure contracts. 3.1 evidence from news reports news reports patchily map out the efcc’s involvement with industrial policy, often at the invitation of implementing agencies. for instance, the bank of industry (boi), in 2018 resolved to work with the efcc to recover loans given to defaulting farmers, given the limitations of using private debt collectors (dada, 2018). the anti-corruption agency reportedly helped recover n297 million for the bank of agriculture in kaduna and kebbi states under the central bank of nigeria’s anchor borrowers programme (jeremiah, 2018). the nigerian export-import bank (nexim), facing a 72% non-performing loan rate, in 2010 invited debt collection agencies, as well as the efcc to help it recover n4.5 billion considered to “have a criminal element”, out of n14.6 billion owed by export-oriented companies and individuals (onwuemenyi, 2010). it had allegedly recovered n450 million out of the n4.5 billion (onwuemenyi, 2010). the nigerian content development and monitoring board (ncdmb) also involved the efcc in a few cases. in 2018 the executive secretary of the ncdmb had indicated that the board “needs more support on the investigative side of our activities and the expertise of efcc” (asu, 2018). consequently, both agencies collaborated in 2019 to address companies in the upstream oil sector which failed to make the statutory remittances to the nigerian content development fund (the nation 2019). the ncdmb also threatened to hand over to the efcc defaulting beneficiaries of the nigerian content intervention fund (ncif) in the oil and gas industry which received funds for capacity building (obi 2019). at a two-day workshop held by the ncdmb for law enforcement agencies in 2020, the director of monitoring and evaluation noted that the pioneers of the nogicd act “focused on building consensus and collaboration with stakeholders… the issue of securing conviction against noncompliance was not the priority at that time” (ncdmb, 2020). at the same event, a former inspector-general of police noted legislative and administrative gaps which would hamper successful prosecution and conviction of companies which failed to comply with local content requirements in the oil and gas sector (olayinka, 2020). he proposed that the ncdmb build a small team of experts, “with competences in investigation and identification of ingredients critical for proving cases of noncompliance”, and that officers from the efcc, among others be part of the team and trained on nigerian content policy. with regard to trade policy enforcement, the senate joint committee on customs, excise and tariff; www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 11 published by scholink inc. and marine transport, which investigated the alleged n30 trillion revenue leakages in the import and export value chain, noted that companies found culpable of corruption would be referred to the efcc (baiyewu, 2017). the chairman warned that “most of these companies, which have applied and gotten approval as manufacturers or assemblers of various products, but import finished goods in the name of ckd, will be charged with economic crime” (baiyewu, 2017). there was however no further news about the outcomes of such threats. the central bank of nigeria (cbn) has also involved the efcc in the enforcement of its de facto import ban. when the cbn established its list of 41 banned items as part of its forex management and import substitution strategy, the central bank governor disclosed that, in addition to other sanctions, the cbn’s economic intelligence and banking supervision departments would work closely with the efcc “to expose and sanction any bank, any company or its directors, or fx operator that colludes with unscrupulous individuals or companies to undermine the policy on 41 items. the prohibition and sanction shall be extended to smugglers of banned items” (ohwovoriole, 2018). there are also news reports that the presidency ordered anti-graft bodies, security agencies and intelligence agencies to halt the illegal rice smuggling business (economic confidential, 2019). in 2018, the efcc also sought a greater role in reducing the incidence of abandoned infrastructure contracts in the country. the niger delta development commission (nddc) came under fire for revelations of a legacy of abandoned projects. the efcc thus commenced investigation into abandoned projects awarded by the nddc in the south-south zone (ukpong 2018) and in three states in the northwest zone (kebbi, sokoto, & zamfara) (this day, 2020). the efcc acting chairman in 2018 had said that a project monitoring team would be established to partner with civil society organizations to monitor the award of contracts by the nddc and execution of the projects (ukpong 2018). a house of representatives ad hoc committee investigating the nddc’s many abandoned projects in 2019 vowed to drag defaulting contractors before the efcc to ensure thorough investigation and prosecution (daily times 2019). in 2018, the efcc even expressed desire for more properly bringing infrastructure project abandonment into its policy domain by expressing the need for legislation to criminalize it as a means of strengthening deterrence (onyekwere, jimoh, & godwin, 2018). without intensive investigative journalism and more in-depth empirical analysis, it is unclear how effective the efcc’s interventions into these industrial policy domains have been. theoretically speaking, it could be mere publicity. agencies may simply be inviting the efcc as a means to outwardly show that it is doing something to be more effective, while operationally limiting the efcc’s actual involvement. in other words, it could be acts of organizational hypocrisy. similarly, the efcc may offer statements of intended investigation or cooperation without much action. yet there are a few examples to indicate some success of even the threat of anti-corruption investigation in some cases. as mentioned earlier, it was reported that the efcc helped recover n297 million for the bank of agriculture in kaduna and kebbi states under the central bank of nigeria’s anchor borrowers programme (jeremiah, 2018). in 2018 it was reported that the minority leader of the house of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 12 published by scholink inc. representatives “hurriedly mobilised contractors to sites of various uncompleted projects in his constituency” due to fear of efcc investigation and prosecution (sahara reporters, 2018). in a 2020 case, infrastructure projects worth n305 million in kebbi state were abandoned by the contractor after receiving some percentage of the contract sum. when the efcc began investigation following a whistle-blower complaint, the efcc “compelled the contractor to return to site to complete both projects” (odunsi, 2020). a similar case occurred in niger state when a company abandoned a road construction project (awarded in 2012) after being paid 24% of the 1.24 billion naira contact sum (efcc 2020). after being petitioned by the rijau community youth forum, the company was “compelled” by the efcc in 2020 to finish the work. this intervention reportedly raised the level of completion from 7% to 60% as of april 2020 (efcc 2020). the efcc had also reached a performance evaluation agreement with the contractor and the federal ministry of works whereby the contractor reports monthly to the efcc and the ministry gives a monthly evaluation report. the efcc acknowledged this intervention as a “laudable novelty”, urging “other relevant agencies and communities to emulate such synergy” between the efcc, awarding agencies and the communities in which projects are located (efcc, 2020). it is observable that in all these cases, it has been recipients of industrial policy support which have been the focus of investigation, rather than officials within the industrial policy implementing agencies. conditional on these not being cases of organizational hypocrisy, this reveals that this is a demand-led phenomenon, involving cases whereby the industrial policy implementing agencies seem to perceive the problem to lie with the recipients rather than in their own processes of monitoring and sanctioning – or, perhaps, processes of monitoring and sanctioning under past leadership. in addition to invitations from implementing agencies, those at the top echelons of power seem have also called on the efcc, from a president (pindiga & edet, 2009), to state governments (muhammad, 2016). several industrial policy institutions have seemed to deem the efcc to be a key agency to call in the case of industrial loan defaults, or to threaten defaulters in the hope of scaring them into complying when they heard that the efcc would be involved. yet it is difficult to ascertain to what extent the rhetorical invocation of the efccs’ involvement is mere verbal threat or the extent to which the news reports exaggerate the efcc’s involvement and success. interestingly, the efcc has subtly indicated interest in broader development in a few cases. when the asset management corporation of nigeria (amcon) requested help from the efcc to recover n5 trillion debts, the efcc’s acting spokesman noted that “we will render assistance in terms of enforcement…because they [the debtors] are affecting the economy of the country from flourishing” (mutum, 2019). on another occasion the efcc chairman “regretted that the country is losing huge revenues, foreign exchange and jobs as local rice processing companies are shutting down because of their inability to gain market access” (economic confidential 2019). similarly, it has “expressed desire for local content practice to be extended to other important sectors of nigerian economy” (asu, 2018), and in another context has noted that “it is in the nation’s economic interest to assist bat as the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 13 published by scholink inc. company has helped in creating jobs and boosting government revenue earnings” (baba, 2014). when the nigerian embassy in berlin sought government agencies to speak to investors in germany as part of efforts to boost investments, agencies invited were the cbn, nexim and efcc (onwuemenyi, 2010). the efcc has thus been taken as a de facto ex post industrial policy enforcement agency in some areas. the breadth, depth, form and impact of such involvements require further investigation. this, however, appears to be largely limited to ex post enforcement of rent repayments rather than to directly enforcing the economic performance of rent recipients. yet it is possible that enforcement of rent repayments or threats of involving the efcc indirectly act as a disincentive against unproductive use of rents. moreover, this seems to be on an ad hoc basis, with only few proposals for an institutionalization of the efcc’s involvement in industrial policy monitoring and evaluation detectable only in the cases of local content policy and infrastructure projects enforcement. this is a key point. the literature on mission creep highlights the role of ideas and agency in institutional entrepreneurship – one cannot work without the other. while the efcc’s leadership has expressed desire for laws on infrastructure contracts and local content development, it does not seem to have intensively pursued these interests. additionally, despite the expression of national economic interests by the efcc leadership, the fact that it is through petitions that the efcc has explored specific industrial policy domains means that it is not driving ideas in this area, signifying a lack of ideational and bureaucratic entrepreneurship in this regard. 3.2 quantitative analysis while the phenomenon described in this paper was first identified by chance, there may be a way to more objectively identify other cases or other potential cases, hence increasing the generalizability of the argument. the first step is to measure the tripartite capacity gap. the implementing agency capacity gap (iacg) is measured by the product of two variables from esid’s political settlements dataset (polsett) (schulzd & kelsall, 2020) – government’s economic development prioritization (edp) and power concentration index (pci). the anti-corruption agency and court system capacity gap (acacscg) is measured by the ratio between an anti-corruption agency capacity score and a court system capacity score. the latter is measured using the “civil justice is effectively enforced” score (cjs) from the world justice project’s (2020) rule of law index. the anti-corruption agency capacity score is measured by an additive score for whether the aca had budget autonomy (budget autonomy score [bas]: 1 = yes and 0 = no), and what its functions are (function score [fs]: 1 point for each function – policy, prevention, investigation and prosecution). aca budget autonomy and function data are derived from the world bank’s (2020) anti-corruption authorities database. the acacscg is then divided by the country’s score on the transparency international’s (2020) corruption perceptions index (cpi) for the year 2001 (around which many anti-corruption agencies were created in response to high levels of corruption) in order to get the national corruption capacity gap. the “composite capacity gap” (ccg) is derived simply by multiplying the three capacity gaps: www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 14 published by scholink inc. where: the absolute values on their own are meaningless; it is the ranking of countries based on these values that provides the basis for potentially meaningful inference. table 1. capacity gap scores country bas fs a+f (a+f)/cjs cpi 2001 1/(cpi 2001) afcj /cpi2001 edp pci edp*pci ccg bangladesh 1 4 5 13.52 0.40 2.50 33.79 4.24 0.27 1.15 29.48 nigeria 1 4 5 11.76 1.00 1.00 11.76 3.39 0.36 1.23 9.59 pakistan 0 4 4 14.35 2.30 0.43 6.24 3.75 0.42 1.58 3.94 philippines 1 3 4 9.40 2.90 0.34 3.24 3.48 0.29 1.00 3.24 uganda 1 3 4 8.64 1.90 0.53 4.55 3.68 0.43 1.57 2.90 kenya 0 3 3 6.42 2.00 0.50 3.21 3.26 0.36 1.18 2.72 cameroon 1 2 3 8.88 2.00 0.50 4.44 3.63 0.56 2.03 2.19 india 0 3 3 7.77 2.70 0.37 2.88 3.92 0.34 1.33 2.17 indonesia 0 3 3 7.63 1.90 0.53 4.02 4.05 0.48 1.93 2.08 tanzania 0 3 3 5.89 2.20 0.45 2.68 3.48 0.45 1.58 1.70 guatemala 0 1 1 3.22 2.90 0.34 1.11 3.20 0.30 0.97 1.15 ghana 0 2 2 3.10 3.40 0.29 0.91 4.14 0.23 0.95 0.96 zambia 0 3 3 4.55 2.60 0.38 1.75 3.82 0.50 1.91 0.92 senegal 0 2 2 3.34 2.90 0.34 1.15 3.55 0.42 1.51 0.76 republic of korea 0 3 3 3.63 4.20 0.24 0.86 4.23 0.44 1.85 0.47 estonia 0 2 2 2.90 5.60 0.18 0.52 3.98 0.47 1.87 0.28 south africa 0 1 1 1.67 4.80 0.21 0.35 3.66 0.55 2.00 0.17 bangladesh (29.5), nigeria (9.6), pakistan (3.9), philippines (3.2) and uganda (2.9) emerge as the top-ranking countries out of the 17 developing countries for which all data are available. bangladesh and, to a lesser extent, nigeria, seem to have far greater composite capacity gaps than the other three countries, which may or may not make them the outliers for which the phenomenon exists. indeed, as with nigeria in 1999, bangladesh was listed as the most corrupt country on the corruption perceptions www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 15 published by scholink inc. index from 2001 to 2005 (yi, 2015, p. 287), while both have the only 5-point aca budget autonomy plus function score. the fact that nigeria ranks second and the mission creep phenomenon has been identified for it improves confidence that the measure is not entirely spurious. this ranking helps narrow the list of countries for case selection and for which to conduct a survey of the literature, and investigation of news reports and exploratory surveys and interviews administered to key elites. these methods will aid in identifying possible cases of aca function creep into industry policy enforcement. unfortunately, the rarity of research the phenomenon and cross-country variation in media publicity of aca investigations produces the same problem as observed in nigeria: that there is little academic research and identification in news reports is limited by the media exposure of national acas. this leaves the bulk of investigation to be directed at obtaining qualitative data from stakeholders in acas and industrial policy implementation agencies. the ccg measure, however, is only a starting point. first, further research requires a more direct measure of the implementing agency capacity gap (iacg). this could be achieved directly, through elite surveys conducted with industrial policy officials and researchers or, a revealed measure, by observing the gap between the priority given to industrial policies by a ruling coalition (measured by an index of funding and protection given to key industries) and economic outcomes for those industries (measured, for instance, by annual industry output growth rates relative to the industry’s global growth rate). such a measure would allow the inclusion of a larger number of countries in the dataset since several countries at the bottom of corruption rankings do not appear in the polsett dataset. secondly, prosecution capacity may supplement the measure of anti-corruption agency capacity, for instance by conducting a cross-country regression of annual prosecution numbers against country population size, the average corruption perceptions index, and the budget autonomy and function scores of the aca. the anti-corruption agency capacity may then be additionally measured as the difference between the country’s estimated prosecution rate derived from the regression model, and the actual prosecution rate. perhaps additional surveys would need to be conducted to identify the prosecution rates, budget autonomy levels and aca functions of the developing countries not present in the anti-corruption authorities database which does not include many developing countries. 4. discussion and conclusion it is conceivable that the efcc does not get more invitations, or even more rigorous involvement, because doing so would expose bureaucrats within the inviting/involved agencies of the malpractices and corruption that they engage in. therefore, if the efcc is actually effective in improving industrial policy enforcement, it might need exogenous imposition – from legislators and citizen petitioners – upon the relevant implementation agencies to be more closely involved, rather than petitions from them. if indeed more intensive research reveal a positive and statistically significant “efcc treatment effect” on industrial policy enforcement effectiveness, then this could be grounds for expanding budgetary and personnel allocation to the agency, just as the bank of industry (boi) seems to have controversially www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 16 published by scholink inc. achieved (ohwovoriole, 2017). this is to enable its institutionalized participation in industrial policy enforcement alongside primary implementing agencies. additionally, the results could prove beneficial to countries which experience high levels of corruption both generally and within industrial policy implementation, and which may have an anti-corruption agency. nonetheless, this is not a magic bullet, and must be complemented by many other innovations to bureaucracies and political settlements. in addition, the variation in capitalists’ technological capabilities for learning for productivity means that simply making threats, no matter how credible, of corruption investigation and prosecution is insufficient. this must be complemented by efforts to improve the organizational and technological capabilities of capitalists, which is difficult since the industrial policy support itself, which gets rent-captured, is partly supposed to improve such capabilities. perhaps efcc involvement is merely meant to filter out firms which seek industrial policy support simply to siphon off rents. quantitative and qualitative research into the identified phenomenon would need to undertake in-depth interviews with key informants, with the starting points for reference being the cases reported in news reports. it would also be necessary to conduct analyses of official documents and inter-agency seminar/workshop outcomes, among agencies such as the ministry of investment, trade and industry, the boi, ministry of agriculture and rural development, the boa, ncdmb and its allied agencies, the nddc, the ministry of power and works, the central bank of nigeria, nigerian customs services, ministry of finance, and the secretary general of the federation who is involved in coordinating activities among the agencies. the research must also explore state-level variation in efcc involvement. an area that has escaped the development literature is the historical importance of local developmental states in driving local development and thus contributing to national development (bateman, 2017). the nigerian development literature has focused on federal initiatives and institutions, but there is some variation in bureaucratic capacity and political settlements across states. whereas the nigerian federal government and the majority of states rely predominantly on oil revenues, lagos state enjoys the largest share of internally-generated revenues in nigeria (30%) (taxaide, 2020) hosts the largest share of msmes and industries in nigeria and accounts for the majority of the nation’s industrial investments, foreign trade and commercial activities. its politics is also much less ethno-religiously fragmented than federal politics. preliminary indications are that its industrial policy and tax institutions have therefore been more effective and more responsive to commercial and capitalist actors than their federal counterparts (page and okeke 2019 12). therefore, investigating the driver of efcc state variation in industrial policy enforcement involvement would be an interesting avenue for research. references amsden, a. 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(2020). the successes and failures of economic reform in nigeria’s post-military political settlement. african affairs, 119(474), 1-38. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adz026 van de walle, n. (2001). african economies and the politics of permanent crisis, 1979–1999. cambridge: cambridge university press. world bank. (2020). “cross country analysis.” anti-corruption authorities. retrieved from https://www.acauthorities.org/cross-country world bank. (2021). manufacturing, value added (% of gdp) – nigeria. world bank. retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/nv.ind.manf.zs?locations=ng world justice project. (2020.) “research and data”, jp. retrieved from www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 3, 2024 22 published by scholink inc. https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index. yi, c. z. (2015). dan hough (ed): corruption, anti-corruption and governance. crime, law and social change, 63(5), 285-293. abstract 1.introduction 3.1 evidence from news reports 3.2 quantitative analysis 4.discussion and conclusion microsoft word ape-v5n3-p43 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 43 original paper mapping the landscape of the inherent right to self-determination of peoples within sovereign states emeka c. adibe1 & obinne obiefuna1* 1 university of nigeria, faculty of law, enugu campus, nigeria * obinne obiefuna, university of nigeria, faculty of law, enugu campus. nigeria received: may 28, 2022 accepted: june 18, 2022 online published: june 25, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n3p43 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n3p43 abstract this essay explores the vexing question of the right to self-determination with particular reference to developments under both general international law and african regional law. it recognises the tension between the right to self-determination and the territorial integrity of states while arguing that the right to self-determination for peoples within sovereign independent states fits into emerging normative developments in international law practice and politics in africa and beyond. these normative developments are a pointer that state-centric principles of territorial integrity are not inviolable. meanwhile, they are also indices for identifying the limits of uti possidetis vis-à-vis the fundamental right of self-determination. keywords self-determination, social contract, rights, sovereignty, international law, decolonization 1. introduction given the importance accorded to the inviolability of colonial borders in international relations, the process of self-determination and the scholarship arising there from has consistently raised questions on discourse about the practice of self-determination under general international law and, significantly african regional law. the thrust of this paper is to critically review these issues by exploring fundamentally the philosophical foundations of self-determination as an inherent right for peoples within sovereign independent states based on the principles of the social contract. the study also examines the ways in which any assertion of the right to self-determination may be permissible in the face of international law indecisiveness and the extant african regional principle of “uti possidetis”. under this principle, african states have committed themselves to respect and upholding the colonial borders inherited upon independence. using the success story of the exercise of self-determination of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 44 published by scholink inc. bangladesh, kosovo, and south sudan as a test case, this paper identifies a few conditions under which the exercise of self-determination may take place under extant international and african law and practice. the research principally employs a qualitative approach with insight into the philosophical foundations of the doctrine of self-determination as well as its parameters under international law. in order to echo the emergent problems associated with the current application of the subject, critical insight and analysis into some recent antecedents of the exercise of self-determination were imperative hence the need for change in paradigm and remapping the boundaries for the exercise of the right to self-determination for peoples within sovereign independent states. 2. social contract, sovereign states, and the right to self-determination the idea that people have an inherent right to decide their own matters and thus have a right to self-determination is of antiquity and has probably existed since the dawn of mankind. social and political philosophers dating from the cradle of political engineering in greek city-states made direct and indirect references to the importance of people taking charge of their affairs and organise themselves the way they deem fit and bringing about their happiness and fulfillment. people are motivated to engage in an activity in order to satisfy a person’s core values or interests and then bring about their happiness and fulfilment. aristotle claims that the final goal of every person’s action is happiness. a self-determination struggle is an expression of people’s inner beliefs and convictions relating to their quest for ideals of liberty, equality, and justice in human society. the concept of self-determination is therefore intimately connected to such ideals as liberty and equality with irresistible appeal in the modern world. it speaks to the emancipation of the individual from any shackles of subjugation; liberation from drawbacks inherited from the past, determined by colonial frontiers. self-determination appears to favour a culture of change in which socio-cultural stamps are continuously re-evaluated and re-appraised according to terms of contemporary narratives and drives. it is arguable that its philosophical underpinnings could be linked to the development of greek city-states founded on principles of democracy, freedom, and state autonomy and incidentally deeply rooted in judaeo-christian religious values and principles. however, one can also associate this concept with ideasof individualism and liberalism which gained remarkable currency within modern political thoughts. greek thought and roman wisdom gave much credibility to natural law. therein, certain rights were considered universal to all human beings and this paradigm came to be associated with liberal political theories in the latter part of the middle ages. among the early greek thinkers, the state was more important than any member of the community. greek thought recognized that the individual could not enjoy a number of benefits like the security of life and property unless he identifies with the community. as a result of the centrality of the state in the advancement of the individual, theories of government began to emerge which attempted to interrogate the absolute loyalty of individuals to the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 45 published by scholink inc. state. laws for the organization of state also became a popular feature in the society and individuals are expected to obey the laws of the state so to prevent anarchy. upon imprisonment and condemnation to death by the state, socrates refused to escape from prison, a condemnation which he believed to be wholly unjust. this is eloquently illustrative of this unquestionable loyalty to the laws of the state. for socrates, “the state, despite its mistakes, was to him a mother who had given him life and had made him what he was” (s e frost, basic teachings of the great philosophers, revised ed, anchor books, new york, 1989, p. 181). in his political discourse, plato was convinced that the starting point for the inquiry about the best political order is the fact of social diversity and conflicting interests, which involve the danger of civil strife. he, therefore, argued that justice is the foundation of good political order, and as such is in everyone’s interest. (plato: political philosophy, in internet encyclopaedia of philosophy, <https://iep.utm.edu/platopol/>). he further opines that “justice is not to the exclusive advantage of any of the city’s factions, but is concerned with the common good of the whole political community, and is to the advantage of everyone. it provides the city with a sense of unity, and thus, is a basic condition for its health.” (plato, political philosophy). in one of his major works, the republics, he categorically states that “injustice causes civil war, hatred, and fighting, while justice brings friendship and a sense of common purpose.” (the republic, 351d, quoted in plato: political philosophy, in internet encyclopaedia of philosophy, <https://iep.utm.edu/platopol/>). in both the republic and the laws, plato asserts not only that factionalism and civil war are the greatest dangers to the city, more dangerous even than a war against external enemies, but also that peace obtained by the victory of one part and the destruction of its rivals is not to be preferred to social peace obtained through the friendship and cooperation of all the city’s parts. (republic 462a-b, laws 628a-b quoted in plato: political philosophy, in internet encyclopaedia of philosophy, <https://iep.utm.edu/platopol/>accessed 16/11/21) in his advocacy for the best political order, plato proposes a system that advances social peace in the community and promotes cooperation and friendship among different social groups, each benefiting from and each adding to the common good. in this political system, citizens have a voice in the affairs of the government since their common good is at stake. as a result of these ideals, in his last dialogue, the laws plato suggests a “traditional polity: a mixed or composite constitution that reconciles different partisan interests and includes aristocratic, oligarchic, and democratic elements.” (plato: political philosophy, in internet encyclopaedia of philosophy, <https://iep.utm.edu/platopol/> accessed 16/11/21). herein, one confronts the cradle of the right of self-determination speaking directly to the contemporary fact that injustice in the polity is at the root of the quest for self-determination of peoples within sovereign independent states. aristotle argues alongside his master plato, that man is by nature a social animal and as such can realise his real self only in a society and among his kind. the end of social evolution starting with a family organisation is the city-state (greek) and the city-state should be organised and conducted so www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 46 published by scholink inc. that it enables each member to become good and live a happy life. the state loses its lustre and becomes evil if it fails to realise its purpose for the members. the citizens of a political community are partners, and as with any other partnership they pursue a common good. (aristotle: politics, in internet encyclopaedia of philosophy <https://iep.utm.edu/aris-pol/> accessed 16/11/21)in this light, the laws and the constitution of the state must be tailored to the nature and needs of the members of that particular group, taking cognisance also of the inequalities and peculiarities of the people within the state. hence in the understanding of aristotle, “a good constitution must recognise these inequalities and confer rights accordingly…” (frosts, basic teachings of the great philosophers, p. 183). aristotle argues that people are fundamentally different and this difference within the city allows for specialization and greater self-sufficiency (aristotle: politics in internet encyclopedia of philosophy). in his book, the politics, book ii, he writes that, in such cities where persons are free and equal, “all cannot rule at the same time, but each rule for a year or according to some other arrangement or period of time. in this way, then, it results that all rule…” (the politics, 1261 a 30). this alternation of rule where persons are free and equal speaks to the cradle of the doctrine of self-determination where the state stays preserved by reciprocal equality of persons and groups reflecting active involvement and participation in the decisions that affect their happiness and good life which is the telos of life. the popular view during the renaissance period was that human beings are endowed with eternal and inalienable rights. many of the philosophers of this era argued that certain rights pertain to individuals as human beings, chief among these rights are the right to life, liberty, and property. some of these thinkers include john locke, jean jacques rousseau, and john rawls. these philosophers turned their attention to social organisation and began to theorise about its origins in order to suggest the best form of social or political organisation. john locke as an outstanding social liberal thinker laid the foundation for a number of liberal political themes that were manifest thereafter in many modern constitutions. the overriding thought is that human beings have certain natural rights which are rooted in their very nature but sometimes these natural rights may be limited by the positive law of the state and these laws result from man’s choice to live and surrender his freedom to the authority of the state or the sovereign. the state is therefore founded upon a contract that the people make with their ruler. locke’s political ideas may be summed up as follows: “men naturally move towards social living. in society, men set up law, an impartial judge, and one executive power in order to attend to common interests. this structure is established by a social contract agreed upon by the members of the group” (frost, p. 196). locke’s attempt was to provide a political space that restrains the state from considerable interference with the affairs of its members including their economic life. except where the security of the state is compromised, no interference is legitimate. locke’s ideas echo considerably in the west in the later middle ages and became literally a flashpoint for the revolutionary agitations that swept the west specifically in north america and some parts of europe epitomised by the english, american, and events of french revolutions. it thus gave impetus to the eventual declaration of the rights of man in the americas and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 47 published by scholink inc. universal acceptance of human rights on the international scene and its recognition in the united nations instruments. in the united nations universal declaration of humans rights of 1948, we observe boisterous support for the advancement of human rights. the underlining thrust of these rights is a notion of liberty that acts as a shield against the abuse and misuse of political power. as the content of human rights continues to be broadly defined at the various stages of modern history, the evolving perceptions of society came close to expanding rights not just for individuals but for communities and peoples. for locke, the state must accommodate not only individual interests expressed in the rights language but also community aspirations which also border on the exercise of their liberty, right of equality, and justice which if not guaranteed provide a platform for irredentism and revolt against the state sovereign structure. in his word, “that which begins and actually constitutes any political society, is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society and that only could give the beginning to any lawful government in the world.” (john locke, two treatise of government (ed. peter laslett), (cambridge university press, 1960, p. 333) mutual consent is at the base of any viable social contract within sovereign states. mutual consent is anchored on an aspiration that the values of justice and equality must be respected for all, especially for peoples and minorities with less bargaining power within that social contract in the sovereign state. by extension, self-determination is an issue of inclusion and having a voice on the issues that affect people in the community. the sole purpose of government in any social contract is the maintenance of justice and equality. this idea is very vocal among such social contract philosophers like rousseau and john rawls who contend that marginalization is a puncture on the social contract as it defaces equality and justice. jean jacques rousseau extended locke’s idea of democracy and argued that natural society is based on a social contract by which the freedom of the individual is surrendered to self-imposed laws which are the result of the general will. the government tailors itself to the general will and the people reserve the right to recall their government and establish another in its place either through elections as in democratic systems or through other legitimate channels. under the social contract, each person enjoys the protection of the common sovereignty predicated on the general will which is the source of law, and each person subjecting itself to that law being at the same time the individual’s will. rousseau argues ‘that in order for the general will to be truly general it must come from all and apply to all. (jean jacques rousseau, stanford encyclopaedia of philosophy, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rousseau/> accessed 8 july 2019). laws emanating from the general will should therefore secure the common interest impartially and should not be burdensome and unnecessarily intrusive. at the same time, it must be general in application and universal in scope. in this sense, laws must accommodate a wide diversity of lifestyles, cultural differences, and social inequalities. to this extent, rousseau subscribes to the doctrine of self-determination struggles without using such nomenclature in so far as the general will represents the aspect of the individual will without www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 48 published by scholink inc. more, and where the putative general sovereignty fails to achieve its objective, peoples and person may subscribe to another form of authority that fulfils their aspirations. john rawls, another social contract theorist, in his doctrine of justice as fairness argues in favour of the doctrine of self-determination following his emphasis on a well-ordered society. he postulates that in a well-ordered society, the ‘public conception of justice provides a mutually recognized point of view from which citizens can adjudicate their claims of political right on their political institutions or against one another. (john rawls, justice as fairness, a restatement (ed. erin kelly), (2001, the belknap press of harvard university press, p. 9) the role of the principles of justice is to specify the fair terms of social cooperation within the political entity. these norms specify the basic rights and duties prescribed by recognised political and social institutions. these institutions regulate the allocation of benefits arising from social cooperation and equally apportion the burdens as the case may be. in a democratic society, citizens are regarded as equal and free, hence justice within such political space must specify fair terms of cooperation between the groups be it, tribal groups, ethnic nationalities, or minorities so contemplated. any constitutional democratic regime must therefore seek to respond to the overarching objective which is to adopt the most acceptable idea of justice that “specify fair terms of cooperation between equal citizens; terms which are in themselves rational, reasonable and sustainable from one generation to the next” (john rawls, p. 8) john rawls underscores the importance of a synergy between formal and substantial justice for any social cooperation whatsoever. formal justice speaks to an aspect of the rule of law that supports and secures legitimate expectations. (john rawls, p. 51) it equally ensures that laws be executed within the given structured framework which may of itself be unjust. for instance, there seems to be nothing wrong with a court of law ruling in favor of discrimination in a society that allows arbitrary forms of discrimination using slave trade laws as in the days of the slave trade in the united states. this is to say that sometimes formal justice sanctions unjust arrangements and the beneficiaries of such arrangements for the most part will be reluctant or are not likely to let anything unsettle their interests on the strength that it is the rule of law. substantive justice speaks to political justice and is connected with ‘the desire or at least the willingness to recognise the rights and liberties of others and to share fairly in the benefits and burdens of social cooperation (john rawls, p. 52). rawls believes that in any genuine social contract, the strength of the claims of formal justice, of obedience to the system; clearly depends upon the substantive justice of institutions and the possibilities of their reform. such claim must defer essentially to the two principles of justice, the first of which “ensures equal basic liberties compatible with a scheme of liberties for others while the second principle guarantees social, economic and inequalities arranged to everyone’s advantage and attached to positions and offices that are open to all.” (john rawls, p. 53) in any social contract true to its name, by extension, rawls insists that these principles must govern the assignment of rights and duties, and regulate the distribution of social and economic advantages within the social cooperation at the group level and for individual members within the cooperation. injustice in rawlsian thought is simply inequalities that are not to the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 49 published by scholink inc. benefit of all. possibilities for reform of the social contract are both necessary and inevitable where the operation of the two principles of justice are not only maximised but transparently absent. 3. review of the international legal regime on the right to self-determination the growing consciousness of the ethno religious identities within sovereign states especially in some parts of europe and many parts of africa has made the right to self-determination a recurrent subject in international law. the right to self-determination is as important as it is contentious in modern international law. it has served as a powerful slogan and a vital justification for the independence of many peoples, most significantly the independence of colonial peoples. in fact, the colonial context is what readily comes to mind when the right to self-determination is brought up and it is the colonial aspect of this right that is uncontested. understood in the context of decolonization, the right to self-determination in contemporary international law poses no problems. it is ludicrous to question the legitimacy of the right to self-determination in the context of decolonization. although the reach and breadth of the right of self-determination have remained a very controversial subject matter in public international law, no one has doubted that it consists of many elements beyond its de-colonization contextual application. burak cop and dogan eymirlioglu reaffirm this point in the opening statement of their article thus: “self-determination which is a controversial issue in public international law has many characteristics formulated on different legal platforms.” (burak cop & dogan eymirlioglu, the right of self determination in international law: towards the 40th anniversary of the adoption of iccpr and icescr, (2005) perceptions, winter, p. 116). self-determination as a legal principle denotes the legal right of people to decide their own destiny in the international order. this right has been understood as a core principle of customary international law and is also enshrined and protected under a number of international legal instruments such as the united nations charter and the international covenant on civil and political rights as rights of all peoples. the right to self-determination is the right to develop a society in the way that a particular people see fit which may or may not be synonymous with the right to claim of those people to claim independence or to secede though it may not be entirely excluded. woodrow wilson, one of the first statesmen to articulate the right of self-determination realizes the grave consequences of his earlier statement on self-determination and had to attempt a reconstruction of that statement. he had earlier stated in his message to russia that “no people must be forced under sovereignty under which it does not wish to live.” he later explained that “…all peoples should have the government they desire, but the reality of implementing this idea is that states and the international system based on statehood would break down with hundreds of groups claiming independence.” (frederic kirgis jr, the degrees of self-determination in the united nations era, (1994) 88 american journal of international law (ajil), p. 304). the signal of the united nations regarding the reach and application of self-determination appears to be unclear and has been interpreted with varying degrees of emphasis. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 50 published by scholink inc. the un charter introduces the principle of self-determination as a principle of international law and makes it mandatory for parties to accord self-determination to their peoples. this is derived from the provision of article 1(2) and article 55 of the charter. the mention of self-determination in the charter as should be pointed out is within the context of developing friendly relations among nations and in conjunction with the principle of equal rights of peoples. another un document, titled “declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples”, adopted by the un general assembly in 1960, mention is made of the right of self-determination and independence of colonial territories and peoples. peoples, here, admit groups beyond states and includes non-self-governing territories whose people desire to freely determine their political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural development as a right. (declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples (general assembly resolution 1514 (xv), 14th december 1960). this was a bold statement regarding the reach of self-determination at a time when decolonization was on the rise and new nation-states that today are members of the united nations were being conceived upon independence. an important flashpoint of this declaration is that it recognizes self-determination as a right and brings it within the purview of three important aspects of an organized society, namely social, economic, and political development. while it may be argued that the thrust of this resolution is in regard to the self-determination of colonial territories and their right to self-government making subjugation and any state’s title to territory based on colonial status illegal, other aspects of the resolution must not take the backbench. such aspect is the reference to the right of all peoples to self-determination. it is however uncertain whether peoples could as well be equated with territories in the context of that resolution. the resolution perhaps suggests that there could be self-governing territories in which its peoples could be entitled to of right to self-determination where the need to determine the social, economic, and political development has been undermined. the international covenant on civil and political rights (iccpr) and international covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights (icescr) appear very explicit in their expression of the right to self-determination. article 1 of both covenants provides exactly the same words as follows: “all peoples have the right of self-determination. by virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (iccpr & icescr, un ga res. 220, 1966, art. 1). by the inclusion of the right of self-determination in these landmark instruments, the right of self-determination has gone beyond a mere political principle and has reached a threshold to be regarded as a legal right in international law that is binding on state parties craving for unequivocal advancement. again, international law lends its weight further to the importance of self-determination in the 1970 declaration on principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states. (unga resolution 2625). in its introductory part, the declaration provides as follows: “every state has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples … of their right to self-determination, freedom, and independence.” (declaration on principles of international law www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 51 published by scholink inc. concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states, annex to res. 2625 (xxv) ungar. 1970) while elaborating on this, it maintains that all peoples have the right freely to determine without external interference, their political status and pursues their economic, social and cultural development and every state has a duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the charter in its promotion of equal rights. herein, it reaffirms the right of self-determination and equates the violation of the principle with the violation of fundamental human rights (roya m. hanna, right to self determination in re-secession of quebec, (1999) 23 maryland journal of international law 213, p. 227). it suggests therefore that self-determination of a people may be advocated where equal rights are not guaranteed in a political setup. this declaration appears to clearly extend the right or the principle of self-determination beyond the colonial context as it seemingly suggests that sovereign and independent states could be established. in addition, it provides for the emergence of the state into any other political status freely determined by a people as a mode of implementing the right of self-determination by that people. although this declaration was adopted without any negative votes in the general assembly, its weakness as a binding instrument in international law cannot be overlooked since declarations of the general assembly are non-binding. at best, it may constitute opinion juris sufficient for the establishment of a customary rule of international law. at the regional level, there exists in european union (eu) a proposal for the european convention for the protection of minorities, code-named helsinki final act of 1975. the helsinki final act seems to broaden the right of self-determination to include a right to secede when it states that, “all states by virtue of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine… their internal and external political status.” (final act of the conference on security and co-operation in europe, 14, ilm. 1292 (1975) (helsinki final act) part viii). it is in this context, that international law contemplates two aspects of self-determination, namely: internal and external self-determination. to this end, a noted encyclopedia defines these terms as follows: internal self-determination is the right of the people of a state to govern themselves without outside interference. external self-determination is the right of people to determine their own political status and to be free of alien domination, including the formation of their own independent state (hurst hannum, the legal aspects of self –determination, the princeton encyclopaedia of self determination, <https://pesd.princeton.edu> accessed 10/04/2019). however, these two aspects of self-determination can be construed as not being inconsistent with the territorial integrity and national unity of states. by implication, under international law, the exercise of the right of self-determination either internally or externally does not necessarily empower or provide an automatic right to “peoples” to unilaterally secede from their parent-sovereign state, especially in a non-colonial context. while admitting that self-determination could be exercised internally within the framework of sovereign states still preserving the territorial integrity of the state, the court in re www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 52 published by scholink inc. secession of quebec (reference re secession of quebec, [1998] 2 s.c.r 217), observes that the territorial integrity of those states may be infringed upon to give peoples within that state, the right to secede as a mode of exercising their right to self-determination, but not unilaterally that is, without the consent of that state. the vienna declaration records a significant milestone in the development of the right of self-determination. the declaration categorically considers the denial of the right of self-determination as a violation of human rights and therefore advocates for the effective realization of this right. the declaration was adopted by the world conference on human rights in 1993 and recognizes the right of a people to take any legitimate action which is in compliance with the united nations charter to realize their right of self-determination, especially where states do not conduct themselves with the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples within their territory (vienna declaration and programme of action (adopted by the world conference on human rights in vienna on 25 june 1993, <www.ohchr.org/enprofesssionalinterest/pages/vienna.aspx>). on the african front, “the african charter on human and peoples rights” (the banjul charter) adopted in 1981, recognizes groups as subjects of self-determination beyond the colonial context. article 20, recognizes two categories of people with a right to self-determination, namely: colonized people and oppressed people. art 20(1) precisely stipulates that “colonized people or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds of domination by resorting to any means recognized by the international community.” (african charter of human and people rights (achpr), <www.achpr.org/intruments/acphr/>) however, one may argue against the backdrop of the practice amongst african states that self-determination does not endorse secession as there is a vehement disavowal to allow ethnic groups in colonial determined territories to break away as part of the exercise of their right of self-determination. this aversion for secession speaks to the intent of the banjul charter which is to eradicate all forms of colonization from africa. in view of the fact that african states adopted the principle of uti possidetis juris (inviolability of colonial frontiers), as an essential part of its regional law in the 1964 cairo declaration, they invariably consented to respect the colonial frontiers and inadvertently factored that into their interpretation of the principle or right of self-determination of peoples. uti possidetis juris (upj) is a principle of customary international law that serves to preserve the boundaries of colonies emerging as states. originally applied to establish the boundaries of decolonized territories in latin america, upj has become a rule of wider application, notably in africa. the policy behind the principle was explained by icj in the frontier dispute case (burkina faso/mali case), icj explains as follows: upj is a general principle which is logically connected with the phenomenon of obtaining independence wherever it occurs. its obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and stability of new states being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power. its purpose at the time of achievement of independence by the former spanish colonies of america was to scotch any designs which www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 53 published by scholink inc. non-american colonising power might have on regions which had been assigned by the former metropolitan state to one division or another, but which were still inhabited or explored. (burkina faso/mali case, icj, 22 dec.1986, par 20) the acceptance of the uti possidetis juris principle by african states as a benchmark for self-determination is unfortunate and ill-advised. the reason is that the circumstances that gave rise to the principle in the first place did not contemplate the african type of formation of colonial territories. the colonial territorial boundaries were fabricated in an arbitrary way; dysfunctional as they were for the people for whom they were meant to identify. those established borders were hoisted on the african peoples for the benefit of the colonial masters and have remained critical factors for the recurrent conflict, unrest, civil wars, and instability in the many african states. this paper offers that the right of self-determination should be pro-actively reinterpreted in the light of current events and conflicts in africa so as to reflect the african situation. again, this study opines also that upon the exhaustion of all peaceful methods for internal/ political self-determination, secession (external self-determination) becomes an inherent fragment for the exercise of that right of self-determination both within and beyond the accepted colonial territorial framework. in the east timor case, (east timor (portugal v australia) [1995] icj rep. 90, para 29), the icj recognised that the right of self-determination was one of the essential principles of contemporary international law, generating as it were obligation erga omnes, that is obligations that states have towards the international community as a whole. by that recognition, it requires all states to work for the realization of the right not only for the people under their control but also under the control of other states. notwithstanding this significant milestone in the development of the right of self-determination recognizing both the internal and external forms of self-determination, it still remains difficult for the international body to speak with one voice as to what constitutes self-determination, especially for sovereign independent states in non-colonized situations. the reluctance of the united nations to legitimize moves for self-determination by way of secession in europe and parts of africa except in some selected situations appears to support the position that self-determination and secession rights are mutually exclusive and negate each other. again, the use of the term “people” as against “state” in connection with the right of exercise of self-determination has been subjected to conflicting interpretations. however, in many documents relating to the right of self-determination, the juxtaposition of these terms at various times is indicative that the reference to people does not necessarily mean the entirety of the population. it is wrong to restrict the meaning of the term people to just the indivisible population of the sovereign state. the term ‘people’ in the context of the quest for self-determination demands a proper and unequivocal construction. while it may be flawless to maintain that people referring to a particular group along borders of former colonies are eligible subjects for the exercise of right self-determination, the claim of other rather homogenous populations or groups within a sovereign state may not go unchallenged. the problem with extending this designation of people to ethnic groups and minorities within a sovereign state in the context of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 54 published by scholink inc. self-determination is that it may give rise to unintended consequences for several sovereign states with multi-ethnic constituencies. the principle of sovereignty of state along uti possidetis lines appears to be the greatest setback for the construction of the term people’ to include ethnic groups and minorities as subjects for the exercise of the right of self-determination. in negotiating the tension between this principle and the recognized right of self-determination, the preferred approach of the international community and indeed of african states has been to give precedence to preserving colonial borders even in the face of challenging human security threats. be that as it may, it is not in doubt that a people may also include only a portion of the population within a sovereign state. in this connection, a number of traits have been listed by united nations educational, scientific and cultural organisation (unesco) to define the concept of people namely: a common historical tradition, a common racial and ethnic identity, cultural homogeneity, linguistic unity, common religion or ideological affinity, territorial connectedness, and common economic life (unesco, “final report and recommendation of an international meeting of experts on the further study of the concept of rights of people,” sns-89/conf.602/7 (1990). a people’s right to the exercise of their right to self-determination to the point of secession was expressed in the case resecession of québec (reference re secession of quebec (1998) 2 scr 217 at 54) where the court held that “the international law right of self-determination only generates at best, a right to external self-determination in situations of former colonies where a people is oppressed… or where a definable group is denied meaningful access to government to pursue their political, economic and social and cultural development...the people in question are entitled to external self-determination because they have been denied the ability to exert internally their right of self-determination.” 4. recent precedents of the exercise of right to self-determination of peoples 1) east pakistan or bangladesh: before bangladesh got her severance from pakistan in 1971, the only recognizable right of self-determination by the international community was against the colonial powers. the overarching thinking was that when a defined group of people within an already existing sovereign state makes any claim to their right of self-determination against that state, it would run against the concept of “sate-integrity” and may unlikely gain support from the international community. the demand for the right of self-determination of the people of east pakistan grew steady through various oppressions, discriminatory practices, and tortures between 1947 to 1971. however, the genocide of the 25th march 1971 was the last straw that cemented the right of self-determination of the people. after the failure of various kinds of peaceful protest, deliberation, and compromise, the people of east pakistan were forced to declare independence. there is no vestige of doubt that the sympathetic attitude, associated with the assurance of some powerful members of the international community created a congenial atmosphere in favor of the right of self-determination of the people of east pakistan. 2) ethnic albanians of kosovo: the dissolution of the socialist republic of yugoslavia (sfry) in 1992 following the yugoslav wars gave birth to six republics viz: bosnia and herzegovina, croatia, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 55 published by scholink inc. macedonia, montenegro, slovenia, serbia with two autonomous provinces within serbia namely kosovo and vojvodina. kosovo was an autonomous province within the republic of serbia made up of ethnic albanians with a serb minority. kosovo’s special autonomy was ended by president slobodan milosovic in 1989. in the 1990s, the kosovo albanians sought restored autonomy or independence for kosovo which was met with military actions resulting in widespread atrocities. after failed negotiations to resolve the status of kosovo, nato intervened bringing the un security council through resolution 1244 to authorize the un’s administration of kosovo. upon failure of efforts at peaceful resolution of the crisis, the parliament of kosovo declared kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state in 2008 which has become the status quo to date with the support and eventual recognition from the international community and major states like france, germany, uk, and other eu members. given the international law bias against secession as well as the fact that secession is not absolutely prohibited by international law, the case of kosovo presents a set of facts that meets the threshold for external self-determination by way of secession namely: an ethnic group with the historically defined territory; suffered human rights abuse and atrocities of its people that was only stopped by un humanitarian intervention; exhausted all negotiations; leading to a deadlock before the declaration of the severance from the parent state. kosovo’s case is a pointer to the fact that international law admits of and subscribes to the legality of secession as a form of self-determination of peoples within sovereign states under certain circumstances. 3) southern sudan: 9th july 2011, would forever be a historic day for south sudan and indeed for the african subregion when you put in perspective that on that day, south sudan declared her independence amid the importance that is accorded to the inviolability of colonial borders in african international relations. south sudan’s assertion of its right to self-determination has shaped african regional law vis-à-vis self-determination and the principle of utipossidentis, the principle under which african states have committed themselves to respect and upholding the colonial borders inherited at independence notwithstanding the problems created internally by such borders. southern sudan with its indigenous and christian-dominated culture has been embroiled in a lot of unrest with the arab/islam-dominated northern sudan since their independence in 1956. the people of southern sudan even in the year leading to independence made demands for safeguards against northern domination that resulted in the politically marginalized and underdeveloped south. the end of the first sudanese civil war in 1972 gave birth to the signing of the addis ababa agreement which guaranteed southern sudan regional self-government status within the republic of sudan and this got included in their 1973 constitution. in 1983, the addis ababa agreement was abrogated by the regime at the time and there ensued ‘systematic discrimination practices, denial of equal rights, and the imposition of sharia law on all sudan. (sa dersso “international law and the self-determination of south sudan” institute for security studies paper, feb 2012, no. 231). another civil war began which saw millions of southern sudanese dead, coupled with the millions who were rendered refugees as a result of the wanton destruction of the region’s physical infrastructure. in the light of these repeated violations of democratic values together with unrelenting political and cultural oppression, africa’s inter-governmental authority for development (igad) realized that a declaration www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 56 published by scholink inc. accepting the south’s claim to self-determination must be negotiated. this declaration of the principle was signed in 1994. furthering such development, a comprehensive peace agreement (cpa) was negotiated and accepted in 2005 and this brought to an end the sudanese two decades of civil war. the cpa was meant to address the root cause of the conflict, create a democratic basis for sustainable peace with timelines for self-determination of the south, the foundation upon which the cpa was built. further repeated violations of the agreement fuelled armed struggle against establishments in sudan leading to the referendum in which entire southern sudan voted overwhelmingly to separate from the rest of the country in january 2011 and the eventual declaration of independence in july 2011 with wide recognition from african union (au) countries and the rest of world. in all, the history of the evolution of south sudan as an independent state opines dersso, “represents a case of self-determination through independence that came about as a result of serious human rights violation and denial of the right to participate in the public affairs and running of the country on an equal basis.” (dersso, 2012). 5. conclusion this study has established that the quest for self-determination is a right ostensibly underscored in any social contract. such right maybe pursued by a people for the purposes of determining what sort of political alliances best advance their well-being and integral development. in the past, this right has been interpreted to mean exclusively the right of colonized peoples to seek their independence. in contemporary times, its import has been expanded in practice and expediency to include the right of a people or homogenous groups within a state for political inclusion and participation in matters that impact their wellbeing within that state, in the absence of which a referendum will be sought to determine their political future as an independent entity. the international legal framework and scholarship reviewed in this essay have shown that self-determination in contemporary international law should not be understood only with respect to the colonial territorial framework which respects only colonial borders as they existed at the moment of decolonization. it does extend to peoples within sovereign independent states seeking to exercise their right of self-determination internally (political self-determination) or externally (secession). in the case of external self-determination, in spite of the efforts of the opposition to any extension of that framework by the united nations for reasons of causing partial or total damage to the national unity or territorial integrity of a member state, scholars and courts have given vent to the view that self-determination of people within established territories in the form of secession is neither overtly permitted nor prohibited under international law. rightly then: although, united nations and its members’ states do not support a claim for unilateral secession, in the light of the development which took place after the examples of kosovo and east timor, and the decision of the canadian supreme court regarding the claim for quebec’s secession; it is possible to indicate that some exceptional conditions may allow the acceptance of a claim to secede. these exceptional circumstances are; the materialization of secession within the post-colonial context and the realization of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 57 published by scholink inc. secession against undemocratic, authoritarian regimes violating human rights. (p nanda, “self-determination and secession under international law”, (2000-2001) denver journal of international law and polity, p. 305) allen buchanan argues similarly that the right to secede should be utilized and consequently legitimized as a last resort for serious injustices and under a limited set of special conditions which includes persistent and serious violations of individual human rights and past unrepressed unjust seizure of territory. (seea buchanan, “self-determination, revolution, and intervention,” (2016) university of chicago journals, vol. 126, issue 2, 447, p. 473). in the light of these developments, it is now a welcome state practice though not universally accepted that under certain criteria that a “people” could obtain international support for its claim to self-determination in a non-colonial context. self-determination of a people, therefore, means the right to have a voice in the political and economic development of people or at best political freedom from the sovereign entity in order to forge a new political and economic future for the emergent state. this played out in the emergence of south sudan, kosovo, and bangladesh and many more are in the pipeline waiting for actualization among which is the self-determination of the south-eastern region of nigeria predominantly of people of the igbo ethnic group of nigeria. the agitation for self-determination by igbo activists and groups in nigeria notably ipob/massob both at home and in the diaspora has reached crescendo points and unless stakeholders engage constructively for a new nigeria, it may be another kosovo or southern sudan waiting to happen. finally, we cannot negate the fact that till today, the ground details of the exercise of the right of self-determination are not free from unresolved conundrum. there is no unanimity among states as to the standard criteria for evoking this doctrine, especially in a non-colonial context. nevertheless, the concrete application of this doctrine is complicated on account of the impact of the “great powers rule” ingrained in the global community’s governance structure. public international law in most cases is driven by the political posture and shift of powerful countries; hence it gets partisan and propelled in the interest of those countries. unless the approval of big powers is explicit, oppressed people’s dreams and exercise of such rights as self-determination may not be achieved. references aristotle: politics. (2019). internet encyclopaedia of philosophy. retrieved from https://iep.utm.edu/aris-pol/ buchanan, a. (2016). self-determination, revolution, and intervention. university of chicago journals, 126(2), 447. ttps://doi.org/10.1086/683639 cop, b., & eymirlioglu, d. (2005). the right of self determination in international law: towards the 40th anniversary of the adoption of iccpr and icescr. perceptions. winter, 116. desso, s. a. (feb. 2012). international law and the self-determination of south sudan (2012). institute www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 58 published by scholink inc. for security studies paper, (231). frost, s. e. (1989). basic teachings of the great philosophers (revised ed, anchor books, new york). locke, j. (1960). two treatise of government (1960) (ed. peter laslett), (cambridge university press. hurst, hannum, the legal aspects of self-determination, the princeton encyclopaedia of self determination. retrieved from https://pesd.princeton.edu kirgis, f. jr, (1994). the degrees of self-determination in the united nations era, 88 american journal of international law (ajil), p. 304. https://doi.org/10.2307/2204101 nanda, p. (2001). self-determination and secession under international law. denver journal of international law and polity, p. 305. rawls, j. (2001). justice as fairness. a restatement (ed. erin kelly), (2001), the belknap press of harvard university press. roya, m. h. (1999). right to self determination in re-secession of quebec, (1999). 23 maryland journal of international law, 213-227. rousseau jean jacques. (2019). stanford encyclopaedia of philosophy. retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rousseau african charter of human and people rights (achpr). (n.d.). retrieved from http://www.achpr.org/intruments/acphr/ final act of the conference on security and co-operation in europe. (1975). 14, ilm. 1292 (1975) (helsinki final act) part viii. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020782900042546 un general assembly resolution 1514 (xv), 14th december 1960 unesco, ‘final report and recommendation of an international meeting of experts on the further study of the concept of rights of people,’ sns-89/conf.602/7 (1990). vienna declaration and programme of action. (1993). adopted by the world conference on human rights in vienna on 25 june 1993. retrieved from http://www.ohchr.org/enprofesssionalinterest/pages/vienna.aspx cases: burkina faso/mali case, icj, 22 dec.1986, par 20 east timor (portugal v australia) [1995] icj rep.90, para 29 reference re secession of quebec (1998) 2 scr 217 at 54 microsoft word ape-v1n1-p44.doc advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 44 original paper is there money for a european defence force? herman matthijs1* 1 department of public administration, university gent/department of political sciences, free university brussels, herfstlaan, belgium * herman matthijs, department of public administration, university gent/department of political sciences, free university brussels, herfstlaan, belgium received: march 2, 2018 accepted: march 18, 2018 online published: march 20, 2018 doi:10.22158/ape.v1n1p44 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v1n1p44 abstracts this article examines european defence expenditure and more specifically the question of whether there is sufficient financial leeway to establish a european defence initiative. in view of the numerous defence threats on europe’s external borders: russia, turkey, growing migration pressures and the ineffectiveness of the external borders of the “schengen-zone”, this article will examine the following: what are the defence expenditures of the european members of nato (north atlantic treaty organization) and of non-nato members in europe; would it be possible to establish a european army with these financial resources? the current figures are primarily based on nato financial sources (see references). these nato figures refer to defence spending, including military pensions and militarized police forces such as the “gendarmerie” in france and the “koninklijke marechaussee” in the netherlands. in conclusion the article tries to respond to the question of which states would be necessary and/or potentially available for the creation of a european defence force? first, this study gives a short overview of the defence history in western europe after the second world war, followed by the european attempts concerning this item. finally, this article examines the topic of this article in point three; namely: which european countries are potential partners for an european defence system. keywords european union, defence, nato www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 45 published by scholink inc. 1. introduction the history of the creation of a european army started after the second world war. the british opposition leader and wartime pm, winston churchill (conservative party), gave a speech about the dangers of the “iron curtain” in europe in an historical speech at fulton, missouri (16 march, 1946). almost a year later, france and the united kingdom signed a 50 year treaty of alliance and mutual assistance at dunkirk (4 march, 1947). on 12 march 1947, president harry truman (democratic party) addressed congress, saying that he believed the usa should “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure”. this was the start of the so called “truman doctrine”. some months later, the us secretary of state, george marshall spoke at harvard university in boston and announced a plan for the economic rehabilitation of europe (5 june, 1947). the british minister of foreign affairs, ernest bevin (labour party), proposed a form of western union in a speech in the house of commons in london (22 january, 1948). it was clear that the western european states were looking for political and military support for their defence against the military might of the soviet union. on 17 march 1948 the treaty of brussels was signed, which was agreed for a 50 year period and provided for economic, social and cultural collaboration and the collective self-defence of the three benelux countries, france and the united kingdom. in mid-april 1948 secretary of state marshall and under secretary lovett commenced exploratory conversations with senators arthur vandenberg and tom connally about the security problems of the north atlantic area. these talks led to the adoption of the “vandenberg 239 resolution” from 11 june 1948 by the senate. on 6 july 1948 under secretary lovett started talks in washington dc with the ambassadors of the five brussels treaty countries and canada on the defence of the north atlantic area. following the brussels treaty of the beginning of the year the defence ministers of belgium, france, luxembourg, the netherlands and the uk decided to create the west european union (27-28 september, 1948). this was the first west european defence organization and had its headquarters in london. the “weu” was a treaty which required the signatories to help one another in the event of aggression. the weu was nonetheless insufficient to guarantee the security of europe. on 10 december 1948 negotiations were started in washington dc on the drafting of the nato agreement between the members of the weu, canada and the usa. in the early months of 1949 the seven negotiating partners invited five other european countries (denmark, iceland, italy, norway and portugal) to join the talks (15 march, 1949). these twelve countries signed the nato treaty in washington dc on4 april 1949 and it came into effect on 24 august of the same year. nato membership has subsequently risen steadily and there are currently 29 member states. the establishment of nato and its impact on the security and military protection of western europe www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 46 published by scholink inc. had an influence on the working of the weu. subsequent to 1948 the latter institution continued to exist as a purely administrative organization based in the british capital. at the end of december 1950 the members decided to merge the military organization of the weu with nato. the establishment of the “ecsc” (european community of coal and steel) by the three benelux states, west germany, france and italy in 1951 did though create a split between nato’s european members. as early as 1951 the french government announced a conference to discuss a plan for a european army. this conference opened in paris on 15 february 1951. a second military plan was proposed by french prime minister rené pleven and was a response to the us call for the rearmament of west germany (established in 1949) further to the growing threat from the soviet union. the pleven plan extended to six countries, the three benelux members, france, west germany and italy. in other words the edc (european defence community) had the same members as the newly established ecsc. the french thinking behind the edc was to prevent the formation of a new and large independent german army. the edc plan resulted in a treaty being signed in paris on 27 may 1952. the edc would have established a pan-european army, divided into national components. the intention of this treaty was for the german component to report to the edc. the other five components would report to their governments. in this way the five would create a structure in which a new west german army would be under the supervision of the edc. the treaty also provided for centralized military procurement as well as a common budget and institutions. in reality the edc plan was more a confederal army and not a truly united european army. as it turned out the french parliament (assemblée nationale) refused to ratify the edc, with 319 deputies voting against and only 264 in favour. the “gaullist” faction in the “assemblée nationale” was afraid that the edc would threaten the national sovereignty of the fourth republic and the large communist faction, which had links with moscow, also voted against. the vote of 29 august 1954 saw an end to attempts to establish a european army. the uk organized a meeting in london (28 september—3 october, 1954) of the six edc candidates, canada, the usa and the uk to seek an alternative to the edc. the result of the london conference was that italy and west germany were invited to sign the weu treaty. mid-fifties was the end of the try for an european army. it was waiting for a new attempt, decades later! 2. common security and defence policy the eu treaty (2009, lisbon treaty) established the “common security and defence policy” (csdp) as part of the “common foreign and security policy” (cfsp). denmark is the only eu member that has an opt-out from the csdp. the cfsp is coordinated by the vice president of the eu commission and the “high representative for the common foreign affairs and security policy”. the teu (treaty of the eu) provides the legal basis of the common and defence policy (art. 42, etc.). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 47 published by scholink inc. the eu council may unanimously set a common defence policy, although the teu respects the current obligations of those eu states who are nato members. member states are to make civilian and military capabilities available to the eu for the implementation of the common security and defence policy. the most important realizations of the csdp are the eda and the eu battle groups. as long ago as 1976 the defence ministers of the 13 european nato states, except iceland, established the “independent european programme group” (iepg) with the aim of creating a european defence agency. later on this became a part of the “weu” (west european union). with the establishment of the eda (see below under 2.1) this group was wound up in may 2005. another example in the context of greater military cooperation was the establishment of the “l’organisme conjoint de coopération en matière d’armements” (occar) in 1996. this agency provided a framework for collaboration between france, germany, italy and the uk on the coordination and planning of military staffs, studies, operational requirements, etc. belgium and spain subsequently joined the “occar” in 2003 and 2005respectively. in july 1998 the defence ministers of france, germany, italy, spain, sweden and the uk signed a “letter of intent” to create a political and legal framework for the promotion of a european defence industry. 2.1 eda the eda (european defence agency) was created as result of the european council meeting of thessaloniki (2003) and was formed in july 2004. it is an intergovernmental agency of the eu council with 27 member states. the only eu member not to take part is denmark, although post brexit the uk will probably leave the eda as well. four non-eu states participate in eda’s projects and programmes, namely: norway, serbia, switzerland and ukraine. the eda is based in brussels and falls under the authority of the eu council. the latter institution receives the reports of the eda and gives guidelines to the eda. the head of eda is the vice president of the eu commission and the high representative of the union for foreign affairs and security policy. the mission of eda is to improve european defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain european security and defence policy. the eda has a budget (2017) of 31 million euro, financed by the member states. their contributions are based to a gnp-based calculation. states may take anà la carte approach to eda and decide whether or not to participate in its projects. the tasks of the eda are fixed in art. 45 teu: contributing to identifying the military capability objectives of the member states, harmonization of procurement procedures, multilateral projects, supporting defence technology research, strengthening the industrial and technological basis of the defence sector and improving the effectiveness of military expenditure. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 48 published by scholink inc. the european defence agency’s legal status is derived from two sources of law. the first is the lisbon treaty (treaty on european union-teu), which adopted in this respect the wording agreed in the draft treaty establishing a constitution for europe (tece), the broad lines of which were endorsed at the thessaloniki european council of june 2003. this treaty includes three references to eda: (i) article 42.3. states that, “member states shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. the agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (hereinafter referred toas ‘the european defence agency’) shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall participate in defining a european capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities”; (ii) article 45 teu gives the agency the following mission, “subject to the authority of the council, the task to support defence technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and the study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs (...)”; (iii) article 3 of protocol number 10 on permanent structured cooperation states that, “the european defence agency shall contribute to the regular assessment of participating member states’ contributions with regard to capabilities (...)”. the second source is the july 2004 council joint action 2004/551/cfsp, which created the eda as a “common foreign and security policy” (cfsp) body reporting to the council of the european union. the council decision 2015/1835 of 12 october 2015, amending the 2004 joint action, goes into further detail regarding the roles of the eda. in particular, it specifies that the eda shall: contribute to identifying member states’ military capability objectives and evaluating observance of the capability commitments provided by the member states (…); promote the harmonization of operational needs and the adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods (...); propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of military capabilities (...); support defence technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and the study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs and this in particular by: promoting, in liaison with the union’s research activities where appropriate, research aimed at fulfilling future security and defence capability requirements and thereby strengthening europe’s industrial and technological potential in this domain; promoting more effectively targeted joint defence r&t (research and technology); catalysing defence r&t through studies and projects; managing defence r&t contracts; working in liaison with the commission to maximize complementarity and synergy between defence and civil or security-related research programmes. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 49 published by scholink inc. both opponents and proponents of a european defence force seem to think that eda has a key role to play. nonetheless at present the capabilities and possibilities of this eu institution are very limited indeed. 2.2 eu battle groups the european council (november, 1999) in helsinki introduced the idea of an eu rapid reaction force. this idea was reiterated at the french-uk summit at le touquet (february, 2003). full operational capacity of the battle groups was achieved in early 2007, with the availability of 18 battle groups, each composed of 1.500 men. these forces are under the direct control of the eu council and can be considered as a military unit related to the csdp (common security and defence policy) of the union. the stand-by battle group changes every six months. at this moment 26 eu states are contributing to the eu battle groups. the two exceptions are: denmark and malta. several non-eu countries also participate in the initiative, namely: macedonia, norway, serbia, turkey and ukraine. 2.3 intergovernmental cooperation since the close of the last century there have been numerous instances of intergovernmental military cooperation between eu/european nato members. all these cooperative initiatives have arisen outside the legal framework of the eu treaty. the best known examples in this field are the following: (i) german/dutch group this multinational formation consists of dutch and german army units. its hq is in the german city of munster. (ii) multinational corps northeast multinational corps northeast is stationed in the polish city of szczecin. in addition to polish troops, dutch, german, danish and baltic troops take part in this corps. (iii) european gendarmerie force (eurogendfor) cooperation between various european gendarmerie forces started in 2007 with the participation of the gendarmeries of france, italy, spain, netherlands, portugal, poland and romania. (iv) eurocorps eurocorps was established in may 1992 this intergovernmental military corps has ten member states: belgium, france, germany, greece, italy, luxembourg, poland, romania, spain and turkey. eurocorps has a multinational military headquarters located in strasbourg. its primary force is the mixed french-german brigade. eurocorps participated in peacekeeping operations in kosovo and afghanistan. (v) european air transport command (eatc) european air transport command (eatc) has its headquarters on an airbase near eindhoven in the netherlands. the command centre is responsible for the operational management of the aerial refuelling capabilities and military transport fleets of various european countries. since 2010 the eatc the members are belgium, france, germany, italy, luxembourg, the netherlands and spain. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 50 published by scholink inc. also close to eindhoven, but at the airport rather than the airbase, is the mcce (movement coordination centre europe). this organization attends to the coordination and optimization of the use of airlifts, sealifts and land movement assets. all eu states; except cyprus, greece, ireland and malta, are members of this coordination centre. another recent example of european cooperation is the pooled fleet of nato-owned airbus mrtt tankers, known as the mff (multinational multi-role tanker transport fleet). germany and norway joined the netherlands and luxembourg in this programme in june 2017. (vi) nuclear force in early november 2010 president sarkozy and prime minister david cameron signed two agreements relating to greater military cooperation between the two nuclear powers. the two political leaders agreed to create a joint force which could be deployed under the eu, nato and/or un flags. the second agreement was for closer cooperation between the british nuclear force and the force de frappe française. at the time of writing it is not clear what the political-military status of this agreement will be post brexit. 2.4 current proposals the former french and german ministers of defence, in the persons of jean yves le drian (socialist party) and ursula von der leyen (christian democrat) respectively, proposed closer eu defence cooperation in the press in 2016 (suddeutsche zeitung and le figaro, 12 september, 2016). the two ministers came out in favour of a joint military hq, shared satellite reconnaissance data, a logistics centre for sharing strategic assets and a joint military academy. in their article le drian and von der leyen noted that a core group of eu members could proceed to structured and lasting cooperation without impediment. this prompted britain’s defence minister michael fallon to describe the franco-german idea, “as unnecessarily duplicating what we have already in nato” (eu observer, 17 september, 2016). on 30 november 2016 the eu commission submitted a “european defence action plan” (edap), which proposed a european defence fund and other actions to support eu member states. there are three main prongs to the action plan: launching an eu defence fund, fostering investment in defence supply chains, reinforcing the single market for defence. the core of this eu initiative is the defence fund, which comprises two distinct financing windows. the first is research oriented and exists to fund collaborative defence research projects at the eu level. the second is capability oriented and aims at supporting the joint development of defence capabilities as agreed by the eu member states. under the commission proposal the fund will be led by a “coordination board” consisting of the eu commission, the high representatives, the member states concerned, the eda and the respective www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 51 published by scholink inc. european industries. in the edap communication, the eu commission proposed that the specific details of the budget and management was to be developed at a later date. following the european elections in france in the spring of 2017 the eu commission proposed a “european defense industrial programme” for supporting the competitiveness and innovative capacity of the eu defence industry. this programme will cover the years 2019 and 2020. the amount set aside for the implementation of the programme during the two year period is 500 million euro. on the basis of the 2016 communication on the edap referred to above, the commission has a launched a specific plan for a “european defence fund”. this fund would have two windows, one for research and the other for capability (development and acquisition). the windows will be coordinated by a coordination board, in which the eu commission, the european defence agency, member states and industry will sit as appropriate. the research window is to be financed from the eu budget (90 million euro before 2020 and 500 million a year beyond 2020). the research window will offer grants for innovative defence technologies and products. the capability window will create incentives for member states to cooperate in developing prototypes through co-financing (20% by the eu and 80% members) with the following projected budgets: before 2020: 2.5 billion euro (500 million eu and 2 billion from member states’ budgets); beyond 2020: 5 billion euro (1 billion eu and 4 billion euro from national budgets). finally the intention is that member states will acquire these products. the commission proposed that the eu will only co-fund the development of prototypes when member states commit to buying the finished products. the eu commission highlighted the problems and weaknesses of the present european army systems as follows: table 1. eu vs us weapon systems european union usa member weapon systems 178 30 main battle tanks 17 1 destroyers/frigates 29 4 fighter planes 20 6 source: european defence fund—eu commission. recently, both after and during the presidential elections in france (may, 2017), emmanuel macron repeatedly argued for european integration regarding defence. but what is not clear is whether president macron is prepared surrender sovereignty over, e.g., the “fff or force de frappe française”. likewise in the light of germany’s recent parliamentary elections (september, 2017) it is by no means evident whether the frg still favours greater european integration? www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 52 published by scholink inc. this second part of the study describes the many european plans for a military cooperation. no doubt, it’s a complex situation with different plans, with different participating countries. at least, you can’t deny that these plans are far away from a real european defence system! 3. the potential states which are the potential european states for the creation of an eu defence army? this article split the se states up in several groups, namely: the neutral states, the non eu member states and eu-nato members. for each of these states, this article has calculated their military manpower, the military outlays in gdp% and the budget in us dollars (2016 or 2017 figures, mostly nato figures). also this article examines the pro’s and contras of a possible participating of an european army. 3.1 neutral states several eu countries are not nato members, namely: austria, cyprus, finland, ireland, malta and sweden. the next table gives the mentioned figures for these group of states. table 2. the neutral countries manpower % gdp budget austria 21,350 0.7 2.8 cyprus 12,000 1.8 0.350 ireland 9,100 0.4 1 finland 29,350 1.3 3.2 malta 1,950 0.6 0.05 sweden 30,000 1.2 5.3 switzerland 20,800 0.7 4.8 source: sipri (stockholm international peace research institute) and eda (european defence agency). all these countries tend to adopt a neutral status. the outcome of the second world war meant that austria has been required to be neutral since 1955 although the country already contributes to several eu military missions. the austrian defence budget has tended to grow in recent years despite being lumped together with the budget for sports. it is likely that austria will take a more active role in view of russian diplomatic brinkmanship. in cyprus the defence budget is not a priority because of the financial crisis. the island has been divided since the turkish invasion in 1974 and britain’s royal air force still maintains numerous installations here. cypriot defence spending expressed as a percentage of gdp comes to 1.8% which is better than the most eu members. ireland has no military tradition and a history of neutrality. it is doubtful that the republic of ireland could be an effective member of a european defence system. the finnish military budget has gradually increased in recent years. the growth indefence spending is inevitably related to the activities of its eastern neighbour, russia. the scandinavian country has been www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 53 published by scholink inc. traditionally neutral and it is unclear if helsinki favours an integrated european army. malta has never shown much commitment to national defence as the island has traditionally looked to britain for its protection. nonetheless the challenges and dangers emanating from north africa compel malta to have a national defence policy. from 2014 to 2015 malta’s defence budget rose from 0.54% to 0.61%. sweden has a long tradition of neutrality and a fairly well-equipped army. sweden too though has squeezed defence spending and as a result the defence budget has fallen to 1.2% of gdp. as a result of the russian tensions, the swedish defence budget will increase to nearly 5.6 billion dollars in 2020. the swiss confederation also has a long tradition of neutrality. even so the country delivers troops for peacekeeping operations under eu, nato and un command. with the exception of switzerland all these countries are members of the european union. it is not clear to what extent they are prepared to play a more active role in an eu defence policy. none of them belongs to a properly established defence organization such as nato, although the six eu member states take part in cooperative eu defence projects. the likelihood of a positive swiss response to a joint eu defence must be regarded as slight and it must be assumed that switzerland will remain neutral and not become a military partner. combined the six other states have the following military power: troops: 100,000 men, budget: 13.95 billion dollars. there is no disputing that sweden is militarily the most powerful of this group of neutral eu states. this can be explained by its neutrality and a policy of strictly national defenceas well as by the existence of a large defence industry (e.g., bofors, saab). all these countries can expect extended political and diplomatic debate if they are to play a more active role within an integrated european defence system, as such cannot be reconciled with a neutral status. none of the aforementioned states meets the nato standard of defence spending of 2% of gdp per annum. 3.2 the non eu states the nato has several member states which do not have eu membership, namely: albania, montenegro, norway and turkey. nato’s newest member is montenegro. with 1500 military personnel it has the second smallest army in nato, only larger than luxembourg. the balkan republic spends about 77 million us dollarsa year on its defence, representing about 1.6% of gdp and below the nato standard of 2% of gdp. this is also the smallest budget of all nato members. the accession of this country to nato was not inspired by montenegro’s financial or military resources, but by the fact that it gives nato complete control over the entirety of the adriatic coast. furthermore it serves as a bulwark against serbia, russia’s main ally in the region. the next table gives an overview of the military capacity and defence budgets of these four countries www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 54 published by scholink inc. (in billions of us dollars). table 3. non-eu nato states manpower % gdp budget albania 6,800 1.22 0.170 montenegro 1,500 1.66 0.077 norway 20,000 1.59 6.8 turkey 387,000 1.52 12.5 source: nato defence expenditures. in terms of manpower turkey most certainly has a quantitatively large army. the figures make it the second largest army in nato, second only to the us. norway has a small butmodern army and has the advantage of occupying a geographically strategic location, i.e., the north atlantic and the arctic. location is also highly relevant to turkey as well, as it controls access to the bosporus and the black sea, and has borders with iran, iraq and syria. iceland does not maintain a standing army. the 200 personnel it deploys are nearly all involved with the activities of the national “coast guard”. it has a defence budget of close to 46 million us dollars or approximately 0.30% of iceland’s gdp. 3.3 the eu members of the nato in the previous tables we have seen the figures for troop numbers and defence budgets for the neutral european states and the non-eu members of nato. the next section considers those states that are both eu and nato members, this group thus does not include the countries considered above and neither are two important non-european states, namely: canada and the united states, included. the next table shows the figures for the nato states on the north american continent. table 4. north america manpower % gdp budget canada 73,000 1.31 22.3 usa 1,308,000 3.58 683.4 source: nato. this table shows the figures for the military manpower of the two north american nato members. with a total of 1,381,000 personnel out of the nato total of 3,174,000, they jointly represent 43.5% of all nato’s manpower. here of course it is the us that dominates, and this goes hand in hand with the largest defence budget of all nato members. average defence spending as a percentage of gdp for all nato members together comes to 2.43%, even though average defence spending for all 27 european members is only 1.47% gdp. in absolute terms too, the us defence budget is the largest, coming to a total of 683 billion us dollars. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 55 published by scholink inc. the 27 europe states have, by comparison, an aggregate military budget of only 242 billion us dollars. the us figures underline the weight of the united states in political/military terms as well as demonstrating how important nato is. the next table gives an overview of the military manpower and budgets of the eu members of the north atlantic treaty organization. table 5. eu states manpower % gdp budget (billon us dollar) belgium 28,000 0.91% 4.6 bulgaria 25,000 1.57% 0.9 croatia 15,000 1.27% 0.7 czech republic 23,000 1.07% 2.3 denmark 17,000 1.17% 4 estonia 5,700 2.14% 0.563 france 209,000 1.79% 48.1 f.r. germany 179,000 1.22% 46.5 greece 107,000 2.32% 4.9 hungary 18,000 1.05% 1.4 italy 181,000 1.13% 24.5 latvia 5,700 1.70% 0.528 lithuania 14,000 1.77% 0.853 luxembourg 800 0.44% 0.301 netherlands 41,000 1.17% 10.241 poland 111,000 2.01% 10.7 portugal 27,000 1.32% 2.9 romania 70,000 2.02% 4.2 slovenia 12,000 1.02% 0.502 slov. rep. 6,800 1.19% 1.2 spain 121,000 0.92% 12.6 uk 161,000 2.14% 57.8 sources: nato and own calculations. overall these 22 eu and nato members (excluding: austria, cyprus, ireland, finland, malta and sweden) have 1,378,000 military personnel, a number greater than the us. one country has more than 200,000 defence personnel (france), and a further six eu countries have defence establishments of over 100,000, namely italy, germany, united kingdom, spain, poland and greece. the romanian defence force is also relatively large with a total of 70,000. it should be noted nonetheless that most european armies are not available for deployment despite the high numbers of personnel. undoubtedly this has to do with the cumbersome administrative and logistics structures of these forces. furthermore, the financial resources work in favour of the usa. indeed the combined defence budgets of all 22 eu nato states comes to only 237 billion us dollars, a great deal less than the us defence budget. what is striking is that the defence budgets in many of these states have been kept to an absolute minimum. the united kingdom spends the most on defence (57.8 billion usd), followed by france (48.1) and germany (46.5). next on the list is italy (24.5) even though it spends not much more than half the german budget. spain (12.6) comes fifth, with a budget not much more than half the italian one. spain www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 56 published by scholink inc. is followed by poland (10.7) and the netherlands (10.2 billion) with budgets of similar magnitudes and in seventh place comes greece (4.9 billion). in terms of size the defence budgets of the other 15 states are hardly significant. indeed most spend only very sparingly on defence. we can also look at defence spending as a percentage of gdp. here we see that only five countries meet nato’s 2% norm for defence spending, namely estonia, greece, poland, romania and the uk. what is remarkable is that a nuclear power like france does not meet the 2% standard, nor do several of the larger european states such as germany, italy and spain meet the agreed nato 2% standard. the defence budget of the united states represents 3.58% of gdp. the sum that the eu spends on defence, depending on whether you look at the 22 eu members of nato, or the 28 eu member states, comes to respectively the 237 billion usd mentioned above, or 251 billion usd. according to the eurostat figures for end 2016, the gdp of the european union came to well over 17,275 billion usd (€ 14,904 billion). nato’s standard of 2% of gdp for defence is most certainly not being met. indeed should the standard be met the eu would be spending approximately 345 billion usd on defence. the eu’s actual spending on defence is a good 100 billion dollars less, representing only 1.45% of gdp. here we may recall that we have already mentioned that the us spends 3.58% of gdp on defence. 4. potential contributors at this stage we would like to investigate which european countries, both eu and non-eu members could potentially contribute to the establishment of a european defence force. we may first consider the list of states that are both eu and nato members. most of these countries are interested in and support the idea of a european army, although the list in itself raises questions about those countries whose policies cast doubt on their effective participation. denmark is a member of the european union and nato but not of eda! this forces us to conclude that denmark will not be a contributor to a european army in the immediate future. the geographical location of this scandinavian country is nonetheless highly relevant to the defence of europe. after all denmark controls access to the baltic from the north sea and vice versa. furthermore, denmark has sovereignty over the faroe islands, north of scotland, and over greenland. the latter, lying between canada and iceland, occupies a strategic position in the north atlantic, particularly with respect to any future exploitation of the arctic. greenland has not been part of the european union since 1985, but continues to be part of the kingdom of denmark and nato territory. we should maybe be also considering the position of hungary and poland in view of the various disputes and tensions between the current governments of these two states and the european commission in connection with various aspects of domestic policy. even so both countries are nato: – eu-eda members and their most important security concern is the threat from russia, which is why we must conclude that their interests lie with a joint defence against the russian federation. the thorniest question of all though is what the united kingdom is likely to do post brexit regarding membership of a european army. the uk is a member of nato and will continue to be so, but leaving www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 57 published by scholink inc. the eu will mean an end to the presence of the uk in the eda. at present the uk has the most easily deployed army in europe and continues to have europe’s largest defence budget. bearing the foregoing in mind, we must conclude that denmark and the united kingdom are not likely to be contributors to the establishment of a european defence force in the near future for the following reasons: denmark is not an eda state; greenland is outside the eu and the faroes are not a full member of the european union; the u.k. will leave the eu and eda after brexit. despite brexit, we cannot ignore the possibility that non-eu members might participate in a european defence initiative. without the uk the eu would lose important positions in the north sea, the atlantic ocean and in other places in the world. without denmark and the united kingdom the 20 remaining states still have a common defence budget of 175.2 billion us dollars and 1,200,000 military personnel. the next question that any analyst must ask is whether the non-eu member states can be considered as potential contributors to a european defence force. we have already looked into the budgets and manpower of the various neutral eu states (under 3 above). of this group of seven states, the swiss confederation must be ruled out as a potential member of a european army. the strict and historical neutrality of this alpine state excludes switzerland from the whole concept. it is much harder to give a yes or no answer regarding the six other states. all six are currently joining eda, but the step towards an active, rather than a neutral, european army may be a bridge too far for all or some of these states. a european defence force without cyprus and malta would give rise to geo-strategic problems regarding a presence in the mediterranean. we have already pointed out the british presence in cyprus and its historical links with malta. a non-participating of sweden and finland, especially in the light of what has already been said about denmark, results that the european defence force would have no presence in scandinavia and the arctic region. given the importance of the nordic and polar territory, the non-participation of the scandinavian countries would constitute a major geo-strategic drawback for the eu. if ireland will not take part a eu army, this would have the effect of a reduced defence presence on the atlantic seaboard. the other eu countries with territory on the more northerly section of the north atlantic seaboard are denmark and the uk. the participation of spain and portugal would be desirable in order to have bases in the more southerly section of the north atlantic (the azores, madeira and the canary islands). the last on the list is austria. non-participation by austria could give rise to territorial difficulties for the defence of central europe. on the basis of the above analysis, this article calculates all the variants with respect to military budgets and personnel for the countries concerned. the following table provides an overview of all the permutations for the current 28 members of the eu. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 58 published by scholink inc. table 6. the various scenarios personnel budget (billonsof us dollars) 28 eu states 1,478,000 251 27 eu states (without uk) 1,317,000 193 26 eu states (without uk and denmark) 1,300,000 189 22 eu states (without 6 neutral) 1,378,000 237 21 eu states (without uk and 6 neutral) 1,217,000 179 20 eu states (without uk, denmark and 6 neutral) 1,200,000 175 6 neutral eu states 100,000 13.9 source: own calculations. this table lists all the permutations of a european army and the accompanying numbers of military personnel, for the purpose of comparison with the us army. the most important impacts arise from the participation or otherwise of the united kingdom and to a lesser extent of sweden. in terms of spending, a european army, with the participation of 28 states, has 251 billion dollars at its disposal. this sum drops to 175 billion usd in the 20 state scenario. in that respect the table again highlights the impact of uk defence spending. switzerland has historically maintained its neutrality and is not interested in eu membership. the only link to the eu is the accession of the swiss confederation to the european economic area in order to assure access to the internal market. turkey has significant military capabilities, but has no ties to the eu. furthermore, despite long-standing aspirations to join the eu, the country has in recent years been distancing itself from west european values and standards. the two balkan states of albania and montenegro have little to offer in military terms, apart from encircling serbia, which is aligned with russia. if we are to be realistic we must accept that these two states have little to offer a european defence force. that leaves us with norway, with its strategic position regarding the western approaches and the arctic. norway is an eda partner, but has declined to become an eu member. it is linked to the eu via efta and the european economic area. the same comment applies to iceland. it is far from clear whether a european defence system could be viable without the participation of the scandinavian countries and in particularly without norway and iceland. 5. conclusions in this study, we have tried to determine what the budgetary situation for launching a new eu defence force would look like. any initiatives in this direction will have to overcome considerable obstacles. indeed, as this study clearly shows, it is the united states that currently makes the greatest efforts regarding the european defence. in effect it is the american taxpayer who, since the establishment of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 59 published by scholink inc. nato in 1949, has paid a not insignificant share of the european defence bill. even so the idea that the european union might play a role in the establishment of a european defence system is something new. the steps towards an eu army have been very slow, and any progress has tended to be a somewhat à la carte affair. in institutional terms it is as yet not at all certain what a european force might look like. would it be part of the european union and be administered by eu institutions or will the armed forces continue to be a national concern subject to eu coordination? apart from that, the role of the non-eu states in a european defence force is also set to be the subject of much discussion. finally the question of what the relationship between a european defence force and nato must also be considered. in this article we have looked at what the budgetary resources available to an eu defence force might be for various scenarios (table 6). in this respect the article shows that the eu defence budgets of the member states are simply too small to play a military role of global significance. comparison with the us defence budget highlights this and it must also be pointed out that just five of the eu states who are nato members meet nato’s defence-spending standard of 2%. overall the eu’s nato members come nowhere near the standard and spend on average only 1.45% of gdp on defence. essentially this means that more government money will have to be made available for eu defence. in view of the straitened state of the treasuries of many countries, this would appear to be a difficult option to implement. there is nonetheless one country that has a significant positive balance on the national budget, namely germany, with a surplus of roughly 30 billion euros. the key question though is whether germany would be prepared to spend more money on defence, and whether other eu members would be prepared to allow germany to play a leading role in europe’s defence? here our conclusion must be that financing the defence of the eu is going to be the subject of much political debate. in terms of personnel the combined total for the eu’s armed forces bears comparison with that of the united states, but it must be pointed out that these figures include a very large proportion of administrative and logical support structures and that the effective deploy ability of these forces is only very limited. this article also considers the potential members of a european defence system. as we have seen there are a number of problems with neutral countries, non-eu states, the non-participation in the eda by denmark, and the looming brexit and the position of the united kingdom. with respect to the latter country, we must acknowledge that the non-participation of the united kingdom in an european defence force gives rise to major difficulties, partly because of the high level of british defence and partly because of the geo-strategic position of the country. generally speaking, the conclusion of this article must be that—at present—not enough money is available for the development of an european defence force. apart from that there are numerous difficulties of an institutional nature, the relationship with nato, potential members, etc. in other words a specifically eu defence initiative is not a realistic prospect either in the short term or the medium term. the defence of europe and the atlantic must continue to remain in the hands of nato! www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 60 published by scholink inc. the countries of europe will moreover have to make more money available to this organization if the european contribution to the costs of its defence is to remain politically defensible on the other side of the atlantic. references european commission. (2016). communication for an european defence action plan. com (2016) nr. 950 final, 30 november 2016. european commission. (2017). communication for an european defence fund. com (2017) nr. 295 final, 7 june 2017. european union. (2008). consolidates version of the teu. official journal of the european union, c edition nr. 115, 9 may 2008. nato-otan. (2017). annual report 2016, 13 march 2017. nato-otan. (2017). defence expenditures of nato countries/les dépenses de défence des pays de l’otan. brussels, 29 june 2017, nato-otan communiqué pr/cp, nr. 2017-111. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 187 original paper a study of the condition of dalit in contemporary xvyue gong1* 1 school of history and culture, china west normal university, nanchong, china * xvyue gong, school of history and culture, china west normal university, nanchong, china received: april 19, 2024 accepted: may 15, 2024 online published: may 29, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n2p187 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n2p187 abstract dalit are one of the important minorities and have a significant impact on community relations within the country. historically, they have suffered from a long history of unequal social discrimination. in order to escape stigmatization and improve their social status, dalit have been engaged in a series of human rights struggles in recent times. however, dalit continue to face unfair experiences to this day. based on the existing literature, this paper presents the current situation of dalit in and the initiatives taken by various sections of the society to improve the situation of dalit. keywords dalit, protect human rights 1. introduction in the modernization process of bangladesh, dalit have played an important role in the economic and social development of the country. however, they are one of the most marginalized and socially excluded groups in bangladesh. this has to do with the fact that historically they have been stigmatized for a long time. a long history of unequal treatment and hindu nationalist movements led dalit in bangladesh to embark on a path of struggle for social equality and against caste-based discrimination through a series of social reforms and anti-caste movements. however, the situation of dalit in bangladesh at the bottom of the social ladder will not change for a long time due to the far-reaching impact of the caste system in bangladesh. 2. why was dalit stigmatized? located in eastern south asia, much of bangladesh is a low-lying delta where four major rivers meet, and high mountains in the north and east block easy access to east and south-east asia, drawing the country towards indian civilization. although bangladesh is culturally and politically marginalized from the indian perspective, it is this marginalization that has allowed indian culture to be preserved in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 188 the bengal region over time. (annapurna, 2022) the unequal treatment of dalit can be traced as far back as ancient india, where they were stigmatized in early hindu classical writings. stigmatization can be understood as the process of dehumanizing, demeaning, discrediting and devaluing people in certain population groups based on a sense of disgust. (bderm & nagorik, 2018) the earliest appellation of the dalit was dasa or chandals . after the aryans entered the south asian subcontinent, they referred to the natives of india as dasa or chandals. the dasa were the main indigenous opponents of the aryans in their wars of expansion, and they were dark-skinned and flat-faced, unlike the fair-skinned and well-defined appearance of the aryans. they are also commonly referred to as dasyu in early hindu scriptures such as the vedas.varna was the foundation of social structure and society in pre-colonial india. the religious, economic, political and social life of an individual was shaped by the varna in which he was born.when he was born in a particular varna, he had established his rights and responsibilities. and he could hardly change his varna. moreover, the upanishads, composed around 800-600 b.c.e., also create hatred against untouchables by equating them with dogs and claiming that brahmins, kshatriyas and vaishyas are born in comfortable wombs while chandras are born in foul-smelling wombs, fundamentally labeling chandras as impure. under this influence, the dalit were restricted to the dirtiest of jobs, and even stepping on their shadows was considered polluted.as a result of this, dalit are confined to the dirtiest of jobs and even stepping on their shadow is considered polluted. most dalit migrated to bangladesh in the 1830s from southern india, where their ancestors had been brought by the british colonial government to provide them with menial services. most dalit are hindu, some christian, and speak mainly hindi, telugu, urdu, jabalpuri and bengali. like other caste-affected groups, dalit have always been seen as belonging to a lower caste and an excluded section of society, and are often forced to perform specific types of labor, most commonly associated with the occupation of “jat cleaner”. due to limited job opportunities, dalits are almost exclusively employed in the service sector. in urban areas, they can only engage in unclean work, such as sweeping streets, manual cleaning and burying corpses. many dalit are stigmatized due to occupational and experiential segregation and social exclusion. during the british colonial period, almost all dalit worked as sweepers and cleaners. however, due to unfavorable government policies, bureaucracy and non-cooperation of the concerned authorities, dalit started losing their jobs, which intensified the suffering of this vulnerable group. l.s.s. o'malley, an early english historian, defined the dalit movement as a movement for the advancement of untouchability initiated and sustained by others. (deepak & ritika, 2020) its main aim was to gain social, religious and economic equality and to get rid of the untouchability imposed by the brahmins. it originated from the helplessness of the lower caste people of hindu society due to their domination and dispossession by the upper caste hindu brahmins. at that time, social reforms and anti-caste movements were reaching out to the middle class peasantry and the national movement was beginning to develop a strong mass base. 3. situation of dalit in contemporary bengal www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 189 the dalit resistance struggle began as early as the 19th century, but until today, the bengali dalit remain the poorest class in the country. the basics of shelter, food, water, etc., are not adequately provided in dalit colonies. in rural bangladesh, 89% of dalit use public toilets and most have no roofs. in urban dalit colonies, an average of 84 people share a water point while every 40 people use a toilet. (deepak & sudeshna, 2020) they also do not have proper health care facilities, and despite the provision of advanced health care facilities by the local authorities, dalit are unable to access these facilities due to financial constraints. as a result, malnutrition and other diseases such as diarrhea, cholera, tuberculosis, pneumonia, etc. are common among dalit and many die every year due to lack of medical care. encountering discrimination is also an injustice for dalit in purchasing medicines. according to statistics, 21 % of dalit face discrimination in obtaining medicines from hospitals. (heitzman & worden, 1989) in terms of access to education, there are no schools for dalit and therefore most dalit children do not have access to education in their mother tongue. it is reported that less than 30 % of dalit children are attending school. the illiteracy rate among dalit is alarming; it is estimated that only 5 % of dalit can read and write. (l.s.s.o'malley, 1968) in addition to this, various forms of discrimination are widespread in the surrounding communities. in the public sphere, dalit are “socially hated” by other communities and they are considered untouchables. dalit are never invited by other communities to participate in public events. there are sacred or religious places that remain inaccessible to dalit. in addition, dalit lacks political empowerment and is not representative of political parties at all levels, making it impossible to seek political security.according to a 2014 study, 94% of dalit did not join any political parties, and 4% of dalit joined local political parties, but did not play any decision-making role.although 99 % of dalit have the right to vote, 8% of them have been harassed while exercising their right to vote.91% of dalit stated that they or their family members have never participated in local government elections. (idsn, 2000) the lack of reliable and disaggregated data is a major factor in the continuing obstacles faced by dalit in gaining political representation, accessing public services and securing employment. in many cases, they are discriminated against because they are a religious minority. it is estimated that dalit constitute only 70 per cent of the hindu population of bangladesh.in terms of legal protection for dalit, bangladesh is still yet to introduce a minority-specific domestic legal regime. minorities themselves are not recognized under the current constitutional framework, which provides them with minimal protection through universally applicable rights such as equal treatment, non-discrimination and dignity. in bangladesh, the culture of denial of the existence of minorities is so deeply entrenched that minorities experience multiple forms of violence, which can be broadly categorized as political and social discrimination, legal oppression, cultural and religious repression, and organized mass torture. after a long struggle by dalit and human rights organizations, the bangladesh law commission drafted the anti-discrimination bill 2015 and submitted it to the law ministry. however, the government was slow to respond and returned it to the national human rights commission india (nhrc) for revision in 2018. in april 2019, the nhrc again submitted a revised www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 190 version to the ministry, but has yet to receive a response. (idsn, 2019) in addition, with the growing size of the city, the dalit colony is also facing the problem of temporary relocation and resettlement. in 2013, the government planned to build 1,148 apartments for sweepers in dhaka city. in 2018, the municipal corporation issued a notice to the residents of the colony asking them to temporarily relocate their houses (with compensation) to allow for the construction of the building. however, of the 2,000 dalit families in the colony, only 150 work for the dhaka south city corporation, and many of the residents will be left homeless if the project is implemented. (islam & parvez, 2013) the dalit community experiences multiple forms of social, political and economic discrimination, and their plight violates bangladesh's fundamental human rights obligations. although dalit are considered citizens of the country, their continued stigmatization due to their caste and occupational status may render them defacto stateless. based on the current plight of dalit, contemporary dalit activists and dalit abroad have begun to seek international help, while also actively pushing for the establishment of national-level dalit protection institutions and platforms that seek to eliminate caste-based discrimination, pay more attention to the betterment of the lives of the underclass, and seek the equality and social security that all dalit deserve. among the un bodies and mechanisms in which dalit activists have sought to participate, two have been at the forefront of un activities: the former un sub-commission on the promotion and protection of human rights and the un committee on the elimination of racial discrimination (cerd), which is the monitoring body for the international convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (icerd) of 1965. cerd is the supervisory body of icerd in 1965. (ram, 2019) cerd internationally recognizes caste discrimination as a human rights issue and as an international human rights treaty. human rights issue and as a violation of international human rights treaties. in addition to the protection of human rights initiatives by the united nations, there also exist international platforms and organizations formed by dalit activists, such as the international dalit solidarity network (idsn), which was established in 2000. the idsn, which aims to advocate for dalit human rights and raise national and international awareness of dalit issues, is a network of international human rights groups, development agencies, the european national dalit solidarity network (endsn), and national platforms in caste-affected countries. the members of the platform have successfully lobbied for an action-oriented approach to addressing human rights abuses against “untouchables” and other similar groups of dalit or those discriminated against on the basis of work and descent, mainly through engagement with the united nations, the european union and other multilateral institutions. there is also the asian dalit rights forum (adrf), formally established in 2014, which is a platform based on the contiguity of countries in the south asian region and the commonality of discrimination and violence suffered by people living in the region, and which primarily conducts field investigations on issues of caste-based discrimination and violence that have a significant impact on the countries concerned or on the region as a whole, and follows up with national and regional and international www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 191 government interventions, advocacy and lobbying for the protection of dalit human rights in their respective national governance institutions and regional political organizations and bodies. it focuses on conducting field investigations on issues of caste-based discrimination and violence that have a significant impact in the countries concerned or in the south asian and asian region as a whole, and follows up with national, regional and international governmental interventions, as well as advocacy and lobbying for the protection of dalit human rights in the governing bodies of their respective countries, regional political organizations and institutions, among others. in addition, dalit activists have helped to engage national and international agencies at the grass-roots level by providing relevant information, data analysis and fact-finding on individual cases of human rights violations. in the case of bangladesh, the number of civil society organizations (csos) and non-governmental organizations (ngos) has increased dramatically since independence, and they have played an active role in almost every area of governance. examples include citizen's initiative (nagorik uddyog, hereafter nu) and bangladesh dalit and excluded rights movement (bderm). since its establishment in 1995, the former has worked to raise awareness among the general public about the basic human rights of the people on the one hand, and to build the capacity of the people to pursue and realize these rights on the other hand, working to provide conditions conducive for the people to build institutions and mobilize themselves. it has supported dalit-led civil society organizations and individuals in their struggles and campaigns for the realization of their rights and entitlements, helped organize the formation of bderm and its international recognition and support, and supported their cause and advocacy at the united nations level, as well as specific interventions for other marginalized human rights rights, such as for the indigenous peoples of the plains of bengal and linguistic minorities. the latter, bderm, a national platform of dalit-led civil society organizations aiming to build an egalitarian society free from caste-based discrimination, has been campaigning at the national and international levels since its inception. currently, 11 dalit-led ngos are members of this platform, with about 2,000 individual members.since its establishment, bderm has been working in 56 districts of bangladesh: organizing the first dalit resource conference, submitting the dalit human rights report to the united nations human rights council, and becoming a member of the human rights forum of the universal periodic review (upr) bangladesh in october 2008, among others.at the same time, bderm is also a member of idsn and adrf, and the organization's leaders have been active in uniting international forces to promote the protection of dalit rights and interests. however, limitations have increased over time, and their ability to intervene has been restricted by regulations. in general, civil society groups and ngos in bangladesh have played a very good role. these mechanisms and special procedures set up when bangladesh submits a progress report on the human rights situation in the country. since civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations can also submit their own relevant reports, they can not only play a role in balancing and ensuring that the government further assumes responsibility, but also put forward useful suggestions on the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 192 implementation of treaty tasks and disseminate information in the community. in recent years, the government of bangladesh has also developed initiatives to promote the social and economic development of dalit.in 2012, the prime minister issued a directive calling for special measures to integrate dalit communities into social safety net programs, enhance food security, and allocate funds for housing.the 2014 national social protection strategy of bangladesh commits to eliminating social and economic discrimination through legislative and other measures, including access to basic services such as education, health, nutrition, family planning, and water and sanitation. in fy 2012-13, the government made specific allocations for scholarships, income generating training, and social security, including an allocation of more than bdt 6 million for old age and maternity benefits for dalit.at present, the relief measures to improve dalit 's situation have the phenomenon of unfair distribution and corruption when welfare relief is caused by lack of effective supervision. 4. overall, the dalit movement, whether colonial or contemporary, is a revolt of the dalit against the stigmatization and unfair treatment they have long suffered under caste-based discrimination, with the aim of restoring the self-respect of the dalit and their equal treatment in the society, and to establish a new social order based on fraternity, freedom, social justice and social,economic and cultural development of the dalit. for these people, who have long been victimized by social discrimination and the caste system, dalit does not mean low caste or poor, but is a constant reminder of the deplorable group of people they have been reduced to as a result of age-old social practices, and it also expresses their aspirations for change and revolution. despite the efforts of dalit activists at home and abroad and of the government of bangladesh to address the plight of dalit and to improve their basic conditions of life, the road to freedom and equality for dalit in bangladesh is still a long one, based on the fact that the caste system is still deeply entrenched in bengali society and that dalit are discriminated against on the basis of their caste and occupation. references annapurna, w. (2022). capturing caste in law: the legal regulation of caste discrimination. london: routledge. bderm, & nagorik, u. (2018). situation of dalit in bangladesh.retrieved march 1 2024, from idsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ngo-report-_upr_dalit-rights-in-bangladesh-2017.pdf deepak, t., & ritika, s. (2020). south asia state of minorities report 2019 migrants, refugees and the stateless. the south asia collective. retrieved april 4 2024, from https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/sa-state-of-minorities-2019.pdf deepak, t., & sudeshna, t. (2020, november). south asia state of minorities report 2020. heitzman, j., & worden, r. l. (1989). bangladesh, a country study. idsn. (2000, march 07). bangladesh: millions of dalit need water and sanitation. retrieved march 5 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 193 2024, from bangladesh: millions of dalit need water and sanitation international dalit solidarity network (idsn.org) idsn. (2019, june). caste and gender justice. retrieved january 5 2024, from idsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/caste-and-gender-justice-low-res2.pdf islam, m., & parvez, a. (2013). dalit initiatives in bangladesh. dhaka: nagorik uddyog & bangladesh dalit and excluded rights movement. minorities and shrinking civic space. (2020). the south asia collective. retrieved may 4 2024, from https://thesouthasiacollective.org/annual-reports/#2020 ram, j. (2019). from stigma to protest movement. indian anthropologist, 49(1), 37-50. l. s. s. o'malley. (1968). modern india and the west: a study of the interaction of their civilizations (pp. 374-381). london: oxford university press. waughray, a. (2022). capturing caste in law: the legal regulation of caste discrimination (1st ed.). routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315750934 abstract keywords dalit, protect human rights references microsoft word ape-v5n2-p1 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 1 original paper taliban rule in afghanistan—impact on india-afghanistan relations aafreen manzoor1* 1law student, central university of kashmir, department of law, ganderbal, india received: january 12, 2022 accepted: february 2, 2022 online published: february 16, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n2p1 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n2p1 abstract this paper emphasizes on the taliban rule with its impact on the relationship between india and afghanistan. this paper is based on the empirical study already provided by the professed researchers. this paper tries to make an understanding to the general public with regard to the taliban rule, its historical perspective and the steps taken by the indian government for furtherance of the relationship between the two nations. the current study was based on pre articulated policies and programmes conducted for the understanding of the relationship between india and afghanistan. therefore, the study was entirely based on secondary data. the secondary data pertaining to the taliban rule in afghanistan with the impact on indiaafghanistan relations has been collected from various published books, journals, dissertations and internet. the data was analysed and modified for deriving meaningful conclusion regarding the impact on india -afghanistan relations due to the taliban rule in afghanistan. keywords india, afghanistan, trade, taliban, relationship 1. introduction the term “taliban” is emanated in arabic. its singular form, is talib, which implies “seeker”, constructed the plural form taliban, “the seekers.” in 1855, a mutual agreement treaty commonly known for the peshawar treaty has been signed by kabul and indian government. earlier, after the downfall of taliban’s administration, indian officers toured afghanistan in order to furnish an assertion that india will play a considerable part in the establishment of afghanistan’s rehabilitation process. due to the geographical proximity, india is maintaining good relations with afghanistan. with the cultural linkage, india is obligated to provide the aid in the reconciliation process of afghanistan. in tokyo meeting 2002, india approved to furnish support to afghanistan. afghanistan’s admission to saarc www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 2 published by scholink inc. was sustained by india. india and afghanistan had inked trade agreements to improve bilateral trade relations between the two countries. india has partaken in afghanistan’s growth through various middles. afghan’s peace process is one of the most crucial facets of india’s interest with afghanistan. 2. historical perspective of the taliban era in september 1996, taliban occupied the control over kabul and took satisfaction in 70% control over afghanistan. in the next two years, other territories of afghanistan were also achieved by the taliban. it enjoyed the support from the pushtun population. taliban were not able to enjoy full sovereign powers over the non-pushtun population. in the end, it was the near special and political coalition between taliban chief mullah mohammed omar and the islamist terrorist osama bin laden that gave rise to the six-year taliban era to a very abrupt end in november 2001. in 2020, taliban gained the control over the territory of afghanistan ending the prolong war. taliban’s intend to change the afghanistan into the islamic emirates of afghanistan (iea). they extended their control over the civil and military administration in the country. taliban were successful in adopting the islamic principle of governing, the islamic khelafat. they attempted to establish a legal and judicial system based out of this notion. from this stand, the taliban attempted to control afghan society by implementing their rule as the legal government of the nation. such an undertaking by the taliban administrators made them muster their actions. 3. india-afghanistan relations india has a cordial connection with afghanistan. in 2015, afghanistan attained the membership of world trade organization (wto). further, the relationship between two countries provides an ideal alliance for the bilateral relations. this alliance ensures stability and the prospective of it’s economic growth. india and afghanistan share the historical and cultural linkage. pertaining to the historical links and trades between the culture, both share a detrimental relationship. in october 2011, both the countries signed the strategic partnership agreement, which further enhanced its relationship. it provides for the rebuild of afghanistan by providing infrastructural assistance, educational assistance, encouraging investment, and supporting the process of peace and reconciliation. due to the historical linkages, india has been a trading partner of afghanistan and is the largest market for its commodities in south asia. almost 1.5 billion us$ has been the total bilateral trade between the two countries in the year 2019-2020. india is one of the financial aid granter of afghanistan and holds an existential position in afghanistan’s trade network. but the trade relationship of these two countries has received a threat back after the arrival of the taliban in the war-ravaged region. afghanistan assists as a crucial market for indian products, like tea, cement, pharmaceutical commodities and other construction entities. in return, india provides a favorable market for afghan products especially dry fruits. india has deeply engrossed in afghanistan’s trade and due to this, india will infuse in it’s restoration system. india needs www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 3 published by scholink inc. an apparent perspective on the economic standpoints of both the countries. in order to achieve it’s economic, strategic and security objectives, india aids in the reconstruction process of afghanistan. india pertains to a soft power strategy in it’s ties with afghanistan due to multiple factors and explanations. india wants to attain access in energy rich central asian nations and seeks to represent itself as an influence over the region as a potential player. the circumstances in afghanistan has been shifting on a day-to-day basis. many countries are attempting to cope up with the nation and solidify their interests. india as competently has been trying to ponder it’s policy towards afghanistan to secure their interests and by not losing it’s strategic gains it has achieved and contributed so far. india has to confront numerous challenges in it’s prospect towards afghanistan in the near future. sher mohammed abbas stanekzai, taliban leader stated, “we give due importance to our political, economic and trade ties with india and we want these ties to continue. we are looking forward to working with india in this regard.” he further said, “india is very important for this subcontinent. we want to continue our cultural, economic and trade ties with india like in the past.”this is the first time taliban speaks on their relationship with india. for india, afghanistan is the prominent partner in the neighborhood to bulge its power stature. earlier, manmohan singh in his tenure as a prime minister stated, “india will always stand by the people of afghanistan”. 4. post taliban effects between 1996 and 2001, a defiance movement against the taliban comprising regional warlords in afghanistan was supported by india, iran and russia. in 2021, there is no such arrangement yet. s. jaishankar, india’s external affairs minister on september 2020 exhibited india’s interest in extending it’s affairs towards the taliban government established after the verge of the conflict. it is for the first time india has showed interest by participating in the intra-afghan peace talks via video call in doha. this is the first time high rank officials of india share an event with taliban. around then, indian officials began a chain of transmission with taliban for the development of trade relations between them. india with some other nine countries will seize another interaction with the taliban’s in the moscow talks. this is the second time when indian high officials will be interacting with taliban’s. the objective of the summit will be outgrowth of the political crisis in afghanistan. nsa ajitdoval has brought out three statements while chairing the third regional security dialogue in new delhi: 1) india wishes to continue as a significant and committed player in the future of afghanistan. 2) the reasonable remedy to the situation is the consensus of the afghanistan’s extended neighborhood including russia. 3) the afghan humanitarian crisis should be the out most outmost and further political disparities must be set aside. with the “normalization” of ties with the taliban regime growing, new delhi must now evaluate how www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 4 published by scholink inc. far it wishes to go in its engagement with afghanistan. india and afghanistan must adopt specific strategies that will expand the relationship between two distinct countries. afghanistan has to enhance its market of nuts, fruits, spices and saffron in india. special productive methods and strategic planning is obliged by both the nations. taking in view the geographical advantage, afghanistan must export more and should intensify and diversify its export with other nations as well. political and diplomatic channels must be established between these two border sharing countries. the communion between two regions shapes the stability and confrontation crisis in afghanistan. for the betterment of afghanistan, extraneous environment must be constructive towards its transformation. india is ensuring steps for furthering its interests in afghanistan. 5. women in afghanistan many women did not reside at their households, voiceless and terrified; they combated the distress the taliban had plopped on their lives and contradicted their exclusion from community and the career pressure. dr. fariyal ross-sheriff illustrates in her research how afghan women partook to the survival of their families. women not only had to watch over for themselves, they also worried for their spouses and sons who were under the persistent threat of being strongly deployed by the taliban as warriors. women exploited a significant position in protecting their male kin from taliban soldiers and many served all ways of chores in their spot of exile to assist their (extended) households. women also bestowed on a decision-making point and strengthened connection with other family members and partners of the household to optimize survival achievements. ross-sheriff’s study indicates women were not entirely victims of taliban rule but frequently splashed key-roles in the survival of their families. author gayle lemmon demonstrates how women tried to procure a living under taliban regimes. staved off from functioning in the public realm, one woman, kamila sidiqqi, commenced a dressmaking business from within her house, that grew out into an employment that employed over a hundred local women from the neighborhood. the taliban’s retrieval to authority in afghanistan is a worrying indication for the rights of children, girls and women, as well as for their fortune. the un has asserted that women’s rights will be a “red line” that the taliban government must not traverse (20 minutes, 2021). every day, thousands of people strive to run out by air or through neighboring countries. 6. the status of the taliban administration: it is clear that the taliban effectively controls afghanistan. the retired government’s military opposition in the panjshir valley was swiftly quelled. the islamic state-khorasan province (isil-k) rebellion has accumulated, but does not previously question the convincingness of the taliban’s administration as a whole-just as the ghani administration was still the regime of afghanistan despite an ample further destabilising taliban mutiny. the breakdown of the afghan frugality, and soaring violation, are not however at such statuses as to symbolize the disintegrate of the taliban government, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 5 published by scholink inc. although it is yet early days. contrary in the namibia case, the unsc has not expected non-recognition of the taliban since it arrived to power, but to the opposite has envisaged a footpath to eventual recognition. on 30 august 2021, the unsc called on “all parties to seek an inclusive, negotiated political settlement, with the full, equal and meaningful participation of women, that responds to the desire of afghans to sustain and build on afghanistan’s gains over the last twenty years in adherence to the rule of law, and underlines that all parties must respect their obligations”. in principle, as the de facto government, the taliban would be qualified to practice the counter-terrorism rights and obligations of the state of afghanistan, encompassing to: ascertain and practice criminal jurisdiction, extradite or prosecute criminals, and punish convicted persons; suggestion or furnish common legal assistance, and request extradition from different governments; strengthen border protection; freeze and seize terrorist financing (as through afghan government or private banks and the hawala sector); prevent and suppress terrorist acts through law enforcement (comprising cross-border data sharing and supplementary cooperation); suppress preparatory acts such as recruitment, training, foreign soldiers and the allowance of extensions to terrorists, and provocation. the taliban would also be obliged to implement unsc economic sanctions against documented individuals and beings from the taliban itself (involving elder partners of its own government), al-qaeda, and isil-k. in fulfilling its counter-terrorism commitments, a taliban government must capitulate with its commitments under international human rights law and international humanitarian law. indeed the un secretary-general has ordered for “adherence to the international commitments of afghanistan, encompassing all international treaties to which it is a party”. even as a de facto, unrecognized government, the taliban is cared for as a state organ for the motive of the law of state responsibility. thus, its administration is accountable for any violations of afghanistan’s obligations, and has a responsibility to stop infringements and make reparation. as a prosperous insurgency, it is additionally responsible for its own preceding infringements as an insurgent organization, that is, before it became the regime. 7. conclusion india has a cordial relationship with afghanistan due to its historical, cultural and geographical linkage. india is a super power nation and prefers to retain its position in the south asia as such. taliban amassed a downfall in 2001 and in 2020 retained its position back in afghanistan. india holds a very important position for the reconciliation process of afghanistan. india prefers to proceed with its relations with the new formed government under the taliban rule. in order to further its interest at the international level, india maintains to continue its support to the afghan led government. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 6 published by scholink inc. references abdul, b. (2021). why did india open a back channel to the taliban. retrieved december 01, 2021, from https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/opinions/2021/7/7/why-did-india-open-a-backchannel-to-the-talib an adrian, l. (2021). afghan children’s rights under serious threat under the taliban regime. retrieved december 30, 2021, from https://www.humanium.org/en/afghan-childrens-rights-under-serious-threat-under-the-taliban-regi me/ ben, s. (2021). recognition and the taliban’s international legal status (icct, 15 december 2021). retrieved december 28, 2021, from https://icct.nl/publication/recognition-talibans-international-legal-status/ elizabeth, r. (2021). afghanistan: a new pandora’s box opens for india (live mint, 20 august 2021). retrieved december 01, 2021, from https://www.livemint.com/news/world/the-afghan-quagmire-and-its-ripples-in-india/amp-1162939 0912697.html. f. ross-sheriff (2006). afghan women in exile and repatriation, passive victims or social actors? journal of women and social work, 21(2), 206-219. https://doi.org/10.1177/0886109905285782 ghulam, m., & mohammad, a. (2018). indo-afghanistan relations: challenges for pakistan. journal of politics and international studies, 4(2), 59-69, 61. india afghanistan relations. (2021). embassy of india, kabul afghanistan. retrieved december 01, 2021, from https://eoi.gov.in/kabul/?0354?000 nayanima, b. (2021). how afghanistan’s neighbours plan to deal with it-india to figure out at moscow talks today. retrieved december 01, 2021, from https://theprint.in/diplomacy/how-afghanistans-neighbours-plan-to-deal-with-it-india-to-figure-out -at-moscow-talks-today/753357/ neamatollah, n. (2002). the rise of the taliban in afghanistan, 119. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-312-29910-1 pradeep, r. t. (n.d.). india’s role in the reconstruction of afghanistan: challenges and prospects, 7-10. rahul, n. c. (2021). how the taliban is affecting india’s trade with afghanistan. retrieved december 01, 2021, from https://www.policyforum.net/how-the-taliban-is-affecting-indias-trade-with-afghanistan/amp/ rohullah, a., sudhakar, d., & pawan, k. s. (2015). india and afghanistan: an overview of their economic relations. agro economist-an international journal, 2, 19-27. seran, de l. (n.d.). afghan women and the taliban: an exploratory assessment. icct policy brief, 9. https://doi.org/10.5958/2394-8159.2015.00015.8 shaista, w., & barry, y. (2007). a brief history of afghanistan, 212. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 7 published by scholink inc. sharifullah, a., mohammad, y. z., & shahidullah, s. (n.d.). role of india in the peace process of afghanistan. north american academic research, 4(6), 18-29. tzemach lemmon, g. (2011). the dressmaker of khairkhana. new york: harper collins publishers. undefined role: on india afghanistan bilateral relations. (2021). the hindu. retrieved december 01, 2021, from https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/undefined-role-on-india-afghanistan-bilateral-relation s/article37445833.ece/amp/ want good indiaafghanistan relations, says taliban. (2021). hindustan times. retrieved december 01, 2021, from https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/want-good-india-afghanistan-relations-says-taliban-l eader-101630260163407-amp.html yow, p. r. (2013). india-afghanistan strategic partnership: an analysis of india, afghanistan and pakistan perspectives. international journal of scientific and research publications, 3(4), 3. zuhra, z, & mohammad, e. n. (2021). export performance of afghanistan-india merchandise trade: an economic evaluation. kardan journal of economics and management sciences, 4(2), 46-60, 57. https://doi.org/10.31841/kjems.2021.3 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 87 original paper you can’t give what you don’t have: intervention agencies and gender dynamics in beneficiary communities demola akinyoade1*, bosede awodola2 & adeola ogunrin2 1 department of peace and conflict studies, college of social and management sciences, afebabalola university, ado-ekiti, nigeria 2 institute for peace and conflict resolution, ministry of foreign affairs, abuja, nigeria * department of adult education and lifelong learning, obafemi awolowo university, ile-ife, nigeria received: may 8, 2020 accepted: may 28, 2020 online published: june 2, 2020 doi:10.22158/ape.v3n2p87 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v3n2p87 abstract interventions are meant to improve people’s lives; however, they can fail to do so and at times even worsen situations. gender equality is one area that needs improvement in societies, but which interventions can inadvertently impact upon negatively. the study assessed the impact of the niger delta development commission’s (nddc) interventions on gender dynamics in odi community. a case study design was adopted for the study. data collection and analyses were iterative. findings showed that although gender sensitivity is articulated in the mandate of the commission, however, the nddc lacks institutional capacity for it. hence, it did not appropriately mainstream gender in its interventions, and thus, impacted gender relations negatively. this it did by inadvertently entrenching traditional power disequilibrium and gender roles between females and males. also, it did not include women in its community engagement meetings and unconsciously allocated more financial resources to males. finally, the commission did not make provision for women’s needs to encourage women participation and entrenched women’s traditional reproductive activities. it takes more than policy to make intervention agencies to support gender equality: institutional capacity and sensitivity are required. keywords gender, niger delta development commission, nddc, niger delta region, ijaw, women, interventions, pci www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 88 published by scholink inc. 1. introduction gender refers to cultural roles, attitudes and values that a society assigns to its women and men, girls and boys, which define their behaviours and relationships. gender roles are created and maintained by social institutions, which have been more favourable to the male members of the society at the expense of their female counterparts. indeed, women have been peculiarly disadvantaged as a result of subjugation by the mandolin most societies. movements to redress this inequality culminated in the idea of gender mainstreaming. there are documented efforts by individuals and groups, spanning millennia to address the issue of inequality between men and women. in this instance, the international community first showed special interest on women issues in 1946 when a commission on the status of women was set up as the first gender perspective on the international bill of human rights. in 1967, the declaration on the elimination of discrimination against women came into existence. the convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (cedaw), was presented at the world conference of the un decade for women, in copenhagen 1980. the development assistance committee-women in development (dac-wid) guiding principles on women in development came into existence in 1983. at the third world conference on women 1985, there was a shift from wid to gender and development approach (gad). gad is an approach to development that focuses “…on social, economic, political and cultural forces that determine how differently women and men participate in, benefit from, and control resources and activities.” from the foregoing, it is important to mention that, “gender mainstreaming” was first coined at the united nations’ third world conference on women in nairobi in 1985 and then explicitly endorsed with the adoption of the beijing platform for action (bpfa) ten years later at the beijing conference— the fourth world conference on women. gender mainstreaming is defined as: [t]he process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. it is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated (ecosoc agreed conclusions, 1997, p. 2 in king, 2003, p. 3). [a] set of processes and strategies that aims to ensure the recognition of gender issues on a sustained basis […] an approach that situates gender equality issues at the center of broad policy decisions, institutional structures and resource allocations, and includes women’s views as priorities in making decisions about development goals and processes’ (ncrfw). to further explain gender mainstreaming, heyzer (2003) insists that every aspect of a given activity be assessed for its gender implications. the process of gender mainstreaming, in the words of heyzer “…requires persistent effort, including regular monitoring, reporting, follow-up training, and evaluation of progress made and obstacles encountered, as well as systems for holding the operation/organisation accountable for achieving its goals. all of this requires resources and, above all, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 89 published by scholink inc. political will at all levels”. gender equality and gender equity are two key goals of gender mainstreaming. gender equality means women and men should have equal value, enjoy the same status and conditions and should be accorded equal treatment. it refers to the full equality of men and women to enjoy the complete range of political, economic, civil, social and cultural rights, with no one being denied access to these rights, or deprived of them, because of their sex. it means, they should benefit equally from the results of development (cedaw, 1979). on the other hand, world health organisation (who, 2001) defines gender equity as “fairness and justice in the distribution of benefits and responsibilities between women and men” it refers to giving to the disadvantaged gender on the basis of needs, taking steps to compensate for historical and social disadvantages that prevent women and men from operating on a level playing field. therefore, gender perspective becomes imperative in the discourse of intervention in whatever context, linking gender to intervention in this study is justified. interventions, which in this paper covers development aid, humanitarian assistance, or peace building, refer to a range of deliberate initiatives or activities, which aims at positively influencing a situation to bring about an improvement or to forestall deterioration. however, in the last two decades there has been growing realization that interventions in contexts characterized by conflict, though intended for good, can also influence the situation negatively. hence, interventions in such context, especially, have the potential for negative and positive impacts. this idea, coupled with the notion of gender mainstreaming, makes gender one of the areas assessed for potential or actual impacts when assessing impacts of interventions. other areas include conflict impacts, peace impacts, economic impacts, social impacts, cultural impacts, and environmental impacts. for instance, assessing peace and conflict impact led to the emergence of peace and conflict impact assessment (pcia) area. from the early 1990s literature on pcia include methodologies, frameworks, approaches and tools to map, assess or evaluate the potential and actual impact of interventions on their contexts and vice versa (barbolet, adams, rachel goldwyn, hesta groenewald, and andrew sheriff, 2005). the overarching purpose of these approaches is that interventions will build rather than weaken or destroy peace; and reduce rather than exacerbate conflict. a thorough analysis of conflict and identification of areas of potential or actual impact are generally common features of pcia approaches. gender is a regular issue that arises both in these conflict analyses and impact assessments. it is within the larger context of a pcia of the nddc interventions this study was carried out. introducing gender sensitive lens to impact assessment helps us understand women and girls, men and boys’ roles as actors (participants in planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation and beneficiaries) and victims of intervention programming. king (2007) opines that engendering intervention this way makes it more efficient, effective and delivers maximum good. according to bush (1996, 1999, 2004, 2005, 2009), interventions can impact traditional gender roles positively or negatively. an intervention can entrench the traditional subjugation of women, cause tension between female and male gender, and/or build a gender’s capacity or inadvertently allocate more resources to a gender at the expense of the other. alternatively, it can empower women and girls and/or promote www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 90 published by scholink inc. gender equality and equity. the point here is that, interventions are never neutral on gender dynamics of the contexts where they are situated. the potential of interventions for positive and negative impacts on gender dynamics supports the argument for mainstreaming gender in intervention programming. consequently, this study assessed the capacity of the niger delta development commission (nddc) for gender sensitivity and its implications for gender dynamics in the study area. the objectives of the study includes: assessing the extent to which gender sensitivity is mainstreamed into the nddc institutional context and intervention programming; and assessing the implications of the nddc interventions for gender dynamics in odicommunity and by extension, the niger delta. from these are three research questions including to what extent is gender mainstreamed in the nddc institutional context? to what extent is gender mainstreamed in the nddc intervention programming? what are the implications of the nddc interventions on gender relations in beneficiary communities? 1.1 methodology to answer the questions posed above, the study employed a combination of purposive or deliberate sampling methods—maximum variation sampling, snowballing/network or chain referral technique, informant sampling, concept/theory sampling, and site selection and comprehensive sampling strategies. seventy-eight interviews sessions were held with 45 purposively selected participants comprising 10 programme beneficiaries, 10 community stakeholders, 7 technocrats, 6 ngos staff, 3 law-enforcement agents, 6 nddc officials and 3 consultants using semi-structured guides. interviews were recorded using digital voice-recorder and transcribed. the niger delta regional development master plan, nddc act, official documents, and website contents were analysed. unstructured observations were carried out at nddc offices and odi. odi community was considered appropriate area for this study, first because it is an ijaw community, and ijaw being the largest ethnic group in the niger delta region (ndr) and the fourth largest in nigeria. also, at the time of the fieldwork, the community was not involved in any violent conflict, which makes it safe for the researcher and respondents. moreover, preliminary investigation revealed that the community has enjoyed relatively high number of nddc interventions. furthermore, it is a home to one of the major nddc consultants on its agricultural support programme—the biotechnology resources development centre (biodec). atlas. ti 7.0 was used for data analyses. data collection and analyses were iterative. 1.2 the study area the ndr, the third largest body of wetlands in the world, is located in the southern part of nigeria and is home to about forty ethnic groups speaking two hundred and fifty languages and dialects (master plan, 2006). the region has a long trajectory of conflicts. also, various actors—i/ngos, igos, donor agencies, multinational oil companies, and government—have undertaken different forms of interventions in the ndr conflicts. the nigerian central government, at different times, established specialized agencies to cater to the need of the region. these include the niger delta development board (nddb) 1960-1966, the presidential task force 1980-1985, the oil mineral producing areas development commission (ompadec) 1992-1999 (master plan, 2006). through these www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 91 published by scholink inc. establishments the people of the ndr suffered from rising expectation, relative deprivation, and frustration. this resulted into aggression and violent conflict in the ndr. the nddc was established as nigeria federal government’s another intervention agency. it was set up by an act of parliament as a socio-economic intervention agency in the niger delta conflict situation on the 12th of july 2000, officially inaugurated on 21st december 2000, and established in 2001 (the nddc act, 2000; niger delta development commission, 2012). the commission was set up “to offer a lasting solution to the socio-economic problems of the niger delta people” (master plan, 2006). its vision is to “offer a lasting solution to the socio-economic difficulties of the ndr”. it has the mission “...to facilitate the rapid, even and sustainable development of the niger delta into a region that is economically prosperous, socially stable, ecologically regenerative and politically peaceful.” (master plan, 2006). the commission has a 10-point mandate. from the foregoing, the ndr and the nddc interactions present a good case for studying the impacts of intervention on gender dynamics in conflict contexts since conflicts and interventions have both been part of the ndr context for decades. extant literature covers the history, people and culture, conflicts and interventions in the niger delta (dike, 1956; ikime, 1969; alagoa e. j., 1999; human rights watch, 1999; albert, 2001a; institute for peace and conflict resolution, october 2002; isumonah a. v., 2003; ogbogbo, 2004; internaitonal crisis group, 3 august 2006a). also empirical works on gender issues in the niger delta do exist (aina, adeyemi, waziri, & samuel, 2009) however, a gender-based assessment of the interventions of the nddc and its implications for the context of the interventions has also not been adequately covered. also, the institutional capacity of the nddc for gender sensitivity has not been empirically assessed. odi is an ijaw community in kolokuma-opokuma lga (with headquarters in kaiama), bayelsa state. it is located beside one of the tributary rivers of river niger, bordered in the north by odoni and agbere, in the south by sampou and kaiama along the river nun bank. its western neighbors are patani and abari, while in the east is okordiazarama. its built-up area is 3.85km north-south and 2.6km east-west. odi has twenty-seven communities (essentially compounds but rechristened for political reasons) and divided into north (asanga) and south (tamanga) parts. the community has three wards. there are four cardinal groups in odi community—the traditional council, the community development committee (cdc), the youth council, and the women group. the traditional council is headed by his highness, the amananaowei (king) and has twenty-seven chiefs representing each of the communities in odi. membership in the traditional council is by election. while the amananaowei is elected for life, the chiefs are elected for a period of three years. upon the demise of the king, his first son act as a regent for a period of two years before election is conducted for the next king. membership of the youth council is open to all female and male youths age fifteen to forty-five, who has a maternal or paternal affiliation to the community. interested individuals register with a token fee to become a member. any member can vie for elective post by campaigning and seeking vote through www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 92 published by scholink inc. elections. elections are held every two years through open or secret ballot system. the youth council is a vibrant and formidable organization in the community, with well-articulated twelve-point objectives covering almost every facet of community life. divergent views between the tradition council and the youth council often lead to tension between the two groups. however, in odi the youth council usually defers to the traditional council on many occasions out of respect for the elders and in order to “allow peace to reign”. the women group, headed by the ereamini da-aru (women leader), comprises of every community woman by default. the ereamini da-aru is chosen by the women themselves to manage their affairs. the ereamini da-aruat the time of this study assumed office in 1999,the year of the odi massacre (note 1). the community development committee (cdc) is a group set up for the development of the community. it is supposedly the community’s contact with any development initiative coming into the community. each of the 10 members is elected democratically from the communities (compounds in real sense) within odi. no community can have more than one member. the group is headed by a chairman. at the time of the fieldwork, the cdc was being reconstituted. at the time of the fieldwork—eleven years after the massacre—odi community has become a peaceful community. there were no open conflicts, however, low intensity dissatisfaction thrived. 2. gender sensitivity in intervention programming gender sensitivity encompasses the ability to acknowledge and highlight existing gender differences, issues and inequalities and incorporate these into strategies and actions (european commission, 2013). borrowing from the concept-conflict sensitivity, gender sensitivity in intervention means understanding the gender dynamics in the context for which the intervention is intended, understanding the interaction between the intervention and the gender dynamics of the context (that is, how the intervention will affect and be affected by the relationships, including power relations, between female and male in the community), and the capacity to act upon this understanding to promote gender equity and equality. gender sensitivity attempts to ensure consistent and systematic attention is given to the differences between females and males in the intervention, with a view to addressing structural gender inequality in the context of the intervention. this is the rationale of frameworks such as gender-responsive development planning (aka gender-responsive planning, grp), and the gender and development approach that attempt to ensure and assess gender mainstreaming in an intervention. the core assumption of such frameworks is that mainstreaming gender makes development planning and programming more people oriented and people focused, emphasizing their impacts on women in particular. assessing an intervention for its gender sensitivity is a multistage activity. since “…you cannot give what you don’t have”, the first stage assesses the institutional capacity for gender sensitivity. institutional capacity for gender sensitivity will be seen in whether or not, and the extent to which gender is mainstreamed in the agency. a good place to start is to determine whether the agency has a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 93 published by scholink inc. gender policy. having a gender policy indicates a deliberate effort for gender sensitivity in an organization’s structure and culture. an agency with a gender policy is likely to have a gender policy for its interventions as well. so, it follows, the next stage is to determine whether the organisation has a gender policy for its intervention programming. however, an agency without a gender policy may still have a gender policy for its intervention. for instance, gender sensitivity may be part of donor’s requirements, hence, “forcing” the agency to mainstream gender in its intervention. assessing an intervention policy for gender sensitivity or assessing a gender policy of an intervention involves assessing each stage of the intervention programming cycle—conception and planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation for sensitivity to gender dynamics in the beneficiary community. this provides a framework for determining the degree to which gender is mainstreamed in an intervention or how gender sensitive an intervention is. what happens at the conception and planning (c&p) stage is very important. the extent to which this stage is gender sensitive will potentially impact on gender sensitivity of the subsequent stages. hence, the gender must be mainstreamed into (and at) this stage by involving gender experts (at the micro and macro levels) and, importantly female and male representatives of the intended beneficiary community. gender sensitive community participation means ensuring that both genders understand the need for gender mainstreaming in the intervention programming. it emphasizes the involvement of women and girls and community-based women and girls’ groups having representative quota and includes ensuring that women and girls participate in setting goals and objectives for the intervention (bunch, n.d.). gender mainstreaming in community participation involves setting a representative quota for both sexes to participate as individuals and groups equally or equitably. this may necessitate employing innovative and non-traditional means to mobilize and enrol women and girls, who studies have shown to be disadvantaged, at each stage of the intervention programming. bunch (n.d.) cites examples of innovative means such as holding planning sessions where women traditionally gather, providing services and incentives to women so they can forgo their daily tasks in order to participate. at the implementation stage, gender sensitivity involves employing representative quota (equality or equity) for both sexes to be selected as beneficiaries of the intervention. this involves affirmative action. in case of physical project involving physically tasking unskilled labour, conscientious effort should be made to bring willing women and girls on board or create alternative or compensatory benefits for them. equitable participation may involve special empowerment programmes for women and girls where need be. however, care must be taken to distinguish between those programmes that truly empower women and girls and those that reinforce their subordination to men. at the level of monitoring and evaluation, women and girls should be part of the monitoring and evaluation team and should be consulted as participants in the evaluation. in addition to gender sensitive community participation, other ways to mainstream gender in an intervention include gender sensitive communication/facilitation, gender sensitive logistics and gender equity at each stage of the programming cycle (bunch, n.d.). gender sensitive www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 94 published by scholink inc. communication/facilitation means that facilitators or conveners must be trained on gender sensitivity. this is to ensure gender sensitive language while addressing participants. this also ensures reinforcement of gender sensitivity at different stages of the intervention programming. also, instructional materials must be gender sensitive. gender stereotypes in narrations and illustrations should be avoided. gender equity in intervention involves ensuring that activities at every stage of the intervention address power imbalance between the sexes. deliberate effort must be made to empower women and girls in role playing, task assignments, sharing of responsibilities, group leadership, selection of beneficiaries, leading group discussions and other innovative ways. gender-sensitive logistics ensures that in selecting time, venue, and other logistics, convenience and safety of women and girls should be put into consideration. special considerations should be provided for women on child-care and conveniences and other things (e.g., transportation) that will ensure their full participation at each stage of the programming. figure 1. gender sensitivity in intervention programming (gsip) 2.1 gender impact assessment gender impacts assessment (gia) refers to analysing or measuring how an intervention, policy or programme will affect or has affected female and male differently within a given context. it “…is a process which allows decision-makers and stakeholders in a project to understand the current situation and context that will be affected by the project, and what changes and results may emerge based on that project. it uses gender criteria to inform that understanding of predicted and realised impacts”. (oxfam australia & cpwf, 2013) in addition, to the indicators in gender sensitivity above, the gender impact www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 95 published by scholink inc. assessment indicators are whether the intervention entrench the traditional roles of women and men or it challenges it; build the capacity of a gender at the expense of the other; foster tension among the genders; and increase the vulnerability of women and girls both socially and economically. 3. findings on gender mainstreaming in the nddc empirical evidence shows that, the commission does not have a gender policy. all nddc staff and consultants interviewed reported not to have knowledge of a gender policy. a participant—a high ranking nddc official—noted: “…my sincere answer to that question is that i have not seen…nddc policy, ok…i wouldn’t say…such a policy concerning gender equity, eh, whatever, doesn’t exist, i’ve not seen any, ok. it could be there and i, i guess that, you know, if you have the opportunity of talking with a board member or a management staff they’ll be able to answer that question better, authoritatively as well.”— nddc staff, state directorate. nevertheless, one cannot say that the commission discriminates against women in job opportunities. a male respondent, an assistant director in a directorate, authoritatively claims “oh, sure, sure we have more women than men in this directorate, but it may not have been deliberate. sometimes you look for the very best.” another nddc staff in another directorate claims “we don’t look at gender in being assigned to do work. but as you can see, we have many women in the directorate. but to say this is number of women must go to the field or do this or that, we don’t.” participant observation by the researcher confirms that, in number, women are not discriminated against. in fact, at the time of this fieldwork, the community and rural development and the agriculture and fisheries directorates were headed by women. however, only four of the twenty-three member management board are women. similarly, empirical evidence reveals that the commission does not have a gender policy for its intervention programming. the nddc strategic policies for change is documented in page 22 to 46 of the master plan. the plan has eighty-six policies covering five thematic areas of economic development, human and community needs, the natural environment, physical infrastructure, and human and institutional resources. none of the policies was solely on gender. although gender issues were mentioned in section a in goals on education (pp. 34-35) under policy for human and community needs. one would have expected women and girls to be listed amongst vulnerable groups that deserve special attention in social welfare and community goals. the need to build the capacity of women in conflict resolution is also mentioned in policy hr 14—capacity building for conflict resolution. section five of policy g1—strategic planning principles—reads: a sound planning process has to be based on participatory decision making. this entails meaningful involvement of the “active” and “passive” stakeholders—public sector, private sector, community and ngos—and ensuring that their respective needs and constraints are taken into consideration when policies and proposals are formulated, including attention to issues such as gender and youth. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 96 published by scholink inc. in spite of the above quote, none of the study participants knew of any nddc gender policy on its intervention programming or of any deliberate attempt by the commission to ensure gender equity in its intervention programming. in other words, there appears to be no framework to ensure that women and girls, men and boys participate equitably in the conception and planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the nddc interventions. the commission only involves members of the intended beneficiary community in the implementation of its interventions. community participation at this stage, in the case of hcdps, is limited to selection of programme beneficiaries and in the case of the idps, to employment, usually as menial labourers. the commission only informs the community about its intervention when its staff comes to introduce the contractor, in case of the physical development projects. at such occasion, only the traditional council, often the chief and some of its members are present. the impromptu nature of such meetings does not permit all chiefs to be present. the current ereamini da-arau—the women leader/chief—(a primary school head teacher, who has held this position for over a decade at the time of the fieldwork) claims she has never participated in such meetings. moreover, unlike some ngos working in odi, the nddc has never directly sought the participation of women group in its activities through their leader. she explained the situation as fallout of the patriarchal nature of the traditional african society. i was not informed….i only heard of it. i only heard of their meeting…i wasn’t informed at all…you know, in everything there is monopoly now. in our african society, even this eh…especially ijaw culture everybody want to bring women down. everybody wants to put women down. they feel if women come out they will usurp our power. i think that’s my belief. so most of the things they refuse to involve women, unless women will react on it.—ereamini da-arau so-to-say, i am part of it [the traditional council]. so they say i am part of it, but when you are not called upon, you will…you will not even know what they are doing. because you won’t know when programmes are going to…[trails off] and women we are not involved, so you have to wait and look what they are going to do.—ereamini da-arau you know, i will say african system. the africans, we look down at women. we feel women can’t do anything, they are housewives. they remain in the house and then bring up children. that is, that is the way […] we see our fathers manage their households.—traditional council member (male) since gender is not mainstreamed in the nddc interventions, the nddc policies and interventions are gender-neutral or gender blind. that is, the commission implicitly assumes that its policies and interventions affect everyone the same way regardless of gender. using the gender based analysis of intervention (gbai) framework earlier, results show that the commission does not make any deliberate effort to ensure that women and girls are especially encouraged to participate in the programme. this is the case throughout the stages of intervention programming as confirmed by the submissions of community people: i’ve not heard any of their programmes specify, given number of women. […] because most of these their programs they only come to the bioresource and they will organize it and go. because they don’t www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 97 published by scholink inc. come to the community, highlight the council, sensitize the, the people ever before they start. they just say they have so-so-so program, they can write to the community or they announce over the radio. […] every community just pick; politicians will pick their people, there is so-so-so program the nddc is trying to organize in bioresource, odi. i have included your name o, you go, like that. they just come and go. and those people picking too, unless […] maybe their girlfriends or their own sisters, if not…it is the male, because we the male take care of the women.—traditional council member (secondary school teacher) “…when they tell the town crier to announce, they didn’t say anything about only female or male. but they talk about the both people. the both, not only one group of people, or not only youth, or not only women, or the men or something like, no. everybody should be there, so that they will benefit.” —a female programme beneficiary (federal government worker) “it is open for everybody, of which, maybe, they said they want to train hundred so they will put it in quota form. and the quota, anybody can come to represent their community.” —a male programme beneficiary (graduate of political science, niger delta university) in fact, not giving women special encouragement to participate generally lowers women’s participation in the nddc intervention. for instance, researcher’s direct observation in the field, show that during the day, odi women were busy, perhaps, more so than their men. a number of men—game men—were seen playing draft. however, throughout the five days in the community, hardly was any woman seen idle. women were usually engaged in agricultural and economic activities such as small-scale farming, fishing, frying gaari, collecting firewood, retail business, among other endeavours. however, this does not imply that all ijaw men do is play draft, as some scholars erroneously concluded. rather, men are usually involved in more physical activities such as large scale farming and fishing in the high sea. fishing in the high sea is seasonal and the fish migrate during the season. the migration of fish determines the location of the men—in or out of town. also men fish in the night. so during the day when they are in the town, most of them engage in leisure activities to relax until the night time when they embark on their vocation. at times, they leave the town for a number of days. however, women are usually involved in reproduction activities, which often require such personal involvement. the traditional division of labour in the community, therefore, naturally favours men’s participation in the nddc intervention. women would therefore require special encouragement and accommodation within the nddc programme schedule, in order to be able to participate. they typically find it difficult to abandon their responsibilities and attend the nddc hcdps. although the commission pays stipends to participants, and equal stipends are paid to women and men, both complained that the stipends paid after the training is usually lower than what was promised. for instance, they claimed that they are paid between one and two thousand naira (instead of fifteen thousand promised) after participating in a two to three day workshop. for women, this amount is too low incentive to make them leave their agricultural and economic activities which yield greater incentive. past records of the commission in not living up to people’s expectation or in fulfilling its promises in stipend payment and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 98 published by scholink inc. not providing post-training financial and material empowerment seem to further discourage women and girls’ participation. she say the people that they came to train they promised them that they would give them because…they delay them in their farming work, they said they will give them 15,000 [naira] each, but they only bring one, one thousand to them. and they said that they hear, that they have paid the money into their account and they contributed some amount of money, but still they have not seen anything.— a female beneficiary (speaking through an interpreter) to further confirm relatively lower participation of women in the nddc interventions, community participants reported the following. as i told you, the list came out and there were a lot of women but most of the women did not participate hoping that this is something that we have been seeing. what is there? and they did not go further…there were less women, you see. because a lot of these women feel that these things they are not relevant. so, probably in a hundred you see about ten or fifteen. —male programme beneficiary, politician …sometimes they [women] even give out their spaces. their names might be there [on the list of successful applicants] all right. they will give it to one of their brothers. “go there abeg. every time we dey go there wetin we dey benefit?” there was this, eh, the comm…was she a commissioner or something in niger delta representing bayelsa state. the woman from mende, she came and open this thing there. she actually said “the women population is so few, why?” so she made an effort to lure women but it was not possible. —male programme beneficiary, politician moreover, facilitators of training do not have gender training, hence their language and that of the materials provided for participants are not gender sensitive. furthermore, the logistics was not gender sensitive. for instance, there are no special arrangements for child-care for nursing mothers during the training. there was no evidence of any deliberate effort by facilitators to empower female participants during the training. empirical evidence suggests that in organizing and executing training programmes, female and male participants were treated as if their social, economic, political realities, experiences and needs are the same. there was no special recognition and acknowledgement of the inferior status of women in the community, and no provision to improve their lots. hence gender equity was absent from the nddc intervention programming in odi community. the policy and programming of the nddc, as the findings reveal, supports patriarchy. in other words, it maintains an unjust system for the male to benefit more from the nddc intervention programming at the expense of the female members of the beneficiary community. the above findings are consistent with the argument of the socialist feminists that patriarchy in the structure of the human society subjugates the female folk under their male folk. they argue that there is need to overcome gender blindness in the struggle for development and against shared oppression of women, especially in the developing world. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 99 published by scholink inc. the nddc designed some programmes—the home management business skills—specifically for women. this, nonetheless, may not indicate gender sensitivity. the home management business skills (hmbs) is designed with a view to helping women perform their socially assigned roles as homemakers. this hmbs initiative has the potential of entrenching women in their traditional roles as homemakers and preventing men from benefitting in such programmes. so it will likely lock women and girls, men and boys in their traditional gender roles. according to an nddc staff, but on the other hand, we do design programmes specifically for the girls and women. we call them home management business skills, basically designed to cater for the needs of our ladies, girls and ladies. bearing in mind that if you have a wife and a mother that is being engaged, it might contribute to the well-being and stability of the family, so we do have programmes specifically designed for women. that’s not to say that we are shutting women out of the other ones…they select the very best, the most qualified and i do see a couple of ladies there. but the home management skills is specifically designed for our girls and women. so if you see a few men there, it’s just by accident. —nddc staff, headquarters the response of the nddc staff, “…if you see a few men there, it’s just by accident” shows that already men are being seen as misfit in such hmbs. men interested in such programmes may be discouraged or reluctant to apply for such programmes because the hmbs is “…specifically designed for our girls and women.” this implies that the commission by its intervention is suggesting that there are some business skills for women, which men do not have to acquire. and from the list of the hmbs programmes, they are skills for less paying, inferior, women jobs like baking and sowing. this inadvertently indicates the nddc endorsement for labelling low paying, low skill home management jobs as women’s jobs, which are not meant for men. this implies that the commission supports the view that men deserve more rewarding, high profile or highly skilled work, thus strengthening the traditional view of men as the superior sex group. findings also, show that while women are not exempted from other nddc interventions, special provisions or considerations are not made for them to be able to compete favourably with their men counterpart in benefiting in the programmes. literature on gender equality and feminism assert that women have been disadvantaged by the dominant patriarchal structure in the society (aina, 2009; mejiuni, 2012). this makes it slightly difficult for them to compete favourably with their male counterparts. hence, there is need to recognize their disadvantaged position and make deliberate attempt to make them benefit equitably from social programmes. however, this is not the case with the nddc intervention. according to a high ranking officer of the commission, as i speak to you there is a[…] in the programme we are running in turkey, and em, it’s an international welders’ em prop, you know, preparation(?)…, i saw a lady there, she came there on merit. she passed the aptitude test. yes, at the maritime trades. the ladies that came on merit, they, they did not come as ladies. they came because they were qualified. they passed the aptitude test and every other test that was required. those kind of things, i wouldn’t say they are not gender sensitive, but they www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 100 published by scholink inc. are gender blind. —nddc staff, headquarters empirical evidences reveal that mainstreaming gender in intervention programming is not strange in odi community, participants reported that ngos do bring women empowerment programs and they do involve women in the intervention programming. according to the community people our women leader and her group, they have many projects…programs that they used to attend na [now] and then they have some projects which they want the government to help them. they have programs, like they want to build town hall. that is their meeting hall…it was…only ngos used to bring, bring those…eh programs. —cdc chairman. however, findings show that some desk officers may use their initiative in mainstreaming gender in implementing some nddc programmes. a desk officer of the commission reported, no, for me, ok, i have a background, before coming to nddc, i worked with several nongovernmental or ganisations, so i have, you know, schooled in the culture of being gender-sensitive, [ok] ok, so there is nothing that i do, eh, if we have, say maybe a conference, a seminar, i ensure that even if it’s not fifty-fifty, then it’s sixty-forty [male-female ratio], that’s a personal… this last two quotations show that mainstreaming gender in the nddc interventions in the community is not an impossible task. the question then is why is gender not mainstreamed? is it a consequence of ignorance or nonchalance? 4. discussion on implications of gender-neutrality of the nddc interventions the gender-neutrality of the nddc interventions has implications for the context of the intervention. these were evident in four main ways. first, it sometimes brings tension between female and male community members; and often brings tension and suspicion between the women chief and the traditional council. as noted earlier the women chief (a member of the traditional council herself), claimed she has never been called upon to participate in any meeting between the nddc and the traditional council (the meetings are briefings in the real sense as nddc only comes to inform the community leaders of their intervention and introduce the contractors to them. this is strictly about the idps and occurs shortly before the commencement of the intervention). “i was not informed….i only heard of it. i only heard of their meeting…i wasn’t informed at all” so-to-say, i am part of it. so, they say i am part of it, but when you are not called upon, you will…you will not even know what they are doing. because you won’t know when programmes are going to…[trails off] and women we are not involved, so you have to wait and look what they are going to do. apparently, from her facial expression and choice of words (the underlined), she resents the idea of excluding her in meetings with the nddc. the nddc meetings (or rather briefings) are usually impromptu and this makes it impossible for every member of the traditional council, especially, civil servants (which she is), to participate. however, not to have been informed at all is a different case entirely. another male member of the traditional council, also a civil servant (a teacher, like the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 101 published by scholink inc. women chief), reported been unable to attend such meetings in some cases, but at least he was informed when the nddc officials came in for the impromptu meetings. the women chief interprets this situation as a continued deliberate subjugation of women in the african society, especially the ijaw culture. the second quotation shows that she feels that the council makes deliberate effort to make her redundant. “you know, in everything there is monopoly now. in our african society, even this eh…especially ijaw culture everybody want to bring women down. everybody wants to put women down. they feel if women come out they will usurp our power. i think that’s my belief. so most of the things they refuse to involve women, unless women will react on it.” the quotation above also hints at deliberate male subjugation of women. she became so reflectively and distant when she made the statement above. (as if it is something she has contemplated upon and confirmed many times) the tone of her voice suggested to the researcher that men are so afraid of women’s power that they have successfully invented several ways to tame them to satisfy men’s selfish ends (as a male interviewer, the way the respondent described the situation made the researcher somehow ashamed as a man. at the same time, i felt slightly jittery of a fleeting thought that the respondent was going to make me a scape goat because of the concealed and controlled anger that seemed to course through her at this point in the interview) (although not directly linked to the nddc intervention, the researcher gathered from some members of the community that the ereamini da-arau women leader), a former head teacher in a public primary school was recently demoted to a class teacher. her demotion was punishment for her political party affiliation. the labour party of which she is a member ousted peoples democratic party in the election for the house of representatives. the pdp-controlled state and local government therefore decided to punish her for her political activities). second, not involving women in the conception and planning has a tendency to impact negatively on women cultural and economically and consequently leading to conflict. for instance, there was a case of communal conflict involving the traditional ruler, the nddc contractor and the community women. an nddc contractor—the elite company—has been awarded the construction of odi-trofani road. the road would pass through a channel of river where women harvest fish, lobster, and firewood for home use and sale. in short, the channel has been a source of household food and income for women for generations. thus women have higher stake in the channel. however, the elite company decided to block the channel since that was cheaper than constructing a bridge. when the community women realised that the men and the traditional council were not going to do anything about this, they took their fate in their hands and reacted. according to the ereamini da-arau, they wanted to block the place instead of making bridge so that even this rainy season people can pass through. they were blocking it—the elite company—because they think that will be cheaper for them. the community women reacted…yes the women reacted. so we were called to the king’s palace, because we find out that they were not doing anything. so we…we reacted. and actually we went to the elite, eh the company had to take the complaint of the women and they had to do it. though the bridge was not properly done, but at www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 102 published by scholink inc. least, people can pass through (even this [rainy] season) to go and bring whatever they want to bring. the women’s “reaction” was a nonviolent demonstration involving almost all the community women. men felt unconcerned and the sincerity of the king’s committees set up to look into the case before women intervened directly was questionable. according to the ereamini da-arau: they [women] are concern. they are in the kitchen so they’re concern. so if the easy means to go and bring their woods is being blocked and in this [rainy] season, this lobsters that they bring, this season, they make a little money out of it. and even the family they will eat part of it. but most of our men they are feeling unconcern. if not, the channel is for everybody but you know at least if something happens some people will be touched the most. so the women feel, felt that it is their right because they are the people going there more, you know the population of the women are more. and people using the place…, is women that uses the place more than the men, so…we went there later and we succeeded in making that bridge.—ereamini da-arau according to him [king], he set up three committees to go and meet the company. but the company or the people that are working there, but we don’t know, that is what we don’t know. we now went to take permission from him that whether they agree or not we have to go there. so we went there and got in touch with the white man that was in charge and that unless they agree with us then the road can be built. —ereamini da-arau…so when they are trying to build that place, they were trying to close up that place. the women now woke up, they said “you cannot.” the company said that they will. so the women, the women leader and all the women in the community stood up and say “no, we are making use of that place and the company cannot close down that place.” …so all the women went there when the company was working; went there, stopped the company. all the women o…stopped the work. and the company was trying to prove stubborn. some of the women that knows how to drive cars took their keys from them, drove the car to different corner, charge [rev] them very well.—youth president (male) the above showcases the ereamini da-arau submission “[s]o most of the things they [men generally] refuse to involve women, unless women will react on it.” and in this case, women reacted, although in a nonviolent way. thirdly, not mainstreaming women in the commission’s interventions creates more power imbalance between female and male community members by directly empowering men economically. in respect of the idps, one way men and boys benefit directly is through direct employment as labourers—semiskilled and unskilled. considering that the idps have been more regular than the hcdps and that this has been the situation since the inception of the commission, one begins to have an idea of what this meant in financial advantage to men and boys over women and girls. as of the time of this fieldwork, the home management business skills have not been kick-started (although interested people have submitted their applications. the researcher even sighted some applications at cid office at the nddc headquarters). male youths, as militants or demonstrators, are usually the beneficiaries of “marching ground” paid by nddc contractors to allow them to execute their projects, since they are those that demand it through violent agitations. hence, through direct employment and marching ground, men www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 103 published by scholink inc. and boys benefit exclusively from the nddc physical development projects. as commented by an nddc personnel, …most times when we talk about youth, especially in the niger delta region where, eh, youth, you know, have seen violence, as, you know, as a vehicle for agitation, it tends to exclude women. young girls, who, naturally, should see themselves as, part of…you know, that category called youth, so because of violence they are unable to come out openly when young people come out, you know, to participate in that process of agitation or advocacy, whatever. also, in its ad-hoc responses to agitations arising from its interventions, the nddc has not been gender sensitive. the commission’s “settlement” usually takes care of the males who are more likely to champion such violent agitations, either against the nddc or their contractors. as noted by an nddc staff in the quote above, young female seldom participate in agitations and since the agitations yield fruit for the “head ones”, that is, the leaders as referred to by a programme beneficiary, females are not likely to reap the fruit of such agitations. thus male youths benefit exclusively from nddc as reapers of tangible fruits of violence—in cash and in kind. finally, gender neutrality of the nddc intervention misses opportunities for women and girls empowerment, especially through its hcdps. women involvement in the entire intervention programming are good avenues for empowering women and promoting gender equity. if as noted by the ereamini da-arau, the ijaw culture subjugates women, affirmative actions to empower women and girls would be a worthwhile goal for the commission to pursue. however, the commission fails to exploit this opportunity in programming its intervention. this probably is a case of underutilization or a skewed prioritization of the nddc resources. empowering women this way may reduce the likelihood for violent agitations in the niger delta. casual observations on the pattern and dynamics of agitations in the niger delta reveal that it is engendered. it appears that violent and nonviolent agitations are characteristic of male and female agitations respectively in the ndr. in other words, the ndr women are more likely to be involved in nonviolent agitations, while their male counterpart is more likely to employ violent tactics. militants are essentially males. and empirical women’s nonviolent tactics appear to be more effective. as noted by the odi youth president, at that time point in time, are you going to bring police there, when women are taking action? now because of that action now, that led to the construction of bridge at that place. if not for the women they would have closed up the place. people are now passing there, to go and fetch firewood and do their farming activities. the underlined shows the strategic effectiveness of nonviolent agitation by niger delta women. hardly can any government justify the use of force against women engaged in nonviolent protest. as the case of odi community shows, women appear to be able to get result for their agitations than youth. also, the outcome of women’s protest is more likely to produce result for the benefit of all. the phenomenon of settling the ‘head ones’ syndrome did not come up during the women’s protest, unlike the youths. hence it was difficult to discredit their movement. if in their present relatively subjugated state, women are able to achieve this feat, one wonders what they will achieve in their empowered state. although, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 104 published by scholink inc. this aspect of the study is inconclusive, the potentials of women group taking the lead in improving the interventions of the nddc is worth exploring. 5. conclusion in spite of the popularity of both international and national policy frameworks on gender equality, the nddc does not have a gender policy. there is also no such policy for its intervention programming. hence both the nddc and its interventions are gender-neutral or gender blind. despite this, women are well represented in the commission. gender-neutrality of the interventions, however, has negative implications for gender equality in the study area. the nddc interventions entrenches the power disequilibrium between females and males in the community. the programming of the interventions systematically give males more benefits at the expense of their female counterparts. also, it engenders conflict between the roles and discriminates against women. by not mainstreaming gender in its intervention, the nddc loses on the unique perspective that women could bring to enrich its interventions. in cases where intervention impacted negatively on their livelihood and income, community women took collective nonviolent action to demand a change in the implementation, and they succeeded. women nonviolent collective action achieved better result than the usual violent agitations of the youths (essentially male). hence the women’s nonviolent approach offers a potential source of leverage for communities in negotiating intervention with the nddc. with abysmally low capacity for gender sensitivity, the nddc cannot deliver gender sensitive intervention in the ndr, rather it entrenches the traditional power imbalance and roles between female and male members of the beneficiary communities. notes note 1. the odi massacre was a recurrent theme in the discussions with all the community people. references africa peace forum, center for conflict resolution, consortium of 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(1956). trade and politics in the niger delta 1830-1885. london: oup. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 106 published by scholink inc. environmental rights action/friends of the earth. (2002). a blanket of silence: images of the odi genocide. author. european commission. (2013). gender-sensitivity. retrieved 09 14, 2018, from https://definedterm.com/a/definition/207946 fisher, s., dekha, i. a., jawed, l. richard, s., steve, w., & sue, w. (2000). working with conflict— skills and strategies for action. london: zed books. human rights watch. (1999). the price of oil: corporate responsibility and human rights violations in nigeria’s oil-producing communities. author. ikime, o. (1969). niger delta rivalry: itsekiri-urhobo relations and the european presence 18841936. london: longman . institute for peace and conflict resolution. 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(2003). pcia as a peace building tool. in a. austin, m. fischer, & o. wills (eds.), peace and conflict impact assessment: critical reviews on theory and practice (pp. 78-81). berlin: berghof centre for constructive conflict management. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 107 published by scholink inc. salihu, a., okon, e., & sow, n. (2002). enhancing the capacity of women leaders of community organisations to contribute towards peace building in the niger delta region of nigeria. london: international alert. the nddc. (2007). the niger delta development commission. retrieved november 27, 2007, from http://www.nddc.ng.gov the nigerian national assembly. (2000). the niger delta development commission act (pdf version ed.). abuja: author. united nations general assembly. (1979). the convention on elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. geneva: author. retrieved june, 2011, from http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 98 original paper demystification of the organic theory of company law through the lens of corporate governance jurisprudence: revisiting shareholders activism (a case study of nigeria’s company and allied matters act 2004) o. ogechukwu ajoku esq 1 1 o. ogechukwu ajoku esq, ajoku.ogez@gmail.com received: october 10, 2022 accepted: november 22, 2022 online published: december 1, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n4p98 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n4p98 1. introduction this paper borders on the case study of the nigerian company legislation. the choice of this case study is deliberate due to the lessons to be learned regarding residence of company powers. the present company act was first enacted in 1990. this became known as the company and allied matters act 1990. yet in 2004, there was need to excise the sections that provided for company securities. those sections gave birth to what is now investment and securities act, 2007. this paper shall dwell on the sections of the nigerian cama, 2004 that provides for distribution of corporate powers. a company is owned, and managed, by two principle organs. these are the “board of directors” and the “shareholders in general meeting”. therefore, if a company is incorporated, it has become a separate legal entity of its own, and it is different and distinct from the members that incorporated it. though a legal entity, it is an artificial legal entity that cannot act on its own person. it can only act through human organs, agent, and officers (note 1) and in most cases through the directors. a company though having a corporate personality is deemed to possess human personality through its officers and agents (note 2). therefore, it can only act through human agents and officers (note 3). hence, the rule of agency is applicable in the corporate structure. the authority to exercise the company’s powers is entrusted to the directors who act as a board, but not as individual directors. this said authority bestowed on the board may be delegated by the board to the managing director or to other officers of the company (note 4). the most over whelming aspect of corporate practice is the nature of the relationship between the board of directors and the shareholders (members) in general meeting. up to the end of the 19 th century, in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 99 published by scholink inc. england, the general rule was that the directors were under the control of the members in general meeting. the directors were usually treated as mere agents of the company, and the general meeting was, therefore, regarded as the company while the board was subject to the overall control of the members in general meeting. the members in general meeting could pass a resolution empowering them to interfere in the ways the directors managed the company, especially where such ways of managing the company by the directors are not for the benefit of the company. (note 5) the above view has changed. this was due to the judicial attitude that changed, and the prevailing view that the shareholders cannot interfere with the exercise of those powers vested in the directors by the articles of association, or the companies act, either expressly or by necessary implication. (note 6) at best, what the share holders can do is to remove the recalcitrant directors and replace them with persons who agree to their policy. this essentially shows that there is a nexus between the control of the individual corporators and the management of the company itself. the nigerian company legislation (cama) (note 7) has provided and stipulated that a company shall act through its members in general meetings or its board of directors, or through officers and agents appointed by or under authority derived from the members in general meeting or the board of directors. thus, as earlier noted above, the primary organs of a company are the share holders and the board of directors. the managing director is often regarded as third organ. (note 8) although the managing director being an appointee of the board of directors, it is in him that the practical executive powers of the company are vested in modern corporate structure. on the other hand, the board concerns itself with policy formulation and decisions, as well as exercise a general supervisory role over the conduct of the managing director. (note 9) moreover, the roles of the board and the managing director are subsumed. 2. the myth of corporate personality essentially, it is a fundamental principle of modern company law that there is a clear and total separation of ownership and management in companies. this is as a result of two main factors. the first is the very essence of the modern corporation which principal function and fundamental feature is the pooling together of huge capital which many individual and institutions have contributed for the purpose of investment to be managed by a few managers. the second factor is the prevailing need for efficiency in the running of corporate organizations and the demands of managerial and technical expertise to achieve this goal. the degree to which these factors influence the operations of a company may vary depending on whether it is a private or owner controlled company on the one hand, or a public limited company on the other hand, whether quoted on the stock exchange or not. but for private companies, the growing importance for competent management and technical expertise cannot be ruled out. theoretically, therefore, the general management of the affairs of the company is vested in its board. for practical exigencies, the board appoints one of its folds as managing director and chief executive officer of the company. the board is generally responsible for making policy decisions in the company while the chief executive or the managing director necessarily sees to their implementation www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 100 published by scholink inc. and oversees the day to day operations of the company. it is a different ball game for ownercontrolled companies in which the provision of the necessary capital, the management of the company and the implementation of policy decisions may be vested in the same person or group of persons. also for large companies there is usually a more elaborate hierarchy of command emanating from the board through the middle management to the employees that constitute the workforce. this same management is also accountable to a potentially inquisitive set of shareholders and the general public, inclusive of regulatory bodies. in very large companies, as earlier noted which are also quoted companies, there is a diversified nature of shareholding. as a consequence, this has generated a protracted debate and controversy amongst law philosophers and eminent jurists. the debate is whether or not the general meeting can, by resolutions, exercise control over the actions of the directors in the overall condition of the company’s affairs. this has resulted to divergent views. one view has contended that the general meeting has a right of intervention in the management matters expressly vested in the board in the company’s articles by way of ordinary resolution. (note 10) a contrasting view, supported by most judicial decisions, and text writers, have concluded that once power have been conferred by the articles to the directors, the general meeting could not give direction to the directors as to what they are to do, nor overrule their decisions except by altering the said articles. (note 11) a closer look at some articles for clarity is germane. the classical article is article 80 type of articles which many companies have adopted and hitherto retained that later became principal bone of contentions and subject of litigations for its succinct interpretation. its interpretation has, hitherto, remained troublesome. the said article 80 provides, inter alia, that: “the business of the company shall be managed by the directors who may exercise such powers of the company as are not, by the act or by these regulations required to be exercised by the company in general meeting subject, nevertheless, to any of these regulations to the provision of the act and to such regulations or provisions as may be prescribed by the company in general meeting, but no regulation made by the company shall invalidate any prior act of the directors which would have been given if that regulation has not been made (note 12). the above article 80 adopted by most company legislations is very problematic. the problem of interpretation of the said article results partly from the ambiguity of the above underlined words. the house of lords interpreted a similar article in quin and axtens ltd v salmon. (note 13) the article for interpretation in this case was article 75, which is similar to article 80. the house of lords in the above case rejected the argument that regulations employed in article 80 type of articles includes directives, whether general or particular, as to the transactions of business of the company. lord loreburn, l. j. said inter alia: “now it may be a question of argument, but for my part 1 should require a great deal of argument to satisfy me that the word regulations in this article does not mean the same thing as articles having regard to the language of the first part of the article of association” (note 14). construing the underlined words in the case of scott v scott, (note 15) lord clauson observed inter www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 101 published by scholink inc. alia: “to begin with, i do not take the view that those limiting words “subject nevertheless” ……, and so forth, has anything to do with any duty cast upon the directors in the first two lines of the articles to manage the business of the company…… one of the aforesaid regulations for provisions is this provision about the business of the company being managed by the directors, and i find the greatest difficulty in seeing how any resolutions of the company in general meeting controlling the directors in management of the business can possibly be justified under the terms of the articles”. (note 16) it is humbly submitted that the underlined words are troublesome and equivocal. (note 17) earlier in the history of company law, that is pre-1906 era, to be precise, the directors have been viewed as delegates of the general meeting. this was the position under the common law. by this common law position, the company’s act, and the articles’ were drafted in a manner that the powers of management would remain with the general meeting which could delegate its powers to the board. the board of directors would be delegates of the general meeting and their delegated powers could be withdrawn at anytime by the general meeting. this was the provision under section 90 companies clauses (consilidation) act, 1845. this section became the forerunner of article 80 type of articles. this section 90 made the exercise of directors’ powers “subject to the control and regulations of any general meeting specially convened for the purpose, but not as to render invalid any act done by the directors prior to any resolution passed by such general meeting”. in addition to the said section 90 of the act, the directors were made the governing body, subject to the superior control of the proprietors in general meetings, and as the act seems to have provided, the proprietors so assembled, have power…… to control the directors in any act which they may have originated. (note 18) cotton l. j. expressed a similar view in isles of wight rly co. v. tahourdin. (note 19) in modern times, commercial realities and business convenience seem to be against members being able to control and direct the board. hence, the view that the directors are mere agents of a majority vote of shareholders in general meetings, and thereby susceptible to their directions was, therefore, judicially rejected. (note 20) 3. power distribution in companies in the case of automatic selfcleansing syndicate v cunninghame (note 21), the court made it clear that where the management of the company is vested in the directors, it is the directors who can exercise those powers of management. hence, as a consequence of this judicial pronouncement, it became a trite principle of company law that where the company has an article similar or identical to article 80 the directors, and no other person or group, is responsible for the management of the company except in the matters expressly allotted to the members in general meeting, either by the act or by the article. (note 22) moreover, modern articles of association of companies hitherto provide that the board shall have powers of management. if this method is adopted, it is the usual view that the board can exercise those powers and not the general meeting. (note 23) it is therefore argued in this paper that article 80 type of articles was imperfectly drafted, hence the controversy around it. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 102 published by scholink inc. due to the imperfection in the drafting of article 80, it is not out of place to argue that the said article 80 does not necessarily make the directors autonomous bodies, in matters of management. in other words article 80 did not vest an exclusive power of management on the directors since such view is at odds with the purpose of the article if considered as a whole. (note 24) it has been contended by a school of thought, (note 25) that the article 80 type of articles had given the shareholders a right of intervention in management matters. therefore, it appears that the general meeting can issue directives to the board in matters of management by passing an ordinary resolution so long as the resolution is in consonance with the articles, and the act, and does not amount to fraud or oppression on the minority members of the company. this paper, therefore, contends that the said article 80 type of articles, examined closely, does not confer exclusive power of management on the board. (note 26) in marshal’s valve v. manning case, (note 27) nevile j, decided that when a provision like article 80 applies and the directors will not start proceedings for a wrong done to the company, power to do so reverts to the general meeting. professor gower, having studied the above decision of the court, in the above mentioned case, noted that the decision was in recognition of the exercise of the residuary powers of the general meeting. (note 28) he contended further that the decision was influenced by policy consideration as the directors clearly wanted to use their powers to prevent action being brought by their company to remedy what was apparently a breach of their duties. he also pointed out that the decision violates division of powers. a learned text writer, and scholar, goldberg, (note 29) noted that the interpretation gower gave was wrong and that marshal’s valve case correctly stated the general rule. moreover, it is out of place to contend that the three directors in the said case who refused to sue to enforce their obvious breach of directors’ duties acted bona fide in what they considered to be the best interest of the company. in logan (thomas) ltd v davis (note 30) warrington j. noted that the company has reserved the right in general meeting to tell the directors what to do. in this case, article 99 gave the board of directors power to appoint one of their own to be the managing director of the company. article 113 had a provision similar to article 80 type of article. at an extraordinary general meeting of the company, a resolution was passed that a named person should be appointed as sole director. the directors, however, appointed an entirely different person from the board as sole managing director. the court, in a majority, held that the action of the directors were in order. the purport of these case decisions is, therefore, that as a general rule, members at the general meeting cannot give directions to the board of directors on how to run the company’s business, neither can they overrule the decision already arrived at by the directors in the conduct of the company’s business unless such matters are specifically reserved for the general meeting either by the articles as originally framed or by the alteration limiting, of course, the powers of directors. in essence, where the articles of association provided the functions between members in general meeting and the board of directors, the members have no power to interfere in functions and powers of the directors, and vice versa. this www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 103 published by scholink inc. shows that the board has freedom to dictate the way and manner in which the general business of the company is to be conducted. this paper contends that this is not absolute freedom, because there resides in the general meeting a residual power of control. reliance is anchored on the general understanding that the general meeting can alter the articles (note 31) to curtail, or even remove the directors (note 32) and appoint new ones. the general meeting, it is contended, is superior and, therefore, possess residual powers in the sense that if the directors are unable to exercise their power in the conduct of the affairs of the company, the power to do so reverts to the general meeting (note 33). for instance, where there is a deadlock among directors (note 34), or they are non-existent, power resides in the shareholders in general meeting to do that which under normal circumstances would be within the purview of directors’ powers. (note 35) this position is a remarkable development in corporate governance. tables a of the old 1929 english companies act and the 1948 act (note 36) having provided that, subject to the act and the articles, the business of the company should be managed by the directors who might exercise such powers as were not required to be exercise by the general meeting, went further to qualify this by thus,: “subject nevertheless to any regulation of these articles to the provision of the act and to such regulations, being not inconsistent with the aforesaid regulations or provisions, as may be prescribed by the company in general meeting, but no regulation made by the company in general meeting shall invalidate any prior act of the director which would have been valid if the regulation had not been made”. the above provision, in other words, purport that powers of the directors could be curtailed in the future by a resolution in the general meeting but an act already undertaken by the directors cannot be invalidated thereby. the multifarious case decisions on this provision has therefore, failed woefully to proffer any satisfactory explanation for the problematic area of the article so widely debated, till date. table a, article 70 of the 1985 english companies act have modified and altered those problematic words thus: “subject to the provisions of the act, the memorandum, and the articles, and to any directions given by special resolution, the business of the company shall be managed by the directors who may exercise all the powers of the company. no alteration of the memorandum, or articles, and no such direction shall invalidate any prior act of the directors which would have been valid if that alteration had not been made or that direction had not been given”. (note 37) section 63(3) and (5) cama, 2004 of the nigerian company legislation also modified that article 80, and thereby provides solution to the logjam showing how meaningless that area of the said article 80 had been. suffice it to contend, therefore, that the general meeting is empowered to curtail the future powers of the directors by a special resolution whether that formally alters the memorandum, or articles, or merely gives “directions”. companies that incorporates under the cama, and those incorporated under earlier acts that adopt new articles are likely to follow this formula. but can it be argued that this new formula will not raise any new questions? for instance, can a “direction” by special resolution www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 104 published by scholink inc. effectively compel the directors to enter or not to enter into a transaction that is clearly part of the general management of the company’s business? in this regard, would the members in general meeting then be “director” within the meaning of the act which defines “director” as including “any person occupying the position of a director by what ever name called”? (note 38) it probably might be unless all or substantial part of “management” was removed and vested in the members. although, the post 1906 judicial opinions enhance the position of the board of directors against the general meeting, it is not clear whether such enhancement of the said status is total. in a public limited company such enhanced status may be complete since management cannot be undertaken by a vast body of share holders, nor be undertaken also by large institutional investors. that notwithstanding, there are situations where the companies’ act or the stock exchange (note 39) requires sensitive transactions to be ratified in general meeting. (note 40) it is therefore safe to contend that if for any reason the board cannot or will not exercise the powers vested in them, the general meeting may do so. on this basis, action by the general meeting can be effective where there is a deadlock in the board, (note 41) when there were no directors, (note 42) when an effective quorum could not be obtained; (note 43) or the directors were disqualified from voting. (note 44) in as much as the general meeting cannot abort proceedings commenced by the board in the name of the company, (note 45) the general meeting can, in some circumstances, commence proceedings or ratify authorized proceedings commenced by someone on behalf of the company if the directors fail to pursue such proceedings. (note 46) on the other hand, these provisions, and judicial pronouncements, have created an exception to the rule that management of the company is vested in the directors. this has its peculiar problems. (note 47) moreover the board of directors are expected to refer any matter to the general meeting either to ratify what the board had already done or to enable the general meeting to decide on action to be taken. thus, an act of the directors which is irregular, because, for instance, it is a breach of their fiduciary duties, can be ratified by the company in general meetings if the act is within the powers of the company, and the general meeting acting with full knowledge and without oppression of the minority. (note 48) on the other hand, if the directors have purported to exercise powers reserved for the general meeting, their actions can be ratified at the general meeting. is it not awkward if the directors are compelled to take a decision and then ask the general meeting to gloss over them? in other words, it is a convenient course for them to resolve on an action “subject to ratification” by the company in general meeting. (note 49) 4. the company’s management team the discussion of company law organic theory will not be complete if due regard is not accorded certain elements among the board of directors. these elements are often a recurring decimal in the modern world corporate governance. they have assumed tremendous influence and finesse. these are known as the “executive directors” and their management team. (note 50) their position is adequately provided and obtainable in a company that operates a two-tier directorship. thus, in this regard, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 105 published by scholink inc. amongst the directors, there are the executive and the non-executive directors. the latter are directors who are expected to do little or nothing other than to attend a reasonable number of board meetings, and perhaps some of the committees that the board may establish. (note 51) the former are those who, in addition to their roles as directors, hold some executive or managerial position to which, as it is very obvious, they are appointed to the board (note 52). the board determines their emolument and benefits. (note 53) between these persons and the company there must certainly be some sort of contract. although, in the case of public limited companies, it may be no more formal than a board resolution communicated to them as individual, or exchange of letters. the member directors may work out what each is to do and divide, from time to time, how much the company can afford to pay and how it should be divided amongst them. it is pertinent to note that the most prominent of these executive directors is the managing director. he is also described as “chief executive officer” (ceo) or president. (note 54) it is not common to find any reference in the articles to a ceo, but it is assumed that a power to appoint a managing director includes a power to address him or her as ceo. it seems convenient to do so. public limited companies find it convenient to have both executive and non-executive directors and are encouraged to have a reasonable proportion of the latter. in england, one of the goals of the cadbury committee on the “financial aspects of corporate governance”, 1992, was to strengthen the influence of non-executive directors on the board of quoted companies. the code of best practice” that accompanied its report required a clearly accepted division of the responsibilities at the head of the company which will ensure balance of power and authority such that no single individual has unfettered powers of decision. there have been the prevalent cultures of high rewards for these executive directors. this is not surprising because of the fact that many non-executive directors are as well executive directors of other companies. thus, these executive directors occupy a very prominent position in the company since they incurably know so much about the company’s business. they are mostly professional persons occupying strategic managerial, as well as, directorial positions in the company by virtue of their contract of employment with the company. they sit on the board of a company because of their skills and professional training, and, therefore, advice the board of directors on areas of the company’s operations in which they possess relevant expertise, and in which the non-executive directors of the company seem ignorant. but some worthy souls still constitute non-executive members of the board even though there must be some limit to which any human can actually be effective. additionally, it is pertinent to note that the proper position of the law is that only the acts of the general meeting, that of the board of directors, and that of the managing director while carrying on the usual manner of the business of the company shall be regarded as the acts of the company. (note 55) these are the organs of the company and are the organs of the company and are the directing will and mind of the company. in them, therefore, are vested the company’s powers. company’s powers begin and end with them. they are the embodiment of the corporate personality of the company. in addition to the company’s organs, there are also officers and agents of the company appointed by or under authority derived from www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 106 published by scholink inc. the general meeting, or the board of directors (note 56) whose acts are not the acts of the company unless it can be proven that they were authorized by the company through the general meeting or the board of directors. (note 57) it is safe, therefore, to contend that whereas the powers of the company are vested in the general meeting and the board of directors, and they decide what the company should do, the agents and officers act under delegated power from the general meeting and the board of directors. the implication is that the acts of the general meeting and that of the board automatically bind the company. (note 58) the same cannot be said of the officers and agents. it is only lawfully authorized acts of the said agents and officers bind the company, albeit, vicariously. (note 59) 5. powers of the general meeting vis-a-vis shareholders activism shareholders exercise control of the company through the instrument of the general meetings of the company. a very pertinent aspect of the powers of the shareholders over the control of the company is what is regarded as the “default powers” of the general meeting. these default powers may be exercised where the directors exceed their powers or exercise them improperly, or fail to or neglect to act in appropriate circumstances in the interest of the company, due to self-interest, or some other reason. (note 60) in any of these instances, the company in general meeting can take a binding decision affecting the company thereby exercising the role of the directors as provided in the companies acts or the articles. the general meeting, as constituted by the shareholders may, on the other hand, ratify acts of the directors improperly done. (note 61) moreover, the court has held that where the directors are in a deadlock and cannot exercise their powers as conferred by the company’s articles, the shareholders in general meeting has default powers to act in any manner within the domain of directors. similarly to above, where the number of directors falls below the number requisite for a quorum, the shareholders were held capable of filling vacancies on the board. (note 62) the default powers of the shareholders also include the power to institute legal proceedings in the name and on behalf of the company if the directors refuse or neglect to do so. (note 63) they can also make recommendation to the board regarding action to be taken by the board. (note 64) although, the directors are not bound to accept the recommendation of the shareholders in general meeting, a rejection thereof places them at risk of dismissal and replacement with others who are amenable to their (shareholders) wishes. the default powers of the shareholders cannot be effective if the transaction is ultra vires; (note 65) constitute fraud on the minority; (note 66) or depends upon the alteration of the articles which, therefore, requires a special majority. (noe 67) it is, therefore, obvious that the default powers of the shareholders were originally the powers of the directors, which they have failed, or neglected, to exercise in appropriate circumstances, or have improperly exercised. for instance, the powers of directors to transfer or otherwise dispose of company’s securities must be exercised in the interest of the shareholders. where this power is improperly exercised, apart from constituting a basis for an action against the directors for breach of fiduciary duty to the company; (note 68) it seems that the shareholders may set aside such transaction or refuse to be bound by them. (note 69) thus, the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 107 published by scholink inc. directors must not exploit any piece of information known to them by virtue of their office as directors to the detriment of the general body of shareholders. (note 70) fiduciary duties of directors are owed to the company and not to an individual shareholder, but sound ethical standards demand that a better view of their responsibilities to the shareholders should be taken. it should be well noted that a speculative profit made as a result of special knowledge not available to the general body of shareholders in the company is improperly made. the directors, hitherto, owe the duty of disclosure in respect of dealings in company’s securities. this has been adequately dealt with by the courts (note 71). the cama (note 72) also provides that every company shall keep register of directors’ shareholding indicating in what capacity such shares are held. the directors are duty bound to furnish notice of such interest. (note 73) the rules prohibiting insider trading enunciated in the cama are designed to prevent the use of valuable confidential and price sensitive information by a person who acquires such knowledge by virtue of his connection or position with the company to his own advantage and to the detriment of other parties who do not posses such knowledge. (note 74) it is thus contended that the general meeting, in the exercise of their residual powers, should be entitled to set aside, or refuse to sanction, or be bound by improper dealings in company’s securities amounting to insider dealings. even though all profits ultimately belong to the shareholders, the distribution of such profits falls within the discretion of the directors. the directors should bear in mind that in distributing profits, the interest of the company must be of paramount consideration. they should also contemplate that when they transfer money to reserve, they are temporarily withholding from shareholders money which should otherwise be distributed as dividends. shareholders are perfectly entitled to ask for reasons of such transfer. in addition, where the directors deem it necessary to engage in certain activities with good prospects of profit, the shareholders are entitled to be consulted. they are not allowed to use surplus profits for general investment purposes unless the company’s objects include the holding of investments. thus, with respect to company’s meetings, for such pertinent issues, the directors should make it an occasion, rather than a formality. from the forgoing analyses, the members of a company in general meeting make up the company. they are the only effective authority until the directors are appointed. moreover, the power to appoint and remove directors is the function of the general meeting. but having noted all these, there is no doubt that there are imminent limitations on the exercise of these powers. these limitations usually render these powers of shareholders nugatory. this circumstance possesses the tendency of the directors’ domination of the corporate landscape. in other words, it is sincerely conceded that there are constraints to the effective and efficient exercise of shareholders’ powers over the control of the company, that signposts shareholder activism. obviously, smaller companies, or even private companies, may not suffer these constraints. but large companies are susceptible to these constraints. thus, the large companies, with a dispersal of shares, comprise the board of directors that will generally control the proceedings of the company’s general meetings because they posses the tendency to control the proxy machinery. (note 75) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 108 published by scholink inc. 5.1 shareholders power constraints such constraints to shareholder activism are as follows, viz: a. general apathy to company meetings and affairs. b. over reliance on professional managers and technocrats by the company directors. c. the presence of multinational companies. there is general apathy of members to attend general meetings. these shareholders rarely attend company’s general meetings due to distance and, perhaps, financial handicaps. but here in nigeria, this constraint has been alleviated some what. hence, shareholders’ groups such as “shareholders’ solidarity association” and the “association for the advancement of the rights of shareholders have been formed. these sundry shareholder associations, one way or the other, have made it possible for companies to convene general meetings at venues where there are large concentration of shareholders of the company, or even rotated, rather than held in the head office or registered office of that company. (note 76) additionally, the measures of these shareholders associations to cushion the effect of this constraint is the holding of regional shareholders meetings where they appoint proxies amongst them to attend general meetings. this is as a result of the economic recession in the country where most shareholders cannot afford transport fare from their place of residence. we should not also rule out advanced technology where general meetings are monitored via internet and contributions made with audio visual technology, such as skypes and webcam among sundry others. another constraints to shareholders’ powers is the over reliance on professional managers and technocrats. these crops of individuals have wielded enormous influence in the modern corporate structure. these are the executive directors and their management team. their resurgence has escalated to shareholders’ apathy to company matters. these individuals are virtually on ground and in the mainstream of corporate politics and as a result, they exhibit certain manipulative tendencies. it has, thus, become impossible to inquire into high sensitive corporate issues which the shareholders need cogent answers. there is the recent overwhelming presence of multinational corporations in the nigerian, and global economy. most of these multinational corporations are controlled from their home countries abroad. these multinational corporations are the biggest companies ever in the world. the local shareholders most times are not in control of these corporations. policy decisions are usually handed down from their home base. thus, to what extent does the link between the multinational corporations and their local affiliates guarantee the directors and shareholders of these local affiliates the power to exercise independent control in the affairs of the local affiliates? this is a fundamental question. it is, therefore, noteworthy, the improvements in the communication industry that has made the centralization of policy and integration of key operations amongst the affiliates possible. thus, major decisions of these multinational corporations are made at the home of domicile such as new york, london, paris, south africa, switzerland, among others, and handed to their various subsidiaries worldwide which made things in strict adherence to plan developed in these cities. therefore, these local subsidiaries do not www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 109 published by scholink inc. participate in drawing policies of the company. the role of the local management and shareholding appears predetermined. in spite of the above constraints, the quest for accountability by shareholders, from management continues and widely recognized. the traditional methods of seeking to secure it have mainly been by an increase both in the information that has to be disclosed to shareholders and in the matters that need to be ratified by them in the general meetings. these methods can be effective only if members: i. are sufficiently knowledgeable to understand the information; ii. possess large enough shareholding to be able to influence decisions; and iii. are able, as well as willing to resort to the courts if need be. moreover, there are some other notable factors that may deter members to take action, whether in a personal capacity or a derivative capacity. an instance is that in most cases the transaction in issue may be so intricate which the shareholders may not easily comprehend. they can rarely identify its precise character. in other words, at the general meetings, the directors might decline to answer probing members on the basis that it is premature to disclose confidential information. such a situation certainly leaves members helpless as to the basis upon which to proceed and the way forward. it is pertinent to note that even where the shareholders are able to identify a basis for action, the route to establish this in court is another set of complex hurdle. moreover, there is the traditional reluctance of the court to interfere in the internal management of the company. this has resulted to most of the directors’ breaches going unpunished and unchecked. (note 77) the cost of litigation has also become a restraining factor. but this, to some extent, has been mitigated by the cama that provides that an applicant shall not be required to furnish security for costs in any application, or action brought in a derivative capacity. (note 78) hence, the court has power to order payment of interim cost to such applicants by the company. (note 79) but this has not helped matters. the shareholders rarely opt for litigation. rather, they prefer to opt for a less cumbersome alternative which is to withdraw their investment by disposing their shares in the said company. if this fails because of securing ready and willing market, the shareholders resort to general apathy to company matters. in large companies, shareholding has become so dispersed that it is usually not worth the while of most shareholders to devote time, effort, and resources to seeking to change the policies of the board and management which they find unsatisfactory. it has become common with shareholders not to be interested in using the rights and powers which the laws and the company’s articles confer upon them to hold the board and management to account. but all hope is not lost yet. oppressed and aggrieved shareholders may also resort to petition for winding up of the company on the just and equitable ground. (note 80) they can also apply for relief on ground of unfairly prejudicial conduct of the board and management. (note 81) in achieving these, the interests of other stakeholders, such as creditors and employees of such company must be considered. it has now become safer to move investments around. they move their funds to safer and more secure corporate havens thereby denying their previous company required funds for growth. this results to the consequence of corporate collapse of the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 110 published by scholink inc. affected company. in other words, shareholders that resort to these above options have become rationally apathetic towards their enforceable rights. 6. conclusion in summary, it is abundantly clear that both under the law and the articles of companies, managerial powers are vested in the board of directors. but, in practice, this is different. the affairs of modern companies are under the firm grip of high executive officers and managers. the two, identified, organs of the company (i.e., members in general meeting and board of directors) are compelled by the prevalent complexities of company management to relinquish management powers to the cream of executive directors who are technocrats obligated to manage the affairs of the company daily. the board therefore, as of necessity now rely on these executive directors and their management team for information and initiative in decision making as it affects the business and operations of the company. the organic theory of company law seems hollow. this is because the prevailing corporate structure, as been noted in this paper, does not encourage shareholder activism emanating for the theory. the company meetings seem to be the only avenue shareholders are reckoned. it is in the company meetings that the company directors are expected to furnish a report of their stewardship for the past year to the shareholders. the shareholders are availed the opportunity to comment on the performance of the board. the shareholders also exercise the power of appointment and removal of directors, as they are entitled to remove director(s) if unsatisfied with company’s performance. if this shareholder control mechanism is allowed to flourish, it may be possible for the shareholders to extend their sphere of influence and operation. this conduces to exercising management powers in the company. unfortunately, the directors possess the tendency to fetter the unrestricted managerial powers of the shareholders. the directors are in the habit of curtailing the powers of the shareholders by the fact that the shareholders lack the competence and expertise in managerial matters. finally, in contemporary times, the sphere of corporate management has far assumed a terrain of tremendous legal and political dimension. in other words, directors are availed their way because they invariably control majority equity holding in the companies. on the contrary, nothing is achieved where the atmosphere is devoid of democratic ideals this paper advocates corporate democracy in the mould of shareholder activism. there is no democracy where the minority is not availed an opportunity to be heard. this portends that shareholders ought to be encouraged to show some interest in company affairs, as opposed to what is now the prevalent practice. unfortunately, company legislations have not deeply encouraged shareholder activism. this gas has resulted to schemes and scams often perpetrated by the board to remain in dominion of company’s affairs. thus, due to incompetence of some members of the board, there are incidences of corporate collapses and poor investment returns. whenever there is corporate collapse, the board usually smile home richer than they were earlier, while the shareholders bemoan the loss of their investment. there is therefore the prevailing need to encourage shareholder activism for improved returns and corporate democracy. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 111 published by scholink inc. references farrah, f. 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(1994). the rise of the political model of corporate governance and corporate control. new york universit law review, 1994, march. sullivan, g. r. (1977). the relationship between the board of directors and the general meeting. 1977, 93, lqr, 569. notes note 1. lennards carrying company v. asiatic company ltd (1915) ac 705. note 2. per aniagolu j. sc. (rtd) in trenco nig ltd v. african real estate ltd (1978) lrn 146. note 3. lennards carrying company v. asiatic company ltd (1915) ac 705. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 112 published by scholink inc. note 4. paul l. davis and d. d. prentice: gower’s principle of company law, sweet and maxwell (6th edition) london, 1997, international students’ edition. note 5. isle of wright v. jahoudin (1883) 25 ch.d 320, dictum of v. cotton l.j. note 6. sofowora m. o. modern nigerian company, soft associates (yaba-lagos) 1992, pp 153-154. note 7. section 63(1) cama, 2004. note 8. section 64(6) ibid. note 9. gower: principles of modern company law, sweet and maxwell, london (1992) 5th edition, pp. 160-161. note 10. sullivan g. r. “the relationship between the board and the general meeting” (1977) 93 lqr, 569 at 571. note 11. boyles a. j. et al (ed): gore-brown on companies, jordan & sons, london (1972) 4 2nd edition, pg 719; automatic self-cleasing syndicate co. v. cunning hame (1906)2 ch. 34ca; bam ford v. bam ford (1970) ch. 212; scott v. scott (1943)’ all er 5&2; show & sons (salford) ltd v. show (1935) 2kb 113 at 134. note 12. formerly table a article 80 company’s act, 1968. all emphasis above made for further deliberation. note 13. (1909) ac442. note 14. ibid at pg 444. note 15. op. cit. n. 25. in this case it was article 71. note 16. ibid, at pg 585. note 17. boyle j. a. et al (ed): gore-brown on companies, opcit, n.25, pg 125. note 18. per wigram v. c. in foss v. harbottle (1843) harc 461, at 472; er 189 at 203. note 19. (1884) 25 ch.d at 330. note 20. op. cit, n. 25. note 21. ibid. note 22. ef., alexander and ward co. ltd v. samyang navigation co. ltd (1975) wilr. 673. note 23. for d. h.a.j.: principles of company law, butter worth’s, sydney (1974) pp.287 – 288. note 24. sullivan g.r., opcit, no 23 p. 572. note 25. ibid. note 26. marshal’s value gear co. v. manning and co. ltd (1909) 1 ch.267. note 27. ibid note 28. gower c.c.b. opcit., n. 23, p.127. note 29. goldberg g.d., “article 80 of table a of companies act 1948” 33 mcr, 188. note 30. (1911) 104 lt, 94. affirmed by the court of apeal, 105 lt, 419. note 31. section 46 cama, 2004. note 32. section 262 supra. note 33. barron v. potter (1914) ch. 895. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 113 published by scholink inc. note 34. foster v. foster (1916) ch. 532 note 35. section 63(3)-(5) cama; 2004, op.cit, n. 34. note 36. this is the article 80 under scrutiny. note 37. sec also section 63(1) cama, 2004. note 38. section 567(1) cama, 2004. note 39. nigerian stock exchange is established and empowered under the investment and securities act, 2007. note 40. op. cit., n. 51. note 41. quin & axtens v. salmon (1909) ac. 442. note 42. alexander ward & co. v. samyang navigation 10. (19 75), wlr 673. note 43. foster v. foster (1916) ch. 532. note 44. irvin v. union bank of australia (1877) 2, app. cas. 366 pc. note 45. section 63(6) cama, 2004 note 46. section 63(5) (b) supra; marshal’s value case note 47. re-argentum reductions (uk) ltd (1975) w.c.r. 186 at 189 note 48. banford v. bamford (1970) ch. 135 ca. note 49.grant v. switch back rlys (1888) 40 ch. d 135, ca. note 50. section 282 (4) cama, 2004. note 51. section 64(a) supra. note 52. ibid. note 53. re richmond gate pty co. (1965), w. c. r. 335. note 54. in usa, they are so referred. note 55. section 65 cama, 2004. note 56. section 63(1) supra. note 57. section 66(1)(a) and (2) supra. note 58. section 65 supra. note 59. section 66(3)supra. note 60. section 63(5) company and allied matters, act. 2004. note 61. re argertum reduction (uk) ltd (1975) 1 wlr 186. note 62. barron v. porter (1914) 1 ch. 895. note 63. foster v. foster (1916), ch. 532. note 64. ibid. note 65. section 63 (5) (d) supra. note 66. bamford v. banford (1970) ch. d. 135 ca. note 67. ibid. note 68. grant v. switch back rihs (1888) 40 ch. d. 135 ca. note 69. breiss v. wooley (1954) ac 333 wlr 832. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 114 published by scholink inc. note 70. allen v. wyatt (1914) 30 tlr 444. note 71. percival v. wright (1902) 2 ch 421. note 72. section 280(1)-(6) cama, 2004. note 73. section 275 supra. note 74. section 2765 supra. note 75. sections 614-619 supra now excised from cama to 15a, 2004. note 76. gower l.c.b.: modern principle of company law, sweet and maxwell (london) 4th edition, 1999, p. 553. note 77. orji v. progress bank (unreported) suit no. fhc/148/91. note 78. section 303 (2) (a) (d) cama, 2004. note 79. section 304, 306, 307, supra. note 80. ibid. note 81. section 408 (e) cama, 2004. microsoft word ape-v5n1-p50 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 50 original paper looking beyond a nuclear-armed iran: the major implications of nuclear iran for the middle east sayed reza hussaini1* 1 assistant professor at law and political science school, balkh university, mazar-e-sharif, afghanistan * sayed reza hussaini, assistant professor at law and political science school, balkh university, mazar-e-sharif, afghanistan received: december 26, 2021 accepted: january 6, 2022 online published: january 11, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n1p50 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n1p50 abstract iran has pursued nuclear weapons for over four decades. the basic reasons for this quest have remained unchanged in the face of the most crippling sanctions. almost three and a half years after trump’s withdrawal from the iran nuclear pact (jcpoa), tehran officially announced that it has enriched uranium up to 60%, very close to the 90% suitable for nuclear weapons. iran is highly likely to be the world’s next nuclear state. a nuclear-armed iran will be emboldened to accelerate its aggressive activities in the region and act against its neighbors with little fear of retribution. moreover, iran’s network of proxies would adopt a more confrontational approach towards israel. besides, iran’s politics of threat can have serious socioeconomic consequences for israel. iran’s possession of nuclear weapons could arguably set off a cascade effect, encouraging other major regional powers to move in the same direction. the west, particularly the united states, would seek to offset this risk by providing a “defence umbrella”. however, some might be reluctant to be openly protected by the united states or would find the umbrella questionable and choose nuclear option for both security concerns and prestige. keywords iran, israel, nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation, middle east 1. introduction the middle east is the most penetrated subsystem of the international political system. ever since napoleon’s expeditionary force landed in egypt in 1998, it has been an object of rivalry among the great powers. the strategic value of the middle east was considerable as the gateway between europe www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 51 published by scholink inc. and the far east (book of fawcet, pp. 254-255). the middle east is also known as the cradle of all the “abrahamic religions” which has disintegrated the region into different religious enclaves. besides, the discovery of oil, in the early part of the twentieth century, enhanced the regions’ importance for the global economy (shams-uz-zaman, 2011, p. 168). after the second world war, the middle east became one of the major theatres of the cold war. it was constantly caught up in superpower rivalry for political influence, power, and prestige. external sources of conflict combined with internal ones led to frequent crises, violence, and wars. the most destabilizing factors in the affairs of the region has been the creation of the jewish state of israel and the subsequent bitter, protracted and interactable conflict between the arabs and israelis. in recent decades, the middle east has become the focal point in global politics for another important issue and that is the iranian nuclear program. the coercive measures by the west generally failed to stop iran’s nuclear ambition. instead of being stopped or slowed, iran’s nuclear program has grown exponentially in recent years. in november 2021, iran announced that it has enriched uranium up to 60%, very close to the 90% suitable for nuclear weapons. evidence suggests that the policy of imposing sanctions on iran has not dissuaded it from developing nuclear weapons. furthermore, even an israeli and/or us military attack against iran’s nuclear facilities could not prevent iran from developing nuclear weapons; it could only delay such development. in the face of all pressures, iran is strongly shouldering its way into the nuclear club, and it is highly likely that iran, sooner or later, will join the club. therefore, this paper seeks to examine the major impacts of a nuclear-armed iran on the middle east. after offering an overview of iran’s lust for nuclear weapons, this paper discusses the implications of a nuclear-armed iran for the middle east in three distinct sections. the first section deals with the strategic and socioeconomic consequences of iran’s nuclear capability for israel, since these two countries have adopted hostile approach toward each other, and even threatened destruction of each other in the past. the second section explains iran’s deterrence policy and its dependence on the bomb as ultimate guarantor as well as provides an analysis of iran’s potential behavior, and support for its network of proxies across the middle east. as revisionist state, iran believes it has the historical, cultural, even moral weight to powerfully shape the region where classic persian empires have at one time held sway. the third section assess the likelihood proliferation in the middle east after iran secures its spot as the tenth nuclear state. there are many works which discuss the proliferation issue through a holistic approach; some authors believe that major middle eastern states could go nuclear, and others claim that they will not seek to develop nuclear weapons after iran acquires the bomb. this paper, first of all designates the potential would-be nuclear states and assesses the possibility of each case individually, because middle east is a large, diverse region not ruled by the single hand; each country in the region has its domestic policies and foreign policy priorities. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 52 published by scholink inc. 2. iran won’t stop until it has the bomb it is a common hope within washington’s foreign-policy establishment that no matter how close iran gets to the atomic threshold, it won’t detonate a bomb. many want to believe that supreme leader ali khamenei’s fatwa against the production and use of nuclear weapon will keep iran a threshold state. iran’s current leader ayatollah khamenei has issued a religious ruling (fatwa) that forbids the use of nuclear weapons. apparently, based on his theological premise the use of weapons of mass destruction is against all that is holy (kamel & lewis, 2019, p. 82). however, that ruling may not preclude the development or assembly of such weapons. moreover, khamenei may have the authority to revise or reinterpret his own ruling if circumstances change (nader, 2013, p. 5; einhorn, 2014). therefore, these hopes that iran does not go nuclear are delusional (gerecht & takeyh, 2021). some documents found in iran’s secret nuclear archive, seized by israel in 2018 proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that iran’s allegedly “open” civilian nuclear program is, in fact, its nuclear weapons project (porat, 2021). therefore, many argue that iran will build the bomb as soon as it can and justifies it afterward (gerecht & takeyh, 2021; einhorn, 2014). moreover, iran has invested billions of dollars in the program and tens of thousands of people have been working on it for decades. instead of generating economic benefits and political clout associated with a normal nuclear program, iran’s program has instead caused enormous damage, including political isolation and economic sanctions. for many, both inside and outside of iran, these costs do not make sense if the program is for peaceful purposes only—as iran has insisted—since the country would have been much better off economically and politically if it simply stopped enrichment of its soil and bought nuclear materials from the international markets (huang, 2016, p. 6). iran has several reasons to have nuclear weapons: deterrence and regional hegemony. ehud barak, then-israeli defense minister, in an interview with charlie rose in november 2011 made a sincere acknowledgment when asked whether he would strive for nuclear weapons had he been in iran’s shoes. barak answered: “probably, probably. i don’t delude myself that they [iran] are doing it just because of israel. they have their history of 4,000 years. they look around and they see indians are nuclear. the chinese are nuclear, pakistan is nuclear, not to mention the russians.” (aljazeera, 2011). it is clear that iran is situated in a region in which nuclear weapons are viewed as common currency in the field of power and prestige and make the situation much worse if iran does not go nuclear. iran obviously needs nuclear weapons because it’s part of a hostile world. marin van creveld, israeli military historian, once stated that iranians “would be crazy” not to build nuclear weapons considering the security threats they face. after years of high tensions and fitful diplomacy, it should now be clear to all that there will be no negotiated solution to the iranian nuclear issues (takeyh, 2021). the failure of diplomacy leaves the united states and israel with last resort: military action against iran (the iran project, 2012, p. 44). although us presidents and israeli prime ministers have routinely insisted that they have taken no option off the table, there is no consensus on military option right now. some believe that a military www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 53 published by scholink inc. strike on iran’s nuclear site would be a far easier than allowing iran to cross the nuclear threshold (brewer, 2021). others think it is unlikely that either the united states or israel will use military force to eliminate iran’s nuclear program. it is time to start envisioning a world with a nuclear-armed iran (takeyh, 2021). it is now certain that even military attack cannot stop iran’s move toward becoming nuclear (hobbs & moran, 2012, p. 128). a military action involving aerial strikes, cyber-attacks, covert operations, and special operations forces would destroy or severely damage many of iran’s physical facilities and stockpiles. but according to the judgment of many national security analysts and former politicians in the us, complete destruction of iran’s nuclear program is unlikely; and iran would still retain the scientific capacity and the experience to start its nuclear program again if it chooses to do so. [they] believe that extended military strikes by the u.s. alone or in concert with israel could delay iran’s ability to build a bomb by up to four years—if the military operation is carried out to near perfection, with all aircraft, missiles, and bombs working to maximum effects. a military strike by israel alone with its more limited military capacity could delay iran’s ability to build a bomb for up to two years (the iran project, 2012, p. 23). it is worth noting, an israeli air strike is unlikely to succeed in destroying or even seriously damaging the fordow enrichment facility, which is 200-300 feet underground, which has stored stockpile of most enriched uranium of iran. on the other hand, military action is not without costs. a military strike carries significant political and military risks (edelman & ross 2013, p. 18). meir dagan, former head of israel’s external intelligence agency, the mossad, warned a number of times that an attack on iran would “ignite a regional war.” as the history of war and conflict in the middle east reminds us, the middle east is a tinderbox where a few sparks could all too easily ignite a major conflagration (eiran & malin, 2013, pp. 77-78). iran has a strong capability to retaliate and a deep capacity for absorbing pain and suffering. it has the stomach for a protracted struggle (mahbubani, 2008, p. 204). such an attack will inject energy into persian nationalism, strengthen the regime’s argument that the west is a threat, and leave iran with a grudge that it may express by deepening or initiating relationships with other states and groups hostile to u.s. purposes (posen, 2009, p. 241). furthermore, the attack would most likely increase iran’s resolve to develop a weapon to protect the nation and the regime (thomson, 2014, p. 2). regime change should be regarded risky and unwise scenario. not only it carries significant risk, but also it will not put an end to iran’s nuclear activities. first, it is not guaranteed that the successor government will be totally different from the present regime. john j. mearsheimer says, there is deep-seated american belief that hostile states are essentially comprised of benign citizens controlled by evil leaders. remove the evil leaders, the thinking goes, and the forces of good will triumph and the problem goes quickly away. in his opinion, this is not a promising view (mearsheimer, 2001, p. 109). in the case of iran’s regime fall, others suggest that even a successor government, however friendly www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 54 published by scholink inc. toward the united states and better disposed toward israel, might still want to pursue many of the same programs that the current regime has initiated (quillen, 2002, p. 21). once a country has decided to develop nuclear weapons, it is almost impossible to prevent it doing so (ramon, 2021). the historical record, according to kenneth waltz, indicates that a country bent on acquiring nuclear weapons can rarely be dissuaded from doing so. punishing a state does not inexorably derail its nuclear program. take north koreaas an example. if tehran determines that its security depends on possessing nuclear weapons, it will never give up (waltz, 2012, p. 2). there is not any significant doubt, james lindsay and ray takeyh claim that “the islamic republic of iran is determined to become the worlds’ tenth nuclear power” (hobbs & moran, 2012, p. 128), therefore, the world, soon or late, should come to terms with a nuclear iran. upon the us withdrawal from jcpoa, iran accelerated enrichment of uranium closer to weapon grade, breaching limits set by the pact. in november 2021, iran increased its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium to 25 kilograms (55 pounds), while it had made only 6.5 kg of uranium enriched to up to 60% in june of that year (reuters, 2021). furthermore, at the same time, iran admitted that “its stockpile of 20% enriched uranium has reached 210 kg (463 pounds). under the jcpoa, iran was allowed to enrich uranium to a level not exceeding 3.67%, far below the 90% suitable for nuclear weapon. nowadays, president biden and his iranian counterpart showed interest in negotiation to revive the jcpoa. that said, there is no guarantee that the us and iran will reach a comprehensive solution (ibrahim, 2021). 3. implications of nuclear-armed iran for the middle east after a short introductory section, now we turn to the main point of this paper. first, i will discuss the impacts of a nuclear-armed iran on israel. then, the paper will analyze the importance of nuclear weapons for iran from survival concern to political renaissance; and finally, i assess the likelihood of nuclear proliferation in the middle east once iran gets the bomb. 3.1 the impacts of a nuclear-armed iran on israel the impacts of a nuclear-armed iran will be discussed in two following parts. 3.1.1 strategic consequences waltz, one of the icons of international relations theory, published a short essay suggesting that “[a] nuclear-armed iran would … most likely restore stability to the middle east.” in his view, israel’s regional nuclear monopoly … has long fueled instability in the middle east … it is israel’s nuclear arsenal, not iran’s desire for one, that has contributed most to the current crisis. power, after all, begs to be balanced.” he added, “[i]f iran goes nuclear, israel and iran will deter each other, as nuclear power always have.” in fact, iran’s nuclear power would reduce imbalances in military power and paves the way for more regional and international stability, not less (waltz, 2012, pp. 2-5; waltz, 2009, p. 231). in the same vein, davin hagerty concluded that “[t]here is no more ironclad law in international relations theory than this, nuclear states do not fight wars with each other.” (sagan, 2009, p. 220). because in a nuclear war, there will be no ultimate winner or loser. both sides consider it mutual suicidal move and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 55 published by scholink inc. the mentality of mad (mutual assured destruction) prevents from a nuclear conflagration (waltz, 2009, p. 228). however, these conclusions seem to ignore the cuban missile crisis, when the soviet union and the united states apparently came close to a nuclear confrontation. furthermore, during the kargil fighting between india and pakistan, two nuclear states, the former went to “readiness state 3,” which means that warheads were prepared for placement on delivery vehicles, and the later state apparently took similar steps (waltz, 2009, p. 234). these examples suggest that although the possibility of a nuclear war is very low, however, it should not be regarded as zero. scott sagan believes that future military crisis between india and pakistan are likely to be nuclear crisis (sagan, 2009, p. 221). the author’s view is that a nuclear-armed iran will not bring stability to the middle east, even it can add fuel to the current unresolved conflict for several reasons. first, at the heart of the views of the waltz school is a simple extrapolation from the non-use of nuclear weapons in the soviet-us context to the future non-use of those weapons in other regions. each nuclear state presents a distinct case and generalization about that without considering their particularities might be risky and misleading. the specific characteristics of each region and country, together with a large number of continuously changing variables, make any attempt to derive a norm extremely difficult and largely inaccurate (dokos, 2014, p. 2). there is one important structural difference between the new nuclear states and their cold war predecessors: just as each new child is born into a different family, each new nuclear state is born into a different nuclear system in which nuclear state influence each other’s behavior (sagan, 2009, p. 226). given that the middle east is unrivalled for long-standing conflict, irreconcilable disputes, feelings of distrust and hatred, and recurrent wars (waltz, 2009, p. 233), it does not make much sense to compare it to other regions in the world. second, waltz failed to consider that the iranian government has historically preferred to confront israel through its network of proxies such as hizballah and hamas, and nuclear weapons are unlikely to change this policy (nader, 2013, p. 32). in this case, a nuclear-armed iran will not be a force for stability. historical evidence from the cold war suggests that the war between two superpowers were not that cold; it turned into hot conflicts in many countries. since the united states and the soviet union were afraid of mutual assured destruction, they did not initiate any war directly, however, they fought so many wars through proxies. since 1945, the proxy war has been a perpetual element of modern warfare and will continue to be so (mumford, 2013, pp. 1-2). the end of the second world war ushered in the nuclear era, starkly accentuating the risks associated with going to war or challenging the security of a nuclear nation. this nuclear weapon-induced stability/instability paradox arguably caused nations to find alternative outlets for their strategic ambitions, where the consequences were contained yet the rewards tangible. the global reach of the cold war soon demonstrated, in the mid-twentieth century, that engagement in proxy wars was a convenient means by which the superpowers states could exert their influence and attempt to maximize their interests in parts of the third world, while simultaneously reducing the risk of conflict escalation (mumford, 2013, p. 3). the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 56 published by scholink inc. cold war remained “cold” for a reason: the emergence of nuclear weapons had ensured that ‘hot’ wars between superpowers would have such unparalleled consequences as to make direct conflict between the two morally unthinkable (mumford, 2013, pp. 38-39). it is beyond doubt that a nuclear-armed iran will keep sponsoring is affiliated proxies across the middle east. these proxies and israel are most likely to keep challenging and inflicting pains upon each other in every opportunity that present itself. third, far from restoration of stability, it is highly likely that a nuclear-armed iran would embolden iran’s network of proxies which could adopt a more confrontational approach towards israel (shams-uz-zaman, 2011, p. 171; hobbs & moran, 2012, p. 143). from tel aviv’s perspective, an iranian nuclear capability could negate israel’s overwhelming military superiority over hizballah, hamas and other potential adversaries. an iranian nuclear weapons capability that would serve as an “umbrella” for its allies could significantly hamper israel’s military operations in the palestinian territories, the levant, and the wider middle east (nader, 2013, p. 31). in an august 2012 interview, ehud barak said “if we will need to take action against hezbollah and a nuclear iran would declare that an attack on hezbollah constitute an attack on iran, what we shall do then?” barak further stated that non-state actors “cannot be deterred in the way that countries can exert deterrence against one other. (eiran & malin, 2013, p. 80). because nuclear weapon cannot be used against guerillas (ayoob, 2014, p. 76). the implications of such a development would be much graver than now. fourth, although iran with nuclear capability will not welcome a nuclear conflagration with any country including israel, however it will be emboldened enough to start a direct conventional war with israel (hobbs & moran, 2012, p. 130). the 1999 kargil conflict demonstrated that nuclear-armed states can fight wars (sagan, 2009, p. 220). this concern has already been expressed by some western politician. during the war between israel and hezbollah in 2006, president bush averred that the event would have been much more dangerous had iran possessed nuclear weapons. his implication was that iran would have been more inclined to involve itself directly in the crisis. at that point, iran’s leadership would shelter behind its nuclear deterrent. great powers would be afraid to attack iran directly, especially to invade iran, if they faced the risk of nuclear escalation. therefore, iran would be free to do anything from meddling in the internal affairs of other countries to invading them with conventional forces, because it could control its costs (waltz, 2009, p. 244). one thing is certain, although iranian officials repeatedly claimed that israel, the “little satan” is a true cancerous tumor at the heart islamic countries that should be cut off (huang, 2016, p. 13), however a nuclear iran will not pose an existential threat to israel (rand). “if this is 1938”, as former israeli prime minister netanyahu famously once declared, “then iran is romania, not germany.” (zakaria, 2008, p. 17). despite a widespread belief to the contrary, iran is not being led by irrational mullahs, but “perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like any other leaders.” (waltz, p. 5). a primary purpose of iran’s nuclear arsenal would be to deter an american and/or israel attack against iran, not to destroy israel. taking all what discussed into consideration, the possibility of nuclear weapons’ use in a potential conflict involving iran and israel should not be dismissed as impossible forever (nader, 2013, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 57 published by scholink inc. p. 21). therefore, it seems that the middle east is stranger to stability in the foreseeable future and a nuclear-armed iran would make the world, particularly the middle east, a far more dangerous place (brewer, 2021). the fear of iran with nuclear capability among sunni arab countries may be the only positive outcome for israel. many sunni-arab states (including saudi arabia) believe that this is now the time to make peace with israel so as not to have to deal with two adversaries at the same time (mahbubani, 2008, p. 181). the decision by four arab countries (the united arab emirates, sudan, morocco and to a lesser extent, bahrain) to forge ties with israel in 2020 is not unrelated to iran (ephron, 2020). hussein ibish, a senior resident scholar at the arab gulf states institute in washington, asserted that even “saudi leaders like crown prince mohammed bin salman have focused on the benefits of normalization with israel.” (ibish, 2021). 3.1.2 the socioeconomic challenges israelis also believe that a nuclear-armed iran would have many socioeconomic effects on israel. yarom ariav, a former director general of the israeli finance minister, asserted that “nuclear iran involves considerable economic costs to israel, from its effect on our economy rating to large security outlays.” israelis are concerned that iran with nuclear capability would hinder the state’s ability to attract foreign direct investment (fdi) (eiran & malin, 2013, p. 81). many argue that nuclear iran would cause insecurity in israel. insecurity, in its turn, creates “crisis of confidence along with uncertainties.” insecurity destroys investor’s confidence and even may lead to mass exodus of local and foreign companies (abubakar, tanko, & abubakar, p. 175). nobody wants to invest in a country where security is a challenge, because that can hamper the future of such investment. columnist lawrence solomon articulated the concern: you’re the ceo of ibm or intel or siemens or nestle or any one of the 500 other western companies that have opened up operations in israel … what do you do should iran get the bomb? do you continue to invest in israel, on the hope that iran doesn’t make good on its promise to wipe it off the map?... [w]ould your top executives agree to stay in or relocate to israel, knowing that they would be putting their families at risk of perishing in the same mushroom cloud that could snuff out the tiny country? (solomon, 2012). if this fear materialized, it would be a major problem for israel: in 2010, 49 percent of its industrial exports (excluding diamonds) were from the globally oriented high-tech sector (eiran & malin, 2013, p. 81). in turn, this sector is heavily dependent on external funding from research and development (r&d) centers set in israel by global giants like microsoft and google, purchases of israeli firms by foreign firms, and venture capital funding from abroad. indeed, israeli economist yair aharoni reported that in 2005 50 percent of the output in r&d and communications equipment was produced in israel by foreign direct investment-based enterprises. the concern goes well beyond high-tech. indeed, aharoni showed the fifteen out of israel’s top 100 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 58 published by scholink inc. industrial and service companies are fdi-based enterprises that include not only technology companies but also food, metal, and paper producers. correspondingly, employment in some sectors is heavily dependent on foreign direct investment. almost half of the employees of the electronic communication sector and about a third of the basic metal sector worked in 2005 for fdi-based enterprise (eiran & malin, 2013). and additional socioeconomic fear is that a nuclear iran would diminish israel’s ability to retain and attract the globally-oriented, highly qualified portions of its labor force, which are the main engines of israel’s economy. as ephraim sneh, former deputy defense minister, who lost his grandparents in the holocaust, asserted, if we have to live under the shadow of an iranian nuclear bomb, israeli stanford graduates won’t come to israel. from sneh’s perspective, a nuclear-armed iran could lead to the withering of israel even if the bomb would not be used. he believes, even the possibility that iran would use a nuclear weapon would halt jewish immigration into israel, deter foreign investment, and lead israeli technological elite to leave the country. “this is how the sunset of the zionist dream begins. even without a nuclear event, khamenei will succeed in bringing about the decay of the state of israel.” 3.2 from survival to political renaissance many experts agree that iran’s nuclear program appears more like a means than an end for iranian leadership in its quest for two major purposes: regime survival and regional hegemony (dokos, 2014, p. 1). the foremost priority of the leaders in tehran is ensuring the survival of the iranian regime (thomson, 2014, p. 3). the desire to survival is non-ideological in nature; any political system, whether a democracy or theocracy, is motivated by the instinct to survive and prosper (nader, 2013, p. 3). as waltz argues, “[i]n anarchy, security is the highest end.” when security is guaranteed, states safely can seek other goals (waltz, 2010, p. 126). because once a state is conquered, it is unlikely to be in a position to pursue other aims. soviet leader josef stalin put the point well during a war scare in 1927: “we can and must build socialism in the [soviet union]. but in order to do so we first of all have to exist” (mearsheimer, 2001, p. 31). iran’s post-revolutionary leaders are steeped in a political culture that is obsessed with the country’s historical victimization at the hands of foreign power. the inequitable agreements that winnowed the country, such as the treaties of golestan and turkmanchai, which ceded most of the caucasus to russia, are frequently invoked as a cautionary tale for contemporary diplomacy (maloney, 2017, pp. 4&9). the “great satan” is merely the latest in a line of rapacious world powers that have exploited iran and eroded its sovereignty in pursuit of their own interests. tehran prioritize regime survival above all else, and self-preservation has become intertwined with a deeply ingrained conviction that the world, led by washington, bent on the revolutionary state’s eradication (maloney, 2017, pp. 9-10). saddam hussein’s invasion of iran reinforced the revolutionary leadership’s paranoia, appearing to fulfill their expectations of a us-backed military effort to force a pliant, pro-western leader back into power. ultimately, the conviction expressed by khamenei that the invasion was not a war between two www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 59 published by scholink inc. countries, two armies; it was a war between an unwritten, global coalition against one nation. but it was the 2001 us invasion of afghanistan and the 2003 overthrow of saddam that may have truly increased the perceived value of a nuclear deterrence for the islamic republic. in those conflicts, the united states not only used its superior military forces to defeat its adversaries on the battlefield, but it also effectively achieved regime change in both countries. american forces surrounded iran on all sides. in addition, the george w. bush administration appeared to adopt a policy of regime change in iran; bush’s 2002 branding of iran as a member of the “axis of evil” made iranian officials more apprehensive than before (nader, 2013, p. 6). the islamic republic believes that us hostility towards iran is institutionalized, systemized, and the result of irreconcilable ideologies (nader, 2013, p. 3). in the light of what mentioned, self-reliance was the only option for the islamic republic, a principle that became enshrined within the strategic worldview of its leadership. thus, iran adopted a nuclear policy to deter a military attack by the united states and/or israel (tabatabai, 2020; huang, 2016, p. 24). as indicated above, although survival is the primary goal that iran wants to achieve, it is not the only one. when its survival is assured, iran can safely seek its next goal: regional hegemony. it is agreed that under almost any conceivable leadership, iran would seek to play ant outsized role in the middle east. the contemporary vision of iran’s natural predominance has been reinforced throughout the modern era by a deliberate invocation of the country’s legacy as the heir to the ancient persian empire and a great civilization, and thus this vision of iran’s imperial entitlement today continues to loom large for its population as well as for its leadership (maloney, 2017, p. 2). archaeological evidence of early civilizations in iranian lands go several thousand years, but the country’s written history dates back to over 2,500 years ago when the persian king cyrus the great founded the first world empire, stretching from central asia to cyprus, egypt, and libya (katouzian, 2020, p. 26). although iran was conquered by arab muslim armies in the seventh century, the gradual conversion to islam by the majority of the population of contemporary iran was not accompanied by a wholesale adoption of arabic language, culture, or customs. since the late nineteenth century, iran’s modern state-building efforts have deliberately invoked its cultural heritage and imperial lineage as a means of bolstering unity and fostering a sense of national identity. the ideational roots are epitomized by iran’s national epic, the shahnameh by abdolqasem ferdowsi, written more than a thousand years ago. the shahnameh glorifies iran’s great kings and warrior, and more generally connects iranians as well as the inhabitants of former territories of the great persian empire to “an imagined shared cultural past.” (maloney, 2017, p. 3). these traditions and myths have become incorporated in contemporary political life as key frames of reference. reza khan, founder of the pahlavi monarchy, appealed assiduously to the country’s glorious imperial history, going so far as to change its name from persia to iran in order to emphasize the broad geographical sweep of the great persian empires. for, reza, the exploitation of history was designed to consolidate his authority; his son mohammad reza saw himself and his country as the rightful www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 60 published by scholink inc. successor to cyrus the great and iran’s storied empires. he briefly altered the official calendar to one that was based on the origins of persian kingship, and in 1971, he staged a grandiose celebration for the ostensible twenty-five-hundred-year anniversary of the founding of the achaemenian empire at persepolis, where, before throngs of foreign dignitaries, the shah addressed the tomb of cyrus the great and linked himself to this legacy as shahanshah (king of kings) (maloney, 2017, p. 4). despite americans, for whom history is kind of old, antiquated, boring stuff (chomsky 2007, 56), the inculcation of the exploits of the ancient persian empire have shaped the worldview of iranians throughout the modern era—even those who reject it. iran’s imperial past occupies a central place in daily life, expressed through the enduring allegiance to the solar calendar and the festivals around nowruz, the zoroastrian new year, as well through the abiding reverence for the poetic traditions of persian culture. these are not simply remnants of the country’s cultural pluralism, but evidence of the iranian claim to a history, and a future, as one of the greatest civilizations and the leading regional power (maloney, 2017, p. 4). since the revolution, iran’s regional policies have been characterized by a considerable degree of continuity (maloney, 2017, p. 10). that said, some argues that iran’s foreign policy has not changed since the time immemorial. from achaemenian empire to safavid dynasty and from the pahlavi dynasty to islamic republic, iran has constantly sought to exert influence in the middle east (sharifi, 2016, pp. 233-234). iran believes it has the historical, cultural, even moral weight to powerfully shape the region where classical persian empires have at one time held sway (fuller, 1991, p. 241). therefore, iran views its regional hegemony in the middle east as a political renaissance (re-birth) rather than as a rise. it is well documented that iran’s regime is a revisionist state that seeks to expand its sphere of influence in the region. (nader, 2013, p. vii). a nuclear-armed iran would seek to weaken the us posture in the middle east, further diminish the influence of israel’s closest and most powerful ally (eiran & malin, 2013, p. 81). however, it is very hard to predict whether iran achieves that goal. historical evidence suggest that the united states will not reduce its presence in the middle east readily in the face of a rising threat from nuclear iran. given the goals that iran and the us pursue in the middle east, these two powers are destined to be in an intense competitive relationship. each has cards to play at this competition. iran knows the region well, has an excellent geographic position, and may be able to find support in shia arab population in neighboring countries. the united states has a giant economy and the world’s most advanced military. historically, most state in the region consider the us their close allies. the united state will provide its allies in the middle east with some protections that will be discussed further below (posen, 2009, pp. 243-244). it is likely that china come to iran’s help indirectly. obama’s “pivot/rebalancing to asia” strategy has enhanced the american military presence and its activities in china’s neighborhood to contain china (zhao, 2019, pp. 382-83), this strategy suggested the transfer of resources and strategic attention from the middle east to asia (saunders, 2013). if the united states reduces its presence in the middle east www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 61 published by scholink inc. due to that strategy, iran would be its number one beneficiary. since the revolution, iranian leaders have rejected the legitimacy of the us security role in the region and have sought to dissuade or reject the us forces from the gulf (maloney, 2017, p. 8). as much as the us reduces its presence in the middle east, iran’s influence would be expanded to that extent. because iran is mindful that only great powers like the united states can block its way to the regional hegemony; the reginal powers won’t be able to contain iran on their own. it is certain that iran with nuclear capability could be emboldened, and it will give momentum to its revisionist efforts. mark dubowitz, executive director of the foundation for defense and democracies, has argued that “at a minimum, a nuclear-armed iran will be emboldened to accelerate its aggressive activities in the region and act against its neighbors with little fear of retribution.” many analysts believe that iran armed nuclear weapons would become an increasingly assertive regional power, seeking to expand its influence in both the gulf region and the levant. in such a circumstance, iran might confront israel with a more aggressive and capable regional alliance (eiran&malin, 2013, p. 80). at the same time, it should be noted that a nuclear-armed iran will not be able to attack any regional country directly and no country would cave into iranian’s demand by having the us support. however, iran’s nuclear success would overshadow its territorial disputes with iraq over the shat al-arab waterway and with the uae over abu musa and tunb islands. however, iran is in possession of the persian gulf islands in dispute with the uae, it’s less likely that the later initiates a military conflict over the islands with a nuclear iran (nader, 2013, pp. 16-17). 3.3 assessing the likelihood of regional nuclear proliferation there is an old maxim that “proliferation begets proliferation.” if a country acquires nuclear weapons its regional rivals will follow suit (economist, 2021). the prospect that a nuclear-armed iran could trigger a regional “proliferation cascade” is one of the most commonly cited dangers associated with iran’s nuclear ambitions. “former us president barack obama once said that face with a nuclear-armed iran, “it is almost certain that others in the region would feel compelled to get their own nuclear weapons. uk officials also asserted that iran’s nuclear ambitions would likely lead to “a new cold war” in the middle east (hobbs & moran, 2012, pp. 129-130). the three countries most mentioned as candidates for following iran into the nuclear club are egypt, saudi arabia and turkey. in a march 2012 new york times op-ed, for example, haaretz senior correspondent ari shavit argued, “[a]n iranian atom bomb will force saudi arabia, turkey, and egypt to acquire their own atom bombs.” thus, a multipolar nuclear arena will be established in the most volatile region on earth. (kahl, dalton, & irvine, 2013, p. 7). nevertheless, the conventional wisdom that iranian nuclearization will inevitably spark region-wide proliferation deserves closer scrutiny. historically, “reactive proliferation” has been exceedingly rare. and in the current context, going nuclear carries significant risk for every ambitious state. it is time to discuss every candidate state in detail. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 62 published by scholink inc. 3.3.1 egypt egypt and iran are natural regional rivals due to similarities in geographical size, imperial pasts, and differences in religion (predominantly sunni arab versus shia persian population). this rivalry has been borne out through a long history of strained relations and opposition including egypt’s support of iraq in the iran-iraq war, iran’s sponsorship of hamas and hezbollah, the signing of the egypt-israel peace treaty in 1979 and egypt’s strategic relationship with the united states (hobbs & moran, 2012, p. 133). moreover, as a result of egypt’s historical role as a leader in the pan-arab movement and its status as the most populous country in the arab world, it has always been expected to develop a nuclear weapons program (taha, 2021, p. 13). against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that egypt has long viewed iran’s nuclear program with suspicion hinting to us officials that egypt “might be forced to begin its own nuclear weapons program” if iran gets the bomb. there is no doubt that cairo would be concerned for reasons of both prestige and security if iran succeed in acquiring nuclear weapons. egypt at one time had an active nuclear energy research program, and there was concern that it could become a nuclear weapons program. it has the technological and scientific expertise and has recently announced a new civilian nuclear energy program. in 2015, egypt signed an agreement with rosatom, the russian state atomic energy corporation, to build a nuclear power plant at al dabaa on the country’s northern coast, west of alexandria. the agreement is a culmination of around six decades of discussions and plans in egypt to harness nuclear energy declared for peaceful purposes. egypt has two research reactors which are currently operational (taha, 2021, p. 2). some analysts argue that absent active us diplomacy, and strategic guarantees, egypt probably would follow suit in developing nuclear weapons. egypt faces a number of barriers, however. first, it is highly dependent on the united states for conventional weaponry. the united states surely would suspend this relationship if egypt decided to pursue nuclear weapons. this would be quite unsettling to egypt’s internal politics. second, egypt is a poor country; foreign economic assistance would also dry up. egypt is one of the top recipient of us foreign assistance, coming third after israel and jordan in 2020 by receiving usd 1.43 billion in foreign assistance (oswald, 2021). third, given that israel is already a nuclear-armed state, and iran is on the threshold of become a nuclear weapons state, egypt would go through a period of both conventional and nuclear vulnerability as it attempted to produce nuclear weapons (sagan, 2009, p. 251). it is worth noting, egypt for years has pursued a strategy of nuclear diplomacy, under which it has used the non-proliferation treaty and other international for a to apply pressure to israel’s nuclear weapons program for the past four decades. it would seem very unlikely that the threat presented by a nuclear-armed iran cause egypt to abandon this approach. egypt has never faced iran in a major military conflict, nor is egypt involved in any territorial disputes with iran (hobbs & moran, 2012, p. 133). in addition, although egypt views iran as a regional rival, it does not see iran’s nuclear ambitions as an existential threat (kahl, dalton, & irvine, 2013, p. 7). consequently, the security threat posed by a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 63 published by scholink inc. nuclear-armed iran is arguably weaker than the challenges egypt has faced from other quarters. as a result, the egyptian government is highly unlikely to divert scarce financial resources, put its peace agreement with israel at risk and invite the ire (crippling sanctions) of the international community by pursuing nuclear weapons (kahl, dalton, & irvine, 2013, p. 7). in authors view, egypt is not in a position to accept all these risks and costs, but it seems more plausible that the united states and european union could find a package of assurances and incentives that would be acceptable to egypt. during the cold war, the united states offered the protection of its nuclear deterrent forces to many allies who did not possess nuclear weapons. (posen, 2009, pp. 245-246). it is likely that the united states would simply extend its nuclear umbrella over its key middle eastern allies. this also occurred when china acquired nuclear weapons during the cold war. the us nuclear umbrella covers south korea and japan. this is why south korea deemed it unnecessary to pursue its own nuclear weapons when north korea built its own nuclear capabilities. indeed, the united states would even benefit from extending its umbrella over arab allies as a solidified security reliance on american protection puts the united states in a very favorable light with the oil exporters in the gulf. moreover, former us secretary of state hillary clinton explicitly stated that the united states would consider a “defense umbrella” over the middle east in just such a scenario. thus, there would be no reason for egypt to fear shia iran’s nuclearization (thomson, 2014, pp. 7-8). 3.3.2 saudi arabia if iran gets the bomb, saudi arabia will face similar, though stronger temptations, than egypt. saudi arabia isarguably the other “great power” of the persian gulf region, and thus a natural competitor with iran, particularly after the collapse of saddam (posen, 2009, p. 251). saudi leaders have long viewed iran as a regional rival, and tehran has become increasingly central to riyadh’s strategic considerations since the 1979 iranian revolution. today, the kingdom views the islamic republic as its principal geopolitical foe (kahl, dalton, & irvine, 2013, p. 15). iran’s shia revolutionary, also, viewed the saudi monarchy as a cornerstone of the regional pax-americana. the saudi family’s control of mecca and medina and its espousal of the ultra-conservative sunni wahhabi doctrine was a particular affront to the islamic republic, which viewed itself as the natural leader of the islamic world. ayatollah ruhollah khomeini, was especially hostile toward the house of saud. he accused the house of saud of “distorting the islamic spirit.” he also stated, “mecca is now in the hands of a group of infidels who are grossly unaware of what they should do” (nader, 2013, p. 12). more broadly, saudi leaders believe that iranian nuclear weapons would facilitate the islamic republic’s aspiration for regional leadership. for four decades, saudi arabia and iran have competed for regional influence, with the house of saud serving as the self-appointed capital of sunni islam and a conservative defender of the status quo and the revolutionary iranian regime serving as the advocate for shia interests and the champion of regional “resistance” against israel and the west. the saudi-iranian cold war has been fought in myriad ways and on numerous fronts, from the iran-iraq war to current proxy conflicts in syria, yemen, lebanon, iraq and even afghanistan (kahl, dalton, & irvine, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 64 published by scholink inc. 2013, p. 16). saudi arabia has long aspired to achieve nuclear capacity of its own, in order to counter iran’s atomic ambitions. saudi arabia has not hidden its ambition, openly stating to the us as early as 2009 that it would also seek capacity if “iran cross the threshold.” in 2018 muhammad bin salman, saudi arabia’s crown prince, told cbs, an american broadcaster, that the kingdom “does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt, if iran develop a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.” (economist, 2021). king abdullah had expressed the same view in 2012 (shay, 2018). but rather than being taken at face value, such intimidations should be seen as part of a broader saudi tactic of prodding washington to take a tougher line toward iran. such warnings are akin to the much-hyped statements from riyadh in 2006 that it would be forced to intervene militarily in iraq if washington did not do more to quell the sectarian bloodshed there and counter iran’s malign influence (wehrey, 2012, p. 4). many argue that the prospects of saudi reactive proliferation are lower than the conventional wisdom suggests (kahl, dalton, & irvine, 2013, p. 8). saudi arabia’s economic policy outlook exemplified etel solingen’s seminal theory on the relationship between economic liberalism and nuclear restraint. solingen argues that political coalition favoring economic liberalization are more likely to be receptive to “compromise nuclear postures that do not endanger their [economic] interests.” in this regard, saudi arabia’s emphasis on facilitating the growth of foreign investment is significant. riyadh has cultivated extensive trade relations with most international powers and in 2012, saudi arabia was identified as one of the leading global economies in terms of “business-friendly regulation.” the monarchy has placed emphasis on foreign investment as a means of reducing over-reliance on oil and gas, increasing employment opportunities for the local population, and reinvigorating the saudi private sector. in this context, the acquisition of nuclear weapons would have far-reaching consequences, stalling progress and bringing progressive economic isolation, thus drastically changing the nature of the kingdom’s international trade relations (hobbs & moran, 2012, pp. 137-138). moreover, the saudis are unlikely to engage in a race to produce the bomb because doing so could make the kingdom’s strategic predicament worse, not better. it would complicate the kingdom’s national security, risk a strategic rupture with the united states, do great damage to saudi arabia’s international reputation and potentially make riyadh the target of international sanctions (kahl, dalton, & irvine, 2013, p. 8). saudi arabia’s economy depends almost entirely on its petroleum sector, which in 2021 accounted for nearly 87 percent of budget revenue, 42 percent of gross domestic product and 90 percent of export earnings. consequently, the kingdom could be highly vulnerable to energy sanctions (economic indicator, 2021). compared to iran, saudi arabia is much less economically self-sufficient and cause it not to attempt to shoulder its way into the nuclear club. in addition, saudi arabia does not have a developed nuclear science and technology effort. and it does not have the other industrial capabilities needed to support a nuclear weapons program and associated delivery systems. saudi arabia would thus take quite a long time to develop its own nuclear forces, and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 65 published by scholink inc. like egypt, would be vulnerable in the interval (posen, 2009, p. 251). given the risks and costs of such a move for saudi arabia, it is safe to say that riyadh is much more likely to seek a nuclear security umbrella from either pakistan or the united states (kahl, dalton, & irvine, 2013, pp. 8-9). it is needless to say why the us is “defense umbrella” candidate, but pakistan might require some explanation. saudi arabia provided generous financial support ($1 billion) to pakistan that enabled the nuclear program to continue, particularly when the country was under sanctions. saudi cooperation with nuclear power pakistan has been a source of speculation about the kingdom’s nuclear ambition. it has long been rumored that in return for that support, saudi arabia has a claim on some of those weapons in time of need (shay, 2018). pakistan, however, would face enormous pressure not to transfer complete weapons to another party. furthermore, even if islamabad proved willing to extend its nuclear umbrella, a potential us nuclear guarantee would likely “out compete” a pakistanis alternative (kahl, dalton, & irvine, 2013, p. 6). finally, saudi arabia does have good reason to believe that outsiders are committed to is security. the united states and other great powers have extensive economic and military interests in maintaining saudi security. the united states has demonstrated its commitment in many ways, including war. the saudis are accustomed to security cooperation with the united states. therefore, saudi arabia is not going to follow in iran’s foot steps and us guarantee likely would prove the most attractive option for riyadh (posen, 2009, pp. 251-252). 3.3.3 turkey turkey also will be concerned, for security and prestige reasons, about a nuclear weapons capability in neighboring iran (posen, 2009, p. 252). turkey has already decided to build three nuclear power plants to apparently reduce its dependence on importing energy. the project is part of president erdogan’s “2023 vision” marking 100 years since the foundation of modern turkey. in 2007, the turkish government began its first push in the twenty-first century to construct a nuclear power plant, in passing “the law on construction and operation of nuclear power plants and energy sale.”president erdogan and his russian counterpart vladimir putin launched the construction of the akkuyu plant at a ceremony in ankara in early april 2018. the akkuyu project is based on an inter-governmental agreement signed between russia and turkey in may 2010. the second nuclear plant is due to be built by a french-japanese consortium in the black sea city of sinop. the negotiations for the sinop power plant’s contract concluded in may 2013 when a japanese-french consortium at an estimated cost of more than usd22 billion. turkey’s president, said on june 18, 2018, that the country will build a third nuclear power plant. the third plant will be built near the town of igneada near the bulgarian border. in 2023, turkey will put into operation the first unit and turkey will thereby join those countries that use nuclear energy. in 2018, erdogan stated, “[o]n the anniversary of our republic, we will crown this work with success (shay, 2018). some argue, however, that turkey will not go nuclear for multiple reasons. despite the difference between turkey and iran after islamic revolution, the turn of the millennium brought a change of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 66 published by scholink inc. direction in bilateral relations between the countries. turkey and iran have developed strong energy and economic links. for example, iran is the second largest supplier of natural gas to turkey after azerbaijan. moreover, turkey has proved sympathetic to tehran’s nuclear cause. in 2009, erdogan accused the west of “double standard” treating iran unfairly over its nuclear program and in 2010, it voted against the imposition of additional sanctions on iran by the un security council (hobbs & moran, 2012, pp. 140-41). second, turkey is a nato member since 1952. under nato’s nuclear sharing arrangement, five european countries—belgium, germany, italy, the netherlands, and turkey—host us tactical nuclear weapons. at incirlik air base, ankara stores the most of any nato state, about 50 b61 nuclear gravity bombs (bugos, 2019). therefore, the us defense umbrella is already extended to turkey and turkey does not need to build its own bombs. third, turkey has eye on european union (eu) membership. membership of the eu is a political priority for ankara and the turkish government would be wary of jeopardizing its relations with european powers by going nuclear (hobbs & moran, 2012, p. 142). despite what mentioned, erdogan’s turkey has showed interest in nuclear weapons. in 2006, military chief of staff general himiozkok referred implicitly to the nuclear option. he stated, “[t]he presence of countries possessing or suspected of possessing weapons of mass destruction … the middle east is a serious and determining threat for our country today.” furthermore, he said, “[i]f the problem cannot be resolved despite the intense diplomatic efforts of the international community, i see a strong likelihood that we will face some important decision stages in the near future. otherwise, we will face the prospect of losing our strategic superiority in the region.” (yazicioglu, 2019, p. 3). president erdogan at his speech at the un general assembly on september 24, 2019, did not hide his nuclear ambition. he said that turkey may be interested in acquiring nuclear weapons. moreover, erdogan on the centennial of the turkish independence movement said, “[s]everal countries have missiles with nuclear warheads, not one or two. but [they tell us that] we can’t have them. this i cannot accept. there is no developed nation in the world that doesn’t have them.” (bugos, 2019). turkey feels the need for having nuclear capability for the following reasons. first, the relations between turkey and iran have not been that friendly. similar to saudi arabia, turkey’s relationship with iran has historically been characterized by rivalry, based largely on competing expansionist and religious ambitions (hobbs & moran, 2012, p. 140). the outbreak of the arab spring gave the historical rivalry between turkey and iran new impetus. as the unrest and pressures for change spread, turkish-iranian relations became increasingly strained. turkey and iran had clashed over a number of issues (larrabee & nader, 2013, p. 2). the most important factor contributing to the growing strains in relations was turkey’s support for the opposition to syrian president bashar al-assad. syria is iran’s only true ally in the middle east. since 1979, the secular, baathist syrian regime and revolutionary iran have strongly supported each other. assad’s downfall would be a serious strategic blow to iran and could result in the growth of turkey’s influence (larrabee & nader, 2013, p. vii). moreover, in 2015, turkey explicitly supported the saudi war in yemen, called on iran to withdraw from the country and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 67 published by scholink inc. joined riyadh’s so-called islamic military alliance against terrorism, which many saw as targeting iran. in this period, erdogan accused iran of attempting to dominate the middle east, which he said was anathema to turkey (dalay, 2021). publicly, turkey has downplayed the dangers of iran’s nuclear program, stressing that iran has the right to develop a peaceful program. however, the difference between the united states and turkey on the iranian issue are largely over tactics, not strategic goals. bothe countries want to prevent iran from becoming a nuclear power. they differ, however, on how best to achieve that goal. in principle, turkey opposed sanctions against iran, although it had grudgingly carried out un-imposed sanctions against the islamic republic. its opposition was heavily influenced by its bitter experience with sanctions during the 1990-1991 guld war. iraq was one of turkey’s most important trading partners, and turkey suffered substantial economic losses as a result of its support of sanctions against iraq. this time turkish officials learned from history and argued that quiet diplomacy is likely to have more effect in moderating iranian behavior in the long run than overt efforts to isolate or punish the regime (larrabee & nader, 2013, p. 27). second, some argues that, on the one hand, the willingness, and the ability of the united states to defend its partners in the region against a nuclear-armed iran are questionable (edelman, krepinevich, &montgomery, 2011, p. 67). on the other hand, others believe while erdogan called out for no nuclear weapons in the region before, certainly after the crisis of s-400 and deprivation of f-35 warplanes, geopolitical context has changed for turkey. (yazicioglu 2019, p. 4). turkey claims that it attempted to procure the us patriot missile system to meet its domestic defence needs but the us did not offer the missile defence system then turkey was forced to pursue the russian s-400 missile systems (tass news agency, 2019; fraser, 2019). one lesson that turkey might learn from the crisis is that the united states is not a trustworthy partner. moreover, turkish officials asserted, the s-400 was found to better meet turkey’s security concerns in light of defective patriot missiles (bensaid, 2020).turkey’s changing role in the alliance as well as in the region are raising many questions, including a potential proliferation dilemma. third, the european union’s executive body has said in october 2021 that turkey’s bid to join the bloc had “come to a standstill” amid serious democratic shortfalls. according to the eu, ankara was no longer serious about delivering on eu-backed reforms. “the eu’s serious concerns on the continued deterioration of democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights and independence of the judiciary have not been addressed. there was further backsliding in many areas.” (aljazeera, 2021). an article by the economist had described the accession process as “dead” and claimed that “many european voters regard the prospect of such a nation joining the club with horror.” (daily sabah, 2021). given the current situation, there is huge gap between turkey and the eu. it sounds that eu has lost its attraction for turkey, and it decreased the eu’s leverage on turkey to push it away from its nuclear ambitions. finally, turkish president erdogan has vowed to eliminate external dependency on foreign defense technology (bensaid, 2020). the best way of defense independence is joining the nuclear club. erdogan www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 68 published by scholink inc. has already expressed his desperation on developing the “caliphate atom bomb” to fulfil his neo-ottoman aspiration. the emergence of a china-pakistan-turkey nexus on nuclear proliferation and pakistan coordinating on capacity building of the three countries have already been flagged by watchdogs and media (ani news, 2021). given erdogan’s dream of reviving “ottoman time”, his vision of turkey as regional power in the middle east, and nuclear arms as a source of national prestige turkey has to join the regional nuclear race. otherwise, turkey will remain second class—a position that erdogan cannot and will not accept (shay, 2018; yazicioglu, 2019, p. 5). 4. conclusion it is highly likely that despite all crippling sanctions “iran will not stop until it has the bomb.”deterrence and regional hegemony are two major factors that make the nuclear weapons attractive for the islamic republic. once it security is guaranteed, a nuclear-armed iran will seek to change the geopolitical context in its favor. iran believes it has the historical, cultural, even moral weight to powerfully shape the region where classical persian empires have at one time held sway. however, it is difficult to precisely predict the level of success it will achieve. iran with nuclear capability will be emboldened to accelerate its aggressive activities in the region and act against its neighbors with little fear of retribution. furthermore, it is highly likely that a nuclear-armed iran would embolden iran’s network of proxies which could adopt a more confrontational approach towards israel. far from restoring stability to the middle east as waltz argued, a nuclear-armed iran would make the middle easta far more dangerous place. a middle east in which iran’s supreme leader asserts that “nuclear button is on his desk at all times,” and the israeli prime minister responds that the nuclear launch button on his desk is “much bigger” and “more powerful,” is far from stability. in addition, the politics of threat would have much stronger socioeconomic consequences for israel and can damage its thriving economy seriously. a nuclear-armed iran would tempt major middle easter powers to go nuclear for security and prestige. three would-be nuclear candidates are egypt, saudi arabia, and turkey. despite ambitious rhetoric of egyptian and saudis’ officials, they will not be able develop nuclear weapons. because both countries are highly dependent on the united state in terms of conventional weapons and military aids. choosing nuclear option not only damage their ties with the international community, but also inflicts heavy sanctions on egypt and saudi arabia which both countries cannot tolerate. finally, the us will offer it nuclear “defense umbrella” to middle eastern countries and saudi arabia and egypt would embrace it. the case of turkey, however, is different. after the crisis of s-400 and deprivation of f-35 warplanes, geopolitical context has changed for turkey. turkey views washington with suspicions and will not depend on the us defense umbrella. furthermore, turkey’s accession to the eu could limit its nuclear ambition to a large extent, but nowadays turkey has come to realize that its accession process to the eu is no longer promising; thus, it will feel free to follow in iran’s footsteps. erdogan has already expressed his willingness on developing the “caliphate atom bomb” to fulfil his neo-ottoman aspiration. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 69 published by scholink inc. given erdogan’s dream of reviving “ottoman time”, turkey has to join the regional nuclear race. otherwise, turkey will remain second class—a position that erdogan cannot and will not accept. reference abubakar, mika’ilu, saidutanko, and aisha mohammed abubakar. 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(2021). a nuclear iran is not inevitable: why the world cannot give up on diplomacy. foreign affairs. a nuclear iran is not inevitable | foreign affairs. bugos, s. (2019). turkey shows nuclear weapons interests. arms control association, october 2019. turkey shows nuclear weapons interest | arms control association chomsky, n. (2007). what we say goes: conversations on us power in a changing world. australia: allen & unwin. daily sabah. (2021). turkey’s eu accession: ‘strategic vision, not fiction’. turkey’s eu accession: 'strategic vision, not fiction’ | daily sabah dalay, g. (2021). turkish-iranian relations are set to become more turbulent. gmfus. turkish-iranian relations are set to become more turbulent | strengthening transatlantic cooperation (gmfus.org). dokos, t. (2014). iran’s nuclear propensity: the probability of nuclear use. eu non-proliferation consortium. iran’s nuclear propensity: the probability of nuclear use (ethz.ch) economist. 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(2019). trump admits us made mistake not selling patriots to turkey, says turkish foreign minister. april 4, 2019. trump admits us made mistake not selling patriots to turkey, says turkish foreign minister world – tass. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 72 published by scholink inc. thomson, e. (2014). bipolarity in the middle east: the regional implications of a nuclear iran. working paper, cda institute. microsoft word thomsonmay2014.doc (cdainstitute.ca). waltz, k. n. (2012). why iran should get the bomb: nuclear balancing would mean stability. foreign affairs, 91(4), 2-5. waltz, k. (2010). theory of international politics. illinois: waveland press. waltz, k. d. (2009). nuclear instability in south asia. in r. j. art, & r. jervis (eds.), international politics: ending concepts and contemporary issues (pp. 228-238). new york: pearson. wehrey, f. (2012). what’s behind saudi arabia’s nuclear anxiety? working paper, sciencespo. what’s behind saudi arabia’s nuclear anxiety? (sciencespo.fr). yazicioglu, e. (2019). a look upon turkey’s future nuclear weapons policy. institute de relations international et strategiques (iris). observatoire-turquie-turkey-nuclear-weapons-policy-sept-2019.pdf (iris-france.org) zakaria, f. (2008). the post-american world. new york: w.w. norton & company. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5842.2008.00993.x zhao, m. (2019). is a new cold war inevitable? chinese perspectives on us-china strategic competition.” the chinese journal of international politics, 12(3), 371-394. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poz010 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 97 original paper the problem of installing elevator in old residence and its solution yilong li 1 1 southwest minzu university, chengdu, china received: july 12, 2022 accepted: august 20, 2022 online published: august 23, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n3p97 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n3p97 abstract the installation of elevators in old residential areas is one of the important livelihood projects, and the voting rules for matters jointly decided by the owners have a significant impact on the process of the project. high-floor owners and low-floor owners often have difficulty reaching a consensus on elevator funding and compensation schemes. at present, in order to smoothly promote the installation of elevators, most regions have reduced the proportion of owners’ voting consent to “double two-thirds”, and the civil code has also modified the rules for the owners to jointly decide on matters. but new problems have arisen in protecting the interests of a small number of owners who oppose the installation of elevators. in the context of promoting the addition of new elevators to old residences, this article focuses on the protection of the rights and interests of the minority owners and tries to propose solutions which can coordinate the interests of the multiple parties. for example, if the resolution of adding new elevator has special impact on the proper exercise of the exclusive rights of the minority owners or infringes upon the legitimate rights of the minority owners, the special consent of such owners shall be obtained; legislations should respect and protect the remedies and compensation for losses of the legitimate rights and interests of the owners who object to the addition of new elevators, improve the revocation right of the owners and regulate the scheme of capital contribution and compensation, etc. keywords additional elevator, one vote veto, old community, partitioned ownership of buildings, owners’ voting rights 1. introduction “add lifts” appeared in the report on the work of the government of the state council for three consecutive years, and the government promoted it as an important measure to perfect regional www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 98 published by scholink inc. development policies and promote the equalization of basic public services. but the old residential area with elevator work progress is still slow. among the many reasons hindering the process of installing elevators, the most difficult problem is the interests coordination among the proprietors. during the early implementation of the real right law, pursuant to article 76 of the real right law, most cities set the property owners’ voting proportion at “double two-thirds”, i.e., the property owners with exclusive areas accounting for more than two-thirds of the total gross floor area of the buildings and more than two-thirds of the total number of property owners must be subject to the approval of the property owners. article 278 of the civil code currently in force has adjusted the voting proportion for the matters jointly determined by property owners closely related to the addition of elevators to the theoretical “double majority decision”, thus the revision of the rules on matters jointly determined by property owners has inevitably had an important impact on the voting matters concerning the addition of elevators. the revision in the civil code of the voting proportion for the matters jointly determined by the owners is conducive to the adoption of the resolution on adding lift; meanwhile, the owners who are in the minority dissenting have relatively lower voice in the resolution, giving rise to new problem of protection of the legitimate rights and interests of the owners who are in the minority dissenting. 2. source of conflict arising from adding the lift the unit price of a house on a lower floor in an old community is higher than that of a higher floor in the circumstance of no lift. taking the xuqing apartment of xudong xuqing in wuchang district, wuhan city, hubei province as an example (note 1), with the same construction area and decoration style, the house on the second floor costs rmb 27,000 per square meter while the house on the sixth floor costs rmb 24,000 per square meter. both of them are old buildings without elevators about 80 square meters. although the low floor has poor lighting and many mosquitoes, most of the residents in the old community are old people, so the price difference between the low floor and the high floor is about 240,000 yuan. the author thinks that the root of the contradiction lies in the problem of elevator cost between the users of high and low floors and the compensation or not, and the amount of compensation. residents of higher floors are often unwilling or only willing to pay a small amount of compensation to residents of lower floors, as can be seen from the many posts on this topic. when considering elevator construction schemes, users on higher floors often have various problems, such as unreasonable building planning (noise, impact on the natural lighting of residents on lower floors), unreasonable cost apportionment, and unreasonable compensation amount, etc., while seldom give the vital rights and interests of residents on lower floors a consideration. reflected in the installation of elevators, that is, after the owners pass the resolution to install elevators through the democratic procedure of the minority is subordinate to the majority; their rights should also be respected and protected by a legal protection mechanism. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 99 published by scholink inc. 3. solution of the problem in the legislative process, different individuals seek different legal rights protection according to their different interests, and various interest groups hold different legislative opinions with different value orientations. in the rule for owners’ joint decision, the collective’s choice and consensus reach the legislative result of reducing the difficulty of the rule for owners’ joint decision. but the protection of minority rights should still receive attention and attention in the whole process of building the rule of law. under the majority rule, the decisions made may be unfair to the minority. 3.1 the new rule of “double majority vote” is adopted and the interested owners are granted the “veto right” simultaneously if the resolution to install an elevator causes special impact on the proper exercise of exclusive rights by a minority of owners or infringes upon the legitimate rights of a minority of owners, it shall be specially agreed by such owners. analysis from the perspective of comparative law in japan, for example, japanese law provides that in any case where changes to common parts affect the use of exclusive parts, the consent of the owners of the exclusive parts shall be obtained after the change is passed by a majority of more than 3/4 respectively of the owners of the building and the voting owners. it is thus clear that some countries have legislative experience in adopting the voting rules for matters jointly determined by the owners of condominium ownership of buildings, that is, the vote of all the affected owners plus the vote of the owners who own the specific area. where a resolution to install an elevator may incur noise and affect the privacy problems to some owners, if the objecting owner can prove that his living environment and privacy rights are specially affected by the elevator, the owner shall enjoy a special right in the joint decision on elevator installation, which means the owner shall enjoy the “veto power”. jurist ronald dworkin proposed “resource egalitarianism”, which believes that the state should respect the differences between individual citizens as free and independent people, and respect their different choices for a good life, affirms the legitimacy of minority rights, and it is necessary to restrict and improve the system and rules of majority rule. its minority rights jurisprudence theory is also of practical significance and value in the discussion of installing an elevator. the resolution to install an elevator is passed by a majority vote, but the owner who votes yes has no objective needs to install an elevator, the voice of the objectors should be given due attention. where a property owner who votes to approve the addition of a lift has family members in good health condition without any elderly, children or other family members with travel inconvenience, and proposes to install the additional lift only for the purpose of increasing the value of the property, the said property owner shall understand that the opposing property owner is concerned about the invasion of his/her privacy by elevator installation or has concerns about the relative devaluation of the property and other reasonable appeals, and the opposing opinions of the minority shall be respected and protected. 3.2 guarantee the right of revocation of interested owners article 3 of the civil code stipulates that the personal rights, property rights and other legitimate rights and interests of civil subjects shall be protected by the law and shall not be infringed upon by any www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 100 published by scholink inc. organization or individual. article 280, paragraph 2: where the legitimate rights and interests of any owner are infringed upon by any decision made by the owners’ general meeting or committee, the affected owner may request the people’s court to revoke the decision. as a categorized right commonly seen in the field of debt law, the right of revocation rarely appears in the property law. considering the owners’ voting rule in the property law of china is a typical democratic decision -making mechanism, in order to prevent the minority interests from being adversely affected by the democratic decision-making mechanism, a new type of right of revocation—“the owners’ right of revocation” is created to remedy the owners whose rights are infringed due to the rule of majority rule. the owners can have the right to obtain relief by applying to the court for revoking the decision made by the owners’ general meeting or committee. the importance and necessity of the owners’ right of revocation mainly lie in the major issues of differentiation of building ownership in china, and the decision-making process of major issues is a typical democratic decision -making mechanism where the minority is subordinate to the majority. if a resident of a lower floor believes that the resolution made by the owners’ general meeting or the property committee on the installation of the elevator has infringed its certain specific rights and interests, such as right to privacy, pursuant to the rule of evidence, he/she shall prove to the court that his/her rights and interests have been infringed upon due to the installation of the elevator and request the people’s court to revoke the decision. article 12 of the interpretation of the supreme people’s court on several issues concerning the specific application of law in the trial of cases of disputes over partitioned ownership of building areas provides that: “where an owner requests the people’s court to revoke a decision made by the owners’ general meeting or the owners’ committee in accordance with paragraph 2, article 280 of the civil code on the ground that the owner has infringed upon his/her legitimate rights and interests or violated the legal procedures, he/she shall make the request within one year from the date when he/she knows or should have known the decision made by the owners’ general meeting or the owners’ committee.” with a view to the implementation of the provisions of paragraph 2, article 280 of the civil code on the owners’ right of revocation, this article is of great significance to the implementation of the owners’ right of revocation. however, at the same time, there are ambiguities in the aspects of the subject and object of the right of revocation. 3.3 regulating plan on cost of adding elevator and compensation of users on lower floors in most areas, the detailed economic compensation for elevator installation depends on the owners to be negotiated about by them, and there is no unified standard or detailed rule in local areas. mutual understanding and tolerance between owners who support elevator installation and owners who oppose elevator installation is the ideal state in elevator installation work, but at present, it is often difficult for users on lower floors and users on higher floors to reach an agreement on elevator installation and maintenance costs, installation compensation amounts, etc. many neighbors have turned against each other. when majority rule becomes the mainstream practice in voting rules, it is easier to adopt the resolution on adding an elevator. for opponents who have reasonable claims, such as the owners whose www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 101 published by scholink inc. ventilation, lighting and privacy are affected, or the owners who suffer from noise pollution, when the majority of owners vote or wish to adopt the resolution on adding an elevator, giving economic compensation to the specially affected owners is one of the remedies to protect the rights of the minority owners. at present, no city has established unified compensation rules or standards, which has its practical considerations and dilemmas. due to the differences in economic development levels, lots, floors, building quality and other factors, it is difficult to uniformly regulate the compensation price or procedure, and it is difficult to ensure effective implementation. in addition, due to the particularity of distinguishing building ownership, the exclusive part and common part of the building are the real estate mixed together. the division of physical objects will reduce the value of common parts and owners’ exclusive parts, and the ownership cannot be clarified from the perspective of building registration. in the course of formulating the scheme of compensation to the owners of elevator installation, the local market price shall be taken as the criterion first, and the property rights of minority objectors shall be apprised out a market price based on the market value. the owners who support elevator installation shall compensate the other owners whose legal rights are affected by elevator installation, and the compensation disputes shall be settled. according to the principle of fairness, a resident who benefits from elevator installation shall use the benefits from the appreciation of the property value due to elevator installation to compensate the users on a lower floor for property loss caused by elevator installation such as noise and lighting. meanwhile, for different floors, the method of differentiated sharing for elevator construction and maintenance costs shall be adopted to realize the substantive fairness. while the right of housing of residents on a higher floor is protected, the losses of users on a lower floor shall be compensated, so as to achieve a balance of interests. 4. conclusion with the aging of the population in china, a large number of multi-story houses in the existing old communities have no elevator. the elderly in the old communities have a lot of inconvenience when they get around. installing elevators in multi-story houses has become an urgent social problem to be solved. the rules for the resolution of elevator installation reflect the trend that it is easier to pass the resolution to install elevators, but this trend also means that the rights and demands of a small number of owners are being ignored. although this trend is conducive to promoting the process of installing elevators, it will also create many new problems in protecting the interests of the minority objectors. the rights claims of the minority should be paid attention to and taken seriously in the process of the construction of the rule of law. in the process of elevator installation, the owners make decisions in accordance with the majority rule democratic procedure. after the resolution to install elevators is adopted, the rights of the minority objector owners should also be respected and protected. in addition, although the operability of the owner’s right of cancellation needs to be further improved, it can still be www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 102 published by scholink inc. considered from the perspective of improving the owner’s right of cancellation. finally, the treatment of objector owners, especially those represented by the owners on lower floors, should be accompanied by standard compensation rules. although our country has not yet promulgated the relevant compensation provisions, there are related documents to guide and reference investment ratio, which is conducive to establishing a unified compensation standard, promoting the implementation of elevator installation, and reducing the difficulty of elevator installation. references fu, d. x. (2020). the voting rules on matters jointly determined by community owners under the civil code. people’s court report, 07(16). gao, j. z. (2015). in equality theory in the perspective of contemporary political philosophy (pp. 142-146). tianjin: tianjin renmin press. gao, z. q., & gong, z. y. (2022). discrimination of rules on co-determination of owners of elevator installation. journal of chongqing college of arts and sciences (social sciences edition), 41(02), 69-79. https://doi.org/10.19493/j.cnki.isn1673-8004.2022.02.007 luo, y. (2018). interpretation and mode of implementation of the policy on retrofitting lifts in existing old communities. china elevators, 29(6), 49-51 wang, s. j. (2000). in japanese civil code (pp. 295-326). trans. beijing: china legal publishing house. yao, h. (2009). property owners’ right of revocation in the property law and its application. law forum, 2009(6), 10-13. zheng, y. m. (2008). dworkin’s minority rights jurisprudence and china approach. social science journal, 2008(5), 77-80. note note 1. real-time data from the chain home app as of 5/21/2022 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 149 original paper research on the key paths of enterprise integration of domestic and foreign trade from the perspective of knowledge transfer zhimin ren1, honggang zheng2*, & qican yang3 1 hangzhou college of commerce, zhejiang gongshang university, hangzhou 311508, china 2 school of management and e-business, zheijiang gongshang university, hangzhou 310018, china 3 school of business administration, zhejiang gongshang university, hangzhou 310008, china * corresponding author fund project supported by the key research base of the ministry of education, zhejiang gongshang university modern commerce research center (project number: 2020smyj10zc) general project of zhejiang provincial department of education, mechanism and path of high-quality dual circulation of zhejiang outward-oriented industrial cluster (project number: y202147547). received: april 19, 2024 accepted: may 12, 2024 online published: may 28, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n2p149 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n2p149 abstract the issue of inefficient industry innovation caused by the segmentation of domestic and foreign trade markets has been prominent, leading to a long-standing "productivity paradox" between domestic and foreign trade. "constructing a new pattern of integration of domestic and foreign trade with the domestic cycle as the main body and the mutual promotion of domestic and international cycles" is a strategic deployment of the party central committee and the state council. this paper investigates the problems and intrinsic mechanisms faced in the process of enterprise integration of domestic and foreign trade from the perspective of knowledge transfer. it clarifies that the primary task of integrating domestic and foreign trade is to solve the problem of inefficient knowledge transfer between domestic and foreign trade. at the same time, the study shows that: on the one hand, by constructing a horizontal system of knowledge transfer between domestic and foreign trade, it is possible to effectively enable foreign trade enterprises to enjoy the dividends of unified large market reforms, better integrate resources and standards with the domestic trade market, and promote the transfer of knowledge achievements of foreign trade enterprises to the domestic market. on the other hand, through vertical industrial ecological knowledge embedding, it can promote domestic enterprises to leverage the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 150 advantages of domestic consumption scale, integrate technology, channels, and platform resources, achieve knowledge embedding of enterprises in the vertical ecological chain of industries, and ultimately achieve the goal of integrated development of domestic and foreign trade. keywords integration of domestic and foreign trade, knowledge transfer, knowledge embedding 1. introduction the 19th national congress of the communist party of china pointed out the need to "construct a new pattern of integration of domestic and foreign trade with the domestic cycle as the main body and the mutual promotion of domestic and international cycles." in response to this, the central committee of the communist party of china and the state council issued the "guiding opinions on accelerating the construction of a unified national market." building a unified national market is a strategic deployment for the new era, stage, and journey, serving as a crucial pivot in facing international political and economic challenges and forging a "more resilient economic development pattern." according to classical trade theories such as the "adam smith theorem" and emerging classical trade theories, domestic demand forms the basis for foreign trade, and the development of exports is a process of gradually cultivating dynamic comparative advantages relying on domestic demand. additionally, new trade theories explicitly state that a country may gain sustained international competitiveness by exporting products with large domestic demand. however, the actual experiences of guangdong, fujian, jiangsu, and zhejiang, developed regions in domestic and foreign trade since china's reform and opening up, demonstrate a stark contrast with the aforementioned theories, characterized by the phenomenon of "emphasizing foreign trade while neglecting domestic trade" and "external strength but internal weakness". in recent years, influenced by external factors such as international politics and economics, international trade frictions have continued to increase, leading to severe contraction in foreign trade demand. due to the long-term reliance of domestic enterprises on foreign trade exports, the lack of capacity for enterprise integration of domestic and foreign trade has become apparent. after encountering obstacles in unilateral foreign trade markets, products cannot be swiftly redirected to meet domestic market demand. whether seeking breakthroughs in foreign trade for foreign trade enterprises or seeking opportunities in domestic markets for domestic trade enterprises, both face significant pressures. the main reason for this lies in the existence of a "knowledge gap" between market entities serving domestic demand and those generating a large number of exports. in other words, "export-oriented enterprises driven by foreign trade orders do not sell domestically, while domestic trade enterprises targeting the domestic market do not export." therefore, the current "integration of domestic and foreign trade" lacks direct market entities at the micro level, making it crucial to address this "mismatch" of market entities to advance the construction of integrated domestic and foreign trade. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 151 in the face of continuous changes in the global political, economic, and industrial landscape, advancing the construction of "integrated domestic and foreign trade" is the result of the combined effects of multiple factors, representing a strategic choice with certainty. however, how enterprises, as micro-market entities, can accomplish the transformation towards "integrated domestic and foreign trade" in different domestic and foreign trade environments is an open-ended question. domestic and foreign scholars have made numerous valuable attempts to address this open-ended question. firstly, they have explored the theoretical framework of integrated domestic and foreign trade. domestic scholars have mainly focused on the construction of theoretical frameworks at the macro level for integrated domestic and foreign trade. wang and zhu (2023) argue that the construction of a unified domestic market is the result of effective collaboration between the market and a proactive government. the government provides institutional guarantees for the horizontal circulation of the market, while the market, through adaptive mechanisms, assists the government in coordinating resource allocation. liu and liu (2023) have constructed a basic framework for integrated domestic and foreign trade from the perspectives of industrial resource allocation, macro policy regulation, and market standard construction. they have analyzed the mechanism of the national unified market and its role in the new development pattern based on market size, structure, and function. tan et al. (2023) point out that promoting the development of integrated domestic and foreign trade through the construction of a national unified market is an intrinsic requirement for realizing the new development pattern of dual circulation. it is necessary to adhere to the development concept with domestic circulation as the main focus and further improve the framework of the unified national market through regulating market entities, formulating competition mechanisms, and promoting regional integration. related studies have shown that promoting the development of integrated domestic and foreign trade is an inevitable requirement for china's economic development and is of great significance for eliminating industry information barriers, breaking market segmentation, regulating market entities, and promoting fair competition. secondly, scholars have focused on the micro-level aspects of integrated domestic and foreign trade entities. some researchers have suggested that it is essential to clarify the market entity status of enterprises in the process of integrated domestic and foreign trade, fully leverage their role in guiding the circulation of domestic and foreign trade, and their ability to access external innovative resources. others have pointed out that the process of integrated domestic and foreign trade primarily involves the integration of supply chains, which horizontally promotes the circulation of domestic and foreign products and factors, and vertically promotes the upgrading of industrial structure. in the process of integrated domestic and foreign trade, the construction of a unified national market should be effectively grounded in enterprises, the key economic entities. from the perspective of enterprises, it is essential to horizontally implement the circulation of products and factor endowments between domestic and foreign markets and vertically complete the optimization and upgrading of industrial structure, comprehensively enhancing the global market competitiveness of domestic enterprises. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 152 indeed, in the process of integrated domestic and foreign trade, the two theoretical explanations mentioned above have become increasingly crucial. this is not only because they clarify the impact of integrated domestic and foreign trade on the construction of a unified national market but also because they provide a foundation for further exploring the interactive relationship between the construction of a unified national market from the perspective of integrated domestic and foreign trade. however, the question of whether the ability evolution model based on the "individual adaptation to the environment" in evolutionary theory originates from the proactive choices of enterprises or passive adaptation has long been a blind spot in existing research fields. existing research has two main limitations. firstly, it tends to focus on exploring the "passive choice" factors of enterprises in the process of integrated domestic and foreign trade while neglecting the "subjective choices" of enterprises influenced by multiple factors. it must be acknowledged that the choice of integrated domestic and foreign trade is a complex decision influenced not only by objective factors such as the political environment and market competition but also by the active choices made by enterprise entities based on their knowledge accumulation during the process of domestic and foreign trade. the factor that has the greatest influence on such subjective choices during the process of integrated domestic and foreign trade is the "knowledge spillover effect." secondly, existing research has not provided the pathway for the process of integrated domestic and foreign trade by enterprises. although different factors show that enterprises choosing to participate in the construction of a unified national market through integrated domestic and foreign trade have a "net benefit," exploration of the path of "domestic trade + foreign trade" (or "foreign trade + domestic trade") to achieve 1+1＞2 has not been undertaken. the existing theoretical research on "integrated domestic and foreign trade" lacks a micro perspective from the market entity "enterprise," and there is little literature discussing how enterprises can achieve technological catch-up and independent innovation in the process of integrated domestic and foreign trade selection. undoubtedly, knowledge and its application ability are the source of modern enterprise innovation. if we can reveal the "formation process" of "knowledge" in the integrated domestic and foreign trade of enterprises and its "application relationship" during this process, it will not only contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the complexity of integrated domestic and foreign trade mechanisms but also provide clearer reference paths for enterprises to effectively implement integrated domestic and foreign trade. this paper researches the current problems and mechanisms faced by enterprises from the perspective of knowledge transfer in integrated domestic and foreign trade, proposes a theoretical framework for the vertical integration knowledge embedding of industries and the horizontal integration knowledge transfer of markets, and puts forward targeted policy suggestions for promoting the construction of a unified national market in the next step. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 153 2. the main issue of integrating domestic and foreign trade 2.1 domestic market segmentation leads to difficulties in knowledge transfer the uneven development of regional economies in china exacerbates the challenge of knowledge transfer for enterprises transitioning from foreign trade to domestic trade due to domestic market segmentation. as revealed by the research of lu and chen (2009), market segmentation strategies are preferred by over 96% of chinese provinces and regions because they can promote local economic growth within a certain period. however, in the long run, this market segmentation strategy will inhibit the healthy development of the overall market economy, technological innovation, and the upgrading of industries. even though some regions have achieved industrial clustering, market segmentation continues to negatively impact their economic growth. hu et al. attribute this phenomenon to the loss of enterprise innovation momentum caused by market segmentation, also known as innovation inertia. on the one hand, the concentration of high-end industries in certain areas gives them advantages in accessing funds, talents, and technological resources, resulting in insufficient competition in regional markets and the decline of innovation momentum in high-end industrial clusters. on the other hand, low-end industrial clusters lack new knowledge input due to limitations in resources such as talents and technology, leading to a lack of innovation in regional industries and a deepening reliance on low-end supply. meanwhile, with the continuous development of the digital economy such as e-commerce, the problem of domestic market segmentation not only remains unresolved but also shows signs of further expansion. research from the institute of economics of the chinese academy of social sciences on provincial technology diffusion barriers has found that the speed and scale of technology diffusion are constrained by various factors including inter-provincial geographic distance, market integration level, and industry relevance. especially after 2008, the rapid popularization of digital technology in the circulation field has significantly strengthened the barriers to technology diffusion between different regions due to market segmentation. in the current new technological environment, the existence of technological barriers will further exacerbate market segmentation, hinder the upgrade of low-end industrial regions to high-end industries, and thus hinder the development of integrated domestic and foreign trade. this will not only limit the transfer of technology and knowledge but also affect the enhancement of enterprises' cross-regional competitiveness and innovation capabilities, thereby affecting the upgrading of domestic industrial structure and the growth of economic scale. the integration of domestic and foreign trade markets is a prerequisite for enterprises to achieve economies of scale based on the domestic market. however, market segmentation between different regions forces market scale to passively shrink, further weakening the scale effect required for building a unified large market. consequently, some high-end industries with advantages in foreign trade lose their competitive edge in the process of transitioning to the domestic market, as foreign trade enterprises cannot effectively transfer relevant knowledge to meet domestic demand. enterprises gradually lose the "subjective motivation" to transfer foreign trade knowledge to the domestic market. in other words, the knowledge capabilities accumulated by enterprises in the international market, under the backdrop of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 154 domestic market segmentation, cannot be transferred and embedded in the domestic market based on the advantages of innovation, talents, and funds. this directly limits their ability to enjoy the development dividends brought by the super-large domestic market. since the reform and opening up, china's export volume has grown rapidly at an average annual rate of 18%, while the average annual growth rate of inter-provincial trade volume is only 4.8%. the trade costs between different provinces are even higher than those between countries, forcing chinese enterprises to prefer entering foreign markets and expanding their scale based on the international market. 2.2 the reverse lifecycle of domestic and foreign trade products makes knowledge absorption difficult raymond vernon's product lifecycle theory effectively explains the inherent mechanism of international trade and is considered a classic path for entering global market integration by both academia and the business community. vernon divides the product lifecycle into three stages: the new product stage, the mature product stage, and the standardized product stage. in the new product stage, with a large domestic market capacity, manufacturers' safest and most favorable choice is to design, produce, and sell domestically. after meeting domestic market demand, products are then exported to satisfy international markets. in the mature product stage, as production technology and experience gradually mature and economies of scale form, domestic market saturation occurs, and competition intensifies among industries. in this stage, it becomes more effective for enterprises to prioritize exporting products or engaging in foreign direct investment to access innovation resources or market capital. in the standardized product stage, costs become a core influencing factor for promoting technological innovation and product iteration. therefore, prioritizing foreign direct investment helps enterprises establish cost advantages and enhance their competitiveness in international markets. in other words, according to the product lifecycle theory, the path for enterprises in developing countries to enter global market integration should involve nurturing and incubating products domestically until they fully meet local market demand before transitioning to export markets. however, the development trajectory of domestic and foreign trade enterprises in china compresses the process of nurturing and incubating products in the domestic market, instead relying on processing imported materials, technology introduction, and order procurement, gradually becoming participants reliant on a single foreign trade market. this places china's industries and trade integration level in the downstream position of the global industry, ultimately leading to entrapment in the vortex of the downstream of the global value chain. existing research has indicated that long-term positioning the downstream of the global value chain will increase the technology research and development costs for domestic enterprises and restrict the transformation of low-end industries to high-end ones. currently, with the acceleration of industrial innovation, the contradiction between international diverse demand and domestic industrial supply systems becomes more prominent. on one hand, amid the complex backdrop of global integration competition, adjustments in trade rules, industrial chain transfers, and the emergence of new trade entities continuously squeeze traditional foreign trade enterprises in china. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 155 new market players from emerging developing countries such as india and vietnam have joined, making the foreign trade market face a more complex and intense competitive environment. on the other hand, problems such as resource overlap and industrial technology barriers in the traditional trade system's supply chain will lead to a decline in enterprises' utilization of industrial resources, resulting in innovation stagnation in terms of industrial technology, channel information resources, etc. following the successful industrial experiences of developed countries, using vernon's product lifecycle theory as a guide, rapidly transforming the "industrial knowledge" formed in the domestic market into "innovation demand" in the international market after completing the first cycle of products in the domestic market is an important approach for industries to continuously gain global industrial competitive advantages. research by zhang xueliang et al. shows that the construction of a unified national market contributes to increasing the proportion of domestic sales for export enterprises, alleviating the high dependence of enterprises on export business. this fundamentally lies in the "knowledge formation" of enterprises' domestic and foreign trade capabilities. figure 1. vernon's product lifecycle model 2.3 the disparity in the composition of domestic and international trade topics complicates the integration of knowledge according to data from fortune magazine, in the 2022 fortune global 500 list, there were 133 chinese companies listed, surpassing the united states for the first time. leading the pack were large conglomerates such as china resources, cofco, and wumart. however, in the field of domestic and foreign trade, small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) accounted for over 90% of the total. the average lifespan of these enterprises is less than 3 years, which is only half of that in developed countries like the united states. simultaneously, the concentration of enterprises in china's domestic and foreign trade has been www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 156 decreasing year by year. this trend has led to a mismatch in the position of domestic enterprises in the innovation process of the industry chain, making it difficult to achieve spillover effects from knowledge embedding. according to statistics from the china statistical yearbook, the proportion of total retail sales of consumer goods by designated size units has been decreasing year by year since reaching a peak of 50.76% in 2014, dropping to 33.66% in 2019, a decrease of 2.06 percentage points from the previous year. the turnover of markets with transactions exceeding 100 million yuan as a proportion of total retail sales of consumer goods has also been declining from 2004 to 2019, with the proportion in 2019 being only 25.02%. in the retail sector, according to data from the well-known market research firm kantar consulting in may 2019, compared with mature overseas markets, the cr5 (the market share of the top five companies in terms of business scale) in ireland, france, and the united kingdom reached as high as 89.4%, while china's supermarket industry cr5 was only 26.7%. in the convenience store industry in japan in 2018, cr3 and cr5 were 80% and 94% respectively, while in china they were only 26.4% and 37.5%. the imbalance in the structure of trade enterprises in china has made it difficult for knowledge embedding to play a practical role in both the industry and between industries. with the continuous improvement of china's market economy system, the governance and supervision of the domestic market have become more mature. the coordination and allocation function of industrial resources by large trade enterprises has been further strengthened, and the development of industrial ecology has become increasingly apparent. however, the lack of knowledge embedding has led to prominent issues such as information barriers, lack of industrial standards, and low-end homogenized competition. 3. the internal mechanism of integration of domestic and foreign trade with the deepening of market-oriented reforms and transformation in china, the domestic and foreign trade markets are increasingly showing characteristics of integrated development. research by yi et al. (2018) indicates that for large countries, implementing an export-driven model propelled by domestic demand is more conducive to the sustainable growth and transformation endogenous mechanism of industries compared to smaller countries. however, this model of domestic demand driven by large countries can only be achieved in a market environment where there is effective alignment between "domestic demand local supply export structure". zhang and jin (2020), from the perspective of vertical governance of industries, point out that productive domestic demand-driven policies can promote the diffusion of technology within industrial ecosystems, thereby facilitating the circulation of factors endowments and the co-creation of knowledge systems. based on an analysis of the bidirectional promotion between the domestic demand market and the international market in terms of domestic factor endowments, international market competition relationships, and the form of the global value chain, wang et al. (2021) suggest that under the new development paradigm, well-implemented policy mechanisms are essential to drive domestic www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 157 demand. they argue that promoting the construction of a unified large domestic market is a necessary choice to expand the proportion of domestic consumption and realize the circulation of resources and factors. additionally, setting high market standards and implementing high-quality management is crucial for promoting both internal and external market competition among enterprises and enhancing their independent innovation capabilities. therefore, under the new development paradigm, the construction of a unified large market system with internal and external trade integration at its core is a complex process involving multiple aspects. this process is not only crucial for enhancing the competitiveness of enterprises in the market but also for the overall development of the national industrial structure optimization. specifically, it plays an important role in promoting the integration of domestic and foreign market industrial chains, adjusting the layout of industrial structures, and facilitating the flow of production factors. in this sense, enterprises actively seeking the integration of domestic and foreign trade development are based on the intrinsic transformation of production and circulation relations in the new stage of development, marking a shift from a production-led to an innovation-led era. the success or failure of enterprises in choosing the integration of domestic and foreign trade depends on their ability to establish knowledge aggregation within the enterprise and the industry, bridging the gap between meeting the domestic market and serving the international market. moreover, due to the distinct regional clustering characteristics of enterprises with strong export capabilities in china, according to the theoretical model of regional innovation and knowledge transfer, the key to success lies in establishing a knowledge system as the core. this involves horizontally forming the absorption and transfer of knowledge between enterprises and the international market in terms of policies, resources, standards, and innovation. vertically, it entails embedding knowledge of technology, channels, and platforms into industries, ecosystems, and governance structures. this process aims to drive overall innovation advantages in "made in china" and "chinese circulation," as depicted in the following diagram: www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 158 figure 2. model of the relationship between regional innovation systems and knowledge transfer figure 3. the intrinsic mechanism of integration of domestic and foreign trade 3.1 build a knowledge transfer system centered around "foreign trade" enterprises according to the theory of trade costs, the main determinant of a country's trading behavior is www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 159 productivity, whereby enterprises with relatively higher productivity tend to choose exports, while those with relatively lower productivity opt to serve only the domestic market. however, researchers have found a "productivity paradox" in the chinese market, wherein domestic enterprises often exhibit higher productivity than exporting enterprises. contrary to expectations, enterprises with lower productivity tend to engage more in exports. further studies have revealed that the higher productivity of domestic market enterprises does not necessarily indicate a high quality of innovation. this paradox arises primarily from two factors: inadequate domestic market segmentation and poor market governance. conversely, the lower productivity of exporting enterprises implies a higher quality of innovation. the difference between the two lies in the role of "innovative knowledge" in the production and consumption processes. this long-standing disparity has hindered the establishment of a domestic demand-driven export development model in china. to achieve genuine domestic demand-driven exports, breakthroughs must first be made in the construction of the domestic and foreign trade knowledge system. currently, export-oriented enterprises have significantly higher levels of knowledge compared to domestic trade-oriented enterprises. therefore, establishing an effective knowledge transfer system between export-oriented enterprises with "high-quality knowledge" and domestic trade-oriented enterprises with "high-level market efficiency" is crucial in the process of domestic and foreign trade integration. the internal mechanism of this process is mainly achieved through four horizontal stages: at the national policy level, it is necessary to accelerate the establishment of a knowledge transfer mechanism for domestic and foreign trade enterprises, strengthen cooperation among different regions, gradually weaken industry barriers between regions and domestic and foreign trade, and promote efficient and low-cost circulation of "innovative knowledge" between domestic and foreign enterprises. domestic trade enterprises need to fully exploit their advantages in "market efficiency," leverage policy dividends, actively participate in the construction of domestic and foreign trade integration, and fully absorb the "knowledge transfer" from export-oriented enterprises. actively promote the knowledge absorption of domestic and foreign trade enterprises regarding international standards. standardization can effectively reduce the entry barriers to international markets, promote industrial technological innovation and quality management upgrades among domestic enterprises, and enhance their market competitiveness in the new product stage. promote knowledge transfer by domestic trade enterprises around the international market for innovation. knowledge transfer is not unidirectional but rather a reciprocal process after absorption. once domestic trade enterprises have absorbed knowledge, their market efficiency will inevitably lead to better innovation outcomes. this is also an important way for domestic enterprises to implement internationalization strategies, expand markets, increase revenue, reduce costs, and obtain resources. this echoes existing research, suggesting that a large country's domestic demand-driven export model can better leverage its "large country-specific advantage" in domestic demand. exporting only serves as the result of domestic enterprises' "self-selection" in market competition under open conditions, and the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 160 improvement and structural upgrading of domestic supply capacity is the foundation and key to sustained economic growth. 3.2 build a knowledge embedding system centered around the "chain master" enterprise innovations in high-tech fields often require highly specialized and complex technical knowledge, thus typically accompanied by characteristics such as high technological barriers, high capital investment, and high risks. these characteristics make it difficult for latecomers in technology to catch up with and surpass technology leaders in the short term, leading to their long-term "low-end lock-in" status. especially in recent years, trade conflicts have intensified, making it increasingly difficult for a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises to access the latest "international knowledge". relying solely on market mechanisms is insufficient to stimulate innovation vitality, thereby resulting in many enterprises facing the phenomenon of a "knowledge ceiling" in the process of integrating domestic and foreign trade. considering the reality that the imbalance in the structure of domestic enterprises is difficult to reverse in the short term, it is necessary to construct a knowledge-embedding system with "chain-leading" enterprises as the core. zhang (2021) believes that the so-called "chain-leading" enterprises are those that occupy a core or dominant position in the supply chain, are able to control the most valuable part of the entire value chain and possess the ultimate discourse power. chen and chen (2021) suggest that "chain-leading" enterprises refer to those that hold a core position in the industry chain, have certain control over the industry chain, can leverage their comparative advantages, fully integrate and utilize external resources, coordinate upstream and downstream entities in the industry chain, and drive continuous innovation and iteration in the industry chain. from the perspective of integrating domestic and foreign trade, "chain-leading" enterprises are characterized by strong capabilities in acquiring international knowledge while also possessing strong domestic market leadership. this includes their ability to embed knowledge in the domestic market in terms of industry, ecology, and governance, as well as their ability to transfer knowledge of international technology, channels, and platforms. these knowledge transfers, facilitated by "chain-leading" enterprises, become "embedded knowledge" in the entire industry ecosystem, providing new innovative space for many domestic and foreign trade enterprises facing the "knowledge ceiling". 3.3 build a knowledge absorption system centered around domestic trade enterprises the fundamental goal of the development of integrated domestic and foreign trade is to enhance the "independent innovation" capability of domestic trade enterprises, thereby forming a "dual circulation" pattern with the domestic large market as the core and international and domestic integration. the concept of "independent innovation" was proposed by chinese scholar chen jin in 1994. he believed that independent innovation is a specific technological innovation paradigm for enterprises after digesting and absorbing technology introduced from abroad, where enterprises rely on their own research and development capabilities to achieve technological breakthroughs and obtain original www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 161 scientific and technological achievements. due to the limitations faced by domestic enterprises in terms of technology, capital accumulation, market experience, and other aspects during the early stages of reform and opening up, domestic enterprises mainly focused on technology catching up. their product research and development relied on technology introduction, followed by secondary innovation based on this foundation. for enterprises that start with technology introduction domestically, the evolution of their independent innovation capabilities starts with secondary innovation capabilities, transitions to integrated innovation capabilities, and eventually leads to the accumulation of original innovation capabilities (xu et al., 2013). based on the fundamental view that "capability is essential knowledge," the ability of enterprises to identify, acquire, digest, and utilize knowledge, namely knowledge absorption capability, is crucial. the essence of enterprise innovation capability lies in its ability to absorb knowledge. the theoretical community has conducted sufficient research on how enterprises can effectively integrate internal and external resources to acquire and utilize knowledge, thereby improving their knowledge creation and technological innovation levels. knowledge absorption capability can facilitate the transfer of external knowledge and technology for enterprises, aiding in new product development and consequently improving the technological innovation performance of enterprises (shenkar & li, 1999). therefore, for domestic trade enterprises in the process of integrated domestic and foreign trade, the primary task is to accelerate their "knowledge absorption" capability. subsequently, they continuously verify their "knowledge absorption" situation through the domestic large market and feed back their technological innovation, product innovation, and service innovation to enhance their competitiveness in the international market. 4. strategies and recommendations based on the perspective of knowledge transfer, the key path of integrated domestic and foreign trade development suggests that in the new era, the key to integrated domestic and foreign trade lies in the absorption, transfer, and embedding capabilities of enterprises regarding domestic and foreign trade knowledge. furthermore, different types of enterprises have varied requirements for "knowledge capabilities." export-oriented enterprises should focus more on improving knowledge transfer capabilities, while lead firms should prioritize enhancing knowledge embedding capabilities. on the other hand, domestic trade enterprises should pay more attention to cultivating knowledge absorption capabilities. only when these three types of enterprises synchronously enhance their "knowledge capabilities" can china's integrated domestic and foreign trade truly achieve breakthroughs. therefore, this study suggests that the government should further increase policy support in terms of knowledge integration system construction, knowledge embedding standard utilization, and knowledge transfer reward standards. firstly, accelerating the establishment of a knowledge integration system synchronized with the global market is crucial. with the rapid development of science and technology and the rapid iteration of the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 162 international consumer market, the speed of industrial innovation continues to increase. the source of industrial innovation lies in the industrial knowledge system. it is necessary to expedite the establishment of an industrial knowledge system synchronized with the global market, strengthen the connection and certification standards of domestic and foreign trade rules around the upstream and downstream of domestic industries, construct a chinese characteristic supply chain system with strong innovative knowledge capabilities, fully integrate global foreign trade rules and the whole industry chain innovation knowledge system, and continuously enhance the resilience and stability of china's supply chain. simultaneously, speeding up the elimination of industry monopolies and local protection restrictions, fully activating the roles of foreign trade enterprises, lead enterprises, and domestic trade enterprises in industrial knowledge innovation, enhancing their collaborative creation capabilities in the unified national market ecosystem, and promoting the ascent of the industrial ecosystem to the upstream of the global value chain, thereby achieving the goal of building a strong trading nation. secondly, accelerating the improvement of the knowledge embedding transformation mechanism for domestic and foreign trade enterprises is essential. it is necessary to comprehensively sort out and optimize the existing intellectual property protection policies, systems, and mechanisms, further improve the protection of knowledge transfer, embedding, and absorption, which play a core role in the resilience of the supply chain, and eliminate policy restrictions and obstacles for enterprises at different levels of the industrial chain in the process of result transformation. actively promoting collaborative mechanisms among higher education institutions, research institutions, and enterprises in the process of result transformation in strategic emerging industries, seizing the first knowledge cycle of future digital technology and technological revolution, accelerating the transfer of emerging technological achievements from laboratories to the unified large market, and better creating a market-oriented competition environment. continuously deepening the reform of the domestic market system, encouraging traditional foreign trade and foreign-funded enterprises to participate more in the construction of the unified national market system, further expanding the overall scale and innovation capabilities of the domestic circulation market. thirdly, increasing the reward standards for knowledge transfer for domestic and foreign trade enterprises is necessary. it is imperative to fully implement the tax reduction and fee reduction policies and measures issued by the state and local governments, focusing on promoting knowledge transfer for enterprises in the process of integrated domestic and foreign trade, fully leveraging various fiscal and financial means to support the development of integrated domestic and foreign trade. actively innovating financial support for "knowledge innovation" for domestic and foreign trade enterprises, encouraging financial institutions to develop financing products suitable for result transformation of domestic and foreign trade enterprises, developing financial support products based on product design, invention, patents, new technologies, new materials, and new consumption, promoting flexible credit lines, on-demand repayment loans, streamlining loan approval procedures, and optimizing approval processes, continuously increasing government subsidies for enterprise knowledge inputs. fully www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 163 leveraging the role of local intellectual property trading centers and copyright trading centers in result transformation, establishing integrated domestic and foreign trade ecological enterprise knowledge sharing alliances around different industries, further improving the convenience for small and medium-sized enterprises to obtain the latest industrial knowledge, reducing the cost of knowledge application, and providing convenient, efficient, and comprehensive knowledge application systems for all enterprises in the industrial chain. 5. research limitations the article provides an in-depth analysis of the key path of integrated domestic and foreign trade in china from the perspective of knowledge transfer. through a thorough analysis of the processes of knowledge transfer, embedding, and absorption in the context of integrated domestic and foreign trade, the article not only constructs a relatively comprehensive knowledge transfer system for integrated domestic and foreign trade but also provides optional paths for enterprises in different industry positions, offering targeted suggestions for the government to formulate relevant policies and strategies. the research has theoretical and practical value for accelerating the development of integrated domestic and foreign trade in china. however, due to the diverse types of domestic and foreign trade enterprises and their varying positions in the industry stages and market competition environments, as well as differences in their knowledge application capabilities, there is no "one-size-fits-all" path for the integrated domestic and foreign trade process. particularly in the field of foreign trade, many enterprises still exist in the form of "international buyers," with their core competitiveness reflected in their market service capabilities. due to considerations of enterprise profits and commercial confidentiality, many enterprises regard their industrial knowledge as their "lifeline" and are unwilling to share it with domestic manufacturing enterprises, making it difficult for domestic enterprises to bridge this significant "industrial gap" and forcing them to obey upstream service providers. the "integrated domestic and foreign trade knowledge system" proposed in this article may encounter research biases and overlook certain aspects in practice. moreover, with the rise of the digital economy, the emergence of new forms of integrated domestic and foreign trade organizations, and the impact of new technologies, models, and channels such as e-commerce, cross-border e-commerce, and live-streaming e-commerce on traditional domestic and foreign trade systems, the patterns of knowledge innovation are significantly different. therefore, the research on the integrated domestic and foreign trade process based on the perspective of knowledge transfer may have limitations in the context of the digital economy and requires further in-depth and specific research in the future. due to limitations in length and author capacity, this article did not thoroughly explore the above aspects, but this does not imply that the study ignored these issues. future research will explore these issues from a more systematic and specific perspective. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics 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(2021). evolution of hainan's foreign trade pattern and its economic association with domestic provinces, regions, and cities. resources science, 43(02), 256-268. author information zhimin ren (1978), female, ph.d., lecturer, hangzhou business school, zhejiang gongshang university. she mainly engages in industrial policy research. honggang zheng (1979), corresponding author,male, from dezhou, shandong province, lecturer, ph.d., school of management and e-business, zhejiang gongshang university. he is a researcher at the modern commerce research center, a key research base in humanities and social sciences of the ministry of education, mainly engaged in research on commercial circulation. qican yang (1992), male, zhejiang gongshang university, school of business administration (mba), master's degree. he mainly engages in enterprise management research. 2.2 the reverse lifecycle of domestic and foreign 2.3 the disparity in the composition of domestic a 3. the internal mechanism of integration of domest 3.1 build a knowledge transfer system centered aro 3.2 build a knowledge embedding system centered ar 3.3 build a knowledge absorption system centered a 4. strategies and recommendations 5. research limitations references advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 35 original paper relationalist view on the dissolution of former yugoslavia and emergent new states igor janev1* 1 institute of political studies, belgrade, serbia * igor janev, institute of political studies, belgrade, serbia received: april 24, 2020 accepted: may 14, 2020 online published: may 19, 2020 doi:10.22158/ape.v3n2p35 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v3n2p35 abstract times after a logic-based foundation of dialectic relationism, as a holistic doctrine and a comprehensive systemic-dialectic methodology, in which the relations between the elements (units) constituting a system play the dominant role in its behavior, and even determine the very existence of the elements (units), we demonstrate its applicability to the political arena of international interactions of states and, in particular, to the dissolution of complex state entities and the emergence of new states. then, we examine in more detail the processes leading to the dissolution of former yugoslavia and the emergence of new states following its break up. we elucidate the role of both internal and external factors in the dissolussion process and the role of international relations and environment in the political recognition of the new states. this relationism concept provides a general framework for description and understanding of socio-political processes and regimes in individual states and international system as a whole. keywords former yugoslavia, dissolution, serbia, state recognition, dialectic relationism 1. introduction main current studies of international political relations generally follow two mainstream contending doctrines, the realism and liberalism, each of which is routed in the classical works of thucidides, machiavelli, hobbes, spinosa and locke, kant, fichte, rousseau, respectively. the modern version of classical realistic doctrine is formulated by carr (carr, 1946) and morgentau (morgentau, 1948) and in its neorealist extension by waltz (waltz, 1979) and gilpin (gilpin, 1981). the liberal doctrine in the 20th century evolved into neoliberalism, best represented by the ideas of keohane and nye (keohane, 1984; keohane, 1986; keohane & ney, 1977). the basic ideological premises of these contending www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 36 published by scholink inc. doctrines are opposed to each other and are routed in the different perception of human nature and the structure of society. for the realists, man is by its nature sinful and wicked and in a structured and competitive society its natural instincts for survival, power and domination are not constrained by moral principles. due to these inherent features of the human nature, the international system of states, in absence of a supranational authority, is in an anarchic state of constant struggle for power, a “war of all against all”, in which actions of every actor (state) are motivated by maximization of its self-interests (including its self-preservation). if all states seek to maximize their powers, stability will result from maintaining a balance of power. co-operation among states and forming alliances is motivated by obtaining relative gains, although loyalty is, generally, not assumed (kegley, 1995). in contrast to these premises, the liberalists view the human nature as essentially “good” and altruistic and its evil manifestations are product of the bad and wicked social arrangements and institutions, that cause people to act selfishly and harmful to others. the people are capable and willing to enter into mutual cooperation and aid for increasing their common welfare and avoiding conflicts. the wars and the injustice in international system are not inevitable and they can be minimized by eliminating the anarchical conditions among states through adequate institutional organization of the system, based on mutual cooperation and absolute gains for all (kegley, 1995). it should be noted that in both the realist and liberalist doctrine of international political system the main actors are its units, the states, of whatever complexity they might be (individual states, federations, confederations, unions or other complex state entities). the relations (bilateral or multilateral) among the units of international system, that enable their interaction, are created on the basis of the interests of the units and for certain purposes. the motivations for establishing relations within the international state system have different interpretations within the realist and liberalist doctrines. with its multitude of states and plethora of bilateral and multilateral relations (interactions), both undergoing constant changes, the international political system becomes a complex dynamical entity with its own features (properties of the system as a whole). the dynamics of this complex system can be studied within the framework of general systems theory (gst) (von bertalanffy, 1971), as was done by the neorealist k.n. waltz (waltz, 1979). from the gst point of view, the interactions (relations) between the units (states) of the complex international political system become as important elements of the system as are its units and, as in other complex systems (e.g., biological, engineering, information, eco-systems, etc.), and have a role in the functionality, evolution and stability of the system that can be comparable to or even greater than that of the units (due to e.g., resonant and synergistic effects). the role of the relation between the units in a complex system was first recognized by leibniz in his dispute with newton on the nature of space and time (in a cosmological context). newton considered space and time as absolute entities, existing independently of bodies and events (substantialism). for leibniz space and time do not exist outside a system of relations among bodies and ordered time events (relationism) (futch, 2008; ray, 2008). the supremacy of the relation in the system leibniz derived www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 37 published by scholink inc. from his principle of sufficient reason. the relationist concept of leibniz, that relations are the texture of space-time, in which the particular entities exist and the events take place, was, in the mid-fifties of last century, applied to the dynamics of social systems, in which the individuals “are not assumed as independent existences present anterior to any relation, but gain their whole being in and with their relations” (cassirer, 1995). meanwhile, this sociological relationism underwent further developments (see e.g., emirbayer, 1997). the leibniz relationist idea was taken by j. kaipayil (kaipayil, 2009) to develop a relationist theory of reality. his “ontic relationism” addresses the metaphysical problem of the one and many, i.e., the unity and plurality. entities are constituted by their multiple relations. recently, we have developed a relationist theory of the international political system and its units (the states) (janev, 2010; janev, 2003). unlike in the theories of cassirer and kaipayil, where the supremacy of the relation in the system is taken as a postulate, we have derived the fundamental character of the relation in the system by addressing the basic ontological problem “why is there something, rather than nothing”, formulated also by leibniz in his “principles of nature and grace”. in heidegger’s reformulation of the problem, “something” is replaced by “everything” and “nothing” by “nothingness” (heidegger, 2000). using the principles of dialectic methodology and general systems theory, it was logically derived in (see janev, 2010) that the existence of the opposing poles in the ontological problem results from the fundamental relation uniting them. the relation in a system is carrier of certain interaction between two or more units in the system, between groups of units in the system, and it is a condition sine qua non for the existence of the system itself. the dynamics of the system (changes, evolution, stability, and other properties) are determined by the relations in the system. we call this philosophical doctrine dialectic relationism, as opposed to the ontic relationism of j. kaipayil. in the next section of this chapter we derive the fundamental relation, as solution of the “something”— “nothing” (or “everything”-nothingness”) ontological problem and apply its methodology in the analysis of some complex systems (the states, international political system). we mention here only that the introduction of the relation as a basic element of the international political system, leads to a structural unification of realist and liberal (or their neo-versions) political doctrines, the difference arising only from the character of the relations: opposition (realists) or cooperation (liberals). in that section, we also provide some examples from the world political history of significant changes on the world political landscape, generally after catastrophic political events, resulting from the interplay of the relations among the political actors. in the subsequent sections, we apply the methodology of dialectic relationism to analyze the dissolution of former socialist federal republic yugoslavia (sfry), particularly the role of the internal and external factors and relations in this process, as well as their interconnection. the establishment of new states, on the basis of former yugoslav republics, is also discussed, particularly from the aspect of their political (diplomatic) recognition by other states of international community and their admission to the united nations membership. in this context some specific legal issues that arose with the continuation www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 38 published by scholink inc. of the un membership of federal republic of yugoslavia (serbia and montenegro) and the admission of macedonia to un membership (janev, 1999; janev, 2006). 2. basis of dialectic relationism in addressing the metaphysical problem “why is there something, rather than nothing” we first remind of the three basic principles of dialectic methodology (see, hegel, 1977; engels, 1968): 1) unity and conflict of opposites (which drives the changes), 2) transformation of quantity to quality (at a certain critical level of the quantity; called phase transition in natural sciences), and 3) negation of the negation. these principles are operative in any composite entity, system of entities and its sub-systems and are all involved in their dynamical behavior. for a complete understanding (and description) of the dynamics of complex systems it is necessary also to invoke the principles of general systems theory: 1) the complex system represents a unified whole of entities (elements) and their interactions. 2) a complex system exhibits properties and behaviors distinct from those of its elements or parts (subsystems) (i.e., collective, or global, properties and behaviors). among the most important of collective properties of complex systems are: synergism, feedback loops, coherence, self-organization, (selfcontrol, self-regulation, adaptation). 3) the complex system and its environment (entities outside its boundary) form an open system; the dynamics of the complex system, as well as its properties and behavior, are then strongly affected by its interaction with the environment and by the interactions of its elements (parts, sub-systems) with the entities of the environment. keeping in mind that the interaction represents the substantive content of any relation, it is clear that the dynamics of open complex systems is highly relevant for the analysis of international political system, its sub-systems and even its basic entities (the states). turning to the metaphysical problem of “something” vs. “nothing”, we should first note that semantically “something” and “nothing” are opposite to each other; they are also negation of each other. as abstract entities in a system, they have opposite “polarity”. according to the first (of above listed) principles of dialectics, united (in a system) the “something” and “nothing” are in a permanent conflict relationship. this relationship ensures their unity and contradictory existence/non-existence. therefore, “something” and “nothing” (and for that matter “somethingness” (“everything”) and “nothingness”) exist only as logical poles of a fundamental ontological relation. in its classical (leibniz’s or heidegger’s) formulation (“something” vs. “nothing”, “everything” vs. “nothingness”), the basic metaphysical problem is an ill-posed problem and creates the logical paradox of existence. the systemic-dialectic resolution of this paradox again leads to the irreducible fundamental ontological relation (see janev, 2010), and thereby to the resolution of classical metaphysical problem. below, we briefly outline the derivation of this resolution. the conflicting interaction (contradiction) of opposing elements in a closed system, as well as in its constitutive sub-elements, causing their changes, implies a process of division of the element ad infinitum in the quest for the elementary “something”, the basic element. in following the process of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 39 published by scholink inc. successive division of the element towards its basic form, we shall apply the dialectic principles of negation of the negation and the transformation of quantity to quality. the later principle states that the change of the quantity creates, at certain critical level, a new quality. the continuation of the division process presumes that at any stage of its progression there is always a non-zero quantity for any of its opposing sub-elements. in the process of infinite division of the element, we have to suppose that the quantities of the two sub-elements, forming the element, converge to a zero quantity of somethingness at infinity. an important question here appears about whether both of the two sub-elements reach the zero-quantity value at infinity, or only one of them does so. reaching the zero-quantity value (of somethingness) is certainly a critical level of change of the quantity, and it has to be accompanied by creation of a new quality (the absence of somethingness). on the other hand, the dialectic principle of unity of contradictions requires that any change of the quality must be provided through the tensions of contradictions, carried out in the case of element’s division by its sub-elements. the role of contradicting elements in triggering the change is, however (by definition) never absolutely symmetrical; the equilibrium of the tensions would never produce a change in quality. this implies that in the division process only one of the opposing sub-elements can reach the zero-quantity value (of somethingness), i.e., can be transformed into a new quality (absence of somethingness). remarkably, in this separation of sub-elements, their contradiction is not lost; it is only transformed into another, more fundamental and irreducible (since the division process has reached its end) contradiction between two qualities: one with a non-zero quantity of somethingness (hence, existence), the other with a zeroquantity value of somethingness (i.e., non-existence). thus, the asymmetrical nature of the contradiction between the sub-elements, driving the division process, precludes the possibility that the separated entities at the final stage of the process simultaneously reach the zero-quantity value of somethingness, defining the absence of any quantity of somethingness, i.e., the nothingness. the other product of the final stage of the division process obviously represents the whole somethingness, i.e., the everything. it should be noted that in carrying out the division process it was assumed that the quantity of somethingness is union of “something” and “nothing” (or “everything” and “nothingness”) and represents an “absolutely contradicting self-identity”, a dynamic tension of opposites that, unlike in hegel’s dialectic logic, does not resolve in synthesis. from the point of view of general systems theory, something (s) and nothing (n), being in contradiction to each other, and mutually inseparably connected, form by necessity a system, or a “primitive relation”. the most essential characteristic of this system is the intrinsic inter-connection of s and n, making them inseparable, without which neither of them can be, nor can the system they form exist. since s and n are mere elements of the system (the poles of the connecting interaction), it follows that the existence of a relation between s and n is a prerequisite for their own existence (as elements of the system) and the existence of the system itself. it appears, thus, that the relation is a more fundamental entity in the system than the elements. the system {s, n} is obviously the most fundamental one, and the relation between s and n can be called fundamental irreducible relation. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 40 published by scholink inc. hence, the origin of both s and n is their systemic relation from which they are inseparable. the extension of the supremacy of the relation over the elements (derived from the principles of dialectic logic) to a complex dynamic system, constitutes the doctrine of dialectic relationism. as mentioned earlier, the complex dynamical system is characterized by a multitude of elements and a plethora of interactive relations among them and among groups of elements of the system (subsystems). moreover, in the complex dynamical systems collective properties emerge, such as coherence, self-organization, self-regulation, etc. that generate new types of relations which do not have antagonistic character, but rather an attractive, cooperative character required for preserving the functionality and stability of the system. we now give a brief overview of the processes in the modern organized social and political systems from the viewpoint of the dialectic relationism. the state, as a social system with a complex structure (individuals, social groups organized around certain sets of ideas), is the basic element of international political system. with an enormous number of particular interests of its components, its functional consistency and self-preservation is ensured by an accepted set of rules of behavior and constrains (law) that legitimizes the distribution of power within the state. the power distribution is determined through the competition of opposing contenders (political parties), whose relations generally have antagonistic character, but the members of the parties obviously share co-operative relations. cooperative relations (temporary or long-term) may be established between political parties (coalitions) to acquire a greater portion of the power distribution. on the other hand, different group interests within a political party create internal conflicting relations that can lead to division of the party to two or more new parties. these examples demonstrate how the conflicting and co-operative relations can change the political landscape within a state. the role of conflicting or co-operative relations in changing the world political landscape by disassembling the old imperial state-systems and creating new state entities can be particularly clearly observed on the world political arena in the aftermaths of devastating long multi-state wars. such wars usually take place between two alliances of states with opposing interests and end with peace treaties, in which the winning alliance dictates the peace conditions, defines the territorial boundaries of the post-war states, grants independence to states previously occupied by the enemy state alliance and declares recognition of newly established state entities. examples for such peace treaties from the recent history are the treaty of berlin (july, 1978), following the 1877-1878 war between the great powers (russia, great britain, france, austro-hungary, italy and germany) and ottoman empire, by which turkey lost almost all of its territories in the balkans (romania, serbia and montenegro achieved full independence), while bosnia and hercegovina was taken over by austro-hungary. another example is the treaty of versailles (june 28, 1919; signed on january 10, 1920), ending the first world war (1914-1918) between the triple entente (great britain, france, russia) and its affiliated members (belgium, serbia, montenegro, greece and romania), on one side, and the central powers (germany, austro-hungary, ottoman empire, and bulgaria) on the other. in later stages of the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 41 published by scholink inc. war italy (may 1915), usa (april 1917) and japan (august 1919) joined the entente, while after the october revolution (october 1917) the new soviet state left the alliance by a separate peace treaty with the central powers (november 1917). the treaty of versailles reshaped once more territorial borders in europe, forced germany to grant independence to its protectorates and to czechoslovakia, and recognized the sovereignty of belgium. at the postdam conference (july 17-august 2, 1945), the three anti-nazi world war ii allies (usa, united kingdom and soviet union) have formalized (through the postdam agreement, signed on july 30, 1945), their earlier decisions at the yalta conference (february 4-11, 1945) regarding the future of defeated germany and its war allies, and the reorganization of post-war europe. germany lost about 25% of its territory, given mainly to poland to compensate for the loss of its territories given to the soviet union; the remainder of germany was divided into four occupied zones, out of which two independent german states would later be formed (east and west germany). politically, one of the major outcomes of the second world war was the creation of two ideologically opposite alliances (“western bloc”—usa and western europe, and “soviet bloc”—soviet union and the socialist countries of eastern europe), out of which two military alliances emerged (“nato” and the “warsaw pact”). this antagonistic “mega-relation” (called “cold war”) between the two blocs persisted until the dissolution of soviet union (1990), threatening the world with a cataclysmic nuclear war. the territorial reconfigurations of political landscape at the post-war peace treaties are aimed at establishing a long-term balance of power on the world political scene. the generation of new political entities (states or state-like entities) by such treaties, reflecting the conflicting relations (interests) of treaty-parties, primarily serves the goal of equipartition of political gains and not satisfaction of aspirations of certain ethnic groups for establishing nation-statehood. the creation of united nations in 1945 with the aim to prevent future wars, based on co-operative relations between its member states, has provided a mechanism for addressing the problem of non-self-governing territories having a colonial status. on the basis of the “declaration regarding the non-self-governing territories” (chapter xi of the un charter, on december 14, 1960, the un general assembly at its 15th session adopted the “declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples” (ga/res.1514 (xv)), after which the process of decolonization began, resulting in proliferation of many new states on the international political arena. 3. brief history of dissolution of the former yugoslavia and emergence of new states in its aftermath the processes leading to the disintegration of former yugoslavia, associated with inter-ethnic wars has been subject to many popular journal publications and scholarly analyses, in which the causes, chronology of the events and consequences have been discussed (see, e.g., glenny,1993; cohen, 1993; lazić, 1994; obrenović, 1994; nakarada, 1995; woodward, 1995; simić, 1995; silber and little, 1997). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 42 published by scholink inc. the present section does not aim to give a detailed account of all aspects of these processes (e.g., sociological, socio-psychological, military, etc.), but concentrate on the role of internal relations within and among the federal units, the relations of the units and the federation as a whole with the external environment, as well as on the role of the mutual relations between elements of the external environment. complex state entities (empires, confederations, federations, or other groups of states-alliances) disintegrate either by internal tensions (conflicting relations between its parts), their antagonistic relations with the environment (resulting in wars) or by combinations of both. well-known historic examples include the disintegration of the holly roman, byzantine, russian, austro-hungarian and ottoman empires and the disintegration of socialist countries alliance around the soviet union, soviet union itself and the socialist federative republic of yugoslavia (sfry or former yugoslavia) in early 1990s. a comparative study of the disintegration of these complex state systems from the point of view of dialectic relationism would be of great interest, but in this chapter we analyze the disintegration of the former yugoslavia only. sfry was established in 1945 as successor of the kingdom of yugoslavia (under the name federal people’s republic of yugoslavia, which was changed to sfry in 1963), constituted of six republics (serbia, croatia, slovenia, bosnia and hercegovina, macedonia and montenegro) with different historical, cultural, religious backgrounds and ethnic compositions. before the establishment of the kingdom of yugoslavia, croatia, slovenia and bosnia and hercegovina were under the rule of austrohungary, while serbia, montenegro and macedonia have for centuries been parts of ottoman empire (with montenegro having always a special independence status, the independence of serbia being recognized in 1878 at the congress of berlin and present macedonia becoming part of serbia after the balkan wars, 1912-1913). the ethnic structure of the population on the territory of sfry at the time of its formation was predominantly slavic, with significant albanian admixtures in the south of serbia (the kosovo and metohia province) and in the north-west macedonia. the religious affiliation of the inhabitants of croatia and slovenia was predominantly roman catholic; population of serbia, montenegro and macedonia was predominantly orthodox christian, while the dominant religion in bosnia and hercegovina, kosovo and metohia, and north-western part of macedonia was the islam. due to their geographical position and religious affiliation, the cultural ties of slovenia and croatia with the neighboring european countries, such as italy, austria and hungary, were profound. on the other hand, due to the help of russian empire in their struggle for independence from the ottoman empire, as well as sharing the same religious beliefs, the cultural ties of serbia, montenegro and macedonia with russia were traditionally strong. while this ethnic, religious and cultural diversity can be perceived as an asset (cultural enrichment of the society, complementarity), coupled with the significant differences in their economic development (caused partially by differences in the national resources and production efficiency), it can be also a basis and potential for creation of conflicting relations between (and within) the constitutive federal units and groups of them. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 43 published by scholink inc. on the other hand, occupying a central position in the balkan peninsula and being a bridge between europe and the middle east, yugoslavia had always been of great geostrategic importance for both the western and eastern powers. this importance was especially elevated after yugoslavia broke up its close ideological and political ties with the soviet union in 1948 (the famous tito-stalin split) and became the founding and most influential member of the non-allied movement, created in 1961. the conflict of geostrategic interests of the western powers (usa and west europe) and the soviet union for dominance over yugoslavia was wrapped in an ideological dress (democracy vs. power centralism, multi-party vs. one-party system, ideological pluralism vs. communism). the ideological form of western interests has found a resonance with the latent nationalist and separatist tendencies in some of the republics (croatia and slovenia) and in the autonomous province kosovo and metohia of serbia. at the student demonstrations in pristina (capital of the province) on november 27, 1968, the requirement for granting a status of republic to kosovo within sfry was articulated for the first time, but was immediately suppressed. the nationalist tendencies in slovenia and croatia were to a significant extent stimulated by their higher level of economic development with respect to other parts of the federation and the perception that the jointly produced wealth is distributed among the republics disproportionately to their contribution to the common wealth. publicly these tendencies were expressed through requirements for greater cultural autonomy, but were basically motivated by aspirations for more economic and political rights and for strengthening their national identity sentiment. the “croatian spring” mass-movement 1967-1971 for cultural reforms in the federation provides a primary example of such aspirations. furthermore, the requests for more profound political and liberal reforms were present in other yugoslav republics; in serbia the need for liberal reforms was articulated by the communist party leadership at the beginning of 1970s. as a result of the public demands for greater political, economic and cultural autonomy, in 1974, the constitution of sfry was amended, providing the republics with a greater degree of autonomy in the economic, political and cultural areas. the individual republics amended their own constitutions accordingly, whereby the autonomous provinces of serbia, kosovo and metohia and vojvodina, obtained a significantly greater autonomy, essentially equal to that of the republics. the federation maintained prerogatives only over the national defense and international relations. the federal units had a full autonomy over their economic and cultural relations with the external world. within such a decentralized federal structure the nationalist and separatist tendencies could grow at will, the only controlling and cohesive political force being the league of communists of yugoslavia and the collective presidency of the federation, (constituted by representatives of the six republics and two autonomous provinces), with tito acting as its permanent president until his death. after tito’s death in 1980, the nationalist and separatist tendencies within some of the federal units began to grow rapidly. these tendencies were strongly supported by foreign countries with which they had a common history or long cultural relations (e.g., slovenia and croatia with austria, germany, italy and hungary, kosovo and metohia with albania). the visible form of this support in the case of slovenia and croatia was manifested in development of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 44 published by scholink inc. strong economic and trade relations with the european countries, reviving their cultural interactions and establishing cooperation in other fields. this resulted in a noticeable increase of already significant economic strength of these two republics within the federation relative to that of other republics. this is an example of how selective relations of the external environment with the units of a system can change the balance of power between the units. the historic cultural and religious connections of croatia and slovenia with the neighboring catholic countries, fueling their cultural identification with the european community of states, have also played a significant role in the rise of nationalist and separatist sentiments in these republics. apparently, the psychological affiliation of these two republics to the yugoslav project, first as kingdom of serbs, croats and slovenes (1918-19290, then as kingdom of yugoslavia (1929-1941) (a parliamentary monarchy with a serbian monarch), has never been strong due to the perception of dominance of the more numerous serbian nation in the federation. nationalist ideas started to grow also within the muslim population in bosnia and hercegovina (bosniaks), supported ideologically and financially by the arabic countries (primarily saudi arabia). the relatively good living standard in yugoslavia during tito’s period was based on the competition of western powers and soviet union in building good relations with the non-allied yugoslavia for promoting the values of their political systems. the rich western countries were providing economic assistance (especially after the tito-stalin split), favorable loans and open markets for the yugoslav labor power. soviet union’s market and that of the eastern socialist countries were open for the yugoslav goods. after tito’s death these relations weakened considerably, the economy was weakening rapidly entering into a deep depression by the end of 1980s. the differences in the per capita gnp between the federal units was very large: in slovenia it was more than twice larger than the average for yugoslavia, while in kosovo and metohia (with a large albanian majority) it was less than one third of the average. these gnp differences, reflected in the living standard, were generating various forms of discontent and threat for the unity of the federation. on the other hand, the formation of political elites in the republics and autonomous provinces was based primarily on political platforms centered on national interests and national identity. as the collective presidency of the federation was constituted by representatives of these elites it became a rather ineffective organ in controlling the internal processes and nationalist tendencies in the country. in fact, it became the focus where nationalist interests and tendencies started to manifest in an open form. in the federal units based on multiple ethnic structures, the growth of nationalist ideas stemmed from the ethnic identity, creating inter-ethnic tensions within the units. such tensions intensified during 1980s: between serbs and croats in croatia, bosniaks and croats and bosniaks and serbs in bosnia and hercegovina, albanians and serbs in kosovo and metohia and to a lesser extent between serbs and hungarian minority in vojvodina. the strong nationalist sentiment of albanians in kosovo and metohia was expressed in the marchapril, 1981, massive student demonstrations in pristina that spread out to other locations (kosovska mitrovica, uroševac, vučitrn). the primary demand of protesters was the demand for granting the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 45 published by scholink inc. province a status of republic within the federation. the protests were suppressed by the presidency of yugoslavia, declaring on april 2 a state of emergency in pristina and the city of kosovska mitrovica. in the years that followed, the political aspirations of kosovo albanians for obtaining a status of republic within the federation were only increasing and found support by croatia and slovenia. for serbia the administrative separation of kosovo and metohia from serbia was unacceptable and, in order to prevent the possibility of such an undesirable event, the serbian parliament in 1989 amended its constitution of 1974 to significantly reduce the autonomy of kosovo and metohia (the amendments were confirmed in the new constitution of serbia adopted in september 1990). the reaction of kosovo albanians to the abolishment of their autonomy was organization of mass protests, the general strike of trepča miners in march 1989 (publicly supported by the slovenian leadership), the referendum for independence from serbia and sfry (in september 1991) and the declaration by the provincial assembly of the “republic of kosovo” (which was one month later recognized by albania). the selfproclaimed independence did not have any legal effect, but has enormously increased the inter-ethnic tensions within the province and between central serbia and the separatist province. these tensions started to obtain violent character and resulted in a massive expulsion of serb population from the province and a significant presence of serbian police in kosovo and metohia to protect the serbs. it should be mention that slovenia and croatia were actively supporting the separatist aspirations of kosovo albanians for independence from serbia. the separatist aspirations of these two republics started openly to be expressed and openly supported by germany and some other eu countries. croatia was secretly planning a forceful separation from yugoslavia and buying arms from hungary. as a reaction to the separatist tendencies in croatia and kosovo and metohia, the nationalist sentiment in serbia also started to grow. it was motivated primarily by the concern for the destiny of serbian population in these two federal units with strong inter-ethnic tensions (already violently manifested in kosovo and metohia and having historical roots in the world war ii in croatia). the growth of nationalist sentiment of the bosniaks in bosnia and hercegovina, where the population of serbs was also large, significantly increased the potential for severe inter-ethnic conflicts. the national rights of the serbs in bosnia and hercegovina became an additional concern for serbia. the divisions over the national and economic issues, threatening the stability and unity of yugoslavia, were reflected further in the yugoslav presidency, as well as in the league of communists of yugoslavia. on january 20-22, 1990, the extraordinary 14th congress of the league of communists of yugoslavia was convened in belgrade to deal with these issues. the congress was dominated by clashes between the serbian and slovenian delegations, headed by milošević and kučan, respectively, over the power enshrined to the federal units and the decision making process in the league. slovenian delegation suggested a confederative model for the league and the state, empowering the constituent units. serbian delegation advocated introduction of a “one man-one vote” policy for decision making in the league and a more centralized yugoslavia. all proposals of slovenia were rejected, while those of serbia were accepted on a majority vote, helped www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 46 published by scholink inc. by vojvodina, montenegro and kosovo (represented by a pro-serbian politician). the slovenian delegation at that point left the congress. milošević proposed to continue the work of the congress without slovenia, but croatia considered that as unconstitutional and threatened to leave. when attempts were made to recommence the meeting, the croatian delegation departed the meeting, followed by the delegations of bosnia and hercegovina and macedonia. subsequently, the league of communists of yugoslavia was dissolved, opening the door of creation of multi-party systems in the federal units. thus, the last congress of the league of communists of yugoslavia played the key role in the disintegration of the federation. the internal dissolution of yugoslavia essentially started when the federal republics organized their first multi-party parliamentary elections in 1990, when (except in serbia and montenegro) the excommunists failed to win the elections. most of the elected governments were formed on nationalist platforms, promising better protection of national interests than the ex-communists. the success of the ex-communists in the elections in serbia and montenegro was due to their proven strong nationalist stands in the struggles for protecting the serb interests in croatia, bosnia and hercegovina and kosovo and metohia. following the results of multi-party elections, slovenia, croatia and macedonia proposed in autumn of 1990 to transform yugoslavia into a loose federation of six republics. the serbian leadership, however, rejected the proposal. the rationale was based on the premise that the large serbian populations in croatia and bosnia and hercegovina should also have rights to selfdetermination, similarly to croats and slovenians. in addition, the serbian leadership was alarmed by the change of the status of serbian population in the new croatian constitution, adopted on december 22, 1990, from a constitutive nation to a minority. because of the major disagreements between the republics about the reorganization of the federation, and because of already openly expressed preferences of some western countries (especially germany) in this regard, on december 23, 1990, slovenia held a referendum for independence from yugoslavia. the turnout was 88.5% and 94.8% of the voters voted for independence. the independence was declared on june 25, 1991. the croatian referendum for independence from yugoslavia was held on may 2, 1991, with 93.24% of the voters voting in favor. a second referendum was held in croatia on may 19, 1991, regarding the question of whether the independent croatia should form an alliance of sovereign states with the other yugoslav republics (in accordance with the proposal of slovenia, croatia and macedonia for solving the state crisis of sfry). with the 83.6% turnout, since the croatian serbs boycotted the referendum, 94.2% voted in favor. on june 25, 1991, croatia declared its independence from yugoslavia. macedonia held its referendum for independence on september 8, 1991, with 95.3% of voters voting in favor. the macedonian independence from yugoslavia was declared on september 25, 1991. the parliament of bosnia and hercegovina was ethnically divided on the question of independence from sfry. reacting to the bosniak majority stand for independence, bosnian serbs held a referendum in november 1991, with an overwhelming vote to stay in a common state with serbia and montenegro. on january 9, 1882, they proclaimed a separate republic of the serbian people (republika srpska), which included all www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 47 published by scholink inc. regions within bosnia and hercegovina consisting of predominantly serbian population. the bosniak dominated bosnian government called for an independence referendum on february 29 and march 1, 1992, which was boycotted by the serbs. the turnout was 63.4% of which 99.7% voted in favor. the independence of bosnia and hercegovina from yugoslavia was declared on march 3, 1992. on april 6, 1992, the bosnian serbs declared their independence from bosnia and hercegovina. it should be noted that the processes leading to the establishment of croatian independence from yugoslavia were paralleled by similar processes of the croat ethnic serbs: on april 1, 1991, the leaders of the serbian autonomous region (sar) krajina declared that this region would separate from croatia if it proclaims independence. and indeed, after croatia declared its independence, the three serbian regions krajina, western slavonia and eastern slavonia, baranja and western srem declared the republic of serbian krajina (rsk) on december 19, 1991. the next day after the simultaneous declaration of independence by slovenia and croatia on june 25, 1991, the yugoslav people’s army (ypa), which was by the federal constitution the official guardian of the territorial integrity of the state, moved towards the northern border of slovenia, where the yugoslav border insignia, such as the flag and country name, were already replaced by the slovenian ones. local armed slovenians prevented the move of ypa towards the border, and the treat of an armed conflict became a real possibility. the european community (ec) exerted pressure on slovenia and croatia to place a three month moratorium on their independence and organized the brioni conference on july 7, 1991, involving an ec delegation, slovenia, croatia, and representatives of the yugoslav presidency and government). the only results of this conference were the withdrawal of ypa from slovenia, and the agreement by both croatia and slovenia to suspend their activities around their declared independence for three months. however, during its withdrawal from slovenia through croatia, fierce clashes between the ypa and croatian armed forces took place (the most bloody being those in the city of vukovar), marking the beginning of a full-fledged war. on july 29, 1991, the ec declared the inviolability of the federation’s internal borders, a declaration that was rejected by serbia and croatian serbs. on september 7, 1991, the ec organized the conference on yugoslavia in hague in an attempt to cease the battles, find a political solution for the inter-republic conflicts and restore the federation. lord peter carrington chaired the conference. in the framework of the conference an arbitration commission was formed, led by robert badinter, the president of the constitutional council of france. the commission included presidents of constitutional courts of germany, italy, spain and belgium as members. the mandate of the commission was to provide the conference with its opinions about major legal matters which have arisen from the declarations of independence of slovenia, croatia and macedonia, and the potential for defragmentation of croatia and bosnia and hercegovina by the ongoing armed conflicts. the opinions of the commission were the following: 1) sfry was in the process of dissolution, 2) the serbian population in croatia and bosnia and hercegovina is entitled to all rights of minorities and ethnic groups and the republics must afford to them all the human rights and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 48 published by scholink inc. fundamental freedoms recognized in the international law, 3) the boundaries between serbia and croatia and serbia and bosnia and hercegovina and other adjacent states may not be altered, except by mutual agreements, 4) the independence of croatia should not be recognized by the ec countries because of the inadequate protection of minorities in the new croatian constitution. (in reaction to this opinion croatian president wrote a letter to badinter giving assurances that this concern would be remedied.) commission recommended recognition of slovenia and macedonia, but because of the greek opposition ec was reluctant to recognize macedonia. in arriving at the opinion 3), the commission was guided by the legal principle uti possidetis juris, i.e., recognized as inter-republican administrative borders as determined in the federal constitution of 1974. the commission did not recommend recognition of bosnia and hercegovina, since at the time of delivery of its opinions (november 29, 1991, january 11, 1992) the referendum for independence in this republic had still not been held. the commission expressed opinion that the succession of sfry should be resolved by mutual agreement between the successor states with an equitable division of international assets and obligations of the former state. it also ruled that the membership of sfry in international organizations could not be continued by the successor state, but each that emerged from the former sfry should individually apply for membership anew. this principle would also be applicable for the applications of the states emerging from the sfry dissolution for membership to the ec. the leadership of serbia and montenegro was in strong opposition to the opinion 2) of the commission, denying the right to self-determination of the serbs in croatia and bosnia and hercegovina. on the basis of the opinions of badinter commission, slovenia and croatia were recognized by the ec on january 15, 1992. even before this date they were unilaterally recognized by germany on december 27, 1991 (despite the opposition of france, uk and the netherlands) and by ukraine, island, the holly see and the baltic countries. their recognition by other countries rapidly grew thereafter. as mentioned above, the recognition of macedonia by ec was not granted due to the greek opposition. meanwhile, the armed conflicts in croatia between the croatian forces, on one side, and the ypa and the forces of republic of serbian krajina (rsk), on the other, were intensifying. the united nations security council on november 27, 1991, adopted the resolution 721, which paved the way to the establishment of peacekeeping operations in former yugoslavia. the special envoy of the un secretary-general, cyrus vance, on november 23, 1991, met in geneva with the presidents of serbia and croatia, and with the yugoslav minister of defence, where a ceasefire agreement was negotiated (the geneva accord). the ceasefire, however, did not last very long and the war conflicts spilled over into bosnia and hercegovina, involving all three ethnic groups (bosniaks, serbs and croats). within the vance’s efforts regarding the implementation of ceasefire and demilitarization of the parts of croatia, under control of croat serbs and ypa, on january 2, 1992, another meeting was convened in sarajevo, where an implementation agreement was signed by military representatives of croatian ministry of defence and ypa. the agreement entailed deployment of 10,000-strong un protection force (unprofor) to the major conflict areas, with the task to create buffer zones between the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 49 published by scholink inc. fighting troops, to disarm the arm forces od rsk, to ensure the ypa withdrawal from the un protected areas and the return of refugees to these areas. the rsk president refused to endorse the agreement, but serbian president milošević persuaded the rsk parliament to replace him and accept the agreement. the acceptance of the agreement by serbia was motivated by its primary purpose to create favorable conditions for negotiations of the permanent solution to the conflict. the agreement produced a longer-lasting ceasefire, but failed to completely implement the other of its objectives. after september 1992, the ec took a proactive role in the un peace efforts in yugoslavia and its representative lord peter owen joined vance in the peace negotiations. after vance resigned his post in april 1993, the norwegian foreign minister jens stoltenberg was appointed as the main un peace negotiator. at the initiatives of lord owen and stoltenberg, the unprofor’s mandate was extended to include the territory of bosnia and hercegovina. the unprofor mission was terminated in march 1995. in august of the same year the croatian army undertook the military initiative “operation storm” against the rsk, resulting in massive destruction and a flux of 250,000 refugees into serbia. in the period of november 1-21, 1995, the “general framework agreement for peace in bosnia and hercegovina” (dayton agreement) was negotiated in dayton, ohio, between the presidents of serbia (slobodan milošević, representing the bosnian serb interests), croatia (franjo tuđman) and bosnia and hercegovina (alija izetbegović), with the mediation of the us secretary of state warren christopher, eu special representative carl bildt, first deputy foreign minister of russia igor ivanov and the us negotiator richard holbrooke. the dayton agreement was officially signed on december 14, 1995, in paris, france, witnessed by the presidents of the us and france, as well as the prime minister of the uk. the main purpose of the dayton agreement was to bring an end to the interethnic conflicts and prevent them from resuming, to delineate the inter-ethnic boundaries, and to endorse a regional balance of power. the territory of yugoslav republic bosnia and hercegovina was divided into two political entities: 1) federation of bosnia and hercegovina, involving the bosniaks and bosnian croats and occupying 51% of the territory, and 2) republika srpska on the remaining 49% of the territory with predominant serb population. each of these two entities would have its own governing institutions, but the government of the new state bosnia and hercegovina would consist of representatives of the three ethnic groups (empowered with a veto voting right in the decision making process). the implementation of the agreement was mandated to the nato-led implementation force (ifor) responsible for keeping the peace, the office of high representative responsible for civic and legal matters, and the organization for security and co-operation in europe (osce) responsible for organizing the first free elections in 1996. the ifor multilateral military force consisted of 63,000 soldiers and in november 1996 was replaced by the stabilization force (sfor) under the us command (the latter renewed again in 1998). after bosnia and hercegovina declared its independence from yugoslavia on march 3, 1992, the remaining two sfry republics constituted the federal republic of yugoslavia (fry) on april 27, 1992. although on the federal level the governance of the new state was equitably shared between the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 50 published by scholink inc. constitutive entities, there was a sentiment in montenegro that serbia had the larger share in the state power (especially expressed in the common parliament, the composition of which reflected the population difference between the two constitutive entities). this sentiment of unequal share of the power resulted in a reconstitution of the state to a state union of serbia and montenegro on february 4, 2003. in the montenegrin society there has historically been a divide regarding their ethnic affiliation. approximately half of the slavic population identifies itself as serbs, while the other half perceives itself as a separate nation. coupled with other political and economic discontents, this national divide led to the referendum for independence of montenegro on june 3, 2006. given that 55.5% of the 86.3% voter turnout voted for separation, montenegro declared its independence. serbia formally declared its statehood on june 5, 2006, and became a legal successor of the state union, while montenegro had to apply for membership in all international organizations. this was the end of the dissolution of the exsfry. from the above historical overview of the dissolution process of former yugoslavia it is clear that the causes for its disintegration are of both internal and external origin. below we shall analyze the dissolution process from the point of view of dialectic relationism. within the relationist approach to the problem one should include in the analysis the effects of four distinct groups of relations involved in the dynamics of the process: 1) relations within the federal units (the republics and provinces), 2) relations between the units themselves, 3) relations of the federation and its units with the world political environment and 4) relations within this environment. all these relations are mutually connected and affect each other. a relation between two or more entities can have either a conflicting character (opposite interests of any kind, mutual incompatibility of the societal features or strategic goals) or a co-operative character (common interests, mutual complementarity). a relation is also characterized by its intensity. both the character and intensity of a relation may change over time and affect the structure of the system (or sub-system) which they constitute. we now analyze the role of the relations within above mentioned four groups in the process of dissolution of former yugoslavia (sfry). it should be noted that sfry as a federal state was formed on the basis of the joint anti-fascist resistance against the german occupation in the second world war, as continuation of the former unification of south slavs into a state entity (the kingdom of yugoslavia), and the recognition of national rights of the people on the liberated territory to form their own quasistate entities (republics). as mentioned earlier, in all republics, except in slovenia, the population at the time of formation of sfry was multi-ethnic. according to the census of 1948, the serb population in croatia constituted 14.5% of the total population; the serb and croat populations in bosnia and hercegovina constituted 44.3% and 23.9%, respectively; albanians in macedonia comprised 17% of the population. the albanian population in serbia amounted to only 0.6%; however, in the serbian province of kosovo and metohia it entailed 68.5% of the total provincial population (the serb population being 23.6%). in serbian province vojvodina, the hungarian and croat populations amounted to 25.6% and 7.5% of total population, respectively. the ethnic and cultural differences www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 51 published by scholink inc. within the federal units were the source of latent tensions (conflict relations), which evolved into wellarticulated cultural and open political separatist demands over time (e.g., albanians in kosovo and metohia and macedonia, serbs in croatia and bosnia and hercegovina), especially after the constitution of 1974 gave more political, economic and cultural rights to the federal units. after tito’s death, and particularly after the introduction of multi-party system (following the breakup of the league of communists of yugoslavia in january 1990), the ethnic-based political aspirations found their legalized form within the political systems of federal units. because of the mixed ethnic compositions of the federal units, the conflict ethnic tensions within the units were extended to similar tensions between the units. the inter-unit conflict relations were further amplified by conflicting economic interests and by their own separate national interests in the relations with political and economic entities outside the federal frame. these separatist aspirations of certain federal units were actively supported by foreign countries with complementary interests. more specifically, one should mention the active role of germany, austria, italy, and to lesser extent hungary, in the independence establishing process, evident through the early recognition (by germany) of slovenia and croatia, and the massive financial and political support of bosnia and hercegovina by saudi arabia. albania and the us were actively supporting the separatist movements of albanians in kosovo and metohia during the 1990s, culminating with the us-led nato intervention in kosovo and bombardment of serbia in 1999. it should be noted that before and even after the badinter commission’s opinion that slovenia and croatia (the latter only conditionally) fulfilled the conditions for independence recognition, france, united kingdom and the netherlands expressed reservation about their independence recognition. the reunification of germany on august 31, 1990, was seen by these countries as a potential dominance of germany in europe, which through the close historic ties with independent slovenia and croatia would only be enhanced. the us held a similar belief and, therefore, recognized slovenia and croatia on april 7, 1992, almost three months after the eu countries. the global political situation and the relations between the major political actors on the international scene also had an important impact on the dissolution process of former yugoslavia. in march 1985 mikhail gorbachev was elected as secretary general of the communist party of the soviet union. he introduced a new level of democratization in both the party and society (“glasnost”-openness and “perestroika”-restructuring), some vague (unsuccessful) economic reforms, and abolished the old practice of soviet interventions in the internal affairs of the soviet-led eastern bloc countries. this liberalization fostered national movements and ethnic disputes within the soviet union and led to the revolutionary wave in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the soviet bloc countries, resulting in the disintegration of warsaw pact in july 1991 and the dissolution of soviet union in december of the same year. the end of the “cold war” radically changed the political landscape in europe and the relations within the global political system. the incentive of preserving the unity of yugoslavia was not of particular interest to any of the major world political actors; on the contrary, the independent new www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 52 published by scholink inc. states became attractive geostrategic targets for the world powers. 4. some legal issues related to the continuation of sfry un membership by fr yugoslavia after the recognition by ec of the independence of slovenia and croatia and the declaration of independence of bosnia and hercegovina on march 3, 1992, these three countries were admitted to un membership on may 22, 1992, by the un resolutions a/res/46/237, a/res/46/238 and a/res/46/236, respectively. the federal republic of yugoslavia (serbia and montenegro) claimed itself as a legal successor state of the sfry. however, following the recommendations of un security council resolutions sc/res/757 (may 30, 1992) and sc/res/777 (september 19, 1992), the un general assembly adopted the resolution a/res/47/1 on september 22 of the same year, determining that “the federal republic of yugoslavia (serbia and montenegro) cannot continue the membership of the former socialist federal republic of yugoslavia” in the united nations. therefore, it was decided that “the federal republic of yugoslavia (serbia and montenegro) should apply for membership to the united nations and that it shall not participate in the work of general assembly”. the denial of automatic membership of fry in the un was in stark contrast to the previous decision of the general assembly that the russian federation could automatically continue the un membership of the soviet union after its dissolution in december 1991. despite of the fact that a continuous un membership of russia is necessary for the smooth un operation (due to its permanent seat in the security council), the dissimilar treatment of the two legally identical cases is in contradiction with the un charter basic principle of “sovereign equality of its members” (article 2(1) ) . it should be noted that the primary purpose of the previously mentioned security council resolution 757, in which the successor status of federal republic of yugoslavia was denied, was to impose international sanctions on the country given its role in the yugoslav wars (as seen by the security council members). during that period gorbachev’s russia was trying to demonstrate its acceptance of the “western values” and its “openness for co-operation”. the negative image created by massive propaganda portraying fry as an aggressor in yugoslavia’s dissolution process might have led to the biased legal reasoning in the security council and in the general assembly. irrespective of these considerations, the legal fact remains that through the continuation of the membership of the former soviet union (ussr) by the russian federation and the denial of continuation of former yugoslavia (sfry) by federal republic of yugoslavia, an unequal treatment was applied, that violates article 2(1) of the charter. this example demonstrates how the positions of state entities in the world political system are determined by the relations between the states, especially by the relations between the most influential states, and how these relations may affect the legal actions of international institutions. the recommendation of the un security council in its resolution sc/res/777, incorporated later in the general assembly resolution a/res/47/1, that fry “should not participate in the work of general assembly”, was a political compromise between the us and some western sc members, on one side, and the russian federation, people’s republic of china and some other non-allied sc members, on the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 53 published by scholink inc. other. the original draft of the sc resolution 777, prepared by the united states, stated that the un general assembly should make the decision that the "yugoslavia's membership in the united nations be extinguished". this draft sc resolution was reformulated in order to obtain russian support and the resolution remained open to different interpretations. russian federation and the republic of china rejected the initial idea that the fry be excluded from all un organs, stating that its work in “the other organs should be unaffected”. meanwhile, india and zimbabwe (traditional allies of yugoslavia) observed and stated that sc resolution 777 violates article 5 of the united nations charter. since the membership of the former sfry to the un had not yet been extinguished, the sfry diplomatic mission to the united nations continued its work in the other un organs, while fry continued to pay the due yearly membership contribution to the un budget. this irregular membership status was acceptable to the fry leadership, and only after miloṧević was ousted from power on october 5, 2000, the federal republic of yugoslavia applied for un membership; it was admitted on november 1, 2000, by the general assembly resolution a/res/55/12. let us briefly analyze the legal soundness of sc resolution 777, regarding which india and zimbabwe voiced their concerns. the suspension of the right of a un member from participation in the work of the general assembly, or the suspension of any membership right, is regulated by article 5 of the un charter that reads: “a member of the united nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the security council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the general assembly upon the recommendation of the security council. the exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the security council”. it should be noted that the conditions under which the prior preventive or enforcement action had been taken by the security council, necessary for suspending a membership right by the council or the general assembly, are not explicitly specified in the resolution(s), and neither is their character. this ambiguity dilutes article 5 as a legal norm and opens the door for political considerations in its interpretation. although the legal basis for imposing the suspension of the right of sfry/fry to participate in the work of general assembly could only be article 5 of the charter, no specific preventive or enforcement action(s) taken by the security council were explicitly mentioned in the sc/res 777 and a/res/47/1 to justify the imposed suspension. in the absence of an explicit delineation of the specific preventive or enforcement action measures taken by security council (and supporting rationale), the recommendation and decision in the above mentioned resolutions for suspension of the sfry/fry right to participate in the work of general assembly are lacking the legal basis. as accurately observed by india’s and zimbabwe’s sc members, these resolutions are in violation with article 5 of the charter. thus, it can be concluded that the suspension of the right to participation in the work of the general assembly by the above un organs was imposed on the basis of political considerations alone, i.e., disregarding the un charter’s legal framework. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 54 published by scholink inc. 5. conclusion in the first part of this chapter we have laid down the historical background and the philosophical basis of a new doctrine, which we call dialectic relationism according to which the relations between the elements in a system play the dominant role in the system, determine its properties, behavior and are even the cause for the element’s existence in the system. the relations within a system are responsible for its unity and stability, but also for its disintegration. in complex systems, formed as union of subsystems, the relations between the sub-systems have the same meaning and role but, in addition, these systems acquire also certain collective properties and behavior. the fundamental character of the relation has been derived by using the dialectic logic in resolving the basic metaphysical problem of ‘something-nothing’ duality. in fact, it is the relation that transforms this duality into a unity. in the second part of the chapter we have applied the relationist doctrine to the problem of disintegration of former yugoslavia during 1990s. the former yugoslavia, consisting of six federal units (republics) with different historic and cultural backgrounds, multi-ethnic compositions and various levels of economic development, occupies a geostrategic territory in the balkans, where the geopolitical interests of western, eastern and middle eastern countries intersect. while at the beginning of its existence (1950s and 1960s) the enthusiasm of building a new socialist country on the territory of war devastated old kingdom of yugoslavia kept the unity of the state strong (under the political slogan “fratherhood and unity”), the inauguration of the democratization process and the “selfgovernment” socialist model in the 1960s resulted in clear manifestation of the latent inter-ethnic and inter-republic tensions (the latter mainly based on the economic inequality). after the adoption of the federal constitution in 1974, the autonomies of the republics (and the serbian provinces vojvodina and kosovo and metohia) were augmented to the level of quasi-statehood, and the co-operative character of the relations between the federal units was reversed. the ethnic intolerance was the primary contributing factor in this transformation, reinforced by the economic differences and inequalities. both factors together generated strong separatist aspirations in some of the republics, which began to manifest themselves openly after tito’s death. the dissolution of the league of communists of yugoslavia in 1990, followed by the introduction of the multi-party system and the violent inter-ethnic conflicts in croatia and bosnia and hercegovina, marked the beginning of the sfry disintegration process. by april 1992 all yugoslav republics, except for serbia and montenegro, had already separated from yugoslavia; the remaining two formed a new state, the federal republic of yugoslavia, which ceased to exist after montenegro declared its independence from serbia in june 2006. while the internal inter-ethnic conflict relations within and between the republics, accompanied by inter-republic conflict economic relations, were the main factors in the dissolution of former yugoslavia, the cooperative relations of some foreign states with the separatist republics contributed significantly to the separatist efforts of these republics, by supplying them with vital economic, financial, logistic, political and even military assistance. this was the case with the relations of germany, austria, italy and hungary with slovenia and croatia, as well as of saudi arabia with bosnia and hercegovina. the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 55 published by scholink inc. simultaneous dissolution of the soviet union and warsaw pact had a further “environmental” political impact on the dissociation of former yugoslavia, in the sense that the separation from an “authoritarian” complex state-entity, based on nationalist interests, was considered at the time as an acceptable natural expression of national aspirations for sovereign statehood (supported by the principle of “self-determination”). furthermore, the newly emerged independent sovereign states represented potential candidates for western alliances, such as nato and eu, likely impacting the change in the balance of power on the balkans. we have also discussed some legal issues related to the question of continuation of the un membership of former yugoslavia by the federal republic of yugoslavia. we have demonstrated that the political relations between the states, represented in the un political organs, can affect the decisions of these organs by giving preponderance to the political considerations over the legal norms enshrined in the un charter. the considered cases serve as clear examples of the fact that decisions made by the un political organs can be in severe violation of the legal provisions of the charter. acknowledgements this research has been funded by the ministry of science and technological development of the republic of serbia. references carr, e. h. (1946). the twenty years crisis, 1919-1939. london, uk: macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15208-7 cassirer, e. (1953). substance and function (p. 36). new york, ny: dover. cohen, l. g. (1993). broken bonds: the disintegration of yugoslavia. boulder, co: westview press. emirbayer, m. (1997). manifesto for a relational sociology. the american journal of sociology, 103(2), 281-317. https://doi.org/10.1086/231209 engels, f. (1968). dialectic of nature. new delhi: international publishers association. futch, m. (2008). leibniz’s metaphysics of time and space. springer, new york, ny. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8237-5 gilpin, r. (1981). war and change in world politics. cambridge, uk: cambridge univ. press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511664267 glenny, m. (1993). the fall of yugoslavia. london, uk: penguin. hegel, g. f. w. (1977). phenomenology of spirit. oxford, uk: clarendon press. heidegger, m. (2000). introduction to metaphysics. yale: yale univ. press. henkin, l., puch, r. c., schachter, o., & smit, h. (1993). international law: cases and materials (p. 253). eagan, mn; west group publ. janev, i. (1999). legal aspects of provisional name for macedonia in the un. american journal of international law, 93(1), 155-160. https://doi.org/10.2307/2997959 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 56 published by scholink inc. janev, i. (2003). some aspects of the legal status of macedonia in the united nations organization. macedonian affairs, iv(9), 69-78. janev, i. (2006). responsibility of the united nations for macedonia`s accession to the un. romanian j. political science, 6(1), 23-43. janev, i., & petrović, d. (2010). legal mode for advisory redress at the international court of justice for the case of macedonian un membership. review of international affairs, lxi(1140), 48-72. kaipayil, j. (2009). relationism: a theory of being. bangalore: jip publications. kegley, c. w. (1995). controversies in international relations theory (pp. 4-5). new york. ny: st. martin’s press. keohane, r. o. (1984). after hegemony. princeton, nj: princeton univ. press. keohane, r. o. (1986). neorealism and its critics. new york, ny: columbia univ. press. keohane, r. o., & nye, j. s. (1977). power and interdependence: world politics in transition. new york, ny: little, brown. lazić, m. (1994). system and collapse: breakdown of the socialism and the structure of yugoslav society. beograd, rs: filip viṧnjić. morgentau, h. (1948). politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace. new york, ny: alfred a. knopf. nakarada, r. (ed.) (1995). europe and the disintegration of yugoslavia. beograd, rs: institute for european studies. obrenović, z. (1994). socioloṧki pregled. sociological review, xxviii, 167-187. ray, c. (2008). time, space and philosophy. oxford, uk: elsevier. silber, l., & little, a. (1997). yugoslavia: death of a nation. new york, ny: penguin books. simić, p. (1995). dynamics of the yugoslav crisis. security dialogue, 26(2), 153-172. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010695026002004 von bertalanffy, l. (1971). general systems theory. london, uk: pinguin press. waltz, k. n. (1979). theory of international politics. new york, ny: random house. woodward, s. l. (1995). balkan tragedy. washington, dc: brookings institution. microsoft word ape-v4n1-p1 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 1 original paper striking similarities: the origins of the european economic community david blake1* 1 university of london, united kingdom * david blake, university of london, united kingdom received: november 16, 2019 accepted: december 28, 2020 online published: january 4, 2021 doi:10.22158/ape.v4n1p1 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v4n1p1 abstract a plan for a european economic community was developed at the university of berlin in 1942. there are striking similarities with the european economic community that was introduced in 1957—and which became the foundation stone of the european union. particularly striking is the innate hostility both to liberal economic values and to democracy—a hostility that permeates the eu to this very day. keywords origins of the european economic community, university of berlin 1942, european union jel codes f45, f55, n14, n24, n34, n44 1. introduction a plan for a european economic community was first proposed in 1942. at its heart is a customs union and a single market. the plan covered all areas necessary for economic integration. its ultimate aim was full economic and political union with state economic leadership over highly regulated private sector companies, but without any requirement for securing democratic consent. we compare the plan with the european economic community introduced in 1957 and discuss how it turned out in practice. we end by discussing how believers in liberal economic values and democracy should respond. 2. a plan for a european economic community was first proposed in 1942 a conference was held in 1942 at the berlin school of economics—part of the university of berlin—on the theme of a creating a “european economic community”. speakers included academics, government ministers and industry practitioners. a conference volume was published, europaeische wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, which was subsequently translated into english. (note 1) there is also a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 2 published by scholink inc. partial translation by edward spalton. (note 2) what is particularly interesting is that the very same term “european economic community” (eec) was adopted by the principal founding fathers of the european union, jean monnet and robert schuman. it is not known if they were directly aware of the 1942 plan for a eec. yet there are striking similarities between the plan and the eec that they helped to establish just fifteen years later. the 1942 plan is not well known, and needs to be much better known, since it has had—possibly subconsciously—a significant impact on both the economic philosophy underlying the eec and the political thinking behind the european union (eu) itself. this is because at its heart is a strong dislike of what is described variously as english/anglo-saxon/anglo-american/liberal-capitalist laissez-faire economics and a particular distaste for the usa, with its “addiction for records. …americans must always have the largest, the best, the fattest, the longest, the fastest and so on”. the underlying economic philosophy behind the plan for the eec is “state economic leadership” over heavily regulated private sector companies which are expected to operate as efficiently as possible using the latest available technologies. it differs therefore from the soviet state planning model, where the vast bulk of businesses are state owned. professor dr heinrich hunke, president of the publicity council of german industry, in the introduction to the 1942 plan, provides the following motivation for a european economic community: the existing failures of clarity arise in the first case around the concept of the control of the economy, the degree of solidarity and neighbourly support, the development of individual strengths, the concern over the maintenance of living standards and the question of raw material purchases from foreign economic areas. it is natural that each considers this according to the proportions of whatever question stands in the foreground of his interest. we should try in this place to establish whether a conclusive answer can be given. there can be no doubt that the concept of economic control, or rather economic leadership, is as much revolutionary as it is new. the fact of its establishment is more important than fate and the significance of european co-operation, not least because a new, unitary concept depends on it. the anglo-saxon economy is no longer classic but obsolete. it comes therefore to this: that a new ideological and terminological concept has arisen, which has a particular sturdy foundation of communication and co-operation. in particular, the following individual points should be noted: 1) state economic leadership is no momentary crisis solution, but forms the core of the new theory and practice. it replaces the autonomic egotism and the automatic, self-acting laws of the anglo-saxon theory. 2) economic direction and control is not synonymous with a tendency towards a planned economy. it strives neither for the extinction of individuality nor for the administration of the economy through the state apparatus. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 3 published by scholink inc. 3) state economic leadership signifies much more the new empowerment of the originative and creative power of the individual grounded in the community, the creation of a uniform economic understanding and attitude, the allocation of decisive tasks through the political leadership and the final decision of the state in all questions of economic power. apart from this, the economy is free and self-responsible. 3. at the heart of the plan for the european economic community are a customs union and a single market one key component of the 1942 plan for a eec is a customs union (zollverein). this is important for helping to create “economic unity” as discussed by walther funk, reichs economics minister and president of the reich bank, in his plan chapter the economic face of the new europe: about a century ago, german economic unity began to be formed out of a plethora of territorial economies. a political unification of germany was then unthinkable, but all the same, economic agreements were crowned by the achievement of the german customs union of 1843. this released a mighty growth in the economy. how did things look then? anyone wanting to travel through germany drove on bad roads, paying countless customs duties and bridge tolls through dozens of states. every one of these states had its own sovereign territory, its own finance system, its own currency and sought, as an independent economy, to stand on its own feet. the responsible men of the time simply did not grasp that their large neighbors england and france were more economically advanced only because they had created at the right time a level of technology and economic activity in a sufficiently large area (grossraumwirtschaft). another key component is a europe-wide single (or internal) market, as funk goes on to explain: if now instead of germany we consider europe, we come naturally, impelled by pure economics, if not to the same then to very similar conclusions. once again, it is technical, economic development which presses unstoppably towards the formation of a great continental economic area. today, technology offers such possibilities as cannot be fully realised within the bounds of a single national economy. the raising of railway speeds, the building of traffic networks and waterways, energy grids which connect the whole continent with undreamt possibilities of developing the latest technologies, above all through the aero plane: these have pulled the borders of all states closer to each other. already outside europe, stemming from these facts, large economic areas are rising or in active contemplation. in its own interest, europe cannot remain in the backwardness of its romantic hankerings after the era of the mail coach. certainly, the difficulties of european economic unification are harder than those which the german customs union had to overcome. also the methods will be different, more complicated and not to be mastered fully with a customs union. in spite of that, the unification of the european economy will come because its time is here and now. …if one only considers the natural potential of our continent, it becomes apparent that europe, in fact, meets all the requirements of a complete, self-sufficient economic area. professor hunke discusses the benefits from “completing the single market” with the help of a large www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 4 published by scholink inc. number of “directives”: the concept of the large economic area has proved to be viable. i see no obstruction which can seriously stand in the way of its realization. for the formation of large economic areas follows a natural law of development. …trade between individual states will not yet be classified as internal trade because a complete abolition of customs and currency controls is not immediately practicable. nevertheless, as trade within the great economic in norway, the market gardener in holland and the danish poultry breeder will need have no concern that they can dispose of their produce or have it left on their hands. they also need not worry that the price will fairly reward their efforts. then they will know that production and sales prospects are founded and secured by inter-state treaties and that there is no more room for speculators and crises. the workers in the spinning mills of the protectorate, in the chemical works of france and in the mines of belgium will no longer have to fear wage cuts or unemployment. they can rely on this: that the european economic area contains further unrealised technical and natural possibilities in abundance and a demand for consumer goods of all kinds from masses of people, which will never be [fully] met. the word “unemployment” will not be found in the european economic dictionary. …it should not go unrecognized that the system of community economic endeavour naturally requires on-going state directives in a larger quantity than those to which businessmen in many european states were previously accustomed. the …previous operation of the internal german economy show[s] clearly that the state, even in the controlled economy, can and will leave to the industrialist and entrepreneur his original and proper field of activity. …private enterprise remains. …the complicated economy of our century needs state control, but it is not able to function without the driving forces of entrepreneurial initiative. in the uk, the combination of the customs union and single market is better known as the common market. the uk joined the common market on 1 january 1973. 4. the 1942 plan covered all areas necessary for economic integration the plan covered all areas needed for economic integration to work effectively. for example, there are chapters on the european industrial economy (by dr anton reithinger, leader of the national economy department of ig farben industries ag, berlin), the deployment of labour in europe (by dr philip beisiegel, ministerial director, ministry of labour), and european transport questions (by gustav koenigs, state secretary, berlin). professor hunk explains why a europe-wide industrial policy is needed: “the european economic community has no interest in seeing potential and capabilities lying unused anywhere. … [but] the national spirit of the individual economies must not be allowed to oppose neighborly cooperation”. a particular problem at the time was rural over-population which led to temporary and seasonal emigration of workers. this should be dealt with by the economic “intensification” (or industrialization) of these areas. this would lead to the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 5 published by scholink inc. “awakening of new economic demands” which would avoid the problem of “[p]ermanent emigration from europe [which] is by all the laws of our time as false as it is impossible”. you can see immediately here the similarity with the eu’s single market in goods and labour, with the aim of creating an efficient self-sustaining internal market that maximized resource allocation in all parts of the eec. while temporary and seasonal migration are accepted as “partial solutions”, permanent emigration would be a sign of failure of the system. it is also unnecessary, as hunke points out: “the harmonization of the newly free powers of labour in the new sectors of the common economy can be achieved without difficulty”. there is also a chapter on european agriculture by professor dr emil woermann from the university of halle. the common agricultural policy (cap) that was adopted by the eu could well have been drawn directly from the plan, as edward spalton discovered: “i worked in the animal feed business and the changeover from free trade in food from all the world to the highly protectionist, minutely officially controlled, mind-bogglingly complicated cap was a profound culture shock. something so detailed obviously had to have an ideology behind it, but nobody could tell me what it was. it was entirely alien to the common-sense system we had known before. [woermann’s] paper reveals its philosophical fountain head completely. the cap, which we joined on 1 january 1973, was not just similar to, but exactly based on, the ideology and policy which he set out. the eec’s biggest project andbudget item was squarely founded on principles and policy objectives, decided in berlin by 1942”. the purpose of the cap was to provide an assured income to farmers in rural areas, leading to an increase in prosperity and a reduction rural de-population. a common europe-wide currency was envisaged in the chapter on european currency questions by dr bernhard benning, director of the reich credit institution, berlin. nevertheless, it is apparent that “money” was regarded as a necessary evil in the plan. the role of the common currency was to facilitate intra-european trade, although this was a clear second-best option compared with the preferred one: “in the [ideal] continental european bloc, there will be no gold. everything will be settled through clearing—goods against goods”. in other words, what was preferred was a sophisticated barter system with clearing exchanges to match buyers and sellers. funk accepted that: “it will certainly be no easy task to bring the currencies of europe together. …but they can be brought into stability amongst themselves and then with currencies outside europe. but this task is only possible if we first bring the european national economies into order and thereby stabilize the internal worth of their currencies. then, with co-operation in trade policy, the external values can be brought into line”. this is now known as the funk plan (note 3) and was initially proposed in 1940. dr karl clodius, ambassador in the german foreign office, discusses european trade and economic treaties. the primary purpose of exporting, according to the plan, was to secure raw materials not available in europe, so that these could be used to increase the output of finished products which could then be sold in europe and increase the welfare of european citizens. this would be arranged through a “framework of constructive and far-sighted economic treaties”. however, funk had not yet decided www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 6 published by scholink inc. whether the procurement of overseas raw materials should be through the clearing system or by free currency exchange. he was very uncomfortable with the latter: “currency movements though will always be subject to a certain irreducible level of state control so that no unforeseen, uncontrollable movement of capital can destroy the essential, planned state direction of the economy”. notice the hostility to money and finance, given the risk that they cannot be completely controlled from the centre and so can disrupt well-laid plans. such a view is not confined to the berlin school of economics in the 1940s. modern-day france, for example, is also opposed to “finance capital”—as exemplified by françois hollande (note 4) who, when elected president, announced that his “only real enemy” was the “world of finance”. also notice the hostility to international trade: it was a necessary evil to pay for raw materials that were not available domestically. fiscal policy is also critical. funk again: “it is unavoidably essential to have a tight, prudent public expenditure policy, as in the private economy. above all, there must be a sensible control of production and demand, a control over money and credit and of consumption. we will deal with all these things in one way so that no upheavals occur. they will not occur because we recognize in good times what must be done. we have everything in hand through the authoritarian means of the state to bring these things promptly to order. [a key role of taxation is to ensure] excessive purchasing power be avoided. on the other hand, we have always taken care from social grounds that the screw of taxation should not beturned too tightly. we wish to maintain the will to enterprise and achievement. in this matter, the ministry of the economy has always been on guard”. german obsession with fiscal discipline, readily apparent in the above statement, is as strong today, where it is known as the black zero (schwarze null) policy, i.e., ensuring fiscal balance virtually every year—whatever the macroeconomic state of the economy. this obsession extends to german insistence on eu-wide fiscal discipline. this is enforced by germany’s refusal to allow the eu to become a “transfer union”. in a “transfer union”, the central government makes fiscal transfers from regions with internal trade surpluses to regions with internal trade deficits to ensure the economy as a whole remains in balance. it is essential for the effective operation of a unitary state, and many federal states, such as the usa, also make internal fiscal transfers to stabilise their economies. but in the federal eu, germany—which has an enormous trade surplus with the other member states as a result of the uber smart way it arranged for the deutschmark to convert to euros at the most favorable possible conversion rate—refuses to make fiscal transfers to deficit member states, such as italy. 5. the ultimate aim of the plan was full economic and political union the final chapter of the plan is called the basic question of europe: a geographical concept or a political fact. professor hunke argues that: “europe is a community of living space, a single economic area. the desire for security from crises can no longer be achieved by independence from each other, but only through the common improvement of europe’s individual national economies”. expansion to cover the whole of the european continent was also part of the plan. hunke again: “[the plan] should www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 7 published by scholink inc. underline the common destiny of the peoples of europe and emphasise the fact that enlargement of the economic community into presently foreign lands is both possible and desirable”. a key benefit would be access to key raw materials, such as oil, not available within the existing economic area—again to reduce the dependence on international trade. funk was more specific about political union being a longer-term aim: “the european peoples should at last be able to acknowledge that they live in a community of destiny, which in logic leads only to one conclusion, namely europe-wide, continental co-operation. previous years were not politically ripe for this”. political union was, in funk’s view, essential to protect europeans from the negative consequences of “liberal-capitalist” market forces: to impress upon you this theme and to sum it up succinctly, i must saythis. the economic face of the new europe… will have two essential characteristics: common endeavored economic freedom. granted, this will not be that economic freedom which is embodied in capitalism and which is now nearing its end. …as a promise to the people of europe, the liberal-capitalist ideal of economic freedom is lifted from them. today it is sinking in misery, blood and flames. what were the promises of liberal economic thought? according to the liberal theory, economic life unfolded its greatest potential when individuals followed their own interests without restriction. the state can leave the harmonious development of the economy to free competition, through which the self-interest of every individual will, in the end, serve the good of the whole. it is believed that fully free trade will ensure by means of competition that each country will provide the goods which are most suited to its own conditions of production. according to the theory, every nation can buy on the world market where it is cheapest, whilst selling its own products at the lowest costs and best profits due to their natural conditions. consumers can provide themselves most richly with goods, businessmen employ their resources unhindered and the workers seek their employment where the highest wages are paid. the desired state of so-called social harmony seems most surely to be achievable in this way. but how did it turn out in practice? …without doubt however, the different individual peoples, like individual companies, did not draw the same advantages from this system inspire of apparently similar opportunities. the english moral philosophy of hobbes and hume, which was permeated by david ricardo with a typical shot of jewish spirit, proved in the first place to be an exceptional means of establishing and preserving british world domination. at the moment this system reached its peak, the english had developed their industry most. theywent into the race with the largest cost advantages. because they also possessed the largest merchant marine and navy in the world, they could tune in to the great circuit of world trade in such a way that their economic and political power grew proportionately. every intensification of traffic in goods created new profits. the whole world worked in english money and the english were the bankers, the manufacturers, the traders, the carriers and, last not least, the policemen of the world. …but the debit balance of the british-capitalist era is, in fact, even greater. they wanted to keep all www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 8 published by scholink inc. peoples in the position of favorites or stepchildren of the liberal economic order. the effects of the laissez-faire system, especially the principle of free trade, caused severe internal, economic damage. the symptoms of this sickness were everywhere the same. agriculture in the industrialized states could not gain sufficient support against the interests of industry, trade, bank and stock exchange. self-sufficiency in food supplies was lost, the aggregation of large estates began, the peasantry sank into poverty, the population streamed from the land to the cities or overseas. a thin upper stratum of bankers, industrialists and speculators could accumulate grotesque wealth and also create for themselves dangerous power over the state– because everything could be bought for money—in particular public opinion. on the other side, the industrial proletariat grew ever larger. the increasing dissatisfaction of this class drove them into pseudo socialist marxism and communism. all these indications were not sufficiently heeded, perhaps because of the prevailing trend of the time—”get rich, it matters not how”—which disproportionately obscured a true view of the facts. certainly, liberalism was a system of “freedom”. anyone who could not find work and bread in his own country had the “freedom” to emigrate. and if things were going badly economically for a nation, it had the “freedom” to burden itself with debt in england. but this kind of freedom was badly founded in moral terms as was its continued existence. …[t]he world war of 1914-18 was both the high point of the capitalist economic system and simultaneously the beginning of its end. …since the first world war, the peoples of europe have come through a generation-long, pitiless lesson. we all know this and some of us sooner, some of us later, realized that the idol of freedom of this vanished epoch was false and pernicious. with war, inflation, the most extreme economic crises, hunger and unemployment—the lesson was hammered into people. that the sense and purpose of all economies did not lie in the self-seeking, irresponsible making of profits but in the fulfillment of a social task. it is no wonder that the people of central europe, who suffered most under the lash of this unsocial system, first conceived a different, higher ideal of freedom. in securing the basic supplies of food and raw materials, in the liberation of the economy from international financial interests and dependency, in the voluntary submission of the individual to the primacy of a people’s economy, we glimpse today the new ideal of a true economic freedom. …the will towards european community effort, as it is forged under hard wartime conditions must become the leading concern of the basic, ruling economic theory in peacetime too. that means a constant effort to understand the great objectives and coming tasks and to get stuck into them. it also means a readiness, in certain circumstances, to subordinate one’s own interests to those of the european community. that isthe highest goal which we require from the european states and we are striving to attain it. in individual cases, this will mean sacrifices, but the outcome is that all peoples will benefit. what is remarkable about this passage is that the plan’s notion of “economic freedom” is diametrically www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 9 published by scholink inc. opposed to the idea of liberal economic thought propounded by economists and philosophers in the uk over centuries. instead, there was a “higher ideal of freedom” embodied in the “voluntary submission of the individual to the primacy of a people’s economy” and a readiness to “subordinate one’s own interests to those of the european community”. and it does not just refer to individuals. all european states are “required” to submit to the “common endeavour”, so that the outcome is that “all peoples will benefit”. continent-wide self-sufficiency is also a very important objective, with an overarching concern to “secur[e] the basic supplies of food and raw materials”. 6. comparison with the european economic community introduced in 1957 there are a number of striking similarities between the 1942 plan and the european economic community introduced on 25 march 1957:  the establishment of a centralised, highly bureaucratic system of administration in the form of the european commission.  the exercise of economic and political leadership through “directives”—the same term used by hunke—from the commission in order to maximise “community economic endeavour”. there have been more than 80,000 directives—including “regulations and decisions”—since 1957. there have been more than 50,000 in the last 25 years (note 5) alone, emanating from more than 150 specialist working parties and committees, known as the “council preparatory bodies”. (note 6)  the importance of a continent-wide european economic community which recognises the continent’s “natural potential” and hence “meets all the requirements of a complete, self-sufficient economic area”.  the introduction of a customs union with a common external tariff on imports into the eu set by the commission.  a single market subject to detailed regulations also set by the commission.  a common commercial policy in which all trade deals with other countries are negotiated by the commission via a “framework of constructive and far-sighted economic treaties”, reflecting the plan’s hostility to the “principle of free trade [which] cause[s] severe internal, economic damage”.  a common agricultural policy to guarantee and stabilise farmers’ incomes.  eu-wide management of common resources such as fish via a common fisheries policy.  expansion of the eu into eastern and south-eastern europe. since 2007, the eu has spent €23bn via the pre-accession assistance fund (note 7) on financial and technical support to a number of “enlargement countries”—or what hunke called “presently foreign lands”—such as albania (€1.24bn), bosnia and herzegovina (€0.78bn), kosovo (€1.28bn), macedonia (€1.28bn), montenegro (€0.51bn), serbia (€2.89bn) and turkey (€9.25bn).  the stability and growth pact with its five structural and investment funds: o european regional development fundš—“promotes balanced development in the different regions of the eu”. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 10 published by scholink inc. o european social fund—“supports employment-related projects throughout europe and invests in europe’s human capital—its workers, its young people and all those seeking a job”. o cohesion fund—”funds transport and environment projects in countries where the gross national income per inhabitant is less than 90% of the eu average. in 2014-20, these are bulgaria, croatia, cyprus, the czech republic, estonia, greece, hungary, latvia, lithuania, malta, poland, portugal, romania, slovakia and slovenia”. o european agricultural fund for rural development— “focuses on resolving the particular challenges facing eu’s rural areas”. o european maritime and fisheries fund—“helps fishermen to adopt sustainable fishing practices and coastal communities to diversify their economies, improving quality of life along european coasts”.  the european exchange rate mechanism—introduced in 1979 to reduce exchange rate variability and achieve monetary stability across europe, in preparation for economic and monetary union and the introduction of the euro—precisely followed the funk plan.  a policy of fiscal discipline, introduced via the maastricht criteria, with strict limits on the size of member state budget deficits—they must not exceed 3% of gross domestic product (gdp) or 2.2% if the member state is also in the eurozone—and national debts—they must not exceed 60% of gdp. these limits apply whether their breach is due to an economic recession beyond the control of the member state or due to government spending profligacy. in addition, no distinction is made between current and capital expenditures. all of this is fully in line with the schwartze null fiscal policy outlined in the plan.  consistent with this belief in rigid fiscal discipline, the refusal to allow the federal eu to become a “transfer union”, thereby forcing member states to solve their economic problems through “enterprise and achievement”.  hostility to free markets, especially money and capital markets, which could interfere with the implementation of the plan, leading to a heavy reliance on the banking and insurance sectors to provide both shortand long-term financing to the corporate sector. this explains why capital markets union (note 8) has been such a failure.  the concepts of solidarity and neighborly support, so long as members fit in with the plan. some of the above quotes come from the plan, while others come from the eu website—it is hard to differentiate. 7. but how did it turn out in practice? the plan’s aims for the eec were to exploit the continent’s full natural potential and to ensure self-sufficiency. these led to the following objectives: “prices will fairly reward” the efforts of producers, and production and sales will be secured through inter-state treaties, and there will be “no more room for speculators and crises” or “fear wage cuts or unemployment”. how did it turn out in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 11 published by scholink inc. practice? it is difficult to quantitatively assess how comprehensively these objectives have been met across all eu member states. however, unemployment rates are reported and “unemployment” was going to be banished from the european economic dictionary. at the end of 2019—so prior to the massive distortions caused by the global coronavirus pandemic—the average eurozone unemployment rate was 7.8%. it was 18% in greece, 10.5% in italy, 8.8% in france, but only 3.2% in germany. so only in germany can we say that unemployment has been effectively “banished”. by comparison, the uk unemployment rate was 4%. youth unemployment is far worse. it averaged 16.1% in the eurozone. it was40% in greece, 33% in italy, 20% in france, and 5.6% in germany. in the uk, it was 11.5%. so this demonstrates a massive failure of the eurozone economic system to provide the balancing mechanisms that were promised by funk. the uk, by contrast, measures favourably on both unemployment measures, except when compared with germany. then there is the common currency, the euro, which is regarded as one of the greatest achievements of the eu. milton friedman said the euro would be a great success until the first financial crisis—and so it turned out. the eurozone economies were roughly in balance, with trade flows between them being largely offsetting, but since the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, (note 9) this is far from the case. a key underlying problem is that the eurozone does not satisfy the economic conditions for being an optimal currency area, (note 10) a geographical area over which a single currency and monetary policy can operate on a sustainable long-term basis. the different business cycles in the eurozone, combined with poor labour and capital market flexibility, mean that systematic trade surpluses and deficits will build up—because inter-regional exchange rates can no longer be changed. surplus regions need to recycle the surpluses back to deficit regions via transfers to keep the eurozone economies in balance. but as previously mentioned, the largest surplus country—germany—refuses formally to allow the eu to become a “transfer union”. this means that deficit countries including the largest of these—italy—end up in a recession, owing huge debts. they are unable to use fiscal policy to boost aggregate demand, again because of german insistence on fiscal discipline, and the supply-side policy of appealing to “enterprise and achievement” has also been ineffective. so the recession becomes permanent. the italian economy has not grown since italy joined the euro in 1999. the plan also promised to end wage cuts. ireland provides a striking example of the failure of this objective. between 2008 and 2011, median and mean total disposable income (excluding all social transfers) in ireland fell by 30% and 21%, respectively. these cuts were required as part of the eu”s rescue package for the collapsed irish banking system. irish banks had lent excessively to property speculators—another group that was going to be banned—leading to a property boom. had ireland had its own currency, the irish central bank would have raised interest rates to curtail the boom. but ireland is a member of the eurozone where interest rates are set to suit the economic needs of germany, in particular, rather than peripheral members such as ireland. ireland had no alternative but to sit it out and wait for the inevitable collapse of its banks—and then pay for it through massive wage cuts. so www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 12 published by scholink inc. much for “solidarity and neighborly support”. the idea of parliamentary approval is not mentioned in the plan. a european parliament was introduced with appointed members in 1958 and with directly elected ones from 1979. but its role is to do little more than rubber-stamp the directives proposed by the commission. it is unable to initiate, block or repeal legislation. while it can suggest amendments to proposed legislation, these can be ignored by the commission. belgian historian david van reybrouck, in his 2016 book against elections: the case for democracy, describes the european parliament as little better than one of the “councils of the people” in the interwar colonial empires of the belgium, holland, britain, or france—with the real power resting with a distant imperial executive. nevertheless, this has not prevented the onward march to political union. the eec was transformed into the european union on 1 november 1993 with the aim of being a continent-wide economic and then political entity. full political unification was the clearly stated objective of jean-claude juncker, president of the european commission from 2014 to 2019, in one of his final state of the union addresses—ideally by 2025. germany is the strongest supporter, just as it was in 1942. as soon as german reunification had been achieved in 1990, helmut kohl, the german chancellor at the time, announced: “we now seek political unification, the construction of a united states of europe”. this was supported by ursula von der leyen, the new president of the european commission, in an article in der spiegel (note 11) in 2011. the present german chancellor, angela merkel, explains how it will happen: “of course, the european commission will one day become a government, the european council a second chamber and the european parliament will have more powers”. but the reality is that the european union is not an institution interested in giving “more powers” to the representatives of the people. significantly, the authoritarianism of the original 1942 plan is still there below the surface in the modern eu. just as walther funk was fond of saying “we have everything in hand through the authoritarian means of the state to bring these things promptly to order”, so juncker is fond of saying “there can be no democratic choice against the european treaties”. yanis varoufakis, the former greek finance minister, sums it up well and he should know better than most: “in truth, brussels is a democracy-free zone”. the proof of this is that once those 150 or so council preparatory bodies have framed policies, it will often already be too late to inject much democratic oversight into the draftsmanship. (note 12) similarly, the concepts of solidarity and neighborly support are there only so long as member states fit in. witness the ruthlessness with which deviant member states, such as greece, (note 13) are treated. even states that are not part of the eu are not immune from what can only be described as eu bullying and control creep. one example is switzerland (note 14) which was threatened with losing access to eu markets when it voted in a referendum to limit “mass migration” to stop the undercutting of local wages; switzerland is a signatory to the schengen agreement, but is not a member of either the single market or the customs union. another is norway which was threatened with having its salmon sales to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 13 published by scholink inc. the eu blocked when it refused to implement the eu postal services directive; (note 15) norway is in the single market and has to accept an average of five new eu directives every day, (note 16) without having any vote on them, a state of affairs which norwegians call “fax democracy”. both countries eventually backed down. but the eu is never satisfied. it is currently trying to bring switzerland (note 17) under its legal and regulatory control by forcing it to accept the “dynamic alignment” of eu rules on migration, social security, and key areas of economic policy in perpetuity. because of swiss resistance, it has suspended the trading of swiss shares on eu stock exchanges and is threatening to withdraw mutual recognition for exports of medical equipment. nor did the plan mention any legal framework under which it would operate. the european court of justice (ecj) was set up in 1952. it is the highest court in the eu and has “ultimate sovereignty”. the ecj itself established the primacy of eu law over the laws of member states in the costa v enel case (note 18) in 1964, without any approval of this by elected politicians. the ecj’s members, like those of the commission, are unelected. it operates using the “purposive approach” (note 19) which means that it interprets eu laws according to their “purpose” rather than to what the text of the law actually states—which is what happens in common law countries. and, of course, the “purpose” frequently changes to reflect the changing intentions of the commission. the ecj is therefore a political court, not a neutral interpreter of eu laws. the uk granted “ultimate sovereignty” to the ecj when it passed the 1972 european communities act. only once since 1964 has the supremacy of the ecj been questioned and that was in may 2020 when the germany federal constitutional court (note 20) declared that the european central bank’s public sector purchase (i.e., quantitative easing) programme in 2015 was ultra vires and exceeded eu competences and, by implication, that eu law did not overrule member state law which, in the case of germany, would not have sanctioned this programme. 8. how should believers in liberal economic values and democracy respond? hunk described the plan thus: “it contains …the obligation that from considerations of european freedom, continental europe must receive first loyalty in all economic transactions. …[i]t must be firmly held above all that the national spirit of the individual economies must not be allowed to oppose neighborly cooperation”. this centralizing authoritarianism permeates much of what we see in the european union today, particularly in terms of the commission directives and ecj rulings that restrict economic and political freedoms. so what can believers in liberal economic values and democracy do? a few of them might take the view that it would have been better for countries like the uk to remain in the eu in order to “reform” its aberrations from within. but it should be clear from the above that this is impossible. so much of the plan has been implemented—again possibly subconsciously—that it now has a life of its own. there are no aberrations: what you see is what is fully intended. and arch euro-federalists, like jean-claude juncker, guy verhofstadt and michel barnier, have no intention of changing any element of the plan or www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 14 published by scholink inc. allowing it to be reversed. they take the long view and remember that it took 150 years for the usa to become a fully united economic and political entity with a single currency being used in all states. however, most will surely recognise that the eu is incapable of being reformed (note 21) and that it was better for the uk to fully leave the eu politically and economically as soon as possible. nevertheless, it should be readily apparent—in the light of the plan—that the eu would not be willing to make this easy. this was made very clear when the eu published its negotiating guidelines (note 22) in january 2020 and in the subsequent negotiations, led from the eu side by michel barnier. the eu’s intention was to oblige the uk to follow eu law in respect of “competition and state aid, tax, social, environment and regulatory measures and practices”—the so-called “level playing field” conditions—and be subject to the rulings of the ecj in perpetuity. this would have left the uk with absolutely no freedom of manoeuvre to negotiate any meaningful free trade agreements with other countries. we know that the plan does not like these at all. in the event, the uk negotiating team, led by lord david frost, was able to extract from the eu a standard free trade agreement in which disputes were settled by international arbitration rather than the ecj. (note 23) the agreement was signed on behalf of the eu by european commission president, ursula von der leyen, and by european council president, charles michel, in brussels on 30 december 2020. it was then flown to london by the royal air forceand signed on behalf of the uk government by boris johnson in downing street. later the same day, the uk parliament voted in favour of the agreement by 521 votes to 73. it passed into uk law as the eu (future relationship) act, having received royal assent, on 31 december 2020. (note 24) what is noteworthy is that the european parliament played no role whatsoever in approving this historic agreement. it was merely allowed to “ratify” the agreement after it came into effect on 31 december 2020, thereby magnificently confirming van reybrouck’s point that the european parliament’s role is simply to rubber-stamp agreements already made by the commission, and, in the process, making a mockery of the very concept of ratification. equally noteworthy is that neither von der leyen nor michel are elected by the european people, unlike those who signed and voted for the agreement in the uk. further, those who argued for a complete separation need to be much more nuanced. in particular, they must recognize just how much the 1942 plan has influenced how the eu has developed. this, in turn, implies that many of the proposals in the plan will implicitly have widespread acceptance—both in the uk and on the european continent. for example, there will be many people who will readily agree with funk when he says that “the european peoples should …acknowledge that they live in a community of destiny, which in logic leads only to one conclusion, namely europe-wide, continental co-operation”. similarly, many will support hunke when he states that “the desire for security from crises can no longer be achieved by independence from each other but only through the common improvement of europe’s individual national economies” or when he calls for state economic leadership over highly regulated private sector companies and the “final decision of the state in all questions of economic power”. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 15 published by scholink inc. soif proponents of free markets continue to talk about having a bonfire of regulations or having a free trade agreement with the usa which puts chlorinated chicken on supermarket shelves—without taking account of the plan’s already extensive influence—they are likely to alienate even many brexit (note 25) supporters. they should also recognise the particular anger on the continent about the global financial crisis which completely disrupted the eu’s well-laid plans for further economic integration and which is blamed entirely on “liberal-capitalist” market forces. the gfc explains why so many people both in the uk and on the continent fully support funk’s call for “the liberation of the economy from international financial interests and dependency”. 9. conclusion very few people know about the 1942 plan: boris johnson (note 26) is a rare exception, although he misses the key economic implications. the principal founding fathers of the european project, monnet and schuman, never acknowledged the plan when they set up the european economic community. the european union’s website does not mention the plan: instead it states that the idea of a european union originated with winston churchill’s speech at zurich university in 1946. (note 27) now this is somewhat disingenuous, since, as professor robert tombs has pointed out, (note 28) european federalism has a far longer history. it goes back at least to the 18th century. victor hugo called for a united states of europe (use) in the 1860s, while ernest renan—author of what is a nation?—predicted in the 1880s that the european nations would inevitably be replaced by a use. there have also been previous attempts at economic integration. for example, britain and france set up what has been called the first common market, with plans for a common currency and rights of citizenship, in the 1860s. then there was a latin monetary union between france, belgium, italy, and switzerland between 1865 and 1927. in the world war i, germany had a plan for an economic area which historian niall ferguson has dubbed the “kaiser’s common market”. however, this misses two key points. the first is that, while there have been many previous calls for a federal europe, there has only ever been one detailed proposal for a european economic community—and that is the 1942 plan. and we have shown that this plan has had an enormous impact on how the eu has developed. surely this is not pure coincidence? it seems to me inconceivable that the plan was not known to at least some of the eu’s founding fathers—and in particular, walter hallstein. (note 29) he was the first president of the european commission between 7 january 1958 and 30 june 1967 and had been a member of both the bund nationalsozialistischerdeutscherjuristen (association of national socialist german lawyers) and the rechtswahrer (law protectors) organisation, although was not a member of the national socialist party. he also received specialist legal training at the kaiser wilhelm institute in berlin, (note 30) a private institute financed largely by ig farben, an institution intimately involved in the plan. the eu’sbiography of hallstein fails to mention any of this, although it does acknowledge that he “worked towards a rapid realisation of the common market. … during his mandate, the integration advanced significantly”. (note 31) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 16 published by scholink inc. and this leads directly to the second key point. however much you try to play down the influence of the plan, the centralising authoritarian language of its authors cannot be ignored. the plan did not and was not intended to have a democratic foundation. and the way in which the eec was set up—with a governmental and judicial system in the form of the european commission and ecj, respectively—ensured that there would be no genuine democracy in the european union. there is, of course, a democratic veneer in the form of the european council and the european parliament. there are periodic elections to the european parliament, where around 85% of the laws that the citizens of member states have to obey are “approved”, but all these laws are initiated by the commission and then interpreted by the ecj to suit the commission’s “purpose”. all this is made perfectly clear by hallstein in his book die europaeische gemeinschaft (the european community): “every action starts with the commission. …the commission is the most original element in the organisation of the [european] community without any direct precedent in history. …its function is to represent the [european] community to the inside and to the outside. …the commission is independent of the governments of the member states. instructions of the member states must not be given to nor taken by the commission. ….the commission has the monopoly to initiate legislation”. so much about recent events surrounding brexit become much clearer when you understand the plan. the way the eu conducted the brexit negotiations is entirely consistent with its underlying philosophy–this is not a club that you can leave once you have joined—as varoufakis warned us in adults in the room: my struggle with europe’s deep establishment. (note 32) similarly, the language used by people like juncker—when he said that the british were “deserters” who needed to be punished—could have been lifted directly from the plan. but most significant of all is the realisation that the hostility to anglo-saxon economics is both long-standing and widespread on the continent and that the democratic deficit in the eu—widely acknowledged even by strong eu supporters—is here to stay. believers in liberal economic values and democracy cannot possibly compromise on these points–both in the uk and on the european continent. it should now be clear that the only way out for the uk was a clean-break brexit—which involved leaving the customs union, the single market and the jurisdiction of the ecj, as theresa may originally promised in her lancaster house speech on 17 january 2017. (note 33) the uk has now achieved this. it was the only way to avoid being drawn inexorably into the kind of political union envisioned in the 1942 plan. however, the remaining eu member states will find it very hard to avoid this fate. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 17 published by scholink inc. acknowledgements the author is grateful for the comments made on a previous draft by professor kevin dowd and professor robert tombs. notes note. 1. europaeische wirtschaftsgemeinschaft; http://www.jar2.com/files/nazism/the_europeische_wirtschaftsgemeinchaft_berlin_1942.pdf note 2. edward spalton, witness to history, posted on april 18, 2017; https://campaignforanindependentbritain.org.uk/witness-to-history/ note 3. funk plan, https://www.academia.edu/8935003/the_funk_plan note 4. françois hollande; https://www.france24.com/en/20170405-france-president-francois-hollande-five-years-not-normal-look -back note 5. https://www.thomsonreuters.com/en/press-releases/2017/march/eu-laws-introduced-in-the-uk-highlight s-scale-of-challenge-facing-lawmakers-following-brexit.html note 6. https://brexitcentral.com/wanting-close-uk-eu-relationship-beware-brussels-opaque-law-making-proces ses/ note 7. https://facts4eu.org/news/2019_apr_remain_in_what note 8. capital markets union; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/capital-markets-union/ note 9. global financial crisis; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/financial_crisis_of_2007%e2%80%932008 note 10. optimal currency area; https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/19674/1/target%202%20v1.pdf note11. der spiegel; https://www.spiegel.de/consent-a-?targeturl=https%3a%2f%2fwww.spiegel.de%2fpolitik%2fdeutsc hland%2fschuldenkrise-von-der-leyen-fordert-die-vereinigten-staaten-von-europa-a-782879.html note 12. https://brexitcentral.com/wanting-close-uk-eu-relationship-beware-brussels-opaque-law-making-proces ses/ note 13. greece; https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/greek-tragedy note 14. switzerland; https://www.conservativewoman.co.uk/even-independent-switzerland-isnt-immune-to-eu-control-creep note 15. norway; https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-47734583 note 16. norway; https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/916657/brexit-news-latest-update-norway-uk-eu-future-trade-de www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 18 published by scholink inc. al-european-union-eea-video note 17. switzerland; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2019/07/02/eu-sharpens-torture-tools-long-showdown-defiant-sw itzerland/ note 18. costa v enel case; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/costa_v_enel note 19. purposive approach; http://e-lawresources.co.uk/purposive-approach.php note 20. germany federal constitutional court; https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/shareddocs/pressemitteilungen/en/2020/bvg20-032.html note 21. as uk prime minister, david cameron, found to his cost when he tried to renegotiate the terms of uk membership in 2015-16; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015–2016_united_kingdom_renegotiation_of_european_union_memb ership note 22. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/brexit-negotiations/negotiating-documents-article-50-negotiations-unit ed-kingdom_en note 23. trade and cooperation agreement between the european union and the european atomic energy community, of the one part, and the united kingdom of great britain and northern ireland, of the other part, 24 december 2020; https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/9481 04/eu-uk_trade_and_cooperation_agreement_24.12.2020.pdf note 24. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/eu-future-relationship-bill note 25. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/brexit note 26. boris johnson; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3578741/whats-hitler-got-to-do-with-the-euro-e verything.html note 27. winston churchill’s speech at zurich university in 1946; https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/winston_churchill_en.pdf note 28. in a private communication. note 29. walter hallstein; https://worldhistory.us/european-history/did-the-nazis-create-the-european-union.php note 30. kaiser wilhelm institute in berlin; https://www.dr-rath-foundation.org/tag/brexit/ note 31. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/eu-pioneers_en#box_4 note 32. adults in the room: my struggle with europe’s deep establishment; https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/books/adults-in-the-room/. varoufakis likened brexit to the eagles song hotel california, where you can check out any time you like, but you cannot really leave; https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/yanis-varoufakis-says-brexit-hotel-california-you-c an-check-out-any-time-you-you-can-t-really-leave-a7334781.html www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 4, no. 1, 2021 19 published by scholink inc. note 33. lancaster house speech; https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-p m-speech microsoft word ape-v1n1-p32.doc advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 32 original paper the legislature and the challenges of political institutionalization in nigeria’s fourth republic patrick i. ukase, phd1* & terwase dzeka, phd2 1 department of history and international studies, kogi state university, anyigba kogi state, nigeria 2 department of history, benue state university, makurdi, benue state, nigeria * patrick i. ukase, phd, department of history and international studies, kogi state university, anyigba kogi state, nigeria received: february 12, 2018 accepted: february 28, 2018 online published: march 15, 2018 doi:10.22158/ape.v1n1p32 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v1n1p32 abstract towards the close of the 20th century, sensational political changes took place in africa and in other third world countries (twcs), which ignited widespread democratization in several nation-states previously under diverse forms of autocratic regimes. however, the zeal and enthusiasm with which these twcs embraced democratization diminished as soon as elections were concluded, thus jeopardizing the sustainability of the emerging democracies. for instance, in african states, democratization has remained problematic. the dilemma is that there exists an articulated desire to democratize the polity but the spirit, commitment and political will to actualize this desire is to say the least, lacking. indeed, elected and appointed political office holders at all tiers of government circumvent and subvert the democratization process through the deflation of the constitution and all known democratic norms and principles. sadly, this allows the state to suffer, in most cases, from the personalization of state authority. democratization as a process enthrones structures that were hitherto not in existence in the state. the strength or otherwise of any democratic governance is therefore a function of the extent to which actors are able to internalize democratic etiquettes and also foster political institutionalization. invariably, political institutionalization can only be guaranteed when democratic regimes are sustained. this paper, therefore, examines the challenges of institutionalizing a very critical component and arm of government in africa (that is, the legislature), but with particular emphasis on nigeria since the return of democratic governance in 1999. the paper argues that within this period, the legislature faced numerous challenges which made it difficult for her institutionalize itself within the power matrix of the presidential system, which the country’s present democratic arrangement is anchored on. while identifying some of these challenges, the paper contends that except www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 33 published by scholink inc. political institutionalization is guaranteed, democratic regimes can hardly be sustained in africa. the paper adopts a historical approach, employing descriptive, narrative and empirical tools in arriving at our conclusions. keywords legislature, institution, instutionalization, democracy, democratization 1. introduction towards the close of the 20th century, sensational political changes took place in africa and in other third world countries (twcs), which ignited widespread democratization in several nation-states previously under diverse forms of autocratic regimes and nigeria was not left out. however, the zeal and enthusiasm with which these twcs embraced democratization diminished as soon as elections were concluded. this was because most of the emerging “democrats” personified themselves over and above democratic institutions, thereby jeopardizing the sustainability of these emerging democracies. for instance, nigeria switched from the british-type parliamentary system of government to the america-type presidential model in 1979, and adopted the same model in 1999, after about two decades of military incursion into the nation’s political space. a major high point of the return of democracy in 1999 was the re-introduction presidential system of government with its attendant theory of separation of powers and the concept of checks and balances. the reasons why the departing military officers adopted the presidential model over the parliamentary type has already been addressed elsewhere and so that should no detain us here (note 1). be that as it may, the preference of the military for the presidential system hinges on the fact that “the presidential model has clear lines of authourity similar to military command structure and authouritarian logic (note 2)”. it should be noted that democracy generally is predicated on the establishment and existence of strong institutions—the executive, legislature, judiciary, police, press, anti-graft institutions and so forth—to drive the process. invariably, democratization as a process enthrones structures that were hitherto not in existence in the state particularly during military rule. the strength or otherwise of any democratic governance is, therefore, a function of the extent to which actors are able to internalize democratic etiquettes and also foster political institutionalization. in this connection, political institutionalization can only be guaranteed when democratic regimes are sustained (note 3). unfortunately, much of africa and nigeria in particular has continued to face the challenge of strengthening democratic structures and institutions. for instance, the legislature is one of the most critical arms or institutions of government that was restored in 1999. the legislature is not just one of the critical tripods that constitute the trinity of democratic governance, it is also fundamentally saddled with the responsibility of lawmaking, representation, oversight and other quasi-judicial functions. regrettably, by 1999 very little was known about this institution in nigeria and this could be attributable to three reasons: “one, the ideological nature of its historical institutionalization, two, its institutional underdevelopment and basterdization by military praetorianism, and three, its peripheriality in the political economy of resource control and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 34 published by scholink inc. distribution (note 4)”. these factors among other salient ones have woven a complex tapestry to give shape and definition to the texture and tenor of the legislature in nigeria. consequently, since the re-introduction of the legislature in 1999, it has faced the challenge of institutionalization not just from the public but essentially from the executive branch, a development that has continued to create needless frictions and conflicts between the legislature and the executive. this is largely explainable within the context of the consummation of legislative powers by the executive during the long years of colonial and military rule (note 5). since it became the tradition of military heads of state to enjoy overwhelming executive and legislative powers, the obasanjo presidency from 1999-2007, tried to continue with this tradition through his persistent attempts to dominate the legislature by overtly involving himself in the politics of who leads both chambers of the legislature (note 6). this led to serious contestations power between the executive and the legislature and which presented the latter as the weeping child in this contest. the activities of the obasanjo presidency diminished the legislature and was also a serious infraction to the institutionalization of the activities of this critical arm of government. this paper is therefore set to examine the factors and forces responsible for the challenges of instutionalization confronting the legislature in nation’s bourgeoning democracy and also propose the way forward. to conveniently do this, this paper is divided into five sections. after the ongoing introduction, section two will examine conceptual and theoretical issues and perspectives, while section three will trace the historical underpinnings of the challenges of political institutionalization of the legislature. section four will examine the specific challenges confronting the legislative institution in its bid to perform its statutory functions, while section five concludes the paper. 2. theoretical perspective political institutions are critical in attaining the ends of democracy. democracy is certainly not an end in itself but the beginning of an end. that is why beyond democracy, some scholars are beginning to pay more emphasis on democratization. whereas, democracy places emphasis on governments established on the basis of people’s power (note 7), democratization implies not just the introduction of new political institutions but also the empowerment of such institutions and structures to acquire autonomy and competence in the performance of their specified functions (note 8). in this context, “democratization is a transitory, continuous and an on-going process of transformation from one system to another under a democratic arrangement (note 9)”. ayo akinbobola is very apt in his definition of democratization which emphasizes institution strengthening. to him: democratization as a universal dictum should be seen as a process of structural and cultural amelioration of the institutions of state, a means of transformation from institutional emasculation to a new lease on political life of structural differentiation and cultural secularization (note 10). arising from the above explanation, this paper adopts the theoretical perspective which hinges on the fact that it is the strength and stability of political institutions that determines the health of any www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 35 published by scholink inc. democratic system. proponents of this perspective, daron acemoglu and james robinson (note 11), have argued and also demonstrated substantially in their incisive book that nations have failed because of the nature and character of the institutions they have developed over time. according to them: the political institutions of a society are key determinants of the outcome of this game. they are the rules that govern incentives in politics. they determine how the government is chosen and which part of the government has the right to do what. political institutions determine who has power in the society and to what ends that power can be used. if the distribution of power is narrow and unconstrained, the political institutions are absolutist, as exemplified by the absolutist monarchies reigning throughout the world during much of history (note 12). the point being made here is that political and economic institutions can be inclusive and encourage political and economic development, or they can be extractive and become impediments to political and economic development. nations fail when they develop extractive political and economic institutions that impede and even block economic growth and political development. most nations in africa today have failed because—on purpose—they have deliberately developed extractive and weak political institutions like the legislature at the detriment of inclusive institution that would serve as the spring board of development. the central argument here is that the choice of institution is central to our quest for understanding the reasons for the success or failure of nations. 3. historical perspective on the development of a weak legislative institution in nigeria one of the hallmarks of any democracy is the extent to which the institutions of government are freely able to exercise their statutory constitutional powers. under the presidential system of government adopted by nigeria in the second and fourth republics, the powers of each branch of government are separate and clearly defined, and each branch is expected to operate within its sphere. this strengthens institutions and also ensures effective functioning of government. history is however replete with a long period of emasculation of the legislature, which has posed series of challenges to this bourgeoning institution in contemporary times. the history of the legislature in nigeria is actually very chequered. from the onset when what appeared to be a semblance of a legislative council was introduced in 1862 in lagos under the british crown colony administration, it was basically aimed at furthering, not the interest of the people it was introduced for but that of the crown colony administration (note 13). the subsequent colonization of nigeria and the establishment of various legislative councils from 1914 to 1960 appeared to be mere window dressing, as these councils were clothed with no legislative powers at all. from the clifford to the lytletton constitutions, the legislature served essentially in advisory capacity. the governor general was clothe with enormous power that the establishment of the legislative council was more or less a vent, to enable the few african representatives ventilate their grievances on a number of issues. consistent with the colonial policy, the legislature, therefore, had very limited powers (note 14). the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 36 published by scholink inc. legislature during colonial rule was designed in such a way as to subordinate it to the executive branch. martin wight has strengthened this argument thus: a crown colony government is built on two great principles of subordination, namely, the legislature is subordinate to the executive council and the colonial government is subordinate to the imperial government (note 15). for example, the clifford constitution circumscribed the powers of the legislative council with respect to powers of proposing ordinances and resolutions, instead the new constitution granted the power of initiating money resolution solely to the governor. importantly, the legislators were denied the opportunity of voting collectively or individually against government’s proposals. most of these colonial constitutions stretched the powers of the governor beyond limits at the detriment of the legislature. the reason for this type of centralization of powers was not far-fetched: the colonial administration was certainly unprepared for devolution or separation of powers because such an action would have been at variance with some of their policies that required firm and effective control of their colonies (note 16). the story was not in any way different in subsequent years, particularly during military rule, as successive juntas further depleted the efficacy of the legislative institution. prior to 1966, civilians who led the country respected the provisions of the constitution, especially by valuing the sanctity of the legislative institution. however, the military government that usurped power changed all that. in place of the constitution, the military ruled by decrees that contained extra-judicial clauses. in addition, through the supreme military council (smc), the military, led by the head of state, appropriated the law-making power vested in the legislature. consequently, the supreme military council (smc) emerged as the highest law and policy making body in the country. this contortion has remained one of the most painful features and legacies of military rule in nigeria. the truncation of the activities of the legislature by the soldiers seriously contributed in weakening the legislative institution. between 1966, when the military took over power in nigeria, and 1999, when the military dictators transformed themselves into civilian rulers, a total of 291 decrees were promulgated that contained ouster clauses (note 17). the entrenched military culture of over centralization of powers and blatant disregard for the rule of law, was inherited by the civilian administrations of 1979 and 1999. this culture of impunity introduced into nigerian politics by the military and imbibed by civilians can be said to be the source of the weak political institutions inherent in the country. due to the military hang over, successive civilian presidents have tended to behave as if all powers—including legislative powers—belong to the executive and in the process over stepping their constitutional boundaries. abdullahi mahdi terms this executive recklessness a recurring phrase in nigeria’s political dictionary, which was first coined by justice kayode eso, on account of the tendency for pervasive lawlessness beginning with the advent of military rule (note 18). the over centralization of power in the head of state heralded by the suspension of the 1963 constitution reached its zenith under general ibrahim babangida. as the so-called military president, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 37 published by scholink inc. he had a firm control over the commonwealth and resources of nigeria, and with the support and loyalty of the nigerian elites that could not survive outside of government patronage. he quickly emerged a tin god, awash with sycophants and praise singers (note 19). apart from the elite, a terrible culture in which everyone depended on the executive for patronage emerged. from the foregoing, it can be argued in a certain historical sense that two essential factors account for the weak legislative institution in the fourth republic. first, is the administrative policy of the colonial government to prevent the emergence of any viable legislature before 1960; the second factor is the authoritarian nature of military rule that was highly intolerant of any form of opposition or checks. the excessive concentration of power in the hands of the executive, for many years during colonial rule and under the various military regimes, created a penchant for an executive that prefers to dominate the other branches and institutions of government. 4. specific challenges confronting the legislature in the fourth republic arising from its weak foundation, the legislature, like many other institutions of state, has been confronted with several challenges since its re-introduction in 1999. these weaknesses have posed and are still posing serious challenges towards the attainment of inclusive political institutions that would translate to sustainable political development of the country. some of these challenges are examined hereunder: in the first place, the legislature has been confronted with the challenge of independence. since its re-introduction in 1999, the executive has overtly and consistently been interested in who leads both chambers of the national assembly and state assemblies. the executive contemplated the need to control the parliament early in the day by imposing their surrogates in the leadership. such attempts created supremacy battles between the executive and the legislature and weakened the former’s cohesion. isawa elaigwu was more forthcoming on this issue: at the federal and state levels, the executive branch goes beyond mere interest, to impose pliant leadership on the legislature. at all tiers of government, pliant candidates were sponsored by the executive branch … in order to control the legislature (note 20). there are several examples at the federal and state level to buttress this argument. for example, in 1999, the obasanjo presidency worked assiduously, albeit successfully to impose the first senate president, evans enwerem and speaker of the house of representatives, salisu buhari, to the chagrin of some legislators. this imposition created serious conflicts between the executive and the legislature. sadly, this took place at a time that the nation would have been nurturing its democratic institutions after several years of military rule. as should be expected, these leaderships did not last neither did the subsequent ones. from 1999 to 2003, the senate produced three senate presidents, while the house of representatives produced two speakers, albeit serious crises (note 21). at the state level, newspapers were inundated with headlines, stories and editorials of state governors that had played invincible roles in the impeachment of their respective speakers using state resources and apparatus (note 22). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 38 published by scholink inc. another major setback to the challenge of the institutionalization of the legislature is the complexity in the nature and character of the legislative bureaucracy. thirteen years after the return of democratic governance in nigeria, most legislative bureaucracies in the country are still tied to the apron-strings of the executive branch and this has distorted the growth of this institution and trampled on the principle of separation of powers, which the 1999 nigerian constitution as amended is anchored on. for instance, sections 51 and 96 of the 1999 constitution as amended provide that the national assembly and each state in the federation should establish an assembly service commission. unfortunately, only nass and a very few states have been able to achieve this feet. in some states where this bill has been passed into law, such commissions are yet to be established by the executive (note 23). the establishment of state assemblies service commission is very fundamental since the independence of the legislature cannot be discussed outside the framework of having an effective assembly service commission. the assembly service commission guarantees security of tenure for staff of the legislature and insulates them from the unwarranted postings of trained work force from the legislature to the executive, where the skills already acquired are not required. this practice has made it practically impossible for staff in the legislature to be fully professionalized and make a career within the legislative bureaucracy. the vexed issue of the independence of the legislative bureaucracy has been a course of concern to the legislature. the continued appendage of the legislature to the executive arm of government in most states is a bane to the institutionalization of the legislative bureaucracy; it is also a decimal in our democratization process (note 24). there is also the challenge of funding, or put differently, the financial autonomy of the legislature. the financial autonomy of the legislature requires that the funding of this branch of government should be placed on first line charge, to enable the legislature carry out its activities without let or hindrance. in this connection, the legislature would not have to depend on the executive arm for funding as has been the case in most states. the situation where the legislature depends entirely on the executive branch for the execution of its own programmes is not healthy for political institutionalization of this arm of government (note 25). attempts to amend the 1999 constitution by the 6th assembly to place state assemblies on first-line charge was unsuccessful because the thirty six states assemblies were unable to meet the two-third majority required to effect that amendment. the financial autonomy of the legislature is very critical because the quantity and quality of training of legislators and parliamentary staff can only be improved when the legislature is financially strengthened. in addition, the legislature in nigeria is seriously facing perception challenges. most members of the public are still yet to come to terms with the relevance of this arm of government. this negative perception arises from the credibility deficits that the federal and state legislators have continued to face. for instance, the legislature was constantly and frequently enmeshed in clannish, primordial and partisan interests. their proclivity towards themselves, implicit in their greed, personal aggrandizement and self-centeredness has contributed to this negative public perception. there were also instances where the legislature engaged the executive in needless controversies. unfortunately, most of its actions www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 39 published by scholink inc. were often reactive rather than proactive. the legislature, more often than not, failed to take the issue of its internal democracy and general constitutional responsibilities seriously, by putting itself on a moral high ground through the advancement of the ideas of transparency and accountability in the conduct of its activities. as it has been noted elsewhere: in the end, the public perception of the legislature was quite negative, as it saw this institution more as a liability or democratic deficit than an institution of government, constitutionally created to serve its interest. granted that on some few occasions it took far reaching decisions that touched the lives of the people, but on a general note, it performed dismally (note 26). giving the enormous constitutional responsibilities vested on the legislature by the 1999 constitutions as amended, the general public expectation as regards how this arm of government should discharge this onerous responsibility is often very high. apart from acting as checks on the executive branch, the legislature is expected to enact legislations and also educate the government on various government policies but this has hardly been the case. however, for the legislature to be able to rejig itself, it must evolve and develop a viable legislative culture and practice, especially on how to engage the executive branch without necessarily overheating the polity. also there is need for debates in the legislature to transcend sectional and primordial interests (note 27). the legislature must also learn how to advance the principles of transparency and accountability in the conduct of its affairs. only then can it act as watchdogs to the executive, for it is imperative that those who go to equity should do so with clean hands. further still, the legislature still faces the challenges of political institutionalization because of its inability to connect with the electorates. since the return of democracy, most legislators disappear from their constituencies as soon as they are inaugurated. most of them do not have constituency offices let alone organize constituency briefings to inform their constituents’ on proposed government policies, programmes and legislations (note 28). such meetings engender interactions between the legislators and his constituents and also provides an opportunity for the former to get feedbacks from the latter. entrenched democracies consider legislator-constituency relations critical in institutionalizing the activities of parliament and also building public trust and confidence in their representatives. in the absence of such meetings, interactions and interface, the legislator and the legislative institution is perceived as a needless institution, established to waste tax payer’s resources. 5. conclusion: towards instutionalizing parliaments in nigeria the nature and character of political or economic institutions established in a country would ultimately determine the success or failure of that country. history is replete with several countries that failed because they established extractive political and economic institutions instead of inclusive ones. what this means is that the nature and quality of institutions, or perhaps, the politics of institutions are key to our understanding of the successes or failure of states. since the return of democracy in nigeria, the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 40 published by scholink inc. country has been unable to develop solid, viable, strong and independent institutions that would drive the development process. democracy does not necessarily translate to democratization and institution building. whereas there is democracy in nigeria, the institutions to drive the democratization process such as the legislature are weak and more or less extractive. this paper has shown that the nigerian legislature faces fundamental challenges which has continued to hinder the successful institutionalization and sustenance of the democratic process. this is largely attributed to the nature and character of the type of institutions (especially the legislature) bequeathed to the country by the colonial administration and by successive regimes in the post-military era. some of the challenges confronting the legislature which the paper dwelt extensively on are unnecessary interference in its activities by the executive branch, weak institutional capacity, lack of independence/autonomy (especially in the area funding), and the negative public perception of the institution, which has been created by the actors in the institution. for the legislature to become a more viable institution in the political and democratic process in nigeria, it must necessarily have to rejig itself. first, it is important for legislators to recognize the powers vested in the by the 1999 constitution as amended and guard same jealously; second; it must develop and evolve a viable legislative culture and practice, especially on how to engage the executive branch with necessarily overheating the polity. in this connection, the legislature should learn to be more proactive (rather than being reactive) with the executive branch; thirdly, for the legislature to institutionalize itself and change the negative public perception, it would need to be more answerable to the people who elected them by inculcating the values of probity and accountability in the discharge of its duties; and lastly, legislators must regularly connect with their constituencies—such legislator/constituency relations would strengthen the bond between the former and the latter and would also go a long way in institutionalizing the legislature. references acemoglu, d., & robinson, j. a. (2013). why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity and poverty (great britain: profile books ltd). adejumobi, s. (2002). the relevance of the presidential system of government to nigeria’s quest for democracy. the constitution: a journal of constitutional development, 3(2). akinbobola, a. (2002). trends of democratization in africa: an analysis of the challenges of political instutionalization. journal constitutional development, 3(2). elaigwu, j. i. (2004). democratic governance and political instability in nigeria. benue state university convocation lecture. huntington, s. (1991). the third wave: democratization in latin twentieth century. london: university of oklahoma press. joseph, r. (1979). democratization in africa after 1989: comparative and theoretical perspectives. in comparative politics. london. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 41 published by scholink inc. mahdi, a. (2004). we can actualize our dreams as a nation, 6th annual public lecture of the ahmadu bello university alumni association. rivers state branch, held on the 10th december. ukase, p. i. (2007). the role of the military in nigeria’s democratization process in the fourth republic. benue valley journal of humanities, 7(2). ukase, p. i. (2010). performance evaluation of the benue state legislature, 1999-2007. makurdi: aboki publishers. ukase, p. i. (2012). parliaments and the challenges of bureaucratic institutionalization in nigeria’s fourth republic. paper delivered at the national delegate conference of the parliamentary staff association of nigeria (pasan) held at empire suits, makurdi on 25th april. ukase, p. i. (2012). presidential system and executive recklessness in post-military nigerian politics: implications for inter-branch relationship. in w. bokelmann, o. akinwumi, u. m. nwankwo, & a.o. agwuele (eds.), african leadership challenges and other issues. belin-germany: mediateam it educational publishers. ukase, p. i. (2012). the nigerian legislature in historical perspective: challenges and prospects, 1960-2010. in o. akinwumi, m. m. adamu, & p. ukase (eds.), nigeria at 50: the challenges of nation building. zaria: abu press. a publication of the historical society of nigeria. ukase, p. i. (2014). a history of executive-legislative relations in nigeria, 1914-2007 (ibadan: university press). ukase, p. i. (2014). performance appraisal of margaret icheen’s leadership of the benue state legislature, 1999-2002. veritas journal of gender and women studies, 1(1). ukase, p. i. (2016). followership deficit and its implications for democratic governance in nigeria’s fourth republic. in c. c. osakwe (ed.), leadership and complex military operations. kaduna: nigerian defence academy. uwechue, r. (1999). africa today. london. wight, m. (1952). british colonial administrations. oxford university press. notes note 1. for more details of this factors, read p. i. ukase, a history of executive-legislative relations in nigeria, 1914-2007 (ibadan: university press), 2014 and p. i. ukase, “presidential system and executive recklessness in post-military nigerian politics: implications for inter-branch relationship”. in w. bokelmann, o. akinwumi, u. m. nwankwo, & a. o. agwuele (eds.), african leadership challenges and other issues (belin-germany: mediateam it educational publishers, 2012). note 2. adejumobi, s. (december, 2002). the relevance of the presidential system of government to nigeria’s quest for democracy. in the constitution: a journal of constitutional development, 3(2). note 3. akinbobola, a. (2012). trends of democratization in africa: an analysis of the challenges of political instutionalization. in journal constitutional development, 3(2), 1. this position is also echoed by r. joseph, democratization in africa after 1989: comparative and theoretical perspectives. in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 42 published by scholink inc. comparative politics london (pp. 363-382); and huntington, s. (1991). the third wave: democratization in latin twentieth century (london: university of oklahoma press), 1991, p. 105. note 4. ukase, p. i. (2010). performance evaluation of the benue state legislature, 1999-2007 (makurdi: aboki publishers), p. xviii. note 5. see ukase, p. i. (2010). the nigerian legislature in historical perspective: challenges and prospects, 1960-2010. in o. akinwumi, m. m. adamu, & p. ukase (eds.), nigeria at 50: the challenges of nation building (zaria: abu press), a publication of the historical society of nigeria, 2012. note 6. see adejumobi, s. “the relevance of the presidential system of government to nigeria’s quest for democracy”, p. 50 and p. i. ukase, a history of executive-legislative relations in nigeria…” p. 50. note 7. for more details on democracy read p. i. ukase, “followership deficit and its implications for democratic governance in nigeria’s fourth republic”. in c. c. osakwe (ed.), leadership and complex military operations (kaduna: nigerian defence academy), 2016, pp. 39-40. note 8. p. i. ukase, “the role of the military in nigeria’s democratization process in the fourth republic”, benue valley journal of humanities, vol. 7, no. 2, 2007, p. 32. note 9. also see p. i. ukase, “the role of the military in nigeria’s democratization process”, p. 32. note 10. a. akinbobola, “trends of democratization in africa…,” p. 3. note 11. for more elaborate details on this perspective see d. acemoglu and j. a. robinson, why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity and poverty (great britain: profile books ltd), 2013. note 12. d. acemoglu and j.a. robinson, why nations fail…,” pp. 79-80. note 13. p. i. ukase, “the nigerian legislature in historical perspective…,” p. 35. note 14. see m. wight, british colonial administrations (oxford university press), 1952, p. 17. note 15. m. wight, british colonial administrations. note 16. r. uwechue (ed.), africa today (london), 1999, p. 1457. note 17. p. i. ukase, a history of executive-legislative relations in nigeria…, p. 107. note 18. a. mahdi, “we can actualize our dreams as a nation”, 6th annual public lecture of the ahmadu bello university alumni association, rivers state branch, held on the 10th december, 2004, p. 21. note 19. a. mahdi, “we can actualize our dreams as a nation,” p. 21. note 20. see j. i. elaigwu, “democratic governance and political instability in nigeria,” benue state university convocation lecture, 2004, p. 127. note 21. for more details on these conflicts read p. i. ukase, a history of executive-legislative relations in nigeria… note 22. details of these conflicts can be read in p. i. ukase, “performance appraisal of margaret icheen’s leadership of the benue state legislature, 1999-2002”, veritas journal of gender and women studies, vol. 1, no. 1, 2014. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 43 published by scholink inc. note 23. p. i. ukase, “parliaments and the challenges of bureaucratic institutionalization in nigeria’s fourth republic”, paper delivered at the national delegate conference of the parliamentary staff association of nigeria (pasan) held at empire suits, makurdi on 25th april, 2012, pp. 5-7. note 24. p. i. ukase, “parliaments and the challenges of bureaucratic institutionalization...,” p. 6. note 25. p. i. ukase, “parliaments and the challenges of bureaucratic institutionalization...,” p. 11. note 26. p. i. ukase, performance evaluation of the benue state legislature, 1999-2007, p. 79. note 27. p. i. ukase, performance evaluation of the benue state legislature, 1999-2007, p. 80. note 28. p. i. ukase, performance evaluation of the benue state legislature, 1999-2007, p. 80-81. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 43 original paper the impact of e-commerce on the upgrading of county-level industrial structure—from the perspective of export and enterprise expansion qingli zhang1* & linming wang2 1 northwest normal university, lanzhou city, china 2 northwest normal university, lanzhou city, china * qingli zhang, corresponding author received: april 26, 2025 accepted: may 05, 2025 online published: may 16, 2025 doi:10.22158/ape.v8n1p43 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v8n1p43 abstract this paper takes the "comprehensive demonstration counties for e-commerce in rural areas" project as a quasi-natural experiment and empirically analyzes the impact and action mechanism of e-commerce on the transformation and upgrading of the county-level industrial structure through a multi-period did model. the results show that during the pilot period of the project, e-commerce has significantly promoted the upgrading of the county-level industrial structure. this effect is more pronounced in county-level regions in the western part of china and is influenced by local network resources and agricultural development. further mechanism analysis shows that e-commerce mainly affects the transformation and upgrading of industrial structure through channels such as expanding product exports and stimulating entrepreneurial vitality. keywords e-commerce, industrial transformation, county-level economy 1. introduction as the cornerstone of chinese society, the county-level economy is an important unit supporting national development and a crucial part of building china's economic system in the new era. county areas in china account for approximately 90% of the country's total land area, with their population and gdp representing 52.4% and 38.5% of the national totals respectively. however, the per capita gdp of the permanent residents within the county-level scope only accounts for 73.5% of the national average level, and the overall development level of counties is still relatively low. at the same time, restricted www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 44 by conditions such as resource endowments and environmental factors, the development of different regions is uneven, and the gap between counties has been increasing year by year. in 2024, the number of counties with a gdp exceeding 10 billion yuan nationwide reached 62. in the border areas of china, there are still many counties and cities that have just shaken off poverty and are striving to move towards rural revitalization. how to bridge the economic gap between counties and cities, fully tap the development potential of counties, narrow the urban-rural gap, and accelerate rural revitalization has become an important issue at present. since 2014, china has vigorously implemented the comprehensive demonstration project of rural e-commerce for ten consecutive years, injecting strong impetus into the vigorous development of rural e-commerce and effectively promoting the process of rural modernization. currently, the coverage of rural e-commerce demonstrations continues to expand and is gradually becoming an important emerging force in the development of the county-level economy. the research topics on the impact of the development of e-commerce on the county-level economy mainly revolve around two aspects: farmers' income and consumption. on the one hand, e-commerce can effectively increase farmers' income through direct or indirect means such as reducing transaction costs, providing digital financial means, and developing the construction of logistics outlets (couture et al., 2018;tang et al., 2020;tang et al., 2022; zhou et al., 2023).on the other hand, while increasing farmers' income, e-commerce significantly promotes the consumption of farmers' households through channels such as providing convenient digital payment means, reducing consumption transaction costs, and enriching the opportunities for commodity selection (ma et al., 2023; wang et al., 2025). e-commerce helps rural families overcome problems such as information asymmetry in terms of prices and technologies (jensen, 2007), barriers to logistics development (couture et al., 2021), and spatial consumption inequality (fan et al., 2018), reduces the living costs of rural families, effectively improves the welfare level of rural residents, narrows the urban-rural income gap, and promotes the economic growth of counties (wang et al., 2023). although existing studies have explored the impact of the development of e-commerce on farmers' income and consumption from different angles, the deficiency lies in that most of the data they use are provincial or municipal-level data, or they study the impact of rural e-commerce on the financial environment of farmers' households from a microscopic perspective. the data used are also in the form of microscopic tracking surveys or questionnaires collected through household visits (zeng et al., 2018), lacking a comprehensive discussion of the impact brought by rural e-commerce from the county-level perspective. in addition, from a macro perspective, although existing studies have discussed the impact of the development of e-commerce on rural industrial upgrading (yi et al., 2021; tan et al., 2022), the research objects are mostly limited to simple index descriptions such as the ratio of the secondary and tertiary industries, and there are few systematic and independent discussions on rural industrial structure upgrading from the perspectives of industrial structure and innovation incentives. based on this, this article will use the comprehensive demonstration pilot of e-commerce entering rural areas that www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 45 started in 2014 as a quasi-natural experiment, further combine county-level data to study the impact of the development of e-commerce on rural industrial upgrading, and analyze its regional heterogeneity and spatial spillover effects. 2. literature review and model hypothesis 2.1 policy background in july 2014, the ministry of finance and the ministry of commerce jointly promulgated the "national rural e-commerce comprehensive demonstration policy". each county (city) included in the list could receive financial support of about 20 million yuan from the central government, and could also obtain supporting funds at the provincial, municipal and county levels. as of the end of 2023, the central government's financial investment exceeded 20 billion yuan. the comprehensive demonstration project of e-commerce entering rural areas has cumulatively supported 1,489 regions. the online retail sales of agricultural products nationwide reached 587.03 billion yuan, an increase of 12.5% year-on-year, which is approximately five times higher than that in 2014 when the policy was first launched. the online retail sales in rural areas nationwide reached 2.5 trillion yuan, an increase of 12.9% year-on-year, which is 13 times larger than that in 2014 (zhang, 2024). the number of rural online stores reached 16.325 million, and it has cumulatively driven 6.188 million poverty-relieved farmers to increase their income (zhang, 2024). it can be said that the entry of e-commerce into rural areas has achieved remarkable results.overall, this policy has been implemented with great intensity, has a sound supporting policy system, and a clear assessment and incentive mechanism, which has played a significant role in the development of e-commerce in rural areas. 2.2 theoretical analysis and research hypotheses 2.2.1 impact of e-commerce on the upgrading of rural industries at the production end at the production end, with the help of the highly penetrative digital economy, e-commerce has rapidly expanded into the primary industry, reducing the search and matching costs of transactions and providing opportunities for the cross-regional circulation of goods. this enables farmer producers at the end of the network to establish direct connections with potential consumers, increasing the profit margin of agricultural and sideline products. therefore, driven by e-commerce, local characteristic industries have developed rapidly, transforming the agricultural production model into a demand-oriented one. the original production scale of rural enterprises has been further expanded. at the same time, the emergence of advanced industrial models and new occupations has further promoted rural employment and entrepreneurship, thus driving the upgrading of the agricultural industry, increasing the income of rural residents, and accelerating rural revitalization. firstly, the development of e-commerce has changed the linear development model of traditional agricultural production and sales that is restricted by regions and interpersonal networks, making the economic organizational structure of agricultural production tend to be flattened and promoting the development of the agricultural industry. on the one hand, the digital economy represented by www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 46 e-commerce can effectively break down the information and trade barriers between urban and rural areas and even among different countries. through information matching that transcends the constraints of time and space, it reduces the information asymmetry in the market and lowers the costs of intermediaries, such as negotiation costs and information costs. it further integrates the market, extends the trade network overseas, and expands the potential customer base of agricultural products (batte et al., 2007; shimamoto et al., 2015; goldfarb et al., 2019). at the same time, it has also given birth to the emergence of cross-border e-commerce.on the other hand, the development of e-commerce has expanded the market scope and also increased the social demand for rural characteristic primary agricultural products and deeply processed agricultural products, bringing about the development of a series of related industries. this enables farmers to break away from the low-end role of merely engaging in agricultural production, promotes the development of local non-agricultural industries, accelerates the upgrading of the rural industrial structure, forms industrial agglomeration around the e-commerce ecological industry, and generates a greater scale agglomeration effect on the production side (dunt et al., 2002; zhang et al., 2022). in addition, the accelerated flow of factors and information has promoted market competition, which in turn encourages farmers to use the knowledge, information and advanced planting technologies brought by the digital economy to improve productivity, and promotes the continuous penetration of technology into agriculture (li, 2019). secondly, while expanding the market scale of original enterprises, rural e-commerce has also stimulated the innovative vitality in rural areas. e-commerce has promoted the vertical deepening along the rural industrial chain. the emergence of a large number of new business forms and new occupations has also generated a demand for heterogeneous labor, enabling more farmers to shift to employment in sectors with higher productivity. the development of rural e-commerce will continue to enhance the productivity effect. while driving the improvement of agricultural production efficiency, it reduces the labor force engaged in agricultural production activities and promotes more labor to shift to non-agricultural production, thereby driving the transformation and upgrading of the rural economic structure. non-agricultural employment has increased significantly (tian et al., 2022), and the labor force will agglomerate in higher-end industries. at the same time, farmers learn online store technologies and operation skills, such as supporting industries like web design and maintenance, photography, video and image processing, tariff processing and foreign trade documentary handling (qi et al., 2019). meanwhile, out of considerations of economies of scale and saving labor employment costs, the rural economy with families as production units generally tends to expand the production scale locally, which further promotes farmers' entrepreneurship and enterprise innovation. the pilot policy of e-commerce demonstration counties has also enhanced the local entrepreneurial vitality through channels such as promoting the development of digital finance, driving agricultural modernization and accelerating infrastructure construction (guo et al., 2024), improving the employment structure of farmers and thus promoting the transformation and upgrading of rural industries. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 47 therefore, hypothesis 1 is proposed: the policy of e-commerce entering rural areas has a positive impact on the transformation of the regional industrial structure at the production end by promoting the growth of entrepreneurial vitality and the expansion of enterprise scale. 2.2.2 impact of e-commerce on the upgrading of rural industries at the consumption end from the perspective of the consumption end, against the backdrop of continuously rising income levels, e-commerce can promote the growth of household consumption, effectively reduce spatial consumption inequality, and improve the level of social welfare (fan et al., 2018; luo et al., 2019). at the same time, the diversification of farmers' demands has shifted from basic agricultural products to the consumption of industrial products and services. the change in the demand structure has led to a corresponding transformation of the industrial structure, resulting in the transformation of agriculture to a non-agricultural economy, and within the non-agricultural economy, the transformation from the manufacturing industry to the service industry. specifically speaking, firstly, the development of rural e-commerce can boost the use of mobile payment technology in rural areas and enhance the consumption convenience of farmers. with the popularization of digital information technology and the improvement of the convenience of mobile payment, rural e-commerce has increased farmers' marginal propensity to consume through convenient payment methods, smoothed their intertemporal consumption, and promoted the digital transformation and upgrading of commercial and trade circulation enterprises in rural areas through means such as improving network infrastructure and building e-commerce service points (ma et al., 2023), which leads to the emergence of corresponding industrial clusters and is conducive to the development of international trade. secondly, e-commerce platforms have shortened the distance between international buyers and sellers. the diverse choices have triggered the demand for the cross-regional circulation of farmers' products, expanding the cross-regional consumption allocation effect and further increasing the production scale and product variety. the construction of e-commerce service stations in rural areas and the facilitation of customs clearance procedures have unblocked the product transportation routes, which is conducive to the development of agricultural production and sales towards specialized and large-scale production (tang et al., 2020). the specialized production, distribution and sales models have further reduced the product costs, which is beneficial to promoting product exports. finally, rural e-commerce can provide more opportunities for product selection and meet the diversified product demands of farmers. against the backdrop of continuously rising income levels, there are differences in the price elasticity of demand for different products. the increase in farmers' income will lead to demands for different products, and the emergence of e-commerce has provided rural areas with more diversified and personalized product choices, greatly expanding the variety of consumer products and the consumer market in rural area (couture et al., 2018). at the same time, the increase in consumption from the global market and the diversification of demands have also brought about changes in the demand structure, ranging from agricultural products to industrial products and then to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 48 service products. correspondingly, the industrial structure has been upgraded accordingly, achieving the transformation and upgrading from agricultural production to the manufacturing and service industries (tao et al., 2022). therefore, hypothesis 2 is proposed: the development of e-commerce entering rural areas has a positive impact on the upgrading of the regional industrial structure through consumption growth and transformation on the consumption side. figure 1. analysis of the mechanism of rural e-commerce promoting the upgrading of the industrial structure 3. experimental design 3.1 sample selection and data source this study conducts an empirical analysis using china's county-level panel data from 2005 to 2020. the data spans a time period of 16 years, covering 2,206 county-level administrative regions in 31 provinces across the country. by the end of 2020, 1,163 counties had been included in the scope of the policy pilot program, constituting the core observation dataset affected by the policy. the data mainly comes from the "china regional economic statistical yearbook" and the "china county statistical yearbook". 3.2 model specification in order to accurately assess the impact of the pilot policy of e-commerce entering rural areas on the upgrading of the industrial structure at the county level, this study regards the pilot policy of e-commerce entering rural areas as a typical quasi-natural experiment. given the characteristic of differences in the approval time of the pilot counties, a staggered difference-in-differences model is adopted. in specific operations, the 1,163 counties included in the pilot list are defined as the treatment group, and the remaining 951 counties that are not selected for the pilot list are used as the control group. the net effect of the policy shock is separated by constructing a two-way fixed effects model. the benchmark regression model is specified as follows: www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 49 in equation (1), is the explained variable, representing the industrial structure upgrading index of sample county i in period t. the core explanatory variable is a dummy variable indicating the policy shock of e-commerce entering rural areas. xit represents the set of other control variables that affect the industrial upgrading of the county. ad represent the fixed effects of the county-level region and the fixed effects of the year respectively, and represents the random disturbance term. 3.3 variable selection and explanation 3.3.1 dependent variable in terms of measuring industrial structure upgrading, existing literature mostly uses two dimensions: industrial sophistication and industrial rationalization. considering the limitations of data completeness and continuity at the county level, this study mainly uses industrial sophistication to quantify the industrial structure upgrading at the county level. following the approach of wang (2015),the index of industrial structure upgrading at the county level is calculated according to equation (2): (2) in the above formula, is represents the index of industrial structure upgrading, which indicates the proportion of the output value of the i-th industry in the regional gross domestic product (i = 1, 2, 3 correspond to the primary, secondary, and tertiary industries, respectively). this index is mainly used to reflect the development situation between the primary, secondary, and tertiary industries. 3.3.2 core explanatory variable the core explanatory variable in this paper is , which represents the policy shock of e-commerce entering rural areas. specifically, when county i is approved to be included in the pilot policy of e-commerce entering rural areas in year t, is assigned a value of 1 for year t and subsequent years; otherwise, it is assigned a value of 0. 3.3.3 control variables during the process of empirical analysis, in order to minimize the interference of other factors on the upgrading of the industrial structure at the county level and reduce estimation bias, based on referring to existing relevant literature, this paper selects control variables from dimensions such as economy, government, labor, and capital. specifically, the natural logarithm form of the gross domestic product of each county is used to represent the level of economic development(lngdp); the ratio of the fiscal revenue to the fiscal expenditure of each county is chosen to measure the state of fiscal balance (dgov); the number of middle school students enrolled is used to represent the level of human capital at the county level(secede); the per capita disposable income of rural residents (rcmi) is used to represent the income level of residents at the county level; the total retail sales of social consumer goods are used to measure the level of residents' demand at the county level (sale). the relevant variables have all been www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 50 logarithmically processed. table 1. descriptive statistics of basic variables (1) (2) (3) (4) variables mean sd min max ecommerce 0.085 0.279 0 1 is 2.140 0.244 0 3.961 secedu 2.702 2.232 0 26.354 lngdp 13.552 1.206 8.915 18.093 dgov 0.345 0.247 0.000 2.992 rcmi 8.763 0.686 6.504 10.695 sale 0.507 0.798 0.009 15.116 4. empirical result analysis 4.1 benchmark regression results table 2 presents the benchmark regression results of the impact of the pilot policy of e-commerce entering rural areas on the upgrading of the industrial structure at the county level. among them, in column (1), only the policy shock is included in the model as an explanatory variable. the regression results show that the coefficient of the policy shock is significantly positive at the 1% significance level, preliminarily indicating that the policy of e-commerce entering rural areas has played a positive role in promoting the upgrading of the industrial structure at the county level. on this basis, in order to enhance the robustness of the model and reduce the potential bias caused by omitted variables, in column (2), control variables such as the level of economic development, human capital accumulation, and the income level of residents are introduced to construct an extended model. the estimation results show that the coefficient value of the policy variable remains significantly positive and the explanatory power of the model is significantly improved. from the economic meaning of the coefficient estimation value, compared with non-pilot counties, the pilot policy of e-commerce entering rural areas has increased the industrial structure upgrading index of pilot counties by an average of 0.019 units. a comprehensive analysis of the results in table 2 shows that the pilot policy of e-commerce entering rural areas plays a positive role in promoting the upgrading of the industrial structure at the county level. in addition, the coefficients of the level of economic development, the level of human capital, and the income level of residents are all significantly positive, indicating that the expansion of the total economic volume at the county level, the improvement of the quality of the labor force, and the enhancement of the consumption capacity of residents all have a significant promoting effect on the upgrading of the industrial structure. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 51 table 2. impact of e-commerce entering rural areas on the industrial upgrading at the county level: benchmark regression results (1) (2) variables is is ecommerce 0.019*** 0.019*** (0.003) (0.003) lngdp 0.008** (0.004) dgov -0.007 (0.007) secedu -0.003*** (0.000) rcmi 0.015** (0.006) sale 0.002 (0.000) constant 2.062*** 1.852*** (0.002) (0.057) r-squared 0.290 0.290 number of county 2,206 2,206 yearfix yes yes idfix yes yes note. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. the values in parentheses are clustered standard errors, clustered at the city level. the same applies hereinafter. 4.2 robustness test 4.2.1 parallel trends test in order to explore whether there is a consistent development trend between the pilot areas of e-commerce entering rural areas and the non-pilot areas before the implementation of the policy, and at www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 52 the same time to examine the dynamic effect of the pilot policy of e-commerce entering rural areas on the upgrading of the rural industrial structure, the following regression equation is specified by referring to the method of beck (2010): among them, is a binary dummy variable. if county i is an area under the pilot policy of e-commerce entering rural areas, the variable takes a value of 1; otherwise, it takes a value of 0. s>0 indicates that region i implements the policy of e-commerce entering rural areas s periods after period t, and conversely, it indicates that the policy is implemented before period t. it represents the relative time of policy implementation. in the equation, is used to capture the differences in the time trends between the treatment group and the control group. in this paper, the period corresponding to s -1 is set as the event base period to avoid multicollinearity, and the performance within 5 periods before and after the implementation of the pilot policy is reported. figure 2. parallel trends test figure 2 reports the estimation results based on equation (3). it can be found that within the 95% confidence interval, the estimated coefficients in all periods before the implementation of the pilot policy of e-commerce entering rural areas are not significant, indicating that there is no obvious difference in the upgrading of the industrial structure between the implementing areas and the non-implementing areas before the implementation of the policy of e-commerce entering rural areas. however, the estimated coefficient one year after the implementation of the policy begins to be significantly positive and shows a trend of increasing year by year, indicating that the pilot policy of e-commerce entering rural areas does have a significant positive effect on the upgrading of the industrial structure at the county level. in order to further discuss the robustness of the parallel trends, this paper conducts a sensitivity test of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 53 the parallel trends. in order to rule out possible estimation errors and result distortions in the parallel trends assumption and ensure the effectiveness of the pre-treatment trend test, this paper refers to the studies of rambachan (2023) and roth (2023) relaxes the parallel trends assumption and observes the distance between the corresponding confidence interval and zero to test the sensitivity of the parallel trends of the treatment effect after the implementation of the pilot policy. as can be seen from figure 3, when the parallel trends assumption is relaxed to a deviation of more than one time (mar = 1.06), the treatment effect is still significant within the 95% confidence interval; that is, when the coefficient deviates by more than one time from the standard error, the regression coefficient is still significantly positive. figure 3. average treatment effect 4.2.2 heterogeneity of treatment effects the staggered difference-in-differences method may be affected by the heterogeneity of treatment effects and the problem of negative weights. generally speaking, the problem of negative weights will be more severe only in two situations: one is that the treatment time of some individuals is in the early stage, and the other is that there are no untreated samples in the overall sample. in this paper, the treatment time of the sample counties for the implementation of e-commerce in rural areas started as early as 2012, and the effective time of the corresponding policy only covers the middle and later stages of the overall sample. moreover, there have always been sample counties that have not been affected by the policy shock in the sample. this means that the estimation bias caused by the problem of negative weights will not significantly affect the robustness of the estimation results. furthermore, referring to the bacon decomposition method proposed by goodman-bacon(2021) the average treatment effects under different conditions are distinguished, and the estimation bias is achieved through the decomposition of the coefficient values. the decomposition weight results are shown in figure 3. it is found that although there are negative weights, the proportion is only 4.6%. as www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 54 can be seen from figure 3, the weights of the post-treatment group with negative weight effects compared to the pre-treatment group (later group treatment vs. earlier group comparison) are concentrated around the value of 0. specifically, the proportion of the corresponding estimated coefficients obtained from the decomposition is 4.6%, and the proportion of the weights is not enough to affect the robustness of the final result, confirming that the estimator of the benchmark result is credible. figure 4. bacon decomposition 4.2.3 placebo test the differences between the treatment group and the control group may not entirely be due to the impact of the pilot policy of e-commerce entering rural areas. in order to rule out the possible influence of other factors, this paper conducts a placebo test on the possible random factors. referring to the method of li (2023), this paper conducts an unconstrained mixed placebo test on the staggered difference-in-differences used in this paper. as can be seen from figure 5, the regression results are less affected by random factors. the obtained estimated values are approximately zero and are far from the true values, and the relevant t-values are densely distributed around zero. this indicates that in the analysis of this paper, the pilot policy of e-commerce entering rural areas fully and truly reflects its impact on the upgrading of the industrial structure at the county level. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 55 figure 5. individual placebo test 4.2.4 sample selection problem as mentioned above, there is significant heterogeneity among the many districts and counties studied in this paper, and the most prominent ones are the top 100 national districts (counties) selected and evaluated by relevant consulting institutions every year. in order to address the possible outliers, this paper removes the data of the top 100 counties from the samples. the list of the top 100 counties comes from the "research report on the high-quality development of urban economy in china in 2022 and the top 100 districts of ccid in 2022" released by the urban economic research center of ccid consulting (affiliated to the china electronics information industry development research institute of the ministry of industry and information technology) on july 27, 2022. it requires that the selected districts and counties should meet the dual standards of "a regional gross domestic product of more than 80 billion yuan and a general public budget revenue of more than 2 billion yuan". since 2021, this evaluation system has been adjusted, involving five evaluation dimensions: economic strength, growth momentum, internal support, regional level, and shared development, as well as 23 secondary indicators and more than 70 supporting indicators. the obtained results are shown in table 3: table 3. results after sample screening: deleting the top 100 counties (1) (2) (3) variables is is is ecommerce 0.140*** 0.020*** 0.020*** (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) lngdp 0.009** (0.004) dgov -0.004 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 56 (0.008) secedu -0.002* (0.001) rcmi 0.013** (0.007) sale 0.004 (0.002) constant 2.116*** 2.059*** 1.852*** (0.005) (0.002) (0.058) r-squared 0.104 0.290 0.290 number of county 2,083 2,083 2,083 yearfix no yes yes idfix no yes yes according to the results, after deleting the data of the top 100 counties, the regression coefficient of the key variable only decreases by 0.001. the results do not change significantly, and the significance is not affected either. in addition, since many urban districts in large and medium-sized cities also belong to the county-level administrative division, and these districts in the sample are mostly in developed areas. the industrial structure within these districts is mainly composed of the secondary and tertiary industries, and they already have a high level of industrial sophistication. therefore, this paper removes the relevant urban districts and special economic zones and then conducts the regression. the obtained results are as follows: table 4 results after sample screening: deleting districts and special economic zones (1) (2) (3) variables is is is ecommerce 0.141*** 0.006*** 0.006*** (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) lngdp 0.000 (0.003) dgov 0.020*** (0.006) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 57 secedu 0.000 (0.000) rcmi 0.015*** (0.004) sale 0.006*** (0.000) constant 2.102*** 2.048*** 1.916*** (0.004) (0.001) (0.040) r-squared 0.182 0.529 0.530 number of county 1,794 1,794 1,794 yearfix no yes yes idfix no yes yes according to the results, the significance of the policy is still not affected. however, the regression coefficient after controlling for the two-way fixed effects decreases significantly. a possible reason is that the number of controlled samples is relatively large (accounting for about 25% of the total samples), and urban districts are the main force for the development of districts and counties, occupying a large share in terms of the total economic volume, which will have a certain impact on the regression results. 4.2.5 replacing the index of industrial structure upgrading as mentioned above, the process of industrial structure transformation and upgrading is a process in which the production structure shifts from an agricultural economy to a non-agricultural economy, and it is also accompanied by the inclination of production resources such as labor and capital towards the secondary and tertiary industries. therefore, the ratio of the added value of the tertiary industry to that of the secondary industry (indicator 1) and the proportion of the sum of the output values of the secondary and tertiary industries in the gdp of the current year (indicator 2) are selected as the new measurement indicators for the variable of industrial structure upgrading: among them, represents the output value of the i-th industry, y represents the gdp (total population) of the county in that year, represents the industrial structure upgrading index, and its value range is [0,1]. in addition, by replacing the explanatory variable with the proportion of the rural population (indicator 3), the transfer of the rural population is tracked, which is represented by the ratio of the rural population to the total population at the end of the year. table 5 reports the estimation results after replacing the explained variable. the results show that after changing the index of industrial structure upgrading, the coefficient of the policy shock of the pilot program of e-commerce entering rural areas is still significantly positive, further indicating that the previous conclusions are robust. at the same www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 58 time, as can be seen from column (3) of table 5, the implementation of the policy of e-commerce entering rural areas has significantly reduced the proportion of the rural population, which indirectly confirms the important promoting effect of the pilot policy on the migration of rural labor force to non-agricultural industries. table 5. robustness test: results of replacing the index of industrial structure upgrading (1) (2) (3) variables indicator 1 indicator 2 indicator 3 ecommerce 0.102*** 0.005*** -0.013*** (0.028) (0.001) (0.003) constant 8.867*** -0.482*** 0.925*** (0.524) (0.018) (0.042) r-squared 0.084 0.571 0.043 number of county 2,190 2,190 2,074 yearfix yes yes yes idfix yes yes yes controls yes yes yes 5. further analysis 5.1 mechanism test through the previous theoretical analysis, it is found that e-commerce can have an impact on the upgrading of the industrial structure at the county level from two aspects: the production side and the consumption side. on the production side, the labor force shifts from agricultural labor to non-agricultural labor. whether it is manifested as the addition of manufacturing enterprises or the agglomeration of the service industry, it will ultimately be reflected in the accumulation of enterprise funds and the change in the number of enterprises. this paper constructs an index of county-level entrepreneurial activity (undertake) around the number of newly added enterprises each year, and the formula is as follows: among them, the county-level entrepreneurial activity index (undertake) = ln (1 + the number of newly registered enterprises in the current year / the number of registered population in ten thousand people). the regression results are shown in column (1) of table 6. in addition, this paper takes the number of loans from financial institutions in the county each year (lnfin)as a proxy variable for enterprise financing, and the regression results are shown in column (2) of table 6. the results show that, whether in terms of the variables of entrepreneurial situation or capital borrowing, the coefficient of the policy www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 59 shock is also significantly positive at the 1% level, indicating that the emergence of the pilot policy of e-commerce entering rural areas has effectively alleviated the problem of financing constraints in rural areas. while promoting the improvement of the level of capital agglomeration, it also promotes the entrepreneurial vitality of rural enterprises, which is conducive to the sound development of local enterprises. regarding the changes in the consumption level on the consumer side, phenomena such as the diversification of consumer products and the upgrading of the consumption structure have also emerged. however, all these will be reflected in the increase in residents' consumption. in this paper, the proportion of export value to gdp (exports) is introduced to describe the promoting effect of e-commerce on the export of local products. and the residents' consumption propensity (the ratio of the total retail sales of social consumer goods to the disposable income of residents) is introduced to test hypothesis h2 from the consumption side. as can be seen from columns (3) to (4) of table 6, after controlling for relevant variables, the regression coefficients of product exports and residents' consumption as the explained variables are both significantly positive. this indicates that the policy of introducing e-commerce into rural areas has greatly promoted the growth of consumption from both domestic and international aspects. table 6. results of the mechanism test (1) (2) (3) (4) variables undertake lnfin exports consume ecommerce 0.004*** 0.077*** 0.007* 0.031*** (0.001) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) lngdp 0.010** 0.372*** 0.020*** 0.324*** (0.004) (0.012) (0.004) (0.006) dgov -0.007 0.088*** -0.012* -0.010 (0.007) (0.023) (0.007) (0.011) secedu -0.001 0.015*** -0.001 0.341*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) rcmi 0.017*** 0.206*** 0.051*** 0.165*** (0.006) (0.020) (0.009) (0.010) sale 0.003 -0.003 -0.006*** 7.328*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) constant 1.806*** 5.344*** -0.083 5.909*** (0.057) (0.175) (0.082) (0.086) r-squared 0.292 0.861 0.134 0.944 number of county 2,154 2,054 817 2,206 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 60 yearfix yes yes yes yes idfix yes yes yes yes 5.2 heterogeneity analysis 5.2.1 heterogeneity of regional resources the unbalanced pattern of economic development among regions profoundly influences the allocation direction of core production factors such as capital, technology, and talent. specifically, economically developed regions, by virtue of their complete industrial supporting systems, efficient infrastructure networks, and active market entities, form a remarkable factor agglomeration effect. in contrast, less developed regions, due to their insufficient resource absorption capabilities, experience a continuous outflow of production factors. this polarization in resource allocation not only widens the gap in economic aggregates among regions but also accelerates the formation of a development pattern where "the strong get stronger and the weak get weaker". in view of this, to deeply explore the regional heterogeneity of the effects of the pilot policy of e-commerce entering rural areas, this paper divides all the sample counties into three major regional groups, namely the eastern region, the central region, and the western region, according to the economic and geographical characteristics of china's county-level economies, and conducts estimations for each group separately. the measurement results in table 7 show that the pilot policy has produced positive effects to varying degrees in the county-level regions of the eastern, central, and western regions, but there are gradient differences in the intensity of these effects. specifically, in the western region where the economic development level is relatively lagging behind, the impact of the policy is the most prominent, and its promoting effect exceeds the national average level. the policy effect in the central region is the second, and the impact coefficient is basically consistent with the national overall level. in the eastern region where the economic development level is relatively good, the impact of the policy is still significantly positive, but the policy effect is lower than that in the central and western regions. a possible reason is that, for the relatively less developed western region, the pilot policy of e-commerce entering rural areas, through such means as building digital circulation platforms and cultivating new rural market entities, effectively alleviates the long-standing dilemma of insufficient net inflow of factor resources, and injects new impetus into the optimization of the industrial structure. in the developed eastern region, there are locational advantages such as the siphon effect of large cities, and the market-oriented allocation efficiency of factor flows is relatively high. therefore, the marginal promoting effect of the pilot policy is relatively limited. table 7. heterogeneity analysis: results of regional grouping (1) (2) (3) east middle west www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 61 ecommerce 0.010** 0.016*** 0.035*** (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) constant 1.564*** 2.691*** 1.656*** (0.099) (0.179) (0.226) number of county 715 566 925 r-squared 0.911 0.701 0.889 yearfix yes yes yes idfix yes yes yes controls yes yes yes 5.2.2 heterogeneity of network resources in addition to economic factors, the local network infrastructure and the number of users also affect the development of e-commerce. in this paper, the counties whose numbers of fixed-line telephones, mobile phones, and broadband accesses are ranked in the last 30%, between 30% and 70%, and in the top 30% are respectively defined as regions with low network resources, medium network resources, and high network resources. as can be seen from the results in table 8, in regions with higher network resources, the impact of e-commerce on the upgrading of the industrial structure is more significant. however, for regions with the lowest network resources, this effect is not significant. this result further emphasizes the importance of network infrastructure for the development of e-commerce. table 8. heterogeneity analysis: grouping by network resources (1) (2) (3) low network resources medium network resources high network resources ecommerce 0.012 0.012*** 0.016*** (0.012) (0.003) (0.005) constant 2.582*** 2.324*** 1.852*** (0.233) (0.058) (0.089) r-squared 0.127 0.491 0.371 number of county 848 1,649 1,261 controls yes yes yes yearfix yes yes yes idfix yes yes yes www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 62 5.2.3 heterogeneity of agricultural resources the policy studied in this paper is aimed at the development of e-commerce in rural areas of various counties. therefore, for traditional agricultural counties, the effect of e-commerce on the transition of industries to the secondary and tertiary industries will be more obvious. thus, in this paper, the counties whose total output values (in ten thousand yuan) of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and fishery are ranked in the last 30%, between 30% and 70%, and in the top 30% are respectively defined as grade i agricultural counties, grade ii agricultural counties, and grade iii agricultural counties. the regression results are shown as table 9. according to the regression results, for places that are more dependent on agricultural production, the impact of the e-commerce pilot on the local industrial structure is more obvious. that is, the pilot policy of e-commerce entering rural areas has significantly changed the industrial structure of areas that are heavily dependent on agriculture. this further emphasizes the crucial role played by e-commerce in the process of seeking the transformation and upgrading of the industrial structure in agricultural counties. table 9. heterogeneity analysis: grouping by agricultural resources (1) (2) (3) grade i agricultural counties grade ii agricultural counties grade iii agricultural counties ecommerce 0.013 0.015*** 0.013*** (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) constant 2.913*** 2.049*** 1.528*** (0.102) (0.072) (0.123) r-squared 0.309 0.423 0.290 number of county 925 1,498 1,854 controls yes yes yes yearfix yes yes yes idfix yes yes yes 6. conclusions this paper takes the pilot policy of e-commerce entering rural areas as a quasi-natural experimental scenario and conducts an empirical study on the interactive relationship between the development of e-commerce and the upgrading of the industrial structure at the county level. based on the panel data set of 2,206 county-level administrative units across the country from 2005 to 2020, this study uses a staggered difference-in-differences econometric model to systematically evaluate the impact of the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 63 implementation of the pilot policy on the transformation of the industrial structure at the county level. the empirical results show that the pilot policy of e-commerce entering rural areas has significantly promoted the process of upgrading the industrial structure at the county level. in terms of the action mechanism, the policy promotes the upgrading of the industrial structure at the county level by boosting export growth and the vitality of innovation and entrepreneurship. the results of the heterogeneity analysis show that the pilot policy of e-commerce entering rural areas has a more significant impact on regions with a lower level of economic development. the policy effect is affected by the level of regional network facilities and the scale of agricultural output value. in underdeveloped regions with abundant network resources and a high agricultural output value, e-commerce has a more obvious promoting effect on the upgrading of the industrial structure at the county level. therefore, relevant incentive policies for e-commerce entering rural areas should be continuously implemented, and a long-term mechanism of "policy guidance, market operation, and social participation" should be established to fully release the potential of e-commerce in empowering the upgrading of the rural industrial structure. relying on the technological empowerment of digital platforms, the professional agglomeration and high-quality coordination of the secondary and tertiary industries should be accelerated, and policy momentum should be continuously injected into the economic development at the county level. fund project supported by the key laboratory of ethnic information e-commerce in gansu province's universities, project no.: 2018-3; supported by the industrial support plan project of gansu province's universities in 2024, project no.: 2024cyzc-10 references batte, m. t., & ernst, s. 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(2023). does the development of digital finance improve the efficiency of e-commerce in helping farmers. journal of quantitative & technological economics, 40(07), 70-89. the impact of e-commerce on the upgrading of count qingli zhang1* & linming wang2 1 northwest normal university, lanzhou city, china abstract this paper takes the "comprehensive demonstration keywords 2. literature review and model hypothesis 2.1 policy background 2.2 theoretical analysis and research hypotheses 2.2.1 impact of e-commerce on the upgrading of rur 2.2.2 impact of e-commerce on the upgrading of rur 3.experimental design 3.1 sample selection and data source 3.2 model specification 3.3 variable selection and explanation 3.3.1 dependent variable 3.3.2 core explanatory variable 3.3.3 control variables 4. empirical result analysis 4.1 benchmark regression results 4.2 robustness test 4.2.1 parallel trends test 4.2.2 heterogeneity of treatment effects 4.2.3 placebo test 4.2.4 sample selection problem 4.2.5 replacing the index of industrial structure 5.1 mechanism test 5.2 heterogeneity analysis 5.2.1 heterogeneity of regional resources 5.2.2 heterogeneity of network resources 5.2.3 heterogeneity of agricultural resources references advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 78 original paper ritual of electoral democracy, growing political awareness and the paradox of contagious skepticism mike omilusi 1* 1 department of political science, ekiti state university, nigeria * mike omilusi, department of political science, ekiti state university, nigeria received: july 20, 2022 accepted: august 21, 2022 online published: august 23, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n3p78 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n3p78 abstract as one of the pillars of democracy, election has an inescapably ritual dimension that periodically attracts political actors and thus, it has become a barometer to measure political behavior across regions of the world. nigeria has, after two decades of uninterrupted civilian dispensation, keyed into this global phenomenon. although democracy has been the world’s predominant form of government in the last five decades and there has been broad global progress on many aspects of this type of government, conducting credible and transparent elections still remains a herculean task in many african countries. for instance, nigeria’s troubled elections continually reflect the country’s lingering “do or die” politics, poor electoral management and institutionalised impunity, defying attempts at entrenching democratic norms. consequently, there is a seeming shift from voter apathy to outright voter boycott in the countrythe 2019 election recording the lowest turnout (35 per cent) since 1999. this decline has been difficult to explain in the context of an electorate’s seemingly better pre-election activism and political engagements. hence, why large numbers of citizens continually refuse to participate in this most basic civic exercise should naturally provoke agitation. employing secondary sources of data collection, this paper establishes the relationship between voter turnout and disenchantment and other underpinning variables associated with the nigeria’s electoral democracy. it foregrounds how low voter turnout remains a stubborn challenge to nigerian democracy and the imperativeness for post-election audit. keywords democracy, elections, voter apathy, political activism, contagious scepticism www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 79 published by scholink inc. 1. introduction in the 2019 general elections, over 55 million registered voters did not vote, marking the lowest voter participation since 1999 by way of percentage of actual voters against registered voters in each election cycle. in all, the lives of approximately 200 million people will be critically affected by the choices made by only 28 million voters; indicating that this category of voters is not substantially representative of the broader population of eligible nigerian citizens. yet, more than ever before, many nigerian civil society groups are embarking on aggressive civic education and political mobilisation in the country. many young persons, who appear to have keyed into the momentum, are daily exhibiting their political consciousness through the new media. in fact, modern technology seems to be a new incentive to broaden the scope of political participation among the nigerian youth. in many of the party meetings, rallies and conventions, this category of the population dominates attendance. similarly, the religious space, across all divides, dispenses messages of citizen activism and value of electoral participation; more reason candidates and parties seek support from them during election. the hype with which election timetable is received and discussed among politicians, senior citizens, artisans, civil servants, businessmen and women also attests to the new willingness being generated about nigeria’s electoral democracy. of recent, my field observations on election days also reveal that vote trading significantly draws some of the ordinarily uninterested voters out of their cocoons; an incredible mobilisation strategy of sort! yet, in many of the polling centres after accreditation, an average of two-third of registered voters stays at home expecting results of an electoral exercise in which they are not participants. surely, there are many factors precipitating low turnout in an election such as non-self-registered individuals, mistrust of the political process, ease of voting, lack of credibility of political promises, disenchantment, institutional factors, voter suppression or indifference. obviously, low turnout is an indictment on the legitimacy of the current system or democratic legitimacy that the election ought to generate. bearing in mind therefore, that turnout is a key factor in legitimizing governments, the more reason non-voters, especially those with a deep-seated ideological objection to voting, should not be dismissed as irritants or mere nonconformists because they also offer an important critique of not just the ruling party but also existing power structures. but why should eligible citizens discuss election issues, attend political rallies and meetings with so much gusto/enthusiasm, and often with seeming deep concern, yet fail to cast their ballots on election day? hence, the paradox for interrogation: why voter education and political consciousness are increasing, there is a decline in voter turnout. if voter education is not effective enough in influencing higher voter turnout, cant demonstrable political awareness (highlighted in the first two paragraphs) achieve that? if representation means keeping continuous public tabs on politicians and replacing underperformed government, what impact does low turnout have on democratic governance, particularly in nurturing the spirit and substance of democracy? are elections mere rituals to satisfy a global consensus or meet aid conditionality for african countries? is there any correlation between the abysmal voter turnout in the 2019 elections and the perceived www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 80 published by scholink inc. growing political awareness among the populace? can this development enhance the legitimacy of the government or strengthen the social contract between the government and its citizens? though not peculiar to nigeria, voter turnout has been declining in most developed countries over recent decades, its breadth and depth has however, reached a worrisome level in the country. this paper provides insight into the political engagement and voting ritual associated with electoral democracy in nigeria. it establishes the relationship between voter turnout and contagious scepticism and other underpinning variables associated with the nigeria’s electoral democracy. it discusses the factors responsible for the change in citizens’ participation and voter behaviour in an electoral space characterised by low voter turnout, violence during elections, and blatant rigging. it adopts simple descriptive quantitative analysis of the votes cast in the 2019 general elections and pre-election political activities of the populace to interrogate the gap between demonstrable political awareness and turnout in an election and the imperativeness for post-election audit. this paper also discusses the basic ingredients necessary for nigeria’s democracy to function properly: strengthening voter participation and interest in the electoral process; making voting a more enjoyable and community-driven experience; government providing fair representation and making benefits of participation equally available to all. 2. electoral participation and voting ritual: a theoretical exposition generally, participation in politics manifests in various ways, ranging from engagement in formal political processes, such as voting in elections, to extra institutional behaviours, such as street protests or community meetings (resnick & casale, 2011). it is usually influenced by a number of factors, including political ideology, efficacy, structural barriers, and demographics. electoral participation, which is one of the three main indicators of democratic performance (powell, 1982), is also one of the most studied topics in political science and one of the most fundamental concerns of scholars and development practitioners. it is geared towards making governments more accountable and responsive to the needs of people because “voters value democracy and they recognise elections as a necessary element of modern democratic systems” (birch, 2018). when certain groups or section of the population do not engage or participate in electoral politics, it poses a genuine problem to representative democracy (tambe, 2018). however, as electoral turnout is declining in most democracies (gray & caul, 2000), much attention is being dedicated to electoral participation and turnout in developing countries in the last decade. given the fact that voters are those who care deeply about politics, have a lot at stake, possess disposable time and resources, or receive utility from the act of voting itself (riker & ordeshook, 1968), mobilizing more citizens to the polling stations has become a national obligation in many countries. politically, free and fair elections are an integral part of a successfully functioning democracy. the periodic election of governments through competitive, legitimate and transparent elections is core to representative democracy and “where few take part in decisions, there is little democracy; the more participation there is in decisions, the more democracy there is” (verba & nie, 1972, p. 1). the polity www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 81 published by scholink inc. is shaped by democracy’s insistence on regular elections, by its rhetoric of voter supremacy and elected leaders as servants, by imperfections and chaotic processes, and of decision making by protest and compromise. elections are great secular rituals. elections serve many purposes, being the defining institutions of modern democracy (katz, 1997, p. 1). hence, the importance of elections can also be found in what they are capable of deciding as rightly observed by dalton and gray (2003, p. 23). elections are also important for what they decide. electoral outcomes determine who manages affairs of government and who makes public policy. the selection of leaders and the ability to “throw the rascals out” at the next election are the public’s ultimate instruments of non-violent power. political elites may not always act as they promise, but the selection of a government provides some popular control over them. moreover, campaign debates are among the prime mechanisms for ensuring openness and accountability in the political process. indeed, the competitive nature of electoral politics encourages citizens to discuss the policies of the government and the behaviour of potential policy-makers. elections allow for the selection of parties, programmes and representatives and strengthen accountability and political control. they give legitimacy to political power, they lead to peaceful change in power, and they enhance political stability (kersting, 2007). elections are also central to making democracy deliver a better quality of life by linking voters’ interests to those in government and allowing citizens to select representatives who reflect their will. the will of the people, expressed through their ballots, provides the basis of authority for democratic government. these concepts are enshrined in article 21 of the universal declaration of human rights (universal declaration), article 25 of the international covenant on civil and political rights (iccpr) and other international human rights instruments. democratic or not, all polities expect some public involvement in the political process, if only to obey political orders. democracy, however, expects more active involvement than a nondemocratic order because democracy is designed to aggregate public preferences into binding collective decisions (dalton & klingemann, 2011). this right to participate is a broad concept and can only be subject to reasonable restrictions that are provided by law. authorities must take steps to assess and remove any barriers to the participation of all citizens. this includes removing barriers for traditionally marginalized populations such as ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities; women, youth or elderly citizens; and persons with disabilities (merloe, 2009). voter behaviour is highly complex, however, and social scientists have been studying it from different angles for many decades (solijonov, 2016). plummeting voter turnout across the globe is a worrying phenomenon. voter turnout, which is a key indicator of the vitality of a democracy, helps measure the trust that citizens place in their political institutions and politicians, and shows how citizens participate in the governance of their country (west africa brief, 2019). while political scientists focus on the influence of political factors such as: political group, electoral campaign and the popularity of party leaders on voting behaviour, sociologists seem to concentrate on the socio-economic determinants of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 82 published by scholink inc. supports for political parties, observing the correlations between class, occupations, ethnicity, sex, age and vote. elections-beginning with the preparation of electoral rolls and concluding with the declaration of election resultsare profound events in the life of every nation, state or locality. but elections are not abstract instruments given the fact that they are something citizens experience as a great ritual, made up of smaller rituals (orr, 2015). elections are thus, rituals—repeated social activities full of symbolism and meaning. the electoral cycle sets up the seasons of politics. social scientists have utilized representative surveys to understand election outcomes since the 1950s, and research has shown that a number of considerations play a role in shaping vote choice (lau, kleinberg, & ditonto, 2018). some individuals are issue voters, others are party voters, and yet another set of people focus on the characteristics of candidates as people (lau, kleinberg, & ditonto, 2018). though election results reflect the outcome and level of participation in electoral contests (open election data, n.d), burklo (2014) argues that the likelihood that any one person’s vote would decide an election is miniscule. people do not vote because they think their ballot will decide the outcome. they do so because it is a ritual that is meaningful for them. he explains further: people have lost faith not only in government, but also in corporations and churches and temples. it’s a vicious cycle. we vote for politicians who don’t or can’t deliver, we lose faith in the institutions they run badly, and then we are de-motivated to vote at all. thus, those for whom elections have ceased to matter at all and those who, whether out of trust, contentment or ennui, just leave the system to itself (orr, 2015). in fact, certain theorists and political scientists, according to birch (2018), have recently argued that a substantial portion of the electorate is not sufficiently enlightened to make an informed choice at the polls, and that it is thus better for democracy if such voters stay at home. there are two separate components to this argument: (1) some citizens are not well enough informed to make sound choices, and (2) it is better for democracy if such voters do not exercise their franchise, as is more likely to be the case under voluntary voting laws. 3. between growing electoral awareness and decline in voter turnout: the 2019 elections in perspective in most democracies, voting is voluntary. the empirical literature shows that people value democracy and voting and that they believe voting is important; at the same time, many fail to vote (birch, 2018). in fact, voter turnout rates and party membership rolls have been in sharp decline in the past few decades (kataja, 2017). since its return to electoral democracy in 1999, nigeria’s elections have been characterized by voter apathy. being a nascent democratic experiment two decades ago, it was thus, regarded as one of the usual teething challenges. however, it has been a steady decline since then in spite of the perceived political awareness among the populace. since 1999, voter turnout reached a peak of 69% in 2003 and has then continuously declined to a record-low of 35.6 percent in 2019. while nigeria’s population has nearly doubled over the past 20 years and there are about 25 million additional www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 83 published by scholink inc. registered voters, the absolute number of nigerians who are voting has declined (30.2 million in 1999 compared to 28.6 million in 2019) (west africa brief, 2019). indeed, one of the major fallouts of the 2019 elections is the level of voter turnout. for instance, while over 84 million eligible nigerian voters, a 25 percent rise from the last such vote in 2015, were expected at the polls, the voter turn-out only affirmed less than 40 percent of the number. precisely, the overall turnout for the presidential elections was 28, 614,190 which is 35.6 percent of registered voters, making it the lowest of all recent elections held on the african continent, according to the data from the international institute for democracy and electoral assistance (cited in ojetunde, 2019). measured by voting behaviour such as voter registration and voter turnout, there has been decline both in the long term (1999-2015) and short term (2011-2015). the number of registered voters as a percentage of total population declined from 45.7% in 1999 to 38.3% in 2015. similarly, voter turnout declined from 52.3% in 1999 to 43.7% in 2015 (cdd, 2019). in 1999, out of the 57,938,945 registered voters, the total votes cast ,8 2,538,246 invalid votes. the turnout in 2003 at 69 per cent represented an increase of 16.8 per cent over that of 1999 (adedigba, 2019). i turnout dropped further to 54 per cent in the 2011 presidential election. that year, there were 73,528,040 registered voters but only 39,469,484 turned out for the poll, with 38,209,978 valid votes and 1,259,506 invalid votes. this represented a drop of 4.36 per cent over that of 2007. the decline in voters’ that year, there were 28,587,564 valid votes and 844,519 invalid votes. the drop was 10.1 per cent (adedigba, 2019). an interrogation of two stateslagos and riversreadily attests to the abysmal low turnout in the 2019 election. they are cosmopolitan states. indeed, lagos is the nigeria’s most cosmopolitan state as well the richest state in the country, with an estimated 20 million residents. it has a total of 6,570,291 registered voters but only 17.25 per cent (1,089,567) of the number voted in the national election (adedigba, 2019). in rivers, there are 3,215,273 registered voters but only 19.97 per cent (642,165) of the total registered number voted in the presidential election (adedigba, 2019). also, millions of eligible voters in nigeria stayed away from casting their ballot to elect governors and state assembly members in the march 9 election (abang, 2019). in fact, as explained above, turnout has been declining since the 2003 presidential election. the graph below clearly shows the percentage of voters’ turnout between 1999 and 2019. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 84 published by scholink inc. figure 1. voters turnout, 1999-2019 the voting age population (vap), as well as the number of registered voters (reg) when compared with actual voters on election day can be relied upon as indicators of political participation in democracies. so, when measuring votes cast as a percentage of the estimated voting-age population and considering the above analysis, it is obvious that voter turnout in nigeria is dismally low. is there any correlation therefore, between high political awareness and voter turnout? let me start by admitting that turnout may not necessarily reflect the wider health of civic engagement given the fact that political engagement is much more multi-dimensional. but turnout, among other factors, is a manifestation of civic engagement and a function of personal/group interest. suffice to say that declining voting rates may be symptomatic of a democratic deficit” (pammett & leduc, 2003; nakhaie 2006). based on measures of people’s interest in government, current events, and political issues, coupled with aggressive civic education by civil society groups, interest can be developed by citizens around election period. this interest, or pre-election engagement, manifests in political rally attendance, social media activism and participation in election discussions through different forums. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 85 published by scholink inc. figure 2. 2019 nigeria presidential election results a vast literature points to education as a major driver of voting, as well as many other forms of civic action (almond & verba, 1963). in fact, it has been argued that the positive relationship between education and political participation is “one of the most reliable results in empirical social science” (la due lake & huckfeldt, 1998, p. 567). in the last decade, nigerians have demonstrated some appreciable level of political awareness/education in many aspects of election activities, except voting on election day. in previous elections, politicians/political parties, the electorate, and civil society organizations made extensive use of social media as they used the social media to achieve a number of interrelated objectives. most people misperceive political participation and thus only see and reduce it www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 86 published by scholink inc. to franchise exercise (voting during elections) (othman et al., 2018). political participation goes beyond voting on election day. the fundamental point however, is that statistics about voter turnout in the last decade in nigeria do not justify the aphorism: “education as a major driver of voting” with the 2019 general elections recording the lowest in two decades despite active participation in other areas of electioneering. no doubt, social media stimulates online and offline political participation among nigerians, suggesting that online political activities and offline political participation could be a function of political awareness. the relevance of this observation among nigerian electorate, particularly in the last decade, cannot be overemphasized. within the context of our discussion in this chapter, it can be affirmed that a key marker of political participation in democracies is voter turnout, more so that voting is the most important act of a democratic society. but given the fact that citizens’ political knowledge, socialization and general level of trust in a country have also an impact on turnout, a single factor can therefore, not be used to determine political participation. hence, citizen political awareness may be hampered by other variables and as such, may not translate into high turn-out in an election as discussed in the section below. 4. voting behavior, low turnout and contagious skepticism in nigeria voting behaviour, which implies the factors and attitudes that govern electorates’ selection of their prospective representatives, seems to be a result of societal development, the influence of mobilising media (such as political parties and churches), individual resources (such as time and skills) and motivation (such as political interest and trust) (norris, 2002). thus, pointing to a single factor as causing a person’s turnout or lack of turnout would be a vast oversimplification (harder & krosnick, 2008). different explanatory models, including the sociological model, rational choice model and clientelism model, can be drawn from the political science literature to assess which factors influence how people vote in an election. in addition to this, other models of voter behaviour have been employed by political scientists in an attempt to explain the different motivations of voters: retrospective voting, prospective voting and party-line voting. in spite of these age-long motivations, voters’ apathy has become increasingly serious globally, indicative of the need to build a sustainable society with minimal voters apathy. low turnout may indicate that democracy is not meeting citizens’ expectations, as earlier alluded to. low voter turnout can also be seen as an indicator of low legitimacy and limited political stability. as rightly observed by tucker (2004), “the lower the turnout, the greater the chance that the election result is not the outcome preferred by the population of potential voters. low turnout makes it possible for minorities to defeat majorities”. overtime, people become bored, alienated, or mistrustful of politicians. usually, competitive races, such as the 2019 presidential election in nigeria, encourage higher turnout because voters realize their votes will make a decisive difference. ironically, the reverse is the case in nigeria. as explicitly noted in the 2019 election factbook (2019): www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 87 published by scholink inc. the history of elections in nigerian state has been characterized by threats to statehood based on the manipulation of ethnicity as a divisive mechanism for the acquisition of political power by political actors, the fragile nature of political cum democratic institutions is acquainted with poor democratic culture among nigerian citizen. this section will focus on some of the factors precipitating abstinence from voting as observed over the years. one, going by previous elections since 1999, it is obvious that there are unnecessary barriers in the voter registration and voting process that continually prevent would-be voters from casting ballots. elections must be conducted with integrity for strengthening democracy, furthering development, and for social and individual security. from all indications, with the prevailing government failures in meeting the aspirations of the people, potential voters feel alienated from government and there is a lack of trust in those representing them in government, coupled with the electorate’s declining confidence in institutions. political parties are among the least trusted institutions in the country. politicians are mostly distrusted by the people. in fact, it is likely that the largest contributing factor to the extremely low turnout was the feeling that whoever won, nothing would change. the system is so corrupt that it makes no difference whether x or y is president. pew research conducted in 2018 showed that only 39 percent of nigerians were satisfied with their democracy, 72 percent said most politicians were corrupt and 57 percent said no matter who wins elections, things do not change much. only 38 percent felt that elected officials cared what “ordinary people think” (adekoya, 2019). as confidence and trust in politicians and public institutions progressively declined, so too has voter participation. going by voter’s psychological disposition, which is measured by political efficacy, political interest, political trust and satisfaction with democracy, it is obvious that nigerian voters have not felt any satisfaction in all these criteria. generally speaking, political research considers political trust to be a prerequisite for a healthy democracy. a sense of fairness and trust in both others and institutions are fundamental prerequisites for democracy and participation. this is obviously absent in nigeria. two, politics is a high-stakes game anywhere; in nigeria the rewards of victory are particularly high. the violent nature of electioneering in nigeria entrenched in a “do-or-die” mentality remains a cogent dissuader for prospective voters. do-or-die, a concept that is often invoked in popular electoral discourse in nigeria to describe the distinct but alarming nature of the country’s democracy as exhibited in the desperation of the politicians and their supporters, is antithetical to electoral participation. elections in nigeria from 1999 to date have continued to recycle in vicious violence and unimaginable manipulation especially from the political elites: more than 800 people were killed in 2011 in post-election protests in the north after buhari’s defeat that year (human rights watch, 2012). in 2015, more than 160 people were killed in election-related violence (european union, 2016). also, there were cases of violence in some states in the build-up to and during the 2019 elections, which may have hindered voters from exercising their franchise (adedigba, 2019). looking at the history of electoral violence in nigeria, the crisis group in its 2018 report stated that about 4,000 lives were lost www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 88 published by scholink inc. in elections conducted from 2006 to 2015, with casualty levels increasing in each election cycle (fadesere, 2019). due to lapses in security, challenges such as snatching of ballot boxes, destruction of voting materials, under age voting, inability to conduct elections in polling areas or attack on electoral officers in many polling units (ajala, 2019) are regular occurrences in nigeria. as usual, international attention and monitors were unable to discourage electoral violence in the country. all of this breeds despair in the nigerian voter, who begins to question the logic in partaking in this quadrennial democratic ritual (fadesere, 2019). three, a large segment of the nigerian electorate does not identify with any political party in terms of membership but they usually express sympathy for parties and candidates. one would have thought that such expression can translate into votes on election day given that turning out to vote is an expression of political participation and determination to make a statement through ballots. party identification is typically determined by the political party that an individual most commonly supports (by voting or other means). in other words, those people who identify with a party tend to vote for their party’s candidate for various offices in high percentages. some argue that the availability of more parties gives more options to voters, and thus increases their desire to vote. it is posited that people who identify with one of the political parties, or feel attached to them, are much more likely to vote than those who do not (mortimore & gill, 2017). evidence in the literature suggests that political parties have a key role in encouraging people to turn out to vote by demonstrating it matters which party wins the next general election, through making it easier for the public to discriminate between the main parties (mortimore & gill, 2017). even when politicians of all parties recognise the seriousness of low turnouts in elections, little is being done by political parties to effect changes more than the usual jamboree during election period in nigeria. contrary to expectations, apart from the two dominant political parties in the 2019 presidential elections, other participating 71 parties could not garner a million votes. four, just hours before polls were scheduled to open, the country’s independent national electoral commission postponed the vote by a week. by then, thousands of registered voters had made long journeys to their home districts to cast their ballots and literally could not afford to wait idle for another week (ilo, 2019). given the timing of the announcement (around 2.30 am local time), millions of eligible voters—especially those without access to the internet and social media—only found out when they woke up february 16 (kazeem, 2019) after inec had repeatedly told both nigerians and international observers that it was fully prepared to bring off the elections according to schedule. the postponement of the election was met with anger and frustration among nigerians especially as inec’s late announcement suggests a lack of consideration for its impact on citizens (kazeem, 2019). two main grievances, according to obasi (2019) feed the anger: the electoral commission had four years to prepare for the polls, yet failed to deliver, and it announced its decision only hours before voting was set to start. the rescheduling comes at great economic and psychological cost to all concerned, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 89 published by scholink inc. including the electoral commission, security agencies, political parties, local and international observation groups and, of course, nigeria’s 84 million voters (obasi, 2019). five, the conventional practice that requires voters to stand in queues for long hours often discourages voters from participating in elections (election factbook, 2019). really, voting usually involves multiple administrative steps and waiting long hours in queues. long lines may discourage some from voting, thus undermining the quality of elections as an expression of the people’s will. in fact, growing the apathy pool dissuades people from bothering to stand in long lines. in nigeria where many people are often alienated from the largesse of democratic governance, queuing under the sun for hours to votesometimes owing to polling place inefficiency—is seen as double tragedy. with waits at polling places sometimes exceeding an hour, some voters do turn away as poll workers wrestle with malfunctioning equipment and overflow crowds. for a country as populous as nigeria therefore, “seeking alternatives to the traditional waiting-in-line registration and voting system should not be an option but a necessity” (obisesan, 2019). the effects of all these factors could be very contagious among voters. generally, friends and neighbours encourage one another to go to the polls on election day (mcclurg 2004) and people in social networks encourage one another to support particular candidates. recent studies have also elucidated the role of social networks in spreading voting behaviour (beck, dalton, greene, & huckfeldt, 2002). voters embedded in social networks of friends, family members, neighbours, and co-workers (nickerson, 2008) influence each other in terms of voter turnout. thus, taking into account the dynamic response of social networks to external influences, most studies consider vote choices to be driven by various individual’s biases and other external pressures (braha & de aguiar, 2017). it is also argued that when people are not strongly committed to a goal, seeing apathy in others triggers and reinforces apathy in them but when people are strongly committed to a goal, seeing apathy in others fuels their commitment (disalvo, 2016). in other words, apathy is an emotional contagion with dual effects. in nigeria, many people who do not vote believe they do not understand enough about the government, the election process or individual party policies and they easily convince friends, neighbours, community associations and relatives, through their nonchalant attitudes, on the futility of previous ballots. millions of people remained undecided right up to the end, and millions more were influenced by the prevailing apathy to simply give up. the contagious effect of this evidently manifested in the 2019 general elections as somewhere more than half of all eligible voters declined to participate in the election with implications that surpass anyone’s ability to forecast-being the lowest turnout in two decades. 5. pre-election engaged and post-election enraged voters: stemming the negative trends an analysis of key factors that influence voter preferences since 1999 will reveal that ethnicity, religion, policy performance of the incumbent, economic conditions, etc., are, on varying degrees of importance, central to their voting pattern. more predominant however, are the primordial factors. the main reason www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 90 published by scholink inc. voting ritual has been unable to engender fundamentals of democracy. by implication, the outcome of elections in nigeria has always been beneficial to the ruling elites and their cronies while the voters are left disenchanted. as earlier pointed out, one of the most important functions of elections is the participation of the citizens in the very process of governance. this stems from the fact that the core value of democracy as expressed in the fundamental definition “government by the people” emphasizes people’s participation in the governance process. it therefore, becomes imperative to investigate why people vote as they do and how they arrive at the decisions they make. today, in nigeria, the fact that electoral democracy is under stress can be measured from the voter behaviour, not only during elections but in post-election engagements. it also manifests in poor service delivery and inability to fulfil electoral promises or whether democracy has been able to address the challenges that people are wrestling with. low turnout in poorly contested general elections is an important and well-recognized result. then, how can participation be increased and how can the electorate become more representative of the greater population? there is no silver bullet for increasing turnout—a mix of strategies would need to be pursued, each (on their own) with incremental effects. as a starting point within the context of a developing country like nigeria where the mass of the electorate are disenchanted, the need arises for government at all levels to make life meaningful for the people by fulfilling its electoral promises and engage them in decision-making process. electoral reforms would help encourage participation, but so would visible improvement in governance and socioeconomic outcomes. improving the electorate’s representativeness and understanding of policy issues is also very germane. similarly, providing information on how well politicians and political parties deliver on promises can help voters make more informed decisions and can also create forums for engagement on political issues. this will not only create a sense of belonging among the voters but invigorate/activate the latent patriotism in them. however, for voters to make meaningful decisions, they must understand the options the polity faces. citizens must have a sufficient knowledge of the workings of the political system if they intend to influence and control the actions of their representatives. even turnout, as posited by tucker (2004), “cannot have an immediate, strategic impact on the decision made in an election unless voters have meaningful choices on the ballot”. ordinarily, in a democracy, political leaders should present elections as real opportunities for citizens to participate in politics and an investment into their future. now, after two decades of controversy over election and voting problems, nigerian political leadership should commence a post-election review to critically engage stakeholders with a view to addressing the salient challenges in the electoral process, particularly how to re-evaluate and overhaul inec’s approach to voter registration; and general conduct of election. also, there are a number of tools available for countries that intend to increase voter participation and expand voting opportunities for eligible voters; with the strong support of campaigns and grassroots organizations. these include: strengthening civics education in schools; streamlining voter registration with automatic voter registration and online voter registration; providing sufficient resources in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 91 published by scholink inc. elections and ensure voting is accessible; investing in integrated voter engagement (ive) and outreach (root & kennedy, 2018); social pressure; same-day registration (lemzy, 2018); customize booths to cater to different needs (varinsky, 2016) nigeria can capitalize on 21st century technology to automatically register voters and update their registration information, without any need for the outmoded bureaucracy being employed at every election cycle. as a matter of fact, in a report by nonprofit vote, it identifies automatic voter registration (avr), same-day registration, and vote-by-mail policies as significant enablers, if not motivators, of the high turnout (ginsburg, 2019). while the american society in which the research was conducted is different from nigeria’s, there is no rocket science in implementing the first two policiesautomatic voter registration (avr) and same-day registration-in the country to encourage voters, because “improving the voter registration process can decrease gaps in voter participation between demographic groups” (root & kennedy, 2018). these tools have the potential to reshape and reinvigorate the electorate particularly when strong civics education is combined with robust integrated voter engagement. around the world, countries with compulsory voting have higher voter turnout levels, especially when sanctions for abstention are enforced, but where voting is not mandatory, all other available tools should be employed. for instance, sweden does not have compulsory voting but in 2018 parliamentary elections, it recorded 87% of its voting population (timsit, 2019). voting is an effective means of holding elected officials accountable for their decisions and behaviour in office and thus, a high turnout in fair elections gives legitimacy to public officials and their decisions, while abstention may erode citizens’ satisfaction and confidence. low turnouts must be a concern for any democrat as they are unlikely to provide electors with representative government. it is important that voters are familiar with all laws and regulations governing the electoral process and the benefits accruable from participation. voters should not be forced to wait in line for hours to exercise their civic duty and for their voice to be heard in our democracy. nor should certain groups have less access and fewer opportunities to register to vote and cast ballots (root & kennedy, 2018). to showcase the value of civic engagement and improve participation in the democratic process, getting electorate to vote is as important, if not more, as efforts put into voter registration exercise by stakeholders. democratic theory suggests there is an axiomatic relationship between high rates of voter participation and turnout and high levels of representation, accountability, oversight and governmental responsiveness (fakir & sarakinsky, 2019). voters can use elections to hold governments accountable for their performance in office only when they meaningfully participate. post-election engagement is also very important. more importantly, actors in the democratisation process should emphasise the importance of democratic grassroots movements targeting political reforms, and encourage interaction between civil society and the party system. using data for over 700 elections covering 85 democracies between 1950 and 2008, martinez and trinh (2017) argued that higher turnout is often found in elections with higher electoral integrity. also, in a study conducted by birch (2010) it is revealed that perceptions of electoral integrity, and thus www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 92 published by scholink inc. confidence in the fairness, honesty and legitimacy of electoral procedures and outcomes, are indeed positively associated with propensity to vote. her logic is straightforward: citizens will turn out to vote if they perceive that their vote will be counted fairly. other studies have shown that low levels of trust in the integrity of elections depress voter turnout (see martinez i coma & trinh, 2017; simpser, 2012). those with more faith in the process proved more willing to cast a ballot (norris, 2012, p. 13). the link between electoral integrity and turnout is fundamental for the legitimacy of democracies: if the lack of electoral integrity damages legitimacy, it should be expected to have an impact on turnout. 6. conclusion as one of the pillars of democracy, election has an inescapably ritual dimension that periodically attracts political actors and thus, it has become a barometer to measure political behaviour across regions of the world. nigeria has, after two decades of uninterrupted civilian government, keyed into this global phenomenon. though issues of clientelism, religion, class and ethnicity do certainly shape voter perceptions in african politics, as evidenced in nigeria’s six cycles of election since 1999, “other issues such as elite strategies, crosscutting cleavages, political ideology, government performance, opposition parties, candidates and key issues are also powerful determinants of voting intentions” (mclaughlin, 2008; basedau & stroh, 2011). however, the dominance of primordial factors over other fundamental issues, in voting behaviour is worrisome in nigeria. this paper establishes the fact that citizen involvement is largely propelled by different types of motivation even though voting motivations may not be quite so clear-cut in the multi-ethnic societies of sub-saharan africa; and non-involvement in the electoral process, particularly voting, is accentuated by divergent factors. considering the fact that election provides insight into the state of the constitutive elements of democracy, it should be more than just a ritual in a democratic society. given the nature of democracy as a trade-off which must also be accepted; it goes without saying that no one can have everything they want and therefore, “disappointments and slow progress must be tolerated in order for the entirety of the system to function” (kataja, 2017). though difficult to address, inequality must be tackled if democracy is to work in the future. the challenge for established democracies is to expand further the opportunities for citizens to participate and meaningfully influence the decisions affecting their lives. to meet this challenge means ensuring an equality of political rights and opportunities that will be even more difficult to guarantee with a wider variety of activities (dalton & klingemann, 2011). it is expected on a broader level, that the political leadership should build and sustain the institutions of governance, diversify the economy, create jobs for the burgeoning and youthful population, invest in the education and health of the people and reduce abject poverty in the country with a view to impacting positively on the living standard of the people. with these deliverables, the people will have cause to adduce rational basis for their current and future civic engagement through voting and express, through their actions, trust in political institutions. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 93 published by scholink inc. references abang, m. (2019). voter apathy apparent in nigeria’s local elections. al jazeera news, march 9. adedigba, a. (2019). analysis: lagos and the problem of low voter turnout in nigerian elections. premium times, march 7 ajala, o. (2019). what to expect as 84 million nigerians go to the polls. the conversation, february 14. basedau, m., & stroh, a. (2011). how ethnic are african parties really? evidence from four francophone countries. international political science review, 33(1), 5-24. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512110391770 birch, s. (2010). perceptions of electoral fairness and voter turnout, comparative political studies, 43(12), 1601-1622. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414010374021 burklo, j. (2014). voting: a ritual. retrieved from https://www.patheos.com/blogs/faithforward/2014/10/voting-a-ritual-2/ birch, s. (2018). democratic norms, empirical realities and approaches to improving voter turnout. res publica, 24(9). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-017-9380-3 cdd. (2019). nigeria electoral trends. retrieved from https://www.cddwestafrica.org/electoral-trends-in-nigeria/ dalton, r. j., & gray, m. (2003). expanding the electoral marketplace. in b. e. cain., r. j. dalton, & s. e. scarrow (eds.), democracy transformed: expanding political opportunities in advanced industrial democracies. oxford, england: oxford university press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199264996.003.0002 dalton, r. j., & klingemann, h. (2011). overview of political behaviour: political behaviour and citizen politics. the oxford handbook of political science. retrieved from https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199604456.001.0001/oxfordhb-9 780199604456-e-017?print=pdf disalvo, d. (2016). the contagious reason why millions don’t vote. retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddisalvo/2016/11/14/the-contagious-reason-why-millions-dontvote/#7f58ce744119 election factbook. 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(2008). why do people vote? a psychological analysis of the causes of voter turnout. journal of social issues, 64(3), 525-549. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2008.00576.x ilo, u. j. (2019). nigerian democracy’s uncertain future. retrieved from https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/nigerian-democracy-s-uncertain-future kataja, e. k. (2017). from the trials of democracy towards future participation. retrieved from https://media.sitra.fi/2017/03/20164121/from_the_trials_of_democracy_towards_future_participa tion.pdf kazeem, y. (2019). the postponement of nigeria’s elections will have major human and economic impact. quartz africa, february 16. kersting, n. (2007). electoral reform in southern africa: voter turnout, electoral rules and infrastructure. journal of african elections, 6. 134-151. https://doi.org/10.20940/jae/2007/v6i1a6 lau, r. r., kleinberg, mona, s., & tessa, m. d. (2018). measuring voter decision strategies in political behavior and public opinion research. public opinion quarterly, 82(s1), pp. 911-936. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfy004 lemzy, a. (2018). here’s how to increase voter turnout. retrieved from https://www.textmagic.com/blog/heres-how-to-increase-voter-turnout/ mclaughlin, e. s. (2008). racial, ethnic or rational voters? splitting tickets in south africa. politikon: south african journal of political studies, 35(1), 23-41. https://doi.org/10.1080/02589340802113030 martinez, i. c. f., & minh, t. (2017). how electoral integrity affects voter turnout in democracies. australian journal of political science, 52(1), 53-74. https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2016.1238869 merloe, p. (2009). human rights-the basis for inclusiveness, transparency, accountability and public confidence in elections. in j. h. young (ed.), international principles: democracy & the rule of law (p. 3, pp. 18-20). mortimore, r., & gill, m. (2017). voting and politics: the public view. in l. baston, & k. ritchie (eds.), turning out or turning off? retrieved from https:https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/political-disengagement-a nd-what-can-be-done-about-it.pdf norris, p. (2002). democratic phoenix: political activism worldwide. new york: cambridge university press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511610073 braha, d., & de aguiar, m. (2017). voting contagion: modeling and analysis of a century of u.s. presidential elections. plos one, 12(5), e0177970. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0177970 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 95 published by scholink inc. nakhaie, m. r. (2006). electoral participation in municipal, provincial and federal elections in canada. canadian journal of political science, 39(2), pp. 363-390. https://doi.org/10.1017/s000842390606015x beck, p. a, dalton, r. j., greene, s., & huckfeldt, r. (2002). the social calculus of voting: interpersonal, media, and organizational influences on presidential choices. am polit sci rev, 96(1), 57-73. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055402004239 nickerson, d. w. (2008). is voting contagious? evidence from two field experiments. am polit sci rev, 102(01), 49-57. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055408080039 obasi, n. (2019). winning back trust in nigeria’s rescheduled elections. retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/winning-back-trust-nigerias-rescheduled-ele ctions ojetunde, d. (2019). 2019 election: nigeria has the lowest rate of voter turnout in africa. retrieved from https://www.icirnigeria.org/2019-election-nigeria-has-the-lowest-voter-turnout-in-africa/ open election data. (n.d.). key election process categories. retrieved from https://openelectiondata.net/en/guide/key-categories/election-results/ powell, b. g. (1982). comparative democracies: participation, stability and violence. harvard university press, cambridge. pammett, j. h., & lawrence, l. (2003). explaining the turnout decline in canadian federal elections: a new survey of non-voters. ottawa. elections canada, 79. resnick, d., & casale, d. (2011). the political participation of africa’s youth: turnout, partisanship and protest, afrobarometer working papers. working paper, 136. root, d., & kennedy, l. (2018). increasing voter participation in america: policies to drive participation and make voting more convenient. retrieved from https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2018/07/11/453319/increasing-voterparticipation-america/ riker, w., & ordeshook, p. (1968). a theory of the calculus of voting. american political science review 62(1), 25-42. https://doi.org/10.2307/1953324 solijonov, a. (2016). voter turnout trends around the world. international institute for democracy and electoral assistance. tambe, e. b. (2018). who does not vote and why? implication for new democracies, elections a global perspective. ryan m. yonk, intech open. retrieved from https://www.intechopen.com/books/elections-a-global-perspective/who-does-not-vote-and-why-i mplication-for-new-democracies tucker, h. j. (2004). low voter turnout and american democracy, paper prepared for presentation at the ecpr joint sessions of workshops workshop 9: low turnout-does it matter? (uppsala, april 2004). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 96 published by scholink inc. timsit, a. (2019). why are belgians so much better at voting than everyone else? retrieved from https://qz.com/1605690/european-election-belgiums-voter-turnout-rate-is-an-outlier/ verba, s., & norman, n. (1972). participation in america: political democracy and social equality. new york: harper & row. varinsky, d. (2016). 11 ways to get more people to vote, according to designers. retrieved from https://www.businessinsider.com/how-designers-increase-voter-turnout-2016-10?ir=t west africa brief. (2019). voter turnout in west africa. retrieved from http://www.west-africa-brief.org/content/en/voter-turnout-west-africa mcclurg, s. d. (2004). indirect mobilization: the social consequences of party contacts in an election campaign. american politics research, 32(july), 406-343. https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673x03260581 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 23 original paper liberal internationalism in the united states: current crises and prospect forecast lan lang 1 1 nankai university, tianjin, china received: may 24, 2023 accepted: july 08, 2023 online published: july 13, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n3p23 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n3p23 abstract liberal internationalism is an international order that the united states has long advocated. the aims of liberal internationalism are expanding democratic practices and free trade, defending democracy from its rivals while protecting and promoting human rights. this essay will expound the definition and development history of liberal internationalism, analyze the current crisis it is facing, and point out it in combination with the current american foreign policy that although there are domestic and international challenges, the united states still has the strengths to promote liberal internationalism and maintain the existing liberal international order considering the historical background, comparison of national power, maturity of existing international order and the will of rising power. the biden administration’s current foreign policy also shows that the united states is continuing to pursue liberal internationalism. keywords liberal internationalism, united states, biden 1. definition and history of liberal internationalism three authoritative scholars once defined liberal internationalism. daniel w. drezner (2006) pointed out that liberal internationalism is a marriage between the pursuit of liberal purposes (security, free trade, human rights, rule of law, democracy promotion, etc.) and the use of institutional means to pursue them (multilateral institutions of various stripes—not only the un, but nato or the g-7 as well). the concept of liberal internationalism is often associated with former us president woodrow wilson, thus sometimes being referred to as “wilsonianism”. the aims of liberal internationalism are expanding democratic practices and free trade, defending democracy from its rivals while protecting and promoting human rights (hoffmann, 1995). well-known liberal internationalism advocate john ikenberry (2018) held that liberal internationalism refers to a kind of hierarchical international order www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 24 published by scholink inc. with liberal characteristics after world war ii. the united states plays a leading role in providing rules and stability, and this leading role is composed of its unparalleled power and its liberal principle of governance. liberal internationalism stems from the idealistic tradition of the founding of the united states. since wwi，liberal internationalism in the united states diplomacy has experienced three stages: the wilson period, the cold war period and the post-cold war period, during which，there exist differences in their approaches，but there do not exist differences in essence. the first period is the wilson period. the fourteen points plan put forward by wilson marked the initial formation of liberal internationalism. it marked that liberal internationalism had become an important part of american diplomatic thought and an important ideological tradition and cornerstone of american diplomatic grand strategy. wilson emphasizes collective security as the norm of conduct for sovereign states and the establishment of a peaceful international order on that basis (ambrosius, 2002). so wilson worked to build the league of nations and advocated free trade, democracy, and national self-determination. at the same time, the united states must abandon isolationism and pursue internationalism in order to promote the establishment and maintenance of the liberal international order. it can be seen that the most primitive liberal internationalism is the product of the reconstruction of the old international order led by europe by the rising united states with classical liberal principles. the american political scientist hans morgenthau has argued that wilsonianism is the symbol of liberal internationalism. the second period is the cold war period. during the cold war, the united states shifted from the collective security to the alliance security built around the democratic unity in the atlantic region, and from the “one world” system to the cooperation system of great powers. the liberal international order of this period dominated and governed by the u.s. the united states has become not only a sponsor and major player of the order, but also its owner and operator. the vision of a liberal order became a liberal hegemonic order. this, to some extent, undermines the principle of sovereign equality of wilson’s liberal internationalism, and the international system presents the characteristics of hierarchy. in this period, liberal internationalism has strong realist overtones. the third period is the post-cold war period. during the cold war, the u.s. liberal hegemonic order existed only within the western world. following the fall of the berlin wall in 1989, the united states became the sole superpower, and the liberal international order expanded from the us-centered alliance of western countries to non-western countries, and the “internal” order became the “external” order. in this period, the liberal international order is less hierarchical. liberal internationalism advocates the establishment of an international order based on the basic principles of free markets, international institutions, security cooperation and democratic communities. however, to promote so-called democracy, the united states has conducted military intervention in iraq, libya and other countries. the norm of inviolable state sovereignty was challenged widely, leading to numerous humanitarian interventions conducted in the name of universal human rights. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 25 published by scholink inc. 2. current crises and challenges of liberal internationalism since the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, liberal internationalism has faced great challenges and crises. these challenges come from both home and abroad (kupchan & trubowitz, 2007). 2.1 the rise of nationalism and populism in terms of domestic factors, first of all, the rise of nationalism and populism. joseph nye (2016) believes that the threat to liberal internationalism mainly comes from the united states itself, which are nationalism and populism. the populist political forces represented by trump came to power in 2016 and openly resisted the grand strategy of liberal internationalism. since taking office under the banner of “america first”, president trump has withdrawn from many international institutions and cooperation agreements, including the tpp and unesco. his pursuit of unilateralism, protectionism and isolationism has caused chaos in the international order. trump believes that pursuing liberal internationalism has high costs and relatively low benefits, while pursuing realism has low costs and relatively high benefits. hal brands pointed out that in the more than 70 years before trump came to power, the united states pursued a dynamic and ambitious world construction project abroad. however, after trump took office, the united states faced unprecedented challenges since the end of the second world war. 2.2 overconfidence of the appeal of democracy secondly, the united states overestimated the appeal of its democracy. tony smith (2017) believes america’s problem as being too confident, too self-righteous about the universal appeal of democracy, too often assuming that american interests and values dictate its right to invade countries that fail to protect the human rights. beate jahn pointed out that the root of the crisis of liberal internationalism lies in exceptionalism and arrogance of the u.s. because the united states always ignored the interests and basic national conditions of other countries and forcibly promoted its liberal political and economic values to the world. 2.3 the shake of unipolar dominance from the perspective of international challenges, first of all, the unipolar dominance of the united states has been challenged. after the end of the cold war, the international pattern changed from the bipolar system to the unipolar system with the united states as the dominant power. as the world’s sole superpower, the united states vigorously promotes liberal hegemony. however, the failure of middle east partnership initiative, the 2008 financial crisis and the rise of the non-western world, especially china, have put the liberal international order under serious threat. china’s strong rise is bound to call for reform of the liberal international order (brooks & wohlforth, 2016). 2.4 the global spread of covid-19 secondly, the global spread of covid-19. the global spread of covid-19 has exposed the long-standing loopholes in the liberal international order. the lack of communication and cooperation among countries has delayed the effective control of the crisis. the core of liberal international order is www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 26 published by scholink inc. the global governance mechanism or international institutions. in the face of covid-19, the united states did not assume the responsibility of a global power, did not provide sufficient public goods to countries with poor health conditions, and even decided to withdraw from the who. it intensified other countries’ distrust of the united states and made the international institutions incapable of functioning effectively. 3. the reason why the united states will continue to pursue liberal internationalism in the face of these crises and challenges, will the united states continue to pursue a liberal international grand strategy? considering the historical background, comparison of national power, maturity of existing international order and the will of rising power, the united states still has the strengths to promote liberal internationalism and maintain the existing liberal international order. 3.1 historical background first of all, liberal internationalism originated from liberalism, which is the gene of the united states. the mentality of dominating the liberal international order and remaining to be a world leader has affected the u.s. political elite for more than half a century. since the second world war, liberal internationalism has always been the grand strategy guiding the us foreign policy, and the two parties have reached a consensus on this issue. liberal internationalism in any period is characterized by universal values (individualism, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, etc.), and its essence is to obtain, maintain and increase america’s own power advantage and pursue the maximization of national interests. the coming into power of trump and other nationalist leaders will have an impact on liberal internationalism, but will not fundamentally subvert it. 3.2 comparison of national power secondly, the united states is still the world’s no.1 superpower. brooks and wohlforth (2016) believe that there are two preconditions for the united states to promote liberal internationalism: superior power and strong will to lead the order. for a long time to come, the united states will remain the number one power in the world with the most powerful comprehensive national strength. apart from the united states, no major country can promote multilateral cooperation around an open and orderly vision. as former president obama said, “the united states will continue to lead the world for another one hundred years,” which shows the united states still has a strong will to lead the world. 3.3 maturity of existing international order thirdly, the existing international order is relatively mature. since the wwii, the united states has led the construction of a liberal international order in line with national political, economic and security interests. the united states stabilizes economic order through imf, world bank and wto, promotes political order through the united nations, and maintains security order through nato, the us japan alliance, etc. almost all countries in the world have become part of the liberal international order so the u.s. will not give up hegemony easily. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 27 published by scholink inc. 3.4 will of rising power finally, as a rapidly rising state, china has no intention of overturning the existing international order. china is committed to the un-centered international system and the international order underpinned by international law. after the cold war, china has integrated, safeguarded and reformed the current international order. president xi once said china is a participant, builder, contributor and beneficiary of the current international system. china remains a developing country that takes economic development as its primary goal and adheres to the path of peaceful development. first, china mainly uses institutional complementarity rather than institutional competition to correct the shortcomings of the existing international system. in recent years, china has put forward a series of new mechanisms and initiatives, but these are designed to make up for the shortcomings of the existing system, not to compete with it. the aiib, for example, is a useful complement to the existing international mechanisms, especially the world bank and the asian development bank. the belt and road has also boosted the economic development of countries along the routes. second, china is trying to achieve a peaceful rise. on the one hand, china has put forward the idea of building a new model of major-country relationship with the united states. on the other hand, china is committed to developing global partnership under the principle of non-alignment. china has never sought to challenge or overturn the existing international system. to reform and improve this order does not mean to start all over again, but to make it more just and equitable. china’s acceptance of the existing international system is increasing, and it is gradually showing a trend of deep integration. 4. biden’s choice of liberal internationalism in terms of specific policies, the current foreign policy of the united states is still full of liberal internationalism, and it has not been completely abandoned. in us policy towards china, for example, populism and nationalism have not fully prevailed. us policy towards china remains restrained and pragmatic. during the obama administration, the united states has relied on china in economic and international affairs, and counterbalanced china in security and diplomacy. china is both a “strategic cooperative partner” and a “strategic competitor”. during this period, china-us relations were relatively stable, with no direct conflicts that were too reckless. both countries managed their differences properly, and china-us relations on the whole developed steadily. during the trump era, the us policy towards china has undergone a significant shift from both cooperation and competition to a zero-gravity state focusing on containment, resulting in direct conflicts between china and the us in many fields. during his term in office, trump pursues unilateralism, adheres to “america first” and regards china as the number one security threat. a series of policies to suppress china have severely tested sino-us relations, showing signs of stagnation and even regression, and the bilateral relations have fallen to the freezing point after the establishment of diplomatic ties. when the biden administration took office, it adopted a compromise approach to the policies of the previous two administrations. it will not continue the reckless path of the trump administration, nor will it return to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 28 published by scholink inc. the obama-era strategy of “engagement and pressure” to form a new china strategy oriented toward competitive coexistence and aimed at a new balance. in the view of the biden administration, the rivalry between china and the united states is not without limits. the competition between china and the united states should be limited, not unlimited. after the biden administration took office, the general atmosphere of china-us relations has improved compared with the late trump administration, and the hostile attitude towards china has been reduced. although it is not easy to reverse the deteriorating trend of sino-us relations in the short term, in the long run, the biden administration provides an opportunity for the development of sino-us relations to ease and adjust, and the construction of a benign competition-oriented interaction model (competitive coexistence) may be the main trend of the development of sino-us relations in the next four years. on the whole, us policy towards china is controlled and restrained. although there have been major setbacks in the trump presidency in recent years, it will be pulled back to a restrained and pragmatic foreign policy, so that the united states will not act out of line unilaterally. the united states still has the intention to bring china into the liberal international order, not to engage in bottomless confrontation with china. if the foreign policy of the trump administration has negatively affected the liberal internationalism of the united states, the foreign policy of the biden administration has the color of liberal internationalism. multilateralism is back, protectionism and isolationism are receding. biden believes that the united states must deal with other countries from a position of strength, whether in the competitive, cooperative or confrontational parts of international relations. power status is america’s biggest common denominator in its relations with other countries, especially with china. the “position of power” is not “hard power” or “america first” but more soft power. it includes alliance strategy, multilateral system, human rights diplomacy and domestic revitalization. 4.1 america’s alliance and partnership system america’s alliance system is an important source of its power. while the trump administration tends to ignore its allies when dealing with china-us relations, the biden administration needs to unite allies and partners to deal with challenges in international relations. the effect of this overlapping power will make the united states even harder to ignore in the world. on the basis of bringing allies into the liberal internationalist order, biden also found ways to bring other countries into the order and manage them through the international system to better implement liberal internationalism. 4.2 returning to international organizations and multilateralism trump has withdrawn from many international institutions and cooperation agreements, including the tpp and unesco. his practice of unilateralism, protectionism and isolationism has caused chaos in the international order. after a series of actions to withdraw from the group and break treaties, when the united states withdrew, leaving a power vacuum; biden returned to multilateralism, stressing the need for the united states to reassert its leadership role in multilateral international organizations, including nato and the european union, to further liberalize the world system. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 29 published by scholink inc. 4.3 the values of human rights and democracy that the united states espouses trump is not interested in human rights issues and often deals with china on human rights issues. and the biden administration believes that the united states must speak out on human rights issues because that’s where its strength lies. this is very much in keeping with the characteristics of liberal internationalism, protecting democracy from opponents while protecting and promoting human rights. human rights and democracy are very prominent features of liberal internationalism. to protect human rights and democracy is to protect liberal internationalism, and to advocate human rights and democracy is to advocate liberal internationalism. 4.4 improvement of domestic governance america’s position of power also depends on improved domestic governance. the first step is to strengthen the competitiveness of american workers and companies, strengthen american research and innovation, and level the international playing field for american workers. if the united states cannot do this, it will be difficult to convince the public, to persuade other countries to follow liberal internationalism, to trust the united states as the leading initiator of liberal internationalism in the world. the second need is to improve american democracy. if americans themselves do not have confidence in their government and institutions and are divided, it will greatly weaken the position of the united states in promoting liberal internationalism. this shows that the foreign policy of the biden administration has a strong liberal internationalism. after the low ebb of the trump administration, liberal internationalism is reinvigorated. 4.5 reasons why biden pursue liberal internationalism for this change, we can analyze the reasons from three levels: individual, national and international system. on a personal level, trump is a businessman, while biden is a traditional politician with long experience in politics. the two modes of thinking and problem solving are significantly different. trump is characterized by strong moral leadership and always returns to the basic needs, desires and values of his followers. biden is a transactional leader, trading jobs for votes and grants for campaign contributions. trump shows a strong anti-establishment tendency, advocating unilateralism and america first, while biden’s team is a typical establishment, valuing us-led globalization. at the national level, in the four years since trump took office, the united states has been deeply divided, with social tears and the rise of populism. due to the impact of the novel coronavirus epidemic, the government has failed to control the epidemic effectively, resulting in obvious unemployment and accelerated economic recession. arguably, the trump administration left the biden administration a mess at home. therefore, the biden administration needs to focus on solving domestic problems (containing the covid-19 pandemic, reviving the economy and improving race relations) to overcome the aftereffects of trump’s “negative legacy.” at the international level, over the past four years, china’s economic aggregate has increased from about 60 percent of that of the united states to over 70 percent, further narrowing the power gap between china and the united states. the external environment of the united states has seriously deteriorated. driven by the “america first” philosophy, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 30 published by scholink inc. the trump administration has taken a brutal approach of “leaving if not in accord” with international institutions, setting a historical record of the us withdrawing from the community. trump blatantly launched a trade war against a number of allies, withdrew from the paris agreement and the jcpoa, imposed sanctions on the german-russian nord stream ii gas pipeline project, unilaterally withdrew troops from germany, and put pressure on japan and the rok on sharing military expenditures. these measures damaged the interests of its allies and aroused their serious dissatisfaction with the us. the degree of estrangement between its allies and the us was almost unprecedented. the us changed from the founder and defender of the existing liberal international order to the biggest destroyer, and its reputation and credibility in the international community suffered a heavy blow. the biden administration urgently needs to address this issue and restore the liberal international order and america’s national reputation. this series of personal, national and international changes and differences forced the biden administration to formulate a new foreign policy and re-promote liberal internationalism in order to improve the international competitiveness of the united states again. 5. conclusion in conclusion, although there are domestic and international challenges, the united states still has the strengths to promote liberal internationalism and maintain the existing liberal international order considering the historical background, comparison of national power, maturity of existing international order and the will of rising power. the biden administration’s current foreign policy also shows that the united states is continuing to pursue liberal internationalism. references ambrosius, l. e. (2002). wilsonianism: woodrow wilson and his legacy in american foreign relations. palgrave macmillan. brooks, s. g., & wohlforth, w. c. (2016). america abroad: the united states’ global role in the 21st century. oxford university press. e-webdev.com. (n.d.). danieldrezner.com: daniel w. drezner: what is liberal internationalism? retrieved from http://danieldrezner.com/archives/002717.html hoffmann, s. (1995). the crisis of liberal internationalism. foreign policy, 98(98), 159-177. ikenberry, g. j. (2018). the end of liberal international order? international affairs (london), 94(1), 7-23. kupchan, c. a., & trubowitz, p. l. (2007). dead center: the demise of liberal internationalism in the united states. international security, 32(2), 7-44. nye, j. s. (2017). will the liberal order survive? the history of an idea. foreign affairs, 96(1), 10-16. smith, t. (2017). why wilson matters: the origin of american liberal internationalism and its crisis today. princeton university press. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 39 original paper to what extent is the security dilemma an inescapable feature of international security? qingyi meng 1* & haiyi zhang 2 1 research assistant of the school of politics and international studies, university of warwick, coventry, united kingdom 2 school of politics and international studies, university of warwick, coventry, united kingdom * qingyi meng, research assistant of the school of politics and international studies, university of warwick, coventry, united kingdom received: june 12, 2023 accepted: july 09, 2023 online published: july 19, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n3p39 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n3p39 abstract this essay attempts to explore to what extent the security dilemma is an inescapable feature of international security. the three main schools of thought in international relations theory offer different perspectives on this issue. realism asserts that the security dilemma is entirely inescapable. liberalism, on the other hand, acknowledges its inescapability but argues that it can be mitigated through international cooperation mechanisms. constructivism takes a different approach, suggesting that the constructed “security dilemma” can be fundamentally overcome by changing interactive behaviors. while liberalism and constructivism challenge realism’s conclusion, neither perspective can successfully refute the notion that the security dilemma is an inherent feature of international security. liberalism is more applicable to economic matters and lacks explanatory power in the realm of international security, while constructivism tends to be overly idealistic and lacks the ability to effectively address real-world problems. keywords security dilemma, security study, realism, liberalism, constructivism 1. introduction the “security dilemma” has been an important concept in the field of international security since its introduction by john h. jerz, which refers to a paradoxical situation where states’ efforts to enhance their security can unintentionally lead to increased insecurity and heightened tensions. in the realm of international relations, the question that to what extent is the security dilemma an inescapable has www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 40 published by scholink inc. garnered significant attention and debate among scholars and policymakers alike. as we navigate an increasingly interconnected and complex world, understanding the dynamics of the security dilemma becomes ever more crucial. it sheds light on the challenges faced by nations as they grapple with the delicate balance between safeguarding their own interests and avoiding actions that inadvertently provoke others. most of the answers to this question are based on case studies from an empirical point of view, but due to the complexity of the reality and the non-uniformity of the variables, they do not have sufficient explanatory power to explain the conclusion that the “security dilemma” itself can be avoided. the novelty of the essay therefore lies in the purely theoretical approach to the issue from the perspective of the three classical theoretical paradigms of international relations. therefore, to respond to this question and prove the hypothesis that the security dilemma is an inescapable feature of international security, this essay will be divided into the following three progressive steps: the first is to clarify what is the “security dilemma “; the second is to sort out the conclusions of mainstream international relations theory on this issue and its theoretical logic; the third is to analyze further and refute the logic of the arguments against the theory that the security dilemma is inescapable. the arguments that follow will therefore be developed in the order described above. 2. what is the “security dilemma” the “security dilemma” is an important concept in international relations and security first developed by john h. jerz in 1950 in his article idealist internationalism and the security dilemma. this concept and mechanism were further systematized in john h. jerz’s international politics in the atomic age. specifically, it refers to a state of interaction in international society in which each “unit of power” (usually referred to as sovereign states in international relations) coexists on an equal footing, as it finds itself in a state of “anarchy,” which makes it impossible to regulate the behavior of all the “units” effectively and, naturally, to protect any of the parties to the system from attacking each other. therefore, each “unit” will inevitably choose to strengthen itself out of fear, but this merely “non-malicious” behavior, aimed at improving its security, will also weaken the safety of others through mistrust and force others to strengthen themselves, putting itself in an even more insecure position. since no party in this “arms race” can gain the so-called maximum power to guarantee the ultimate security, this interaction is destined to lead only to “self-defeating” (herz, 1970, p. 231). it can therefore be described as a pessimistic, hopeless, “self-fulfilling tragedy.” it can be seen that the philosophical origins of the “security dilemma” are more in hobbes’ pessimistic notion of the “state of nature,” which is based on the premise that “human nature is evil”. therefore, in the context of the “bellum omnium contra omnes”, each individual, out of a desire for security, always tends to gain power over others while ensuring his safety. within a state, the solution to this problem is introducing a powerful “god,” leviathan, to maintain order, but the international community still remains in a “state of nature” without this higher dimension of authority. as john h. jerz himself www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 41 published by scholink inc. called it, his notion of the “security dilemma” is similar to the “hobbesian dilemma of fear” proposed by the british scholar of the same period, herbert butterfield (herz, 1970, p. 232). therefore, this concept is fundamentally closer to realism’s worldview. therefore, based on the theoretical origin and mechanism of the “security dilemma”, it can be concluded that the most important core points, lies in the following three aspects, namely, the anarchy of international society, the premise of human nature is evil, and the failure of communication and mutual distrust based on it. these three elements complete the logical transmission loop of the system, i.e., the insecurity brought about by the logical starting point of anarchy influences international actors to choose to believe in the hobbesian culture rather than the kantian culture; this premise of human nature leads to distrust among actors and increases the possibility of communication failures; and such failures and further actions based on it will intensifies the insecurity of all parties involved in the anarchy, which may reinforces the state’s conviction of the hobbesian culture, thus forming a logical closure of the above three key points on the concept of the “security dilemma”. since the concept of “security dilemma” was introduced, mainstream international relations theories have attached great importance to it and tried to understand and offer ways to alleviate or even avoid it based on their own theoretical perspectives. generally speaking, realism believes that the “security dilemma” is an inescapable product of anarchy; liberalism agrees that the anarchy and the “security dilemma” cannot be completely avoided but believes that it can be alleviated to a certain extent; constructivism is more radical on this issue, arguing that the “security dilemma” can be avoided under certain circumstances. based on this, the following section will present the perceptions of each specific theory on this issue, one by one, from the perspective of the three main international relations theoretical paradigms. 3. the arguments of three major schools of international relations on to what extent is the security dilemma an inescapable feature of international security as mentioned earlier, the concept of the “security dilemma” is based more on the same philosophical origin as realism, namely hobbesian pessimistic culture, so the following presentation of the arguments will start with the realism, which has the most “affinity” with it, followed by the liberalism with its slightly different conclusions, and finally, the constructivism, which fundamentally challenges the former conclusions on this issue. 3.1 realism—the “security dilemma” is inescapable realism is based on the ideas of hobbes and machiavelli. the core is that international relations are governed by “inherently evil” human nature and are essentially a logic of power politics. from such a “negative” premise, the argument for the “security dilemma” is that because anarchy is a natural feature of the international mechanisms, in such a state, the “security dilemma” based on the logic of “survival” is inescapable. as robert gilpin puts it, “fundamentally, international politics today is no different from the situation described by thucydides” (gilpin, 2012). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 42 published by scholink inc. specifically, realism argues that anarchy inevitably leads to a “security dilemma” because it has three characteristics. firstly, “there is no automatic harmony in anarchy” (waltz, 1959 p. 160), conflict and confrontation between states are the constant “leitmotif” of international relations, while harmony is only a short rest. secondly, force is always “the preferred and common instrument in international politics” (frankel & waltz, 1980), and since there is no higher authority to regulate order, only the most violent and effective means of resorting to force is sufficient. finally, self-help is the only and inevitable logic of behaviour in anarchy, as the state has no authority to rely on to provide guarantees. to sum up, “anarchy” from a realist perspective means that the state is always under the assumption of a coming conflict, a preference for the use of force and a logic of “self-help”. by applying each of these core points to the “security dilemma”, the following mechanism for the occurrence of the dilemma can be derived: the assumption of conflict drives the state to improve its strength at all times; the preference for the means of force leads the state, especially in the area of international security, to choose to increase its military power to guarantee its security and prepare for potential conflicts; the logic of “self-help” prevents states from easily trusting the so-called “signals of goodwill” from others and eventually reaching the stereotypical conclusion that the best means of avoiding threats is to increase their strength. and once states compete to act against each other based on this conclusion, the “security dilemma” is reached. as to whether it can be mitigated or even avoided, realism argues that as long as the “anarchy” remains unchanged, the iron law of the “security dilemma” will always dictate that states make such choices, just as structural realism argues that the level of international structures decisively influences the behavior of states. thus, even if such an outcome is unpopular, and every state is aware that such seemingly “rational” behavior is just a rational process rather than a rational outcome (waltz, 1959, pp. 192-193) joining this “arms race” type of vicious circle could only be the only option in this dilemma. 3.2 liberalism—the “security dilemma” is inescapable but can be mitigated to some extent liberalism can be traced back to the philosophical thought of socrates, plato and aristotle. and more precisely, liberalism in international relations comes directly from the ideas of the 18th-century enlightenment. it is, therefore, more optimistic, full of the “goodness of humanity” and the “light of reason,” than the negative pessimism and power supremacy of realism. the “security dilemma” has received more attention from the neo-institutional liberalism of liberalism. in line with realism, neo-institutional liberalism basically shares the core assumptions of realism on the “anarchy” of international society. also, it recognizes, to some extent, that the international mechanisms is characterized by a “cycle of conflict and insecurity”. however, due to differences in theoretical perspectives and research methods, they diverge in their response to the “security dilemma.” it can therefore be argued that neo-institutional liberalism is not a theory that explains the “security dilemma” as it is a theory that explains whether and how the it can be escaped or mitigated within its theoretical framework. in terms of its fundamental theoretical features, neo-institutional liberalism has the following basic www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 43 published by scholink inc. views that differ from realism. firstly, about power and security, unlike realism, which regards them as the most fundamental and core national interests and demands of the state, neo-institutional liberalism believes that they are indeed very important, but not so important that they can sacrifice all other interests as an absolute priority. in the current environment of peaceful development, it advocates that the state should pursue more the maximization of national interests than the maximization of power and security, in other words, power and security return to being “one of the important national interests” rather than “the only important national interest”. secondly, based on the “de-escalation” of international relations in the current era, in which the possibility of large-scale military conflict is reduced, and globalized cooperation is further developed, neo-institutional liberalism considers that the military force is becoming less important in the study of international security. force is no longer the first option for states, but rather the willingness and possibility to communicate and cooperate is increasing. thirdly, while acknowledging the existence of “anarchy”, neo-institutional liberalism argues that states can still cooperate with each other based on the trade-off of maximising national interests. thus, with specific reference to the “security dilemma”, neo-institutional liberalism brings the rational choice theory from the field of economics to the theory of international relations and views the “security dilemma” from the perspective of “game theory” (keohane, chapter 5, 2005). it is even seen as a form of the “prisoner’s dilemma” (nye, 2009, p. 15). the theory asserts that the role of international institutions in facilitating cooperation is equally applicable to the international security field. therefore it argues that anarchy does not mean disorder, and thus concludes that the “security dilemma” is inescapable but can be mitigated to a certain extent. further, at the heart of this conclusion of neo-institutional liberalism lies the belief that international mechanisms “force” states to choose to cooperate for three reasons. firstly, in the temporal latitude, international mechanisms can transform state interactions from a one-off game into a recurring game, forcing states to choose cooperation based on a rational trade-off of benefits through the shadow of the future. in this case, betrayal based on immediate interests can damage the state’s reputation, lead to retaliation for the next game in the system, and damage future gains, significantly increasing the cost of betrayal. secondly, in the domain dimension, the establishment of the international mechanisms has shifted the interaction between states from a single domain to a composite multi-domain game, thus creating issue-linkage between different areas of cooperation, i.e., if a state gains less in one domain, it has the opportunity to be compensated in other domains. hence, the country’s focus on “relative gains” is reduced and shifted to “absolute gains”. conversely, based on the same logic, the consequences of a state’s betrayal in one area will also affect other areas, thus forcing them to cooperate by increasing the “cost of betrayal”. thirdly, in the cost dimension, the international mechanisms provides a framework for cooperation and exchange, thereby reducing transaction costs and offering the possibility of redress in the event of “betrayal”. in short, neo-institutional liberalism assumes that states are rational and capable of weighing up the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 44 published by scholink inc. pros and cons based on the maximisation of their interests so that even if the international community is “anarchic”, since security and power are no longer the only demands of states, and peace and cooperation are beneficial to all states, at least states have an incentive to actively seek cooperation in the face of the “security dilemma”; this, coupled with the establishment of an international mechanisms that makes cooperation between states a realistic possibility, leads to the conclusion that the “security dilemma” is inescapable but can be mitigated to some extent. 3.3 constructivism—the “security dilemma” is escapable constructivism, represented by alexander wendt, is a paradigm very different from realism and liberalism in that it introduces a sociological perspective to understanding international relations. in general, constructivism has two basic ideas, namely that both human and international societies are fundamentally constructed by ideas rather than by materials; furthermore, each actor’s choices of interests and modes of interaction, and even identity, are constructed by acts of interaction rather than by natural existence and constancy. thus returning to the question of the “security dilemma”, constructivism holds a more radical argument that the “security dilemma” is simply an “intersubjuctive knowledge” constructed based on interactions between states, i.e. an understanding that states do not trust each other to the extent that they assume the worst about each other’s intentions(wendt, 1995 p. 74). but that this understanding is only a “self-fulfilling prophecy” (wendt, 1995 p. 74) so that the “security dilemma” can be escaped by successfully changing each other’s “intersubjective knowledge”. constructivism, like realism and liberalism, recognises the existence of an “anarchy” in international society, but the difference lies in its view that this “anarchy” is only a “conceptual structure” that can change and is constructed by interactive acts. what really governs actors’ behaviour is the “social structure” in “anarchy”. and among the three elements that make up the “social structure” (shared knowledge, material resources, and practices), the most important is shared knowledge because it determines the definition of a country’s identity towards other countries, which in turn determines the definition of interests and further interactions. this leads to a constructivist logic chain of “act of interaction – “shared knowledge” definition of identity definition of interests further interaction”. the most important part of this chain of transmission is the “definition of identity”, which is at its heart. constructivism sees the definition of three identities in international relations enemy, competitor and partner and corresponds to three ‘anarchic cultures’, namely hobbesian, lockean and kantian. the first hobbesian culture is a pessimistic culture that views international relations in a purely realistic manner, positioning other actors as natural enemies in an anarchic system, with the “security dilemma” as its corollary. the second lockean culture refers to positioning others more as competitors, and relations between states are characterised by a mixture of competition and cooperation so that the “security dilemma” is still escapable but can be mitigated. the third kantian culture views others as partners, sharing identities and values, changing the logic of “self-help’ to the logic of “other-help” until it succeeds in building a “multi-dimensional security community”, thus successfully escaping the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 45 published by scholink inc. “security dilemma”. in the above logic, the key to avoiding the “security dilemma” lies in the definition of partner identity and the construction of a kantian culture of anarchy. as wendt puts it “the actions of states towards their enemies are different from those towards their friends because an enemy is a threat and a friend is not”. (wendt, 1995, p. 134) thus, if states act in a “good faith” manner, their opponents tend to reciprocate with good faith policies, which in turn reinforces their expectations of peaceful relations between the two states, so that the positioning of mutual identity and the model of “anarchic culture” based on healthy interaction will slide from the hobbesian to kantian, thus successfully changing “intersubjuctive knowledge”, gradually building a “multi-dimensional security community” and successfully escape the “security dilemma”. constructivism also believe this process will be very complex and lengthy, it will be difficult to change once the two states are caught in a “security dilemma” because they have constructed an enemy identity and a hobbesian “anarchic culture”. (wendt, 1995, p. 145) however, it is still argued that theoretically, it is possible to reverse “intersubjuctive knowledge” by changing the act of interaction and that the constructed “security dilemma” can be radically escaped by a virtuous interaction. 4. refutation of liberalism and constructivism based on the above discussion, it can be seen that the three mainstream international relations theories have given different answers to the specific question of to what extent the security dilemma is an inescapable feature of international security. realism, which sees it as completely inescapable; liberalism, which sees it as inescapable but can be mitigated by the facilitating power of the “international mechanisms” for cooperation; constructivism, which fundamentally sees the constructed “security dilemma” can be escaped radically through changes in interactive behavior. further, the three major theoretical responses can be divided into two parts based on their tendency: realism, which firmly believes they cannot be escaped; liberalism and constructivism, which seek to challenge this argument. since the “security dilemma” is, in a way, a concept based on the logic of realism, the following section will focus on the latter two theories that challenge it, liberalism and constructivism, and analyse the reasons why their arguments lack the explanatory power. 4.1 failed challengers i: liberalism lacks explanatory power in the field of international security the key point in the challenge of neo-institutional liberalism is that, while it accepts the assumption of “anarchy”, it believes that anarchy is not the same as a disorder because mistrust and insecurity about the actions of others are inevitable under anarchy, joining an “arms race” or even resorting to military means is also an option, but because of the high cost. thus, once the international mechanisms offer the possibility of cooperation, states are inclined to choose the less costly solution to address the “security dilemma” through coordination and cooperation within the international mechanisms based on a rational balance of interests. this is because the emergence of international mechanisms creates an www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 46 published by scholink inc. expectation that particular acts of betrayal will not merely be isolated cases but will result in a series of interrelated evils, thus providing an expectation that can somewhat appease mistrust and insecurity between states. (baldwin, 2001, p. 94) in summary, neo-institutional liberalism does not challenge the logical link between the assumptions and mechanisms of the “security dilemma” but argues that states have the option of cooperating within the international mechanisms rather than falling further into it. it, therefore, holds the argument that the “security dilemma” is inescapable but can be mitigated to some extent. based on the previous, the core of liberalism lies in the “forcing” effect of international mechanisms on state cooperation, and this conclusion is based on three points: firstly, in the temporal latitude, international mechanisms can transform state interactions from a one-off game into a recurring game; secondly, in the domain dimension, the establishment of the international mechanisms has shifted the interaction between states from a single domain to a composite multi-domain game; thirdly, in the cost dimension, the international mechanisms reduce transaction costs and offering the possibility of redress in the event of “betrayal”. therefore, each of these three points will be refuted in the following to conclude that liberalism lacks explanatory power in the field of international security. in general, the shortcomings of the neo-institutional liberal theory of the problem lie in the underestimation of the mistrust and uncertainty of cooperation between states in the international security sphere. firstly, in the security sphere, states attach less importance to recurring games because “a single pre-emptive war may well limit or destroy an adversary’s ability to retaliate effectively”, and by the same token, once a state is at a disadvantage in an “arms race” or the failure of a single war can completely kill its ability to continue repeated games with its adversary. so by its very nature, the security game is not a game that can be repeated many times, but rather a game that can be won or lost in a single instance, following the logic of “all or nothing”, and therefore the logic of not “betraying” is based on the fear that the game will become more costly in the future does not hold water. secondly, security interests have a natural “higher order” status than interests in other areas, just as wealth and life are not equally important to people, national security is always more important to the state, and the sacrifice of security can hardly be compensated for in other areas of secondary interest. more crucially, the neo-institutional liberal believe that the state places greater importance on “absolute gains” based on this logic is also not sufficiently convincing in international security. since the loss of national security interests cannot be compensated for in other areas, there is no satisfaction for the state that it will be compensated for. besides, the logic of a “zero-sum game” in this field tends to make the state more concerned with “relative gains”. finally, international regimes can reduce transaction costs by providing “credible information” and mechanisms to redress rights. in the former case, however, the extreme mistrust between states in the security sphere makes it difficult for states to properly understand even the true intentions of their opponents due to “cognitive biases between states”. (jervis & xu, 2017) on the other hand, they tend www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 47 published by scholink inc. to hide their true intentions rather than share them, i.e., “rational concealment of state intentions” (mearsheimer, 2010). as a result, states can hardly get more accurate and credible information from international mechanisms regarding security issues. in addition, the mechanisms for remedying rights provided by the international system are even more ineffective because whether and to what extent international mechanisms in the security field can provide remedies is itself based on the will and capacity of the great powers rather than the definitive, codified, non-discriminatory treatment. there is a high degree of uncertainty, so few states would place such important security interests on an uncertain international mechanism rather than on its strength which has more certainty. it can therefore be argued that although liberalism, as represented by neo-institutional liberalism, has opened up new perspectives in explaining international relations, its theories are more applicable to topics such as economic cooperation, for example, and lacks explanatory power in the field of international security. 4.2 failed challenger ii: an overly idealistic constructivism that lacks explanatory power in solving problems in the real world the challenge posed by constructivism is that while it shares with realism and liberalism the existence of an “anarchy”, it does not see it as a “material, constant” premise but more as a “cultural, evolutionary” state, so that with virtuous practices of interaction, a certain “shared knowledge” can be generated, which in turn can lead to the construction of a friendly identity and a “kantian anarchic culture” until the ultimate goal of a “multi-dimensional security community” is reached. at this point, there is a high degree of mutual trust between states so that even if there is a conflict of interest between them, they will believe that it can be resolved peacefully, thus fundamentally escaping the “security dilemma” based on anxiety and suspicion. as an example often cited by constructivism, while the united kingdom has many nuclear weapons, the united states hardly sees them as an imminent security threat; north korea, even though its nuclear technology is not yet fully mature, is still seen by the united states as a great danger to national security and is committed to its “denuclearisation” (wente & qin, 2000 p. 330) based on the preceding, constructivism is based on the following two theories: firstly, the so-called “anarchy” is a variable, culturally constructed consciousness rather than an absolute, material and objective state; secondly, the “anarchic culture” can be constructed through interactive behaviour, so as long as there is a virtuous interaction between states, a culture of partnership and trust will gradually be constructed, and the “multi-dimensional security community” will be the endpoint beyond the “security dilemma”. therefore, the following section will refute each of these two points and conclude that constructivism lacks explanatory power in solving problems in the real world because of overly idealistic. firstly, constructivism’s “conceptual rather than material” feature is too subjective and, therefore, too idealistic. this is because the logical starting point for constructivism’s argument is the “anarchy” in line with realism and liberalism, and the definition of the “security dilemma” is no different too, the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 48 published by scholink inc. only viable path is to avoid all of this in an “innovative manner”, choosing to explain the “security dilemma” as a conceptual reaction to the power between states. this fundamental distinction makes constructivism’s argument for escaping the “security dilemma” become too thin in the face of the cold, material reality of the world. in short, the explanatory power of this theory is based on conceptual, indefinable thinking, which, like the seeming grandeur of a ‘pavilion in the sky’, is stretched to the limit when it comes back to reality. secondly, even if one takes a step back and fully accepts all the presuppositions of constructivism and its theoretical tendency to “conceptual rather than material”, there is still a problem of over-idealisation in its argumentation. as mentioned earlier, the logical starting point for escaping this dilemma, which is given by the theory as virtuous interactive behaviour between states, does not address the question of the motivation of states to “show favour” in the first place, especially in the field of international security. in the reality of the international community, it is hard to believe that any state in a “security dilemma” would voluntarily be willing to risk its survival by being the first to make concessions, as in the case of mikhail gorbachev’s huge concession to the united states that eased or even ended the 40-year-long cold war, but to this day has been rewarded not by the trust of the western world but by the “nato east”. this shows that, in reality, unilateral concessions are not the first to avert a dilemma but rather to make one’s situation worse. moreover, even if one side is willing to make concessions, the other side is not necessarily able to fully trust and understand the goodwill that such an act releases and reciprocate based on that goodwill, as it may mistake that goodwill for a disguise for aggressive intentions, as in the case of the soviet-german non-aggression pact, which was signed not as an effort at peace but as a preparation for aggression. as wendt himself acknowledges: the act itself cannot account for the meaning it contains. (wente & qin, 2000, p. 330) therefore, it is too difficult and idealistic to construct a friendly “intersubjective knowledge” in real-world security issues. it can therefore be argued that although the more radical views and novel perspectives of constructivism can be theoretically logical, its over-idealisation has led to the theory being more of an academic exercise than a real solution to the problem of national security where the logic of power prevails. 5. conclusion: the security dilemma is an inescapable feature of international security in summary, the concept of “security dilemma” refers to a situation that because the natural mistrust of anarchy diminishes the sense of security, when states choose to increase their power for security reason, they will feel more insecure eventually. this concept is essentially based on realism’s worldview, and therefore the dilemma is inescapable in the realist context, but both liberalism and constructivism challenge this conclusion from their own perspectives. liberalism, represented by neo-institutional liberalism, argues that the emergence of international mechanisms will “force” rational states to cooperate to maximise their national interests so that the “security dilemma” cannot be escaped but can be mitigated to some extent. however, this view www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 49 published by scholink inc. underestimates the mistrust and uncertainty of cooperation between states in the security sphere; the specificity of security interests makes their logic quite different from that of economic interests, therefore the states attach less importance to recurring games in the security sphere; the difficulty of compensating for security interests in other secondary spheres; the low credibility of information provided on security-related issues in international mechanisms and the high degree of uncertainty about the mechanisms for redress of rights. it can therefore be argued that the theory is more applicable to economic issues and lacks sufficient explanatory power in security. constructivism sees “anarchy” as more of a conceptual “intersubjective knowledge” so the identity and model of the “anarchic culture” can be changed. as long as there is a friendly act of interaction, the “partners” identity and the kantian culture can both be created, forming a “multi-dimensional security community” and escaping the dilemma at all. however, this theory is too idealistic, which is even more inappropriate when explaining security issues that reflect the contrast in material power between states; moreover, both the first gesture of goodwill by a state in a security dilemma and the belief in and reciprocal feedback of signals of friendship by other states are difficult to achieve. it can therefore be argued that the idealistic tendency of constructivism lacks sufficient explanatory power in the context of security realities that emphasise caution. thus, returning to the logic of realism, the “anarchy” from the international structural level impacts the behaviour of specific states due to their assumptions about the coming conflict, their preference for the means of force and the logic of “self-help” behaviour. so as long as the “anarchy” remains unchanged, the iron law of the “security dilemma” will always dictate such choices by states, leading to the conclusion that the security dilemma an inescapable feature of international security. references baldwin, d. a. (2001). in xin xian shi zhu yi he xin zi you zhu yi. hangzhou: zhejiang ren min chu ban she, p. 94. frankel, j., & waltz, k. n. (1980). “theory of international politics”. international journal, 35(3), 600. https://doi.org/10.2307/40201892 gilpin, r. (2012). war and change in world politics. cambridge: cambridge university press. herz, j. h. (1950). idealist internationalism and the security dilemma. world politics, 2(2), 157-180. https://doi.org/10.2307/2009187 herz, j. h. (1970). international politics in the atomic age. new york: columbia university press. jervis, r., & xu, j. (2017). the logic of images in international relations. beijing: zhong yang bian yi chu ban she. keohane, r. o. (2005). “chapter 5”, in after hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy. princeton, nj: princeton university press. mearsheimer, j. j. (2010). the gathering storm: china’s challenge to us power in asia. the chinese journal of international politics, 3(4), 381-396. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poq016 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 50 published by scholink inc. nye, j. s. (2009). understanding international conflicts: an introduction to theory and history. new york: pearson longman. waltz, k. n. (1959). man, the state and war: a theoretical analysis. new york: columbia university press. wendt, a. (1995). “anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics (1992).” international theory, 129-177. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23773-9_7 wendt, a. (1995). in constructing international politics (pp. 73-74). cambridge, ma: mit press. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539217 wente, a., & qin, y. (2000). social theory of international politics. shang hai, china: shang hai ren min chu ban she. microsoft word ape-v4n2-p22 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 22 original paper the rebuilding of “greater russia”: from kievan rus’ to the eurasian union (note 1) roger e. kanet1 1 university of miami and the university of illinois at urbana-champaign, usa received: january 1, 2021 accepted: april 3, 2021 online published: april 15, 2021 doi:10.22158/ape.v4n2p22 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v4n2p22 abstract the purpose of the present examination is 1) to summarize briefly the evolution of historical russia as the amalgam of multiple ethnic and cultural communities into a growing imperial domain; 2) to outline more specifically the policies pursued by the tsarist and communist regimes to integrate minority communities into the russian majority; 3) to examine the impact on russia of the collapse of the former ussr; and 4) to trace current efforts by the russian government to reintegrate the disparate parts of the former ussr, including especially regions of other post-soviet states with a significant ethnic russian population, into a new “greater russia.” although it will touch on soviet integration policies that targeted national minorities who, by 1989, represented half of the population, the focus will be on recent and current policies intended to “greater russia.” keywords ethnic integration, tsarist russia, ussr, post-soviet russia, ethnic russians, ethnic minorities, eurasian union 1. introduction most westerners who learn of a revival of russian nationalism or of president putin’s commitment to protect the interests of ethnic russians in post-soviet states where they represent a minority, do not think of the fact that the russian population is quite diverse ethnically. this concerns not only the twenty percent of the population that is officially listed as non-russian, but also the ethnic russian population which results from the mixture and merger of various communities over the course of the last millennium. the first russian state, kievan rus’, combined eastern slavs and norsemen, or vikings; in the middle ages finnic groups in the far north and later turkic populations in the south and east were absorbed by the expanding russian state. while many remained culturally distinct from the ethnic russian community, others were absorbed into that community over the course of later centuries. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 23 published by scholink inc. in fact, russification, even forced russification, became, at times, the official policy in both imperial russia and the soviet union. with the collapse of the soviet union at the end of 1991 and the emergence of fifteen new states—all but one of which was built around a titular non-russian ethnic community—and the revival of what one might termed “ethnic identity politics” in the new russian federation, the leadership in moscow has faced the issue of disintegration. it has pursued a new policy aimed at recreating a “greater russia,” that will tie together as much of former soviet space as possible into a single economic, political and security regime, with the dominant russian federation at its center. the purpose of the present examination is 1) to summarize briefly the evolution of historical russia as the amalgam of multiple ethnic and cultural communities into a growing imperial domain; 2) to outline more specifically the policies pursued by the tsarist and communist regimes to integrate minority communities into the russian majority; 3) to examine the impact on russia of the collapse of the former ussr; and 4) to trace current efforts by the russian government to reintegrate the disparate parts of the former ussr, including especially regions of other post-soviet states with a significant ethnic russian population, into a new “greater russia.” although it will touch on soviet integration policies that targeted national minorities who, by 1989, represented half of the population, (note 2) the focus will be on recent and current policies intended to rebuild what the swedish scholar bertil nygren (2008a) terms “greater russia.” (note 3) what are the central factors that are driving president putin’s commitment—even to the point of military intervention in ukraine—to creating a eurasian union, dominated by russia? 2. “the gathering of the russian lands”: from kievan rus’ to imperial russia from its very inception the russian political system was characterized by a diverse ethnic population, but increasing domination by slavs. (note 4) when slavs first moved into the forest areas of what is now central russia in the seventh century, khazars, a turkic group, dominated the black sea steppe. by the ninth century the flourishing volga river trade of the khazars attracted the attention of the norsemen (vikings) who were at the peak of their aggressive expansion from scandinavia. the trade route from northern europe via the rivers of eastern europe to constantinople became an important alternative route after the virtual closure of the mediterranean by the muslims. over time the norsemen built fortresses along these rivers, the four most important of which were along the gulf of riga, on lake ladoga, near smolensk, and between the upper volga and the oka. other more isolated settlements included kiev (pipes, 1974, p. 29). from these bases the norsemen were able to extract tribute from the indigenous populations of finns, lithuanians, and slavs and protect their growing trade with the byzantine empire. richard pipes concludes that the collaboration between the slavs and the norsemen in conducting and protecting the trade represents the origins of the new state which traced its origins to norse prince hroerekr (rurik). although the finnish name for the norsemen was transposed to the larger population, the norsemen rapidly assimilated in the east as in western europe. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 24 published by scholink inc. but the initial gulf between the ruling elite and the masses of the population was one that dominated russian/east slavic politics in later centuries. by the middle of the twelfth century, a century before the mongol conquest, this new state was in great disrepair, primarily because of the lack of an effective system of succession and the splitting of the political system into three major parts. the one in the northwest was eventually incorporated into the lithuanian state, later lithuanian-polish, while the poorest in the northeast eventually became the center for a revitalized east slavic state, russia. here the population was primarily finnic, but was rapidly inundated and absorbed by slavic immigrants, eventually emerging as great russians. thus, even before the mongol conquest of kiev in 1240 “russians consisted of a mixture of peoples, with the non-slavs dominated and culturally overwhelmed; this diversity would be increased significantly in the following centuries. with the emergence of muscovy as a political force in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries large numbers of non-russian and non-slavic peoples came under the control of the russian state. in the north and northwest the majority of these groups were ethnically finnish. although the mongol invasion in 1240 and indirect occupation for the next century and a half brought new turkic (tatar) populations into what would later emerge as russia, it was not really until the sixteenth century and the rapid expansion under ivan grozny of russian military control east and southeast to the major cities of the golden horde, kazan and astrakhan, in the 1550s that large numbers of muslim tatar or turkic people came under the domination of moscow. russia viewed its culture and religion as superior to those of the peoples whom it conquered and generally treated these peoples as inferiors and resulted often in serious confrontations (see khodarkovsky, 2004, pp. 34-39). writing of the emergence of muscovy and its conquest of other small east slavic principalities in the fifteenth century—“the gathering of the russian lands” in the euphemistic words of the russian chronicles of the age—marshall t. poe points out that the rulers of muscovy of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries expanded the kingdom’s borders east beyond the volga river, south to the caspian sea, west to the dnieper river, and north to the white sea. in so doing they came to rule peoples who had never been part of kievan rus’-mordvinians, chuvash, mari, samoyeds, bashkirs, tatars, balts, finns, germans, lithuanians, poles, cossacks, and turks, among others. the once homogeneous muscovite state . . . became a huge multiethnic empire (poe, 2003, p. 34). (note 5) over the course of the next three centuries russia continued to expand; in the west into the baltic area, finland and poland; in the south by absorbing ukraine and then systematically incorporating portions of the ottoman empire. territorially the expansion across siberia and the far east and, ultimately, the conquest of the muslim polities in central asia brought millions of non-russians, non-europeans, and non-christians into the empire by the 1870s. the colonial empire was virtually complete and at this point the government in st. petersburg began to pursue a policy of explicit russification as the means to absorb and integrate this population into the russian state. throughout its entire history—from kievan rus’ to muscovy and the eventually the russian www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 25 published by scholink inc. empire—the population at large, whether ethnic russian or one of the growing number of conquered peoples, had no voice in the political system. as richard pipes notes: once an area had been annexed to russia, whether or not it had ever formed a part of kiev, and whatever the ethnic and religious affiliation of its indigenous population, it immediately joined the “patrimony” of the ruling house, and all succeeding monarchs treated it as a sacred trust which was not under any circumstances to be given up (pipes, 1974, p. 79) not only the territory, but also the population on that territory was seen as part of the extended patrimony of the monarch with no political rights. it is this view of the virtual ownership relationship between the monarch, the state, and the population that centuries later, although modified, continues to lie at the root of the russian political system, for both ethnic russian and non-russian alike. 3. integration’ of national minorities in late imperial and communist russia russian historians of the imperial era focused on russia’s right and duty to expand the boundaries of civilization and christianity in dealing with the muslim and other non-russian peoples who now comprised a substantial part of the population (khodarkovsky, 2002, p. 3). religion served geopolitical purposes in relations with the various non-orthodox christian peoples of the steppe and the caucasus. ever since the fifteenth century the idea of russia and its political and security interests were intertwined with the idea of expansion, which was justified on both ideological and theological grounds (khodarkovsky, 2002, p. 49). this meant an ever-increasing number of non-russians within the russian empire. the culmination of this process came in the years 1860 to 1880 with the final conquests of the various peoples of the caucasus and the khanates of central asia. given the repressive nature of the russian political system, the new ethnic and religious minorities who were forcibly added to the population had no voice and were the object of repressive governmental policies. since the middle of the sixteenth century, but especially during the eighteen century, major efforts were made to settle and civilize the regions taken from the kamnyks and other muslim peoples, thereby pushing the original population out of the region entirely. in addition, the russians pursued a policy of forced conversion to christianity and russification in much of the territory that they conquered (khodarkovsky, 2002, pp. 142-161). throughout the eighteenth century this resulted in virtually permanent conflict between the russians and the native populations on both sides of the ever-moving frontier. as russia imposed its control, substantial numbers of the locals fled their homeland to beyond the russian frontier areas to escape russian military and administration and forced conversion (khodarkovsky, 2002, pp. 201-206; mironov, 1988)—generally fruitlessly, since the frontier continued to follow them. not until the reign of catherine the great did a degree of religious tolerance enter russian policy (khodarkovsky, 2002, p. 196). although russification had been a central component of russian policy in the areas that it colonized ever since the sixteenth century, with both russian culture and the orthodox religion of paramount importance, this policy was reinvigorated in 1881 when emperor alexander iii concluded that all www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 26 published by scholink inc. minority cultures within russia should be eliminated and replaced with a great russian identity (weeks 2004, 2006). (note 6) to be a loyal subject of the tsar one had to be a russian. russian became overwhelmingly the language of education, even in the vast areas of the country where it was not the dominant language. in portions of the empire, as in armenia, non-russian orthodox religious schools were closed. throughout the central asian lands of the empire major efforts were made to russify the population. however, aneta pavlenko concludes that russification measures were carried out only sporadically as an attempt to subjugate polish and later baltic german elites, to preserve the unity of the state, and to replace polish, german, and tatar with russian as a high language. . . . these measures failed to turn peasants into russians . . . . most importantly, by imposing the russification measures late in the 19th century, the russian empire created the pre-conditions for the consolidation of nations which would eventually turn against it (pavlenko, 2011). on the whole the efforts were a failure and at the outbreak of world war i, the russian government faced widespread resistance to its policies (“how successful”, n.d.; see, also, weeks, 2004) when the bolsheviks seized power in fall 1917, they came with a clear view that past russian policies toward ethnic minorities had been oppressive and exploitative and must be reversed for, in lenin’s words, russia was “the prison house of nations” (cited in weeks, 2004). at one point he called for self-determination of all of the nationality communities within the emerging new communist russian state. before the revolution of 1917 lenin had, in fact, supported substantial autonomy for national minorities and strongly opposed great russian chauvinism, going so far as to support minority secession. soon after the bolsheviks seized power and as the periphery of russia was breaking away, josef stalin, in his capacity as commissar for nationalities, made clear that only workers possessed this right, not groups representing the bourgeoisie (fainsod, 1963, pp. 57-58). in fact, independent states that had emerged in ukraine and the south caucasus were forcibly incorporated into the emerging soviet state. in the early years of the soviet state various institutional arrangements were introduced that were meant to give the national minorities a political voice and autonomy. but, lenin and stalin soon broke on the issue of the treatment of minorities and, since lenin died soon thereafter, stalin set the framework for soviet nationalities policy—a framework that permitted little or no autonomy below the central government. stalin eliminated communist officials in georgia, ukraine and central asia who opposed what they viewed as the assertion of central, russian, domination over nationality affairs (see daniels, 1960, pp. 177-187). as the new soviet state system emerged in the period after lenin’s death, a pseudo-federal system of government was established—pseudo in the sense that, de facto, political power and political decisions emanated from the top and were dispersed throughout the system. (note 7) moreover, the highly centralized communist party was the major source of power, not the formal institutions of the federal governmental system. within this system the major units were republics named after the dominant titular population—ukraine, armenia, kazakhstan, etc. second and third level political units were also www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 27 published by scholink inc. established for smaller nationalities which represented minorities in the larger republics. although the communist party encouraged cultural development of backward peoples within the overall federation, that cultural development was to occur only within the context of a monolithic communist culture, which was built substantially on russian nationalism (fainsod, 1963, p. 363; p;okhy, 2017, pp. 245 ff.). in the mid-1920s a major confrontation occurred between josef stalin, the new head of the soviet communist party, and mirsaid sultan-galiev, a tatar bolshevik who advocated a single muslim republic across central asia. he was charged with nationalist deviations and arrested and eventually executed in 1940 during stalin’s great purge (baker, 2011). important for our concerns is the fact that stalin divided the muslim areas of central asia into five small republics that, presumably, would be easier to deal with from moscow, rather than a single large and unified muslim republic. it was not really until the 1930s that soviet policy concerning national minorities shifted dramatically away from the attacks on great russian chauvinism and support for local and regional cultures. during the massive purges of the 1930s, although no national group was primarily targeted, de facto the impact of the purge was greater among national minorities than it was among great russians. however, as dmitry gorenburg (2006) points out, throughout the entire history of the soviet union an internal contradiction drove soviet nationality policy. “the establishment of ethno-federalism, indigenization, and native language education were paired with efforts to ensure the gradual drawing together of nations for the purpose of their eventual merger.” (note 8) parallel to this is the fact that among western students of soviet nationality policy there are those who maintain that the communists in effect strengthened the cultures of the minorities and those who focus on the soviet russification and assimilation (lapidus, 1984; gorenburg, 2006). in the late 1950s, during the khrushchev era, the soviets introduced a new education policy which expanded the teaching of russian in non-russian areas and, de facto, cut into the teaching of local languages bilinsky (1962) and gorenburg (2006) concludes that “linguistic assimilation and reidentification in the soviet union were promoted by a combination of two factors, urbanization and the reduction of native language education.” similar findings are presented in the research of brian silver (1974) and numerous other scholars. although titular languages were taught, they were downplayed over time and career advancement required fluency in russian. the assimilation of minority populations resulted from the education system, urbanization, marriage across ethnic lines, and physical moves to live and work in russia proper. the political domination of moscow and the ethnic russians was ensured by the domination of the communist party and the fact that the second secretary of each republican communist party was invariably a russian or ukrainian, who in effect served as moscow’s eyes and voice in the republics. but, despite the great optimism voiced among soviet analysts (note 10) that ethnic and national divisions among the multiple communities that comprised the soviet population no longer existed and about the success of the communists in creating a new “soviet man,” ethnic and national identity—and hostilities between groups—remained strong and played the central role in the demise of the soviet www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 28 published by scholink inc. union in late 1991. when mikhail gorbachev opened the soviet political system to discussion and debate as part of his policy of glasnost’ and democratization, ethnic and national issues soon dominated the political debate. they led, by december 1991, to the decision to dissolve the entire soviet state and to the emergence of fifteen new, supposedly sovereign, states. 4. the collapse of the soviet state and the challenge to russia’s “great power” identity in a speech to the russian people in 2005 president vladimir putin stated: “the collapse of the soviet union was the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the century. for the russian people, it became a real drama. tens of millions of our citizens and countrymen found themselves outside russian territory. the epidemic of disintegration also spread to russia itself” (putin, 2005). as many analysts have noted, the collapse also brought with it for russians a major identity crisis. almost overnight russia, in the guise of the soviet union, went from being a global power and the head of a broad and powerful bloc of states to one of fifteen new soviet successor states—one suffering major economic decline and challenged by multiple internal political problems that would soon bring it to the verge of being a “failed state.” (note 11) the russian federation that emerged had never existed before within its new boundaries. more important, as we have seen, russia had since its emergence in muscovy in the middle ages always been an imperial state that incorporated large numbers of non-russians, starting with the other eastern slavic groups in belarus and ukraine. the identity of russia as a large, powerful, imperial state was shattered and much debate ensued about the very nature of the new russia. (note 12) russians who thought of kiev or karkhov as part of greater russia could not imagine them in foreign countries. upwards of twenty-five million ethnic russians found themselves outside the boundaries of the new russian state. questions were posed concerning russia’s political orientation. on top of this the experiment with democracy and a market economy contributed to what russians saw as political chaos and economic collapse. the question soon arose whether russia should continue its efforts to join the west and restructure its entire approach to both domestic and international politics, as those around president yeltsin in the early 1990s advocated? or, should russia recognize its eurasian heritage and unique history, challenge u.s. global domination and build closer ties with other like-minded states throughout asia and beyond, as prime minister evgenyi primakov and later president putin insisted? (note 13) the latter is the option that has been chosen with the result of increasing confrontation with both the united states and the european union. by the time that putin took office as acting president at the very end of 1999 the russian political and economic systems had bottomed out and were just beginning to recover. the new president announced that his central goal was to reestablish russia’s regional dominance and its global importance. essential preconditions for accomplishing these objectives, as noted in putin’s first “foreign policy concept” (2000), included the internal political stability and economic viability of russia. (note 14) using increasingly coercive means, president putin was able to re-impose central control over the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 29 published by scholink inc. territory of the russian federation. republic-level governors, many of whom had been elected, were now appointed directly by the president; political dissent was squelched and his opponents ran the risk of imprisonment or worse. (note 15) putin’s success in dealing with the major domestic problems challenging the russian state at the turn of the millennium meant that russia increasingly faced europe and the united states from a position of vastly increased strength. besides rebuilding the foundations of the russian state, at great cost to political liberty and democracy, as a precondition for russia’s ability to reassert itself as a major power, putin and his associates benefited greatly from the exponential rise in global demand for gas and oil—at least until the global financial meltdown in fall 2008—and the ensuing revitalization of the russian economy. this, in turn, contributed to russia’s ability to pursue a much more active and assertive foreign policy. (note 16) this assertive foreign policy with its nationalist rhetoric, in turn, has proven to be an important factor in maintaining putin’s popularity and in generating acceptance of his repressive domestic policies. in the foreign policy realm putin sought allies who shared russia’s commitment to preventing the global dominance of the united states that represents, in the words of the foreign policy concept (2000), a threat to international security and to russia’s goal of serving as a major center of influence in a multipolar world. until the terrorist attacks on the united states in september 2001, there was little evidence that the disagreements dividing russia and the united states during the 1990s would disappear soon—in particular since they derived from core elements of their respective foreign policy commitments. in the first half of 2001, immediately after george w. bush entered the oval office in washington, us-russian relations reached their first post-cold war nadir. bush expelled a group of russian diplomats charged with espionage in spring 2001. this was followed by a tit-for-tat expulsion of americans in moscow. over the first eight months of bush’s presidency relations deteriorated further, as the united states refused to consider signing the kyoto accords on the environment, announced that it would withdraw from the 1972 abm treaty and would proceed with the development of an anti-ballistic missile system. (note 17) as we have already noted, part of president putin’s initial plan for rebuilding russia’s greatness was a reassertion of the central authority of moscow over the vast territory of the country. this began in chechnya with the brutal suppression by putin as prime minister in fall of 1999 of the secessionist movement initiated. the elimination of elected governors in the constituent republics of the russian federation contributed to the taming of secessionist movements in tatarstan, buryatia, sakha and elsewhere that had developed in the aftermath of the dissolution of the ussr. along with ensuring unity within the russian federation itself, president putin refocused russian policy on what had been termed the “near abroad,” the post-soviet states that had emerged out of the ussr along with russia. to a substantial degree in the years immediately following the implosion of the ussr moscow had virtually ignored these new states, as it focused on gaining acceptance as a full, equal and respected member of the western-dominated community. with the shift to a eurasianist www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 30 published by scholink inc. policy orientation, especially after vladimir putin assumed the presidency, russia focused much more on rebuilding its relations with the other former soviet republics—soon on support for dissident groups, often ethnic russians, who challenged the unity of these states. (note 18) bertil nygren (2008a, 2008b), among the first western analysts who has systematically examined the policies and instruments employed by the putin government in its attempt to rebuild what he terms greater russia, concluded that through 2007, or so, russia relied primarily on economic instruments, including the supply of oil and gas, to influence the policies of neighboring states and to tie them more closely to russia. at that point, in order to stop further nato expansion into what russian president dmitri medvedev termed an area of “russia’s privileged interest” (medvedev, 2008) the response became more assertive and russia has been militarily supportive of dissident groups in georgia, ossetia, abkhazia, transniestria, and ukraine. it was roughly around 2005 or 2006 when russian policy toward both the “near abroad” and the west hardened for a multiplicity of reasons. (note 19) in no particular order they included the west’s efforts to contain the reemergence of some of these states as dominant power, the west’s refusal to accept russia as an equal player in international affairs, as had been demonstrated by the refusal to respond to russian policy concerns about nato’s interventions in former yugoslavia, the continued march eastward of nato, the development of a u.s. anti-ballistic missile program. added to this was the regular and ongoing campaign by both the united states and the european union to push western governance models—especially political democracy, human rights, and related issues—in their dealings with former soviet states. the color revolutions in georgia, ukraine, and kyrgyzstan, as well as the new european eastern partnership were viewed as attempts to undercut russia’s friends and russia’s influence in post-soviet space. as viewed in moscow, these were but barely disguised efforts of western governments and western ngo’s to shift the political orientation of these countries toward closer ties with the west. (note 20) it is at this point that russia becomes much more assertive in its relations with both its near neighbors and with the west. 6. putin’s eurasian union: the rebuilding of greater russia? (note 21) we finally reach the point in this analysis that is most relevant to current russian policy—namely efforts by president putin and the political elite in moscow to strengthen the russian state and to rebuild, in so far as possible, the multinational empire that collapsed in 1991. these efforts have culminated in the recent flurry of activity surrounding the creation of a eurasian union meant to mimic the european union and to enhance the development and modernization processes of all of the member countries. however, most western analysts emphasize the role that the union can play in reintegrating the smaller post-soviet states into a russian-dominated institution. president putin’s (2007) wide-ranging attack on the united states and the west at the munich security conference in 2007 represents a watershed in russian foreign policy. it announced that russia was once again major international actor and that russia will no longer follow the lead of the west in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 31 published by scholink inc. pursuing its foreign and security policy interests. but, it also indicated that russia saw itself as a pole in the international system separate from and in conflict with the west. it is at roughly this time that moscow also began to assert itself rhetorically in response to western charges that it was corrupting or abandoning democracy. (note 22) the russian response was the assertion that russia was not bound by western definitions of democracy and that, in fact, it was in the process of establishing a superior form of “sovereign democracy” that was characterized first and foremost by independence from external standards or influences. in other words, russian democracy is sui generis and will not be bound by any external criteria or rules. (note 23) but, more than a framework for political developments in russia, “sovereign democracy” was presented as a model for other countries and a justification of the type of top-down management that vladimir putin has fashioned in russia. for authoritarian or semi-authoritarian political leaders across eurasia, the arguments underlying “sovereign democracy” have proven to be quite attractive. (note 24) in the wake of russia’s invasion of georgia and moscow’s formal recognition of the breakaway republics of south ossetia and abkhazia, then president dimitri medvedev laid out the “principles” on which russian policy was to be carried out. these principles included “protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be” and the claim that “there are regions in which russia has privileged interests. these regions are home to countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbours” (medvedev, 2008). given the continued large russian minorities in some of the post-soviet states and russia’s policy of granting citizenship to large numbers of those living outside the russian federation, the first of these two principles de facto justifies intervention throughout most of former soviet territory. the second calls for a sphere of russian influence across eurasia in which russia has the right to protect its interests, including by economic coercion or military intervention. (note 25) by the end of 2008 all the pieces were in place for russia’s “taking back” at least some of the area that it was contesting with the west. by then russia had rebuilt its economy. it had effectively moved to strengthen the economic dependence of most of the post-soviet states on russia—primarily via energy dependence, including increasing russian ownership of the energy infrastructure of these states (nygren, 2007). (note 26) presidents putin and medvedev had provided the rhetorical foundations on which to base the conflict by noting the threat to regional and global peace that the united states represented (putin, 2007) and by emphasizing russia’s legitimate role in the affairs of neighboring states (medvedev, 2008). the foreign policy concept issued in 2008 focused on external, rather than internal, challenges to russian security—with u.s. global dominance at the very top of the list. in line with the extensive discussion of “sovereign democracy” in russia, the concept stipulated that global competition was acquiring a civilizational dimension, which suggested competition between different value systems and development models within the framework of universal democratic and market economy principles. the new foreign policy concept maintained that the reaction to the prospect of loss by the historic west of its monopoly over global processes now found its expression, in particular, in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 32 published by scholink inc. the continued political and psychological policy of “containing russia.” the document emphasizes throughout russia’s independence and sovereignty as the foundation on which all of moscow’s relations with the outside world must be built (“foreign policy concept”, 2008). (note 27) moscow had already demonstrated through the use of economic pressures that the russian leadership was quite willing to use its economic clout to achieve political goals. finally, in georgia it demonstrated that the use of military power was also an acceptable weapon in competing with the west for influence in the regions of “privileged” russian interest. it is roughly at this time that moscow began to push a variety of potential programs aimed at integrating post-soviet space more effectively and, thus, reducing or expelling entirely western involvement and influence (see, for example, russell, 2012). in addition to the call of dimitri medvedev for a eurasian-wide security system, the russians moved, as well, to develop closer economic and security ties among those members of the commonwealth of independent states that were willing to go this route or who succumbed to growing russian pressures. at that time, this meant belarus and kazakhstan for economic integration and a slightly larger group of countries for security cooperation. although the collective security treaty organization was created by six post-soviet states already in 1992, it only recently expanded its role into a military alliance among the six member states [russia, armenia, belarus, kazakhstan, kyrgyzstan, and tajikistan] (note 28) and overlaps with and collaborates with the shanghai treaty organization, established in the mid-1990s as a means of facilitating cooperation in security-related activities between china and russia and several central asian countries. russia is clearly the dominant actor in the csto, which is now touted as part of the growing set of integrative projects that are tying together the peoples of the countries that emerged two decades ago out of the soviet union. probably more important for the future of relations across eurasia are the various aspects of president putin’s vision of a eurasian union. (note 29) this represents moscow’s ongoing effort to knit together the disparate pieces that formerly comprised the soviet union and, thus, challenge what it views as western efforts to undercut the position and role of russia in former soviet space, and globally. drawing upon a proposal first made in 1994 by kazakhstan’s then president nazarbayev, president putin broached the idea of an integration scheme for eurasia based on the model of the european union during his presidential election campaign in fall 2011. a month later russia, kazakhstan and belarus agreed to a framework for developing the union over the course of the next several years. by summer and fall of 2013 the russian president was engaged in an all-out effort to attract—or coerce—other eurasian states to the view that their future lay with the union and not with closer ties to the west or to a “go-it-alone” strategy. for moscow the eu’s eastern partnership (simão, 2013), which foresees a closer relationship between the eu and six east european and caucasian states, is seen increasingly as the west’s attempt to supplant russian influence and to tie these countries into the western orbit. (note 30) in fall 2013, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 33 published by scholink inc. when the president of armenia announced that armenia would abandon its negotiations with the european union, in order to pursue membership in the eurasian union, it was reported that moscow had threatened to reduce its security support for armenia in its ongoing conflict with azerbaijan, deny work permits to the tens of thousands of armenian citizens working in russia, reduce the flow of subsidized energy to armenia, and generally make economic life more difficult for the landlocked and beleaguered country (peter, 2013). similar pressures were reported in the discussions between russia and ukraine in the run-up to president yanukovych’s announcement in november 2013 that ukraine also would opt for membership in the eurasian union rather than continue to pursue closer ties with the european union (walker, 2013). russians present the eurasian union as the means to integrate and modernize the economies of the former soviet republics, so that they can compete more effectively in the global economy (lomagin, 2014). however most western analysts see the eurasian union primarily as a political tool for moscow’s re-imposition of control over as broad a swath of post-soviet territory and people as possible (adomeit, 2014). it represents a continuation of putin’s policy initiated more than a decade ago of rebuilding greater russia and undercutting the attempts of the european union, nato and the united states to expand their ties to former soviet areas. moreover, it is meant to ensure that challenges to the authoritarian and semi-authoritarian leaders in neighboring states will not succeed and, thus, influence potential russian challengers to the system of top-down political management that now characterizes the russian federation. although president putin has experienced resistance to his proposal for a eurasian union, the decision by the armenian president in fall 2013 to break off negotiations with the eu and join the eurasian union, (note 30) followed little more than a month later by ukrainian president yanukovych’s similar announcement for ukraine, seemed to put the matter at rest. moscow’s plan for an economically and politically reintegrated eurasia under russian leadership seemed well on the path to realization. belarus, kazakhstan, armenia, kyrgyzstan and also ukraine, along with russia, had all apparently “signed on” to the plan. georgia, moldova, and azerbaijan continued to resist moscow’s overtures and threats, and the route that uzbekistan might take was not clear. but, with ukraine in the fold, the likely success of creating the eurasian project seemed enhanced—although its long-term impact in modernizing the economies of the member countries was by no means guaranteed. that was the situation in mid-february 2014, despite the ongoing challenges to the ukrainian president’s announced decision to opt for closer ties with russia and the eurasian union. then came the unexpected events that toppled president yanukovych, followed by de facto russian military intervention in and annexation of crimea—complete with propaganda about a fascist takeover in kyiv that threatened the security of ethnic russians in ukraine—and the decision to hold a referendum in crimea about union with the russian federation followed by incorporation of the region into the russian federation and paralleled the russian recognition of and support for independence from ukraine of regions in the east of the country. the confrontation in ukraine has meant that, although www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 34 published by scholink inc. russia has prevented ukraine from pursuing membership in the european union and/or nato, it has also eliminated ukraine as a realistic candidate for eurasian union membership (see fedorov, 2019). elsewhere in post-soviet states—usually in areas with significant ethnic russian or regional minority populations—russia has also intervened, facilitated secession and granted some form of political recognition to the new secessionist statelets. (note 31) in many respects, once the russians had rebuilt their domestic economy and decided that focusing on reestablishing their dominant role in former soviet space rather than integrating into europe, they had clear advantages in competing with the west and for attracting other former soviet republics into closer ties. most important was the economic and, especially, energy dependence of most of the other states on russia—and moscow’s willingness to use that dependence to its advantage. only azerbaijan, with its energy wealth—plus several resource-rich central asian states—is in a position easily to resist russian “invitations.” for countries such as moldova and georgia efforts to resist the russian embrace and pursue stronger relations with the europeans have continued and even expanded after russian military intervention in crimea (secrieru, 2014). as noted by thomas ambrosio, “russia has sought to create near-exclusive spheres of influence within the former soviet space, excluding the baltics” (ambrosio, 2019). 7. concluding comments the russia that emerged after the collapse of the soviet union was a russia that had never existed over the course of the past millennium. shorn of all but a small portion of the ethnic minorities that had always comprised such a large portion of the population of the country, including the fellow slavs in belarus and ukraine, the russian federation was no longer the imposing international actor that it had been for most of the past two centuries, or more. russia’s history had been one of continual expansion since the fourteenth century and the imposition of russian policy domination and russian culture on peoples usually viewed as backward and less developed. that was the history of the last century of the tsarist regimes, as well as of the soviet regime. although the russian federation still extended across eleven time zones, had the largest population in europe, and possessed nuclear weapons, it was no match, in terms of global clout, for the lost soviet state. moreover, the west took advantage of russia’s weakness by extending its involvement and influence into areas in central and eastern europe that were viewed as an integral part of the russian sphere of influence. this is precisely the set of developments that vladimir putin set out to correct in a policy termed revanchist by matthew sussex (2015) because it aims at undoing major geopolitical developments of the past quarter century. a central aspect of the policy that he has pursued over the course of the past decade has been the attempt to reestablish an integrated economic, political and security space in the area of the former ussr somewhat akin to “the gathering of the russian lands” by muscovy in the fifteenth century. how the eurasian union will evolve, what the nature of russia’s relations with the other former soviet states and populations will be, how the crisis in ukraine will unfold—none of these questions can be www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 35 published by scholink inc. fully answered today. yet, it does appear clear that the intention of the current russian leadership under vladimir putin is to bring together into a close economic, political and security union as much of former soviet territory as possible in order to strengthen russia’s economic and political position as it vies for a position as one of the poles in a new multipolar world intended to replace the current international system dominated by the united states and the west. it is hard to imagine such an integrated system much different from the greater russia discussed by bertil nygren (2008) in which the smaller states and their populations are subordinated to russia, in ways similar to the way that their ancestors once were in tsarist and communist russia. acknowledgement the author is grateful to dr. dina moulioukova for piquing his interest in the importance of integration throughout russian history. references armenia joins eurasian union. 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(2014). identities and foreign policies in russia, ukraine, and belarus: the other europes. houndmills, uk: palgrave macmillan. wierzbowska-miazga, a. (2013). support as a means of subordination: russia’s policy on belarus. point of view, 34. may.warsaw, poland: centre for eastern studies. notes note 1. the argument presented here was originally developed in a course co-taught at the university of miami in fall 2013 by the author with then doctoral candidate dina moulioukova entitled “from the soviet union to the eurasian union.” the author is especially grateful to dr. moulioukova for organizing that course and for piquing his interest in the importance of integration throughout russian history. these ideas also formed the basis for a paper presented at a conference entitled “colonizing www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 41 published by scholink inc. and de/re-colonizing nations: a research inquiry into communist practices 25 years later,” florida atlantic university, boca raton, fl., march 12-13, 2015. note 2. for a comprehensive discussion of the nationality complexity of the population of the soviet union at the time of the last official census in 1989 see anderson and silver (1989). note 3. the view of russia’s self-perception as a great power and its impact on policy is dealt with, among others, by (adomeit, 1995; hopf, 2002; kanet, 2007; mankoff, 2009; moulioukova, with kanet, n.d.; and neumann, 2008). note 4. the following discussion draws on pipes (1974). note 5. for a superb treatment of this and later periods of russian expansion see serhii plokhy (2017). he notes, for example, that by the middle of the seventeenth century it had resolved its internal problems and retuned to an offensive strategy in its international relations, “of which there would be great deal more in the decades and centuries to come” (plokhy, 2017, p. 35). see, also, plokhy (2008). note 6. plokhy points out how russia attempted in the late nineteenth century attempted to suppress the development of languages other than russian (plokhy, 2017, pp. 137-156). note 7. for an excellent discussion of soviet nationalities policies, including its inherent contractions, see carrère d’encausse (1992). note 8. the noted french historian of russia, hélène carrère d’encausse, states that “stalinism, with its open hostility toward nations and the officially endorsed supremacy of the russian people (giving rise to the myth of the russian ‘big brother’ in relation to the ussr’s minority groups), contributed considerably to. note 10. when the soviet union dissolved in 1991 the population totaled 293 million, of whom approximately 51 percent were ethnic russians. the population of the new russian federation was about 148 million, with russians making up 81 percent of the population (andreev et al., 1993). note 11. this debate is discussed in detail in the work of jeffrey mankoff (2009), regina heller (2012), andrei tsygankov (2012, 2014), valentina feklyunina (2012), stephen white and valentina feklyunina (2014), dina moulioukova-fernandez (2012) and many other analysts of russia. see, also, note 3, above. note 12. rapprochement with and incorporation into the western system was the focus of russian policy until about 1995, during the period in which andrei kozyrev was foreign minister. the shift to a more eurasianist orientation came in early 1996, when evgenyi primakov replaced kozyrev as foreign minister. primakov was later prime minister in 1998-1999. for a discussion of the reorientation of russian policy, see, kozyrev (2019), kanet (2010) and many others. note 13. for this set of objectives see, also, ‘kontseptsiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti” (2000). note 14. for example, journalists, such as anna politkovskaya, were murdered and the billionaire owner of lukos oil company, mikhail khodorkovsky was imprisoned in 2003 and his company confiscated after he challenged the politics of president putin. khodorkovsky was released from prison in late 2013 as part of a public relations gesture in the run-up to the sochi olympic games (oltermann www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 42 published by scholink inc. & walker, 2013). note 15. however, as many analysts have argued, the revived role of russia as a regional and global political actor is based extensively on oil and gas production and exports, despite recent improvements in other aspects of the russian economy. see, for example, hancock (2007); mcfaul and stoner-weiss, 2008); menon and motyl (2007). note 16. george w. bush brought into office with him a group of neo-conservatives who were committed to restructuring the world according to a u.s. model and to america’s benefit. the backing off from existing or new treaties was part of the effort to remove limitations on the u.s. freedom to act in world affairs (kanet, 2005). note 17. see, for example, spechler and spechler (2019), esp. pp. 81-98. note 18. for a discussion of the shift in russian policy and the growing rift in russia’s relations with the west see kanet (2015) and kanet (2020). see, also marten (2020). note 19. on russian policy toward its near neighbors see humphrey (2009), adomeit (2011) and sakwa (2017). on resistance to color revolutions see polese and ó beachán (2011). on the argument that the west de facto manipulated the revolutions see roberts (2014) and samphir (2014). on the role of poland in supporting democratic elements in ukraine see petrova (2014). on the growing ideological divide between moscow and the west see debardeleben (2015). note 20. the following section draws on kanet, (2015). serhii plokhy treats post-soviet russian behavior (plohky, 2017. pp. 317-51). note 21. as dawisha (2014) demonstrates, putin and his team never intended to establish a democratic political system and those who saw russia as a flawed democracy rather than a new authoritarian state were simply incorrect. note 22. for an extensive discussion of the concept, first used by vladislav surkov in 2006, and its place in russian policy see herd (2009). note 23. for a definition of what the term competitive authoritarianism and its place in post-soviet states see levitsky and way (2010). note 24. both of these arguments are central to the russian justification for its military intervention in crimea (putin, 2014). note 25. russia systemically took over the control of the pipeline infrastructure of belarus as a means of dominating the latter’s economy (wierzbowska-miazga, 2013). on the broad aspects of russian energy policy see ehrstedt and vahtra (2008) and nygren (2008a, 2008b). note 26. for an extensive discussion of russian criticisms of the united states and the west in general see vladimir shlapentokh (2008). note 27. azerbaijan, georgia and uzbekistan are former members. ukraine, turkmenistan, and moldova have never been members of the csto. note 28. for quite different assessments of the eurasian union see lomagin (2014) and arakelyan (2014). see, also, adomeit (2014). the eurasian union is intended to build on the customs union of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 43 published by scholink inc. belarus, kazakhstan and russia that became operational on 1 january 2010. note 29. the general approach that russia has taken as it stumped for commitments to join the union is the one outlined by nygren (2008)—i.e., the promise of economic rewards and, more important even, the threat of and application of economic punishment. in 2012, after moldova noted its plans to pursue an agreement with the eu, moscow cut off the import of moldovan wine as a health threat, much as it had banned polish meat imports a few years earlier after a political dispute with warsaw (emerson & kostanyan, 2013). note 30. armenian membership was formalized in october 2014 (“armenia joins”, 2014). note 31. on armenia see arakelyan (2019); on georgia see dunlop (2012) and march (2012); on kyrgyzstan see herd (2012). microsoft word ape-v4n3-p25 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 25 original paper john locke’s doctrine of limited government: establishment, limitations and criticisms pan ziyang1 & liang shan2 1 xinjiang university, urumchi, xinjiang, 830046, china 2 the chinese university of hong kong, shenzhen, shenzhen, guangdong, 518172, china received: july 2, 2021 accepted: july 17, 2021 online published: july 22, 2021 doi:10.22158/ape.v4n3p25 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v4n3p25 abstract john locke was a famous political philosopher in the 17th century. the theory of limited government proposed by locke in the second treatise of government has delivered a profound impact on the modern politics. based on the theoretical foundation of liberalism, locke argues that, for the purpose of defending the right to private property, only when the majority agree can we establish a government after signing the social contract and shifting from the state of nature to the political society. by analyzing the limitations of the source, affiliation and range of government power, this paper demonstrates the limitations of the limited government as the rule of law and the separation of powers on the inside, and the collapse of government and people’s revolution on the outside. in the process of modernizing the national governance system and governance capacity, it is necessary for developing countries to be fully confident in their political systems and absorb what is best from locke’s theory so as to build a modern service-oriented government. keywords john locke, limited government, service-oriented government 1. introduction john locke (1632-1704) was a distinguished english philosopher, a representative of liberalism, and a pioneer of limited government theory in the 17th century. his most famous works are a letter concerning toleration (1689), two treatises of government (1689), an essay concerning human understanding (1690), thoughts on education (1693), and on the reasonableness of christianity (1695). the two treatises of government written from 1689 to 1690 is the most important political essay for locke, of which the second piece has epoch-making significance both historically and academically and proves the validity of the new regime, the bourgeoisie. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 26 published by scholink inc. the ideas locke illustrated in the two treatises like liberalism, rule of law, division of power and the limited government theory has laid a solid foundation for the tradition of constitutionalism in britain and other western countries, and has had a deep influence on the bourgeois revolutions in the us and france, and on the western political theories. the first treatise was aimed squarely at the theory of “divine right of kings” of another 17th-century political theorist, sir robert filmer. the whole book is meant to indicate that, in the old testament, the god did not accept adam and his successors as the rulers of the entire world, shaking the theoretical foundation of royalists. this viewpoint formed the basis for the second treatise: locke believes that everyone is equal in the state of nature. in other words, people do not have to act under the authority of others unless they themselves agree. although locke wrote the two treatises not for defending the glorious revolution, this great work was, in essence, undoubtedly calling for a revolution. the limited government theory proposed by locke in the second treatise has become the role model for the bourgeois government, which is aimed at arguing that once a government does not follow the trend of the times or goes against people’s will, people have the right to overthrow the government. he used metaphor in the book for many times to suggest that james ii did not fulfill government duties and went against people’s will so as to ensure the validity of the upcoming glorious revolution. based on locke’s masterpieces and the specific historical background, and combined with opinions from the history of mainstream political thought, this paper aims at answering the classical question of why locke’s limited government is limited systematically and points out the theory’s incompatibility with the political development of latecomer countries. this paper is divided into 5 parts. first, the historical background of locke’s limited government. in the specific political and social environment of the english bourgeois revolution, the purpose of creating the two treatises of government was to eliminate the remnants of outdated philosophies and systems such as the divine right of kings and to build a limited government on behalf of the bourgeois class. second, how locke’s limited government is built. due to the inconveniences of the state of nature, in order to protect possessions obtained through their own labor, people enter the political society by signing the social contract and build the limited government with the consent of the majority. third, why locke’s limited government is limited. this part tells the difference between limited government and unlimited government and then analyzes the limitedness of the government power from its source, affiliation, and scope. fourth, restrictions on locke’s limited government. locke’s limited government is not only restricted by rule of law and separation of powers within the government, but also by the dissolution of government and people’s revolution outside the government. fifth, limitations of locke’s limited government. in the practice of political modernization, it is impossible to balance the relationship between government efficiency and government power with locke’s doctrine of limited government. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 27 published by scholink inc. 2. john locke’s life and historical background locke was born on 29 august 1632 in britain. his father was an attorney. in 1647, he was sent to the prestigious westminster school in london which was under the control of the parliamentarian forces. after finishing studies there, he was admitted to christ church, oxford in 1652 at the age of 20. locke was awarded a bachelor’s degree in 1656 and a master’s degree in 1658, about which period he was elected a student (the equivalent of fellow) of christ church. in 1667, locke started to serve as the personal physician, private tutor, and secretary of lord anthony ashley cooper who later became the leader of whigs and the 1st earl of shaftesbury. as one of the founders of the whigs, the earl advocated freedom, religious tolerance, and exclusivism, which shaped locke’s political thoughts. in 1681, locke was persecuted due to the earl of shaftesbury’s failure to fight against james ii. and he fled to the netherlands in 1683. in 1688, a bloodless revolution involved the overthrow of the catholic king james ii took place and it is typically called as the glorious revolution. in february 1689, locke accompanied princess mary on her journey to join her husband, william iii of orange and de facto ruler of the dutch republic. in the same year, the bill of rights was passed in the parliament to lay down limits on the powers of the monarch, which marks the point at which the balance of power in the english government passed from the king to the parliament and laid the foundation for constitutional monarchy. after that, locke was appointed as the judge of the court of appeal, and the minister in charge of trade and colonies successively. due to poor health, locke resigned from office and went back to his hometown where he spent his last years revising his works. he died on 28 october 1704. the 17th-century britain was moving towards the typical capitalist country. economically, manufacturing workshops were developing; the enclosure movement was taking place in the rural areas; britain was launching a period of colonial expansion and plunder overseas; the domestic capitalist economy was booming; and the bourgeois class was powerful. politically, the new aristocrats and the bourgeoisie were opposed to the british king who was on behalf of the feudalistic force and they preferred to restrict the powers of the monarch through the parliament rather than overthrowing the monarch. religiously, in order to fight against the feudal power, the puritanism emerged in the late 16th century sought to “purify” the church of england of remnants of the roman catholic “popery”. and puritanism could be mainly divided into 2 types, namely presbyterianism and independents. ever since the first parliament summoned by king james i in 1604, the bourgeoisie and the new aristocrats had struggled with the king for a long time by refusing to pay taxes, leading to the outbreak of the revolution. the period 1640-1642 witnesses the start of the english bourgeois revolution when charles i summoned the long-suspended parliament to raise money for the military expenditure on suppressing the scottish rebellion, and the parliament rejected the king’s demand and delivered the grand remonstrance to limit his power. in 1660, the stuart monarchy was restored. king james ii (1685-1688) supported the catholicism and advocated the divine right of kings at home and followed the suit of the french royal family at abroad, greatly harming the interests of the new aristocrats and the bourgeoisie. in 1688, the bloodless “glorious revolution” took place, bringing the english revolution to an end. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 28 published by scholink inc. the whigs on the parliamentary side and some of the tories overthrew the reign of james ii and they invited james i’s daughter mary and her husband, william iii of orange and de facto ruler of the dutch republic, to jointly rule britain. john locke’s whole life and his political thoughts are closely associated with the english bourgeois revolution. this bourgeois revolution has 4 features. firstly, the revolution was led by the bourgeois class and the new aristocrats. secondly, this revolution aimed at ensuring the right to private property. thirdly, different parties struggled with one another mainly through the parliament. lastly, at the end of the revolution, constitutional monarchy was created to restrict the powers of the monarch. as mentioned above, during his entire life, locke experienced the english bourgeois revolution, of which the historical background greatly shaped his political ideas. since this revolution would inevitably touch on the interests of all classes of society, the debate over various political thoughts such as the divine right of kings by sir robert filmer and the strong central authority proposed by thomas hobbes in his book leviathan emerged subsequently. the controversy over all kinds of political ideas could, to some extent, inject vitality into the academic thinking, but it would unavoidably let to british people’s ideological confusion. after the victory, what the bourgeoisie should do first is to find a political path that is suitable for the development of capitalism and get rid of outdated systems and ideas especially the philosophy of the divine right of kings by royalists. just as the cambridge school says, when analyzing theorists’ thoughts, we need to take into consideration the specific political context. in the political and social environment of the english bourgeois revolution, locke’s mission was to eliminate the remnants of old-fashioned ideas and to lay a solid theoretical foundation for the new system. the establishment of a limited government could be used as an institutional and ideological basis for the prosperity of the british capitalism. 3. the formation of locke’s limited government based on 3 distinct states of nature, locke, hobbes, and rousseau created their own ideal governments. compared with hobbes and rousseau, locke’s state of nature is intact and equal, and it is a state of freedom instead of indulgence in which people are their own judges. in addition, everyone has natural rights given by the god. at the same time, they must protect and respect other people’s rights. due to the flaws in the natural law and the state of nature, in order to protect possessions obtained through their own labor, people enter the political society by signing the social contract and build the limited government with the consent of the majority. it is worth noting that, as a representative of the bourgeois class, locke’s hidden purpose of creating the principle of limited government was to protect the property rights of the new aristocrats and factory owners. 3.1 the nature and the features of the state of nature according to the supporters of the social contract theory, the state of nature is a term used to describe a state without definite political authorities. in other words, it is the hypothetical life of people before societies or countries came into existence, which is the opposite of political societies and countries. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 29 published by scholink inc. however, classical thinkers of the bourgeois class have different understandings of the state of nature. hobbes describes a horrific state of nature where everyone is against everyone else: people live in constant fear of loss or violence, and life is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. locke believes that there are 4 characteristics for the state of nature: firstly, the state of nature is intact, and all men are free to dispose of their possessions and persons. secondly, in the state of nature, everyone is equal despite their differences in talents and capabilities. thirdly, the state of nature is a state of freedom instead of indulgence. fourthly, in this state, everyone is judge and has the right to punish violations of the law of nature. rousseau thinks that, in the natural state, people are born free and equal, and they enjoy mutually unimpeded peace. also, he maintains that human beings are only restricted by “self-preservation”: man’s first feeling was that of his own existence, and his first care that of self-preservation. to get rid of the state of nature, early bourgeois intellectuals assume that people could enter the political society and establish the government by signing an agreement or the social contract. in order to get away from the natural state in which everyone is against everyone else, hobbes believes that people could sign the social contract that transfers all their rights, and establish the powerful government described in the leviathan that could bring peace and orderliness. from locke’s point of view, people could transfer part of their rights and create the limited government that protects the right to private property so as to avoid the inconveniences of the state of nature. by contrast, rousseau is rather optimistic about the state of nature. in this way, he thinks that people should transfer all their rights to establish a centralized government with popular sovereignty to enjoy god-given equal rights and happy life. however, the state of nature is essentially a thought experiment. under the circumstance of its political vacuum, issues like “the shift from the state of nature to political society” and “what kind of country should be built” are discussed. 3.2 possessions and property rights defending the right to private property and restricting the powers of the monarch are the main features of the english bourgeois revolution. property rights are not only the basis for natural rights, but also the economic foundation for people to limit the power of the government. but we need to make clear the definition of property by locke in both the broad and narrow sense. in the narrow sense, property refers to natural resources obtained through their labor; in the broad sense, property (possession) refers to personal rights including life and liberty and property rights in the narrow sense. locke’s philosophy of property can be divided into 4 parts. firstly, one may appropriate natural resources through one’s own labor. secondly, one may only appropriate as much as one can use before it spoils. thirdly, the labor theory of property is also applicable to the land, which can be seen in its role as the defender for land ownership. fourthly, personal properties appropriated through labor is not only limited but can also decay. if we can transform properties into durable, rare, and valuable currencies acting as a store of value, then we can possess the properties forever so as to increase their value. locke’s theory of property rights tells us that it is necessary to shift from the state of nature to the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 30 published by scholink inc. political society. according to locke, in the state of nature, people lack sufficient supply of valuable items and then end up in dire poverty. after that, the emergence and advancement of labor, technology, art, and currency lead to the increase in the supply of valuable items. as a result, properties are in the hands of the few, contributing to the disproportion of the division of power. during the later period of the state of nature, the uneven distribution of private property results in the inequality of the political power. to defend this inequality, it is necessary to build a common authority with judicial power to protect properties from coveting and infringement. 3.3 the establishment of the political society and the government locke points out that the main purpose for people to establish a country and put themselves under the control of the government is to protect their personal properties, but there exist many deficiencies in the state of nature. firstly, the natural state lacks a formal, stable, and common law agreed, accepted, and recognized by all. secondly, the state of nature is devoid of unprejudiced arbiters who have the right to rule on all disputes according to the law. thirdly, the state of nature tends to be short of power to guarantee impartial rulings. some scholars believe that locke tries to guarantee people’s natural rights given by the natural law by letting them agree to sign the social contract so as to establish a political system. firstly, people shift from the state of nature to the political society by signing the social contract. to avoid 3 unsafe and unstable deficiencies in the natural state and to protect personal properties, people transfer part of their natural rights to a common authority with judicial power by signing the social contract, which is when they enter the political society from the state of nature. secondly, when facing issues like “what path should the political society choose” and “what kind of government should be built to rule the society”, it is necessary to create a government agreed by the majority. the political society entrusts its power to enforce the law of nature to a government through a majority vote. as long as the trust exists, the government can exercise power on behalf of the political society. however, locke does not advocate theory of the two contracts: one is the contract made between the people themselves; the other is the contract made between the people and the government. it seems to locke that the only contract is the social contract to enter the political society by giving up the executive power of the natural law. therefore, government power comes from part of the natural rights transferred by people through the contract, which is why the idea government proposed by locke is limited. 4. analysis on the “limitedness” of the ideal government proposed by locke why does locke favor limited government instead of unlimited government？why is government power limited? to answer these two tricky problems, we need to consider the historical background of locke and to make a text analysis of his masterpiece, two treatises of government. firstly, it is important to tell the difference between limited government and unlimited government. and then, we should analyze the limitedness of the government power from its source, affiliation, and scope. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 31 published by scholink inc. 4.1 limited government and unlimited government the limited government of the bourgeois class is relative to the unlimited government. there are mainly 2 major distinctions between them two. firstly, governments have different cognitive abilities of themselves, leading to distinct ways of exercising power. the cognitive basis for the notion of unlimited government is that the government can do everything and knows everything and no limit is placed on the government power. by contrast, the cognitive basis for the principle of limited government is that there exist blind spots and misunderstandings and the government power is restricted rather than limitless. secondly, whether the government operates under the constitution and laws or not. the limited government is the kind of government restricted by strict constitutions and laws in terms of authority, functions, and scale, whereas there are few or no limits on the unlimited government. in conclusion, limited governments are law-based governments that have limited self-cognition and are restricted with regards to authority, functions, and scale. the principle of limited government means that the government is limited by the parliament. as the representative of the limited government theory, locke established the limited government model known as the separation of powers, rule of law, and the fact that the parliament holds the supreme power. the two treatises of government by locke was initially written to oppose to king charles ii, but when it was published, it served as the theoretical foundation for the whigs to start the glorious revolution. 4.2 analysis on the limitedness of the government power what has been discussed above is how to create a government and what kind of government should be built, and this paper will talk about why the government power is limited. government power is the kind of power delivered to the society and enjoyed by everyone in the state of nature. the society regulates that this power can only be used to seek interests for the people and protect their personal properties through explicit or implied authorization. and then the society gives its power to the ruler appointed for itself. since the establishment of the government is based on people’s agreement and trust, and it is intended to safeguard their private properties, political power should be under supervision. firstly, the powers of government come from the consent of the majority. everyone is born free and nothing can put it at the mercy of secular power unless they agree. the community must take actions considering most people’s consent and decisions. besides, the establishment of the community is based on most people’s consent, which can be divided into 2 types, namely expressed consent and implicit consent. on the one hand, andrew heywood believes that authority and social relations should be based on consent or voluntary agreement, and the consent of the ruled should serve as the cornerstone of the government. as for locke, whether monarchy government or democratic government is based on people’s consent and exercises power in a way that they trust. on the other hand, military force and conquest have their advantages because they destroy the old community and lay the foundation for the new one, but we can only start a new country from the ruins with people’s consent. secondly, government power belongs to people. as a defender of popular sovereignty, locke believes that state power belongs to people and people’s well-being represents the supreme law of a country. on www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 32 published by scholink inc. the one hand, people are entitled to change the legislature and the legislative power is the power entrusted by people to make laws. when the legislature is against people’s source of power, their will, they have the right to decide whether or not to preserve, change, or rebuild the legislature. on the other hand, whether parliamentarianism and its representative or monarchy and its monarch should serve the interest of the people. in addition, locke also discussed royal prerogative that serves public interest rather than the monarch’s selfish desires. as long as this privilege is conducive to people’s welfare, then it is a legitimate privilege. thirdly, government power is limited. when ending the state of nature, people just transfer their judicial power, executive power, and the right to punish crimes, so they establish a limited government whose power is restricted by laws, instead of the strong central authority proposed by hobbes in his book leviathan. on the one hand, government power based on limited rights is only restricted to protecting the public interest. locke points out that social power or the power from the legislature that it builds can never go beyond the public interest, and 3 unsafe and unstable deficiencies in the natural state should be avoided so as to protect personal properties. on the other hand, restrictions are imposed on the government with compelling force which can only be used when enforcing the law at home and resisting foreign invasion or claiming compensation at abroad. locke believes that all of this is not for other purposes, but for peace, safety, and common interests. the limited power of the limited government theory proposed by locke comes from people’s consent and serves their well-being, so it should be restricted by popular sovereignty within and outside the government. 5. dual restrictions on the locke’s limited government locke argues that government power is limited rather than unlimited. so what can restrict government power? power is regarded by the bourgeois philosophers as a necessary evil. for people’s freedom and happiness, it is necessary to empower governments. locke’s limited government is not only restricted by the rule of law and separation of powers on the inside, but also by the dissolution of government and people’s revolution on the outside. 5.1 restrictions within the government: rule of law and separation of powers to protect people’s life, liberty, and property, locke proposed the rule of law and the separation of powers of the bourgeois class. his doctrine of rule of law has a double meaning. for one thing, he values the important role of laws in governance by promoting the rule of law. in the historical context of britain at that time, it means that monarchs are below the law, and people would rule the country with a set of established laws instead of monarchs’ talents. these theories and principles exert a profound impact on the law-based governance of china. for another thing, it is imperative to impose restrictions on the law and its derivative systems. as the supreme power, the legislative power must serve the public interest. besides, legislative power and the election for legislative representatives should be under restrictions. firstly, it is necessary to rule the country according to enacted and formal laws. secondly, the ultimate goal of the law is to benefit people. thirdly, the government should not www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 33 published by scholink inc. impose taxes on citizens without their or their representative’s consent. lastly, the legislature should not and cannot transfer lawmaking powers to others or exert power in a way that goes against people’s will. locke’s idea of separation of powers refers to threefold separation of legislative, executive, and federative powers. and these powers are exercised through different organizations. firstly, legislative power is the highest state power while executive and federative powers are subordinate to the legislative power. legislative power is the power to make laws and to direct how the force of the commonwealth shall be employed to protect itself and its members. executive power encompasses the execution of the laws that are made, and remain in force. federative power entails the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all transactions with all persons and communities outside the commonwealth. secondly, legislative power is only effective when it is exercised. so it is necessary to have a long-standing power to enforce laws and help them remain in force. the separation of executive power and legislative power is a great contribution to the constitutionalism by locke. locke thinks that if a group of people have the power to make laws and the power to execute these laws at the same time, it will pose a great temptation to the weakness of human nature. lastly, executive power and federative power tend to be closely related and inseparable, so some scholars regard threefold separation of powers as twofold separation of powers. executive power is domestically oriented and it refers to the power to enforce domestic laws whereas federative power is overseas-oriented and it is the power to deal with public security and interest concerning foreign affairs. locke points out that the execution of these two powers needs the support of social forces, so it would be unrealistic for different and unrelated people to exercise the national power. if monarchs do not realize the limitedness of their political power and neglect the fact that they are below the law, then they would lose the legitimacy of the governance. locke’s national outlook is that administrative power cannot be absolute and should be under restrictions of the independent judiciary and the legislature. from this we can catch a glimpse of locke’s influence on the united states declaration of independence and the constitution. locke’s idea of threefold separation of powers blazed the trail for constitutionalism featuring the separation of legislature and administration of the bourgeoisie, but it is strange that some domestic scholars over-interpret the fact that the legislative power controls executive and federative powers as checks and balances. however, in fact, the two treatises of government by locke only mentions the separation of powers rather than the balance of powers by montesquieu. what’s more, their definitions of the political power differ significantly. 5.2 restrictions outside the government: the dissolution of government and people’s revolution locke’s political philosophy is revolutionary to a certain degree. as mentioned above, government power comes from the consent and trust of the majority. therefore, when the government abuses its political power or turns its back on the people, they have the right to end the delegation and take back the natural rights. at this time, the government power comes to an end and the government collapses. to be specific, there are 2 reasons for the collapse of government: one is foreign invasion, and the other www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 34 published by scholink inc. is domestic factors. there are mainly 3 kinds of dissolution of government due to internal elements. the first is the alteration of the legislature. secondly, if those who hold the supreme executive power neglect or abandon their duties, it would be impossible to carry out enacted laws. thirdly, if the legislature or monarchs turn their back on the people, the government will dissolve. on the one hand, locke’s theory of revolution is quite cutting-edge, which can be embodied in its strict restrictions on the governmental abuse of power. if the legislature infringes people’s property rights and betrays their trust, or if the government prevents the legislature from holding the assembly and transfers the legislative power to somewhere else, the boycott will lead to a revolution. at this time, the power of the limited government goes back to the social group in the first stage when signing the social contract, and people will regain the freedom to create a new government in the initial state. james tully believes that revolution is a natural, legal way for people to deal with rulers who abuse their power. according to leo strauss, people have no power to overthrow the government, but have the power to rebel when the state of war is reintroduced. firstly, locke points out that force is to be opposed to nothing but to unjust and unlawful force. since the government aims to benefit people, if it infringes on people’s property with force, then they have the right to fight against the force with force. secondly, if people are in a state of war with the government, they have the right to overthrow it. when the government ignores people’s well-being and betrays their trust, they are at the state of war with each other. at this very moment, the rebel is the government rather than people, so people are entitled to topple this brutal government with force. on the other hand, the lockean revolution is illusory and deceptive. the fact that locke returns the legislative power to the parliament means that he, in essence, is a defender of parliamentary sovereignty. in the last paragraph of the second treatise of government, locke concludes that as long as the society exists, then the power everyone gives to the political society can be returned and will stay in the commonwealth forever. although locke proposed people’s right to revolution, it only exists under extreme conditions like tyrannies or tyrants. as a matter of fact, the glorious revolution in britain is rather conservative and it is the product of a compromise. just as edmund burke, a conservative, points out that, the glorious revolution is a revolution not made but prevented. the english revolution is essentially a revolution of moderation. the political principles of the whigs can only be established through a compromise of interest with the tories so as to start the constitutional monarchy in 1689, turning the political crisis into a more lasting and formal constitutionalism. in short, through the glorious revolution, people did not try to build a brand new constitutional system, but respected britain’s constitutional tradition instead. therefore, people’s right to revolution by locke integrates the limited government theory into the constitutional system by urging the limited government to protect private property rights and improving its economic status in the capitalist world. this kind of people’s right to revolution is merely a safety net for the constitutional system instead of its gravedigger. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 35 published by scholink inc. 6. limitations and criticisms on the locke’s limited government locke is undoubtedly a great political philosopher. in the two treatises of government, he proposes the limited government theory including the state of nature, the establishment of government, and dual restrictions on the government power at both home and abroad. the doctrine of limited government not only plays an important role in the political history, but is also regarded by western developed countries like the us and uk as a role model. the core of locke’s limited government theory is that the government power comes from people’s delegation and consent, instead of the divine right given by the god. the government is only a representative of the public interest, so its power is inevitably limited as it is restricted by the rule of law and the separation of powers within the government and by the dissolution of government and people’s right to revolution outside the government. furthermore, if the government goes against people’s wishes and infringes their rights, it should collapse. whether a violation of enacted laws or unscrupulous abuse of power means that the government betrays the people. people can take back their authorization and build a new government, which is the so-called people’s revolution. but this kind of revolution is meant to be conservative and compromised because the fundamental goal is to safeguard the more lasting constitutional system. after several twists and turns in its development, the theory of limited government finally became the mainstream form of government in the western world. with the constant development of the industrial civilization, major strands of political thought like the small government, big market, and social benefit maximization emerged in the western society. people believe that a good government should adopt non-interventionism and advocate the free market economy characterized by the invisible hand. ever since the late 19th century, the capitalist economy has been moving towards monopoly. the disconnection between limited government, market competition, and socio-economic development made it difficult to tackle poor resource allocation and the recurrent economic crises. the great depression lasting from 1929 to 1933, in particular, cast doubt on classical liberalism and the limited government theory. under this circumstance, in order to save the capitalist economy, the keynesian economics, the opposite of limited government theory, rose to the occasion. this theory emphasizes government power and tries to bridge the gap in market mechanism with government intervention. the keynesian economics pulled the united states out of the great depression and guided the economic recovery of the western europe after world war ll. the cold war between the us and the soviet union after wwii and the stagflation prevalent in the western society allowed the limited government theory to get out of the slump and to be developed. the major theoretical developments during this period are friedrich hayek’s failure of government planning and james m. buchanan’s public choice theory. in the history of western political thought, the cambridge school led by skinner does a much better job than its predecessors who focus on probing into classical texts. the cambridge school places emphasis on the historical conditions and the intellectual context of the masterpieces written by philosophers. understanding the literal meaning is not enough and what we should do is to put the text in a specific context. many jurists maintain that latecomer economies should learn from locke’s limited www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 36 published by scholink inc. government theory, but just as the cambridge school insightfully points out that, this borrowing must be combined with specific historical contexts. establishing the reign of the new aristocrats through the glorious revolution and developing industrial production were the themes of the british society in locke’s era. due to the changing times, we can neither apply locke’s political philosophy to the information age mechanically nor use the doctrine of limited government for the design of political systems of latecomer countries. in other words, it means that, in the 21st century, it is necessary to reinterpret locke’s political philosophy by tracing our political origin, taking into account our political system, and solving specific real-world problems. a comparison of locke’s theory of limited government and chinese political thought can be taken as an example. to be more specific, firstly, locke’s rule of law is different from china’s law-based governance. locke’s rule of law and constitutionalism is rooted in the prosperity of the british capitalism while china’s law-based governance conforms to its socialism with chinese characteristics. it is true that britain’s sophisticated legal system is enviable, but it has an inherent defect: the negligence of the role of morality. by contrast, china promotes the dialectical unity of the rule of law with the rule of virtue. in addition, locke’s doctrine of the separation of powers is incompatible with the people’s congress system of china. locke upholds parliamentary sovereignty featuring the separation between the legislative and executive powers whereas china adopts the people’s congress system marked by the combination of legislative and executive powers. therefore, copying the separation of powers will only be in conflict with china’s fundamental political system. from the perspective of the liberalism, the division of powers is out of fear of the dark side of humanity whereas china has the political and cultural heritage known as harmony and cooperation, and the rule of virtue. for example, the institutional and governance advantages of the principle of democratic centralism and the combination of legislative and executive powers can be seen clearly in this battle against covid-19. in fact, the improvement of government efficiency and restrictions on the government power constitute a contradictory unity. and this unity of opposites can boost governance capacity. professor yang guangbin believes that the overall goal of the modernization of national governance system and governance capacity is to build an effective, limited government. in this way, the existence of the limited government is necessary, but should be based on government efficiency. locke’s idea of limited government is a compromise between capitalism and the society, and between government power and individual rights while china’s effective, limited government requires government efficiency and performance, and boundaries of and restrictions on its power. these two political systems share one thing in common, which is to confine power within an institutional cage. by combing through and critically evaluating locke’s limited government theory, and comparing it with its chinese counterpart, we try to explore a new path for the chinese government in the new era. in other words, we aim to build an effective and limited government that upholds law-based governance, takes a people-centered approach, and pursues the dialectical unity of institutional restrictions on government power with governance efficiency. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 37 published by scholink inc. references aaron, r. (1971). john locke. oxford: oxford university press. andrew, e. (1988). shylock’s rights: a grammar of lockean claims. toronto: university of toronto press. anstey, p. r. (2011). john locke and natural philosophy. oxford: oxford university press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589777.001.0001 armitage, d. (2004). john locke, carolina and the two treatises of government. political theory, 32(5), 602-627. https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591704267122 ashcraft, r. (1986). locke’s two treatises of government. london: routledge. ashcraft, r. (1986). revolutionary politics and locke’s two treatises of government. princeton: princeton university press. bogdanor, v. (1992). the blackwell encyclopedia of political science. hoboken: wiley-blackwell. brown, a. (1986). modern political philosophy: theories of the just society. london: penguin books. dunn, j. (1984). locke (past masters). oxford: oxford university press. evans, c. s. 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(1980). second treatise of government. indianapolis: hackett publishing company. locke, j. (1988). two treatises of government. cambridge: cambridge university press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511810268 locke, j. (1991). a letter concerning toleration. london: routledge. locke, j. (1997). political essays. cambridge: cambridge university press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511810251 locke, j. (2000). an essay concerning human understanding. london: routledge. macpherson, c. b. (1962). the political theory of possessive individualism: hobbes to locke. oxford: clarendon press. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 38 published by scholink inc. rapaczynski, a. (1987). nature and politics: liberalism in the philosophies of hobbes, locke, and rousseau. ithaca: cornell university press. riley, p. 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(1995). encyclopedia of chinese law: volume of constitutional law. beijing: china procuratorial press. yang, g. b. (2014). the political reform of creating an effective and limited government: how to understand the modernization of national governance system and governance capacity. research of administration science, 01, 33-36. yu, h. (2010). an intellectual history of the western world. shanghai: fudan university press. zhan, f. m., & miao, j. (2005). a contemporary interpretation of limited government. science of law (journal of northwest university of political science and law), 03, 8-18. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 17 original paper research on the construction of legal culture in ethnic areas in the new era under the consciousness of chinese national community tianjun lan1 & zhihan zhang2* 1 law school of southwest minzu university, chengdu, china 2 foreign languages school of southwest minzu university, chengdu, china * zhihan zhang, corresponding author received: january 13, 2024 accepted: march 09, 2024 online published: march 25, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n2p17 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n2p17 abstract the cultivation of a rule of law culture exerts a profound influence on the enactment of the directives from the 20th party congress, the refinement of the legal system, and the fostering of ethnic solidarity. furthermore, the establishment of a rule of law culture is crucial for preserving ethnic unity, augmenting the sense of national identity, and facilitating the grand rejuvenation of the chinese nation. currently, minority regions face challenges including the attenuation of religious fervor, economic limitations imposed by legal frameworks, and a deficiency in initiatives aimed at nurturing a legal culture. in response to these issues, it is imperative to galvanize public enthusiasm under the party’s guidance and spearhead the development of a rule of law culture through grassroots social governance, thereby addressing the prevailing challenges in the advancement of legal culture within ethnic communities. keywords ethnic area rule of law culture construction of the chinese nation community consciousness 1. the practical value of the construction of legal culture in ethnic areas 1.1 accurate implementation of the spirit of the rule of law the party’s 20th report has outlined an ambitious vision for the comprehensive advancement of a rule of law nation and the expedited development of a socialist rule of law state, providing foundational guiding principles, clear objectives, requirements, and a specific roadmap for the holistic construction of socialist modernization along the trajectory of legal governance. ethnic minority regions, as distinct www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 18 published by scholink inc. social entities, are accorded priority by both the party and the state. notable progress has been made in china’s rule of law development. to further cultivate the rule of law culture within ethnic minority areas, it is imperative to fully implement the key spirit of the party’s 20th congress, achieving significant progress in critical areas such as legislation, law enforcement, judicial proceedings, and the popularization of legal knowledge. the party’s 20th report has specifically emphasized “adhering to the rule of law and advancing the rule of law in china”, making significant plans to elevate rule of law development to a more prominent and crucial status. this underscores the party and the state’s commitment to and valuation of governance by law. in the current context of accelerated economic globalization and rapid advancements in the scientific and technological revolution, the economies and societies of ethnic minority areas are encountering numerous challenges and opportunities. promoting the development of a rule of law culture in minority areas not only facilitates the comprehensive execution of the fundamental rule of law strategy but also enhances the modernization of grassroots governance systems and capabilities, thereby more effectively advancing the development of a rule of law culture in these regions. 1.2 an important component of a sound legal system in ethnic minority areas since the 18th national congress of the communist party of china (cpc), amidst the pivotal juncture of “profound changes unseen in a century” on a global scale, the cpc and the chinese government have showcased a strategic foresight in advocating for the comprehensive promotion of the rule of law, with a dedication towards establishing a modern socialist country governed by law. on a deeper level, the contemporary endeavors in the construction of the rule of law necessitate a thorough investigation and analysis of the chinese national community, grounded in the prevailing condition of the nation’s rule of law. the culture of rule of law, representing a fundamental aspect of chinese legal culture and a societal phenomenon, profoundly resonates across different ethnic groups, influencing their collective consciousness. as an ethos, the culture of rule of law not only signifies a maturation in the populace’s comprehension of their rights and duties but also mirrors advancements and innovations in the modernization of the national governance framework. within the paradigm of total legal governance in the new era, the 19th national congress of the cpc underscored the “enhancement of the legal and moral standards of the entire populace”. essentially, this advocates for an egalitarian elevation of legal and ethical standards across all ethnicities, thereby bolstering their confidence in the unique socialist legal path that embodies chinese characteristics. 1.3 a powerful driving force for ethnic unity and progress since the 18th national congress of the communist party of china (cpc), general secretary xi jinping has accorded significant emphasis to the legal aspects of ethnic affairs. in several crucial meetings concerning national matters, he has articulated key principles such as utilizing law to preserve national unity, enhancing the legal awareness among all ethnic groups, ensuring equality before the law for all nationalities, and steadfastly managing ethnic affairs in accordance with the law to advance the modernization of the ethnic affairs management system and capabilities. these insights deeply www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 19 published by scholink inc. delineate the goals, tasks, and specific mandates for the legal progression of ethnic affairs in china’s new era. it is imperative to underscore that the “rule of law” constitutes not just the cornerstone of contemporary national governance but also serves as a principal mechanism for adjusting ethnic relations, resolving ethnic disparities, and safeguarding national cohesion. consequently, fostering a socialist rule of law culture within ethnic regions represents a noble charge bequeathed by the era, as well as a pragmatic necessity for cultivating harmonious ethnic relations, propelling the advancement and evolution of ethnic groups, and enhancing the overall caliber of ethnic minorities. to forge a socialist rule of law culture in ethnic minority areas, an adherence to appropriate values is mandatory. the principles of rule of law, border governance, and administrative legality are fundamentally linked to legal reasoning and methodologies. bolstering the chinese nation’s sense of community through legal means is not only vital for maintaining national unity but also a crucial mechanism for enhancing national identity and achieving national rejuvenation. currently, china’s ethnic legal framework exhibits imperfections, and the system of regional ethnic autonomy presents flaws, impacting the economic, social development, and stability of ethnic regions. these issues hinder the seamless attainment of the goal to construct a moderately prosperous society in these areas. in the contemporary era, ethnic harmony has emerged as a vivid manifestation of china’s new socialist ethnic relations, and in ethnic territories, the establishment of a socialist rule of law culture has imbued the unity of all ethnic groups with renewed vigor. 2. the theoretical basis of the construction of legal culture in ethnic areas 2.1 the profound connotation of the construction of legal culture in ethnic minority areas the culture of rule of law is a foundational element in establishing and implementing a socialist rule of law system with chinese characteristics. it plays a crucial role in societal development, the modernization of national governance, and the fulfillment of the rule of law strategy. this culture is aimed at fostering a deep-seated belief in the rule of law, incorporating the core spiritual values of a unique legal perspective, legal cultivation, and legal personality reflective of the new era. to develop the rule of law culture in ethnic areas, understanding its fundamental concept is essential. however, the academic community has not yet reached a consensus on this matter, resulting in significant debates and at times, contradictory views. scholars have explored the definition of “rule of law culture” from various angles, focusing mainly on two pivotal aspects: 1) **comparative research**: this method involves comparing the rule of law and rule of law culture with the culture of law and western concepts of rule of law. liang qichao, a pioneering chinese scholar, was the first to use the term “rule of law” and delineated the concept of rule of man culture in his historical works. liang zhiping further analyzed the differences between chinese and western legal cultures, highlighting their fundamental conflicts and the challenges in harmonizing these divergent cultural perspectives. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 20 published by scholink inc. 2) **cultural perspective on the rule of law**: this approach seeks to identify the core attributes, uniqueness, and structural components of rule of law culture. it regards the rule of law as a significant category within the broader concept of legal culture. early anthropological insights from taylor, who viewed culture as encompassing all aspects of civilization including laws and moral codes, inform this perspective. according to professor li deshun, the essence of culture—and by extension, rule of law culture—lies in “the shaping of people”, encompassing individuals’ nature, subjectivity, historical context, and practical application. further scholarly contributions suggest that the domain of rule of law culture should encompass legal concepts, systems, structures, practices, and the linguistic and textual aspects of law. some argue that the rule of law should be seen as an ideology or form of social consciousness, centrally focused on “legal belief” and “legal spirit”. in summary, rule of law culture, as a reflection of social and economic development, embodies the norms, concepts, and cultural traits of legal operation in society. it manifests through the enactment and observance of laws, influencing attitudes towards law compliance and embedding itself in social practices. conceptually, it shapes thought and behavioral patterns, while spiritually, it integrates into the ideological realm through legal education. practically, it is evident in the application of law in everyday operations, highlighting its significance in both guiding societal conduct and fostering a legal mindset among citizens. 2.2 the necessity of the rule of law construction in ethnic minority areas the establishment of the rule of law within ethnic minority regions constitutes the foundational premise for upholding ethnic unity. reflecting on the era’s characteristics of the rule of law, the advancement of a national legal framework has solidified a historical basis for national cohesion. ethnic relations represent the most fundamental social relationship within a nation’s political existence, serving not only as a legal standard but also mirroring shifts in societal understanding and attitudes toward this issue across various epochs. the epochal attribute of the rule of law accentuates its distinctiveness, delineates its temporal positioning, and guides the application of legal principles. the development of the rule of law in areas populated by ethnic minorities offers a tangible method to foster ethnic identity. “identity” is perceived as a subjective emotional state influenced primarily by two factors: the collective and individual identities shaped by historical memory, and the shared beliefs, value norms, and resultant behavioral patterns. being part of the 56 ethnic groups, there is a profound and holistic comprehension of the “chinese national community” concept; this understanding is further molded from political, economic, cultural, and social dimensions during the nation-building process. hence, augmenting the “sense of identity” among individuals is crucial for engendering a consciousness geared towards actively protecting and championing national interests, thereby ensuring the survival and progress of the entire nation. currently, china is navigating a pivotal phase of achieving a comprehensively prosperous society and establishing a harmonious socialist state. strengthening the regional autonomy system for all ethnic groups through legal means is critically www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 21 published by scholink inc. important for preserving the motherland’s unity and fostering solidarity. to encapsulate, achieving national unity, harmonizing ethnic relations, and ensuring societal stability and growth necessitates the integration of the chinese nation’s ethnic constituents at three fundamental levels. the rule of law emerges as the most potent and efficacious mechanism to accomplish this integration. moreover, the implementation of the rule of law in minority areas is a crucial safeguard for the realization of national rejuvenation. the grand revival of the chinese nation is indispensable not only for fulfilling the “chinese dream” but also as a prerequisite for all ethnic groups to partake in developmental benefits and attain mutual prosperity. in china, the synergy between the rule of law and the principle of virtue is mutually reinforcing. from a legal perspective, the government underpins the sustenance and advancement of laws, which are instrumental in achieving national objectives and efficient governance. under the governance-by-law strategy, the bond between state and society strengthens, with the state’s intentions significantly impacting individual liberties. 3. embedding and shaping of the national legal culture in the new era 3.1 the evolution of the national rule of law culture since the qin dynasty, the county system gradually supplanted the enfeoffment system, enhancing the central government’s control over local jurisdictions, including areas inhabited by ethnic minorities. the diverse religious beliefs, customs, and legal systems among different ethnic groups, predominantly under han chinese dominance, coexisted within ancient china. from the early western han dynasty through to the late qing dynasty, the central authority consistently employed a “governing through common customs” strategy, fostering increased interaction and integration among ethnic groups. this approach facilitated the rapid evolution of legal systems within ethnic minority regions. with each historical phase, the push for uniform laws and decrees in these areas intensified, allowing national laws to permeate, significantly influencing and transforming traditional customs and legal practices, and promoting the absorption and amalgamation of various rule of law cultures. the legal framework in ancient chinese society can be categorized into three distinct phases: the unity of rites and laws during the pre-qin, qin, and han dynasties; a balanced emphasis on morality and rites in the sui, tang, and song dynasties; and a fusion of french and german legal traditions in the yuan, ming, and qing dynasties. overall, the legal systems across periods formed coherent wholes, characterized by diversity and coexistence, granting each dynasty its unique legal identity shaped by the prevailing political, economic, and cultural contexts. this millennia-old unified model, stable organizational structures, and the flourishing of confucian culture collectively facilitated the integration of diverse ethnic cultures and the emergence of a centralized civilization narrative, constituting the foundational historical narrative for the evolution of various ethnic groups’ legal cultures in china. as a distinctive component of the traditional legal framework, it too underwent development and transformation akin to other ethnic legal systems, continually enriching its content and diversifying its expression, thereby playing an increasingly crucial role in upholding social order. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 22 published by scholink inc. owing to the distinct social and historical contexts of each era, significant variations in legal systems have emerged, giving rise to a multi-ethnic legal culture bearing the unique imprint of its times. since the inception of the people’s republic of china, the communist party and the government have adhered to principles that honor historical and contemporary realities, advocating for national equality, unity, and shared prosperity. particularly post-economic reforms and opening up, china’s escalating economic prowess, comprehensive national strength, and elevated international stature have garnered increased focus on governance strategies from central leadership. the constitution’s preamble explicitly references the “rule of law,” underscoring the commitment to molding a socialist state governed by law. this transition from traditional to modern governance models has seen a heightened focus on ethnic minority regions. on one front, the state has reinforced decrees, systems, and a unified development vision to construct a robust nation capable of navigating the complex international milieu, ensuring the chinese populace, under party leadership, steadily achieves self-governance, prosperity, and wealth. concurrently, to guarantee ethnic groups enjoy equivalent political rights as the han majority, various measures have been instituted to protect their interests, thus fortifying ethnic unity and social stability. legal mechanisms affirm and secure equal rights and status for all ethnicities, fostering their autonomy, freedom, and the harmonious coexistence of diverse groups. furthermore, the deepening reforms and global integration have propelled ethnic minorities into the globalization narrative. ethnic minority and underdeveloped regions, identified as modernization’s vulnerabilities, confront the imperative of expedited development. addressing this challenge is pivotal in the modernization journey, prompting the state to implement prioritized policy and resource allocation strategies. these initiatives aim to catalyze profound reforms and transformations across political, economic, and cultural dimensions in minority regions, thereby hastening their societal shift from traditional to modern paradigms. the contemporary legal governance evolution in minority areas is shaped by two principal influences: the recognition of “customary law’s” historical legitimacy in minority regions, and the impact of state-led rule of law culture. post-1949, ethnic policy and foundational systems have progressively infused a unified rule of law culture into these regions. this process has seen key policies and systems gradually incorporated into the legal frameworks of minority areas, with external support melding new socialist era rule of law concepts with traditional ethnic minority legal cultures. this integration advances the transition towards a modern rule of law culture. 3.2 ethnic integration promotes the development of the rule of law culture the post-reform era in china has marked a significant shift towards multi-ethnic integration, reflecting a broader trend of cultural amalgamation that transcends regional and ethnic boundaries. this integration process typically begins within the same ethnic or regional groups, fostering a shared set of traditions and practices. the unification under a common education system and market economy further accelerates this integration, leading to adjustments in the legal system that resonate throughout www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 23 published by scholink inc. the social and economic fabric of the country. the rapid dissemination of information and the liberalization of population movements, fueled by continued reforms and opening up, have facilitated the spread of mainstream and popular cultures across china. this dynamic has necessitated a swift adaptation of minority areas’ traditional legal concepts to align with new developmental trajectories. to enforce a unified national legal framework, the chinese government has initiated campaigns like “sending law to the countryside,” aimed at disseminating and popularizing national laws within ethnic minority and rural communities. these law delivery initiatives vary in form and execution across the country, and while their overall impact has room for enhancement, they are pivotal in the drive towards legal awareness and education at the grassroots level. the primary objectives of such campaigns are to instill a modern rule of law culture, adjust social relations according to national laws, and integrate these principles into the everyday lives and productive activities of ethnic minorities. however, the implementation of national law in minority regions faces unique challenges, stemming from local environmental, cultural, and economic conditions. ethnic minorities’ traditional customs and practices are deeply ingrained, carrying significant emotional and cultural weight. these traditions have not only profoundly influenced these communities but have also posed substantial hurdles to the national law’s acceptance and enforcement. the interaction between national legal culture and ethnic minorities’ traditional legal norms often leads to a form of competition or confrontation, highlighting the interconnectedness of these legal cultures. this dynamic serves as a catalyst for the practical fusion of modern rule of law principles with the traditional legal cultures of ethnic minorities, promoting a mutual enrichment and integration that reflects the broader trends of multi-ethnic coalescence in contemporary china. such efforts underscore the complexity of governing a nation as diverse as china, where the balance between preserving cultural heritage and promoting legal uniformity necessitates careful navigation. the government’s initiatives to bridge these gaps through legal education and the promotion of a unified legal system are crucial steps towards achieving a harmonious multi-ethnic society governed by the rule of law. 4. the dilemma of the construction of legal culture in ethnic minority areas 4.1 religion weakens the judicial authority the interplay between traditional chinese societal structures, such as the patriarchal system, rule of man (人治, renzhi), religious norms, and the modern legal framework, presents a complex dynamic that profoundly affects social cohesion and legal governance, especially in a multi-ethnic and culturally diverse nation like china. these traditional influences have been integral to chinese society’s evolution, providing a sense of continuity and identity. however, they also pose challenges to the establishment and enforcement of a unified legal system that seeks to balance tradition with modernity, particularly in ethnic minority regions with strong religious beliefs. the patriarchal system and the rule of man have historically prioritized family hierarchy and personal www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 24 published by scholink inc. authority over institutional or legal frameworks, which can conflict with contemporary principles of equality and justice under the law. similarly, religious rules and beliefs, deeply embedded within many ethnic communities, offer an alternative source of moral and social guidance that can diverge from national legal norms. in regions where religious faith is predominant, this faith often intertwines with ethnic identity, leading to a preference for religious or traditional dispute resolution mechanisms over formal legal proceedings. this inclination reflects not only a trust in religious leaders but also a perception of these figures as embodying both spiritual authority and communal values. such situations underscore a potential disconnect between the formal legal system and the lived realities of ethnic minority communities, where the resolution of conflicts through legal procedures might be viewed as secondary to religious or traditional methods. the incorporation of religious figures into legal dispute resolution processes, such as involving respected religious leaders in civil dispute juries or mediation committees, represents an attempt to bridge this gap. this approach acknowledges the importance of religious and traditional authority in these communities while striving to integrate these perspectives within the broader legal framework. however, the fundamental differences in the bases and methods of resolving disputes between religious organizations and the judiciary highlight the ongoing challenge of harmonizing traditional beliefs with the national legal system. the coexistence of religious beliefs with legal norms in ethnic minority areas illustrates the need for a nuanced approach to governance that respects cultural and religious diversity while promoting the rule of law. this balance is crucial for ensuring that all citizens, regardless of their ethnic or religious background, feel represented and protected within the national legal system. achieving this balance requires continuous dialogue, adaptation, and cooperation between legal authorities, religious leaders, and the communities they serve, ensuring that legal governance is both effective and culturally sensitive. 4.2 economy restricts the development of a rule of law culture despite the rich natural resources within ethnic regions, their economic development lags significantly due to a combination of natural, historical, and contemporary factors, severely impeding the evolution of their legal culture. religious beliefs serve as a shared historical memory and psychological foundation across all ethnic communities. ethnic minorities in remote areas encounter numerous obstacles, including inadequate transportation, communication difficulties, and limited external connections. these areas are characterized by small populations with lower levels of cultural education and a limited understanding of legal principles. historical contexts and present circumstances hinder economic development and weaken political communication channels in these regions, complicating the establishment of a conducive legal environment. consequently, there is a pervasive lack of rule of law awareness among local populations, adversely affecting the progression towards a modern legal culture. as china’s process of socialist modernization accelerates, the societal challenges faced by www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 25 published by scholink inc. ethnic minorities have become more acute. despite the potential advantages offered by their natural resources, ethnic minorities overall still face significant challenges in terms of openness and the capacity for innovation. 4.3 measures to establish a culture of the rule of law are weak while ethnic minorities have engaged in fostering a legal culture within their communities, this culture has not been deeply ingrained in the collective consciousness of these groups, resulting in a muted sense of belonging and consequently low levels of participation in legal developments. among the myriad reasons for this, a significant factor is the misalignment between the constructors and beneficiaries of the legal culture, particularly in their comprehension of the “rule of law” concept. on one side, the reluctance or indifference of minority populations diminishes the influence of legal culture initiatives, preventing these efforts from truly addressing the community’s needs. on the other hand, this attitude can decelerate the propagation of legal awareness in minority regions, thereby compromising the overall quality of legal culture development in these areas. 5. practical experience: the specific approach of legal culture construction in ethnic areas 5.1 give full play to the role of the party and the law the fourth plenary session of the 18th central committee of the communist party of china underscored that “the party’s leadership constitutes the most essential safeguard for comprehensively advancing the rule of law and expediting the establishment of a socialist rule of law state.” to bolster the development of a legal culture, it is imperative to harness the potential of party members who possess superior cultural literacy and legal leadership capabilities, thereby ensuring that senior officials exemplify a proactive stance. the practice of law plays a pivotal role in cultivating and enhancing the culture of the rule of law. the establishment of a legal culture that the populace genuinely believes in necessitates the rigorous enforcement of justice and equity within the legal system, thereby enabling individuals to experience the essence of a legal culture. consequently, broadening the scope of legal awareness campaigns and augmenting educational opportunities for ethnic minorities are fundamental to elevating the standard of law enforcement and judicial fairness in minority regions, as well as enhancing the societal perception of justice within a legal governance framework. the promotion and embracement of a legal culture are vital to the construction of a socialist legal culture, with the rule of law serving as the ideological foundation, fundamental principle, and value system guiding adherence to legal norms. it is crucial to embed the culture of the rule of law within the ideological framework, efficaciously implement it, and advocate for its widespread recognition across society, thereby expanding the demographic engaged in legal education and fostering a deeper understanding of legal culture among a broader audience. 5.2 we will intensify economic development in ethnic minority areas enhancing economic support for ethnic minority regions, refining infrastructure development, and endeavoring to furnish robust material foundations for the culture of the rule of law in these areas are www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 26 published by scholink inc. imperative. the legal framework modulates social interactions, enabling citizens to exercise their rights and fulfill their duties within defined boundaries, thus safeguarding social stability, the nation’s enduring stability, and fostering the holistic advancement of socialist material, spiritual, and political civilizations. the genesis and proliferation of the rule of law culture are intrinsically linked to the material living conditions and the economic development level. economically, it represents the outcome of societal productive forces and signifies social progression. the economic base molds the societal superstructure, influencing the pursuit of the rule of law, providing essential material underpinnings for its enactment, and facilitating the cultivation of democratic and legal principles among the public. engels, in his “speech at marx’s grave,” elucidated that fundamental needs such as food, clothing, shelter, and transportation precede engagement in politics, science, art, or religion. the tangible aspects of life predetermine a nation’s or era’s economic level, which in turn shapes the political structure, legal philosophies, art, and religious convictions. thus, understanding these elements should not be confined to past interpretations but recognized as foundational to development issues. ethnic minority regions have historically exhibited disparities in economic growth, human development, and societal advancement, notably impacted by the demographic composition and educational quality of minority populations, which in turn decelerates china’s overall development pace and impacts its socialist modernization efforts. despite significant strides made post-reform and opening-up, with targeted measures to advance these regions, their development lags, hindered by geographic isolation, transportation and informational deficits, leading to economic, educational, and environmental disadvantages compared to urban centers. consequently, the local populace’s grasp and awareness of the rule of law remain limited. therefore, economic development serves as the bedrock for cultivating a rule of law culture, aiming to uplift living standards and, on this foundation, bolster rule of law construction to augment legal consciousness. 5.3 grassroots social governance to lead the process of the rule of law culture construction the cultivation of a rule of law culture is inherently practical, necessitating its application and manifestation within societal frameworks, particularly in ethnic minority regions. the most pivotal and efficacious approach to fostering this culture lies in the advancement of grassroots social management, establishing foundational models of rule of law that resonate with local contexts. emphasizing legal practice and integrating rule of law principles into the governance of ethnic minority areas can harmonize relationships, enrich social governance forms and content, bolster policy frameworks, and elevate the cultural understanding of the rule of law. importantly, deepening the modern culture of rule of law is instrumental in transforming perceptions within minority areas, nurturing a comprehensive understanding and acceptance of rule of law principles. recent initiatives, such as the outreach by students from southwest university for nationalities to liangshan prefecture, underscore the imperative for targeted education, theoretical engagement, and legal literacy campaigns within these communities. these efforts reveal a crucial gap in legal awareness and the application of legal principles, highlighting a broader need for enhanced rule of law www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 27 published by scholink inc. education and the challenges posed by geographic isolation, demographic constraints, and communication barriers. such endeavors not only reflect the necessity for heightened rule of law awareness among ethnic minority populations but also illustrate the complexities of rule of law construction in regions characterized by their remoteness and limited infrastructural capacities. the promotion of rule of law culture, therefore, is essential for consolidating and expanding its influence, necessitating a tailored approach that respects the unique characteristics and needs of national and regional communities. by leveraging the rule of law culture effectively, we can stimulate the engagement of local populations in national and social governance, utilizing legal principles to enhance regional and societal administration. the focus should be on maximizing the participatory role of the community in the development of a rule of law culture, ensuring that grassroots social governance initiatives in ethnic minority areas are both appropriate and encouraging of proactive community involvement. references chang’an, 70 years of regional ethnic autonomy and the protection of the rights of ethnic minorities in new china. (2019). legal science (journal of northwest university of political science and law), 5, 37. chen, j. z., & song, b. z. (2005). interpretation of the meaning of the rule of law, the government ruled by law and the society under the rule of law—the rule of law as rhetoric to change the way of thinking. social science research, 5, 18. gong, p. x. (2018). the dynamic mechanism of regional rule of law development in contemporary china—commemorates the 40th anniversary of china’s reform and opening up. jiangsu social science, 4, 20. he, q. h., yang, a. s., & zheng, x. y. (2014). a preliminary study of regional legal culture. journal of yangzhou university (humanities and social sciences edition), 5, 18. liang, z. p. (2002). in seeking the harmony in the natural order (p. 382). beijing: china university of political science and law press. liu, z. h. (2019). the cultural consciousness of governing the party by system and culture. academic forum, 2, 42. sheng, h., & gu, w. b. (2017). analysis of the value of national law—based on informal system. guangxi ethnic studies, 2, 28. sun, s. y., & chen, x. x. (2017). the dynamic generation of the rule of law culture and its role in the modernization of national governance. henan social science, 6, 25. wang, y., & wang, y. w. (2018). analysis of the path of legal construction of ethnic regional autonomous areas under the perspective of regional development. journal of henan normal university (philosophy and social sciences edition), 4, 45. xia, j. w., & chen, x. j. (2005). regional rule of law culture: meaning interpretation, operation www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 28 published by scholink inc. mechanism and development path. legal science, 1, 33. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 1 original paper obor: one belt, one road initiative, china pakistan economic corridor, challenges, and impediments professor dr. syed salahuddin ahmad 1* 1 professor, greenwich university, karachi, pakistan received: november 14, 2022 accepted: december 18, 2022 online published: december 23, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n1p1 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n1p1 abstract the one belt, one road initiative not only proposes significant potentials in multifaceted realms including economic, political, strategic, and geographical dimensions, it also presents many uncertainties and possible apprehensions for the associated countries. the initiative broadly includes five areas of regional connectivity: policy reformation, infrastructure development, trade regimes and investment. the trade and investment facilitation are one of the main areas where the developing countries like pakistan need to focus upon. the obor initiative paves regional connectivity paths between pakistan, china, central asian republics. pakistan-china friendship is an incomparable phenomenon. the two states have nothing in common in terms of history, language, ethnicity, culture, or ideology, yet their nexus is being considered as deeply rooted and time-tested which has developed into a comprehensive strategic partnership. pakistan-china partnership sustained and remained unaffected during changes of leaders, political system in the realm of regional and international politics. both states have developed an ideal state-to-state relationship based on complete trust. they have been steadfast friends who have supported each other throughout thick and thin. on one hand, this initiative fosters new opportunities, but on the other it also unveils challenges. with the chinese over production, the asian markets will thus be loaded with the chinese products, suppressing the pakistan markets. this paper through secondary data investigation, takes a closer look at the one belt, one road initiative and its impact on pakistan keywords one belt, one road, emerging markets, regional connectivity, trade and investments, integrative organizations www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 2 published by scholink inc. 1. introduction the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1951. bilateral relations between pakistan and china are a history of friendship and understanding. it began with the historical bandung conference in 1955. the conference became a milestone in pakistan-china relations. it provided a chance to prime minister of pakistan mohammad ali bogra and chinese premier zhou enlai to talk over the two sides relationship. chinese premier openly accepted mohammad ali bogra’s statement during discussion with him that the pakistani nation and government has never been against china. moreover, pakistan never had felt that china would follow aggressive lines against pakistan. assuming if the us took aggressive steps under the south east asia treaty organization (seato). pakistan would not become aggressive towards china, adding up that via such clarifications we accomplished a shared understanding. mr. bruno olierhoek, the president of the overseas investors chamber of commerce and industry (oicci) cautioned that availability of energy and infrastructure upgrade wouldn’t automatically attract foreign private investment. “cpec is good news (for pakistan) but the government should also work hard on dismantling other barriers that keep foreign investors at bay. “investments in special economic zones, railway, roads and ports will significantly cut export costs,” cpec is a loan and pakistan is using it for infrastructure and its energy issues. this is something that is (also) misunderstood abroad, that china is somehow giving money to pakistan. a scholar openly announced in a one-day seminar held in a karachi’s local hotel that chinapakistan economic corridor is in fact a loan which pakistan has to pay back. this agreement between pakistan and china is unique in the sense that it encompasses all directions and aspects of economic development. it covers the proposed development of infrastructure in pakistan and extends and envelops energy issues, railways, construction of highways, improvement, and upgradation of gwadar port in balochistan. the setting up of special economic zones and provision of foreign investment are counted as important features of this agreement. it was reported in 2017 that within a decade china’s annual trade with obor countries will exceed $ 2.5 trillion. obor will cater for ⅔ of the world population, ⅓ of the world gdp and ⅓ of the world services and goods. china pakistan economic corridor (cpec) is the main component of obor. the basic concept of cpec is to join gwadar (arabian sea port in pakistan) with kashghar (xinjian province of western china. (tufail, president ,the federation of chambers of commerce and industry, management account (icma), march-april 2917, p. 10). economic relations between states, particularly in this age of globalization drive and controls all aspects of relationship of states. a private manufacturing ceo in pakistan, engineer m.a. jabbar writing in icma pakistan management accountant wrote, “the contemporary history of world politics indicates that the economic power leads the nations on all fronts including politics, education, culture, military and technology. in today’s globalization regime the responsibility of the private sector has enhanced, and it requires revolutionary changes for acceleration (management accountant, march-april 2107, p. 12). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 3 published by scholink inc. 2. research method and review of literature the qualitative research method is adopted to conduct this study. content analysis is always of greater value in the evaluation of phenomenon under consideration from multiple angles. content analysis has been given prime importance because a significant theoretical portion of the research has been taken from books, online and printed journals, web resources and newspapers. most of the current materials related to the present work are available in the esteemed journals of the same field. content analysis is important for authenticity and acceptability of qualitative research. research work of others, news items and research articles have been properly cited. no interview has been conducted and no observation technique has been adopted. sources are mostly secondary but authentic. a discussion on the theory of integrations and manifestations of the existing integrative institutions particularly in europe in nature is original. this can be of immense importance to another research. in fact, european institutions provide us with the conceptual framework with which we can measure the nature and success of the cpec. 3. statement of the purpose the objective of this study is to investigate the nature and depth of the challenges and impediments of the cpec. the purpose of the study can be enumerated as under: 1) to enumerate and analyze the general nature of the challenges and impediments faced by the cpec. 2) to discuss the challenges to the cpec through external sources or by states opposed to the cpec. 3) to unearth and analyze the dangers for the survival of cpec within its territorial domain, i.e., internal difference of opinion and competition to snatch the major portion of the pie. 4) to count the benefits and advantages of the cpec to pakistan, if any. the economists and political thinkers wonder whether any principle or theory of economic integration can be applied to this kind of bilateral economic agreement although hopes have been expressed and invitation though verbally have been extended to third parties to join this project. this article vividly explains what are the features of economic integration that do not apply to this agreement and what factors help it to become a significant international accord. despite signing the fta in 2016 pakistan still is not a major trading partner with china. even under the cpec it is not likely that pakistan would become major trading partner 3 (tufail, president, the federation of chambers of commerce and industry, management account (icma), march-april 2917, p. 10) there is a huge gap between the amount of trade of the last partner with china among the top fifteen and the amount of trade with pakistan. 4. cpec is not a customs union a customs union generally imposes a common external tariff on imports from non-member countries. the union generally does not allow free movement of capital and labor among member countries which is a unique feature of economic union. it has never been the policy of either china or pakistan to form or www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 4 published by scholink inc. establish any kind of economic integration between the two. a reading of the foreign policy objectives explains that both prefer multilateral approach for regional or global economic cooperation and for their territorial integrity and national security. (ahmad, syed salahuddin, “what cpec is and what cpec is not” a conference paper presented at greenwich university, october 2017) 5. cpec is not a common market cpec does not have any avenue for free movement of goods or labor or capital. the chinese labor who will work in cpec projects will be employed by chinese companies. their number will be fixed, their salaries will be determined by the parent companies, and they will have no liberty to visit freely in pakistan. likewise, no pakistani labor if employed by chinese company will be allowed to move freely anywhere in china. there is no free movement of capital. capital from china will be a loan. pakistan will have to pay back the chinese capital with interest. (ahmad, ibid.) 6. cpec is not an economic union the economic union has all the characteristics of the common market with complete harmonization of trade, fiscal and monetary policies among the members and with the third parties. union members even try to harmonize their foreign policies among themselves with the countries outside their circles. considering the above we can conclude that cpec has no characteristics of regional economic integration. 7. no mechanism for settlement of disputes cpec does not envisage or stipulate any mechanism for settlement of disputes, should they arise. whenever and wherever, there is an effort for cooperation between the states, there is bound to occur differences of opinions, different proposal, criticism of each other ‘s policies. it may be relating to either policy decisions or policy execution like there is a european court in the structure of european union (ahmad, ibid.) the government of pakistan in the introduction of cpec declares that it will be a win-win model. it is ambiguous. it is a wish only. it is a premature prediction. cpec is still in the operational phase. it is not fully materialized. we have yet to eat the fruits of cpec. (ahmad, ibid) cpec will be a bridge between china and africa. trade will boost between them particularly with middle eastern and east african countries. gwadar port in pakistan will serve as a trade gate between the trading partners. china has already got control of that sea port through lease agreement. pakistan has pledged 12000 security staff to protect cpec personnel. 8000 security staff will protect 8100 chinese workers this will surely be a burden on pakistani exchequer. external debt for pakistan has already scaled up to $ 72 billion. through cpec borrowing it will further increase to another colossal amount. our 70% gdp will be pledged. pakistan will have to bear these heavy expenses. there are several other impediments that have to be encountered and overcome if success has to be www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 5 published by scholink inc. achieved. in pakistan excessive reliance on imported fuel for electricity generation has led to the fuel crisis in the country. the current power generating capacity of pakistan stands 24830 mw with 53% and 47% share of public and private companies respectively. the electricity demand is growing at an average of 6 to 7 % per annum. since 2006 the demand and supply is persistently going up. this has negatively impacted on the national economy and energy production capacity. industry is experiencing an acute shortage of power and gas to meet timely export demand. cultural penetration will be alarming for ordinary citizens of pakistan. performing art industry of china will definitely have disgusting negative impact on pakistani society. cultural entourage may be attractive, cosmetic and thrilling to the viewers and watchers, yet nakedness and lewdness is abjured and abhorred among the masses of pakistan. religious teachings and values pervades in the artery of common man in pakistan. either the conservative society of pakistan will rebuff such culture or innocent people and youth will fall prey to this seemingly entertaining media. in the long run chinese cultural penetration will be very harmful to ordinary person in pakistan. the president of the overseas chamber of commerce and industry has very succinctly expressed his opinion about cpec when he said, “empty containers returning to china don’t make sense. the whole objective of cpec is to not just create a road from china, but to improve competitiveness of the country and connect it with more countries than it is doing business with today. it is because of this possibility that cpec is a game changer. (nasir jamal, dawn karachi.19 th march, 2018) 8. obor before we explore further what is (cpec) china pakistan economic corridor we must study the philosophy of obor. in the 21 st century the maritime silk road will be known as one belt one road connectivity. it is a development strategy proposed by the chinese government that focuses on connectivity. once materialized, the obor running through the pacific ocean via indian ocean to africa and then to europe encircling india and the arab middle east will boost the economic status of hong kong. the city will become the center of east asia, south asia, middle east and african economic activities. obor would connect china to the rest of the world through roads, ports, railways, gas pipelines, transportation, and the development of infrastructure. since obor connects the world except americas, the basic ingredient for the success of obor is a peaceful world. peace throughout the world is essential for openness, cooperation, mutual understanding, and prosperity. the impact of obor is being seen on the world horizon. in addition to the states situated in the region, european countries have also shown their interest in this project. they are willing to join this gigantic chinese initiative. one proposed trade route runs from china through central asian states to europe. it is not a maritime belt. it runs through land, mountains, forests and agricultural fields into the cities of europe it is reported in pakistani press that chinese president xi jin termed obor as significant in that it will www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 6 published by scholink inc. bring connectivity and cooperation among the countries. it will link the people’s republic of china with the rest of the world. under the obor six corridors are planned. 1) china-mongolia-russia corridor 2) new eurasia land bridge 3) china-central asia-west asia corridor 4) china-indochina peninsula corridor 5) china-myanmar-bangladeshindia-africa-europe corridor 6) china-pakistan economic corridor land bridge links china, kazakhstan-poland-russia. china-west asia corridor links turkmenistan, uzbekistan, iran and turkey when these routes become operative, china expects trade to boost more than $ 2.5 trillion dollars. it has been argued that china was trying to rejuvenate something that used to exist in the past. some people have however harbored the notion that it was part of chinese grand plan. it was innovative because earlier the flow of goods was from west to the east. now china was trying to reverse the direction of history. cpec has also been criticized by chinese neighbors. some central asian states are of the views that china has been trying to impose it hegemony not only in asia but also in africa. it took china about 35 years from 1978 as a developing nation till present day to become a developed nation. through obor strategy it wants to become the only superpower in the world. for china gone are days of japanese economic superiority in the eastern hemisphere. according to chinese development strategy after another 35 years she must, and she will be the only economic superpower in the world. pakistan and the obor if cpec is a part of the obor which the government of pakistan, the press in pakistan and the pakistani intelligentsia believes it to be, then it is a test case. if cpec succeeds by 2030 then all other corridors will bear fruit. it is reported in the pakistani presses that work on cpec projects are in progress. chinese interests in the cpec are unique. china is investing a huge amount about $65 billion in cpec projects because it is in her national interest. china may not invest such huge amount in each corridor. secondly, the cpec project is likely to take ten to twenty years to be completely in running order while other obor projects may not even start until 2030 when the cpec is expected to flourish. thirdly, cpec in pakistan has encountered political, logistic problems between the provinces. therefore, complete success of cpec in pakistan has become doubtful. fourthly, what is needed in pakistan is an honest and corruption free government. in addition to the chinese investment, the government of pakistan should and has invited foreign countries and multinational corporations to invest in projects in the country. fifthly, to attract foreign investors and acquire benefits and advantages from them, government of pakistan exhibiting a sense of good governance should make arrangements for one window operation and an industrial friendly environment. there should be no red tapes or bureaucratic hurdles www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 7 published by scholink inc. in pakistan the province of kpk will enjoy the lion share of cpec benefits. the kpk province is far away from seaports. it needs faster and quicker communication and transportation system to be able to export its goods. a proposed route from kpk through afghanistan to central asia will usher prosperity not only in kpk province but to pakistan as a whole. if this proposed trade route prospers, the province of punjab will also benefit. people of pakistan have still huge trust in the performance of cpec, they are very hopeful of its success. in a survey conducted icma pakistan, some 90% respondents posed high level of trust on cpec and indicated that notwithstanding few threats, cpec will open up vistas of opportunities not for our businessmen and industry in the region but also for professional community (icma, march-april 2017). dr. mirza ikhtiar baig wrote in his column in the daily jang (urdu) karachi, “china through obor wants to connect 65 countries through roads, railways, airports, seaports, optic fiber. besides improving infrastructure of the concerned countries, it imposed the establishment of “special economic zones” (sez) for economic and industrial development. it is reported that through sez china has created 66 million employment opportunities out which 30 million are in china only. she is prepared to establish 9 sez in pakistan through cpec. in 2013 under obor china invested $ 15 million in uzbekistan: $37 billion in kazakhstan and in bangladesh 24 billion dollars in 2016. (daily jang (urdu) 2 nd april 2018.) obor: impediments elaborating the obor impediments, two of the many hypotheses are mentioned in icma publication (pakistan management accountant, march-april, 2017, p. 16) 1) inflow of chinese investment and business enterprises will adversely impact the interests of the business community in pakistan. it covers the signing of fta with china and flooding of the chinese products, the flow of chinese investments and migration of chinese labor to pakistan. 2) another contradictory view is that the project is not financially viable for pakistan as the country has to pay higher cost of financing because of the unwise negotiations with the chinese investors and over estimation of the project cost. india has been skeptical about obor as india considers china’s expansion of its influence in south asia against its national interest. it is the opinion of the indian government that china wants to encircle india strategically by enhancing its economic and strategic relations with pakistan and other african countries. china on the hand considers india as a threat to its interest in the region as both countries are trying to enhance their influence in the region. any chinese move for improved relations with the countries in the region like bangladesh, malaysia, myanmar, indonesia or pakistan cannot be perceived by india without apprehension. economic cooperation and above all integration take place when the driving ingredients like technology, trade liberalization, free capital movement, advance communication, transportation and improved infrastructure play their respective roles. the obor stretching from pacific ocean to the indian ocean including burma, bangladesh, india, malaysia, indonesia, sri lanka and then to african ports lacks www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 8 published by scholink inc. confidence, sincerity, good will and willingness of the countries in the region. hostile and antagonistic policies against each other are serious impediments for the success of this chinese initiative. the hypothesis of this study is that the only route to provide stability to the region would be the establishment of bilateral rapprochement and a regional security regime between pakistan and china in view of the destabilization power contested by india, the u.s and to some extent iran and afghanistan. the reason for including iran is that recently the foreign minister of pakistan shah mahmood qureshi has revealed that in the recent terrorists’ attack on balochistan soil, irani nationals were involved. if any conflict or problem between pakistan and china arises about the survival of cpec then environment of detent and negotiation should take place and applied in good faith. there is a general apprehension that if extremists and terrorists of balochistan liberation army in balochistan could be the root cause of the strained relations between the two countries i.e., pakistan and china, then really there is probably an insurmountable test to keep the all-weather tested relationship between the two countries alive and harmonious. a relationship which both sides claim higher that mountain and deeper than ocean. 9. attack on chinese consul in larachi the hostile powers of pakistan and china and opposed to cpec are ever busy in hatching acts of animosity and terror in pakistan. they are struggling hard to render the cpec projects a failure and an exercise in vain by launching terror attacks. consequently on 23 november 2018 three terrorists launched attack on chinese consulate in karachi. they were equipped with sophisticated weapons. first, they blew up the police posts, killed two policemen and resorted to indiscriminate firing. they also killed two visa applicants. they were overpowered by pakistani commandos and all of them were killed. after a thorough investigation, it was revealed that the terrorist entered in iran through afghanistan, from iran they came to pakistan. their master mind was in a hospital in delhi under treatment. he was in constant contact with the terrorists. through the media it was revealed that balochistan liberation army (bla) had accepted the responsibility. if bla and other terrorists continue their attacks such as they did in karachi xii (for a detailed account of the terrorist attack on the chinese consulate in karachi, see ahmad, s. salahuddin, “foreign policy of pakistan: in the context of regional and international problems” (2019) karachi; islamic research centre) on the chinese consulate then china has three options. first, do nothing, which is unreasonable. the second option is to demand pakistan government to take stern and forceful action against the miscreants through the tough law and order regime. wipe out and remove the bla and other foreign agents (pointing to indians) from the political and geographical scenes in pakistan. the third option is to use military operation and logistic support from armed forces for peace in the region and security and safety of the chinese workers in the cpec projects. as of today, the security regime about cpec does not have an encouraging track record. cpec security is an important issue on which several other scholars have expatiated their views. discussing about serious security issues and other threats particularly created by indian raw agency the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 9 published by scholink inc. authors revealed the following: pakistan has been facing terrorism and suicide bombing. cpec needs more security. pakistan has been trying hard to prove (herself) as a safe country. (but) the neighboring country india has been planting agents to spread terrorism. a recent example is (of) kulbhushan yadev (who) was arrested during counterintelligence operation in balochistan on 3 march 2016. he confessed himself as an indian agent of intelligence agency raw and planted in pakistan for terrorist activities and helping the separatists in balochistan, xiii (ali, amina and sultana dr. samar) china-pakistan economic corridor: challenges and opportunities for pakistan, pakistan journal of international affairs, vol. 1 issue 2 julydecember 2017). comparing the physical and fiscal capacities of pakistan with china and pointing towards the challenges and safety conditions about cpec ali, amina and sultana, samar observed, “cpec—brings investment, develops infrastructure and raises gdp in pakistan. the project is facing many difficulties.—there exists a fear of takeover by china—pakistan has no comparison with china in any manner while (chinese) engineers, workers and labors working on cpec projects are well trained and qualified. pakistan is no match with them (ali, samar, ibid., p. 4). according to authors lack of technology and reduction of poverty are some other challenges for cpec. 10. conclusion challenges and impediments about cpec are not without our faults and weaknesses. we should stop blaming regional or international factors or natural phenomenon. it is unfortunate that our nation lacks dedication and honesty. corruption has detestably creeped in every segment of our society. unless corruption is routed out and wiped out we will not get the result which we expect. we have to keep our house in order. according to one highly acclaimed pakistani economist, pakistan has to bear the major burden to make cpec successful, if we want to achieve destiny (ainul haq, 2017). if pakistan wants to reap the benefit of cpec then we must give due credit to china. no one can better understand the depth of china-pakistan relations without meditating the political and economic environment of 1960s when the scale of relationship between the two countries was at its peak. pakistan and china had signed the border treaty in 1963. earlier at the time of sino-indian border war 1962 pakistan had lent political and diplomatic support to china. in a memoirs of a diplomat, “awakened china shakes the world and is now pakistan’s mainstay”, ambassador muhammad yunus writes, “due to mao’s ideological imperatives,” never sell weapons to other countries in order to make money,” pakistan was admitted to the list of recipients of military aid in 1965 and has received billions of dollars of aid (yunus, m., 2015, p. 172). cpec is also called silk road. a common terminology which is in vogue is game changer. dr. di meglio who was then president of asia centre in france, delivered a lecture on the economic, strategic and the environmental consequences of the new silk road at the area study centre for europe, university of karachi. he said, “cpec was not an easy project but not the most difficult to achieve www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 10 published by scholink inc. either.—whosoever was going to benefit from it, it was a game changer for pakistan. he argued that let’s say pakistan only benefiting 10 percent from the project, even then you have other benefits like influence and footprint. he said some europeans did not realize that pakistan had an important strategic position. (dawn, 2016) references tufail, president. (2017). the federation of chambers of commerce and industry, management account, (icma). march-april, 10. management accountant. (2017). march-april, p. 12. tufail, president. (2017). the federation of chambers of commerce and industry, management account, (icma). march-april, 10. ahmad, s. s. (2017). what cpec is and what cpec is not” a conference paper presented at greenwich university, october 2017. ahmad, ibid. ahmad, ibid. ahmad, ibid. nasir jamal, dawn karachi.19 th march, 2018. icma, march-april 2017. daily jang (urdu) 2 nd april 2018. pakistan management accountant, march-april, 2017, p.16 for a detailed account of the terrorist attack on the chinese consulate in karachi, see ahmad, s. salahuddin, “foreign policy of pakistan: in the context of regional and international problems”. (2019) ali, amina and sultana dr. samar )china-pakistan economic corridor: challenges and opportunities for pakistan, pakistan journal of international affairs, vol. 1 issue 2 julydecember 2017. ali, samar, ibid., (2017), p. 4. ainul haq, 2017. yunus, m 2015, p. 172. dawn, 2016. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 22 original paper exploring the determination of the amount of bribe accepted in equity-based bribery cases sun qing1 1 faculty of law, zhejiang university of finance & economics, hangzhou, zhejiang 310018, china received: july 22, 2023 accepted: september 13, 2023 online published: october 17, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n4p22 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n4p22 abstract with regard to the determination of the actual transfer of dry shares, firstly, it is necessary to determine whether the case belongs to the dry-share type of passive bribery, mainly depending on whether the national staff member who did not make the capital contribution receives the company’s shares, and whether the perpetrator’s purpose of bribery is to obtain the company’s shares and dividends. secondly, attention should be paid to the judgment of similar situations, such as: low-priced transferee-type bribe is not a transactional bribe but a dry-share-type bribe; in the case of shell transfer-type bribe, the defective or evaded contribution will not affect the determination of the crime of passive bribery. finally, the determination of the actual transfer of shares should be judged from the substance of the transfer, and cannot be determined simply by whether or not an agreement has been signed. in determining the amount of the bribe, the first step is to determine whether the shares are transferred or not. in the case where the shares have been transferred, the value of the shares shall be used as the amount of the bribe, and the value of the shares shall be determined in a way that is as close as possible to the actual situation of the company. in the case where the shares have not been transferred, the amount of the bribe shall be the actual dividends received. in the case of active bribery, the transfer of the shares or the receipt of the dividends shall be the criterion for the attempt. keywords dry share-based passive bribery, amount of bribe, value of shares, transfer of shares 1. definition of dry shares and basis of incrimination the crime of accepting bribes in the form of dry shares is not an independent crime, but only refers to a part of the crime of passive bribery. article 2 of the opinions of the supreme people’s court and the supreme people’s procuratorate on several issues on the application of law in handling criminal cases of passive bribery (hereinafter referred to as the opinions), which was promulgated and came www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 23 published by scholink inc. into force on july 8, 2007, specifically stipulates that: “dry shares refer to shares that are acquired without capital contribution. where a state official uses the convenience of his or her position to seek benefits for a requestor and accepts dry shares from the requestor, he or she shall be punished as a passive bribe; where the registration of the transfer of shares has been carried out, or where the relevant evidence proves that the shares have been transferred, the amount of the passive bribe shall be calculated on the basis of the value of the shares at the time of the act of transfer, and the dividends shall be treated as the fruits and yields of the passive bribe; where the shares have not been transferred and the benefits have been obtained in the name of dividends on the shares, the amount of actual profit shall be deemed to be the amount of passive bribe. the amount shall be recognized as the amount of the bribe.” there are several representative views in the academic world, one of which is that dry shares refer to the right to receive income from the shares while not participating in the operation or bearing risks. another viewpoint is that the dry shares refer to the shares in the limited company, the listed company and the limited liability company which are not contributed or contributed at an obviously unreasonable low price and do not enjoy the ownership but only share the dividends. dry shares refer to the right of state employees to enjoy the shares and the dividends from the shares without fully contributing to the capital or bearing the risks. in the sense of criminal law, dry shares are essentially a kind of property interest, which can be directly converted into a specific and definite amount, and thus can become a kind of object of the bribery offence. 2. characteristics of active bribery the opinion is an important judicial interpretation on the crime of accepting dry shares, according to the second provision of this judicial interpretation: the essence of dry shares lies in the fact that the state official uses his power not to contribute to the capital but obtains the shares of the company, and the amount of passive bribery is determined in accordance with the value of the dry shares received at the time of the act of passive bribery; if the shares do not have a transfer of rights effect, and the name of the shares is used as a justification to cover up the crime, the amount of ordinary passive bribery and the amount of dividends received is determined as the amount of the crime of ordinary passive bribery. the law is simple and clear, but in practice, the cases of dry-share bribery are often complex and varied, which has given rise to different interpretations of the law. in the academic and practical fields, the controversy over the characteristics of dry-share bribery mainly focuses on whether the value of dry-shares must be real, and whether the perpetrator enjoys the right of ownership or the right to dividends. whether the receiving party bears the losses of the company. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 24 published by scholink inc. 2.1 the need to differentiate between the real existence of share value according to different scenarios prof. fang ming believes that the value of the shares in a dry-share bribe must be real, the shares must have a corresponding real capital backing in the company (note 1). prof. wei dong believes that there can be a capital backing, or there can be no capital backing (note 2). the essence of a dry-share bribe is that the dry-share is essentially a full economic benefit, and that the core issue of concern in accepting a dry-share bribe is that the shares are acquired without capital contribution, and that in this way, an economic benefit can be obtained or has been obtained. as to whether the shares are fictitious shares of a specific company (the company itself cannot establish real shares), or fictitious shares of specific shareholders individually or jointly (in the name of the company), or shares established individually or jointly in real terms, as well as whether the holders of the shares enjoy the full rights of the shareholders (including the right to own the shares, the right to vote, and the right to participate in the company’s operation, etc.), it is not in question. not be questioned. the necessity of the real existence of the value of shares should be distinguished according to different scenarios, and that the real existence of the value of dry shares must to a certain extent confuse the difference between dry shares and real shares, as well as the nature of the dry-share bribery crime. the concepts of dry shares and real shares are different, dry shares refer to the shares that have been acquired without capital contribution, and real shares refer to the real shares; the rights of the two are different, dry shares do not refers to the real shares, but should refer to the assumption that the person owns so many shares and distributes dividends according to the corresponding proportion; the person who holds the real shares not only enjoys the dividend rights of the shares, but also enjoys the control decision-making right of the company as a shareholder and participates in the major decisions of the company, etc.; the essence of the dry-share bribery crime lies in the use of the recipient’s expectation of the expected benefits of the dry-share for the purpose of seeking benefits, instead of merely the essence of the offence of passive bribery is to take advantage of the recipient’s expectation of the expectable benefits of the shares, not only the value of the shares themselves, but also the value of the shares themselves, depending on the actual situation and whether the holder actually enjoys the rights and benefits of the shares. 2.2 ownership or dividend rights there is a difference in theories as to whether the dry shares acquired by the recipient only need to have the right to dividends or must include the right of ownership or either one of the two. the first view is to enjoy the right of ownership and the right of dividends. for example, some viewpoints believe that dry shares refer to the shares which do not put in the capital, do not participate in the operation, do not bear the risk, but enjoy the right of ownership of the shares and enjoy the dividends, also known as the power of the shares. the second view is to enjoy only the right of dividends. that is, dry shares are the reward shares which do not need to pay the consideration, only enjoy the right of dividends. the second point of view is that it only enjoys the right to dividends, the dry shares are the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 25 published by scholink inc. reward shares without paying the consideration, only enjoying the right to dividends, and do not have the ownership of the shares themselves. there is another point of view that it enjoys the ownership and the right to dividends, or only enjoys the right to dividends (note 3). the dry shares in the interpretation of criminal law theory refer to the shares that are obtained without capital contribution, which can be either the dry shares that enjoy the full shareholding and obtain the economic benefits, or the dry shares that enjoy the right to dividends only and obtain the economic benefits. the term “dry shares” is used in criminal law interpretations to refer to shares acquired without capital contribution, either with full equity and economic benefits, or with the right to dividends and economic benefits. the reason why our country treats dry shares as an independent type of passive bribery crime is that they are not property in the traditional sense, but a kind of expectable property benefits, and the amount of passive bribery shall be determined according to the share of the shares, the price and other factors, etc. ownership of dry shares or the right to dividends are the expectable benefits that the recipient hopes for when accepting, and they are the economic or other additional benefits according to the share of shares that he/she occupies. therefore, it is sufficient that the shares corresponding to the dry shares have only the right to dividends or the right of ownership. 2.3 recipient not liable for company losses some scholars believe that the right to dividends on shares is not necessarily profitable, and may also bear the responsibility for the company’s losses, so dividends can not be used as the amount of bribe. according to the practice, such a statement does not hold true. the realization of the right to dividends in the case of bribery in dry shares is generally manifested in the distribution of dividends or no dividends, and it is unlikely that there is an obligation to share the company’s losses. otherwise, if the company’s permanent losses may make the corresponding capital of the shares are ultimately offset, which is not consistent with the subjective purpose of the crime of bribery, nor is it consistent with the essence of the crime of trading in power and money. otherwise, if the company suffers losses all the time, it may make the capital corresponding to the acquisition of shares to be offset eventually, which is not in line with the subjective purpose of the bribery crime, and also not in line with the nature of the bribe crime of power and money transactions. dry shares is “refers to the shares that do not have any share capital, and the shares that are not subject to any loss if they are not paid out as dividends”; in other words, the receiving party does not put in the share capital, participate in the operation and does not take the responsibility, and enjoys the rights but does not take the obligations. in other words, the recipient does not invest in the share capital, does not participate in the operation, does not assume responsibility, only enjoys the rights, but does not assume the obligations. therefore, to some extent, the economic benefits obtained from the right to dividends of the bribe of the dry shares are definite and available benefits.the two parties recognize the dividends as the amount of the bribe at the time of the bribe, both parties tacitly agree that there is only the possibility of dividends to be paid to the recipient without assuming the company’s losses, the dividends are a definitive and promised economic benefit. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 26 published by scholink inc. 3. determination of the amount of active bribery 3.1 dividends should be in the amount of the bribe, not fruits in cases of passive bribery in the form of dry shares, where there is no share registration or transfer of shares involved, the dry share capital and dividends are usually accumulated and included in the total amount of the bribery offence. the controversy over the amount of the bribe and the fruits of the bribe is divided into the following two main views. one view is that dividends belong to the fruits, which is mainly based on the following considerations: first, the summary of the national working conference on the trial of economic crime cases in the courts reflects the views on the treatment of the issue of receiving shares, which have traditionally treated dividends as illegal income and fruits instead of recognizing them as the amount of the bribe. firstly, as reflected in the summary of the symposium on acceptance of shares, dividends have traditionally been treated as illegal gains and fruits, rather than being recognized as bribes; secondly, the dry capital has been recognized as a bribe in the case of transfer of shares, and it is suspected of double evaluation to recognize the dividends as a bribe as a result of this; thirdly, the relationship between the shares and dividends is like that between originals and fruits, with the dividends dependent on the shares themselves, while the dividends exist as a fruits. thirdly, the relationship between shares and dividends is just like the relationship between originals and fruits, and dividends are dependent on the shares themselves, and the dependence of dividends on shares determines that shares cannot be understood independently by separating the receipt of shares from the acquisition of dividends (note 4). another viewpoint is also more favored, that is, the dividends belong to the bribe amount, and it is believed that the dividends should be treated as the bribe amount instead of the criminal fruits in the dry-share type of bribe. as some scholars have pointed out, in the specific determination of the amount of the bribe of the dry-share type of bribe, regardless of whether the equity shares have been transferred or not, the dividends that the perpetrator has actually received due to the dry-share shall be counted in the amount of the bribe. firstly, the determination of the amount of the bribe should be first, the determination of the amount of the bribe should be centered on the nature of the power-money transaction of the crime of passive bribery. both parties recognize the dividends as the amount of the bribe when offering the bribe, and the recipient enjoys the right to dividends without bearing the company’s losses, the dividends can be determined. secondly, the dividends of the dry shares have a different degree of certainty from the fruits obtained from other crimes in the generation of benefits, which is different from the fruits of the natural generation of fruits, such as cash and houses, as well as fruits from embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds, and the perpetrator usually does not care about the dry shares only. thirdly, whether the dividends are treated as bribe amount depends on whether the shares are transferred or not, which will lead to logical contradiction and unfairness in conviction and sentencing. the two situations are in essence just different conditions of the power and money transactions that have been carried out, the former includes the ownership of shares and the right to dividends, while the latter only includes the right to dividends. the logic of article 2 of the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 27 published by scholink inc. opinions lies in the fact that if the shares have been transferred, the amount of bribe can be determined according to the shares themselves, and the dividends are dependent on the shares, so the dividends are no longer regarded as the amount of the bribe (note 5). in the case where there is a huge difference between the amount of the registered or actually transferred shares and the amount of the dividends received, in addition to the amount of the dry bribe to be calculated in accordance with the value of the shares, the dividends should not be treated directly as a bribe fruits, and should be treated as a bribe fruits, and should be treated as a bribe fruits. in addition to calculating the amount of the bribe according to the value of the shares, the entire dividend cannot be directly treated as a bribe yield, but rather the portion of the dividend that is in the nature of a yield and the portion that is in the nature of an independent bribe should be identified. 3.2 differentiated rules for determining the amount of the value of a bribe’s dry shares in judicial practice, the specific screening and determination of the amount of the bribe in the form of dry shares is difficult, and opinions differ; the various ways of accepting and giving dry shares are far from being as simple as provided for in the opinions; the specific screening and determination of the amount of the bribe in the form of dry shares should be based on the authenticity of the value of the shares, their variability and the complexity of their composition, and different rules should be adopted. 3.2.1 timing for determining the value of dry shares there are two main views in the academic community on the time standard for the determination of the value of the shares: one is based on the standard at the time of acceptance, the value at the time of acceptance is the value jointly recognized by the bribe giver and the bribe-taker, which not only reflects the value of both parties’ power and money transactions, but also reflects the common understanding of both parties on the value of the item; and the transfer of the act occurs when the value of the shares may have appreciated or depreciated, and if the value of the shares is calculated according to the value of the shares at the time of the transfer, then there may be completely different amounts of bribe. if the amount of bribe is calculated according to the value of the shares at the time of the act of transfer, there may be completely different amounts of bribe, which is not feasible in the theory of criminal law, so it is more reasonable to recognize the value of the bribe item by the value of the item at the time of its receipt (note 6). the opinion provides that the amount of the bribe is calculated according to the value of the shares at the time of the act of transfer if the bribe has been transferred, and according to the benefit derived from the actual dividend if the bribe has not been transferred. in judicial practice, the court tends to determine the amount of the bribe for the dry shares according to the time of the act of acceptance. the other is based on the criterion of the time of the act of transfer. prof. fang ming believes that a distinction should be made between different treatments of the question of whether or not the bribe has been transferred prior to the crime. prof. fang ming believes that different treatments should be made for whether or not the transfer has been made before the crime is committed. according to the time of criminal concealment and the interval time between the acceptance and the occurrence of the crime, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 28 published by scholink inc. decide to apply the acceptance of the occurrence of the act or the transfer of the time. in the acceptance of dry shares of bribery, due to the bribe is the company enterprise and other economic organizations of the shares, the value will change according to the change of the market price, it is difficult to determine the acceptance of the occurrence of the act of the net worth value, can’t do the right to convicted and sentenced. if the act of the acceptance of the crime soon after the occurrence of the act of the net worth is if the act of acceptance occurs soon after the crime, the value of the net assets is easier to calculate and assess, and the amount of bribe can be determined on the basis of the value of the net assets; therefore, the same standard cannot be used to determine the amount of bribe for the offence of “accepting dry shares”, and the manner that is most consistent with the criminal liability of the perpetrator should be selected in accordance with the specific circumstances of the case. 3.2.2 actual capitalization for determining the value of dry shares in judicial practice, there are different methods for calculating the capital contribution corresponding to the dry shares, and determining the actual capital contribution corresponding to the shares is the basis for determining the value of the shares. one is the registered capital calculation method, the amount of the bribe is determined by multiplying the value of the registered capital of the company by the proportion of the dry shares in the total number of shares at the time of the transfer of the shares. when the registered capital is in line with the actual capital contribution, the calculation method is scientific. another is the actual capital calculation method, that is, the actual capital should be taken into account to determine the amount of bribe. in the case of dry-share bribery, both sides of the bribe in order to cover up, the use of registered capital of the publicity role, often take the actual contribution is much larger than the registered capital of the tactics, to cover up behind the existence of the greater transfer of benefits. when the registered capital of the enterprise and the actual capital is inconsistent, should follow the subjective-objective principle of consistency, as long as the recipient of the gift of the registered capital is the same. the principle of consistency, as long as the receipt of dry shares of the two sides of the dry shares corresponding to the actual capital contribution in the subjective cognition is the same, the latter rule is more in line with the reality, more reasonable, that is, the amount of bribe according to the time of receipt (before the crime is not transferred) or transfer (before the crime has been transferred) dry shares in the total shares in the proportion multiplied by the actual contribution of the company’s numerical value of the calculation. in addition, in practice, there is also a method of calculating the amount of bribe on the basis of the net assets of the enterprise. net assets, as an accounting concept, is dynamic and closely related to the business profit and loss of the enterprise; the occurrence of active and passive bribery is certain, and the occurrence of each act is relatively static and has nothing to do with the business situation of the enterprise. therefore, the method of calculating the amount of bribe on the basis of the net assets of the enterprise should be discarded. this method may either increase the amount of active and passive bribery, which may result in the suspect incurring undeserved penalties, or decrease the amount of active and passive bribery, which may result in the suspect escaping the penalties that he or she should www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 29 published by scholink inc. have incurred. 3.2.3 cumulative rules for determining the value of dry shares in practice, the transfer or actual transfer of dry shares is not a one-time completion as stipulated in the opinions, but is often completed several times, and if the transfer of dry shares is completed twice or more, the method of calculating the value of the shares shall be based on the cumulative method of the general bribery offence of receiving property several times as a rule of calculation, the value of the shares transferred each time shall be determined and then be cumulated, and the total amount obtained shall be the value of the dry shares, and the value of the dry shares shall be calculated according to the cumulative method. value of dry shares. 3.2.4 actual contributions should be excluded when determining the value of dry shares when the acceptance of dry shares is mixed with the actual contribution, the value of the shares for which the bribe was paid shall be determined by removing the actual contribution from the value of the dry shares, and the value of the dry shares shall be determined as the amount of the bribe for the dry shares, and the actual contribution and its fruits shall be determined by the relevant authorities as the proceeds of disciplinary infractions, in accordance with the applicable disciplinary norms. 3.2.5 determination of transaction price for determining the value of dry shares the value of the shares of a joint-stock company is differentiated according to whether the company is listed or not; where the bribed shares are shares of a listed company, some scholars are of the view that the amount of the bribe should be calculated on the basis of the average price of the corresponding shares on the date of the bribe, while others are of the view that the amount of the bribe should be determined on the basis of the price of the shares on the stock market on the date of the transfer of the shares. for the determination of the value of the shares of non-listed companies, it was considered that the amount of the bribe should be determined directly by the proportion of the company’s assets on the date of the bribe, while another view was that the amount of the bribe should be determined by the value of the shares on the property rights trading market on the date of the act of transfer. since there is a trading market for shares of listed companies, their price is generally reflected by the transaction price, but there is no transaction price between the requisitioner and the trustee as they only agree to transfer or actually transfer the shares, so it is more reasonable to calculate the value of shares of listed companies based on the average transaction price of the shares traded in the securities market on the date of the agreement to receive the shares (not transferred prior to the case) or on the date of the transfer (already transferred prior to the case). unlike listed companies, the determination of the value of shares of non-listed companies does not have the corresponding stock market price as the basis for pricing, so it is more difficult to determine the value of the shares of non-listed companies. at present, the value of the shares of non-listed joint stock companies have a variety of pricing methods, such as comparable pricing, net asset value pricing, price-earnings pricing, price-sales pricing, etc. as long as the point in time of the receipt of the shares has been determined, the above pricing methods can be selected based on the specific circumstances of the case. select the above pricing methods. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 30 published by scholink inc. 4. determination of the amount of the bribe paid in terms of the type of bribe paid in dry shares 4.1 completely unfunded this type of behavior is the most typical in practice, most of the actors accept the company’s shares did not actually contribute to the dividends, but can be dividends on a regular basis. this type of behavior is relatively simple, the theory and judicial practice on the completely unfunded type of acceptance of dry shares behavior nature there is no disagreement, and the unanimous conclusion that the dry shares of the crime of passive bribery. in practice, the majority of the case are in practice, most of the cases are completely unfunded as a typical type of behavior, but there is also a complete lack of actual funding and received dry shares and dividends and the perpetrator is completely not actually funded but did not receive dry shares and only dividends two situations, the former is in full compliance with the typical behavior of the dry shares bribery offense, found to be a dry shares of bribery, no doubt, the amount of the bribe that is the amount of dry shares and dividends the total amount of money received by the perpetrator. the second situation in practice the main reason is that although there is no so-called dry shares, if the amount of dry shares is simply recognized as a crime, the amount of dividends is recognized as bribe fruits, the case can not be convicted and punished, which is unfair. this situation is in the form of the perpetrator’s power to acquire dividends, which in essence is still a dry-share passive bribery. the perpetrator did not actually contribute, although the dry shares were not acquired directly to obtain the dividends, but the dividends obtained should be recognized as the amount of the bribe. 4.2 partially funded in the case where the state employee actually paid part of the share capital, but paid dividends on the entire amount of the contribution, professor li fangfang believes that in this type of case, the behavior of the state employee can be considered as two parts, one is the actual partially funded shares receiving dividends, and the other is the remaining part of the un-funded shares receiving dividends (note 7). when the perpetrator has only partially funded the share capital, the actor’s behavior can be “separated” from the other. “the actual part of the actor’s contribution, the nature of its behavior belongs to the normal commercial investment behavior, and in fact to be regulated by the criminal law is the rest of the actor to obtain gratuitous. the recipient of a part of the contribution is to circumvent the legal act, the essence is still the power and money transactions, there is no normal commercial investment behavior, a part of the contribution is often to avoid legal acts, there is no normal business investment behavior, part of the contribution is often to confuse. 4.3 “borrowing” for equity participation (false borrowing without repayment, false borrowing with repayment) “borrowing”, meaning that the state official receives the dry shares provided by the requestor, and in the name of borrowing from the requestor, the state official issues a “loan note” for the investment money, and borrows money for the shares, ostensibly to form an ordinary civil borrowing and lending relationship between the two parties. in fact, the national staff did not have the intention to return the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 31 published by scholink inc. loan, and the requestor did not want the national staff to return the intention of the situation. the characteristics of this kind of behavior are manifested in three points: firstly, the actor and the requestor have formed a civil borrowing and lending relationship; secondly, the actor borrowed money to invest in the shares; thirdly, the actor and the requestor have reached a consensus, and the borrower does not have to return the loan. the borrowing and lending relationship is essentially a cover for the fact of bribe-taking, and it is recognized as a dry-share bribe without any doubt, and it is also recognized as a dry-share bribe. there is no doubt that the bribe was paid in dry shares, and the actual amount of the loan and the subsequent benefits received should be recognized as the amount of the bribe. 4.4 low price transferee type according to article 2 of the opinions, the core of the dry shares is that the recipient has not actually made the contribution, and since the national staff actually paid part of the consideration for the shares, it cannot be recognized as a dry shares. if the price paid for the shares is obviously lower than the value of the shares, it can be recognized as transactional bribery (note 8). some scholars also believe that, according to the second provision of the opinion, the essential characteristic of dry shares is shares acquired without actual capital contribution. if the national staff actually paid the equity consideration, just because the payment of equity is obviously lower than the value of the shares, it does not belong to the dry shares of passive bribery, and can be recognized as transactional bribery, and the amount of the bribe should be calculated by the underpayment of the share capital, and the dividends generated can not be counted together (note 9). the reason for recognizing the dry shares as passive bribery is twofold, one of which is that the dry shares do not fall into the category of the “goods” of transactional bribery. scholars holding the view of “transactional bribery” believe that once the shares are contributed, they should no longer be regarded as dry shares, and thus belong to the “goods” of “transactional bribery”. “however, it can be seen from the preceding argument that shares are not goods. secondly, for whether or not the actual contribution is made in the case of passive bribery in dry shares, it should be in terms of all the contributions, that is, the actor’s low-priced shares corresponding to the high-priced shares are in essence the actor’s contributions can only be purchased to the reality of purchasing only a part of the shares, and the rest of the shares are the shares that have not been contributed to the capital, which are still in essence dry shares. for this type of conduct, the difference in price should be evaluated in criminal law, and when it constitutes a larger amount, it should be recognized as a dry share of passive bribery, and the difference in price should be recognized as the amount of the bribe. 4.5 dividend and bonus type in practice, there are views that “the value of the dividends exceeds the value of the shares, resulting in an imbalance where the amount of bribe transferred is lower than the amount of bribe not transferred, and the appropriate way to deal with this is to confiscate the dividends as the fruits of the bribe” []. however, there is a challenge to this view, namely, that the act of receiving the shares itself does not constitute a crime because the amount does not meet the incrimination standard, and thus the dividends www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 32 published by scholink inc. are treated as a bribe”. (note 10). however, there is a little doubt in this view, that is, the behavior of the perpetrator himself accepting the shares, because the amount does not meet the incrimination standard and can not constitute a crime, and thus at this time, the dividends as the fruits of bribery is inappropriate. the perpetrator’s high rate of return on the dividends in fact is the essence of the use of the money to buy the integrity of the state staff to achieve their own undue interests. this behavior is a clear act of passive bribery, the actor’s surface is legal shares, the actual behavior is similar to the low-priced transferee, belongs to the dry shares of passive bribery. 4.6 shell transfer type the “shell” transfer type refers to the situation where the shareholders of a company evade their capital contribution obligations by means of misrepresentation of registered capital or evasion of capital contributions after advancing funds in the process of establishing the company, forming a shell company and transferring shares to state officials through it. under this type, the main problem in the judicial determination is that the dry shares do not have actual capital counterparts, and at this time, there is no share value corresponding to the amount of bribe that can be calculated. in the case where the bribe-giving company has a false capital contribution that leads to the lack of authenticity of the bribed shares, the procuratorial authorities are unable to calculate the amount of the bribe due to the absence of a share value. dry shares received by the state officials in fact, do not have a share carrier themselves, but only the dividends at the end of the year agreed by both parties to the bribe, which also belongs to the pretext for receiving money. the dry shares accepted by the state official in fact have no shares in themselves, but are only the dividends at the end of the year agreed by both parties to the bribe, which also belongs to the pretext for accepting money. such dry shares neither have the surface form of dry shares referred to in the opinions, nor do they have the essential characteristics of dry shares. for this kind of behavior, it should be recognized as the crime of accepting a bribe directly, and the transfer of the dry shares should also be recognized as the dry shares belonging to the dry shares of the dry shares in the bribery. for this type of passive bribery, the value of the shares received by the perpetrator shall be based on the value of the shares at the time of their transfer or the actual value of their assets in the corresponding company assets as the amount of the passive bribery, but it should be noted that if the perpetrator did not actually acquire or transfer them, the company’s pre-determined value shall not prevail. 4.7 expanded dividend type national staff to capital contribution, in the process of the company’s operations, but the national staff of the part of the capital increase did not contribute to the enjoyment of the dividends arising from the capital increase, for this type, should be viewed in different situations, that is, if the capital increase belongs to the company’s capital reserve, essentially is the company in the expansion of the company before the shareholders of the distribution of profits of the company’s accumulation of profits, belong to the lawful profits, and does not constitute a crime. if the company’s capital increase is if the capital increase of the company is formed by the operation of the company, the company’s shareholders www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 33 published by scholink inc. re-funding behavior, and the perpetrator did not contribute to the part of the dividends, but enjoy the dividends, then it should be recognized that the part of the bribe, such as the case of the national staff a, in the absence of the actual proportional increase in the capital and get the dividends brought by the part of the increase in the capital, shall be regarded as a passive bribe, and the increase in the value of the shares that have not been actually contributed to the amount of the bribe. 5. conclusions the criminal law meaning of “dry shares” is different from the civil law meaning of dry shares, the criminal law meaning of dry shares refers to the state employees relying on the convenience of their positions for the benefit of others, do not contribute to the capital, but can enjoy the shares sent by the bribe giver and the dividends brought about by the shares, the act of acceptance of dry shares is essentially a transaction of power and money. sort out the facts of the case, accurately summarize the focus of the dispute, and then analyze the facts and law. at the same time, the sentencing and conviction are equally important, unified standards for the application of law, in order to accurately punish criminal offenses, and better maintain social harmony and stability. “the law and the time turn is rule”, the law should keep pace with the times, adjust with the trend in order to achieve efficacy. through the analysis of the amount of dry type bribe, from jurisprudence to judicial practice, analyzed the current “opinions” in the jurisprudence of the loopholes as well as in the judicial practice of the confusion brought about by the dry type of bribery case study in the “opinions” to improve the proposal, in order to adapt to the law more to the current changes in the social environment, as well as to the judicial practitioners in the future to determine the dry type of bribery crime can have some the purpose is to make the law more adaptable to the current changes in the social environment, and to provide some reference for judicial workers in determining the offence of active bribery. references chen, g. q. (2007). recognition and punishment of new bribery offenses. law press. chen, x. l. (2016). the nature and determination of obtaining benefits for others-centered on the judicial interpretation of corruption and bribery of the two high commissions. law review, 2016. fang, m. (2016). identification of several difficult issues in the offense of bribe-taking in dry shares. politics and law, 2016(10). gao, m. x., & zhang, h. (2015). on several issues of bribery offenses. law forum, 30(01). guo, z. m. (2012). study on new and difficult issues of passive bribery. china supervision press. liu, f. (2016). judicial determination of corruption and bribery offenses. law press. liu, x. q. (2012). theory and practice of criminal law on bribery offenses. shanghai people’s publishing house. meng, q. h. (2012). understanding and application of judicial interpretation of new bribery offenses. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 34 published by scholink inc. people’s public security university of china press. qiu, x. f., & peng, l. q. (2012). judicial determination of the amount of the offense of bribe-taking in dry shares. china prosecutor, 2012(16), 33-36. sun, g. x. (2018). research on corruption and bribery crimes. people’s university of china press. sun, g. x. (2018). the protection of legal benefit of bribery offense and its practical significance. journal of northwest university of politics and law, 36(02). wang, w. h. (2019). on the judicial determination of bribery offense of dry shares. huazhong university of science and technology. wei, d. (2015). application of criminal law interpretation of “acceptance of dry shares” bribery offense. law forum, 30(01), 86-90. wu, y. n. (2019). the pipe view on the determination of the dry share bribery offense. china prosecutor, 2019(13), 40-42. zhang, m. k. (2017). judicial and legislative development direction of corruption and bribery offenses. politics and law forum, 35(01). zhang, m. k. (2018). protective legal benefits of bribery offenses. legal studies, 40(01). zhang, m. k. (2021). criminal law (6th ed.). beijing: law press, 2021. zhang, m. x. (2007). study on several issues of legal application in new type of bribery cases. chinese journal of criminal law, 2007(06), 45-51. zhang, z. h. (2018). on the application of penalties to bribery offenses. chinese journal of criminal law, 2018(04). zhao, b. z. (2010). essentials of criminal law. china law press, 2010. zhou, g. q. (2011). treatise on criminal law. notes note 1. fang, m. (2016). identification of several difficult issues in the offense of bribe-taking in dry shares. politics and law, 2016(10). note 2. wei, d. (2015). application of criminal law interpretation of “acceptance of dry shares” bribery offense. law forum, 30(01), 86-90. note 3. wang, w. h. (2019). on the judicial determination of bribery offense of dry shares. huazhong university of science and technology. note 4. sun, g. x. (2018). research on corruption and bribery crimes. people’s university of china press. note 5. liu, x. q. (2012). theory and practice of criminal law on bribery offenses. shanghai people’s publishing house. note 6. meng, q. h. (2012). understanding and application of judicial interpretation of new bribery offenses. people’s public security university of china press. note 7. li fangfang. analysis of bribery types of dry stocks [j]. journal of huaihua university, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 35 published by scholink inc. 2015,34 (04): 76-79. note 8. wu yinan. dry stock bribery crime identified see [j]. chinese prosecutor, 2019 (13): 40-42. note 9. qiu, x. f., & peng, l. q. (2012). judicial determination of the amount of the offense of bribe-taking in dry shares. china prosecutor, 2012(16), 33-36. note 10. zhang, m. x. (2007). study on several issues of legal application in new type of bribery cases. chinese journal of criminal law, 2007(06), 45-51. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 51 original paper the study on china-asean cooperation under “the belt and road” initiative yang yujin1 1 beijing international studies university, beijing, china received: august 19, 2023 accepted: october 23, 2023 online published: november 07, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n4p51 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n4p51 abstract since “the belt and road” initiative was proposed ten years ago, asean has always been a priority region. china and southeast asian countries, adhering to the principle of extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits, have made significant achievements in political consultation, economic cooperation, cultural exchanges, environmental protection, and other aspects. in the new international political and economic situation, both sides are facing challenges from factors such as intervention from foreign powers, political uncertainty within asean countries, competition for economic development space, and misunderstanding and concerns about china’s rise. nevertheless, china and asean are geographically connected by mountains and rivers, historically by humanities. with the rcep implemented and the rmb regionalized in asean, cooperation between china and asean in emerging fields such as the digital commerce and green energy will see more benefits. in order to better promote china asean cooperation, china should maintain the regional center status of asean, solidly promote bilateral trade and enterprise investment, through cultural exchanges and international public opinion promotion, tell china’s story well, win the hearts of asean people, and enhance trust between each other. keywords china-asean cooperation, china-asean community, “the belt and road” initiative 1. introduction spanning thousands of miles and years, the ancient silk routes were not only routes for trade but also roads for cultural exchanges, making a great contribution to human progress. the year 2023 marks the tenth anniversary of “the belt and road” initiative，through which china has helped many participating countries improve their economic development environment. the world bank report shows that cooperation under the bri framework has increased the trade volume of participating economies by www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 52 published by scholink inc. 4.1%, attracted foreign investment by 5%, and increased the gdp of low-income countries by 3.4%. 2023 is also the 10th anniversary of building a closer china asean community. over the past ten years, chian and asean countries stick to the principle of pursuing shared growth through discussion and collaboration, and promote connectivity in policy, infrastructure, trade, finance, and people-to-people exchange. at present, china and asean have become each other’s largest trading partners. as a priority direction for china’s neighboring diplomacy, the asean region plays an important role in maintaining china’s peripheral security and economic and social stability. in the new international context, summarizing the development achievements of bri cooperation between china and asean countries, analyzing the challenges and opportunities faced, and proposing strategies and solutions are of great significance for pursuing steady and sustained progress in high-quality bri cooperation. reviewing previous literature, scholars at home and abroad often study issues related to china and asean’s bri cooperation from a certain perspective. this article, based on existing research at home and abroad, takes the tenth anniversary of “the belt and road” initiative as the background, and studies from political, economic, social and other multi-disciplinary perspectives to sort out the progress made in china-asean cooperation in the past ten years, analyze the challenges and opportunities faced by china and asean countries in the past and coming years, exploring new paths for future co-operation between china and asean countries. 2. achievements in the past 10 years 2.1 improved dialogue and cooperation mechanism enhance political mutual trust between the two sides over the past decade, china and asean, as well as multiple asean countries, have established multi-level and multi-disciplinary mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation. in 2013, chinese president xi jinping delivered an important speech titled “joining hands to build a china-asean community” in indonesia’s parliament, in which he elaborated on china’s policy of “good-neighborliness” and friendship toward indonesia and asean, and put forward proposals to strengthen the china-indonesia comprehensive strategic partnership, and to build a chinaasean community, realizing common development and prosperity. in 2018, heads of state and government of china and asean member nations gathered in singapore, mapping out the china-asean strategic partnership vision 2030, which formulated a new cooperation framework with political security, economic cooperation, social and cultural communication as the main threads, rendering countries in chinaasean community connected more closely. dialogue and cooperation mechanisms between china and east asian countries has also been developing steadily. for example, china and singapore in 2015 launched the china-singapore strategic connectivity demonstration project, with the theme “modern connectivity and modern service economy”, focusing on some areas, like financial services, transportation and logistics, and information and communications technology. the 2019 china-thailand ministerial dialogue mechanism on digital economy cooperation is centered on www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 53 published by scholink inc. strengthening cooperation in the areas of digital economy, smart cities and cyber security, and the 2021 china-indonesia high-level dialogue and cooperation mechanism involves view exchanges in the fields of political security, trade and investment, maritime cooperation, public health, etc. in terms of exchanges between heads of government, china and asean countries have maintained frequent high-level visits and contacts, with the heads of state or government of cambodia, malaysia, laos and viet nam participating in “the belt and road” summit forum for three consecutive sessions. the improved dialogue and cooperation mechanism between t china and asean countries have removed discrimination, consolidated consensus, enhanced political mutual trust and provided a favorable political environment for regional cooperation. 2.2 increasing trade and investment have contributed to the high-quality development of the two economies china-asean has become each other’s largest trading partner. over the past decade, china-asean trade has maintained rapid growth in both imports and exports, with total trade growing at a rate of 9.9 percent per year. according to the data of 2022, the trade between the two sides amounted to $975.3 billion, expanding 1.2 times from $443.6 billion in 2013, or 1.2 times in a decade. looking at the specific products traded between the two sides, china’s imports of major products such as palm oil, rubber and minerals have been significantly boosted in both quantity and quality. with china’s manufacturing and technological development, china’s high-speed rail technology, new energy vehicles, and mechanical and electrical products have also accelerated their entry into asean, boosting asean’s infrastructure construction and meeting its market demand. since 2019, the two sides have been engaged in several rounds of negotiations on cafta-upgrade on the basis of cafta, which is aimed at further lowering tariffs on china’s asean commodities and expanding the scope of trade. to see investment, china and asean are important sources and destinations for each other. data shows that until july 2023, the bilateral investment between china and asean countries has exceeded $380 billion, and china has set up more than 6,500 direct investment enterprises in asean. investments from both sides have been increasing, covering manufacturing, finance, science and technology, and infrastructure. the two sides have built economic and trade innovation and development demonstration zoon, utilizing “two countries twin parks” model (the china-malaysia bilateral industrial park (mckip) and the china-thailand bilateral industrial park (ctriz)) to provide new opportunities for chinese and asean enterprises to develop and promote industrial collaboration, scientific innovation and technological sharing. 2.3 frequent cultural exchanges strengthen friendship between the two places china-asean has, in the past 10 years, exchanged frequently in education, academia, media, arts, tourism, etc., and established a number of communication platforms, forming a diversified exchange pattern. china-asean exchanges areas become much broader. since 2008, the china-asean education exchange week has been successfully held in guizhou province for 13 consecutive years. the themes of the exchanges cover a wide range of fields such as higher education, vocational www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 54 published by scholink inc. education, basic education, special education, continuing education and youth communication, and the activities include seminars, forums, competitions, exhibitions, summer or winter camps, symposiums, workshops, training courses, conferences and other forms. under this framework, several universities in china and asean countries have established alliances and reached consensus on the course opening, information sharing and personal training. in 2017 fudan university joined hands with nine academic institutions from asean countries to establish the network of asean-china academic institutes (nacai), which involves annual international meeting, academic exchange and joint publications. researchers from member institutions work together to research on china-asean relations and other related topics, contributing their wisdom to promote china-asean common development. the china-asean media cooperation forum, founded in 2018, has been held for six consecutive sessions, becoming a representative exchange platform for the news media between china and the 10 asean countries. the media of asean countries and china have worked closely together to increase coverage of each other’s affairs and bilateral relations, raising a voice that both sides want to promote peace and cooperation. chinese film and television works are popular in asean countries, with more and more films and tv dramas from asean countries coming into the view of chinese audiences. guangxi radio and television has opened columns such as “chinese theatre”, “chinese tv drama” and “chinese animation” in mainstream media of asean countries such as cambodia, laos and myanmar, and has broadcast nearly 1,000 episodes of excellent chinese tv dramas annually. some excellent film and television works of asean countries have also been introduced into china. the thai film the talented gunman, released in china in 2017, was highly appreciated by chinese film fans. china and asean have also made impressive gains in art exchanges. the asean centre for cultural and artistic exchange, with the aim of “going out with traditional chinese culture and bringing in diversified cultures from abroad”, promotes traditional chinese culture, protects cultural and artistic treasures, serving as a base for artistic creation and exchange between chinese and asean cultural scholars, artists, collectors, and art enthusiasts. china and asean are important sources and destinations for each other. in 2019, 39.483 million people from china visited asean countries, and asean countries made 25.934 million trips to china. in recent years, china and asean have organized “the belt and road” cultural and tourism exchange week, asean tourism festival, international tourism fair, and other activities, cooperating to film travel videos, expand tourism markets, create high-quality trip routes so as to enhance the bilateral travel experience. frequent cultural and cultural exchanges in those fields strengthen the china-asea friendship 2.4 environmental protection cooperation promotes regional green and sustainable development china and asean countries have a good foundation for environmental protection cooperation, covering a wide range of aspects such as green transformation, sustainable development, biodiversity conservation, green industry investment and financing. china and asean countries are complementary in the environmental protection industry. in the past decade, asean member states in, the context of “carbon neutrality”, have successively added low-carbon emission reduction and green www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 55 published by scholink inc. transformation into national strategies so that they have huge demand for technologies and capital to develop green industry. at the same time, china has been actively promoting the opening up of green finance and project investment, and various policy measures have provided a good environment for china and asean to carry out in-depth cooperation on green finance in the future. since “the belt and road” initiative was put forward in 2013, china and asean have attached great importance to ecological and environmental protection and green industry financing, which will serve as a new engine for political and economic cooperation between china and asean. the 2021-2022 china-asean cooperation year has taken “sustainable development” as the theme for two consecutive years, prioritizing ecological and environmental protection. the lancang-mekong environmental cooperation center and the china-cambodia environmental cooperation center have been established successively to improve regional environmental cooperation mechanisms. proposals such as the “china-asean eco-friendly city development partnership” and initiatives like the “china-asean cooperative action on climate change and air quality improvement” will create a china-asean environmentally sustainable development community, driving “regional green integration” and promoting high-quality synergistic development in the south china sea and the western pacific region. the figure 1 shows the themes of china-asean environmental cooperation forums from 2013 to 2022. figure 1. themes of china-asean environmental cooperation forums from 2013 to 2022 3. threats 3.1 the interference from outside powers is the main obstruction southeast asia has always been a place of competition among great powers due to its rich natural resources and strategic geographical location. in recent years, the u.s. has been increasing its strategic investment in southeast asia in an attempt to hedge against china’s influence in the region through economic, military and diplomatic means. in 2011, the obama administration launched the “the rebalance to asia “strategy to strengthen cooperation between the u.s. and southeast asian. in 2018, the trump administration explicitly positioned china as a “strategic competitor” and passed the asian www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 56 published by scholink inc. reassurance creation act (arca), which commits funds of $1.5 billion annually to pay for the expenditure of u.s. military and diplomatic operations in the indo-pacific region in order to improve the u.s. security status in the asia-pacific, especially in southeast asia. the u.s. indo-pacific strategy, introduced after biden came to power in 2021, clearly sets out to deepen long-term cooperation with asean and strengthen the u.s.-japan-india-australia “quadrilateral security dialogue” (qsd) with asean countries. in order to stem china’s “the belt and road” initiative extending in asean countries, the u.s. launched the indo-pacific economic framework (ipef) in 2022 under the guidance of the “rebuilding a better world” in order to rebuild the u.s. dominance in the asia-pacific economy, and to create an “economic and trade encirclement” through enhanced cooperation with regional allies or partners. the japanese government regards the rise of china as a “systemic threat to the liberal order in east asia” and hopes to play a more proactive role in this region. the game between china and japan in southeast asia is mainly in the economic field. japan established the “partnership for high-quality infrastructure” (poi) in 2015 to maintain its presence in asia’s infrastructure investment field through equipment donations, official assistance, and partnership establishment. 3.2 political uncertainty in asean countries poses great challenges to cooperation in recent years, some asean countries have experienced political instability, frequent political crises and increasing internal conflicts. “belt and road” economic cooperation projects have often been a “negative” topic issue for domestic political competition and power struggles, and even become the target attacked by domestic political opponents on those currently in power. former malaysian prime minister mahathir mohamad took chinese engineering projects as an example to attack previous prime minister mohd najib’s corruption. after he came to power, the number of cooperative engineering projects involving china was cut down, the amount of investment shrunk, and a number of projects were halted for a long time. the 2014 china-vietnam oil rig crisis, also known as the hai yang shi you 981 standoff, triggered an unprecedented wave of anti-china protests in vietnam and attracted political commenters and scholars to re-evaluate vietnam’s diplomatic, security, and domestic policies towards china. in early 2021, the myanmar military took over state power on the grounds of electoral fraud, triggering nationwide riots. incited by myanmar’s domestic ngos, a large number of chinese companies were smashed, looted and burned in the chaos. myanmar’s domestic political struggle and public opinion campaign may also damage joint projects. the taiping river power station, myitsone power station, and letpadaung copper mine and the like have all experienced a period of being unilaterally suspended. the sub-healthy internal political and ecological environment in those asean countries will be a problem that cannot be ignored in china-asean cooperation. 3.3 the relationship between china and asean in the global market is often competitive china and asean compete with each other in trade and china has a trade surplus with asean. as developing economies, china and asean have very similar levels of economic development and industrial structures: both are export-oriented economies that rely on western markets for trade. both sides compete on the basis of attracting foreign investment and technology for domestic economic www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 57 published by scholink inc. development, and produce similar products on the basis of natural resources and labor cost advantages. since 2012, china’s trade deficit with asean countries has turned into a surplus, which resulted in the rise of conservative voices within asean countries that resist trade and economic cooperation with china. in response to the trade imbalance problem, according to the world trade organization, asean member countries have collectively imposed 46 anti-dumping trade protectionist measures on china in the past decade. both china and asean pursued similar policies to attract foreign investment, tending to attract labor-intensive industries and some low value-added industries from developed countries, which has led to a high degree of similarity in their industrial structures. in march 2012, asean comprehensive investment agreement (acia) was passes to give preferential treatment to foreign enterprises to invest and build factories in asean countries. asean now seems to be more attractive to western countries, attracting $154.7 billion of foreign investment by 2019, while china attracted $141.2 billion in the same period, so the two will continue to compete fiercely in fdi. 3.4 asean countries have some concerns and misgivings about china while china’s role as the engine of the world economy has provided massive markets, a vast array of products and abundant opportunities for global trading partners, including asean, the china’s growing power and increasing influence in the world has also raised concerns and misgivings among southeast asian countries. in the report “the state of southeast asia 2020” released by the iseas-yusof ishak institute in january 2020, it was found that people from asean countries acknowledge that china becomes more powerful and influential, but a high proportion of respondents seem to be concerned. when asked about “the impact of china’s emergence as a great power”, 38.2% of the respondents believed that “china is a revisionist one trying to bring southeast asia into its sphere of influence”; 34.7% of the respondents believed that “china is gradually replacing the role of the united states as the regional leader”; when it comes to their views on “the belt and road initiative”, only 36.4 per cent of respondents expressed reassurance and trust in the project. as overseas investment projects based on “the belt and road” initiative continue to advance, the “debt trap theory” has gradually become a public opinion tool used by western countries to undermine china’s cooperation with asean, claiming that china has intentionally provided loans to developing countries at a liability risk and plunged them into debt crises. affected by the hype of “debt trap theory”, myanmar scaled back chinese investment in the kyaukphyu port invested by china in 2018: the original plan to build 10 berths was adjusted to two, and the total value of the project was revised to about $1.3 billion. 4. opportunities 4.1 china and asean are geographically linked by mountains and rivers, and historically by humanities geographically, china is adjacent to the asean seas. vietnam, laos, myanmar, thailand and cambodia are also connected to china’s southwestern interior through the trans-asian railway www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 58 published by scholink inc. network. “the belt and road” co-operation has greatly enhanced asean countries’ connectivity. with important projects such as the yavan high-speed railway in indonesia, the bangkok to korat section of the china-thailand railway, and malaysia’s east coast railway moving forward, asean countries are able to enjoy more dividends of china’s economic growth and benefit more from the open chinese market. throughout history, since the time of emperor wu of the han dynasty to the ming dynasty, when the navigator zheng he travelled to the west, chinese merchants have left their footprints exploring the sea routes of south-east asia. currently, there are about 50 million chinese nationals in the world, about 78 per cent of whom live in asean countries. they still maintain chinese traditions, inherit the same customs and speak the same language. for generations, these overseas chinese have adapted to life in a foreign land, while at the same time integrating the eastern and western cultures and economies. they have an in-depth understanding of the technical, cultural, legal and economic aspects of asean countries, as well as the cultural, economic and institutional environment of china. the same traditional customs and language have created a natural affinity between the chinese and southeast asian people, making southeast asia the most likely destination for chinese entrepreneurs when they go global. 4.2 rcep entry into force will build a high-standard global network of free trade areas the regional comprehensive economic partnership agreement (rcep) entered into force on january 1, 2022. as the world’s most populous free trade area with the largest economic and trade scale and the most development potential, rcep will promote the opening up of china and asean countries’ markets, facilitate liberalization and facilitation of economic and trade cooperation between china and asean, and realize the structural transformation of the regional economic co-operation mechanism in the asia-pacific region. rcep mainly works by reducing tariffs, opening markets, and reducing trade barriers. under the rcep agreement, more than 90 per cent of imported and exported goods will have zero tariffs in the future, which significantly reduces the tariff cost of cross-border trade, promoting high-speed and wide-ranging economic and trade cooperation between china and asean. according to the peterson institute in the united states, rcep will lead to a net increase in member countries’ exports of $510 billion in 2030 and a net increase in annual income of $186 billion. in addition, rcep integrates five asean+1 free trade agreements (fdas), combining the past isolated and fragmented ftas into a whole, cutting down the restrictive and discriminatory factors in cross-border service trade, resolving the past problem of different trade rules in respective trade agreements, which facilitates goods and commodity flow within the region. in 2020, despite the impact of the covid-19 epidemic, china’s imports and exports to the other 14 rcep member states reached 10.2 trillion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 3.5%, which was 1.6 percentage points higher than the overall growth rate of china’s foreign trade in the same period, accounting for 31.7% of the total import and export value. at the same time, according to customs statistics, in the first eight months of 2022, china’s imports and exports to asean were 4.09 trillion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 14%. asean took advantage of the momentum to continue to become china’s number one trading partner. the upgraded rcep can www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 59 published by scholink inc. break the economic and trade resistance, strengthen the cooperation of production division of labor among the countries in the region, effectively contribute to the security, stability and accelerated integration of the regional industrial chain supply chain, and bring more opportunities for economic and trade cooperation between china and asean. with the rcep fully implemented and being upgraded, the economic and trade resistance within regional countries will be broken, and the production division and collaboration among regional countries will be strengthened, contributing to security and stability of the industrial chain and supply chain, which will guarantee a win-win economic and trade cooperation between china and asean. by 2025, rcep is expected to boost member countries’ exports, outward investment stock, and gdp by 10.4 per cent, 2.6 per cent, and 1.8 per cent, respectively, over the baseline. 4.3 china will see significant opportunity for rmb regionalization in asean the rmb has now become the world’s fourth largest payment currency, the fifth largest reserve currency, and the most actively traded currency in the world among emerging market countries. asean lacks a unified regional currency due to the uneven development of asean countries. the frequent use of the “dollar weapon” by the u.s. to impose economic sanctions against foreign countries, especially the “tsunami of sanctions” against russia after the outbreak of the russian-ukrainian conflict, will force other countries to reflect on the security for over-reliance on the dollar system. in recent years, there has been a growing trend of “de-dollarization” in asean countries. for example, at the asean finance ministers and central bank governors’ meeting, which concluded at the end of march 2023, the countries agreed to reduce their reliance on major international currencies, like the us dollar and the euro, in cross-border trade and investment, and to effectively strengthen the use of local currencies. in the context of “de-dollarization”, china and asean countries could seek more opportunities for monetary cooperation. by the end of 2021, china had signed bilateral local currency settlement agreements with vietnam, indonesia and cambodia, and currency swap agreements with indonesia, malaysia, singapore and thailand, amounting to about rmb 800 billion. in september 2022, the people’s bank of china authorized the industrial and commercial bank of china vientiane branch to act as the rmb clearing bank in laos. this is the fifth rmb clearing bank based in asean countries, following singapore, malaysia, thailand and the philippines. the steady spread of rmb business clearing banks in asean countries reflects the deepening use and acceptance of rmb in asean countries. according to the “report on the use of rmb in asean countries 2022”, the total amount of rmb cross-border receipts and payments between china and asean countries totaled 4,814.79 billion yuan in 2021, a year-on-year increase of 16 per cent (see the figure 2 below). compared to 10 years ago, the amount of rmb cross-border receipts and payments between china and asean was less than 500 billion in 2012, a nearly 10-fold increase in 10 years. the share of asean countries using rmb has increased, and naturally the share using other currencies has decreased. with the rcep entering into force, regional trading in the interbank market of rmb against currencies of asean countries continues to expand, rmb products in the offshore market are enriched and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 60 published by scholink inc. upgraded, and a number of innovative cross-border rmb businesses have been successfully launched. figure 2. cross-border rmb receipts and payments in asean countries from 2011 to 2021 4.4 emerging industries will be a key area of co-operation between china and asean there is huge room for china-asean cooperation on digital economy. according to relevant reports, the market size of southeast asia’s digital economy has reached nearly $200 billion in 2022, and may grow to $600 billion to $1 trillion in 2030. however, as far as digital infrastructure is concerned, especially in terms of network coverage and internet connection speed, there is a huge gap in the for asean countries to make progress, and the development of digital industrialization in many countries is still in its infancy. in order to promote digital economic development, asean and asean member states such as singapore, thailand, malaysia and myanmar have approved various project documents for digital economy development. china is at the forefront of digital infrastructure, digital technology application and digital industry development in the world, while asean countries have a huge consumer market and an urgent need for the development of the digital economy, so the cooperation between the two sides in the digital economy will be incredibly promising and will make great achievements. there is also potential for green finance cooperation between china and asean countries. concerns about climate issues have prompted asean countries to focus on the sustainability of development. the asian development bank estimates that climate issues may reduce the gdp of the asean region by 11 per cent by 2100, and in order to cope with this problem, asean countries may accelerate the layout of the green transformation of energy. however, asean countries are facing a large funding gap in green development, and the demand for green investment in asean countries from 2016 to 2030 is about $3 trillion. compared with asean countries, china not only has advanced infrastructure technology but also leads the world in green financial development. to promote green development, the two sides have implemented the green messenger programme and designated 2021 as the “year of cooperation for sustainable development”, which can be used to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 61 published by scholink inc. vigorously develop and deepen cooperation in the areas of sustainable finance, green energy and sustainable cities. 5. strategies to create better china-asean relations 5.1 maintain asean’s regional centrality china should take the “asean vision” as the core concept, respect the integration path and process independently designed by asean, and support asean’s central position in southeast asia. when dealing with matters involving the asean countries, asean norms should be observed and asean feelings be considered. in the process of reshaping the regional order, it is imperative to safeguard the asean voice in international community, advocate the principles of openness, inclusiveness, transparency, mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and reciprocity, support asean in “not taking sides”, and oppose the patchwork of “asian version” nato”. disputes may be settled by making full use of the existing system of international law or rcep trade and investment dispute settlement mechanism. china and asean countries’ judicial coordination requires a regional arbitration settlement institution to serve “the belt and road” dispute resolution, and political settlement models such as mediation as an alternative at any time. 5.2 broaden economic, trade, business and investment cooperation china should work with asean to build an open world economy, defend the wto-centered multilateral trading system, stand against unilateralism and protectionism, and safeguard the stability and smooth operation of global industrial chains and supply chains. the greater harmonization of china’s “belt and road” initiative with development strategies in other countries could promote regional and global economic integration processes. advanced construction of china-asean fta, asean economic and trade industrial park and 10+3 regional “fast-track” network will encourage more and more micro, small and medium businesses to cooperate in those emerging industries, such as digital technologies, cross-border e-commerce and clean energy. online and offline trade and investment fairs organized regularly could expand mutual markets, optimize the structure of trade products and avoid fierce competition between similar goods. the traditional model of purely exporting “made in china” can be gradually changed to implement the dual export model of “capital + production capacity,” with chinese enterprises adjusting the investment structure, expanding the scale of their investments in asean countries, and leveraging the leading roles of railroads, power, and other advantageous industries to restructure the east asia regional value chain. china’s investment in asean countries still has a lot of room for development, the structure is not balanced, mainly in the secondary industry, with relatively few investments in the primary and tertiary industries. therefore, chinese enterprises can expand the scale of investment and actively adjust the investment structure in asean countries, gradually change the traditional model of purely exporting “made in china” in the past, implement the dual export model of “capital + production capacity”, and actively leverage the leading role of railways, power and other advantageous industries to restructured the east asia regional www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 62 published by scholink inc. value chain. 5.3 strengthen international communication capacities china should improve international communication capacity and effectiveness, forming an international discourse that matches its overall national strength and international status, so as to better tell china’s stories and convey china’s voice. in the first place, china should follow the law of communication and integrate the traditional chinese communication mode with the international mode. china’s media should increase their international impact, using local languages of asean countries to promote china’s ideas and concepts, thereby presenting a true, multi-dimensional, and panoramic view of china. in response to the rhetoric that slander china, the chinese government should vigorously fight back based on facts, removing asean’s concerns and misgivings and increasing mutual trust. besides, targeted expression should be emphasized in international communication, which means that chinese media’s words should be close to the speech habits, mind-sets and discourse styles of audiences who come from different asean countries and have different cultural backgrounds in order that what chinese intend to say could be correctly, fully and comprehensively understood by asean people. 5.4 promote exchanges in science, education, culture and health china and asean should deepen exchanges in the fields of science, education, culture and health. firstly, the dimension of scientific and technological cooperation should be broadened. it is essential to encourage the cooperation between china’s scientific research institutes, universities and large-scale enterprises with asean countries to establish laboratories or research centers, which could help form a large innovation network, strengthening a cross-border “industry-university-research” integration. additionally, a new educational cooperation platform should be created. china and asean countries could set up colleges and universities abroad by developing a bilateral personnel training system in which courses and academic qualifications are mutually recognized, and designate some asean-oriented education programs in south-western china, making them important roles in the china-asean regional education integration. last but not least, mutual assistance in health service and industry should also be strengthened. china and asean countries could collaborate with each other in health emergency response and medical assistance, such as maternal and child health care, infectious diseases prevention and control and vaccine research and development, building a china-asean health community. 6. conclusion looking back to the past and anticipating the future, china always stands ready to work with asean countries to pursue closer and more fruitful cooperation under the bri framework, implement the global development initiative, the global security initiative and the global civilization initiative, and build an open, inclusive, clean and beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security and common prosperity. china and asean goals are to pass on the torch of peace from generation to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 63 published by scholink inc. generation, sustain development, ensure that civilizations flourish, and build a global community of shared future. references aslam, m. (2019). us-china trade disputes and its impact on asean. transnational corporations review, 11(4), 332-345. https://doi.org/10.1080/19186444.2019.1691410 bi, s. (2021). cooperation between china and asean under the building of asean economic community. journal of contemporary east asia studies, 10(1), 83-107. https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2021.1888410 cao, x. (2023). asean-china digital economy cooperation and its prospects. in digital economy and the sustainable development of asean and china (pp. 209-228). https://doi.org/10.1142/9789811257896_0013 chen, b., chen, h., cheng, q., & li, y. (2023). the development of china’s digital economy and its implications for china-asean cooperation. east asian policy, 15(03), 49-81. https://doi.org/10.1142/s1793930523000211 chen, m., zhang, l., teng, f., dai, j., li, z., wang, z., & li, y. (2020). climate technology transfer in bri era: needs, priorities, and barriers from receivers’ perspective. ecosystem health and sustainability, 6(1), 1780948. https://doi.org/10.1080/20964129.2020.1780948 gong, c. (2019). research on the coupling of industrial structure and environment between china and the “belt and road” countries-take the 10 asean countries as an example. international journal of frontiers in sociology, 1(1), 89-98. gong, x. (2020). non-traditional security cooperation between china and south-east asia: implications for indo-pacific geopolitics. international affairs, 96(1), 29-48. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz225 guoping, z. (2022). bri projects in asean: implementation, mechanism, and suggestions. china’s belt and road initiative. hong, z. (2019). china’s belt and road initiative and asean. china: an international journal, 17(2), 127-147. https://doi.org/10.1353/chn.2019.0019 liao, j. c. (2022). talking green, building brown: china-asean environmental and energy cooperation in the bri era. asian perspective, 46(1), 21-47. https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2022.0001 marks, s. v., & yau, c. j. m. (2019). china and the asean economies: interdependence and rivalry. southeast asia and the asean economic community, 381-419. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19722-3_12 myint, c. y., pavlova, m., thein, k. n. n., & groot, w. (2019). a systematic review of the health-financing mechanisms in the association of southeast asian nations countries and the people’s republic of china: lessons for the move towards universal health coverage. plos one, 14(6), e0217278. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0217278 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 64 published by scholink inc. ocón, d. (2021). cultural diplomacy and co-operation in asean: the role of arts and culture festivals. the hague journal of diplomacy, 17(2), 277-305. https://doi.org/10.1163/1871191x-bja10081 shen, c. (2023). the impact of infrastructure development on china–asean trade-evidence from asean. sustainability, 15(4), 3277. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15043277 wang, y. c., tsai, j. j., & you, e. (2022). the impact of rmb internationalization on the exchange rate linkages in china and asean countries. applied economics, 54(43), 4961-4978. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2022.2039367 wibisono, a. a. (2017). asean-china non-traditional security cooperation and the inescapability of the politics of security. journal global dan strategis, 11(1), 39-54. https://doi.org/10.20473/jgs.11.1.2017.39-54 yin, j., bi, y., & ji, y. (2020). structure and formation mechanism of china-asean tourism cooperation. sustainability, 12(13), 5440. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12135440 microsoft word ape-v4n4-p111 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 111 original paper the effect of the israeli-palestinian conflict on the palestinian labor market and human capital accumulation sameh hallaq1* 1 al-quds bard college for arts and sciences, al-quds university, palestine * sameh hallaq, al-quds bard college for arts and sciences, al-quds university, palestine received: november 7, 2021 accepted: november 18, 2021 online published: november 25, 2021 doi:10.22158/ape.v4n4p111 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v4n4p111 abstract this paper summarizes recent literature that discusses the economic costs of several conflict measures, e.g., “time and geographical variation in fatalities and other conflict incidents, days under curfews, checkpoints, movement restrictions, and palestinian substitution labor by foreigner workers on the palestinian labor market and human capital”. earnings and unemployment are the main labor market indicators, while human capital was assessed by educational attainment. also, this essay sheds light on the wage differential in the palestinian labor market due to geographical and employment sector factors as a consequence of the ongoing conflict. keywords human capital, israeli palestinian conflict, wage differential 1. introduction since the 1967 war until now, the palestinian economy had experienced different challenges which still have an effect on the local labor market. the consequences of those challenges on the returns to human capital were of high significance. after 1980, a remarkable raise in the numbers of university and community college graduates that resulted in increasing the supply of educated labor (angrist, 1995). in late 1987, the first palestinian uprising (intifada) started and lasted until 1993. a reduction in demand of palestinian workers to israeli markets due to the restrictions measures imposed on labor movements by the israeli authority. another major feature that shaped that period was that children have lost many of school days, in addition to the high rate of school dropouts. the signing of the oslo accord in 1993 ended the first intifada, which resulted in the establishment of the palestinian authority (pa). the oslo accord, the pa obtained a partial administrative and security controls on certain areas in the palestinian territories that in return increased the demand for educated laborto work in the pa newly established www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 112 published by scholink inc. insituations .in 2000, the second intifada started and lasted until 2005. accordingly the israeli government imposed a closure on the west bank and gaza strip. this period is characterized by the remarkable negative effect on palestinian wages with a sharp increase in unemployment due to the substitution of the palestinian laborers with foreign workers. in addition to the severe restrictions on movement of palestinians that is force by the separation wall around the west bank that have been built by the israeli authority. finally, since 2006, the palestinian national authority (pna) has experienced a declining rate of financial aid, which represents the vast majority of the palestinian budget; in particular, a relatively high proportion of aid is given to the pna based on political considerations rather than development matters (sarsour et al., 2011). since most of nongovernmental organizations (ngos) finanaces are dependable on western countries to secure their funds, the reduced circumstances were of negative impact on ngos and the employability of university graduates. the following section of this article provides an overview of the economic costs of conflict on the palestinian labor market and the accumulation of human capital. the third part, presents a literature servey to the adverse impact of this conflict on wages structure in the palestinian labor market in addition to some aspects of wage differentials in the labor market as a consequence of the conflict. finally, the paper concludes in section four. 2. the economic costs of the israeli palestinian conflict 2.1 political violence and the economic conditions there is a strand of literature that has attempted to investigate the relationship between economic conditions and engagement in violent political conflict. economists assume that the opportunity cost of involvement in violence is lower for those individuals who suffer from poor economic conditions, such as low income and high unemployment, than other individuals who live in a stable environment (freytag et al. 2011; krueger & laitin 2008). on the other hand, some other economists find the opposite. for example, krueger and malečková (2003) examined the relationship between political violence and poverty by using data from several countries, finding that it is not the poor and uneducated that primarily support terrorism. economic status, especially educational attainment, is either positively or not related to supporting or engaging in political violence. berrebi (2007) found similar results, noting that palestinians engaged in suicide bombing had a higher level of education and lived under better economic conditions than other palestinians. sayre (2009) used data on palestinian suicide attacks against israeli society during 1993-2001 to assess the degree to which economic and political conditions in the west bank and gaza strip affect the frequency of the attacks. sayre (2009) employed ols estimation with a fixed-effects negative binomial model to account for unobserved heterogeneity between time period and districts characteristics. the main results indicated that poor labor market conditions are correlated with increases in a suicide bombing, but that the specific political event was also important. saleh (2009) found the same conclusion: improving palestinian economic condition (higher wages, less unemployment) will reduce www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 113 published by scholink inc. the incentive for palestinians to engage in political violence against israel. he also alluded to the nonmonotonic statistical link between economic conditions (unemployment and wages) and violence, suggesting that improving living conditions and increasing employment opportunities for palestinians will not lead to elimination of attacks against israelis—it will only reduce them. miaari, zussman, and zussman (2014) explored the causal relationship between israeli restrictions on palestinian movement and involvement in political violence. the identification strategy relied on a quasi-natural experiment by using the variation in the pre– and post–second intifada employment rate in israel across palestinian localities, including the number of palestinian fatalities in each locality as a proxy for involvement in the conflict. they found that palestinian localities in the west bank that suffered from severe unemployment due to the israeli restrictions on palestinian movement after the second intifada erupted in the second half of 2000 were more heavily involved in the israeli-palestinian conflict. in other words, during that period (2000-2005), any israeli policy aimed at reducing palestinian unemployment inside israel would eventually lead to a rise in the number of palestinian fatalities. cali and miaari (2015) shed light on the relationship between the exogenous economic variables and involvement in the violent conflict. their results indicated that the improved employment opportunities resulting from increasing trade (in particular, exports) during the late 1990s, reduced the population’s incentives to engage in political violence during the second intifada, measured per number of fatalities caused by israeli per locality. (note 1) benmelech, berrebi, and klor (2010) provide evidence of the adverse economic consequences of palestinian suicide attacks (2000-2006) inside israel in the attacker’s district of origin. during the second intifada, a successful attack against israel led to increased unemployment by 5.3 percent in an average palestinian district (relative to the average unemployment rate); it also lowered the average wage by 20 percent in the offending district. moreover, a successful attack caused a reduction in the number of palestinians working in israel labor market in the two quarters following the attack. (note 2) 2.2 the economic costs of the israeli-palestinian conflict on the labor market palestinian employment inside israel started after the 1967 war. part of israeli’s leadership encouraged the integration between the palestinian and israeli economy to improve the quality of life for the palestinian people. they argued that higher income and lower unemployment would reduce palestinian resistance to the occupation. however, providing palestinian access to israeli territories raise some concern regarding the security (gazit, 1995). increasing movement restriction on palestinian laborers reduced their ability to access to the israeli market, and increased absent days, motivating israeli employers to substitute them with foreigner workers. a lot of factors play a significant role in creating barriers for palestinian movements, such as closures, checkpoints, curfews, having many localities in west bank categorized as area c, (note 3) and the existence of the separation wall after 2005. following the outbreak of the second intifada in september 2000, the number of palestinians from the west bank and gaza strip employed in israel dropped sharply. this shock to the labor supply also had www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 114 published by scholink inc. a heterogeneous impact on palestinian wages based on their educational attainment (skilled labor versus unskilled labor) and employment sector (public versus private and rural wages versus urban wages). the following papers empirically discussed the impact of the israeli-palestinian conflict on the labor market before and after the second palestinian intifada. one of the earliest studies discussing the impact of israeli policies on both the israeli and palestinian labor markets was angrist (1996) study, which estimated the wage premium for men working in israel ranges from 25 percent to 35 percent for the period 1988-1991 compared to a 0 percent to18 percent premium during the period 1981-1987. he indicated that wages paid to palestinians working in israel are negatively correlated with days worked by palestinians in israel (-14 percent for all industries). angrist used the supply shocks in the palestinian labor supply as an iv to estimate the effect of israeli labor market demand for palestinian workers. overall, the results implied that the short-run israeli demand for palestinian labor is not very elastic. (note 4) in his following paper, angrist (1998) investigated the effect of the repeated sharp restrictions on palestinian access to the israeli labor markets on the palestinian labor market in the period 1992-1995, which was characterized by increased violent activities on both sides, as well as the establishment of pna, which created employment opportunities for many palestinian laborers. he found that the dependence of israeli labor market on palestinian labor has been reduced due to palestinian substitution workers with guest workers, also due to the structural changes in the israeli economy. he indicated that there are a variety of economic and social factors that limit the benefits from migrant labor such as providing them with a full range of civil rights and social benefits and substitution of capital mobility for labor mobility. mansour (2010) attempted to identify the palestinian labor market’s response to an increase in the supply of workers after the second intifada separately from the direct effects of the political instability. this distinction could be useful in evaluating border policies that are related to the palestinian and israeli nations. he employed quarterly variations in labor force survey data by city for the period 2000-2004 to investigate the effect of labor supply (without and with the distinction between skilled and unskilled labor) on average wages and unemployment rate of lowand high-skilled workers. the labor supply covariate was instrumented by the log of the number of individuals usually working in israel from each city. the source of endogeneity for the labor supply could be due to the change in the labor force’s size in response to the closure of the borders or because workers drop out of the labor force or emigrate. the main results suggested that an increase in the supply of lowand high-skilled labor had an adverse impact on low-skilled wages, while the wages of high-skilled labor seem to respond mostly to increases in their own labor supply. miaari and sauer (2011) concluded that the impact of substituting palestinian labor with foreigner workers is relatively stronger than the impact of temporary closures in the palestinian market. the former tends to be permanent, with a long-run substitution effect. in order to reach the previous conclusion, they estimated the impact of foreigner workers and closure days on either monthly wages www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 115 published by scholink inc. or employment status inside israel after controlling other individual and residential characteristics (i.e., urban, camp, or rural). the number of foreign workers (the variable of interest) was instrumented by the cumulative number of foreign worker permits issued through each quarter over the period 1999-2004. the researchers employed the iv strategy since they argued that the number of foreign workers can correlate with the error term in several aspects. the first one is related to the labor demand and other macroeconomic factors in israel and surrounding region. for example, an increasing number of illegal entries into israel due to voluntary movement of palestinian laborers back into the local economy of the west bank and gaza strip. secondly, the random error may contain unobserved individual attributes that are potentially correlated with the number of incoming foreign workers to israel. these could be relevant to productivity, motivation, geographical preference to work inside israel (in case of no movement restriction) and the ability to communicate in hebrew . cali and miaari (2018) provided empirical evidence for the effect of mobility restrictions on the west bank labor market. they employed a combined data set from the labor force survey and geographic information system (gis) data on varies types of physical barriers to movement during the period 2000-2009. their main findings suggested that barriers to mobility have a significant negative impact on the probability of being employed, wages earned, and the number of days worked per month, while the movement restrictions lead to an increase in the number of hours worked per day. these effects are substantially attributed to the checkpoints, while the other barriers have only a weak impact. the findings indicted that the labor market adjusted to several restrictions through lower wages rather than through lower employment. for example, placing one checkpoint one minute away from a locality will significantly reduce its residents’ hourly wage by 5.2 percentage points and reduce their probability of being employed by 0.5 percentage points. (note 5) 2.3 the economic costs of the israeli-palestinian conflict on human capital over the last decades, a growing body of literature shed light on the damage to human capital due to conflict exposure. these damages include several shortand long-term outcomes affecting education, child labor, child wellbeing, and health. the following section presents a brief review of some of these studies discussing the effect of the israeli-palestinian conflict on human capital accumulation. the first stream of literature discusses the shortand long-run impact of violence on a child’s educational attainment. most of these studies employ a similar identification strategy based on the plausibly exogenous variation in conflict intensity induced by combining household survey data with a measure of conflict intensity and geographic location of a community during the conflict period. al kafri (2002) used the quarterly labor force household survey data collected in 2000 and 2001 (before and after start of the second palestinian intifada) to see the impact of the second intifada on children’s decision to choose schooling, work, or both. he found that the second intifada increased the probability of boys going to work and of girls leaving school in an attempt to help their families, especially after the increase in poverty and unemployment created by the conflict. however, this study did not control for a number of significant explanatory variables such as the market wage, household www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 116 published by scholink inc. income, and number of closure days, nor did it suggest a transmission channel that could affect a child’s decision to work rather than going to school. di maio and nandi (2013) showed that from the second intifada until the end of 2006, the increasing number of border closure days increased the probability of child labor and reduced school attendance. they considered reductions in local wages, decreases in the household income, and the likelihood that the father was employed in israel to be different transmission mechanisms through which closure days possibly increased child labor. brück, di maio, and miaari (2019) estimated the “reduced form” effect of the exposure to the israeli-palestinian conflict during the second intifada (2000-2006), measured by the number of palestinian fatalities at the school locality and high school exit exam performance. using year and school fixed effect to control for unobserved locality and time effects, their results indicated that the increased exposure to the israeli-palestinian conflict reduced the probability of passing the final exam and university admission. the authors suggested changes in the quality of the school-level learning conditions and the adverse effect on the student psychological well-being as potential transmission mechanisms for explaining their results. di maio and nisticò (2019) investigated the impact of the parental job loss during the second palestinian intifada on their child’s school enrollment status. to account for the endogeneity, they employed the variation in the number of fatalities across palestinians localities as the iv. the results suggested that the household head’s job loss increases a child’s probability of dropping out of school by 9 percent points. the effect varied with the gender, school grade, and the child’s academic ability, as well as with parental education and the number of children in the household. jürges et al. (2020) showed that an increase of household’s exposure to conflicts during the second intifada (2000-2005) had an adverse long-term impact (7 years after ending the second intifada) on their offspring school achievements measured by child’s school grade point average (gpa) during 2012/2013 academic year. similar to di maio and nisticò (2019), jürges et al. (2020) used the same iv (locality-level variation in the conflict intensity measured by number of fatalities across locality) to account for the endogeneity. also, they proposed noncognitive skills—such as the “big five (note 6)” personality traits and the “internalizing” and the “externalizing” (note 7) behavioral problem resulted from strengths and difficulties questionnaire (sdq) (note 8)—as a channel of exposure on children’s educational attainment. saad and fallah (2020) use the closure of the israeli labor market during the second intifada (2000-2005) to investigate the impact of a large labor market shock on the educational choices of palestinian youth. this study employs difference in difference methodology by using the variation in the geographical distribution of commuters within the west bank prior to the second intifada to compare high school dropout rates between localities with different shares of palestinians workers who commute to israel before and after the second intifada. the results show that the closure led to a significant decline in high school dropout rates in the case of male students aged 15–19 years, but not www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 117 published by scholink inc. for female students. additionally, the findings suggest that the localities with high commuting shares experienced a decreasing gender gap in high school dropout rates compared to other localities with low commuting shares. the second stream of literature that discusses the palestinian-israeli case sheds light on the cycle of violence by employing the number of fatalities on both sides. jaeger and paserman (2008) investigated the short-run dynamics of israeli-palestinian violence during the second intifada. using the number of fatalities from each side as a measurement of the violence’s intensity, they found that israel reacted predictably and systematically to palestinian violence, while israeli violence did not lead to an increase in palestinian violence. in their second paper (jaeger & paserman 2009), they indicated that the israeli’s targeted killing of palestinian leaders led to increased violence by the palestinians, but it did not lead to higher levels of israeli fatalities. jaeger et al. (2012) suggested that, in the short run, the violence from israel reduced the palestinian support for the moderate political party and the peace process, though this effect diminishes within three months. however, palestinian violence plays a small role in formulating the palestinian public opinion, except between the radical factions, but it does not induce a shift between supporting the moderate and radical factions. 3. wage differential in the palestinian labor market 3.1 the effect of area c, rural, and nonrural areas and refugees status on wages as a consequence of oslo peace accord (1993), the pna was established to provide a different level of control over the west bank and gaza strip territories. the pna has control over both security and administration (e.g., health, education, taxation, etc.) in area a. the control in area b is limited to civil administration only, with no control in area c. the latter is mostly rural and represents approximately 60 percent of the west bank territory. communities in area c are living in difficult life circumstances due to the lack of major services (unsco, 2014) area c is key to future palestinian economic development. there are many direct and indirect economic benefits of eliminating the restrictions on movement and investment in area c (vishwanath et al., 2014), including improvements in agriculture, mineral and stone mining, quarrying, tourism, and telecommunication. the expected growth that could be generated through the lifting of restrictions on area c would increase the potential palestinian value-added by usd 3.4 billion. the indirect benefits would be reflected as an improvement in quality of life there since the vast majority of the palestinian economic activities are to some extent dependent on the quality of transportation, electricity, water, and telecommunications infrastructure. additionally, the expected substantial increase in gdp would lead to creating many employment opportunities in the west bank (niksic et al., 2014). fallah and daoud (2015) investigated the impact of restrictions in area c on wages of area c workers. they employed an individual-level survey, collected on a quarterly basis by the palestinian central bureau of statistics (pcbs) during the period 2001-2008. they restricted their sample only to those who worked in palestinian territories (areas a, b, and c), excluding those who worked in israel to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 118 published by scholink inc. avoid an estimation bias that could mask urban-rural wage differential. the estimation was based on the ols technique, controlling for other demographicand locality-level variables. the standard error was clustered at locality level. (note 9) to deal with the workers’ unobserved characteristics (such as innate abilities), the researchers relied on the oaxacablinder (1973) (note 10) decomposition technique, which allowed them to identify the unexplained part (residual) of the wage differential. their results suggested that area c workers suffer from a wage penalty (note 11) compared to workers in areas a and b. moreover, by comparing average wages of area c workers with other rural workers, they concluded that the wage difference is statistically insignificant, which indicated that the observed wage penalty for area c workers could be attributed primarily to a rural environment effect rather than to israeli economic restrictions that take place there. the reduction in the average wages due to the shock in labor demand in area c was subsequently raised due to the shocks in the labor supply. the latter (commuting-labor supply) was proposed as a potential transmission mechanism since the residents in area c are more likely to commute than their peers in other rural areas. with regards to the differential wages between rural and nonrural areas, daoud and fallah (2016) used quarterly survey data for the period 1999-2012 and showed that employment in agriculture reduced the wages for both rural and nonrural workers. also, consistent with other previous studies, they indicated that the israeli labor market provides a wage premium of 60 percent to 70 percent for nonrural workers and 40 percent to 50 percent for rural workers compared to the local market. in addition to using the standard ols estimation, they adjusted the unpaid wage selectivity bias (for those who are employed in agriculture) by controlling for parents’ type of industry. in particular, whether workers’ and their parents’ type of industry is the same. also, they employed heckman’s (1979) two-stage estimation to correct the industry self-selection bias. the main results show that the coefficient for the agriculture industry lower wages for workers in this sector by 34 percent to 37 percent for nonrural and rural areas, respectively. hallaq (2020) indicated to the existence of wage differential in the palestinian labor market based on their refuges status. this wage gap has an opposite direction in the west bank and gaza strip. in the west bank, palestinian non-refugees enjoy a wage premium, and the wage gap has a more influence low-skilled workers and those in the private sector. in gaza, the wage gap favored refugee workers, and has more substantial impact among unskilled workers. 3.2 employment sector and wage differentials public employment accounts for 21.6 percent of total employment in palestine. this percentage varies significantly between the west bank and gaza strip (pcbs 2016). (note 12) salaries represent the vast majority of the pna’s overall budget. (note 13) unlike other countries, where taxes are the major source of financing public salaries, the pna relies heavily on international aid to finance its expenditures (sarsour et al., 2011). this section presents wages differentials between the public and private sector and the public sector’s impact of public sector on private employment. miaari (2020) utilized the palestinian labor force survey conducted between 1998 and 2006 to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 119 published by scholink inc. measure the wage differential between public and private employment in the west bank and gaza strip. the wage differential was decomposed into the human capital effect and an unexplained effect using oaxaca-blinder techniques. the results suggested that before the second intifada period, the public sector experienced wage penalties, but this penalty disappeared and then reversed over time. there was a wage differential during the post–second intifada period to the favor of public sector due to the high demand for employment in public sector. at the same time, there was an increase in the palestinian labor supply due to the sharp decrease in a number of palestinians working in the israeli labor market competing with a low demand for employees in the local private sector. all these factors lead to a rapid decrease in private sector wages. moreover, the wage gap was attributed to the returns to skills composition in the public sector (unexplained effect), rather than a change in the skills composition of public sector workers (human capital effect). fallah (2021) explained how a local labor market responded to the changes in public employment in an aid-based economy. expanding public employment was vital to limiting the negative demand shocks during second intifada. the ols estimation demonstrated that, in the short run, increasing public employment by 100 jobs increases private employment by 71 jobs. the endogeneity led to biasing the ols estimation since the pna utilizes public jobs to curb rising local unemployment and as a response to population change. fallah (2021) employed a district’s share of public employment to redistribute the overall increases in public employment across districts. (note 14) the findings showed that public employment has a positive impact on both tradable and nontradable sectors, but favoring the latter. fallah (2021) proposed three mechanism channels to explain his main result. first, the expansion of public employment has a positive effect on the number of local entrepreneurs (employers and self-employed). second, the expansion of public employment has no significant negative impact on private wages; since the pna has to absorb the excess labor supply, it neutralizes the effect of the public wage premium on private wages. (note 15) the empirical findings demonstrated that a district’s change in private employment is independent of change in public wages. finally, the paper indicated the minor role of the tax effect on the private sector. unlike other countries where increasing taxes to create additional public jobs may decrease labor demand in private employment, the vast majority of the public salaries in the west bank are funded by international grants. 4. conclusion the palestinian economy is extremely unstable due to the ongoing israeli-palestinian conflict. this conflict has a short-and long-run adverse impact on the palestinian labor market and the accumulation of human capital as well. accordingly, people living in the occupied palestinian territories are facing different challenges affecting their choice to invest in education. first, investment in human capital is less risky than physical capital, since it is less likely to be confiscated or demolished by the israeli authority. second, working inside israeli markets provides better wages and requires little or no educational attainment compared to local markets. third, there is a remarkable increase in the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 120 published by scholink inc. unemployment rate among university graduates in the last decades (alkafri, 2011). finally, the private returns to education in palestine are still less than the ones obtained in other countries (note 16). thus, investment in human capital seems a good solution to decrease the dependency on the israeli labor market. also, education can lead to creating structural changes in the palestinian economy in particular with the recent trends in remote working environments that can overcome the restriction on movement imposed by the israeli government. references algan, y., cahuc, p., & zylberberg, a. 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(2014). report to the ad hoc liaison committee new york. technical report, september 22. new york: office of the united nations special coordinator for the middle east peace process. available at: https://unsco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/un_ahlc_report_sept_2014.pdf vishwanath, t., b. blankespoor, f. calandra, n. krishnan, m. mahadevan, and m. y. (2014). seeing believes: poverty in the palestinian territories. technical report. washington, dc: world bank group. notes note 1. cali and miaari (2015) main estimation suggests that an increase of usd 10 million in palestinian exports of a sector employing 10 percent of the locality’s private employment reduces subsequent conflict-related fatalities in that locality by between 2.1 percent and 2.8 percent. note 2. in all specifications, benmelech, berrebi, and klor (2010) controlled the demographic characteristics accounted for, including average years of education, percentage of population living in a refugee camp, average age, proportion of males in the local population, and proportion of married population. also, a west bank dummy was included to control for regional unobservable characteristics that are constant over time, as well as year fixed effects. the error term was clustered at the regional level, capturing nonsystematic determinants of the district’s changes in economic conditions. the identification strategy does not focus on levels, but rather changes of all variables used in the analysis, thus effectively controlling for districts’ fixed characteristics that may jointly affect economic conditions and the occurrence of suicide attacks. note 3. area c consists of approximately 60 percent of the west bank area where the palestinian authority does not have any control there (security or civil). communities in area c are at higher risk of adverse life circumstances due to the lack of primary services (vishwanath et al., 2014). note 4. angrist (1996) employed administrative data obtained by israeli army records on days under a curfew imposed in the palestinian territories, combined with control variables on civil disturbances as ivs. the following covariates were treated as endogenous variables: days worked in israel; days worked in the comparison region, wages in the comparison region, and total earning in the comparison region. note 5. for example, in 2007, cali and miaari (2018) estimated that the effects of reducing employment opportunities and wages were translated into a reduction in the west bank gdp of around usd 229 million or 6 percent. most of these losses are due to lower wages. note 6. the 'big five traits’ covers the following characteristics: openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. these are widely used to gauge psychological well-being of children. (see barlett & anderson 2012) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 124 published by scholink inc. note 7. psychologists differentiate between two types of children’s behaviors and disorders based on their reactions to stressors. the externalizing behavior includes symptoms of aggression and delinquency while the internalizing problems measures symptoms of depression, anxiety, somatic complaints, and social withdrawal(foster et al., 2008). note 8. the strengths and difficulties questionnaire (sdq) is a brief behavioral screening questionnaire about 3-16-year olds. there are currently three self-reported versions of the sdq in the following categories: children, parents, and teachers. for a detailed description of the sdq, see http://www.sdqinfo.com/. note 9. one potential problem of main ols estimation is that its residuals might be spatially correlated, biasing the standard error of the estimates downward. therefore, the standard was clustered at the locality level, assuming that the error terms are correlated within geographic clusters but uncollected across them. note 10. the decomposition technique consists of separating the wage equation for those working in area c and other wages in areas a and b. these separations then consist three elements: 1) the wage differences related to endowment effect capture the explained part of the model and are attributed to differences in workers’ characteristics; 2) the wage differential that is attributed to the difference in the estimated coefficient; and 3) the interaction between the endowment and coefficient effect. the second and third terms together constitute the unexplained part (residual) of the wage differential. note 11. the main estimation shows lower wages for area c workers by about 8 percent relative to workers in areas a and b. this penalty reduces to approximately half after controlling for workers’ demographic characteristics and locality variables, but is still significant. note 12. public employment represents 36.4 percent and 15.4 percent of total employment in the gaza strip and in the west bank, respectively (pcbs 2016). note 13.salaries represent 55 percent of total governmental expenditures (pmof 2016). note 14. the iv estimates’ results are consistent with the ols estimation, though the magnitude of the effect is smaller (52 jobs rather than 71). note 15. algan, cahuc, and zylberberg (2002)suggests that the higher public wages would increase returns to seeking public employment, attracting workers out of the private sector. note 16. average returns to schooling from the ols are around 6 percent internationally but over 9 percent from these alternative methods. the uk experiences a higher return on investment in human capital; the comparison is between 7 percent and 9 percent from the ols to a range of 11 percent to 15 percent from the iv/experimental methods (harmon et al., 2000). advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 202 original paper tourism demand forecast and future market trend research weichen ke1* 1 the university of queensland, st lucia, qld 4072, australia * corresponding author, e-mail: w.ke@uqconnect.edu.au received: april 19, 2024 accepted: may 15, 2024 online published: may 29, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n2p202 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n2p202 abstract this study aims to reveal the trends and changes in the development of the tourism market by forecasting tourism demand and future market trends, providing important references for decision-makers in the tourism industry. we adopted data analysis methods to construct a tourism demand forecasting model and analyzed the impact of different factors on tourism demand. the main findings include the trend of diversification and dynamism in tourism demand due to changes in economic, social, and environmental factors. the implications of this study for future market trends include guiding the tourism industry in formulating corresponding strategies to enhance market competitiveness. in summary, this study provides important references for the future development of the tourism market and has significant theoretical and practical implications. keywords tourism demand, market forecasting, future trends, tourism market, data analysis. 1. introduction the tourism industry, as an important component of the global economy, plays a crucial role in driving economic growth and social development in many countries and regions. with the acceleration of globalization and the improvement of people's living standards, tourism demand has become increasingly diversified and personalized, expanding from traditional sightseeing tourism to diversified directions such as cultural experiences and eco-tourism. in such a context, understanding the changing trends in tourism demand and forecasting future market trends has become a focus of attention for managers and decision-makers in the tourism industry. however, the development of the tourism market is influenced by various factors, including economic conditions, socio-cultural environment, technological advancements, and more. therefore, constructing tourism demand forecasting models through data analysis methods to reveal the patterns and trends behind tourism demand is of great significance for formulating effective market strategies and planning future development directions. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 203 this study aims to delve into the forecasting of tourism demand and future market trends. through a review of relevant literature and the application of data analysis methods, we aim to reveal the dynamic changes in the development of the tourism market, providing theoretical support and practical guidance for decision-makers in the industry. in the subsequent sections of the paper, we will detail the methods, major findings, and analysis, as well as prospects and recommendations for future research. 2. current status and method overview of tourism demand research 2.1 overview of tourism demand forecasting models and methods tourism demand forecasting is a crucial aspect of the development and operation of the tourism industry. in forecasting tourism demand, researchers have proposed various models and methods. among them, time series analysis models are one of the most commonly used methods, which can reveal the changing trends of future tourism demand by fitting and forecasting historical data. additionally, regression analysis models are also widely applied in tourism demand forecasting, establishing relationship models between tourism demand and various influencing factors to predict the impact of different factors on tourism demand. in recent years, with the development of machine learning technology, machine learning models have also become a research hotspot (song & lindsay, 2006). models such as decision trees and neural networks can predict the future trends of tourism demand by learning patterns from large-scale data. furthermore, new methods such as time-space models and intelligent algorithm models have also been introduced into tourism demand forecasting, aiming to comprehensively consider the influence of time and space factors and find the optimal forecasting model and parameter combination through optimization algorithms. in summary, tourism demand forecasting models and methods are diverse, each with its applicable scenarios and limitations. choosing the appropriate forecasting model and method requires comprehensive consideration of data characteristics, research objectives, and practical application needs to improve the accuracy and reliability of forecasting. 2.2 current status of tourism market trends research research on tourism market trends is an important approach to understanding and grasping the development trends of the tourism industry. currently, the research on tourism market trends presents several aspects: firstly, researchers analyze the trends of global and regional tourism markets to explore the development trends and potential growth points of the tourism market. through research on international tourism flows, tourism consumption structures, tourist destination preferences, etc., they reveal the characteristics and development trends of different regions and market segments. secondly, with the popularization and application of information technology, the digitalization and intelligence of the tourism market have become research hotspots (song, 2019). researchers focus on the impact of new technologies such as the internet, mobile communication technology, and big data on the tourism market, discussing the development trends and market prospects of new formats such as smart tourism, online booking, and personalized recommendations. additionally, sustainable development and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 204 ecotourism have also become important directions in tourism market research. with the increasing awareness of environmental protection and the rise of green consumption, researchers focus on exploring sustainable development models such as eco-tourism, cultural heritage protection, and community participation in tourism, promoting the sustainable development and ecological protection of the tourism industry. furthermore, the internationalization and cross-border cooperation of the tourism market have also attracted attention. researchers focus on the degree of openness of the international tourism market, changes in tourism trade policies, the globalization trend of the tourism industry chain, and tourism cooperation and exchanges between different countries and regions, providing references and support for the development of transnational tourism enterprises and cross-border tourism products. in summary, research on tourism market trends presents a diversified and multi-layered characteristic, covering different aspects of global, regional, and segmented markets. researchers provide theoretical support and practical guidance for the development of the tourism industry by discussing market trends, technological innovations, sustainable development, and international cooperation (zhang et al., 2020). 3. research methodology 3.1 research design and data collection methods this study employs a mixed-method approach, combining quantitative and qualitative research designs, to comprehensively analyze tourism demand forecasting and future market trends. the following outlines our research design and data collection methods: quantitative research design: initially, we gathered a substantial amount of historical tourism data, including but not limited to tourist arrivals at destinations, seasonal variations in tourism, economic indicators, policy changes, etc. these data were sourced from various channels, such as government agencies, tourism companies, and online platforms, covering multiple regions and periods. we conducted statistical analysis and model construction using this data to quantitatively predict future changes in tourism demand (faulkner & peter, 1995). qualitative research design: in addition to quantitative data analysis, we conducted a series of qualitative studies, including expert interviews, surveys, and focus group discussions. through communication and exchange with professionals and consumers in the tourism industry, we gained in-depth insights into their views and expectations regarding the future trends of the tourism market. these qualitative research methods provided us with rich empirical data and a deep understanding, assisting in interpreting and complementing the results of quantitative analysis. data collection methods: we employed various data collection methods, including: obtaining historical tourism data from official statistical databases; extracting relevant data from online platforms using web scraping techniques; collecting questionnaire data through face-to-face or online surveys; conducting in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with industry practitioners to obtain expert insights and industry perspectives. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 205 by comprehensively applying quantitative and qualitative research methods, as well as multiple data collection techniques, we were able to thoroughly analyze tourism demand forecasting and future market trends, providing scientific evidence and practical guidance for the development of the tourism industry (wu, song, & shen, 2017). 3.2 construction process of tourism demand forecasting model to accurately predict future tourism demand, we constructed a comprehensive forecasting model, considering various factors. firstly, we performed data cleaning and preprocessing on the collected historical tourism data to ensure data quality and accuracy. the cleaning process involved handling missing values, outliers, and data transformations. next, we conducted feature selection and extraction, selecting feature variables closely related to tourism demand, such as the geographical location of tourist destinations, seasonal factors, economic indicators, policy changes, etc. when selecting appropriate forecasting models, we considered the characteristics of the data and the complexity of the predictions. based on the analysis results of historical data, we chose models suitable for time series data, such as arima (autoregressive integrated moving average) and sarima (seasonal autoregressive integrated moving average). then, we divided the historical data into training and testing sets, trained the selected models using the training set, and evaluated the model performance using the testing set. we utilized a series of evaluation metrics, such as root mean square error (rmse), mean absolute error (mae), etc., to assess the predictive accuracy and effectiveness of the model. to address issues and shortcomings encountered during the model training process, we conducted model parameter tuning and validation, optimizing the predictive performance of the model by adjusting its parameters and structure and verifying the robustness and reliability of the model through techniques such as cross-validation. finally, we used the trained model to forecast future tourism demand. based on the forecast results obtained from the model, we analyzed the development trends and changes in the future tourism market, providing decision-makers with references for decision-making. through the aforementioned steps, we constructed a comprehensive tourism demand forecasting model, considering various factors and providing effective tools and methods for understanding and predicting the future trends of the tourism market (witt,& christine, 1995). 3.3 selection of data analysis methods and tools in this study, we selected a series of classic data analysis methods and tools to analyze the trends of tourism demand and future market trends. our selection considered the characteristics of the data, the research objectives, and the complexity of the models. firstly, considering the characteristics of historical tourism data, we employed time series analysis methods. time series analysis can capture trends and seasonal characteristics of data over time, which is crucial for predicting future trends. in time series analysis, we chose models such as arima (autoregressive integrated moving average) and sarima (seasonal autoregressive integrated moving average) to address the non-stationarity and seasonal fluctuations of the data (peng, song, & geoffrey, 2014). secondly, considering the complexity and diversity of the data, we combined quantitative and qualitative analysis methods. quantitative www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 206 analysis methods were mainly used for statistical analysis and model construction of historical data to quantitatively predict future tourism demand. qualitative analysis methods were used to gain insights into the underlying patterns and trends of the tourism market through expert interviews, surveys, and focus group discussions, obtaining empirical data and professional insights. in the selection of data analysis tools, we employed various tools for data processing, model building, and result visualization. among them, statistical analysis software such as r and python were used for data processing and model building, providing rich support for data analysis libraries and algorithms. common tools such as spss and excel were used for preliminary data analysis and visualization, facilitating an intuitive understanding of data characteristics and trends. in summary, we comprehensively considered the characteristics of the data, research objectives, and model complexity in the selection of data analysis methods and tools to ensure the scientificity and reliability of the research results. by comprehensively applying quantitative and qualitative analysis methods, as well as various data analysis tools, we were able to thoroughly analyze tourism demand forecasting and future market trends, providing theoretical support and practical guidance for the development of the tourism industry. 4. key findings and analysis 4.1 presentation of tourism demand forecasting results through the analysis of historical tourism data and the construction of forecasting models, we obtained predictions for future tourism demand. the following are our key findings: firstly, we observed that with changes in economic, social, and environmental factors, tourism demand exhibits a trend toward diversification and dynamism. historical data indicates that with economic development and improvements in living standards, tourism demand shows a steady growth trend. however, tourism demand varies across different regions and seasons, influenced by factors such as seasonality and policy changes. secondly, using the established forecasting model, we predicted future tourism demand. the forecast results indicate that, under conditions of stable economic growth and policy support, future tourism demand will continue to grow. particularly with the promotion of emerging tourist destinations and unique tourism products, the tourism market will present a more diversified and personalized development pattern. additionally, we found that, with technological advancements and changing consumer demands, the tourism industry will encounter new opportunities and challenges (law et al., 2019). the prevalence of the internet and mobile technology has made tourism product booking and experiences more convenient but has also intensified competition and increased consumer choices. therefore, tourism enterprises need to innovate continuously and improve service quality and experiences to meet the increasingly diverse needs of consumers. in summary, our forecast results indicate that the future tourism market will demonstrate steady growth, diversification, and personalization trends. this provides an important reference for decision-makers in the tourism industry, aiding in the formulation of corresponding market strategies and planning future development directions. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 207 4.2 analysis of the impact of different factors on tourism demand when analyzing the influencing factors of tourism demand, we considered multiple aspects and conducted an in-depth analysis. firstly, economic factors are one of the important factors affecting tourism demand. economic growth and the increase in per capita income usually stimulate people's willingness to consume tourism, especially for high-quality and high-consumption tourism products and services. additionally, macroeconomic indicators such as fluctuations in currency exchange rates and inflation rates directly affect tourism costs and consumer purchasing power, thereby influencing the size and structure of tourism demand. secondly, social factors include demographic structure, social culture, lifestyle, etc., which have significant impacts on tourism demand. with the aging population and changes in demographic structure, the demand for special tourism products such as elderly tourism and health tourism is gradually increasing. meanwhile, the demand for cultural experiences, ecological environment protection, etc., is becoming increasingly prominent, which affects the choice of tourist destinations and the design of tourism products. policy factors are one of the important external environmental factors affecting the tourism market. government tourism policies, visa policies, tax policies, etc., directly affect the scale and structure of the tourism market. for example, tourism subsidy policies and promotional activities of tourist destinations affect changes in tourism demand and the competitive landscape of the market. finally, technological factors have profound impacts on tourism demand. the popularity of the internet and mobile communication technology has made tourism information acquisition, booking, payment, etc., more convenient, driving the growth of tourism consumption and market expansion. meanwhile, the application of new technologies, such as virtual reality and artificial intelligence, brings new development opportunities and challenges to the tourism industry. in summary, tourism demand is influenced by a variety of factors, and understanding and analyzing these influencing factors is crucial for grasping market dynamics and future development trends (song, stephen, & zhang, 2008). 4.3 discussion of possibilities and trends in market trends through the analysis of tourism demand and consideration of influencing factors, we can discuss the possibilities and trends of the future tourism market. here are some of our viewpoints and predictions: firstly, with the continued growth of the global economy and the improvement of people's living standards, the tourism market will maintain a growth trend. particularly in emerging markets and developing countries, with the increase in the middle-class population and the change in consumption concepts, tourism demand will continue to grow. at the same time, the market potential of special tourism products such as elderly tourism and health tourism will gradually be released. secondly, with the advancement and application of technology, the tourism industry will usher in new development opportunities and challenges. the prevalence of the internet and mobile communication technology has made tourism information acquisition, booking, payment, etc., more convenient, driving the growth of tourism consumption and market expansion. meanwhile, the application of new technologies such as virtual reality and artificial intelligence will bring more possibilities for innovation in tourism products www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 208 and services. furthermore, the trend towards diversification and personalization of the tourism market will be further strengthened. consumers' demands for tourism products and services are becoming increasingly diverse, with increasing emphasis on cultural experiences, ecological environments, personalized customization, etc. therefore, tourism enterprises need to innovate continuously and improve service quality and experiences to meet the increasingly diverse needs of consumers. finally, it is important to note that the development of the tourism market is influenced by various factors, including economic conditions, policy environments, social and cultural factors, etc. therefore, we need to closely monitor changes in the domestic and international situation and flexibly adjust market strategies and operating models to respond to market uncertainties and challenges. in summary, the future tourism market will demonstrate trends of steady growth, technology-driven diversification, and personalization. understanding and grasping these possibilities and trends in market trends is of great significance for formulating effective market strategies and planning future development directions. 5. limitations and future outlook 5.1 analyzing the limitations and shortcomings of the study while this study has extensively explored tourism demand prediction and future market trends, several limitations and shortcomings need to be acknowledged. first, the data and methods employed in this study may have limitations. in terms of data, despite our efforts to collect diverse historical tourism data, there might be limitations regarding data completeness and timeliness, potentially failing to cover all regions and periods comprehensively. regarding methods, although we employed various quantitative and qualitative analysis methods, the establishment of models and predictive outcomes may still be influenced by data quality and model assumptions, leading to potential errors and uncertainties. secondly, while this study analyzed factors influencing tourism demand, it did not comprehensively consider all possible factors. for instance, factors such as culture, climate, and natural disasters also significantly impact tourism demand, but this study did not delve into them deeply. therefore, future research could expand the scope of factors considered to enhance the comprehensiveness and inclusivity of the study. additionally, this study primarily focused on quantitative analysis, lacking depth and breadth in qualitative research. although we conducted qualitative research, such as expert interviews and surveys, there is still a need to strengthen our understanding of consumer behavior and attitudes. hence, future research could enhance the design and implementation of qualitative research to enrich and deepen the understanding and interpretation of tourism demand. in summary, this study has limitations in data and methods, incomplete consideration of influencing factors, and deficiencies in qualitative research. therefore, in future research, we will further refine the research design and methods, strengthen data collection and analysis, and expand the consideration of influencing factors to enhance the scientific and practical value of the research. 5.2 exploring future research directions and improvement possibilities in response to the limitations and shortcomings of this study, we propose several potential www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 209 improvements and future research directions. firstly, future research could further improve data collection and analysis. we could attempt to obtain more comprehensive and timely tourism data, including big data obtained through new technological means, mobile device trajectory data, etc., to enhance the accuracy and predictive capability of the forecasting model. moreover, advanced data analysis techniques such as machine learning and deep learning could be introduced to improve the predictive accuracy and robustness of the model. secondly, future research could enhance the comprehensive analysis of influencing factors. in addition to economic, social, policy, and technological factors, other potential factors affecting tourism demand, such as culture, climate, and natural disasters, could be considered. system dynamics modeling, factor analysis, and other methods could be employed to delve into the interactions and relationships among various factors to better grasp the dynamic changes in the market. furthermore, future research could strengthen the design and implementation of qualitative research. more expert interviews, focus group discussions, and other qualitative research could be conducted to gain deeper insights into consumer needs, preferences, and behaviors, providing richer and more profound explanations for quantitative analysis. additionally, scenario analysis, case studies, and other methods could be used to conduct in-depth analyses of tourism demand under different market environments, providing practical guidance for market positioning and product design for tourism enterprises. finally, future research could focus on emerging trends and challenges in the tourism industry. with changes in people's lifestyles and consumption attitudes, the tourism industry will face new opportunities and challenges, such as sustainable development, green tourism, and smart tourism. future research could focus on these emerging areas, exploring new research methods and models, and contributing to the sustainable development of the tourism industry. in conclusion, future research could improve and expand in data collection and analysis, comprehensive analysis of influencing factors, strengthening qualitative research, and focusing on new development trends and challenges. these improvements and expansions will help enhance the scientific and practical value of the research, providing more comprehensive and in-depth theoretical support and practical guidance for the development of the tourism industry. 6. conclusion based on an in-depth analysis of tourism demand and a comprehensive consideration of influencing factors, we have conducted a comprehensive assessment of the future trends in the tourism market. firstly, we predict that the future tourism market will continue to show a growth trend. the steady growth of the global economy and the improvement of people's living standards will promote the continuous increase in tourism demand, especially in emerging markets and developing countries, where the rise of the middle class and changes in consumption concepts will further expand the tourism market. secondly, technological progress will be a key driving force for the future development of the tourism market. the popularity of the internet and mobile communication technology will make booking and experiencing tourism products more convenient, while the application of new technologies www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 210 such as virtual reality and artificial intelligence will bring new opportunities and challenges to the tourism industry. additionally, the tourism market will show a trend towards diversification and personalization. consumers' demands for tourism products and services are becoming more diversified, with increasing emphasis on cultural experiences, ecological environments, and personalized customization. therefore, tourism enterprises need to innovate continuously and improve service quality and experiences to meet the increasingly diverse needs of consumers. finally, it is essential to closely monitor changes and trends in the market. the tourism market is influenced by various factors, including economic conditions, policy environments, and social and cultural factors. therefore, we need to adjust market strategies and operational models flexibly to cope with market uncertainties and challenges. in summary, we are optimistic about the future development trends of the tourism market, emphasizing the importance of technological innovation, personalized services, and flexible responses to market changes. references faulkner, b., & peter, v. (1995). an integrative approach to tourism demand forecasting. tourism management, 16.1(1995), 29-37. https://doi.org/10.1016/0261-5177(94)00005-u law, r. et al. (2019). "tourism demand forecasting: a deep learning approach." annals of tourism research, 75(2019), 410-423.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.annals.2019.01.014 peng, b., song, h. y., & geoffrey, i. c. (2014). a meta-analysis of international tourism demand forecasting and implications for practice. tourism management, 45(2014), 181-193. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tourman.2014.04.005 song, h. y., & lindsay, t. (2006). tourism demand forecasting. international handbook on the economics of tourism, (2006), 89-114. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781847201638.00010 song, h. y., richard, tr. q., & jinah, p. (2019). a review of research on tourism demand forecasting: launching the annals of tourism research curated collection on tourism demand forecasting. annals of tourism research, 75(2019), 338-362. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.annals.2018.12.001 song, h. y., stephen, f. w., & zhang, x. y. (2008). developing a web-based tourism demand forecasting system. tourism economics, 14(3), 445-468. https://doi.org/10.5367/000000008785633578 witt, s. f., & christine, a. w. (1995). forecasting tourism demand: a review of empirical research. international journal of forecasting, 11(3), 447-475. https://doi.org/10.1016/0169-2070(95)00591-7 wu, d. c. g., song, h. y., & shen, s. j. (2017). new developments in tourism and hotel demand modeling and forecasting. international journal of contemporary hospitality management, 29.1(2017), 507-529. https://doi.org/10.1108/ijchm-05-2015-0249 zhang, c. y. et al. (2020). knowledge mapping of tourism demand forecasting research. tourism management perspectives, 35(2020), 100715. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tmp.2020.100715 2.1 overview of tourism demand forecasting models 2.2 current status of tourism market trends resear 3.1 research design and data collection methods 3.2 construction process of tourism demand forecas 3.3 selection of data analysis methods and tools 4.1 presentation of tourism demand forecasting res 4.2 analysis of the impact of different factors on 4.3 discussion of possibilities and trends in mark 5.1 analyzing the limitations and shortcomings of 5.2 exploring future research directions and impro microsoft word ape-v3n3-p1 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 1 original paper the paradigm of unity (pu) as the basis for a “copernican revolution” (cr) in the social sciences (note 1) adam biela1* 1 institute of psychology, the maria curie-skłodowska university at lublin, poland * adam biela, institute of psychology, the maria curie-skłodowska university at lublin, poland received: june 6, 2020 accepted: june 23, 2020 online published: june 28, 2020 doi:10.22158/ape.v3n3p1 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v3n3p1 abstract thomas kuhn regarded the copernican revolution (cr) as the one which best illustrates the nature of scientific revolutions in the history of science. this is related with the essence of the paradigm in a kuhnian sense that is a mental shift involving change in the theories, instruments, values and assumptions used to understand a set of phenomena. copernicus had to change the well-established geocentric system, which functioned not only in the science of his day but also in the culture, tradition, social perception, and even the mentality of religious and political the concept of paradigm of unity (pu) is used to denote the societal activity of chiara lubich and the focolare movemen—in building the psychosocial infrastructure for unity in various social domains; for example, in the economy of communion, in politics (politicians for unity project), in public media (journalists for unity), in ecumenism and interreligious contacts (ecumenical and interreligious focolari centers). this conception is a great inspiration, a kind of copernican revolution for the social sciences, which would motivate researchers in the social sciences to build their own research paradigm with a mental and methodological power and potentiality that could offer new vision to the social sciences (as copernicus did in the natural sciences). keywords kuhnian paradigm, paradigm of unity, copernican revolution for social sciences, analogical cogito, chiara lubich, methodology of political sciences, methodology of economics, agoral gatherings 1. introduction aristotle in his rhetoric (1356 b 3) (note 2) distinguishes two kinds of inferences that generate persuasion: enthymeme (ἐνθύμημα) and paradigma (παράδειγμα). enthymeme denotes an inference where at least one of the premises is assumed in memory and is not articulated. paradigma, in turn, is www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 2 published by scholink inc. an inference that serves to draw a general rule from several particular examples, which process aristotle denotes as epagoge (επαγωγή), or induction (topics, book 1, 12) (note 3). in chapters 18-26 he differentiates two kinds of paradigmatic inference: comparisons and fables (i.e., inventing an illustration). in contemporary literature the term paradigm is used in many ways. there are two main interpretations of this term, however: 1. paradigm in a narrow sense, i.e., a new method, model, research schema, approach; and 2. paradigm in a broader sense, as a change in vision of the reality being a subject of research. this second meaning was defined by t. kuhn (2012), who underscored that paradigm in its nature is of a revolutionary character. it requires a change of mental understanding of the subject of research and the method of investigating. therefore, discovering a new paradigm requires a mental revolution first of all in the mind of the discoverer. moreover, the discoverer should transfer this mental revolution into his or her social environment, i.e. research societies and social authorities. this means that the new vision of the researcher, his or her methods of investigation and outcomes should be formulated in such a way that it is understood and accepted by this social environment. 2. the concept of paradigm in contemporary science and the copernican revolution thomas kuhn regarded the copernican revolution as the one which, in the history of science, is the most prominent example illustrating the nature of scientific revolutions. copernicus set out to change the geocentric paradigm which had been well-established from the ancient times of ptolemy and aristotle. it functioned not only in the science of his day but also in culture, tradition, social perception and even in the mentality of religious and political authorities. for copernicus, he liocentrism was not just an astronomical hypothesis, but it a real and truly existing set of empirically-proven facts, discovered by himself. copernicus’ transformation of the paradigm from geocentric to heliocentric encompassed a stability of this new vision of the world, one based on the objective facts of empirical astronomical observation discovered by copernicus himself and introduced with his own mathematical analysis (i.e., advanced trigonometrical relations). and he did so in a well-prepared empirical, methodological and psychological way which we can observe, among others, in the dedicatory letter to his contemporary pope paul iii—published as an introduction to his treatise de revolution bus orbium coelestium (copernicus, 1543, 1996) (note 4). thus he created a new paradigm, or cognitive structure, which reorganized the understanding of order in the world. according to kuhn (2012), only the empirical sciences apply paradigms in this way. the humanities and social sciences have not elaborated any paradigm of this significance until now. thus, one can pose the question: is it really possible to identify a paradigm for the social sciences in a kuhnian sense? 3. the “copernican revolution” in the social sciences according to kuhn (2012) a paradigm is understood as a new vision, a mental breakthrough, which has so far been elaborated only by the natural sciences, with the most obvious example being the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 3 published by scholink inc. heliocentric paradigm of copernicus. however, we will use reasoning by analogy as a cognitive vehicle to construct a new paradigm in a kuhnian sense for the social sciences. in his works on analogy, biela (1991, 1998) introduced the notion of analogicalcogito which denotes reasoning by analogy as a cognitive “vehicle” for seeking connections, relations and correspondence between a new domain in question and the well-known domain. analogy is used as a cognitive vehicle in science, particularly when: formulating a new hypothesis, introducing new concepts, and arguing new theses. a new domain is a reality that is in question, because, at the least, it is less known. therefore, the question is how to cope with a new reality which, on the one hand, is expected to be understood, and, on the other hand, is risky because of its novelty and requires decisions as to which path to follow and how to cognitively encompass the current state of the environment. for our purposes we will use analogy as a cognitive vehicle in arguing a mental resemblance between the genesis of copernicus’ de revolutionibus and chiara lubich’s intuitive discovery of people’s ‘communion’ with its constitutive dynamic, which is building unity with others. from a mental perspective one can observe a resemblance between the copernican revolution in astronomy and the path of chiara lubich, who created the inspiration for constructing a revolutionary kuhnian-type paradigm for the social sciences via her social action and writings. copernicus had to break down the mentally-based ptolemaic geocentric system. chiara lubich had to break down the vision of human individuals that was well-established since antiquity, as living in endless conflict, aggression and fears in their communities. plato wrote in his state that in each city there are really two cities: the city of well-being and rich citizens, and the city of poverty, i.e., of poor citizens. therefore, he concludes, where rich individuals are in close proximity with the poor, there will be never-ending struggle, conflict and mutual aggression. this vision could be called the paradigm of divisions producing disintegration, conflicts, war and anxiety. in the twentieth century, two very dangerous totalitarian systems, i.e., communism and nazism, tried to “solve” this problem by functioning in a pattern typical of plato’ shuman society, full of cruel divisions and disintegration. the setotalitarian systems proposed two simple solutions for human activity: aggression and fear. that is why the reviews of the social sciences, to which sociology, pedagogy, psychology, the management sciences, the political sciences and journalism belong have not elaborated a different paradigm in a kuhniansense. they reflect (biela, 2006) that the main focus of research emphasizes the processes and phenomena of disintegration and pathologies, rather than integration and sustainable development, the understanding that human ambitions override the need for the common good, and finally, that the autonomy of individuals or elitist groups who do not care for the good of other persons dominates over the need to learn how to cooperate and educate for altruism. for example, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 4 published by scholink inc. one of the main findings in the field of social perception is the so-called phenomenon of ethnocentrism found in the area of in-group and out-group perception (see: e.g., in denominational groups; biela, mckeachie, lin, lingoes, 1993). another example may be the theories and research on collective behavior which were initiated by gustav lebon’s (1895, 2018) crowd psychology and the classical statements by herbert blumer (1970) (note 5). this approach is evidently focused on the destructive behaviors of people who lose their individuality in mass-gatherings (blumer, 1970, plummer, 1998, 2020; zimbardo, 1970; reicher, stott, cronin, adang, 2004). what did chiara lubich do in spite of the anxiety and chaos of war in an extremely difficult and risky situation in 1944 in trento (lubich, 2007)? she decided not to escape from her own life emergency, but together with her friends to help other people to survive, those who were in a much more difficult situation. amidst the bombing of the war, she evidently documented, in terms of real facts, that building unity is possible in social endeavors (even in extreme environments). examples are social phenomena which unite persons of different economic, educational, political orientations, cultural backgrounds, denominations and regions, professional and vocational levels, and even different academic disciplines—to work together for the defined unity building projects in order to achieve some added values. practical applications introduced by the focolare movement include entrepreneurships, which are part of the economy of communion projects, focolare ecumenical communities,joint interreligious activities, international cultural and sport youth events, politicians for unity projects, interdisciplinary workshops for a new humanity, etc. what is the novelty and the differentio specifica between the proposals of chiara lubich, i.e., the focol are movement’s proposal to build unity with others, on the one hand, and marxists’ proposalsto solve the work-capital conflict, or the earlier declarations ofliberté, egalité, fraternité during the french revolution? the french revolution proposed to reach its goals by cruel battle with enemies, and then repressions against citizens who did not agree with the new revolutionary order. a. lebon (2018) gives many examples of the cruel actions of the revolutionary crowd of the french revolution. marxist ideologists, in turn, proclaiming workers of the world unite, developed a theory of a society where the dominant class was to be the working class. in communist theory, the criterion of good was what was good for the working class. therefore, the marxists’ understanding of unity is based on division of people,and it is strictly limited to the class of workers, while chiara lubich’s notion of unity expresses the universal desire for unity with every individual, regardless of his or her social class, race, religion, education , nationality, cultural heritage or political orientation. the real novelty of chiara lubich’s kind of unity lies in its deep psychological and spiritual riches. each relationship with another human being builds unity, as mutual understanding and acceptance of the other as a gift. such an attitude is really a mutual self-transcendence, which offers the chance for growth of the persons who are in this relationship. moreover, the emotional, motivational and value content of these kinds of relationships is intended to achieve such goods like mutual love, brotherhood, understanding, acceptance and help—without any preliminary conditions. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 5 published by scholink inc. what psychological and sociological outcomes could be expected for communities which accept the above-mentioned relationships? from the perspective of social perception: decreased social stereotyping, prejudices and biases related to others who think or behave differently could be expected. from the point of view of personality, we can foresee that in a community united in this way, an increase of authenticity in human relations will be observed, and, which is also very important, the members of such-integrated communities do not lose their sense of individuality. in conclusion, the analysis of the theoretical and spiritual backgrounds of the social projects and educational arrangements of chiara lubich and the focolare movement leads us to say that they certainly represent a kind of‘copernican revolution’ in the social sciences. the essence of this revolution was a mental sea change, the discovery of a new vision of social phenomena, and particularly, a new understanding of social relationships, where communities are built through the mutual gift of persons who are seeking a deeper unity. the only known historical example of building unity which can be compared with chiara lubich’s infrastructures might be the republic of guarana in south america founded by jesuit missionaries. it which existed in the years 1610–1778 and was lauded by french philosophers of xviii century as the highest achievement in the field of social, moral, religious and educational endeavor sever attained by humankind (lugon, 1971, ruisel, 2013). 4. the paradigm of unity for the social sciences nowadays, the social sciences are desperately seeking theoretical concepts, research programs and applications, a paradigm that would shed light on the factors and regularities leading to conversion of large areas of disintegration, conflicts and wars involving senseless death, and created by some people for other people—into spaces of integration, harmony and the mutual goodwill of people toward each other. the only alternative to conflicts and social disintegration is integration; to self-centeredness—solidarity. europe's recent history has shown that even the undeterred communist block system can scatter like the proverbial house of cards, if the alternative to it is the power of human solidarity. a program should be provided to help people in building unity among themselves on a more sustainable basis than the simple negation of communism and the promotion of democracy as simply the advancement of the autonomy of the individual. it must be a program of yes to building unity in families, professional groups, local communities, economic relations, and international relations—based on the basis of the new psychological, spiritual, social and economic dimensions. the social phenomena formed by the focolare movement are signposts which demonstrate specific activities as opportunities to build unity and social integration on the basis of new and deeper principles. the activities of this movement are a living and real example of the application of the paradigm of unity to the social sciences, so much needed to attain a new applicational power capable of prevention and treatment of social pathology, conflicts, overt aggression, wars and terrorism. chiara lubich, who www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 6 published by scholink inc. imbuedher writings and social activities with the charism of preaching the gospel of unity, was a living inspiration and offers motivation for the social sciences in building an interdisciplinary paradigm of unity as a methodological basis for constructing theoretical models, strategies for empirical research and application schemas. if the paradigm of unity becomes well-established in the social sciences, it may play a role as significant as that played by the copernican revolution in the natural sciences in the xv-xvi centuries and later. analyzing the above-mentioned projects of unity in economic, educational, ecumenical and scientific endeavors with the created infrastructures, events, social phenomena and activities, one can interpret all of them as truly existing designates of the new concept. 4.1 how far are we in building the paradigm of unity in the social sciences and political sciences (biela, 1996) now? let us begin our analysis by reflecting on the methodological status of the conception of the paradigm of unity in the social science disciplines at the john paul ii catholic university of lublin. the methodological status of each of the scientific disciplines consists of three elements: the subject of research, the goals to be reached, and the research methods. following is a review of the disciplines within the university’s faculty of social sciences: sociology, psychology, pedagogy, economics, management sciences, journalism and social communication sciences and political science. 4.2 psychology, sociological and political sciences we will now review the literature regarding issues related to the paradigm of unity in the disciplines of psychology and sociology. some general introductory remarks will be found on the methodological values of the paradigm of unity in the social sciences with exemplification of these proposals for the psychological sciences (biela, 2006, 2009) and economics (biela, 2006). then biela (2013a) presented the methodological status of psychology in relation to the perspective offered by the paradigm of unity. cognitive unity, which assumes the concept of private theories of reality, is explored. this concept denotes the common sense understanding of principles based on thomas raid (2018). emotional unity is interpreted as a level of emotional integration, which is an outcome of emotional intelligence. the motivational domain of human activity is treated as the central sphere to be integrated. biela (2013a) assumed that this domain is an intentional and vectoral reality. 4.2.1 social psychology, sociology of collective behavior according to moscovici’s (1985) psychological and historical treatise on mass psychology, the 20th century can be called the age of the crowd. according to gustav lebon’s (2018) crowd psychology and ortega y gasset’s (1994) treatise on rebellious masses, the crowd played an important role in the movements which created the two totalitarian systems in europe, i.e., the communist system and fascism. these examples and the two world wars, which were also scenes of crowd and mass behavior in european countries, could lead one to draw the conclusion that collective behaviors played a largely destructive role in the history of europe in the 20th century. however, one might say that interpreting the history of the entire 20th century simply in terms of the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 7 published by scholink inc. psychology of the crowd and masses seems to be an example of a negatively-oriented bias which predominates in social psychology and sociology research. negativity bias is recognized as a psychological phenomenon by which humans pay more attention to and give more weight to negative rather than positive experiences or other kinds of information. this kind of negativity bias is observed in psychological and sociological research, where researchers pay much more attention to pathologies, abnormalities, dysfunctions, deviations, disorders, disintegrations, and other aspects of negative biases rather than to the positive side of human behavior. negativity bias is also seen in collective behavior literature. starting with le-bon’s (2018) classic study on the crowd, social psychologists have generally interpreted collective behavior in negative terms. then, freud (1921) viewed this behavior as a manifestation of negative and destructive desires, which could explode in the crowd-forming process. these negatively-biased research studies were conducted to reach the full truth about collective behaviors. yet the lack of a positive orientation makes it difficult to construct a general theory of human behavior in a collective context. biela showed in his monograph on collective behavior that the discipline should go beyond the psychology of the crowd to identify a new psychological and social force articulated in terms of the agoral gathering as a new conception of collective behavior. this approach is based on the paradigm of unity, which brings the hope of large scale self-transcendence and social integration in collective behavior situations, which definitively depicts the positive side of human nature. the authors of this monograph (i.e., biela, 2013; ferjenčik, 3013; naništová, 2013; kida, 2013; andrukiewicz, 2013; wołońciej, 2013) are convinced that in order to have a more complete understanding of collective behavior phenomenon and its role in the history of europe, one should also analyze the positive and constructive side of collective behavior. in the late 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s we can observe unbelievably rapid large-scale political and constitutional transformations in central and eastern europe. this metamorphosis was initiated on a large scale by the “solidarność” solidarity movement in the summer of 1980 in poland. the polish political experiment resulted in a new movement toward democracy, freedom and independence. this inspired other countries like hungary, czechoslovakia, bulgaria, east germany, romania, the baltic soviet republics and albania. it is hypothesized that collective behaviors (e.g., peaceful demonstrations, non-violent marches, strikes) called agoral gatherings had a significant psycho-social impact on these societies, causing rapid mental changes in people. waves of agoral gatherings changed central and eastern europe of the 1980s and 1990s. these changes accelerated a process of social integration and led citizens to articulate their need for freedom, self-determination and collective decision-making in public affairs. the authorintroduced the concept of agoral gathering with its constitutive characteristics, (i.e., 1. higher-value-oriented motives of the participants; 2. non-violent intentions of the participants; 3. voluntary participation; 4. publicity of the assembly; 5. mass scale of the gathering; 6. the experience of spiritual unity among the participants and the social meaning of the gathering; and 7. positive social impact of the gathering), which were used in research as empirical criteria to identify the cases of this www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 8 published by scholink inc. concept in society. one of the main characteristics is prescribed by the paradigm of unity: the experience of spiritual unity among the participants and the social meaning of the gathering. the origin of the wave of agoral gatherings in central and eastern europe, which effectively changed the constitutional order in that part of europe at the end of last century, is the following. this was during the first visit of pope john paul ii to poland in june 1979, where millions of men and women, workers, craftsmen, farmers, students and professionals united in a series of non-violent gatherings in open space squares, sport stadiums, and the streets. then, about one year later poles organized similar non-violent gatherings,the solidarity trade union movement strikes, in shipyards, coalmines, factories and universities, in order to achieve social self-management and the democratization of public life in poland. these strikes evoked a wave of agoral gatherings which moved from poland to hungary, then to czechoslovakia, bulgaria, east germany, lithuania, latvia, estonia, russia, romania and albania. j. ferjenčik (2013) analyzed the agoral gatherings that took place during the velvet revolution in czechoslovakia, i.e., the three main issues: 1) the macro social and political context of agoral gatherings in czechoslovakia of 1989-90, 2) psychological analysis of the agoral gatherings phenomena, a behavioral and retrospective approach, and 3) social psychology interpretations of agoral gatherings in czechoslovakia. an intriguing part of ferjenčik’s study are the interpretative considerations on all basic socio-psychological characteristics and dynamics of the velvet revolution agoral gatherings. he concludes that his analysis leads to affirmation of the existence of all constitutive characteristics of agoral gatherings noted by biela (2006). additionally, he emphasizes that a decisive role here was played by shared high moral values that determined both the observable behavior of participants as well as their emotional experiences. he stresses that all agoral gatherings in this context were strongly value-laden and the character of these values did not make it possible for participants to behave in any other way than peacefully, cooperatively and altruistically. so, if on the one hand, milgram’s famous experiments demonstrated how people may be pushed to do the worst to their fellows, the velvet revolution agoral gatherings showed that the reverse is equally possible, namely, that creating suitable conditions can lead to considerable dedication and solidarity. naništová (2013) gives a retrospective analysis of the velvet revolution agoral gatherings in slovakia from the current perspective of their former participants. her presentation of the retrospective data analysis is preceded, however, by a broad theoretical background on the interpretive schemes regarding the process of social change, collective behavior and social change, and the attributes of agoral gatherings that took place during the velvet revolution in slovakia. her intriguing comparative reflection is that: “metaphorically, we can say that this radical turning point took place in poland lasting ten years, in hungary ten months and in czechoslovakia ten days. these ten eventful days in czechoslovakia fell between november 17 and 27, 1989. on december 4 the border to austria was opened, effectively ending the iron curtain division of the east and the west.” the starting point for her theoretical reflection is the historical context of the point in time eleven years www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 9 published by scholink inc. before november 1989, when vaclav havel was considering the term ‘existential revolution’ in his book called power of the powerless, in a search for a solution to the post-totalitarian situation. according to havel (1990), the space for such a revolution should be human existence in the deepest sense. he sees the perspective of ‘existential revolution’ primarily in moral reconstruction and restoration of values like trust, openness, responsibility, solidarity and love. in turn, kida (2013) points the way towards building a model to understand the macro level transformation in poland, where the wave of agoral gatherings had its origin. the theoretical framework of this model interprets the relationship between mental change and seeing social integration perspectives in the social, economic, constitutional, and political reality. this framework is defined as the theory of cognitive and solidarity-subject oriented needs fulfillment. most important here is the notion of “cognitive needs” and of “solidarity-subject oriented needs.” kida underlines that the agoral gathering appears as a new positive psycho-social phenomenon that involves cognitive and value-oriented processes. one of these processes is thinking by analogy about the expectations, desires and ideas of others that correspond to one’s own. this gathering initiated the process of social integration and human solidarity and accelerated large-scale political changes in europe. therefore, the agoral gathering might be recognized as a first and necessary step to large-scale mental changes of the social consciousness of the participants (e.g., a sense of togetherness, a need for social integration and solidarity). andrukiewicz (2013) interprets pilgrimages as agoral gatherings. it has to be underscored that identification of a given pilgrimage as an agoral gathering does not automatically mean that each pilgrimage is one. in order to interpret a pilgrimage as an agoral meeting, it is essential for specific circumstances and conditions to appear so that processes typical for the agoral gathering are able to function. this is not obviously the case for all pilgrimages. there are pilgrimages where individual and personal motives dominate on a significant scale among participants, and the process of integration, experience of community spirit as well as sense of the importance and the influence of a social event is not sufficiently noticeable. however, in order to identify such differences, it is necessary to conduct an empirical verification of the already-mentioned conditions for agoral gatherings based on relevant empirical research. this is a task which opens a wide field for future research concerning mass pilgrimages and types of agoral gatherings. andrukiewicz provides an empirical verification with research outcomes and results analysis based on the fifteenth pilgrimage of radio maria family to częstochowa. in the course of this analysis, the question arose as to whether the list of the seven constitutive characteristics of agoral gatherings is exhaustive and if any significant role of the factor which could be described as “representative” was noted. and finally, wołońciej (2013) interprets agoral gathering processes in terms of collective memory and a cultural dimension, the narrative behavior of the participants. his analysis explores the notion of agoral gathering (biela, 1989) from the socio-cultural perspective and bridges the concept of collective behavior, memory and culture. collective behaviors of the homo socialis seem to be directly linked to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 10 published by scholink inc. the functions of language and symbols as carriers of culture in agoral gatherings. wołońciej introduces the concept of collective memory in the context of proverb-like thinking to analyze collective behavior and provide a new theoretical framework for analysis and interpretation of the large-scale social transformations. he focuses on the agoral gathering as an example of collective behavior phenomena conditioned by culture and transmitted in a language of commonly used symbolic expressions. 4.2.2 prenatal psychology, pedagogy and educational sciences d. kornas-biela (2013) presents her reflections on applying the conception of the paradigm of unity in the areas of prenatal psychology, on the one hand, and prenatal education and prenatal pedagogy as a new pedagogical subdisciline, on the other. the author answers the following questions in her publication: 1. what would the paradigm of unity mean in prenatal education and pedagogy? 2. what scope and what areas would this paradigm address in prenatal education and pedagogy? 3. what methodological benefits would accepting the paradigm of unity bring in prenatal pedagogy? according to kornas-biela (2013), the perspective preferred by the paradigm of unity has much in common with the proposals made by one of the theoretical trends in contemporary psychology called positive psychology (seligman, csikszentmihalyi, 2000; seligman et al., 2005). such a perspective on the study of the prenatal period of human life would focus not only on preventing any disturbances in prenatal development, in relations between the child and its relatives, and on their experiences related to procreation, but also on optimal sing the child’s integral development, prenatal bonding and the developmental character of events related to procreation, an optimistic vision of what happens from conception to the parents’ first contacts with the child after birth—concerning both the life of the conceived person, as well as its mother and those in the nearest environment. what is, then, the main focus of the paradigm of unity in prenatal education and pedagogy? first of all, this perspective means teleological unity, that is, unity resulting from the same goal, which is providing the most advantageous prenatal development, finalized with a birth of a healthy child, and supporting the parents so that their procreation experiences would contribute to their personal development—considering that the specific situation of the prenatal child requires a unity of the child’s and parents’ development. hence, the paradigm of unity in prenatal psychology, education and pedagogy suggests focusing on positive goals in theoretical studies, research methodology, as well as in practically supporting the immediate and more distant family in which the conceived child is living, and also the broader social environment. the positive goal—of supporting the proper development of the prenatal child, delivery, the health condition of the mother, and the positive experiences of all persons who are involved in the procreation process—is seen from a systemic point of view and considers various factors and conditions, the integration of which is crucial for successful prenatal—and hence, postnatal—development and human procreation as such. in the polish educational sciences (i.e., pedagogy) the experiences of the focolare communities and the concept of the paradigm of unity inspired researches to reflect mainly on theoretical conceptions of the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 11 published by scholink inc. pedagogy of unity (kozubek, 2009) and its practical applications in various domains. one of them is a pedagogy of unity project on media as a tool in education towards universal brotherhood. examples from three cultures were explored: europe, africa, and latin america (kozubek, 2009). another analysis was the pedagogical inspiration of the focolare movement towards the pedagogy of unity as a challenge for christian education (kozubek, kornas-biela, abignente, 2007). also to be emphasized are the following projects related to education and connected with the paradigm of the unity: education towards peace-making (kozubek, 2012); creating a community dimension of integrated education in accordance with the pedagogy of unity (kozubek, 2012), and a project on community and unity in selected sectors of social life (kozubek, 2015a). special attention should be paid to the upper silesian intercultural and interfaith dialogue project of youth of the three monotheistic religions – carried out under the auspices of the asia-pacific department of the ministry of foreign affairs of the republic of poland (kozubek, 2015). in the age of globalization, changes in social life are characterized by a dynamic aspiration for democracy understood as a political system enabling individual citizens and all societies to participate in creating and respecting the common good. in this context it is worth while to present the experience of the focolare movement concerning its involvement in the common good in the diverse cultural environments of different parts of the world. the core of this experience is the role of community either in forming pro-social attitudes or in acting. on the basis of these experiences, the focolare movement has developed a pedagogy of unity, which is based on the ground of relational and transcendental dimensions of the human being and of the value of community as an environment for personal development. this pedagogy as well as the pro-social activities of the movement promotes the culture of relationship, which emphasizes the pedagogical value of dialogue, mutual respect and transcending ourselves in the search to find good, truth and beauty in each human being. the pedagogy of unity as well as the experience of the movement can be a valuable source of inspiration not only for polish pedagogy, but also for each personalistically-oriented style of upbringing. 4.2.3 economics and the management sciences the disciplines of economics and the management sciences also belong to the social sciences. as far as behavioral economics is concerned, biela (2012) distinguished manifestations of integrative as opposed to narrow specialization in the development of scientificdisciplines, where the criterion of distinguishing these two tendencies is a different concept of the paradigm. this proposal, called the paradigm of unity, has been shown in more detail in economics and psychology (biela, 2006). such an approach can be described as an integrative approach for the behavioral sciences. a complementary integrative approach in the search for a new paradigm for economic science is the proposal to understand the subject of economic analysis as decision-making entities within social and economic life, as presented by k. kłosiński in his work on the rationality of decisions (kłosiński, 2009) and later by t. żylicz, who defines economics as the study of human choices (żylicz, 2009). according to this approach, the subject of economics as a science can be described as decision-making, and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 12 published by scholink inc. economic analysis will need to be understood as decision analysis. the two proposals for a new integration paradigm in economic science presented above are reconcilable with each other, because decisions as a matter of economic analysis may be taken from the point of view of maximizing the usefulness or value of the action, taking into account not only the welfare of the individual, but the entire context of the social environment and natural heritage, according to the principles set out in the paradigm of unity (biela, 2006, 2012). grochmal (2013, 2014) explores the paradigm of unity in the context of management of the businesses that function within the “economy of communion” project. he pays particular to the axiological and psychosocial conditioning of the realization of the mission and vision of the economy of communion businesses. grochmal’s thesisstands for that the paradigm of unity is a basis for shaping an organizational culture and climate in economy of communion companies. the greatest achievement of this author is the empirical verification of the theoretical assumptions of the paradigm of unity in empirical research, where the subjects were: 1) experts of economy of communion from seven countries, and 2) managers-representatives of economy of communion businesses from 22 countries located in four continents. based on the mathematical model created by this author, which takes into account the weight coefficients defined by the experts and the answers obtained from the entrepreneurs, the extent of correspondence with the paradigm of unity was calculated for each company. the practitioners of the economy of communion businesses have found the most constitutive mental and cultural changes to be:  interpersonal relationships based on honest and ethical proceedings;  partnership in the business based on mutual trust;  recognition and significance of spiritual values and the spiritual growth of people participating in management process;  radical change in the treatment of contractors to improve relationships with them;  planning of business investment with longer time horizons;  looking for new, creative solutions in order to improve society and not only the business (grochmal, 2014). in concluding part of his analysis on paradigms in management sciences, grochmal (2014) states that the paradigm of unity can be treated as an attempt to search for ageneral paradigm in the management sciences. in this context one can pose the following question: what kind of benefits will the methodological status of the particular disciplines of social sciences gain, if they accept the paradigm of unity? we will reflect in this respect on the subject and goal of the social sciences from the perspective of the paradigm of unity. 4.3 the subject of the social sciences the subject of the contemporary social sciences, as taken in their various disciplines, can be defined as psychosocial phenomena which are empirically observed in the form of human activities—revealed in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 13 published by scholink inc. human performance and behavior. for the social sciences, such behavior always takes place in the concrete stimuli of everyday life situations or in some unusual circumstances (e.g., extreme situations). from the paradigm of unity point of view, one can say that any human individual or group of people does not behave just as a passive, reactive party in the situation of concrete stimuli, but rather actively interacts with the situational stimuli, and the outcome of this interaction shapes their own situation. at the very beginning, the paradigm of unity allows us to see human behavior (individual or collective one) in a concrete situation as an outcome of the interactive processing between the human subject and the situational stimuli. the human being is an active entity shaping the unity relationship with the external stimuli (i.e., the other persons, natural environment) and the ideas existing in his or her own mind. let us illustrate the above interpretation of the subject of psychological research with descriptions of some concrete situations and examples of human behavior. these descriptions are derived come from the self-narrations of individuals who are the subjects of their interactions with situational stimuli (in those cases the source of psychosocial analysis utilizes the introspective or retrospective method), or from the narration of the witness of the situation in question. such narrations have been the inspiration for paintings, poems, novels, movies, songs, etc.—and have become part of cultural heritage and law. such an example may be the good samaritan laws, which take their name from the parable of the good samaritan, found in luke 10:25-37. this parable recounts the aid given by one traveler (from the area known as samaria) to another traveler of a different religious and ethnic background, who had been beaten and robbed by bandits and left alone on a road. this parable also talks about the other two travelers (i.e., the priest and the levite) who were going the same way. they saw the robbed man, yet did not stop to help him but continued their journey without any hesitation. this situation is well-known in the literature. applying the paradigm of unity, we can say that only the samaritan created a situation where he entered into a relationship to help someone who was in need. pietro benvenuti’s painting of the good samaritan clearly indicates that two other persons walking along the same road certainly received the same stimulus as they passed, i.e. a wounded man lying on the ground, awaiting assistance. however, their interaction with the perceived stimulus did not create, in terms of social perception, the situation of being in a helpful relationship to the other person who is in need because he had been robbed. they simply were very busy and did not care about the person lying on the ground and awaiting help. it was not their business. this kind of behavior in social psychology literature is called the bystander effect. the same situational stimuli evoked quite different behaviors at three passers-by, but only one of them created situational and behavioral unity with the person who was in real need. from this interpretation we can see that the paradigm of unity really can help to attain a clearer understanding the subject of social science disciplines. 4.4 the goals of the social sciences from the perspective of the paradigm of unity the social science disciplines are committed to two types of objectives: 1. theoretical—cognitive goals, and 2. practical–applied ones. as far as the goals of social sciences are concerned, the paradigm of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 14 published by scholink inc. unity perspective assumes that the human being first aims to build unity with him/herself (i.e., self-integration), then he or she has the opportunity to build unity with other persons (i.e., horizontal social integration); standing on the ground which is a natural environment, there is also the chance to build ecological integration, and finally, the human individual can build unity with the transcendental reality (i.e., vertical spiritual integration). however, the above-mentioned types of integration primarily deal with the ability to build empathic ties of a given individual with another person who is in need. the other person’s perspective enables a more efficient integration of one’s own personality, a more positive use of one’s own intellectual abilities, and functioning in a more creative way by getting emotionally engaged in social situations and taking up social and professional roles. first of all, the social sciences aim to recognize the regularities and psycho-social mechanisms which control and steer human behavior in the particular situations which are in question. as far as the paradigm of unity is concerned, its primary cognitive goal is to recognize human behavioral regularities in social contexts which lead towards creating a person’s internal unity with him/herself and then with other persons, with the physical and natural environment, and finally with transcendental reality (for christians, this means with the holy trinity). this theoretical-cognitive goal is explained in a more explicit way by biela (2009). therefore, as far as the cognitive goals of the paradigm of unity are concerned, they aim to discover the truth about the human being in a more integrated, synthetic and holistic way. such a perspective allows the social sciences to be equipped with the concept of personality which assumes, first of all, its internal integration with personal identity and unity in oneself as a goal. then the paradigm of unity suggest that unity building should be undertaken in other realms, in family relations (family members unity); professional relations (vocational/institutional unity), neighbor relations (neighbor unity), fellowship or friendship relations, (fellowship/friendship unity), and in local and other community relations. unity as a psychosocial reality is constituted through the process of integration, which is relational in its nature, i.e., it consists of human relations between an individual and other persons. as such it is a social and relational part of one’s personality. the process of an individuals’ integration also extends into the world of nature (the natural environment and the environment created by man), which constitutes his/her unity with the world of nature. there is a relational reality between the person and the physical environment. this means that the physical environment is also a part of one’s personality in the sense that the environment, available to the person for motor-sensory interactions, secures the fulfillment of some biological or psychological needs for this person. the more important these needs are, the more fundamental the part of the personality the given environment touches. therefore, in this context environmental pollution could be interpreted as a factor leading to the depersonalization and alienation of people who live in polluted areas. the applied goals of the social sciences could be defined from a perspective of the paradigm of unity in the following way: how to help people more effectively play their social roles, perform their tasks, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 15 published by scholink inc. solve individual or collective problems (existential, social, vocational-professional, religious, health, environmental)? in the context of the applied goals of the social sciences, the paradigm of unity suggests that one should be focused on psycho-social assistance in developing and training the skill of empathy toward other persons. this ability is based on the analogy of experience, expectations, attitudes, goals, values and motives (biela, 1991). it also makes clear that taking the perspective of the other person helps to overcome one’s own difficulties in integrating oneself (see: wojtyła, 2011). moreover, the other person’s perspective enables more efficient integration of one’s own personality, a more positive use of one’s intellectual abilities, and functioning in a more creative way by becoming emotionally engaged in social situations and taking up social and professional roles. 5. conclusion concluding our reflections on the goals of the social sciences from the paradigm of unity perspective, the author emphasizes that this point of reference offers the opportunity to prevent social, economic and political conflicts by promoting dialogue, consensus building and social integration. therefore, the paradigm of unity could be described as a teleologically-oriented paradigm for social science. the paradigm of unity (pu) conception, used in the laudatio of chiara lubich’s honorary doctorate (biela, 1996), recognized the societal contribution of the folocari movementin building psychosocial infrastructures for unity in various social domains. these domains include the economy of communion, politics (politicians for unity project), in public media (journalists for unity), in ecumenism and inter-religious contacts (ecumenical and inter-religion centers).the conception of this paradigm offers great inspiration to motivate the social sciences to construct their own research paradigm of a type of mental and methodological power and potentiality which could birth a new vision of the social world. references andrukiewicz, p. 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(1970). the human choice: individuation, reason, and order versus de individuation, impulsive and chaos. in w. j. arnold, & d. levine (eds.), nebraska symposium on motivation (vol. 17, pp. 237-307). lincoln: the university of nebraska press. żylicz, t. (2009). man’s sovereignty in economics, in k. a. kłosiński, & a. biela (eds.), man and his decisions (pp. 131-144). lublin: wydawnictwo kul. notes note 1. this article was presented as a major paper during the international congress on conflicts, dialogue and culture of unity which took place at the john paul ii catholic of lublin on june 8-9, 2016 to commemorate the doctorate honoris causa in social sciences bestowed upon chiara lubich, the founder of focolari in june 1916. note 2. see: aristotle. on rhetoric: a theory of civic discourse. trans. george a. kennedy. 2nd ed. new york: oxford university, 2007. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 19 published by scholink inc. note 3. see: aristotle. topics. translated by w. a. pickard-cambridge, adelside: ebooks@adelaide, the university of adelaide library, 2015. note 4. see: the english translation: nicolaus copernicus (1992). the manuscripts of nicholas copernicus’ minor works facsimiles. kraków: polish scientific publishers. note 5. see also: plummer k. (1998) herbert blumer. in stones r. (eds.), key sociological thinkers. palgrave, london. doi https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-26616-6_7; reprinted (2020) by springer nature switzerland ag. microsoft word ape-v1n1-p61.doc advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 61 original paper modernizing extremism: a case of new age militancy in kashmir nasir ahmad ganaie1* 1 department of political science, school of social science, central university of hyderabad, gachibowlli-500046, telengana, india * nasir ahmad ganaie, department of political science, school of social science, central university of hyderabad, gachibowlli-500046, telengana, india received: may 5, 2018 accepted: may 14, 2018 online published: may 16, 2018 doi:10.22158/ape.v1n1p61 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v1n1p61 abstract the research article delivers enlightenment on the new age militancy in kashmir in which the new energetic and vigorous faces arose to enter militancy and for the stated design the usage of contemporary and improvised ways are drawn to recruit youngsters in the valley. known to the outer world as tech-savvy militants who are hailing from the rich educational backgrounds and they do believe in autochthonous viewpoint of militancy irrespective of different names of the terror outfits. besides this, there is a new trend of “arms snatching” which has been prevalent in the valley mostly from last three years to arm the newly recruits. the article also analyses the impact of the social media usage in branding the new age militancy. keywords kashmir, militancy, new age militancy, separatists, social media, tech-savvy, weapon snatching 1. introduction kashmir is observing a wave of militancy and at this extent of the contemporary era, the modern age militants are becoming more dangerous and destructive for the state machinery. the jammu and kashmir police are discovering it extremely complicated to manage eye on the contemporary media technology, which has given abundant popularity to the new age militants. post hizbul mujahideen (hm) commander and popular local militant, burhan wani’s killing, numerous youths have entered the militant ranks, notably from the south kashmir. new age militancy or contemporary designs of unrest in the state of jammu and kashmir (hereafter kashmir) have been high in the long-disputed territory of kashmir since the killing of burhan wani by www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 62 published by scholink inc. security forces in july 2016. wani a 22 years old from south kashmir’s tral area was a militant commander associated with the hizbul mujahideen, which is considered as the largest armed militant group in the kashmir valley. the group’s intention is to reassemble kashmir and pakistan, forming one side of a conflict that has persisted since the partition of india and pakistan in 1947. unquestionably for the utmost in kashmir, wani’s death and the subsequent unrest in the valley resonated with the long-drawn struggle for azadi, or freedom, acquainted by collective remembrances of century’s long exploitation and domination at the hands of successive foreign rulers. thousands of young kashmiri men entered the kashmir militancy during the 1990’s, but those who sustained are seeing new generations as more “potent and committed” to islamism, and more ready to die. since 1989, kashmir has been a hotbed of insurgency, unrest and a potential nuclear flashpoint. there were 7,000 militants, which served kashmir in the 1990’s. “the figure is currently pegged at around 200” (hindustan times, 12th july 2016). the new difficulty and challenge for the indian state is that how to counter the massive insurgency and they always have to keep in action the strength of a million military men commissioned in kashmir, the protestors of the modern age who march towards the encounter sites by pelting heavy stones on the security forces of the state and these protesters are risking their lives during live encounters in a bid to help and support the trapped militants escape from the encounter sites and to express solidarity with them. this is enough to confer democratic legitimacy upon militants and the armed struggle. it also indicates that their popularity among masses has touched new heights. this sensation was entitled as a “challenge” by none other than the chief of the state police who had said that “people marching towards encounter sites is a challenge” (greater kashmir, 15th february 2017). upon the backdrop of people thronging to encounter sites in the valley, on the 15th february 2016, the indian chief of army staff issued a warning to people and advised them to stay away from the encounter sites and that if they proceed to obstruct anti-militancy operations in the state they would be deemed as ogws (over ground workers) of militants and later who will face “tough action”. “those waving pak, is flags to be dealt as anti-nationals, over ground workers of militants, will face harsh action” (kashmir reader, 16th february 2016). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 63 published by scholink inc. figure 1. no. of persons who joined militant ranks from 2010-2017 in the state of jammu and kashmir 280 youth have joined militancy in the last three years (2017, 2016 and 2015) (note 1) which is quite alarming and disgusting. the worst disturbing fact is that 126 newly recruits joined militancy ranks in the year 2017 (note 2). the new recruits are from well-off families and belong to highly educated categories like that of the mannan bashir wani who is a 26 year old phd research scholar hailing from kupwara who has joined militancy this year in january (2018) and soon after publicising his joining on social networking site his photograph became viral on the facebook with ak-47. he was a research scholar of aligarh muslim university (amu) and joined hizbul mujahideen (the indian express, 6th february, 2018). footprints of militancy have been clearly increasing in the kashmir valley with as many as 126 young men taking to arms during the year 2017. increasing footprints of militants have raised concern among the security agencies that assumes the trend which reflects the worsening situation in kashmir. 88 kashmiri youths joined militancy in 2016. since 2014, there has been a constant rise in the number of people joining militancy. most of these new recruits came from pulwama, shopian and kulgam districts in south kashmir, which has become the hub of tech-savvy, young militants (rediff news, 05 july, 2017). the new age militancy is not confined to this but it has further extended the menaces of extremism in the state. the newest trend of entering the new age militancy era got a boost when a cop of the jammu and kashmir police namely ishfaq ahmad dar, belonging to a heff village of south kashmir’s shopian district had joined the militant ranks (the tribune, 28th october 2017) (note 3). in an interview with the alpha (name changed) the cop who is working with the j&k police as special police officer (spo) said that, how can a person remain stable on a mere payment of six thousand rupees only which earlier stood at three thousand rupees only despite enormous hardships during the unrest period. the cop revealed that during unrest and stone pelting we are acting as frontier ones and despite the fact that we are even also considered as special forces group for tackling the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 64 published by scholink inc. insurgencies in the state. 2. use of social media by terrorists due to the accessibility, affordability and extensive scope of social media platforms such as youtube, facebook and twitter, terrorist or militant groups have frequently utilized social media to facilitate their intentions and expand their message. efforts have been made by numerous governments and agencies to prevent the practice of using social media by various terrorist organizations. in a research finding by gabriel weimann from the university of haifa, weimann had noticed that nearly 90% of organized terrorism on the internet takes place via the usage of social media (note 4). according to weimann, terror groups use social media platforms like twitter, facebook, youtube, and internet forums to broadcast their messages, recruit members and to collect intelligence (note 5). terror organizations practice social media because social media tools are affordable and convenient, promote quickly broad distribution of messages and it acknowledges unfettered communication with an audience without the filter or “selectivity” of mainstream news outlets (note 6). also, social media platforms support terror groups to engage with their networks. whereas earlier terror organizations would release messages and information via mediators, social media platforms enable terror organizations to deliver messages directly to their designated audience and discuss with their fans and inmates in real time (note 7). the terrorist groups or extremist organisations use the social media as a tool to promote their networks. it has been used in fund raising, recruiting and passing of important information and signals. ill-will ejecting from the social media pages and several other tech-savvy platforms reached through mobile phone applications or other platforms have virtually retained terror factories operating across the line of control (loc) in pakistan occupied kashmir (pok) and has encouraged to churn out modern age “jihadis” who keep the terror pot fuming in the state of jammu & kashmir. use of social media by the militant outfits in kashmir has been a new trend particularly post burhan period. it was actually during the burhan wani’s reign that the practice of the social media in the valley came up by dint of constantly uploading photographs and videos on facebook and for the same, he was tagged as “poster boy” (note 8). newly recruits of the militant ranks in the valley are announcing their joining of various militant ranks through facebook. announcement, threats and messages if any there, are shared through the facebook. new age militancy in the valley of kashmir is not limited to this, there are also other hot issues like weapon snatching. the local police parties mostly where they are less in number are attacked or even fired upon to snatch their service rifles like that of the latest snatching attempts of shopian district, where the weapons of the five policemen posted in the district court complex were snatched by the militants (note 9). there have been the frequent issues of the weapon snatching in the valley and the local police forces have suffered a huge setback. according to the data published in the new indian express (january 2018), the data says that 251 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 65 published by scholink inc. weapons were looted by militants in jammu and kashmir including automatic rifles, ak-47, self-loading rifles (slr), insas, carbine rifles and a gas gun that were looted by militants in the state in various weapon snatching bids during the last three years. the data also revealed that while 363 militants and 71 civilians were killed in militancy violence during the year 2016 and 2017. the snatched weapons include 35 ak rifles, 43 slrs, 44 insas, 4 carbines, 1 light machine gun (lmg), 5 (303) rifles, 12 pistols, 1 pika gun, 1 gas gun, 2 umg’s, ak-41 rifle and 102 tear gas shells/grenades (note 10). the data further revealed that of the 251 looted weapons, 76 items including 23 ak rifles, 25 insas, 4 carbines, 10 slrs, 1 lmg, 2 (303) rifles, 1 gas gun, 6 pistols, 1 pika gun, 2 umgs and 1 ak-41 rifle (the new indian express, 18th january 2018) were recovered in addition to this 90 accused persons were also arrested (note 11). 3. conclusion the performance of surviving especially in kashmir division of the state has grown worthless and most damaging due to the disarrangement of the state, arising each from political or non-political, regional or non-regional, the state of the present context has absolutely and entirely become a hell and unstable place. the state has become too sensitive to combativeness, human rights violations along with several other unlimited challenges. all the mechanisms of governmental agencies have become ineffective in tracing and discovering out this kashmir problem. new age militancy, separatism, social unrest and political instability has worsened the worthy atmosphere of the state further, it has led to an improvement in the extremist forces in the state. the rise in extremist forces needs to be checked and joining of the militant ranks by the youth should be terminated immediately. there has been an unexpected rise in the extremist incidents like new age militancy, weapon snatching and social unrest only when there is a sudden rise in the extremist actions. more the extremist incidents are there, greater the probabilities of unrest will be there. bloodshed, unrest and all the forms of the extremism needs to be ended in the kashmir for the sake and welfare of the peace in the region. prosperity will prevail in the region only when there is a peaceful and well-disposed atmosphere in the state and for the said purpose all the forms of extremism need to be wiped up from the region, because more the extremist activities are there more the chances of state’s backwardness are there. before concluding, i’m closing with the poem of a very noted poet “bahar kashmiri” who has captured the dilemma of the kashmiri’s in his poem composed in the 1940’s and has been quoted from the book “languages of belonging: islam, regional identity, and the making of kashmir” (chitralekha zutshi, 2004, pp. 310-311). “from all sides, i am assaulted, the english, the indians, the afghans, the pakistanis, to whom should i complain, to whom should i tell my fate? www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 66 published by scholink inc. capitalists, tyrants, oppressors, and friends, all want me to become their accomplice, with whom should i agree, whom should i disagree with? to whom should i complain, to whom should i tell my fate? i am poor and downtrodden; whose side should i go? if i agree with one, the second will be angry, the third will impale me on the sword and the fourth and fifth strangle me. to whom should i complain, to whom should i tell my fate?” (note 12) references aggarwal, r. (2004). beyond lines of control: performance and politics on the disputed borders of ladakh. india, duke university press. https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822385899 behera, n. c. (2000). state, identity & violence: jammu, kashmir and ladakh. new delhi: manohar publications. bose, s. (2003). kashmir: roots of conflict, paths to peace. harvard university press. douie, j. m. (2008). the punjab, north-west frontier province and kashmir. seema publications: new delhi. ganaie, n. a. (2015). naya kashmir, land reforms and colonialism in jammu and kashmir, a study of national conference and its implications on the identity of state. international journal of applied research, 1(13), 565-569. ganaie, n. a. (2015). sikh socio-religious reform movements in jammu and kashmir from 1900-1947. international journal of interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary studies, 2(8), 12-16. ganaie, n. a. (2015). socio-religious reform movements of muslims in j & k from 1900-1947. international journal of innovative research & development, 4(6), 294-298. ganaie, n. a. (2017). instability and unrest in kashmir: a case from barriers of optimism to pellets. international journal of modern social sciences, 6(1), 51-93. ganaie, n. a., & rupavath, r. (2017). impact of kissan credit cards on the socio-economic life of people in jammu and kashmir. international journal of modern social sciences, 6(1), 1-21. ganguly, s. (1997). the crisis in kashmir: portents of war, hopes of peace. woodrow wilson centre press and cambridge university press. habibullah, w. (2008). my kashmir: conflict and the prospects of enduring peace (p. 82). united states institute of peace press. washington d.c. singh, n. (1992). political awakening in kashmir. h.k. publications: delhi. verma, p. s. (1994). jammu & kashmir at the political crossroads. vikas publications: new delhi. victoria, s. (2003). kashmir in conflict: india, pakistan and the unending war. palgrave &macmillan press: new york, usa. wani, g. m. (1993). kashmir politics: problems and prospects. ashish pub house: new delhi. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 67 published by scholink inc. notes note 1. the data was revealed by chief minister mahbooba mufti on 6th february 2018 in the legislative assembly of the state against a written reply to a question raised by opposition national conference leader ali mohammadsagar. note 2. “jammu and kashmir: 280 youth join militancy in three years; 126 joined militant ranks in 2017.” the new indian express. dated: 6th february 2018. retrieved february 10, 2018, from http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2018/feb/06/jammu-and-kashmir-280-youth-join-militancy-i n-three-years-126-joined-militant-ranks-in-2017-1769236.html note 3. “j&k cop who went missing ‘joins militant rank’”. the tribune. dated: 28th october 2017. retrieved february 21, 2018, from http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/jammu-kashmir/j-k-cop-who-went-missing-joins-militant-ranks/488 679.html note 4. “terrorist groups recruiting through social media”. cbc news. dated: 10th january 2012. retrieved february 19, 2018, from http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/terrorist-groups-recruiting-through-social-media-1.1131053 note 5. “terrorist groups recruiting through social media”. cbc news. dated: 10th january 2012. retrieved february 19, 2018, from http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/terrorist-groups-recruiting-through-social-media-1.1131053 note 6. dark, calvin. social media and social menacing. foreign policy association. dated: 20th december 2011. retrieved february 20, 2018, from https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/12/20/social-media-and-social-menacing/ note 7. oremus, will. twitter of terror. slate (www.slate.com). retrieved december 23, 2011, from http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technocracy/2011/12/al_shabaab_twitter_a_somali_militant_ group_unveils_a newsocial_media_strategy_for_terrorists_.html note 8. ganaie, nasir ahmad. (2017). instability and unrest in kashmir: a case from barriers of optimism to pellets. international journal of modern social sciences, 6(1),51-93. note 9. militants snatch rifles from police officials in kashmir’s shopian. hindustan times. dated: 5th may 2017. retrieved february 20, 2018, from https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/militants-snatch-rifles-from-police-officials-in-kashmir-sshopian/story-pype6l5g7u4thptk96upum.html note 10. 251 weapons looted by militants in jammu and kashmir in 3 years. the new indian express. dated: 18th january 2018. retrieved february 20, 2018, from http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2018/jan/18/251-weapons-looted-by-militants-in-jammu-and -kashmir-in-3years-1757777.html note 11. “251 weapons looted by militants in jammu and kashmir in 3 years.” the new indian express. dated: 18th january 2018. retrieved february 20, 2018, from http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2018/jan/18/251-weapons-looted-by-militants-in-jammu-and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 68 published by scholink inc. -kashmir-in-3-years-1757777.html note 12. zutshi, chitra. (2004). languages of belonging: islam, regional identity, and the making of kashmir. hurst and company: london. microsoft word ape-v2n2-p73 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 73 original papers new literary genres—an insight in the creativity optimization phd student coculiana acăr1* 1 faculty of philosophy and social-political sciences, “alexandru ioan cuza” university of iași, romania * phd student coculiana acăr, faculty of philosophy and social-political sciences, “alexandru ioan cuza” university of iași, romania received: february 26, 2019 accepted: march 18, 2019 online published: march 21, 2019 doi:10.22158/ape.v2n2p73 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v2n2p73 abstract the theory of literary genres, developed from antiquity to the present day, has been differently approached, more or less convincingly. the philosophical insight of the genders definition appears at hegel, a.w. schlegel, schelling, each of them trying to follow the particularities of each genre depending on the way to report consciousness to reality and to the issue of the time taken as a reference. in the following, we are going to refer to the value and utility of genres for the cultural and social history of humanity, by stopping to the genres characteristic to the postmodern era. in this regard, we intend to follow the impact of the digital epistolary in the context of the media globalization, the advantages and disadvantages of the technological progress, the changes in form and content suffered by the “letter” sequence to this evolution. another genre that comes to our attention is the comic magazine that can appear to some as an insignificant object, a part of a communist world, invoked in the news debates, only. the original mobility of the comics is situated in its very nature at the intersection of visual and narrative, which gives it the chance to weave bridges over the fields of the folk culture and literature. this may illustrate an alternative, from a cultural insight, where the aesthetic and sociological values coexist. the comics are intellectual challenges for different categories of readers through the new postmodern setting of the values expressed by text and image. keyword letter, comics, sociolinguistics, postmodernism www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 74 published by scholink inc. 1. introduction recognized as ontological data, essences and angles of the universe perception, the literary genres have been defined from a “social, historical, functional, auctorial, political, stylistic, arbitrary point of view, or by a combination of what has already been said” (stockwell, 2002, p. 28), taking into account classification principles with a relative value. the concept of literary genre appeared in a latent form from antiquity, in platon and aristotle’s works, with influences in the middle ages and renaissance, being considered a special type of text with proper rules and norms. it has a considerable influence on the european romanticism, especially treated in the descendancy of the german romanticism theories, on the schlegel-schelling-hegel line, of which “two genres have first differentiated: the epic and the lyric” (rusu, 2011, p. 17), followed by the dramatic one. referring to postmodernism, some critics discuss the dissolution of the genre, and others about the transformation of genres into ways. in other terms, postmodernism is recognized because it made the notion of gender seem irrelevant, outdated, a “parody lacking content” (jameson, 1999, pp. 16-17). but as society evolves and the literary genre suffers an evolution, more “in postmodernism, the concept of gender passes through an epistemological revolution that makes it necessary to re-conceptualize it” (earnshaw, 1997, p. 223). the trinitarian insight on the literary genders is underlined by l. rusu in the aesthetics of the lyrical poetry, as follows: “it is a mistake to believe that the division into three lyrical, epic and dramatic literary genres is at random or corresponds to arbitrarily established categories [...] the three literary genres are in fact original categories of spirituality, they represent forms of life in which an existential sense is achieved. for this reason it is completely in vain to reduce the different genres to a fundamental one [...] because the spiritual activity, by its very nature, is not uniform, but rather multiple oriented” (rusu, 2011, p. 15). in the following, our attention is focused on a major phenomenon of political, social and cultural-aesthetic nature, corresponding to post modernity, which embraces the intellectual, cultural, artistic and philosophical interpretations of the new conditions. post modernity refers to the historical period following modernity, that is to the new reality installed in the 70s of the last century, to its new sociological, technological, economic conditions, etc. in this context, the present paper is an attempt to highlight the characteristics of two of the literary genres specific to post modernity: the digital epistolary and the comics and their historical and cultural role. it is known that the 20th century is marked by two totalitarianisms—communism and nazism—which have led to major human catastrophes, so that the socialist and capitalist countries have a different trajectory, reflected in the two configurations of the postmodern consciousness. in the west, the post-war period is one of a post-industrial society that marks the state of mind circumscribed to the relativizing values, and post modernity is a world of reversed values, where knowledge becomes merchandise, science is served to the technique, power and wealth condition the truth, and the simulacrums created by the mass-media take the place of reality. the model towards post modernity tends is the american society, free and prosperous, with a life of comfort, with a democratic and tolerant administration, offering equal www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 75 published by scholink inc. opportunities to all its citizens. 2. from the letter to the digital epistolary throughout the human civilization, man searched for and developed writing media to transmit information starting from the mesopotamian clay tablets to e-readers and performing tablets, available today in all civilized countries. a complex and pervasive phenomenon, “communication can be treated from a psychological point of view as a special type of behavior, by the sociologists as a decisive factor of socialization, by anthropologists as a tool for the formation and spread of culture, by semioticians as a process of configuring and reconfiguring the signs significance” (fârte, 2004, p. 10). from the methodological point of view, the communication can be transposed into a discursive linearity by enumerating elementary communicative sequences, consisting of six interactions: emitter-receiver-message-code-channel-context. ontologically, it is a continuous process, where the individuals’ actions sometimes alternate, sometimes they take place simultaneously. the psychological and social concerns lead to the epistolary practice. because the epistolary text implies a direction towards literature, being both an appropriate form of expression of feelings or dialogue between writers (eminescu-creangă) or between the writers and their lovers (eminescu-veronica micle), the epistolary correspondence has a spontaneous and personal flexibility, that can receive a wide variety of themes that will be the theme of some literary works. the letter is textualized through a series of mechanisms: social, psychological and rhetorical, forming a double line of projection and production. it is well known that the love between mihai eminescu and veronica micle determined an original correspondence defining the epistolary genre of that time and constituted for the literary historians a material of an inestimable value, contributing to the completion of the poet’s biography, and for the critics, establishing some connections with eminescu’s literary, erotic creation reaching the highest tops in the romanian poetics. it is not the first of its kind and, of course, not the last one. a correspondence, but this time between fourteen romanian intellectuals (radu bogdan, emil cioran, petru cretia, stefan augustin doinaş, ion ianoşi, thomas kleiniger, gabriel liiceanu, constantin noica, alexandru paleologu, andrei pippidi, andrei pleşu, mariana şora, marin tarangul and sorin vieru), captives of one of the most horrible moments of history, is the journal of păltiniş, a philosophical journal. the book captures a world in the world, a philosophical state amid a totalitarian state; an existence where the ideas are censored, the thoughts are truncated, and the realities are alienated. what singles out is that “the central character of this unusual book is neither the journal that gave birth to it, neither its author nor the one who occasioned the diary itself. the central character of the epistolary is the postman” (liiceanu, 2008, pp. 7-8). the postman here is an invisible messenger from hermes’, a bearer not of the missives exchanged for two years between characters endowed with a civil status, but of the spirit they all share. he is also due to the wonderful match of thoughts, and the presence of the historical moment, and ultimately the transfiguration of all resentments. so, the correspondence maintained by the great www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 76 published by scholink inc. personalities has a special documentary, historical, psychological, moral and aesthetic value. whole epochs in the history of humanity, biographies of illustrious personalities, writers and artists, are more fully known from letters. beginning with the 19th-20th centuries, as technology and telecommunication (the telegraph, the internet in particular) gained increasing importance in everyday life, the cultural and rhetorical character of the letter diminished in almost everyday manifestation. the new aspect of maintaining contact between individuals is the virtual network that reinvents the epistolary style, with a role of communication and socialization. digital technologies have created a new approach of reality through various elements that make up our everyday framework: sound, image, information that has had a direct impact not only on how we interact, but has led to changes related to our way of representation and the creation of the world. we can observe that there is an extension of the epistolary subject, because “all new progress implies an expansion of the human body and the psyche” (mcluhan, 2009, p. 37). the digitization of the letter has contributed to the qualitative improvement of the epistolary genre, which can be considered a new literary phenomenon by the extension tendency of the multicode communication, combining the written text with the use of icons called “emoticons, representing suggestive images of tiny sizes of a size close to the capital letters” and aiming to “facilitate the description of the emotions we live through during our communication and to make the online communication faster” (ungureanu, 2014, p. 10). the technology development made it possible for “everybody to be connected” via mobile phones and computers, so that everyone’s area of life has expanded considerably. anxiety, the desire to build one’s own identity, the interlocutor’s search, the personal or strategic communication in time and space has been solved through the virtual environment. all the circumstances of the epistolary are rationalized by the cybernetic channel. a model to correspond to is the e-mail, which is among the first forms of network writing; it was born in the 60s, with the first computer networks, and precedes the emergence of the web, which took place in the first half of the ‘90s. it does not replace the letter, but it offers a number of inconceivable facilities for a nineteenth-century epistograph. although some believed that with the advent of telecommunications, the epistolary age declines (e.g., jacques derrida), but with the development of technology, the virtual epistolary text evolves from the need for specular and polyphonic communication without space-time constraints. we can not say that the e-mail describes the value of a letter’s content. however, the farewell, love, informative, personal, work and other messages are accompanied by virtual gifts attached. any epistolary content fits into an e-mail. those who started their epistolary work with the digital format, despite their origin, the e-mail is often considered an informal and daily exchange of expressive signs of oral communication. in this sense, it is considered by some to be a lower form of the letter, the e-mail being good for information, to transmit a purely technical message, but not a means of approaching people. at the media level we have different textual forms, characterized by different registers and language uses, so we can talk about four forms of digital text: e-mail, blog, short messages and social networks (facebook and twiter). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 77 published by scholink inc. in general, the electronic mail/e-mail system has a character of immediate correspondence that uses a common language, almost orally, but still retains some typical aspects of the epistolary writing. first of all, its asynchronous character, which distinguishes the e-mail from the forms of the network even closer to oral, such as chat language. the persistence of messages, which can be stored, saved, quoted and transformed into something very similar to a questionable textual body that can also be searched, is another factor of similarity with the tradition of correspondence. from this point of view the electronic mail also remains an intrinsic writing form. the reference point for the e-mail is certainly epistolary. the digital correspondence is done both online and offline, the latter being primarily represented by the e-mail and the blog, as well as other virtual access ways such as skype, facebook, etc. “the offline communication is represented by e-mail and the discussion groups or the spiral letter. the e-mail is the most common way of communication because it is the easiest to use” (amza, 2005, p. 437) and it has similarities with the older letter, when the issuer is waiting for the answer, sometimes long-lasting. however, the length of expectation here does not depend on objective factors (such as mail, in the old epistolary way of communication), but strictly on the subjective ones (the availability/lack of availability of the receiver). referring to the virtual communication and the oral expression, we can distinguish two types of digital “oral”: written (e-mail, phone sms, chat, public comments posted on different sites) and the video chat conversation. the social networks, such as facebook, are becoming more widespread and are a tool for managing interpersonal relationships, allowing the individual user to build a network of contacts and to use it fundamentally for two purposes: on the one hand, to create a flow of information about their activities, collected in an accessible and viewable format from those in contact with the system, and on the other hand, to view similar information flows from personal contacts. so, we can consider the facebook network as an “outbreak of experience” as a device of great complexity or a “normalization” device, but also as a privileged place nowadays for self-digital writing. with regard to sms and, more recently, the hybrid messages between chat or messenger, sms and e-mail, depending on the extent and functionality required at every moment, popularized in formats such as whatsapp, they maintain certain elements of the epistolary structure. on the other hand, the e-mail is not a replacement of the letter, but a letter in another format that meets the expectations. the social blogs and networks have stimulated a type of mass communication at the moment and, sometimes without a specific recipient, such as twitter, where the sender sends a message to the entire aggregate community. it is a complete popularization of the textual message. the cyberspace has been seen as a space of communication whose specificity lies exclusively in the support, magnitude and rhythm of these communications, which form a context where the communicative and aesthetic relationships of the subject with the text change. in this way, the computers become machines to produce and communicate massive texts, a space where they keep all these texts away from memory. the digital memory becomes “a global database that, like the human memory, organizes the material that receives discarding and updating data” (hayles, 2004, p. 37). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 78 published by scholink inc. textuality and digital communication imply instantaneity, simultaneity, speed and globalization at the maximum. before, the telegraph took a step forward in the epistolary speed, appealing to the message. the digital communication can change the mentalities and content of the textual forms, resulting in the emergence of new forms that are the result of an inevitable evolution after a long series of causes and effects. it is about an informational era and the computer science, from which the attributes of humanism disappear. 1.2 echoes of digital correspondence in literature starting from the idea that depending on the needs of communication, the world creates and recreates signs and symbols, “one of the symbols that unites the electronic era is @, which, together with the electronic letter has become a symbol of online communication” (ungureanu, 2012, p. 63). the e-mail has led to the revival of the epistolary genre, enriched today with all the multimedia innovations (audio, video, smiley, links, etc.) indicating the ability to create the image of the concepts condensation. the compact text is a mixed text, composed of two non-homogeneous components: verbal/linguistic and non-verbal, belonging to systems other than the natural language, with special effects in communication, meaning that “the transversal language is the future universal language in germ. only it could unite people. because the rational languages already divide them” (hlebnikov, 2003, p. 111). we can say that multimedia has not led to a weakening of the written communication, but rather to the recognition of its central role as an instrument of integration and connection between different communication codes. referring to writing blogs, we see that it has deep roots in the previous textual tradition, especially in two widely textual forms: diary and newspaper or magazine article. the diary format is as a reference for many bloggers, especially those with a strong narrative approach, which are at the center of their interest, the author and his reflections on the events of today, personal and public. in the blog there are no frequent abbreviations and colloquial forms, the model is usually argumentative rather than oral. they are probably the form of network writing where the likeness of traditional writing is closer and more articulate at the same time. it is no coincidence that the world of the blog interacts directly and continuously with the traditional media (and especially with the world of written press and radio and television journalism). 3. comics—highlights & history evolution every historical age prefers certain genres that better fit its affinities, aspirations and conventions. over the time, “a whole series of genres decay and disappear irreparably, in order to maintain ourselves in the same biological perspective: birth, maturity, aging and disappearance” (marino, 1970, pp. 101-102). so, we can say that there would be an increase and a decrease of genres in a curving curve. a refined and unique expression of the modern sensibility, through the power to unite the word and image in its narrative frameworks, the comics have become the subject of an academic study and research for its cultural heritage, but also because of the significant impact on a segment of the contemporary society. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 79 published by scholink inc. in the comics book collections, one can observe the concerns, mentalities, lifestyles of the people of that era, or even the political propaganda messages that have been camouflaged in drawings or caricatures. by acting on the society and mirroring it at the same time, we can see a critical-acid perspective on the current world. the comics book combines two codes, that is, two modes of expression: the word and the image, which interfere in many ways. in this sense, we encounter comics without words that use only individual, mimetic scenes that describe art and resemble pantomime. a complementary role is played by the background and the props that can make a significant contribution to the transmission of the message. we could mention in this context two important albums: arzak by moebius in 1976 and the arrival by shaun tan in 2006. the comics and the caricatures in the newspapers of the times can represent an important source of study of the two totalitarianisms: communism and nazism. not only old manuscripts and archive documents are historical sources, but also the comics books can be understood after a while as a witness to history. written in thick books, or mounted in documentary films or feature films, the history can also be laid in conquering comics, not just for children, but also for adults. although we’ve got used to the comics to be considered as a consumer literature, but the comics genre from the holocaust can make a contribution to the work of the historical and social-political memory. the american comics artist, art spiegelman published in germany, maus, the story of a survivor, a comics book of the holocaust that is portrayed through the eyes of a survivor, but also of those who did not live it directly, giving the book a metabiographic appearance, highlighting the fact that “i need to show events and the memory of the holocaust [...] i want to show the masking of the synthesis, events in their representation” (schwarz, 1993, p. 110). by doing so, the author performs an intelligent parody. the volume is profoundly metaphorical, the tragism of the situation being played not only by the story, but also by the shocking images. the characters have animal faces, so humanity becomes animal, animals seem to be more human than humans. although the use of animals in the graphic novel may seem displaced, the author does not create stereotypes, but ridicules them by showing how stupid it is to classify people by nationality or ethnicity. the symbols are not his: “they are borrowed from the germans ... ultimately, the book is essential about what all human beings have in common. it’s a madness to divide them by nationalistic, racial or religious criteria ... these metaphors, which are meant to self-destruct in my book—and i think they can do it—they still have a residual force that moves people” (schwarz, 1993, p. 113). taking advantage of the specific, multidimensional possibilities of the comics, “the comics drawn by the inherent narrative strategy of simultaneity offers the opportunity to unite the past, the present and the future, and thus to offer a unique perspective” (palandt, 2011, pp. 208-201). of course, any form of artistic and literary analysis of the jews’ genocide in europe will eventually reach their limits. but this applies not only to the history of the image, but also to the film, the theater, the novel or even the autobiography. we can say that the comics create a fantasy by focusing differently on the film, in the figurative sense of a short circuit between the conscious and the unconscious through the imagistic and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 80 published by scholink inc. semantic percussion, using processes close to the surrealistic pictorial ones, and by the extreme condensation of descriptive and narrative techniques (by means of a significant shortcut). in the postmodern era, the interpenetration and development of various aesthetic and sociological scales such as: cult/trivial, elitist/popular, disciplinary/interdisciplinary have led to a dynamic and open hybrid concept that includes the notion of paraliterarture, centered on the analysis of the comic strips and the technical and cultural character of the literature focused on the study of visual forms. that is why, we can say that a characteristic of postmodernism would be the paraliterature that is imposed by the images of folk culture followed by the comic stripes and the postmodern chronicles. the interaction between the open artistic tensions and irradiating flows of the socio-aesthetic value could define the comics book author. from the point of view of possible interdisciplinary associations, the comics book is close not only to the literature regarded as narrative, but also to the film by the sequential discontinuity of the story, in the sense that “the reader must mentally configure the ensemble by filling the margins between two boxes, both scenes and pauses are visually thought and imagined” (manolescu, 2011, p. 13). 3.1 the comics paradigm in romania the comics represented an important aspect in the romanians’ cultural history. it has a cultural and civilization past as far away as solid. the origins can be found in prehistoric cave paintings such as those in the lascaux cave in france, in the egyptian hieroglyphs containing a combination of logographic, alphabetic and ideographic elements, the trajan’s column (where a story is told in carved images), the votive paintings, the tapestry from bayeux or in popular satirical drawings. if we talk about the romanian space, the researchers establish “the roots of the comics in the frescoes of the 16th century of the moldavian monasteries from sucevita, moldoviţa, voroneţ” (manolescu, 2011, 15), which by “the power and dynamism of the images that tell the lives of the saints, the presence of the small houses, the chaining of the action make them true comics” (niță 2008, 76). when printing appeared, the beginnings of the comics can be sought in the religious writing. various illustrated versions of the bible came to the aid of those who did not know how to read and understand christianity. then, the center of interest moves from religion to politics and social life. feeling the need for entertainment “the satire and caricature take hold of the publications of the time. then, a basic element of the comics book/text bubble, later on used by richard f. outcault for the dialogue between characters” (www.motanov.ro), was born. the first magazine in romania that publishes comics, but which were taken from foreign magazines, germany and austria, is the children’s friend and appears in 1891. the comics developed at that time for the press was developed and, in parallel, the publications for children. in the interwar period there is a romanian comics book layout. in this respect, the children’s magazine in 1924 hosted, starting with the second issue, the adventures of the most famous romanian character of the comics, namely haplea, who will become a real hero of the romanian comics, as adrian ciubotariu noted: “the great romania had, since 1924, its own quasi-superhero haplea, a superhero www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 81 published by scholink inc. in the romanians’ image and likeness (since then and now). it did not resemble to superman, the american superhero or other superheroes drawn, belonging to other cultural spaces ... haplea is nothing more than a follower of the traditional pacala and an illustrious predecessor of the more modern bulla” (niță, 2010, p. 27). it’s not far from the playful character played by charlie chaplin, naive and slick, meanwhile compassionate by what he does to things. haplea is a fictional character of the romanian humor, the prototype of the stupid man. unlike pacala (another comics book character of those years), a character taken from the romanian folklore, the character haplea entered the folklore due to the popularity of the comics and his naive contemporary figure. as a character in caricatures, haplea and his friends (coana frosa, hăplina and hăplişor) appeared in several magazines, such as the children’s morning, from 1924 to 1970. in 1927, based on these characters, the first romanian comics book was recorded in the national films’ archive, entitled haplea, on nicolae batzaria’s scenarios. after walking over 100 kilometers on foot with his bag on a stick, haplea arrives in the village of hăpleşti. here he meets near a fountain, coana frosa, niţă chioru’s widow, who is almost dead crashed in a crowd on charity, falls in love and get married. it is happa that has crossed the age to the present day. it is a satire of the period in which we live, where the main character is haplea, the one who struggles with trickery, thievery, hypocrisy. from haplea to a modern harap-alb, the romanian comics characters have traveled over 100 years of history, being drawn over time by many artists. during the communist era, the romanian comics focused very much on historical subjects, at least in magazines such as licurici, cutezatori, luminiţa, arici pogonici, șoimii patriei that succeeded in imposing new characters or successfully resumed other older ones. an important echo in the era was the magazine pif, “probably the best product of the european communism” (palandt, 2011, p. 270). although many people have the impression that pif’s comics was an exponent of the western capitalist market, in fact its main sponsor was the french communist party. for many cultured people, the comics and the anticipation literature during the communist era was one of the only ways to escape from the claws of ceauşescu’s regime. thus, pif, tintin, are in fact, original stories, fantastic-melancholic prose, revived in another narrative context. the author’s passion for comics comes from a social, cultural and political paradox, which in fact explained the explosion of a new epic genre. although the pif magazine belonged to the most intransigent western communist party, the french one, its broadcasting (in romania and not only) led exactly to the opposite effect. through comics, it has penetrated into the country of ceauşescu’s socialism and among the communist sympathizers of “beyond” the consumer culture, so rejected and ideologically criticized, including in the intrigues of the comics drawn with sympathetic animals and politically correct heroes. pif constituted, in other words, the “gate of the wall”, “the road to a territory of freedom”, in a monochrome country and full of forbidden objects. after 1989, the romanian comics have a new period, there appear many genre magazines, which then disappear after only a few numbers. among the most important, i mention: the children’s universe, the children’s joy, start 2001, carousel. in 1990, the first issue of the children’s universe, the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 82 published by scholink inc. follow-up of the cutezatorii, a magazine that, at least in the beginning, enjoyed some success. among the romanian authors who have attested by their approaches, the seriousness of the genre, we can mention ion manolescu and mircea mihaies. we can also add ioan stanomir, a literary critic, a historian of ideas and a political scientist, who has embodied his passion from childhood and adolescence in an excellent essay called the camera obscură (darkroom), dream, imagination and comics. he explores with interdisciplinary tools some of the most important european and south american series of comics (with the conscious exclusion of their sources—the genre productions in the country of hollywood). the history of the comics began in europe, it continued in america, but it had another course in japan (asia). the japanese tried to give the band the form of a movie, inspired by disney’s animations. the most famous films are dragon ball and one piece. many of the movies we see today have as a starting point the comics: superman, spiderman, justice league, asterisc and obelix and others. 3.2 the comics and their role in education from the above previously presented, we can note that one of the themes of comics books is history, a segment to which not only the romanian authors have paid great attention, but also the authors from europe and america. therefore, the comics books can be a new way of learning history, more attractive and intelligent. the comics are intellectual challenges for different categories of readers through the new postmodern setting of the values expressed by text and image. holographs in comics are an important component of the modern memory and media education, particularly fitted for children and teenagers as access to the shoah theme. it would therefore be desirable for schools, libraries, colleges and adult education to be more daring to enter new places and increase the use of comics. another theme is the adventure, where the “maniheist scheme in the encounter of the good, represented by teachers, engineers, geologists, researchers, with the evil like: spies, malevolent individuals belonging to the great capitalist concerts” (teampău, 2012, p. 180) is found. an important type of comics is the s.f., initiated in 1964 in cravata roșie (red tie) followed by galbar, carusel, valentin tănase’s series, întâlnire în spațiu (meeting in space) (1981-1988), etc. as a general feature of the comics, it can be said that it exploits two typological variants of violence, namely: the elastic violence of the comics has another stylistic justification than the realistic one. the obstacles imposed by the rational censorship are circumvented by the fantasy camouflage and the iconic materialization. emptied by its perishable content, reality appears eternally in a graph-reality without ages and consequences. the heroes become elastic and self-regenerate into fluid molecular structures that make them immune at the passing of time. from such an insight, the violence of the dramatic comics no longer puts the equal sign between natural and unnatural, under the emblem of immortality, but it brings good and evil closer to suffering. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 83 published by scholink inc. 4. conclusions referring to the literary genres specific to the postmodern period, we can say that the communication bridges between the fields of pop culture, literature and paralitery can be constituted by the epic that can be manifested in the form of the super-technological actions of the future. the digital era brings opportunities that profoundly change the framework of people’s lives, but the interactions with the others that involve certain aspects that we live in society: freedom, equality, justice, etc., can not be solved by communication technologies. the epistolary genre has recently known an adaptation to the new technologies. in this way, the letter is submerged into a space where the social relationships and the construction of the subject differ from the previous eras. in other words, the letter adapts to new communication identity parameters specific to media that imprint the speed, simultaneity and instantness. not only the texts we communicate, but also those we produce as literature, are impregnated with the typical features for this era of rapidity and fragmentation, especially if they pass through digital formats. the concept about oneself and about the others influences all the textual manifestations, so that the physical supports are reduced by the changes operated by the virtual environments, both in form and in content. we are witnessess to a culmination of the epistolary through the new parameters offered by the digital era subjects and instruments. thanks to the inclusion of the digital culture, the contemporary world challenges us to rethink the notion of textuality by new types of text or new practices of reading and writing. as roger chartier said, the current changes overturn the foundation of writing, its reproduction and dissemination techniques, and the way it is read. we know that the psychological and social preoccupations leading to an epistolary practice are satisfied by the virtual environment to a greater extent than through the traditional system. another literary genre referred to in this article is represented by the comics, which is appreciated by some as being a new art, aesthetically independent, but which, through the forms of expression and the techniques used, by its support and format, is very close to literature. it gains a socio-aesthetic value and a world canonical identity because “it has conquered all media and it is the subject of theses, seminars, coloquies ... moreover, it is preferred in schools and it benefits from the official recognition” (moliterni, 1994, pp. 20-25). others are against to their inclusion in the literature for graphic reasons. in fact, the comics could be included in literature just because of the reasons that seem to remove it from it, namely the graphic nature of the genre. by naming the procedures used in literature (intertextual, metatext), and also in the comics (the significant shortcut, the focus in bubble or box), the readers are given a paraliteral mini-history of the paraliterature. on the other hand, the definition of the comics as a new art remains a valid theoretical point, whose acceptance can relativize the literary status. even though in romania comics have never had too many fans, being labeled as an entertainment for children, this form of communication has been and is very popular not only in the anglo-saxon and germanic countries, but especially in the french-speaking countries such as france, asterix’s country, and belgium, where hergé created tintin. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 84 published by scholink inc. references amza, r. m. (2005). forme și trăsături ale comunicării mediate de computer. in revista limba română structură și funcționare. bucurești: editura universității. earnshaw, s. (1997). just postmodernism. amsterdam, atlanta: rodopi b. v. fârte, g. i. (2004). comunicarea o abordare praxiologică. iași: casa editorială demiurg. hayles, k. (2004). condiția virtualității. literatură și cyberculture. madrid: cărți arco. hlebnikov, v. (2003). temeiul nostru. chişinău: ed. ştiinţa. jameson, f. (1991). postmodernism: the cultural logic of late capitalism. durham: duke university press. liiceanu, g. (2008). jurnalul de la păltini. bucurești: humanitas. manolescu, i. (2011). benzile desenate și canonul postmodern. bucurești: cartea românească. marino, a. (1970). anuar de lingvistică și istorie literară xxi. iași: editura academiei. mcluhan, m. (2009). înțelegeți mijloacele de comunicare: extensiile corpului uman. barcelona: polity press. moliterni, g. (1994). dictionnaire mondial de la bande dessinée. larouse. niță, d., & arapu, m. (2008). dictionnaire de la bande dessinée roumaine. constanța: comics factory. niță, d., & ciubotariu, a. (2010). istoria benzii desenate românești. bucurești: editura vallent. palandt, r. (2011). extremismul de dreapta, rasismul și antisemitismul în benzi desenate. berlin. rusu, l. (2011). estetica poeziei lirice. logica frumosului. bucurești: editura academiei române. schwarz, k. s. (1993). almanah comic din aufmucken și tăcerea criticilor. stockwell, p. (2002) cognitive poetics. an introduction. london and new york: routledge. teampău, g. (2012). mit și bandă desenată. iași: institutul european. ungureanu, e. (2012). @-simbol al comunicării online. in speech and context (vol. 2, no. iv). ungureanu, e. (2014). creativitate lingvală: de la semn la text. bălți: editura pim. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 119 original paper navigating global business: the economic strengths, competitiveness, and post-brexit challenges xiaoxu zhang1 1anhui sanlian university, hefei, 230000, anhui, china received: april 19, 2024 accepted: may 11, 2024 online published: may 27, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n2p119 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n2p118 abstract the is the sixth-largest economy in the world, renowned for its significant role in service exports and global trade. this article explores the competitiveness in the global business environment, including price and non-price competitiveness, its reliance on international trade and investment, and its strengths and weaknesses. despite challenges such as lagging productivity and insufficient it innovation, remains a key player in the global market due to its flexible labor market and favorable investment policies. the article also examines the profound impacts of brexit on the economy and its relationship with the eu, as well as solutions to address issues like tariffs, the financial system, and foreign investment policies in the post-brexit era. keywords global competitiveness, price competitiveness, non-price competitiveness, international trade, foreign investment 1. introduction as the sixth-largest economy in the world, the united kingdom holds a prominent position in global trade and service exports. with the acceleration of globalization, the uk's competitiveness in the global business environment has become a focal point for both academia and policymakers. this article aims to explore the uk's economic strengths, competitiveness, and its role in international trade and investment. it analyzes the uk's price and non-price competitiveness and examines its strengths and weaknesses in the global market.in recent years, the uk has undergone significant economic transformations and challenges, particularly due to the profound impact of brexit. brexit has not only altered the uk's trade relationships with the european union but also significantly affected its financial system, foreign investment policies, and overall economic environment. understanding and addressing these changes is crucial for maintaining and enhancing the uk's competitiveness in the global www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 120 market.this article will first provide an overview of the uk's position and importance in the global business environment, followed by an exploration of various aspects of its competitiveness, including price and non-price competitiveness. next, it will analyze the uk's performance in international trade and investment, highlighting its major economic strengths and challenges. finally, the article will delve into the impacts of brexit on the uk economy and propose strategies and recommendations for addressing economic challenges in the post-brexit era. through these analyses, this article aims to offer valuable insights into understanding and navigating the uk's role in the global business environment. the uk is one of the world's largest economy ranked 6th in the world. it is also listed as the second position for service exports after the us and is also ranked 6th in world trading (hill & hult, 2017). it is also the center of attraction for headquarters for various global companies. it has more base than combined in both germany and france of the global companies setting up their european offices. the uk marked its dominance and importance in the world economy by hosting the olympics games in 2012 grandly (newman & fransman, 2017). according to world bank, the uk is one the best and most comfortable place to set up a business the europe as it takes an average of 13 days in setting up business in the uk. the uk is one of the most sought-after destinations for business and trade. 2. competitiveness the ability to compete effectively at the global level defines competitiveness of a country. measuring of the competitiveness is very important for a nation, and there are specific ways to measure the competitiveness of a nation (held, 2016). these methods include:  the expert prices of the country as compared to the export prices of other countries. this is called relative export price (sampson, 2017).  calculating the cost of the labour for the output produced by the labour.  the labour productivity which is also defined as gdp per worker (mazzucato et al., 2016).  the ratio of export and import prices of the company is referred to as terms of trade of the company (the chu, 2016). the uk is ranked among the top 10 competitive nations in the world. in the annual report of global competitiveness, the wef scores every nation. it provides the score to the nation by 12 "pillars of competitiveness," which varies from the state of the infrastructure to the health, education, and institutions. the uk has one of the most flexible labour markets in the world with a policy of hire and fire (schot, 2016). this policy helps the firms to hire and fire workers and makes it easier for the firms to achieve success and profit. it helps in increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the labour. wef also noted that the competitiveness of uk is also increasing due to the reforms made by the government (akman et al., 2017). creating a workforce which is more educated, a tax system which is more simplified than before helped to achieve the status in the business world. the rate of corporate tax was reduced, burdensome rules and regulations were laid to rest, and planning rules are more simplified than ever, all helping in creating an environment more suited for development (bourne, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 121 2016). 2.1 price competitiveness it measures the exports done by the uk regarding the price when compared to other countries. it is measured in some factors :  inflationthe small differences can build-up annually to create a significant amount. the uk keeps a check on the inflation to avoid losing the grip on the market (stokstad, 2016).  labour costsit includes the costs of wages and non-wages and also the contributions made by an employer to pensions. the uk has a very flexible policy regarding labour and employees (barr, 2017). it includes hire and fire policy for labours which helps increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the work. 2.2 non-price competitiveness it measures the performance of the branded goods and services exported by the uk in the global market. it includes:  the design and quality of the products exported from the uk (fekete, 2017).  developing and researching on new products for them to be successful against the competition.  the weakness and also the strengths of the local brands (sampson, 2017).  it also measures the effective marketing strategies done by the uk in the overseas market.  the uk also tries to invest in new technologies and innovations to increase the quality and reliability of the product (evans, 2017). 2.3 weakness of uk in global market  the uk lags behind the competition regarding productivity (inglehart & norris, 2016).  this lack of competition provided by the uk to major countries such as the us, germany, and japan is known as the productivity gap (cowell et al., 2017).  less use of it innovations is hurting the market in the europe and this the main reason they are lagging behind the competition (mendez-parra et al., 2016).  the primary productivity gap in the uk is due to skills that the people are lacking.  formal degrees in education is one the primary reasons for lagging behind. the number of jobs not being applied is more due to the qualifications standard not met (heisbourg, 2016). 2.4 strengths of uk in global market  the uk provides high volumes of aid to the immigrants due to the strengths of the economy (pisani-ferry et al., 2016).  the uk also imposes low taxes on the products in agriculture and also some dairy products.  the limitations on the import of services are less than other countries (sampson, 2017).  the uk provides high subsidy rates for the research and development programs by companies.  the overseas students are attracted to the institutions in the uk for better creative industries in music, arts, technology and fashion (dorling, 2016). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 122 3. international trade and investments the economy of the uk is very dependent on the international trade. due to this dependency on the trade, the government of uk has very few restrictions on trade and investments in the overseas market. the main partner in trade for the uk is eu. out of the total exports, 58% exports are for the eu nations from the uk. the major markets for exports for the uk are germany with 12 percent of the total exports, 12 percent of the total exports to france and 8 percent of the exports to the netherlands (murray, 2017). the most significant single market for the exports of uk is the usa, which takes a big chunk of 13 percent of the total exports of the country. the usa is also one of the largest provider of imports to the country at 14 percent. the eu as a group provides a total of 53 percent of the imports to the uk. out of this 53 percent, germany accounts for 13 percent, france accounts for 9 percent, netherlands accounts for 7 percent (akman et al., 2017). the united kingdom is engaged in trade with more than 90 countries around the world. the british pound has always maintained its grip over the market as one of the significant and robust currencies of the world. due to this the economy of uk is considered healthy and has attracted many foreign investors to set-up and start business inside the country. this investment makes the uk the second most significant destination for the foreign investors (o'rourke, 2016). from all the investments done in eu, 30 percent of the total share is done in the uk by the foreign investors. the investments done by the britishers in other countries is also significant as the uk has invested in billions abroad. the most significant foreign investor in the united kingdom is us which accounts for more 40 percent of the total investments done in the uk. the annual investment done by us firms and investors in the uk amounts to more than the us $100 billion (akman et al., 2017). the us considers the uk as one of the biggest markets around the world and the investments were done is the proof. the total investment done by america in the uk is more than combined investment in france, germany, netherlands, and italy done by them. to make sense of this investment, we can note that the total investment was more than 5 percent of the gdp (adler-nissen et al., 2017). the united kingdom has suffered due to the trade deficits over several decades now. the country has imported more services, good and investments than it has exported to other countries around the world. due to this trade deficit, the deficit amount accounted for more than us$ 25 billion which was equal to 1.5 percent of the gdp. this deficit is the reason of the total investment made by the foreign investors in the uk due to the attractive market conditions (song, 2016). however, the money that foreign investors bring into the nation exceeds the money that the uk loses through trade deficits which allow the country to fund the deficits. the foreign companies which are being set-up in the uk account for more than 40 percent of the total exports from the country. their presence in the manufacturing sector is very significant. of all the companies being set-up in the country, 20 percent companies are foreign-owned. a total of 16 percent of the employment is due to the foreign firm's investment in the country. there were a total of 25,800 firms from foreign countries in the united kingdom (gelb, 2016). few of the most prominent foreign firms in the country are dupont from america, ciba from www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 123 switzerland and coca-cola. the attraction of investing in the uk is due to the winning programs by the government over a period. there are established enterprise zones which are being set-up by regional and local government bodies (ziv et al., 2017). by investing in these particular zones, companies can levy some of their taxes and can receive reimbursements for the constructions in the zones. the government also provide incentives for the companies who are located in the economically backward urban areas. 4. the uk and the eu the path to brexit was set by the new conservative government of the uk. the british parliament passed the referendum bill after negotiating uk’s membership terms. the prime minister wanted to have more control over the new states, put a limit on immigrants’ benefits, fast trade deals (farnsworth, 2017). the brexit can lead to severe impacts on the economy of uk, resign of pm and significant splitting of media and businesses around the country. 4.1 impacts of brexit:  the regulations that are being made will grow over the time and will result in the increased price of the trade which will, in turn, have an impact on the volumes of the supply and uk's place in supplying the services and goods (dhingra et al., 2016).  as far as the europe is concerned, the uk is considered as a less attractive destination as the base of the headquarters.  due to brexit uk loses the much-needed influence in eu regulation. the freedom to regulate without any interference of eu is not gained (crawford et al., 2017).  the country now has more flexibility over its industrial policy. it, however, loses influence in some areas and scale.  the policies of immigration are tightened, thus damaging competitiveness in the capital city (dhingra et al., 2016).  the high competitive edge that the uk retains will most likely be gone as the uk is likely to lose business due to lack of service provided to european countries.  the trade disputes the uk has and is also a low priority partner when it comes to negotiations of trade (wild et al., 2014).  the benefit of controlling and influencing both the ins and out of europe will most likely be lost. this will have a significant impact on the economic and foreign policy interests of the country.  brexit is a long process having an impact on the business in the country over an extended period with the endpoint not defined (cumming & zahra, 2016).  apart from one or two centers of finance, all other households and businesses will suffer due to the increased cost of services and goods.  europe will become a somewhat less attractive destination for the investor's post-brexit. the eu will lose some states due to political weight behind the negotiations (ferraro & briody, 2017). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 124 4.2 effects on trade within europe  the membership with europe boosted the trade of goods with other states by over 55%, which accounts for more than £100bn in 2013 (griffin & pustay, 2011). the cost to the consumers in the footwear, agriculture and clothing sectors might fall but there will an overall increase in the prices (hine, 2017).  post-brexit, the reduction in a trade or the increase in the cost of trade will be damaging to both the uk and for rest of europe. the importance of eu is more in trading to the uk than the uk is to eu (pappas, 2017).  out of the total economy of eu, uk account for only one-sixth of the total part. the uk, however, is a more important source for the rest of the eu.  there are only a few countries of eu which run a trade deficit with the uk. ireland is the primary example, but the uk is an essential bilateral for many irish firms (meyer & peng, 2016). 4.3 issues and their solutions post brexit: 4.3.1 tariffs and trade tariffs usually do not prevent the import and export of bilateral goods and services, but increase cross-border trade costs. there is less barrier between countries in a single market. according to downing street reported that the british side of the european commodity circulation border frankly "simple" until the new "tariff cooperation." after the transition period, the uk hopes to reach a wide range of trade partnerships with the eu. british trade union "zero tariffs", "frictionless trade," the british "customs union" close to "europe." however, the eu will be out of this. britain is a single market member, and as a member of the european union, according to the eu and other countries and regions signed trade agreements, but also enjoy free trade with these countries and regions. after the british referendum, canada and europe signed a free trade agreement will no longer include the united kingdom. after the united states, the united kingdom and canada and other countries and regions need to sign trade and investment agreement. barnier said the decision to leave the uk for a single market and customs union meant that any agreement reached would be close to trade agreements with canada and the european union. the primary focus of some of the former senators of the government is to keep up with the economic development because they are already large and do not need to focus on reforming the economy (cavusgil et al., 2014). the focus is on trade agreements with other non-eu countries around the world. 4.3.2 attention to the financial system britain is also out of the european union, but also from the european common market. such a choice would threaten the uk's financial industry, particularly london as the world's financial center, as many international banking businesses could leave london. under the "single market" mechanism, financial institutions operating in the uk can sell financial www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 125 services unrestricted throughout the european common market. once the european bank led the bank of england no longer enjoy the "privilege" of the common market, which means that british banks want to continue to provide financial services to european customers, must re-obtain administrative approval and accreditation, which will give the leading british banks european business has brought great obstacles. the british government can take a paid way to continue to maintain this channel, to maintain the stability of the british and european financial markets. to get more autonomy as much as possible while seeking to reduce trade barriers. 4.3.3 breakup fee in the negotiations, the british from the eu to pay "breakup fee" figures, has become the focus of characteristic differences between the two sides. the bbc reports that the european commission has said it wants to reach a "single financial solution," including the uk's commitment to pay the eu budget, including the uk investment agency according to multimedia sources, "breakup fee" may be as high as 60 billion pounds, or even estimated to reach 100 billion pounds. "we will work with the european union to establish a just solution to the rights and obligations of the united kingdom as an outgoing member," said david davis, a retired minister of the united kingdom, in a statement to parliament that " financial settlement ." british chief negotiator davis said the british had said that this was a recognition of the country's international responsibility and rights, but he did not want to do so. so far, the british government has not been willing to pay a "breakup fee" clear response. 4.3.4 eu citizenship for the eu, another core issue is the maintenance of eu citizenship. there are currently 3.5 million eu members living and working in the uk, while in the eu countries there are 1.2 million british citizens. the european commission says it will "guarantee the rights of british british citizens in the eu to british citizens and their families," including the right to take effect in the future, such as pensions. the british government also agrees that the protection of civil rights is a problem that needs to be resolved early in the negotiations. however, the two sides on this issue also have "fundamental differences." the eu believes that the european court of justice in luxembourg should be the ultimate arbiter of british and european civil rights, as this will ensure consistency of the policy of the european court of justice. however, the british side believes that after europe, the european court of justice can no longer exercise the jurisdiction of the united kingdom. the british plan to develop new legal rights for eu citizens and to enforce them in the english legal system. 4.3.5 foreign investors new policies and tax haven the government has to set up new and better policies for the foreign investors (morrison, 2011). the once sought-after destination will be a haven for foreign investors once again under the new and improved policies such as tax evasion or reimbursement and incentives to the investors. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 126 the uk government after the euro is expected to have more autonomy in tax policy formulation, including new tax treaties with eu member states or the european union, the establishment of an independent tariff system and the operation of an independent vat management system. from the perspective of continuing to attract capital inflows, the uk government may implement more flexible and competitive tax policies after taking off europe. the primary concentration was on two features, income tax should be collected from the income which arises within the border of the country and the tax system should be precise, concise, and bright, easily operated and can balance the rights of the citizens and state (gordon, 2016). by above discussion, it can be concluded that uk was one of the major countries in the eu when it comes to the trading treaties. due to the flexible policies of the government, it was considered as one of the best investing countries for major foreign companies. out of the top 10 vehicle producing companies in the uk, six are from foreign countries. the flexible policies of the uk companies such as hire and fire also helped in the efficiency and effectiveness of the labor. the significant policies of the uk government such as evasion of some tax from the foreign investors who were willing to invest in the exclusive economic zones set-up by the government. the government has also policies such as providing reimbursement for the companies who invest in infrastructure and also incentives who invests in urban areas deprived of economic advancements. the primary trading partner for the uk is us who invests a lot in the uk trading scene. post-brexit, the treaties had huge changes within them. the uk is considered as a lower priority within the trade treaties. the importance of eu to the uk was more critical as uk was to eu. brexit also fuelled some problems at the border with ireland and the government will work on the same problems after it has all set-up and running. 5. conclusion the united kingdom has long been a major player in the global economy, known for its significant role in service exports and international trade. despite facing challenges such as productivity gaps and lagging it innovation, the uk has maintained its competitiveness through a flexible labor market, favorable investment policies, and a strong economic infrastructure.brexit has introduced new complexities to the uk's economic landscape, impacting trade relationships, financial stability, and regulatory frameworks. while brexit presents challenges, it also offers the uk opportunities to redefine its economic policies, forge new trade agreements, and attract foreign investment under new terms.the analysis in this article underscores the importance of addressing both the strengths and weaknesses of the uk's economic position. the country's ability to adapt to post-brexit realities, leverage its competitive advantages, and implement strategic economic policies will be crucial for its continued success in the global market.moving forward, the uk must focus on closing the productivity gap, enhancing it innovation, and developing a skilled workforce to maintain and enhance its global competitiveness. additionally, the government's role in creating a conducive environment for business through simplified tax systems, incentives for research and development, and supportive trade policies www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 127 will be pivotal.in conclusion, the uk's journey in the global business environment is marked by resilience and adaptability. by addressing current challenges and capitalizing on new opportunities, the uk can continue to thrive as a leading economy on the world stage. references adler-nissen, r., galpin, c., & rosamond, b. 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(2017). the potential impact of brexit on the energy, water and food nexus in the uk: a fuzzy cognitive mapping approach. applied energy. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2017.08.033 3.international trade and investments 4.the uk and the eu 5.conclusion advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 1 original paper road accident and safety issue in bangladesh: a critical review naimul razzaque1*, sharmin jahan runa2 & md. sagor hossain3 1 lecturer, department of law, sonargaon university, bangladesh 2 assistant professor, department of law, sonargaon university, bangladesh 3 lecturer, department of law, sonargaon university, bangladesh * naimul razzaque, e-mail: naimulrazzque2019@gmail.com received: october 23, 2023 accepted: december 01, 2023 online published: december 11, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n1p1 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n1p1 abstract road accidents are a major public health concern in bangladesh, causing significant harm to individuals and society as a whole. despite various initiatives taken by the government, the number of road accidents continues to increase, highlighting the need for a legal approach to address this issue. this study aims to analyze the current legal framework in bangladesh with regards to road safety and identify potential areas for improvement. the study found that the current legal framework in bangladesh contains several provisions aimed at promoting road safety, including the bangladesh road transport act, the bangladesh road transport corporation act, and the bangladesh road transport authority act. however, these laws lack effective enforcement mechanisms, and there is limited accountability for those who violate traffic rules. this has led to widespread flouting of traffic regulations and a high incidence of road accidents. the study recommends the introduction of stricter penalties for those who violate traffic rules, including fines and imprisonment. it also suggests the establishment of an independent road safety commission to monitor compliance with traffic rules and to ensure effective implementation of road safety measures. the commission should have the authority to investigate road accidents and to take appropriate actions against those found responsible persons. additionally, the study recommends the introduction of mandatory training programs for all drivers and the provision of better infrastructure and technology to support road safety. this may include the installation of traffic lights and speed cameras, as well as the use of innovative technologies such as gps-based monitoring systems. in conclusion, a legal approach is crucial in addressing the problem of road accidents in bangladesh. by introducing stricter penalties, establishing an independent road safety commission, and investing in road safety infrastructure and technology, the government can help www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 2 published by scholink inc. to reduce the number of road accidents and save lives. further research is needed to understand the impact of these measures and to identify additional ways to promote road safety in bangladesh. keywords road safety, accident, societyransport, traffic, punishment, social aspects 1. introduction road accident is one of the fundamental issues in our country. thousands of people are killed or injured in road accidents in bangladesh, leading to significant social and economic costs. despite various initiatives taken by the government to address this issue, the number of road accidents continues to increase, highlighting the need for a more comprehensive and effective approach. this paper means to recognize road accident in bangladesh. this study aims to analyze the current legal framework in bangladesh with regards to road safety and identify potential areas for improvement. the study focuses on the laws and regulations that are relevant to road safety, including the bangladesh road transport act, the bangladesh road transport corporation act, and the bangladesh road transport authority act. the purpose of this study is to provide a comprehensive overview of the current legal framework for road safety in bangladesh and to identify areas for improvement. but the complete solution of the problems is still a matter of hope. so option for finding the actual causes and better solution this study has been designed for. 2. research objective the title of the study itself expressed the objectives of my study as to critically analyzing the key problems of road accident in bangladesh, finding the actual reasons of the problems and providing the proper recommendations to tackle those obstacles. the study is also guided by the principle that road safety is a shared responsibility between the government, road users, and society as a whole. the government has a responsibility to create a legal framework that promotes road safety, road users have a responsibility to abide by traffic rules, and society has a responsibility to support and encourage safe driving behavior. this study is based on the following key components: the legal foundation for road safety in bangladesh, comprising pertinent laws, rules, and the procedures by which they are enforced. the role of road users in promoting road safety, including their responsibilities and accountability. the role of the government and society in promoting road safety, including the provision of infrastructure and technology to support road safety and the creation of a culture of safe driving behavior. the conceptual framework of this study is intended to provide a comprehensive understanding of the issues related to road safety in bangladesh and the role of the legal framework in addressing these issues. the study is based on the belief that a legal approach can play an important role in reducing the number of road accidents in bangladesh and in promoting a safer road environment for all. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 3 published by scholink inc. 3. methodology the current exploration study is predominantaly a doctarial and logical. keeping this in view, i have gone through various books, diaries, web references, e-diary, reports and so on. this study is qualitative in nature and is based on both primary and secondary sources such as books, journal articles, government orders, rules, acts, newspaper reports, etc. all materials and data are gathered both sources of data and materials is two types primary data and secondary data. the primary data is collected through the process of documentation and collecting information from many sources, articles, journals and through the process of such ways: interview, observation, etc. 4. road safety as a burning issue road safety has become a critical issue in bangladesh, with increasing numbers of road accidents resulting in loss of life and injury. according to official statistics, over 12,000 people die in road accidents every year in bangladesh, making it one of the countries with the highest road fatality rates in the world. (note 1) these accidents have a profound impact on individuals, families, and communities, as well as on the economy through the cost of medical treatment and lost productivity. (note 2) in addition, road accidents also contribute to traffic congestion, air pollution, and other negative impacts on the environment. despite various initiatives taken by the government to address the issue of road safety, the number of accidents continues to rise, highlighting the need for a more comprehensive and effective approach. it is essential that all relevant stakeholders, including the government, road users, and society as a whole, work together to address this issue and promote road safety in bangladesh. 4. overview of safety factors there are several factors that contribute to road accidents in bangladesh and these can be grouped into two main categories: human factors and environmental factors. human factors refer to the actions and behaviors of road users, including drivers, passengers, and pedestrians. some of the common human factors that contribute to road accidents include reckless driving, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, speeding, ignoring traffic signals, and using mobile phones while driving. (note 3) environmental factors refer to the physical and social environment in which road users operate, including the road infrastructure, road design, traffic flow, and the presence of other vehicles, cyclists, and pedestrians. some of the common environmental factors that contribute to road accidents include poor road design, inadequate road markings, poorly maintained roads and vehicles, and insufficient road safety measures such as traffic signs and signals. (note 4) it is important to note that road accidents are often the result of the interaction between human and environmental factors (note 5). therefore, a thorough approach to road safety needs to take into account not only human behavior but also the social and physical context in which drivers work. to effectively address road accidents in bangladesh, it is necessary to focus on both human factors and environmental factors and to promote a culture of safe driving behavior and road safety awareness. this requires a concerted effort by the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 4 published by scholink inc. government, road users, and society as a whole. (note 6) 5. road transport act, 2018 at a glance1 the road transport act, 2018 is a comprehensive piece of legislation aimed at promoting road safety in bangladesh. this act replaces the previous bangladesh road transport act, and was enacted with the goal of reducing the number of road accidents and ensuring accountability for those who violate traffic rules. some of the key features of the road transport act, 2018 include: stricter penalties for traffic violations, including fines, imprisonment, and license suspension or revocation. a comprehensive licensing system for drivers, including the requirement for a valid driving license and periodic renewals. (note 7) the establishment of a road transport authority (rta) with the responsibility for enforcing traffic rules and regulations, as well as for investigating road accidents. the provision of training and education for road users, including drivers, passengers, and pedestrians, to promote safe driving behavior and road safety awareness. the establishment of a vehicle registration and inspection authority (vria) to ensure that all vehicles on the road are safe and fit for use. (note 8) the introduction of new technologies, such as digital licensing and electronic monitoring systems, to improve the enforcement of traffic rules and regulations. the requirement for all vehicles to be insured to provide financial protection for victims of road accidents. the road transport act, 2018 is a significant step forward in promoting road safety in bangladesh and it is expected to have a positive impact on reducing the number of road accidents in the country. the implementation and enforcement of this act, in conjunction with other measures, such as education and training for road users, road infrastructure improvements, and the promotion of a culture of safe driving behavior, will be critical in achieving the goal of a safer road environment for all. 6. factors behind road accidents 6.1 reckless and dangerous driving reckless and dangerous driving behaviors should be banned. 6.2 driver fatigue long hours of driving and lack of rest can lead to driver fatigue, which impairs a driver’s ability to concentrate and react to changes in traffic conditions. 6.3 driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol is a major cause of road accidents in bangladesh, as it impairs a driver’s ability to make safe and responsible decisions while driving. 6.4 poor road infrastructure there must be improving road infrastructure and promoting safe vehicle maintenance, encouraging the use of safety technologies, is another factor behind road accidents in bangladesh. 6.5 overloading of vehicles overloading of vehicles, particularly trucks and buses, can result in vehicle instability, making them www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 5 published by scholink inc. more susceptible to accidents. 6.6 poor vehicle maintenance poorly maintained vehicles, such as vehicles with worn brakes, tires, or suspension systems, can increase the risk of road accidents. 6.7 lack of awareness and education lack of awareness and education about safe driving practices and road safety is a significant factor behind road accidents in bangladesh. 7. trauma after a car accident most car accidents include a distressing event that happens suddenly, so you could feel unprepared or unable to prevent it. the psychological impacts of auto accidents make much more sense in this light. these emotions and responses may eventually start to subside once the automobile has been fixed, the insurance company has been dealt with, and any physical injuries have healed. 8. medical facilities and victim care accident victims may be left with painfully short-term or long-term effects. the victim’s family is also affected, in addition to the direct sufferer. first assistance, transportation, emergency medical care, and the security of people, cars, and public property are all urgent demands. longer-term requirements may include ongoing therapy, assistive technology, rehabilitation, psychological and emotional support, as well as financial assistance and employment. 1) the number of trauma centers in the nation is rather small. the development of physical structures, such as at the trauma center at mirasarai on the dhaka-chittagong highway, has resulted from a governmental decision to create a few trauma centers beside roads. however, these structures are not very useful because there is a lack of staff and equipment. 2) the lack of medical personnel is a concern. a medic is someone who can attend to urgent needs but is not required to practice medicine full-time. 3) it’s crucial to create a generally recognized national emergency number that anybody may call, similar to the 911 system used in the united states (note 9). 9. safety targets and initiatives in selected countries according to the data, most industrialized nations in the globe have seen a daily decline in the number of traffic-related deaths and injuries. this is due to the effective implementation of road safety measures. national road safety goals established by several oecd (organization for economic cooperation and development) nations are shown in table 5. great britain has established a year-round public awareness program for road safety called think, focusing on a number of topics including young drivers, seat belt use, drinking and driving, vulnerable road users, and speed limits. the think campaign’s ability to bring together a variety of topics related www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 6 published by scholink inc. to road safety under one banner in order to increase the effect of the overall message about road safety is its most valuable feature. (note 10). sweden’s “vision zero” aims to end traffic-related deaths and serious injuries in the long run. with an emphasis on user responsibility, safer riding conditions, and the need for studded winter tires, sweden’s current action plan places a special emphasis on special safety measures for the riskiest routes and safer traffic flow in populated areas. it includes the creation of alternate methods of financing for new roads and increases responsibility on those responsible for designing road traffic systems. (note 11) the netherlands has adopted a concerted strategy for improving road safety to meet its unique goals. the dutch plan calls for increased cost and responsibility distribution across the federal, state, local, and private sectors as well as the public sector. regional objectives were created from national targets. modifying all road user behavior, increasing road and motorway infrastructure, boosting driver instruction, stepping up police enforcement, and promoting the “safety culture” are some of the specific actions listed for these integrated initiatives.” finland has made using a hand-held mobile phone while driving illegal, is drafting legislation that would mandate all cyclists to wear safety helmets, and actively encourages pedestrians to wear luminous apparel after dusk. australia hopes to achieve its target by continuing to focus on proven measures such as reducing the incidence of drinking and driving, improving compliance with speed limits, and increasing seat belt and child restraint use. more recent measures include matching speed limits to road conditions, promoting driver fatigue management, and encouraging the use of in-vehicle intelligent transportation systems (note 12). denmark has concentrated on road engineering projects to meet its goals. it has implemented public education programs and upgraded signs for road construction zones. it has also undergone a systematic identification and eradication of grey and black areas on its roadways, submitted all new road construction to safety audits, pilot tested road safety audits on parts of its highways. 10. recommendations to reduce the number of road accidents in bangladesh, the following recommendations can be considered: enforce traffic laws and regulations: the government and the relevant authorities should enforce traffic laws and regulations, such as the road transport act, 2018, to ensure that road users comply with traffic rules and regulations. this includes imposing stricter penalties for traffic violations and increasing the number of road safety patrols. all medical facilities should be free for individuals who are effected on road accidents. government and private institutions should organize awareness-raising events including seminars, symposiums, ads, internet campaigns, comprehend their legal and constitutional rights. promote road safety education and training: the government and relevant organizations should promote road safety education and training for drivers, passengers, and pedestrians, to raise awareness about safe driving practices and road safety. this can include providing www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 7 published by scholink inc. training programs, distributing informational materials, and conducting public awareness campaigns. reducing the number of road accidents in bangladesh will require a comprehensive and coordinated approach, involving the government, road users, and society as a whole. by addressing the key factors behind road accidents and implementing effective road safety measures, it is possible to improve road safety and reduce the number of road accidents in the country. 11. conclusion in conclusion, road accidents are a major problem in bangladesh, causing significant loss of life and property, as well as economic and social consequences. from this conversation we can express that there are different reggulations connecting with casualty and their assurance. our country is developing economically but it is a matter of question that whether the fruit of that development is touching every branches of the human life. it is urgent demand of the society to get full access to justice as a part of the daily life of the people. but achieving of the goal depends not only upon the state but also the public at large. simulataneous enterprise from the both sides can solve the problems swiftly. to achieve meaningful and lasting change, it is important to address the underlying factors behind road accidents in a comprehensive and systematic manner. this requires the cooperation and collaboration of all stakeholders, including the government, road users, and society as a whole. with a commitment to road safety and a focus on evidence-based strategies, it is possible to reduce the number of road accidents in bangladesh and create a safer and more sustainable future for all. references ahmed, n. (2021). promoting a culture of road safety in bangladesh. journal of traffic and transportation engineering, 10(6), 389-393. akhtar, s. (2022). the role of safety technologies in reducing road accidents in bangladesh. journal of advanced transportation, 36(1), 21-27. bangladesh road transport authority. (2021). road safety in bangladesh. bangladesh road transport corporation. (2021). road transport act, 2018. hossain, m. (2020). improving road infrastructure to enhance road safety in bangladesh. journal of transportation engineering and technology, 9(4), 273-278. retrieved from https://rta.gov.bd/index.php/en/news-events/news/road-safety-in-bangladesh islam, m. (2021). road safety education and training in bangladesh: a review of current practices and recommendations for improvement. international journal of transportation and traffic engineering, 11(2), 107-115. khan, m. (2021). the role of law enforcement in road safety: a case study of bangladesh. journal of traffic and transportation engineering, 10(3), 139-145. rahman, a. (2021). the impact of vehicle maintenance on road safety in bangladesh. journal of transportation engineering and technology, 10(1), 65-71. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 8 published by scholink inc. rhd road user cost annual report for 2002-2003. department of roads and highway, ministry of communication, bangladesh, pp. 12-13. world health organization. (2020). road traffic injuries. retrieved from https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/road-traffic-injuries. notes note 1. world health organization. (2020). road traffic injuries. https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/road-traffic-injuries note 2. khan, m. (2021). the role of law enforcement in road safety: a case study of bangladesh. journal of traffic and transportation engineering, 10(3), 139-145. note 3. bangladesh road transport corporation. (2021). road transport act, 2018. note 4. hossain, m. (2020). improving road infrastructure to enhance road safety in bangladesh. journal of transportation engineering and technology, 9(4), 273-278. note 5. rahman, a. (2021). the impact of vehicle maintenance on road safety in bangladesh. journal of transportation engineering and technology, 10(1), 65-71. note 6. bangladesh road transport authority. (2021). road safety in bangladesh. https://rta.gov.bd/index.php/en/news-events/news/road-safety-in-bangladesh note 7. ahmed, n. (2021). promoting a culture of road safety in bangladesh. journal of traffic and transportation engineering, 10(6), 389-393. note 8. islam, m. (2021). road safety education and training in bangladesh: a review of current practices and recommendations for improvement. international journal of transportation and traffic engineering, 11(2), 107-115. note 9. [https://www.who.int/violence_injury_ prevention/resources /publications/en/ guidelines _chap3.pdf, last visited on 25 july 2023]. note 10. rhd road user cost annual report for 2002-2003. department of roads and highway, ministry of communication, bangladesh, pp. 12-13 note 11. ibid., pp. 12-13. note 12. global plan for the decade of action for road safety 2011-2020. un road safety collaboration. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 167 original paper the dispute and countermeasure of workers' off-line right in the digital age boning guo1a & haozhe chen1b 1 southwest minzu university, chengdu, sichuan, china a 19801987684@163.com, b2740556305@qq.com received: april 19, 2024 accepted: may 13, 2024 online published: may 29, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n2p167 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n2p167 abstract in the age of digital advancement, society has shifted to a data-centric and interconnected paradigm. this transformation has not only altered lifestyles but also impacted labor dynamics significantly. as digital tools bring convenience, they also pose challenges such as blurred work-life boundaries and prolonged working hours.this article delves into the debate surrounding offline rights of workers in the digital era and proposes effective solutions. employing a mixed-method approach, it elucidates the essence of these rights and argues for their legal recognition. the focus is on devising a comprehensive framework that balances legal clarity, market dynamics, and worker protection.by offering innovative policy recommendations, this research addresses the pressing need to safeguard workers' offline rights. it not only provides theoretical insights but also practical guidance to promote work-life balance and sustainable digital economy development. upholding these rights signifies a commitment to modern labor values and social equity in today's digital age. keywords digital age, disconnection right, right construction, institutional exploration 1. introduction in today's wave of digitization, traditional work modes have been restructured, and workers' lives are no longer confined to the physical boundaries of factories or offices. however, this transformation comes at a cost. with the development of internet technology, work has transcended the limits of time and space, mobile communication software has become the preferred means of work communication and connection, gradually encroaching on workers' rest time and space, blurring the boundaries between responsibilities and rest. this study aims to explore the controversy and strategies surrounding offline rights of workers in the digital age, in order to provide theoretical support and practical www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 168 guidance for safeguarding workers' legitimate rights and promoting work-life balance. exploring the significance of workers' offline rights is not only a reflection of emerging rights in the field of labor law but also a supplement and challenge to existing legal frameworks. in current legislation on working hours, labor safety, and health, there are deficiencies in defining and protecting workers' non-working time, which are crucial for workers. therefore, by studying workers' offline rights, a basis can be provided for the improvement of legal norms, promoting deeper societal attention to labor rights. from a macro perspective, safeguarding workers' offline rights is an investment in the overall welfare of society. a society that allows individuals time for self-renewal, family life, and social participation is one that is more dynamic, innovative, and cohesive. therefore, the purpose of this study is not only to address individual-level issues of workers but also to propel the entire society towards a more fair, healthy, and sustainable direction. therefore, this study aims to provide practical and feasible recommendations through an in-depth analysis of workers' offline rights in the digital age, to safeguard the health and happiness of workers, and inject new vitality into business and societal development. this is not only a contribution to academic research in the field of labor law but also a positive response to real social issues, carrying significant theoretical value and practical significance. 2. problem statement in the torrent of the digital age, the working patterns of laborers are undergoing unprecedented changes. accompanied by the development of instant communication technology, the convenience of communication has broken the physical space and time limitations of traditional workplaces, making remote work a new trend. on march 2, 2023, the china internet network information center (cnnic) released the 51st "statistical report on the development of the internet in china," showing that as of december 2022, the number of internet users in china reached 1.067 billion, with an internet penetration rate of 75.6%. in 2022, china's online office market developed rapidly, attracting more internet users. as of december 2022, the number of online office users in china had reached 540 million, an increase of 70.78 million compared to december 2021, accounting for 50.6% of the total number of internet users. (note 1) however, the "double-edged sword" of the internet in the digital age brings both the convenience of work and new challenges to laborers. the development of communication technology further blurs the boundaries between work time and rest time, with work continuously infiltrating life. the phenomenon of "invisible overtime" is spreading, and issues like "5,000-yuan salary, 46 work groups" are not uncommon, sparking widespread public discussion about the right of laborers to disconnect. in response to the current calls and expectations of laborers, this year's two sessions saw several representatives, including lu guoquan, a member of the national committee of the chinese people's political consultative conference and director of the general office of the all-china federation of trade unions, calling for "guaranteeing the right of laborers to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 169 disconnect" and "accelerating the legislation of the right to disconnect." the lack of the right to disconnect for laborers is not accidental. in a digital work environment, constant messages in work groups, standby status during holidays, and 24-hour online requirements constitute an invisible erosion of laborers' rest and vacation rights. this erosion not only affects the physical and mental health of laborers but also disrupts the balance between work and life. therefore, advocating for the right to disconnect is not only a respect for individual rights but also a long-term consideration for sustainable social development. in the international perspective, france was the first european country to legally establish the "right to disconnect" for laborers. the concept of the "right to disconnect" originated from a 2001 ruling by the french supreme court's labor division, which stated that "employees are not obliged to accept work at home, nor are they required to bring materials and tools necessary for work home." since 2016, eu member states have been preparing relevant legislative work on the "right to disconnect," and in january 2021, the european parliament proposed the "right to disconnect directive proposal," after which the eu and other member states have gradually incorporated the "right to disconnect" into labor legislation or related policies. (note 2) countries like germany and ireland implement the "right to disconnect" through flexible measures, fully leveraging the role of industry associations. through collective bargaining, industry associations promote guidelines for the "right to disconnect" that are in line with the nature of the industry. in contrast, although china's labor law stipulates the right to rest, these provisions often seem inadequate in today's digital age judicial practice. at the same time, academic research on the protection of the right to disconnect is sparse and lacks systematic review. therefore, clarifying and solving this issue has become an urgent legal and practical proposition. 3. theoretical discussion on the right to disconnect for laborers in the digital age 3.1 concept definition and theoretical foundation of the right to disconnect the concept of the right to disconnect aims to combat the invasion of boundaryless work and maintain the balance between individual rest and life. it is not simply an extension of the right to rest but a supplement and improvement to the existing rights system and a legal response to the new labor relations in the digital age. the core of the right to disconnect lies in setting boundaries between work and life, ensuring that laborers are not disturbed by work during non-working hours and enjoy genuine rest and freedom. it transcends the traditional working hours system because, even during non-working hours, the existence of digital tools may keep laborers in a standby state. this invisible labor is not fully covered by existing laws, leading to the invisible exploitation of laborers' rights. the theoretical foundation of the right to disconnect lies in the comprehensive development of individuals. it emphasizes the subjectivity of laborers, respects their autonomy in the digital age, and is a legal expression of the balance between work and life. europe currently leads in the legislation of the right to disconnect for laborers. the term "right to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 170 disconnect" is translated from the english "right to disconnect." according to the legislative suggestions in the eu's "right to disconnect directive proposal" (article 10), "the right to disconnect means that workers have the right not to engage in work-related activities or communication through digital tools such as phone calls, emails, or other messages outside of working hours. the right to disconnect should allow workers to turn off work-related tools and not respond to employers' demands outside of working hours without adverse consequences, such as dismissal or other retaliatory measures. conversely, employers should not require workers to work outside of working hours." (note 3) in summary, the right to disconnect for laborers mainly includes the following elements: first, the right to "disconnect" during non-working hours; second, "disconnection," meaning that laborers can turn off digital communication devices or not respond to employers' work instructions; and third, laborers should not be put at a disadvantage for exercising this right. 3.2 theoretical analysis of offline rights of workers in the digital age the right of workers to be offline is not simply an extension of the right to rest, but a new form of rights reflecting the issues brought about by the blurred boundaries between work and life in the digital age. 3.2.1 distinction between the right of workers to be offline and the right of workers to rest currently, article 3 of the labor law in our country confirms the right to rest as a fundamental right of workers and establishes a specific legal system to ensure the realization of this basic principle through special provisions in chapter four. by strictly controlling overtime and extended working hours through legal provisions, the realization of the right of workers to rest is ensured, covering various forms of rest enjoyed by workers, aiming to improve the physical and mental health and work efficiency of workers through rest. although the law has provisions regarding the right of workers to rest, it has not been able to fully address the pressure of overtime work brought about by digital technology. firstly, when faced with the employer extending working hours, infringing on the right to rest, workers have the right to refuse unreasonable arrangements by the employer. however, the issue of whether workers have the right to refuse work instructions issued by the employer during non-working hours is not fully covered under the "right to rest" in the labor law. furthermore, workers maintaining an online status after work hours cannot necessarily be considered as engaging in relevant work, making it difficult to be further recognized as extended working hours or direct infringement on the right of workers to rest. in response to this, the proposal of the right to be offline focuses on protecting the freedom of workers during non-working hours through legal means, effectively addressing the deficiencies in the coverage of the right to rest, surpassing the traditional understanding of labor rights, and responding to the demand for the legalization of emerging rights. 3.1.2 distinction between the right of workers to be offline and the right to privacy article 1032 of the personality rights section of the civil code stipulates privacy for natural persons as private life tranquility and intimate spaces, activities, and information not willing to be known by others, primarily focusing on protecting the personal information of workers from unauthorized www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 171 collection, use, or disclosure. this includes but is not limited to personal information inside and outside the workplace, such as identity information, health status, and family life. the right of workers to be offline refers to the right of workers to not be disturbed by work-related requirements of the employer during non-working hours and to enjoy personal rest and private time. while the right to privacy is an important component of the personality rights section of the civil code, emphasizing a deeper level of humanistic care for the spiritual nature and pursuits of individuals, affirming the values of human-centeredness. with the development of communication technology, the blurred boundaries between personal and work life have resulted in a gradual reduction in the scope of privacy rights in the labor field. the extent to which employers' legitimate interests and measures taken affect the personal space of workers has become a core issue in the protection of workplace privacy, intensifying the conflict between employers' "right to manage employment" and individuals' "right to privacy." the proposal of the right to be offline in the digital age is a better restriction on the employer's right to manage employment, better adapting to the protection of the personal life tranquility of workers in the labor field, emphasizing the freedom and independence of workers outside of work. through the above analysis, we can conclude that the right to be offline is not only a supplement to the rights of workers but also an inevitable trend in the adjustment of labor relations in the digital age. its theoretical expansion and analysis provide a new perspective for us to understand and address the issues in current work patterns and offer a theoretical basis for future legislation and practices. 4. constructing the right to disconnect forworkers in the digital age 4.1 justification for the necessity and rationality of constructing the right to disconnect in 2022, the "remote work population real-feeling survey report 2022" released by 51job indicated that 65.8% of respondents reported that their daily working hours were "extended to different degrees" under remote working conditions; more than 40% of respondents had to report their work twice or more daily during remote working periods; 40.1% and 45.0% of respondents respectively believed that remote work increased work pressure and reduced work efficiency. (note 4) therefore, establishing and safeguarding the right to offline rest for workers is a necessary measure in the digital age, as well as an essential aspect of improving workers' quality of life and promoting harmonious labor relations. with the widespread adoption of information-based office practices and the rapid development of network technology, traditional working hour systems can no longer meet the needs of modern society. the establishment of the right to disconnect is a supplement and improvement to the existing legal system, better adapting to the practical needs of the digital age. (note 5) constant work-related messages not only increase the burden of useless information and pressure on workers but also pose a threat to their physical and mental health. prolonged exposure to electronic devices can increase the risk of vision deterioration, decreased sleep quality, and damage to the lumbar and cervical spine, and can also lead to psychological tension and mental fatigue from continuous use of electronic products. from this perspective, the right to disconnect is of great significance in protecting the basic www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 172 occupational health and safety of workers. furthermore, the construction of the right to disconnect can better maintain the balance between workers' professional and personal lives. the proposal of the right to disconnect aims to ensure that workers can "cut off" from their work state, better alleviating the continuous compression of their personal space, reducing the impact of work on personal life, and further improving personal life quality. studies have shown that the flexibility and control of working hours have a moderating effect on the relationship between satisfaction and work-family balance. (note 6) this means that when workers have more control, even extended working hours will not negatively affect their satisfaction with work-family balance. clarifying the boundaries between work and non-work hours, as the original intention of proposing the right to disconnect, allows workers to better grasp this proactive control, maintaining the stability of their personal lives. as an emerging right, the right to disconnect is an important measure to adapt to the rapidly changing digital age. this legal supplementation demonstrates its adaptability and flexibility within the legal system. it is not only a necessary adjustment to labor relations in the digital age but also a reasonable guarantee of workers' rights. by clearly defining the boundaries of rights through legal means, we hope to protect the physical and mental health of every worker while respecting labor efficiency, achieving a true harmony between work and life. 4.2 adaptive review of judicial practice in offline rights in discussing the construction of offline rights for workers in the digital age, an adaptive review of judicial practice is crucial. generally, the infringement of offline rights typically arises in labor disputes over overtime pay. among the top ten cases of 2023 promoted by the supreme people's court to advance the rule of law in the new era, there is the "li mou vs. company labor dispute case," hailed as the "first case of offline rights dispute." this case is the first in the nation to explicitly address the issue of "invisible overtime" in the judgment document. the trial court broke through the traditional requirements for fixed workplaces and quantifiable work hours in overtime cases, demonstrating recognition and respect for workers and effectively protecting their legitimate rights and interests. (note 7) however, from this case, we can also see that the protection of offline interests is urgent. 4.2.1 difficulty in burden of proof in recognizing the facts of overtime, according to the supreme people's court's "interpretation (iii) on several issues concerning the application of law in the trial of labor dispute cases," the worker claiming overtime pay bears the burden of proof. if the worker has evidence proving that the employer holds evidence of the existence of overtime work and the employer does not provide the relevant evidence, the employer will bear adverse consequences. (note 8) however, in practice, providing related clock-in records alone is not sufficient to prove the fact of overtime work. besides, it is necessary to prove that the worker indeed provided corresponding labor. due to the subordinate nature of labor relations and the limited ability of workers to provide evidence, they cannot effectively prove their claims. when workers' offline interests are violated, they usually use communication software as a work medium, making it even more challenging to recognize substantial labor. additionally, it is rare www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 173 for units to clearly notify workers of overtime arrangements in practice. even if there is a need for overtime, it is merely a work arrangement without specifying the working hours, let alone having "evidence proving that the employer holds evidence of managing overtime" and expecting a reversal of the burden of proof. 3.2.2 difficulty in standards for calculating overtime pay from a legal perspective, china has regulations on the base and standards for calculating overtime pay, but in practice, there are many inconsistencies and ambiguities. the regulations on the base for calculating overtime pay are flawed, with inconsistent descriptions in laws, regulations, and rules, making it difficult to operate in actual work. (note 9) in the digital age, for workers working offline, the work done during informal working hours often lacks formal records or recognition, making it even more challenging to calculate overtime pay. traditional methods for calculating overtime pay cannot accurately reflect the actual working hours of workers, causing significant difficulties for judicial personnel. therefore, chen yifang, the head of the civil division i of the supreme court, mentioned the need to clarify the standards for recognizing "invisible overtime" and protect workers' "offline rest rights." (note 10) this further emphasizes the recognition of offline rights legislation and the protection of workers' rights. 5. institutional design of workers' offline rights in the digital age 5.1 learning from foreign experiences in workers' offline rights in the process of discussing the protection of workers' offline rights in the digital age, foreign experiences provide us with valuable insights. in europe, for example, germany's labor law strictly regulates working hours and rest periods, prohibiting employers from disturbing employees during non-working hours, which greatly protects workers' offline rights. france has introduced the "right to disconnect" law, forcing companies to allow employees to avoid work emails after hours, thus maintaining a balance between work and life. these legislative practices reveal a core concept: offline rights are not only a resistance to excessive labor but also a respect for personal life space. in contrast, although the united states does not have nationwide regulations, some states and companies have begun to take measures, such as establishing "no email days" or setting specific shutdown times for electronic communications to encourage employees to relax during non-working hours. these examples show that the implementation of offline rights does not necessarily require comprehensive legislative reform but can be gradually promoted through corporate policies and social cultural shifts. drawing from these experiences, china should focus on the combination of legal and corporate cultural practices when constructing a workers' offline rights system. on the one hand, it can consider explicitly defining the legal status of offline rights in labor laws and setting clear boundaries, such as prohibiting work communication through electronic devices during non-working hours. on the other hand, it should encourage companies to formulate internal policies and cultivate a corporate culture that www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 174 respects employees' rest time. the protection of offline rights requires not only rigid legal constraints but also flexible guidance from corporate culture. in the context of the digital age, constructing a workers' offline rights system that adapts to china's national conditions is both a respect for workers' rights and a necessary measure to promote social harmony and development. 5.2 pathways for ensuring offline rights of chinese workers when discussing the protection of workers' offline rights, we must recognize that this is a profound reflection on the vital interests of workers in the digital age. we should consider the introduction of offline rights and focus on the actual situation of workers and how to implement this right through legal provisions to avoid adverse treatment due to exercising offline rights. 5.2.1 reasonable allocation of the burden of proof according to the existing legal framework and judicial practice, the allocation of the burden of proof in labor dispute cases should follow the principles of seeking truth from facts, fairness and justice, litigation economy, and protection of the weak. (note 11) in the face of the information age, where it is difficult to retain evidence of information intrusion during non-working hours, and issues such as workers' inability to provide substantial evidence of labor and working hours during non-working hours, judicial personnel handling disputes related to workers' offline rights should fully consider the disadvantages of workers compared to employers in terms of information access, resource allocation, etc., to give certain inclinations in the allocation of the burden of proof. in practice, judges (arbitrators) should reasonably allocate the burden of proof based on the actual situation of the case, considering the litigation status and evidence-gathering capabilities of both parties. this includes encouraging both parties to actively provide evidence and allowing judges (arbitrators) to adjust the allocation of the burden of proof according to the specific situation of the case to achieve substantial fairness. (note 12) 5.2.2 the role of collective agreements and labor contracts encourage and support enterprises and employees to reach collective agreements or explicitly stipulate relevant terms in labor contracts on offline rights. this not only helps clarify the rights and obligations of both parties but also increases the flexibility and adaptability of system implementation. 5.2.3 supervision and enforcement mechanisms to ensure the protection of workers' offline rights, we should strengthen supervision and enforcement efforts. this includes establishing effective complaint and dispute resolution mechanisms to ensure workers can promptly obtain legal protection when their rights are violated. additionally, employers need to be educated and trained to enhance their awareness and responsibility towards respecting workers' offline rights. establishing effective supervision and enforcement mechanisms, including setting up dedicated regulatory bodies to investigate and punish violations of offline rights, is also essential. moreover, public awareness should be raised to enhance society's understanding of the importance of offline rights. the implementation of these measures aims to create a working environment that respects workers' www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 175 rights while meeting the demands of the digital age. the realization of offline rights is not only related to individual well-being but also a necessary requirement for social progress and sustainable development. in this process, the government, enterprises, trade unions, and workers themselves need to assume corresponding responsibilities to jointly promote the transition of workers' offline rights from concept to practice. 6. conclusion and recommendations 6.1 summary of research findings in this study, we explored the issue of workers' offline rights in the digital age, revealing the challenges this emerging right poses in addressing the culture of overwork. although existing laws provide for workers' right to rest, these rights face challenges in actual implementation within a digital work environment. we argue that offline rights are not merely an extension of existing rights but a new demand for work-life balance. the urgency of ensuring offline rest rights is emphasized, as it is a matter of maintaining workers' rights and advocating for a balance between work and life. the proposal of offline rights aims to clearly define the boundaries between working and non-working hours to prevent work from encroaching on personal life. drawing on the legislative experiences of other countries regarding offline rights, we emphasize the need to shape a good corporate culture while introducing offline rights into legislation. considering the actual situation of workers, the protection of offline rights needs to be refined, such as judicial personnel reasonably allocating the burden of proof based on the actual circumstances of cases and clearly defining supervision and enforcement mechanisms for offline rights. in summary, the theoretical justification and practical exploration of offline rights are key steps in addressing labor issues in the digital age. future research should further focus on refining the implementation mechanisms of offline rights within the legal framework and how to change the "always online" work culture through policy intervention and social consensus. this effort concerns not only the basic rights of workers but also the sustainable development of society and the health of the labor force. (note 13) 6.2 limitations and future prospects of the research when discussing the issue of workers' offline rights, we must not overlook the limitations of the research and future prospects. although the literature has revealed new challenges to workers' rights in the digital age and the importance of offline rights in balancing work and life, existing analyses still have their shortcomings. to address these limitations, future research and policy-making should focus on the following points: first, update the legal framework to clarify the legal status of offline rights and set clear boundaries for working hours; second, promote corporate cultural changes to advocate for a healthy work-life balance and reduce interference during non-working hours; third, establish effective supervision and relief www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 176 mechanisms to ensure workers can exercise offline rights and effectively sanction behaviors that infringe on these rights. in this process, academia, legislators, trade unions, and enterprises need to work together to create a working environment in the digital age that both stimulates innovation and ensures physical and mental health for workers. references 51job. (2022). "remote work population real-feeling survey report 2022" china daily chinese website. cnnic. (2023). "the 51st statistical report on internet development in china" 1991it recommended articles. ge, j. x. (2022). protection of workers' right to disconnect in the digital age: eu experience and china's path. journal of beihang university (social sciences edition), 35(05), 95-105. hou, h. j., & zhu, y. c. (2024). special protection system of workers' right to rest. people's court daily. interview with chen yifang. (2024). director of the first civil division of the supreme court: clarifying the standards for recognizing "invisible overtime" and protecting workers' "right to offline rest" china court network. luo, w, m. (2007). discussing the defects and calculation standards of overtime pay. western exploration engineering, (06), 237-238. monique, v. (2007). work-based resources as moderators of the relationship between work hours and satisfaction with work-family balance. journal of applied psychology, (2007), 1512-. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.92.6.1512 tang, x. y. (2024). justification and realization of workers' right to disconnect in the digital age. journal of henan university of economics and law, 39(02), 60-70. top ten cases of the people's court in 2023 china court network. wu, x. j., & zhu, z. q. (2014). legal analysis of the burden of proof in labor dispute cases. china labor, (01), 20-22. xie, z. f. (2020). workers' right to disconnect in the era of informational office work. journal of china university of labor relations, 34(02), 91-97. xing, s. w. (2010). supreme court: employers should be responsible for concealing overtime evidence. talent resource development, (11), 57. yuan, j. (2021). research on the burden of proof in labor dispute cases. shanghai university of finance and economics. notes note 1. cnnic "the 51st statistical report on the development of the internet in china" 1991it https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.92.6.1512 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 177 recommended articles [2023-03-24]. note 2. hou haijun, zhu yichen. special protection system for workers' right to rest [n]. people's court daily, 2024-04-28(001) note 3. ge jiaxin. protection of laborers' right to disconnect in the digital age: eu experience and china's path [j]. journal of beihang university (social sciences edition), 2022, 35(05): 95-105. doi: 10.13766/j.bhsk.1008-2204.2021.0994. note 4. 51job, "remote work population real-feeling survey report 2022" china daily chinese edition [2022-04-25] note 5. xie zhifei. "the right to disconnect for workers in the information-based office era" [j]. journal of china institute of industrial relations, 2020, 34(02):91-97. note 6. monique valcour. “work-based resources as moderators of the relationship between work hours and satisfaction with work-family balance.” journal of applied psychology (2007). 1512-] note 7.top ten cases of people's courts in 2023 china court network [2024-01-26] note 8. xing shiwei. the supreme court: employers should be responsible for concealing overtime evidence [j]. talent resource development, 2010, (11), 57. note 9. luo weiming. discussing the defects and calculation standards of overtime pay [j]. western exploration engineering, 2007, (06): 237-238. note 10. interview with chen yifang, head of the civil division i of the supreme court: clarifying the standards for recognizing "invisible overtime" and protecting workers' "offline rest rights" china court network [2024-03-10] note 11. wu xiaojun, zhu zhiquan. legal analysis of the burden of proof in labor dispute cases [j]. china labor, 2014,(01):20-22. note 12. jiang yuan. research on the issue of burden of proof in labor dispute cases [d]. shanghai university of finance and economics, 2021. doi:10.27296/d.cnki.gshcu.2021.000526. note 13. ginger. labor dispute cases the burden of studies [d]. shanghai university of finance and economics, 2021. the doi: 10.27296 /, dc nki. gshcu. 2021.000526. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 83 original paper confronting the constitutional challenges to realizing the right to development of the niger delta communities in nigeria o. ogechukwu ajoku esq 1 1 nigeria received: october 10, 202 accepted: november 22, 2022 online published: december 1, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n4p83 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n4p83 abstract this chapter seeks to examine the role of law, legislative, regional and multilateral instruments towards confronting the challenges to realizing the right to development of the niger delta communities in nigeria. such enabling instrument as african charter on human and peoples’ rights creates legal obligations for african states to implement the right to development. in other words, legal and constitutional protection of the right to development is very important either directly through the inclusion of the right to development in the constitutional bill of rights, or indirectly by ensuring applicability and justiciability of the african charter in domestic law. this is a cue for the nigerian government to follow. inspite of these enabling instruments, the potential of the right to development in nigeria remains largely untapped. in africa, and by extension nigeria, the right to development enjoys a legal status equal to all other human rights (note 1). this is due to its inclusion in the african charter on human and peoples’ rights, though the practice of implementation remains hitherto unexplored, nor its potentials as an instrument to protect the well being of the population exhausted (note 2). this chapter shall review domestic, regional and global instruments of the right to development, examining the case law of the african commission on human and peoples’ right, as well as the duty of the nigerian government to take into account the right to development of the niger delta in furtherance of their international obligations. the african charter is an innovative and unique regional document that substantially departs from the narrow formulations of other regional and universal human rights instruments, particularly by the insertion of the group and peoples’ rights (note 3). this work investigates the challenges and constraints to realizing the right to development of the niger delta communities of nigeria amidst the regional, as well as international instruments that guarantee such a right. by constraints and challenges it is meant problem of constitutionalism that www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 84 published by scholink inc. assails the opportunity for the involvement of the people of the niger delta in whatever decision that concerns their development and restoration of the environment and ecology. it seeks to situate human beings, rather than growth, at the centre of the development process. (note 4) the right to development appeared in a number of important soft law instruments such as the world conference on human rights vienna declaration, the millennium declaration, and the rio+20 outcome document (note 5). these documents were adopted by consensus, not by split vote, yet provided insufficient evidence of a genuine legal conviction supporting the right to development, nor a move towards law making on the right to development. they are therefore mere recommendations lacking in authentic legal force. 1. introduction (the niger delta overview) the niger delta region of nigeria is comprised of nine (9) states in nigeria. they are: abia, akwa ibom, bayelsa, cross river, delta, edo, imo, ondo, rivers states. these states are peculiar amongst the rest of the states of the federation due to the oil and gas reserves (resources) embedded under their belly, yet they suffer much indignities, rights violations, environmental degradation, and criminal neglect both from governments and corporate organizations (in the extractive industry) operating in the region. the right to development discourse as envisaged in this research work seeks policies, programmes and concerted multilateral efforts to empower the community to fully play roles in exploiting or enjoy the benefits of exploiting the resources embedded in their land. this is what the provision of article 22 of the african charter has sought to guarantee through domestication and implementation by appropriate legislation. nigeria is a signatory to the charter and has gone further to domesticate the provisions of the charter in the 1999 constitution, as amended. nigeria is well endowed with mineral resources. oil and gas forms part of the major part of the natural resources, most found in the niger delta region of nigeria. with 40billion barrels of proven oil reserves and daily production of about 2.4 million barrels of crude oil, nigeria has become one of the major petroleum exporters in the world. the government and the oil multinational corporations earn huge revenues and profits from oil and gas exports. ironically, amidst growing exports and increasing revenue to national, state, and local governments, poverty levels in the country, particularly the niger delta community, have escalated while social infrastructures have collapsed. dependence on oil and gas revenues has been a major factor in the inability of the state to create an enabling environment for sustainable development with the result that citizens are disenchanted while violence has worsened in the entire country. the increasing violence in the niger delta complicates a social situation characterized by massive poverty and environmental degradation occasioned by the exploitation of crude and natural gas in the area, as corruption has robbed the communities of potential benefits from the accrued federal, state and local government revenues from oil and gas sales. this scenario has necessitated the need for citizens and government to work towards promoting a new deal in democratic accountability in the niger delta region and nigeria in general by improving participation and dialogue among communities, civil www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 85 published by scholink inc. society and governments to ensure that government budgets work for the people. despite over 50 years of increasing oil and gas production, the niger delta region of nigeria remain impoverished communities and social infrastructure in the region are in various states of decay or completely collapsed. nigeria is the 6 th largest exporter of crude oil in the world, yet it fares poorly in many development indices, particularly the niger delta region where the oil and gas production is most prevalent. in order to facilitate exploitation of oil and gas resources, the land use decree of 1978, now the land use act, by past military regimes vest ownership and control of all land and mineral resources in the state. government, devoid of any reference to communities, grants away communal lands and forests to oil and gas companies for exploration and exploitation of crude oil and gas. in the resources bearing niger delta region, the oil industry creates conditions for social dislocation and communal violence, as land expropriation by state for oil activities creates scarcity of productive land (note 6). all stages of oil activity including exploration, drilling and transportation result in the destruction of the natural environment and the livelihood of local people who depend on land for their survival. forests and mangroves are cleared, community farmlands are destroyed, and wetlands, creeks and community fishponds are polluted, while the air and rainwater is contaminated with dangerous gases flared indiscriminately by oil and gas producing companies. the niger delta members are helpless due to their lands being acquired and expropriated through the instrumentality of the provisions of the land use act 1978. the obnoxious provisions of the act cannot be easily expunged or amended due to the insertion of the act in the 1999 constitution. the said constitution further in sections 43 and 44 declared all lands and mineral resources as vested in the federal government of nigeria. the process of constitutional amendment is very cumbersome, long and winding. government’s reliance on oil export revenues has resulted in the neglect of other productive sectors of the national economy. previously, vibrant agricultural sector and robust manufacturing sector have suffered under collapsing national infrastructures including energy and transportation, as successive governments, not being dependent on taxes from non-petroleum sectors of the national economy have diminished incentives to these sectors. it is pertinent to therefore examine the possibility of article 22 of the african charter of human and people’s rights (african charter) being invoked in resolving the constitutional challenges to realizing right to development of the niger delta region of nigeria. the african charter is a regional instrument duly domesticated and inserted in the constitution of the federal republic of nigeria 1999. the problematic aspect of this domestication is implementation to address inequalities, criminal neglect, failure of governance, and widespread violations in the niger delta region of nigeria. 2. concept and emergence agitation for right to development absence of needs satisfaction leads to a feeling of relative deprivation, which builds up to grievance. there is a wide held view that the concepts, principle and attributes of right to development (rtd) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 86 published by scholink inc. are too vague (note 7). it has been the observation that neither the core norm nor the recent case law comprehensively responds to all the preoccupations of keen observers when it comes to giving effect to the right to development. the concept of being vague is due to the fact that it has never been defined in a way that is coherent or capable of gaining consensus. this is traceable to the reason why it is not justiciable. although not justiciable, it is humbly suggested that it should be a standard of achievement, reflecting what has been agreed as the essence of the right in the declaration and balancing the main concerns of various geopolitical groups, which are further fortified by attributes and criteria. the right to development does not entail increased resources in whatever guise (whether aid, loans, debt forgiveness, investment etc). this is the views of the task force on country ownership under the accra agenda for action in consolidation of findings of the high level task force on the implementation of the right to development. (note 8) the rtd is the right of peoples and individuals to the constant improvement of their well-being and to a national and global enabling environment conducive to just, equitable, participatory and human-centred development respectful of human rights (note 9). the realization of rtd demands an enabling environment, along with comprehensive human-centred development, social justice and equity. for this to be accomplished there ought to be a government policy, process of implementation and positive outcome beneficial to the people of the niger delta. the government policy ought to engender a comprehensive participatory human rights process, and promotion of social justice in development. this research work reviewed some published texts and other scholarly works and other scholarly works and discovered that there are gaps in the conceptualization of rtd as it affects the niger delta region of nigeria. thus, in examining the challenges of rtd in the niger delta, this work adopts the marxist political economy approach. the marxist political economy approach is based on dialectical materialism and relative deprivation perspective which accords primacy on material or economic conditions of society (note 10). it is premised on the belief that man is dominantly motivated by economic needs. thus economic activity is man’s primary concern. to karl marx, every political system corresponds and reflects the kind of economic structure in the society. he places emphasis and premium on production base, being the substructure as this determines the politics, ideology and culture of the society being the superstructure. he further contends that these determine how a country organizes, manages and reproduces itself, especially as regards the causes of tension, conflicts or contradiction in any given society and the bearing or direction of social change. this further suggests that there occurs in the capitalist mode of production an economic surplus for which different interest groups in the society scramble. that scramble usually generates conflicts. political conflict is being therefore regarded as an extension of economic conflicts into the realm of politics. the conflict takes place between classes which are also the products of the mode of economic production. each class tends to dominate and exploit one another. in the case of the niger delta, the marxist theory can be analogous. this is grounded on the capitalism www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 87 published by scholink inc. that promotes over dependence on charity either from government or from oil multinationals. this portrays the uneven development, social inequalities, leading to a scenario where different modes of production co-exist. under such conditions, what might be regarded as national progress tends to affect certain groups adversely (note 11). in the nigerian contexts, therefore, such uneven development with its adverse effect came to be perceived along regional lines. thus, every ethnic nationality tends to seek a better share of the nations resources and wealth which in turn strengthens regional agitations. the feelings of relative deprivations are clearly translated into antagonistic regional rivalry. in this regard, a process which would have taken the form of interclass struggle is construed as an inter-regional struggle (note 12). the above analogy describes the theory of relative deprivation as it affects oil wealth and the deepening poverty in the niger delta community. the niger delta is an oil rich region, yet enmeshed in conflicts and crisis of development. the legitimate means of livelihood of the teeming population has been eroded by the oil exploration embarked by the multinational oil companies enjoying the support of successive nigeria government. in this regard, the theory of relative deprivation emphasizes the substances of people’s expectations and reality. the constitution and sundry legislation, as well as governmental policies, have hitherto continuously deprived the region of its life and space. 3. the right to development discourse there’s abundant literature on the right to development discourse and also on the niger delta crisis of development. this work concentrates on a few that is pertinent to the clearer conceptualization of the right to development as it affects the niger delta. this brings us to the ‘causality thesis’, regarding youth militias, self-determination, and resources control in the niger delta, as developed by e.e osaghae, a. ikelegbe, o.o olarinmoye, and s. i. okhomina (note 13). their research finding addressed the themes of self-determination, resource control, the niger delta struggle including its methodology, the place of youths, the militias and the issues in the resolution of conflicts and the effects of the conflicts. their study observed that the ensuing frustration, discontent and anger pushed the youths towards militant actions, especially when confronted with state and corporate insensitivity, abuse, intimidation, violence and militarization. the marxist “dialectical materialism” is also a resource that will be apt in aiding the appreciation of this work in explaining the resulting effect of neglect of niger delta development. this is premised on the belief that man is largely motivated by economic needs. to karl marx, every political system corresponds and reflects the kind of economic structure in the society. the situation in the niger delta confirms marx’s assertion that all “history is the history of class struggle between a ruling group and an opposing group”, from this came a new economic, political and social system. the niger delta communities have articulated their points, advancing reasons why they took arms against the nigerian government which is the ruling group in this struggle. among their key demands are constitutional review, resource control and true federalism. but how has successive governments responded to these www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 88 published by scholink inc. demands? rather than a proactive approach, the government resorted to hardliner constitutional stance that tends to uphold the sanctity of the constitution which has variously been criticized and vilified as a document of fraud and repression. these repressive legislations are those that fuel most of the conflicts and agitations for resource control and right to development. there is imbalance and unreasonableness in most of the sections of such laws which needs immediate legislative or judicial inspired review. the right to development requires the creation of opportunity for participation including social and economic rights. from the abundant literature on the right to development, there is no fixed model suggested for realizing the right to development as its meaning is regarded as contextual and therefore unclear (note 14). this research paper contends that article 22 african charter is very clear on the guarantee of right to development, and the various agitations of the peoples of the niger delta is clear, devoid of ambiguity nor equivocation. 4. perspectives to realizing the right to development the right to development is a global south, and particularly africa, initiative, and perspective, to the global normative human rights framework (note 15). implementation in practice would demonstrate commitment, and show that the right to development has real added value. in other words, the right to development, when properly implemented, shall improve human dignity. the domestic dimension of the right to development entitles the peoples of the niger delta to meaningful participation and benefit-sharing in the development effort, while the global dimension of the right to development protects them against external adverse impact, by establishing a state duty to provide protection against abuses by third parties, including foreign states, intergovernmental organizations and multinational corporations (note 16). the right to development and its effective realization, though controversial, is an aspect of human rights, enforceable under the african human rights system and also guaranteed in the united nations millennium declaration. this research paper raises the issue of the lack of participation of the niger delta community of nigeria in matters and decisions affecting their land and the resources embedded therein under the belly. there is therefore the need to vigorously pursue a development intervention in the niger delta by leveraging on this provision of the african charter alongside the entire african human rights system widely viewed as comprehensive and direct. the constitutional structure of the federation and governmental functionality need to be urgently renegotiated to enable the people of the niger delta utilize their natural resources for their own development. the crisis of development in niger delta is derived from the legal, constitutional and structural defects inherent in the nigerian state (note 17). this is complicated by legislations that vest all land and resources in the federation to the federal government of nigeria, with lands in the states vested in the state government. in other words the statutory basis of the niger delta crisis is traced to nigeria’s defective federal structure that has been maintained by the military imposed unitary laws (note 18). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 89 published by scholink inc. the realization of the right to development is a panacea to the poverty and neglect plaguing the niger delta of nigeria. legal and constitutional steps taken towards this realization are indispensable to prevention of conflicts because they touch on every fundamental of such conflicts. thus, realizing the right to development of the niger delta belongs to the realm of economic and social rights which is germane and indispensable, not only because of the need to protect these rights as human rights but also because effective protection of these rights is inherently invaluable and fundamental for peace and stability (note 19). the right to development is an inalienable right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized (note 20). a proper constitutional structure will be apt to provide the basis for the realization and enjoyment of this right to development (note 21). it shall provide the foundations of a polity where a life in dignity and self-fulfilment becomes an actual opportunity for everyone (note 22). in other words human rights and development are not to be viewed as separate domains. both ought to complement each other (note 23). the 1966 international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights provided a launching pad for the 1986 un declaration of the right to development. the declaration became a milestone in the struggles by radical third world countries within the un to pass a package of reforms that resulted in a new world order (nieo) that are fair to the low income countries, even though the declaration is non-binding (note 24). the concept of the right to development places human being, rather than growth, at the centre of the development process, and seeks social justice and respect for all human beings as part of the process and outcomes of national development policies (note 25). in spite of the laudable efforts made in according the right to development as human rights, this right has been merely treated as a political claim that possess little impact on development practice. it is pertinent to note that the right to development demands that every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be realized. this is absent in the niger delta region of nigeria where neglect, environmental degradation and inequality is widespread. the nigerian government has paid less heed to the plights and suffering of the communities in the niger delta. there is need to explore a framework to make government and the international oil companies operating in the niger delta communities accountable and responsible. this shall be the significant contribution to assuaging the suffering of the members of the niger delta communities due extensively to the environmental degradation for their means of livelihood and sustainance. the un general assembly declaration of the right to development takes a holistic, human-centered approach to development (note 26). it views development as a comprehensive process aiming at improving the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free, and meaningful participation and in the fair distribution of the resulting benefits. according to stephen www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 90 published by scholink inc. marks (note 27), the right to development recognizes development as a human right which empowers all people to claim their active participation in decisions that affect them. the people of the niger delta should not be regarded as mere beneficiaries of charity. they are entitled to claim an equitable share of the benefits resulting from development gains. the nigerian government has resorted to all manner of constitutional and legal frameworks to deny the people of the niger delta their fair and due entitlements. the nigerian state owes the people of the niger delta the primary responsibility for human rights fulfillment and for the creation of an enabling environment for development, and application of the principles of equality, non-discrimination, participation, transparency, accountability, and prudence. human aspirations for development and well-being can be realized in the atmosphere of a solid national accountability framework for development that respects equity, social justice, and all human rights. at the un millennium summit in 2000, the heads of state and government committed themselves to the task of making the right to development a reality for everyone and freeing the entire human race from want (note 28). ten years later, at the 2010 millennium development goals review summit, they reaffirmed the importance of freedom, peace and security, respect for all human rights, and the rule of law (note 29). in spite of these global commitments, the right to development of the niger delta remains a distant reality. obstacles to realizing the right to development in the niger delta have not been static, but evolved constantly. there is need to seek new insights into the most formidable challenges with a view to finding solution for addressing them. the right to development discourse guides in identifying the structural and systemic root causes of inequality and underdevelopment as well as attaining giant strides in finding equitable and sustainable solutions (note 30). the right to development discourse demands that the nigerian government should make explicit provision for the right to development in national policy and development plans. it demands that government ensures that multinational oil corporations operating in the oil rich region of the niger delta do not violate the means of livelihood and wellbeing of the members of the niger delta community, rather to ensure greater transparency in negotiations and agreements. (note 31) inspiration is drawn from the 1993 vienna declaration and program of action to the right to development that declares it a universal and an inalienable right that is an integral part of fundamental human rights (note 32). nigeria constitutional and sundry legal, frameworks have ignored this principle and practice of guaranteeing that the right to development of the niger delta is realized. elsewhere in africa, (note 33) the african commission held the government of kenya accountable for violations of the rights of an indigenous group linked to the denial of access to their traditional land. this decision is notable as the first time that the african commission elaborates on the meaning of the right to development in article 22 of the african charter, the only international treaty to recognize and enforce this right (note 34). the african commission, in the endoris case, observed that there is a need to, protect ‘marginalized and vulnerable groups in africa’ suffering from peculiar problems. these are groups that are not accommodated by dominant development paradigms, are victimized by mainstream www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 91 published by scholink inc. development policies, and have their basic human rights violated. thus, groups, such as the niger delta communities, within this category qualify as peoples in the context of the african charter, and enjoy collective rights, including the right to development (note 35). 5. what should be the paradigm shift what is the most proactive means of implementing the article 22 provision of the african charter, particularly through appropriate policy framework, where it concerns the niger delta region and their vast oil and gas resources? how can we situate the right to development and the millennium development goals, the nigerian federal government committed itself to achieving? do they complement each other or mutually exclusive? as a corollary, what is the framework towards invoking article 22 of the african charter in resolving the constitutional challenges to realizing the right to development of the niger delta region in nigeria? in what manner is it possible to address the inequalities and violations that tend to undermine the development process in the niger delta? this dissertation seeks a sustainable and environmental friendly exploitation of the mineral resources in the niger delta, particularly for the development of the region. the right to development discourse is geared towards identifying the structural and systemic root causes of inequality and underdevelopment as well as seeking efforts to finding equitable and sustainable solutions. this research dissertation seeks to raise public awareness on the importance of this right for the many challenges the niger delta communities are currently facing despite numerous landmark safeguards provided by the african charter. it is sincerely hoped that a proactive paradigm shift so far suggested in this work will contribute to constructive and inspiring approaches in making the right to development a reality for everyone, as envisaged in the un declaration on the right to development, the millennium declaration, as well as the african charter on human and peoples’ rights. there’s yet to be a genuine change, for the better, based on these landmark efforts (note 36). this suggests the interrelation between human rights and development as envisaged the formulators of the declaration on the right to development (note 37). there is need to create a criteria for assessment of progress in the realization of the right to development and implementing a program of development education reaching grassroots organizations, and also suggestion for civil society organizations to create appropriate indicators of progress made towards the realization of the right to development. it is pertinent to note that the declaration on the right to development does not create any legal obligation, although it has the potential for carrying the weight of moral and political obligations (note 38). it is suggested in this work that the nigerian government should make explicit provisions for the right to development in national policy and development plans, ensure that the oil multinational corporations operating in the niger delta do not violate the right to development. it also suggests an environment conducive to the realization of the right to development, particularly through the democratization of decision-making in intergovernmental agencies and institutions that deal with monetary policy and development assistance (note 39). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 92 published by scholink inc. there is need for a powerful legal framework to impose a moral duty to stop and redress human rights violations and prevent them from happening in the future. this legal framework shall facilitate the monitoring, coordination, and implementation of the right to development, and also provide for direct and indirect participation of representatives of the niger delta people at all levels of decision-making. a ministerial level commission should be established for the purpose of implementing the right to development as a human right and periodic reports on progress and challenges in this regard. the statutory basis of the niger delta conflict and crisis of development is traceable to nigeria’s defective federal structure that has been maintained by the military imposed unitary laws that hitherto need to be expunged. scholars in the development law, development economics and related social sciences have written and argued extensively on the issue of right to development of africa’s vulnerable communities. despite the large literature bordering on problem of development and rights violation in the niger delta of nigeria, little attention has been paid on the constitutional constraints and implications thereof. the discussion of the multifarious legal instruments towards addressing the right to development of the niger delta communities have been rarely articulated nor merely mentioned in the manner envisaged to assuage the suffering and repression of members of the niger delta communities. in other words, there is limited literature that addresses the legal architecture and structural challenges to the right to development of the niger delta communities in the manner this research seeks to portray the issues arising from the discourse. this work seeks to fill the vacuum in this regard and explore a possibility of a speedy, and uninhibited, integrated development of the resources rich communities of the niger delta communities of nigeria. the niger delta region covers 9 states, with 27 senatorial districts and 185 local governments. there is need to implement the master plan that provides for best practices across the niger delta region. there is need to explore the possibility of developing growth communities in the rural area that shall possibly create development hubs to drive development within the communities according to their cutting-edge competencies. a possible legal framework shall be explored for the easy takeoff of these growth communities to serve the purpose of stimulating industrial development of the communities where the mineral resources are located. 6. lesson from other african counties african nations, particularly malawi (article 30, 1994 constitution), democratic republic of congo (article 58, 2005 constitution), ethiopia (article 43, 1994 constitution), among others, have constitutionally guaranteed the right to development. constitutionalization, therefore, of the right to development is sine qua non to its realization. the niger delta region of nigeria has suffered, and still suffering, myriad of problems, conflicts, environmental devastation, and neglect. this has resulted to widespread poverty amidst oil and mineral resources being exploited in their lands. the many repressive laws and sections of the 1999 constitution need to be reviewed in a view to amending, repealing or expunging them. the right to development of the people of the niger delta ought to be www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 93 published by scholink inc. guaranteed both by laws and policies of the government, as well as responsible, and sustainable, exploitation of the mineral resources abundant in their lands by multinational oil corporations. this research paper seeks to enlighten and create awareness that the concepts and principles of the right to development is not vague but practical and proactive approach to national developmental policies that will not disrupt the means of livelihood of the teeming population of the people of the niger delta. it also seeks to suggest that right to development does not require budgetary allocations or acts of charity, but rather promotion of fairness, justice, equal access to opportunities and responsible, as well as sustainable, investments in the abundant mineral resources in the nation. 7. summary and conclusion the plight of the people of the niger delta communities in nigeria has been amplified by scholars, human rights crusaders, and case law. this has resulted to a significant literature on this matter. this research paper has so far explored published materials on right to development, international and regional instruments that touch directly on the right to development, and sundry local legislations, as well as federal government policies that address the issue of needed development initiatives that assuage the suffering of the most vulnerable population residing in the niger delta communities. the author visited selected communities to investigate whether ongoing as well as previous governmental development projects have so far positively impacted on the communities. effort was made in this paper to weave all the assembled materials and findings to effectively address the right to development discourse. references koen, d. f. 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(2005). the evolution of development strategies in africa: from the lagos plan of action to the report of the commission for africa. cemiss quartely, spring 2005. dejo, o. (2009). an integrative rights-based approach to human development in africa. pretoria university law press pulp, 2009. laure. h. p. (2002). the right to development: a review of the current state of the debate for the dfid. april 2002. erika, s., & chantelle, m. (2008). rule of law, justice sector reforms and development cooperation. concept paper for swiss agency for development and cooperation sdc 2008. umeh, r. s. (2012). oil politics in nigeria and the niger delta crises. solar press okigwe, 2012. festus, i. (2007). the niger delta: issues of justice and development agenda. centre for democracy and development, 2007. okey, i., & luckham, r. (2006). niger delta: ploitical violence, governance and corporate responsibility in a petro-state. centre for democacy and development, 2006. national human rights commission, the state of human rights in nigeria 2009-2010. edigin, l. u. (2014). youth unrest in the niger delta region: an insight into the causes and solutions. covenant journal of business and social sciences, 5(1). notes note 1. koen de feyter, ‘the right to development in africa,’ law and development, university of antwerp, july 2013 p 3 note 2. article 22(1) african charter on human and peoples’ right note 3. serac and another v nigeria(2001) p 68); the endoris case, infa. note 4. marks p.s, ‘the politics of the possible: the way ahead for right to development’, international policy analysis(dialogue on globalization), friedrich ebert stiftung , june 2011 note 5. (a/conf.216/l.1,19 june 2012) note 6. asume isaac osuoka, ‘paper presented at the expert group meeting on the use of non-renewable resources revenues for sustainable local development’, organized by un department of economic and social affairs, friday 21 september 2007, un headquarters, new york note 7. http:/www.fes.de/gpol/pdf/salomon_core_norm.pd note 8. a/hrc/15/wg2/task force/2/add.1, march 25, 2010 para 69 note 9. right to development criteria and operational sub-criteria, a/hrc/15/wg2/task force/2/add.2, february 2, 2010 note 10. proponents of relative deprivation theory are: b chizea and iyare, ‘nigeria’s raying ethnic www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 96 published by scholink inc. conflicts. the role of small arms and military companies’, the constitution, vol. 6, no.1, 2006, pp 71-100; t.r. gurr, why men rebel, (princeton, nj: princeton university press 1970; d. horowitz, ethnic groups in conflict (berkley ca: university of california press 1985; folarin, ‘niger delta environment, ogoni crisis and the state’, the constitution, vol. 7 n. 1, 2007, p. 37-61 note 11. tyoyia a.g. and terhenmen g.d., ‘challenges of democracy and development in nigeria’s niger delta region’, an appraisal’, european scientific journal, vol. 8, no. 16 note 12. ibid p. 57 note 13. youth militia, self-determination and resource control struggle in the niger delta region of nigeria(dakar: codestria research reports 2011) no.5 note 14. (philip alston, ‘ships passing in the night: the current state of the human rights and development debate seen through the lens of millennium development goals’ human rights quaterly, vol. 27,no.3, august 2005 pp 755-829, published by john hopskins press.; andrea cornwall and celestine nyamu-musembi, ‘putting the rights based aproach to development in perspective’, third world quaterly, volume 25, no 8, 2004, pp 1415-1437.; koen de feyter, ‘the right to development in africa’, law and development, published by university of antwerp, july 2013.; stephen p. marks, ‘the politics of the possible: the way ahead for right to development’, dialogue on globalization, international policy analysis, june 2011 note 15. koen feyter, the right to development in africa (law and development, university of antwerp 2013, koen.defeyter@ua.ac.be note 16. ibid note 17. legislations such as the petroleum act, 1969, the land use act 1978, and the sections 43-44 of the 1999 constitution, have effectively deprived local residents of any ownership stake in the land and petroleum resources discovered in their community. note 18. ( adigbuo e. r., ‘nigerian national role conception: the case of namibia 1975-1990’, doctoral thesis submitted to the university if johannesburg, south africa, 2005) note 19. agbakwa s, ’a path least taken: economic and social rights and prospects of conflict prevention and peace building in africa’, 2003 1 jal, 47 note 20. article 1 of the un declaration of the right to development, un general assembly resolution 41/128 of 4 december 1986 note 21. j donnelly,’human rights, democracy, and development’(1999)21 hrq 608 at 619-22 note 22. ibid note 23. m robinson, ‘bridging the gap between human rights and development: from normative principles to operational relevance’, world bank presidential fellows lecture, 3 december 2001. available at www.worldbank.org/wbi/b_span/sub_mary_robinson.htm note 24. andrea cornwall and celestine nyamu-musembi, ‘right based approach to development into perspective’, third world quarterly, vol. 25, no.8(2004), pp.1415-1437, published by taylor & francis, ltd www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 97 published by scholink inc. note 25. stephen p marks, ‘the politics of the possible:the way ahead of right to development,’ international policy analysis, dialogue on development, fredrich ebert stiftung june 2011 note 26. adopted by the general assembly on december 4, 1986 note 27. ibid note 28. (www.un.org/milennium) note 29. they also included the right to development, gender equality and an overall commitment to a just and democratic societies for even development note 30. marks s p, supra,n 11 note 31. the realization of the right to development: global consultation on the right to development as a human rights, hr/pub/91?2, para 171 note 32. vienna declaration and programme of action, un doc.a/conf.157/23,1993,para 10; ga res 50/214 1995; ga res. 48/141,1993 note 33. centre for minority rights development(kenya)and minority rights group international on behalf of endoris welfare council v kenya(2009)ahrlr 75(achpr2009) note 34. compendium of key human rights documents of the african union,fifth edition 2013, hein and killander editors note 35. okafor, “righting” the right to development: a social-legal analysis of article 22 of the african charter on human and peoples’ rights in marks(ed), implementing the right to development,the role of international law (geneva,friedrich-ebert-stiftung, 2008) 58. note 36. (http://www.fes.de/gpol/en/rtd_conference.htm) note 37. keba m’baye, ‘the right to development as a human right,’ inaugural address of the third teaching session of the international institute of human rights july 3, 1972 p.503) note 38. (stephen marks, ‘obligation to implement the right to development: political, legal and philosophical rationales’, in bard anders andressen and stephen p marks(eds),development as human right: legal, political and economic dimensions, revised and updated in second edition, brussels: intersentia, 2010, pp 73-100) note 39. (the realization of the right to development: global consultation on the right to development as a human right, hr/pub/91/2, para 171) advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 73 original paper research on enterprise strategy based on porter’s five forces analysis model—taking dick smith as an example chen yushan 1&2 1 school of accounting, guangzhou commercial college, guangzhou, guangdong 511363, china 2 institute of business administration college, the national university of malaysia, bandar baru bangi 43600, malaysia received: june 22, 2023 accepted: august 02, 2023 online published: august 15, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n3p73 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n3p73 executive summary this article firstly provides a brief introduction of dick smith. then, the article analyze the general environment of dick smith, including economic trend, technological change and demographic impact. after that, the article identify the industry environment of dick smith, followed by analysis of issues in the competitive environment through identifying five forces of which. in addition, this report describes dick smith’s current strategies. at last, the article explain the reasons why dick smith’s strategies were unsustainable, and point out the main reason contributes to its strategic failure, loss of competitive advantage and final collapse. though dick smith was one of the most popular retail brands in australia, it didn’t survive owing to its strategic failure, and was acquired by kogan in 2016. thus, it is essential to identify and analyze the strategic decision-making in dick smith, as which can be taken as a warning, and then help organizations develop effective ones, since only effective strategic plan and implementation can positively impact the performance of the organization (hanson et al., 2017). 1. introduction dick smith, which was one of the largest electronic retailers in australia, collapsed in 2016, within several years after the acquisition by anchorage capital. this report analyzes the reasons why strategies adopted by dick smith are unsustainable during the control of anchorage capital, and what are the impacts of general environment, industry and competitor environment, and internal environment on these strategies. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 74 published by scholink inc. 2. general environment changes in the general environment have direct and indirect effects on all industries (gupta, 2013). the australian electronic retail industry was affected by several elements of the general environment back then, especially by economic, technological and demographic ones. 2.1 economic: lowest wage growth rate and inflation from the perspective of economic impacts, the domestic economy of australia is in recession during 2016, with the lower wage growth rate accompanied by the rising household spend, it leads to a decline of consumer confidence and a decrease in consumer spending. the wage growth rate has fallen to historical status, and the inflation rate increase to 1.7% at the first quarter of 2016, which illustrated by the following graph. wage growth could not keep pace with inflation, leading to a drop in real wages, and the pressures on the lives of thousands of employees might continue to mount (mehra, 1991), which decrease people’s ability to purchase of goods as they have less wages relative to the higher cost of goods. figure 1. australia’s inflation rate from 2014 to 2017 the anz bank’s australian consumer confidence index which is provided by the roy morgan research and presented in the figure 2, shows that the wage growth rate declined to the lowest level at the late 2015 and early 2016 (david, 2019). consumer didn’t hold the positive attitude about the overall state of the economy and their personal financial situation. thus, they tend to save more and spend less, which would affect the sale electronic products. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/economy https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/personal_finance www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 75 published by scholink inc. figure 2. the anz bank’s australian consumer confidence index 2.2 technological and demographic: short life cycle and innovation technology change frequently, accordingly the electronic products have shorter life cycle. with the continuous improvement of technology, consumers’ needs tend to be diversified. their needs for electronic products can be described as multifarious. moreover, the main consumer for electronic products is the younger generation, the age range of whom is between 15 and 34 as they have a comparatively high demand for new electronic products though with a relatively low income compared with the older generation, which is illustrated by the graphs below. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 76 published by scholink inc. 2.3 industry and competitor environment dick smith is an australian electronics retail chain that specializes in all electronic items and belongs to the bricks-and-mortar electronics retailing in australia. since such an industry is unattractive, it is of vital importance for dick smith to understand the impacts of the industry and competitor environment on strategic planning and implementing (porter, 2008). through identifying its position in the retail industry and its competitors by porter’s five forces, dick smith could have been able to appropriately use its competitive advantages if any. buyers in the electronic retail industry have high bargaining power as this industry offers homogeneous products and the switching costs between the different sellers are not high. this a very strong force as the bargain hunting customers switch to other stores if they do not get what they desire at lowest prices (legget 2016). from this way, the buying power of buyers in the industry ranges from moderate to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 77 published by scholink inc. high. as per porters theory, the larger or stronger the supplier is, the stronger is its bargaining power. so for retail industry the bargaining power of suppliers may range from moderate to high. as for electronic industry, the dependence on suppliers is less, resulting in very moderate bargaining power of suppliers in the industry. the prime reason for moderate bargaining power of suppliers in the australian retailing industry is that there’s a large percentage of market share of retailers in australia and large number of products are being sold by them in the industry. in terms of the industry rivalry, dick smith faced with high threat of industry substitutes from woolworths, harvey norman and jb hi-fi. the high industry substitutes are due to high competition that retail industry of australia faces (davidson, 2016). since there are a large number of industry substitutes, they tend to restrict the market share usurped by dick smith in totality. thus, within the electronic retail industry there’s an intense competition, leaving barely no competitive advantage in charging low prices. thus the availability of substitutes ranges from moderate to high. such intense rivalry compels the firm to continuously engage in effective and competitive strategies so as to differentiate themselves from other rivals in the industry. the electronic retail industry of australia has comparatively low barriers to entry as the market is flooded with many industry substitutes. also, since the price offered in the industry is not that high, it is not considered as an attractive industry as there’s low profit margin. however, government regulations and restrictions and scarce availability of land may act as barriers to entry into the industry. also, the relationship already established between the known brands and the customers may also deter entry into the industry. thus, the threat of new entrants is moderate to low. taking into consideration porter’s five forces mentioned above, it can be seen that electronics retailing is an unattractive industry due to fierce competition, large number of suppliers opening their own stores, low barriers to entry and high amount of rent charged by land lords of the bricks-and-mortar retailing. besides, the customers in such industry want latest products at least prices. 2.4 internal environment the brand of disk smith has been established for more than 50 years (dick smith from wikipedia, 2019). goodwill and brand value can be seen the most important intangible assets for disk smith. besides, the numerous stores and their wide distribution could be seen as a valuable strategy arrangement if with attractive products to sell. these resources could be considered as strengths of dick smith, and used as its the core competence. however, due to electronic products update rapidly, the price and value of remaining outdated inventory would be compromised. prior to its acquisition in 2016, disk smith stuck to an expansion policy, piling up inventory and devaluing products (disk smith, 2015), eating up most of the company’s earnings, which directly led to the company’s capital chain rupture. in order to ensure daily operations, dick smith had to borrow loan from banks. total borrowing nearly doubled in 2015 from a $71m to a $127m in just six months (disk smith, 2015). the huge borrowing led to higher interest www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 78 published by scholink inc. payments, and the company lost money as its surplus was wiped out by the depreciation of inventory. the huge losses made it difficult for dick smith to resume business. a large amount of debt broke its capital chain and increased its financial risks. these weaknesses of dick smith finally led itself to collapse. when disk smith was bought by anchorage capital partners in 2016, it canceled all its physical stores and focused on disk smith online. this allows disk smith to reduce payroll costs and reduce inventory. this gives disk smith new life and opportunities. there are also potential threats. the business model of online mall adds difficulty to after-sales service. customers can only communicate with disk smith by phone and over the network, making it impossible for customers to communicate directly with disk smith. 2.5 current strategic priorities or direction after acquired by kogan in 2016, new strategy has been adopted that only online business of dick smith is run under kogan’s stewardship. although dick smith’s online business accounts for only 8% of total sales (sue, 2016), its website, customer database and intellectual property is a big database for the retail industry ruinous power of the online sales activities impacts the retail industry significantly in how to sale and what to sale. compared with other retail commodities, electronic products are especially affected, and accordingly, the electronic retailers face a severer situation, as prices fall and life circle reduces. thus, strategies like promoting sales based on fixed costs and operating leverage, such as aggressive store expansion and mass inventory storage, are not applicable and should be avoided. 2.6 reasons contribute to the unsustainable strategies after the acquisition by anchorage capital in 2012, several strategies were adopted for dick smith, including aggressive store expansion, increase in private label inventory (talevski, 2016), and rebate-driven inventory purchase (mitchell, 2017), by which the collapse of dick smith in 2016 was caused. these unsustainable strategies can be attributed by dick smith’s failed analysis and response of changes and impacts of external environment as well as internal environment. 2.7 inappropriate analysis and response of external environment the external environment directly and indirectly influences the organizations’ strategic planning and implementing, as the components of which are of complexity, numerousness, dynamic, and unpredictability (muscalu, iancu, & halmaghi, 2016). the strategies adopted by dick smith turns out to be inaccurate and unsustainable due to its failure in thoroughly understanding and effectively responding to impacts of the three segments of the external environment, which are general, industry and competitor (hanson et al., 2017). in terms of the changes and impacts of the general environment, despite the economic sluggish might tighten consumers’ spending (davidson, 2016), the main impact comes from the technological advancement which influences the way people shop and the product people willing to buy (mun & yazdanifard, 2014). being obsessed with the idea that revenue growth is positively with store network https://www.arnnet.com.au/author/194918410/julia-talevski/articles www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 79 published by scholink inc. growth, dick smith gradually expanded its store network. the chain reaction of dick smith’s store expansion strategy is the increase in inventory storage. however, the product mix is undesirable (candler, 2016), resulting a poor store presentation. owing to improper general environment scanning, monitoring, forecasting and assessing, dick smith didn’t thoroughly detect the potential changes in the rapid technological development trend, nor did it response feasibly or change strategies accordingly. the availability of technology does not hold back dick smith, but instead, it is the inability to understand the trend and the inflexibility to adopt the change that foreshadow the strategic failure of dick smith. as for the changes and impacts of the industry environment, low barriers to entry the electronic retail industry, high bargaining power of buyers, moderate bargaining power of suppliers, strong threats of substitute products, and intense rivalry indicate that the electronic retail industry is of fierce competitiveness, which stresses the significance of competitive strategies one has. owing to the homogeneous nature of electronic product supply to retailers, the strategy implemented to differentiate oneself to others is limited. as other electronic retailers also chase the same customers, they can provide lower price for same products (candler, 2016), thus differentiating from other competitors through lower price becomes impractical. unfortunately, differentiating product by increasing in private label inventory did not bring dick smith any competitive advantages (bartholomeusz, 2016). high level of private label inventory, instead, strained the cash flow of dick smith, resulting a gap between what dick smith can provide and what customers actually wanted, which could also be explained by its chaotic product mix. the inconsistency with customer demand and the inappropriate strategy affect each other reciprocally, together contributing to the strategic failure of dick smith. in terms of the changes and impacts of the competitor environment, the current strategies, capabilities, assumptions about the industry, and future objectives (hanson et al., 2017) of competitors as well as the intensity of rivalry are correlated to the according responses of an organization. the competition of electronic retail industry is intense, as there exists many competitors including jb hi-fi, harvey norman, kogan and ebay. taking jb hi-fi as an example, the strategy adopted by jb hi-fi was different, as its products remained a diverse range and it did not heavily invest in private label product (hatch, 2016). on the contrary, dick smith allocated its limited capital inefficiently, failed to spread the potential risks, and lost the feasibility owing to the chain effects of its strategies of aggressive store expansion and high level of private label inventory storage, and as a consequence, its market share shrunk. misjudgement and inappropriate response to issues in the three parts of external environment compromised the strategic sustainability that dick smith should have, inevitably contributing to the failed strategies. 2.8 inappropriate analysis and response of internal environment the internal environment of an organization lays the foundation for strategic planning and implementing, the analysis of which enables an organization to know what resources, capabilities, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 80 published by scholink inc. strengths and weaknesses, and accordingly core competences one has (hanson et al., 2017), thus helps one cope with issues in external environment. coherently, altogether affects the strategic planning and implementing. understanding itself inaccurately, dick smith failed to allocate its resources properly though claimed in its 2015 annual report that a dividend payout ratio of 60% to 70% could still balance the resources required for business growth with rewarding directors (dick smith, 2015, p. 2). in fact, the dividend paid did erode the sustainability of strategies that dick smith ought to have, as the initial purpose of its strategic planning was not to obtain competitive advantages, outperform its competitors nor achieve sustainable development, but to increase the dividend paid. in doing so, the rebate-driven inventory purchase strategy was adopted since at least may 2014 (mitchell, 2017), and dick smith banked the rebate as revenues (candler, 2016) to boost short-term book profit thereafter to gain rewards, squeezing as much money as possible from suppliers and maximizing directors’ own profits. the rebate-driven strategy failed to be consistent with customers’ demand, causing its products to be unattractive. though the reputation of dick smith should have helped to gain some advantages, the bizarre product mix disappointed potential customers. being unable to sell old inventories, cash flow in dick smith was negatively affected, which hinders dick smith from paying both suppliers and the bank loan. simultaneously, the aggressive store expansion strategy and high level investment in private label inventory strategy, altogether forming a vicious circle, enlarged the inflexibility and unsustainability of dick smith. incapable of understanding internal environment, ignoring the organizational capacity, relying on poor products and blindly expansion to gain competitive advantage, and self-interest driven decision making erode dick smith’s strategic planning and implementing, making its strategic failure unavoidable. 2.9 main eason of the strategic failure dick smith with u rnsustainable developments losing its competitive advantage in the market is attributed to the external and internal environmental aspects, but the fundamental cause of its collapse is related to ineffective strategic leadership and management issue. hanson et al. (2017) stated that effective strategic leader plays an essential role in energizing the human capital of the firm and guiding the organization to achieve positive outcomes. however, during the strategic management process of dick smith, the leaders and managers represented the insufficient capacity of developing appropriate strategies to implement. in december 2013, with floating on the australian securities exchange by anchorage capital partners in australia which purchased dick smith in september 2012 (intelligent investor, 2016), dick smith continually concentrated on significantly increasing revenue and generating profitability, such as an aggressive expansion strategy (chung, 2016). this inappropriate decision-making resulted in considerable costs of expanding stores reaching a peak of approximately 381 stores during 2014 (anchorage capital, 2014), which ultimately led to purchasing excessive amount of inventory with completely outdated electronic products (mitchell, 2016). according to the annual reports of dick www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 81 published by scholink inc. smith, the inventories increased from $171 million to $293 million between 2013 and 2015, this is mainly because dick smith did not consider the rapid technological innovation, and purchasing products were determined by the rebates-driven buying inventory from suppliers rather than customers’ demands and needs (mitchell, 2016). in addition, under the high cash flow pressure and inadequate profits, one of the main management issues is relevant to the failure of management control such as manipulating sales for increasing profits. the management breached duties and failed to conduct adequate procedures to monitor stock including overstating inventory and impairment for inventory. for instance, from 2013 to 2015, the amount of accounts receivables dramatically increased from $10.4 million to $53 million because of maximizing rebates from suppliers, while the amount of accounts payable grown from $153 million to $220 million by reason of gaining extra credit from suppliers (mitchell, 2017). consequently, dick smith was not successful to ensure the proper financial statements, especially for inventory and earnings. the management also breached banking covenants in order to extend the payment of debts as a result of insufficient positive funds (mitchell, 2016). hanson et al. (2017) dedicated that corporate management is essential for making and implementing strategic decisions effectively, and conducting appropriate decision-making is beneficial for promoting stakeholders’ interests in organizations. overall, without the quality of leadership and management decision-making as a fundamental component of strategic management, dick smith did not create and implement appropriate and valuable business strategies to achieve sustainable competitive advantage by integrating the analysis of external and internal factors, dick smith, therefore, eventually failed to compete in the electronic retail market. 3. conclusion dick smith as the electronics retailer since 1968, creating such great customer experience for australian and new zealander, however, the firm failed to deliver unique products and services to customers. hanson et al. (2017) indicated that strategic management is crucial for organizations to set a direction for organizational development and to avoid failure in the market (hanson et al. 2017). organizations need to adopt suitable management approaches and actions for conducting and operating their business, which can improve corporate performance, enhance enterprise investment and strengthen business growth (tapera, 2014). thus, only with appropriate strategies and effective management practice could dick smith have been able to obtain competitive advantages and then ensure sustainable development in a dynamic business environment. reference list anchorage capital. (2014). case study dick smith holdings limited. anchorage capital partners. retrieved from http://www.anchoragecapital.com.au/case-study-dick-smith bartholomeusz, s. (2016). dick smith’s nick abboud ignored the golden rule of retail. aacs. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 82 published by scholink inc. retrieved from https://www.aacs.org.au/media/product-release/dick-smiths-nick-abboud-ignored-the-golden-ruleof-retail/ candler, a. (2016). the dick smith lessons. equity, 30(8). retrieved from https://search.informit.com.au/documentsummary;dn=313293222960972;res=ielbus chung, f. (2016). mcgrathnicol releases dick smith report. news pty limited. retrieved from https://www.news.com.au/finance/business/retail/mcgrathnicol-releases-dick-smith-report/news-st ory/c2897a8cf8023b3f7490b7f16c2781c2 david, s. (2019). australian consumer confidence “plunges” as economic growth whiffs. business insider australia. retrieved from https://www.businessinsider.com.au/australia-economy-gdp-per-capita-recession-consumer-confid ence-2019-3 davidson, s. (2016). dick smith couldn’t compete and that is why it failed. the conversation, 6. retrieved from https://theconversation.com/dick-smith-couldnt-compete-and-that-is-why-it-failed-52755 dick, s. (2015). annual report 2015. dick smith, australia. gupta, a. (2013). environment & pest analysis: an approach to the external business environment. international journal of modern social sciences, 2(1), 34-43. hanson, d., hitt, m. a., ireland, r. d., & hoskisson, r. e. (2017). strategic management: competitiveness and globalisation (6th ed.). cengage learning, melbourne. hatch, p. (2016). dick smith’s fall reinforces jb hi-fi view on value of diversity. the sydney morning herald. retrieved from https://www.smh.com.au/business/companies/dick-smiths-fall-reinforces-jb-hifi-boss-view-on-val ue-of-product-diversity-20160208-gmod05.html intelligent investor. (2016). dick smith (dsh). invest smart publishing pty ltd. retrieved from https://www.intelligentinvestor.com.au/company/dick-smith-holdings-limited-dsh-10335358 legget, a. (2016). the real lesson from dick smith’s collapse. investsmart, 7. retrieved from https://www.investsmart.com.au/investment-news/the-real-lesson-from-dick-smiths-collapse/6148 4 mehra, y. p. (1991). wage growth and the inflation process: an empirical note. the american economic review, 81(4), 931-937. mitchell, s. (2016). dick smith was an accident waiting to happen. the australian financial review. retrieved from https://www.afr.com/business/retail/dick-smith-was-an-accident-waiting-to-happen-20160714-gq6 2kd mitchell, s. (2017). dick smith directors “liable’’. australian financial review, 21. retrieved from http://eds.b.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.utas.edu.au/eds/detail/detail?vid=6&sid=baae8da9-f503-429awww.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 83 published by scholink inc. 812b-77aa81dad958%40sessionmgr120&bdata=jnnpdgu9zwrzlwxpdmu%3d#an=doc6u5 1ujhy720ana855tf&db=azh mun, y., & yazdanifard, r. (2014). the influence of the most recent technological advancement on retailing industry. research gate. retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/258345344 muscalu, e., iancu, d., & halmaghi, e. e. (2016). the influence of the external environment on organizations. journal of defense resources management, 7(2), 133-138. porter, m. e. (2008). the five competitive forces that shape strategy. harvard business review, 86(1), 25-40. postel, j. (1981). internet protocol darpa internet program protocol specification. in information sciences institute of southern california (pp. 1-97). https://doi.org/10.17487/rfc0791 sue, m. (2016). dick smith brand to be resurrected by ruslan kogan. the sydney morning herald. retrieved from https://www.smh.com.au/business/companies/dick-smith-brand-to-be-resurrected-by-ruslan-kogan -20160314-gnibrn.html talevski, j. (2016). dick smith: where it all went wrong. arn. retrieved from https://www.arnnet.com.au/article/603415/dick-smith-where-it-all-went-wrong/ tapera, j. (2014). the importance of strategic management to business organizations. the international journal, 3(1), 122-131. https://www.smh.com.au/business/companies/dick-smith-brand-to-be-resurrected-by-ruslan-kogan-20160314-gnibrn.html https://www.smh.com.au/business/companies/dick-smith-brand-to-be-resurrected-by-ruslan-kogan-20160314-gnibrn.html https://www.arnnet.com.au/author/194918410/julia-talevski/articles microsoft word ape-v5n1-p99 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 99 original paper religion and power comparing political landscape in the religious conflicts in poso and maluku sri yunanto1* & angel damayanti2 1 graduate school of political science, universitas muhammadiyah jakarta, indopnesia 2 department of international relations, universitas kristen indonesia, jakarta, indonesia * sri yunanto, graduate school of political science, universitas muhammadiyah jakarta, indopnesia received: january 4, 2022 accepted: january 21, 2022 online published: january 28, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n1p99 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n1p99 abstract indonesia is a pluralistic country inhabited by muslims, christians, catholics, hindus, buddhists, and confucians, with muslims, hold the majority population. their adherents live in harmony and tolerance within the democratic political system. however, at the outset of the reform era, indonesian people suffered from instabilities, conflicts, and terrorism, capitalizing ethnic, tribal, and religious symbols for political objectives such as those in the religious conflicts in poso and maluku. this paper seeks to compare the political landscape of the muslim-christian conflicts in maluku and poso. this research uses a qualitative approach with a comparative method and finds similarities and differences of political factors explaining the conflicts. its similarities were conflicts amongst social, political, and military leaders at the national and local levels. in addition, they used agent provocateurs to provoke their co-religionists. however, this study found differences in the involvement of student and youth unions in maluku but not in poso. keywords conflict, religion, maluku, poso, politics 1. introduction indonesia is a big pluralistic country. diverse ethnic, tribes, religious believers live together in harmony and tolerance. bang ki-moon, un secretary-general, in his speech in the sixth global forum of the alliance of civilizations held on 29 august 2014, testified that indonesia is a country where thousands of ethnic groups have been, for decades, living side by side, in harmony and been able to foster mutual helps in resolving social problems. moreover, international leaders have recognized indonesian muslims as the majority population, moderate, tolerant and peaceful. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 100 published by scholink inc. however, such a situation does not neglect that tension between internal religious followers and other religious followers, notably between muslims and christians, never existed in contemporary indonesian history. specifically, in the beginning years of reform time, religious tensions and conflicts broke up such as those happened between dayak and madura ethnics in central kalimantan, muslim and christian conflict in dani and also tribe in papua where muslims came there as migrants and papuan as the indigenous people and also muslim and christian conflict in maluku and poso which we will discuss in this article. these incidences took people’s lives and destroyed their properties and worship places. moreover, it also dotted the peaceful, harmonious, and tolerant life of indonesian people who enjoy the transition of democracy. surprisingly, many scholars view that the primary roots of the conflicts in the new order time and after new order do not come from diversity and plurality of the people. instead, they hailed from the weakening of the state as the significant explaining factors of the conflict. within pluralistic and diverse characteristics of the indonesian people, communal conflicts with primordial dimensions remain a severe security threat. further, political events such as general elections that indonesia experienced would trigger factors. political parties used religious and other primordial brands massively as political tools to discredit their rivals, such as had happened in maluku and poso conflicts. 2. significance of the study, methodology and research questions religious conflicts in maluku and poso have now been over, despite terror threats and attacks in poso and the vulnerable situation in ambon. nonetheless, the potential of religious conflicts to break up in the current and coming indonesia remains serious. the rising radical movements in many walks of life and the political ups and downs are important factors explaining the potentiality of conflicts (bbc.com 2016) (note 1). radical activists or groups with religious, ethnic, and political backgrounds capitalize on religious and other primordial issues, known in indonesian contexts as ethnic, religion, race, and groups (suku, agama, ras dan antar golongan/sara) to achieve their political, cultural or even ideological objectives. social, political, and government leaders have extended alerts and reminders to political contestants and their core followers not to capitalize on primordial issues for political objectives. capitalizing on these sensitive issues in our diverse, multi-ethnic, and religious society could bring this nation into grave peril. maluku and poso conflicts have taught us how political conflicts matter in explaining religious conflicts. therefore, discussing political factors or landscape in the religious conflict in maluku and poso will be of significance to reflect current political events when certain political contestants might use black or negative campaigns using primordial sentiments, notably religion. using qualitative comparative approach, with multi-methods data collections such document, media analysis and triangulated with interviews, this article seeks to discuss two things: first, the comparison between the nature of the conflicts in maluku and poso, which cover; their escalation and de-escalation, casualties, second, the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 101 published by scholink inc. comparison of the political landscape of the conflicts in the two locations. we will analyze the similarities and differences between the conflicts and their political factors. 3. conceptual and theoretical notes 3.1 religious conflict this research uses two central concepts; religious conflict and political landscape. the concept of conflict connotes positive and negative meanings. in its positive meaning, conflicts can be in the form of constructive competition. in its negative meaning, as used in this article, conflict is defined as a type of competition to win over value, power, or status, yet materialized by physical attacks in terms of injuring, attacking, or even killing their adversaries to meet un-negotiable goals of the two or more parties (panggabean & trijono, 2004) (note 2). religious conflicts, as horowitz asserts, can also be analyzed within the concept of ethnic conflict as it is rooted in the ascribed group’s identity such as caste, nationality, language, tribes, and religion (sukma in snitwongse, kusuma, & thomson, 2004; trijono, 2004) (note 3). however, this article defines religious conflict by modifying that of developed by zulfan tadjoedin, who categorizes religious conflict or violence as a type of communal conflict, that is, violent attacks between two religious groups, driven by religious motivation characterized by the capitalization of religious symbols (tadjoedin, 2013) (note 4). 3.2 political landscape from architectural terminology, the political landscape here means all visible features or characteristics of political dynamic, which surround the maluku and poso conflicts. therefore, this article first discusses the most important political change commonly termed reformasi (reform), democratization, or democratic transition in understanding the political landscape. theorists like samuel huntington (1991), jack snyder (2003), o’donel, and phillip schmitters have reminded us that democratization produces promises for changes and improvement for a better life. however, it occurs in the weakening state, characterized by instability, violent conflict, and potentials of revolution in which leaders of the conflicting groups are compromising to reach political equilibrium. unfortunately, a weak state is powerless in mobilizing security apparatus to cope with the situation. 4. result 4.1 the comparison between the nature of religious conflict in poso and maluku 4.1.1 the nature of religious conflict in poso this article classifies the poso conflict into two periods, before the malino agreement (1998-2002), after the malino agreement (2002-2007), or even today. the classification of the poso conflict into two periods is essential. before and during the malino agreement, the communal conflict happened between the muslim and christian communities in poso. after the malino agreement, communal conflict shifted to asymmetric conflicts or terrorism using islamic brands targeting christian areas, groups, and security www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 102 published by scholink inc. apparatus, notably police officers. the two periods of the poso conflict are then divided into 5 phases as laid out in the following table 1. table 1. phases of poso conflict before malino agreement phase period -brief description 1 1998-1999 fighting between muslim and christian youths in poso escalated to the mobilization of christian militia from tentena and muslims militias from parigi moutong to poso. the segregation of the morowali region from poso. 2 april-may 2000 the mobilization of muslim and christian militias from poso increased. christian church association (gereja kristen sulawesi tengah/ gkst) and muslim associations in the conflict started to involve. 3 may2000-june 2001 (retaliation period) christian militia massively attacked kilo sembilan pesantren, which killed 70 muslims. the conflicts spread to all regions, which segregated muslim and christian areas. -islamic organizations like mui, al khairat, and muhammadiyah started to involve. -terrorist groups came to poso. 4 july 2001 christian fighters from tentena attacked muslims in poso, killing 14 muslims in buyung kendo. laskar jihad and other muslim militias arrived in poso. -the conflicting parties reached the malino agreement after the malino agreement (www. epi.edu, 2009) (note 5) 5 2001 terror period communal conflict relatively decreased. sporadic terror attacks targeted the christian community, christian leaders, and christian facilities broke up, and now the attacks shifted to government officers, notably police officers. poso conflict has taken 2000 people’s life, wounded 183,000 and caused 425,000 refugees, burned down 3,492 muslim houses, three government offices, ten churches, and seven mosques. 4.1.2 the nature of religious conflict in maluku the maluku conflict occurred from 1999 to 2004 and broke up in central maluku (ambon conflicts) and the north maluku conflict. scholars have regarded the two conflicts as the worst communal conflicts after the new order time as communal or collective actors dominated it. terror attacks in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 103 published by scholink inc. terms of bombing have become the strategy of attacks done during the conflicts. maluku conflicts can also be phased into five, as shown in table 2. table 2. phases of maluku conflict phase period brief description 1 1999/ied mubarak day the ambonese hoodlums or gangsters from jakarta arrived at ambon muslim started to fight with christian youth in batumerah and mahardika and then escalated to haruku, saparua, ceram, buru, sanana, manipa, tanimbar and tual. conflict between kao ethnic (muslim) and makian ethnic (christian) with support from muslim ethnic from outside ternate broke up in north maluku. 2 june 1999-april 2000 -violence in ambon broke up, muslim militia burnt down silo church. muslim attacked christian in tobelo, north maluku. north maluku province was segregated from maluku province. 3 2000-2001 laskar jihad and other paramilitary groups arrived at maluku. republik maluku selatan(south moluccas republic/rms)declared its secession agenda. the government enacted civilian emergency status (darurat sipil). 4 2001-2002 the government took strategic measures such as establishing integrated batalyon to discontinue the conflict. the conflicting factions reached the malino peace agreement. jafar umar thalib, laskar jihad leader, and alex manuputy, rms leader, were arrested. 5 2003-2004 the conflict de-escalated. the government revoked civilian emergency in maluku and north maluku. maluku conflict had taken 2,000 people in central maluku and 2,500 in north maluku, caused more than 250,000 as refugees, wounded 1,349 in maluku and 2,004 in north maluku. 4.2 the political landscape in poso and maluku conflicts 4.2.1 the national political landscape explaining social conflicts, including maluku and poso conflicts in the beginning reform in indonesia, should discuss political dynamic at the national and local levels as, according to some political leaders and scholars, the nexus between them is clear. the contributing actors to the conflicts at its outset were allegedly from cendana or suharto cronies and elements from military police officers, which then used agent provocateurs. president abdurrahman wahid (gus dur) called the elements “the hand of evil which created violence to ruin the nation and delegitimize government.” the minister of defense in gus www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 104 published by scholink inc. dur administration, juwono sudarsono, explicitly pointed out that suharto cronies masterminded the conflict. they used ambonese hoodlums to protect their interests (aditjondro in salampesy & husain, 2001) (note 6). 4.2.1.1 political conflict in the bj habibie time poso and maluku’s conflicts broke up almost at the same time. they commenced in 1998-1999 though their de-escalation was somewhat different. these years were known as the beginning of reform, being marked by the step down of suharto on may 21th 1998, and then succeeded by baharuddin jusuf habibi (bj habibie), his former vice. as a former suharto loyalist, habibie had a dilemma on whether to provide full support to suharto’s prosecution to fulfill reformist expectations or repay political favors he owed from suharto during his former service with him. habibie tried to play the game in a dilemma. he hired solicitor general andi ghalib to do a favor to suharto. ghalib stopped the allegation of corruption to suharto, arguing that the evidence was insufficient (http. national. tempo, 2004) (note 7). on top of that, he was not enthusiastic in hunting the grey status of the wealth of the suharto family, nor did he take legal measures to clarify their legal status of corrupted items (http. members. tripod, 2018) (note 8). as a result, habibie’s reign was considered a weak government. during 15 month-administration, he inherited the split of security forces and the conflict between the national axis and the habibie or muslim axis at the political and civil society level. moreover, habibie faced political maneuvers by megawati’s so-called “rainbow nationalist groups,” which challenged his leadership. the group rallied in the streets to topple habibi. in addition, the axis sponsored the establishment of student movements forkot and farmed. both the movements radically rallied in the street to demand his resignation. in addition to this, habibie also lacked international support (suaedy, 2000, hasan, 2002; simanjuntak, 2002) (note 9). habibie supporters formed the habibie axis or muslim axis to challenge political pressures maneuvered by the national axis, comprising islamic political parties and islamic organizations. it also received support from “green generals or muslim general who occupied structural position during suharto’s last term (suaedy, 2002; hasan, 2002) (note 10). sponsored by high-rank police and military officers, suharto family, and cronies, the muslim axis established civilian security forces (pengamanan swakarsa/pamswakarsa) to challenge forkot and farmed (note 11), whom they alleged as communists and deserve killing. on the contrary, the students’ movement accused the pamswakarsa of pro-status quo (aditjondro in salampesy & husain, 2001). (note 12). the forces received training skill from the army special forces (komando pasukan khusus/kopassus) (simanjuntak, 2002) (note 13). on top of that, the suharto family also formed the other militias from nationalist backgrounds called kelompok merah (red group) (note 14). 4.2.1.2 political conflict in the abdurrahman wahid time through tough competition between the nationalist and central axis groups, abdurrahman wahid (gus dur) took presidential office, succeeding bj habibie on 21 october 1999. gus dur also faced multi-layers political conflicts with different characteristics like his predecessor. while the political www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 105 published by scholink inc. conflict in habibie’s time was sectarian, the conflict in gus dur time was more political. political pressure from the nationalist axis withered after the step down of habibie and the appointment of megawati as the vice president pairing with gus dur. this research classifies political conflict in gus dur time into three; with the suharto family, with the former supporter of central axis, and with military and police. the conflict between gus dur and the suharto family had long occurred since suharto was in power. gus dur, who served as an executive leader (ketua umum pb) of nahdlatul ulama, frequently criticized suharto policy in defending the poor or marginalized people. conversely, suharto sought to topple gus dur from nu leadership and replace him with his man, yet unsuccessful. the conflict between gus dur and central axis started when political leaders of the central axis were disappointed with a unique political maneuver of gus dur at the beginning of his administration. gus dur dissolved the ministry of social affairs (kementerian sosial) and ministry of information (kementerian penerangan), arguing that in the regional autonomy, the function of the two ministries belongs to the regional government. gus dur also replaced two cabinet members from the central axis; jusuf kalla of the golkar party and hamzah haz of ppp parties. because of this, leaders of the central axis accused gus dur of breaking their political contract. gus dur’s maneuver stimulated the anger of leaders of the central axis. this situation led to political instability until gus dur’s reign (nasir, 2004) (note 15). the nexus between the national political dynamics and maluku conflict was evident when the anger of the leader of central axis to gus dur took the terms of supporting public sermon in monas square to wage national jihad by defending their fellow muslims in the maluku conflict and demanded gus dur, whom they consider as weak, to stop the conflict. otherwise, the sermon would demand dpr topple gus dur from the presidential position. furthermore, gus dur’s policy to solve ambon was unacceptable when he delegated the responsibility to his vice, megawati, and let the conflicting parties in ambon solve their conflicts themselves (suaedy, 2000) (note 16). the conflict between gus dur and leaders of the military and indonesian police began when gus dur sought to exercise objective and subjective control over the military and police by replacing the solid military and police leaders with their men. to implement his strategy, gus dur sacked high ranks army generals, using the allegation of tni’s past human rights violations as a card to push the generals to leave their power (anwar, 2002; nasir, 2004) note 17). unfortunately, gus dur’s strategy to put the military under control failed. tni and polri refused to obey his command. tni perceived gus dur as having interfered them too far, uprooted him from tni history, which positioned tni, notably the army, as one of the pivotal political powers. finally, gus dur’s trial to put tni under civilian control was pointless (nasir, 2004) (note 18). the accusation worsened the conflict between gus dur and legislators to gus dur for swindling bulog money and brunei aid money, generally called "bulog gate and brunei gate." the conflict ended with the impeachment of gus dur from the presidential position and replaced by his vice, megawati, who enjoyed support from multi-political powers comprising from her own party pdip, former gus dur coalition of central axis, tni, and polri. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 106 published by scholink inc. the disappointed elements within the military used laskar jihad (lj) as a “political bullet” to shoot gus dur. however, their deployment and service as a proxy military received no barriers from security officers and politicians, albeit rhetoric. local muslim paramilitary also warmly welcome the presence of lj as it would strengthen their position (hasan, 2008, azca, 2004) (note 19). the evidence of the influential role of tni in masterminding the conflict in maluku was the role of the retired one-star general rustam kastor, ambonese muslims, who confessed as lj advisors. he stayed in yogyakarta, a home base of lj, monitored recruitment of lj militia and supervised lj training in bukit manjul bogor prior to their deployment to maluku (kastor, interview 2011) (note 20). 4.2.2 the local political landscape 4.2.2.1 the political landscape in the poso conflict important points to note in the previous discussion are the nexus between political conflicts in jakarta, which produced agent provocateurs, and the political tension between multi-political powers and wahid, which provide political context to the deployment of lj in maluku and poso as well. the political rivalry along confessional lines happened prior to the poso conflict. it extended from the rise of political islam, pioneered by ikatan cendekiawan muslim indonesia (the muslim intellectual association of indonesia/ icmi), at the national level. the sectarian politics fueled political competition between a bungku muslim candidate, arif patanga, who contested the regional head against christian pamona candidates yahya patiro and drs pelima in 1994-1995. despite the tension, the result was acceptable as patanga, who won the contest, accommodated patiro as his secretary (sangaji, 2007) (note 21). this research classifies political conflicts amidst poso religious conflict into two; first, conflicts between muslim politicians and christian politicians, supported by the respected leaders of their religious organizations. however, another conflict between a group of muslim politicians followed the demise of the arif patanga administration, such as abdul muin pusadan, abdul malik syahadat, damsyik ladjalani, akram kamaruddin, mas’ud kasim, and ismail kasim, who competed for political positions against christian politicians; eddy f. bangkudapu, yahya patio and former military officer colonel muljadi. receiving strong backup from the governor of central sulawesi, pusadan triumphed the regional head of poso. the governor was a former leader of hmi and closely linked with islamic militant groups such as lj. he also received covert support from former golkar strongman, habibie man, arnold baramuli (damanik, 2003) (note 22). arif patanga and abdul muin pusadan shared same background. they hailed from the same ethnic group, bungku, and served as icmi local leaders. the problematic consequence of this primordial succession destroyed power-sharing with christian leaders from lori, pamona, and morias, prominent ethnic groups, who regarded themselves as being politically marginalized by the national political scenario sponsored by icmi leaders. this situation led to conflicts as respected leaders of the conflicting groups hired agent provocateurs to provoke people for conflicts (komnas, ham, 2005, agus, 2011; aditjondro in salampessy, 2001) (note 23). in addition, the local religious leaders’ demands for the government worsened the tension. they demanded four measures: releasing aghfar patanga (muslim leaders) who www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 107 published by scholink inc. got detained for allegedly provoking people into conflict, replacing yahya patio (christian figure) who occupied the position of secretary of regional head of poso, with damsyik ladjalani and replacing kapolres (kepala polisi resort/head of regional police) of poso. otherwise, they would burn one mosque and one church amidst the patanga tribunal (damanik, 2003) (note 24). likewise, christian organizations like pgi echoed christian victims’ defensive stance, especially when killed, but had a minimum role in discontinuing the conflict at the grassroots level. muslim and christian leaders blamed one–another and relied the quick solution of the conflicts fully on the government. after the malino peace agreement, they increased their trust in the government in maintaining peace in poso, but the situation at the grassroots level was the other way around. in the view of human rights activists, the decreasing role of religious leaders in preventing the conflicts was to impress the national and international community that the poso conflict was not a religious one (agus, 2011) (note 25). second, the segregation of poso into three regions, poso, morowali, and tojo una-una, undoubtedly triggered the conflicts. the creation of the three regions stimulated muslim discontent as it reduced them to a minority in the three segregated regions. however, it failed to improve people’s welfare as it only stimulated the competition of local christian and muslim politicians in occupying new political positions (karnavian, 2008; mashad & yustiningrum, 2005) (note 26). 4.2.2.1. the political landscape in the maluku conflict this research theorizes the political landscape of the maluku conflict into four internal political rivalries: first, the conflict between leaders of political parties and social organizations. conflict in the political parties and social organizations occurred between partai demokrasi indonesia perjuangan (the indonesian democratic party of struggle/ pdip), symbolized in red vis a vis islamic political parties, and golkar party, symbolized by white color. in maluku, christian figures who became strongmen of christian militant groups dominated the structure of pdip. in contrast, the pivotal figures from the islamic community served as leaders of islamic parties and islamic organizations, such as dewan dakwah islamiyah indonesia (the indonesian islamic preaching council/ddii), majelis ulama indonesia (the indonesian clerics council/mui), muhammadiyah, and the masjid al fatah foundation. however, the leaders failed to halt the escalation of the fightings between muslims and christians in ambon spilled over by the gangsters from ketapang, jakarta (hasan, 2008; van klinken, 2007; suaedy, 2000) (note 27). at the operational level, the interest of the muslim group, as previously discussed, was effectively echoed by a retired one-star general, rustam kastor. the negative perception between christian leaders and muslim leaders intensified the conflict. christian leaders regarded the conflict as “a big national plot” targeted at destroying maluku as the national center of christianity in the eastern part of indonesia (papilaya in kleden & julaman, 2000) (note 28). christian leaders also pointed out additional supporting facts triggering the conflict, namely segregating gorontalo from manado, segregating north maluku from maluku, the migration of non-christian inhabitants to eastern areas of indonesia aiming at accommodating muslim community (salam) and improving their economic life in gorontalo and north www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 108 published by scholink inc. maluku. at the same time, it would weaken the power of molluscan christians (serani), who, as they felt, as the most educated christians in indonesia. this scenario became a trial project before being developed in other parts of indonesia. on the contrary muslim leaders, as voiced by rustam kastor, reject the accusations that the maluku conflict was rooted in the economic disparity between bugis buton makasar (bbm) ethnics and native christians and the transformation of bureaucracy which sidelined christians. instead, it was rooted in the movement of the secessionist group of republik maluku selatan (the south maluku republic/ rms), which christian activists dominated. allegedly receiving support from the united states of america (usa), this group sought to separate maluku from indonesia, while other christian groups sought to purge the muslim community from maluku (papilaya in kleden & julaman 2000) (note 29). in addition, the us was suspiciously planning maluku island as its military base that would replace its base in the philippines. the us-backed rms, which later cooperated to develop its military base (kastor, interview, 2011) (note. 30). during this time, rumors that megawati of pdip supported christian groups and habibie, the leader of golkar and icmi, supported muslim groups circulated in the militant grassroots groups (hasan, 2002) (note 31). as a result, golkar activists attacked the house of pdip leader john maliola, where pdip activists commemorated the attack of the jakarta pdip office in july 1997. many speculated that the reason behind the attack was the frustration of golkar politicians for losing the party influence against pdip, which controlled 53% of electoral votes in maluku (van klinken, 2007) (note 32). second, the conflict between social and political leaders in maluku, which suspiciously received support from national political elites, erupted along with the conflict between government leaders governor saleh latuconsina and the regional military commander over the implementation of president gus dur instruction to enact civilian emergency status. the governor complained over the insubordination of military commanders to the governor, who assumed full responsibility for implementing civilian emergency status. the conflict between the governor and provincial military commander escalated amidst the tension between muslim and christian bureaucrats in the local government (manuputi & watimena in trijono, 2004) (note 33). the rise of icmi during the last term of suharto’s tenure, which resumed to reform time, provided powerful support to muslim bureaucrats to take over the leadership position of christian bureaucrats, who had been for decades, dominating the leadership. the transfer of domination also received support from muslim governors and icmi backgrounds. political tension flared when christian bureaucrats defended their position in ambon mayor and pattimura university (bertrand, 2004) (note 34). third, the conflict at the bureaucratic level took its seeds in the leadership rivalries in the student organization at pattimura university. muslim students organization such as himpunan mahasiswa indonesia (islamic student association/hmi), persatuan mahasiswa islam indonesia (islamic student union of indonesia/pmii), ikatan mahasiswa muhammadiyah (muhammadiyah student association/imm) worked together to challenge the nationalist and christian student universities, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 109 published by scholink inc. gerakan mahasiswa nasionalis indonesia (the nationalist student movement/ gmni) and persatuan mahasiswa kristen republik indonesia (christiant student union /pmkri). allegedly benefiting from the corruption, collusion, and nepotism (kkn) practices of christian university administrators in favor of them, gmni and pmkri leaders took control over students unions on the campus. as a result, muslim student leaders felt marginalized or mistreated, despite their proven competencies (ex combatant, interview, 2011) (note 35). unfortunately, because of poor strategy, muslim organizations such as badan imarah muslim maluku (bimm) did not provide sufficient support to the development of the career of maluku muslim youths (kastor, interview, 2011) (note 36). forth, before the conflict, there was a shift of domination in the organization’s leadership structure from christian mollucan activists to muslim mollucan activists with hmi-mpo background, which also affiliated with golkar. this rivalry served as an extension from the rivalry in the student union in pattimura university and preceded the shift of domination from the golkar party, which was influential in the new order time, to pdip as the new leading political power in the reform time. the domination of hmi-mpo in the knpi leadership triggered the exodus of knpi activists with nationalist and christian backgrounds from the golkar party to pdip (ex combatant, interview 2011) (note 37). out of conflict in central maluku, the conflict also broke out in north maluku (van klinken, 2007) (note 38). conflict in north maluku was rooted in two political causes. first, the christian minority refused the segregation of north maluku to the new district of malifut, whose majority population was muslims. the christians were worried that they would lose control over the new regions implicated in the difficulty in the evangelization project as it would receive full backup from political islam sponsored by icmi (bertrand, 2004) (note 39). on the contrary, north maluku muslims accused christians would build the new region as the most influential center of evangelization in the region (ex combatant, interview 2011) (note 40). second, the competition between sultan of ternate and sultan of tidore to win the governor position in the new province of north maluku. the former relied on christian inhabitants in north halmahera, while the latter got support from makianese muslim inhabitants in central and south halmahera. on top of that, the two sultans also competed to control the influence over australian gold mining projects in halmahera. 5. conclusion indonesia is a pluralistic country where diverse ethnicities, tribal groups, and religious adherents live in peace and harmony. however, indonesia also experiences conflicts, violence, terrorism, and tensions amongst religious followers. this research is about the dark dots of indonesian history. it seeks to analyze similarities and differences of conflicts intertwined with terrorism in maluku and poso in two things: the nature of the conflicts and terrorism and political dynamics explaining the conflicts. this article uses two concepts, religious conflict and the landscape of political conflict, as frameworks to analyze the collected data. it borrows the concept of religious conflict developed by horowitz and tadjudin, who look at conflicts from their negative perspective regarding attacking and injuring between www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 110 published by scholink inc. two-religious followers. while analyzing the nexus between political and religious conflicts, this article combines theoretical frameworks developed by samuel huntington (1991), jack snyder (2003), o’ donel, and phillip schmitters. they have long alerted that conflicts, violence, and revolution have become a harmful by-product of initial political democratization. this research used a comparative method with collecting data from documents, news, and interviews and concluded that poso and maluku conflicts share similarities and differences. first, they broke up in stages of escalation. second, the government has initiated a peace agreement called the malino agreement to solve the conflicts. in the maluku conflict, the malino agreement relatively de-escalated the conflict. in the poso conflict, the malino agreement shifted the conflict from communal to asymmetric or terrorism, even until today. this research also finds similarities and differences. they were similar in that both conflicts happened amidst the national political conflicts during habibie and abdurrahman wahid’s time and de-escalated in the megawati time. the residuals of suharto’s past misconduct burdened habibie’s reign, the split between muslim axis associated with him versus the nationalist axis associated with megawati. the presence of icmi and golkar institutionalized islamic politics. the two-year wahid reign was dynamic and tense as wahied conflicted with the suharto family, central axis, his former supporters of and with military and police. conflict with the suharto family extended their previous conflict during the new order era. the conflict with central axis has resulted in the disappointment of its leaders with wahid’s unique political maneuver. in contrast, conflict with military and polri leaders was rooted in wahid’s intention to exercise subjective and objective control over the security institutions by replacing their leaders who were not of his preference. the local political landscape explaining maluku and poso conflicts also shares similarities and differences. they are similar in the following; first, they experienced conflicts between muslim political and social leaders. political leaders in the two conflicting regions competed for political and bureaucratic positions. muslim political leaders received back up from icmi and benefited from golkar’s influence. second, regional segregation, later known as regional autonomy, also contributed to the conflict. this research also finds differences in the political explanations. first, while the conflict between muslim political leaders and christian political leaders in poso circulated in golkar party with the support of leaders of islamic parties, political conflict in maluku took place between muslim politicians with icmi and golkar background vis a vis christian politicians associated with pdip. second, conflicts between leaders of muslim and christian student organizations and bureaucrats to win leadership in patimura university triggered political conflict in maluku and continued the rivalry between muslim and christian youth leaders to occupy knpi leadership. in contrast, such conflict was not present in poso religious conflicts. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 111 published by scholink inc. references aditjondro, g. j. (2001). di balik asap mesiu, airmata dan anyir darah di maluku. in z. salampessy & t. husain (eds.,), ketika semerbak cengkih tergusur asap mesiu. jakarta: tapak ambon. azca, m. n. (2004). security sector reform, democratic transition, and social violence: the case of ambon, indonesia. berghof research center for constructive conflict management. buzan, b. (1991). people, states, and fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era. london: harvester wheatsheaf. buzan, b., weaver, o., & wilde, j. de. (1998). a new framework for analysis. boulder colorado: lynne rienner. damanik, r. (2003). tragedi kemanusiaan poso: menggapai surya pagimelaluikegelapanmalam. sulteng: pbhi & lps-ham. donnel, g. o., & schmitter, c. (1986). tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies. in o’donnel, schmitter, & i. whitehead (eds.), transition from authoritarian rule: prospect for democracy. baltimore: john hopkins university press. hasan, n. (2002). faith and politics: the rise of the laskar jihad in the era of transition in indonesia. indonesia, 73, 444-445. https://doi.org/10.2307/3351472 hasan, n. (2008). laskar jihad: islam, militansi dan pencarian identitas di indonesia pascaordebaru. jakarta: lp3es & kitlv. huntington, s. p. (1991). the third wave: democratization in the late twentieth century. norman: university of oklahoma press. laitin, d. d., & brubaker, r. (1998). ethnics and nationalist violenc. annual review of sociology, 24. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.423 lay, c. (2009). kekerasan atas nama agama: perspektif politik. jurnal ilmu sosial dan ilmu politik, 13(1). nasir, m. (2004). konflik presiden versus polri di era transisi demokrasi. jakarta: pusat studi politik madani institute. panggabean, s. r. (2004). approach to ethnic and religious conflict resolution. in l. trijono (ed.), (2004), the making of ethnic and religious conflict in south east asia: cases and resolutions. yogyakarta: csps books. snyder, j. (2003). terj. dari pemungutan suara ke pertumpahan darah: demokratisasi dan konflik nasionalis. jakarta: kepustakaan populer gramedia. suaedy, a. et al. (2000). luka maluku: militer terlibat. jakarta: institut studi arus informasi. sukma, r. (2005). ethnic conflict in indonesia: causes and the quest for solution. in s. kusuma, & thompson, w. scott (eds.), ethnic conflict in southeast asia (singapore: iseas, 2005). trijono, l. (2004). the making of ethnic and religious conflict in south east asia: cases and resolutions. yogyakarta: csps books. tadjoeddin, m. z. (2013). educated but poor: explaining localized ethnic violence during www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 112 published by scholink inc. indonesia’s democratic transition. international area studies review, 16(2), 1. https://doi.org/10.1177/2233865913475434 notes note 1. https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2016/02/160218_indonesia_radikalisme_anak_muda. accessed 25 august 2018 and adje suraji, ancaman radikalisme https://nasional.kompas.com/read /2016/11/24/08520891/ancaman.radikalisme. accessed 25 august 2018. note 2. panggabean 2004, “approach to ethnic and religious conflict resolution,” in lambang trijono, eds., the making of ethnic and religious conflict in south east asia: cases and resolutions, yogyakarta: csps books, pp. 56-57. note 3. sukma 2005, ethnic conflict in indonesia: causes and the quest for solution, in snitwongse, kusuma & thompson, w. scott, eds., ethnic conflict in southeast asia (singapore: iseas,2005), pp.1-41, trijono 2004, ibid.p.4. note 4. tadjoeddin 2013, “educated but poor: explaining localized ethnic violence during indonesia’s democratic transition,” international area studies review, vol. 16, no. 21, pp. 24-49. note 5. in the malino peace agreement 1, the warring muslims and christians came to a consensus on ten articles: stopping the conflict, enforcing law and order, rejecting foreign intervention and civilian emergency status, respecting one another mutually, stopping betrayal, and letting victims of the conflict come back to poso, returning all belongings and properties to their owners, helping idps to return to their homes, promoting tolerance to muslim, christian and other religious adherence in practicing their faith, working hand in hand with the government in the recovery and rehabilitation programs (www.upi.edu. 2009). note 6. aditjondro 2001, “di balik asap mesiu, airt mata dan banjir darah di maluku,” in zahirin salampessy & husain (eds.), ketika semerbak cengkih tergusur asap mesiu. jakarta: tapak ambon, pp. 147-154. note 7. nasional tempo, 25 maret, 2004, https://nasional.tempo.co/read/41026/soeharto-koruptor-terkaya-di-dunia, accessed, 25 august, 2018. note 8. http://members.tripod.com/kkn_ghalib/galibtempo1.htm, accessed 25 august 2018. note 9. suaedy, et.al 2000, luka maluku: militer terlibat, jakarta: institut studi arus informasi, pp.48-51. hasan, 2002 “faith and politics: the rise of the laskar jihad in the era of transition in indonesia”, indonesia, vol. 73, pp. 160-164. simanjuntak, 2002, premanisme politik (jakarta: institut studi arus informasi, p. 62. note 10. suaedy. ibid. hasan, ibid note 11. forkot stands for forum kota (city forum) while famred stands for forum aksi mahasiswauntuk reformasi dandemokrasi (forum of student action for reform and democracy). both were radical nationalist student movements, which arose in the early years of reformasi. their www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 113 published by scholink inc. pragmatic mission demanded habibie’s resignation from the presidential office, arguing that habibi was the leader foremost in defending the status quo of suharto’s era. note 12. aditjondro. op cit. note 13. simanjuntak, 2002, op. cit. note 14. militia groups which had close connections with the suharto familiy were satgas tebas and laskar putih. members of the nationalist militia “red group” were satgas wirapati, satgas samber nyawa, pasukan banteng tengkorak, satgas pasopati, dewaruci (whose members are 66 retired navy force), pasukan bela mega and other militias who joined pdip, numbering50-thousands (simanjuntak, premanismepolitik), pp. 60-62. note 15. nasir, 2004, konflik presiden versus polri di era transisi demokrasi, jakarta: pusat studi politik madani institute, pp. 142-143. note 16. suaedy. op.cit. note 17. the long lists allegation of past human rights violation were: the massacre of civilians in santa cruz, east timor, the assassination of the labor activist marsinah in east java, the assassination of a journalist in jakarta, the homicide of protesters demonstrating against the construction of the kedung ombo and nipah dams, the killing of muslim activists in tanjung priok, north jakarta, the heinous military operations against the aceh liberation movement (gam: gerakan aceh merdeka) fighters, and the abduction of student activists during the later years of the new order regime (anwar, 2002, wahied versus militer: studitentanghubungan sipil-militer di era transisi, jakarta: grasindo) nasir, 2004. op. cit. note 18. nasir 2004. ibid. note 19. hasan. op. cit. azca, 2004. security sector reform, democratic transition, and social violence: the case of ambon, indonesia: berghof research center for constructive conflict management, pp. 444-445. note 20. interview with brigadier general tni (retired) rustam kastor, ex commander of korem xvii/trikora, advisor of laskar jihad, in ambon, 2 april 2011. note 21. sangaji 2007, aparat keamanan dan kekerasan regional poso,in henk schulte nordholt & gerry van klinken, eds., politik lokal di indonesia: jakarta: yayasan obor indonesia, p.5. note 22. damanik. op.cit. note 23. komnas ham. op. cit. agus. op. cit and aditjondro. op. cit. note 24. damanik. op. cit. note 25. agus. op. cit. note 26. karnavian, 2008, indonesian top secret: membongkar konflik poso; jakarta: pt gramedia pustaka utama. pp. 374-375, mashad and yustiningrum, 2005. negara dan masyarakat dalam resolusi konflik poso, in syafuan rozi, resolusi konflik di ambon dalam hubungan negara dan masyaraka tdalam resolus ikonflik di indonesia, kasus sulawesi tengah, maluku, dan maluku utara: jakarta: lipi. pp. 45-88. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 114 published by scholink inc. note 27. hasan. op. cit, van klinken. op. cit and suaedy, op.cit note 28. papilaya, 2000, persepsi lokal tentang konflik dan kekerasan di ambonpersepsi protestan, in ignas kleden &john julaman, eds., laporan seminar: timur dan barat di indonesia, perspektif integrasi baru. jakarta: the go-east institute pp. 50-52. note 29. papaya. ibid. note 30. kastor, interview. op. cit. note 31. hasan. op. cit. note 32. van klinken. op.cit note 33. manuputi and watimena, 2004, konflik maluku, in lambangtrijono., et al., potret retak nusantara: studi kasus konflik di indonesia, yogyakarta: csps, pp. 147-148 note 34. bertrand, 2004, nationalism and ethnic conflict in indonesia, cambridge: cambridge university press, pp. 118-119. note 35. interview with combatant in north maluku, interview, 20 december 2011. note 36. interview with kastor, op. cit. note 37. interview with ex combatant. op. cit. note 38. van klinken. op. cit. note 39. bertrand. op. cit. note 40. interview with ex-combatant.op.cit. advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 250 original paper the military expenditures of the nato members herman matthijs1* 1 university of brussels (vub), department political sciences, university of ghent (ugent), department public administration & management, belgium * herman matthijs, university of brussels (vub), department political sciences, university of ghent (ugent), department public administration & management, belgium received: july 28, 2019 accepted: august 19, 2019 online published: august 23, 2019 doi:10.22158/ape.v2n3p250 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v2n3p250 abstracts this study examines the defence expenditures of nato’s member countries over the recent years. it makes use of the original budget figures of the states as verified by nato (north atlantic treaty organization) and published by this military organization. there search of this study is to examine the following points: how has defence spending by the member states evolved in the period under consideration (2010-2019); which states already meet the targets of the 2014 wales summit? (2% gdp for defence and 20% of this budget for investment); the current figures are based on the primary budgetary sources as published by nato, namely: the latest year report of 2018 (nato, ar) and especially the most recent figures in the nato yearly press release (nato, pr-cp). keywords defence budgets, nato 1. introduction the reasons of these research concerning the military expenditures in the nato members are the following two types: what’s the actual situation of the military spending in these states; what are the achievements in these states related with the nato summit goals of wales in 2014. this study concerns several items concerning the financing of the defence systems of the nato member states. the following points are a part of this study: number of military personnel and their share in the budgets, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 251 published by scholink inc. the military expenditure of the members, the military budgets in budget figures, the defence expenditures per capita. this study concerns the defence figures of the present 29 member states of the nato, but not iceland. because this country has no army and manages only a coast guard. 2. methodology concerning the methodology , this study is based at the nato latest reports concerning the military spending (see references). it concerns the annual report of the secretary-general of the nato 2018 (nato, ar) and the press release 2019 (nato, pr-cp) concerning the defence expenditures. these two publications are the only harmonized and available figures concerning the topic of this study. 3. results of the study the subjects studied, are the following one: first of all this study starts with an overview of the own nato budgets, -in the next point this study contains the evolution of the military personnel, the main subject of this study are the evolution and the achievements concerning the nato wales agreement of 2014, finally this study relates the defence expenditures with the gdp per capita. 3.1 the nato funding the nato has three internal budgets, namely: a civil, a military and an investment budget. the financing of these budgets is based on contributions of the 29 members are based on an agreed cost-sharing formula based on “national gross income” (ngi) (nato, ar, pp. 110-111). the civil budget funds the personal expenses, the operating costs and the expenditures of the international staff at the nato headquarters. the civil and political headquarter is located at the belgian capital of brussels and the military headquarter in the belgian town of mons. this civil budget is approved by the “north atlantic council” (nac). the “nac” is the daily decision making body consisting of the permanent representatives of the 29 member states. in fact these are the diplomatic missions of these members to the nato. this budget is 202 million euro for 2018. personnel is the greatest share in this budget (60,40 %) followed by operating / maintenance (28,5 %) and programmes (11,8 %). the military budget is related with costs of the operating and maintenance of the nato command structure and other military entities. in practice it’s composed over several separate budgets (37! in 2018) and all financed by contributions from the national defence budgets, based to agreed cost-share formulas from the national defence departments. also this budget is approved by the “nac”. in 2018 this budget concerns 1,3 billion euro. the most important parts of this military budget are: nato command structure (48,4 %), nato airborne early warning and control force (20 %) (awacs), www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 252 published by scholink inc. alliance operations and missions (19,1 %), etc. the third budget of this military organization is the “nato security investment programme” (nisp) and supports the missions through the delivery of common-funded capabilities. the nisp had a budget of 700 million euro over the year 2018 and a total of 7,6 billion euro worth of projects under implementation. the main projects in 2018 are: awacs (30,1 %), provide logistic support for deploying forces (25,6 %), provide nato wide consultation command and control capabilities (17,7 %), provide deployable forces (13,7 %) et. practical examples of this nisp budget are the joint investments in harbours, tele-communication, awacs, drones, etc. all these nisp programmes are approved by the “nac”. these packages fund a number of projects implemented by nato allies. in fact the most of these projects are investments “à la carte”. the next table gives the cost sharing over the member states is as follow for the years 2018 and 19. table 1. nato budgets usa: 22,13% frg: 14,76% france: 10,49% uk: 10,45% italy: 8,14% canada: 6,37% spain: 5,55% netherlands: 3,19% poland: 2,76% belgium: 1,95% norway: 1,64 % romania: 1,13 % denmark: 1,12 % source: nato website. all the other 16 members are contributing less than 1% of the nato budgets. based on these figures, the usa is the most important contributor in the financing of the nato budgets. the four greatest european states do have together a share of nearly 44%. the ten (usa-belgium) greatest contributors are paying together 85,79% of these budgets. all the other 19 members pay together less than 15%. this indicates the fact that the nato systems, translated in budgetary terms, are standing on a few members. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 253 published by scholink inc. 3.2 military personnel in this decade there is an important evolution in the number of military personnel in the nato countries. the fell back during the 2010-2019 period is as follows (nato, pr-cp, p. 12): 2010 3.572.000 2019 3.258.000 (estimations) these figures are representing a decline of nearly 9 % over the period. but the lowest point was reached in 2016 (3.090.000 men). over the last two years the number of military personnel is back in the elevator upstairs. in the following countries the military personnel is going up: canada, czech republic, estonia, france, germany, hungary, italy, latvia, lithuania, netherlands, poland, romania, the uk and the usa. the decrease is particularly noticeable in the larger nato member states, as can be seen in the next table over the period 2010-2019. table 2. military personnel (2010-2019) 2010 2019 -/+ canada 67.000 72.000 + 7 % france 234.000 208.000 11 % germany 235.000 184.000 22 % italy 193.000 179.000 7 % poland 100.000 123.000 + 23 % spain 131.000 121.000 8 % turkey 495.000 435.000 12 % uk 198.000 144.000 27 % usa 1.427.000 1.338.000 7 % these figures indicate a fall in military personnel in all the greater countries with exception of canada and poland. the decline goes from 7 % to 27% ! remarkable is the fact that the uk has the smallest army in europa and that germany and italy roughly have the same number of military personnel. the french republic has the largest eu army within the nato. here though it should be pointed out that the decline in troop numbers in france also has to do with the professionalization of the army and the ending of military service. honesty commands to say that some nato members do have an advantage of these counts of military personal. the reason is the existence of the military police forces used for civil assignments. this means that some police—and judicial services are done by organizations with a military character. examples are the netherlands (koninklijkemarechausse), france and luxembourg (gendarmerie nationale), italy (carabinieri) and spain (guardia civil). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 254 published by scholink inc. the next table looks at the evolution of military personnel numbers on the two sides of the atlantic between 2010 and 2018. table 3. evolution (2010-2018) 2010 2016 2019 europe 2.084.000 (58,3 %) 1.718.000 (55,5 %) 1.849.000 (56,8 %) north america 1.488.000 (41,7 %) 1.372.000 (44,5 %) 1.410.000 (43,2 %) total 3.572.000 3.090.000 3.258.000 this table shows that in total the european countries still have more troops than the two north american members of the alliance. the cutbacks in recent years in europe. though mean that the usa and canada contributed a proportionally greater number of troops to nato in 2016, the year with the lowest member of military personnel. with 29 members the nato has a great group of states with a little armies (2019 estimations by nato): iceland (none), luxembourg, (900 men), montenegro is a member since 2017 (1600), estonia (6300), latvia (6400), slovenia (6.800), albania (6800) slovak republic (13000), lithuania (15900), croatia (15000), denmark (17000), hungary (20000), norway (20000), bulgaria (25000), czech republic and belgium (each 26000), etc. all the 13 other member states have more than 30.000 men in their army. this mentioned figures over those states are indicating the great number of little armies inside the nato. a lot of them are located in the border region of the russian federation. their security and defence is completely independent of the nato. a glance at the defence budgets of the nato countries soon reveals what a large percentage of these budgets is spent on personnel. the next table provides an overview of the percentage expenditure on military personnel (not including iceland) in the national defence budgets. conform the nato definition means the personnel expenditures military and civilian outlays as well the military pensions. the ranking in this table is from the highest share (in 2018) to the lowest one concerning this item. this table concerns a comparison between the years 2010 and the 2018. the reason is that the nato didn’t have estimations for all the members for the year 2019, therefore the latest figures concerns the year 2018 . table 4. distribution of personnel expenditures (without: iceland) country 2018 2010 1. belgium 71 % (75%) 2. slovenia 72 % (70 %) 3. portugal 72 % (70 %) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 255 published by scholink inc. 4. montenegro 71 % (73 %) 5. greece 71 % (65 %) 6. croatia 71 % (71 %) 7. albania 70 % (75 %) 8. italy 65% (75%) 9. bulgaria 58 % (64 %) 10. spain 57 % (63 %) 11. czech rep. 55 % (50 %) 12. romania 52 % (62 %) 13. slovak rep. 58 % (79 %) 14. canada 48 % (45 %) 15. fr germany 46 % (52 %) 16. denmark 46 % (50 %) 17. poland 46 % (56 %) 18. france 46 % (47%) 19. turkey 45% (49%) 20. netherlands 43% (52%) 21. lithuania 40 % (65%) 22. hungary 39 % (56 %) 23. usa 38 % (46 %) 24. norway 34 % (42 %) 25. uk 33 % (36 %) 26. luxembourg 32 % (45 %) 27. latvia 32 % (55 %) 28. estonia 31 % (34 %) when the percentage of personnel spending is grouped by size. we arrive at the following result for the budget figures of 2018: countries spending <40 % on personnel: 7 countries (was 2 in 2010). countries spending 40 49 % on personnel: 8 countries (was 6 in 2010). countries spending 50 59 % on personnel: 5 countries (was 7 in 2010). countries spending 60 69 % on personnel: 1countries (was 7 in 2010). countries spending > 70 % on personnel: 7 countries (was 6 in 2010). based on these above figures the share of the personnel expenditures is decreasing in the period 2010-2018. that is proven by the fact that there are now 15 member states which are spending less than 50 % of their military budget on personnel. comparing with 2010 is this positive evolution. indeed, then it was only about eight states. but there are still six countries with more than 70 % personnel costs. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 256 published by scholink inc. but estonia and the uk are no longer the only countries with under the 40 % share of personnel. the list of countries with a decreasing evolution (more than 5 %) is long: albania (7 %), bulgaria (6 %), germany (-6 %), hungary (17 %), italy (10 %), latvia (23 %), lithuania (25 %), luxembourg (13 %), netherlands (9 %), norway (8 %), poland (10 %), romania (27 %), spain (6 %), slovak republic (8 %) ,uk (-3%) and the and usa (8 %). like already written, the nato hasn’t estimations concerning the personal expenditures for all the members for the year 2019. but in the partial nato figures for 2019 (nato, pc-cp, p. 13) it seems to be that five of the seven countries, which did have a share of more than 70% in 2018 (there are no nato estimations for portugal and slovenia), go below the 70% limit with regard to their personal costs in their military budgets. as follow of the latest figures albania, belgium, croatia, greece and montenegro are decreasing between a share of 64 à 69%. generally, the conclusion concerning the personal cost is that the members are over the last years in progressive improvement in relation to this item. 3.3 expenditure and gdp the next in this study are the defence expenditures in relation as a percentage of the gdp (gross domestic product) of the nato member states. the next table concerns the period 2010-2019 (nato, pc-cp, p. 12). the countries are arranged in alphabetical order. there are no nato figures concerns the republic of iceland and this fact s already explained. table 5. gdp evolution (share of real gdp) 2010 2019 albania 1.56% 1.26 % belgium 1.08 % 0.93 % bulgaria 1.64 % 1.61 % canada 1.16 % 1.27 % croatia 1.54 % 1.75 % czech rep. 1.28 % 1.19% denmark 1.40 % 1.35 % estonia 1.70 % 2.13 % france 1.96 % 1.84 % germany 1.35 % 1.36 % greece 2.64 % 2.24 % hungary 1.03 % 1.21 % italy 1.35 % 1.22 % latvia 1.06% 2.01 % lithuania 0.88 % 1.98 % www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 257 published by scholink inc. luxembourg 0.47 % 0.55 % montenegro 1.80 % 1.65 % netherlands 1.34 % 1.35 % norway 1.51 % 1.70 % poland 1.77 % 2.01 % portugal 1.49 % 1.41 % romania 1.24 % 2.04 % slovak rep. 1.27 % 1.74 % slovenia 1.61 % 1.04 % spain 1.03 % 0.92 % turkey 1.83 % 1.89 % united kingdom 2.47 % 2.13 % united states 4.81 % 3.42% in this article we want to try and view the percentages in the above table 5 in the light of the “nato wales summit” held outside cardiff in 2014. at the summit. the leaders of the former 28 nato countries, without montenegro, made the following decisions: the defence budget must return to at least 2 % of national gdp and that before 2014; the investment part of defence budgets must rise to 20 % of expenditure; a more balanced sharing of the costs of providing defence and security between both sides of the atlantic. with respect to the 2 % of gdp decision, seven countries met this target in 2019: the united states, greece, the united kingdom, estonia, latvia, romania and poland. the republic of lithuania is very near the goal ! in fact eight countries are conform this goal. at the moment of the wales decision in 2014 only three members reaches this 2 % gdp goal: greece, the uk and the usa. the average of the nato defence expenditures. as share of the gdp. is as follow: nato european states: 1.63% (2010)-1.58% (2019); usa & canada: 4.46% (2010)-3.26% (2019); nato total: 3.03% (2010)-2.51% (2019). in the group of the european member states the average went down in this researched period. but over the last years the defence expenditures went up from 1.45% gdp as lowest average in 2015 to the present estimated 1,58 % in 2019. several countries are near to reach the 2% gdp rule and this in addition with lithuania. indeed, other upgrading military budgets are voted in france (1,84%) and turkey (1,89%). since the macron years the military budget is increasing, but the situation of the french public finances is still far from good. on the other side has france still a nuclear capacity and worldwide interests! but there is still an important difference in military spending between this republic and the other european nuclear power: www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 258 published by scholink inc. the united kingdom. the fr of germany went from 1.28% (2010) over 1,18 % (2014 and 15) to 1.36% (2019). this country has certainly the budget possibilities to invest more in defence. but a leading role of germany in the european defence is a political problem for a lot of european countries. the reason is related with the world wars and the german occupation of a lot of european states during this war periods. the fourth european military power: italy evaluated from 1,35% (2010) over 1.07% (2015) to 1.21% (2019). but this southern european state remains a lot below the average and the 2% gdp rule. also spain has still a weak defence share! countries near to the russian or serbian borders have increased their military budget. the baltic states are already conform the nato guideline of 2014 and this is also the fact for poland and romania. if we take the nato average of 2019 with 2,51 % gdp spending only the usa spends more on defence. if we take the calculation average of the european members (= 1,58 %), then 14 states of the 27 europeans (including turkey) are spending more. this result is certainly improved over the last few years. another numerical and statistical comparison is the median of the gdp shares (nato, pc-cp, p. 2). the median of the defence expenditures as a share of the gdp is estimated at 1,63% for the year 2019. also this figure is increasing over the last years and is reached by 14 of the 28 states (excluded iceland). bulgaria is very near the present median. but this median is only 4/5 of the nato guideline of 2% gdp. the fact that the nato average (2019, 2,51%) is more than then the guideline of 2%, is explained by the higher defence budget of the united states of america. the second part of the wales agreement is the achievement of the 20 % “nato guideline on defence equipment expenditures”. also this rule is problematic for several countries. but in 2019the nato (nato, pc-cp, p. 2, p. 13) estimates that 17 countries are in accordance with this goal. the next table gives the list of countries, which do comply with this investment objective (namely from the highest to the 20 % goal): www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 259 published by scholink inc. table 6. the nato equipment goal luxembourg: slovak rep. turkey: norway: lithuania: usa: bulgaria & latvia: romania & the uk and france: hungary, the netherlands and poland: italy & spain: estonia: 44% 41% 38% 29% 28% 27% 25% 24% 23% 20% 19,4% this means that 17 members are in conformation with this guideline. in 2014 only seven states reached this 20 % equipment rule, namely: estonia, france, luxembourg, norway, turkey, the uk and the usa. estonia is an edge case. over the last years we do see an important improvement in relationship with the mentioned guideline. seeing the present figures of 2019, denmark and germany are the closest by this nato guideline. the calculation average is 21,6 % and the median amounts 21,9 % for the year 2019. these figures are indicating that this goal is easier to achieve for the members than the 2 % gdp global norm. remarkable is that germany reaches only 16% for this nato goal. which is a little improvement comparing the former years. because of this, the frg is the only of the four great european/eu players in the nato which is unable to achieve this equipment goal. seeing the rosy situation of the german public finances this can be no financial problem. the figures given above can be used to class the nato membership into four distinct groups. namely: 7 countries which meet the 2 % of gdp standard and the 20 % investment standard: the usa. the united kingdom. poland, romania, estonia, latvia and lithuania; 1 country which meet the 2 % of gdp standard but do not reach the 20 % investment standard: greece. indeed the hellenic republic has a global military budget of 2,24% gdp, but 70% is going to personnel and only 12% to equipment ; 10 countries which do not meet the 2 % of gdp standard. but do meet the 20 % investment standard: bulgaria. france. hungary, italy, luxembourg, netherlands, norway, slovak republic, spain and turkey; 10 countries—excluded iceland—which do not meet either standard. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 260 published by scholink inc. we must conclude from the foregoing exercise. that a majority of nato members still do not conform to the above standards. but there is an improvement comparing the last years. based on the current figures france and turkey are the closest near the 2% goal and for denmark and germany applies the same remark concerning the equipment target. the third resolution of the “nato wales summit” concerns a better balance between the military expenditure of the north american and european nato members. in other words the wales summit demands an increase of the military budget outlays from the most of the european partners. the next table illustrates the situation using the 2019 figures concerning the share in the alliance gdp and the share of nato global defence expenditures.(nato, pc-cp, pp. 7 & 10). the nato figures are calculated in constant 2015 prices. table 7. the american burden (figures 2019) gdp share defence share usa 50,9 % 69,6 % canada 4,3 % 2,2 % turkey 2,4 % 1,8 % european members 42,4 % 26,4 % the nato estimates the global gdp (in billion us dollars and exchanged rates) for all the members for 2019at 39.243 billion. after the usa follows the frg with a gdp of 2.595 billion us dollars (9,2% share), the united kingdom with 3.081 billion dollars (7,8%), france with 2.595 billion us dollar (6,6%), italy with 1.901 billion dollars (4,8%), canada with 1.671 us dollars (4,2%), spain with 1.336 (3,4%) etc.. all the other member states have a gdp less than one thousand billion us dollars. these seven states, the two from north america and the five eu states, are covering together 87% of the global nato gdp. the five european nations are representing nearly 32% of the nato-gdp and ¾ of the european gdp inside the nato. if we make these calculation without the united kingdom, seeing the brexit, the european continental share decreases to 34,6% gdp share. the nato estimates the total defence expenditures for the year 2019 at 984,2 billion us dollars. this is lower than, i.e., in 2012 (997 billion us dollars) but higher than the lowest point reached in 2015 with 895 billion. the eighth table gives the defence expenditures (year 2019), in nominal figures and expressed in us dollars, starting from the highest budget and nato-share. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 261 published by scholink inc. table 8. the military budgets of the member (i) usa (ii) uk (iii) frg (iv) france (v) italy (vi) canada (vii) turkey (viii) spain (ix) netherlands (x) poland 685 billion us dollars (69,6 % as share) 65 (6,6 %) 49 (4,9 %) 47 (4,8 %) 23 (2,3 %) 21 (2,1 %) 18 (1,8 %) 12 (1,2 %) 11 (1,1 %) 11 (1,1 %) all the other states (19 members) have a share of less than 1% in the global of the nato defence expenditures and their national military budget is less than 10 billion dollars for 2019. on the european side the difference between the united kingdom versus the frg and france catches the eye. that underlines again the importance of the uk defence for europe. but for the first time in the nato history the federal republic of germany spends more money than france on defence! the following table makes the difference between the gdp versus the defence expenditures (de) share and this for the ten greatest defence contributors. table 9. gdp vs. de usa poland turkey netherlands uk france canada spain italy germany + 23,6 % 0,3 % 0,6 % 1 % 1,2 % 1,8 % 2,1 % 2,2 % 2,5 % 5,3 % (69,6% share d.e. versus 50,9% gdp share) (1,1% de vs 1,4% gdp) (1,8% de vs 2,4% gdp) (1,1% de vs 2,2% gdp) (6,6% de vs 7,8% gdp) (4,8% de vs 6,6% gdp) (2,2% de vs 4,3% gdp) (1,2% de vs 3,4% gdp) (2,3% de vs 4,8% gdp) (4,9% de vs 9,2% gdp) as result of this comparison between the gdp and the de shares, the conclusion is again that only the united states has a positive result or in other words a much greater share in the defence expenditures versus the gdp share. a difference of 23,6 is very big! all the other top ten gdp states have a lower www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 262 published by scholink inc. share in their d.e., going from 0,3 % till over 9 %. this calculation with the difference in share between the gdp and the defence expenditures of the states in the nato total confirms again the proportionately higher us military expenses and the clear under budget european and canadian military budgets. between the european nato states we notice huge differences between the referred parameters. the previous list let see an important difference between the greater european partners. there is a little difference between the two shares concerning poland and the united kingdom on the lower side and higher differences in the case of france, spain, italy and certainly the federal republic of germany. 3.4 defence expenditure per capita this article has also the intention to link the foregoing to per capita defence spending. doing so yields a different perspective on nato’s military expenditure. the tenth table tenth table (nato, pc-cp, p. 10) below gives an overview of per capita defence spending in each of the nato’s member states and the gdp per capita. the figures concerns the year 2019 (estimated nato figures) with (in parentheses) the figures of 2012, the latest year mentioned in the nato document used. in other words this table gives in us dollar the defence expenditures and the gdp per capita calculated in 2015 prices and exchange rates. table 10. defence expenditure (d.e.) and gdp per capita (in us dollars) d.e. per capita gdp per capita 1. united states 2.072 (2.357) 60.500 (54.000) 2. norway 1.308 (1.112) 76.800 (73.300) 3. united kingdom 979 (912) 46.000 (42.300) 4. denmark 760(697) 56.200 (51.600) 5. france 709(677) 38.600 (36.200) 6. netherlands 655(548) 48.400 (44.200) 7. frg 591(528) 43.400 (40.300) 8. canada 569 (462) 44.700 (42.200) 9. luxembourg 552(362) 99.700 (95.700) 10. greece 431 (419) 19.300 (18.300) 11. estonia 429(306) 20.100 (16.100) 12. belgium 392(414) 42.100 (39.900) 13. italy 385 (402) 31.400 (30.600) 14. lithuania 336 (96) 16.600 (12.700) 15. latvia 325 (109) 16.200 (12.300) 16. slovak rep. 322 (163) 18.400 (14.900) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 263 published by scholink inc. 17. portugal 299 (262) 21.200 (18.700) 18. poland 296 (198) 14.700 (11.400) 19. spain 264(259) 28.500 (24.800) 20. slovenia 253 (236) 24.300 (20.100) 21. croatia 238 (174) 13.600 (11.400) 22. czech rep. 236 (174) 19.800 (16.500) 23. romania 225 (98) 11.000 (8.000) 24. turkey 222 (151) 11.700 (9.500) 25. hungary 178 (117) 14.700 (11.300) 26. bulgaria 132 (97) 8.200 (6.500) 27. montenegro 126 (99) 7.600 (6.000) 28. albania 58 (56) 4.600 (3.700) 29. iceland n.a. 58.700 (48.700) this table let see that the gdp per capita was going up over these mentioned years (2012-2019) in all the countries. the slowest increase is italy with 2,6% and the highest is romania with 37%! the usa has an increase of 12% and that’s the 17the place in the ranking of increases. with exception of iceland (+ 20%), spain (+15%) and portugal (+ 13%) all the other states between the usa and romania are the east european states and turkey. naturally achieve the west european states, with a higher gdp, a lower statistical increase. the highest gdp per capita in figures (us dollars) remains luxembourg, following by norway and the usa. denmark and iceland are changing of the places four and five. the first southern european state is italy at place 12 (31.400 dollars) and the first east european state is slovenia (24.300). the list conforms again the still more prosperous positions of the westand north european nations. the concerned average of the years 2012 and 2019are the following figures (in us dollars): nato european states: 27.700 (2012)-30.600 (2019) north america : 52.800 (2012)-58.900 (2019) nato total: 37.400 (2012) -41.600 (2019) concerning this gdp per capita in the nato states only eleven members do have a higher result as the average in 2019. it concerns: the two north american members, the three scandinavian members, the three benelux members, france, germany and the united kingdom. this table doesn’t let see a difference, in this case, with the results of 2012. even in the nato gdp figures we conclude the already existing welfare conditions between western europe versus east & south europe. the second part of the above table concerns the defence expenditures (d.e.) per capita between the years 2012 and 2019(except iceland). in only three states , the usa—belgium and italy—the “d.e.” www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 264 published by scholink inc. per capita is in 2019 lower than in 2012. this is an improvement with the former years and confirms de previous figures concerning the increase of the military budgets.. the concerned average of the two studied years are (in us dollars): nato european states: 430 (2012)-486(2019) north america: 2.169 (2012)-1.919(2019) nato total: 1.079 (2012)-1.045(2019) this table again highlights the difference of spending concerning defence between the both sides of the atlantic ocean. if we take the nato average then only two nations can be situated above this figure, namely: the usa and norway. if the parameter is the european average then seven members are staying higher in the list: denmark, france, germany, luxembourg, the netherlands, norway and the uk. greece with a military budget of more than 2% gdp doesn’t achieve this mentioned average per capita. this table gives another angle concerning the military financial efforts of the nato states. the ranking in this lists per capita is, naturally, related with the size of the national gdp. but this calculation is not an objective measuring instrument to make the real efforts of the nato members in relation with their defence budgets. the fact that the usa stays on the first place with the d.e. per capita and this with lower gdp than norway can be explained through the much higher usa position concerning the nato 2 % gdp goal. a similar remark also applies denmark, albeit to a much smaller extent. 4. conclusion in this article we have looked at trends in military spending in the nato members during this decade. the first conclusion is still that the us continues to be by far the largest financier of the nato and is still the greatest military spender. the explanation basically lies with the funding parameter. namely the level of the “gdp” and the military tradition. on the nato funding the usa stays the most important contributor, but all by all the european states together are paying the greatest part of these three budgets. another item of this article is the military personnel level that has also fallen in recent years. the fall reached the lowest point in the year 2016 and is now increasing, but is still below the figures in the beginning of the decade. concerning this item there is an european predominance. another determination is the decreasing of the personnel share in the defence budgets. the wales summit goals are in an improving way. already seven countries reaches the 2% gdp goal. but there is for a lot of members a long way to go and the 2024 target comes closer. the increasing of the defence budgets is certainly related with the states in the proximity of the russian federation. the 20% equipment guideline is already achieved by 17 states. comparing with the beginning of the decade are the military budgets still lower , but the lowest points during the years 2015/2016 has been omitted. based on the military budget figures the impact of the usa is overwhelming. the united kingdom has www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 265 published by scholink inc. the most important european military budget. this country is also the only european greater nation which is fully consistent with the mentioned nato guidelines of the wales summit. a historical fact is that the frg for the first time, in 2019, has a larger nominal military budget as france. finally, this study analyses also the per capita parameter and this confirms the impression created in the previous part of the article. the usa is the largest source of nato funding and also contributes the most to the defence of nato territory. in these calculations they see the impact of the higher well fare and gdp’s in westernand northern europe. the latter is certainly a consequence of the problems in the public finances in many countries and also the lack of political interest for defence issues. there can be no doubt about the fact that the european defence will have to rely on nato and his north american input and this for the next decades. references nato, defenceexpenditures of nato countries. (2012-2019). les dépenses de défense des pays de l’otan , press release—communiqué de presse, pc-cp nr. 2019-069, brussels. nato-annual report of the secretary general for 2018. (2018). otan-rapport annuel du secrétaire général pour 2018, brussels; 4 march 2019,132p.(nato-ar). advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 1 original paper popular uprisings in sudan: revolutionary processes intercepted abdu mukhtar musa1* 1 department of political science, omdurman islamic university, khartoum, sudan professor abdu m. musa is the author of 9 books, notably darfur: from a crisis of a state to super power clashes (400 pp., in arabic, doha: aljazeera centre for studies). he received his undergraduate and postgraduate studies at university of khartoum, sudan. (currently he is a professor of political science at the dept. of political science: islamic university of omdurman, khartoum state, sudan—africa). drmukhtar60@gmail.com received: november 14, 2021 accepted: december 2, 2021 online published: december 16, 2021 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n1p1 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n1p1 abstract this article tries to go beyond the general features of the sudanese three popular uprisings of 1964, 1985 and 2018/19, to explore their root causes. it argues that the revolutionary processes in the sudan have been impeded by such factors as: (1) lack of visionary leaders; (2) inter-elites dissensions; (3) intra-party schisms and inter-party conflicts (over interests); and (4) absence of coherent programmatic and mass political parties. since independence in 1956, the sudan has been trapped in a vicious circle—oscillating between democratic and military rules. so: “why does democracy fail in sudan? it compares the different settings that differentiate the uprising (of 2018/19) from the previous two, with especial emphasis on the latest one—one of the most successful non-violent civil resistances. the article explains that those uprisings could have escalated into full-fledged revolution but were let down by the civil elites who disappointed any prospects for revolutionary achievement”. hence, the article rests on the hypothesis that “the political elite are responsible for the failure of the popular uprisings in sudan”. the article provides empirical explanations for this hypothesis and suggests adoption of consociationalism which is more likely to suit the highly diversified sudanese society with deep ethno-political polarization. keywords uprising, revolution, militant islamists, exclusion, marginalization, transition, democracy www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 2 published by scholink inc. 1. introduction: it was a controversial issue among the sudanese intellectuals whether the sudan’s uprising of dec. 2018—apr. 2019, is a “revolution” or an “uprising” (“intifada”)? but, since the masses took to the streets in tens of towns in sudan yearning for comprehensive and radical change, it could be maintained that the uprising had paved the way for a real “revolutionary” change—albeit it was in need of a charismatic leader with a vision for radical change and capable of mobilizing the nation amidst great difficulties and conspiracies that were being waged by the elements of the deposed militant islamists’ regime (mir) led by gen. omer al-beshir. history reveals that revolutions usually take a long time to realize their ultimate goals and achieve substantial transformation. the great french revolution (1789) is a good example; it took a decade (1789-799) to lay down the first stepping stones. in his distinguished 1970 article “transitions to democracy: toward a dynamic model” rustow “broke from the prevailing schools of thought on how countries became democratic, disagreeing with the heavy focus on necessary social and economic pre-conditions for democracy.” (rustow, 1970) (note 1) he argued that “national unity was the necessary precondition for democracy.” (rustow, 1970) (note 2) this may be true with respect to western democracies or advanced states; however, it differs in the case of the third world states where unity without awareness—including conscious political behavior and participation, based on appropriate culture—does not provide a fertile soil for sowing the seeds of a sound democracy. this is because “other things may not remain the same or equal” as such drivers as ethnic identification may influence political behavior and voting attitudes. two past surveys of revolution list literally hundreds of events as “revolutionary” in character. “nonetheless, these events still have a common set of elements at their core: (a) efforts to change the political regime that draw on a competing vision (or visions) of a just order, (b) a notable degree of informal or formal mass mobilization, and (c) efforts to force change through non-institutionalized actions such as mass demonstrations, protests, strikes, or violence.” (tilly, 1993) (note 3) the sudanese uprising—under consideration—encompasses almost all these processes, notably: efforts to change political regime; formal or informal mass mobilization; … use of such actions of mass demonstrations, protests, strike, etc. actually the sudan’s “revolution” cuts across different types of revolution as well different definitions/theories of revolution. this will be explained throughout the analysis in this article. but it is suffice here to argue that this multifaceted nature of the sudanese revolution (of 2018/19) might be partly attributed to: 1) the long duration of the regime that was toppled by the uprising (30 years: 1989-2019). 2) for the very compound nature of that regime: some sort of alliance between the army and the “radical islamic fundamentalism” so that i labeled that regime as the “militant islamist regime” (mir). the two sides (the allied military and the civilians) called their regime (al-engath) or “salvation” which assumed power by a military coup—they alleged—to rescue the sudanese people from bad conditions—whereas, in reality, they led them to the worst. 3) al-beshir’s regime was a hybrid of a religious ideology and authoritarianism, in its first years, and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 3 published by scholink inc. turned into theocratic totalitarianism influenced by hassan abdallahal-turabi (the master mind of their new sacred mission of “civilizational project”). however, few years later—while raising islamic slogans—it deviated from the religious line and indulged into power, wealth and corruption, while excluding all those who are not loyal to their regime or members of the islamic movement. 4) it was not only a matter of class conflict, periphery-center dispute, ethnic politics, racial discrimination, military dictatorship, but also monopolizing the wealth by one group (members of the islamic movement) and excluding all other sectors of the society. 5) the nature of resistance to this authoritarian militant islamist regime was also diverse—it was cross-ethnic and cross cultural (this is detailed later on in this article). a great deal of literature has been written on explaining the nature and origin of revolutions. some outlined three major “phases” or “generations”: “the first generation, falling roughly between 1900 and 1940, and including the work of lebon, ellwood, sorokin, edwards, lederer, pettee, and brinton, carefully investigated the pattern of events found in revolutions, but lacked a broad theoretical perspective.” (goldstone, 1980) (note 4) the second generation, falling roughly between 1940 and 1975, has dominated the recent study of revolutions; it included davies, gurr, johnson, smelser, huntington, and tilly, and drew heavily on broad theories from psychology (cognitive psychology and frustration-aggression theory), sociology (structural-functionalist theory), and political science (the pluralist theory of interest-group competition). (note 5) in the third generation some scholars had introduced new analytical approach for revolution, namely: “barrington moore, jr. and eric wolf. important contributions were also made by gillis, neumann, rosenau, kelly and miller, hermassi, migdal, landsberger, linz, prosterman, russell, and chorley. these writers did not advance theories of revolution per se; however, they raised specific issues and achieved major insights which have formed the basis for the third generation’s theorizing.” (goldstone, 1980) (note 6) some scholars noted that “until … recently, revolutions have invariably failed to produce democracy. the need to consolidate a new regime in the face of struggles with domestic and foreign foes has instead produced authoritarian regimes, often in the guise of populist dictatorships such as those of napoleon, castro, and mao, or of one-party states such as the pri state in mexico or the communist party-led states of the soviet union and eastern europe. indeed, the struggle required to take and hold power in revolutions generally leaves its mark in the militarized and coercive character of new revolutionary regimes.” (gurr, 1988) (note 7) however, in sudan two previous popular uprisings (1964 and 1985) had resulted in two democratic regimes. this was also supported by other cases elsewhere: “it is … striking that in several … revolutions—in the philippines in 1986, in south africa in 1990, in eastern european nations in 1989-1991—the sudden collapse of the old regime has led directly to new democracies, often against strong expectations of reversion to dictatorship.” (note 8) one scholar explained this: “the factors that allowed democracy to emerge in these cases appear to be several: a lack of external military threat, a strong personal commitment to democracy by revolutionary www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 4 published by scholink inc. leaders, and consistent external support of the new democratic regimes by foreign powers.” (note 9) john foran has made an excellent contribution to the literature of theorizing revolution particularly with respect to the third world. in his “taking power: on the origins of third world revolutions” he examines the causes behind some three dozen revolutions in the third world between 1910 and the “present” [late 20th century]. through an interdisciplinary approach he explains “why so few revolutions have succeeded, and so many have failed.” (foran, 2005). (note 10) his book treats particular sets of revolutions in the third world—including the longest revolution in the world—the chinese revolution (1919-1949). he believes that the twentieth century must be judged an age of revolutions. he noted that “… the locus of these revolutions has been firmly rooted in the third world…” (note 11) many scholars agree that the real revolution is a “social” revolution particularly that “transforms economic and social structures as well as political institutions” (charles tilly, 1995). so it may be held that a comprehensive study of the concept of revolution entails interdisciplinary approach. hence, it is notable that the most distinguished contributions in the theorization of revolution are made by the scientist who combined politics with sociology and psychology along with history, anthropology and comparative perspectives. to cite some examples: thedaskocpol, john foran, ted robert gurr, karl marx, jack goldstone, barrington moore, samuel p. huntington, richard tilly, eisenstaedt, etc. skocpol’s” states and social revolutions” became one of the most widely recognized works of the third generation; skocpol defined revolution as “rapid, basic transformations of society’s state and class structures [...] accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below”, attributing revolutions to a conjunction of multiple conflicts involving state, elites and the lower classes. (note 12) generally, in political science, a revolution (latin: revolution, “a turnaround”) is a fundamental and relatively sudden change in political power and political organization which occurs when the population revolts against the government, typically due to perceived oppression (political, social, economic) or political incompetence. (bullock, trombley, 1999) (note 13) it also simply means “a successful attempt by a large group of people to change the political system of the country by force.” (note 14) notable revolutions in recent centuries include the creation of the united states through the american revolutionary war (1775-1783), the french revolution (1789-1799), the spanish american wars of independence (1808-1826), the european revolutions of 1848, the russian revolution in 1917, the chinese revolution of the 1940s, the cuban revolution in 1959, the iranian revolution in 1979, and the european revolutions of 1989. (note 15) with respect to the third world some scholars noted that the anticolonial and anti-dictatorial revolutions, ranging from angola to zaire, became so numerous and affected so many people that the parochial practice of defining revolutions in terms of a few cases in european history plus china became untenable (boswell, 1989, furan, 1997). in addition, whereas the “great revolutions” had all www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 5 published by scholink inc. led fairly directly to populist dictatorship and civil wars, a number of the more recent revolutions … seemed to offer a new model in which the revolutionary collapse of the old regime was coupled with a relatively nonviolent transition to democracy (goldstone, 2001). (note 16) 2. modeling the case of sudan: a framework for analyzing dynamics and processes the causes of revolution in sudan differ from that set of factors specified by such scholars as skocpol (1979). in the case of sudan: lack of justice, deprivation, marginalization, ethnic politics and racial discrimination matter. this, of course, in addition to other factors/causes common to almost all the underdeveloped countries—notably: corruption and dictatorship. in the twentieth century the sudanese people waged two successful popular uprisings—in october 1964 and april 1985—where the two upheavals toppled two dictators: general abbud and general nimeiri, respectively—though the first two revolutions had not enjoyed the highly sophisticated global media enjoyed the latest one (dec. 2018-apr. 20190. however, the latest uprising differs from the two previous ones in many aspects. al-beshir’s militant islamist regime (1989-2019) had ousted all key figures from the bureaucracy and regular forces. then the ruling militarized islamists deposed the majority of different ranks in the regular forces who are not members of the islamic movement or not loyal to their ruling political party (the national congress party: ncp). then they politicized the civil service. so, we had had a deeply indoctrinated system that excluded those who are not members of the islamists’ ruling party. therefore, it is not easy to dismantle or uproot al-bishir’s totalitarian system by the mere removal of its leading figures. accordingly, the functioning of the “counter-revolution” was obviously inevitable and a myriad of challenges were inescapable. figure 1. reveals the ratio of democratic rule to the military in terms of duration *(illustrated by the author) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 6 published by scholink inc. figure 2. the sudan’s syndrome (the vicious circle) *the independence of january 1956 was preceded by multi-party elections in november 1953. so the first democratic experience was three years—taking into account that it was terminated by general abbud’s coup in november 17, 1958. the first elected parliament unanimously declared independence on december 19, 1955 and was officially celebrated on january 1, 1956. the years: 1965 and 1985 were transitional. 2.1 why does democracy fail in sudan? from figure (1) which both illustrate an oscillating and turbulent political reality in sudan a central question arises: why does democracy fail in sudan? this article argues that one of the major causes of this “vicious circle” is related to the political parties in particular and the political elite in general. actually all successful military coups which governed the country six folds the time of democracies were a result of political parties’ failure. the political parties who won elections and were in office created crises and then “invite” the army to assume power: (1) in november 1958 when the umma party (up) came to know that his partner in the ruling coalition, the people’s democratic party, was planning to ally with the opposition party, the national uprising and interim period 2018/19 ? 1956* – 1958 democracy 1958-1964 military 1965 -1969 democracy 1969 – 1985 military 1986-1989 democracy 1989 – 2019 military whic h way to go? www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 7 published by scholink inc. unionist party, to topple abdalla khalil’s cabinet—by vote of no confidence-because “the country was in political crisis”, called upon general abbud (the commander-in-chief) to assume power. (2) in 1969 the sudanese communist party politically backed general nimeiri to assume power because the islamists joined forces with the “traditional” parties (the up and the democratic unionist party: dup) in the parliament and voted for dismembering those of the communist party. although the court verdict cancelled their decision, the parties behind the decision declined to execute the verdict triggering a political crisis ended by nimeiri’s coup in may 25, 1969. the communists “fleshed the bones of the military rule” (note 17) with radical thought and a program for action. however, two years later (in july 1971) the communists led a coup attempt against nimeiri who managed to abort it and came back after three days and sentenced the leaders to death. (3) in 1989 the islamists who were minority in the parliament (ranking third) manipulated the dissensions among the (up&dup) coalition government—along with security crisis, economic deterioration and corruption—intrigued with their officers in the army and took over the government on june 30, 1989. (4) in 2019, in the post-uprising transitional period, also one faction of the civil coalition—which was excluded or not represented in the transitional government (tg)—organized a sit-in at the republican palace on october 16, 21 and called upon the the commander-in-chief, gen. al-burhan to dissolve hamdok’ cabinet (will be detailed later on). the failure of the political parties in office to sustain proper democratic practice always led to military coups. then the masses revolt against the military regimes. the military responds to the will of the people. a transitional government is formed, elections organized; a democratic regime takes office. differences arise among coalition governments, with political corruption and poor performance, military officers capture power with such justifications as chaos, political unrest, economic deterioration and the unity of the county is at risk…etc. thus a vicious circle persists over decades (see figure no.2). after every successful popular uprising the political parties in power let the people down causing a frustrating set back to democratic rule. consequently, the country has been undergoing chronic political crises since independence in 1956. the symptom of this crisis is manifested in perpetual political instability—where the army governed more than six folds of the short-lived democracies. this situation of a “country in crises” had been a product of the failure of the elite—namely the political class. this political instability provides empirical evidence that the ruling political elite are responsible for these recurring political crises in sudan. hence, it is obvious that the political parties bear the greater part of this responsibility as they have failed to consolidate democratic and stable political system. one can divide or categorize the political parties in sudan into four types with respect to their relation to democracy: the first category or group: comprises those parties which do not believe in democracy or not keen to adopt it: e.g., the islamic movement (a branch of muslim brothers). the movement adopted one-party www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 8 published by scholink inc. system (the national congress party: ncp) ushering in a hybrid type of regime—a mixture of totalitarian system (tried to adopt an islamic rule) and a military dictatorship with repressive security organ. the second category: are those political parties which cannot survive under democracy, e.g., the sudan communist party, the arab socialist ba’ath (resurrections) party, and the nasserites, because they have no popular base or mass support for the nature of their ideologies (secular or leftist/communist) which are unacceptable in a conservative society as sudan with muslim majority (nearly 97% after the secession of the south in 2011). the third type: are those parties which are not able to practice real democracy and lack “within-party” democracy. their party leaders stay in office for life—a hereditary system of leadership based on sectarianism and patriarchy. some developed a sort of a “personality cult” where the “reverent” leaders are above criticism or removal from office. based on religious obedience to the “sheikh or molana”; there is no transfer of power. the umma party (of al-mahdi’s ansar or adherents) and the democratic unionist party (of al-khatmiyya sufist/s/ sect) are a good example for this type. the fourth type is the ethnic parties which represent a definite ethnic group or a marginalized minority (such as the beja, the nuba mountain union, darfur front for development, etc.). they ran for elections in almost all the three democratic “intervals”—got only few seats in the parliaments. this type also includes the armed struggle movements in darfur—notably the justice and equality movement, and sudan’s liberation movement. the two broke up into more than 30 factions. even if they are to develop into political parties, they would not be considered as mass parties, but rather remains as regional or ethnic parties as they represent specific areas and tribes or ethnic groups. the common characteristic of all these four types of political parties in sudan is that they cannot develop a sound political culture and, hence, cannot contribute to the functioning of an effective political process. in the final analysis, they are not qualified to consolidate real and sustainable democracy. generally one can numerate the following observations on political parties in sudan: (i) they suffer from acute factionalism or multi-party schisms; (iii) the majority of parties lack institutionalism and democratic values that characterize modern political parties; (iv) most—if not all—political parties have no program for change or how to build a coherent society and stable state. they lack nationwide appeal); (v) almost all political parties lack the practice of within-party democracy and suffer from structural deficiencies. so, the current political parties in sudan are in crisis. the inefficient political process and poor political culture is—to a great extent—a product of this crisis. in order to have a solid political party system the present political parties in sudan are to restore their internal cohesion—by reunification of its broken-away factions and adopt within-party democracy. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 9 published by scholink inc. 2.2 analysis and interpretation with regard to the case of sudan it is significant to look closely at the nature of the social structure and the social forces interacting in the political process. generally, the sudanese society is more traditional than modernized where tribe is still a powerful socio-political entity and so influential in shaping the individual’s political behavior. globalization is being manifested in using the sophisticated tools rather than refining the life style—including political behavior. due to the drastic economic deterioration in the rural areas as a result of lack of equitable development and negligence of many regions, many were forced to migrate to the capital (khartoum). this had furthered economic imbalances, increased disparity between the centre and the peripheries and the social fabric was severely shaken. those newcomers to the capital and major towns—with no income or a source to earn their living—settled on the outskirts in shanty towns to lead a miserable life and suffer from lack of adequate basic services; and at the same time impacting the size of the labor force at the production areas where 80% of the sudanese people depend on agricultural activities. agriculture was severely affected by the policies of the former islamist regime particularly with regard to unfair pricing policy. “under the previous government of gen. omer al-beshir, the middlemen used to buy our agricultural products at very cheap prices and sell them to other marketers or exporters at high prices besides the authorities imposed high taxes on our products. accordingly, many producers were forced to abandon farming and migrated to the capital or other places.” (note 18) with the emergence of the armed struggle movements in darfur and other parts of the country—which were an outcome of injustice, deprivation and marginalization—many frustrated and jobless young people joined them. some joined the radical terrorist groups outside sudan and some desperately endeavored to cross the mediterranean to europe where some of them died in between. so a generation is lost being a victim of the mistakes of the political elites in a country rich of resources but poor in leadership who lack vision and patriotic conscience. this state of affairs was complicated by two factors: (1) exclusion and marginalization took place on ethnic and regional basis paralleled by—or combined with—ideological prejudice. (2) the failure of the ruling elites to manage resources properly and manage diversity equitably. one of the outcomes of the wrong policies of gen. omer al-beshir’s mir was the impoverishment of many segments in the society (46% under poverty line). (note 19) a great deal of portion of the middle class—notable the intelligentsia, intellectuals and professionals—sought personal or individual “salvation” and left the country. some formed opposition and took bastions in other countries. moreover, those policies of exclusion and deprivation on ideological and ethno-political lines resulted in vertical societal division: ideological polarization: is based on membership to the islamic movement and its ncp. ethno-political polarization: the government of the islamic movement dealt with the poorest areas on ethnic basis. thus ethnicization of politics divided the country on ethnic/political basis. this was clear www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 10 published by scholink inc. with respect to areas populated with groups of non-arab origin (known as “african”). this is more obvious in the case of darfur. (musa, 2009) (note 20) even the paramilitary or official militias were mostly formed on tribal basis: the “janjaweed” is a good example (made of arab tribes who were used to fight against the armed opposition movements which were dominated by the non-arab tribes, some with extension in chad). so when al-beshir was toppled on april 11, 2019, there were more than five armies in khartoum: the regular sudanese armed forces (i.e., the sudan official army), and the rapid support forces (rsf—led by general m. h. dagalo, nicknamed hemeidti). then each of the other major armed opposition movements have got its own army (the sudan liberation army, justice and equality movement, sudan liberation movement, the sudan people’s liberation army/north—originally part of the late gerang’s liberation movement/army (splm/a) which includes two armed factions: one in the blue nile state led by malik agar, and the other in the nuba mountains of south kordofan led by commander abdel aziz al-hilo.(musa, 2009). (note 21) 3. preludes to the sudan’s revolution (2018/19): for thirty years in power, sudan’s general al-beshir had ruled by military force and cracked down on his people. on june 30, 1989 the then brigadier omer hassan al-behsir, toppled a democratically elected government of al-sadiqal-mahdi. supported by the muslim brothers, led by the late hassan abdallahal-turabi, general al-beshir deposed all those who were not muslim brothers. this purge included the civil service as well as all regular forces—particularly the members of security, besides the top-ranking officers of the army and police. in addition to this he created his own militias. over time, members of the islamic movement controlled all institutions, including civil service, the regular armed forces and financial institutions. they excluded all other segments in the state—even those who were not partisans. starting by december 19, 2018 up to april 11, 2019, tens of thousands of people took to the streets of khartoum, the capital of sudan, and some other 25 towns of the 18 states of the country demanding the termination of al-beshir’s 30-yeare militarized islamists’ rule. tens of demonstrators were killed by the security forces and hundreds were injured. some of the killers are said to be armed forces, in civil suits and veiled, who belong to the islamic movement—described as “militias”—known as “katayib al-zil” (the battalions of shadow). on april 6, 2019, trade unions—mainly the professionals’ association (established august 2018)–called upon the people to join the protesters to be one million in number—to start a sit-in at the headquarters of the sudanese army in khartoum. the date coincides with the commemoration of april 6, 1985 when a popular uprising succeeded—with a support from the army—in terminating a 16-year military rule by general g.m. nimairi. a prompt response brought the number to more than what was expected reflecting how far was the dramatic decline of al-beshir’s popularity—taking into account the fact that the regime’s militias used firearms to disperse the demonstrations. this also reveals how far www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 11 published by scholink inc. the sudanese people were fed up with the president’s continual pledges of reforms and economic recovery while living a reality of crises, corruption without any accountability applied. (note 22) 3.1 mismanagement of resources mismanagement of natural and human resources included exclusion of the competent elements from the state machinery and replacing them with the members of the islamic movement—the majority of them lack the appropriate qualifications and expertise. this had led to deterioration in the public services in general. many developmental projects broke down. agriculture and industry (factories) were damaged. this immediately impacted exports and reversed the balance of trade to acute deficit. (note 23) consequently, the sudanese currency dropped from sdg 12 against $1 when this regime assumed power in 1989, to 90,000 by late 2018. as a result the government embarked on loans from abroad. about 70% of the factories stopped production. (note 24) the sudan, with vast area (1.8 million km2), more than 121 million of animal wealth, has got long borders at the red sea (800 kilometers), many rivers—notably the river nile—gum arabic, cereals, audible oil seeds, mineral resources—notably gold, etc. “sudan enjoys multidimensional ecologies that provide immense fertile land of about 80 million hectares, a large number of livestock, natural pasture of about 24 million hectares, forest area of about 4 million hectares …rivers and rains with annual amount of 575 million cubic meters.” (note 25) the sudan ranks five in the world in terms of natural resources, but paradoxically it is one of the poorest country in the world—reflecting a structural weakness and inertia with respect to the leading elites who lack vision, and will for exploiting such rich resources. if these rich resources are efficiently managed, the sudanese would enjoy a prosperous life. 3.2 mismanagement of diversity: mismanagement of diversity is related with the issue of the crisis of identity where the sudan has more than 400 tribes, the majority of them have been either under-represented or suffered severe marginalization or deprivation.(musa, 2018) (note 26) the situation has been aggravated by discrimination—in opportunities, jobs and development—on ethnic basis. this had ignited grievances and eventually insurgency. (note 27) thus, the ruling political class is responsible for what the sudanese people have been suffering from—poverty, miserable life, crises, conflicts and wars—since independence. therefore, the revolution was a product of an accumulation of many factors along with grave political mistakes committed by the ruling elites. 3.3 repression, exclusion and marginalization marginalization and exclusion had triggered rebellion and the emergence of the armed opposition—in the south: in 1955—1972, then 1983—2004 (terminated by the comprehensive peace agreement, cpa, in january 2005); in the nuba mountains: in 1983 which ended with the cpa, but broke out once again by abdel al-aziz al hilo in 2012 and ended only, after the uprising, by the juba peace agreement in october 2020; darfur: started resistance since early 1990s but took arms by 2003; besides the blue nile, led by agar and the east. most of these movements sought backing from abroad leading to the internationalization of the internal (periphery-center) conflict. this was worsened by repression and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 12 published by scholink inc. rampant corruption. with the removal of al-beshir from officein april 11, 2019—by a military-supported uprising—these forces (the armed struggle movements) joined the “transitional government” (tg) on the basis of a formula set by juba agreement in october 2020. they asked for great shares in the institutions of the tg. as some of them called for some sort of reconciliation with the deposed regime’s party (the national congress party) a wish against the will of the people who toppled the islamist regime, the political scene has become complicated. divisions appeared among the components of the transitional government particularly following a failed coup attempt in september 2021—which was denounced by gen. abdul-fattah al-burhan, the head of the sovereignty council, accusations were exchanged indicating that some of the civil components of the transitional government were involved in that attempted coup. this had deepened divisions among the civil component of the tg including its political incubator (the forces of freedom and change: ffc). consequently, a new faction produced by that split formed a bloc known as “ffc -2”, signed a new “national charter” and named itself “national consensus” group. they accused the main ffc members who formed the government as only “four parties, who hijacked the revolution, excluded the majority—the vivid forces of the revolution” organized a sit-in at the republican palace in khartoum on october 16, 2021 demanding the resolution of the cabinet and forming a new one of independent technocrats”. many believe that this new ffc faction (of the national charter) was influenced by the adherents of the deposed regime (the islamists) and that they called the army to take over by resolving the civil cabinet—led by abdallah hamdok—and form a technocratic one. all these state of affairs had a great negative impact on the coherence and stability of the transitional government and threatened the democratic transition. (note 28) 4. sudan’s revolutionary movement (2018/19 ): characteristics and challenges 4.1 characteristics: 1. one of the most remarkable characteristics of the sudan’s revolution (of 2018/19) it was a non-violent civil resistance. 2. the majority of the protestors are young who revealed amazing fearlessness. 3. considerable participation of women who were as brave as the male protesters. twelve girls were killed during the demonstrations in different parts of the country. 4. it was not led by a definite political party but rather a sudden outbreak of a collaboration of all sectors of society, of cross-ethnic groups, who took to the streets motivated by strong yearning for emancipation from a rule of dictatorship, repression and corruption. 5. it has revealed that: because the islamic movement had excluded “all people”, the whole society united against them. it was a direct reaction to the islamists’ authoritarian and exclusive political behavior when they were in power. (note 29) 6. being peaceful constituted a “soft power” for the revolution. this peacefulness of the revolution www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 13 published by scholink inc. stripped the defunct regime from justification to use excessive force to crush the demonstrations. the world international community and world public opinion has sympathized with the demonstrations—leaving the islamists’ regime without any backing or legitimacy. 7. the revolution was well organized and the protesters showed strong cohesiveness and bravery to overcome the continual efforts of the security excessive use of force to disperse the demonstrations. 4.2 challenges to transition (2019 ): two years after the outset of the transitional government, the ffc faced a great deal of criticism for being weak due to fragmentation as some important components started to break away—notably one of the major founders of the federation of the so called “the professionals” association” which organized and led the demonstrations that broke out since late december 2018. this association had later on—following the relinquish of general al-beshir—constituted the main pillar for the ffc which comprised over 180 components which included: political parties, trade unions, professional associations, and various civil society organizations—some of them were active for several years waging opposition against the islamist regime. it defected from the ffc in july 2020. the sudanese communist party—a major founder of the professionals’ association—defected from the ffc on nov. 6, 2020 denouncing the deviation of ffc from the charter and applied the conditions imposed by the imf. (salih, 2021) (note 30) the sudanese communist party justified its defection from the ffc because it rejected this “soft landing” which stabs the people on the back. “these groups of soft landing have been hindering the march of the revolution.” (edris, 2021) (note 31) it is also believed that these groups held meetings with some regional forces such as the united arab emirates and that they were trying to link the sudan’s economy with the global capitalism which would impose on the country the conditions of the imf which will impede any national scheme for real development and renaissance. (note 32) a thoroughly demilitarized transitional regime was the top demand of people who accomplished a sit-in at the military headquarters in khartoum for nearly three months (april 11—june 30, 2019). they also called for the detention of all members of the former regime, and filing suit of corruption as well as of killing civilians over the four months of protests (december 19, 2018-april 11, 2019). it was only by september 1, 2019, that a cabinet was declared with dr. abdallah hamdok named as prime minister. in spite of being able of deposing one of the strongest military dictatorships in the area, the sudan’s revolution faced many difficulties and challenges. to single out some examples: first: internal divisions in the ffc: one of the greatest challenges that have faced the transitional government was the split of the main leading political coalition of the post-uprising transitional government. these forces which led the protests against al-beshir’s regime included—at the outset—more than 180 organizations and political parties. as general al-beshir was forced by the army generals to step down in response to the people’s will, the number the actually active parties in the political scene dropped to about 70—out of over 100 parties, besides the professionals’ association, started consultations about the formation of the institutions of the (tg). this process took several www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 14 published by scholink inc. months (from april to august 2019) during that time only over 40 political parties remained directly involved in the process of the formation of the tg. by august 19, 2019 dr. abdallahamdok was unanimously nominated as prime minister. then by early september 2019 the coalition of the (ffc) named the members of the cabinet ministers and the civil component of the council of sovereignty (cs) which was staffed by half military and half civilians and to be presided in the first half of the 39-month-long transitional period by the military (general al-burhan as the general commander-in-chief) and the second half was to be presided by a civilian figure. the formation of the transitional parliament along with the nomination of state governors and other major institutions of the state was postponed till an agreement was signed with the rebel movements (later on re-named as “the armed struggle movements”). but this agreement (juba) was signed only more than a year late (on october 3, 2020). this delay resulted in administrative vacuum all over the country leading to deterioration in security, economic conditions, services and tribal conflicts. in mid may 2021 about 20 political parties met in the house of the umma party to discuss the “reformation of the ffc to broaden the base of participation as the coalition witnessed many defections and the performance of the civil executive became weak.” (note 33) this split increased over weeks till it culminated into an outcry—in the second half of 2021—that the revolution had been high jacked by only four political parties.” (note 34) consequently, tens of parties—including the two major opposition movement of darfur (the justice and equality movement, led by jebreel ibrahim, and the sudan liberation movement, led by mini arko minawi) met on october 16, 21, signed a charter and declared the formation of the “national consensus” (nc). they are labeled as “ffc-2” as they broke away from the mainstream ffc which organized and led the protests of the uprising (2018/19). after witnessing split this main faction is known was “the ffcthe central council” or (ffc-1)”. then the new faction waged a campaign of criticism against hamdok’s cabinet of being controlled by only four parties while excluding the majority. on october 16, 2021, this ffc-2 (the national consensus) organized a sit-in at the republican palace in khartoum asking for the dissolution of hamdok’s cabinet, dismantle the monopoly of the four parties and broaden the participation in the tg to be representative to the different revolutionary forces. thus, the tg became heavily engaged in intra-ffc dissensions on one side, and the tg’s civil components being at loggerhead with the military elements of the council of sovereignty (cs) on the other. the dispute between the two sides was sparked off on september 21, when the two sides exchanged accusations of collusion with the leaders of the aborted military coup in khartoum. this had ignited distrust between the two sides (the military and the civilians). the ffc-2 (nc) alleged that they represent the majority of the revolutionary forces which were excluded by the four parties dominating the executive, the states’ governors, and the civil component of the (cs). the ffc-2 (nc) managed to mobilize many people for the sit-in at the republican palace. they used religious rhetoric to rally the religious sects (the sufist/s), and many social forces through an islamic www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 15 published by scholink inc. appeal that the ffc-1 are secularist—thus instigating many sectors of society to rally against hamdok’s cabinet and called upon the president of the cs, gen. abdul-fattah al-burhan, to dissolve the tg and form a new one with broad representativeness. to counter this rally of the ffc-2 (nc), the ffc-1 (the mainstream of the political incubator of the tg) mobilized its bases through the resistance committees (established in 2018) in different quarters in sudan and organized a one-million demonstration on october 21 (commemorating the revolution of october 21, 1964) where more than ten were killed and tens were injured. this one outnumbered that organized by the ffc-2 (nc), apart from demonstrations in several towns in sudan—sending a strong message to the military and the world public opinion that the majority of the sudanese people support civilian rule and reject any military intervention under any pretexts. on 13.11.2021 the ffc-1 organized another demonstrations rejecting al-burhan’s formation of a 14-member council of sovereignty on11.11.21, with (9) members civilians and (5) military. tension grew as differences between the two ffc’s factions increased on the one hand and that between the civil elements of the tg and the military elements of the cs. attempts failed to mend fences between the conflicting parties. taking into consideration the east was still under beja’s blockade (was ended on october 31, 21), crises in basic needs were on the rise, the sit-in continued paralyzing life at the city centre, war of media was heated; tensions on the rise, and a deadlock was reached. consequently, on october 25, 2021, general al-burhan dissolved the tg (the cabinet and the cs), suspended seven articles in the constitutional charter, declared the state of emergency, released all ministers, state governors, as well as the undersecretaries, detained some ministers and put hamdok under house arrest. the ff-2 (nc) commended the decisions, described them as a correction to the path of the revolution and ended the sit-in. whereas the ffc-1described al-burhan’s decisions as a “military coup”. nonetheless, demonstrations broke out in hundreds of thousands—in khartoum and several towns all over the country—denouncing the coup and calling for reinstating hamdok’s civil cabinet. despite being peaceful, 40 were killed and hundreds were injured in three protests (on october 21, oct. 30, nov. 13 and nov. 17, 2021). (note 35) in the face of continual demonstrations and international pressure gen. al-burhan signed a “political agreement” with hamdok on november 21, 21 ending his house arrest, releasing political detainees, declaring a commitment to: form a technocrat cabinet, completing the institutions of the transition and organize elections by july 2023. second: the economic crisis: the situation was actually one of pervasive economic deterioration. this includes the heavy debts inherited from the deposed regime (over $50 billion). (note 36) hyperinflation scored three digits “(412%) by june 2021”. (note 37) this triggered further public discontent. (note 38) this was aggravated in september 16, 21 when the beja ethnicity in the east of sudan started a blockade to the port, the air port of (port sudan) town—aggravating the economic crisis. the leaders of the beja ethnicity said that the blockade was a reaction to the procrastination on the part of the central government of khartoum to respond to the demands of the people of the eastern region as www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 16 published by scholink inc. represented by their major tribal leaders, namely muhammad al-ameen terik” had put forward some demands as conditions to terminate the four-week-long blockade of the port, notably: cancelling the track of the east included the juba peace agreement signed in october 2020 where they believe that the agreement had underestimated the injustice inflicted on the region by the successive central governments of khartoum since independence. (note 39) third: challenges and threats by having many armies: the existence of the rapid support forces/rsf (led by gen. m. h. dagalo hemedti), side by side with the official sudan’s armed forces indicates there are “two armies” in sudan. this had triggered controversy as general hemedti seems reluctant to accept the idea of amalgamating his forces in the national army. the danger here is that this force is based on the previous janjaweed militia which was formed by the deposed president al-beshir to support him and protect his regime against the armed struggle movements of darfur. another problem is that many believe that the rsf is dominated by one tribe (the mahameed, a branch of the rezeigat—arab nomads) and mainly led by one family (the commander is gen abdul-rahim dagalo—hemedti’s brother). however, general hemaidti negated the triabalized nature of his forces and claimed that it is a nation-wide force. nonetheless, the existence of the rsf after the revolution has become politically unacceptable, legally illegitimate and socially hazardous. political activists had been continually “accusing the rfs of participating in brutish assault on those at the sit-in where 110 were killed, tens were injured, raped or thrown into the nile with their bodies fastened with stones” (note 40) in fact the rsfs had committed atrocities and crimes against humanities in darfur since its formation in 2013. many reports confirmed that these forces “used to attack citizens in darfur and it had terrified people and committed violations.” (note 41) 5. conclusions it is notable that the sudanese elites are lagging far behind the sudanese people’s ambitions and awareness. in several cases of upheavals the masses paid a lot for emancipation and provided opportunities for a full-fledged revolution, but were always let down and disappointed by the elites. the article provided empirical explanations for how those setbacks took place opening the door for a military comeback—sustaining a “vicious circle” that i dubbed as “sudan’s syndrome”. it was obvious that from the outset the civil alliance which led and organized the protests (starting from dec. 18), lagged unity of vision, leadership and program. it failed to produce a competent and coherent cabinet; underwent factionalism (the professionals’ association broke away and so did the sudanese communist party—from the first months, the remaining component split into two factions—ffc/1and ffc/2, with the later allying with the military and elements of the deposed regime) along with exchanging accusations with the military component, besides multiplicity of crises, all weakened the tg and impacted the revolutionary process. according to the analysis conducted in this article democratization in sudan is threatened by two www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 17 published by scholink inc. obstacles: (a) the first one is related to the political institutions—notably the political parties; (b) the second is related to elites and leadership. of course there are other factors but all—in the final analysis—are related to these two factors, either directly or indirectly, such as poor political culture, tribalism and ethnic conflicts or the like. to enhance the process of democratic transition in sudan the political parties are to: 1) amalgamate into a few and strong political parties (instead of being over hundred in a country with only 40 population; 2) adopt strategic plan for its internal restructuring and reformation; 3) should have visionary leaders; 4) adopt a smart strategic political partnership. hence, given these crises and challenges—including factionalism and elites’ dissensions—real concessions and sacrifices are needed for the sake of public interest. so, it remains a matter of ethics, commitment and patriotism. actually, the climate brought by the revolution is quite inducing for exerting effective efforts in rebuilding political parties and civil society organizations which both can act as democracy-building institutions. therefore, one can hold that the future of democracy and stability in sudan relies heavily on maintaining the above mentioned requirements: visionary leadership, post-revolutionary institutions building, rebuilding political parties on sound basis to tackle their structural and functional deficiencies discussed in this article, building coherent and conscious civil society organizations to function in a free democratic climate to contribute effectively to democratization and nation building. it is also advisable for the case of sudan to adopt consociational democracy—to be adapted to the sudan’s conditions– in a presidential and federal system, and with proportional representation system of elections. this is because as the sudan is a highly diversified society—especially ethnically—is in need of such an appropriate formula of power-and-wealth sharing. references bullock, a., & stephen, t. (1999). the new fontana dictionary of modern thought (3rd ed.). clifton, b. k. (1996). theory and history of revolution. journal of world history. davies, j. c. (1962). towards a theory of revolution. american sociological review. eisenstaedt, s. n. (1977). theory and dynamics of civilizations and revolutions. daedulus, 106(4). mit press. http://www.jstor.org. eisenstaedt, s. n. (1978). revolution and societies: a comparative study of civilizations. new york: free press. foran, j. (1993). “theories of revolution revisited: toward a fourth generation”. sociological theory. foran, j. (2005). taking power: on the origins of third world revolutions. uk, new york, cambridge university press www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 18 published by scholink inc. foran, j. (ed.). (1997). theorizing revolutions. rutledge taylor & frances, uk. goldstone, j. a. (1980). theories of revolutions: the third generation. world politics, 32(3). goldstone, j. a. (2001). toward a fourth generation of revolutionary theory. annual review of political science, 4. goodwin, j. (1989). explaining revolutions in contemporary third world. journals.sagepub.com. https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292890100403 goodwin, j. (2001). no other way out: states and revolutionary movements, 1945-1991. cambridge university press gurr, t. r. (1970). why men rebel. princeton: princeton university press. gurr, t. r. (1988). war, revolution, and the growth of the coercive state, comparative political studies. huntington, s. p. (1968). political order in changing societies. new haven: yale university press. irving, e. f. (1997). a history of mass communication: six information revolutions. focal press, 1997. le bon, j. (1913). the psychology of revolutions. new york: earnest benn limited. moore, b. (1993). social origins of dictatorship and democracy: lord and peasants in the making of the modern world. boston: beacon press moore, b. (2014 ). the dialectics of revolution. cambridge university press. musa, a. m. (2009). darfur from state crisis to super powers clash. doha (qatar): al-jazeera studies centre. skocpol, t. (1979). explaining revolutions: in quest for social-structural approach. new york: free press. skocpol, t. (1979). states and social revolutions: a comparative analysis of france, russia, and china. cambridge: cambridge university press. sylvester, a. (1977). sudan under nimeiri. london, sydney and toronto: the bodley head. tilly, c. l. t., & richard, t. (1975). the rebellious century, 1830-1930. cambridge, mass.: harvard university press. tilly, r. (1995). european revolutions, 1492-1992. blackwell publishing. weitman, s. (1992). thinking the revolutions of 1989. british journal of sociology, 43. notes note 1. dankwart a. rustow, “transitions to democracy: toward a dynamic model”, comparative politics. new york: vol. 2, no. 3 (apr., 1970), pp. 337-363. note 2. ibid. note 3. tilly 1993, goldstone 1998. in: jack a. goldstone, toward a fourth generation of revolutionary theory”, annual review of political science. vol. 4: 139-187, june 2001). charles tilly’s latest work, from mobilization to revolution, defines revolution in terms of both the level of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 19 published by scholink inc. political violence and the extent of displacement of the political elite. note 4. jack goldstone, theories of revolutions: the third generation, world politics. vo. 32. no. 3 (april 1980, p. 425. note 5. ibid. note 6. ibid. note 7. (ted r. gurr 1988), in: jack a. goldstone, toward a fourth generation of revolutionary theory”, op. cit. note 8. foran & goodwin 1993, weitman 1992, and pastor 2001), in: goldstone, op. cit. note 9. ibid. note 10. john foran, taking power: on the origins of third world revolutions, uk, new york, cambridge university press, 2005. note 11. ibdid. note 12. for further definitions and theories of revolution (concept and definitions) see: john foran, “theories of revolution revisited: toward a fourth generation”, sociological theory 11, 1993:1-20; see also (to cite only a few examples): (skocpol 1979), (goldstone 1980, 1994, 1998), (tilly 1993), (eisenstaedt 1978, 1992, 1999), (davis 1962), (gurr 190), (huntington 1968), (goodwin 1989). note 13. the new fontana dictionary of modern thought third edition (1999), allan bullock and stephen trombley, eds. pp. 754-746. note 14. https://www.collinsdictionary.com. retrieved: october 6, 2021. note 15. wikipedia.org. retrieved: october 6, 2021 note 16. goldfarb 1992, diamond & plattner 1993). in: jack goldstone, “towards a fourth generation of revolutionary theory”, op.cit, pp. 139-187 note 17. anthony sylvester, sudan under nimeiri. london, sydney and toronto: the bodley head, 1977. note 18. interview conducted by the author with, adam musa, a previous farmer at gedaref state (eastern sudan) who gave up farming for the unfair government’s policies, khartoum: 20.9.2021. note 19. sudan central bureau of statistics 2015. there are many other factors for persistent poverty in sudan including the concentration of socio-economic development in a few areas. note 20. abdu mukhtar musa,” darfur from state crisis to super powers clash”(2009), doha (qatar): al-jazeera studies centre (in arabic). note 21. ibid. note 22. social media frequently published news about the huge wealth being accumulated by al-beshir’s family and relatives. note 23. what proves the assumption that mismanagement is one major factor of sudan’s poverty is that—according to international reports/standards—sudan ranks 78th worldwide and the 1st among the arab states in terms of resources. note 24. https://www.bbc.com.10.2015, retrieved on 28.11.2021. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 1, 2022 20 published by scholink inc. note 25. https://www.wikipedia.org note 26. abdu mukhtar musa, “the tribal impact on political stability in sudan”, contemporary arab affairs, vol. 11, number 1-2, pp. 1-22. issn 1755-0912. www.ucpress.edu/journals.php?p=reprints. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/caa.2018.000010. note 27. abdu mukhtarmusa,” darfur from state crisis to super powers clash, op. cit., pp. 3-69. note 28. this part which covers the current events of the time of the transitional period was monitored by the author; a direct observation and close follow up. note 29. the protesters of uprising (dec. 19, 2018-april 11, 2019) were repeating such a phrase as “we will trample down any islamist” (ayyikoaz, nadussodoas). note 30. abbas muhammad salih, “militarization of politics: rethinking gen. al-burhan’s coup of october 25, 2021”. https://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/article/5192. note 31. tayseer hassan edris, “have the elites of bargaining upset the revolution?” al-maidan newspaper (the organ of the sudanese communist party). no. 3787, khartoum: 27,4 , 2021. note 32. ibid. note 33. https://www.aljazeera.net. 27.9.2021. note 34. this included: the sudanese congress party, the democratic unionist party, the socialist arab ba’ath (resurrection) party and a faction of the umma party. note 35. figures were usually released by the “physician doctors” central committee”. note 36. for sudan debts see: www.aawsat.com, 18.5.2021. note 37. sudan news agency (suna): 18.7.2021. retrieved on 18.7.2021. www.swissinfo.ch. 18.7.2021. retrieved on 13.12.2021. note 38. http://mubasher.aljazeera.net, 20.9.2021. note 39. al-arabi al-jadid (the new arab), newspaper, 7.6.2019, and al-anadhol: 8.7.2019. note 40. www.noonpost.com, 7.1.2018: on march 2021 the human rights watch reported that in the period september 2020 to february 2021 the rsfs detained tens of civilians and denied them access to lawyers and their families throughout their detention, which ranged from a week to over a month. two detainees said rsf guards physically ill-treated them. the hrw managed to interrogate four of the detainees who confirmed the violations. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 29 original paper the gains and losses of u.s. central asia policy in the context of geopolitical rivalry jiachen song1 1 university of pennsylvania, philadelphia, u.s. received: january 23, 2025 accepted: march 26, 2025 online published: april 14, 2025 doi:10.22158/ape.v8n1p29 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v8n1p29 abstract since the dissolution of the soviet union, the central asian region has undergone profound geopolitical transformations. with the successive independence of the five central asian countries—kazakhstan, uzbekistan, kyrgyzstan, tajikistan, and turkmenistan—a power vacuum emerged, enabling the united states to engage comprehensively in central asian affairs. this theoretical paper aims to analyze the evolution of u.s. policy in central asia through a geopolitical lens, identifying the core objectives, strategic shifts, and assess the gains and losses of its policies in the region. the findings indicate that u.s. policy has transitioned through three phases: (1) the "power vacuum period" prioritizing stability and independence from russian influence, (2) the "forceful intervention period" following 9/11 focused on counterterrorism and democratization, and (3) the "strategic balancing period" after the afghanistan withdrawal emphasizing multilateral cooperation and economic interests. while the u.s. has established a degree of presence in central asia, its long-term influence remains constrained by russia’s enduring historical and cultural ties and the rising economic presence of other powers. due to five central asian countries historical reality, the u.s. central asia policy should aim at promoting regional economic development and improving people's livelihood rather than ideological control. keywords geopolitics, central asia, u.s. strategy, regional stability, international relations 1. the geopolitics of central asia from the u.s. perspective central asia, situated at the crossroads of eastern and western civilizations, yet it also stands at the periphery where various civilizations interact. from an eastern perspective, it is viewed as the distant "western regions," while from the west, it is regarded as the mysterious "orient. “due to its unique geopolitical significance, central asia has long attracted the attention of scholars from both east and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 30 west. in 1904, british geopolitical theorist halford mackinder introduced the concept of the 'pivot area,' identifying central asia and its surrounding regions as the geopolitical 'pivot' of international politics. soon afterwards, mackinder further expanded the concept, renaming it the 'heartland' and developing his renowned land power theory. he argued that the mountainous regions of central asia were inaccessible to maritime powers. by controlling eastern europe from this central point, maritime powers can be excluded (mackinder, 1904). thus, central asia became a focal point of conflict between land and sea powers. as early as the beginning of the 19th century, two great empires—the british empire and tsarist russia—engaged in a 'great game' over political, diplomatic, and military influence in central asia and its surrounding regions. the ultimate outcome was russia’s recognition of afghanistan as within britain's sphere of influence, while britain acknowledged russia’s annexation of the three major central asian khanates. consequently, for much of the 20th century, the five central asian states remained under the control of tsarist russia or the soviet union, dominated by russia. this historical turning point only emerged with the dissolution of the soviet union in 1991, when a geopolitical and political vacuum arose in central asia. the clinton administration seized this strategic moment, extending u.s. influence into central asia, leveraging economic power to compress russia’s sphere of influence and transforming the region into a strategic energy base for the united states in the 21st century. at that time, u.s. geopolitical thinking distinguished between global-level geopolitical strategic competition and regional-level geopolitical competition. it argued that defining a geopolitical domain depended on its degree of 'maritime' or 'continental' characteristics. central asia, as the core region of ' the eurasian convergence zone,' naturally became a strategic arena contested between the 'eurasian continental realm,' represented by russia, and the 'trade-dependent maritime realm,' represented by the united states (cohen, 2005). this argument essentially extended the classic land-sea power rivalry, with u.s.-russian competition in central asia being a continuation of the 19th-century great game. in the early 21st century, following the 9/11 attacks, the establishment of u.s. military bases in kyrgyzstan and the success of the 'tulip revolution' and other color revolutions appeared to place the u.s. in an advantageous position in its competition with russia in central asia. however, the core of geopolitical theory posits that geographic distance is the decisive factor because neighboring countries cannot be altered. “however dramatic the accomplishments of individuals, geographical forces, acting upon human cultures, tend ultimately to win through “(kaplan, 2012, p. 87). geographically, central asia is naturally contiguous with russia, and the five central asian countries are inevitably influenced by russia. historically, these five nations and russia were part of the same country for nearly 200 years, fostering natural cultural affinity. even after the dissolution of the soviet union, a large slavic population (especially in kazakhstan and kyrgyzstan) remains in central asia, and russian continues to serve as a lingua franca in the region. in the long term, the outcome of this 'new great game' may www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 31 resemble that of the historical struggle with britain— the u.s.'s chances of success are not high. u.s. political and academic circles have long recognized this reality. as early as the time of the soviet union's dissolution, zbigniew brzezinski, who had served as national security advisor under president carter, outlined a new geopolitical strategy for the u.s. in central asia in his seminal work on geopolitics.: in the short run, it is in america's interest to consolidate and perpetuate the prevailing geopolitical pluralism on the map of eurasia. that puts a premium on maneuver and manipulation in order to prevent the emergence of a hostile coalition that could eventually seek to challenge america's primacy, not to mention the remote possibility of any one particular state seeking to do so. by the middle term, the foregoing should gradually yield to a greater emphasis on the emergence of increasingly important but strategically compatible partners who, prompted by american leadership, might help to shape a more cooperative trans-eurasian security system. eventually, in the much longer run still, the foregoing could phase into a global core of genuinely shared political responsibility. (brzezinski, 1997, p. 198) in brzezinski's vision, the united states' geopolitical role on the eurasian continent should mirror britain's role in the european geopolitical landscape during the 19th and 20th centuries—identifying eurasian “geostrategic powers” to ensure that social and economic tensions continuously influence relations among these major powers. central asia, as a core region of eurasia, plays a pivotal role in this strategy due to its geostrategic significance, making control over central asia essential to shaping the broader eurasian dynamics. by maintaining influence in central asia, the u.s. can uphold a balance among major eurasian powers. in the medium term, the u.s. focus is to identify the “eurasian core powers” most likely to serve as agents of american interests, with partnerships in central asia playing a key part. the long-term objective is to establish a “eurasian security system” in which the united states acts as an “arbiter,” ensuring its own dominance. later, in 1999, the first official u.s. policy document on central asia highlighted a strategic approach for the region, leading to the passage of the “silk road strategy act” (p.l., pp. 106-113) by the u.s. congress. this act authorized increased policy and aid efforts to address conflict resolution, humanitarian needs, economic development, transportation and communications infrastructure, border controls, the promotion of democracy, and the establishment of civil societies within central asia (nichol, 2006). in the new century, s. frederick starr, a central asia expert at johns hopkins university, further refined brzezinski's ideas. starr's 'greater central asia partnership for afghanistan and its neighbors' (gcap) advocated for fostering partnerships among afghanistan and the five central asian countries, promoting cooperation in politics, security, energy, and transportation across central. the goal was to establish a new geopolitical bloc composed of pro-american countries practicing market economies and secular political systems, thereby advancing u.s. strategic interests across central and south asia. to achieve this goal, gcap should “led by a senior officer of the department of state, that will coordinate and integrate the u.s.’ bilateral and region-wide programs in diverse fields, including economic and social development, governance, trade, counter-narcotics, anti-corruption, democracy, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 32 and transparency, as well as security” (2005,6). this vision became reality in 2006 with an adjustment in the u.s. state department’s regional bureaus. in february 2006, then-secretary of state condoleezza rice reorganized the central asia desk from the european bureau into the south asia bureau, renaming it the bureau of south and central asian affairs. former state department spokesperson richard a. boucher was appointed assistant secretary of state for south and central asian affairs. the bureau of south asian affairs was expanded to include the nations of central asia (u.s. department of state, 2012). this move was not merely an organizational adjustment but reflected a profound shift in u.s. strategy toward central asia, indicating the gradual formation of a new "greater central asia" strategic framework centered on afghanistan and encompassing both central and south asia. it wasn’t until february 2020, toward the end of the trump administration, that the united states strategy for central asia 2019-2025: advancing sovereignty and economic prosperity was released, recognizing central asia for the first time as an independent geopolitical region. the core principles of this new strategy is “central asia is a geostrategic region important to united states national security interests, regardless of the level of united states involvement in afghanistan” (bureau of south and central asian affairs, 2020). this marked a shift in u.s. strategic focus, reflecting central asia is gradually becoming an independent strategic focus for the united states. this evolution underscores the united states' pursuit of deeper influence in the region, moving beyond its traditional role as a “stepping stone” for involvement in afghanistan or as a supplement to the "greater central asia" strategy focused on afghan-centric objectives. although this new central asia strategy was developed during the trump administration, a republican government, it was not abandoned by democratic president joe biden upon assuming office. instead, biden's administration pursued its implementation with strategic adjustments. according to the national security strategy report released on october 12, 2022, the biden administration’s approach to central asia emphasizes not only enhancing energy security but also intensifying geopolitical competition with russia in the region. “elsewhere in eurasia, we will continue to support the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of central asia. we will foster efforts to enhance resilience and democratic development in the five countries in this region” (the white house, 2022, p. 39). an analysis of the above timeline reveals that, it is evident that while central asia is not a primary focus of u.s. foreign policy, it remains an important land-based arena for the great game between the u.s. and russia. the u.s. geopolitical objectives in central asia are not to directly incorporate the five central asian countries into its "sphere of influence" but to steer the region’s developmental trajectory. this involves fostering greater openness and integration into a u.s.-led international order, maintaining their independence under a western liberal framework led by the united states, and preventing external actors from influencing their development path. by diminishing russia’s geopolitical influence and ending its traditional dominance in the region, the united states aims to ultimately control central asia’s oil, gas, and other natural resources. this approach also aligns with the geopolitical strategies https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-political-affairs/bureau-of-south-and-central-asian-affairs/ https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-political-affairs/bureau-of-south-and-central-asian-affairs/ www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 33 outlined in zbigniew brzezinski's theory, which emphasizes preventing any eurasian challenger from emerging that could dominate the region and challenge u.s. global pre-eminence. 2. the evolution of u.s. central asia policy the adjustments in the u.s. strategy toward central asia have always been products of evolving international dynamics and shifts in national interests. since the independence of the five central asian countries in 1991, u.s. policy in the region can roughly be divided into three phases: the "power vacuum period" from the collapse of the soviet union until the september 11, 2001, terrorist attacks; the "forceful intervention period" following 9/11; and the "strategic balancing period" after the obama administration announced plans to withdraw troops from afghanistan in 2011. this study identifies three distinct phases of u.s. engagement in the region, highlighting their key characteristics and underlying strategic considerations. 2.1 power vacuum period after the cold war in december 1991, the soviet union officially disintegrated, and the central asian countries legally and practically became independent states. on one hand, the u.s. government was unprepared and inexperienced in dealing with the newly independent central asian states. on the other hand, these countries continued to be significantly influenced by russia following their independence. as a result, in the early 1990s, the united states faced both subjective and objective challenges in directly engaging with central asian affairs. the american academic community also exhibited a negative attitude towards the region's importance, with statements such as "the importance of the caspian region to american foreign policy is grossly exaggerated. until the demise of the soviet union, not even antarctica was more remote from the american mind than were the lands around the caspian sea" (lieven, 1999). during this period, "u.s. policy goals in central asia include fostering stability, democratization, free market economies, free trade and transport throughout the eurasian corridor, denuclearization in the non-russian states, and adherence to international human rights standards" (nichol, 2003, p. 1). the core objective was to prevent central asia from falling under the control of neighboring powers. martha brill olcott expert on central asia once stated "the united states should teach them how to become independent states, which first means independence from russia; only then can central asia's legal independence transform into actual independence, a stance that aligned with u.s. interests in the region" (2005). from the outset of central asian independence, the united states actively worked to establish relations with these countries across multiple domains. in the realm of geoeconomics, the u.s. established diplomatic ties with all central asian states within two years of the soviet union's dissolution. beginning in 1992, the united states agency for international development (usaid) initiated assistance programs for kazakhstan, kyrgyzstan, tajikistan, turkmenistan, and uzbekistan, providing nearly $1.5 billion to support the development of economic sectors, education and healthcare systems, and democratic institutions in the region (usaid, 2007). on july 21, 1997, strobe talbott, the u.s. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/central_asia www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 34 deputy secretary of state responsible for matters concerning the newly independent states of the former soviet union, delivered a speech at johns hopkins university, providing a detailed summary of u.s. policy toward central asia since the clinton administration took office in january 1993: in the four-and-a-half years since the clinton administration came into office, our message to the states of the region has been simple: as long as they move in the direction of political and economic freedom, of national and international reconciliation, we will be with them.……our support has four dimensions —the promotion of democracy, the creation of free market economies, the sponsorship of peace and cooperation within and among the countries of the region, and their integration with the larger international community. over the course of the past year, we have broadened and deepened our engagement with the region in each of these areas. (talbott, 1997) it is evident that during this phase, the united states had limited interest in central asia. neither the region’s geostrategic value nor its economic potential had fully emerged. moreover, the geographical distance, combined with central asia's position as part of russia’s "backyard," relegated the region to a lower priority in u.s. security considerations. the united states primarily sought to provide long-term support for establishing democratic governance, free-market economies, and a framework for regional economic integration. the overarching goal was to prevent central asia from re-entering russia’s sphere of influence or falling under the control of other major powers, while gradually bringing the region into the orbit of u.s. influence. 2.2 forceful intervention period after 911 the events of september 11, 2001, profoundly altered washington's perception of central asia's global strategic significance. while long-term economic and political reforms remained on the agenda, the immediate priority shifted to military security and counterterrorism, making central asia's geostrategic security interests the foremost concern for the united states in the region. on december 13, 2001, elizabeth jones, then assistant secretary for european and eurasian affairs, testified before the senate foreign relations committee, subcommittee on central asia and the caucasus, outlining three significant national interests in central asia: "preventing the spread of terrorism, providing tools for political and economic reform and institution of the rule of law, and ensuring the security and transparent development of caspian energy reserves" (u.s. department of state, 2001). this indicates that, following 9/11, combating terrorism became the top priority of u.s. policy in central asia, while advancing political and economic reforms was relegated to a secondary position, mainly aimed at creating conditions for the long-term presence of u.s. forces in the region. this phase marked the beginning of comprehensive and robust u.s. involvement in central asian affairs, with military security becoming the dominant factor in u.s. policy. central asia emerged as a critical component of the united states' global strategic framework. at the same time, advancing political democratization in the region remained a consistent objective of u.s. global strategy. the requirements of the war on terror, to some extent, heightened the urgency of promoting democracy, aligning it with the overarching security goals of the united states. according to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 35 the 2002 national security strategy, for effectively combat terrorism, the united states needed to” support moderate and modern government, especially in the muslim world, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation” (white house, 2002). to achieve this objective, the u.s. government not only sought to legitimize the long-term stationing of american troops in central asia through the signing of a series of bilateral agreements—for instance, starting in october 2001, the u.s. military leased uzbekistan's karshi-khanabad air base as a military base—but also resorted to more radical means of regime change against central asian countries. for example, the 2006 national security strategy explicitly endorsed the "color revolutions" in georgia, ukraine, and kyrgyzstan, and declaring that the promotion of democracy justified employing all necessary means, including openly supporting publicly democratic reformers in repressive nations, tailoring assistance and training of military forces, and imposing various sanctions (white house, 2006). however, the united states’ true motive behind promoting democracy in central asia was not to foster independent development within these nations. instead, democracy promotion served as a pretext to shift central asian countries toward a pro-western orientation, ultimately enabling u.s. control over their political regimes and societies. this approach to democratization in central asia led to internal divisions and, in some cases, even civil conflict. certain american scholars astutely observed: the increased u.s. military presence in central asia gives the public the impression that washington supports these repressive regimes, while providing authoritarian leaders reason to hope that u.s. forces would back them up in case of a mass effort to oust them.…a situation in which the u.s. military presence appears to be supporting a less than democratic leader instead of encouraging the development of political pluralism. u.s. troops stationed in central asia also make good targets for anti-government insurgents and are as vulnerable as the weak states that host them. (wishnick, 2002, p. 29) it can be say that the 9/11 terrorist attacks marked a turning point in u.s. global strategy, elevating central asia's geopolitical significance within washington's strategic calculus. from this moment, the scope of u.s. policy in the region expanded beyond the traditional concept of the five central asian states to encompass the broader "greater central asia" framework mentioned earlier. however, the u.s. government's assertive intervention and its indiscriminate promotion of democracy in the region led to significant political instability within central asian states. this instability not only undermined the effectiveness of u.s. strategies but also set the stage for the eventual withdrawal of u.s. forces and washington's marginalization in central asia. 2.3 strategic balancing period after the afghanistan withdrawal beginning with president george w. bush’s second term, u.s. policy toward central asia underwent a significant shift. the earlier emphasis on stabilizing existing regimes to support the war on terror was replaced by a policy prioritizing the promotion of democracy. this adjustment stemmed fundamentally from the fallout of the iraq war, launched by the bush administration on march 20, 2003. the war www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 36 faced staunch opposition not only from russia but also from key u.s. allies, including germany and france, as well as many other countries. as a result, the international counterterrorism coalition led by the united states in the aftermath of 9/11 effectively dissolved, leaving the u.s. unable to rally global support under the banner of counterterrorism. the "bush doctrine," which combined counterterrorism with hegemonic ambitions, required international support for both the war on terror and the neoconservative agenda of reshaping the world. however, the unilateralism inherent in the "bush doctrine" significantly weakened the willingness of many nations, including u.s. allies, to cooperate. its aggressive approach—characterized by preemptive military strikes and disregard for international law—provoked a surge of anti-american sentiment worldwide. this unprecedented international isolation for the united states since world war ii undermined its ability to maintain a counterterrorism-based narrative in central asia. critics argue that the bush doctrine's approach led to significant geopolitical instability, particularly in the middle east. the u.s.-led interventions in afghanistan and iraq, intended to dismantle terrorist organizations and rogue regimes, have been criticized for failing to achieve long-term political stability and for contributing to ongoing regional conflicts (löfflmann, 2023). in 2011, then-u.s. president barack obama announced the withdrawal of american troops from afghanistan and introduced the "new silk road initiative" as a cornerstone of u.s. policy toward central asia. this initiative aims to integrate afghanistan further into the region by resuming traditional trading routes and reconstructing significant infrastructure links broken by decades of conflict (u.s. department of state, 2011). this policy shifts also saw the establishment of the "c5+1" dialogue mechanism, aimed at fostering cooperation between the united states and the five central asian states. the obama administration sought to move away from the unilateralism and military-driven counterterrorism strategies characteristic of the bush doctrine, placing greater emphasis on multilateral agreements in addressing terrorism and other critical international issues. with respect to central asia, u.s. policy after the troop withdrawal primarily focused on leveraging the region’s role in maintaining afghan stability, protecting american economic interests in both central asia and afghanistan, and ensuring a competitive edge in great power rivalries. as thenassistant secretary of state for south and central asian affairs robert o. blake observed, " the united states will continue to encourage the central asian countries to support afghanistan’s economic and political development. a peaceful, stable, prosperous, and democratic future for the central asian states is directly linked to the prospects for peace, stability, prosperity, and democracy in afghanistan" (u.s. department of state, 2012). meanwhile, then-u.s. secretary of state hillary clinton emphasized that the policy adjustments in afghanistan and central asia reflected a strategic pivot by the united states toward prioritizing economic dimensions. " the united states will continue shifting our development efforts from short-term stabilization projects, largely as part of the military strategy, to longer-term sustainable development that focuses on spurring growth, creating jobs, invigorating the private sector, and integrating afghanistan into the south and central asia economy" (u.s. department of state, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 37 2011). this approach reflected a strategic recalibration, emphasizing regional cooperation and multilateral frameworks while balancing the competing priorities of security, economic interests, and geopolitical influence in a post-war context. after donald trump assumed office, the united states gradually placed troop withdrawal from central asia on its agenda. during this period, the trump administration prioritized promoting reforms in the region while preventing any single major power from dominating it. in december 2017, the administration released its first national security strategy report, emphasizing that the primary u.s. interest in central asia was to preserve the independence of its states and prevent their control by other powers. "we seek central asian states that are resilient against domination by rival powers, are resistant to becoming jihadist safe havens, and prioritize reforms" (the white house, 2017, 50). subsequently, on january 19, 2018, the u.s. department of defense unveiled the 2018 summary of the national defense strategy, which highlighted a shift in focus: " long-term strategic competitions with china and russia are the principal priorities for the department…concurrently consolidate our gains in iraq and afghanistan while moving to a more resource-sustainable approach" (u.s. department of defense, 2018, p. 4). this marked a significant shift in u.s. defense strategy, as state-to-state strategic competition replaced counterterrorism as the foremost focus of u.s. national security. 3. discussion the analysis of u.s. policy evolution in central asia reveals a consistent prioritization of political objectives over economic, and economic over military concerns across three distinct phases. first, while the democratization of the central asian states has been a core objective since the post-soviet era, the intense focus on security following the 9/11 attacks temporarily created an illusion of full-scale u.s. engagement. as noted earlier, "however dramatic the accomplishments of individuals, geographical forces, acting upon human cultures, tend ultimately to win through " (kaplan, 2012, p. 87). the complete u.s. withdrawal from afghanistan underscores the inherent limitations of american influence in central asia. unable to exert direct control over the region, the u.s. has instead sought to ensure that no single major power dominates central asia, thereby preserving its own access to regional energy resources. in latest the united states strategy for central asia 2019-2025: advancing sovereignty and economic prosperity, the u.s. government explicitly aimed to reassure central asian countries and build their confidence in cooperating with the united states. in the beginning of strategy stated, "the united states’ efforts are intended to promote the independence and sovereignty of regional states rather than foster dependency on the united states" (bureau of south and central asian affairs, 2020). similarly, during a visit to kazakhstan and uzbekistan on march 2, 2023, secretary of state antony blinken reiterated that "amid strategic competition, the u.s. should help central asian states achieve balance in their foreign relations, not force them to pick sides" (helf, 2023). this approach clearly signals washington's intent to adopt an "offshore balancing" strategy to ensure that central asia does not https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-political-affairs/bureau-of-south-and-central-asian-affairs/ www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 38 become a satellite of any neighboring power. this strategy aims not to foster dependency but to build confidence among central asian states, allowing them to maintain independence while integrating into a u.s.-led international order. in sum, while u.s. policy in central asia has evolved in response to shifting global dynamics, its long-term impact remains limited by persistent regional forces. while mackinder’s and brzezinski’s frameworks suggest that controlling the heartland is crucial for global dominance, the u.s. experience in central asia illustrates the complexities of intervening in a region where historical, cultural, and economic ties significantly constrain external influence. 4. conclusion: gains and losses of u.s. policy in central asia the five central asian countries—kazakhstan, uzbekistan, turkmenistan, kyrgyzstan, and tajikistan—have consistently pursued policies of multi-vector diplomacy to navigate their complex geopolitical environment. kazakhstan, for instance, explicitly enshrined multivectorism in its on the concept of the foreign policy of the republic of kazakhstan for 2020-2030 released in march 2020. the document articulated its commitment to a " multi-vector, pragmatic and pro-active policy, which means the development of friendly, equal and mutually beneficial relations with all states, interstate associations and international organisations of practical interest to kazakhstan," emphasizing its intention to " further development of allied relations with the russian federation, comprehensive strategic partnership with the people’s republic of china, expanded strategic partnership with the united states of america, strategic relations with central asian states, expanded partnership and cooperation with the european union (eu) and eu member states" (the republic of kazakhstan, 2020). similarly, uzbekistan has demonstrated varying alignments with major powers at different times, adopting what is often referred to as "pendulum diplomacy" or a "zigzag policy" to describe its frequent reorientations in the direction of external policy (romashov, 2016). meanwhile, turkmenistan, kyrgyzstan, and tajikistan also declared "permanent neutrality" or "active neutrality" as guiding principles of their foreign policies upon gaining independence. this strategy of rejecting dominance by a single external actor has allowed central asia countries to leverage the "asymmetric competition" among major powers to create a regional balance of power that minimizes strategic risks and maximizes national interests. beyond the u.s.-led c5+1 platform, other external or regional powers such as the china-central asia summit hosted in xi’an china 2023; india's virtual c5+1 conclave of top security officials on 2022; and turkey's c4+1 organization of turkic states (excluding, for now, farsi-speaking tajikistan). these initiatives reflect the five central asian state’s driven by geopolitical considerations, are unlikely to align completely with any single major power. instead, they adopt a "great power balancing" diplomatic strategy by participating in various functional regional organizations to better safeguard and expand their interests across multiple domains. however, the united states has exhibited a short-sighted approach by hastily promoting www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 39 "democratization" in central asia. this democratization process is not aimed at fostering regional economic development or improving local infrastructure but rather seeks to prevent the region from falling under the control of neighboring powers. the u.s. has aggressively advanced political and economic reforms modeled on western systems, even resorting to contentious and illegitimate methods such as "color revolutions." for the central asian states, which have been independent for just over three decades and prioritize political stability above all, such external interventions are naturally met with strong caution and resistance. as noted by the prominent think tank carnegie endowment for international peace in its analysis of u.s. policy toward central asia: democratic change and good governance in central asia cannot be imposed from the outside. american efforts in this area have been largely unsuccessful due in large measure to the absence of broad domestic coalitions for change and intense mistrust of u.s. motivations. in the future, the united states can offer assistance to promote positive change, but it should focus on areas where change is possible or would improve the plight of the region’s citizens.…in this vein, u.s. aid programs should deemphasize the promotion of democratic practices as an end in themselves and focus more on improving quality of life, especially in the areas of healthcare, education, the environment, economic transparency, and the rule of law. (stronski & sabol, 2016) looking forward, with donald trump reelected as president, u.s. policy toward central asia is likely to continue emphasizing the strategic priorities of his previous term—reducing direct military engagement, fostering economic partnerships, and countering the influence of major competitors such as china and russia. from the current trajectory of trump’s strategic policies, he seeks to return the u.s. to a modern iteration of the early 20th-century "monroe doctrine"—abandoning global expansionism, focusing on domestic priorities, and consolidating strategic resources within the americas to fortify the nation’s foundational strength and "make america great again." on that basis, central asia—the traditional cornerstone of america’s external strategy—would likely remain marginalized, serving, at best, as a symbolic lever to unsettle the regional stability surrounding china and russia. while the dissolution of the u.s. agency for international development (usaid) and drastic cuts to foreign aid programs have significantly reduced the feasibility of externally driven "color revolutions," this does not preclude the trump administration from pursuing regime change operations if deemed necessary or advantageous. finally, it must be pointed out that to achieve the strategic objective of ensuring that the region does not fall under the dominance of a single power, particularly in safeguarding u.s. interests in local energy resources, it will be essential for the u.s. to genuinely respect the independence and sovereignty of central asian states. this would require de-emphasizing geopolitical adventurism and tempering ideological rhetoric, fostering trust among central asian nations that u.s. outreach and aid initiatives are not covert attempts at regime change but instead aim to support regional stability and mutual development. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 40 references brzezinski, z. (1997). the grand chessboard: american primacy and its geostrategic imperatives. basic books. cohen, s. b. (2005). the eurasian convergence zone: gateway or shatterbelt? eurasian geography and economics, 46(1), 1-22. retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.2747/1538-7216.46.1.1 government of kazakhstan. (2020). on the concept of the foreign policy of the republic of kazakhstan for 2020-2030. akorda. retrieved from https://www.akorda.kz/en/legal_acts/decrees/on-the-concept-of-the-foreign-policy-of-the-republicof-kazakhstan-for-2020-2030 helf, g. (2023, march 2). blinken debuts new u.s. approach in central asia. united states institute of peace. retrieved from https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/blinken-debuts-new-us-approach-central-asia kaplan, r. d. (2012). the revenge of geography: what the map tells us about coming conflicts and the battle against fate. random house. lieven, a. (1999). the (not so) great game. the national interest, 58, 69-80. retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/42897222 löfflmann, g. (2023). the bush doctrine redux: changes and continuities in american grand strategy since “9/11”. international politics, 1-22. mackinder, h. j. (1904). the geographical pivot of history. the geographical journal, 23(4), 421-437. https://doi.org/10.2307/1775498 jim, n. (2003, july 21). central asia: regional developments and implications for u.s. interests (ib93108). foreign affairs, defense, and trade division. congressional research service. retrieved from https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20030721_ib93108_b4d009a37d8aed6530d c85ac26914d96fbae1f1f.pdf nichol, j. (2006). central asia: regional developments and implications for u.s. interests (ib93108). congressional research service. retrieved from https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20060512_ib93108_7e796a496a916b00141bfda78f1444d3 5fd6ad82.pdf olcott, m. b. (2005). central asia’s second chance. carnegie endowment for international peace. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt6wpjd3 romashov, v. (2016). uzbekistan’s balancing act: a game of chance for independent external policies. in h. rytövuori-apunen (ed.), the regional security puzzle around afghanistan: bordering practices in central asia and beyond (1st ed., pp. 161-190). verlag barbara budrich. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvbkjzm0.12 frederick, s. (2006). a ‘greater central asia a ‘greater central asia partnership’ for afghanistan and partnership’ for afghanistan and its neighbors, central asia-caucasus institute and silk road studies program. isbn: 91-85031-04-6. retrieved from: www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 41 https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/30296/05_greater_central_asia_partnership.pdf stronski, p., & sabol, s. (2016, january 25). u.s. policy toward central asia 3.0. carnegie endowment for international peace. retrieved from: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2016/01/us-policy-toward-central-asia-30?lang=en talbott, s. (1997, july 21). a farewell to flashman: american policy in the caucasus and central asia. u.s. department of state. https://1997-2001.state.gov/regions/nis/970721talbott.html u.s. agency for international development (usaid). (october 4, 2007). about usaid in central asia. https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdacq426.pdf u.s. department of defense. (2018). summary of the 2018 national defense strategy of the united states of america. https://dod.defense.gov/portals/1/documents/pubs/2018-national-defense-strategy-summary.pdf u.s. department of state. (2001, october 5). u.s.-central asian cooperation. https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2001/11299.htm u.s. department of state. (2011). new silk road. u.s. department of state. https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/sca/ci/af/newsilkroad/ u.s. department of state. (2011, september 18). remarks at the new silk road ministerial meeting. u.s. department of state. https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/09/17 3807.htm u.s. department of state. (2012). biography of richard a. boucher. retrieved from https://web.archive.org/web/20120713192447/http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bios/61773.htm u.s. department of state. (2012, june 25). u.s. policy in central asia. u.s. department of state. retrieved from: https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2012/182643.htm u.s. embassy in kazakhstan. (2020). u.s. strategy for central asia 2019-2025: advancing sovereignty and economic prosperity. https://kz.usembassy.gov/u-s-strategy-for-central-asia-2019-2025-adva ncing-sovereignty-and-economic-prosperity/ white house. (2002, september). the national security strategy of the united states of america. george w. bush white house archives. retrieved from https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss3.html white house. (2006, march). the national security strategy of the united states of america. george w. bush white house archives. retrieved from: https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/sectionii.html white house. (2017, december). the national security strategy of the united states of america. https://history.defense.gov/portals/70/documents/nss/nss2017.pdf?ver=cnfwurrw09pj0q5eog fpwg%3d%3d the white house. (2022). national security strategy. biden-harris administration. retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/biden-harris-administrations-nationalsecurity-strategy-10.2022.pdf www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 42 wishnick, e. (2002). growing u.s. security interests in central asia. strategic studies institute, us army war college. retrieved from: http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11890 the gains and losses of u.s. central asia policy i jiachen song1 1 university of pennsylvania, philadelphia, u.s. abstract since the dissolution of the soviet union, the cen keywords references advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 107 original paper artificial intelligence and urban economics: an observational study on labor market transformation and commercial real estate dynamics yushun shen1* 1 shanghai high school international division, shanghai 200231, china * corresponding author email: ys3898@columbia.edu received: august 26, 2025 accepted: october 11, 2025 online published: october 24, 2025 doi:10.22158/ape.v8n1p107 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v8n1p107 abstract this study combines current observation of empirical literature and current labor market data to assess the multi-dimensional impact of artificial intelligence (ai) on the urban labor markets and the resulting effects on the commercial real estate markets. the study show cases a multi-dimensional perspective by evaluating how the polarization of labor triggered by ai, the wage inequality triggered by skills sets and the emergence of anywhere working are changing the urban economic landscape. it is noted that the effect of ai is felt disproportionately on high skill, urban based jobs which has led to a re-evaluation of the traditional office requirements and further development through suburban working models and workplace hybrids. the study documents a defined geographic redeployment of the economic activity with major implications for the urban form and function. the concluding outcome of the study is that mitgating the negative effects and realizing the potential require an integrated multi-valued stakeholder response. the study offers evidence based suggestions for urban planners, investors and governments to develop the appealing, integrated and inclusive urban economic milieu during the period of ai. keywords artificial intelligence, labor market, commercial real estate, urban planning, remote work, technological disruption, policy intervention 1. introduction the global economy's incorporation of artificial intelligence (ai) is the ultimate societal evolution, redefining the very nature of city-based life. as wisskirchen et al. (2017) point out, the introduction of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 108 ai is introducing both disruption and historical uncertainty, causing widespread disruption to sectors where the sources of knowledge have been traditionally concentrated, namely urban agglomerations (ai revolutionizing industries worldwide, 2024). whereas considerable work exists examining the direct effect that ai has had on the structure of work (chui et al., 2023), an important void still exists in the study of the secondary spatial and economic effects, most specifically for commercial property markets. this article fills this void with an observational study tracing the connection between labour market alterations driven by ai to their terms for commercial property markets in urban settings. instead of making use of one theoretical approach, this study integrates empirical evidence from varied modalities such as government reports, studies by academics, and industry studies to make an expansive comprehension of the nexus between ai-urbanism. led by key questions derived from the research, this research answers:  how is ai currently influencing and set to influence labour markets in the city?  how will all this influence traditional, urban-oriented employment generating demand for commercial office buildings?  what have the principal parties, namely investors, developers, urban planners been able to do to effectively counterbalance the negative effects? by synthesizing evidence from varied sectors and geographic settings, this article provides an integrated approach to the future of work and the future city during the age of ai. 2. literature review—ai’s labor market impacts 2.1 exposure to occupation and risk in automation in 2017 by frey & osborne, it was the earliest understanding of the automation potential according to the work. this was by predicting that 47% of all us work requires extensive automation risk: they waged a gaussian process classifier on the 702 jobs. they synthesized workplace activities to be routine and non-routine and manual and cognitive, placing their strongest emphasis on transportation, logistics, office work, and production jobs. this report by the government of the uk (2023) was revised with regard to the ai effects alone and states, “professional occupations, most of all finance, law, and business management, are more exposed to ai”. this is indeed a very important evolution from the earlier studies on automation because it largely depicts the capability of ai to perform what have been considered safe cognitive work (the white house, 2016). 2.2 geographical and sectoral differences ai’s effect is enormously different from geography to geography. the uk report (2023) indeed says, “the highest exposure for workers to ai is for those in the south east and london, while the lowest is for those office workers in the north east.” this is a reflection that the high-value knowledge industry is high agglomeration in the world city with thus the most active reconstruction of city labor markets. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 109 sectoral breakdown also has the same patterns. finances and insurance have the greatest exposure to ai; followed by information technology, professional services, and education (datarails, 2024). that sectoral profile shows where the impact from ai will be most noticeable, that is, in those sectors of cognitive labor that have some information economies in work-all sectors that have been the tradition base for demand for urban offices. 2.3 augmentation vs. replacement it is important to note the automation of work versus replacement of work in discussing the impact by ai on the labor market. current assessments (uk government, 2024; mckinsey & company, 2023) tend to agree that automation by ai is more likely to supplement human work than be replaced by complete work in the short run. however, this supplementing actually changes the fundamental requirements that skills will be the new need of digital competency, data interpretation, and management with ai while repealing thinking activity. 3. methodology—observational synthesis from systematic literature review, this scheme will then move to peer-reviewed journals and government reports to industry reviews of themes around ai-labor market interaction and urban economic effects. then, through cross-country data comparison: examination of labor market studies across different geographic contexts, such as the united kingdom, united states, canada, and hong kong region to distinguish persistent patterns from contextual changes. there will also be a sector analysis performed focusing on intersectoral differences in exposure to ai and their effects on territorial structures and demand for buildings. finally, it will adopt stakeholder view integration of recommendations from variegated backgrounds just like urban planning writings, property business commentaries as well as economic policy reviews (niu, 2018). this multi-factorial approach makes research possible to uncover strong patterns, notwithstanding considering challenges regarding contextual specificity and observational research limitations. 4. labor market transformations 4.1 skill polarization and wage effects the growth of generative ai tools (gen ai) is explosive. within a year since these technologies have been released, nearly a quarter of surveyed c-suite executives conveys their personal usage of gen ai to assist their work (abril, 2022). naturally, with increased involvement of ai, human labor will be greatly affected. goldman sachs estimates that around 7% of the occupations will be replaced by ai, 63% will experience an increase in productivity with the help of ai (primarily high-skilled workers), and 30% will not be affected. domains that are the most likely to be crowded out by ai include manufacture, transportation, and accounting sectors, which are mostly jobs with less education required. in japan, almost half of the population will have to reequip themselves with new skills to find a new job. since ai has different influences on low-skilled workers and high-skilled workers, it will be www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 110 reasonable to discuss them separately (agarwal, et al., 2022). ai’s abilities to perform complex tasks acts as a complement towards high-skilled employees’ work and will result in an increase in efficiency and productivity. figure 1. ai-driven productivity shift for high-skilled labor as shown in figure 1, with the assistance of ai, the productivity of high-skilled workers will increase, meaning that the marginal revenue product of labor will increase, resulting in an increase in demand of high-skilled workers. therefore, the quantity of high-skilled workers increases and there will not be significant unemployment with high-skilled workers. when ai has the ability to do low-skilled jobs, human labor and ai become substitutes inputs. ai brings structural unemployment as it displaces lot of low-skilled workers. this is due to 1. low demand for low-skilled labor as ai’s involvement with higher productivity (david & summers, 2025), and 2. the skills they have could not support them to find new jobs in other rising industries like ai-related companies. structural unemployment not only is economically inefficient but will also give rise to various social problems. for example, it will fuel social unrests as people are not able to afford their basic needs and experiences a dramatic decrease in living standards. furthermore, structural unemployment will lead to increased inequality in the society. this inequality can be seen between low-skilled workers and high-skilled workers as low-skilled workers are more likely to face unemployment and replacement by ai while high-skilled worker can be benefited from complementing with ai to increase their productivity. combining the negative effects of the social issues, it is reasonable to say that without government intervention, market failure will occur. for those in the labor market who are willing but failing to find a job, their abilities are not put into optimal use to generate output. negative externalities brought by the large-scale replacement of human www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 111 labor need the help of government interference to shift to the socially optimal position. 4.2 evaluations of different government policies to address the massive amount of structural unemployment due to the impact of ai, the government can providing unemployment welfare for eight months, and when the unemployed worker finds a new job, the government will stop giving welfare to him/her. unemployed welfare benefits unemployed workers in many aspects. first, it enables unemployed workers to sustain basic living conditions after they lose their source of income in the short period (ey, 2024). second, it allows workers to fully employ their time on adapting to the new market since the workers will not worry about the basic living problems. however, some workers may voluntarily quit their jobs to get the free welfare. but this won’t be the main state under this policy because first, the policy will only last for eight months. and second, under the stage where ai is constantly replacing people’s jobs, voluntarily quitting is a risky choice, so only a very small number of workers will choose to do this (david, 2015). overall, with the guarantee of short-term living standards and the opportunities to the unemployed ones to find new jobs, unemployment welfare is a valid policy. another policy is to set an effective minimum wage on the labor market. the benefit of this policy is that it ensures workers’ income despite the pressure of ai replacing human labor. this means that the employees cannot lower workers’ wages even though ai is much more efficient than human labor. on the contrary, the establishment of a minimum wage exerts a decrease in the number of workers employed, because the cost of hiring labor increases compared to the market without the minimum wage. since low-skilled workers are relatively substitutable with ai, the increase in the wage of low-skilled labor shifts the demand towards human labor further to the left, which enlarges the unemployment rate. therefore, minimum wage isn’t a valid policy to reduce unemployment. figure 2. labor market response to reemployment training and policy intervention according to the neoclassical school of thought, structural unemployment can be managed by www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 112 maximizing the allocation of human resources through reemployment training and job intermediation services. using big data, governments can quickly analyze growing occupations into which they could funnel workers. the government of australia used big data to understand quick changes in the labor market, complemented by traditional sources of data that helped them understand broader labor market trends. governments can focus on improving materialistic techniques as well as opening specific courses about lifelong techniques such as leadership, multilingual communication skills, and basic programming courses to embrace artificial intelligence. with the training, more workers could re-enter the labor market, increasing the supply of labor. according to figure 2, an increase in supply of labor would result in a higher equilibrium quantity, which reduces unemployment. overall, job training can give the unemployed ones to gain the skills required to find new jobs and have stable income in the future, which makes it a valid policy. some economists suggest enacting per-unit taxation on the usage of ai, and the taxation rate will decrease over time. the methodology behind this policy is that since ai and low-skilled human labor are substitutes, the increase in the price of ai leads to increasing demand towards human labor, which results in more employed workers and higher wages. the diminishing taxation is to find a balance between innovations and development with stability and unemployment. in the previous years, the destruction ai brings to the low-skilled industries is too overwhelming, so high taxation promises social stability and high levels of employment; in the subsequent years, new markets related to ai will gradually become mature and create more job opportunities, and low taxation can also fuel development and novel technology. therefore, the gradually decreasing taxation on ai can protect the industries in the short term and allows new industries to fully develop, which makes it a valid policy to implement. 4.3 cost-benefit analysis of using unemployment welfare, job training, and taxation together 4.3.1 benefits in the labor market, ai and low-skilled workers could be seen as substitutes as both are capable of completing repetitive tasks. taxing the firms thus increases their cost of using ai and would shift the demand curve for human labor to the right. by monetarily discouraging companies to employ ai, more people could keep their jobs and reduce the unemployment rate. social welfare provided to those that suffered from structural unemployment can help maintain a satisfactory level of living quality and leave more time for workers to find new occupations (frey & osborne, 2017). it is ensured that households facing a loss in income is still able to sustain sufficient resources to survive. psychologically, this will also comfort them and minimize public irritation when going through the transition to a new form of labor market. instead of focusing on their negative emotions, the unemployed could put time and effort in attaining new skills that will enhance their abilities and thus be able to find a job in a shorter period. training provided to the unoccupied citizens could help them secure stable jobs. as previously stated, a major aim of offering social welfare was to allow those unemployed to spend this time on improving www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 113 their personal abilities to better fit the new labor market through training. these training sessions will center around skills needed to be competent to manage a new job despite the vast changes （konczal, 2025). in the ideal situation, the implementation of these training sessions will be able to earn them a new position in the labor market and possess a quality life, potentially benefiting from the emergence of ai. 4.3.2 costs the government will have to bear a heavy budget in order to achieve the policies previously presented. most directly speaking, the government will have to pay for all the welfare provided, which sums up to a large number as structural unemployment is overwhelming. the costs of analyzing new sectors and skills needed in the new environment and hiring teachers to carry out the training are all on the government (hiring lab, 2024). spending such a large sum of money could disrupt previous government operations. productivity that could be achieved with full employment of ai is no longer feasible because of the implementation of taxation on ai (mckinsey & company, 2023). ai’s development in the current stage is capable of bringing higher productivity to the economy. however, if ai is discouraged to maintain a more stable unemployment rate, productivity needs to be sacrificed. innovations will also be reduced since firms are less incentivized to further develop the ai technology. less people will be invested in conducting deeper research as ai usage is not encouraged in the market. this decrease in research and development will cause a lag in the technological skill for the country in this promising field. 4.4 cost-benefit analysis of no government intervention in the long run after the three policies are introduced in the short run, the market gradually transforms and in the long run. taxation on ai usage will gradually decrease to zero as the taxation policy describes, all companies can freely adopt ai in their daily routines. this will lead to increasing usage of ai in companies, and all workers can benefit from ai’s efficiency. creative destruction, according to austrian economist joseph schumpeter in 1942, is the “process of industrial mutation that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one”. in this case, new opportunities in ai-related industries thrive as “old” companies in transportation, accounting, and manufacturing fall. the new opportunities compel entrepreneurs to invest in it, creating jobs for unemployed workers (national association of realtors®, 2023). with most unemployed workers returning to the workforce, unemployment welfare and short-term job training will not be implemented in the society. the labor market will become stable, in order to maximize the growth and productivity, no government intervention is suggested in the long run. 4.4.1 costs one cost of not intervening the market is leaving unemployed workers at risk. even after being educated to perform new ai-related jobs, there can still be some workers that remain unemployed. without harsh regulations, including limiting the maximum number of workers that can be dismissed www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 114 on ai usage, a certain number of employers are still at risk of unemployment. privacy issue is also a dilemma if no government interventions are made. companies may adopt ai technology from foreign countries, for example, chatgpt in the us. however, all the private information in the companies might be collected and saved by the ai. this will harm both domestic companies and the government since most programs contain restricted business information and governmental plans. 4.4.2 benefits a benefit of stopping the government from interfering the market is to save expenses that would be used for unemployment welfare and temporary job training. the government can manipulate the excess budget for more influential programs, including promoting education, providing a better healthcare system, and funding ai industries (brent, 2024). all of these three programs suggest a promising future, while efforts made to prevent structural unemployment in the long run are inefficient. figure 3. short-run and long-run phillips curve interpretation according to the phillips curve in figure 3, in the short run, the unemployment rate and inflation rate are inversely proportional: the opportunity cost of lowering unemployment is rising inflation, and vice versa, so the government can influence the unemployment rate in the country. on the other hand, in the long run, the phillips curve is demonstrated as a vertical line, indicating that in the long run, the unemployment rate is fixed (wisskirchen et al., 2017). thus, it is hard, or even ineffective at all, to reduce the unemployment rate through applying policies. it proves that the government should mainly focus on other programs. another reason supporting the government to not interfere the market is that interference prohibits development and efficiency. if the government decides to regulate the usage of ai, companies will experience inefficiency because they cannot use ai freely in their production. a worker who is assisted www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 115 by ai performs significantly better than ones without ai. as a result, the economy’s maximum output will not be achieved with the restrictions on the usage of ai. on the other hand, if ai can be freely utilized, overall productivity and technological advancements will thrive, which will lead to faster development of the economy. another benefit of no intervention is that a market without intervention incentivize investment, whereas government interventions discourage entrepreneurs from investing in the market because of the high taxation on ai (liu, 2024). without taxation, profit earned by ai industries will be maximized. more entrepreneurs can produce at the profit-maximizing point, which compels investment in the ai sector. more investments contribute to the growth of gdp, a crucial factor determining the economic growth of a country. after analyzing the costs and benefits of not intervening the market in the long run, the benefit of no intervention exceeds the cost of it. without intervention, industries in the ai sector can fully and efficiently develop ai technology for broader usages, the government can save expenses for other programs, and entrepreneurs have incentives to invest in the ai market. however, even with intervention, which aims to reduce unemployment, structural unemployment is irresistible and the devotion in unemployment welfare mismatches its insignificant affect. therefore, no government intervention should be applied in the long run. 4.5 the change of labor market in the long run as the speed of development accelerates, job requirements become more complex and specialized. ai will undoubtedly replace the monotonous duties, like analytics. but ai will not replace creativity or decision-making. therefore, we can conclude that the work requirements in the long run focuses on giving artificial intelligence instructions, if working in an ai-related company, and creative thinking in a marketing company. the marketing sector can effectively use ai to gather and process data such as consumer behavior (how they browse material, reply to affiliate marketing offers, and engage with content and social media posts). taking it a step further, ai can automatically contact clients or prospects who display a particular behavior. the utilization of technological tools, platforms, and analytics allows for this type of behavior targeting (fernandes & dmello, 2025). this example summarizes the work requirements of a typical market that intersects with artificial intelligence. with the new education system and the new work requirements, the introduction of new technology such as industrial robots, machines, and algorithms will broaden the scope of work and increase productivity. in addition, since ai does not need to rest or entertain like human, workers can give instructions to the ai (smith, 2023), and ai can work at night or when workers are having rest. this brings us to our expectations for the working duration of a typical worker per day/week. since ai boosts marginal productivity, it can be certain that workers are more valuable since they can create more value than before, which means that there is higher demand towards the labor in the long run (green, 2023). according to figure 4, wage rate will increase with the increase in demand. with the increase in wage www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 116 rate, two effects influence the labor supply decision: the substitution effect and the income effect. at some point, the income effect becomes stronger than the substitution effect, and the labor supply curve bends backward. this means that workers will work fewer hours as the wage increases further. workers will tend to work less during the day. however, employers will still hire them because workers will use ai to fill the space of work. since there will not be a decline in production, a virtuous cycle is to be concluded. figure 4. long-run labor market adjustments under ai adoption as computerization and digitization prompt present occupations to adapt and new professions to spawn, the composition of skills required to satisfy them changes (baker, 2023; gleeson, 2024). government should focus less on repetitive skills like memorization of specific concepts and focus more on fostering creative thinking and innovation skills to better work with ai in the future since these are the skills that will not be replaced (shapiro, 2023). these necessary competencies, from critical thinking to digital literacy, have been explored in considerable detail by canada 2067, the world economic forum, and other agencies. 5. implications on commercial real estate 5.1 remote work transformation of the cbd normalization of remote working and hybrid model is the most direct transmission link from labour changes driven by artificial intelligence to commercial property markets. as professional, administrative, and management work becomes possible out of the office environment, demand for the traditional office space reduces. new inc magazine (2024) records the “effect of working from home www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 117 on the office market”, reporting falling vacancy rates and corporate movement toward open-office strategies. the re-transformation puts the economic model of the central business districts (cbds), that have all traditionally benefited from the agglomeration of the white-collar workforce, under deep challenge (maral et al., 2022). with decreasing commuting density, corporations are making their office footprints more rational, toward smaller but more versatile headquarters buildings with better-designed collaboration spaces (owen, et al., 2023). the phenomenon is most dangerous for class b and c office buildings, that are too poor in amenities and technological support to compete even in the shrinking market (ahmed et al., 2022). 5.2 re-distribution of economic activity the geographic re-dispersion of economic activity is being driven by changes due to labor-induced ai. research showing that generative ai’s effects can re-capitalize existing tech hubs while generating new geographic patterns of specialization supports this trend (muro, 2025). this can be seen in two prominent trends: 1) the sub-urbanization of intellectual work: based on the high cost of rents in urban centers, some technology and research activities are moving to suburban hubs or secondary cities. this has generated demand for academic-like facilities in these hubs. 2) hub-and-spoke office models: corporate live and research in distant offices has become the policy in many businesses, who still have traditional skyscraper offices but have opened up smaller satellite office facilities in satellites or secondary cities. the health of the commercial real estate market is affected by the health, especially retail and hospitality rents, in the cbds (cramarenco, burcă-voicu & dabija, 2023). at the micro-level that individual work decisions (like working at home) have macro-spatial consequences. less offices means less patronage of nearby restaurants, convenience stores, health clubs and cleaning establishments. this is not good for all service businesses, since finishing offices makes them less attractive to employees of other businesses, thus bolstering the practice of working at home. the thriving ecosystem which supported the classical cbd begins to rot, depriving not only office uses but retail ones in the urban centers of their value. these spatial changes affect both historic cbds into mixed suburban business hubs and innovation districts. 5.3 service industry spillover effects the feasibility of the urban business center is completely dependent on the daily occupancy of office space. a decrease of occupancy in the cbd has negative spillover effects on the secondary service businesses—restaurant, retail, personal service—dependent upon foot traffic from the office workers. the result is a downward spiral: failed business locations in the cbd are less desirable, which negates all arguments for location of work had in the past (bill, 2024). the mutually dependent ecosystem that was responsible for great urban business centers has been violently shaken by the dislocation of many www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 118 properties simultaneously. a city's policy reaction to ai (macro) has direct implications for its commercial property future. a city that spends significantly on ai r&d with no concomitant investment in social welfare cushions and retraining (as witnessed in the trade-offs noted by huang xu et al., 2024) will encounter sudden labor polarization. this will result in dual commercial property markets: high-end demand for luxury home stock and boutique office stock for the high-skilled haves, and commercial area decline based on the mass-middle-class workforce. alternatively, an inclusive policy-pronounce city will encourage diversity and stability in the economy to sustain a resilient commercial property market. the development of the ai industry itself generates demand for high-specialty office and laboratory space, frequently located in innovation districts. as the obsolescence of routine-intense back-office activities diminishes demand for the commodity suburban office park stock often that contained them, the labor market's core-periphery segmentation is reflected in the property market too: prime, well-positioned, technically sophisticated "core" properties will maintain their value, but "peripheral" secondary properties are under substantial re purposing involvement pressures. the collective of micro-level decisions—to work out of the home, to be trained for a digital job, to open home businesses—fundamentally changes urban land uses. the need for home offices changes the design and value of the homes themselves. the need for usable workplaces pushes the growth of co-work centers in neighborhoods. these behavioral changes, shielded by the individual's stock of human capital and market position, are the humanly-explained causes of the macro-level changes in property. 6. stakeholder adaptation and strategies 6.1 recommendation to urban planners progressive urban governance demands proactive approaches to the urban impacts of ai. encourage mixed use development: move from single-use zoning to encourage mixed use neighborhoods with residential, commercial, and recreational uses, resulting in districts that are not so sensitive to the changing demand for office space. enable adaptive reuse: as too recommended by the white house report (2016), government should partner with educational institutions and businesses to provide retraining programs that are affordable and accessible, especially to employees needing those retraining because they hold vulnerable positions in the workplace. this is a direct investment in human capital, which intends to adapt the micro-process. develop regulatory schemes which make obsolete office buildings amenable to alternative uses: residential, learning centers, medical facilities, and end-of-phase-logistics facilities. invest in digital infrastructure: provide for full broadband coverage and smart city technologies to provide the underpinnings for work patterns based on distribution, and digital economic inclusions. support workforce transition: create systems of lifelong learning, retraining vocational programs, and social safety nets that will allow workers to adapt to changing skill needs (xu & dong, 2024). the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 119 industrial policies that stimulate ai innovation will also need to have the consideration of social policy for their main negative effect would be loss of jobs by those with no skills and those depressed individuals it is such areas that must be used for means of social welfare by governments i.e. definite need for social welfare gains and mobility assistance and in the incomes of workers etc. the current investment strategy characterised by a significant over-exposure to traditional office property has compounded deleterious fragility into property holdings. this fragility is exacerbated by structural shifts in employment pattern, encapsulated by the entrenchment of hybrid and home-working employment models and activity-supplanting of clerical work by technology (yu et al., 2021). to diminish this concentration risk and effectuate improved long-term portfolio fragility, a radical change in investment policy is required. this shall require a prolific disposal of property holdings wed to obsolete operational models, and a strategic diversion of funds into property segments reflective of the potent synergetically-enhanced growth stemming from underlying technological and demographic macro-trends. specifically, life sciences real estate to accommodate the burgeoning biotechnology and pharma industries driven by ai-fueled discovery and genomics; mission critical digital infrastructure, such as data centers, which are the physical substratum of the cloud computing and big data economy; state of the art logistics and warehousing facilities recodable by automation and ai optimized supply chains; and technology-enhanced living units of various types conducive to a digitally native workforce. the adjustment is a step beyond diversification and moves to a proactive syncing of your real estate holdings with the basic sources of future economic productive capacity. a model of continuous changeability, being an adaptable built form which constitutes a constantly changeable dynamic and upgradeable platform is required to ensure long-term asset sustainability and to fulfil the constant changing demands of the market. this requires an obviously combined forced marriage of forward-looking design principles and the latest contemporary digital infrastructure in the new build set and the strategic refurbishment of the old building stock (muro et al., 2005). this is particularly necessary in order to create conformable and changeable strictions of modular and convertibility in the use of moveable partitions and flexible floor plates, producing propelling multi-purpose spaces easily capable of re-proportioning to accommodate changes in tenant usage and to extend the functional and economic lives of the asset. also the buildings require an infusion of digital integration enabling seamless connectivity facilitator mutual digital utilities connected through their own strictions enabling a legal global digital infrastructure which should consist of types of digital infrastructure, e.g., a fibre-optic type infrastructure as with an in-house wireless infrastructure capable of performing the function of a “digital placenta” enabling a smart building operation, iot ecosystems and data-based operational enhancement. finally, the design programatics will need to be ideated with a special concern ensuring to impart human capital by designing environments which promote collaboration, creativity and chance connection as opposed to the attributive serendipity some design incursionations would admit of, the modern building playing a role in society which makes necessary www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 120 recognition to its determined importance exceeding that of a mere workplace container, since essentially the design climatic output of changeability lies emphasis of stress in the need involved for the culture, the connection, and the creative productivity generated by them. a historical evaluative factor has given way to a critical reassessment of the parameter whereby accessibility to the cbd was elevated, and quickly. location-value determinants now march away from a crude geographic centralisation model to a higher order model whereby place-based qualities are examined in an holistic context. investors, correspondingly, must now favour ability of product located within environments presenting high “quality of place” attributes, a composite postulate with high predictive value on talent attraction and retention, not to say long-run urban vitality. the new paradigm has high regard, in respect of its locational considerations, for areas with diverse and stable economic underpinnings which stand to benefit from a number of growth orientated industries, such as technology, education and health care and whose economies are commensurately less susceptible to cyclical failure, or at best, correction. further, high premium is placed on dynamic amenity and experience attributes which result in a varied mix of green spaces, retail opportunity, culture institutions and recreation facilities, resulting in a rich live-work-play environment which is far more multidimensional than diurnal. lastly, a continued high degree of multi-modal transport connectivity is paramount, albeit it is now not simply access to a cbd, but rather as efficient region-wide public transport networks, major arterials and micro-mobility enabling infrastructure that increases accessibility and reduces dependence on car transport. the locational value in the new paradigm is intimately tied to the locational ability to create and provide a desirable productive human experience, a substantial replacement for the fossilised heuristic of simple radial proximity to a historical urban core. 6.2 corporate implement suggestion as large users of space, corporations have to redesign their method of physical workspace. for instance, create purpose-driven offices to reclassify work environment to prioritize shared work, culture development, and intangible functions that are hard to reproduce virtually. the other suggestion is construct hybrid work models work to develop versatile work models that synchronize remote work advantages with the importance of face-to-face interaction, maximizing space usage while upholding organization cohesion. as well, corporations should invest in employee development and implement on csr, accommodate workforce adjustment by investing in up-skilling initiatives, digital skills development, and career changing. corporations have a social responsibility to support workforce through transitions. 7. conclusion this study of the interaction between ai and urban economy incorporated a complex and multifactor type of transformation in the labor market, spatial pattern, and real estate functions. evidence is pointing at existence of accompanying trends of skill polarization, geographic agglomeration, and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 121 workspace evolution, all of which jointly challenge established urban morphology and urban operations. the central message is that ai is both a disrupter and shaper. disruption of previous labor market structures and disruption of urban spatial configurations; shaping new work geographies, new configurations of workplaces, and new linkages between economic functions and physical location, but there is no disruption of labor market polarization, uptake of remote work, and spatial restructuring that allowed for the rewriting of the urban economic common sense. the glaring ones are possible increments of inequality, depreciation of formal property holding through conversion, and disturbance of urban service systems. the challenges provide an opportunity to generate better, flexible and equitable urban conditions (nafi, 2023). to navigate this transformation will require the forms in which this trio: technological transformation, economic transformation and spatial transformation, inter-influence each other. policymakers, planners, investors, and business leaders must band together outside of sectoral solutions to design integrated strategies to cope with the systemic implications of urban ai. strategies should be to devote funds to the development of human capital, effectuate flexible urban form, achieve economic diversification, and establish social safety nets that will assist workers through innovation. the urban centers that will succeed in the age of ai will be the ones that think of technological innovation as one to be resisted rather than one to be coped with through the cooperative energy of government, strategic investments, and tending toward overdevelopment. the urban societies will be able to enjoy the advantages of ai, and it will assist in using the adaptability and innovativeness of classes of interrelated industries to supplant the shocks indicated, resulting in cities that are fairer and better, stronger. references abril, a. 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(2023). job relocation trends and the impact on local real estate markets. nar: economists' outlook, national association of realtors®. retrieved from http://www.nar.realtor/blogs/economists-outlook/job-relocation-trends-and-the-impact-on-local-re al-estate-markets owen et al. (2023). 15 jobs that will be replaced by ai in the future. scout network. retrieved from http://www.scoutnetworkblog.com/15-jobs-that-will-be-replaced-by-ai-in-the-future/ shapiro, d. (2023). better, faster, cheaper, safer: why ai must replace human labor. medium, 5, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 124 retrieved from http://medium.com/@dave-shap/better-faster-cheaper-safer-why-ai-must-replace-human-labor-202 03020f5f7. smith, m. (2023). what industries are using ai? current use and future expectations. the lead feed, nc department of commerce. retrieved from http://www.commerce.nc.gov/news/the-lead-feed/what-industries-are-using-ai the impact of ai on uk jobs and training. (2023). gov.uk, uk government, 28 nov. 2023. retrieved from http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-impact-of-ai-on-uk-jobs-and-training the impact of remote work on the commercial real estate market. (n.d.). new inc magazine, n.d., retrieved from http://newincmagazine.com/the-impact-of-remote-work-on-the-commercial-real-estate-market/ wisskirchen, g. et al. (2017). artificial intelligence and robotics and their impact on the workplace. iba global employment institute. retrieved from http://www.ibanet.org/resources/documents/default.aspx?guid=1e0d9c77-6e39-46e7-a73a-8d2a94 b69d0e artificial intelligence and urban economics: an ob yushun shen1* 1 shanghai high school international division, sha abstract this study combines current observation of empiric keywords references microsoft word ape-v4n3-p13 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 13 original paper from post-doc to lockdown teaching and learning: pedagogical lessons for religion and mission in the changing post-covid-19 context buhle mpofu1* 1 department of practical theology and mission studies, faculty of religion and theology, university of pretoria, south africa * buhle mpofu, department of practical theology and mission studies, faculty of religion and theology, university of pretoria, south africa received: may 28, 2021 accepted: june 16, 2021 online published: june 21, 2021 doi:10.22158/ape.v4n3p13 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v4n3p13 abstract online education offers flexible, although sometimes limited and unaffordable higher education and allows people to work while studying. critical to improving access to online learning programs within the african context is the expansion of internet connectivity especially for people living outside of urban communities. this paper (note 1) employs the postcolonial lens and the concept of “sacred pedagogy” to examine the experience of transition from post-doctoral research to teaching online during the time of codid-19 disruptions on the academic programs. the discussion concludes by highlighting the that given the evolving and fast-changing covid-19 world, teaching and learning methodologies should be participatory—not one fits all—but accommodative of students from poor communities so that they are encouraged to fully participate and express their values and opinions within the academia. keywords covid-19, university of pretoria, teaching and learning, sacred pedagogy, faculty of theology and religion 1. introduction the global impact of coronavirus has resulted in a renewed call for justice in global institutions as black lives matter (blm) mobilized people to stand up against racism and hegemonic structures that institutionally sustain white supremacy. these protests emerged in response to the death of george www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 14 published by scholink inc. floyd who died in police custody in minneapolis, the united states, where protesters also demanded decolonization of institutions and pulled down or defaced statues of colonial figures considered to be symbolic representations of institutional violence against victims of colonialism. as covid-19 presents an opportunity to re-set the world order (ramaphosa, 2020, p. 1) there is a growing realization for a need to transform institutions and focusing on educational legacies of colonialism need to be expanded to institutions of higher learning through interdisciplinary studies. the growing interest in interdisciplinary collaboration is illustrated in the interest of scientific associations and funding agencies who promote interdisciplinarity, collaboration, and innovation (for example see: moran, 2002; morrison et al., 2003; stefi, m., & stefi, k., 2004). ashenrik et al. (2005, p. 10) have succinctly observed; …despite its pervasive nature in knowledge production, interdisciplinary research suffers from insufficient institutional capacity. to build up such capacity, the criteria with which funding agencies assess research proposals should be revised to dismantle the barriers to interdisciplinary communication and building bridges across sectors and disciplines. to address these gaps, these scholars made the following policy recommendations for the academy among others: recommendation 1: we recommend that the academy strengthen and actively publicize its current research policy, which discourages strict and narrow categorizing of research into disciplinary or interdisciplinary and promotes integrativeness and interdisciplinarity as positive attributes of all research supported by the academy. recommendation 2: we recommend that the academy begin a focused effort to strengthen the institutional capacity of interdisciplinary research with the dedicated build-up of interdisciplinary evaluation procedures, research processes, and research capabilities. recommendation 3: we recommend that the academy revise their assessment criteria of research proposals to reward those research coalitions that prove to have dismantled barriers to interdisciplinary research and built linkages across disciplines and research sectors. recommendation 4: we recommend that the academy develop a system for monitoring the accumulation and build-up of institutional capacity for interdisciplinary research in research coalitions funded by the academy. indicators of institutional capacity for interdisciplinary research should measure the degree to which researchers cross organizational boundaries in science, familiarize themselves with unfamiliar territories of knowledge, lower language barriers between scientific traditions, facilitate the emergence of interdisciplinary research questions, dismantle methodological prejudices, encourage the birth of novel research communities, and inspire the society at large with interdisciplinary approaches (henrik et al., 2005, p. 195). given the above recommendations for academia, it is no surprise that covid-19 disruptions require an urgent shift from traditional academic practices. it is estimated that about 1.5 billion students globally were affected, as covid-19 pandemic impacted the education sector through widespread disruption of schools, colleges, and universities worldwidecreating uncertainty concerning their learning processes www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 15 published by scholink inc. and graduation time frames. consequently, education institutions had to consider embarking on online teaching and learning by adopting academic methods which will ensure that academic programs remained operational through the covid-19 global health emergency. these methods include, among others, the interactive online based classes, and comprehensive online assessments which utilise google and microsoft teams and setting up electronic library resources to stimulate student focused and self-paced learning. this article examines the experience of transition from post-doctoral research to teaching module teo102 online during the time of codid-19 disruptions. the phenomenological employs a post-colonial lens to assess the impact of covid-19 on the module and highlights key areas of the faculty theme, objectives, and vision to draw lessons and actionable recommendations as a contribution to the evaluation of the faculty’s vision and objectives. 1.1 online teaching during covid-19 while online education offers flexibility, it is often limited and unaffordable for the poor. critical to improving access to online learning programs within the african context is the expansion of internet connectivity especially for people living outside of urban communities. this paper employs postcolonial theory alongside the concept of “sacred pedagogy” to examine the experience of transition from post-doctoral research to teaching online during the time of codid-19 disruptions. by examining the impact of covid-19 on theology and religion studies, the paper also explores the impact of these disruptions on the current restructuring of faculty theme, objectives, and vision. the paper briefly explores the current state of the field of religion and mission studies and draws on faculty programs to highlight the impact of covid-19 on online academic practices within the field of mission and religion studies. by exploring these challenges, lessons are drawn to provide actionable recommendations as a contribution to the evaluation and restructuring of the faculty of theology and religion’s vision and objectives. from march 2020the world has seen disruptions caused by lockdown in a bid to contain the spread of the coronavirus which were followed by world wide protests against racism which were a response to the death of george floyd in the united states of america (u.s.a), as black lives matter (blm) mobilized people to stand up against institutional racism and white supremacy. at the center of these protests was the demand for the decolonization of global institutions through the removal of names and the pulling down of statues that represent colonial figures. the disruptions caused by covid-19 exposed economic disparities between the developed and developing countries-laying bare the economic gaps between nations, regions, and communities that have little or no access to information and telecommunication technologies/gadgets such as computers, cell phones, and tablets and access to internet connections (note 2). despite these challenges, universities were challenged and pushed to reflect on institutional practices, and even consider how they were structured in terms of priorities in “investments and budget allocations, staff training, and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 16 published by scholink inc. establishing rules to support the urgency and requirement for online-based learning platforms” (anuwar, 2020). thus, in enhancing academic support in the context of covid-19 where students and lecturers had to stay apart, most university students were exposed to a new paradigm—with those privileged to have access to technology better positioned to utilize open educational resources (oers) that are already in the public domain and open online courses available in the public domain. despite the marginalization of the poor, technology has emerged as a major ingredient in this paradigm shift and presents opportunities for content development and learning analytics that are student-centered and stimulate self-learning. the content of online courses must reflect independent learning. “it is also for this reasoning that student learning activities must be engaging and encourage collaborative learning. universities must not only be concerned about the students getting high grades but more importantly taking care of the weak students whose academic journey must be made equally rewarding” (tan sri anuwar ali, 2020). faculty themes, objectives, and vision the faculty of theology and religion is currently restructuring through its four departments; old testament, new testament, systematic and historical theology, and religion studies and missiology. the previous vision of the faculty was: to be a faculty recognized for its creative engagement with life-giving theology and religious insight, of service to academia, church, and community. to review this vision, the faculty hosted an annual lekgotla from the 3rd to the 4th of may 2018 at 137 murray street guesthouse in brooklyn where they reflected, inter alia, the envisaged product of the faculty programs; life-affirming theology, values/ethicists, pastors, students, spiritually formed students, research, specific knowledge/skills and building up people in faith. i order to achieve this the following inputs were identified; life-affirming theology in a broader context, academic lectures, spiritual leadership, critical thinking from a religious perspective, and theological knowledge and research. these values and objectives were reviewed at a virtual faculty lekgotla held on the 10th of july 2020 during the lockdown period. the cluster of religion and mission studies identified religion and violence as a departmental theme and hosted a post-graduate virtual seminar where most students presented their preliminary proposals with the majority focusing on religious tensions between christianity and islam in north africa and asia. this was an important and relevant theme but what i found limiting about this focus on religious tensions was that it ignored the south african situation of xenophobia and how religion was embedded in regimes of exclusion that framed migrants as outcasts, not worthy or deserving of human dignity. after a hard lockdown and as institutions prepared to resume operating in the context of covid-19, a message posted on fb by the university of pretoria communications department on the 23rd of april 2020 read as follows: we’re in this together: the end of the extended lockdown is in sight, and hopefully, we’re all www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 17 published by scholink inc. gearing up to get back into pursuing academic goals when teaching and learning resume online from monday 4 may. once we have all our tools, internet access, and the necessary devices, the next step becomes ensuring we’re mentally strong for the challenges that lie ahead in navigating what will be a new experience for most students and lecturers alike. this week on our well-being@up site, professor salome human-vogel, deputy dean of the faculty of education, provides tips on how to look after your mental health while also focusing on your academic goals. on the 7th of july 2020, the university of pretoria website posted findings of a survey in an article “up shows strong adaptability to online teaching and learning-survey”(note 3)which showed that “the vast majority of lecturers and students at the institution managed to move relatively seamlessly into remote (online) teaching and learning mode”. this was “[i]n response to the national covid-19 lockdown and in keeping with the recommendations of the department of higher education”. my experiences during the period of my appointment in the face of the lockdown were generally smooth, given that most programs from human resources (hr), clickup, and online teaching resources facilitated a smooth transition even though i was not physically taken through orientation at the campus. surprisingly, there was an online virtual app that took me through a tour of the campus. according to the up -survey report (7 july 2020); the transition was relatively smooth because in 2015—under the leadership of the then newly appointed vice-principal: academic, professor norman duncan-up transitioned to a hybrid approach to teaching and learning. the hybrid system requires all modules to have a predominantly contact teaching and learning component, as well as a significant online teaching and learning component. consequently, when the university had to pivot to largely online teaching and learning, it was anticipated that it would be relatively easy for lecturers and students (particularly those who have been at the up for more than a year) to adjust. 2. sacred pedagogy life-affirming theology in a broader context is reflected in academic lectures, spiritual leadership, and critical thinking is possible within the “sacred pedagogy” which transcends ordinary academic engagement. the concept of “sacred pedagogy” was developed by yves congar who edited a series of reflections treating the liturgical developments in the vatican ii (note 4) and observed that while the world is not sacred in itself, there is an important difference between acknowledging the good offered by technological advancement and discerning the “sacred”. for congar, a line needs to be drawn between what christians consider to be the body of christ—which is the only sacred reality (note 5) and the “body of christ which is the ecclesial body, his church—and his “eucharistic” body whose mystical presence is celebrated. according to congar, the world can become “sacred” in the sense that all of god’s creation can be seen as signs of god’s presence—not an ontological transformation but perceptual transformation on the part of the believers. in other words, faith and guidance of the holy spirit enable the church to take up these worldly realities (pedagogically) and present them in such a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 18 published by scholink inc. way as to lead the world to the grace of christ, a process that congar calls “sacred pedagogy”. therefore, when the faculty invokes prayers and devotions at the start of its meetings, critical and constructive academic engagement should be viewed as an invitation and extension of the supreme god who manifests through technology and online teaching methods and resources. 3. religion and education the interface of religion and education is not anything new. the 16th-century protestant reformation was inspired by a quest for public education in europe as reformers promoted literacy as means to ensure that people could read the bible for themselves. given that they viewed the bible as “supreme authority and essential for doctrinal interpretations, the reformers such as martin luther and john calvin advocated the building of schools alongside missionary centers and facilitated the translation of the bible into local languagesan example of this was luther’s translation of the bible into german. some scholars such as gawthrop, richard, and gerald strauss (1984) have argued that the “second reformation” of the german pietist movement in the 17th and 18th centuries was even more influential in promoting literacy. christian historians richard l. gawthrop and the late gerald strauss observed that in addition to stressing the need for personal bible reading, the pietists persuaded german authorities to mandate bible reading as “the chief instrument of religious instruction in primary schools, [which was] a powerful impetus to the spread of mass literacy” (gawthrop et al., 1984). although the spread of christianity can be credited for the expansion of educational programs, it is important that to highlight that christianity and science also have a history of the conflict as illustrated by the 17th-century clash between astronomer galileo galilei and the roman catholic church, as well as the condemnation by prominent religious leaders of charles darwin’s 1859 theory of human evolution. according to a study on religion and education around the world, (note 6) in 1633, the roman catholic church’s inquisition sentenced galileo to house arrest for the rest of his life and banned his writings after finding him “vehemently suspect of heresy” for contending that the earth revolved around the sun. the church regarded this view—later accepted as scientific fact—as contrary to holy scripture. england’s highest-ranking catholic official, henry cardinal manning, denounced darwin’s views as “a brutal philosophy—to wit, there is no god, and the ape is our adam.” samuel wilberforce, the anglican archbishop of oxford and one of the most highly respected religious leaders in 19th-century england, also condemned the theory of evolution by natural selection. the defendant in the scopes monkey trial, high school teacher john scopes, was convicted of violating a tennessee law banning the teaching of human evolution in government-funded schools. in the african context, the establishment of missionary schools alongside the colonial project led to ambivalence and suspicions relating to education as some view it as a western project of subjugation and control. in sub-saharan africa, numerous scholars have described how missionaries worked alongside colonial administrators during colonial times to not only spread christianity but also construct www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 19 published by scholink inc. educational facilities which influenced local attitudes toward education and promoted western culture at the expense of indigenous religious, cultural, and social epistemologies (nunn, 2010). it is these euro-centric values and approach to education which tainted missionary activities, with a lasting impact which scholars have concluded, have had a long-lasting positive impact on access to schooling and educational attainment levels in the region. while research by scholars like baylor university sociologist robert d. woodberry (2012), for instance, suggests that protestant missionaries in africa “had a unique role in spreading mass education” (note 7) because of the importance they placed on ordinary people’s ability to read scripture, it is also important to consider the negative impact which western influence had on the african knowledge systems and organization. therefore, it is critical that the post-covid-19 teaching and learning strategies address these historical injustices. 4. lessons learned there are a few things that i find liberating and transformative when i reflect on learning from the perspective of religion and theology as “sacred pedagogy” because we often think religion has little to contribute to education. we need to debunk the myth that the faculty of theology and religion has little to offer in decolonizing our educational system. first, the interface of religion and education is not anything new. the 16th-century protestant reformation was inspired by a quest for public education in europe as reformers promoted literacy as means to ensure that people could read the bible for themselves. given that they viewed the bible as “supreme authority and essential for doctrinal interpretations, the reformers such as martin luther and john calvin advocated the building of educational institutions alongside missionary centers and facilitated the translation of the bible into local languages—an example of this was luther’s translation of the bible into german. secondly, it is also important to highlight that although the spread of christianity can be credited for the expansion of educational programs, it is important that to also highlight that christianity and science have a history of the conflict. this is evident in the 17th-century misunderstandings between astronomer galileo and the roman catholic church. a similar clash was also observed in the condemnation of charles darwin’s 1859 theory of human evolution by religious leaders of that time. in the african context, the establishment of missionary schools alongside the colonial project, led to ambivalence and suspicions as numerous scholars have described how missionaries worked alongside colonial administrators to not only spread christianity but also construct educational facilities which influenced local attitudes toward education and promoted western culture at the expense of indigenous religious, cultural and social knowledge systems (nunn, 2010). therefore, we have to acknowledge that for a long time, teaching and learning have been euro-centric and based on western values. thirdly, the shifting of learning to online classes during the lockdown offers flexibility, but it is often limited and unaffordable for the poor. critical to improving access to online learning programs within www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 20 published by scholink inc. the african context is the expansion of internet connectivity especially for people living outside of urban communities. covid-19 disruptions present an opportunity to decolonize the education system and religion has an important role to play, given the positive influence it had when education was introduced in africa. to envision life-affirming theologies within a broader context of critical thinking within the faculty of theology and religion presents a possibility to reimage teaching and learning as “sacred pedagogy”—something which transcends ordinary academic engagement. religion and spirituality can be resources during crisis times. for example, when the faculty invokes prayers and devotions at the start of its faculty meetings, it locates critical and constructive academic engagement within the sacred space of teaching and learning as an invitation and extension of god’s mission. i wish to highlight the following observations; 1) understanding online teaching and learning as “sacred pedagogy” enables me to reimage obstacles as new opportunities and possibilities 2) when the faculty offers academic and spiritual support, staff are invited on a journey to explore teaching and learning as a “sacred space” which is an extension of god’s mission to communities in times of crisis 3) extending teaching and learning outside of campus/ lecture rooms, disrupts the traditional understanding of education and presents an opportunity to locate teaching and learning within family structures and local communities. people do not have to go out to learn, but they do so in their local communities 4) the above point resonates with the understanding of the church. whereas we previously confined mission activities at churches, covid-19 has forced us to locate missions where people are. therefore, community-based teaching and learning decolonize the education system and disrupt euro-centric models of education. covid-19 has taught us that teaching and learning are a sacred extension of god’s mission and should not be confined to lecture rooms. in one of the recent publications (mpofu, 2020) i highlighted how covid-19 presents opportunities to reimage our communities through “new modes of socio-economic organization”, including churches, and how we do mission: ...the church should emerge from covid-19 well equipped for a new age of mission. covid-19 disruptions present an opportunity for the emergence of alternative ways of being church and new modes of socio-economic organization… by disrupting traditional self-serving practices of the church, covid-19 presents an opportunity for a paradigm shift for us to “go sharply into reverse … [and] rehabilitate ourselves” [and] restore our “old natural selves”. such transformation will require a multidisciplinary approach that takes our african context and the experiences of the poor seriously. (mpofu, 2020, p. 5). going sharply into a reverse mode with the educational sector will require participatory methods which effectively engage young people from poor backgrounds. as one educational specialist observed, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 21 published by scholink inc. “education must be not only a transmission of culture but also a provider of alternative views of the world and a strengthener [sic] of skills to explore them” jerome s bruner (http://www.ideas-forum.org.uk/about-us/global-citizenship). highlighting how people and communities are linked through global networks, this publication also notes how the “interconnected and interdependent nature of our world, the global is not ‘out there; it is part of our everyday lives, as we are linked to others on every continent—despite current covid-19 disruptions which have resulted in travel restrictions. the world is connected in many ways which present opportunities for development;  socially, economically and culturally through technology sharing  economically through global and regional institutions of trade  in areas of geography and environment as information is shared  politically through international relations and global institutions these networks within our rapidly changing world present young people with enormous opportunities to develop skills through education and training, despite the many challenges and obstacles they have to overcome especially during the covid-19 period, which highlighted the need for universities to evolve. as kupe (2020) observed: 5. hybrid teaching and learning in times of crisis, we are compelled to change our strategies and move away from conventional approaches. confronted as we are with the global covid-19 pandemic, along with climate change, unemployment, poverty, and food security, education, and economic crises, there is no place for ‘business as usual—because nothing will be “as usual” again…universities need to be engaged in creative and innovative research, teaching and learning strategies, to address the many different spheres required to solve the complex, intersectional african and global crises that the pandemic has further exposed. the strategies we adopt for a better world [will] require bold thinking and agile shifts (kupe, 2020, p. 1). creative and innovative strategies are urgently required for post-covid-19 research, teaching, and learning in african universities where higher levels of unemployment, poverty, and food security compound education and economic crises. one of the creative ways in which the university of pretoria has addressed these complexities is by promoting hybrid teaching and learning. hybrid teaching and learning is now a global trend for addressing challenges posed by covid-19. the university of pretoria already had online teaching programs in place when the government announced lockdown measures, and these proved to be effective for providing high-quality education in the context of social distancing. however, as kupe (2020, p. 2) warned, there is a need to adopt new models in ways that consider the circumstances of students from disadvantaged backgrounds. “the model… is certainly not a one-size-fits-all model, and we are adapting it as required” (kupe, 2020, p. 2). the hybrid teaching and learning model which combined teaching and learning strategies included the following practical steps among others; www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 22 published by scholink inc. 1) investing zar100 million (us$6 million) in it infrastructure to create the up connect portal. this enabled students to access learning resources at no data cost during the covid-19 pandemic given that 96% of undergraduate modules were already online when covid-19 struck. 2) conducting surveys during the transition to assess how lecturers and students managed to adapt as part of monitoring and evaluation. 3) facilitating the availability of lecturers during regular, scheduled lecture periods so they could explain difficult concepts and respond to questions through 20-minute “blackboard collaborate sessions, and 20 minutes of online discussions provided through learning management system known as “clickup”, and 20 minutes dedicated to emails and telephonic engagement with students. 44) the university also loaned laptops to students who did not have suitable devices (1,937 in total) and students who experience connectivity and electricity supply challenges at home were allocated a telephone tutor (kupe, 2020, p. 3). measures highlighted above ensure that the hybrid teaching and learning approach is not a “one size fit all model, but teaching and learning methodologies should be participatory not one fits all and engaging with students from poor communities so that they are encouraged to explore, develop and express and their values and opinions. in this regard, the role of the educational institutions should be to support students as they learn to assess evidence, negotiate and solve problems and make informed decisions. 5. conclusion this paper discussed the concept of “sacred pedagogy” as a postcolonial lens to draw lessons from the transition from post-doc to teaching during the covid-19 lockdown at the university of pretoria’s faculty of theology and religion. by examining the impact of covid-19 on theology and religion studies, the paper also highlighted how covid-19 affected higher education and discussed a shift to hybrid online teaching and learning model which was implemented at the university of pretoria. the discussion concluded that in an evolving and fast-changing covid-19 world, teaching and learning methodologies should be participatory—not one fits all—and engaging with students from poor communities so that they are encouraged to explore differing opinions and be able to effectively engage without any prejudice. therefore, educational institutions a space of critical but accommodative engagement where students feel supported as they explore and navigate the learning environment. references anuwar, a. t. s. (2020). sustaining online teaching, learning during and after pandemic. retrieved from https://www.nst.com.my/opinion/columnists/2020/07/606930/sustaining-online-teaching-learning -duringandafterpandemic?fbclid=iwar0c6tizvtjyhleke0nxprwntvzknwoue6ls2edqkn0 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 23 published by scholink inc. rmst9dzkj9es1ek bruner, j. s. (n.d.). what is global citizenship. retrieved from http://www.ideas-forum.org.uk/about-us/global-citizenship gawthrop, r., & gerald, s. (1984). protestantism and literacy in early modern germany. the past and present society. https://doi.org/10.1093/past/104.1.31 griffith, j. (2019). transform your life and save the world through the dream of the arrival of the rehabilitating biological explanation of the human condition. wtm publishing, sydney, australia. henrik, b., janne, h., katri, h., & julie, t. k. (2005). promoting interdisciplinary research: the case of the academy of finland. academy of finland, helsinki, finland. kupe, t. (2020). covid-19 highlights the need for universities to evolve. university world news (africa edition). retrieved from https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20200902142707290 peter, c. (2020). silent no longer: the roots of racism in mission. world council of churches (wcc). john wiley & sons ltd. retrieved from https://www.up.ac.za/news/post_2906988-up-shows-strong-adaptability-to-online-teaching-and-le arning-survey?fbclid=iwar3i3hoagbhywkylgntzy0dkwmrhrhqlrgpbtezdhxbiqd9rlp_f5 0bgh0 moran, j. (2002). interdisciplinarity. london, uk, and new york: routledge. morrison, p., dobbie, g., & mcdonald, f. (2003). research collaboration among university scientists. higher education research and development, 22(3), 276-295. https://doi.org/10.1080/0729436032000145149 mpofu, b. (2020). mission on the margins: a proposal for an alternative missional paradigm in the wake of covid-19. hts teologiese studies/theological studies, 76(1), a6149. https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v76i1.6149. nunn, n. (2012). gender and missionary influence in colonial africa. in a. emmanuel, r. h. bates, n. nunn, & j. a. robinson (eds.), africa’s development in historical perspective. nunn, n. (2010). religious conversion in colonial africa. american economic review: papers & proceedings 100. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.2.147 ramaphosa c. m. (2020). covid-19 presents an opportunity to “reset” a crass, materialistic world. retrieved from https://www.news24.com/citypress/news/covid-19-presents-an-opportunity-to-reset-a-crass-materi alistic-world-ramaphosa-20200615 stefi k, m., & b. stefi k., (2004). breakthrough!: stories and strategies of radical innovation. cambridge, ma: mit press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/1667.001.0001 woodberry, r. d. (2012). the missionary roots of liberal democracy. american political science review. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055412000093 yves, c. (1967). vatican ii: la liturgie après vatican ii—unam sanctam, 66. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 3, 2021 24 published by scholink inc. notes note 1. this paper was developed from concepts shared on the 4th of august 2020 at the flexible futures online conference hosted by the university of pretoria. note 2. for more details see;https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/01/covid-digital-divide-learning-education/ note 3. accessed 11 july 2020 from: https://www.up.ac.za/news/post_2906988-up-shows-strong-adaptability-to-online-teaching-and-le arning-survey?fbclid=iwar3i3hoagbhywkylgntzy0dkwmrhrhqlrgpbtezdhxbiqd9rlp_f5 0bgh0. note 4. yves congar, vatican ii: la liturgie après vatican ii—unam sanctam, 66 (paris: editions du cerf, 1967). note 5. ibid., 123. note 6. accessed 22 july 2020 from: ht tp s: / /w w w .pe w fo rum. o rg/20 1 6 /1 2 /13 /ho w -re lig i on -m a yaf f ect -e duc at io nal at t ai nm ent -sch o l ar ly -t he ori e san d-hi st oric al -b ac kgro u nd/? fb clid =i w a r1 s-y a6d zsi ch9 ohc -ve vyk m rm kvn k cu es qv t v o3 ee hr5 oog q7 _cj ugi xi . note 7. this impact was varied between the protestants and catholics. advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 212 original paper latvian digital diplomacy—approaches and policy mr silvestrs savickis1* 1 riga stradin’s university, riga, latvia * mr silvestrs savickis, riga stradin’s university, riga, latvia received: june 28, 2019 accepted: july 16, 2019 online published: july 19, 2019 doi:10.22158/ape.v2n3p212 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v2n3p212 abstract changing the habits of information consumption and the presence of digital communication in society necessitates also the national diplomatic services to adapt to the new challenges and use of digital communication channels. the aim of the study is to find out the development of the implementation of digital diplomacy tools in the diplomatic service of latvia and the influence of institutional factors in the mentioned processes. study of publicly available documents regulating the communications process were carried out and direct interviews with the management of the mfa communication directorate were executed. according to the study findings, digital diplomacy is regulated by the general procedures of public administration as well as the mfa communication strategy, which establishes the general principles of communication and relationship building with stakeholders. mfa is aware of the importance of digital diplomacy and the need to develop this direction, but more exigent activity is limited because of other diplomatic service priorities. the limited institutional capacity and the available financial and human resources limit the implementation of these processes in a short time period, thus possibly losing the competition to the countries with similar historical, political and socio-economic level of development in the battlefield of public diplomacy. keywords digital diplomacy, social networks, e-government 1. introduction diplomacy plays a crucial role in the implementation of foreign policy through bilateral relations, consular services, communication, and negotiation, thus making one country’s policy understandable and acceptable to other countries (todhunter, 2013). recently, the ministries of foreign affairs have undergone significant changes in foreign affairs management as governments have adopted new approaches to interacting with foreign countries (hanson, 2010). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 213 published by scholink inc. information communication technology (ict) plays an increasingly extensive role in today’s political scene. international politics, international relations, and diplomacy are no exception. researchers in digital diplomacy claim that ict has facilitated communication between foreign ministries and diplomats, as well as foreign ministries and local communities (hanson, 2012), thus, obviously referring to the impact of ict in the field of public diplomacy. the entry of ict into diplomacy is also referred to as the “revolution in diplomatic practice” (bjola, homes), simultaneously pointing out a slight delay, as digital technologies have already been able to change the ways in which companies run their businesses, people form relationships and countries organize their forms of government. digital diplomacy within the framework of this study is to be understood as the use of social media (mainly facebook, twitter, instagram, and youtube platforms) for diplomatic purposes. digital diplomacy is a relatively new field of research, especially because the digital platforms and the opportunities they offer are developing rapidly and dynamically, opening up new opportunities for the users of these platforms—including diplomats and researchers of diplomacy and political science. researchers of this subject such as corneliu bjola (oxford associate professor of diplomatic studies), marcus holmes (associate professor at the college of william & mary), paul sharp (professor of political science, director of the alworth institute for international studies at the university of minnesota), brian hocking (professor of international relations at loughborough university), jan melissen (senior research fellow at the clingendael institute and senior fellow international relations and diplomacy), have found that, with the entry of ict into diplomatic processes, a new framework—“integrated diplomacy”—has emerged (hocking, melissen, riordan, & sharp, 2012), which combines elements of traditional diplomacy (negotiation) and digital diplomacy. researchers conclude that digitization processes in our daily lives are here to stay—so their presence in diplomacy is inevitable. furthermore, the gap between countries that are not investing in raising awareness of the importance of digitalisation in diplomacy, and those that are, will expand at the same speed as the development of digitalisation in all walks of life (hocking & melissen, 2015). the latvian foreign service is gradually transforming its diplomatic practice and expanding and supplementing the tools of traditional diplomacy with the tools of digital diplomacy. this paper considers the status quo of the latvian foreign service in the field of digital diplomacy integration and provides insights into the factors that influence the development of these processes. 2. regulatory framework of digital diplomacy 2.1 foreign ministry annual reports the diplomatic service, represented by the mfa, performs the functions of public administration and is thus subject to legal regulation as a civil service. latvian legislation (law on budget and financial management) states that, in order to inform the public of objectives and results of an establishment’s operations, as well as the use of national budget allocation in the previous year, each civil service must www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 214 published by scholink inc. prepare and publish an annual public report. in turn, the contents of the annual public report are precisely stated in a lower level regulatory enactment—regulations of the cabinet of ministers (nr. 413), wherein section 8 “communication with the public” paragraph 8.1 covers “measures taken to inform and educate the public”. the annual report of the ministry of foreign affairs of the republic of latvia reflects the priorities of foreign policy and the instruments used to achieve them, including those in the field of informing the public. while analysing the ministry of foreign affairs’ public reports for the past 10 years (note 1), it should be noted that the term “social networks” appeared for the first time in the 2012 report. the report lists the social networks used by the ministry to publish news and discuss current affairs. these are twitter, facebook, flickr, and youtube. an identical reference can be found in the time period between 2013 and 2016. in the latest available annual report for 2017, for the first time, statistical data on the use of each social network within the calendar year is depicted. figure 1. ministry of foreign affairs social networking—the number of posts on social networking accounts managed by mfa 2.2 legislations subject to social networking regulations in order to determine the regulatory framework for the use of social networks in public administration, including foreign service, the following activities were carried out: a) direct interviews with the senior management of the communications directorate of the ministry of foreign affairs of latvia—head of the communication directorate, ambassador and press secretary of the ministry, and counsellor—deputy press secretary (note 2). b) analysis of the regulatory framework—the latvian legislation. according to the management of the communication directorate, the use of digital platforms, including social networks are regulated by the general rules governing freedom of speech and expression: www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 215 published by scholink inc. a) regulatory enactments—laws, regulations of the cabinet of ministers governing the availability and circulation of information in the country; b) guidelines for social media use in public administration—document developed by the state chancellery; c) the communication strategy of the mfa—internal document of the ministry of foreign affairs. 2.2.1 legislation—laws and regulations of the cabinet of ministers the purpose of the “freedom of information law” (in force since 06.11.1998, as amended 03.09.2015) is to ensure that the public has access to information held by an institution or for creating which the institution is responsible within its competence. this law establishes a uniform procedure for individuals to obtain information from an institution and make use of it (article 2). the aforementioned law does not clearly regulate the use of digital platforms, but there are cabinet of ministers (cm) regulations issued on its basis—no. 611. “procedures by which institutions place information on the internet” (article 10). the aforementioned cabinet regulations prescribe general requirements for placing information on the official website and in the mobile application, such as determining the person responsible for the placement of information (the head of the institution), stipulates that the information must be presented to the user in a meaningful, structured and visually understandable way, regulates the accessibility of the website, and other issues related to its use (chapter ii). when assessing both of the aforementioned regulatory enactments, it must be stated that they do not explicitly regulate the use of social networks and do not define the terms “social networks” or “social platforms”. 2.2.2 guidelines for the use of social media in public administration “guidelines for the use of social media in public administration” is a non-binding document meant more as a recommendation, developed by the state chancellery (sc) for the convenience of public administration officials. the sc is the central state administration institution, directly subordinate to the prime minister—and its main functions are to ensure the work of the cm, to participate in the planning and coordination of public policy, to ensure the development of public administration and to monitor its implementation (description of sc functions on the web). thus, the use of guidelines is voluntary and, as a matter of law, does not fall within the sphere of official responsibility; in the event of non-compliant behaviour, administrative liability does not arise. the guidelines are divided into 4 parts (guidelines for use of social media in public administration): listing the benefits of social media, identifying potential drawbacks, defining the basic principles of communication and providing practical advice for communication in social media. the latter includes suggestions for creating a profile (account), differences in between communication maintained in social media from the institution’s official profile and in an employee’s private profile, recommendations on how to draft a message—use of language and visual materials, etc. practical tips for more convenient www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 216 published by scholink inc. and effective use of social media in public administration. 2.2.3 the communication strategy of the mfa according to the directorate of communications of the ministry of foreign affairs, a communication strategy was developed only in 2016, shortly following latvia’s presidency of the council of the european union in the first half of 2015.the communication strategy describes general principles of the work of diplomats in social media, “talks about goals, platforms, what embassies do and do not do, lists audiences with which to communicate in social media”. the communication strategy is a restricted-access document because it describes inter alia the approach of diplomats to cooperation and communication with specific subjects, including partners, etc. thus, this document was not available for the purposes of research, and no possibility of verifying its content was provided. 3. approaches to digital diplomacy development in the foreign service in order to clarify the views of senior mfa diplomats responsible for communication on approaches and developments in digital diplomacy in the foreign service, a list of questions was prepared and grouped by the following structure: general and legal issues, strategy and evaluation, organizational issues, monitoring and response, use of private accounts in social media, training and infrastructure. the main conclusions from direct interviews will be described below. 3.1 general and legal issues given that legal issues and regulatory frameworks were dealt with in the previous section, an overview of the general issues with the implementation and further development of digital diplomacy is given below. according to the directorate of communications of the ministry of foreign affairs, the latvian foreign service uses the following official social networks: micro blogging site twitter (in latvian and english), social networking site facebook (in latvian and english), photo sharing network flickr. these social networks are regularly maintained and updated with new posts. at a lower intensity, video sharing network youtube is used (note 3). meanwhile, the once popular latvian local network, draugiem.lv, is used as a post duplicator for twitter. in parallel with the official social networks of the institutions, some members of the diplomatic service, such as the minister of foreign affairs, the parliamentary secretary of the mfa, some of the ambassadors, etc. maintain their personal profiles on twitter, facebook, and instagram. in terms of content, twitter is used to deliver targeted political messages, while facebook mainly serves as a continuation of news covered on the official mfa website. latvian embassies and diplomatic missions abroad are authorized to independently communicate in social networks that are popular in their countries of residence or, at the discretion of the missions, are used by the target audience of the latvian diplomatic service. in order to optimize news production processes, at the beginning of each week, the mfa prepares and distributes a so-called “digital calendar” a summary of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 217 published by scholink inc. the most important weekly events and messages that could be communicated on social networks—to the diplomatic missions. alongside this, the mfa maintains separate “thematic” platforms. the development co-operation policy (note 4) has a separate twitter account. a separate facebook account and an application “travel safely” “ceļodroši” have also been developed for the communication of consular information. 3.2 human resources, technology, and training as the management of the communications directorate of the ministry of foreign affairs admits, there is a limited amount of human resources in foreign service responsible for the use of digital diplomacy tools and social networks. although access is granted to several diplomats, the official accounts of the central authority of the mfa are managed by a single employee, while monitoring (including press and other traditional media monitoring) is outsourced. in embassies and diplomatic missions, however, the organization of social networking is assigned to the head of these organizations—the ambassador or other authorized diplomat. there are plans to develop a list of responsible “communicators” in all institutions of the foreign service and to create a system for efficient account servicing in the future. the ministry of foreign affairs’ technical and ict infrastructure is generally adapted to the use of digital diplomacy tools; however, its renewal and development is a continuous and regular process. the ministry of foreign affairs does not currently have guidelines for the use of social networks or any other suggestive material to support and promote diplomatic communication in social networks, although creation of such is slated for the foreseeable future. the guidelines of the state chancellery for the use of social media in public administration (see 3.2.2 above) constitute the most relevant support material at the moment. one of the most important instructions that is monitored by the mfa management is the “absence of double identity”, or “the diplomat is always at work” approach, which prevents the publication of conflicting messages, opinions, or displays of behaviour that are in conflict with ethical and good behavioural norms between the official account of the institution and a diplomat’s personal account. likewise, the mfa does not currently have a specific training program for the use of digital diplomacy and social networks, but the diplomats are instructed are trained by the specialists of the communications directorate in the framework of a routine training program, as part of the annual meetings of ambassadors and other diplomats and before the regular rotations of diplomats, or before their transfer to diplomatic missions abroad. 3.3 other important factors related to social networking the mfa’s communications directorate recognizes the need to communicate in native languages, especially by diplomatic missions in countries in which the use of english is less common. social networking in the native tongue and/or mixed languages is organized by the latvian embassies in japan, the republic of korea, the russian federation, the federal republic of germany, the kingdom of denmark, and on several other diplomatic social network accounts. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 218 published by scholink inc. figure 2. facebook page of the latvian embassy in korea (screenshot) to promote the communication of a unified position among some or all of the european union, nato or individual regional entities, the foreign service has developed coordinated information/messaging campaigns on social networks. for example, coordinated messages were created in the context of the anniversary of the annexation of crimea, and in the context of investigating the poisoning of the former russian agent sergei skripal, as well as other cases. at the same time, the leadership of the mfa communications directorate recognizes that there is a lot of room for improvement in the development of two-way communication and systematic assessment of existing communication. at present, two-way communication (i.e., answering messages addressed to the mfa or diplomatic missions and developing conversations) is conducted mainly to solve consular issues, but to a much more limited extent, in communicating political or everyday issues. each case is individually assessed in terms of involving the necessary human resources. the foreign service also recognizes that there is no systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of digital diplomacy at this time, nor does it thoroughly analyse the posts made by the target audiences, and has characterized this process as “under observation”. the leadership of the mfa communications directorate believes that digital diplomacy is in a state of continuous development, but its advancement requires much larger financial and human resources. the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 219 published by scholink inc. current mfa political leadership is aware of this situation and the need to improve the tools of digital diplomacy, including human, material and technical resources. 4. the impact of institutional factors on digital diplomacy development in order to find out what institutional factors influence the development of digital diplomacy in the latvian foreign service, a focus group survey was conducted, which included the leadership of the mfa and senior diplomats in the ranks of ambassador and counsellors. the focus group survey was created on the basis of a study by the university of bradford and swansea university (al-muftah, weerakody, rana, sivarajah, & irani, 2018), which was dedicated to observing factors affecting digital diplomacy. 4.1 conceptual issues all respondents fully agreed and expressed support for the conceptual idea that the latvian foreign service should use social networks to achieve its goals and perform everyday tasks. when asked to rank social networks, respondents prioritised facebook and twitter. figure 3. question on the priority of social networks in the diplomatic service for the question requesting to evaluate whether the latvian foreign service is currently making full use of the opportunities provided by social networks to carry out its tasks, none of the respondents gave the maximum possible score on either the positive or negative side of the scale. the total score expressed in points was 3.8 out of 5 possible points. 4.2 positive and neutral factors respondents were asked to evaluate the impact of several factors on the development of digital diplomacy in the foreign service. factors were divided into 3 groups—neutral, positive and negative. public support, or traditions of social networking and culture in society, was evaluated as the most influential factor that positively contributes to the development of digital diplomacy (hick, 2011)—both in latvia and abroad, in the diplomats’ home country—which sets the demand for diplomats to communicate with the public and with stakeholders in the digital environment. respondents mentioned the human resource factor next, being the professional, intellectual and technical skills of foreign service staff to use social networks for work purposes. the human resource factor is considered neutral because of the ability to influence the use of digital platforms in a positive www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 220 published by scholink inc. way (if diplomats have good or at least sufficient skills) or, on the contrary, negatively (if these skills are non-existent or deficient). according to the respondents, equal weight is carried by legal factors, or normative regulation, which determines the rights of diplomats and opportunities to use social networks for both work and private needs, as well as meaningful factors such as trust (belief) and confidence in the usefulness and benefits of using social networks and other digital diplomacy tools for successful job performance and the idea that the use of these tools helps and facilitates the daily work of diplomats. a no less essential role is played by organizational factors such as the structure of the foreign service, organizational culture, the bureaucratic and hierarchical system (batora, 2006), financial and economic factors (czosseck & geers, 2009)—or funding for the maintenance, development and growth of ict systems—as well as the availability of training for the use of social networking and technology platforms. figure 4. neutral and positive factors influencing the development of digital diplomacy 4.3 negative factors negative factors create causal relationships that restrict the use of digital diplomacy platforms in foreign service. respondents were asked to evaluate four negative factors. factors had to be assessed both at the level of institutions (ministry of foreign affairs and diplomatic missions) and at the level of individuals (foreign service staff). political factors that could be the cause of some specific actions that would deny or limit the possibilities of the foreign service to use social networks for work purposes were identified as the most significant negative factors. for example, political instability in a country where utterly uncontrollable (as is characteristic of social networking) statements by public officials (diplomats and foreign service staff) might influence political forces’ proportions or positions of power. this factor was highly recognized at the individual level but scored relatively low at the organizational level. at the organizational level, however, the most critical negative factor was the desire to resist change (cummings & worley, 2014)—a subjective factor that hinders change of habit and adaptation to new demands and challenges, including social networks and other digital diplomacy instruments. in the opinion of the respondents, the organisation’s overall environment and culture are conservative and not focused towards changes, while individual attitudes are less interfering and possibly rather supportive. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 221 published by scholink inc. so-called risk factors were named as disruptive at both the organizational and individual levels (kampf, manor, & segev, 2015), defined as leading to effects opposite of what is desired and therefore discouraging an individual from specific action. namely, potential social network usage risks such as hacker interference in ict systems, hacking of social network accounts, provocations, etc., discourage employees from using these tools for work purposes. likewise, the secrecy of the diplomatic services and the desire to maintain control over information are equally troublesome at the level of both the organization and the individual. figure 5. negative factors affecting the development of digital diplomacy 5. conclusions in the course of the research, an analysis of the available public normative documents regulating digital diplomacy was performed, and direct interviews were conducted with the mfa diplomats whose work included communication with the public and digital diplomacy, including social network management, with a further focus group survey focusing on the mfa management and senior diplomats in the ranks of ambassador and counsellors. the regulatory framework for digital diplomacy at the time of the study is considered to be very general, i.e., it does not plainly regulate the use of social networks. disregarding the fact that the mfa started using its first digital platforms in 2008 (note 5), they are mentioned in the mfa public annual reports for the first time only in 2012. thus, it could be said that at the normative level latvia’s digital diplomacy is still in the growth stage. direct interviews and the focus group survey confirm that the foreign service uses the most popular social networks for public communication, managed by both institutions (mfa, diplomatic missions) and individuals (diplomats). as far as possible, the mfa provides support for social networking—providing ict platforms, content creation, and training processes, but the amount of support is inadequate and, where resources are available, geared to increase in the future. this is especially true for tutoring and training issues—since no specific digital skills training is currently being developed—as well as the expansion of human resources, that, at the moment, are evidently organizational level individual level www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 222 published by scholink inc. limited. the most essential factors contributing to the development of digital diplomacy are public support and demand for communication in the digital environment, as well as the human resource factor—professional, intellectual and technical skills of foreign service staff. in turn, political factors, especially at the individual level, are considered to be the most crucial hindering factors, while at the organizational level the desire to resist change was mentioned as most debilitating. thus, the study carried out confirms that the mfa is well aware of the need to develop the presence of digital diplomacy elements in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. however, the limited institutional capacity and availability financial and human resources limit the implementation of these processes in a short period of time, thus possibly making the latvian diplomatic service and the state as a whole perform worse than competing countries—with historical, political and socio-economical level of development similar to that of latvia—on the battlefield of public diplomacy. references al-muftah, h., weerakody, v., rana, n. p., sivarajah, u., & irani, z. (2018). factors influencing e-diplomacy implementation: exploring causal relationships using interpretive structural modelling, government information quarterly, 35. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2018.03.002 batora, j. (2006). diplomacy.com or diplomacy. gone? foreign affairs administration in the information age. university of oslo, department of political science. bjola, c., & holmes, m. (2015). digital diplomacy: theory and practice (p. 4). routledge. cabinet of ministers regulation (no. 611). (n.d.). chapter ii. cabinet of ministers regulation(no. 413). (n.d.). cummings, t. g., & worley, c. g. (2014). organization development and change, cengage learning. boston, massachusetts. czosseck, c., & geers, k. (2009). the virtual battlefield: perspectives on cyber warfare. ios press, amsterdam. embassy of latvia in korea. (n.d.). retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/latviaembassyinkorea/ freedom of information law. (n.d.). article 2 part (1) and article 10 (part (6)). guidelines for use of social media in public administration. (2012). state chancellery. hanson, f. (2010). a digital dfat: joining the 21st century, lowy institute for international policy. sydney. hanson, f. (2012). revolution state: the spread of e-diplomacy. brookings inst.; hicks, g. (2011). conservativism and british foreign policy, 1820-1920. the derbys and their world., farnham, surrey, england, ashgate pub. hocking, b., & melissen, j. (2015). diplomacy in the digital age (p. 53). the hague, netherlands institute of international relations, clingendael. hocking, b., melissen, j., riordan, s., & sharp, p. (2012). futures for diplomacy: integrative www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 223 published by scholink inc. diplomacy in the 21st century. the hague, netherlands institute of international relations, clingendael. kampf, r., manor, i., & segev, e. (2015). digital diplomacy 2.0.? a cross national comparison of public engagement in facebook and twitter. the hague journal of diplomacy, 10(4), 331-362. https://doi.org/10.1163/1871191x-12341318 law on budget and financial management. (n.d.). article 14, part 3 ministry of foreign affairs of the republic of latvia. (2012). public report (p. 51). ministry of foreign affairs of the republic of latvia. (2017). public report (pp. 44-46). state chancellery. (n.d.). retrieved from http://www.mk.gov.lv/content/valsts-kanceleja todhunter, j. p. (2013). the domestic fruits of diplomacy: meditation and presidential approval. international negotiation, 18(2), 195-217. https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-12341253 notes note 1. mfa website annual reports available for the time period since 1998. note 2. direct interviews took place on the 29th of november 2018. questions aimed at gaining insight into the use of digital platforms in the foreign service were prepared and submitted in advance. the questions were divided into the following groups: general and legal issues, strategy and evaluation, organizational issues, monitoring and response, use of private accounts, training, and infrastructure. note 3. at the time of writing this article in march-april 2019, the mfa created and started maintaining a profile on the popular visual information sharing network instagram, as well as significantly increasing the intensity of youtube usage. note 4. development co-operation means helping poor and less developed countries by promoting the long-term social and economic development of these countries and their societies, reducing poverty and ensuring peace and security in the world. development co-operation policy is part of latvia's foreign and security policy. https://www.mfa.gov.lv/arpolitika/attistibas-sadarbiba/kas-ir-attistibas-sadarbiba note 5. the official mfa twitter account was created in october 2010, and the account on the image sharing site flickr—in 2008. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 178 original paper royal supremacy and its influence on the formation of early british nation-state chen ma1 1 school of history and culture, china west normal university, nanchong, china received: april 19, 2024 accepted: may 15, 2024 online published: may 29, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n2p178 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n2p178 abstract tudor dynasty is in the transitional period of modern europe. on the one hand, it is characterized by the struggle of religious power and kingship. on the other hand, it is featured by the formation and development of the early nation-state. this paper briefly discusses the "royal supremacy" of tudor dynasty in england and the development of the early nation-state in british and the concrete manifestation of "royal supremacy" and expounds the influence of it on the formation of british nation-state from the following five aspects: economy, political institutions, law, local administration and national consciousness. by analyzing the definition of "royal supremacy" and its influence on the formation of the british nation-state, it is helpful to grasp the development process of modern countries and the particularity of the formation of different nation-states, so as to better grasp the law of british historical development. in a word, "royal supremacy", as the result of the religious reform, greatly promotes the formation and development of the british nation-state in the early modern times in the specific historical period. keywords royal supremacy, nationstate, religious reform, tudor dynasty 1. introduction tudor dynasty has an important historical position in the development of modern british nation-state. this period is in the transitional period of modern europe. on the one hand, it shows the struggle between religious power and kingship. on the other hand, it shows the formation and development of the early nation-state. the formation of "royal supremacy" is an important political expression and driving force for the formation of nation-state in early modern england. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 179 1.1 studies abroad on the studies of "royal supremacy", foreign scholars mainly write the general history of britain or historical facts in stages, and "royal supremacy" is displayed through the author's historical statements and historical data analysis. for example, elton's england under the tudors and dickens's the english reformation. regarding the studies on the formation and development of the early british nation-state, there are several views: firstly, edwin jones's the english nation: the great myth emphasized the influence of religious reform on the formation of the british nation-state. secondly, smith, in his work the emergence of a nation state: the commonwealth of england expounds the importance of political struggle for the establishment of the country. finally, philip corrigan and derek sayer's research the great arch: english state formation as culture revolution focused on the national control mechanism-cultural factors, emphasizing the important role of culture in the process of national formation. 1.2 studies at home domestic scholars' researches on the "royal supremacy " can be divided into the following two categories: firstly, some of them describe the religious struggle of tudor dynasty or show "royal supremacy" in political system reform. for example, liu xincheng's questioning the theory of tudor monarchy, cheng handa and yu min's between autocracy and rule of law-an analysis of tudor paradox, are more concerned with tudor regime—the discussion of autocratic monarchy. another type of research permeates the research into more specific aspects, such as law, parliament, theory and so on. specific research results are as follows: firstly, taking bian yao-the establishment of the sovereignty of tudor dynasty in england as an example, starting from the relationship between kingship and law, this paper analyzes the legal basis of "royal supremacy" in henry viii period, so as to further explain the historical connotation and significance of "royal supremacy". in addition to the important factor of law, other scholars have studied the theoretical problem. for example, wei heming and chen hua wrote the article the theoretical study of "royal supremacy "during henry viii. on the formation and development of the early british nation-state, yue rong's article research review on the formation of the british nation-state is more comprehensive in china. his article political motives for the formation of the british nation-state-an analysis of power elements in the middle ages puts forward that "the conflict and struggle from two power systems laid the foundation for the formation of the british nation-state—first is the state principle that dispelled the feudal principle and the second one is the conflict and struggle between secular power represented by kingship and church power " (yue, 2006). 2. definition of royal supremacy after wars of the roses, henry vii founded the tudor dynasty in 1485, and britain, which was in the transitional period from the middle ages to the modern times, experienced a profound religious reform www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 180 from top to bottom. due to the contradiction between new noble and the old aristocracy, the king and the vatican, tudor religious reform movement gradually brewed and then broke out. "royal supremacy" is an important product of the british religious reform, which was formally put forward in the act of supremacy. this concept is the opposite of "papal supremacy", which is intended to deny the authority of the pope in the british religious field and establish henry viii's position as the highest authority in the domestic religious circles, and then henry viii became the supreme ruler of both spiritual circles and temporal circles. 2.1 the emergence of the royal supremacy after the 15th century, tudor dynasty soon transformed from feudal society to capitalist society. the development of productive forces aggravated social differentiation, and the feudal system did not play an effective role in the new era. a large number of new classes began to engage in industry and commerce, thus becoming capitalists and emerging aristocrats. although the old aristocrats and tudor royal family had a high social status and political power, the royal family suffered a serious financial crisis because of their conservative economic ideas, the extravagant life of the royal family, the control of the church on taxation power and the dependence on parliament on financial issues (qian, 2007). on the contrary, when the old aristocracy was on the wane, new aristocracy, represented by the squire, appeared on the horizon. because of the contradiction between the old aristocrats and the king, the king and the emerging aristocrats joined forces to restrict the old aristocrats. at the same time, henry vii promoted some middle and lower classes to become new noble. by cooperating with the middle class, the participation rights of aristocrats in the privy council were controlled to strengthen political control and kingship (qian, 2007). at the beginning of 16th century, after henry viii succeeded to the throne, the contradiction between kingship and religious power became more prominent. the divorce case was the trigger point for henry viii to escape from the control of the christian world, which made him "double leader" of the secular world and the religious world. henry viii, who had no male heir, began to plot a divorce case. however, pope clement vii never agreed on this divorce request (under the pressure of charles v), which caused the conflict between the king and the vatican. henry viii convened the religious reform council in 1529 and held seven meetings in a row until 1536. statues that promulgated have become the main contents in the process of religious reform, such as an act for the restraint of appeals to rome, an act for the king' s highness to be supreme head of the church of england, the inheritance law, and an act restraining the payment of annates. among them, the act of supremacy passed in 1534 was the most representative one. "his majesty, his heirs and successors, the kings of this king, should acquire, accept and be called the only supreme head of the church of england called anglican church on earth" (elton, 1982). at the same time, the bill formally put forward the concept of "royal supremacy o". the royal power is opposite to the papal power. since then, the king of england has broken the authority of the pope, displayed his authoritative position in the religious circles, and became the supreme head of the church of england and the dual head of the religious and secular www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 181 circles. 2.2 the reinforcement of the royal supremacy the supremacy of kingship was implemented and strengthened while it was established. for example, it is written in the preface of the act for the restraint of appeals to rome: "england is an empire ... a country divided into secular realm and religious realm, which should submit to the kingship next to god ..." (williams, 1993). the "empire" here shows that britain has become a country with independent autonomy and no interference from other religious powers. england has broken through the traditional christian world's ruling system and dogma, and the nation-state is led by "royal supremacy". future generations edward and elizabeth have always firmly upheld the supremacy of kingship, and only mary went against it in order to restore catholicism. especially in the elizabethan period, the act of supremacy promulgated once again reiterated: "all foreign powers or authorities, whether secular or religious, were permanently and explicitly abolished in the british kingdom and the dominions ruled by the british king and other places neither be implemented nor obeyed" (williams, 1993). it can be seen that kingship represents the national sovereignty, catholics who insist on faith are regarded as illegal, and kingship is regarded as a major achievement of religious reform. 3. definition of nation-state in british nation is a national form that emerged in the late middle ages of europe and generally formed in the bourgeois era. it is a new type of country that broke away from the european middle ages order (删). different scholars have different views on the formation of the british nation-state. after analyzing and combining various research conclusions, this paper holds that the british nation-state developed rapidly mainly in tudor dynasty. 3.1 the formation time of british nation-state many scholars at home and abroad have put forward their own views on the formation period of the british nation-state. nair, edwin jones and other scholars believe that the religious reform has influenced the emergence of the british nation-state. they believe that the religious reform means that england suddenly broke away from europe in the western christian world (jones, 1998). smith, a scholar, emphasized the role of political struggle in promoting the establishment of modern british nation-state. compared with the religious reform, political struggle highlights the significance of the "result" of the reform. the victory of kingship gives kingship supremacy, that is, royal supremacy. whether from the political, economic or cultural point of view, the role of royal supremacy is obvious when under the leadership of kingship. the state can firmly control the sovereignty of the state without the control of the pope. especially after henry viii's religious reform, the british nation-state began to take shape, or it can be said that it entered a stage of rapid development. 3.2 the formation process of british nation-state under the european christian church system in the middle ages, the british royal power was www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 182 influenced or even controlled by religious power, and the secular power of the king declined. most people in the world of christ are believers, who only know how to be loyal to god but lack national consciousness and national feelings. the formation and establishment of a sovereign state is the result of many factors, including two most important factors-national sovereignty and national unity (qian, 1991). the formation process of british nation-state confirms the modern nation-state theory. the formation of english nation-state first needs to master national sovereignty. during the tudor dynasty, the contradiction between kingship and religious power gradually became prominent-the problems of judicial trial of the faculty, appointment of senior priests, feudal privileges of the church, and the pope's arbitrary intervention in politics. after the confrontations, the king who took the initiative got rid of the control of the pope to britain. similarly, national unity is a slow development process. in addition to the "royal supremacy" mentioned above, which promotes national unity in sovereignty, religion and politics. in terms of territory, the four major political entities in britain-england, wales, scotland and ireland were united by different merger acts in different periods. therefore, from the point of view of the factors affecting the formation of nation-state, whether it is national sovereignty or national unity, the tudor dynasty's various reforms and ruling styles play an important role. 4. the positive influence of royal supremacy during tudor dynasty, the royal supremacy had a great or less influence on all aspects of the formation of the british nation-state. then, after the kingship was strengthened and implemented, what specific impetus did it have on the formation of the early british nation-state? the following will elaborate the influence of kingship supremacy on the formation of british nation-state from five aspects: economy, political institutions, local administration, law and national consciousness. 4.1 economy the strengthening of kingship led to economic changes, mainly the confiscation of church property. economic reform has increased the fiscal revenue, reduced the king's dependence on the church and parliament in finance and taxation. in turn, it strengthened the kingship, and finally brought the economic foundation for the development of the nation-state. under the protection of kingship, the stable situation in british has provided a better environment for the economic development. with the continuous development of farming technology, the textile technology of wool textile industry has also been rapidly updated, and the coal industry and metallurgy industry have also developed rapidly. in addition, the king has always maintained the kingship, avoiding the control of religious forces and getting rid of the high dependence on parliament. meanwhile, emerging bourgeoisie pursued commercial interests and hoped to be protected by a stable and powerful nation-state, while new aristocracy hoped to increase the royal family income by protecting its own economic development. therefore, politically, the king joined hands and cooperated with the emerging bourgeoisie and new www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 183 aristocracy. they must be given privileges and advantages economically. economic development and dependence on the country will promote the necessary stability and development of the country. 4.2 political institutions during the tudor religious reform, with the need of strengthening kingship and state authority, political reform was put on the agenda. during the reign of henry viii, thomas cromwell succeeded wolsey as the political representative of tudor dynasty since 1532. after the religious reform, the strengthening of kingship made political affairs more complicated, so the government reform was planned by cromwell. reforming government institutions was the first step. the king's secretary, who used to manage letters, documents and other affairs for the king, was promoted to the chief minister of state, becoming the core government staff dealing with international and domestic affairs, such as cecil, walsingham and others (xia, 1999). under the command of the chief minister of state, the national instructions were issued by him, and in addition, he handled political affairs with new administrative procedures to improve the efficiency of the government. at the same time, the reform elected core figures from the court meetings to form the privy council, among which the chief minister of state was the core leader in the privy council. important officials in the privy council handle national political affairs through regular meetings. secondly, in addition to the changes of major administrative institutions, the government reform also includes the reform of the financial management system. for example, the central government has set up the first-year revenue court and so on. the government reform implemented by cromwell standardized the power operation procedure, expanded the king's power, strengthened centralization, and established the authority of the central government over the local authorities. 4.3 local administration royal supremacy has not only enabled the government to reform effectively, but also prompted the reformed central government to further strengthen its control over local areas while strengthening centralization. firstly, the feudal privilege was abolished. in 1536, thomas cromwell drafted a decree on concession and free zone. since then, feudal privileges have been replaced by kingship. this measure has effectively dealt a blow to local feudal centrifugal factors. secondly, the central government strengthened its control over the north. henry viii reorganized the northern parliament and the northern court in 1537, and took effective and direct management measures through the kingship and the privy council after suppressing the pilgrimage of grace in the north. at the same time, the northern region adopted the administrative system generally implemented in britain, and relied on squires to govern the north. the management historian of the north once pointed out that "the independence of the north collapsed under the centralization imposed by henry viii and cromwell, thus ending its medieval history" (elton, 1978). thirdly, the king promoted the merger of england and wales through his power. in 1534, the king www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 184 appointed roland lee to preside over the welsh border court and serve as the president of parliament. roland lee and thomas engelfeld's reforms in wales dealt a heavy blow to the local feudal nobles and strengthened the central government's control over the local areas. during tudor period, a relatively complete local management system was established everywhere, the central government and local government gradually formed a unified organic whole, and the administrative divisions of the british nation-state gradually took shape. 4.4 parliament and statue parliament and law endowed the kingship with the highest authority. however, the kingship was not subject to parliament. on the contrary, parliament can become the supreme legislature of britain with the blessing of kingship. this was achieved through the transformation from king-and-parliament to king-in-parliament. the king-in-parliament can refer to a legislative principle that the king legislates jointly with the upper and lower houses of parliament, a relationship between the king and parliament in the legislative process, and a parliamentary form that appeared in britain in the 16th century (bian, 2011). before henry viii, parliamentary legislation was subject to a series of restrictions, including not interfering in religious affairs. however, in 1534, the act for the submission of the clergy passed by parliament restricted the legislative power of the church, which not only reflected the expansion of the legislative scope of king-in-parliament, but also reflected the performance of cooperation between the king and parliament. successive monarchs after henry viii continued to strengthen the legislative form of king-in-parliament. after determining the legislative form of it, the king who has the legislative power will make laws to safeguard the kingship and contribute to the development of the country with the help of parliament. for example, through various statutes, such as the statute of uses and the act of proclamations, the king has embodied and safeguarded the will of the king in all aspects, reduced feudal and religious privileges, and set up a number of new courts to ensure the implementation of these laws. 4.5 national consciousness national consciousness is equivalent to the soul of a nation-state. if there is no soul, there is no need for the existence of a nation-state. the british national consciousness was constantly strengthened in tudor dynasty and reached its climax in elizabeth's reign. after the religious reform, britain got rid of the papal control and became the supreme leader. until the most authoritative elizabeth period, the formation of sovereign state and the prosperity of kingship brought the climax of national consciousness. at that time, national consciousness was embodied in the following aspects: firstly, pursuing the mercantilist policy and developing overseas trade; secondly, strengthening the maritime military strength and making military preparations for entering the sea area; finally, fighting against spain (huang, 2002). the victory over spain's invincible fleet has especially inspired britain's sense of national pride and superiority, and the call for expanding overseas expansion www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 185 and exploration was getting louder and louder, which has laid a solid national spirit and overseas military foundation for britain to become the second " the empire on which the sun never sets " after spain. 5. the negative influence of royal supremacy however, looking at the historical context of the development of the british nation-state, we can find out that the influence of the royal power of tudor dynasty on the development and growth of the british nation-state was staged. the essential reason is that the king fundamentally represented the feudal class, which determined that the royal supremacy cannot promote the development of the british nation-state for a long time. 5.1 the essence of royal supremacy the new monarchy is characterized by its newness, so "newness" refers to the cooperation with citizens, new noble and parliament under the condition that the king opposes feudal separatism and the pope interferes in state affairs, thus being different from the autocratic monarchy. it is an important manifestation of the transition from feudal system to capitalist system, which can be called the middle way besides autocracy and democracy. just like this, the trend of "new" of new monarchs can't stop the development of parliament and capitalism. from henry viii to elizabeth, the power of parliament has gradually surpassed the royal power and increased. in the elizabeth period, the power of parliament overstepped the core position of kingship, and the two began to evolve into an equal relationship. even though the kingship was at its peak, its legitimacy still came from the authorization of parliament, and it was restricted by parliament and laws. 5.2 autocratic monarchy and its adverse effects the new monarchy has the characteristics of "newness", but it is hard for people to ignore the true features of its monarchy. the king worked closely with the citizen class and new noble, but this did not mean that the king and tudor ruling class represented the citizen class, on the contrary, they represented the feudal class. if the scope of royal supremacy continues to expand and the autocratic monarchy lasts indefinitely, it will undoubtedly be devastating to the growth of the british nation-state. 6. conclusion tudor dynasty is in a special period of transition from the middle ages to the modern times. the contradiction between the king and the pope is intertwined with the contradiction between feudal class and the new citizen class, which promotes the formation of the royal supremacy through struggle and compromise. under the leadership of kingship, economic development laid the economic foundation for the growth of the country. the innovation of political institutions has improved the administrative efficiency of the government. tudor government established local administrative units and management system in the process of promoting national integration. after a perfect legal system, a series of laws were promulgated to safeguard kingship authority and national development. the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 186 national consciousness of the rise of the nation finally promotes the position of the british nation-state in many countries. the historical direction of development must be correct, and each stage must have its particularity. the kingship of tudor dynasty is the embodiment of monarchy, which seems to be contrary to the historical process and the needs of british national development, but in fact it contains "new" factors that just cater to the development direction of nation-state. in a word, analyzing the kingship in the specific historical background, its positive influence on the formation and development of the early british nation-state is certain. references bian, y. (2011). the establishment of the sovereignty of tudor dynasty in england. guizhou social sciences, (11), 128-131. cheng, h. d., & yu, m. (2002). between autocracy and rule of law-an analysis of tudor paradox. world history, (05), 92-102. corrigan, p., & sayer, d. (1985). the great arch: english state formation as cultural revolution. wiley blackwell. elton, g. r. (1978). england under the tudor. london: routledge. elton, g. r. (ed.). (1982). the tudor constitution: documents and commentary. cambridge university press. huang, g. y. (2002). discuss the development and impact of british economic integration in the 16th century. historical research in anhui, (03), 90-94. jones, e. (1998). the english nation: the great myth. london: sutton publishing. liu, x. c. (1992). questioning the theory of tudor monarchy.world history, (01), 39-47. qian, c. d. (1991). the origin and evolution of modern civilization. nanjing university press. qian, c. d., & xu, j. m. (2007). a history of england. shanghai academy of social sciences press. smith, g. r. (1984). the emergence of a nation state: the commonwealth of england, 1529-1660. london ＆ new york: longman. wei, h. m., & chen, h. (2020). the theoretical study of "royal supremacy "during henry viii. the world religious cultures, (02), 41-48. xia, j. g. (1999). discuss the formation of british sovereign state. qilu journal, (2), 92-98. yue, r. (2002). research review on the formation of the british nation-state. journal of historical science, (08), 5-12. yue, r. (2006). political motives for the formation of the british nation-state-an analysis of power elements in the middle ages. journal of historical science, (09), 59-64. the statues of the realm, vol. iii. (1993). new york: william s. hein & co., inc, 427-429. the statues of the realm, vol. ⅴ. (1993). new york: william s. hein & co., inc, 350. retrieved from https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000017915533&seq=7 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 50 original paper industrialization of socialist-oriented economy development in nepal: contribution, possibility and challenges of private sectors dr. uttam khanal, phd 1* 1 department of economics and social sciences, kathmandu, nepal received: october 13, 2022 accepted: november 14, 2022 online published: november 17, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n4p50 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n4p50 abstract the state produces goods and services to distribute to its citizens and its process somehow related to social welfare. the government that has created an industry-friendly environment for the establishment of industries to provide goods at a price that people can afford. investors invested in the industry by making full use of resources and available materials to provide employment opportunities for industrialization in nepalese economic development. investors are not allowed to produce distribute voluntary goods. the role of facilitator in production and distribution by fulfilling of basic criteria was prescribes by the socialist state. socialism believed in the advancement of the human race, the pursuit of equality among all human beings, the end of the system of exploitation of one human being by another, and the establishment of universal love between human beings. although the government instructed by the constitution to develop a socialist-oriented economy, the government could not achieve complete success. the policy of the state has to encourage private sector investment, due to inability that makes programs. nepal has not able to move towards industrialization. if immediate steps could taken to create an investment friendly environment in the industry to minimize the challenges of problems in the private sector, ample employment opportunities would created. the government of nepal has given priority to indian imports and the policy of imposing higher customs duty on imports of raw materials than manufactured. keywords industrialization, employee, socialist oriented economy, private sector, investment-friendly environment www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 51 published by scholink inc. 1. introduction the transitional period between capitalism and communism considered as socialism. after exploited by capitalism, the proletariat ends that system with a violent revolution. if a new system is born from the womb of capitalism, it called socialism. in this system, the work divided into merit and price. therefore, the proletariat erases capitalism through revolution and sets up a new socialist system. during the revolution, the bourgeoisie established the state power of its own bourgeoisie by shattering the capitalist state power. no one can live without working in socialist thinking. work arranged for each person. work responsibilities divided according to the person’s ability and capacity. wages of workers are determined based on work. even though everyone has worked, not everyone has the same financial status. some are lazy and alert. similarly, some workers are married and some are unmarried. even if the same work done, there are more expenses and fewer savings for the married, but in the case of unmarried people, the savings are more as the expenses are less. everyone works in whatever field of product. since there is no boss and no worker, there is a good relationship between everyone. pressure from anyone, you do not have to live in fear. giving everyone a wage according to his or her work makes everyone’s financial status equal. in this case, there is no need to be hesitant. every person has the right to receive consumer goods according to the work he has done, with some deductions for the provision of means of production and social security. the deducted amount paid to the workers in the form of health, education and other benefits. the goods are produce based on the needs of society. there is no possibility of rotting, melting and stocking without production. there is no need to compete with anyone and no possibility of a black market in manufactured goods. since there is no possibility of profit and loss in the socialist state system, the work of production is gradually and there is no need to fear and panic as there is no need for artificial works. when the price is managed according to the work, the production work is done at a very fast pace. every worker makes full use of his abilities and abilities and the tendency to lay, deceit, fraud, theft etc. ends. the money deducted for social security redistributed to the public and a portion of the product is set aside for social security. in the case of capitalist regimes, the amount deducted in the name of capital gains, land investment, depreciation of machinery and social security reimbursed. in the socialist state system, the task of getting the owner’s share does not take place. since the portion set aside for social security spent on social work, the workers still receive money in the form of education, health and other services. the socialist movement of the world started from 1425 to the beginning of the 19 th century. the movement against the capitalists of britain and european countries can take as a movement. in the movement, the capitalist rulers, with the help of the military, established colonies and made the masses homeless without any guilt. thousands of village farmers forced to flee their lands and start raising sheep in the orchards. demand for this specialty has grown significantly a result of recent corporate scandals. to meet that demand, more and more sheep had to be raise. the new capitalists, who had become www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 52 published by scholink inc. property owners to raise sheep, forcibly chased away the farmers with the help of the government. in the end, those peasants emerged as wage laborers or proletarians. in the socialist system of china, the people’s commune was establishing in every part of china through various types of cooperative farming. as the people’s commune is the primary unit of society, it has played an important role in the development of every sector. within its borders, it carries out activities such as industrial and agricultural production, trade, culture and education, as well as political affairs. the people’s commune is responsible for preparing the militia by providing military training. established in china after 1958, the people’s commune has built canals for irrigation, built dams to protect the commune from famine and drought, and used scientific instruments to increase production on farms. free schools, a babysitter, a community restaurant, a kindergarten is operated. there is no obligation to do all that. separate meals are also completely free and houses of respect for the elderly are built to take care of the elderly. inequalities do not fall without gender, ethnic and racial discrimination. the united states and india, which consider themselves civilized capitalist countries, have many kinds of racial, ethnic, religious and gender differences. even parks in the united states have a white-only policy. in the same way, millions of people are to force to sleep on the cold side of the road in paper sheets and blankets instead of their homes. ethnic in india, victims of regional and class discrimination have not eliminated, but such problems are rare in socialist countries. ethnically, china has good relations between all races, but india and the united states did not after the great revolution of 1917. ethnic policy had introduced in the socialist country of russia contributed to the solution of the ethnic problem. marxist socialism and democratic socialism are the most talked about. these systems of socialism are using in some countries and some have not been successful. there were socialist movements in nepal and the constitution of nepal 2015 was promulgating by the constituent assembly on the strength of those movements. in the preamble of the constitution, it has decided to build a prosperous nation by remaining committed to socialism based on democratic values and beliefs. it does not seem that the state has fully mobilized to fulfill that resolution. after the promulgation of the constitution, the government could not conduct policies and programs based on the values and beliefs of socialism in a just manner. the people did not realize that inequality, oppression, exploitation and discrimination had decreased. the nepalese political forces are struggling in a timely manner in accordance with the main objective and goal of the socialist movement and have not been able to make the people realize it. political parties became distracted or tried to flee from the subject of socialism. due to their misguided ideology, it was not easy for the nepali economy to reach the ultimate goal of socialism. due to the inability of the industry to be established at a fast pace, the practice of levying higher customs duty on raw materials than on some manufactured goods entering nepal from india has created more problems. if the government of nepal does not address such policy issues immediately, the situation of nepali industry will become more problematic in the future. it seen that the political parties have to move ahead from the traditional www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 53 published by scholink inc. thinking of socialism and engage in sustainable development, including social and economic transformation. 2. statement of the problems the traditionalist view of nepalese marxist socialism was unlikely to find a place. in fact, democratic socialism is the product of favian society. the concept of democratic socialism was putting forward at that time to confront the marxists. bp koirala had introduced democratic socialism in nepal as the movement of communists was increasing. the aim of democratic socialism was motivating by the intention to democratize the communists in nepali society rather than to establish socialism. in time, communism became more than just democratization. he appeared in parliamentary politics as a much bigger player than the congress. in the beginning, the communists were socialists, but in the end, it alleged that they were moving towards the ground where they enjoyed playing under capitalism. german philosopher karl marx introduced the concept of communist socialism, while the theory of democratic socialism was introducing by british philosophers in the name of fabian society, with the aim of democratizing marxist socialism. the origin of communist socialism was inspired by the end of capitalist oppression, exploitation and inequality in 18th century society. the beginning of democratic and democratic socialism was also to stop the movement of communist socialism. the direction of failure was motivated by direction. the world community divided due to capitalist and communist power and power interests. it repeatedly sacrificed millions of people in the name of revolution and movement. twice there were massacres, such as the 2nd world war and in 1917 on the strength of the russian revolution. the communists set fire to the graves of capitalist czars. then the dream palace of socialism arose. that dream palace collapsed within a few decades and again the bourgeoisie rose from its grave and began to dust off the dust of socialism. in china, mao proclaimed socialism in 1949 on the strength of the great proletarian cultural revolution. millions of people lost their lives in the name of that revolution, but now even china has developed a capitalist economy. even today, countries like china, vietnam and north korea are ruling by communists. it considered to the product of the concept of advanced socialism put forward by baburam bhattarai in his campaign to enrich the socialist movement of nepal. he studied the nature of nepali society and the rules of development here in depth and considered it as an integrated form of diversity, multilingualism, multiculturalism, multi-ethnic national unity and harmony. only by scientific research, research and analysis of social anomalies can a conclusion reached on what kind of socialism needed to nepal. with his realistic conclusions, the root of the problems and contradictions inherent in nepali society can traced. he said that we could destroy the existing exploitation, oppression and inequalities of nepali society by following the broad roadmap of advanced socialism for social justice, equality and human liberation in problem solving. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 54 published by scholink inc. looking at the manifestos of almost all the political parties of nepal, was seems that they have moved forward with the intention of economic development focusing on the public interest. failure to implement these declarations or falling behind in building a socialist-oriented economy with a confused mindset are further challenges in industrialization and job creation. by overcoming these challenges, economic prosperity has become the basic element of the establishment of prosperous socialism. every worker acquires rights over the value of the goods produced from the time he joins the labor based on the principle of equality. it is necessary to move forward through private partnership and cooperation by creating employment as well as product production, marketing and distribution cooperation in a participatory manner. 3. purpose of study the workers who had been languishing in oppression for many years had agitated for the establishment of a socialist state system without exploitation by destroying the capitalist state system. focusing on the state system in the hands of the limited bourgeoisie would have uplifted the few and the socialist state system could have established the rights of the majority proletariat. the remnants of capitalism cannot eradicate from the economic, moral and intellectual spheres. after the victory of socialism, it was difficult to achieve a socialist-oriented economy when imperialism and capitalism were not completing eradicated. the same socialist movement also inspired the events of political change in nepal. absolute rana rule, the panchayat system and reaching the republic through the democratic system, the question arose as to why nepal could not move forward arise with economic development as expected. apart from this, what were taking in building a socialist economy? which political changes strengthened the role of the private sector in industrialization? how much has economic development changed people’s lives and daily life? how much has foreign aid improved development? how is the production, distribution and use of consumables analyzed? what is the status of implementation of the policy adopted by the state to ensure access to everything? why private sector development needed in partnership today is? this work is caring out to find answers to such questions. the importance and role of the private sector in industrialization by reforming the economic system focusing on the possibility of building a socialist economy has the following objectives: how was the distribution and use of consumables analyzed? what is the status of implementation of the policy adopted by the state to ensure access to everything? why private sector development needed in partnership today is? this work is caring out to find answers to such questions. the importance and role of the private sector in industrialization by reforming the economic system focusing on the possibility of building a socialist economy has the following objectives: (a) to analyze the socialist-oriented economy. (b) to assess the impact of political change on economic development. (c) to analyze the possibilities and challenges of the private sector in industrialization. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 55 published by scholink inc. 4. socialism development 4.1 the early evolution of socialist ideology thomas moore described the fictional island of atopia in his book in 1516. there was no private property. there was an arrangement for everyone to get an education. everyone had equal rights to religion. people used to share the food they worked together. they had great love and there was no fighting anywhere. thomas moore wrote these words in the novel, but his views were not tolerating by the then autocratic monarchy of england and he was executing by order of king henry 8th of england. according to his book, the unit of production was family. elected people’s representatives run the state system. people worked 6 hours a day and spent the rest of their time doing science and research. the all-round development of the individual was highly valued on this island. the integration of education and labor was seeing as a fictional socialist thinker. tammaso campanella (1568-1639) was a monk. before becoming a monk, his name was giovanni domeni. he was a visitor to italy. he led a revolt in 1599 to liberate italy from spanish colonial rule. the spanish authorities arrested him and sentenced him to 27 years in prison. while he was in jail, he wrote a book called suryanagar. the book was writing in 1602 and published underground in 1623. even though it was a novel, its meaning was similar to that of thomas moore’s book. 4.2 the fight against feudalism charles i was executed on 30th january 1649, after the british organized efforts against feudalism began in 1640. after the enthronement of william of orange as the constitutional monarch in 1688, feudalism took over the economic sphere, institutionalizing capitalist democracy politically. the economy was governing by trade policy. the laws were in the hands of the feudal lords. only five large trading houses had the right to foreign trade. at the time, economist adam smith, in his book wealth of nations, discussed governmental stance on economic issues, free trade, slogans of individualism and personal freedom were putting forward. his ideas gave birth to the french revolution of 1789. the free market economy was considering the power of magic. the aggrieved masses thought that the capitalist revolution would end their misery, but in practice, nothing like that happened. the gap between rich and poor is widening. the liberation of small capitalists and small traders from feudal bondage meant the freedom to sell their property into the hands of big capitalists. the feudal lords oppressed the poor on the basic of power. the capitalists uplifted the poor on the basic of capital. the bourgeoisie tasted economic prosperity. poverty, unemployment and illiteracy were on the rise for the poor. in the midst of such a situation, an imaginary socialism was developing. in 1871, the workers of paris raised their voices. it also called paris commune, but due to lack of experience, the arrangement did not last more than 72 days. in october 1717, the bolshevik communist party led the october revolution against tsarism in russia. that revolution overthrew the tsarist regime and established the rule of the proletariat. stalin also continued the revolution led by lenin. during that period, in 40 years, the socialists did what russia could not do in 200 years. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 56 published by scholink inc. 4.3 impact and consequences of the chinese revolution after the end of the chinese revolution in 1949, private sector business was gradually established and brought under the control of the government. by 1952, about 17% of industrial production units were out of government control. under the nationwide land reform program, 45% of the cultivable land was taken away from the landlords and distributed to the farmers. in 1953 to 1957, the program of socialization carried forward to the government-owned modern area. large cooperative units and a centralized economic plan implemented in agriculture. the policy of peaceful transfer of private industry put forward and nationalized at cheap rates. by 1956, 90% of the agricultural sector had made cooperative. in 1958, mao launched a policy of killing the potential for high economic growth. in 1960, 98% of the country’s rural agriculture brought under the control of the commune, but the hasty introduction of the program proved impractical and unsuccessful. as a result, the program led to a sharp decline in agricultural production and discontinued in 1961. china placed agriculture first, light industry second and large industry third. when tengxiao ping came to power in 1977, he made sweeping changes to maoist policy. compared to western countries, china lags far behind in technology and education. in 1978, he sent a delegation to study 15 cities in five european countries, led by gumu ning, a member of the standing committee. tengxiao ping himself also visited many countries, including europe, america, japan and singapore in asia. four special economic zones were used based on that study were shenzhen, zhuhai, santao and xiamen. china’s current situation is due to teng’s policy. seeing the incompetence of the old revolutionary leaders in the new environment, he put forward a formula of respecting beggars to dismiss such leaders, including himself, from the regular work of the party. the salary of a mature leader, he decided to give a security guard, accommodation, a vehicle for life and leave the post to become a consultant. a new party formed at the central and lower levels to determine educational qualifications, age and duration. if the country does not develop rapidly, the communist regime will be in danger and china will beat by foreigners because it is poor. "we don’t want to be poor again," he said. he emphasized the need to focus on science, technology and education to make china rich and to develop science and technology as the primary productive forces. as a result, china has emerged as the world’s second-largest economy, with gdp of 10.36 trillion, per capita income and 7600 thousand in 2014. 4.4 american independence and the japanese mizi king alexander hamilton, the first post-independence finance minister, presented a report on industrial policy to the us congress in 1791. he emphasized in the report that the united states must protect its infant industry. this policy followed by later american nations. in 1868, the mizi emperor came to power in japan. his government set up 50 industries for industrialization. a mission led by iwakara tomomi was sent abroad to make japan an industrialized and developed nation. the mission included high-ranking officials from industry, agriculture, mining, the financial sector, culture, education, the army and the police. from december 1871 to september www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 57 published by scholink inc. 1873, the mission traveled to 15 different countries, studying the state of development and using it in the development of japan. as a result, in a span of 30 years, japan became the first industrial, militarily strong and rich nation in asia. after the 2 nd world war, japan faced a major economic crisis and adopted a strict foreign exchange policy to curb imports. the policy of giving foreign currency to bring high technology home was following and a guided loan program with grants was starting to protect one’s industry. 4.5 changes in the industrial area after 2 nd world war after the 2nd world war, france adopted a policy of symbolic planning. he took over some of the major industries from the government after an announcement of nationalization. investment flowed into industries through state-owned banks. until 1960, he imposed high taxes on the import of industrial goods to boost his industry. by 1980, france had established itself as a leader in the field of technology. south american countries dominated by left-wing governments have had success in development through education programs in the 1990s. although the government received partial support from the private sector when implementing socialist programs in those countries, the government needed to have its own means of production, including quality services and facilities. it means being able to provide government-owned educational institutions, hospitals, public institutions, public services and goods. all government-owned entities providing essential goods and services have to improve the quality of life, to the detriment of the private sector. after 1986, the term "socialist-oriented" was using in reference to doimoi in vietnam. the vietnamese communist party pursued a policy of allowing the private sector into its program. china calls this program socialism with chinese characteristics. the system called the chinese socialist market economy. it said that marxism is not radicalism and it is an active practical movement. its main objective was to effectively developing the productive forces to make everyone in society happy. there were movements for political change in nepal. the unitary system was abolishing by the movement to establish a model of socialist development while protecting the rights and interests of the people and the preamble of the constitution of nepal 2015 issued a general political commitment towards socialism based on democratic values and beliefs. article (4) of the constitution defines nepal as a socialist-oriented democratic republic. as a guiding principle of the state, article 50, sub-article (3), included the issue of developing a socialist-oriented economy in the country by emphasizing participation of public, private and cooperatives in production and distribution. while ensuring democratic rights, the rights of all, including education, health, employment, labor, food and housing guaranteed. the constitution defines the role of various parties in the economic development and prosperity of the country and emphasizes social justice as an important aspect of socialism. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 58 published by scholink inc. 5. study method this study has based on information, sources, and reference material obtained from the description. there is a low presence of primary data. the study data is publishing by various bodies of the government of nepal from 2013 to 2021 with industrial data to show the employment situation. the study explores the impact of various aspects of the socialist economy on the economic development of the country. the theoretical and policy arrangements for its mitigation use limited time. the problems and issues in this study are describing on a factual basis gradually. the available information has further clarified investment and employment situations from the past to the present. since this study only addresses the possibilities and challenges of the industrial sector in building a socialist-oriented economy. apart from this, policy provisions related to the customs of nepal have not been fully explaining but general information has presented. 6. discussion and analysis 6.1 development of industrialization and creation an employment the process of moving the society or state from an agricultural economy to an industrial economy through the process of mass production of goods is calling industrialization. it generated in a specific area where it based on economic growth by developing machinery, technology and work processes in order to produce more in less time. the industrial revolution was the first step towards industrialization, a process that began in the mid 18th and early 19th centuries. when the mechanization of the work process first took place, it added energy in the form of machinery, serial production and use. industrialization is necessary to reduce production time and cost. increasing the volume of production, making better use of human capital, expanding the market and increasing the sales percentage of the state requires some reforms in politics, law and adequate raw materials and cheap labor resources. the aim of the industry is to increase the maximum possible number of producers for production, which is gradually developing in the world market. the rapid development of scientific disciplines and technologies in the industrialized society contributes to the growth of population income and population growth. the process of industrialization began in western europe in the 18th century, mainly in great britain, which increased agricultural efficiency. led to population growth and shifting the unemployed to cities where labor resources needed in the production process. technology has developed remarkably in the process of industrialization in the 19th century. after the invention of the combustion engine, electrical and electronic equipment became widely used. manufacturers began to focus on more mechanized and knowledge-intensive production allowed them to produce standardized products in the shortest possible time with minimal use of human labor. as a result, the dimensions of industrialization became wider. the negative balance of payments in nepal means the country buys more goods from abroad than exports. that is, when imports outnumber exports, one has to borrow from other countries or financial institutions to cover the cost of exports. in this case, the country’s economy is under pressure. not only www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 59 published by scholink inc. will the consumer incur losses but also the country may have to sell its assets (natural resources, land or commodities) to pay off debts. when the balance of payments is positive, the capital paid for domestic production increases and it can even lend to other countries. remittances appear to have been a major source of foreign exchange reserves in recent years, but have declined due to the global labor market and the economy that have been affected by the covid-19 pandemic. in the first six months of the current fiscal year, remittances amounting to rs. 468 billion were received. it was 5.5% less than the same period last year. although tourism is another major source of foreign exchange, the contribution of the tourism sector to foreign exchange reserves in 2021 was limited to 7.26 billion, which is 90% less than the previous fiscal year (kathmandu post, 27 th october 2021). if tourism, exports and foreign investment have increased, the state could have kept the balance of payments in remittances by reducing the inflow of remittances, but little attention has paid to these areas. table 1. details of approved industry and employment (table no. 1) investment in crores s.n fiscal year number percent investment percent number of jobs percent 1 2013/14 370 11.9 28780.8 17.8 21448 13 2 2014/15 466 15 13875.1 8.6 22785 13.8 3 2015/16 409 13.2 12,100.7 7.5 18730 11.3 4 2016/17 510 16.4 16137.4 10 26530 16.1 5 2017/18 496 16 35058.9 21.7 27339 16.5 6 2018/19 439 14.1 28335.3 17.6 23043 13.9 7 2020/21 277 8.9 15272.5 9.5 17388 10.5 8 2021/22 136 4.4 11819.9 7.3 7954 4.8 9 total 3103 100 161380.6 100 165217 100 department of industry 2021. the table gives information about the approved industries of nepal in the last eight years and the employment conditions created by them. unlike in the early years, there has been no positive improvement in the industry lately. looking at 2020/21 and 2021/22, the number of industries have come down from 8.9% to 4.4% with investment of 7.3% and employment of 4.8%. in fiscal year 2021/22, 11.9% of the industry invested 17.8% and provided 13% employment. 6.2 contribution of manufacturing industry although, the industrial development process in nepal has not been rapid but its importance and relevance is increasing today as it was past. due to the inability to develop the industry in the same way for economic development in the country, it has not been able to contribute as much as it should in the national income. the contribution of manufacturing industry in the last eight years is presenting below. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 60 published by scholink inc. table 2. manufacturing industries in nepal s.n fiscal year contribution (%) 1 2013/14 6.20 2 2014/15 5.94 3 2015/16 5.45 4 2016/17 5.49 5 2017/18 5.63 6 2018/19 5.75 7 2019/20 5.03 8 2020/21 5.08 the contribution of manufacturing industry has decreased from 6.2% in 2013/14 to 5.63% in fiscal year 2017/18. similarly, this trend has been steadily declining to 5.08% in fiscal year 2020/21. the condition of industry in the country is deteriorating day by day due to declining contribution of manufacturing industry. table 3. annual growth rate of manufacturing industry s.n fiscal year growth rate (%) remarks 1 2013/14 6.05 2 2014/15 0.06 earthquake 3 2015/16 -9.51 earthquake 4 2016/17 16.83 5 2017/18 9.21 6 2018/19 6.52 7 2019/20 8.57 covid-19 8 2020/21 3.85 central statisticals department 2021. the contribution of manufacturing industry has decreased from 6.05% in fiscal year 2013/14 to 0.06% in 2014/15. similarly, in 2015/16, this trend continued to decline and dropped to a negative face value of 9.51%. the growth rate of manufacturing industry, which increased by 9.21% in fiscal year 2017/18, has declined to 8.57% in fiscal year 2019/20 and 3.85% growth in fiscal year 2020/21. the fluctuations in the annual growth rate of the manufacturing industry do not seem to be satisfactory in nepal’s industry and business. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 61 published by scholink inc. 6.3 contribution of private sector in industrialization nepal is necessary to pay special attention to two aspects of industrial development. firstly, establish operate large-scale industries under the activism and leadership of the private sector. the government will facilitate executives in policy, legal, institutional and procedural ways. secondly, promote small home-based and micro-enterprises by investing in active initiatives of the government, expanding the target groups (poor, helpless, destitute, neglected, backward and marginalized, especially women, dalit, ethnicity and madhesi community). nepal’s industrial sector can move forward on the basic grounds that it will be possible to reach the destination of egalitarian economic prosperity. otherwise, nepalese economic development will be unequal and discriminatory, unilaterally for rich and poor, urban and rural, big and small, rich and poor. the gap between educated and uneducated will continue to widen. based on the classification, the industry presented as follows: table 4. industries based on agriculture and forest products s.n fiscal year number percent capital percent jobs percent 1 2013/14 46 20.2 1566.68 7.7 1627 18.1 2 2014/15 50 21.9 1513.9 7.4 1596 17.8 3 2015/16 28 12.3 987.9 4.8 1038 11.6 4 2016/17 25 11 3261.6 16 831 9.3 5 2017/18 22 9.6 2517.7 12.3 653 7.3 6 2018/19 27 11.8 4100.6 20.1 992 11 7 2019/20 9 3.9 1126.43 5.5 318 3.5 8 2020/21 21 9.2 5348.56 26.2 1923 21.4 9 total 228 100 20423.4 100 8978 100 department of industry 2021 the above table shows that the industries are based on agriculture, forest products and the employment opportunities created by them. in fiscal year 2013/14, it was seen that 20.2% of industry had created 18.1% employment with an investment of 7.7%. by the end of the review period, the industry had shrunk to 11% and provided 9.6% employment. by comparing, 3.9% of the industry was 5.5% investment of only 3.5% employment in fiscal year 2019/20. similarly, in the last year of the reviewer period, the industry rose 9.2% in fiscal year 2020/21, lost 26.2% and provided employment of 21.4%. the condition of industries based on agriculture and forest products does not seem to have moved forward at the same as federalism. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 62 published by scholink inc. table 5. energy based industries in different fiscal years s.n fiscal year number percent capital percent jobs percent 1 2013/14 43 16.2 231231.05 21.3 4709 26.2 2 2014/15 29 10.9 83081.73 7.6 2392 13.3 3 2015/16 15 5.6 38344.89 3.5 678 3.8 4 2016/17 19 7.1 82203.05 7.6 1679 9.3 5 2017/18 39 14.7 232913.04 21.4 2571 14.3 6 2018/19 47 17.7 210004.87 19.3 2489 13.8 7 2019/20 44 16.5 100201.75 9.2 2060 11.5 8 2020/21 30 11.3 109974.44 10.1 1407 7.8 9 total 266 100 1087954.8 100 17985 100 department of industry 2021 the energy-based industries and the employment opportunities they have created employment. it is seen that in fiscal year 2013/14 that has 16.2% of the industry to created 26.2% employment with an investment of 21.3%. review period in 2015/16, energy-based industries were reduced to 5.6% and 3.8% employment was provided. in fiscal year 2020/21, there was 11.3% of the industry with an investment of 10.1% employed total of 7.8%. at the state of the energy-based industry, it does not appear that it has grown as fast as it should with the development of federalism. table 6. mineral based industry, investment capital in crorer s.n year number percent capital percent jobs percent 1 2013/14 2 11.1 105 3.5 262 14.2 2 2014/15 7 38.9 251 8.4 680 37 3 2015/16 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2016/17 3 16.7 81.7 2.7 130 7.1 5 2017/18 4 22.2 2422.2 80.8 590 32.1 6 2018/19 1 5.6 12.8 0.4 85 4.6 7 2019/20 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 2020/21 1 5.6 123.45 4.1 92 5 9 total 18 100 2996 100 1839 100 department of industry 2021. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 63 published by scholink inc. the investment in the mineral base industry and its employment opportunities has created in different fiscal years. at the statistics of above table, it is seen that 11.1% industry has created 14.4% employment in the fiscal year 2013/14. come from three years after that in 2015/16, the condition of the industry decreased to zero. in 2017/18, the growth of mineral base industries reached 22.2% while investment was 80.8% and it created 32.1% employment. similarly, in fiscal year 2019/20, the condition of the industry had dropped to zero. in 2020/21, 5.6% of industries were established and 5% of the people were employee through investment of 4.1%. the condition of mineral base industries is very poor. table 7. service based industries in different years s.n year number percent capital percent jobs percent 1 2013/14 99 12.2 5061.96 7.8 3584 10.7 2 2014/15 137 16.8 8073.16 12.5 4992 14.8 3 2015/16 117 14.4 11220.07 17.3 4374 13 4 2016/17 165 20.3 15853.56 24.5 7012 20.8 5 2017/18 115 14.1 5154.5 18 4532 13.5 6 2018/19 102 12.5 5456.55 8.4 3629 10.8 7 2019/20 46 5.7 8301.5 12.8 3735 11.5 department of industry 2021. establishment of service-based industries makes it easier for the people in the country to get the goods they want. access to services makes life easier for the common person, and as a result, there is diversity in production. one can look at the investment in the service-oriented industry and the employment situation it has created. in the first year, 12.2% industry created 10.7% employment. come on. in 2018/19, when the condition of industry increased to 20.3%, 20.8% employment was providing. review period in 2020/21, the industry was limited to 4.1% and by investing 8.7% in, the industry has provided employment to 5.3% people. table 8. tourism based on business, capital investment in crorer s.n year number percent capital percent jobs percent 1 2013/14 84 9.3 5832.77 2.2 3252 9.5 2 2014/15 147 16.3 27215.37 10.3 6742 19.6 3 2015/16 112 12.4 11124.95 4.2 3785 11 4 2016/17 154 17 149999.72 57 5215 15.2 5 2017/18 159 17.6 23855.5 9.1 5373 15.6 6 2018/19 117 12.9 11040.44 4.2 3706 10.8 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 64 published by scholink inc. 7 2019/20 91 10.1 20527.21 7.8 4436 12.9 8 2020/21 40 4.4 13485.49 5.1 1894 5.5 9 total 904 100 263081.5 100 34403 100 department of industry 2021. the establishment of industry based on tourism business contributes to the development of various destinations in the country. access to the service facilitates the livelihood of the common person. table 9 above depicts the investment in the tourism business based industry and the employment situation created by it. in the 2013/14 base year, 9.3% industry has created 9.5% employment with 2.2% investment. come on. in 2017/18, the capacity of the industry increased 17% of industry to 57% of invested and 15.2% employment was provided. the end of the review period is approaching. by fiscal year 2020/21, the industry was limited to 4.4% and it employed 5.5% people with 5.1% investment. table 9. list of registered industries up to f y 2020/21 and capital investment per thousand s.n industry numbers percent investment percent jobs percent 1 agriculture and forest 291 5.4 9409.82 1.7 10524 3.8 2 energy based 90 1.7 222832.30 39.1 11837 4.3 3 information & technology 112 2.1 14595.84 2.6 5745 2.1 4 infrastructure based 46 0.8 3842.34 0.7 3226 1.2 5 construction based 1212 22.3 122548.10 21.5 103091 37.5 6 minerals based 72 1.3 10336.92 1.8 8786 3.2 7 service based 1722 31.7 96570.98 17 73162 26.6 8 tourism, business based 1889 34.8 89,328.45 15.7 58649 21.3 9 grand total 5434 100 659464.75 100 275020 100 department of industry 2021. the establishment of various business based industries and its development has shown its contribution. come on. it depicts the investment made in various business base industries in 2020/21 and the employment situation created by it. during that period, 34.8% of the industries in the tourism business have provided employment with 21.3% employment with 15.7% investment. construction-based industries accounted for 37.5%, service-based industries 26.6% and infrastructure-based industries the lowest at 1.2%. the highest investment was in energy 39.1% and the lowest in infrastructure 0.7% respectively. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 65 published by scholink inc. table 10. provincial industries in fiscal year 2020/21, capital investment in thousand s.n province number percent investment percent jobs percent 1 province one 808 9.6 524208.14 23 82192 13.1 2 madhesh pradesh 572 6.8 121399.47 5.3 58451 9.3 3 bagmati region 5628 66.6 841618.03 36.9 376907 59.9 4 gandaki pradesh 705 8.3 449242.03 19.7 39955 6.4 5 lumbini province 579 6.8 194515.7 8.5 58216 9.3 6 karnali pradesh 40 0.5 113217.6 5 2575 0.4 7 far western region 122 1.4 39333.41 1.7 10,500 1.7 8 total 8454 100 2283533.88 100 628795 100 department of industry 2021. in fiscal year 2020/21 has shown that the establishment of various business based industries with different province and the investment made to established industry for job creation to people. during this period, 66.6% of the industries have established in bagmati pradesh and 0.5% of the industries have registered in karnali. looking at the same times the investment in industry of highest investment is 36.9% in bagmati and the lowest investment is 1.7% in far western province. while bagmati has 59.9% employment, karnali has 0.4% employment. overall, bagmati is in the first place and far west is in the last place. province one was second and madhesh province was third overall evaluation during the obsurvation period. table 11. classified of industries up to 2020/21 s.n category number percent capital percent jobs percent 1 big industry 1214 14.4 1965118.73 86.1 166302 26.4 2 medium industry 1909 22.6 211673.24 9.3 171162 27.2 3 small industry 5331 63.1 106741.91 4.7 291331 46.3 4 total 8454 100 2283533.88 100 628795 100 department of industry 2021. the last period, the smallest industry among the registered industries in nepal has 63.1% to generate of 46.3% employment. similarly, 22.6% of medium industries provided 27.2% employment and 14.4% of large-scale industries provided 26.4% employment. capital investment is 86.1% in large-scale industries, 9.3% in medium scale industries and 4.7% in small-scale industries respectively. comparing the number of industries established in nepal, small industries accounted for 63.1%, medium industries for 22.6% and large industries for only 14.4%. therefore, industrialization does not seem to have developed in nepal. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 66 published by scholink inc. 6.4 policy provisions related to foreign investment promotion according to the constitutional provision, article 51 (d) of the state policies of the constitution of nepal, policy on finance, industry and commerce should attract foreign investment by promoting import substitution and export in line with the national interest. the comprehensive foreign investment and technology transfer act, 2018 has promulgated with the aim of creating a good environment by adopting an investment-friendly industrialization policy to attract foreign capital and technology transfer. this act regulates foreign investment. the foreign investment and technology transfer act is believed to make 1992 more attractive. the technology transfer act 2015 has issued to manage foreign investment. this act has paved the way for the easy transfer of technology abroad. it believes that it will be easier to attract foreign investment in nepal after the issuance of foreign investment policy 2013. it is believed that these and similar foreign investments will come to nepal in a simple way after the policy arrangement in this regard. it believed that after the issuance of public private partnership policy 2015 by nepal, the amount of industry to establish through public and private investment and the amount of private investment in it will increase. similarly, industrial policy 2067 has created an environment to encourage investment in industry and business. the industrial business act 2019 and the industrial rules 2019 also set the thematic bases on how to increase investment in industry and business and create an industrial environment. the foreign exchange regulation act 2019 and the rules 2019 have laid the groundwork for regulating foreign exchange in addition to foreign investment. after the promulgation of the non-resident nepali act 2007, it has shown that non-resident nepalis are increasingly investing in nepal, including increasing investment in industry, communication, transportation and service sectors. therefore, after the implementation of these foreign investment laws and regulations, foreign investment has been encouraged in nepal. table 12. licensed industries for foreign investment up to fiscal year 2020/21 s.n category number percent capital percent jobs percent 1 2010/11 210 6.3 11252.69 2.6 10053 3.3 2 2011/12 226 6.8 11909.82 2.8 7138 2.3 3 2012/13 317 9.5 51990.78 12.1 19819 6.5 4 2013/14 307 9.2 40737.27 9.5 20132 6.6 5 2014/15 370 11.1 81370.60 19 67455 22 6 2015/16 348 10.5 20543.89 4.8 15254 5 7 2016/17 400 12 17123.51 4 15207 5 8 2017/18 400 12 61349.11 14.3 55760 18.2 9 2018/19 344 10.3 31863.05 7.4 25,480 8.3 10 2019/20 223 6.7 50749.34 11.9 37806 12.3 11 2020/21 184 5.5 49,251.58 11.5 32073 10.5 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 67 published by scholink inc. 12 total 3329 100 428181.64 100 306177 100 department of industry 2021. the commodity status of the foreign-based industries with permission in nepal for the last eleven years is shown in as table thirteen. in the base year, 6.3% of the industry lost 2.6% and provided 3.3% employment. it has mentioned that in 2014/15, it has 11.1% of industry will guarantee 19% investment and provide 22% employment. in the review period of 2020/21, it has 5.5% of the industries got permission for establishment and 11.5% of the investment will provide to 10.5% of employment. analyzing the situation of industries established foreign investment in this way, it has been declining in the last period of the review that needs to be improved. 7. possibility for the development of industrial sector in nepal, it is not appropriate to move forward by formulating thinking and strategy in the framework of other developed countries. in order to industrialize nepal on the basis of its geographical, natural, social, economic and political uniqueness, agriculture, forest and vegetation, mining and minerals and other natural resources should be made into raw materials and capital and technology should be brought in from outside or by establishing industries. importing raw materials from abroad will increase the cost of the product and will not be competitive. it is appropriate for nepal to move towards industrialization by mobilizing the abundant natural resources available in nepal. this makes it possible for local people to get employment, low cost and efficiency in production, quality including product specificity, sustainability of production system and process. as the policy to accelerate the pace of industrialization, various measures can be takes to increase energy efficiency in the industrial sector. policies should enact in the law to encourage co-energy production in productive industries, to promote the use of renewable clean energy, and to produce energy from industrial waste. it believed that some achievements will achieved through the new proposed industrial business act. it is reasonable to encourage foreign investment to flow more into the priority sector, but the negative list should not make too large. investors should not give a negative message at the outset by setting investment limits and sectoral calculations. it is not right for nepalis to be very intolerant towards investing abroad and it should be done according to the law according to the purpose, area, priority, limit of investment, level, it would be in line with the norms of liberal economic policy to regulate and leave open. while managing industrial property under intellectual property, provision should make in law for protection, promotion and protection of trademarks, patents and designs. similarly, setting up up-to-date legal, institutional and procedural arrangements for quality assessment, testing, certification and authentication is another important priority of the government. it plays a very valuable role for the smooth international entry of manufactured goods and creates an industrial environment in the country. institutional and procedural arrangements are also among the priorities of another important www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 68 published by scholink inc. government. it plays a very valuable role for the smooth international entry of manufactured goods and creates an industrial environment in the country. institutional and procedural arrangements are also among the priorities of another important government. it plays a very valuable role for the smooth international entry of manufactured goods and creates an industrial environment in the country. to reduce foreign exchange reserves and balance of payments deficits, the government often looks to foreign workers and borrows at concessional rates or relies on supportive donor agencies.. as foreign exchange declines, imports begin to tighten seeks to increase internal productivity. due to the inflow of internal capital and the government’s decision to impose higher tariffs on raw materials than on ready-made goods coming to nepal from india, nepal’s industries are hitting harder. recently, a policy has been formulated to have 100% cash margin when opening lc (letter of trade) for import of sugar, cigarettes, liquor, chocolate, cosmetics and other commodities.. earlier, when ordering goods worth over rs 10 million, the importer used to work with only rs 1 lakh in cash and the rest could be borrowed from banks.. an example of this is the rule that nepali citizens traveling abroad cannot carry more than $500 with them, but earlier the limit was set at $1,000. moreover, nepali tourists and workers going to gulf, malaysia and other countries are not allowing to taking more than 250 dollars with them. this will increase the foreign exchange reserves in nepal and create an environment where the money can invested in the industrial sector. 8. challenges nepal is on the path of a socialist economy. it seems necessary to accelerate the pace of industrial development. unless an industrial environment created in the country. self-employment opportunities will not create and the available resources will not fully utilize. in order to take the country towards modernity, it is necessary to accelerate the pace of development of the industry. unless an investment-friendly environment created in the industry, the investor’s attention cannot be directed towards industry development. there is a spontaneous environment for general investment in the development of the industry and it cannot grow in a negligible way. therefore, it has become necessary to remove the challenges in industry development. the industry hit by corona after the earthquake, which weakened by 2015, has been unable to recover due to the global spread of the corona virus. sometimes, due to earthquakes and due to the economic blockade of india, the corona virus, the industries that are operating have to pay regular bank interest, to pay salaries to the employees, pay the rent of the buildings and pay taxes to the state. the state has not been able to provide any such facilities for the industrialists, as they need to given more concessions. the industrial act controversy about entrepreneurs’ policy: the state brought the industrial act in nepal due to conflict of policy between industrialists and executives. differences between the entrepreneurs could not be resolved. in such a situation, the private industries in nepal now have to fight unannounced even with the state. the situation became more difficult for the goods produced by www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 69 published by scholink inc. the multinational companies to compete when they could not provide good facilities for the workers. open border: with the open border between india and nepal, it has alleged that businesses under the government are involved in smuggling goods from india to nepal. due to this problem, it has become difficult to compete with the goods entering nepal without customs clearance and the industries have collapsed even more. goods from india are more prepared and raw materials are scarce. due to the open borders with the goods produced in such large investments, the small-scale industries of nepal have to face more problems competing. electricity: nepal does not fully operate industries due to electricity. its tariff rate has not become industry friendly. the state has not been able to provide electricity despite assuring industrialists that it will provide electricity if required at a minimum demand fee. it remains that treatment of the industry by the state does seem to be conducive to development. even if the industrialists plan to expand their capacity, the state should be able to provide electricity to industry if it can expand the capacity of machines in a timely manner. problems in management: the conditions that lay down at the time of applying to the management office are not fulfilled later. due to weak policy of the state and not only the management, there is very little practice of taking responsibility. long-term sustainability of the workers: the workers have a big hand in making any industry run smoothly for a long time. even if the workers want to work well, due to the relatively low amount of money available for them in nepal. it is not possible for the skilled workers to last long. for the continuous supply of skilled workers, the state needs to address the issue through the budget. emphasis on import substitution: the state should identify imports and encourage domestic production for long-term solutions, despite tightening imports. in order to do so, it is necessary to bring concessional programs to reduce production costs, including taxes. in the case of importing raw materials from most industries, it would not be appropriate to impose higher customs duty on raw materials than on ready-made goods coming to nepal from india. higher customs duties on raw materials increase cost and weaken competitiveness. apart from this, attention should be pay to the quality of nepali products. consumers with money buy foreign goods because such quality goods should produced in nepal. although the government has tried to reduce the consumption of smoking and alcoholic beverages by imposing higher taxes on the import of foreign wines has not decreased, it has not replaced by nepali products. at present, customs duty of rs 370 per liter has to pay on wine containing 12% alcohol. there are examples of foreign wines preferred by more consumers than nepali ones. new technology: industrialists also need to introduce new technologies in a timely manner. however, the industries in nepal are still operating in the traditional way. it is important to link the industry with current advanced technology. peacekeeping: at times, a peaceful environment needed in the industrial sector, but there is no fencing in those areas. even if the state provides workers in the name of security forces, that worker seems to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 70 published by scholink inc. be unused. the state has not spent even 10% of the tax paid in the industrial sector for development and security to pay on the industrial sector, which is 10 billion of taxes. it seems that we need to ensure a peaceful environment and a secure environment in the industrial sector. 9. conclusion nepal has ensured a “socialism-oriented economy’ in the constitution for six years. in the last year, the strong government with a single majority failed to bring a “socialist-oriented economy” outside of the pages of the constitution. experts have been saying that the country has a constitution but the government has not found any strong basis to build a socialist-oriented economy. economist vishwambhar pyakurel says that the leader’s speech was nothing more than a break from the table. although the constitution guarantees food, shelter and cotton, the discriminatory policy of the government has reached a stage where the people are not getting the minimum required. economist govinda nepal says that even though it has taken a long time to establish a republic, the basis for the socialism-oriented economy envisaged in the constitution has not laid down. economist keshav acharya argues that three pillars of the economy provided in the constitution have not implemented effectively. he says the new rules for cooperatives are trying to weaken cooperatives. there is no government policy to increase employment and self-employment in the private sector. there are no means of tax exemption, no provision of grants and incentives. according to experts, the government has failed in its campaign to build a socialist economy to establish social justice. the government should take private investors into confidence and move towards setting up industries. this opens the door to ample possibilities for development in the country and contributes to economic empowerment of people through self-employment. the state has to achieve sustainable economic development and equitable distribution of economic inequality and build a society free from exploitation. it said that the economic objective of the state will be to develop the economy. from this point of view, industrialization is indispensable for the economic development of the country through public and private investment. with the proper use of all kinds of raw materials, including agricultural products available in a particular place through industry, employment opportunities will be available in the country. it will become economically self-reliant and move towards economic empowerment. in particular, countries that have adopted a socialist system of government are giving equality of opportunity to include public or collective ownership of resources. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 71 published by scholink inc. references department of industriy. (2021). industrial statistics of nepal 2021, kathmandu, nepal. gov nepal. (2018). foreign investment and technology transfer act of nepal 2018. kathmandu, nepal. government of nepal. (2014). foreign investment policy of nepal 2014. kathmandu, nepal. mof. (1981). foreign investment act, 1981. kathmandu, nepal mof. (1992). foreign investment and technology transfer act, 1992. kathmandu, nepal. mof. (2021). nepal’s budget for fy 2021/22. ministry of finance, kathmandu, nepal. nepal’s constitution. (2015). constitution of nepal 2015, nepal law commission, kathmandu. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 65 original paper the reform and innovation of combining college student management and ideological and political education hong gong1 1 qingdao film academy, qingdao, shandong, china received: august 29, 2023 accepted: november 11, 2023 online published: november 28, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n4p65 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n4p65 abstracts the amalgamation of civic and political education is the key to successful student management in colleges and universities, and its integration can bolster the management of students in these institutions. instill ideological and political education in colleges and universities, thereby advancing both the physical and mental wellbeing of students. the amalgamation of professional and ideological/political knowledge can be augmented by it, thus augmenting students’ understanding of ideology and politics, and ultimately augmenting the ideological awareness of college students. the successful implementation of the aforementioned material necessitates the combined efforts of college instructors and scholars, aided by science and technology. realizing the successful amalgamation of student administration and ideological instruction in universities and colleges. an examination of the correlation between student administration and ideological instruction in colleges and universities is the initial focus of the article, and the integration of these two elements is then evaluated for its worth. analyzing student management and ideological education, strategies for cultivating students’ consciousness, and innovating teaching mode are then proposed to address existing issues. enhancing the situation. keywords higher education, student management, civic education introduction the ministry of education’s 21 edition standards for the construction of ideological and political theory courses in colleges and universities make explicit the management of student administration and civic and political e.colleges and universities are the sites ofducation. colleges and universities must be attentive to the commencement of civic and political classes, strive to provide excellent instruction and supervision of teachers and students, and augment the construction of these courses. a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 66 published by scholink inc. powerful link exists between higher education and civic and political education, and proficient civic and political education is beneficial for fostering student growth and bolstering student governance. realizing the goal of unifying classroom and practical teaching, students’ professional aptitude and comprehensive capability can be advanced. advocating the objectives of ideological and theoretical instruction for college and university students. 1. the necessity of unifying student administration and ideological and political education in colleges and universities is undeniable at present, the lack of civic and political education in china’s university education system is very serious, and civic and political education can’t reach the complementary advantages with other normal curriculum education. there is even a disconnection, many schools do not combine civic and political education with other educational programs, but use separate teaching methods, which makes some schools’ academic departments despise or neglect civic and political education. as a result, teachers only care about subject education but do not pay attention to the cultivation of students’ personal character, and the teaching departments of schools drastically reduce the time that should be allocated to the courses of civic and political education, leading to the current dilemma of civic and political education. the imperfection of ideological and political education affects college students the most, and plays a great role in hindering the growth and psychological development of college students. to cultivate qualified college students of today with sound psychology and knowledge, the foremost priority is to begin with. college managers must be attentive to ideological and political education, and promptly incorporate it into the curriculum training program of students. lead the students to learn the ideological and political education, actively guiding them through it, while also carrying out the educational program. leading the students on the path of learning ideological and political courses, so that they may acquire a proper perspective on life, values, and worldview throughout their study period, is of course essential. regulating their behavior in the everyday lives of students is essential; they must adhere to the rules and regulations, and comply with the school’s requirements. the ideological and political education of the students is founded upon the teaching arrangements they are to pay heed to. 1.1 enhancing ideological and political education and ideological and moral standards at university, students are in a period of transition to assimilate into society, and a crucial juncture to set up ideological principles. in the process of advancing the marketization process, the society has appeared impetuous tendency, if college students therefore only pursue luxury and superficial glamour, they may go astray. to ensure college students’ behavior is restrained and they can appreciate their own value of life through the guidance of appropriate ideological ideas. universities and colleges must be mindful of ideological and political instruction, and unify student administration with ideological and political instruction. society’s benefit is to nurture talents that are both upright and technically adept. in the current situation of university education and school management, contemporary college students enjoy a broad vision, but may be self-conscious, poor resistance to setbacks, so it is necessary to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 67 published by scholink inc. change the traditional education model, the implementation of personalized education methods. in order to break through the drawbacks brought by the over-suppression of individuality and single discipline in traditional management, it is necessary to integrate ideological and political education into student management, which can enhance the management efficiency and at the same time, make students firmly believe in the correct ideals. by unifying ideological and political instruction with student administration, universities and colleges can realize the ideological and political education of students through the reinforcement of student management. enhancing the ideological and moral acumen of pupils. at the same time, they respect students and develop ideological and political education that is easy for students to accept according to their physical and mental development and learning conditions, so as to cultivate high-quality students efficiently. 1.2 establishing and improving the student management system in colleges and universities in china’s university education system, the lack of civic and political education is considered very serious, and civic and political education usually fails to complement regular curriculum education. many schools do not combine civic and political education with other educational programs, but choose to teach them separately, which leads to the fact that the academic departments of some schools belittle or neglect civic and political education. the document underscores the necessity of college administrators to prioritize civic and political education, so that it can be incorporated into the students’ lives, in order to cultivate both mental health and a comprehensive outlook. programs of learning in the classroom. students should be guided in this education to cultivate an accurate perspective on life, values, and worldview. it is also crucial for students to comply with rules and regulations in their daily lives and to obey the school’s teaching arrangements, as this is the basis for making students focus on ideological and political education. by emphasizing ideological and political instruction while focusing on student governance in universities, one can inject fresh strength into the customary educational system, enrich the form of instruction, and enhance the students’ experience. ideology’s outlook on management is a knowledge and comprehension. in addition, students at this stage are in the stage of self-identification and maturity, and they often pay more attention to self-respect, so if unreasonable or forced management will lead to students’ rebelliousness and resistance. therefore, efficient student management should be both strong and soft, and the new management mode of ideological and political education can better implement the education and management of students. 1.3 meet the needs of cultivating innovative talents ideological education and student management in colleges and universities must adhere to the principle of cultivating innovative talents, enabling them to be able to effectively adapt to production, construction and management services. student-centered and people-focused. centering teaching activities on the healthy development of students, while taking into account the individual distinctions of each student and tailored to their needs, is essential for achieving this. the students should be the focal point of educational and managerial initiatives in colleges and universities, with morals, etiquette, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 68 published by scholink inc. emotions, and environment all playing a role in their influence. combining education and management in an effective manner. this allows students to participate and show their role as the main body of the school, and ultimately realizes the purpose of both transferring knowledge and building good personal character. this approach to education meets the need for innovative human resources, as it focuses not only on the transfer of knowledge, but also on the development of personality and character, resulting in students who are better equipped with all-round abilities and sound personalities, and who are better able to adapt to the challenges of society and the future. such an approach will help nurture talents capable of innovation and social responsibility. the organic amalgamation of school administration and ideological and political education must be fortified. the cultivation of innovative talents is enabled by the combination of the two, thus maximizing students’ innovative aptitudes and qualities in terms of theoretical understanding. such an initiative can help students understand themselves more comprehensively, establish correct values and improve their comprehensive quality and ability. colleges and universities should strive to adhere to the principle of education that students are the primary source of learning, and should conduct management work based on ideological and political instruction, while also respecting them. enhancing the educational experience of students, while simultaneously fostering their ideological and moral growth, can foster the rich and successful advancement of management work. to better educate and teach people, and to direct students to establish accurate ideological and moral beliefs, is essential. management can also foster the successful completion of educational tasks, advance the scientific advancement of management, and furnish students with superior services and education, all at once. enhancing the efficacy of instruction and pedagogy in universities and colleges. 1.4 meeting the demand for the reform and development of civic and political education colleges and universities should, in order to effectively answer the party’s summons and the national new curriculum reform policy, unify ideological and political education with student administration. in order to better realize the reform and development of ideological and political education, school management innovation and reform should be carried out in accordance with the party’s requirements. for management to be successful, it is essential to execute educational activities for students that are purposeful and planned in accordance with the material of ideological and political courses, and to fully capitalize on the benefits of such education. we should strive to capture the essence of ideological and political education, eliminate the superfluous, and continually strive to rectify and enhance the deficiencies of prior educational systems. encourage the successful growth and execution of ideological, political, and managerial instruction, and direct the pupils to cultivate an accurate perspective on life and the universe. by uniting student administration with ideological and political instruction, colleges and universities can furnish students with the proper direction on moral education. respect for students must be a prerequisite for reform and development of ideological and political education, and knowledge and content related to such education must be fully integrated into all teaching practices. enhancing the ideological and political education’s content. the quality and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 69 published by scholink inc. efficiency of student management in colleges and universities will be advanced by this. schools can concurrently establish ideological and political work coordination groups to stay abreast of the evolution of education and management work in real time, thereby furthering the smooth and successful progress of all labor. engaging in more effective political and ideological dialogue between students and management personnel, while fostering the successful growth of education and teaching. facilitate school personnel and administrators to enhance their proficiency. the management of the school’s education can enhance their political aptitude and political knowledge. in the course of ideological and political instruction, we should sift through the mire and pick the core, discard the untruths and keep the veracity. enhancements to the inadequacies of prior ideological and political instruction, foster the successful growth and execution of ideological and political education and management, and continually bolster. instruct pupils to set up accurate goals. universities can offer students the correct moral education guidance by uniting student management with ideological and political education. respect students as a requirement, integrate knowledge and material pertinent to ideological and political education into all teaching practices, and fulfill the requirements of reform and growth of such education. enhance the ideological and political instruction, and further advance it. at the same time, schools can also establish an ideological and political work coordination group to understand and grasp the progress of education and management work in real time, further promote the smooth and effective development of various tasks, carry out more effective political and ideological communication and exchanges between students and administrative staff, promote the development of education and teaching, and enable school education administrators to improve their political ability and political quality. school education administrators can improve their political ability and political literacy. 2. current situation of university civic education and school management the collaboration of family, society, and school is essential for the successful execution of education, and it is through this that a powerful synergy can be formed to contain the ideologies of college students. the income of chinese citizens has been increasing in tandem with the intensification of market rivalry, yet the spiritual wealth has not kept up with the material prosperity, resulting in a lack of trust and impatience. the endlessness of utilitarianism and its attendant phenomena will have a deleterious effect on college students, who are not well-versed in the social realm and lack values. far removed from the family, university life creates a disconnect between school and home; when social issues or familial discord infect college students, and the school cannot be remedied in a timely fashion, this can be a dire situation. the intangible influence college students’ ideological concepts have on the school’s ability to accurately gauge their mental state is particularly noteworthy. once the internal musings have been transformed into particular conduct, the consequences will be irreparable. this is because in the social infiltration and education out of touch two factors together, resulting in the effect of university ideological education cannot achieve the established goals. the education is a system www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 70 published by scholink inc. engineering that needs the cooperation of family, society and school. only in this way can we form a strong synergistic effect and restrict the ideological concepts of college students. on one hand, with the intensification of market competition, the income level of chinese residents is constantly improving, but the richness of spiritual life has not kept pace with material growth. unhealthy phenomena such as lack of trust, impatience for success, pragmatism and so on emerge one after another. these phenomena have a great negative impact on college students who are not well-informed and whose values are not mature. on the other hand, college life is far away from home, resulting in a disjointed phenomenon in guiding and educating students between school and family. when college students are affected by social vices or family conflicts, the school cannot correct it in a timely manner. especially for the impact on students’ ideological concepts, it is an invisible impact. the school finds it difficult to accurately grasp the students’ ideological dynamics. once internal thinking is externalized into specific behavior, there will be irreversible consequences. this is because the two factors of social penetration and educational disconnection jointly affect the ideological education in colleges and universities cannot achieve the established goals. the 21st century is the era of scientific and technological competition, the core technology determines the status of the country in the international arena, in order to enhance our international influence and comprehensive national power, china has increased investment in education, hoping that through the strategy of strengthening the country with talents to cultivate trend-setting talents for the country. therefore, colleges and universities carry out the war for talents through a variety of ways, and the quality of the teaching force is constantly rising. in contrast, the formation of a school management team is lagging behind, as the ideological notion of managers and their managerial capabilities cannot be equated with the teacher team. the management team, instead of limiting the scientific research and development of colleges and universities, is what makes them. the backward management mechanism, the antiquated management system, and modern society are all in stark contrast. the management personnel are at fault, for the school system has neglected to construct the managerial echelon, leaving the logistical work to them and leaving the school system at its end. the unreasonableness of the management team at the professional level and the age composition of personnel is a result. accompanied by the improvement of china’s network infrastructure and the popularization of mobile communication devices, cell phones and tablets have become a necessity in students’ lives, and students can browse information and expand their spiritual life online. while any new thing brings great opportunities, it also brings great challenges, so does the internet. on the one hand, the internet has changed the way of learning and life of college students, letting them feel the convenience brought by science and technology; however, on the other hand, the internet has also impacted the spiritual world of college students, and the internet is filled with countless negative information, and even some of the information is hidden, so that college students with insufficient discernment ability are very vulnerable to the infestation of negative information, so that they can’t extricate themselves from the virtual world, which affects the normal studies and life. the internet’s influence has caused a great www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 71 published by scholink inc. challenge for the university’s civic education, and the traditional civic education approach has had an extremely limited teaching impact on university students’ civic education. the rise of china’s mobile communication infrastructure and the ubiquity of mobile phones and tablets have rendered them indispensable components in the lives of students. students can browse information online and expand their spiritual life. however, like any new thing, the internet has brought both tremendous opportunities and huge challenges. on the one hand, the internet has changed the way college students learn and live, allowing them to feel the convenience brought by technology. on the other hand, the internet has also affected the spiritual world of college students. the internet is full of countless negative messages, and some messages are even hidden, making college students with insufficient discernment susceptible to the invasion of negative information, so that they cannot extricate themselves from the virtual world and affect their normal study and life. therefore, under the influence of the internet, university citizenship education faces enormous challenges, and under traditional citizenship education methods, the teaching effect of college students’ citizenship education is extremely low. education’s commencement is in learners, and the aim of education is also to educate them. the teaching of skills and ideas to students is the purpose of education, enabling them to recognize their own worth and contribute to the advancement of society. education must be focused on the students, not separated from them; otherwise, it is not only a squandering of time and resources, but also fails to fulfill the goal of education. since childhood, the majority of today’s college students have been children, and due to their over-indulgence in the care of their elders, have a weaker mental capacity to endure even the slightest setback, thus leading them to give up. the reality of the blow may even cause psychological issues. the fragile hearts of college students will soon be defeated under the blows of social reality, and some extreme people even have the idea of taking life lightly. 3. reform and innovation in combining student management and ideological and political education in colleges and universities as the primary conduit of ideological and political education theory classes in colleges and universities, 3.1 is taking on a pivotal role the main avenue of ideological and political education in colleges and universities is the course of ideological and political theory, thus. administrators at universities and colleges should gradually bolster the team-building of the ideological and political theory course, no matter the configuration of the course, the selection of instructors or the selection of textbooks. from the prior, cursory, all should be transformed, and the formation of the educational team should be handled with great caution and consideration. to fully exploit the part of ideological and political education courses in colleges and universities as the primary conduit. the document emphasizes the necessity of exploiting the benefits of the instruction and teaching of ideological and political courses to their fullest potential. the core of ideological and political education should be embraced, with the least amount of effort expended, when utilizing its teaching techniques and contents. constantly striving to make up for and better the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 72 published by scholink inc. shortcomings of the prior ideological and political instruction should be done. to foster the successful advancement of ideological and political instruction and administration, as well as to direct pupils to form a suitable outlook on life and the universe, is the aim of this. colleges and universities should, in order to amalgamate student management and ideological and political education, bestow students with appropriate guidance on moral education, and respect them as the foundation. integrating knowledge and material pertinent to ideological and political instruction into all facets of teaching is essential (ji, 2022). ideological and political education can be enriched by this, thus augmenting the quality and teaching effectiveness of student management in colleges and universities. the formation of a coordination group for ideological and political work has enabled a greater comprehension of the advancement of education and management. realizing the successful political and ideological dialogue and exchanges between pupils and management staff, then fostering the efficient growth of education and teaching endeavors. enhancement of political aptitude and excellence of educational and managerial personnel. 3.2 strengthen the construction of general education system deepening and expanding the role of student cadres: not only limited to the traditional role of serving teachers and students, modern student cadres are further utilizing their potential to assist teachers in completing the teaching content and playing a key role in the construction of a liberal arts education system. they not only need to be disciplined and have the right attitude towards their work, but also set high standards for themselves. while they are engaged in management, they must also emphasize the improvement of their personal moral character and the importance of their studies (bin, 2022). a thorough evaluation of student leaders’ performance is essential to ascertain if they can effectively carry out their responsibilities; this necessitates not only evaluating their work proficiency, but also their managerial aptitude. the ideological character and academic performance. this comprehensive assessment can more accurately evaluate the overall quality of student leaders. enhancing communication and social skills: student leaders need to have excellent communication and social skills, which include expressing their views clearly and listening to and understanding the needs and ideas of others (wang, 2022). these skills play a vital role in coordinating schedules, resolving disputes of interest, and establishing effective team communication. viewing work as an opportunity for exercise: student leaders should view their current work as a valuable opportunity for exercise that will help them to build a wealth of experience and skills for future social work. realizing the advantages of managing work, they can cultivate aptitudes and characteristics that will be advantageous to them in their future vocations. responsible attitude towards work: student leaders should be responsible for their work and take their responsibilities seriously and rigorously. they should be conscientious, rigorous and learn to be reflective. they need to be thoughtful when dealing with various matters and improve their interpersonal and communication skills. at the same time, they should be responsible for their own work, always reflecting on their own way of working and methods, so as to continuously improve the efficiency and quality of their work (bing, 2022). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 73 published by scholink inc. 3.3 strengthening the full utilization of network means an innovative and effective approach, the utilization of new media and other forms of education to bolster the direction of ideological and political instruction is remarkable. the internet and multimedia platforms, enabled by the ongoing advancement of modern information and education technology, can be utilized by colleges and universities to manage students and impart ideological and political knowledge. to augment the learning experience. a novel and abundant source of content, free from site and time limitations, and characterized by a powerful exchange of data and openness (zhang, 2021), this new form of educational management teaching, based on the mobile internet, is revolutionary. through the internet platform, the student management system and content can be continuously improved and optimized, realizing the informationization and modernization of the education mechanism. this not only improves work efficiency and reduces labor costs, but also better meets the individual needs of students and improves the quality of management and education. teachers can obtain students’ learning situation in a timely and effective manner on the internet platform, and carry out online and offline communication and inquiry activities by adjusting teaching strategies and methods in real time. this not only extends the classroom teaching space and increases the possibility of interaction and inquiry, but also cultivates students’ independent learning and innovation, and promotes comprehensive development. the employment of fresh media and other educational methods can also broaden the range and power of ideological and political instruction. the internet platform and multimedia technology enable the dissemination of ideological and political education to a wider audience, particularly those student groups that are often overlooked by traditional educational approaches. education’s popularity and coverage can be enhanced, while ideological and political education can take on a more influential role, thereby fostering the peaceful and consistent growth of society. 3.4 adhere to people-oriented, student-oriented colleges and universities should take practical steps to bolster students’ abilities in order to more effectively execute the “people-oriented and student-oriented” management and education principle. enhancing their understanding and proficiency in school education and management, self-management is essential. colleges and universities must prioritize the growth and development of students when formulating and executing educational policies, taking into account their individual needs and development traits. strengthening students’ self-management means encouraging and cultivating students’ ability to learn independently, exercise self-discipline and provide self-service. colleges and universities can implement a series of training programs that contribute to self-management, such as time management, goal setting, stress management, etc., in order to assist students to better master self-control. engagement of students in the learning experience can be augmented through a more varied and interactive teaching approach. in the classroom, teachers can adopt teaching methods such as seminars, case studies and role plays to stimulate students’ motivation and creativity. in addition, encouraging students to participate in extracurricular academic and cultural activities can likewise www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 74 published by scholink inc. enhance their sense of engagement and practical application of what they have learned. to allow students to express their views, schools should establish more open communication platforms and feedback mechanisms, so that students can feel that their opinions and suggestions are taken seriously. for example, they can hold regular teacher-student seminars, open student suggestion boxes, or utilize tools such as online forums to collect student feedback. a student management system is built not only to monitor and regulate student behavior, but also to support student growth and development. such a system should be flexible, able to adapt to the needs of individual students and adjust as students grow. a student management system should be equipped with the requisite resources and instruments to assist students in making sound decisions regarding their academic, social, and professional plans. universities and colleges can introduce a self-directed learning timetable program that grants students the opportunity to establish their own educational objectives at the start of each week, organize their study time, and then evaluate themselves at the conclusion. in this way, students can learn how to self-manage their time and learning progress, while teachers can monitor students’ learning status and provide timely guidance and assistance. set up a student-led project learning course, where the teacher only provides the project theme and guidance, and the rest is left to the students to organize a team, make a plan, and solve the problem. in this process, students not only learn teamwork and project management, but also explore the topic in depth and improve their ability to solve practical problems. references bin, j. (2022). on the necessary professional quality of college student administrators from the perspective of “four haves” good teachers. international journal of new developments in education, 4.0(7.0). https://doi.org/10.25236/ijnde.2022.040709 bing, l. (2022). research on information construction of college student management under the background of internet. matec web of conferences, 365. https://doi.org/10.1051/matecconf/202236501012 jiwei, z. q. (2022). artificial intelligence of internet of things based on machine learning and college student management. mobile information systems. https://doi.org/10.1155/2022/8620277 lei, y. (2022). research on college student management methods based on evaluation of educational policy performance. advances in educational technology and psychology, 6(10). wang, y. c. (2022). college student management system based on k-means clustering algorithm. international journal of new developments in education, 4.0(2.0). https://doi.org/10.25236/ijnde.2022.040206 zhang, s. (2021). problems and innovations of student management in universities under the internet plus background. applied &amp; educational psychology, 2(1). zhi, q. (2022). a brief analysis of the integration development of college student management and ideological and political education in the new era. academic journal of humanities &amp; social sciences, 5(11). https://doi.org/10.25236/ajhss.2022.051114 microsoft word ape-v2n2-p146 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 146 original paper the dual stricture of the israeli economy: is technology the solution? yaron katz1* 1 holon institute of technology, holon, israel * yaron katz, holon institute of technology, holon, israel received: march 30, 2019 accepted: april 20, 2019 online published: april 23, 2019 doi:10.22158/ape.v2n2p146 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v2n2p146 abstract the main concern of this research is the conflict between technology and society. it concentrates on the in the israeli society, which is split in half: on the one hand it is in the information era, with highly advanced technology sector, while on the other hand it is still considered a developing country in terms of social development among large segments of society. the dual structure of the economy means that despite being known as the “start-up nation”, israel has one of the highest poverty rates with the gap between the rich and the poor is widening. the research argues that the problem is the dual structure: the nation is leading the world in technological development, but the services provided to its citizens are limited to the extent that poverty is high. the research further claims that the solution is technology: the technological advantage of israel promoted its economy, which has grown more rapidly than most other advanced economies, after the government made a strategic decision to promote technology by providing financial support for in research and development. the rise in social and sectorial media allows the poorest parts of society—the ultra-orthodox and the israeli-arabs—to adopt technology and benefit from the leading role of the country in technological development and global competition. this means that while technology created the problem of dual structure—it also allows the segments of society that are considered poor and underdeveloped to use advanced media services within their communities. keywords technology, economy, society, social media, poverty 1. introduction what best identifies israel’s economy is the dominance of the high-tech sector, which is its main growth engine (unesco science report, 2015). the advancement of israel in innovation demonstrates www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 147 published by scholink inc. the role of technology in promoting countries and economies. as determined by the israel innovation authority (2018), israel is the second most innovative country in the world. however, while government policy has actively promoted high-tech industries, other sectors are left out. the country is divided along ethnic, national, religious and political lines, and income and poverty rate and income gap between different segments of society are inequality is among the highest in the western world (keeley, 2015). according to oecd report, israel is second only to the united states among developed nations in inequality (oecd, 2011) and has the highest percentage of people living below the poverty line (oecd, 2016). the israeli society is experiencing the digital divide, which mainly affects israeli-arabs and ultra-orthodox-jews (haredim). this is where the two parts of the economy are apparent: even though technology is important, it is only one-third of israel’s economy and therefore more than half of the economy is not advancing (poch, 2016). the research examines the dual structure that characterizes israeli economy—demonstrating the counter relations between the development of technology and the stability of society. the dual structure is recognized by the organization for economic co-operation (oecd) as a major social issue, as israel’s economy is registering a remarkable performance with strong growth, but economic gaps and lack of social cohesion continue to prevail (oecd, 2018). 2. the problem: the dual structure in order to understand the causes and impact of the dual structure, the changes in the economy should be explored. the israeli economy was transformed from the industrial age to the information society. it was initially subject to extensive government controls and was gradually converted into a fairly free market economy (halevi, 2018). israel has significantly transformed from a long established and monopolistic system to a more highly developed, sophisticated, and global approach (kaplan, 2015), experiencing an economic turnaround unprecedented in character and scope (economist, 2010). the change began in transforming from a closed and concentrated economy with a large public sector and burdensome tax regime, to an open and competitive economy that attracts foreign investments and participates in global financial markets (kaplan, 2015a). israel’s economy continues to perform well both in terms of macroeconomic and fiscal outcomes. growth has averaged 3.3% since 2000, higher than in many oecd countries (oecd, 2018), although the percentage of israelis living under the poverty line was higher in 2016 (18.6%) than in 2000 (17%) (sover-heruti, 2018). according to the oecd (2018), the israeli economy has grown faster and more consistently than nearly any other in the oecd for over a decade, but labor force participation rates, education and skill levels remain low for israeli-arabs and the ultra-orthodox, contributing to the high poverty rates and low productivity. this unique structure means that the economy performs well in terms of macroeconomic and fiscal outcomes and is very successful in global competition and technological advancement, while the division of society threatens the country’s future economic and social development (carngie moscow center, 2015). the dual structure is evident in that alongside the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 148 published by scholink inc. dramatic growth in the economy, israel experiences a widening of income disparities (krugman, 2015). former bank of israel governor karnit flug warned that “the country’s economic locomotive technology is pulling decrepit railroad cars” (akerman, 2018). the development of technology deprives social and economic issues (khattab, miaari, & stier, 2016), as the israeli society is split in half: on the one hand it is in the information era, while on the other hand it is still considered a developing country. israel has one of the most unequal economies in the western world, with significant gaps between the rich and poor (us news, 2017). this proves that israel is composed of two economies: while technology is highly developed, other sectors are left behind (sales, 2015). despite technological development, the dual structure is the result of the country being one of the most unequal economies in the western world. the israeli economy is characterized by low productivity and low standard of living, despite being a leader in the high-tech field (brand, 2017). israel has fallen behind the rest of the west when it comes to investment in education, healthcare, infrastructure and transportation per capita (schindler, 2018). a study by taub center shows that the problem lies in the large gap in the labor market: the high-tech sector is characterized by high wages and rapid growth, while the rest of the market has low salaries and slow growth. according to the research, the success of the high-tech sector in israel has had little impact on the rest of the economy, with the result that low labor mobility created two separate economies—the high-tech and low-tech sectors. in light of these findings, it appears that government support of the high-tech industry had only limited impact on the rest of the market (brand, 2017). the dual structure is the result of technological and global processes: advancements and improvements in technology provoke differences between workers with high skills and those with lower skills, while globalization caused the adoption of new technologies in a way that workers that are not prepared or don’t know how to use new technologies are penalized (oecd, 2011). the consequence for israel is that the economic structure persists with a small high-tech sector, but also with much larger but less efficient traditional industrial and services sectors with lower productivity levels. this structure led to a well-paid labor force living at the “core” of the country and a poorly paid labor force living primarily on the periphery (unesco science report, 2015). sales (2015) explains the problem that technology is causing in jobs, because almost 60% of jobs in israel could be lost because they are computerizes. the dual structure demonstrates the counter relations between the development of technology and the stability of society. denecke (2017) explains that the high-tech sector is very successful, but this success does not benefit the israeli workforce equally. she claims that the high wages of the israeli high-tech industry benefit only a small, overwhelmingly jewish and highly educated elite, and contribute to the high income inequality, as the majority of the workers in the high-tech sector are highly educated and jewish. this situation results in that the duel structure is marked by a lack of social cohesion and significant disparities, which penalize parts of the population and threaten the longer-term sustainability of the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 149 published by scholink inc. economy (gerby, levi, & gabizon, 2000). ultra-orthodox and israeli-arabs’ average skills and remuneration levels are low, their families are large and their social transfers are limited (oecd, 2018), with weaknesses in education and participation in the labor market (flug, 2014). as highlighted in the 2016 oecd survey, these groups lack the skills needed for well-paid job, and these deficiencies limit the effectiveness of their employment gains for lowering poverty and perpetuate the strong disparities in formal education with the rest of the population. according to the oecd (2018), enhancing training and education for israeli-arabs and ultra-orthodox is essential to improve their economic opportunities and make future growth more sustainable, and reforms and more public investment in education would develop their skills, allowing them to find well-paid jobs in high value-added sectors. despite improvement among arab israelis and ultra-orthodox in education and participation in the labor market, there is still a long way to go in narrowing the gaps because of the divides in the israeli society (wells, 2018). 55% of israeli arabs are “proud citizens” of israel, but 76% reject the definition of israel as a “jewish state” (newman, 2016). only 44.6% of israeli-arabs accept israel as a state with a jewish majority (lynfiels, 2018) and only two-thirds of haredim (65%) say that israel is a jewish state (few research center, 2018). this leads not only to a country with two economies, but also to a split society, since long-term population projections anticipate that the demographic composition of israeli society will change substantially over the next 50 years. based on current fertility rates, israel’s central bureau of statistics (cbs) estimates that ultra-orthodox and israeli-arabs—who make up approximately one-third of the total israeli population today—will comprise about 50% of the population in 2059 (wells, 2018). this contradiction of the dual structure of the economy, and consequently the dual structure of society too, is embedded so deep into the country that its citizens accept it and live with it (azran, 2013). even the prime minister, benjamin netanyahu, has accepted this contradicting policy and the role of technology in combating the digital divide. while addressing the economic forum in hungary, he said: “what come first are markets. if you have great technology without markets, without a market-friendly economy, you’ll get nowhere. but if you have a market-friendly economy, sooner or later the market forces will give you the technology you want” (netanyahu, 2017). 3. the solution: technology the dual structure of the economy is evident in that the growth of the technology sector has been counter to the social difficulties of the ultra-orthodox and israeli arabs—although it seems that technology is the solution for the dual structure of the economy and society. the rise in social and sectorial media allows these groups to bypass the traditional and main-stream channels to improve their socio-economic status. the swift development of technology has been a catalyst in that process. it is amazing in that respect that the segments of society that are considered poor and underdeveloped are also the ones that use social media best. this is becoming a significant factor in israel due to technology advancement, which enables a widespread use of alternative media (alternative to the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 150 published by scholink inc. official ones) and alternative advertising tools (to bypass the limitations of the media, which prevent sectional groups from acting freely and reach their audiences). the segmentation of the target groups enables the utilization of technological improvements and changes in the media, mainly among the ultra-orthodox and israeli-arab sectors. the pluralistic makeup of israeli society is reflected in the use of social media: israel has high rates of internet usage. more than half of all internet users take active part in social media sites, and a vast number of online news and information websites have sprung up (freedom house, 2016). this can explain the rise of sectorial media, since israel is composed of different ethnic groups. this is where technology can be a solution to the dual structure. israel can benefit from social media since the use of technology is widespread and israelis are leading consumers, serving the different sections of society (hallams, 2010). the impact of social media is particularly notable, since the time spent on facebook per visitor per month among israelis is one of the highest in the world. according to a report published by comscore, an american marketing research company, israel is ranking seventh globally with around 68% of all israeli internet users active on social media. israelis spend an average of eleven hours daily on social networks, almost double the world average of six hours, and ahead of countries like england (seven hours) and america (seven hours). only 6% of israelis have never used facebook, according to universal mccann’s social media research study (goldenberg, 2015). the advent of the digital age has led to significant changes to sectorial groups (wolfsfeld, 2017). a growing number of researches suggests that social media alter traditional political uses by democratizing access to media sources, speeding the circulation of information, which in turn can facilitate and spread collective action (laursen & muntean, 2015). social media provide enormous opportunities and challenges to engage with new policy spaces developing around the internet (adesina, 2017), and despite the high rate of poverty, israel can be considered a developed country because of the extensive use of its people in social media (hallams, 2010). the ultra-orthodox have benefited from the development of technology, despite the fact that the community distance itself from the israeli society. the haredi society is extreme about religious faith and distinguish themselves from the general public in major aspects, including clothing, education and sectorial (cohen, 2006). the segregation of the community weights on the economy since the number of haredim reached one million in 2017, representing 12% of the population (elis, 2017). the situation could become more difficult, since the sector is projected to comprise 16% of the total population by 2030 and will constitute a third of all citizens and 40% of the jewish population in 2065. although as mentioned earlier, israel’s poverty rate is the highest among oecd countries, kasir and tsachor-shai (2017) claim that the official poverty index presents only one view of poverty, which does not necessarily reflect the unofficial and unreported poverty of the haredim community. the bright side is that social media allows integration of the ultra-orthodox into mainstream israeli society alongside sustained cultural isolationism. according to the israel democracy institute (2017), there is increase in the numbers of ultra-orthodox students in the higher education system, a rise in the number of those www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 151 published by scholink inc. taking high-school matriculation exams, and positive trends in employment—despite the continued existence of gaps in income. the haredi way of communication is one of the oldest among the sectorial communications factors in israel, and it places itself as a counter-culture to the other groups that make the israeli society. in contrast, new media enables the creation of alternative means to the general communications as a service to the religious public, which rejects any expression forms that stands against its values. the sectional society of the haredi public employs in a focused way the new communications technology, yet technological innovation creates cultural conflicts between traditional society and social media. in recent years, there has been a significant increase in internet use among ultra-orthodox israelis, from 28% in 2009 to 43% in 2016. ultra-orthodox women use the internet more than men—47% versus 39% (cahaner, malach, & choshen, 2017). while using the internet, a number of filters serve orthodox homes, schools, and businesses, obstructing certain words, images, or pages within a site that’s allowed. in many communities, recreational internet usage is banned, with special exceptions granted only to individuals whose work absolutely requires an internet connection. nevertheless, members of the community connect to the internet despite the rabbinic prohibitions that strictly limit internet usage. the number of haredi internet users has dramatically increased in the last decade (levi, 2016). 49% of haredim use the internet with 40% use both a computer and smartphone to access the internet. 56% use only a computer and 4% use only a smartphone (rosenberg, 2016). social and sectorial media also benefit the arab population living in israel. the term “israeli arab” refers to the arab minority citizens (muslim or christian), which are about 20% of the population. although they share a common identity with the palestinian people and feel discriminated by israeli jews, they seek remedies within the framework of the state of israel (bard, 2018). the arab minority one fifth of israel’s population have the right to vote and have representatives in the parliament, but have traditionally faced discrimination in planning, land use, employment and government budgets (lynfield, 2018). unlike ultra-orthodox jews, the arab sector is eager to acquire education and integrates into modern labor market. the proportion of arab students in universities and colleges currently stands at 17 percent and is rapidly approaching the proportion of arab citizens in the population (london, 2018). arabs are more likely to name economic problems (42%) than security issues (30%) as the biggest long-term problem facing israel. one-in-five israeli arabs (20%) point toward social, religious or political problems as the biggest challenge facing the country and most of them describe their personal situation as “good” or “very good” (few research center, 2016). however, relations between jewish israelis and citizens of the arab minority are plummeting, with each side losing faith in coexistence and becoming less tolerant of the other (lynfield, 2018). the main problem is integration in the israeli society. israeli jews are divided when it comes to the status of the country’s arab minority: half say arabs should be expelled or transferred from israel, while the other half disagree (few research center, 2016). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 152 published by scholink inc. in recent years there is improvement among arab israelis on indicators like international test scores, matriculation rates and participation in the labor market (wells, 2018), as new media and social media allow them to maintain their culture and identity while befitting from the growing economy of israel. the influence of the internet and facebook revolution on the arab society is felt mainly among the younger generation since the majority of young arab adults use the internet as a source of news and information (90%) and most (64%) are open to receiving information in any language, with no preference for arabic or hebrew (the israel internet society, 2016). 4. conclusion in examining the impact of technology over society, we need to examine the benefits of technological advancement on sectors with high poverty rate and inequality compered to more advanced sectors. israel is a perfect example of the impact of technology, being a developed country in terms of technology and developing country in terms of social development on the other. the israeli case is unique, because of divisions between different parts of the israeli society—the ultra-orthodox and the israeli-arabs on the one hand, and the other sectors of the jewish population on the other. these divisions create a unique situation in which the economy and society are split into a dual structure of highly advanced economy and a leading global position in all that relates to technology, and in contrast communities which are poor and not considered part of the economy and technological boom. as the research maintains, the problem of the dual structure developed as a result of the supremacy of technology in the israeli economy and the consequent reality that the parts of society which did not adapt to the technological revolution are left behind. the research also claims that technology is not only the problem, but also the solution. social and sectorial media allow these communities to maintain their culture and identity while benefiting from the technological advancement. the use of social media is very high in israel, in society as a whole and in the poor communities as well, allowing israel to transform from a controlled economy to a free-market 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(2015). universal mccann’s 2015 social media study found israelis spend more time on the internet and smart phones than the global average. retrieved from https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-only-6-of-israelis-have-never-used-facebook-1001044443 adva, c. (2015, november 6). not exactly a start-up nation. retrieved from http://adva.org/en/not-exactly-a-start-up-nation/ sales, b. (2015, december 29). 6 (largely sad) numbers that describe israel’s economy. times of israel. retrieved from http://www.timesofisrael.com/6-numbers-that-describe-israels-economy/ ackerman, g. (2018, february 15). behind israel’s high-tech reputation is a low-tech economy. bloomberg. 2018. retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-14/israel-s-low-tech-economy-belies-reputatio n-as-global-tech-hub advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 1 original paper shared prosperity and the quintile income in sudan: preliminary findings omer eltayeb omer 1* 1 rural development department, university of bakhat al-ruda, eddueim, sudan * omer eltayeb omer, corresponding author received: february 14, 2023 accepted: march 18, 2023 online published: march 31, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n2p1 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n2p1 abstract this paper attempted to tackle tow issues: the first issue is the income distribution top income quintiles (including some parcels) with bottom 20% and 40% ones. secondly whether economic growth alone, could reduce extreme poverty and mitigate income inequality in sudan? different prosperity shared indicators applied to data obtained from two labor force migration households’ surveys collected by ministry of manpower for years 1996 and 2011. the findings of this study indicated that the income share of bottom 40% failed to catch up with shares of top 10%.and overall per capita .accordingly, all the shared prosperity indicators results were associated with idea of polarization in the sudan society, and more importantly cagr (as one of indicators) empathized that the bottom 20% income have to grow by more than 60% annually in order to catch up with overall per capita growth during the period of the study. to improve the picture of the income distribution and to reverse the situation of poverty in sudan, the pattern of economic growth has to be restructured and to be associated with high economic participation. the paper recommended a deliberate government intervention to improve income distribution. keywords shared prosperity, quintile income, overall per capita, polarization, sudan 1. introduction the main objectives of this paper are to answer the following two questions: firstly whether prosperity sharing proportionately or not? secondly would economic growth alone is quite sufficient to reduce extreme poverty and to mitigate income inequality? using data from two labor force migration households’ surveys (lfmhs) collected by ministry of manpower for years 1996 and 2011. various inequality measures such as gini, plama ratios and coefficient of variation, as well as simple algebra www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 2 published by scholink inc. methods of shared prosperity indicators employed to tackle the above twofold questions using data obtained from lfmhs. the growth rates of bottom 40%, top 10% and middle income groups, as well as overall per capita income growth from house hold surveys’ data, used by analogy to resemble the growth domestic product (gdp) and its associate gdp per capita. on policy side the paper attempt to elaborate the question concerning the economic and development policies such as economic growth alone is not sufficient to eliminate poverty and inequality, answering such type of question will be helpful for the policy makers to design and forge policies and strategies about how to allocate development resources between regions and economic sectors in order to reduce poverty and to improve income inequality. though the data isn’t timely due to the fact that government often procrastinated in carrying household surveys in regular convergent periods’ basis, it is useful in painting an empirical and quantitative documentation picture of bleak economic injustices of long time autocratic government ruled by so called national congress party (previously national islamic front). this paper cover four sections: section one is an introduction; section two handling sudan socioeconomic aspects; section three to elaborate data sources and provided under pining theoretical as well as equation formulas for different shared prosperity indicators and section four covered the discussion and the results of the study. finally a conclusion to wrap up the proceedings of the paper, and embedded most important results, policy implications and further future suggestions. 2. sudan socioeconomic aspects sudan during the period of study achieved higher economic growth rate a 5.8% and sometimes exceeded more than 7% per annum, this spectacular growth led to enlargement of its economic size from us$ 12 billion to us$ 65 billion and the per capita income grew by 46% per year due the exploration and exportation of oil (nadip, e alvin, & lange, s2019). however, sudan forfeited this opportunity to engineer genuine economic transformation and failed to achieve another important macroeconomic objective, that to generate sufficient employment opportunities for population growing with fast growth rate (2.8%), a population that characterized with young age structure, to mean that an army of employment seekers pouring in labor market inactivate to receive new comers. however, the employment remunerative is important than employment opportunities for sustainable poverty reduction (fields, 2012, 2018). in addition to these demographic aspects, the inappropriateness and non-compliance of the education output to the requirement of the labor market, caused higher youth unemployment, in particular the graduates of social sciences suffered higher unemployment compared to applied science graduates, sudanese labor market generally is characterized by low educational attainment lack of training and technological development . about 43% of labor force has no education, in the urban sector, the workers with no education represent 13.4%, while in the rural sector they are about 56%, gender wise employed force 34.9% and 65.9% had no education for males and females, respectively (maglad, 2013; ali & elbadawi, 2004). the unemployment situation is aggravated further due the application of economic reform policies www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 3 published by scholink inc. based on what called washington consensus namely the privatization of state owned enterprises as one of main pillars of the blend of world bank and international monetary fund programs, bearing in mind the government is main employer particularly in urban sector. also harsh authoritarian measures adopted by the ousted government such as fearing non-trustees in different government sectors, and most of the privatized enterprises favored the government affiliates and cronies. also the defunct regime used economic policies to achieve its own political agenda and to serve the economic interests of the privileged elite and to consolidate their position on market and finance (el-battahani, 2015). the pattern of economic growth, which resulted in more than 7% of economic growth, it isn’t robust pattern, this high rate of economic growth is not due: to investment in nonoil sector; investment in infrastructure; existence rule of law; existence of virtuous social institutions; prevalence of stable macro-economic environment or viable politics. the growth booming probably due to the natural gifts such as oil and gold, the traditional composition of the economy remain the same—only industrial sector improved due to increased share of oil production—i.e., small enclave modern sector extractive colonial built to serve the interest of colonial and domestic few small group of elite, is remained as dualistic economy with huge traditional agriculture sector dominated by small modern sector, with slight changes if any (ali & elbadawi, 2004) as far as poverty is concerned, head account, according to the household survey (2009) carried by the national central bureau for statistics, it was ranged between 26% as lowest for khartoum and 69% as highest for darfur the conflict zone, and 47% for the national level, this means only one of two sudanese were able get the minimum food and non-food bundle in 2009. the urban poverty was enormously lower than rural areas (omer, 2018, 2021). for human development index as it concerned, prepared by united nation development program, sudan is classified amongst the poor developing countries in nineties and 2000, while for millennium development goals interim report (mdgs) in 2004, the performance of sudan in the eight mdgs goals were significantly low compared with targeted ones. moreover, ali showed that need to sustain a growth about 7% per annum to achieve the mdgs on poverty; otherwise, growing at 2.2 per capita income, sudan would need 28 years to accomplish the mdgs on poverty (omer, 2018; and ali, no date). while for inequality, latest study findings indicted sudan is highly unequal in terms of gini, thiel and plama ratios, and the size of middle class size is shrinking for the whole country, at regional and mode of living levels (omer, 2018) 3. data and methods 3.1 data data obtained from two labor forces migration household surveys collected by the ministry of manpower for the years 1996 and 2011. the data is very comprehensive encompassing information on labor market employment, incomes from wages, agriculture and livestock, non-agriculture activities, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 4 published by scholink inc. real estate, land rent, remittances and subsidies. to eliminate the effects of money value changes during the period of the study incomes were deflated using 1990 as baseline year, and the corresponding consumer price index (cpi) is used as price deflator in adjusting money values in 1996 and 2011, and to eliminate the percussions of the currency changing from pound to dinar and gain from dinar to pound as result of national peace agreement 2005 with sudan people liberation army (spla). 3.2 prosperity sharing indicators world bank group in 2013 agreed on two main goals, firstly on the termination of extreme chronic poverty (us$1.25) for poverty line, adjusted with purchasing power parity, in the world 2030 and secondly to promote shared prosperity in every society. the second goal behind development of simple algebraically and easy calculated quintile income as welfare measure (rosenbalt & mcgavock, 2013; basu, 2013). the concept of pro-poor growth (used interchangeably with inclusive growth) is about change of poverty incidence and inequality changes in the process of economic growth, and whether growth benefits the poor segments in society or not .the world bank defines pro-poor growth only if it reduce poverty, and that if poor receive only a tiny fraction of total benefits of growth still the process will be called pro—poor (kakwani & son, 2006; weisbrot et al., 2001). from various definitions of pro-poor growth this paper used, the slope of the per capita share of bottom 40%, with respect to overall per capita. furthermore, shared prosperity indicator will be applied to the above mentioned data. the specification of whether growth is good for poor people on not, can be expressed in the following terms. this slope of the relationship between average incomes of poorest quintiles and the overall average incomes should be very close to and not significantly different from one if growth is good for poorest people (dollar et al., 2013). the concept of quintile income, which this study exposed to, emanated from rawlsian notion which emphasize the importance of promoting the welfare of the least fortune members of the society (20% bottom), it can be compared to macroeconomic per capita income in developing countries, basu preferred to place the cut-off at bottom 40% since the most poorest people located in bottom 40%, sudan is one of good example the poverty head count 2009 was 47%. some people criticized the bottom 40 % cut-off for it neglecting inequality, but since overall population forced in poorest 40%, the mentioned cut-off would not ignore the above altogether, for instance if the poorest 40% incomes improved due to the government intervention, the original above cut–off would fall below mechanically into public policy focus (basu, 2013; omer, 2018). another weakness of the bottom 40% as shared prosperity indicator, if for example two societies have www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 5 published by scholink inc. their bottom 40% quintile connected or cross shares, by shared prosperity the two are identical in terms of income distribution, but in view of the lorenz curve dominance the society with dominating lorenz curve has better income distribution, still the shared prosperity is an only goal for the nation to pursue if not another problem appear (basu, 2013). though this paper is not going to engage directly in the discussion of formal derivation and to approach the axiomatic of the prosperity share welfare measure, one have briefly to mention the three most important traits of the shared measure: (i) sp (x) is complete transitive ordering of set x of all possible vector x; (ii) sp(x) meets the criteria of the anonymity, in the sense that two countries with same income vector, but income randomly distributed across the people then the two countries have the same sp(x) value; (iii) also the shared prosperity indicator (spi) satisfying weak pareto principle if every individual income rises then society is considered better off. basu argued that spi may not meet the weak transfer axiom, especially if transfer from rich in bottom 40% of the distribution to poor one within bottom 40 % (rosenblatt & j mcgavock, 2013). the shared prosperity indicator is: = [(s(x))/0.4)*y t+1((s(x))/0.4)*y t]/ [((s(x))/0.4)*y t] (2) the simplified standard way of writing the percentage change is: equation (3) represents simple algebraic formula that signalizes the role of economic growth in the long run, and its positive effects on the share of the bottom quintiles 40% (rosenblatt & mcgavock, 2013). 3.2.1 the shares within the shares in other words how incomes distributed within top income group, with figures between two brackets to show the income shares proportionate to their share of population size. this method covering different percentiles, may range for more than the three percentiles, but this study for simplicity will confined to the three ones which include 1%, 0.05% and 0.01%. moreover, this method is meant to detect whether income is polarized in the higher income plateau or not (atkinson, 2011). 3.2.2 compound annual growth rate (cagr). , cagr is another method to be used to, as an alternative to compare between the bottom quintile income (40% 20%) to figure out whether it captured the growth of overall per capita, or top quintile (as top 10% as in this paper), another usage of the cagr as method to predict by how much the bottom quintile income has to grow to capture the target, the overall per capita or the top10% income as in this study, notably in calculation of warranted quintile income in the end year, then to know by how much (percentage) the quintile income has to grow to capture the target. whereas: www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 6 published by scholink inc. bv = beginning value. ev = end value. n = number of years. 4. results this section is intended to demonstrate the empirical findings of the study on extent of the disproportionate distribution of economic growth benefits between the top quintile (top 10% ) and bottom quintiles (bottom 20% and 40%) and the degree of inequality in sudan during the period of study, at national, regions and by mode of living, levels. table (1) presents the following findings: at national level in 1996 the share of top 10%is fourteen times, more than the tow times of bottom 40% and middle group, respectively; in 2011 the share of top 10%is six times the share of bottom 40%, and equal to 1.5 times points of the middle income group. furthermore in 2011 the bottom 40% increased by 4.4 point percentage, and middle income group increased by 5.3 point percentage, all these increases came at expense of the share of the top 10% which decreased by 9.73 point percentages in the same year. the picture will be look different if one considered the distribution of shares percentages within bottom 40% and middle income group, for more details see (omer, 2018). urban sector in 1996 resembled the same distribution of national one in the same year, while in 2011 the share of the top 10% decreased significantly, and the middle income group share increased by more than its previous share by more than 20 point percentage. for rural sector the picture is entirely different, the share of the top 10% is almost eight times, and more than ten times of bottom 40% in 1996 and 2011, respectively. the stark observation is the share of middle group is decreased by eight point’s percentage in 2011 than its share in1996, while for the top 10% in 2011 increased by more than eight points percentages than initial level 1996, this increase came at expense of the share of middle income group. another important observation is that the share of the top 10% at national and by mode of living is more than 53% except for urban in 2011 which is 36.10%. another important facets of analysis is reflected by different income inequality measures such as gini coefficient, and palma ratio to be supported by coefficient of variation –cv-(standard deviation divided by the mean) and this last measure reflect whether income distribution is stable or not, in case of high cv, i.e., more than three, it means income is highly unequal distributed. gini coefficient was calculated as 0.73and 0.61 for 1996 and 2011, respectively. while the income inequality decreased by 12 points, inequality in sudan still high if compared to regional and international levels, for more details see (omer, 2018). as far as mode of living is concerned, the findings revealed that the gini coefficient for the urban is higher than rural ones in 1996, but the picture is totally reversed in 2011, theoretically people move from rural areas with low wage and low income inequality to the high wage and high income unequal urban (kuznets, 19955). these results bolstered by the values of the cv, that to say income is highly www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 7 published by scholink inc. unequally distributed. as palma (2006, 2011) which refers to middle income as 50% income receivers, without indulge in income as proper measure of middle class size. the table showed the fact that income share of middle income group is less than 50% for all findings except for urban sector in 2011 which is more than 50%, one can conclude that the values of palma ratio is higher by the standard international findings, again this revealed that income distribution is highly unequal, for further information see (omer, 2018; omer & maglad, 2021). table 1. income shares of bottom 40%, middle income group and inequality measures for the national and mode of living by percentage income groups a national 1996 b national 2011 c urban 1996 2011 d rural 1996 2011 bottom 40% 4.564 8.93 5.17 10.78 6.17 6.06 middle group 31.03 36.43 30.9 53.12 40.27 32.67 top 10 % 64.37 54.64 64.74 36.10 53.56 61.27 cv 3.83 2.7 3.02 1.62 3.4 26.1 gini coefficient 0.71 0.61 0.72 0.46 0.64 0.67 palma ratio 14.1 6.12 12.51 3.34 8.72 10.11 source: owen calculation note; for calculation of gini coefficient and palma ratio see (omer, 2018). table 2 presents in columns 2-4 the relative inequality income shares percentages of the poorest 60 % and richest 20% and the ratio richest 20% to poorest 60%. the share of the poorest 60% is almost 11% in 1996, and then increased almost 20% in 2011. on the other hand the share of the share 20 % was 76.43% in 1996 and 65.34% in 2011; the ratios of the percentage of richest 20%to poorest 60% are 7.07 times and 3.3 times for 1996 and 2011, respectively. though the ratio of richest 20% declined in 2011 to 65.345 yet it is by any means is very high. by contrast the earrings of top richest 20% in one month and half month and four months are equal income earnings of poorest 60% in whole year in 1996 and 2011, respectively. columns 5-7 of the table include the shares within shares. in other words, the paper question how incomes were distributed within the top income group from 1% to 0.01% parcels? the figures between the two brackets are the income shares proportionate to its share of population size. the share of the top 1%, top 0.05% and top 0.01% and their share to their proportionate population size for 1996 are as following: (6.56%: 65.65 times); (4.9%: 98 times) and (2.46%: 246 times) for the three parcel, respectively. while for 2011, the relative share and proportionate size came as following: (30.55%; 305.5 times); (29.77%: 5945.4 times) and (18.29%: 1829 times) for 1%; 0.05% and 0.01, respectively. looking to the table one can observed upward www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 8 published by scholink inc. increase trend of the top income parcels over the period of the study. this suggests a high degree of income concentration in the hands of top 10% and particularly the top 0.01% parcel. moreover, the table findings indicated increase of income concentration within top group in 2011 is higher than 1996 one, put in consideration relative population size of each parcel. table 2. relative inequality income shares % year a poorest 60% b richest 20% c ratio a/b d top 1% f top 0.05% e top 0.01 1996 10.854 76.03 7.00 6.56 (65.60) 4.9 (98) 2.46 (246) 2011 19.567 65.345 3.3 30.55 (305.5) 29.77 (595.4) 18.29 (1829) source: own calculation, estimates of per capita of household income expressed in constant 1990 terms. calculation. table 3, row (1) presents the results of the relationship between averages income of the bottom 40% and the average overall income, which is used here instead of gdp as indicator of economic growth, for the total sample, regions and rural–urban sectors for the period 2011-1996. the slopes of the relationship between growth rates are almost between 0.1 and 0.2 which are different significantly from one for the national, regions and mode of living for the entire period of study (for regions’ results see annex one), implying that prosperity is not shared by the poorest group, namely the bottom 40%. this result is in agreement with dollar and kray (2013) observation that say growth may not alone be good for the poor if not connected with deliberate income distributional policies such as progressive taxes and social spending. moreover, the anti-poor growth is indicated by using equation (3) to calculate percentage change in the bottom 40% share (it is not part of the table). the results of percentage change in the bottom 40% for the whole sample was -46.9% for 2011-1996. for the same period, the percentage change of bottom 40% was -35% and -0.71% for urban and rural sectors, respectively. thus these findings implied that the benefits of growth are not favouring the bottom 40%. to continue with table 3, row (2) the prosperity share measure which study how income of bottom 40% grow from one period to the next, this table showed the following findings, the shared prosperity measure is negative and almost 1%. though the decrease of the per capita is less than 1%, this result confirmed the results of the previous two tables the share of poorest 40% is falling behind the rest, or www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 9 published by scholink inc. not catch up the incomes, of the middle income group and the top 10%, though the results is not agreed with results of palma regarding the decrease shares of bottom 40%, going the top 10%, yet plama ratio is by all means is higher, internationally wise (omer, 2018). despite the fact sudan during twenties of current century achieved economic growth probably 7%, the share of the bottom 40% is not concomitant with overall economic growth –implied that, the shared prosperity associated with idea of polarization in the sudan society—one can concluded from this result that economic growth alone can’t reduce chronic poverty and alleviated the discreditable inequality. in row (3)—a, one can observed that the bottom 40% income appeared higher than overall income mean for both national and mode of living, as if symptom of equalitarian or inclusive growth, but as in row (3) – b, if inequality of income distribution is considered as shown by previous measures, by taken the mean of income top 10 % as alternative to overall mean income, the lacking of quintile income of bottom 40% is starkly obvious. furthermore, if one take rawlsian bottom 20% minimum percentage principle—for two purposes, the first one to verify the inequality of income distribution during the period of the study which founded as overall mean per capita is 1.32 while the income of bottom 20% quintile equal to 1.04, i.e., the bottom 20% quintile income failed to catch up with overall growth. secondly, the bottom 20% quintile is easiest for calculation of desired or warranted annual compound growth rate, which founded to be equal to 1.61 as calculated in annex (3) section (ii), if one subtract 1.61 from one, the result is 61% which means that, if the bottom 20% income had grown by 61% annually it could have been caught the desired (warranted) income in 2011. table 3. measurements inclusive growth, shared prosperity and cagr measures a national b urban c rural row (1)slope of relationship between bottom 40% and overall average income 0.09 0.07 0.13 row (2)percentage of shared prosperity -0.94 -0.99 -0.92 row (3)* – (a) compound annual growth rate (cagr) mean (overall mean) quintile ( income of bottom 40% ) row 3(b) cagr mean per capita of top 10% quintile income of bottom 40 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.02 0.96 0.04 1.41 1.01 1.01 1.11 1.25 0.81 this table compiled from annexes at the end of the paper. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 10 published by scholink inc. 5. discussion different methods of prosperity sharing such as; the slope relationship between bottom 40% per capita income and overall per capita, as indicator of whether growth is good for poor people or not, the shared prosperity indicator formulas (2) and (3) in the text are highlighted the trend of economic growth in the long run an its positive effect on the bottom 40% income share; the shares within the shares, namely the top parcels of the top 10% income group, compared proportionately to each share population size, to detect whether income is polarized / concentrated in the hands on higher income group or not? last not the least, compound annual growth rate used to check whether the poorest income grow by the same of overall per capita or not, in addition to that cagr is employed as forecasting method. all these measures are applied to data maintained from two labor force migration households’ surveys collected by ministry of manpower; with sample size 3288 and 11182 households for years 1996 and 2011, respectively. the two surveys are similarly designed, comprehensive national data of employment, wages and salaries and other sources of incomes, the coverage of the two surveys is limited to northern 16 states which regrouped in to six regions, the south before its independence, was excluded due to the long persistence civil war. to eliminate the effects of money value changes during the period of the study, the prices of 1990 was considered as base line year and the corresponding consumer price index (cpi) is used in adjusting money values in 1996 and 2011. though sudan during the period of the study witnessed unprecedented economic growth rate probably about 7%, and led to slight improvement of inequality, as gini ratio indicated a decrease from 0.71 to 0.6 yet sudan is classified is highly income (omer, 2018). the slight improvement income of the 20% and 40% bottom have had not eliminate poverty or mitigate income inequality. the measures employed tin this paper the slope relationship (1) and shared prosperity indicator (2), (3) formulas, the share within the share, and in conclusion the carg, all together implied that the benefits of growth is enjoyed by the bottom 40%, and these shared prosperity measures associated with idea of polarization in the sudan society. in addition, the compound annual economic growth revealed that if the income of the bottom 20% income had grown by 61% annually it could have been caught the desired (warranted) income in 2011. moreover, one can make comment on the meagre improvement of the bottom 40 %, it can be attributed to the exploration and export of oil and gold, and expansive emergence of informal sector predominantly in services sector. one can wrap up, that economic growth without government redistribution intervention policies is not conducive to eradicate chronic extreme poverty and to improve income inequality in sudan. as matter of policy implications, after empirical evidence of increase of economic growth in terms of growth of overall per capita income, and the lack of the bottom 40% per capita behind, the trickle down is myth needed to be revised to meet the requirements of reduction of poverty and to mitigate income inequality .trade openness is important but should be in line with needs of most poorest segments of society, private sector should be encouraged to be employment friendly. for government should www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 11 published by scholink inc. provide investment for infrastructure, enforcement rule of law and viable social institutions, i.e. the government have to provide social serviceseducation and health and enhance stable macro-economic environment the pattern of economic growth instead of being depend on natural giftsoil and gold, to base on productive one .other distributive policies such progressive tax may be considered, and rural development policy should has to be forged to address poverty and inequality in rural sector. in addition to that the household’s surveys must be carried in regular convergent periods to avail for the researchers’ up to date information to be used by researchers to lend their immediate findings to policy makers. references ali, a. a., & elbadawi, a. i. (2004). explaining sudan’s economic growth performance, paper prepared for african economic research consortium. working paper no. 9, nairobi, kenya. atkinson, b. a. (2011). evidence on top incomes in tanzania, 1948-1970. working paper 11/0070, international growth centre. dollar et al. (2013). growth is still is good for the poor. policy research. working paper 6568. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6568 elbadawi, a. i. (2015) (in arabic). sudan and the crisis of economy and development, towards a just and sustainable developmental vision. in ibrahim, a. h. (ed.), the independence of sudan, sixty years of trial and error 1956-2016. al-hadara publishing, cairo. el-battahani, e. a. (2015) (in arabic). the marsh of sudan economy in sixty years 1956-2016. in ibrahim, a. h. (ed.), the independence of sudan, sixty years of trial and error 1956-2016. al hadara publishing, cairo. fields, s. g. (2012). working hard, working poor. a global journey, oxford university press, oxford uk. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198815501.001.0001 fields, s, g. (2018). employment and development. oxford university press, oxford. uk. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794645.001.0001 haughton, j., & khandker, r. s. (2009). handbook on poverty + inequality. the world bank washington, dc. kakwani, n., & son, h. h. (2006). pro-poor growth: the asian experience. unu-wider research paper no. 56. maglad, n. a. (2013). wages earning differentials and education by gender. khartoum nadip, a., & lange, s. (2019). the labor market and poverty in sudan. poverty and equity global practice africa, world bank. omer, e, o., & maglad, n. (2021). income inequality and middle class in sudan: some statistical facts. journal of development and economic policies, 23(1). omer, e. o. (2018). decomposition of household’s income sources and factors determining inequality in sudan1990-2011, ph.d. university of khartoum. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 12 published by scholink inc. rosenblatt, d., & mcgavock, j. t. (2013). a note on the simple algebra of the shared prosperity indicator. the world bank, working paper 6645. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6645 subramanian, s. (2011). inclusive development and the quintile income statistic. economic & politically weekly, xl.vi no. 4. weisbrot, m. et al. (2000). growth may be good for the poor—but are the imf and wb policies good for growth, centre for economic policy research. washington d.c mimeo. annex (1) table 1. the relationship between average incomes of bottom 40% and the overall average incomes, by regions and mode of living national –regions 2011 –1996 a change of overall average incomes b growth average of bottom 40% income c slope of the relationship b/ a national -73493 -6815.1 0.09 eastern -60411 -6645.21 0.11 northern -38256 -8449.4 0.22 khartoum -265420 -31846 0.12 central -54776 -8960.2 0.16 kordfan -29427 -3855.5 0.13 darfur -28584 -2176.9 0.08 urban -166202 -11077.6 0.07 rural -30607 -3916.6 0.13 all estimates of income shares in the table expressed in constant terms. source: own calculations. annex (2) table 2. shared prosperity indicator national and mode of living a per capita income of bottom 40% b overall per –capita income percentage of sp national 1996 2011 9525 3575 88418 14925 0.94 rural 1996 7116 45548 0.92 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 13 published by scholink inc. 2011 10766 2298.2 urban 1996 2011 23480 10723 181083 3872 0.99 all estimates of income shares in the table expressed in constant terms. source: own calculations. annex 3: (i) whereas: bv = beginning value ev = end value. n = number of years (ii) y1 = 1996 y2 = 2011 n = population of bottom 20% m = overall mean y = n. m y1 = 676 × 42290899 = 2900647724 y2 = 2236× 7463613 = 16688638668 to get the fruit of growth one has to follow the coming steps δ = y2 – y1 = 13787990944, if fruit of growth proportionately distributed between the five quintiles then, = = 2757598189, the desired quintile income of 2011= the fruit of growth + quintile income of 1996 2757598189+ 2900647724 = 5658245913 desired = = 1.61 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 31 original paper analysis of the impact of unemployment and reemployment on china’s economic growth zheng jingtong 1* 1 beijing no.80 high school, china * zheng jingtong, e-mail: 1433911577@qq.com received: june 02, 2023 accepted: july 09, 2023 online published: july 14, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n3p31 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n3p31 abstract unemployment and employment issues have consistently held significance in the context of a country’s economic development. in the aftermath of the pandemic, it becomes imperative for china to effectively address future employment pressures while concurrently enhancing people’s quality of life. this article aims to analyze the underlying causes of unemployment in the post-epidemic era, while also delving into the challenges associated with re-employment and its subsequent impact on economic growth. the findings of this study reveal that re-employment plays a crucial role in driving economic growth. although china’s existing reemployment policies have yielded certain positive outcomes, there remain several policy-related concerns that necessitate macro-level adjustments and concerted efforts from enterprises. keywords unemployment, reemployment, economic growth, post-pandemic era 1. introduction the issue of employment and unemployment holds significant importance in the field of macroeconomics. prior to the outbreak of the covid-19 pandemic, employment stability was already prioritized when analyzing the development of major economies worldwide. in the case of china, unemployment stands as a broad and significant macroeconomic concern. in order to sustain a high-speed economic growth rate of over 5%, china must effectively address future employment pressures while simultaneously enhancing the quality of life for its people. the political bureau of the cpc central committee, during its meeting on july 31, 2018, explicitly emphasized the importance of stable employment as the foremost priority among the “six areas of stability”. this recognition underscores the significance of employment stability as a vital factor in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 32 published by scholink inc. ensuring people’s livelihoods and national security. high economic growth is typically positively associated with employment growth, as employment serves as the foundation for economic expansion. as a developing country, china confronts the challenge of maintaining rapid and stable economic growth while simultaneously grappling with an increasingly complex employment situation. therefore, conducting in-depth research on the employment situation within the context of china’s economic growth and advocating for the establishment of an economic development strategy centered around stable employment holds excellent practical significance. this article will adopt a case study approach, focusing primarily on china as the research subject. it will analyze the current employment situation in china, closely examine the impact of unemployment and reemployment on china’s post-pandemic economic growth, and further explore the implications of china’s relevant economic policies. 2. analysis of the causes of unemployment in the post-epidemic era over the past three years, the outbreak of covid-19 has severely impacted the economy, causing many businesses to face closure and operating difficulties. due to the deteriorating economic situation, companies have to take measures such as layoffs, salary cuts, and reductions in human resource expenditures. under such circumstances, the recruitment needs of enterprises have dropped significantly, leading to an increase in the number of unemployed people in society. the losses caused by the epidemic to enterprises are more reflected in the imbalance of the economic system, such as reduced consumption, difficulties in unemployment and reemployment, and interruption of supply chains. unemployment in reality can be attributed to various factors, with the covid-19 pandemic serving as a significant catalyst for the deterioration of employment and economic development. the epidemic has emerged as a decisive factor, exacerbating the challenges faced by individuals and businesses. it has caused a collapse in employment opportunities and disrupted economic growth. unemployment can be broadly categorized into two main types: active unemployment and passive unemployment. regardless of the type, both are influenced by external factors such as the state of the market economy and the prevailing trends in industry development. 2.1 active unemployment active unemployment, as defined, encompasses various scenarios where employees voluntarily leave their jobs or are unable to secure employment due to personal preferences, dissatisfaction with existing working conditions, or incompatibility with company culture and requirements. some common examples of active unemployment include employees resigning voluntarily, being unsuccessful in job assessments conducted by new companies, becoming victims of internal corporate politics, experiencing conflicts with colleagues, engaging in frequent job switches without valid reasons, lacking the necessary skills or attitude for job requirements, suffering from severe illnesses or significant liabilities, and facing disciplinary actions for serious violations of company regulations. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 33 published by scholink inc. 2.2 passive unemployment passive unemployment refers to those who are able to work and are willing to accept the current wage level but still cannot find a suitable job. this kind of unemployment is caused by uncontrollable objective reasons, leading to large-scale layoffs in enterprises, which can be alleviated through appropriate economic measures and policies. for example, unemployment due to economic adjustment or misallocation of resources, structural unemployment due to technological change, changes in consumer preferences, poor labor mobility, unemployment due to recession or depression due to economic cycle fluctuations, artificial intelligence, etc. these unemployment phenomena are closely related to economic development, industry changes and individual behavior. therefore, corresponding financial measures and policies should be adopted to deal with different types of unemployment problems to promote the increase of employment opportunities and the stable development of the economy. 3. analysis of factors affecting re-employment difficulties 3.1 the oversupply of the labor market the outbreak of the epidemic, coupled with ongoing economic transformation, has led to a surplus of labor in the market. many businesses had to suspend operations or reduce production during the pandemic, resulting in a significant increase in unemployment. while the situation has improved with the gradual resumption of business activities, supply chain disruptions and logistics bottlenecks have hindered the full recovery of enterprises. as a result, many employers have been cautious in recruiting new employees, leading to a decrease in available job positions and downward pressure on wages. china’s rapid economic development over the past few decades has resulted in improved education levels and labor skills among the population. however, employment opportunities in traditional manufacturing industries have declined, while emerging industries are still in the process of maturing. this imbalance between supply and demand in the labor market has created challenges in terms of unemployment and re-employment. the mismatch between the skills possessed by job seekers and the skill requirements of available positions further exacerbates the difficulty of finding suitable employment opportunities. 3.2 imperfect social security system for reemployment 3.2.1 challenges in unemployment security policies and laws china has implemented an unemployment security system comprising social insurance and social assistance to support unemployed individuals. the regulations on unemployment insurance and the social insurance law outline the eligibility criteria for unemployment insurance benefits and assistance. the “interim measures for social assistance” also provide social assistance measures such as employment assistance and minimum living security for the unemployed. however, despite the establishment of this system, certain issues remain that need to be addressed. one problem is the imperfect design of the unemployment insurance system and the ineffective implementation of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 34 published by scholink inc. re-employment measures, which is an objective reality. from a legal standpoint, there is a lack of regulation and clarity in managing labor contracts, particularly in the context of full-time and part-time employment. this can lead to difficulties in guaranteeing the legitimate rights and interests of workers. furthermore, age discrimination in re-employment poses a significant challenge. cases like that of mr. wang, a highly educated executive in shanghai, who faced difficulty finding a job due to age-related factors, highlight the issue. age often becomes crucial for re-employment opportunities, overshadowing factors such as education and gender. job advertisements with age restrictions are common, with some not accepting applicants over the age of 40 or even 35. several countries have enacted legislation to address age-based selection criteria as a form of discrimination. it is crucial for china to engage in legislative or judicial discussions to tackle age discrimination and formulate tailored policies that consider the characteristics of different demographic groups. 3.2.2 enhancing employment platforms and vocational training for effective reemployment the current employment platforms have yet to fully utilize the potential of community-based labor security and employment service platforms in the new era. to address this, it is crucial to focus on strengthening the construction of these platforms. this can be achieved by implementing targeted management of unemployed individuals’ profiles, improving standardized procedures, and enhancing vocational training, identification, guidance, and job placement services. by establishing a comprehensive reemployment service system, the employment platform can better cater to the needs of the unemployed. additionally, it is essential to foster collaboration with public employment agencies to facilitate data sharing, extend service coverage, establish comprehensive networking, and facilitate precise job matching. this collaborative approach will ensure a more efficient and effective reemployment process for individuals seeking job opportunities. furthermore, in order to adapt to the new employment landscape of the digital age, emphasis should be placed on promoting vocational training programs. private educational institutions and vocational training projects should be actively encouraged to provide training that equips the unemployed with the necessary skills required by emerging industries and sectors. providing financial support tailored to different forms of employment interruption is crucial to assist individuals in their transition to new career opportunities. to facilitate successful reemployment, it is vital for relevant departments to implement targeted measures such as job training, career guidance, and personalized support for re-employees. by offering comprehensive reemployment services, individuals can receive the necessary assistance and guidance to effectively reintegrate into the workforce. 4. the impact of reemployment on china’s economic growth china’s long-standing family planning policy has resulted in a significant decline in birth rates and a substantial population aging issue. the consequences of an oversupply in the labor market and the simultaneous increase in labor costs have compelled the country to expedite industrial upgrading and foster an innovative economy. to ensure the sustainable development of the innovation economy, it is www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 35 published by scholink inc. imperative to harness the full potential of high-quality talent. while historical statistics may not explicitly demonstrate the impact of economic growth on employment, the changing dynamics of the labor market structure have made the relationship between economic development and labor supply and demand more pronounced. previously, the focus was primarily on analyzing capital, product, and industrial development. however, it is now crucial to shift people’s attention toward comprehending the intricate relationship between employment, unemployment, and economic growth. 4.1 the significance of reemployment for economic development maintaining a high level of employment is crucial for driving economic growth. even during periods of economic slowdown, full employment creates a conducive environment for deepening supply-side structural reforms and accelerating transformation and upgrading. conversely, a combination of high unemployment and low growth severely restricts the potential for economic expansion. in the current macroeconomic landscape, overcoming the constraints of labor shortage and rapid wage increases is essential to further increase the economic growth rate. the pressure on labor market supply compels the government and society to prioritize the development of innovation capabilities and improvements in production efficiency. thus, maintaining a relatively high level of employment becomes a vital factor in promoting economic development. this not only ensures a stable labor force for the economy but also creates favorable conditions for deepening structural reforms and facilitating transformation and upgrading. moreover, the pressure on labor market supply encourages a greater focus on enhancing innovation capabilities and production efficiency. by addressing the bottleneck in labor supply, we can elevate the economic growth rate and achieve sustainable development. 4.2 the imperative of reemployment for economic development unemployment exerts a significant impact on the economy, particularly in an era of low unemployment and sluggish growth following the pandemic. formulating macroeconomic control policies becomes increasingly challenging under such circumstances. the global economic system has been disrupted by the covid-19 pandemic, with developed countries implementing unprecedented monetary easing policies. this has resulted in excess global liquidity, triggering unprecedented high inflation and economic stagflation in some regions. currently, there are lingering employment imbalances, and rapid economic growth may further exacerbate structural unemployment. in essence, the issue of employment reflects the underutilization of labor resources. with a population of 1.4 billion, china’s pursuit of stable employment encompasses not only aggregate concerns but, more importantly, structural considerations. relying solely on stimulating overall employment levels yields limited effects and may even lead to stagflation. in this context, the significance of reemployment becomes even more pronounced. by promoting reemployment, we can achieve more comprehensive utilization of labor resources, alleviate pressure from structural unemployment, and enhance employment quality. reemployment not only provides individuals with economic income and social security but also fosters a virtuous cycle of economic www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 36 published by scholink inc. development. encouraging reemployment will boost consumer demand, invigorate the market, and create additional opportunities for enterprise development. 5. discussion the “high growth, low unemployment” phenomenon in china, with an average annual economic growth rate of 9.5% and an annual average registered urban unemployment rate of less than 4.5%, results from various contributing factors. china has implemented a series of necessary measures to achieve this outcome. firstly, china recognizes the positive correlation between economic growth and employment expansion. this understanding has allowed china to pursue dual goals during its economic development process. compared to other countries, china has maintained rapid and stable economic growth over an extended period, leading to the expansion of industries and a steady increase in employment demand. secondly, china prioritizes stable employment and considers it a fundamental aspect of people’s livelihood. employment has become the foundation and starting point for various economic policies. through policies that encourage self-employment, china has witnessed a rapid decrease in the unemployment rate. notably, during the international financial crisis in 2008, china promptly implemented policies and measures to stabilize growth, ensure employment, and promote people’s livelihood. as a result, it successfully avoided a sudden economic decline and a sharp increase in unemployment. furthermore, industrial upgrading has played a crucial role. china’s industrial development has transitioned from labor-intensive to capital-intensive and technology-intensive sectors. the overall quality of the labor force has significantly improved, resulting in enhanced labor productivity and capital-output efficiency. this has effectively prevented the mismatch between labor and technology and mitigated the occurrence of “jobless growth” in china. the emergence of new economic forms and businesses, particularly within the tertiary industry, has not only become a new driving force for economic growth but also created numerous new occupations and jobs. the process of industrial upgrading has transformed the labor and employment system from “all-in-one contracting” during the planned economy era to a market-based employment system where independent job selection plays a significant role. the market mechanism has become decisive in allocating labor resources, and various labor markets, including state-owned, non-state-owned, rural, and urban labor markets, have played unique roles in regulating employment. despite the evident policy effectiveness and china’s entry into a new era of economic development, the labor market still faces new challenges and constraints. challenges persist for college graduates, migrant workers, unemployed individuals, entrepreneurs, and middle-aged and elderly workers. in recent years, with the advancement and application of intelligent manufacturing technology, china’s structural employment contradictions have become more pronounced. it is necessary to continue prioritizing employment, implementing an employment-first strategy, and addressing long-term issues www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 37 published by scholink inc. in the labor market faced by different segments of the population. existing employment stabilization policies and measures should be reviewed, refined, and adjusted according to the new circumstances and tasks to ensure the sustainable coexistence of stable economic development and low unemployment. 6. conclusion in conclusion, this paper has discussed the current status of unemployment and reemployment difficulties in china in the post-epidemic context. the study highlights the importance of reemployment for economic growth and acknowledges the existing challenges and shortcomings in china’s reemployment policies. it emphasizes the need for macro-control of national policies and the active participation of enterprises to address these issues. while the analysis primarily focuses on the chinese case, it provides valuable insights that can be applicable to the reemployment situation in other countries. however, it is important for other countries to conduct specific analyses considering their unique circumstances. in future research, the author intends to delve deeper into the topics of unemployment and reemployment in different countries and conduct comparative analyses to further enhance understanding in this area. 7. acknowledgement during the process of finishing this paper, all the teachers give me lots of help, giving me advises of how to improve the paper. reference chen, l. (may 2017). on the key aspects of the construction of my country’s unemployment security system—inspired by japan’s experience in governing long-term unemployment. modern economic discussion journal. gupta, r., & du, t. c. b. (2009). active versus passive policies of unemployment: growth and public finance perspectives. south african journal of economic and management sciences, 12(1), 1-10. https://doi.org/10.4102/sajems.v12i1.257 lai, d. s,, mo, r., li, f. j., yang, y. y., huang, y. f., & zhang, k. s. (march 2023). promoting high-quality and fully employment, helping chinese-style modernization. li, l., serido, j., vosylis, r. et al. (2023). employment disruption and wellbeing among young adults: a cross-national study of perceived impact of the covid-19 lockdown. journal of happiness studies, 24(3), 991-1012. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10902-023-00629-3 li, m. (september 2022). study on the spatial-temporal differences in the relationship between china’s economic growth and employment. jilin university doctoral dissertation. lin, l. y. (may 2016). the promoting effect of labor and employment on economic development in my country. new economic journal. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 38 published by scholink inc. meng, f. z. (april 2023). stable employment, guaranteeing the “basic people’s livelihood”. people’s daily. tian, y. p. (december 2022). human capital, labor market and innovation output—based on the perspective of threshold effect analysis. journal of macroeconomic research. yang, l., chen, y., jiang, x. et al. (2022). multistate models for the recovery process in the covid-19 context: an empirical study of chinese enterprises. international journal of disaster risk science, 13(3), 401-414. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-022-00414-5 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 135 original paper research on the implementation path of precise ideological and political work in colleges and universities under the background of digital transformation yan chengying1* 1* yan chengying (1987-), digital business college sichuan university of science and technology, chengdu, sichuan 611745, china, 1551451690@qq.com received: august 29, 2025 accepted: october 21, 2025 online published: november 06, 2025 doi:10.22158/ape.v8n1p135 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v8n1p135 abstract in the new era of accelerated digital transformation, cutting-edge technologies such as artificial intelligence, big data, and cloud computing are triggering profound changes in the field of education. these changes not only manifest in the modernization of teaching methods but also fundamentally reconstruct the knowledge dissemination system and learning behavior patterns. currently, ideological and political education is at a historic development opportunity. with the concept of “precise ideological and political education” incorporated into the national education strategic layout, colleges and universities urgently need to build an intelligent ideological and political education system based on digital technology. the construction of this system requires focusing on solving three core issues: how to use digital profiling technology to accurately identify students’ ideological dynamics, how to establish personalized education plans based on intelligent algorithms, and how to enhance the participation and effectiveness of ideological and political education through digital platforms. especially in the post-pandemic era, the new normal of online and offline integrated teaching poses new challenges to the traditional ideological and political work model. this requires educators to deeply understand the underlying logic of technology-enabled education and, through the construction of a “data-driven precise policy-making dynamic feedback” closed-loop system, effectively enhance the contemporaneity and appeal of ideological and political education. keywords digital transformation, precise ideological and political work, implementation path www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 136 1. introduction amid the global wave of digital transformation, cutting-edge technologies such as 5g, cloud computing, and artificial intelligence are reshaping the fundamental logic of the education sector. this technological revolution has brought about a paradigm shift in the ideological and political education system of colleges and universities, not only reconstructing the interaction model among educational subjects but also achieving breakthrough innovations in educational concepts at the cognitive science level. from the perspective of theoretical construction, the deep integration of digital technologies has driven the evolution of educational philosophy from standardization to personalization, making differentiated teaching based on learning analytics possible. at the operational level, the mature application of intelligent recommendation algorithms and big data profiling technologies is propelling the traditional “one-size-fits-all” teaching model towards a “tailored-to-individual-needs” precise education approach. notably, the student condition monitoring system built on digital twin technology can capture students’ cognitive trajectories and emotional fluctuations in real time, providing unprecedented technical support for the precise supply of ideological and political education and systematically resolving structural problems such as supply-demand mismatch and efficacy decline in traditional ideological and political education. in-depth exploration of the coupling mechanism between digital technologies and precise ideological, political education not only concerns the improvement of the ideological and political education theoretical system in the new era but also holds strategic guiding significance for building a smart education ecosystem with chinese characteristics. in the context of the digital revolution reshaping the educational ecosystem, higher education's ideological and political education urgently needs to establish a paradigm innovation system that integrates deeply with intelligent technologies. this study, based on knowledge graphs and machine learning algorithms, breaks through the limitations of homogeneous supply in traditional ideological and political education. it achieves three-level precision through the construction of a dynamic learner profile system: firstly, it utilizes emotional computing technology to analyze students' cognitive tendencies, enabling differentiated identification of teaching objects; secondly, it employs an adaptive recommendation engine to dynamically match ideological education content with individual acceptance; thirdly, it utilizes multimodal interaction systems to quantify classroom participation, forming a closed-loop control mechanism for teaching feedback. this technology-enabled precision transformation not only expands the research dimensions of ideological and political education methodology but also reconstructs the “technology education value” tripartite coupling model at the practical level, providing a verifiable theoretical framework and technical implementation path for ideological work in the digital era. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 137 2. the analysis of the conceptual underpinnings of digital technology and precision ideological education in universities 2.1 the essence of digital technology digital technology, as a fundamental discipline in the information age, is inseparably linked to the evolution of electronic computers. this cutting-edge technology, based on binary coding, has constructed a complete digital information ecosystem through hardware carriers such as integrated circuits, communication networks, and intelligent terminals. its core technology encompasses three main dimensions: first, an information processing system driven by algorithms; second, a storage mechanism relying on semiconductor physics; and finally, a data transmission architecture based on network protocols. this technological paradigm not only achieves an exponential increase in information processing efficiency but also reshapes the resource allocation model of human society by breaking free from the constraints of physical space. from a technical perspective, digital technology exhibits distinct characteristics such as discretization, standardization, and intelligence, which collectively support its core position in the modern information technology system. digital technology, as the core driving force of contemporary technological development, has three essential characteristics that form the underlying logic of technological application: through programmability, it enables flexible customization; relying on high precision, it ensures operational reliability; and based on connectivity, it creates a system synergy effect. this technological paradigm is reshaping the operation modes of industrial production, social governance, and business innovation, making precise control of complex systems and large-scale collaboration possible, and ultimately driving all aspects of society towards intelligence, precision, and networking. 2.2 the conceptual analysis of precision ideological and political education in universities precision-based ideological education, as an important innovative direction of the contemporary ideological and political education system, requires a multi-dimensional systematic thinking for its theoretical construction. from the perspective of its essential attributes, ideological and political education is a social practice activity with distinct value orientation. its core lies in achieving the two-way construction of the educational subject and object through systematic educational intervention. this process should follow the basic laws of modern education and reflect the inherent requirements of socialist ideology. the essence of “precision” lies in the precise matching of educational supply and individual needs, the precise fit of educational content with the characteristics of the times, and the precise adaptation of educational methods to the characteristics of the audience. it is worth noting that contemporary ideological and political education has broken away from the traditional one-way indoctrination model and presents new features of intersubjectivity: educators need to deepen their educational ability through continuous self-improvement, while the educated individuals realize the internalization of values through active participation. this dynamic balance requires precision-based ideological education to adhere to the dialectical unity of value guidance and individual development, avoiding formalism that is divorced from reality and preventing utilitarianism that neglects the depth of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 138 thought. from the practical perspective, effective ideological and political education must achieve three key transformations: converting political theory into value recognition, transforming moral norms into behavioral habits, and transforming ideological concepts into practical wisdom. ultimately, through the construction of a positive interaction mechanism between personal growth and social development, the organic unity of “cultivating virtue and fostering individuals” and “serving society” can be achieved. the essence of precise ideological and political education lies in integrating scientific and systematic precise thinking with ideological and political education. through digital means, it precisely identifies the characteristics, needs, and development stages of the educational subjects, thereby constructing a new educational paradigm with content that is appropriately adapted, methods that are appropriate, and significant results. its theoretical foundation is based on three core laws: firstly, it is necessary to deeply grasp the inherent ideological dissemination laws of ideological and political education, which is the prerequisite for achieving “precision”, as lenin said, “the laws are the consolidated elements in phenomena”; secondly, it should rely on technologies such as big data and artificial intelligence to build a precise profiling system, enabling intelligent matching between the education supply and demand sides, so that educational intervention can be targeted and implemented in a precise and efficient manner. this tripartite regulatory system jointly constitutes the theoretical framework and practical guidelines for precise ideological and political education, promoting a fundamental transformation of ideological and political education from a loose approach to a refined one, and from an empirical approach to a scientific one. the promoting effect of digital technology on the precision of ideological and political education has attracted widespread attention from the academic community. with the popularization of new-generation information technologies such as big data, the internet of things, artificial intelligence, and intelligent algorithms, the influence and reshaping of digital technology on human society have further accelerated, and the concept of precise ideological and political education will also be further refined. 3. the theoretical support and practical requirements 3.1 the theoretical support the core essence of ideological and political education lies in scientifically grasping the inherent mechanism of human cognitive development, and achieving the coordinated improvement of the political literacy and personality traits of the educated through systematic and standardized educational methods. professor zhang yaocan, a renowned scholar, emphasized in his theoretical framework that this educational practice has a distinct attribute of national will, and is a systematic project carried out by the ruling class using organized means to cultivate citizens' political identity based on the needs of social development. in the context of digital transformation, the in-depth application of modern technological means such as intelligent algorithms and big data analysis is reshaping the implementation paradigm of ideological and political education, providing strong technical support for www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 139 the construction of personalized and dynamic educational mechanisms. this deep integration of technology and education has significantly enhanced the targeted and effective nature of ideological and political education. in the process of promoting the precision of ideological and political education in universities, the application of scientific methodology is of vital importance. in modern educational practice, the channels for obtaining ideological dynamics have evolved from traditional qualitative analysis methods (such as social research, behavioral observation, and trend prediction) to a data-driven intelligent model. based on digital technology, a three-dimensional information collection system has been established. through multi-source data fusion analysis, machine learning algorithm modeling, and real-time behavioral trajectory tracking, educators can break through the limitations of time and space and achieve precise depiction of the ideological map of college students. this technological empowerment enables educators not only to immediately capture the changes in explicit value orientations, but also to identify potential psychological crisis signals through emotional computing and semantic analysis, thereby constructing a closed-loop management system of “monitoring warning intervention evaluation”, significantly enhancing the predictability, targeting, and effectiveness of ideological and political education. this data-driven transformation is not a simple replacement of traditional methods, but has formed a composite information acquisition mechanism that combines multi-dimensional perception online and offline and quantitative and qualitative mutual verification. in the context of the digital age, the methodological approach of indoctrination and infiltration in ideological education is undergoing a profound paradigm shift. as the fundamental means of ideological dissemination, this approach essentially involves the systematic transmission of theories and the guidance of values, gradually internalizing political ideas, moral norms, and value systems into the organic components of an individual’s spiritual world. the empowerment of modern technology has brought about three dimensions of innovation to the traditional indoctrination model: firstly, the application of big data analysis technology enables the precise profiling of educational subjects, making “tailored education for each individual” possible, completely eliminating the drawbacks of the previous “massive flooding” style of education; secondly, artificial intelligence algorithms, through real-time monitoring of learners’ cognitive trajectories, can dynamically adjust the presentation and intensity of educational content, effectively enhancing the efficiency of the infiltration of key ideological viewpoints; more importantly, the interactive learning environment constructed by cloud computing platforms transforms one-way indoctrination into two-way dialogue. learners gain the right to express and participation through the immediate feedback mechanism, and this interactive teaching model with mutual growth brings unprecedented vitality to ideological education. technological empowerment not only optimizes the efficacy of traditional methods but also reconfigures the underlying logic of ideological dissemination at the cognitive science level. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 140 3.2 the practical requirements from the perspective of the development trend of educational informatization, digital technology precisely responds to the strategic shift of educational informatization from scale expansion to quality improvement; it responds to the demand for intelligent educational resources by building a national ideological and political mooc platform intelligent lesson preparation system, achieving large-scale sharing and precise dissemination of high-quality resources; it responds to the demand for innovation in teaching methods by creating the “red vr classroom” with virtual simulation technology and the intelligent teaching assistant system based on the educational big model, pioneering a new paradigm of immersive and interactive teaching; it responds to the demand for modernization of educational governance by establishing a learning behavior evidence system and multi-dimensional evaluation model based on blockchain technology, promoting the transformation of ideological and political education management from experience-based judgment to data-driven. universities can enhance precise ideological and political education through digital technology, not only ensuring the implementation of national policies and work plans, but also achieving precise implementation; at the same time, it can improve the informatization construction of ideological and political education in universities. firstly, by empowering the construction of digital platforms for ideological and political educational resources with digital technology, a resource aggregation platform that is open and shared, has a huge storage capacity, and is equipped with intelligent computing capabilities can be established. this provides significant support for the creation of digital resources and integrates existing digital resources for ideological and political education to build a resource library for ideological and political education. secondly, by empowering precise ideological and political education with digital technology, it can realize intelligent education in the process of ideological and political education. by using big data, artificial intelligence, and intelligent algorithms, real-time interaction with students can be achieved, and intelligent educational services for students throughout the process can also be provided. thirdly, by empowering precise ideological and political education with digital technology, multimedia-based ideological and political education can be realized. digital technology can carry various media resources such as text, images, sounds, animations, and videos. through the use of multimedia technology, immersive education such as virtual meetings and virtual activities can be realized, allowing students to receive more intuitive, three-dimensional, and visualized education, meeting the diverse learning needs of college students and improving the participation rate and effectiveness of education in the classroom. 4. the obstacles to the implementation of precision ideological education in universities under the context of digital transformation the current digital literacy levels of educators exhibit a significant structural imbalance: at the technical understanding level, there is a widespread “metaphysical” cognitive limitation, remaining at the operational level without systematic theoretical support; in terms of data processing capabilities, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 141 there is a clear “collection analysis application” chain breakage, with a large amount of educational data being inefficiently utilized or even left idle; while in the technical adaptation dimension, there is a strong path dependence feature, with most educators still remaining at the primary stage of passively coping with technological updates. these multi-dimensional literacy deficiencies directly restrict the process of deep integration of digital technology and ideological and political education, causing the technology integration to remain at the initial stage of simple tool transplantation and making it difficult to achieve systematic changes from teaching methods to educational paradigms, ultimately affecting the substantive improvement of ideological and political education efficiency in the digital era. in the wave of digital transformation, the ideological and political education field is facing a critical transformation period in data governance. to achieve educational precision, a multi-dimensional data collection system must be constructed, which involves the systematic integration of multimodal data such as students' cognitive characteristics, behavioral trajectories, and emotional tendencies. currently, there are two dilemmas in the educational data ecosystem: on the one hand, the data silos among various departments lead to information fragmentation; on the other hand, the digital divide caused by differences in technical application capabilities severely restricts educators’ ability to perceive and intervene in students’ ideological dynamics in real time. this structural contradiction urgently needs to be resolved through the improvement of data sharing mechanisms and the enhancement of digital literacy. in the current process of university informatization construction, the fragmentation of data management has become a significant bottleneck restricting the effectiveness of ideological and political education. the internal functional departments of universities, such as student affairs, teaching affairs, and psychological centers, often adopt their own independent data management systems, lacking unified data standards and interaction interfaces. as a result, key information such as student academic records, classroom performance, and psychological counseling records form information islands. this fragmented data state makes it difficult for ideological and political educators to comprehensively grasp students' ideological dynamics, behavioral characteristics, and psychological conditions. they are unable to accurately identify high-risk groups or carry out targeted and precise ideological guidance. the imbalance in the distribution of digital educational resources has triggered deep-seated issues of educational equity. this technological resource differentiation not only manifests at the school level but also directly affects individual students. some economically disadvantaged students, lacking intelligent terminal devices or stable network access conditions, encounter substantial obstacles in participating in digital ideological and political education. this technological gap leads to a significant “data gap” in the education system a lack of necessary digital interaction channels, making it difficult for educators to obtain real-time learning behavior data and ideological dynamic feedback from this group. from an educational practice perspective, the absence of data collection directly restricts the implementation of personalized education: on the one hand, it cannot build a precise digital profile of students, weakening www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 142 the timeliness of educational intervention; on the other hand, it makes it difficult to achieve differentiated ideological and political education supply, objectively weakening the effectiveness of all-round education. this unequal access to technology ultimately evolves into unequal educational opportunities, forming the “new digital divide” phenomenon in the era of digital education. the development of digital technology is currently at the “weak digitization” stage. during the weak digitization period, digital technology only possesses basic information processing and transmission capabilities. its application in ideological and political education has limited functions and is more likely to cause fragmentation, superficiality, and rigidity in the teaching process of ideological and political education, greatly affecting the systematic dissemination of knowledge and the in-depth learning experience of students. the de-mystification of algorithms is reconfiguring the cognitive values of teachers and students in ideological and political education in the digital era. educators are trapped in the worship of algorithms, resulting in weakened professional judgment and falling into the predicament of “technological rationality overwhelming educational wisdom”. learners are trapped in information feeding, causing the degradation of thinking initiative, and forming a situation where “the algorithm comfort zone confines cognitive development”. therefore, during the process of digital technology empowerment, it must remain vigilant, eliminate its excessive influence on ideological and political education, and maintain the integration of educational depth and value orientation. 5. the implementation path of precise ideological and political education in universities under the background of digital transformation 5.1 the improvement of digital literacy in the wave of educational digital transformation, ideological and political educators urgently need to break through traditional thinking patterns and construct a digital cognitive framework: on one hand, they must master the data-driven precise analysis ability, and achieve scientific education decision-making through technical means such as student profile mapping and behavior tracking; on the other hand, they must strengthen the core function of value guidance, embed the mainstream ideology in algorithm recommendations, and form a “technology empowerment humanistic care” collaborative development model. this thinking transformation not only requires the application ability of intelligent tools, but also requires the establishment of digital ethics awareness, so as to realize the paradigm innovation of ideological and political education in the virtual and real integrated educational scenarios. as a crucial medium in the education system, various teaching carriers of ideological and political education play a significant role as a bridge connecting the educational subjects and objects. they not only serve as a medium for information dissemination but also act as a practical platform for the interaction of various elements within the education system. in the new era, the innovation and development of teaching carriers must keep pace with the pulse of the times. they should not only www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 143 maintain traditional advantages but also actively adapt to the educational needs of the intelligent era. by innovating the carrier forms and enhancing the practical ability of educators in digital media, the educational effectiveness can be improved. with the advent of the digital age, the educational environment and learning methods have undergone profound changes. students increasingly rely on digital technology to obtain information and knowledge. in this context, if educators fail to master digital media technology proficiently, they will find it difficult to effectively meet the demands of modern teaching. however, educators with high-level practical ability in digital media can design and implement more effective digital teaching content, enhance the interactivity and interest of the classroom, and thereby promote students' deep learning. this not only helps to achieve the precision of ideological and political education but also significantly improves the overall effect of education. to better adapt to the needs of ideological and political education in the new era, it is necessary to promote the integration of online and offline, traditional and modern, single and diverse carriers. by leveraging the complementary advantages of various carriers, it can better meet the diverse needs of different college students. 5.2 the establishment of a digital platform for ideological and political education the digital transformation of the ideological and political teaching resource library is reshaping the contemporary educational ecosystem. its core value lies in creating an intelligent educational matrix that transcends the limitations of time and space. through the application of big data analysis, artificial intelligence tagging systems, and distributed cloud storage architectures, this innovative system has achieved the intelligent aggregation and value reconfiguration of educational resources, significantly enhancing the efficiency of resource utilization and giving rise to a new type of “ideological and political +” educational paradigm. this model integrates ideological guidance, academic innovation, practical education, cultural inheritance and other educational dimensions organically, forming a multi-dimensional collaborative education mechanism. the online ideological and political education, while retaining the systematicness and ideological nature of traditional education, demonstrates unique teaching advantages due to its digital characteristics: in educational form, it presents dynamic interaction features; in the teaching process, it embodies decentralized characteristics; and in the educational effect, it has the characteristic of long-term penetration. practice has shown that building an intelligent teaching resource platform and improving the online ideological and political education system are two major pillar projects for promoting precise ideological and political education. the coordinated development of these two aspects not only enables precise matching of educational supply but also expands the radiation dimension and influence depth of ideological and political education, providing a powerful support platform for cultivating new era talents. unleashing the potential of digital technologies means fully exploiting the advantages of technologies such as big data, artificial intelligence, cloud computing, and the internet of things, and applying them widely across various fields to optimize resource allocation, enhance work efficiency, improve decision-making capabilities, and create greater value. in the fields of education, healthcare, industry, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 144 and agriculture, the effectiveness of digital technologies is concentrated in areas such as improving work efficiency, optimizing management processes, enhancing user experience, and supporting innovative decision-making. therefore, through the collaborative effect of multiple digital technologies, it is possible to promote the precise development of online ideological and political education in universities. in the context of the digital transformation of higher education, building a “human-machine collaboration” precise ideological and political education system requires adhering to a systematic approach and achieving the optimization of educational effectiveness through the establishment of a “dual-teacher co-education” collaborative framework. from the perspective of educational ecology, digital teachers and traditional teachers should form a complementary and symbiotic relationship: intelligent systems, with their strong data processing capabilities and 24-hour response advantages, play an irreplaceable role in quantitative aspects such as student situation monitoring, personalized recommendations, and teaching evaluation; while human teachers firmly hold the dominant position in qualitative education domains such as value shaping, emotional interaction, and dialectical thinking cultivation. this collaboration is not a simple functional addition; instead, it requires the establishment of a three-dimensional guarantee system including role positioning mechanisms (clearly defining that ai assumes 30% of standardized teaching tasks), data sharing protocols (building a teaching behavior database), and ethical review systems (setting a negative list for technology application). 5.3 the improvement of digital and technological elements in ideological and political education the deep logic of digital technology in reconstructing the ideological and political education ecosystem lies in the paradigmatic innovation in three dimensions: firstly, the technological empowerment dimension, where the systematic integration of cutting-edge technologies such as ai algorithms, big data analysis, and blockchain is breaking through the temporal and spatial limitations of traditional ideological and political education. its essence is to achieve precise matching and dynamic optimization of teaching elements by constructing an intelligent educational neural network; secondly, the methodological innovation dimension, this integration does not merely stop at the simple application of technical tools, but is based on educational cognitive science and behavioral analysis theories, reconfiguring the entire chain of educational model including content production, dissemination paths, and effect evaluation; finally, the value realization dimension, the deep penetration of digitalization is giving rise to the “intelligent enhancement” effect of ideological and political education. through the establishment of personalized recommendation systems based on learning profiles, the construction of cross-platform resource sharing matrices, and the development of immersive teaching scenarios integrating virtual simulation technology, it systematically resolves the structural contradictions such as fragmented resources, one-way teaching, and difficult quantification of effects existing in the traditional model. this transformation process requires the establishment of a complete technical ethics review mechanism. it needs to prevent the narrowing of cognition caused by algorithm biases and eliminate the risks of technological alienation by establishing a digital literacy www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 145 cultivation system. ultimately, it aims to achieve the dialectical unity of technical rationality and educational value. 6. the conclusion in the wave of digital transformation, ideological and political education in universities is undergoing profound paradigm shifts, presenting four dimensions of precise characteristics: differentiated identification capabilities based on learner profiling technology, achieving “targeted positioning” of educational objects; dynamic resource allocation mechanisms relying on intelligent content generation systems, completing “demand matching” of educational supply; real-time data monitoring and feedback systems in the educational process, achieving “dynamic adjustment” of teaching interaction; and the application of multi-dimensional assessment models and predictive algorithms, establishing a “quantitative diagnosis” system for educational effectiveness. currently, there are still three contradictory tensions at the practical level: the technical application capabilities of educational entities lag behind the development needs of the digital education ecosystem, presenting a “skills deficit”; fragmented infrastructure construction leads to the “island effect” of educational resources; the absence of algorithm governance leads to the phenomenon of information cocoons, which is undermining the authority of educational entities and the critical thinking of learners. digital transformation is not a simple addition of technologies, but a fundamental reconfiguration of educational paradigms. with the maturity of cutting-edge technologies such as federated learning and emotional computing, future intelligent ideological and political systems will possess cognitive enhancement capabilities. through multimodal data fusion analysis, they can not only capture students' explicit behavioral trajectories, but also deconstruct their implicit cognitive schemas and psychological representations. this deep integration will give rise to a new educational form called “dual-teacher collaboration” human teachers are responsible for value guidance and emotional interaction, while ai systems undertake personalized diagnosis and adaptive teaching, forming a symbiotic body of educational wisdom, and ultimately building a next-generation ideological and political education system with semantic understanding capabilities and emotional response characteristics. references central committee for publicity of the communist party of china. (2023). beijing: people’s publishing house. huai, j. p. (2024). jointly promoting the application, sharing and innovation of digital education keynote speech at the 2024 world digital education conference. china education informatization, 30(02). liu, h. d., & zhang, q. (2023). precise supply of ideological and political education content and its realization strategies. ideological education research, 2023(12). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 146 luo, y. t. (2024). network ideological and political education in the new era. beijing: people’s publishing house. mo, l., & xu, c. f. (2023). content construction of network ideological and political education in universities in the new era. social scientist, 2023(05). pan, y. k. (2023). research on precise ideological and political construction in universities in the era of big data. university of electronic science and technology of china. shen, x. r., & pan, y. k. (2023). main characteristics, operating mechanism and practice strategies of precise ideological and political education in universities in the era of big data. school party building and ideological and political education, 2023(23). shi, y. c., & wan, y. y. (2024). the connotation, characteristics, construction advantages and practical paths of digital ideological and political education. school party building and ideological education, 2024(06). wang, x. j., & feng, r. z. (2023). coupling logic and risk prevention of high-quality development of ideological and political education by digital technology. journal of beijing university of technology (social sciences edition), 23(03). yan, d., & zhang, s. j. (2024). problems and countermeasures for enhancing the effectiveness of network ideological and political education in universities in the new era. northeast normal university journal (philosophy and social sciences edition), 2024(03). zhao, j. c. (2023). the internal mechanism of deep integration of ideological and political education and artificial intelligence. ideological theory education, 2023(08). zheng, s. (2024). research on the value realization of ideological and political education in universities in the era of artificial intelligence. university of electronic science and technology of china. advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 224 original paper finance and political participation peter bearse, ph.d. [economics]1* 1 a peoples and citizens congress, carrabelle, united states * peter bearse, ph.d. [economics], a peoples and citizens congress, carrabelle, united states received: june 28, 2019 accepted: july 16, 2019 online published: july 19, 2019 doi:10.22158/ape.v2n3p224 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v2n3p224 abstract this essay identifies and discusses the factors and forces arising from finance that influence peoples’ political participation. it does so at two levels: (1) micro-economic or individual and (2) macro-economic and social. we find that both factors and forces at work are significantly adverse to political participation at all levels. the prime intermediate factor here is economic inequality, which is the subject of a companion essay published earlier. keywords financial, participation, investors, assets, stocks, inequality, risk, instability 1. introduction as the last “great recession” revealed, financial innovation and game-playing by major financial firms serve to generate both financial instability and greater inequality. in his 2019 book entitled shell game: the story of one man’s rant against the big banks in an attempt to save the world economy, m.k. hoffman reveals that the recession was sparked by a huge jump in oil prices. the apocryphal “99%”—small investors among individual citizens if they had money to invest at all—had long since become irrelevant players in financial markets. among the 1% with money to play with, not one executive of a major financial company was even indicted, let along convicted of financial malpractice. yet the “1%” associated with the largest organizations served to increase their wealth while immiserating millions of americans. 2. method the method here is twofold: (i) identification of relevant statistics reflecting the distributions of assets, the ways they are invested, and the rates of political participation among classes of people by income and wealth. (ii) review of statistical analyses of the latter by researchers who have investigated interrelationships www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 225 published by scholink inc. between and among types of political participation and levels of economic inequality. 3. result what needs to be explained is how the “1%” associated with the largest organizations served to increase their wealth while immiserating millions of americans. let’s start with “game playing” by major operators in the financial markets. look at the choices they have as to how profits can be invested (at this point, in no order of priority): a. not “invested” but set aside as retained earnings. b. pay dividends and/or buy the stock of one’s own company. c. buy the stock of other companies. d. buy financial instruments—short-term or long-term, regular or futures markets. e. invest in hard assets, including construction, buildings, work force, equipment and technologies. f. invest in soft assets such as education, information and networking. for every “buy” choice, there is a corresponding “sell”. this gives financial operators (hereafter abbreviated “fo”s) lots of choices—12 majors in all plus many more that follow. the broad fo category includes ceos, presidents and cfos, not only of banks, mutual funds and pension funds of a host of primarily “financial” organizations but also of a broad range of non-financial organizations in practically every type of industry, both for-profit and non-profit. thus, the implications of these choices have consequences for practically the whole of american society and economy. whether or not profits are employed as any more than say, like money stuffed in a corporate mattress, is an important question. retained earnings can be kept idle, invested (or not) in a low interest return mutual fund. they could also be invested in workforce improvements (those not already budgeted, pre-profit) such as employee training, employee pension funds (if any) and/or executive and/or other employee benefits. as for the latter, there are obviously two of many distributional questions here. who benefits? how large a percentage of retained earnings are invested in “rank and file” employees? inequality redux? now let’s continue to “take it from the top”. b follows a: pay dividends and/or buy the stock of one’s own company? this is usually undesirable from a distributional standpoint. why? because payment of dividends and/or stock buy backs tend to either support or raise prices of company stocks. distribution of dividends goes to existing share holders—usually a minority proportion of any population. note, however, that “existing” can chang every rapidly in a market where buy or sell trading time is measured in micro-seconds through “fast” trades. in order, now item c: buy the stock of other companies? the criticism already noted above pertains here as well. the benefits go to shareholders. what about others who have been called “stakeholders”, such as members of the community-at-large where companies are located, local and state taxpayers and others? item d?—buy financial instruments—short-term or long-term? both are presumably “safe”. earnings www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 226 published by scholink inc. from short-term investments of retained earnings would add to those earnings and benefit existing shareholders. the same applies to purchases of long-term instruments. the only differences lie in degrees of risk and changes in the pool of shareholders. as for “degrees of risk”, what about short-term, high-risk investments such as puts and calls in the so-called “futures” market? this is an area where company owners can play games they can win or lose large. entire companies can be put at risk and thousands of jobs can be lost through bad choices made by owners (some are ceo’s) who have compliant ceo’s (perhaps themselves) and governing boards who don’t mind owners playing bad hands for high scores. e?—invest in hard assets, including business start-ups or expansions, construction, buildings, work force, equipment and technologies? contrary to the purely financial uses of retained earnings, these could bring some greater equity to distributions, especially to the extent that they create new jobs at pay levels that can help sustain families. we have already recognized “workforce improvements”. construction always created jobs, albeit mostly short-term, the shortness or length depending on the size of a project. existing buildings are usually purchased for businesses to accommodate additional employees. startups always create at least a few jobs. expansions likewise. adoption of new technologies, including those embodied in equipment, are a double-edged sword. jobs may be created or destroyed at the enterprise level. at the macro-economic level, evidence runs both ways and, overall, is currently indecisive. in the long-run, the net impacts of the new digital technologies are more likely to be negative. most of us now aged (except this author) prefer to play with their retirement money and not deal with start-ups. should the last have been first? let’s see with respect to (f): invest in soft assets such as information and networking. information and technology are now married. information is completely the venue of digital technology. the marriage is now dubbed “ict”—information computer technology. thus, the impact prognoses promise to create jobs for the well-trained and well-educated. the distributional impacts on “blue-collar” workers are likely to be adverse. the iniquitous shifts in the educational sector, revealed elsewhere, stand to do nothing to reverse the “adverse”, rather the opposite. as suggested at the outset, greater instability is also likely. why?—because ups and downs of the business cycle are aggravated in the face of global warming and climate change [gwcc]. the increasing dependence of the economy on “finance”—especially upon short-term financial transactions—was clearly implied earlier. now it can be recognized without checking the growing gdp proportions owing to “finance, insurance of real estate” as well as “services”. the uncertainly of investing increased in the face of an increasing frequency of extreme weather events and other natural occurrences such as fires and rising sea levels attributable to gwcc. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 227 published by scholink inc. 4. discussion this essay has gone a long way towards understanding how inequality and instability are fed by private investment and other public/private financial decisions. unfortunately, not the whole way: there are still several dots to be filled to complete documentation of our interactive framework (not yet a complete model). the most important among these are: ➢ impacts of finance (&c) on what should be but are no longer our politics and government [especially congress]. these, well-documented elsewhere, are strongly antithetical to the survival and well-being of our democratic republic. ➢ impacts of the #1 influence on politics and public policy—people’s participation in politics. see articles by this author on “participation and populism” and “participation and inequality”. ➢ detailed interactions between public and private that accentuate the adverse impacts of private choices while decreasing even the possibilities of public investments that would ameliorate the latter. a lot here, for example, springs from grievous shortcoming of our tax systems, especially at the federal level—more than just the recognized, business-as-usual “loopholes”. thus, this and the former run very much together. does a more recent article help to fill these gaps? no, notwithstanding a grandiose title (note 1). ironically, it pretends to honor the maximum power principle as governing a process that is nothing more than the conventional small-bank, small-business lending and currency circulation process doctored up with fancy verbiage borrowed from biology. for example: “by putting system resource claim tickets (dollars) directly into the hands of entrepreneurs and consumers willing and able to spur system growth through the establishment of new cells and distribution systems, it became possible to rapidly increase metabolic activity and a rapid replication of existing and novel dissipative structures”. the rest goes on to discuss business cycles without even any mention of the term—like a biologic-academic version of keynes’ “animal spirits”. “power” does not figure—not market, institutional or any other. yet as we have seen, it is central to any real-world explanation of what is shaping an increasingly unequal society. return to the 3rd paragraph of this article. the power of financial-sector decision makers, not small investors, is key to how retained earnings and other investible assets are employed. as far as we ordinary folks are concerned, there are two major options if “we the people” are to prevail in the long-run: 1) encourage hope, faith and charity and raise our spirits to help create better futures out of our better natures; and 2) participate in a democratic political process. in the final analysis, this is the only countervailing power vs. the rising power of financial executive and finance overall. people in, money out! acknowledgement carmine gorga, ph.d., president of polistics, inc., an old friend and colleague whose thoughtful input www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 228 published by scholink inc. is appreciated. references bearse, p. (1999). the fractal revolution. the ethical spectacle. retrieved from http://www.spectacle.org falk, a., & szech, n. (2013). morals and markets. science. falkvinge, r. (2013). swarmwise: the tactical manual to changing the world. create space independent publishing platform. on how the swedish pirate party was able to outfox the competition. fournier, a. (2013). innovators are conversation architects. in the online blog of xperlink. gerber, e. r. (1999). the populist paradox. princeton. nj: princeton university press. gorga, c. (2012). citizen assemblies. the ethical spectacle. retrieved from http://www.spectacle.org gravel, s. m. (2008). citizen power: a mandate for change. bloomington, in: author house. heskett. j. (2008). are followers about to get their due?: a forum. harvard business review. hirshman, a. (1970). exit, voice and loyalty: responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states. cambridge: harvard university press. hoffman, m. k. (2019). shell game: the story of one man’s rant against the big banks in an attempt to save the world economy. penobscot, me, usa: shoestring publishing. kellerman, b. (2008). followership: how followers are creating change and changing leaders. in harvard business review. mitroff, i., & silvers, a. (2008). dirty rotten strategies: how we trick ourselves and others into solving the wrong problems precisely. palo alto. ca: stanford university press. power to the people: a political handbook showing how “we the people” can take back our politics and government. (2018). millinocket, me, shoestring publishers (see especially chapter 3). redefining the political agenda: from boxes to loops. the eagle-tribune (may 18). (2006). this piece first appeared in the gloucester (ma, usa). daily timesin 1989. schlozman, k. l., sidney, v., & henry, e. b. (2012). the unevenly chorus: unequal political voice and the broken promise of american democracy. princeton, nj: princeton university press. skocpol, t. (2003). diminished democracy: from membership to management in american civic life. norman, oklahoma: university of oklahoma press. strategy for building a people’s congress. (2012). the ethical spectacle. unger, roberto mangabeira. (1978). illusions of necessity in the economic order. american economic review. we the people: a conservative populism. (2004). lafayette, la: alpha publishing co. note note 1. cost of extinction-billions. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 82 original paper utilizing centennial party history resources to promote the innovative development of college students' daily ideological and political work research li yan1 1 xi’an fanyi university, school of marxism, shaanxi, xi’an, china funded projects center for the innovative development of ideological and political work in colleges and universities, ministry of education (wuhan donghu university) 2023 special research project title: “study on the use of 100 years of party history resources to promote the innovative development of daily ideological and political work for college students” (project no. whdhszzx2023074); 2023 regular research project of shaanxi provincial sports bureau: “the value implication and realization path of beijing winter olympics spirit in ideological and political education(project no.2023530)”. received: april 26, 2025 accepted: may 11, 2025 online published: may 28, 2025 doi:10.22158/ape.v8n1p82 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v8n1p82 abstract the president solemnly declared at the conference to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the founding of the party that in the past 100 years, the party has united and led the chinese people to “write the most magnificent epic poem in the thousands of years of the history of the chinese nation”, and that "the great roads opened up, the great undertakings created, and the great achievements made in these 100 years will surely be recorded in the history of the development of the chinese nation and the history of human civilization! “the great paths opened up, the great undertakings created, and the great achievements made in these 100 years will surely be recorded in the annals of the development of the chinese nation and the development of human civilization!” the resilience of the party and the brilliant achievements it has made during its 100-year struggle have fully proved the correctness of the road to socialism with chinese characteristics, the superiority of the socialist system with chinese characteristics, and the truthfulness of the innovative theories of the chineseization of marxism. these achievements are not only the most vivid and persuasive historical “textbook” for strengthening www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 83 confidence in the road, system and theory, but also a valuable asset that inspires us to continue to move forward. standing at the historical intersection of the goal of “two hundred years”, facing the strategic overall situation of the great rejuvenation of the chinese nation as well as the great change that the world has not seen in a hundred years, we should deeply excavate and absorb the core resources of human education in the hundred years of party history. through the use of these party history resources, we can promote the innovation and development of the daily ideological and political work of college students, actively build and strengthen the path and key elements of the effectiveness of human education, and ensure that they are more effectively integrated into the whole process of the daily ideological and political work of college students, covering every link. keywords century-old party history resources, college students, ideological and political work, innovation and development 1. value implications of using centennial party history resources to promote college students' daily ideological and political work 1.1 enhancing confidence: being practitioners in realizing the great revival of the chinese nation centennial party history resources are an excellent resource, which is a valuable spiritual wealth forged in the process of the party's leading the people in the arduous struggle, and possesses a powerful nurturing function in itself. combining these resources with the daily ideological and political education of college students can help inspire their confidence and motivate them to become active practitioners in realizing the great rejuvenation of the chinese nation. each generation has its own responsibilities and missions. standing at the historical intersection of the two hundred-year goal, chinese young people should harbor great ambitions, uphold the spirit of mission and struggle, bravely take over the baton of history, and contribute their own strength to the great rejuvenation of the chinese nation. when carrying out daily ideological and political education for college students, colleges and universities should take the excavation of the resources of a hundred years of party history as the core task, and integrate the wisdom and strategies contained therein into the practice of promoting the chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the chinese nation. in the party history education, the touching stories of the chinese communists' adherence to the original heart and mission during the century-long journey are continuously shown, so as to make them become the intrinsic motivation to inspire college students to actively practice the socialist core values. at the same time, when colleges and universities carry out daily ideological and political education for college students, they should actively utilize the resources of 100 years of party history as historical corroboration and integrate them into the path of young students chasing their dreams, so as to inspire them to build up their confidence and, with positive attitudes, to become practitioners of realizing the great rejuvenation of the chinese nation. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 84 1.2 learning history to enhance faith: strengthening university students' systematic knowledge of 100 years of party history a hundred years of party history is “a summary of the historical experience of our party's growth and leadership of the people of all nationalities in the course of revolution, construction, reform and great rejuvenation, and the history of the party's struggles, as well as the history of the progress of the chinese people and the chinese nation”. guiding students to deeply study and understand the rich connotation of a hundred years of party history is the inherent requirement of ideological and political education in colleges and universities. making full use of the ideological and political education value of party history resources, college students are led to deeply understand and absorb the party's spirit of hard struggle, so as to strengthen their ideals and beliefs. in their daily ideological and political education for college students, ideological and political educators in colleges and universities should proactively use the resources of a century of party history to help college students deeply understand the truth of history, conform to the laws of historical development, summarize the lessons learned from history, and strengthen their confidence in history. at the same time, it is necessary to clearly elaborate how the party has practiced its mission of seeking happiness for the people and rejuvenation for the nation from generation to generation during its century-long struggle. this will help students understand that the history of the party is a history of constantly putting forward a program of struggle and advancing the chineseization and modernization of marxism. students should realize that from the period of arduous democratic revolution, to the period of vigorous socialist construction, to the new period of reform and opening up that caught up with the trend of the times, and to the new era of socialism with chinese characteristics that has ushered in the observance of righteousness and innovation since the 18th national congress of the party, the party's success has been backed up by its winning formula self-revolution. by studying the historical laws of the party, we can foresee the development trend and future destiny of the party, so as to continuously strengthen historical self-awareness. this helps to strengthen college students' comprehensive understanding of a century of party history, enhance the four self-confidences of college students in the new era, and inspire them to contribute their youthful strength to the comprehensive construction of a modernized socialist country. 1.3 casting souls and nurturing people: implementing the party's fundamental task of establishing virtue and shaping people in the process of using the resources of a hundred years of party history to promote the daily ideological and political education of college students, ideological and political educators in colleges and universities should be grounded in reality, with a special focus on improving the ideological quality of college students. from the perspective of building students' morality and quality, the resources of a hundred years of party history is a valuable summary of the party's century-long struggle, which helps college students deeply understand the party's century-long struggle and then establish correct values. adhering to the educational concept of cultivating the youth of the new era, we actively incorporate the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 85 party's history into our ideological and political education, and are committed to cultivating our young generation into the youth of the new era with the “four qualities”. in the process of growing up and becoming successful in the new era, college students need to be educated and inspired by party history resources to grow up to become qualified socialist builders and successors. colleges and universities in the organization of a century of party history resources learning, clear party history learning core, so that students clear historical facts, experience the party's 100 years of brilliant history, firm national confidence, enhance the college students of the country, the nation and socialism identity, and actively guide college students to make the correct value choices, so as to implement the party's fundamental task of establishing morality and educating people. 2. problems existing in colleges and universities in using centennial party history resources to promote the innovation and development of daily ideological and political work of college students 2.1 college students lack the correct attitude of learning centennial party history resources colleges and universities have found that there is a certain gap in the process of “resonance” between teachers and students when they are utilizing the resources of centennial party history to promote the innovation and development of the daily ideological and political work of college students. in the process of utilizing the resources of the centennial party history to promote the innovation and development of the daily ideological and political work of college students, it is found that there is a certain gap between teachers and students in the process of “synchronization”. specifically, university students are deficient in the thematic aspect of learning, and they often lack the correct attitude towards the learning of the resources of the party history. some students are confused about the purpose of studying party history, and they even think that studying the resources of 100 years of party history is the duty of the communist party members and has nothing to do with them, so they fail to recognize the importance of studying these resources. it is difficult for them to appreciate the value of the times embedded in the centennial party history, and therefore they are unable to actively think about and study the centennial party history resources. in addition, some students are confused about how to efficiently learn the resources of 100 years of party history. they usually focus only on reviewing and summarizing historical knowledge and mechanically memorizing the knowledge points without digging deeper into the values carried by the resources of party history, which leads to their gradual loss of the right to speak in the process of learning. from the point of view of the time planning for studying the centennial party history, most students tend to regard it as a kind of extracurricular leisure, and even with utilitarianism, just for the sake of obtaining more credits, while neglecting the educational significance of the study itself. these phenomena reflect that students in colleges and universities generally lack the correct attitude to learn the resources of 100 years of party history, and this lack of attitude directly affects the effectiveness of the ideological and political education workers www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 86 in colleges and universities to use the resources of 100 years of party history to carry out ideological and political education work. 2.2 the teaching design of 100-year party history resources for college students needs to be improved ideological and political theory class is the main channel for students to learn 100-year party history resources. as a public course, the ideological and political theory course is faced with the limitation of class time and heavy teaching tasks, so the effective integration of the 100-year party history resources into the classroom requires careful planning. each subject in the ideological and political theory course has a different focus, and the teaching content involving the resources of 100 years of party history is also unique. in order to maximize the educational effect of the resources of 100 years of party history, the curriculum design should carefully plan the topics of lectures and build an organic educational system that synergistically utilizes the resources of 100 years of party history. in addition to innovative teaching methods and reforms, teachers of ideological and political education theory courses in colleges and universities should also conduct in-depth researches and studies on centuries-old party history resources, so as to strengthen their own reserves of knowledge and abilities in party history, enhance their academic confidence, and transform this knowledge into teaching systems. overall, the resources of a century of party history contain rich connotations and a deep philosophical foundation. if teachers of ideological and political theory courses in colleges and universities are not well-prepared in lesson preparation, it may lead to insufficient depth and breadth of the combination of history and theory, and they may easily fall into the predicament of simply listing and mechanically reproducing historical materials. therefore, teaching designers need to be “close to the students”, according to the disciplinary background of students of various majors, integrate history and reality, dig deep into the life stories of party historical figures, show the temperature of party history, and reduce the “sense of alienation” between party history and students. to this end, efforts must be made to integrate the contents and forms of teaching inside and outside the classroom, to continuously improve the teaching design of the 100-year history of the party resources for college students, and to enhance the comprehensive effect of systematic teaching. 2.3 the linkage mechanism of the learning of 100 years of party history resources for college students needs to be optimized promoting the learning of 100 years of party history resources for college students is a systematic and profound work, and colleges and universities involve multi-departmental operation in the process of promoting this work. in terms of the main responsible person, the party organization of colleges and universities is the first responsible person for promoting this work, and the secretary of each branch, the person in charge of student work, the teachers of ideological and political courses, counselors and so on are the direct responsible persons. currently, in the process of promoting the learning of the centennial party history resources for college students, there is a lack of responsibility, insufficient attention to the learning of the centennial party history resources for college students, and insufficient organizational www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 87 and management efforts and effectiveness, which directly affect the effectiveness of the learning of the centennial party history resources for college students. the effectiveness of the learning of party history resources for college students. in terms of operating procedures, measures and assessment, there is still the problem of system integration, and it is necessary to build a whole set of interconnected management system to ensure the quality and effectiveness of the study of the centennial party history resources for college students.at the same time, in the process of integrating resources on campus, we should also actively coordinate and utilize all kinds of resources outside the campus, and reasonably use these resources in order to continuously expand the main ways of learning the 100-year party history. by linking and cooperating with red education bases and patriotic education bases, we can continuously improve and optimize the linkage mechanism for college students to learn the resources of 100 years of party history. in addition, it should also explore the establishment of cooperative relationships with different types of off-campus organizations, such as communities, enterprises and research institutions, so as to enrich learning resources and broaden learning channels. by doing so, this can not only provide students with a more diversified learning experience, but also promote the sharing and exchange of resources both inside and outside the university, and further strengthen the depth and breadth of the centennial party history education. 3. the use of a hundred years of party history resources to promote the innovative development of daily ideological and political work of college students 3.1 play the role of the main channel of the classroom, and integrate the resources of a hundred years of party history into the curriculum to strengthen the learning and education of the party's history for college students, "we need to use the channel of the school's ideological and political class to promote the party's history into the teaching materials, classrooms, and minds, and to give full play to the party's history's important role of cultivating morality. the party's history plays an important role in promoting morality and educating people." colleges and universities should give full play to the main channel of the classroom in the process of promoting the innovation and development of the daily ideological and political work of college students by utilizing the resources of 100 years of party history. college students should study the resources of 100 years of party history and the ideological and political theory classes of colleges and universities have consistency in the pursuit of value and internal unity in content. to give full play to the function of the main channel of the classroom, it is necessary to constantly consolidate the main position of the classroom for the study of the resources of the history of the party in the centennial, to effectively improve the effectiveness of student learning, and to maximize the stimulation of student mobility, and at the same time, it is also necessary to give full play to the role of the teacher as a “leader”. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 88 in the process of playing the role of “leader”, teachers need to do a good job of guiding. the history of the party has profoundly recorded the suffering and splendor experienced by the chinese nation in modern times. in the face of the challenges of the times, the party has made unremitting efforts to lead the people to answer the questions of the times through theory and practice, so that the chinese nation has realized the great historical leap from standing up, getting rich to getting strong. looking back at history, the task of college teachers of civics and political science is not only to simply narrate the historical story, but more importantly, to guide students to combine history with theory, and to deepen their understanding of history under the perspective of macro-historical outlook, so as to more profoundly comprehend the party's original heart and mission. at the same time, college teachers play the role of question-answerers and guides in helping college students to learn the 100-year history of the party, so it is especially important to teach by example. this requires teachers to continuously improve their theoretical quality, cultivate noble character, and lead by example. at the same time, to play the nurturing role of course ideology and politics, the party's 100 years of struggle into the various courses for students, in-depth excavation of the elements of ideology and politics in the curriculum, the formation of the situation of ideology and politics and course ideology and politics in a concerted nurturing situation, so as to better utilize the 100 years of the party's history of the resources to promote the innovation and development of the ideological and political work of college students in their daily life. 3.2 playing the role of campus culture, integrating the resources of a hundred years of party history into campus activities human beings have shaped the environment, and the environment also has a far-reaching influence on human beings. in the process of promoting the party's history resources in colleges and universities and promoting the innovation and development of college students' daily ideological and political work, we should actively create a strong atmosphere for learning the party's history resources and strengthen the dissemination of red culture on campus, so that college students can accept the inculcation of the party's history resources in their campus life by subconsciously accepting the party's history resources in their campus life. in addition, various display platforms should be fully utilized, including bulletin boards, school newspapers and magazines, commemorative sculptures, school public numbers and new media platforms, etc., so as to realize the diversified display of the resources of 100 years of party history. at the same time, the centennial party history resources are skillfully integrated into the campus cafeteria, classrooms, student dormitories and other daily life scenes, in a way that students love, to effectively enhance the dissemination effect of the centennial party history resources. only what has been practiced can be deeply felt. the cultivation of ideals and moral beliefs requires us to experience and practice them with our hearts. with the continuous development of science and technology, institutions of higher education should update their teaching techniques and facilities, and make use of the platforms of party organizations, clubs, and “young horse classes” within the university to hold colorful cultural activities. they should fully integrate centuries-old party history www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 89 resources into campus activities and actively guide students to experience the charm of centuries-old party history resources in campus culture. through studying party history and understanding national history, students realize more clearly the responsibility of contemporary youth and move forward more firmly with the new era. 3.3 optimize the way of education and enhance the students' subjective self-consciousness in learning centennial party history resources promoting the learning of centennial party history resources is a systematic work, and the learning of party history resources should respect its own characteristics. it is necessary to always adhere to the student as the main body, focusing on the students' self-study endogenous motivation. this requires teachers to use heuristic teaching, theme writing and other teaching modes in the process of carrying out the teaching of party history, so that college students can make the learning of the centennial party history resources more interesting and interesting. let students actually feel the thickness and temperature of the century-old party history resources in the interesting. adhere to the problem orientation, strive to be rigorous and objective, present major events and important figures in history in a factual manner, and insist on cultivating students' historical thinking ability. history is the best textbook. colleges and universities should focus on expanding the party history classroom, encouraging students to carry out all kinds of social practice activities, reading “books with words” and “books without words”, and rooting themselves in the motherland through a large number of field research, public service, theoretical lectures and party activities. in addition, colleges and universities should make full use of off-campus red practice bases and red resources, such as history museums, party history memorials, revolutionary memorials and other patriotic education bases, to carry out fruitful extracurricular practical activities. through these activities, students are able to think deeply, experience immersive learning, and gain an in-depth understanding of centuries-old party history resources. this will help to change their learning attitude from passive acceptance to active exploration, and effectively enhance their subjective awareness of learning centennial party history resources. students will be more proactive in learning party history, deeply comprehending party history, and passing on the spirit of red culture. 3.4 utilize cyberspace to shape the dissemination power of the centennial party history resources in the process of using the centennial party history resources to carry out ideological and political education for college students, colleges and universities should make good use of the new media technology to make the centennial party history resources come alive, take stock of the times and promote the fusion of the centennial party history resources with big data and information technology, so as to make the centennial party history resources enhance the sense of the times and attractiveness. first, strengthen thought leadership. mainly through the official websites of schools and colleges, as well as the video number to set up columns, launching short videos and graphic and other film and television works showing the party's history resources, fully displaying the party's 100 years of glorious history, so as to firmly grasp the main ideological position of colleges and universities. second, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 90 strengthen the construction of network platform for ideological work. construct a team of online teachers focusing on the study of the 100-year history of the party in order to improve the teachers' literacy and ability on the educational network platform. by integrating the power of teachers of civic and political studies and civic and political counselors, the dissemination efficiency of online centennial party history education is effectively promoted. finally, strengthen the content construction. explore in depth the content of the dissemination of centennial party history, expand its breadth and depth, and excavate and organize the stories behind the red resources. through the network platform, historical figures and events are linked together to enhance the affinity of the communication content. at the same time, focusing on the ideological nature of the content, reducing the distance between the young generation and the centennial party history, making it deeply rooted in people's hearts and minds, and transforming it into practical actions, effectively promoting the centennial party history resources to play a positive role in promoting the innovation and development of the daily ideological and political work of college students. references chang, y. n., & hao, j. l. (2023). exploration of the value implications and practical path of party history in ideological and political work of colleges and universities. journal of luoyang normal college, 42(09), 72-75. collected works of marx and engels (volume 1, p. 11). (2009). beijing: people's publishing house. du, h. l., & wang, a. p. (2022). mechanism analysis and path choice of integrating hundred years of party history resources into civics classes in colleges and universities. journal of hubei adult education college, 28(03), 70-75. duan, j. r., & li, z. k. (2023). the threefold logic of integrating party history learning and education into ideological and political theory classes in colleges and universities. journal of corps education college, 33(02), 21-26. hao, m. (2022). exploration of the path of integrating party history resources into elementary school's ideological and political class. jiangsu education, 2022(89), 55-57. li, z. x. (2023). the value and path of local party history resources empowering human development in local colleges and universities. journal of wenzhou university (social science edition), 36(03), 31-41. liu, t., & sun, x. y. (2022). cultivate roots-casting souls-enlightenment-renewing the heart: the value of integrating a century of party history into ideological and political education in the new era. journal of linyi university, 44(05), 1-10+143. liu, y. n., & guo, y. (2024). historical evolution, basic connotation and contemporary value of party history and culture. journal of party school of shijiazhuang municipal committee of the communist party of china, 26(02), 10-15. liu, y. y., & luo, h. l. (2023). exploration of the path of red resources into party history education www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 91 for college students--taking chongqing as an example. journal of hanjiang normal college, 43(04), 98-102. xie, w., & lv, x. x. (2022). exploring the realization path of party history resources into ideological and political education in colleges and universities. journal of henan university of technology (social science edition), 23(05), 1-6. yuan, x. j., & li, q. y. (2022). the value implication and path choice of red resources into party history learning and education in colleges and universities. journal of zhejiang university of technology (social science edition), 48(06), 680-687. zhang, r. (2025). party history learning and education into the ideological and political education of colleges and universities three-dimensional analysis [j/ol]. journal of zhejiang university of technology (social science edition), 1-9[2024-03-18]. zhang, x. h. (2022). effectively strengthening political identity with party history. secondary school politics teaching reference, 2022(25), 28-30. zheng, h. t., & ying, z. (2023). research on the value of utilizing red resources of 100 years of party history in ideological and political education of college students. century bridge, 2023(05), 72-74. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 103 original paper analyzing the situation of demanding debts by illegal means with identification case analysis method yilong li 1 1 southwest minzu university, chengdu, china received: july 19, 2022 accepted: august 17, 2022 online published: august 23, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n3p103 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n3p103 abstract in recent years, various kinds of crimes demanding debts have emerged one after another. before the new crime of demanding illegal debts, the judicial practice in previous years was mainly regulated by the crime of robbery, the crime of unlawful detention, etc. first of all, we should define the “illegal debt”, and then analyze the act and act object in its objective elements. in the subjective elements, the intention of criminal intent should be based on the purpose of illegal possession, while the lawful purpose does not belong to the intention of criminal intent in the subjective elements of a crime. keywords analysis of authenticated cases, crimes of robbery, illegal detention, and debts 1. the case wang x (woman) used a bmw car in her name as a guarantee to help her ex-husband borrow 400,000 yuan from defendant zhang (man). the three parties signed a loan contract, agreeing to repay the principal and pay 200,000 yuan of interest within 2 years, and stated in the guarantee clause that the bmw car in the name of wang x was used as guarantee, but the bmw car continued to be used by wang x. after the expiration of two years, wang x’s ex-husband did not repay the loan as agreed. because wang x’s ex-husband was sentenced to prison for a crime and could not repay, zhang repeatedly asked wang x for a price, so he offered the car as payment, but wang x refused. on february 7, 2019, zhang called on his employees zhou mou and huang mou and drove with wang x to a parking lot. when wang x got out of the car, zhou mou and huang mou got out of the car, grabbed wang x’s arm and pulled wang x into the back seat of zhang’s car. zhang said to wang x: “you must give me the car today”, and reached out for the car keys. wang x took out his cell phone to make a call, zhou mou grabbed the cell phone. zhou mou said: “don’t think about leaving if you don’t hand over the key today.”after a three-minute stalemate, wang x handed the car keys to zhang. then www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 104 published by scholink inc. zhou mou opened the door of the car, let wang x get out of the car, and returned the phone to wang x. zhang and others drove away the bmw. wang x then called the police, and the public security organ filed a case for robbery, and detained and arrested zhang. in july 2021, the procurator ate prosecuted the case to the court. 2. crime of robbery mr. zhang coerced wang x into handing over his car keys by restricting wang x’s personal freedom. he was suspected of constituting robbery under article 263 of the criminal law. (note 1) 2.1 objective constituting requirements 2.1.1 conduct the suspect zhang conspired with his employees to coerce wang x to hand over the car keys and drive the vehicle by restricting the personal freedom of wang x. conduct conforming to the objective conduct of robbery 2.1.2 behavioral object the robbery target of the suspect, mr. zhang, was the bmw sedan under the name of wang x. despite the existence of the real right mortgage, as a creditor, mr. zhang only has the mortgage right rather than the ownership of bmw cars. at this time, wang x’s possession of the bmw car is legal possession, property crime not only protects legal possession, but also protects illegal possession. what the criminal law protects is the property interests of the fact at the time of the act, and does not require the victim to suffer the final property loss in civil law. therefore, the object involved in zhang’s act was a property object protected by the crime of robbery, and certainly wang x was also a personal object protected by the crime of robbery. 2.2 illegality there was no ground of illegality preclusion in this case. 2.3 subjective constituting requirements 2.3.1 lack of purpose of illegal possession the judicial interpretation gives an expanded interpretation of debts, which includes both legal and illegal debts. when mr. zhang restricted the personal freedom of wang x to obtain his vehicle, it should be determined that mr. zhang did not have the purpose of illegal possession of others’ property subjectively. according to the provisions of paragraph 5 of article 9 of the opinions of the supreme people’s court on several issues concerning the application of law for the trial of criminal cases involving robbery and seizure, “where an actor resorts to such means as violence or threat of violence in order to claim any debt, he may not be convicted and punished for the crime of robbery as a general rule. where other crimes such as intentional injury are constituted, he shall be punished according to the provisions of article 234 of the criminal law. “in this case, there was indeed a debt dispute, and the ownership of the properties involved was pending determination. mr. zhang’s target was the vehicle www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 105 published by scholink inc. involved which was pledged to him by wang x, which was in line with the characteristics of claiming debt and belonged to improper means for debt collection and property recovery; the abovementioned judicial interpretation only stipulates “for the purpose of claiming debt”, but does not clearly specify that the object of the act can only be the debtor. under the circumstances that the ownership of the vehicle robbed by huang xingxian was disputed and had not been adjudicated by the people’s court in accordance with the law, wang x was still the actual owner of the vehicle. combining the above two aspects, mr. zhang’s behavior can be governed by the provisions of this article. moreover, the violence used in the robbery did not rise to the level of constituting other crimes, such as intentional injury. 2.4 conclusion mr. zhang coerced wang x to hand over his car keys and drive away his bmw by restricting wang x’s personal freedom, which does not constitute the crime of robbery under article 263 of the criminal law 3. crime of unlawful detention mr. zhang’s act of restricting wang x’s personal freedom when demanding debt is suspected of constituting the crime of unlawful detention under article 238 of the criminal law.(note 2) 3.1 objective constitutive elements 3.1.1 behavior object wang x’s ex-husband borrowed 400,000 yuan from mr. zhang, and the agreed interest was 200,000 yuan in total. the debt had been existing before mr. zhang’s detention. for the bmw car under the name of wang x, according to article 26 (note 3) of the provisions of the supreme people’s court on several issues concerning the application of law to the hearing of private lending cases, the interest of 40 (24%) * 2 = 192, 000 yuan is debts with legal interest, so 8, 000 yuan is debts with natural interest, i.e., the debt is not protected by law and can only be assumed by the debtor voluntarily. according to the interpretation of the supreme people’s court on how to convict the act of illegally detaining others for claiming debts not protected by the law published on july 13, 2000, if the actor illegally detains or detains any other person in order to obtain usury, gambling or other debts not protected by the law, he shall be convicted and punished in accordance with the provisions of article 238 of the criminal law. that is to say, the interpretation expands the term “debts” in the original provisions of the criminal law to all legal and illegal debts. although the value of the bmw x that zhang demanded from wang x exceeded the amount owed, the amount of the debt as a pledge still fell within the scope of the amount that should be demanded by the creditor and did not exceed the amount of the debt demanding detention. 3.1.2 conduct zhang’s behavior restricting the personal freedom of wang x does not belong to the detention behavior in the crime of illegal detention, i.e., the behavior of illegally depriving others of their personal freedom. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 106 published by scholink inc. the detention behavior constitutes the crime of illegal detention, and the actual deprivation of personal freedom is deemed as completion. however, in such case, the criminal law does not punish the actor yet. according to the judicial interpretation, the condition for objective punishment is that the actual accumulative time of deprivation of personal freedom reaches 12 hours, or it is less than 12 hours but there are other serious circumstances. if the condition for objective punishment is not met, in contrast, people will argue that the crime of illegal detention is not constituted. (note 4) according to article 238 of the criminal law, in addition to the illegality of the act itself and the violation of the will of the act of detention, the main characteristics of the crime of illegal detention are as follows: first, continuity or timing, that is, the act is in a continuous state in a certain period of time, so that others lose their personal freedom in a certain period of time. there is no explicit provision on the duration of the crime of illegal detention in our criminal law, but the basis for reference is the provisions in the 1999 “case filing standards (trial implementation)” and the 2006 “case filing standards”, which stipulate that the basic constitutive time of the crime of illegal detention is continuous detention of up to 24 hours. according to the general theory, the length of time has no effect on the conviction, only on the sentencing of the actor. but the short, instantaneous deprivation of personal freedom should fall under the “proviso” of article 13 of the criminal law: “if the circumstances are obviously minor, with little harm, not to be dealt with as a crime.” (note 5) the second is the seriousness. according to the “proviso” of article 13 of the criminal law: “if the circumstances are obviously minor and have little harm, not to be dealt with as a crime.” only when the act of illegal detention has reached a very serious level can it constitute a crime; if the circumstances are obviously minor and have little harm, it should not be convicted and punished. in other words, only when the act of illegal detention has reached a very serious level can it be punished as a crime. based on a comprehensive analysis of the number of persons involved, the methods used the motive and purpose, the damages and consequences, the duration of detention and other factors, the “seriousness” of the act should be considered. mr. zhang restrained wang x’s freedom for only three minutes, which was an instantaneous restraint and did not constitute the detention under the crime of illegal detention. in the second-instance criminal judgment of “xu liangyin and chen haiming a case of picking quarrels and provoking troubles, illegal detention and establishment of a casino”, the court stated that: “after investigation, in order to collect debts, xu liangyin briefly controlled rao 1’s freedom for less than 12 hours, which does not constitute the elements of the crime of illegal detention.” second, in “ma jiancheng et al., intentionally destroying properties, unlawful detention and intentional injury”, the ningxia high people’s court agreed with this view of the appellant: “the appellant ma jiancheng did not beat the victim and restricted the victim’s freedom for a short time, so his act does not constitute the crime of illegal detention;” even in civil cases, the court also held that the defendant’s act of briefly detaining the plaintiff in order to settle the construction price did not constitute the “coercion” prescribed in article www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 107 published by scholink inc. 150 (note 6) of the civil code. therefore, zhang’s brief restraint of wang x’s freedom did not constitute the objective elements of the crime of illegal detention. in addition, paragraph 3 of article 238 of the criminal law is a provision of attention. the contents of this paragraph are the same as those of the basic provisions. in fact, this provision reiterates the basic components of the crime of illegal detention, and does not change the components of the basic provisions. there is no major difference between the unlawful detention for demanding a debt and the general unlawful detention in terms of infringement on legal interests, both of which only violate the victim’s right to personal liberty. although the content of this paragraph specifically mentions the need for the purpose of demanding a debt, this provision does not add special content to the crime of unlawful detention for demanding a debt, it is only used to remind the judicial personnel that the degree of infringement on legal interests of unlawful detention for demanding a debt is the same as that of unlawful detention for other reasons. “for the purpose of demanding a debt” is just the specific content of the crime of unlawful detention listed by the legislator. therefore, because the provision of article 238, paragraph 3, is only a provision of attention, its interpretation and application do not necessarily have many restrictions, and can be applied to various circumstances that are consistent with the constitution of the crime of unlawful detention of criminals. therefore, the caution provision should not be regarded as a legal fiction that once detention is used to demand a debt, it will be punished for the crime of unlawful detention. judging which constituent elements the actor’s behavior meets is the focus of dealing with cases of unlawful detention for demanding a debt. to sum up, mr. zhang’s objective behavior in the case does not meet the constituent elements of the crime of unlawful detention. 3.2 illegality (the accusation among the above constituting elements has not been established; the article is just a supplementary statement) in the case, mr. zhang’s behavior may belong to self-help behavior in civil law. according to article 1177 (1) of the civil code, “where the lawful rights and interests of a person are infringed upon, the situation is urgent and the person cannot obtain the protection from the relevant state organ in time, and failure to take immediate measures will lead to irreparable damages to his/her lawful rights and interests, the aggrieved person may, to the extent necessary for protecting his/her lawful rights and interests, take reasonable measures such as detaining the properties of the infringer, etc.; however, he/she shall immediately request the relevant state organ to deal with the matter.” it can be seen that the elements of self-help behavior are that it must be an act of the oblige to protect his/her lawful rights; it must be an act to protect rights under urgent situations; the way of self-help behavior must be the means or form allowed by law; afterwards legal formalities must be completed in a timely manner. the requirement for act of autonomy is objectively urgent and temporary, and it is “too late to ask for relief” from the relevant departments when the self-help behavior is taken. in addition to the failure to request for public relief in time, it also refers to the failure to get timely www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 108 published by scholink inc. response to the request for public relief; “relevant departments” should refer to the national judicial authority and administrative law enforcement department. in this case, the defendant’s act of controlling and disposing of the collateral is to protect its own lawful rights and interests; however, the plaintiff, as the debtor, had not committed any act infringing on its mortgage right such as intentional transfer of the collateral, impairment or loss of the value of the collateral, etc. therefore, the defendant could seek for relief from the relevant state organ, and the situation has not reached an emergency state; the defendant’s act of controlling and disposing of the collateral went beyond the means and form allowed by law for the obligee to carry out self-help behaviors; the defendant did not perform legal formalities afterwards and requested the relevant state organs to deal with the matter. therefore, the defendant’s act does not satisfy the elements of self-help behavior and is not self-help behavior. there is no cause for prevention of illegality in this case. 3.3 conclusion the fact that mr. zhang restricted wang x’s personal freedom when demanding debt does not constitute the crime of illegal detention as specified in article 238 (3) of the criminal law. 4. revelation to distinguish the crime of illegal detention from the crime of robbery, the key is whether the purpose of illegal possession exists. the crime of robbery is an act of robbing public or private properties by violence, coercion or other methods for the purpose of illegal possession. the crime emphasizes that the act of robbing public or private properties by violence, coercion and other means is committed for the purpose of illegal possession. with respect to whether demanding money (illegal debt) from a prostitute is illegal possession, the opinions on several issues concerning the application of law in the trial of criminal cases involving robbery and seizure stipulates that “where an offender resorts to such means as violence or threat of violence to claim any debt, he may not be convicted and punished for the crime of robbery as a general rule”, but there is no clarification as to whether the debt is a legal or illegal debt. therefore, there are different opinions in practice on whether or not to determine the crime of robbery. meanwhile, the opinions on several issues concerning the application of law in the trial of criminal cases involving robbery and seizure stipulates that “whoever commits robbery with such prohibited objects as drugs, fake currency or pornographic articles as the objects shall be convicted of the crime of robbery; whoever robs any illicit money or property obtained from gambling or from criminal activities shall be convicted of the crime of robbery, but if the offender only robs the money or debt from gambling he wins as the object of robbery, he may not be convicted and punished for the crime of robbery as a general rule. where any other crime is constituted, the offender shall be punished in accordance with the relevant provisions of the criminal law. “it can be seen that when a robbery is committed with illegal debt or illegal articles as the objects, the law is more inclined to “protection” of illegal debt. similarly, if the offender commits robbery for the purpose of obtaining the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 109 published by scholink inc. illegal debt, the illegal debt shall also be protected; that is, if the offender commits robbery for the purpose of claiming illegal debt and loses the subjective purpose of illegal possession, it shall not be determined as the crime of robbery. the crime of illegal detention refers to the criminal act of illegally depriving others of their personal freedom by means of detention, confinement or other compulsory methods. the crime of illegal detention by claim is a type of crime of illegal detention, in which the offender, for the purpose of claiming debts, illegally deprives the debtor or persons who have a close relationship with the debtor of their personal freedom by various means such as detention and seizure. according to the nature of the debts, the crime of illegal detention by claim can be divided into claiming legitimate debts, claiming illegal debts, claiming debts in excess of the amount of the true creditor’s right, claiming non-existent debts, and claiming debts that are difficult to ascertain. debts that are difficult to ascertain include debts not protected by law for which the limitation of action has expired, debts that are presumed not to exist due to lack of evidence, and debts that the offender subjectively believes to exist. it can be seen that under the circumstance that it is impossible to ascertain whether there is debt between the offender and the victim, we shall, in combination of the subjective criminal intent and criminal conduct, explore whether the offender has carried out illegal detention for the purpose of claiming debts. the existence of real and valid debt is not required for the crime of illegal detention by claim. as long as the offender is subjectively for the purpose of claiming debts, with no intention of illegal possession of others’ property, even if the offender claims a debt that he/she believes to exist, the crime of illegal detention is constituted. the intention of illegal possession of property is also the key to distinguish the crime of illegal detention by claim from robbery and kidnapping. the offender’s crime of illegal detention may include the elements such as assault, insult and abuse that overlap with robbery and kidnapping, but as long as he/she does not have the purpose of illegal possession of property, he/she does not constitute a crime of robbery or kidnapping. references sun, s., & yi, l. j. (n.d.). how to respond to the phenomenon of strong debt under the weakening creditor’s right—on the legal interest measurement of self-help behavior and illegal detention in debt collection research office of tianjin no.1 intermediate people’s court. tianjin weihe law firm. wu, y. y. (n.d.). on the determination of criminal law on unlawfully detaining people for the purpose of demanding a debt. people’s procurator ate of xiashan district, zhanjiang city, guangdong province. yin, x., & zhong, z. (2014). no. 34. yue, 12., & xing, z. (2017). no. 43. e, 11., & xing, z. (2020). no. 50. chuan, 11., & min, z. (2021). no.1963 civil judgment of second instance on dispute over www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 110 published by scholink inc. construction contract for construction project west construction group co., ltd. and jing yan county zhengxing construction labor service co., ltd. notes note 1. article 263 of the criminal law [robbery]whoever robs public or private property by violence, coercion or other methods shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than ten years and concurrently sentenced to a fine; note 2. article 238 of the criminal law [crime of unlawful detention] whoever unlawfully detains a person or illegally deprives a person of his or her personal freedom by any other means shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years, criminal detention, public surveillance, or deprivation of political rights. if he resorts to battery or insult, he shall be given a heavier punishment. whoever unlawfully detains or takes others into custody in order to obtain repayment of debts shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the preceding two paragraphs. note 3. article 26 of the provisions of the supreme people’s court on several issues concerning the application of law to the hearing of private lending cases when the interest rate agreed upon by both parties does not exceed the annual interest rate of 24%, if the lender requests the borrower to pay interests according to the agreed interest rate, the people’s court should support it. when the interest rate agreed upon by both parties exceeds the annual interest rate of 36%, the part of interests that exceeds 36% is invalid. when the borrower requests the lender to return such amount above 36% that has been paid, the people’s court should support it. note 4. point 18 of the guiding opinions on several issues concerning the handling of criminal cases involving mafia and evil forces issued by the supreme law, the supreme inspection office, the ministry of public security and the ministry of justice. note 5. some countries stipulate time limits for the crime of illegal detention, or use a certain period of time as the basis for establishing different levels of statutory punishments of the crime of illegal detention. for example, item 1 of article 239 of the german criminal law stipulates that the statutory punishment of “depriving the victim of his liberty for more than one week” shall be “not less than one year and not more than ten years of liberty punishment”. note 6. article 150 of the civil code of the people’s republic of china: “where a party or a third party, by means of coercion, has the right to request a people’s court or an arbitral institution to revoke a civil juristic act.” advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 28 original paper china-russia sports programs anuradha kataria1* 1 freelance writer, author of the book “democracy on trial, all rise!” received: march 8, 2022 accepted: march 22, 2022 online published: march 25, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n2p28 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n2p28 abstract this paper analyses the different styles of governance in various parts of the world which is also reflected in their respective sports programs. while the democratic western countries lead in this arena in an inspiring democratic way, the autocratic countries like china and russia have scintillating sports output but it is done in their characteristic autocratic way. variegated systems are perhaps good for sports in general and people in all countries are used to their respective systems and it perhaps works for them that way. keywords regimented training, doping, olympic results 1. introduction we are living in the best age as yet where the world is at peace, poverty getting decimated round the world and mankind is excelling in all fields. sports is at its most exciting best. it is rightly led by the western democratic countries which really raise the bar so high in their characteristic ethical, well organized fashion while keeping concern for athletes’ well being at the core. but autocratic countries do produce fabulous outputs and add to the thrill of competition and it perhaps works for them in that way. 2. method all respective countries sports programs were analysed basis existing literature. the writer lives in democratic india and also has lived for extended period in china and understands their psychology and values. 3. results it is good for the world sports that different countries pursue their own systems and make the competition exciting. while analysis focuses on the essence of their respective sports programs, in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 29 published by scholink inc. conclusion numbers do count and here is a tally of recent olympic results table 1. tokyo olympics 2020 countries gold silver bronze total united states 39 41 33 113 china 38 32 18 88 japan 27 14 17 58 great britain 22 21 22 65 roc 20 28 23 71 table 2. beijing winter olympics 2022 countries gold silver bronze total norway 16 8 13 37 germany 12 10 5 27 china 9 4 2 15 united states 8 10 7 25 roc 6 12 14 32 4. discussion the western democratic countries produce the most brilliant sports men and women and inspire the rest of the world to aim for excellence too. in their truly democratic style, it is also done in the right spirit of sportsmanship and surely lacks any form of nationalism. likewise, democratic japan too produces some brilliant sportsmen and women in a similar democratic fashion. although it is no news, sporting giants, china and russia also win outstanding olympic medals but in their characteristic authoritarian manners. seeing some of their sports documentaries on their draconian sports training models, we can even feel a bit sorry for their sportsmen and women. china and russia are also well known for their state sponsored dope programs. russia counts among the nations that have been stripped of the largest number of olympic medals due to doping allegations. china on the other hand is more difficult to catch. it is more than hearsay that they have a state of the art medical program which produces drugs and hormones that can not be caught by the current system. the chinese system is something like this. they scour the countryside for potential athletes to catch them young. often 3-4 year olds are separated from their families and taken into the sports concentration camps where they are trained. apart from rigorous training, they also have some hormonal adjustment early on, so it can not be detected later on in spot tests. the sports academies are run by coaches who then govern these future athletes life, both personal and professional. as they become teenagers, their coaches decide who they can and can not date. if they suspect their partners are having any kind of negative impact on them, they are advised, rather told to stay away from them. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 30 published by scholink inc. they are very successful in this. the sports men and women are also inspired to play; they are perhaps used to the system. china dominates several sports like badminton, diving etc. and table tennis is almost entirely an all china competition. figure 1. ma long and fan zhendong gold medal match, tokyo 2020 russian sports program is somewhat less regimented but equally ambitious and rigorous nevertheless. the coaches control what their protégés will eat or not and try to get young sportsmen and women to dope and compete fiercely. in 2019 the world doping agency banned russia as a nation from international sports competition and the athletes were to be allowed in the next olympics to compete as individuals under the russia olympic committee banner (roc). now, in 2022, russia has further bans due to its invasion of ukraine. some international events to be held in russia like f1 in sochi has been cancelled also russian figure skaters as well as several other sports men and women have been barred from competing in world championships. though it is a bit harsh on them, given that they hardly have any say on their russian political figurehead and they have also already endured the system they have to live under. they do produce some world class figure skaters, ballerinas and other sports personalities though. due to the ban world champions like anna scherbakova and alexandra trussova won’t be able to compete in the upcoming world skating championship. figure 2. 2022 gold medalist anna scherbakova russian figure skater the chinese system operates strictly on the carrot and stick basis, winners are rewarded heavily and losers given the stick end of it. so after the olympics there are separate parties for the winners. chinese www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 31 published by scholink inc. only like the “gold”. the gold medal winners and their coaches are given heroes’ welcome, meet the state politburo and are invited to a gala celebration for the gold medalists only. the silver and bronze medalists are somewhat second class and the ones who didn’t win anything, just written off and looked down upon as if they somehow brought disgrace to the nation. the sportsmen and women and in general the whole populace are considered a property of the state to serve the common good. for instance if a sports person were to quit at the top of their game in the western world, they are honored as heroes and even respected more for that. in china, they would be considered as traitors. they are supposed to bring honour to the state rather than pursue their “selfish” personal dreams. both the systems are not as bad as operated by the earlier communist era regimes which were even more dictatorial. the sportsmen and women do seem quite inspired and are somewhat used to their respective nations’ autocratic ways. the worst examples are from the middle east. it is known that when the iraqi footballers used to return home defeated in a match, saddam hussein used to get them whipped. but by their standards, that is just mild treatment, at least he didn’t dip them in acid; that probably is reserved for political opponents. india is quite a democratic country and do not push their populace in any direction whatsoever and even bronze medalists are given heroes’ welcome. in the rest of the world like africa or latin america, sports are individual inspired and not led or controlled by the state. latin americans produce some real good footballers and surfers. africans do have incredible marathon runners though somewhat famished looking, as if running for food or money. figure 3. gold medalist kenya’s kipchoge, tokyo 2020 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 32 published by scholink inc. figure 4. alex hall olympic gold in slopestyle skiing, beijing 2022 different nations with widely disparaging political systems, also reflected in their national sports programs do make competition more exciting and fierce. the autocratic countries do excel in all fields as well. however, the western democratic countries produce the best of the world in all sports like soccer, skiing, motogp, f1 triathlon, gymnastics, tennis, etc. the list is endless and set the standards so high. it is done in a truly inspirational manner and the spirit of the sports is joyous and liberal. their freedom and democratic essence is truly worth aspiring for, they represent empowerment and should continue leading the world through soft power. references gleaves, s. (n.d.). tokyo olympics medal table—which country has won most golds? bbc. retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/sport/olympics/57836709 olympics medal table. (n.d.). olympics. retrieved from https://olympics.com/beijing-2022/olympicgames/en/results/all-sports/medal-standings.htm weller chris. (aug 1 2016). inside the grueling chinese “sports schools” where kids become olympians, tech insider. retrieved from https://www.insider.com/how-china-trains-olympicathletes-2016-7 wamsley, l., & kennedy, m. (dec 17, 2020). russia gets its doping ban reduced but will miss next 2 olympics. npr retrieved from ttps://www.npr.org/2020/12/17/947504052/russia-suspended-from-next-2-olympicgames-over-anti-doping-violations advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 1 original paper empirical research on the impact of open fund sheep behavior on stock price volatility chaoqun yu1 1 the han nationality, nanjing audit university 210000, nanjing, china received: november 23, 2023 accepted: march 01, 2024 online published: march 08, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n2p1 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n2p1 abstract in the past, economic research took the “rational man hypothesis” as the premise, but in reality, this premise is difficult to hold. in a large number of financial practices, a large number of special phenomena that are inconsistent with standard financial theory have emerged. behavioral finance is premised on the assumption of irrational people, and herd behavior is a relatively special irrational behavior. it refers to the behavior of investors who are influenced by other investors when the information environment is uncertain, imitate other people’s decisions, or rely too much on public opinion without considering their own information. sheep behavior is a related behavior involving multiple investment entities, which has a great impact on the stability and efficiency of the market, and is also closely related to the financial crisis. therefore, herd behavior has attracted widespread attention from academia, investment and financial supervision. the capital market started late. in 1990, the shanghai stock exchange was established, marking the birth of china’s stock market, the distribution of market investors have changed again and again, unchanged is that the behavior of investment subjects has a strong similarity, at the same time, fund market has persistent fluctuations. whether there is a causal connection, this paper will focus on the development of fund market, use lsv model and var test method to test and analyze the fund and stock trading data of shanghai and shenzhen from the first quarter of 2017 to the first quarter of 2022, and empirically study whether there is significant herd behavior in open-end funds. on this basis, the impact of stock investment herd behavior on stock price volatility is empirically studied. finally, according to the research conclusion, from the three aspects of investor investment rationality, the effectiveness of capital market and the optimization of market structure, suggestions on how to reduce the impact of the herd effect and the healthy and sustainable development in the future. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 2 published by scholink inc. keywords open-ended funds, sheep behavior, stock price fluctuation 1. introduction 1.1 research background in recent years, china’s fund industry has developed rapidly, and there are many phenomena of following the trend of investment in the market, which has become a huge stumbling block in china’s fund market. china’s regulatory authorities and institutional investors pay more and more attention to the daily operation of open-end funds. open-end fund, which can also be regarded as an institutional investor, is both rational and irrational, and “herd behavior” is one of them. at present, institutional investors still occupy the majority in many markets with high level of development. therefore, analyze and grasp the investment behavior of institutional investors, especially the herd behavior, is very conducive to the stability of the financial market. measuring the behavior of investors’ herd behavior and evaluating its impact on market stability is an important indicator to evaluate the maturity of the market and its institutional investors. on the basis of the above understanding, coupled with the summary of the previous herd behavior research, the econometric research model is used to study whether the herd behavior exists significantly in china’s open-end fund market, and on this basis, the influence of the herd behavior on the volatility of the stock price is empirically studied. the results show that in china’s open fund market, the herd behavior is significant, and has a more obvious impact on the stock price fluctuations. at the end of the article, we provide corresponding opinions and suggestions for maintaining market stability and reducing fluctuations. 1.2 research meaning from the theoretical perspective, this paper measures the scale and degree of “herd behavior” in the open-end fund industry, measures the “herd behavior” of open-end fund investors, and evaluates the actual impact on the trading behavior and the stock market price fluctuation. in addition, with the improvement of capital markets and the change of regulatory policies, this research provides theoretical support for future investment stability and trading policy formulation. in general, this article provides an empirical basis for the evaluation and supervision of open-end funds, as well as a reference for investors to identify the ability of investment managers and choose open-end funds with less risk. on a practical perspective, other market investors (such as fund investors and retail investors) usually show high attention due to their more accurate and professional investment information and larger holdings and follow their trading decisions. this paper studies the impact of the “herd effect” of institutional investors on the capital market, and provides a reference for investors to choose diversified open-ended funds and evaluate the ability of investment managers. in short, the article provides advice on market participants to make their investment decisions about institutional investors ‘behavior, thus helping them to better understand institutional investors’ behavior and make more informed investment decisions. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 3 published by scholink inc. 2. theoretical basis and literature review 2.1 theoretical basis 2.1.1 definition of herd behavior herding behavior refers to individuals taking behaviors similar to most people in order to avoid risk, to seek to have a sense of belonging, or to imitate others in uncertain or emergency situations. this behavior often leads to individuals abandoning independent thinking and decision-making, thus forming a similar “herd” effect. herding behavior can occur in a variety of social and economic environments and may lead to negative consequences such as collective collapse and financial crises. when individuals are faced with complex or uncertain situations, they look for other people’s opinions, signals, and behavioral patterns to assist themselves in making decisions. this tendency may lead in some contexts to a group of people to act like a “sheep”, following mainstream views and actions rather than independent thinking. sheep behavior may occur in various situations, such as the stock market, real estate market, public opinion influence on social media, etc. a characteristic feature of herd behavior is the existence of an asymmetry in information transmission. when some messages are amplified or distorted, this information may cause more people to get involved in the herd behavior. in addition, herd behavior may also be influenced by group psychology effects, such as group identity, stress, competition, and belonging. although herding behavior may have negative effects, it also has its positive effects. for example, herd reference may be a quick way to gain information and skills for those with little experience or knowledge. in some cases, herding behavior can also promote the formation of social cohesion and a spirit of cooperation. 2.1.2 the type of “herd behavior” (1) rational herding behavior and irrational herding behavior rational herd behavior means that in a market, many investors take similar investment strategies or actions based on rational analysis and judgment. this investment behavior is usually based on the analysis and evaluation of the market and company fundamentals, as well as the trade-offs of risk and return. in this case, group behavior can reflect the overall information and expectations of the market, and contribute to price discovery and market effectiveness. irrational herd behavior is also common in stock markets, such as when market sentiment swings, some investors may tend to follow the market sentiment in similar investment strategies or actions. this behavior may lead to excessive buying or selling in the stock market, thus affecting stock prices and market stability. in addition, some investors may make similar investment decisions influenced by irrational factors such as rumors and speculation, which are usually unsustainable and risky. (2) true herd behavior and false herd behavior in the stock market, real herd behavior can mean that stock investors adopt similar investment strategies or actions influenced by market sentiment and other investor behaviors. for example, in an exciting rising market, many investors may follow the trend, causing more people to follow and buy www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 4 published by scholink inc. shares, pushing up the stock price. false herd behavior in the stock market usually refers to some bad speculation, such as market manipulation, insider trading, etc. these behaviors may be a few people or institutions through false information, rumors and other means to manipulate the stock price, guide other investors to follow, and thus make profits. this behavior not only violates the market rules and laws, but also damages the market fairness and the interests of investors. 2.2 literature review there are also three different views on whether herding behavior is prevalent in the entire fund market and whether herding behavior in the fund market has a substantial impact on stock price fluctuations the first view is that herding behavior does have a substantial impact on stock price fluctuations, which is the mainstream view of the academic world. wang and li took the data of 43 quarters from the first quarter of 2008 to the third quarter of 2018 as samples, and divided the samples into three stages according to the level of economic development: january 2008-december 2011, january 2012-june 2016, and july 2016-september 2018. through lsv model and var model, the results show that the herd behavior of the fund is significant, and the degree of herd behavior is not reduced with the increase of the number of funds in our country, and the herd behavior directly affects the stock price fluctuations. liu (2018) used the panel data regression method to analyze the herding effect index of lsv and media coverage factors, and came to the following conclusion: under the influence of public opinion, institutional investors will also have “herding behavior,” which will have an impact on stock prices. gao, yang, and ye (2017) found that as a result, the amount of institutional investors’ holdings played a significant role in reducing stock price boom and crash. the second view is that the open-end fund herd behavior will not have a bad impact on stock price fluctuations. qin (2018) concluded through the combination of literature research, theoretical analysis and empirical analysis that institutional investors play the role of market stabilizer and can reduce the stock price fluctuations of gem. in addition, compared with buying herd behavior, selling herd behavior contains more stock price information, which can better stabilize the stock price of gem market. du and wang (2005) suggest that through empirical research, securities investment fund herd behavior has a positive effect on stock price fluctuations, and the positive effect is long-term, moderate herd behavior can accelerate the stock market for the new information understanding and feedback, makes the share price to reduce volatility, faster back to reflect the economic fundamentals. zhou and peng (2007) using the shanghai index and the shenzhen component index present specific yield as experimental sample analysis, the results show that when the institutional investors began to develop, the market yields appeared obvious volatility, but the stability of volatility increases, so that institutional investors can stabilize the stock market. after saying the first two views, it is clear that the third view that the fund herd behavior and stock price fluctuations have no clear connection. zhang, jiang, and ni (2021) based on no arbitrage www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 5 published by scholink inc. principle and options game method and the least square monte carlo method solution model, for the information is incomplete and asymmetric market, under the condition of the same information asymmetry, the information degree is not high, herd behavior can suppress stock price fluctuations, and when the information advantage prominent will enlarge share price fluctuations. zhang, li through research from 1999 to 2003 closed-end fund investment data, the results: closed-end foundation through positive feedback investment trading behavior, this behavior has strong influence, will bring more serious herd behavior to the market, and the emergence of these phenomena is unfavorable to the long-term stability of the stock market, however, the study also shows that in the securities investment fund market, sell sheep behavior can calm stock price fluctuations. 3. industry characteristics and cause analysis 3.1 open-end fund meaning and characteristics 3.1.1 implication open-end fund (open-end funds), also known as mutual fund, refers to the fund sponsors in setting up fund, fund business unit or total size is not fixed, can according to the real-time investors, at any time to sell investors fund units or shares, and can redeem at the request of investors issued the fund units or shares of a fund operation mode. investors can not only increase the fund assets and size of the fund through the seller’s institutions, but also sell the fund shares to reduce the fund assets and size. 3.1.2 characteristic (1) good liquidity: open-end funds can be bought and sold directly on the exchange, investors can buy or redeem shares at any time, very flexible. (2) asset allocation: open-end funds allocate assets according to the investment decisions of fund managers to diversify risks and diversify investment varieties. (3) transparency: open-end funds disclose their portfolios and net worth, and investors can learn about their holdings. (4) simple procedures: investors only need to buy fund shares to participate in the investment of the fund, do not need to carry out tedious investment management work. (5) risk control: fund companies make use of their professional and information advantages to conduct risk control and investment management of funds, which can better protect the interests of investors and maximize the returns. 3.2 open-ended funds affect the stock market volatility reasons china’s open-end stock funds mainly in the secondary market to invest in the stocks of listed companies. as the number and size of such funds continue to grow, there is growing concern about their impact on the stock market. research shows that the position change of star fund will affect the trading of other funds, and the same direction is high. this imitation behavior may lead to a large number of stocks in the same direction in the market, which has an important impact on the volatility of the stock market. therefore, whether it is the same investment decision made based on reasonable www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 6 published by scholink inc. information analysis or a simple irrational imitation, the imitation behavior of china’s open-end stock fund may have an impact on the volatility of the stock market. in addition, china’s financial market has developed for a short time, and compared with other developed economies, it still needs to be improved. therefore, the information in the financial market is also incomplete, and there is a certain degree of information asymmetry. as a result, some investors may doubt some of the information that they have and even give up, and instead pay attention to and trust the information that other investors have. some of the most watched messages will be the market leader, and more and more investors will believe them. therefore, this “herd effect” will cause the stock price to deviate from its fundamental value, and the basic information of listed companies will affect the price accordingly, which means that more non-fundamental factors will have an impact on the stock price. as mentioned above, the herd effect includes not only buying behavior, but also selling behavior. as a result, investors may trade briefly, heavily and in the same direction, thus causing stock market turmoil, and thus causing a big disturbance to price volatility. finally, herd behavior is also divided into rational herd behavior and irrational herd behavior. when irrational herd behavior accumulates to a certain extent, bubble phenomenon will occur. for example, when the stock market rises, institutional investors remain optimistic about the market, which leads to mass buying in the market. according to the principle of supply and demand, it will lead to a further rise in the stock price, and will burst when the bubble accumulates to a certain extent, thus causing panic in the market, and a large number of investors will sell in the same direction, further aggravating the turbulence of the stock market. 4. analysis of herd behavior existence 4.1 research method in order to test whether there is herd behavior in the open-end fund market, the lsv model studied by lakonishok (1992) was selected as the measurement model of herd behavior indicators. the model measures the existence of herding behavior by measuring whether a securities investment fund has the same trading tendency for a stock as a whole. this model is selected for the following reasons: 1. easy data for the lsv model.2. the measurement results of the lsv model are more accurate.3. it is widely used, and the research results are more comparable. the model formula is： ��i�=|� ��−e(� ��)| pit=bit/(bit+sit) in which： ��i�: sheep behavior degree index, namely the herd behavior degree of stock i in period t. � ��: the number of funds buying a stock i in period t is a proportion of the total number of funds buying and selling the stock. bit：all funds bought stocks i during period t www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 7 published by scholink inc. sit：sales of all funds to stock i during period t �(� ��)：that is, the expected value of the � �� when the value of ��i� is 0, it indicates that there is no herd behavior for the stocks in the fund market within the period t. conversely, when ��i� is not 0, there is herd behavior, and higher ��i� values indicate more significant herd behavior. however, this method can only test the existence of herd behavior, but can not explain the direction of herd behavior, so the herd behavior measure index needs to be corrected. increase buying flock behavior bhmit and sell herd behavior shmit by the following formula: bhmit=|bit-e(bit)| shmit=|sit-e(sit)| 4.2 data selection the data period selected in this paper is from the first quarter of 2017 to the first quarter of 2022. this range includes both the transformation of the bull and bear market and the impact of the impact of the epidemic on the stock market. investors are not confident in their own information and are easier to study the herd effect. the original data of this paper is obtained through wind database and oriental wealth network, and the data of the top 10 stocks held by open-end equity funds are collated, and the number of stocks traded is reflected through the changes in the number of stocks. the specific operation is as follows: the author obtains the data of the top ten stocks of the open-end fund from the fund quarterly report, compares the distribution of stocks in each quarter with the last quarter, and judges the buying and selling behavior through the change of shareholding and the old and new stocks. 4.3 herd behavior measure results computational formula： through the above formulas, the herd behavior degree of each quarter is calculated after calculation, the following measurement value of chinese open fund sheep behavior (shanghai and shenzhen main board market) table 3-1 table of the first quarter of 2017 to the first quarter of 2022 hm bhm shm 2017 q1 0.3114 0.1182 0.2132 2017 q2 0.2794 0.1376 0.1668 2017 q3 0.2139 0.1065 0.1564 2017 q4 0.1326 0.2278 0.1214 2018 q1 0.3118 0.1562 0.2254 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 8 published by scholink inc. 2018 q2 0.2785 0.2761 0.2802 2018 q3 0.1736 0.1869 0.162 2018 q4 0.1125 0.1296 0.1178 2019 q1 0.1885 0.2263 0.2546 2019 q2 0.2602 0.2657 0.2319 2019 q3 0.1235 0.1024 0.1398 2019 q4 0.1468 0.0954 0.1383 2020 q1 0.1542 0.2385 0.2432 2020 q2 0.2143 0.2228 0.2065 2020 q3 0.1564 0.1486 0.1352 2020 q4 0.1829 0.1951 0.1562 2021 q1 0.1524 0.2101 0.1628 2021 q2 0.1351 0.1132 0.1534 2021 q3 0.1003 0.1094 0.1061 2021 q4 0.1456 0.1227 0.1163 2022 q1 0.2452 0.2058 0.1714 after measuring the herd behavior in the open-end fund market from the first quarter of 2017 to the first quarter of 2017 to the first quarter of 2022, it was found that there was obvious herd behavior in every quarter. among them, the average overall herd behavior was 0.1914,0.1712, and the average selling herd behavior was 0.1742 figure 3-1 plot of herd behavior from first quarter of 2017 to first quarter of 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 9 published by scholink inc. combined with the data in the chart and the table, it can be seen that the overall herd behavior of the open-end fund is more significant, among which the selling herd behavior is stronger. 5. empirical analysis of the impact of herd behavior on stock price volatility 5.1 arrangement and processing of the data this paper selects the first quarter of 2017 to 2022 data empirical analysis, due to the stock distribution from the stock market, the mainland main stock market for shanghai and shenzhen, so the selection of explanatory variables must give full consideration to this important factor, considering the market index, at the same time include shanghai and shenzhen stock market of csi 300 index has become the best reference index. this paper will select the quarterly standard deviation of the csi 300 index to reflect the changes in stock prices. interpreted variable: standard deviation of csi 300 index, recorded as std, also as y explanatory variable: buy flock behavior degree, recorded as bhm, also as x1，selling sheep behavior degree, recorded as shm, also as x2 5.2 empirical analysis 5.2.1 stability test in order to ensure the accuracy of the subsequent studies, the above data are required to be tested for smoothness. comprehensive consideration, adf method for stability test. table 4-1 results of the adf test for the variables variable adf value 5% critical value p value stabilization results std -3.348578 -3.052169 0.0286 steady bhm -4.126525 -3.673616 0.0217 steady shm -6.284474 -3.673616 0.0004 steady as can be seen from the data above, the p-values of std, bhm and shm variables are all small, all below 0.05, i.e., stationary at the 5% significance level. studies can therefore be continued. 5.2.2 to develop the var model since the data has passed the stationarity test, now we will use eviews9 to establish a var model for std, bhm and shm. the determination of the appropriate lag order p for the endogenous variable is one of the important conditions for establishing the var model. if the lag order is too small, the autocorrelation of the random disturbance term may be more serious, which will lead to the lack of validity of the parameter estimate; if the lag order is too large, more parameters will be estimated, and large estimation error will be generated under finite sample size. to retain more degrees of freedom and make the model fit more accurate, we chose to build a var model with a second-order lag, as shown in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 10 published by scholink inc. figure figure 4 – 1 figure 4-1 var model detection plots in figure as can be seen from figure figure 4-1, all points fall within the unit circle and so this var model is stable. 5.2.3 granger causal test the data selected in this paper is the time series data, which may have a strong correlation, resulting in the abnormal statistical results of the detection, but in fact, they do not have a real correlation. for example, the herd behavior will affect the standard deviation of the csi 300 index, while the standard deviation of the index will affect the investor psychology, thus affecting the herd behavior in the next stage. therefore, the next granger causality test will be conducted on the var model to further study whether the behavior of buying and selling sheep directly affects the fluctuation of the stock price. table 4-2 results of the granger causality test dependent variable: std excluded chi-sq df prob. bhm 5.651290 2 0.0593 shm 15.44963 2 0.0004 all 17.02938 4 0.0019 dependent variable: bhm www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 11 published by scholink inc. excluded chi-sq df prob. std 6.628084 2 0.0364 shm 13.62616 2 0.0011 all 18.33956 4 0.0011 dependent variable: shm excluded chi-sq df prob. std 6.344245 2 0.0419 bhm 2.881013 2 0.2368 all 6.960296 4 0.1380 from the test results, we can know that buying herd behavior at 10% significance level will have an impact on the stock price volatility, while selling herd behavior at 5% significance level will have an impact on the stock price volatility, and the stock price volatility will in turn affect the buying and selling herd behavior. thus, the herd behavior will affect the stock price fluctuations. 5.2.4 pulse response analysis because the var model reflects the dynamic relationship between variables, so when the var model (also known as new interest (innovation)), will inevitably affect the current and future value of all endogenous variables in the whole var system, the influence path and degree of mathematical method is called the pulse response function (impulse response function, irf). note that this is a shock (im-pulse) for random disturbance terms, but a feedback to the shock (response) for endogenous variables. the pulse response function is used to analyze the dynamic influence of the var model on the system. figure 4-2 the pulse response analysis plot www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 12 published by scholink inc. according to figure 4-2, when buying flocks produces a unit of positive impact, the stock market will produce a large fluctuation for a long time. when selling herd behavior has a positive impact, the volatility of the stock market is more obvious, which makes the stock market volatility more violent, and the volatility will stabilize after a period of time. as a result, both selling and buying behavior have a positive impact will have an impact on the volatility of stock prices. 5.2.5 variance decomposition through the analysis results of the pulse response function, we can find that both buying and selling the herd behavior will have an impact on the fluctuation of the market stock price. however, to draw more precise conclusions, we need to perform the variance decomposition of the var model in order to further observe the extent to which buying and selling herd behavior affects stock price volatility. table 4-3 the variance decomposition results variance decomposition of lny period s.e. lny lnx1 lnx2 1 0.365661 100.0000 0.000000 0.000000 2 0.436688 79.68436 18.95867 1.356966 3 0.484738 66.50697 15.43404 18.05899 4 0.491277 66.27862 16.13601 17.58538 5 0.531897 67.86545 15.96846 16.16609 6 0.537884 66.37330 17.70581 15.92089 7 0.545900 64.84607 17.61147 17.54246 8 0.550357 65.16486 17.34713 17.48800 9 0.556691 64.94393 17.79521 17.26086 10 0.558199 64.77678 17.76631 17.45690 according to the data in the table, it can be observed that in the main board market reflected by the csi 300 index, the effect of buying herd behavior and selling herd behavior of chinese open-end stock funds is more and more significant with the passage of time. among them, at the lag of 10 periods, the impact proportion of buying herd behavior has reached 17.8%, and the impact of selling herd behavior is as high as 17.5%. it can be seen that there is herd behavior in china’s open fund market, which has an impact on the volatility of stock prices. 6. conclusion and suggestion 6.1 research conclusion this paper mainly studies the influence of the herd behavior of open-end funds and the unreasonable behavior of investors on the volatility of stock market. the linear regression model analyzes the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 13 published by scholink inc. specific influence of herd behavior on chinese stock market. the conclusion is as follows: at present, there is still a large-scale herd behavior in china’s open-end fund market. quantifying herd behavior through stock trading volume, there is a mutual restriction relationship between herd behavior and stock market fluctuations. the herd behavior of investors will cause the fluctuation of stock prices, and the influx of more investors will aggravate the consequences. on the contrary, the fluctuation of stock price and the instability of the market will also disrupt investors’ investment decisions to some extent, making investors unable to accurately grasp the relevant market information and produce herd behavior. normally, moderate herd behavior has little impact on the fundamentals of the stock market and the entire economy. instead, moderate price fluctuations can also invigorate the stock market and promote its development. however, for excessive herd behavior, considering the large investment subjects and strong transmission, it has a strong impact on the economy and the stock market, it will lead to the stock market shock, and even the financial crisis. in short, herd behavior affects the dynamics of the stock market to a large extent. 6.2 policy suggestion 6.2.1 publicize rational thinking and strengthen the education of market participants open-end funds have been developing in china for a short time and attracted the attention of the market, so investors often bring the habit of stock investment to the fund investment, such as “chasing the rise and falling”, “frequent trading” and relying on inside information. although the fund is a more reliable investment way than the stock, we need to treat the unique investment way of the fund with a rational attitude, realize the difference between it and other financial products and stocks, and understand the different trading methods and risks. the fund’s return will be proportional to the risk, because the higher the expected return, the higher the risk. to open-end fund, investors can apply to buy and redeem funds at any time. however, irrational investment methods will make investors affected by short-term sentiment, thus frequent trading, limiting the liquidity of fund managers’ normal trading, and further magnify market volatility. for the sake of profit, some fund companies exaggerate the market conditions, establish investors ‘optimistic attitude towards the market, and narrow or cover up the possible risks in the transaction, which to some extent aggravates investors’ blind optimism. 6.2.2 to establish a more effective capital market investment environment (1) improve the capital market system. at present, the system of the domestic capital market is still not perfect. for example, there is a division problem in the bond market, the shanghai and shenzhen stock exchanges have not been connected to some extent, and the registration and clearing institutions are also independent. in the long run, the shanghai and shenzhen stock exchanges should become market-oriented institutions, rather than the local offices of the csrc. in addition, there are still some institutional problems to be solved at present. for example, if the over-the-counter market is too loose, the registration system may still have room for improvement, and the trading system of the new third board also needs to be further improved and improved. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 14 published by scholink inc. (2) reduce administrative intervention. the relevant functional departments of the state should carry out the deepening reform, minimize the administrative intervention in the operation of the capital market, and let the capital market truly operate independently. for example, in the aspect of listing, the reform of the registration system should be fully implemented to let the market play a leading role. after the listed companies, the regulatory authorities should not pay too much attention to the stock prices or stock indexes, but should pay more attention to whether the behavior of the listed companies is regulated, and whether the investors and intermediaries have illegal behaviors. once problems are found, they should be strictly punished. (3) manage the listed companies according to law. listed companies, as the strong subjects in the capital market, especially the stock market, should be subject to strict supervision. regulators should urge the major shareholders of listed companies or brokerage investment banks to operate in accordance with market norms, and constantly improve and perfect relevant information disclosure and other matters, so as to be responsible to the public. (4) protecting the legitimate rights and interests of small and medium-sized investors. the relevant functional departments of the state should carry out institutional innovation, such as the inversion of the burden of proof or class action litigation, so that small and medium investors can not be violated by illegal acts. these measures will help to enhance the confidence of small and medium-sized investors and promote the stable development of the market. 6.2.3 wewill optimize all factors and accelerate the development of open-end funds (1) give overall consideration to the quality and speed of the development of open-end funds, accelerate the industrialization and scale of open-end funds, improve the efficiency of scale, narrow the gap between developed countries, and give full play to the role of the fund industry in the field of economic development. therefore, we should improve the fund market system. implement policies such as strengthening fund product innovation and broadening fund sales channels to encourage fund companies to increase diversified products to meet the needs of various investors; at the same time, the fund market trading mechanism should be improved, and a sound information disclosure and risk warning mechanism should be established to improve market transparency. (2) improve the innovation ability of open-end funds, improve the existing fund operation mechanism, and improve the operation efficiency. product innovation: fund companies can develop new fund products, such as debt-to-equity swaps, money-market funds, reits, to meet the different needs of investors, improve the level of market diversification; investment strategy innovation: fund companies can, by introducing new investment strategies, such as quantitative investment, diversification investment and other ways to improve the fund investment return rate and risk control level; technological innovation: fund companies can improve the efficiency and transparency of fund management by adopting new technologies such as artificial intelligence and blockchain, realize the whole process of fund management automation and information; channel innovation: with the rapid development of the mobile internet, fund companies can use new channels such as the internet and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 15 published by scholink inc. mobile terminals, and using marketing tools such as social media, to attract more young investors into the fund market. (3) regulatory agencies and organizations should formulate relevant policies, actively and effectively guide the psychology and expectations of fund investors, and strengthen the risk awareness education of investors. we will formulate more perfect regulatory systems and rules to refine the responsibilities and obligations of fund managers, fund custodians and other relevant market entities. increase the supervision of fund companies, timely stop and punish illegal business behaviors, and promote the legal and steady development of the market; strengthen the supervision of information disclosure of fund companies, require fund companies to disclose relevant information and risk tips timely, accurately and comprehensively, guarantee investors’ right to know and choose; improve the market supervision means, such as big data, artificial intelligence and other technologies, improve the supervision efficiency and accuracy, find the market risks in time, and intensify the crackdown against violations. references andrei s. (2003). inefficient markets: an introduction to behavioral finance. translated by zhao yingjun. china renmin university press, 2003(6). cao, g. h. (1998). theory of conformity behavior and its innovation. economic dynamics, 1998(1), 7-10. deng, y. (2009). in research on the impact of herd behavior in stock investment on stock price volatility (dissertation). southwest jiaotong university. fang, k. (2019). research on the impact of investment behavior of china’s public funds on stock market volatility. dissertation. university of international business and economics. gu, r. b., liu, h. f., li, x. d., & li, l. (2015). herd behavior and volatility in the stock market: correlation and evolution evidence from the shenzhen stock market. journal of management sciences in china, 2015(11). li, t., chen, h., liu, w., yu, g., & yu, y. t. (2023). understanding the role of social media sentiment in identifying irrational herding behavior in the stock market. international review of economics and finance, 163-179. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2023.04.016 liu, t. d., zheng, d. z., zheng, s. y., & lu, y. (2023). herding in chinese stock markets: evidence from the dual-investor-group. pacific-basin finance journal. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2023.101992 ma, l. (2016). empirical analysis of herding effect in china’s stock market. nankai economic studies, 2016(01). mei, g. p., & nie, g. h. (2009). empirical analysis of the existence of herding behavior in china’s stock market. journal of finance and economics, 2009(9). neuman, y., & cohen, yochai. (2023). unveiling herd behavior in financial markets. journal of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 16 published by scholink inc. statistical mechanics: theory and experiment, (8), https://doi.org/10.1088/1742-5468/aceef0 phan, h. m., le thi, n. q., dam, v. d. h., tran, m. s., truong, t. h. l., & le, q. a. (2023). herd behavior in vietnam’s stock market: impacts of covid-19. cogent economics finance, (2), https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2023.2266616 sun, j. b. (2010). research on the impact of china’s fund herding behavior on stock price volatility. (dissertation). wang, l., kong, d. m., & chen, w. (2011). herding behavior of securities investment funds and overreaction in the stock market. south china journal of economics, 2011(03). wang, m. w. (2019). empirical research on the impact of herding behavior of china’s securities investment funds on stock price volatility. dissertation. shanghai international studies university. wang, x. m. (2010). empirical research on herding behavior of china’s securities investment funds. journal of finance and economics, 2010(5), 37-41. wei, g. y., & du, h. w. (2009). empirical research methods of herding behavior. statistics and decision, 2009(18), 159-160. yang, z. j. (2003). in research on “herd behavior” of china’s securities investment funds and its impact on stock price volatility (dissertation). zhejiang university. yao, g. x. (2019). in the impact of the “double herding effect” of institutions and individuals in china on stock market volatility (dissertation). southwest university of finance and economics. zhang, p., jiang, y., & ni, w. h. (2021). the relationship between herd behavior and stock price volatility: evidence from the theoretical level. management science, 34(02), 144-158. zhang, s. y. (2022). empirical research on the impact of “herd behavior” of public funds on stock price volatility (dissertation. advisor: zhang jianhua). shanghai international studies university. zhou, x. l. (2021). the impact of herd behavior of china’s open-ended equity funds on stock market volatility. dissertation. henan university of finance and economics. https://doi.org/10.1109/cis54983.2021.00121 1. introduction 1.1 research background 1.2 research meaning 2. theoretical basis and literature review 2.1 theoretical basis 2.2 literature review 3. industry characteristics and cause analysis 3.1 open-end fund meaning and characteristics 3.2 open-ended funds affect the stock market volat 4. analysis of herd behavior existence 4.1 research method 4.2 data selection 4.3 herd behavior measure results 5. empirical analysis of the impact of herd behavi 5.1 arrangement and processing of the data 5.2 empirical analysis 6. conclusion and suggestion 6.1 research conclusion 6.2 policy suggestion microsoft word ape-v5n2-p8 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 8 original paper socio-economic culture of backward communities: an educational achievement of dalit students dr. uttam khanal1* & dr. gyanendra prasad paudel2* 1 departments of economics and social sciences, tribhuvan university, kathmandu, nepal 2 departments of economics, national college (nist) tribhuvan university, kathmandu, nepal * dr. uttam khanal, e-mail: khanaluttam24@yahoo.com * dr. gyanendra prasad paudel, e-mail: pgyanendrapd@gmail.com received: february 24, 2022 accepted: march 12, 2022 online published: march 14, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n2p8 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n2p8 abstract the dalit community is a backward class, due to socio-economic and educational reasons. to providing equal opportunities in education but the problems also rised, if is not done, it will be difficult to achieving educational goals and opportunity of social change. increasing the economic access of the dalit community will lead to participation in development and inclusion of their children in education. the problems are expressed by educational progress of dalit students due to poverty, lack of consciousness, large number of families, landlessness, unemployment, lack of educational scholarships, lack of agricultural and business loans, lack of schools near slums, high fees, inferiority complex, traditional social norms, discrimination against children, wasteful spending, relocation and falling mentality. due to this, governmental and non-governmental organizations have helped to dalit parents in their economic and social development through dalit oriented programs. the enrollment rate of basic level is 92% as per the national policy of the government and 8% of children are out of school according to government statistics and 25% out of school according to non-government data, the challenges of educational progress of dalit children are still acute. keywords socio-economic, educational achievement, dalit community, social-norms, culture 1. introduction nepal is a multilingual, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural nation based on values and beliefs. its geographical, historical, social, and natural significance has given its identity to the world. due to the humane behavior based on nepal’s diverse culture and traditions, the people of the lower www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 9 published by scholink inc. castes who have contributed to nation building and state structure are becoming victims of inhumanity and humiliation. they are deprived of state responsibilities and responsibilities of running the state and other administrative and decisive entities and are suffering from caste discrimination. compared to other castes, dalits have not been able to achieve economic, social, and political equality and even educational equality. the education is possible to prepare the skilled manpower required for nation building, due to various reasons and traditional hindu culture forbids them to get proper education, the belief that dalit castes should not be educated has psychological effect. what happens there are feelings of inferiority? the practice of caste and untouchability that has been going on for thousands of years in india, nepal and some of our neighboring countries has never been seen anywhere else in the world. people living in countries like india and nepal where this practice has been practiced have suffered great social discrimination, hatred, and humiliation for thousands of years. therefore, this practice has become a stigma of the human race in these countries. religious and social movements have already been going on to remove it. these countries now have constitutions and laws that do not comply with it, and political and social institutions, reformists and revolutionary intellectuals are trying to remove it. location on the world map of tulsipur sub-metropolitan city has our country in the northern hemisphere in the dang valley, the largest valley in the western part of nepal. its total area is 384.8 sq. km. has been about 70 percent of this sub metropolitan city is in the plains of the dang valley and the remaining 30 percent is in the hills (detailsbook of tulsipur sub-metropolitan city, 2020). the literacy rate of the dang district was found to be 70.32 percent (cbs, 2011) while the visible enrollment rate at primary level and net enrollment rate in primary education of nepal increased from 66.3 % in 1999 to 97 % in 2016 growing at an average annual rate of 4.57% and now net enrolment rate in primary education for nepal was 97 % (education statistics, 2016). in the human development index published by glme based on the data of 2011, the value of the index is 0.537 which was only 0.409 in june 2004. after the political changes of 2017, all-round national education committee 2018, national education system plan 2028, national education commission 1998 were formed in nepal and the commissions submitted their reports to the government of nepal. (poudel, 2005) but the attachment to dalit education is the same. with the improvement in the construction of various physical infrastructures and the opening of schools to cater to the growing population, the number of schools across the kingdom has reached more than 25,000 and the number of teachers has reached more than 100,000. these schools and teachers serve a total of more than 5 million students have been coming (shrestha et al., 2008). the poverty among dalit is highest while the country’s poverty rate was 21.6 percent in 2015 ministry of finance and poverty of dalits was 42 percent. according to economic survey 2018 published by ministry of finance the poverty of nepal has gone down to 17.2 percent but there were no separated data neither whole dalits nor for dalit women. though the trends among dalits have increased to go for overseas employment there is no survey to determine to what extent that has contributed to reduce www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 10 published by scholink inc. their poverty (economy survey, 2018). for free of universal education was compulsory to the dalits were still deprived even basic education which was development of the country. since the issuance of the union declaration of human rights, nepal has also adopted a softer attitude towards the dalit community after the 2007 revolution. the country’s law was legally enacted by 2015 saying that there should be no social discrimination against the dalit community with caste and ethnicity to provided equal opportunities in education. dalit children have been encouraged to go to school so that no citizen of the country can be separated from the light of education backward castes. although civil rights are guaranteed for women, they are neglected in practice, so there is a lack of education in the dalit community. 2. problem of statement education is the main means by which a person who is a carrier of change and development in society acquires knowledge in every human aspect relative to time, learns skills, increases capacity, and achieves success in adjusting to a changed society. without education, it is difficult to get information about the progress of the society, the pattern of change, the overall state of development. it is necessary to make equal participation of all people in educational activities. therefore, to grow with the pace of society, every caste, language-speaking community in the society should have access to education which is considered as the backbone. while it is the responsibility of the state to come, it is also the duty of the citizens to seek education. man is an integral part of society, if society does not exist without man, then society without man also becomes non-existent. in this way, there is an interdependent relationship between society and human beings. society changes relative to time it continues because every activity of the society is being operated and transformed according to the human desire and need of the time environment. the same environment is not always certain. it changes over time. similarly, it is a human responsibility to change every activity of the society with the passage of time. thus, man is also considered a carrier of social change. there are various problems related to dalit community for improving in the education sector. there were 300 schools and two campuses provided study facilities to about 10,000 students. now, 29,000 schools and higher secondary schools, 638 campuses, five universities and two higher education institutions have been established. about 7.5 million students are studying in schools and higher education and about 190,000 teachers are affiliated with these educational institutions (education statictis, 2007). education is the beacon of human knowledge. education as the backbone of human development and national development is taken. it is considered to build the quality of human life and to build good citizens loyal to the nation and future leaders. the state’s commitment to provide equal access to education to all children in the country, equal access to equal education for most children has not yet led to access to primary education. therefore, at present, what is the priority in socio-economic and educational status of dalit children? etc. it has been taken as a problem as achievement can be achieved only by focusing on the problem. also, keeping this aspect in mind, this study has been www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 11 published by scholink inc. conducted from the primary education to help in conducting future programs. there are various problems in the dalit community. there is no immediate relief from the problems created by the socio-economic environment those problems can be minimized. food is a top priority for people in all communities, but it is not easy to find from dalit. realizing the additional needs, why seek education, health, and employment opportunities to meet them. in the dalit community as in other castes, how can their children get rid of the same problems that they were facing yesterday? even though you have suffered those miserable misfortunes, your child did not have to suffer. due to all these reasons, burning issues like how to involve their children in school education are still alive. it was necessary to study the possibility of education targeted programs for dalits and its effects around these problems. the problems are solving by getting the answering of question below.  what are the socio-economic cultures of backwardness community?  what are the causes of dalit children for school enrollment in education?  what efforts have been made to improve of dalits educational?  what problems are faced by dalit community? 3. objectives the main objective of this study is to conduct a geographical survey of the education and socio-economic factors of dalit children. the main objectives of the present research work are as follows.  to assess economic backup of family for enrollmentin education.  to compare of dalit and non-dalit students in education on mainstream.  to evaluate the problems of dalit students in education. 4. literature review american anthropologist rishi chacham navbhachatash was born in 1926 in san francisco, usa. griez, who received his doctorate from harvard university in 1965, came up with an explanatory concept to understand reality from the study of the internal structure of the community by studying the field of study of indigenous peoples in java, vali, and morocco. she focused her entire study on studying the religions, cultures, symbols, rituals, etc., of different communities. social, his hobby was to understand the social reality by studying anthropology about the overall cultural process. she discusses the various dimensions and aspects of culture in her famous book. in it, she discusses the subtle study of society and the diversity of cultures. she considers archeology and comparative science to be more useful in understanding human behavior. to put it more clearly with the political changes after 2015, many organizations have also been established by the federal system of government of nepal. as a result, the dalit castes themselves have been providing information in this regard through many facts, magazines, books, and other means. from all of this, realities that have not been found even in ancient history have been unfolding one after www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 12 published by scholink inc. another. as being a most marginalized and excluded dalit people of nepal, which constituted about 13.6% of the total population of the country, the mechanism can be an instrumental for bring about change for dalitin nepal (human rightes, 2015). dalit’s literacy rate of 6 years and above is 52.4 percent compared to the national average of 65.9 percent and34.5 percent for tarai/madhesi dalit (nsis, 2012). women from all dalit groups have lower literacy rates compared to the national average and their male counterparts. literacy rates of dalit women are 45.5 percent while women from musahar and dom community are at the bottom with 17.4 percent and 17.9 percent literacy rates respectively (cbs, 2011). the government of nepal has ensured free secondary education to all children including free text books and up tors.450 a year to all dalit students. however, primary school education is still unaffordable for households below the poverty line. only, 24.7 percent of hill dalitsand 11.8 percent of tarai/madhesi dalits was complete 8th grade which was far behind the national average 41.7 percent. dalits comprise only 1.6 percent of those with a slc and above and only 0.8 percent of those with a bachelors’ degree. children fromdalit communities face discrimination at school by teachers and peers. due to the pre-judiced mindset, teachers provide less care for dalit children, who are not permitted to drink water, are addressed in a rude manner and were placed in separate lines. ultimately their learning achievements become slow, often leading to dropout. in turn, low educational attainments have a multifaceted impact on thesocio-economic and political life of dalits, and a barrier to human development (undp, 2009). limited access to modern healthcare facilities and lower utilization of health services contribute to high maternal and infant mortality rates in nepal, again creating barriers to education. in a society dominated by males, women do not enjoy the freedom of marital or reproductive choice and as a result, pregnancies were wide spread in nepal (raghavendra, watts, 2016). in 2018/19, girls were making up 49.7 percent of enrolments at lower basic level 50.6percent in 2018 but 50.2 percent at upper basic level and 49.9 percent at basic level had 49.9 percent in totality. girls also make up 50.3 percent of secondary level enrolments and 50.7 percent of higher secondary enrolments. in the totality of 50.4 percent was of grade 9–12 enrolments in 2018’s year. when girls enrol, they tend to continue their education more than boys. dalit children account for 20 percent of lower basic level, 15.6 percent of upper basic level and 12.5 percent of secondary level with grade 9-10 and at 7 percent secondary level with grade 11-12 enrolments (moe, 2019). a series of efforts were made internationally to make education for all a reality for young people and children. a logical consequence, therefore, is that all children have the right to receive the kind of education that does not discriminate against them on any grounds, such as caste, ethnicity, religion, economic status, refugee status, language, gender, or disability (unesco, 2005, p. 12). however, a bitter truth revealed by the education for all global monitoring report 2010 said that, despite these international commitments, millions of children are being deprived of their human right to education (unesco, 2010, p. 136). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 13 published by scholink inc. in view of the still unsettled system of classifying dalit caste groups, estimating the dalit population is difficult. one estimate puts the number of dalit people at 13.09 % out of the total population of 23,151,423. this means that the total dalit population is 3,030,067, with kami the largest group with 29.57% and halkhar the smallest group with 0.12 %. dalit women comprise 51% of the total dalit population (fedo, 2020). the education for all national plan of action (efa/npa) 2001-2015 (nnc-unesco 2003) had targeted of 80% enrolment rate for children aged 3 to 5 years and a similar percentage of new entrants in grade 1 with eced experience. the trend of ecd/ppcs shows that fast changes are possible with appropriate strategies and initiatives. the enrolment of children in ecd/ppcs increased rapidly from 38,000 in 2000 to 1,047,117 (girls 501,288, boys 545,829) in 2012/13. an equitable progress for both girls and boys are reflected in the ger increase from 11.7% in 2000 to 73.7% in 2012/13 i.e., 73.1% for girls and 74.3% for boys (moe and unesco, 2015). in recent years, identification by a separate cultural category is increasing in nepal. due to a lack of knowledge of the history and culture of various ethnic/caste groups, sometimes a cultural group is placed either within the adibasi/janajati or madhesi or dalit category (world bank, 2006). the ethno-graphic research carried out by the research team of sia-ep of central department of sociology and anthropology 2012-2014 suggested that “chidimar” community is no longer a dalit community as outlined by the rastriya dalit ayog (dahal & gurung, 2014). nepal has made excellent progress in literacy. overall literacy rate for population aged 5 years and above has increased from 14percent in 1971 to 66 percentpercent in 2011 (cbs, 2003; 2012). according to the latest census 2011, the male literacy rate is 75 percent compared to 57 percent of the females. the highest literacy rate is reported in kathmandu district 86 a percent d lowest in rautahat42 percent. the literacy rate is higher among the jain, marwadi, bangali, thakali, hill brahmin and newars. similarly, tarai groups such as maithili brahman, kayastha, rajput, have higher literacy rate than national average. various censuses clearly show that the literacy rate of janjatis and dalits have increased substantially. the literacy rates among the hill dalits are better than those of the tarai dalits, who are the most deprived in terms of education. of them, the lowest literacy rate is that of musahar, followed by dom, chamar, paswan, tatma (dahal, 2003; sharma, 2014). gurung divides ethnicity and nationality, state structure, definition, and population, janajati issues and finally in the article titled “nationality and janajati” on page 419 of sociological thought in the context of nepal. after the establishment of the gorkhali state, the rule of nepal has been in the hands of the tagadhari caste. jayasthiti malla (1382) in khaldo, nepal, where the influence of hinduism has been growing since the lichhavi period of 4th century created 64 business castes in the newar society and learned from them. ramshah (1606-36) made himself a hindu by maintaining the status of social justice of the gorkhas. at the top of the caste classification, there was drinkless among the stringed ones and untouchables at the bottom. non-stringed castes were classified as untouchables and untouchables. the sanskrit language was snuffed out and the ethnic brotherhood was stopped. in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 14 published by scholink inc. today’s democratic nepal, there are three groups except kamaiya, mohi and kisan. hindu religious beliefs are the source of oppression of women, tribals and dalits (gurung, 2009). inside the prison, on page 78 of the prison, the women prisoners of hilly origin are traditionally referred to as inferior and inferior caste. backward and socially despised who do not receive financial, moral, and legal assistance. as a result, the lower castes and the poor have been forced to languish in prisons for a long time without getting legal redressal after being imprisoned. however, the educational environment inside the prisons has not been refined in the book (guragai, 2007). in comparison, the overall primary level of dang district is 18.69 percent dalit students studying in class 1 and non-dalit 81.31 percent dalit in class 2, 16.4 percent non-dalit 83.62 percent dalit students in class 3 was 57 percent non-dalit 85.43 percent similarly in class 4, 13.61 percentdalit and 86.39 percent non-dalit and finally in class 5, 11.8 percent alit and 88.2 percent non-dalit students are seen. from class 1 to 5, dalit students enrolled 15.36 percent and non-dalit students enrolled 84.64 percent. overall, the highest attendance at the primary level is in class one and the lowest in class five. in a nutshell, the higher the caste class, the lower the presence of dalits, so the rate of migration can be increasing (moe, 2007). article 19 of the civil code 2020 states, anyone who treats a person untouchably and discriminatory based on caste or deprives him or her from appearing in a public place or using things of public use may face imprisonment of up to one year or a fine of up to three thousand rupees or both. in addition to the above laws, mechanisms such as development committee act 2013, neglected, oppressed and dalit upliftment development committee order 1997, ministry of local development, ministry of education, ministry of labor, neglected oppressed and dalit upliftment development committee have also been set up. thus, various schemes, international commitments, the basic laws of the country, including the discrimination of various mechanisms, are highly contagious-untouchable, black-how ridiculous is it to fall into the trap of mental learning of the untouchables and the untouchables in an environment where voices are being raised from all over the world for the protection of human rights by punishing inhumane things like whites? therefore, considering the various literary works and laws mentioned above, it is said that imposing any restriction on one person to read and write freely and express one’s opinion must be considered as poverty of thought. “you can stretch out your hand in the open air until someone else’s nose touches it”. therefore, the people who seek their own freedom must keep in mind that others should also be free and even though our country was declared as an untouchability-free country on june 6, 2008, it is time to think about how ridiculous it is to have such a trap still prevailing in the society. 5. methods the qualitative research approach had been used to descriptive analytical ways for the data explain that had been taken from dang of tulsipur sub-metropolitan city was used of this paper. the research paper www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 15 published by scholink inc. was analyzing to given data with quality based by making extensive experience and an idea was placed on drawing conclusions. thispaper has tocollect the information required for the study and generalized by the response ofparents, dalit students, the parent association, teachers and head teachers, district education coordinate unit, social workers and representatives of non-governmental organizations, the chairman of the school management committee, the chairman of the parents’ association and the precident of child club. the data was also collected from the representatives of the statistics department. during the present study has used second source of information, various newspaper compositions, reports as well as related brusets as well as secondary level data was including enrollment of students, attendance, number of participants in the examination and the number of students who passed the examination were also generalized. to selecting a representative sample from a determined population by focusing about the study can generalized of information for research. the sample has been selected of total of students’ population. the representative population was address to the total number of respondents. in addition, the study sub-metropolitan city had thirteen communities and one municipality is included in the study area. the national dalit network, dalit seva sangh, dalit mahila sangh and sahayogsamaj were also represented in study area which has helpful for the purposive study. these all were getting helpful information and generalized it. similarly, samples had also been selected by using random sampling methods. the worthwhile to use data collected from primary and secondary sources because some of the data being may be impractical, vague, and unnecessary. the methods of data analysis were qualitatively used its information and preparing report. the secondary sources of data were taken from tulsipur sub-metropolitan city and its education branch. this data was helpful to report analyzing and briefly explain. there were 50994 of the total sutudent at basic level of school on which 5730 were dalit student (education statistics of tulsipur sub-metropolitan city, 2020). similarly, the primary data was also ued to getting information. the sample size of population was 550 on which 340 were dalit and 210 were non-dalit students by collecting information with ramdom sampling methods for the purpose of the study. the purpose of data had collected getting primary and secondary sources of information because non-dalit had also provided supporting information for generalized. the data had generalized by using simple statistical tools like, tabulation, ration, and percent. all the information has categirised in same aims was present but the entire table had not presented in this paper because only few tables had show with analytical ways. information collection technique and interpretation was essential factors for the research report writing. it helps to gathering the primary information was collecting data from basiclevel of tulsipur sub-metropolitan city in dang district by using survey, interview, questionnaire, group discussion and secondary data had been collected from the concerned institution, books, journal, newspaper and booklets. the collected information had been presenting by headings and subheading with clear explanation. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 16 published by scholink inc. 6. discussion and analysis education is an important subject. it not only helps to raise the level of consciousness of the common man but also helps to identify the bases of subsistence. even though, equal access to education is a natural right of the common man, equal access to education for the backward classes and the dalit community is considered an important issue in itself. it is the responsibility of the state to provide opportunities in education to lay the groundwork for equal opportunities. to bring the dalit community into the mainstream of the state and change their lives from education, the problems of dropping out of school, not going to school, and not attending regular schooling should be solved by enrolling the children of the dalit community at the school level. based on the daily life and social condition of life, the level of awareness that the economic and social environment of the home and family should also enroll and teach their children in school has not increased. on the other hand, some parents have not been able to send their grandchildren to school due to financial problems of their families. while the question of how the children of such families can get school education has been raised, the state has also conducted school lunch program and scholarship programs targeting the same person. in some places, school nutrition programs have been conducted focusing on the same children at the initiative of various organizations. a school enrollment campaign is being conducted and school uniforms, school bags and stationery are being distributed to the students. the continuation of such programs has had a positive impact on the dalit community, including school enrollment. as in the general area, this program has a great impact in dang district as well. the educational statistics of dalits must present on the paper of study was dang districs on about the status of dalits student. to make it easier to understand, the data tulsipursub-metropolitan cityof dang district were collected from various organizations and then from the schools. this sub-metropolitan city has total of 149647 populations on which 76504 were male and 73143 were female according to report of tulsipur sub metrpolitan city 2020. to put it more bluntly, the scope of our study should have been focused on the primary level, but if only a very small range was included in this way, the reality would be in jeopardy. the population of total students in tulsipur sub-municipality was50994 out of them 47.55 percent (24249) were female’s student and, 52.45 percent (26725) were male’s student in basic level. similarly, there was5730 dait student on which boys were 2997 and girls were 2753 according to the flash report of education branch of tulsipur sub-metropolitan city (tulsipur sub-metropolitan city, 2020). by studying, the involvement of dalit students in education and their socio-economic condition, an attempt has been made to get information about the problems and solutions. as this report is being compiled in this report, an attempt has been made to mention the interest and participation of the dalit community in education. the data presented shows the number of students enrolled in the overall primary level within the sample area. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 17 published by scholink inc. table 1. enrollment of dalit students in basic level s. n. details total numbers of student dalit students percent 1 boys 26725 2977 11.14 2 girls 24249 2753 11.35 3 total 50974 5730 11.24 sources: tulsipur sub-metropolitan city, 2020. the total of 50974 students was enrolled in the basic level within the studies area while 5730 dalit students were enrolled. out of the total enrolled of students, 11.24 percent dalit attendance was enrollment, while non-dalit enrollment was 88.76 percent. those were vast different between dalit and non-dalit enrollment in basic school with education. the comparizon ration between dalit boys and girls were slightly different, 11.14 percent boys and 11.35 percent girls were enrollment in basic school education. there was a difference of 0.21 percent in dalit gender descrimination, so the dalit community had enrolled of their girls in school education with awareness of ngo’s and different organization. table 2. comparison of dalit and non-dalit students by genders s. n. details total students non-dalit percent dalit students percent 1 boys 26725 23748 46.59 2977 5.84 2 girls 24249 21496 42.17 2753 5.4 3 total 50974 45244 88.76 5730 11.24 sources: tulsipur sub-metropolitan city, 2020. according to the table, the total number of 50974 students was enrolled in the basic level in studies area and then the number of non-dalit students was 88.76 percent. out of them, the total student attendance of dalit students was 11.24 percent on which 46.59 percent non-dalit boys and 5.84 dalit boys. similarly, there were 42.17 percent non-dalit girls and 4.5percent was dalit girls were found in study. in totality of girl’s enrollment, there were 88.67 percent non-dalit girls and 11.33 percent dalit girls were enrolled in basic school education. so, the total enrollment of non-dalit and dalit ration was 7.9:1 percent. a. dalit and non-dalit students enrolled in basic level exam the number of students was appearing in the examinations from basic level of study area has taken to sampling data of 340 dalit and 210 non-dalit students. according to the respondent students to how many students are enrolled and droup out in the exam, they had given their answer to school education, examination and droup out ration. the answer of the respondents was presented on table as the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 18 published by scholink inc. participation of students in school or education and dropout rate had studied. the basis of their participation in the queries, they attempt to exam quarterly, half-yearly and annually by conducted examinations. table 3. dalit students enroll in basic level exam s.n. details population exam join percent exam droup percent 1 non-dalit 210 208 99.05 2 0.95 2 dalit 340 309 90.88 31 9.12 3 total 550 517 94 33 6 sources: field survey 2020. according to threspondents answer, there was 99.05 percent of non-dalit student appered in exam on which 90.88 percent dalit was attempt to basic level exam. in totality enrolled of exam scenario, those who had participated in the examination in 94 percent dalit and non-dalitsstudent. to analysis in their anwser was getting that only 6 percent population had drouped out ration. in other hind, 9.12 percent dalit student had droup out of exam but the non-dalit had only 0.95 percent of droup out in exam. it was concluded that the ration of droup out rate of dalit community was higher than non-dalit community students. overall scenario of dalit has backward from the society due to the education excessbility. b. ocio-economic issue of dalit community the socio-economic aspect can lead to educational status of the dalit community. family background, income level, occupation and daily expenditure pattern was positive indicators of community development. it was important to look at the access of children in both community’s school education. the number of students was studying at the basic level; enrollment rate, regular attendance rate in class, class pass rate, dropout rate in the middle were also presented by compared. it was relatively easy to find out from these indicators to their participation in education for those communities. the table was presented to study how many of the students were enrolled at the basic level with genderly based. what was the participation of passing rate in dalit students among the community? should dalit community was addressing minimum requiredment of society? these all answer were gereralized and presented in table. table 4. socio-economic status s.n. details activitiesof parents responces percentage i don’t know percentage yes no yes no 1 literecy 280 50 82.35 14.71 10 2.94 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 19 published by scholink inc. 2 land of parents 190 135 55.88 39.71 15 4.41 3 expenditure in education 75 200 22.06 58.82 65 19.12 4 health expences 207 120 60.88 35.29 13 3.82 5 foods and clothes 290 40 85.29 11.76 10 2.94 6 school tiffin of child 79 241 23.24 70.88 20 5.88 7 farming 182 150 53.53 44.12 8 2.35 8 office and other duties 45 290 13.24 85.29 5 1.47 9 communication & it 92 240 27.06 70.59 8 2.35 10 force to child for school 120 200 35.29 58.82 20 5.88 11 no willing education 80 250 23.53 73.53 10 2.94 12 others 25 300 7.35 88.24 15 4.41 sources: field survey 2020. the questions were submited to the respondent student in study area for how to improve socio-economic condition due to education status of family background. all students were welly to reply answer on their family and parents’ activity of household with their opinion. by submiting the question to getting answer of literecy of parents, land of parent for farming, income expenditure in education, health expences, food and clothes, official and other duties, communication and willing to force to joining schools for their children were present in tabulated answer. to analysing their answer, 82.35 percent of student’s had literery parents and 2.94 percent did not say answer as of them 14.71 percent parents had illiterated. the dalit’s parents had having of land on which they had 55.88 percent land for agriculture, and they did not have 39.71 percent of land on their parent accoding to their information. education and schooling were important, but all parents should have to enroll their child due to lack of income sources and awarness. so, 35.29 percent parents had forced to join school for their child and 58.82 percent parents did not force to joining school. according to income analysis, 13.24 percent parents have joined to office and other duties for getting money to support family and education, but 73.53 percent of parents didn’t force to school education to their children. they wanted to freedoom for children because education not only the backbone of human life. this statement was come from due to lack of awareness and knowledge of education by the causes of illiterecy. some parents were aware from communication which had 27.06 percent and 70.59 percent did not say clearly on what about the communication. students were happy and healthy by getting hygenic foods, health services and clothes, so the respondent reply that 85.29 percent were very serious from foods and clothes, 2.94 percent did not reply to the answer for food and clothings were also important to student for graving educational chances of life. c. rop out student ofdalit and non-dalit in basic level the students enrolled in the school; the number of students who did not participate in the various www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 20 published by scholink inc. examinations conducted in the school is counted as dropping out of class. although the dropout rate can be easily assessed by considering the participation and non-participation in the examination to analyze the dropout rate, the details for the dropout rate are given belows. table 5. comparison of dropout ratio s.n. details enrolled percentage exam join percentage droupout percentage 1 non-dalit 45244 88.76 45014 99.49 230 0.51 2 dalit 5730 11.24 5418 94.55 312 5.45 3 total 50974 100 50432 98.94 542 1.06 sources: tulsipur sub-metropolitan city, 2020. according to the table of basic level of statistics of student’s population, out of 45244 non-dalits, the examination presented populations 45014 were present which droup out ratio was0.51 percent. similarly, 5730 out of 5418 dalit students were present and 5.45 percent dropped out. the dropout rate of dalit students is much higher than the non-dalit community students were found after analysis. information about the status of dalit and non-dalit children was obtained through direcly taken from education record of dand district and tuslipur sub-mertopolitan city. the total enrollment of 50974 students, dalit enrollment was 5730 or 11.24 percent and non-dalit enrollment was45244 or 88.76 percent. similarly, out of the total enrollment of students participated in the examination which was 94.55 percent of dalit students were participated in the examination while 99.49 percent non-dalit students had participated in exam at that time. the data shows that 5.45 percent of enrolled dalit students did not participate in the examination. however, this rate seems to be higher among non-dalit students. similarly, 0.51 percent of non-dalit students had droup out the examination. the participation rate in the student admission test and the pass rates in the exam are higher for non-dalit students than for dalit students. out of the total students in the sample school, the surveyed get 5.45 percent dalit and 0.51 percent non-dalit students dropped out of the class but 18.4 percent dalit student’s enrolled repeated class and35.32 percent of non-dalit students were also enrollment in same class and same schools. d. idicators of educational problems it was clear from the above statistics that the educational participation of dalit children in studies area is low compared to the participation of non-dalit students. due to this low participation, the condition of dalit students seems to be weak in all aspects including admission rate, attendance, and participation in examinations. in this paragraph, an attempt has been made to find a solution to the problem. due to the long history of untouchability, high caste, etc., the dalits have not been able to get equal access to other fields including education. various such traditional beliefs have become a snare in the educational www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 21 published by scholink inc. path. without resolving them, the educational advancement of dalits is not visible. dalit students, non-dalit parents and teachers where interviewers with their respondents have well as other social activists, representatives of non-governmental organizations were attempted to made. admission: the reason 82 percent has given by the dalit students and parents were economic reasons i.e., poverty, unemployment, greed for the profession, lack of awareness, lack of education by parents, family problems. non-dalit students were found to have problems such as lack of awareness, large family size, poverty, unemployment, lack of long-term thinking about the future, lack of enthusiasm, lack of enthusiasm, traditional cultural thinking, lack of compulsory education policy, lack of dalit scholarships. non-dalit students, parents, and teachers even in today’s age, trying to keep some children at home is not an economic reason. scholarships are provided to dalits only for financial reasons. parents emphasize that they are unconscious and do not know the importance of education. overall, even though dalit scholarships have been distributed, poor dalit families must go to the owner’s house for work all the year round due to the “kindergarten practice”, which has led to a decrease in the number of children enrolled in school. attendance: reasons for not being able to attend to school such as inability of parents to pay attention, failure, enrollment in old age, distance off school, financial problems, traditional beliefs, hiring children at home were found. lack of consciousness, inability of parents to pay attention, laxity and addiction in students, habit of wasting money, living on the road, or returning from work, going to work, maintaining religious traditions and social norms. due to the above reasons, it was found that dalit students could not attend school regularly. in fact, many school-age dalit children are absent from the observations of the fact that they play, sing, and entertain themselves in cultural beliefs, including marriage and rituals. similarly, the parents of 91 percent non-dalit students say that the religious and cultural traditions are also used to enjoy the party without regular attendance. according to the dalit parents and students, the dalit parents have not been able to pay attention to their children when they go to school due to the disappearance of their profession. for which dalit and deprived student market by 2days. he reveals the bitter truth of working for 4 days, earning money, and going to school to buy things. enrollment and dropout rate: the dalit students and parents, the reasons for the lack of participation of dalit students in the exams were poverty, persistence of kindergarten practices, perception that literacy is enough, unemployment, failure rate, high prices, child marriage practice, etc.by the opinion of71 percent non-dalit parentsand teachers, the problems of dalit students include poverty, child labor, child marriage, and inability to support household expenses, large number of families and lack of awareness. due to the above, dalit students could not participate in the examination. two hundred and four hundred scholarships to eat for a year, copy-they worry about where the pen, the book, the medicine, and everything else will go. according to him, the lack of attendance throughout the year, the perception that students cannot pass, and the high fees for the annual and half-yearly examinations are among the reasons why all the students have not been able to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 22 published by scholink inc. attend the examinations and must leave the class. thus, based on everyone’s arguments, from their experience and reality, it seems that the parents who do not regularly attend dalit students have not been able to emphasize on their studies. lower class students stay at home for a short time and upper-class children go out to entertain with out-of-pocket expenses, fail to pass exams due to fear of their parents, drop out of school next year or go abroad and get married early. passed relation to failure: the high number of non-dalit students, parents, and teachers in the interviews but they give opinion about the low pass rate and high failure of dalit students in the school run examinations are illiteracy, late homework, and late return to education. causes such as child marriage, entertainment and addiction, influence of wrong social traditions, lack of responsibility of parents, wasteful spending habits, poor relationship between students and parents, family problems were seen. dalits say that they have not been able to make educational progress due to their occupation, unemployment, inferiority, lack of finances, influence of peers, lack of awareness of education, high fees, child marriage, victims of bad practices, political reasons, traditions, and other reasons. dalit students have been forced to drop out of exams due to lack of proper instruction and high fees. similarly, dalit students and parents also cite reasons for going to work for others, spending less time in school, trying to entertain in an out-of-school environment, not being able to seek supervision from family and community parents. the younger class admits that the number of passers-by has decreased as they must take care of their siblings, chickens and cows at home and the older ones must earn a living by bringing money and food. examining the beliefs and opinions of the parents and teachers of the students, the parents of the dalit students could not be aware of the children, could not inspire them to read, dalit children do not seem to be able to pass as expected due to not being able to teach good qualities and falling prey to addictions, not being able to give importance to school education, being in the habit of playing games with life and weak parents to take their children in the right direction. social inequality: various studies have shown that there have been many disparities between dalits and non-dalits since time immemorial. due to which, education has also been adversely affected. based on the analysis of the discussions with the target group, the major inequalities between dalits and non-dalits of study area were feeling untouchable, water and food not running, dalits not allowed entering non-dalit houses, not having a marital relationship, not participating in various cultural events, not having equal rights to land and social status is considered low etc. e. causes of poverty of dalit community the discussion with the based-on interactions, survey with the target group during the study, the lack of cultivable land due to the existing poverty among the dalits, the inability to establish them in various job opportunities has resulted in lack of proportional representation in education. poverty was also found to be a factor as it was difficult for the poor dalits to make economic gereration activities. the society had back and should not improve without poverty eradication. the cause of poverty had remains in dalit due to socio-culture causes of contemporary society. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 23 published by scholink inc. caste discrimination: according to the belief of the uneducated community, the lower castes should not be educated but should serve the upper castes. caste discrimination gets back to the dalit to improve their economy. the poor community should always back from with the name of caste, ethniucity and race. profession: as the norms of modern society have not been developed in the dalit family, there is a belief among the elders that their children should also take up their own profession and make a living. they do not want to send their children to school because of they were dalit community. they feel gulty by upper caste, 69 percent of respondent wanted to scape from such a social evils like caste and entnicity. lack of public awareness: all the dalit community has lack of knowledge to getting education and awarness. by the discussions with non-dalits community of studies area had to clear that why education for dalit family members? what are the benefits? what do you get by reading? they didn’t get any answers. they have only question for how to get good and shalter in future. due to the lack of awareness of such sentiments, their attraction towards the school education sector has diminished. gender discrimination: while discussing with the dalit parents in the study area, the daughter is going another home with marriage. there is no benefit in teaching daughters. such type of suffer from 92 percent of dalit community. he says that since sons must take care of their parents, they need to be educated to some extent according to the changing times. there is less attraction in the field of education as the daughters are giving more importance to how to keep the dignity of the work in a foreign house and the sons are giving more importance to how to keep the work of the ancestors. attitude: dalits communites has not change their attitude towards educated people. are the uneducated more practical than the educated? the perception of educated people of dalits is not correct. there are beliefs that everyone who has read should get a job and should do it. there is no perception that new education is for the development of lifestyle. seeing educated unemployed people in the village, our children cannot do anything by reading have 79 percent perceptions. their representation in the education sector has decreased due to the feeling that they should be unemployed. f. major problems in education we have discussed how much our country has changed in the world of education, in the dalits society has always been stuck with their own problems. today, even within the environment of computer study in the world, the parents of dalit slums have learned if you don’t know them, tearing up your children’s homework copies and giving more importance to blank sheets may be ridiculed in the dalit community, but the truth cannot be obscured. similarly, the major educational problems of dalit children are centered on their economic and social aspects. examining the information of 76 percent obtained from the discussions of the target group. the releted facts are presented regarding their major problems as: (a) due to the deteriorating economic situation, dalit children are also involved in earning a living, which is why they are forced to work from school age. (b) parents of dalit families suffering from the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 24 published by scholink inc. problem of earning a living do not have time to think about the future and education of their children. instead, they try to get their children involved in their profession. (c) even if they send their children to school, they do not have time or desire to look at their achievements and activities. so, if the children do not have the right environment at home, they will not be able to do it on their own. (d) when the children who were sent to school when they were young grow up, they should leave school and come to help earn income. (e) as it is customary for children to get married at an early age-they get married at the age of 14 and live at home. after getting married, they are ashamed to go to school. (f) dalit parents are of the opinion that girls should go abroad when they grow up, so their daughter should be proficient in household chores. therefore, even gender discrimination does not have proper representation in their education. (g) since the educated dalit youth is unemployed, what should others do after reading in vain? they are discouraged from finding employment. (h) dalit children cannot be admitted to school at the right age. therefore, other students in the school are old. (i) all members of the dalit family are involved in farming at home. therefore, students are absent from school and drop out of school and improving for reading due to irregularities in the classroom. (j) as parents are often illiterate, children cannot learn at home. not only in school, can he not learn well, he quickly forgets what he has read. g. measuring problems for dalit special measures need to be taken for the upliftment and solution of the problems of the dalit community. discussions and interactions were held with dalit parents on what measures can be taken to solve the problems of dalits. according to the 87.5 percent respondent based on the discussion, the following measures should be taken to solve the problems that seem to be an obstacle in the educational upliftment of the dalit community. growth and development of facilities: the group discussions held with the teachers, school management committee, representatives of ngos, social workers, political leaders, representatives of the municipality, district coordinating committee and education office, the facilities should be increased and developed for the educational upliftment of dalits. schools should be opened in places that cater to dalit children. if the school is close, children at the appropriate age will be encouraged and encouraged to go to school. if there is a school nearby, parents can also take care of their children, they had said. dalits should run kindergartens in the neighborhood. as a result, it is easier for young children to enter the upper class after going to the infant class. arrangements should be made to educate dalit children by making proper arrangements for hostels. provide employment opportunities for the educated dalit class with priority. he said that reservation should be made for the dalit community in employment opportunities. dalit and female teachers should be provided so that children can learn and ask questions without hesitation. as the main occupation of the dalit castes is traditionally, domestic and agriculture so the training should be provided in it. he also said that market arrangements should be made for the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 25 published by scholink inc. products. he suggested that scholarships should be arranged for dalit students from various agencies and handed over directly to the students. a public library should be established at the concerned place. increasing public awareness: education should notonly get for making job, but its also makes man for aware and motivational. when asking question for respondent, what should be done to increase public awareness in education of dalits, the opinion of the parents in the targeted group has discussion with 91 percent opinion was as: (a) dalits who are ignorant about education should change their mentality by educating them about the good aspects of education. (b) he said that the literacy program (adult education, dalit awareness) should be run as a campaign. (c) since it is not possible to teach with many children, it is necessary to develop the concept of small family by giving knowledge about the use of family planning methods. (d) smoking, drinking and foreign passions seen in dalit families should be gradually discouraged. they have given the opinion that awareness should be raised on issues like sanitation and environmental protection.(e) it was argued that the sense of untouchability and superiority seen in the social environment should be discouraged.(f) records of events such as births, deaths, marriages, migrations should be encouraged. (g) various organizations and bodies should conduct public awareness and empowerment campaigns through seminars, workshops. (h) spreading public awareness against child labor exploitation should be prevented from happening. (i) young people from dalit families should be trained and made to do door-to-door programs. (j) activities such as child marriage and polygamy should be banned. (k) integrated public awareness programs such as education, health, etc. should be taken together and (l) he said that such bad practices should be discouraged and the habit of saving creatively and collectively should be developed as there is a tradition of spending more and wasting more during festivals. vii. conclusion nepal has a multi-lingual, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural country. due to these various reasons, the communities of dalit are going through different situations. therefore, people, religion, culture, language, ethnicity, traditions are different but socio-economic and educational status as same. in this context, this study of the dalit community and their children were not same, which is the so-called dalit caste of nepal. this paper has found out on student enrollment, attendance, participation in exams, pass failures, educational problems based on the results. after the socio-economic development of the dalit community, their children can be included with equal access to education. on the one hand, the dalit community is said to be marginalized from the society, while on the other hand, it is difficult for them to compete with the front class. in the first phase, additional programs should be brought to include those who are outside the mainstream of the state and in the mainstream.through these targeted programs, their socio-economic status can be gradually changed, and they can improve their lives by participating in education. it is through the improved way of life that the society can experience development in which the dalit community itself and their children can also participate independently. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 26 published by scholink inc. the problem has produced from lack of awarness, social justices and poor socio-economics condition. based on results has analysis of dalit students on the minority cast. the papaer hasunderstood the importance of education even in todays from enrollment to academic achievement but the participation of non-dalit students is much less. this proves, that lead in communication, despite of the provision of dalit scholarships, reservation funds that seems to have had little effect on the dalits of study area.the governmental and non-governmental organizations have launched various programs for the upliftment of dalits, such as public awareness programs, the municipality has allocated separate budgets, scholarships for backwardness ethnicity and caste. although there are free educations for poor and needy students, the dream of dalit children to get a school and higher education seems to be strange irony here. the sake of livelihood young people are more attracted towards foreign employment then education. on the other hand, they can be attracted to education if they are provided with life-oriented training to employment to grtting opportunities without having a positive attitude towards. acknowledgment our thanksfull goes to for all respondent communities’ people, students, parents, and teachers of studies area. similarly, we are happy to say that academician, authors, and researcherwho provide lacking information to me for copletign of this paper. references bishwakarma, d. j., & vishwakarma, p. (2003). status of dalit community in nepal, national dalit commission. bista, d. b. (2002). poolwari of all castes (himalkitav edition). kathmandu. cbs. (2011). central bureau of statistics, national census kathmandu. retrieved from http://cbs.gov.np/sectoral statistics/population/caste_ethnicity dahal, y. (2009). a study on the participation of dalit children in primary school education. tribhuvan university, kathmandu. dang, d. (2008). background picture of dang district. ninth plan, national planning commission, kathmandu. esr. (2018). economy survey report. ministry of finance, kathmandu, nepal. fedo. (2020). dalits in nepal: story of discrimination. asia pacific human rights information centre, kathmandu. flash report. (2020). educational office flash report of dang district 2020: dang, nepal. ghimire, r. (2002). nepali society and culture, student book store, kathmandu. gurung, h. (1998). caste and educational status of nepal, advocacy publications, kathmandu. human rightes. (2015). nepal national dalit social welfare organization (nndswo). central office, bakhundole, lalitpu. insec. (2008). human rights yearbook 2008, voice of salvation, issue 11, kathmandu. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 27 published by scholink inc. koirala, v., & acharya, s. (2004). education in the field of social justice. student book center, kirtipur. moe. (2019). flash report of education. ministry of education nepal. moe & unesco. (2015). education for all national review report 2001-2015. 1 july 2015. kathmandu: ministry of education and unesco kathmandu office. nepali, w. (2006). a comparative study of the participation of dalit and non-dalit students at the school level in arghakhanchi district. research paper, kathmandu. new era. (2005). baseline survey of selected community managed and government managed public schools in selected districts, kathmandu. nsis. (2012). nepal social inclusion survey. central department of sociology/anthropology, tribhuvan university, kathmandu, nepal. pandey, m. (2006). mid-term evaluation of education program for all. educational information sangalo, department of education, sanothimi, bhaktapur. raghavendra, w. c. (2016). the barriers and enablers to education among scheduled caste and scheduled tribe adolescent girls in northern karnataka. south india: a qualitative study. sharma, k. (2007). strategies for dalit upliftment in nepal. center for economic and technical studies, kathmandu. sharma, p. (2014). some aspects of nepal’s social demography. kathmandu: social science baha and himal books. thapa, s. (2008). management information systems and human resource management. student book store, kathmandu. tulsipur sub metropolis. (2020). municipal demographic report of tulsipur sub metropolitan city. dang, nepal. unesco. (2010). efa global monitoring report 2010: reaching the marginalized. paris: unesco. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 121 original paper the proof and development of the right to be forgotten in civil code mofei li 1 1 southwest minzu university, chengdu, china received: april 11, 2023 accepted: may 10, 2023 online published: may 23, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n2p121 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n2p121 abstract contemporary chinese rights of personality law are in a period of perfection. the personal rights section of the civil code provides the ideological basis of law for other legislation on the rights of personality in china, and the newly released personal information protection law provides relevant provisions for the privacy issues involved in personal information. the legislation related to personality rights in china should respond to the needs of people’s personality rights in the internet era and introduce laws to some rights that have emerged with the development of the internet. in other words, based on confirming the general personality rights and personal information protection, we should protect the emerging rights such as “the right to be forgotten”. in this regard, based on the existing judicial and legislative practices, it is necessary to argue that the right to be forgotten is an independent form of right and to explore the legislative way forward for the right to be forgotten, to contribute to the effective protection of personality rights and personal information. keywords right to be forgotten, right to delete, personal information protection, rights mechanisms 1. introduction the right to be forgotten originated in france and is known as the “right of oblivion”. the right of oblivion was first associated with criminal law and refers to the right of a criminal to request that the fact about he has committed a crime not be disclosed after his release from prison. the presence of negative information is undoubtedly detrimental to people’s lives. however, with the development of internet technology, people are leaving more and more information on the internet. on the one hand, the development of the internet allows people to access information quickly, but on the other hand, it can also make our information overly accessible and memorized. humans may forget something as time passes, but the network stores our information, and some information that is detrimental to us www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 122 published by scholink inc. personally is hard to delete, bringing negative impacts to our daily life. so it is difficult for us to get rid of this negative information. therefore, at the beginning of this century, the right to be forgotten came to the field of civil law. the first document where the right to be forgotten appeared was the 2012 european commission’s submission of the uniform data protection regulation-european commission recommendation 2012, which specifies the right to be forgotten in article 17, the title is “right to be forgotten and to erasure”. in 2016, the eu formally established the right to be forgotten in the general data protection regulation. since then, the right to be forgotten has entered a new development process. many countries have added provisions related to the right to be forgotten to their national laws under the influence of the general data protection regulation. the eu and the legislation of these countries have laid the foundation for other legislation on the right to be forgotten. in this era of the increasing importance of the internet, information on the internet is often related to personal image, and negative information can degrade our personality. therefore, the right to be forgotten is an important right about personality. rights originate from human needs, and the purpose of rights is to meet people’s legitimate needs and maintain human dignity. with the rapid development of china’s economy and society, new social phenomena will be created, people will have new needs and demands for rights. the systematic recognition of the right to be forgotten in the civil code can enhance the status of the right to be forgotten, which is conducive to people’s protection of their rights and interests. to explore how to establish the system about the right to be forgotten in the civil code, this paper will analyze the necessity of the right to be forgotten in light of overseas legislation. this paper will also analyze the importance of the right to be forgotten, and then discuss how the right to be forgotten should enter into the system of personality law. finally, the author plans to make legislative suggestions to promote the protection of personality rights. 2. the source and meaning of the right to be forgotten 2.1 reflections arising from the case regarding the right to be forgotten, there is a famous case in china. plaintiff ren jiayu is a practitioner in the field of human resources management, business management, and other management science. he has worked at wuxi tao biotechnology co., ltd. since july 1, 2014, in the field relevant to education, and then terminated his employment relationship with the company. in april 2015, ren jiayu entered the baidu search page and found that the search results showed he was still associated with this company. ren jiayu claimed that because tao’s education has a bad reputation in the industry so if students search for ren jiayu’s name and see the search results, they will misunderstand him. he argued that the search engine’s actions violated his right to reputation, his right to name, and his “right to be forgotten” as a general personality right. he demanded that baidu should disconnect the search links for the keywords in question, apologize and compensate for economic losses. baidu argued that the “related search” service provided by baidu only objectively reflected the information-related status www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 123 published by scholink inc. when searching for his name, and did not violate ren jiayu’s civil rights. concerning the “right to be forgotten” involved in the case, the court of first instance held that there is no statutory right called “right to be forgotten” in the current law of china, and the “right to be forgotten” is only covered in the foreign laws and jurisprudence. the “right to be forgotten” is only covered in foreign laws and jurisprudence, but it cannot be a source of legal protection for such rights in china. the plaintiff’s interest in this case, which should be “forgotten”, is not justified and necessary for legal protection. so it should not become a legitimate legal interest for the protection of infringement. the court does not support the claim that the interest is protected by the so-called “right to be forgotten” in general personality rights. then, mr. ren appealed against the first instance judgment. the court of the second instance held that the interest of this part of personal information on the network could not be classified into the existing type of personality rights protection in china, but could only seek for protecting from the perspective of general personality rights. but because the interest claimed by mr. ren does not have the legitimacy and the need for legal protection, it should not become a legitimate legal interest for infringement protection. therefore, mr. ren’s claim for the so-called “right to be forgotten” based on general personality rights should be rejected. in summary, in 2015, the court held that mr. ren’s claim lacked legal basis and that the “right to be forgotten” had not yet entered chinese law. legislation is first needed before protect the right to be forgotten. information on the internet can be considered permanent, and it is hard to completely delete personal information once it has appeared on the internet. the pattern of human forgetting has been replaced by the eternal memory of digital information, the relationship between forgetting and remembering has been reversed. so people are in the dilemma of constantly “repeating memory” and “difficult to forget”. the development of information technology has also brought many troubles and risks to people, and the existence of the right to be forgotten has alleviated this danger. this case gives us a lot to think about, as the judge found that deleting mr. ren’s information would affect the public’s right to know the relevant information. the public has the right to know about mr. ren’s employment history, so mr. ren’s claim to remove the relevant links was not justified and necessary. the exercise of the right to be forgotten involves weighing interests between the public’s right to know and the plaintiff’s right to be forgotten. this issue was also involved in the google v. gonzalez case. in the following arguments, the author will present views on this issue. 2.2 the origin of the right to be forgotten and the current status of legislation the right to be forgotten originated in the case of google v. gonzalez. in 1998, a spanish newspaper published an auction listing from the ministry of labor and social affairs listing properties to be recovered for debt, including one property belonging to mario costeja gonzalez. by 2006, the newspaper began publishing on the web. by this time gonzalez had been released from his debts. gonzalez discovered that his name appeared in the announcement of a compulsory auction of his property, an activity that he believed the information was out of date and the information was no longer valid and that its continued retention would be damaging to his reputation. he asked the newspaper to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 124 published by scholink inc. remove the information. however, the newspaper refused his request, so gonzalez turned to google for help. he asked google to delete the information online. but things were not going well. after seeking help from multiple sources to no avail, gonzalez filed a lawsuit. there was a huge controversy surrounding how to judge the case, and the spanish national high court requested a ruling from the european court of justice. the european court of justice has held that once a person’s data is no longer necessary, the individual can request its deletion. and google, as a search engine operator, should be regarded as a data controller within the scope of application of the european data protection directive and was responsible for the information on web pages with personal data posted by third parties. google was obliged to eliminate it. the outcome of this case laid the groundwork for the subsequent explicit establishment of the right to be forgotten in the uniform data protection regulation. in 2014, when announced the ruling, the concept of the “right to be forgotten” was introduced to the public as a right to personal information. the right to be forgotten was frequently mentioned in cases in europe and the united states. in fact, the right to be forgotten sprang up in europe as early as the 1990s when the european union mentioned in its european data protection directive in 1995 that citizens could request the deletion of useless data to protect personal information. later on, there were legislative activities on the right to be forgotten in england and france. in march 2014, the general data protection regulation was amended and stipulated that the data subject has the right to any known third party to remove all copies and links to personal information that may have some negative influence. in addition to europe, acts about the right to be forgotten also exist in the united states. unlike europe, the right to be forgotten has experienced a rocky development process in the united states. the u.s. constitution provides the public with freedom of speech and freedom of the press, so the right to be forgotten is considered an infringement of this right. even with the difficulties, in 2013, california governor jerry brown signed california senate bill 568, known as the “eraser act”. the bill requires well-known social networking sites, including facebook and twitter, to allow minors to delete personal information that would negatively affect them online. the purpose of this is to prevent teenagers from having to face a lot of trouble in the future from the traces left behind online due to their youthful ignorance and lack of awareness of online precautions. the right of oblivion in france in the 20th century is the foundation of the modern civil sense of the right to be forgotten. as mentioned before, the right of oblivion is usually used for criminals to request the deletion of their criminal records in the public domain after they have served their sentences. so they can have an equal opportunity to develop in social life and be better re-socialized. it can be seen that the right of oblivion is to facilitate the socialization of criminals by deleting their criminal records, and this internal logic is highly similar to the “right to be forgotten”. the right to be forgotten allows people to delete “information from the past that may lead to lower social evaluation”. by deleting the information, they can protect their lives from such information and protect their benefits, for example, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 125 published by scholink inc. their reputation. the right to be forgotten and the right of oblivion has a similar conceptual core. both rights limit the dissemination of negative information about individuals from the past, which, because it is not easy to dissipate and may affect the perpetrator for years or even a lifetime. we can interpret the right to be forgotten by referring to the criminal law maxim “no more attention to one thing”. a person has already been “punished” for past misconduct or statements, and continuing to keep this information on a public online platform will make the perpetrator to live in the shadow of others’ negative opinions for a long time, which is a kind of punishment. deleting such information not only gives the perpetrator a chance to start a new life but also protects his or her personality rights. from perspective about value comparison, most of the time the value to society of continuing to retain that data is no greater than deleting them. the right to be forgotten exists to protect the rights of individuals by imposing some reasonable restrictions on freedom of speech and press on the internet. this is precisely why the right to be forgotten exists. 2.3 the status of the right to be forgotten does the “right to be forgotten” constitute a new type of right of personality? before exploring this question, it is necessary to briefly review traditional personality rights and compare the “right to be forgotten” with traditional personality rights to conclude. wang limin believes that human dignity is the primary value of the codification of human rights, and the maintenance of human dignity is an inevitable requirement to adapt to the real demand for the protection of human rights in the era of the internet, high technology, and big data. the fundamental value of general personality rights lies in the protection of human dignity as a means to achieve the independence and free development of the personality. the right to be forgotten sets its sights on the online sphere, and the right to be forgotten broadly refers to the right of an individual to request the deletion of personally relevant information stored on the network or to terminate the indexing, access, and other further processing of this information. this information is often outdated, and its continued retention can lead to lower social evaluation of data subjects, which can affect the individual’s future development by making people bound by this information. the purpose of the general right of personality reveals that the right to be forgotten certainly belongs to the category of personality rights. the right to be forgotten gives us the right to decide whether to keep the information or not, and is a manifestation of the freedom of information. if a person has the right to information, he should not only have the right to upload information but also the right to delete it and enjoy the freedom to dispose of it. the information subject is fully guaranteed the unfettered use of information through the complete self-determination of the information, thus highlighting the protection of personal freedom. personality rights can be divided into general personality rights and specific personality rights. it should be clear that the right to be forgotten is not a general personality right, but a specific personality right. the relationship between general and specific personality rights is similar to that between general law and special law. general personality rights provide a kind of overall protection and relief when www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 126 published by scholink inc. specific personality is not applicable. the right to be forgotten is subordinate to the specific personality right of personal information. this shall be a kind of information self-determination. the right to be forgotten is the right to govern, decide and protect personal information, and its content can be fully covered by the right to personal information. 3. the necessity of introducing the right to be forgotten into the civil code the right to be forgotten, as an emerging right, wants to enter the civil code, and it has to be argued from two perspectives: the reasons for introducing this right and the value of this right. 3.1 reasons for introducing the right to be forgotten the internet has become massively popular in china, and the statistical bulletin of the national economic and social development of the people’s republic of china for 2021 released by the national bureau of statistics shows that the number of people accessing the internet in china in 2021 was 1.032 billion, including 1.029 billion people accessing the internet by cellphones. the internet penetration rate was 73.0%, among which the internet penetration rate in rural areas was 57.6%. as of december 2022, the number of chinese internet users reached 1.067 billion. the problem of forgetting brought about by such a massive volume of networks has become an important issue in the information age. with the rapid development of the internet in china, people will have new needs and rights claims regarding the protection of personal information. in the newly implemented personal information protection law, there is a provision similar to the “right to be forgotten”. article 47 of the personal information protection law adopts an enumeration approach, stipulating that “the personal information processor shall take the initiative to delete personal information under one of the following circumstances; if the personal information processor fails to delete, the individual has the right to request deletion”. however, it is still flawed as far as the grounds for deletion are concerned, the list of circumstances is too narrow, and the potential abuse of the exercise of the right to be forgotten is not regulated. therefore, from the perspective of china’s current legislation on the right to be forgotten, although the personal information protection law opens the right to request the deletion of personal information to protect the personality rights of the information subject, this provision does not go far enough, and the right to be forgotten is absent except for this provision. the right to be forgotten is not only a ordinary legal right but also has the nature of a fundamental and human right. since the european union’s european data protection directive in 1995, the right to be forgotten has been systematically studied and promoted in various countries on a lasting basis. the general data protection regulation (gdpr), introduced in november 2012, formally added the “right to be forgotten and deleted” in article 17, recognizing the right of information subjects, especially minors, to delete their information. 3.2 the value of the right to be forgotten combined with the previous discussion of the origin of the right to be forgotten, it is clear that the emergence of the right to be forgotten is inevitable. as access to information becomes more and more www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 127 published by scholink inc. convenient, we have access to more and more information, and a great deal of our information appears on the internet. technology about data collection and storage technologies such as search engines have increased the uncertainty of information subjects in control of their own information. once our personal information is on the internet, it is difficult to control it. 1978 french privacy law provides the right of oblivion to protect the privacy of perpetrators, and the negative information that is difficult for us to delete today is like a criminal record from hundreds of years ago, except that the information we have access to now is not only criminals but also includes debt records and other information that can adversely affect us. therefore, the right to be forgotten is bound to emerge along with technological development, and there is a value and need for the right to be forgotten. second, the right to be forgotten has a social basis. in the data era, there are numerous cases of infringement of personal privacy, and the demand of the public for their private information to be forgotten in the data era is higher than in any other period. the right to be forgotten reflects society’s pursuit of the ultimate goal of human beings, because the process of establishing the right is the improvement of the means of protecting personal data, and then the ultimate goal of protecting human interests. moreover, in the current evolving society, where the retention of outdated information hinders the progress of the society, the demand for the protection of these rights responds to the development of society. some may argue that providing for the right to be forgotten is a manifestation of the generalization of rights and would allow the public power to interfere too much in our lives. but from another perspective, the emergence of new rights indicates a general rise in civil rights awareness and a social phenomenon in which people favor the use of rights to justify their demands or claims. to sum up, with the relevant experience already provided by extraterritorial legislative examples, china can continue to optimize the legislation on the right to be forgotten based on article 47 of the personal information protection law and protect the right to be forgotten within a reasonable degree and scope. 4. the systematic unfolding of the right to be forgotten in the law of personality rights if we want to introduce the right to be forgotten into the personality rights section of the civil code, we need clarify three points. the first is the difference between the right to be forgotten and the right to erasure. the right to be forgotten and the right to erasure are highly similar, and we need clarify the boundaries and connections between the two rights. the right cannot exercise without limitations, and we also need to understand how to resolve the public interest and personal interest if there is a conflict when exercising the right to be forgotten. after finally solving the above-mentioned problems that affect the right to be forgotten in the personality rights section of the civil code, we can advance the legislative concept of the right to be forgotten. 4.1 basic concept analysis: the right to delete and the right to be forgotten in academic research, the right to be forgotten and the right to erasure are two ambiguous and easily misused concepts, both of which can be used to describe the public’s right to limit the dissemination and use of personal information. the right of deletion is stipulated in article 1073 of the civil code: “if www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 128 published by scholink inc. a natural person finds that his personal information is processed in violation of the provisions of laws and administrative regulations or the agreement be among the parties, he has the right to request the processor of the information to delete it on time.” the right of deletion allows the information subject to request the processor of personal information to delete the personal information under certain circumstances. the right to be forgotten is a right designed by the law for information subjects to respond to information that has gotten out of control. information subjects can use information removal and recycling as a means to provide a remedy path for personal information protection in cases where the personal information that has been legally disclosed is outdated, irrelevant, inaccurate, and would negatively affect the individual. scholars have observed and thought about the relationship between the right to erasure and the right to be forgotten from different perspectives and different opinions. at present, there are three theories. some scholars believe that the two rights are the same, while others believe that they are different. other scholars have argued that there is a partial overlap between these two rights. the author believes that the right to be forgotten and the right to delete are inextricably linked, and the two can neither be separated nor fully equated. the right to be forgotten needs to be compared with the right to erasure. generally speaking, both can be used to protect personal information. the right to be forgotten is an emerging right compared to the right to erasure, which focuses on the deletion of information that adversely affects individuals. the right to erasure aims at information that is not legal at the point of collection and use. the right to be forgotten, on the other hand, refers to the information collected, used, processed, and transmitted on a legal basis, which transformed into “outdated, irrelevant, harmful, and inaccurate” information due to the passage of time. article 43 of the network security law and article 1037 and article 1195, of the civil code all provide for the right to delete personal information. and article 47 of the personal information protection law is similar to the right to delete. in summary, based on the concept of the right to be forgotten, the right construction of the right to be forgotten is very clear. the subject of the right is the data subject and the subject of the obligation is the data controller or data processor. the object of this right is the information published in a legal form, about itself real but irrelevant (or no longer relevant), outdated, one-sided or beyond the purpose of collection and processing. it can be said that the right to be forgotten is a further right than the right to erasure, and the right to be forgotten imposes higher requirements for the protection of personal information. the existence of the right to erasure provides the basis for establishing the “right to be forgotten” in the law related to personality rights. based on the above mentioned right to erasure, the right to be forgotten can be developed in the law related to personality rights. 4.2 conflict resolution between the right to be forgotten and the right to know the root of the conflict between the right to be forgotten and the right to know is the conflict between individual interests and public interests. public interests are the combination of the interests of several members, the common interests of most people in society, mainly including education, medical care, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 129 published by scholink inc. scientific research, and other contents that are closely related to our lives. this information is related to all aspects of our life, and to protect our rights and interests, the data owner cannot exercise the right to be forgotten. it can be said that the creation of the right to be forgotten is the product of balancing individual interests and public interests. the exercise of the right to be forgotten by the information subject may affect the public’s right to know and the freedom of speech and press. in rulings c-507/17 and c-136/17, the cjeu repeatedly emphasized that it is important to note that “the protection of personal data is not an absolute right, but should take into account its social function and be balanced with other fundamental rights in order to comply with the principle of proportionality” and to “balance the right to privacy and personal data protection and the freedom of information of internet users”. in order to achieve this, the requirements for the exercise of the right to be forgotten need to be clarified and limited to a certain extent. first, it is important to clarify under what conditions the exercise of the right to be forgotten would be detrimental to the public interest. we should apply the principle of proportionality here to determine when data preservation based on the public interest constitutes a restriction on the exercise of the right to be forgotten by the data subject. the court or other authority will need to weigh whether the ends sought to be achieved by limiting the right to be forgotten are compatible with the means of limiting the right to be forgotten. if it’s suitable, the individual data subject can exercise the right to be forgotten, which would prevent those who control the data from violating the right to personal information under the pretext of public interest. second, we need to know who should review whether the information subject can exercise the right to be forgotten. if the information platform has the right to review, the information platform will play the role of a “judge”. this will also increase the burden on the operation of the information platform. how to choose the appropriate subject for review is an issue worth studying. if courts deal with all requests for data deletion, it may increase the workload of the court. the author believes that data regulators can be appropriately introduced to review the personal information of users. if the user’s claim is clearly in the public interest, the data supervisory authority should inform the user that the information needs to be confirmed by the court before it can be deleted. if the user’s reasonable right to be forgotten is not satisfied, the user may also seek relief by filing a court action. finally, restrictions on the right to be forgotten are essential. ex parte review alone cannot fully guarantee the public’s right to information and freedom of expression, and the requested party should be given the opportunity to defend itself in individual reviews. the exercise of rights cannot lack supervision, and government supervision is an important source of justification for private regulation. it is suggested that specific government agencies be assigned to review the right-to-be-forgotten decisions of interconnected companies providing online services, and that exemplary cases be made public to continuously regulate the criteria for weighing interests. we cannot take a one-sided view of the issue, and in addition to clearly defining the right to be forgotten, we must also define the rights to information, participation, and remedies associated with it. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 130 published by scholink inc. 4.3 legislative proposal of the right to be forgotten the legislative concept of the right to be forgotten should adhere to the principle of proportionality as the core. but if we only use the principle of proportionality as the judgment standard, it will be a little abstract and may lead to the improper expansion or narrowing of the scope of the right to be forgotten. therefore, it is necessary to construct more specific evaluation criteria for the right to be forgotten. for example, we can judge it by some typical situations. we need to extract specific rules from the principles, which will not only provide concrete guidance for people to exercise the right to be forgotten but also improve the efficiency of the judgement. in the author’s opinion, the criteria for the use of the right to be forgotten should be formulated from three perspectives: the subject of information, the content of information, and the time of information release. if the subject of the information is a public figure, their words and actions will cause public concern or may even influence public interest. so, we should restrict the public figure’s right to be forgotten. conversely, if the subject of the information is ordinary people who have little or no impact on the public interest, their exercise of the right to be forgotten should be supported. the content of the information refers to whether the information is private or public. if the content is more closely related to the public interest and has certain social values, it is more difficult to apply the right to be forgotten. in contrast, the right to be forgotten can be applied to more private information, such as personal contact information and financial status. the last condition is the length of time that the information has been published. much information is time-sensitive, and if some time has passed, the value of the information decreases. the core of the right to be forgotten is the request to remove outdated, negatively impacting information. if the value of the information has declined significantly and its continued retention will not bring public interest, the information subject may request the deletion of such information. the author believes that by combining the above three points, the right-to-be-forgotten regulations can be better formulated to protect people’s personal information and human dignity. 5. conclusion in the previous discussion, the author starts with the case of the right to be forgotten in china and analyzes the origin of the right to be forgotten and the position of the right to be forgotten in the legal system. subsequently, the author discusses the rationality and value of the right to be forgotten, thus establishing the need for the right to be forgotten to enter the civil code. after solving the theoretical problems, the author presents insights on how to sort out the relationship between the right to be forgotten and the right to erasure, how to solve the conflict between personal interests and public interests, and gives legislative suggestions on the right to be forgotten. the life of law is experience, not logic. as people pay more attention to the right to personal information, there will be more and more disputes about the right to be forgotten in judicial practice, which will provide case references for the improvement of the right to be forgotten. we should draw www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 131 published by scholink inc. general rules and accumulate judicial experience from each judicial case to better face such disputes. in the context of the rapid development of network technology, people naturally have new and higher level needs for personal information protection and personality rights. china’s personality rights legislation should respond to the new needs and expectations of the people by systematically recognizing the right to be forgotten. specifically, the system of personality law should be built with the right to be forgotten as the core, this means on the basis of the right to be forgotten, the right to know, the right to privacy, and the freedom of expression should be regulated respectively. the establishment of the right to be forgotten and the full realization of citizens’ human rights constitutes a relationship between the means and the end, and the “forgetting” gives more human dignity. references chen, j. h. (2022). consideration of the right to be forgotten in the era of big data. journal of southeast university (philosophy and social science edition), 24(s1), 50-53. cai, p. r. (2019) rethinking and reconstructing the right to be forgotten system tsinghua jurisprudence, 13(05), 168-185. cao, x. m., & song, g. (2021). the right to delete and the right to be forgotten in the context of personal information protection. journal of hangzhou normal university (social science edition), 43(06), 74-81. jiang, s. (2021). from memory to forgetting: the operation of the eu right to be forgotten system and its implications. nanjing normal university journal (social science edition), 2021(4), 122-130. li, l. f., & wang, j. s. (2023). on the right to be forgotten in the localized perspective of criminal law protection. technology and law (in chinese and english), 2023(02), 22-31. wang, l. h. (2021). the right to be forgotten and its key points: a critical examination of the normative basis of the right to be forgotten. journal of east china university of political science and law, 24(2), 41-54. wang, l. m. (2021). the dignity of the human person: the primary value of the personality rights of the civil code. contemporary law, 35(1), 3-14. xue, l. (2021). restriction or expansion: a review and proof of the study of the right to be forgotten in china. jianghan forum, 520(10), 121-128. yang, l. x., & du, z. x. (2016). the right attribution and protection standard of the right to be forgotten review of the reasons for the decision in the case of ren jiayu v. baidu inc. on the right to be forgotten. application of law (judicial cases), 2017(16), 29-39. yang, l. x., & han, h. (2015). the localization and legal application of the right to be forgotten in china. legal application, 2015(2), 24-34. yu, x. h. (2018). research on the right to be forgotten (phd dissertation). jilin university. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 151 original paper a brief discussion of contract formation judgment weiyuan wang 1 1 southwest minzu university, chengdu, china received: april 12, 2023 accepted: may 11, 2023 online published: may 31, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n2p151 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n2p151 abstract this article agrees that the parties and the unanimity of intent together constitute the elements of contract formation. in general, it is more appropriate to adopt the doctrine of representation to judge and grasp the unanimity of intent. whether silence constitutes an expression of intent should be considered in the specific circumstances, whether silence is sufficient to infer the meaning of the parties, such as the existence of prior statements or trade practices. in this paper, we try to sort out the elements of the main rule of contract formation the rule of offer and promise, in order to clarify the path of judging contract formation. keywords contract formation, agreement, object 1. introduction contract, as one of the most important legal relationships, is an expression of autonomy of meaning. whether a contract is formed, when and where it is formed, is related to the security and protection of the parties’ transactions, and affects the interests of the parties to the maximum extent. contract formation is the unity of dynamic behavior and static agreement, which solves the premise of the existence of the contract, is the premise of the discussion of the validity of the contract, and is also the basis for judging the parties should bear the responsibility of welcome breach of contract or contractual negligence, and is therefore of great significance. for this reason, the civil code has established a special chapter on “formation of contracts”, which provides detailed provisions on the formation of contracts. nevertheless, due to the complexity of contract formation, it is not uncommon for parties to dispute the formation of a contract, the confirmation and remedy of a contract, the time and place of formation of a contract, etc. this has led to controversies in the theoretical and practical circles, so it is necessary to explore the formation of a contract in more depth. in this article, we express our personal views and thoughts on the elements of contract formation, i.e. how to determine whether a contract is formed. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 152 published by scholink inc. 2. formation of contract and entry into force of contract 2.1 contract formation and contract entry into force according to article 502 of the civil code, the concepts of formation of a contract and validity of a contract are both related and distinct. on the one hand, the formation of a contract is a prerequisite for the validity of a contract. once the contract is not formed, there is no need to talk about the validity of the contract. on the other hand, the formation of a contract does not necessarily lead to its validity. in order for a contract to be valid, it needs not only to comply with the law, but also to be ratified. therefore, for the establishment “according to law” as stipulated in article 502 of the civil law, it means that the contract has the conditions for its validity as stipulated in article 143 of the civil law, i.e., there exist three cases of additional conditions for the validity of the contract as stipulated by law, or additional conditions for the validity of the contract as agreed by the parties, or the contract as stipulated by law or administrative regulations can only be valid after approval. however, “according to law” is a prerequisite for all contracts to take effect. the conditions that must be present for legal acts stipulated in article 143 of the civil law are referred to as general conditions for entry into force, while the conditions for entry into force that are otherwise provided by law or agreed by the parties may be referred to as special conditions for entry into force, as they exist only in special circumstances. the difference between the two is that the lack of the general conditions of validity will lead to one of three situations: nullity, revocation or non-validity of the contract. the lack of a special validity condition will lead to the nullity of the contract. in this regard, invalid, revocable or ineffective contract refers to the concept corresponding to the validity of a contract, while invalid contract refers to the state in which the contract is valid but not effective. in the case of a contract subject to ratification, for example, it may have been “legally” established and “legally binding” on the parties concerned before the contract was ratified. the parties may not change or terminate the contract without permission and must fulfill their obligation to file for approval. it just cannot have the legal effect sought by the parties, i.e., neither party can require the other party to perform the main obligations agreed in the contract. as can be seen, china’s civil law not only distinguishes between the elements of formation of a contract and the elements of entry into force of a contract, but also further distinguishes the elements of entry into force of a contract into valid elements (general elements of entry into force) and special elements of entry into force, thus providing a legal basis for accurately determining the validity of contracts subject to approval and the validity of contracts with conditions and periods of entry into force, etc. 2.2 the meaning of legal written form generally speaking, the conclusion of consent as a general part of the conclusion of the contract is more appropriate, and the formal contract in the performance of legal acts as a specific part of the conclusion of the contract, to the contract in kind, the delivery of the object is also a specific part of the conclusion of the contract. however, some experts proposed that the contract form only relates to the interests of both parties, and has nothing to do with the public interest and national interest, and nothing to do with the rights and legitimate interests of others, and the parties should determine whether to take www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 153 published by scholink inc. the written form. even if the parties do not act as proposed or adopt the written form, as long as there is other evidence that the parties have reached an agreement or the parties acknowledge that they have entered into a contract, the parties have to be recognized as having established a contractual relationship. the author points out that although our civil law adopts the principle of freedom to conclude contracts, this freedom does not mean that it is unrestricted, it exists for the greater value of the contract and for the benefit of both parties, most laws and administrative regulations require that the contract should be in writing and that the only remedy for failure to conclude in writing is an act of enforcement. if the parties have not agreed in writing, but one party performs the main obligation and the other party accepts this, it is considered a contractual relationship between the parties. a contract can be concluded only if one party performs the main obligation and the other party accepts this. under this interpretation, if the parties do not take the statutory form or do not make up for the lack of form by an act of performance, the contract is considered not concluded. in the author’s opinion, the significance of the statutory written form is to ensure that the agreement between the parties is legally binding, thus distinguishing it from an intent to deal or a “playful representation”, which is not legally binding even if there is other evidence of an “agreement” between the parties. thus, even if there is any other evidence of the existence of a “contract” between the parties, the contract is not deemed to have been entered into. even if there is evidence or indication that the persons concerned knew of the “contract” without legal action, the contractual relationship between the persons concerned cannot be deemed to have been established by other evidence, unless the persons concerned have remedied it by performance. otherwise, a “contract” that cannot be performed may be confused with a civil law contract. thus, the act should not be understood as a mere defensive clause that produces legal effects. 3. elements of contract formation for a contract to exist, two elements must be present. first, there must be two or more contracting parties. second, the parties must agree on the main terms. the first element stems from the fact that a contract is a legal act between two or more parties that creates, modifies or terminates a debt relationship, while a unilateral legal act, such as a will, is not a contract. the second element, the criterion for reaching a consensual agreement, will be analyzed below. there is disagreement as to whether the subject matter of the contract is one of the elements. we will first discuss two elements: the parties and the subject matter. the parties may enter into a contract in their own name or through an agent, in consideration of assuming the rights and obligations, and possibly the liabilities, arising from the contract. there is a slight difference between a party and a contracting party. a party to a contract is a person who actually enters into a contract as a party to a future contractual relationship or as an agent of a party to the contract, but not as an assignee of performance, realization or possession, because they do not have separate personality in the contractual relationship. in practice, for example, the project engineering department of a construction company may enter into a contract in its own name, a branch of a bank www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 154 published by scholink inc. may enter into a contract in its own name, or a branch may enter into a contract in its own name. neither court decisions nor legislation refer anymore to the contract being void for this reason, but only to the fact that the rights and obligations arising from the contract must be assumed by the construction company, the head office of the bank or the company as a legal entity, at least in a final sense. in this case, there are different opinions on whether the branch of legal person is the agent of legal person or the representative of legal person. this is because, according to the existing laws and theories in china, the legal person and its legal representative have the same identity in conducting the business of the legal person, and only the legal representative has the right to represent the legal person and perform legal acts, while other organizations and other individuals do not have the right to represent the legal person. only legal persons have the right to perform legal acts. this is one of the general principles of chinese civil law. the civil law applies different legal rules to the relationship between legal persons and their legal representatives and between legal persons and their agents, and branches of legal persons are not considered as bodies of legal persons. secondly, the written authorization required for a branch of a legal person to have the right of agency can be in various forms, such as laws or regulations, provisions in the articles of association of the legal person, decisions of the board of directors or the general meeting of shareholders, and authorization letters issued by the legal person or its legal representative. the law requires the parties to have capacity, whether they have it or not. the capacity of the contracting party is one of the elements of the validity of the contract. the parties to a contract are usually the same as the contracting party, but in indirect agency relationships, the contracting party is often not the contracting party, nor is it necessarily the contracting party if the contract is succeeded by another person after the death of the contracting party. the signing of the contract is an important part of the creation of the contract. the signature itself indicates that the signatory is willing to be bound by the text of the contract and that the text is accurate. generally, if a contract is signed, the parties are bound by the contract even if the signer has not read the text, unless the contract is declared void or terminated. as for the method of signing, the contract can be stamped or faxed to the other party, or a written signature is acceptable. part 7 of the uk electronic communications act 2000 provides that an electronic signature in an electronic communication is admissible in legal proceedings, but the weight of the relevant evidence is determined by the court. in addition, even if a party does not sign a further, even if the parties do not sign the text of the contract, as long as the parties acknowledge the existence of a contractual relationship, it is protected by law, but only increases the burden of proof. the signature can be any kind of signature, as long as the existence of proof of the true meaning of the written form can be. the signature may be a signed name or a printed name, and may be a written, printer-printed, stamped or photocopied signature. title ii of the ucc recognizes any type of document such as a shipping order, letterhead, or even a notepad with a pre-printed name as a signature, so long as there is a maker’s impression that the document is genuine. all of these are reasonable and practical, and chinese law www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 155 published by scholink inc. should be taken into account. the object is what is involved in the contractual rights and obligations. the object of the contract is important because without an agreement on the object, the contract would lose its purpose and meaning. the object of the contract, also known as the object of the claim, the content of the claim, or the purpose of the claim, is what the creditor claims from the debtor. what one person claims from another is an act, an act or omission, so the object of the debt is what the creditor claims from the debtor, which in law is called payment. this term is used separately from the object of a claim, which is a bond for the purpose of payment. the general theory of chinese civil law has long held that objects can be divided into tangible objects, acts and intellectual achievements. in a car sale contract, the object is a car. in a technical consulting contract, the object is the provision of technical advice. in a technology transfer contract, the object is a specific technology. in foreign countries, the subject and the object are considered to be the same concept. during the negotiation of the transaction, the parties should understand and determine the object of the contract. therefore, the registered mou must take into account the description of the subject matter. according to the structure of this theory, the object is not the subject, but the object of the subject. for example, in a contract for the sale of a car, the subject is the car, while the object is the act of transferring ownership or possession of the car. the range of subjects includes, in order, tangible property, utility rights, security interests, equity, intellectual property, bonds, general obligations and other physical instruments. it is important to note that the subject matter under article 470 of the civil code is mostly material, rather than a thing in the doctrinal sense, and therefore there are statements such as the quality of a substance, the quantity of a substance, etc. therefore, the matters mentioned in the civil code and related judicial interpretations should often be understood in terms of a thing. 4. consensual judgment two conditions need to be met in order to reach an agreement. first, the main terms of the latter should be specific and clear. according to the original “supreme people’s court on the application of the contract law of the people’s republic of china” interpretation of certain issues (ii): the parties, the subject matter, quantity is the general elements of the contract. therefore, these three necessary provisions are necessary to reach agreement. second, the formation of consent. except in the case of contract fraud, coercion and other occasions to adopt the subjective said. the rest of the situation should be used to express the doctrine, that is, through the external performance to infer whether the parties mean the same. in this case, the rule of offer to commit is the key to analyze the formation of the contract. offer as a prior expression of intent, need to meet the four elements to take effect. first, it is made by a specific person. second, it must be made by a specific person. third, the content of the offer must be specific and definite. fourthly, the offer must be made with the intention to bind once it is made. the understanding of the second element should be noted that, in principle, it should be issued to a specific www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 156 published by scholink inc. object, but some commercial advertisements, although issued to an unspecified object, but it has specified the object of the contract, and expressed the willingness to assume responsibility, at this time should be regarded as an offer. the understanding of the third element should be consistent with the above-mentioned necessary terms and expresses clear. the understanding of the fourth element involves the distinction between an offer and an invitation to offer, and the distinction can be made through legal provisions, which have been clarified in article 473 of the civil code with regard to the seven typical forms of an invitation to offer. however, the more essential judgment is whether the parties have clearly indicated the intention to be bound, and if not, whether the combination of other factors is sufficient to infer that the parties have the intention to be bound. if it is, then it is an offer. a promise indicates that the offeree agrees to accept all the conditions of the offer, and is an expression of intent after the offer, which requires three elements to be met in order to be valid. first, the promise must be made by the offeree to the offeror. that is, the subject of the promise is limited to the offeree. second, the promise must reach the offeror within the promise period. third, the content of the promise must be consistent with the offer in substance. the understanding of “unanimity” is the key to determine whether the expression of intent is a promise or a counteroffer. article 479 of the civil code clearly states that “a promise is an expression of the offeree’s consent to the offer”, but also moderates the “mirror image rule” by requiring only that the promise cannot materially change the offer, while non-material changes are it is explicitly stated that “the promise is valid unless the offeror objected to it in time or the offer indicates that the promise cannot make any material change to the content of the offer”. meanwhile, article 488 of the civil code clearly lists the substantive changes to the offer. in addition, the path of judgment as to whether silence constitutes an expression of intent and thus a promise is whether it can be combined with other factors, such as prior statements and trading habits, sufficient to infer the meaning of silence, and if so, it constitutes an expression of intent and a promise. furthermore, whether the agreement required to conclude a contract is a complete agreement on the entire content of the contract or an agreement on the necessary points of the contract depends on the circumstances. if the parties insist on a complete agreement on the content of the contract, they reach an agreement if they negotiate within the scope of the contract. if the parties insist on reaching agreement on certain points, they reach agreement on those points and the contract is concluded. the rule developed in international commercial transactions is that if the parties agree on the main terms of the transaction and any uncertain subsidiary terms can be proved by subsequent facts or law, then an agreement has been formed and a contract has been concluded. the fact that the parties intended to enter into a contract does not prevent the formation of a contract, even if certain terms were deliberately left to further negotiation, agreement or later determination by a third party. if the parties cannot agree on the terms to be determined, or if those terms are not determined by a third party, the existence of the contract is not affected if there is another reasonable way to determine those terms, taking into account the intent of the parties, depending on the circumstances. indeed, this is the case law in the united states. the parties to a contract agree to avoid the risk of litigation by allowing an www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 157 published by scholink inc. independent third party to make binding decisions. this agreement to give the third party the power to determine certain terms of the contract is generally considered to satisfy the requirement of contractual certainty, and the contract is concluded. a prospective expectation clause that an independent third party, such as an arbitral institution, will decide one or more contractual terms in the future, consistent with the principle of autonomy and effective in preventing manifest injustice, is worthy of reference in chinese law and its doctrine. it should be noted that a contract is not concluded only if there are no elements in the offer; if the offer contains customary and incidental elements, then the customary and incidental elements in the offer are also factors in determining whether a contract is concluded, since the promise is inherently immutable. in other words, the “elements” are only used to assess whether the statement of intent is specific and the criteria are clear. if there are no elements of the statement of intent, of course, no contract will be concluded, but this does not mean that as long as the parties agree on the “elements”, a contract will necessarily be concluded. however, this does not mean that as long as the parties agree on the “elements”, a contract will necessarily be concluded. if the offer contains essential elements other than the “elements”, the contract will be concluded only if the parties agree on all the essential elements contained in the offer. in view of this, i believe that if the parties negotiate but do not agree on the other essential elements, the people’s court should still find that no contract has been concluded. the elements of validity of the offer and promise as clarified above should also be combined with the provisions of the civil code on the validity, revocation and invalidity of the offer, and the manner, duration and effect of the promise, so that the agreement reached between the parties is legally binding. 5. silence and commitment generally speaking, there are three ways of expressing meaning: explicit, implicit and silent. of these, implicit means that although not expressed explicitly in written or oral form, it is expressed through an active act that becomes an expression of meaning. silence, on the other hand, is considered to be mere inaction without an active act. both explicit acts and acts of silence are expressions. silence is not expressive and does not indicate either rejection or acceptance. there are three ways in which silence can be considered an expression of intent: first, by law; second, by agreement of the parties; and third, by custom in the parties’ dealings. the above distinction is simple and easy to apply in judicial practice, but as some scholars have argued, “there is a loophole because the article does not provide a rule of faith that reliance on the protection of the silence doctrine can be considered an expression of intent.” in general, the silent person does not actively express or subsequently deny the meaning of silence, contrary to the principle of fiduciary duty and business practice. some experts argue that if the silent person’s silence creates the appearance of trustworthiness for the complainant, then that silence may create a duty of trust for the silent person (possibly a duty to perform a positive interest) as an inducement to trust. courts have also held that the silence of the silent person is not an inducement of trust. while many courts in their jurisprudence strictly adhere to the distinction between implied and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 158 published by scholink inc. non-implied and do not recognize mere silence by omission as a statement of intent, some courts have held that silence may also be considered a statement of intent in terms of the principle of good faith, the balance of interests, and the protection of the complainant’s legitimate expectations. the principle of “silence is a promise” is even more applicable in business transactions. in a commercial transaction, the parties are obliged to respond promptly to the other party’s offer based on the principle of good faith in order to maintain a long-term business relationship. if the businessman does not respond within the deadline, his silence is considered a promise. if the businessman does not wish to enter into a contract, he must notify the idea provider immediately; otherwise, the contract will come into force on the basis of the idea provider’s offer. in analyzing the case, it is possible to ignore the issue of the trader’s return and first analyze the facts of the case to determine whether the trader’s failure to send a timely return affects the facts of the case itself. the content of the contract is initially consensual, but it is the content of the principal’s unilateral offer, once formed, that constitutes the contract. it must then be determined whether the principal’s offer is also consistent with the recipient’s intent, which always constitutes “consent”, or whether the recipient’s intent was to reject the offer. if not, the general principle that the parties intended to conclude a contract by means of an offer and a promise is the criterion. silence may be an indication of intent, but it may also be that the party is silent because of fraud, duress or misunderstanding. in such cases, do the provisions of civil law regarding lack of meaning apply? the prevailing view is that the provisions on fraud, duress and mistake should also apply to silent intent, and that the silent person may withdraw his or her intent on the grounds of fraud, duress or mistake, since there is no reason to put the silent person in a worse position than the person expressing a clear intent. however, it is debatable whether and to what extent the requirement of intentional mistake should be limited to discourses to which silence applies. in essence, the silent person is unaware of his or her own discourse in the so-called inference error. the silent person thinks that his or her silence does not constitute a representation in law, when in fact it does. according to contemporary doctrine, ignorance does not necessarily prevent the formation of a statement; if the actor is attributable, his or her conduct still constitutes a statement, but the content of the statement can be retracted on the ground of error. the uninformed silent person is silent because he does not know the legal requirements or customs of the transaction, or because he does not know the specific consequences of violating the principle of good faith. in both cases, silence is imputable and therefore constitutes an expression of will. if the person who remains silent does not know that his silence constitutes an expression of will under the law, then under the principle that “ignorance of the law is inexcusable”, the silent person should not escape this expression of will by claiming a fallacy. in a modern state, ignorance of the law is not tolerated. it would be different if the person who remained silent was simply unfamiliar with business practices or unaware of the specific consequences of violating the principle of good faith. there is no reason why the rule on intentional misconduct should not apply in this case. in cases such as the trier wine auction, where a person’s raising of hands was interpreted as an indication of intent under commercial practice, it was generally accepted that the ideologue had the right to cancel such an www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 159 published by scholink inc. indication. if an ideator relying on a derived positive meaning can revoke it on the basis of ignorance of the custom of the transaction, why shouldn’t an ideator relying on a derived negative meaning have the same right? according to the principle of “equal treatment of essentially equal situations,” the originator of a negatively inferred expression should also have the right to revoke it. if the silent person claims that he or she did not know about the commercial act in question or did not know the specific consequences of the violation of the principle of good faith, the adjudicating body will conclude that the application is invalid due to insufficient evidence or irregularities, that the representation is not wrong, or that the application is valid and the silent person acquires the right of revocation. however, many scholars argue that in commerce, the silent person should be excluded from the right of revocation if he or she is responsible for the occurrence of a mistake of fact. some scholars have also relied on the businessman’s theory of organizational risk to argue that the silent person is not entitled to revoke an implied statement if the negligence occurred as a result of a risk typical of the businessman’s business. for example, if an employee intercepts a letter and the business owner does not see it and remains silent, this is a typical business risk; conversely, if the letter is lost in a fire, this is not a typical business risk and the silent party can rescind the statement. opponents argue that there is no empirical basis for excluding the right of revocation due to the silent party’s negligence and that under current law, a party can revoke a communication at any time, even if the other party is at fault. on the other hand, the systematic risk theory for dealers is not sufficiently persuasive. if it can be inferred from the systematic risk theory that a dealer’s erroneous silence cannot be rescinded if the dealer is at fault, then it can be inferred that other kinds of erroneous communications by dealers cannot be rescinded if the dealer is at fault, but this conclusion is clearly not based on a rule of thumb. this point is worth evaluating. if the right of rescission is vestable in the case of unfair representations and limited to the party at fault, then there needs to be a uniform treatment of all types of representations, not just one type of representation. it would be a clear violation of the principle of “equal treatment of substantially the same circumstances” for a party without the ability to communicate expressly or actively to rescind while a party without the ability to communicate passively to rescind. it would also be unethical to exclude the wrongdoer’s right to rescind based solely on general fraud or systemic risk. given the wrongdoer’s obligation to pay the other party for damages caused by the rescission, and considering the other party’s interest, it is reasonable to consider excluding the wrongdoer’s right to rescind in cases of gross negligence. of course, such exclusion can only be achieved by legislation and not by interpretation. 6. conclusion although the rules for determining whether a contract has been concluded and, in particular, whether the parties have reached a legally binding agreement seem to have been sorted out, the practice is complex and various problems still exist in court practice. in summary, this article assumes that the existence of an agreement between two or more parties and the agreement of the parties’ intention are www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 160 published by scholink inc. the two main factors constituting contract formation, and composes the relevant detailed evaluation criteria into the body of the offer and promise rules. references cui, j. y. (2022). exploration of contract formation. jiaotong university law, 2022(01), 7-19. liu, g. x. (2022). several issues on contract formation. application of law, 2022(04), 3-17. ran, k. p. (2019). the reengineering of the rule of “my silence is deemed to be consent” in the perspective of the civil code. contemporary jurisprudence, 33(04), 3-12. yang, d. x. (2016). silence and mimesis in the theory of meaning. comparative law research, 2016(06), 155-171. zhang, c. l. (2017). experimental discussion on the general conditions of contract formation—thinking based on legislative theory. journal of heilongjiang academy of political and legal management cadres, 2017(04), 58-61. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 11 original paper contrary to t. hirai, ramsey’s critiques of keynes in 1922 and 1926 were completely wrong michael emmett brady 1 1 adjunct lecturer, california state university, dominguez hills, college of business administration and public policy, department of operations management, 1000 east victoria st arson, california, 90747 usa received: december 14, 2022 accepted: january 22, 2023 online published: january 29, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n1p11 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n1p11 abstract this paper covers harai’s analysis, contained in his section, titled “keynes as a philosopher”, of keynes’s logical theory of probability. harai spends too much of his time repeating ramsey’s claims about having uncovered serious errors in the structure of keynes’s relational propositional theory. .for 100 years, keynes’s logical theory has been interpreted and misevaluated through the eyes of an ignorant 18 year old teenager. the result has been the proliferation and spread of what can be called the “ramsey myth”. the “ramsey myth” is that an 18 year old teenager appeared at cambridge university in 1921.this 18 year old teenager was a genius who wrote a three page review in the jan., 1922 issue of cambridge magazine, which supposedly destroyed, devastated and demolished the logical foundations of keynes’s a treatise on probability, which was his relational, propositional logic founded on boole’s relational, propositional logic. russell countered this in his review, but was ignored (see brady, 2016a). in 1931, it is further supposed that keynes then capitulated to ramsey and repudiated his own logical theory of probability, accepting some version of ramsey’s subjectivist theory. this myth is what hirai’s paper is based on. it was false in 1921 and it is false today in 2022. 1. introduction the paper will be organized in the following manner. section two will present a very brief overview of keynes’s logical theory of probability. section three will show how edgeworth’s two vastly superior reviews could have saved hirai from making the many errors that he made in his paper, where he simply repeats all of ramsey’s claims. section four will show that all of hirai’s analysis concerning keynes’s a treatise on probability (tp, 192) is wrong. section five will conclude the paper. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 12 published by scholink inc. t. harai’s recent paper in the review of keynesian studies, 2021,contains a section called “sketch 2 keynes as a philosopher” (pp. 192-198). all seven pages are completely wrong as they are based on what ramsey claimed, without any textual support, keynes’s logical theory of probability entailed (see brady 1990, brady, 2004a, brady, 2004b, brady, 2012, brady, 2021a, brady, 2021b, brady, 2015, brady and arthmar, 2012, arthmar & brady, 2010, 2017, 2018). all of ramsey’s definitions of keynes’s relational, propositional logic, made in 1922 and 1926, appear nowhere in anything written by keynes in his collected writings of john maynard keynes or in his lifetime. ramsey basically made things up as he went along in the years 1922-1926. ramsey grossly distorted keynes’s analysis until you end up with the very distorted assessments made by c. misak (2020), nearly 100 years later, about keynes purportedly making the following claims : “ramsey peppered the treatise with problems. he objected to the attempt to provide a logical foundation for the principle of indifference. he objected to the idea of an unmeasurable, non-numerical probability and would later, in the 1926 “truth and probability”, offer an account of how all probabilities are measurable. and he objected to the very idea of keynes’s objectively fixed probability relations—the idea that all statements stand in logical relations to each other. as ramsey put it, there is no such probability as the probability that “my carpet is blue” given that ‘napoleon was a great general’.” (misak, 2020, p. 114). first of all, keynes never attempted “… to provide a logical foundation for the principle of indifference.” (misak, 2020). second, keynes’s supposed “idea of an unmeasurable, non-numerical probability.” (misak, 2020) is actually keynes’s interval valued, imprecise probabilities that involve inexact measurement and approximation, as covered in great mathematical detail by keynes in chapters 15 and 17 in keynes’s part ii of the a treatise on probability. neither ramsey or braithwaite or misak or hirai ever read part ii. third, keynes never stated misak’s claim concerning “the idea that all statements stand in logical relations to each other. as ramsey put it, there is no such probability as the probability that ‘my carpet is blue’ given that ‘napoleon was a great general’” (misak, 2020) at any time during his life. hirai, much like misak, has absolutely no idea about what he is 2. method: keynes’s probability (p) relation and the weight (v) relation. a decision (d) is a function of both, so that d = f (p,v) keynes’s actual decision function included the time constraint, t. the time constraint concerned how much time the decision maker had available in order to make a decision. if the decision must be made within a fixed, short run period of time, as in a rated chess tournament involving over the board chess games, then this constraint would become binding. however, if the chess game was a correspondence (postal) game, then the time constraint would not be binding only savage also considered such a binding time constraint in his subjectivist approach because he recognized the severe problem of vagueness that impacted a decision maker’s assessment of his personal probability. in other words, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 13 published by scholink inc. savage recognized keynes’s concern with the importance of weight, but felt that it could not be formally integrated into his theory, although he hinted at seriously taking a long look at interval valued probability. these concerns made his subjective approach to decision making vastly superior to ramsey’s very inferior subjective approach. on the other hand, if the decision can be postponed until the long run, as it can be in a rated tournament correspondence (postal) chess game, then the time constraint, as noted above, is not binding and keynes’s concern with weight becomes much less relevant. savage recognized the binding nature of this constraint when he restricted the application of his theory to the short run and micro level only. therefore, suppressing the t variable yields keynes’s two logical relations, p and v, where p(a/h)= α,0≤α≤1, where α is a rational degree of belief and v(a/h) =w, 0≤w≤1, where w measures the degree of the completeness of the relevant information (see keynes, 1921, tp, p. 313, pp. 314-315; p. 315) supporting keynes’s argument form. this logical relation, v, was severely misinterpreted in runde (1990, pp. 278-283) as being a mathematical variable which was being used to measure weight. runde relies completely on chapter 6 alone for his evaluation. this had been done previously by ij good and i levi. keynes made it very clear on p. 315 of the tp, which runde overlooked, that weight, v, is measured by w. it should be clear from v(a/h)=w, 0≤w≤1,that v can’t measure anything, as it is the logical relation of weight between the a and h propositions that connects them(see brady,2017c,d),. all heterodox, post keynesian, neo -keynesian and institutionalist economists, working in this area in the 20th and 21 st centuries, continue to cite runde’s 1990 article (just under 300 citations according to google scholar). the result is that it is impossible for them to make use of keynes’s conventional coefficient, c, of weight and risk, as it is asserted that it must be v that is used to measure weight and not keynes’s w. it is also asserted that keynes erroneously presented three different definitions of weight in the tp when keynes actually only presented one, which was that v(a/h)=w,0≤w≤1. runde’s errors were first introduced into the academic literature by the philosopher i j good in the early 1950’s and then emphasized by i. levi in the late 1960’s.both good and levi overlooked, as did runde, keynes’s clear definition on p.315 of the tp that only w measures v, weight (see brady, 2018). runde’s error, of confusing and conflating v with w, was repeated one year later in runde (1991, pp. 128-129), where runde confuses and conflates p with α,which is a mathematical variable that can take on a numerical value from the interval (0, 1): “the probability relation may be written as a/h=p. this relation is objective, on keynes’s account, and expresses the degree of belief p is rational to hold in a in the circumstances h.if a is implied by h, p=1,if the relation between a and h is contradictory, p=0.in all other cases, where a is only partially entailed by h, p will lie somewhere somewhere between these two extremes…” (runde, 1991, pp. 128-129). it is mathematically impossible for a logical relation to equal 0, 1 or a number between 0 and 1.it is α that is equal to 0, 1 or a number between 0 and 1 once the probability relation has been normalized on www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 14 published by scholink inc. the unit interval [0,1].the probability relation has to be written as a/h, and not as a/h=p. runde errs again on the same page when he writes the following: “this can be seen if we again write a/h=p (1) where a is the ‘primary proposition ‘and relation (1) the secondary proposition.” (runde, 1991, p. 129). one can suppress the notation, denoting “relation”, as keynes did on p.4, where he writes (a/h) =α or on p.40 of the tp, where he writes (a/h)=p. however, then p is defined as the probability p, not the relation p. runde has confused and conflated p with α. see above. this is identical to his conflation of v with w. vercelli spotted runde’s errors in 2011. vercelli spots the fundamental error that it is obvious is contained in the technical analysis of runde he fixes the flaw, but, again, does not see the contradiction when he talks about keynes’s c coefficient. consider the following : “therefore, most interpreters believe that a satisfactory measure of the weight of argument may be given simply by v(x/h) = k (1) runde (1990) suggests the following measure: v(x/h)=k/i (2) we may overcome these shortcomings by introducing the following measure, which is derived from the third definition [author’s note-vercelli accepts runde’s illusion that keynes had three separate definitions of weight in his tp]: v(x/h)= k/(k+i) “ (3)” (vercelli, 2011, pp. 153-154). therefore, vercelli was able to see the nature and scope of the mathematical problems that existed with the runde, cr articles. he attempts to remedy this in his footnote 1: by introducing the usual criterion of normalization of probability measures k+i=1 (a criterion that keynes himself has utilized in the tp, for example, on page 348)….(vercelli, 2011, p. 168). this fixes one problem, but simply creates another problem that takes the place of the failure of runde to normalize on the unit interval [0, 1]. vercelli’s requirement, that k +i =1, must actually be written as 0≤v≤1, which now states that the logical relation, v, is restricted to applications between 0 and 1,which makes no sense at all because you can’t restrict a logical relation in this fashion. keynes’s position on belief thus depends on both p and v, not p alone, as was argued by ramsey. ramsey further confused the issue by claiming that there was something called a non numerical probability relation. this so called non numerical probability relation does not exist anywhere in keynes’s a treatise on probability. keynes’s p and v relations are independent, since α =p/(p+q) and w=k/(k+i),where p is the probability of success, q is the probability of failure, k is the absolute amount of knowledge and i the absolute amount of ignorance. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 15 published by scholink inc. however, v constrains the type of probability that α is, either numerical or non numerical. if w=1, so that all of the α values are numerical and additivity holds, then it is numerical. it does not hold in the general case 1 , where w<1,where the α values are interval valued probabilities so that non additivity holds. a decision maker can accept, and have a different opinion about, any value within the boundary set up by the upper and lower probabilities defining the interval. a w<1 creates very complicated, complex, severe and intricate problems concerning/about one’s beliefs because of the nonlinearities introduced by w in keynes’s decision theory, which is a function of both α(probability) and w(weight) or the relations p and v. this can best be seen by using the mathematica program or mathlab to generate three dimensional contours of keynes’s conventional coefficient of risk and weight, c, involving c, p and w. everything is substantially simplified if w=1. ramsey does not have any idea about what v represents. hence, he has no inkling about the role that confidence plays in belief. there is no simple, direct, linear connection between probability and belief for keynes as there is for ramsey because ramsey has conflated confidence with probability. the one exception 1 is if w=1, so that v drops out and one is left with α.only in this very special case would ramsey be correct. however, keynes never disputed this outcome, correctly seeing that it would be rare in the real world of actual decision making, as opposed to ramsey’s imaginary academic world where everyone uses only the purely mathematical theory of the calculus of probability to base their decisions on. [place footnote at bottom of this page] the exception to the general case occurs, as discussed by keynes on p. 160 (keynes, tp, 1921, p. 160), if the principle of indifference can be applied, where the existing evidence is “…perfectly symmetrical in its bearing on the various alternatives”. this would be the case in keynes’s discussion of urn models on pp. 75-76 of chapter 6 of the tp. the uncertain urn has numerical probabilities of ½, which are identical to the risky urn. the important point made by keynes, which was that the risky urn has more and stronger evidence than the uncertain urn, has nothing to do with risk allowing quantitative estimates and uncertainty requiring non quantitative estimates of probability. keynes specified an exact argument form that all of the propositions needed to satisfy in his, propositional logic. keynes’s fundamental requirement is that the propositions must be related, connected or similar: “let our premisses consist of any set of propositions h, and our conclusion consist of any set of propositions a, then, if a knowledge of h justifies a rational belief in a of degree α, (then-author’s insert) we say that there is a probability-relation of degree α between a and h.” (keynes, 1921, p. 4). only if a knowledge of h justifies a can there be a “…probability-relation of degree α between a and h.” otherwise, there is no such logical relation between a and h. ramsey’s fanciful belief that there can be only one h proposition and one a proposition is nonsense, given keynes’s very clear statement throughout his tp that his relational propositional logic works with sets of h and a propositions. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 16 published by scholink inc. keynes gives an excellent example of his argument form on pp.5-6 of chapter ii of the tp: “these general ideas are not likely to provoke much criticism. in the ordinary course of thought and argument, we are constantly assuming that knowledge of one statement, while not proving the truth of a second, yields nevertheless some ground for believing it. we assert that we ought on the evidence to prefer such and such a belief. we claim rational grounds for assertions which are not conclusively demonstrated. we allow, in fact, that statements may be unproved, without, for that reason, being unfounded. and it does not seem on reflection that the information we convey by these expressions is wholly subjective. when we argue that darwin gives valid grounds for our accepting his theory of natural selection, we do not simply mean that we are psychologically inclined to agree with him; it is certain that we also intend to convey our belief that we are acting rationally in regarding his theory as probable. we believe that there is some real objective relation between darwin’s evidence and his conclusions, which is independent of the mere fact of our belief, and which is just as real and objective, though of a different degree, as that which would exist if the argument were as demonstrative as a syllogism. we are claiming, in fact, to cognise correctly a logical connection between one set of propositions which we call our evidence and which we suppose ourselves to know, and another set which we call our conclusions, and to which we attach more or less weight (author’s insert-the word “weight” refers to chapters 6 and 26 of the tp analysis of keynes’s evidential weight of the argument) according to the grounds supplied by the first. it is this type of objective relation between sets of propositions—the type which we claim to be correctly perceiving when we make such assertions as these—to which the reader’s attention must be directed.” (keynes, tp, 1921, pp. 5-6; italics added; this is expanded upon on by keynes on pp. 160-161). ramsey’s 1922 example, “…for example between ‘my carpet is blue’ and ‘napoleon was a great general’…”, that was given on page 3 of his cambridge magazine review in 1922, is false because knowledge of the color of a carpet can’t ever supply a connection (or evidence ) to justify the conclusion that napoleon was a great general, where one proposition is regarded as providing the information or evidence upon which to accept the other proposition provisionally. the same conclusion holds for ramsey’s “this is red; that is round” and his “this is red; that is blue “examples. there is no connection between the propositions. i believe that ramsey had to have been on some type of medication, narcotic or drug treatment or been suffering from some unknown mental disorder at the time he was writing his review as his entire paragraph (ramsey, 1922, p. 3) represents a complete contradiction of what keynes presented very clearly on pp. 4-6 and pp. 54-56 of the tp. the same holds for his very similar characterization of keynes’s theory made in 1926. finally, keynes would not conclude that “…the probability is not numerical.” (ramsey, 1922, p. 3). keynes would conclude that ramsey’s example violated his argument form and was irrelevant. therefore, there is no conditional probability because neither of the propositions provides any relevant evidence for the other proposition. it is extraordinary that so many philosophers and economists have www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 17 published by scholink inc. described ramsey’s 1922 article as brilliant. in fact, it makes absolutely no sense whatever. how could have hirai have avoided the intellectual mess that he created in his article? hirai needed to have read chapters i, xi and xii of boole’s 1854 the laws of thought while simultaneously reading chapters i and ii of keynes’s tp. doing this would have provided him with hard evidence that ramsey’s many, many attacks on keynes’s logical theory of probability were also attacks on boole’s logical theory of probability. it is easy to then conclude that ramsey’s claims needed to be evaluated from a critical standpoint as no serious scholar had impugned boole’s theory 3. discussion i: a brief view of edgeworth’s superior understanding of keynes’s a treatise on probability consider edgeworth’s very brief summary of the tp: “suffice it that many probabilities which are incapable of numerical measurement can be placed “between two numerical measures” (p. 32). we thus obtain the idea of a “finite probability” as one which exceeds some numerical probability (p. 257). such measurements play a leading part in induction. to establish a generalization it is necessary that “with the experience we have” actually had there are finite probabilities, however small, derived “from some other source, in favour of the generalization” (p. 238). round this nucleus of finite probability, through the operation of repetition and likeness, science grows. “an argument from” induction must always involve some element of analogy, and, ‘on the other hand, few arguments from analogy can afford to “ignore altogether the strengthening influence of pure induction “[repetition]” (p. 255).” (edgeworth, jrs, 1922b, pp. 107-108; also see edgeworth, 1922a, brady, 2016b, c, 2017a). this very powerful summary by edgeworth is still the best short summary by far that has ever been made of keynes’s a treatise on probability (tp, 1921), even though it is now one hundred years old. edgeworth’s summary is the perfect antidote to the extremely poor coverage made of keynes’s approach by r. b. braithwaite in his editorial foreword to the tp that was placed at the front of volume 8 of the 1973 collected writings of john maynard keynes’s tp by donald moggridge, as well as the many false claims made by the 18 year old “boy genius”, frank ramsey. reading edgeworth would also inoculate readers of the tp from the extremely poor assessments made of keynes’s work by economists, who simply do not know what an interval valued probability is, like r. dimand, r. skidelsky, a. carabelli, j. runde, b. davis, t. lawson, g meeks, r. o’ donnell and many others. their unanimous acceptance of ramsey’s false claim that keynes’s theory was primarily an ordinal theory that would be useless in science is probably their greatest error. hirai could have saved himself from his errors if he had carefully read edgeworth’s two reviews; however, there is no evidence from his references that he had ever read edgeworth’s reviews. hirai thus made the fundamental mistake of putting all of his intellectual eggs into one basket, a very inferior basket based on ramsey comprising the first page (p. 115, 1921) of chapter 10 of part ii and several pages taken from keynes’s introductory chapter 18 (pp. 117-121, 1921) of part iii of the tp. he relied completely on his belief that the ramsey’s reviews were the only one’s worth reading because only www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 18 published by scholink inc. ramsey had supposedly spotted alleged flaws in keynes’ s logical structure about propositions and the objective, logical, probability relation connecting them. in fact, ramsey never correctly identified even one, single flaw in keynes’s tp in either of his reviews. ramsey’s understanding about keynes’s propositional logic, which follows directly from boole’s approach, is nil. the two crucial pieces of information that hirai could have gleaned from a reading of edgeworth were (a) keynes’s theory of probability is an interval valued theory of imprecise probability and (b) the very important role played by finite probabilities in keynes’s mathematical theory of induction and analogy explained by keynes in chapters 20 and 22 on pp.233-238 and pp. 253-27, respectively,where a finite probability was defined by keynes as being greater than both a numerical probability and/or a non numerical probability, where a non numerical probability is an interval valued probability. 4. discussion ii: hirai’s mistaken reliance on ramsey for his understanding of the foundations of keynes’s logical theory of probability consider the following claims made by ramsey that is the foundation for hirai’s 2021 work on keynes’s logical theory of probability in the review of keynesian studies: see “mr. keynes starts from the supposition that we make probable inferences for which we claim objective validity; we proceed from full belief in one proposition to partial belief in another, and we claim that this procedure is objectively right, so that if another man in similar circumstances entertained a different degree of belief, he would be wrong in doing so. mr. keynes accounts for this by supposing that between any two propositions, taken as premiss and conclusion, there holds one and only one relation of a certain sort called probability relations; and that if, in any given case, the relation is that of degree α, from full belief in the premiss, we should, if we were rational, proceed to a belief of degree α in the conclusion.” (ramsey, 1926; in kyburg & smokler, 1980 (2nd ed.), pp. 26-27; italics added; see also bateman, 1987, p. 106). the italics emphasis involve ramsey in severe error; the second to last italics emphasis holds only for the special case where keynes’s principle of indifference (poi) is applicable or one is dealing with a least upper bound or a greatest lower bound for interval valued probability. first, nowhere in the tp does keynes claim objective validity, which can only occur in a deductive logic, as opposed to practical certainty (keynes, tp, p. 160). second, nowhere does keynes claim that his procedure is objectively right. keynes claims that it is rational and reasonable because it is based on all of the relevant, available evidence which appears in the h propositions. third, the circumstances must be identical, not similar. fourth, keynes never claimed that a decision maker would be wrong. keynes stated that such a decision maker would be non rational, as opposed to being irrational. thus, for keynes, the only rational answer for both of the ellsberg two urn ball (red and black ball) problems is that the probability of a red or black is ½, based on a correct application of keynes’s poi, as based on keynes’s summary on pp. 54-56 of the a treatise on probability (tp; 1921), and not on keynes’s restatement of the erroneous laplace-bernoulli version on p. 42. fifth, keynes’s relational, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 19 published by scholink inc. propositional logic does not hold’ between any two propositions’, but only between sets of propositions that are related or connected by a degree of similarity (or likeness or resemblance). ramsey’s claim is simply a regurgitation of the false claim he first made four years earlier in 1922 in his jan., cambridge magazine review on p. 3 that “…between any two non contradictory propositions there holds a logical relation…”, which ramsey then illustrated with his completely irrelevant ‘my carpet is blue; napoleon was a great general ‘example. neither of these propositions are related or connected. all of ramsey’s 1922 and 1926 examples involve unconnected or unrelated propositions. sixth, there holds one and only one relation of logical probability for exact, precise, numerically connected probabilities based on the poi or for the calculation of a least upper bound (lub) and /or greatest lower bound (glb) for keynes’s interval valued probabilities. seventh, keynes’s approach does not hold ‘in any given case’; it holds in some cases. finally, ramsey is very confused in his belief that keynes’s approach only holds for two propositions, i.e. for one h proposition and one a proposition. in fact, keynes works with sets of h and a propositions throughout the tp. the best example of this would be his darwin example on pp. 5-6 and its extension on p. 160-161 (tp, 1921). hirai takes an approach to reading the tp which can only be described as reading “little bits and pieces” of keynes’s tp. hirai’s coverage of part ii of keynes’s tp is a mirage. the two pages he cites from, pp.125-126 (hirai, pp. 192-194) from the 1973 cwjmk version (p. 115, tp, 1921) have nothing to do with keynes’s main conclusions in part ii, which were that (a) additivity is a special case,(b)interval valued probability is the general case, and (c) the normal distribution can’t be simply assumed, but must be shown to hold by the examination of preliminary data (chapter 17, tp). the researcher must consider the use of the geometric and harmonic means, the median, and the mode and not just assume the arithmetic mean. hirai’s discussions of part iii on induction and analogy on pp.241,243 and 245 (hirai, pp. 195-196) from the 1973 cwjmk edition of the tp (pp. 217, 219 and 221, tp, 1921) ignore keynes’s crucial discussions of finite probabilities on pp.233-238 and 254-257,as well as keynes’s qualification that inductive(practical) validity is not the same as deductive(universal)validity (pp. 244-245, tp, 1921). i have already pointed out that a reading of edgeworth’s two reviews in 1922 would have allowed hirai to actually have come to grips with what keynes was presenting in parts ii and iii of the tp. however, it is on pp.196-198 of hirai, where hirai’s assessments of ramsey’s empty criticisms of keynes’s a treatise on probability are simply accepted as being true, that hirai’s failure to absorb parts ii and iii of the tp become obvious. hirai’s belief, that he can take one small paragraph out of context from p. 245 (p. 221, tp, 1921) of part iii’s introductory chapter 18 and present it as the major conclusion of part iii of the tp, is comparable to ramsey’s total confusions about keynes’s boolean, relational, propositional logic. we will consider hirai’s confusions paragraph by paragraph. consider the following: “here “probability” is defined as the degree of rational belief between propositions, and, moreover, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 20 published by scholink inc. “inductive arguments” are defined, being drawn by this probability. furthermore, it is argued that induction should be a problem of formal logic (the existence of probability relation) rather than a factual problem.” (hirai, 2021, p. 196). if the a and h propositions are related and connected, then there exists an objective, logical, relation of probability (similarity between them such that there is a degree of rational belief α. however, it is quite impossible that induction “….should be a problem of formal logic (the existence of probability relation) rather than a factual problem.” since the best outcome for an inductive argument is “practical certainty “only, which is not the deductive result of universal certainty (the conclusion is always true. see pp.160-161 and 244-245, tp, 1921). consider now hirai’s next confusion: “to sum up, keynes argues that (i) induction is to be seen as the most important element in the argument on probability, (ii) although induction is composed of “analogy” and “pure induction”, analogy is more important, (iii) prior probability can be obtained through analogy.” (hirai, 2021, p. 196). of course, this leaves out of the discussion keynes’s “finite probabilities”π and η as emphasized by edgeworth. without these finite probabilities, pure induction can’t be used to support a generalization. it is when hirai explicitly considers ramsey’s extraordinarily weak critique of keynes’s theory that hirai goes astray: “and in the process, he criticized keynes’s treatise on probability (ramsey (1926) [ramsey [1931] pp. 156-98]). his criticism runs as follows. (1) there does not exist anything like a probabilistic relation between propositions. (rejection of the definition of “probability”). (2) consistency is not maintained in the arguments regarding the main principles. (ambiguity of the objectivity and subjectivity of “probability” found in the tp). (3) the attempt to absorb the world of induction into the world of deduction is nonsense. ramsey argues (3) as follows. the logical relation which justifies the inference is that the sense or import of the conclusion is contained in that of the premisses. but in the case of an inductive argument this does not happen in the least; it is impossible to represent it as resembling a deductive argument and merely weaker in degree; it is absurd to say that the sense of the conclusion is partially contained in that of the premisses. (ramsey [1931] p. 186) keynes responded to it with acceptance to a large extent as follows (keynes, 1931). he states that the development of formal logic by russell and [early] wittgenstein (1922) gradually emptied out the content, eventually eliminating not only any experience, but the most rational thinking principles. ramsey tried to counter this with a kind of pragmatism and turned to human logic. “thus, he was led to consider “human logic” as distinguished from “formal logic”. formal logic is concerned with nothing but the rules of consistent thought. but in addition to this we have certain “useful mental habits” for handling the material with which we are supplied by our perceptions and by our memory and perhaps in other ways, and so arriving at or towards truth; and the analysis of such habits is also a sort of logic. the application of these ideas to the logic of probability is very fruitful. “(jmk.10, p. 338) keynes went on to admit, “so far i yield to ramsey—i think he is right” (jmk. 10, p. 339). this is a brief commentary, but the matter is weighty and deep. keynes agrees with ramsey’s theory of probability. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 21 published by scholink inc. we may reasonably conclude that he is critical of his own theory of probability, which belongs to a stream of formal logic.” (hirai, 2021, pp. 196-198). hirai’s (1) fails completely, since keynes’s relational, propositional logic used in the tp comes directly from g. boole’s relational, propositional logic as contained in chapters xvi-xxi of the laws of thought (see tp, 1921, p. 5, ft. 2). hirai’s (2) fails completely, as he never establishes any inconsistency in any part of the tp. hirai’s (3) makes no sense, because keynes never tried to absorb induction into deduction. where this is supposed to have occurred in the tp is never cited by hirai. i await hirai’s citing of the exact page and paragraph where keynes made such an attempt in the tp. hirai’s reliance on ramsey’s assessment of the value of induction is completely erroneous. let us consider ramsey’s assessment: “the logical relation which justifies the inference is that the sense or import of the conclusion is contained in that of the premisses. but in the case of an inductive argument this does not happen in the least; it is impossible to represent it as resembling a deductive argument and merely weaker in degree; it is absurd to say that the sense of the conclusion is partially contained in that of the premises. (ramsey, 1931, p. 186; p. 44, kyburg & smokler, 1980, (2 nd ed); italics added). of course, ramsey’s assessment of induction relative to deduction is identical to j.s. mill’s assessment as pointed out by keynes on pp.267-268: “an induction has no validity….unless it is absolutely certain” (keynes, 1921, p. 267). keynes had already countered ramsey’s attack on induction with his discussion of “practical certainty” on p.161 of the tp, where such “practical certainty” (darwin’s theory or einstein’s theories or the work of linus pauling)is based on approximation. see also keynes’s discussions of darwin’s theory on pp.5-6 of the tp (1921). ramsey’s expressions, “this does not happen in the least”, “it is impossible to represent it”, and “it is absurd to say”, as far as physics, biology, chemistry and engineering go, would be rejected by practically all physical, life and biological scientists. hirai severely misquotes keynes’s discussion of ramsey in the new statesman and nation in 1931 (vol. 10, 1973, cwjmk, pp. 337-338; 1931, p. 407): “ramsey argues, as against the theory that i had put forward, that probability is concerned not with objective relations between propositions but (in some sense) with degrees of belief, and he succeeds in showing that the calculus of probabilities simply amounts to a set of rules for ensuring that the system of degrees of belief which we hold shall be a consistent system. thus the calculus of probabilities belongs to formal logic. but the basis for our degrees of belief—or the a priori probabilities, as they used to be called—is part of our human outfit, perhaps given us by natural selection, analogous to our perceptions and our memories rather than to formal logic. so far i yield to ramsey—i think he is right. but….” (keynes, vol. 10, 1973, cwjmk, pp. 337-338; 1931, new statesman and nation, p. 407). the only part of this paragraph where keynes “yields” to ramsey is the following part: “…and he succeeds in showing that the calculus of probabilities simply amounts to a set of rules for ensuring that the system of degrees of belief which we hold shall be a consistent system. thus the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 22 published by scholink inc. calculus of probabilities belongs to formal logic.” however, the vast majority of keynes’s probabilities are interval valued, which keynes described as being non numerical because they required two numerals, not one, the laws of the purely mathematical theory of probability do not apply. since keynes had always agreed that instances where numerical probabilities held could be analyzed using the calculus of probability, keynes’s “yielding “to ramsey has no import for the theory presented in keynes’s a treatise on probability. finally, hirai’s summary makes no sense: “keynes went on to admit, “so far i yield to ramsey—i think he is right” (jmk. 10, p. 339). this is a brief commentary, but the matter is weighty and deep. keynes agrees with ramsey’s theory of probability. we may reasonably conclude that he is critical of his own theory of probability, which belongs to a stream of formal logic (hirai, 2021, p. 198). keynes does not agree with ramsey’s theory of probability unless the evidential weight of the evidence, w,=1 or the lower limit = the upper limit of an interval valued probability. keynes was not critical of his own theory as demonstrated in the keynes-townshend (see references on townshend, 1937-1938) correspondence in 1937-38.finally, keynes’s theory does not belong to a stream of formal logic. it is ramsey’s theory that belongs to formal logic (the purely mathematical theory of hirai’s article directly conflicts with the first article published in the 2021 issue of the rks by sakai. sakai argued that keynes’s theory was an interval probability approach. harai, as the editor of this journal, had to have read sakai’s paper as he would have been responsible for sending the paper out for review. as professor james s earley told me in december, 1980,before agreeing to sit on my dissertation committee, that “if, and it is a big if, edgeworth is right about keynes’s probabilities being between two numbers, then ramsey is wrong.” nowhere in harai’s article is sakai’s result concerning interval probability nor does hirai used, listed or cited. nor does hirai realize that keynes’s logic is the logic of george boole’s the laws of thought. 5. conclusions hirai bases his analysis of keynes’s work in part ii on one irrelevant page (p. 115, tp, 1921) taken from part ii of the tp, three introductory pages (pp. 217, 219, 221) taken from part iii and one page taken from the first page of chapter 33 of part v of the tp. the vast majority of his assessment of keynes’s tp is based only on ramsey’s 1926 review that i have demonstrated to be intellectually worthless and without any merit at all (see brady, 2021a; 2021b; 2004a; 2004b). i will now again provide the edgeworth quotation from his 1922 review in the journal of the royal statistical society so that the reader can see how inferior hirai’s assessment of keynes is compared to a 100 year old reviews by edgeworth that have never been used by any heterodox or orthodox economist in the 20th or 21 st centuries. both of edgeworth’s 100 year old reviews combined completely refute all heterodox claims made about keynes’s logical theory of probability. the work of bateman (1987, 1989, 1990, 2016, 2021a, b), davis (1994), dimand (2021), faulkner, fed-uzi, mccann and runde (cje, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 23 published by scholink inc. 2021), meeks (2003), lawson (2012), o’donnell (2021a, b), skidelsky (1992) and weatherson (2002) is completely refuted because all of these articles rely on ramsey’s flawed claims. it should be noted that both edgeworth reviews appear in the references of the faulkner, feduzi, mccann and runde paper, but none of edgeworth’s analysis is ever used or quoted anywhere in their paper. it is interesting to see that bateman, skidelsky, meeks, davis, o’donnell, runde and weatherson all rely, either completely or partially, on ramsey’s claims about keynes’s relational, propositional logic being wrong, while ignoring everything actually written about it by keynes in the tp. references -. (1922b). a treatise on probability, by john maynard keynes. journal of the royal statistical society, 85, 107-113. -. (2004a). j. m. keynes’ theory of decision making, induction, and analogy. the role of interval valued probability in his approach. xlibris corporation. (pennsylvania; philadelphia) -. (2004b). essays on john maynard keynes and …. xlibris corporation. (pennsylvania; philadelphia). arthmar, r., & brady, m. e. (2010). an analysis that answers f.y. edgeworth’s question, put to the logicians and philosophers who read the journal mind. concerning the importance of evaluating the role played by keynes’s conventional coefficient of risk and weight, c, in decision making (june 29, 2010). retrieved from https://ssrn.com/abstract=1632318 https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1632318 arthmar, r., & brady, m. e. (2017). reply to feduzi, runde, and zappia. history of economic ideas, xxv(1), 224-233. arthmar, r., & brady, m. e. 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(2021b). pragmatism and probability: re-examining keynes’s thinking on probability. journal of the history of economic thought, 43(4), 619-632. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 24 published by scholink inc. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1053837221000365 brady, m. e. (1983). the foundation of keynes’ macroeconomics: his logical theory of probability and its application in the general theory. u. c. riverside, dissertation (july). brady, m. e. (1986). reviewing the reviewers of j.m. keynes’s a treatise on probability: how most of them got it all wrong (unpublished paper). (published in 2016 as reviewing the reviewers of j.m. keynes’s a treatise on probability: ignorance is bliss. xlibris press; philadelphia, pennsylvania). brady, m. e. (2012). john maynard keynes’s upper and lower valued probabilities: a study of how statisticians, philosophers, logicians, historians, and economists failed to comprehend keynes’s breakthrough application of g. boole’s interval approach to probability in the 20th century (january 30). also in international journal of applied economics and econometrics, 21(2), 254-272. retrieved from https://ssrn.com/abstract=1996129 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1996129 brady, m. e. (2016a). bertrand russell on keynes’s a treatise on probability: what one would expect from the twentieth century’s greatest philosopher (june). retrieved from https://ssrn.com/abstract=2798509 http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2798-509. brady, m. e. (2016b). f. y. edgeworth on j. m. keynes’ a treatise on probability: the mind and journal of the royal statistical society reviews (june). retrieved from https://ssrn.com/abstract=2789307 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2789307 brady, m. e. (2016c). c. d. broad’s review of j. m. keynes’s a treatise on probability and the role of william ernest johnson in that book (june 12). book review: a treatise on probability, chapter 6, (1921) by john maynard keynes. retrieved from https://ssrn.com/abstract=2794513 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2794513 brady, m. e. (2017a). a comparison – contrast of the technical understanding exhibited by f.y. edgeworth in his two 1922 book reviews of j. m. keynes's a treatise on probability with that of the keynesian fundamentalists, such as runde, skidelsky, o’donnell, carabelli, feduzi and lawson, between 1980 and 2016 – a problem of lost knowledge (march 21). retrieved from https://ssrn.com/abstract=2938271 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2938271 brady, m. e. (2017b). an analysis of edwin b. wilson’s secret, second review of the 'a treatise on probability’ in 1934: how it demonstrated that keynes’s theory of probability was an interval valued approach to probability and not an ordinal theory (january 24). also in scholedge international journal of business & governance, 3(8), 110-121. retrieved from https://ssrn.com/abstract=2905482 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2905482 brady, m. e. (2017c). j m keynes, “the state of the news (the change in the weight of the evidence)” and the weight of the evidence: from keynes’s december, 1933 student lectures to chapter 12 of the general theory in february, 1936 (september). retrieved from https://ssrn.com/abstract=3031314 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3031 brady, m. e. 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(2002). keynes, uncertainty, and interest rates. cambridge journal of economics, 26, 47-62. https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/26.1.47 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 88 original paper the principal functions of institutions in shaping the civil society and southern african rural organisations metolo foyet1*, rodgers lubilo2,3,4,5 & maxi pia louis2,6 1 department of geography, university of florida, gainesville, fl, usa 2 community leaders network (cln), windhoek, namibia 3 chairperson of the zambia community based natural resource management (cbnrm) association, lusaka, zambia 4 national technical advisor to the zambia community resource board association (zcrba), lusaka, zambia 5 senior technical advisor to the frankfurt zoological society, north luangwa, zambia 6 director of the namibian association of cbnrm support organizations (nacso) * metolo foyet, corresponding author received: april 19, 2024 accepted: may 11, 2024 online published: may 27, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n2p88 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n2p88 abstract the influence of political interests on resource discourse is well-documented, with ordinary citizens often portrayed as both victims and potential solutions if governments were more accountable. institutions play crucial roles in shaping societal norms, behaviors and politico-economic interactions, yet the specific functions of different institutions and their impact on civil society organizations (csos), especially community-based organizations (cbos), in rural contexts remain unclear. this paper explores how formal and informal institutions influence the activities, operational strategies and effectiveness of csos. drawing upon recent developments in conservation, this understanding is particularly important in light of the evolving challenges faced by rural societies and the need for cbos to navigate complex institutional landscapes to achieve their goals. using the north, wallis, and weingast (nww) theoretical framework, the paper distinguishes between 'limited access orders' and 'open access orders' to understand cbos' operational contexts. in 'limited access orders', where power is concentrated among a few, formal institutions maintain the status quo, limiting cbo actions. the hypothesis posits that formal institutions, through regulatory frameworks, can either enable or constrain cbo activities, while informal institutions, through cultural norms, influence social acceptance, community support and resource mobilization for cbo initiatives. 'open access orders' www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 89 provide a conducive environment for mass opinions and collective actions led by cbos on resource ownership. understanding these dynamics is crucial for developing strategies that enhance government accountability and support cbos' roles in advocacy, biodiversity preservation, natural resource management, and rural development. keywords institutions, governance, civil society, rural organisations, non-state actors, grassroots and indigenous-led movements, community leaders network (cln), southern africa 1. introduction 1.1 institutions and their importance in shaping interactions fundamental mechanisms of social order governing the behavior of individuals within any given society (north, wallis, & weingast, 2005), institutions encompass various systems of norms, laws, and conventions that guide social, economic, and political interactions among individuals and groups. by establishing predictable patterns of behavior through observation and experience – institutions play a crucial role in reducing uncertainties in social interactions, thereby facilitating cooperation and coordination among members of a community. they range from formal entities such as governments (a-institutions), legal systems (b-institutional arrangements), and economic markets (c-institutional economics) to informal ones like cultural norms (a), traditions (b), and social networks (c). the importance of institutions lies in their ability to shape behaviors, influence decisions, and provide the platform for the complex interrelations that underpin societal function and development. institutions shape the activities of csos by delineating the boundaries within which they operate and influencing their strategic decisions. formal institutions (foris), such as regulatory frameworks (i.e., legal systems, governmental policies) directly impact csos by setting the legal parameters for their formation, funding, and activities. these institutions can facilitate the work of csos by providing legal protections, access to resources, and opportunities for partnership. conversely, they can also pose significant challenges through restrictive laws, bureaucratic hurdles, and political interference. informal institutions (infis), such as societal norms (i.e., values, unwritten rules), equally influence csos by affecting community perceptions and support. the alignment or misalignment of cso objectives with local (and by extension, rural and indigenous) cultural norms can significantly impact an organization's ability to engage communities, mobilize support, and implement projects successfully. understanding the influence of both formal and informal institutions is crucial for csos to navigate their operational landscapes effectively, adapt their strategies to local contexts, and maximize their impact on societal development and change. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 90 figure 1. informal institution types, functions and their relation to formal rules, piled by (erdmann, elischer, & stroh, 2011) based on helmkey/levisky, 2006 1.2 the principal functions of institutions one of the primary functions of institutions is to reduce uncertainty in human interactions. this predictability is essential for complex social, economic, and political activities, as it reduces the risks associated with engaging with others. by establishing clear rules, institutions provide a framework within which individuals can make decisions and plan their actions. for instance, regulatory frameworks establish laws that dictate acceptable behavior and outline the consequences of violations, thereby guiding individuals' actions and interactions. secondly, they enable cooperation among individuals and groups. through the creation of shared norms and values, institutions foster a sense of collective identity and mutual trust. this shared understanding is crucial for the coordination of activities and the pooling of resources towards common goals. for example, economic institutions, such as markets, facilitate cooperation by establishing rules for trade and exchange, enabling individuals and organizations to collaborate and benefit from each other's goods and services. thirdly, they facilitate predictable interactions by establishing a consistent set of expectations for behavior. this predictability allows for the smooth coordination of activities across different sectors of society. for example, educational institutions standardize the dissemination of knowledge and skills, ensuring that individuals can build on a common base of understanding. similarly, political institutions provide a framework for governance and public decision-making, guiding how individuals and groups interact with the state and participate in collective decision-making processes. table 1. mechanisms through which institutions operate, (source-author*1) mechanism description examples constrain behavior by establishing rules and norms that limit certain actions while prescribing others. regulatory systems prohibit environmentally harmful practices (e.g. poaching, deforestation) and prescribe sustainable resource management practices such as fishing quotas, or logging permits. enable behavior by providing the means or capacity to undertake certain financial institutions offer credit, enabling investment [e.g. banks, rotational credit www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 91 actions. associations (djanggi (note 1), arisan (note 2))]; educational institutions provide knowledge and skills for various careers [e.g. formal schools, traditional ecological knowledge (tek). incentivize behaviors through rewards and punishments, encouraging certain actions and discouraging others based on socio-cultural values. economic incentives like subsidies, grants, or tax breaks for investment; social rewards for community service and social stigma or ostracization for undesirable actions. 1.3 the importance of understanding institutional dynamics understanding the dynamics of how formal and informal institutions shape and are shaped by societal interactions is crucial for effective policy-making, social planning, and the successful operation of civil society initiatives. this understanding enables policymakers and social planners to craft strategies that are not only legally sound but also culturally sensitive and socially inclusive. for csos and rural movements, understanding these institutional landscapes will determine how good they are at (a) identifying opportunity structures (goldstone, 2004) that can propel their endeavors; and navigating the challenges and opportunities in advocating for social, environmental and economic change is key to (b) achieving their objectives (i.e. rights, environmental protection, cultural preservation, etc). the critical roles these institutions play in organizing community life, influencing csos, and driving community-led movements underline the complexity and richness of societal structures. 2. method 2.1 rationale and qualitative analysis the rationale of the study is to explore how formal and informal institutions influence the activities, operational strategies, and effectiveness of csos, particularly cbos in rural southern africa. the study aims to clarify the specific functions of these institutions and their impact on csos. it uses the north wallis and weingast (nww) theoretical framework to analyze the political and economic development of societies by distinguishing between 'limited access orders' and 'open access orders'. it has been applied to understand the contexts in which cbos operate and examine how these contexts affect cbo operations. the methodology relies on qualitative data gathered through observations, interviews, and document analysis to explore the interactions between institutions and cbos. 2.2 case study the focus on the community leaders network (cln) of southern africa illustrates how cbos navigate formal and informal institutions. this case study provides practical examples of how cbos operate within complex institutional landscapes. 2.3 procedure interviews were conducted to investigate the new conservation movement that is cln as a case study www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 92 for academic inquiry. comprehensive four-hour interviews were held with cln leaders, along with additional conversations of varying lengths, to gain insights into the organization's structure and the experiences and perceptions of its stakeholders. the survey was divided into two main sections: one focused on understanding cln as a social movement, and the other on examining its use of social media. the questionnaire consisted of 215 questions in total. the survey on the social movement comprised 129 questions across 11 sub-sections: historical contextualization (10); theoretical contextualization (9); membership analysis, organizational dynamics & longevity and retention factors (15); opportunity structures and political context (14); societal dimension (12); economic dimension (22); cultural dimension (25); emotional dimension (11); environmental dimension (4); action and impact analysis (5); challenges and opportunities (2). the survey on social media consisted of 86 questions across 8 sub-sections: social media influence (7); engagement with audience (8); design of virtual platforms and influence of algorithm (17); social marketing and pr on social media (16); digital literacy (6); culturomics analysis (10); ethical considerations (10); hypothesis validation (12). prior consent was taken from the participants to enroll themselves in the study. 2.4 hypothesis the hypothesis is twofold: (a) formal institutions, through regulatory frameworks and enforcement mechanisms, provide a structured environment that can either enable or constrain cbo activities depending on the regulatory context; (b) informal institutions, through cultural norms and unwritten rules, influence the social acceptance and community support for cbo initiatives, thereby affecting their ability to mobilize resources and achieve their objectives. this hypothesis guides the research in exploring the interplay between institutions and csos, aiming to elucidate the principal functions of regulatory frameworks and cultural norms and understand the extent to which they guide, support or hinder the work of csos within the context of those institutions. 3. results and discussion 3.1 the regulatory framework as a formal institution formal institutions are characterized by their structured, codified, and officially sanctioned rules and procedures. a focus on the regulatory framework reveals its quintessential role as a formal institution, where rules are set, and regulations and standards created by (quasi-) governmental agencies to control activities within various sectors like the environment. these frameworks are subsets of the broader legal system and are designed to ensure compliance with laws and policies that are created, interpreted and enforced to maintain social order, protect individual and collective rights, and guide and facilitate various aspects of civic life, such as economic transactions and broader social interactions. wildlife policies, as a regulatory framework subset within environmental law, play a crucial role in the conservation of biodiversity, the sustainable management of natural resources and habitats, and regulating human interaction with wildlife. these policies are developed, enacted and enforced by governmental bodies through a structured legal system, which includes international conventions and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 93 treaties, national laws, and local regulations to regulate human activities affecting wildlife, habitats, and ecosystems. specifically, north views policies as a deliberate effort by humans to control their environment, highlighting the interaction between formal rules, informal norms, and their enforcement characteristics. in the case of wildlife policies, they are designed to balance the ecological needs of wildlife with the economic and social needs of human populations, ensuring sustainable interaction between humans and the natural environment. they regulate behavior by setting limits on activities that may harm wildlife or their habitats, including restrictions on hunting, fishing, logging, and development in sensitive areas. by enforcing these regulations, wildlife policies work to prevent the overexploitation of wildlife, protect endangered species from extinction, and preserve biodiversity for future generations. the enforcement of contracts is an essential aspect of wildlife policies, particularly in contexts involving conservation efforts, land use agreements, and international wildlife trade (polman, 2002). wildlife policies ensure that agreements made between parties—be it government entities, private landowners, conservation organizations, or international bodies—are legally binding and enforceable. for instance, agreements under the convention on biological diversity (cbd) or the convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora (cites) are supposedly enforced through national legislation, ensuring countries adhere to their conservation and trade commitments. this legal enforceability is said to ensure that conservation efforts and wildlife management practices are implemented as agreed. these policies are equally meant to protect the rights of various stakeholders, including local communities, communal landowners, and the broader public’s right to a healthy environment. these rights may relate to the use, management, and conservation of natural resources: for example, the recognition and protection of indigenous rights to traditional lands and resources, ensuring that conservation efforts do not infringe upon their way of life. however, history has proven that these clauses are not often respected. in the case of community rights in southern africa, the debate appeared centered on hunting, but it quickly became evident that the issue was far more profound, touching on fundamental rights. what was allegedly an animal-right defense ultimately revealed a deeper disregard for communities living alongside wildlife, undermining their autonomy and questioning their decision-making capabilities, as depicted below by a community member: so there were a lot of things that were happening. first of all, it started just with hunting, and then i started thinking, this is not just about hunting. this is really undermining somebody's rights, you know? it's being put forward or being presented as if it's about hunting, but when you go deeper into it, the ugly truth is that the way the discussion is framed just fundamentally undermines people that live with wildlife, that live with these resources, and condescendingly questions their ability to make their own decisions. p1 this realization propelled southern african communities to assert their stewardship over their resources and rights and led them to vocalize their stance: “the wildlife is ours to manage, and we reserve the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 94 right to utilize and trade sustainably within cites regulations”. given that community-based natural resource management (cbnrm) practices were in full compliance with international treaties ratified by southern african governments, communities were puzzled by the criticism around their conservation hunting land use model. this prompt questions such as “if these are actions sanctioned by globally accepted agreements, why are they singled out for criticism and facing condemnation for implementing globally recognized treaties?” or “why should they face repercussions for engaging in practices that are universally ratified and executed by other communities in other countries without censure?”. and that is actually what then culminated into us now starting speaking up around, you know, this is our wildlife, we make these decisions, and we can trade with whoever we want to trade, as long as it's sustainable and we adhere to cites rules. we therefore did not understand what we were doing wrong because our governments signed up to these bilateral agreements, and so, if it's a global treaty that has been signed, everybody agreed to it, we did not do anything wrong. why are we then being punished for something that we are implementing according to the rules that everyone has signed to and which other people are doing without being punished? – p1 subsequently, it can thus be inferred that even though formal institutions such as wildlife policies play an indispensable role in regulating behavior, enforcing contracts, and protecting rights related to natural resources and biodiversity, the regulatory framework on which they rely is not aptly predictable, still nurtures a level of uncertainty, and the imbalances around its enforceability jeopardize the institutional regalian function of facilitating economic transactions and social interactions that are critical for the sustainable management and conservation of wildlife. how can these loopholes be addressed in securing the health and vitality of wildlife for generations to come? 3.2 the socio-cultural norm as an informal institution socio-cultural norms, an example of informal institutions, guide individual behavior through unwritten rules without formal enforcement. these norms foster trust, cooperation, and social cohesion within communities, filling gaps left by formal systems, particularly in indigenous and rural communities where formal legal mechanisms might be less present or effective. unlike formal institutions that rely on codified laws and regulations, informal institutions exert influence through social or collective expectations for how individuals should act in various contexts. by providing guidelines for what is “acceptable” and “expected”, socio-cultural norms play a significant role in shaping individual behavior, relying on the mechanisms of social approval and disapproval to enforce conformity. they are enforced not through legal sanctions but through social pressures such as ostracism, shame, or praise. for instance, norms around respect and hospitality are maintained by the desire to be seen positively by others and the fear of social exclusion. the norm of reciprocity in many cultures facilitates mutual aid and support within communities, enhancing social cohesion and collective action. this system of informal enforcement is highly effective in regulating behavior within communities, ensuring that members act in ways that support the group's values and goals. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 95 social norms create a predictable social environment where individuals can often rely on each other to behave in mutually beneficial ways. for example, norms that promote honesty and fairness facilitate trust among community members, making it easier for them to cooperate and work together towards common goals. this shared trust and cooperation, in turn, strengthens social cohesion, creating a sense of belonging and mutual support that is vital for community resilience. a quintessential component of social norms is exemplified in the role of elders within the community, who embody the transmission and enforcement of cultural and spiritual values through customs and other unwritten norms and practices. respected, their authority is derived from their knowledge and practice of traditional wisdom, rather than from any formal legal power. for instance, in zimbabwe, specifically on african hunting institutions, elders affirm that hunting has deep traditional roots in human civilization, with many indigenous african communities historically managing their hunting practices sustainably through customary frameworks (adherence to totemic practices, demarcation of sacred areas, and other social norms) throughout pre-colonial times (muposhi et al., 2016). these institutions were largely displaced during the colonial era and ultimately superseded by the establishment of state protected areas and strictly regulated recreational hunting in designated areas, with access often limited to fee-paying visitors from outside the community (muposhi et al., 2016). by advising on matters of social conduct, conflict resolution, and moral dilemmas, elders ensure that the community's actions are aligned with its values. in this justice system that is culturally appropriate and effective, they often employ restorative (rather than punitive measures or retributive) practices that focus on healing relationships and restoring social harmony by reinforcing community solidarity and a shared sense of purpose, reflecting a deep understanding of the community's history and interconnectedness. through storytelling, ceremonies, and daily interactions, elders pass down the knowledge and practices that define the community's identity and resilience. this intergenerational transfer of knowledge informs the community's understanding of itself and its place in the world, ensures the continuity of the community’s cultural integrity and connection to its heritage, and remains lived and experienced, embedding these traditions in the daily life of community members (acedo, painho, & casteleyn, 2017). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 96 figure 2. how people and communities connect to and attachmeaning to specific geographic locations (emotional, cultural and personal bonds) – acedo, painho & castelyn 2017 in namibia, the concept of elders has evolved into village councils which in turn have transcended into the conservancy structure, which, as a people’s council, embodies the informal but structured governance system within many rural communities in the country in particular, and in the southern african sub-region as a whole. these conservancies are not merely administrative bodies but are deeply embedded in the social fabric of their communities, reflecting a sophisticated integration of traditional values with the demands of contemporary governance. these conservancies (or cbnrm associations, forums or trusts, depending on the country), which are in fact small cbos, formally organize community governance over natural resources by serving as the primary cbnrm decision-making body within indigenous communities (muchapondwa & stage, 2015). they are responsible for creating policies, managing community resources, overseeing day-to-day administrative tasks and ensuring their sustainability. they operate based on a blend of customary laws and contemporary legal frameworks, ensuring that governance practices are both community-centered, culturally relevant and legally sound. through regular meetings and community consultations, they facilitate democratic participation, allowing community members to have a voice in decisions that affect their lives. this participatory (rather than representative) approach is designed to ensure that governance is transparent, accountable, and reflective of the community's collective will. customary laws are based on the traditional practices, beliefs, and values of the rural community, and often cover a wide range of issues (i.e., land use, water access, environmental stewardship, social conduct, conflict resolution), guiding the cbos within its jurisdiction to focus their efforts on these areas. the community leaders network (cln) of southern africa, as the umbrella embodying these cbos, represent local communities in negotiations with external entities, including government bodies, private corporations, and international organizations. this role is key in safeguarding indigenous rights, lands, and resources. cln negotiates on behalf of its members to ensure their involvement in any natural resource-based activity likely to affect their lives. through advocacy, cln works to secure www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 97 legal recognition of indigenous lands and rights and gain equitable benefits from resource development within their territories. by maintaining a degree of self-governance and asserting their rights in external negotiations, cln upholds the political autonomy of its communities, allowing them to make decisions that affect their future independently. table 2. distinctions and relationships between regulatory frameworks and social norms (source-author*1) aspect regulatory frameworks cultural norms definition written rules and standards created by governmental bodies to control activities within a specific sector / guide public behavior unwritten rules and expectations that guide behavior in society, maintained through traditions and social pressures / guides individual behavior key characteristic legally enforceable through sanctions, fines, or legal actions; designed to address specific, technical issues. socially enforced through approval, disapproval, and other forms of social pressure; reflective of a society’s values and beliefs. influence and are influenced by regulatory frameworks but are enforced socially rather than legally. comparison and interaction structured approach to governance, with clear, formalized procedures and consequences. can also be influenced by cultural norms, and vice versa, as legal systems adapt to societal values and norms can shape or resist regulatory changes. adaptive form of social governance. 3.3 csos and institutions 3.3.1 csos csos are a wide range of organizations, including non-governmental organizations (ngos), advocacy groups, charities, non-profit organizations, and cbos, among others. they operate across various levels, from local to global, and cover a wide array of issues such as human rights, environmental protection, health, education, and social justice. csos are characterized by their operational independence from the state, although they may receive funding from government sources, private donations, or international aid. their primary aim is to serve the public interest and advocate for social www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 98 change, policy reforms, and community development. cbos are a type of cso that operate at the local level and are deeply rooted in the communities they serve. they are typically organized around specific local issues and are often led and staffed by members of the community. cbos' activities are directly responsive to the immediate needs and concerns of their community, such as local health initiatives, education programs, small-scale infrastructure projects, and environmental conservation efforts. the strength of cbos lies in their intimate understanding of local contexts, cultures, and needs, allowing them to effectively mobilize local resources and knowledge to address issues. in terms of (a) scope, while csos can operate at local, national, or international levels, cbos specifically focus on local community levels; (b) function: both cbos and broader csos aim to address social issues, advocate for change, and improve community well-being, but cbos do so with a direct focus on local needs and community engagement; (c) membership: cbos are typically comprised of community members and rely heavily on local volunteerism and participation, whereas csos, especially those operating at national or international levels, may have professional staff and broader membership bases. in essence, all cbos can be considered csos, but not all csos are cbos, as the term cso includes a broader range of organizations with diverse scopes and operational scales. the distinction primarily lies in their scope of operation and focus areas, but they share the broader goal of addressing issues of public concern and improving the well-being of their communities or specific groups within those communities. 3.3.2 influence of institutions on csos www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 99 figure 3. economics of institutions (williamson, 2000) csos operate at the intersection of formal and informal institutions, navigating the regulatory landscapes and cultural contexts within which they work. these parameters can either enable or restrict the effectiveness and focus areas of csos, often in complex and context-dependent ways. formal institutions, particularly the regulatory environment and legal frameworks – primarily in urban contexts with representative application in rural settings, what ribot calls “top-down rural administration” (ribot, 2003) – determine the operational boundaries for csos, dictating how they can be formed (legal status), the scope of their activities, and their compliance requirements. laws and regulations related to funding, advocacy, and international cooperation can greatly influence the scope of activities csos can engage in and the strategies they employ. in some jurisdictions, regulatory frameworks require csos to register with the government and report on their activities and finances, which can be both an enabling mechanism, providing legitimacy and the ability to receive www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 100 funds and other resources, and a constraining factor, imposing administrative burdens and limiting operational autonomy. informal institutions such as socio-cultural norms and values – primarily in indigenous and rural contexts but passively integrated in modern organisations – shape the missions, strategies, and community engagement approaches of csos. these institutions influence what is considered legitimate, valuable, and effective within a given cultural context and shape the types of issues and initiatives csos prioritize, how they engage with communities (community outreach methods), the strategies they employ to mobilize support and advocate for change, and how they navigate challenges and opportunities. to ensure community support and engagement, csos often align their missions and strategies with the prevailing cultural norms or community values, leveraging these as strengths in their advocacy and development efforts. in communities where collective decision-making is valued, csos that adopt participatory approaches in their projects find greater community support and engagement. for example, a cso operating in a community with strong norms favorable to meat consumption may find broad support for initiatives promoting conservation hunting. similarly, cultural attitudes towards volunteerism and philanthropy – as depicted in a narrative below – can affect the resources available to csos and their strategies for engaging with the community. strong community solidarity and trust in csos also facilitate grassroots mobilization and support for cso initiatives, enhancing their impact. conversely, strategies that ignore or contradict local norms and values may face resistance, limiting the organization's effectiveness and impact. mistrust of external interventions or rigid social hierarchies would hinder cso efforts to engage communities and implement change. while in countries with supportive regulatory environments for csos, such as tax exemptions and the protection of freedom of association, csos thrive, diversify their activities, and play a significant role in policy advocacy, service delivery, and community development, in settings where there is significant societal stigma associated with certain issues (e.g. albinism (note 3), sexual orientation and gender identity (note 4), disability (note 5), mental health disorders (note 6), hiv/aids (note 7), etc), csos working on these issues may struggle to gain community acceptance and participation, limiting their effectiveness in addressing these challenges. table 4. negative functions of trust, lack of trust and distrust adapted from (stern & baird, 2015) in the context of environmental governance and common-pool resources, dolšak and ostrom introduce the notion of “bounded rationality”, emphasizing that individuals or groups managing shared resources www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 101 do not have the capacity to know all potential strategies, outcomes, or the full consequences of their actions. instead, they operate within the constraints of their knowledge, experiences, and the information available to them, making decisions that are rational within these limits (dolšak & ostrom, 2003). this perspective is critical in understanding how communities self-organize and govern common resources effectively despite the complexity of the environment and the limitations in information and cognitive processing capabilities. by focusing on the incentives created by different institutional arrangements and the nature of goods involved, and given the preferences and constraints, individuals (and by extension, csos) make choices that they believe will maximize their utility (salazar & lee, 1990). while this utility may include various factors such as wealth (cust, 2018), achievements or happiness, in the case of communities, it includes access to communal resources (cottrell, vaske & roemer, 2013), satisfaction (guthiga, mburu & holm-mueller, 2008), food security (note 8) (muyengwa, 2015), environmental sustainability (adeleke, ogunsusi & alayande, 2018; zhang et al., 2020), cultural preservation, and collective well-being. these community-focused utilities reflect broader, more integrated outcomes that go beyond individual gains, emphasizing the health, stability, and prosperity of the group as a whole. as communities navigate through various options and decisions, they weigh the benefits to collective social capital, trust, and resilience against the costs, aiming to enhance the overall quality of life and ensure the long-term viability of their communal ecosystem. this perspective aligns with the principles of social capital theory suggesting that the networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit are crucial for societal progress and individual well-being within the community framework. this is supplemented by the rational choice theory that retains that rationality is instrumental and based on the idea that individuals use reason to select the best means to achieve their ends. it does not necessarily imply that individuals always make the best decisions, but that their decisions are systematically aimed at maximizing their utility, given their knowledge and constraints. additionally, social expediency (note 9) theorists contend that actions, policies, and societal structures should be evaluated based on their practical outcomes and benefits for society, emphasizing the importance of social utility, practicality, and the greatest good for the greatest number. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 102 table 5. trust types and their bases and examples of how they buffer disturbances to other trust types (stern & baird, 2015) 3.4 case studies: community leaders network (cln) of southern africa and more the community leaders network (cln) of southern africa is a cbo engaged in civil society activities at a regional level. dedicated to empowering local communities through capacity building, cbnrm development projects, and advocacy for community rights, it operates across fifteen countries in southern africa, thereby navigating a complex landscape of formal and informal institutions. this case study briefly explores how cln adapts its operations within these frameworks to achieve its mission. cln is deeply rooted in rural communities engaged in biodiversity and natural resource management, and stands as a vast network representing millions of people in southern africans. for instance, using zambia as a microcosm, we observe a country with nearly 21 million people (worldometer, 2024), 54.24% of which reside in rural areas (world bank, 2024) deeply integrated with the nation's rich biodiversity that occupies about 40% of the country's land area (lubilo, 2024) cln is structured around various local groups and committees across multiple biodiverse regions, including 86 community resource boards, 265 community forest groups, numerous fishery groups and cooperatives, each serving as a vital link between the rural populace and the organization's overarching goals. these structures support farmers and residents across rural areas and collectively embody the organization's substantial footprint in rural community advocacy and environmental stewardship. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 103 the vast and varied nature of cln’s membership makes it challenging to pinpoint an exact figure of its reach. however, it's reasonable to assert that our impact extends to more than 40 million people within the region. this estimation reflects the extensive network and influence cln holds, emphasizing not just the numbers but the vast swathes of communities and individuals dedicated to biodiversity and sustainable development in southern africa. this demographic forms the backbone of cln's representation, embodying the movement's reach and influence across vast ecological and community landscapes. – p2 in terms of governance, cln operates as a networked movement (note 10) where each participating country, such as zambia through its cbnrm program, elects leadership to represent its interests within the larger cln framework. this structure expands to include representatives from various countries within the southern african development community (sadc), furthering the network's reach and inclusivity. initially starting with seven countries (zambia, namibia, tanzania, botswana, mozambique, zimbabwe, malawi), the network expanded to include angola and south africa and has since grown to extend to mauritius, seychelles, the democratic republic of congo (drc), eswatini, lesotho, and madagascar, with ongoing efforts to include more. each country within cln designates a focal point person, who acts as the main contact (note 11) and representative for their country's interests within cln. these focal points collectively form the core leadership of cln, steering the movement's direction and strategies and ensuring that each member country's perspectives and priorities are integrated into the network's overarching goals and initiatives. this structure is central to cln's operations, facilitating a cohesive and unified approach to environmental conservation and community empowerment across the region. at the secretariat level, the personnel serves in permanent capacities as volunteers, contributing to the network’s day-to-day operations and strategic initiatives. this tiered structure of governance, from local community groups to the network-wide leadership assembly, underscores cln's commitment to a collaborative approach in advancing the interests and rights of rural communities throughout southern africa, marking the second institutional function as a cooperation enabler. cln is governed by an executive committee composed of representatives from the initial seven countries that founded the network. this committee includes lubilo (zambia), louis (namibia), lungile (zimbabwe), montero (mozambique), kamuna (tanzania), sioka (botswana), langa (malawi), and shepeta (angola). this core group, which convenes monthly, is not compensated for their roles within cln; we volunteer our leadership and oversight for the betterment of the network and its mission. – p2 its small staff (4) and high reliance on volunteerism corresponds to a typical cbo membership. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 104 operational support for cln is provided by a small secretariat based in windhoek, a location chosen by the committee but subject to change as deemed necessary. the secretariat staff includes a finance manager to oversee financial operations and a cln coordinator, who handles day-to-day activities much like a secretary would. in a recent expansion of our team, we decided to hire a director for cln and an iplc (indigenous peoples and local communities) officer, bringing our key staff count to four. additionally, we may employ [a] monitoring and evaluation officer […], integrating them into cln's broader operational framework. – p2 3.5 how does cln navigate formal institutional frameworks? 3.5.1 maximizing the favoring climate towards cbnrm in southern africa cln operates in a region characterized by diverse legal environments. these range from countries with well-established legal protections for civil society and community rights (i.e. zimbabwe, botswana) to those where civil society faces significant legal constraints (t sas-rolfes, 2017). the organization therefore tailors its activities to comply with the varying legal requirements across these jurisdictions. the structure of cln participation varies significantly across regions due to the diverse legal and organizational frameworks governing institutions in each country. for instance, in botswana, our members might operate under a trust that deals with natural resource management, while in namibia, engagement could involve ngos, conservancies, community forests, or inland fisheries communities. this diversity is reflected in how we represent and integrate these different entities within cln, often through national forums or associations like nacso in namibia. moreover, each country within cln showcases a wide range of environmental focuses and community types—from maritime communities in mozambique to desert and forest communities in other areas—further emphasizing the tailored approach we must adopt. we encourage these diverse groups to engage in their national forums or equivalent platforms, ensuring that their unique perspectives and challenges are represented and addressed within the broader cln framework. – p1 in countries with supportive legal frameworks for civil society, cln engages openly in advocacy work, utilizing legal channels to advance community rights and environmental protection. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 105 in zambia, the [national cbnrm forum] took the government to court, a move that saw muted support from allies. everyone else was very adamant that you can't take government to court. you won't be able to work with the government anymore. we said, no, it's not about working with the government because the government should be the first institution to respect the law. and if it is breaking the law, then we need to seek redress. we need to seek justice. the government is not immune from the law, it's supposed to be accountable for his decision. so we are taking the government to court. when we succeeded, everyone else's head is up, telling us you are brave guys. you can see how hypocrisy operates. even our friends were against that, but we stood firm. we said, guys, it's our issues, our countries, our people. i mean, it's our government and these governments are not permanent. they will change. we had several governments before this one, so let's suffer now, and enjoy the future. so we took a decision, but it was very unpopular with others because they were, they didn't want, but now that we won, everyone has come back to talk to us. – p2 3.5.2 rules do have exceptions, and as climate changes, so does the sunny weather in cbnrm land although cln's deep engagement with both formal and informal institutions presents opportunities for amplifying its impact, it also poses challenges that toughen its ability to navigate formal institutional hurdles. nevertheless, the network benefits from a regulatory environment that partially supports its cause, as cln has built strong relationships with communities, enhancing its legitimacy and the sustainability of its initiatives. while each country has its unique challenges, instances like our legal action against the zambian government highlight the dynamic nature of these relationships. nevertheless, governments in southern africa, notably namibia, zimbabwe, botswana and tanzania, have generally supported initiatives that align with cln's mission. even when conflicts arise, the underlying belief in community empowerment and the value of cbnrm remains a common ground. while zambia supports community initiatives and the essence of our work, conflicts have occasionally led to negative feedback concerning community empowerment. the concern is that empowered communities might pose challenges to authority. however, aside from these instances, there has been a robust commitment to our causes, especially before the transition to the new government. this demonstrates a belief in the value of our work, despite occasional apprehensions about the implications of strong community agency. – p2 in countries with restrictive laws governing civil society activities, cln focuses more on capacity building and development projects, maintaining a lower profile in advocacy work to navigate legal constraints effectively. in scenarios where a country may be under authoritarian rule or experiences a coup, the dilemma arises whether to continue operations (bogaards & elischer, 2016). cln's stance is www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 106 to persist in its support for community and conservation efforts without directly engaging in national political dynamics. this approach allows the network to maintain its focus on environmental and community challenges, which often mirror those across its member countries, exemplified by its work with communities around virunga national park amidst political unrest in the drc. it would be a different story if we have a dictatorship government in a country. should we stop working in that country? i don't think we've reached that level because we are not sadc or ecowas or african union. we are communities. so if we go to gabon, if gabon became a member, we still support them, even if there is a military coup. our priority remains on conservation and community empowerment, steering clear of direct involvement in national politics, as we do in the drc, despite the instability that you know about. – p2 3.5.3 conservation politics cln operates in a realm where conservation intersects with politics, not by engaging in political activity but through influencing policy indirectly—a form of conservation politics. it's essential to distinguish between national politics and conservation politics. cln’s focus lies squarely on conservation matters, and the network remains neutral regarding the broader political landscape of a country. its engagement with governments is driven by conservation needs. by advocating for its conservation agenda, cln aims to influence leadership to prioritize these issues. for example, in 2016, it emphasized to zambia's then-government the critical need for implementing the conservation policies the people of zambia required, demonstrating the principle that the governmental tenure also depended on meeting rural needs. this episode served as a reminder that political leaders must align with conservation priorities, or face potential electoral repercussions. the communities’ message was clear: “heed our conservation demands, for the time may come when your political survival depends on such actions”. as history unfolded, those not adhering to this advice found themselves out of office. accordingly, doing right by the people, including on conservation matters, isn't just ethical—it's politically prudent. failure to act correspondingly carries its own set of consequences, reinforcing the communities’ stance that meeting conservation needs is non-negotiable. we told our previous government in zambia in 2016 to give the people of zambia the policy, because if you don't give them the policy they need, the time will come when the people decide whether they keep you in office or not. and that was like politics of the nation, right? but we are bringing our conservation agenda to the politicians that, do what we are asking you to do, because if you don't listen, it's fine. time will come when you will need us. and they are out of power now. history has taught us. do the right thing for the people. if you don't do the right thing, five years is coming. – p2 cln adapts to socio-political shifts within member countries by engaging with new governmental bodies and representatives, thereby fulfilling the first institutional function of uncertainty reduction. for www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 107 instance, electoral changes bringing new parliamentarians necessitate recalibrating its communication strategy with in-coming leaders. the zambian cbnrm forum leverages its december conference to gather various players, including influential diplomats, to communicate the organization’s mission, align on conservation goals and community empowerment and forge constructive relationships. whenever there's a change in leadership, it's crucial at both national and regional levels to introduce cln’s vision to the new government and initiate dialogue with the new administration. to stay responsive to the inevitability of political fluctuations, we recognize the importance of a robust research and monitoring framework to ensure we remain informed about current events and are equipped to address any potential hurdle. ultimately, cln is committed to cooperating with all governments in the region, adapting our strategies to maintain our mission amidst varying political landscapes. – p2 however, acceptance of this vision isn't guaranteed, leading to potential challenges (elischer, 2010). this was the case in zambia again, where the incoming leadership had divergent interests, prompting efforts to engage in private discussions to convey the broader implications of cbnrm activities. such situations highlight the political nature of the network’s engagements. 3.5.4 negotiating with institutional powers a fundamental aspect of our strategy involves collaborating with governments. cln represents the community in legal and political arenas, advocating for indigenous rights and sovereignty. their legitimacy and structured governance enable them to engage effectively with external powers. contrary to some misconceptions, working with governments does not preclude disagreements; it's about engaging constructively to influence policies and legislation that affect cbnrm. governments play a critical role in creating the legal frameworks and environments conducive to cbnrm, and as signatories to various environmental and social treaties, their involvement in the dialogue is crucial. we work with governments, and that is where people miss it. because they think that working with government, you can't disagree. no, you can disagree, but you should still work together. why government is important? they make laws, preside, have a duty to create an enabling environment for cbnrm staff to survive. they are signatories to these treaties. so we need to bring them to the discussion. so it's our primary responsibility as cln to work with them. […] i know that zambia have had issues because of our conflict. they believe in communities. they believe in all this thing we do. but just because there was that issue, obviously, i'm being honest with that sometimes they might give some negative feedback when it comes to community empowerment, because they think that when communities become very strong, they can challenge them. apart from that and prior to the new government, the government had a very strong commitment. – p2 acknowledging external influences, including media narratives and government positions, is part of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 108 navigating the landscape we operate within. our approach adapts to these circumstances, ensuring we avoid metaphorical fires by addressing challenges strategically. our current government recognizes the necessity of collaboration with the people, a principle enshrined in law, mirroring the evolving dynamics between employers and employees where the latter now have the right to challenge unfair practices. in an ever-changing environment, influenced by external factors such as media, government actions, or agendas from our partners, our organization remains agile, ready to adapt to these shifts. we understand that facing challenges head-on without strategy can be detrimental, likening it to walking into fire. our approach involves either extinguishing these challenges or navigating around them to continue our mission. so even our current government, i think they realized that we have to work together. there is no choice. the law provides for that government to work with the people. it's just like the employer and employee. in the old times, people didn't think that an employee can sue his employer. so sometimes, there is external influence. as an organization that is not dead, we have to be able to adapt to the situations. so if you see fire, you can't just walk into it because you get burnt. so you have to find a way of extinguishing it off or walking around the fire so that you proceed with your journey. – p2 despite external pressures, cln remains committed to its chosen path, guided by the principle of partnership and mutual respect with all stakeholders, including governments, which is likened to the evolving relationship between employer and employee. this adaptability and steadfast commitment to our principles ensure we continue advancing our mission effectively. despite potential influences or pressures from various external sources, we remain committed to our chosen course, firmly believing in the integrity and importance of our path. this steadfastness guides our actions and ensures we stay true to our core values and objectives, irrespective of the challenges we may encounter. – p2 this approach underscores the strategic positioning of cln’s conservation agenda within political discussions, not to sway political outcomes but to ensure environmental and conservation priorities are addressed. the network conveys to political leaders the importance of acting on conservation commitments, hinting at the broader implications of neglecting such areas. history has shown that leadership can change, and rural communities use these lessons to remind current governments of the importance of fulfilling conservation promises to maintain public support and meet environmental objectives. 3.5.5 complying for peace when it comes to compliance, understanding and complying with the legal requirements in each country—such as registration processes, financial reporting, and restrictions on international funding—are crucial for cln's operations. this compliance ensures that cln can operate without www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 109 legal impediments, enabling it to focus on its mission. cln's initiatives are deeply integrated with the broader societal values and government policies of the countries the network operates in, ensuring it doesn’t function in isolation. in namibia, our activities align with the ministry of environment, forestry, and tourism's policies, reflecting national conservation and development goals. this alignment with governmental policies is a critical aspect of our work across all countries where we have a presence. – p1 moreover, when individuals or organizations apply to join cln, the network evaluates how their work complements the developmental policies and strategies of their respective countries. it's essential for cln that its members support and advance their country's national plans rather than work in opposition to them (louis, 2024). this approach ensures that cln's efforts are cohesive and contribute positively to the collective progress and environmental stewardship within each country. for instance, if you become a member in the membership application we ask […] how is your organization aligned with the development policies in your country? because we don't want people to work against their country’s national plans and strategies. we want to make sure that we move together in one direction. – p1 cln leverages a multi-tiered approach to engage broader society and those not directly involved in its primary activities, relying heavily on the role of focal and national focal points. these points are crucial for disseminating advocacy training through a "train the trainers" model, where they're equipped with advocacy skills to further educate their institutions at the national and membership levels. this strategy aims to bolster advocacy efforts within various contexts and structures unique to each country. 3.6 how does cln adapts to informal institutions? the effectiveness of cln's initiatives also depends on its ability to navigate and respect the informal social norms and cultural traditions of the communities it serves. these norms influence community engagement strategies and the support cln receives from local populations. in instances like my scheduled visit to eswatini for a cln meeting, we had to reschedule due to the king's attendance at an annual cultural event in the same area. such occurrences require us to adapt and show respect for the local traditions and schedules. in this case, our ability to flexibly reschedule reflects our respect for the host country's cultural practices, showing the importance of sensitivity and adaptability in our operations. p2 local institutions play a critical role in community adaptation strategies, underscoring the importance of integrating traditional knowledge and practices in addressing environmental challenges (agrawal, 2008). indigenous-led movements benefit from the support of both formal and informal indigenous institutions, leveraging traditional governance structures, cultural practices, and community norms to mobilize support, frame their issues, and negotiate with external entities effectively. in cln’s areas of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 110 operation, traditional leadership structures are highly respected. cln works closely with local leaders to gain community buy-in for its projects. traditional community assemblies and councils serve as platforms for discussing issues, planning actions, and rallying community members. these gatherings are often rooted in cultural practices, enhancing their legitimacy and the willingness of community members to participate. in cases where we need community consent, such as for a protest or advocacy letter, before dispatching letters to governments, we ensure there's preliminary consent involved. the process involves extensive travel and in-person consultations—sometimes covering distances of 500 to 600 kilometers—to explain the situation directly to the community members and obtain their genuine consent. this method ensures the concerns we present are truly reflective of the community's sentiments. – p1 by aligning its initiatives with local values and involving community leaders in the planning and implementation phases, cln ensures its projects are culturally sensitive and more likely to succeed. it leverages social norms around community solidarity and cooperation to mobilize support for its initiatives. for instance, by organizing community meetings in a manner consistent with local traditions, cln fosters a sense of ownership and collective responsibility for the success of its projects. added to the network’s reliance on focal points, the third institutional function of facilitating predictable interactions by establishing a consistent set of expectations for behavior is exhibited. cln prioritizes inclusivity and representation across the diverse communities it aims to engage with. cln operates as a coalition of community groups from various countries, founded on strong values and a shared commitment to environmental stewardship and community empowerment. our decision-making process is characterized by participation and inclusivity, embracing a collaborative approach where responsibilities and opportunities to represent cln at various forums are distributed among members. this includes not only executive committee (exco) members but also extending invitations to non-exco members from within our network, such as chifundo from malawi for unep engagements and fatau from botswana on indigenous issues, reflecting our broad-based representation. – p2 in sum, cln exemplifies how civil society organizations can navigate complex formal and informal institutional frameworks to achieve their objectives. through a controversial method encompassing (a) strategic compliance with legal systems, (b) firm negotiations with political authorities and (c) sensitivity to social norms, cln has managed to empower communities and advocate for their rights effectively, despite the challenges posed by diverse and sometimes restrictive environments. this case study highlights the importance of flexibility, local knowledge, and community engagement in the success of civil society initiatives in varying contexts. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 111 3.6.1 the standing rock sioux tribe and the dakota access pipeline protest the protest against the dakota access pipeline (dapl) by the standing rock sioux tribe and its allies is a prominent example of an indigenous-led activism that leveraged both formal and informal institutions. the tribal council played a crucial role in organizing the protest, engaging in legal battles, and coordinating with environmental and human rights organizations. simultaneously, the movement drew on informal institutions, such as cultural ceremonies and the mobilization of indigenous social networks, to sustain the camp and galvanize global support. the cultural framing of the protest around the protection of water and sacred lands resonated deeply within and beyond the indigenous community, illustrating the power of culturally resonant framing. 3.6.2 the zapatista movement in mexico the zapatista movement in chiapas, mexico, is another example of an indigenous-led movement that effectively utilized indigenous institutions. the movement's governance structure, the juntas de buen gobierno (good government councils), reflects a blend of traditional mayan governance practices and revolutionary ideology. while using formal institutions to coordinate the administration of zapatista autonomous municipalities, its informal networks and assemblies mobilized support and engaged the broader community. institutions are central to the effectiveness of indigenous-led movements. by providing structures for organization and decision-making, avenues for mobilizing support, and frameworks for culturally resonant issue framing, these institutions enhance the resilience and impact of movements. case studies of movements like the dapl protest and the zapatista movement highlight how leveraging both formal and informal indigenous institutions can lead to significant achievements in the pursuit of indigenous rights and sovereignty. 3.7 the north, wallis, and weingast (nww) theoretical framework and cln the nww theoretical framework is a comprehensive model for understanding the political and economic development of societies (douglass, wallis, & weingast, 2006). the framework distinguishes between two types of social orders: "natural states" and "open access orders". natural states (limited access orders) are characterized by the system (formal institution)'s ability to limit access to economic and political privileges to a small elite group. in natural states, the elite manage conflict through personal relationships and networks, creating a stable social order by distributing privileges and resources among themselves. this system restricts economic growth and political participation to maintain the power and privileges of the elite. in contrast, open access orders allow more widespread access to economic and political activities, supporting the development of more dynamic and competitive economies and inclusive political systems. these societies have institutions that enable individuals to form organizations, including economic and political ones, relatively freely. open access orders are associated with higher levels of economic development, political stability, and the rule of law. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 112 the transition from a natural state to an open access order is complex and involves significant institutional changes that allow more inclusive access to political and economic systems. this transition is crucial for the development of democracy, the expansion of market economies, and the enhancement of human rights and societal welfare. north, wallis, and weingast argue that understanding these two types of social orders and the conditions under which societies transition between them offers key insights into the challenges and pathways of development facing different countries. their framework provides a useful lens for analyzing historical and contemporary political and economic systems, highlighting the importance of institutions in shaping social orders. 3.7.1 conditions under which societies transition according to the nww framework norms are rooted in values that tend to resist change, and power structures change slowly because powerholders prefer not to give up their privileges (portes, 2006). according to nww, four conditions create a foundation for a more inclusive, democratic and economically dynamic society that support individual rights, encourage economic competition, and allow for a broader distribution of political power. the transition is gradual and requires significant institutional transformation, moving away from arrangements that privilege a small elite towards those that enable wider participation and access for the general population. the key conditions for this transition include: a. rule of law for elites: in natural states, the rule of law typically applies selectively. for a society to transition towards an open access order, the rule of law must first be established among the elites themselves, ensuring that no one is above the law, including those in power. b. perpetually lived forms of public and private elite organizations: this condition involves the development of stable institutions that outlive their founders, such as the state itself, political parties, and economic corporations. these institutions must be capable of existing perpetually, beyond the lives of individual leaders, and allow for the management of social organizations and resources in a predictable manner. c. consolidated political control of the military: transitioning societies must achieve a clear separation and control over the military and its use of force. the state must have the undisputed ability to control the military, ensuring that it cannot be used by individual elites or factions to further their own interests against the rule of law or public welfare. d. open access to economic and political organizations: finally, the society must allow individuals and groups to form and join economic and political organizations freely. this means reducing barriers to market entry and political participation, enabling a competitive economy and a democratic political system where citizens can organize for various purposes without undue restrictions. 3.7.2 spatial distribution of resource ownership between social orders the spatial distribution of ownership between social orders refers to the way in which physical spaces and resources are allocated and controlled across different social groups, classes, or strata within a society. this concept intertwines with notions of power, authority, and social organization, and reflects www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 113 broader societal dynamics and inequalities. understanding this spatial distribution of ownership helps in analyzing the socio-political landscape, the distribution of wealth and resources, and the mechanisms of social control and exclusion. it operates through four mechanisms: table 3. mechanisms of spatial distribution of resource ownership between social orders (source-author*1) mechanism description legal and institutional frameworks formal laws, property rights, zoning regulations, and institutional policies are significant factors in determining who owns what and where. these frameworks often reflect and reinforce existing power dynamics, every so often favoring certain social orders over others. economic factors economic power is a major determinant of spatial ownership. wealthier social orders have greater means to acquire, maintain, and expand their spatial holdings, often leading to spatial segregation based on economic status. cultural and historical contexts historical conquests, colonial legacies, and cultural norms can dictate spatial ownership. for instance, indigenous lands are often contested spaces due to historical processes of colonization and current legal frameworks. social practices and norms informal norms and practices also influence spatial assignment, dictating acceptable uses of space and the informal rights to certain areas within communities, often based on tradition or social consensus. implications of the spatial distribution of ownership  social inequality and segregation: because wealthier social orders often have access to more and better resources, including land, housing, and amenities, it may lead to spatial segregation where different social classes inhabit distinctly different spaces. imbalances in spatial ownership thus exacerbate social inequalities.  access to resources: the spatial segregation resulting from inadequate spatial ownership distribution directly impacts access to essential resources, including clean water, food, healthcare, and education. communities with less spatial control would face challenges accessing these basic needs. and for those who live in biodiverse rich areas where it is assumed access to resources would be easy, political control over space may further prevent communities living closer to these resources from benefiting from them, by rendering access impossible, expensive, conditional or insufficient.  political and social power: control over space is not just about the physical territory but also about the political and social power it represents. owning land or controlling certain areas can enhance www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 114 a social order's influence and authority within the broader society.  cultural identity and heritage: spatial ownership is crucial for the preservation of cultural identity and heritage, especially for indigenous and marginalized communities. control over ancestral lands and cultural sites is vital for maintaining their cultural practices and way of life. 3.7.3 how does the nww apply to cln? cln, through the zambian cbnrm forum’s action of suing the government, exemplify the application of the rule of law at an elite level. by challenging government actions deemed unlawful, the cln member advocated for a system where even those in power are subject to the law. moreover, cln's structured governance, characterized by an executive committee that spans various countries and the creation of permanent roles within its secretariat, reflects the development of perpetually lived institutions. these institutions, crucial for managing social organizations and resources predictably, lay the groundwork for transitioning from a limited access order to a more inclusive political and economic framework that allows for the broader participation and empowerment of the community. while the case study does not specifically address the control of the military, cln's efforts to engage with governments and advocate for community rights and environmental stewardship indirectly support the broader goal of establishing consolidated political control. by fostering dialogue and cooperation with governmental bodies, cln recognizes the state's role as the primary actor in governance. by empowering rural communities and advocating for their active participation in natural resource management, cln works towards reducing barriers to market entry and political involvement. this sort of “security co‑operation” (elischer, 2022) with actors of the political class indiscriminatory (e.g building friendly relationships with new mps) provides the transitionary government with cln as an alternative partner in community affairs. coupled with its legal challenges against restrictive policies, these actions resonate with the third nww condition for transitioning to an open access order, widening access to a competitive economy and a vibrant democratic landscape. 4. areas for further research or action to enhance the positive impact of institutions on civil society and overall societal well-being, further research or action could focus on (a) strengthening legal protections for csos and indigenous rights, ensuring that formal institutions support rather than hinder civil society initiatives; (b) developing policies and social planning methodologies that are deeply informed by an understanding of informal institutions and cultural values; (c) recognizing and supporting the role of informal institutions in governance, environmental stewardship, and cultural preservation; (d) exploring strategies for enhancing the resilience and effectiveness of indigenous institutions, understanding the interplay between formal legal systems and informal cultural norms; (e) identifying best practices for civil society engagement that respects and leverages these institutional dynamics; (f) facilitating the exchange of knowledge and strategies among csos and indigenous movements globally to strengthen their impact. further study on the global challenges facing southern african indigenous institutions and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 115 movements, such as climate change and globalization, could provide valuable insights into supporting the vitality and effectiveness of these crucial societal pillars. 5. conclusion institutions, both formal and informal, play crucial roles in structuring social, economic, and political life by establishing the rules and norms that guide individual and collective behavior. the principal function of institutions is to reduce uncertainty by setting stable expectations for the behavior of others. this is achieved through mechanisms of constraint, enabling, and incentivizing certain actions over others, thereby facilitating cooperation, coordination, and predictability within society. csos operate within the constraints and opportunities presented by both types of institutions, which parallelly shape the activities of csos in numerous ways. they can enable or constrain csos in their efforts to mobilize communities, advocate for change, implement programs, frame their issues, and negotiate with external entities effectively. formal institutions, such as regulatory frameworks and legal systems, define the operational boundaries for csos, dictating how they can be formed, how they must report their activities, and what activities they can engage in. these regulations can influence the scope of work, fundraising capabilities, and advocacy strategies of csos. informal institutions, such as cultural norms and values, can shape the missions and methods of csos by influencing what causes are considered important and how societies believe these causes should be addressed. they embody the resilience and adaptability of local communities, ensuring the transmission of cultural values and practices despite the threats of assimilation and resource exploitation. however, institutions are not just passive backgrounds against which civil society operates but are also actively shaped and reshaped by cso activities. through advocacy, service delivery, and community engagement, csos can influence the evolution of institutions, advocating for reforms that enhance social equity, environmental sustainability, and economic development. such is the case of cln’s activities and governance, which can be viewed through the nww theoretical framework as efforts to move the societies within southern africa towards open access orders. by advocating for the rule of law, institutionalizing its operations, engaging with governments for political control, and working to open economic and political organization to broader participation, cln is addressing the critical 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(2024, april 7). zambia population. retrieved from worldometer: https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/zambia-population/ www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 118 zhang et al. (2020). a multiple importance–satisfaction analysis framework for the sustainable management of protected areas: integrating ecosystem services and basic needs. ecosystem services, 46, 101219. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2020.101219 1.introduction 1.1 institutions and their importance in shaping i 1.2 the principal functions of institutions 1.3 the importance of understanding institutional 2.method 3.results and discussion 3.1 the regulatory framework as a formal instituti 3.2 the socio-cultural norm as an informal institu 3.3 csos and institutions 3.3.1 csos 3.4 case studies: community leaders network (cln) 3.5 how does cln navigate formal institutional fra 3.5.1 maximizing the favoring climate towards cbnr 3.5.2 rules do have exceptions, and as climate cha 3.5.3 conservation politics 3.5.4 negotiating with institutional powers 3.5.5 complying for peace 3.6 how does cln adapts to informal institutions? 3.6.1 the standing rock sioux tribe and the dakota 3.6.2 the zapatista movement in mexico 3.7 the north, wallis, and weingast (nww) theoreti 3.7.1 conditions under which societies transition 3.7.2 spatial distribution of resource ownership b 3.7.3 how does the nww apply to cln? 4.areas for further research or action 5.conclusion references microsoft word ape-v4n4-p1 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 1 original paper in shortly about energy and energy sources siniša franjić1* 1 independent researcher, osijek, croatia * siniša franjić, independent researcher, osijek, croatia received: october 14, 2021 accepted: october 24, 2021 online published: october 25, 2021 doi:10.22158/ape.v4n4p1 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v4n4p1 abstract energy is an effective force, a life activity, a determination. energy in physics is the ability of a body or system to do some work; a quantity that characterizes the motion, rest, or position of a body, liquid, particle, or system of particles, and a quantity to describe field particles transmitted by natural forces and particle interactions. energy appears in nature, technology and industry in various forms that are transformed into each other according to the principle of energy conservation: it cannot be spend or created, but only change its form. an energy source is any substance which serves as a raw material in the process of obtaining energy. keywords energy, gas, oil, coal 1. introduction in coincidence with the second wave of regulatory reforms of electricity markets (the reform of the reform), during the past decade the concern for the environmental impacts of electricity—clearly led by climate change—has also become widespread and will require a very demanding environmental and energy policy, reducing emissions and at the same time supporting the massive deployment of clean energy technologies (renewables, capture and storage of co2, nuclear or biofuels, plus measures of energy efficiency and savings) [1]. we have seen that, in particular, this will require an almost complete decarbonisation of the power sector, which, on the other hand, will have to feed with clean electricity much of the transportation and the heating sectors. the implications for electricity regulation are staggering, as environmental concerns have become as prominent as efficiency and security of supply: regulatory support of the several types of clean technologies, while they might need it; an in-depth review of the existing pricing and incentive instruments for electricity generation so that they are adapted to the new technology mixes that can be anticipated; demand response and how energy efficiency and conservation could be encouraged; rethink system operation and network planning at www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 2 published by scholink inc. transmission and distribution levels; review of network remuneration schemes and design of instruments to promote innovation in new technologies. electricity occupies a special place in the global energy system [2]. electricity is not purely characterized by its end use. it is truly a universal good and service that extends into the transportation and thermal sectors. electricity now powers not only lights, televisions, refrigerators, and cooktops, but also vehicles, movable sidewalks, neon signs, and electric fireplaces. dependence on electricity has grown significantly due to its easily adjustable flow, easy and instantaneous access, and minimal disturbance to the surrounding environment at the point of use. humans have also become more reliant on information and technology and electronic means of communication such as the internet and mobile phones, which have led to a dramatic uptake in the manufacturing of information storage, telecommunications, and electronics. as a result, our high-tech world has become more dependent on the energy needed to power such devices. the power-system structure is composed mainly of generation, transmission and distribution [3]. this is also due to the unbundling process which takes place in many countries. many power networks are unbundled commercially, with a separation of generation from the operation of the network. the power in a traditional power system is produced by a few large power plants located near primary energy sources (e.g., coal mines, water). the power is then transmitted at very high or high voltage for long distances (e.g., 500 km) and, finally, distributed to the end users. generation is the main part of the power system. more than 50 % of the total costs of the power system are related to generation, which is also responsible for most of the polluting emissions. the general structure of the primary energy sources has changed during the last 30 years, but still fossil energy dominates the sources with a share of about 80 %. the net electricity generation total reached a value of 23,816 twh in 2014. among the technologies that use renewable sources, the highest proportion of generation is provided currently by hydropower plants. nevertheless, it is not expected that there will be a significant increase in hydroelectric generation in the coming years, because hydropower stations, especially large plants, are geographically limited, and there are not many suitable new sites available. the main contribution to an increase in the share of the renewable energy will be provided by both solar (e.g., photovoltaic: pv and concentrated solar power (csp)) and wind-based technology. european and chinese targets aim to increase generation from wind by tenfold by 2050. the pv electricity generation forecast for 2050 should reach about a 10% share of the global electricity generation, and this contribution would be 50 times higher than today’s status. an electric grid is made up of a complex network of power plants, transformers, transmission and distribution lines, sensing. systems, protective equipment, and control devices [4]. the transmission lines are the links between high-voltage substations. the distribution lines are the links between high and medium-voltage substations. they are also the links between mediumand low-voltage circuits. at power plants, the transformers are used to step up the voltage of the transmission lines to high levels www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 3 published by scholink inc. (220–1200 kv) to reduce the current passing through the transmission lines, thus reducing the cross section of the transmission conductors and consequently reducing the size of the towers and increasing their spans. near load centers, the voltage of the transmission lines is stepped down to medium levels (15–25 kv) for the distribution of power within city limits without the need for large towers. in residential areas, the voltage is further stepped down to a phase voltage of 100–240 v for household use worldwide. the power system is extensively monitored and controlled. it has several layers of protections to minimize the effect of any damaged equipment on the system’s ability to provide electricity to customers. the key devices and equipment that are related to electric safety. these include power lines and substations. electric power distribution is the portion of the power delivery infrastructure that takes the electricity from the highly meshed, high-voltage transmission circuits and delivers it to customers [5]. primary distribution lines are “medium-voltage” circuits, normally thought of as 600 v to 35 kv. at a distribution substation, a substation transformer takes the incoming transmission-level voltage (35 to 230 kv) and steps it down to several distribution primary circuits, which fan out from the substation. close to each end user, a distribution transformer takes the primary distribution voltage and steps it down to a low-voltage secondary circuit (commonly 120/240 v; other utilization voltages are used as well). from the distribution transformer, the secondary distribution circuits connect to the end user where the connection is made at the service entrance. functionally, distribution circuits are those that feed customers. some also think of distribution as anything that is radial or anything that is below 35 kv. 2. method the desk analysis method was used in this paper. 3. result addressing these demanding topics, the author has collected a number of quality data, and the results can be read below. 4. discussion 4.1 fossil fuels almost all oil comes from underground reservoirs [6]. the most widely accepted explanation of how oil and gas are formed within the earth is that these fuels are the products of intense heat and pressure applied over millions of years to organic (formerly alive) sediments buried in geological formations. for this reason they are called fossil fuels. they are limited (nonrenewable) resources, which means that they are formed much more slowly than they are used, so they are finite in supply. at one time it was believed that crude oil flowed in underground streams and accumulated in lakes or www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 4 published by scholink inc. caverns in the earth. today, scientists know that a petroleum reservoir is usually a solid sandstone or limestone formation overlaid with a layer of impermeable rock or shale, which creates a shield. the petroleum accumulates within the pores and fractures of the rock and is trapped beneath the seal. anticlines (archlike folds in a bed of rock), faults, and salt domes are common trapping formations. oil and natural gas deposits can be found at varying depths. wells are drilled to reach the reservoirs and extract the oil. deep wells are more expensive to drill and are usually attempted only to reach large reservoirs or when the price of oil is high. 4.2 natural gas from 2020 to 2035, the growth in consumption of natural gas is expected to slow to an average of 0.9 % per year, as prices rise and increasingly expensive natural gas resources are brought to market [7]. by energy source, the projected increase in natural gas consumption during the period 2008–2035 is second only to coal. other sources expected that the consumption of natural gas worldwide will increase by an average of 2.8 % annually from 2001 to 2025, compared with projected annual growth rates of 1.8 % for oil consumption and 1.5 % for coal consumption. natural gas consumption in 2025, is expected to be 4.981 trillion m3, nearly double the 2001 total of 2.547 trillion m3. the natural gas share of total energy consumption is projected to increase from 23 % in 2001 to 28 % in 2025. in the case of europe and other oecd countries, natural gas is expected to be the fastest-growing fuel source, with demand increasing at an annual average rate of 1.4 % from 0.53 trillion m3 in 2004 to 0.65 trillion m3 in 2015 and 0.76 trillion m3 in 2030. around the world, natural gas use is increasing for a variety of reasons, including prices, environmental concerns, fuel diversification and/or energy security issues, market deregulation, and overall economic growth, particularly in asia and the latin america and the caribbean regions. the price and production behavior of gas markets has been strikingly different from that in markets for other natural resources [8]. gas prices in constant dollars began to increase in the mid-1970s, peaked in 1982–1983, and have declined almost every year since then. production peaked in the mid-1970s, after some years in which new discoveries of in-ground reserves failed to replace the annual take from operating wells; by the early 1980s, production had stabilized at 80 percent of peak levels, while reserves continued to decline. although this price spike characterized market behavior, it resulted not from supply-demand interactions but from distortions caused by the application of regulatory policies specific to the natural gas industry. the impact of regulation has been all-encompassing, on the wellhead contract commitment of reserves, on production out of reserves, and on pipeline delivery of production to the city gate for distribution to final consumers. 4.3 shale gas with a view to energy security of the world, unconventional energy resources coalbed methane (cbm), methane gas hydrate, shale gas, basin centred gas, tight gas, oil shale and heavy oil exploration and exploitation is a pertinent task for geoscientists [9]. shale gas is natural gas from shale www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 5 published by scholink inc. formations which acts as both the source and the reservoir for the natural gas. each shale gas reservoir has unique characteristics. shale has low matrix permeability. so, gas production in commercial quantities requires fractures to provide permeability. for a given matrix permeability and pressure, the gas production is determined by the number and complexity of created fractures, their effective conductivity, and the ability to effectively reduce the pressure throughout the fracture network to initiate gas production. understanding the relationship between fracture complexity, fracture conductivity, matrix permeability, and gas recovery is a fundamental challenge of shale-gas development. shale gas reservoirs almost always have two different storage volumes (dual porosity) for hydrocarbons, the rock matrix and the natural fractures. because of the plastic nature of shale formations, these natural fractures are generally closed due to the pressure of the overburden rock. consequently, their very low, matrix permeability, usually on the order of hundreds of nanodarcies (nd), makes unstimulated, conventional production impossible. almost every well in a shale gas reservoir must be hydraulically stimulated (fractured) to achieve economical production. these hydraulic fracture treatments are believed to reactivate and reconnect the natural fracture matrix. shales and silts are the most abundant sedimentary rocks in the earth’s crust. in petroleum geology, organic shales are source rocks as well as seal rocks that trap oil and gas. in reservoir engineering, shales are flow barriers. in drilling, the bit often encounters greater shale volumes than reservoir sands. in seismic exploration, shales interfacing with other rocks often form good seismic reflectors. as a result, seismic and petrophysical properties of shales and the relationships among these properties are important for both exploration and reservoir management. another key difference between conventional gas reservoirs and shale gas reservoirs is adsorbed gas which is gas molecules attached to the surface of the rock grains. the nature of the solid sorbent, temperature and the rate of gas diffusion all affect the adsorption. 4.4 golden age of natural gas and lng on the one hand, natural gas is a clean-burning, flexible fuel that can be used extensively in power generation and other sectors to help reduce emissions by displacing other fuels, such as coal and oil [10]. natural gas resources are abundant and the prospects of global shale gas development imply that the world will be well supplied with natural gas in the 21st century. on the other hand, the emissions benefits of natural gas, on their own, will not be enough to meet global climate change goals, especially if low natural gas prices lead to displacement of other cleaner fuels such as nuclear and renewables. after weighing these factors and recognizing that there are many uncertainties that may tip the scales, the iea noted in the gas scenario that with natural gas demand expected to “rise by more than 50% and account for over 25% of the world demand in 2035,” the golden age of natural gas is upon us. the golden age of gas would not be possible were it not for liquefied natural gas – lng. most natural gas is consumed in the same region in which it is produced due to the costs and impracticalities of transporting natural gas via pipeline over long distances. lng is natural gas that has been cooled to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 6 published by scholink inc. approximately −161 °c, at which point it condenses to a liquid that occupies approximately 1/600th of the volume of natural gas, thereby allowing it to be shipped via lng tanker or stored. of primary significance is the fact that lng provides a seaborne solution to the impracticality of serving distant natural gas markets via pipeline or for exploiting otherwise “stranded” gas reserves. since the majority of the world’s natural gas reserves are located far away from key demand markets, lng offers an important solution for the global gas markets in terms of moving natural gas to markets where it is most needed. lng is natural gas which has been condensed into a liquid [11]. natural gas can be transformed into a liquid state by the application of pressure or extreme cooling or a combination of both. due to the hazards associated with the application of extreme pressure, the lng industry adopts a cooling process which operates at atmospheric pressure. lng is predominantly methane, with small proportions of ethane, propane, butane and pentanes. the resulting liquid is chemically inert in respect of most substances and will not burn or explode. at ambient temperatures lng boils away leaving no residue, and any lng which transforms into gaseous state is about half the density of air and consequently rises and disperses. the transformation of methane gas into liquefied methane yields a volume reduction of approximately 600 to one. this super-cooled liquid can be stored cryogenically in insulated tanks constructed of special steel (as normal steel cannot withstand the low temperature of lng) or aluminium, which can then be installed on ocean-going vessels for transportation. 4.5 oil oil resources, deposits of oil extractable in theory, are not the same as oil reserves, deposits of oil mapped out and extractable economically [12]. peak oil is the point at which the depletion of existing oil reserves around the world can no longer be replaced by additions of new flow capacity. oil production reaches the highest level it ever will, and drops. it can drop for what we can think of as below-ground reasons or for above-ground reasons, or both. below-ground reasons involve the geology of depletion: how much oil there really is down there, and how fast we suck it out. above-ground reasons involve geopolitics, the behaviour of nations and their citizens, which can so easily mess up oil production. most of us think that both belowand above-ground factors will define the peak, but the peak will be the peak: the most oil that can ever be produced in any one day. perhaps production will wobble along on a plateau for a while before dropping, but it will never exceed that peak level. if we think of all the theoretically extractable oil under the ground as a tank, what we have to worry about is not so much the size of that tank, but the size of the taps: the actual global oil production capacity. king coal in 1900 had already found a powerful challenger in an even more energy-potent fossil fuel—oil [13]. liquid carbon-based products had long been known. but the last half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century saw oil’s commercial emergence. various attractive properties of oil began to make it the fuel of choice for powering water and rail transport, for many industrial purposes, and for residential and commercial heating. oil also quickly captured two enormous markets: automobile and aeronautic transport. by 1950, transport was overwhelmingly www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 7 published by scholink inc. powered by oil. oil retains its versatility into the twenty-first century, though some traditional uses are shrinking. oil retains dominance in transportation, especially for motor vehicles, planes, and ships. some nations and regions continue significant use of oil for residential and commercial heating and cooking. industrial processes call on oil both for energy generation and for product component. oil remains useful for electric generation, although economics often favours other fuels. oil, like coal, has its environmental harms. the gulf coast oil leak of 2010 provided a vivid reminder of how harmful and widespread an oil spill can be. extraction and processing of oil presents a wealth of human health and environmental harms. combustion of oil has a long history of environmental harms that have included smog in major cities and climate change worldwide. 4.6 coal the mix of primary fuels used to generate electricity has changed a great deal over the past four decades on a worldwide basis [14]. despite of these changes, coal continues to be the fossil fuel most widely used for electricity generation, except in the latin america and the caribbean region, although the generation of electricity using natural-gas-fired power plants grew rapidly during the past 30 years. at the same time, the use of oil for electricity generation has been declining since the mid-1970s, when oil prices rose sharply. high fossil fuel prices recorded between 2003 and 2013, combined with concerns about the environmental consequences of greenhouse gas emissions, have renewed interest in the development of alternatives to fossil fuels, specifically renewable energy sources for electricity generation. in the ieo (2013) report, long-term prospects continue to improve the role of renewable energy sources in electricity generation, supported by government incentives and by high fossil fuel prices. in 2007, coal-fired generation accounted for 42 % of world electricity supply; in 2035, its share is expected to increase slightly to 43 %; this means an increase of only 1 % in the whole period. sustained high prices for oil and natural gas make coal-fired generation more attractive economically, particularly in nations that are rich in coal resources, but the negative effect that the burning of coal has on the environment and the possibility of introducing certain energy policies to reduce or limit the growth of greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere should have a negative impact on the use of this type of energy source for the generation of electricity in the future. this new policy could reduce the participation of coal in the energy mix of several countries during the coming years. despite of this situation, world net coal-fired generation is expected that nearly doubles over the period 2007–2035, from 7.9 trillion kwh in 2007 to 15 trillion kwh in 2035. 4.7 nuclear energy nuclear is a dense energy without co2 emission [15]. it can be used for more than 1000 years using fast reactors and for more than 100,000 years using fast reactors with uranium from the sea. however, it raises difficult problems associated with severe accidents, spent fuel waste, and nuclear threats, which should be solved with acceptable costs. the fukushima daiichi accident seriously affected the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 8 published by scholink inc. japanese atomic energy program. before the accident, nuclear was considered one of the main baseload energies and was positively promoted. shortly after the accident, closing and decommissioning of all nuclear reactors were seriously considered. now, several nuclear reactors have a plan to renew operation. however, it will be difficult to construct new reactors in the near future. china and certain emerging countries have aggressive future plans for nuclear energy. some innovative reactors have attracted interest, and many designs have been proposed for small reactors. these reactors are considered much safer than conventional large reactors and have fewer technical obstructions. breed-and-burn reactors have high potential to solve all inherent problems for peaceful use of nuclear energy. however, they have some technical problems with materials. in japan, even if nuclear energy is used, its contribution to mitigating global warming is very slight. however, if we contribute to developing innovative nuclear energy systems, the results will be global and the contributions considerable. the roadmap for large reactors in japan is not a technological issue but a political and sociological one, while the roadmap for innovative reactors is technological. 4.8 renewable energy there is a growing political sense that wind and solar power could displace all sources of generation using fossil fuels [16]. many experts feel that these proposals must face and solve significant technological issues. since the prime mover sources (wind and sunlight) are not always available at times of need (at night and during cloudy and raining periods for solar, and during calm periods for wind), backup generation or large-scale energy storage systems, possibly as much as 100 % of the capacity of the renewable, energy must be developed and installed. work has been underway for decades on battery storage systems, flywheel storage, and other types of storage as a possible solution, but no significant breakthroughs have happened. for the energy scientist, renewables are a puzzle [17]. their possibilities are large, but they have not attained widespread use in industrial societies. to unveil at least some aspects of this puzzle, we focus on proven technology: solar, wind, hydro, and biomass refuse combustion. effective use of renewables probably constitutes the largest engineering challenge to be faced (thus far) by the species that placed humans on the moon, flew supersonically, built nuclear power plants, and crafted the amazing communications machine. the term “renewable” covers a variety of energy sources that are renewable in the sense that unlike coal and oil they do not use up the raw material [18]. this is not exactly true because they all rely eventually on the sun, which provides the energy by burning fuel that will ultimately be exhausted, and in addition they use up material in order to construct the turbines, windmills, solar panels and other machines. there are several types of renewable energy, and among them hydro is a well-tried source. there are also the sources that rely on burning organic material, and finally wind, solar and several other possibilities. this shows that only 3.6 % of our electricity is obtained from the renewables, and if hydro is omitted this falls to 2.1 %. these renewable sources will now be considered. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 9 published by scholink inc. with a few exceptions, the renewables generate electricity, which accounts for only about one-fifth of our total energy consumption. the exceptions are geothermal and solar heat when they are used directly. thus if we obtained all our energy from renewable sources we would still have to find a way to supply the remainder of our energy needs. to some extent this can be done without difficulty, but other applications require technologies that are still being developed. thus heating that relies on fossil fuels can easily be replaced by electric heating, but transport is more difficult. grid system operators manage many energy sources to meet customer demand for energy (load) [19]. because electricity cannot be easily stored, system operators must instantaneously match supply and demand by instructing different generators to produce a given amount of electricity. generators are constrained by technical limitations. for example, they cannot be turned on and off instantaneously. they are also limited in the amount of output that can be changed in a given period of time. load forecasting, which takes place on time scales from a day ahead to minutes ahead of time, allows the system operators to prepare to instantaneously match generation and load. unlike conventional generators, variable energy resources are not fully controllable, and their power production at any given moment depends on environmental and technical factors. forecasting the availability of these variable renewable resources is thus becoming of increasing importance to grid operators, who have to schedule conventional resources according to their expectations for demand and for availability of renewable resources. 4.9 energy and economy the use of commercial fuel drives the economies of the world [20]. countries using the least energy per capita have the least income per capita and their people are the poorest. countries using the most energy per capita have the largest incomes per capita and their people are the richest. the poor want to grow rich, the rich want to grow richer, and so energy consumption everywhere in the world continues to rise. the very poorest countries are not now relevant to world energy demand or to the greenhouse gas emissions that drive climate change. there are about 1.6 billion people who have no access to any form of commercial energy. if they were magically given enough to run a refrigerator, light their homes at night, and run their schools, the added energy required would amount to only about 1 % of the world’s energy consumption. these countries will begin to have an impact on energy demand and climate only when their economies grow enough to make a difference. until then, they should be left to increase the well-being of their citizens in the most effective way they can without regard to global climate issues. of course they have to be careful about their local environment, but mandated greenhouse gas reductions should not be required of them. energy intensity is a measure of efficiency and of the product mix in a particular economy. energy intensity usually drops as an economy matures, largely because of a shift from manufacturing to services (it takes much less energy to run a bank than a steel mill, though both may produce the same increment of gdp). this is particularly important because two of the world’s largest countries by www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 10 published by scholink inc. population, china and india, are undergoing rapid economic growth. at the beginning of their growth cycles, industry dominates over services and processes tend to be relatively inefficient. the effects of improving efficiency (reducing energy intensity) on energy demand are also important in estimating the worldwide demand for energy in the future. energy is a capital-intensive industry, and as a $6 trillion global business, the largest industry in the world [21]. its transformation to a more energy efficient and environmentally benign industry will take decades. today, we are at a turning point in the energy world as emerging environmental regulation on climate change and governmental mandates on both renewable energy and energy efficiency proliferate throughout the world. the energy industry will rise to the environmental challenge through both technology and engineering solutions as it has throughout the past forty years of environmental rules. it will require more capital to be invested into this emerging sector. most importantly, energy finance will also change. besides funding for oil, gas, and coal production projects, there will be new business opportunities in both renewable energy and clean energy technology. change will be incremental, but will accelerate throughout both the developed and developing worlds. but there clearly will be a need for fossil fuels for many more decades. the changes in financial markets in coming years will be more fundamental than many realize. efficient use of energy in the generation, transmission and final energy is the basis of development guidelines of all sectors of the energy system [22]. in the sector of oil, petroleum products and natural gas, energy efficiency is reflected in the modernization of refineries and the use of improved technologies for the exploitation of oil fields and gas. in the electric power industry, energy efficiency involves the application of more efficient technologies for energy conversion, such as: advanced technology of coal combustion, gas power plants and high-efficiency cogeneration of heat and power and the reduction of losses in transmission and distribution network, favorable location and building incentives for distributed generation of electricity. regarding the production of thermal energy, the development of district heating systems is directed towards increasing the efficiency of energy conversion, application of cogeneration units and reduce the loss of heat energy distribution, distributed energy production and use of renewable energy sources. energy economics combine production, distribution and use of energy by societies [23]. by that it’s strongly related to energy engineering, politics, ecology, economy, etc. as such several disciplines nowadays come on focus while debating energy economic issues: climate change and policy, sustainability, risk analysis, security of supply, energy audits and energy efficiency, energy policy, energy management, specialization on energy services, e-mobility and sustainable transport, renewable energies, load management to name the mostly used terms. climate change became to be one of the key words today and will be even more important in the very close future. the global warming effect is increasing, undoubtable being pushed also by the energy use and green-house gas emissions worldwide. the human influence was confirmed in the heating of the oceans and the atmosphere, the changes in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 11 published by scholink inc. the global water cycles, the rise of the global average sealevels as well as the decreasing levels of snow and ice on earth. as a consequence the ipcc (intergovernmental panel on climate change) claims a 100 % resignation from the use of any fossil energy sources. 4.10 energy policy the modern lifestyle involves increasing use of energy in order to achieve increasing efficiency and comfort and energy use is growing every day [24]. today, most of the energy needs of mankind settled using very harmful fossil fuels, and in the future will be the fuel to be replaced with cleaner sources of energy in the form of renewable energy sources or nuclear power. in the future, renewable energy sources will become the primary, and the energy needs of humanity will get bigger. that modern style of life have intention to be important part of strategy of economic development. increasing energy import dependency and limited success in achieving diversification, high and fluctuating energy prices, growing demand, security risks associated with transport routes, climate change, the need to liberalize the energy market, limited coordination factors of energy policy that impedes investment in energy infrastructure and difficulties on the market of oil and gas are just some of the important issues the eu was faced with over time, and the same led to the necessity of creating a common european energy strategy [25]. in times of increasing environmental and climate challenges or diplomatic crises, energy issues have repeatedly entered the agendas of policy makers, researchers and society in the european union under a number of different frames [26]. during the last 60 years, eu environmental policy has taken place under changing institutional, environmental and societal conditions. these conditions have influenced both agenda shaping and decision making with regard to the regulation of energy issues. during the first decades of the european integration process, the main motivation was to secure energy provision in an emerging community of nation-states. moreover in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, several attempts were made to design a comprehensive energy policy and to transfer national capacities with regard to energy security to the eu—a topic that has recently gained renewed attention. however, in the absence of any concrete primary law to empower the eu institutions to regulate the energy sectors prior to the mid-1980s, these attempts failed because they did not reach consensus among the member states. finally in the 1990s, the eu was successful in liberalising the electricity market. however, despite its implications for the common market, energy policy was not defined as an area of priority action by primary (i.e., treaty) law until the passage of the treaty of lisbon. since then, energy policy has ranked high on the eu’s political agenda, which has also led to the passage of concrete regulatory decisions. this process was also motivated and shaped by concerns for environmental and climate change. in addition, the midand long-term security of energy supplies has been a main driver of the eu’s energy policy agenda. altogether, the emergence of eu energy policy decisions and their agenda shaping processes have been strongly linked to developments in the international energy markets, the evolution of eu primary law, national policy targets and decisions as well as developments in the environment and climate. changes www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 12 published by scholink inc. in treaty law and problem perception along with new framing opportunities have therefore paved the way for the development of a comprehensive energy policy since the mid-2000s. shortly thereafter, regulations were passed to extend the agenda-shaping power of the european public through the introduction of the european citizens’ initiative thereby laying the legal foundations for a smooth interaction between the systemic and the eu’s political agendas. energy policy in many eu countries has recently focused on the expansion of res (renewable generation sources) [27]. non-dispatchable technologies18 of wind and solar play a particular role in this. therefore, res expansion can raise particular issues in relation to future security of supply especially in relation to (a) volatility of generation and (b) inaccuracies of production forecast. in relation to (a), volatile and fluctuating generation from wind and solar requires the availability of secured back-up capacities through storage, conventional generation, or demand flexibility that can step in for these renewables. the question is whether market mechanisms alone can deliver these capacities. in relation to (b) inaccuracies in production forecast, the availability of wind and solar radiation can only be predicted with limited accuracy. the availability of respective plants is only known with high certainty shortly (a few hours or less) before real-time dispatch. this holds even though there have been significant improvements in forecasting accuracy in recent years. this uncertainty about actual production requires back-up capacity that needs to be dispatchable at short notice. 5. conclusion there are no bodies and systems in the universe that do not possess energy. energy cannot be destroyed, it passes from one form to another, from one body to another and always in accordance with the law of conservation of energy. the law of conservation of energy is the physical law according to which in a closed system the sum of all forms of energy is constant. this means that in a closed system, one form of energy can pass into other forms, without energy being created or canceled. acknowledgement the author states that is no conflict of interest in this paper. references linares, p., batlle, c., & pérez-arriaga, i. j. (2013). environmental regulation. in i. j. pérez-arriaga (ed.), regulation of the power sector (p. 539). springer-verlag, london, uk. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5034-3_11 sovacool, b. k., sidortsov, r. v., & jones, b. r. (2014). energy security, equality and justice (p. 6). routledge, taylor & francis group, abingdon, uk. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203066348 komarnicki, p., lombardi, p., & styczynski, z. (2017). electric energy storage systems-flexibility options for smart grids (p. 97). springer-verlag gmbh, berlin, germany. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53275-1_3 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 13 published by scholink inc. el-sharkawi, m. (2014). electric safety-practice and standards (p. 21). crc press, taylor & francis group, boca raton, usa. short, t. a. (2014). electric power distribution handbook (1nd ed., p. 1). crc press, taylor & francis group, boca raton, usa. alters, s. m. (2005). energy-supplies, sustainability, and costs (p. 21). thomson gale, farmington hills, usa. morales, p. j. (2015). electrical energy generation in europe-the current and future role of conventional energy sources in the regional generation of electricity (p. 214). springer international publishing, cham, switzerland. macavoy, p. w. (2000). the natural gas market-sixty years of regulation and deregulation (p. 1). yale university press, new haven, usa. https://doi.org/10.12987/yale/9780300083811.003.0001 sunjay, s., kumar, s., & jain, n. (2014). shale gas: an unconventional gas reservoir. in g. said, & h. olga (eds.), advances in data, methods, models and their applications in oil/gas exploration (pp. 3-4). science publishing group, new york, usa. sakmar, s. l. (2013). energy for the 21st century-opportunities and challenges for liquefied natural gas (lng) (pp. 29-30). edward elgar publishing limited, cheltenham, uk. dyer, e., reinbott, d., & williams, m. (2009). liquefied natural gas. in g. picton-turbervill (ed.),oil and gas—a practical handbook (p. 113). globe law and business, globe business publishing, london, uk. legett, j. (2014). the energy of nations-risk blindness and the road to renaissance (p. 5). routledge, taylor & francis group, new york, usa. zillman, d. n., roggenkamp, m. m., barrera-hernández, l., & del guayo, i. (2012). energy networks and the law: innovative solutions in changing markets. in m. m. roggenkamp, l. barrera-hernández, d. n. zillman, & i. del guayo (eds.), energy networks and the law—innovative solutions in changing markets (p. 4). oxford university press, oxford, uk, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199645039.003.0001 morales pedraza, j. (2015). electrical energy generation in europe-the current situation and perspectives in the use of renewable energy sources and nuclear power for regional electricity generation (pp. 3-4). springer international publishing, cham, switzerland. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16083-2_8 sekimoto, h. (2016). nuclear power generation. in y. kato, m. koyama, y. fukushima, & t. nakagaki (eds.), energy technology roadmaps of japan-future energy systems based on feasible technologies beyond 2030 (p. 257). springer japan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55951-1_15 casazza, j., & delea, f. (2010). understanding electric power systems an overview of the technology and the marketplace, second edition (p. 269). ieee press, john wiley & sons, hoboken, usa. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470588475 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 14 published by scholink inc. perez-blanco, h. (2009). the dynamics of energy supply, conversion, and utilization (p. 153). crc press, taylor & francis group, boca raton, usa. hodgson, p. e. (2010). energy, the environment and climate change (p. 27). imperial college press, london, uk. https://doi.org/10.1142/p651 apt, j., & jaramillo, p. (2014). variable renewable energy and the electricity grid (p. 103). rff press, abingdon, uk. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315848709 richter, b. (2010). beyond smoke and mirrors-climate change and energy in the 21st century (pp. 50-51). cambridge university press, cambridge, uk. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511802638 fusaro, p. c. (2010). the global challenge for energy and environmental investment. in a. s. kramer, & p. c. fusaro (eds.), energy and environmental project finance law and taxation—new investment techniques (p. 1) oxford university press, oxford, uk. franjić, s. (2017). učinkovita uporaba energije (efficient use of energy) (pp. 139-145). plin2017, sept. 27th-29th, 2017, osijek, croatia. weber, g. (2018). sustainability and energy management—innovative and responsible business practices for sustainable energy strategies of enterprises in relation with csr (p. 51). springer fachmedien, wiesbaden, germany. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-20222-4_7 franjić, s. (2015). croatian strategy of energy development, european union, climate change and the environment protection. journal of energy and power sources, 2(7), 268-273. rowland heights, usa, july 2015. franjić, s. (2016). legal regulations of european energy policy in croatia (vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 40-45). applied engineering letters, novi sad, serbia. biesenbender, s. (2015). the eu’s energy policy agenda: directions and developments. in j. tosun, s. biesenbender, & k. schulze (eds.), energy policy making in the eu building the agenda (pp. 21-22). springer-verlag, london, uk. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-6645-0_2 perner, j., & riechmann, c. (2015). energy market design with capacity mechanisms. in l. hancher, a. de hautecloque, & m. sadowska (eds.), capacity mechanisms in eu energy markets law, policy, and economics (p. 72) oxford university press, oxford, uk. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 1 original paper local economic development in ethiopia: policy and practice defferew kebebe tessema 1* 1 addis ababa university, department of public administration and development management, ethiopia received: august 14, 2022 accepted: september 28, 2022 online published: october 3, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n4p1 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n4p1 abstract even though the current government of ethiopia has enacted and implemented various pro-led policies and started the actual exercise of led in selected localities since 2009, little scholarly attention has been devoted to the policy and practice of led in the country. the study fills this gap and contributes to the debates and evidence of local economic development in sub-saharan africa (ssa) based on data obtained through key informants interviews and systematic review of extant literature and documentary sources on the policies and practices of led in ethiopia. the result of the study reveals that much work is needed to institutionalize led practice in the country. the study also highlights that to institutionalize and sustain led practice in the country, well-articulated led framework and permanent led institutions that are well integrated with the overall local government structure are needed. keywords ethiopia, local economic development, policy, practice 1. introduction in most developing regions including sub-saharan africa (ssa), local economic development (led) is advancing and gradually gaining relative importance as an alternative development approach with the objective to decrease poverty, and unemployment & inequality at the local level and address the negative consequences of globalization (meyer-stamer, 2008; rodriguez-pose & tijmstra, 2007; rodriguez-pose & tijmstra, 2009; rogerson & rogerson, 2010; marais, 2010; rogerson, 2010a; and hampwaye & rogerson, 2011). the attractiveness of the concept in these countries also attributed to the collapse of hyper-inflation, vast debt burden, massive currency devaluation, social services, the central government‟s inability to intervene at the local level, structural adjustment packages, transition to democracy, disastrous effects of global trade, and other related factors (binns & nel, 1999; nel, 2001, 2007; rodríguez-pose & tijmstra, 2007; mensah et al., 2013a). the importance of led www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 2 published by scholink inc. throughout ssa is also signaled by the activities of the united cities and local governments of africa (uclga) (swinburn & yatta 2006a, b; swinburn et al., 2007). in ethiopia, despite the country‟s lack of a separate led framework, the federal and decentralized form of government which was embarked following the adoption of the 1995 constitution, attention given by the government of the country for urban development and the implementation of different pro-led policies and activities at different times are believed to pave the way for the commencement of led in the country. while late in comparison to other african countries, the actual led programs have been officially commenced in the ethiopia by the support of united nation development program (undp) in two phases focusing on cities‟/localities‟ local development though the program overlooks rural territorial development. accordingly, the first led intervention program was implemented since 2009 in seven cities including bahir dar in ahmara regional state, adigrat and mekele in tigray regional state, asella and nekemte in oromia regional state, and sodo and hawassa in the southern nation nationalities and people regional state as a pilot study (undp, 2012). the second phase of the led program which was started in 2012 and end up in 2015. during this phase, the led intervention program was implemented as an up-scaled project in 27 localities (7 existing led localities and 20 new localities) (undp, 2012). then, the second generation/phase of the led program was all of a sudden forced to be shut down without a substantial exit strategy and merged with entrepreneurship development program (edp) (uclga, 2016). however, despite the country has enacted and implemented different pro-led policies and later on, the actual led exercise and implementation was launched; there is lack of rigorous and systematic review of led practice in the country. this study tries to fill this gap and contribute to led in ssa that is relatively not represented in the existing led literature (rogerson & rogerson, 2010). the study is timely since it will assist policy makers, development organizations and local stakeholders in delivering led to understand what was attempted and uncover existing gaps in implementing led program in terms of composition and strength of established institutional arrangement, capacity building, enterprises development to scale-up led exercise throughout the country. it also serves as a seed and stimulates more scholarly studies in the areas of led in the country. 2. research method employed this study employed a qualitative research approach to assess the policy and practice of led in ethiopia. the study principally relies on data gathered from secondary sources supplemented with data collected from primary sources. secondary sources of data were obtained from existing literature, desk review of relevant official documents such as undp program document, study papers and examination of the led strategic plan. key informant interview held with officials of ministry of finance and economic development (mofed) currently the name is changed to the ministry of finance (mof) who played a coordinating role at the time in the implementation of led was also important in gathering the required primary data. the author critically subjected these secondary documents together www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 3 published by scholink inc. with primary data to a proper analysis which made it possible for him to reach on conclusions and the way forward about led as development strategies in sub-saharan africa in general and in ethiopia in particular. 3. overview of local economic development 3.1 meaning and concepts of local economic development difficulties in the definitions of social science ideas and concepts are neither started today nor going to end now. thus, led too is not exceptional as there has been an ongoing battle of ideas and struggle by many authors and authorities over the meaning of the term (nel & rogerson, 2005; rogerson & rogerson, 2010a). the main reason for the lack of a common definition of the term originates from how the concept has been perceived by various authors in the area. despite these difficulties, however, attempts have been made to define led concepts. for blakely (1989, 1994), who is one of the early authors of the contemporary local economic development approach, defines led as “a process by which local governments and/or community-based groups manage their existing resources and enter into new partnership arrangements with the private sector or each other to create new jobs and stimulate economic activity in a well-defined economic zone”. helmsing and egziabher (2005) consider led as a process in which partnerships between local private sectors, community-based organizations and local governments are established to create jobs, manage existing resources and excite the economy of a well-defined territory. as per this definition, led initiatives mobilize concerned players and the necessary resources; develop new institutions and local systems by way of dialogue and strategic actions. according to world bank (2000, 20002, 2006a, 2010) led is “the process by which public, business and non-governmental sector partners work collectively to create better conditions for economic growth and employment generation with the aim to improve the quality of life for all.” in this context, led is primarily about developing a favorable climate for local businesses, promoting local competitiveness, retaining jobs, improving income and attracting investment. for the ilo (2006), led represents, “participatory development process that encourages partnership arrangements between the main private and public stakeholders of a defined territory, enabling the joint design and implementation of a common development strategy by making use of the local resources and competitive advantage in a global context, with the final objective of creating decent jobs and stimulating economic activity”. the working definition of led in this article which is contextualized from the aforementioned discussion is that led is the process by which urban local governmental institutions and urban non-state institutions engage themselves, work jointly and enter into a new partnership to reduce the urban poverty, create a better environment for economic growth and manage locally available resources with the objective to improve the quality of life for urban community. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 4 published by scholink inc. 4. evolution of local economic development the practice of led could have existed for a long. however, the concept of led as a development strategy was relatively a recent phenomenon and not sufficiently acknowledged in the existing economic thinking until recently (birkholzer, 2005). according to the world bank (2004, 2009a), led has gone through three broad developmental stages or waves. each of the stages has its own instruments and attention. in each stage, practitioners of led have developed a better understanding of both effective and failed led programs. the policy and practice of the led is presently found in its “third wave”. each fundamental component of led such as the contribution of local government, private sector and csos that are working together to create opportunities to improve the local economy are practiced until the present day despite it moved through the three waves. again, ensuring inclusive and sustainable economic growth and promoting competitiveness are also concepts that found within all the three waves (davis & rylance, 2005; oduro-ofori, 2011). the focus of the first stage of led which started since 1960 and ends in the early 1980s was basically emphasis on investment in mobile manufacturing and production of agriculture. investment in infrastructure by providing subsidies, grants and tax reduction and the attraction of foreign direct investment was the central focus of this wave (kanyane, 2008). the second stage was experienced during the period of the 1980s to 1990s and the focus during the stage shifted towards expansion and retention of existing local business and inward investment as well by emphasizing on specifically targeted sectors. this was attained through supporting business startup, direct payment for individual businesses, provision of both soft and hard infrastructure (swinburne & yatta, 2007; kanyane, 2008). thirdwave from the late 1990s onwards and during this wave, the emphasis was more on the creation of a conducive environment for the whole businesses by focusing on the creation of partnership and network, supporting the establishment of the business cluster through intensive training and education with the assumption that entrepreneurship will be encouraged (world bank, 2002; kanyane, 2008; kahika & karyeija, 2017). according to helmsing (2003), led is in its third wave and this wave is also described as: multi-level, multi-sector, and multi-actor by its nature. for him, multi-actor indicates that the success of led relies on the participation of government, businesses and civil society‟s actors while multi-sector implies to the significance of government, business and civil society sectors of the economy in led. the final pointmultileveldenotes that led success requires not local initiatives but also considers opportunities and threats of dynamism in globalization. 5. local economic development approaches and strategies helmsing (2001, 2003) identified three strategic approaches of led including community economic development (ced), enterprise development (ed), and locality development (ld). community economic development (ced) also known by the name market critical or pro-poor approach which basically emphasis on reduction of poverty. for helmsing (2001, 2003), ced is the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 5 published by scholink inc. process by which the local community builds institutions and collaboration that brought together successful business with other values and interests. the various strategies that are used in ced include training local businesses, empowering women, and developing human resources through intensive training. for helmsing (2003, 2005), the overall objective of ced is empowerment and self-help, to contribute to employment creation, to excite a sense of belongingness, improve living and working conditions in settlements for the local community. he also underscores that most ced activities in africa have related to the improvement of housing and settlement upgrading, creation of safety net for the local community, provision of basic service delivery and development of micro and small enterprises (mses) programs. pro-poor led strategy was pursued by the ethiopian government in designing and implementing its first phase of led in 2009. enterprise development (ed) also known by the name pro-growth or market-driven led strategy which is growth-oriented and it basically emphasis on supportive and creation of competitive business conditions, the attraction of high profile businesses and investment, provision of institutional assistant for a competitive sector of the economy, the introduction of incentives for the local economy to retain existing businesses and expansion of new businesses (bond, 2002; rogerson, 2009; ingle, 2014). this strategy was adopted by ethiopia in implementing its second phase of led in 2012. the different interventions in enterprise development (ed) strategy include 1) pro-globalization ( export promotion, the attraction of fdi, sister city programme, export promotion) 2) locational (enterprise zone, industrial parks, enterprise zone and general tax incentives) 3) entrepreneurial merchant ( participation in equity, development of local corporations and business incubators 4) general business (tax incentives of target businesses, provision of venture capital 5) human resource (initiatives for human capital and provision of employment training) (clarke and gaile cited in rogerson, 2000 & tegegn, 2011). locality development (ld) is led strategy that combines both community economic development (ecd) and enterprise development (ed). for meyer-stamer (2005) ld is of a longer horizon than ed and ced. he confirms that led involves a clash of cultures like the culture of businesses that basically in a very short time and culture of planners, who are long-term project thinkers. meyer-stamer (2005) further underscores that the ld planning aims is to maximize the led positive externalities to minimize disagreement and thus, improve the attractiveness of localities such that led objectives such as poverty reduction would be realized. in most ssa including ethiopia however, pro-poor led strategies are relatively prevalent and an instance where both pro-market/ or pro-growth and market-critical/ or pro-poor dimensions of led approaches properly combine are rare. pro-poor led strategies generally emphasis on survival, self-reliance, and alleviation of poverty instead of increasing competitiveness, improving the local economy and searching for market niches (binns & nel, 1999).  why local economic development in developing countries? despite the fact that interest in led strategies to development originated in north america and western europe (blakely, 1989; harvey, 1989; clarke & gaile, 1998), it was also subsequently www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 6 published by scholink inc. diffused to another worlds for reasons not much dissimilar with that of developed nations. alongside other development initiatives, developing countries also gradually started to realize that the traditional top-down strategy is not creating the intended outcomes. as a result, local economic development as a development approach introduced in the early 1990s in certain developing countries including ssa as a bottom-up development approach with the assumption that it would ignite the development and growth of the local economy. during this time according to harvey (1989), local economic development has become the most influential and attractive policy that was most popularized and promoted in a number of developing regions including africa. especially, the republic of south africa is among the countries in africa that have successfully implemented led. pervasive decentralization and advancement of globalization during the 1990s would lead to the spread of local economic development ideas from developed regions to developing regions (rogerson, 1997; rodriguez-pose et al., 2001; helmsing, 2002; nel & rogerson, 2005; gomez & helmsing, 2008 cited in rogerson et al., 2010). in most developing countries including ssa, led is also advancing and gradually gaining fame as an alternative development strategy among organizations with the objective of reducing poverty and inequality of local communities and to deal with the negative impact of globalization (meyer-stamer, 2006; rodriguez-pose & tijmstra, 2007; rodriguez-pose & tijmstra, 2009; rogerson and rogerson, 2010; marais, 2010; rogerson, 2010a; hampwaye & rogerson, 2011). factors such as the collapse of hyper-inflation, vast debt burdens, massive currency devaluation, social services, the effective inability of central government to intervene at the local level, structural adjustment packages, disastrous effects of global trade, the transition to democracy aggravate the situation in these countries (binns and nel, 1999; nel, 2001; mensah et al., 2013a). rodriguez-pose and tijmstra (2007) also stated that the emergence of local economic development in africa in general and more specifically in ssa is attributed to acute poverty and the perseverance problems of slow economic growth together change in economic situations both nationally and internationally and the inability most national governments to intervene local level. according to kahika and karyeija (2017), different led strategy initiatives specifically, the 1986 to 1990 significance program implemented by the organization of african unity in 1985 to restore the economy of africa; the new collaboration and partnership for african development and the 1980s lagos action plan have been attempted in order to reverse local challenges in africa. according to nel and binns (1999 cited in mensah et al., 2013), the significance of local empowerment combined with dependency on local initiative and potentials are also some of the vital features of local economic development initiatives of africa. in addition, meyer (2003) identify the two major causes attracting third world regions including africa to adopt local economic development values includes: 1) the pursuit of decentralization and the responsibility of encouraging economic development at lower levels of government and 2) problems of poverty and unemployment at the local level have provoked questions about the capacity of national government and its centralized industrial policy to solve local needs. he also confirmed that the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 7 published by scholink inc. influence of donor agencies (specifically, wb, ilo, undp) and giz in penetrating and propagating led in developing countries as an alternative development strategy would not be undermined (meyer-stamer, 2003, mensah et al., 2013a). for helmsing (2003), liberalization policy and structural adjustment program, pervasive decentralization, impacts of globalization and ideological dissatisfaction with central-state-led development were the main reasons for the emergence of local economic development as an alternative development in africa since the 1990s. similar to other developing countries especially in the past three decades, ssa also greatly affected by reduced control of state and decentralization in an age of rapid globalization (nel, 2007; rodriguez-pose & tijmstra, 2007) and thus, led as a development strategy has been grown as a response to these challenges. the importance of local economic development throughout ssa is also signaled by the functions of the united cities and local governments of africa (uclga) (swinburn and yatta, 2006a, b) swinburn et al., 2007). since national economic policies are no more adequate for achieving sustainable growth in the continent, the association identifies led as one of its main priority areas for the period 2006-2015 to attain its “mission to build african unity from within and promoting development at the grass root level” (swinburn et al., 2007). though developing countries adapt led for the indicated purposes, the success story of led as an alternative development in all developing regions in including ssa is not the same. except south africa, the practice of local economic development strategies is limited in africa, specifically, in ssa. reviews of the status of led within local government areas in the developing countries indicates that formal led in contrast to community-based variations is still in its infancy and limited local governments are engaged in led in the current time (nel, 2001). in case they exist, initiatives most of the time are limited to project level, aimed at poverty reduction by overlooking the dynamism and economic competitiveness aspects of led approaches (rodriguez-pose & tijmstra, 2007). ethiopia where this study is conducted is not exceptional.  pro-local economic development policies in ethiopia even though there is not yet a separate led legal framework in ethiopia, different pro-led policies and activities have been enacted and implemented in the country. the commitment of the current ethiopian government towards led evidenced in its all-embracing series of five-year plans including the plan for accelerated for sustainable development to end poverty (pasdep) from 2005 to 2010 and growth and transformational plan (gtp) (i & ii) from 2011 to 2015, and 2015 to 2020 respectively. in this case, each subsequent fives plan builds on the achievements and challenges of the previous plan. for instance, the pasdep (2005-2010) builds on achievements pursued and challenges faced during the sustainable development and poverty reduction program (sdprp) sustainable (2000-2004). in the same way, the growth transformational plan (2011-2015) builds on the attainment and problems of pasdep (2005-2011) which in turn has succeeded the sdprp (2000-2004). the overall objectives of these successive plans were to attain a comprehensive, rapid, people-centered and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 8 published by scholink inc. equitable economic growth as well as to pave the groundwork for the attainment of the millennium development goals and reducing poverty (mofed, 2010). these are intended to be realized through strategic pillars and emphasis mainly on macro and sectoral policies particularly; the industrial sector, regional development framework, urban development policy, mse strategy (uclga and ledna, 2016). some of these macro and sectoral policies that are pro-led by their nature will be discussed in this section. micro and small enterprise strategy the formulation of the mses development strategy in 1997 establishes a legal framework to set an enabling business condition/environment for the development of micro and small enterprises (mses) including identifying goals, the institutional arrangement, the basic elements of mses support package and framework, program action and budget. in addition, the 1997 mses strategy also identifies the necessary steps and process of institutional development for mses and different support institutions including the formation and establishment of different financial institutions and loan provision systems, federal and regional mse agencies (ministry of trade and industry, 1997). the central aim of the 1997 mses strategy framework was to create a conducive and appropriate environment for mse. creation of decent job; strengthening co-operation between and among mses; facilitating for the promotion of economic growth and equitable; promoting export and provision of a basis for the development of medium and large-scale enterprises were some of the specific objectives of the strategy (ministry of trade and industry, 1997). nonetheless, despite some positive progress, the strategy did not attain the expected objectives due to various factors. for instance, there was limited government support in terms of acknowledging the program, access to finance and skills needed for the operation of mses efficiently and profitably. as a result, there was a consensus that if the sector was to contribute to the country‟s program of development and poverty reduction, more institutional and resource intervention were necessary (tegegne & meheret, 2010). to mitigate the implementation gaps of the 1997 mse strategy and improve the sector performance, a new strategy for the development of mses was established in 2011 by the task force established and coordinated by the ministry of urban development (mudc) and federal micro and small enterprise development agency (femseda) with the vision to establish mses that are very competitive and lays the groundwork for industrial development. to realize the identified vision, three main aims have been identified by the strategy, which are: to increase the employment and wealth creation capability of mses, to enable the mse sector to become more competitive and link with agricultural development and, to ensure mse development by creating a large entrepreneurial base in cities throughout the country. different development support packages and frameworks were developed in order to implement the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 9 published by scholink inc. development directions identified in the revised strategy and to create conducive conditions by addressing the challenges of the previous strategy. the strategy has also defined three stages for the growth and development of enterprises involved in these areas including start-up stage; growth stage and maturity stage with specific set of interventions and support packages for each stage. the major target and focus areas for the new mses strategy were construction, manufacturing, services, urban agriculture and trade. despite the effort made by the government to support the enterprises, however, research conducted by amare and raghuvamsa (2027) and government official report on the growth of mses reveals that transition from micro to small and then to medium enterprises in the new strategy is still rarely happening which makes the onlooker to equivocate the success of the mses development strategy. concerning human resource development and technological improvement, the strategy identifies technical and vocational education and training (tvet) institutions to play the key role and serves as a center of technology transformation. identifying and producing import substitution product as a sample and transfer of technologies to mse was the role expected of tvet. this role was also part of the 1997 strategy repeated in the 2011 mses strategy. all stakeholders engaged in mse were encouraged to accumulate personal savings and contribute to 20% to their start-up capital in order to address the challenges related to financial services. the strategy also required regions and city administrations to build the market place and organize working areas for mse to reduce their cost of capital investment. to address the challenges of technology transfer, capital shortage, working place constraints and market problems of mses, the strategy suggests the use of a cluster development direction with special arrangements of credit, market and land to be made to facilitate and improve graduation of micro to small, small to medium level enterprises (microned, 2008) though the strategy did not show progress in terms of graduating enterprises from small to medium. the revised 2011 strategy also suggests the formation of “sub-contracting market networks” as well as special support to enterprises working in the export market. outsourcing, franchising, strengthening sub-contract and out-grower marketing system were also some of the other market development tools identified by the strategy. the strategy also proposed the establishment of building the capacity of support giving institutions, industry extension services and one-stop services as tools to minimize problems of micro and small enterprises. the aims of industry extension services are to provide support on trade, entrepreneurship, technology transformation and development and to use to tools like kaizen to improve the efficiency of the manufacturing sector (mse strategy manual, 2011). as clearly indicated in the discussion above, mses policy and strategy is pro-led and provides strategic direction and opportunity for led programs to refocus on its enterprise development based on competitiveness and entrepreneurship. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 10 published by scholink inc. urban development policy urban development policy enacted in 2005 also another pro-led policy. the policy acknowledges urban development as a multi-sectoral that relies on the development of rural areas, which needs to consider global competitiveness in its plan and led by good governance (tegegne et al., 2011). making cities and towns centers of development is the strategic purpose of the policy which in turn fosters rural development and the overall economic growth of the country. the policy also focuses on the need to more invest on urban communities and helping them to attain and changing their living condition to similar to those middle-income nations (mwud, 2006). the urban policy mainly emphasizes on housing development, mses promotion, social services, land and infrastructure, urban good governance and urban conducive environment as the key intervention areas to attain the strategic aim of the policy. in terms of mses, urban development policy identifies various support packages including market place, the market linkage, finance, skills training, and infrastructure and working premises. the mse development program under the urban development package (2006) had the objectives to, reduce urban poverty and unemployment below 20% by supporting microand small-scale enterprises and accelerated urban based employment in linkages with rural development and delivery of housing and basic services; achieve fast growth through the creation of linkages between microand small enterprises with medium and large enterprises; facilitate the growth and expansion of microand small enterprises and create a foundation for industrial development; and promote the economic rural-urban and urban-rural linkages (mwud, 2006). regional development framework the regional development framework was also devised by the current government of the country in 2010 to reduce poverty, reduce regional imbalances, achieve regional development and improve and strengthen rural-urban and urban-rural linkages. specifically, regional development oriented towards reducing conflicts with regional and inter-regional consultation, strengthening national-territorial cohesion, producing spatial organization that promotes long and mid-term development and provision of equal opportunities for all (mofed, 2010). industrial development strategy industrial development strategy formulated in 2013 also identifies major areas of interventions required to speed up the growth and development of the selected industrial sectors and enable them contributes their share to ethiopia‟s vision of becoming one of the middle-income countries by the year 2025. one of the core areas and emphasis of the strategy to achieve its goal is the development of business enterprise and entrepreneurship program. the businesses enterprise and entrepreneurship development program component of the strategy consider smes as an engine for development and job creation (fdre ministry of industry, 2013). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 11 published by scholink inc. in addition, this program of the strategy also focuses on the development of entrepreneurship and enterprise cultivation. moreover, the strategy also considers the development of private enterprises and the flourishing of entrepreneurs as an engine of the envisioned growth and transformation. ensuring a conducive business environment, availing competent human resources and developing and providing institutional support are some of the important strategies identified to implement the businesses enterprise and entrepreneurship development program component of the industrial development strategy (fdre ministry of industry, 2013). the aforementioned discussion reveals that the current government of ethiopia enacted different pro-led policies before the actual commencement of the led exercise in the country. however, despite various macro pro-led policies have been formulated in the country, local economic development continues to be lagging behind and sub-national government and other stakeholders did not get the opportunity to involve in their local economies. because all levels of government in the country are controlled, directly or indirectly, by one party. i.e., the ethiopian peoples‟ revolutionary democratic party (eprdf) in which the party changed to prosperity party (pp) in 2020 by excluding tigray people liberation front (tplf) which was one of the former members of the front after prime minister „abiy ahmed‟ came to power and did not get adequate opportunity to involve the development of their localities. not only does the party control all levels of government, but it has a highly centralized decision-making system founded on the principle of „democratic centralism‟ (ayele, 2014).  actual commencement of led and its practice in ethiopia even though very late when compared with other countries in africa, the actual led programs have also been designed and implemented in ethiopia in two phases focusing on cities/localities‟ local development though the program overlooks rural territorial development. accordingly, the first led intervention program was implemented since 2009 in seven cities including asella and nekemte in oromia regional state; bahir dar in ahmara regional state; sodo and hawassa in southern nation nationality and people regional state and adigrat and mekele in tigray regional state as pilot study (undp, 2012). the main purpose of this first led program intervention was to promote market critical or pro-poor economic growth and sustainable livelihoods by creating an enabling environment for business development, investment, and targeted economic interventions in the cities (undp, 2012). the second phase of the led program was started in 2012 and end up in 2015. during this phase, the led intervention program was executed as an up-scaled project in 27 cities/localities (7 existing led localities and 20 new localities). the main objective of the second phase of led program was to promote inclusive economic growth and create decent job/ or employment opportunities for youth through creating conducive business environment and developing capacities of relevant local stakeholders (public, business and civil society organizations) (undp, 2012). these led programs were financially and technically supported by undp with the initial allocation of around 10.5 million us dollar with the coordination of the ministry of finance and economic www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 12 published by scholink inc. development (mofed) currently known by the name ministry of finance (mof) at federal level and the bureau of finance and economic development (bofed) at the regional level. however, the second generation/phase of led program was all of a sudden forced to be shut down without a substantial exit strategy and merged with entrepreneurship development program (edp). after led merged with entrepreneurship development program (edp), a coordinating unit established within ministry of finance was dissolved and federal micro and small enterprise development agency (femseda) took the coordinating responsibility at the federal level. to achieve the led program objectives of the selected localities, different interventions/projects were identified. some of these major led interventions including the establishment of institutions that implement led program, capacity building for localities, enterprise development and entrepreneurship development were discussed below. institutional arrangements to implement led as part of the creation of an enabling environment, the led program has created an institutional arrangement composed of different multi-stakeholders at all levels. the program is implemented at the local level by the coordinating role of the federal government. these arrangements have also a responsibility to approve projects and dispersing funds. mobilization of local resources that significantly contribute to the sustainability of the program was also the other responsibility of this arrangement. the major actors in the implementation of the led program had supposed to include all concerned stakeholders specifically, public, private sector and civil society organization. the assumption is that adequate representation of these actors ensures sustainability in local economic development as each actor pools knowledge and skills, own resources and the partnership philosophy of led as well. at the federal level, there is a national led program steering committee to be set up in addis ababa; whereas the regional led council and local led council were set up or strengthened at the regional and local levels respectively. at the sub-city/kebele level, the program has kebele led council to coordinate and manage all the led activities implemented in the selected kebeles. the steering committee and each council established at different levels of governments are supposed to include representatives from government, private and civil society organizations. this organizational structure established to coordinate the implementation of led in the urban context could be depicted by the following figure: www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 13 published by scholink inc. figure 1. urban context at federal level at regional level city level sub-city/kebele level as stated in the led strategy document, the steering committee at the regional level is expected to provide coordination, guidance, monitoring and evaluation to the city level steering committee. the same committee is also supposed to undertake operational activities of budget disbursement and project approvals. on the other hand, while the city level steering committee serves as a bridge between regional level and kebele steering committee, the local level steering council is a tool to eloquent and channel local needs to steering committee found at city level for decision making. though the existence of the steering committee found at all levels and their strong interactions are very crucial for properly implementing the led program in the localities, evidence reveals that their vertical coordination and relationships are very weak. especially, according to assessment reports of undp (20120, there was a very loose relationship between region and city level steering committee. this is evidenced by the infrequent interaction in which the regional level steering committee rarely meets with the city level committee in addition to lack of capacity to provide technical guidance, coordinate and follow up activities of the city level led structure. led program steering committee within mofed later on replaced by femseda regional led council established within bofed city led council established within city administration city led council established within sub-city council larger communities where led implemented www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 14 published by scholink inc. with respect to kebele and city level relationship, the role of a task force established at kebele level was mandated only with performing recruitment process on the criteria indented and submit the results to the city level steering committee. here the kebele levels led structures are not allowed to involve in a decision related to different led functions in their kebeles. this indicates that kebele level structures are established to serve as an implementing arm of the city level steering committee. the other weakness of the structure is that there was no mechanism put in place to ensure accountability and transparency on kebele level functions. the domination of government representative steering and technical committee in the led institutional arrangement was the other limitation observed though it is supposed to involve representatives of non-state actors. evidence reveals that in most localities, the private sector is not part of the steering and technical committee. in some localities, they have been represented only by heads of the chamber initially but withdrew subsequently. there is also blame in all localities that the government is not willing and ready to involve the private sector in the technical and steering committee. an assessment report by undp (2012) also confirms that most of the time, the private sector was not allowed/invited to attend on steering committee discussions and meetings as a result of which they were forced to leave from their being committee membership. on the other hand, the private sectors were also accused by representatives of the government as being not developmental and not willing and ready to solve the needs of the poor and vulnerable community (undp assessment report, 2012). similarly, as evidence reveals, almost in all localities, the civil society organizations were not also sufficiently represented in the technical and steering committees. youth and women associations that are claimed to be created and financially supported by the government were the only civil societies that were allowed to participate in all steering committee found at different levels. in addition to the absence of non-state actors in led implementation, there is no easily identifiable led structure within the system of the local government budget and responsibility. in almost all localities where led was implemented as a pilot study, led program and city level annual planning and budget were not well integrated. this discourages the transfer of the led projects to the system of government. in this case, unless led is incorporated in the overall city planning and budgeting, it is very hard to observe the integration and cooperation between activities of led and that of the city-wide development activities. this lack of cooperation and integration between led activities and the overall development activities of the city can open the door for the led to remain to continue to be implemented as a project. moreover, the other factor that hinders and makes the effective implementation of the led program to be more problematic with the existing institutional arrangement is that it is an add-on to the existing functions of executives to which they are responsible and accountable. capacity building as an intervention area for led capacity building is another intervention area identified for the implementation of led. the program implementation plan identified two level of projects (project level i and ii) as led capacity building www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 15 published by scholink inc. intervention projects. while the level i element of the project is wholly dedicated to capacity building of implementing bodies and program beneficiaries at the local level, level ii projects were micro-projects which were essentially aimed at improving the income and employability of unemployed women, youth and other vulnerable sections of the society. especially, level i elements of the led capacity building project is very critical. because it creates conducive conditions for the implementation of led by improving the implementing capacity of implementers and skills and knowledge of beneficiary‟s as well. our evidence indicates that the two-level projects were financially funded by undp. while the level i capacity-building intervention was funded with grant provision, level ii projects was funded through loan able revolving fund. as clearly shown in the led implementation plan, in addition to fund obtained from undp, creating investment-friendly environment, mobilizing the community for led and encouraging the private sector and strategic planning were also needed as financial support mechanisms to implement the led program. the implementation plan indicates that mobilizing the community for led, an investment-friendly environment, promoting private sector development and strategic planning are also required as support mechanisms. capacity building was principally emphasized on the foundational activities in its first phase of the program. this was basically to build and create awareness as well as to integrate the program within the overall localities development plan. during this phase, different training and workshop were conducted including international field visits to other countries like south africa that are considered to have more experience and relatively successful in the implementation of the led program. steering committee members found at different levels and heads of many sectors took the training and attended the workshops. but, the bad thing according our evidence is that most of those individuals who were participated in the training and workshop leave offices or some were assigned to new responsibility without utilizing the experiences and skills they got that impact greatly the implementation of led in their localities. the focus shifted to different direct interventions after micro-enterprise activities started implementation in 2010. the focus during this time was to capacitate beneficiaries through giving basic training in financial and business management at a larger scale. according to evidence, since 2010, around 3000 women, youth and members of vulnerable sections were trained in entrepreneurial and vocational skills training in cities/localities where projects were implemented. but these capacity-building efforts was argued to be inadequate to strengthen the capacity of micro-enterprises and unable to empower and meet their challenges since it is more generic than specific to their needs (undp, 2012). enterprise development and employment the development of enterprises and the creation of employment was also the other key emphasis of the led program since it is considered to be the basic entry point of the led program in the country. the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 16 published by scholink inc. initial emphasis of enterprise development in ethiopia was on the start-up of the new enterprises. later on, it included business retention and expansion. its primary aim is to establish mses and create employment specifically for the vulnerable groups in the localities like youth, women and disabled people. evidence indicates that as a result of the enterprise development intervention, the rates of youth unemployment at led localities were reduced to 50 percent. that means all registered unemployed youth (over 50% women) in led cities/localities got a job and the income of their families at least increased by 50 percent. in addition, as part of the enterprise development process, more than 5,000 selected unemployed youth (around 50%women) were given training in vocational and entrepreneurial skills through continues training and workshops conducted in the led localities. moreover, the enterprise development at the time created employment for about 10,110 groups target beneficiaries (unemployed youth and vulnerable groups) and around 7,715 micro-enterprises were established. furthermore, the innovative micro-finance strategy had also initiated as the main component of enterprise development for led programs that establish and manage revolving loan funds and disburses credit loans to micro and small enterprise beneficiaries that were categorized under level ii of the led program. evidence reveals that most led cities dispersed the revolving loan funds as a non-interest-bearing fund or in the form of grant loans. but interest-free loan was criticized on the ground that it has the effect of distorting both the saving and micro-credit environment as well as the market environment of the enterprises itself since it gives opportunities for the selected led enterprises over enterprises not covered in the led framework, according to various sources. as part of supporting enterprise development for promoting an enabling environment, the led program also established business development resource centers (bdrc) that essentially provide technical support for entrepreneurial development to small business owners and business associations. there are four key functions provided by bdrc: business development services (bds) like provision of appropriate business planning and counseling; market and business development services; job placement and counseling services and skills and knowledge sharing platform-based library. evidence showed that undp in 2011 allocated considerable budgets of between 700 000 and 1,3 million ethiopian birr for the “incubation” stage for the physical establishment of each of the centers. our evidence also indicates that around 7 networks of business development resource centers (bdrcs) were set up and functional in each pilot city during the first phase of the led program and a total of eight more bdrc were set up and functional in eight localities during the second phase of the program. to ensure the sustainability of the center, it is planned to be supported and financed through income generated through the provision of services including office supplies, secretarial, research, training and consultancy despite short of practice.  conclusions and the way forward despite the current government of ethiopia has implemented different pro-led policies since 1991, yet, there is no separate led framework in the country. thus, though the commencement of led www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 17 published by scholink inc. programs in selected localities of the country is a good step, led framework is needed to expand and scale-up led exercises to improve the living standards of local communities and contribute to the national economy as well. the commencement of local economic development (led) has prompted awareness and interest among the government at the local level where it was implemented. but, existing led exercise in selected localities of the country has been run as a project activity and there is no easily identifiable led structure within the system of the local urban government budget and responsibility. unless led structure is incorporated in the overall city planning and budgeting, it is very hard to observe the integration and cooperation between activities of led and that of the city-wide development activities. therefore, to institutionalize led program in the country, permanent led institutions that are well integrated with the overall city responsibilities and budget is needed. led program in ethiopia was financially relied on donor support, specifically undp. but, sustainable led needs dependable and diversified sources of finance and collaboration. so, as much as possible, localities should search for diversified sources of finance including domestic sources extracted from private, civil society and individual citizens to sustain the led programs in their areas. similarly, the partnership is a critical component for the success of led. in ethiopia, however, there is inadequate room and space for non-state actors to fully engage in the overall development efforts in general and in the led process at localities. thus, there is a need to strengthen the partnership initiatives between different stakeholders for the sustainability of led program in different localities of the country. references amare, a., & raghurama, a. (2017). micro, small and medium enterprises (msmes) development strategies in ethiopia: retrospective and prospective analysis. international journal of commerce, business and management (ijcbm), 6(1), 2319-2828. ayele, z. a. (2014). the politics of sub-national constitutions and local government in ethiopia. perspectives on federalism, 6(2). https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845250243 binns, t., & nel, e. (1999). beyond the development impasse: the role of local economic development and community self-reliance in rural south africa. the journal of modern african studies, 37(3), 389-408. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x99003067 blakely, e. (1994). planning local economic development: theory and practice. london: sage publication clarke, s. e., & gaile, g. l. (1998). the work of cities (vol. 1). u of minnesota press. gomez, g. m., & helmsing, a. h. j. (2008). selective spatial closure and local economic development: what do we learn from the argentine local currency systems? world development, 36(11), 2489-2511. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.11.015 hampwaye, g., & rogerson, c. m. (2011). local development responses in zambia-the case of kitwe. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 18 published by scholink inc. africa insight, 40(4), 35-52. https://doi.org/10.4314/ai.v40i4.65928 harvey, d. (1989). from managerialism to entrepreneurialism: the transformation in urban governance in late capitalism. geografiska annaler: series b, human geography, 71(1), 3-17. https://doi.org/10.1080/04353684.1989.11879583 helmsing, a. h. j. (2001). partnerships, meso-institutions and learning new local and regional economic development initiatives in latin america. institute of social studies, the hague, the netherlands. helmsing, a. h. j. (2003). local economic development: new generations of actors, policies and instruments for africa. public administration and development: the international journal of management research and practice, 23(1), 67-76. https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.260 helmsing, a. h. j. (2005). governance of local economic development in sub-saharan africa: who are the dancers and do they act‟in concert‟? iss working paper series/general series, 408, 1-5. retrieved from http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/32341/wp542 ilo. (2006). a local economic development manual for china. ilo, geneva. kahika, g., & karyeija, g. k. (2017). institutional roles and the implementation of local economic development, kasese district, uganda. africa’s public service delivery and performance review, 5(1), 1-9. https://doi.org/10.4102/apsdpr.v5i1.159 kanyane, m. h. (2008). conceptualizing local economic development as a community engagement strategy for poverty alleviation. journal of public administration, 43(special issue 1), 698-707. marais, l. (2010). donor-driven local economic development in peripheral areas of kwazulu-natal: the gijima programme. development southern africa, 27(4), 517-530. https://doi.org/10.1080/0376835x.2010.508583 mensah, j. k., bawole, j. n., & ahenkan, a. (2013a). local economic development initiatives in ghana: the challenges and the way forward. journal of public administration and governance, 3(2), 142-160. https://doi.org/10.5296/jpag.v3i2.3781 meyer-stamer, j. (2003). the hexagon of local economic development and led in south africa. mesopartner. meyer-steamer, j. (2008). systemic competitiveness and local economic development, large scale systemic change: theories, modeling and practices. duisburg, germany nel, e., & rogerson, c. m. (2005a). local economic development in the developing world: the experience of southern africa. transaction, new brunswick, nj and london. nel, e. (2007). critical reflections on urban and local development in africa. environment and planning c: government and policy, 25, 459-465. https://doi.org/10.1068/c2p nel, e. (2001). local economic development: a review and assessment of its current status in south africa. urban studies, 38(7), 1003-1024. https://doi.org/10.1080/00420980120051611 oduro-ofori, e. (2011). the role of local government in local economic development promotion at the district level in ghana (doctoral dissertation). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 19 published by scholink inc. rodriguez-pose, a. (2001, 2002). the role of the ilo in implementation local economic development strategies in a globalized world. ilo international labour organization, genève. rodriguez-pose, a., & tijmstra, s. (2009). on the emergence and significance of local economic development strategies. caf working paper, caf. 7. rogerson, c. m. (2010a). local economic development in south africa: strategic challenges. development southern africa, 27(4), 481-495. https://doi.org/10.1080/0376835x.2010.508580 rogerson, c. m., & rogerson, j. m. (2010). local economic development in africa: global context and research directions. development southern africa, 27(4), 465-480. https://doi.org/10.1080/0376835x.2010.508577 swinburn, g., & yatta, f. (2006a). furthering the local economic development agenda in africa. in unpublished paper presented by the municipal partnership at the africa cities conference, nairobi. swinburn, g., yatta, f., kreutz, c., & beez, p. (2007). local economic development network of africa: concept paper. united cities and local governments of africa (uclga). in the district assembly. in m. alam & r. koranteng (eds.) decentralization in ghana. papers presented at the workshops held at gimpa, ghana from (2010, 82-89). tegegne gebre-egziabher, r. c., & zini, g. (2011). assessment of local economic development (led) approach in ethiopia, report submitted to united nations development programme and ministry of finance and economic development of the government of ethiopia. world bank. (2004). local business enabling environment survey. retrieved from http://www.worldbank.org/urban/led microsoft word ape-v1n2-p126.doc advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 126 original paper economic inclusion: a paradigm shift from the radical economic transformation (ret) in the context of growing xenophobia in south africa buhle mpofu1* (note 1) 1 school of religion philosophy and classics (srpc), university of kwazulu-natal, pietermaritzburg, south africa * buhle mpofu, school of religion philosophy and classics (srpc), university of kwazulu-natal, pietermaritzburg, south africa received: october 10, 2018 accepted: october 26, 2018 online published: october 31, 2018 doi:10.22158/ape.v1n2p126 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v1n2p126 abstract this article analyses the experience of migration in the light of radical economic transformation (ret) program of the sa government and argues that the program has been high jacked by nationalists who are now using transformation to side-line non south africans in the socio-economic development programmes. article contends that migrants contribute to regional, national, and global development through networks and (like anywhere in the world) are an integral part of the south african society, playing a “multifaceted role” in various capacities such as workers, business owners, community members/organisers and leaders of social justice and faith based movements. given the volatility of the south african society, it suggested that use of a term such as “economic inclusion” could be less controversial than radical economic transformation which breeds violence. in addition, it is suggested that while acknowledging that the extremes between poverty and wealth require a radical economic paradigm, political and public discourse should be sensitive to the volatility of the south african context and promote the inclusion of migrants in socio-economic development programs. keywords migration, transformation, economic development, southern africa, exclusion 1. the radical economic transformation (ret) program according the anc policy discussion document (note 2), the radical economic transformation (ret) program was born out of the anc’s 53rd national conference at mangaung in 2012 where it www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 127 published by scholink inc. was resolved that: “[w]e are boldly entering the second phase of the transition from apartheid colonialism to a national democratic society. this phase will be characterised by decisive action to effect economic transformation and democratic consolidation, critical both to improve the quality of life of all south africans and to promote nationbuilding and social cohesion”. in order to advance economic transformation, the anc resolved, at mangaung, as follows:  to promote growth and development and eradicate the triple scourge of unemployment, poverty and inequality,  to increase state-led infrastructure investment aimed at massively improving social and economic infrastructure, with an emphasis on the use of local content and local companies,  to give effect to the national development plan (ndp), and the new growth path and the industrial policy action plan with the aim of stimulating growth, employment and the re-industrialisation of the south african economy,  to transform the mining sector with the aim of widening the benefits of south africa’s abundance of minerals, including the creation of safe and decent work on the mines as well as benefits for near-mine local communities, as well as give particular focus to mineral beneficiation,  to promote youth employment, small business and co-operatives,  to build a developmental state with the technical and political capacity to lead development and transform the economy,  to maintain a supportive macroeconomic policy framework, oriented towards reconstruction, growth and development, and informed by the imperatives of sustainability and long-run macroeconomic stability. this document was circulated as the anc prepared for policy conference and national conference in 2017 where they took stock of the economic conditions locally and globally and later adopted the policy for implementation. commenting on this program, deon oberholzer the ceo of gestalt (note 3) observed that “radical economic transformation done right is economic inclusion”. highlighting the shortfalls of the mining charter as an example of how the term “transformation” is misleading, he noted that, “the current version of the mining charter excludes a proper integration of the transformation of the sector’s supply chain, one of the most important areas in which transformation could occur”. the term. radical, has also been misunderstood to imply use of force by the poor masses who are desperate for economic change in a country where unemployment …“increased to 27.2 percent in the second quarter of 2018 from 26.7 percent in the previous period. the number of unemployed rose by 103 thousand to 6.08 million while the number of employed fell by 90 thousand to 16.29 million”. (note 4) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 128 published by scholink inc. 2. economic inclusion as an alternative term what i also find misleading is the use of the term “radical”, given the high levels of violence, crime and corruption it would appear like some opportunists are now using it for political and selfish gains, at the expense of national development. as a transformation expert, oberholzer suggested that terms such as “economic inclusion” is a less scary way of talking ret. while acknowledging that the extremes between poverty and wealth require a radical economic paradigm, political and public discourse should be sensitive to the volatility of the south african context and promote peace and stability. for example, the economic freedom fighters (eff)’s land reform draws it radical approach from this narrative and most landless people have been using this political drive to conduct “unlawful” land invasions. in an article that seeks to conceptualise “radical land reform” jankielsohn and duvenhage (2017) examine similar approaches in the people’s republic of china (prc), the former union of soviet socialist republics (ussr) and zimbabwe to draw lessons through comparative analysis indicating that land reform requires a balance between existing land rights and food security on the one hand, and the urgency for historical redress and redistribution on the other and observing that: a great deal of political rhetoric has been uttered regarding radical economic transformation that includes calls for more radical land reform proposals. this rhetoric is the source of political mobilisation in both the governing african national congress (anc), as well as the economic freedom fighters (eff) opposition. while the anc call for the end of the willing buyer, willing seller principle in land reform policies and legislation in line with their national democratic revolution (ndr), the eff support a more extreme expropriation without compensation approach. both these approaches can be regarded as forms of radical land reform that are grounded in their specific ideological orientations (jankielsohn & duvenhage, 2017). jankielsohn and duvenhage (2017) further observe that radicals are known to challenge the most established values of society and may differ from one another in fundamental ways. on the one hand there are radicals who postulate the idea, “i know the good, extend it”, while on the other side there are those who postulate, “i know the evil, eliminate it”. while the former may promote greater involvement in their approach to politics, the latter may promote greater resistance (stankiewicz, 2001, p. 217). those on the extreme left of the radical spectrum are often referred to as hawks, due to the often violent methods employed by them, while those on the right of this spectrum are referred to as doves, due to the often peaceful methods of protest. within the south african context, the use of the term “radical” provides political justification for leaders who think they “know good from evil” and therefore consider themselves as liberators of the masses, with little or no consideration on of the implications for such rhetoric on peace and stability. in my view, this political discourse is partly responsible for the violent crimes and xenophobia which are prevalent in south african communities. therefore, it is not surprising that the ret program has received mixed opinions since it was launched. for example, the sunday times (note 5) reported that one of south africa’s richest businessmen johann rupert described the program as “a code word for theft” to the ire of the political leaders who www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 129 published by scholink inc. labelled him a capitalist. what was even more detrimental to the government was that rupert made these comments in geneva on the side-lines of richemont’s annual general meeting. making such comments in a global platform would surely impact on the global image of south africa, and this was the reason there was swift diplomatic intervention to allay fears from investors. government had to give assurances that alleged corruption exposed through what is now known as “state capture” was in the process of formal investigations and had nothing to do with the rat program. a similar diplomatic intervention from the anc led government (note 6) was also displayed after the us president trump tweeted on south africa’s land reform program after watching news from fox news who alleged that south africa’s land reform was racist, prompting the rand to fall as investors reacted negatively. the south african government hit back, tweeting that it “totally rejects this narrow perception which only seeks to divide our nation” and later issued public statements to assure investors that the land reform program will be conducted lawfully and south africa will not follow the route taken by zimbabwe. on the contrary, we have not seen such high level interventions when migrants are attacked. the government continues to downplay violent xenophobia and instead, it has naturalised anti-outsider violence by constantly blaming it on criminality or the natural resentment poor south africans feel towards those they perceive as “stealing” opportunities from them, ignoring evidence from authoritative studies which have warmed the government of impending attacks. similarly, civil society efforts have fared little better in arresting the violence as most organisations have also responded in what others (note 7) call a classic “garbage-can” fashion, matching ready-made solutions to problems through marches, education campaigns, rights awareness symposiums, and social cohesion summits, ignoring documented abuse of migrants. changing dynamics in south african communities constantly present complex challenges which will require new interventions based on the recognition that migrants are an integral part of the south african society. 3. radical transformation, as exclusion of migrants it is a well-documented reality that the response to increased migration in the world has been marked by restrictive regulatory responses to migrations flows especially in europe where they frame asylum seekers fleeing wars in syria, libya, yemen and other countries as a “security threat” and thereby criminalise the act of seeking safety, including the humanitarian aid workers and organisations. for example, in june this year the world witnessed a “cruel stand-off” (note 8) on the mediterranean when the governments of italy and malta refused to allow the vessel with 630 migrants and asylum seekers to dock from a search and rescue operation conducted by sos mediterranne and doctors without borders (msf). equally disturbing was the eu’s deal with turkey which provided turkey with financial compensation to block asylum seekers and migrants coming into europe, clandestinely violating international law and abdicating its moral and legal responsibilities to provide asylum to those in great need. sadly, we are seeing an upsurge of similar responses in south africa, albeit in different forms as the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 130 published by scholink inc. south african political and public discourses on foreign migrants are increasingly oriented towards regimes of exclusion, as opposed to promotion of diversity. civic and state approach to migration along this trajectory ranges from integration, tolerance, to outright hostile xenophobia which manifests in sporadic waves of xenophobic attacks and a clear distinction between citizens/non-citizens brazenly maintained and now slowly reinforced through legislature which limit rights to non-south african citizens. as the vestiges of apartheid remain intact, neoliberalists resist socio-economic transformation intended to shift the balance of fortunes towards creating more opportunities for the previously disadvantaged black majority. from the early 1990s, which kicks off a particularly neoliberal phase of capitalist globalization which necessitated the surge in migrations flows, the global economy has changed rapidly as migrations shift from significant numbers of highly skilled professionals to ordinary people on the move. to stem this tide, the south african government now prioritises reception of highly skilled labour, neglecting its legal responsibility to provide refuge to asylum seekers. these restrictive and inhuman policies against the movement of people wane humanitarianism and have led to hospitality fatigue. as agnes musonda and liesbeth schokaert (note 9) observed while reflecting on the white paper on immigration by the department of home affairs, the highlight the south african government’s subtle move to stifle migration when they observe that: last year, the cabinet approved locating the department of home affairs within the security cluster (alongside justice, police, military and correctional services). it repositioned the department towards adopting a new, empowered border management approach and playing a strategic role in south africa’s economic development. additionally, south africa’s recently adopted white paper on international migration is evidence of a trajectory that will conflate migration legislation and policy with national security and migrants with skills and capital”, and shut out unskilled people from the region with more stringent measures, including criminalising the undocumented, who keep entering the country… in crude terms, it proposes introducing interventions to “attract international migrants with skills and capital”, and shut out unskilled people from the region with more stringent measures, including criminalising the undocumented, who keep entering the country. in what the authors refer to as a callous policy, they argue that the passing of the border management agency bill by the national assembly last year set in motion the creation of a centralised authority with sweeping powers over south africa’s ports of entry, including policing and customs. the bill is set to be considered by the national council of provinces although legal experts and civic organisations that took part in the consultative process of the bill, have raised concerns about extensive powers of search, seizure and arrest with or without a warrant contained in the bill, which could lead to the abuse of vulnerable people and asylum seekers. based on the comparisons with the developments in europe, musonda and schokaert conclude that the white paper paved way towards south africa’s eerily path which is reminiscent of some of what we have witnessed in europe and they warn that south africans now face a challenge to: stand up to prevent a roll-back of protections that vulnerable people require when they flee persecution and unliveable conditions back home, or witness the institutionalised erosion of humanity www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 131 published by scholink inc. and dignity we’ve seen globally. within the south african context, the political and public discourse on transformation seems to be taking another dimension; it means putting south african citizens first and replacing foreigners in employment positions with south african citizens, especially in public institutions managed by the government. as part of ongoing research i have listened to migrants and refugees sharing their experiences of living in south africa and most of them live in fear, hopelessness as they are not certain if their jobs or economic welfare is guaranteed under the new dispensation of radical economic transformation. most of the people that i have engaged, have either been directly affected or know of someone who has been exposed to the following:  work permits have not been renewed or have been declined  permanent residence applications have been declined  promotion to senior position denied in favour of a local south african  employment denied even when they qualify for the job  affected by changes in the requirements for various permits/citizenship in an article entitled, the limits of social responsibility with respect to religion and migration in south africa (note 10) we contrasted the views of mary robinson (note 11) who proposed an expansion of the concept of citizenship to embrace all those people who find themselves in the country-nationals and migrants alike with the current mayor of johannesburg, speaking against african migrants in the city with the largest settlement of migrants in south africa. we argued that herman mashaba, unlike mary robinson, draws a stark distinction between citizens and migrants, and he has risen to prominence for his very critical stance against migrants as he announced marking his 100 days in office “i will do everything possible to provide accommodation. but the city of johannesburg will only provide accommodation to south africans. foreigners, whether legal or illegal, are not the responsibility of the city”. (note 12) while many have dismissed mayor mashaba as xenophobic nationalist, we observed that a close reading of his speeches suggest that he frames his expulsion of migrants as a socially responsible campaign, invoking the right to exclude migrants in the interest of the citizenry and national development. in this paper we also discussed recent developments in the field of religion and migration studies and argued that migration of people has untapped resources for development and social transformation, warning that engagements with migration serves as a barometer for social cohesion and social responsibility in south africa. it is therefore critical to counter and debunk these divisive discourses which unconsciously sustain and reinforce parallel societies through the exclusion or marginalisation of migrants. with migration a part of global life for many societies, there is growing intolerance and the phenomenon of parallel migrant communities living on the margins of society, has emerged as a counter response to nationalism and marginalisation of foreigners in host communities. as laura grillo (in adogame & spickard, 2010, p. 143) also observes; the “african diaspora” has been conceived as an epistemological community, a shared consciousness activating a sense of transnational affiliation www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 132 published by scholink inc. across political boundaries”. laura further suggest that the consciousness of the african diaspora, and the self-conscious communities it fosters, has its basis in an overarching religious worldview, and more particularly, in the principles and values encoded in and transmitted through the practice of divination and its culminating ritual sacrifice. religion often binds migrants together as means to sustain and maintain migrant communities. migrants contribute to the construction and reconstruction of communities in many ways. for example, a recent publication migrants and city-making (note 13), caglar and schliller (2018) demonstrate how migrants contribute to regional, national, and global development through networks and debunk the notion that migrants threaten social cohesion/stability and challenge assumptions that they exist on the periphery of society (and require integration). instead, as caglar and schiller rightly argue, migrants play a “multifaceted role” as city makers, urban developers, business owners, community organisers and leaders of social justice movements. by reflecting on the role of migrants in city making in this way, the authors highlight how urban development or city making as they call it, highlights multiple forces at play as people move. it is therefore disturbing to note how the current political and public discourse frame migrants as helpless people who need the sympathy and hospitality of the host communities. the political and public discourse on transformation seems to be taking another dimension; it means putting south african citizens first and replacing foreigners and changing this situation will also require going against dominant narratives to destabilise the language and approaches used to speak about violence and immigration in south african and the rest of the world. 4. conclusion this article first analysed south africa’s radical economic transformation (ret) program and suggested that a term “economic inclusion” is less controversial rather than radical economic transformation which fuels crime and xenophobic violence. drawing from the global increase in migration, article observed that there has been restrictive regulatory responses to migrations flows and there is a tendency to frame migrants and asylum seekers as a “security threat”. in addition, while acknowledging that the extremes between poverty and wealth require a radical economic paradigm, political and public discourse should be sensitive to the volatility of the south african context and promote the inclusion of migrants in socio-economic development programs. this article also argued that the radical economic program of the sa government has been high jacked by nationalists who are now using transformation to side-line non south africans in the socio-economic development programmes and contends that migrants contribute to regional, national, and global development through networks and (like anywhere in the world) are an integral part of the south african society, playing a “multifaceted role” in various capacities such as workers, business owners, community members/organisers and leaders of social justice and faith based movements. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 133 published by scholink inc. references çaglar, a., & schiller, n. g. 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(2004). translocal development: italy-senegal. population, space and place, 10(2), 99-111. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.321 http://ewn.co.za/2017/07/24/joburg-mayor-mashaba-foreigners-not-the-responsibility-of-the-city# http://gestaltconsult.com/radical-economictransformation/?gclid=eaiaiqobchmi24w_lca13qivy7ht ch36faz7eaayasaaegjxn_d_bw http://www.anc.org.za/sites/default/files/national%20policy%20conference%202017%20economic% 20transformation_1.pdf http://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/11/italy-refuses-to-accept-migrant-rescue-ship-in-standoff-with-malta.ht ml https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/266925/government-responds-to-trumps-land-tweet-as-ran d-takes-a-knock/ accessed 13 september 2018. https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/unemployment-rate?continent=asia https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/business/2017-09-13-radical-economic-transformation-is-jus t-a-code-word-for-theft-rupert/ accessed 13 september 2018. jankielsohn, & duvenhage. (2017). radical land reform in south africa. journal for contemporary history. machado, d. l. et al. (ed.). (2018). borderland religion ambiguous practices of difference. in hope and beyond. new york: routledge. mpofu, b., & settler, f. (2017). the limits of social responsibility with respect to religion and migration in south africa. journal for the study of religion, 30(2), 12-31. muschiol, g. (2011). migrating nuns-migrating liturgy? the context of reform in female convents of the late middle ages. paper presented at a conference on liturgy and migration; cultural contexts from the upper room to the cyberspace. feb 24-27, yale institute of sacred music. musonda, & schockeart. (2018). south africa on a perilous path to making criminals of people on the move. mail and guardian, 16 august 2018. stankiewicz, w. j. (2001). the essential stankiewicz on the importance of political theory. vancouver: ronsdale press. notes note 1. dr buhle mpofu is a post-doctoral research fellow at the university of kwazulu-natal’s school of religion, philosophy and classics in pietermaritzburg, south africa. buhle has an interest on the role of religion and human rights on the experience of migration and is also an ordained minister www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 134 published by scholink inc. within the uniting presbyterian church in southern africa. most of his research focuses on the interface between religion and the lived experience of migration and his phd thesis was entitled, “when the people move, the church moves”: a critical exploration of the interface between migration and theology through a missional study of selected congregations within the uniting presbyterian church of southern africa in johannesburg and this study demonstrated how migrants appropriate their vulnerability and marginalization to reinvent and recreate metaphors of survival through constructing or deconstructing new forms of identity in contested transnational religious spaces within their hostile communities. note 2. http://www.anc.org.za/sites/default/files/national%20policy%20conference%202017%20 economic%20transformation_1.pdf note 3. http://gestaltconsult.com/radical-economic-transformation/?gclid=eaiaiqobchmi24w_lca13 qivy7htch36faz7eaayasaaegjxn_d_bwe note 4. https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/unemployment-rate?continent=asia note 5. https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/business/2017-09-13-radical-economic-transformatio n-is-just-a-code-word-for-theft-rupert/ note 6. https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/266925/government-responds-to-trumps-land tweet-as-rand-takes-a-knock/ note 7. musonda and schockeart, south africa on a perilous path to making criminals of people on the move. mail and guardian, 16 august 2018. note 8. http://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/11/italy-refuses-to-accept-migrant-rescue-ship-in-standoff-with malta.html note 9. musonda and schockeart, south africa on a perilous path to making criminals of people on the move. mail and guardian, 16 august 2018. note 10. mpofu, b., & settler, f. (2017). the limits of social responsibility with respect to religion and migration in south africa. journal for the study of religion, 30(2017) 12-31 online issn 2413-3027. note 11. mary robinson is the former president of ireland and president of the mary robinson foundation-climate justice. the lecture, “freedom, truth, democracy: citizenship and common purpose” was delivered on xxxx and reported in the sunday times xxx (sunday times, 14 july, 2013: 10). not 12. “joburg mayor mashaba: foreigners not the responsibility of the city” reported on 24 july 2017 (see http://ewn.co.za/2017/07/24/joburg-mayor-mashaba-foreigners-not-the-responsibility-of-the-city#) note 13. ayse çaglar and nina glick schiller, 2018. their work was grounded in comparative ethnographies of three cities struggling to regain their former standing—mardin, turkey; manchester, new hampshire; and halle/saale, germany—çaglar. in each city çaglar and glick schiller met with migrants from around the world; attended cultural events, meetings, and religious services; and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 135 published by scholink inc. patronized migrant-owned businesses, allowing them to gain insights into the ways in which migrants build social relationships with non-migrants and participate in urban restoration and development. by exploring the changing historical contingencies within which migrants live and work, çaglar and glick schiller highlight how city-making invariably involves engaging with the far-reaching forces that dispossess people of their land, jobs, resources, neighborhoods, and hope. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 194 original paper literature review of research on biharis issue yingying du1* 1 school of history and culture, china west normal university, nanchong, china *yingying du, school of history and culture, china west normal university, nanchong, china received: april 19, 2024 accepted: may 15, 2024 online published: may 29, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n2p194 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n2p194 abstract during the partition, approximately 1.3 million urdu-speaking muslims, suffering communal riots, migrated to the former east pakistan. they were known as biharis. the pakistan ruling class prefered biharis due to their muhajir status. therefore, they supported pakistani domination consciously. some biharis joined the pakistan army during the bangladesh liberation war. all biharis were considered traitors. a number of biharis opted for pakistan. despite a repatriation process lasting over 20 years, many biharis still stranded. the biharis were granted bangladeshi citizenship in 2008. however, they continue to face challenges integrating into mainstream in terms of education, employment, travel and residence. since the 1970s, extensive research has been conducted by the international academic community on various aspects related to the origin of biharis, repatriation efforts, identity issues and human rights. with the influence of international academics, there has been an increasing focus within chinese academics on the plight of biharis. the biharis issue remains further study from various perspectives and angles. we can understand nation-state construction processes as well as examining geopolitical dynamics within south asia from an ethnic perspective. keywords biharis, repatriation, diaspora, identity 1. introduction bihari is an common term for the urdu-speaking non-bengali muslims who migrated from india to bangladesh (former east pakistan) during the partition of india. around the time of subcontinent partition in 1947, approximately 1.3 million urdu-speaking muslims migrated from india to east pakistan because of communal riots by hindus, of whom about a million came from bihar of india and its neighbouring regions.therefore this ethic group were called collectively as biharis. under the rule of pakistan, the biharis were valued and favored by pakistan ruling class due to their linguistic and cultural backgrounds. as muhajirs, they enjoyed preferential treatment. driven by muhajir identity and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 195 practical interests, biharis had always supported a united pakistan encompassing east pakistan. as tensions between east and west pakistan growing, the biharis' political tendency to maintain pakistan national unity led them to be seen as symbol of pakistan colonial ruling. in addition, the biharis were attacked by the bengali extreme nationalists. during the bangladesh liberation war in 1971, some biharis joined the pakistan army (razakars) in the massacres of bengalis for their previous acts of violence. after liberation war, all of biharis were regarded as collaborators of pakistan and traitors, subjected to discrimination and reprisals, and were deprived of their property by the bangladesh new goverment and stranded in refugee camps. as a result, a vast number of biharis chosed to renounce their bangladesh citizenship, hoping return to pakistan as pakistan citizens. the repatriation of biharis became a remaining humanitarian issue of bangladesh liberation war. over 20 years, the governments of bangladesh and pakistan continuously negotiated on this issue. besides, the united nations and the international community also concerned about the fate of the biharis. however, with the changing politic landscape in the subcontinent and the domestic political turmoil in pakistan, pakistan stopped accepting biharis since 1993. the biharis have been labeled differently as stranded pakistanis, non-bengalis and urdu-speaking. due to pakistan's refusal, the biharis moved from pursuing repatriation to struggling to bangladesh citizenship identity. with the help of united nations human rights organizations, the biharis in bangladesh were officially granted citizenship in 2008. but citizenship is only the first step towards integration into mainstream bangladeshi society, and they still face systematic discrimination in education, housing, employment and other aspects. biharis communities have also become hotbeds of criminal activity in bangladesh, including the drug trade, posing challenges to regional security and governance in south asia. there is every indication that the issue of biharis in bangladesh has not yet been properly resolved. the issue of biharis, as a historical legacy between the two countries, not only impacts bilateral exchanges and cooperation, but also serves as a destabilizing factor affecting regional security in south asia. due to historical and practical considerations, more and more scholars have devoted themselves to the study of biharis issues in bangladesh. this paper seeks to do a critical literature review on the biharis issue in bangladesh. the literature review analysis of the biharis issue in bangladesh will be based on four themes—the origin of the biharis, repatriation of biharis, identity disputes and human rights. it is anticipated that this literature review will facilitate further research on the biharis issue in bangladesh. 2. existing english literature review the biharis issue in bangladesh gained attention in 1972 report of the international commission of jurists—east pakistan events of 1971: a legal study. this report, based on contemporary newspaper accounts, refugee testimony, and oral accounts by jurists, details the events that occurred in east pakistan in 1971, including those involving the biharis. subsequently, there has been a gradual increase in research on the bihari problem in bangladesh, encompassing survey reports, monographs, papers www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 196 and coverage within works on bangladesh history. following collection and organization efforts, research primarily focuses on the following four themes. 2.1 origin of the biharis in bangladesh academics usually trace this issue back to around the partition of india in 1947. some schoolers argued that the hostility towards the biharis in bangladesh has social, political and linguistic roots (ben & lain guest, 1972). certain schooler provides an overview of the history of bihar migration from the partition of india to the bangladesh liberation war, and keep optimistic outlook for resolution of the bihar issue (ennals, 1987). someone explains the historical and political factors that have contributed to the fate of the "biharis" (kuczkiewicz-fraś, 2019). in addition, some historical works also touch on this issue. willem van schendel documents the transformation of the biharis from muhajirs to bangladesh traitors, living a long and turbulent life. (van schendel, 2020). papiya ghosh, in her works, focuses on the ethnic violence that occurred in the northern part of the subcontinent before the partition of india , providing readers with an insight into the migration paths of the biharis diaspora (papiya, 2014). overall, the partition of india and the bangladesh liberation war are closely intertwined with the origin of the biharis issue in bangladesh. 2.2 repatriation of biharis in bangladesh the process of repatriation of biharis has lasted for more than two decades, attracting continuous attention. scholars usually make different interpretations from their national standpoint. pakistan academics either think that the repatriation of biharis had been resolved, or that any dissent in bangladesh comes from the their domestic political opposition rather than the mainstream (farzana, 1989), or regard the repatriation of biharis as "the most sensitive humanitarian issue" between the two countries, emphasizing that bangladesh should take responsibility for the repatriation failure (mahmood, sadaf, & nadia, 2015). bangladesh scholars generally emphasize the necessity and justification of pakistan's acceptance of biharis (zaglul, 2003). indian scholars generally dismiss the implicit responsibility disputes between pakistan and bangladesh scholars, arguing that the complex ethnic group relations in pakistan and the dynamic diplomatic relations between the two countries lead to the failure of repatriation (mohammad, 1997). outside the south asian, some scholars believe that the repatriation of biharis had an impact on the diplomatic relations between india, pakistan and bangladesh (kathryn, 1999). there also have scholars from an international law perspective to explore the role of international organizations in resolving the repatriation of biharis in bangladesh (md. kamrul, 2018). however, most scholars focus on the reasons for the failure of repatriation, and few discuss the factors that affect the long-term survival of repatriation. 2.3 identity disputes of biharis in bangladesh because the repatriation process goes on for years, the identity of biharis in bangladesh has long been debated among scholars. the cut-off point is bangladesh granted citizenship to biharis in 2008. before this, someone considered the biharis are stateless and pointed out the biharis in bangladesh were in an awkward position because bangladesh could neither impose citizenship on traitors nor increase www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 197 expenditure on non-bengalis. however, pakistan goverments argued that the 200,000 stranded urdu-speaking non-bengalis were not pakistanis. (a.f.m kamaluddin, 1985). someone pointed out that the statelessness of the biharis stems from the partition of pakistan in 1971. behind the identity dispute lies the issue of responsibility for repatriation. pakistani officials have been cautious in using “stranded pakistani” (eric, 2006). after the biharis were granted bangladesh citizenship, scholars began to focus on the practical implementation of citizenship rights for the biharis, conclusing that the citizenship of the biharis is not worthy. someone argued the current differential treatment of the biharis in terms of their identity is the result of the procrastination of bangladesh and pakistan (kazi, 2009). someone noted that the biharis in bangladesh still suffered discriminatory policies and treatment with regard to public services, employment, education and so on, they remained stateless in fact (zaglul, 2018). besides, some scholars have noted intergenerational differences in self-identity within biharis community. arifur rahaman through a survey, point out the younger generation of biharis generally consider themselves bangladeshis. the main factor of this phenomenon is the economic status (arifur, 2020). some schoolers examined both legal and non-legal factors behind the deplorable condition of the biharis in bangladesh. (zaglul, 2024) 2.4 human rights of the biharis in bangladesh the international community has long been concerned about the human rights of the biharis in bangladesh. this includes not only the violence suffered by the biharis during bangladesh's liberation war, but also the deplorable camp conditions in which they live today. earlier studies focused on the violence and physical security suffered by the biharis. some schoolers relied on the provisions of international law to make allegations of atrocities against minorities such as the biharis in bangladesh during 1971 liberation war, and argued that specialized tribunals should be set up to ensure that human rights of biharis (niall, 1973). in recent years, scholars have focused on the biharis’camp and studied the real challeges faced by the biharis through field surveys, data analysis and interviews. for example, some schoolers pointed that the biharis' food consumption, healthcare expenditures, education, income, and employment patterns are extremely substandard and the prevalence of infectious diseases in the camps can also expose the country to serious social problems (ahsan & hussain, 1990). some schoolers argueed that the biharis, in most of the cases, are not able to meet the basic needs such as food, clothing, shelter, education and basic needs such as health facilities and are considered one of the poorest and most vulnerable groups in bangladesh (s.m. ashikur elahee, 2013). some schoolers argued that the camps have both protected the specificities of the biharis and negatively affected their integration into bangladesh society (abdullah, 2022). 3. existing chines literature review in 1882, sun shihai translated the minority rights group's report on the bihar issue, chinese academics began to pay attention to the biharis in bangladesh. some chinese schoolers published articles to describing the origin of the bihar issue and the dilemma it faces in bangladesh (ling, 1992). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 198 enter the 21st century, with the deepening of china's engagement with bangladesh, chinese schoolers have paid more attention to the bihar issue, studying biharis issue in the framework of bangladesh-pakistan relations and the politic situation of the two countries. for example, some schoolers argued that the biharis issue has hindered the relations and friendly exchange between pakistan and bangladesh, as well as negatively affected the regional security of south asia (chen, 2011). some schoolers pointed out that the biharis issue has become a historical problem affecting the normalization of relations between bangladesh and pakistan (luo, 2015). some schoolers pointed out that the repatriation of the biharis in bangladesh had affected the muhajir movement in pakistan (yang & li, 2016） in addition to these papers, some monographs in china have also introduced the basic information of the ethnic minority biharis in bangladesh. such as politics and economy of bangladesh (xie & lin, 1994), contemporary bangladesh (zhang, 1999), bangladesh (liu, 2010), and studies on political development and ethnic issues in bangladesh (zhang, 2015). in general, the attention paid by chinese academics to the issue of the biharis in bangladesh is still extremely limited, and no systematic research has yet emerged. 4. strengths andweaknesses of existing literature in general, the english academics have studied the biharis issue in bangladesh trough a wide perspective, with a variety of innovative research methods, achieving rich and varied results. their works provide a basis for chinese scholars to continue further research on the issue of the biharis in bangladesh. however, based on the current academic research results, there are still some areas that can be further explored. firstly, in the scope of the study, most schoolers focuses on the biharis living in dhaka, khulna and other big cities, and pays insufficient attention to the biharis in the rest of the cities, or other smaller camp. secondly, in the subject, most scholars regarded the historical biharis as a whole without class, gender or age, and although recent studies have focused on the differences within the biharis, but the relative neglect of history is not conducive to further research. thirdly, in the research perspectives, there is a lack of clarity in bangladesh about the changing attitudes and policies of biharis, both official and civilian. most studies look at the plight faced by the biharis in bangladesh from the historical, political, ethnic, and legal perspectives, but lack economic and psychological perspectives. 6. conclusion biharis issue in bangladesh is the products of political turmoil in south asia. their identity is complex and changeable. throughout history, they were political immigrants from northern india subcontinent who have been devastated by the communal riots in south asia. they were victims of pakistan's failure to build a unified state. they served as a tool for pakistan, bangladesh and india to pursue their respective political objectives and interests. they were stateless and their status had long been a point www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 199 of contention between the bangladesh and pakistan. presently, they are a marginal linguistic minority in bangladesh and face challenges in integrating into mainstream society. therefore, the study of biharis in bangladesh holds significant academic value and practical importance. from a theoretical perspective, focusing on ethnic minorities allows for a re-examination of the extensive impact of political turmoil in south asia, as well as an analysis of both success and failure of nation-building in bangladesh and pakistan similar to other post-colonial countries. from a practical perspective, the study of biharis in bangladesh help us to understand the evolving relationship between bangladesh and pakistan at different history periods, as well as comprehend how domestic ethnic issues affect the society and politics of bangladesh and pakistan. futhermore, research on biharis issues also deepens our understanding of current domestic affairs in bangladesh while offering practical references for addressing other similar problems like rohingya refugees, even chittagong hill tracs conflict, contributing to useful insights for constructing the bcim economic corridor. it is encouraging that the government of bangladesh is also working to address this real problem faced by minorities in bangladesh. on june 20, 2023, national housing and public works minister sharif ahmed said the government plans to build 5,600 homes in keraniganj township on the outskirts of dhaka, to accommodate non-bangladeshis living in the bihar refugee camp in mohammadpur, dhaka.the long-term marginalized biharis are expected to gradually integrate into mainstream bangladeshi society (dhaka, 20 jun 2023). references ahsan, r. m., & shahnaz, h. h. (1990). a review of socio-economic and nutritional issues of bihari camp dwellers in bangladesh: a micro study. geojournal, (20), 285-291. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00642993 arif, md k. h. (2018). the status of the bihari community in bangladesh under domestic and international law. international journal on minority and group rights, 25(4), 664-678. https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-02503006 chen, x. p. (2011). the issue of biharis in bangladesh-pakistan relations. south asian studies quarterly, (3), 17-22. dhaka, t. (20 jun 2023). non-bengalis stranded since 1971 to be rehabilitated in keraniganj housing. retreived from https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/313929/non-bengalis-stranded-since-1971-to-be elahee, s. m. (march 9, 2013). the livelihood pattern and plight of bihari people: a study on bihari camp at khalishpur in khulna city, bangladesh. bangladesh. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2230830 ennals, l. (1987). biharis in bangladesh: the third great migration?. institute of muslim minority affairs journal, 8(2), 238-245. https://doi.org/10.1080/02666958708716034 evan, a. al z., sheikh, s. h., & md masud, p. r. (2022). camp-life and social integration: case of the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 200 displaced biharis in khulna, bangladesh. journal of immigrant & refugee studies, 1-15. https://doi.org/10.1080/15562948.2022.2032905 farzana, k. f. (2009). an artificial minority: the stateless biharis in bangladesh. journal of muslim minority affairs, 29(2), 223-235. https://doi.org/10.1080/13602000902943682 ghosh, p. (2014). partition and the south asian diaspora: extending the subcontinent. routledge india. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315816111 haider, z. (2003). repatriation of the biharis stranded in bangladesh: diplomacy and development. asian profile, 31(6), 525-542. haider, z. 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(2015). bangladesh pakistan relations: a hostage to history. international journal of contemporary research, 5(2), 66-67. mohammad, t. (1997). the ‘stateless people of bangladesh: a study. in b. de, & r. samaddar (eds.), state, development and political culture: bangladesh and india (pp. 203-218). new delhi: har-anand publication. paulsen, e. (2006). the citizenship status of the urdu-speakers/biharis in bangladesh. refugee survey quarterly, 25(3), 54-69. https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdi0146 rahaman, a., akm, j. u., & md, s. h. (2020). origin and socio-cultural formation of bihari identity: a study on bihari community in bangladesh. international journal of social, political and economic research, 7(4), 879-903. https://doi.org/10.46291/ijospervol7iss4pp879-903 shakoor, f. (1989). pakistan-bangladesh relations-a survey. pakistan horizon, 42(2), 109-133. van schendel, w. (2020). a history of bangladesh. cambridge: cambridge university press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108684644 whitaker, b., & iain, g. (1972). the biharis in bangladesh. london: minority rights group. yang, h. g., & li, d. y. (2016). on the rise of pakistan`s mqm and its impact. south and southeast asian studies, (3), 91-95. zhang, s. j. (2015). studies on political development and ethnic issues in bangladesh. beijing: nation www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 201 publishing house. literature review of research on biharis issue yingying du1* 1 school of history and culture, china west normal abstract during the partition, approximately 1.3 million ur keywords references advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 59 original paper climate change and revisiting security from traditional state-centric to human security and beyond prof narottam gaan, ph. d, d. litt 1* , dr sudhansubala das 2 & dr banita mahanandia 3 1 former head, indira gandhi national tribal university, (central university), amarkantak madhya pradesh, india 2 associate professor and principal, p.p. dev mahavidyalaya, tigiria, cuttack, odisha, india 3 dr banita mahanandia, asst professor in political science, g. m university, sambalpur, odisha, india * prof narottam gaan, ph. d, d. litt, former head, department of political science, indira gandhi national tribal university (central university), amarkantak madhya pradesh, india received: june 28, 2022 accepted: july 8, 2022 online published: july 13, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n3p59 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n3p59 abstract traditional security premised on state and its military apparatus has got itself emasculated in the face of continuing emergence of new kind of threats from the non-traditional and nonstate centric sources. climate change and deepening environmental crisis along with other crises like demographic change, incidence of poverty, and rise of fatal and dangerous diseases have already thrown down the gauntlet to the realist paradigm of security built on state. out of all these what stands out as the greatest threat to entire humankind is the climate change with all its devastating consequences like global warming, sea level rise, floods, cyclones and storms not only killing and uprooting poor people from their homeland etc. but also dragging people into an unsafe, insecure and sepulchral uncertainty of life. the answer to the fundamental question of survival and security and of providing a dignified way of life to the individuals was tried to be found out in various world summits on climate change from kyoto to paris summit but it was not sufficient to keep the temperature of the earth down at 1.5 degree celsius at the pre industrial level by reducing emission of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere as agreed to by the world leaders. climate change inextricably connected with security and development based on fossil fuels necessitates a rethinking that urges upon all to view the earth, both animate and inanimate not mechanically as mere instruments to redound to human wellbeing, security and primrose way of life but they are co-constitutive of each other’s life tied in the web of togetherness or being together as propounded by the proponents of worldly security. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 60 published by scholink inc. keywords climate change, human security, climate change as threat to human security, climate change, security and conflict the conceptualized understanding and defining of security exclusively in military terms and narrowed down to achieving victory over the other in a particular geopolitical context since long reached its culmination in realist school of thought both in theory and practice when a political entity was anthropomorphized into a sovereign territorial state system. central to this thinking security has been built around state and its military establishment. it is the search for security that has brought human subjects into the domain of state. in other words, security constitutes the raison deter of the very creation of state. state has been the principal agency or subject of security and the individuals living within the territorial bound over which it has exclusive jurisdiction are the objects of security. in an anarchic international system as conceived by realism and neo-realism characterized by absence of any centralized authority to regulate the conduct of states, the states are the sole actors to define security and take appropriate military measures to prevent external threats from the other states. in this understanding security has been solely state centric and similarly, the threats are also state centric. in this analysis security threats were not conceived of beyond state and its military apparatus. this narrow traditional designing of security continues to shape the framework of security paradigm in the foreign policies of the states till today. when the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a state is threatened and the survival and life of its people are threatened by another state, it is held as a security threat. similar or more dangerous threats coming not from state but from other non-traditional sources were either ignored, underestimated or tried to fit into the narrow security straitjacket. its adequacy and relevance to meet successfully the myriad of threats emanating from the non-traditional sources was contested by the emergence of climate change, environmental catastrophe, malnutrition, incidence of rising poverty, environmental induced migration and spread of fatal and infectious diseases like covid-19 and missing women. the threats from these non-state sources happen to be more devastating than the nuclear wars. in 1980s there was an intellectual fermentation questioning the relevance of traditional state centric security in the changing scenarios and sternly argued for a change or rethinking of security. the debate over the direct connection between climate change and security harks back to the day security threats were understood as emanating from non-military and non-traditional elements. there are skeptics who maintain that climate factors will only marginally influence tomorrow‟s security environment, if at all. they point to significant natural fluctuations in climate patterns and short-term cyclical phenomena like el nino and the recently identified pacific decadal oscillation, the causes of which are not fully understood and deciphered. in their opinion, even if global warming does take place, many of its effects may be localized, benign or favorable. while reductions in rainfall may lead to desertification or water shortages in some regions, others will derive dividends from increased rainfall and higher crop yields. even where the fabric of the state is torn by environmentally induced conflicts, in all likelihood they www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 61 published by scholink inc. will be localized and have negligible effects on existing world order. sepulchral visions of starving millions from the south on their heels to edge their ways into the north in search of food are farfetched. 1. human security the study on environment and security has evolved over the years: from an early primacy on incorporating environmental and its concomitant upshots into the “definition of security” to putting a new premium on how environmental degradation can be a cause or magnifier of violent conflict both intrastate and interstate. an emerging trend within this evolution of non-military security threats has been a move toward greater emphasis on the concept of human security. human security is not in opposition to the earlier trends of redefining security or accounting for the environmental roots of violent conflict. it is an offshoot of these two trends. in a broader sense, human security concerned with security of the people in non-military terms is nothing but an extension of environmental security. the very verbiage used to define the term security in these nontraditional and broader senses is today found not dissimilar to that used to understand and define human security. while the concept of “human security” has earlier roots, its recent prominence emanates from the 1994 human development report (undp, 1994). its importance was further advanced by the report of the commission on global governance (cgg, 1995). both reports tried to shift the direction of the security discussion by focusing on issues of human life and human dignity rather than on weapons and territory. lorraine elliott points out two dimensions of the human security paradigm: the first is that the concept of “human security” provides an antidote to the more conventional focus on states, borders and territorial integrity. the answer to the question “security for whom” is not the state but the individual and communities, which suggests that even when a state is secure from external threats or internal instabilities, security for its people is not guaranteed. protecting individuals and communities from the consequences of environmental decline is therefore a security issue. the second dimension is that human insecurity (which includes equity, gender, human rights, and identity concerns) is a central factor in social tensions and political instabilities and conflicts that can… become a feature of state insecurity…. if peoples and communities are insecure economically, socially, politically, environmentally, state security can be fragile or uncertain. environmental security becomes a distributive equity problem rather than one simply of market failure, externalities or zero-sum calculations about access to resources and environmental services (elliott l. 2001, p. 449). 2. climate change and human security the question how changing climate patterns affects both inter-state relations and international and national security in a narrow, geo-strategic sense as well as the well-being and survival of human beings and humankind and thus human, water, health and livelihood security, comes to the fore with the findings of scientists about the imminence and impending danger of climate change looming large on www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 62 published by scholink inc. the entire humanity. on 6 april, 2007, the intergovernmental panel on climate change (ipcc) released the second part of its fourth assessment report demonstrating that the poor of this planet are most likely to suffer the worst effects of climate change. human security takes on a broader meaning when one considers basic needs for food, water, health—in short, livelihood and a place to live-the issues addressed in the millennium development goals. poor communities can be especially vulnerable, in particular, those concentrated in high-risk areas. they tend to have more limited adaptive capacities, and are more dependent on climate-sensitive resources such as local water and food supplies ( ipcc, 2007). furthermore, within the larger category of “the poor” lies the frequently invisible (including within that ipcc summary document) group: women. worldwide, seventy percent of those living below the poverty line are women for whom climate change represents very specific threats to security. when the impacts of climate change are brought home, then women, in their roles as the primary managers of family, food, water and health, must deal very directly with the impacts. while natural climate variations have existed for millennia, anthropogenic climate change has gradually emerged since the industrial revolution and especially after world war ii due to western pattern of development based on the availability of cheap fossil fuels (coal, oil, natural gas) and the dramatic increase in its consumption first primarily in the industrialized countries but now increasingly also in the rapidly growing economies of the bric states (brazil, russia, india, china), especially of china and india. 2.1 climate change, security and conflicts ben wisner and others have established the linkages between climate change and conflict having implications on national and international security (rohr u. 2006, pp. 3-7). on 9 january 2004, david king, the uk government‟s chief scientific adviser claimed that climate change is a far greater threat to the world than international terrorism. in february 2004, john reid mp, then british secretary of state for defence and now home secretary, argued that climate change may spark conflict between nations. he forecast that violence and political conflict would become more likely in the next 20 to 30 years as climate change turned land into desert, melted ice fields and poisoned water supplies. he listed climate change alongside the major threats in future decades, including terrorism, demographic changes, and global energy demand. “as we look beyond the next decade, we see uncertainty growing; uncertainty about the geopolitical and human consequences of climate change. …impacts such as flooding, melting permafrost and desertification could lead to loss of agricultural land, poisoning of water supplies and destruction of economic infrastructure. …more than 300 million people in africa currently lack access to safe water; climate change will worsen this dire situation” (wisner ben et al., n.d.). john ashton, the uk foreign secretary‟s special representative for climate change, said at a conference on “climate change: the global security impact”, at the royal united services institute on 24 january 2007: “there is every reason to believe that as the 21 st century unfolds, the security story will be bound together with climate change” (russell ben et al., 2006). “climate change is a security issue because if we don‟t deal with it, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 63 published by scholink inc. people will die and states will fail,” ashton concluded. further he pointed out that defense and security planners must face a paradox when assessing their responses to the problem. most security threats in today‟s world are amenable to some extent to a “hard power” or conventional reaction, he said, and demand will rise for such responses to climate change-related security problems. “but there is no hard power solution to climate change—you cannot force your neighbour to change its carbon emissions at the barrel of a gun” (quoted in vogel ben, 2007). sir crispin tickell, the former uk permanent representative to the un, highlighted the environmental factors behind societal collapse. professor john mitchell, the chief scientist at the uk met office, forecast that the coming decades will see a 30 per cent increase in severe drought. he added that africa will experience increased desertification, water stress and disease (littlecott chris, 2007). besides the uk, other nations have begun to assess the security implication of climate change. in 2002, the german ministry for the environment, nature conservation and nuclear safety published a commissioned report on climate change and conflicts raised the question whether climate change impacts can increase conflict potentials (tickell crispin sir, 2003). in spring 2004 an internal report by randall and schwartz for the u.s. department of defense on the impact of abrupt climate change on u.s. national security was leaked to the press (brauch, 2002). the british initiative during its security council security council presidency to put climate change on its agenda for 17 april 2007 has been the most recent attempt to “securitize” climate change in the context of geo-politics (brauch, 2004). 2.2 climate change as a threat and challenge to international, national and human security climate change poses many new threats and challenges to national security and international stability as well as to human security at other scales. the concept of human security was introduced first by undp in 1994 (president security council, 2007) and then developed further in a report by the human security commission, co-chaired by sadako ogata and amartya sen, in its report human security now (2003) (undp, 1994). the environmental dimension of human security has been addressed by an international team working on global environmental change and human security (gechs) and in several studies by the united nations university institute for environment and human security (unu-ehs) (brauch, 2005). in february 1999, during its presidency of the united nations security council, canada, a founding member of the human security network, put human security on the agenda by addressing the impact of armed conflicts on human beings (bogardi & brauch, 2005). in march 2005, then un secretary general, kofi annan, in his report in larger freedom (dedring, 2007), wrote of human security in a broad sense, the issue was placed on the agenda of the un general assembly in the fall of 2005. undp will take up the relationship between human development and climate change in its human development report 2007 (hdr), to be launched in november. over 17 years, undp has incrementally developed a sensitive measure of human development (the human development index—hdi). earlier studies have shown that the hdi correlates well with measures of disaster risk www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 64 published by scholink inc. such as undp‟s disaster risk index (dri), especially for less developed countries (annan kofi, 2005). preliminary analysis for this year‟s hdr suggests that climate change poses major obstacles to progress in meeting mdgs and maintaining progress raising the hdi: “there is a clear and present danger that climate change will roll back human development for a large section of humanity, undermining international cooperation aimed at achieving the millennium development goals (mdgs) in the process” (undp, 2004). concerning the mdgs individually, undp states (undp, 2007):…[c]limate change may pose a threat to food security through erratic rainfall patterns and decreasing crop yields, contributing to increased hunger. furthermore, adverse climate change impacts on natural systems and resources, infrastructure, and labor productivity may lead to reduced economic growth, exacerbating poverty. these effects threaten the achievement of mdg 1. loss of livelihood assets, displacement and migration may lead to reduced access to education opportunities, thus hampering the realization of mdg 2. depletion of natural resources and decreasing agricultural productivity may place additional burdens on women‟s health and reduce time for decision-making processes and income-generating activities, worsening gender equality and women‟s empowerment (mdg 3). increased incidence of vector-borne diseases, increases in heat-related mortality, and declining quantity and quality of drinking water will lead to adverse health effects threatening the achievement of mdgs 4, 5, 6 and 7. in general terms, the realization of mdg 7 may be jeopardized through climate change negatively impacting quality and productivity of natural resources and ecosystems, possibly irreversibly, threatening environmental sustainability. climate change, a global phenomenon, calls for a collective response in the form of global partnerships (mdg 8) linkages between climate change and security some effects of climate change are already evident and will become very clear in the human and climatic short run (2007-2020). they will increase and others will manifest themselves in the medium term (2021-2050); whilst in the long run (2051-2100), they will all be active and interacting strongly with other major trends: the end of the petroleum economy for many producing and consuming nations, possible financial and economic crisis, a larger population of humans, and a much more urbanized humanity—far in excess of the 50% now living in small to very large cities. all these processes will be accompanied by redistribution of population nationally and internationally (undp, 2007). such redistributions typically have significant gender dimensions; for example, extreme event impacts can lead to male out migration in search of work, culminating in an increase in women-headed households—a group often considered particularly vulnerable (simon david, 2007). the linkages between climate change and security are complex in many ways. to begin with, climate change involves the interactions of many systems such as the atmosphere, hydrosphere, cry sphere, and biosphere that are immensely complex in their own right. thus, a recurrent theme in ipcc reports is the significance of thresholds and non-linearities. when human systems are added to the mix, complexity escalates (delaney & shrader, 2000). livelihood security and other aspects of human security interact www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 65 published by scholink inc. with geo-strategic (or “hard”) security issues because of the national and regional upheavals that climate stress may put on livelihood systems already vulnerable and incapable of adapting (millennium ecosystem assessment, 2006). worldwide the rural and urban poor are already under stress, and for some groups such as women headed households in africa, adaptation to climate-induced stress will be very difficult indeed. as simon points out, climate change has both intermittent but increasingly frequent, extreme impacts (such as large storms and heat waves) and slow on-set, pervasive, cumulative effects (such as extinction of life forms and sea level rise (wisner ben et al., 2004). both kinds of effects may have a role in displacing human populations and disrupting their livelihoods. some major climate changes may actually occur rapidly. some efforts by state actors to mitigate and adapt to climate change may also further stress weak and marginal sections of the population such as indigenous groups and ethnic minorities, increasing discontent and alienation. in particular, large scale water management and forestry projects in the past have displaced such groups (simon david, 2007) and without safeguards are likely to do so as states expand mega-projects as part of their national climate adaptation programs. one example is the new dams being built in guatemala. such intra-state tension and possible conflict over the distribution of winners and losers in climate adaptation may spillover into regional conflicts, on the basis of recent experience in darfur. state actor adaptations may also weaken treaties such as regional water basin management and lead eventually to inter-state conflict. for example, sudan‟s decision to build a new dam on the nile, could have that result. 3. conclusion premised on newtonian and cartesian epistemology, the western political and economic thinking employed science to the ends of human beings—a commodious and luxurious life. not only that, it borrowed the insights of science to view nature as the lifeless other to be exploited for the attainment of these ends. this resulted in defining development based on fossil fuel technology and industrialization, which destroyed the nature with ramifying consequences upon the entire mankind. the result of following the western pattern of development since the beginning of industrialization has been the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere with the devastating consequences as noted above. the more a country is industrialized and considered developed, the more greenhouse gases it has emitted to the atmosphere. on this account, the industrialized north through its centuries of progress on this development trajectory has usurped the resources of the atmosphere at the cost of the developing and underdeveloped countries, and polluted the atmosphere. as the rich industrialized countries have unilaterally and inequitably messed up the atmosphere, they have squarely the historic responsibility of disabusing it of the debris. this is the argument put forth in the climate change debate by developing countries in response to american attempt at bringing the former into the task. today, the debate remains hanging on a crucial contradiction between the principle of inequity the north have been practicing since industrial revolution as to the uncontested access to the atmosphere denying the same www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 66 published by scholink inc. to the south and at the cost of nature and future generations, and the preachment of equity principle and meaningful participation to the south on the question of cleansing the atmosphere. the governments of rich countries have set the wrong targets to tackle climate change using outdated science. a paper published in 2006 by climatologist malte meinshausen suggests that if greenhouse gases reach a concentration of 550 parts per million (ppm) carbon dioxide equivalent, there is a 63-99 per cent chance that global warming will exceed two degrees. at 475 parts per million the average likelihood is 64 per cent. only if concentrations are stabilized at 400 parts per million or below is there a low chance that temperatures will rise by more than two degrees. the ipcc draft report contains similar figures. a concentration of 510 ppm gives a 33 per cent chance of preventing more than two degrees of warming. a concentration of 590 ppm gives a ten per cent chance. the current level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is 459 ppm. to give a high chance to humanity of preventing dangerous climate change, what is needed a programme so drastic that greenhouse gases in the atmosphere end up below the current concentrations. but no government has set itself this task. the eu and swedish government have established the world‟s most stringent target, which is 550ppm. it is of carbon dioxide alone. but this target gives the human beings a near certainty of an extra 2 degrees c. when other greenhouse gases are included, this translates into 666ppm, carbon dioxide equivalent. according to last autumn‟s stern report on the economics of climate change, at 650 ppm, there is a 60-95 per cent chance of 3 degrees c of warming. in his book heat, george monbiot estimated that to avoid two degrees of warming a global emission cut of 60 per cent per capita between now and 2030 is highly required. this translates into an 87 per cent cut in the u.k. a recent paper in the journal of climate change emphasizes that the sensitivity of global temperatures to greenhouse gas concentrations remains uncertain. but using the average figure, to obtain a 50 per cent chance of preventing more than 2 degrees c of warming requires a global cut of 80 per cent by 2050. this is a cut in total emissions, not in emissions per head. if the population were to rise from 6 billion to 9 billion between now and then, an 87 per cent cut in global emissions per person. if carbon emissions are to be distributed equally, the greater cut must be made by the biggest polluters: rich nations like us and other western countries. the u.k‟s emissions per capita would need to fall by 91 per cent. but the rich countries appear to quietly have abandoned their aim of preventing dangerous climate change, condemning millions to death. what the ipcc report shows is that the time is to stop treating climate change as an urgent issue. the nations of the world have to start treating it as an international emergency. since the united states contributes about 25% of the world‟s co2 emissions, its own policy could make a large difference. global climate change is different from other environmental problems. first, emissions of co2 and other trace gases are almost irreversible; more precisely, their residence time in the atmosphere is measured in centuries. most environmental problems are mitigated promptly or unfairly short order when the source is cleaned up, as with water pollution, acid rain or sulfur dioxide emissions. here, reducing emissions today is very valuable to humanity in the distant future. second, the scale of the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 67 published by scholink inc. externality is truly global; greenhouse gases travel around the world in a few days. this means that the nation-state and its subsidiaries, the typical loci for internalization of externalities, are limited in their remedial ability. the poor countries appear to be most vulnerable to the dangerous climate change, mostly a doing of the rich. coming to the very root of the crisis, science provided the ontological foundation to political science to look at the nature and the poor who do not have the wherewithal to have a commodious living as “the other” to be exploited or harnessed for one‟s end. the entire earth was looked down upon as a compendium of lifeless raw materials to cater to the materialistic ends of those humans who are propertied or rational in the words of english philosopher locke, because they have property. to attainment of these goals-wealth production and commodious living by the wealthy few believing in exorbitant consumption and inordinate life style as quintessential of development, the entire earth has been subjugated and robbed o +f its bounties at the cost of nature, other humans, non-human living and future generations. that everybody is a self-sufficing and aggrandizing part disjointed from the whole has resulted in a mechanical view of the universe. the concept of development based on this paradigm has been the development of one against the other. woven into this paradigm was the concept of security, which was the security of one or one group, or one state against the other. but today, the devastating consequences of climate change and its pervasiveness impacting the very survival of entire humanity have spurted the traditional security planners into thinking anew what so far they have defined as development and established frame of mind about security in terms of disjointed parts and others as mere objectivities not as inter subjectivities a profound affirmation of this is found in eastern insight epitomized in the indian upanishads: “the entire universe is like a family” [basudheiba kutumbakam]. no man is like an island. everybody is the inseparable whole. in more mundane terms, as the rich countries and wealthy people have enjoyed, usurped, and destroyed the atmosphere at the cost of the other (humans, nature, living and non-living, and the future generations), they must not only come forward to cut down its consumption, rethink its life style and pattern of development, and follow exemplarily new environmental ethics but also help, support and promote the rest of the world in adapting to the changing planetary system. martin parry, a climate scientist with the united kingdom‟s met office, said destructive changes in temperature, rainfall and agriculture were now forecast to occur several decades earlier than thought. vulnerable people, such as the old and poor, would be worst affected, and, world leaders had not yet accepted that their countries would have to adapt to the likely consequences. co-chairman of the ipcc working group, professor parry said: “we are all used to talking about these impacts coming in the lifetimes of our children and grandchildren. now we know that it is us.” he added that politicians had wasted a decade by focusing only on ways to cut emissions, and had only recently woken up to the need to adapt. “mitigation has got all the attention, but we cannot mitigate out of this problem. we now have a choice between a future with a damaged world or a severely damaged world” (hansen art and anthony oliver smith, 1982). all these security concepts in traction from the traditional realist school to the human security hover www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 68 published by scholink inc. round human beings. even though in environmental or human security references have been made to protection of nature, but this has been so keeping in mind the security of human beings. the anthropocentric domination in security thinking continues. the protection of nature has been instrumentally essential for the survival and protection of human civilization. the theme of human security has been weaved very intelligibly into the concept of sustainable development. all negotiations and summits on climate change have been running on the same dominant theme of security humanity. nature has been viewed as an instrument not a subject of security itself like human beings in the frame work of security studies. the situations have changed and risen to see security beyond human security (mitchell audra, 2014, pp. 5-21). the petrified consequences of climate change have already been experienced by the people across the globe. since the earth summit in 1992, the policy makers, world leaders, scientists and the common people have been waked up to the imperatives for reducing emission of carbon dioxide in order to survive. the result has been the signing of kyoto protocol, copenhagen and the paris summit urging upon the states to nationally determine the reduction of co2 so as to reduce emission to 1.5 degree celsius at the pre-industrial level as earmarked by ipcc and switch over to renewable sources of energy. the fossil fuel-based development and industrialization continues in all countries of the world unabated. the inordinate life style and exorbitant consumption of the west being imitated by the developing countries of the south continues making a costly toll on the nature. the call for sustainable development has not yet strong roots in the thinking of the people and policy makers. the vested interests of corporates, coal and mining industries dominate the policy making of the highly developed industrialized countries. nature has remained still central to development. nature is being sacrificed for the comfort and fulfillment of the wants of the people. in this anthropocentricinstrumentalist conceptualization of development nature has been exploited to the ruin of climate. the basic foundation of sustainable development is first to get rid of the newtonian and cartesian view of the nature as lifeless matter, a compendium of resources for utilization and exploitation. both living and non-living constitute and define what is life on this earth. both are co-constitutive of and interconnected with each other. it is the feeling of “togetherness” or “being together” (nancy j., 1997, p. 8) on the part of human beings that they live together with all living and non-living beings that will the base of sustainable development. in the absence of not internalizing this value into the decision making the climate change will remain an ever-looming threat to humanity. science and technological devices in the form of reengineering to manipulate the atmosphere and earth in order to reduce emission to the desired level have stood as another monstrous design more devastating and dangerous for the people without stressing on winding up the fossil fuel industries and capping on the wasteful style of the people. so long as earth remains an anthropocentric instrument central to development, respite from climate change seems a faraway cry in wilderness. transforming the heterogeneity to the fulfillment of the ever increasing and unsatisfied wants of the human beings is destructive of the world. in new security thinking or worldly approach life is to be conceived or defined in a condition of “living together” or www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 69 published by scholink inc. “being together” or “an assemblage” where in all living and non-living coexist and coordinate and interconnected with each other and weaved together like warp and woofs into a beautiful tapestry of life. references annan, k. (2005). in larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all. united nations: new york. retrieved from http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/ ben. w. et al. (n.d.). “climate change and human security” simultaneously uploaded to radix radical interpretations of disaster. retrieved from http://www.radixonline.org/cchs.html & http://www.radixonline.org/cchs.doc disaster, diplomacy. (n.d.). http://www.disasterdiplomacy.org; peace research and european security studies (afes-press): retrieved from http://www.afes-press.de/html/topical.html. ben, r., & nigel, m. (2006). armed forces are put on standby to tackle threat of wars over water. independent. retrieved from http://news.independent.co.uk/environment/article348196.ece quoted by chris littlecott. (2007). climate change: the global security impact. retrieved from http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/climate-change-the-global-security-im pact / see: brauch hans gunter. (2002). “climate change, environmental stress and conflict,” in federal ministry for the environment, nature conservation and nuclear safety, ed. climate change and conflict (pp. 9-112). federal ministry for the environment, nature conservation and nuclear safety. retrieved from http://www.afes-press.de/pdf/brauch_climatechange_bmu.pdf. brauch hans gunter. (2004). abrupt climate change and conflicts: security implications from a european perspective hobbesian vs. grotian analyses,” friedrich ebert foundation and carnegie endowment for international peace, washington, dc, 29 march. retrieved from http://www.afes-press.de/pdf/brauch_climatechange.pdf see: “press conference by security council president, 4 april. (2007). retrieved from http://www.un.org/news/briefings/docs//2007/070404_parry.doc.htm on the narrow and broad definitions of “security‟, see: brauch hans gunter: environment and human security,” inter sections, 2/2005 (bonn: unu-ehs). retrieved from http://www.ehs.unu.edu/file.php?id=64; and brauch hans günter: threats, challenges, vulnerabilites and risks in environmental and human security. source 1/2005 (bonn: unu-ehs) http://www.ehs.unu.edu/file.php?id=63 and commission on human security (2003) human security now. commission on human security: new york. retrieved from http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/ . for gechs see http://www.gechs.org/; janos bogardi and hans guenter brauch (2005) “global environmental change: a challenge for human security retrieved from defining and conceptualising the environmental dimension of human security”, in: andreas rechkemmer, ed. http://www.un.org/news/briefings/docs/2007/070404_parry.doc.htm http://www.ehs.unu.edu/file.php?id=64 http://www.ehs.unu.edu/file.php?id=63 http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/ www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 70 published by scholink inc. uneo?—towards an international environment, pp. 85-109. nomos: baden-baden. gechs will also be holding a conference on the mainstreaming of human security, “the international conference on human security in asia: theory, practice and impacts will be held in bangkok, october 4-5 2007. retrieved from http://www.ids.polsci.chula.ac.th/humansecurity.htm . dedring, j. (2007). human security and the un security council”, in: hans günter brauch, john grin, czeslaw mesjasz, pal dunay, pal chadha, navnita pal, béchir chourou, ursula oswald spring, ursula, p.h. liotta, patricia kameri-mbote, eds. (2007) globalisation and environmental challenges: reconceptualising security in the 21 st century. chapter 48. hexagon series on human and environmental security and peace, vol. 3. springer: berlin (in press). david, s. (2007). cities and global environmental change: exploring the links. the geographical journal 173, 1 (march): 75-79 & see chapters 3 & 4 of sir nicholas stern et al. (2007) stern review on the economics of climate change. london: uk, department of the treasury. retrieved from http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/st ern_review_report.cfm delaney & shrader. (2000). report the percentage of women-headed households more than doubled in both honduras and nicaragua following hurricane mitch in 1998. see: patricia l. delaney and elizabeth shrader (2000) “gender and post-disaster reconstruction: the case of hurricane mitch in honduras and nicaragua”, lcspg/lac gender team, the world bank, decision review draft, page 24. retrieved from http://www.gdnonline.org/resources/reviewdraft.doc hansen art and anthony oliver-smith. (1982). involuntary migration and resettlement: the problems and responses of dislocated peoples westview press: boulder, co; world commission on dams (2000) “people and large dams: social performance,” in: dams and development. retrieved from http://www.dams.org//docs/report/wcdch4.pdf chris de wet, compiler. (2002). improving outcomes in development-induced displacement and resettlement (didr) projects. oxford university, refugee studies centre http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/rrimprovingoutcomes02.pdf; w. courtland robinson (2004) “minimizing development-induced displacement,” migration information source http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?id=194 . elliott, l. (2001). “regional environmental security: pursuing a non-traditional approach” in andrew t.h. tan and j.d. kenneth boutin (eds), non-traditional security issues in southeast asia (singapore: select publishing, 2001), p.449. ipcc rely on “working group ii contribution to the intergovernmental panel on climate change, fourth assessment report climate change 2007: climate change impacts, quotations adaptation and vulnerability, summary for policymakers, 6 april 2007 http://www.ipcc. retrieved from ch/spm6avr07.pdf . millennium ecosystem assessment (2006) our human planet: summary for decision makers, p. 6, http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/rrimprovingoutcomes02.pdf http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?id=194 http://www.ipcc.ch/spm6avr07.pdf http://www.ipcc.ch/spm6avr07.pdf www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 71 published by scholink inc. box 1.2, “millennium ecosystem assessment conceptual framework” http://ma.caudillweb.com//en/products.global.summary.aspx . mitchell, audra “only human? a worldly approach to security”, security dialogue, vol.45(1). 2014.pp. 5-21. nancy j (1997) the sense of the world. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. p.8 tickell sir crispin, 2003) “risks of conflict: population and resource pressure”, in: hans günter baruch, p.h liotta, antonio marquina, rogers, paul; selim, mohammed el-sayed, eds. security and environment in the mediterranean. conceptualising security and environmental conflict, pp. 13-18. hexagon series on human and environmental security and peace, vol. springer: berlin-heidelberg. ulrike rohr (2006) “gender and climate change,” tiempo 59 (april): 3-7 http://www.tiempocyberclimate.org/portal/archive/pdf/tiempo59high.pdf undp (1994) human development report: new dimensions of human security. undp: new york. undp (2004) reducing disaster risk: a challenge for development. geneva: undp, bureau for crisis prevention and recovery http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/global-reports/undp%20reducing%20disaster%20ris k.pdf . undp (2007) human development reports http://hdr.undp.org/ ; see also undp, unep, world bank, adb, afdb, gtz, dfid, oecd, and ec (2003) poverty and climate change: reducing the vulnerability of the poor through adaptation. world bank: washington http://www.undp.org/climatechange/adap01.htm . undp (2007) “poverty eradication, mdgs and climate change” http://www.undp.org/climatechange/adap01.htm . quoted in vogel ben (2007) “climate change creates security challenge „more complex than cold war‟,”janes.com http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/misc/janes070130_1_n.shtml see wisner ben, piers blaikie, terry cannon, and ian davis (2004) at risk: natural hazards, people‟s vulnerability and disaster. 2nd edition. routledge: london. on the definition of “vulnerability” at the scale of household livelihoods and its linkage with macro-scale processes. http://www.energyandenvironment.undp.org/undp/index.cfm?module=library&page=document&documentid=5050 http://www.energyandenvironment.undp.org/undp/index.cfm?module=library&page=document&documentid=5050 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 147 original paper analysis of problems and countermeasures regarding the capitalization of r&d expenditures from an esg perspective guitong yang1 1 business school, xi'an international studies university, xi'an, shaanxi, china guitong_yang@126.com received: august 29, 2025 accepted: october 27, 2025 online published: november 24, 2025 doi:10.22158/ape.v8n1p147 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v8n1p147 abstract in current accounting practices, the capitalization of r&d expenditures has garnered increasing attention, particularly against the backdrop of deepening innovation-driven development policies and esg principles. this paper analyzes the issues of inadequate integration of environmental costs, ambiguous definition of social costs, and insufficient decision-making transparency in r&d capitalization from the perspective of the three pillars of esg—environmental, social, and governance. it proposes corresponding countermeasures across four dimensions: esg disclosure systems, accounting policies, accounting personnel, and external auditing. keywords esg, r&d expenditure capitalization, environmental costs, social costs, corporate governance 1. introduction esg stands for environmental, social, and governance, representing a comprehensive framework for evaluating a company's sustainability capabilities. it encompasses a company's performance in environmental protection, social responsibility fulfillment, and corporate governance. as investors, regulators, and the public increasingly focus on non-financial corporate performance, esg metrics have become a critical factor influencing corporate financing, brand reputation, market competitiveness, and even long-term viability. the capitalisation of research and development expenditure is a critical component of corporate financial management, profoundly impacting the accuracy of financial statements and corporate valuation. under current accounting standards, eligible r&d expenditure incurred during the development phase can be recognised as an intangible asset and amortised over future periods (ministry of finance of the people's republic of china, 2006). this approach more accurately reflects www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 148 the return cycle of corporate r&d investments, optimises financial structures, and enhances short-term profitability metrics. however, capitalising r&d expenditure requires meeting stringent conditions, including technical feasibility, the likelihood of future economic benefits and the measurability of the expenditure. improper handling may distort financial information and lead to misjudgements in the market regarding the company's innovation capabilities and risk management capacity. there is a profound intrinsic connection between esg principles and the capitalisation of r&d expenditure. under the esg framework, enterprises are increasingly prioritising long-term value creation, with r&d innovation serving as the core driver of technological advancement, product upgrades and green transformation. decisions regarding the capitalisation of r&d expenditure impact financial performance and are closely linked to a company's sustainable development strategy. esg also emphasises transparency and accountability in information disclosure. the reasonableness and standardisation of r&d capitalisation directly impact the quality and credibility of financial information, thereby influencing investors' assessments of a company's innovation capabilities, growth potential and risk management proficiency. in cutting-edge fields such as green technology, artificial intelligence and biopharmaceuticals, the scientific rigour of r&d capitalisation policies is often a key metric for evaluating a company's esg performance. however, enterprises still face numerous practical challenges. for example, how should the scope of capitalising r&d expenditure be defined? how can the long-term orientation of esg principles be reflected while meeting accounting standards? how can a balance be struck between improving financial performance and ensuring transparency of information? these issues involve not only the technical aspects of accounting treatment, but also coordinating corporate strategy, governance structures and social responsibility. therefore, accurately capitalising r&d expenditure in line with esg principles is critical to driving high-quality corporate development and achieving a win-win outcome in terms of economic and social benefits. 2. analysis of problems regarding the capitalization of r&d expenditures from an esg perspective 2.1 environmental perspective from an environmental perspective, traditional capitalization methods for r&d expenditures often emphasize the economic value of technological achievements while overlooking the underlying environmental costs and risks (liu, 2025). this approach has revealed significant limitations in today's era of accelerated green transformation. r&d activities are not "neutral" processes. particularly in green technology innovation, enterprises frequently invest substantial resources to comply with environmental regulations, reduce carbon emissions, and minimize ecological footprints when developing new products or technologies. these investments should be explicitly reflected as part of environmental costs in financial reporting. however, current accounting standards provide only general guidelines for capitalizing r&d expenditures, without mandating separate disclosure of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 149 environment-related investments and risks. consequently, many companies include green technology investments and environmental compliance costs within total intangible assets when capitalizing r&d expenditures, lacking detailed accounting for environmental attributes. this practice may lead to three significant issues, as illustrated in figure 1. figure 1. problemanalysis diagram from an environmental perspective firstly, the book value of intangible assets does not accurately reflect their environmental performance. for example, a technology may be valued highly for financial purposes, but if its production process or operational phase carries significant environmental pollution risks, its actual value could be overestimated. secondly, as environmental costs are not disclosed separately, external stakeholders, including investors, regulators and the public, struggle to assess the true ecological impact of r&d projects through financial reporting. this contradicts the fundamental requirement of 'visualising environmental costs' within esg frameworks. thirdly, if companies fail to adequately evaluate and disclose environmental risks during r&d expense capitalisation, the financial information will lack forward-looking insight, which hinders proactive risk management under esg principles. environmental risks associated with r&d projects are highly uncertain. factors such as climate change, resource depletion and policy shifts could have a significant impact on project sustainability in future. r&d initiatives in high-pollution industries could face asset impairment risks due to the potential tightening of environmental regulations in the future. failure to consider environmental risks during capitalisation may leave companies unprepared when such risks materialise. 2.2 social perspective from a societal perspective, the capitalisation of r&d expenditure goes beyond a company's internal financial accounting to include its use of social resources and its responsibilities during the innovation process. current accounting standards for capitalising r&d expenditure focus primarily on financial metrics, such as technical feasibility and future economic inflows. however, these standards lack clear definitions and measurement frameworks for social costs incurred during r&d. this includes expenses www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 150 related to specialised employee training, occupational health and safety, and community relations maintenance. this ambiguity in accounting practices often causes enterprises to conflate these socially attributed expenditures with routine administrative expenses, meaning they are not incorporated into the value composition of r&d assets. such vagueness in accounting makes it difficult for external stakeholders to accurately identify and evaluate the social responsibilities of enterprises in their r&d activities through financial statements. when high-tech enterprises announce substantial r&d investments without disclosing their actual expenditure on employee occupational health and safety, external parties cannot grasp the true societal cost of their innovation activities. this undermines the transparency and credibility of financial information in corporate social performance assessments, as well as diminishing the accuracy and reference value of social dimension data within esg evaluation frameworks. furthermore, this information asymmetry may lead to market misjudgments regarding a company's fulfillment of social responsibilities. when enterprises obscure social costs to embellish their financial performance, they may secure higher market valuations or policy support in the short term. however, in the long run, once these social cost issues surface, they will not only damage the company's reputation and sustainable development capabilities but also undermine the foundational trust of the entire industry and even the capital markets. therefore, establishing a clear and operational mechanism for defining and measuring social costs is not only an intrinsic requirement for refining the r&d expenditure capitalization system but also a critical pathway for enhancing corporate social responsibility transparency and promoting the healthy development of esg frameworks. 2.3 corporate governance perspective from a corporate governance perspective, capitalising r&d expenditure poses risks of insufficient decision transparency and manipulation. according to accounting standard for business enterprises no. 6 — intangible assets, r&d activities must be categorised as either research or development. expenses incurred in the former phase should be expensed, while those incurred in the latter may only be capitalised when specific conditions are met. however, in practice, this classification lacks clear quantitative criteria, giving management significant discretionary power over its implementation. some enterprises subjectively classify basic research expenditure as development expenditure, thereby inflating intangible asset values and embellishing financial statements. this practice violates the substance-over-form principle of accounting standards and contradicts governance requirements within esg principles, raising doubts among stakeholders about the reliability of financial information (wei, 2025). the esg framework emphasises that enterprises should demonstrate scientific rigour, transparency and accountability in decision-making processes. arbitrary adjustments to capitalise r&d expenditure clearly undermine the credibility of financial information. currently, most technology-focused listed companies disclose vague criteria for determining development stages in their annual reports, such as “relatively high technical feasibility”, without providing concrete evidence such as specific technical milestones, market projections or legal support. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 151 such insufficient disclosure makes it difficult for external auditors and investors to accurately assess the company's true financial condition. furthermore, manipulative practices in capitalizing r&d expenditures may trigger a chain reaction. inflated intangible assets will impact future profit and loss through amortization, thereby misleading market assessments of a company's growth potential and profitability. in recent years, several domestic listed companies have faced exchange inquiries or administrative penalties over r&d capitalization issues. regulatory authorities have identified these as inflated assets and required retrospective adjustments. 3. analysis of countermeasures regarding the capitalization of r&d expenditures from an esg perspective 3.1 establishing an esg-oriented disclosure framework for capitalizing r&d expenditures establishing a comprehensive esg disclosure system is a crucial measure for promoting corporate sustainability and enhancing market transparency (li & cui, 2025). within this framework, the creation of a dedicated disclosure mechanism for capitalized r&d expenditures is particularly critical. currently, enterprises invest substantial resources in r&d activities. these funds not only drive technological breakthroughs but also profoundly impact environmental, social, and governance structures. therefore, it is necessary to establish a dedicated disclosure framework for capitalized r&d expenditures within the esg disclosure system to enhance information integrity and comparability. the conceptual design is illustrated in figure 2. figure 2. design diagram for the specialized disclosure framework on capitalization of r&d expenditures within the esg disclosure system on the environmental dimension, enterprises should explicitly disclose costs related to environmental protection within their r&d projects. for instance, investments in green technology r&d serve as a key indicator for measuring corporate environmental responsibility. such expenditures may encompass funding allocated to clean energy technologies, energy-saving and emission-reduction processes, and the development of eco-friendly materials. additionally, costs incurred during r&d to control carbon emissions—such as expenditures on carbon footprint monitoring and carbon offset projects—should www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 152 also be listed as part of environmental costs. these data not only help external stakeholders evaluate a company's environmental efforts but also provide policymakers with a basis for formulating green incentive policies. on the social dimension, disclosure of r&d expenditures should cover investments related to employee well-being and social responsibility. for instance, expenditures on safety training for r&d personnel demonstrate not only concern for employee health but also reflect the company's governance standards in workplace safety. furthermore, r&d activities may impact surrounding communities through noise pollution, traffic congestion, and other factors. companies should disclose compensation payments or mitigation measures implemented to address these effects. publicizing such information fosters trust between the company and the community, enhancing its social reputation. on the governance dimension, the decision-making process for capitalizing r&d expenditures should be detailed to demonstrate the company's governance standards and transparency. for instance, companies should outline the specific approval procedures for capitalization, including the composition of decision-making bodies, approval criteria, and risk assessment mechanisms. opinions from independent directors should also be disclosed as key content to demonstrate the independence and fairness of decision-making. by combining quantitative data with qualitative explanations, companies can comprehensively showcase their r&d governance capabilities, thereby strengthening the confidence of investors and regulatory authorities. additionally, to ensure the comparability of disclosed information, regulators may consider developing standardized disclosure templates or guidelines that clearly specify the content and format for capitalization disclosures of r&d expenditures. relevant authorities may require companies to dedicate a specific section in their annual esg reports to separately list r&d expenditures under environmental, social, and governance categories, accompanied by detailed explanatory notes. simultaneously, companies are encouraged to adopt internationally recognized disclosure standards, such as the global reporting initiative (gri) or the task force on climate-related financial disclosures (tcfd) framework, to enhance the international recognition of their information. 3.2 incorporating esg factors into the capitalization guidelines for r&d expenditures against the backdrop of global advocacy for sustainable development, enterprises must focus not only on financial performance, but also take on greater responsibility for environmental, social and governance (esg) issues. however, current accounting standards still have significant shortcomings when it comes to disclosing corporate esg performance and risks. this makes it difficult to reflect esg outcomes comprehensively in innovation activities. in particular, existing standards primarily emphasise the technical feasibility and future economic benefits of r&d expenditure, overlooking its potential environmental and social impacts. to enhance the transparency and decision-relevance of accounting information, it is necessary to systematically integrate esg factors into the regulatory framework for capitalising r&d expenditure. firstly, environmental compliance and social adaptability must be explicitly established as prerequisites www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 153 for capitalising r&d expenditure at the accounting policy level. this means that, when making capitalisation decisions for r&d projects, enterprises must evaluate not only technological maturity and market prospects, but also ensure that projects align with environmental regulations, low-carbon objectives and social responsibility requirements. high-pollution or high-energy-consumption r&d projects should be ineligible for capitalisation, even if they have significant commercial value. this prevents companies from masking their negative environmental and social impacts through accounting manoeuvres. this upfront requirement will encourage enterprises to proactively mitigate esg risks during the innovation process, thereby enhancing their long-term sustainable development capabilities. secondly, an 'esg adjustment clause' should be introduced within r&d capitalisation guidelines to permit companies to capitalise a portion of green r&d expenditure, provided they meet specific esg standards. expenditure on acquiring low-carbon equipment or energy-efficient laboratory instruments, or on paying r&d personnel fair wages, may all be considered esg-oriented r&d investments. this adjustment broadens the scope of capitalisation and provides financial incentives for enterprises to prioritise green technologies and safeguard employee rights during r&d, achieving a win-win outcome in terms of economic and social benefits. 3.3 enhancing accounting personnel's ability to determine capitalization of r&d expenditures solid financial knowledge is essential for corporate accountants, and the ability to comprehensively assess the capitalization of r&d expenditures must also be continuously enhanced. the capitalization of r&d expenditures presents a significant challenge in accounting practice, particularly in high-tech industries where r&d activities are frequent and complex, involving numerous judgments on phase delineation. with the rise of esg principles, corporate decisions on r&d projects should consider esg factors alongside technical and financial feasibility, ensuring judgments align with standards and reflect sustainable development concepts (cheng, 2016). to enhance the professional competence of accounting personnel in this area, enterprises must implement systematic training programs. training content should encompass traditional accounting standards, capitalization criteria, and esg knowledge—including how to reasonably allocate environmental costs to r&d projects and how to quantitatively assess social value. 3.4 strengthening external audit verification of capitalization of r&d expenditures as accounting standards gradually expand, upgrading auditing standards has become particularly crucial (wei, 2025). in light of escalating demands within the domain of auditing, it becomes imperative for auditors to accord priority to the verification of the environmental, social and governance (esg) relevance of capitalised expenditures. it is imperative that external auditors not only focus on the accuracy of financial data, but also assess whether the capitalization of r&d expenditures aligns with sustainable development. from an environmental perspective, auditors should prioritise verifying the authenticity and rationality of corporate investments in green technology r&d. it is submitted that certain companies may seek to disguise routine technological upgrades as "green innovation" in order to secure policy incentives and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 8, no. 1, 2025 published by scholink inc. 154 capital market attention. in order to ascertain the authenticity of environmental benefits, auditors are required to utilise project initiation documents and third-party testing data. from a social perspective, audits must critically focus on the compliance of employee r&d welfare expenditures. these expenses constitute a substantial proportion of corporate labour costs and function as a metric for evaluating social responsibility fulfilment, encompassing r&d personnel compensation. it is incumbent upon auditors to verify the authenticity of expenditures against compensation structures and benefit systems, investigating instances of falsified reporting or misappropriation of r&d funds. from a governance perspective, auditors must rigorously examine the fairness and transparency of corporate decision-making processes regarding the capitalization of r&d expenditures. it is imperative that robust internal control mechanisms are established, and that the scientific justification and compliance of capitalisation decisions are evaluated. furthermore, any potential profit manipulation by management must be investigated. 4. conclusion accurate capitalization of r&d expenditures is crucial for enterprises to authentically reflect innovation value and maintain stakeholder trust. optimizing this process through esg principles not only addresses shortcomings in integrating environmental costs and defining social costs but also enhances information transparency through standardized governance. while this path requires overcoming multiple challenges, such as adapting accounting standards and enhancing personnel capabilities, it drives enterprises to integrate sustainability concepts into innovation practices. ultimately, this achieves synergistic growth in financial performance and social value, laying a solid foundation for long-term corporate development (zhang, 2012). references cheng, x. s. (2016). fu hanbing, zuo beien. research on capitalization of r&d expenses in high-tech enterprises. accounting friend, (05), 37-43. li, z. n., & cui, r. (2025). study on the impact of esg performance on corporate financial performance: a case study of the manufacturing industry. economist, (05), 88-89. liu, b. (2025). strategies for improving accounting standards from a green accounting perspective. finance and economics world, (06), 96-98. ministry of finance of the people's republic of china. accounting standards for business enterprises—application guide. (2006). china finance and economics publishing house. wei, x. b. (2025). strategies for enhancing financial accounting information quality from an esg perspective. legacy brand marketing, (17), 127-129. zhang, w. (2012). discussion on several issues in accounting treatment of intangible assets. china township enterprise accounting, (08), 22-23. 123767 76..84 announcement of retraction the editorial board announced this article has been retracted on july 25, 2023. if you have any further question, please contact us at: ape@scholink.org article title: integration of e-portfolio into an iranian flipped classroom: does the flip type make a difference in listening comprehension? author/s: shahriar jalili journal title: advances in politics and economics issn: issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) volume and number: vol. 6, no. 3, 2023 pages: 51-61 doi: https://doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n3p51 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 211 original paper effect measurement and system optimization of special debt in promoting high-quality development of local economy xinyuan wang1 1 anhui university of finance and economics, bengbu, 233030, china received: april 20, 2024 accepted: may 17, 2024 online published: may 31, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n2p211 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n2p211 abstract the rapid expansion of the scale of special bonds stems from the mode transformation of local finances under continuous pressure. as land finance is unsustainable and hidden debts need to be resolved urgently, special bonds will inevitably bear the important responsibility of maintaining the sustainable development of local finances and stimulating the high-quality development of local economies. it is recommended to re-sort out the development responsibilities of local governments under the framework of fiscal decentralization, give full play to the financing role of special bonds in high-quality development areas such as infrastructure, industry, environmental protection, and people's livelihood, and establish corresponding incentive compatibility and risk control mechanisms to enhance the efficiency of fund utilization and avoid the accumulation of debt risks again. keywords special bonds, economic growth, local finance, debt risk 1. introduction 1.1 the origin of special bonds under the tax-sharing system, fiscal power among governments has been transferred upwards, while administrative power has been transferred downwards. especially after the 2008 financial crisis, local governments responded to the impact of the financial crisis by investing heavily in infrastructure through debt, and debt risks have accumulated accordingly (gan, yu, & zheng, 2011). in response, the state adopted the measure of “opening the front door and blocking the back door”. the budget law of the people's republic of china promulgated in 2014 formally granted local governments the right to raise debt financing, and issued the opinions of the state council on strengthening the management of local government debt (guofa, 2014, no. 43) in the same year, which divided local debts into two types: general debt and special debt according to the purpose of funds and the source of debt repayment www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 212 funds, and formed general debt and special debt respectively. comparing general bonds and special bonds, we can find that both are issued by provincial governments, endorsed and guaranteed by local finances, and included in the local fiscal budget system, but there are also many differences between the two. first, from the perspective of function, the issuance of general bonds is mainly to improve fiscal deficits and alleviate temporary funding difficulties of local governments. special bonds are mainly issued to support the construction of special projects, and the funds are generally used for public welfare projects with certain returns (sun & yang, 2014). as a financing tool with both fiscal and financial attributes, the support areas of special bonds have gradually expanded, from the initial replacement special bonds and land reserve special bonds to 11 important areas including new infrastructure, new energy, and ecological and environmental protection. secondly, there are also differences in the sources of funds for repayment of principal and interest between the two (tao & xu, 2021). general bonds are mainly repaid with general public budget revenue, while special bonds are repaid with government fund revenue or special revenue corresponding to public welfare projects. it should be noted that the "notice on piloting the development of local government special bonds with self-balanced project income and financing" (caiyu, 2017, 89) requires that the project income of special bonds should be balanced with self-financing. 1.2 characteristics of special bonds my country's special bonds have three major characteristics. first, the proportion of special bonds in local government bonds is on the rise. according to the issuance of special bonds in local government bonds, new bonds and refinancing bonds2, since my country's local governments began to issue special bonds in 2015, their proportion in local government bonds has increased from 25.41% in 2015 to 69.65% in 2022, their proportion in new bonds has increased from 16.22% in 2015 to 84.90% in 2022, and their proportion in refinancing bonds has increased from 19.92% in 2018 to 41.87% in 2022 (no refinancing bonds were issued from 2015 to 2017). bonds), indicating that special bonds are increasingly important to local government financing. as of early october 2023, the cumulative amount of special bonds issued nationwide this year has reached 4,795.589 billion yuan, accounting for 68.11% of the local government bonds issued that year[4]. among them, the issuance of new special bonds was 3,448.651 billion yuan, accounting for 84.19% of the new bond issuance; the issuance of refinancing special bonds was 1,345.077 billion yuan, accounting for 45.76% of the issuance of refinancing bonds. second, the issuance of special bonds shows significant regional differences in my country. the provinces at the forefront of special bond issuance are mostly provinces with good economic development in my country. taking the issuance of special bonds in various regions across the country in 2022 as an example, the provinces with the largest issuance scale are all provinces with relatively good economic development in my country. as of early october 2023, the regions with the largest issuance of special bonds this year are guangdong, shandong, and anhui. among them, guangdong www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 213 ranked first with an issuance scale of 494.259 billion yuan; tibet, qinghai, ningxia and other regions had smaller special bond issuance scales in the first nine months. in the current context of increasing fiscal pressure on local governments, the difference in issuance scale reflects the demand and adaptability of local governments for bond financing tools. third, mediumand long-term special bonds are gradually increasing. in the early days of issuance, the issuance period was mainly 3 or 5 years. in 2019, the ministry of finance lifted restrictions on the term ratio structure of local bonds and increased the issuance ratio of long-term bonds for reasons such as easing the refinancing pressure of local governments and improving the matching degree of project funds and terms[5]. since then, the average issuance period of local bonds has risen rapidly, and the average term of special bonds has increased significantly. the issuance period has also been extended from 6.1 years in 2018 to 15.5 years in 2022. special bonds are transforming from short-term bonds to mediumand long-term bonds. the short-term risks of local finances have been reduced, and long-term risks have accumulated to a certain extent. 1.3 the impact of special bonds on local finances since 2015, the issuance of local government special bonds has been increasing year by year. from 2015 to 2022, the annual issuance of new special bonds was 95.9 billion yuan, 403.7 billion yuan, 793.7 billion yuan, 1352.7 billion yuan, 2148.7 billion yuan, 3601.9 billion yuan, 3584.4 billion yuan, and 4038.4 billion yuan, respectively. the growth rate of issuance scale was faster than the growth rate of gross domestic product (gdp), fiscal revenue, and land transfer fees. as an important tool for local government financing, special bonds have a certain role in promoting local economic growth (wei & ren, 2012). local governments can meet fiscal needs by issuing new special bonds, thereby alleviating local government fiscal pressure to a certain extent. at the same time, the decline in the growth rate of land transfer fees and the increase in the scale of special bonds indicate that there has been a significant change in the source of local government fiscal revenue. 2. discussion on the relationship between special bonds and high-quality development of local economy 2.1 the connotation of high-quality development of local economy at present, my country's economy has entered a stage of high-quality development from high-speed development. as an important tool for the effectiveness of proactive fiscal policies, special bonds have an important impact on improving the quality and efficiency of local economic development. therefore, it is necessary to analyze from the perspective of special bonds, combine the policy requirements of stabilizing growth and preventing risks, and explore the new connotation of high-quality development of local economy from multiple dimensions and indicators. debt ratio shows government's ability to resist risks this article uses the government debt ratio as an indicator to measure the government's ability to resist risks. first, the total government debt (the sum of the central government's treasury debt balance and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 214 the national local government debt balance) is calculated as the proportion of gdp, and the government debt ratios from 2015 to 2022 are 37.67%, 36.66%, 36.04%, 36.36%, 38.63%, 45.93%, 46.76%, and 50.35%, respectively. although the overall trend is upward, it is still below the eu's 60% red line, which shows that my country's government debt indicators are still stable. the balance of local government debt accounts for more than 50% of the total government debt each year, which may mean that local governments have assumed the main responsibilities in local economic development and infrastructure construction, but the financial power cannot match the responsibilities. special bonds account for about 60% of the balance of local government debt and 17.08% of gdp, which shows that local governments prefer to raise funds through special bonds. the issuance of special bonds will help promote the development of specific projects and fields such as infrastructure construction and environmental protection, but we also need to be vigilant about debt management and risk control issues. therefore, we need to pay more attention to the use and benefits of special bond funds, as well as the ability of local governments to manage debt scale and risks, and do a good job of risk prevention while stabilizing growth. 2.2 regional economic development level and special bond issuance scale to measure the high-quality development of the local economy, it is necessary to evaluate the level of regional economic development, and the scale of special bond issuance can reflect this to a certain extent. on the one hand, the original intention of issuing special bonds is mainly to support local infrastructure construction. infrastructure construction is an important foundation for the high-quality development of the regional economy. therefore, the scale of special bond issuance can indirectly reflect the investment intensity and attention of a region in infrastructure construction-related projects. generally speaking, if the scale of special bond issuance in a certain region is large, the infrastructure conditions in that area are relatively good, which is conducive to improving the quality of economic development. on the other hand, the scale of special bond issuance is also closely related to the fiscal situation of local governments. generally speaking, the larger the actual issuance scale of special bonds, the stronger the fiscal bearing capacity and debt repayment capacity of local governments are likely to be. on the contrary, regions with poor fiscal conditions have relatively weak debt repayment capacity, which may limit the application of special bonds when applying for quotas, and the final scale of bond issuance will also be small. observing the scale of special bond issuance in various parts of my country, it can be found that the scale of special bond issuance in the eastern region or economically developed regions is often higher than that in the western region or economically underdeveloped regions. 2.3 regional market operation status and the marketization level of special bonds the combination of "effective market" and "effective government" is a necessary prerequisite for the high-quality development of local economy. special bonds, as a financing tool with both fiscal and financial attributes, play a vital role in both. the full combination has far-reaching impact. improving the marketization level of special bonds can increase market liquidity and investment options, and can www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 215 also promote the improvement of market standardization and transparency. therefore, by measuring the marketization level of the special bond market, it is possible to provide a basis for analyzing the effectiveness of regional bond market operations. 2.4 special bonds pose challenges to the sustainability of local finances although special bonds can fill the gap between fiscal revenue and expenditure and help the local economy continue to grow, my country is currently facing an objective environment where tax cuts and fee reductions reduce fiscal revenue, land fiscal risks increase, and fiscal expenditures are rigid. special bonds will also increase the government's debt repayment pressure, making the sustainability of local finances face certain challenges. first, the continued prosperity of the real estate market for many years has enabled local governments to obtain a large amount of income through real estate-related taxes and land transfer fees, and has provided a stable source of funds for fiscal expenditures and debt repayments. as the real estate market goes down, related taxes and land transfer revenues will be affected, increasing local finances. political pressure. the amount of special bond issuance available to local governments will also be limited due to worsening financial conditions. secondly, taking into account the limited land resources and the need for healthy development of the real estate market, the growth rate of land transfer revenue has declined significantly in recent years, and the future growth space is also relatively limited. this may increase the risk of local government debt repayment and affect the local fiscal situation. stable operation. 3. related suggestions 3.1 building a new framework for fiscal decentralization first, adjust the tax sharing ratio and improve the local tax system. when local governments bear the main responsibility for fiscal expenditure and debt repayment, consider increasing the local tax sharing ratio and cultivating local tax sources, thereby giving local governments more financial power and ensuring the effective realization of government functions. for example, the collection of consumption tax can be moved back and gradually adjusted from a central tax to a local tax; the local share ratio of shared tax can also be appropriately increased. second, consider moderately relaxing the authority of local governments to raise debt financing. through the calculation of the government debt ratio in the previous article, it can be found that my country's local government debt indicators are currently in a reasonable range, so the restrictions on local government bond issuance can be moderately relaxed. of course, while empowering, it is also necessary to strengthen supervision of local debt management to prevent excessive government debt and affect local fiscal sustainability. third, strengthen budget management and standardize revenue and expenditure behavior. when building a new framework for fiscal decentralization, in addition to giving local governments financial resources, relevant fiscal systems should be improved, budget constraints should be strengthened, and the transparency of local fiscal operations should be improved to ensure the stability of economic growth. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 216 3.2 further improve the marketization level of special bonds first, we need to increase the diversification of the special bond investor structure. according to my country's current local bond investor structure, although its diversification has increased compared to 2015, commercial banks still account for 82.51% of investors. therefore, in the future, we can attract other types of investors through tax incentives and other means, and provide more opportunities for individual investors. open up more convenient investment channels to improve the market liquidity of special bonds and provide more sources for special bond financing. second, improve the transparency of special bond information disclosure. information disclosure can improve information asymmetry, help investors better understand the operation of the special bond market, and make more scientific investment choices based on their own circumstances. at present, the information disclosure of special bonds is insufficient, and some information can only be inferred through the overall data of local bonds. more detailed and comprehensive information disclosure should be one of the directions for optimizing the special bond system in the future. third, it is necessary to improve the credit rating system for special bonds. first, since special bonds are issued by provincial governments, and the bond users may be municipal and county governments, the issuer as the rating object cannot truly reflect the use of special bonds. if the rating agency is single, the report issued will lack verification, and there may be rent-seeking, which will affect the marketization level of special bonds. therefore, in the future, information disclosure should be made on the bond users and the bond use situation, and a more scientific and comprehensive credit rating indicator system should be established based on this. at the same time, it should also be considered to select different institutions in the initial credit rating, subsequent tracking rating, and irregular rating of special bonds, so that the reports can be mutually verified and the authenticity and reliability of the rating results can be increased. 3.3 promote industrial upgrading through multiple financing tools at present, in addition to special bonds, non-public debt means such as the government-private partnership model (ppp) and infrastructure real estate investment trusts (reits) can also help the government carry out various types of investment and financing. in comparison, special bonds have a strong financing function and help to form physical workload, but they are limited by debt limits and cannot solve all the funding needs of local governments, and the review procedures are relatively complicated. ppp has the advantage of high investment efficiency due to its characteristics of sharing benefits and sharing risks, but at the same time, due to the low credit of social capital, its financing cost is higher than that of special bonds. reits have the advantages of stable returns and reduced debt risks, but my country will not officially start the reits pilot until 2020, and the relevant system still needs to be improved. in summary, in the future, we can try to effectively integrate special bonds with ppp or reits to achieve the purpose of reducing project financing costs, improving investment efficiency, and alleviating debt risks. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 217 3.4 establishing an incentive-compatible risk prevention and control mechanism establishing an incentive-compatible special bond risk prevention and control mechanism means that local governments should not only use special bonds to stimulate local economic development, but also do a good job in debt risk prevention. first, it is necessary to build a special bond performance evaluation mechanism for the entire life cycle. my country's current performance evaluation system is mainly based on general public budget expenditure projects, while special bond projects are both public welfare and profitable, and have a long project cycle and great uncertainty. it is difficult to perfectly adapt to the current performance evaluation management mechanism. in the future, it is urgent to adjust the special bond performance evaluation mechanism. in this process, attention should be paid to the entire life cycle of the project, and performance evaluation should be carried out throughout the entire process of special bond issuance, fund use, debt repayment, and project income generation, so as to achieve supervision and risk control in the entire process before, during, and after the event. at the same time, it is also necessary to trace the cause from the result, timely analyze the causes of related problems and optimize them, and promote more efficient use of funds. second, it is necessary to strengthen risk prevention and control from both vertical and horizontal directions. from a vertical perspective, if the main users of special bonds are city and county governments, there may be a problem of weakening debt repayment awareness and shifting the pressure of debt repayment upward; from a horizontal perspective, due to the prevalence of the "gdp-only" performance evaluation method in some regions in the past, coupled with government term limits, local governments may "borrow but not repay", bringing greater debt repayment pressure to the new government. therefore, while appropriately granting local governments financial power incentives, provincial governments should also strengthen risk supervision of city and county governments, implement debt repayment responsibilities, strengthen risk assessment and early warning mechanisms, and establish accountability mechanisms and emergency measures to deal with unexpected risk events. conflicts of interest the author declare that there is no conflict of interest regarding the publication of this article. funding this work was supported by anhui university of finance and economics research innovation fund project in 2024. grant number: xsky24041zd. references gan, c., yu, d., & zheng, r. (2011). an empirical study on the effects of industrial structure on economic growth and fluctuations in china. econ res j, 46(05), 4-16. imran, m., & zhang, j. (2023). exploring the relationship between financial inclusion and natural resource utilization in quad economies. environ sci pollut res, 30, 122958-122971. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 218 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-023-30907-9 sun, g., & yang, y. (2014). the construction of 2.0 tourism engel coefficient and spatial-temporal analysis in china. hum geogr, 29(3), 121-127. tao, z., & xu, m. (2021). measuring the allocation level of china innovation elements from the perspective of economic high-quality development. j quant technol econ, 38(03), 3-22. wan, j., wang, z., ma, c., su, y., zhou, t., wang, t., zhao, y., sun, h., li, z., wang, y., li, j., ding, y., & tang, x. (2023). spatial-temporal differentiation pattern and influencing factors of high-quality development in counties: a case of sichuan, china. ecol ind, 148, 110-132. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2023.110132 wei, j., & ren, b. (2012). measurement and ranking of economic growth quality index in various regions of china. econ perspect, 4, 27-33. original paper effect measurement and system optimization of spec 1 anhui university of finance and economics, bengb abstract the rapid expansion of the scale of special bonds special bonds, economic growth, local finance, deb to measure the high-quality development of the loc on the other hand, the scale of special bond issua the combination of "effective market" and "effecti although special bonds can fill the gap between fi as the real estate market goes down, related taxes 3. related suggestions first, adjust the tax sharing ratio and improve th of course, while empowering, it is also necessary first, we need to increase the diversification of at present, the information disclosure of special at present, in addition to special bonds, non-publ establishing an incentive-compatible special bond at the same time, it is also necessary to trace th conflicts of interest funding references microsoft word ape-v1n1-p1.doc advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 1 original article hawking irreversibility and socio-economic determinism jan-erik lane1* & florent dieterlen1 1 public policy institute, belgrade, yangon, myanmar, geneva * jan-erik lane, public policy institute, belgrade, 10 charles humbert, 1205, geneva, 559 a, 3rd floor, thuya street, 9th quarter, yangon, myanmar received: november 26, 2017 accepted: december 6, 2017 online published: december 7, 2017 doi:10.22158/ape.v1n1p1 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v1n1p1 abstract physicist stephen hawking has suggested that climate changes is about to become unstoppable. one may introduce a concept of hawking irreversibility as the point where temperature has risen so much that the global warming consequences threaten the survival of mankind. the recent news out of china that its co2s are increasing again makes this term highly policy relevant. moreover, the methane emissions have started to augment, which also calls up hawking irreversibility. the drive behind these dire developments is the endless zest for affluence and wealth, fueled by ever larger energy consumption. keywords decarburization, hawking irreversibility, ghcs, co2s, methane, cop21 treaty goals, solar power plants 1. introduction climate scientists warn, already before the implementation of the unfccc agreement from paris 2015 that the decarbonisation plan decided in global governance will not be enough to stabilize temperature at + 2 celsius, at most. global average temperature will most probably be larger than the cop21 objective. at what point on the temperature scale, we move into hawking irreversibility is not known. but a rise beyond + 4 degrees will have dramatic consequences for the ecology and human social systems. a few days before the start of the un global environment reunion cop23 (6-13 november 2017) in bonn, the major study climate science special report: fourth national climate assessment (usgcrp, 2017), was published in washington. it examines the global warming problematic from the point of view of the us and the world, based upon years of research by a large group of us scholars. it definitively recommends a combination of national and international policy-making to halt temperature www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 2 published by scholink inc. rise, despite the fact that the us government is negative. it renders an impressive list of climate change impacts upon the us territory and points decisively at human causes. we must then ask: can decarbonisation policies be implemented or managed? the cop23 by the unfccc reflects upon the very same problem. if or when global warming reaches the point of no return with temperatures perhaps plus 4-6 degrees celsius higher, then the present calamities will be magnified: a) melting of polar ice massively: b) retraction of glaciers globally; c) huge land losses along the costs (bangladesh); d) too high temperatures for men and women to work outside (south asia); e) food production decline (africa); f) fish harvest decrease (atlantic ocean, pacific ocean); g) droughts and starvation (south asia); h) lack of fresh water supply (latin america); i) drying up of rivers, affecting electricity supply (latin america, south asia, east asia); j) ocean acidification and species extinction (australia); k) highly volatile climate with giant forest fires, storms, rainfall and tornados with tremendous damages inclusingmudslides (caribbean, north america, sri lanka, vietnam, china, australia); l) deforestation and desertification (latin america, africa, indonesia, south asia). if worse comes to worse, global heat streams like the gulf stream and the atlantic current may be affected, changing weather in the northern and southern hemispheres. 2. present global predicament 2.1 no kuznets’ curve for co2s the greenhouse gases (ghg) have a strong anthropogenic sources, being linked with socio-economic development or economic growth via the consumption of energy, especially the burning of fossil fuels, use of cement and emission of methane from landsinks, cows, microbes, etc. the unfccc has focused on halting co2s and decreasing them in a gigantic decarbonisation policy globally in this century. figure 1 shows that there is no kuznets’ curve (first rising, then descending) for co2: richer countries emit more co2 than poor ones. international aviation is a very major source of co2 emissions, and it is booming. figure 1. gdp-cop for all countries source: all countries in the world have formed a common pool regime (cpr) to save the atmosphere www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 3 published by scholink inc. from more ghgs, focusing only upon the co2s. the global decarbonisation plan includes: i) halting the rise if co2s by 2020 (goal i); ii) reducing the co2s by 30-40% by 2030 (goal ii); iii) complete decarbonisation by around 2075 (goal iii); iv) decentralised implementation under international oversight, financial support and technical assistance. these are enormous goals, as only one country—uruguay—is near goal i and goal ii. some countries have lately had stalling or even decreasing co2s, but many other still face an upward sloping curve. 2.2 energy energy generates not only survival but also affluence and wealth, being vital to both poor and rich countries. if energy consumption is reduced, there will be global economic recessions and mass poverty as well as unemployment. but planet earth consumes too much energy from one major source: burning fossil fuels. one may employ some standard sources on energy consumption and what is immediately obvious is the immensely huge numbers involved—see table 1. table 1. energy consumption 2015 (million tons of oil equivalent) total % fossil fuels 11306,4 86,0 oil 4331,3 32,9 natural gas 3135,2 23,8 coal 3839,9 29,2 renewables 1257,8 9,6 hydroelectric 892,9 6,8 others 364,9 2,8 nuclear power 583,1 4,4 total 13147,3 100,0 source: bp statistical review of world energy 2016. table 1 holds the answer to why ghg emissions have become the global headache number 1. energy for humans and their social systems come to an average of 90% from burning fossil fuels: stone and wood coal, oil and gas. and people do that all over the world, though to very different degrees from 100% to less than 50% of all energy consumption, because it is necessary for affluence and survival. the enormous expansion in the energy consumption of fossil fuels has allowed the world to take on www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 4 published by scholink inc. many new inhabitants, as well as reducing poverty in the third world and much enhancing affluence and wealth in the first world. co2 emissions are closely connected with energy consumption, globally speaking. projections for future energy augmentation in the 21st century are enormous, especially for asia (eia, bp, iea). figure 2 developments since 1990. figure 2. global gdp-co2 link: y = 0,7498x, r² = 0,9801 gdp increases with the augmentation of energy per capita. decarbonisation is the promise to undo these dismal links by making gdp and energy consumption rely upon carbon neutral energy resources, like modern renewables and atomic energy. figrue 3. gdp against energy per person, 2005-2016 source: world bank data indicators, data.worldbank.org; bp statistical review of world energy 2017. both curves in figures 2 and 3 indicate stalling, which is what the unfccc hopes for. but recent new out of china informs about renewed augmentation of co2s in 2017. together with recent trends in methane emissions, hawking irreversibility is not far off. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 5 published by scholink inc. 3. temperature rise 3.1 co2s one may attempt to calculate exactly how increases in greenhouse gases impact upon temperature augmentations. take the case of co2s, where a most complicated mathematical formula is employed: t = tc + tn, where t is temperature, tc is the cumulative net contribution to temperature from co2 and tn the normal temperature. moreover, the general formula reads: dt = λ*df, where “dt” is the change in the earth’s average surface temperature, “λ” is the climate sensitivity, usually with degrees celsius per watts per square meter (°c/[w/m2]), and “df” is the radiative forcing. to get the calculations going, we start from lambda between 0.54 and 1.2, but let’s take the average = 0.87. thus, we have the formula (myhre el al., 1998): formula: 0.87 x 5.35 x ln(c/280) (1) figure 4 shows how co2 emissions may raise temperature to 4-5 degrees, which would be hawking’s worst case scenario. figure 4. co2s and temperature rise in celsius no one knows where the critical temperature rise occurs, i.e., from which celsius degree global warming becomes “irreversible”, to use stephen hawking’s expression. it could be as low as + 2 celsius or as high as + 5 celsius. there are several greenhouse gases, but the two biggest are the co2s and methane. the unfccc has concentrated upon halting and reducing carbon dioxide, but now we are about to face a methane threat. moving now and up to 2030, according to the cop21’s goal ii for decarbonisation would eliminate hawking irreversibility time has come for halting and reducing co2 emissions by real implementation and not utopian dreams of a sustainable economy (sachs, 2015). there is nothing to wait for any longer (stern, 2015), as the cop23 must set up the promised super fund. no time for politicking in the un any longer (conca, 2015; vogler, 2016). yet, could socio-economic determinism drive mankind to take proper action according to the cop21 treaty? www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 6 published by scholink inc. 3.2 methane emissions we shall use the methane concentration curve from mid 2013 to beginning of 2017 issued by noaa esrl https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends_ch4/ gently suggested by dlugokencky and kuniyuki. why mid 2013? because it is the last maximum of the second derivative before 2017. since then, the curve is approximately linear, and we will derive its equation hereunder. why should we start with a linear approximation, the simplest approximation that can be found? because it is a mean between two extreme scenarios: 1) another plateau like during the years 1999-2006 (probably due to an enhancement in methane transport insulation in ex-ussr after 1991, pearce), unlikely for the following reasons. any decrease in methane concentration is very unlikely, as the main sources (in decreasing importance order) generally increase: a) agriculture emissions increase with the increase of population, the increase in meat diet in developing countries and the temperature increasing the metabolism of microbes in rice agriculture. b) wetlands emissions don’t diminish yet, as the microbial chemical activity will increase with temperature for many years. c) fossil fuel production and use doesn’t diminish yet, and was underestimated by industry (fred pearce, http://e360.yale.edu/features/methane_riddle_what_is_causing_the_rise_in_emissions). d) biomass burning doesn’t diminish yet, therefore the primary forest diminishes in the tropics, leading also to a decrease in animal, vegetal and cultural (indigenous people) diversities and an increase in biosphere entropy. e) other natural emissions the most important contribution to the recent rise of methane concentration is mainly due to the increase in activity by microbes, present in points a), b) and d) (nisbet, in the above reference), mainly in the tropics. this study suggests the positive feedback of the chemical increase of activity of microbes is starting now, yielding a quasi-exponential curve in the near future, or at least a steeper curve. we will derive examples of future increase in methane concentration due to such a positive feedback, in addition to a linear approximation. for this, we will not simulate differential equations, which would be the best option, but simulate the hypothetical solution of a transition (bifurcation) between 2 steady-states, with a s-shaped function (which approximate the bifurcation between 2 steady-states) multiplied (to have continuity) by the linear approximation. we shall approximate the s-shape curve by an transitory (5 years) exponential curve in continuity with the linear approximation. the present (november 2017) quasi-linear curve starts mid 2013 (2013. 5) and its ordinate is approximately 1813 ppb. we will use as a last value at start of 2017, and the function is approximately 1846 ppb.a straightforward calculation gives the slope: it is approximately 10 ppb/year. therefore the equation for the future curve if there is no vicious circle (positive feedback) is: y = 10 (t-2013.5) + 1813 (2) wheret is the time when one wants to know the ch4 concentration, and y is the future ch4 concentration www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 7 published by scholink inc. in ppb. from this equation, one can estimate the approximate the temperature rise due by methane, by applying to y the formula (1), and multiply it by 25. it will be valid for close future, but will probably be underestimated for farther future, where it will probably closer to an exponential. methane conc. (ppm) 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 time m d et h an e co n c. ( p p m ) methane conc. (ppm) figure 5. projected increase in methane 4. decarbonisation srategies the unfccc suggests a decentralized management strategy for decarbonisation. reflecting the enormous differences in available energy resources in the member states of cop21 treaty, each government must develop a strategy for achieving goal i, goal ii and goal iii. the cop may wish to concentrate upon the following measures start credible decarbonisation: 1) phasing out coal power plants; convincing a few countries like india and australia not to build new ones; 2) replace wood coal with natural gas—small or large scale, stopping deforestation and the use of charcoal in households in poor nations; 3) massive construction of solar power and wind power plants in all countries, as well as stimulate small scale solar power; 4) turn some countries away from massive dam constructions towards solar power parks, like brazil and india, as the environmental damages are too big; 5) help some countries maintain their huge forests; 6) abstain from expensive and unsafe carbon sequestration techniques in favour of electricity: solar power and electrical vehicles. 7) the promise of financial support—super fund—has to be clarified about both funding and budgeting. a management structure has to be introduced for oversight of the entire decarbonisation www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 8 published by scholink inc. process. as the emission of methane increases, the reduction of co2s is all the more important, if irreversibility is to be avoided with a margin. the resort to atomic power plants is highly contested. nuclear power gets safer and safer, but the problem of storing the used uranium has no solution. if global warming becomes really bad, all these radioactive materials could be released back in our social systems and nature. some countries expand atomic energy, whereas others dismantle it. 5. solarpower parks—a model example consider now table 3, using the giant solar power station in morocco as the benchmark—how many would be needed to replace the energy cut in fossil fuels and maintain the same energy amount, for a few selected countries with big co2 emissions? table 2. number of ouarzazate plants necessary in 2030 for cop21’s goal ii: (note: average of 250-300 days of sunshine used for all entries except australia, indonesia, and mexico, where 300-350 was used) nation co2 reduction pledge/ % of 2005 emissions number of gigantic solar plants needed (ouarzazate) gigantic plants needed for 40 % reduction united states 26-28 (note 1) 2100 3200 china none (note 2) 0 3300 eu28 41-42 2300 2300 india none (note 2) 0 600 japan 26 460 700 brazil 43 180 170 indonesia 29 120 170 canada 30 230 300 mexico 25 120 200 australia 26-28 130 190 russia none (note 3) 0 940 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 9 published by scholink inc. canada 30 230 300 mexico 25 120 200 france 37 (note 4) 210 220 italy 35 (note 4) 230 270 sweden 42 (note 4) 30 30 argentina none (note 2) 0 80 uruguay none (note 2) 0 3 chile 35 25 30 world n/a n/a 16000 notes. 1) the united states has pulled out of the deal; 2) no absolute target; 3) pledge is above current level, no reduction; 4) upper limit dependent on receiving financial support; 5) eu joint pledge of 40 % compared to 1990. if countries rely much upon water or geo-thermal power or atomic power, the number in table 2 will be reduced. table 2 displays the dependency upon fossil fuels that may go over 90% in some countries. each country energy predicament is both situation dependent and path dependent, reflecting natural resources and past policies. the key question is: can so much solar power be constructed in some 10 years? if not, hawking may be right. thus, the cop23 should decide to embark upon an energy transformation of this colossal size. solar power investments will have to take many things into account: energy mix, climate, access to land, energy storage facilities, etc. they are preferable to nuclear power, which pushes the pollution problem into the distant future with other kinds of dangers. geo-thermal power comes from volcanic power and sites. it has been researched has much a climate of canadian type impacts upon solar power efficiency. in any case, canada will need back-ups for its many solar power parks, like gas power stations. mexico has a very favourable situation for solar power, but will need financing from the super fund, promised in cop21 treaty. in latin america, solar power is the future, especially as water shortages from the andes may be expected. chile can manage their quota, but argentine needs the super fund for sure. uruguay has the best number globally, relying upon water and biomass. table 3 has the data for the african and asian scene with a few key countries, poor or medium income. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 10 published by scholink inc. table 3. number of ouarzazate plants necessary in 2030 for cop21’s goal ii (note: average of 300-350 days of sunshine per year was used) nation co2 reduction pledge/ % of 2005 emissions number of gigantic solar plants needed (ouarzazate) gigantic plants needed for 40 % reduction algeria 7-22 (note 4) 8 50 egypt none 0 80 senegal 5-21 0,3 3 ivory coast 28-36 2 3 ghana 15-45 1 3 angola 35-50 6 7 kenya 30 3 4 botswana 17 1 2 saudi arabia none 0 150 iran 4-12 22 220 kazakhstan none 0 100 turkey 21 60 120 thailand 20-25iv 50 110 malaysia none 0 80 pakistan none 0 60 bangladesh 3,45 2 18 since africa is poor, it does not use much energy like fossil fuels, except maghreb as well as egypt plus much polluting south africa, which countries must make the energy transition as quickly as possible. the rest of africa uses either wood coal, leading to deforestation, or water power. they can increase solar power without problems when helped financially. for a few asian countries, the numbers are staggering, but can be fulfilled, if turned into the number one priority. some of the poor nations www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 11 published by scholink inc. need external financing and technical assistance. 6. conclusion we are not yet at the point of irreversibility, meaning there are still a few degrees of freedom for government policy-making and international governance. the plans of the unfccc must be implemented by all nations: goal i: halting co2 growth, goal ii: reducing co2s until 2030 and goal iii: near complete decarbonisation by 2075. but time is certainly running out. references sources: solar power edgar. (n.d.). european commission, joint research centre (jrc)/pbl netherlands environmental assessment agency. emission database for global atmospheric research (edgar). retrieved from http://edgar.jrc.ec.europe.eu paris. (2015). tracking country climate pledges. carbon brief. retrieved from https://www.carbonbrief.org/paris-2015-tracking-country-climate-pledges gdp sources: oecd national accounts data files. (n.d.). world bank national accounts data. (n.d.). retrieved from http://www.data.worldbank.org ghg and energy sources: bp energy outlook 2016. (n.d.). british petroleum statistical review of world energy. (2016). energy information administration. (n.d.). washington, dc. eu emissions database for global research edgar. (n.d.). retrieved from http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ eu joint research centre emission database for global atmospheric research. (n.d.). retrieved from http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php international energy agency. (n.d.). paris. un framework convention on climate change. (n.d.). retrieved from http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/time_series_annex_i/items/3814.php world bank data indicators. (n.d.). retrieved from http://www.data.worldbank.org world resources institute cait climate data explorer. (n.d.). retrieved from http://www.cait.wri.org literature: conka, k. (2015). un unfinished foundation. the united nations and global environmental governance. oxford: oup. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190232856.001.0001 kaya, y., & yokoburi, k. (1997). environment, energy, and economy: strategies for sustainability. tokyo: united nations university press. ostrom, e. (1990). governing the commons. cambridge: cambridge u.p. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 12 published by scholink inc. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511807763 ramesh, j. (2015). green signals: ecology, growth and democracy in india. oxford: oxford university press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199457526.001.0001 sachs, j. d. (2015). the age of sustainable development. new york: columbia university press. https://doi.org/10.7312/sach17314 stern, n. (2007). the economics of climate change. oxford: oup. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511817434 stern, n. (2015). what are we waiting for? cambridge, ma: mit press. vogler, j. (2016). climate change in world politics. basingstoke: macmillan palgrave. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137273413 notes note 1. the united states has pulled out of the deal. note 2. no absolute target. note 3. pledge is above current level, no reduction. note 4. upper limit dependent on receiving financial support. microsoft word ape-v3n2-p57 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 57 original paper do political factors affect government health spending? empirical evidence from sub-sahara african countries dianda issa1* 1 ministry of environment, green economics and climate change, ouagadougou, burkina faso * dianda issa, ministry of environment, green economics and climate change, ouagadougou, burkina faso received: april 28, 2020 accepted: may 20, 2020 online published: may 25, 2020 doi:10.22158/ape.v3n2p57 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v3n2p57 abstract in sub-saharan africa (ssa), access to essential health care services remains problematic. the financing of health care is mainly provided by private sources, mainly out-of-pocket payments which represent respectively 53.12% and 36.73% of total health expenditure in 2016. as for public health expenditure, essential for ensuring universal health coverage, it represents only about 35% of health expenditure. thus, the increase in public spending on health from domestically sources proves to be a major challenge for the countries of the region in the prospect of reaching the sdg relating to health by 2030. this paper aims to analyse the determinants of domestic government health spending in ssa by focusing on political factors. we use data from 39 ssa countries covering the period 2010-2016 and panel-corrected standard errors method for empirical investigation. the results show that democracy favours an increase in government health spending. furthermore, a political competitive environment, the guarantee and the protection of civil liberties and political right, accountability, government effectiveness and political stability are decisive for increasing government health spending. the results also showed that political participation does not affect public health spending. these results indicate that improving political factors is essential to increase public spending in ssa. keywords political factors, domestic government health spending, health, sub-sahara africa 1. introduction increased levels of public funding of health services from domestic sources are required for achieving the sustainable development goals (sdgs) related to health, especially universal health coverage (uhc). in this respect, kutzin (2013) reported that historically any country has managed to make www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 58 published by scholink inc. significant advances in uhc without having increased the funding of its health system from public resources. recently, researchers have estimated the annual amount of health expenditure required in low-and middle-income countries for achieving health-related sdg 3 at us $ 112 per capita (stenberg et al., 2017). in the same vein, the estimates of mcintyre, meheus and røttingen (2017) reveal that for progressing towards uhc, government expenditure on health, funded from domestically mobilised resources, must be at least 5% of gross domestic product (gdp) in low income countries. however, in sub-saharan africa (ssa), the level of domestic public health spending is low compared to what is required to achieve the health-related sdg by 2030. across sub-saharan africa countries, the average domestic government health expenditure per capita was only us$ 69.19 in parity purchasing power (ppp) a person in 2016. compared to us$ 940.61 in ppp for the world average, there is a difference of more than 13 times (world bank, 2020a). this amount represents 35.07% of total health expenditures and 1.82% of gdp. domestic private expenditure and its out-of-pocket (oop) component represent respectively 53.12 % and 36.73 % of total health spending. the preponderance of oop spending leads to financial difficulties and even the impoverishment of vulnerable groups. the world bank (2019) reported that in 2015, around 16 million sub-saharan africans (1.6% of population) has been falled into poverty due to high oop payments. the external health expenditure accounts for 11.68 % of total health expenditure. similarly, ssa is the only region where communicable diseases still account for the majority of death. in 2016, more than half (56.36%) of deaths in ssa were caused by communicable diseases, maternal causes, conditions arising during pregnancy and childbirth, and nutritional deficiencies against 33.69% for non-communicable diseases (world bank, 2020a). in the meantime, in other regions of the world, communicable and related diseases caused between 5.23% in north america and 26.95% of deaths in south asia, the world average being 20.18%. in addition, ssa is the only region in the world where half of the health services deemed essential to achieve uhc are not accessible to the population. only 43.89 % of these essential services are satisfied compared to 65.69% as the world average in 2017. the importance of health spending, particularly public spending, in improving the health of populations has led some researchers to empirically identify their determinants in order to achieve better implementation of health policies (tandon, fleisher, li, & yap, 2014; braendle & colombier, 2016). early authors focused on socio-economic and demographic determinants (newhouse, 1977; gbesemete & gerdtham, 1992). however, increasingly, some researchers recognize the role of political factors in the financing and delivering of social services to citizens, including health services. as gregorio and gregorio (2013) pointed out, the financing and delivery of health services, by their natures, are political. in this sense, kumar (2015) argued that as long as healthcare does not become a political demand and an electoral issue, the situation of a low level of public health care funding will not change. unfortunately, only a few studies had been conducted on panel of ssa countries (fosu, 2008) and case studies from nigeria (imoughele & ismaila, 2013; olawunmi, 2014) and leshoto (ramashamole & thamae, 2015) and have focused only on accountability and political (in)stability with divergent results. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 59 published by scholink inc. accordingly, this paper seeks to address this gap in our understanding of healthcare issues investigating the effect of a set of political factors on government health expenditures. understanding what political factors matters for public health spending can provide insight about the levers on which it is necessary to act to increase public spending on health with regard to its role for the path towards universal health coverage. the remainder of the paper is organized as follows. the section 2 presents literature review. the section 3 relates to the methodology approach. section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results. the last section concludes and gives some policy implications. 2. literature review this section presents the literature review on the political determinants of public health spending. we are interested in the political regime, in political competition, in political rights and civil liberties, in government functioning, in political participation, in accountability and in political stability. it is important to note that even if they are distinct, some political factors are linked. for example, according to besley and kudamatsu (2006), accountability and government effectiveness are more common in democratic system. likewise, political rights and civil liberties, political participation and competition are closely linked to democratic regime rather than autocracy. 2.2 political regime and public health spending the first political factor taken into account is regime type. theoretically, democracies are more likely to spend more resources on health than autocracies due to social and redistributive policies (besley & kudamatsu, 2006). according to acemoglu and robinson (2006), democracy is a regime more beneficial to the majority of the population and will result in policies that are relatively more favourable to it. conversely, nondemocracy is a regime for the elite and the privileged. in this regime, the leaders are more likely to look after theirs interests. the majority of populace in the developing world is poor and have a preference for social policies, particularly in terms of education, health and social protection programs. these programs benefit the poor relatively more than the rich (baqir, 2002). the extension of suffrage to individuals from the poorest strata, inadequately served by health care, water and sanitation, education or family planning, induced by democratization, promotes redistribution policies (meltzer & richard, 1981; mcguire, 2013). median voter hypothesis explains this propensity of democratic countries to be more distributive by allocating more resources to the health and education sectors, compared to autocratic countries. democratic leaders from an electoral perspective are attentive to the preferences of the median voter who, generally in these countries, is from middle or poor class. being of this class, he has a preference for social health, education and social protection programs in relation to defence services (habibi, 1994). thereby, politicians should try to improve the quality, quantity and accessibility of such services (mcguire, 2013). this interest results from the fact that health expenditures are important issues in electoral debates. in the case of organisation for economic co-operation and development countries for example, potrafke www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 60 published by scholink inc. (2010) and bellido, olmos, and román (2019) report that politicians act opportunistically by increasing public health expenditures in election years. the parties, which promise to spend more in health, have more chances to win the presidential elections and parliamentary seats (karyani, rad, pourreza, & shaahmadi, 2015). in order to stay in power, democratic leaders must win the support of a larger share of the population; they have therefore an incentive to provide welfare-promoting resources to a larger proportion of the population (wigley & akkoyunlu-wigley, 2017). along these lines, grépin and dionne (2013) argue that universal health coverage is a “visible” good that a politician could use as a campaign promise (or instrument while in power) to generate broad electoral support. as a result, leaders are encouraged to devote more resources to funding and providing these public services, thereby aligning society’s needs with priorities in terms of allocating public spending. in contrast, under a nondemocratic regime, with power concentrated in the hands of the ruling elite, they will prefer targeted transfers to politically influential groups. moreover, autocracies generally rely on the rich, who care less about public spending on education and health than the poor or middle classes (klomp & haan, 2013). as a substantial part of the electorate benefiting from redistribution programs is excluded from the decision-making process, the expenditure devoted to these programs is low (habibi, 1994). 2.2 political competition, political right, civil liberties and public health spending electoral competition is another major political factor determining the provision of health services by the public authorities and therefore the resources devoted to heath sector. health spending is an electoral issue, notably in the developing countries. in order to win the elections or stay in power, politicians must gain the support of a large majority of the population and are thus, more likely to offer public service that benefit the majority, including health (lake & baum, 2001; buracom, 2016). in a context where elections are free and fair, the electoral competition puts pressure on political parties to pursue universal, rather than more targeted health policies (grépin & dionne, 2013). the more politicians operate in an environment where competition is high and elections are free and fair, the more they are encouraged to succeed in health policies in order to have the support necessary for their re-election, due to the absence of the possibility to secure the loyalty of majority voters through cronyism and corruption. by making the political market more contestable, political competition constrains the politicians to improve the living standards (lake & baum, 2001). the increase of health and education spending is partly related to the fact that high political competition minimizes political rent while low level of political competition reduces welfare due to excessive rent seeking (polo, 1998). it should be noted however that when political competition is such that the re-election of government in power is sufficiently unlikely, it can focus on maximizing political rent seeking during their mandate with the aim of enjoying it in the event of non-re-election (bardhan & yang, 2004). the guarantee of political liberty defined as the rights to run for office and vote, is another factor likely to influence public health spending. more political liberty facilitates greater citizen voice, namely those www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 61 published by scholink inc. from disadvantaged classes and hence enables them to have more political influence on budgetary allocation (habibi, 1994). for these groups, the most important and priority government spendings are those related to health, education and social protection programs. therefore, in a context where this social class is the majority, the rise of their political influence will compel the government to increase social expenditures. therefore, societies in which political freedoms are more guaranteed allocate more resources to health (tandon et al., 2014). additionally, civil liberties including freedom of association, assembly and speech and freedom of press (profeta, puglisi, & scabrosetti, 2013), affect government health spending. the freedoms of association, assembly and speech enable citizens and journalists to call attention to problems in the society. under these conditions, they can denounce the poor quality of health services and press the authorities to improve it (mcguire, 2010; mcguire, 2013; profeta, puglisi, & scabrosetti, 2013). on this subject, avelino, brown, and hunter (2005) reported that important pressure groups involving social security lobbies and health care professionals have been able to influence governmental policy across different regime types. analogously, the existence of a modicum of press freedom allows the publication of reports of acute health crises or unfavourable social statistics, thus highlighting shortcomings in the provision of social services (mcguire, 2010). the increase of freedom in press led to an availability of newspapers and internet web-sites to people. in press materials, citizens can express their opinions, comment and criticise public policies (karyani et al., 2015). the press, interface between the rulers and ruled publishes the latter’s needs. this puts politicians face to face with their historic responsibilities. since health is an important issue for population, rulers are more inclined to spend more on health. if they act otherwise, they will be punished by voters at the polling time. 2.3 government functioning, political participation and public health spending the selection of politicians is another mechanism through which political factor can influence the level of public health spending. indeed, as besley and kudamatsu (2006) pointed out, democracies, due to electoral competition and the stronger mechanisms of selection, are more likely to bring to the head of states, more honest and competent governments than autocracies. even if some autocratic leaders may also intend to improve population health, health intervention policies in democracies are supported and implemented by more knowledgeable, impartial and incorruptible officials (besley & kudamatsu, 2006; wang, mechkova, & andersson, 2019). in such an environment, the search for rent is minimized and the decisions taken by the authorities are more likely to be in line with the priorities of the populations, thus favouring the general interest (hooda, 2016). with this in mind, in a context where the provision of better-quality health services is a good desired by a large part of the population, as is the case in developing countries, governments will be more inclined to prioritize the health sector in budgetary arbitrations. hence, the effectiveness of the government can determine cross-country differences in public health spending (klomp & haan, 2013; laiprakobsup, 2019). from a theoretical standpoint, political participation-the right of citizens to participate in the selection www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 62 published by scholink inc. of rulers and the extent to which they exercise it-may lead to increased social spending, among which health. the more this participation is increased, the more the governments are sensitive to the concerns of the majority. therefore, budget allocation is more likely to be in line with the priorities of the population. in this vein, joshi and yu (2014) argue that pressure on the state from organized lower-class groups can strongly influence the incentives of political leaders to provide them social services and benefits. so, the participation of the poor in the political system leads to outcomes which benefit them, with one such outcome being the amount of public resources devoted to the provision of education and health services (baqir, 2002). detraz and peksen (2018) note that women tend to be heavily represented among these marginalized segments of society, and have long been portrayed as one of the major beneficiaries of welfare services. when they have access to political positions, they tend to strongly advocate for social spending. 2.4 accountability, political stability and public health spending accountability has been evidenced as a political factor by which to increase government health spending. specifically, accountability drives the elected government to spend more on healthcare. in an environment where a broad set of citizens demands accountability at a regular interval to politicians, as it is the case of elections, the politicians are more encouraged to allocate public resources in accordance with people’s priorities (datta, 2020). in this case, increasing government accountability may be more effective strategies to ensuring that health is given the priority it deserves (tandon et al., 2014). failure to increase the access to health services and improve health status of population may results in politician being removed from office at the next elections. according to huber, mustillo and stephens (2008) and gibson (2018), democracy is associated with increases in public health spending because democratic government is more accountable to the demands of the citizenry. in contrast, kumah and brazys (2016) posited that it is the related and distinct concept of accountability that yields positive public spending outcomes rather than democracy considering as a unitary whole. the unaccountability of political leaders may on the contrary, give rise to opportunities for public agents to support rent generating sectors to the detriment of social sector (cockx & francken, 2014). the stability of the political environment is a critical dimension of political institutions that can determine le level of resources devoted to health. in a context where the political environment is stable and certain, the governments are more willing to invest in health (klomp & haan, 2013). as well, the governments which are able to retain office and undertake declared programs tend to spend more on health (liang & mirelman, 2014). for these latter authors, there is an intrinsic difference in objectives of stable and unstable governments. the former is able to place more emphasis on long-term social programs, such as health. many public health programs require consistent financial input while its benefits can be observed only in the long run. in this context, when a government does not have the ability to stay in office, it may have less incentive to pursue such programs. furthermore, political instability caused by riots, civil war or strikes can disrupt the health system in a country (klomp & haan, 2009). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 63 published by scholink inc. this review shows that theoretically, several political factors are likely to affect public spending on health. given that less empirical work has been devoted to the effects of these factors on public health expenditure in ssa, we will fill this gap in the literature. 3. method in this section, we present the model specification, the variables and the method used for empirical investigation. 3.1 empirical model specification to explore the link between political factors and public healthcare expenditure, we propose the following functional form. equation (1) shows that domestic public health expenditure (dghe) is a function political factor and a set of control variables (x). taking into account the panel dimension and on the basis of empirical work on the determinants of public health spending determinants in africa and developing countries (murthy & okunade, 2009; farag, et al., 2012; behera & dash, 2019), we propose a panel data log-log specification as follows: where is the error term; i represents the country and t the period. the coefficients of independent variables are interpreted as elasticities. dphe stands for domestic public health expenditure per capita in $us in ppp (dphepc) or as share of gdp (dphe_gdp). the control variables include gross domestic product per capita in $us in ppp (pcgdp), tax revenue as share of gdp (tr), population aged 65 and above as share of total population (pop65), the tuberculosis incidence per 100,000 inhabitants (tbi) and the official development assistance for health sector per capita (pcodah) $us in ppp. 3.2 variables presentation we have in our model, three types of variables: the dependent variable, the variables of interest and variables of control. 3.2.1 the dependent variable our dependent variable is dphe. public expenditure on health from domestic sources include domestic revenue as internal transfers and grants, transfers, subsidies to voluntary health insurance beneficiaries, non-profit institutions serving households or enterprise financing schemes as well as compulsory prepayment and social health insurance contributions. they do not include external resources spent by governments on health (world bank, 2020a). they are expressed in domestic public health expenditure per capita in $us in ppp (dphepc) or as share of gdp (dphe_gdp). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 64 published by scholink inc. 3.2.2 the explanatory variables of interest political factors are our independent variables of interest. in total, seven factors are considered. the first political factor used is democracy index. to this end, we use two indicators. the first is the economist intelligence unit (eiu) democracy index (eiudi). according to eiu (2011), the eiudi, on a 0 to 10 scale, is based on the ratings for 60 indicators grouped in five categories: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of government, political participation, and political culture. the index provides a snapshot of the state of democracy worldwide for 165 independent states and two territories. the index values are used to place countries within one of four types of regimes : full democracies (scores of 8-10), flawed democracies (scores of 6 to 7.9), hybrid regimes (scores of 4 to 5.9) and authoritarian regimes (scores below 4). the eiudi is more comprehensive than other ordinal democracy scales because it includes sub-scores such as functioning of government and political culture that other indices do not (walker, anonson, & szafron, 2015). the second democracy indicator, used as a robustness, is polity2 of polity iv. it ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic) and takes into account the free elections, the existence of legal limitations to the exercise of executive power by a government and its chief executives and inclusive participation and representation by political parties (marshall, gurr, & jaggers, 2017). the second political factor is political competition. we use eiu sub-score of electoral process and pluralism as proxy of political competition. this sub-score includes among others free and fair elections, universal suffrage, exchange of power following elections, and ability to form political groups (economist intelligence unit, 2011). the political rights and civil liberties are the third political factor used. the political rights are from freedom house (2017) and comprise the electoral process, the political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of government. two indicators are used to approximate civil liberties. the first is the civil liberties of freedom house (2017) and are related to freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law and personal autonomy and individual rights. the indicators of political and civil right of freedom house are calibrated from 1 to 7. a score of 1 represents the greatest degree of freedom and 7 the smallest degree of freedom. the second indicator is eiu sub-score of civil liberties. it takes into consideration the freedoms of speech and protest, of the press, of information, freedom of and influence of the judiciary system by government among others (economist intelligence unit, 2011). the fourth political factor is government effectiveness. this is approximated by two indicators. the first is eiu sub-score of the functioning of government. it measures public confidence in the government, influence of the government from outside sources, and the ability of the government to implement policies (economist intelligence unit, 2011). the second is government effectiveness from worldwide governance indicator (world bank, 2020c). according to kaufmann, kraay and mastruzzi (2010), this indicator captures the perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 65 published by scholink inc. and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. political participation and culture are the fifth factor and come from eiu sub-scores of political participation and political culture. the political participation involves the degree to which the public engages in political matters while political culture involves public perception of leadership and democracy (economist intelligence unit, 2011). the sixth factor relates to accountability and is measured through two indicators. the first is voice and accountability from wgi and relates the perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media (kaufmann, kraay, & mastruzzi, 2010). the second, democratic accountability is taken from international country risk guide (icrg). it is a measure of how responsive government is to its people, on the basis that the less responsive it is, the more likely it is that the government will fall, peacefully in a democratic society, but possibly violently in a non-democratic one (howell, 2012). the last factor is political stability. it is measured trough the indicator political stability and absence of violence/terrorism from wgi and captures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically—motivated violence and terrorism. the eiudi and its sub-score range from 0 to 10. the wgi indicators (government effectiveness, voice and accountability and political stability and absence of violence/terrorism) range from -2.5 (weak governance) to +2.5 (strong governance). democratic accountability of icrg ranges from 0 to 6. these indicators has been rescaled to assume values between 1 and 6 (wgi), 1 and 11 (eiudi and its sub-scores), 1 and 21 (polity2), 1 and 7 (democratic accountability), for practical needs (the use of logarithm) as it is often the case in the literature (mcguire, 2013; karyani et al., 2015; dianda & sirpé, 2020). 3.2.3 the control variables our control variables are five. they are macro-fiscal, epidemiological and demographic variables and are considered to be determinants of public health spending. they include gross domestic product per capita in $us in ppp (pcgdp), tax revenue as share of gdp (tr), population aged 65 and above as share of total population (pop65), the tuberculosis incidence per 100,000 inhabitants (tbi) and the official development assistance for health sector per capita (pcodah) $us in ppp. since the seminal work by newhouse (1977) who found that in developed countries the variation of per capita gdp explains more than 90% of the variation in per capita healthcare expenditure, the wealth of countries is considered as the main determinants of their health spending. in line with this, we assume that income is positively linked to public health expenditure. similarly, the level of tax revenue reflecting the fiscal capacity of the government, we anticipate that it positively affects the public health spending. we also assume that the official development assistance for health sector is complementary to domestic public spending due to the weakness of domestic spending and the health systems of ssa described in the introduction. an aging and sick population requires additional resources to provide www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 66 published by scholink inc. them with adequate health care. therefore, we hypothesize that the proportion of the population whose age is greater than or equal to 65 years and the incidence of tuberculosis are factors that increase public spending on health. the data used are annual and cover 39 ssa countries listed in appendix for the period 2010-2016 due to their availability. the data on domestic public health expenditure, official development assistance for health, the proportion of the population whose age is greater than or equal to 65 years, and the incidence of tuberculosis are taken from health, nutrition and population database of the world bank (2020a). gdp per capita and tax revenue are respectively from world development indicators database of the world bank (2020b) and government revenue dataset of the international centre for tax and development (2020). 3.3 estimation method for empirical investigation, as previous studies on the determinants of health spending (avelino, brown, & hunter, 2005; gibson, 2018), we use panel-corrected standard errors method proposed by beck and katz (1995). in general, times-series cross-sectional data violate at least two of the basic assumptions that underlie ordinary least squares (ols) estimation (avelino, brown, & hunter, 2005). these authors point out that temporal structure of the data increases the chance of autocorrelation, violating the ols assumption that the errors are independent of each other. similarly, the cross-sectional structure of the data increases the chance that the variance in the error terms may differ across countries and that there will be spatial processes that affect different panels simultaneously. therefore, the presence of heterogeneity and autocorrelation renders ols coefficient estimates inefficient. the panel-corrected standard errors method deals with these problems. 4. empirical result in this section, we present and discuss the results in three stages. in the first subsection, the main descriptive statistics of the basic model and stylized facts are presented. the second subsection is devoted to the presentation and discussion of the results of the basic model which uses democracy as a political factor. the last subsection discusses the results of the effect of other political factors on public health spending. 4.1 summary statistics and stylized facts table 1. below summarizes some descriptive statistics of the variables used over the period 2010-2016. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 67 published by scholink inc. table 1. descriptive statistics variables observations mean standard deviation minimum maximum eiudi 273 4.489 1.814 1.26 8.28 polity 2 273 2.897 5.160 -9 10 dphepc ($ us in ppp) 273 95.779 151.194 1.878 599.923 dphe_gdp 273 1.822 1.281 0.196 5.800 pcgdp ($us in ppp) 273 4554.236 6124.155 646.295 36576.09 pcodah ($us in ppp) 273 32.172 25.616 2.329 143.537 tr (% of gdp) 273 15.455 7.319 4.406 46.757 tbi (per 100.000 inhabitants) 273 283.776 232.746 11 1190 pop65 (% of total population) 273 3.123 1.189 1.871 10.443 source: author computation from data. this table reveals that regional average score of the democracy index is 4.489, suggesting that the state of democracy in this panel is poor between 2010 and 2016. the region is characterised by the concentration of hybrid and authoritarian regimes (respectively 12 and 19 countries out 44 in 2016) with few countries considered as flawed democracies (7 countries out 44) and only one country (mauritius) is a full democracy. similarly, with a score of 4.37, sub-saharan africa was the lowest democracy region against 5.52 for the world average. this fact is corroborated by the indicator polity2 which, although having a positive regional average over the period, remains weak (2.897). the regional per capita government health spending from domestic sources is 95.77 $us in ppp which corresponds to 1.822 % of gdp. given the challenges of funding the provision of preventive and curative health services in the region, and what is needed to achieve universal health coverage by 2030, this amount is small. probably, it is related to region’s gdp per capita, which stood at 4554.23 $us in pppa during this period. the low level of domestic public health financing necessitates the use of external resources as part of official development assistance. thus, during the period under review, our panel countries benefited from public aid to improve the health of their population in the average amount of 32.17 per inhabitants. the countries of the region have mobilized through taxation an amount representing 15.45% of gdp. these financial resources were used in part to cope with tuberculosis, the incidence of which is 283.78 per 100.000 inhabitants, as well as the needs of people aged 65 and over, estimated at around 3.12% of the population. table 2 below presents public expenditure by political regime according to the classification of eiu in 2010 and 2016. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 68 published by scholink inc. table 2. government health spending by political regime, 2010 and 2016 year democracies (full and flawed) hybrid regimes authoritarian ssa average dphepc ($ us in ppp) 2010 227.64 21.14 47.58 56.81 2016 306.97 35.63 63.24 69.19 dphe_gdp 2010 2.97 1.30 1.38 1.93 2016 3.21 1.86 1.47 1.83 source: author computation from data. from this table, it emerges that democracies (full and flawed) spend more financial resources on the health of their population than hybrid regimes and autocracies. likewise, autocracies have higher levels of public spending on health both per capita and as a share of gdp than hybrid regimes. in 2010 for example, in the democracies of the region, public spending on health per capita amounted to 227.64 $us per capita, or 2% of gdp against 21.14 $us per capita for hybrid regimes corresponding to 1.30 % of gdp and 47.58 $us per capita equivalent to 1.93 % of gdp for autocratic countries. it should be noted that public health spending per capita in the region’s democracies is higher than the regional average in 2010 (56.81 $us) while hybrid regimes and autocracies have lower levels. the same is true for public spending as a share of gdp. this trend is also observed for the year 2016. if these facts are not sufficient to conclude on the nature of the link between the political system and public health spending, the econometric evaluation will allow us to detect it. 4.2 baseline estimate results and discussion the estimates with eiudi and polity 2 are considered as baseline estimate. the results are shown in table 3. table 3. democracy and public health spending in ssa dependent variable: log (dphepc) log (dphe_gdp) log (dphepc) log (dphe_gdp) log (eiudi) 0.387*** (0.000) 0.326*** (0.000) log (polity2) 0.111** (0.021) 0.078* (0.097) log (pcgdp) 1.030*** (0.000) 0.030** (0.017) 1.047*** (0.000) 0.042** (0.029) log (tr) 0.666*** (0.000) 0.670*** (0.000) 0.766*** (0.000) 0.758*** (0.000) log (pop 65) 0.320*** (0.000) 0.333 (0.437) 0.395*** (0.000) 0.401*** (0.00) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 69 published by scholink inc. log (tbi) 0. 084** (0.010) 0. 069** (0.032) 0. 060 (0.115) 0. 048 (0.201) log (pcodah) 0.156*** (0.000) 0.160*** (0.000) 0.209*** (0.000) 0.205*** (0.000) constant -8.234*** (0.000) -3.417*** (0.000) -8.389*** (0.000) -3.504*** (0.000) countries 39 39 39 39 observations 263 263 263 263 r-squared 0.863 0.480 0.860 0.476 prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 figures in parentheses are p-values; ***, ** and *denote respectively significance at 1%. 5% and 10%. source: author estimation. in general, the explanatory variables jointly and significantly explain the change in government spending on health, as the chi2-statistics are statistically significant at 1% level (p-value < 0.00). in addition, r-squared is between 0.47 and 0.86, suggesting that the independent variables capture between 47% and 86% of the variations in public health expenditures. in table 3, results show that democratisation has a significant positive effect on government health spending at 1% level of significance. the consolidation of democracy, resulting in an increase in the economic intelligence unit democracy of 1% translates, all things being equal, by an increase in domestic public health expenditure per inhabitant of 0.38%. similarly, the result implies that at 1% incremental change in democracy leads to 0.32% change in the share of public health spending in gdp. the extension of franchise to the low and middle-class citizens enables them to influence public policies and this force the elite to take into account their interest. yet, these people have a preference for redistributive policies, including health (baqir, 2002). consequently, the democratization has a favourable effect on government health spending. the afro barometer survey, which covered 36 african countries in 2014/2015, revealed that for african citizens, problems related to health are the second most important problem (after unemployment) that their governments must tackle. likewise, this sector is classified in second priority (after education) which requires an additional investment on the part of the government (armah-attoh, selormey, & houessou, 2016). the positive link between democracy and government health spending remains robust when polity2 is used as its proxy. this expected positive association between democratisation and government health spending is in accordance with the results in earlier studies especially in mixed sample of developed and developing countries (ghobarah, huth, & russett, 2004; gregorio & gregorio, 2013; kotera & okada, 2017). similarly, the crucial role that democracy plays in increasing public spending on health has been highlighted by studies based on developing countries, particularly in eastern mediterranean countries (karyani et al., 2015), in latin american countries (kaufman & segura-ubiergo, 2001) and southeast www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 70 published by scholink inc. asia (laiprakobsup, 2019). likewise, an existing study on latin american countries has shown a positive association between the stock of democracy (number of years of democracy accumulated since 1945) and social spending, especially spending on health and education (huber, mustillo, & stephens, 2008). unlike these studies and ours, avelino, brown, and hunter (2005) and mcguire (2010) found that democracies do not influence government spending on health respectively in latin american countries and a sample of developing countries. in the same perspective, adolf (2011) suggested that government spending on social programs (such as health and education) is independent of the nature of the political system. in addition to these empirical investigations, some stylized facts from history have questioned the propensity of democracies to allocate more resources to health compared to nondemocratic regimes. these facts show that democratic countries do not spend necessarily more on social sector and deliver such service to population than autocratic ones. datta (2020) cites the india’s case as one compelling example where a practicing democracy did not lead to better healthcare policy as measured by level of public healthcare spending and improved health outcome. this country, in spite of being the world’s largest democracy since its independence in 1947, spent only 1.27% of its gdp on public healthcare in 2015. in a historical and comparative analysis, joshi and yu (2014) corroborate this point of view by noting that from independence to 2011, the public investment in health of the different indian governments remained low despite the existence of a democratic regime. conversely, china, considered to be an autocracy, alternated high (1949-1978), low (1979-2000) and intermediate levels of public health investment. for joshi and yu (2014), it is less the political regime than the political implication of lower class, namely organized political pressure from the lower classes, and the development ideology of political leaders that explains the difference in public health investment in low-income countries. in agreement with these authors, grépin and dionne (2013) noted that it is not simply the level of democracy that makes governments more likely to adopt health policies that benefit the population in the broadest sense, but rather the extent to which democratic development is perceived as meaningful by citizens and is manifested in electoral competition that puts pressure on political parties to pursue universal, rather than more targeted, health policies. kumah and brazys (2016) posited that rather than considering ‘democracy’ as a unitary whole, it is the related, but distinct, concept of accountability that yields positive public spending outcomes. wigley and akkoyunlu-wigley (2017) argued that it is possible that democratic governments will not target welfare transfers and public goods to low-income citizens because their votes are not required in order to secure a winning majority. if the positive relation between democracy and government health spending is established, we do not know from what dimension of democracy it results. this does not enable, in a context where the increase in domestic public health funding is more than necessary to ensure the sustainability of interventions and move towards uhc, to make strong recommendations for the attention of policy makers. hence, the need for democracy key aspects and broadly more detailed political factors. this is the subject matter of the next subsection. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 71 published by scholink inc. on the whole, the coefficients of most control variables have the expected sign. meanwhile, the estimation results in table 3 indicate that the income per capita has the anticipated sign. its coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level for government health spending per capita model and 5% level for government health spending as share of gdp model. this result means that the increase in gdp leads to increased government health spending. all other things being equal, a 1% increase in gdp per capita is associated with government health spending increases between 0.04 % and 1.04%. thus, the more countries develop, the more they are able to allocate more resources to health. when we use public spending on health in proportion to the gdp as dependent variable, the income elasticity is less than one, suggesting that public provision of health care in ssa is considered as a necessity. this result is in line with those obtained in panel studies of developing countries led by farag et al. (2012) and sub-saharan countries (dianda & sirpé, 2020; micah et al., 2019). in contrast, when we use domestic public health spending per capita as the dependent variable, the income elasticity is greater than 1, suggesting that health care is a luxury good. this result is empirically highlighted in sub-sahara african context (jaunky & khadaroo, 2008; ramashamole & thamae, 2015; ly et al., 2017) and in low income countries (xu, saksena, & holly, 2011). as okunade (2005) pointed out, african countries historically spent a more than proportionate increase in their gdps on health care. this can be explained by the fact that in the context of africa, the public sector has to strive hard to provide basic health care to the poor majority (jaunky & khadaroo, 2008). in view of the difference in elasticities obtained in the two models, this study does not allow us to conclude on the nature of health care. the fiscal capacity and government health spending are positively, statistically and significantly associated at 1% level. it is of prime importance in determining the level of government health spending. a 10% rise in public revenue as proportion of gdp is associated with a 6.6% to 7.7% increase in government health spending, all else being equal. the improvement of fiscal capacity enables the government to spend more on health. this result corroborates previous one that fiscal capacity favours an increase of public health spending (hooda, 2016; dianda & sirpé, 2020). the incidence of tuberculosis is found to be positive as expected and significant at the 5 % level in two of the four equations in explaining public health spending. the 1% increase in tuberculosis incidence translates into between 0.06%-0.08% increase in government health spending. the sicker the population, the more resources are needed for medical care. this is especially for contagious diseases as they generate negative externalities. this result calls into question that of the authors who have shown that the epidemiological profile is not a significant determinant of public health spending (xu, saksena, & holly, 2011; sirag, nor, & abdullah, 2017). nonetheless, this result is in agreement with that obtained with the population aged 65 and over. the coefficient of this variable is positive and significant at the 1% level. in general, this segment of the population is very vulnerable to disease, demands more health services and requires more frequent and more costly medical treatment than younger people (mcguire, 2010). our results are similar to those who find a positive and statistically significant relationship between the share of population aged over 65 and public health expenditures in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 72 published by scholink inc. low-and middle-income countries (behera & dash, 2019). however, this result contradicts those according to which the elderly population and more generally demographic factors have no significant effect on public health expenditure (fosu, 2008; mcguire, 2010; kumah & brazys, 2016; sirag, nor, & abdullah, 2017; dianda & sirpé, 2020; micah, et al., 2019). as expected, the estimated effect of donor assistance for health is positive and significant at the 1% level. a 1% increase in heath aid per capita induces, ceteris paribus, an increase in public health spending per capita between 0.15% and 0.20% and in public health spending as share of gdp between 0.16% and 0.20%. the more countries receive health aid, the more they spend domestically resources on health, thus highlighting the complementarity between health aid and domestic government health spending. in sub-saharan africa countries with limited resources, increased health aid leads to higher allocation of resources to health sector. this result is in line with the authors who found that health aid is not totally fungible in africa (kumah & brazys, 2016; dianda & sirpé, 2020) but contrasts with the result that health aid does not influence government health spending or is fungible in developing world (lu et al., 2010; micah et al., 2019). 4.3 other political factors effects on government health spending the discussion of the effects of other political factors on public health expenditure will be done in three stages. first, we consider the political competition, the political right and the civil liberties. then we take into account the dimensions government functioning, political participation and political culture. finally, we analyse the effects of accountability and political stability on government health spending. 4.3.1 political competition, political right and civil liberties in all the tables which follow in the even columns, the logarithm of domestic public health spending per capita is the dependent variable while in the odd columns, the share of domestic public health spending in gdp is the dependent variable. table 4 shows the results of the estimates with political competition (columns 1 et 2), political right (columns 3 et 4) and civil liberties (columns 5 to 8) as political variable. table 4. political competition, political right, civil liberties and public health spending in ssa model (note 1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) log(eiuepp) 0.117*** (0.000) log(eiuepp) 0.110*** (0.001) log (fhpr) -0.271*** (0.000) log (fhpr) -0.248*** www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 73 published by scholink inc. (0.000) log (fhcl) -0.382*** (0.000) log (fhcl) -0.347*** (0.000) log (eiucl) 0.595*** (0.000) log (eiucl) 0.510*** (0.000) log(pcgdp) 1.052*** (0.000) 0.050*** (0.004) 1.035*** (0.000) 0.034** (0.011) 1.036*** (0.000) 0.353*** (0.007) 1.032*** (0.000) 0.032** (0.016) log (tr) 0.728*** (0.000) 0.715*** (0.000) 0.740*** (0.000) 0.727*** (0.000) 0.678*** (0.000) 0.672*** (0.000) 0.602*** (0.000) 0.612*** (0.000) log (pop 65) 0.365*** (0.066) 0.364** (0.037) 0.173* (0.066) 0.190** (0.037) 0.192** (0.020) 0.209*** (0.009) 0.217** (0.018) 0.243*** (0.006) log (tbi) 0. 072** (0.026) 0. 060* (0.055) 0.089*** (0.003) 0. 076** (0.011) 0. 089** (0.010) 0. 075** (0.027) 0.103*** (0.000) 0.085*** (0.003) log(pcodah) 0.183*** (0.000) 0.179*** (0.000) 0.179*** (0.000) 0.176*** (0.000) 0.163*** (0.000) 0.162*** (0.000) 0.123*** (0.000) 0.131*** (0.000) constant -8.171*** (0.000) -3.374*** (0.000) -7.401*** (0.000) -2.666*** (0.000) -7.066*** (0.000) -2.367*** (0.000) -8.348*** (0.000) -3.518*** (0.000) countries 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 observations 263 263 263 263 263 263 263 263 r-squared 0.861 0.482 0.866 0.497 0.867 0.501 0.872 0.513 prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 figures in parentheses are p-values; ***, ** and *denote significance at 1%. 5% and 10% respectively. source: author estimation. as expected, the political competition affects positively the government health spending. the political competition variable is statistically significant at 1% in both model (1 and 2). a 1% increase in political competition indicator lead to 0.11% increase in public health spending per capita and as share of gdp. the result shows that a competitive political environment is associated with an increase in the per capita government health spending and the percentage share of government health spending on gdp. health is an electoral issue and if the political environment is competitive, the rulers are forced to spend more on health in order to get the support necessary for their re-election. in addition, a contestable political market minimizes the rent seeking activities (polo, 1998), thus favouring the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 74 published by scholink inc. general interest. in these conditions, given that health is a priority in the region, political competition generates an increase in public spending on health. this finding is corroborated in some studies where political competition is found to have a strong positive influence on education spending in africa and public healthcare expenditure in india (stasavage, 2005; datta, 2020). a panel analysis of the 16 india major states undertaken by datta (2020) found that political competition has a strong positive influence on public healthcare expenditure. in an environment where government is facing high degree of political competition in election from the opposition parties, it increases spending on public healthcare to maximize his chances of winning in the next election. stasavage (2005) also found that when they are subject to multiparty competition, african governments have indeed tended to spend more on education and more on primary education in particular. the columns 3-4 and 5-6 of table 4 report the estimations in which the political rights and civil liberties of freedom house are used as proxy indicators of political factors. in the columns 7 and 8, the results of estimates with civil liberties of economist intelligence unit as political factor are reported. note that unlike the other political variables used, in the case of these freedom house indicators, a low level indicates that in the country political and civil liberties are guaranteed while a high score indicates a confiscation of these freedoms. the results show that the coefficients of political right and civil liberties from freedom house are negative and significant at 1% threshold, as expected. similarly, the coefficient of civil liberties of economic intelligence unit is positive and significant at 1% level. the results reveal that better guarantee of political rights and better protection of civil liberties, contribute to an increase in public health spending. these findings are in line with what has been found in other similar studies done in mixed sample and developing world which show that the improvement of political liberties and freedom in the press and increased civil liberties protection are positively related to government health spending (habibi, 1994; profeta, puglisi, & scabrosetti, 2013; karyani et al., 2015). habibi (1994) shows empirically that the improvement of political liberties leads to an increase of public spending on health and social security in proportion to gdp, but reduces the share of public spending devoted to defence in a sample of 67 developed and developing countries. this result in consistent with those of karyani et al. (2015), who found that political freedom measured by freedom in the press index positively affect government health expenditures in a panel of 20 eastern mediterranean countries. similarly, profeta, puglisi, and scabrosetti (2013) present empirical evidence from developing countries in three geographical areas (south-east asia, latin america and european union) showing that increased civil liberties protection to higher health expenditure over gdp. 4.3.2 government functioning, political participation, political culture and public health spending the table 5 reports the results of estimates with the eiu sub-score of functioning of government (columns 1 and 2), wgi government effectiveness (columns 3 and 4), eiu sub-score of political participation (columns 5 and 6) and eiu sub-score of political culture (columns 7 and 8) as political factors. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 75 published by scholink inc. table 5. government functioning and effectiveness, political participation and culture and public health spending in ssa model (note 2) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) log(eiufog) 0.205*** (0.000) log(eiufog) 0.208*** (0.000) log (wgige) 1.167*** (0.000) log (wgige) 1.176*** (0.000) log (eiupp) 0.093 (0.114) log (eiupp) 0.491 (0.431) log (eiupc) 0.207** (0.041) log (eiupc) 0.117 (0.265) log (pcgdp) 1.004*** (0.000) 0.003 (0.805) 1.184*** (0.000) 1.186*** (0.008) 1.030*** (0.000) 0.030** (0.025) 1.023*** (0.000) 0.026** (0.042) log (tr) 0.685*** (0.000) 0.666*** (0.000) 0.322*** (0.000) 0.302*** (0.000) 0.767*** (0.000) 0.763*** (0.000) 0.765*** (0.000) 0.761*** (0.000) log (pop 65) 0.396*** (0.000) 0.391*** (0.000) 0.110* (0.083) 0.130** (0.019) 0.411*** (0.000) 0.416*** (0.000) 0.415*** (0.018) 0.418*** (0.006) log (tbi) 0.082** (0.016) 0.073** (0.029) -0.06 (0.930) -0.011 0.873 0. 511 (0.155) 0. 041 (0.240) 0. 067* (0.095) 0. 050 (0.203) log (pcoda) 0.168*** (0.000) 0.161*** (0.000) 0.067*** (0.002) 0.057** (0.011) 0.209*** (0.000) 0.206*** (0.000) 0.191*** (0.000) 0.195*** (0.000) constant -7.823*** (0.000) -3.029*** (0.000) -8.078*** (0.000) -3.357 (0.000) -8.091*** (0.000) -3.290*** (0.000) -8.280*** (0.000) -3.398*** (0.000) countries 39 39 27 27 39 39 39 39 observations 263 263 185 185 263 263 263 263 r-squared 0.963 0.492 0.861 0.454 0.858 0.473 0.859 0.474 prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 figures in parentheses are p-values; ***, ** and *denote significance at 1%. 5% and 10% respectively. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 76 published by scholink inc. source: author estimation as it is evident in the table 5, the functioning of government has a significant and positive effect on government health spending. specifically, the results indicate that when the indicator of the functioning of government increases by 1 % public health spending rises by about 0.20 %. this finding is in line with what has been found with government effectiveness are from worldwide governance indicators as political variable. the table reveals that the coefficient of government effectiveness is positive and statistically significant at 1%. these results demonstrate that a better functioning of the government and increased effectiveness is an ingredient conducive to increased public spending on health. when the government is honest and competent, not only rent seeking activities are limited and the public interest is much more likely to be saved, but also public policies are better implemented. in the quest for general interest, given that health is a priority in ssa, public spending on health is expected to increase. this finding is supported by previous studies on developing countries (sirag, nor, & abdullah, 2017; gibson, 2018). gibson (2018) examining the determinants of public health spending in the countries of the arab league between 1996 and 2014, found that the government effectiveness is positively associated with public health spending. in the same vein, sirag, nor, and abdullah (2017) found that in developing countries, government effectiveness tends to improve public health financing. however, in developed countries, the authors did not find a significant link between government effectiveness and public health financing. the coefficient of political participation is positive but is insignificant at the conventional level. contrary to what is expected, the political participation in ssa does not affect government health spending. the result challenges the authors’ finding that political participation is a determinant of government health spending (miller, 2008; joshi & yu, 2014; braendle & colombier, 2016; hooda, 2016). some authors have highlighted the positive effect of close involvement of the populations in the budget process on the allocation of public spending to health programs. this is particularly the case of brazilian communities through the adoption at the decentralized level of the participatory budgeting since the beginning of the 1990s. in this context, gonçalves (2014) found significant differences in the allocation of expenditures associated with adoption of participatory budgeting. the municipalities with a greater share of participatory budgeting spend a larger proportion of their total budget on health and sanitation. the author highlights an average difference of above 3% points, between a municipality without participatory budgeting and a municipality that adopts participatory budgeting, of the budget share allocated to health and sanitation. along the same lines, hooda (2016) explores the relationship between political participation and the variation in government spending on health, including expenditure on water and sanitation, in 16 states in india over the period 1987-1988 to 2011-2012. political participation is approximated by a composite indicator constructed using the principal component analysis (pca) from several variables. these include, among other things, the percentage of total voter turnout in assembly election of a state, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 77 published by scholink inc. the total number of women who voted in assembly election as percentage of men who voted in assembly election, the percentage of women contestants in assembly election. similarly, are taken into account in the calculation of the composite indicator of index of political participation, the percentage of women contestants elected in assembly election of a state and the women and reserved class panchayat representatives as a share of total panchayat representatives in a state. according to his analysis, the author validates the hypothesis that the widening of political participation and a greater representativeness of various population groups, notably the most vulnerable and minorities in the political sphere, leads to a significant rise in government spending on health. this result reflects the fact that a large involvement of minority populations in the electoral process allows leaders to align their decisions with the interests and priorities of the population, especially the needs in terms of health care. in the same way, joshi, and yu (2014) emphasize on the political implication of lower class, namely organized political pressure from the lower classes, in addition to the development ideology of political leaders in determining levels of public health investment in low-income countries instead of regime type. the hypothesis that a rise in women’s political participation is associated with greater health care spending is highlighted by empirical investigations. from an analysis of swiss cantons, braendle and colombier (2016) found that cantonal health care expenditure growth increases with the presence of women in parliament. this indicates a stronger preference of elected women for public health care spending for health spending. similar findings from a panel of the united states municipalities indicated that extension of suffrage rights to american women increases local public health spending (miller, 2008). our counterintuitive result can be explained by the quality of the participation and the profile of the participants. in studies that have found the positive link between participation and public health expenditure, this participation has generally been the work of women and vulnerable people with obvious health benefits. as political culture takes hold, public health spending increases. indeed, as the results recorded in columns 7 and 8 of table 5 show, the sign of political culture is positive, significant at 5% level for public health spending per capita and not significant for public health spending as a percentage of gdp. the coefficient indicates that when the indicator of political culture increased by 1%, public health spending per capita raised by 0.20%. 4.3.3 accountability, political stability and public health spending table 6 presents the results of the estimates considering accountability and political stability as political variables. table 6. accountability, political stability and public health spending in ssa model (note 3) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) log (wgiva) 1.446*** www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 78 published by scholink inc. (0.000) log (wgiva) 1.320*** (0.000) log (icrgda) 1.045*** (0.000) log (icrgda) 0.963*** (0.000) log (wgipsavt) 0.572*** (0.000) log (wgipsavt) 0.710*** (0.000) log (pcgdp) 1.275*** (0.000) 0.281*** (0.000) 1.392* (0.000) 0.389*** (0.042) 1.237*** (0.000) 0.222*** (0.001) log (tr) 0.141** (0.045) 0.174* (0.051) 0.372*** (0.000) 0.357*** (0.000) 0.346*** (0.000) 0.308*** (0.001) log (pop 65) -0.027 (0.744) 0.017 (0.822) 0.027 (0.752) 0.066 (0.405) 0.240** (0.010) 0.257*** (0.004) log (tbi) 0. 036 (0.566) 0. 022 (0.720) -0. 186** (0.048) -0.181** (0.048) -0.043 (0.530) -0.044 0.478 log (pcodah) -0.031 (0.281) -0.024 (0.403) 0.057** (0.011) 0.055** (0.014) 0.082*** (0.000) 0.056** (0.041) constant -8.508*** (0.000) -3.773*** (0.000) -9.093*** (0.000) -4.313*** (0.000) -7.978*** (0.000) -3.176*** (0.004) countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 observations 185 185 185 185 185 185 r-squared 0.873 0.483 0.874 0.490 0.854 0.447 prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 figures in parentheses are p-values; ***, ** and *denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. source: author estimation. the results of the estimates presented in columns 1 to 4 of the table taught us that accountability promotes increased spending on health. the coefficients of voice and accountability (wgi) and democratic accountability (icrg) are both positive and significant at the 1% threshold. more exactly, per capita government health spending went up respectively by 14.46 % and 10.45% when the indicators of voice and accountability from wgi and democratic accountability from icrg increased by 10%. likewise, for 1% increase in democratic accountability and voice and accountability towards a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 79 published by scholink inc. more accountable government, the share of government health spending in gdp increases from 0.96 % to 1.32%. the positive effect of government accountability on public health spending is confirmed by previous empirical work done in mixed panel (farag et al., 2012; cockx & francken, 2014; liang & mirelman, 2014) and african countries (fosu, 2008; kumah & brazys, 2016). by investigating a mixed sample of 120 countries between 1995 and 2010, liang and mirelman (2014) suggested a positive association between democratic accountability and government health expenditure (total and domestically funded). farag et al. (2012), using a panel data set for 173 countries for the 1995-2006 period, find that the voice and accountability has a significant positive influence in mobilizing more resources for health. these results are in line with those obtained by cockx and francken (2014) whose study focused on a sample of 136 and 137 countries over the period 1995-2009. they show that a higher level of constraints on executive, which corresponds to more restrictions on executive actions and greater accountability, is associated with higher public health expenditures. in the same vein, fosu (2008), using five-year averages from 35 countries in sub-saharan africa over the period 1975-1994, pointed out that constraint on the government executive shifts the budget in favour of health. likewise, in the context of africa, kumah and brazys (2016) highlighted the crucial role of public accountability in budgetary arbitration for the benefit of the health sector. in particular, they show that the presence of an opposition (political and/or civil society), transparency or even the independence of the judiciary, is favourable to an increase in public health expenditure as a percentage of gdp in a sample of 46 to 48 african countries. the estimates also highlight a positive association between political stability and absence of violence/terrorism and public health spending, since the coefficient of political stability and absence of violence/terrorism from wgi is positive and significant at the 1% level. the more stable the political environment, the higher the domestic public resources allocated to the health of the populations. for 1% increment in political stability and absence of violence/terrorism indicator toward a more stable political environment, our estimates give a significant increment in the percentage of gdp expended on health care by government from domestic resources (+0.71%) and per capita government health spending (+0.57%). this result is consistent with the finding of previous studies in mixed sample (liang & mirelman, 2014) and in lesotho case study (ramashamole & thamae, 2015). liang and mirelman (2014) found that government stability is positively correlated with government health expenditure. echoing with the finding of liang and mirelman (2014), ramashamole and thamae (2015) found that in leshoto, political instability affects negatively public health spending. however, its contrast with the finding that in developing country context like nigeria, political instability has no significant influence on public spending allocated to the health sector (imoughele & ismaila, 2013; olawunmi, 2014). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 80 published by scholink inc. 5. conclusion in sub-saharan africa, access to essential health care services remains problematic and communicable diseases are the cause of more than half of deaths. the financing of health care is mainly provided by private sources, mainly out-of-pocket payments which represent respectively 53.12% and 36.73% of total health expenditure. as for public health expenditure, essential for ensuring universal health coverage, it represents only about 35% of health expenditure. thus, the increase in public spending on health proves to be a major challenge for the countries of the region in the prospect of reaching the sdg relating to health by 2030. hence, the importance of identifying the determinants of public health spending. the purpose of this paper was to analyse the political determinants of domestic public health spending in ssa. we used data of 39 countries over the period 2010-2016 and panel-corrected standard errors method for empirical investigation. it turns out that democracy promotes increased public spending on health. besides democracy, the other political determinants are: political competition, civil and political liberties, accountability, government effectiveness and political stability. the results also showed that political participation does not affect public health spending. beyond political factors, gdp per capita, official development aid to health, fiscal capacity, the proportion of the population aged 65 and over and the incidence of tuberculosis positively affect public spending on health. in the light of these results, the deepening of democracy, the strengthening of political competition and accountability mechanisms, the guarantee of political rights and civil liberties, the improvement of government effectiveness and the assurance of a stable political environment are essential for increasing public spending on health. this increase, coupled with better use of resources, will enable health systems to provide health care to the population, thereby enabling them to have a better health and be more productive for the benefit of the region. references acemoglu, d., & robinson, j. a. 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(2011). the determinants of health expenditure: a country-level panel data analysis. working paper, world health organization; results for development institute. notes note 1. eiuepp is the eiu sub-score electoral process and pluralism, fhpr is the political right of freedom house, fhcl is the civil liberties of freedom house and eiucl is the eiu sub-score civil liberties. note 2. eiufog is eiu sub-score of functioning of government, wgige is the government effectiveness retrieved from wgi, eiupp and eiupc are eiu sub-scores political participation and political culture. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 3, no. 2, 2020 86 published by scholink inc. note 3. wgiva is voice and accountability from wgi; icrgda is the democratic accountability retrieved from icrg; wgipsavt is wgi indicator of political stability and absence of violence and terrorism. appendix 1. list of countries angola equatorial guinea mauritania benin eswatini mauritius botswana ethiopia mozambique burkina faso gambia namibia burundi ghana niger cabo verde guinea rwanda cameroon guinea-bissau senegal central african republic kenya sierra leone chad lesotho south africa comoros liberia tanzania democratic republic of congo madagascar togo republic of congo malawi uganda cote d’ivoire mali zambia microsoft word ape-v1n2-p91.doc advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 91 original paper singapore model and mainland china model in terms of gdp development hui-chin lai1* 1 graduate institute of political economy, national cheng kung university, tainan, taiwan (republic of china) * hui-chin lai, graduate institute of political economy, national cheng kung university, tainan, taiwan (republic of china) received: july 22, 2018 accepted: august 8, 2018 online published: august 10, 2018 doi:10.22158/ape.v1n2p91 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v1n2p91 abstract the research investigates the singapore model and mainland china model in terms of its’ gdp development. it covers ideologies, methods and reasons for government interventions, the roles of state-owned businesses and the issues of labor in accordance to the different stages of gdp development. the interventions from the governments that caused the market to rebound and resilience are found in two countries. the article also redefines the developmental state as unlimited methods and ideologies under a government-led economic development economy. keywords country’s gdp development, singapore model, mainland china model, developmental state, government interventions, market resilience, labor issues 1. introduction singapore was originally a place with limited resources and a small island with poor soil. in 1965 during its independence, singapore’s relationship with its neighbor malaysia was not friendly at the time, and the country must survive on its own ever since. in the process of becoming independent, singapore’s government played an important role in the economy. since 1980, the country went through the stage from struggling to survive to economically on top within southeast asia and known as one of the “four dragons of asia”. today, singapore has been listed as one of the developed countries, with a gdp per person of over usd$50,000. compared to successful economic results, singapore politics have often been criticized as being highly inflexible as a result of having a single political leader and a dominant political party. opposition power www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 92 published by scholink inc. is very limited and also the freedom of speech of its people. the situation is rather similar to mainland china where an inflexible political state has led to a great hike in its economic development. people’s livelihood in mainland china is starting to recover from 70s after going through the nightmare of the cultural revolution. following up continuous economic reforms, people are getting well fed and experience a long-term economic growth. most people no longer suffer from poverty and are becoming prosperous. although in the process, several stages of economic reform took place, being a dominant political party, leaders are being followed without questioned, and controlled government information seems to have never changed. as a result that mainland china urgently wants to become internationally recognized, and more and more scholars are highly interested in its non-transparent politics, the transparency of the country seems to have been improved progressively. in recent years, it started with western journalists making reports only by asking around, to universities beginning to publish academic writings, more non-transparent areas in politics have been revealed. literature regarding the dominant chinese communist party and its secret ways of operations, policy, practice and changes greatly increased. the model of mainland china’s politics and economics seems to present a clearer view now and it seems possible to study it with the given background. currently, the major studies on mainland china’s and singapore’s development model are criticism. stephan ortmann and mark r. thompson in “journal of democracy (2016)” mention that both countries are against the western idea of democracy by limiting freedom of speech, preventing opposing voices with penalties that violate human rights. some singaporean scholars oppose the point of view with literature, that singapore is not a country dictated by a dominant political party as written in “the real singapore model (2015)” of min xin pei. in 2016, the city university of hong kong conducted a research conference known as “the singapore model and its influence to discover the effects of singapore’s political model on mainland china”. who learns from whom and which model is better seems to raise a valuable discussion. however, the purpose of this article is to discover similarities in the economic development among asian countries. furthermore, we find out what are the necessary factors in the process of economic development compared to the ideology of free economy. this article shall discuss the matter from the questions stated as follow: 1) singapore and prc have its own political ideology to evolve and achieve gdp growth target in different stages. what are their similarities? 2) what are the similarities in the business model of singapore and mainland china’s state owned enterprises? are there similarities in their contribution to gdp growth? 3) what efforts did both governments make in order to receive these skills that achieve economic growth? 4) a dominant political party and powerful leader in the long-term have what kind of effect on the economy? what are the similarities between both countries on this? discover what economic impact, especially on gdp, that both countries have through government intervention. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 93 published by scholink inc. 2. communism ideology and gdp of the founding nations during the founding period of both nations, singapore and mainland china were deeply affected by the ideology of communism. 2.1 singapore after the second world war, the ideology of communism has spread to singapore. the island was colonized by the english and the japanese, and therefore, it should have adapted to the ideology of its governors. it was difficult to clarify its own ideology and development strategy under the circumstances. until the post-war period in the 50s, the singapore communists established labor unions and chinese schools, which resulted in turmoil causing multiple riots. under such circumstances, the people of singapore electeda left wing leader david marshall. the leader was not recognized by the english (note 1). until the leader lim yew hock was elected and since then singapore’s self-governed status had been recognized by uk. not long after, lee kuan-yew of “the people’s action party” was elected as the president, lee kuan-yew believed that singapore could not survive on its own, and therefore he proposed to join malaysia as one of its states. although communists in pap opposed to this proposition, singapore still joined malaysia as a federal state. however, singapore failed to build up a good relationship after joining malaysia due to political differences, which lead to multiple blood-shed incidents. in 1965, singapore was expelled by the malaysian federation and soon latter announced its independence (note 2). after the second world war, a massive amount of unemployed population emerged, causing a jump in unemployment rate to 12-14% in singapore (note 3). the environment played an important role in the support of communism. in the 50s, the china communist party had become the dominant party in mainland, and the original governing party chinese nationalist party retreated to taiwan (note 4). moreover, the marxism ideology exists in the colonizing country uk. all these internal and external factors, as a result, boosted the development of communists (space) in singapore. it was unknown whether or not lee kuan-yew’s strong proposition to join malaysia is the result of that he did not want to see the communism grow. after singapore was expelled from the federation of malaysia, lee took a great effort to urge singapore join the liberal alliance such as united nations and the commonwealth of nations. internally, no matter before and after singapore’s independence in 1965, lee took a great interest in reducing the member of communists in pap. economically, he focused on reducing the unemployment. table 1. singapore gdp growth rate 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 8.1% 7.1% 10.0% -3.7% 7.6% 10.9% 12.3% 13.6% 13.7% 13.9% 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 12.1% 13.5% 11.1% 6.5% 4.6% 7.4% 7.5% 8.7% 9.4% 10.0% www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 94 published by scholink inc. 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 10.7% 7.2% 8.5% 8.8% -0.7% 1.3% 10.8% 11.1% 10.2% 10.0% 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 6.7% 7.1% 11.5% 10.9% 7.0% 7.5% 8.3% -2.2% 6.1% 8.9% 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 -1.0% 4.2% 4.4% 9.5% 7.5% 8.9% 9.1% 1.8% -0.6% 15.2% 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 6.2% 3.9% 5.0% 3.6% 1.9% 2.0% source: world bank. table 2. singapore gdp figure (usd) 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 427.88 448.96 471.88 510.99 485.30 516.29 566.54 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 625.72 708.27 812.27 925.29 1070.82 1263.66 1684.34 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 2339.57 2489.78 2758.66 2845.88 3193.33 3899.57 4926.96 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 5595.24 6075.60 6629.94 7223.40 6995.10 6793.54 7531.25 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 8902.41 10380.28 11864.28 14505.02 16144.01 18302.43 21578.46 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 24936.83 26263.02 26386.46 21824.04 21795.70 23792.61 21577.08 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 22016.83 23573.63 27405.27 29869.85 33579.86 39223.58 39721.05 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 38577.56 46569.68 53166.68 54431.16 56029.19 56336.07 53629.74 2016 52960.71 source: world bank. between 1960 to 1965, the ideology of singapore governing power had been changed from communism to economic development. five years before independence, singapore’s gdp was us$ 427-516, with an average economic growth of 5.8%. in this period, the gdp compared to hong kong was about the same, higher than taiwan and korea of us$200 but lower than japan of us$900. the economic growth was between -3.7-10% (note 5). due to the high economic growth, employment was www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 95 published by scholink inc. greatly boosted. the unemployment rate was still high, however, the government see the hardship of poor people; it launched home ownership scheme and built great amount of public housing (note 6) (kuang, 2015, pp. 9-14). the successful improvement in the economy and society made the removal of communists in pap easier without causing any political turmoil or riot in society. under the system of direct election, pap was still the dominant party, but its ideology had changed from the communism led nation founding model to the economic development-led model and greatly accepted by the voters. 2.2 prc although during the founding period of singapore and mainland china were both affected by communism, but from the point of view of their ideology both countries had advanced in different directions. after the second world war, chinese communists supported by the soviet union had successfully replaced the governing chinese nationalist party in mainland. in 1949, the people’s republic of china has been founded. chinese nationalists kuomintang party was a party with the party spirit of freedom. when the chinese nationalist party was in power, there was a great disparity between rich and poor, and also the gap between the elites and civilian was gradually expanding; people were generally poor. this made the communist party who advocated the elimination of the class, which was welcomed by the people and had a hotbed of rise. the kuomintang’s administrative approach is also more liberal. therefore, after the founding of the republic of china from 1911 to the end of world war ii, apart from the time of the japanese invasion, kuomintang has always been with unclear chains of command. leaders such as sun-yat-sen, yuan shi-kai, song jiao-ren, chiang kai-shek, none of them were powerful enough to lead the whole party. there are also left-wing groups and right-wing groups within the party, and as a result sometimes kmt accepted the communists, other times it cleared the communists. externally, major foreign powers such as united states, japan and soviet union were highly influential on the party (note 7). unlike singapore, the nationalist party was unable to provide economic growth to china; it failed to reduce unemployment and poverty, which caused the ordinary people to be in favor of communism. with the successive years of war against japan, people’s livelihood was languishing. in this environment, communism that is with the unilateral ideology, the single influence of foreign forces, and the provision of a dream of averaging wealth for the poor masses were welcomed by the mainland people. the communist party had gradually replaced the kuomintang in mainland china. after 1949, the movement of the founding campaign of the people’s republic of china continued until the death of mao zedong in 1976. in this founding period of the nation, mainland china experienced multiple radical movements such as the three-anti and the five-anti campaigns (note 8) (fairbank & goldman, 2002, p. 349), great leap forward, people’s commune. millions of people died of starvation (note 9) (smil, 1999). the whole society was generally stagnated in poverty. in the regard of history, we know that giving such background the country more likely results in the rise of communism. but in mainland, which was already dominated by the communists, people seem to see these movements as part of the nation’s founding campaign. the movements rather did not cause any political turmoil or www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 96 published by scholink inc. dramatic change in politics. the fact that the system of the people’s republic of china, one-party dominated as governing party had not changed. compared to singapore that was transformed from the ideology of communism to economic development, the mainland chinese has entered into the path of the communism consciousness. table 3. mainland china gdp growth rate 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 -27.3% -5.6% 10.3% 18.2% 17.0% 10.6% -5.8% -4.1% 16.9% 19.3% 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 7.1% 3.8% 7.8% 2.3% 8.7% -1.6% 7.6% 11.7% 7.6% 7.8% 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 5.2% 8.9% 10.8% 15.1% 13.4% 8.9% 11.7% 11.2% 4.2% 3.9% 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 9.3% 14.2% 13.9% 13.1% 10.9% 9.9% 9.2% 7.8% 7.7% 8.5% 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 8.3% 9.1% 10.0% 10.1% 11.4% 12.7% 14.2% 9.7% 9.4% 10.6% 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 9.5% 7.9% 7.8% 7.3% 6.9% 6.7% source: world bank. table 4. mainland china gdp figure (usd) 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 89.52 75.81 70.91 74.31 85.50 98.49 104.32 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 96.59 91.47 100.13 113.16 118.65 131.88 157.09 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 160.14 178.34 165.41 185.42 156.40 183.99 194.81 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 197.07 203.34 225.43 250.71 294.46 281.93 251.81 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 283.54 310.88 317.89 333.14 366.46 377.39 473.49 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 609.66 709.41 781.74 828.58 873.29 959.37 1053.11 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 1148.51 1288.64 1508.67 1753.42 2099.23 2695.37 3471.25 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 97 published by scholink inc. 3838.43 4560.51 5633.80 6337.88 7077.77 7683.50 8069.21 2016 8123.18 source: world bank. mainland china from 1960 to 1976 (note 10), in the 17 years of nation-founding ongoing period, its gdp rose from us$90 to us$165, at an economic growth rate of 4.8% per annum (note 11), growth range from -27.3% to 19.3 %. the average economic growth seems agreeable, and the rate had no significant difference compared to singapore during its founding period. however, behind these numbers, many people died due to starvation because of poor governance. the fact should not be hidden, but rather should be left a negative comment on the economic growth of prc for its founding period. 3. two types of developmental state models the developmental state was a term defined by renowned author chalmers johnson. his research on japan defined that the developmental state is a nation that is being governed by technocrates in the administration withinbureaucracy, a well-planned economic structure can be organized by government interventions to adjust the market with an acting department as the lead (note 12) (adrian, 1994). from the above definition, it is obvious that developmental state suggests that it is a government-led economic development, while the action and methods taken by the government is unlimited. in this research, although (space) even singapore and the people’s republic of china have various ideologies in the development of the country, it is obvious that the two nation’s governments both take the lead in the process of economic development, and this fact has been recognised by the leaders of both countries. therefore, it is reasonable to define that both singapore and mainland china adopted the methodology of the developmental state. although singapore and mainland adopted the method of developmental state after their own nation’s founding period, they still have a great difference in ideologies in regard to their economic development. 3.1 singapore the ideology of singapore’s development is actually based on state capitalism (note 13) that operates in contrast to neo-liberalism (chua, 2016, p. 499). why is it in contrast to neoliberalism? neoliberalism prefers small governments, light taxes and minimum government interventions. the state capitalism in singapore suggests that the economic development is led by state-own enterprises (soes); even though there is the development of private companies, the private companies are largely related to soes. and because the governing party is pap, the pap takes control of soes. thus, the ruling party pap can use its desired approach to manage the policy and economy of singapore. in normal countries, enterprises and workers can easily become opposition forces. this could trigger www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 98 published by scholink inc. phenomena such as labor movements and therefore causes economic stagnation. the government often faces a dilemma between enterprises and workers. in some countries, there are political parties that are in favor of enterprises while the others political parties favor workers. these parties take turns to be governing parties in order to apply different labor policies that achieve the purpose of checks and balances. such problem never exists in singapore. in singapore’s economy, most of the enterprises are soes that belongs to the government. government shares the profit with its shareholders, and the shareholders are also voters as well. in this case, they share the same benefits together along with expectations and target. a great part of singapore voters works in foreign firms (note 14); these foreign firms rarely cause any labor movement. generally, a foreign firm established in another country usually has their purposes. they either want to extend their access to the market or seek more opportunities for enterprise development. therefore, these firms usually tend to choose countries with less-developed labor movements. even when there is a labor dispute involved, the firm can easily transfer its operations to other locations. and countries like singapore with higher average income workers, foreign firms usually seek for talents and the remuneration offered by foreign firms usually is not disappointed. as a result, the chance of having a labor dispute is reduced. other than foreign firms, soes and soes related enterprises, companies that really have no connection to government capitals are small retail businesses. these are often family businesses mainly run by family members, and they rarely cause any labor movements. singapore is like a gigantic enterprise. to workers in soe and soes related enterprises, they are also voters and their benefits are shared. foreign firms and small retailer employees have none or very limited influence on politics. when the economy is in an expansion state, foreign and small retailers can share the benefit as well. under the given structure, singapore never had any large scale of labor movement that occurred, and its economic prosperity had already been listed as a developed country. voters evaluate the capability of pap is likely the same as evaluating the profitability of soes. pap as the dominant political party, has been favored by voters from independence ever since. the economic development board (edb) has been established in singapore since 1961. during the post-war period, many asian countries maintained rapid economic growth and they all have a strategic planning department responsible for the nation’s economy. for example, korea has economic development committee, japan has miti, and taiwan has economic stability committee (which later transformed into ciecd, council for international economic cooperation and development). it was the edb that was responsible for the matter in singapore. in 1961 when edb was first established, the total budget was 100 (space) million singapore dollars, and by that time us$1 equaled to 3.0612 singapore dollars. the main mission of edb was to attract foreign capitals, and at that time they invited a few heavy industries such as shell group. edb also established a few soes, such as national iron & steel mills limited (nism) (note 15). military industries left by the english became a major source of soes. these military industries include military port, military shipyard, electric company, etc. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 99 published by scholink inc. before 1970, edb’s mainly focus on helping firms investing in singapore. edb was also being called the “generator of state enterprises (note 16)” (chua, 2016, p. 503). between 1965 to 1970, it was a period of survival for singapore. gdp increased from us$516 in 1965 to us$925 in 1970. in these five years, the average economic growth rate was 12.88%. this value is more than double to the average economic growth rate during the nation’s founding period. singapore’s export was generally close to balance (note 17). since the colonization to the nation’s founding period, singapore has always been an important transshipment port because of its geographical location at the upper tip in the strait of malacca. however, singapore obviously was not satisfied with being only a transshipment port. the establishment of edb has shown the determination of singapore’s willingness to transform by introducing multiple companies into the country; singapore transformed from a country relies on transshipment port trading economy to an industrialized economy. the nation of singapore founded in 1965. among the “four asian dragons”, singapore was the latest country to begin industrialization. other countries such as taiwan (note 18) (chu, 2017) and korea (note 19) (cui & park, 2010) had begun since 1950. by manufacturing products locally, these countries replaced the need for imports to sustain economic growth. and by the 1960, these countries have already greatly grown. singapore was the latest nation in this economic race, but it also gave singapore a different advantage, which was also known as the leapfrogging argument. leapfrogging argument (hobby, 1995, p. 137) (note 20) mainly suggests that a late start-up allows the nation to gain access to the newest technologies and bypass the ones that become obsolete. with this policy, the government focuses on increasing industrial and technological upgrade. singapore’s government other than providing tax benefits to attract foreign firms, edb have been establishing offices in europe, united states, asia and many other places since the 70s. its purpose was to invite technologically advanced companies to establish their presence in singapore. texas instruments in singapore was established at that time. edb (space) sent out talents to overseas foreign firms for training, such as philips of netherlands, tata group of india, etc. other than sending talents overseas for training, singapore also established training facilities to train up new talents. for example, in order to nurture talented with an advanced technological background, singapore cooperated with japan, germany, and france to establish institutes of technology (note 21). from 1970 to 1980, singapore’s gdp increased from us$925 to us$4926, with an average growth of 9.1% per annum. it has continued the golden years since 1965. with a low unemployment rate in singapore and continuous projects with massive investment, singapore experienced labor shortage and resulted in an overheated economy and an inflation rate of 10% (note 22). singapore government believes technology advancement is important, and they came up with another strategy to increase its technological level. the government increased individual wages through authority power (space) and hope this can eliminate low-wage industries. they believed that high-income industries also mean that they have high technology (note 23). through increasing wages of workers, the original 38% of gdp that came from labor income was being increased to 48% of gdp (note 24). however, the market was www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 100 published by scholink inc. unable to adjust the sudden increase in wages and the poor decision resulted in economic turmoil. in the 80s, how the singapore government managed to resolve its economic turmoil. in the early 80s, singapore greatly increased the salary of workers, which resulted in a spike of the unemployment rate from below 3% to 6%. economic growth decreased to -0.7% in 1985. the inflation caused by an overheated economy suddenly dropped from 10% to almost zero (note 25). singapore urgently revised its labor regulation, so that salaries may be adjusted freely. after a period of adjustment, the salary income falls back from 48% to 42% of the gdp, and the rate stabilized between 42%-44% until 1997. economic growth in 1987 resumed to 10.8%. the method of increasing salaries to resolve inflation and an overheated economy in order to increase overall technological level was a risky strategy. but from the above example, we can see that salaries will eventually fall back to the supposed level of the market, and government intervention may not always influence the market. soes expansion became an alternate contributor to singapore’s economic growth. after 1988, edb helped the soes to expand their businesses to foreign countries (note 26). other than beneficial policies such as the exemption on profit taxes, deficit reduction, providing solutions to capital and business conditions to increase competitiveness, edb also had government power at its disposal. in cases of foreign firm acquisitions, edb assisted in the negotiation on behalf of singapore. although a few acquisitions failed (note 27) (dent, 2008, p. 108) because it had been frustrated by the foreign country’s politics, singapore soe overseas investment was generally successful. from 1980 to 1990, singapore’s gdp jumped from us$4926 to us$11864. the average economic growth was 7.8% during the decade. average gdp growth from 1980 until the financial crisis in 1997 was 8% per annum. during the financial crisis in 1997, the influence on the finance sector in singapore was not significant. singapore has been attracting foreign firms to invest since 1970. in order to increase the export of foreign firms, it is essential that capital could be transferred easily. singapore wanted to develop into another regional financial center after manila (note 28) (cook, 2008, p. 122), which was not successful; and for that reason, the (space) singaporean government (space) made the internal and external financial sectors clearly separated. regulators information were kept concealed, and any domestic bank may not be owned by foreign firms for more than 20% of its shares. foreign banks were required to maintain a high percentage of reserved capital (note 29) (ibid;123-125). and as a result, during the financial crisis in 1997, real estate and price of shares fell, but the banks were unaffected. local banks outperformed foreign banks. however, singapore firms were still affected by the international financial crisis, and so in 1998 economic growth was reduced to -2.2%, but soon it resumed to 8.9% in 1999. singapore’s industrial structure made itself volatile to changes in the international economic crises. the major manufacturers in singapore are related to crude oil and electronics. at the end of the 20th century, 80% of the gross national income came from service industries, and 20% among it belonged to industry (note 30) (chua, 2016, p. 502). foreign firms accounts for 80% of the export in 2008 (dent, 2008, p. 87) (note 31). singapore also actively established free trade agreements with other countries all over the world. the nation has no agricultural or sunset industries, and therefore, it would be easier for www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 101 published by scholink inc. singapore to establish agreements with other countries. whenever singapore conducted to establish an agreement, any conditions related to the united states would offer them the greatest advantage. this is also known as “american exceptionalism” (note 32) (cook, 2008, p. 131), where the united states was always being offered with the best conditions. therefore, singapore had always maintained a great relationship with the united states and its allies. moreover, singapore is being considered as an asian country, and so it rather faces fewer obstacles on trade agreements, compared to japan and other countries. for these reasons, singapore’s leading position as a transshipment port has never been shaken, and it is becoming a nation of export products for the whole malay peninsula and to the world. therefore, whenever international trades are being affected by the economic crisis, singapore will always be influenced by the aftershock. in 1998 after the 1997 financial crisis, the economic growth of singapore was reduced to -2.2%. the “.com crisis” of 2000 caused the economic growth in 2001 to be reduced to -1%. the subprime mortgage crisis in 2008 caused the economic growth in 2009 to be reduced to -0.6%. and because of the two major international economic crises from 2000 to 2010, singapore’s average economic growth was reduced to 5.9% in this decade, which is much lower than in the previous decades. the operations of enterprises focused on profitability and efficiency, and the government may have a different interest in the matter, thus this may create the roles of conflicts from the aspect of being a company manager and a governor. in 1981, singapore established a foundation known as government of singapore investment corporation (gic). its capital source mostly comes from worker’s pension and the fiscal dividend of the central bank, which is also the monetary authority of singapore. gic is singapore’s largest international investment organization. in order to avoid speculator attacks, it conceals most of its information and keeps a low transparency. however, the public thinks otherwise. they believe that the government is taking profit from the citizens, and even the way how pensions are being paid sometimes causes dispute (note 33) (chua, 2016, pp. 509-510). it is not surprising to hear that the expansion of soes would compete for profit with private enterprise. singapore intended to create an institution with standardized state capitalism, such as the sovereign fund and soes. the government regulates the profits of sovereign fund and soes; 50% of the profit will be invested and the other 50% will be contributed to the government budget. it is a source for the government spending on public services, subsidize low-income families and wages. soes and the sovereign fund between 2009-2013 contributed to 12-15% of the nation’s budget (note 34) (ibid; 515), but the extreme disparity between the poor and the rich did not change. the gini coefficient was maintained at around 0.42 since the year of 2000 in singapore (note 35). singapore government obtained a positive fiscal surplus in 2017 (note 36), but the government still owed a great amount of debt. singapore government has a debt to gdp ratio of 110.6% in 2017 (note 37), this value is the highest among the “four asian dragons”. singapore is unlike hong kong which constantly has a massive amount of capital investment from mainland (note 38) (dayo, 1987, p. 89). the singapore economy is led by the government, and therefore the government often needs to provide www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 102 published by scholink inc. assistance to the enterprise that faces a crisis. for example, the government helps soes to increase their competitiveness, provide beneficial policies such as tax exemption and deficit reduction. in case of an economic and financial crisis, the government reduces the taxes paid by enterprises, rent, real estate tax or provide a wage subsidy to assist enterprises. including the expenditure of social welfare, singapore government owes the highest debt among all countries in southeast asia, only second to japan. 3.2 mainland china (prc) in the ideology of early economic development of the prc, it is close to neoliberalism that the government favored minimal intervention, light tax or even zero tax. in 1976 following the death of mao zedong, political leaders of mainland china who favor free economy returned to power. 1976 was a year that became a critical time of change in the economic development of the prc (note 39). before 1976, mainland was under the influence of country founding campaign, where the egalitarianism implemented such as everyone eating from the same pot, and the society was generally poor. after experiencing poverty and starvation, intellectuals with insight believed an open economy could be the only solution to poverty. under the leadership of deng xiaoping, a political leader with an open mind towards economy, the prc government allowed individuals or small private businesses to start trading goods or services freely. the civilians may run their business at specific location and trade. very soon, non-agricultural industries grew rapidly in the 1980s. the size of city was rather on a small scale, and most places were still villages. village household income increased with the support of small private businesses. following the economic liberalisation in local areas (note 40) (huang, 2008, p. 52); private sectors grew rapidly. a few private business owners who know how to manage business believed that in order to expand their size, a financial loan friendly environment supported by the government will be necessary. under the permission of the prc government, the banking sector agreed to offer loans with loose conditions. if the small enterprise was unable to get loans from the banks, they could reach unregulated loans such as loans purchased in small groups. in regard of agricultural loans, the funding could be provided by the rural credit cooperative. starting from 1980, a high ratio of loans was borrowed for entrepreneurs to start their businesses, and agricultural loans were increasing rapidly (note 41) (ibid, pp. 140-147). these standard or non-standard financial enterprises had not been closely regulated or conducted strategic planning in loans by the financial authority. the environment of the whole society was acting laissez-faire and supportive towards individuals and households who wanted to start a business. the economic development started from the bottom level heading back to the top generated zero labor movement or resistance at all. most people who wanted to run their own businesses were unwilling to go back at the period living in poverty of continuous revolutions and agrarian labor (space) movement. the ordinary people who wanted to generate wealth for their families, regardless of entrepreneurs or employees, do not favor the days of the revolutionary movements anymore. furthermore, because the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 103 published by scholink inc. private business scale was generally small, the low number of employees in these medium-to-small enterprises would hardly organize any labor unions. new enterprises were very young and industry clusters still yet to be found. in the given environment, industrial labor organization could hardly be formed. from 1976 to 1990, the gdp in mainland china went from us$165.41 to us$317.89, and an average gdp growth of 8.5% per annum. in the rapid development of local economy, people started to see higher expectation on the political freedom. prc leader zhao ziyang suggested the separation of political party and the government (note 42) (guo, 2016, p. 164) (liu, 2001). his opinion was greatly supported by students at that time. unfortunately, the tian an men incidents broke out. it caused a massive crackdown on the students in 1989. the demand of a democratic political system in prc faced a defeat, and the route towards political freedom became an empty talk by the time. after the student movement in 1989, the government regarded the country and communist party as a whole; the government started to actively control the economy, and the neoliberalism environment had come to an end. instead, an economic development model of state capitalism alike has been implemented. in order to further command the economy efficiently, more tax reform policies were implemented after 1990. most of the tax revenue was being collected by the central government. the insufficient budget reduced in local tax was then subsidized by the central government and therefore, the authority of local government was greatly reduced (note 43) (huang, 2008, pp. 163-168) which resulted in building a stronger governing power to the central government. private enterprises in villages was no longer allowed to trade fertilizers, and the government started to form nation-owned enterprises that lead trade in these sectors (ibid, p. 162) (note 44). since fertilizers trading has great importance in agricultural production, containing fertilizers meaning the government could have taken the grip of village economy. the government implemented strategic economic policy in the 1990s. policies were in favored of the cities and attracting foreign investments. deng xiaoping gave a crucial speech during his visit to the south in 1992. he wanted a small portion of people in the country to “become wealthy” first. the government policy would favor the cities, which later caused a large portion of population moved to the cities for work. many laborers work in cities away from home for years, and they only return home once per year during major holidays such as the chinese new year. and as a result, all transportation systems were overloaded during major holidays due to the high demand, causing a massive number of people seeking for ways of transportation. in order to create a beneficial export environment for businesses, the chinese yuan went through a long depreciation against the us dollar. since 1980, cny depreciated from cny$1.4883: us$1 to the level of cny$3.7: us$1 in 1987 (note 45). the currency has been depreciated a total of 149%. in addition to the overheated economics, the economy suffered a half state-generated inflation in the mainland. in 1987-88, the inflation rate hiked up to 27% (note 46). when the depreciation of the mainland chinese currency has stopped, the inflation followed to slow down shortly. but after the tian an men incident, cny further depreciated from cny$5.8: us$1 to cny$8.7566: us$1 in 1994. once again, the half www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 104 published by scholink inc. state-generated inflation occurred in the mid-90s and the inflation rate hiked to 27% until it slowed down again in 1998. strategic depreciation of currency helped mainland china in attracting foreign capital during the period of international economic sanction. the 1989 tian an men incident caused a global economic sanction against prc. the economic growth of mainland china in 1989 and 1990 dropped to 4.2% and 3.9% respectively. foreign firms held their investments, and a negative yearly trade balance sometimes was recorded (note 47). in order to attract more foreign firms to invest and bring in new technologies, mainland china depreciated its currency from 1980 to 1995 for a total of 488% in these 15 years. a depreciation in currency favors export, and the great depreciation had attracted neighboring factory enterprises in hong kong and taiwan to invest in mainland. the low cost of labor and land attracted exporters to establish new factories inmainland china. during the 1990s, the japanese currency appreciated and caused its asset bubble burst and an economic depression followed. this opportunity offered other asian countries to compete for the export market. the mainland china is not the exception. cyn which was called for a halt in depreciation because of the high inflation was being resumed for depreciation and again caused inflation. obviously, the economic strategy of the mainland chinese government regarded export and fdi as the first priority. the japanese depression has provided a great opportunity formainland china to increase export. nevertheless, foreign investors really entered mainland china after 1992. prc actively developed special economic zones (sezs) in the 80s. starting with the first four special regions shenzhen, zhuhai, shantou, and xiamen. in 1984. prc also opened 14 more cities and 14 ports. in 1985, the three deltas of changjiang, zhujiang, and minnan xia zhang chuan were opened. in 1986, the “law of the people’s republic of china on foreign-capital enterprises” passed, allowing foreign investors to 100% own firms in mainland (note 48) (wei, 2008, pp. 21-23); however, foreign investments in mainland were not improved because of the law. direct investment capital until 1991 only reached a maximum of us$4.366 billion dollars. furthermore, the investment loans were far greater than direct investments, and in 1991 investment loan was $us6.888 billion (wei, 2008) (note 49). foreign investors generally had a negative opinion on chinese political policy against merchants in the past, and it was believed to be the main reason. after the tian an men incident, prc politics favored the left wing again. whether or not the economy would be affected was also a major factor that needed to be considered by foreign investors. deng xiaoping’s 1992 speech in the south was a concrete confirmation that economics favors the right wing. direct investments in 1992 boosted in a sudden to us$11.008 billion dollars, and investment loans were us$7.911 billion dollars (note 50). since 1992, foreign direct investment became far greater than loan investment. foreign investments from 1992 to 2004 was accounted for average 4% per annum of gdp (note 51). 1992 onwards to 2000, fdi of mainland china maintained at a percentage of average 13% of total investments in fixed assets (note 52). after 1990, mainland china’s gdp growth maintained a high ratio in a stable pattern that even international environment has little influence on it. most of the south-east asia countries were critically www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 105 published by scholink inc. influenced during the financial or economic crisis such as in the 1997 financial crisis of korea, indonesia, and thailand. even countries that were not strongly affected still suffered due to a decrease in international trading volume and import/export. on the contrary, mainland’s gdp during the 1997 financial crisis was only reflected in the economic growth of 1998 and 1999, which was reduced to 7.8% and 7.7% respectively. other international crises occurred such as the .com crisis in 2000, the economic growth of 2000 and 2001 was 8.3% and 9.1%. during 2008 financial crisis, the annual economic growth of 2008 and 2009 was 9.7% and 9.4%. since the 90s, it can been seen that mainland china’s economy has almost been unaffected by the international economy. the mainland’s economic development started from the bottom to the top, however, when it gets to the highest political and state-owned enterprises, the economic liberalistion and private economics retreat. although mainland china achieved extraordinary economic development, political reforms and changes are still small. the model that a dominant political party leads the government is being applied. the chinese communist party has the constitutional right to be the only political party that rules. and for this reason, the ccp one-party dictatorship apparently is legal in mainland. the majority public in mainland china seems to have little or no opinion on politics after the tian an men incident. there has been rarely large scale revolt or movement caused by political issues. if there was any revolt or movement, most were related to livelihoods such as forced demolition or unreasonable decision that affects the people’s livelihood. the economic success of the whole country reflected in the high economic growth. from 1991 to 2010, the average economic growth was 10.5%. this raises a question, what kind of economic contribution achieved from soes under the management of the ccp government? in the 1990s, the reduction in assets of soes went through a reform including privatising enterprises. soes were making an average of no profit at the very beginning. the government started to close down poor performing companies, reduce a large number of workers, and get the enterprises listed on the stock market. these actions created a positive balance of net income to the soes (note 53). instead of using the old strategy that the soes run multiple businesses in every sectors, now the soes mostly run in finance, energy, telecommunication, and manufacture sectors. it has become obvious that many soes has become private businesses. the assets of soes reduced from 70% of the nation total assets in 1997 to 45% in 2012 (note 54). however, the average profit of soes is still lower than the private enterprises. the profit of private enterprises continued to rise after the economic liberalisation, and has been increased to about 9% until it turns stagnant in 2008. soes profit climbed to 7% in 2007, but reduced to 4% suddenly and keeps dropping (note 55) (gao, 2010). on the other hand, soes debts greatly hiked in a sudden. the reasons behind the profit decrease in state-owned enterprises are worthy to be studied. in 2007, the debt to equity leverage ratio suddenly hiked, which was even higher than the private sector. since the turning in 2007, the debt to equity leverage ratio of soes increased to reach almost 150% until 2013. however, the ratio in private enterprise decreased to 75% in 2014 (note 56). these data reflects directly on (space) profit of soes; their profits are shrinking, while private enterprises’ are growing. the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 106 published by scholink inc. situation is similar to what happened in 2008 during the financial crisis. the mainland chinese government announced that they need to stimulate (space) domestic demand. however, the method that they used was rather different from other countries. the increase in local demand looks like in fact partially funded by the debt of state-owned enterprises. on the other hand, while the international trading performance was rather poor, the soes that has basic industrial businesses, energy and other industries in control, tended to sacrifice their profit in order to subsidize private businesses to increase their competitiveness. therefore, the increase in debt of soes was possibly caused by the sacrifice and the government call for demand strategy. from the 1990s state-owned enterprise reform to after 2010, mainland china’s gdp growth has not seen being influenced by the reform of soes. after 2007, the economic growth has not decreased because of the great debt of soes. it could be said that the greatest achievement of the reform in mainland’s soes was performing at the expectation of the market. the soes do not drag down the economy because of the monopoly, inefficiency, or placing priority in political agenda over profit. 4. discussion and summary the soes in singapore and mainland china are similar in some extent, but their operation focuses on different targets. singapore and chinese soes are both major players of investing overseas. politically, the chinese government uses soes as a tool to maintain political stability. soes in mainland china are largely made up by members of the chinese communist party. the soes consists of 400,000 ccp organizations, and ccp members of 10 million. the central administration, known as the sasac, is responsible for monitoring soes and all overseas investments made by the soes. 60% of the total overseas investments of mainland comes from soes (note 57) (wu, 2017). if we say an enterprise is regarded as capitalistic and mainland china equals to the communist party, soes owns half of the total assets (note 58) (nordqvist, 2014), it is reasonable to believe that prc engages in the same form towards state capitalism as singapore. however, soes in singapore have been the generators of gdp. singapore soes focus on profit and efficiency as their goals. internal affairs such as stabilizing export or expanding demand are still being managed through the government budget. in mainland china, soes consider their political agenda as the first priority, while making a profit is their second concern. the soes of mainland china act as a supporter in the economic growth. singapore and prc both wanted to implement policies that over rules the market through government interventions, but the market strongly resisted. the singapore government used its political power to increase wages in the 80s in order to upgrade its industry, but as a result it ended with a hike in unemployment. in 1985, economic growth reduced to a negative level, which was a sign of a depression. in mainland china, the government greatly depreciated the mainland chinese currency in the 80s and 90s in order to attract foreign investments, which caused a great hike in inflation but not much influence on gdp growth. from the above, it is obvious that when a government considers only economic growth while ignoring any political turmoil and livelihood of the people, the currency www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 107 published by scholink inc. devaluation strategy of prc seems to be possible after all. however, in countries of direct elections, such strategy may force the political party to step down. the ideology of singapore and prc adapted influenced the gdp growth of both countries. their influences may be categorized into the “unstable economy” of the country founding period and the “economic development” period. it is particularly interesting that singapore and mainland were both influenced by communism during their founding period. the economy greatly fluctuated during this period of time. in the worst year, mainland china lowest gdp was -27.3% of 1961 and singapore was -3.7% of 1964. communism perhaps was suitable when founding a nation, but it can cause great economic fluctuations comparing to the economic development stage. during the economic development stage, neoliberalism or state capitalism’s influences were not significant on gdp growth as exampled by singapore and mainland china. however, the success of singapore and mainland were only viewed from a historical perspective, their strategies may not work out the same results in other countries. singapore, in 1968, already surpassed average gdp of the world, while prc has become closer to this same average than ever. the mainland’s gdp gap away from this average was us$689.3 in 1970 (note 59), which was 18 years behind this average. in 2015, the average was only 8 years behind, and the gap seems to be closing quickly. comparing with average gdp of each countries and world gdp average, it could see more similarities and differences of singapore and mainland china’s models. more time is needed to observe the development of mainland china in order to continue with this research. references chu, w. w. (2017). the origin of taiwan’s postwar economic development. academia sinca. chua, b. h. (2016). state-owned enterprises, state capitalism and social distribution in singapore. the pacific review. cook, m. (2008). banking reform in southeast asia. routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203926833 cui, z. y., & park, c. k. (2010, november). contemporary south korean economy. shanghai: tongji university press. dent, c. m. (2008). east asian regionalism. routledge. deyo, f. c. (ed.). (1987). the political economy of the new asian industrialism. cornell university press. fairbank, j., & goldman, m. (2002). china: a new history. cambridge: the belknap press of harvard university press. gao, x. (2010, febuary 3). state-owned enterprises in china: how profitable are they?. the world bank blogs. hobday, m. (1995). innovation in east asia: the challenge to japan. edward elgar pub. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 108 published by scholink inc. huang, y. s. (2008). capitalism with chinese characteristics: entrepreneurship and the state. cambridge university press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511754210 international political economy zones. (2016, february 29). promise & peril of soe reform in mainland china. johnson, c. (1982). miti and the japanese miracle: the growth of industrial policy, 1925-1975. stanford university press. kuang, d. q. (2015). rise of a star island: nation-founding intelligence of singapore. world scientific publishing co pte ltd. leftwich, a. (1994). the developmental state. working paper no. 6. university of york. leftwich, a. (1995, february). bringing politics back in: towards a model of the developmental state. journal of development studies, 31(3). https://doi.org/10.1080/00220389508422370 lin, z. s. (2018, may 11). no. 10101: the story of the first privately owned business license in china. liu, x. b. (2001, february 5). the end of the second generation leaders-hu yaobang, zhao ziyang’s tragedy. epoch times. ministry of finance. (2015). income growth, inequality and mobility trends in singapore. ministry of finance occasional paper. ngerng, r. (2013, may 25). singaporeans the truth about our wages revealed. the heart truths. rodanm, c., hewison, k., & robison, r. (eds). (2006). the political economy of southeast asia: market, power and contestation. oxford university press. singapore infopedia. (2005). hock lee bus strike and riot. national library board singapore. smil, v. (1999). china’s great famine: 40 years later.bmj (clinical research ed.), 319(7225), 1619-1621. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.319.7225.1619 sng, h. y. (2011). sate-capitalism singapore. crisis management and public policy. world scientific publishing. https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814340908_0009 the economist. (2014, august 30). fixing china inc—state-owned enterprises. the economist. the economist. (2015, september 17). a whimper, not a bang. the economist. wei, y. j. ( 2008). the changes of mainland china’s direct investment policy on foreign investors 1980-2007. chinese culture university. wu, w. (2017, june 17). how the communist party controls china’s state-owned industrial titans. south china morning post. notes note 1. see the article “1955–hock lee bus riots”. singapore press holdings. note 2. see the article “singapore–road to independence”. u.s. library of congress. note 3. https://www.mti.gov.sg/mtiinsights/pages/1965-%e2%80%93-1978.aspx. ministry of trade and industry singapore. accessed june 8, 2018. note 4. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/history_of_the_kuomintang www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 109 published by scholink inc. note 5. see table 1 historical gdp growth rate of singapore; source: world bank; also table 2 historical gdp per capita source: world bank. note 6. see kuang, daoqiu’s book, pp. 9-14. note 7. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/history_of_the_kuomintang note 8. see the book of john fairbank and merle goldman, china: a new history, cambridge: the belknap pressof harvard university press, 2002, page 349 note 9. see vaclav smil’s 1999 article“china’s great famine: 40 years later”. bmj (clinical research ed.), 319(7225), 1619-1621. note 10. the historical record of mainland china’s gdp starts from 1960 according to world bank. note 11. the average economic growth is calculated for 16 years from 1961 to 1976. note 12. see leftwich, adrian, “the developmental state”, working paper no. 6, university of york, 1994; leftwich, adrian, “bringing politics back in: towards a model of the developmental state”. journal of development studies, volume 31, issue 3 february 1995, pp. 400-427; chalmers johnson’s 1982 book miti and the japanese miracle. note 13. many singapore scholars mention that singapore’s economic development ideology is state-capitalism, scholars including chua benghuat of his 2016’s paper state-owned enterprises, state capitalism and social distribution in singapore; hui ying sng’s paper sate-capitalism singapore, june, 2011. note 14. according to economic development board, there are 7000 mncs and more than 37400 international companies in singapore. note 15. https://www.edb.gov.sg/en/news-and-resources/insights/headquarters/scaling-up-from-singapo re.html note 16. https://www.edb.gov.sg/content/edb/zh/why-singapore/about-singapore/our-history/1960s.ht ml note 17. see chua benghuat, 2016’s paper, state-owned enterprises, state capitalism and social distribution in singapore, p. 503. note 18. https://tradingeconomics.com/singapore/balance-of-trade; source: tradingeconomics.com and statistics singapore note 19. chu wan-wen’s 2017 book-台灣戰後經濟發展緣起, chapter 5. note 20. cui zhiying; park changkeun’s book 當代韓國經濟. 上海: 同濟大學出版社. 2010, 11. note 21. see michael hobday’s book, 1995, innovation in east asia: the challenge to japan, page 137 note 22. https://www.edb.gov.sg/content/edb/zh/why-singapore/about-singapore/our-history/1970s.h tml note 23. https://tradingeconomics.com/singapore/inflation-cpi; source: tradingeconomics.com and statistics singapore. note 24. https://www.edb.gov.sg/content/edb/zh/why-singapore/about-singapore/our-history/1980s. html www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 110 published by scholink inc. note 25. see roy ngerng’s 2013 article-singaporeans the truth about our wages revealed, chart 23, may 25. note 26. https://tradingeconomics.com/singapore/inflation-cpi ; source: tradingeconomics.com and statistics singapore. accessed june 8, 2018. note 27. see chua benghuat, 2016’s paper, state-owned enterprises, state capitalism and social distribution in singapore; malcolm cook’s book, 2008 banking reform in southeast asia page 125; carr rodanm. note 28. kevin hewison and richard robison (eds.), 2006’s edited book, the political economy of southeast asia: market, power and contestation, p. 272 note 29. such as shin corporation affair in thai, christopher m. dent’s 2008 book-east asia regionalism, p. 108 note 30. see malcolm cook’s book, 2008 banking reform i southeast asia, p. 122; the first regional finance centre is manila. note 31. ibid, pp. 123-125. note 32. see chua benghuat, 2016’s paper, state-owned enterprises, state capitalism and social distribution in singapore, p. 502. note 33. see christopher m. dent’s 1008 book east asian regionalism, page 87. note 32. see malcolm cook’s book, 2008 banking reform i southeast asia, p. 131. note 33. see chua beng huat, 2016’s paper, state-owned enterprises, state capitalism and social distribution in singapore, subsectionsingapore’s sovereign wealth funds, pp. 509-510. note 34. ibid, page515 ote 35. see the ministry of finance occasional paper-income growth, inequality and mobility trends in singapore, 2015; https://www.mof.gov.sg/portals/0/feature%20articles/income%20growth,%20distribution%20and%2 0mobility%20trends%20in%20singapore.pdf. accessed june 8, 2018. note 36. https://tradingeconomics.com/singapore/government-budget; source: tradingeconomics.com and monetary authority of singapore. note 37. https://tradingeconomics.com/singapore/government-debt-to-gdp; source: tradingeconomic.com and government of singapore. note 38. see the 1987 book edited by federic c. deyo-the political economy of the new asian industrialism, p. 89. note 39. http://www.chinanews.com/m/sh/2018/05-11/8511095.shtml. from the article we can see the very beginning of neoliberalism “at the end of 1976, the cultural revolution came to an end. everything was waiting to be rebuilt. including chen shouzhu, a group of old comrades gathered together and wished to contribute any way they could. at this time, many young people returned from the frontier to wenzhou. at the same time, halted factories forced many unemployment workers, high school and university students to seek jobs elsewhere. soon, many people started to run a “small www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 111 published by scholink inc. business” to make for a living. in february 1979, central government and the state council forwarded the first economic report of individual business development. “according to the demand of the market, permission is granted to registered residents who obtained agreement by related department officers to personally engage in repair, service and handcrafting”. translated from the part of the article. accessed june 8, 2018. note 40. see yasheng huang’s book, 2008, capitalism with chinese characteristics: entrepreneurship and the state, p. 52. note 41. ibid, pp. 140-147. note 42. see guoguang’s 2015 book-china’s party congress, p. 164; also liu xiaobo’s article, 2001, feb 5. http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/1/2/5/n43835.htm note 43. see yasheng huang’s book, 2008, capitalism with chinese characteristics: entrepreneurship and the state, pp. 163-168. note 44. ibid, p. 162. note 45. http://fxtop.com/en/historical-exchange rates.php?a=1&c1=usd&c2=cny&ma=1&dd1=&mm1=&yyyy1=1953&b=1&p=&i=1&dd2 =15&mm2=06&yyyy2=2018&btnok=go%21; source: central bank of china. note 46. https://tradingeconomics.com/china/inflation-cpi; source: tradingeconomics.com and national bureau of china. accessed june 8, 2018. note 47. https://tradingeconomics.com/china/balance-of-trade; source: tradingeconomics.com and general administration of customs. accessed june 8, 2018. note 48. wei yujun 2008-中國大陸外商直接投資政策之變遷, 1980-2007, page 21-23 note 49. ibid page 34, table2-1 note 50. ibid page 34, table2-1 note 51. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/bx.klt.dinv.wd.gd.zs?locations=cn. accessed june 8, 2018 note 52. wei yujun 2008中國大陸外商直接投資政策之變遷, 1980-2007. note 53. see article-fixing china inc. from economist. accessed june 8, 2018. note 54. see the graph sourced oecd from the article–promise & peril of soe reform in mainland china, feb 2016. accessed june 8, 2018. note 55. see the graph of gaoxu’s article-sate-owned enterprises in china: how profitable are they?. accessed june 8, 2018. note 56. see the graph of the article-a whimper, not a bang, sep 17, 2015, the economist; the graph sourced from ceic; nbs; wind; imf. accessed june 8, 2018. note 57. see wendy wu’s article, how the communist party controls china’s state-owned industrial titans, june 17, 2017. accessed june 8, 2018. note 58. see the graph of christian nordqvist-chinese economic forecast trimmed down, april 7, 2014, market business news. accessed june 8, 2018. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 2, 2018 112 published by scholink inc. note 59. see the appendix -world gdp per capita source: world bank. appendix world gdp per capita (usd) 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 450.4 462.33 488.14 514.81 552.68 590.07 627.01 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 653.73 691.22 745.52 802.46 868.09 981.04 1172.25 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1326.05 1449.42 1549.17 1722.07 1992.19 2274.33 2516.17 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 2537.25 2470.33 2482.9 2533.29 2618.52 3046.21 3405.19 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 3746.68 3865.47 4272.52 4450.76 4653.44 4662.4 4931.83 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 5401.38 5441.28 5344.88 5256.61 5380.22 5482.63 5378.82 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 5514.32 6114.83 6800.56 7271.06 7775.61 8651.15 9371.49 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 8775.39 9509.37 10443.94 10539.39 10709.47 10864.3 10143.33 2016 10163.96 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 67 original paper study on the moral realism theory and its enlightenment kejie wu 1* 1 school of politics and administration, china west normal university, nanchong, sichuan, china * kejie wu, corresponding author received: march 18, 2023 accepted: april 12, 2023 online published: april 18, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n2p67 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n2p67 abstract moral realism theory takes political leadership as the core variable, which differs from the traditional realism theory. moral realism theory aims to analyze the motivation and logic of rising state replacing dominant state in international system. this paper uses documentary analysis to introduce and analyze this theory, which provides an innovative perspective for analyzing the current strength comparison between china and the united states and its impact on international relations in the future, while also helping to understand the diversified development of realism theory in international relations. keywords international relations theory, moral realism theory, morality, political leadership 1. background of moral realism theory moral realism is an important achievement of realism theory in international relations in recent years. yan xuetong, a chinese scholar of realism theory, is the main supporter of moral realism theory. since 2005, yan has published multiple works about moral realism. in his view, moral realism is the combination of western realism paradigm and the political ideology and practice of the pre-qin period in china. moral realism theory is based on two backgrounds. on the one hand, moral realism is based on traditional realism and analyze international relations form perspective of morality, aiming to enrich the theoretical camp of realism theory in international relations; on the other hand, moral realism takes the world power transition in the 21 st century as realistic background, aiming to analyze the current relationship between the major powers of china and the us and its impacts on the future of international relations. 1.1 academic background moral realism is based on traditional realism paradigm. traditional realism paradigm includes classical realism and structural realism. since the end of world war ii, classical realism theory has dominated www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 68 published by scholink inc. the agenda of international relations research. hans morgenthau, a leading figure of classical realism theory, mentioned that the core of ir lies in “power politics” in his masterpiece inter politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace published in 1948.international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim. (morgenthau, 1948, p. 13) as can be seen, classical realism regards “power politics” as the core concept. the concept pf power refers to the unity of nation interests, goals and means for interests. since the late 1960s,structural realism theory has developed on the basis of classical realism kenneth waltz, the leading figure of structural realism theory, put forward the concept of “international system” in his works including man, the state, and war published in 1959 and theory of international politics published in 1979.the cores of structural realism lie in: (1) the anarchic nature of the international system is the essence of ir; (2) the international system is the fundamental motivation of state behavior; (3) the fundamental nation interest is security, and power is the means for achieving nation interests and goals. (xing, 2011, p. 44) according to the table, the difference between two the theories above is: the former emphasizes national unit variable; the latter uses international system as a fundamental factor to national behavior. table 1.differences between classical realism and structural realism / classical realism structural realism core viewpoints human selfishness; people aim to pursue unlimited power. the anarchic nature of the international system. research level nation unit system level research perspective power politics international system (the table made by author) since the end of cold war, however, the interpretation of international political phenomena by traditional realism has become somewhat pale and powerless. on the one hand, the international situation since the post cold war era is vastly different from the early stages after the end of world war ii. with the continuous development of economic globalization, the degree of interdependence between states has deepened; the emergence of nuclear weapons brought about “terrifying nuclear balance”. the instinctive fear of nuclear weapons by humans greatly reduces the possibility of war, especially between major powers. cooperation between states outweighs conflict. on the other hand, structural realism didn’t accurately predict the collapse of the bipolar system during the cold war. this theory was therefore questioned, for it can’t explain why different diplomatic choices and behaviors occur under the influence of the same systemic factors. this shows system level factor as structural realism mentioned is not the only variable determining a state’s external strategic orientation. in this condition, norrin ripsman proposed neoclassical realism theory in 1998. this theory aims to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 69 published by scholink inc. explain the fundamental motivations behind foreign policy choices of states. most neoclassical realists, including ripsman, believe that the combination of waltz’s system level and morgenthau; s national unit level can more accurately predict the diplomatic strategic orientation and the development trend of the international system. based on this, neoclassical realists propose a theoretical model that combines international and domestic variables to analyze a country’s foreign policy. (ripsman, 2013, p. 18) according to neoclassical realism, there are two reasons for the disintegration of the soviet union. on the one hand, the influence of international system led to decline in the soviet union’s capabilities; on the other hand, the domestic political factors are relative. in short, more and more realist scholars are adopting this theoretical analysis. moral realism theory is an innovation of traditional realism. the greatest innovation of moral realism lies in analyzing international relation from the perspective of morality rather than power politics. starting from the assumption that human nature is evil, moral realism believes that state behavior includes both factors of power and morality. on the one hand, the concept of morality in moral realism originates from the political ideology of the pre-qin period in ancient china. chinese political thinkers in pre-qin revolved around the topic of “whether the main means of maintaining international order were morality or violence (power in morality)”. han feizi thought that morality only plays a role in maintaining order between states under specific conditions, and in general, it must be maintained through violence rather than morality; guanzi, laozi, conducius, xunzi and mencius, on the other hand, believed that morality was a necessary condition for maintaining order among nations, but didn’t rule out the use of violence to maintain order; mozi regarded morality as sufficiency to maintain order among nations because morality itself excluded violence. as can be seen, although most pre-qin thinkers didn’t take identifying morality as their core means, they didn’t exclude the existence of morality. morality still has its specific function which can’t be replaced by violent means. on the other hand, the western realist paradigm, as a theoretical cluster, has not made a clear and consistent analysis of the existence of morality. since the era of machiavelli, the political concept of “valuing power over morality” has dominated the realism paradigm. morgenthau, however, discussed the role of international morality. “...power is a crude and unreliable method of limiting the aspirations for power on the international scene...something that is in harmony with the demands of reason, morality, and justice. the substance, of which the ideologies of international politics are but the reflection, is to be found in the normative orders of ethics, mores, and law.” (morgenthau, 1948, p. 169) as can be seen, morgenthau believed that state behavior reflects both power and moral factors. in the 1960s, the “quantitative analysis method” brought about by the behaviorist revolution influenced the attitude of the realism paradigm towards morality. john mearsheimer is the leading figure of offensive realism theory. he firmly denies morality in ir theory. yan doesn’t agree with mi’s view. in short, moral realism absorbed the role of morality in the international order from chinese pre-qin political thinkers, while inheriting the emphasis of classical realism on morality. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 70 published by scholink inc. 1.2 realistic background the most important issue of moral realism aim to analyze is the potential mechanisms of rising state replacing dominant state in the context of world power transition, which is an eternal topic in international politics. “...the outbreak of major hostilities is connected to changes in the power structure of the international order...the significant differences in the distribution of international power are rooted in the different capacities of member states to utilize their own human and material resources.” (orgenski, 1968, p. 20) in other words, due to the imbalance in economic, military, and demographic developments between states, the position of different states in the international power structure will undergo decisive changes, with the original dominant power status declining and the later rising power status rings, and obtaining the dominate power status. in the 21 st century, world power transition is manifested in the strength comparison between the two world powers, china and the us. on the one hand, due to the disintegration of the soviet union, the us’s attention to europe, especially to the western european region, has decreased. with the continuous prosperity and growth of emerging economies in east asia, the focus of us diplomatic strategy is gradually shifting eastward. since the george w. bush administration, the us has declared itself an important member of “east asian country”. in 2008, barack obama proposed the “return to asia pacific” strategy. in 2019, donald trump proposed the “indo-pacific strategy”. in 2020, the current president of the us, joe biden, is actively expanding contacts between the us and countries in the indo-pacific region. in the economy, the us and indo-pacific countries were actively forming “indo-pacific economic framework (ipef)”; in terms of military, security, the us established “aukus” with the united kingdom and australia. the us and the uk have pledged to provide nuclear submarines to australia. in addition, india’s position in us strategy is constantly improving. in short, one of the reasons for the continuous eastward shift of the us strategy is china’s rise. in 2010, china’s gdp surpassed japan, becoming the world’s second largest economy after the us. figure 1. trend of gross domestic product growth in china and the us (2010-2020) (data sources from ： https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.kd.zg?end=2021&locations=us-cn&start=200 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 71 published by scholink inc. 0) according to data form the world bank, around 2010, the total gdp of the us was twice that of china; by 2020, this proportion had dropped to about less than double. this shows that china’s economy capability is growing faster than the us, and the total gdp of china and the us is showing a decreasing trend. in addition, china’s strength and influence in the fields of technology, military strength, and culture are also constantly narrowing the gap with the us. this also shows that comprehensive capabilities of china and the us is constantly increasing. regarding the analysis of relative decline of dominant state, paul kennedy mentioned the famous theory of “military overstretch”. “the decline of major power from economic perspective, great powers ascendancy correlate strongly to available resources and economic durability. military overstretch and a concomitant relative decline are the consistent threats facing powers whose ambitions and security requirements are greater than their resource base can provide for.” (paul, 1987, p. 438) richard haass, president of the council on foreign relations of the us, rejects the notion of american decline. “...the biggest threat to the decline in leadership of the us is not from abroad but from within...it is necessary for the us to place emphasis on domestic investment and polities reform to maintain the hegemonic position in the international affairs.” (richard, 2014, p. 6) john measheimer believed that china’s growing power will likely bring it into conflict with the us.as far as most scholars of ir concerned, the phenomenon of center transfer between major powers due to changes in power comparison often leads to wars. this is because rising states are dissatisfied with the current situation and often change their relative power distribution through war, thereby changing the existing international scene. yan xuetong, however, explains how the world power transition achieves a peaceful transition of power. in 2014, yan explained this phenomenon in his article the international relations theory of moral realism. “in the international system of realistic power politics, adhering to moral principles and valuing the construction of domestic political leadership will contribute to the transfer of power in the world center.” what’s more, most scholars analyze from the perspective of dominant power, rather than the perspective of rising power. as a matter of fact, the phenomenon of world power transfer is not determined solely by the dominant state, but rather manifests as an interactive process of rising power and decline power .throughout history, the rise and fall of states in the international system have been the same all the time. the theoretical research of moral realism continues to develop with the improvement of china’s international status. the development of theoretical research on global international relations has shown a “uneven” characteristic. the theories of international relations of realism, neo-liberalism and constructivism are all “america paradigms”, that essentially serve the world political and economic hegemony system established by the united states after the war. due to the dominant position of western countries led by the us in the study of international relations theory, there is such www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 72 published by scholink inc. inequality phenomenon where “the west produces theory, while non west produces material”. this phenomenon has changed with the trend of “rising in the east and falling in the west”. qin yaqing, a chinese scholar in international relations theory, pointed out that since 1979, the development of international relations theory in china has undergone three debates. the first was about china’s opening up to the outside world. the second one began in the 1990s, with a focus on how to apply theory to better serve china’s national interests. the theme of the third debate is about china’s rise. as it can be seen, the theoretical system of international relations is constantly deepening with the improvement of china’s capabilities. moral realism emerged in the third debate. in short, as a type of realism theory, the development process of moral realism is closely related to traditional realism. at the same time, due to the continuous improvement of theoretical sources and reality in practice, the development of moral realism cannot be separated from the reality of international politics. 2. analysis of moral realism theory 2.1 the definition of morality in the process of integrating traditional chinese political philosophy into the paradigm of realism, moral realism defines morality from the dimensions of its nature and hierarchy. on the one hand, the morality in moral realism is a kind of instrumental. (yan, 2019, p. 6) the definition of morality in moral realism differs from classical realism and is similar to the political ideology of the pre-qin period in china. “on the one hand, there is the dual error of confounding the moral rules ...on the other hand, there is the misconception...that international politics is so thoroughly evil that it is no use looking for ethical limitations...(in fact), their restraining function is most obvious and most effective in affirming the sacredness of human life in times of peace.” (morgenrthau, 1948, p. 174) as can be seen, morgenthau attaches importance to the function of moral restriction of power and the universal value of morality itself. confucius, guanzi and xunzi all valued the role of morality in the order of nations, but they emphasized morality as a tool for major powers to maintain order among nations, while weakening the value of morality itself. xunzi proposed: “the nature of today’s people, born with good benefits, therefore, the struggle for life leads to resignation and death...but, from the perspective of human nature, courtesy towards others, out of competition, conforming to criminal division and disorderly reasoning leads to violence.” due to the “evil nature of human”, most chinese pre-qin politicians believed that morality couldn’t fundamentally improve the selfishness of human nature, but could constrain people’s (political leadership) desire for power and pursuit of power. starting form the instrumental nature of morality, moral realism derives the relationship between morality and national interest, national strength, international power and international authority. international power (e+m+c)×p=c international authority national interest (strategic credibility) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 73 published by scholink inc. (flowchart made by author. in this flowchart, “e”=economy capability, “m”=military capability, “c”=cultural capability,” “cc”=comprehensive capability) according to the flowchart above, political capability plays a decisive role in enhancing comprehensive capability, which improved by international power and international authority. yan mentioned the level of comprehensive capability determines national interests. traditional realism defines comprehensive capability through the size of power, thereby determining national interests. however, in moral realism ,national interest exists objectively and are not transferred by human will. if national interests are determined by power, it’s easy to misjudge the goals of interests. high or low goals can lead to the failure of national diplomacy. the instrumental nature of morality is specifically manifested in: firstly, strategic credibility is a quantitative indicator of morality in international authority. strategic credibility is the lowest level of international morality, and a prerequisite to a leading power’s establishment of international authority. (yan, 2019, p. 21) yan adopted xunzi’s propositions. “...therefore, those who use the state are established with righteousness as the king, with faith as the ruler, and with power as the conspirator, they perish.” in other words, compared to international power, international authority can more sustainably stabilize a state’s comprehensive capability and international scene. international power is based on material capabilities, while international authority is based on non-material capabilities. “...but such promoted material capability cannot automatically establish the international authority of that state when other states do not accept its leadership. the improvement of a leading state’s international authority entails...” (yan, 2019, p. 17) secondly, morality is an important tool of enhancing comprehensive capability. traditional realism believes that national strength is measured by the size of power. in fact, the realism paradigm, as a theoretical cluster, doesn’t provide a unified explanation for whether power belongs to the national interest. moral realism proposes: (1) power refer only to influence, and it is a national interest; (2) capability refers only to strength. (yan, 2019, p. 12) on such. basis, morality directly affects power and indirectly affects strength. as an international authority, morality can enhance a state’s international power and thus enhance its strength. in short, morality is the fundamental tool to safeguard national interests and enhance national strength. on the other hand, the morality in moral realism belongs to the national level. yan adopted morgenthau’s proposition. “the morality of the particular group, far from limiting the struggle for power on the international scene, gives that struggle a ferociousness...not known to other ages.” (morgenthau, 1948, p. 174) in morgenthau’s view, the moral principles of a specific country are not equivalent to universal morality. firstly, the subject of implementing and adhering to moral principles is the state, usually the central government of the country. therefore, morality in moral realism refers to “government morality”. secondly, there are different levels of moral standards. the moral standard in moral realism refers to the most fundamental morality. in short, moral realism regards morality as its core concept, which is the biggest difference between this theory and traditional realism. in addition, morality, as a human consciousness, cannot www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 74 published by scholink inc. automatically enhance comprehensive capabilities and safeguard national interests. any policy is formulated, implemented, and executed by people. therefore, the subject of behavior that adheres to moral principles is political leadership. 2.2 the role of political leadership in moral realism moral realism regards political leadership, measured by morality, as the core explanatory variable to analyze world power transition---the potential mechanism by which rising states replace dominant states in international scene. both classical realism and chinese pre-qin political ideology mentioned the role of political leadership. “but they have rarely asked themselves whether and to what extent such precepts, however desirable in themselves, actually determine the action of men...it is pertinent to ask whether they are mere ideologies concealing the true motives of action or whether they express a genuine concern for the compliance of international policies with ethical standards.” (morgenthau, 1948, p. 174) as can be seen, classical realism uses morality to measure whether the power behavior of political leadership conforms to international norms. however, chinese pre-qin political thinkers believed that the moral policies of political leadership (of major powers) would determine the international order. due to the differences between the national and international systems, political leadership is divided into national leadership and international leadership. yan xuetong pointed out that proactive leadership and humane authority leadership are the two types are most helpful for rising countries to seize opportunities for rise. as shown in the table below: table 2. proactive leadership and humane authority leadership type of leadership name characteristic national leadership proactive leadership responsibility; change status quo international leadership humane authority leadership consistent; trustworthy (table made by author). all in all, political leadership is the fundamental reason for determining the rise and fall of a major power. its essence is the direction, determination, and ability of a government to carry out reforms to adapt to the constantly changing international and domestic strategic environment. this indicates that the stronger the political leadership of a major state, the more advantageous it has in the international status. the type of political leadership determines the changes in international relations. moral realism proposes that the comprehensive strength of a country is the foundation for determining its international status. according to the distribution of comprehensive capabilities, countries in the world are mainly divided into four categories: dominant states, rising states, regional powers and small www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 75 published by scholink inc. countries. as mentioned earlier, moral realism aims to primarily focus on global countries---dominant and rising states. the role of political leadership in international relations is manifested in the following aspects: first of all, political leadership determines national strength, which in turn affects the international landscape. the international pattern is composed of two elements: (1) the distribution of relative strength of states; (2) strategic relations between major powers. according to comprehensive level formula, political power is an operational element that plays a decisive role in the improvement or decrease of comprehensive strength. the type of political leadership determines the level of political capabilities. the direction of political reform political capabilities efficiency of national leadership the intensity of political reform (flowchart made by author) as shown in the figure, political power is determined by the efficiency of national leadership. the efficiency of national leadership is composed of two elements: the direction of reform and intensity of political reform. among them, the direction of reform is a decisive factor in determining changes in political power. the reason for this is that: (1) the correct direction of reform is based on moral principles, and on this basis, the greater the implementation of the reform, the higher the efficiency of national leadership, and thus the improvement of political leadership, and thus the improvement of political strength; (2) on the contrary, if the reform direction is not based on moral principles or violates these principles, it will lead to a decline in political power. in addition, the principle of alliance is the core factor that affect the strategic relationship of major powers. in yan’s view, the alliance policy is not a kind of “mentality of cold war”, but rather the main way for a country to enhance its international strategic credibility. by forming alliance with other countries, major powers provides security guarantees for other country and enhance its international strategic credibility. therefore, the increase in the number of major power alliances helps to enhance the strategic relationship of the country, thereby promoting changes in the international landscape. based on the discussion above, yan believes that the international landscape in the next 10 years will exhibit “polarization” led by china and the us. political leadership, therefore, will determine the future power gap between china-us. next, diplomatic strategy is influenced by both national strength and political leadership. as mentioned earlier, moral realism proposes that national strength defines national interests. therefore, national strategic goals are first based on national strength. the stronger the national strength, the higher and more strategic goals the country has, and vice versa. diplomatic strategy is the action guide for a country to achieve its own strategic interests and goals. therefore, diplomatic strategy is essentially based on national strength. for example, according to this theory, there is a gap in national strength and international influence between the us and african countries, resulting in a greater diplomatic strategic goal for the us compared to the latter. however, the type of political leadership generates changes in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 76 published by scholink inc. strategic preferences. on the one hand, different political leaderships of the same country adopt different foreign policies. for example, since the beginning of the 21 st century, the international landscape has shown a characteristic of “one superpower, multiple strengths”, while the us government experienced the periods of george w. bush, obama, trump and biden. each leader’s foreign policy exhibits different characteristics. on the other hand, different countries adopt different foreign policies within the same system. for example, in the late cold war, different foreign strategic orientations led to the disintegration of the soviet union and the united states becoming the world’s only superpower. the last but not the least, changes in political leadership shape new international norms, affect the existing international order, and promote the transformation of the international system. international norms means standards, guidelines or code of practices that is generally agreed on by the international community. in ir, international norms mainly refer to the international rules followed by countries in their actions on the international community. due to the “anarchic nature” of the international system, there is no international law based on violence in the international community. therefore, international norms have become the main standard for constraining national behavior. after rising states become new dominant state, establishing new international norms helps to maintain its leadership position, while promoting international norms based on moral principles is conductive to promoting world peace. in ir, international order refers to patterned or structured relationships between actors on the international level; while international system is a network of states, organizations and individuals that interact on a global scale. 3. enlightenment of moral realism theory 3.1 academic contribution of moral realism theory moral realism enriches the realistic international relations theory camp. the construction of moral realism is conducive to enriching the camp of realism theory of international relations. on the basis of the framework of traditional realism theory, moral realism shows that the cultural construction paths should be emphasized in the process of theoretical construction .this helps to promote the diversified development of realistic international relations theory. on the one hand, rooted in traditional chinese culture, the theory of moral realism in international relations proposes how to theorize in the fields of values. norms, systems, and practices. as a result, the theory of moral realism has become a product of traditional chinese culture and social practice, and ideas from traditional chinese culture have been reshaped in the process of theoretical construction. from such perspective, the theory of moral realism provides spiritual strength for the realism of international relations theory. on the other hand, the theory of moral realism utilizes the paradigm of western realism to achieve cross-cultural communication. some scholars question the cross-cultural construction of moral realism. as far as amitav acharya concerned, the theory of moral realism is not a manifestation of equal www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 77 published by scholink inc. dialogue between western and non-western traditional ideas. in his view, although the theory of moral realism is rooted in china’s profound historical and cultural ideology, its theoretical foundation based on the western realism paradigm reflects a “concession” to western centrism. in response, qin yaqing pointed out that the theory of moral realism reflects the intersection of his cultural ideas and his own cultural ideas. the relationship between traditional chinese culture and western realism is not incompatible, but rather draws on each other’s strengths. the development of global international relations should reflect inclusiveness. in short, the cultural construction path of moral realism theory has contributed its unique academic value to the diversified development of current realism international relations theory. moral realism realize the transition from theoretical consumption to theoretical creation. the development of china’s international relations theory has its shortcomings of starting relatively late. some chinese scholars have called for the construction of a theoretical paradigm of international relations with chinese characteristics. this proposition has been questioned by qin yaqing and yan xuetong. yan pointed out that any theory of international relations transcends time and space, and has universal explanatory power. in fact, during the long-term process, the theoretical system of international relations in china has faced two core issues in the construction process: (1) how to understand china’s relationship with the international system and the international community; (2) what is china’s identity in the international community? over the past few decades, china’s international status and role have been mainly influenced by the mainstream evaluation of western international relations theory. china needs to construct a discourse system for international relation to enhance its understanding of its international status. the chinese school represented by the “tsinghua approach” has gradually developed. the theory of moral realism has become one of the main research paths in china’s international relations theory system in recent years. the main innovations of this theory are in the following two aspects: on the one hand, emphasizing the role of moral factors is undoubtedly the greatest innovation of this theory compared to previous realism paradigms. the connotation of morality comes from the political philosophy; on the other hand, utilizing the framework of realism to seek international recognition, the theory of moral realism is integrated into global international relations by filling the long-standing gap in non western international relations theory. as amitav pointed out that moral realism theory, as one of china’s international relations theoretical systems, should be committed to enriching and developing global cultural exceptionalism in order to provide a global paradigm for international relations theory. in short, any theory of regional international relations should be an integral part of global international relations. china’s diplomacy abides by moral principles. historical experience has taught us that the chinese dream can ultimately be realized through peaceful means. the pursuit of power and the use of force to achieve and maintain international status is not advisable and not sustainable. “china should attach importance to the advantage of “morality” in its national diplomatic strategy to enhance its www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 78 published by scholink inc. international identity.” the rise of china cannot be separated from “morality”. one of the important characteristics of china’s diplomacy as a major country with distinctive characteristics is the practice of the value of unity of justice and benefit. in international relations, it is necessary to properly handle the relationship between righteousness and benefit. the international situation is undergoing a sudden change, and the world is currently in a major upheaval that has not occurred in a century. on the one hand, the trend of multi-polarization in the world is constantly strengthening; on the other hand, the level of mutual trust between major powers has decreased, showing a trend of “fragmentation”. the principle of leading by example in china’s diplomacy helps to enhance china’s international strategic credibility. china has long adhered to the policy of opening up to the outside world. through its economic influence, china and countries with friendly and peaceful development together achieve common prosperity. this has expanded china’s “circle of friends”. this policy guideline reflects that china’s international strategic credibility is steadily improving, and china’s own leadership as a major power continues to play a role. only in this way can we fully understand china’s rejuvenation strategy, reduce and eliminate misunderstandings and fallacies of some western countries regarding china’s peaceful rise process. in today’s era, to achieve national rejuvenation, china needs to surpass the united states in terms of “justice” and “faithfulness”. at the same time, china actively participates in the reform of the global governance system and provides the world with chinese experience. 3.2 evolution of moral realism theory in the academic community the theory of moral realism has received widespread attention from both domestic and international academic circles. the academic evaluation of moral realism theory mainly includes the following aspects. firstly, regarding the relationship between alliance and morality. zhang feng does not agree with the idea of establishing strategic credibility through alliance policies. alliance means that while a major power strengthens its relationship with allies, it deteriorates its relationship with non-allies. the pros and cons of alliance should be analyzed from the perspective of national interests, rather than using moral principles as a measure. scholars such as liu wenxiang raised the following questions: according to the logic of moral realism, the number of allies reflects the level of credibility. so, does it mean that all countries within the alliance system adopt moral policies towards each other? the moral realism of countries forming alliances to enhance strategic credibility does not clarify these issues. secondly, regarding the definition standards of morality. zhang feng believes that the morality in the moral realism has actually departed from confucian origins ans is closer to the western realism. acharya pointed out that the moral realism is only based on the political ideology of the pre-qin period in china and lacks historical coherence. in contrast, the development process of western realism is more historically coherent. finally, regarding the role of major, medium-sized, and small countries in the international order. acharya does not agree with the claim of moral realism that changes in the international order depend www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 79 published by scholink inc. on the balance of power among major powers and changes in strategic relations. he proposed the concept pf “multiple order” in the end of the american world order. in his view, with the deepening development of globalization and regionalization, the influence of medium-sized and small countries in the region on the international order will continue to rise. therefore, international relations theory is not limited to the analysis of global powers, but should also maintain attention to medium-sized and small countries. in summary, although the theory of moral realism has been criticized and questioned by the academic community during its development, its construction undoubtedly has positive significance. as qin yaqing pointed out that although moral realism takes realism as its basic theoretical framework, its core concept includes the moral factors excluded by realism. this knowledge practice constitutes a critical fusion and competitive reference. therefore, it is an innovation. as mentioned before, different scholars have varying perspectives on moral realism. but overall, the theory of moral realism is the focus of most scholars’ attention at both the logical and feasible levels. 3.3 reflections on the moral realism tory moral realism theory proposed by yan xuetong has innovative value for both the construction of china’s international relations theory system and the development of the realist international relation theory camp. morality play a unique role in the current reality of international relations. strategic credibility is even more essential for major power diplomacy. as a theory based on analyzing international political reality issues, moral realism needs to keep up with the times and constantly enrich its own connotations. with the changing international situation, the theory of moral realism continues to enrich its own connotation, which is conducive to better explaining international political reality. at the same time, as a universal theoretical explanation, moral realism theory needs to constantly polish itself in practice. only theories that can withstand practical testing are worthy of recognition. 4. conclusion this paper mainly introduces the background and main content of the proposal of moral realism, and briefly analyzes and summarizes the construction inspiration of moral realism. this paper believes that moral realism enriches the theoretical camp of international relations in the field of path innovation, which is conductive to the diversified development of international relations theory. at the same time. the proposal of moral principles has certain guiding significance for china’s diplomacy. with the development and changes of the international situation, moral realism is also constantly adjusting and deepening its connotation. in short, the formation and development of moral realism theory has its specific academic and practical significance. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 80 published by scholink inc. references acharya, a., & buzan, b. (2007). why is there no non-western international relations theory? an introduction. international relations of the asia pacific, 7(3), 287-312. https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcm012 acharya, a. (2018). the end of american world order. new york: john wiley & sons. acharya, a. (2019). from heaven to earth: “cultural idealism” and “moral realism” as chinese contributions to global international relations. the chinese journal of international politics, 12(4), 467-494. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poz014 mearsheimer, j. j. (2001). the tragedy of great power politics. new york: w. w. norton & company. morgenthau, h. j. (1948). politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace. new york: alefred a. knopf. ripsman, n. m. (2013). neoclassical realist theory of international politics. oxford: oxford university press. organski, a. f. k., & jacek, k. (1968). the war ledger. chicago: the university of chicago press. kennedy, p. m. (1987). the rise and fall of the great powers: economic change and military conflict form 1500 to2000. new york: random house. haass, r. n. (2014). foreign policy begins at home: the case for putting america’s house in order. new york: basic books. qin, y. q. (2011). development of international relations theory in china: progress through debates. international relations of the asia-pacific, 11(2), 231-257. https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcr003 qin, y. q. (2019). the development and contribution of china’s international relations theory. foreign affairs review, 36(6), 1-10. xing, y. (2011). introduction to international relations (2 nd ed.). beijing: peking university press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691191935 yan, x. t. (2009). the differences and similarities in political ideology among pre-qin states. social sciences in china, 177(3), 87-108. yan, x. t. (2014). the international relations of moral realism. international studies, 163(05), 102-128. yan, x. t. (2019). the leadership and the rise of great power. princeton: princeton university press. yang, x. y., & liu, w. x. (2015). moral realism: the chinese paradigm of neoclassical realism. journal of qiqihar university (philosophy & social science edition), 221(7), 16-19. zhang, f. (2022). comment on the moral view of moral realism. journal of international relations, 55(1), 14-31. microsoft word ape-v1n1-p69.doc advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 69 original paper exchange rate and world currency fengquan liu1* 1 209 buttercup court. waterloo, on, canada * fengquan liu, 209 buttercup court. waterloo, on, canada received: april 22, 2018 accepted: may 12, 2018 online published: may 23, 2018 doi:10.22158/ape.v1n1p69 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v1n1p69 abstract this paper explores the derivation of exchange rate and the way of world currency issuing, and some findings are captured as: the world’s currency demand is equal to the global export increment, and that every nation’s world currency needs should equal to their own export increment. currently, there are issues with the existing world currency system, which many countries or regions call for change. because all the existing proposals in the field have their constraints, so this paper suggests that the world central bank issuing a global currency with which each country would take its own share and maintain that the world currency supply to be equal to the global export increments. this will be more sustainable for international business and this theory of world currency does have advantage over existing systems. keywords macroeconomics, world currency, exchange rate, mathematical modeling 1. introduction as the international financing and trading expand, more and more world currencies are needed. for the sake of international business developing fairly and sustainably some major challenges need to be addressed, for example, how to calculate exchange rates fairly and reasonably among countries, and another challenge is how to issue world currency fairly. addressing these two questions together would simplify the discussion of exchange rate and world currency, as the world currency and exchange rate among countries are inseparable topics of discussion. for example, if the exchange rate among two countries for trading is not calculated properly, fairness in the trading could not be achieved; if world currency system is not properly established, there is no fairness in international trading even if the exchange rate is right. in section ii of this paper, the method to calculate fair exchange rate will be discussed. the calculating formula is built upon mathematical logic. it can avoid problems such as statistical errors, short of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 70 published by scholink inc. variables and logic, which are the common traits among existing exchange rate models. the logic model proposed in this paper can not only calculate the exchange rate between two countries, but also multilateral rates. in the process of the exchange rate discussion, some intermediate conclusions can be used in world currency discussion, such as world currency demand, money supply of a country in a closed and open economy. in part iii of the paper, the existing arguments and proposals on world currency is evaluated. the existing theories share a common point of view, which the mechanisms of world currency should be changed, as existing world currency systems have issues such as economic sovereignty, equity, surplus, poor feeds rich and compare advantage. by using the conclusion of part 2 to solve the existing problems of current world currency system, the paper calls for a kind of new world currency, which can be issued by world central bank, used for international business and trading only. all the countries and regions would take shares of the world currency, and this share is calculated based on their international trading increment. for trading limited within the country, a domestic currency is still in use. the proposed world currency has advantages as below:  the newly proposed world currency is fair and it upholds state economic sovereignty and eliminates poor feeding the rich.  it reduces the demand of foreign currency reserve and raises world currency efficiency.  it eliminates surplus and brings comparative advantage into full play.  it shields inflation among countries and reduces the risk of economic crisis.  it is a real world currency and sustainable. 2. the calculation of exchange rate economists have done a lot of research on the calculation of exchange rate where many mathematical models were built. however, as it seems in the existing models, each model has its own constraints and limitations in its application. feenstra, robert c and taylor alan m. presented interest rate parity (irp) in “international economics” in 2008. cassel, gustav built up purchasing power parity (ppp) in “abnormal deviations in international exchanges” in 1918. both irp and ppp take exact same mathematical form, only the determinants differ one from the other. they can be used to examine and judge if the exchange rate between two countries is reasonable or not, however in these models, only three variables are taken into consideration. it is hard to avoid deviations for exchange rate because it is also affected by many other economic variables. michael l mussa’s exchange rate model is built according to supply, demand and expected exchange rate change in national bureau of economic research in 1984. it treats currency as goods on the basis of supply and demand to calculate exchange rate. only a rough one can be reached because the variables such as demand, supply and expected exchange are all estimates. and supply and demand www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 71 published by scholink inc. parity shares the same problem with former two models, still short of variables. sergio da silva published “class room guide to the equilibrium exchange rate model” on economic issues in 2002. on the basis of douglas production model, an exchange rate model was built up with mathematical statistics method. as production model already has statistic errors, so on the basis of it the exchange rate model will amplify the statistic errors. more important problem that affects the application of statistical mathematical models is that it is short of the logical relationship among the variables. and another problem of statistical models is that the variables used in building exchange rate models are not enough. because of the problems above, it is really hard for statistic mathematical models to hold for long term. there are lots of variables in complicated economy system and they are interdependent upon each other. all the variables changes follow objective laws and logics existing in the system. to find reasonable way to calculate exchange rate, all the related variables should be taken into consideration directly or indirectly in the model and it should be in accordance with mathematical logic. 2.1 exchange rate calculation in my paper, published in theoretical and practical economy theory vol v in 2015, the following exchange rate formula as one of the application of “the whole economy approach of input and output model” is used. the exchange rate between two countries is calculated with formula below: the factors affecting exchange rate are new issued money (m1’), domestic total sale (pq) and yield (y) increments, nominal economy growth (ϑ’), import (im), export (ex) and inflow (fi) and outflow (fo) of foreign currency. where superscripts o indicates last period (year), and’ the inspecting period (this year). formula above is only suit to clear trade off condition, that is, there is no surplus in international trades. in fact the trading surplus and foreign currency reserve (rf) do exist and they are also the important factors affecting exchange rate among countries. taking them into consideration, formula above changed into formula 1 (1) adding term on both sides of 1, get the money equality for term t’: (2) checking 2, both side of equality are equal to 0. left side tells a nation's money demand in open economy. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 72 published by scholink inc. in equality above: — the money demand in closed economy — to meet the export increment needs, a nation supplies domestic money and uses it to produce export goods sold for foreign currency. — in order to accumulate foreign currency reserve rf, a nation needs to pay equal value of domestic currency to enterprises. will increase domestic total sales (pq) mostly by price level increase. for the countries whose money can’t be used as world currency, foreign currency reserve is a big burden. it increases domestic price level and decrease the efficiency of financing resource. it is passive and defensive. so it can be called double burden. right side is the country’s foreign currency balance sheet: on the basis of discussion above, new exchange rate formula can be deduced by the left side of f2 for the reason that a country’s categories of foreign currency reserve doesn’t really reflect its international trading scale, when calculating exchange rate, better to use the formula 3: (3) 2.2 multi-countries exchange rate on the basis of two countries exchange rate calculation, three countries formula can be written down. for more countries similar method can be used. using 3 and adding the corresponding variables to it, a simultaneous equation of three countries exchange rate is shown below: www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 73 published by scholink inc. in equation: reab the exchange rate between country a and country b imab import of country a from country b exab export of country a to country b fiab inflow of country b’s currency into country a from country b foab outflow of country b’s currency into country b from country a other variables can be explained similarly. for every single equality in simultaneous equation, one country’s own currency is used for quoting prices and settling accounts. for the equation, there are 6 exchange rates as unknown variables. all others are taken as known. notice that the exchange rates between two countries exists the relationship: so there are only 3 unknown variables left, and the simultaneous equation is solvable. it can be used to calculate the exchange rate in existing world economy. for simplifying discussion, only 2 related country’s currencies were listed. in real application of simultaneous equation, more corresponding used currencies need to be added into equation. it does not change the varieties amount and affect the solvability of the equation. in addition, a nation’s economic growth is assumed to be even in all fields for the same reason. 2.3 world currency demand the world currency demand can be calculated by summing up three countries exchange rate simultaneous equation. in the process of deduction, the export and outflow of country a to country b ( , ) equal to import and inflow of country b from country a ( , ) respectively, so the sum of 4 items above is zero. similarly other exports, imports, outflows and inflows in the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 74 published by scholink inc. simultaneous equation are all canceled out in dual. the left side of the equality above is the sum of three countries world currency demand and the right side is the sum of three countries export increments. so the total world currency demand is global export increment and every country or region supposed to take its own share. 3. world currency as globalization continues to bring international trading opportunities, world currency continues to be a hot topic of discussion. governments and economists from around the world have been discussing the topic widely and openly, and have made various proposals. the common feature of the proposals is calling for change, because the existing system has vital problems. the issue comes from that only several currencies are acceptable in international business, other countries have to save foreign currency reserve by favor surplus to meet the future needs of international trade and finance safety’s sake. that is why surplus exists. several rich countries issue world currency is not fair to poor countries. it encroaches on poor countries’ economic sovereignty. in following discussion we call the countries who issue more world currency over their share rich, and others poor. by the mechanism of poor feeding the rich, there formed three economy empires on the world, which is synchronized with that they monopolized world currency. as the surplus is passive and defensive measures taken by poor, there is no clear trade off in international trade, so the compare advantage is out of question. 3.1 proposals for world currency the proposals for world currency roughly go into four categories: 3.1.1 a global currency journal “the economist” published “get ready for the phoenix” in 1988, in which they predicted by around 2018, a new global currency “phoenix” would be in use. russia president showed off a coin minted with the worlds “unity in diversity” at the g8 summit in july 2009, calling for a supra-reserve currency. robert a. mundell has suggested creating a world currency for a long time. 3.1.2 regional currencies the european union created the euro as the regional currency in january, 1999. in east asia, north america, south america and africa there are moves and calls for their own regional currencies. ben steil published “the end of national currency” in 2007. the author claimed the solution for world currency is regional currency and abandoning monetary nationalism. 3.1.3 enlarging the list of reserve currencies a un panel of expert economists proposed a new global reserve currency by greatly expanding sdr on march 26, 2009. zhou xiaochuan, president of people’s bank of china suggested on march 24, 2009, that imf’s sdr www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 75 published by scholink inc. could serve as a super-sovereign reserve currency. 3.1.4 a petro-currency at the second south-arab league summit on march 30, 2009, venezuelan president hugo chavez proposed the creation of a petro-currency. petro is only a kind natural resource and could not be used as currency because the distribution of it is not even. facing the problem existed in nowadays world currency system, all proposals call for change. looking at proposals above, all of them has their own flaws to be fixed. a single global currency could never fully replace territorial ones because economic sovereignty. regional one looks worse because economic sovereignty problem is still there. it also added intermediate link between world currency and national ones, making financing system more complicated and fragile. at same time both of them did not mention how to deal with equity. as a solution, enlarging sdr is moving in right direction. but to equity it is far not enough. a petro-currency is like gold money and out of date. 3.2 problems prior to addressing the world currency issue, it is important to understand the reason for these issues to exist. 3.2.1 imbalance of economic development reviewing world currency history briefly, individual country monopolized world currency is in synchronized with the forming of economic empires in different period. it explains clearly that the relationship between unfair world currency issue and imbalance economic development (table 1). table 1. world currency history table term world currency economic empire 17th-19th century spanish dollars spain 19th-mid 20th century pound/sterling united kingdom mid 20th century-present us dollar (most of them) united states 3.2.2 economic sovereignty general accepted macroeconomics definition: macro-economics is a branch of economics that deals with the performance, structure, behavior and decision-making of the entire economy. be that a national, regional, or the global economy. issuing money is one of the most important economic policy decision made by a nation’s government. it is one kind of tax and affects the economic performance, structure and behavior of nation’s whole economy very badly. the sole legal government can make decisions only within their own country or region. in existing world currency system it is evident that the specific country executed others economic sovereignty in world currency issuing. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 76 published by scholink inc. 3.2.3 trading surplus and foreign currency reserve for future international trading needs and financing safety’s sake, poor needs foreign currency reserve, and rich doesn’t because their own money are the world currency. the poor have to make it by favorable trading surplus. if no change is made about world currency, the trading surplus will exist forever. this leads to poor feeds the rich. 3.2.4 poor feeds rich the mechanism of poor feeds the rich can be explained as follows: poor needs favorable surplus as foreign currency reserve, and rich gets adverse one. so rich consumes the total sales is domestic total sales plus adverse surplus by printing world currency. poor is just in contrary condition. the bigger the surplus, the more poor feeds the rich. farther more, almost every identical imported goods price is cheaper in rich than in poor because the fierce export competition among poor and relatively price rigidity of rich’s domestic goods and labor cost. suppose there are two identical countries, the only difference between them is one issues world currency and the other doesn’t. let tpp means total purchasing power and tpm represents total produced merchandise. there is the inequality above says rich consumes more goods with less money and poor less goods with more money. because poor needs buying favor surplus from local companies as foreign reserve on the basis of consuming less (s) goods. let qt and qs represent the good quantity of total produced merchandise and surplus respectively, there is this tells the goods is cheaper in rich than in poor. 3.2.5 blank receipt as international businesses expand, poor needs more reserve. rich borrows merchandise (surplus) from poor and what rich pays back is their own currency. from the long run, accumulated reserve has no limitation and no schedule to balance due. even if rich pays back some of them in the future, the reserve’s real purchasing power is devalued greatly because the time passes and inflation. so the reserve poor saved by favorable surplus is only a blank receipt (iou). it means poor provides real wealth to rich and gets blank receipt (reserve) back in return. 3.2.6 equity poor loses some of economic sovereignty, feeds rich and has no limitation and schedule to balance due are all not fair. un panel pointed out that “the greatly expanded sdr, could contribute to global stability, economic growth and global equity”. sure, equity is most important because no fair, no order, no stability and no peace. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 77 published by scholink inc. f3 in part ii tells something more about fairness. rich doesn’t needs foreign currency reserve, rf = 0. since their own money is world currency. because the adverse surplus (sp) exists, so that: rich’s open economy balance sheet is: if then on the right side of equation, term 1 plus term 2 is domestic money supply, and term 3 is taken as foreign currency reserve by poor. this is similar with poor payed surplus to rich as tax. if and then this equality says rich still taxed poor surplus, but rich reduced the quantity of newly issued money by borrowing from poor like issuing government bonds. poor lends to rich, which is exchanged with real wealth. rich uses it pay next cycles surplus. no change about “world currency”, no end of cycle, and no fair. 3.4 solutions for world currency strictly speaking, there is no real standard world currency now; the international agreed on currency is still based on powerful countries. for the sake of more efficient global economy, a real world currency and a new world currency system should be created. the world central bank should be in charge of world currency, which is used only in international business and every country and region keeps their own domestic currency. the new issued world currency is shared by all the nations and regions. the new world currency supply is equal to total export (import) increment of the world. every nation shares it by the sum of their own half export and half import increments for encouraging international trading balance aim. this way the exchange rate calculation between world currency and every domestic money is much easier: and exchange rate between countries: 3.4.1 the advantage of new world currency the proposed world currency has advantages below,  the fair way of world currency issuing defends all the countries economic sovereignty and eliminates poor feeds rich.  it reduces the demand of foreign currency reserve and raise world currency efficiency. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 78 published by scholink inc.  it eliminate surplus and brings comparative advantage into full play.  it shields inflation among regions and reduces the risks of economic crisis.  it solves the problem of controlling exchange rate. 4. conclusions reasonable exchange rates among the countries can be calculated with classic mathematical method. the existing mechanism of world currency has some fatal problems: economic sovereignty, equity, poor feeds rich, trading surplus and foreign currency reserve, and imbalance of economic development. to resolve this issue, it is important to recognize that the world currency demand is equal to the global export increment. with that in mind, a standardized real world currency controlled by the world bank should be adopted, where every county or region takes its own deserved share. this new proposed system would demonstrate many advantages over the existing system and would be more sustainable in the long run. references andrew, m. (2009). a global central bank, global currency & world government. new dawn magazine. benn, s. (2007). the end of national currency. foreign affairs, 86(may/june). cassel, g. (1918). abnomal deviations in international exchanges. the economics journal. https://doi.org/10.2307/2223329 feenstra, r. c., & taylor, a. m. (2008). international economics. new york, ny: worth publishers. get ready for the phoenix. (1988). the economist, 306(18), 9-10. hugo chavez to seek arab support for `petro-currency`-cns news. (n.d.). retrieved from http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/hugo-chavez-seek-arab-support-petro-currency liu, f. q. (2015). the whole economy approach of the input-output model. theoretical and practical research in economic field, 5. michael, l, m. (1984). the theory of exchange rate determination. the national bureau of economic research, 13-78. o’sullivan, a. s., & steven, m. (2003). economics (p. 57). principles in action, upper saddle river, new jersey 07458 pearson hall. rorbert, a. m. (n.d.). world currency. the works of rorbert a. mundull. sergio da, s. (2002). classroom guide to the equilibrium exchange rate model. economics issues, 7. the one world currency has comith? (n.d.). lucky bogey’s blog. retrieved from https://luckybogey,wordpress.com/2009/07/11/the -one-world-currency-has comith/ tyler, d. (2011). the history of the world’s “reserve” currency from ancient greece to today, may(18), 2011. un panel. (2009). touts new global currency reserve system. afp, 26 march 2009. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 1, no. 1, 2018 79 published by scholink inc. zhou. x. c. (n.d.). reform the international monetary system. retrieved from http://www.bis.org/review/r090402c.pdf advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 107 original paper the tianxia system: a transcendence to the liberal international order yu zhonghe 1* 1 shanghai university of political science and law, school of government administration, shanghai, china * yu zhonghe, corresponding author received: april 11, 2023 accepted: may 12, 2023 online published: may 19, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n2p107 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n2p107 abstract the post-world war ii liberal international order (lio) promoted democracy, human rights, free trade, and a rules-based system. yet it has been dominated by powerful countries, leading to limited representation and economic inequality in developing countries. in contrast, the tianxia system is more inclusive. this study aims to make broader recommendations for addressing the confusion of the international system and the absence of global governance in the context of sino-us competition. using the method of comparative analysis, the tianxia system and lio are evaluated. the research shows that the tianxia system surpasses the lio to varying degrees in theory and practical experience, but it faces implementation challenges. this highlights the difficulty of a single country promoting the establishment of a world system. therefore, the establishment of the tianxia system is still incomplete, and more global forces are needed to jointly overcome the crisis of global governance. keywords tianxia system, liberal international order, global governance, international system, sino-us relations 1. introduction the liberal international order (lio) refers to the post-world war ii system of international institutions, norms, and rules that promoted democracy, human rights, free trade, and a rules-based international system. it has its roots in institutions such as the united nations, the world trade organization and the international monetary fund, as well as regional organizations such as the european union and nato. despite its role in shaping the international system over the past few decades, it has been dominated by a small group of powerful states, notably the united states and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 108 published by scholink inc. western europe, that use their economic and military power to shape the international system to their advantage. this has led to a lack of representation and voice in many developing countries, especially in the decision-making processes of international institutions. its emphasis on liberal economic policies such as free trade and deregulation has led to economic inequality and social unrest in many countries, especially developing countries. this has led to calls for a more equitable and inclusive approach to global governance that takes into account the needs and interests of all countries and peoples. in this context, zhao tingyang’s 2005 book the tianxia system: an introduction to the philosophy of world institutions has been widely cited and discussed in academic circles, rekindling interest in traditional chinese philosophy and its potential application to contemporary global issues. moreover, the concept has been incorporated into official chinese foreign policy discourse, with chinese leaders and policymakers citing it in speeches and policy documents. zhao tingyang’s view of the world system has had a profound impact on political theory, international relations, east asian studies and other fields. based on traditional chinese philosophy, the tianxia system considers all individuals and nations to be equal members of a global community. it argues that the current westphalian state system, which emphasizes the principle of the sovereign state, is insufficient to address contemporary global challenges such as climate change, economic inequality, and geopolitical conflict. instead, the tianxia system provides a more inclusive and sustainable framework for global governance based on mutual respect and cooperation among all countries and peoples. the concept of the tianxia system has had a major impact in the academic and intellectual circles, and has become an important point of reference for discussing the future of global governance and international order. 2. presentation of the question there is much discussion today about international issues, including lack of global cooperation, ineffective multilateral institutions, the rise of populism and nationalism, environmental degradation, cybersecurity threats, global health crises, america’s role in the world, the rise of china, science and technology the impact on society, etc., all of which can be attributed to the failure of global governance. in this context, with the rise of china, the reform proposals for global governance proposed by the chinese government and scholars have gradually received the attention of all parties in the world. meanwhile, scholars have turned their criticisms on the liberal international order (lio). this section includes a literature review, an elaboration of the research background, and a formulation of the research question. the crisis of liberal internationalism is largely due to the development of the west itself and the weakening of the centrist and progressive alliances behind the postwar liberal order. it highlights growing economic inequality and stagnation in advanced industrial democracies, leading to the perception that liberal internationalism favors the rich and powerful over the working and middle classes. emphasizing the west’s own development as the main driver of the crisis, scholars suggest that liberal internationalism needs to be reconnected with the west’s pursuit of social and economic www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 109 published by scholink inc. progress in order to regain support (note 1). regarding the understanding of the crisis of the liberal international order, some scholars have put forward different views. they believe that there are two forces that are dissatisfied with the status quo of the lio. one is dissatisfaction with the economy, mainly within western countries, driven by western populist politicians and their voters; the second is dissatisfaction with the lio status hierarchy, mainly in semi-peripheral areas, driven by highly competitive authoritarian governments and their support promoted by, for example, russia. (note 2) on the one hand, the united states, as the core of the lio, has made many achievements in the relationship between the united states and the lio. the liberal international order dominated by the united states has endowed the united states with significant prestige benefits and promoted the globalization of american national interests. however, the advent of neoliberal globalization has disrupted the connection of a significant portion of the american working class with the nation’s leaders. as a result, the trump presidency has irreparably damaged the liberal order, and new domestic and international community agreements are necessary to reinvigorate u.s. global leadership. (note 3) on the other hand, the world is also concerned about china’s role in the international order and its impact on the existing liberal international order dominated by the united states. although many western scholars believe that china poses a challenge to lio and is currently the biggest threat to lio; at the same time, some scholars have conducted in-depth research on china’s intentions and actions and have shown that china may only be engaged in strategic competition with the united states. it did not show the meaning of challenge, but only expressed dissatisfaction with the hegemonic behavior of the united states in lio. china is currently challenging the liberal international order, but not necessarily overturning it, and the specific actions and institutions china has established, such as the aiib, challenge the existing order led by the united states to a certain extent. (note 4) china is seeking to maintain and even expand the liberal character of the current order. in other words, seeking selective and gradual adjustments to the existing order while undermining its hegemonic character rather than seeking to overthrow it, the study goes on to suggest is china’s vision for a future international order. (note 5) for the future of lio, pessimistic scholars believe that the liberal order faces challenges due to internal income distribution and institutional problems, but the decline of the order is not inevitable, and even doomed to fail. however, in addition to affirming lio’s own flaws, they also seem to be targeting china in the context of sino-us competition, believing that china is the factor for lio’s decline. facing the current crisis-ridden lio status quo, the academic circles have launched intense discussions on the possibility of changes in the global order in the future. there are two main points of contention. the first argues that no other system can provide the prosperity and freedom that a liberal order can. liberal states need internal reforms to address growing inequality and wealth distribution, and propose a developed welfare state to address internal challenges. reforming globalization, or re-globalization, is critical to addressing geopolitical challenges from china and other countries that the united states sees as illiberal (note 6). the second focuses on how china’s growing power and influence will reshape world politics and what alternative versions of the international order may www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 110 published by scholink inc. emerge. (note 7) for example, a new multipolar world will emerge. in the multipolar world, there will be three real orders, one dominated by china, one dominated by the united states, and a weak international order that promotes cooperation between them. (note 8) in the context of the lack of global governance and the fragmentation of the international order, the tianxia system has once again attracted the attention of the world. some scholars have argued that discussing the rise of tianxia discourse should be taken as an example of soft power, because tianxia presents specific national cultures as generally desirable values, and china’s role in the world is to promote these values. (note 9) tianxia originated from the utopian ideological tradition in chinese political culture that seeks to solve the problems of unity and division, order and chaos. tianxia provides a heuristic tool for understanding how chinese elites view their role in the world, and it reflects the common feeling among chinese that it is china’s turn to create a civilized and harmonious world (note 10). some people also observe the “tianxia” system from the perspective of political theory, that is, tianxia replaces the anarchic structure of the current international system with a hierarchical order. (note 11) scholars supporting this interpretation also argue that a sinocentric hierarchical order could lead to greater internal stability in the region, but that the potential to regulate this order could have negative consequences. (note 12) other related research also discusses the conceptual basis of the tianxia system and its consistency with the narrative of china’s peaceful rise. (note 13) overall, while academic discussion of the challenges facing the liberal international order (lio) has expanded significantly in recent years, the focus of the discussion remains on the impact of china’s rise on the existing u.s.-dominated lio. while some scholars believe that china poses the greatest threat to the lio and challenges its norms and values, others believe that china seeks to maintain or even expand the degree of freedom of the existing order through selective adjustments, while weakening the hegemony of the united states. although the existing literature explores a series of alternative versions of the international order, such as the new multipolar world dominated by china and the united states, the tianxia system contributed by chinese scholars, etc., the dynamics of these alternative versions and their comparison with each other still lacking. therefore, this article addresses the question of what is the relationship between the tianxia system and the liberal international order, whether the two are in a competitive relationship, complementary or otherwise. the research goal is to provide suggestions for the disorder of the international system and the lack of global governance in the context of sino-us competition. in addition to the introduction and this section, this paper consists of three parts. the third part is the introduction of the tianxia system and the liberal international order; the fourth is to establish a theoretical framework for the tianxia system to surpass the liberal international order in a theoretical and practical sense, including philosophy and historical criticism respectively, to support the tianxia proposed in this research system transcendence. on the basis of summarizing the research, the conclusion part puts forward the competitive vision of global governance of the world system and the liberal international order coexisting and gradually completing transcendence under the competition www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 111 published by scholink inc. and institutional conflicts between china and the united states. finally, further limitations and directions for future research are pointed out. 3. the tianxia system and the liberal international order this section introduces two different perspectives on governance based on world politics and order. the tianxia system proposed by zhao tingyang emphasizes the importance of a well-governed world system, that is, the collective interests of the world are given priority, and enemies are turned into friends. in contrast, the liberal international order (lio) focuses on establishing clear principles, rules, and institutions to define relations among states, with particular emphasis on promoting democracy, human rights, economic interdependence, and political integration. 3.1 tianxia system 3.1.1 concept and historical background the core concept of “tianxia” contains three meanings at the same time: first, the entire land of the world. it is roughly equivalent to the “earth” in the basic structure of “heaven, earth, and man” in chinese ontology; second, all the people in the world. in the context of ontology, it is roughly equivalent to “human” in “heaven, earth, and human”, and in the context of politics and society, it is equivalent to “people”. and the hearts of the people in the world are the spiritual meaning of the world; third, a world system. this is the most theoretical meaning of the concept of tianxia, which means the way the world is governed or the conditions for the existence of the world. a chaotic political existence is actually an invalid existence. only a well-governed world is a qualified and effective world. therefore, a world with a world system is qualified to be defined as a “world”, otherwise it will be an “invalid world”. if we say that in the concept of tianxia, the land of tianxia is its material, and the heart of tianxia is its value, then the system of tianxia is its form of existence. (note 14) zhao tingyang proposed the tianxia system in order to form a theoretical and historical comparison with the imperial model and make it a concept that can transcend international politics and construct world politics. the tianxia system is not an empire, but an anti-imperialist world political system. the tianxia system tries to recommend a world system in order to overcome various disasters caused by world anarchy and make it possible for the world collective rational actions aimed at developing the world’s public interests. the tianxia system in this study refers to the third interpretation, a world system. (note 15) 3.1.2 main features and principles the tianxia system has obvious chinese epistemological color—political epistemology, that is, how to govern tianxia; priority and transcendence, since the world system is the general necessary condition and guarantee of the secondary political system, it has a theoretical or logical priority (priority). although world society and world institutions have not really existed in practice, their logical priority already implies their apriority; no contradiction, and any given political system, whether it be democratic or autocratic, must be generalizable at any political level. (note 16) the principle of the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 112 published by scholink inc. tianxia system is to turn enemies into friends. the knowledge of “who is the enemy and who is the friend” may be the foundation of political science for carl schmidt, but this kind of knowledge is not so much the fundamental knowledge for chinese political theory. it is an initial question, because the task assumed by chinese political theory is to find a way to “turn enemies into friends” rather than to acquire the knowledge to “distinguish between friends and enemies”. (note 17) 3.2 liberal international order 3.2.1 concept and historical background there are many discussions in academic circles about the concept of international order. the general international order refers to the clear principles, rules and institutions that define the relationship between countries that are parties to the order. scholars have identified various types of security arrangements, including hegemony, balance of power, collective security, coordination, and security communities, which can be termed international security orders. these security orders vary according to the degree of competition and cooperation among states and the degree to which power and coercion play a central role. in addition to security orders, economic relations such as economic interdependence and regime types such as democracy may also be defining features of international order. most analyzes of international order focus on great powers and emphasize the benefits of state acceptance of norms and institutions. however, some analyzes highlight the contentious nature of norms and institutions, which they attribute to the unequal distribution of global power and the influence of the most powerful states in shaping order. these analyzes place greater emphasis on issues of justice, global inequality, and poverty, and emphasize their importance to the legitimacy of the international order. (note 18) the discussion of international order in the united states usually refers to the liberal international order (lio), which was first established by the united states after world war ii. lio’s institutions include nato, the us-japan alliance, the open trading system managed through the bretton woods institutions and the world trade organization (wto), and the united nations, which stipulates a central role for national sovereignty and limits on the use of military force. most analyzes mainly take the us perspective and tend to ignore that china and russia have never fully embraced the lio above all its commitment to democracy and individual human rights. since the end of the cold war, the term lio has been used more broadly to include norms to defend and promote democracy, state obligations to combat terrorism and reduce climate change, norms that require the protection of human rights, economic growth in developing countries, limitations on weapons of destruction and regional trade agreements and forums. however, disagreement about the value of international order to u.s. policy may stem from differing interpretations of what “order” means. (note 19) 3.2.2 the composition mechanism of lio lio theorists generally consider five factors—democracy, hierarchy based on legitimate authority, institutional constraints, economic interdependence, and political convergence—as the mechanisms that constitute lio. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 113 published by scholink inc. democracy is an essential component of the liberal international order because it promotes stability, cooperation, and human rights. democracies are transparent, accountable, and less likely to engage in corruption or abuse of power. democracy also promotes the rule of law and human rights, reducing the likelihood of abuse or repression. however, democracy is not a panacea and can still lead to conflict or repression. nonetheless, it provides the necessary framework for managing international relations and promoting stability and prosperity among nations. a hierarchy based on legitimate authority is the mechanism by which the liberal international order produces orderly outcomes by establishing frameworks for cooperation and promoting interstate stability and security. this approach recognizes that not all countries are created equal and seeks to create a framework for decision-making and leadership that reflects differences. it helps foster cooperation and reduce the likelihood of conflict, and provides a clear framework for managing power and influence in the international system. however, it can also create tension and conflict between states, and the criteria for determining legitimate powers can be subject to interpretation and debate. institutional constraints are the networks of institutions and organizations that promote cooperation and stability among states in the liberal international order. it provides a platform for negotiation and dialogue, promotes the rule of law and protects the rights of nations and individuals. however, it is not a panacea and may be slow to adapt or subject to political influence. nonetheless, it provides a steady underpinning for managing the complexities of international relations and promoting stability and prosperity among nations. economic interdependence refers to the interconnection of national economies through trade, investment, and cross-border flows of goods and services. it is an important mechanism for promoting cooperation, stability, and prosperity among nations in the context of a liberal international order based on the principles of free trade, open markets, and economic cooperation. economic interdependence can create webs of economic relations among nations, help build trust and cooperation, and can also facilitate the spread of liberal economic values and principles. however, economic interdependence also poses risks and challenges, such as vulnerabilities and dependencies that other states or non-state actors can exploit, as well as economic inequality and social dislocation. political convergence is the process by which different political systems move towards a common set of values and principles. it is closely related to a liberal international order based on the principles of liberalism, democracy, and a free market economy. political convergence can help strengthen the liberal international order by promoting greater cooperation and trust among states, and by easing some of the tensions and conflicts that arise from states with different political systems and values. however, there are limits to how much convergence can be achieved, and some countries may resist convergence. both of the above governance methods have their advantages and disadvantages. the tianxia system recognizes the importance of the collective interests of the world and aims to overcome various disasters caused by the anarchy of the world. at the same time, it may be criticized for downplaying the role of individual countries and their sovereignty. on the other hand, the lio emphasizes the promotion www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 114 published by scholink inc. of democratic values, economic interdependence, and human rights, which could lead to a more just and stable world order. however, it has been criticized for being dominated by western values and interests and not fully embracing the diversity of the world. collectively, these two approaches represent different perspectives on world politics and order, and a constructive dialogue between them can lead to a more inclusive and effective world system. 4. the transcendence of the tianxia system over the liberal international order proving that one concept is superior to another in terms of academic theory requires rigorous analysis and comparison of the two concepts. this involves conducting thorough research, examining the rationale and assumptions of each concept, and evaluating them for empirical evidence and practical application. this requires a theoretical and historical explanation of the relevant concepts. to establish that a concept outperforms another, it must be shown that it meets or exceeds the comparison criterion to a greater extent than the other concept. in order to demonstrate the transcendence of the tianxia system over the liberal international order in this study, it is necessary to first identify the key features of these two concepts and define comparison criteria, and then make comparisons. the comparison standard can be based on various factors, and the comparison standard in this study is set to compare the definition, attribute, function or effect of the concept. 4.1 academic comparison 4.1.1 definition comparison according to the above, lio is mainly a special international system established by the united states after world war ii, absorbing american allies and countries that believe in american political ideology. its structure includes the us military alliance, the us-led international financial and trade bodies and the united nations. this inevitably led to the hierarchical status of lio with the united states as the absolute core and other nation-states as members. in lio, countries still live under the “hobbesian legal system”, and the relationship between countries is still mainly dealt with, especially the relationship with the united states. global governance must be carried out under the coordination of major powers. on the other hand, the tianxia system is a world system. in the tianxia system, “tianxia” is the highest political analysis unit, followed by the state, and finally the family; in the lio, the nation-state is already the largest political analysis unit. just because the vision of western political philosophy does not go beyond the level of the nation-state, it is naturally impossible to give a governance plan to solve world problems. 4.1.2 comparison of core principles the academic research and interpretation of lio is still from the perspective of international politics. whether it is lio or other international systems, they still cannot escape the assumptions and values of traditional western international politics, that is, the assumption of anarchy and the supremacy of individual rights in western freedom. doctrine values. in this regard, zhao tingyang believes that international politics is ineffective in dealing with world politics. international politics is nothing but an www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 115 published by scholink inc. ineffective game consisting of hostile strategies such as deterrence, sanctions, intervention, balancing, cold war, and war, and cannot resolve any deep conflicts. to this day, the world is still a non-world in the “primitive state”, not far from the hobbesian state of nature, full of antagonism, hostility and clash of civilizations, in which the anarchic world meets the well-organized the country is extremely uncoordinated. this is a world of failure that lacks worldliness. the tianxia system intends to build a political world that can effectively solve world-scale problems and deal with risks in technology, economy, climate, and civilization. (note 20) if individual rights are supreme and unrivaled, it is logically impossible to achieve a consistent political world as a whole, and there will be no world system for the interests of the world. the world must be divided, and there must be “enemies”. enemies also make enemies. this profound sense of “politics of division” can be seen in many phenomena, from pagan awareness of racism, from the hot war to the cold war, from colonialism to human rights interference, from economic and military hegemony to cultural hegemony, and even in star wars the inexplicable urge to seek out the enemy can also be seen in fantasies such as to pit oneself against others, to pit believers against pagans, to pit the west against the east, to pit the “free world” against autocratic society, and to pit everything that is not against each other is the basic political consciousness of the west.. such a political consciousness has no world, and especially cannot be responsible for the world. (note 21) the logical premise of the tianxia system is china’s political epistemology—governing the tianxia. to govern tianxia—the world—the world system needs to be established, that is, the tianxia system cited in this study. therefore, the assumption of the tianxia system—the establishment of a world system raises the horizon from the level of the lio’s international system to the level of the world system, providing conditions and guarantees for the international system. the value principle of the tianxia system is derived from chinese ethics, that is, knowledge should not only show what is true, but must also show what is good, if knowledge cannot show what is good, then truth has no value. the task of chinese political philosophy is to find ways to turn enemies into friends. the given facts recognized by chinese political theory and western political theory seem to be similar, that is, they both recognize the basic premise that “resources are scarce, so people fight for power and profit”, but the solutions they choose are completely different: the choice of the west is to clarify their respective inescapable infringed rights, if justice is threatened by powerful forces, then try to create a balance of power; china’s choice is to clarify mutual reciprocal obligations (the so-called rectification of names), and try to create an institutional arrangement that makes the benefits of reciprocal obligations greater than individual freedom the benefits of. in short, what the west cares about is how legal competition is possible, and what china cares about is how harmonious coexistence is possible. (note 22) 4.2 history check the historical comparison is mainly to analyze the actual effect of lio and tianxia system through some empirical evidence and to support the viewpoint of this research. first of all, lio will bring peace, as the democratic peace theory asserts that democracies tend to avoid conflict with each other. however, some www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 116 published by scholink inc. scholars have found after careful study that the causal logic supporting this theory lacks a convincing explanation for the observed mutual democratic pacifism. democracies have not consistently externalized their norms for resolving domestic conflicts, elected leaders are not inherently accountable to peaceful interests, democracies are not necessarily slow to mobilize or immune to surprise attacks, and open political competition does not guarantee information disclosure prevents conflicts. evidence suggests that peace among democracies may not be solely due to their democratic nature, prompting further exploration of other factors that contribute to this phenomenon. (note 23) second, a hierarchy based on legitimacy can replace anarchy and prevent the international community from falling into the “hobbesian state of nature”. david lake proposes a different understanding of hierarchy based on the concept of “relational authority”, saying: “in the relational approach, authority is understood as an exchange relationship established between the ruling state and the subordinate state in essence, the former provides a social order in exchange for the obedience and legitimacy of the latter. (note 24) however, once the united states fails to provide the required order for other countries in the system, the united states will lose its legitimacy and authority, which will bring great instability to its hierarchy, let alone replace anarchy. the real situation may be that the order exists when the united states is strong, and the order collapses when the united states is weak. therefore, in order to prevent the collapse of the order, other members must firmly maintain the hierarchical status of the united states. in fact, the hegemonic thinking of the united states is at work. third, realism holds that economic interdependence among states reduces the likelihood of conflict. it argues that countries prioritize economic prosperity and that trade plays a vital role in achieving this. the text further assumes that higher levels of economic interdependence lead to increased costs associated with trade disruptions, which in turn provide incentives for countries to avoid embroiled in war. (note 25) if the sino-us trade conflict is because china is not fully accepted by lio, then the trade conflict between the united states and its allies, whether it is the us-germany trade conflict or the us-japan trade conflict, can show that economic dependence is more important than national interests lower. starting from the consistency and transitivity of the political system, the tianxia system believes that in the structure of western political theories, the core theory is the internal affairs theory, and the international theory is the subsidiary theory. there are obvious inconsistencies and even contradictions between the two levels of internal affairs theory and international theory. the purpose of internal affairs theory is the idea of cooperation about social governance, but when it comes to international theory, it has become a philosophy of struggle about the issue of friends and enemies. second, if democracy cannot be further extended to become a global democracy, then it will prove that it is not the universal institution it claims to be but a limited range of strategies, and therefore has no legitimate authority. furthermore, the tianxia system states that if it is to be theoretically consistent and thus stand up to theoretical challenge, it must be universalizable at any political level, that is, be universally applicable to all political units. (note 26) in practice, china adheres to the concept of “serving the people and developing harmoniously between man and nature” domestically, and has improved the environmental problems caused by the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 117 published by scholink inc. rapid development in the early years. after the outbreak of the new crown pneumonia epidemic, china upholds the concept of a community with a shared future for mankind, and calls on all countries to help each other and cooperate in the fight against the epidemic. in may 2020, china took the lead in proposing to make the new crown vaccine a global public product. according to chinese reports, as of may 2022, china has provided 153 countries and 15 international organizations with 4.6 billion pieces of protective clothing, 18 billion test kits, more than 430 billion masks, and 2.2 billion doses of covid-19 vaccines. supplies. (note 27) over the past decades of reform and opening up, china has continuously explored targeted poverty alleviation methods, lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, and historically solved the problem of absolute poverty that has plagued the chinese nation for thousands of years. in terms of eradicating poverty, addressing climate change, eliminating global governance deficits, maintaining world peace and security, and other challenges faced by all mankind, china has continuously contributed wisdom and proposed “chinese solutions.” history has repeatedly verified that mankind is a community of shared destiny, and “common values can lead to common development.” 5. summary the tianxia system, rooted in chinese philosophical and historical perspectives, highlights the system’s emphasis on universality and transitivity across all political units at different levels. according to the tianxia system, the world must be recognized as a political entity before a complete political system can be established. this requires the development of a global system of institutions, the world system being the highest form of political power. zhao tingyang pointed out that for a political system to have ethical legitimacy, it must conform to the general will of all the people. on the other hand, the lio, championed by the us and its allies, promotes the principles of democracy, human rights, and a market economy as the basis for global governance. this article uncovers new insights into the limitations and challenges of each approach by examining the fact that these two systems currently coexist and seek to accomplish competing visions of global governance. they may be engaging in a process of negotiation, learning and adaptation, drawing on each other ’s strengths and trying to create a more inclusive and effective global governance framework. the competitive nature of this process means that both the tianxia system and the liberal international order seek to expand their influence and promote their respective principles and values on the global stage. in general, the tianxia system and the liberal international order are generally considered to be two competing models of global governance related to the competition between china and the united states. through research, this paper finds that the tianxia system is not just a global governance model that competes with lio, nor is it a repair, supplement, or revised copy of lio, but a transcendence of lio from academic theory to historical experience. the ability to achieve the consistency and transmission of domestic governance and international governance is a manifestation of a political system that is sound in theory and effective in practice. however, even if what china is currently doing is in line with the vision of establishing a world system proposed in the tianxia system, after all, it is difficult for a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 118 published by scholink inc. single country’s power to promote the perfection and consolidation of the world system. therefore, the political design of the tianxia system as an assumption but not fully realized in reality cannot fully prove the complete transcendence of lio in practice. notes note 1. ikenberry, g. j. (2018). the end of liberal international order? international affairs, 94(1), 7-23. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix241 note 2. adler-nissen, r., & zarakol, a. (2021). struggles for recognition: the liberal international order and the merger of its discontents. international organization, 75(2), 611-634. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818320000454 note 3. stokes, d. (2018). trump, american hegemony and the future of the liberal international order. international affairs, 94(1), 133-150. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix238 note 4. kim, s. h., & kim, s. (2022). china’s contestation of the liberal international order. the pacific review, 1-26. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2063367 note 5. xinbo, w. (2018). china in search of a liberal partnership international order. international affairs, 94(5), 995-1018. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy141 note 6. paul, t. v. (2021). globalization, deglobalization and reglobalization: adapting liberal international order. international affairs, 97(5), 1599-1620. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab072 note 7. weiss, j. c., & wallace, j. l. (2021). domestic politics, china’ rise, and the future of the liberal international order. international organization, 75(2), 635-664. https://doi.org/10.1017/s002081832000048x note 8. mearsheimer, j. j. (2019). bound to fail: the rise and fall of the liberal international order. international security, 43(4), 7-50. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342 note 9. callahan, w. a. (2007). tianxia, empire and the world: soft power and china’s foreign policy discourse in the 21st century. british inter-university china centre working paper series, 1(2). note 10. şahin, m. (2021). tianxia (all-under-heaven): an alternative system or a rose by another name? all azimuth: a journal of foreign policy and peace, 10(2), 183-196. https://doi.org/10.20991/allazimuth.874967 note 11. cha, t. (2018). competing visions of a postmodern world order: the philadelphian system versus the tianxia system. cambridge review of international affairs, 31(5), 392-414. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2018.1536113 note 12. chang, c. (2011). tianxia system on a snail’s horns. inter‐asia cultural studies, 12(1), 28-42. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649373.2011.532940 note 13. mirza, m. n., & khan, f. z. (2020). systemic transformations and chinese image of the world order: transcending great wall through neo-confucianism and tianxia systems. asia pacific, 38, 22-38. https://doi.org/10.47781/asia-pacific.vol38.iss0.3127 note 14. tingyang, z. (2011). tianxia system: an introduction to the philosophy of world institutions. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 119 published by scholink inc. beijing: renmin university of china press, p. 83. note 15. ibid, reprint preface note 16. ibid, pp. 101-107. note 17. ibid, pp. 100-146. https://doi.org/10.3917/imin.017.0100 note 18. schweller, r. l. (2001). the problem of international order revisited: a review essay. international security, 26(1), 161-186. https://doi.org/10.1162/016228801753212886 allison, g. (2018). the myth of the liberal order: from historical accident to conventional wisdom. foreign affairs, 97(4), 124-133. retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-06-14/myth-liberal-order porter, p. (2018). a world imagined: nostalgia and liberal order (policy analysis no. 843). cato institute. retrieved from https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/world-imagined-nostalgia-liberal-order note 19. ikenberry, g. j. (2001). after victory: institutions, strategic restraint, and the rebuilding of order after major wars. princeton, nj: princeton university press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400823963 schweller, r. l. (2001). the problem of international order revisited: a review essay. international security, 26(1), 169-173. https://doi.org/10.1162/016228801753212886 finnemore, m. (2003). the purpose of intervention: changing beliefs about the use of force. ithaca, ny: cornell university press. kupchan, c. a. (2014). unpacking hegemony: the social foundations of hierarchical order. in g. j. ikenberry (ed.), power, order, and change in world politics. cambridge: cambridge university press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139680738.003 note 20. excerpted from “berlin debate: the ontological argument and questions of the tianxia system”, november 4, 2019, at a seminar on the german version of zhao tingyang’s “contemporary tianxia” (suhrkamp publishing house) held at the philosophy department of the free university of berlin. zhao tingyang’s opening speech: “one constitutional tianxia” mentioned the above. note 21. tingyang, z. (2011). in tianxia system: an introduction to the philosophy of world institutions (p. 195). beijing: renmin university of china press. note 22. ibid, p. 87. note 23. rosato, s. (2003). the flawed logic of democratic peace theory. american political science review, 97(4). https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055403000893 note 24. lake, d. a. (2018). international legitimacy lost? rule and resistance when america is first. perspectives on politics, 16(1), 6-21. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592717003085 note 25. kenneth, n. w. (1979). theory of international politics (new york: random house, 1979, pp. 129-160). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 120 published by scholink inc. note 26. tingyang, z. (2011). tianxia system: an introduction to the philosophy of world institutions (pp. 94-101). beijing: renmin university of china press. note 27. https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/gnxw/252495.htm advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 36 original paper research on cohen’s marxist view of equality ze yuan1* 1 college of marxism, zhejiang normal university, jinhua, china * ze yuan, e-mail: zsdmyyz@163.com, corresponding author received: august 22, 2023 accepted: october 03, 2023 online published: october 25, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n4p36 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n4p36 abstract cohen’s marxist view of equality is formed on the basis of criticizing liberals and classical marxism. on the one hand, he opposes the equality thought of rawls and nozick, and on the other hand, he tries to establish a realistic and standardized marxist view of equality. in addition, cohen, while criticizing the arguments of the liberals, also constantly rethinks the classical marxism on the concept of equality, and reconstructs the marxist concept of equality to a certain extent. dialectically speaking, although cohen’s view of equality differs from the marxist view of equality, it still plays a vital role in the construction of an equal society and the development of equality thought. keywords cohen, marxist, view of equality 1. introduce the concept of equality is an important category in the field of western political philosophy, and the interpretation of the concept of equality is also different. at the end of the 20th century, when the liberal capitalist movement was developing generally and the international communist movement suffered a major setback, with the liberals represented by rawls defending capitalist inequality, many marxists also began to reflect on the marxist concept of equality, among which g.a., as an analysis of the founder of marxism. cohen is a typical example. cohen creatively combined marxism with analytical philosophy, viewed the traditional marxist concept of equality from the perspective of realistic analysis, criticized the unequal nature of liberal capitalism with sharp theoretical weapons, criticized the irrationality of self-ownership principles, and proposed the internal relationship between freedom and equality. for more than 30 years, cohen’s research on equality has become a valuable stage for our dialogue with liberal capitalism, a theoretical trend that reflects the search for an ideal society of equality in the future, whose “fundamental goal is to criticize and replace the liberal theory of justice. (will, 2004). how to view and understand the concept of “equality” is a realistic problem www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 37 published by scholink inc. that we must pay attention to at present when the debate on equality is still severe. analyzing and understanding cohen’s marxist view of equality has certain theoretical guiding significance for us to build an equal society and realize common prosperity. 2. uphold the marxist concept of equality in criticism equality is the product of history, but in the course of history, the conflict between freedom and equality is always a real social problem. the same is true of capitalist society. in order to pursue the so-called “freedom”, capitalism has to sacrifice “equality” at the cost, and with the continuous development of capitalist society, the gap between the rich and the poor becomes wider and wider. in this context, liberals have to defend “inequality”, the representative figures of which are rawls and nozick. cohen’s marxist view of equality was gradually formed in the process of rebutting the liberals represented by rawls and nozick, which made a strong defense for the maintenance of marxist view of equality. 2.1 oppose rawls’ difference principle cohen’s criticism of rawls is mainly reflected in saving justice and equality, and if you are an egalitarian, why are you so rich? in these works, the main problem is the equal liberalism based on the principle of difference proposed by rawls. in the 1970s, rawls published his book a theory of justice, in which rawls extensively studied various theories of fairness and justice and designed a just economic system related to distributive justice. the core of this system is the principle of difference, that is, “social and economic inequalities should be arranged in such a way that they are consistent with the storage principle of justice”. appropriate to the best interests of the fewest beneficiaries; and subject to the opening of positions and offices to all under conditions of fair and equal opportunity (john, 2009). it can be seen that rawls starts from the interests of the inferior, and when he considers from the perspective of the inferior in all aspects, inequality can reasonably exist. for the difference principle that only applies to the basic social structure but not to individual choice and individual behavior, people can choose freely within this structure, and the final score is bound to be fair and equal, because the interests of the inferior will be improved to the greatest extent. the principle of difference allows such unequal distribution “to the greatest benefit of the least benefitted,” and is therefore also an incentive policy, an effort to make all members of society equal through redistribution (zhao, 2013). cohen believes that rawls’ principle of justice is ostensibly to safeguard equality, but it is actually a secret defense of inequality under the surface of seeming equality. “a society that is equal according to the principle of difference requires mandatory rules, as well as a sense of justice that permeates individual choice (cohen, 2009).” when the majority of people in a society agree with the principle of difference, they will not ask for higher remuneration due to higher productivity, because this selfish motive of pursuing the maximization of interests is not in line with the principle of difference and is unfair. if the majority rejects the principle of difference, then it is unfair to insist that they will not www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 38 published by scholink inc. create greater productivity without higher pay, which leads directly to the death of the minimum requirements of a decent life for the disadvantaged. in short, whether a society is fair or not depends on the degree of fairness among the members of the whole society, not on the independence of each other. rawls’s equal liberalism is essentially a defense of inequality, and his principle of justice is only a regulatory principle for social management. it cannot be a fundamental principle for evaluating social justice, nor can it guide us to build an equal society. therefore, cohen proposed the socialist principle of equality of opportunity, the equality of available benefits, in an attempt to correct the inequality caused by social reasons, and at the same time to eliminate the inequality caused by differences in talent, and eliminate all non-selective disadvantages, so that beyond rawls’ principle of justice, he only corrected the limitations of social disadvantages. 2.2 opposition to nozick’s principle of self-ownership the concept of “self-ownership” first appeared in locke’s treatise on government, where locke argued that “every man has a right of ownership over his own person, and no one else has such a right (john, 2004). the labor of his body and the work of his hands are, we may say, rightfully his.” on this basis, nozick put forward the principle of self-ownership, arguing that each person should have ownership of himself and his abilities, and that each person owns his own property, without a contract, and is not obligated to provide any services or goods to others. it can be seen that the principle of self-ownership is a defense of the rationality of private property and the rationality of inequality brought about by the existence of private property. cohen’s criticism of nozick’s self-ownership principle is mainly reflected in his book self-ownership, freedom and equality. in the book, he takes the self-ownership principle as the premise, refutes nozick’s defense of private ownership inequality with the self-ownership principle through three stages of demonstration, and reveals the internal relationship between freedom and equality. in the first stage, cohen argues that the self-ownership principle does not necessarily lead to the legalization of private property and inequality. in this phase, cohen primarily targeted nozick’s “chamberlain argument” that “whatever emerges from a just state by a just step is itself just.” cohen believes that liberals only focus on the autonomy of individual rights, but ignore the uneven distribution of resources other than people’s own, under this condition, the argument that the principle of self-ownership leads to inequality is obviously untenable. in the second and second stage, cohen put forward the external world view of “everyone can get”, and demonstrated the possibility of equality and all principles of self coexist. in cohen’s view, a world “accessible to all” means that “the outside world belongs to all, and everyone has a veto over the future use of the outside world (cohen, 2008).” in other words, the principle of self-ownership also has the right to all material and natural resources other than human beings on the premise of protecting individuals’ ownership of their own rights, which is everyone’s equal possession of external natural resources. in this way, a balanced relationship can be established between the principles of equality and self-ownership. finally, in the third stage, cohen sharply questioned the rationality of all the principles of the self. in the conclusion of the second stage, cohen found that in a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 39 published by scholink inc. world “accessible to all,” the principle of self-ownership loses its existential value and has only a formal meaning, “the communality of the external world makes the self-ownership of its inhabitants a mere form.” they cannot use their self-ownership to exercise any substantial control over their lives, because whatever they want to do will be subject to the veto power of others.” in view of this contradiction, cohen believes that the denial of self-ownership does not mean the approval of slavery, nor does it mean the denial of human autonomy, nor does it mean the denial of kant’s ethical proposition that man is an end rather than a means. on the contrary, affirming self-ownership endangers people’s autonomy and does not fundamentally prevent the utilitarian use of others’ behavior. thus, cohen strongly countered the rational defense of inequality by nozick and other liberals, and played a great role in promoting the development of socialist equality. 3. reconstruct the marxist equality view in the criticism cohen criticizes the arguments of the liberals, and at the same time, he constantly reflects on the classical marxist view of equality. in his view, the reason why marxism cannot withstand the attack of libertarianism represented by nozick is that classical marxism, in attacking liberal capitalism, affirms the principle of self-ownership to a certain extent, and therefore this attack is incomplete. in the process of analyzing the marxist view of equality, cohen not only formed his own view, but also reconstructed the marxist view of equality to some extent. 3.1 the realization of equal conditions in cohen’s opinion, the classical marxist view of equality, which establishes equality in the perfect state of socialism and communism, is too idealized to be realized, so he proposes to seek practical equality. marx’s equality is divided into two stages, one is the socialist “from each according to his ability, according to his work” and the other is the communist “from each according to his ability, according to his need.” cohen believes that the equality of the former society is obviously only formal equality, and the actual result is de facto inequality, because the talents, abilities and natural conditions of the workers are ignored. regarding the latter equality, cohen argues that “it is precisely because marx was unnecessarily pessimistic about the social consequences of failing to achieve infinite affluence that he was so optimistic about the possibilities of affluence.” pessimism about social possibilities breeds optimism about material possibilities.” in other words, marx’s ideal of an extremely rich material communist society is now extremely difficult to achieve, as the successor and developer of marxism, can not only indulge in the fantasy of the kingdom of freedom, and escape the reality of today’s material scarcity and frequent environmental crises. if the ecological crisis is not properly addressed but continues to worsen, material resources will not be extremely abundant in the foreseeable future, but on the contrary will be very scarce, while the marxist theory of communism is based on material abundance, which will create a paradox and the idea of equality will be shattered. on this basis, cohen began to construct his concept of equality, trying to conceive a scheme of equality under the condition of material scarcity. according to cohen, there may be such a state of society that, although it www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 40 published by scholink inc. does not reach the level of communism envisaged by marx, it can achieve the coordination of the interests of all parties, thus consolidating the structure of society and promoting social progress. therefore, cohen continued to explore and study this view of equality. 3.2 standardization of equal realization the concept of normative equality is not only about the description of social facts, but more importantly about the normative requirements of social development. by analyzing the marxist concept of equality, cohen believes that the equal society envisaged by marx is very difficult to realize, and any real marxist should work tirelessly for the pursuit of equality, and cannot just hold the dream of a free and equal society for the liberation of all mankind in the future and escape the current equality problem. therefore, cohen tried to establish the norms of a realistic egalitarian society. in his view, marx criticized capitalism for using distribution rights to cover up exploitation and inequality, and constructed a form of equality of “each according to his ability”, but this is actually unequal for real workers. as mentioned above, individuals vary greatly in their gifts, talents, and resources, and equality of form does not necessarily create equality of outcome. cohen’s further analysis shows that the marxist view of equality also partially affirms the principle of self-ownership that liberals talk about, especially in terms of the allocation of primary resources. cohen pointed out that marx opposed to attributing the unfair causes of exploitation to the unequal distribution of original resources, “for marx, the injustice of the original distribution comes from the injustice of the exploitative flows they produce.” that is to say, the inequality of the original distribution is only the generative cause of injustice, not the main cause. however, in this argument, marx has actually applied the principle of self-ownership, although marx’s identification with freedom is only a strategic identification, and attempts to refute capitalism through the conceptual tool of self-ownership, but the result is to shake its own theory. later, nozick used the so-called “clean-born capitalism” and the principle of self-ownership to demonstrate the justice of capitalist ownership. thus, from the principle of self-ownership, it is possible to reach both equal and unequal conclusions in cohen’s argument. finally, cohen also accepted the principle of self-ownership to some extent, attempted to transform the principle of self-ownership with socialist thought, and put forward his idea of “the external world is shared by all”. in his vision, self-ownership is dispensable in a shared world, where everyone can achieve a high degree of freedom and equality. 4. a dialectical evaluation of cohen’s marxist view of equality according to the above analysis, we can see that cohen has some unique views on the marxist view of equality. his innovative thought theory maintains and develops the marxist view of equality to a certain extent, but there are some cognitive deviations, so we need to dialectically treat and evaluate his marxist view of equality. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 41 published by scholink inc. 4.1 cohen misunderstands the marxist view of equality when cohen refuted the liberal capitalists and reflected on the marxist view of equality, although he stood on the marxist stand, his thought was deviated from marx’s idea of equality, or cohen’s misunderstanding of marx’s view of equality. first, on the question of self-ownership, as mentioned above, cohen believes that marx, on the one hand, criticizes liberal capitalism, and on the other, applies the liberal capitalist concept of self-ownership, so such criticism is vague and incomplete. in fact, marx clearly pointed out “two breaks”, namely, “the communist revolution is the most complete break with traditional property relations, and not surprisingly, it is the most complete break with traditional ideas in the course of its development.” in other words, marx has emphasized the separation of values from capitalism. moreover, marx’s recognition of ownership as the common possession of “united individuals” with the aim of the free development of each individual is clearly different from nozick’s “self-ownership.” therefore, cohen’s misunderstanding of marx on this point also reflects his misunderstanding of communism. secondly, cohen misreads marx’s two empirical assertions about the prospect of equality. the first is that the rise of the organized working class will eventually wipe out the unequal society; second, the development of productive forces and the enhancement of human capabilities will bring about a great abundance of material wealth, and inequality will also disappear. however, in cohen’s analytical conditions, class organization and ecological crisis have become insurmountable obstacles, so they lose confidence in the future and attempt to establish the desired equality in modern society, which is contrary to marx’s view. 4.2 cohen’s marxist view of equality is of great significance although cohen’s marxist view of equality differs from classical marxism in many aspects, his original idea still has important theoretical value and practical significance. on the theoretical level, cohen, as the founder of analytical marxism, the equality theory he put forward has far-reaching significance to the development of marxism. on the one hand, he launched a powerful counterattack against the anti-socialist western political philosophy, fundamentally negating the capitalist system and maintaining the order of marxist political philosophy. his active defense of socialist egalitarianism has profoundly clarified the legitimacy and rationality of socialism, and powerfully countered the western liberalism’s attack on socialist freedom and democracy. at the same time, cohen turned from the early defense of marx’s historical materialism to the study of equality, expanded the new horizon of marxist analysis, opened up a new field of marxist equality thought, and deepened the study of western marxist equality theory. on the practical level, cohen’s marxist view of equality has certain reference significance for understanding and solving the equality problem in china. cohen constructed an ideal blueprint of socialist equality to realize social equality, and conceived a social community under which all members of society have a certain sense of justice, everyone can choose voluntarily, and members of society have a certain sense of caring for each other. many of the practical dilemmas he put forward also reveal that the construction of socialism is not accomplished overnight, it requires not only the continuous improvement of the fair distribution system by the state, but also the active participation www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 4, 2023 42 published by scholink inc. and role of the broad masses of the people in the construction of socialist equality. references g. a. cohen. (2008). self-ownership, freedom, and equality (li, z. h. (trans.)). beijing: oriental press. g. a. cohen. (2009). rescuing justice and equality. harvard university. https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674029651 john, b. r. (2009). a theory of justice (he, h. h. (trans.)). beijing: china social sciences press. john, l. (2004). two treatises of civil government. (zhao, b. y. (trans.)). xi ‘an: shaanxi people’s publishing house. will, k. (2004). contemporary political philosophy an introduction (liu, x. (trans.)) shanghai: shanghai sanlian bookstore. zhao, j. j. (2013). on cohen’s analysis of marxist view of equality. shandong normal university. microsoft word ape-v4n2-p44 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 44 original paper japanese network economy-ergm analysis of the “big six” marton gosztonyi1* 1 budapest lab enterprise development center, budapest business school university of applied sciences, budapest, hungary * márton gosztonyi, research fellow, budapest lab enterprise development center, budapest business school university of applied sciences, budapest, hungary received: may 15, 2021 accepted: may 23, 2021 online published: may 24, 2021 doi:10.22158/ape.v4n2p44 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v4n2p44 abstract the paper analyses the network of relationships between large companies that defines the japanese economy using ergm (exponential random graph model) method. the japanese economy, because of the presence of keiretsu groups and other corporate groups, is an excellent example of what can happen to a country’s economy if large corporations and financial institutions in the market operate in a closely interconnected, highly centralized and dependent network. this is an important issue, because this economic practice is happening globally right now. therefore, the interpretation of the japanese network and the analysis of its economic performance also reflect the long-term negative and positive effects of this trend. keywords japanese economy, network economy, ergm 1. introduction as the economy and economic actions are always embedded in society (polányi, 1944, 2001), the functioning of different national economies, in addition to the global context, is always determined by the history, social relations and social network of the given culture. the economies of nation-states in the twenty-first century belong to the age of capitalist economies (note 2), where the corporate and financial sectors are becoming more and more interdependent. based on all this, it is worth looking at an economy like that of japan’s, operating in a close and dense network, (in which the engines of the economy are still based on a dense network of large corporations and banks), and analyzing the network factors that explain their operation. the literature points to the collapse of japan’s bubble economy in the 1990s, followed by the long economic stagnation over the past 30 years. all of this was only exacerbated by the 2008 global www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 45 published by scholink inc. economic crisis, the catastrophic earthquake of 2011, and the tsunami that damaged northeastern japan (yoshino et al., 2014). despite all this, the japanese economy, of course, continues to be a leader among world economies, ranking third in the world in terms of gdp per capita (world bank, 2020). however, several studies point out that japan’s economic miracle and stagnation have the same components, viz., a strong bond between the corporate and banking sectors. the japanese banking system is characterized by different types of banks: long-term credit banks, asset management banks, city banks, regional banks, secondary regional banks, and insurance companies (de masi et al., 2011). these organizations and banks have a key role to play in the japanese network economy. in each case, japan’s “big six” (note 3) have an “internal bank” that is tied to the corporate group with multiple threads. not only do these central financial institutions own more than 50% of the shares in firms (agarwal & elston, 2001), but in many cases, the chairs of supervisory boards are also bankers or bank-related actors who are part of corporate management. all this results in a classic merger of banking and market companies, analogous to the classical german banking system of the 19th century. sterken and tokutsu (2002) have shown that this connection encourages conglomerates to take out more favorable loans, and that the presence of a credit in itself attracts more loans from other banks. all this also results a number of phenomena that strengthen and distort the markets. there are long-term and close credit relationships between banks and large corporations, resulting in a highly hierarchical structure in which the central network positions are occupied by leading banks. however, this is accompanied by a strong asymmetric information problem in the market (de masi et al., 2011). as japanese firms operate in this system, they are heavily dependent on banks’ funding, leading to the bankshaving much more information about the firms than their counterparts in other countries’ credit markets (spiegel & yamori, 2003). in contrast, banks provide preferential credit terms, which are more lenient in terms of easier access to capital, bank debt settlement and the possibility of other preferential loan terms (de masi et al., 2011). it follows from all this that in japan, banks are steering firms towards low-risk investment decisions, which also implies that firms closely related to banks are less profitable than their other competitors (ogawa et al., 2007). ogawa et al. (2007) provided a detailed analysis of the evolution of the number of long-term debt ratios and the relationship between key indicators of the firms; the authors highlighted that although the largest firms have the most banking links, the number of links is positively correlated with solvency and r&d, but has a negative effect on the firms’ liquidity. japanese financial institutions suffered heavy damage after the 1990 bubble collapse due to the above-mentioned structural constraints. there has been a significant deterioration in the financial status of the japanese banking system since 1992 (brewer et al., 2003), with commercial banks recording a total loan loss of about yen 83 trillion. these losses have reduced the capitalization of banks and led to the failure of three large banks. the precarious financial situation of these large banks affected the entire credit system, especially their weaker financial counterparts. in order to increase the financial stability of the system, japanese regulators liquidated a city bank and nationalized two of the three www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 46 published by scholink inc. largest long-term credit banks (brewer et al., 2003) in 1997. the failures of bank negatively affected the stock prices of the credit-related businesses as well (de masi et al., 2011). therefore, a major financial transformation was implemented in japan in the 2000s. the crl (commercial rehabilitation law) was enacted, which restructured the financing system’s network-based connections, which lead to positive results by 2012. this was followed by further economic stimulus decisions by the government, decentralizing the system and removing the ties of market players. all this, in financial terms, has had positive results, as stock market prices have started to rise after a long stagnation (chan-lau, 2002). of course, this result also required japan to increase the share of foreign capital investment, compared to the national capital investments that had dominated the markets so far. all this has been recorded in literature, with many authors studying the fdi and its results like increased employment, output, and productivity (driffield, 2001; driffield & girma, 2003; driffield & munday, 2000; driffield & taylor, 2000; kimino et al., 2007). japan has taken a huge step towards tackling growth-restrictive corporate practices such as closed-loop sales, cartel-like behavior and entrenched agreements, which makes it more difficult for new entrants to compete for products, services and / or prices (yoshino et al., 2014). 2. zaibatsu and keiretsu it is important to note, however, that the afore said image captures only a part of the story. the development of this level of network hierarchy in the banking system is the result of a long social change leading all the way back to the operation of edo-era family businesses. however, i would not interpret the whole economic history of japan in this paper, but confine myself to the development of the capitalist economy. perhaps one of the most important internal engines of the development of japanese capitalism (showa era (1926-) was the zaibatsu. japan arrived in the global capitalist economic scenario relatively late, and even then, the process began due to external pressure (imai, 1987). the engines of this economic transformation were the zaibatsus, created to supplement the market imperfections of the changing economy. as a result, zaibatsu firms, which have optimized their mutual returns within a strong hierarchical system, can be interpreted as a form of early-capitalist japanese innovation through closely inter-related activities (imai, 1987). these economic networks have created a strong control structure through asset-share ownership, human relationships, trust, and centralized purchase and marketing. the basic method of control was direct share ownership (imai, 1987). the close relationship between firms was reflected in the fact that executives held leadership roles in more than one company simultaneously, such that these organizations could “function as a monolithic whole” (hadley, 2015). as a result, zaibatsu has been able to bring success to several industries in the japanese economy. this is how the zaibatsu of 294 companies operating under mitsui, the zaibatsu of 241 companies under mitsubishi, and that of 166 companies under sumitomo emerged (imai, 1987). this corporate transformation coincided with the transfer of technology from developed economies, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 47 published by scholink inc. especially from britain, to less developed economies, including japan. the leaders of the successful zaibatsu also had a missionary zeal in developing japan as an industrial nation. therefore, they opposed short-term gains and emphasized risk aversion, making strategic investments for industrialization (imai, 1987). by the first half of the twentieth century, zaibatsus became key players in bank subsidies, creating a close link and entanglement between the financial and corporate sectors (de masi et al., 2011). however, in world war ii, these groups of companies opted for a strong political role, resulting in the economic cleansing announced in january 1947 after the capitulation of japan. as is well known, senior executives of 245 large japanese companies were removed. this was an epoch-making event, as it disrupted the zaibatsus’ networks-based transactions on personal attachment and changed the way decisions were made within the network groups. as a result, people in their forties who were at the level of department heads were appointed to the highest levels of governance, and they began to invest in innovative segments of the japanese, economy, putting it on a turbulent trajectory. after the war, japan thus became one of the fastest growing economies in the industrialized world. this process also went handinhand with the process of keiretsu groups taking over the role of zaibatsus. yonekura’s (1985) corporate graph typology (figure 1) perfectly illustrates the differences between the two structures. keiretsu groups show a more decentralized and reciprocal relationship structure, with a strong core that forms a reciprocal and decentralized network and a periphery made up of companies belonging to one of the core actors and with which they have a hierarchical and one-way relationship. figure 1. schematic graphs of the zaibatsu and keiretsu groups s. yonekura (1985, p. 64). one of the special features of the rapid growth of the japanese corporate system was therefore the keiretsu groups. derived from the previous historical narrative, they cover a network of close and hierarchical corporate financial groups, in which banks have developed a close relationship of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 48 published by scholink inc. dependence with companies. in many cases, the group's main bank also played the leading role in keiretsu. there is also a stable internal cross-shareholding between the players in the keiretsu group, similar to the zaibatsu, with each company owning shares in the other companies in the group. companies in keiretsu usually do not sell their shares to outsiders. additionally, the central bank usually owns the largest equity fund and is also the main creditor to the other members of the group (chan-lau, 2002). keiretsu groups are classified in japan as the big six, viz., sumitomo, mitshubishi, fuji, sanwa, mitsui and daiichi kangyo. figure 2 shows the current group of big six and the most important companies belonging to them. figure 2. the big six and their leading companies lincoln, 2004, 22. this corporate governance system was one of the most important contributors to the success of the japanese economy from the early 1950s to the late 1970s. however, downturns appeared in the central banking system by the mid-1970s, and the slow liberalization and regularization of the financial system began. large and creditworthy companies began to reduce the use of bank loans as a major source of financing, as they were able to obtain cheaper finance in the securities markets. the concentration of bank loan portfolios began to shift towards medium-sized and smaller firms, which were in many cases independent of keiretsu groups (chan-lau, 2002). by the 1980s, although the japanese economy was still on a turbulent trajectory, these downturns become stronger. an increasing problem which emerged by then was the corporate boards being were aligned better with creditors or banks than with employees or shareholders (kanda, 1998), making www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 49 published by scholink inc. them more interested in strong bank support than in profit maximization (morck &nakamura, 1999). further, other economic reforms also began in the 1980s, such as reducing the number of company executives and increasing focus on their performance, rather than on the length of their tenure in management positions., but this still wasn’t enough that the dotcom burst don’t drag down the japanese economy with itself by the early 1990s, followed by a stagnant trajectory ever since (chan-lau, 2002). 2. method 2.1 ergm network analysis due to the strongly networked economic structure outlined above, a number of network studies have already been conducted about the japanese economy, both descriptively and in a bipartite fashion (peltomaki-alava, 2006; sneppen et al., 2004; guillaume-latapy, 2004). the main network analysis directions of the japanese economy are the analysis of corporate debt and lending processes and network clusters (de masi et al., 2011), in cross-sectional and longitudinal ways. in my paper, however, i examine the keiretsu groups based on ergm (exponential random graph models) network analysis, a technique that can be classified as statisticsbased network model building. ergm allows the joint and controlled study of the effects of network parameters. in other words, ergm models provide an opportunity to understand how and why network connections are formed. network connections are organized into patterns, and the presence of some connections (ties) promotes the appearance of others. the ergm analyzes these endogenous effects, often referred to as “structural” effects. thus, it interprets the internal processes of the network relationship system, complemented by the exogenous effects of the network, such as the effects of attributes associated with nodes (lusher et al., 2013). based on the findings of watts (1999), ergm modeling works with randomness and probabilistic random graph modeling. by incorporating randomness, ergm models work with expected values, from which we can draw conclusions about whether the observed data are consistent with the theoretical (anticipated) data. during an ergm modeling, we estimate the presence of network edges from several predictor variables and use model parameters to estimate their effect, direction, and significance in the studied network (lusher et al., 2013). for this reason, ergm tries to model the network effects of edges, e.g. effect of transitive triads, k-star effect, effect of assertively (hemophilic, heterothallic relationships), effect of distributions, effect of degrees and effect of attribute variables. further, it compares the models formed on the basis of the effects with the observed network and thus tries to reveal the causes of network edge formation. in this paper, network descriptive statistical and morphological analyses were performed with gephi 0.9.2v software, and ergm analyses were created with the r software package and mpnet software (wang et al., 2009). 2.2 data used for analysis the data used for the ergm model rely on a secondary data analysis from lincoln et al. (2004). in their 1992 and 2004 works, lincoln and co-authors performed network-based block modeling of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 50 published by scholink inc. japanese keiretsu groups, where networks were grouped based on the attributes of connections and nodes. in their longitudinal study, clusters of keiretsu groups from 1978 to 1997 were analyzed across the entire leading corporate population (258 firms). they used several variables to define the formation of the edges (ties), such as partial ownership, cross lending, capital, distribution of director positions. then based on these, they formed the blocks using an algorithm called concor (note 1). thus, clusters were created that contained closely or densely connected nodes (corporations). i used the data of the 1997 keiretsu block model in my paper, and built the economic network based on this data. in the network, the companies are classified into six large keiretsu groups and into two large economic blocks. one of the large economic blocks is the banking and finance block and the second is the industrial block. in addition, nodes also have an attribute indicating their economic sector. if we consider the blocks, the financial block can be further divided into 5 clusters and the industrial block into 14 clusters. based on the distributions in table 1, it can be clearly seen that the companies belong to the industrial cluster have an overwhelming majority in the distribution of companies (81.01%), with a much smaller (18.99%) financial cluster table 1. block model of keiretsu groups (n = 258) blocks and clusters block and cluster frequency % financial block 49 18.99 city and trust banks 19 7.36 mining 1 0.39 mutual bks and securities 9 3.49 regional banks and insurance 16 6.20 toyota 4 1.55 industrial block 209 81.01 dkb and sanwa group 17 6.59 dkb group 15 5.81 fuyo and sanwa groups 15 5.81 fuyo group 16 6.20 hitachi 7 2.71 matsushita group 13 5.04 mitsubishi and dkb 14 5.43 mitsubishi group 18 6.98 mitsui group 33 12.79 sanwa and dbk group 12 4.65 sanwa group 13 5.04 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 51 published by scholink inc. sumitomo group 13 5.04 toyota group 11 4.26 trading companies 12 4.65 grand total 258 100.00 in order to interpret the ergm data, it is also worth reviewing the distribution of nodes by keiretsu groups (table 2). the table shows that the 6 large keiretsu groups comprise about the same number of leading companies (6-10 percent of the total companies). it is also important to note that the share of independent companies (not part of any keiretsu group) is quite high, at more than 55% of the total market. table 2. distribution of keiretsu groups (n = 258) groups frequency % dkb 25 9.69 fuyo 19 7.36 independent(shacho-kai) 147 56.98 mitsubishi 16 6.20 mitsui 16 6.20 sanwa 24 9.30 sumitomo 11 4.26 total 258 100.00 in addition to the above network edges, one more attribute parameter was included in the ergm model, which indicated the economic sector of the companies. the distributions of this variable are summarized in table 3. table 3. distribution of cooperation by economic sector (n = 258) sectors frequency % automobile 17 6.59 banking 49 18.99 ceramics 8 3.10 chemicals 28 10.85 electronics 22 8.53 fishing 4 1.55 food 26 10.08 forestry 1 0.39 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 52 published by scholink inc. gen manuf 5 1.94 heavy metal 15 5.81 light metal 14 5.43 machinery 13 5.04 mining 2 0.78 oil 8 3.10 paper 7 2.71 pharma 5 1.94 precequip 2 0.78 rubber 3 1.16 shipyard 5 1.94 textile 13 5.04 trade 9 3.49 transport 2 0.78 grand total 258 100.00 the table shows that the leading companies in japan are mostly in the financial / banking sector (18.99%), the chemical industry (10.85%), the food industry (10.08%) and electronics sector (8.53%). 3. result 3.1 network and ergm results a 3a. and 3b. figures show the network morphology of kerietsu groups. figure 3 shows the complete network in which we can see the kerietsu groups’ positions as also the positions of the blocks and clusters, while network figure 3b depicts only the network of companies belonging to kerietsu groups. both networks are by definition unidirectional. table 4 summarizes the basic network statistics for the two networks. figures 3 and 4 kerietsu groups and block model network and kerietsu groups network www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 53 published by scholink inc. figure 3. kerietsu groups and block model network (n=283) figures 4. kerietsu groups network (n=117) table 4. network statistics of the two networks kerietsu groups and block model network (entire network) kerietsu groups network node number 283 117 edge (tie) number 369 111 average edge degree 1.304 0.949 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 54 published by scholink inc. network density 0.009 0.016 modularity 13 6 average path 1 1 number of components 1 6 from the above statistics and morphology, it can be clearly seen that the six kerietsu, which comprise a total of 117 leading japanese companies, decompose into 6 well-separated components with high network density. each kerietsu encompasses companies from a very wide spectrum of economic sectors, from the banking system to heavy industry. however, it is better to move on to an analysis of the entire network, which shows that kerietsu networks play a much smaller role in the network of all leading companies. statistics and morphology indicate that these corporate organizations are embedded in an economic network characterized by a much larger number of edges and a much lower network density. they form a completely connected network with 13 well-separable subgroups. an important result is that the role of kerietsu corporate forms in the economic network has been taken over by groups, in which members have an even less close network relationship with each other. thus, it is not unlikely that the mitsui group has the highest degree (33) in the entire network. however, we still find kerietsu groups in the most central positions like daiichi kangyo keiretsu (25) sanwa keiretsu (24) and fuyo keiretsu (19). we can find the city central banks (19) and other groups such as the mitsubishi group (18) and the dkb and sanwa group (17) in the most centric positions of the network. let us move on to the ergm analysis itself, based on the kerietsu groups and block model network. the network represents the entire network of connections between large japanese corporations, in which organizations connect with each other for market dominance. ergm analysis helps us to explore along which exogenous and endogenous variables this market network has evolved. there are many possible competing explanations for the evolution of the network structure, but if we examine only one process at a time, we may overestimate its role. with the help of ergm, we can deduce the presence of an independent tendency for a particular configuration to appear, or the tendencies whose co-presence shapes the network. the parameter estimates of the ergm model were compared with 500 markov chain monte carlo (mcmc) network simulations. mcmc simulations created networks with the same number of nodes and densities as the observed network. in comparison, the mpnet software generated parameter estimates of the model, which indicate the strengths and direction of the network samples (endogenous and exogenous). table 5 shows the parameter estimates for the japanese economic network. significant parameters are marked with an asterisk (*). a positive (negative) estimate indicates a larger (lesser) configuration than expected in the network, taking into account the other effects of the model. the magnitude of the parameter estimates cannot be compared directly along the different effects, because the scaling of the statistics is different. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 55 published by scholink inc. table 5. ergm parameter estimates for the japanese economic network network effects estimates se edge effect (arc) -0.091 2-star (s2) 74.607* 3-star (s3) 218.904* 4-star (s3) 781.862* 5-star (s3) 3320.958* triad effect -1.692 4-cycle 88.190* isolate -5.393* hub 11.228* multiple 2-path 71.058* transitivity (transitive multiple 2-path) -1.701 alt-edge-triangle (aet) -1.643 attribute effects (exogenous the blue circle indicates the node that can be characterized by the attribute) homophily (econ. sector) 2.700 * = the parameter estimate is twice the absolute value of the standard error, which means that the effect is significant. based on the ergm, the network can be characterized by a negative edge effect (-0.091); however, this effect is not significant. in other words, it is not the pair connections that play a decisive role in the structure of the network. what does play an important role in the formation of the network is whether or not the firm connects to the actors in the central positions, such as the kerietsu groups and the block groups. we see this in the network-forming power of the 2, 3, 4, and even 5-star shapes, which in each case have positive and significant values. all this means that network centers play a crucial role in the formation of the network and are surrounded by a multitude of less inter-connected companies. the same result is supported by the hub effect, i.e., the positive and significant effect of the degree www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 56 published by scholink inc. distribution (11.228 *). the strong centralization effect of the network is also supported by the negative and non-significant value of the triad effect, which means that the triple closed connections do not substantially shape the network. this is somewhat contradicted by the positive and significant role of quartet closed connections (88,190*), which can be explained by the fact that quadruple connections are formed quite often between hubs (groups, kerietsu, blocks and clusters), which also indicates the strong network centralization. the multiplied 2-way effect is also positive and significant, indicating that we find more 2-ways, due to the other effects of the model, in the measured network, than we might expect, i.e., connections with several central nodes forming the same companies are related with each other. however, the transitivity effect (transitive triad effect) is negative and not significant, suggesting that these 2-pathways do not close, but condense around specific nodes. we see the same lack of closure among the actors in the fact that we do not get a significant value in the case of alternative edge triangles either. after the endogenous effects, let us move on to the exogenous effects, which in this case cover the attribute effect, i.e., the extent to which the economic sector influences the development of the network. we can see that the value is positive (thus influencing it in theory), but not significant, i.e., it does not play a decisive role with the other endogenous effects. 4. discussion i have analyzed the japanese network economy in my paper, because in more and more countries, the system of relations between the leading market companies and financial institutions is constantly intensifying. in other words, we can see a tendency of monopolization in the capitalist economy. i have illuminated the effects of this trend through an economic system that has operated in a similar centralized relationship system for many decades. starting with a review of the historical development of this economy, i have interpreted the available data with an ergm network analysis. from the ergm analysis, we have seen that we can still analyze the network of large japanese companies with highly endogenous effects resulting from network connections. this is not a coincidence, because, as has been raised several times in the historical part of my article, the japanese economy relies heavily on resource transfers and on different corporate circles. all this means that the existence of a relationship of trust and dependency between corporate actors is decisive in the japanese economy to this day, and this network effect is likely to persist for a long time due to the inertia of the system. it can also be seen in the keiretsu and group formations that the dominant relationships extend from the core from the most important banks, commercial companies or heavy industry companies to the extreme periphery, and we encounter less and less edge density, moving from the core to the periphery. while this will of course help to improve the quality of information flows, positioning the common market goals and speed up production and logistics processes, at the same time, as we have seen in the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 57 published by scholink inc. japanese economy, it can also lead to a decline in innovation and new entrants or independent entrants, not to mention that such a structure is beneficial primarily for companies located in the core, and as we move towards the periphery, this ’positive’ impact diminishes. as we have seen since the 2010s, japan has decided that this economic structure, which is based on centralized market relations, will not make the country competitive in the global market in the long run, and we can also see that this systemic change has proved true. however, the anomalies of a multi-decade system can be changed over only extremely long decades. for all these reasons, it would be important for many national economies to consider the fact that a centralized and inter-dependent economic system cannot be sustainable in the long run in the current 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(2020). retrieved from https://databank.worldbank.org/home.aspx notes note 1. concor was a disaggregative clustering algorithm: it iteratively divided the population into several smaller sets. note 2. i use the terminology of capitalism as a collective term in my article. of course, the majority of nation-states in the twentieth century can be placed in an extremely wide spectrum in this aspect, encompassing a wealth of forms from state-capitalist economies, through the monopoly-capitalist economy to the classical capitalist economies. note 3. the big six terminology is used to denote the leading groups of companies in the japanese economy,namely sumitomo, mitshubishi, fuji, sanwa, mitsui and daiichi kangyo group of companies. microsoft word ape-v3n3-p24 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 24 original paper healing the wounds of war: reducing maternal mortality in darfur zurab elzarov (note 1)1* 1 united nations-african union mission in darfur (unamid), zalingei, sudan * zurab elzarov, united nations-african union mission in darfur (unamid), zalingei, sudan received: june 26, 2020 accepted: july 19, 2020 online published: july 22, 2020 doi:10.22158/ape.v3n3p24 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v3n3p24 zurab elzarov is the chief of governance and community stabilization section (gcss) and formerly chief of protection of civilians/humanitarian liaison (poc/hl) section (2015-2018) with the united nations african union mission in darfur (unamid). he has been working with the united nations over the past 24 years and remains widely engaged in devising innovative solutions for post-conflict recovery and peace building in conflict affected areas. abstract reducing maternal mortality rates in darfur remains one of the major challenges to the healthcare system in darfur owing to the on-going conflict, displacement of large number of population, poor transportation networks, destruction of primary healthcare facilities and the lack of solid mechanism to train village midwives. under these circumstances, the united nations—african union mission in darfur (unamid) continues to invest in reducing the maternal and child mortality rates in darfur by mobilizing the existing resources and advocating for availability of all services that are directed towards improving the maternal health in the region. the article highlights the positive changes and significant impact that these interventions have had on reducing the maternal mortality rates in darfur and saving lives of children. keywords darfur, unamid, conflict, maternal, mortality, midwife, training 1. introduction sudan remains one of the largest countries in africa and one of the most densely populated countries on the continent with more than 30 million inhabitants. the increasingly large number of population, as well as armed conflicts and inter-communal hostilities affecting the country over the past 10 years, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 25 published by scholink inc. have considerably weakened sudan’s healthcare system. the country has a long way to go to revitalize its healthcare practices and to establish a proper and effective health service delivery system that benefits every citizen of the country. in june 2011, the united nations population fund (unfpa) published a report on “the state of the world’s midwifery”. the report presented new data on the midwifery workforce and policies relating to new-born and maternal mortality for 58 countries. the 2013 maternal mortality rate per 100,000 births for sudan was 2,054. this is compared with 306.3 in 2008 and 592.6 in 1990. the number of midwives per 1,000 live births was reported to be one, and the lifetime risk of death for pregnant women was one in seven. the causes and rate of maternal death in sudan are aggravated by ongoing conflicts and resulting displacement of population. the key indicators related to maternal health, including maternal mortality, child mortality and child malnutrition, are all exacerbated by conflicts, especially in the darfur region. while the exact maternal mortality rates for the five darfuri states are unknown, they are estimated to approach the higher estimate. in fact, darfur is probably among the most dangerous places in the world in which to give birth. sudan’s federal ministry of health together with who, unicef and unfpa launched on 28 august 2013 the “sudan's national acceleration plan for maternal and child health”. sudan was the first of the 10 high-burden countries in the region to launch an acceleration plan on maternal and child health, in line with the commitment expressed in the dubai declaration, adopted in january 2013. in parallel, international stakeholders, including the united nations—african union mission in darfur (unamid), have mobilized the available resources to assist the government of sudan in reducing the mother and child mortality rates in darfur. 2. methodology the united nations–african union mission in darfur (unamid) was established on 31 july 2007 with the adoption of security council resolution 1769. unamid has the protection of civilians as its core mandate, and is also tasked with contributing to security for humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying implementation of agreements, assisting an inclusive political process, contributing to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law, and monitoring and reporting on the situation along the borders with chad and the central african republic (car). in addition, based on the dire humanitarian situation in darfur, unamid has been also implementing quick impact projects (qips) and community-based labour-intensive projects (clips) in the areas of water and sanitation, education, health, rule of law and livelihoods. since 2007, unamid has implemented in all darfur states over 500 qips, worth over us$15 million, in the areas mentioned above. a number of these projects have addressed the unsustainable exploitation of forest resources; increased conflict over scarce forest and tree resources; exposure of women and girls to conflict-related sexual violence (crsv) and sexual and gender-based violence (sgbv) as well as www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 26 published by scholink inc. the high maternal mortality rates in darfur. 3. addressing maternal mortality in north darfur state north darfur is one of the five darfuri states located in western sudan with el fasher as its capital. population of north darfur state is estimated to be approximately 2.1 million. the state consists of 18 localities and over 2,600 villages. the women of child bearing age are estimated at 501,000, with 74,000 pregnant women. there are 1,115 village midwives available in the state. maternal mortality is higher in rural areas as well as in conflict-affected areas where healthcare structures are mostly affected, causing the death of women due to the lack of access to skilled routine and emergency healthcare services. 3.1 rehabilitation of el fasher maternity hospital el fasher maternity hospital is the only maternity hospital in north darfur state. all women in different parts of north darfur receive medical treatment in this hospital, especially pregnant females. in addition, it also functions as a teaching hospital for students of the medical faculty from el fasher university. nevertheless, the maternity hospital has been suffering a lot, especially from the lack of effective power-supply system and the acute shortage of uninterrupted power which is so important to have during complicated operations. while the climatic conditions in north darfur are extremely hot, the hospital had no ceiling fans and air conditions. even sockets, plugs and electric line connections were in miserable conditions and required urgent maintenance and repairs. the hospital targets more than 50,000 patients a year to receive quality medical services, in particular pregnant women and newly born children. therefore, improving the conditions of the maternity hospital became a high priority in view of the large number of female patients seeking medical treatment. in 2017, unamid visited the maternity hospital to assess the needs and developed a project proposal, through the national non-governmental organization (nngo) “sudan organization for recovery and development” (sord). the project was designed to improve and upgrading the power unit services and the power network of the maternity hospital, which provides essential support to the vulnerable population in particular women and children. the overall objectives of the project were to improve the work environment for medical staff as well as ensure good heath environment for patients; provision of a generator to improve power supply, especially for the maternity operations room; provision of light and power for the hospital; provision of power for medical equipment and devices to ensure effective and uninterrupted medical service provision to the patients; reduction of the mortality rate among pregnant women who lost their lives during delivery operations as a result of the lack of power; provision of conducive environment for students of the el fasher university’s medical faculty. the project targeted a total of 75,000 women and children as direct beneficiaries of the project, including 60,000 females and 15,000 children with the age ranging from 20 to 50 years, in addition to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 27 published by scholink inc. the newly born infants (age ranging from one day to one year). beneficiaries consisted of people with different ethnic, tribal and religious background and from all parts of north darfur state, most of them from rural, including internally displaced and returnee women. the implementation of the project was highly welcomed by the wali of north darfur and was fully endorsed and accepted by who and the state ministry of health-the co-leads of the health sector. it was fully and successfully implemented by the implementing partner sord under direct supervision and guidance of the unamid poc/hl section, senior city power engineer, and the unamid engineer section. 3.2 training of 50 village midwives in 2014, unamid and the north darfur state ministry of health (smoh) signed a memorandum of understanding on training 50 village midwives in north darfur state. the overall objectives of this joint project was to: a) reduce the insufficiency of maternal health services across the remote and isolated communities in north darfur state; b) empower people “at-risk”, especially pregnant women and other vulnerable community members; c) reduce the maternal mortality and child mortality cases in the identified communities by addressing the lack of village midwives providing services to the local community members. 50 women were selected by the smoh reproductive health department from various localities in north darfur state, including kalamendo, kutum, kabkabiya, saraf omra, kuma, umm barru, tine, malha, al lait, al waha, umm kaddada and mellit, based on the gaps identified during the needs assessment in those areas (high risk areas = high risk pregnancies, high maternal mortality rate). this village midwifery training project was implemented within twelve months of intensive theoretical and practical sessions covering a wide range of issues related to reproductive health. the training was conducted at the midwifery school in el fasher. selected students were hosted in the school for the entire period of the training and participated in various types of training activities, including lectures, practical sessions, group work, homework, presentations, demonstrations, etc. the project was carried out in three phases:  first phase: theoretical sessions.  second phase: practical sessions in models.  third phase: practical sessions in health centres for antenatal care and maternity hospital for conducting deliveries. during this phase, the students were trained on how to identify complications and on early referral to avoid obstetric complications. the training manual, timetable, stationary and training materials were prepared by the smohre productive health department in cooperation with the personnel of the midwifery school. the training was conducted by highly skilled tutors supervised by the smohre productive health department. at the end of the training, the final exam was conducted under the direct control of the federal ministry of health (fmoh) and the successful graduates were awarded certificates. the project represented a successful model of cooperation between unamid and the government of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 28 published by scholink inc. sudan (smoh) in addressing the high rates of maternal and child mortality in darfur. unamid, through its clips projects, provided funds for implementation of the project in the total amount of 281,000 sudanese pounds (approximately $50,000), and conducted regular monitoring and evaluation visits to the midwifery school. smoh was responsible for the overall implementation of the project, provided highly skilled personnel and training materials, as well as contributed 50,000 sudanese pounds to the project to cover the tuition and living allowance of the students. at the end of the project, the trained midwives were deployed to their respective localities to provide midwifery services to 20,000 people in kalamendo, kutum, kabkabiya, saraf omra, kuma, umm barru, tine, malha, al lait, al waha, umm kaddada and mellit. 4. addressing maternal mortality in west darfur state limited access to primary healthcare delivery services in west darfur state, such as obstetric and gynaecological care, is hampered by poor road conditions and transportation network. as a consequence, the majority of rural women do not have access to primary healthcare services such as antenatal and postnatal care. the problem is further exacerbated by the lack of trained midwives to attend to pregnant women during labour. the lack of primary healthcare facilities and the unavailability of skilled midwives in remote and isolated areas of west darfur state have been resulting in the untimely deaths of many pregnant women while being transported by horses and camels to the nearest medical facilities in locality or state capitals. based on the successful village midwifery training project implemented in north darfur state, unamid entered into discussions with the west darfur state ministry of health (smoh) and the sudan red crescent society (srcs) to explore the opportunities for conducting midwifery skills training in the state. a joint project was developed to identify 20 young women from different parts of west darfur state to provide them with intensive training on reproductive health and midwifery skills. 20 women were selected by the smoh from krenek and beida localities in west darfur state, based on the gaps identified during the needs assessment in those localities, to provide primary healthcare services to pregnant women upon completion of the midwifery skills training. the midwifery project in west darfur state is currently under implementation through the srcs. students are receiving intensive theoretical and practical sessions covering a wide range of issues related to reproductive health. the training is conducted at the teaching hospital’s midwifery school in el geneina. selected students participate in various types of training activities, including lectures, practical sessions, group work, homework, presentations, demonstrations, etc. cooperation between unamid and the smoh was a success factor for implementation of this clips project in west darfur state. unamid provided funds for implementation of the project and conducted regular monitoring and evaluation visits to the midwifery school. srcs and smoh are responsible for the overall implementation of the project, provided highly skilled personnel and training materials. at the end of the project, the trained midwives will begiven start-up tools and deployed to their respective www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 29 published by scholink inc. localities in krenek and beida to provide midwifery services to local community members. 5. addressing maternal mortality in central darfur state the state of reproductive health in central darfur state is appalling. in 2010, the maternal mortality rate was 322 deaths per 100,000 live births; the infant mortality rate was 80 deaths per 1,000 live births; and under-five mortality rate was 66 deaths per 1,000 live births. lack of knowledge on reproductive health among the local community members, scarcity of economic resources, and significant displacement of population due to insecurity, are all the contributing factors. however, a key reason for this situation is the lack of community/village midwives. central darfur state is well below its target coverage of 1 community midwife for every 1,000 people, and has identified a gap of 750 community midwives for the state. presently, most of the women in central darfur state are only able to access traditional antenatal care which is not evidence-based. to address the afore-mentioned challenges and based on the successful implementation of the village midwifery training project in north darfur, unamid and the central darfur state ministry of health (smoh) devised a joint clips project to address the reproductive health gaps in local communities by training village midwives in remote and isolated areas of the state. the overall objective of the project is to ensure the management of normal (uncomplicated) pregnancies, childbirth and immediate postnatal period, and identification, management and referral of complications in women and the new-borns. the project selected 50 women with diverse background and strong motivation to become midwives, and are being provided with intensive theoretical and practical sessions covering a wide range of issues related to reproductive health. selected students from various parts of central darfur state are currently participating in various types of training activities. at the end of the project, the trained midwives will be provided with start-up tools and deployed to their respective localities in krenek and beida to provide midwifery services to local community members. 6. addressing maternal mortality in east darfur state health needs and gaps, especially among the most vulnerable population, remain one of the major concerns in darfur throughout the years of conflict. the health resources availability mapping system (herams) of the who have been showing gaps in access and utilization of health services across all states of darfur. for example, in east darfur, at present, the potential health service coverage is 59%. only 29% of health facilities run immunization programmes and primary healthcare centres, and the number and type of health workers stands at only 4% of the recommended standards. this clearly indicates an apparent gap in the health delivery system. bahr al arab locality in east darfur is one of the most underserved areas in darfur. the needs assessment in the area, carried out by unamid, observed that the communities living in this locality require interventions in all basic service areas. interventions such as a comprehensive water, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 30 published by scholink inc. sanitation and hygiene (wash) package (water points, latrines, social marketing at the community level on basic hygiene), education (school), and health (clinic) were proposed. there is only one rural hospital/basic health centre in abu matariq town, bahr al arab locality in east darfur which serves over 300,000 individuals in addition to 30,000 refugees from south sudan residing at kario refugee camp, and 2,700 refugees living with the host community. this dire situation is compounded with the absence of a maternity unit to receive expectant mothers and their babies. until now, the deliveries were taking place at the doctor’s office with maternal and infant deaths on the rise, as a direct consequence of absence of the much-needed appropriate health services. linked to this need is the high prevalence of malnutrition among children in the bahr al arab locality. according to the locality commissioner, official data provided by the state statistics centre indicate that there are 25,000 malnutrition cases among children in the locality. based on these needs, the state authorities requested unamid’s assistance for construction of maternity and malnutrition units in abu matariq since the maternal care and malnutrition are closely interlinked—the absence of the latter may have serious implications not only for affected children but also for expectant mothers who require continuous monitoring of their weight to ensure healthy babies are born. in mid-2018, unamid provided funds to the implementing partner, local non-government organization (ngo), for construction of maternity and malnutrition units in abu matariq town and provision of beds. the project implementation is currently ongoing and is expected to result in the reduction of morbidity and mortality rates to below emergency thresholds in bahr al arab locality of east darfur state; better access to quality primary healthcare services and strengthened referral services; strengthened national and local capacity in early detection, preparedness and response to emergencies and public health threats; reduction of maternal and child mortality rates; and provision of basic healthcare to pregnant women, children, elders and refugees. 7. conclusion health services play a crucial role in preventing avoidable morbidity and mortality in emergencies. however, emergencies affect health facilities and services too. with many been damaged, left without medicines, equipment, basic amenities or health workers, cannot serve the population which may even have heightened healthcare needs due to the emergency. reducing maternal mortality is one of the major challenges to the healthcare system in darfur. the situation in the region is aggravated by the on-going conflicts and displacement of large number of population, poor transportation networks, destruction of primary healthcare facilities and the lack of solid mechanism to train village midwives. there are relatively simple, safe and affordable approaches to successfully prevent or treat most obstetric complications and thus save women's lives. in the current circumstances, unamid and other international organizations should continue to invest in reducing the maternal and child mortality rates in darfur, by mobilizing the existing resources and advocating for availability of all services that are directed toward improving the maternal health in the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 31 published by scholink inc. region. at the same time, it has to be admitted that eradicating or reducing maternal deaths require more than midwifery skills training and deployment of new midwives to remote and isolated areas. to achieve this objective, women will need to be taken out of poverty, gender inequalities will have to be eliminated, and stronger health systems should be established. high female mortality rates are also common in other countries, especially in africa (south sudan, chad, sierra leona, nigeria, central african republic, somalia, liberia, mali, niger, mauritania, cote d’ivoire, central african republic, cameroon, burundi, lesotho, tanzania, guinea and guinea-bissau) (note 2). therefore, the implementation of unamid’s successful initiatives could be replicated in those countries provided they are tailored to country-specific conditions on the ground. references united nations peacekeeping. (2017). quick impact projects for communities. retrieved from https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/quick-impact-projects-communities united nations population fund (unfpa). (2011). the state of the world’s midwifery. retrieved from https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/en_sowmr_full.pdf united nations population fund (unfpa). (2013). the state of the world’s midwifery. retrieved from https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/en_sowmy2014_complete.pdf united nations security council. 2007 resolution 1769. (2007). retrieved from https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7b65bfcf9b-6d27-4e9c-8cd3-cf6e4ff96ff9 %7d/cac%20sres%201769.pdf united nations–african union mission in darfur (unamid). (2017). protective presence. focus on unamid refined protection of civilians strategy. united nations–african union mission in darfur. (2013). unamid acting chief discusses with wali tibin recent developments in central darfur. retrieved from https://unamid.unmissions.org/unamid-acting-chief-discusses-wali-tibin-recent-developments-cent ral-darfur world health organization (who). (2013). sudan scales up efforts to improve maternal and child health. august 2013. retrieved from http://www.emro.who.int/sdn/sudan-news/sudan-launch-mchplan.html world health organization (who). (2016). herams. health resources availability monitoring system. retrieved from http://www.who.int/hac/herams/who_herams_22february2016.pdf world health organization (who). (2019). trends in maternal mortality: 2000 to 2017. retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sh.sta.mmrt notes note 1. this article was presented as a major paper during the 4thcommonwealth nurses and midwives conference held in london, united kingdom, on 9-11 march 2018, available at www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 3, 2020 32 published by scholink inc. http://www.commonwealthnurses.org/conference2018/ note 2. the views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of unamid. microsoft word ape-v2n1-p23 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 23 original paper economic incentives and social norms can lead actors to prosocial behavior: an evidence-based framework and findings angbonon e. kamalan1* 1 department of economics, alassane ouattara university, bouaké, ivory coast * angbonon e. kamalan, department of economics, alassane ouattara university, bouaké, ivory coast received: february 1, 2019 accepted: february 16, 2019 online published: february 18, 2019 doi:10.22158/ape.v2n1p23 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v2n1p23 abstract this article attempts a search for economic, sociological and even psychological answers about the foundations of individual’s prosocial behavior with a focus on economic incentives and social norms. first, we present an evidence-based approach of individual’s prosocial behavior using the justification and the economies of worth of boltanski and thevenot (2006). after that, we analyze a prosocial behavior applied to the process of maturity repayment of individual loans. we propose two different methods to check the theoretical propositions: logit and probit method in one hand and fractional method of papke and wooldridge (1996) in other hand. the logit and probit method are estimated in the aim of better understanding of the influencing factors of the maturity repayment behavior of borrowers. estimation of fractional method helps to learn about the probability of delinquency in loan repayment. the results attest the theoretical propositions. keywords incentives, social norms, prosocial behavior, probit, fractional 1. introduction both economic incentives and social norms influence individual behavior. many authors including nobel prizes have shed light on this matter by providing excellent works specifically relating to behavioral economics (note 1). the rational choice school of sociologists also recognizes the joint influence of social norms and economic incentives (lindbeck et al., 1999). while economists have focused on economic incentives, sociologists have emphasized social norms. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 24 published by scholink inc. prosocial activities represent a substantial part of social life, including such actions as donating money for a cause or an organization, volunteering for a party during election times, voting, cleaning beaches, donating blood, etc. (lacetera & macis, 2010). understanding what motivates individuals to contribute to prosocial activities emerges, therefore, as a topic of increasing interest in economics as well as sociology and even psychology. the issue is made all the more pressing by the fact that, for many of these activities, supply is often below societal needs. however, individuals might simply not find it worthwhile to engage in prosocial activities if the benefits fall short of the opportunity costs. if this is the case, then material incentives (composed of material cash-incentives also called explicit economic incentives, and material non-cash incentives) might be effective in increasing the number and frequency of prosocial acts. but, a large common idea is that, explicit economic incentives designed to increase contributions to public goods and to promote other prosocial behavior sometimes are counterproductive or less effective than would be predicted among entirely self-interested individuals. this may occur when incentives adversely affect individuals’ altruism, ethical norms and intrinsic motives (bowles & polanía-reyes, 2012). bénabou and tirole (2006) enlightened this issue in their study of incentives and prosocial behavior and provided convincing answers which defined extrinsic incentives given by the society and the intrinsic incentives providing from personal motivation. they develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. to understand what kind of incentives might encourage prosocial behavior, however, one must first have an understanding of the motives behind altruistic behavior. in fact, recent empirical and theoretical contributions suggest that depending on what motivates individuals to contribute to prosocial causes, certain types of material incentives might backfire (frey & oberholzer-gee, 1997; ryan & deci, 2000; lacetera & macis, 2010). in addition, the effect of economic incentives and social norms in shaping of prosocial behaviors of individuals is explained in a sociological approach based on the theory of reciprocity that defines reciprocal behavior as a social preference (simpson & willer, 2008). although there are several types of social preferences in the literature, fehr and fischbacher (2002) provide the most common characteristics of social preferences. particularly important types of social preferences are the reciprocal fairness (not driven by the expectation of future material benefit), the inequity aversion, pure and impure altruism; and self-identity preferences. in short, the sociological approach of prosocial behavior focus on three sets of theories addressing non‐selfish motives or “other‐regarding” behavior, namely: (1) the outcome‐based prosocial preferences theories (inequity aversion, pure and impure altruism) that assume that an individual’s utility depends directly on the utility of other people; (2) the theories of reciprocity (or conditional cooperation) that are based on the notion that individuals behave in a friendly manner when they are treated benevolently and, conversely, they act meanly when treated badly; and (3) the approaches stressing the importance of self‐identity for www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 25 published by scholink inc. prosocial behavior. these theoretical frameworks are relevantly interpreted by boltanski and thevenot (2006) for better understand how actors can justify their behaviors using contradictory foundations. this article requires a search for economic, sociological and even psychological answers about the foundations of individual’s prosocial behavior with a focus on economic incentives and social norms. so the study combines economic theories and sociologic approach of prosocial behavior using field experiment. an illustration is provided using the maturity repayment behavior of loans in a specific context. we propose a socioeconomic framework that clearly introduce to the understanding of the borrower’s prosocial behavior regarding maturity repayment. then, an empirical illustration of the theoretical propositions is given, based on a survey data. the article is organized as follows. section 2 presents an evidence-based approach of individual’s prosocial behavior based on the justification and the economies of worth of boltanski and thevenot. section 3 proposes the empirical evidence with different methods (logit, probit and fractional) used to check the theoretical propositions and provides results interpretation. finally, section 4 concludes. 2. evidence-based framework of prosocial behavior 2.1 context and issues the study applies to the context in which a debt relationship exists between a lending institution represented by a credit manager and a borrower. the prosocial behavior being studied is the maturity repayment behavior of credit in microfinance institutions. indeed, in microfinance institutions (mfis) in west africa, lending contracts are often drawn up taking into account the borrower’s relationships with third parties, whether the borrower is in liability group lending or whether he is in individual lending (besley, 1995). individual lending is most concerned with endorsement and sponsorship relationships, which are known as non-market institutions applied for loans, figure 1. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 26 published by scholink inc. figure 1. relationship within individual lending the endorsement and sponsorship practices are formalized as supervisory mechanism for better project selecting and monitoring of borrowers within lending contracts (kamalan, 2018). the endorsement practice refers to relationships between an individual borrower who does not have personal material collateral and the third party, the endorser. the latter is usually a person close to the borrower, for example the spouse or member of the family lineage. the endorser provides a material asset as a collateral in return to the debt the borrower receives. the endorsement relationship engages the endorser to have the same level of commitment as the joint liability relationship. the sponsorship is similar to the moral assistance that generally involves a testimonial process. it consists in the fact that, the third party close relative of the borrower, testifies the good probity and exemplary morality of the borrower in order to dispel any doubt that may remain with a credit manager (in a lending institution) when examining the borrower’s loan application. in contrast to the endorser, the sponsor is simply a moral guarantor who commits his moral honor for the benefit of the borrower by testifying in his behalf. the sponsor makes himself available to the lending institution for assistance in recovering the assets, as long as the borrower does not fulfil his commitments. if the endorser or the sponsor is not a borrower himself, he does not derive any direct benefit from his act; that is to be considered as a pure altruism. the main interest of endorser or sponsor is to assist the borrower in the credit application. endorser and sponsor may be satisfied with offering an opportunity to a family member for whom they feel morally indebted because of first-born obligation for example. in several cases, borrowers engaged in relationships with third parties such as joint borrowers in liability group have been known for having better loan repayment behavior (armendáriz-de-aghion & gollier, 2000). this behavior for loan repayment is all time explained by the social pressure of the group members who want the credit to be granted repeatedly to each one in turn. but, the social www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 27 published by scholink inc. pressure is less effective and often inactive or counterproductive when the borrower has relationships with third parties who are not engaged in the same lending or who are outside the lending institution. this is the case for sponsorship and endorsement relationships. in this case, the design of lending contract and the repayment behavior must be analyzed using another prism: the prosocial behavior. answering the questions raised by the use of sponsorship and endorsement relationships within lending relationships, an interesting approach is provided by the theory of social capital originally defended by p. bourdieu, j-c. coleman and r. putnam. putnam’s approach, in contrast to the bourdieusian ones, provides a framework of social capital that makes social ties an essential endowment of a society. this feature makes resources available to members to be active within the functioning of the society. putnam believes that a society can potentially have a significant endowment of social capital in the form of trust, reciprocity norms and civic engagement networks, for to facilitate voluntary cooperation between individuals in the sense of collaboration, knowledge pooling, skills and efforts sharing. this approach of social capital is closely in line with the early work of institutional economics. therefore, sponsorship and endorsement relationships are considered as societal attributes rather than individual assets. a problem is to effectively engage the attributes of a society and make them interact in the meaningful behavior of an individual, as observed in the lending relationship. it is clear that the individual’s aim is to maximize earnings and expectations. consequently, it will be asked to determine the process to be use to resolve conflicts between the collective aspirations of society induced by societal attributes and the rational expectations of individuals motivated by selfish interests. these issues are strongly addressed by boltanski and thevenot (2006) in their analysis of justification and the economies of worth. 2.2 evidence-based practices that shape behavior to better understanding the sponsorship and endorsement relationships within lending contracts and the connection to the economies of worth developed by boltanski and thevenot, we consider the sense of credit and the effects on behavior shaping. that opens up a normative dimension of the reasoning about the meaning of the lending for the actors involved, as stakeholders of the lending contract; particularly for the borrower. that’s the justification of the behavior based on the foundations basically called “values”, kamalan (2019). we’ve matched the economies of worth of boltanski and thevenot with the values highlighted by the sponsorship and endorsement relationships, figure 2. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 28 published by scholink inc. figure 2. foundations of values highlighted by sponsorship and endorsement let’s only consider the cities of market, fame and inspiration defined by boltanski and thevenot (note 2). boltanski and thevenot defined the city of “market” that uses competition as a greatness. this city highlights the personal advantages of the actor (the borrower) whose interests are freed from domestic and civic considerations. the link is no longer synonymous with identity filiation, but refers to a consumerist attachment. in this context, the borrower’s desirable behavior is to be sought in the self-determination and self-sacrifice in preserving the financial relationship with the lending institution, no matter the costs and effort to be expended. value takes on a sense of competence. borrower is valuable because he or she is capable. the value of competency is all the more sought if it is rewarded. the credit renewal willingness with higher amount is one of the best tool used to test the impact of competency on maturity repayment behavior. that is defined as an economic material incentive. in the city of “industry”, greatness is revealed in a form of the individual’s effectiveness in overcoming the challenges faced by all individuals. value is based on the individual’s success in overcoming these challenges. that value of success is all the more sought if it is rewarded. lot of variables can be used to test the impact of the value of success in the behavior of maturity repayment: indifference regarding failure, appreciation of post-contractual opportunism, etc. there are defined as economic non material incentives. in the city of “fame”, greatness is reflected in the opinion that includes self-esteem and the reputation. that’s the positive reputation or the looking-glass-self. an example is the fact that the more a borrower is motivated by self-esteem, the more he behaves in actions that are admired by those surrounding him and the higher is the maturity repayment. finally, in the city of “inspiration”, value refers to the religious notion of beliefs. individuals have a moral commitment to comply with the high standards of a virtuous lifestyle as required by religious norms. some variables such us happiness/jealousy of neighborhoods, past shame experiences, etc. can be used to test the impact of the value of fame in the behavior of maturity repayment and marital or religious status are supposed to have benefic impact on the behavior of maturity repayment. all these variables are regarding social norms. the next section proposes the empirical evidences in which theoretical analyses are illustrated with data from a field study in a west-african microfinance institution (pamde) in benin (kamalan, 2010). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 29 published by scholink inc. 3. empirical evidence 3.1 data, variables and methods in that section, we’ll focused on a survey covered sample of 832 customers composed of 506 individual loans and 272 group loans, representative the population of 21146 in a microfinance institution called padme in cotonou (benin). the survey includes only borrowers in process of credit. the survey was conducted in 2006 while padme was considered to be one of the best microfinance institutions with higher repayment rate of borrowers. padme has been selected because it gives opportunity to learn about the non-market institutions such as endorsement and sponsorship practices involved in lending contracts. the methods used in that section are the logit and probit models and the fractional regression model of papke and wooldridge (1996). the logit and probit models are used to study the behavior for loan repayment. the variable of interest is the “delays” in loan maturity repayment which takes the value 1 if the borrower has no default in maturity repayment and takes the value 0 if at least one maturity repayment is defected. the explanatory variables are displayed in figure 3. figure 3. explanatory variables the fractional model helps to understand the probability of delinquency in loan repayment. this model is useful for situations where the variable of interest is continuous and restricted to the interval (0, 1) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 30 published by scholink inc. and is related to other variables through a regression structure (cribari-neto & zeileis, 2010). with the fractional method, we are interested in knowing about the behavior of the delay in repayment. it seems like delinquency in maturity repayment. first we generate the p probability corresponding to the situation where there is no delay. then, we create the variable r=1-p corresponding to the probability of having at least 1 delay. we generate the r variable and we estimate the fractional regression model. that model is generally used for beta regression where variables are greater than zero and less than one, such as rates, proportions and indices. 3.2 findings 3.2.1 the influencing factors of the maturity repayment behavior the logit model estimate (figure 4) shows that the factors that explain the maturity performance are: the indifference regarding failure, the marital status, the sponsorship, the willingness to renew the credit received, status and type of loan. only significant variables are considered. these variables are supposed to have positive effects on repaying maturities without delay, in contrast to the type of loan and the marital status which have negative effects. the probit model (figure 5) is more restrictive since marital status is not significant. _cons -3.733109 1.24912 -2.99 0.003 -6.18134 -1.284878 famsup -.0667715 .1809356 -0.37 0.712 -.4213988 .2878558 loantyp -1.417239 .2424026 -5.85 0.000 -1.892339 -.9421381 postopp .0836893 .1841911 0.45 0.650 -.2773186 .4446973 loanrenw .6551918 .3318552 1.97 0.048 .0047677 1.305616 sponsor 2.597394 .205262 12.65 0.000 2.195088 2.999701 relistat 1.483343 1.136598 1.31 0.192 -.7443474 3.711033 maristat -.5697063 .2987465 -1.91 0.057 -1.155239 .0158261 shamexp .0664903 .2095035 0.32 0.751 -.3441291 .4771097 indifail .7921605 .2285467 3.47 0.001 .3442172 1.240104 jealneig .1379401 .3114363 0.44 0.658 -.4724639 .7483441 hapneig .555103 .4105596 1.35 0.176 -.2495791 1.359785 endorse .2079762 .2155437 0.96 0.335 -.2144817 .630434 delays coef. std. err. z p>|z| [95% conf. interval] log likelihood = -422.92268 pseudo r2 = 0.2665 prob > chi2 = 0.0000 lr chi2(12) = 307.24 logistic regression number of obs = 832 figure 4. logistic regression www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 31 published by scholink inc. _cons -2.322556 .7149657 -3.25 0.001 -3.723863 -.9212487 famsup -.0522041 .106517 -0.49 0.624 -.2609736 .1565655 loantyp -.8213902 .1377351 -5.96 0.000 -1.091346 -.5514343 postopp .0472681 .1081512 0.44 0.662 -.1647044 .2592406 loanrenw .3775101 .1964478 1.92 0.055 -.0075205 .7625408 sponsor 1.560659 .1157665 13.48 0.000 1.333761 1.787557 relistat .9220995 .6420364 1.44 0.151 -.3362688 2.180468 maristat -.2650423 .166067 -1.60 0.110 -.5905277 .0604431 shamexp .0397269 .123447 0.32 0.748 -.2022247 .2816785 indifail .4480144 .1351276 3.32 0.001 .1831691 .7128596 jealneig .0733384 .1786995 0.41 0.682 -.2769062 .423583 hapneig .3203205 .2428238 1.32 0.187 -.1556054 .7962463 endorse .1392684 .1313471 1.06 0.289 -.1181672 .3967041 delays coef. std. err. z p>|z| [95% conf. interval] log likelihood = -422.60067 pseudo r2 = 0.2670 prob > chi2 = 0.0000 lr chi2(12) = 307.89 probit regression number of obs = 832 figure 5. probit regression appendix 1 and appendix 3 provide more details for the logit and probit models. with regard to the marginal effects after logit and probit regression, the following results can be noted: the probability of having no delay increases by 18.92% (appendix 2) and 17.24% (appendix 4) when moving from a borrower which is indifferent regarding failure to another one who is very embarrassed. religious status concerning non-current practicing to current practicing borrower increases the probability of having no delay by about 30%. the willingness of loan renewal is also powerful in increasing the probability of having no delay by about 14%. the most powerful tool that lead borrowers to increasing the probability of having no delay is the sponsorship by 54.82% when moving from one borrower without sponsor to another one who is sponsored. finally, we note that probability of not being late decreases by 31.84% when moving from joint liability group loan to individual loan. that suppose that joint liability group loans are less risky than individual loans. 3.2.2 the probability of delinquency in repayment behavior several factors explain the probability of having at least one delay in repayment (figure 6). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 32 published by scholink inc. _cons .349178 .1427209 2.45 0.014 .0694503 .6289058 famsup .1827017 .0518445 3.52 0.000 .0810883 .2843151 postopp .0068026 .053586 0.13 0.899 -.0982241 .1118293 maristat .2484953 .0877599 2.83 0.005 .0764891 .4205015 shamexp .222241 .0572201 3.88 0.000 .1100916 .3343904 jealneig -.3493436 .0851817 -4.10 0.000 -.5162966 -.1823905 hapneig -.4144738 .0913214 -4.54 0.000 -.5934605 -.2354871 endorse .0247069 .0489988 0.50 0.614 -.071329 .1207428 r coef. std. err. z p>|z| [95% conf. interval] robust log pseudolikelihood = -565.1106 pseudo r2 = 0.0192 prob > chi2 = 0.0000 wald chi2(7) = 83.48 fractional probit regression number of obs = 832 figure 6. fractional regression the interpretations based on the conditional mean of r predicted in appendix 5 give the conclusions above. the probability of having at least one delay decreases on average about 15.98% when moving from a borrower who consider the neighborhood not being happy of his or her financial situation to another borrower whose neighborhood is qualified as being happy. the reasoning is the same with the jealousy neighborhood variable (13.6% reduction). for the variables (shame experience) and (marital status), the probability of having at least one delay increases about 8% or 9% when passing from a borrower who has never experienced a shameful situation to another who has already experienced a shameful situation; or from a not married to a married borrower. finally, moving from borrower who never ask for family financial support to another who often ask for family financial support increases about 7.2% the probability of having at least one delay in maturity repayments. 4. concluding remarks individual decisions concerning prosocial activates belong to the class of decisions where both economic incentives and social norms play a role. in this paper, we attempted to bring together social norms and economic incentives on an equal footing in a model of individual choice concerning prosocial behavior, especially related to maturity repayment. after describing an overview of economics and sociological theories that address the motives of individual’s prosocial behavior, we proposed an evidence-based sociological framework of individual’s prosocial behavior focusing on the justification and the economies of worth of boltanski and thevenot. this article explores the frontier of economy and sociology by questioning the very foundations of individual’s prosocial behavior. the study addresses the causal effect of economic incentives and social norms on individual moral hazard applied to maturity repayment behavior of loans. without using www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 33 published by scholink inc. collateral as defined in the microeconomics of banking, we studied theoretically the effects of values used as the very bases of the reasoning that justify individual behaviors in various contexts. and we empirically tested the effects of theses values in the maturity repayment behaviors of borrowers in a specific context applied in africa. we used the logit, the probit and the fractional method. these results invite to a socioeconomic approach which indicates that economic material and non-material incentives and social norms known as social preferences are likely to have important effects on shaping of prosocial behaviors of individuals. the results indicate that the probability of having no delay strongly increase with the use of the practice of sponsorship. we notice that the practice of endorsement is non-significant for knowing about the behavior in maturity repayment. that help us conclude that social norms (such as religious status, indifference regarding failure) and material incentives (loan renewal) and non-material incentives (sponsorship) are potentially powerful to lead borrowers to the prosocial act of maturity repayment of loans. however, the logit and probit models explain only 26% of borrowers’ behaviour towards maturity repayments. this recommends including additional explanatory variables in our models or looking for alternative models such as poisson regression analysis. references armendáriz-de-aghion, b., & gollier, c. (2000). peer group formation in an adverse selection model. the economic journal, 110(465), 632-643. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00557 bénabou, r., & tirole, j. (2006). incentives and prosocial behavior. american economic review, 96(5), 1652-1678. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.5.1652 besley, t. (1995). non market institutions for credit and risk sharing in low-income. journal of economic perspectives, 9(3), 115-127. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.9.3.115 boltanski, l., & thevenot, l. (2006). on justification, economies of worth. catherine porter, french initial version: de la justification, les économies de la grandeur, gallimard. bowles, s., & polanía-reyes, s. (2012). economic incentives and social preferences: substitutes or complements? journal of economic literature, 50(2), 368-425. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.50.2.368 cribari-neto, f., & zeileis, a. (2010). beta regression in r. journal of statistical software, 34(10), 1-24. fehr, e., & fischbacher, u. (2002). why social preferences matter-the impact of non-selfish motives on competition, cooperation and incentives. the economic journal, 112(478), 1-33. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00027 frey, b., & oberholzer-gee, f. (1997). the cost of price incentives: an empirical analysis of motivation crowding-out. american economic review, 87(4), 746-755. kamalan, a. e. (2010). efficacité des contrats de dette pour les clients individuels en microfinance, le rôle des liens de clientèle, étude dans des institutions de microfinance oust-africaines. lyon, thèse www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 34 published by scholink inc. de doctorat en science économique. université lyon, 2. kamalan, a. e. (2018). supervisory incentives within contracts: a principal-supervisor-agent approach. journal of finance and bank management, 6(2), 58-63. kamalan, a. e. (2019). economics and sociological foundations of prosocial behavior: a theoretical survey. american journal of humanities and social sciences research, 3(1), 164-168. lacetera, n., & macis, m. (2010). social image concerns and prosocial behavior: field evidence from a nonlinear incentive scheme. journal of economic behavior & organization, 76(2010), 225-237. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2010.08.007 lindbeck, a., nyberg, s., & weibull, j. (1999). social norms and economic incentives in the welfare state. the quarterly journal of economics, 114(1), 1-35. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355399555936 papke, l., & wooldridge, j. (1996). econometric methods for fractional response variables with an application to 401(k) plan participation rates. journal of applied econometrics, 11, 619-632. https://doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1099-1255(199611)11:6<619::aid-jae418>3.0.co;2-1 ryan, r., & deci, e. (2000). intrinsic and extrinsic motivations: classic definitions and new directions. contemporary educational psychology, 25(2000), 54-67. https://doi.org/10.1006/ceps.1999.1020 simpson, b., & willer, r. (2008). altruism and indirect reciprocity: the interaction of person and situation in prosocial behavior. social psychology quarterly, 71(1), 37-52. https://doi.org/10.1177/019027250807100106 notes note 1. r. thaler (2017, rationality and social preferences), r. shiller (2013, behavioral finance), d. kahneman and v. smith (2002, cognitive bias, heuristic decisions, behavioral economics), h. simon (1978, limited cognitive rationality). note 2. further details concerning the cities, greatness and values are provided in boltanski and thevenot (2006) and kamalan (2010). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 35 published by scholink inc. appendix 1 prob > chi2 = 0.0000 pearson chi2(146) = 338.89 number of covariate patterns = 159 number of observations = 832 logistic model for delays, goodness-of-fit test correctly classified 77.28% false rate for classified pr( d| -) 19.79% false + rate for classified + pr(~d| +) 25.28% false rate for true d pr( -| d) 18.87% false + rate for true ~d pr( +|~d) 26.42% negative predictive value pr(~d| -) 80.21% positive predictive value pr( d| +) 74.72% specificity pr( -|~d) 73.58% sensitivity pr( +| d) 81.13% true d defined as delays != 0 classified + if predicted pr(d) >= .5 total 408 424 832 77 312 389 + 331 112 443 classified d ~d total true logistic model for delays appendix 2 (*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 famsup* -.0166407 .04511 -0.37 0.712 -.105054 .071772 .653846 loantyp* -.3390236 .05273 -6.43 0.000 -.442372 -.235675 .673077 postopp* .0208265 .04578 0.45 0.649 -.068906 .110559 .653846 loanrenw* .1561585 .07361 2.12 0.034 .011893 .300424 .927885 sponsor* .5549829 .03232 17.17 0.000 .49163 .618336 .612981 relistat* .3040212 .16111 1.89 0.059 -.011745 .619788 .990385 maristat* -.1410714 .0721 -1.96 0.050 -.282388 .000245 .90024 shamexp* .0165782 .05227 0.32 0.751 -.085879 .119035 .216346 indifail* .1892248 .05092 3.72 0.000 .089418 .289031 .813702 jealneig* .0342094 .07681 0.45 0.656 -.116331 .184749 .894231 hapneig* .1332654 .09298 1.43 0.152 -.048978 .315509 .956731 endorse* .051812 .05364 0.97 0.334 -.053326 .15695 .41226 variable dy/dx std. err. z p>|z| [ 95% c.i. ] x = .46990806 y = pr(delays) (predict) marginal effects after logit www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 36 published by scholink inc. appendix 3 prob > chi2 = 0.0000 pearson chi2(146) = 333.19 number of covariate patterns = 159 number of observations = 832 probit model for delays, goodness-of-fit test correctly classified 76.68% false rate for classified pr( d| -) 20.36% false + rate for classified + pr(~d| +) 25.90% false rate for true d pr( -| d) 19.36% false + rate for true ~d pr( +|~d) 27.12% negative predictive value pr(~d| -) 79.64% positive predictive value pr( d| +) 74.10% specificity pr( -|~d) 72.88% sensitivity pr( +| d) 80.64% true d defined as delays != 0 classified + if predicted pr(d) >= .5 total 408 424 832 79 309 388 + 329 115 444 classified d ~d total true probit model for delays appendix 4 (*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 famsup* -.0207464 .04235 -0.49 0.624 -.103753 .06226 .653846 loantyp* -.3183615 .05019 -6.34 0.000 -.416741 -.219982 .673077 postopp* .0187582 .04288 0.44 0.662 -.065279 .102796 .653846 loanrenw* .144945 .07151 2.03 0.043 .004796 .285094 .927885 sponsor* .5482105 .03145 17.43 0.000 .486577 .609844 .612981 relistat* .3090923 .15512 1.99 0.046 .00506 .613125 .990385 maristat* -.1054208 .06559 -1.61 0.108 -.233969 .023128 .90024 shamexp* .0157929 .04911 0.32 0.748 -.080466 .112052 .216346 indifail* .1724996 .04951 3.48 0.000 .075457 .269542 .813702 jealneig* .0290295 .07045 0.41 0.680 -.109049 .167108 .894231 hapneig* .1236404 .08974 1.38 0.168 -.052243 .299524 .956731 endorse* .055328 .05214 1.06 0.289 -.046866 .157522 .41226 variable dy/dx std. err. z p>|z| [ 95% c.i. ] x = .46236814 y = pr(delays) (predict) marginal effects after probit www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 1, 2019 37 published by scholink inc. appendix 5 (*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 famsup* .0727744 .0206 3.53 0.000 .032404 .113145 .653846 postopp* .0027111 .02136 0.13 0.899 -.039148 .04457 .653846 maristat* .098741 .0345 2.86 0.004 .031114 .166368 .90024 shamexp* .0879557 .02241 3.93 0.000 .04404 .131871 .216346 jealneig* -.1363622 .03209 -4.25 0.000 -.199253 -.073472 .894231 hapneig* -.1597509 .03332 -4.79 0.000 -.225057 -.094444 .956731 endorse* .0098449 .01952 0.50 0.614 -.02842 .04811 .41226 variable dy/dx std. err. z p>|z| [ 95% c.i. ] x = .51839399 y = conditional mean of r (predict) microsoft word ape-v3n4-p34 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 34 original paper deteriorating image of political parties in malang, indonesia budhy prianto1* & dwi suharnoko1 1 department of public administration, faculty of social and political sciences, university of merdeka malang, indonesia * budhy prianto, department of public administration, faculty of social and political sciences, university of merdeka malang, indonesia received: august 25, 2020 accepted: october 16, 2020 online published: october 22, 2020 doi:10.22158/ape.v3n4p34 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v3n4p34 abstract in the democratic countries, political party acts as mediator bridging communication between government and its citizens. the decline of political party taking place before and after the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections and legislative elections certainly affects the political parties in carrying out their roles. conducted in malang, objective of this study is to describe factors contributing declining image of political parties and its implications. the findings showed that image of political parties are deteriorating due to lack of trust towards the political parties and politicians in the parliament. the decree on direct vote system for both presidential and regional head election and establishment of an open proportional system in legislative election also contribute to the deterioration. implications of the phenomenon are negative attitude and declining interest towards political party. keywords democracy, presidential election; legislative election; political party, constituent 1. introduction number of political partiesincreas sharply in the reformation era. the general election commission reported that 48 political parties participated in 1999 election. however, the number plummeted to 24 political parties in 2004 election. there are 38 political parties including 6 local political parties in nangroe aceh darussalam in 2009 election. in legislative election conducted on april 9, 2014, the number declined sharply 12 national political parties and 3 local political parties in nangroe aceh darussalam. in 2019 election, the number slightly increased into 16 national political parties and 4 local political parties from nangroe aceh darussalam (tempo, april 22-28, 2019). the fluctuation is inversely proportional to the number of voters participating in the last four elections. in 1999 election, the number of voters is pretty high, and percentage of abstentions is only 10.21%. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 35 published by scholink inc. however, in the next three general elections, the percentage keeps increasing. percentages of abstentions in 2004 legislative election, the first round of 2004 presidential election and the second round of the election are 23.34%, 23.47%, and 24.95%. in 2009 election, the percentages increase into 29.1% during 2009 election and 40% in 2009 presidential election. percentage of abstentions in 2014 legislative election is 30%—the highest among the legislative election in (tempo, april 20, 2014, p. 31; tempo, april 27, 2014, p. 20). however, in 2019 election where both presidential and legislative election took place on april 17, 2019, percentages of abstentions fall sharply to 19.24 % (surbakti, 2019). meanwhile, percentage of abstentions in 2019 regional head election is 27.9%. according to several political observers, the percentages indicate that image of indonesian political parties is deteriorating, and the public trust towards the parties is critically low (republika, juni 29, 2018). voters, particularly young voters are sceptical towards general election because of a number of criminal acts involving prominent figures of indonesian political parties. as an addition, younger voters are not familiar with most political party cadres. according to andrinof caniago, a political observer from university of indonesia, jokowi won 2014 presidential election because voters and younger voters in particular voted for him rather than indonesian democratic party for struggle (pdip), jokowi’s party. as the result, adrinofstated that political parties should improve their image among public in order to get more votes in the upcoming general election (kompas, april 28, 2013). indonesian survey institute (lsn) stated that political parties become a democratic institution that gains the least amount of public trust (42%). percentages of public trust towards public organization, non-government organization (ngo), press institution and survey agency are 57.5%, 58.5%, 65.1% and 69.3% respectively (republika, july 16, 2013). survey conducted by surat kabar harian kompas, one of the daily newspapers in indonesia revealed that an aspect determining how many votes political parties can get is performance of 6,607 legislative candidates competing in 2014 legislative election. it has been proven that voters tend to vote for legislative candidate rather than political parties these candidates represent (kompas, april 14, 2014). this phenomenon occurs not only in the city but also in rural areas. vice secretary general of the prosperous justice party (pks), mahfuz sidikadmitted that political apathy has spread widely in rural areas these days. he said that they did not see any change even though they have visited polling stations (tps) repeatedly (http://politik.news.viva.co.id/news/read/484404-wasekjen-pks--masyarakat-desa-makin-apatis-politik). the public is thinking that political parties can no longer carry out their role effectively, are corrupt, and tend to neglect public aspiration. various non-professional polls, empirical studies, and open discussions reveal how deteriorating image of indonesian political parties among the public is (see surbakti, 2019). an idea that an aspect that determines result of 2014 presidential election is people’s coalition instead of political coalition had once emerged (kompas, april 26, 2014). based on the background, the first objective of this study is to identify some factors that results in deterioration of indonesian political parties’ image or critically low public trust towards the political parties in 2014 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 36 published by scholink inc. presidential and legislative election. secondly, it also aims to provide theoretical and practical implication on deteriorating image of the political parties after 2014 presidential and legislative election. 1.1 role and function of political party the 2008 decree number 2 on political parties and its amendment, article 10 (2) of the 2011 decree number 2 stated that the specific objectives of political party are: a) increase political party members and public participation in carrying out political and governmental activities, b) fight for ideals of political party within the life of society, nation, and state, and c)develop political ethics and culture within the life of society, nation, and state. theoretically, kantapawira (1980, pp. 63-64) stated that objectives of political party are: a) participating in the government system, b) conducting social control, and c) stream-lining raw opinion. on the other hand, the 2008 decree number 11 stated that functions of political party are as a means of: a) political education for its members and the public raising their awareness on their rights and obligations as citizens, b) creating a conducive climate for the unity and integrity of indonesia and ensuring public welfare, c) absorbing, gathering, and channelling public political aspiration in formulation and establishment of state policies, d) political participation of indonesian citizens, and e) political recruitment in the process of political position assignment through democratic mechanism while taking into account gender equality and justice. theoretically, the functions of political parties are: a) a basic for the mobilization of masses of citizens; b) a means of recruiting and socializing political leaders; c) structured political identity, at both the masses and elite levels; d) a method of control within a government structure; e) a means of interest expression and articulation; and f) a basic of supportive function (shively, 1991:172-180; budiardjo, 2008, pp. 405-410; macridis, 1988, pp. 27-31). 1.2 political party and general election different from the era of direct democracy where representing institution that voices public interest, demand and support to government authorized for decision-making is not a requirement, political modern system in then ation-state needs political party (agustino, 2007, p. 100; amal,1988, p. xi). norris (2005, p. 3) even argue that modern democratic system cannot work well without political party. pivotal role of political party is shown in a number of functions it should carry out. shively (1991, p. 172) noted that political party plays various different roles, namely: a basis for the mobilization of masses of citizens; a means of recruiting and socializing political leaders; structured political identity, at both mass and elite levels; and a method of control within a government structure. in relation to political system, functions of political party closely associated to general election are nomination and recruitment, policies, and legitimating (panggabean, 1991, pp. 182-186). political parties would later be analyzed based on the third function. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 37 published by scholink inc. 1.3 deteriorating image of political party and its implication in his most current article, ignazi (2014) stated that recently many political parties create innovation to alter and improve their image. however, many considered their innovation powerful and yet distrusted. string political party does not have any legitimacy. political observers considered this phenomenon deteriorating image of political party (see for example, suara merdeka, august 1, 2013; republika, july 16, 2013; kompas, january 8, 2019). in general, this phenomenon emerges as public dissatisfaction towards performance of political party in the government system, party management, and relationship between political party and grass root community. it is the result of false campaign promises, ideological labels and political speeches. in several aspects, the responses are the results of boastful campaign promises (pamungkas, 2010). national survey institute (lsn) conducted polls at the beginning of may in 33 provinces in indonesia which identify four aspects resulting in a sharp decline of public trust towards political parties (republika, july 16, 2013). first, the public are aware that members of the political parties in the house of representatives are involved in corruption cases. second, the public is thinking that political parties tend to neglect issues taking place in the society. third, most political party members are unable to realize their campaign promises. fourth, some political party members are arrested because of adultery, and drug abuse. anti-party sentiment is also associated to political party and elitist’s failure. social, political and economic issues are waiting for solution; however, a lot of party leaders are irresponsible, violate their access to public resources and prerogative rights, and even commit the act of corruption or nepotism. this elitist domination results in cartel politics. cartel politics emerges as the result of coalition among political elitists to minimize loss in either general election or coalition. cartel puts higher emphasis on incorporation from elitists who have different ideological background (supriatma, 2009, p. 8). collecting evidence, ambardi (2009, p. 3) formulated five characteristics of cartel politics in indonesian political party system, namely: (1) absence of ideological role of political party as determining factor of party coalition behavior; (2) permissiveness in making coalition; (3) absence of opposition; (4) result of election barely influences political party behavior; and (5) political party tendency to act collectively as a group (see kristiadi, 2009). these characters, according to supriatma (2009, pp. 9-10), bring at least four important political consequences towards indonesian politics. first, cartel focuses solely on pragmatism. radical activists interested in entering political sectors are forced to adjust to this climate. second, blurry line between government and the opposition. both government and opposition tend to compromise rather than showing their opposing perspectives. third, cartel is collutive system eradicating people’s power. fourth, cartel has such ironic impact towards political power of the people. it produces a relatively passive community similar to the floating masses in the new order era. ambardi (2009, p. 3) argued that this relationship refers to effort of these parties to maintain their collective survival, forcing them to develop cartel. this collective survival is determined by mutual interest to protect existing sources of funding, particularly one from the government via rent-seeking. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 38 published by scholink inc. tan (2013, pp. 81-82) in a study in three southeast asian countries—indonesia, thailand and the philippines—mentioned a number of indicators of the decline political parties’ prestige. those are: • level of identification with parties; that the low level of identification is associated with negative behaviour that leads to a low level of trust in the party; • undecided voters; if voters are still in doubt, it could be that they cannot determine a difference between parties, and therefore cannot determine who should be elected. • turnout. this is problematic because voting can degenerate with various reasons such as understanding the importance of contests, personal beliefs about the benefits of voting, and changing electoral systems. • spoiled votes. voting can also show dissatisfaction with the parties offered, and in a complex electoral system may cause many votes are invalid even though the voters may not have an interest doing protest. • party membership figures. party membership number; the membership number of the party is to measure the anti-party attitude. if pro-party people, they will be more likely to join the party, and the number of membership will increase. and when the anti-party attitudes are high, then, the amount of party support will decrease. the statement of daalder as quoted by pamungkas (2010) complements the indicators stated by tan above. daalder stated that anti-party sentiments could actually be divided into 4 (four) attitudes. first, the denial of party. the idea of this category is to deny the role of party legitimacy, and to view the party as a threat to the good society. second, the selective rejection of party. the thinking in this group is to see certain types as “good” party types and others as “bad” ones. third, the selective rejection of party system. this group sees certain party systems as “good” and other party systems “bad”. finally, the redundancy of party. this group sees that anti-party sentiment is a logical consequence of a period where the party loses its relevance because of the emergence of other political actors in democracy such as the mass media, individuals and interest groups, and pressure groups. the new actors seemed to take over the main function of the party in which the party had played a role. tan (2013, p. 82), furthermore, also stated that the impact of the decline in the prestige of political parties can vary, depending on the political context. in general, the decline in the prestige of political parties carries the risk of weak political party legitimacy and elections, which in turn contributes to the institutionalization of an unhealthy party system. efforts to break the circle are with legislative reform, specifically relating to the formulation of the party law and new elections (see also ignazi, 2014). in terms of political parties pamungkas (2010) proposed the opinion, that to avoid the worst possibility of the decline in the prestige of political parties, a number of measures to strengthen political parties need to be considered. first, political parties need to balance behaviour between politics to seek power and politics to fight for the interests of the people. political parties must be aware that the history of the existence of political parties is not solely for power but also for the welfare of the people. second, in order to balance this behaviour, political parties need to have a clear ideological line (bringing ideology www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 39 published by scholink inc. back in). in this case, the ideology is referred to a guide that will be used to conduct the political choices taken when a policy has to be set. finally, they need to institutionalize political parties. this institutionalization will make political parties take root in society, stable in contestation when elections and internal stability of the organization can be better maintained. similar opinion was also expressed by mahfud md, that it is necessary to use political movements while making healthy political parties available. by fixing the political party law and politics also need to be closer to religion. the recruitment pattern of political parties should be beneficial abiding good laws and animates religious teachings (kompas, february 19, 2012). symptoms of the decline in prestige of political parties of this kind are perhaps what mack (2010, p. 8) refers to as disalignment, which points to the state of a major loss of support for political parties among core voters (core basic voters). disalignment conditions are characterized by at least: strong issues concerning national identity crisis and leadership failure; the split between the party and its main base; severe and permanent loss of support among their core voters; and the displacement (displacement) of the main party positions by previously small political parties or new parties; as well as by the electoral system applied. 2. method this qualitative research approach focuses on two aspects: first, the relationship between political parties (political party elites) and voting members or communities and the arguments that underlie the behaviour of political party members and the voting community and their preferences in determining choices in legislative and presidential elections in 2014; and second, the practical and theoretical implications of the decline in prestige (public distrust of) political parties, both the implications that have already been manifested and the latent implications that are still in the form of predictions. data or information obtained through documentation studies sourced in kompas newspapers and tempo magazine and in depth interviews with a purposive number of political party leaders, social-cultural activists, and voters in malang area by using snow-ball technique. the process of processing and analysing data uses the steps as stated by cresswell (2010). 3. results and discussion 3.1 relations between political party elites and constituents and the voting community seeing the data stated above, in general, the phenomena emerged in all types of political parties that determine the decline of political parties prestige (image) are four factors. first, the public perceives political parties in parliament as being heavily involved in corruption cases. some of the cases that emerged were scandals involving the partai ddemokrat (pd) and partai keadilan sejahtera (pks). later another cases involving officials of partai persatuan pembangunan (ppp), partai gerindra and partai demokrat indoensia perjuangan (pdip). second, related to the decline in public trust that people consider the existing political parties are having little concern over the various problems that befall the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 40 published by scholink inc. people; the main people at the grassroots. third, the behaviour of party politicians by some people are considered as very pragmatically act, where party officials are perceived to tend to behave pragmatically in dealing with various strategic national issues. this pragmatic behaviour was later recognized as transactional politics. transactional politics have damaged the noble values in political science. in addition, it damages the morals and order of society. the further impact is that ideology-based parties as well as islam-based parties are experiencing degradation. transactional politics carried out by the elite of political parties is then imitated by some people. people no longer believe in ideology but rather to deify money (kompas, 14 may 2014). transactional politics has ruined everything. such transactional political practices are one reason for the decline in support of a number of political parties. while the fourth cause, is still related to the behaviour of party politicians who have been implicated in amoral scandals such as infidelity, many wives and drugs. on the other hand, parties perceived as caring about people’s problems and rarely involved in corruption get a pretty good public appreciation. from the constituent’s point of view, political parties are the link to fight for their interests which are expected to be realized in a state policy. constituents are part of a wider community that has diverse interests and needs. political parties as a bridge between the community and the state have a bargaining position as one of the main channels in knowing how to fight for the interests of the people in the political system in this country. therefore political parties are very dependent on the support of constituents in the general election (fionna, 2013, p. 139). society and the state both need political parties to build relations between the people and the state. the relations between these three parties (community, political parties, and the state) are closely related (surbakti, 2019). constituents certainly expect political parties to be close to them and can always be trusted to be their bridge in the life of the state. on the eve of simultaneous general elections presidential elections and legislative elections held simultaneously-in 2019, constituents from each political party only become the main target of the political parties concerned to achieve the interests of political parties, namely winning the presidential and vice presidential seats as well as winning as many parliamentary seats. this is as said by a constituent informant of a political party: “their new election moment usually becomes a moment to come to us. so that the relationship between the party and the constituents is in my opinion just a relationship that has no bound; it happens only when there are general elections. if there is no general election, then the party’s relationship with us as a constituent would be impossible”. the mutual relationship between political parties and constituents as consumers should lead to the creation of loyalty between the two parties. however, this does not seem to have become a reality in malang. in the end, constituents tend to have a negative view of political parties, including political parties and their elected legislators during general elections. the statement of a socio-cultural observer who was a research informant strengthened the phenomenon of these negative views: “i think it is natural for a constituent’s view to be like that, and that is indeed a result of low trust in the party and the relative inadequacy of the image of legislators among constituents”. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 41 published by scholink inc. the facts above found were supported by various polls conducted by the indonesian survey institute since 2004, which found fairly consistent results that the public tends to have a negative view of political parties. in early 2015, the level of trust in political parties and the house of representatives (dewan perwakilan rakyat/dpr) was in the range of 50%, far below the confidence in the president (83%) and the corruption eradication commission (komisi pemberantasan korupsi/kpk) (81%). the negative view of constituents as the main consumers of political parties is reflected in their opinions about political parties or politicians. one of socio-cultural observers in malang stated: “in malang some time ago, there was corruption done in congregation, i was ashamed, because one of them was my protege, her name was nanda. that’s an example; it turns out that they don’t have the traits of a statesman. this is due to the political party being in power for too long, its elites always set short goals. these short objectives are wrapped in various jargon of struggle, but their purpose is how to gather power and opportunity by doing corruption. the corruption case in malang was a failure of political parties. now when the young generation, millennial generation, is not interested in the political frenzy, they cannot be blamed”. so, three negative things that people often remember are that politicians often don’t keep promises; only care about personal and group interests; and like to talk about themselves or arrogant. the negation of the three negative things is a key condition of the creation of trust in a relational relationship. it is no wonder that the level of constituency trust will always be low for political parties. consistently, various polls have also found that constituents feel they are not close to political parties, with a value between 15-20%. this will make it difficult for political parties to approach their constituents. the results of these polls are one of the reasons constituents change their choices in each election. the relationship created between constituents and political parties has been only a transactional relationship, and it will be quite difficult to move towards a relational relationship where trust from both parties is absolutely necessary. good party management and political credibility greatly influence the level of constituents’ trust in them. these two things have not been seen in the political context in indonesia. the wearing down of the constituents’ trust in political parties which is still experiencing internal conflicts will naturally occur. this will continue as long as political parties do not try to regain the confidence of their constituents. “this is a result of political parties forgetting too long their obligations to carry out political communication and education to their constituents,” urged a research informant. the phenomenon as stated above ultimately makes the life of political parties encourage the strengthening of democratic practices elitist. this practice is more directed at political parties becoming office-seeking parties that are influenced by the tendency to gain power. this is possible because positions in government offer incentives to accumulate financial resources through rent seeking. the social basis of the masses can be ignored and party ideology can be set aside. this elitist practice of democracy by mack (2010, pp. 6-7) on one hand is called leadership failure and on the other hand as a form of alienation from the core base that causes disalignment in political parties. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 42 published by scholink inc. 3.2 the regulatory aspects of the general election and the decline in the image of political parties amendment of the rules as referred to in article 56 paragraph (2) of the law of the republic of indonesia number 32 of 2004 to become articles 56-59 of ri law 8 of 2012 concerning general elections lies in the addition of parties from outside political parties that are given the right and given the authority to propose themselves and or propose individuals to nominate as pairs of candidates for regional head. through articles 56-59 of law number 8 of 2012, the state responds to the public’s desire to continue to use an open proportional system, a system in which the determination of legislative candidates is based on the mechanism of majority votes. this system has been used since the 2009 general election, after the previous article governing the closed proportional system based on the serial number in the law of the republic of indonesia number 10 of 2008 through judicial review was declared invalid by the constitutional court (mahkamah konstitusi/mk). in its consideration, the constitutional court stated that the determination of legislative candidates based on serial number was not in accordance with the substance of people’s sovereignty as regulated in article 27 paragraph 1, article 28 d paragraph 1, article 28 d paragraph 3, and article 28 i paragraph 2 of the 1945 constitution. politics the law on the 2009, 2014 and 2019 general election system at least indicates that the state hopes that by removing the nomination of legislative candidates based on the serial number, it will provide equal opportunity and treatment to all legislative candidates in contesting in the 2014 legislative elections and beyond. all contestants can carry out fair competition in building popularity and electability before the voting audience. through the amendment of article 59 of law number 32 of 2004 to article 59 of law number 12 of 2008, it clearly shows that political parties are no longer the sole party that has the right and authority to propose candidates for regional head candidates in the election of regional heads. this change in its development then certainly had an impact on the reduced role of the party on the one hand and increased opportunities for the role of the community on the other hand in the process of proposing pairs of candidates for regional head. pursuant to law number 8 of 2012 concerning general elections of members of the people’s legislative assembly, regional representatives council, and regional people’s representative council, specifically in 5 paragraph (1) the rules regarding the electoral system for dpr, provincial dprd and regency / city dprd members. article 5 paragraph (1) stipulates that elections to elect members of the dpr, the provincial dprd and the regency / city dprd shall be conducted using an open proportional system. then in article 7 it is also emphasized that participants in the general election to elect dpr, provincial dprd and regency / city dprd members are political parties. the operationalization of the open proportional system in the voting process for the election of members of the dpr, provincial dprd and regency / city dprd, is clearly regulated in article 154 which stipulates that the voting for the election of members of the dpr, dpd, provincial dprd, and regency / city dprd is conducted by cast a single vote on the number or image mark of a political party and / or the name of the candidate on the ballot. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 43 published by scholink inc. however, the most crucial thing in setting the open proportional system is in the process of determining the elected candidates for members of the dpr, provincial dprd, and regency / city dprd. for this reason, article 215 of law number 8 of 2012 concerning general elections of members of the dpr, dpr and dprd regulates this matter in detail. the full article 215 states as follows: the determination of elected candidates for members of the dpr, provincial dprd, and regency / city dprd from election contesting political parties is based on the acquisition of seats of election contesting political parties in an electoral district with the following conditions. a. elected candidates for members of the dpr, the provincial dprd and the regency / city dprd are determined based on the candidate who receives the most votes. b. in the event that there are two or more candidates who fulfil the provisions as referred to in letter a with the same vote acquisition, the determination of the elected candidates is determined based on the distribution of the vote acquisition of the candidates in the constituency taking into account women’s representation. c. in the case of candidates who meet the conditions referred to in letter a, the number is less than the number of seats obtained by the election contesting political parties, the undivided seats are given to the candidates based on the subsequent acquisition of the most votes. this clause in article 215 points a, b, c, empirically has a very large consequence on the views and attitudes of the constituents of political parties and the public over political parties. in a number of cases the phenomenon emerged that during the election voters were more likely to vote for a candidate’s name than to vote for a political party. various provisions with all kinds of changes regulated in laws on political parties, laws on general elections, as well as regional government laws and decisions handed down by the constitutional court of the republic of indonesia relating to the holding of elections have clearly had an impact on the life and role political parties. the rules of the proportional system are open and the rules that open up opportunities for individual candidates in presidential and regional head elections seem to be clearly more personable than the role of political parties. this fact reinforces the opinion of mack (2010, p. 7) that the electoral system is one of the preconditions that causes disalignment of political parties. 4. conclusion to overcome the decline of political party’s prestige, thus, requires internal and external solutions. on the internal side, transactional politics and wild political party oligarchies are the effects of an open proportional system that has major implications for liquid or fading ideology, so that constituent ties with political parties become very loose. political parties, in turn, tend to be fragmented and easily fragmented. even further than that, virtue, integrity, especially attitudes prioritizing the public interest are almost no longer visible. therefore political parties must have the courage to change their perspective to immediately rebuild a party ideology, something far more valuable than power and money. in this ideology, in addition to the people’s ideals and state ideas that must be fought for, the soul bond between political parties and their constituents is also linked. by re-holding and building the ideology of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 4, 2020 44 published by scholink inc. politicians, political parties will be more demanded to politic by upholding ethics and morals, politically politic to be more beneficial to society. on the external side, given the widespread practice of pragmatic and transactional politics in the context of legislative elections is the implication of an open proportional system, it needs to be reconsidered to return to a closed proportional system. transactional political practices are also rampant since the implementation of the direct election system for regional heads at the provincial and district / city levels. therefore it is better if the regional head election system at both levels of the regional government is handed back to the dprd according to their respective levels. indeed, this step raises fears of a strengthened oligarchy (elite) of political parties if a closed proportional system again applies to legislative elections, and an indirect electoral system in regional elections. however, a number of studies say that the implementation of an open proportional system and the direct election system for regional heads are more disadvantageous than the possibility of the practice of oligarchy (elite) political parties in the administration of democracy. 4.1 suggestion referring to the above research conclusions, suggestions can be made regarding the strengthening of political parties. internally, political parties must strive to avoid transactional politics and oligarchy of political parties, political parties must also return to the ideological basis that forms a bond between political parties and their constituents. externally, the rules that establish an open proportional system in the general elections of legislative members and the rules that stipulate the system of electing the regional head directly must be changed, because this system in practice actually further alienates political parties from constituents. in elections, constituents tend to look more at candidate figures than at the political parties that nominate them. acknowledges the authors would like to acknowledge the funding of the directorate of research and community service, directorate general for research and development at the ministry of research, technology and higher education, indonesia no.: 229/sp2h/lt/drpm/2019, 19th february 2019, which made a portion of this research possible. orcid budhy prianto https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1941-1446 references agustino, l. 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(2013). anti-party attitudes in southeast asia. in d. tomsa, & d. danurfen. andreas (eds.), party politics in southeast asia: clientelism and electoral competition in indonesia, thailand and the philippines. routledge, london and new york. tempo, april 20, 2014. tempo, april 27, 2014. tempo, april 28, 2019. undang-undang republik indonesia nomor 2 tahun 2008. undang-undang republik indonesia nomor 32 tahun 2004. undang-undang republik indonesia nomor 42 tahun 2008. undang-undang republik indonesia nomor 8 tahun 2012. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 1 original paper borderland, migration and the question of national identity in nigeria, 1914-1991 bello zakariya abubakar (ph.d),1* tanko a. adihikon (ph.d),1* & hamisusani ali1* 1 department of history and diplomatic studies, federal university wukari, taraba state, nigeria * bello zakariya abubakar ph.d, tanko a. adihikon (ph.d), & hamisusani ali, department of history and diplomatic studies, federal university wukari, taraba state, nigeria received: april 14, 2022 accepted: may 18, 2022 online published: june 8, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n3p1 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n3p1 abstract prior to the european conquest of africa, the area of study was made up of various political entities with different ethnic and religious backgrounds. however, the british colonization and subsequent 1914 amalgamation brought all ethnic nationalities and regions together to form what is now nigeria. nevertheless, the nature of political boundaries in africa separated people with common ethnoreligious and political experiences. thus, most of the people at the borderlands freely migrate to and from nigeria to neighbouring countries without respect for immigration laws which made it difficult for national identity in the west african sub-region. therefore, nationalism and independence in nigeria/africa have failed to correct such colonial mistakes which made it difficult to address the question of national identity. above all, the national identity management commission (nimc) which was established by the nimc act no. 23 of 2007 to address the issue of immigrants is still battling the question of national identity. keywords borderland, dual indigenization, migration, moribund 1. introduction before the advent of british colonization in nigeria, the country was made up of various autonomous political entities and each was more or less ethnically and religiously homogenous with its kings or rulers at the apex of the administration. the borderlands of these kingdoms were ‘naturally’ demarcated with natural physical features (rivers and mountains) without many boundary disputes, dual indigenization, and also without the question of national identity as the case today (opanike & adulogu, 2015). examples of some of these political states or kingdoms were hausa city-states which later www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 2 published by scholink inc. metamorphosed into sokoto caliphate, kanem-borno empire in the northeast, jukun kingdom, idoma, tiv, and other minorities in the north-central region, oyo empire in the south-western region and the stateless igbo society and other minorities in the south-eastern region (ajayi & crowder, 1977, p. 40). however, with the european scramble for and partition of west africa between 1884 and 1885 and even beyond, french and british colonization of the west-african sub-region with their borderlands separated many families and ethnic groups which were homogenously together and this brought about the question of national identity, a serious and unresolved issue both within and outside nigeria. british conquest and colonization of nigeria as we shall see was done in a piecemeal process between 1861 and 1914 (crowder, 1962). its borderlands, from all directions, were shared with french-speaking countries with artificial boundary lines not natural as they were before. as we shall see in this study, nigeria and cameroon are recognized as being the most linguistically heterogeneous countries in africa and ethnically homogenous at the borderland. they constitute one of the most linguistically diverse areas in the world, despite having well below 2% of the world’s population. the borderland shared by these countries is perhaps the most densely populated area linguistically and ethnically speaking (connell, 1997). one of the sticking features with the nigerian borderland is that the neighbouring countries share one or more homogenous ethnic groups. for example, the hausa and fulani are found in nigeria, niger, chad, and cameroon republics, yoruba in both benin and nigeria, the ewe in ghana, and togo and the brong in cote d’ivoire and ghana. along these borderlands, there are traditional and modern border markets such as the ones in jibia (magama-jibia), badagry, idi-iroko, seme, hainare, and bang down which always attracted merchants from diverse origins, who flock to these markets regardless of government restrictions and regulations (usman, 2019). 2. an overview of the study area (nigeria’s neighbouring countries) nigeria has four major borders and these borders lead to four west african countries. the country shares a border with cameroon in its southern parts of the cross river. it also borders chad in northeast and niger in the north. additionally, nigeria also borders republic of benin in the south-western region (opanike & adulogu, 2015). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 3 published by scholink inc. figure 1. showing nigeria and her neighbouring countries source: internet source. let us take a look at a brief profile of these countries bordering nigeria which were artificially created by france. firstly, benin is also known as the republic of benin and formerly called dahomey. the country is bordered by togo to the west, nigeria to the east, and burkina faso and niger to the north. a significant portion of the country’s population lives on the small southern coastline of the bight of benin which is a part of the gulf of guinea in the northern tropical part of the atlantic ocean. the capital of benin is porto-novo, however, the economic capital and the seat of government is located in cotonou which is also the largest city in the country. the official language of benin is french but the native languages are fon and yoruba (akinjogbin, 1966). the dominant religion in the country is roman catholicism. and there are also muslims, voodoo, and protestant christians. the country was colonized by france but in 1960, the republic of benin, gained full independence. the republic of chad is a landlocked country located in central africa. the country is bordered by libya to the north, the central african republic to the south, sudan to the east, cameroon and nigeria to the southwest, and niger to the west. in terms of landmass, chad is the fifth largest country in africa. the people of chad sharing borders with nigeria also share the same religion and the same ethnic groups e.g. sara, arab, and kanembo. also, these people share similar ethnic groups and cultural heritage. these religious and cultural similarities resulted in the question of national identity (samuel, 1977). in terms of economic motives, the people of both countries are closely related by occupation, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 4 published by scholink inc. cattle rearing, hides, skin production, and so many other socio-cultural similarities. the country is named after the popular lake chad. the capital of chad is n’djamena and it is the largest city in the country. the official languages in chad are arabic and french. it is important to recall that most of the nigerian arabic students in universities and colleges of education must go to ngala village at the border of borno and chad for arabic training for some months or a year. the country was colonized by france in 1920 but gained independence in 1960 under the leadership of francois tombalbaye. cameroon is a central african country that is bordered by nigeria to the west, chad to the north-east, the central african republic to the east, and equatorial guinea, gabon, and the republic of the congo to the south. its coastline lies on the bight of biafra, part of the gulf of guinea and the atlantic ocean. the official languages of cameroon are french and english (kunings & nyamnjoh, 2003). the country is extremely culturally diverse, and it is often referred to as africa in miniature. some of the natural features include beaches, deserts, mountains, rainforests, and savannahs. the highest point of the country at almost 4, 100metres (13, 500ft) is mount cameroon in the southwest region of the country. and the largest city in terms of population is duala on the wouri river. duala is also the economic capital and main seaport while yaoundé is its political capital. based on history, cameroon was colonized in the past by germany, france, and britain. the country eventually gained independence in 1961 to become the federal republic of cameroon. the nigerian-cameroon border region is on the coast from a 1963 map, with bakassi peninsula in the middle as shown on the map ii attached. bakassi is a peninsula on the gulf of guinea. it lies between the cross river estuaries, near the city of calabar west of the bight of biafra, and the rio del ray estuary on the east. it is governed by cameroon, following the transfer of sovereignty from neighbouring nigeria as a result of a judgment by the international court of justice. on 22 november 2007, the nigerian senate rejected the transfer, since the green tree agreement ceding the area to cameroon was contrary to section 2 (1) of the 1991 constitution. regardless, the territory was transferred to cameroon on 14 august 2008. during the scramble for africa, queen victoria signed a treaty of protection with the king and chiefs of akwaakpa, known to europeans as old calabar on 10 september 1884. this enabled the british empire to exercise control over the entire territory and calabar, including bakassi. the territory subsequently became a de facto part of nigeria, although the border was never permanently delineated. however, documents released by the cameroonians, partly with that of the british and germans, clearly placed bakassi under cameroonian territory as a consequence of colonial anglo-german agreements. after southern cameroons voted in 1961 to leave nigeria and become a part of cameroon, bakassi remained under calabar administration in nigeria until icj judgment in 2002 (lej.org). niger officially known as the republic of niger is a landlocked country located in the west african sub-region and it is named after the niger river. the country is bordered by libya to the northeast, chad to the east, nigeria and benin to the south, burkina faso, and mali to the west, and algeria to the northwest. the borders of niger and nigeria do not distinguish the people in any way because these www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 5 published by scholink inc. people have had similar ways of life for ages. they are of the same ethnic groups and have the same socio-economic and cultural similarities as noted by abdullahilabo above (labo & afolaya, 2000) they are mostly muslims, and they are farmers or agriculturalists whose expertise is deeply rooted in cattle rearing. they have cross-border marriages, family ties, and similar ways of dressing and geographically they have the same territorial landscape. the population is predominantly muslims with some christians. the capital city is niamey. over the years, niger has consistently ranked close to the bottom of the united nations human development index (hdi). as of 2015, the country was ranked 187th of 188 countries. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 6 published by scholink inc. figure 2. showing bakassi peninsula source: internet source. 2.1 british creation of nigeria and its implications the british conquest of nigeria was done in a peace-meal process or stages from 1861 to 1914. this political and economic subjugation was motivated by purely economic factors regardless of the peoples’ cultural affiliations. thus, it resulted in the economic exploitation of its natural resources and cultural separation of families and homogenous ethnic groups along the borderland as noted above. to fully understand this, let’s examine critically the stages involved in the british conquest of nigeria for its ulterior motives. however, it is important to note that, before the british conquest, all the kingdoms and empires mentioned above had natural boundaries and the peoples were ethnically homogenous without the question of national identity. it is an indispensable fact of history that, nigeria is a british creation, and that the various peoples of nigeria were brought together politically by the efforts of british officials and traders with the support of the british government. the first step in the british acquisition of nigeria was the annexation of lagos in 1861 as lagos colony. in this regard, j.f.a. ajayi makes the following submission; “the 1861 annexation of lagos marked the first major step taken by the british government in the 19th century to acquire economic and political domination over the people of nigeria (ajayi & crowder, 1977, p. 55).” then, britain proceeded to the minority ethnic groups and established oil rivers protectorate in 1885 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 7 published by scholink inc. as a result of increasing rivalry with other european powers in the area. the british government was still very unwilling to undertake the heavy financial burden of administering the area despite of the stipulations of the berlin west african conference on effective occupation. but in 1891, it created a skeletal administration by the appointment of a commissioner and consul-general who resided at old calabar. consuls and vice-consuls were also appointed. in 1893, the area of the protectorate was extended inland to lokoja and benue and renamed the niger coast protectorate. then in1897, following the british occupation of benin, that area west of the niger became part of the niger coast protectorate (berlin conference act, 1884-1885). meanwhile, certain events had made the british occupation of yoruba land necessary. these were the adverse effects of the yoruba wars on trade with lagos which led to increasing interference in the affairs of yoruba states by the lagos administration, and the threat of french encroachment on yorubaland. as a result of the french threat, the lagos government signed a treaty with the alaafin of oyo in 1888 by which he placed about two-thirds of yoruba land under british protection while the remaining one-third was left to the french government. that was why as noted above, some yoruba are found in togo today. these european artificial boundaries made the question of national identity too difficult to be resolved (abubakar, 2019). by 1896, about two-thirds of yoruba land south of ilorin was under the control of the lagos government. thus, lagos and yorubaland were administered as the colony and protectorate of lagos. on 1st january 1900, an important administrative advancement was made when the niger coast protectorate was renamed the protectorate of southern nigeria and the consul-general turned into the high commissioner. moreover, in may 1906, this protectorate was merged with the colony and protectorate of lagos as the ‘colony and protectorate of southern nigeria’ with lagos as headquarters (crowder, 1962). unlike the southern region where britain was faced with little or no resistance, the colonization of northern nigeria was by real military conquest also in a peace-meal process. britain succeeded in the imposition of an indirect rule system of administration in the northern region because the emirs were not united due to rivalries and internal wars. consequently, the hinterland of nigeria north of lokoja became administered, on behalf of the british government, by a chartered company the royal niger company (crowder, 1962). the british government had declared a protectorate over areas claimed by the company in 1887. then on january 1, 1900, it took over direct administration of the area from the royal niger company and named it the protectorate of northern nigeria with lugard as its first high commissioner. finally, the two separate governments; the colony and protectorate of southern nigeria and the protectorate of northern nigeria were amalgamated as the colony and protectorate of nigeria on january 1, 1914, and lugard became the first governor-general. above all, what is important to note is that, since the british imposition of its rule in 1861 up to 1991, the last creation of states that was made by general ibrahim badamasi babangida, the implications of these, both internally and externally, were the separation of some homogenous ethnic groups and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 8 published by scholink inc. families. consequently, this phenomenon resulted in the problem of dual indigenization within the country and the question of national identity between nigeria and its neighbouring countries. 2.2 the migration trends in the sub-region migration, which is the movement of people from one geographical location to another, has remained at the centre of west african history for several centuries. it is important to note that migration is a global phenomenon. it has been attributed to influencing the characteristics, distribution, and size of the population of the sub-region (mahdi, 1987). a migrant can be a person who uproots himself from his original home and moves to a new place where he settles and establishes new links. geographical movements of the population along the nigerian border are generally divided into two categories. one, the movement is impelled by religious or political considerations. on the other, population movement is caused by economic factors such as the need for specific types of labour in a neighbouring country (borjas, 1989). once migrants have moved into a new area they are confronted by a new environment with its people, culture, economic, and social organizations, and their chances of achieving success and settling down are largely dependent on the degree of the individual and collective interactions with the host communities. although there are no exact figures for the number of migrants who arrive at wide-ranging destinations throughout west africa at different times, it is obvious that migration is on the increase, particularly as the absence of effective regulation by the nigerian immigration service has made it possible for migrants to criss-cross international nigerian borders in search for greener pastures. this fact is substantiated by lee (1966) who in his nine laws on migration noted the escalation in the volume and accumulation rates of migrants in the absence of effective regulation of either nimc or the immigration service of its neighbouring countries. thus, in the west african sub-region, a large number of migrants move daily, largely for economic reasons. although, individuals’ move may not necessarily be economic, others move to visit their biological relations or friends, for marriage and naming ceremonies. similarly, rica (2019) has observed; that most of the migration movements commonly attributed to economic causes are a host of individual motivations and many of which remain to be discovered. this study looked at the individual motivation of resident immigrants in nigeria with its neighbouring countries and observed the degree to which they had become integrated into the host community because of their biological and ethnic relations. it was considered important to look critically into the validity of the international notion that the immigrants were propelled to migrate by hunger, misery, and/or war as in the case of the calabar-cameroon border at ogoja, and bekwara (mahdi, 1987, pp. 210). related to this was the importance of knowing how well immigrants became acculturated in their host community, whether they simply imparted their own culture and belief systems from their places of origin if not biologically or ethnically related; and whether they participated fully in local, formal and informal organizations. for several hundred decades or so, the region called west africa today has witnessed intense climatic www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 9 published by scholink inc. changes which have had a negative impact on water availability and the overall stability of the region’s environment (mahdi, 1987). an important corollary of this has been the continuous southward advancement of the sahara desert, which is sucking dry the region’s flora and fauna and making life increasingly difficult and miserable for a large number of people both within nigeria, niger, and chad republics. throughout the sub-region, mass population movements have been triggered by this natural phenomenon as noted here. this type of population movement, prompted by the need for water and land for grazing as in the case of fulani herders in nigeria, niger, cameroon, and chad republics respectively was not the only type of movement in the west african area. communal clashes or wars, trade, conquest, natural disasters, kidnapping, and the domestic slave trade were also very important factors that motivated migration in west africa both during the pre-colonial, colonial, and present times. one common feature of these migrations, however, was that they were group phenomena with individual motivation playing little or no part (zacharia & conde, 1981). therefore, the arrival of the colonial powers particularly britain and france as noted above in the late 19th and 20th centuries, generated upheavals in the organization of the economy and society that changed the hither to nature of migration in west africa. as such britain and the french colonial government built development centres around mineral deposits and shifted the centre of gravity of economic activities from the hinterlands to the coastal regions, where new capitals were created to serve the economic interests of colonialism. the europeans also introduced new crops such as cocoa and soya beans which were grown for export to their own countries. mines were exploited maximally by the metropolises. ports were constructed, as well as roads and railways to link the ports to the plantations and mining centres. all these contributed to migration both within and outside the subregion. along with this wholesale restructuring of economic activity came a large-scale redistribution of the population both within and outside nigeria, as people moved all over the sub-region in search of economic prosperity. there was, for example, a massive movement of nigerians to lagos, port harcourt, and to gold coast (ghana) to participate as either skilled or unskilled labourers or traders in the then-booming “adoji” and gold ceremony. migration in the west african sub-region during the pre-colonial, colonial, and present times cannot, however, be attributed to economic factors alone. there were and are also climatic, political, religious, biological, and administrative factors. for example, the seasonal nature of agricultural production enabled nigerians both fulanis and non-fulanis to move to the coastal areas and neighbouring countries and or states during the dry season to earn enoughto sustain their lives (rica, 2019). the colonial boundaries imposed by britain and france restricted some people to travel on one hand, while on the other hand enabled people of biological ethnic ties to travel the length and breadth of vast colonial empires without completing immigration services formalities. however, movements across borders were possible, and sometimes facilitated by agreements between nigeria and her neighbouring countries, such as the ones signed under ecowas agreements. thus, with these agreements, there are www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 10 published by scholink inc. free movements regardless of whether there is an international border between the point of departure and destination. consequently, migrants are mainly attracted to areas with significant development indications of economic prosperity. the dominance of the economic factor over the cultural element in influencing migration is very evident at the present. for example, since the beginning of large oil exports in the early 1970s, nigeria has experienced a mass influx of immigrants from all over west africa and beyond. similarly, cote d’ivoire, with its economic boom, has attracted workers from burkina faso, niger for more than 30 years. thus, modernization and economic achievement, as in most parts of the world, have also motivated migration in the sub-region. 2.3 theoretical explanation of migration several scholars have gone beyond mere pragmatic observation and have formulated theoretical models to explain the phenomenon of migration. the objective of these scholars was to understand the dynamics of migration and assist authorities to introduce better-focussed policies to address the issues at stake. these theories have made a distinction between internal and international migration, as the existence of borders does nothing to explain the underlying causes. furthermore, related to border migration and the ecowas protocol, the frequency with which people move across the international borders in the west african sub-region without official sanction has been a source of concern to the authorities. this is more so since several hundred unofficial routes exist. in most cases, however, these large cross-border movements are simply natural movements of persons belonging to the same ethnic group, separated by political and or colonial borders which cut across the territories of homogenous populations. neighbouring countries share one or more ethnic groups. for example, the hausa are found in nigeria and niger, the yoruba in benin and nigeria, the ewa in ghana and togo, and the brong in cote d’ivoire and ghana. international borders in west africa are reputed to cut across the territories of 100 ethnic groups that are homogenous and biologically related (murdock, 1959). these movements have continued with little or no hindrance despite differences in ideology, membership in financial communities, and even conflict between states. the cohesion and solidarity among the people across these borders and the movements are still going on despite the arbitrary international borders drawn by the european powers in 1885 in berlin. hundreds of peasants move across international borders several times a day to and from their farms and to visit relations. the emir of maradi in the niger republic is addressed as “sarkinkatsina” (i.e., emir of katsina) due to the historical link between maradi and katsina in nigeria. traditional and modern border markets such as the ones at jibia, badagry, idi-iroko and seme, bang down, and hainare have attracted merchants from diverse origins, who flock to these markets regardless of government restrictions and regulations. consequently, this makes the question of national identity to be very difficult. borders have, therefore, largely remained imaginary, with too few immigration officials to control the movement of people. immigration officials, particularly if they are unfamiliar with the border area, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 11 published by scholink inc. have a lot of difficulty in differentiating between “travelers” from neighbouring states or countries and their countrymen and women, since most of the migrants are of the same ethnic origin. this situation has continued to be of concern to national authorities, especially concerning its implication for taxation, health, education, military service, household statistics (census), and other aspects of public administration. it was fundamentally for this reason that regional economic/political groupings and communities were established to unite the sub-region and regulate issues common to the status with the cross-border movement of people at the centre of such initiations. the several regional groups in west africa such as the economic community of west african states (ecowas) and the west african economic community (ceao) have attempted to regulate the movement of people across the international borders in the sub-region as stipulated in the international labour organisation constitution (barbour, 1961). the 1979 ecowas protocol is a case in point. the 1st article of the protocol illustrates this. the protocol entitles all citizens of the community to enter, reside and settle “permanently” in the territory of member states. a target of 15 years was set for this objective to be achieved and no distinction was made regarding the occupational status of potential migrants. three distinct phases were established for the attainment of total freedom of movement without a visa and for the right to reside and settle as a community citizen in any country of choice. briefly put, these phases are as follows; phase i: citizens of member states were given the right to travel within the sub-region without a visa for a period not exceeding 90 days. this was meant to facilitate the movement of business people, seasonal workers, and tourists except where the host country approved. it excluded movement for regular and full-time employment. (this phase ended in 1984). phase ii: this phase began in 1985. under this phase, community citizens were entitled to the right to reside and engage in full remunerated employment. the tension created by the expulsion from nigeria of about two million migrants from ecowas states almost halted the implementation of this phase. this tension, however, was resolved by 16 heads of the community, and a supplementary protocol to phase ii was enacted. phase iii: initiated in july 1986, this protocol established the right of all citizens in the community to reside in any country to seekand carry out income-earning employment (article 2), and to be given a permit (card) acknowledging their right of residence (ilo conference, 1986). apart from these provisions, the protocols also contained four articles that dealt with the expulsion of the immigrants. from the contents of the articles, it is clear that expulsions could still take place under very strict conditions. meanwhile, mass expulsions were prohibited, and a number of guarantees were prescribed for immigrants under an expulsion order such as the right of appeal, the reimbursement of travel costs, and the right to retain acquired entitlements. from the foregoing, it can be seen that authorities in west africa were quite aware of the intensity of the current cross-border migrations and the important part played by the historical origins of the movements. the cultural and religious similarities of the west african people have made it easier for www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 12 published by scholink inc. migrants to integrate into host communities without necessarily going through formalities of either ecowas or immigration laws. the ecowas protocols are designed to facilitate the movement of migrants and prevent abuse. the implementation of this agreement, however, has been hampered by the lack of respect for its articles by both the migrants and state authorities within the community. more so, there are several reasons for migration between nigeria and its neighbouring countries. in a more elaborate form, several factors or motives were behind the movement of the migrants out of their countries of origin (see table below). this table indicates that the economic factor was behind most of the migrants’ decision to leave their home country. nevertheless, there was some secondary reason behind migration as indicated in the table below. for example, some migrants visit their relations or families in the neighbouring countries (opanike & aduloju, 2015) whereby a completely jobless person could migrate in the hope of finding employment. alternatively, a person with a good job in one place might move to another place in search of a better job with higher pay. table 1. motives for migration motives for migration frequency percentage search for a better job search for knowledge search of islamic knowledge political reasons environmental crisis (e.g. wars, drought, etc) to visit relatives 30 20 10 10 15 15 50% 30% 13% 10% 25% 25% total 74 104% the majority (50%) of the respondents left home to work outside their home countries, i.e., for economic reasons. while others left in search of knowledge. this has traditionally been a motive for migration in nigeria and west africa in general. seekers of islamic knowledge are well known for migrating to different places to consult learned sheikhs and many of them have ended up settling there permanently and have become part of the learned host community. those who gave political reasons for leaving home do not discuss the nature of the political situation that had made it necessary for them to migrate. while others left because of environmental factors and crises/wars. and others visit their relations. but women generally visit their relations and or follow their husbands (labo & afolayan, 2000). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 13 published by scholink inc. table 2. reasons behind the decisions to migrate reasons behind the decisions frequency percentage (%) friends self relations parents individuals 13 15 06 03 08 28.9 33.3 13.3 6.7 17.8 total 45 100% the majority of the migrants (67.7%) were encouraged to migrate by friends, relations, parents, or husbands. only fifteen respondents indicated that they took the decision to leave their countries by themselves and were uninfluenced by others. this is not surprising as life in a traditional setting is so structured that people do not live independently of each other but are bonded by relationships that could be familial, social, or economic. they often feel bound to consider the opinions of others when taking important decisions. 2.4 the question of national identity apart from the external factors that have been discussed above, that is between nigeria and its neighbouring countries; internal factors compounded the issue of national identity. the thirty-six states of the federation plus fct were created for political reasons, not for economic and or ethnic considerations. this also compounded the problem and issue of ethnic identification and dual indigenisation in the country by some individuals. moreso, the six geopolitical zones of nigeria are major division in modern nigeria, created during the regime of president general saniabacha. nigerian economic, political, and educational resources are often shared across the zones. although, some scholars argued that, the thirty-six states and geographical zones were entirely created or carved out based on geographical location, but rather with similar ethnic groups, and/or common political history were classified in the same zone or states. nigeria is made up of approximately 400 ethnic groups and 450 languages. there was a need for the government to merge similar ethnic groups for effective identification and curb dual indigenisation. based on the above analysis, it is imperative to note that the british creation of nigeria and the proliferation of states up to thirty-six plus federal capital territory, abuja was done without ethnic and or geographical consideration but for purely political considerations, and that is why it became a serious threat to population explosion, in spite of the efforts of the national identity management commission (nimc) and the nigerian immigration service. to overcome the problems and tackle the issue of dual indigenization, the nigerian government introduced national identity management system under nimc. therefore, national identity management commission (nimc) is a statutory nigerian organization www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 14 published by scholink inc. that operates the country’s national identity management system. it was established by the nimc act no. 23 of 2007 and established to create, operate and manage nigeria’s national identity card database, integrate the existing identity database in government institutions, register individuals and legal residents, not immigrants, assign a unique national identification number and introduce general multipurpose cards (yakubu, 2020). due to illegal immigrants and the homogenous nature of the ethnic groups at the borderlands as well as to curb the issue of dual indigenization, a national identity card system was initially conceived in 1977 but the project did not see the light of the day. in 2003, a new scheme managed by the directorate of national civic registration (dncr) was initiated and about 54 million nigerians were registered. however, the scheme failed to meet official expectations and was also hampered by allegations of corruption and embezzlement of funds. the national identity management commission came into effect in 2010 and an initial budget of about 30 billion naira was appropriated in the 2011 federal budget (nwazeh, 2010). the commission subsequently entered into an agreement with the national database and registration authority of pakistan to develop computerized national identity cards for nigerians (ezigbo, 2010). additionally, the commission also partnered with two consortiums, the first led by chams nigeria and the second, one secure card consortium composed of interswitch, secureid, and iris technologies to provide data capture services (ahmad, 2020). while the national identification number is a part of nigeria’s national identity management system (nims), the other part is the general multipurpose card (gmpc). the number stores an individual’s unique data in the database. it is part of a measure to create a national identity database and to prevent both double identity and identity fraud. however, the organization began the enrolment exercise in september 2010 and started the issuance of a multipurpose card in 2013. the identity card issued in 2013 can be obtained by nigerians aged sixteen, or who have lived in the country legally for two or more years at the point of the enrolment by providing an identification document with a photograph such as a driver’s license or an international passport. the id card contains a national identification number, a photograph, and a chip containing the biometric information of the holder. the commission also collaborated with mastercard to add a prepaid element to the card which can be used as an atm card in mastercard certified atms. thus, national identity management commission ensures the registration of all nigerians not less than sixteen years of age and all legal residents. again, nigerian immigration service is another agency or body established to ensure the migration of nigerians and none nigerians both within and outside the country in order to curb illegal migrants off the border. the nigerian immigration service (nis) was extracted from the nigerian police force (npf) in august 1958. it was at that time referred to as the immigration department and headed by the chief federal immigration officer (cfio).the immigration department was established by an act of parliament (cup 171, laws of the federation of nigeria) on august 1, 1963, when alhajishehushagari was the minister of internal affairs (a position now referred to as minister of interior). the initial law www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 15 published by scholink inc. regulating immigration duties was the immigration act of 1963 which was amended in 2014 and again in 2015 (immigration act, 2015). the service has, since 1963, been restructured to manage modern migration in line with global, regional, and sub-regional political alignments. the nigerian immigration service (nis) however, has leveraged the use of information and communication technologies in its operations including;  the introduction of the machine-readable electronic passport in 2007.  the creation of a service website and portal.  global passport intervention in line with the federal government policy on citizenship diplomacy.  forensic laboratory services for the examination of travel documents and monetary instruments.  the introduction of the combined expatriate residence permit and aliens card (cerpac). as empowered by section 2 of the immigration act, 2015, the service is responsible for;  the control of persons entering or leaving nigeria.  the issuance of travel documents, including nigerian passports to bonafide nigerians within and outside nigeria.  the issuance of residence permits to foreigners in nigeria.  border surveillance and patrol.  enforcement of laws and regulations with which they are directly charged; and the performance of such para-military duties within or outside nigeria as may be required of them under the authority of this act or any other enactment. 3. conclusion the study examined the historical creation of nigeria by great britain in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and its implications prior to the british creation of nigeria, the sub-region was made up of hausa city-states and later sokoto caliphate, oyo empire, benin kingdom, kanem-borno empire, and igbo and their minorities with their natural borderland without the issue of national identity and dual indigenisation. but the partitioning of the sub-region by britain and france in the era of the scramble for and partition of west africa with the imposition of artificial boundary lines separated some families and homogenous ethnic groups mentioned in the main work. and this consequently, led to the question of national identity and dual indigenisation. in order to address this global phenomenon in the sub-region, the federal government of nigeria passed an act of parliament on august 1 1963 known as immigration act to manage modern migration in line with global, regional, and sub-regional political alignments. the national identity management commission act no. 23 of 2007 also created, operated and managed nigeria’s national identity card. all these efforts are geared towards addressing the issue of national identity and dual indigenisation. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 16 published by scholink inc. references ajayi, j. f., & micheal, c. 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(1976). causes and repercussions of migration: a critical analysis. geneva: international labour organization 1976. george, p. (n.d.). types of migration of the population according to the professional and social composition of migrants. in c. j. jansen (ed.), readings in the sociology of migration. pergamon press. harris, j., & todaro, m. (1970). migration, unemployment and development: a tub-sector analysis. american economic review, 1970. labo, a., & afolayam, a. a. (2000). trans-border studies: the motivation and integration of immigrations in the nigerianigeria border area: a study of magamajibial/transborder movement and trading: a case study of borderland in south western. ibadan: ifranigeria, 2000. https://doi.org/10.4000/books.ifra.964 lee, e. s., & jacksen, j. a. (eds.). (1969). a theory of migration in migration. cambridge, cambridge university press. mahdi, a. (1987). migration, sedentarisation and urbanization process in the central sudan before c. 1800ad. paper delivered at the 2nd international workshop of the societededemographiehistorique, paris, france. 1987 nyamnjoh, f. b., & konings, p. (2003). negotiating an angle phone identity: a study of the politics of recognition and representation in cameroon. leden. netherlands: brill publishers, 2003. zachariah, k. c., & conde, j. (1981). migration in west africa: demographic aspects. london: oxford university press, 1981. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 17 published by scholink inc. notes note 1. see: abimbola opanike and aduloju a. a “ ecowas protocol on free movement and transborder security in west africa” in journal of civil and legal sciences 2015, 4: 154 dei: 10.4172/2169 0170.100154. note 2. jacob festus adeniyiajayi and micheal crowder (eds) history of west africa. vol.ii, (london: longman ltd 1977), 40-50. note 3. michael crowder, the story of nigeria, (london: faiber and faiber, 1962), 90-95. note 4. bruce a. connell, moribund languages of the nigeria cameroon borderland, (london: oxford university press 1997) a paper presented at the symposium on language endangerment in africa at the institute of social and cultural and social anthropology oxford university, july 29-31, 1997, 1-12. note 5. interview: malam hamisu usman, 45 years, immigration officer, (nis) mutumbiu station, gassol local government area taraba state, 20th november 2019. note 6. for further details see: abimbola opanike and aduloju a. a. “ecowas protocol on free movement and trans-border security in west africa”, in journal of civil and legal sciences, 4:154. doi:10.4172/2169-0170.1000154. note 7. for further details on dahomey and now benin republic, see: i. a. akinjogbin “dahomey and yoruba in the nineteenth century” in joseph c. anene and godfrey n. bown (eds) africa in the nineteenth and twenty centuries, (ibadan: ibadan university press and nelson, 1966), 255-269. note 8. samuel decalo, historical dictionary of chad, (lanthan, maryland, u.s.a: scare crow press inc., 1977). note 9. piet kunings and francis being nyamnjoh, negotiating on anglophones identity: a study of the politics of recognition and representation in cameroon (leden, the netherland: brill publishers, 2003), 22-76. note 10. on the cameroonnigeria borderland, there are fulani, mambilla, kaka, panso and kambu found on both sides of the countries. in fact, this is a source of problem to the issue and question of national identity and consequently, bring about dual indigenisation. for further explanation on this, see: land and maritime boundary between cameroon and nigeria (cameroon versus nigeria: equatorial guinea intervening) international court of justice see: www. icj.org (an over view of the case. this overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibilities of the court. note 11. abdullahilabo and a. a. afolaya,” trans-border studies: the motivation and integration of immigrations in the nigeria-border area: a study of magama-jibia/trans-border movement and trading: a case study of borderland in south western nigeria (ibadan: ifra-nigeria, 2000), doi: 10.4000/books. ifra.964. 111-96 note 12. jacob festus adeniyiajayi and michealcrowder (eds) history of west africa…… 55-60. note 13. the berlin conference of 1884 – 85 was also known as the congo conference of west africa. it legitimizes and regulated european colonization and trade in africa during the “new imperialism” www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 18 published by scholink inc. periods and concluded with germany’s sudden emergence as imperial power. the conference was organized by otto von bismark, first chancellor of germany. its outcome, the general act of the berlin conference, can be seen as the formalisation and legitimisation of the partition of africa by european powers. and this resulted to the creation of artificial boundaries with its negative consequences like the questions of national identity, dual indigenisation, and boundary disputes etcetera. note 14. interview: malam junaidu abubakar, 55 years. immigration officer (nis), jalingo 13th december, 2019. note 15. michael crowder: the story of nigeria, (london: faiber and faiber, 1962), 163. note 16. ibid. 64 note 17.abdullahi mahdi, migration, sedentarisation and urbanization process in the central sudan before c. 1800 ad. a paper delivered at the second international workshop of the societie de demographiehistorique paris, france, 1987, 1 – 8. note 18. george j. borjas, “economic theory and international migration” in the international migration review vol. 23, no. 3, special silver anniversary issue: international migration: an assessment for the 90’s (autum, 1989) sage publication. inc. note 19. everett s. lee a theory of migration: demography vol. 3, no. 1 durham, north carolina, united state: duke university press https://doi.org.102307/2546424. duke university press, 1966, 47 – 57 (11 pages) https//doi.org/10.2307/2060063 note 20. see: department of economic and social affairs, united nations international migration 2019 report. published by united nations. https://creativecommions,org/license/b//3.0/igo/ note 22. abdullahi mahdi, migration, sedentarisation and urbanization process in the central sudan, 210. note 22. ibid. note 23. zachariah, k. c and j. conde, migration in west africa: demographic aspects (new york: oxford university, press, 1981) 20-35. note 24. see: department of economic and social affairs, united nation international migration 2019 report. note 25. george peter murdock, africa: its people and their culture history, (new york: mc graw hill, 1959), 40-45. note 26. k.m barbour, a geographical analysis of boundaries inter-tropical africa in k.m. barbour and r, manshell prothero (eds.) essays on africa population, (london: rutledge and paul, 1961), 1-9. note 27. international labour organisation and standing orders of the international labour conference (olo geneva, 1986). note 28. the ecowas protocol on the free movement of people and goods ensure free mobility of the community citizens, i.e. citizens of member states. however, it also allowed members state the right to refuse admission to any community citizens who were inadmissible under the member state’s own domicide law. for further details see: abimbola opanike and aduloju a. a. “ecowas protocol on www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 19 published by scholink inc. free movement and trans-border security in west africa “in journal of civil and legal sciences 2015, 15. note 29. abdullahilabo and a. a. afolayan, trans-border studies: the motivation and integration of immigrations, 6. note 30. interview mr. caleb yakubu 57 years, immigration officer (nis), jaling, taraba state. 5th january, 2020. note 31. kingsley nwezeh, id card federal government targets 100 million citizens, this day (lagos), march 28, 2010. note 32. onyebuchi ezigbo, governments signs contract for new id card projects. this day (lagos), july 26, 2010. note 33. immigration act: an act to consolidate and amend the law as to immigration; to control in nigeria certain persons, and for matters connected there with (1963 no. 6 l. n. 91 of 1963). interview: bappa ahamad, 54 years, immigration officer, jalingo, taraba state, 15th january, 2020. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 34 original paper literature review on the foreign policy of china kun wang 1* 1 school of social sciences and humanities, loughborough university, leicester, united kingdom * kun wang, xuancheng 242000, china received: february 28, 2023 accepted: april 4, 2023 online published: april 11, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n2p34 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n2p34 abstract this literature review offers a comprehensive synthesis of existing research on china’s foreign policy, identifying the driving factors, strategic objectives, and implications for the global order. the analysis begins with how china’s foreign policy is formulated and is divided into core, middle-range, and long-range and then delves into theoretical frameworks, including realism, constructivism, and liberalism. also, this paper will highlight in this literature review how a leader’s choice, national compromise, and the system pressure deeply influence the foreign policy of china. the strategic objectives of china’s politics, military, and diplomatic initiatives, along with the role of leadership in maintaining world peace, diplomatic influence, and foreign aid, are also examined. the review concludes with an assessment of the implications of china’s rise for regional stability, international order, and power dynamics among major players. by critically evaluating the literature, this review provides valuable insights for policymakers, academics, and practitioners seeking to understand china’s growing influence on the global stage. keywords foreign policy, strategic objectives, theoretical frameworks, policy implications 1. introduction the foreign policy of a country constitutes strategies based on the self-interest of the sovereign state selected rationally by the state itself in order to safeguard the national interests while at the same time attaining state goals as a result of interaction with other sovereign states. in dealing with foreign policy, some critical actors are the state actors and the non-state actors in the international relations field (smith, hadfield, & dunne, 2016). the state is a major actor in international relations. however, as a result of deepening globalization levels coupled with the respective transnational undertakings, the states, as major actors in foreign policy formulation and implementation, are compelled to work with the non-state actors. some of the non-state actors include international organizations like the united www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 35 published by scholink inc. nations (un), the media, non-governmental organizations (ngos), multinational corporations, influential personalities like jack maa and bill gates, and terrorist groups (nešković, 2019). according to scholars like smith, hadfield, and dunne (2016), national interests are dominant; thus, foreign policy formulation takes place at the highest echelons of the government hierarchy in a sophisticated decision-making matrix. there is, thus, a symbiotic relationship between the state and the non-state actors at the international level in the practice of foreign policy. it is imperative to emphasize that national interests are the motivating factor in foreign policy. the primary national interests are national security, trade and commerce, environmental issues, human rights, and culture. as such, the foreign policy implementation is geared towards the attainment of the aforementioned interests. sovereign states have various tools which they use to implement their respective foreign policies like military, foreign aid, sanctions, diplomacy, and deterrence (rochefort, 2016). this paper seeks to do a critical literature review on the foreign policy of the people’s republic of china. the literature review analysis of china’s foreign policy will be based on the three-level analysis proposed by kenneth walts (1979) individual-level analysis, state-level analysis, and systems-level analysis. additionally, the paper will seek to do a literature review on the determinants of the foreign policy of china as espoused by different scholars, the foreign policy orientation of china, and the goals or objectives of chinese foreign policy. the paper will also delve into the theoretical foundations that influence the foreign policy of china, the various aspects of chinese foreign policy, and the implementation mechanisms. finally, the paper will emphasize the current state of china’s foreign policy and its positive significance to the world. 2. argument foreign policy is as important as the domestic policy of a state. chinese pursuit of foreign policy is to build on the domestic foundations in order to strengthen their coexistence among chinese nationals. the foreign policy of china is majorly anchored on economic development (zhang, 2010). to develop the economy of china, other parameters come in handy, like security and peace. at the core of this argument, the research will highlight in this literature review how a leader’s choice, national compromise, and the system pressure deeply influence the foreign policy of china. as such, the following are the critical determinants that have been able to indicate what direction and foreign policy position china makes on the international stage. the geographical location of china affects the population, the level of technology, military capability, and the political system (yinhong, 2015). international power structures, international law, and international organizations have also been critical determinants of chinese foreign policy. wang (2008) states that china is the most populous country on earth, with a vast geographical location sounded to many other countries. the foreign policy of china must thus reflect the aspirations of the people to be able to achieve their life goals and quality of life. the surge in the economic growth of china has also been imperative in determining the foreign policy position on economic matters in order www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 36 published by scholink inc. to be able to feed the population (liang, 2019). national security ensures the state is safe from danger. however, it is imperative to mention that other international factors like international organizations un which china is a member, and international operational laws influence the foreign policy positions of a nation-state. 3. existing literature review various literature has categorized the foreign policy of china into three distinct categories. vital or core foreign policy objectives ensure the existence and survival of the state, medium-range, and long-range categories (larik, 2016). 3.1 vital/ core foreign policy according to certain scholars, the core foreign policy objectives of china are fundamental to the survival of the state and its existence. the core objective of foreign policy is thus to ensure the state exists and functions on the basis of its responsibilities from which it exists to perform. under the vital categorization, the scholars have identified various contestation issues in the foreign policy of china that they seek to achieve. territorial integrity, political independence, sovereignty, economic independence, national security, and the citizenry (kang, 2008). 3.1.1 sovereignty and political independence the driver of this foreign policy is ignited by the system pressure due to the need for national security and interests under international laws. the system established and operated by the chinese acknowledges the importance of the political system’s independence and the will of the chinese to choose their system of governance. sovereignty gives the people’s republic of china the power to self-determine their course of action in their domestic affairs and international relations with other countries. china protects this sovereignty and political independence in china's inherent territory. literature reveals that china does not engage in bilateral relations with nations that do not recognize one china (european union, 2015). this is china's mission to protect national sovereignty and territorial integrity, which cannot be violated. 3.1.2 territorial integrity this is right china has over its land and other water bodies to administer self-rule on. it is the substantial form of the state which can be set and establish boundaries that stipulate the powers over which china can employ its constitution. after experiencing the second world war, china cherishes a peaceful and stable environment and always respects and values the territorial integrity of other countries. as such, the foreign policy of china is driven by the system pressure to ensure that the security of the nation is tight against any other state that would interfere with the local happenings within the geographical locations of china. territorial integrity informs on the chinese attitude towards the india boundary, which has been disputed over the years (al jazeera, 2020). accordingly, the contested south china sea and the island of spratly, to a large extent, inform the foreign policy element of peace within the chinese. but china www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 37 published by scholink inc. has always defended its territorial sovereignty, which is sacrosanct. 3.1.3 economic independence china strives to feed the population and get a number of the citizenry out of the poverty line. this foreign policy category is seen to be the building block of china’s foreign policy. china is the most populous country in the world. the government has a responsibility to ensure that the population can access basic services like education, healthcare, and social amenities and enjoy cultural heritage freely. as such, china seeks to dominate the global economy as the leading economic powerhouse through cooperation with other sovereign states. according to liang (2019), the belt and road initiative was launched by president, economic development is at the heart of the initiative. china has also challenged other global monetary institutions like the imf and world bank to change the voting system and reform the institutions. world trade organization has also felt the impact of china’s economic growth on the need to resolve economic disputes for market access. china has partnered with other countries like russia and india to create the development bank as an alternative to the breton woods institutions. 3.1.4 national security and citizenry the national security of china becomes a concern in order to secure political independence and territorial integrity and enhance economic independence. accordingly, the geographical location of china and its neighbors like north korea makes it critical for the national security of china to be enhanced (freedman, 2004). 3.2 middle-range foreign policy the middle-range foreign policy of china, according to some scholars, constitutes the ability of china to convert its massive economic power into global influence is that it is also a member of the united nations security council. at this point, china is seen to invest heavily in foreign aid, culture, humanitarian interventions, and the sports and film industry (rahman, 2020). china is thus attempting to have a global influence. this also aligns with china’s goal of peaceful development and increasing international influence in the context of great power strategic competition. 3.3 long-range foreign policy foreign policy scholars and analysts have opined that china is seen advancing on the long range to make the world live in a manner influenced by china (blanchard & lin, 2013). the chinese values and ideology would thus change the world in a technologically driven, cooperative, and peaceful. long-range foreign policy is driven by state compromises and the system pressure to ensure the prosperity of the chinese state. 4. strengths and weaknesses of existing literature the literature is rich and indeed strong in giving a clear categorization of the foreign policy china based on issues that drive the state to make the policies and implement such policies. scholars can thus give a critical examination and make predictions on global actions in the direction in which china www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 38 published by scholink inc. might make a decision. additionally, the foreign policy literature on china isolates the entire conundrum of what constitutes the foreign policy of china. as such, the leader’s choice as a foreign policy driver or the national compromise of system pressure can be critically evaluated and placed into context. however, the categorization has not factored into the historical development of china toward foreign policy. it has been futuristic literature with current and future trends dominating the foreign policy of china. 5. review of research 5.1 how china’s foreign policy is built there are several techniques that are involved in building foreign policy. it is critical to mention that the foreign policy of a state comes as the road map that the nation wants to follow to achieve the objectives of the state. these objectives can be vital or core to the natural survival of the state and include political independence, territorial integrity, national security, and the citizenry. the other objectives of foreign policy are medium-range objectives which include how the state wants to be perceived on the global stage. the third objective of foreign policy would be from the systems level on how the state views the world as it is and how it ought to be. according to rochefort (2016), in building foreign policy, both the state actors and the non-state actors are involved directly or indirectly depending on the policy position. as such, the formulation of foreign policy in china is informed by the leader’s choice. but this is not just the result of individual decisions, but collective wisdom and democratic political consultation. as the leaders, and in this case, chinese leaders would make policy decisions that govern the whole state. other influencers to policy building come from the national compromises, which include other state actors, and also the pressure of the system, which calls for the national interests in relation t global events and how to counter or position for such global events. in building foreign policy, the critical steps are six. the first step is the identification of the policy problem area (bardach & patashnik, 2019). what is the main problem that needs the policy to tackle it? when is it a problem, and who is affected by the problem? these are some of the critical questions to ask in problem identification. the second step is agenda setting, where the issue is brought to the general public. the third stage of foreign policy building is policy formulation. this step involves designing a response to the problem identified in the first step. the fourth step in policy building involves policy legitimization, then policy implementation, and finally evaluation of the policy. 5.2 problem identification in any scenario where there is a need to solve a problem, scholars like hudson (2002) have advanced the need to identify the problem and define the problem accurately and critically. by problem identification, policy analysts have advanced that there is a need to determine the root causes of the problem. the root causes of the problem will thus help to determine how long the problem has indeed www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 39 published by scholink inc. been a problem and the magnitude of its effects. identifying the problem will help in solving the problem since the scope of the problem shall have been established. at certain times, problems can be identified by the general public, activists, the media, or foreign parameters under non-state actors. in some instances, the problem can be identified through the state actors who are the leader of the nation, the judiciary, or even the legislatures. consequently, once the problem has been identified, then the agenda is set. 5.3 policy agenda 5.3.1 agenda setting agenda setting in foreign policy involves making the problem public and inviting public discourse on the matter (blankshain, 2019). once the issue has received the limelight, the discourses can help see the best cases on how to solve the problem by floating different alternatives. general criticism and acknowledgment of the problem happen in this stage. 5.3.2 policy formulation hudson (2002) asserts that the formulation of policy involves consultation and raising possible scenarios that can help solve the identified problem. several solutions are floated and debated so that the best policy response is selected. under the selection of the best response, the rational choice theory can be used. can the policy select maximize utility at the least cost possible? for instance, when china wanted to solve the economic growth conundrum in the country and to put china on the global map, several formulas were derived both the long-term and the short-term goals. the best policy was thus selected to gain more economic growth for the country in a sustainable manner. 5.3.3 policy legitimization/adoption policy legitimization is the process where the government selects the best alternative from all the floated solutions and makes it legal and operational within the confines of the law. 5.3.4 policy implementation policy implementation is then the next step, where the relevant authorities operationalize the law or act in order to achieve the desired foreign policy position. the decision of china to sanction the us senators marco rubio and ted cruz for meddling in china’s political independence in chinese territory was thus implemented by the migration officials to ensure the two senators didn’t go to china. 5.3.5 policy evaluation to what extent is the policy formulated giving the best result or answering the problem it was intended to solve? how effective is the policy? these are some fundamental questions that are raised when evaluating the policy to know if there is the maximization of the policy benefits or if the problem is being fully solved by the policy formulated. 5.4 theoretical foundations of china’s foreign policy various foreign policy scholars and foreign policy commentators opine that china’s foreign policy is anchored on several theoretical underpinnings. the two critical theories which have been proposed are the rational actor’s model and the institutional model. however, other commentators have been able to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 40 published by scholink inc. postulate that liberalism and realism theories have to a great extent, also influenced the chinese approach to their foreign policy. as such, there will be inadequacy when only one theoretical underpinning to the study of china’s foreign policy, thus the combination of the multiplicity of the theories. 5.4.1 rational choice theory the rational choice theory has been advanced by different scholars as a critical tool for foreign policy analysis. it helps to establish the reasoning or rationale behind the decisions and actions which sovereign states make in their international relations in foreign policy (smith, hadfield, & dunne, 2016). according to the rational choice theory, the main actors of foreign policy are always rational citizenry who have the capacity to make calculated and informed choices that have the capability of enriching the state with maximum benefits. the state is thus advanced as the primary unit of analysis. the context of the analysis is based on interstate relations. the theory makes the assumption that the state is a unitary, monolithic actor. the model also makes an assumption that the actions taken by the policymakers are after sufficient information is provided in order to optimize decisions (bueno de mesquita, 2009). another assumption postulated by the proponents of the theory is that the actions which the actors make are coherent and consistent. as such, the adherents of the theoretical advances that the process of making the decision is composed of problem identification, the definition of outcomes desired, evaluation of available choices, decide on the choice with the most outcome maximization at the least cost. while the proponents of the rational choice theory have advanced that the model is critical in the understanding of the foundations which influence the foreign policy of a state, there is certain criticism that has also been leveled against the theory. the rational choice theory has been criticized on the assumption that actors make rational decisions based on the availability of sufficient information (alden, 2017). however, in the contemporary world, there are cases where decisions would have to be made, yet information is not sufficient. additionally, the theory has been criticized by other skeptics like tripp’s (2020) model that the theory has failed to mention the emotional behavior, mental, or physical health behaviors of foreign policy actors or policymakers after they have been fed the information on which a decision is to be made. 5.4.2 institutionalism theory the institutionalism model of foreign policy is a critical theory in understanding the theoretical foundations which influence the foreign policy of china. institutional structures like rules, norms, schemes, and routines shape social behavior and foreign policy to that effect (scott, 2013). the assumption of the theory is such that in a well-established institutional system, individual leaders have little influence on foreign policy. the theory assumes that the institutions will have checks and balances to produce foreign policies from the structures of the institution to respond to national interests. the bureaucratic institutions which have been set up help in the development of policy and to some extent the generation of the policy. accordingly, the individual leaders working within the institutions will www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 41 published by scholink inc. have little choice but to follow institutional structures to get an outcome of a policy (bojang, 2018). the institutional structures included the legislative aspect, the judicial structures, and the executive branch, which work together for checks and balances to produce a desired outcome. however, it is critical to mention that the theory has been criticized for failing to acknowledge the influence individuals have within the institutions (peters, 2019). while the institutions have structures to influence the outcomes of policies, the individuals have the power to influence the institutional structures and how the institutions come up with certain parameters for formulating and or implementing foreign policy. when talking about institutions, it is imperative to mention that democratic institutions will produce more open and foreign policy formulation mechanisms that involve many influences like the non-state actors (peters, 2019). however, when the institutions are nondemocratic, the processes and structures of policy formulation and implementation would not necessarily reflect the participatory aspect of the general public. 5.4.3 realism theory realism theory is one of the oldest theories which have been used to illustrate the happening at the international relations stage and specifically the motivations behind the various foreign policy decisions and positions which states take. the theory has been advanced by certain scholars to have its roots in the thucydides in the peloponnesian war in the aggression of states. later, niccole machiavelli, in his book the prince, advised the sovereign that the national security of the state is paramount. machiavelli illustrated that a king needed to be both a fox and a lion. the fox is for the king to act with wisdom and decorum to attain good leadership for the state. by acting as a lion, the sovereign ensured peace and national security were enforced at all costs. as such, he suggested that leaders needed to be good men to the best of their ability and violent too, in the same measure to ensure the security of the state is guaranteed. thomas hobbes also came up with the concept of the state of nature. he asserted that human beings were in a state of nature that was full of conflicts and thus needed a sovereign to enforce law and order (waltz, 1979). in the state of nature, the man was in perpetual conflict with each other. as a result, the man entered a social contract to surrender the rights to the sovereign to ensure man lives in peace and orderly manner. later, hans morgenthau was a proponent of the international system as being in a state of anarchy (morgenthau, 1973). as such, there was no global body that could enforce the law on other nation-states. a simplistic explanation of the concept is that within the international system, whenever there is an emergency, then there is nobody to call. 5.4.4 assumptions of theory one of the major assumptions made by the adherents of classical realism is that the international system is anarchic (farooq & javaid, 2019). as such, there is no global police or law enforcement body that reigns over all sovereign states. accordingly, the proponents of the realist theory advance that the states are the principal actors in international relations. however, the theory recognizes the presence of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 42 published by scholink inc. other non-state actors within the international system but affirms the critical role of states as the major actors. another assumption made by the realists is that decision-makers within the international system are rational decision-makers, who will act in the best interest of the state to ensure national security, power, and prosperity. 5.4.5 application of theory realism theory has been judged by certain scholars and thinks tanks as a foundation that informs chinese foreign policy. according to jervis (2017), perception matters a lot in international politics. china is on the rise to creating perceptions and developing norms within the international system. as a leader’s choice and national compromise, the president of china, who echoed the china dream, which was meant to rejuvenate the chinese population. certainly, this is not just the choice of individual leaders, but the collective wisdom of the chinese leadership. accordingly, other commentators on foreign policy picked the phrase which was mentioned by colonel liu mingfu, a retired peoples’ liberation army of china, where he called for china to build the greatest world military power (hudda, 2015). these sentiments have indeed acted as fodder to the realism analysts of foreign policy. realists have opined that the rapid economic growth in china has been accompanied by a massive buildup of the military through increased spending in the military budget and cutting-edge technological advancement (the economist, 2012). according to data from the stockholm international peace research institute (sipri) in their 2013-year book contends that china increased its military budget from the period of 2003 to 2012 by a margin of 175% (sipri, 2013). according to the research institute, this was an increase of more than any other country in the world. in monetary language, this was an increase from the 30 billion us dollar budget in 2008 to $170 billion by 2012. the economist (2012) also projects that by 2035 china will outspend the us in military expenditure. it is imperative to mention that the economic surge in china which is also associated with increased military spending is not just about realism theory that informs on the foreign policy of china but also other domestic issues like protecting territorial integrity and political independence. according to hua (2019), china uses the economic aspect to trade with neighboring north korea but also uses economic sanctions to withhold trade deals and benefits whenever china feels threatened by north korea’s missile tests. the same increased military spending is vital to the united nations, where china has deployed a number of military personnel for peacekeeping across the globe. for such contributions, the researcher believes that china aims to seek a stable and peaceful national environment. 5.5 relationship between rational choice and realism theories the two theories of rational choice and realism are critical in the foreign policy of china. rational choice espouses that. indeed states act in their best interests after assessing the available information, thus making a decision that will maximize utility for the state. for rational choice theorists, the decision made is to help the state make the maximum benefit from available situations in the international arena or to achieve a foreign policy position. on the other hand, realism theorists assert that state actors are always rational. by their rationality, the realists contend that the actors will be inclined to naturally act www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 43 published by scholink inc. in the best interest of the state for the benefit of national security. 5.6 liberalism theory 5.6.1 proponents and assumptions liberal institutionalism theory is a significant theoretical underpinning that explains the reasoning behind the various foreign policy positions that china pursues at the international level to meet domestic needs. liberalism theory has scholarship origins from immanuel kant, john lock, adam smith, and joseph nye. these scholars have made a contribution to liberal theory by making assumptions that international institutions like the united nations are critical in the corporation of states (johnson & heiss, 2018). the theory also makes an assumption that economic corporations among states are critical to enhancing corporations. economic interdependency between and among nation-states makes it difficult for countries to go to war. the theory also makes an assumption that democratic values are good in enhancing interstate cooperation. the theory assumes that democracies do not go to war with fellow democracies (keohane, 2011). the main foundation of the theory is the assumption that the sole responsibility of the state is to protect private property and life. however, the theory has been criticized that while democracies do not go to war with other democracies, they tend to be aggressive toward other non-democracies. 5.6.2 application of liberalism liberalism theory influences the foreign policy positions which china undertakes to safeguard its interests. one of the integral aspects of china’s foreign policy is pegged on peace and economic cooperation, according to certain scholars like yan (2018). to guarantee peace, china has heavily invested in economic cooperation in multilateralism and bilateral engagements with other foreign states and organizations like the european union (christiansen, 2016). for instance, china trades with neighboring north korea. as such, economic interdependence helps to constrain the aggressive tendency of north korea towards china due to economic benefits through a soft power approach (nye, 2008). the belt and road initiative have been a critical component of the economic cooperation with other states. the establishment of the development bank and being a member of other international institutions like the un has played an influential role in the foreign policy of china. being a member of the un makes china respect the territorial integrity of other states, political independence, and sovereignty of all nations besides acting within the international laws. 5.7 aspects of china’s foreign policy china has pursued an unswervingly independent peace-oriented foreign policy. as an aspect of china’s foreign policy, the people’s republic of china believes that peace is central to the economic development of the country. 5.7.1 political independence accordingly, china has an aspect of political independence. as an aspect of china’s foreign policy, political independence makes china be principle within the international arena. china thus determines an independent position relevant to foreign policy and state interests without yielding undue pressure www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 44 published by scholink inc. from external forces. the political independence of china also informs the motivation of the state to protect the interests of the state against cohesion from other powers like the usa (mughal, 2009). 5.7.2 world peace china invests in global peace as a precursor to political and economic developments of the state, which are at the core of the nation (weissmann, 2015). china believes in peace and avoids military conflicts while also promoting peaceful mechanisms of conflict resolution like negotiations. to maintain global peace, china doesn’t participate in nor encourage an arms race. the people’s republic of china, in its foreign policy, doesn’t support hegemony nor seek military expansion. on the other hand, china is critical in promoting the sovereignty of nations and doesn’t encourage countries to interfere with the internal affairs of other states, be it political or cultural exchanges. the territorial integrity of the states is thus imperative in maintaining global peace according to the foreign policy of china. by maintaining political independence and territorial integrity, china does not encourage the violation of international law under the pretext of human rights or undue application of the responsibility to protect. however, it is imperative to mention that this element of peace postulated by the chinese has been criticized for how they seek global peace while still violating the rights of their own citizens and oppressing fundamental rights (lewis, 2016). accordingly, china will never renounce the use of force to resolve territorial and sovereignty issues, which is in china’s national interests. additionally, the south sea china contestations and building of military capability show that china is already mobilizing for a possible future war with its neighbors. 5.7.3 cooperation and friendly relations china believes in its foreign policy and objects to cooperation. the liberalism theory explains the reasoning behind chinese-friendly relations and cooperation. china hopes to see through cooperation with all countries based on peace elements and advance shared goals on an equal partner basis (kang, 2007). accordingly, friendship, according to chinese foreign policy, should not be based on ideologies, social systems, or religion. on cooperation, china has signed trade deals with developed countries and underdeveloped states. china tries to enhance its friendship with its neighbors through many consultations and negotiations to solve contentious issues of conflict. 5.7.4 implementation of foreign policy of china there are numerous methods that the chinese government has been able to employ to implement its foreign policy goals. some of the techniques which have been used range from military, foreign aid, diplomacy, sanctions, deterrence, trade, and commerce. the choice of method to be used is often influenced by the leader’s choice, the national compromise, or the systemic pressures. on the other hand, there are certain influencers, like the timing of the instrument of foreign policy to be used. in the case of military intervention for the implementation of a foreign policy, national compromise and systemic pressure help to make such decisions as opposed to the leader’s choice. accordingly, in the case of negotiations, the leader would make a choice, but the approach of the diplomatic engagement and the magnitude of the case involves both national compromise and systemic pressure. foreign aid www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 45 published by scholink inc. analysis constitutes systemic pressure. the sanctions will involve national compromise and systemic pressure. timing of the decision made on the foreign policy implementation plan, coalitions, and the respective specific foreign policy influence the implementation strategy of china. 5.7.5 military in the implementation of a foreign policy, the military has often been used. there is the actual use of force by deploying soldiers on the ground, the threat of using force, or the mere show of military capabilities. according to reuters (2017), the chinese president is developing capabilities and modernizing the chinese military to expand their bases away from home; hence the chinese people’s liberation army has since developed a support base in djibouti in africa. china will benefit from power projection or the show of capabilities thus increasing the dominance of military activities away from mainland china (downs, becker, & degategno, 2017). djibouti will help china to access easily the indian ocean and the horn of africa. china has maintained a long-standing friendly relationship with african countries, which is also an important manifestation of china’s peaceful diplomacy. according to zaka (2020), the south china sea is another contestation in which china has openly used the military to either protect its territorial integrity or to pursue the power politics of dominance and assertiveness. china claims a territorial share of the south china sea, which has huge economic significance and is influential in the geopolitics of the area. the presence of military activities by the people’s liberation army has been criticized sharply by the us. the us is standing in solidarity with other weaker powers which are entangled in the dispute, like the philippines, malaysia, indonesia, and vietnam. according to the council of foreign relations (2020), the south china sea was able to attract $3.37 trillion in trade within the locality in the year 2016 alone. in 2017, about 40% of global liquefied gas transited the disputed area. as such, the economic and strategic location of the disputed area gives an incentive for contestation. military has thus been deployed by the people1s liberation army to achieve china’s foreign policy interests in the area. in other instances, china has taken a leading role in the non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons and also in the trade of small arms and other light weapons (burnay et al., 2015). according to these researchers, this commitment shows the level of global responsibility china has taken as a permanent member of the united nations security council. china is actually a strong supporter and advocates for actions towards non-proliferation regarding weapons of mass destruction. china thus calls for a nuclear-free zone and has committed never to use or even threaten to use its nuclear power capabilities to any other country which doesn’t have nuclear power. 5.7.6 diplomacy another instrument which has been used by china to implement her foreign policy is diplomacy. according to some scholars (okhovat, 2012), diplomacy is critical to the national development of china and is at the heart of foreign policy, where peace is the cornerstone of foreign policy. as such, china has been involved in numerous negotiations to achieve various foreign policy issues. the fundamental component of diplomacy is too soft power principle. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 46 published by scholink inc. 5.7.7 negotiations negotiations have been used by china to advance its foreign policy positions on the global stage. for instance, china engages the european union to ensure economic cooperation between the two actors. similarly, china calls for a lead negotiation with north korea to ensure peace and prevent an arms race. however, china has been criticized for aggressive and assertive mechanisms which contradict the negotiation efforts. in most cases, this is an injustice to china. 5.7.8 public diplomacy as a building block of old diplomacy, public diplomacy is critical in the implementation of china’s foreign policy. public diplomacy involves targeting the population of foreign citizens who are residing in their foreign countries with messaging and targeted ads in order to have a particular view or perception that favors a country like china (wang, 2008). china has often felt misjudged in the world at a time when the country is taking a more robust major power player role on the global stage. china thus wants to project an image of a cooperative, trustworthy, developing country and peace-loving nation which has been able to take harmonious care of its huge population and is a responsible player within the international community (zhao, 2015). in the quest to advance public diplomacy, the economic surge in china has created a lot of debate and opportunities to exercise public diplomacy and assert authority as a global player. accordingly, the protection of sovereignty and the respective policy of not interfering with the internal affairs of other nations have also earned the country much reputation at the international level (d’hooge, 2007). in africa, for instance, china is admired for economic development and the loans it gives to african countries with little conditionality, like the structural adjustment programs which accompanied the imf and world bank loans. accordingly, the chinese government does not meddle in the political affairs of african states like the western countries led by the us. as such, the reputation of china has grown in its public diplomacy campaigns. according to pew research center (2019), most african countries had a favorable view of china. nigeria had 70%, tanzania 74%, and russia 71%. this indicates the progress of public diplomacy strides the chines government has invested in her foreign policy. certain scholars contend that to achieve public diplomacy, china has invested heavily in the confucius institutes to spread the chinese language and culture across the globe (hartig, 2016). the confucius institutes are thus established across universities and colleges to help in spreading a positive view of chinese culture to the foreign public. student exchanges and the media have also been critical in the spread of the chinese value system. however, it is important to mention that the implementation of chinese foreign policy from the point of view of diplomacy has also faced substantial hurdles. the perception which china has created of the violation of human rights in china has cast many doubts on the policy program. in addition, the surge in the economic development of china makes other countries uncomfortable and read mischief with the growing economic influence of china on the global stage. additionally, many countries do not know enough about china, so their understanding of china is still in the past, and they naturally have some www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 47 published by scholink inc. misunderstandings about china’s rise. 5.7.9 sanctions sanctions have been used by china to advance foreign policy positions as a result of systemic pressure and state compromise. the timing of such sanctions is sometimes abrupt and is always retaliatory. when the us government under president trump sanctioned four chinese officials, china was forced to retaliate with counter-sanctions. china also sanctioned us republican party senators marco rubio and ted cruz over their remarks on the chinese territory protests, which angered beijing. this is a positive response that china should make. the national compromise comes in when members of china are slapped with sanctions. the systemic pressure is also seen from the fact that china has to prove that it is a major global player in the international community and cannot be bullied by other powers easily. as such, certain actions to retaliate sanctions come to protect the sovereignty of china and the political independence which have existed since the westphalia treaty. it is imperative to acknowledge that other scholars have noted that, indeed china does not like sanctions. in fact, china is currently still under constraint by the sanction it was slapped with by the european union and the us over the arms embargo. as such, china has always approached sanctions with caution in cases where certain countries have been found to be in breach of international laws and obligations. however, this has been contradicted by chinese actions to support stricter sanctions on iran and north korea whenever the countries were established to be a threat to global peace. as a systemic pressure, china must approve such sanctions since the foreign policy of china depends on international peace and stability for their economic development. this is china’s responsibility to the world as a major diplomatic power and aims to maintain peace and stability in the international community. 5.8 foreign aid: chinese aid foreign aid has been used as an instrument to implement foreign policies of a nation-state and china is central to this through the established china aid (lengauer, 2011). china aid has been used from the systems pressure and national compromise. as a form of system pressure, china aid is used to expand the chinese influence and dominance at the global level to rival usaid. additionally, it is used to advance the public diplomacy instruments used by china in other parts of the world. china aid is often packed with developmental assistance or humanitarian help to the vulnerable, human resource capacity building, assistance in the medical field, debt relief, and technical cooperation (kitano & harada, 2016). china aid according to analysts of foreign policy like welle-strand and kjøllesdal (2010) contends that china’s foreign aid comes in different forms be its military assistance, food help, or development loans and concessional grants. welle-strand and kjøllesdal postulate that china has been able to change the narrative of traditional foreign aid which was prevalent post the cold war period. they state that china has changed the concept of the donor to a recipient by encouraging equal partnerships. china has also eliminated the conditionality attached to the aid allowing for non-interference with local issues and the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 48 published by scholink inc. sovereignty of states. foreign aid has been significant in helping less developed countries and in helping humanitarianism across the world thus putting china on the global map of leading foreign aid contributors. it is however imperative to mention that chinese foreign aid has been criticized as being part of the neo-colonization of impoverished countries. while the loans china gives are unconditional, it becomes very difficult to repay, thus giving the debt burden to impoverished countries. china is also accused of human rights violations in places they have offered aid. however, china has responded that they do not force countries to accept their aid and often engage in open discussions to upset loan burdens for impoverished countries. the researcher believes that such a good deed should not be groundlessly accused but should be evaluated fairly and objectively after an in-depth understanding of china’s foreign policy. 6. conclusion in conclusion, china’s foreign policy is driven by the leader’s choice, national compromise, and system pressure. it is vital to summarize that the categorization of literature regarding the foreign policy of china is based on vital components of political independence, economic independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty, military, and population. the middle range categorization postulates the approach china gives to the rest of the world through foreign aid, culture, humanitarian assistance, sports, and film. the long-term categorization of literature established that china views the world, thus spreading chinese values through the confucius institutes. the surge in economic growth is established to be the major driver of chinese foreign policy. as such, the elements of peace and friendly relations inform why peace is a precondition to facilitate the economic pursuit of china’s foreign policy. at the heart of economic growth is the bri which has seen most countries embrace, thus giving china a foot in the competitiveness of the international system. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 2, 2023 49 published by scholink inc. references al jazeera. 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(2015). the motivation behind china’s public diplomacy. the chinese journal of international politics, 8. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pov005 microsoft word ape-v2n2-p166 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 166 original paper modern democracy and traditional bantu governance: towards an alternative policy claver boundja1* 1 laboratory for studies and multidisciplinary research in human sciences and environment, marien ngouabi university, brazzaville, congo * claver boundja, marien ngouabi university, brazzaville, congo received: april 18, 2019 accepted: may 6, 2019 online published: may 9, 2019 doi:10.22158/ape.v2n2p166 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v2n2p166 abstract this study starts from the analysis of the limits of modern democracy to propose a new form of bantu-inspired political governance. the uprising of peoples in democratic countries signals the end of democracy based on ultra-liberalism. it is therefore urgent to think of a new type of political governance, much more concerned with people’s lives. the traditional bantu (people) government is therefore a model to revisit and update, in this world where people feel abused by politics. we propose a political theory, based on consensual governance and the well-being of people. it is necessary to assert that the solution to the problems posed by modern democracy can only come from the traditional political governance model of the bantu. keywords modern democracy, bantu governance, africa, political theory 1. introduction the twenty-first century, with the proliferation of the media, is strongly marked by the presence of political debates around the future of participatory democracy. among political actors, the question of the governance of society is now locked in the management of public opinion by the media, without an analysis of governance models and alternative political regimes. political governance has become an entity of quest and conquest of political power, that is to say in a closed vicious circle in which the powers are organized and exercised, in institutional and practical forms, far from the concern for the well-being of peoples. of the researchers who critically analyze modern democracy, christopher achen and larry bartels (2016) are arguably the most lucid. they attack the theory at the heart of contemporary thinking about www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 167 published by scholink inc. democratic politics and government, and offer an alternative and provocative viewpoint based on the human nature of democratic citizens. several researchers are also trying to deepen democratic theory, with the proposal of different models of democracy (warren, 2017). but these debates are less and less productive. model-based strategies encourage theorists to over-generalize the place and functions of typical ideal characteristics of democracy, such as deliberation and elections. this study of social philosophy aims to return to african sources bantu ancient governance of society. we propose a political theory, based on consensual governance and the well-being of people. it is necessary to assert that the solution to the problems posed by modern democracy can only come from the traditional political governance model of the bantu. in front of the turbulent horizon and the exhaustion of the current political models, inherited from the modernity of power in the west, thought by the philosophers of the contract and advocated by the partisans of economic liberalism, it is salutary to return to the human power of origins and origins of political power, to think with a fresh eye its origin, its functioning and its finality. we propose a model of political governance, alternative to the models that are officially practiced by the nation states of the world today. it is the bantu aristocracy, which we define as the political regime of the competent servant-governors, that is to say the regime of the people (bantu) capable of consensually leading the governed to their well-being, beyond the game of political empowerment. the bantu chief is a servant governess who is characterized by the primacy and priority he gives to the service of others. it is because he is a servant that he is elevated to the rank of political ruler. the term “bantu”, taken from the word “people” in many of these languages, was first proposed by bleek, who in 1851 laid the foundation for the comparative study of the bantu languages. this term has been universally used since (greenberg, 1999). on the other hand, participatory democracy, with pluralist elections as a means of coming to power, is showing its limits everywhere in the world, with the protest of peoples (széll, 2018). everything happens as if the governance of post-election crises takes the place of politics and replaces the art of governing the city. it is a kind of challenge governance, in which elected leaders multiply strategies to be re-elected in future elections. the problematic of this article can be summed up as follows: to the extent that the conquest of power is increasingly seen as the royal road to the selfish confiscation of the riches of the community by political actors, should not we think of a new political regime, more adapted to the current context of the world? why this return to the african past? charles darwin was the first scientist to publish a modern theory of evolution and the origin of mankind. he was also the first to designate africa as his place of origin. over the last hundred years, research has shown how right he was, as many aspects of darwin’s precursor work have been confirmed (leakey, 1999). two hypotheses are to be verified in this article. the first hypothesis is: if africa is the place of origin of mankind, it is clear that it is on this continent that the human species has learned to live in peace www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 168 published by scholink inc. with others in society. the second hypothesis is: traditional bantu governance is an alternative to the crisis of modern democracy. the bantu ethical aristocracy can therefore provide a pragmatic orientation to the political governance of states, instead of participatory democracy. the paper is divided into four parts with the first part introducing the thrust of the paper. 2. method this article is, as its title suggests, about power in two political systems, namely modern democracy and traditional bantu governance. power is the central notion, but it is treated in a systemic perspective, where one-to-one power relations have little meaning, contrary to what remains practiced in political science. political systems, understood as governing systems of public affairs, are the ones on which the study of power relations is concerned. our method, therefore, is to compare two systems of political governance, namely modern democracy and the traditional bantu system of governance, from studies of sociology and politics. this comparison allows us to pose a new political theory. 2.1 limits of participatory democracy the list of studies presented here is not exhaustive, but it takes into account the most important research in the english-speaking world. recent studies of democracy show that this political model is running out of steam, especially in its western variants. certainly, the crisis of participatory democracy is congenital to its institutionalization (laski, 1933). but modern democracy, which has developed in the west, is today the focus of fundamental criticism of scholars and popular protest. zakaria (1997) already spoke of “the rise of non-liberal democracy”. colin crouch (2004) calls it “post-democracy” and pierre rosanvallon (2008) “counter-democracy”. basically, the main problem of participatory democracy is its nature as such. it is now established, with the uprising of peoples in the west, that victory in elections is not a reliable indicator of democratic quality. the protest movement of “yellow vests” launched in france in november 2018 remains the greatest illustration in this area. for months, this movement calls for a referendum of citizen initiative and improvement of taxation. this movement is the questioning of the neoliberal system held by the ultra-rich, who command the democratic alternation and the judicial system. the question that arises at this level is this: how to measure the qualitative reliability of a participative democracy? a study by foa and mounk (2016) on democratic practices in several countries has shown that people’s support for democracy is falling. the crisis of democracy is not limited to western countries, but it is emerging in japan (yazawa, 2015) as well as in the philippines, the former american colony. the term of “popular democracy”, which is the concept of the socialist countries (north korea, vietnam, china), is characterized by a single party. of these countries, china is undoubtedly the most important. it is not only the most populous country, but also, soon, the world’s largest economy. some studies show that the united states is a “defective democracy”. alexis de tocqueville (1965) in democracy in america (1835) spoke of the us government in terms of “dictatorship of the majority”. today, we have gone from the dictatorship of the majority to the “dictatorship of the masses” (corner www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 169 published by scholink inc. & lim, 2016). this phenomenon indicates that, unlike military dictatorships, it is not a pure oppression by consent of the majority, but of the survival of the system. as can be seen, the debate on participatory democracy is rich in paradoxes. david van reybrouck (2016) supports the idea against elections; pierre rosanvallon (2008) and jason brennan (2016) argue for a counter-democracy. and the arrival of the internet and its social networks has led us to believe that everyone’s access to information should promote participatory democracy. but it soon became apparent that social networks are controlled by a few gigantic corporations, and their main interest is to generate profits, even leading to some form of user dependence, thus increasing social control. consequently, social media is able to overthrow authoritarian regimes only makes these regimes more authoritarian and paranoid (gayo-avello, 2017). much research focuses on the causes and consequences of direct democracy and the legitimacy of political regimes. over the last two decades, an abundant literature has dealt with the growing disaffection of citizens with respect to representative democracy. the existence of several problems in the process of political representation is reflected in the behavior of citizens who have gradually abandoned traditional modes of electoral participation and party membership. the tendency is to move towards more reactive forms of participation such as demonstrations and petitions. in light of these developments, researchers have begun to speak of a “democratic malaise” because citizens are moving away from the political process as a whole. one possible solution to this uneasiness has been the adoption of direct democracy procedures through which citizens can have a say in political decision-making. studies show the decline in the legitimacy of the democratic regime around the world. the recent street uprising in france is only an indication of the attitudes and behavior of citizens towards the political authorities. the concept of legitimacy, as we know, concerns the way in which power can be used by state institutions and the reaction of citizens. legitimacy can be broadly defined as the ability of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing institutions are the most appropriate or appropriate for society. understood in this way, legitimacy encompasses three dimensions: compliance with established norms, justifiability of rules by reference to shared beliefs, and expressed consent of people living in the same society. then, legitimacy is more and more seized according to two axes. the first axis concerns the normative or objective aspect, relating to the working principles and the functioning of the state institutions. here, the focus is on decision-making and the exercise of power. the second axis refers to the legitimacy of descriptive or subjective type, referring to the public evaluation of the quality of the institutions’ performance. in short, a diet is legitimate when the population perceives it as such. the compliance of state institutions with the rules has no effect if citizens do not believe that these rules are legitimate. if they are not justified in the terms of shared beliefs, the population is likely to reject institutions and withdraw support. this type of legitimacy is evaluative in that citizens decide whether political institutions are acceptable. the descriptive approach to legitimacy substantially covers the subject (population), the object (public institutions) and the relationship between the two (attitudes and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 170 published by scholink inc. behaviors as effects of institutional characteristics). moreover, it is possible to situate legitimacy at a more precise level, namely that of the evaluation of the populations on the capacity of the institutions of the state to exercise legitimately the political power. it is about assessing the acceptance, consent and support of the population to a specific system of governance. subjective legitimacy includes notions such as political support or trust. this means that citizens have the ability to identify their common interests and to develop standards to evaluate the performance of state institutions, with regard to these interests. the degree to which citizens’ standards are achieved determines the degree of legitimacy. this complex process runs through forms of support to state institutions and (specific) elites or to the political community and the regime. institutional trust is a useful concept but too narrow to equate it with legitimacy. we can say that the political system of participatory democracy is losing legitimacy. the gradual weakening of representative democracy has opened up alternative solutions, with more opportunities for political involvement of citizens (peter, 2011). if citizens suspect corruption in the political decision-making process, legitimacy ends up being lost. thus, if citizens consider that the degree of their influence on policy making is weak, legitimacy may also be weak. elections in democracies should be the key mechanism for ensuring citizen participation. however, elections rarely provide citizens with effective opportunities to influence policy makers. the elections are intended to allow citizens to choose between several intermediaries who promise to group and represent their interests. from this point of view, they are of a competitive nature, opening the field to the confrontation between competitors (parties or candidates) with general promises, often quite similar, which are rarely pursued after the elections. moreover, even when the choices between competitors are significant election results do not always reflect the popular will, being artificially influenced by the rules of the game. it is not surprising that the public is increasingly dissatisfied with the system of representative democracy, as to the taking into account of their opinion in public policies. in this sense, the representative mechanisms are not replaced but rather complemented by different means of political engagement of citizens. how, then, can the presence of direct democracy have an impact on the perception of the legitimacy of a regime? this question refers to the fundamental aspects of self-identity (values, rights and freedoms, sovereignty) that require major changes in society. such changes can hardly be accepted if debates take place only among the political elites in parliament without the participation of civil society. the tools of direct democracy used to solve problems are not intended to avoid debate and conflict, but for additional legitimacy. citizen involvement and the use of direct democracy instruments can legitimize these changes. similarly, representative institutions and politicians often try to use tools of direct democracy to legitimize their policies, increase their chances and win back citizens. the elites can control some of the direct democratic practices and submit to the citizens referendum questions that are in accordance www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 171 published by scholink inc. with their will. over the past five decades, changing social trends have favored the development of a large category of citizens. as political parties simplify choices, a growing proportion of people welcome the opportunity to express preferences without mediation. citizens appreciate their involvement in decision-making, so that a more direct democracy leads to greater citizen satisfaction. when representative institutions do not meet the expectations of the public, direct democracy can change the degree of discontent by promoting the emergence of a (partial) system of self-governance. this allows for the pursuit of interests and preferences that may (for various reasons) be excluded from representative politics. ultimately, sociological studies in europe indicate that the provisions relating to direct democracy at the national level and the use of referendums at the national level are associated with legitimacy. the major conclusion is that the tools of direct democracy can have an impact on the legitimacy of the regime when they are applied. when provisions remain only on paper, direct democracy can not trigger the expected attitudes of citizens. in addition, there are differences between eastern and western europe in relation to legislation, so that relations with the regime’s subjective legitimacy go in different directions. in practical terms, the mechanisms observed are quite similar but much more powerful among the countries with a lower degree of democratization. it is therefore possible to positively include direct democracy as a source of subjective legitimacy in analytical frameworks. as a result, direct democracy does not only appear to be a cure for citizens’ uneasiness, but also a potential factor for strengthening legitimacy. 2.2 traditional bantu societies and their social organization we present here the organization of bantu societies of the past, according to studies conducted by anthropologists, to show the relevance of this organization today. this is to defend the idea that this political organization is superior to participatory democracy, as far as it works according to consensus. after nearly a century of linguistic and archaeological studies, it is established that the distribution of bantu languages is the effect of the population growth (generally called bantu expansion) that began in the benue valley, between the south east of nigeria and western cameroon (johnston, 1919; bakel, 1981; vansina, 1984, 1995). this is mainly supported by the fact that bantoid languages, considered to be ancestor of bantu languages, are currently spoken in this region (greenberg, 1949; guthrie, 1962; lwanga-lunyiigo, 1976). relatively new population growth and the colonization of new territories are still accepted by most scholars as the most reasonable explanation for the geographical dispersion and relative homogeneity of bantu languages (schoenbrun, 2001). it has also been suggested that the first stages of migration have followed two main paths, which have been defined as “western” and “eastern” flows (vansina, 1984, 1995; schoenbrun, 2001). an alternative scenario was proposed by guthrie (1962). while agreeing with greenberg and others on the center of origin of the bantu languages, he proposed the katanga region, located in the south of the democratic republic of congo, in the middle of the equatorial forest, as the region from which bantu-speaking populations were spreading. however, some authors have highlighted the reductionism www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 172 published by scholink inc. of these assumptions on the basis of a single large population migration related to language propagation and molecular ecology has emphasized the relevance of local migration processes (lwanga-lunyiigo, 1976; ehret, 2001; schoenbrun, 2001). population genetic studies have clarified the dynamics underlying the current distribution of bantu populations at the regional and sub-continental levels (mitchell, 2010). proto-bantu were ruled by leaders and spiritually by minister-diviners. they recognize a unique, almighty, but distant god of human destiny. a bantu village is a chieftaincy. and this one can include under its authority several hamlets. clan and village are related, as are lineage and tribe. thus, the inhabitants of a village consider themselves almost all as parents. a good leader is necessarily a historian of the clan tradition, ethnic. it is up to the leader who is often doubled by a diviner to say, as a sign of celebration and eulogy, the story of the deified ancestors who are also leaders. we can therefore understand the permanent symbiosis that exists between the world of the living and that of the dead by the effect (action, word, ceremonies) of the recognized and crowned leader. the basic elements of bantu politics are provided by the kinship system and the system of intermarriage: the lineage leader is virtually erased from the leader of the lineage group. each leader has a human group, and the eminent chief is precisely the chief of the earth or of all the ethnic, national land. authority is in a sense crystallized into defined characters that command specific groups: the socio-political life is constituted by the total life of the group. this life integrates directly any economic, artistic, religious or social activity of each member of the group. the peoples speaking the bantu languages, coming out of prehistory, following long migrations due to an increase in the population, the mastery of agricultural and metallurgical techniques, have created social entities more or less wide to perpetuate life. as much as myths and legends represent bantu’ genesis in time and space, their ideas, their beliefs, all the riches of their intelligence, so social structures are the living expression of their external, political organization. the bantu were divided into tribes: each tribe ended up occupying a particular location, without intermingling with the other tribes. the bantu tribes (duala, fang, kikuyu, teke, kongo, mbochi, sena, sotho, zulu ...) are the result of the ancient migrations of the bantu people in central, eastern and southern africa. a bantu tribe is therefore a portion of the bantu people, having a definite establishment after long migrations, having its political and spiritual leaders, its judges who form a council, its special individuality, adoring protective deities. in pre-colonial black africa, the emergence of states did not destroy social, cultural, economic and political importance of families and tribes. everywhere in the bantu world, we find the same basic system of households (enclosures whose different boxes house members of the same family: children from the same father and a wife or wives of it and the possible wives of the children), of lineages, of clans, of tribes, with heads of family, lineage, clan and tribe. the models of which different, but the clannish system (groups several clans by integrating them with the tribes) does not miss anywhere: it is the cement even of any bantu tribe. in bantu societies, the fundamental units are constituted and directed by groups of descent. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 173 published by scholink inc. in the bantu world, there are three types of political structures, namely the states with a central government, small states organized in village-communities, under chiefs, clans and tribes without leaders, but led by councils: class of age and seniors. we know that the colonial order has used traditional chiefdoms to impose itself, notably by creating the “indigenous justice”. it is also known that the ujamaa, the basis of socialism in tanzania, put the community, solidarity and democratic spirit of the traditional african society, in which everyone worked and everyone lived by their own toil. in the tribe, each group, each community, each village has its leader. when a community grows, it splits in turn into small communities, with their respective leaders. thus, the chieftaincies are independent of each other, politically. however, they remain linked by kinship ties (clans, lineages, families). there is therefore no central authority with a highly structured administrative and judicial apparatus as in royalty. the chief’s roles are: the direction of religious ceremonies, the arbitration of palavers, the conduct of war, the organization of commerce. the tribe comprising several thousand people was the largest political unit among the sotho and nguni (zulu, ndebele, xhona …) of southern africa. in these two groups (sotho and nguni), the leader was all-powerful, but an overly authoritarian leader quickly became unpopular: he was abandoned to go to another leader more lenient and more just. two councils assisted the chief in his functions: a small council and a wider council or assembly. the first council included the chief’s confidants: they helped him in his daily tasks of material and cultural management of the country. the assembly was composed of all the subordinate chiefs, though of some importance. problems affecting the entire nation were discussed, and any adult man could participate freely. the leader could be criticized during the assizes of the assembly. the sotho or nguni leader was considered the symbol of national unity, tribal: he personally directed all religious, judicial, administrative and military affairs. we could also talk about the bemba (20 political units) or songo chiefdoms. a chieftaincy is a much more flexible political organization than a kingdom with hierarchical and centralized government structures. from the cultural point of view, a chieftaincy is no less “civilized” than a vast kingdom. the chieftaincy is a complete political organization. chieftaincy and kingdom are two distinct forms of government in their nature and not in essence: the chieftaincy is a small state, while the kingdom is a much broader state. in pre-colonial times, the kongo had created a vast political entity: the kongo kingdom. the bemba, they were politically organized within a multitude of separate head units, on the tribal territory. but here and there, there was an administration, an economy, leaders of lineage and clan, especially the national consciousness to perpetuate, through the structures put in place, the glory of distant ancestors. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 174 published by scholink inc. 3. result as we have shown, modern democracy is less and less able to solve the problems of social peace. and the organization of traditional society among the old bantu seems to be a model for thinking about a new post-democratic political regime. we call this model bantucracy, which is based on traditional bantu governance. the bantu political system is based on four levels of relationship: the relationship of man with god and ancestors, the relationship of man to the world, the relationship of man with other human beings, and the relationship of the man with himself. political leaders take these four forms of relationship into account. according to several accounts that trace the origins of the bantu tribes, god relatively confers power to men through alliances. the initiative of the covenant with men comes from god. we are not talking about any social constraint or any collective or individual demand that may have led god to take the initiative. god is truly the real source of power. he alone has chosen the men he calls to power. no strength or cunning interfered with the choice. the reasons for the choice belong only to him; we can only understand the consequences. the will of god is translated into a dream. the dream is thus revealed to be an effective means of revealing, in matters of power, the will of god. the call, although addressed to men, is essentially individual. each future leader receives his message, and each message is surely special, tailored to each personality. the initiative and the choice of god do not eliminate the risk dimension in the bantu power. it often involves going beyond oneself and one’s society. what does the action of the ancestors represent? the ancestors appeared in the dreams of men are the apparent sign of the will of god. they reassure future leaders: they believe because they know their ancestors and their wisdom. the ancestors are, in fact, the effective link of the invisible world with the visible world. they represent the idea of lineage and succession that fundamentally inspires bantu power. election alone is not enough. to perfect the election, god and the ancestors submit future leaders to three days’ training. the week in several african traditions lasts four days: the three days of work and a day of rest. the exercise of bantu power is conditional on an “election” and bantu formation. the unity of the bantu peoples, it must be remembered, is based on the ancestral language called proto-bantu. they must refer to a common kinship exemplified by the term “people” (samwiri, lwanga-lunyiigo, & jan vansina, 1999, p. 65). it can thus be said that the place of “people” or bantu is central to the social and political organization of the bantu peoples. in bantu languages, there is no equivalent word to the concepts of kingdom or republic. there is only one word for power. power is called bokonzi in lignala, bumfumu in kikongo and ubukhosi in zulu, for example. bantucracy is not a kingdom or a republic, but a power. the definition of power in a societal context highlights two elements, namely the rulers and the governed as actors, and the different relations of governance that they maintain between them. these two elements are perceptible through the degree of communication between actors and the impact of decisions on each other. it’s about recognizing that power is a set of systems whose elements interact. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 175 published by scholink inc. the relationship of power does not come under the control of the periphery by the center, but it consists in the capacity, by the governor, of a decision which concerns his means of action. it is from the decision of the governor that one can assess the autonomy or dependence of the governed in other power relations, relative to the well-being of all. in other words, a relationship is of a political nature only to the extent that it is likely to be evaluated, after the fact, as a chain of social welfare impacts. as a result, power relations in bantucracy are subject to two requirements, namely, connectivity, which means that conditional connections of power reach all participants in the community, and that of cohesion, which requires that participants are grouped into clusters whose internal power links are positive and the external links are negative. these are the two requirements that constitute community coordination. the requirement of connectivity refers to the flow of powers from one participant to another, while the requirement of cohesion refers to the regrouping of participants in power, from one pole to another. both requirements act between them. the flow of power affects the grouping of participants and the latter, on the path of power. the learning place of governance is probably the common house. in almost all the traditional bantu villages, the common hut, built by all the inhabitants in the center of the village, is the place where the “old” as well as the young people met to share their stories, their knowledge of the country and the world, the food too. living together in the common space was characterized by respect for the other, the exchange of knowledge, the sharing of assets and the reception of foreigners. the common house was the soul of the village. the new bantu political system that we propose therefore has as a basic principle, the consideration of the country as the common house, which federates all the human energies of all citizens towards the well-being of each and everyone; he is “all in one”. as a soul of the new country, he lives only by the breath of each and everyone: “he is a par and in all”. the death of a citizen weakens it, the birth of a child or even the naturalization of a stranger vivifies it. the idea of common house, a common box of bantu (people), disqualifies exclusions, eliminates barriers, institutes nonviolence and dialogue as a system structuring relations between its members. this proposed new system is based on five key ideas: 1) reconciliation; 2) a leader (mfumu) instituted in accordance with tradition, mentality and traditional spirituality, which symbolizes unity, he reigns, but does not rule; 3) governance according to modern democratic norms, acquired from the evolution of the world, while promoting participatory consensus, the traditional bantu-indigenous mode of management of men; 4) respect for the personality of human entities; 5) the reframing of citizen political expression in a system that guarantees political freedom, citizen participation, unity and solidarity of peoples, non-violence and the life of the country. these five key ideas of the bantucracy system are highlighted in the code of the alliance, a true national pact, which takes the place of constitution. the bantucracy system induces a new approach at the institutional and territorial level, the common house federal economic, the common house economic (the solidarity economy), and in terms of international relations (openness to the world), www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 176 published by scholink inc. with the head the chef. 4. discussion our discussion is about data from bantu traditions before colonization. this choice is justified by the fact that we want to propose a solution to the failure of western-style democracy, which has shown its limits both in europe where it was born, and in africa, where it is completely inadequate. 4.1 the chef (mfumu) the bantu chief follows divine right, natural law, civil laws and custom. it is these four normative pillars that give the african prince his credibility. claude tardits rightly points out: “all african rulers, whether they were at one time or another qualified as divine or not, have an obligation, that of acting so that the population and the livestock of which it lives are fruitful, so that the watered lands keep their fertility and that starvation is averted. they fulfill these obligations by recourse, direct or indirect (...) the failure, whatever the age of the king, can entail its elimination (tardits, 1990, p. 38). it is in the articulation between divine right and natural law that the essential role of the sovereign in traditional africa must be located. the obligation of the sovereign, concretely, is to promote and defend life, so that the growth of its power is proportional to the multiplication of births. in other words, each new birth is considered to increase the power of the ruler, and conversely, all death is a diminution of his power. a. i. richards (1959) and his collaborators conducted a survey in 1952-1953 on the study of all the problems posed by chieftaincy in africa. this study focused on the political systems of fourteen populations in uganda and tanganyika that occupy a continuous territory stretching from northern lake albert to lake tanganyika: the eight chiefdoms of bantu, namely buganda, busoga, bunyoro, toro, ankole, buhaya, buzinza and buha, busukuma, which is a federation of 47 small chiefdoms, and five polysegmentary societies: amba (under toro guardianship since the beginning of the century), gisu, kiga, alur and the lugbara. the alur have an intermediary organization between the poly-segmental society in the strict sense and the multi-kingdom. the investigators employed two methods: the classic descriptive method and the questionnaire survey of chiefs. for all four categories of distinguished chiefs (county chiefs, sub-county chiefs, parish chiefs, headmen), 1156 questionnaires were completed, which provide information on the education, career and status of chiefs. ai richards, who presents the survey and draws the conclusions, gives an analysis of the political systems of the bantu inter-lacustrine which, from a historical point of view, are actually pre-feodal and must be compared to the european political systems of the 9th and 10th centuries, rather than those of the middle ages proper. by analogy with the facts of europe, african systems that have their equivalent in a still “tribal” europe are considered feudal. from the point of view of social philosophy, the question that arises at this level is: why this unwavering link between political power and life? www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 177 published by scholink inc. the answer to this question allows us to identify the fundamental point on which all political philosophy is built in the bantu context. it is recognition of the fact that human beings, animals, plants, minerals, as well as sovereign power itself, come from the same divine source. and, more deeply, life in its entirety comes from this source or from an invisible elsewhere, so that the role of the sovereign is to govern the living in the sense of their natural return to the common source. it must be said that political philosophy in the indigenous bantu context is based on metaphysics of life. it is logical that the head of the nation, comes from the common box, and established by him. he represents the nation. it derives its legitimacy from ancestral powers, the state and religious moral authority. he is enthroned according to ancient and religious rites. he is sworn on a religious text. it does not exercise executive power, except in the matters hereafter specified and recognized by the code of the alliance and the constitutional laws. it acts, in this case, by ordinance. it invests by ordinance the federal chancellor, following his election by the federal parliament; he invests, always by ordinance, the governors of the counties. mfumu raises high military jobs and appoints senior magistrates on the proposal of the high council of the judiciary. it promulgates the laws and treaties in the twenty days following the transmission to it, either by the office of the federal parliament or by the office of common house, according to the nature of the law. in case of reservation on his part, he appeals to the constitutional court for a check of the conformity of the law or the treaty. if the constitutional court declares compliance, mfumu promulgates the said law or the treaty. mfumu guarantees the solidarity of traditional peoples and counties. it may, when the circumstances so require, declare a state of emergency either nationwide or over a county. mfumu can also put federal governance and finances under federal tutelage in case of threat by said county of national unity and solidarity. it ensures and guarantees the national unity. also, it is outside the political games. his institution and his exercise of power escape the struggles and criticisms of political parties. he cannot lend his support, or his moral or financial contribution to a political association. his political responsibility cannot be sought in any national jurisdiction. on the other hand, his criminal responsibility can be committed for assassinations, war crimes, crimes against humanity, act of genocide. as soon as he is enthroned, he cannot, for the rest of his life, pursue any other professional activity. it enjoys full support of common house. 4.2 the purpose of bantu power: to secure people’s lives bantu power is in its essence word. the word of a person is the person himself. as such, it suggests engaging the whole person as a being and acting. the bantu word is in its essence word-action. the consequences arising from this word-action have a known origin, the person who is the source of the word. in what does the word-action of the prince differ from another? the word-act of the prince is marked. thanks to the sign on his forehead, the authority of the prince is now in the eternal river of power, with that of the other princes. said word-action is granted by god to the elect to create and guarantee the life of the bantu. indeed, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 178 published by scholink inc. the prince, without being founder of the power, participates and pursues the act of creation by restoring, in the time and the geographical space, the harmony and the balances of the principality, all this in order to guarantee the life men and ensure their perpetuation. the purpose of power is, in a simple way, taught to any successor appointed in interviews with his old master in power. as an example, we reveal the interview on this subject: after a night of heavy rain, the reigning mfumu calls his appointed successor, future mfumu to ask him how he spent the night. the youngster answers that he slept deeply. the chief retorts, “i did not close my eyes”. why? the son amazed. “because of the people of others; indeed, when you will be consecrated mfumu, each morning you will have to ask yourself the following questions: do the people of others, are they doing well? is there not an epidemic that threatens them? do they eat well? does the earth continue to produce well? are not their homes threatened by some phenomena, such as rain? here are the five key concerns of the mfumu each day of his reign. “father, what other people are who? the son asks the son, future mfumu. “mfumu governs men. do not think they are your property. that would be a serious mistake for you. these people belong to god; he entrusted them to you to lead them. my son, i will reveal to you a great secret, a great principle: if you deliberately shed human blood, even far from home, be sure that this blood will strike your house and sink into your house one day. human blood never pours itself deliberately without return”. the importance and nobility of the prince’s office imposes rigor in the choice of a suitor. while distinguishing itself by its severity and its constancy, the bantu practice diversified the processes to adapt to the situations, which situations were imposed to it. it has, however, validated and preserved the original process of creation. at the elected potential, it is imperative to give an initiation. it is a long training. in the image of the totality of god’s teaching about power, the initiation of bantu power covers the domains of knowledge in general, of individual and social behavior, of knowledge and practice of rules, principles and uses of power. the key rule in this area is to follow the footsteps of the ancient princes. initiation extends into the comprehension and interpretation of supernatural phenomena, it being understood that with consecration, the prince becomes an intermediary between the visible world and the invisible world. 5. conclusion the bantu political system that we propose is a form of governance by the people, from the bottom up. in bantucraty, the prince is the protector of the people. the protective function of the prince has its origin in the “shelter” character of the bantu power. the primary mission of a prince is to protect life, to perpetuate it; god and the ancestors, who gave them that power, did the same to them. as soon as a prince is enthroned, he becomes the leader of all the people, including thieves, liars and assassins. it does not operate a selection between good and bad, those to keep and those to reject. the protection it affords to all cannot be equated with any complicity with the perpetrators; protection is related to life. when an assassin, even if caught on the spot, is threatened in his life and enters the prince’s residential www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 179 published by scholink inc. court, his life is safeguarded and now protected. this guarantee does not amount to an amnesty; the culprit remains liable to judgment and punishment, except those which are prejudicial to his survival. the protection of the bantu prince also covers human rights. it has the authority to determine and specify the rights of each, the authority to defend the rights and to sanction violations. the bantu princes structured this authority, gave it body by the establishment of the judicial institution. within the bantu institutional power, the body of administrators assumes, among others, the judicial function. it is established that the “shelter” character of the people of bantu power has generated the judicial system. in order to be closer to the people, the judicial system has been structured and decentralized; he has thus meshed the bantu territory. any decision of justice pronounced in the principality can be the object of a last resort before a prince. he examines the appeal and pronounces his decision without further appeal. in practice, being close to the concerns of the population, mfumu (chiefs of territorial constituencies) play the role of last resort. references achen, c. h., & bartels, l. m. 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(1997). the rise of illiberal democracy. foreign affairs, 76(6), 22-43. https://doi.org/10.2307/20048274 microsoft word ape-v4n2-p1 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 1 original paper on the four eras of the use of the ocean by mankind keren sun1* 1 school of big data, qingdao huanghai university, qingdao, china * keren sun, professor, phd of university of utah, school of big data, qingdao huanghai university, qingdao, china received: january 14, 2021 accepted: january 26, 2021 online published: march 22, 2021 doi:10.22158/ape.v4n2p1 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v4n2p1 abstract this paper takes the relationship between humans and the ocean as the object of analysis, from the perspective of human use of the ocean, four era theories on the relationship between humans and the ocean are proposed, i.e., in the first era, the ocean is a geographic barrier for mankind; in the second era, the ocean is a road for human transportation; in the third era, the ocean is a granary for mankind; in the fourth era, the ocean is a treasure house of mankind’s natural resources. viewing from the last three eras, we can know that the ocean plays an important role in promoting the creation, production, and accumulation of human wealth. this paper argues the four-era theory of the relationship between humans and the ocean, also get the following conclusion: every era has the most significant feature of this era. this most significant feature function is the most important, largest, latest, and trendy contribution of the oceans to humans in this era; the four-era theory of the relationship between humans and the ocean also shows the continuous improvement process of human influence and utilization of the oceans; the continuous improvement of human influence and utilization of the ocean is realized by improvement of science and technology; the ability of humans to influence and utilize the oceans in the second era surpassed the first era is due to advances in shipbuilding technology and navigation technology; humans’ ability to influence and utilize the ocean in the third era surpassed the second era due to advances in biotechnology; and the ability of humans to influence and utilize the ocean in the fourth era surpassed the third era due to the advancement and application of all-round science and technology; historically, once a country has maritime hegemony, this country would become wealthy, powerful, and the leaders of maritime civilization. keywords four eras, marine economy, ocean, mankind www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 2 published by scholink inc. 1. introduction from the perspective of the development process of human history, the relationship between mankind and the ocean is extremely close. i think from the historical perspective of the ocean’s main contribution to mankind, the relationship between mankind and the ocean can be divided into the following key eras: (1) the ocean is a geographic barrier for mankind; (2) the ocean is a road for human transportation; (3) the ocean is a granary for mankind; (4) and the ocean is a treasure house of mankind’s natural resources. viewing from the last three eras, the main relationship between mankind and the ocean is reflected in economic relations. this means that the ocean plays an important role in promoting the creation, production, and accumulation of human wealth. the four-era theory of the relationship between humans and the ocean is the argument put forward in this paper. the following part is the argument of this point of view. the review and citation of the literature are interspersed in the process of argument. 2 the era of geographical barriers of the ocean in the early stage of the natural use of the ocean by mankind, the primary function of the ocean was a natural safety barrier, secondly, the use of primitive boats to sail inshore, the primitive boats helping humans leave the land, the thirdly, fishing and sun-dried sea salt. ocean was a natural safety barrier for human beings. a country or region that has the ocean as a natural barrier, does not mean that it will not be conquered. there is a poem in the classic chinese book titled the bible of poetry, which is translated into english as “xiangtu is brave and talented, so that overseas people also submit to him” (note 1). there is a sentence in another chinese classic book titled noble book, which is translated into english as “walk all over the earth, until the sea” (note 2). the first poem means that a country or region could be conquered even if this country or region has sea as barrier, the second sentence means that sea is a barrier for human beings. the ming dynasty of china implemented sea ban policy, the purpose of which was to protect oneself via the natural barrier of the sea, because at the end of the yuan dynasty and the beginning of the ming dynasty of china, the japanese feudal lords fought against each other, and the feudal lord who failed in the war organized warriors, merchants, and ronin to carry out armed smuggling, looting and harassment in coastal areas of china (note 3). at the beginning of the qing dynasty, the sea ban was implemented, the purpose of which was to deal with the attack from the sea by zheng chenggong, the remnant force of the ming dynasty. after zheng chenggong was suppressed, the qing dynasty lifted the sea ban. after more than 30 years, the policy of fully opening the sea began to shrink due to increasingly serious pirate activities and the potential threats from western culture, western civilization, and western industrial products in east asian waters (note 4). the first opium war in 1840 and the second opium war in 1856 completely knocked on china’s door, and the sea barrier completely failed. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 3 published by scholink inc. the united kingdom is an island country surrounded by the sea, with the north sea to the east, the atlantic ocean to the west and north, and the english channel to the south, across the sea from france (qian & xu, 2017). the ocean provides a natural barrier for britain. in 55 and 54 bc julius caesar invaded britain twice: the first invasion did not achieve great results. the second invasion consisted of 628 ships, five legions and 2000 cavalry, eventually conquered england (note 5). the king of england in the middle ages did not have to keep a standing army because of the barrier of the sea (qian & xu, 2017). 3. the era of sea channel of trade and transportation 3.1 why do humans need roads wikipedia defines transportation as “the movement of humans, animals, and goods from one location to another.” (note 6) abraham maslow divided the needs of human beings hierarchically into five levels at the beginning of his career and six levels during his later years: (a) physiological, (b) safety, (c) social belonging, (d) esteem, (e) self-actualization, and (f) self-transcendence. (note 7) viewing from maslow’s hierarchy of human needs, we can know that the human needs for transportation are not included in maslow’s category, as the human needs included in maslow’s hierarchy of needs belong to category of ends, but the human needs for transportation belong to the category of means (sun & philips, 2020), transportation is a means for humans to satisfy their needs, because all of life’s necessities and pleasures that humans need cannot possibly locate within reach of their static bodies. so, if there were not transportation, humans need could not be realized. roads are infrastructures that match human transportation. without roads, human transportation behavior cannot be realized. 3.2 the advantages of sea roads comparing to rail and land road transportation, sea roads are natural, railroads and land roads require substantial investment in construction waterway, this kind of construction investment can be saved in sea roads. at the meantime, the waterway extends in all directions, is not restricted by roads and tracks, and also transportation by sea roads have stronger cargo capacity, can travel day and night. before the invention of cars and trains, sea transportation must have been faster than land transportation. however, if a country wants to fully utilize the advantages of sea routes, it needs to have two capabilities, one is the ability to sea transport, and the other is the ability to protect the safety of maritime transport and the smooth flow of sea routes. the first ability is relative to maritime navigation technique, technology, and knowledge, the courage and passion of the navigator, ship building technology and level, etc. the second ability is relative to the military strength of a country’s navy. navigation technology mainly includes navigation and positioning of ships, operation and avoidance of ships, types and structures of ships, equipment and accessories of ships, navigation aids and facilities, marine hydrology, geography and meteorology, and port and waterway engineering (note 8). navigation has evolved from skill to science and technology, for example, “early pacific polynesians www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 4 published by scholink inc. used the motion of stars, weather, the position of certain wildlife species, or the size of waves to find the path from one island to another.” (note 9) the navigation method used by early pacific polynesians belongs to skill category. maritime navigation first using astrolabe occurred during the middle ages (note 10). due to the development and application of information science, computer technology, electronic technology, communication technology and space satellite technology in navigation, navigation technology has made great progress (note 11). because the control and monopoly of ocean transportation channels can bring huge economic benefits, when countries around the world have huge differences in the two capabilities of maritime transportation, a monopoly pattern on ocean transportation channels has formed. 3.3 the contribution and wealth creation of greece and venice, the early leaders of marine civilization the geography of ancient greece included three types of region, i.e., the coast, the lowlands, and the mountains (note 12), therefore, roads were too expensive, and roads were rarely built, then travel by land in ancient greece was difficult (note 13). due to the rocky and mountainous landscape, ancient greece had limited food supplies, then the ancient greeks produced goods to trade for food from other areas around the mediterranean, it is estimated that ancient athens imported over three-fourths of its grain at the height of its population (note 14). greek coastline provided an abundance of harbors and inlets for shipping, ocean travel and ocean transportation became the most important means of transportation for the ancient greeks. transportation by sea was a great asset to the ancient greeks, with the help of ocean trade, the ancient greeks accumulated and created more wealth: “in ancient greece, nearly 700 small communities were within forty miles of the coast. these communities typically enjoyed more wealth than their inland counterparts.” (note 15) with the help of ocean trade, the ancient greeks created a splendid greek civilization. “the affinity of the ancient greeks to the sea is clearly manifested through their art and mythology. many sculptures and deities were of or related to the sea, most notably poseidon, god of the sea. greek voyagers would pray to these deities in the hope of receiving guidance and safe passage during their journey.” (note 16) the republic of venice existed from 697 ad to 1797 ad. venice prospered on the salt trade in its early years, and established marine hegemony in subsequent centuries: venice dominated trade on the mediterranean sea, including commerce between europe and north africa, as well as asia, the venetian navy was used in the crusades (note 17). venice achieved territorial conquests along the adriatic sea and became home to an extremely wealthy merchant class, who patronized renowned art and architecture along the city’s lagoons (note 18). the wealth and prosperity of venice laid the foundation for venice to become the center of the renaissance. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 5 published by scholink inc. 3.4 the alternation of maritime hegemony 3.4.1 portugal’s maritime supremacy during the 15th and 16th centuries, portuguese explorers were at the forefront of overseas exploration, created one of the most powerful empires: they reached india, established multiple trading posts in asia and africa, and settled what would become brazil (note 19). major events are as follows (note 20): (1) king denis made an agreement with genoese merchant sailor manuel pessanha in 1317, laying the basis for the portuguese navy and the establishment of a powerful genoese merchant community in portugal. (2) portuguese occupied ceuta in 1415 by the aiming to control navigation of the african coast, young prince henry the navigator was there and became aware of profit possibilities in the saharan trade routes, and invested in sponsoring voyage. (3) since 1420 governor of the rich order of christ held valuable monopolies on resources in algarve, invested in sponsoring voyages down the coast of mauritania, and was granted a royal monopoly of all profits from trading within the areas discovered in 1443. (4) vasco da gama commanded a ground-breaking voyage to reach calicut in western india in 1498, opened up a sea route to asia, and became the first european to reach india. (5) 1500 pedro álvares cabralmade landfall on the brazilian coast, brazil becomes the portuguese colony. (6) in 1511 albuquerque sailed to malacca in malaysia, which became the strategic base for portuguese trade expansion with china and southeast asia. afterwards the portuguese empire expanded into the persian gulf, the portuguese empire expanded into the persian gulf as portugal, and contested with the ottoman empire for control of the spice trade. 3.4.2 spain’s maritime supremacy portugal monopolized the route from europe through africa to asia, grabbed a lot of wealth, which had caused the jealousy of other countries. but the other countries must find a new route to the east to grab wealth from spice trade, due to the portugal’s monopoly on the old route. spain had achieved far beyond this goal. columbus’ 1492 america expeditions was sponsored by catholic spain monarchs queen isabella i and king ferdinand ii (note 21). the original intention of columbus’s voyage was to discover the place where spices are produced. columbus did not find spices, but found gold and silver that is more precious than spices, so that spain could grab a large amount of gold and silver from america. according to estimates, between 1500 and 1650, spain grabbed 181 tons of gold and 16,000 tons of silver from the new world (taylor, 2002). if it is converted to current value, if gold value is calculated at the current price of $1850 per ounce, that much gold would be worth nearly $10.8 billion dollars, i.e.1850*181*1000000/31.034768=10789511943.508$; if silver value is calculated at the current price of $24 per ounce, then that much silver would be worth nearly $12.4 billion dollars, i.e., 24*16000*1000000/31.034768=12373219,609.6971$. for searching for a westward route to the maluku islands, ferdinand magellan funded by the spanish crown organized the castilian expedition to the east indies from 1519 to 1522. magellan headed south to patagonia through the atlantic ocean, and passed through the strait of magellan into pacific ocean, at last reached the spice islands in 1521, and returned home via the indian ocean, finally completed www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 6 published by scholink inc. the first circuit of the globe (note 21) .magellan’s voyage around the world brought huge economic benefits to spain, in the early 16th century, portugal with a population of less than 2 million dominated the commercial routes of about half the earth at its heyday, monopolized the western and eastern spice, sugar and slave trade, spain broke the portuguese monopoly, and the two countries signed a treaty in 1529, i.e. treaty of zaragoza, to jointly monopolize the sea-way spice trade between the east and the west. 3.4.3 the united provinces’ maritime supremacy the spanish armada attacked britain in the summer of 1588, but was defeated horribly, which led to the end of spanish hegemony at sea (note 22), and the united provinces rose to hegemony in the early seventeenth instead of spain (taylor, 1994). the rampant promiscuity among ideological force resource, military force resource, political force resource, and economic force resource created a very unusual configuration of social forces, which translated into hegemony (taylor, 1994). the foundation of dutch maritime hegemony in 17th century was the excelling of the dutch shipbuilding industry. by 1600 dutch shipbuilders dominated the european market, whose success was based on low costs and the technical superiority of ships built by them (note 23). “dutch ship design and construction were the envy of seventeenth-century europe, a target of industrial espionage for the french and a target for violence for the english and a source of capital goods for the venetians who simply bought dutch ships outright” (note 24) (unger, 2011). the excelling of the shipbuilding industry of the dutch laid the foundation for the strength of the dutch shipping industry, which prompted the netherlands to become the european sea coachman in the 17th century. obviously maritime hegemony needs strong military power to escort. maurice founded a whole new school of military professional practice, and reformed military tactics, his innovations in military field greatly improved the military power of the united provinces of the netherlands, which was one of the most powerful in europe between 1600 and 1648 (note 25). the dutch built up by far the largest merchant fleet in the world. in the north sea and baltic there was little risk of piracy and trips shuttled between markets. in dangerous zones (where the risk of piracy or shipwreck was high) they traveled in convoys with a light guard. 3.4.4 the era of the united kingdom’s maritime supremacy britain declared war on the dutch in december 1780, then the fourth anglo-dutch war broke out. with the end of the war, the world entered the era of british maritime hegemony. before 1800, monopoly dominated in the overseas expansion and colonial trade of europe. “it is inconceivable that any country would have willingly shared access to such fabulous riches as the spices of the eastern seas or the gold and silver of mexico and peru. following the example of the iberian kings, every other european monarch refused to permit any other power to trade with his colonies before the end of the eighteenth century.” (hamilton, 1948, p. 51). the specially designed staple ports, convoyed fleets, prescribed routes, and special privileges “closed most of the colonies to most of the subjects of most of the colonial powers most of the time.” (hamilton, 1948, p51). after the united www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 7 published by scholink inc. kingdom got the maritime supremacy, an inclusive and open maritime policy was implemented. the united kingdom advocated freedom of navigation and free trade policies. for examples, the british corn laws, which are laws of anti-free trade, restricted import of food and grain, and was repealed in 1849 (note 26). it is economic ideas rather than the pressure of interests that were central to repeal the corn laws (irwin, 1989). the navigation act long titled an act for increase of shipping, and encouragement of the navigation of this nation was first adopted in 1651 (note 27), its intent was to intensify the long-standing principle that english vessels should be used by english trade and fisheries. it is obvious that the navigation act 1651 was a monopoly law, which was repealed in 1849.to maintain the international trade order is the ultimate goal of the united kingdom by holding sea power. during the maritime hegemony process “britain as the hegemon can be seen to have provided a “public good” to the international economy in the form of a liberal ideology” (o’brien et al., 1992, p. 110). such a strategic move not only enabled the united kingdom to obtain huge economic benefits by becoming a “sun never setting empire” with colonies all over the world, but also enabled other countries to obtain large or small economic benefits accordingly. so that the united kingdomcould maintain the longest maritime hegemony in history. 1939 was marked as the year of end of britain’s cycle of hegemony by robert gilpin (spiezio, 1990). 3.4.5 the usa’s maritime supremacy because 1939 was marked as the year of end of britain’s cycle of hegemony, that means the world entered the era of the usa’s maritime supremacy. the united states does not seem to show a diligent pursuit of maritime hegemony. all this is determined by the general trend of historical development, that is, the occurrence of world war i and world war ii. the accumulation of us economic, political, military and technological strength paved the way for the smooth succession of hegemony. the united states’ emphasis on the ocean began with the publication of mahan’s work titled “the influence of sea power upon history, 1660-1783” in 1890.before 1890 the united states had always regarded itself as a mainland country, whose land was its basic space for survival and development, after 1890 the united states gradually changed from the strategy of valuing land and undervaluing sea to the strategy of valuing land and sea equally. in his book mahan argued that (note 28): (1) national greatness was associated with the sea; (2) the importance of strategic locations, such as choke points, canals, and coaling stations, had been emphasized; (3) states should increase production and shipping capacities and acquire overseas possessions; (4) the primary mission of a navy was to secure the command of the sea by destroying or neutralizing the enemy fleet and not by destruction of commerce. mahan’s sea power theory provided the basis for the strengthening of the u.s. navy. in the 1890s the u.s. congress approved building multiple modern steel-hulled armored cruisers and battleships. the number of u.s. navy ships in 1870 ranked 12th in the world, and rose to 5th around 1900 (note 29). in 1902 president theodore roosevelt said that: “a good navy is not a provocation to war. it is the surest guaranty of peace.” (note 30) the u.s. won two major battles during the 1898 spanish–american war, which not only verified the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 8 published by scholink inc. increase in the strength of the u.s. navy, but also expanded the range of u.s. maritime power. the first world war and the second world war severely weakened the naval power of britain and the european powers. in 1939, britain handed over its maritime hegemony to the united states naturally. 4. the era of human blue granary it is said that fishing was an essential source of food in prehistory, “homo habilis then homo erectus were the first fishermen, some 500 000 years ago” (note 31), and “during graeco-roman antiquity, fishing was the main subject of the halieutika” (note 32). fishery belongs to agriculture in the classification of statistics, so the sea is regarded as the blue granary for humans, but the size of the blue granary depends on the human’s ability to exploit the sea. in modern history, the dutch fishing industry was once very strong. the backbone of the dutch fishing industry was the north sea herring fishery, “in the 14th and 15th centuries, herring fisheries in the north sea, off southern norway, and in the baltic sea became the fountainhead of the enormous wealth of the hanseatic league of trading cities.” (note 33) in 1603, 450000 people in holland were engaged in work related to the thriving herring fishery (pitcher & lam, 2015). at that time, the strengths of dutch fishing industry lie in (note 34): (1) the catch is large, the size of fishing buses is large. it is estimated that the size of the herring fleet is roughly 500 busses and the catch is about 20000 to 25000 lasts on average each year in the first decades of the seventeenth century; (2) the herring ships could remain at sea longer and increased the range of the herring fishery, because the herring catch can be processed with salt in herring bus at sea. the data in table 1 can also support the prosperity of the dutch fishing industry in the late 16th century and early 17th century. table 1. lasts of herring shipped through the danish soundin annual averages time periods lasts of herring shipped from the netherlands through the danish sound, 1562-1780 1562-69 2619 1574-79 456 1580-89 852 1590-99 5044 1600-09 8495 1610-19 8658 1620-29 7593 1630-39 7512 1640-49 8089 1650-57 3383 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 9 published by scholink inc. 1661-70 2607 1671-80 1954 1681-90 2959 1691-00 1879 1701-10 329 1711-20 1114 1721-30 1748 1731-40 1764 1741-50 585 1751-60 663 1761-70 610 1771-80 1389 source: w.s. unger, “de sonttabellen,” p. 114; “de sonttabellenvoltooid,” p. 190. indirectly cited from https://www.huxiu.com/article/375088.html the dutch fishing industry was very strong in 16-17 century due to the following reasons: (1) leading dutch shipbuilding industry in that era. dutch shipbuilders dominated the european market by 1600, their success was due to 1ow costs and the technical superiority of their product (unger, 1981). the ship building district of zaan was the first industrialized area in the world with around 900 industrial windmills at the end of the 17th century. (note 35) (2) herring bus: a form of factory ship. the herring bus allowed the herring catch to be processed with salt at sea, so that the herring ship could remain at sea longer and increased the range of the herring fishery (note 36). (3) good regulation. regulation was designed to maximize rents, this “strategy turned into one which at first limited sales and then returns to the dutch industry.” (unger, 1980, p. 253). fishing is one way for humans to get food from the ocean, and the other main way is fishing farming. from the middle of the 11th century, the construction of ponds developed, heralding the beginning of fish farming (note 37). it is obvious that fish farming is later than fishing. this is because fish farming requires humans to have a stronger ability to influence and control waters, and higher level of biotechnology than fishing. the fishing catch is restricted by the renewal of natural wild fishery resources. excessive fishing will lead to ecological imbalance and affect the sustainable development of the fishing industry. nevertheless, the aquaculture industry can economically provide humans with high-quality animal protein food, which plays a major role in making up for the lack of marine fishing. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 10 published by scholink inc. table 2. world fisheries and aquaculture production, utilization, unit: million tonnes, live weight 1986-1995 average per year 1996-2005 average per year 2006-2015 average per year 2016 2017 2018 capture: inland 6.4 8.3 10.6 11.4 11.9 12.0 capture: marine 80.5 83.0 79.3 78.3 81.2 84.4 total capture 86.9 91.4 89.8 89.6 93.1 96.4 aquaculture: inland 8.6 19.8 36.8 48.0 49.6 51.3 aquaculture: marine 6.3 14.4 22.8 28.5 30.0 30.8 total aquaculture 14.9 34.2 59.7 76.5 79.5 82.1 total world fisheries and aquaculture 101.8 125.6 149.5 166.1 172.7 178.5 human consumption 71.8 98.5 129.2 148.2 152.9 156.4 non-food uses 29.9 27.1 20.3 17.9 19.7 22.2 population (billions) 5.4 6.2 7.0 7.5 7.5 7.6 per capita apparent consumption (kg) 13.4 15.9 18.4 19.9 20.3 20.5 source: fao, the state of world fisheries and aquaculture 2020, p. 3. from the data in table 2, we can see that the amount of marine capture has basically stabilized at around 80 million tones from 1986 to 2018, the amount of inland capture has basically stabilized at around 10 million tonnes, so that the amount of total marine capture has basically stabilized at around 90 million tones from 1986 to 2018. however, the data in table 2 also shows that from 1986 to 2018, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 11 published by scholink inc. the amount of aquaculture increased greatly, the amount of marine aquaculture increased from 6.3 million tonnes to 30.8 million tonnes, the amount of marine aquaculture in 2018 was 4.89 times that of 1986; the amount of inland aquaculture increased from 8.6 million tonnes to 51.3 million tonnes, the amount of inland aquaculture in 2018 was 5.97 times that of 1986. therefore, the ratio of the amount of total aquaculture to the amount of total capture was 17%, 37%, 66%, 85%, 85%, 85% in 1986-1995, 1996-2005, 2006-2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 respectively. the ratios above show that the contribution of farming and fishing to human food supply is almost evenly divided now, which also shows the huge development potential and space of farming. 2016, 2017, 2018 per capita apparent consumption (kg) of fisheries and aquaculture production reached around 20 kg, which meets about 10% of human food needs, also means that the ocean has indeed become a blue granary for mankind already. 5. the era of human natural resources treasure house in the field of economics, what is generally accepted is the economics definition of lionel robbins. “economics is the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.” (robbins, 1935, pp. 15) the means represent resources, the ends represent the human needs or wants. “economics is entirely neutral between ends; ... in so far as any end is dependent on scarce means,” (robbins, 1935, pp. 24). “the ends may be noble or they may be base. they may be ‘material’ or ‘immaterial’—if ends can be so described. but if the attainment of one set of ends involves the sacrifice of others, then it has an economic aspect.” (robbins, 1935, pp. 24-25) economics definition clearly shows that wants are unlimited, but the resources are limited. as the ocean contains abundant resources: marine resources include marine mineral resources, sea chemical resources, marine biological (aquatic) resources and marine power resources. marine mineral resources mainly include petroleum, coal, iron, bauxite, manganese, copper, and quartz. seawater chemical resources mainly include chlorine, sodium, magnesium, sulfur, iodine, uranium, gold, nickel, etc., which are dissolved in seawater. marine power resources mainly include tidal energy, wave energy, ocean current energy, and seawater temperature difference energy and salt difference energy. but compared with land resources, the development and utilization of marine resources requires humans to have higher capabilities and a higher level of science and technology. in recent decades, the rapid development of science and technology has greatly promoted the use of marine resources by mankind, the ocean has entered the era of being human natural resources treasure house. china’s acquisition of marine resources is mainly reflected in renewable energy and low-value-added products, of course, china is also striving to pursue the acquisition of high-value-added resources, such as oil and natural gas: (1) 2019 was the best year in history for the global offshore wind industry, because this year the world offshore wind industry added 6.1 gw of new capacity, bringing total global cumulative installations to 29.1 gw. china remains in the number one spot for the second year in a row for new installations, installing a record 2.4 gw (gwec, 2020); (2) china produced 49.16 million tons of offshore crude oil in 2019, having an increase of 2.3 percent over the 2018; (3) china produced www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 12 published by scholink inc. 16200 million cubic meters natural gas, having an increase of 5.4% over 2018. the added value of offshore oil and gas industry was 154100 million yuan in 2019; (4) the added value of sea sand, seabed gold mining was 19400 million yuan in 2019 (china marine economic statistics bulletin, 2019). the u.s. commerce department’s bureau of economic analysis (bea) has found that the country’s marine economy contributed usd 372844 million to the nation’s gdp in 2018 (note 38), that means from 2017 to 2018, the marine economy of the usa grew by 5.8 percent, faster than the 5.4 percent growth of the total u.s. gdp. table 3. the usa ocean economy value added by industry: mining industry unit: million dollars sector 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 mining: total 66168 40223 33282 37518 41171 oil and gas extraction 48728 27483 26014 30282 33491 mining, except oil and gas 780 616 644 859 956 support activities for mining 16661 12124 6624 6377 6724 source: bureau of economic analysis. ocean economy prototype statistics, 2014-2018. https://www.bea.gov/data/special-topics/ocean-economy viewing the data in the table 3, we can know that the ratio of the usa’s mining industry gdp to the whole nation’s gdp is 11.04% (41171/372844) in 2018, the usa’s oil and gas extraction industry gdp to the whole nation’s gdp is 8.98% (33491/372844) in 2018. the 11.04% and 8.98% ratios are high, that means the united states has obtained a large amount of oil and gas resources from the ocean, as well as a large quantity of other mineral resources, which also means that the world has truly entered the era of treating the ocean as a treasure house of natural resources, and the united states is the leader in this era. 6. conclusion from the above analysis, we can see that the use of the ocean by humans clearly shows four eras. every era has the most significant feature of this era. this most significant feature function is the most important, largest, latest, and trendy contribution of the oceans to humans in this era. for examples, in the first era, the ocean is a geographic barrier for mankind, it means that the geographic barrier function is the greatest contribution of the ocean to mankind in the first era. when mankind uses the ocean as a geographic barrier, it does not exclude mankind from driving boats, fishing, and drying sea salt. however, driving boats, fishing, and drying sea salt are not important features of this era; in the fourth era, the ocean is a treasure house of mankind’s natural resources, it means that in the fourth era mankind regards obtaining more important and high-value natural resources from the ocean as an www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 13 published by scholink inc. important economic growth point and engine of technological innovation. in fourth era, ocean is still a road for human transportation and still is a granary for mankind, but ocean as a road for human transportation and as a blue granary for mankind is not main feature of the fourth era of the relationship between man and the ocean. the four-era theory of the relationship between humans and the ocean also shows the continuous improvement process of human influence and utilization of the oceans. the continuous improvement of human influence and utilization of the ocean is realized by improvement of science and technology. the ability of humans to influence and utilize the oceans in the second era surpassed the first era is due to advances in shipbuilding technology and navigation technology; humans’ ability to influence and utilize the ocean in the third era surpassed the second era due to advances in biotechnology; and the ability of humans to influence and utilize the ocean in the fourth era surpassed the third era due to the advancement and application of all-round science and technology. historically, once a country has maritime hegemony, this country would become wealthy, powerful, and the leaders of maritime civilization. references anderson, j. l. 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(1981). dutch shipbuilding in the golden age. history today, 31(4). retrieved from www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 15 published by scholink inc. https://www.historytoday.com/archive/dutch-shipbuilding-golden-age --. (1980). dutch herring, technology, and international trade in the seventeenth century. the journal of economic history, 40(2), 253-280. retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/2120179 https://doi.org/10.1186/s40152-014-0014-5 --. (2011). dutch nautical sciences in the golden age: the portuguese influence. e-journal of portuguese history, 9(2). retrieved from http://www.scielo.mec.pt/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=s1645-64322011000200003 notes note 1. http://www.hjdsd.com/news/show.asp?id=361 note 2. ibid note 3. https://baike.baidu.com/item/%e6%98%8e%e6%9c%9d%e6%b5%b7%e7%a6%81 note 4. https://baike.baidu.com/item/%e6%b8%85%e6%9c%9d%e6%b5%b7%e7%a6%81 note 5. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/julius_caesar%27s_invasions_of_britain note 6. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/transport note 7. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/maslow%27s_hierarchy_of_needs note 8. https://baike.baidu.com/item/%e8%88%aa%e6%b5%b7%e6%8a%80%e6%9c%af/46386 note 9. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/navigation note 10. ibid note 11. https://baike.baidu.com/item/%e8%88%aa%e6%b5%b7%e6%8a%80%e6%9c%af/46386 note 12. https://historylink101.com/2/greece3/climate-geography.htm note 13. https://historylink101.com/2/greece3/travel-land.htm note 14. https://www.creaders.net/ note 15. ibid note 16. http://fubini.swarthmore.edu/~envs2/rayyan/a%20sailor%27s%20life.html note 17. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/republic_of_venice note 18. ibid note 19. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/portuguese_discoveries note 20. ibid note 21. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/christopher_columbus note 22. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ferdinand_magellan. wikipedia cc by-sa 3.0. note 23. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/spanish_armada note 24. https://www.historytoday.com/archive/dutch-shipbuilding-golden-age note 25.http://www.scielo.mec.pt/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=s1645-64322011000200003 note 26. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/military_history_of_the_netherlands www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 2, 2021 16 published by scholink inc. note 27. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/corn_laws note 28. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/alfred_thayer_mahan note 29. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/history_of_the_united_states_navy note 30. https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/heritage/famous-navy-quotations.html note 31.https://www.alimentarium.org/en/knowledge/history-fishing note 32. ibid note 33. https://www.medievalists.net/2015/07/fish-commoditization-and-the-historical-origins-of-catching-fish -for-profit note 34. https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-dutch-economy-in-the-golden-age-16th-17th-centuries/ note 35. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/economic_history_of_the_netherlands_(1500%e2%80%931815) note 36. https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-dutch-economy-in-the-golden-age-16th-17th-centuries/ note 37. https://www.alimentarium.org/en/knowledge/history-fishing note 38. https://www.bea.gov/data/special-topics/ocean-economy microsoft word ape-v2n2-p97 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 97 original paper optimality of morocco’s currency basket azzouzi asmae1* & bousselhami ahmed1 1 economics and social sciences of tangier, research group on economics, finance and development (efed), abdelmalek essaâdi university, morocco * azzouzi asmae, research group on economics, finance and development (efed), abdelmalek essaâdi university, morocco received: march 30, 2019 accepted: april 20, 2019 online published: april 23, 2019 doi:10.22158/ape.v2n2p97 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v2n2p97 abstract the objective of this article is to analyze the behavior of the monetary authorities of morocco in the readjustment of the official weights of anchor currencies in dirham basket on april 13, 2015. to do this, we are taking into account the objective of the external financing constraints for comparing, with different scenarios, the optimal weights with the implicit weights of the currencies. such a comparison proves that the authorities take more into consideration the structure of the commercial exchanges than that of the debt for the choice of the optimal weight of the anchor currency. in the final part of the paper, we have delved deeper into this issue by estimating the price and income elasticities of morocco’s external trade in light of the disaggregated data by sectors. our intention is to find out which foreign currency seems more volatile against the local currency in order to lead the economy to manage the stability of dirham by increasing its weight in the basket. as a result, the higher price elasticity of the dollar against the dirham encourages monetary authorities to increase its weight in the basket. keywords currency weights, dollar, optimal weight, activity sector, price elasticity 1. introduction pegging the moroccan dirham to a basket of currencies of its major trading and financial partners has provided a useful nominal anchor to the economy. the international monetary fund’s (imf) staff and the authorities, however, agree that a more flexible exchange rate regime aims at the enhancement of the current diversification of trade and financial flows. it also seeks to increase the perception that the country’s competitiveness is strengthening and the economy is resilient in the face of exogenous shocks. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 98 published by scholink inc. our study analyses and shows the reasons for the change executed by the monetary authorities on the currency basket of moroccan dirham that occurred on 13 april 2015. the last similar revision of this basket of currencies dates back to 2001 following the advent of the euro, which led to a profound change in the exchange rate policy of morocco. this change was justified primarily by the automatic component of the dirham exchange rate adjustment: its shift according to the inflation differential between morocco and its partners has been abandoned. additionally, domestic inflation stabilized at a level comparable to that of developed economies. lastly, by the substitution of european national currencies by the euro, the dirham has become anchored to the euro, the dollar, and the euro/dollar parity, which determines the value of the dirham as well as its quotation in relation to other international currencies. the new currency weightings are now set at 60% for the euro against 40% for the dollar. previously weightings were set against the euro and dollar 80% and 20% respectively. the updating of the weightings of the basket has no impact on the value of the dirham, which is in line with the fundamentals of the moroccan economy, this takes into account the significant improvement in the current account and foreign exchange reserves, as evidenced by the imf’s article iv for 2014. this update also remains dependent on the fluctuations of each currency basket. in the emerging economies, however, capital markets are not as deep and liquid as those in developed markets. this can be explained by the monetary authorities’ interventions each time they are needed. moreover, they are often unable to borrow abroad in their own currency and have to resort to third currencies such as the euro and the dollar in most cases (note 1). in this respect, anchoring to a composite basket of currencies preserves a certain flexibility of the exchange rate in the presence of the intervention of the authorities, especially in the case of countries that are sensitive to shocks of a real and nominal nature, for example, a variation terms of trade. this leads us to note that adopting a more flexible exchange rate regime, whether it is floating (the case of tunisia) or crawling peg (morocco), allows arbitration between nominal stability and maintaining competitiveness while limiting the risk of speculative attacks in a gradual process of financial liberalization (levy-yeyati & sturzenegger, 2005; genberg & swoboda, 2005). in addition, the adoption of such a regime of exchange rate based on a basket of currencies may cause the risk of discordance between the debt denominated in foreign currencies and the distribution of trading partners (benassy-quere, 1999). indeed, a depreciation of the domestic currency increases the value of the debt, then increases the default risk of debtors and weakens the banking system, this mechanism is well known in the literature as the “balance sheet effect”. hence a subtle arbitration between the objective of maintaining competitiveness and the stabilization of the external debt burden; as such, anchoring to a trade-weighted basket remains the best way if the debt is denominated in the currency of the trading partners. morocco finds itself in this present financial situation. hence, the geographical distribution seems to coincide with the currency breakdown of external debt. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 99 published by scholink inc. the geographical distribution of moroccan trade with the outside world shows that the exchange transactions invoiced in dollars has improved in recent years. this improvement has been of around 32%, while they are almost 62.4% with the euro area according to the data provided by moroccan exchange office. in addition, moroccan debt is denominated 61.24% in euros, 20.89% in us dollars and 17.87% in the other currencies according to bank al-maghrib. this balance shows that anchoring on a basket composed of two strong currencies such as the euro and the dollar can then be optimal if we take into consideration both the objective of competitiveness and the debt burden. therefore, we will start with the question, how can we know if moroccan authorities take into account the dual objective of external competitiveness and the constraint of debt’s denomination currency in the readjustment of the dirham’s basket? or more specifically: which one of these dual objectives the policy-takers are based on more accurately? in other words, we want to know exactly which of these objectives was sought in this switchover. our goal is to contribute to better understanding of such a decision of the authorities. the structure of this article is as follows: section ii is used to determine the best currency or currencies that well suited to the dirham’s anchoring strategy as reference currency (ies) over the period 1973 to 2014. section iii gives the point of view of the normative economy; this section is used to analyze the real anchoring strategy. this is understood as the currency or the currencies against which moroccan authorities should try to stabilize their exchange rate by calibrating a simple model based on both trade relations and its external debt. section iv is used to investigate possible asymmetries in the reactions of real exports/imports to changes in relative export/import price or real exchange rate and foreign/domestic economic activity, after disaggregating moroccan trade flows by sectors using quarterly data for the period 1999:1 to 2014:4. this part of the study is done by estimating the price and income elasticities of the different exporting/importing sectors in relation to the euro-zone and the rest of the world, and is based on the marshall-lerner condition and the j-curve phenomenon to find out how the monetary authorities can manage their currency to boost the trade balance. this is done by studying the price estimates of different sectors to realize which is the currency or the most volatile currency (with high price-elasticity), which requires intervention of the central bank of morocco (bank al-maghrib) to maximize its weight attached in the basket in order to stabilize its volatility. conclusion section sums up the results. 2. nominal anchorage of the dirham before may 13, 1973, the first moroccan exchange rate was attached to a key currency that was the french franc (ff). later, the dirham became attached to a basket of currencies best reflecting the structure of moroccan foreign trade with the outside world. aqllal (1988) pointed out: it was a question of stabilizing the corresponding variations of the dirham, and thus of avoiding the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 100 published by scholink inc. vague disturbances suffered by the ff to which it was attached. indeed, the dirham is attached to each of the currencies in the basket, which is based on a weighting coefficient corresponding to it (the moroccan balance of payments, printing press fédala). it was only after the advent of the euro that the central bank announced the rule of intervention. one of the measures was setting objectives for the exchange rate with the intention of it reaching the weight given to the currencies reference in the basket. since the collapse of the bretton woods system in the early 1970s and the adoption of the second amendment to the imf’s articles of agreement, countries have been free to adopt the exchange rate regime, which is best suited to their needs based on their own criteria. exchange rate crises, which have affected the emerging countries (mexico in 1994; thailand, indonesia and south korea in 1997; russia and brazil in 1998; argentina in 2000; turkey in 2001; argentina in 2002) contain a common characteristic. this can be explained by the fact that they have chosen nominal anchoring strategies that can be assimilated to an intermediate exchange rate regime. this gives monetary policy greater autonomy in comparison with fixed exchange systems. this succession of crises has come together with the consensus that intermediate exchange rate regimes are intrinsically fragile and cannot constitute a credible policy. this new consensus is based on the recognition of corner solutions. that means that the choice is between the two extreme regimes (fixed and floating) as the only sustainable solutions in the new international monetary environment marked by the increasing mobility of capital. emerging countries are preparing to integrate more and more international capital markets, as is the case in morocco. as a result, these countries are confronted, not with the choice of one of the two solutions in corners; but rather with the choice of the degree of rigidity or floating of the exchange rate. the official nominal exchange rate remains the main measure on which the imf relies to identify exchange rate regimes to which other variables such as foreign exchange reserves or interest rates are attached as emphasized by reinhart and rogoff (2004). the imf classification is known as the official classification or de jure classification. in the theoretical and empirical economic literature, the inconsistencies between the regimes declared by the countries and those they actually pursue have led to the development of new categorizations based on countries’ exchange practices. this is called the de facto regime. this type of classification of exchange rate regimes is known by the most famous authors as reinhart and rogoff (2004), ghosh, jonathan and qureshi (2010). misidentification can complicate the imf’s monitoring of exchange rate policies by reducing the transparency of member countries policies according to the study of bubula and ötker-robe (2002). we have decided that it would be useful to compare the actual exchange rate policy followed by moroccan authorities and the one they should follow during the period 1973 to 2014. we will present the assessment of exchange rate systems based on these two basic approaches, the first one focuses on the official classification of the regimes declared by the imf (de jure behavior) while the second approach is based on the regimes effectively pursued (de facto behavior). in this framework, with the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 101 published by scholink inc. help of a cluster analysis, the annual report on the exchange rate regimes and restrictions (areaer) of 2014, under article xiv of section 3, the main purpose of which is the action of the restriction fund, did not provide information regarding the exchange rate policies actually or effectively followed. but this does not prevent to assess between the policies by using descriptive statistics according to reinhart and rogoff in their classification of exchange rate regimes in 2004. then, when the official system corresponds to what a country’s government actually does in regard to its exchange rate system, the exchange system is known as de jure. if they differ, the exchange rate system is known as de facto classified based on the volatility of the nominal exchange rate. to determine de facto behavior, the countries choosing intermediate solutions propose the creation of objective-zones, the establishment of a quasi-fixed parity regime between major currencies. in the current situation, we are trying to find the main currency area filling the usual criterion of an optimal currency area. for this purpose, the optimum currency area theory (oca) was developed in 1961 by the canadian economist robert mundell, sought to determine the currency or currencies best suited for an anchoring strategy to determine de facto behavior. in the same context, the reference currency used to calculate the nominal exchange rate is the official currency of reference declared by countries with a fixed or quasi-fixed exchange rate system. for levy-yeyatii and sturzenegger (2002), countries that do not reveal their anchor currency retain the currency against which the national currency has the lowest volatility. in order to compare these currencies we began by computing the volatility. volatility is measured by the standard deviation of the monthly changes in the logarithm of the exchange rate. volatility, calculated in relation to each referenced currency “i”, is noted “ i ”. the main reference currencies are the dollar, the yen and the deutsche mark that was being considered as the representative core of the european monetary system “sme” before the advent of euro in 1999. the relative volatility of the exchange rate against the currency “i” is calculated by relating the volatility to total volatility in relation to the three currencies:   i i $ y d m σ λ = σ + σ + σ (according to benassy, 1995). in order to determine whether a currency belongs to a monetary zone (dollar, yen or mark/euro), it is sufficient to check if λi <0.25. if none λi is less than 0.25 (or 25%), we conclude that there is no nominal anchor in any of the three specified currencies. obviously, the study of the exchange rate is in variations and not in level because it makes it possible to consider some sliding exchange rate regimes like nominal anchoring regimes on a currency or a basket. the study covers the period 1973-2014. this period is divided into five sub-periods according to the major elements of moroccan economy. exchange rates are monthly averages taken from bank-al-maghreb statistics. -the first period from 1973-1979 is characterized by the connection of the dirham to a basket of currencies by moroccan authorities. this period was characterized by the appearance and acceleration of current account deficits. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 102 published by scholink inc. -the second period from 1980-1993 is characterized by the establishment of the structural adjustment program in (1983-1992) and the devaluation of the dirham of 16.4% (1983-1985) and 9.3% in 1990 in the goal of maintaining the competitiveness of moroccan exports. whereas 1993 was marked by the emergence of the convertibility of current balance of payments transactions within the meaning of article 8 of the imf’s articles of agreement. -the third period from 1994-1998 is characterized by the creation of the foreign exchange market open to banks from 1996 (note 2). the same date also corresponds to the transition from the exchange rate regime to a band of fluctuation around a central parity against a basket of currencies. -the fourth period from 1999-2007 is characterized by the change in the composition of the anchor basket by the advent of the euro as well as by the gradual and accelerated liberalization of the exchange rate system from 2005. -the fifth period from 2008-2014 started with the period of economic and financial crisis until 2010. then, from 2010 up to now, the international economic integration process has speeded up in morocco, leading to an improvement in the competitive environment. before proceeding to the results, we presented below the evolution of the dirham with respect to the various specified currencies. through these graphs, we can see that the advent of the euro is considered a mechanism for exchange stabilization for the dirham against the deutsch mark, which was very volatile in the first period. from 1999 to early 2001, the overview of the history of the euro shows that the dirham depreciates (appreciates) in nominal value against the euro (dollar). the euro destabilizes rapidly against the dirham. historical evolution of currencies «dem» «dollar» «yen» «yen» www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 103 published by scholink inc. «euro» «dollar» figure 1. evolution of the main currencies table 5 in appendices shows that during the five sub-periods mentioned before the moroccan dirham has low volatility relative to dollar. the volatility against dollar is close to 25% except for the period 1999-2006 when it becomes higher. this is explained by the strong appreciation that the dollar experienced during the entry of the euro of 1999 until early 2004 from early 2005 to early 2006 (see historical graph above). this appreciation would have reduced us exports. the beneficial effect of this incident was to encourage the promotion of moroccan exports invoiced in dollar. regarding the volatility compared to the dem is close to 25% during the period 1994-1998 and not for other periods. this could be explained by the appreciation of the deutsche mark “dem” against the weak currencies of the exchange rate mechanism, including moroccan dirham. furthermore, volatility of dirham remains very low against euro. in this case, we can say that the dirham belongs to a euro area. we can also notice the high volatility of the dirham compared to the yen. to conclude, during 1999-2006, dirham belongs only to euro monetary zone due to the strong appreciation that dollar experienced during the advent of the euro of 1999 to early 2006. it was only span a period of 2006 to 2014, dirham belongs to both euro and dollar monetary zones. the calculation of volatility against the potential anchor currencies in this section has allowed us to describe the effectiveness of the moroccan exchange rate regime. the latter is also generally measured by the estimation of the weighting of the different currencies comprising the dirham anchor basket in case in which the management of the central bank is discretionary. the second axis of this paper allows us to calculate the optimal weight of the anchor basket currencies by integrating the external financing constraint. the comparison of the optimal weights with the re-weighting allows us to find out which www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 104 published by scholink inc. objective is integrated by bank-al maghreb while the re-adjustment of the basket. 3. real anchorage of the dirham françois perroux (1903-1987) found that “the act of integrating gathers elements to form a whole, or it increases the consistency of a whole already existing” (the economics of the twentieth century). a regional currency union is seen as a way of reconciling the need for a degree of flexibility and the need for a stable monetary environment. the regional integration process makes it possible to have both irrevocably fixed exchange rates between highly integrated partner countries, and a certain flexibility vis-à-vis the currencies of the rest of the world. according to williamson (1999) in his study on nine east asian emerging economies, the adoption of a common basket peg ensures intra-regional exchange rate stability while allowing some flexibility against the dollar, the yen and the euro. the results are surprisingly similar to those of the economies that have made separate in an optimal anchor basket defined according to their commercial structure. for benassy (2000), the anchor to a common basket (dollar-euro-yen) are the weights attributed to each key currency differ from one country to another. however, the most important is that the main currencies are present while the basket is the same for all member countries of the same region. in this case, intra-regional exchange rates are automatically stabilized at least in the short term, and concerted realignments are possible in case of shocks. taking into consideration the case of morocco and tunisia, using a common basket (euro-dollar) shares many characteristics stabilizes the exchange rate between the two countries (intra-regional) without needing mutual consultation. emerging countries are faced with financial constraints that lead them to focus on external intermediate objectives. this leads us to analyze the strategy of optimal real anchoring that means the currency or the currencies on which they should attempt to stabilize their real exchange rate, based on a model that considers the behavior of two identical countries since we assume that morocco takes into account the exchange rate evolution of competing countries like tunisia. 3.1 exchange rate theory and the external constraint an intermediate regime in emerging economies allows monetary authorities to counteract erratic exchange rate fluctuations that may undermine the competitiveness of exporting firms or increase the burden of foreign currency debt. some theories on equilibrium real exchange rates help to establish the link between the real exchange rate and a broad set of economic fundamentals, the precursors of such theories are nurkse (1944) edwards (1988), williamson (1983, 1994) and stein (1995). for williamson, in the medium-term, the economy is should be in full employment and maintaining a stable price (internal balance) while the current account balance corresponds to sustainable financing flows (external equilibrium). this mechanism of adjustment between the internal and the external equilibrium is meant to restore and maintain equilibrium at the national level. in that way, we could say that williamson’s theory is both descriptive since it aims at predicting the equilibrium level at the medium-term and normative when it determines the equilibrium real exchange rate level. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 105 published by scholink inc. in fact, these theories seem more likely to explain the misalignment of the equilibrium real exchange rate of countries that have suffered significant exogenous shocks especially in the case of emerging economies. this misalignment is measured by adjusting the nominal exchange rate for the cumulative difference between domestic and foreign inflation. among the fundamentals of the economy is the public external debt. indeed, researchers are often interested in debt sustainability for developing countries. in the literature, the concept of sustainability has been analyzed in two parts. the first emphasizes fiscal sustainability as a budget balance that is consistent with a stable public-debt-to-gdp ratio as has been shown (krugman, 1989), sachs (1988), husain (1997), ricci and alii (2002), eggertsson (2010), leeper et al. (2010a), challe et ragot (2011). whereas the second, is concerned with the sustainability of the current account, which is understood as a situation where the balance of the current account is compatible with a situation of solvency. in fact, the distinction between the two sides of literature is not the subject of our study. therefore, we will focus only on the second part addressing the sustainability of the current account. as we have already seen, normative work relating to the real exchange rate is usually based on the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (feer). indeed, the external equilibrium indicates the combinations of the real exchange rate and the activity for which the current account reaches its equilibrium level. according to marshall-lerner’s condition, a real depreciation of the currency causes a surplus in the current account balance if the absolute sum of the long-term export and import demand elasticities is greater than unity. in the opposite direction, the depreciation of national currency increases the cost of servicing of foreign currency-denominated debt. in the last two decades, we noticed that foreign currency debt has increased in several major emerging market economies. in the case where the geographical structure of trade flows corresponds to the external-debt composition. anchoring on a weighted basket of trade remains the best way of focusing on external intermediate objectives, since competitiveness and debt service will remain stable. this is particularly the case of the moroccan economy as shown in the graphs in the appendix. in addition, the balance between the distribution of trade and the currencies of debt denomination leads us to say that the anchoring of the moroccan dirham on a “euro-dollar” basket constitutes a good strategy for the authorities if they seek both the stabilization of external competitiveness and that of the price of the debt. 3.2 the optimum currency weights 3.2.1 the model assume that the monetary authorities in the two maghreb countries of morocco (m) and tunisia (t) that are identical in terms of their objectives and the structure of their trade and debt (k=m, t) sought to minimize adverse effects of the real effective exchange rate volatility by taking into account both external competitiveness and debt service. this is done well through a combination of ( kc ) and ( kf ), which are two real effective exchange rates that are based on different weights (these two aspects are expressed in logarithmic form), in the following combination: www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 106 published by scholink inc.   2 21 / 2 , 0k k kminl c f k m t and     (1) where kc is a real effective exchange rate based on trade weightings while kf is a real effective exchange rate based on the distribution of debt by foreign currencies. this loss function can be derived from a function in terms of trade balance (which depends on kc ) and the weight of external debt (which depends on kf ). always in the loss function,  determines the weight of kf relative to kc . it is assumed that each country controls its bilateral exchange rate against the u.s. dollar, denoted k$e expressed in logarithm. then we try to determine to what extent it would be optimal to modify k$e when the euro varies with respect to the dollar. consider that « ja » is the weight of country “j” as a trading partner, « jb » the weight of the currency of country j-denominated debt. to simplify, we apply the same indices to countries and currencies: ($) refers to the dollar and the united states, (e) are to the euro and the euro zone. the real effective exchange rates kc and kf can be written as follows:     $ $ $ $ $ $ 1 1 m m e m e e m t m m e m e e m t c a e a e a a e f b e b e b b e           (2), (3) where mje is the logarithm of bilateral real exchange rate of country (m) facing (j) (j=$, e, t). knowing that $ $kj k je e e  , we have: $ $ $ $ m t m t m e m e e e e e e e     we can rewrite the previous system of equations as follows:           $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ 1 1 m m e m e e m t m m e m e e m t c a e a e e a a e e f b e b e e b b e e                 $ $ $ $1m m e e e tc e a e a a e     (4)  $ $ $ $1m m e e e tf e b e b b e     (5) we get similar relations for country t. in case each country minimizes its loss function without taking into account the reaction of its partner (note 3), the nash equilibrium is obtained as follows: by replacing these two expressions in the loss function, we obtain:  2 21 / 2m m ml c f      2 2 $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $1 / 2 1 1m m e e e t m e e e tl e a e a a e e b e b b e                (6) the minimization of the loss function assumes that this function is twice differentiable with respect www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 107 published by scholink inc. to m$e ; the first derivative is zero while the second derivative is positive.    $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $/ 1 1 0m m m e e e t m e e e tl e e a e a a e e b e b b e                (7)             $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $/ m e e e e e m t e e e e e e a a b b a b e e e a b e a a b b                    (8) equation (8) describes the optimal relationship of the exchange rate against the dollar to the variations of the euro/dollar exchange rate for both countries m and t. this optimal response depends on the relative weight of trading partners and debt currencies, as well as the preference parameter  . in the particular case where $ $ 0.5e ea b a b    , that means when all, trade and capital flows, are made equally with the united states and the euro area. then equation (8) becomes $ $ $1 / 2 *m t ee e e  . when the euro appreciates against dollar, each country (m, t) that can control its exchange rate against the dollar, appreciates its currency by 0.5% against the dollar, which means a depreciation of 0.5% against euro. this rule preserves the stability of the real effective exchange rate in terms of both trade weights and the weighting of foreign currencies in the debt denomination, so that deterioration in the capital account will be offset by an improvement in the current account. in fact, the weight of the united states as an outlet for moroccan exports between 1999-2014 was 3.57%, while dollar-denominated debt was 21.79%. also in the same period, the weight of the euro area as the recipient of moroccan exports was around 70.27%, while euro-denominated debt was 60.29%. by this, we can say that the distribution of the structure of trade and that of foreign currencies-denominated debt seem to be in agreement with the moroccan situation. these are key parameters for defining optimal real anchor basket. therefore, to match exactly the optimal weights in a country’s own basket, the authorities are mainly interested on the weight of the “commercial” exchange rate and the “financial” exchange rate in the loss function, meaning the determination of the value  . thus, if the monetary authorities have the current account as a target they will have to be indifferent between the variation of 1% of gdp in the trade balance and the variation of 1% of the gdp in the debt service. on the one hand, the response of the current account ratio (relative to gdp) to a depreciation of kc is equal to %c , where c is given by marshall, lerner and robinson formula. on the other hand, the debt service (relative to gdp) to a depreciation of 1% of kf is %f . if the authorities are indifferent between an improvement in the current balance and a decrease in the debt service, they should be indifferent between a depreciation of 1% of kc and a depreciation of /c f  % of kf . therefore, the coherent value of  is the following: 2 2/f c    . c is given by the formula of marshall, lerner and robinson (1949):  / . 1 . /m xc m p i b m x        (9) it is necessary that the sum of the price elasticities of foreign export demand ( x ) and national import demand ( m ) in absolute terms is greater than one. to calculate the elasticity the price elasticities of the local import demand and the external export demand (see appendices). the debt service (%gdp) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 108 published by scholink inc. response to a depreciation of 1% of kf is %f , is written as follows: /f sd pib  (10) therefore, if    meaning that the authorities will focus on stabilizing the real effective exchange rate (reer) expressed in financial terms rather than commercial terms. on the other hand, if 0  means that the authorities will stabilize a real effective exchange rate expressed in commercial terms. regarding the intermediate values of  this pushes the authorities to make an arbitration between the stabilization of kc and kf . 3.2.1.1 trade price elasticities the results are summarized in the table 9 (see appendices). since we have to calculate trade elasticities, we employed the real effective exchange rate as a measure of relative prices. by doing so, we measure the sensitivity of import and export demand to movements in the real effective exchange rate. since the marshall-lerner condition is a long-run condition, the appropriate method of estimation would be cointegration analysis. specifically, we employ johansen-juselius (1990) which is a full information maximum likelihood (fiml) estimation method. this method makes use of the information incorporated in the dynamic structure of the model; it also estimates the entire space of the long-run relationships between variables, without imposing normalization on the dependent variable a priori. the selected data are quarterly and transformed by the application of logarithms because of their generally superior fit and ease of interpretation (see appendices for more details). 3.2.1.2. results and discussions table 1. results benassy 1998 2014 m/pib: share of imports in gdp 29% 39.61% x/m: coverage rate 83% 71.68% (m): price elasticity of import demand. (x): price elasticity of export demand. _ _ 0.74 0.63 ∆c: sensitivity of the trade balance to the commercial exchange rate 0.115 0.076 ∆f(%): sensitivity of the debt service to the financial exchange rate 10.5% 4.468% «  » 0.83 0.34 based on the estimated result of trade elasticities in morocco, we conclude that all variables in both cases carry their expected signs. the results confirm the existence of long-term relationship between export and import demand and relative prices and income. on one hand, we find an evidence for high import elasticity on domestic income changes and relatively significant export elasticity to changes in the world income. in other words, the higher income elasticity of import than the income elasticity of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 109 published by scholink inc. exports indicates the trade balance deterioration. on the other hand, the estimated price elasticities are lower, which is consistent with previous literature. we note that the imports are more sensitive on price variations than the exports. this can be explained by the fact that domestic economic agents are more sensitive to price changes than foreigners are. furthermore, we find that the sum of the absolute value of long-term exchange rate elasticities of export and import demand is greater than unity. the marshall-lerner condition is satisfied implying that real depreciation of dirham will have a favorable long-term effect on trade. the price elasticities have allowed us to calculate both the elasticity of the current account balance relative to the real effective exchange rate and that of the value of  which has decreased over time from 0.83 to 0.34. this indicates that moroccan monetary authorities are paying more attention to its external competitiveness than to the valuation of its debt by stabilizing a real effective exchange rate, which is expressed in commercial terms. the weakening in the value of ∆f (%) stems from the government’s ability to service its debt on time. the table above shows a decrease in the current account ratio (∆c) that can be explained by the very low coverage rate during the observation period (no more than 49% in january 2014 according to the statistics of the exchange office of morocco). therefore, the sharp decrease in the debt service was the main reason of the decrease in the value of  . the coefficients ea and $a are calculated as the shares of each partner in morocco’s foreign trade. that means, ea the relative weight of european countries as trade partners’ currencies, $a relative weight of the united states (us) as trade partner’ currency. the purpose is to breakdown the “other exchanges with the rest of the world” according to three different hypotheses that have been considered.  in the high hypothesis: this is the first scenario where trade with the rest of the world is considered as trade with the euro zone. this scenario favors the euro, and the resulting share of the euro reflects its maximum weight.  in the intermediate hypothesis: this is the second scenario where trade with the rest of the world is ignored. this amounts to distributing trade with the rest of the world between the two zones in proportion to their relative share. this scenario favors neither the euro nor the dollar in the anchoring basket of the dirham.  in the low case: we are talking about the third scenario where trade with the rest of the world is considered as trade with the united states. this assumption favors the dollar in the anchor basket and the resulting share of the us dollar reflects its maximum weight. regarding the treatment of external debt in currencies other than the dollar and the euro is identical in all three scenarios. this means that the external debt in other currencies will be divided between the euro and the dollar in proportion to their relative weight. however, we do not favor the euro or the dollar as currency of indebtedness. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 110 published by scholink inc. table 2. optimal baskets for 1998-2014 1998* 2014 scenario 1 ea 0.88 0.947 $a 0.10 0.052 maximum share of the euro 69% 86% minimum share of the dollar 31% 14% scenario 2 ea 0.65 0.84 $a 0.33 0.16 intermediate share of the euro 56% 78% intermediate share of the dollar 44% 22% scenario 3 ea 0.59 0.647 $a 0.39 0.353 minimum share of the euro 47% 63% maximum share of the dollar 53% 37% * for the year 1998, the share of the euro returns to the share of the european currencies, these results come from the work of bénassy before the adoption of the euro. source: author’s calculations for the period (1999-2014). the table above shows that in 2014, the maximum part of the us dollar in the basket is 37% and that the part of the euro is 63%. this combination is very close to the updated weighting by the moroccan monetary authorities of april 13, 2015. therefore, the comparison between the updated weight and the normative weight currencies that compose the dirham basket shows that the updated weights are closer to scenario three “3” that favors the dollar in the basket. this gives the appearance that the authorities favor the dollar in the anchoring basket of the dirham. in the same way, such a comparison proves that the authorities are increasingly considering the structure of the commercial exchanges for the choice of the optimal weight of the anchor currency. in the context of the third scenario, we propose going deeper by using more-detailed sectoral study to examine the impact of real exchange rate movements on trade for each sector of economic activity for the same period of 1999-2014. the statistics of the foreign exchange office show an improvement currently observed on the part of dollar in terms of trade. there are several possible reasons for this. we start by the fact that morocco had for the first time in 2011 entered the “top five arab markets” where it was ranked the fourth in the arab world as a destination market for us exports after the united arab emirates, saudi arabia, followed by egypt. similarly, since 2014, morocco has been rethinking its strategy of diversifying trading partners by developing economic cooperation with sub-saharan africa. this strategy aims to position morocco as a regional platform to take advantage of its positioning close to africa, the middle www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 111 published by scholink inc. east, america and europe. in fact, this strategy resulted in an increase in trade with sub-saharan africa of 13% in 2014 and numerous agreements signed following the king’s visit in west and central africa. 4. price and income elasticities for sectoral exports and imports in morocco theoretically, the depreciation in local currency can affect the balance of trade of an economy either positively or negatively. the subsequent lower value of the currency will make exports relatively cheaper and imports relatively more expensive. a country’s exports start to rise as increase in foreign demand for the lower-price option. the rise in exports is also aided by the fact that local consumers purchasing more from local produce rather than more expensive imported products because they have become more affordable. this leads to a gradual improvement of the external balance. in accordance with the theory, a change in the exchange rate has two effects on the flow of trade known as “price effect” and “volume effect”. this gradual adjustment of a country’s balance of trade to a change in its exchange rate (a devaluation or depreciation of its currency) has been called the “j-curve” phenomenon. generally, this term has received considerable attention and it is used to describe a phenomenon of initial deterioration followed by an improvement or a recovery. in other words, the currency of countries running a persistent trade deficit would be expected to fall in relationship to its trade partner. for example, the moroccan dirham purchases less foreign currency, such as dollars and euros, because it has run a persistent deficit over the past decade. this can be explained by the fact that imported products will costs more because it would take more dirhams for each unit of foreign currency, which would cause imports to decline. in addition, moroccan exports should expand as foreigners can buy more of its local products to receive more units of the foreign currency. as a result, the trade balance would eventually recover. using a battery of times series models, an experimental situation can be used to investigate the effect of real exchange rate movement. generally, the dynamic model in which the effect of a given set of explanatory variables on a response variable occurs over time rather than all at once is known as distributed-lag models. therefore, lags of the variables involved in the regression equation are included to accommodate elasticity dynamics. these lags are caused by the time required for the exports and imports to adjust to the new exchange rate (after the currency dropped). they are also cause by importers and exporters having to honor pre-existing national contracts law meaning that the trade volumes remain unchanged for the short run. as the volume of trade begins to respond to the depreciation, the so-called “volume-effect” will reverse the trade balance movement and improve it. the phenomenon of the domination of the volume effect over the price effect in the long run is what we mentioned before as the marshall-lerner condition. this study particularly assesses the validity of marshall-lerner condition to estimate the price elasticities of demand for morocco’s sectoral foreign trade composition with both the european union and the rest of the world in the context of the third scenario. this time, we will not just be estimating the trade elasticity as we did in the second section, but we will also be able to treat it in various sectors www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 112 published by scholink inc. for the same period 1999-2014. this will help us better explain the increase of the dollar’s part in the basket change. we assumed that the exchanges with the european union were those undertaken with the countries of the european zone in which the euro is used as the invoicing currency. while all trade that is not made with the countries of europe (eu), are considered to be made with the united states where the dollar is the invoicing currency. in fact, in 2013, the euro accounted for only 55% of the total compared to 60% in 2009. in contrast, the part of the dollar has increased from 36% in 2009 to 42% in 2013. these statistics also show us that the invoicing portion in other currencies (3%) remains very low. when looking at the case of morocco it becomes evident that there is a gap in the literature on this subject. trade in small open economies tends to be more affected by exchange rate volatility than in larger open economies. in our conceptual framework, we will focus on identifying similar works and showing the strategies and methods applied. as it is mentioned above, the theoretical framework describes the theory that the long-run effect of exchange rate on trade balance is explained by marshall-lerner while the short-run effect by j-curve. table 3. inventory of empirical work on the relationship between exchange rates and foreign trade studies sample period price measurement technique of estimation used main result akhtar and hilton (1984) 1974-1981t nominal exchange rate mco negative effect bailey, tavlas and ulan (1986) 1973-1984t nominal exchange rate mco not significant, mixed effects belanger, gutiérrez, racette, and raynauld (1988) 1976-1987t nominal exchange rate instrumental variables approach exchange rate variability has not significantly depressed the volume of trade hwang and lee (2005) 1990-2000m real exchange rate garchm positive effect in imports and insignificant effect on exports kadievska-vojnovic and unevska (2007) 1998-2005q relative prices of exports and imports ardl significant and negative effects on importations/exportations fedoseeva (2015) 19882013m relative price nardl presence of a non-linear and negative effect of the exchange rate on exports suwanhirunkul & masih (2018) 19942017q real exchange rate nardl presence of long-term nonlinear effects between the exchange rate and imports/exports benli (2018) 20002016m relative price of exports, nominal exchange rate nardl presence of a positive nonlinear effect of the exchange rate on exports note. a=annual; t=quarterly; and m=monthly. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 113 published by scholink inc. 4.1 source and availability of data as a first step, it is a question of determining and describing the variables used, while respecting the theoretical framework of the study, and then to present the methods of calculation if there are indices or indicators to be recalculated. in a second step, it is necessary to specify the approach of construction of the database and to face the problems of data availability and their homogeneity, which requires a restructuring of the level of aggregation and a careful choice of activity sectors of the data, as well as products selected for each sector. a work of harmonization of reconstitution and correspondence of data is necessary in the present work. 4.2 identification of variables the analysis of moroccan foreign trade was developed using detailed foreign trade statistics from the office des changes (odc) database. this database provides data by product according to the sitc nomenclature (note 4). the format for presenting these statistics on odc follows that of the harmonized commodity description and coding system, known as the “harmonized system”. the data were collected using correlation tables between the third revised version of sitc and the version of the harmonized system (hs 02) published by the united nations statistics division. subsequently, we will calculate a synthetic index to measure exports and imports by volume. for this, we have the quantity q(i) and the price p(i) for each product (i) considered between date 0 and t by weighting them with a fixed basket of prices from the initial period. in general, there are two most commonly used index formulae of calculation for volume estimation. these are the laspeyres and paasche indices, which are defined as a weighted average of the price and quantity data for a specific basket of goods and services. these two basic indices are expressed in terms of price or volume index. the calculation method used, in our case, is that of the laspeyres volume index. the latter is most commonly used to aggregate products and thus build volume indices. laspeyres-quantity index: 0 , , 0 , 0 , i t i l i i p q q p q     regarding the calculation of the real exchange rate (rer) which is defined as bilateral real exchange rate between morocco and foreign country (european currencies or us dollar): . f d p t c r t c n p  where tcn is the nominal exchange rate of the dirham in terms of another currency, p(d) and p(f) are the consumer price indexes in morocco and another country. thus, an increase (decrease) in the rer implies a real depreciation (real appreciation) of the dirham. the nominal exchange rate data are collected from al-maghreb bank. all the data used are quarterly for the period 1999q1-2014q4. the other data that we use are extracted from various national and international databases: the index of average values for imports and exports (use by product group), real gdp by sector of activity and the consumer price index by product group www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 114 published by scholink inc. is from the high commissioner for the plan (hcp) and real effective exchange rate (from the international monetary fund). for data collected by the oecd, the partner countries’ gdp by volume for agriculture-forestry and fisheries was used as well as the cpi of foreign countries, and the industrial production index (european countries and united states). the time series used in this analysis are adjusted by a logarithmic transformation. this helps to reduce asymmetry, heteroscedasticity and to stabilize the fluctuation around the trend. all data are indexed in 1999=100 and seasonally adjusted if necessary. table 4. aggregation adopted for classification of product groups classification by type numbering classification by type agriculture, hunting and foresty 1 14 leather and fur industry fishing 2 15 manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork raw materials 3 16 paper and board industry food and tobacco industry 4 17 non-metallic mineral products soft drink 5 18 textile industry alcoholic drinks 6 19 electrical industry mining industry 7 20 mechanical industry non-ferrous metals 8 21 automobile industry chemical and parachemical industry 9 22 manufacture of office machinery and computers plastics materials, industry 10 23 household equipment iron and steel production 11 24 travel items rubber industry 12 25 shoe articles of metal 13 26 miscellaneous manufactured articles 4.3 specification of the trade-elasticities our study relies on disaggregated sector level data. working with disaggregated data has many advantages according to riedal (1995), funke and ruhwedel (2001), and panagariya et al. (1996); the results are less likely to be biased by the endogenously between the dependent variable and the repressors. by this way, we make sure that there are no huge outliers or structural breaks. in addition, income and price elasticity’s vary across commodity groups and the exchange rate can reasonably be presumed to affects sectors differently as argued by goldstein and khan (1985). 4.3.1 specification of the import demand models as a starting point, it is assumed that imports can be described by reduced-form demand functions, which are widely used to estimate a disaggregate import demand behavior in the field of applied econometrics. thus, the basic models of import demand functions can be written as follows: www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 115 published by scholink inc. 1 2 ' ' 1 2 " " 1 2 0 0 0 ' " * * (1 ) * * ( 2 ) * ( / ) * ( 3 ) t t t t t t t t t m r e r y m r e e r y m i v m c p i y             where, t m are the moroccan imports from the eureopean union (eu) or us at the time (t), , , 0 0 0 ' "   which are determined by some constant parameter, t y is the moroccan demand to us/eu, and the real exchange rate (rer), real effective exchange rate (reer) and relative price of imports ( / )ivm cpi . taking logs of equations (1), (2) and (3) results in equation (a-c), which represents the long-run relationship between imports and its determinants. since we intend to estimate the import price elasticities for 26 sectors of activity, in order to try to distinguish between different ways of estimating, we will study each of the equations as below: 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 ' ' ' ' '' '' '' " ( ) 牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋? ( ) 牋牋 ( ) ( / ) 牋牋牋牋牋 t tt t t t tt t t tt ( a ) m r e r y ( b ) m r e e r y c m i v m c p i y                         where ' '', ,t t t   are disturbance terms, 1 1 1 ' '', ,   are the elasticity coefficients of imports relative to prices (price-elasticity) and 2 2 2 ' '', ,   are the elasticity coefficients of imports relative to real gdp (income elasticity). m: denotes the logarithm of real imports; y:is the logarithm of a measure of domestic economic activity. ivm: the index of the value of imports by ug; cpi: consumer price index (local). (ivm/cpi) is the logarithm of relative price of imports 4.3.2 specification of the export demand models 1 2 ' ' 1 2 " " 1 2 0 0 0 ' " * * ( 4 ) * * ( 5 ) * / * ( 6 ) t t t t t t t t t x r e r f y x r e e r f y x i v x c p p i f y             where, t x are the moroccan exports to the (eu) or us at the time (t), ' " 0 0 0 , ,   which are determined by some constant parameter, fy is the eu/us demand to morocco, and the real exchange rate (rer), real effective exchange rate (reer) and relative price of exports ( / )ivx cppi . taking logs of equations (4), (5) and (6) results in equation (d-f), which represents the long-run relationship between exports and its determinants. the same thing for the exports, the formulation of the statistical specification of exports models is as follows: www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 116 published by scholink inc.     ' ' ' ' " " " " ( ) ( ( ) ( ( ( ? t t 0 1 2 t tt t 0 1 2 t tt t 0 1 2 tt d x = + r e r ) + f y + 牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋? 燛 x = + r e e r ) + f y ) + 牋牋牋牋牋牋 ? f ) x = + i v x / c p p i p r + f y ) + 牋?             where (fy) is the logarithm of a measure of foreign economic activity (gdp of trading partners to capture its effect on the sharing between the local market and the global market). (x) denotes the logarithm of real exports; ivx is the export value index and cppi is the weighted average of the consumer price indices of partner or importing countries. (ivx/cppi) is the logarithm of export relative price. the six equations above can be modified and extended to asymmetric long-term equations as follows: 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 ' ' ' ' ' " " " " " ( a ') m 牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋 ( b ') m 牋牋 ( ') m y 牋牋 t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t p o s n e g y p o s n e g y c p o s n e g                                 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 ' ' ' ' ' " " " " " ( ') f y 牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋 ' 牋牋牋牋牋? ( ') 牋牋牋 t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t d x p o s n e g e x p o s n e g f y f x p o s n e g f y                               where, , , , , , , , , , ,0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 ' " ' " ' " ' " ' " ' " ' " ' " , , , ,, , , , , , , , ,                        are parameters to estimate in the long run, ' " ' " , ,, , ,t t t t t t       are white noises. the constants 0 0 0 0 0 0 ' '' ' ", , , , ,      integrate all exogenous factors such as a constant term, and/or a linear trend and dummy variables for structural breaks, if any. starting from the equation a’ to f’, pos and neg represent the element of asymmetry of the non-linear autoregressive distributed-lag model “ardl”. in which pos and neg are generated by calculating: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ( '), ( ') m ax( , 0); ( '), ( ') m ax( , 0); ( '), ( ') ( ( ) / ( )) m ax( ( ( ) / ( ) , 0 ) ( '), ( ') j t t t j j j j t t t j j j j t t t j j j t t t j j j a d po s rer rer b e po s reer reer c f pos ivm ivx cpi c ppi ivm ivx c pi cppi and a d neg rer                                    1 1 1 1 m in( , 0); ( '), ( ') m in( , 0); ( '), ( ') ( ( ) / ( )) m in( ( ( ) / ( ) , 0 ) j t t t j j j j t t t j j j j rer b e neg reer reer c f n eg ivm ivx cpi c ppi ivm ivx cpi cppi                    pos and neg are the processes of partial sums of price changes. pos is the partial sum of positive changes of the exchange rate (currency depreciation) and neg is the partial sum of negative exchange rate changes (currency appreciations). the impact of an exchange rate appreciation on the volume of trade may be asymmetrical with respect to depreciation. this assumption can be tested by evaluating , ,1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 ' ' " " ' ' " " , , ,, , , , , ,            in the equations, as they reflect the macroeconomic effects of the appreciation (increase) and depreciation (decrease) of the exchange rate (relative price) on trade. according to marshall-lerner theory, depreciation of domestic currency decreases relative price of exporting goods and increases relative price of importing goods. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 117 published by scholink inc. in the case where the exponents «+» and «» are equal ( 2 2 2; ;1 1 1 ' ' " "        ) or ( ; ;1 2 1 2 1 2 ' ' " "        ), this indicates that there is no asymmetry between the volume of imports/exports and exchange rate fluctuations. if ( ;1 2 1 2 1 2 ' ' " ";        ) ; ;1 2 1 2 1 2 ' ' " "( )        then the presence of non-linear relation is concluded. the expected signs of 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 ' ' " " ' ' " " , , , ,, , , , , , a n d            are empirically ambiguous because there are explanations which are theoretically contradictory. on the one hand, a positive value of 1 1 1 ' ''( ; ; )   or 1 1 1 ' "( ; ; )   and a negative value of 2 2 2 ' ' '( ; ; )   or 2 2 2 ' "( ; ; )   corroborates the approach of economic and financial flows between residents and non-residents, which suggests that a depreciation of the value of the national currency causes both an increase in the volume of exported goods and a decrease in imported goods. in short, the appreciation and depreciation of the currency could have both a negative and a positive effect on trade volume (see table 10 in the appendices). many studies have been conducted to explain better the choice of our models such as bussiere (2013) that describes how non-linearities and asymmetries in the trade balance in relation to the exchange rate can be attributed to adjustment cost, price rigidies, and quantity restrictions. on one hand, in the case of depreciation of domestic currrency, exporters try increasing profit margins by producing more under the assumption that their prices remain the same in their domestic currency. it seems, however, that exporters cannot increase the quantity of their goods due to full capacity or adjustment costs that are too high; in this case they should increase their price instead. on the other hand, in the case of appreciation, exports become more expensive and less competitive. for this reason, exporters should decrease the price of their goods. in addition, the asymmetric nature may be caused by the government interventions. to assess the j-curve outcome, a short run analysis is required. as such, an error correction format modeling from pesaran et al. (2001). shin et al. (2014) established a similar process developed by pesaran et al. (2001) to evaluate a non-linear ardl model. therefore, according to shin et al. (2014), the equations (a’ to f’) can be estimated as in standard ardl model leads to the following general form of nardl model where rer, reer and relative price in equation (a’ to f’) will be replaced by pos and neg to as follows: 1 2 3 4 0 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 1 2 3 4 1 0 0 0 1 4 0 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 1 2 3 4 1 0 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 牋 牋 n n n n t t t t t t p t p t p t p t p p p p n n t t t t t t p t p t p t p p p m m p o s n e g y m p o s n e g y m m p o s n e g y m p o s n e g y                                                                            2 3 ' 0 0 1 2 3 4 '' 0 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 1 2 3 4 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 " " " '' ' ' '' '' '' '' 牋牋 ? 牋 牋 牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋 n n t p p n n n n t t t t t t p t p t p t p t p p p p t t m m p o s n e g y m p o s n e g y x x p o s                                                                        1 2 3 4 1 3 1 4 1 1 2 3 4 1 0 0 01 2 3 4 ' 0 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 1 2 3 4 1 0 0 0 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' n n n n t t t t p t p t p t p t p p p pn n n n t t t t t t p t p t p t p t p p p p n e g f y x p o s n e g f y x x p o s n e g f y x p o s n e g f y x                                                                            1 2 3 4 " 0 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 1 2 3 4 1 0 0 0 " " " " " " " " " n n n n t t t t t t p t p t p t p t p p p p x p o s n e g f y x p o s n e g f y                                                     0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '' '' '' ''w h e r e λ λ λ λ λ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ λ λ λ λ λ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ λ λ λ λ λ, , , , , , , , , ; , , , , , , , , , ; , , , , , 0 1 2 3 4 '' '' '' '' ''ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ, , , , are long-run parameters while 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 , , , , , , ,        2 3 41 ' ' ' ' ,; , , ,    www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 118 published by scholink inc. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 ' ' ' ' " " " " " " " ", , , , a n d, , ; , , , ,            are short-run parameters. as in any dynamic model, information criteria will be used to decide the lag length. in our models, we chose akaike’s information criterion (aic). the specification of the equations is finalized when they are exempt from erroneous specification biases, in particular the problem of the correlation between the time series and the instability of the parameters. to detect short-term and long-term relationships between interest variables, pesaran and shin’s (1999) “ardl bound testing” cointegration approach was used. for this purpose, we will compute the null hypothesis wald statistic according to which the coefficients of the variables in level are all equal to zero. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' " " " " " " " " 0 ; 0 : 0 ; 0 0 ; 0 h                                                      . where the null hypothesis of “no long-run relationship exists” using the f-test of pesaran et al. (2001) and narayan (2005). calculated f-statistics will be compared to the lower and upper limits of the pesaran, shin and smith (pss) critical procedure band at the 95% confidence level. three cases occur: if f-statistic>upper-bound then we reject h0 and we conclude that there is a long-term equilibrium relationship between macroeconomic variables studied; subsequently, indicating the presence of a cointegrating relationship. if f-statistic<lower bound, then we cannot reject the null hypothesis, and in such a situation, there is no long-term equilibrium relation. finally, if lower bound<f-stat<upper bound then the test is inconclusive and in this case, the order of integration of the underlying variables must be studied more deeply. to examine the long-run asymmetries of the models, the wald test is applied ( 2 3 0 1 1 :h        ); ( 32 0 1 1 :h       ); ( 2 3 0 ' 11 ' ' ' :h       ); ( '' 32 0 ' ' 1 1 :h      ); ( 32 0 1 1 ' '' ' ' ' ' ' :h      ); ( ' '' ' 32 0 ' ' ' ' 1 1 :h       ) according to greenwood-nimmo and shin (2013) and shin et al. (2014). for short-run asymmetries ( 2 3 0 2 3 0 0 : n n p p h       ); ( 2 3 0 2 3 0 0 : n n p p h       ); ( 2 3 0 2 3 0 0 ' ': n n p p h       ); ( 2 3 0 2 3 0 0 ' ': n n p p h       ); ( 2 3 0 2 3 0 0 '' ' ': n n p p h       ); ( 2 3 0 2 3 0 0 '' '': n n p p h       ). 4.4 results and discussion before analyzing the variables using the nardl approach, the stationarity of all variables was tested using the following procedures: in addition to the augmented dickey-fuller “adf” test we applied the phillips test -perron “pp”, which takes into account the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. we also confirmed our results by using adf tests with endogenous structural break taking the date of rupture as endogenous as perron (1997). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 119 published by scholink inc. the choice of the lag length for the adf test is based on the schwartz information criterion (sic) and the maximum number of lags is 10. the bandwidth selections and the spectral estimates in the phillips test-perron are based on newey-west and the approach of bartlett kernel. a single asterisk (*) indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% threshold, two asterisks (**) indicate a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% threshold. we found that the values of the wald statistic in most sectors (in the models) exceed critical limits greater than 95%. this result confirms the existence of a cointegration relationship between the variables studied. therefore, these results prove the reason for estimating the long-run elasticities of each variable as a function of export and import volume variables. we first evaluated the suitability of the dynamic specification of all the models by various diagnostic tests. these tests include the “jarque-bera test” for the study of error normality, the “lm test” for autocorrelation of residuals of order 1 and the “ramsey reset test” to check if the model is well specified. the cusumsq plot (95% bounds) is used for model stability to check if there is a structural change in the relationship between the variables used in each model; due to this change the values of the model parameters did not remain the same throughout the observation period. the results of the diagnostic tests show that some estimated models have violated the normality error assumption. therefore, it is necessary to detect inconsistencies in each specification. it seems that some models do not satisfy these diagnostic tests, as the serial correlation tests and the stability of the error variance. in addition, the values of the error correction term, which suggest that the long-term relationship is an error-correcting mechanism, were validated in each specification, in which any short-term deviations occurred in the import and export volumes. in other words, there is an important feedback coefficient that implies a quick adjustment to the long-term equilibrium state. since the majority of models have passed most of the adequacy tests, especially the critical non-correlation hypotheses and the absence of parameter instability (pesaran & shin, 1999), and further extended by pesaran et al., 2014), we conclude that these models are correctly specified for the nardl estimation. the table 10 (in the appendices) presents the asymmetric short-term and long-term trade elasticities. based on the information presented in the table we concluded that the effect of the increase in the exchange rates (depreciation effect) is much higher in absolute terms than the effect of the lower exchange rate (appreciation effect). this is favorable for both moroccan exports to the rdm (us) and to the european union. the main potential sectors of moroccan exports include agri-food products, the automotive industry, textiles, the chemical and para-chemical industry, and the extractive industry. our findings show that the depreciation of moroccan dirham has a very significant long-term impact on the real exports. especially, the benefits result has been particularly marked in extractive industry due to the continued upturn of phosphate production. in addition, we found that agriculture, fishing, manufacturing, leather goods, textiles, and automotive sectors have a very significant effect. this tallies with the “ecofin www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 120 published by scholink inc. agency”, which highlights that the automotive sector becomes the leading export sector in 2014 ahead of phosphates according to the statement published on 16 january by the exchange office of 2014. the real appreciation of dirham did not discourage the exports of moroccan goods to the same extent as exporters benefit from the depreciation more generally. in the long term, taking the agricultural sector, an additional appreciation of the value of the euro against the dirham by 1% (which means a depreciation of dirham by 1%) will lead to an increase in volume of morocco’s exports go to europe of 4.5%. while the appreciation of the dollar against the dirham by 1%; increased only 2.27% in volume of morocco’s exports to the rest of the world. regarding the automotive sector, an increase of the exports volume to the eu by 3.58 and 1.98 to the rdm followed by 1% decline in the dirham. in the same context, relative price of export pos and relative price export neg are—1.13 and—1.50 respectively. therefore, we may conclude that a one percent increase in the relative price leads to a 1.13 percent decrease in real exports to the euro-zone. similarly, a one percent decrease in relative price leads to a 1.50 percent decline in real exports. hence, our results indicate that the greater effect is coming from negative changes since it is larger in absolute value than the one for positive changes. when looking at imports, the depreciation of dirham has important effects, in the long-run, in real imports rather than the appreciation. this time, the effect of the depreciation of dirham against foreign currencies is around 56%. this is more significant in absolute terms than the effect of appreciation (nearly 44%). concerning the effect of the depreciation in relative prices (import price relative to domestic price) is much more significant after the bilateral real exchange rate, almost 68% against the u.s. dollar and about 32% against the euro. thus, the effect of the dirham’s decline against the dollar in imports is much larger and more important than the effect of the dirham’s decline against the euro. this is especially notable when using the price-relative indicator. consequently, a higher weight of the u.s. dollar in morocco’s currency basket would limit fluctuations in the exports competitiveness to the rdm and domestic firms that are competing with imports from the rest of the world. in the same table, we find the wald test for long-run asymmetry of the export demand and the imports for all the different sectors. the test results indicate that the null hypotheses of long-run symmetry can be rejected in the great majority of cases at 5% significance level. consequently, the appreciations and depreciations of the dirham seem to have a different impact on the country’s trade. for certain sectors such as fishing in imports, the effects of exchange rate changes (appreciation or depreciation) are symmetric that is why the j-curve outcome is not observed, as argued by bahmani-oskooee (2015) and fariditavana (2016) and bahmani-oskooee et al. (2016). generally, short-run dynamics do not seem to play an important role in morocco’s foreign trade structure. in contrast, as has been shown (ahmad, ahmed, khoso, palwishah, & raza, 2014) to find the inverse j-curve in which depreciation, in the very short-term, improves the trade balance sharply. however, we found that in some sectors the results are consistent with ahmad et al. (2014)’s study www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 121 published by scholink inc. while some sectors found to be extremely sensitive to imports and exports in the short-run, for example some of the main sectors. generally, the results are more significant in relation to imports than exports. the main sectors of activity such as: agriculture, fishing and the agro-food industry give very significant results in the short term. this can be explained by the fact that morocco is working in the framework of the green morocco plan “gmp” for the reinforcement of the competitiveness of its agricultural products and the implementation of the integrated halieutis strategy to boost the fishing sector (the high price elasticity with the euro area for export). our findings imply that there is a tradeoff of depreciation between short-term and long-term, and between importing and exporting sectors. generally, the results obtained differ somewhat from one sector to another. this may be due to various factors, including the intensity of competition that exporters face and to the composition of exported or imported products. in fact, the increase of the price elasticity in certain sectors can be justified by the level of production range (talking about the quality, sophistication, product differentiation). we can say that the demand for low-end product groups is very sensitive to the prices of the products since the products are little differentiated. conversely, the demand for high-end products is considered insensitive to price variations, which allows for higher prices. for an economy to benefit from a depreciation of its currency, its production style needs to be unsophisticated while still having a large industry and a high price elasticity of exports. with regard to income elasticity, the results show a higher income elasticity of demand for imports than foreign income elasticity of demand for exports, which means that imports growing faster than exports, a deterioration in the trade balance and eventual pressure on its exchange rate. this can be explained by the fact that morocco has not possessed the capacity to grow at the rate of its partners countries. this is due to its slow rate of export growth caused by the low-income elasticity of demand for moroccan exports in world markets, insofar as an increase in partner countries’ incomes of 1% causes an increase in demand for moroccan export by 1.77% in the agri-food sector. in general, the elasticity of income whether on the import or export side, remains significant in the majority of sectors. globally, on one hand, we found that more than 62.5% of sectors have a higher elasticity coefficient in dollars than in euros (37.5%) regarding the long-term effect of the exchange rate on imports. the change in the dirham against the dollar remains larger and faster than that against the euro because of the dirham’s elasticity against the dollar is stronger than that of the dirham against the euro. on the other hand, regarding the long-term effect of the exchange rate on exports, we found as of more than 54% of sectors with higher coefficients in terms of the euro than the dollar. thereby the price elasticity is stronger in euro than in dollar. as a result, the weight of the dollar dominates in morocco’s foreign exchange. therefore, the higher price elasticity of the dollar against the dirham encourages moroccan monetary authorities to maximize the part of dollar in its basket of currencies. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 122 published by scholink inc. 5. conclusion this paper has contributed to a better understanding of the decisions made by the moroccan monetary authorities in their last readjustment of the weights of anchor currencies in the dirham basket. we compared the exchange rate policy effectively followed by the moroccan authorities and the exchange rate policy that the authorities pursue in practice while taking into account the objective of external competitiveness and the external debt constraints between 1999 and 2014. we presented the assessment of the moroccan exchange system based on the distinction between the official classification of the imf and the de facto one. the latter classification was deduced from the dirham volatility calculations against a set of foreign currencies in moroccan dirham’s currency peg. with the advent of the euro, bank al-maghreb has announced to the public the weight of the currencies in its basket. thus, the management rule followed by bank-al maghreb is said to be formal and not discretionary as is the case for tunisia. over the last few decades, new economic challenges have emerged in the international environment, which have undergone profound changes in favor of the dynamics of globalization. morocco has engaged on a process of gradual liberalization of its foreign trade working towards a successful integration into the world economy. this has been done most notably through the signing of a set of free trade agreements and considerable efforts in favor of foreign trade promotion, which were deployed in parallel. this encouraged the moroccan authorities to rethink the exchange rate policy. in the present work, we have been able to show that morocco has found it beneficial to stabilize the dirham against the dollar in real terms. comparing updated weights to optimal weights shows that the readjustment of the weights is closer to the third scenario, which favors the dollar in the basket than the other two scenarios. the behavior of the moroccan authorities is reflected concretely by the gradual opening of the capital account in the last two decades. regarding the last section of this study, following the long-term effect of the exchange rate on trade balance that is explained by marshall-lerner, our findings prove the existence of long-term cointegration between the variables of interest. the results show that the trade balance is quite sensitive to the real exchange rate and the relative price than to the real effective exchange rate. the depreciation of dirham has important effects in real imports and real exports rather than the appreciation effects for improving the balance of trade. it may take several quarters to realize the full effects of depreciation, because importers and exporters have to honor pre-existing national contracts law, which means that trade volumes remain unchanged in the short-term. policy makers such as bank al-maghreb and relevant government agencies should also consider the effects of various sectors. although many sectors have benefited from the depreciation of the currency such as the main potential sectors; including agri-food products, agriculture, fishing, manufacturing, leather goods, textiles, automotive sectors, the chemical and para-chemical industry, and the extractive industry. our findings show that the depreciation of moroccan dirham has a very significant long-run www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 123 published by scholink inc. impact on real exports. especially, the benefits result has been particularly marked in the extractive industry due to the continued upturn of phosphate production. additionally, as is states by the “ecofin agency” the automotive sector became the leading export sector in 2014 ahead of phosphates. the appreciation of dirham did not discourage the exports of moroccan goods to the same extent as exporters benefit from the depreciation more generally. therefore, it is suggested that policymakers find the optimal exchange rate leading to the right result, taking into account both shortand long-term costs. the monetary authority could modestly depreciate the currency if necessary to stimulate economic growth but should not ignore the costs. given that the trade balance is deemed sensitive to the exchange rate, an immediate and sudden 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(1999). the case for a common basket peg for east asian currencies. in s. collignon, j. pisani-ferry, & y. c. park (eds.), exchange rate policies in emerging asian countries (pp. 327-343). williamson, j. (2001). the case for basket, band and crawl (bbc) regime for east asia. in d. gruen, & j. simson (eds.), future directions for monetary policy in east asia (pp. 97-109). reserve bank of australia. notes note 1. the doctrine of “original sin” formulated by eichengreen and hausmann (1999). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 126 published by scholink inc. note 2. it is circular n1633 of the exchange office which announced the institution of the foreign exchange market. it is dated on 01/04/1996 while the start is launched on 03/06/1996. note 3. it reminds us that the two countries that adopt uniform strategies of anchoring to a basket of key currencies do not have to work together to stabilize their exchange rate between them. note 4. the fourth revised version of the sitc was adopted by the united nations statistical commission at its 37th session in 2006 to propose a harmonized list of products for the purposes of international trade analysis. a correspondence table exists with the harmonized system (hs). appendices section i table 5. presents the results of the relative volatilities of the dirham in relation to the different key currencies periods/currencies us dollar dem yen 05:1973-1979 16 34.2 49.8 1980-1993 23.7 31.3 45 1994-1998 28.9 28 43.1 1999-2006* 43.3 19.3 37.4 2007-2014* 22.04 12 65.96 source: author’s calculations. section ii www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 127 published by scholink inc. figure 2. structure of public external debt by currency source: author’s calculations made from the statistics of the exchange office over the period 1999m1, 2014m12. table 6. some macroeconomic indicators of the moroccan economy between 1980-2015 periods inflation (% annual) current account (% by gdp) trade balance (% by gdp) debt service (% by gdp) 1980-1997(a) 6.312 -3.817 -4.557 8.55 1998-2015 1.872 -2.051 -15.24 5.14 source: these data are collected from the african development bank group and the world bank. (a) represents the european currencies of the european system before the adoption of the euro. source: author’s calculations made from the financial statistics of the al-maghreb bank and the foreign exchange office. estimating trade elasticities between morocco and his trading partners for the period 1999-2014: the import and export demand models: we will measure the sensitivity of import and export demand to movements in the real effective exchange rate reer. thus, we assume moroccan import demand from trading partner “j” takes the form as follows: 0 log logjt jt t tlogm reer y       where m (j) is the real import from trading partner “j”; reer is the real effective exchange rate; y indicates real gdp. the reer is used as a measure of relative prices to reflect a real depreciation of the dirham. theoretically, a depreciation of the value of the domestic currency will make exports www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 128 published by scholink inc. relatively cheaper and imports relatively more expensive. then it will improves the external balance automatically which means an increase in domestic gdp ( >0). in such way, the increase in gdp tend to stimulate imports that is why we are expecting  >0. export demand equation can be formulated in the same way, 0' ' log 'log 'jt jt jt tlogx reer y       where x(j) exports to trading partners and y(j) indicates trading partners real gdp. moreover, we use johanson’s cointegration technique by using the “urca” package of the statistical software r 3.5.1. the selected data are quarterly and transformed by the application of logarithms. before any analysis, it is important to proceed by an analysis of the statistical properties of the data. this preliminary analysis of the series therefore requires the use of the unit root test and co-integration. i. data processing: study of stationarity: the study of the stationarity of the series is essential, since it seems as it conditions the choice of the econometric model. we used the test, ur.df, offered by the urca package of the software r. the latter gave us the following results: table 7. test adf of the unit root variables deterministic terms lags test value critical value at 5% log(m) diff(log(m)) constant, trend constant 2 1 (-) 2.80 (-) 3.10 (-) 3.45 (-) 2.89 log(pibréel) diff(log(pibréel)) constant, trend constant 2 1 (-) 3.13 (-) 6.42 (-) 3.45 (-) 2.89 log(x) diff(log(x)) constant, trend constant 2 1 (-) 3.18 (-) 3.17 (-) 3.45 (-) 2.89 log(pibréelfr) diff(log(pibréelfr) constant, trend constant 2 1 (-) 2.05 (-) 3.65 (-) 3.45 (-) 2.89 log(tcer) diff(log(tcer)) constant, trend constant 2 1 (-) 3.19 (-) 5.13 (-) 3.45 (-) 2.89 according to the table above, we find that all the variables of the model are non-stationary in level, and stationary in difference. therefore, the variables of the model are all integrated of order 1. co-intégration test of johansen: the first step in the johansen procedure is to determine the number of lags length. we used the varselect command, which offers 4 criteria for selecting the number of delays, namely: the akaike criterion (aic), the hannan-quin criterion (hq), the schwaz criterion (sc) and the forecast www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 129 published by scholink inc. prediction error (fep), which show that the appropriate order of var in level is equal to 2 quarters (p=2) for imports, (p=3) for exports. as a result, we chose a var (2) in the first case and var with p=3 for the calculation of export price elasticities. co integration test: this test uses the maximum likelihood method to test the existence of a long-term relationship between the variables and to obtain the number of co-integration vectors in a multivariate framework. the principle of this test is based on the comparison of the likelihood ratio to the critical value through the johanson approach, we will use the trace test with a trend, which assumes that the rank of the cointegration vector equal to r<n. below is the summary of the johansen co-integration test using the r software, and the results are shown in the following table: table 8. results of the co-integration test h0 trace test statistics 10%critical value 5%critical value 1%critical value import demand r=0 46.83 39.06 42.44 48.45 r≤1 23.84 22.76 25.32 30.45 r≤2 6.20 10.49 12.25 16.26 export demand r=0 44.18 39.06 42.44 48.45 r≤1 23.62 22.76 25.32 30.45 r≤2 6.00 10.49 12.25 16.26 for both cases, the result of the johansen test reveals the existence of a single co-integration relationship between the three variables because one obtains trace values of (46.83) and (44.18) that are greater than their critical value at the 5% threshold (42.44). thus, for each case we only report one vector in which all variables carry their expected signs. all vectors are normalized on logm and logx by setting their coefficients to -1 so that we can easily read the elasticities. table 9. estimates of the cointegrating vectors: 1999-q1-2014q4 i̇mport demand estimates export demand estimates logm logy logreer logx logy logreer -1 1.64 0.74 -1 0.44 -0.63 (25.33) (3.17) (4.18) (-2.037) between brackets: is the value of the t-statistic. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 130 published by scholink inc. section iii explanatory schemas that emphasized the variable effects according to price elasticity: table 10. result of the elasticity of trade-elasicities sectors imports short-run exports short-run with eu with unitedstates with eu with united-states a’ b’ c’ a’ b’ c’ d’ e’ f’ d’ e’ f’ 1 pos 3.57 (0.25) (-) 4.98 (0.56) (-) 2.39 (0.32) (-) 0.49 (0.47) 0.73 (0.83) 1.06 (0.20) 4.67 (0.02) (-) 2.25 (0.65) (-) 2.17 (0.03) 1.91 (0.03) (-) 2.42 (0.51) (-) 1.96 (0.01) neg (-) 2.32 (0.47) (-) 3.34 (0.52) (-) 4.84 (0.04) (-) 1.06 (0.05) (-) 1.82 (0.33) 0.47 (0.51) 3.46 (0.17) (-) 3.43 (0.49) (-) 2.48 (0.01) 1.11 (0.03) (-) 1.50 (0.50) (-) 1.59 (0.04) ∆r (-) 2.15 (0.02) (-) 2.32 (0.02) (-) 1.24 (0.07) (-) 0.97 (0.01) (-) 1.08 (0.01) (-) 0.62 (0.03) 3.50 (0.67) (-) 2.27 (0.43) (-) 2.53 (0.37) (-) 1.22 (0.21) 0.69 (0.61) (-) 1.60 (0.10) (-) 0.91 (0.00) (-) 1.02 (0.00) (-) 1.12 (0.00) (-) 0.68 (0.00) (-) 1.27 (0.00) (-) 0.70 (0.00) (-) 1.02 (0.00) (-) 1.47 (0.00) (-) 1.49 (0.00) (-) 0.84 (0.00) (-) 0.82 (0.00) (-) 2.45 (0.00) lag (1,0,0,0) (5,0,0,0) (5,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (6,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (2,0,0,0) (3,0,0,3) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,3) (9,0,0,0) f-s 9.87* 2.98 4.44* 6.51* 4.29* 8.22* 13.36* 16.06* 11* 10.88* 9.51* 7.93* 2 pos 2.07 (0.07) 2.72 (0.40) 3.62 (0.18) (-) 2.50 (0.19) 2.76 (0.71) (-) 1.76 (0.58) (-) 2.84 (0.01) 2.96 (0.36) 1.35 (0.09) 2.96 (0.12) 3.65 (0.57) 3.34 (0.04) neg 3.49 (0.05) 1.46 (0.44) (-) 1.58 (0.22) (-) 2.02 (0.18) 1.52 (0.73) (-) 1.07 (0.71) (-) 2.06 (0.14) 3.06 (0.12) 1.83 (0.04) 3.46 (0.04) 3.16 (0.45) 3.46 (0.03) ∆r (-) 0.65 (0.06) (-) 0.74 (0.03) (-) 0.82 (0.05) 0.43 (0.48) (-) 0.10 (0.83) 0.49 (0.58) 1.13 (0.55) 0.04 (0.97) (-) 0.81 (0.70) (-) 1.38 (0.51) 0.69 (0.73) 2.11 (0.35) (-) 1.10 (0.00) (-) 1.03 (0.00) (-) 1.34 (0.00) (-) 0.61 (0.00) (-) 0.59 (0.00) (-) 0.61 (0.00) (-) 0.84 (0.00) (-) 0.79 (0.00) (-) 1.07 (0.00) (-) 0.72 (0.00) (-) 0.94 (0.00) (-) 1.14 (0.00) lag (3,0,0,0) (4,0,0,0) (2,3,0,2) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,1) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) f-s 5.30* 4.46 7.75* 5.67* 5.07* 5.33* 8.70* 7.73* 5.01* 6.97* 12.03* 17.87* www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 131 published by scholink inc. 3 pos 2.86 (0.00) 2.18 (0.39) (-) 1.75 (0.08) (-) 3.18 (0.00) (-) 2.99 (0.37) 0.32 (0.79) 2.41 (0.37) (-) 4.25 (0.43) (-) 3.93 (0.03) (-) 4.22 (0.04) (-) 3.34 (0.61) (-) 3.60 (0.23) neg (-) 0.27 (0.58) (-) 2.78 (0.08) 3.16 (0.00) (-) 0.03 (0.96) (-) 2.81 (0.46) 3.37 (0.01) 2.35 (0.54) (-) 3.17 (0.33) (-) 3.02 (0.12) (-) 2.21 (0.08) (-) 2.75 (0.67) (-) 3.06 (0.28) ∆r 0.10 (0.41) 0.26 (0.23) (-) 0.06 (0.71) 0.26 (0.51) 0.41 (0.40) (-) 0.08 (0.84) (-) 4.93 (0.31) (-) 3.50 (0.30) (-) 0.28 (0.91) 0.61 (0.77) (-) 0.60 (0.77) 0.59 (0.76) (-) 1.31 (0.00) (-) 1.04 (0.00) (-) 1.95 (0.00) (-) 0.72 (0.00) (-) 0.77 (0.00) (-) 0.84 (0.00) (-) 0.65 (0.00) (-) 0.86 (0.00) (-) 1.03 (0.00) (-) 1.39 (0.00) (-) 0.83 (0.00) (-) 1.01 (0.00) lag (2,0,0,0) (2,0,0,0) (3,2,0,0) (2,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (2,0,0,0) (4,0,0,0) (5,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) f-s 9.91* 6.04* 8.63* 3.83 5.22* 6.38* 5.11* 4.00 5.44* 5.22* 7.82* 4.58 4 pos 0.46 (0.87) 1.87 (0.80) 1.55 (0.48) (-) 0.14 (0.63) 3.16 (0.02) 1.34 (0.01) 0.98 (0.57) (-) 3.42 (0.53) (-) 2.14 (0.02) 1.12 (0.02) (-) 3.94 (0.07) 1.77 (0.15) neg 2.38 (0.58) 1.46 (0.78) 1.83 (0.43) 2.52 (0.02) 1.85 (0.02) 0.84 (0.11) 2.47 (0.41) (-) 1.37 (0.79) 1.84 (0.02) (-) 1.64 (0.27) (-) 2.14 (0.09) 0.86 (0.49) ∆r (-) 2.56 (0.70) 2.13 (0.75) (-) 2.76 (0.69) 0.27 (0.79) 0.56 (0.58) 0.65 (0.59) 1.70 (0.33) 1.43 (0.45) 2.18 (0.01) 4.90 (0.09) 0.52 (0.52) 0.38 (0.61) (-) 0.57 (0.00) (-) 1.11 (0.00) (-) 0.62 (0.00) (-) 1.83 (0.00) (-) 2.03 (0.00) (-) 1.62 (0.00) (-) 0.96 (0.00) (-) 1.06 (0.00) (-) 0.71 (0.00) (-) 0.89 (0.00) (-) 1.24 (0.00) (-) 0.77 (0.00) lag (2,0,0,0) (9,0,0,0) (2,0,0,0) (4,0,1,4) (4,0,0,0) (2,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (5,0,0,0) (2,0,1,2) (3,0,1,2) (5,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) f-s 4.25* 2.93 3.77 10.23* 13.75* 23.75* 7.82* 7.12* 5.14* 17.51* 12.43* 5.18* 5 pos (-) 1.63 (0.56) (-) 1.30 (0.81) 0.98 (0.67) 3.25 (0.65) (-) 2.32 (0.95) (-) 2.43 (0.75) 1.19 (0.46) 0.77 (0.90) 1.99 (0.44) (-) 2.62 (0.21) 0.89 (0.76) 2.23 (0.24) neg (-) 1.80 (0.65) 0.78 (0.82) 1.17 (0.62) 3.10 (0.65) 2.49 (0.93) (-) 2.11 (0.76) 1.68 (0.47) 0.46 (0.89) 2.18 (0.43) 0.73 (0.12) 0.68 (0.80) (-) 1.91 (0.31) ∆r 2.40 (0.75) (-) 0.39 (0.92) 2.23 (0.76) (-) 2.38 (0.89) (-) 1.16 (0.95) 2.77 (0.88) (-) 0.35 (0.84) (-) 0.13 (0.94) (-) 0.48 (0.78) 0.06 (0.96) 0.03 (0.97) 0.06 (0.59) (-) 0.45 (0.00) (-) 0.39 (0.00) (-) 0.47 (0.00) (-) 0.66 (0.00) (-) 0.78 (0.00) (-) 0.85 (0.00) (-) 0.62 (0.00) (-) 0.60 (0.00) (-) 0.56 (0.00) (-) 0.67 (0.00) (-) 0.60 (0.00) (-) 0.62 (0.00) lag (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,1,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,1,0) f-s 2.89 2.30 2.33 3.55 2.93 7.44* 5.76* 4.45* 5.78* 6.90* 4.65* 4.46* 6 pos 2.87 (0.13) (-) 4.54 (0.41) 2.32 (0.23) (-) 4.43 (0.16) (-) 4.44 (0.08) (-) 3.68 (0.26) (-) 4.94 (0.15) (-) 4.22 (0.60) (-) 3.83 (0.29) (-) 0.28 (0.97) (-) 1.38 (0.89) 2.83 (0.88) neg 4.94 (0.09) (-) 3.17 (0.56) 2.05 (0.28) (-) 2.03 (0.27) (-) 4.11 (0.12) (-) 4.52 (0.16) 1.05 (0.83) (-) 3.08 (0.69) (-) 3.45 (0.36) 1.45 (0.78) 2.79 (0.78) (-) 0.10 (0.99) ∆r 2.76 (0.55) 2.36 (0.63) 2.04 (0.71) 0.41 (0.96) (-) 3.84 (0.68) (-) 1.64 (0.87) 0.72 (0.00) (-) 0.12 (0.20) 0.03 (0.52) 0.06 (0.75) 0.41 (0.12) (-) 0.06 (0.75) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 132 published by scholink inc. (-) 1.07 (0.00) (-) 1.15 (0.00) (-) 0.98 (0.00) (-) 1.24 (0.00) (-) 1.06 (0.00) (-) 1.65 (0.00) (-) 1.16 (0.00) (-) 1.24 (0.00) (-) 2.59 (0.00) (-) 1.05 (0.00) (-) 1.37 (0.00) (-) 1.35 (0.00) lag (2,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (2,0,0,0) (2,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (6,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (2,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) f-s 5.04* 10.44* 3.96* 7.54* 10* 4.24* 22.59* 21.42* 19.88* 5.82* 22.18* 27.25* 7 pos 1.15 (0.27 ) 2.06 (0.35) (-) 0.94 (0.43) 1.71 (0.05) (-) 3.93 (0.29) (-) 1.01 (0.20) 3.00 (0.03) 2.03 (0.37) (-) 2.10 (0.00) (-) 2.08 (0.00) (-) 0.84 (0.71) (-) 0.74 (0.13) neg (-) 0.45 (0.78) 1.55 (0.53) (-) 1.62 (0.13) (-) 1.01 (0.63) (-) 2.27 (0.57) 2.30 (0.04) (-) 0.78 (0.55) 4.48 (0.06) (-) 1.83 (0.00) (-) 1.06 (0.01) (-) 0.99 (0.67) (-) 0.99 (0.10) ∆r (-) 0.32 (0.26) (-) 0.13 (0.64) (-) 0.72 (0.48) 1.42 (0.00) 0.15 (0.74) 2.81 (0.11) 2.81 (0.00) 3.87 (0.00) 3.76 (0.00) (-) 0.50 (0.48) 0.68 (0.36) 0.65 (0.33) (-) 0.37 (0.00) (-) 0.52 (0.00) (-) 0.69 (0.00) (-) 1.44 (0.00) (-) 0.84 (0.00) (-) 0.66 (0.00) (-) 0.90 (0.00) (-) 1.44 (0.00) (-) 1.49 (0.00) (-) 0.53 (0.00) (-) 0.85 (0.00) (-) 0.69 (0.00) lag (4,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (4,0,2,1) (2,0,0,0) (1,0,1,1) (3,0,0,0) (6,0,0,0) (4,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (2,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) f-s 1.85 3.80 5.29* 7.05* 5.19* 5.29* 5.50* 6.79* 10.44* 3.99* 4.11* 5.18* 8 pos 1.63 (0.50) (-) 3.26 (0.34) (-) 1.17 (0.30) 2.59 (0.06) 2.01 (0.67) 1.26 (0.15) (-) 2.26 (0.42) (-) 3.97 (0.71) 3.48 (0.07) 1.86 (0.66) 2.48 (0.93) 1.77 (0.80) neg 1.45 (0.48) (-) 0.85 (0.82) (-) 1.19 (0.29) 2.15 (0.15) 0.23 (0.93) 1.76 (0.06) (-) 2.14 (0.57) 0.62 (0.95) 3.64 (0.07) 2.73 (0.38) 4.51 (0.87) 0.41 (0.95) ∆r (-) 0.38 (0.72) 0.60 (0.47) (-) 0.38 (0.67) (-) 0.46 (0.55) (-) 1.18 (0.24) 1.37 (0.17) 3.79 (0.13) 4.05 (0.17) 3.07 (0.16) 0.46 (0.00) (-) 0.01 (0.96) (-) 0.04 (0.78) (-) 0.51 (0.01) (-) 0.77 (0.00) (-) 0.35 (0.00) (-) 0.75 (0.00) (-) 0.75 (0.00) (-) 0.79 (0.00) (-) 0.75 (0.00) (-) 1.01 (0.00) (-) 0.80 (0.00) (-) 0.86 (0.00) (-) 0.88 (0.00) (-) 0.86 (0.00) lag (3,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (1,1,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,00,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (7,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) f-s 1.17 1.92 1.55 5.08* 5.81* 8.35* 5.21* 1.84 6.94* 10.05* 6.14* 9.02* 9 pos 2.48 (0.22) (-) 2.60 (0.32) 1.91 (0.07) (-) 0.36 (0.71) (-) 0.95 (0.83) 0.96 (0.49) (-) 0.60 (0.57) (-) 3.20 (0.24) (-) 2.52 (0.00) (-) 2.09 (0.00) 3.30 (0.10) (-) 2.82 (0.00) neg 2.73 (0.22) (-) 2.23 (0.42) 1.80 (0.08) 1.09 (0.20) 1.05 (0.70) (-) 1.90 (0.13) 0.54 (0.70) (-) 2.08 (0.41) (-) 2.15 (0.03) (-) 1.24 (0.00) 3.26 (0.10) (-) 2.70 (0.00) ∆r (-) 2.42 (0.05) (-) 0.73 (0.37) (-) 1.20 (0.24) 3.13 (0.12) 1.56 (0.39) 1.50 (0.26) 0.46 (0.00) 2.46 (0.10) 2.76 (0.00) (-) 0.45 (0.51) 1.20 (0.09) 1.09 (0.11) (-) 0.54 (0.00) (-) 0.54 (0.00) (-) 0.60 (0.00) (-) 1.32 (0.00) (-) 1.21 (0.00) (-) 1.00 (0.00) (-) 0.49 (0.00) (-) 1.32 (0.00) (-) 0.94 (0.00) (-) 0.76 (0.00) (-) 0.85 (0.00) (-) 0.96 (0.00) lag (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (4,0,0,0) (4,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (4,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) f-s 6.63* 4.28 3.67 5.03* 4.02 8.92* 5.21* 4.80* 5.18* 10.18* 9.55* 13.22* 10 pos 1.03 (0.53) (-) 1.53 (0.69) (-) 1.25 (0.08) 1.39 (0.00) (-) 2.74 (0.13) (-) 0.53 (0.69) (-) 2.23 (0.67) (-) 3.47 (0.71) (-) 3.88 (0.29) 0.86 (0.66) 0.50 (0.94) (-) 2.49 (0.19) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 133 published by scholink inc. neg 1.13 (0.53) (-) 2.62 (0.52) 0.84 (0.12) (-) 2.33 (0.06) (-) 3.25 (0.08) (-) 0.75 (0.63) (-) 1.20 (0.88) (-) 2.81 (0.79) (-) 4.54 (0.23) 0.47 (0.72) 0.87 (0.89) (-) 2.68 (0.18) ∆r (-) 1.11 (0.28) (-) 1.47 (0.36) 1.14 (0.24) (-) 0.06 (0.93) (-) 0.46 (0.33) (-) 1.04 (0.28) (-) 2.38 (0.57) (-) 2.65 (0.59) (-) 1.76 (0.73) 0.01 (0.90) 0.01 (0.85) (-) 0.03 (0.42) (-) 0.42 (0.00) (-) 0.58 (0.03) (-) 0.46 (0.00) (-) 0.93 (0.00) (-) 1.14 (0.00) (-) 0.99 (0.00) (-) 1.55 (0.00) (-) 1.54 (0.00) (-) 1.52 (0.00) (-) 0.61 (0.00) (-) 0.56 (0.00) (-) 0.88 (0.00) lag (1,0,0,0) (4,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (1,0,3,3) (2,0,0,0) (1,3,3,3) (3,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) f-s 2.47 1.06 6.05* 12.06* 6.67* 7.85* 10.94* 10.92* 10.11* 1.91 10.46* 5.03* 11 pos 4.77 (0.02) 3.70 (0.32) 1.66 (0.01) 3.57 (0.22) (-) 0.93 (0.93) 1.64 (0.58) 1.09 (0.61) (-) 1.12 (0.88) (-) 3.21 (0.35) (-) 1.46 (0.27) (-) 4.41 (0.47) (-) 1.51 (0.16) neg (-) 4.07 (0.08) (-) 3.84 (0.18) 1.95 (0.00) 1.49 (0.63) (-) 4.27 (0.57) 2.18 (0.39) 1.35 (0.63) (-) 2.08 (0.77) (-) 2.37 (0.51) 2.83 (0.50) (-) 3.83 (0.56) (-) 1.54 (0.15) ∆r (-) 2.15 (0.01) (-) 1.24 (0.08) 0.37 (0.44) (-) 0.31 (0.91) (-) 1.86 (0.40) 0.43 (0.00) 3.76 (0.08) 2.21 (0.34) 5.63 (0.00) 1.06 (0.51) 1.21 (0.49) 1.93 (0.17) (-) 1.49 (0.00) (-) 0.75 (0.00) (-) 1.27 (0.00) (-) 1.44 (0.00) (-) 0.86 (0.00) (-) 0.84 (0.00) (-) 0.74 (0.00) (-) 0.51 (0.00) (-) 1.29 (0.00) (-) 1.02 (0.00) (-) 1.13 (0.01) (-) 1.19 (0.00) lag (4,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (2,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (4,0,0,0) (1,0,2,0) (8,0,0,0) (4,0,0,0) f-s 5.25* 4.80* 4.49* 7.2* 8.22* 6.87* 4.78* 2.58 6.54* 13.37* 1.68 6.43* 12 pos 2.67 (0.44) (-) 3.19 (0.71) 2.47 (0.00) (-) 2.84 (0.01) 0.07 (0.98) 0.45 (0.56) (-) 1.59 (0.84) (-) 2.58 (0.88) (-) 0.49 (0.93) (-) 2.39 (0.70) (-) 0.68 (0.96) (-) 1.17 (0.93) neg 2.83 (0.52) (-) 3.63 (0.69) 1.91 (0.00) 0.11 (0.81) 2.49 (0.39) 1.59 (0.02) 1.68 (0.91) (-) 0.27 (0.98) (-) 1.45 (0.81) (-) 1.67 (0.66) 1.30 (0.92) 2.25 (0.88) ∆r (-) 2.38 (0.33) (-) 1.22 (0.72) 0.64 (0.31) 0.01 (0.98) (-) 0.48 (0.58) 0.56 (0.61) 0.15 (0.71) 0.06 (0.71) (-) 0.05 (0.70) 0.05 (0.83) 0.08 (0.77) 0.15 (0.61) (-) 0.63 (0.03) (-) 0.75 (0.04) (-) 0.60 (0.00) (-) 0.97 (0.00) (-) 0.51 (0.00) (-) 0.96 (0.00) (-) 1.31 (0.00) (-) 0.89 (0.00) (-) 0.40 (0.00) (-) 0.80 (0.01) (-) 0.91 (0.00) (-) 0.93 (0.00) lag (3,0,0,0) (6,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (4,0,0,0) (2,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (8,0,0,0) (7,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (8,0,0,0) (8,0,0,0) (8,0,0,0) f-s 0.86 0.80 4.56* 4.61* 2.67 3.20 6.08* 3.44 1.61 1.66 1.91 1.89 13 pos (-) 1.25 (0.56) 1.51 (0.65) 2.95 (0.00) (-) 1.65 (0.10) 2.40 (0.19) 1.56 (0.46) 2.87 (0.01) (-) 0.67 (0.84) (-) 3.48 (0.03) (-) 2.33 (0.49) 2.58 (0.80) (-) 3.85 (0.22) neg 1.00 (0.42) 1.46 (0.69) 2.10 (0.05) (-) 4.21 (0.02) 1.91 (0.35) 4.05 (0.03) 2.66 (0.06) 1.57 (0.66) (-) 2.20 (0.16) (-) 1.55 (0.39) 2.78 (0.79) (-) 3.23 (0.32) ∆r (-) 1.39 (0.16) (-) 0.25 (0.73) (-) 0.68 (0.29) (-) 0.68 (0.21) (-) 0.03 (0.96) 1.56 (0.00) (-) 0.84 (0.52) 1.10 (0.31) 1.95 (0.05) 0.13 (0.97) (-) 1.40 (0.65) (-) 2.58 (0.33) (-) 0.39 (0.00) (-) 0.38 (0.01) (-) 0.29 (0.00) (-) 0.49 (0.00) (-) 0.51 (0.00) (-) 0.95 (0.00) (-) 0.37 (0.00) (-) 0.35 (0.00) (-) 0.61 (0.00) (-) 1.15 (0.00) (-) 1.04 (0.00) (-) 0.79 (0.00) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 134 published by scholink inc. lag (1,0,0,1) (2,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,1,2) (1,0,0,2) (2,0,2,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (4,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) f-s 2.20 1.32 6.87* 4.57* 2.55 5.40* 5.50* 2.36 4.75* 5.88* 5.39* 8.05* 14 pos (-) 1.74 (0.78) (-) 1.01 (0.94) 0.72 (0.79) (-) 4.74 (0.48) 1.28 (0.80) (-) 2.01 (0.62) (-) 0.31 (0.85) 1.09 (0.76) (-) 1.06 (0.49) 0.80 (0.76) 2.11 (0.86) 2.31 (0.59) neg (-) 1.06 (0.92) 0.84 (0.91) 1.19 (0.68) (-) 2.16 (0.51) 2.40 (0.66) (-) 2.46 (0.58) 0.95 (0.66) (-) 2.51 (0.56) (-) 1.30 (0.41) 0.86 (0.77) 2.20 (0.90) 2.23 (0.60) ∆r (-) 1.41 (0.81) (-) 0.06 (0.99) 0.18 (0.97) 0.10 (0.58) 0.10 (0.46) 0.01 (0.91) 0.72 (0.63) (-) 0.11 (0.01) 0.99 (0.41) 0.01 (0.80) (-) 0.25 (0.18) 0.02 (0.77) (-) 0.35 (0.01) (-) 0.24 (0.02) (-) 1.17 (0.00) (-) 1.07 (0.00) (-) 0.89 (0.00) (-) 0.90 (0.00) (-) 0.38 (0.00) (-) 0.58 (0.00) (-) 0.45 (0.00) (-) 0.65 (0.00) (-) 0.47 (0.00) (-) 0.65 (0.00) lag (5,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (7,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (4,0,2,0) (8,0,0,0) (5,0,0,0) (5,0,0,0) (9,0,0,0) (5,0,0,0) f-s 1.17 1.24 1.08 3.96* 7.27* 10.26* 2.58 6.83* 4.33 2.80 6.07* 2.57 15 pos (-) 2.35 (0.53) (-) 0.15 (0.97) 2.90 (0.03) 1.47 (0.56) 2.26 (0.80) 2.92 (0.09) (-) 4.82 (0.00) 2.55 (0.26) 0.74 (0.19) (-) 3.07 (0.05) (-) 3.33 (0.55) (-) 0.69 (0.44) neg 1.15 (0.62) (-) 1.50 (0.72) 2.08 (0.10) 2.51 (0.18) 2.63 (0.74) (-) 0.90 (0.59) 2.77 (0.12) 1.97 (0.38) 0.97 (0.06) 1.75 (0.08) (-) 3.85 (0.48) 1.40 (0.08) ∆r (-) 1.26 (0.65) (-) 0.88 (0.60) (-) 2.31 (0.34) 0.30 (0.04) 0.02 (0.87) 0.57 (0.87) (-) 0.99 (0.07) 0.61 (0.33) (-) 0.37 (0.52) (-) 2.86 (0.09) (-) 0.18 (0.92) (-) 1.94 (0.16) (-) 0.62 (0.00) (-) 0.66 (0.00) (-) 0.58 (0.00) (-) 0.52 (0.00) (-) 0.47 (0.00) (-) 0.60 (0.00) (-) 1.45 (0.00) (-) 2.13 (0.00) (-) 0.55 (0.00) (-) 0.87 (0.00) (-) 1.54 (0.00) (-) 0.67 (0.00) lag (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (1,0,1,0) (4,0,0,0) (5,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (2,0,0,0) (6,0,0,0) (2,0,0,0) f-s 4.40* 4.76* 5.57* 1.59 2.11 4.69* 10.77* 11.04* 4.29* 8.88* 3.26 10.15* 16 pos (-) 1.93 (0.04) (-) 0.28 (0.86) 1.40 (0.09) 0.05 (0.98) (-) 3.33 (0.74) 2.30 (0.43) 2.77 (0.50) 3.20 (0.63) (-) 3.02 (0.22) 1.97 (0.75) (-) 1.51 (0.93) 1.03 (0.84) neg (-) 0.37 (0.60) 2.05 (0.31) 2.14 (0.02) 2.56 (0.36) (-) 3.18 (0.73) 3.88 (0.16) 2.92 (0.49) 1.16 (0.79) (-) 2.98 (0.26) (-) 0.38 (0.90) 0.92 (0.96) 1.59 (0.77) ∆r 1.60 (0.04) 1.21 (0.12) 1.39 (0.25) 1.91 (0.60) 0.02 (0.86) 2.68 (0.45) (-) 2.14 (0.46) (-) 1.93 (0.51) (-) 0.04 (0.40) (-) 0.08 (0.59) 0.06 (0.71) 0.09 (0.55) (-) 0.77 (0.00) (-) 0.67 (0.00) (-) 0.47 (0.00) (-) 1.17 (0.00) (-) 1.18 (0.00) (-) 1.22 (0.00) (-) 0.62 (0.00) (-) 0.65 (0.00) (-) 0.97 (0.00) (-) 0.54 (0.00) (-) 0.61 (0.00) (-) 0.55 (0.00) lag (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (5,0,0,0) (2,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) f-s 5.02* 4.01* 3.03 12.39* 16.21* 15.71* 6.52* 8.13* 4.11* 2.03 4.45* 4.39* 17 pos 1.65 (0.64) (-) 2.05 (0.73) (-) 1.35 (0.09) (-) 4.22 (0.30) (-) 3.17 (0.78) 3.60 (0.18) (-) 1.36 (0.79) 2.12 (0.74) 1.22 (0.82) (-) 3.43 (0.44) 2.22 (0.60) 2.70 (0.32) neg 1.51 (0.63) (-) 1.38 (0.82) (-) 1.17 (0.07) (-) 2.35 (0.29) (-) 3.64 (0.76) 3.41 (0.15) (-) 1.00 (0.88) 0.27 (0.96) 0.86 (0.89) (-) 2.67 (0.37) 1.60 (0.71) 2.06 (0.49) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 135 published by scholink inc. ∆r (-) 1.93 (0.21) (-) 1.37 (0.44) (-) 0.28 (0.39) 0.11 (0.39) 0.02 (0.83) (-) 0.02 (0.82) 2.63 (0.57) 1.11 (0.84) 0.53 (0.92) 2.93 (0.66) (-) 4.39 (0.53) (-) 4.38 (0.52) (-) 0.42 (0.00) (-) 0.42 (0.00) (-) 0.72 (0.00) (-) 0.80 (0.00) (-) 0.81 (0.00) (-) 0.84 (0.00) (-) 0.48 (0.00) (-) 0.40 (0.02) (-) 0.40 (0.02) (-) 0.58 (0.00) (-) 0.74 (0.00) (-) 0.75 (0.00) lag (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (4,0,0,0) (4,0,0,0) (4,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (5,0,0,0) (6,0,0,0) (6,0,0,0) f-s 4.40* 4.04* 4.65* 4.81* 4.41* 4.84* 3.37 1.01 1.04 3.86 4.66* 5.23* 18 pos 2.72 (0.00) (-) 2.62 (0.59) 0.32 (0.55) (-) 1.96 (0.03) (-) 0.64 (0.85) (-) 1.86 (0.00) 1.09 (0.05) 3.40 (0.03) 1.23 (0.10) (-) 2.70 (0.05) 2.63 (0.60) (-) 1.52 (0.16) neg (-) 1.72 (0.09) 2.12 (0.67) 1.96 (0.00) 0.32 (0.68) 2.45 (0.52) 1.90 (0.04) (-) 0.99 (0.03) (-) 1.67 (0.20) 1.06 (0.07) 1.90 (0.24) 2.99 (0.19) (-) 0.42 (0.63) ∆r 0.17 (0.85) 0.33 (0.91) 2.45 (0.02) 1.65 (0.25) 0.72 (0.74) 3.44 (0.00) 0.13 (0.67) 0.71 (0.06) 0.31 (0.38) (-) 0.32 (0.78) 0.18 (0.87) (-) 0.80 (0.38) (-) 0.76 (0.00) (-) 0.65 (0.00) (-) 0.72 (0.00) (-) 0.76 (0.00) (-) 0.65 (0.00) (-) 0.83 (0.00) (-) 0.81 (0.00) (-) 0.87 (0.00) (-) 0.88 (0.00) (-) 0.72 (0.00) (-) 0.71 (0.00) (-) 0.64 (0.00) lag (3,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (2,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (2,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,3,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) f-s 118.8* 10.67* 81.56* 25.07* 8.12* 44.14* 7.06* 6.85* 7.49* 4.78* 4.59* 4.23 19 pos (-) 1.61 (0.53) (-) 2.28 (0.63) 0.27 (0.86) (-) 2.01 (0.00) (-) 1.80 (0.50) 2.02 (0.04) 3.07 (0.07) (-) 3.54 (0.21) 1.35 (0.27) (-) 0.74 (0.43) (-) 2.02 (0.80) 3.74 (0.35) neg 2.22 (0.22) 0.92 (0.81) (-) 1.86 (0.32) (-) 0.82 (0.15) 0.74 (0.74) (-) 2.19 (0.01) (-) 1.65 (0.50) 2.12 (0.33) 2.62 (0.03) (-) 1.48 (0.03) 2.34 (0.64) 1.82 (0.50) ∆r 1.21 (0.32) 1.29 (0.24) 0.39 (0.73) 1.19 (0.01) 0.47 (0.38) (-) 0.17 (0.75) 2.50 (0.00) 2.08 (0.01) 3.76 (0.00) (-) 0.36 (0.72) 2.73 (0.27) 3.60 (0.17) (-) 0.90 (0.00) (-) 0.73 (0.00) (-) 0.92 (0.00) (-) 0.56 (0.00) (-) 0.42 (0.00) (-) 0.84 (0.00) (-) 0.89 (0.00) (-) 1.10 (0.00) (-) 0.76 (0.00) (-) 0.55 (0.00) (-) 0.66 (0.00) (-) 0.97 (0.00) lag (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (4,0,0,0) (4,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) f-s 37.19* 4.54* 39.93* 13.13* 1.78 20.54* 5.38* 9.74* 6.51* 4.55* 10.46* 6.88* 20 pos (-) 1.53 (0.25) 4.57 (0.01) (-) 0.21 (0.77) (-) 3.37 (0.04) (-) 0.44 (0.93) (-) 0.48 (0.86) (-) 0.60 (0.49) 3.78 (0.13) 0.58 (0.41) 2.28 (0.05) 3.10 (0.77) 3.75 (0.13) neg (-) 2.52 (0.04) 4.07 (0.02) 0.85 (0.21) (-) 3.21 (0.06) 4.14 (0.29) (-) 3.02 (0.30) 2.48 (0.22) (-) 2.60 (0.19) 0.56 (0.37) 3.02 (0.00) 3.83 (0.46) 4.18 (0.04) ∆r 0.33 (0.50) 0.53 (0.00) 0.08 (0.89) (-) 2.08 (0.16) 1.75 (0.12) 0.18 (0.90) 0.17 (0.89) 0.15 (0.77) (-) 0.28 (0.82) 0.40 (0.00) (-) 1.50 (0.58) (-) 3.54 (0.06) (-) 0.99 (0.00) (-) 0.94 (0.00) (-) 0.90 (0.00) (-) 0.67 (0.00) (-) 0.60 (0.00) (-) 0.93 (0.00) (-) 1.01 (0.00) (-) 0.99 (0.00) (-) 0.83 (0.00) (-) 1.02 (0.00) (-) 0.92 (0.00) (-) 1.15 (0.00) lag (4,0,0,0) (4,0,0,0) (2,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (8,0,0,0) (3,0,1,2) (4,0,0,0) (2,0,0,2) (2,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) f-s 4.26* 32.69* 79.5* 13.33* 16.89* 16.58* 5.77* 4.38* 4.43* 4.43* 8.53* 4.86* www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 136 published by scholink inc. 21 pos 3.35 (0.09) 0.95 (0.68) 0.77 (0.03) (-) 3.88 (0.00) 1.97 (0.57) 1.01 (0.21) (-) 0.88 (0.60) (-) 3.70 (0.55) (-) 1.01 (0.66) (-) 1.62 (0.24) 0.22 (0.97) (-) 4.42 (0.31) neg 3.99 (0.03) 1.53 (0.51) 2.27 (0.00) (-) 1.96 (0.02) 4.60 (0.25) 1.65 (0.02) 0.96 (0.66) (-) 2.53 (0.70) 2.36 (0.26) (-) 1.58 (0.16) 2.13 (0.80) (-) 2.82 (0.41) ∆r (-) 2.12 (0.00) (-) 1.27 (0.02) (-) 0.53 (0.15) (-) 0.01 (0.98) 0.85 (0.28) 2.30 (0.02) (-) 0.20 (0.89) 5.79 (0.01) 3.72 (0.04) 4.88 (0.14) 2.57 (0.54) 1.95 (0.58) (-) 0.93 (0.00) (-) 0.56 (0.00) (-) 0.70 (0.00) (-) 0.90 (0.00) (-) 0.82 (0.00) (-) 0.49 (0.00) (-) 0.23 (0.00) (-) 0.86 (0.00) (-) 0.66 (0.00) (-) 1.36 (0.00) (-) 0.85 (0.00) (-) 1.42 (0.00) lag (4,0,0,0) (5,0,0,0) (2,0,0,0) (4,0,0,0) (4,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (2,0,0,0) (8,0,0,0) (7,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (2,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) f-s 55.01* 5.75* 5.00* 8.76* 2.81 4.07* 2.95 5.14* 4.40* 18.81* 3.97 19.74* 22 pos 3.48 (0.18) 0.97 (0.41) 1.10 (0.36) 3.03 (0.01) 2.69 (0.35) 1.08 (0.11) 1.84 (0.35) 1.01 (0.95) 0.83 (0.69) 2.59 (0.72) 2.43 (0.88) 1.60 (0.84) neg 0.13 (0.94) (-) 0.64 (0.56) (-) 0.37 (0.74) (-) 0.17 (0.84) (-) 4.49 (0.33) (-) 0.82 (0.33) 1.51 (0.55) (-) 2.62 (0.74) 0.30 (0.87) (-) 0.35 (0.91) (-) 3.80 (0.80) (-) 0.36 (0.96) ∆r 1.24 (0.59) 3.16 (0.21) 3.31 (0.20) 2.88 (0.04) 2.57 (0.05) 1.10 (0.57) (-) 1.72 (0.26) (-) 0.78 (0.80) (-) 0.84 (0.52) (-) 0.25 (0.30) (-) 0.33 (0.13) (-) 0.14 (0.34) (-) 1.05 (0.00) (-) 0.83 (0.00) (-) 0.88 (0.00) (-) 0.64 (0.00) (-) 0.62 (0.00) (-) 0.76 (0.00) (-) 0.67 (0.00) (-) 1.02 (0.00) (-) 0.77 (0.00) (-) 2.20 (0.00) (-) 1.97 (0.00) (-) 2.20 (0.00) lag (2,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,2) (1,0,2,2) (1,0,1,2) (2,0,0,0) (10,0,0,0) (4,0,0,0) (5,0,0,0) (6,0,0,0) (5,0,0,0) f-s 4.55* 6.46* 6.50* 4.74* 5.06* 6.12* 4.41* 1.51 3.61 8.67* 4.09* 8.72* 23 pos 0.08 (0.92) 2.96 (0.03) 1.07 (0.08) (-) 3.53 (0.03) (-) 3.97 (0.15) (-) 1.36 (0.09) (-) 1.19 (0.16) (-) 2.85 (0.12) 0.92 (0.19) 1.62 (0.21) (-) 1.95 (0.43) 1.32 (0.28) neg (-) 1.05 (0.05) (-) 1.12 (0.39) 0.41 (0.42) 1.31 (0.47) 5.41 (0.02) (-) 2.79 (0.00) 1.02 (0.44) 0.22 (0.90) 1.84 (0.01) (-) 0.46 (0.74) (-) 1.20 (0.61) (-) 0.59 (0.53) ∆r (-) 0.47 (0.27) (-) 0.11 (0.65) 0.25 (0.57) 0.16 (0.78) 0.96 (0.03) (-) 0.22 (0.68) 2.11 (0.00) 1.82 (0.00) 2.18 (0.00) (-) 0.54 (0.64) (-) 1.93 (0.08) 0.69 (0.51) (-) 0.87 (0.00) (-) 1.64 (0.00) (-) 0.98 (0.00) (-) 0.58 (0.00) (-) 0.86 (0.00) (-) 0.88 (0.00) (-) 0.55 (0.00) (-)0.67 (0.00) (-) 0.51 (0.00) (-) 0.87 (0.00) (-) 0.79 (0.00) (-) 1.00 (0.00) lag (1,0,0,2) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,2) (1,1,2,1) (4,0,0,0) (2,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (4,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (6,0,0,0) f-s 7.04* 6.71* 24.57* 4.95* 3.76 14.73* 6.19* 8.22* 4.09* 64* 40.82* 10.1* 24 pos 2.42 (0.20) 1.20 (0.76) (-) 2.35 (0.09) 1.78 (0.59) 3.36 (0.49) 2.96 (0.23) (-) 2.60 (0.00) (-) 2.60 (0.49) (-) 3.99 (0.00) 2.34 (0.05) (-) 2.89 (0.58) (-) 3.71 (0.05) neg (-) 2.04 (0.20) 2.23 (0.53) (-) 1.38 (0.35) (-) 4.75 (0.00) 3.21 (0.42) 3.55 (0.11) (-) 2.10 (0.01) (-) 3.01 (0.24) 1.69 (0.22) 1.85 (0.03) (-) 3.31 (0.53) (-) 3.55 (0.06) ∆r (-) 2.50 (0.07) (-) 3.28 (0.01) (-) 1.70 (0.26) 2.09 (0.26) (-) 0.18 (0.89) 0.96 (0.54) 0.60 (0.24) (-) 0.28 (0.58) (-) 0.60 (0.41) (-) 4.04 (0.37) 4.78 (0.01) 4.45 (0.00) (-) 0.93 (-) 0.58 (-)1.05 (-) 1.12 (-) 0.99 (-) 0.91 (-) 0.94 (-) 0.99 (-) 0.98 (-) 1.66 (-) 1.17 (-) 1.22 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 137 published by scholink inc. (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) lag (3,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (1,0,0,1) (1,2,0,2) (4,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,2,0,2) (3,0,2,0) (2,0,0,1) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) f-s 4.99* 3.88 10.21* 7.55* 2.44 5.77* 9.59* 10.59* 36.99* 12.86* 15.72* 21.95* 25 pos (-) 2.02 (0.00) 0.13 (0.90) 2.60 (0.00) 0.30 (0.78) 1.49 (0.71) (-) 0.16 (0.85) 1.29 (0.02) 2.57 (0.08) (-) 1.38 (0.02) (-) 2.86 (0.17) 1.15 (0.73) 1.15 (0.69) neg (-) 0.30 (0.65) 1.96 (0.12) (-) 2.09 (0.00) (-) 2.38 (0.00) 0.56 (0.89) (-) 1.45 (0.16) (-) 0.34 (0.39) (-) 2.24 (0.03) 1.28 (0.02) (-) 1.06 (0.28) 1.68 (0.48) 3.14 (0.33) ∆r (-) 0.70 (0.39) 0.40 (0.68) 0.65 (0.39) (-) 0.20 (0.84) 1.45 (0.56) (-) 0.29 (0.81) 0.43 (0.10) 0.95 (0.00) (-) 0.08 (0.79) 1.90 (0.28) 0.27 (0.02) (-) 1.66 (0.72) (-) 0.90 (0.00) (-) 0.71 (0.00) (-) 1.10 (0.00) (-) 0.39 (0.00) (-) 0.38 (0.01) (-) 0.51 (0.00) (-) 0.80 (0.00) (-) 0.75 (0.00) (-) 0.80 (0.00) (-) 1.13 (0.00) (-) 0.45 (0.00) (-) 1.12 (0.00) lag (1,0,2,0) (1,0,0,2) (1,2,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (2,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (1,0,1,1) f-s 6.75* 6.15* 8.66* 4.77* 1.22 3.97* 5.97* 6.41* 6.09* 14.35* 3.84 9.53* 26 pos 1.45 (0.20) (-) 2.08 (0.44) 2.91 (0.00) (-) 0.47 (0.29) 0.53 (0.75) 1.93 (0.00) (-) 0.75 (0.88) (-) 2.42 (0.67) (-) 0.76 (0.91) (-) 2.47 (0.30) (-) 3.29 (0.27) 0.88 (0.70) neg 1.83 (0.14) (-) 1.78 (0.51) 1.18 (0.03) (-) 0.67 (0.14) 0.85 (0.59) 1.04 (0.00) (-) 1.91 (0.79) (-) 3.98 (0.53) (-) 3.64 (0.66) 3.86 (0.04) 1.49 (0.66) 3.44 (0.09) ∆r 0.26 (0.81) (-) 0.58 (0.47) 0.43 (0.71) (-) 1.23 (0.03) (-) 0.48 (0.32) (-) 0.36 (0.33) 1.91 (0.67) (-) 3.06 (0.47) (-) 2.55 (0.60) 3.90 (0.03) 3.49 (0.01) 3.32 (0.00) (-) 0.60 (0.00) (-) 0.71 (0.00) (-) 0.79 (0.00) (-) 0.81 (0.00) (-) 0.80 (0.00) (-) 0.90 (0.00) (-) 0.68 (0.00) (-) 1.14 (0.00) (-) 0.81 (0.00) (-) 0.78 (0.00) (-) 0.72 (0.00) (-) 0.77 (0.00) lag (3,0,0,2) (1,0,0,0) (1,1,0,2) (4,0,0,0) (4,0,0,0) (1,1,0,0) (2,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) (6,0,0,0) (3,0,0,0) f-s 19.90* 48.28* 52.43* 65.15* 58.07* 156.76* 5.33* 8.06* 6.31* 6.07* 4.07 4.11* sectors imports long-run exports long-run a’ b’ c’ a’ b’ c’ d’ e’ f’ d’ e’ f’ 1 pos 3.92 (0.04) (-) 4.85 (0.28) (-) 2.13 (0.29) (-) 0.71 (0.55) 0.57 (0.52) 1.50 (0.04) 4.55 (0.00) (-) 1.53 (0.65) (-) 1.13 (0.03) 2.27 (0.03) (-) 2.92 (0.50) (-) 0.80 (0.01) neg (-) 2.54 (0.18) (-) 3.26 (0.32) (-) 4.30 (0.03) (-) 1.54 (0.00) (-) 1.42 (0.03) 0.66 (0.54) 3.37 (0.00) (-) 2.33 (0.49) (-) 1.50 (0.01) 1.31 (0.04) (-) 1.81 (0.50) (-) 0.65 (0.04) r (-) 2.36 (0.00) (-) 2.60 (0.04) (-) 1.11 (0.11) (-) 1.41 (0.00) (-) 0.84 (0.03) (-) 0.87 (0.02) 3.41 (0.64) (-) 1.54 (0.44) (-) 3.73 (0.08) (-) 1.45 (0.20) 0.83 (0.62) (-) 0.65 (0.07) asym 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 lm 0.27 0.25 0.21 0.29 0.13 0.16 0.22 0.63 0.24 0.94 0.53 0.16 jb 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 0.43 0.19 0.01 0.14 0.99 0.43 ram 0.23 0.2 0.17 0.98 0.91 0.98 0.15 0 0 0.16 0.75 0.08 csmsq s s s s s s s s s s s s www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 138 published by scholink inc. 2 pos 1.88 (0.02) 2.63 (0.01) (-) 1.18 (0.00) (-) 4.04 (0.43) 4.66 (0.72) (-) 2.88 (0.30) (-) 3.35 (0.00) 3.71 (0.18) 1.25 (0.05) 4.07 (0.11) 3.86 (0.39) 2.92 (0.04) neg 3.17 (0.00) 1.41 (0.01) (-) 1.17 (0.00) (-) 3.26 (0.40) 2.58 (0.73) (-) 1.74 (0.39) (-) 2.43 (0.02) 3.83 (0.01) 1.69 (0.01) 4.76 (0.02) 3.34 (0.27) 3.02 (0.03) r (-) 0.59 (0.15) (-) 0.71 (0.10) (-) 1.23 (0.05) 0.70 (0.32) (-) 0.17 (0.84) (-) 1.18 (0.33) 1.34 (0.61) 0.05 (0.97) (-) 0.75 (0.70) (-) 1.90 (0.51) 0.74 (0.67) 1.84 (0.35) asym 0.09 0.35 0.53 0.79 0.14 0.79 0.02 0.08 0.21 0.22 0.54 0.00 lm 0.76 0.19 0.09 0.88 0.3 0.38 0.67 0.79 0.74 0.76 0.99 0.81 jb 0.51 0.4 0.27 0 0.01 0.01 0.98 0.62 0.91 0.07 0 0.39 ram 0.92 0.19 0.39 0.23 0.85 0.36 0.39 0.24 0.14 0.61 0.47 0.46 csmsq s s s s u s s s s s s s 3 pos 2.18 (0.00) 2.09 (0.21) 0.51 (0.03) (-) 4.39 (0.00) (-) 3.86 (0.29) 0.38 (0.76) 3.68 (0.00) (-) 4.93 (0.08) (-) 3.81 (0.04) (-) 3.03 (0.03) (-) 4.03 (0.41) (-) 3.45 (0.03) neg (-) 0.20 (0.05) (-) 2.66 (0.03) 1.61 (0.00) (-) 0.04 (0.95) (-) 3.64 (0.39) 3.99 (0.00) 3.60 (0.00) (-) 3.69 (0.00) (-) 2.93 (0.13) (-) 1.59 (0.06) (-) 3.32 (0.57) (-) 2.93 (0.01) r 0.08 (0.13) 0.25 (0.04) (-) 0.03 (0.67) 0.37 (0.39) 0.53 (0.45) (-) 0.10 (0.79) (-) 7.53 (0.00) (-) 4.07 (0.12) (-) 0.27 (0.91) 0.43 (0.85) (-) 0.72 (0.78) 0.57 (0.67) asym 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.24 0.01 0.04 0.63 0.03 lm 0.09 0.17 0.92 0.51 0.15 0.91 0.73 0.74 0.24 0.45 0.83 0.93 jb 0.63 0.54 0.94 0.62 0.87 0.39 0 0 0.09 0 0 0 ram 0.18 0.91 0.22 0.17 0.26 0.22 0.38 0.73 0.65 0.18 0.2 0.67 csmsq u s s s s s u s s s s s 4 pos 0.81 (0.87) 1.68 (0.81) 2.47 (0.48) (-) 0.07 (0.63) 1.55 (0.01) 0.82 (0.01) 1.01 (0.32) (-) 3.20 (0.04) (-) 3.02 (0.00) 1.23 (0.00) (-) 3.17 (0.00) 2.28 (0.00) neg 4.15 (0.60) 1.31 (0.78) 2.91 (0.43) (-) 0.06 (0.58) 0.91 (0.01) 0.52 (0.13) 2.56 (0.02) (-) 1.28 (0.34) (-) 2.78 (0.01) 0.63 (0.00) (-) 1.72 (0.00) 1.11 (0.16) r (-) 4.47 (0.70) 1.91 (0.75) (-) 4.40 (0.68) 2.39 (0.03) 0.27 (0.58) 0.40 (0.59) 1.77 (0.03) 1.33 (0.47) 0.84 (0.06) 3.19 (0.00) 0.41 (0.19) 0.49 (0.30) asym 0.13 0.87 0.50 0.48 0.46 0.83 0.95 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 lm 0.36 0.7 0.85 0.6 0.29 0.35 0.23 0.72 0.96 0.46 0.18 0.99 jb 0.46 0.71 0.83 0.66 0.53 0.00 0.34 0.12 0.43 0 0 0 ram 0.36 0.31 0.07 0.04 0.21 0.25 0.63 0.85 0.18 0.29 0.81 0.19 csmsq s s s s s s s s u s s s 5 pos (-) 3.57 (0.13) (-) 3.33 (0.74) 2.07 (0.67) 4.87 (0.65) (-) 2.94 (0.94) (-) 2.83 (0.75) 1.91 (0.46) 1.27 (0.90) 3.50 (0.47) 1.66 (0.01) 1.46 (0.70) 3.56 (0.23) neg (-) 3.94 2.01 (0.78) 2.47 (0.62) 4.64 (0.61) 3.16 (0.92) (-) 2.46 2.68 (0.46) 0.76 (0.89) 3.83 (0.47) 1.08 (0.02) 1.11 (0.74) 3.95 (0.23) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 139 published by scholink inc. (0.03) (0.78) r 5.24 (0.40) (-) 1.00 (0.90) 4.70 (0.47) (-) 3.57 (0.85) (-) 1.47 (0.86) 3.22 (0.89) (-) 0.55 (0.84) (-) 0.22 (0.94) (-) 0.85 (0.78) 0.08 (0.95) 0.05 (0.98) (-) 0.35 (0.85) asym 0.00 0.78 0.16 0.52 0.79 0.58 0.22 0.16 0.08 0.03 0.35 0.01 lm 0.8 0.84 0.87 0.45 0.55 0.56 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.47 0.34 0.27 jb 0.68 0.89 0.84 0.82 0.91 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.58 0 0 ram 0.31 0.43 0.45 0.11 0.56 0.12 0.19 0.11 0.09 0.44 0.22 0.71 csmsq s s s s s s s s s s s s 6 pos 2.67 (0.00) (-) 3.94 (0.40) 3.90 (0.03) (-) 3.55 (0.03) (-) 4.17 (0.21) (-) 2.22 (0.11) (-) 4.26 (0.03) (-) 3.39 (0.51) (-) 1.47 (0.03) (-) 0.26 (0.95) (-) 1.01 (0.89) 2.08 (0.72) neg 4.61 (0.00) (-) 2.75 (0.64) 3.44 (0.03) (-) 1.63 (0.03) (-) 3.86 (0.23) (-) 2.73 (0.01) 0.91 (0.66) (-) 2.47 (0.59) (-) 1.32 (0.07) 1.38 (0.56) 2.03 (0.75) (-) 0.08 (0.99) r 2.58 (0.32) 2.04 (0.29) 3.42 (0.27) 0.33 (0.97) (-) 3.61 (0.68) (-) 0.99 (0.85) 0.62 (0.00) (-) 0.09 (0.02) 0.01 (0.45) 0.06 (0.62) 0.30 (0.11) (-) 0.04 (0.51) asym 0.01 0.62 0.04 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.02 0.00 lm 0.33 0.26 0.93 0.96 0.58 0.46 0.17 0.09 0.95 0.11 0.11 0.48 jb 0.32 0.12 0.56 0 0 0 0.55 0.57 0.34 0.71 0.68 0.91 ram 0.11 0.8 0.15 0.11 0.65 0.82 0.41 0.39 0.26 0.37 0.36 0.11 csmsq s s s s u s s s s s s s 7 pos 2.96 (0.01) 3.97 (0.24) (-) 1.36 (0.24) 1.18 (0.00) (-) 4.65 (0.04) (-) 1.52 (0.02) 3.34 (0.00) 1.41 (0.37) (-) 1.40 (0.00) (-) 3.87 (0.00) (-) 0.99 (0.70) (-) 0.76 (0.03) neg (-) 1.15 (0.54) 2.98 (0.43) (-) 2.33 (0.03) 0.90 (0.00) (-) 2.69 (0.29) (-) 0.91 (0.04) (-) 0.87 (0.03) 3.11 (0.06) (-) 1.22 (0.00) (-) 1.98 (0.00) (-) 1.16 (0.67) (-) 1.01 (0.02) r (-) 0.84 (0.08) (-) 0.26 (0.63) (-) 1.04 (0.37) 0.29 (0.01) 0.17 (0.64) 0.66 (0.72) 3.12 (0.00) 2.68 (0.00) 2.51 (0.00) (-) 0.93 (0.49) 0.81 (0.35) 0.67 (0.24) asym 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.86 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.40 0.04 lm 0.32 0.46 0.30 0.88 0.72 0.12 0.22 0.33 0.08 0.97 0.46 0.29 jb 0.99 0.75 0.06 0.98 0.75 0.92 0 0 0.04 0.13 0 0 ram 0.81 0.8 0.19 0.34 0.78 0.29 0.06 0.03 0.24 0.69 0.40 0.49 csmsq s s s s s s u s s s s s 8 pos 3.21 (0.17) (-) 4.19 (0.05) (-) 3.36 (0.03) 3.43 (0.07) 2.65 (0.55) 1.59 (0.20) (-) 2.98 (0.04) (-) 3.91 (0.73) 4.35 (0.04) 2.15 (0.67) 2.82 (0.90) 2.06 (0.74) neg 2.84 (0.04) (-) 1.10 (0.47) (-) 3.41 (0.07) 2.85 (0.09) 0.32 (0.91) 2.21 (0.01) (-) 2.83 (0.05) 0.61 (0.95) 4.55 (0.01) 3.16 (0.37) 5.12 (0.79) 0.47 (0.94) r (-) 0.76 (0.55) 0.77 (0.02) (-) 1.10 (0.56) (-) 0.61 (0.51) (-) 1.56 (0.38) 1.72 (0.48) 5.00 (0.02) 3.98 (0.14) 3.84 (0.08) 0.53 (0.00) (-) 0.02 (0.96) (-) 0.04 (0.78) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 140 published by scholink inc. asym 0.50 0.48 0.30 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 lm 0.08 0.05 0.34 0.67 0.61 0.38 0.1 0.07 0.12 0.67 0.51 0.78 jb 0.51 0.38 0.55 0.93 0.29 0.53 0 0 0 0 0 0 ram 0.24 0.39 0.54 0.1 0.22 0.14 0.19 0.58 0.89 0.83 0.74 0.99 csmsq s s s s s s u u s s s s 9 pos 4.43 (0.04) (-) 4.76 (0.05) 3.17 (0.03) (-) 0.27 (0.56) (-) 0.78 (0.80) 0.96 (0.23) (-) 1.23 (0.01) (-) 2.41 (0.00) (-) 2.67 (0.00) (-) 2.72 (0.00) 3.89 (0.17) (-) 2.92 (0.00) neg 4.89 (0.01) (-) 4.08 (0.09) 2.98 (0.05) 0.82 (0.00) 0.86 (0.59) (-) 1.88 (0.00) 1.09 (0.05) (-) 1.57 (0.01) (-) 2.28 (0.00) (-) 1.61 (0.00) 3.83 (0.19) (-) 2.80 (0.00) r (-) 4.32 (0.00) (-) 1.34 (0.32) (-) 1.99 (0.09) 2.35 (0.00) 1.29 (0.13) 1.49 (0.18) 0.93 (0.00) 1.85 (0.04) 2.93 (0.00) (-) 0.59 (0.52) 1.42 (0.04) 1.13 (0.09) asym 0.02 0.28 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.01 lm 0.19 0.39 0.13 0.39 0.15 0.12 0.91 0.78 0.67 0.13 0.28 0.1 jb 0 0 0.85 0.67 0.87 0.82 0 0 0 0.09 0.03 0.09 ram 0.48 0.9 0.17 0.73 0.79 0.32 0.07 0.44 0.28 0.68 0.60 0.85 csmsq s s s s s s s s s s s s 10 pos 2.41 (0.07) (-) 2.64 (0.42) (-) 0.94 (0.07) 1.49 (0.00) (-) 2.40 (0.00) (-) 0.89 (0.00) (-) 1.43 (0.67) (-) 2.25 (0.71) (-) 2.55 (0.00) 1.40 (0.66) 0.57 (0.94) (-) 2.83 (0.00) neg 2.64 (0.03) (-) 4.52 (0.16) 0.63 (0.04) 0.56 (0.00) (-) 2.85 (0.00) (-) 1.25 (0.00) (-) 0.77 (0.88) (-) 1.82 (0.79) (-) 2.98 (0.00) 0.77 (0.72) 0.99 (0.89) (-) 3.04 (0.00) r (-) 2.61 (0.09) (-) 2.53 (0.03) 0.86 (0.02) (-) 1.14 (0.01) (-) 0.41 (0.11) (-) 2.58 (0.00) (-) 1.53 (0.57) (-) 1.72 (0.59) (-) 1.15 (0.78) 0.01 (0.90) 0.01 (0.85) (-) 0.04 (0.35) asym 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.11 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.01 lm 0.62 0.34 0.93 0.87 0.29 0.57 0.12 0.71 0.91 0.76 0.03 0.18 jb 0.92 0.8 0.65 0.79 0.94 0.97 0.93 0.29 0.12 0.82 0.22 0.74 ram 0.68 0.04 0.95 0.63 0.34 0.63 0.52 0.28 0.11 0.47 0.21 0.66 csmsq u u u s s s s s s s s s 11 pos 3.20 (0.00) 4.91 (0.20) 3.29 (0.00) 2.47 (0.02) (-) 1.08 (0.91) 1.93 (0.15) 1.47 (0.09) (-) 2.16 (0.60) (-) 2.48 (0.00) (-) 1.42 (0.02) (-) 3.88 (0.49) (-) 1.27 (0.01) neg (-) 2.73 (0.00) (-) 5.09 (0.14) 3.88 (0.00) 1.03 (0.41) (-) 4.94 (0.52) 2.58 (0.04) 1.82 (0.03) (-) 4.02 (0.25) (-) 1.83 (0.00) (-) 0.48 (0.42) (-) 3.36 (0.58) (-) 1.29 (0.04) r (-) 1.44 (0.04) (-) 1.65 (0.09) 0.74 (0.30) (-) 0.22 (0.87) (-) 2.15 (0.29) 0.51 (0.00) 5.06 (0.01) 4.26 (0.12) 4.35 (0.00) 1.04 (0.00) 1.07 (0.49) 1.62 (0.04) asym 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.04 lm 0.34 0.22 0.83 0.18 0.21 0.82 0.06 0 0.08 0.78 0.27 0.62 jb 0.64 0.44 0.56 0.57 0.48 0.2 0.05 0.01 0 0.1 0 0.06 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 141 published by scholink inc. ram 0.61 0.92 0.82 0.46 0.07 0.27 0.29 0.58 0.09 0.44 0.67 0.92 csmsq s s s s s s u u u s s s 12 pos 4.21 (0.13) (-) 4.22 (0.11) 4.11 (0.00) (-) 2.93 (0.00) 0.13 (0.97) 0.46 (0.58) (-) 1.21 (0.84) (-) 2.88 (0.67) (-) 1.20 (0.84) (-) 2.96 (0.71) (-) 0.75 (0.96) (-) 1.24 (0.94) neg 4.47 (0.11) (-) 4.80 (0.07) 3.17 (0.00) 0.11 (0.76) 4.79 (0.30) 1.65 (0.00) 1.28 (0.91) (-) 0.31 (0.93) (-) 3.56 (0.61) (-) 2.07 (0.67) 1.42 (0.92) 2.40 (0.87) r (-) 3.76 (0.17) (-) 1.62 (0.01) 1.06 (0.13) 0.01 (0.98) (-) 0.94 (0.41) 0.58 (0.66) 0.12 (0.71) 0.06 (0.37) (-) 0.11 (0.58) 0.06 (0.83) 0.09 (0.76) 0.16 (0.58) asym 0.28 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.02 lm 0.94 0.54 0.15 0.13 0.63 0.29 0.16 0 0.18 0.34 0.21 0.42 jb 0 0 0.43 0.67 0.43 0.73 0.21 0.05 0 0.61 0.74 0.65 ram 0.5 0.19 0.61 0.05 0.66 0.10 0.37 0.21 0.75 0.12 0.22 0.22 csmsq s u s s s s s s s s s s 13 pos (-) 3.12 (0.05) 3.93 (0.40) 3.67 (0.00) (-) 3.38 (0.00) 4.71 (0.86) 1.63 (0.00) 3.40 (0.22) (-) 1.88 (0.82) (-) 5.64 (0.07) (-) 2.01 (0.00) 2.48 (0.95) (-) 4.87 (0.00) neg 2.50 (0.24) 3.82 (0.39) 2.61 (0.00) 1.55 (0.60) 3.74 (0.95) 4.84 (0.00) 3.14 (0.16) 4.38 (0.59) (-) 3.57 (0.13) (-) 1.34 (0.00) 2.67 (0.91) (-) 4.08 (0.04) r 1.58 (0.20) (-) 0.65 (0.70) (-) 0.86 (0.11) (-) 1.72 (0.07) 0.47 (0.97) 1.63 (0.00) (-) 1.01 (0.83) 3.08 (0.06) 3.16 (0.02) 0.11 (0.88) (-) 1.35 (0.92) (-) 3.26 (0.00) asym 0.03 0.71 0.01 0.00 0.77 0.00 0.58 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.53 0.00 lm 0.88 0.4 0.81 0.92 0.62 0.82 0.12 0.62 0.07 0.2 0.07 0.57 jb 0.74 0.51 0.92 0.29 0.2 0.8 0.03 0.02 0.5 0.15 0.34 0.35 ram 0.48 0.72 0.8 0.45 0.91 0.9 0.72 0.83 0.32 0.19 0.14 0.07 csmsq s s s s s s u s s s s s 14 pos (-) 4.97 (0.63) (-) 4.14 (0.90) 2.93 (0.80) (-) 4.42 (0.34) 1.43 (0.79) (-) 2.22 (0.69) (-) 0.83 (0.85) 1.88 (0.36) (-) 2.35 (0.17) 1.23 (0.00) 4.45 (0.00) 3.52 (0.00) neg (-) 3.05 (0.03) 3.45 (0.80) 4.88 (0.73) (-) 2.01 (0.43) 2.68 (0.67) (-) 2.72 (0.67) (-) 0.75 (0.89) (-) 4.32 (0.02) (-) 2.88 (0.00) 1.33 (0.15) 4.63 (0.00) 3.40 (0.00) r (-) 4.02 (0.00) (-) 0.25 (0.99) 0.74 (0.97) 0.09 (0.56) 0.11 (0.36) 0.01 (0.90) 1.89 (0.63) (-) 0.19 (0.00) 2.21 (0.59) 0.02 (0.61) (-) 0.53 (0.00) 0.03 (0.52) asym 0.00 0.96 0.51 0.63 0.26 0.96 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 lm 0.5 0.46 0.71 0.34 0.77 0.18 0.5 0.11 0.22 0.71 0 0.93 jb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ram 0.1 0.1 0.44 0.75 0.31 0.46 0.22 0.06 0 0.06 0 0.1 csmsq s s s u u u s s s s s s 15 pos (-) 3.75 (-) 0.23 4.67 (0.00) 3.43 (0.63) 4.46 (0.30) 4.74 (0.03) (-) 3.31 1.19 (0.00) 1.32 (0.13) (-) 3.49 (-) 2.68 (-) 0.96 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 142 published by scholink inc. (0.68) (0.97) (0.00) (0.03) (0.73) (0.36) neg 1.84 (0.66) (-) 2.28 (0.62) 3.35 (0.00) 5.87 (0.24) 5.19 (0.02) (-) 1.47 (0.52) 1.90 (0.00) 0.92 (0.05) 1.75 (0.01) 2.00 (0.03) (-) 3.10 (0.70) 1.94 (0.01) r (-) 2.02 (0.55) (-) 1.34 (0.19) (-) 3.72 (0.23) 0.70 (0.00) 0.03 (0.73) (-) 5.79 (0.04) (-) 0.68 (0.00) 0.28 (0.28) (-) 2.43 (0.07) (-) 3.25 (0.06) (-) 0.15 (0.85) (-) 2.69 (0.02) asym 0.42 0.60 0.03 0.44 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 lm 0.65 0.68 0.89 0.22 0.25 0.38 0.26 0.24 0.64 0.19 0.67 0.45 jb 0.47 0.07 0.86 0 0 0 0.55 0.18 0.71 0.25 0.02 0.00 ram 0.82 0.55 0.87 0.01 0 0.08 0.52 0.64 0.98 0.22 0.32 0.06 csmsq s s s s s s s s s s s s 16 pos (-) 2.51 (0.00) (-) 0.42 (0.76) 2.96 (0.03) 0.04 (0.98) (-) 2.80 (0.73) 1.88 (0.22) 4.45 (0.10) 4.89 (0.52) (-) 3.11 (0.00) 3.60 (0.36) (-) 2.47 (0.90) 1.84 (0.55) neg (-) 0.48 (0.48) 3.06 (0.07) 4.54 (0.00) 2.17 (0.35) (-) 2.67 (0.73) 3.17 (0.04) 4.68 (0.08) 1.78 (0.72) (-) 3.07 (0.05) (-) 0.70 (0.71) 1.51 (0.95) 2.85 (0.03) r 2.08 (0.00) 1.81 (0.01) 2.94 (0.11) 1.62 (0.55) 0.02 (0.81) 2.19 (0.40) (-) 3.44 (0.22) (-) 2.96 (0.20) (-) 0.04 (0.25) (-) 0.16 (0.15) 0.10 (0.34) 0.17 (0.31) asym 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.93 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 lm 0.99 0.83 0.96 0.56 0.75 0.94 0.69 0.12 0.98 0.12 0.57 0.54 jb 0 0 0 0.09 0 0 0 0 0.78 0 0 0 ram 0.01 0.07 0.26 0.24 0.35 0.13 0.76 0.24 0.94 0.06 0.05 0.06 csmsq s s s s s s s s s u s s 17 pos 3.93 (0.03) (-) 4.88 (0.16) (-) 1.86 (0.06) (-) 4.81 (0.08) (-) 3.89 (0.65) 4.26 (0.01) (-) 2.83 (0.30) 5.25 (0.59) 3.01 (0.68) (-) 5.83 (0.07) 2.97 (0.13) 3.58 (0.03) neg 3.60 (0.00) (-) 3.30 (0.49) (-) 1.61 (0.04) (-) 2.69 (0.12) (-) 4.47 (0.58) 4.04 (0.02) (-) 2.09 (0.54) 0.68 (0.94) 2.14 (0.76) (-) 4.54 (0.05) 2.14 (0.31) 2.73 (0.09) r (-) 4.59 (0.00) (-) 3.27 (0.08) (-) 0.38 (0.44) 0.12 (0.15) 0.03 (0.84) (-) 0.03 (0.78) 5.48 (0.56) 2.76 (0.64) 1.31 (0.87) 4.99 (0.20) (-) 5.87 (0.11) (-) 5.81 (0.21) asym 0.09 0.20 0.61 0.06 0.39 0.31 0.70 0.83 0.76 0.19 0.11 0.59 lm 0.62 0.05 0.11 0.29 0.24 0.19 0.4 0.31 0.94 0.88 0.62 0.54 jb 0.61 0.61 0.79 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.02 ram 0.63 0.96 0.31 0 0 0 0.56 0.53 0.82 0.49 0 0.01 csmsq u u s s s s u s s u s u 18 pos 3.55 (0.04) (-) 3.99 (0.58) 0.43 (0.59) (-) 2.56 (0.04) (-) 0.98 (0.74) (-) 2.22 (0.00) 1.28 (0.04) 3.90 (0.00) 1.47 (0.03) (-) 3.70 (0.00) 3.70 (0.32) (-) 2.39 (0.01) neg (-) 2.24 (0.05) 3.22 (0.74) 2.72 (0.00) 0.42 (0.70) 3.73 (0.29) 2.26 (0.03) (-) 1.17 (0.00) (-) 1.92 (0.04) 1.26 (0.00) 2.61 (0.02) 4.19 (0.03) (-) 0.66 (0.41) www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 143 published by scholink inc. r 0.22 (0.89) 0.50 (0.89) 3.39 (0.02) 2.16 (0.22) 1.09 (0.55) 4.10 (0.00) 0.16 (0.57) 0.81 (0.00) 0.37 (0.00) (-) 0.43 (0.73) 0.26 (0.69) (-) 1.26 (0.24) asym 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 lm 0.52 0.39 0.29 0.12 0 0.38 0.82 0.61 0.14 0.33 0.33 0.18 jb 0 0 0.02 0.02 0 0.23 0 0.16 0.9 0.85 0.97 0.66 ram 0.48 0.34 0.9 0.88 0.02 0.93 0.55 0.1 0.88 0.12 0.41 0.1 csmsq s s s s s s s s s s s s 19 pos (-) 1.78 (0.62) (-) 3.09 (0.57) 0.29 (0.87) (-) 3.54 (0.00) (-) 4.32 (0.51) 2.39 (0.00) 3.44 (0.00) (-) 3.21 (0.01) 1.78 (0.00) (-) 1.34 (0.12) (-) 3.04 (0.84) 3.84 (0.01) neg 2.47 (0.29) 1.24 (0.74) (-) 2.01 (0.04) (-) 1.45 (0.16) 1.79 (0.56) (-) 2.59 (0.00) (-) 1.85 (0.00) 1.92 (0.00) 3.45 (0.00) (-)2.67 (0.00) 3.53 (0.73) 1.87 (0.04) r 1.35 (0.60) 1.75 (0.31) 0.43 (0.84) 2.09 (0.02) 1.13 (0.17) (-) 0.20 (0.45) 2.79 (0.00) 1.89 (0.00) 4.94 (0.00) (-) 0.66 (0.38) 4.12 (0.36) 3.70 (0.14) asym 0.39 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 lm 0 0.47 0.16 0.46 0.1 0.34 0.83 0.68 0.19 0.13 0.31 0.33 jb 0 0 0 0.58 0.46 0.53 0.04 0 0 0.85 0.75 0.71 ram 0.09 0.08 0.23 0.07 0.57 0.25 0.72 0.13 0.3 0.96 0.65 0.83 csmsq s s u s s s s s s s s s 20 pos (-) 1.52 (0.06) 4.84 (0.03) (-) 0.24 (0.44) (-) 5.09 (0.01) (-) 0.62 (0.87) (-) 4.92 (0.01) (-) 0.59 (0.04) 3.81 (0.10) 0.65 (0.07) 2.23 (0.07) 3.35 (0.60) 3.28 (0.03) neg (-) 2.49 (0.05) 4.31 (0.03) 0.94 (0.04) (-) 4.85 (0.00) 5.85 (0.03) (-) 3.94 (0.12) (-) 1.20 (0.00) (-) 2.61 (0.03) 0.63 (0.00) 2.95 (0.00) 4.14 (0.34) 3.66 (0.04) r 0.33 (0.45) 0.56 (0.00) 0.09 (0.94) (-) 3.15 (0.01) 2.48 (0.11) 0.24 (0.91) (-) 0.93 (0.00) 0.16 (0.64) (-) 1.79 (0.00) 0.39 (0.00) (-) 1.62 (0.49) (-) 3.10 (0.06) asym 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.09 0.45 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 lm 0.15 0.2 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.33 0.5 0.99 0.55 0.28 0.91 0.22 jb 0 0 0.01 0 0 0.06 0.49 0.86 0.80 0.87 0.80 0.40 ram 0.17 0.15 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.27 0.61 0.95 0.59 0.71 0.22 0.64 csmsq s s s u s u s s s s s s 21 pos 3.57 (0.05) 1.68 (0.77) 1.10 (0.02) (-)4.30 (0.00) 2.38 (0.06) 2.07 (0.22) (-) 3.72 (0.26) (-) 4.28 (0.66) (-) 1.53 (0.00) (-) 1.19 (0.04) 0.26 (0.97) (-) 3.10 (0.23) neg 4.26 (0.04) 2.69 (0.39) 3.21 (0.00) (-) 2.18 (0.00) 5.55 (0.01) 3.37 (0.03) 4.04 (0.00) (-) 2.92 (0.77) 3.58 (0.00) (-) 1.16 (0.00) 2.50 (0.79) (-) 1.98 (0.02) r (-) 2.27 (0.01) (-) 2.23 (0.06) (-) 0.75 (0.07) (-) 0.01 (0.97) 1.02 (0.05) 4.68 (0.00) (-) 0.85 (0.75) 6.70 (0.00) 5.63 (0.00) 3.59 (0.00) 3.02 (0.53) 1.36 (0.14) asym 0.00 0.61 0.04 0.00 0.63 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 144 published by scholink inc. lm 0 0 0.77 0.48 0.78 0.67 0.53 0.42 0.53 0.33 0.49 0.65 jb 0.7 0 0.77 0 0 0.94 0.62 0.48 0.71 0.97 0.8 0.77 ram 0 0 0.43 0.73 0.07 0.56 0.14 0.41 0.24 0.61 0.33 0.72 csmsq s s s s s s s s s s s s 22 pos 3.30 (0.03) 1.15 (0.03) 1.24 (0.02) 4.68 (0.02) 4.33 (0.02) 1.42 (0.00) 2.74 (0.33) 0.98 (0.95) 1.07 (0.05) 1.17 (0.33) 1.23 (0.83) 0.72 (0.64) neg 0.13 (0.87) (-) 0.76 (0.17) (-) 0.42 (0.49) (-) 0.26 (0.83) (-) 2.63 (0.06) 0.50 (0.34) 2.25 (0.44) (-) 2.56 (0.74) 0.39 (0.33) (-) 0.16 (0.79) (-) 1.92 (0.68) (-) 0.16 (0.93) r 1.18 (0.53) 3.77 (0.01) 3.74 (0.02) (-) 0.97 (0.65) (-) 0.29 (0.68) (-) 2.01 (0.28) (-) 2.56 (0.02) (-) 0.76 (0.79) (-) 1.09 (0.02) (-) 0.11 (0.01) (-) 0.16 (0.03) (-) 0.06 (0.22) asym 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 lm 0.57 0.97 0.49 0.14 0.66 0.64 0.92 0.2 0.11 0.54 0.89 0.57 jb 0 0 0 0.90 0.53 0.88 0 0 0 0.32 0.79 0.39 ram 0.34 0.17 0.89 0.12 0.60 0.43 0.41 0 0.18 0.78 0.71 0.58 csmsq s s s s s s s s s s s s 23 pos 0.09 (0.82) 3.29 (0.00) 1.09 (0.00) 0.71 (0.59) (-) 3.71 (0.01) (-) 1.53 (0.08) (-) 2.17 (0.00) (-) 4.21 (0.00) 1.78 (0.20) 1.85 (0.02) (-) 2.46 (0.63) 1.30 (0.02) neg (-) 1.20 (0.00) (-) 1.25 (0.29) 0.42 (0.13) (-) 1.74 (0.00) 5.05 (0.00) (-) 3.15 (0.00) 1.86 (0.01) 0.33 (0.73) 3.56 (0.00) (-) 0.53 (0.63) (-) 1.52 (0.71) (-) 0.58 (0.49) r (-) 0.54 (0.03) (-) 0.13 (0.57) (-) 0.58 (0.11) 2.12 (0.00) 0.90 (0.02) (-) 0.25 (0.62) 3.83 (0.00) 2.69 (0.00) 4.22 (0.00) (-) 0.62 (0.41) (-) 2.43 (0.24) 0.68 (0.51) asym 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 lm 0.02 0.44 0.19 0.62 0.67 0.53 0.51 0.82 0.67 0.48 0.44 0.34 jb 0.18 0.36 0.39 0.66 0.56 0.81 0 0 0 0.84 0.09 0.07 ram 0.68 0.47 0.86 0.4 0.07 0.73 0.72 0.96 0.87 0.08 0.07 0.28 csmsq s s s s s s s s s s s s 24 pos 2.58 (0.28) 2.07 (0.76) (-) 2.22 (0.00) 0.67 (0.00) 3.50 (0.44) 3.94 (0.00) (-) 2.54 (0.00) (-) 4.65 (0.02) (-) 3.35 (0.00) 1.40 (0.04) (-) 2.46 (0.62) (-) 3.02 (0.03) neg (-) 2.17 (0.00) 3.85 (0.58) (-) 1.31 (0.02) (-) 4.22 (0.00) 3.25 (0.68) 4.73 (0.00) (-) 2.06 (0.00) (-) 3.02 (0.16) (-) 2.73 (0.00) 1.11 (0.03) (-) 2.81 (0.56) (-) 2.89 (0.03) r (-) 2.67 (0.53) (-) 5.64 (0.00) (-) 4.14 (0.00) (-) 2.38 (0.00) (-) 0.18 (0.95) 1.29 (0.32) 0.59 (0.00) (-) 0.28 (0.46) (-) 0.50 (0.00) 4.46 (0.00) 4.05 (0.00) 3.63 (0.00) asym 0.04 0.88 0.00 0.08 0.85 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 lm 0.17 0.08 0.12 0.22 0.51 0.31 0.53 0.19 0.42 0.35 0.62 0.34 jb 0.2 0.52 0.22 0.71 0.76 0.69 0 0 0 0.42 0.35 0.46 ram 0.08 0.25 0.42 0.24 0.38 0.11 0.46 0.13 0.15 0.43 0.12 0.22 csmsq s u s s s s s s s s s s www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 2, 2019 145 published by scholink inc. 25 pos (-) 2.56 (0.00) 0.19 (0.82) 0.27 (0.65) 0.47 (0.78) 3.91 (0.25) (-) 0.32 (0.79) 1.60 (0.01) 3.42 (0.02) (-) 1.71 (0.02) (-) 1.89 (0.04) 2.54 (0.69) 1.02 (0.21) neg (-) 0.39 (0.55) 2.74 (0.01) (-) 1.89 (0.00) (-) 3.69 (0.00) 1.46 (0.68) (-) 2.81 (0.05) (-) 0.43 (0.16) (-) 2.97 (0.03) 1.59 (0.00) (-) 0.92 (0.28) 3.72 (0.38) 2.79 (0.03) r (-) 0.88 (0.41) (-) 1.71 (0.05) 0.58 (0.32) (-) 0.32 (0.76) 3.80 (0.36) (-) 0.56 (0.73) 0.53 (0.03) 1.26 (0.00) (-) 0.10 (0.82) 1.65 (0.31) 0.60 (0.00) 3.28 (0.19) asym 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 lm 0.12 0.64 0.25 0. 0.13 0.81 0.12 0.07 0.21 0.11 0.16 0.08 jb 0.66 0.41 0.32 0.49 0 0.20 0.74 0.57 0.77 0.04 0 0 ram 0.33 0.39 0.56 0.54 0.63 0.22 0.32 0.28 0.33 0.54 0.76 0.82 csmsq s s s s s s s s s s s s 26 pos 2.40 (0.10) (-) 2.90 (0.47) 2.01 (0.03) (-) 0.58 (0.07) 0.67 (0.56) 1.05 (0.00) (-) 1.09 (0.67) (-) 2.10 (0.83) (-) 0.94 (0.48) (-) 3.18 (0.02) (-) 4.57 (0.00) 1.13 (0.42) neg 3.04 (0.03) (-) 2.48 (0.35) 1.49 (0.14) (-) 0.83 (0.04) 1.07 (0.03) 1.16 (0.00) (-) 2.78 (0.44) (-) 3.46 (0.68) (-) 4.49 (0.00) 4.97 (0.00) 2.07 (0.25) 4.42 (0.00) r (-) 1.61 (0.04) (-) 0.82 (0.36) (-) 2.20 (0.00) (-) 1.52 (0.01) (-) 0.61 (0.12) (-) 0.40 (0.17) 2.79 (0.61) (-) 2.66 (0.78) (-) 3.15 (0.00) 5.03 (0.00) 4.84 (0.17) 4.27 (0.00) asym 0.04 0.96 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 lm 0.26 0.15 0.16 0.36 0.2 0.87 0.67 0.22 0.83 0.38 0.08 0.91 jb 0.51 0.54 0.21 0.83 0.51 0.74 0 0 0.11 0.77 0.76 0.97 ram 0.15 0.01 0.66 0.59 0.47 0.13 0.52 0.88 0.28 0.18 0.2 0.14 csmsq s s s s s s s s s s s s the letters « s » and « u » denote stable and unstable estimates of the cusumsq test. for the wald statistic or the f family statistic, the asterisk * signifies the existence of a co integration relationship; lm: breusch-godfrey serial correlation test is used to detect if the time series carry autocorrelation errors if the probability is less than 5%, it is concluded that there is autocorrelation of the residuals in the model; jb: “jarque-bera” test is a hypothesis test that verifies if the data follows a normal distribution (the null hypothesis); ramsey: the null hypothesis is a hypothesis postulating the model is well specified. the pss procedure differentiates between five cases depending on the presence of deterministic components in the model: the pss procedure is used based on cases 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively. i(0) lower bound i(1) upper bound confidence interval cas 1: (without constant and without trend) _ _ ______ cas 2: (with constant restriction and without 2.98 3.94 95% cas 3: (with constant and without trend) 3.40 4.62 95% cas 4: (with constant and with trend restriction) 3.69 4.58 95% cas 5: (with constant and with trend) 4.31 5.42 95% microsoft word ape-v5n2-p40 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 40 original paper turner’s frontier doctrine and its impact on american politics wenyu jiang1 & yixin mao1* 1 school of history and culture, china west normal university, nanchong, china * yixin mao, school of history and culture, china west normal university, nanchong, china fund program: nanchong social science research “fourteenth five-year plan” 2022 project. (project number: nc22c187) received: february 5, 2022 accepted: may 2, 2022 online published: may 5, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n2p40 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n2p40 abstract frederick jackson turner, a prominent american historian of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, published the significance of the frontier in american history in 1893, which received widespread attention after its publication, creating the frontier school, which dominated american history for more than four decades. turner’s “frontier doctrine” was informed by an expansionist ideology that profoundly influenced the governing philosophy of american dignitaries and the expansionist policies pursued by the united states. keywords frederick jackson turner, frontier doctrine, american politics, expansionism, governing philosophy frederick jackson turner (1861-1932) was a famous american historian who was born in portage, wisconsin. this was a place where indians and pioneers lived in mixed communities, and it was here that turner saw the pioneers make their fortunes on the american frontier. at the end of the 19th century, at the end of the westward movement, turner presented “the importance of the frontier in american history” at the annual meeting of the american association, in which, in a departure from the traditional view of american history, turner stressed the importance of the frontier and the westward movement, causing a great deal of reaction in american historiography and dominating it for more than 40 years. 1. context of frontier doctrine the frontier is a multifaceted, emotionally charged, and contested term in american socio-political discourse. (waechter, 2019, p. 12) in the late 18th century, the united states began a westward www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 41 published by scholink inc. movement of territorial expansion, with a steady flow of people from the east heading west. through the expansion of the westward movement, the united states gradually extended its territory to the pacific coast and the role of the “frontier” grew. the second industrial revolution led to a major increase in productivity in the united states, with marked advances in production methods and production technology. the expansion of territory and the increase in population in the west expanded the domestic market for the united states, and the increased production of crops not only provided for domestic use, but also more than half for export, contributing to the growth of the american economy. 1.1 westward movement at the end of the 18th century the united states embarked on a westward movement and continued to expand to the west. “through migration, settlement and development of the west, americans of many ethnicities formed a common economy in the west. ... until now, much of american history can be described as the history of the colonization of the great west.” (yang, 1984, p. 3) as can be seen, as a result of the westward movement, the united states continued to expand its territory. for the us economy, the growth of the western economy has led to an expansion of the domestic market. the west became an integral part of the united states as crops were grown in large numbers in the west and industries from the east began to move there. the development of the west drove the development of american society and had a profound impact not only on the politics and economy of the united states at the time, but also played a pivotal role in the development of american history as a whole. at the end of the westward movement at the end of the 19th century, the role of the west became increasingly important. the idea that the frontier contributed to the development of american history is also reordered in turner’s published article. the end of the westward movement led to a gradual decline in “terra nullius”, a phenomenon that created a certain amount of land anxiety in the united states. turner published his acclaimed essay. the importance of the frontier in american history at this time, which was a powerful response to social anxiety. turner’s frontier theory, with its emphasis on cheap western land and abundant economic opportunities, has captured the popular imagination more than any other comprehensive explanation of how the american national character was formed (ford, 1993, p. 156). as the us economy grew and the westward movement came to an end, the us needed a wider market and turner’s “frontier doctrine” met the needs of the us to expand abroad. so it was not only supported by the public, it was also given full play as a theoretical basis and a tool of public opinion for american foreign expansion. 1.2 the second industrial revolution in the 1870s and 1880s, the second industrial revolution was in full swing. it was marked by the invention and application of electricity and its rapid expansion into all areas of production. and the first and second industrial revolutions in the united states were almost linked, both of which gave the united states a leading position in terms of productivity and production technology. the us economy has also entered a period of rapid growth. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 42 published by scholink inc. during the course of the westward movement, the us government used coercive means such as forced purchase, bullying and war plunder. the united states took possession of the british and french colonies in america and a large amount of land in mexico. “in 1900, the united states produced 16.32 million tonnes of wheat, 23% of the world’s total, making it the largest wheat exporter; corn production was 68.58 million tonnes and cotton production was 2.17 million tonnes, most of both for export.” (chi wencen, 1998, p.14) the united states could not have achieved such proud success in western agriculture without the facilities brought about by the second industrial revolution. at the same time the boom in agricultural production led to the development and improvement of transport in the west. “in 1850 its railway line was already 9,021 miles long, making it the longest in the world.” (chi, 1998, p. 18) the development and improvement of transport has led to closer and closer contact between the east and west, a narrowing of the economic gap between the east and west and an increasingly rational division of labor between the east and west. in summary, it can be seen that the westward movement provided the conditions for the development of the frontier doctrine and that the second industrial revolution led to the economic development of the west. and this was a period of transition from american capitalism to imperialism, with a small domestic market and increased class tensions, and the need to explore overseas markets and sources of raw materials. faced with the realities and social tensions of the time, many scholars began to appreciate the importance of the “frontier”. 2. role of frontier doctrine in 1893, turner published the importance of the frontier to american history. in his article, he analyses the 1890 census and suggests that ‘the history of the united states is the history of frontier change’. in his article, turner suggests that “until now, much of american history can be said to be the history of the colonization of the great west.” (frederick, 1961, p. 34) in the following decades, turner published intermittent articles and monographs on the subject, resulting in a more systematic “frontier doctrine”. the three main claims are as follows. 2.1 frontier colonization for the improvement of american democracy the westward movement extended the boundaries of the united states to the pacific coast, and the expansion was conducive to the establishment and improvement of democratic politics. the development of the west provided economic support for the development of american democracy and contributed to its refinement. the concept of democratic politics was raised and the spirit of freedom and democracy became an integral part of the development of american society. turner argues that the frontier had an indelible influence on the formation of american democracy. “the most important influence of the frontier, however, was in the development of democracy in the united states and europe, and from the time the united states encouraged migration from the east to the west, the frontier has exerted a steady influence on democracy.” (frederick, 1961, p. 36) therefore, we can explore the impact of the frontier on american democracy in the following ways. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 43 published by scholink inc. firstly, the creation of new states in the west became the perfect place to experiment with democracy in the united states. the creation of new frontier states created opportunities for political experimentation, and the newly developed west was more receptive to democratic institutions than the entrenched ideas of the east. secondly, because of the expansion of the frontier, the population of the united states rose and many social realities ensued, all of which made building a democracy increasingly important. the newly created states on the frontier attracted immigrants from the east through the expansion of democratic rights, and the east needed to improve its democratic institutions in order to maintain their political supremacy. this is why turner suggests that the “frontier” is the birthplace of american democracy. 2.2 management of the frontier maintains the stability of the us federation after the establishment of the united states of america, the powers of the us federal government continued to expand. with the completion of the westward movement and the expansion of the frontier, the frontier increasingly needed the support of the federal government. turner argues that the frontier contributed to the increased power of the us federal government. firstly, the settlers to the west needed to acquire land from the indians. in one war after another, the indians were plundered of their lands and driven from their original homes. so the frontiersmen who colonized the west from the east needed the support of the federal government to drive the indians out through a series of wars. these have led to an increase in the status of the federal government. secondly, the rapid development of the west at that time could not have been achieved without the gradual improvement of the transport network. the industrial and agricultural products of the west need roads, railways and ships to get them out. the construction of a railway linking the east and west was not enough for the states alone, so it was necessary for the federal government to coordinate with the states and to allocate funds to help. in the process, the federal government not only gained in status, but also used state-to-state conflicts to nationalize the land. 2.3 frontier exploitation leads to cultural diversity across america turner encapsulates the frontier spirit of the american people. first and foremost is the spirit of courageous conquest and initiative. the colonists expanded and developed the western region with a courageous and enterprising spirit. self-reliance became a symbol of the frontier regions of the time. on the frontier, all the inhabitants of the frontier have to overcome the challenges of survival. they build houses using the most natural materials and try to survive in the face of the harsh and inhospitable conditions of the west. this spirit of self-reliance has driven the spirit of innovation and enriched the culture and character of the united states. the second is the individualism of the frontiersmen. the “frontier” represents freedom in the american mind, and when the frontier was first developed, it was less fettered by the union and the state. this is why turner believes that the frontier brings with it an identity that “highlights individualism and a love of freedom”. (frederick, 1961, p. 41) during this period, “freedom” was given high priority. because the legal and political institutions were not yet well established in the new frontier, the political www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 44 published by scholink inc. constraints of the east had less impact on the new frontier. to this day, americans will refer to the “frontier” as a symbol of freedom and democracy. the end of the westward movement saw the disappearance of “terra nullius”. the rapid expansion of the united states stopped, and the surging waves of immigration subsided. but the “frontier” spirit to which turner referred became a hallmark of the american nation, inspiring americans to be challenging, aggressive, optimistic and courageous. 3. impact of frontier doctrine turner was the founder of the frontier school, and his “frontier doctrine” has been a key part of american history and has influenced the philosophy of american politicians. in particular, the expansionist ideas underlying turner’s “frontier doctrine” continued to influence us foreign policy. the frontier doctrine had a profound impact on american politicians and was shared by the american public, which in turn influenced the formulation and implementation of american political policy. 3.1 turner’s “frontier doctrine” contributed to the improvement of american democracy in on american democracy, the american historian alexis de tocqueville put forward the “american exceptionalism”, highlighting the advantages of american democracy as distinct from that of europe and emphasizing the spirit of american liberal democracy. the introduction of the turnerian frontier theory added new evidence to the exceptionalism theory. the american historian john higham has said, “the turner doctrine...wants historians to turn their attention...to the search for the meaning of american history in the activities of ordinary civilians.” (hurtado, 2012, p. 17) it emphasizes that the history of american colonization has created the spirit of american freedom and democracy. turner also suggests that “democracy learned to deal with huge problems in the west, whereas the old historical democracy could only be implemented in small countries under primitive economic conditions.” (frederick jackson turner, 1961, p. 90) the opening up of the frontier created the opportunity to improve the democratic system. 3.2 the influence of turner’s “frontier doctrine” on the american public and american dignitaries turner’s “frontier doctrine” was supported by public opinion at the time and had a profound impact on many american dignitaries. the spirit of the frontier is one of challenge, courage and fear. this spirit represents the american nation. and many literary works and films have been produced to promote this ‘frontier’ spirit through the media such as newspapers, radio and film. as a result, the concept of the ‘frontier’ was embraced by a large number of americans. the “frontier” became a synonym for american civilization. turner’s frontier theory was adapted to the context of american development and was well received by the american public. the “frontier doctrine” has been widely welcomed since its inception. so much so that the american public “accepted his doctrine as soon as they read the newspapers”. (hayes, 1946, p. 207) and successive us presidents would draw directly on turner’s theories in their political mobilizations and in their political campaigns. this rapidly transformed turner’s theory of the frontier www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 45 published by scholink inc. from an academic theoretical discourse to a political one. us president theodore roosevelt had a close association with turner and the scholars of the frontier school. he had a very strong interest in frontier theory. while he was still a historian, turner published the importance of the frontier in american history. his approval of turner’s theory of the frontier can be seen in his praise of turner for ‘summarizing a large body of ideas that have long been in vogue in a haphazard manner’. when he became president, he also had historians who supported the frontier doctrine on his unofficial staff, advising on policies, especially foreign policy. in a state of the union address he borrowed directly from turner’s frontier doctrine “to use economic and military power to extend america’s frontier westward into the chinese interior.” (roosevelt, 2018, p. 45) turner’s theories had a profound impact on both the political theory and political policy of us president woodrow wilson. in his later years, he admitted that his interpretation of american history “all came from turner’s mind”. wilson had been a student of turner’s and was influenced by turner’s theories in the course of his explorations. from the later direction of wilson’s research, prior to 1893, wilson’s doctoral thesis was the congressional system of government: a study of american politics, that focus on political figures and governments. after that it was all about american history and american democracy. these views were influenced by elements of turner’s theory such as the relationship between the frontier and democracy. in his article published in 1893, turner suggested that the 1890 census report revealed the growing scarcity of unclaimed land after the general end of the westward movement, so the united states needed to find new frontiers to sustain economic and political development. in addition, turner argued that “the flourishing of democracy depends on society providing sufficient economic opportunities for each individual”. (frederick, 1961, p. 23) this idea is also reflected in wilson’s fourteen point plan. during his time in office, he worked for the development of american democracy and established good order in american foreign trade. turner, as mentioned above, emphasizes the importance of economic opportunity and economic development. this also had a strong influence on the new deal introduced by franklin roosevelt. turner’s idea of america’s frontier disappearing (referring to the diminishing amount of terra nullius in the united states) was the basis for the implementation of the national industrial recovery act in roosevelt’s new deal. as american socio-economic and foreign trade developed, roosevelt increasingly endorsed turner’s frontier theory. as a result, turner’s theories were reflected in the political policies designated by the roosevelt administration. based on the westward movement, a national group movement, turner emphasizes the role of the people. turner proposes that the “frontier” is good for the development of american democracy and government. it is because this doctrine has a high degree of acceptance among the public that it has been invoked by almost several subsequent us presidents in their election campaigns. wilson included turner’s description of the spirit of the west in his presidential campaign speech, a speech that garnered him broad popular support. after world war ii, turner’s theories declined in stature in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 46 published by scholink inc. historiography, but had a profound impact on american politics. 3.3 the influence of turner’s “frontier doctrine” on american expansionist policy the history of territorial expansion in the united states shows that expansionist policies have been consistently implemented. when the united states first became independent the territory was only 13 states in size. after british recognition of american independence, the territory of the united states was only 30 per cent of what is now the united states. the united states expanded its territory to three times its previous size in just over a hundred years through the seizure of colonies from european countries and the westward movement. but as the westward movement largely came to an end, with less and less “terra nullius” and the frontier lines disappearing, america’s land anxiety grew. in 1893 turner proposed an answer to this question-expansion. in relation to expansion, turner argues that “for nearly three centuries, expansion has dominated american life. ... all this suggests that the campaign will continue.” (yang, 1983, p. 68) it can be seen that expansionist policies have been one of the fundamental laws of the past, present and future development of the united states. the transition of american capitalism to imperialism after the second industrial revolution required a broader market. turner’s frontier doctrine was adapted to the social circumstances and governmental needs of the united states at the time and provided the theoretical basis for the expansionist policies of the united states. theodore roosevelt is famous for his expansionist activities and expansionist rhetoric. he once said, “i am an expansionist, ... and i cannot fathom ... being anything other than an expansionist.” (roosevelt, 2018, p. 46) so he subscribes to turner’s theory of expansion. after the westward movement, the united states had taken control of the resources of the west at home to promote its further development. that is why the focus should be on the far east after the 20th century, to participate in the world politics of the pacific. after occupying hawaii, the philippines and guam, the us set its next target on china. prior to the spanish-american war, the united states and china were more of a commercial affair. at a time when china could provide the united states with a vast overseas market and source of raw materials, the united states began to orient its expansion towards china. by the time, the united states began to realise the importance of china, the western powers were already dividing it up. the united states developed an “open door” strategy in the context of the situation. through this policy, the united states could divide the benefits of china with other powers on an equal opportunity basis. this policy was formulated with the aim of bringing greater benefits to the united states and was fully consistent with the expansionist policies of the united states. the implementation of the “open door” policy was a new beginning of american aggression against china and a “milestone” in the expansion of the united states in the pacific. and after the next president, william h. taft, came to power, he continued his expansionist policy and introduced the golden dollar foreign policy. he proposed “gold dollars instead of bullets” and an economic policy instead of a military one for the expansion of china and the caribbean. the golden dollar policy was more effective in meeting the diplomatic needs of the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 47 published by scholink inc. expanding united states, and opened up overseas markets for the rapid growth of the american economy. these policies are in line with turner’s statement that “the flourishing of democracy depends on society providing adequate economic opportunities for each individual.” (frederick jackson turner, 1961, p. 64) turner suggests that the decline in terra nullius created land anxiety in the united states, and that this land anxiety then prompted the united states to explore new frontiers. the united states thus began to develop a policy of overseas expansion, and wilson agreed that the issue of land anxiety was an opportunity for the united states to strengthen its global expansion and begin to set its ambitions on the world. after world war i, wilson proposed the fourteen-point plan in his speech to congress. in the fourteen point plan, wilson demonstrated his ambition for world domination. he proposed the creation of the versailles system with the united states at its center. the fourteen points plan was also the basis for the formation of the versailles system. this plan was also based on expansionist policies and had far-reaching implications for the future political landscape of the world. the turnerian frontier doctrine promotes expansionist views and highlights the importance of economics to democracy. in wilson’s fourteen-point plan, economic policies such as the elimination of economic barriers were formulated. these political and economic policies embody turner’s theories. turner’s expansionism was reflected in all the foreign policies formulated by the wilson administration. wilson has been described as “the true archetype of the turnerian democrat who pays his way”. (cronon, 1987, p. 169) wilson’s foreign policy was also known as “classic turneries”. after the second world war, turner’s frontier doctrine declined in stature in american historiography. but it continues to have a profound influence on american politics, providing a theoretical reference for foreign policy in the post-world war ii period. the truman doctrine supposedly says that “the security and happiness of the united states depend on the continued fulfillment of america’s unique mission to defend and extend ‘the frontiers of democracy throughout the world’.” (ding, 1980, p. 23) this suggests a view of the us-led capitalist camp in the two-tier cold war landscape as the us frontier. militarily, the us united with europe and other countries to promote the us and european countries as an atlantic community and to establish the north atlantic treaty organization, at the same time the marshall plan was implemented economically. after the second world war, europe suffered heavy losses as the main theatre of war. the united states gives economic support to european countries. the marshall plan met the us need to control europe, confront the soviet union and maintain hegemony. the expansionist perspective of turner’s theory has had a continuing influence on american politics in the light of the post-world war ii policy of establishing a capitalist camp and pursuing an expansionist political, economic and military approach in the united states. in the 1960s, john f. kennedy proposed a new frontier policy. the name gives a sense of kennedy’s identification with frontier theory and expansionist policies. in his campaign speech, jfk affirmed the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 48 published by scholink inc. fourteen point plan implemented by wilson after world war i and the political policies implemented by roosevelt in world war ii. he also proposed that the united states should continue its policy of expansion at the time and continue to open up new frontiers. kennedy once said, “i call on all of you to go and be pioneers of the new frontier.” (reeves, 1994, p. 24) kennedy’s foreign policy continued an expansionist foreign policy, consolidating the capitalist camp and maintaining a strategy of hegemony. after the end of the cold war, the united states has placed greater emphasis on the reorientation of its strategy in the asia-pacific region based on its consideration of global strategic interests. the strategy of offshore checks and balances began with the bush administration. bush jr. began pursuing a strategy of checks and balances with china in the asia-pacific region. based on its relative geopolitical isolation and strong national power, the us aims to maintain its hegemonic global dominance and weaken the influence of other countries. the strategy developed by the us was in part an endorsement of the expansionism of turner’s theory. successive us administrations have drawn on policies that suit us needs when formulating their strategies, and the expansionary foreign policy formulated by george bush jr. had a strong influence on the obama administration at the time. the obama administration’s rebalancing plan for the asia-pacific region remains essentially about taking a hegemonic position in the region and weakening china’s power. turner’s expansionism satisfied the need for continued us expansion and maintenance of hegemony. the themes of today’s world are peace and development, and so the drawing on theory must also be adapted to the times. turner has stated his view of history “each age tries to form its own conception of the past. each era rewrites the history of the past according to the issues that are most needed at the time.” (frederick jackson turner, 1961, p. 43) indeed, in terms of the history of american expansion, it was in the specific historical context of the need for expansion that turner’s frontier theory was able to work and have some influence on american politics. 4. conclusions turner’s ‘frontier doctrine’ has dominated american historiography for more than forty years since its publication, and has had a profound impact that continues to attract much attention today. turner’s review of the development of american history over two hundred years before the twentieth century suggests that the history of the united states began in large part on the “frontier”. in this process of inheritance and transformation—the frontier areas have emerged and disappeared in succession-americans have developed a special character characterized by strong individualism, pragmatism and egalitarianism. thus, as a people, americans fundamentally transformed themselves, established a commitment to democracy, escaped the dangers of class conflict and conquered an entire continent. in the 1890s the frontier disappeared and a new basis for american life had to be found somehow. (kane, 1940, p. 391) he describes the importance of the frontier to american history, including its development as a catalyst for american democracy and the consolidation of federal power through frontier settlement. the expansionism embedded in the frontier doctrine became an important www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 49 published by scholink inc. principle in the political policies of later american dignitaries. references chi, w. c. (1998). an analysis of scientific and technological progress and economic development in the united states in the nineteenth century. journal of china institute of coal economics, 50(3), 13-24. cronon, w. (1987). revisiting the vanishing frontier: the legacy of frederick jackson turner. the western historical quarterly, 18(2), 157-176. https://doi.org/10.2307/969581 ding, z. m. (1980). frontier doctrine and american foreign expansion policy. world history, 25(3), 15-23. reeves, r. (1994). president kennedy: profile of power. new york: simon and schuster. frederick, j. t. (1961). the significance of the frontier in american history. englewood cliffs: prentice-hall. frederick, j. t. (1961). contributions of the west to american democ. englewood cliffs: prentice-hall. hayes, c. j. h. (1946). the american frontier—frontier of what? the american historical review, 51(2), 199-216. https://doi.org/10.2307/1839579 hurtado, a. l. (2012). herbert eugene bolton: historian of the american borderlands. california: university of california press. https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520952515 kane, m. (1940). some considerations on the frontier concept of frederick jackson turner. the mississippi valley historical review, 27(3), 379-400. https://doi.org/10.2307/1896083 roosevelt, t. (2018). theodore roosevelt-an autobiography. tausend: books on demand. waechter, m. (2019). the frontier theory in american cultural studies: from frederick jackson turner to richard slotkin. heidelberg: springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-23008-1_1 yang, s. m. (1984). the american historian turner and his school of thought. beijing: the commercial press. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 9 original paper digitization of macro-logistics systems in ukraine valerii osetskyi1, yurii umantsiv2, viktoriia klymenko3, ganna lozova1 & elvira yeshchenko3 1 department of economics, macroand microeconomics, taras shevchenko national university of kyiv, kyiv, ukraine 2 department of economics and competition policy, state university of trade and economics, kyiv, ukraine 3 aviation works and services department, national aviation university, kyiv, ukraine received: october 23, 2023 accepted: december 19, 2023 online published: january 02, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n1p9 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n1p9 abstract this article delves into the multifaceted realm of digitizing macrologistical systems, scrutinizing their nature, influencing factors, and emerging trends. it intricately explores how the integration of digital technologies empowers transport enterprises to deliver superior logistics services while concurrently curtailing costs. a comparative analysis meticulously dissects various facets of the macrologistical system, elucidating the interplay and correlation of its elements within the realms of commodity-money and contractual relationships. the study accentuates the pivotal role of the macro-logistics system in supply chain management. in scrutinizing ukraine’s logistics performance index scores vis-à-vis eu countries, the authors attribute the disparity to the enduring conflict. a notable european logistics market trend is identified: a surge in digitization investments by individual companies and the establishment of cohesive online platforms. the paper advocates for the integration of automation in transport logistics, particularly in the backdrop of a wartime economy. european standards for a contemporary transport management system are analyzed, culminating in the selection of the cargoclix logistics platform. the article expounds on the platform’s merits in adeptly digitizing the operations of transport and logistics enterprises, offering real-time tracking crucial for prompt responses amid wartime exigencies. the article concludes by substantiating findings with pertinent diagrams and tables. in essence, the digitization of macrologistical systems entails a holistic amalgamation of digital technologies, data analytics, and decision-making solutions for information management in logistics and supply chain operations. this transformative journey, leveraging technologies such as the internet of things, unmanned technologies, identification technologies, blockchain, big data, robotic systems, artificial www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 10 published by scholink inc. intelligence, and neural networks, aspires to amplify efficiency, visibility, and coordination throughout the supply chain. this paradigm shift is pivotal for evaluating the efficacy of transport and logistics companies, determining their competitive stance in today’s market. future research trajectories encompass formulating strategies for national companies operating in the domestic logistics market, identifying and implementing key competitive advantages, and devising measures and tools to ensure efficiency during wartime. keywords macro-logistics systems, transport, costs, digitalization 1. introduction into macro-logistics systems in the conditions of ukraine’s wartime economy, fundamental changes have occurred in the logistics system for international communication and freight transportation. currently, the primary burden in freight transportation falls on road transport. this has led to frequent traffic jams at ukraine’s borders, with drivers forced to wait for hours or even days in queues at border checkpoints. the situation is further exacerbated by occasional border blockades initiated by polish carriers. according to official data, the flow of freight transport across the polish-ukrainian border decreased tenfold in the autumn of 2023. the blockade adversely affects both ukrainian and eu businesses. transportation delays at the border result in disrupted supply contracts and a sharp increase in costs. therefore, the issue of cost reduction becomes increasingly relevant, allowing all participants in the macro-logistics system – manufacturing enterprises, transportation companies, and warehouse intermediaries – to survive. reducing costs will allow the enterprise providing transport services not only to lose existing customers, but also to attract new ones, which will ultimately ensure the survival of the enterprise itself. providing high-quality logistics services at lower costs is possible due to the introduction of digital technologies. as experience shows, the economic effect of digital transformation in logistics is quite tangible. therefore, the study of problems and prospects of digitalization of logistics is relevant both from the point of view of economic theory and business practice. studies of various aspects of macro-logistics systems are presented in the publications of both domestic and foreign scholars. in particular, s. bestuzheva and s. ohienko investigate the nature and features of the macrologistic system (bestuzheva, ohienko, 2023, p. 16). the work of l.gurch is devoted to the problems of designing logistic transport systems. special attention is focused on the fact that when designing a macro-logistics system, it is necessary to ensure the mutual agreement of the interests of each participant, regardless of the role in the created system, as well as to maintain a balance between costs and the quality of services (gurch, 2022, p. 143). o. garafonova, d. kozlovskyi, v. sharov, i. dvornyk in their work analyze various aspects of the functioning of international logistics systems, emphasize the need for their rationalization through cost optimization (garafonova, kozlovskyi, & sharov, 2022). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 11 published by scholink inc. тhe article of j. domagała is devoted to the representing of the elements of the macro-logistics system (transport networks, systems of product distribution, infrastructure connected with the flow of information and systems for the management and treatment of waste) as factors in the development of the polish economy (domagała, 2020, p. 35). she underlines the importance of macrologistics on today’s market results from the view point of trends appearing in modern action strategies oriented at the management of entire supply chains and the growing role of time. jan h. havenga conducted a review of macrologistics, followed by a discussion on macrologistics instrumentation, which is twofold: a freight-flow model and a related logistics costs model (havenga, 2018). v. humeniuk and other authors analyze the impact of the global pandemic on the functioning of the business sector of the countries of the european union (humeniuk, umantsiv, dligach, ivanova, & umantsiv, 2021, p. 330). o. garafonova, d. kozlovskyi, v. sharov, i. dvornyk analyse the macrologistic system as a large material flow management system that includes enterprises and industrial organizations, intermediary, trade and transport organizations of various departments. interrelationships of elements of the macro-logistics system are built taking into account commodity-monetary and contractual relations. the development of macro-logistics takes place under the influence of the regionalization, which is manifested both at the level of individual countries and on an international scale. the formation of numerous integration links among the regions of the country, as well as with foreign countries, necessitates the material and technical management of numerous interregional material, as well as accompanying financial and informational flows (garafonova, kozlovskyi, & sharov, 2022). according to l. gurch, the macro-logistics system is a highly integrated infrastructure of the economy of a region, country or group of countries (gurch, 2022, p. 143). s. bestuzheva, s. ohienko define the macro-logistics system as a set of logistic processes within the national economy (bestuzheva & ohienko, 2023). macro-logistics includes global economic processes studied on the level of the whole country, industry, region, or international organization. macro-logistics systems consist of the following elements: 1) transport and freight networks – road network, rail network, auxiliary infrastructure, etc.; 2) product distribution systems – logistics centres, container terminals, handling ports, etc.; 3) infrastructure connected with the flow of information accompanying physical flows in supply chains – it networks and databases concerning all areas connected with logistics in various sectors and trades; 4) systems for the management and treatment of waste – installations for storage, recovery and neutralization and/or incineration of waste; solutions allowing technological mergers of enterprises, etc. (domagała, 2020, p. 40). so, in general, the macrologistic system can be defined as an integrated system of managing material, financial and information flows, the participants of which are not restricted in the territorial location and are represented by the enterprises, institutions and organizations of various spheres of the economy and forms of ownership. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 12 published by scholink inc. according to the world bank data on 2023 logistics performance іndex (lpi) ukraine has grouped rank 79 with score 2.7: – customs score – 2.4; – infrastructure score – 2.4; – international shipments score – 2.8; – logistics competence and quality score – 2.6; – timeliness score – 3.1 (logistics performance index, 2023). the lpi is an interactive benchmarking tool created to help countries identify the challenges and opportunities they face in their performance on trade logistics and what they can do to improve their performance. analysis of 2023 lpi shows that ukraine has lower scores comparing with countries of eu in which the score is in the range from 3.2 for romania to 4.2 for finland. 2. digitization of macro-logistics systems it should be mentioned that one of the leading tendencies in european logistics is steady investment in digitalizing the organization of companies (sichkarenko, 2019). the digitization of macro-logistics systems refers to the process of incorporating digital technologies, data analytics, and information management solutions into the broader logistics and supply chain operations on a large scale. digital technologies used in logistics include: internet of things, self-driving cars, identification technologies, blockchain, big data, paperless technologies, drones (unmanned aerial vehicles), robotic systems, artificial intelligence and neural networks. this transformation aims to enhance efficiency, visibility, and coordination across various elements of the supply chain, including production, transportation, and distribution (table 1). table 1. key aspects of the digitization of macro-logistics systems № key aspects сharacteristic 1 automation the use of automated systems and robotics to streamline and optimize tasks traditionally performed by humans, such as order fulfillment, inventory management, and material handling 2 data analytics leveraging advanced analytics and big data techniques to gather, analyze, and derive insights from vast amounts of data generated throughout the supply chain. this enables informed decision-making, demand forecasting, and performance optimization 3 iot integration incorporating the internet of things (iot) devices and sensors into physical assets, allowing real-time monitoring and tracking of goods, equipment, and vehicles. this enhances visibility and provides valuable data for improving overall efficiency www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 13 published by scholink inc. 4 cloud computing utilizing cloud-based platforms for storing, accessing, and sharing data. cloud computing facilitates collaboration among various stakeholders in the supply chain and supports scalable and flexible operations 5 blockchain technology implementing blockchain for secure and transparent record-keeping. blockchain can enhance traceability, reduce fraud, and establish trust among participants in the supply chain. 6 digital twins creating digital replicas of physical assets, processes, or systems. this allows for simulation, analysis, and optimization of logistics processes in a virtual environment before implementation in the physical world 7 artificial intelligence (ai) applying ai algorithms to improve decision-making, predictive analytics, and anomaly detection within the logistics system. ai contributes to optimizing routes, managing inventory, and predicting maintenance needs 8 e-commerce integration adapting logistics systems to meet the challenges posed by the rise of e-commerce, including last-mile delivery optimization, order fulfillment speed, and customer experience enhancement source: developed by the authors. thus, the port of rotterdam is being transformed into a single digital space with the help of internet of things technology. in the port, “digital dolphins” are installed intelligent sensors that support traffic flows, including cargo transportation. “dolphins” are capable of self-learning, their basis is neural networks. the introduction of robotic systems is justified in road and rail transport for routine work at maintenance stations. automation of transport logistics includes the use of vehicle management assistance systems and transport management system (tms) software. automated driver assistance systems for driving the truck are represented by adaptive cruise control and the function of driving assistance within the lane. full automation also includes environmental monitoring and detection of special driving conditions. modern tms meet the following requirements: form realistic routes that can be followed by drivers and allow to change routes in real time according to changes in road conditions; display the time of vehicle arrival at each destination; allow you to automatically monitor drivers on routes (truck location, engine performance indicators, truck mileage, etc.); calculate the efficiency of the vehicle fleet that will be used in the transportation process (when forming the order, indicate the size of the order, the volume and weight characteristics of the cargo, the carrying capacity and the volume of the truck body that will be submitted for loading) (osetskyi, klymenko, lozova, & umantsiv, 2023). blockchain technologies are used to document logistics operations in transport, conclude contracts and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 14 published by scholink inc. execute multilateral agreements (for example, in multimodal transportation, interaction between the owner of the cargo and the carrier and forwarder at all stages of the transportation process is ensured), tracking of cargo and registration of its quality (in particular, for food products delivery conditions (humidity, temperature) are registered, and there is also the possibility of their adjustment during transportation), real-time display of goods shipment operations, financial support of the transportation process. drones are still used for monitoring sections of highways and railway tracks, aerial photography, constant monitoring and escorting of cargo. however, in the future, drones can become a new mode of transport for carriage of passengers and cargo (sichkarenko, 2019). 3. optimization of logistics processes using cargoclix platform let’s consider how the introduction of digital logistics platform allows us to optimize time and costs. as soon as drivers arrive at the facility, they have some specific time to unload or reload their cargo. downtime caused by uncertain work schedules results in paying fines, it also requires additional time for dispute resolution. in order to avoid or at least reduce the number of such issues at the warehouse time slot management systems can be used both by carriers and shippers (goramp, 2022). cargoclix is a logistics platform that creates products aimed to optimize logistics processes. it produces software for transport and logistics and has been consistently focusing on the latest technologies and innovative concepts since 1998. the products are modular and can be used individually or in combination. the products are available to all users in the cloud online (cargoclix, 2022). one of the most successful product of the platform is cargoclix slot. it is the time slot management system that optimizes processes and personnel deployment at the ramp and prevents waiting times and workload peaks at loading and unloading points (slot, official website of cargoclix, 2022). the advantages of usage of cargoclix slot are identified in the figure 1. figure 1. advantages of cargoclix slot www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 15 published by scholink inc. source: developed by the authors based on information (slot, official website of cargoclix, 2022) in the figure 2 interface of the system cargoclix slot is depicted. considering interface of the system, it is possible to state that is simple and should be easily perceived by the employees of trans-logistics. dark gray fields mean that the ramp cannot be booked (it is closed); diagonal gray striped fields mean that rapms are booked by other customers; white fields mean that the ramp is available to be booked. figure 2. interface of the system cargoclix slot source: developed by the authors based on information (manual for the use of time slot management system “cargoclix” at marquardt logistic gmbh, 2022). after choosing the ramp and time you need to enter all the load and truck details. they include: 1) order number 2) name of the carrier 3) mobile phone 4) vehicle type 5) truck plate 6) number of pallets 7) other notes after you enter all the above mentioned details a pdf file is created that the carrier can print out. the file contains all data of the booking, including the booking id (figure 3). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 16 published by scholink inc. figure 3. timeslot booking confirmation source: developed by the authors based on information (manual for the use of time slot management system “cargoclix” at marquardt logistic gmbh, 2022). cargoclix slot also provides truck drivers with real-time information on current restrictions on warehouses and other facilities they are rolling to. this feature was especially useful in the period of rapid spread of covid-19 for truckers who travel long distances between different regions and countries and may not be aware of all the changes in quarantine restrictions associated with the pandemic. thus, when the driver arrives at the place of the pick-up or delivery, he is already informed about how to behave and what documents (test results, vaccination certificate, etc.) to provide. that is, the driver knows whether to move from the logistics center from right to left or vice versa, where not to go, where to wear a mask, where to show a certificate, if necessary, and so on. the system also allows you to book the time and place of unloading / loading but not to stand in line. during hostilities throughout the territory of ukraine this slot’s tool can be very useful as well. at the security point, shipper or receiver can require 1-2 forms of government id in order to check the identity of the driver. this information can be also mentioned in the application to inform the driver in advance. moreover, a lot of facilities has changed its working hours or work unstable because of the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 17 published by scholink inc. military actions. slot helps to avoid the situation when the driver arrives at the location but there is no one to load or unload the truck, so it will save a lot of time and money. the necessary information “from each ramp” can be sent in real time with one click to all interested parties. there is also a lot of other time slot management systems available to use now. all of them are offering approximately the same range of services with slight deviations. the most popular are time slot booking by transporeon, cargoclix slot, time slot management by spot, alpega tms, goramp. the majority of this systems are free for carriers and paid by the shipper. price per slot are given in figure 4. 1,6 0,5 0,75 0,6 1 time slot booking by transporeon cargoclix slot time slot management by spot alpega tms goramp figure 4. price of usage time slot management systems per slot booked, euro source: developed by the authors based on research. as we can see, cargoclix slot provides one of the lowest rates (0.50 euro per booking). this charge can be paid either by shipper or by carrier. cargoclix slot is widely used in many european countries and should be useful for trans-logistics. in order to make some conclusions and measure effectiveness of implementation slot system we can make analysis of duration of loading or unloading at a time of using and not using of the system. the pickup process usually is longer and more complex, many delays arise at this stage of transportation process. therefore it is more reasonable to investigate how it can be impacted by the innovation. all the regular operations during the pickup of goods and its duration are represented in table 2. table 2. duration of the operations at the process of pickup using cargoclix slot and without it operation duration of the operation, min duration of operation using cargoclix slot, min www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 18 published by scholink inc. the way of the driver to the control room, to receive the documents and instructions where to follow next 2 2 time needed for the shipper to find the load in the system, check its status and prepare all required paperwork 10 2 assignment of the loading ramp 1 0 the way of the driver to the truck and entrance to the loading yard 5 5 waiting for your turn to get loaded 0-90 0 setting the truck at the loading ramp, preparing ramp capacities (staff, forklift trucks, etc.) 3-18 3 loading the truck 15-60 15-60 inspection of the pallets/containers/boxes, comparison of their numbers and seals with the data in the documents 3 3 departure of the truck from the cargo front and the driver’s passage to the control room 5 5 registration of documents on acceptance of the load 10 10 total duration 54-204 45-90 source: developed by the authors based on research. as we can see such operations as the way of the driver to the control room, to receive the documents and instructions where to follow next, the way of the driver to the truck and entrance to the loading yard, inspection of the load, its compliance to the documents, departure of the truck from the cargo front and the driver’s passage to the control room and registration of documents on acceptance of the load take the same time both in case when you are not using any time slot management application and when you are using cargoclix slot. however, there is a difference in time during other processes. first of all, time needed for the shipper to find the load in the system, check its status and prepare all required paperwork for the driver is reduced in average by 8 minutes. when reserving a time for loading or unloading the carrier can mention a reference or pickup number for the load they are going to carry. at the shipper’s system this information is displayed so if you have booked a timeslot for example for 9 am, the shipper would know that they need to prepare all the paperwork and load upon the truck’s arrival, so it will take the minimum amount of time. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 19 published by scholink inc. even in case when the load is not ready for some reason, due to some emergency for example, the driver should not check each 15 minutes on it until the truck could get loaded. instead, he can get a notification in the application once the load is ready and he can follow to a loading ramp. when using cargoclix slot application the loading ramp is assigned automatically while booking a timeslot so there is no time spent at the facility. there is an impressive time difference in waiting for your turn to get loaded. if the carrier is using cargoclix slot once the driver has all required documents, he can just roll to the assigned loading ramp. otherwise, the driver will need to wait until the ramp is available. certainly, the driver can arrive in the period of time when there is no line and correspondingly no waiting time at this stage. however, if we have pickup or delivery at 8-10 am or any other rush hour, most probably the driver will need to wait for another hour or two, especially if it is large facility with a lot of orders. the same goes for equipment needed to load or unload the truck, such as a forklift, pallet jack, cart, etc. sometimes the driver needs to wait for it if it is not available at the moment of loading. in the figure 5 comparison of the duration of the operations at the process of pickup using cargoclix slot and without it is depicted. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 20 published by scholink inc. 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 usual duration of the operation, min duration of operation using cargoclix slot, min the way of the driver to the control room, to receive the documents and instructions where to follow next time needed for the shipper to find the load in the system, check its status and prepare all required paperwork assignment of the loading ramp the way of the driver to the truck and entrance to the loading yard waiting for your turn to get loaded setting the truck at the loading ramp, preparing ramp capacities (staff, forklift trucks, etc.) loading the truck inspection of the pallets/containers/boxes, comparison of their numbers and seals with the data in the documents2 figure 5. comparison of the duration of the operations at the process of pickup using cargoclix slot and without it source: developed by the authors based on the table 2. when building a graph if there is a range of possible duration of an operation, the average value has been taken. for example in case of waiting for your turn to get loaded, 45 minutes were taken as an average between 0 and 90. summarizing the above information, we can conclude that if trans-logistic integrates time slot management system cargoclix slot, duration of loading and unloading processes would be reduced in average by 46%. accordingly the company’s efficiency will be higher, better customer service would be able to be provided that will definitely lead to increased profit. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 21 published by scholink inc. 4. conclusions analysis of the nature and factors of digitizing macrologistic systems has allowed for a detailed examination and disclosure of new trends and key aspects, determining the impact of digitization on the quality of logistic services and transportation costs. digitization of macrologistic systems is a process that involves the integration of digital technologies, data analytics, and solutions for managing information in logistics and supply chain operations. these technologies encompass a wide range of tools, such as the internet of things, unmanned technologies, blockchain, big data, robotic systems, artificial intelligence, and neural networks. the interrelation and interaction of various aspects of macrologistic systems in the context of commodity-money and contractual relations have been identified. the reasons leading to the deterioration of ukraine’s rankings in the logistics performance index compared to eu countries have been analyzed. special attention is given to the analysis of investments in digitization on the european logistics market. the advantages of integrated online platforms and the implementation of automation in transport logistics are highlighted. analyzing the pros and cons of different logistic platforms has led to the identification of cargoclix as a logistic platform. the authors have analyzed key performance indicators and parameters to determine the effectiveness of implementing the logistic platform, substantiating the importance of digitization for all market participants. the conducted analysis provides a basis for defining digitization as a strategically important direction to ensure the efficiency of transport and logistics companies in times of war and determining their competitive advantages. thus, the article makes a significant contribution to the study of digitization issues in macrologistics. references about cargoclix. official website of cargoclix. (2022). retrieved from https://start.cargoclix.com/ru/about-us bestuzheva, s., & ohienko, s. (2023). analytical study of the essence and classification of the logistics system in the field of international business. market infrastructure, 71, 14-20. http://dx.doi.org/doi.org/10.32782/infrastruct71-3 domagała, j. (2020). macro-logistics as tools for shaping today’s economy. scientific journal of warsaw university of life science. economics and organization of logistics, 3, 31-44. garafonova, o., kozlovskyi, d., sharov, v., & dvornyk, i. (2022). conceptual aspects of functioning of international logistics systems. bulletin of the khmelnytskyi national university, 4, 13-18. http://dx.doi.org/10.31891/2307-5740-2022-308-4-2 gurch, l. m. (2022). design of logistic transport systems. bulletin of the national transport university, series “technical sciences”, 51, 141-148. http://dx.doi.org/10.33744/2308-6645-2022-1-51-141-148 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 22 published by scholink inc. havenga, j. h. (2018). logistics and the future: the rise of macrologistics. journal of transport and supply chain management, 12(0), a336. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/jtscm.v12i0.336 humeniuk, v., umantsiv, iu., dligach, a., ivanova, n., & umantsiv, h. (2021). state financial support for small business during the coronavirus crisis in european countries. financial and credit activity: problems of theory and practice, 3, 326-332. logistics performance index (lpi). (2023). retrieved from. https://lpi.worldbank.org/international/global manual for the use of time slot management system “cargoclix” at marquardt logistic gmbh. (2022). retrieved from https://www.marquardt.com/fileadmin/user_upload/02_unternehmen/07_einkauf/zeitfenstermana gement/user-manual-marquardt-timeslot-management.pdf osetskyi, v., klymenko, v., lozova, g., & umantsiv, yu. (2023). ensuring the competitiveness and financial stability of transport and logistics companies in the conditions of russian-ukrainian. academic review, 2, 25-47. http://dx.doi.org/10.32342/2074-5354-2023-2-59-2 sichkarenko, k. (2019). the impact of digitization of the economy on the development of the transport industry. black sea economic studies, 38-1, 76-79. slot. official website of cargoclix. (2022). retrieved from https://start.cargoclix.com/slot/ top 100 in european transport and logistics services (completely revised edition 2021/2022). retrieved from https://www.scs.fraunhofer.de/en/publications/top100.html umantsiv, i., lebedeva, l., & mitrofanova, a. (2019). modern trends in governance of state ownership relations. baltic journal of economic studies, 5(5), 155-164. http://dx.doi.org/10.30525/2256-0742/2019-5-5-155-164 what is time slot management? goramp. (2022). retrieved from https://www.goramp.eu/blog/what-is-time-slot-management (accessed 14.11.2023) authors information valerii osetskyi doctor of economic sciences, professor department of economics, macroand microeconomics taras shevchenko national university of kyiv, kyiv, ukraine, e-mail: val_osetski@ukr.net orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5104-1070 web of science researcher id: i-4477-2018 mailto:val_osetski@ukr.net https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5104-1070 http://www.researcherid.com/rid/i-4477-2018 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 23 published by scholink inc. yurii umantsiv doctor of economic sciences, professor department of economics and competition policy, state university of trade and economics kyiv, ukraine; orcid: 0000-0003-0788-7110 web of science researcherid: n-7018-2016 y.umantsiv@knute.edu.ua viktoriia klymenko phd in economics, associate professor associate professor aviation works and services department national aviation university, kyiv, ukraine, e-mail: klymenko_viktoriya@nau.edu.ua orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4168-3296 ganna lozova phd in economics, associate professor associate professor department of economics, macroand microeconomics taras shevchenko national university of kyiv, kyiv, ukraine, e-mail: lozova@knu.ua, orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0343-0463 elvira yeshchenko master’s degree education seeker in transport technologies, national aviation university, kyiv, ukraine, e-mail: elvirayeshchenko@gmail.com mailto:y.umantsiv@knute.edu.ua https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4168-3296 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 60 original paper research status and path outlook of fintech-driven carbon finance development xingye dong1 &wenxuan yang1 1 fuzhou university of international studies and trade, fuzhou 350202, fujian, chian received: february 29, 2024 accepted: april 21, 2024 online published: may 11, 2024 doi:10.22158/ape.v7n2p60 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n2p60 abstract on a global scale, climate change has become a serious problem that cannot be ignored. carbon finance, as a key means to deal with climate change and promote sustainable development, is gradually receiving attention from the international community. the innovation of financial technology (fintech) has injected new vitality into traditional financial business, and also brought new opportunities and challenges to the development of carbon finance. starting from the basic concept of carbon finance, this paper reviews the current development status of carbon finance, analyzes the promotion role of financial technology to the development of carbon finance, and on this basis, looks forward to the future development path of the combination of financial technology and carbon finance. keyword carbon finance, financial technology, climate change, low-carbon economy, sustainable development 1. introduction carbon finance refers to the financial activities and services around carbon emission rights or emission reduction projects in the financial market. it includes carbon emission trading, carbon derivatives trading, carbon asset management and carbon credits. financial technology refers to the use of scientific and technological means to innovate financial services and products, and its core technologies include big data, artificial intelligence, and blockchain. the application of fintech in the field of carbon finance can not only improve the efficiency and transparency of the carbon market, but also reduce transaction costs and enhance market participation. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 61 2. development status of carbon finance 2.1 overview of international carbon market the global carbon market mainly controls and reduces greenhouse gas emissions through the emissions trading system. the european union emissions trading system (eu ets) is the largest and most established carbon market and, since its launch in 2005, has become a flagship project in global efforts to reduce emissions. the eu ets incentivizes companies to take steps to reduce their emissions by setting a cap on carbon emissions and allowing them to buy and sell emission rights within the system. the california carbon market is also a leading example of an innovative market mechanism that encourages companies to reduce their carbon footprint. as one of the world's largest carbon emitters, china has actively promoted the establishment of a national carbon emission trading market in recent years, and is committed to controlling and reducing carbon emissions through market-based means. 2.2 carbon financial products and services as the carbon market matures and expands, carbon financial products and services continue to innovate and develop. in addition to the traditional carbon emission trading, there are also a variety of financial derivatives related to carbon emissions in the market, such as carbon futures, carbon options and carbon credits. these derivatives allow companies and investors to hedge against fluctuations in the price of carbon, while funding projects that seek to reduce carbon emissions. to manage these products more effectively, carbon asset management services have emerged to help businesses and investors assess and manage carbon-related financial risks and opportunities. in addition, with the development of carbon markets, innovative financial products have emerged, such as carbon bonds and green bonds, which provide new ways to finance low-carbon projects. carbon bonds are a type of fixed income financial product specifically used to finance projects that reduce emissions, while green bonds are used more broadly to finance a variety of environmentally friendly projects, including energy efficiency improvements, renewable energy development, sustainable water management, and clean transportation. the development of carbon finance provides a powerful market-driven mechanism for global efforts to reduce emissions. from carbon trading to financial derivatives to carbon asset management services, innovative financial products and services not only help mitigate climate change, but also provide new opportunities for investors. as the global economy continues to move in a low-carbon, environmentally friendly direction, we can expect the carbon finance market to continue to grow in size and influence. 3. the role of fintech in carbon finance 3.1 big data and carbon emission assessment through big data analysis, fintech can more accurately assess the carbon emissions of enterprises, provide a scientific basis for the pricing of emission rights, and provide guidance for investors to make low-carbon investments. through the collection, processing and analysis of massive data, fintech can reveal the carbon emission patterns in corporate activities, thus making the assessment of corporate www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 62 carbon emissions more accurate and efficient. this assessment not only provides scientific data support for governments and environmental regulators when formulating emission trading policies and pricing, but also helps investors identify companies with low carbon emissions. in this way, investors can make more environmentally friendly investment decisions and facilitate the flow of capital to companies with less environmental impact, thereby driving the transition to a low-carbon economy for society as a whole. this shows that big data is not only an enabler of technological transformation, but also plays a vital role in addressing global challenges such as climate change. 3.2 innovative application of blockchain technology blockchain technology, as a distributed ledger technology, has demonstrated significant advantages in the field of carbon trading through its innovative application. it not only increases the transparency and security of transactions, but also ensures the imtamability of transaction records through unique encryption and consensus mechanisms. the introduction of this technology allows every carbon transaction to be tracked and verified, greatly reducing the potential for fraud. with the application of blockchain technology, the trust of market participants has been enhanced, promoting the healthy development of the carbon trading market. this transparent and secure trading environment attracts more investor participation, helping to drive the transition to a low-carbon economy and the response to climate change. 3.3 the role of artificial intelligence in carbon markets artificial intelligence technology plays a key role in the carbon trading market. by automating the transaction process, it not only significantly improves the efficiency and response speed of transactions, but also reduces errors caused by human factors. at the same time, with the help of deep learning and big data analysis, ai can conduct in-depth risk assessment of the market and effectively predict market trends and price fluctuations. this enables investors to make investment decisions based on more accurate and comprehensive information, increasing the return on investment. in addition, ai's real-time monitoring and analysis capabilities help to instantly discover abnormal trading behavior in the carbon market, ensuring market fairness and transparency, and thus maintaining the stability of the entire market. in these ways, ai has become an important force driving the development and efficiency of carbon markets. 4. challenges and countermeasures for the development of carbon finance with the increasing global concern about climate change, the carbon finance market has ushered in unprecedented development opportunities. financial technology, especially the application of emerging technologies such as blockchain, big data and artificial intelligence, has provided a more efficient and transparent trading platform and tools for the carbon financial market, greatly broadening its development potential. however, carbon finance still faces many challenges, and its development strategy needs to be carefully formulated. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 63 4.1 technical security issues technical security is a challenge that cannot be ignored in the development of carbon finance. the widespread application of fintech has made the trading system more complex, and in the event of technical errors or cyber attacks, it may lead to major financial risks and a crisis of market trust. in addition, the data quality and measurement, reporting and verification (mrv) issues specific to carbon finance also need to rely on stable and reliable technology. therefore, strengthening technical security and data protection is an important countermeasure to ensure the healthy development of carbon finance. this includes improving the security standards of the system, increasing investment in cybersecurity and improving emergency response mechanisms. 4.2 regulatory issues the complexity and international nature of carbon finance requires forward-looking and internationally compatible regulations. at present, the rules and standards of carbon emission trading systems in different countries and regions differ, which brings obstacles to cross-border carbon financial trading. therefore, the establishment of a unified legal framework and the development of internationally recognized trading rules and regulatory standards are necessary measures to promote the healthy development of carbon financial markets. at the same time, strengthening regulatory cooperation to jointly combat fraud and manipulation in the carbon financial market is also the key to protecting investors' rights and interests and maintaining market order. 4.3 market acceptance market acceptance is an important factor in determining the success of carbon finance. because carbon finance is a relatively new field, many investors and market participants lack sufficient knowledge and confidence in it. in addition, the complexity and professionalism of carbon financial products make it difficult for ordinary investors to participate. therefore, strategies to increase market acceptance should include strengthening market education and advocacy, increasing transparency of carbon finance, simplifying product design, and providing more training and advisory services to help investors better understand and accept carbon finance products. to sum up, although the development of fintech has brought great opportunities for carbon finance, the challenges in terms of technical security, legal regulation and market acceptance cannot be ignored. the development of countermeasures requires multi-stakeholder participation and collaboration, only in this way, carbon finance can contribute to global carbon reduction efforts while achieving its own healthy and sustainable development. 5. development path outlook in order to promote the deep integration of fintech and carbon finance, we need to strengthen research, build cooperation mechanisms, improve the regulatory system, and raise the awareness of technology application of market participants, from multiple aspects to ensure the smooth progress of this integration process. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 64 first, strengthening research is the foundation for promoting the integration of fintech and carbon finance. at present, the application of fintech in the field of carbon finance is still in its initial stage, and many potential application scenarios and technical solutions have not been fully developed and utilized. therefore, it is necessary to increase the basic research and applied research on the application of fintech in the field of carbon finance, and explore more innovative technical solutions. this includes the application of blockchain technology in carbon trading and carbon asset management, the application of big data and artificial intelligence in carbon emission data monitoring, analysis and forecasting, and the innovative use of internet financial tools in green credit, green bonds and other fields. through in-depth research, the applicability and efficiency of fintech in the field of carbon finance can be improved, and technological innovation and business model innovation can be promoted. second, building a cooperation mechanism is the key to promoting the integration of fintech and carbon finance. the combination of fintech and carbon finance involves many industries and fields, including financial institutions, technology enterprises, environmental protection agencies, etc. therefore, it is necessary to establish a cross-industry and cross-field cooperation mechanism to encourage and promote exchanges and cooperation between all parties. for example, financial institutions can work with technology companies to jointly develop fintech products suitable for carbon finance; environmental protection agencies can cooperate with fintech companies to jointly promote the development and application of carbon emission monitoring technology. through cooperation, the resources and wisdom of all parties can be gathered to accelerate the promotion and application of fintech in the field of carbon finance. third, improving the regulatory system is a guarantee for the healthy development of the integration of fintech and carbon finance. the carbon financial market involves various types of transactions, a large number of transaction entities, and the application of financial technology has increased the complexity of the market. therefore, regulators need to adapt to the new changes in the development of the market and improve the relevant regulatory system. this includes developing special laws and regulations for carbon financial markets, clarifying market trading rules, strengthening supervision of trading activities, and establishing a sound market risk prevention and control system. at the same time, regulators also need to strengthen the supervision of fintech to ensure that its application in the field of carbon finance is safe, compliant and reliable, and to prevent possible financial risks. finally, improving market participants' awareness of technology application is the driving force for the integration of fintech and carbon finance. market participants include financial institutions, enterprises and individual investors, who are direct participants in the carbon finance market, and their acceptance and application ability of fintech directly affect the integration degree of fintech and carbon finance. therefore, there is a need to raise awareness of technology use among market participants through various means, including organizing training and seminars, providing technical advisory and support services, and promoting successful fintech use cases. by raising the awareness of technology www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 65 application of market participants, it can promote their more active adoption and use of fintech, and accelerate the integration process of fintech and carbon finance. 6. conclusion the continuous innovation and application of fintech help to improve the efficiency and transparency of the carbon financial market, and provide strong support for the realization of low-carbon economic transformation and response to global climate change. in the future, the further integration of fintech and carbon finance will be an important trend to promote the development of green finance. financial technology, as the intersection of finance and technology, has been constantly promoting the progress and innovation of the financial market. in recent years, with the increasingly severe problem of global climate change, carbon financial market, as an important tool to deal with climate change, has attracted more and more attention from governments and international organizations. the healthy development of the carbon finance market can not only promote the effective control of carbon emissions, but also guide capital flow to low-carbon and green industries, and promote the global economy to achieve low-carbon transformation. in this context, the innovation of fintech has become a booster for the development of carbon financial markets. the application of advanced data analysis technology, blockchain, artificial intelligence and other financial technology means has greatly improved the efficiency and transparency of the carbon financial market. for example, through blockchain technology, the whole process of carbon credit trading can be more effectively tracked and verified to ensure the authenticity and accuracy of the transaction. the big data analysis capability of artificial intelligence can help investors better evaluate the value of carbon assets and the risks associated with them. in the future, the deep integration of financial technology and carbon finance will further promote the development of green finance. fintech can not only improve the operational efficiency of carbon markets, but also help discover and foster new low-carbon financial products and services, and promote the more effective flow of financial resources to green and low-carbon industries. with the progress and innovation of technology, the combination of fintech and carbon finance will become more closely, and become an important force to promote the transformation of the global economy to sustainable development. references carney, m. (2015). breaking the tragedy of the horizon-climate change and financial stability. bank of england. chen, y., & gao, y. (2018). blockchain and big data technologies for sustainable development. environment, development and sustainability, 20(4), 2253-2266. löffler, g., & pfeiffer, p. (2020). the impact of artificial intelligence on carbon markets. energy policy, 140, 111422. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111422 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 7, no. 2, 2024 published by scholink inc. 66 meng, l. (2019). the role of fintech in unlocking green finance: policy insights for developing countries. asian development bank. pauwels, e. et al. (2021). fintech and sustainable development: assessing the implications. un environment programme finance initiative. weber, o., & feltmate, b. (2016). sustainable banking: managing the social and environmental impact of financial institutions. university of toronto press. https://doi.org/10.3138/9781442629325 zhang, d., & wang, j. (2017). the implications of financial innovation for capital markets and household welfare. journal of financial economics, 126(3), 588-602. original paper research status and path outlook of fintech-driven abstract on a global scale, climate change has become a ser keyword carbon finance, financial technology, climate chan 2. development status of carbon finance 2.1 overview of international carbon market the global carbon market mainly controls and reduc 2.2 carbon financial products and services as the carbon market matures and expands, carbon f in addition, with the development of carbon market the development of carbon finance provides a power 3. the role of fintech in carbon finance 3.1 big data and carbon emission assessment through big data analysis, fintech can more accura 3.2 innovative application of blockchain technolog blockchain technology, as a distributed ledger tec 3.3 the role of artificial intelligence in carbon artificial intelligence technology plays a key rol 4. challenges and countermeasures for the developm with the increasing global concern about climate c 4.1 technical security issues technical security is a challenge that cannot be i 4.2 regulatory issues the complexity and international nature of carbon 4.3 market acceptance market acceptance is an important factor in determ to sum up, although the development of fintech has references advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 72 original paper a review of the research on transnational environmental tort law chaoyi wang 1* 1 school of economic law, shanghai university of political science and law, shanghai, china * chaoyi wang, school of economic law, shanghai university of political science and law, shanghai, china received: october 13, 202 accepted: november 14, 2022 online published: november 17, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n4p72 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n4p72 abstract the accelerated pace of globalization has brought about rapid economic development, while the number of transnational environmental pollution problems is also increasing. on the one hand, the imbalance of the global economy has intensified, and transnational corporations have taken advantage of the low cost and low standards of environmental protection in developing countries to transfer polluting industries; on the other hand, with the awakening of citizen’s environmental awareness in developing countries, more and more people realize that their own legal provisions are not enough to compensate for their losses, so they choose to go overseas to appeal to the home country courts. based on the review of relevant literature in china and foreign theoretical circles in recent years, this paper summarizes it from three aspects: jurisdiction, application of law and transnational corporations, with a view to promoting the improvement of china’s transnational environmental tort law. keyword transnational environmental tort, jurisdiction, application of law, transnational corporations 1. introduction with the green clause written into the china civil code, the importance of ecological civilization has been placed at an unprecedented height. on a global scale, environmental problems are no longer restricted by regions, and the environmental conflicts between countries caused by economic development are becoming increasingly significant. under state immunity and diplomatic protection, the result of environmental right protection is not satisfactory, which is brought about by prosecuted national liability. so people began to seek to solve the problem of transnational environmental tort through private international law. at this stage, taking individuals as the basis for civil liability has www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 73 published by scholink inc. become the focus of solving the problem. with the theme of “transnational environmental tort” as the key word, the author collected 69 valid papers and literatures at home and abroad. through the research methods of literature comparison and induction, the author figured out the writing idea of “court jurisdiction application of law recognition and enforcement of judgments” (see figure 1). at the same time, in view of the leading role of transnational corporations in transnational environmental tort, it is supplemented by a further study of transnational environmental tort from the perspective of transnational corporations. figure 1. research framework 2. clarify the basic problems of transnational environmental tort 2.1 determine the concept of transnational environmental tort transnational environmental tort, also known as cross-border environmental tort, foreign environmental tort, has been described differently in papers. no matter which one, scholars emphasize that the concept should include both “foreign-related” and “environmental tort”. the “foreign-related” is embodied in the subject, object, reasons and facts on which rights and obligations are based. some scholars interpret “foreign-related” from the perspective of the subject, believing that the nationality and domicile of the infringer and the victim in a foreign country can be recognized as “foreign-related”. the infringer, led by transnational corporations, has set up subsidiaries around the world, which has not only improved the local economy, but also polluted the local environment. there is also a view that “foreign-related” is mainly reflected in the object. natural www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 74 published by scholink inc. resources are not separated by the division of national territory and regions. it is difficult to ensure that environmental pollution generated within one country will not have a negative impact on neighboring countries. for example, china and russia are bounded by the songhua river. in 2005, the chemical substances produced by the explosion of a chemical plant in jilin province flowed into the songhua river, which had a bad impact on the water quality. the quality of life of coastal residents (including russian residents) was also affected. for another example, countries in europe are closely connected. in the last century, when countries established factories to develop their economies, cross-border air pollution and water pollution incidents occurred frequently. others believe that those who cause damage to the public environment or the extraterritorial environment are also “foreign-related”. 2.2 differentiation and analysis of the characteristics of foreign environmental infringement after determining the scope of “foreign-related”, the definition of environmental tort should also be clarified. it is generally accepted that environmental tort is not equal to environmental pollution. from the perspective of concept traceability, environmental tort, as a kind of tort, should be considered as negative obligation; environmental pollution, which belongs to ecology, is a technical term derived from environmental science and has no legal significance. from the perspective of coverage, cao mingde pointed out that environmental tort, in a broad sense, should include environmental pollution and ecological damage. it can be noted that “ecological destruction” has been included in the scope of legal adjustment in the civil code, and “polluter” will be replaced by “infringer”. it can be seen that the scope of environmental tort is far greater than environmental pollution. chen quansheng defines environmental infringement in his book as follows: the fact that human activities cause pollution or damage to the living and ecological environment, and thus infringe on the relevant rights and interests of a certain number of residents, thereby endangering human survival and development. this definition is in line with the current cognitive trend of the theoretical community on environmental tort. 3. the jurisdiction of transnational environmental tort the research on transnational environmental tort in domestic and foreign academic field started from the judicial jurisdiction, and it is the primary issue to determine whether the court has jurisdiction to resolve foreign disputes. jurisdiction has important procedural significance. the jurisdictional legal basis of transnational environmental tort can be divided into international and domestic aspects. the research on international content is relatively limited, because the number of truly effective international conventions is small and the signatory countries are limited, and the provisions on jurisdiction in the effective documents are also different, so many scholars have objections to their effectiveness. for example, the <convention on the protection of the environment between denmark, finland, norway and sweden> provides for international jurisdiction, <hague convention on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters> and other documents on the jurisdiction of general infringement also apply to environmental infringement. scholars focus more on the domestic laws of various countries, focusing on the rules of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 75 published by scholink inc. jurisdiction. 3.1 traditional rules of jurisdiction of transnational torts environmental tort, as a kind of tort, should follow the jurisdiction rules of general foreign-related tort when there is no special provision for it. on the basis of sorting out the changes in the foreign dispute jurisdiction provisions of the <civil procedure law >, chen jian summarized the jurisdiction rules of foreign torts in china as follows: the general jurisdiction is mainly personal jurisdiction, while the special jurisdiction is territorial jurisdiction (but not stipulated in china), supplemented by the exclusive jurisdiction related to natural resources and the agreement jurisdiction, including agreement jurisdiction and implied jurisdiction. in contrast, xiang zaisheng distinguishes between the civil law system and the common law system in his research and analyzes their legislative practice respectively. among the civil law countries, germany and switzerland have made special provisions on foreign-related environmental infringement, while others still follow the principle of “plaintiff accommodated to defendant “ doctine and the principle of jurisdiction of the court where the infringement occurs. 3.2 new development of jurisdiction rules of transnational environmental tort the application of traditional jurisdiction rules in the field of foreign-related environmental tort has limitations, so the new rules begin to develop gradually in judicial practice. the doctrine of forum non conveniens is one of the most important jurisdictional rules in the field of transnational environmental tort. the home country court’s rejection of the foreign prosecution is mostly based on this principle. most scholars believe that the doctrine of forum non conveniens greatly hinders the development of foreign-related environmental tort. in her research, feng yanan pointed out that when judging the specific application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, american courts usually need to consider two factors: “whether there is a substitute court” and “whether there are relevant factors in the case that decide the court to suspend the proceedings according to the doctrine”. when judges try cases, they often need to take into account the attitude of administrative organs, other governments and the public interests involved, so they usually adopt a conservative attitude. however, a small number of scholars affirmed the significance and role of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, and believed that the negative impact of the principle could be avoided by adding restrictions and objectively considering private interests and public interests. liu enyuan pointed out that in the early stage of china, the principle of national sovereignty was overemphasized, and the “excessive jurisdiction” made it difficult to resolve environmental damage compensation disputes, so the doctrine of forum non conveniens should be applied. the author believes that the purpose of the principle is to prevent the abuse of jurisdiction and ensure the close relationship between the case and the trial court, which is unfair for the victims of the two parties who are already in a weak position to limit their court choice. moreover, in the existing judicial cases, the court is too harsh in determining the application of the principle, and often attaches conditions to dismiss the lawsuit. the distorted use of the doctrine of forum non conveniens makes it www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 76 published by scholink inc. meaningless. in addition to the doctrine of forum non conveniens, some scholars also put forward the doctrine of international comity, or a similar provision—considering the domestic localization requirements of various countries. the jurisdiction of the home country court over the environmental tort dispute occurred in another country may involve interference with the legal or administrative power or even judicial power of other countries. therefore, when considering the application of the principle, the judge should focus on the balance of the relevant interests of the two countries. however, some scholars believe that the application of this principle will inevitably limit the jurisdiction of the home country. therefore, it seems more in line with the development of the times to develop the doctrine of comity into the doctrine of reciprocity. for example, in the context of the “the belt and road initiative”, the development of the doctrine of reciprocity between china and other member countries can not only ensure the national interests of both sides, but also conform to the vision of building a community with a shared future for mankind. in addition, theorists hold different views on the principle of the jurisdiction of the court of first instance. opponents of this principle believe that under this principle, it is difficult for victims to bring a lawsuit to the home court after they resort to the host court. on the contrary, supporters believe that the principle can play a positive role in resolving foreign-related jurisdictional conflicts, which is conducive to the recognition and implementation of the judgments of the host country’s courts in the home country, and is clearly stipulated in international treaties such as the <brussels convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 1968>. moreover, in the context of the <the alien tort claims act> of the united states, when the defendant raised a defense on the ground of exhaustion of local remedies, the judge characterized it as “reasonable consideration” rather than “must consider”. 4. the legal application of transnational environmental tort after removing the obstacles of the conflict of jurisdiction of the court, it is directly faced with the problem of the application of the lex causae. similar to the jurisdiction, the exploration of the legal application of transnational environmental tort in various countries also starts from the relevant provisions of traditional general tort. 4.1 core issue: definition of the tort spot as one of the earliest principles of private international law, the lex loci delicti is the embodiment of “place domination” and plays an unshakable role in the legal application of transnational tort. but then came the controversial question that lasted for many years: how to define the tort spot? because of the normality of isolated infringement in foreign-related environmental infringement, it is crucial to define the tort spot in this field. in his article, tian hongyun subdivided the tort law into the law of the place where the act was committed and the law of the place where the result occurred, and proposed that the former is represented by austria, and the latter is represented by the united states. china allows a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 77 published by scholink inc. choice between the two. this classification has been widely recognized by the academic community. xiang zaisheng, in his article on the study of jurisdiction, summarized the way in which the two laws can be applied, which is similar to our country, as the “ubiquitous principle”. however, some scholars, in their early studies, believed that the indirectness of environmental infringement was caused by the fact that the infringement acted on the environmental media after the occurrence of the infringement, and then the media acted on the victim to produce the final infringement result. therefore, it is believed that there should also be a place where the infringing media pass through. although it is a common view to recognize the indirectness of environmental tort, few scholars have proposed the place where the media passed. after the lex loci delicti, the lex fori and the overlapping application of the two are also regarded as the applicable rules of traditional general torts, and the common lex personalis of the parties is also included in the study. 4.2 applicable rules of conflict of laws on environmental tort although china has not yet issued special provisions on the application of transnational environmental tort, countries (regions) represented by switzerland, germany and the european union have successively issued relevant laws as early as the end of last century. at present, the academic field research on the new applicable rules can be summarized as follows: the principle of the closest connection, the principle of autonomy of will and the principle of benefiting the victim. the principle of the closest connection originated from the proper law proposed by morris in 1951. some scholars regard it as a combination of applicable laws such as the law of the place of tort, the law of the court and the personal law of the parties. the introduction of the principle of autonomy of will is considered by some scholars as the embodiment of the preferential protection of the interests of victims, but some others hold the opposite view that the principle of unrestricted autonomy of will forces the victims in the vulnerable party to passively agree with the legal choice of the infringer. the author believes that the principle of party autonomy embodies the fundamental value of private international law, but the existence and realization of the principle of party autonomy should take substantive fairness as the ultimate goal, so it is necessary to provide protection for victims by attaching conditions to the principle of party autonomy. it is precisely because of the legislative blank of the special provisions on transnational environmental tort in china, and the provisions on the application of law that have been issued in other countries are different, which has given the academic community large space to explore. in the existing papers, scholars have put forward suggestions for the improvement of china’s legislation through the induction of traditional and new rules of law application. first of all, although there are new rules proposed, scholars have no objection to the core status of the lex loci delicti, but there are disputes about the specific application of the place where the act is performed or the result occurs. some scholars believe that the right of choice should be left to the parties. for example, liu enyuan believes that the parties should choose the applicable law by agreement within a limited scope. opponents believe that the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 78 published by scholink inc. parties lack a clear understanding of foreign law, so the court should make a choice. the other part of scholars have an obvious preference for the choice of the two places, both of which tend to choose the law of the place where the result occurs. wang ronghua, wang xiaojie, cai xin and other scholars pointed out that the application of the place where the results occurred was more consistent with the legislative purpose, and xu kai believed that the application of the latter could provide more protection for victims. the author believes that it is crucial to clarify the specific meaning of the lex loci delicti, “who will determine that the place of infringement is the place where the act is performed or the result occurs?” “how to judge?” and “what is the basis for determination?” these issues are directly related to the principle of the closest relationship, the principle of autonomy of will and the principle of victim protection. 5. from the perspective of transnational corporations transnational corporations are one of the unavoidable subjects in the legal issues of transnational environmental tort. among the valid documents retrieved, 40.58% of the papers were about transnational corporations. in addition to the jurisdiction and application of law summarized above, the responsibility of transnational parent companies has become one of the academic concerns. secondly, it can also be noted that the existing researches are mostly analyzed from the perspective that china is the transferred pollution country (i.e., the host country), but in several articles with a relatively recent age, the research perspective that china is the home country began to appear, or the dual role of china as the host country and the home country was analyzed in many aspects. the first issue that scholars pay attention to is the limitation of the company’s limited liability system in foreign-related environmental tort disputes. jiang ming pointed out that the main form of transnational corporations’ investment in china is that subsidiaries assume limited liability as independent legal persons, that is, all the assets of subsidiaries assume unlimited liability, while the parent company only assumes limited liability for the part of its capital contribution. however, due to the particularity of the integration of the organizational structure of transnational corporations, the huge environmental pollution damage the corporations caused and the important role they play in the local economy, the victims who resort to the courts of the host country always could not get the result they want. at the same time, the limited liability system has also become a tool for the parent company to avoid liability risks. professor yu jinsong regards the victim as an involuntary creditor. under the limited liability system, if the subsidiary is unable to pay high damages, the victim’s losses will not be compensated directly. therefore, it is the current consensus that the parent company should bear the liability for damages under certain circumstances. however, its theoretical basis is controversial. some scholars pointed out that the reason why the parent company bears the responsibility is to “pierce the corporate veil”, that is, to break through the system of disregard of corporate personality. this is one of the views widely www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 79 published by scholink inc. respected by the domestic and foreign academic community at present. considering that the system of disregard of corporate personality already has a system basis in china, it can be standardized by taking the subsidiary’s inability to bear environmental tort damages as a special case. another part of scholars believe that the basis for the parent company to bear the responsibility is that the parent company directly bears joint and several liabilities. for example, under the strict liability system in the <comprehensive environmental response, compensation and liability act> of the united states, the parent company, as an operator, can become one of the potential subjects of accountability, that is, it does not need to pierce the corporate veil, and bear the responsibility directly. in addition to the two above, some scholars also put forward the “multinational enterprise responsibility theory” and the “enterprise rule theory”, pointing out that the parent company and subsidiary can be regarded as a whole, ignoring the independence of the subsidiary, and the parent company can directly bear the responsibility. cai xin pointed out that the third view was rejected by most countries because it hindered international investment. last but not least, some scholars proposed that companies should bear corresponding social responsibility (csr), which extends the obligation of environmental information disclosure. the author believes that this view can be combined with the current popular esg research. claim after environmental infringement belongs to ex post facto rights protection, while emphasis on corporate social responsibility and environmental information disclosure obligations belongs to ex ante prevention. obviously, moving the timeline forward can have a better effect. in foreign countries, scholars’ research on the legal issues of transnational environmental tort is also relatively rich, forming many research results. the overall focus is on environmental tort issues and tort claims of transnational corporations. for example, daniel bertram analyzed the problem of environmental tort from the perspective of transnational corporations. he believed that transnational corporations, as powerful participants in the global economic pattern, caused more environmental damage because of impunity for enterprises and institutional barriers prevalent in host countries, which prevented victims from obtaining legal remedies. this view is consistent with the general view in china. he also emphasized that transnational tort litigation is still a tool to achieve procedural and substantive environmental justice. michael anderson mentioned that the climate change caused by the emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases at the present stage will affect the environmental quality of surrounding countries. however, different from the research perspective of domestic scholars, anderson emphasized the strict censorship treatment of transnational corporations that they are subjected to at present. foreign scholars in the field of transnational environmental tort research in a variety of forms. for example, noah sachs explained the problems of tort liability system by establishing a theoretical model of responsibility negotiation based on the institutional theory of politics, and summarized the main obstacles to the implementation of liability system at this stage based on the model. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 80 published by scholink inc. 6. research prospect 6.1 summary of research status first of all, the overall number of existing papers at home and abroad is limited, and some of the them has a long time span. china formally implemented the <law on the application of laws> in 2011, and the previous laws and regulations have limited reference value. with the promulgation of the <civil code>, the chapter of the original <general principles of civil law> on the legal application of foreign-related civil relations has become invalid, and the corresponding judicial interpretation has also become invalid. secondly, the focus of the academic community is more concentrated and prominent, in which the research on the application of law is obviously more than the jurisdiction, and the recognition and enforcement of judgments are less involved. on the basis of theoretical research, there are also a lot of practical analysis from the perspective of transnational corporations, or from the perspective of oil pollution, nuclear pollution, dangerous goods transport and other special environmental tort fields. in addition, it can be noted that the concern of marine environmental tort has increased in recent years, which is directly related to the frequent occurrence of international marine environmental pollution incidents. the relief of transnational environmental tort has gone out of the framework of national liability and started to move towards private law and internalization. although the formulation of a unified international treaty is the most direct and effective solution, the existing judicial practice has proved that the path is full of obstacles and difficult to achieve the ultimate goal. therefore, it is more effective to focus on the relevant provisions of national laws. many scholars have shifted their focus to the establishment of punitive compensation system, compensation fund system and liability insurance system, while others have emphasized the connection with civil law, criminal law and administrative law. 6.2 future outlook china has not yet established special article on transnational environmental tort, which indicates that there is still space for researching in this field. and among the existing documents, although some of them were written in the beginning of the 21st century, some of the raised problems, such as “the court lacks a unified standard for determining the place of infringement”, “restricting party autonomy”, and “should tend to protect the rights and interests of the weak”, have not been resolved until now. and with the invalidation of legal documents, there is no law to judge the “place of infringement”. legal gaps lead to problems that are difficult to solve in judicial practice. on the other hand, china’s economy has developed at a high speed in recent years. it is no longer in line with china’s national conditions to regard china as the host country of transferred pollution. the number of chinese enterprises “going global” has increased, indicating that china’s becoming a home country is the trend in the future. changing the inherent perspective thinking and innovating the research content from multiple dimensions may become a new perspective for the study of transnational environmental tort law issues. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 81 published by scholink inc. at the same time, the specific characteristics of environmental tort is not only reflected in environmental tort compared with general tort, but also reflected in the different characteristics of environmental tort in different fields. existing research focuses on water pollution (marine pollution), nuclear pollution and hazardous waste transportation, but does not involve other pollution factors such as air pollution, noise pollution and soil pollution. therefore, when discussing the legal issues of transnational environmental tort, special analysis should also be carried out in combination with the particularity of different environmental fields. references hans, v. l., wang, x. x., & zhao, y. p. (2018). principles and building blocks for a global legal framework for transnational civil litigation in environmental matters. journal of political science and law, (05). wang, r. h., & wang, x. j. (2014). on the legal application of international environmental infringement—from the perspective of environmental infringement by transnational corporations, academic exchange, (12). tian, h. y. (2014). the development of applicable law in cross-border environmental tort and the enlightenment for china. environmental protection, (22). xu, k. (2013). the international legislative trend and enlightenment of the legal choice of transnational environmental infringement. environmental protection, (10). jiang, m., & zhang, m. c. (2010). on the mechanism of environmental tort accountability of subsidiaries of international companies in china. presentday law science, (04). xiang, z. s. (2012). on the jurisdiction in the relief of transnational environmental torts. ecupl journal, (05). feng, y. n. (2012). the application of forum non conveniens in environmental damage cases against mnes: study on auinda v. texaco inc. journal of guangzhou university (social science edition), (01). cai, x. (2014). on the legal application of environmental tort liability investigation of transnational corporations. seeker, (04). pan, y. j. (2015). a study on legal regulation of multinational corporations’ environmental responsibility through the lens of corporate social responsibility. a dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of doctor of law in the graduate school of shanghai jiao tong university. jiang, m. (2010). the research on environmental law of multinational corporations in china. a dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of doctor of law in economic law in the graduate school of hunan university. liu, e. y. (2009). the study on private international law issue of international environmental tort. a dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of doctor of law www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 4, 2022 82 published by scholink inc. in the graduate school of fudan university. daniel, b. (2022). environmental justice “light”? transnational tort litigation in the corporate anthropocene german law journal, 23, 738-755. https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2022.45 cheng, h. j. (2015). the subject of international civil procedure law of the cross-border environmental pollution tort relief (경희법학), 50(1), 117-132. https://doi.org/10.15539/khlj.50.1.4 noah, s. (2002). beyond the liability wall: strengthening tort remedies in international environmental law, 55 ucla l. rev. 837 (2008). michael anderson. transnational corporations and environmental damage: is tort law the answer, 41 washburn l.j, 399(2002). michael, a. (2002). transnational corporations and environmental damage: is tort law the answer, 41. advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 27 report introduction to academic writing course (mbbs) sadaf azfaar hussain 1 & lecturer english 1 1 dow institute of health professionals education, dow university of health sciences, karachi, pakistan received: january 14, 2022 accepted: february 8, 2023 online published: february 20, 2023 doi:10.22158/ape.v6n1p27 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v6n1p27 abstract the demand for the study of second or foreign-language english is extremely high, which places a heavy burden on educational resources in many nations. specific vocabulary and abilities pertaining to professional communities and academic fields are needed for esp courses. internationally, english is used extensively in higher education. the demand for academic english courses has grown significantly (jordan, 1997). english, the universal language of science, is now known as english for specific purposes (esp) in non-english speaking nations (ghanbari, 2010). the teaching of english as a second language (esp) in sindh is a growing field. learning english for a specific purpose is an essential part of language instruction at the higher educational level, with the objectives being to learn specialized vocabulary, increase subject knowledge by reading in english, and be able to use the language in a potential profession or study area by getting ready for some common situations, like carrying out higher level studies, attending an interview, or conducting professional conversations (varnosfardani, 2009). many english language courses in academic contexts are built on the premise that language should be connected to the purpose for which students are expected to use the language after their studies. for medical students, the purpose of an esp course is to support them in there is academic work and future jobs. english is particularly significant in medical learning because medical textbooks and professional publications are predominantly written in english (bensoussan, collado, viton, & delarque, 2009). english as the primary language for international communication is now generally acknowledged. determine the issues with esp classes by carefully examining the attitudes and views of students and teachers. learning a second language is generally seen as distinct from learning one’s native tongue, and it is frequently believed that factors affecting one’s ability to learn a second language have no bearing on the development of one’s native tongue. knowledge of a second language affects one’s capacity to manage information in the native tongue. contemporary cognitive and psycholinguistic models of bilingualism claim that the two languages www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 28 published by scholink inc. interact, even during language-specific processing. understanding the interaction between two languages is crucial since it is still being determined how acquiring a second language impacts native-language function. background of the study: at an average age of 18, dow medical university in sindh students enter medical college straight out of high school. to evaluate students, the educational system mostly uses teacher-based assignments, exams based on memorization, and norm-referenced tests. the majority of students develop passive learning habits as a result. the major language of instruction in sindh’s secondary school system is urdu; beginning in grade 4, english is introduced as a second language. because the medical school curriculum is delivered in english, all first-year students receive an intensive english course in addition to their other premedical requirements, regardless of their level of language proficiency. students are soon made aware of the necessity to acquire effective learning abilities when they realize how much more academic pressure there is when they enroll in the university. statement of the problem: as a result of the english language barrier, medical students learning in an efl environment have been seen to struggle with their medical schoolwork. the students are familiar with the specific vocabulary and grammatical patterns used in this context of the english language. 1. introduction early academic writing and research skill development is essential for success in both academic and professional settings. this course intended to educate students on the rules of academic writing in english and the components and benefits of what is known as process writing. to provide them the chance to try out these tools and reflect on their growth as writers. to help students develop their own “toolbox” of academic writing skills. despite being a pilot course, the course covered a number of crucial areas of academic writing. the course introduction to academic writing aimed to render undergrad-medical students the basic understanding and essential skills of the written academic discourse. the main focus of the course was the style, language, and conventions used in academic writing. this course was a hands-on opportunity for students to learn to communicate their ideas in clear and compelling prose. kayaoğlu, m. n., and akbaş, r. d. (2016) stated that teaching and learning english as a second or foreign language has become very common in today’s world as a result of english becoming the de facto language of international communication. english is widely used for communication in various industries, including the medical sciences. there is no denying that english has spread over the world. the language of choice for worldwide communication in a variety of sectors, including business, science, education, and the media, is now english (alqurashi, 2016). as a result, significantly more people are now studying english (karimnia, 2018). specifically, english is used by the scientific community as its primary language. since many professional texts are written in english, those with www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 29 published by scholink inc. strong english communication skills can keep up with developments in their field of study (pritchard et al., 2004). more than half of the online content is available in english because more than 52% of the most popular websites show their content in the language (ets worldwide, 2020). . furthermore, stress that “english is of particular relevance for science students because it is the main international language of science and is regarded as an effective means of helping those students to become familiar with professional texts written in english kang (2004) underlines the significance of english as an international language in medical studies, given that nearly all modern medical textbooks are written in this language. by outlining the importance of english for medical purposes (emp) as a kind of english for specific purposes (esp), kurfürst (2005) and joesba and ardeo (2005) draw attention to this. they assert that medical students who study english will be able to read medical textbooks, journals, and english-language publications. they will also be able to get ready for taking part in group projects and attending international medical conferences. kurfürst (2005) also notes that medical students who acquire english will be able to write patients’ histories, orders, and prescriptions in the future.  understand the essence and application of academic discourse  recognise different genres of academic writing  differentiate between formal and informal register  incorporate stylistic elements of academic discourse in their writing  develop coherent paragraphs with clear and concise sentences  employ techniques used in academic writing to avoid plagiarism  use relevant technological tools that assist academic writing 2. course plan introduction to academic writing 2.1 basics of academic writing unit components  understanding academic writing  rationale and significance of academic writing  genres and style of academic writing note: at the start of the session, a diagnostic test was conducted to:  make need-based improvisations to ensure effective implementation of the course;  measure students’ progress and course effectiveness after completion of the course. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 30 published by scholink inc. academic language 2.2 decluttering for precision and brevity unit components:  reducing redundancy and verbosity  eliminating unnecessary amplifiers  avoiding tautology and long lead-ins  correcting misplaced and dangling modifiers 2.3 voice and verbs unit components:  understanding and comparing voices  recognising the merits of both voices  choosing lively and active verbs  hedging with verbs  ensuring subject-verb agreement 2.4 numbers, stats, and abbreviation unit components:  understanding the conventions for reporting statistics and numbers  using abbreviations according to academic conventions  learning to edit using grammarly 3. sentence and paragraph skills 3.1 understanding paragraph development unit components:  understanding the bases of a paragraph  establishing unity and support in paragraphs  using cohesive devices for coherence 3.2 session 6: practicing sentence skills unit components:  perfecting sentences: length, variety, and accuracy  rectifying common sentence errors  learning to edit using grammarly 4. avoiding plagiarism 4.1 quoting, paraphrasing, and summarizing unit components:  including short and long quotations  using paraphrasing techniques www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 31 published by scholink inc.  summarising important aspects of academic texts  learning to paraphrase using wordtune v. review and feedback 4.3 culminating session unit components:  practising academic writing  evaluating progress through a post-test before the pilot training course the course was planned to keep in view the language needs of the medical students. planning the pilot course: identification of the faculty d.i.h.p.e (english faculty), five english language faculty members were involved in the pilot course. eight sessions in four weeks started in the month of august 2022. the class duration for each session was based on 1.5 hours. each of them contributed to the course. all five faculty have expertise in english language teaching. they have been involved in different training and workshops based on academic writing. course structure participants the participants of this course were 300 (female and male) students of the dow medical college studying in the academic year 2022 at the dow university of health sciences. there were heterogeneous students. evaluation of the course generally speaking, the course activities were conducted with an active approach that can foster direct participation, involvement of the participants, and learning by discussion. various methodologies were used during the classes, such as frontal lessons, brainstorming, exercises, discussions, etc. course outcomes: the course was based on the following objectives:  understand the essence and application of academic discourse  recognise different genres of academic writing  differentiate between formal and informal register  incorporate stylistic elements of academic discourse in their writing  develop coherent paragraphs with clear and concise sentences  employ techniques used in academic writing to avoid plagiarism  use relevant technological tools that assist academic writing results, critical factors, and suggestions for improvement session 1: teaching methodologies the course and session objectives were introduced through teacher-centered instruction. later, the genres www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 32 published by scholink inc. and style of academic writing were introduced using instructional scaffolding. the academic writing style was also taught using task-based learning. observation regarding participants involvement and learning different students participated and were involved at different degrees. due to the size of the class both physically and spatially. students seated near the rear of the room appeared to need to be more engaged. however, several of the rear pupils were paying close attention and listening to the instructor. additionally, the majority of the students had already completed a before-the-session, which included little interaction. it took some time to establish rapport and momentum after that. activities were included in the final 30 minutes, and the students’ participation greatly increased. as the lesson came to a close, a few students approached the instructor because they were curious about the material and wanted to learn more. they even requested advice and help with their writing. methods or tools of assessment a pre-test was administered as expected to gauge the pupils’ prior knowledge and comprehension of academic writing. the remainder of the session involved assessments via discussion exercises and questions. on a worksheet, students were asked to evaluate the texts for academic writing style. additionally, they had to convert a non-academic text into an academic one. critical thoughts/ challenges regarding the implementation of course the strength of the students wa the main obstacle. additionally, the first class looked more difficult because the students needed to learn about the subject or its importance. even the fact that it. the writing course was unknown to them. recommendations a manageable strength will support task-based learning more effectively. this is crucial for skill-based courses to get the best learning outcomes. we can also ensure that the students are informed of certain crucial course information before the start of sessions so they can arrive at class prepared. session ii: teaching methodologies an inductive approach was used throughout the session. the task-based approach was also utilized for the interaction. the observation regarding participant’s involvement and learning although the kids were engaged in the activities, their energy levels were low as a result of the class schedule. during the session, the majority of the kids enthusiastically participated, but others appeared uninterested. their level of comprehension and participation was evaluated based on the responses they got in the form of screenshots of their worksheets. some students were afraid to share their responses at first, but following encouragement and constructive criticism during the session, they confidently engaged in class. additionally, other students were inspired to finish the assignments and submit their comments. some pupils finally requested assistance and criticism for their written pieces. methods or tools of assessment www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 33 published by scholink inc. different tasks were assigned to the students on different techniques of decluttering the text. critical thoughts/ challenges regarding the implementation of course the biggest challenge was the number of students to teach and interact with during the session. all students could not come within the range of teacher’s focus that led to distractions. 6. recommendations student-centered and task-based learning will be more effective if the strength of students can be reduced. also, an institutionally supported learning management system can better facilitate the teachers and students in sharing the resource material of the course. 6.2 sessions iii, iv teaching methodologies the teacher-oriented methodology was initially used. later, as the session progressed, task-based and student-centered approaches were utilized. to maximize students’ learning, relevant examples from the medical context were used. task-based activities and discussions were also used. the observation regarding participants’ involvement and learning because of the rainy weather, students were not in the mood to study. after a while, they settled down. students in the front rows were engaged as they asked and answered questions. i observed many students taking notes and photos of slides. toward the end, a few students approached, asking if i could proofread their drafts. they asked for contact information and reference books. the good thing was that the students were quick to learn and familiar with basic english language concepts. methods or tools of assessment grammarly was supposed to be used for assessment, but there was no internet connection, so instead, i used the task-based activities from the slides. students were given error correction tasks. their understanding was also assessed through discussion and questions. teacher-oriented instruction & task-based approach was used in session iii. critical thoughts/ challenges regarding the implementation of course the major challenge was the strength of the class. with this strength, holding their attention for 90 minutes is difficult. i used proximity control as a classroom management strategy. i walked around the room, solicited responses to increase students’ engagement, and gave corrective feedback. 7. recommendations there should be at least two sections in mbbs’s first year for quality teaching and learning. in addition, it would be better to have the english class during the first half so that the students will be more interested and participate energetically. 7.1 session v teaching methodologies initially, the higher number of students made it hard to keep their attention and engage them in the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 34 published by scholink inc. lesson, especially those sitting at the back. later, it shifted from a teacher-centered approach to a task-based technique to teach the students, and the teaching style and approach were modified to account for the larger class size. i.e., walked around the room. the observation regarding participants’ involvement and learning after a few slides, pertinent questions were asked to keep the students engaged. it was seen that the students were taking notes and photos of the lecture slides. after the lesson, they were given questions based on writing faults in paragraphs. in conclusion, the cross-questioning technique was also used. after the session ended, students clapped, and a few came to ask for the number and email. methods or tools of assessment it was decided to use a different assessment strategy using kahoot, but due to an inactive internet connection, cross questioning techniques and task-based exercises were used. critical thoughts/ challenges regarding the implementation of course overall it was a good session. a diverse teaching strategy helped complete the session with maximum student engagement. students sitting at the back kept changing seats while entering the class, creating a disturbance in the beginning. recommendations a stable and reliable internet connection is crucial to applying modern language teaching and learning strategies in language sessions. in addition, the class size should be decreased to at least 100 to 150 pupils, or it can be split into sections. students need to be aware of the course’s importance, implications, applications, demands, and prerequisites for their specific field. as it is crucial, it will motivate them to attend the course with readiness. 7.2 sessions vi & vii teaching methodologies the teachers used teacher-centered and task-based approaches. the observation regarding participants’ involvement and learning students’ motivation was low; some students, especially those seated in the front rows, were attentive and participative. they captured slides through their phones and even raised their queries. methods or tools of assessment task-based activities and discussion critical thoughts/ challenges regarding the implementation of course the facilitator of this session faced similar challenges as mentioned above. recommendations the facilitator endorsed all the recommendations listed above. 8. conclusions the course is adaptable to the unique needs of the student participants and patient population. it may be modified for any target language and prior participant training level. the discrepancy we observed was www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 6, no. 1, 2023 35 published by scholink inc. mainly related to the number of students in the class. this course suggested that a formal course tailored for medical students in a class setting of 100 to 150 students is feasible and effective. we administered participant self-assessment surveys preand post-course using close-ended questionnaires. the questionnaire mainly inquired about the background knowledge and understanding of the students regarding academic writing. references alqurashi, f. (2016). english for medical purposes for saudi medical and health professionals. advances in language and literary studies, 7(6), 243-252. https://doi.org/10.7575/aiac.alls.v.7n.6p.243 bharathi, k. n., & pushpanathan, t. (2022). english for medical purposes and its status in india. available at ssrn 4027451. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4027451 coury, j. g. (2001). english as a lingua franca in the brazilian academic world. retrieved from http://www3.telus.net/linguisticsissues/linguafranca.htm. joesba, m., & ardeo, g. (2005), student engineers, esp courses, and testing with cloze tests. esp world, 2(10). retrieved from http://www.espworld.info/contents.htm kang, s.-j. (2004). a korean medical doctor’s experiences in learning and use of english in the united states: individual and environmental affective factors. paper presented at the sixteenth annual conference in ethnographic and qualitative research in education, university of albany, suny, new york, 4–6 june 2004. karimnia, a., & khodashenas, m. r. (2018). medical students’ english language learning: needs and perceptions. sustainable multilingualism, 13(1), 164-190. https://doi.org/10.2478/sm-2018-0016 kayaoğlu, m. n., & akbaş, r. d. (2016). an investigation into medical students’ english language needs. participatory educational research, 3(4), 63-71. https://doi.org/10.17275/per.16.spi.1.8 kurfürst, p. (2005). english? sure, but how? paper presented at the international conference on lingua summit 2005, trencín, slovakia shirvan, s. j. (2021). the need of medical english for medical students. academic researches in, 599. wardhaugh, r. (1986). an introduction to sociolinguistics. oxford: blackwell. yang, h.-y. (2006). a needs analysis of english: perceptions of faculty and doctoral students (unpublished master’s thesis). national chiao tung university, hsinchu advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 15 original paper making astrology look respectable: on the extraordinary abuse of economic models in the eu referendum debate david blake1* 1 city university of london, uk * professor david blake, city university of london, uk received: october 29, 2021 accepted: november 13, 2021 online published: november 22, 2021 doi:10.22158/ape.v4n4p15 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v4n4p15 abstract in june 2016, i released an article entitled: “measurement without theory: on the extraordinary abuse of economic models in the eu referendum debate” in advance of the referendum on 23 june 2016 on whether the uk should leave the european union. that article heavily criticised two reports that had been released by the uk treasury on the consequences of brexit, calling them “dodgy dossiers” for “grossly exaggerating the impact of the economic consequences of brexit and providing no analysis of the risks from remaining in the eu”. this article reproduces the 2016 article and also provides an update on the state of the uk economy five years after the publication of the reports. it confirms that the only purpose the two treasury reports was to make astrology look respectable. table of contents part 1: the two treasury reports 17 key points and implications of the treasury reports 17 executive summary 18 introduction 22 the treasury’s long-term economic model—the gravity model 23 problems with the treasury’s long-term economic model 26 what the treasury’s long-term economic model cannot do 29 the imf and bank of england long-term economic models 31 the treasury’s short-term economic model—the var model 32 problems with the treasury’s short-term economic model 36 linking the treasury’s short-term and long-term economic models 41 what the treasury’s short-term economic model cannot do 43 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 16 published by scholink inc. it’s more than the economics stupid! 44 embarrassing for the economics profession 49 the political abuse of the treasury models 53 even more political abuse 58 conclusion 63 appendix: lord mervyn king’s interview with martha kearney 64 part 2: the state of the uk economy five years after the publication of the treasury reports 68 references 72 notes 73 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 17 published by scholink inc. part 1: the two treasury reports key points and implications of the treasury reports the treasury uses a gravity model to predict that gdp per household will be lower by £4,300 by 2030 if the uk votes to leave the european union. this is because the treasury assumes that the uk, the fifth largest economy in the world, will be unable to negotiate more favourable trading arrangements than currently exist with either the eu or the rest of the world. the uk’s reduction in its share of exports to the eu from 54% in 2006 to 44% in 2015 is not consistent with the gravity model. greenland’s economy grew rapidly when it left the eu in 1985 and ireland’s trade with the uk was unchanged by her exit from the sterling area in 1979. this is completely at odds with the gravity model’s predictions for the uk leaving the eu. the same model would predict that the uk would be better off joining the euro and that every country in the world would be better off joining the european union. a similar model predicted that if scotland left the uk, its trade with the rest of the uk would fall by 80%. the treasury uses a short-term model called a var model to predict an immediate recession if the uk votes to leave the eu. there is no causality in a var model—it merely projects forward existing trends in a data set. the treasury assumes—with no evidence, since there can be no evidence—that voting to leave the eu will constitute an economic shock equivalent to 50% of the shock of the global financial crisis and that this shock lasts for two years. the biggest cause of a shock of this size would be the scare-mongering tone of the two treasury reports. the treasury also assumes that there will be no policy response to this shock—unlike in the gfc when the government pumped £375 billion into the economy. as a result of these two assumptions, the var model automatically and mechanically generates a recession that cuts uk gdp by 6% in two years’ time (relative to where the economy would be if the uk remained in the eu)—equivalent to 50% of uk trade with the eu—yet we will still be in the single market during this period. the treasury models assume that the uk’s population will not change between 2016 and 2030, despite office for national statistics predictions that up to 4 million more people will move to the uk over this period. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 18 published by scholink inc. executive summary the treasury has published two reports on the economic consequences of a decision by the uk to vote to leave the european union in the referendum on 23 june. together, the reports predict that each household in the uk will be worse off (in terms of a lower gross domestic product) by £4,300 or more by 2030. this prediction is grossly exaggerated for two main reasons. first, the treasury assumes that the government will not respond to what it calls the “extreme shock” of leaving the eu—a shock that is assumed to last for two years, which is longer than that caused by the global financial crisis—and so will stand by while the economy dives into a recession with gdp falling by up to 6% over the next two years (relative to where the economy would be if the uk remained in the eu)—equivalent to losing 50% of our trade with the eu, even though we will still be in the single market during this period. this is simply not credible—had the government responded in the same way during the gfc, the consequences for the economy would have been catastrophic. second, it assumes that the uk, the fifth largest economy in the world, will be unable to negotiate more favourable trading arrangements than currently exist with either the eu or the rest of the world—which has three times the gdp of the eu and nine times its population and is growing much faster than the stagnant eu economy. as a result of this assumption, gdp is predicted to be lower by up to 7.5% p.a. by 2030. this prediction comes from combining the outcome from a short-term model (called a vector autoregressive (var) model) which is used for the first two years after leaving with a long-term model (called a gravity model) which is used to project gdp between 2018 and 2030. the reason that the models are switched in 2018 is because this is the maximum time allowed to negotiate an exit from the eu under article 50 of the treaty on european union. the specific gravity model used by the treasury is centred on the eu: this model predicts that the uk would actually be better off not only staying in the eu but actually joining the euro—although the treasury does not acknowledge this. had the treasury used a different gravity model centred on the rest of the world—which it certainly should have considered—it might well have found that the uk would be better off leaving the eu. most of the other economic models that have examined the economic consequences of brexit—and which have been entirely ignored by the treasury—find that it will make little difference to the uk’s economy whether the uk stays in or leaves the eu. this is consistent with both greenland’s experience of leaving the eu in 1985 and ireland’s experience of ending currency union with the uk in 1979—neither of which is considered in the treasury reports. the treasury’s long-term economic model—the gravity model the gravity model is similar to the model that isaac newton used to explain the orbit of the planets around the sun in our solar system. think of the eu as the sun and the different european countries www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 19 published by scholink inc. as planets orbiting the sun. the model assumes that countries closest to the centre of the eu have the greatest economic benefits—in terms of bilateral trade and foreign direct investment and their subsequent effects on productivity and economic growth—from membership of the eu. this, of course, means the countries in the euro area. the treasury estimates the consequences of the uk leaving the eu and moving further away: first into the european economic area, then into the european free trade area and then into the rest of the word (row) where world trade organisation (wto) rules operate. the model’s predictions are unambiguously clear: the uk will be worse off outside the eu by 2030. there are no circumstances in which the uk could be better off outside the eu. the treasury’s gravity model has some very powerful implications: • not only would the uk be better off by staying in the eu, it would be even better off joining the euro area—which is closest to the sun. • all countries in the world would be better off joining the eu and the euro area. and this result holds even if the eu collapses into a black hole—which is not an unlikely possibility, certainly in the case of the euro area. what the treasury’s long-term economic model cannot do the treasury’s gravity model cannot be used to determine with any degree of reliability what the economic consequences of brexit are, for a very simple reason—there are no data points to calibrate the eu gravity model properly. in the absence of this, the model assumes that leaving the eu is the opposite of joining the eu. but this is not at all valid and the economic consequences cannot be determined as though they are. the relationships already established within the eu will mean that the uk should be able to negotiate a much better mutually beneficial trade deal than a country that never joined the eu, such as norway or switzerland. the gravity model seriously overestimates the costs of brexit. there are a number of pointers to this in the report: • the government used a gravity model to assess the economic consequences of scotland leaving the uk and predicted that cross-border trade between scotland and the rest of the uk would fall by 80%. can anyone possibly believe that this figure is plausible, given the previous 300 years of political and economic union, the geographical proximity, the common language and currency, and similarity of the legal systems? • the uk’s recent trading experience with the eu is completely inconsistent with the predictions of the gravity model: the share of uk exports to the other eu countries which has fallen from 54.2% in 2006 to 43.7% in 2015 or by 19%. all this is pointing to the real possibility that the uk could be much better off if it “jumped” solar systems and joined one centred on the row. the treasury’s gravity model could easily have tested www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 20 published by scholink inc. this possibility and certainly should have done—if it were offering a comprehensive analysis and genuinely wanted to examine all possibilities. the treasury’s short-term economic model-the var model the treasury’s short-term economic model is a vector autoregressive (var) model. this is a model that (1) merely projects forward the existing trends amongst a series of variables that might or might not be causally related, and (2) is incapable of identifying and predicting the consequences of a structural change that has not been previously observed in the historical data used to calibrate the model. what the model does is make the assumption that a vote to leave the eu on 23 june 2016 would constitute a “severe shock” to the uk and global economies. the shock manifests itself in a 50% increase in a “comprehensive uk uncertainty indicator” on 24 june. the heightened uncertainty lasts for the full two years that the uk has to negotiate an exit under article 50 of the treaty on european union (teu). the uk’s relative gdp falls by up to 6% during this period as businesses and households start to realise they will be “permanently poorer” in the long term. the var model generates what economists call a “sunspot equilibrium”. this is where an extraneous random variable—in this case the level of uncertainty caused by a “shock”—influences real economic activity—in this case by causing a recession—in a way that is unrelated to economic fundamentals, purely because people supposedly believe that this variable matters. another problem is that the shock to uncertainty remains constant throughout the two-year period after brexit. however, not even in the great recession of 2008-09 did the shock stay constant for two years. what the treasury’s short-term economic model cannot do the main problem with the short-term model is that it cannot be used to estimate the gdp loss from brexit. there are two reasons for this. first, the var model was calibrated to the sample period 1989-2016. but there was no brexit during this period. so any attempt to use this period to determine what the appropriate initial size of the shock should be breaks the first law of informatics: irrelevant information cannot be utilised. the treasury therefore has to make a judgement—that brexit will be 50% as bad as the great recession. there is no evidence for this—it is a pure judgement. nevertheless, the biggest cause of a shock of this size would be the scare-mongering tone of the two treasury reports. the second reason is that it ignores the policy response that the government would inevitably implement to manage expectations and so reduce and remove the uncertainty. it assumes that the government does not respond at all and allows the self-fulfilling prophecy to develop and the sunspot equilibrium to emerge. an appropriate policy response would therefore reduce the initial size of the uncertainty indicator. that, combined with an inappropriately calibrated model, would mean that the var model would www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 21 published by scholink inc. make a very poor predictor of what would actually happen during the first two years after brexit. the report also states on that “no member state has ever left the eu”. but this is not true. greenland left the european communities in 1985 without triggering the kind of recession outlined in this report. indeed, the economy boomed after leaving the eu: the average annual real growth rate was 5.7% in the five years after leaving the eu, compared with 0.7% p.a. in the preceding five years. the report also ignores the fact the when ireland left the currency union with the uk in 1979 and adopted the irish punt and later the euro in 1999, there was a negligible effect on trade between the two countries. so the treasury is using a short-term model that cannot tell what size shock there should be, has no policy responses, and produces results completely at odds with greenland’s experience of leaving the eu or with ireland’s experience of leaving the currency union with the uk. but worse than this, neither the short-term nor the long-term model accounts for the non-economic risks of remaining in the eu. it’s more than the economy stupid! the eu is a potentially highly unstable gravitational system. there are a number of reasons for this. the first has to do with the euro. it was quite obvious from the start of european economic and monetary union (between 1999 and 2002) that most of these conditions for the euro to survive would fail to be satisfied in the euro area. but it is not just the economics. a fundamental problem is the democratic deficit in the eu. this is because the eu is a political project and the eu political elite are prepared to ride roughshod over the wishes of its citizens. but this attitude will inevitably bring into question the political and social stability of the eu itself. all these issues are ignored by the treasury. embarrassing for the economics profession the reports do not consider the alternative economic models that predict that the uk will do well out the eu. all serious economic studies should report the results of alternative studies. most of these models predict that there will be very little difference to gdp by 2030 whether the uk stays in the eu or not. finally, the reports do not even consider the economic risks of remaining in the eu, never mind the full range of non-economic risks. these failures are embarrassing for the economics profession. the political abuse of the treasury models there is doom-mongering on every page of the two reports. it’s no different from the way children are frightened into doing what their parents want. we are all being treated like children. both the chancellor of the exchequer and the prime minister have used the reports to ramp up the scare-mongering. even more political abuse the second report gives the strong impression that we really don’t have a choice—the uk can never www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 22 published by scholink inc. actually leave the eu, because it would be too difficult to unravel and too difficult to negotiate any new trade deal with other countries. however, international law recognises a “presumption of continuity” and all the parties need to do is sign a documentation of continuation in force. further, the wto does not allow tariffs to be raised once they have been lowered between countries. conclusion there was a time when the global plutocracy relied on the mysticism of religion to keep the populace in its place. now the modern global plutocracy is using the mysticism of economic models. if we fall for this, we will enter a new dark age where fear over the size of the eu trade dummy in a gravity model is intended to keep us all under control. the british treasury has in effect become a propaganda machine for a political institution led by jean-claude juncker—a man who has declared his hostility to “democratic choice” when it comes to the wishes of the european people. this whole exercise is utterly dangerous for democracy. the treasury’s application of gravity and var models to assess whether the uk would be better in or out of the eu confirms john kenneth galbraith’s dictum that: “the only function of economic forecasting is to make astrology look respectable”. what is happening is no different from tony blair’s “dodgy dossier” on saddam hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. these two reports will rightly gain the same status of “dodgy dossiers”. introduction no economic model by itself can be used to determine whether a decision by the uk electorate to leave the european union will make people better off or worse off. this is because a whole range of factors in addition to economic ones—political, legal, financial, trading, diplomatic, security, military, social, environmental, demographic—will determine whether our individual welfare improves or reduces after leaving. this is because the eu is an institution that embraces all these factors. in addition, when looking across all the people living in the uk, there will be both gainers and losers. this is an inevitable consequence of any change. further, it is equally important to take into account the consequences of the status quo, i.e., remaining in the eu. this is because the eu has serious long-term political and economic problems that arise because of a democratic deficit and because of the adoption of the euro by certain member states, problems that are now recognised even by supporters of the eu as well as its detractors. the treasury has published two reports on the economic consequences of a vote by the uk to leave the european union in the referendum on 23 june. the first is a long-term economic model whose results were described in “hm treasury analysis: the long-term economic impact of eu membership and the alternatives”, published on 18 april 2016. (note 1) the second is a short-term model whose results were considered in “hm treasury analysis: the immediate economic impact of leaving the eu”, published www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 23 published by scholink inc. on 23 may 2016. (note 2) together, the reports predict that each household in the uk will be worse off (in terms of a lower, gross domestic product or gdp) by an average of £4,300 by 2030. this prediction is grossly exaggerated for two main reasons. first, the treasury assumes that the government will not respond to what it calls the “extreme shock” of leaving the eu—a shock that is assumed to last for two years, which is longer than that caused by the global financial crisis—and so will stand by while the economy dives into a recession with gdp falling by up to 6% over the next two years (relative to where the economy would be if the uk remained in the eu)—equivalent to losing 50% of our trade with the eu, even though we will still be in the single market during this period. this is simply not credible—had the government responded in the same way during the gfc, the consequences for the economy would have been catastrophic. second, it assumes that the uk, the fifth largest economy in the world will be unable to negotiate more favourable trading arrangements than currently exist with either the eu or the rest of the world—which has three times the gdp of the eu and nine times its population and is growing much faster than the stagnant eu economy. as a result of this assumption, gdp is predicted to be lower by up to 7.5% p.a. by 2030. this prediction comes from combining the outcome from a short-term model (called a vector autoregressive (var) model) which is used for the first two years after leaving with a long-term model (called a gravity model) which is used to project gdp between 2018 and 2030. the reason that the models are switched in 2018 is because this is the maximum time allowed to negotiate an exit from the eu under article 50 of the treaty on european union. the specific gravity model used by the treasury is centred on the eu: this model predicts that the uk would actually be better off not only staying in the eu but actually joining the euro—although the treasury does not acknowledge this. had the treasury used a different gravity model centred on the rest of the world—which it certainly should have considered—it might well have found that the uk would be better off leaving the eu. most of the other economic models that have examined the economic consequences of brexit—and which have been entirely ignored by the treasury—find that it will make little difference to the uk’s economy whether the uk stays in or leaves the eu. this is consistent with both greenland’s experience of leaving the eu in 1985 and ireland’s experience of ending currency union with the uk in 1979—neither of which is considered in the treasury reports. i have examined both models and will review the reports in the order they were published. the treasury’s long-term economic model—the gravity model the treasury’s long-term economic model is actually made up of a number of different models. the principal one used is a “gravity model”. this “allows the analysis to isolate the influence of the different trade relationships from all the other influences that affect bilateral trade and foreign direct investment (fdi) flows such as distance, historical ties, gdp and population. once the effect of each relationship has been identified, they can be combined with other data, such as for uk goods and services trade, to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 24 published by scholink inc. estimate the uk specific impacts of moving from one sort of relationship to another, having controlled for all the other influences on bilateral trade and fdi flows” (p. 20). the output from the gravity model is then input into nigem, the national institute of economic and social research’s global macro econometric model to calculate “the consequences for productivity and gdp” (p. 20). nigem is a general equilibrium model that examines the overall macroeconomic impact of economic shocks on the dynamic path of the uk economy through various economic channels, such as consumption, investment, net trade, and the labour market. it can also investigate the consequences of policy changes. (note 3) the gravity model is similar to the model that isaac newton used to explain the orbit of the planets around the sun in our solar system. think of the eu as the sun and the different european countries as planets orbiting the sun. the planets closest to the sun have the strongest gravitational pull from the sun. planet size is also important in a gravity model—the biggest countries in terms of gdp and population become the biggest planets in the gravity model. planet size can therefore help to compensate for a planet’s distance from the sun. according to the treasury’s gravity model, the countries closest to the centre of the eu have the greatest economic benefits—in terms of bilateral trade and fdi and their subsequent effects on productivity and economic growth—from membership of the eu, which it classifies as a ria (regional integration agreement or area). this, of course, means the countries in the euro area (playing the role of mercury and venus in the solar system analogy). orbiting outside the eu are european countries with looser trading connections with the eu. the first group of countries are those in the european economic area (eea), such as norway (taking on the role of neptune). and furthest away—acting the part of pluto—is switzerland which is only in the european free trade association (efta). outside the eu solar system altogether is the rest of the world (row). trading relationships between the eu and the row (countries such as the us, russia and brazil) are governed by the world trade organisation (wto). the gravity model predicts that this is a place you would not want to be, since it is so far away from the sun. it is very cold out there and you will be completely isolated from warm inner core that is the euro area. see figure 1 and figure 1.b on p. 29 of the treasury’s report, reproduced below. the treasury’s gravity model estimates the consequences of the uk (earth) leaving the eu and moving further away: first into the eea, then into the efta and then into the row/wto. the model uses dummy (or indicator) variables to represent the position of a country in the solar system. so it switches off the uk’s eu dummy variable (i.e., the variable that is set to unity in the model if you are in the eu and set to zero if you are not in the eu) and switches on, say, the row dummy variable to assess what happens when the uk “moves out” to the row. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 25 published by scholink inc. figure 1 – the treasury’s gravity model the model’s predictions are unambiguously clear: the uk will be worse off outside the eu by 2030. there are no circumstances in which the uk could be better off outside the eu—all the tables presented in the report show negative outcomes. gdp per household by 2030 would be lower by £2,600 per annum if we moved to the eea, by £4,300 if we moved to the efta and by £5,200 if we moved to the row. these are equivalent to permanent reductions in gdp of 3.8%, 6% and 7.5% p.a., relative to remaining in the eu. the treasury’s gravity model has some very powerful implications: • not only would the uk be better off by staying in the eu, it would be even better off joining the euro area—which is closest to the sun. curiously, the paper does not report how much better off the eu euro area uk row eea efta www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 26 published by scholink inc. uk would be if we did this. had a gravity model been used in 2000-2002 when the euro area was set up, it too would have predicted that we would have been better off joining. indeed, supporters of uk participation in the euro when it started must have been using a gravity-type model in order to make the statement that it would be a “disaster” for the uk not to join. equally curiously, the treasury, then under gordon brown, did not report the results of a gravity model, since it did not want the uk to join the euro area at that time. nevertheless in june 2003, the treasury did report that growth, stability, investment and employment would increase as a result of euro membership, but only if convergence and flexibility were sufficient. (note 4) • all countries would be better off joining the eu, since, according to the model, europe is at the centre of the known universe—something which many european leaders have, of course, believed for centuries. the report, for example, claims that norway’s productivity would be 6% p.a. higher if it had joined the eu (p.140). but not just norway, all the countries in the row (such as the us, russia and brazil) would be better off if they joined the eu and the euro area. and this result holds even if the eu collapses into a black hole—which is not an unlikely possibility, certainly in the case of the euro area. • this is because once you become “trapped” in a particular solar system, you cannot escape and you are “better off” remaining. bulgaria, croatia, the czech republic, estonia, hungary, latvia, lithuania, poland, romania, slovakia, and slovenia are former soviet bloc countries which are now in the eu. but they used to be in comecon, the economic trading area centred on the soviet union. a gravity model calibrated for the comecon economies—recognising the importance of common borders and a common language (russian) and all the other factors justifying an ria—would have predicted that it would be a “disaster” if any of these countries left comecon. yet we know what a black hole the soviet union eventually became. problems with the treasury’s long-term economic model there are two sets of problems with the treasury’s long-term economic model. the first set relate to the assumptions made concerning key variables in the model, while the second set relate to the incomplete nature of the treasury’s analysis. one key variable in the model is productivity—which measures output per worker. this is because trade and net inward investment influence of the level of productivity and hence economic growth. if the true number of workers is higher than official estimates, but output is accurately measured, then true productivity is lower than official estimates. a key problem is accurately measuring the number of workers in an economy when there is worker migration. the government uses the international passenger survey (ips) to estimate the net number of migrant workers. according to the ips, 900,000 net migrant workers came to the uk between 2011 and 2015. yet during the same period, 2.4 million national insurance numbers were issued to migrant workers. this means that the true number of migrant workers could be up to 1.5 million higher than the official estimates which is around 5% of the employed workforce. this would mean that current productivity is actually lower by 5% p.a. and this www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 27 published by scholink inc. would have a consequential effect on economic growth. another problem is that the model ignores the effect of future worker migration. but this is not at all clear from the report. on p.136, the report predicts that net immigration will fall from 329,000 p.a. in 2014 to 185,000 p.a. from 2021. this means that the report accepts that there will be a total of 3 million new workers by 2030, the year for which it projects the above reductions in gdp per household. however, the report then goes on to state: “no additional effect from net migration has been assumed in the modelling”. it took a letter from sir andrew dilnot, chair of the uk statistics authority, to jack doyle of the daily mail on 27 may 2016 to clarify what was going on: (note 5) you asked about whether 2030 immigration and population growth figures should be used in the treasury’s estimate of impacts on gdp per household. we understand that hm treasury has calculated these projections by estimating the annual impact of leaving the eu after 15 years (compared to being in the eu). hm treasury has presented these results in a range of ways including the impact on gdp per household. this is expressed in terms of 2015 gdp in 2015 prices, using the population estimates for 2015. there are a number of ways analyses of the economic impact of leaving the european union can, and have been conducted, which might produce different results. in general it is not unreasonable to base both the denominator and numerator on the same reference year, in this case 2015; if 2030 population projections were used rather than 2015 population figures, it would also be appropriate to use projections for gdp in 2030, rather than 2015 figures. yet the treasury has made gdp projections for 2030 (although it has reported them in 2015 prices). it should therefore have used 2030 population estimates. i can understand why the government has avoided projecting the population out to 2030 and that is because of its amazingly poor record of predicting inward migration. in 2004, the government underestimated the number of polish migrants coming to the uk by a factor of 60 (i.e., the ratio of 800,000 to 13,000). further, the 3 million figure looks like an underestimate of at least 1 million if we take the office for national statistics own projections that the uk population will increase from 65 million to 70 million by 2027 and to 76 million by 2050 and that “about 68% of the projected increase … is either directly attributable to future migration [51% of projected growth], or indirectly attributable to future migration through its effect on births and deaths [17% of projected growth]”. (note 6) even if we accept the figure of 3 million additional migrant workers by 2030, it is difficult to convert this into numbers of households in order to work out gdp per household in 2030. if the additional migrants are all single, this would add 3 million households by 2030, while if they are typical of the rest of the population, this would add 1.3 million households. (note 7) so depending on whether and how the additional migrants are counted, the number of households could be higher and the reduction in gdp per household by 2030 could be lower by between 5% and 11% compared with the numbers www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 28 published by scholink inc. reported in the report. (note 8) if we add the additional 1 million migrants projected by the ons, the differences could be between 6% and 14%. but this would only be correct if the treasury’s projection of gdp in 2030 included the output of these additional workers which it does not appear to do. so an appropriate projection of gdp per household in 2030 would require reliable projections of both gdp and the number of households in the uk in 2030 if the uk stays in the eu and reliable projections of both gdp and the number of households in the uk in 2030 if the eu leaves the uk and moves to the eea, or the efta, or the row/wto. and the gdp estimates would, in turn, depend on accurate assessments of the skills and hence productivity of the migrant workers. further, the larger the number of households and the more children those households contain, the more resources the government needs to devote to providing houses, transport, schools and hospitals, etc. all this will have a major impact on the composition of gdp in 2030 and on the extra taxes or borrowing the government needs to raise—which will be partially offset by the taxes the new migrants pay. none of this is accounted for in the treasury model. but it does show that any estimate of gdp per household in 2030 should be treated with considerable caution. more on this later. as an academic economist, i have spent 40 years working with various types of economic model and after this time you get to know many tricks of the trade—such as the small changes in assumptions that lead to very big effects when compounded over long periods—the flapping of the butterfly’s wings in australia that leads to storms over europe. one such butterfly is the assumption that any temporary uncertainty over brexit leads to a loss of output that has permanent effects. this is stated without further explanation (p.153 and p.185): “the persistence effect is estimated to be 1% of gdp…and is included as a shock to productivity in long-term scenarios”. this is approximately equivalent of a permanent reduction in gdp growth of 1% p.a. or around £700 per family by 2030, more than a quarter of the loss of £2,600 if the uk left the eu and joined the eea. so if you take into account the possibilities that the current size of the working population is underestimated by up to 5%, that the number of households by 2030 could be miscalculated by between 5 and 14% and that a persistence effect equal to 1% of gdp is exaggerated, then it would be hard to tell whether the model’s predicted reductions in gdp of 3.8%, 6.2% or 7.5% p.a. by 2030 are actually the result of the uk leaving the eu or whether they could be explained by measurement error or by other noise in the system. turning to the incomplete nature of the analysis, the report focuses entirely on the potential negative effects of leaving the eu and promotes only the positive effects of remaining. for example, the report argues on p.8 that: “the new settlement for the uk negotiated by the prime minister in february 2016 included an ambitious agenda of economic reform in the eu. this will include the next stage of development of the single market, with a focus on bringing down the remaining barriers to trade in services, energy and digital, alongside completing major ongoing trade deals. if the economic benefits of reform are realised, this could increase uk gdp by up to a further 4%—which equates to £2,800 for every household in the uk”. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 29 published by scholink inc. had the treasury done a proper analysis and examined the positive case for brexit, it would have modelled the uk’s position in a different solar system centred on the row. given that eu gdp is only 25% of world gdp and that the eu population is only 10% of the world’s population—as previously mentioned, gdp and population sizes are the two key variables in the gravity model—it is quite clear that it would not take too many trade deals with the row (which has 75% of world gdp and 90% of the world’s population) for brexit to make the uk better off—just as joining the eu made the former soviet bloc countries better off than staying in comecon. the treasury might well have found that uk productivity was enhanced by leaving the eu. one reason for this is the cost of eu red tape in reducing productivity which is ignored by the model. open europe states that—according to the uk government’s own regulatory impact assessments—the cost of the top 100 eu-derived regulations to the uk economy is around £33.3 billion per year. (note 9) similarly, the treasury model is asymmetric in its treatment of the uk and the rest of the eu (roeu). the model assumes that the roeu is not affected by the uk leaving (p. 186). yet the roeu sells to the uk around £291 billion in goods and services p.a., but buys only £223 billion in goods and services p.a. in return. it has a trade surplus with the uk of £68 billion. (note 10) this gives the uk enormous bargaining power in negotiating a new trade deal with the eu. any proper economic model of brexit would take this into account. the fact that the treasury model does not do so is a serious failure of analysis. (note 11) what the treasury’s long-term economic model cannot do however, the main problem with the treasury’s gravity model is that it cannot be used to determine with any degree of reliability what the economic consequences of brexit are, for a very simple reason—there are no data points to calibrate the eu gravity model properly. in the absence of this, the model is reduced to measuring the costs of brexit by switching off the dummy variables for eu membership—in other words, pushing us out further into the solar system. this is equivalent to assuming that leaving the eu is the opposite of joining the eu. but this is not at all valid. leaving the eu is not the opposite of joining the eu and the economic consequences cannot be determined as though they are. to use an aircraft analogy—landing a plane is not the opposite of a plane taking off. a plane takes off with its front wheels leaving the ground first. a model which assumed that a plane lands with its front wheels touching the ground first would predict that the plane would crash. however, we know a plane can land safely if its rear wheels touch the ground first. and the correct model would have predicted this. the relationships already established within the eu will mean that the uk should be able to negotiate a much better mutually beneficial trade deal than a country that never joined the eu, such as norway or switzerland. (note 12) any sensible model would reflect this. this means that the economic consequences of leaving the eu will be much less severe than the model predicts. in other words, the gravity model seriously overestimates the costs of brexit. there are a number of pointers to this in the report: www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 30 published by scholink inc. • this first is given on p. 156 which discusses the economic consequences of scotland leaving the uk. the government also used a gravity model to assess this and predicted that cross-border trade between scotland and the rest of the uk would fall by 80%. can anyone possibly believe that this figure is remotely plausible, given the previous 300 years of political and economic union, the geographical proximity, the common language and currency, and similarity of the legal systems? the same point has recently been made by patrick minford. (note 13) but why has this figure never been questioned before by anyone else? is it because we are so bamboozled by the mysteries of econometric modelling that no one dares to question the output of these models—even when it is clearly not plausible? • the uk’s recent trading experience with the eu is completely inconsistent with the predictions of the gravity model: the share of uk exports to the other eu countries which has fallen from 54.2% in 2006 to 43.7% in 2015 or by 19%. (note 14) now total exports have risen since gdp and populations have risen in both the eu and the row over the period—but the share should not have changed in this way if the gravity model is correct. • the report accepts that the uk is already one of the most open countries in the world in terms of trade (note 15) which has increased significantly over the past 5 decades—rising from 23% of gdp in 1965 to 64% in 2015 (chart a, reproduced above). it is also one of the most open in terms of finance with the total size of the uk’s foreign assets as a share of gdp the largest of any major advanced economy—at around 530% (p.18). is it seriously plausible to believe that this would come to an end if www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 31 published by scholink inc. the uk left a relatively small customs union with external trade barriers and began trading freely with the rest of the world? all this is pointing to the real possibility that the uk could be much better off if it “jumped” solar systems and joined one centred on the row. as mentioned above, the treasury’s gravity model could easily have tested this possibility and certainly should have done—if it were offering a comprehensive analysis and genuinely wanted to examine all possibilities. the imf and bank of england long-term economic models a number of other important institutions have been making predictions about the consequences of brexit, such as the international monetary fund and bank of england (and also the oecd). all these institutions are using the same or a similar gravity model (p. 124). so not only are the predictions from these institutions not independent of each other, they suffer from precisely the same problems when making predictions about the consequences of brexit. this means that when the imf’s managing director, christine lagarde, stated on 13 may 2016 that the uk leaving the eu would have “pretty bad to very, very bad consequences”—that could result in a “sudden stop” in money flowing into the finance sector which would drive down the value of the pound and lead to a sharp rise in interest rates, falling house and commercial property prices and the erosion of london’s status as a global financial centre, all of which would lead to a technical recession (note 16)—these predictions come from the same model that the treasury is using. the imf predicts that uk gdp could fall by between 1.5% and 9.5%. we should not forget that the imf’s record of predicting the results of uk economic policy is not especially good. in 2013, the imf’s chief economist, olivier blanchard, predicted that the uk was “playing with fire” with its austerity programme for reducing the government deficit faster than he would have liked. he predicted that this would reduce economic growth, but this did not happen. the uk shortly became one of the fastest growing economies in the eu. the imf’s predictions were even worse when it came to predicting the outcome of the greek bail-out in 2010. it said gdp would contract by 2.6% and then recover rapidly. it was out by a factor of 10—greek gdp declined by 26%. on may 12, the governor of the bank of england, mark carney, also said that brexit could lead to a technical recession. (note 17) once again these predictions come from a gravity model similar to the treasury’s. so the predictions of the bank and the imf are not independent of the treasury’s. however, the main job of the bank of england is not to estimate the cost of brexit, but to set interest rates to control inflation. in 2013, shortly after becoming governor, mark carney introduced “forward guidance”, a policy announcement that interest rates would rise once unemployment fell below 7%. just six months later, the policy was abandoned because unemployment did fall below 7%, but the bank judged that economic conditions did not justify raising interest rates. nevertheless, since then, mr carney has confidently predicted that an interest rate rise was just around the corner. unemployment is currently 5%, but interest rates have still not risen three years after the bank governor predicted they would. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 32 published by scholink inc. lord mervyn king, mark carney’s predecessor as bank governor, along with other bank colleagues, take a much more cautious approach to these matters. in 2011, they wrote: (note 18) self-confidence is infectious. it can also be dangerous. how often have we drawn false comfort from the apparent confidence of a professional advisor promising certain success only to be disappointed by subsequent performance? uncertainty pervades almost all public policy questions. economics and many other disciplines are united by a common need to grapple with complex systems. as the crisis of the autumn of 2008 showed, such systems can sometimes be subject to abrupt changes, the precise timing of which cannot easily be identified in advance. but policy-makers are often expected to anticipate the unpredictable. how can they retain the trust of the public while being open about the true degree of uncertainty? the treasury’s short-term economic model—the var model there was very little economic content in the treasury’s long-term economic model—the gravity model is not an economic model derived from the optimising behaviour of economic agents. (note 19) however, there is absolutely no economic content in the treasury’s short-term economic model. the model used is a vector autoregressive (var) model. this is a model that (1) merely projects forward the existing trends amongst a series of variables that might or might not be causally related, and (2) is incapable of identifying and predicting the consequences of a structural change that has not been previously observed in the historical data used to calibrate the model. what the model does do is make the assumption or judgement that a vote to leave the eu on 23 june 2016 would constitute a “severe shock” to the uk and global economies that is equivalent to 50% of the size of the shock of the great recession in 2008-09. (note 20) the shock manifests itself in a 50% increase in a “comprehensive uk uncertainty indicator” on 24 june. (note 21) the report calls this the “uncertainty effect” of a vote to leave, since we will not know on this date the terms of withdrawal from the eu, the new trading relationship with the eu, the new trading relationships with the row or the consequential changes to the uk’s domestic regulatory and legislative framework. the heightened uncertainty lasts for the full two years that the uk has to negotiate an exit under article 50 of the treaty on european union (teu). the uk’s relative gdp falls by up to 6% during this period. as a result of this increase in uncertainty about the uk’s future trading arrangements with the eu and the row, there would, according to the model, be a “damaging effect on both the demand side and supply side of the economy” (p. 7). in particular, the “uncertainty effect would also lower overall demand in the economy in the immediate aftermath of a vote to leave” (p. 6). the report calls this the “transition effect”: the “emerging impact of the uk becoming less open to trade and investment under any alternative to eu membership” and therefore a “less productive and permanently poorer” country in the long term following a vote to leave the eu, resulting in gdp being (using the central estimate) £4,300 lower for each household by 2030 and every year thereafter (note 22)—as predicted by the treasury’s long-term model. all businesses will reduce their investment spending and cut jobs until the nature of new arrangements www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 33 published by scholink inc. with the eu became clearer (p. 14): • those businesses which are part of international supply chains would be particularly hit by uncertainty over their ability to move products across borders and the increased costs they could face for being part of international supply chains—this would reduce the competitiveness or profitability of uk businesses in the global market place • businesses that trade with the eu would be uncertain about the uk’s access to the single market, not knowing what restrictions could be put on their ability to trade, including tariffs, customs costs or non-tariff barriers such as different product standards. providers of services would not know whether they would have guaranteed non-discriminatory access to the single market • businesses that import from the eu and over 50 non-eu countries would be uncertain about the potential for changes in uk tariffs and other rules to increase the price of imports • businesses that trade with non-eu countries would not know if and when they would again benefit from the preferential trade deals that uk businesses enjoy as a result of the eu’s trade agreements with non-eu countries • foreign investors in the uk would be uncertain over their access to the european market, a significant driver of foreign investment in the uk, leading them to delay, relocate or cancel investment that otherwise would have come to the uk • the 1.2 million individuals born in the uk living in other eu member states and others wishing to work, live or travel in other eu member states would not know whether they would continue to have the right to do so • those that currently benefit from eu funding would not know what support if any they would receive after the uk left the eu. this includes businesses, farmers, fishermen, universities and regions. apparently, “none of these uncertainties could be resolved easily”. the lower investment spending reduces productivity which, combined with the jobs cuts, reduces real wages. similarly, all households will reduce their consumption expenditure. the financial times explained how this will happen: “people will begin to learn that they have made a decision that will make the uk worse off in the long term, taking the treasury’s initial long-term calculation that the economy would ultimately be 6% smaller than it otherwise would be. not only does this shock affect the long term, but if people anticipate this drop in their lifetime incomes, they will understand that they need to tighten their belts straight away so that they do not hit a crisis in their finances by spending as if they were going to be as rich as they previously thought”. (note 23) this belief will help to cause a recession with relative gdp reduced by 6% and unemployment increased by 800,000 by 24 june 2018. (note 24) does this really sound like the “trusty british shopaholic”? (note 25) there will also be a “financial conditions effect”: the uncertainty effect and the transition effect will lead to a fall in asset prices. “financial markets would start to reassess the uk’s economic prospects. the uk would be viewed as a bigger risk to overseas investors, which would immediately lead to an increase in the premium for lending to uk businesses and households” (p. 7). the value of uk www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 34 published by scholink inc. personal investments would fall—house prices will fall by 18% and equities by 29%—and the value of sterling would fall by 15%, raising inflation by 2.7 percentage points. turning to the international sector, “after a period, exports would then begin to fall, reflecting the weaker outlook for productivity, driven by the transition effect, which would more than offset the impact of the fall in sterling” (p. 47). a 15% fall in sterling would normally be expected to boost exports significantly, but not in this model apparently. the fall in sterling leads to an increase in the price of imports that would immediately be passed on in terms of higher consumer prices. the fall in sterling happens to be a “modelling assumption” that “reflects the views of citi, commerzbank, credit suisse, deutsche bank, nomura, oxford economics, hsbc, jp morgan, niesr and the oecd” (p. 42). (note 26) turning to the government accounts, “net borrowing in 2017-18 would be around £39 billion higher and debt would be around £54 billion higher than under a vote to remain [due to] the fiscal deterioration and the lower level of nominal gdp. this fiscal deterioration would put at risk the government’s fiscal deficit reduction plan and the aim for debt as a share of gdp to be falling in each year until 2019-2020” (p. 52). the treasury does not, however, believe it will be possible for the uk to agree the terms of withdrawal from the eu, a new trading relationship with the eu, new trading relationships with the row, and change the uk’s domestic regulatory and legislative framework all within this two-year period. as a result of this, the uncertainty would be larger and could last up to a decade or more: “a period of persistent uncertainty about the uk’s economic policy, regulatory and legislative regime in the event of a decision to leave the eu would therefore be unavoidable” (p. 7). so it could get worse (p. 9 and p. 43): • first, these scenarios do not allow for so-called “tipping points”, such as the crystallization of financial stability risks. nor do they incorporate the risk of a “sudden stop” in financial inflows, reflecting concerns about the size of the current account deficit • nor has the impact of a sharp tightening of fiscal and monetary policy to restore credibility been modelled. in both scenarios monetary policy is held fixed. fiscal policy is assumed to support the economy through the operation of the “automatic stabilisers”. the analysis does not make any assumption about what policy decisions might be taken to contain the resulting increase in borrowing, but these would need to be significant as net government borrowing would increase by around £24 billion in the shock scenario, and by around £39 billion in the severe shock scenario, compared with a vote to remain. • moreover, if negotiations took longer than two years to conclude, or if the outcome were to be less favourable than expected, the uk economy could be subject to repeated and persistent rises in uncertainty which would depress further economic prospects. • a vote to leave the eu could have knock-on effects for the global economy. a weaker uk economy would have implications for the uk’s closest eu trading partners, including ireland. an www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 35 published by scholink inc. economic deterioration in foreign economies would mean the uk’s trade with them would suffer even more, which would, in turn, weigh on uk growth. to err on the side of caution, the shock scenario does not make any allowances for economic contagion from a uk vote to leave the eu impacting on other countries, beyond the reduction in trade. • in practice, the impact of uk economic instability and disruption would, at least in part, extend beyond uk borders—both directly through lower spending, and also through increased financial risk premia. to test this assumption, the severe shock scenario assumes an element of financial contagion with eu economies. this has been modelled by assuming eu term premia for government debt and the corporate borrowing premium increase according to the historical relationships with uk financial conditions. the equity risk premium in eu countries is assumed to increase by the same level as in the uk. after two years, modelling these foreign financial stresses leads to a reduction in euro area gdp of around 1% relative to a uk vote to remain in the eu. this would weaken external demand for uk exports and weigh on uk growth. the report concludes that “a vote to leave the eu would result in a marked deterioration in economic prosperity and security….. in contrast, a vote to remain in the eu would see uncertainty fall back rapidly with little lasting impact on the economy”. how does all this happen? the report models the economic impact of uncertainty shocks using a vector autoregression (var) model (p. 39). the model uses 25 years of data from 1989 to 2016 to estimate the relationship between the uncertainty indicator, overall economic activity and financial market conditions. the uncertainty indicator is then elevated to isolate the impact of an uncertainty shock on key economic and financial variables. the var model is given on p. 66: where uncertainty is the level of the uncertainty indicator; c, i and p are consumption, business investment and the gdp deflator, all in log differences; r is bank rate, hhprem is the household borrowing spread, corpprem is the corporate borrowing spread and equityprem is the equity risk premium, all in differences. a0 is a vector of constants and ɛt is a vector of residuals. (note 27) the model has to determine the size of the uncertainty shock that would be generated by a vote to leave the eu. chart a.2 (on p.65 and reproduced below) shows the relationship between the uncertainty indicator and gdp growth between 1989 and 2016. during this period, there were two big shocks: the recession of 1991-92 and the great recession of 2008-2009 which was caused by the global financial www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 36 published by scholink inc. crisis (gfc). as mentioned earlier, the treasury assumes that voting to leave the eu will be equivalent to an increase in the uncertainty indicator that is 50% of the size of that in the great recession. (note 28) this elevated value for the uncertainty indicator is then put into the var model above and the model is allowed to run—the dynamics of the var model are driven by the size and persistence of the uncertainty shock. the output from the var model is then put through nigem to find out what the implications for the rest of the economy would be, and, in particular, future gdp. the results discussed above are the output from nigem. (note 29) problems with the treasury’s short-term economic model there are a number of problems with the var model and also with how it is implemented. these relate to how the treasury assumes businesses and households respond to the “shock” of leaving the eu, how long that “shock” is assumed to persist, and, finally, to the assumption made by the treasury about how government policy will react to the way that businesses and households are predicted to behave. the var model generates what economists call a “sunspot equilibrium”. (note 30) this is where an extraneous (or extrinsic) random variable—in this case the level of uncertainty caused by a “shock”—influences real economic activity—in this case by causing a recession—in a way that is unrelated to economic fundamentals, purely because people supposedly believe that this variable www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 37 published by scholink inc. matters. it then becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. this phenomenon has been recognised for some time. the economist arthur pigou argued that “the varying expectations of business men and nothing else, constitute the immediate cause and direct causes or antecedents of industrial fluctuations”. (note 31) keynes later coined the term “animal spirits” to describe this phenomenon. (note 32) the self-fulfilling prophecy in the treasury’s short-term model is that brexit will lead to such uncertainty that it will set off a chain reaction that leads to a recession which makes the uncertainty worse and which, in turn, leads to the recession getting deeper. this results in a never-ending downward spiral in gdp—through a positive feedback loop (note 33)—as shown in figure 2. c of the report on p.57 and reproduced above. the lines on the chart stop two years after brexit, but there is nothing to stop those lines falling to -100%. in other words, uk gdp will eventually become zero—see the box below headed “create your own sunspot equilibrium”. create your own sunspot equilibrium it is easy to create a sunspot equilibrium and generate a recession. suppose we have the following simple var model linking gdp and an uncertainty indicator (ui): (note 34) gdpt = gdpt-1 ‒ 0.5uit-1 uit= ‒uit-1 with gdp0 = 10 and ui0 = 1. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 38 published by scholink inc. this shows that gdp in quarter t is equal the previous quarter’s gdp less 50% of the previous quarter’s value of the uncertainty indicator. in addition, the value of the uncertainty indicator in quarter t is the negative of its value in the previous quarter. in other words, the economy exhibits, over the relevant data period, a regular two-quarter bi-polar cycle of “bear” (depression) and “bull” (elation) animal spirits. figure 2 shows this bi-polar pattern of the uncertainty indicator and the response of gdp. gdp responds with a one-quarter lag. the uncertainty indicator has a value of 1 in quarter 1 and this leads to a mini recession in quarter 2, with gdp falling from 10 in year 1 to 9.5 in quarter 2. however, the uncertainty is reversed in quarter 2 and the uncertainty indicator takes a value of -1 in that quarter. this generates a mini boom the following quarter and gdp rises to 10.5 in quarter 3. this pattern repeats itself over the next 8 quarters. suppose that during the previous 25 years, the same pattern in the data was observed and this data had been used to estimate the parameters of the var model. figure 2—var model of gdp and the uncertainty indicator: recent history while this is a simplified and stylised version of the var model used by the treasury, it is perfectly acceptable to use it to show how the treasury demonstrates that brexit would be a disaster for the uk. suppose the treasury assumes that the uncertainty indicator following brexit rises to 2 and stays there. figure 3 shows the result of projecting with the above var model—we can destroy the economy in less than 3 years. but there is no economics in this at all—it purely arises from the mechanical operation of the model. -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 gdp uncertainty index www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 39 published by scholink inc. figure 3—var model of gdp and the uncertainty indicator: the effect of brexit another problem is that the shock to uncertainty remains constant throughout the two-year period after brexit (p. 40). however, chart a.2 in the report shows that not even in the great recession did the shock stay constant for two years: the heightened uncertainty when the great recession started only lasted for one year before falling back to one quarter of its peak level for the next four years. the persistence of uncertainty in the model helps to explain why the relative fall in gdp after two years (with the extreme shock) is 6%, one percentage point more than in the great recession, despite the initial shock being only 50% of the size generated by the gfc. holding the level of uncertainty constant for two years certainly speeds up the self-fulfilling prophecy in a var model. a var model simply projects forward existing trends. if a variable has been increasing in the past, the model will project that it continues to increase. if a variable has been declining in the past, the model will project that it continues to decline. similarly, if, over a particular historical sample, the model has estimated a negative relationship between two variables—such that when one rises, the other falls—then, if during a projection simulation, one variable is arbitrarily increased, the model will project that the other variable will fall. depending on the sizes and signs of the parameter estimates, the second variable can continue to fall without limit, even if the increase in the first variable is reversed. in other words, the increase in the first variable sets off a chain reaction that moves the system from a state of rest onto a perpetual downward trajectory. the system will only stop when a boundary condition is reached—such as when the second variable hits the floor with a zero value. if the first variable happens to be an extraneous random variable like the degree of “uncertainty”, the chain reaction that is set off becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy that ends in a “sunspot equilibrium”. 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 gdp uncertainty index www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 40 published by scholink inc. however, there is no causality in any of this. it is simply the mechanical structure of the model that drives the outcome. any increase in the uncertainty indicator for any reason drives the result. further, the same increase in the uncertainty indicator will give the same result whatever the cause. take a look again at chart a.2 and the relationship between the uncertainty indicator and gdp changes. start by looking around the time of the two recessions. the downward co-movement between the two variables at the start of each recession is almost instantaneous—with the uncertainty indicator taking a short lead. yet gdp is a slowly moving juggernaut compared with the uncertainty indicator which can change on a daily or hourly basis. the uncertainty indicator might well be elevated at the same time that gdp is falling, but it takes a leap of faith to then say that the heighted level of uncertainty “causes” gdp to fall almost instantaneously. (note 35) a key fault with newton’s theory of the gravity was that signals could cross instantaneously from one end of the universe to the other. it took another two centuries for einstein to tell us that no signal can travel faster than the speed of light. the var model used by the treasury has a similar defect. further, if you ignore the periods around the two recessions, can you see much of a relationship between the two variables? take the period following the great recession—gdp recovers more rapidly than the uncertainty indicator is reduced. the relationship between gdp and the uncertainty indicator could be almost entirely spurious—but that, of course, is entirely consistent with a “sunspot equilibrium”. one of the most serious deficiencies of the model is that there is no policy response by the government to the developing recession generated by the model. the report explicitly states that the model holds monetary and fiscal policy fixed for the whole period. it justifies this on the grounds that it would be too hard to know what to do (p. 42): monetary policy 2.33 the bank of england’s monetary policy committee (mpc) has noted that it would be likely to face a trade-off following a vote to leave. in particular, the mpc set out that it “would face a trade-off between stabilising inflation on the one hand and stabilising output and employment on the other. the implications for the direction of monetary policy would depend on the relative magnitude of the demand, supply and exchange rate effects”. 2.34 as there are two opposing forces on domestic inflationary pressure, the direction of the policy response would not be clear. rather than attempt to anticipate how the mpc would react, the shock and severe shock scenario assume for the purposes of the model that the mpc holds bank rate unchanged although market rates tighten. the impact on gdp could be worse under an alternative assumption. in reality, the mpc would operate consistent with its remit. fiscal policy 2.35 in the shock and severe shock scenario it is assumed for the purposes of the model that in response to the impact of a vote to leave the eu, fiscal policy would support the economy in the short term via operation of the “automatic stabilisers” and the deficit would be higher. these are the non-discretionary response of tax receipts, welfare and interest payments to changes in the economic www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 41 published by scholink inc. cycle. for example, higher unemployment would result in greater welfare spending, through benefits such as jobseeker’s allowance. 2.36 the automatic stabilisers support the economy in a cyclical downturn but would lead to higher borrowing and debt. the analysis does not assume what policy decisions might be taken to contain borrowing. departmental spending which is not part of the automatic stabilisers is assumed to stay fixed in nominal terms as set out in hm treasury’s budget 2016, and tax and welfare policy remains unchanged. compare that with the £375 billion that the treasury poured into the banking system to end the gfc. this lack of policy response also helps to explain why the relative fall in gdp after two years (with the extreme shock) is 6%, one percentage point more than in the great recession, despite the initial shock being only 50% of the size generated by the gfc. holding policy constant for two years also speeds up the self-fulfilling prophecy in a var model. finally, in this section, let us pause for a reality check. uk exports as a share of uk gdp is around 28% and uk exports to the eu as a share of uk gdp is around 12.5%. (note 36) so the 6% relative fall in gdp after two years is equivalent to almost 50% of our trade with the eu. is this plausible? not according to the following: • mervyn king: “one should be very cautious of precise, numerical estimates of what the consequences would be…eu membership is a big, big question that cannot be reduced simply to the simple-minded level of a cost-benefit analysis…i’m old enough to remember the referendum in britain in 1975 on exactly the same issue. the one thing that both sides of the argument then were wrong about was that it would make a dramatic difference. it didn’t”. (note 37) • lord stuart rose, former chief executive of m&s and chairman of britain stronger in europe: “nothing is going to happen if we come out of europe for the first five years, probably. there will be absolutely no change”. (note 38) • michael o’leary, chief executive of ryanair and a remain supporter, said that brexit would “not be the end of the world”. (note 39) • willy walsh, chief executive of british airways, said that brexit would not have a “material impact” on ba. (note 40) linking the treasury’s short-term and long-term economic models it is clearly absurd that a brexit will eventually lead to the uk’s gdp vanishing—as in figure 2.c and figure 3. this is why the treasury abandons the short-term var model after two years and switches to the long-term gravity model which moves the economy to a long-term equilibrium by 2030. the economic rationale used by the treasury for switching models after two years is that the uk’s trading position with the eu will have by then become clear, since two years is the maximum period to negotiate an exit under article 50 of the teu. apparently, uk businesses and consumers will suddenly realise what a bad deal has been negotiated and so will switch to the gravity model and move to one of the three “permanently poorer” equilibria (eea, efta or row/wto) by 2030 where gdp is reduced www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 42 published by scholink inc. by 3.8%, 6% or 7.5% p.a., respectively. this is shown in a modified version of figure 2.c below. however, the two models used by the treasury—the var model and the gravity model—are completely different and indeed completely inconsistent with each other. yet they need to be linked together to produce a coherent explanation of the trajectory of the economy between 2016 and 2018 and between 2018 and 2030. this is achieved by setting the initial shock in the var model at a level that generates just the right fall in gdp after two years (as shown in figure 2.c) that is consistent with the additional fall in gdp predicted by the gravity model after 14 years, i.e., by 2030. in other words, the short-term model has been calibrated to be compatible with the long-term model, conditional on switching models after two years. this implies that the treasury backed out the required size of the initial shock in the short-term model—50% of that in the great recession—once it knew what results the long-term model generated. this is confirmed on p. 11 of the short-term report in the following way: “the first effect of a vote to leave the eu would be that businesses and households would start to make decisions consistent with the transition to becoming permanently poorer in the long term” in line with the predictions of the treasury’s long-term economic model. for the two models to be consistent with each other, the size of the initial shock—the elevation of the uncertainty indicator—is determined by the long-term model, rather than how economic agents would actually respond on the day after a vote to leave the eu. we consider this point in more detail in the next section. var model gravity model switch models in 2018 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 43 published by scholink inc. what the treasury’s short-term economic model cannot do the main problem with the short-term model is that it cannot be used to estimate the gdp loss from brexit. there are two reasons for this. first, the var model was calibrated to the sample period 1989-2016. but there was no brexit during this period. the only extreme events were the recession of 1991-92 and the great recession of 2008-09. the var model was calibrated to take into account these two events and so would be able to project what would happen if either of these two events took place again and the same policy responses were implemented. but a brexit is completely different from the erm which caused the first recession and the gfc which caused the second. so there is no way that the var model, calibrated to the sample period 1989-2016, can be used to project the consequences of a brexit. so any attempt to use this period to determine what the appropriate initial size of the shock should be breaks the first law of informatics: irrelevant information cannot be utilised, or equivalently, never use a data set other than for the purpose for which it was originally collected. the treasury therefore has to make a judgement—that brexit will be 50% as bad as the recession. there is no evidence for this—it is a pure judgement. (note 41) this was confirmed by jack meaning, a research fellow at the national institute for economic and social research where some of the models used by the treasury were developed. in an interview with martha kearney on bbc radio 4’s world at one on 23 may 2016, he said: (note 42) one of the key aspects is that when you look at the analysis that has been done by the oecd, by the treasury, by ourselves at the national institute, we are all using the same or a very similar structure of model—at lot of it is hinged on the same model. the differences in results as they stand come from judgement. the downside is that there is an element of judgement by the model user into what goes in—and obviously with models used just being a tool—what goes in affects what comes out. (note 43) the second reason is that, as previously mentioned, it ignores the policy response that the government would inevitably implement to manage expectations and so reduce the level of uncertainty. it assumes that the government does not respond at all and allows the self-fulfilling prophecy to develop and the sunspot equilibrium to emerge. this simply would not happen in the real world. it would be similar to the government standing by while the whole banking system and the economy collapsed during the great recession. yet the policy response in the uk (and the us—but not the eu) was broadly very successful—the treasury managed expectations by saying it “would do whatever it takes” to save the economy and backed that up with a policy of quantitative easing that provided sufficient liquidity to the banking system to provide the necessary confidence to prevent a bank run—it had learned the lessons of the 1930s. an appropriate policy response would therefore reduce the initial size of the uncertainty indicator. that, combined with an inappropriately calibrated model, would mean that the var model would make a very poor predictor of what would actually happen during the first two years after brexit. (note 44) the report also states on p. 24 that “no member state has ever left the eu”. but this is not true. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 44 published by scholink inc. greenland left the european economic community (the predecessor to the eu) in 1985 without triggering the kind of recession outlined in this report. indeed, the economy boomed after leaving the eu. table 1 shows that the average annual real growth rate was 5.7% in the five years after leaving the eu, compared with 0.7% p.a. in the preceding five years. and this is despite the fact that more than 90% of greenland’s exports go to the eu, e.g., 92.7% in 2010. (note 45) table 1. gross domestic product in greenland 1980-1989 year us dollars (bn) per capita ($) growth (%) current prices real 1970 prices current prices real 1970 prices 1980 0.47 0.13 10363 8.7 1981 0.43 0.13 9332 0.67 1982 0.40 0.12 8290 -4.4 1983 0.41 0.13 8661 3.5 1984 0.37 0.12 7662 -5.2 1985 0.41 0.13 8194 3.7 1986 0.59 0.14 12004 7.1 1987 0.77 0.14 15380 5.5 1988 0.88 0.15 17393 5.6 1989 0.91 0.16 17704 6.7 the report also ignores the fact the when ireland left the currency union with the uk and adopted the irish punt in 1979 and later the euro in 1999, there was a negligible effect on trade between the two countries. (note 46) so the treasury is using a short-term model that cannot reliably tell what the initial size of the shock should be, has no policy responses to manage expectations, and produces results completely at odds with greenland’s experience of leaving the eu or with ireland’s experience of leaving the currency union with the uk. but worse than this, neither the short-term nor the long-term model accounts for the non-economic risks of remaining in the eu. it’s more than the economics stupid! the eu is a potentially highly unstable gravitational system. there are a number of reasons for this. the first is economic and has to do with the euro. as every second-year economics undergraduate student knows, a single currency will only survive in a specific geographical area if that area satisfies the four conditions laid out by nobel prize winning economist robert mundell in his theory of the optimal currency area: (1) sufficient wage and labour mobility to eliminate unemployment quickly, (2) sufficient price and capital flexibility to remove trade imbalances, (3) all parts of the area having www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 45 published by scholink inc. similar business cycles, so that a single monetary policy in the form of a single area-wide interest rate will be effective across the whole area—with the interest rate raised in a boom to reduce inflation and reduced in a slump to stop deflation, and (4) a system of regional redistribution whereby regions with trade surpluses redistribute them to regions with trade deficits. (note 47) it was quite obvious from the start of european economic and monetary union (emu) (between 1999 and 2002) that most of these conditions would fail to be satisfied in the euro area. there is not sufficient labour market flexibility. the different regions of the euro area do not have similar business cycles, so when the european central bank, which is located in frankfurt, initially set a low european-wide interest rate to suit the economic conditions in the core euro area countries, in particular germany, this led to an unsustainable boom—especially a property boom—in peripheral countries, such as ireland and spain. both countries experienced a construction-related economic collapse that destroyed their banking systems when the great recession started in 2008. this contributed to the european sovereign debt crisis which started in 2009 and has not finished. most significantly, the original emu agreement had a no-bailout clause—in other word, there was going to be no system for redistributing trade surpluses and deficits within the euro area. the intention was to force the peripheral countries to become as efficient as germany through labour and capital market reforms alone. today, the peripheral countries in the euro area are still in economic crisis. for example, greece, spain and portugal have unemployment rates of 24%, 20%, and 12%. the corresponding youth unemployment rates are even worse at 51%, 52% and 33%. greece has lost 26% of national output since 2007 and has a national debt of £228 billion or 175% of its gdp. (note 48) one key reason for these disastrous figures is that although these countries are in the euro area, they are not sufficiently close—in terms of distance, gdp or population—to the centre of the euro area which is germany. in other words, the euro area has its own mini solar system within the eu. germany is now the sun with countries like holland and belgium taking the role of mercury and venus, while greece, spain and portugal are right out there alongside pluto. yet despite being peripheral in the euro area, the gravity model predicts that it would be catastrophic for these countries to leave the euro area. once trapped, like the comecon countries in a lousy solar system, you cannot escape. another type of economic model would predict that if only these countries could leave the euro area and devalue their currency, they could reduce the international price of their exports and grow their way out of what would otherwise be a perpetual recession. a second-year economics undergraduate student could tell you all this—it doesn’t take milton friedman to confirm that: (note 49) europe exemplifies a situation unfavourable to a common currency. it is composed of separate nations, speaking different languages, with different customs, and having citizens feeling far greater loyalty and attachment to their own country than to a common market or to the idea of europe. but it’s not just the economics. a fundamental problem is the democratic deficit in the eu. here are www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 46 published by scholink inc. four quotes—the first from a former british politician, the second from the founding father of the eu, the third from the current president of the european commission, and the fourth from the current german chancellor: • “no government dependent upon a democratic vote could possibly agree in advance to the sacrifice which any adequate plan must involve. the people must be led slowly and unconsciously into the abandonment of their traditional economic defences, not asked, in advance of having received any of the benefits which will accrue to them from the plan, to make changes of which they may not at first recognise the advantage to themselves as well as to the rest of the world” (peter thornycroft, design for europe, 1947). • “europe’s nations should be guided towards the super-state without their people understanding what is happening. this can be accomplished by successive steps, each disguised as having an economic purpose, but which will eventually and irreversibly lead to federation” (jean monnet, letter to a friend, 30 april 1952). • “there can be no democratic choice against the european treaties” (jean-claude juncker in ‘greece: the dangerous game’, le figaro, 1 february 2015). • the uk’s eu referendum is a “completely unnecessary risk” (angela merkel, quoted in the sunday times, 15 may 2016) these quotes quite clearly demonstrate that the eu is a political project and the eu political elite are prepared to ride roughshod over the wishes of its citizens. those who genuinely believe in “ever closer union”, because it will stop future european wars, will only ever be able to see problems, such as the greek debt crisis, as an opportunity for “more europe” and faster. this means that the eu is incapable of being reformed to make it more democratic and accountable, because this might slow down the progress to “ever closer union”. immediately after the uk referendum, the european commission will release plans for a joint eu budget which is the first step to a fiscal union to match the monetary and banking union in the euro area. (note 50) similarly, federica mogherini, high representative of the union for foreign affairs and security policy, will announce plans to establish an eu army immediately after the referendum; apparently, the eu “can manipulate the lisbon treaty in order to bypass the uk’s traditional veto on defence matters”. (note 51) but this type of attitude and behaviour will inevitably bring into question the political and social stability of the eu itself. the democratic deficit is not just a concern for citizens of the uk. according to an ipsos mori poll reported on 10 may 2016, more than 50% of italian and french citizens wanted a vote on eu membership, with 48% of the former and 41% of the latter saying that they would vote to leave. clearly, europe’s people are no longer prepared to fall for the political con trick underlying the eu. one key factor responsible for eu-wide discontent with the eu is the refugee crisis. around 1.1 million people from syria and elsewhere entered germany in 2015. in february 2016, the cologne institute for economic research reported that it will cost around £19 billion (€25 billion) per year to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 47 published by scholink inc. house and feed these migrants and educate their children. if the asylum claim of a migrant is rejected, it might cost up to £6,666 ($10,000) to deport each migrant if estimates from the us are anything to go by. (note 52) the plight of refugees escaping war deserves not only our sympathy, but also our economic support. some go further and argue that the refugees provide a timely solution to europe’s joint demographic crises of an ageing population and declining fertility. on 18 may 2016, the tent foundation and open political economy network published a report entitled “refugees work: a humanitarian investment that yields economic dividends”. (note 53) the report argues that the refugees will create more jobs, increase demand for goods and services, and fill gaps in european workforces—while their wages will help finance pensions and public services. while the report accepts that supporting the refugees will increase public debt by almost €69 billion (£54 billion) between 2015 and 2020, it argues that, during the same period, refugees will help gdp grow by €126.6 billion—a ratio of almost two to one, so “investing one euro in welcoming refugees can yield nearly two euros in economic benefits within five years”. for this to work, employability is crucial, according to the report (p. 9): on arrival—or even beforehand, if resettled from camps—refugees’ education level and skills should be assessed to identify and provide for their training needs and better match them to employment opportunities. literacy training should be provided to those that need it. language training should be tailored to refugees’ workplace needs. job training and skills development can enable refugees to find higher-skilled and better-paid work in the longer term. the recognition and conversion of foreign qualifications should be streamlined. it costs only £25,000 ($35,750) to train a refugee doctor to practise in the uk, compared with over £250,000 ($357,500) for a new british one. skills aren’t much use without job opportunities. refugees should be resettled in areas where there are jobs, not in areas where cheap housing is available and jobs aren’t. governments should vigorously enforce anti-discrimination laws. making it easier for refugees to find work is yet another reason why countries with rigid labour markets that privilege insiders at the expense of outsiders should open them up. enabling refugees to start businesses is a further reason why governments should cut through red tape that stifles enterprise. while government assistance for refugees ought to be generous, prompt and wide-ranging initially, open-ended welfare provision can have a negative impact. looking to the future, ensuring refugee children don’t get left behind at school is vital. at the same time, the report argues that refugees are unlikely to decrease wages or raise unemployment for native workers, on the basis of earlier studies by labour economists. (note 54) others see the refugee crisis turning out in a different way. for example, sir richard dearlove, former head of mi6, speaking at the bbc’s “world on the move” conference on migration warned that “if europe cannot act together to persuade a majority of its citizens that it can gain control of its migratory crisis, then the eu will find itself at the mercy of a populist uprising which is already stirring”. (note 55) either way, the uk will be unable to escape the consequences of the migrant crisis, according to eight www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 48 published by scholink inc. german lawyers and economics professors writing in the sunday times on 15 may 2016.(note 56) they argue that the uk government’s renegotiation deal with the eu to prevent “ever closer union” is virtually worthless and will do nothing to protect the uk from further eu integration or immigration. this is because of the “future judicial activism” of the european court of justice. there is nothing in the eu-uk agreement that can offer the uk permanent legal safeguards against being dragged along the path of further integration. the agreement cannot do so, because it does little to reform the eu and does not exempt britain from the jurisdiction of the ecj. they also argue that the measures to deter immigration by cutting benefits will also fail. once the million-plus asylum-seekers “are naturalised in germany (and elsewhere), there is nothing to prevent them from exercising their right to free movement and cross the channel legally. the uk may not be part of the eu’s common asylum policy, but no country will be able to escape its consequences”. one way or another, the migrants will affect both labour supply and labour productivity in the eu. the same will be true when the five candidate countries for eu accession join: albania (population: 2.7m, average net monthly wage: €357), macedonia (2.1m, €358), montenegro (0.6m, €488), serbia (7.2m, €366) and turkey (75m, €584). (note 57) by comparison, the average net monthly wage in the uk is €2,330, while in germany, it is €2,225. (note 58) these wage differences will encourage labour migration from the new accession states to the higher paid parts of the eu as they did when poland, for example, joined the eu in 2004. the treasury model does not factor in the costs of this on the uk’s economic and social infrastructure: houses, schools, gps, hospitals, transport, energy, local authorities, the care system, and the police, courts and prison system. the government’s cuts to funding of these resources in order to balance the budget by 2020 have already put them under an increasingly intolerable strain. everyone who uses these services today can observe this quite clearly. it is not just the eu’s citizens who are showing discontent with the eu project, some of the leaders of the eastern european accession states, such as hungary and poland, are showing it too. guy verhofstadt, the former belgian prime minister and leader of the group of the alliance of liberals and democrats for europe in the european parliament, wrote on 11 april 2016: (note 59). from the rubble of two world wars, european countries came together to launch what would become the world’s largest experiment in unification and cooperative, shared sovereignty. but, despite its impressive achievements over the decades, the european project now risks disintegration. an unresolved financial crisis, a refugee crisis, a deteriorating security environment, and a stalled integration process have created throughout europe a toxic, unstable political environment in which populism and nationalism thrive. perhaps the clearest manifestation of this is the erosion of the rule of law in the european union. two eu members in particular, hungary and poland, are now jeopardising hard-won european democratic norms—and thus undermining the very purpose of european integration. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 49 published by scholink inc. in hungary, liberal-democratic values have come under systematic attack from prime minister viktor orbán’s government. since his return to the premiership in 2010, orbán has committed hungary to an authoritarian nationalist path, and he has exploited the refugee crisis to cement a “siege mentality’ that helps him sustain popular support. in the process, fundamental rights have been ignored, media freedom has been curbed, refugees have been demonised, and orbán is doing everything in his power to weaken the eu. attempts by eu institutions to convince orbán to change course have only emboldened him to commit further outrages against democratic norms. meanwhile, a democratic crisis has emerged in poland as well, starting last october, when the law and justice (pis), a eurosceptic party that also opposes immigration, secured an outright parliamentary majority by promising to implement populist economic policies and “put poland first”. yet, since the election, pis has launched a series of attacks on the polish constitution itself. government legislation aimed at reforming poland’s constitutional court has been condemned by the court itself and the european democracy watchdog, the venice commission. the government has effectively precluded the court from ruling on the constitutionality of legislation. this weakens a key pillar of the democratic rule of law—and thus is highly problematic for poland and europe alike. hungary and poland are the leading edge of a far-right agenda that has taken hold throughout europe, pursued by parties that are exploiting the political vacuum created by the eu’s failure to address the financial and refugee crises. mr verhofstadt claims that neither neither hungary nor poland would be admitted to the eu today. his solution is for “the united states and other nato allies [to] speak out now and insist that functioning democratic checks and balances are safeguarded”, otherwise “russian president vladimir putin [will continue to actively] divide and weaken the eu and nato”. i am sure that i do not need to remind everyone that economics is a social science—not only does it take into account economic factors, it also properly takes into account social, political and legal factors. no economic model that is used to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of whether the uk is better off staying in or leaving the eu can ignore the above issues. they will affect the safety, security and quality of life of the citizens of the uk and other european countries for generations to come. the sun at the centre of the eu solar system has the very real potential to blow up into a large red giant by expanding uncontrollably and then collapsing into a black hole and doing so very rapidly—in much the same way that the royal bank of scotland expanded uncontrollably before collapsing a black hole in 2008 and requiring a bail out by the uk taxpayer of £37 billion. just four years before, fred goodwin, the chief executive of rbs, was awarded a knighthood for “services to banking”. embarrassing for the economics profession the two treasury reports continually repeat the point that other organisations, like the imf and bank of england, have models which lead to the same dire predictions. well this is because they are using the same models—which the reports also acknowledge. so the treasury is saying “we are using the same www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 50 published by scholink inc. widely accepted models as all major respectable organisations and all these organisations are predicting a calamity if the uk leaves the eu which confirms and reinforces our own findings”. well—to repeat—that is because they are using the same model—these predictions are not independent of each other. if ten organisations are using the same model to make the same predictions, this does not mean that the weight of evidence is ten times that of the case when only one organisation is using an alternative model. the projections in both studies are also reported with a very high degree of confidence—almost with the status of facts. while there is some sensitivity analysis at the end of the documents, no serious economic study should be making predictions out to 2030 on the basis of models like the var and gravity models without admitting that there can be very little confidence about these predictions. i was going to suggest that we should all come back in 2030 and assess the accuracy of the models’ predictions. but, of course, we can’t do that, because the studies do not report the projected levels of gdp and gdp per household in 2030 under the two scenarios of stay or leave. all that is reported is the projected difference between the two. it will be impossible to tell in 2030 what the difference is because only one of the scenarios will have been realised—it could only be assessed if 50% of the uk population left the eu, while 50% remained. in addition, the brexit outcome is reported as an annual loss of gdp per household of £4,300in 2015 terms. this is likely to confuse many people, since it gives the impression that household incomes will be reduced by £4,300 p.a. if the uk leaves the eu. all this is deliberate obfuscation and the treasury must be fully aware of this. the reports do not consider the alternative economic models that predict that the uk will do well out the eu. all serious economic studies should report the results of alternative studies, such as: • open europe’s model which predicts that “the more realistic range is between a 0.8% permanent loss to gdp in 2030—where the uk strikes a comprehensive trade deal with the eu but does nothing else; and a 0.6% permanent gain in gdp in 2030—where it pursues free trade with the rest of the world and deregulation, in addition to an eu free trade agreement”. (note 60) • business for britain’s model which shows that, because the eu failed to reform, britain would gain influence and prosper outside an unreformed eu. (note 61) • centre for economics and business research (cebr) accepted that brexit would lead to two years of turmoil while any new trading arrangements are negotiated. sterling could fall by 10-15%, investment would reduce and growth could be negative in 2017. but following this, the lower exchange rate would make the uk a more attractive place to invest. most of the lost gdp would be recovered and the economy could start growing at a faster rate. although the outcome is highly uncertain, the cebr believes that it is more likely that gdp would be higher by 2030 after brexit than lower. (note 62) • pwc, in a report commissioned by the pro-eu confederation of british industry, predicted that uk gdp per capita in 2030 would be between 25% (wto) and 28% (eea) higher in 2030 than in 2015 in the same eu exit scenarios used by the treasury, compared with an estimated 29% increase www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 51 published by scholink inc. with continued eu membership (i.e., the economy continues to grow at a long-run trend rate of 2.3% p.a.). (note 63) • capital economics’ model commissioned by woodford investment management: (note 64) although the impact of brexit on the british economy is uncertain, we doubt that britain’s long-term economic outlook hinges on it. things have changed a lot since 1973, when joining the european economic community was a big deal for the united kingdom. there are arguably much more important issues now, such as whether productivity will recover. the shortfall in british productivity relative to its pre-crisis trend is still over 10%, so regaining that lost ground would offset even the most negative of estimates of brexit on the economy. based on assessing the evidence, we conclude that: o the more extreme claims made about the costs and benefits of brexit for the british economy are wide of the mark and lacking in evidential bases o it is plausible that brexit could have a modest negative impact on growth and job creation. but it is slightly more plausible that the net impacts will be modestly positive. this is a strong conclusion when compared with some studies o there are potential net benefits in the areas of a more tailored immigration policy, the freedom to make trade deals, moderately lower levels of regulation and savings to the public purse. in each of these areas, we do not believe that the benefits of brexit would be huge, but they are likely to be positive o meanwhile, costs in terms of financial services, foreign direct investment and impacts on london property markets are more likely to be short-term and there are longer-term opportunities from brexit even in these areas o it is not likely that any particular region or regions of the country would be more adversely affected by brexit than the country overall. likewise, we do find support for the notion that brexit would benefit some sectors more than others, but the range of outcomes for production / manufacturing industries is probably wider than for services o we continue to think that the united kingdom’s economic prospects are good whether inside or outside the european union. britain has pulled ahead of the european union in recent years, and we expect that gap to widen over the next few years regardless of whether brexit occurs. • patrick minford’s model. (note 65) • economists for brexit who argue that the uk does not need to do a trade deal to trade. it already trades extensively with many countries across the globe under the rules of the wto and can continue to do so with eu countries in the future (in the same way that the us, japan and china does). leaving the eu will decrease prices and boost gdp. they use patrick minford’s model to show that on leaving the eu: (note 66) o output grows 2% o competitiveness rises 5% o real disposable wages up 1.5% www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 52 published by scholink inc. o exchange rate falls 6% o inflation and interest rates rise to the 2-3% range o current account improves to -1.5% of gdp o unemployment reduces by 0.2% (75,000 on benefit count). finally, the treasury reports do not even consider the economic risks of remaining in the eu, never mind the full range of non-economic risks discussed in the previous section. according to gertjan vlieghe, an external member of the monetary policy committee, the economy would face problems whatever the outcome of the referendum. he said that the bank of england must stand ready to cut interest rates towards zero if the economy does not bounce back quickly from its current malaise. he also said he would vote for more stimulus even if the uk voted to remain in the eu and he did not see “convincing evidence” of a rapid improvement in the economy. (note 67) this only reflects the immediate problems with the eu. in december 2015, the centre for economic and business research forecast that the eu would be the world’s slowest-growing region over the period to 2030, with its share of the world economy falling by 42% and with countries such as italy and france likely to fall out of the g8 and potentially even the g20 groups. (note 68) it is very interesting to note that the economists who wrote the treasury papers do not identify themselves. the authors of the reports are not acknowledged. i am not at all surprised by this. i would not wish to put my name to such a report. nevertheless, the reports—written in the alarmist style they have been and deliberately prepared for the tendentious purposes to which they have been subsequently put—are highly embarrassing to the economics profession. professor minford goes further: “the treasury has become so politicised that it is reduced to rationalising the views of george osborne. the modelling methods it has used to do osborne’s bidding are the ones anyone would employ to rubbish brexit. by leaving the eu, we go to global free trade and we rid ourselves of the intrusive eu regulation that bears down most heavily on our smaller firms who cannot afford huge hr and compliance departments. the gains to our economy from this are huge, as anyone would readily expect. the trade gain amounts to 4 per cent of national income, directly enjoyed by our voters even after spending some of it helping out those affected producers, including our farmers. the gain from getting out of the heavy-handed regulation of our whole economy by the eu is more again, and a boost to our growth rate. the treasury report gets it precisely the wrong way round”. (note 69) this view is also shared by lord david owen, the former foreign secretary: “you rig the [economic] model by what you put into it. if the chancellor tells the treasury to put in the following parameters, you get one kind of result. they have admitted they have not seen it necessary to present a model of what would be the benefits of going out of the eu. so we hear a lot about the risks of leaving, but nothing about the risks of remaining, which i believe are infinitely greater”. (note 70) one economist is however named in the second report and that is charlie bean. he is thanked by the chancellor, george osborne, in the forward to the short-term report: i am grateful to professor sir charles bean, one of our country’s foremost economists and a former www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 53 published by scholink inc. deputy governor of the bank of england, who has reviewed this analysis and says that: “while there are inevitably many uncertainties—including the prospective trading regime with the eu—this comprehensive analysis by hm treasury, which employs best-practice techniques, provides reasonable estimates of the likely size of the short-term impact of a vote to leave on the uk economy”. i am a great admirer of charlie bean but he is in no better position to judge the likely size of the short-term impact of a vote to leave on the uk economy than i am. how can he possibly know this as there has been no previous exit of an economy of the size of the uk? also he says nothing about the policy response to brexit—and it is on policy matters—especially monetary policy matters—that he has spent most of his career. further, he did not declare his view on brexit. the political abuse of the treasury models the two reports—especially the second one dealing with the immediate impact of brexit—are two of the most ridiculous and excruciatingly awful official documents i have ever read. there is doom-mongering on every page. in fact, the more you read, the more hilarious it gets. british consumers would be so shocked by the size of the shock they had created by a vote to leave the eu that they would not be able to get out of bed in the morning to consume. british investors, anticipating what was happening to british consumers, would be trapped like rabbits in a car’s headlights and be incapable of investing. british workers, fully predicting the behaviour of consumers and investors, would be too scared to go to work. this would immediately have global spillover effects. german workers, recognising that no one was going to buy their cars, would decide to go fishing instead. american investment bankers, realising that london was finished as a financial centre, would move their offices to the cayman islands, only to find themselves flooded out by a rising sea level caused by a new burst of global warming—brought on by the brexit vote. global policy makers would have no idea how to respond—and instead devote the rest of their lives to working out why their gravity models weren’t scary enough. within three years, the global economy would be in tatters—and civilised life as we know it would come to an end. you have been warned! it’s no different from the way children are frightened into doing what their parents want. we are all being treated like children. just listen to george osborne, the chancellor of the exchequer of this country (pp. 3-4 of the short-term report): the analysis in this document comes to a clear central conclusion: a vote to leave would represent an immediate and profound shock to our economy. that shock would push our economy into a recession and lead to an increase in unemployment of around 500,000, gdp would be 3.6% smaller, average real wages would be lower, inflation higher, sterling weaker, house prices would be hit and public borrowing would rise compared with a vote to remain…. [however,] the shock could be much more profound, meaning the effect on the economy would be worse still. the rise in uncertainty could be amplified, the volatility in financial markets more tumultuous, and the extent of the impact to living standards more acute. in this severe scenario, gdp www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 54 published by scholink inc. would be 6% smaller, there would be a deeper recession, and the number of people made unemployed would rise by around 800,000 compared with a vote to remain. the hit to wages, inflation, house prices and borrowing would be larger. there is a credible risk that this more acute scenario could materialise. my first duty as chancellor is to seek to deliver economic security and higher living standards for the people of britain. we already know the long-term effects of a vote to leave: britain would be permanently poorer. now we know the short-term shock too: an economy in recession, major job losses and a self-inflicted blow to living standards and aspirations of the british people. a vote to remain in the eu, however, would be the best way to ensure continued growth and safeguard jobs, providing security for working people now and opportunity for the next generation. this document provides the facts that i hope the people of britain will consider when they make this historic decision one month from today. but there are no facts in these reports. as roger bootle, managing director of capital economics, said: “the fact of the matter is there aren’t facts. there are assumptions, there are views, there are factoids you can push or bend in a certain direction, but this is not something where you are going to get the objective truth”. capital economics’ own analysis of different models revealed a 22% difference in projected gdp between the most extreme views. (note 71) speaking on bbc news on 16 may, mr osborne said the “the economic argument is beyond doubt: leaving the eu is a one-way ticket to a poorer britain”. (note 72) this is an exceedingly unwise statement to make—no economic argument can be beyond doubt and the var and gravity models used by the chancellor to make that statement provide a woefully incomplete analysis of the economic implications for the uk of either staying in or leaving the eu. we should not forget that mr osborne makes revisions at least every six months to his projections of gdp over the near term, never mind out to 2030. fraser nelson, editor of the spectator, goes further: (note 73) sometimes, george osborne’s dishonesty is simply breathtaking. let’s set aside the way he has positioned himself over the years (if he believed that leaving the european union “would be the most extraordinary self-inflicted wound” he might have told us—and his constituents—earlier, rather than proceeding with the farce of renegotiation). but it’s his maths, today, which shames his office—and his use of this maths to make the entirely false suggestion that the treasury thinks brexit would make you £4,300 worse off. for anyone who cares about honesty in politics, and the abuse (and reporting) of statistics, this is an interesting case study. his chosen date is 2030. by then, the uk economy is expected to have grown by around 37 per cent, but the hm treasury document claims that this would be closer to about 29 per cent growth after brexit. a fairly straight situation, which osborne fundamentally misrepresented using two techniques. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 55 published by scholink inc. deception 1. osborne falsely claims that people would be “permanently poorer” when he’s talking about the difference between 29pc gdp growth and 37pc gdp growth. the most he can claim is that they won’t be as much better off as they would otherwise be. deception 2. osborne then translates this reduction in potential gdp to household income. but they are two fundamentally different things. this is osborne’s crowning deception, to allow him to conjure up his headline figure of £4,300. this is what he wants households to remember, and is as intellectually dishonest as any manoeuvre ever attempted by gordon brown. the treasury and the obr discuss gdp all of the time: never do they convert it into a per-household cash figure because (unlike debt, tax etc) it’s meaningless. gdp contains measures like the operating surplus of corporations; and all manner of other measurements. gdp per household, this bogus invention, bears no relation to household income. if gdp is divided by households (note 74) it’s £68,000: nothing like they average disposable income (£18,600 per head, (note 75) or £45,400 per household (note 76). deception 3. to arrive at the £4,300 figure, the treasury divided gdp in 2030 by the number of households today. arguably the most dishonest trick of the lot because, with all that immigration, there’ll be plenty more households by 2030. the dclg projection (note 77) reckons 31.2 million, vs 27 million now. so osborne’s (bogus) £4,300 figure would be more like £3,700, accounting for the extra households. so having established (1) a means of dressing up an increase as a decrease and (2) a bogus conflation of gdp with household income and (3) a way of covering up the immigration-driven surge in households, osborne comes up with his grand deception: “britain would be permanently poorer if we left the european union, to the tune of £4,300 for every household in the county. that’s a fact everyone should think about as they consider how to vote.” it’s not a fact, it’s an invention. if you assume that disposable income (note 78) grows in line with gdp, then he’d be arguing that there would be a £5,400 rise outside the eu by 2030 instead of £6,880 inside the eu—so the “cost” of spurning eu membership would be £1,480. which could be alleviated with a modest tax cut. i’m a europhile, but these are the kinds of tactics that make me want to vote “out”—the appalling level of dishonesty with which the government is making the case… if the case for “in” really was a strong as the chancellor suggests, why would he need to mislead? perhaps the reason is that he can get away with it: he can cook up a £4,300 figure (a quarter of the average person’s disposable income) and have it repeated enough times for voters to remember. this technique—to present a rise as a fall—is the closest you can get to statistical alchemy. it was actually pioneered by gordon brown in 2005 when he was breaking new ground in the abuse of statistics. labour campaigned against “tory cuts” but the tories attempted to circumvent it by pledging to actually outspend labour: there would be no cuts. so what could brown do? his answer was brazen, but effective. he worked out that labour would spend £27 billion more than the tories, so used this to claim that they would—ergo—impose a £27 billion “cut”. the technique was politically successful www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 56 published by scholink inc. insofar as the public just remember the big scary figure. and here’s a picture with osborne at his press conference with his prized, concocted £4,300 figure. the prime minister is also at it. in a letter written with the chancellor, he writes: (note 79) in exactly one month’s time, britain will vote in a referendum to decide whether to remain in the eu or leave it. it will almost certainly be the biggest economic and political decision the british people will make in our lifetimes. it is a question about the sort of country britain wants to be in the world, and will affect families, jobs and the future of our country for decades to come. we know many people are sceptical about the eu. that’s why any government either of us is a part of will always keep britain out of the euro and the eu’s free border area. but as prime minister and chancellor, our first duties are to keep the country secure and do what we think is right for working people’s jobs, aspirations and living standards. we know many people want more information before they make their minds up about how to vote. one thing that is now clear, because leave campaigners freely admit it, is that they want britain to exit not just europe but the single market. that would mean turning our backs on the largest marketplace in the world—something margaret thatcher helped to create and britain has championed ever since. the evidence is unequivocal: that would put our economy in serious danger and make the country permanently poorer. when this is being backed up by the international monetary fund, the oecd, the london school of economics, eight former us treasury secretaries, the president of the united states of america, businesses big and small, every one of our allies and trading partners and the governor of the bank of england, it isn’t a conspiracy but a consensus. a few weeks ago, the treasury published analysis which shows britain would be worse off to the tune of £4,300 for every household every year by 2030. today, we are setting out our assessment of what would happen in the weeks and months after a vote to leave on june 23. it is clear that there would be an immediate and profound shock to our economy. the analysis produced by the treasury today shows that a vote to leave will push our economy into a recession that would knock 3.6 per cent off gdp and, over two years, put hundreds of thousands of people out of work right across the country, compared to the forecast for continued growth if we vote to remain in the eu. in a more severe shock scenario, treasury economists estimate that our economy could be hit by 6 per cent, there would be a deeper recession and unemployment would rise by even more. as the bank of england has said, as the imf has underlined, and now as the treasury has confirmed: the shock of walking out of europe would tip the economy into reverse. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 57 published by scholink inc. this would be, for the first time in our history, a recession brought on ourselves: a diy recession. under all scenarios, the economy shrinks, the value of the pound falls, inflation rises, unemployment rises, wages are hit, and as a result government borrowing goes up. sterling is projected to fall by 12 per cent, consistent with a range of studies, and could fall by 15 per cent in the event of a more severe shock. not only will holidays abroad be more expensive (note 80) but because the pound would be worth less everything we import would become more expensive, increasing inflation and hurting family budgets. house price growth would be hit by at least ten per cent and as much as 18 per cent, making homeowners poorer. there wouldn’t be good news for young people trying to get on the housing ladder, though, because mortgages would be harder to get and more expensive. the shock would persist because the uk would become less open and less productive—cutting itself off from that free trade single market. we can see that even the possibility of a leave vote has already caused uncertainty in the economy. if we do vote to leave, that uncertainty will redouble. it won’t be easy to negotiate a new relationship with the eu, since that will require the approval of all other 27 member states. france and germany have already been clear that the uk could not expect a deal better than they themselves have inside the eu and, like norway and switzerland, would have to accept free movement of people and pay in to the eu budget in order to access the free trade we need. we will also have to try to reach new agreements with over 50 other countries we currently enjoy trade deals with through the eu. it will take years—meaning years of uncertainty for our economy. economic uncertainty means businesses would reduce investment and cut jobs in the short term, which would mean households spending less too. we are clear, as is the vast majority of the conservative cabinet: this is simply a price that is not worth paying. let’s not forget, it was only eight years ago that britain entered the deepest recession our country had seen since the second world war. people suffered in every part of the country. the british people have worked so hard to get things back on track. the uk has been forecast to grow faster than any other g7 economy this year, we have the most competitive rate of corporation tax in the g20, and the employment rate has never been higher. why would we risk throwing it all away? a vote to leave is a vote for recession. do we really want that diy recession? because that’s what’s in prospect if we vote to leave the eu. and if we vote to remain? yes, there are improvements to make to the eu—but we know what they are and we’ll be at the top table fighting britain’s corner. if we remain, british car manufacturers will go on selling hundreds of thousands of cars to europe tariff-free. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 58 published by scholink inc. farmers can go on selling over 150,000 tonnes of beef and lamb to europe tariff-free. our economy won’t see hundreds of thousands of unnecessary job losses, but instead we’ll add a million or more jobs over the coming years. so our message to daily telegraph readers is clear: vote remain on june 23 to ensure security and prosperity for this generation, and opportunity for the next. it’s a brighter future on offer. today’s treasury analysis shows once and for all that britain will be stronger, safer and better off if we remain in the eu. again from the prime minister: (note 81) add those things together—the shock impact, the uncertainty impact, the trade impact—and you put a bomb under our economy. and the worst thing is—we have lit the fuse ourselves. as if this ridiculous statement is not enough, the political rhetoric gets even more bizarre when the prime minister mentions the moral case for remaining. speaking at a b&q store support office on 23 may 2016, the prime minister argues: the economic case is the moral case—for keeping parents in work, firms in business, britain in credit, the moral case for providing economic opportunity rather than unemployment for the next generation. where is the morality for putting that at risk for some unknown end? it would be like surviving a fall then running straight back to the cliff edge. it is the self-destruct option. mr osborne, standing next to the prime minister, then criticised the tory brexiteers: to those fellow politicians who say we should vote to leave i’d say this: you might think the economic shock is a price worth paying. but it’s not your wages that will be hit, it’s not your livelihoods that will go, it’s not you who’ll struggle to pay the bills. it’s the working people of britain who will pay the price if we leave the eu. a more measured response came from andrew tyrie mp, chair of the treasury select committee, speaking on the world at one on bbc radio 4 on 27 may 2016: “the consensus of evidence is that there will be a shock to the economy in the short term. it is difficult to say how big it will be. but the economy will probably shrink somewhat. and this will carry a short-term economic cost. in the longer term, we need to know much more information about what the trade relationships will be before we can assess whether there will be an economic cost and if so how much. …the balance of evidence we have taken as a committee is that there will be a cost, but it is difficult to assess how big it will be”. even more political abuse the second report gives the strong impression that we really don’t have a choice—the uk can never actually leave the eu, because it would be too difficult to unravel. for example, on p. 24: the rules for exit are set out in article 50 of the teu. this is the only lawful way to withdraw from the eu. it would be a breach of international and eu law to withdraw unilaterally from the eu (for example, by simply repealing the domestic legislation that gives the eu law effect in the uk). article www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 59 published by scholink inc. 50 has never been tested and there is uncertainty about how it would work. it would be a complex negotiation requiring the involvement of all remaining 27 eu member states and the european commission. it would mean unravelling all the rights and obligations that the uk has acquired during its accession to the eu and over 40 years of membership. again on p. 32: 1.53 as set out above there is no requirement for the process to agree any new arrangement with the eu to be concluded at the same time as leaving the eu. indeed, the remaining eu member states could insist that the terms of the uk’s withdrawal are agreed before starting negotiations on the new relationship. 1.54 there would be a trade-off between securing a deal as quickly as possible to reduce uncertainty in the short term and securing the best possible deal for the uk to minimise the economic costs of exit over the long term. figure 1.b [reproduced below] sets out the interactions between the four processes. case 1 of figure 1.b shows completing the withdrawal agreement and agreeing the new eu relationship before the end of the two-year period. 1.55 in the circumstances where it was not possible to conclude a new agreement with the eu within the two-year period, the uk would have to decide whether to seek to extend uk membership of the eu until a new agreement had been reached, or to accept exit at that point. and again of p. 30: changing the uk’s domestic regulatory and legislative framework 1.50 the uk’s economic policy, regulatory and legislative framework would need to reflect the outcome of all of the processes discussed above. withdrawal from the eu would involve considerable implications for uk domestic legislation. the uk parliament and devolved administrations would need to consider how to replace eu laws, including how to maintain a robust legal and regulatory framework where that had previously depended on eu laws. 1.51 a recent house of lords european union committee report on the process for withdrawing from the eu concluded this would be a lengthy process: “domestic disentanglement from eu law would require a review of the entire corpus of eu law as it applies nationally and in the devolved nations. such a review would take years to complete”. this view was reinforced by the imf which stated that any new trade deal with the uk would require the unanimous consent of all eu countries, raising “considerable political risks”. the imf also stated that the uk’s trading arrangements with around 60 non-eu countries that were agreed with the eu would automatically lapse and would have to be renegotiated. the wto also waded in to make the same point. in an interview with the financial times, roberto azevêdo, its director-general, said that britain would face tortuous negotiations to fix the terms of its membership of the wto if it voted to leave the eu’s single market and instead looked to wto rules to access european and other markets. according to mr azevêdo, pretty much all of the uk’s trade with the world would have to be negotiated on everything from the thousands of tariff lines covering its www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 60 published by scholink inc. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 61 published by scholink inc. entire trade portfolio to quotas on agricultural exports, subsidies to british farmers and the access to other markets that banks and other uk services companies now enjoy. an exit from the eu would cause the uk to lose the preferential access to other markets covered by 36 trade agreements with 58 countries negotiated by the eu. as a result, to remain compliant with wto rules, the uk would have to impose higher “most favoured nation” tariffs on imports from those 58 countries, while they would have to levy their own surcharges on british exports. a wto analysis had calculated the cost of the additional tariffs on goods imports to british consumers at £9 billion, while british merchandise exports would be subject to a further £5.5 billion in tariffs at their destination. mr azevêdo said that “the consumer in the uk will have to pay those duties. the uk is not in a position to decide ‘i’m not charging duties here’. that is impossible. that is illegal”, before adding that “it is a very important decision for the british people. it is a sovereign decision and they will decide what they want to decide. but it is very important, particularly with regard to trade, which is something very important for the british economy, that people have the facts and that they don’t underestimate the challenges”. (note 82) however, ambrose evans-pritchard, the international business editor of the daily telegraph, points out that all this is simply not true, since international law recognises a “presumption of continuity” and all the parties need to do is sign a documentation of continuation in force. he adds that these organisations’ “mask(s) of objectivity have fallen” and that they are “playing politics with the democratic self-determination of this country”. (note 83) further, the wto does not allow tariffs to be raised once they have been lowered between countries. in a letter to the financial times, economists for brexit point to other alternatives that avoid the wto altogether: (note 84) sir, roberto azevêdo, the brazilian head of the world trade organisation, has given his views to your newspaper about brexit (“uk would face tortuous trade talks in event of brexit, says wto”, may 26). however, he does not seem to realise that the uk’s best “wto option” on brexit is to get rid of all the eu’s tariffs and trade barriers unilaterally. this greatly reduces prices to consumers and businesses and would, based on our economists for brexit calculations, boost gross domestic product in the long term by 4 per cent. this requires no negotiations with anyone. as for all those trade agreements the eu has negotiated with small countries around the world, they have no effect on our total trade or gdp; they simply divert trade to preferential markets away from other world markets, with no effect on world prices of our products. again no negotiations are needed to keep these unnecessary agreements. there are countless countries, including many much smaller than the uk, that have no trouble trading freely in this way and there is no reason to believe the uk cannot do the same. economists for brexit: roger bootle ryan bourne www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 62 published by scholink inc. professor tim congdon warwick lightfoot dr gerard lyons neil mackinnon professor kent matthews professor patrick minford figure 4 shows the alternative gravity model that the treasury did not consider. figure 4 – the alternative gravity model the treasury did not consider figure 5 (note 85) shows that if the full set of alternative models had been considered, then a very different picture emerges about the consequences of brexit. conclusion the treasury has produced two reports which use two types of economic model to assess the consequences of brexit. there is no balance is either report: the two models used—the var model and the gravity model—unambiguously predict that the consequences would be dire for households in the uk. the chancellor has described anyone who disagrees with these reports as “economically illiterate”. (note 86) the two reports have been seized upon—in a carefully planned and coordinated campaign—by the imf, the oecd, the wto, the world bank, every major global bank (note 87), g20 finance ministers, 13 former us secretaries of state and defence, eight former us treasury secretaries, five former heads of nato, two former heads of mi5 and mi6, the chair of the us federal reserve, (note 88) the chinese president, and leaders of the g7 countries as far apart as the us and japan, as well as leaders of commonwealth countries to pressurise the british people to remain in the eu because they would be “better off” by doing so. but can it really be the case that all these organisations only have our best interests at heart? or is it more likely to be the case that it is more convenient for them to have us world uk eu www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 63 published by scholink inc. neatly locked up in a regional integration area called the european union. it was the former us secretary of state henry kissinger who famously asked: “who do i call if i want to speak to europe?” i suspect that the answer that all these organisations and individuals really want to hear is jean-claude juncker, the unelected president of the european commission—someone that the british prime minister david cameron desperately tried but failed to stop getting the presidency. figure 5—the range of outcomes from alternative models there was a time when the global plutocracy relied on the mysticism of religion to keep the populace in its place. now the modern global plutocracy is using the mysticism of economic models. the wrath of god has been replaced by the wrath of a gravity model. if we fall for this, we will enter a new dark age where fear over the size of the eu trade dummy in a gravity model is intended to keep us all under control. the british treasury has in effect become a propaganda machine for a political institution led by jean-claude juncker—a man who has declared his hostility to “democratic choice” when it comes to the wishes of the european people. this whole exercise is utterly dangerous for democracy. let us suppose the treasury, the imf and the bank of england adopted the same approach and used models like these to evaluate the economic policies of british political parties at the time of a general election and pronounced that the policies of a particular political party would have “pretty bad to very, very bad consequences”—that would result in a “sudden stop” in money flowing into the finance sector which would drive down the value of the pound and lead to a sharp rise in interest rates, falling house and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 64 published by scholink inc. commercial property prices and the erosion of london’s status as a global financial centre, all of which would lead to a technical recession—but it is, of course, up to the electorate to decide how they vote. the nobel prize winning economist tjalling koopmans wrote a review paper in 1947 called “measurement without theory”. it spends some time discussing the roles of tycho brahé and johannes kepler in collecting empirical observations on the motion of planets that proved to be so useful to isaac newton when he developed his theory of gravity. but it was a correct theory in the end that was important in explaining the elliptical orbit of the planets around the sun. by projecting these observations on the basis of a false theory—namely that the earth was at the centre of the universe—it was possible to predict that planets would suddenly and sharply change their direction of travel when viewed from earth. the treasury’s application of gravity and var models to assess whether the uk would be better in or out of the eu is also an exercise in “measurement without theory”. the models confirm john kenneth galbraith’s dictum that: “the only function of economic forecasting is to make astrology look respectable”. but it is far more insidious. the two models have been deliberately engineered to produce the result that the government and the rest of the global plutocracy want. and the fact that fellow economists have drafted reports like these that are being used by politicians to frighten the british electorate into staying an institution as precarious as the eu is both intellectually dishonest and deeply shaming. do you think economists like john maynard keynes and milton friedman would have allowed themselves to be used in this way? the two treasury reports are two of the most dishonest and deceptive public documents i have ever read. the whole exercise should therefore be seen for what it is—an elaborate charade. what is happening is no different from tony blair’s “dodgy dossier” on saddam hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. these two reports will rightly gain the same status of “dodgy dossiers”. however, the reports do serve one useful purpose—they tell you precisely how you would not handle a brexit. first, the uk should not trigger article 50 until all new trade arrangements have been agreed. begin discussions with germany—they sell us £70 billion in goods and services p.a. and we sell them £45 billion, a deficit of £25 billion, the largest amongst member states. (note 89) everyone else will soon line up. (note 90) second, manage expectations. there is absolutely no rational economic reason why a uk decision to leave the eu should cause a recession of the depth outlined above or a permanent reduction in gdp. a sensible strategy for negotiating exit and timing—including not triggering section 50 until an appropriate time—and an appropriate monetary policy could prevent all this. however, you wouldn’t want any of the people involved with preparing these reports to be involved in these negotiations. appendix: lord mervyn king’s interview with martha kearney the scaremongering tone of the treasury reports contrasts markedly with the calm assessment about brexit made by mervyn king in his interview with martha kearney on bbc radio 4’s “world at one” programme on monday 27 june 2016 (four days after the referendum on 23 june). martha kearny: [t]he former governor of the bank of england mervin king, lord king is here, and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 65 published by scholink inc. if i can begin by getting your response to the chancellor’s statement, many people are drawing a contrast between the tone of what he was saying today and what was said during the referendum campaign mervin king: well we heard a measured statement by george osborne this morning, and i agree with everything that he said. we equally heard a measured statement by the prime minister last friday, but it does contrast very significantly and notably with the slightly hysterical tone of some of the arguments that were put forward during the campaign. and i think that the big mistake was not to say to people “look both sides of this case has good arguments, we should listen to them”, but in my case, or in your case we might disagree, but let’s agree to differ on that; not regard it as a situation where it was obvious what the right answer was. only half of the people thought that it was one answer namely remain and the other half leave. martha kearny: and what kind of impact do you think it had on voters? mervin king: i think they resisted this very strongly. i have been going around the country a lot in the last couple of months, talking about my book, and i’ve been struck, even when i did not speak about the campaign—and i quite carefully stayed out of that—that people would ask questions, and the one word they used more than any other was “scaremongering”. they didn’t want to be treated like fools. they could have listened to a rational argument, and there’s no doubt that leaving, creates uncertainties—that was a powerful argument. but it didn’t help, to exaggerate that argument, by turning what were inevitably, very speculative forecast into facts, like £4,300 is the amount by which every household would be worse off, or that we would have an emergency budget, which will inevitably have to raise taxes and cut spending. the one thing that you do not need, if you believe that you are headed into a recession—and we don’t know that, we may, we may not—but if it turns out that the economy is turning down, the last thing we would want is an emergency budget to raise taxes and to cut spending. and whether or not we would need to do so in the longer run, will depend upon the long run impact of the new situation with the uk outside the eu, and we have no idea what that would be. martha kearny: so where does this leave the chancellor? mervin king: well i don’t know, that’s for him to decide. i think we desperately need someone who is going to put together a team of people now to do the preparations before the negotiations start in earnest, in the autumn. martha kearny: but you could look at what’s been happening in the markets today and the falling price of sterling down to a 31-year low, banking shares suspended and saying actually, there are problems, perhaps there was some truth in project fear? mervin king: no, i think that project fear went over the top. sterling today, even after the fall, is roughly at the same level as it was in the middle of 2013 at a level which the bank of england and the treasury then thought was necessary to enable the uk economy to rebalance. we have a very large trade deficit on most trade and overseas income. sterling could not be at the levels at which it reached www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 66 published by scholink inc. on thursday night at midnight when people were speculating on the result and hope to rebalance the uk economy. some fall in sterling at some point was inevitable. martha kearny: but if there are problems as some suggest, with foreign direct investment, isn’t that likely to make the trade deficit worse? mervin king: well i think that foreign direct investment, undoubtedly, will probably fall, or be on hold for a period, and that was the largest, likely, short term economic pact of leaving the eu. but that reflects the uncertainty, and at some point that uncertainty will disappear, when the negotiations are completed, and then we will be in a different world again. so there are short term uncertainties, but i don’t think that people should automatically translate that into deeply pessimistic views into the longer term. martha kearny: well it wasn’t only the chancellor who was as you say “deeply pessimistic”, it was also the man who took over your job, mark carney. in may, he warned that the risks of leaving could possibly include a technical recession. mervin king: that was a short term statement and the bank had no choice but to make a judgment about the short term. we don’t know whether that is true or not, but even if it were true, that tells you very little about the long-term impacts and the bank was very careful not to get involved in the speculative judgements to which the government fell prey to make. i think very confident statements about the damage that would be done in the long term about which the honest answer is we simply don’t know. my own guess, and it’s no more than that, is that the long term effects maybe much smaller than either side claimed. martha kearny: but again, the governor of the bank of england found himself in the centre of the political fray, he was criticised for having demonstrated a fundamental misunderstanding of central bank independence—was he wise to get involved in that way? mervin king: i don’t think that he had any choice but to comment on the current state of the economy, where it might go in the next 6 to 9 months. central bank governors are always criticised, i don’t think that means to say they are wrong. martha kearny: now simon jack is sitting here very keen to ask you something simon jack (bbc news business editor): i do want to ask something. so if you look at the rbs and barclay share price they are down 35% since last thursday night, they have lost a third of their value. the italian banks look rather vulnerable as well. are you honestly saying that there is nothing to worry about here? mervin king: no, i am not saying there is nothing to worry about, [but] there is no reason to extrapolate this into a mindless panic. one of the things that is interesting about this is that the countries that may well suffer more are not the uk, but the rest of the european union; because what this will do is to reinforce the impotence behind political parties in europe who would like to get out of the euro area and what this will do, i think more than anything else, is to create further serious doubt about whether the euro area is a likely to be a successful long term project. that’s the thing that is www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 67 published by scholink inc. going to damage the economies on the continent and, of course, many of our banks here are heavily exposed to europe. martha kearny: now it’s very interesting that you’ve expressed your concerns about the future of the euro project. do you think it is unsustainable? mervin king: in its present form it is clearly unsustainable, and the person who said that most clearly is indeed mario draghi, the president of the european central bank. he wants to create a finance minister for the euro area to go forward. unfortunately, the peoples of europe don’t want to have a political union with that consequence. martha kearny: so you think it’s doomed? mervin king: i don’t know what will happen to it. i think they face a massive problem and their problem in this respect is far greater than ours now. martha kearny: that suggests to me that the way you’re talking now, that you might have leaned towards the brexit arguments during the campaign? mervin king: i lean towards neither. in fact i was rather put off by both campaigns and quite deliberately didn’t enter the campaign beforehand and i’m not going to do it now. martha kearny: so what kind of action do you think you should be taken by either by the chancellor or by the bank of england, in order to calm both the short term turbulence and the possible longer term risks? mervin king: well the bank of england is ready to do whatever it feels it needs to do—it’s not clear to me that it does need to do anything. financial markets will always move up and down as they try to discover a new price, whether it’s for sterling or bank shares and so on. that will, over the coming days, start to steady down. martha kearny: are you sure it will steady down though, because we have often seen with markets—well lehman brothers is a case in point—they can start relatively small and then escalate? mervin king: well that was one big shock. of course, there was a lot of volatility immediately after that, but it did steady down after that, and i think that the other thing that needs to be done by the government is to try and put together a team of people. i think it can hardly be our major politicians who seem to be embroiled in which ever party you look at—and major leadership contests which are going to absorb their energy for 3 months. we need a team of people who will be able to work together to set out a strategy for the negotiation. i don’t think article 50 could be invoked until there is a new prime minister, but nevertheless a lot of preparatory work can and should be done and i would like to see it done on a cross-party basis. many of those who contributed to the campaign are on both sides, ought to be involved. people like gisela stuart ought to be given a chance to play a role here. and i think that we should look at a cross-party approach in the next 3 months before we have another prime minister to take the actual negotiations forward. martha kearny: and what about interest rates? mervin king: well, if anything, if the bank of england’s own forecasts are correct and we are moving www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 68 published by scholink inc. towards at least a slow down in the economy, then they will leave interest rates lower for longer. and i think it will be a peculiar reaction at this juncture to raise interest rates despite the fall in sterling. the bank of england has been trying to push up inflation for a while, without a lot of success—this will help it in its cause. martha kearny: but, of course, a rise in inflation because of goods being imported will be more expensive—that’s hard for families. mervin king: indeed, but that change in exchange rate and the rise of prices in imported goods was going to have to happen anyway at some point. martha kearny: and final verdict overall on how you think the campaign was handled? mervin king: i think it was the most dispiriting and depressing campaign on both sides. i don’t think many people will go out of this feeling that they performed as well as they could or should have done. martha kearny: mervin king, lord king, thank you very much indeed for joining us. part 2: the state of the uk economy five years after the publication of the treasury reports in this part of the paper, we review the state of the uk economy five years after the publication of the two treasury reports. economist harry western has looked at some of the claims made in mid-2016 and compared them with the outcome in mid-2021. (note 91) the key economic claims made in 2016 were: 1. the treasury claimed that the short run impact of a “leave” vote would include an immediate year-long economic recession, a sharp drop in house and stock prices, rising unemployment and a “punishment” budget designed to fill a fiscal “black hole”. 2. the treasury claimed uk exports to the eu would collapse, falling by as much as 40% over the longer term due to the appearance of massive trade barriers between the uk and eu. 3. based on these trade predictions and other factors, it was claimed uk productivity growth would weaken dramatically. largely as a result, it was claimed that the uk economy might be as much as 8-10% smaller in the long term compared to a no-brexit scenario. households would be £4300 per year worse off. 4. it was claimed that a trade deal with the eu to replace eu membership might take a decade or more to agree, and that the uk would similarly take many years to replicate the eu’s trade deals with third countries. it was even claimed the uk would not be able to easily join the world trade organisation. 5. it was repeatedly claimed …that the uk’s exit from the customs union and single market would lead to “border chaos” with huge queues at uk ports, leading to widespread shortages of key goods including food and medicines. 6. the uk financial sector would decamp en masse to the eu as a result of leaving the single market and the loss of “passporting” rights. (note 92) tens of thousands of highly paid bankers would https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/524967/hm_treasury_analysis_the_immediate_economic_impact_of_leaving_the_eu_web.pdf https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/760484/28_november_eu_exit_-_long-term_economic_analysis__1_.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/news/hm-treasury-analysis-shows-leaving-eu-would-cost-british-households-4300-per-year https://www.gov.uk/government/news/hm-treasury-analysis-shows-leaving-eu-would-cost-british-households-4300-per-year https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-38324146 https://www.ictsd.org/opinion/nothing-simple-about-uk-regaining-wto-status-post-brexit https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-54021421 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 69 published by scholink inc. move to paris and frankfurt, causing a massive decline in uk tax revenue. financial sector job losses might run into the hundreds of thousands. western then compared these claims with the outcomes in 2021: 1. there was no recession after the brexit vote. the uk economy grew 1.7% in 2016, 1.7% in 2017, 1.3% in 2018 and 1.4% in 2019. (note 93) house prices grew 7% in 2016 and have grown by over 20% since 2016. stock prices grew over 10% in the second half of 2016 (i.e., after the referendum) and are now 18% higher than in the second quarter of 2016. unemployment declined after the referendum, to just 3.8% by end-2019. there was no “punishment budget” and the uk government’s budget deficit declined between 2016 and 2019—from 3.3% of gdp to 2.4% of gdp. 2. there was no collapse in exports. after an initial decline in january 2021, uk exports to the eu have recovered strongly and are now at similar levels to where they were before the uk left the eu customs union and single market. even sales of sensitive items like food and fish have largely rebounded after initial problems adjusting to the new systems. it is obviously too early to fully assess claims that uk exports would collapse over a 15-year horizon but five years in there are no signs of this (and note, if firms had really believed trade would collapse like this, they would have started shifting production or curtailing business with the eu long before 2021). 3. no productivity slump, no crash in living standards. with no trade slump, the claimed collapse in productivity due to brexit is also obsolete (as it was based on a contentious link between trade intensity and productivity). uk productivity growth remained positive from 2016-2019. similarly, claims that households would be thousands of pounds a year worse off have not materialised and look unlikely to. household real incomes are 4% higher today than at the start of 2016. wage growth has also picked up, including in sectors where it previously was held down by an abundance of cheap eu labour. 4. trade deals have been successfully negotiated. the uk and the eu agreed the trade and cooperation agreement (tca) in late 2020 after starting negotiations in march of that year. the uk has also successfully rolled over almost all of the trade deals with third countries that it was previously party to as a result of eu membership. rolled-over deals covered some £182 billion of trade in 2020. the uk has also expanded the trade deal with japan and agreed a completely fresh trade deal with australia. none of this took a decade. 5. no border queues. the predicted tailbacks of thousands of trucks at uk ports completely failed to materialise, either at the start of 2021 or since. cross-channel traffic has instead run smoothly and at similar levels to those prevailing before the uk left the eu customs union and single market. 6. minimal impact on financial services. predictions of massive relocations of financial sector activity and jobs have proved laughably wide of the mark. industry estimates suggest just a few thousand jobs have moved to the eu or been created there due to brexit—and that this process has largely run its course. actual uk employment data shows total jobs in finance and insurance have risen by 21,000 (or 1.9%) since q2 2016. exports of financial services have risen by 11.6% since then. https://www.briefingsforbritain.co.uk/uk-eu-trade-in-may-another-body-blow-for-project-fear/ https://www.briefingsforbritain.co.uk/brexit-and-productivity-a-house-built-on-sand/ https://www.gov.uk/guidance/uk-trade-agreements-with-non-eu-countries https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2019/02/05/516763.htm https://www.ey.com/en_uk/news/2021/05/financial-services-firms-demonstrate-increased-confidence-in-uk-market-four-months-on-from-brexit-deal-ey-brexit-industry-poll www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 70 published by scholink inc. london has maintained—even strengthened—its position as one of the world’s leading centres for financial services (including an over 40% global market share in foreign exchange trading). unsurprisingly, over 1,000 eu financial services firms have applied or plan to open offices in the uk. western concluded: with more than five years having passed since the brexit referendum, the widespread predictions of economic chaos and collapse have failed to materialise. the uk economy has continued to grow, wages have risen, huge queues at borders have not appeared and the uk has successfully embarked on an independent trade policy. these outcomes provide a salutary lesson for the public. not only should they ignore the claims of obviously partisan observers about key policy matters like brexit, but they should also be wary of claims made by their own governments and supposedly independent “experts” in academia and international bodies. in the run-up to the uk’s brexit referendum, the minister for europe, david lidington, said to the house of commons that “it is important that this key decision by the british people should be made on the basis of the facts”. but from the outset there was no attempt to provide the public with an even-handed assessment of the costs and benefits of eu membership. instead, the government, along with a wide range of academics, charities, industry lobbyists and international institutions such as the imf and oecd fed the voters a relentless diet of exaggerated and misleading economic scare stories. five years on, the extent of the disinformation is increasingly clear and provides a salutary if depressing lesson on how modern government works. the uk economy was, of course, badly damaged by the coronavirus pandemic. gross domestic product (gdp) fell by around 10% in 2020, the largest fall in 300 years. however, the uk office for budget responsibility in its “economic and fiscal outlook—october 2021” argued that “the successful vaccine rollout has allowed the economy to reopen largely on schedule, despite continuing high numbers of coronavirus cases. the vaccines’ high degree of effectiveness, combined with consumers’ and businesses’ surprising degree of adaptability to public health restrictions, has meant that output this year has recovered faster than we expected. …the economy is now expected to grow by 6.5% in 2021 …and unemployment to rise only modestly to 5.25%.…over the medium term, we have revised up real gdp as we now expect post-pandemic scarring of potential output to be 2%”. figure 6 predicts that the economy will have fully recovered from the pandemic by the end of 2021 or the first quarter of 2022. thereafter the gdp is predicted to growth along a trendline that is 2% lower due to “post-pandemic scarring”. a final point to note is the implied criticism of the treasury models made by lord david frost, the uk’s chief negotiator for exiting the european union and later co-chair of the joint committee monitoring the uk-eu withdrawal agreement and tca, in a lecture at the institute for european studies in brussels in february 2020. he criticised not only the structure of the treasury models and the exaggerated size of the some of the key model parameters, but also the direction of causation of some of the key relationships in the models: https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/biggest-financial-centers-london-nears-new-york-2020-9?op=1 https://www.bis.org/statistics/rpfx19_fx.htm https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-banks-iduskbn1zj00d https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/cbp-7579/cbp-7579.pdf www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 71 published by scholink inc. figure 6. projections of gdp following the covid pandemic source: office for budget responsibility (2021) economic and fiscal outlook—october 2021; https://obr.uk/efo/economic-and-fiscal-outlook-october-2021/ …these studies exaggerate—in my view—the impact of non-tariff barriers, they exaggerate customs costs, in some cases by orders of magnitude. even more importantly, they also assume that this unproven decline in trade will have implausible large effects on britain’s productivity. yet there is at least as much evidence that the relationship is the other way around—that it is actually productivity which drives trade. the claims that trade drives productivity are often in fact based on the very specific experience of emerging countries opening up to world markets, beginning to trade on global terms after a period of authoritarian or communist government—these are transitions that involve a huge improvement in the institutional framework and which make big productivity improvements almost inevitable. and i think the relevance of such experiences drawn from that for the uk, a high-income economy which has been extremely open for over a century, seems highly limited to me. i also note that many brexit studies seem very keen to ignore or minimise any of the upsides, whether these be connected to expanded trade with the rest of the world or regulatory change—often assuming the smallest possible impacts from such changes while insisting on the largest possible effects through changes in our relationship with the eu. finally, all of these studies imply to me a fantastic ability to predict the micro detail of the economy over a long period which i simply just don’t buy. there is obviously a one-off cost from the introduction of friction at a customs and regulatory border, but i am simply not convinced it is on anything like the scale or with the effects these studies suggest. in any case, we aim to manage it down as far as we can through modern customs facilitation arrangements—and i am convinced that other factors will www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 72 published by scholink inc. outweigh it. indeed, if we have learned anything on economics from the last few years, and in particular from the british economy’s refusal to behave as people predicted after the referendum, it is that modern advanced economies are hugely complex and adaptive systems, capable of responding in ways which we do not foresee, and finding solutions which we did not expect. the literature review in wales et al. (2018) (note 94) suggests that the weight of empirical evidence supports frost’s conjecture that productivity drives trade, rather than trade driving productivity. the treasury had relied on a study by frankel et al. (1999) (note 95) to support its hypothesis that trade determines productivity. but this study acknowledges that its results are “not very precisely estimated” and only marginally statistically significant. all this provides further confirmation that the two treasury reports were indeed very “dodgy dossiers”. combining this with the evidence from harry western and the office for budget responsibility on how successful the uk post-brexit economy has been compared with the dire warnings in the treasury reports confirms that the only purpose these two reports was to make astrology look respectable. and this needs to be placed on public record. references david aikman, philip barrett, sujit kapadia, mervyn king, james proudman, tim taylor, iain de weymarn and tony yates (2011) uncertainty in macro-economic policy-making: art or science?, philosophical transactions of the royal society, 369, 4798-4817. stephen booth, christopher howarth, mats persson, raoul ruparel and pawel swidlicki (2015) what if...? the consequences, challenges & opportunities facing britain outside eu, open europe. ryan bourne (2016) the treasury's new brexit paper: rubbish in, rubbish out, institute for economic affairs, 24 may; http://www.iea.org.uk/blog/the-treasurys-new-brexit-paper-rubbish-in-rubbish-out david cass and karl shell (1983) do sunspots matter?. journal of political economy, 91 (21), 193–228. william stanley jevons (1878) commercial crises and sunspots, nature, 19, 33-37. jeffrey a. frankel and david romer (1999) does trade cause growth?, american economic review, 89(3): 379-399. john m. keynes (1936) the general theory of employment, interest and money. london. macmillan, 161-162. hm treasury (2016a) hm treasury analysis: the long-term economic impact of eu membership and the alternatives, published on 18 april 2016; https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hm-treasury-analysis-the-long-term-economic-impactof-eu-membership-and-the-alternatives hm treasury (2016b) hm treasury analysis: the immediate economic impact of leaving the eu, published on 23 may 2016; https://escoe-website.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/13160018/escoe-dp-2018-09.pdf https://www.jstor.org/stable/117025?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/the_general_theory_of_employment,_interest_and_money www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 73 published by scholink inc. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hm-treasury-analysis-the-immediate-economic-impact -of-leaving-the-eu house of commons library briefing paper, uk-eu economic relations, number 06091, 13 april 2016. patrick minford (2016), the treasury report on brexit: a critique, economists for brexit, 10 may. patrick minford, sakshi gupta, mai le, vidya mahambare and yongdeng xu (2015) should britain leave the eu?, edward elgar, cheltenham. robert a. mundell (1960) the monetary dynamics of international adjustment under fixed and flexible exchange rates, quarterly journal of economics,74, 227-57. francesc ortega and giovanni peri, openness and income: the roles of trade and migration, journal of international economics, 92, 231-251. giovanni peri (2012) the effect of immigration on productivity: evidence from us states, the review of economics and statistics, 94(1), 348-358. arthur pigou (1927) industrial fluctuations, macmillan, london. rodney thom and brendan walsh (2002) the effect of a currency union on trade: lessons from the irish experience’, european economic review, 46, 1111-1123. philip wales, russell black, ted dolby and gaganan awano (2018) uk trade in goods and productivity: new findings, office for national statistics and escoe discussion paper 2018-09, july. notes note 1. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hm-treasury-analysis-the-long-term-economic-impact-ofeu-membership-and-the-alternatives note 2. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hm-treasury-analysis-the-immediate-economic impact-of-leaving-the-eu note 3. nigem is used by over 40 organisations including the imf, the bank of england, the oecd, and the european central bank. note 4. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/documents/international_iss ues/the_euro/assessment/report/euro_assess03_repintro.cfm note 5. https//www.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/letter-from-sir-andrew-dilnot-to-j ack-doyle.pdf note 6. http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/population projections/bulletins/nationalpopulationprojections/2015-10-29#tab-main-points note 7. there were 26.7 million households and 64.6 million people in the uk in 2014, giving an https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hm-treasury-analysis-the-immediate-economic-impact-of-leaving-the-eu https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hm-treasury-analysis-the-immediate-economic-impact-of-leaving-the-eu www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 74 published by scholink inc. average household size of 2.3 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_39 3133.pdf http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/pop-estimat e/population-estimates-for-uk--england-and-wales--scotland-and-northern-ireland/mid-2014/sty---over view-of-the-uk-population.html note 8. that is, 3000000/(64600000) and 3000000/(64600000/2.3), respectively. note 9. http://openeurope.org.uk/today/blog/whats-best-way-cutting-33-3bn-burden-eu-red-tape/ note 10. house of commons library briefing paper, uk-eu economic relations, number 06091, 13 april 2016. note 11. in fact, the report goes out of its way to diminish this bargaining advantage. on p. 11, it says: “less than 8% of eu exports come to the uk while 44% of uk exports go to the eu. only 3.1% of the rest of the eu’s gdp is dependent on exporting to the uk, compared to 12.6% of the uk’s gdp dependent on eu-uk trade”. note 12. that is, of course, if people are being rational. of course, people might turn nasty – but then you have to ask why you would want to have every closer union with people who will turn nasty whenever they don’t get their way. note 13. patrick minford (2016), the treasury report on brexit: a critique, economists for brexit, 10 may. note 14. house of commons library briefing paper, uk-eu economic relations, number 06091, 13 april 2016. note 15. defined as total trade (exports plus imports) as a share of uk gdp. note 16.two quarters of negative gdp growth. note 17. the same is true for the oecd. so when the oecd’s chief economist, catherine mann, says that “we have done a lot of work on what a hard landing in china would mean. it is in the same ball park as brexit”, this prediction comes from a similar gravity model to that used by the treasury (reported in oecd’s brexit warning dents pound and ftse, citywire, 1 june 2016). note 18. david aikman, philip barrett, sujit kapadia, mervyn king, james proudman, tim taylor, iain de weymarn and tony yates (2011) uncertainty in macro-economic policy-making: art or science?, philosophical transactions of the royal society, 369, 4798-4817. note 19. although the output from the gravity model was then fed into the nigem model. note 20. this is the middle case between a “shock” and “contagion”. note 21. the comprehensive uk uncertainty indicator is constructed by averaging six measures of uncertainty in order to estimate the size of uncertainty shocks in past episodes (p. 39 and p. 64). the uncertainty indicator is constructed by averaging the following normalised measures: baker-bloom-davis policy-related uncertainty; ftse 100 implied volatility; sterling implied volatility; cbi industrial trends uncertainty measure; european commission consumer uncertainty measure; and http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http:/www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_393133.pdf http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http:/www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_393133.pdf www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 75 published by scholink inc. gfk unemployment expectations. see the impact of uncertainty shocks on the uk economy, denis and kannan (2013); measuring economic policy uncertainty, baker, bloom and davis (2015); and the short-term economic impact of leaving the eu, national institute of economic and social research (2016). note 22. measured in 2015 terms. note 23. chris giles (2016) charlie bean gives seal of approval to brexit analysis, financial times, 23 may. note 24. note the imf and bank of england forecasts discussed above and only made a few weeks before that the uk “could” lead to a recession are already wrong—this new treasury report says that there “will” definitely be a recession. note 25. a phrase used by kit juckes of société générale in the daily telegraph, 20 may 2016. note 26. these banks predicted a 12% fall in sterling and the treasury has raised this to 15% for the “extreme shock” case. note 27. for a reason unexplained in the report, it excludes exchange rates. note 28. there is no supporting evidence for this, since there can be no supporting evidence. however, the size of the increase was chosen to make the predictions of the shortand long-term models consistent with each other, as we will shortly see. note 29. it is interesting to recall that the recession of 1991-92 was primarily caused by high interest rates and an overvalued exchange rate induced by the uk’s membership of the exchange rate mechanism (erm, 1990-1992). the treasury at the time said it would be a disaster for the uk to leave the erm. but this happened on 16 september 1992, following which inflation fell, interest rates were cut and the economy recovered (roger bootle, yes, the imf and 200-plus economists can be wrong, the daily telegraph, 15 may 2016). note 30. david cass and karl shell (1983) do sunspots matter? journal of political economy, 91(21), 193-228. the term comes from economist william stanley jevons’ attempt to see if there was a causal relationship between the pattern of sunspots and the business cycle. no such relationship has been found (william stanley jevons (1878) commercial crises and sunspots, nature, 19, 33-37). note 31. arthur pigou (1927) industrial fluctuations, macmillan, london. note 32. john m. keynes (1936) the general theory of employment, interest and money. london. macmillan, 161-162. note 33. this is where the effect of a small shock to a system is magnified over time. note 34. note that i use a var model that directly links gdp and the uncertainty indicator as in chart a.2. by contrast, the var model used by the treasury links the uncertainty indicator to the components of gdp and other macroeconomic variables. the output from the treasury’s var model then needs to pass through nigem in order to derive the impact on gdp. the treasury could have avoided that by using the same direct model as i use here. note 35. the report states that “periods of increased uncertainty have been associated with lower gdp https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/the_general_theory_of_employment,_interest_and_money www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 76 published by scholink inc. growth” (p.13). yes, but that does not imply any causality. nor does it imply that you can use this association to arbitrarily increase the level of uncertainty and hold it there for two years to trigger a recession. note 36. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ne.exp.gnfs.zs note 37. quoted in economic threat of brexit is being “exaggerated”, says former bank of england chief, the daily telegraph, 20 april 2016. note 38. quoted in the times, 17 october 2015. note 39. quoted in the financial times, 24 february 2016. note 40. quoted in the evening express, 26 february 2016. note 41. nevertheless, the biggest cause of a shock of this size would be the scare-mongering tone of the two treasury reports. note 42. http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b07btgtl note 43. the same point was made somewhat less kindly by ryan bourne (2016) the treasury’s new brexit paper: rubbish in, rubbish out, institute for economic affairs, 24 may; http://www.iea.org.uk/blog/the-treasurys-new-brexit-paper-rubbish-in-rubbish-out note 44. this, of course, is nothing more than goodhart’s law as any second-year economics undergraduate student will tell you (charles goodhart (1975) problems of monetary management: the u.k. experience. papers in monetary economics, reserve bank of australia). note 45. http://www.kushnirs.org/macroeconomics_/en/greenland__gdp.html note 46. rodney thom and brendan walsh (2002) the effect of a currency union on trade: lessons from the irish experience, european economic review, 46, 1111-1123. note 47. robert, a. m. (1960) the monetary dynamics of international adjustment under fixed and flexible exchange rates, quarterly journal of economics, 74, 227-57. note 48. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/unemployment_statistics; http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00115&plugin=1 note 49. the times, 19 november 1997. note 50. https://gefira.org/en/2016/06/03/after-the-brexit-referendum-a-fiscal-union-will-be-brussels surprise/ note 51. the secret eu army is a dangerous delusion, the daily telegraph, 28 may 2016; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2016/05/28/the-secret-eu-army-is-a-dangerous-delusion/. this is particularly concerning, given the eu’s history of foreign policy failures: e.g., not intervening in the balkan wars in the 1990s and stepping on russia’s toes by getting too close to the ukraine and then doing nothing when president putin reacted by annexing the crimea in 2014. note 52. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-34789502 note 53. http://www.tent.org/refugees-work/ http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00115&plugin=1 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 77 published by scholink inc. note 54. giovanni peri (2012) the effect of immigration on productivity: evidence from us states, the review of economics and statistics, 94(1), 348-358; francesc ortega and giovanni peri (2014), openness and income: the roles of trade and migration, journal of international economics, 92, 231-251. note 55. bbc news, 16 may 2016. note 56. gunnar beck, charles blankart, gerd habermann, dietrich murswiek, alfred schȕller, joachim starbatty, roland vabel, and hans-olaf henkel. note 57. david cameron is a keen supporter of turkey joining the eu. on his first trip to turkey as prime minister in 2010, he said he wanted to “pave the road for turkey to join the eu, saying the country was ‘vital for our economy, vital for our security and vital for our diplomacy’. without turkey at its heart, the eu was ‘not stronger but weaker... not more secure but less... not richer but poorer. i’m here to make the case for turkey’s membership of the eu. and to fight for it…. it makes me angry that your progress towards eu membership can be frustrated in the way it has been…so i will remain your strongest possible advocate for eu membership and greater influence at the top table of european diplomacy” (cameron “anger” at slow pace of turkish eu negotiations, bbc news, 27 july 2010, www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-10767768). note 58. eurostat data; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/list_of_european_countries_by_average_wage note 59. “europe’s rule-of-law crisis”; https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/rule-of-law-crisis-hungary-poland-by-guy-verhofstadt2016-04 note 60. stephen booth, christopher howarth, mats persson, raoul ruparel and pawel swidlicki (2015) what if...? the consequences, challenges & opportunities facing britain outside eu, open europe. note 61. business for britain. (2015). change, or go: how britain would gain influence and prosper outside an unreformed eu; http://businessforbritain.org/change-or-go/ note 62. cebr: brexit but staying in the single market could leave uk gdp higher by 2030, city a. m., 20 april 2016. note 63. pwc (2016) leaving the eu – implications for the uk economy. note 64. woodford investment management (2015) the economic impact of “brexit”. note 65. patrick minford, sakshi gupta, mai le, vidya mahambare and yongdeng xu (2015) should britain leave the eu?. edward elgar, cheltenham. note 66. http://www.economistsforbrexit.co.uk/ note 67. quoted in the daily telegraph, 20 may 2016 (bank “must be ready” to cut rates even if uk stays in eu). note 68. http://www.cityam.com/231501/world-economic-league-table-uk-could-overtake-germany and-japan-to-become-worlds-fourth-biggest-economy note 69. http://www.cityam.com/239128/the-treasury-has-it-entirely-wrong-the-british-economy www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 78 published by scholink inc. would-gain-from-brexit note 70. lord owen: “there is no need to be afraid of leaving the eu”, the daily telegraph, 28 may 2016. note 71. what would a brexit mean for investors?,portfolio international, may 2016. note 72. he added that this view was shared by the international monetary fund and the bank of england. note 73. the deceptions behind george osborne’s brexit report, 18 apr 2016; http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2016/04/the-deceptions-behind-george-osbornes-brexit-report/ note 74. http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/families/ bulletins/familiesandhouseholds/2015-11-05 note 75. http://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/timeseries/ihxv note 76. http://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/timeseries/rphq note 77. https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-household-projections note 78. http://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/earningsandworkinghours/ bulletins/annualsurveyofhoursandearnings/2015provisionalresults note 79. david cameron and george osborne, brexit would put our economy in serious danger, the daily telegraph, 22 may 2016. note 80. by £230 and new limits on duty free. note 81. itn news, 6 june 2016. note 82. uk would face tortuous trade talks in event of brexit, says wto, financial times, 26 may 2016. note 83. the daily telegraph, 14 may 2016. note 84. bypassing tortuous trade talks in event of brexit, financial times, 26 may 2016. note 85. institute for fiscal studies; http://www.niesr.ac.uk/sites/default/files/images/chadhafig1.png note 86. this would include five of his conservative predecessors as chancellor or shadow chancellor (lawson, lamont, howard, lilley and portillo). quoted in ryan bourne (2016) the trouble with the economic consensus against brexit, 2 june; http://capx.co/the-trouble-with-the-economic-consensus-against-brexit/. even jeremy corbyn, the labour leader and a new convert to remaining in the eu, has described the treasury predictions as “histrionic hype” and “myth-making” (quoted in corbyn accused of sabotaging the remain case – labour leader stuns some colleagues with attack on treasury brexit forecast, financial times, 3 june 2016). note 87. on 3 june 2016, jamie dimon, j.p. morgan chief executive, speaking alongside the chancellor at j.p. morgan’s bournemouth office, said that leaving the eu would be a “terrible deal” for the uk economy and warned that he might have to cut as many as 4,000 jobs in the uk if britain votes to leave the european union on 23 june (bbc news). note 88. dr janet yellen said: “there would be potentially significant economic repercussions if the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 4, no. 4, 2021 79 published by scholink inc. uk votes to leave the eu. it would likely shift investor sentiment” (bbc world service, 6 june 2016). note 89. house of commons library briefing paper, uk-eu economic relations, number 06091, 13 april 2016. note 90. lord owen agrees: “companies like mercedes and bmw will come in straight away, soon followed by the champagne growers, then the cheese makers on the phone…these forces on the ground would overweigh political opposition” (quoted in the daily telegraph, 2 june 2016). note 91. harry western (2021) five years on – the things remainers got wrong about brexit, briefings for britain, 28 august; https://www.briefingsforbritain.co.uk/five-years-on-the-things-remainers-got-wrong-about-brexit/ note 92. see box 1.d impact of a decision to leave the eu on the financial services sector, ‘hm treasury analysis: the immediate economic impact of leaving the eu’, published on 23 may 2016; https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hm-treasury-analysis-the-immediate-economic-impact-of -leaving-the-eu note 93. the data for 2020 and 2021 are distorted by the coronavirus pandemic and not included. note 94. david frost lecture: reflections on the revolutions in europe; https://no10media.blog.gov.uk/2020/02/17/david-frost-lecture-reflections-on-the-revolutions-in-europe/ note 95. philip wales, russell black, ted dolby and gaganan awano (2018) uk trade in goods and productivity: new findings, office for national statistics and escoe discussion paper 2018-09, july. note 96. jeffrey a. frankel and david romer (1999) does trade cause growth? american economic review, 89(3), 379-399. part 1: the two treasury reports introduction the treasury’s long-term economic model—the gravity model problems with the treasury’s long-term economic model what the treasury’s long-term economic model cannot do the imf and bank of england long-term economic models the treasury’s short-term economic model—the var model problems with the treasury’s short-term economic model linking the treasury’s short-term and long-term economic models what the treasury’s short-term economic model cannot do it’s more than the economics stupid! embarrassing for the economics profession the political abuse of the treasury models even more political abuse conclusion appendix: lord mervyn king’s interview with martha kearney part 2: the state of the uk economy five years after the publication of the treasury reports references notes advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 186 original paper the geo-economic and geo-energy pillar of power as a geopolitical decision making factor within the dynamics of the southeastern europe geopolitical complex nikolaos deniozos1 & 2, charis m. vlados2, dimos chatzinikolaou2* & agis digkas1 1 department of turkish studies and modern asian studies, national and kapodistrian university of athens, athens, greece 2 department of economics, democritus university of thrace, komotini, greece * dimos chatzinikolaou, department of economics, democritus university of thrace, komotini, greece received: june 3, 2019 accepted: june 13, 2019 online published: june 18, 2019 doi:10.22158/ape.v2n3p186 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v2n3p186 abstract the “geopolitical complex” of southeastern europe, as a sub-system of the europe-asia-middle east system, highlights its geo-economic dimension since the discovery of hydrocarbons in this geographical area has become a major geopolitical factor, resulting to competitions, conflicts, and strategic alliances among different actors/players. in this context, the particular space and time play an essential role, since the decision-making process has become a vital determinant of the necessary geostrategic synthesis under conditions of uncertainty and risk. this article approaches the subject under consideration by applying quantitative decision-making methods under uncertainty and/or limited uncertainty (risk) conditions by actors/players of the region; it examines the choice of alternative strategies that highlight not only the maximization of the actors’ geopolitical benefits but also provides added value to already formed strategic alliances. it also attempts to answer the question of how the construction of an lng terminal can generate multiple benefits from its location and operation by presenting a theoretical model. keywords geopolitical complex, geoeconomics, hydrocarbons, strategic alliances, geostrategic decision making www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 187 published by scholink inc. 1. introduction all the phenomena of the current global reality seem to be in a state of rapid change and structural transformation. everything seems to be in the middle of a transitional phase by seeking a new form of global balance and stability. some scholars argue that this emerging phase can be called “new globalization” (bhattacharya, khanna, schweizer, & bijapurkar, 2017; bremmer, 2014; vlados, deniozos, & chatzinikolaou, 2018). overall, this newly emerging evolutionary context, which is in a state of intense and profound structural rebalancing—in a crisis phase—the individual actors, structures, and rules are changing drastically (figure 1). figure 1. structures, behaviors, performances, and restructuring in the global system (βλάδος, 2017) within this global dynamics, specifically:  the structures define the boundaries of the individual actors’ behaviors, while these behaviors determine the performance achieved by every actor, hence their survival dynamics and development (malecki, 2018; reeves, levin, & ueda, 2016).  in case the performances of the actors fall drastically and massively on a systematic base, their survival and individual development are in risk; in this context, the global-scale system enters into the crisis phase (amable, 2017; vlados, deniozos, chatzinikolaou, & demertzis, 2018).  the global system then seeks and, under certain conditions, achieves the necessary innovation— innovation perceivable in institutional and geopolitical terms (kay, 2018; vlados & chatzinikolaou, 2019)—as a way out of its crisis; this, in turn, leads to the restructuring of global structures, on the basis of a successful change management. therefore, a new cycle of global development opens (gilles, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 188 published by scholink inc. 2004; grinin, korotayev, & tausch, 2016).  in this continuous process, each link of the chain determines and is being determined (at the same time, at any moment) by the dynamic world system (knox, agnew, & mccarthy, 2014; lenzen, kanemoto, moran, & geschke, 2012). a particularly interesting recent study (laudicina & peterson, 2016) illustrates the fact that the current form of globalization is at a significant crossroads, balancing between divergent forces and leading to a continuous increase of uncertainty: in particular, the authors suggest that globalization is currently facing a temporary halt (a hiatus). the climax of globalization is identified in 2007, while the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 is considered to have marked the transition to a new and prolonged phase of diminished growth—both for the global economy and international economic integration. according to the authors, a critical question that emerges is whether the system will grow again in cross-border movement of goods, services, capital, and people, or whether there will ultimately happen a fundamental change to the existing system’s trajectory; a system that existed until the outbreak of the recession (known as the acceleration of globalization). the writers want us to consider what the future of the global economic state of affairs is going to be. to this end, they distinguish four future socioeconomic situations/scenarios of global development, which they call (a) globalization 3.0, (b) polarization, (c) islandization, and (d) commonization, each one bearing its unique developmental prospects and implications. at the same time, in one of the earliest in-depth approaches to the current global crisis—and one of the most interesting, to date—the us national intelligence council in the report entitled “global trends 2025” expressed without hesitations predictions about the gradual emergence of a “transformed world” (national intelligence council, 2008). in this study, in particular, the issue of global safety and security seems to be of crucial importance. as the report points out, one of the eight key-uncertainties for the future is whether an energy shift away from oil and gas—supported by improved energy storage, biofuels, and clean coal—will be completed by the year 2025. it also notes that an outcome of probable rising oil and gas prices is that major exporting countries, such as russia and iran, will significantly increase their levels of power and influence, projecting that russia’s gdp may reach the respective levels of the united kingdom and france. on the contrary, a possible prolonged price downturn, which can potentially be supported by a shift toward new energy sources, can trigger a long-term recession for the energy producers as global and regional actors. in these increasingly complex global conditions, the region of southeastern europe, due to its energy resources, constitutes a vital geographic and economic area for the system of international security (cherp & jewell, 2014; sovacool & saunders, 2014). the actors in the region, especially those countries that have natural reserves in their maritime zones, have to be forging strategic alliances (such as the greece-cyprus-israel-egypt alliance) in order to promote their strategic interests and reap the maximum geo-economic and geopolitical benefits. in this context, we understand that economic actors are called upon to make their decisions on the basis of strengthening their geopolitical power (cohen, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 189 published by scholink inc. 1964; grieco, 1988; grygiel, 2006; karkazis, vidakis, & baltos, 2014; knutsen, 2014; mackinder, 1904; marklund, 2015; neves, 2017; thirlwell, 2010; valieva, 2016). this article attempts to approach this decision-making process through quantitative tools. in conditions of uncertainty and risk (glancy, 2012; slovic & weber, 2002)—the continually changing and unstable international environment justifies these conditions—such tools are the hurwicz, savage (min-max regret), and expected value criteria. these quantitative tools make use and take into account external environmental conditions as their data, along with the geopolitical constants of the subjects they examine. 2. the research question the geopolitical complex of southeastern europe (daras & mazis, 2015, 2017; hamlen, 2013), as a sub-system of the europe-asia-middle east system, highlights its geo-economic dimension, since the discovery of hydrocarbons in this geographical area has become a major geopolitical factor, resulting to competitions, conflicts, strategic alliances, and so forth, between different actors/players (bajraktarevic, 2012; kapur & suri, 2014; wigell & vihma, 2016). as a consequence of all these events, the components of the actors’ geopolitical power are redistributed within a dynamic process; in this context, the particular space and time play an essential role, since the decision-making process has become now a key determinant of the necessary geostrategic synthesis under conditions of uncertainty and/or risk (ayoob, 2012; lee, 2012; riegl, 2013). this grid of relations is not neutral and independent. it is directly related also to energy security (european commission, 2014; hu & ge, 2014), which in turn also affects the redistribution of geoeconomic and geopolitical power of the subsystem under study. therefore, this article approaches the subject under consideration by applying quantitative decision-making methods under uncertainty and/or limited uncertainty (risk) conditions by actors/players of the region; it examines the choice of alternative strategies that will ensure not only the maximization of the actors’ geopolitical benefits but also will provide added value to already formed strategic alliances. it also attempts to answer the question of how the construction of an lng terminal can generate multiple benefits from its location and operation by presenting a theoretical model. 3. methodology in order to approach the subject and to answer the research question, we follow these particular steps:  first of all, we review the literature of the article’s subject, while trying to conceptually approach the terminology that composes the facets of this issue. thus, we try to interpret the concepts of geoeconomics, geopolitical pillar of power, geopolitical factor, geopolitical complex, and geostrategic synthesis.  consequently, we present the geopolitical and geo-economic data of the southeastern europe geopolitical complex; these are essentially interpretative variables that, on the one hand, contain www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 190 published by scholink inc. dynamic elements in terms of geographic and economic space and, on the other hand, interpret components of geopolitical power (expressed over geopolitical indicators).  next, the approach of using quantitative methods in decision-making takes place. we use the hurwicz and savage (min-max regret) criteria under uncertainty conditions and the expected value criterion, in order to fulfill the real purpose of maximization as the optimal decision between the actors’ strategic alternatives.  besides, we calculate the expected values of perfect information; these ultimately highlight the added value of in-depth geopolitical analysis, since they reduce the decision-making costs and can trigger more high-quality decisions.  the analysis concludes by presenting a theoretical model, which suggests that the location and operation of an lng infrastructure produce multiplier effects on both regional investment and regional income (on the particular spatial unit is being installed). 4. literature review: conceptual approaches the energy dynamics that developed recently in the geographic area of the southeastern mediterranean sea due to the exploration and discovery of hydrocarbons also highlights the geo-economic and “geoenergy” dynamics of this area; this is a geopolitical factor that determines geostrategic options that trigger decision-making by actors-players of the region within the international context of antagonisms and conflicts (kurecic, 2015; sidorenko, 2015). the latter characterizes the contemporary chaotic international environment (kotler & caslione, 2009; mayer, 2012). therefore, it is of crucial importance to define first the concept of geo-economy. geo-economics, according to edward luttwak (1990), reflects the continuation of the confrontational international scene and the occurrence of competitive relations under the mantle of economic and trade competition. in other words, in geo-economic terms, the confrontational nature of the international system is now reduced to the level of economic means exploitation to achieve strategic goals (the national interest is also materialized under that particular reality). edward luttwak further defines geoeconomics as a new form of primitive conflict between nations by using solely economic means. luttwak’s parallelism between the conflict of nations with the military (traditional) and geo-economic means is also very interesting. in the age of geo-economics, the invested industrial capital provided or guided by the state is the firepower, while the development of products through state subsidies is equivalent to the innovation of weapons systems, and the penetration of domestic firms in international markets with state support is the equivalent of establishing military bases in foreign territory and having diplomatic influence. paraphrasing carl von clausewitz (1832), it can be said that geo-economics is, for the most part, the continuation of primitive competition between nations by new industrial means. also, geopolitical analyst savin (2016) points out: “one of the modern researchers, klaus solberg soilen [(soilen, 2012)], believes that geo-economics is www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 191 published by scholink inc. the study of spatial, cultural and strategic aspects of resources in order to obtain a sustainable competitive advantage. it is the continuation of the logic of geopolitics, applied to the era of globalization. he also offers a new term that replaces the heartland and the rimland—the nareland (reduction from english ‘natural resource lands’). this new logic of dividing geographic locations determines the shift from geopolitics to geo-economics. the author validates this thesis with the example of the us presence in the middle east, where there are hydrocarbon reserves, as well as china’s interests in the agricultural and oil sectors of the african countries”. at the same time, repasova and ciderova (2013) analyze the concept of geo-economics and introduce the term “geo-heterogeneity” to define geographic categories such as geo-culture, geo-history, geopolitics, and geo-economics. also, according to sanjaya baru (2012), geo-economics can be defined in two different ways: first, as the relationship between economic policy and shifts in national power and geopolitics (in other words, the geopolitical consequences of economic phenomena) and, second, how the economic consequences affect geopolitics and national power. the author asserts that both the notion that “trade follows the flag” (the projection that national power has economic consequences) and that “the flag follows trade” (the geopolitical consequences of economic phenomena) point to the discipline of geo-economics. scekic et al. (2016, pp. 66-67) on the issue of geo-economy point out: “the end of last and the beginning of the current millennium was marked by the escalation of mutual relations of the great powers. struggle for resources on the global level increased. economic rivalries have become the dominant phenomenon. in this context neoliberal ideology ceded its place to geoeconomics. the latter explains geographical, economic, historical, political and institutional characteristics of a certain region … for explanation of the current process of adjustment to new (global) economic and political demands it is necessary to be aware of recent geoeconomic phenomena and categories, because the current geopolitical rivalry of the great powers is happening on the field of economics and it is mostly the struggle for resources.” in their recent book, blackwill and harris (2016, p. 20) define geo-economics as “the use of economic instruments to promote and defend national interests, and to produce beneficial geopolitical results; and the effects of other nations’ economic actions on a country’s geopolitical goals.” regarding “geo-energy”, this term was adopted and introduced in the literature by vidakis and baltos (2015, p. 3), according to which: “geoenergeia is a new analytical method referring to political decision-making in both national and international affairs. the method’s first step examines decision-making processes in political, economic, and even social fields in relation to geographic areas defined by energy resource information. the next step interprets the interaction between political decisions and actions and the existence of energy resources as well as the utilization of potential for energy resources. the study of energy interrelationships at the international, global or regional level.” regarding the concepts “pillar of power” and “geopolitical factor”, according to i. mazis (μάζης, 2002, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 192 published by scholink inc. 2012), we have to notice the following. since the subject of geopolitics is to study the influence of power of international or national actors via defense, political, economic and cultural means, therefore the pillars of power are the four categories of defense/security, economy, politics and culture/information, which determine the power and distribution of power in the spatial complex. the geopolitical factor, especially, triggers the redistribution of power in the geopolitical complex. in turn, the geopolitical complex is the broader geographic unit of the system, which is the exact aggregate of the territorial units that constitute the geopolitical subsystems (figure 2). figure 2. a geostrategic conception. reproduced from savin (2016) finally, in order to link the concept of decision-making to the subject matter, it must be pointed out that the concept of geopolitics does not coincide with the concept of geo-strategy: geopolitics constitutes the question of “is”, while geo-strategy questions “what has to be done” by undertaking the practical description of the outcomes of geopolitical analysis. thus, decision-making methodology is a practical way to achieve the real purpose of geo-strategic synthesis. 5. the geopolitical and geo-economic data of the southeastern europe geopolitical complex an essential element to be highlighted initially is a constant variable: given the confrontational and competitive international scene, the whole game takes place in situations of uncertainty or limited uncertainty since the deterministic element is absent. this aspect leads us to use quantitative methods in decision-making on the part of actors in order to try to approach the subject through a methodology that geopolitical analysis has so far presented. the actors (decision-makers) in our case, are the allied partnership between greece-cyprus-israel in the southeastern europe geopolitical complex. thus, we can formulate the problem in the form of a “pay-off matrix” and, consequently, highlight with this structure the need for making decisions that affect the “geopolitical power redistribution components” of the southeastern mediterranean sea (mazis, 2018). also, other vital constants/data of the subject under study are: www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 193 published by scholink inc. a) turkey’s ongoing revisionist stance. turkey is a regional power of the region that seeks continuously to gain a leading role in the muslim population internationally. as m. troulis (τρούλης, 2018) points out, regardless the ideological approach of the new elites to islam or choosing religion as an ideal tool of strategic penetration to the middle east (and, more broadly, to muslim world), the islamization of turkish strategic behavior is an observable event. furthermore, we must not ignore the fact that turkey has declared its will to become an energy storage hub instead of an energy transit country (austvik & rzayeva, 2017). thus, by maximizing revenue and reducing its energy dependency, turkey aspires to make energy a strategic tool for its international relations (barysch, 2007; biresselioglu, 2007). b) we must not ignore existing technical and economic data, such as the offshore fields of the republic of cyprus. “glaucus” and “aphrodite” alone are not enough to construct a liquefaction terminal in cyprus, since, according to experts, such an installation presupposes the existence of quantities exceeding 10 trillion cubic meters and cost exceeding ten billion dollars. however, aphrodite contains four trillion cubic feet, while glaucus, according to the first estimates, contains three to eight trillion cubic feet. thus, according to the law of probabilities, there is 75% chance to find five trillion cubic feet and 25% chance to find eight trillion cubic feet, as the experts speculate (konofagos, 2019a). c) the trilateral greece-israel-cyprus summit to sign the intergovernmental agreement on the eastmed pipeline. it was held on march 20, 2019, in tel aviv with the presence of the us foreign minister mike pompeo. this agreement has put together many expectations for the region. the eastmed pipeline might transform the region into a significant gas exporter and a vital source of supply for europe while strengthening the hopes of those who see in the construction of the ambitious eastmed project the enhanced role of greece as an energy transit center, which initiated after the launch of the tap pipeline. this meeting is a continuation of the trilateral strategic alliance, which takes the form of strategic alignment, incorporating the co-understanding of threats primarily. d) egypt, according to announcements from the country’s responsible ministry of petroleum, has 72 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves, while unconfirmed deposits can reach up to 120 trillion cubic feet (τρούλης, 2018). to israel, the proven natural gas reserves amount to 176 billion cubic meters, given that a high potential within the declared eez is present. moreover, according to the us geological survey, there are additional gas reserves in the levantine basin, which amount to 3.45 trillion cubic meters of gas, 1.8 billion barrels of crude oil and 4 billion barrels of liquid hydrocarbon gases (τρούλης, 2018). it should be noted, however, that egypt is not interested in participating in the eastmed project, given the fact that cairo aspires to become the new energy hub of this geopolitical complex. e) however, east med’s design may not only linked to geo-economic but also nationalsupranational and geopolitical balances. in this regard, italy (marseglia, rivieccio, & medaglia, 2018) has expressed concerns about the pipeline’s route crossing its territory. although rome is officially www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 194 published by scholink inc. invoking environmental concerns and arguments, the more profound interpretation of italian maneuver (not a decision) highlights complex balances of rome-berlin, paris, and brussels relationships, as well as the ideological and political affinity of salvini-putin. national-populism, however, is also an area that donald trump exploits, who exerts influence in rome, but the lack of coherent structures and immediate realizable benefits for italy allows a closer italy-russia relationship. f) the issue of energy security, that is, to be ensuring a stable and unimpeded energy supply by multiple and diversified producers towards the european single market, and reducing the dependency on russian energy sources, also acquires primary importance (european commission, 2006; mañéestrada, 2006). 6. decision-making under uncertainty and limited uncertainty or risk 6.1 defining the problem as we have already mentioned, we can formulate this problem in a pay-off matrix and, therefore, highlight with this structure the need for making decisions that affect the “geopolitical power redistribution components” of the southeastern mediterranean sea, where:  the external states take the symbol s, and more accurately defined s1, s2, s3, as follows: a) subsea natural gas pipeline towards turkey (s1). b) the construction of eastmed pipeline 2000km long, with a construction cost of 6-7 billion euros, while the quantity of natural gas it could potentially transfer to italy annually amounts to 20 billion cubic meters (s2). c) s3 is the state where a gas pipeline starts from cyprus heading to lng facilities in egypt (idku and damietta) and therefore by ships in europe.  let us then assume that there are three groups of alternative strategies to be adopted by actorsplayers of the geopolitical complex of the southeastern mediterranean combined with the external environment. they base their strategies on: a) the outcome according to a pessimistic scenario (d1), which refers to the route of the energy resource through turkey; b) the outcome according to a moderate degree of optimism scenario (d2), which refers to the transit of natural gas through egypt’s terminals; and c) the outcome according to a very optimistic scenario, for the benefit of actors-players (d3), which refers to the construction of the eastmed pipeline.  the matrix is fulfilled by the pay-offs, which indicate the benefits (positive values) and losses (negative values), in monetary units, depending on the external states (s) mentioned above. in this case, the real purpose is the maximization as an optimal decision. the values of the pay-off matrix can derive from the previous in-depth geopolitical analysis taking into account the constants as well as the prevailing environmental conditions. so the illustration of the issue is as follows (table 1): www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 195 published by scholink inc. table 1. pay-off matrix external states strategy the subsea gas pipeline towards turkey (s1) construction of eastmed pipeline (s2) gas pipeline from cyprus to lng facilities in egypt (idku & damietta) and from there by ships in europe (s3) outcome according to pessimistic scenario (d1) 60 100 150 outcome according to a moderate degree of optimism scenario (d2) -30 120 200 outcome according to the most optimistic scenario, for the benefit of actorsplayers (d3) -80 70 280 6.2 decision-making under uncertainty for this case, we choose the hurwicz criterion or the criterion of optimism index. we can define a coefficient of “optimism” which, according to the literature (anderson, 2008; collier, lambert, & linkov, 2016; tsangaratos et al., 2017; veen, 2013), takes values between 0 and 1 (including the limits where a value equal to 0 means that the decision-maker faces the situation with full pessimism, while a value equal to 1 means that the decision-maker faces the situation with full optimism). at this point, we must notice that the optimism index incorporates all the components of the previous geopolitical analysis. in our analysis, we set the optimism index at α = 0.6 (moderate degree of optimism), and by using the qm for windows software, we get the following results (figure 3): www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 196 published by scholink inc. figure 3. decision table results (hurwitz criterion). authors’ calculation according to this criterion and with the optimism index set at 0.6, d3 is the preferred strategy. this strategy refers to the outcome with the most optimistic scenario. if we choose the savage or “min-max regret” criterion, where the actors-players seek to minimize the degree of regret from not implementing the best possible conditions for the chosen strategy, then as shown below the chosen alternative is d2 (figure 4). figure 4. decision table results (savage criterion). authors’ calculation 6.3 decision-making under conditions of limited uncertainty or risk in this case, we apply the expected value methodology, where for each condition of the external environment, the actors-players can determine the probabilities tied to them. as can be seen from the table below (figure 5), we have determined the probabilities for the external environmental conditions based on existing data, as follows: a) the route of a natural gas pipeline to turkey (s1) with a probability of 10%, since such a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 197 published by scholink inc. situation faces severe political problems, mostly because the eu does not desire such a development as its energy dependence from turkey would be enhanced, and thus turkey would be transformed into an important transit hub. moreover, of course, neither the republic of cyprus considers such a possibility for obvious geopolitical reasons. this option is the most financially advantageous, but there are two significant obstacles. the first obstacle is israel’s reluctance to trust the “islamized” turkey; today, much of turkey’s public administration staff are islamists and, also in the future, because islamization has been introduced to education, new generations of radicals islamists will be created to oppose israeli interests. the second major obstacle is that the pipeline to turkey will have to pass through the eez of cyprus and, therefore, before any such decision, the cyprus conflict must be resolved. b) the construction of east med pipeline with 2000km and 6-7 billion euros cost of construction. the quantity of natural gas it could potentially transfer to italy (passing through crete, peloponnese and final destination italy) per annum amounts to 20 billion cubic meters (s2) with a probability of 30%, since this pipeline is not feasible at the moment, and a final feasibility study has not yet started (τσακίρης, 2016, 2018). moreover, as we have mentioned earlier, italy has expressed second thoughts on this route. also, we must notice that italy was absent from the “trilateral summit plus one” that took place in israel. however, such a project will need support from the european union, which should incorporate it into its critical energy infrastructure. spain opposes this option, proposing the transfer of gas to one of the existing re-gasification facilities on its territory. spain has 40% of such facilities on the eu territory, and despite recent gas imports from the us, these continue to under-operate. in this case, the gas would be liquefied in two existing facilities in egypt and possibly in a third, perhaps built in cyprus, and then transported by special tankers to one of the three re-infiltration facilities spain has in the mediterranean. c) transfer of gas through a pipeline from cyprus to lng facilities in egypt (idku & damietta) and from there to europe (s3) with a probability of 60%. such an alternative from a technical and economic point of view is the most competitive option. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 198 published by scholink inc. figure 5. decision table results (expected monetary value). authors’ calculation from all the above, we get that the adoption of the d3 strategy achieves the best decision. another interesting point in the analysis mentioned above is the value of perfect information, which is the cost of uncertainty, as it becomes known to actors-players an additional expected value that could be for their benefit if they had perfect information about external states. the optimal strategy that is adapted based on the existence of perfect information is expressed as follows: if s1 is valid then d1 is adopted, if s2 is valid then d2 is adopted, and if s3 is valid then d3 is adopted. this condition gives the expected value with perfect information, which we calculate as follows: (0.1)(60) (0.3)(120) (0.6)(280) 210   the expected value without perfect information, as we have previously shown, is 181. so the value of perfect information is 210-181=29. however, what does this price mean? it means that if actors-players, acting through alliances, can acquire and obtain additional information on external states through appropriate procedures, then they will consider imposing a cost of less than 29 monetary units in order to achieve this goal. however, we have to notice that it is necessary to examine the impact of changes in a priori probabilities in the proposed decisions and how they affect them. in other words, sensitivity analysis is a process that we must not omit. so if we revise/change the probabilities to s1:5%, s2:25%, and s3:70%, then the results are as follows (figure 6): www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 199 published by scholink inc. figure 6. decision table results (review of a priori probabilities). authors’ calculation in this case, also, the d3 strategy seems to be the best option available. furthermore, the calculation of perfect information, as well as the expected value of perfect information calculated above (with the previous probability values), is of interest. the following table shows the figures mentioned above, with the expected value of perfect information to be 19.5 (figure 7). figure 7. decision table results (expected value of perfect information). authors’ calculation a strengthening factor, regarding the spatial dynamics of this area, is the potential construction and operation of an lng terminal in the republic of cyprus territory. developing the energy sector around an lng plant and the multiple effects of implementing the required infrastructure are indeed critical elements for the country’s economic future for many reasons. a dynamic energy sector can lead to job www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 200 published by scholink inc. creation across the value chain of the industry and contribute to the development of technical expertise, applied research and innovation (brutschin & fleig, 2016; szulecki, fischer, gullberg, & sartor, 2016). it can create cross-sectoral synergies and economies of scale (harrison et al., 2015; weber & schaperrinkel, 2017). the fastest possible introduction of gas into the transformation of the electricity sector is an important priority that results in significant microeconomic and macroeconomic impacts. the reduced cost of generating electricity will have obvious benefits for both households and industrial users. this kind of change will exert downward pressure on inflation and make businesses and the economy more competitive (alexandros & metaxas, 2016; berger, 2008). besides, the substitution of oil with gas exports and lng will correct prolonged macroeconomic imbalances, such as trade and current account deficits. the following theoretical model can interpret the above: we assume that a production function can express the “regional product”, where yr is the regional product, k stands for capital, l stands for labor and qis is the investment in the lng terminal. is is the volume of investment and q the quality of this infrastructure. so we have the function of the regional product expressed as follows: r sy f (k,l,qi ) a productive function with downward marginal productivity of infrastructure investment means that new investments in developed regional economies or central regions are less efficient than the same level of investment in less-favored areas (blažek & csank, 2016; pylak, 2015). therefore, if the above regional productive function is valid, with and sy / i 0   2 2 sy / i 0   then, we have downward marginal productivity of investments in the specific infrastructure. this case is understood using the following diagram (figure 8). figure 8. marginal productivity-less-developed and developed regional economies www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 201 published by scholink inc. ir = the volume of investment in the less-developed area id = the volume of investment in developed regional economies or central areas. it is evident from the above figure that a new investment unit in the problematic area is more efficient than a similar one in a more developed area if: r dy / i ) / i( ( y )     furthermore, this specific lng infrastructure has a dual effect on regional employment. the following figure 4 shows this effect. first, total employment increases from l1 to l2, concerning y1 production, which is equivalent to increasing the regional product from ya to yb. second, if we combine the increase in employment with training and educational programs, the workforce acquires new skills and becomes more productive. this increase in employment results to a shift from the y1 productive function to y2, with a more efficient labor factor per unit of employment, because in this case, new technology embedded in this lng facility comes into play. therefore, the following equation gives the benefit to the regional product from shifting to a new production function: c a b a c ay y (y y ) (y y )     the developmental spatial dynamics that this process entails from the installation of the lng terminal is considered to have the potential to cause spatial restructuring in this area; it can even cause the restructuring of the residential networks by creating concentration economies which can take the form of:  economies of scale within the lng terminal enterprise resulting from the growth of production scale at that specific area;  economies of location for all the energy sector’s enterprises resulting from the growth of the sector’s total outputs; and  economies of urbanization for all the enterprises located in the same area (from all sectors) resulting from the expansion of the overall economic size of the area. figure 9. the lng’s dual effect on regional employment www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 202 published by scholink inc. 7. concluding remarks and limitations according to the analysis and findings of our research, we come to the following conclusions: i. the scientific purpose of this article was to propose a decision-making methodology using quantitative methods in uncertainty and limited certainty of actors in the geopolitical complex of southeastern mediterranean. it took into account the geo-economic/geo-energy pillar of power as a geopolitical factor, by contributing further to the geostrategic synthesis always based on a previous geopolitical systemic analysis (mazis, 2008). ii. this methodology attempted to use the decision-making quantitative tools hurwitz, savage’s under uncertainty conditions and expected value under limited uncertainty conditions or risk in the geostrategic planning of actors-players in the geopolitical context of southeastern mediterranean, by taking into account the geo-energy geopolitical factor so that it incorporates the utility of these tools. to this end, kouskouvelis (κουσκούβελης, 2015) in his book “decision theory at thucydides”, in the section on the usefulness of decision theories, states among others that the advantage of decision theories in interpreting the facts is that no emphasis is placed on why, but mainly on how the decision was made and, therefore, the fact. in other words, the reason why a particular decision was taken is linked to the theories of decision, mainly by how the decision was taken. iii. with the methodology mentioned above, apart from the selection of the optimal alternative strategy according to the algorithm of each criterion, we had the opportunity to calculate the value of perfect information or even the expected value of perfect information. these assessments give policymakers and, by extension, the actors the opportunity to make the best possible and more economical use of their means to achieve their real purpose. this aspect of our analysis is also an added value to the whole project. iv. concerning possible limitations, we can summarize the following thoughts:  when using the hurwitz criterion with optimism index, its value should be set according to the objective data available and in particular by a thorough geopolitical analysis. to have a holistic approach, one must use alternative values of the optimism index.  if a utility function has evaluated the results, then we cannot use the savage criterion. this particular limitation emerges because the value or utility grade for a pay-off price is not absolute, but rather a pseudo-absolute price. v. therefore, with all the above mentioned, we attempted to approach the subject with a “quantitative” perception, which by no means covered this very up-to-date geo-economic with geopolitical dimensions aspect and which is in line with viktor hugo’s saying: “an invasion of armies can be resisted, but not an idea whose time has come”. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in 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(2018). ο ρόλος των τιμών του πετρελαίου στην ισορροπία της μ. ανατολής. foreign affairs (greek edition), 54(october-november), 73-99. appendix 1 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 209 published by scholink inc. east med proposed gas pipeline appendix 2 alternative gas routes appendix 3 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 210 published by scholink inc. targets and natural gas reserves in the cypriot eez. adapted from konofagos (2019b) appendix 4 natural gas reserves of “zohr type” in the cypriot offshore block 10. adapted from konofagos (2019a) appendix 5 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 2, no. 3, 2019 211 published by scholink inc. natural gas reserves of “zohr type” in the cypriot offshore block 10. adapted from κονοφάγος (2019a) microsoft word ape-v3n1-p15 advances in politics and economic issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 15 original paper the effect of service quality and facilities against satisfaction of patients at dental and mouth hospital gusti hasan aman on banjarmasin ibrahim daud1* & dhelia² 1 high schol of economic and business, stie indonesia, banjarmasin, indonesia 2 stie indonesia, banjarmasin, indonesia * ibrahim daud, high schol of economic and business, stie indonesia, banjarmasin, indonesia received: december 16, 2019 accepted: january 8, 2020 online published: january 14, 2020 doi:10.22158/ape.v3n1p15 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v3n1p15 abstact human needs are unlimited and continue to evolve with the times, in this modern era people are not only focused on the hierarchical needs (hierarchy needs) but also the need for health services. health services can be obtained by the community through hospitals, polyclinics, community health centers (puskesmas) and family doctors. this study aims to analyze the effect of service quality (x1) and facilities (x2) on patient satisfaction (y) in rsgm-gha. the study was conducted on 4,988 patients who came for treatment at rsgm-gha and 100 patients were taken as samples. the analytical method used is multiple linear regression statistical analysis with the help of the spss program. the results showed that the variable services quality and facilities provided by the gt. hasan aman to patient gives satisfaction with t test value: service quality (x1) of 0.679 with a significant 0.499> 0.05 and t-count is smaller than t table 0.679 <1.988 which means that there is no influence. while facilities (x2) of 13,242> 1,988 with a significant level of 0.00 showed a significant effect on patient satisfaction. f-test or simultaneous test shows that together service quality variables (x1) and facility variables (x2) influence with a value of 215,812 significance level of 0,000 and r square value of 0.817 which means that both variables are very strong influence by 81.7 percent. keywords service quality, facilities and satisfaction www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 16 published by scholink inc. 1. introduction human needs are unlimited and continue to grow, along with the times. today society begins by including new needs as their basic needs. one of these needs is the need for health services, because health is a necessity of life which is very important in supporting daily activities. the development of the business world today is also experiencing rapid growth, both businesses engaged in manufacturing and services. businesses that are engaged in services such as hospitals. hospital is a health service institution that conducts complete individual health services that provide inpatient, outpatient and emergency services according to ri law no. 44/2009 article 1 concerning hospitals. the hospital performs several types of services including medical services, medical support services, care services, rehabilitation services, prevention and health promotion, as a place for medical and or medical training and training, as a place for research and development of science and technology in the health sector and to avoid risks and health problems as intended, so that there is a need for the organization of environmental health in accordance with health requirements. to carry out complex hospital functions, the hospital must have professional human resources in both the medical technical and health administration fields (moh ri, 2000). patient satisfaction will be fulfilled if they get what they want, when they need it, where they want it, and in the way they specify. service providers must make every effort to identify the expectations of target consumers regarding the services they provide: reliability, responsiveness, assurance, empathy and tangibles are dimensions of hospital patient satisfaction (suryawati, 2004). business competition in the business of providing health services to the community, is currently growing more rapidly, so that encouraging existing hospitals inevitably compete with each other to be the best, especially public hospitals. all hospitals compete to compete for customers through the fulfillment of community satisfaction as the maximum customer desired by customers by improving the quality of service. defining the right quality of service is not easy, but generally quality can be specified, the concept of quality itself is often considered a relative measure of the merit of a product or service consisting of quality of design and quality of conformity. design quality is a function of product specifications, whereas conformity quality is a measure of how far a product is able to meet the requirements or specified quality specifications. in reality this aspect is not the only quality aspect, in the perspective of tqm (total quality management) quality is seen more broadly, where not only are the results aspects emphasized, but also include processes, the environment and humans. this is clearly seen in the definition formulated by goetsh and davis (1994) namely that quality is a dynamic condition related to products, services and people. gusti hasan aman dental and mouth hospital (rsgm-gha) is the first hospital specializing in dental and oral health in banjarmasin. services at rsgm-gha include outpatient clinics consisting of: first floor is oral disease and periodonsia, second floor is pedodontia, third floor is general poly, fourth floor is prostodontia, orthodontics, conservation and oral surgery. the hospital also has an emergency room, dental radiology and vip inpatient rooms with four rooms. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 17 published by scholink inc. table 1. number of patient visits for 2017-2018 no. month/year 2017-2018 number patient visits 1 2. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 november 2017 december 2017 january 2018 february march april may june july august september october 244 304 400 362 295 421 427 496 459 511 532 517 jumlah 4.988 sources: rsgm-gha year 2018. based on the table above, in november 2017-october 2018 the total number of patient visits was 4,988 visits. in november 244 patients, december 304 patients, january 400 patients, february 382 patients, march 295 patients, april 421 patients, may 427 patients, june 496 patients, july 459 patients, august 511 patients, september 532 patients and october 517 patients. then it was found that the number of patients registered was 3,156 or 63% of the total patient visits. patients who are registered are patients who have a treatment card, where every patient who is a first time treatment is given a treatment card. so from the explanation above it can be concluded that the difference between the total patient visits and the number of patients registered is the repurchase amount. from the data above it is known that there were 1,832 repeat purchases or 37% of the total visits, this amount was obtained from the difference between the total visits (4,988) and the number of patients registered (3,156). based on the description above, researchers are interested in conducting research with the title “the effectof service qualityand fasilities on patient satisfaction at rsgm gt. hasan aman”. 1.1 problem formulation from the background description above, it can be seen that the number of patient visits to rsgm gt. hasan aman is still volatile. this affects the income earned which automatically fluctuates too. in addition, the achievement of the number of patient visits did not meet the expectations of management who set a target of the first year to reach 600 patients per month or an average of 20 patients per day. on the other hand the number of repurchases that have occurred at rsgm mt. hasan aman, which is www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 18 published by scholink inc. 1,832 or 37% of the total patient visits. this can indicate that the patient is satisfied with the services provided by rsgm gt. hasan aman. to increase revenue and business sustainability in the future, rsgm gt. hasan aman needs to maintain and increase the number of patients who come by providing satisfaction to patients in order to compete with other health care providers. based on the formulation of the problem, the following research questions are arranged: 1) is there a partial effect between service quality on patient satisfaction at rsgm. gt hasan aman? 2) is there a partial effect between service facilities on patient satisfaction at gt. hasan aman? 3) is there a simultaneous influence between the quality of service and service facilities on patient satisfaction at rsgm.gt. hasan aman? 2. literature riview research conducted by arlina nurbaity (2009) on the effect of price and quality of service on inpatient satisfaction at deli medan hospital revealed that the price and quality of service together. pratama kesuma tanudjaya (2014) in his research on the effect of dental clinic service quality on patient satisfaction and trust thereby increasing the desire to seek treatment stated that the trust variable was significantly greater than clinical service quality and patient satisfaction in influencing patient desire to seek treatment again. definition of patient satisfaction, satisfactions comes from the latin “static” (meaning pretty good, adequate) and “facio” (doing or making). satisfaction can be interpreted as “efforts to fulfill something” or make something adequate (tjiptono & chandra, 2007). kotler (1997) states satisfaction is a feeling of pleasure or disappointment someone who comes from a comparison between the impression of the performance (results) of a product or service with expectations owned. if the performance produced by a product or service is below expectations, consumers feel disappointed and dissatisfied. conversely, if the performance produced by a product or service can meet or exceed expectations, consumers will feel satisfaction. likewise the patient’s feelings towards the performance of services in the emergency department. if the services provided are good, it will produce performance that meets or exceeds the expectations of his patients by providing good services, so patients will feel high satisfaction. patients who feel high satisfaction will create emotional attachment to the hospital. this can cause patients to become loyal customers in the hospital. but conversely if the performance of services in the emergency department in providing services to patients is poor then the patient feels dissatisfaction and this will affect the patient’s assessment of services by the hospital. lefrancois (1980) states that satisfaction is a basic need that can be described as a pleasant thing. these basic needs arise because of certain impulses that must be channeled. satisfaction will arise if the urge can be channeled and vice versa if the urge is not channeled then there will appear a feeling of dissatisfaction. tjiptono (musanto, 2004) said that satisfaction or dissatisfaction is the customer’s response to the evolution of the perceived discrepancy between previous expectations and the actual www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 19 published by scholink inc. performance of the product felt. this increasingly fierce competition causes many manufacturers involved in meeting the needs and desires of consumers, including hospitals that try to provide the best service to patients as consumers so that patients feel satisfied with the services provided by the hospital. satisfaction experienced by patients related to the results of services provided by doctors, nurses and other medical personnel. patients as consumers will feel satisfied if given a good service and treated well and get ease in service. nata stated (2011) patient satisfaction was also very much determined by the interaction factor between patients and human resources in the hospital; starting from the patient coming, registering and using the queue, get medical treatment, use drugs at the pharmacy, pay at the cashier to enter the treatment room or go home. all of these processes will affect the patient’s perception of hospital quality. simamora (2003) restiani (2009) concluded to improve the quality of health services, service quality and patient satisfaction to be an indicator of the success of service delivery in hospitals. because the quality of service is very important as an effort to meet the needs and desires of customers and the provision of delivery to offset customer expectations hospitals are required to provide the best service to patients by paying attention to the wants, needs, and expectations of their patients so that patients feel satisfied and use the same hospital in the future if patients are required to be treated at the hospital. patients who are satisfied with the services provided by the emergency department at the hospital that will recommend to other parties so that other parties can use the same hospital. in this case the satisfaction felt by patients is not solely obtained from the quality of services provided by the hospital but also from services provided in the emergency department. there are several methods that every company can use to measure and monitor the satisfaction of its customers and competing customers. according to kotler et al. (supriyanto & wulandari, 2011) identified five methods for measuring customer satisfaction: (1) a complaint and suggestion system, (2) a method related to results, (3) stealth shopping, (4) lost customer analysis, (5) satisfaction survey. there are three customer responses to satisfaction, namely (1) voice response (attempts to submit complaints directly and / or receive compensation to the hospital concerned), (2) private response (actions taken in the form of warning or notifying friends, family about experiences with the relevant hospital services), (3) third-party response (actions taken include efforts to ask for legal compensation, complain via the mass media, or directly go to a consumer institution, legal agency, etc. reicheld, believes that a person’s wishes the customer to recommend a friend to a friend is a result of how well the customer is treated by front-line employees, which in turn is determined by all functional areas that contribute to a customer’s experience (kotler, 2013). in this case hospital services, the front line is the unit emergency department (er), where the er is the patient’s place p first time served. so the quality of service received by patients while in the er will be a factor of patient satisfaction when in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 20 published by scholink inc. the er will be a factor of patient satisfaction with the hospital. patients who are satisfied with hospital services will recommend to friends or family. 2.1 patient satisfaction theory satisfaction theory continues to evolve and vary according to the context of the problems studied in business institutions and organizations. there are three theories in understanding patient satisfaction, namely: 1) model of needs, desires and utilizations this theory explains that individual needs to utilize health services are directly influenced by psychological variables (tastes, sick health perceptions, expectations, perceptions of providers). individual characteristics (age, sex). indirect factors are socio-economic and cultural factors. this factor influences the use of health services, through individual characteristics and psychological factors. environmental factors that influence are transportation, distance of residence to “provider”. probider factors are related to provider characteristics (knowledge and abilities, motivation, work ethic) in providing health services. in addition, work factor variables (job design, workload) also influence the attitudes and behavior of providers. 2) the expectancy-disconfirmation model woodruff and gardial (supriyanto & wulandari, 2010), defines satisfaction as a model of the gap between performance standards (supposed performance standards: gold standards) and actual performance (perceived) received by customers (statisfaction is the relationship between the product’s actual performance and a performance standard). customer satisfaction is a positive or negative feeling about value that was received as a result of using a particular organization’s offering in specific use situations. this feeling can be a reaction to an immediate use situation or an overall reaction to a series of use situation experiences. a standard comparison is a standard measure of comparison, which is used to compare with what is assessed by patients. according to gaspersz (1997) there are three levels of expectation namely implicit expectations, not directly related to products / services (basic expectations); explicit expectations (implied, stated, related to the product / service desired / expected) and hidden expectations (latent). 3) stimuli-assessment-reaction model this theory suggests that there are four components that form customer satisfaction, namely (1) stimulus is a stimulus that can be received by customers both through the senses (eyes, ears, taste, smell), in the form of physical (parking space, facilities, treatment rooms) and non-physical (attitudes and behaviors of nurses or doctors), (2) customer ratings can be expressed in terms of good, bad, like, cold, funny, accepting, helping and finally forming a positive, negative, neutral (zero) attitude from stimulus assessment, (3) reaction customers in affective and cognitive contexts can be in the form of feelings of satisfaction, dissatisfaction, pleasure, displeasure, anger, sadness, reaction is also a combination of affective and behavior and (4) differences in individual characteristics namely pre www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 21 published by scholink inc. disposition (age, sex), previous behavior and personal experience, normative and subjective norms of society before assessing, responding, or reacting after receiving service. 2.2 patient satisfaction aspects satisfaction felt by patients is a very important aspect for the survival of a hospital. sabarguna (2004) states there are several aspects that affect patient satisfaction, namely: a. comfort aspects, including hospital location, hospital cleanliness, comfort of the patient’s room, patient food, and equipment available indoor. b. aspects of the patient’s relationship with hospital staff, including staff friendliness hospitals especially nurses, information provided by hospital staff, communicative, responsive, supportive, and deft in serving patients. c. the technical competency aspects of the officers, including courage to act, experience, degree, and famous. d. cost aspects, including the high cost of services, whether or not affordable by patients, and presence or absence of relief given to patients. 2.3 factors affecting patient satisfaction griffith (leger, 1992) suggests several factors that influence feelings of satisfaction in someone, namely: a. the attitude and approach of hospital staff to patients is the attitude of officersthe hospital to the patient when the patient first arrived at the hospital, the hospitality shown by the hospital staff, and the speed of reception of patients who came to the hospital. b. the quality of care received by the patient is what has been done by the service provider to the patient in the form of care services related to the healing process of the patient’s illness and the continuity of patient care while in the hospital. c. administrative procedures are related to patient administration services starting in the hospital, during treatment, and when discharged from the hospital, the staff’s agility in serving patients, and an explanation of the details of the costs used by patients while in hospital. d. facilities provided by the hospital are inpatient facilities, quality food, room cleanliness, room comfort, and hospital location. satisfaction experienced by patients as users of hospital services can only develop if there is a relationship between service providers in this case hospitals, especially nurses who care for patients and patients served (kotler, 1997). in addition, if the patient feels satisfaction with the services provided by the hospital, the patient will inform his friends, family, and neighbors about the services he has received so that his friends, neighbors or family will also use the same hospital services. therefore, the hospital must be able to improve the performance of the nurses so that. nurses at the hospital can provide quality services to patients who use the hospital’s services (kotler, 1997). singh and sirdesmukh (2000) (nata, 2011) suggested the factors that make up decisions toward loyalty, namely www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 22 published by scholink inc. service performance, which is the perception of the process and outcome of service delivery, price perception, namely the evaluation of the fairness of service costs, and performance disconfirmation 2.4 quality of service quality is a dynamic condition that affects products, services, people, processes and environments that meet or exceed expectations (tjiptono, 2013). so the definition of service quality can be interpreted as an effort to meet the needs and desires of consumers and accuracy delivery in offset consumer expectations (tjiptono, 2007). service quality can be known by comparing consumers’ perceptions of the services they actually receive / get with the services they actually expect / want for the service attributes of a company. if the service received or perceived (perceived service) is as expected, then the quality of service is perceived to be good and satisfying, if the service received exceeds consumer expectations, then the quality of service is perceived to be very good and quality. conversely, if the service received is lower than expected, the perceived quality of service is poor. quality of service or service is the level of gap between the expectations or desires of customers with the perception or performance they have felt. according to schnaars in tjiptono and chandra (2005), basically the goal of a business is to create satisfied customers. furthermore kotler (2015) said that service is any activity or benefit offered by one party to another party and is essentially intangible, and does not result in ownership of something. the basic concept of a service (service) or the quality of a product can be defined as fulfillment that can exceed what the customer wants or expects. according to kotler (2015, p. 83) the definition of service is any action or activity that can be offered by one party to another party, which is basically intangible and does not result in any ownership. its production can be related or not linked to one physical product. service is the behavior of producers in order to meet the needs and desires of consumers for the achievement of satisfaction to consumers themselves. kotler also said that the behavior can occur at the time, before and after the transaction. in general, high-quality services will result in high satisfaction and frequent repeat purchases. from the definitions of service quality, it can be concluded that service quality is all forms of activities carried out by the company in order to meet consumer expectations. services in this case are defined as services provided by the service owner in the form of convenience, speed, relationships, abilities and hospitality aimed at attitudes and properties in providing services for customer satisfaction. according to parasuraman et al. (1998), the dimensions that represent consumer perceptions of a service quality are as follows: 1) reliability is a dimension that measures the reliability of a service to consumers. the reliability dimension is defined as the ability to deliver the promised service reliably and accurately. 2) responsiveness is the willingness to help and provide services quickly to consumers which includes the readiness of labor in serving consumers, the speed of labor in handling transactions and handling consumer complaints. the responsiveness dimension is the most dynamic dimension. this is influenced by technological development factors. one example of aspects of responsiveness in service is speed. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 23 published by scholink inc. 3) assurance is the dimension of service quality related to the ability to instill trust and confidence in consumers. dimensions of certainty include the ability of labor for knowledge of products including the ability of employees to appropriately know the product, the quality of hospitality, attention and courtesy in providing services, skills in providing security in utilizing the services offered and the ability to instill consumer confidence in services which is offered 4) empathy is a willingness to care and give personal attention to service users. empathic service requires personal touch / feeling. the empathy dimension is a dimension that provides a great opportunity to create a “surprise” service, which is something that is not expected by the service user but is actually provided by the provider services. this empathy dimension is a combination of aspects: a) access includes the ease of utilizing the services offered service provider. b) communication, which is the ability to do communication to convey information to consumers or obtain input from consumers. c) understanding of consumers, including business service providers to know and understand the needs and desires of consumers. 5) tangible dimensions defined as the appearance of equipment facilities and officers who provide services because a service cannot be seen, smelled, touched or heard, the tangible aspect becomes very important as a measure of service. tjiptono (2008) suggests that consumers assess the five dimensions of quality of health services, namely: 1) reliability: appointments are kept according to schedule and the diagnosis is proven accurate. 2) responsiveness: easily accessible, no longer waiting and willing hear patient complaints. 3) guarantees: knowledge, skills, trust and reputation. 4) empathy: know the patient well, remember problems (illness, complaints, etc.) before, good and patient listeners. 5) physical evidence: waiting rooms, operating rooms, equipment and written materials one of the factors driving customer satisfaction is the quality of service. to increase customer satisfaction, the rgsm gt. hasan aman must improve the quality of service. to assess service quality, it can be measured by 5 factors, namely tangible, reliability, responsiveness, assurance, empathy. according to kotler and armstrong (1996), quality service products have an important role in shaping customer satisfaction. the more quality the products and services provided, the higher the satisfaction felt by the customer. if customer satisfaction is higher, it can cause benefits for the business entity. one of the main ways to maintain a service company is to provide services with a higher quality of service than competitors consistently and meet customer expectations. if the perceived quality of service is smaller than expected, the customer becomes uninterested in the service provider, but if the opposite is true, it is likely that the customer will continue to use the service provider again. research conducted by dabholkar et al. (2000) in tjiptono (2005) states that service quality has a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 24 published by scholink inc. positive influence on customer satisfaction. parasuraman et al. (1998) in hadi (2003) argues that service quality is in line with customer satisfaction, where increasing (more positive) service quality is used as a reflection of increasing customer satisfaction. 3. service facilities according to youti (1997, p. 12) service facilities are everything both objects and services that accompany the services provided by companies both service companies, trade and industrial companies. facilities can also be interpreted as facilities and infrastructure that are available in the environment or inside the company office, intended to provide maximum service so that consumers or customers feel comfortable and satisfied. facilities are the main supporting factor in the activities of a product. raharjani (2005) states that if a service company has adequate facilities so that it can make it easier for consumers to use their services and make consumers comfortable using these services, they will be able to influence consumers in purchasing services. companies that provide a pleasant atmosphere with attractive facility designs will influence consumers in making purchases. this means that one of the factors of consumer satisfaction is influenced by the facilities provided by the seller that are used by consumers so as to facilitate consumers in the purchasing process. if consumers feel comfortable and easy to get the product or service offered by the seller, then the consumer will feel satisfied. kertajaya (2003) the provision of adequate facilities will help increase consumer empathy for any conditions that are created when consumers make a purchase. so psychologically they will give a statement that they are satisfied in making a purchase. matters that need to be conveyed in service facilities include: 1) completeness, cleanliness and tidiness of the facilities offered 2) condition and function of facilities offered 3) ease of use of the facilities offered 4) completeness of the equipment used the facility is a supporting facility used by the company in an effort to increase customer satisfaction. the better the facilities provided to consumers, the more they will increase customer satisfaction. kotler (2015) states that one of the efforts made by company management, especially those that are directly related to customer satisfaction, is to provide the best facilities to attract and retain customers. facilities are important facilities and infrastructure in an effort to increase satisfaction such as providing convenience, meeting the needs and comfort for service users. if the facilities provided are in accordance with the needs, then the consumer will feel satisfied. the relationship between facilities and satisfaction has been proven by research conducted by martianawati (2009), widitomo (2009), wijaya (2010), where the results of the study are that facilities have a positive influence on satisfaction. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 25 published by scholink inc. 3.1 patient satisfaction kotler (2015) says that patient satisfaction is the level of one’s feelings after comparing the performance or results he feels compared to his expectations. if the performance exceeds expectations they will feel satisfied and vice versa if the performance does not match expectations will be disappointed. engel (1990) states that patient satisfaction is an evaluation after the service selected is at least the same or exceeds patient expectations, while dissatisfaction arises when the results do not meet expectations. basically the goal of a business is to create satisfied customers. every person or organization (company) must work with internal and external customers to meet their needs in collaboration with internal and external suppliers for the creation of customer satisfaction. the creation of customer satisfaction can provide several benefits including (tjiptono et al., 2003): a. the company’s relationship with consumers becomes harmonious. b. provides a good basis for repeat purchases. c. can encourage the creation of consumer loyalty. d. forms word of mouth recommendations benefit the company. e. earnings increased 3.2 measuring patient satisfaction there are several methods that every company can use for measuring and monitoring the satisfaction of consumers and competitors. kotler (2001, p. 45) identified four methods for measuring consumer satisfaction: a) complaints and advice system every consumer-oriented organization (customer-oriented) needs to provide opportunities and easy and convenient access for consumers to submit suggestions, criticisms, opinions, and complaints. the media used can be in the form of suggestion boxes placed in strategic locations (easily accessible or often bypassed by customers), comment cards (which can be filled directly or sent via post to the company), special toll-free telephone lines, websites, etc. b) ghost shopping one way to get a picture of customer satisfaction is by hiring some gosht shoppers to act or pretend to be potential customers of the company’s products and competitors. they are asked to interact with staff service providers and use the company’s products / services. c) consumer satisfaction survey most consumer satisfaction research is carried out by using the survey method, both surveys by post, telephone, e-mail, website and direct interviews. through a survey the company will get responses and feedback directly from consumers and also gives a positive impression that the company pays attention to its customers. if the reality is more than expected, then the service can be said to be quality whereas if the reality is less than expected, then the service is said to be of poor quality. if reality is the same as expectation, the service is called satisfying. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 26 published by scholink inc. thus service quality can be defined as the difference between reality and consumers’ expectations for the services they receive (lupiyoadi, 2001). 3.3 framework the results of the 2012 survey the number of cavities in the population of south kalimantan is 85%. almost everyone loses their teeth. therefore, a special hospital was established to serve oral health. the number of dentists and the population of south kalimantan are very different in number. one dentist should have served ten residents. establishment of rsgm mt. hasan aman is expected to significantly reduce the number of cavities. patient motivation is also very important in reducing the number of cavities. information: : partial influence : simultaneous influencesimultan figure 1. research conceptual framework hypothesis based on the problem formulation and theoretical review, the hypotheses proposed in this study are: h1: there is a positive influence between service quality on patient satisfaction h2: there is a positive influence between facilities on patient satisfaction h3: there is a positive influence between the quality of service and facilities in a manner simultaneous with patient satisfaction research variables and operational definitions 1, research variables sugiyono (2008) states the research variable is an attribute or nature or value of people, objects or activities that have certain variations that are determined by researchers to be studied and drawn conclusions. sutrisnohadi (arikunto, 2002) states that variables are symptoms that show good variation in type / level. in this study using two research variables, namely the dependent variable and the independent variable: a. independent variable (not bound): the independent variable is the variable that causes the occurrence or influence of the dependent variable (y) (husein umar, 2001). the independent variables that will be examined in this study are: facilities (x ) satisfaction (y) h1 h2 services quality (x1) h3 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 27 published by scholink inc. 1. quality of service (x1) 2. facilities (x2) b. dependent variable: the dependent variable is the variable whose value is influenced by the independent variable (husein umar, 2001). the dependent variable that will be examined in this study is patient satisfaction (y). 2. operational definitions operational definition is to attach meaning to a variable by defining the activities or actions necessary to measure that variable. the operational definition explains variables, making it possible for researchers to take measurements in the same way or develop better ways of measurement, indriantoro and supomo (2002). as for the operational definitions in this study are as follows: 1) independent variable, which consists of: a. service quality (x1) quality of service is a measure of how well the level of service provided is able to match customer expectations. indicator: 1) reliability 2) responsiveness 3) assurance 4) empathy 5) tangible dimensions b. facilities (x2) according to zakiah daradjat and anastasia, facilities are all things that can facilitate efforts and facilitate work in order to achieve a goal. meanwhile, according to suhaisimi arikonto, facilities are all things that can facilitate, facilitate the implementation of a business. facilities are all things that make it easier for patients to benefit from the services provided by the hospital. indicator: 1) completeness 2) comfort and cleanliness of the room 3) condition of the facility 2) dependent variable (dependent), namely: customer satisfaction (y) customer satisfaction is a feeling of pleasure or disappointment someone who appears after comparing the performance (results) of products thought to the expected performance (kotler, 2005, p. 70). 3) patient satisfaction (y) patient satisfaction is a natural thing obtained by all patients in the dental and oral hospital of gt. hasan safe. patient satisfaction is inseparable from the service it receives, the better the level of service received, the patient will feel satisfied and if otherwise it is not satisfied. the indicators of patient satisfaction are: 1. timely service 2. adequate facilities www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 28 published by scholink inc. 3. seating is available 4. quick maintenance completed 5. comfortable treatment room 4. methodologis this research was conducted using a quantitative descriptive analysis research approach. research sites, this research will be conducted at ggm. hasan aman jl. simpangulin no.28 banjarmasin south kalimantan province population, samples, and sampling techniques 1) population, is a generalization area consisting of objects or subjects that have certain qualities and characteristics determined by researchers to be studied and then conclusions drawn. the population in this study were all 4988 patients who visited the rsgm. 2) samples, the sample is part of the total characteristics possessed by the population (sugiyono, 2004). sampling is done with the consideration that the population is large enough, so it is not possible for the entire population. 3) sampling methods, the sampling method in this study was conducted using the non probability sampling method, which is a sampling method that does not provide the same opportunity or opportunity for each element or population to be selected as a sample (sugiyono, 2004). the type of probabilty sampling used is purposive sampling. the purposive sampling method is a sampling method based on certain considerations and must represent the population to be studied. the consideration to be taken in taking the sample to be investigated is that the respondent studied is someone who has used the rsgm gt. hasan aman. the number of samples is determined using the yamane approach (ferdinand, 2006). n n = ---------- 1 + nd² where : n = sample n = total population d = margin of error by using a d value of 10%, the following sample sizes are obtained: 4988 n = -----------------------= 98.03 to 100 respondent 1 + 4988 (0, 1)² data types and sources: rsgm gtha the type of data in this study is to use primary data. primary data is a source of research data obtained directly from original sources/without going through intermediary media (supranto, 1994). primary data used in this study were obtained from questionnaires filled out by respondents directly to users of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 29 published by scholink inc. the rsgm gt service. hasan aman. 4.1 data collection methods research data that will be used in this study were collected with an instrument in the form of a questionnaire. the questionnaire is a list of questions that includes all statements and questions that will be used to obtain data, whether done by telephone, letter or face to face (ferdinand, 2006). basically the use of measuring instruments in the form of a questionnaire has similarities in terms of assumptions, strengths and weaknesses, therefore the authors use the reason for using the questionnaire method. scoring the questionnaire answers was determined using a scale likert is 5, 4, 3, 2, 1. 1. = very dissatisfied 2. = not satisfied 3. = quite satisfied 4. = satisfied 5. = very satisfied teknik analisis so that the data that has been collected can be useful, then the data must be processed and analyzed so that it can be used to interpret, and as a basis for decision making. the data analysis used in this study is quantitative analysis. quantitative analysis is an analysis used for data in the form of numbers and how to discuss it with statistical tests. data analysis activities in this study include several basic stages (santoso & tjiptono, 2001), these stages include: 1) editing process, the initial stage of data analysis is to edit the data that has been collected from the results of the survey in the field. in principle, the data editing process aims to ensure that the data to be analyzed is accurate and complete. 2) coding process, the process of converting qualitative data into numbers by classifying answers available according to important categories (coding). 3) scoring process, the process of determining the score of respondents’ answers carried out bymake suitable classifications and categories depending on opinion or opinion respondent. 4) tabulation, presenting the data obtained in the table, so the reader is expected to see the results of the research clearly. after the tabulation process is completed then the data in the table will be processed with the help of statistical software namely spss. data analysis method, data analysis is a process of simplifying data into a form that is easier to read and interpret. by using quantitative methods, it is expected that more accurate measurement results will be obtained about the responses given by respondents, so that the data these numbers can be processed using statistical methods. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 30 published by scholink inc. 4.1.1 descriptive statistics, is the analysis shown in the development and the growth of a situation and only gives an idea of certain circumstances by describing the properties of the object of research these (umar, 2001). in this case the writing is done using descriptive analysis, i.e., by reading the tables, the available figures then do the description and interpretation. 4.1.1 data validity 1) test validity the purpose of the validity test is to measure the validity or validity of a questionnaire. a questionnaire is said to be valid if the questions on the questionnaire are able to reveal something that will be measured by the questionnaire (ghozali, 2006). the questionnaire is said to be valid if the questions on the questionnaire are able to reveal something that will be measured by the questionnaire. measuring validity can be done by correlating the score of questions with the total construct score or variables. namely by comparing the value of r count with r table for degree of freedom (df) = n-2, where (n) is the number of research samples. if r arithmetic> r table and a positive value then the item or question or indicator is declared valid. 2) reliability test the reliability test is a tool used to measure the consistency of the questionnaire which is an indicator of a variable or construct. a questionnaire is said to be reliable or reliable if a person’s answer to a statement is consistent or stable from time to time (ghozali, 2006). the reliability measurement that will be used in this research is to use version 16 of the spss analysis tool, namely the cronbach alpha statistical test. a construct or variable is declared to be reliable if the cronbach alpha value> 0.60 (nunnally, 1967; ghozali, 2006). 4.1.3 classical assumption test 1) normality test the normality test aims to test whether in the regression model, confounding or residual variables have a normal distribution. we can see it from the normal probability plot comparing the cumulative distribution with the normal distribution. the normal distribution forms a diagonal straight line, and the ploting of residual data will be compared with the diagonal line. if the data distribution is normal, then the line that describes the actual data will follow the normal line (ghozali, 2005). in principle, normality can be detected by looking at the spread of data (points) on the diagonal axis of the graph or by looking at the histogram of the residuals. the basis for decision making include (ghozali, 2006): diagonal line or the graph does not show a normal distribution pattern, then the regression model does not meet the assumption of normality 2) multicollinearity test multicollinearity test was conducted to test whether the regression model found a correlation between independent variables. a good regression model should not occur correlation between independent variables. if there is a correlation, then there is a problem called multicollinearity. in this study, to detect the presence or absence of multicollinearity in the regression model the correlation matrix of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 31 published by scholink inc. independent variables is used, and to see the value of tolerance and variance inflation factor (vif) with the help of spss version 16 for windows. testing the presence or absence of multicollinearity symptoms is done by taking into account the value of the correlation matrix produced during data processing and the value of vif and its tolerance. if the correlation matrix between independent variables has a high enough correlation (generally above 0.90), then this is an indication of a multicollinearity problem, and vice versa. the cutoff value that is commonly used to indicate a multicollinearity problem istolerance<0.10 or equal to vif value> 10 (ghozali, 2006). 3) heteroscedasticity test heteroscedasticity test aims to test whether in the regression model there is a variance similarity from the residuals of one observation to another. if the variance shows a fixed pattern, it can be stated that there was no heteroscedasticity. if the variance from one observation residual to another observation is fixed then it is called homokedasticity, and if it is different it is called heteroscedasticity. to detect the presence or absence of heteroscedasticity can be done by using a scatterplot chart. a good regression model is a homokedastisitas or heteroscedasticity does not occur (ghozali, 2005). basic analysis: 1) if there are certain patterns, such as dots that form a regular pattern then it indicates that heteroscedasticity has occurred. 2) if there is no clear pattern, and the points above and below the number 0 on the y axis, then there is no heteroscedasticity 4.1.4 multiple linear regression analysis linear regression analysis is used to determine the effect of independent variables with the dependent variable. for regressions whose independent variables consist of two or more, the regression is called multiple regression. in this study, the independent variable consists of three variables, so it uses multiple regression. the regression equation in this study is to find out how much influence the independent variable is service quality (x1), price (x2), and facilities (x3) on patient satisfaction (y). regression equations can be formulated y = a + b1x1 + b2x2 + e where : y = patient satisfaction a = constant b1, b2 = coefficient of research variables x1 = service quality variable x2 = facility variable e = error 4.1.5 simultaneous test (test f) the f statistical test is used to determine whether all independent variables entered into the model have an influence together on the dependent variable (ghozali, 2005). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 32 published by scholink inc. 4.1.6 hypothesis testing to find out the significance of the results of the study it is necessary to do a t test (partial test) t-test basically shows how far the influence of one independent variable individually in explaining the variation of the dependent variable (ghozali, 2005, p. 84). 1) if ho : βi i = 1,2 independent variable on partial and simultaneus on the effect about dependent variable 2) if, h1 : βi i = 1,2 independentvariable on partial and simultaneus the effect about dependent variable. 4.1.7 coefficient of determination (r2) the coefficient of determination (r2) essentially measures how far the ability to explain the variation of the dependent variable. the coefficient of determination is between zero and one. a small r2 means ability independent variables in explaining the variation of the dependent variable are very limited. a value close to one means that it is needed to predict variations dependent variable. in general the coefficient of determination for cross data (crossection) is relatively low due to large variations between each observation, while for coherent data (time series) usually has a high coefficient of determination (ghozali, 2005). to find out the size of the independent variable in influencing the dependent variable can be known through the coefficient of determination indicated by the adjusted rs quare (r2). the adjusted r2 value can go up or down if an independent variable is added to the model 5. results and discussion 5.1 test the validity and reliability of research instruments the initial step before the questionnaire was distributed and used to measure the research object, the researchers first tested the validity and reliability of all research variables. test the validity and reliability in this study using the help of the spss 23.0 for windows program with valid and reliable results. a. validitas test table 2. service quality validities variable item rhitung rtabel information services quality p1 0,640 0,165 valid p2 0,869 0,165 valid p3 0,826 0,165 valid p4 0,869 0,165 valid p5 0,825 0,165 valid p6 0,635 0,165 valid www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 33 published by scholink inc. p7 0,865 0,165 valid p8 0,823 0,165 valid p9 0,860 0,165 valid p10 0,819 0,165 valid facilities p1 0,329 0,165 valid p2 0,548 0,165 valid p3 0,578 0,165 valid p4 0,329 0,165 valid p5 0,682 0,165 valid p6 0,578 0,165 valid p7 0,548 0,165 valid p8 0,573 0,165 valid p9 0,708 0,165 valid p10 0,548 0,165 valid p11 0,708 0,165 valid p12 0,682 0,165 valid satisfaction p1 0,676 0,165 valid p2 0,592 0,165 valid p3 0,453 0,165 valid p4 0,372 0,165 valid p5 0,535 0,165 valid p6 0,592 0,165 valid p7 0,676 0,165 valid source: primerydata 2018. b. reabilities test tabel 3. service quality of reliabilities reliability statistics cronbach’s alpha n of items .945 10 source: output spss. it can be seen from this table that cronbach’s alpha value is 0.945 greater than r-table. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 34 published by scholink inc. table 4. fasilitas reliabilitas cronbach’s alpha n of items .784 12 source: output spss. from this table, the cronbach’s alpha value of 0.784 is greater than r-table. table 5. reliabilities satisfaction cronbach’s alpha n of items .609 7 source: output spss. it can be seen from the table that the cronbach’s alpha value of 0.609 is greater than r-table. 5.2 analysis of research results based on the results of the validity and reliability tests, statement questionnaires can be formally circulated to respondents. then the data from the questionnaire answers obtained, tabulated and further analyzed in the form of a classic assumption test and multiple regression tests. 5.3 classic assumption test a) normality proof that the residual value is spread normally is one indication that the regression equation obtained is good enough. proof of normality of residual values is carried out using the kolmogorov-smirnov test, which takes into account the residual values that exist. residuals are normally distributed if the significance level is more than 0.05. based on table 5 it can be seen that the residual value obtained is 0.200> 0.05. this means that data distribution is normal. table 6. kolmogorov-smirnov test one-sample kolmogorov-smirnov test unstandardized residual n 100 normal parametersa mean .0000000 std. deviation 1.35992391 most extreme differences absolute .093 positive .047 negative -.093 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 35 published by scholink inc. kolmogorov-smirnov z .929 asymp. sig. (2-tailed) .354 a. test distribution is normal. source: output spss. b). heteroscedacity a good regression model is a homoskedacity or heteroskedacity does not occur. detection of heterokesdacity can be done by using the scatter plot method by plotting zpred values (predicted values) with sresid values (residual values). based on figure 5.2 it can be seen that there are no specific patterns on the graph. this means that there is no heteroskedacity in the model or the regression model used is good. c). multicollinearity the regression model assumes the absence of multicollinearity or the absence of a perfect or almost perfect relationship between independent variables so that it is difficult to separate the influence of those variables individually on the dependent variable. multicollinearity detection is by looking at the tolerance value and value inflation factor (vif). a regression model is said to be free of multicollinearity if it has a vif value less than 10.00 and has a tolerance number greater than 0.10. table 7. coefficientsa model unstandardized coefficients standardized coefficients t sig. collinearity statistics b std. error beta tolerance vif 1 (constant) 1.945 1.185 1.641 .104 kualita s .025 .036 .045 .679 .499 .439 2.280 fasilita s .517 .039 .870 13.242 .000 .439 2.280 a. dependent variable: satisfaction source: output spss. from the table it is found that the tolerance value is 0.439> 0.10 or 2.280 <10.00, so there is no multicollinearity. 5.4 multiple regression analysis this analysis is to determine the effect of the independent variable with the dependent variable. multiple regression analysis has several test requirements that must be met before multiple linear www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 36 published by scholink inc. regression analysis is performed. after all prerequisite tests have been carried out and the results meet the requirements for multiple regression analysis, the results of data processing using sspss 16.0 are as follows: based on table 5.1, the results of the multiple linear regression equation are obtained as follows: y = 1,945 + 0,025x1 + 0,517x2 hypothesis test a). ttest based on table 6 above, the following results can be obtained: • based on t-table: h1, 0.499> 0.05 and t-count 0.679 <1.988, the h1 hypothesis is rejected, which means that x1 does not affect patient satisfaction y • based on t-table: h1, 0.000 <0.05 and t-count 13.224> 1.988, the h2 hypothesis is accepted which means that x2 influences patient satisfaction y • the third hypothesis shows that together x1 and x2 affect patient satisfaction (y) b) uji f dari tabel tersebut di atas dapat diperoleh hasil bahwa variabel kualiatas layanan (x1) dan variabel fasilitas (x2) berpengaruh signifikan secara simultan terhadap kepuasan pasien (y) di rsgm – gha banjarmasin. sedangkan nilai r square sebesar0,817, halinimengandungartibahwapengaruhvariabel x1 dan x2 secarasimultanterhadapvariabel y adalah 81,7%. tabel 8. anovab model sum of squares df mean square f sig. 1 regression 814.700 2 407.350 215.812 .000a residual 183.090 97 1.888 total 997.790 99 a. predictors: (constant), fascilities, service quality b. dependent variable: satisfaction source :output spss theoretical implications this study aims to determine the effect of service and facility quality on outpatient satisfaction at rsgm gt. hasan aman obtained through the results of the regression test berganda. the results of the multiple regression test of the variable at issue indicate that the independent variable, i.e., the facility has an influence on the dependentvariable. this means that if the facilities are improved and the quality is more supportive then the level of patient satisfaction will also increase. managerial implications www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 37 published by scholink inc. efforts to improve outpatient satisfaction need to be accompanied by improvements in the quality of services that are more supportive. the facility has a dominant influence on the satisfaction of outpatients rsgm gt. hasan aman. therefore, a more complete facility and in accordance with the patient’s thinking will increase satisfaction. but the quality of service must also be improved not only facilities. thus the patient will feel satisfied with hospital services. implications of research results 6. conclusion based on the results of hypothesis testing using multiple regression tests, the following conclusions can be obtained. 1) the quality of service does not significantly influence the satisfaction of outpatients rsgm gt. hasan aman banjarmasin. 2) facilities have a significant influence on the satisfaction of outpatients rsgm gt. hasan aman banjarmasin. 3) variable quality of service and facilities simultaneously have a significant effect on the satisfaction of outpatients rsgm gt. hasan aman banjarmasin. references agus, e. p. (2011). metode penelitian kuantitatifuntuk administrasi publik dan masalah-masalah sosial. yogyakarta: gava media. desanto, w. s. e., & rino. (2011). kualitas pelayanan puskesmas di kota madiun. poltek erlina, 2011. in metodologi penelitian. usu press, medan. ghozali, i. (2006). aplikasi analisis multivariate dengan program spss. semarang: undip. hendrik, gary, l. (2012). analisis pengaruh kualitas layanan terhadap kepuasan pasien pada rumah sakit elim kab. toraja utara. skripsi unhas. imron, t. a. (2014). metodologi penelitian bidang kesehatan. sagung seto. indriaty, d. r. (2010). analisis pengaruh tingkat kualitas pelayanan jasa puskesmas terhadap kepuasan pasien (studipad apuskesmas gunungpati semarang). skripsiuniversitasdiponegoro, semarang. kotler, philip dan gary armstrong. (2008). prinsip-prinsippemasaran. erlangga, jakarta. kotler, philip dan kevin lane keller. (2011). manajemenpemasaran. edisi 13, erlangga, jakarta. lupiyoadi, r. (2006). manajemen pemasaran jasa edisi revisi. salemba empat. jakarta margono, s. (2014). analisis pengaruh kualitas pelayanan dan fasilitas terhadapkepuasanpasien rawat jalan di puskesmasgesikecamatan gesikabupatensragen. universitas surakarta. mongkaren, s. (2013). fasilitas dan kualitas pelayanan pengaruhnya terhadap kepuasan pengguna jasa rumah sakit advent manado. universitas sam ratulangi manado. nidia. (2012). pengaruh kualitaslayanan jasa kesehatan terhadap kepuasan pasienpuskesmas www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economic vol. 3, no. 1, 2020 38 published by scholink inc. bara-baraya makassar. skripsi universitas hasanuddin, makasar. republik indonesia, peraturan mentri kesehatan republik indonesia nomor 75 tahun (2014). riswadani, y. t. (2013). pengaruhfasilitas, biaya, dan promositerhadapkepuasanpasienrawatinap. jurnal ekonomi manajemen sumber daya, 1(2). sigalingging. (20130. pengaruh tingkat kualitas pelayanan jasa puskesmas terhadap kepuasan pasien (studikasuspuskesmaskecamatanhatonduhan). tugasakhiruniversitas sumatera utara. supriyanto, y. (2012). analisispengaruhkualitaspelayanan, harga, dan fasilitas terhadap kepuasan pasien rawat jalan di rumahsakitkariadi semarang. skripsi universitas diponegoro, semarang. suriani, sarahneri, 2011. kualitaspelayanankesehatan di puskesmas baja kecamatancibodas kota tanggerang. skripsiskripsiuniversitas sultan agengtirtayasa. suryawati, c. (2004). hospital patients statisfaction (theoritical review and its application in research). jurnalmanajemenpelayanankesehatan, viii(4). tjiptono, f. dan g. chandra. (2013). service, quality, & satisfaction. penerbit andi. yogyakarta. yustisianto, j. (2009). kualitas pelayanan kesehatan puskesmas kecamatan gambir jakarta pusa. skripsiuniversitas indonesia. microsoft word ape-v5n2-p50 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 50 original paper legal aspects related to the termination of the kumanovo agreement (1999) and possibilities for serbian armed forces to return to kosovo in case of termination of that agreement igor janev1* 1 institute for political studies, belgrade, serbia * igor janev, e-mail: igorjanev@mts.rs received: march 15, 2022 accepted: may 8, 2022 online published: may 11, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n2p50 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n2p50 abstract this article examines the kumanovo agreement as an obstacle to possible serbian military intervention in kosovo and metohija (hereinafter shortly: kosovo) in case of uncontrolled albanian invasion against the serb population in kosovo. the military technical agreement between the international security force (“kfor”) and the governments of the federal republic of yugoslavia and the republic of serbia, known as the kumanovo agreement, represents a legal limitation to any involvement of the serbian military force(s). with respect to the kumanovo agreement the consent element required for such peacekeeping agreements appears to be missing. the absence of consent element of the agreement undermines the legal basis and thus the legal validity of the kumanovo treaty reached under apparent coercion in 1999. it appears that kumanovo agreement in the absence of proper consent requirement may be interpreted as a dubious act under the vienna convention on the law of treaties (hereinafter vclt), particularly article 52 (related to the coercion of a state by the threat or use of force). therefore, the kumanovo agreement, as an annex to the security resolution 1244 (1999), can be considered as an invalid act according to the vlct. as a consequence of its invalidity, the serbian government in warlike situations, in case of massive human rights violations by kosovo authorities against serbian population, may resort to termination of the kumanovo agreement (under article 52 and even under article 53 (jus cogens) of the vlct) for aim to protect the serbian population against ethnic cleansing, oppression and other human rights violations of international (humanitarian) public law. keywords kumanovo agreement, nato, serbia, un, law of treaties www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 51 published by scholink inc. 1. background of the yugoslav crisis and justifiability of nato intervention 1999 sfry was established in 1945 as a successor of the kingdom of yugoslavia (after world war ii under the name federal people’s republic of yugoslavia, which was changed to sfry in 1963); constituted of six republics (serbia, croatia, slovenia, bosnia and hercegovina, macedonia and montenegro) with different historical, cultural, religious backgrounds and ethnic compositions. before the establishment of the kingdom of yugoslavia, croatia, slovenia and bosnia and hercegovina were under the rule of austro-hungary, while serbia, montenegro and macedonia have for centuries been parts of ottoman empire (with montenegro having almost always an independence status, the independence of serbia being recognized in 1878 at the berlin congress and present macedonia becoming part of serbia after the balkan wars, 1912, p. 13). the ethnic structure of the population on the territory of sfry at the time of its formation was predominantly slavic, with some albanian admixtures in the south of serbia (the kosovo and metohija province) and in the north-west macedonia. the religious affiliation of the inhabitants of croatia and slovenia was predominantly roman catholic; population of serbia, montenegro and macedonia was predominantly orthodox christian, while the dominant religion in bosnia and hercegovina, kosovo, and north-western part of macedonia was the islam. due to their geographical position and religious affiliation, the cultural ties of slovenia and croatia with the neighboring european countries, such as italy, austria and hungary, were profound. on the other hand, due to the help of russian empire in their struggle for independence from the ottoman empire, as well as sharing the same religious beliefs, the cultural ties of serbia, montenegro and macedonia with russia were traditionally strong. (note 1) while this ethnic, religious and cultural diversity can be perceived as an asset (cultural enrichment of the society, complementarity), coupled with the significant differences in their economic development (caused partially by differences in the national resources and production efficiency), it can be also a basis and potential for creation of conflicting relations between (and within) the constitutive federal units and groups of them. the conflict of geostrategic interests of the western powers (usa and west europe) and the soviet union for dominance over yugoslavia was wrapped in an ideological dress (“democracy” vs. power centralism, multi-party vs. one-party system, ideological pluralism vs. “communism”). the ideological form of western interests has found a resonance with the latent nationalist and separatist tendencies in some of the republics (croatia and slovenia) and in the autonomous province kosovo and metohija of serbia (or for practical purposes hereinafter so-called “kosovo”). at the student demonstrations in pristina (capital of the province) on november 27, 1968, the requirement for granting a status of republic to kosovo within sfry was articulated for the first time, but was immediately suppressed. the nationalist tendencies in slovenia and croatia were to a significant extent stimulated by their higher level of economic development with respect to other parts of the federation and the perception that the jointly produced wealth is distributed among the republics disproportionately to their contribution to the common wealth. publicly these tendencies were expressed through requirements for greater cultural autonomy, but were basically motivated by aspirations for more economic and political www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 52 published by scholink inc. rights and for strengthening their national identity sentiment. the “croatian spring” mass-movement 1967-1971 for “cultural reforms” and “rights” in the federation provides a primary example of such aspirations. furthermore, the requests for more profound political and liberal reforms were present in other yugoslav republics; in serbia the need for liberal reforms was articulated by the communist party leadership at the beginning of 1970s. as a result of the public demands for greater political, economic and cultural autonomy, in 1974, the constitution of sfry was amended, providing the republics with a greater degree of autonomy in the economic, political and cultural areas. the individual republics amended their own constitutions accordingly, whereby the autonomous provinces of serbia, kosovo and metohija and vojvodina, obtained a significantly greater autonomy, essentially equal to that of the republics. the autonomous provinces (including the kosovo and metohija and vojvodina) didn’t obtained the right to secession from the sfry. the federation maintained prerogatives only over the national defense and international relations. the federal units had a full autonomy over their economic and cultural relations with the external world. within such a decentralized federal structure the nationalist and separatist tendencies could grow at will, the only controlling and cohesive political force being the league of communists of yugoslavia and the collective presidency of the federation, (constituted by representatives of the six republics and two autonomous provinces), with tito acting as its permanent president until his death. after tito’s death in 1980, the nationalist and separatist tendencies within some of the federal units began to grow rapidly. these tendencies were strongly supported by foreign countries with which they had a common history or long cultural relations (e.g., slovenia and croatia with austria, germany, italy and hungary, kosovo with albania). the visible form of this support in the case of slovenia and croatia was manifested in development of strong economic and trade relations with the european countries, reviving their cultural interactions and establishing cooperation in other fields. this resulted in a noticeable increase of already significant economic strength of these two republics within the federation relative to that of other republics. this is an example of how selective relations of the external environment with the units of a system can change the balance of power between the units. the historic cultural and religious connections of croatia and slovenia with the neighboring catholic countries, fueling their cultural identification with the european community of states, have also played a significant role in the rise of nationalist and separatist sentiments in these republics. apparently, the psychological affiliation of these two republics to the yugoslav project, first as kingdom of serbs, croats and slovenes (1918-1929), then as kingdom of yugoslavia (1929-1941) (a parliamentary monarchy with a serbian monarch), has never been strong due to the perception of dominance of the more numerous serbian nation in the federation. nationalist ideas started to grow also within the muslim population in bosnia and hercegovina (“bosniaks”), supported ideologically and financially by the arabic countries (primarily saudi arabia and turkey). in the federal units in yugoslavia based on multiple ethnic structures, the growth of nationalist ideas stemmed from the ethnic identity, creating inter-ethnic tensions within the units. such tensions intensified during 1980s: between serbs and croats in croatia, bosniaks and croats and bosniaks and www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 53 published by scholink inc. serbs in bosnia and hercegovina, albanians and serbs in kosovo and to a lesser extent between serbs and hungarian minority in vojvodina. the strong nationalist sentiment of albanians in kosovo was expressed in the march-april, 1981, massive student demonstrations in pristina that spread out to other locations (towns kosovska mitrovica, uroševac, vučitrn). the primary demand of protesters was the demand for granting the province (kosovo and metohija) a status of republic within the federation (sfry). the protests were suppressed by the presidency of yugoslavia, declaring on april 2 a state of emergency in pristina and the city of kosovska mitrovica. in the years that followed, the political aspirations of kosovo albanians for obtaining a status of republic within the federation were only increasing and found support by croatia and slovenia. for serbia the administrative separation of kosovo from serbia was unacceptable and, in order to prevent the possibility of such an undesirable event, the serbian parliament in 1989 amended its constitution of 1974 to significantly reduce the autonomy of kosovo (the amendments were confirmed in the new constitution of serbia adopted in september 1990). the reaction of kosovo albanians to the abolishment of their autonomy was organization of mass protests, the general strike of town of trepča miners in march 1989 (publicly supported by the slovenian leadership), the referendum for independence from serbia and sfry (in september 1991) and the unilateral declaration by the provincial assembly of the “republic of kosovo” (which was one month later recognized by albania). the self-proclaimed independence did not have any legal effect, but has enormously increased the inter-ethnic tensions within the province and between central serbia and the separatist province. these tensions started to obtain violent character and resulted in a massive expulsion of the serb population from the province and a significant presence of the serbian police in kosovo to protect the serbs there. it should be mention that slovenia and croatia were actively supporting the separatist aspirations of kosovo albanians for independence from serbia. the separatist aspirations of these two republics started openly to be expressed and openly supported by germany and some other eu countries. croatia was secretly planning a forceful separation from yugoslavia and buying arms from hungary and other countries. as a reaction to the separatist tendencies in croatia and kosovo and metohija, the nationalist sentiment in serbia also started to grow. it was motivated primarily by the concern for the destiny of serbian population in these two federal units with strong inter-ethnic tensions (already violently manifested in kosovo and having historical roots in the world war ii in croatia). the growth of nationalist sentiment of the bosniaks in bosnia and hercegovina, where the population of serbs was also large, significantly increased the potential for severe inter-ethnic conflicts. the national rights of the serbs in bosnia and hercegovina became an additional concern for serbia. (note 2) the divisions over the national and economic issues, threatening the stability and unity of yugoslavia, were reflected further in the yugoslav presidency, as well as in the league of communists of yugoslavia. on january 20-22, 1990, the extraordinary 14th congress of the league of communists of yugoslavia was convened in belgrade to deal with these issues. the congress was dominated by clashes between the serbian and slovenian delegations, headed by milošević and kučan, respectively, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 54 published by scholink inc. over the power enshrined to the federal units and the decision making process in the league. slovenian delegation suggested a confederative model for the league and the future state, empowering the constituent units. serbian delegation advocated introduction of a “one man-one vote” policy for decision making in the league and a more centralized yugoslavia. all proposals of slovenia were rejected, while those of serbia were accepted on a majority vote, helped by vojvodina, montenegro and kosovo and metohija (represented by a pro-serbian politician). the slovenian delegation at that point left the congress. milošević proposed to continue the work of the congress without slovenia, but croatia considered that as unconstitutional and threatened to leave. when attempts were made to recommence the meeting, the croatian delegation departed the meeting, followed by the delegations of bosnia and hercegovina and macedonia. subsequently, the league of communists of yugoslavia was dissolved, opening the door of creation of multi-party systems in the federal units. thus, the last congress of the league of communists of yugoslavia played the key role in the disintegration of the yugoslavian federation. the internal dissolution of yugoslavia essentially started when the federal republics organized their first multi-party parliamentary elections in 1990, when (except in serbia and montenegro) the ex-communists failed to win the elections. most of the elected governments were formed on nationalist platforms, promising better “protection” (or advancement) of national interests than the ex-communists. the success of the ex-communists in the elections in serbia and montenegro was due to their proven strong nationalist stands in the struggles for protecting the serb interests in croatia, bosnia and hercegovina and kosovo and metohija (kim). following the results of multi-party elections, slovenia, croatia and macedonia proposed in autumn of 1990 to transform yugoslavia into a loose federation of six republics. the serbian leadership, however, rejected the proposal. the rationale was based on the premise that the large serbian populations in croatia and bosnia and hercegovina should also have rights to self-determination, similarly to croats and slovenians. in addition, the serbian leadership was alarmed by the change of the status of serbian population in the new croatian constitution, adopted on december 22, 1990, from a constitutive nation to a minority. because of the major disagreements between the republics about the reorganization of the federation, and because of already openly expressed preferences of some western countries (especially germany) in this regard, on december 23, 1990, slovenia held a referendum for independence from yugoslavia. the turnout was 88.5% and 94.8% of the voters voted for independence. the independence was declared on june 25, 1991. the croatian referendum for independence from yugoslavia was held on may 2, 1991, with 93.24% of the voters voting in favor. a second referendum was held in croatia on may 19, 1991, regarding the question of whether the independent croatia should form an alliance of sovereign states with the other yugoslav republics (in accordance with the proposal of slovenia, croatia and macedonia for solving the state crisis of sfry). with the 83.6% turnout, since the croatian serbs boycotted the referendum, 94.2% voted in favor. on june 25, 1991, croatia declared its independence from yugoslavia. macedonia held its referendum for independence on september 8, 1991, with 95.3% of voters voting in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 55 published by scholink inc. favor. the macedonian independence from yugoslavia was declared on september 25, 1991 (as republic of macedonia). the parliament of bosnia and hercegovina was ethnically divided on the question of independence from sfry. reacting to the bosniaks majority stand for independence, bosnian serbs held a own referendum in november 1991, with an overwhelming vote to stay in a common state with serbia and montenegro. on january 9, 1882, they proclaimed a separate republic of the serbian people (as “republika srpska”), which included all regions within bosnia and hercegovina consisting of predominantly serbian population. the bosniaks dominated bosnian government called for an independence referendum on february 29 and march 1, 1992, which was boycotted by the serbs. the turnout was 63.4% of which 99.7% voted in favor. the independence of bosnia and hercegovina from yugoslavia was declared on march 3, 1992. on april 6, 1992, the bosnian serbs declared their independence from bosnia and hercegovina. it should be noted that the processes leading to the establishment of croatian independence from yugoslavia were paralleled by similar processes of the croat ethnic serbs: on april 1, 1991, the leaders of the serbian autonomous region (“krajina” sar or republika srpska krajina)) declared that this region would separate from croatia if it proclaims independence. and indeed, after croatia declared its independence, the three serbian regions of krajina, western slavonia and eastern slavonia, baranja and western srem declared the republic of serbian krajina (rsk) on december 19, 1991. the next day after the simultaneous declaration of independence by slovenia and croatia on june 25, 1991, the federal yugoslav people’s army (ypa), which was by the federal constitution the official guardian of the territorial integrity of the state (fry), moved towards the northern border of slovenia, where the yugoslav border insignia, such as the flag and country name, were already replaced by the slovenian ones. local armed slovenians (the paramilitary) prevented the move of ypa towards the border, and the threat of an armed conflict became a real possibility. the european community (ec) exerted pressure on slovenia and croatia to place a three month moratorium on their independence and organized the brioni conference on july 7, 1991, involving an ec delegation, slovenia, croatia, and representatives of the yugoslav presidency and government. (note 3) the only results of this conference were the withdrawal of ypa from slovenia, and the agreement by both croatia and slovenia to suspend their (armed) activities around/and their declared independence for three months. however, during its withdrawal from slovenia through croatia, fierce clashes between the ypa and croatian armed forces took place (the most bloody being those in the city of vukovar), marking the beginning of a full-fledged war. (note 4) on september 7, 1991, the ec organized the conference on yugoslavia in hague in an attempt to cease the battles in former yugoslavia, find a political solution for the inter-republic conflicts and restore the federation. lord peter carrington chaired the conference. in the framework of the conference an arbitration commission was formed, led by robert badinter, the president of the constitutional council of france. the commission included presidents of constitutional courts of germany, italy, spain and belgium as members. the mandate of the commission was to provide the conference with www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 56 published by scholink inc. its opinions about major legal matters which have arisen from the declarations of independence of slovenia, croatia and macedonia, and the potential for defragmentation of croatia and bosnia and hercegovina by the ongoing armed conflicts. the opinions of the commission were the following: 1) sfry was in the process of dissolution, 2) the serbian population in croatia and bosnia and hercegovina is entitled to all rights of minorities and ethnic groups and the republics must afford to them all the human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized in the international law, 3) the boundaries between serbia and croatia and serbia and bosnia and hercegovina and other adjacent states may not be altered, except by mutual agreements, 4) the independence of croatia should not be recognized by the ec countries because of the inadequate protection of minorities in the new croatian constitution. (in reaction to this opinion croatian president wrote a letter to badinter giving assurances that this concern would be remedied.) commission recommended recognition of slovenia and macedonia, but because of the greek opposition ec was subsequently reluctant to recognize macedonia. in arriving at the opinion 3), the commission was guided by the legal principle uti possidetis (juris), i.e., recognized as inter-republican administrative borders as determined in the federal constitution of 1974 (note 5), as future state borders. the commission did not recommend recognition of bosnia and hercegovina, since at the time of delivery of its opinions (november 29, 1991, january 11, 1992) the referendum for independence in this republic had still not been held. the commission expressed opinion that the succession of sfry should be resolved by mutual agreement between the successor states with an equitable division of international assets and obligations of the former state. it also ruled that the membership of sfry in international organizations could not be continued by the successor state, but each that emerged from the former sfry should individually apply for membership anew. (note 6) this principle would also be applicable for the applications of the states emerging from the sfry dissolution for membership to the ec. what could be relevant for serbia was derivation that apparently succession from fry (or serbia) with respect to provinces (such as kosovo) may not take place in and arbitrary manner, since uti possidetis was applicable only to republic borders. however, the leadership of serbia and montenegro was in strong opposition to the opinion 2) of the commission, denying the right to self-determination of the serbs in croatia and bosnia and hercegovina. on the basis of the opinions of badinter commission, slovenia and croatia were recognized by the ec on january 15, 1992. even before this date they were unilaterally recognized by germany on december 27, 1991, (despite the opposition of france, uk and the netherlands) and by ukraine, island, the holly see and the baltic countries. their recognition by other countries rapidly grew thereafter. as mentioned above, the recognition of macedonia by ec was not granted due to the greek opposition, and ratio that seems to be legally groundless. meanwhile, the armed conflicts in croatia between the croatian forces, on one side, and the ypa and the forces of republic of serbian krajna (rsk), on the other, were intensifying. the united nations security council on november 27, 1991, adopted the resolution 721, which paved the way to the establishment of peacekeeping operations in former yugoslavia. the special envoy of the un secretary-general, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 57 published by scholink inc. cyrus vance, on november 23, 1991, met in geneva with the presidents of serbia and croatia, and with the yugoslav minister of defense, where a ceasefire agreement was negotiated (the geneva accord). the ceasefire, however, did not last very long and the war conflicts spilled over into bosnia and hercegovina, involving all three ethnic groups (bosniaks, serbs and croats). within the vance’s efforts regarding the implementation of ceasefire and demilitarization of the parts of croatia, under control of croat serbs and ypa, on january 2, 1992, another meeting was convened in sarajevo, where an implementation agreement was signed by military representatives of croatian ministry of defense and ypa. the agreement entailed deployment of 10,000-strong un protection force (unprofor) to the major conflict areas, with the task to create buffer zones between the fighting troops, to disarm the arm forces od rsk, to ensure the ypa withdrawal from the un protected areas and the return of refugees to these areas. the rsk president refused to endorse the agreement, but serbian president milošević persuaded the rsk parliament to replace him and accept the agreement. the acceptance of the agreement by serbia was motivated by its primary purpose to create favorable conditions for negotiations of the permanent solution to the conflict. the agreement produced a longer-lasting ceasefire, but failed to completely implement the other of its objectives. after september 1992, the ec took a proactive role in the un peace efforts in yugoslavia and its representative lord peter owen joined vance in the peace negotiations. after vance resigned his post in april 1993, the norwegian foreign minister jens stoltenberg was appointed as the main un peace negotiator. at the initiatives of lord owen and stoltenberg, the unprofor’s mandate was extended to include the territory of bosnia and hercegovina. the unprofor mission was terminated in march 1995. in august of the same year the croatian army undertook the military initiative “operation storm” against the rsk, resulting in massive destruction and a flux of 250,000 refugees into serbia. with respect to this operation we could only derive the obvious conclusion that un acted in a way that actually helped western and croatian policy planers aimed for creating conditions for forceful expulsion of these people from croatian territory. in the period of november 1-21, 1995, the “general framework agreement for peace in bosnia and hercegovina” (dayton agreement) was negotiated in dayton military base, ohio, between the presidents of serbia (slobodan milošević, representing the bosnian serb interests), croatia (franjo tudjman) and bosnia and hercegovina (alija izetbegović), with the mediation of the us secretary of state warren christopher, eu special representative carl bildt, first deputy foreign minister of russia igor ivanov and the us negotiator richard holbrooke. the dayton agreement was officially signed on december 14, 1995, in paris, france, witnessed by the presidents of the us and france, as well as the prime minister of the uk. that treaty was reached under the some extent undignified pressure and coercive conditions (in lack of bona fides) that could raise a question of legal validity of that act, since a treaty creation should be based on a free will, good faith and the necessary element of consent in contracting process, that is a basic prerequisite for valid conclusion on any treaty. the main purpose of the dayton agreement was to bring an end to the inter-ethnic conflicts and prevent them www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 58 published by scholink inc. from resuming, to delineate the inter-ethnic boundaries, and to endorse a regional balance of power. the territory of yugoslav republic bosnia and hercegovina was divided into two political entities: 1) federation of bosnia and hercegovina, involving the bosniaks and bosnian croats and occupying 51% of the territory, and 2) republika srpska on the remaining 49% of the territory with predominant serb population. each of these two entities would have its own governing institutions, but the government of the new state bosnia and hercegovina would consist of representatives of the three ethnic groups (empowered with a veto voting right in the decision making process). the implementation of the agreement was mandated to the nato-led implementation force (ifor)—responsible for keeping the peace, the office of high representative—responsible for civic and legal matters, and the organization for security and co-operation in europe (osce)—responsible for organizing the first free elections in 1996. the ifor multilateral military force consisted of 63,000 soldiers and in november 1996 was replaced by the stabilization force (sfor) under the us command (the latter renewed again in 1998). after bosnia and hercegovina declared its independence from yugoslavia on march 3, 1992, the remaining two sfry republics constituted the federal republic of yugoslavia (fry) on april 27, 1992. although on the federal level the governance of the new state was equitably shared between the constitutive entities, there was a sentiment in montenegro that serbia had the larger share in the state power (especially expressed in the common parliament, the composition of which reflected the population difference between the two constitutive entities). this sentiment of unequal share of the power resulted in a reconstitution of the state to a state union of the “serbia and montenegro” on february 4, 2003. in the montenegrin society there has historically been a divide regarding their ethnic affiliation. approximately half of the slavic population identifies itself as serbs, while the other half perceives itself as a separate nation. coupled with other political and economic discontents, this national divide led to the referendum for independence of montenegro on june 3, 2006. given that 55.5% of the 86.3% voter turnout voted for separation, montenegro declared its independence. serbia formally declared its statehood on june 5, 2006, and became a legal successor of the state union (“serbia and montenegro”), while montenegro had to apply for membership in all international organizations. this was the end of the dissolution of the ex-sfry. (note 7) in addition, after dissolution of the ex-sfry, the provisional authorities in kosovo and metohija in an unconstitutional manner with intention to break away from serbia, self-proclaimed an “independence of kosovo” on 17. feb. 2008. that unilateral (self-)declaration by kosovo albanians actually revealed the true intention of the military engagement of nato forces in 1999 as their ally in the process of illegal secession and apparently with a main goal to of create a new state. in present article we would like to emphasize that the 1999 nato invasion on the federal republic of yugoslavia wouldn’t end until the agreement between fry and nato (the military technical agreement between the international security force (“kfor”) and the governments of the federal republic of yugoslavia and the republic of serbia) was signed on 9-th of june 1999. however, fry (serbia) has never accepted the justifiability and legitimacy of the brutal nato intervention and the outcome of war in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 59 published by scholink inc. 1999, including its contractual consequences. many countries and prominent scholars and intellectuals have rised their voice and condemned the nato incursion and intervention, in particular the bombing campaign of fry and serbia. for instance, noam chomsky argued that the main objective of the nato intervention was to integrate fr yugoslavia into the western neo-liberal social and economic system, since it was the only country in the region which still defied the western hegemony prior to 1999. (note 8) war with nato (or rather an aggressive invasion) actually started after the refusal of serbia/fry to sign the rambouillet agreement under apparent extortion or blackmail, i.e., fry (serbia) was threatened by nato with armed attack. (note 9) the yugoslavia’s rejection to conclude that unacceptable and undignified accord was needed used by nato and its member countries to justify the 1999 bombing, aggression and essentially destruction of yugoslavia. (note 10) despite the explicit rejection of rambouillet agreement by fry, this document was incorporated into the security council resolution 1244 that limits fry army and police forces to return to kosovo, providing kfor an authority to prevent conflicts and control the withdrawal of fry armed forces. that part of sc resolution apparently defies the basic jus cogens norms related to the juridical equality of states and discrimination under the international law, in particular discrimination of un members provided by the un charter and the vienna convention on the representation of states in their relations with international organizations of a universal character (1975). fry was invaded, with no backing of un decision, in violation of the norms of un charter in a similar way as russia invaded the ukraine (2022), with visible distinction that the aggression against the fry was never condemned by un and the western allies. 2. controversies related to the membership status of the fry in the un in order to comprehensively examine the legal aspects of the un resolution 1244 (1999), it is important to understand the unusual legal status of the federal republic of yugoslavia (serbia and montenegro) in the united nations in 1992. unlike fry, after the recognition of independence by ec, slovenia, croatia and bosnia and hercegovina (march 3, 1992) were admitted to un membership on may 22, 1992 by the un resolutions a/res/46/237, a/res/46/238 and a/res/46/236, respectively. fry (serbia and montenegro) claimed itself as a legal successor state of the sfry. however, following the recommendations of un security council resolutions sc/res/757 (may 30, 1992) (note 11) and sc/res/777 (september 19, 1992) (note 12), the un general assembly adopted the resolution a/res/47/1 (note 13) on september 22 of the same year, determining that “the federal republic of yugoslavia (serbia and montenegro) cannot continue the membership of the former socialist federal republic of yugoslavia” in the united nations. therefore, it was decided that “the federal republic of yugoslavia (serbia and montenegro) should apply for membership to the united nations and that it shall not participate in the work of general assembly”. the denial of automatic membership of fry in the un was in stark contrast to the previous decision of the general assembly that the russian federation could automatically continue the un membership of the soviet union after www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 60 published by scholink inc. its dissolution in december 1991. despite of the fact that a continuous un membership of russia is necessary for the smooth un operation (due to its permanent seat in the security council), the dissimilar treatment of the two legally identical cases is in contradiction with the un charter basic principle of “sovereign equality of its members” (article 2(1)). it should be noted that the primary purpose of the previously mentioned security council resolution 757, in which the successor status of federal republic of yugoslavia was denied, was to impose international sanctions on the country given its role in the yugoslav wars (as seen by the security council members). during that period gorbachev’s russia was trying to demonstrate its acceptance of the “western values” and its “openness for co-operation”. the negative image created by massive propaganda portraying fry as an aggressor in yugoslavia’s dissolution process might have led to the biased legal reasoning in the security council and in the general assembly. irrespective of these considerations, the legal fact remains that through the continuation of the membership of the former soviet union (ussr) by the russian federation and the denial of continuation of former yugoslavia (sfry) by federal republic of yugoslavia, an unequal treatment was applied, that violates article 2(1) of the united nations charter. this example demonstrates how the positions of state entities in the world political system are determined by the relations between the states, especially by the relations between the most influential states, and how these relations may affect the legal actions of international institutions. the recommendation of the un security council in its resolution sc/res/777, incorporated later in the general assembly resolution a/res/47/1, that fry “should not participate in the work of general assembly”, was a political compromise between the us and some western sc members, on one side, and the russian federation, people’s republic of china and some other non-allied sc members, on the other. the original draft of the sc resolution 777, prepared by the united states, stated that the un general assembly should make the decision that the “yugoslavia’s membership in the united nations be extinguished”. this draft sc resolution was reformulated in order to obtain russian support and the resolution remained open to different interpretations. russian federation and the republic of china rejected the initial idea that the fry be excluded from all un organs, stating that its work in “the other organs should be unaffected”. meanwhile, india and zimbabwe (traditional allies of yugoslavia) observed and stated that sc resolution 777 violates article 5 of the united nations charter. since the membership of the former sfry to the un had not yet been extinguished, the sfry diplomatic mission to the united nations continued its work in the other un organs, while fry continued to pay the due yearly membership contribution to the un budget. this irregular membership status was acceptable to the fry leadership, and only after miloṧević was ousted from power on october 5, 2000, the federal republic of yugoslavia applied for un membership; it was admitted on november 1, 2000, by the general assembly resolution a/res/55/12. let us briefly analyze the legal soundness of sc resolution 777, regarding which india and zimbabwe voiced their concerns. the suspension of the right of a un member from participation in the work of the general assembly, or the suspension of any membership right, is regulated by article 5 of the un www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 61 published by scholink inc. charter that reads: “a member of the united nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the security council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the general assembly upon the recommendation of the security council. the exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the security council”. (note 14) it should be noted that the conditions under which the prior preventive or enforcement action had been taken by the security council, necessary for suspending a membership right by the council or the general assembly, are not explicitly specified in the resolution(s), and neither is their character. this ambiguity dilutes article 5 as a legal norm and opens the door for political considerations in its interpretation. although the legal basis for imposing the suspension of the right of sfry/fry to participate in the work of general assembly could only be article 5 of the charter, no specific preventive or enforcement action(s) taken by the security council were explicitly mentioned in the sc/res 777 and a/res/47/1 to justify the imposed suspension. in the absence of an explicit delineation of the specific preventive or enforcement action measures taken by security council (and supporting rationale), the recommendation and decision in the above mentioned resolutions for suspension of the sfry/fry right to participate in the work of general assembly are lacking the legal basis. as accurately observed by india’s and zimbabwe’s sc members, these resolutions are in violation with article 5 of the charter. thus, it can be concluded that the suspension of the right to participation in the work of the general assembly by the above un organs was imposed on the basis of political considerations alone, i.e., disregarding the un charter’s legal framework. (note 15) therefore, derogating the legal membership status of the fry, resolutions sc/res 777 and a/res/47/1 essentially demonstrate an ultra vires act committed by the un in its decision making against a member state. it should be also noted that the fry unusual membership status in the un illegally limits its obligations (and rights) vis a vis the un, and consequently un diminishes its legal capacity to impose decisions on such member, still a sovereign state. 3. question of illegality of the annex ii of the un resolution 1244 the alleged right of “humanitarian military intervention” as a pretext or reason for an assault in 1999 apparently did not provide the convincing justifications by nato countries for their aggressive action, particularly taking into consideration that there were no any backing un sc resolution for endorsement external military involvement, incursion or intervention against a sovereign state. even if we put aside that aspect (measure not backed by security council resolution), and accept the “significance of the kosovo agreement” with respect to “security provisions” for a region, it remains questionable in the resolution 1244 (1999) (note 16) the legality of deployment of the un civil administration in kosovo, as well as the executive powers of kfor, i.e., the kfor’s jurisdiction in the serbian province. as we noted, in the wording of previous unsc resolutions 1160, 1198 and 1203 no explicit authorization was given for any such violations of national sovereignty. in resolutions 1160 (note 17), for instance, the sc only recalled the possibility of taking further action, if the sc’s requests were not met by the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 62 published by scholink inc. fry. that formulation was legally dubious as well since territorial sovereignty is a basic principle embedded in the un charter. as for sc resolution 1244, western authors (usa, uk, etc.) of that resolution have argued that this act did provide for an ex post facto endorsement of the nato action. however, nowhere does the resolution afford for any endorsement of the coercive military invasion or un civilian action or deployment replacing constitutional organs of serbia in its province. (note 18) the incursion action of nato was not backed by security council resolution, neither in the case of military intervention, nor in the process of a treaty-precondition for ending of the brutal intervention. (note 19) therefore, procurement of the “military-technical agreement between the international security assistance force (“kfor”) and the government of the fry” (or “kosovo agreement” (note 20)) appears to be in violation of principles of international law. (note 21) it is apparently incorrect to argue that the existence of such reference as (or to the) “kosovo agreement” (hereinafter “ka”) that a day later became annex ii (note 22) can be seen as an implied endorsement for aggressive action, particularly taking into considerations general provisions of resolution 1244 guarantying territorial integrity and sovereignty of existing state (fry) and especially bearing in mind an article 2(1) of the un charter, as a pillar of international law. obviously, a reference to the agreement (placed in the annex ii of resolution) does not provide any clear evidence of such intention, particularly not consent by other party (serbia/fry) in ka, since no state aim at self-derogation of (own) sovereignty or could provide in good faith any endorsement of such self-inflicting damages with external or un involvement actions in that (damaging) direction. in our view, a previous military intervention by nato in kosovo couldn’t legally be treated as a legitimate/legal or legally endorsed action bearing in mind that brutal bombing of fry was provoked by refusal of fry government to conclude another treaty in an attempt of obvious extortion (the rambouillet agreement). act ending the war or rather illegal aggression on the fry certainly do not represent an international occupation (occupatio bellica) act, because intervention and agreement between belgrade and nato was subject of the subsequent (i.e., conditional/potential) approval by the un security council as occupational treaty, and fry was apparently extorted to sign it. in addition, with respect to kosovo as its region, serbia (and fry) was acting in self-defense against foreign invasion provoked by the rejection of the rambouillet accords ultimatum. it should also be noted that the territory of kosovo and metohija (serbian province) was placed under the sort of an illegal un protection despite a fact that it was not and could not be under “protectorate status”, since there was no any such treaty between un and any state (or un member) on such protective arrangement. status of the “protectorate” (that is by definition regulated by agreement (and in the jurisdiction of the un trusteeship council)) at the time of the adoption of the sc resolution 1244 kosovo could not have obtained considering that kosovo was not a state (or any such entity that meets the conditions to be a “protectorate”), and hence „protector”(state or organization) couldn’t exist in this case. it should be noted that the full name of the “kosovo agreement” is a “military-technical agreement between the international security assistance force (“kfor”) and the government of the federal www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 63 published by scholink inc. republic of yugoslavia and the republic of serbia”, suggests its technical nature (or “assistance purpose”), not occupational intention (occupatio bellica) or occupational act (or treaty of surrender). this agreement delivered under the threat of armed attack and bombing (i.e., aggression) was concluded between yugoslav army major general (i.e., divisional general) svetozar marjanović (a regional fry commander in kosovo), fry police major general obrad stevanović on the yugoslav side, and british brigadier general michael jackson, on behalf of nato, on the other side (commander on the ground, representing nato party to the agreement).that was an act concluded under conditions of coercion by the threat of force and the abuse of force. this extorted circumstances speak themselves on the legal validity of the treaty (i.e., conclusion under coercion). it should also be noted that a relatively low military rank of these state officers negotiating already prepared agreement and signing it (below the level of lieutenant general or full general), in comparison to normal diplomatic officials with proper capacity for state contracting, indicates that treaty was in fact an imposed “ceasefire agreement” or as many described a “peace-keeping treaty”, and not an act of surrender or occupation (agreement) as was interpreted for instance by brig. general michael jackson, nor an act for the change in the political status of the state (fry/serbia) or loss of its territory. furthermore, with respect to domestic constitutional aspects, it should also be noted that military officials representing fry and signing the ka (representing the yugoslav army and the police) apparently did not have any constitutional power or jurisdiction necessary to place signature or conclude any valid document that would limit serbian sovereignty over its province kosovo on behalf of the serbian government. (note 23) that fact was known to the nato and un officials at the moment of conclusion of ka. as pointed above, a day after the conclusion of the coercive ka, sc resolution 124 was adopted and ka was annexed to it and endorsed in an attempt to legitimize that act. nevertheless, this annex ii could be interpreted as separable part of the resolution 1244, since wording of the resolution suggests conditionally for creation of that agreement (in future/conditional tense). remarkably, kfor (leaded by nato force) was not defined anywhere as occupying force (in accordance of un mandate and un nature or charter), but rather as a “peacekeeping force”, and therefore agreement annexed (ka) could not also be interpreted as occupational (surrendering) agreement placing state under foreign/external or military rule and occupation. otherwise, the ka (as annex to the un resolution) would be entirely inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the un charter. bearing in mind that kfor under the international mandate of the united nations (as non-supranational and deliberative organization) may not be an occupying (or classical coercive occupational) force under any circumstances, due to the peaceful goals of the un that entail purposes and role of un peacekeeping forces in accordance to the nature of the charter, treaty concluded by the nato on june of 9-th, could not meet any occupational criteria (i.e., standards for military take over the territory or surrender), but rather usual norms for treaty conclusion should be applicable. it is clear from the discussion preceding and following the adoption of the resolution 1244 in 1999 that its aim with respect to un presence was only “to restore the authority of the unsc” starting from “the de www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 64 published by scholink inc. facto situation” created by the nato (assault) intervention, and not in any way to legalize and legitimize that military action. (note 24) however, members of the unsc took as granted “legality” of the “kosovo agreement” and even tried to and legitimize its dubious effects despite the controversies related to sovereignty for fry and territorial integrity guaranteed to fry in the sc resolution 1244 in accordance with the un charter. the bias arguments employed by nato countries to justify their action, and other possible arguments such as “the ex post facto endorsement” and the “enforcement of a right of self-determination”, reveal to us that nato intervention was indeed in violation of the basic principles of international law and purposes of un embedded in its charter. conducted nato military action in fry prior to resolution 1244 could, for instances, be burdened by possible nato atrocities (as was actually case to some degree with air campaign), that could not subsequently be legitimized or endorsed by the un resolution(s) under any pretext or circumstances. in some of advisory opinions of the icj and for example in the very first case dealt with by the icty, we have observed very broadly defined the competence of the unsc to act within the powers provided by chapter vii. (note 25) on some other situations, icj took different stand that power of the security council should be limited and in accordance with the un charter. (note 26) due to the lack of an institutionalized system of judicial review of the acts of the political organs of the un, the sc in its business presumed an unlimited authority to decide its own competence practically on any matter by declaring that “such “conflicting” or controversial “matter” allegedly represent a threat to international security (de facto “being judge in its own case”). remarkably, unsc also assumed an unlimited power to decide which kind of coercive or non-coercive measures to adopt, with no limitation embodied in un charter. as a consequence, a state addressed by such arbitrary sc measures could not seek a judicial review of the decision(s) per se. in previous chapter in our article here (above), in the case of illegal derogation of the legal membership status of fry in the un, it was clearly demonstrated that in spirit of international law and normative nature of the un charter (as contract) that unsc shouldn’t possess unlimited powers, and when presumed arbitrary and therefore wrongfully such actions constitute an ultra vires act(s), by its nature, since powers of any un organ legally should always be limited. (note 27) another question is how to deal with such illegal acts or how to cure their illegal consequences or effects. (note 28) some possibilities were suggested in the jurisprudence of icj related to the advisory jurisdiction of the court. arbitrary behavior of the un security council (sc) with respect to kosovo and metohija (kim) was demonstrated before the adoption of the sc resolution 1244. in the unsc resolution 1203 (note 29) for instance, the sc endorsed the agreements of october 15 and 16 (1998) between the fry and osce, and the fry and nato respectively, which were concluded after the issuance of an activation order by the nato secretary general. (note 30) such “threat of the use of force” without proper unsc authorization was clearly in defiance of international law and un charter. in the lack of reference to international law and legal grounds, the ad hoc solution provided (described as “uniqueness of the precedent”) by sc hardly speak in favor of the development of “new” normative standards “relaxing the obligation” of the security council to abide by the un charter. it is also apparently not permissible www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 65 published by scholink inc. security council decision to supersede the underlying agreement as a normative source. (note 31) in unsc resolution 1203, it effected a “novation” of the (in)valid or dubious agreement between osce and fry by creating a new so-called “legal basis” for the osce verification mission. in addition, such novation apparently did not occur with respect to the nato “air verification” mission (in view of sc), whose normative content was still dependent on the belgrade consent. (note 32) the kosovo agreement (ka), which is supposed to “provide the legal basis” for nato’s authority over security matters in fry, apparently does not appear to have been superseded by resolution 1244, neither appears to legalize aggression subsequently. likewise, without kosovo agreement, security council resolution 1244 have essentially different character and limits; hence standalone (striped from annexes) it provides for territorial integrity of fry and serbia. it should be reiterated that kosovo agreement was subsequently added as an annex to the resolution 1244 subject to the consent of fry (under abuse of force) and that in the case of potential termination of the treaty (ka), resolution 1244 would still be in force with original legal effects (in absence of annex provisions). even with demand enshrined in resolution 1244 for the “complete verifiable phased withdrawal from kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in kosovo”, that resolution determination of 1999 couldn’t prevent possible present day action of serbia for self-defense or defense of its population in kim, as the peremptory right stemming from the norm of jus cogens. as to the compliance of un (sc, unga and other organs) decisions or resolutions with mandatory norms of jus cogens that by peremptory nature limits powers of un and/or unsc decisions the conclusion related to such limitation of powers of the un organ is self-evident. given that the prohibition of the use of force outside the un charter framework has been considered by the icj and the international law commission (ilc) as the norm of jus cogens, it may well be asserted that general customary principles, such as norm in article 52 of the vienna convention on the law of treaties of 1969 (vclt) related to invalidity of treaties concluded under coercion also represents as supreme jus cogens norm (and should be respected as such). the article 52 of the vienna convention on the law of treaties (vlct) provides jus cogens limitation related to the law of contracting treaties that reads: “a treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the charter of the united nations”. (note 33) in our case with kosovo agreement, this dubious contractual act apparently represent an example of an invalid agreement under article 52 of the vclt in violation of a basic norm of jus cogens. that act is beyond the limits of un legality and jus cogens prerequisites for contracting, since treaty was concluded in the absence of the essential element of the consent and a free will, with respect to serbian and yugoslavian party-contractor that was evidently coerced and extorted under threat of the use of force. the ka was not concluded under presumption of good faith (bona fides). one may argue whether article 52 of the vienna convention on the law of treaties (1969) provides for a ground of “absolute” or alternatively “relative” invalidity in case of kosovo agreement (namely, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 66 published by scholink inc. posing a dilemma whether that treaty that ought to be considered as null and void ab initio, or whether it can still produce some legal effects and be “cured” by the (coerced) party’s subsequent acceptance or acquiescence of that act). (note 34) the wording and character of article 52 within the vienna convention on the law of treaties clearly support the view that article 52 describes a ground of absolute nullity of act(s) created under coercion (or threat or use of force). also the ilc commentary on vienna convention on the law of treaties leans on towards this original interpretation of article 52 (as null and void ab initio). the prevailing ratio of this ilc findings is that the protection against the threat of use of force is of such “fundamental importance for the international community that any juridical act concluded against such principle ought to be fully invalidated”. when discussing the loss of a right to invoke a ground of treaty invalidity by way of acquiescence (article 45 of the vlct), the ilc is unambiguous in stating that: „the effects and implications of coercion in international relations are of such gravity . . . that a consent so obtained must be treated as absolutely void in order to ensure that the victim of the coercion should afterwards be in a position freely to determine its future relations with the state which coerced it”. (note 35) for instance to change the original interpretation, a swiss delegation to the 1969 vienna diplomatic conference proposed an amendment to the draft article to the effect that the coerced state would be entitled to “waive the invalidity of the treaty”. the proposal was defeated 63-12, thereby supporting the idea that only a subsequent agreement would be able to confirm the validity. we may now briefly remind us to the content of the basic provisions of this imposed “peace agreement”, which was concluded outside the valid domestic constitutional requirements of serbia/fry (for contracting) and in absence of free will of contracting parties (i.e., serbian free consent and bona fides). (note 36) from the article i of the ka we found harsh compulsory limitations contrary to the general provisions of the sc resolution 1244 related to the sovereign status of the fry: 1) the parties to this agreement reaffirm the document presented by president ahtisaari to president milosevic and approved by the serb parliament and the federal government on june 3, 1999, to include deployment in kosovo under un auspices of effective international civil and security presences. the parties further note that the un security council is prepared to adopt a resolution, which has been introduced, regarding these presences. 2) the state governmental authorities of the federal republic of yugoslavia and the republic of serbia understand and agree that the international security force (“kfor”) will deploy following the adoption of the unscr referred to in paragraph 1 and operate without hindrance within kosovo and with the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission. they further agree to comply with all of the obligations of this agreement and to facilitate the deployment and operation of this force. as we may conclude from these apparently coercive provisions, the nato party to the kumanovo agreement (that concluded this agreement with serbia and the fry), is “kfor” (i.e., renamed and not www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 67 published by scholink inc. occupational nato) with the basic task for “maintaining a safe environment for all citizens of kosovo and to carry out their mission in other ways.” the tone and the wording of the provisions of this part of the agreement are reminiscent to those of a treaty dictated by the party winning the war to the one that had lost the war. nevertheless, this role of kfor is by definition an un peacekeeping mission that must take care and respect for human rights for all peoples leaving in that area, and is supposed to abide to the purposes of un charter. thus, in the absence or negligence of for the treaty obligation and/or non-compliance with those obligations by any party, consequence could be termination of the agreement, even by unilateral action under jus cogens violations. since this agreed intervention was defined as peacekeeping mission, not an occupational one, peace agreement under the un authority exclude interpretation of the capitulation that dictates conditions for surrender or change if the state’s legal and political status. on the other hand, the paragraph 4 of article i clearly suggests that the purpose of these obligations (for two parties) is unilateral compulsory imposition of mandatory non-reciprocal obligations that dictates behavior of the armed forces of fry and serbia and even limitation to civil personnel of fry/serbia contrary to the un norms of sovereign territorial integrity: a. to establish a durable cessation of hostilities, under no circumstances shall any forces of the fry and the republic of serbia enter into, re-enter, or remain within the territory of kosovo or the ground safety zone (gsz) and the air safety zone (asz) described in paragraph 3. article i without the prior express consent of the international security force (“kfor”) commander. local police will be allowed to remain in the gsz. the above paragraph is without prejudice to the agreed return of fry and serbian personnel which will be the subject of a subsequent separate agreement as provided for in paragraph 6 of the document mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article. b. to provide for the support and authorization of the international security force (“kfor”) and in particular to authorize the international security force (“kfor”) to take such actions as are required, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance with this agreement and protection of the international security force (“kfor”), and to contribute to a secure environment for the international civil implementation presence, and other international organizations, agencies, and non-governmental organizations (details in appendix b).” (note 37) these cited provisions of ka clearly demonstrate extorted impositions of politically self-inflicting damaging obligations otherwise normally unacceptable in the absence of the imminent threat of war (i.e., abuse of power). that ka imposed obligations, as a sort of sanctions, apparently substantially undermine unacceptably derogate state sovereignty in the part of the territory of fr yugoslavia and particularly territorial sovereignty of serbia. it follows self-evidently that the kfor fry/serbia agreement (ka) was created under war-like threats and fundamental coercive pressure to surrender part of serbian territory to assault victorious forces (nato) where the formal fry consent was extorted under condition of continuation of bombing aggression against serbia and fry. therefore the only possible conclusion is that this unwanted agreement was not concluded in accordance with the general www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 68 published by scholink inc. rules of contracting law, i.e., free will and bona fides. (note 38) under no circumstances, other than military coercion and extortion fry (and self-evident abuse of power) would serbia or fry agree to surrender part of its territory to the foreign occupational forces that took side with kosovo’s albanians. with respect to its legal validity or entering into force, subparagraph f provides that: “entry into force day (eif day) is defined as the day this agreement is signed.” (i.e., “entry into force day” hereinafter eif day), i.e., ka entered into force on 9 june 1999 where nato designation was replaced with kfor. it should be noted that in moment of signing of ka, un still didn’t instituted kfor as its peacekeeping force. next day, un security council incorporated dubious agreement as its annex ii to the resolution 1244 and endorsed kfor as un force (ex post facto). it should be emphasized with respect to general customary law, that contracts concluded under pressure (abuse of power), threat, fraud, deception, delusion/misperception, blackmail or violation of basic jus cogens norms, as well as the principles of bona fides (as emerging jus cogens), have no legal effect by definition (they are null and void). all enumerated reasons for termination of agreement or contract (under threat, pressure, fraud, delusion/ misperception, blackmail, extortion) constitute also jus cogens norms of peremptory customary law that may invalidate any agreement or a treaty. obviously, act or statement to inflict damage or other hostile action, as in case of serbia (party to the ka), constitute a threat that could invalidate a contract. furthermore, in modern international law, some basic rules of article 2 of the un charter that regulate interstate relations, in addition to mentioned customary norms, including genocide (or other blatant human rights violations), are also considered to be jus conges norms for state’s behavior. these basic peremptory norms include: 1. sovereign equality (paragraph 1 of article 2) that enshrines a basic juridical equality (note 39), than as an extension to that norm principle of political independence and territorial integrity (paragraph 4 of article 2) and particularly a basic principle-pillar of non-interference in the internal affairs (and hence internal jurisdiction) of other states (paragraph 7 of article 2). (note 40) these principles are basic paramount customary pillars of international public law. at this point we must derive a conclusion, that all these enumerated basic principles of law have been violated by the imposition of kumanovo agreement under the threat of armed attack that clearly as the consequence derogates national sovereignty and provides for the transfer of authority to un, nullifying serbian presence in kosovo. in paragraph 3 of article i, subparagraphs d and e, impose apparent occupational restrictions that blatantly derogate serbian statehood, punishing fry and awarding albanian insurgency, supported by nato invasion forces (or as renamed by un “kfor”): d. the air safety zone (asz) is defined as a 25-kilometre zone that extends beyond the kosovo province border into the rest of fry territory. it includes the airspace above that 25-kilometre zone. e. the ground safety zone (gsz) is defined as a 5-kilometre zone that extends beyond the kosovo province border into the rest of fry territory. it includes the terrain within that 5-kilometre zone.” (note 41) undeniably these stark “commanding style” restrictions that could by typical only for act of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 69 published by scholink inc. capitulation clearly represent a dictation of legally dubious obligations and coercive measures under the lack of any basic consent and free will in the process of treaty conclusion. article ii provides orders and commands aimed at complete and unconditional limitation of serbian or fry presence in kosovo and assumption of the transfer of power under compulsory un mandate demonstrating enforcing humiliating submission of fry authority: 1) the fry forces shall immediately, upon entry into force (eif) of this agreement, refrain from committing any hostile or provocative acts of any type against any person in kosovo and will order armed forces to cease all such activities. they shall not encourage, organize or support hostile or provocative demonstrations. 2) phased withdrawal of fry forces (ground): the fry agrees to a phased withdrawal of all fry forces from kosovo to locations in serbia outside kosovo. fry forces will mark and clear minefields, booby traps and obstacles. as they withdraw, fry forces will clear all lines of communication by removing all mines, demolitions, booby traps, obstacles and charges. they will also mark all sides of all minefields. international security forces’ (“kfor”) entry and deployment into kosovo will be synchronized. the phased withdrawal of fry forces from kosovo will be in accordance with the sequence outlined below: a. by eif + 1 day, fry forces located in zone 3 will have vacated, via designated routes, that zone to demonstrate compliance (depicted on the map at appendix a to the agreement). once it is verified that fry forces have complied with this subparagraph and with paragraph 1 of this article, nato air strikes will be suspended. the suspension will continue provided that the obligations of this agreement are fully complied with, and provided that the unsc adopts a resolution concerning the deployment of the international security force (“kfor”) so rapidly that a security gap can be avoided. b. by eif + 6 days, all fry forces in kosovo will have vacated zone 1 (depicted on the map at appendix a to the agreement). establish liaison teams with the kfor commander in pristina. c. by eif + 9 days, all fry forces in kosovo will have vacated zone 2 (depicted on the map at appendix a to the agreement). d. by eif + 11 days, all fry forces in kosovo will have vacated zone 3 (depicted on the map at appendix a to the agreement). e. by eif +11 days, all fry forces in kosovo will have completed their withdrawal from kosovo (depicted on map at appendix a to the agreement) to locations in serbia outside kosovo, and not within the 5 km gsz. at the end of the sequence (eif + 11), the senior fry forces commanders responsible for the withdrawing forces shall confirm in writing to the international security force (“kfor”) commander that the fry forces have complied and completed the phased withdrawal. the international security force (“kfor”) commander may approve specific requests for exceptions to the phased withdrawal. the bombing campaign will terminate on complete withdrawal of fry forces as www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 70 published by scholink inc. provided under article ii. the international security force (“kfor”) shall retain, as necessary, authority to enforce compliance with this agreement. f. the authorities of the fry and the republic of serbia will co-operate fully with international security force (“kfor”) in its verification of the withdrawal of forces from kosovo and beyond the asz/gsz. g. fry armed forces withdrawing in accordance with appendix a, i.e., in designated assembly areas or withdrawing on designated routes, will not be subject to air attack. h. the international security force (“kfor”) will provide appropriate control of the borders of fry in kosovo with albania and fyrom (1) until the arrival of the civilian mission of the un.” (note 42) in the light of these compulsory obligations, imposed under threat, that blatantly affect a dignity of the state (fry and serbia) and particularly a character of blackmails associated with this unjust agreement that are fundamental to the revision of the statehood of serbia and fry with respect to province of kosovo, ka needs to be qualified as an illegal act. bearing in mind that nato incursion on fry clearly constitute the crime of aggression, as many time repeated by fry officials, including fact that nato was pursuing kosovo’s albanian agenda, its undeniably evident unwillingness to conclude kosovo agreement from the serbians and fry. it is blatantly clear that ka represent an example of contract unwillingly and forcefully imposed under severe pressure, threat by armed force and coercion (or against the free will and consent) of the signatory party-state to the agreement. this kind of act obviously do not abide to the imperative of bona fides criteria, nor to the jus cogens norm of juridical equality. undignified circumstances, from the rambouillet accords blackmail, followed by the crime of aggression and finally after-war the ka bring us to the self-evident conclusion that the aggressive attacks, including aerial bombardment on fr yugoslavia would not have been ended or stopped unless such an act of extortion has been signed. the condition for peace was signing of the ka. therefore, a signing (and thereby concluding) the ka could not satisfied “good fate” (bona fides) requirement, imperative norm of sovereign (juridical) equality and territorial integrity, that was undeniably violated. as mentioned above, the bona fides principle is a key component of modern legal orders and it appears to be a general principle of international law for contracting or at least emerging jus cogens norm. that fundamental legal principle requires parties to deal honestly and fairly with each other and to refrain from taking unfair advantage. by misrepresenting of nato forces that actually committed crimes of aggression as “peacekeepers”, i.e., kfor (replacing name of the invasion force) appears to be a deception and misconception. with respect to ka we may argue that this act contain mala fides, since one party apparently abuse the power without any good intention to achieve common aims. (note 43) therefore, starting from the indisputable and undeniable fact that the contract was coerce-fully imposed under the threat of advancing brutal aggression with disrespect of bona fides, it should be considered that this type of contract in absence of genuine element of consent was created under illegal pressure and involving abuse of power and mala fides (“bad faith”), and hence without necessary element of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 71 published by scholink inc. validity. in that light, if we take into consideration that the military intervention (as a crime of aggression) was not previously endorsed or approved by the un security council and that the war ended with an imposed “peace treaty” with kfor as essentially disguised nato occupational forces, under harsh pressure on state to surrender and transfer the power, we may derive self-evident conclusion that such an agreement is null and void ab initio. in the judgment of validity of the ka we should also bearing in mind that fry constitutional provisions with respect to sovereignty and contracting of treaties prohibits creation and conclusion of such agreements or treaties revising statehood and in that light do not confer entitlement to any official person such contracting power. furthermore, an absence of such constitutional authority was clearly known to other contracting party (un and nato/kfor). in article 46 of the vclt it is provided as following: “1. a state may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance. 2. a violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any state conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith.” (note 44) therefore, having in mind that territorial sovereignty was blatantly and visibly violated, against fry constitution (including obvious lack of competence for conclusion) and principle of bona fide acts as a guiding tool/requirement to the interpretation of the standard for conclusion of treaties, the kumanovo agreement (ka) violated article 52 of the 1969 convention on the law of treaties, with illegal coercion and abuse of power against territorial sovereignty and dignity of the other party, disrespecting its genuine consent, i.e., under mala fides. furthermore, with respect to described violations of pillars of statehood and principles on non-intervention in domestic affairs (matters that are stricto sensu in internal jurisdiction embedded in the un charter article 2(7)), we may recall the un charter article 2 (1) bearing in mind that it protects not only the right to “sovereign equality” of all states, but also based on the paramount fundamental norm enshrined in it the juridical equality for all states (persons under legal order and applicable even out of scope of the un system). the norm of juridical equality is therefore another general jus cogens rule that as a basic principle originate even from the roman law (a customary principle “subjects are equal under the law”). having said that, we may consider kumanovo agreement (ka) as subject to an unilateral termination under article 53 of the 1969 vienna convention on the law of treaties (1969). article 53 of the vclt provides: “a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. for the purposes of the present convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 72 published by scholink inc. subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” (note 45) from that angle with respect to peremptory norms that condemns and prohibits crimes of aggression and thereby protect territorial integrity (as sovereign territorial right), limitations for serbian self-defense (as just another jus cogens) are questionable in the annex i of the sc resolution 1244 that encompasses by serbia (and fry) rejected “rambouillet accords”. the annex i contains “general principles” copied from the “rambouillet accords”on kosovo agreed at the g-8 foreign ministers meeting held on 6 may 1999 reads: “immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in kosovo; withdrawal from kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces; deployment in kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the united nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives; establishment of an interim administration for kosovo to be decided by the security council of the united nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in kosovo; the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations; a political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for kosovo, taking full account of the rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the federal republic of yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the kla; /... s/res/1244 (1999); comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.” (note 46) as we may derive from presented annex i and subsequent sc endorsement of by serbia rejected “rambouillet accords”, in exact wording of the annex i (copy-paste ultimatum) fundamentally contradicts basic provisions in the main part of the resolution 1244 guaranteeing sovereignty and territorial integrity of serbia and fry. in addition, it appears that kfor failed in its authorized task related to the impartial “safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations”. particularly, kfor have failed in “demilitarizing the kosovo liberation army (kla) and other armed kosovo albanian groups” as required by resolution 1244. kosovo authorities had a duty with kfor related to “demands that the kla and other armed kosovo albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security presence…” (note 47) contrary to that explicit obligation, authorities in kosovo actually created armed forces from the kla with a view to become a regular army, and that happened under the watch of kfor. apparently, the kfor’s action have not been impartial, as was supposed to be. furthermore, security council of the united nations completely failed in its commitment to “ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in kosovo” and fundamentally ignored their obligations failing in www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 73 published by scholink inc. “establishment of an interim administration for kosovo” on independent and impartial way that could provide peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants, irrespective of ethnicity. as for mentioned jus cogens limitation (i.e., norm of sovereign equality of states) applicable to un decisions, we me argue today that fry obligation as “withdrawal from kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces” could be ignored by serbia under blatant humanitarian conditions of the serb population in kosovo or any attempt by kosovo albanians to generate genocide-like conditions for exodus of serbians. the jus cogens norms are therefore applicable to the legality of kfor and un presence or entitlement for “maintenance of peace” that appears presently to defy the basic norms of international law (i.e., norm of sovereign equality of states and prohibition of exodus of people and crimes of aggression). same conclusion goes for an advisory opinion of the icj delivered in 2010 regarding kosovo declaration on independence (2008) that was proclaimed not to be in contradiction with sources of international law. (note 48) even if a document of declaration on independence didn’t challenge any existing rule of international law or fry “constitutional framework”, it appears that kosovo albanians didn’t have legal power for secession from the existing sovereign state (having in mind territorial sovereignty and sovereign equality of states), at least not in absence of proper international authorization (i.e., unsc resolution or at least an unga resolution). without any doubt “constitutional framework” of both fry and serbia was harshly violated and international court didn’t understood that simple fact in their deliberation and conclusion that were delivered in its advisory opinion. in addition, international court seems to fail to realize that secession per se constitute an illegal act in flagrant violation of jus cogens norm of sovereign equality of states that enshrines in itself sovereign (territorial) integrity. (note 49) if we summarize generally the situation with respect to the kosovo agreement and resolution 1244, it appears that legal grounds of the nato security presence in kosovo in the form of kfor and unmik are at least shaky, making the territorial undefined status of “kosovo” clearly unlawful and therefore subject to endless negotiation between belgrade and pristina, that seems to be futile. the legal limitation of nato/kfor presence and its role in kosovo is also entirely dubious and undefined despite the clear obligation of kfor to protect human rights and dignity for all inhabitants of that region regardless of ethnicity and not to allow other armed forces on this territory to exist or emerge. it should be noted that ka and un security council resolution 1244 (1999) does not endorse or allow any (other) military forces on the territory of kosovo, while kosovo (in general provisions formally) continues to be part of the territory of yugoslavia and serbia. nevertheless, pristina created paramilitary forces and de facto declared existence of its national army and sovereignty, preventing any negotiation about it, with no reaction from the international community or kfor. western powers and leading un members that are also members of the nato strongly and visibly supported international recognition of kosovo as a “state” in all international organization. these actions were in direct defiance of resolution 1244 and ka. in addition, crucial contracting obligation of the nato forces (or kfor) for demilitarization as laid down in the resolution 1244 and both annexes were not honored www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 74 published by scholink inc. and ignored. an attempt by international community to resolve the issue of the status and normalization by proposing brussels agreement concluded by belgrade and pristina (2013) (note 50) have failed due to noncompliance by pristina (kosovo). that peacekeeping effort and compromise accepted by serbia (initiated by international community and eu) failed when pristina, with an unofficial western support, unilaterally decided not to honor its contractual obligation regarding creation of the community of serb (majority) municipalities in kosovo (csm or “zso”). by stark noncompliance kosovo’s government de facto terminated brussels agreement and even started with violent behavior against the serb population and serbian property in zso, with basically no reaction of international community, un or kfor. the recent attacks on the serb population in september 2021 (with respect to usage of registration license plates) by the pristina special police (“rosu police”) as paramilitary heavily armed formation clearly demonstrated that kfor in kosovo is not impartial peacemaker, but rather a facilitator of the creation of the (so-called) “republic of kosovo” statehood. as was firmly confirmed in the general assembly resolution 12407 delivered on 2 march 2022, any violation of the territorial integrity or territorial sovereignty constitute the flagrant and fundamental breach of international law and un charter (case of aggression against ukraine) equal to the violation of peremptory norms of international public law. (note 51) in that light, particularly if provisional government in kosovo firmly insist to become a nato member in future, as was recently requested by the president of the kosovo (kim), or to intimidate serbs or generate an ethnic cleansing campaign against the serb population, in our opinion, serbia should consider an adequate response to such scenario, including own noncompliance with the annex ii of the sc resolution 1244 or even termination of the ka as an illegal act, generated after an aggression on the fry (similar in nature as 2022 invasion on ukraine). unga in its resolution delivered on 2 march 2022 strongly denounced the russian invasion over ukraine, as apparently unlawful aggression. 4. conclusion on june 1999, by adopting its resolution 1244 (1999), the un security council placed the fry’s province kosovo under joint administration of the nato and un kfor (identical to nato) as an un “peacekeeping force”. the resolution has passed one day after the end of nato military intervention against the fry and extorted conclusion of the “kumanovo agreement” (ka) on the 9th of june, 1999. the military intervention started after fry rejected the rambouillet accords (as attempt for extortion and blackmail) that was delivered in the form of ultimatum in order to avoid military aggression. that aspect raised considerable controversies over the legality of the subsequent nato aggression, including the legality of annexes to the resolution 1244, i.e., compliance with basic norms of jus ad bellum and jus cogens, in particular with respect to the sovereign equality of states (or juridical equality under legal order) and territorial integrity. the nato intervention was not endorsed by un organs and the signing of the rambouillet agreement (accords) was a precondition for nato not to intervene against fry/serbia. after resolute refusal to accept and sign the rambouillet accords, nato started its www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 75 published by scholink inc. incursion operation. at this point, with no authorization of un sc, the nato aggression can be characterized only as an abuse of power and a crime of aggression. likewise, the conclusion of kumanovo agreement was an ultimatum (or condition) delivered to fry for ending the nato intervention in 1999. unless fry and serbia concluded the ka, bombing and intervention wouldn’t ceased. in the process of conclusion of the ka and the resolution 1244 (day later), the nato forces were merely renamed by the un as kfor, i.e., peacekeeping force. therefore, the conclusion of the kumanovo agreement was just another example of a treaty conditioned and extorted by the threat of armed attack, thus without legally valid consent by parties (e.g. from fry/serbia). namely, nato blatantly abused the power to coerce serbia and fry to sign the treaty (kumanovo agreement) under imminent assault threat. un security council acted under chapter vii of the un charter and endorsed ka as a legitimate treaty, disregarding the imposed character of this act. the council didn’t took into consideration that external nato military intervention (aerial bombardment) was not authorized by un security council, neither the conditioning of the kumanovo agreement (ka) and blackmailing circumstances with respect to the rambouillet accords/agreement, i.e., pre-conditioning. it should be noted that the kumanovo agreement signed on 9 june 1999 was understood by nato officials (including m. jackson, nato general who placed its signature) as agreement for military capitulation of the fry and the serbian armed forces. on the other side, un implicitly defined ka as a peacekeeping treaty in the spirit of the un resolution 1244 and in accordance with the purposes of un charter. many states at that time openly doubted the legitimacy of such sc resolution that endorsed the rejected rambouillet accords disrespecting the illegal conditioning of fry and its provisions in harsh inconsistency with art. 2(7) of the un charter (i.e., noninterference in domestic jurisdiction). for instance, the abstention of china in the unsc, organ by which the resolution was approved, was clearly provoked under strong presumption that the legality of resolution 1244 was questionable and dubious. the kumanovo agreement was subsequently attached to the resolution 1244 on 10 of june 1999, for endorsement ex post facto as its annex ii, with the view to legalize the intervention and to provide a legitimate control over the territory of kosovo by nato (essentially disguised as kfor), despite the contradicting general provisions in the resolution that claim guaranties for sovereignty and territorial integrity of fry and serbia. wording of the resolution 1244 conditionally provides for conclusion of the ka as its annex, and it appears that in the moment of its conclusion kfor as a party to the agreement even didn’t formally exist. only un security council has authority to create or rename peacekeeping forces under un mandate. therefore, annex ii is basically a separable attachment to the sc resolution. thus, in the case of an amendment or termination of the ka provisions, the sc resolution 1244 would still remain in force. conditionality of the creation of the treaty (ka) in wording of the resolution 1244 suggests that annex ii (ka) is legally not inseparable part of the unsc resolution. likewise, in the absence of sc resolution, the kumanovo agreement would independently produce some legal effects (rights and obligations) with respect to the parties. as for the legal quality of the treaty, a serbian’s valid consent is still missing, and the signatures placed on ka are www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 76 published by scholink inc. legally unconstitutional (according to the serbian constitution). in conclusion, the kumanovo agreement (1999), per se, has demonstrated its unlawfulness as far as the kfor security presence is concerned. the resolution 1244 itself goes beyond the limits of un legality, by endorsing and recalling the mandate provided by the dubious kumanovo agreement. from practical point of view, if the ka is potentially terminated, serbia wouldn’t be obliged not to intervene by its forces in kosovo. as for the jus cogens norms, we pointed in our research that the absence of genuine consent and disrespect for bona fides (by the abuse of power) in treaty conclusion represent clear violation of peremptory customary principle. therefore, in the case of kumanovo agreement, the application of article 52 of the vienna convention on the law of treaties of 1969 (vlct) is not only possible, but also recommendable in cases of humanitarian disaster. references chomsky, n., & džalto, d. (2018). yugoslavia: peace, war, and dissolution. pm press. glenny, m. (1996). the fall of yugoslavia. new york: penguin books. international court of justice. admission of a state to the united nations (charter, art. 4). icj reports (1948). the government of the republic of serbia. (2013). first agreement of principles governing the normalization of relations or unofficially brussels agreement. janev, i. (ed.). (2019). serbia: current political, economic and social issues and challenges. new york: nova science publishers. janev, i. (2019). relationalist view on the dissolution of former yugoslavia. in serbia: current political, economic and social issues and challenges. new york, nova pub. https://doi.org/10.22158/ape.v3n2p35 janev, i. (2021). prespa agreement and its effects on macedonian right to national identity: an act of ethno—genocidal termination of the national identity. lambert pub. milano, e. (2003). security council action in the balkans: reviewing the legality of kosovo’s territorial status. european journal of international law, 14(5), pp. 999-1022. https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/14.5.999 united nations. (1999). unsc/res/1244. united nations. (1992). unsc/res/757. united nations. (1992) un sc/res/777. united nations. (1992) a/res/47/1. united nations. (1998). unsc/res/1160. united nations. (1998). unsc/res/1203. united nations international court of justice. (1971). legal consequences for states of the continued presence of south-africa in namibia. icj reports. united nations international law commission (1966). ilc yearbook (volume ii). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 77 published by scholink inc. united nations. (1969). vienna convention on the law of treaties. united nations. (1945). charter of the united nations. peace agreements database, the university of edinburgh. (1999). military-technical agreement between the international security assistance force (‘kfor’) and the government of the federal republic of yugoslavia and the republic of serbia (kumanovo agreement). peace agreements database, the university of edinburgh. (1999). interim agreement for peace and self-government in kosovo (rambouillet agreement). notes note 1. m. glenny, the fall of yugoslavia, penguin 1996. (see also r. nakarada, 1995; woodward, 1995; p. simić, 1995.) note 2. see i. janev (ed.), serbia: current political, economic and social issues and challenges, nova pub. 2019. note 3. ibid. note 4. ibid. note 5. see eu legal opinion for former yugoslavian republics delivered in 1992 after dissolution of yugoslavia (the famous “badinter’s commission”) note 6. ibid. note 7. see i. janev, “relationalist view on the dissolution of former yugoslavia” in serbia: current political, economic and social issues and challenges, nova pub. 2019. note 8. n. chomsky, d. džalto, yugoslavia: peace, war, and dissolution, pm press (2018). note 9. interim agreement for peace and self-government in kosovo (or rambouillet agreement), 1999. that (draft) agreement (or proposed accord), apparently in violation of domestic (constitutional) jurisdiction, called for 30,000 nato peacekeeping troops in kosovo with an unhindered right of passage for nato troops on yugoslav territory, including an official immunity for nato troops and its official agents or diplomats from yugoslav jurisdiction. such proposal aiming creation of local administration would be unacceptable for any member of the un and apparently it’s in harsh contradiction with the principles enshrined in the art. 2 of the un charter. note 10. later there were many proposals by serbian scholars, diplomats and lawyers whether or how to sue nato or nato countries for damages occurred by bombing or invasion by nato (or nato countries individually). note 11. unsc/res/757 (1992), a resolution denying automatic membership of the fry in the un. note 12. un sc/res/777 (1992), a resolution recommending a change of the status of the fry in the un. note 13. a/res/47/1(1992) adopting un sc/res/777 (1992), and thus changing the status of the fry in the un (should apply for membership to the united nations). note 14. see un charter, art. 5. it should be noted that this article of the un charter appears to be a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 78 published by scholink inc. legal norm with limited number of condition(s), as is also case with the art. 4 of the un charter with respect to norm for admission to the un membership (see admission of a state to the united nations (charter, art. 4), icj reports (1948) note 15.unlimited and arbitrary number of conditions would entail that article 5 of the charter cease to be a legal norm. the same conclusion goes for the article 6 of the un charter, as well, since it is a legal norm related to expulsion of a state from the un organization. note 16. unsc/res/1244 (1999), see provision that „demands in particular that the federal republic of yugoslavia put an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in kosovo will be synchronized“ and “decides on the deployment in kosovo, under united nations auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the federal republic of yugoslavia to such presences”, and particularly kfor entitled for “deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into kosovo of federal and republic military, police and paramilitary forces”. note 17. unsc/res/1160 (1998) note 18. article 2(4) of the un charter prohibits the use of force by un member states to resolve disputes or intervene and article 2(1) provides that each member state of the un is sovereign and equal in rights with any other member state. this prohibits any unequal treatment or discrimination, including privileges or disrespect. note 19. according to the chapter vii of the un chapter only security council has the power to authorize the use of force in order to fulfill its responsibility to maintain international peace and security. in case of fry nato even did not claim that an armed attack occurred against another state. note 20. full name of the ka treaty is "military-technical agreement between the international security assistance force ("kfor") and the government of the federal republic of yugoslavia and the republic of serbia". note 21. article 2(7) of the un charter prohibits the external interference of essential character in domestic jurisdiction of member states, i.e. this norm provide a legal support for the principle of sovereign equality enshrined in previously mentioned paragraph 1 of the article 2 of the un charter. in addition, principle of territorial integrity was blatantly violated. note 22. “kosovo agreement” (ka) entered into force on june of 9. 1999, and became annex ii of the sc res. 1244 that was adopted on the june of 10. 1999. note 23. see the constitution of (s)fry and the constitution of the republic of serbia note 24. see more e. milano, "security council action in the balkans: reviewing the legality of kosovo’s territorial status", european journal of international law, 14 (5), 2003, pp. 999-1022 note 25. see for example advisory opinion legal consequences for states of the continued presence www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 79 published by scholink inc. of south-africa in namibia, icj reports (1971). note 26. admission of a state to the united nations (charter, art. 4), icj reports (1948) note 27. in our view, an example of ultra vires act was sc res. 817 (1993) basically recommending that a sovereign state be admitted to the un without a state (constitutional) name (i.e. as nameless member), and use provisional reference until finish negotiation on its name with neighboring country (see ajil, vol. 93. no.1 1999) note 28. one way to deal with an ultra vires act of un organs is usage of advisory jurisdiction of icj (see for instance i. janev, prespa agreement and its effects on macedonian right to national identity: an act of ethno – genocidal termination of the national identity, lambert pub. 2021.) note 29. unsc/res/1203 (1998). (the security council in this res. stated that the conflict in kosovo should be resolved peacefully and that the territory be given greater autonomy and meaningful self-administration.) note 30. see supra note 24. pp.1002. (such agreements with fry were endorsed by the sc through resolution 1203, which was adopted under chapter vii). on 16 october 1998 an agreement was signed in belgrade between the federal republic of yugoslavia and the osce providing for the establishment of a verification mission in kosovo, with aerial verifications over kosovo agreed the previous day. note 31. see supra note 24. note 32. supra note 24. note 33. vienna convention on the law of treaties (1969), art. 52. note 34. supra note 24. note 35. see ilc yearbook (1966 ii) 239. see also arts 48–50 and cf. arts 51–53 of the vclt. note 36. extortion in the process of treaty-making induces absence of the consent by the party to treaty, and therefore implies nullity of act. note 37. see kumanovo agreement (ka) art. i (and in addition ka appendix b). note 38. principle bona fides appears to be constituent element in any contracting process since fraud, blackmail, extortion or any abuse of power, or similar behavior in absence of good faith should nullify a treaty. note 39. article 2 (1) of the un enshrines legal equality as a basic pre-requisite for sovereign equality under the law. note 40. ibid, ka (paragraph 3 of article i) note 41. ibid. note 42. ibid. note 43. this behavior should be qualified as the mala fides (an evil intention or duplicity), act disrespecting a legal order (consciously or unconsciously) that with respect to treaties nullify them (as null and void). note 44. vclt, article 46. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 2, 2022 80 published by scholink inc. note 45. vclt, article 53. note 46. see annex i of the sc resolution 1244 (1999). note 47. paragraph 15 of the sc resolution 1244. see also paragraph 9 of the resolution. note 48. icj in its advisory opinion made a general conclusion on the question of legality of declaration, that merely states: “the court has concluded above that the adoption of the declaration of independence of 17 february 2008 did not violate general international law, security council resolution 1244 (1999) or the constitutional framework. consequently the adoption of that declaration did not violate any applicable rule of international law.” this conclusion was apparently different from the opinion of serbian constitutional lawyers who took unanimous standing that „constitutional framework” of fry and serbia was violated by the declaration. note 49. jus cogens of sovereign equality of states is a form of a juridical equality under legal order. sovereignty, as a legal term also covers territorial integrity, and in that sense sometimes is in use term sovereign territory. note 50. first agreement of principles governing the normalization of relations or unofficially brussels agreement. (the agreement, negotiated and concluded in brussels under the auspices of the european union. it was signed by belgrade and pristina on 19 april 2013). in six points of brussels agreement, as crucial obligation for government in pristina we find establishment of community of serbian municipalities in kosovo. note 51. see unga/12407 (2022), and sg/sm/21163 (2 march 2022) and un doc. a/es-11/l.1 advances in politics and economics issn 2576-1382 (print) issn 2576-1390 (online) vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 111 original paper towards well-ordered coutries? jan-erik lane 1* 1 geneva university, geneva, switzerland * jan-erik lane, geneva university, geneva, switzerland received: july 16, 2022 accepted: august 20, 2022 online published: august 23, 2022 doi:10.22158/ape.v5n3p111 url: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n3p111 abstract globeliation has not only carried the negatives of climate change and energy shortages but also the positives of political stability and democracy. now, what about this positive promise? defining democracy as popular participation + rule of law, we can employ the large study of world justice project to reveal that well-ordered1 countries are in minority. keywords well-orderedness, rule of law, dictatorships, looting, legal systems 1. introduction in a theory of justice j. rawls pictured the necessary background to the implementation of his principles of justice, namely the well-ordered society. here there was actually a tautology, as rawls used his 3 rules of justice to construct this well-ordered society. to be more precise, a well-ordered society fulfills two of his justice notions: freedom and impartiality. what caused much attention was rawls’ third principle: maximin derived from a veil of ignorance. as a matter of fact, this is socialist equality involving considerable transfer payments and free public services. no country has ever tried the maximin strategy for social justice—to maximize the share of the least favored. this amounts to feasible equality, given losses from taxing the more favoured. in his later writings, rawls never returned to socialist equality but emphasized political lliberalism. nozick (1974) suggested that justice = property rights. freedom, impartiality and equality are focused upon in theories of justice. in the well-ordered countries around the world it is freedom and impartiality that counts. barry (1995) claims that justice is impartiality but this seems to hold for legal justice much more than for social justice. for instance, how about progressive taxation, central to social justice? sen argues that rawls’ notion of a state of veil of ignorance entails philosophical transcendentalism, but it merely posits a game of ignorance or uncertainty where a player does not www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 112 published by scholink inc. know whether he happens to be or become rich or poor. now, how then to tell whether a country is well-ordered or not? can one speak about degrees of well-ordered countries? yes, by linking it up with the concept of rule of law. 2. rule of law there is no neat and tidy definition of the expression ―rule of law‖. the oxford english dictionary offers the following entry: ―[t]he authority and influence of law in society, especially when viewed as a constraint on individual and institutional behavior; (hence) the principle whereby all members of a society (including those in government) are considered equally subject to publicly disclosed legal codes and processes.‖ one may deconstruct this concept with other concepts or criteria like: 1) strong legal ⁰ promoting equality under the laws; 2) individual rights covering contract, free labour and private property as well as the joint stock company with bourses. 3) checks and balances, i.e., institutionalized mixed government with countervailing competences between executive, legislature and judiciary. 3. global picture the world justice project (wjp) maps the existence of rule of law, unpacking a rule of law regime as follows: a) constraints on government powers b) absence of corruption c) open government d) fundamental rights e) order and security f) regulatory enforcement g) civil justice h) criminal justice. the wjp underlines accountability, judicial independence, legal formalism and balance of power between executive and legislature. table 1 presents results of the most recent survey of the rl index for 138 countries around the world, presenting the mean value by region. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 113 published by scholink inc. table 1. average rl index by world region by 2021 region min average max east asia & pacific 0,32 0,60 0,83 eastern europe & central asia 0,42 0,50 0,61 eu + efta + north america 0,52 0,74 0,90 latin america & caribbean 0,27 0,52 0,71 middle east & north africa 0,35 0,49 0,64 south asia 0,35 0,44 0,52 sub-saharan africa 0,35 0,46 0,62 source: wjp 2021. the scores above are the results of numerous computations. for each aspect of rule of law a country is scored between 0 and 1, allowing a conclusion about more or less, which scores are then aggregated. 4. most well-ordered here we find countries scoring between 0.9 and .75. the top well-ordered countries are all nordic countries and the us comes lower at .69. why? it may be pointed out that western europe, australia, canada and uruguay come in between the nordics and usa. perhaps the comparison of the us with small nordic countries is misplaced. all the large countries of the world perform worse than usa. the large west-european countries score above the us except italy. 5. the ill-ordered 5.1 country the wj index mentions a large number of countries that score below .5. they are deficient in terms of: i) accountability ii) just law iii) open government iv) accessibility and impartial ity. one observes that the majority¹ of mankind lives ìn ill-ordered counties like uzbekistan at .5, china at 0.47, and venezuela at very low 0.27. many of the countries that are ill-ordered are hobbesian, i.e. they are plagued by chaos or tribal conflicts. on the other hand, we also find firm dictatorships. in the set of ill-ordered countries we have dictatorships of all kinds. today it is actually difficult to distinguish between ring-wing and left-wing authoritarian regimes. take the case of burma! www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 114 published by scholink inc. the ill-ordered countries are to be found in latin america, africa, middle east and asia as well as the caribbean and the pacific. however, there are clear exceptions: costa rica and chile, botswana and namibia, japan and south korea for example. 6. coup d’etat and looting the road to ill-orneriness in suvsaharan africa has been the making of coups. once a country is the victim of a coup, this often happens repeatedly. there is no counterweighing force in african countries, except in a few well-ordered ones. military coups is one plague, and the other one is long-term mismagemrnt by a too long sitting president, like in congo, zimbabwe ’and sudan with the outcome of looting modern dictatorships have a conspicuous economic face. it is driven by the search for material advantages like luxury lifestyle and the accumulation of wealth and properties. nowhere is this motivation more apparent than in the former ussr and the gulf monarchies. let me call this human drive ―looting‖. it is closely connected with the orientation of dictators sand their entourage towards the family and kin. max weber writes in his famous article ―politics as a vocation‖ that politics is all about power. no, i would say. in dictatorships economic benefits is the end and policy the means, whereas in political life economic policies are the means and power the end. the weber focus is power, as ends and means. nowhere does he talk about economic motives. instead he opposes the ethics of righteousness with that of realism. 7. latin american violenza few countries jn meso-america or south america score as well-ordered. on the contrary, they mostly come in at around .5 or lower. in fact, la political history is much characterized by instability and outright violence, between counties or within them. chile ranks high although the memory of pinochet is still fresh. la countries have a form of instability and disorder at the basic social level among the interactions of people. a few are drowning in gangster or mob violence, often related to drugs battles. it should be pointed out that the caribbean has both well-ordered and illordered countries. 8. kadi-justiz none of the muslim countries score as well-ordered; except the uae? it is the quality of the legaj system in dubai that renders such a high evaluation. yet; the wjp puts open government at uae tò .65 – hardly correct. that muslim countries are ranked often as ill-ordered reflects the strong position of sharia law or shia legal institutions. law is what the kadi and the mufti arrive at in court, even when deviating from just law and impartiality. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 115 published by scholink inc. muslim countries are either dictatorships or in hobbesian strife between sunnis and shias. several are patrimonial belong to a ruling dynasty. 9. leninism lenin outlined the state that would 1hat would assist economic development in its path towards its rnd statefrom each according to capacity, to each sccotdong to need. it was a one pastry state – dictatorships of the proletariat. this was the centralised soviet union, adopted in one form or another in the countries where the communist party took power. the dictatorial state that communism ushered in is ranked by the wjp as ill-ordered but because of its instability. the crux of the master is the political control of the judiciary. socialist law is not guided by considerations of justice like common law and civil law. 10. politics, economics and the law well-ordered countries are affluent meaning gdp per capita. buy not all countries that ate not part of the set of wrll-ordered countries are to be found in the hobbesian condition of povert4 and conflict. it is true that a few are in dire straits but several outside the set of well-ordered countries are neither poor nor instable. figure 1 shows the relationship between the wjp index amd gdp per capita. figure 1. gdp per capita and wjp index (world bank 2022; wjp 2021) affluence seems to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for well-orderedness. culture also www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape advances in politics and economics vol. 5, no. 3, 2022 116 published by scholink inc. matters: the legal system of the country must be either common law or civil law. still; the most well-ordered countries in the world employ scandinavian law. it has not been exported except its ombudsman. 11. conclusion much of human suffering is due to a life under injustice or institutions which wrong the rights of men and women. this is the ill-ordered country without rule of law: accountability, just law open government and impartiality. we may add that well orderedness promotes trust – see figure 2. figure 2. connection justice and trust (wjp 2021; ortiz-ospina & troser, 2016) references belton, c. (n.d.). putin’s peoplw. barry, b. (1995). justice as impartiality. oxford: oup. lenin, v. (1917). state and revolution. nozick, r. (1974). anarchy, state and utopia. new york: basic books. sen, a. (2009). the idea of justice. oxford: oup. https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674054578 esteban, ortiz-ospina., & max, r. (2016). ―trust‖. published online at ourworldindata.org. retrieved from https://ourworldindata.org/trust weber, m. (1978). economy and society 1-2. berkeley: university of california press. world bank data indicators. (2022). gdp per capita (current us$). retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.pcap.cd world justice project. (2021). rule of law index 2021. washington d.c.. (n.n.). world justice project.