


































Advances in Politics and Economics
ISSN 2576-1382 (Print) ISSN 2576-1390 (Online)

Vol. 7, No. 2, 2024
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape

48

Original Paper

Strategy and Challenges for Turkmenistan’s participation in the

Central Asia Integration
Xie Cheng1 & Deng Bei2

1 School of Government , Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, Shanghai, China
2 School of Government , Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, Shanghai, China

Received: February 20, 2024 Accepted: April 04, 2024 Online Published: May 09, 2024

doi:10.22158/ape.v7n2p48 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v7n2p48

Abstract

After gaining independence, Turkmenistan actively pursued the status of a "permanently neutral state",

aiming to leverage a neutral foreign policy for enhanced stability and peace in Central

Asia.Turkmenistan has formulated distinct engagement policies at various stages of Central Asian

integration, ensuring the country's flexible position in the region based on national interests, neutrality,

and the decisions of the supreme Leader. However, Turkmenistan encounters significant practical

obstacles in engaging in Central Asian integration due to the uncertain prospects of regional

integration and its unitary economic structure. If Turkmenistan can sustain its engagement,

strategically adjust its foreign policy, and optimize its economic reforms, it will be able to assume a

more significant role in the process of Central Asian integration.

Keywords

permanent neutrality, the Central Asia Integration, turkmenistan, regional cooperation

1. Introduction

In 1991, the Cold War came to an end, and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and

Turkmenistan, the former republics of the Soviet Union, became independent sovereign states.

Geopolitically speaking, Central Asia is situated at a crucial crossroads connecting Eurasia - referred to

as "the heart of Eurasia and Africa" by Mackinder - and holds unique geopolitical and economic

significance. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a power vacuum emerged in the "heartland",

leading to intensified geopolitical competition in Central Asia. To prevent excessive external

intervention in Central Asia and strengthen cooperation among its countries, the concept of Central

Asian integration has gained traction. Subsequently, through collaborative efforts from Kazakhstan,

Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the Central Asian Economic Union was established in 1994 as a



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formal step towards integration. As of June 2022，Central Asian integration has progressed through

three main stages: inception (1994-2005), stagnation (2005-2018) and revival (2018-).

Turkmenistan, located in Central Asia, is considered a middle-power country in terms of overall

strength. However, its poor natural environment poses significant challenges: 80% of the territory is

covered by the Karakum Desert, and the strong continental climate brings extreme drought, limiting

agricultural development. Additionally, excessive reliance on natural gas and other energy sources has

resulted in noticeable shortcomings in national comprehensive strength. Following independence,

Turkmenistan has faced a complex international situation and embarked on arduous national

construction and economic restructuring at home. In an effort to reduce external pressure, it seeks to

minimize its participation in international affairs through its status as a neutral country.

The fact that Turkmenistan has long been a relatively enigmatic country is worth noting. The process of

obtaining visas in Turkmenistan is exceedingly challenging for foreigners, and there is a notable lack of

academic research on this country. The existing literature seldom directly addresses Turkmenistan's

approach and strategy towards Central Asian integration, but rather examines the relevant issues

through the lens of Turkmenistan's policy of neutrality, energy trade, and high-level decision-making.

Firstly, according to Turkish scholar Utku Yapici, Turkmenistan's policy of neutrality is not the cause of

its isolation in foreign affairs. Neutrality actually contributes to the stability of the state regime and

facilitates energy trade, thus making it a viable long-term policy. (Utku, 2018) Barbara

Kiepenheuer-Drechsler argues that Turkmenistan's self-imposed isolationism in foreign policy is a

result of its policy of neutrality, aimed at maintaining state stability and minimizing the influence of

external countries. (Barbara, 2006) Despite their differing views on Turkmenistan's "isolationism," both

scholars contend that the country's policy of neutrality significantly influences its foreign policy

decisions. Therefore, Turkmenistan's neutrality is a crucial factor in determining its participation in

Central Asian integration.

Furthermore, due to the significant role of energy trade in Turkmenistan's economy, numerous

academics have directed their attention towards the concept of 'oil and gas diplomacy' as a pivotal

factor shaping Turkmenistan's foreign policy. Zhang Zhenguo believes that Turkmenistan's policy of

neutrality is conducive to leveraging its abundant resources for national development and achieving the

goal of becoming an energy-rich nation. Boris Shikhmuradov, former foreign minister of Turkmenistan,

also expressed a similar perspective, stating that the policy of neutrality can enhance Turkmenistan's

attractiveness to foreign investment and enable it to fully leverage its energy resources.

Finally, the perception and stance of Turkmenistan's highest decision maker (the President) have

significantly shaped Turkmenistan's approach to Central Asian integration.Fabio de Leonadis

conducted an analysis of the "Turkmenbashi" phenomenon and its impact on state construction through

the lens of comparative politics. His findings revealed that the authority of the president of

Turkmenistan serves as a crucial tool for maintaining stability in the country, highlighting the necessity

of incorporating factors related to supreme leadership when studying Turkmenistan's foreign policy



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from a micro perspective. (Fabio, 2017)

The aforementioned three explanations offer a fresh outlook for the analysis of Turkmenistan's foreign

policy. Neutrality is a prerequisite for Turkmenistan's participation in the integration of Central Asia.

The principle of integration and neutrality must not conflict for Turkmenistan to engage. Energy trade

and economic benefits are significant factors driving Turkmenistan's evolving stance on integration.

The President of Turkmenistan's stance and perspective on the integration of Central Asia directly

impacts the country's "integration strategy".

The study is structured into four main parts based on the analytical framework. The first part examines

Turkmenistan's "apathetic" stance towards early Central Asian integration, focusing on national

economic interests, neutral institutions, and decision makers. The second part describes the process and

development of obstruction to Central Asian integration, explaining Turkmenistan's participation

strategy in a non-regional power-dominated integration mechanism. The third part introduces the restart

and development trend of Central Asian integration, summarizing the motivation and purpose behind

Turkmenistan's sudden change in integration strategy through its diplomatic practice in three Central

Asian heads of state meetings.The concluding part delineates the external obstacles to the second phase

of Central Asian integration and evaluates the potential for Turkmenistan's involvement in this process.

2. Turkmenistan's Early Attitude towards Central Asian Integration (1991-2005)

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the five Central Asian countries embarked on a path towards

independence. However, following their independence, these nations encountered numerous practical

challenges, with economic restructuring being foremost among them. In the past, the five Central Asian

states were integrated into the Soviet state system and lacked a relatively independent economic

structure, resulting in challenges following their independence. The Central Asian countries are not

self-sufficient in industrial and agricultural products, leading to a deteriorating economic situation

characterized by high inflation and rising unemployment. There is an urgent need for comprehensive

economic restructuring to achieve development goals.

Secondly, the issue of regional cooperation in Central Asia has gained increasing prominence. Take

water resources cooperation as an example. During the Soviet period, water resources cooperation

among the Central Asian republics was coordinated by the Central Committee of the Communist Party

of the Soviet Union. After independence, each country independently formulated its own policies for

protecting and managing water resources to safeguard their respective interests.The differences in water

resource management among the five countries have become increasingly apparent due to varying

government policies, leading to significant disputes over the allocation of transboundary river flow,

construction of hydroelectric power stations, and water drainage. (Igor, Andrey, Tatyana et al., 2018)

The third concern is security. In the post-Soviet era, Central Asia experienced significant turmoil,

marked by the proliferation of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. The ongoing war in

Afghanistan, as well as issues related to drugs and cross-border crimes, have further exacerbated



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security challenges in the region.At the outset of their independence, the defense systems of the five

Central Asian states were still in a nascent stage and lacked robust barriers against external threats.

Finally, ecological issues are frequently encountered in Central Asia, primarily encompassing water

contamination, nuclear contamination, industrial emissions and air pollution. The issue of water

scarcity and pollution is particularly severe. As a result of the overexploitation of water resources, the

volume of water in the Aral Sea has decreased by 75% in just 40 years, leading to the Aral Sea crisis,

which has imposed significant constraints on the social and economic development of Central Asia.

In light of the pressing regional issues, leaders of Central Asian countries have consistently advocated

for building upon existing cooperation and establishing a robust integrated cooperation mechanism to

collectively address challenging problems. Under the leadership of Kazakh President Nursultan

Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan established the Central Asian Economic Union in

1994, marking the beginning of economic integration in Central Asia. In 1998, the organization was

rebranded as the Central Asian Economic Cooperation Organization and successfully expanded its

membership to include Tajikistan. The Presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and

Tajikistan signed the Treaty on Safeguarding Peace in the Region in Tashkent in April 2000, marking a

significant advancement in countering terrorist forces in Central Asia and enhancing cooperation within

Central Asian integration.

Since gaining independence, Turkmenistan has been actively involved in top-level design for the

integration of Central Asian States as a member of the five Central Asian countries. In 1992, during a

meeting of the leaders of the five Central Asian states to discuss regional cooperation, Turkmenistan's

President Saparmurat Niyazov suggested the establishment of a "Union of Central Asian States" as an

alternative to joining the Russian-led CIS. (Sebsatain & Alexandra, 2020) The program, however,

failed to elicit a positive response from the remaining four countries, as they expressed a preference for

cooperation within the CIS framework.

Table 1. Participation of Central Asian Countries in Major Regional Organizations

Participating

countries

CIS

(1991- )

Central Asian

Cooperation

Organization

(1998-2005)

Eurasian

Economic

community

(2001-2015)

Shanghai

Cooperation

Organization

(2001- )

Central Asian

regional

economic

cooperation

mechanism

(1996- )

Kazakhstan √ √ √ √ √

Uzbekistan √ √ Observer state √ √

Tajikistan √ √ × √ √

Kyrgyzstan √ √ √ √ √



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Turkmenistan withdrew

in 2005

× × × √

Turkmenistan's limited engagement in Central Asian regional integration mechanisms can be attributed

to three primary factors. Firstly, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkmenistan inherited

a highly specialized and trade-dependent economy focused on processing, with the energy industry and

cotton cultivation serving as the primary material basis for trade exports.Turkmenistan possesses the

world's fourth largest natural gas reserves, with natural gas trade historically constituting 80% of the

country's exports. Russia and China stand as its primary energy trading partners due to their substantial

size, while other Central Asian nations, constrained by relatively simple economic structures and

underdeveloped levels of development, struggle to challenge the dominance of non-regional powers in

trade.

Secondly, from the perspective of neutrality, Turkmenistan's permanent neutrality constrains its

involvement in integration organizations. The model of neutral diplomacy represents a strategy

employed by small states to secure themselves amidst power struggles with larger states, as articulated

by Robert Rothstein: "Small states seek to leverage their 'smallness' for self-protection." By

maintaining an impartial stance and convincing larger countries that they pose no threat, small nations

can safeguard themselves amid this tumultuous environment. (Robert, 1968) Turkmenistan embarked

on a path of neutrality within one year of gaining independence, and during the OSCE Helsinki Summit

in July 1992, President Niyazov introduced a foreign policy of "positive neutrality" as an initial

framework for pursuing this stance. (Smith, 1998) On 12 December 1995, the fiftieth session of the

United Nations General Assembly deliberated on the issue of Turkmenistan's permanent neutrality.

Turkmenistan's permanent neutral status has a twofold impact on its participation in the Central Asian

integration mechanism. On one hand, Turkmenistan has established a buffer zone in Central Asia

through its neutral policy, actively mediated conflicts in the region, fostered strong relations with

Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and other countries, and secured its "independence" within Central Asia,

thereby diminishing the necessity for integrated security functions in the region. Furthermore, both en

route to and following its establishment as a permanently neutral State, Turkmenistan has diligently

upheld its obligations of neutrality under international law and steered its foreign policy with a

commitment to neutrality. Article 4 of the Permanent Neutrality Act of Turkmenistan stipulates that

"Turkmenistan shall refrain from participating in military alliances, inter-state associations with binding

obligations, or collective responsibilities among parties. Therefore, due to the strong intensity and high

degree of integration in the first Central Asian integration, it possesses a certain alliance nature that

requires member states to relinquish part of their sovereignty, making it impossible for neutral

Turkmenistan to join.

Thirdly, from the perspective of decision-makers, the supreme leader of Turkmenistan Niyazov's

attitude and judgment towards the first Central Asian integration are pessimistic. Due to Turkmenistan's



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initial economic fragility and abundant oil and gas resources, it became a strategic battleground for

major powers. Consequently, Turkmenistan is reluctant to be labeled as a "banana republic" in Central

Asia and rejects any participation in asymmetrical alliances. Niyazov is also not sanguine about

cooperation within the framework of the CIS, showing reluctance to participate in the Economic

Cooperation Organization and maintaining a cautious stance towards regional integration initiatives

such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union, or the Central

Asian Economic Community. (Charles, 2020)

3. Obstruction of Central Asian Integration and Turkmenistan's Foreign Policy (2005-2018)

Since the beginning of the 21st century, an increasing number of countries from outside the region have

started to enhance their geopolitical influence in Central Asia with the intention of achieving their own

strategic objectives. During this period, an increasing number of contradictions surfaced in the process

of integrating Central Asia. The significant disparity in economic development levels among countries,

the challenges of coordinating monetary policies, frequent border conflicts, and other issues have

undermined the integration led by Central Asian countries and gradually supplanted by the integration

mechanism led by non-regional powers.

During this period, Turkmenistan's domestic and foreign policies underwent a transition as a result of a

change in leadership. On December 21, 2006, the supreme leader of Turkmenistan, Saparmurat

Niyazov, passed away due to illness, leading to Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov formally assuming the

presidency. Confronted with the intervention of non-regional powers, the second Turkmen government

re-evaluated the power dynamics in Central Asia, prioritized national economic development as its

main focus, pursued a "balance of great powers" strategy, and endeavored to secure its flexible position

in Central Asia.

Firstly, the Turkmen government has shown a lack of enthusiasm for participating in the Central Asian

integration and the Eurasian Economic Community organization led by Russia. This is attributed to

President Berdymuhamedov's proactive efforts to normalize Russia-Turkey relations after assuming

office, leading to the abandonment of the previously adopted "one-sided" policy against Russia during

Niyazov's tenure. Turkmenistan's unbalanced approach to Russia has compromised the country's

neutrality, and the subsequent government has been cautious about Russian-led integration mechanisms,

while prioritizing economic cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Community.

Secondly, the United States has also incorporated Central Asia into its global strategic framework and

actively engaged in the region's integration efforts. The United States has pursued Central Asian

integration not through the establishment of new multilateral institutions, but by leveraging existing or

regionally inclusive organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, NATO's Partnership for

Peace Program, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In response to the "olive

branch" extended by the United States, Turkmenistan has actively engaged in certain less integrated

mechanisms that promote national economic development, and other Central Asian countries have also



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enthusiastically joined these organizations. Furthermore, Turkmenistan plays a significant role in the

U.S. Caspian Energy Initiative, which aims to facilitate collaboration between its business partners and

the governments of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkmenistan for the construction of the

Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP).

In the 21st century, China has increasingly prioritized institutional development in Central Asia.

Through regional mechanisms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Belt and Road

Initiative, China has engaged in practical cooperation with Central Asian countries in areas including

security, energy, economy, and trade. Since President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov assumed office in

2006, Turkmenistan's engagement in China-led regional cooperation mechanisms has increased, and

bilateral relations between the two countries have continued to flourish. Since 2008, the China-Turkey

"Central Asia Natural Gas Pipeline" project has been successfully completed, with the construction of

four natural gas pipeline lines from Turkmenistan to Khorgos in Xinjiang Province. This infrastructure

is capable of providing China with over 65 billion cubic meters of natural gas energy annually,

solidifying China as Turkmenistan's primary trading partner. On September 3, 2013, the President of

China paid a visit to Turkmenistan and the leaders of both nations signed a joint declaration, signifying

the elevation of bilateral relations to the level of strategic partnership.

Overall, during the period of impeded integration led by Central Asian countries, Turkmenistan

prioritized economic development and selectively engaged in the Central Asian integration mechanism

led by Russia, the United States, and middle powers through neutral diplomacy, thereby enhancing its

participation and enthusiasm in regional affairs. Although Turkmenistan places great importance on

balancing relations with major powers, it demonstrates a stronger inclination towards regional

cooperation with China, which objectively promotes the expansion of Central Asian integration

cooperation and also generates economic momentum for future participation in integration led by

Central Asian countries.

4. The Revival of Central Asian Integration and Turkmenistan's Strategic Adjustment

(2018-Present)

The initial failure of Central Asian integration had numerous adverse effects on the region, leading to

ongoing instability in political and diplomatic relations among the countries. This resulted in frequent

disputes over ethnic, religious, border demarcation, and water resource issues. The Central Asian

countries have established diverse economic development strategies and competed to prioritize

relations with non-regional countries, leading the region from former "integration" to the opposite

extreme of "anti-integration". Against this backdrop, state-led integration in Central Asia has been

mired in a "period of stagnation" for over a decade.

The assumption of the presidency by Shavkat Mirziyoyev in 2016 marked a significant turning point

for the revival of Central Asian integration. He emphasized that "Central Asia is the top priority of

Uzbekistan's foreign policy" and committed to overhauling the country's long-standing economic



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model, reestablishing ties with Central Asian nations through economic reforms, and actively seeking

to mend relations with neighboring countries. (Daisuke, 2019) Subsequently, at the 72nd session of the

United Nations General Assembly in September 2017, Mirziyoyev further proposed convening a

regular consultative meeting of the heads of Central Asian States. Kazakh President Nursultan

Nazarbayev articulated the rationale for the summit: "To address the challenges facing the Central

Asian region, we are capable of resolving them internally without external intervention, hence our

collective gatherings." (Paul, 2018) The inaugural summit of Central Asian countries proceeded

smoothly, with the heads of state and government engaging in discussions on topics such as

communication, trade, and transportation. This meeting holds significant historical importance as it

marks the first summit held by Central Asian countries without the participation of external nations

since 2005. The gathering demonstrates the commitment of Central Asian countries to collaborate and

can be seen as the "first step" towards reinitiating integration in Central Asia.

In light of the renewed integration of Central Asia, Turkmenistan is exercising caution and carefully

evaluating the nature and process of development in order to determine its participation, while also

dynamically adjusting its corresponding strategy. In the inaugural Central Asian summit, President

Berdymuhamedov opted for an indirect participation, engaging in post-meeting deliberations following

a thorough clarification of the agenda, nature, and objectives. The Central Asian integration, initiated

by the first meeting of the Heads of State in Central Asia, initially focused on issues related to

transportation, communications, and environmental protection. However, there was a lack of detailed

top-level design for "high political issues". Furthermore, with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan joining the

Eurasian Economic Union, they have delegated their foreign trade sovereignty to the Supreme Council

of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Intergovernmental Committee. As a result, they are no longer

able to independently sign binding trade agreements with third parties.Consequently, there are inherent

barriers to establishing a customs union, let alone supranational institutions.

The resumption of Central Asian integration presents a favorable opportunity for Turkmenistan. Firstly,

the integration commences at a foundational level with a "broad but not deep" scope of cooperation that

does not encroach upon issues of sovereignty transfer, aligning with Turkmenistan's neutrality policy.

Secondly, integration contributes to fostering warmer relations among Central Asian countries,

addressing the "fragmentation" in the region and supporting China's development strategy of "reviving

the Silk Road". Consequently, following the inaugural summit of the Central Asian States,

Turkmenistan has decided to gradually adjust its foreign policy and participate in integration.

At the second Central Asian Summit in 2019, Turkmenistan made the decision to end its "diplomatic

isolation" and demonstrated its commitment to participating in regional integration. President

Berdymuhamedov personally attended the meeting, where he proposed measures for Central Asian

integration, endorsed the establishment of a platform for regional dialogue and discussion, and

suggested practical initiatives such as creating a Central Asian Business Commission. With

Turkmenistan's involvement, the second Summit of Central Asian States experienced significant



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expansion, with pressing issues in the region consistently included on the agenda. One scholar observed

that this gathering signified "Central Asian leaders' efforts to redefine their vision for the region and

promote a more comprehensive and diverse geopolitical narrative globally."

The second Summit of Central Asian States has had a positive impact on regional cooperation and

further enhanced Turkmenistan's positive perception of Central Asian integration. A year later,

Turkmenistan also won the right to host the third Summit of Central Asian States, aiming to bolster its

influence in the region and facilitate the robust development of integration.The third meeting was

attended by the Presidents of the five Central Asian States and the Special Representative of the UN

Secretary-General for Central Asia, Natalia Gell-Mann. They issued a Joint Statement addressing

pressing issues in the region, including regional security and governance, COVID-19 prevention and

control, ensuring regional denuclearization, stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan, and promoting

institutionalization of the heads of state summit through negotiations and consultations. As the host,

Turkmenistan adhered to the concept of "practical cooperation" and focused the meeting on addressing

current regional hotspot issues, enhancing political mutual trust, and providing economic assistance.

This contributed to the establishment of a high-level dialogue mechanism in Central Asia and offered

valuable insights for the reinvigoration of Central Asian integration.

The diplomatic engagement of Turkmenistan in the three summits of the heads of state of Central Asia

holds significant importance, marking its inaugural participation in the integration mechanism led by

Central Asian countries. Historically, Turkmenistan has upheld a policy of neutrality as the cornerstone

of its foreign relations, maintaining a stance of non-involvement in the Central Asian integration

mechanism and showing limited interest in regional affairs. Therefore, Turkmenistan's participation in

the reset phase of Central Asian integration is a crucial adjustment to its regional strategy. This

represents a strategic shift away from the dominance of the "policy of neutrality" in order to better

adapt to the new regional environment, while still upholding international treaties and commitments.

However, this also signifies Turkmenistan's gradual transition from its previous role as an "observer" to

actively pursuing a role as a "participant in Central Asian integration" and even a "decision maker."

Since the revival of Central Asian integration, Turkmenistan has progressively expanded its efforts

towards regional integration, hosting numerous multilateral cooperation conferences and leveraging its

position as host to propose innovative solutions for economic cooperation, regional security,

environmental governance, and political mutual trust in Central Asia. This has significantly bolstered

Turkmenistan's influence in Central Asian affairs.

5. Challenges of Turkmenistan's Participation in Central Asian Integration

The participation of Turkmenistan has injected fresh impetus into the integration of Central Asia and

heralded a new era in the collective development and shared future of the five Central Asian countries.

However, due to the dynamic deficiencies in Central Asian integration and internal factors within

Turkmenistan, the path to reinitiate integration is certain to encounter numerous practical challenges.



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After the restart, Central Asian integration is hampered by a lack of political impetus, insufficient

economic momentum, and weak cultural synergy. The integration process has been further slowed

down in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Western scholar Speicher has pointed out that

compared to European integration, Central Asian integration lacks strong political impetus. In

post-World War II Western Europe, fear of the Soviet Union and its ideology generated significant

political momentum, while US economic aid (the Marshall Plan) and military protection (NATO)

further propelled Europe towards economic integration. However, Central Asian integration does not

have an external force driving it due to Russia's economic downturn. Additionally, Central Asia only

faces common security threats such as Islamic extremism. (Martin, 2002)

At the regional economic level, there are three primary impediments to the integration of Central Asia.

The first is the limited complementarity of national economies, stemming from the region's low

industrialization and its reliance on energy and mineral extraction. This results in a low degree of

interdependence between countries. The second constraint is the significant economic disparity among

nations. Kazakhstan stands as the most developed country in Central Asia, with its GDP accounting for

approximately 65% of the total for all Central Asian countries, while Turkmenistan, positioned in the

middle economically, only contributes around 10%. Such substantial discrepancies exist in economic

output across these nations.The third factor is the high external dependence of the regional economy.

Since 2015, the proportion of imports and exports in the GDP of Central Asia as a whole has exceeded

75%, indicating a significant reliance on external sources. This has dampened enthusiasm for economic

and trade cooperation in Central Asia. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine, along with Western

economic sanctions against Russia, also impacted the economy of Central Asia, leading to severe

turbulence in financial markets and disruptions to regional industrial and supply chains, further

exacerbating economic integration in Central Asia.

Secondly, Turkmenistan's economic momentum remains inadequate, with limited progress in economic

reform and a persistent reliance on energy trade as the mainstay industry, posing challenges for

complementing the economies of the other four Central Asian countries. Following a seven-year

economic recession from 1991 to 1997 due to declining productivity and disrupted trade routes,

Turkmenistan gradually began its recovery in 1998. In contrast to Russia's shock therapy approach,

Niyazov pledged a modest and gradual transition towards a market economy through privatization and

rationalizing the country's industrial structure. Presently, Turkmenistan is undergoing systematic efforts

to embrace market-oriented reforms while striving for accelerated industrialization and privatization

between 2019 and 2025. Despite some improvements in its foreign trade structure after extensive

reforms, natural gas and oil continue to dominate the domestic industry as the leading sectors within

the national industrial system. According to reports from Russian news network "Arzuw" on January

26th, 2021, Turkmenistan's industrial output accounted for 27.8% of GDP in 2020, with total industrial

product value exceeding 59 billion manats during that year; energy products alone contributed up to

40%, signifying their continued prominence. Consequently, Turkmenistan currently faces limitations in



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serving as an "engine" for economic integration across Central Asia.

The recent internal regime change in Turkmenistan has introduced uncertainty regarding the country's

participation in integration initiatives. On March 15, 2022, Deputy Prime Minister and Democratic

Party candidate Serdar Berdymuhamedov was declared the winner of the presidential election by the

Central Election Commission of Turkmenistan, securing 72.97% of the votes. The newly elected

president, Serdar, is the son of former president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov and has held positions in

the foreign Ministry, parliament, and National Security Council. At present, specific policy objectives

under President Serdar's leadership are yet to be revealed, leaving it uncertain whether Turkmenistan

will maintain its active involvement in Central Asian integration efforts since 2019.

In conclusion, Turkmenistan has emerged as a significant driving force in the integration of Central

Asia through its domestic economic reforms and adjustments in foreign policy, objectively creating

favorable conditions for security, stability, and development in the region. However, Turkmenistan's

integration strategy is confronted with several practical challenges, the most prominent being the

uncertainty surrounding the prospect of integration and potential domestic regime changes. The lack of

clarity regarding the progression of Central Asian integration from partial to higher stages, insufficient

vertical development of integration, and difficulties in establishing customs unions or other

supranational mechanisms pose significant obstacles. Additionally, questions have arisen about

Turkmenistan's integration policy due to recent government changes. It remains uncertain whether

President Serdar—son of a former president—will continue with previous policies or adopt a different

approach towards integration participation. Nevertheless, there are indications that if President Serdar

maintains the same level of commitment as his predecessor did, Turkmenistan will play a pivotal role

as Central Asian integration advances to higher stages.

6. Discussion

The paper concludes that Turkmenistan's participation in Central Asian integration is influenced by

three core issues: the potential conflict between the principle of neutrality and the integration

mechanism, the compatibility of Turkmenistan's strategic needs with the integration mechanism, and

the perception and attitude of Turkmenistan's decision makers towards integration.The paper also

delves into the challenges that Turkmenistan faces in participating in Central Asian integration through

research. From a macro perspective, the level of Central Asian integration is much lower than it was in

1994, both in terms of intensity and mechanism construction. There are still significant deficiencies in

political power and economic strength, resulting in a "semi-vertical and semi-horizontal" integration

model with an uncertain outlook. On a micro level, Turkmenistan itself has numerous shortcomings and

limited capacity for integration. In the short term, domestic economic reform in Turkmenistan has

limited impact, and its economic structure is not sufficiently rational to drive regional economy growth.

The change of political leadership in Turkmenistan has introduced uncertain factors into its integration

strategy.



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The framework of Turkmenistan's participation in the Central Asian integration mechanism offers a

perspective for comprehending the rationale, constraints, processes, and impacts of neutral countries'

involvement in the integration mechanism. For instance, in light of the Russia-Ukraine conflict,

Sweden and Finland, two permanently neutral countries, have opted to join NATO and abandon their

neutrality. It is worth exploring whether the research perspective presented in this paper can be applied

to elucidate this case.

References

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	Original Paper
	Strategy and Challenges for Turkmenistan’s partici
	1 School of Government , Shanghai University of Po
	2 School of Government , Shanghai University of Po
	Abstract
	After gaining independence, Turkmenistan actively 
	Keywords
	permanent neutrality, the Central Asia Integration

