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Advances in Politics and Economic 
ISSN 2576-1382 (Print) ISSN 2576-1390 (Online) 

Vol. 1, No. 1, 2018 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 

13 
 

Original Paper 

The Limits of Sanctions as Instrument for Interest Actualisation 

in the International System: The Case of North Korea’s Nuclear 

Weapons Development 

Eze Malachy Chukwuemeka (Lecturer)1* 
1 Department of Political Science, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka 
* Eze Malachy Chukwuemeka (Lecturer), Department of Political Science, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, 

Awka  

 

Received: December 12, 2017   Accepted: December 28, 2017   Online Published: March 3, 2018 

doi:10.22158/ape.v1n1p13             URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v1n1p13 

 

Abstract 

This paper interrogates the potency of sanctions as US and UN instrument for de nuclearising DPRK 

and the intervening variables thereof. With the aid of secondary methods of data gathering, content 

analysis, and rational action theory as framework of analysis, the paper observes that sanctions failed 

to actualize US and UN goals in denuclearising DPRK. It further observes that this failure is attributed 

to the absence of most of sanctions enhancing factors in the international system such as weak 

economy and political instability, quick imposition with decisive maximal impact, and active 

participation in liberalized trade, tacit coordination of enforcement, of sanctions with manifest political 

appetite to enforce penalties, lack of capacity to circumvent sanctions, avoiding an overuse of 

sanctions, weak offshore capital, and immobility of target assets. Therefore, this paper recommends 

objective international engagement and integration of DPRK as a nuclear state. 

Keywords 

nuclear weapons, sanctions, US, UN, DPRK, denuclearisation 

 

1. Introduction 

The nature of emergence of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), i.e., North Korea in 1948 

defines it nuclear programme and success in spite of numerous international sanctions. DPRK emerged 

as an extreme self-reliant hermit kingdom, isolationist, and socialist state with strict dictatorship out of 

the struggle between US allies (capitalist enclave) and that of former Soviet Union (socialist enclave) 

for the control of the Korean peninsula. State power is concentrated in the hands of the military, which 



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from the emergence of DPRK has the priority of acquiring assured national security in the midst of 

powerful multilateral threats. As posited by Mearsheimer (2003), they want to maximize their power as 

a guarantee for long-term security, and attain a nuclear deterrent posture against the US and allies 

(Sagan, 1996, p. 97; Pritchard, 2007). The same view was expressed by Pinkston (2003) in the 

following manner: 

“The bitter history of colonialism and war and the lack of confidence in Pyongyang’s security alliances 

partners have driven the North Korean leadership to allocate a tremendous number of resources to its 

missile program” (p. 11). 

The United States military capabilities and international behaviours are the “central nervous system” of 

this threat. Precisely, the US nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War 11, 

USrole in the1950s Korean War (Scobell & Sanford, 2007), and the disintegration of the Soviet 

Union—DPRK’s major ally, laid the background for these threats. However, General Douglas 

MacArthur of US threat to use nuclear weapons against North Korea during the 1950s Korean War 

prompted Kim Il-Sung—the founding father of DPRK—to practically embark on the development of 

nuclear weapons as deterrence and/or for security reasons. This view was validated by DPRK’s 

ambassador to the United Nations, Se Pyong, who stated that “If the United States continues, then we 

have to make the counter-measures also. So we have to develop and we have to make more 

deterrence—nuclear deterrence” (Al Jazeera, 2016). 

Thus, President George Bush’s doctrine of unilateral pursuit of US critical national security interests 

through the spread of democratic values; and his preparedness to wage preventive wars (Jervis, 2005; 

BBC News, 2006) as seen in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya; the administration’s declaration of North 

Korea as “axis of evil” in the January 2002 State of the Union address, and categorisation of DPRK as 

a threat to America’s national security (Arkin, 2002); the U.S. crack down on the Macau-based 

Banco-Delta Asia due to its alleged money laundering and counterfeiting; US freezing of moratorium 

on missile and nuclear weapons development programmes, and the United States reckless imposition of 

financial sanctions against DPRK exacerbated the perceived threat. These are responsible for DPRK’s 

ambition and success in developing nuclear weapons capabilities. 

Consequently, they announced its intent to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 

on 13 June, 1994 and subsequently withdrew in 2003. The country intensified her nuclear weapons and 

missile development programmes, which eventually led to DPRK’s conducting of her first nuclear 

missile test on October 9, 2006. This development attracted serious condemnation and international 

pressure led by the US and with the United Nations as a willing instrument that culminated in multiple 

multilateral negotiations and imposition of international sanctions aimed at slowing down the nuclear 

programme and coercing Pyongyang into a negotiated reversal of the programme (Kim, 2014). On one 

part, the US and its allies prominently Japan and South Korea imposed multiple bilateral sanctions on 

DPRK, while international sanctions form the other part. 



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The goals or purposes of the multiple bilateral sanctions are broader than the international sanctions, 

which is associated with the nuclear and missile programs. South Korea imposes its own sanctions 

primarily to punish DPRK for its military actions, Japan’s case is to punish the country for cases of 

abductions, while the US raises human rights violations and trade in illicit goods as reasons. The policy 

objective of the multilateral or international sanctions pursues a verifiable nuclear disarmament and 

cessation of all efforts to procure nuclear weapons. In addition, the US wants to know the actual status 

of the nuclear weapons and the forms of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and to establish an 

inspection regime to determine the baseline and ensure compliance. 

The United States began to impose sanctions on DPRK from March 6, 1992 when it sanctioned 

Lyongaksan Machineries and Equipment Export Corporation and Changgwang Sinyong Corporation 

for missile proliferation activities. Subsequently, other sanctions followed. These include 23 June, 1992 

“missile sanctions”; 24 May, 1996 sanction for missile technology-related transfers; 6 August, 1997 

sanction for unspecified missile-proliferation activities; 17 April, 1998 sanction for transfer of missile 

technology and components to Pakistan; 6 April, 2000, 2 January, 2001 and 26 June, 2001 sanctions 

against Changgwang Sinyong Corporation for proliferating MTCR Category I items; 16 August, 2002 

sanctions against Changgwang Sinyong Corporation of DPRK and the DPRK’s government for 

transferring missile technology to Yemen; 24 March, 2003 against Changgwang Sinyong Corporation 

of North Korea for transferring missile technology to Pakistan; 29 June, 2005 sanction and assets froze 

of three North Korean entities “responsible for WMD and missile programs; 21 October, 2005 sanction 

against 8 DPRK for proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or related delivery 

vehicles; and 30 March, 2006 punishment of a Swiss and US companies for procuring “goods with 

weapons-related applications” for DPRK (Blix, 2017) among others. United States allies such as Japan, 

Australia among others joined the sanction regime after the 2006 DPRK nuclear weapon’s test. 

Subsequent multilateral and bilateral negotiations on stopping DPRK from acquiring nuclear weapons 

and missiles led to series of United Nations Security Council Resolutions that impose severe sanctions 

on DPRK between 2006 and 2017. These sanctions include UNSC 1695 of July 2006, UNSC 1718 of 

October 2006, UNSC 1874 of June 2009, UNSC 2094 of February 2013, UNSC 2270 of March 2016, 

UNSC 2321 of December 2016 (Haggard & Noland, 2017), and the UNSC 2371 of August 5, 2017 that 

imposed additional sanctions, including a complete ban on the export of coal, iron, seafood and lead. 

These sanctions regime “were accompanied by other forms of collective enforcement. Inspection and 

interdiction activities were conducted not only under the aegis of the UN resolutions but through the 

US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as well” (Haggard, 2016, p. 945). The primary objectives 

of these sanctions and enforcement mechanisms are to prevent nuclear and missiles related items, 

materials, goods and technology export to DPRK, prevent the provision of conventional arms, nuclear 

technology and training to North Korea. They seek also to prevent the procurement of such items from 

DPRK and the transfer of fund to aid the weapons programmes. Consequently, the sanctions regime 

target DPRK’s international financial flows, third-country brokers, and financial enablers of the nuclear 



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programs. 

However, in spite of all these multilateral and bilateral sanctions, a total of 21 missiles were advertised, 

tested, and/or launched in 2016 alone on 14 different occasions DPRK. Pyongyang celebrated the 

success of majority of these launch, which international observers equally acknowledged as successful. 

These weapons include the Hwasong-6, Nodong, Musudan, Taepodong and Pukkuksong-1, which are 

medium—and long-range missiles (Macias, 2016). Advancing these tests, DPRK successfully launched 

a ballistic missile—the Pukguksong-2—on February 12, 2017. Further, four ballistic missiles were also 

launched on March 6, 2017; others were tested on April 5, 2017; April 16, 2017; May 14, 2017 testing 

of an intermediate-range ballistic missile known as Hwasong-12; July 3, 3017 testing of an ICBM 

known as Hwasong-14; August 25, 2017 testing of 3 short-range ballistic missiles; August 28, 2017 test 

of Hwasong-12 missile; and September 3, 2017 testing of a hydrogen bomb. Significantly, each of 

these tests is more sophisticated and advanced than the former.  

Thus, the efficacy of sanctions as instrument of interest actualization in the international system is 

highly disputed even among scholars. Many argue and research findings equally suggest that 

imposition of sanctions do not orchestrate behaviour change on the recipient actor or state (Martin, 

1992; Morgan, 1994; Pape, 1998) but led to the actor’s establishment or formation of new alignment or 

bilateral relations with other actors that did not support the sanctions (Escribà-Folch, 2012; Oechslin, 

2014; Morgan, 2015; Huish, 2017). 

With a sample of 116 case studies extracted from international activities between World War I and the 

1990 UN embargo of Iraq, Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (1990) found that sanctions have poor track 

record of initiating or enforcing behaviour change among actors in the international system. These 

scholars argue that the efficaciousness of sanctions in achieving behaviour modification or change 

depends on the following factors: the relative modesty of the goals of the sanctions, when the sanction 

recipient is smaller than its protagonists, faced with weak economy and political instability, where 

pre-sanction bilateral relations exist between the two parties, if the sanctions are imposed quickly and 

decisively to maximize impact, and where the protagonist avoids high costs to itself (Ruediger, 2006). 

Thus, the success of sanction is rare and/or very little (Cortright & Lopez, 1995). 

However, dominant position in the literature argues that sanction is an important instrument in 

enforcing behaviour change among actors in the international system (Giumelli & Ivan, 2013; Peterson, 

2013; Lehne, 2013; de Vries & Hazelzet, 2005; Cortright & Lopez, 2000; Pape, 1997; Galtung, 1967) 

but certain conditions are needed for its effectiveness (Huish, 2017). These conditions include the 

sanction recipient must be an active participant in the liberalized international trade (van Bergeijk, 

2009), the protagonists of the sanction must exhibit political appetite or will to enforce penalties (Bapat 

& Kwon, 2015; Huish, 2017), there should be lack of personal capacity on the part of the recipient 

government to circumvent the sanctions (Hufbauer & Oegg, 2000), sanctions target and inflict damages 

to the ruling elites and their hostile programmes or projects (Drury, 2001; Tostensen & Bull, 2002; 

Gordon, 2011), checkmating or avoiding the overuse, abuse, and/or misuse of sanctions as foreign 



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policy instrument of a particular state (Eckert, 2008), none availability or weak offshore capital 

(Hampton & Christensen, 2002), and where the recipient state is unable to move assets to safe location 

in time (Lopez & Cortright, 1997).  

Consequently, this paper seeks answers to the following questions: 

1) Were international sanctions potent in securing US and UN interest over DPRK’s nuclear weapons 

development? 

2) What are the factors that limited the efficaciousness of international sanctions against DPRK’s 

nuclear programmes? 

 

2. Materials and Methods 

Considering the avalanche of literature and/or empirical studies available on international sanctions 

against DPRK against its nuclear programmes and the development of the programmes and its 

economy in spite of sanctions, this paper adopts the secondary method of data collection. In this 

method, accessible books, journals, conference/seminal papers, workshop and lecture papers, 

magazines and newspapers are the primary sources of data. Relevant publications from these sources 

were read and their findings extrapolated as data.  

The data thereafter was analysed using content analysis. In the analysis, the consistency of opinion in 

each work was verified and evaluated in the light of other findings made by different scholars to 

establish their reliability. These findingshaving stood the test of timevalidate the pieces of information 

contained in this paper. The sources of these data are thoroughly referenced. 

To explain inter-variables relations in a framework that enhances objective inferences, this paper adopts 

therational action model/theory for its analysis. The theory holds that states are rational actors whose 

behaviours are rational options. Their behaviours balance “costs against benefits” in pursuit of maximal 

“personal advantage” (Friedman, 1953, p. 22). According to Elster (1986), Roemer (1988), and Wright 

(1989), individual state actors are motivated by the goals that express their “preferences”. In this, they 

anticipate the outcomes of alternative courses of action and envisage the best cost-effective course of 

action that yields maximum advantage. Thus, such state actor rationally chooses the alternative that is 

likely to give them the greatest satisfaction (Heath, 1976; Carling, 1992).  

Therefore the basic assumption of the theory is that the patterns of behaviour in the international 

system reflect the choices made by states in pursuit of benefits maximization with minimal costs. It 

entails choosing a “rational” action given one’s preferences, the actions one could take and the 

expectations therein.  

This paper considers the theory relevant in spite of its weaknesses such as its disregard for the role of 

uncertainty, assumption ofactor’s complete knowledge of other contending actors, and the assumptions 

of actor’s full knowledge of environmental implications and different limitations affecting its rational 

capacities. Its relevance lies in its ability to highlight the place of (national) interests as drivers of states 

choices. In this case US/UN pursuit of denuclearizing DPRK and their pursuit of nuclear programme. 



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Equally, it enables this research to isolate specific rational choices made by US/UN, i.e., international 

sanctions, examine their costs and benefits, and therefrom assess the potency of the choices. The theory 

enables this paper to assess the role of the weaknesses of the theory on the failure of US/UN sanctions 

to abort DPRK’s nuclear programmes. 

 

3. Data Presentation and Analysis 

This section investigates the nature and level of DPRK’s external trade relations during the sanctions 

regime with a view to establish the impact of the regime. As reflected in Table 1, Japan is the only 

country that stopped all forms of exports to DPRK due to the sanctions. As a consequence, many other 

countries such as India, Italy, Sri Lanka, and Russia embarked on expanded and/or comprehensive 

export services during the sanctions regime to DPRK. The products, which they export to DPRK 

include among others: x-ray related equipment, nickel alloys, light oil, aircraft, platinized catalysts, 

explosives, filtering or purifying machineries possibly including centrifuges, vacuum pumps, data 

processing machines, and transmission apparatus. These led to a tremendous increase in DPRK’s 

volume of international trade during the sanctions regime. 

In addition to this, the report of International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (2013, p. 1) observe 

that “Sanctions clearly have not stopped North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, but the sanctions 

have made it more difficult for North Korea to acquire goods for these programmes”. Similarly, Choi, 

and Bae (2016) summarised the impact of sanctions on DPRK as follows: 

“However, far from resolving the standoff with the North (Haggard & Noland, 2012), sanctions have 

made the situation worse. North Korea’s ability to sustain its nuclear weapons program does not seem 

to be weakened and its regime remained intact even as it increased its nuclear and ballistic missile 

technologies” (p. 820). 

This observation is supported by over 40 interception cases and consequent successful interdictions 

against DPRK’s exports, and the various DPRK’s launch and tests of high tech and advanced nuclear 

weapons such hydrogen bomb, Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, etc. 

DPRK’s successful defiance of international sanctions has been attributed to a number of factors. This 

include DPRK’s evasions of sanctions through the “use of legitimate trade as a cover” up for 

sanctioned goods, the “use of multiple layers of intermediaries, shell companies and financial 

institutions” (IISS, 2013, p. 2), falsification of Cargo documentations and the use of legitimate 

shipping/courier companies and multiple ports for shipments, hidden trade relations, money laundering 

and other illicit activities.  

Similar to this factor, poor and insufficient knowledge of DPRK’s sources of nuclear technology, 

nuclear materials, and financing limits the impact of the sanctions on the development of the weapons 

programmes. Thus, United States and its allies could cause delays, create financial discomfort and 

harass the DPEK’s efforts, but cannot abort programmes that are opaque to Western intelligence and 

enjoys limited outside support. As an addendum to this, the some members of the UNSC that are part of 



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the group that impose sanctions on DPRK are responsible for advancing the nuclear and missile 

development programmes. For instance, technological transfer from the Soviet Union and China’s 

assistance led to the development of Nodong (Cordesman et al., 2011). Similarly, DPRK’s initiation 

and development of indigenous intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), the Taepodong-1 and the 

Taepodong-2 was facilitated and assisted by Chinese and Russian engineers. 

In addition, DPRK does not produce luxury goods that are of interests to the protagonists of the 

sanctions regime. Similar to this, Table 1 reveals that there are no close trade ties between DPRK and 

these countries that are at the vanguard of the sanctions such as the United States, European Union, 

Japan, and South Korea, etc. Countries at the vanguard of the sanctions against DPRK either have 

negligible economic and trade exchange with or significantly reduced their exchange as a result of 

bilateral or secondary sanctions since the early 1950s. For instance the United States has little or 

nothing to cut-off again from DPRK, while South Korea and Japan are increasingly facing similar 

experiences since the contemporary nuclear stand-off. Therefore, their prohibition of exports to DPRK 

could not alter their trade equation. DPRK has being heavily dependent on inputs from the Soviet 

Union, trade with the Eastern bloc countries, and with other socialist states across the world. 

Very important to note is the fact that Offshore Ownership and Weak Oversight of Maritime 

contributed to the failure of international sanctions against DPRK. Most of the vessels are owned, 

registered, and managed by companies based in Hong Kong, Bahamas, Singapore, and Pyongyang, etc., 

in offshore locations with the assistance of third-party intermediaries. This made it impossible for the 

US and its allies and the UN to enforcement DPRK’s sanctions. The Offshore business is a closed one 

where it is impossible for the US, UN and others to identify their stakeholders, boards of directors, and 

intermediaries for punishment due to sanctions violation. DPRK maintains substantial offshore capital 

and links, which makes it impossible to stop their international transactions. 

Complementing these factors, the prevalence of “weak links” and coordination problems among 

sovereign states who are members of the UN and UNSC advancing the sanctions regime hindered or 

obstructed the imposition of a robust sanctions regime on DPRK. For instance, Russia and China have 

always blocked such proposals, while they remain DPRK’s major trading partners (Haggard, 2016; 

Hufbauer et al., 2007). Further, China is always playing a patronage role to DPRK in the international 

system because it has continued to provide the leeway for DPRK amidst of sanctions. China remains 

the life wire of DPRK’s economy. Grieger (2016) observed it thus: 

“China has huge economic leverage over North Korea, since it is the country’s largest trading partner. 

In 2014, the volume of Sino-North Korean trade reached US$6.9 billion, up from US$1.7 billion in 

2006 when the first UN sanctions were adopted. China has largely profited from North Korea’s 

increasing economic isolation by monopolising trade with the country, resulting in the latter’s reliance 

on trade with China growing to 90.1% by 2014. China provides North Korea an estimated 40% of its 

food, 70% of its crude oil, 95% of its foreign direct investment and a huge amount of foreign aid” (p. 

6). 



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In addition, there are evidences that DPRK acquired enough stockpile of nuclear materials prior to their 

first nuclear test, which enables them to advance in the nuclear weapons development in spite of 

sanctions and blockades. Siegfried (2006) observed that DPRK has a stockpile of about fifty kilograms 

of plutonium, which is sufficient to build eight nuclear bombs prior to the post 2006 nuclear tests 

sanction. 

However, some scholars like Zarate (2009), Rosett (2015), and Dethomas (2016) observe that the 

sanctions were ineffective in aborting the DPRK’s nukes programme because they are inappropriate to 

reverse DPRK’s nuclear programme (Dethomas, 2016). DPRK’s nuclear and missile programmes has 

three great functions, which are regime security, instrument for international negotiations and 

felicitation for economic assistance, and independent source of energy. Consequently, any international 

pressure, programme and/or action that fail to provide trusted alternative security guarantee, alternative 

means of income and source of energy is bound to fail in swaying DPRK to abandon the nuclear and 

missile programmes. 

On these alternative provisions that could influence DPRK, Ruediger (2006) observes that DPRK has 

no trust in international agreements, the United States, and the United Nations. As quoted in Ruediger 

(2006, p. 23, footnote 56), the DPRK Armed Forces Minister-Kim Il Chol—stated: “neither the UN nor 

anybody else can protect us .... one can defend the nation’s dignity and the country’s sovereignty and 

independence only when it has its own powerful strength”. The experiences of Colonel Muamar 

Ghaddafi of Libya who trusted international guarantees and aborted its nuclear weapons programme 

only to be invaded and killed, and President Saddam Hussein of Iraq that complied with international 

resolution and withdrew from Kuwait only to be invaded and killed may have influenced DPRK’s 

stand. 

This argument is supported by the reality of United States long history of aggression, threats, and 

sanctions against DPRK, which are progressively being institutionalised and internationalised. It is not 

a classified policy goal that United States sanctions are designed to bring down DPRK’s regime (Mihm, 

2006). Concurring to this, McCormack (2006) observed: 

“Under the direction of Vice President Dick Cheney, with Undersecretary for Arms Control Bob Joseph 

as coordinator, and in accordance with the national security provisions of the Patriot Act designed for 

the struggle against terrorism, they set out to squeeze North Korea on every front, especially in regard 

to its alleged illegal activities and its human rights record” (p. 2). 

Equally, DPRK has continued to demonstrate its ability to circumvent or bypass US and UN sanctions. 

They always develop new networks and bilateral relations that counter the ones blocked or damaged by 

sanctions. For instance, the difficulties of engaging international exchange and payments in US dollar 

due to the sanctions led DPRK to covert to euros as its medium of international exchange and payment. 

China’s crackdown on trading with DPRK due to sanctions has led DPRK to divert to Russia as major 

trading partner. In addition, DPRK’s trade with others countries such as India, Pakistan, Burkina Faso, 



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Thailand, Iran, Hong Kong, Italy, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines among others increased (see Table 1 

annexed). 

In addition, black economy rosesharply and rapidly in DPRK as a substitute for legal trading and 

exchange concerns as a means of providing for people’s needs. Accordingly, Ruediger (2006, p. 30) 

observed that “North Korea needs hard currency. If sanctions limit the options for earning hard 

currency by legal means, this will change the cost-benefit balance of illegal transactions”. Generally, 

the imposition of US and UN sanctions have only led to trade diversion in DPRK and news 

international alliance with socialist countries and all other countries facing US aggression or threat. In 

all, DPRK’s economy has continued to grow annually at the rate of 3.9% as at 2016 in spite of 

sanctions (Hutt, 2017). 

Further, the nature of the sanctions makes them ineffective in influencing DPRK behaviour change. 

The sanctions were meant to increase the economic and political costs of the nuclear and missile 

programs as well as impede access to outside assistance for developing the nuclear weapons. The 

sanctions were never broad enough or powerful enough to be regime threatening. These types of 

sanctions are insufficient and impotent in stopping the DPRK nuke’s development because the 

programmes are both a constitutional and security agenda. These programmes are managed by a 

military command structure and have attracted substantial investments, which such sanctions cannot 

easily neutralize. This position is countered by the nuclear deterrent regime security school, which 

argues that DPRK pursues the acquisition of nuclear weapon as their top most priority to secure regime 

security. 

 

4. Summary and Recommendation 

The necessity to acquire nuclear capability and achieve military deterrence against the United States 

and its allies led to the development of nuclear weapons and missiles programme in DPRK. This 

projected culminated in multiple bilateral and international sanctions against DPRK with the aim to 

freeze to programme and force the country to negotiating table. Nevertheless, DPRK’s numerous lunch 

and tests of different degrees of missiles capabilities between 2006 and 2017 demonstrate Pyongyang’s 

technological advancement, development and diversification of improved missiles operational 

capabilities stockpile. Its lunch of ICBM and hydrogen bomb in 2017 clearly demonstrate that the 

sanctions failed to achieve both their primary and secondary aims. 

The sanctions failed because virtually all the pre-conditions for efficacious sanctions regime as 

demonstrated by scholars in the literature were lacking or none existing. Although DPRK is relatively 

an under size when compared with the US, Japan, South Korea, and the United nations in general; it 

enjoys considerable economic and political stability, and has being insulated from the sanctions 

protagonists who were its belligerent enemies prior to the sanctions. Economic relations between them 

were either infinitesimal or non-existing prior the sanctions, while DPRK was not an active participant 

in the liberalized international trade. 



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In addition, the sanctions were imposed gradually and were mixed with carrot policies. Initially, the US 

failed to exhibit stringent political will or appetite to enforce penalties on violations even with 

Executive Orders, while DPRK has sufficient capacity to circumvent the sanctions’ regime with strong 

offshore capital. Equally, the sanctions are not targeted against neither do they inflict damages to the 

ruling elites individually. It is observed also that DPRK’s nuclear and missile programmes are 

intertwined with its nationalism, regime and national security. Thus, they are managed by 

constitutionalised hierarchical military structure, which makes it impossible to terminate the 

programme because of the death of any individual or group of individuals in the country. Therefore, the 

alleged plots to assassinate DPRK’s leader by United States, South Korea, and Japan does not 

guarantee the freezing of its nuclear programme. 

It is also pertinent to aver that with the failure of sanctions and DPRK’s acquisition of nuclear 

capabilities and weapons, military campaign shall equally fail. Its costs will be catastrophic and very 

high because millions of lives will be lost, cities on both sides of the divide shall be laid waste while 

the consequences shall hunt humanity for decades. Therefore, the reality of DPRK being a nuclear state 

should be acknowledged and proper international engagement pursued. Precisely, DPRK should be 

integrated into the world system as such due to its power balancing and deterrent posture. 

 

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Appendix 1 

Supplementary Data/Tables 

Table 1. Exports to DPRK from 2004 to 2012 

countries Pre-Sanctions (2004-2006) Post-Sanctions (2007-2012) 

 HSPC MECR

s 

Description HSPC Possible 

MECRs 

Description 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

902214 NSG Apparatus based on 

the use of X-rays 

902214 NSG Apparatus based 

on the use of 

X-rays 

847989 NSG, 

MTCR

, 

and 

AG 

Machines 847989 NSG, MTCR,

and AG 

Machines 

846390 NSG 

and 

MTCR 

Machine tools for 

metal processing 

 

842129 

 

AG 

Filtering or 

purifying 

machines 



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Germany 902730 NSG Spectrometers or 

spectrophotometers

902720 AG Chromatographs 

or electrophoresis 

instruments 

847150 MTCR Data processing 

units 

902710 AG Electronic gas 

analysis apparatus 

903149 MTCR Optical Instruments 850440 NSG Electrical static 

converters 

841350 NSG 

and 

AG 

Reciprocating 

positive 

Displacement 

pumps 

847141 MTCR Data processing 

machines 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

China  

847141 MTCR Data processing 

machines 

847141 MTCR Data processing 

841480 NSG 

and 

AG 

Air or gas 

compressors 

870590 MTCR Special purpose 

vehicles 

391721 AG Tubes and pipes 391721 AG Tubes and pipes 

391723 AG Tubes and pipes 391723 AG Tubes and pipes 

690290 MTCR Refractory bricks 621040 AG Garment 

760429 NSG Aluminium bars 

and rods 

841869 AG Refrigerating unit 

850440 NSG Electrical static 

converters 

850440 NSG Electrical static 

841780 AG Industrial or lab 

furnaces 

(incinerator)  

711510 NSG Catalysts in the 

form of wire cloth 

or grill, of 

platinum 

842119 MTCR 

and 

AG 

Centrifuges 847989 NSG and 

MTCR 

Machines 

848210 MTCR Ball bearings 841370 NSG Centrifugal 

pumps 

870590 MTCR Special purpose 

vehicles 

760429 NSG Aluminium 

profiles 

841381 NSG 

and 

Pumps 850590 NSG and 

MTCR 

Electro-magnets  



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AG 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hong 

Kong 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

India  

902710 

AG 

90271

0 AG 

Electronic gas 

analysis apparatus 

902720 AG Chromatographs 

or 

electrophoresis 

instruments 

841480 NSG 

and 

AG 

Air or gas 

compressors 

853230 NSG Capacitors 

852910 MTCR Aerials and aerial 

reflectors 

847150 MTCR Data processing 

Units  

901480 MTCR Navigational 

instrument 

854320 NSG Electric signal 

generators 

851410 NSG Resistance heated 

furnaces and ovens 

854370 NSG and 

MTCR 

Other electrical 

machines  

847989 NSG, 

MTCR

, and 

AG 

Machines  847989 NSG and 

MTCR 

Machines 

   854239 MTCR Integrated 

electronic circuits 

   850440 NSG Electrical static 

converters 

721914 NSG 

and 

MTCR 

Flat-rolled products

of stainless steel 

721934 NSG and 

MTCR 

Flat-rolled 

products of 

stainless steel 

741999 NSG Articles of copper 721914 NSG and 

MTCR 

Flat-rolled 

products of 

stainless steel 

841480 NSG 

and 

AG 

Air or gas 

compressors 

810890 NSG and AG Titanium 

852990 MTCR Parts for 

transmission 

apparatus 

841350 NSG and AG Reciprocating 

positive 

Displacement 

pumps 

   852990 MTCR Parts for 



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transmission 

apparatus 

   841480 NSG and AG Turbo charger (or 

air or gas 

compressors) 

   902214 NSG Apparatus based 

on the use of 

X-rays 

   841780 AG Industrial or lab 

furnaces 

(incinerator)  

Indonesia 852990 MTCR Parts for 

transmission 

apparatus 

852990 MTCR Parts for 

transmission 

apparatus 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Italy  

841950 AG Heat exchange units 381512 NSG Reaction initiators 

with 

precious metal  

847989 NSG, 

MTCR

, and 

AG 

Machines 842489 MTCR and 

AG 

Mechanical for 

spraying liquids or 

powders 

852610 MTCR Radar apparatus 841850 AG Refrigerating unit 

852990 MTCR Parts for 

transmission 

apparatus 

880330 MTCR Parts of aircrafts 

or helicopters 

903180 NSG, 

MTCR

, and 

AG 

Measuring or 

checking 

instruments 

391721 AG  Tubes and pipes 

   391723 AG  Tubes and pipes 

   844400 MTCR Filament extrusion

machines 

   842230 AG  Machines for 

filling, closing and 

labelling 

 841950 AG  Heat exchange units 841869 AG  Refrigerating unit 



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Japan  

870590 MTCR Special purpose 

vehicles 

   

841869 AG  Refrigerating unit    

841370 NSG Centrifugal pumps    

 

Malaysia  

283711 AG  Sodium cyanides  841480 NSG and AG Air or gas 

compressors 

841950 AG  Heat exchange units 854370 NSG&MTCR Other electrical 

machines 

   853230 NSG Capacitors 

 

 

 

Russia  

846029 NSG Grinding machines 844630 NSG&MTCR Weaving machines

841480 NSG 

and 

AG  

Air or gas 

compressors 

850440 NSG Electrical static 

converters 

841950 AG  Heat exchange units 880240 MTCR Airplanes 

810890 NSG 

and 

AG  

Titanium tube 

andpipes 

841181 NSG&MTCR Gas turbines  

   847150 MTCR Data processing 

units 

   847141 MTCR Data processing 

machines 

Singapore  841869 AG  Refrigerating unit  847150 MTCR Data processing 

units 

847149 MTCR Automatic data 

processing machine

847149 MTCR Automatic data 

processing 

machine 

847989 NSG, 

MTCR

, and 

AG 

Machines 842890 NSG Lifting, handling, 

loading 

or unloading 

machinery 

847130 MTCR Portable automatic 

data processing 

machines 

852580 NSG Digital cameras 

847150 MTCR Data processing 

units 

847130 MTCR Portable automatic 

data 

Processing 



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machines 

292219 AG  Oxygen-function 

amino-compounds 

   

Sri Lanka     401519 AG  Articles of Apparel

   250410 NSG Graphite 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Taiwan  

845891 NSG Numerically 

controlled lathes 

847141 MTCR Data processing 

machine 

846599 NSG Machine tools for 

processing 

materials 

841360 NSG Rotary positive 

displacement 

Pumps  

850162 NSG 

and 

MTCR 

AC Generators 846019 NSG Flat-surface 

grinding 

machines 

847141 MTCR Data processing 

machines 

280429 NSG Rare gases 

847149 MTCR Automatic data 

processing machine

854370 NSG and 

MTCR 

Other electrical 

machines 

845969 NSG Milling machines    

903180 NSG, 

MTCR

, and 

AG 

Measuring or 

checking 

instruments 

   

850440 NSG Electrical static 

converters 

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Thailand  

 

847989 

NSG, 

MTCR

, and 

AG 

Machines  721933 NSG and 

MTCR 

Flat-rolled 

products of 

stainless steel  

880390 MTCR Parts of balloons, 

aircrafts, Space 

crafts, and satellites

854231 MTCR Processors and 

controllers 

841989 NSG, 

MTCR

, and 

AG 

Machinery, plant or 

laboratory 

equipment 

721934 NSG and 

MTCR 

Flat-rolled 

products of 

stainless steel  

852910 MTCR Aerials and aerial 852580 NSG Cameras 



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reflectors 

841850 AG  Refrigerating unit  846593 

NSG 

NSG Grinding, sanding 

or Polishing 

machines 

 721933 NSG 

and 

MTCR 

Flat-rolled products

of stainless steel 

854370 NSG and 

MTCR 

Other electrical 

Machines 

841869 AG Refrigerating unit  701919 NSG Glass fibres 

841480 NSG 

and 

AG 

Air or gas 

compressors 

842489 MTCR and 

AG 

Mechanical for 

spraying liquids or 

powders 

845630 MTCR Machine tools for 

working material 

(electro-discharge 

processes) 

846031 NSG Sharpening (tool 

or cutter 

grinding) 

machines  

401519 AG Articles of apparel 841319 NSG Pumps for liquids 

Source: Hyuk, Kim (nd.). The Impact of United Nations Sanctions on North Korea (DPRK), Stockholm 

International Peace Research Institute paper, pp. 109-113. 


