







































Advances in Politics and Economics 
ISSN 2576-1382 (Print) ISSN 2576-1390 (Online) 

Vol. 5, No. 1, 2022 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 

1 
 

Original Paper 

Popular Uprisings in Sudan: Revolutionary Processes 

Intercepted 
Abdu Mukhtar Musa1* 

1 Department of Political Science, Omdurman Islamic University, Khartoum, Sudan 

 

Professor Abdu M. Musa is the author of 9 books, notably - Darfur: from a Crisis of a State to Super 

Power Clashes (400 pp., in Arabic, Doha: Aljazeera Centre for Studies). He received his 

undergraduate and postgraduate studies at University of Khartoum, Sudan. (Currently he is a professor 

of political science at the Dept. of political science: Islamic University of Omdurman, Khartoum State, 

Sudan—Africa). drmukhtar60@gmail.com 

 

Received: November 14, 2021  Accepted: December 2, 2021  Online Published: December 16, 2021 

doi:10.22158/ape.v5n1p1         URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n1p1 

 

Abstract 

This article tries to go beyond the general features of the Sudanese three popular Uprisings of 1964, 

1985 and 2018/19, to explore their root causes. It argues that the revolutionary processes in the Sudan 

have been impeded by such factors as: (1) lack of visionary leaders; (2) inter-elites dissensions; (3) 

intra-party schisms and inter-party conflicts (over interests); and (4) absence of coherent 

programmatic and mass political parties. Since independence in 1956, the Sudan has been trapped in a 

vicious circle—oscillating between democratic and military rules. So: “why does democracy fail in 

Sudan? It compares the different settings that differentiate the Uprising (of 2018/19) from the previous 

two, with especial emphasis on the latest one—one of the most successful non-violent civil resistances. 

The article explains that those uprisings could have escalated into full-fledged revolution but were let 

down by the civil elites who disappointed any prospects for revolutionary achievement”. Hence, the 

article rests on the hypothesis that “the political elite are responsible for the failure of the popular 

uprisings in Sudan”. The article provides empirical explanations for this hypothesis and suggests 

adoption of consociationalism which is more likely to suit the highly diversified Sudanese society with 

deep ethno-political polarization. 

Keywords 

uprising, revolution, militant Islamists, exclusion, marginalization, transition, democracy 

 



www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape              Advances in Politics and Economics                 Vol. 5, No. 1, 2022 

2 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 

1. Introduction: 

It was a controversial issue among the Sudanese intellectuals whether the Sudan’s Uprising of Dec. 

2018—Apr. 2019, is a “revolution” or an “Uprising” (“intifada”)? But, since the masses took to the 

streets in tens of towns in Sudan yearning for comprehensive and radical change, it could be 

maintained that the uprising had paved the way for a real “revolutionary” change—albeit it was in need 

of a charismatic leader with a vision for radical change and capable of mobilizing the nation amidst 

great difficulties and conspiracies that were being waged by the elements of the deposed Militant 

Islamists’ Regime (MIR) led by Gen. Omer al-Beshir. History reveals that revolutions usually take a 

long time to realize their ultimate goals and achieve substantial transformation. The great French 

Revolution (1789) is a good example; it took a decade (1789-799) to lay down the first stepping stones.  

In his distinguished 1970 article “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model” Rustow 

“broke from the prevailing schools of thought on how countries became democratic, disagreeing with 

the heavy focus on necessary social and economic pre-conditions for democracy.” (Rustow, 1970) 

(Note 1) He argued that “national unity was the necessary precondition for democracy.” (Rustow, 1970) 

(Note 2) This may be true with respect to Western democracies or advanced states; however, it differs 

in the case of the Third World states where unity without awareness—including conscious political 

behavior and participation, based on appropriate culture—does not provide a fertile soil for sowing the 

seeds of a sound democracy. This is because “other things may not remain the same or equal” as such 

drivers as ethnic identification may influence political behavior and voting attitudes. 

Two past surveys of revolution list literally hundreds of events as “revolutionary” in character. 

“Nonetheless, these events still have a common set of elements at their core: (a) efforts to change the 

political regime that draw on a competing vision (or visions) of a just order, (b) a notable degree of 

informal or formal mass mobilization, and (c) efforts to force change through non-institutionalized 

actions such as mass demonstrations, protests, strikes, or violence.” (Tilly, 1993) (Note 3) The 

Sudanese Uprising—under consideration—encompasses almost all these processes, notably: efforts to 

change political regime; formal or informal mass mobilization; … use of such actions of mass 

demonstrations, protests, strike, etc. Actually the Sudan’s “Revolution” cuts across different types of 

revolution as well different definitions/theories of revolution. This will be explained throughout the 

analysis in this article. But it is suffice here to argue that this multifaceted nature of the Sudanese 

revolution (of 2018/19) might be partly attributed to: 

1) The long duration of the regime that was toppled by the Uprising (30 years: 1989-2019). 

2) For the very compound nature of that regime: some sort of alliance between the army and the 

“Radical Islamic Fundamentalism” so that I labeled that regime as the “militant Islamist regime” (MIR). 

The two sides (the allied military and the civilians) called their regime (Al-Engath) or “Salvation” 

which assumed power by a military coup—they alleged—to rescue the Sudanese people from bad 

conditions—whereas, in reality, they led them to the worst. 

3) Al-Beshir’s regime was a hybrid of a religious ideology and authoritarianism, in its first years, and 



www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape              Advances in Politics and Economics                 Vol. 5, No. 1, 2022 

3 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 

turned into theocratic totalitarianism influenced by Hassan Abdallahal-Turabi (the master mind of their 

new sacred mission of “Civilizational Project”). However, few years later—while raising Islamic 

slogans—it deviated from the religious line and indulged into power, wealth and corruption, while 

excluding all those who are not loyal to their regime or members of the Islamic Movement. 

4) It was not only a matter of class conflict, periphery-center dispute, ethnic politics, racial 

discrimination, military dictatorship, but also monopolizing the wealth by one group (members of the 

Islamic Movement) and excluding all other sectors of the society. 

5) The nature of resistance to this authoritarian militant Islamist regime was also diverse—it was 

cross-ethnic and cross cultural (this is detailed later on in this article). 

A great deal of literature has been written on explaining the nature and origin of revolutions. Some 

outlined three major “phases” or “generations”: “The first generation, falling roughly between 1900 

and 1940, and including the work of LeBon, Ellwood, Sorokin, Edwards, Lederer, Pettee, and Brinton, 

carefully investigated the pattern of events found in revolutions, but lacked a broad theoretical 

perspective.” (Goldstone, 1980) (Note 4) The second generation, falling roughly between 1940 and 

1975, has dominated the recent study of revolutions; it included Davies, Gurr, Johnson, Smelser, 

Huntington, and Tilly, and drew heavily on broad theories from psychology (cognitive psychology and 

frustration-aggression theory), sociology (structural-functionalist theory), and political science (the 

pluralist theory of interest-group competition). (Note 5) 

In the third generation some scholars had introduced new analytical approach for revolution, namely: 

“Barrington Moore, Jr. and Eric Wolf. Important contributions were also made by Gillis, Neumann, 

Rosenau, Kelly and Miller, Hermassi, Migdal, Landsberger, Linz, Prosterman, Russell, and Chorley. 

These writers did not advance theories of revolution per se; however, they raised specific issues and 

achieved major insights which have formed the basis for the third generation’s theorizing.” (Goldstone, 

1980) (Note 6) 

Some scholars noted that “until … recently, revolutions have invariably failed to produce democracy. 

The need to consolidate a new regime in the face of struggles with domestic and foreign foes has 

instead produced authoritarian regimes, often in the guise of populist dictatorships such as those of 

Napoleon, Castro, and Mao, or of one-party states such as the PRI state in Mexico or the Communist 

Party-led states of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Indeed, the struggle required to take and hold 

power in revolutions generally leaves its mark in the militarized and coercive character of new 

revolutionary regimes.” (Gurr, 1988)  (Note 7) However, in Sudan two previous popular uprisings 

(1964 and 1985) had resulted in two democratic regimes. This was also supported by other cases 

elsewhere: “It is … striking that in several … revolutions—in the Philippines in 1986, in South Africa 

in 1990, in Eastern European nations in 1989-1991—the sudden collapse of the old regime has led 

directly to new democracies, often against strong expectations of reversion to dictatorship.” (Note 8) 

One scholar explained this: “The factors that allowed democracy to emerge in these cases appear to be 

several: a lack of external military threat, a strong personal commitment to democracy by revolutionary 



www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape              Advances in Politics and Economics                 Vol. 5, No. 1, 2022 

4 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 

leaders, and consistent external support of the new democratic regimes by foreign powers.” (Note 9) 

John Foran has made an excellent contribution to the literature of theorizing revolution particularly 

with respect to the Third World. In his “Taking Power: on the Origins of Third World Revolutions” he 

examines the causes behind some three dozen revolutions in the Third World between 1910 and the 

“present” [late 20th century]. Through an interdisciplinary approach he explains “why so few 

revolutions have succeeded, and so many have failed.” (Foran, 2005). (Note 10) His book treats 

particular sets of revolutions in the Third World—including the longest revolution in the World—the 

Chinese Revolution (1919-1949). He believes that the twentieth century must be judged an age of 

revolutions. He noted that “… the locus of these revolutions has been firmly rooted in the Third 

World…” (Note 11) 

Many scholars agree that the real revolution is a “social” revolution particularly that “transforms 

economic and social structures as well as political institutions” (Charles Tilly, 1995). So it may be held 

that a comprehensive study of the concept of revolution entails interdisciplinary approach. Hence, it is 

notable that the most distinguished contributions in the theorization of revolution are made by the 

scientist who combined politics with sociology and psychology along with history, anthropology and 

comparative perspectives. To cite some examples: ThedaSkocpol, John Foran, Ted Robert Gurr, Karl 

Marx, Jack Goldstone, Barrington Moore, Samuel P. Huntington, Richard Tilly, Eisenstaedt, etc. 

Skocpol’s” States and Social Revolutions” became one of the most widely recognized works of the 

third generation; Skocpol defined revolution as “rapid, basic transformations of society’s state and 

class structures [...] accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below”, 

attributing revolutions to a conjunction of multiple conflicts involving state, elites and the lower classes. 

(Note 12) 

Generally, in political science, a revolution (Latin: revolution, “a turnaround”) is a fundamental and 

relatively sudden change in political power and political organization which occurs when the 

population revolts against the government, typically due to perceived oppression (political, social, 

economic) or political incompetence. (Bullock, Trombley, 1999)  (Note 13) It also simply means “a 

successful attempt by a large group of people to change the political system of the country by force.” 

(Note 14) 

Notable revolutions in recent centuries include the creation of the United States through the American 

Revolutionary War (1775-1783), the French Revolution (1789-1799), the Spanish American wars of 

independence (1808-1826), the European Revolutions of 1848, the Russian Revolution in 1917, the 

Chinese Revolution of the 1940s, the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the Iranian Revolution in 1979, and 

the European Revolutions of 1989. (Note 15) 

With respect to the Third World some scholars noted that the anticolonial and anti-dictatorial 

revolutions, ranging from Angola to Zaire, became so numerous and affected so many people that the 

parochial practice of defining revolutions in terms of a few cases in European history plus China 

became untenable (Boswell, 1989, Furan, 1997). In addition, whereas the “great revolutions” had all 



www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape              Advances in Politics and Economics                 Vol. 5, No. 1, 2022 

5 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 

led fairly directly to populist dictatorship and civil wars, a number of the more recent revolutions … 

seemed to offer a new model in which the revolutionary collapse of the old regime was coupled with a 

relatively nonviolent transition to democracy (Goldstone, 2001).  (Note 16) 

 

2. Modeling the Case of Sudan: a Framework for Analyzing Dynamics and Processes 

The causes of revolution in Sudan differ from that set of factors specified by such scholars as Skocpol 

(1979). In the case of Sudan: lack of justice, deprivation, marginalization, ethnic politics and racial 

discrimination matter. This, of course, in addition to other factors/causes common to almost all the 

underdeveloped countries—notably: corruption and dictatorship. 

In the twentieth century the Sudanese people waged two successful popular uprisings—in October 

1964 and April 1985—where the two upheavals toppled two dictators: General Abbud and General 

Nimeiri, respectively—though the first two revolutions had not enjoyed the highly sophisticated global 

media enjoyed the latest one (Dec. 2018-Apr. 20190. However, the latest Uprising differs from the two 

previous ones in many aspects. al-Beshir’s Militant Islamist Regime (1989-2019) had ousted all key 

figures from the bureaucracy and regular forces. Then the ruling militarized Islamists deposed the 

majority of different ranks in the regular forces who are not members of the Islamic movement or not 

loyal to their ruling political party (the National Congress Party: NCP). Then they politicized the civil 

service. So, we had had a deeply indoctrinated system that excluded those who are not members of the 

Islamists’ ruling party. Therefore, it is not easy to dismantle or uproot al-Bishir’s totalitarian system by 

the mere removal of its leading figures. Accordingly, the functioning of the “counter-revolution” was 

obviously inevitable and a myriad of challenges were inescapable. 

 

 

Figure 1. Reveals the Ratio of Democratic Rule to the Military in Terms of Duration 

*(illustrated by the author) 



www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape              Advances in Politics and Economics                 Vol. 5, No. 1, 2022 

6 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 2. The Sudan’s Syndrome (the Vicious Circle) 

 

*The independence of January 1956 was preceded by multi-party elections in November 1953. So the 

first democratic experience was three years—taking into account that it was terminated by General 

Abbud’s coup in November 17, 1958. The first elected Parliament unanimously declared independence 

on December 19, 1955 and was officially celebrated on January 1, 1956. The years: 1965 and 1985 

were transitional.  

 

2.1 Why Does Democracy Fail in Sudan? 

From Figure (1) which both illustrate an oscillating and turbulent political reality in Sudan a central 

question arises: why does democracy fail in Sudan? This article argues that one of the major causes of 

this “vicious circle” is related to the political parties in particular and the Political elite in general. 

Actually all successful military coups which governed the country six folds the time of democracies 

were a result of political parties’ failure. The political parties who won elections and were in office 

created crises and then “invite” the army to assume power: 

(1) In November 1958 when the Umma Party (UP) came to know that his partner in the ruling 

coalition, the People’s Democratic Party, was planning to ally with the opposition Party, the National 

Uprising 
and interim 

period 
2018/19 - ? 

1956* – 1958 

Democracy 

1958-1964 

military 

1965 -1969 

Democracy 

1969 – 1985 

military 

1986-1989 

Democracy 

 

1989 – 2019 

military 
Whic

h way 

to go? 



www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape              Advances in Politics and Economics                 Vol. 5, No. 1, 2022 

7 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 

Unionist Party, to topple Abdalla Khalil’s cabinet—by vote of no confidence-because “the country was 

in political crisis”, called upon General Abbud (the Commander-in-Chief) to assume power. 

(2) In 1969 the Sudanese Communist Party politically backed General Nimeiri to assume power 

because the Islamists joined forces with the “traditional” Parties (the UP and the Democratic Unionist 

Party: DUP) in the Parliament and voted for dismembering those of the Communist Party. Although the 

court verdict cancelled their decision, the parties behind the decision declined to execute the verdict 

triggering a political crisis ended by Nimeiri’s coup in May 25, 1969. The Communists “fleshed the 

bones of the military rule” (Note 17) with radical thought and a program for action. However, two years 

later (in July 1971) the Communists led a coup attempt against Nimeiri who managed to abort it and 

came back after three days and sentenced the leaders to death.  

(3) In 1989 the Islamists who were minority in the Parliament (ranking third) manipulated the 

dissensions among the (UP&DUP) coalition government—along with security crisis, economic 

deterioration and corruption—intrigued with their officers in the Army and took over the government 

on June 30, 1989. 

(4) In 2019, in the post-Uprising transitional period, also one faction of the civil coalition—which 

was excluded or not represented in the Transitional Government (TG)—organized a sit-in at the 

Republican Palace on October 16, 21 and called upon the the Commander-in-Chief, Gen. al-Burhan to 

dissolve Hamdok’ cabinet (will be detailed later on). 

The failure of the political parties in office to sustain proper democratic practice always led to military 

coups. Then the masses revolt against the military regimes. The military responds to the will of the 

people. A transitional government is formed, elections organized; a democratic regime takes office. 

Differences arise among coalition governments, with political corruption and poor performance, 

military officers capture power with such justifications as chaos, political unrest, economic 

deterioration and the unity of the county is at risk…etc. Thus a vicious circle persists over decades (see 

Figure No.2). 

After every successful popular uprising the political parties in power let the people down causing a 

frustrating set back to democratic rule. Consequently, the country has been undergoing chronic political 

crises since independence in 1956. The symptom of this crisis is manifested in perpetual political 

instability—where the army governed more than six folds of the short-lived democracies. This situation 

of a “country in crises” had been a product of the failure of the elite—namely the political class. This 

political instability provides empirical evidence that the ruling political elite are responsible for these 

recurring political crises in Sudan. Hence, it is obvious that the political parties bear the greater part of 

this responsibility as they have failed to consolidate democratic and stable political system.  

One can divide or categorize the political parties in Sudan into four types with respect to their relation 

to democracy: 

The first category or group: comprises those parties which do not believe in democracy or not keen to 

adopt it: e.g., the Islamic Movement (a branch of Muslim Brothers). The movement adopted one-party 



www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape              Advances in Politics and Economics                 Vol. 5, No. 1, 2022 

8 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 

system (the National Congress Party: NCP) ushering in a hybrid type of regime—a mixture of 

totalitarian system (tried to adopt an Islamic rule) and a military dictatorship with repressive security 

organ.  

The second category: are those political parties which cannot survive under democracy, e.g., the Sudan 

Communist Party, the Arab Socialist Ba’ath (Resurrections) Party, and the Nasserites, because they 

have no popular base or mass support for the nature of their ideologies (secular or leftist/communist) 

which are unacceptable in a conservative society as Sudan with Muslim majority (nearly 97% after the 

secession of the South in 2011). 

The third type: are those parties which are not able to practice real democracy and lack “within-party” 

democracy. Their party leaders stay in office for life—a hereditary system of leadership based on 

sectarianism and patriarchy. Some developed a sort of a “personality cult” where the “reverent” leaders 

are above criticism or removal from office. Based on religious obedience to the “Sheikh or molana”; 

there is no transfer of power. The Umma Party (of al-Mahdi’s Ansar or adherents) and the Democratic 

Unionist Party (of Al-Khatmiyya Sufist/s/ sect) are a good example for this type. 

The fourth type is the ethnic parties which represent a definite ethnic group or a marginalized minority 

(such as the Beja, the Nuba Mountain Union, Darfur Front for Development, etc.). They ran for 

elections in almost all the three democratic “intervals”—got only few seats in the parliaments. This 

type also includes the armed struggle movements in Darfur—notably the Justice and Equality 

Movement, and Sudan’s Liberation Movement. The two broke up into more than 30 factions. Even if 

they are to develop into political parties, they would not be considered as mass parties, but rather 

remains as regional or ethnic parties as they represent specific areas and tribes or ethnic groups.  

The common characteristic of all these four types of political parties in Sudan is that they cannot 

develop a sound political culture and, hence, cannot contribute to the functioning of an effective 

political process. In the final analysis, they are not qualified to consolidate real and sustainable 

democracy. 

Generally one can numerate the following observations on political parties in Sudan:  

(i) They suffer from acute factionalism or multi-party schisms; 

(iii) The majority of parties lack institutionalism and democratic values that characterize modern 

political parties; 

(iv) Most—if not all—political parties have no program for change or how to build a coherent society 

and stable state. They lack nationwide appeal); 

(v) Almost all political parties lack the practice of within-party democracy and suffer from structural 

deficiencies.  

So, the current political parties in Sudan are in crisis. The inefficient political process and poor political 

culture is—to a great extent—a product of this crisis. In order to have a solid political party system the 

present political parties in Sudan are to restore their internal cohesion—by reunification of its 

broken-away factions and adopt within-party democracy. 



www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape              Advances in Politics and Economics                 Vol. 5, No. 1, 2022 

9 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 

2.2 Analysis and Interpretation  

With regard to the case of Sudan it is significant to look closely at the nature of the social structure and 

the social forces interacting in the political process. Generally, the Sudanese society is more traditional 

than modernized where tribe is still a powerful socio-political entity and so influential in shaping the 

individual’s political behavior. Globalization is being manifested in using the sophisticated tools rather 

than refining the life style—including political behavior. 

Due to the drastic economic deterioration in the rural areas as a result of lack of equitable development 

and negligence of many regions, many were forced to migrate to the capital (Khartoum). This had 

furthered economic imbalances, increased disparity between the centre and the peripheries and the 

social fabric was severely shaken. Those newcomers to the capital and major towns—with no income 

or a source to earn their living—settled on the outskirts in shanty towns to lead a miserable life and 

suffer from lack of adequate basic services; and at the same time impacting the size of the labor force at 

the production areas where 80% of the Sudanese people depend on agricultural activities.  

Agriculture was severely affected by the policies of the former Islamist Regime particularly with regard 

to unfair pricing policy. “Under the previous government of Gen. Omer al-Beshir, the middlemen used 

to buy our agricultural products at very cheap prices and sell them to other marketers or exporters at 

high prices besides the authorities imposed high taxes on our products. Accordingly, many producers 

were forced to abandon farming and migrated to the capital or other places.” (Note 18) With the 

emergence of the armed struggle movements in Darfur and other parts of the country—which were an 

outcome of injustice, deprivation and marginalization—many frustrated and jobless young people 

joined them. Some joined the radical terrorist groups outside Sudan and some desperately endeavored 

to cross the Mediterranean to Europe where some of them died in between. So a generation is lost 

being a victim of the mistakes of the political elites in a country rich of resources but poor in leadership 

who lack vision and patriotic conscience.  

This state of affairs was complicated by two factors: 

(1) Exclusion and marginalization took place on ethnic and regional basis paralleled by—or combined 

with—ideological prejudice. 

(2) The failure of the ruling elites to manage resources properly and manage diversity equitably.  

One of the outcomes of the wrong policies of Gen. Omer al-Beshir’s MIR was the impoverishment of 

many segments in the society (46% under poverty line). (Note 19) A great deal of portion of the middle 

class—notable the intelligentsia, intellectuals and professionals—sought personal or individual 

“salvation” and left the country. Some formed opposition and took bastions in other countries. 

Moreover, those policies of exclusion and deprivation on ideological and ethno-political lines resulted 

in vertical societal division:  

- Ideological polarization: is based on membership to the Islamic Movement and its NCP. 

- Ethno-political polarization: the government of the Islamic Movement dealt with the poorest areas on 

ethnic basis. Thus ethnicization of politics divided the country on ethnic/political basis. This was clear 



www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape              Advances in Politics and Economics                 Vol. 5, No. 1, 2022 

10 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 

with respect to areas populated with groups of non-Arab origin (known as “African”). This is more 

obvious in the case of Darfur. (Musa, 2009) (Note 20) 

Even the paramilitary or official militias were mostly formed on tribal basis: the “Janjaweed” is a good 

example (made of Arab tribes who were used to fight against the armed opposition movements which 

were dominated by the non-Arab tribes, some with extension in Chad). So when al-Beshir was toppled 

on April 11, 2019, there were more than five armies in Khartoum: the regular Sudanese Armed Forces 

(i.e., the Sudan official Army), and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF—led by General M. H. Dagalo, 

nicknamed Hemeidti). Then each of the other major armed opposition movements have got its own 

army (the Sudan Liberation Army, Justice and Equality Movement, Sudan liberation Movement, The 

Sudan People’s Liberation Army/North—originally part of the Late Gerang’s Liberation 

Movement/Army (SPLM/A) which includes two armed factions: one in the Blue Nile state led by 

Malik Agar, and the other in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan led by Commander Abdel Aziz 

Al-Hilo.(Musa, 2009). (Note 21) 

 

3. Preludes to the Sudan’s Revolution (2018/19): 

For thirty years in power, Sudan’s General al-Beshir had ruled by military force and cracked down on 

his people. On June 30, 1989 the then Brigadier Omer Hassan Al-Behsir, toppled a democratically 

elected government of al-Sadiqal-Mahdi. Supported by the Muslim brothers, led by the late Hassan 

Abdallahal-Turabi, General al-Beshir deposed all those who were not Muslim brothers. This purge 

included the civil service as well as all regular forces—particularly the members of security, besides the 

top-ranking officers of the army and police. In addition to this he created his own militias. Over time, 

members of the Islamic Movement controlled all institutions, including civil service, the regular armed 

forces and financial institutions. They excluded all other segments in the state—even those who were 

not partisans.  

Starting by December 19, 2018 up to April 11, 2019, tens of thousands of people took to the streets of 

Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, and some other 25 towns of the 18 states of the country demanding the 

termination of al-Beshir’s 30-yeare militarized Islamists’ rule. Tens of demonstrators were killed by the 

security forces and hundreds were injured. Some of the killers are said to be armed forces, in civil suits 

and veiled, who belong to the Islamic Movement—described as “militias”—known as “Katayib al-Zil” 

(the Battalions of Shadow).  

On April 6, 2019, trade unions—mainly the Professionals’ Association (established August 

2018)–called upon the people to join the protesters to be one million in number—to start a sit-in at the 

headquarters of the Sudanese army in Khartoum. The date coincides with the commemoration of April 

6, 1985 when a popular uprising succeeded—with a support from the army—in terminating a 16-year 

military rule by General G.M. Nimairi. A prompt response brought the number to more than what was 

expected reflecting how far was the dramatic decline of al-Beshir’s popularity—taking into account the 

fact that the regime’s militias used firearms to disperse the demonstrations. This also reveals how far 



www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape              Advances in Politics and Economics                 Vol. 5, No. 1, 2022 

11 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 

the Sudanese people were fed up with the president’s continual pledges of reforms and economic 

recovery while living a reality of crises, corruption without any accountability applied. (Note 22) 

3.1 Mismanagement of Resources 

mismanagement of natural and human resources included exclusion of the competent elements from 

the state machinery and replacing them with the members of the Islamic movement—the majority of 

them lack the appropriate qualifications and expertise. This had led to deterioration in the public 

services in general. Many developmental projects broke down. Agriculture and industry (factories) 

were damaged. This immediately impacted exports and reversed the balance of trade to acute deficit. 

(Note 23) Consequently, the Sudanese currency dropped from SDG 12 against $1 when this regime 

assumed power in 1989, to 90,000 by late 2018. As a result the government embarked on loans from 

abroad. About 70% of the factories stopped production. (Note 24) 

The Sudan, with vast area (1.8 million km2), more than 121 million of animal wealth, has got long 

borders at the Red Sea (800 kilometers), many rivers—notably the river Nile—Gum Arabic, cereals, 

audible oil seeds, mineral resources—notably gold, etc. “Sudan enjoys multidimensional ecologies that 

provide immense fertile land of about 80 million hectares, a large number of livestock, natural pasture 

of about 24 million hectares, forest area of about 4 million hectares …rivers and rains with annual 

amount of 575 million cubic meters.” (Note 25) The Sudan ranks five in the world in terms of natural 

resources, but paradoxically it is one of the poorest country in the world—reflecting a structural 

weakness and inertia with respect to the leading elites who lack vision, and will for exploiting such rich 

resources. If these rich resources are efficiently managed, the Sudanese would enjoy a prosperous life. 

3.2 Mismanagement of Diversity: 

Mismanagement of diversity is related with the issue of the crisis of identity where the Sudan has more 

than 400 tribes, the majority of them have been either under-represented or suffered severe 

marginalization or deprivation.(Musa, 2018) (Note 26) The situation has been aggravated by 

discrimination—in opportunities, jobs and development—on ethnic basis. This had ignited grievances 

and eventually insurgency. (Note 27) Thus, the ruling political class is responsible for what the 

Sudanese people have been suffering from—poverty, miserable life, crises, conflicts and wars—since 

independence. Therefore, the revolution was a product of an accumulation of many factors along with 

grave political mistakes committed by the ruling elites. 

3.3 Repression, Exclusion and Marginalization 

Marginalization and exclusion had triggered rebellion and the emergence of the armed opposition—in 

the South: in 1955—1972, then 1983—2004 (terminated by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, CPA, 

in January 2005); in the Nuba Mountains: in 1983 which ended with the CPA, but broke out once again 

by Abdel Al-Aziz Al Hilo in 2012 and ended only, after the Uprising, by the Juba Peace Agreement in 

October 2020; Darfur: started resistance since early 1990s but took arms by 2003; besides the Blue Nile, 

led By Agar and the East. Most of these movements sought backing from abroad leading to the 

internationalization of the internal (periphery-center) conflict. This was worsened by repression and 



www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape              Advances in Politics and Economics                 Vol. 5, No. 1, 2022 

12 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 

rampant corruption. 

With the removal of al-Beshir from officein April 11, 2019—by a military-supported Uprising—these 

forces (the armed struggle movements) joined the “Transitional Government” (TG) on the basis of a 

formula set by Juba Agreement in October 2020. They asked for great shares in the institutions of the 

TG. As some of them called for some sort of reconciliation with the deposed regime’s Party (the 

National Congress Party) a wish against the will of the people who toppled the Islamist regime, the 

political scene has become complicated. Divisions appeared among the components of the Transitional 

government particularly following a failed coup attempt in September 2021—which was denounced by 

Gen. Abdul-Fattah al-Burhan, the Head of the Sovereignty Council, accusations were exchanged 

indicating that some of the civil components of the Transitional Government were involved in that 

attempted coup. This had deepened divisions among the civil component of the TG including its 

political incubator (the Forces of Freedom and Change: FFC). 

Consequently, a new faction produced by that split formed a bloc known as “FFC -2”, signed a new 

“National Charter” and named itself “National Consensus” group. They accused the main FFC 

members who formed the government as only “four parties, who hijacked the revolution, excluded the 

majority—the vivid forces of the revolution” organized a sit-in at the Republican Palace in Khartoum 

on October 16, 2021 demanding the resolution of the cabinet and forming a new one of independent 

technocrats”. Many believe that this new FFC faction (of the National Charter) was influenced by the 

adherents of the deposed regime (the Islamists) and that they called the army to take over by resolving 

the civil cabinet—led by Abdallah Hamdok—and form a technocratic one. All these state of affairs had 

a great negative impact on the coherence and stability of the Transitional Government and threatened 

the democratic transition. (Note 28) 

 

4. Sudan’s Revolutionary Movement (2018/19 - ): Characteristics and Challenges 

4.1 Characteristics: 

1. One of the most remarkable characteristics of the Sudan’s Revolution (of 2018/19) it was a 

non-violent civil resistance. 

2. The majority of the protestors are young who revealed amazing fearlessness.  

3. Considerable participation of women who were as brave as the male protesters. Twelve girls were 

killed during the demonstrations in different parts of the country. 

4. It was not led by a definite political party but rather a sudden outbreak of a collaboration of all 

sectors of society, of cross-ethnic groups, who took to the streets motivated by strong yearning for 

emancipation from a rule of dictatorship, repression and corruption.  

5. It has revealed that: because the Islamic movement had excluded “all people”, the whole society 

united against them. It was a direct reaction to the Islamists’ authoritarian and exclusive political 

behavior when they were in power. (Note 29) 

6. being peaceful constituted a “soft power” for the revolution. This peacefulness of the revolution 



www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape              Advances in Politics and Economics                 Vol. 5, No. 1, 2022 

13 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 

stripped the defunct regime from justification to use excessive force to crush the demonstrations. The 

world international community and world public opinion has sympathized with the 

demonstrations—leaving the Islamists’ regime without any backing or legitimacy. 

7. The revolution was well organized and the protesters showed strong cohesiveness and bravery to 

overcome the continual efforts of the security excessive use of force to disperse the demonstrations.  

4.2 Challenges to Transition (2019 - ): 

Two years after the outset of the transitional government, the FFC faced a great deal of criticism for 

being weak due to fragmentation as some important components started to break away—notably one of 

the major founders of the federation of the so called “the Professionals” Association” which organized 

and led the demonstrations that broke out since late December 2018. This association had later 

on—following the relinquish of General al-Beshir—constituted the main pillar for the FFC which 

comprised over 180 components which included: political parties, trade unions, professional 

associations, and various civil society organizations—some of them were active for several years 

waging opposition against the Islamist regime. It defected from the FFC in July 2020. The Sudanese 

Communist Party—a major founder of the Professionals’ Association—defected from the FFC on Nov. 

6, 2020 denouncing the deviation of FFC from the Charter and applied the conditions imposed by the 

IMF. (Salih, 2021) (Note 30) 

 The Sudanese Communist Party justified its defection from the FFC because it rejected this “soft 

landing” which stabs the people on the back. “These groups of soft landing have been hindering the 

march of the revolution.” (Edris, 2021) (Note 31) It is also believed that these groups held meetings 

with some regional forces - such as the United Arab Emirates - and that they were trying to link the 

Sudan’s economy with the global capitalism which would impose on the country the conditions of the 

IMF which will impede any national scheme for real development and renaissance. (Note 32) 

A thoroughly demilitarized transitional regime was the top demand of people who accomplished a sit-in 

at the military headquarters in Khartoum for nearly three months (April 11—June 30, 2019). They also 

called for the detention of all members of the former regime, and filing suit of corruption as well as of 

killing civilians over the four months of protests (December 19, 2018-April 11, 2019). It was only by 

September 1, 2019, that a cabinet was declared with Dr. Abdallah Hamdok named as Prime Minister. 

In spite of being able of deposing one of the strongest military dictatorships in the area, the Sudan’s 

revolution faced many difficulties and challenges. To single out some examples: 

First: Internal divisions in the FFC: one of the greatest challenges that have faced the Transitional 

Government was the split of the main leading political coalition of the post-Uprising transitional 

government. These forces which led the protests against al-Beshir’s regime included—at the 

outset—more than 180 organizations and political parties. As General al-Beshir was forced by the army 

generals to step down in response to the people’s will, the number the actually active parties in the 

political scene dropped to about 70—out of over 100 parties, besides the Professionals’ Association, 

started consultations about the formation of the institutions of the (TG). This process took several 



www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape              Advances in Politics and Economics                 Vol. 5, No. 1, 2022 

14 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 

months (from April to August 2019) during that time only over 40 political parties remained directly 

involved in the process of the formation of the TG. 

By August 19, 2019 Dr. AbdallaHamdok was unanimously nominated as Prime Minister. Then by early 

September 2019 the coalition of the (FFC) named the members of the Cabinet Ministers and the civil 

component of the Council of Sovereignty (CS) which was staffed by half military and half civilians and 

to be presided in the first half of the 39-month-long transitional period by the military (General 

al-Burhan as the General Commander-in-Chief) and the second half was to be presided by a civilian 

figure. The formation of the transitional parliament along with the nomination of state governors and 

other major institutions of the state was postponed till an Agreement was signed with the Rebel 

Movements (later on re-named as “the armed struggle movements”). But this Agreement (Juba) was 

signed only more than a year late (on October 3, 2020). This delay resulted in administrative vacuum 

all over the country leading to deterioration in security, economic conditions, services and tribal 

conflicts. 

In mid May 2021 about 20 political parties met in the House of the Umma Party to discuss the 

“reformation of the FFC to broaden the base of participation as the coalition witnessed many defections 

and the performance of the civil executive became weak.” (Note 33) This split increased over weeks till 

it culminated into an outcry—in the second half of 2021—that the Revolution had been high jacked by 

only four political parties.” (Note 34) Consequently, tens of parties—including the two major 

opposition movement of Darfur (the Justice and Equality Movement, led by Jebreel Ibrahim, and the 

Sudan Liberation Movement, led by Mini Arko Minawi) met on October 16, 21, signed a charter and 

declared the formation of the “National Consensus” (NC). They are labeled as “FFC-2” as they broke 

away from the mainstream FFC which organized and led the protests of the Uprising (2018/19). After 

witnessing split this main faction is known was “the FFC- the Central Council” or (FFC-1)”.  

Then the new faction waged a campaign of criticism against Hamdok’s cabinet of being controlled by 

only four parties while excluding the majority. On October 16, 2021, this FFC-2 (the National 

Consensus) organized a sit-in at the Republican Palace in Khartoum asking for the dissolution of 

Hamdok’s cabinet, dismantle the monopoly of the four parties and broaden the participation in the TG 

to be representative to the different revolutionary forces. 

Thus, the TG became heavily engaged in intra-FFC dissensions on one side, and the TG’s civil 

components being at loggerhead with the Military elements of the Council of Sovereignty (CS) on the 

other. The dispute between the two sides was sparked off on September 21, when the two sides 

exchanged accusations of collusion with the leaders of the aborted military coup in Khartoum. This had 

ignited distrust between the two sides (the military and the civilians). The FFC-2 (NC) alleged that they 

represent the majority of the revolutionary forces which were excluded by the four parties dominating 

the executive, the states’ governors, and the civil component of the (CS).  

The FFC-2 (NC) managed to mobilize many people for the sit-in at the Republican Palace. They used 

religious rhetoric to rally the religious sects (the Sufist/s), and many social forces through an Islamic 



www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape              Advances in Politics and Economics                 Vol. 5, No. 1, 2022 

15 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 

appeal that the FFC-1 are secularist—thus instigating many sectors of society to rally against Hamdok’s 

cabinet and called upon the President of the CS, Gen. Abdul-Fattah al-Burhan, to dissolve the TG and 

form a new one with broad representativeness.  

To counter this rally of the FFC-2 (NC), the FFC-1 (the mainstream of the political incubator of the TG) 

mobilized its bases - through the Resistance Committees (established in 2018) in different quarters in 

Sudan and organized a one-million demonstration on October 21 (commemorating the Revolution of 

October 21, 1964) where more than ten were killed and tens were injured. This one outnumbered that 

organized by the FFC-2 (NC), apart from demonstrations in several towns in Sudan—sending a strong 

message to the military and the world public opinion that the majority of the Sudanese people support 

civilian rule and reject any military intervention under any pretexts. On 13.11.2021 the FFC-1 

organized another demonstrations rejecting al-Burhan’s formation of a 14-member Council of 

Sovereignty on11.11.21, with (9) members civilians and (5) military. 

Tension grew as differences between the two FFC’s factions increased on the one hand and that 

between the civil elements of the TG and the Military elements of the CS. Attempts failed to mend 

fences between the conflicting parties. Taking into consideration the East was still under Beja’s 

blockade (was ended on October 31, 21), crises in basic needs were on the rise, the sit-in continued 

paralyzing life at the city Centre, war of media was heated; tensions on the rise, and a deadlock was 

reached.  

Consequently, on October 25, 2021, General al-Burhan dissolved the TG (the cabinet and the CS), 

suspended seven articles in the Constitutional Charter, declared the state of emergency, released all 

ministers, state governors, as well as the undersecretaries, detained some ministers and put Hamdok 

under house arrest. The FF-2 (NC) commended the decisions, described them as a correction to the 

path of the revolution and ended the sit-in. whereas the FFC-1described al-Burhan’s decisions as a 

“military coup”. Nonetheless, demonstrations broke out in hundreds of thousands—in Khartoum and 

several towns all over the country—denouncing the coup and calling for reinstating Hamdok’s civil 

cabinet. Despite being peaceful, 40 were killed and hundreds were injured in three protests (on October 

21, Oct. 30, Nov. 13 and Nov. 17, 2021). (Note 35) In the face of continual demonstrations and 

international pressure Gen. al-Burhan signed a “Political Agreement” with Hamdok on November 21, 

21 - ending his house arrest, releasing political detainees, declaring a commitment to: form a technocrat 

cabinet, completing the institutions of the transition and organize elections by July 2023. 

Second: the Economic crisis: the situation was actually one of pervasive economic deterioration. This 

includes the heavy debts inherited from the deposed regime (over $50 billion). (Note 36) Hyperinflation 

scored three digits “(412%) by June 2021”. (Note 37) This triggered further public discontent. (Note 38) 

This was aggravated in September 16, 21 when the Beja ethnicity in the East of Sudan started a 

blockade to the Port, the Air Port of (Port Sudan) town—aggravating the economic crisis. The leaders 

of the Beja ethnicity said that the blockade was a reaction to the procrastination on the part of the 

central government of Khartoum to respond to the demands of the people of the Eastern region as 



www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape              Advances in Politics and Economics                 Vol. 5, No. 1, 2022 

16 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 

represented by their major tribal leaders, namely Muhammad al-Ameen Terik” had put forward some 

demands as conditions to terminate the four-week-long blockade of the Port, notably: cancelling the 

track of the East included the Juba Peace Agreement signed in October 2020 where they believe that 

the agreement had underestimated the injustice inflicted on the region by the successive central 

governments of Khartoum since independence. (Note 39) 

Third: challenges and threats by having many armies: 

The existence of the Rapid Support Forces/RSF (led by Gen. M. H. Dagalo Hemedti), side by side with 

the official Sudan’s Armed Forces indicates there are “two armies” in Sudan. This had triggered 

controversy as General Hemedti seems reluctant to accept the idea of amalgamating his forces in the 

national army. The danger here is that this force is based on the previous Janjaweed militia which was 

formed by the deposed President Al-Beshir to support him and protect his regime against the Armed 

Struggle Movements of Darfur. Another problem is that many believe that the RSF is dominated by one 

tribe (the Mahameed, a branch of the Rezeigat—Arab nomads) and mainly led by one family (the 

commander is Gen Abdul-Rahim Dagalo—Hemedti’s brother). However, General Hemaidti negated the 

triabalized nature of his forces and claimed that it is a nation-wide force. Nonetheless, the existence of 

the RSF after the revolution has become politically unacceptable, legally illegitimate and socially 

hazardous. 

Political activists had been continually “accusing the RFS of participating in brutish assault on those at 

the sit-in where 110 were killed, tens were injured, raped or thrown into the Nile with their bodies 

fastened with stones” (Note 40) In fact the RSFs had committed atrocities and crimes against 

humanities in Darfur since its formation in 2013. Many reports confirmed that these forces “used to 

attack citizens in Darfur and it had terrified people and committed violations.” (Note 41) 

 

5. Conclusions 

It is notable that the Sudanese elites are lagging far behind the Sudanese people’s ambitions and 

awareness. In several cases of upheavals the masses paid a lot for emancipation and provided 

opportunities for a full-fledged revolution, but were always let down and disappointed by the elites. 

The article provided empirical explanations for how those setbacks took place opening the door for a 

military comeback—sustaining a “vicious circle” that I dubbed as “Sudan’s syndrome”. 

It was obvious that from the outset the civil alliance which led and organized the protests (starting from 

Dec. 18), lagged unity of vision, leadership and program. It failed to produce a competent and coherent 

cabinet; underwent factionalism (the Professionals’ Association broke away and so did the Sudanese 

Communist Party—from the first months, the remaining component split into two factions—FFC/1and 

FFC/2, with the later allying with the military and elements of the deposed regime) along with 

exchanging accusations with the military component, besides multiplicity of crises, all weakened the 

TG and impacted the revolutionary process.  

According to the analysis conducted in this article democratization in Sudan is threatened by two 



www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape              Advances in Politics and Economics                 Vol. 5, No. 1, 2022 

17 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 

obstacles: (A) the first one is related to the political institutions—notably the political parties; (B) the 

second is related to elites and leadership. Of course there are other factors but all—in the final 

analysis—are related to these two factors, either directly or indirectly, such as poor political culture, 

tribalism and ethnic conflicts or the like. 

To enhance the process of democratic transition in Sudan the political parties are to: 

1) Amalgamate into a few and strong political parties (instead of being over hundred in a country with 

only 40 population; 

2) Adopt strategic plan for its internal restructuring and reformation; 

3) Should have visionary leaders; 

4) Adopt a smart strategic political partnership. 

Hence, given these crises and challenges—including factionalism and elites’ dissensions—real 

concessions and sacrifices are needed for the sake of public interest. So, it remains a matter of ethics, 

commitment and patriotism. Actually, the climate brought by the revolution is quite inducing for 

exerting effective efforts in rebuilding political parties and civil society organizations which both can 

act as democracy-building institutions. 

Therefore, one can hold that the future of democracy and stability in Sudan relies heavily on 

maintaining the above mentioned requirements: visionary leadership, post-revolutionary institutions 

building, rebuilding political parties on sound basis to tackle their structural and functional deficiencies 

discussed in this article, building coherent and conscious civil society organizations to function in a 

free democratic climate to contribute effectively to democratization and nation building.  

It is also advisable for the case of Sudan to adopt consociational democracy—to be adapted to the 

Sudan’s conditions– in a presidential and federal system, and with proportional representation system 

of elections. This is because as the Sudan is a highly diversified society—especially ethnically—is in 

need of such an appropriate formula of power-and-wealth sharing. 

 

References 

Bullock, A., & Stephen, T. (1999). The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought (3rd ed.). 

Clifton, B. K. (1996). Theory and History of Revolution. Journal of World History. 

Davies, J. C. (1962). Towards a Theory of Revolution. American Sociological Review. 

Eisenstaedt, S. N. (1977). Theory and Dynamics of Civilizations and Revolutions. Daedulus, 106(4). 

MIT Press. http://www.jstor.org.  

Eisenstaedt, S. N. (1978). Revolution and Societies: A Comparative Study of Civilizations. New York: 

Free Press. 

Foran, J. (1993). “Theories of Revolution Revisited: Toward a Fourth Generation”. Sociological 

Theory. 

Foran, J. (2005). Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions. UK, New York, Cambridge 

University Press 



www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape              Advances in Politics and Economics                 Vol. 5, No. 1, 2022 

18 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 

Foran, J. (ed.). (1997). Theorizing Revolutions. Rutledge Taylor & Frances, UK. 

Goldstone, J. A. (1980). Theories of Revolutions: The Third Generation. World Politics, 32(3). 

Goldstone, J. A. (2001). Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory. Annual Review of 

Political Science, 4. 

Goodwin, J. (1989). Explaining Revolutions in Contemporary Third World. Journals.sagepub.com. 

https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292890100403 

Goodwin, J. (2001). No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991. Cambridge 

University Press  

Gurr, T. R. (1970). Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 

Gurr, T. R. (1988). War, Revolution, and the Growth of the Coercive State, Comparative Political 

Studies. 

Huntington, S. P. (1968). Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press. 

Irving, E. F. (1997). A History of Mass Communication: Six Information Revolutions. Focal Press, 

1997. 

Le Bon, J. (1913). The Psychology of Revolutions. New York: Earnest Benn Limited. 

Moore, B. (1993). Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and peasants in the making of 

the modern world. Boston: Beacon Press 

Moore, B. (2014 ). The Dialectics of Revolution. Cambridge University Press. 

Musa, A. M. (2009). Darfur from State Crisis to Super powers Clash. Doha (Qatar): al-Jazeera Studies 

Centre. 

Skocpol, T. (1979). Explaining Revolutions: In Quest for Social-Structural Approach. New York: Free 

Press. 

Skocpol, T. (1979). States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and 

China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

Sylvester, A. (1977). Sudan under Nimeiri. London, Sydney and Toronto: The Bodley Head. 

Tilly, C. L. T., & Richard, T. (1975). The Rebellious Century, 1830-1930. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 

University Press. 

Tilly, R. (1995). European Revolutions, 1492-1992. Blackwell Publishing. 

Weitman, S. (1992). Thinking the Revolutions of 1989. British Journal of Sociology, 43. 

 

Notes 

Note 1. Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model”, Comparative 

Politics. New York: Vol. 2, No. 3 (Apr., 1970), pp. 337-363. 

Note 2. Ibid. 

Note 3. Tilly 1993, Goldstone 1998. In: Jack A. Goldstone, Toward a Fourth Generation of 

Revolutionary Theory”, Annual Review of Political Science. Vol. 4: 139-187, June 2001). Charles 

Tilly’s latest Work, From Mobilization to Revolution, defines revolution in terms of both the level of 



www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape              Advances in Politics and Economics                 Vol. 5, No. 1, 2022 

19 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 

political violence and the extent of displacement of the political elite.  

Note 4. Jack Goldstone, Theories of Revolutions: The Third Generation, World Politics. Vo. 32. No. 3 

(April 1980, p. 425. 

Note 5. Ibid. 

Note 6. Ibid. 

Note 7. (Ted R. Gurr 1988), in: Jack A. Goldstone, Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary 

Theory”, op. cit. 

Note 8. Foran & Goodwin 1993, Weitman 1992, and Pastor 2001), in: Goldstone, op. cit. 

Note 9. Ibid. 

Note 10. John Foran, Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions, UK, New York, 

Cambridge University Press, 2005. 

Note 11. Ibdid. 

Note 12. For further definitions and theories of revolution (concept and definitions) see: John Foran, 

“Theories of Revolution Revisited: Toward a Fourth Generation”, Sociological Theory 11, 1993:1-20; 

See also (to cite only a few examples): (Skocpol 1979), (Goldstone 1980, 1994, 1998), (Tilly 1993), 

(Eisenstaedt 1978, 1992, 1999), (Davis 1962), (Gurr 190), (Huntington 1968), (Goodwin 1989). 

Note 13. The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought Third Edition (1999), Allan Bullock and 

Stephen Trombley, Eds. pp. 754-746. 

Note 14. https://www.collinsdictionary.com. Retrieved: October 6, 2021. 

Note 15. Wikipedia.org. retrieved: October 6, 2021 

Note 16. Goldfarb 1992, Diamond & Plattner 1993). In: Jack Goldstone, “Towards a Fourth Generation 

of Revolutionary Theory”, op.cit, pp. 139-187 

Note 17. Anthony Sylvester, Sudan under Nimeiri. London, Sydney and Toronto: The Bodley Head, 

1977. 

Note 18. Interview conducted by the author with, Adam Musa, a previous farmer at Gedaref state 

(Eastern Sudan) who gave up farming for the unfair government’s policies, Khartoum: 20.9.2021. 

Note 19. Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics 2015. There are many other factors for persistent poverty 

in Sudan including the concentration of socio-economic development in a few areas. 

Note 20. Abdu Mukhtar Musa,” Darfur from State Crisis to Super powers Clash”(2009), Doha (Qatar): 

al-Jazeera Studies Centre (in Arabic). 

Note 21. Ibid. 

Note 22. Social media frequently published news about the huge wealth being accumulated by 

al-Beshir’s family and relatives. 

Note 23. What proves the assumption that mismanagement is one major factor of Sudan’s poverty is 

that—according to international reports/standards—Sudan ranks 78th worldwide and the 1st among the 

Arab states in terms of resources.  

Note 24. https://www.bbc.com.10.2015, retrieved on 28.11.2021. 



www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape              Advances in Politics and Economics                 Vol. 5, No. 1, 2022 

20 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 

Note 25. https://www.wikipedia.org 

Note 26. Abdu Mukhtar Musa, “The Tribal Impact on Political Stability in Sudan”, Contemporary Arab 

Affairs, Vol. 11, Number 1-2, pp. 1-22. issn 1755-0912. www.ucpress.edu/journals.php?p=reprints. 

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1525/caa.2018.000010. 

Note 27. Abdu MukhtarMusa,” Darfur from State Crisis to Super powers Clash, op. cit., pp. 3-69. 

Note 28. This part which covers the current events of the time of the transitional period was monitored 

by the author; a direct observation and close follow up. 

Note 29. The protesters of Uprising (Dec. 19, 2018-April 11, 2019) were repeating such a phrase as 

“We will trample down any Islamist” (AyyiKoaz, nadussodoas). 

Note 30. Abbas Muhammad Salih, “Militarization of Politics: Rethinking Gen. Al-Burhan’s Coup of 

October 25, 2021”. https://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/article/5192. 

Note 31. Tayseer Hassan Edris, “Have the Elites of Bargaining upset the Revolution?” Al-Maidan 

Newspaper (the organ of the Sudanese Communist Party). No. 3787, Khartoum: 27,4 , 2021. 

Note 32. Ibid. 

Note 33. https://www.aljazeera.net. 27.9.2021. 

Note 34. This included: the Sudanese Congress Party, The Democratic Unionist Party, the Socialist 

Arab Ba’ath (Resurrection) Party and a faction of the Umma Party. 

Note 35. Figures were usually released by the “Physician doctors” Central Committee”. 

Note 36. For Sudan debts see: www.aawsat.com, 18.5.2021. 

Note 37. Sudan News Agency (SUNA): 18.7.2021. Retrieved on 18.7.2021. 

www.swissinfo.ch. 18.7.2021. Retrieved on 13.12.2021. 

Note 38. http://Mubasher.aljazeera.net, 20.9.2021. 

Note 39. Al-Arabi Al-Jadid (the New Arab), newspaper, 7.6.2019, and Al-Anadhol: 8.7.2019. 

Note 40. www.noonpost.com, 7.1.2018: On March 2021 the Human Rights Watch reported that in the 

period September 2020 to February 2021 the RSFs detained tens of civilians and denied them access to 

lawyers and their families throughout their detention, which ranged from a week to over a month. Two 

detainees said RSF guards physically ill-treated them. The HRW managed to interrogate four of the 

detainees who confirmed the violations.  

 

 


