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Advances in Politics and Economics 
ISSN 2576-1382 (Print) ISSN 2576-1390 (Online) 

Vol. 5, No. 3, 2022 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 

31 
 

Original Paper 

Democracy’s Invisible Savior: Why Citizens Should Welcome 

Taxes with Open Arms 

Samantha Schwarz1* 
1 Independent Researcher, Washington DC, USA  
* Samantha Schwarz, E-mail: samschwarz0@gmail.com 

 

Received: May 28, 2022         Accepted: June 8, 2022        Online Published: June 20, 2022 

doi:10.22158/ape.v5n3p31            URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v5n3p31 

 

Abstract 

This article aims to understand the transformative power that the fiscal requirement to impose taxation 

has on democratization. An exploration into the fiscal development of early modern Europe alongside 

modern empirical examples, demonstrates the value of taxation as a solution to leaderships that don’t 

represent their people. It’s reasoned that the confluence of taxation and democracy can be attributed to 

two distinct mechanisms. One, that the government is more willing to compromise to the peoples’ 

demands, and two, that the people are more willing to demand this compromise. The latter is of 

particular significance in suggesting the role that behavioral phenomena play in inflaming democratic 

engagement. Critically, the behavioral effects of taxation should take more of a leading role in policies 

that pursue democratization whilst aid, more of a support role. 

Keywords 

democracy, taxation, citizen participation, loss aversion, representative governance, tax bargaining 

 

1. Introduction 

The freedom that the leaders of petrostates—most notably those of the gulf economies—have been 

granted by their opulence of resource wealth, has been eyed with envy by other nations. The chateaus 

of Saudi Arabia, or the gilded architecture of Qatar, are of particular salience. Increasingly however, 

this envy appears to have been merely in the eye of the beholder. The state revenue of these economies 

has been entirely fueled—quite literally—by high oil prices. Amongst the many disturbances of 2020, 

was the colossal crash in the price of oil. Price wars in March saw the sharpest decline since 1991 

(Stevens, 2020). Whilst oil has since rallied back to high prices, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has 

awoken the world to the myriad of geopolitical risks that surround a dependence on fossil fuels. 

Volatility in oil markets and the resounding calls for renewable energy indicate that it won’t be a 



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reliable source of revenue for oil exporting nations for long—suggesting that oil may be unsustainable 

in more ways than one. 

The 2020 oil price collapse, whilst no doubt the source of headache for many a fund manager, also 

exposed how vulnerable oil-rich economies’ balance sheets really are (Miller, 2020). In 2020, the 

Algerian government required oil priced above US$100 a barrel to balance its books (The Economist, 

2020). The UAE required US$70 per barrel (Financial Times, 2020). For Saudi Arabia, US$83 

(Financial Times, 2020). Yet in 2020, the price sunk beneath US$30 per barrel (The Business Times, 

2020). Amassing further debt to offset such oil losses didn’t offer much hope to many of these 

nations—Oman was projected to owe 89-percent of its GDP to creditors (The Economist, 2020). An oil 

market crisis couldn’t have come knocking at a worse time. The onslaught of the Covid-19 pandemic 

didn’t just damage demand for oil, it froze tourism—a revenue alternative for Gulf nations—in its 

tracks, to deliver a simultaneous blow. All of which, raises a larger, far more consequential question: 

when a government has nowhere left to turn to for money but to its own people, what will happen? 

 

2. A Historical Account 

Leadership that can no longer sustain itself by way of externally sourced revenue, unable to buy loyalty 

or pay-off competition, faces a transformative dilemma. Such a state will be forced to pivot elsewhere 

for financing—taxation. The historical record provides a curious account of this process. The Holy 

Roman Empire, a collection of sovereignties in Western and Central Europe over the Middle Ages to 

the 19th century, displays iterations of fiscal development. Unlike death, there was no certainty in taxes 

during early modern Europe. Initially, court fees, commodity sales and other monopolies were the 

source of sovereign revenue. However, as the costs of warfare with neighboring territories increased, 

survival depended on finding additional revenue. Rulers began to solicit this revenue by levying tax on 

their subjects (Bates & Lien, 1985, p. 54). This created a dilemma for the state: if citizens were to be 

expected to contribute their income to the monarch, then the citizenry had not only been supplied a 

cause to expect better treatment, but they’d also been given a means to negotiate it too.  

The capability of private agents to resist taxes, meant that those early modern European states who 

choose to impose said taxes, had to engage in tax bargaining. If citizens were to voluntarily participate 

in this new revenue model the state had to earn their acquiescence by ceding them political voice. This 

led to the expanded provision of public goods and the creation of institutions including financial 

councils (Cantoni et al., 2019, p. 8). Consequently, the government inevitably had to transform into one 

that was more representative of the people. As a result, by the early 17th century England had 

established a more or less independent court and Parliament (Prichard, 2015, p. 51). England was not 

the only nation to do so—notably, France and the Netherlands amongst others (Prichard, 2015, p.51; 

Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, 2008, p. 9). 

 

 



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2.1 Give Me Tea and Give Me Freedom 

Of all the historical examples, a particularly theatrical one comes from the role that Britain’s relentless 

taxes played in inciting the American Revolution of the 17th century. British Parliament’s tea tax 

infuriated American colonists so much so, as to prompt patriots dressed as Mohawk Indians to 

forcefully hurl an entire ship’s supply of tea overboard—the infamous Boston Tea Party of 1773 

(Prichard, 2015, p. 53). This was a clear example of collective action by the people to demand greater 

representation. Importantly, whilst tax bargaining need not always require citizens to go so far as to 

flood a harbor with ninety-thousand pounds of tea leaves, minimal citizen engagement can still prompt 

democratic change. Even economist Joseph Schumpeter in his 1918 Crisis of the Tax State, 

acknowledged the requirement of financing the state as empirically being the driving catalyst of social 

and political change (Schimdt, 2003, p. 342). In plain English: the transition from the feudal system to 

the capitalist free economy was reliant on the tax state. 

The notion that the introduction of tax will spark democratization is an alluring idea. However, it isn’t 

so simple. Firstly, negotiating power is never distributed evenly amongst a population. In the Holy 

Roman Empire, aristocratic taxpayers with significant wealth—the most important taxpayers—had the 

resources and profile to demand compromise. Comparatively, the peasants did not. This reality was 

recognized by Montesquieu, who noted that monarchs needed to exercise restraint where mobile assets 

were abundant (Bates & Lien, 1985, p. 60). Indeed, agrarian states (home to poorer citizens) were more 

likely to use coercion to collect taxes from their people in comparison to the leaders of capital-intensive 

ones (Cantoni et al., 2019, p. 50). Secondly, some sovereigns, uninterested in entertaining citizen 

demands, never bothered to engage in a negotiating process in the first place. Why did taxation spur 

democracy in some territories in early modern Europe but not others? Put simply, whether the necessity 

of taxation leads to democracy is sensitive to many factors. Whilst taxation does confer power to the 

people, it does so in unique ways. This is particularly evident in today’s world. 

 

3. A Theoretical Account 

3.1 No Taxation without Representation 

A theoretical exploration into the transformative effects of introducing tax is first taken. This 

process—tax encouraging representative governance—condenses into two distinct mechanisms. First, 

the government will be more willing to compromise to the demands of its people, and second, the 

people will be more willing to demand better governance. The former arises from the simple fact that 

by requiring the population to supply the revenue, the government has empowered the people with a 

choice (Paler, 2013: 709). Taxpayers can choose to undermine the government’s fiscal strength by 

refusing to oblige their tax requirements. The government is therefore incentivized to placate taxpayers 

into quasi-voluntary compliance through compromise. Citizens might demand the expanded provision 

of public goods and services—perhaps improved schools or infrastructure—or even an end to 

corruption. Tax bargaining, that is, a citizen’s ability to leverage their choice to extract government 



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concessions, effectively transforms their power vis-à-vis the government. Furthermore, should citizens 

demand transparency, the subsequent publicization of budgets and establishment of independent 

tribunals will improve tax infrastructure itself—a cycle of improvement and mutual behavior 

adjustment. 

However, a government’s incentive to compromise is only half of the explanation. In the absence of 

taxation, what has stopped citizens from using elections or similar leverage to demand accountable 

governance? This puzzle can be explained by the second mechanism. Put simply, the people are willing 

to demand better governance. Citizens who are told to forfeit their income are very quickly intolerant 

of an unresponsive and corrupt government (Paler, 2013, p. 723). Several psychological theories 

underpin this phenomenon. Behavioral economists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky identified that 

people display a consistent pattern in their choice preferences. Specifically, that avoiding a loss is 

preferred to receiving an equivalent gain, labelling this loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 

279); (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991, p. 10). A government that begins collecting from citizens own 

income, has shifted its citizens into the psychological “loss realm”. Whereas, when a government 

simply siphons away foreign aid, citizens only lose a potential “gain”. If a citizen’s loss in utility, as 

roused by the imposed tax, is accompanied by corrupt governance, their tolerance for inadequate 

government will be uniquely eroded. 

An extension to loss aversion, the endowment effect, describes that people appraise a higher value to 

those objects which they perceive ownership of (Kahneman et al., 1991, p. 194). In 1991, Kahneman 

was joined by Richard Thaler and Jack Knetsch, to study this phenomenon. In this study, some 

participants were gifted a mug to prompt their sense of ownership over the good, whilst other 

participants were not. Participants were then able to sell or trade the mug. The results showed that those 

participants who felt “ownership” would only agree to sell a mug at an average of twice the amount 

that they’d be willing to pay to purchase the same mug had they not felt ownership (Kahneman et al., 

1991, p. 196). Applying these findings, requiring citizens to contribute a share of their income fosters 

their perception of ownership over national revenue. After the introduction of taxes, the interaction of 

loss aversion and the endowment effect positively operate to drive citizen engagement. Both the 

personal loss of a citizen’s income and their newfound sense of entitlement to state income, has 

provided citizens with a significantly more powerful motivator to punish and hold their government 

accountable. Comparatively, a leader’s abuse of externally sourced revenue simply won’t spark outrage 

and collective action the way misuse of tax revenue will. 

It is emphasized—and cannot be understated—that the revenue raised itself is irrelevant to the primary 

role that taxation plays in democratization. Yet, when tax is proposed as a development solution 

revenue is too often the focus and capacity too often the language (Bachas, Kondylis, & Loeser, 2021; 

Pomeranz & Vila-Belda, 2019). If raising more revenue was the solution, resource rents, foreign aid or 

other externally sourced revenue would have furthered democracy already. Foreign income requires 

little—if any—interaction with local citizens, reducing the government’s reliance on local support to 



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almost nil. In effect, financing a budget wholly externally is counterproductive to good governance. 

Thus, what matters is the means in which the revenue is raised not the revenue itself. It’s unlikely that 

the fiery sentiment behind the famous American Revolutionary slogan, “no taxation without 

representation”, would have emerged without the relentless taxation by the British. The greatest power 

of taxation: it reaps participation dividends. 

3.2 A Solution or a Siren Call? 

Despite the compelling siren call of the theoretical account of tax and democracy, it’s likely of no 

surprise that in reality a happy outcome is far from guaranteed. In predicting whether tax will promote 

democracy, several factors must be considered. A government with an alternative means to externally 

source funds won’t risk the political costs of imposing taxes. Therefore, the level of fiscal pressure 

facing a government is the first factor (Prichard, 2015, p. 70). Secondly, taxpayer capacity to bargain, 

as influenced by the extent of political openness in an economy, is important (Prichard, 2015, p. 73). A 

state with a repressive government that has few independent civil or business organizations may not see 

democracy gains from the imposition of tax alone. Third, is the availability and strength of institutions, 

including parliamentary processes, which can facilitate bargaining (Prichard, 2015, p. 75). Finally, is 

the political salience of introduced taxation (Prichard, 2015, p. 76). Citizens can’t protest taxes that 

they aren’t aware of, and not all taxes are designed to be visible—an insidious yet often common 

strategy for governments to have their cake and eat it too. 

These factors combine to influence citizen’s expectations of, and trust in, their government—both of 

which are very important. Citizen’s demands are tethered to their own perceptions of the role of 

government, meaning they are quite literally limited by their imagination. And when there is no trust, 

citizens may choose to simply evade taxes altogether. However, despite these potential pitfalls the 

imposition of taxation has been shown to positively affect democracy in some environments, 

suggesting it indeed is a possible solution. 

 

4. An Empirical Account 

The greatest argument for the specific use of taxes to encourage democracy are empirical examples. 

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a kleptocracy of sorts, collects little tax and has neither 

much citizen participation nor formal channels for such (Weigel, 2020, p. 1857). Kananga, a city in the 

DRC, suffered a loss in diamond revenue after decouplagé of local government in 2015 (Weigel, 2020; 

1858). A narrative that was reminiscent of many petrostates in 2020, Kananga’s government found 

itself looking to other sources of income. A field experiment in Kananga published in 2020 provides 

evidence that introducing taxation can indeed prompt citizens to demand representative governance 

(Weigel, 2020, p. 1853). This study measured the impact of property tax collection on citizens who had 

never previously been registered to pay formal taxes. This randomized rollout was the first citywide tax 

campaign. Prior to its introduction, only 39-percent of Congolese citizens had even heard of the 

provincial tax ministry and fewer than eight-percent made tax payments (Weigel, 2020, p. 1857).  



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Post-campaign, the study found that political participation in the form of attendance at town hall 

meetings and submission of evaluation forms had significantly increased (Weigel, 2020, p. 1872). 

These citizens were even willing to incur costs—largely travel and foregone work—to do so. The 

demands made by these citizens included more inclusive government, public goods such as improved 

infrastructure and greater transparency. One participant said: “Erosion threatens our neighborhoods, 

and the government does nothing…so why should we pay?” (Weigel, 2020, p. 1855). Whilst another 

wrote: “inform us how this money will be spent…[and] not wasted on other things” (Weigel, 2020, p. 

1896). The mere fact that citizens attended forums at all indicates their attempt to achieve policy 

concessions. Some of these citizens agreed to be registered as a formal taxpayer but did not pay the tax 

in the end. This in of itself demonstrates the process of tax bargaining in action.  

Perhaps of most interest was the finding that study participants’ expectations of their government were 

influenced. Citizens positively updated their expectations of reciprocity and an improved administrative 

ability of the Kananga tax ministry (Weigel, 2020, p. 1853). Such an update to norms and expectations 

plays a vital role in civic engagement and a reformed, more resilient, social contract. It appears that in 

this case the mere fact that the ministry tried to register taxpayers—whether they paid or not—signaled 

a capacity improvement. It’s important for long-term progress that citizens have faith in the capability 

of their public institutions. Signals of state competence in Kananga allowed citizens to demand better 

governance once they knew the government was capable of it. Indeed, those individuals who did 

comply with taxes were more likely to express positive attitudes towards leadership. Overall, incidents 

of bribery were reported at very low and property tax compliance increased—signaling that tax 

bargaining can have benefits for both the people and the government. The campaign, by increasing an 

individual’s sense of ownership over public revenue, resulted in a significant broadening of the tax base 

and a sizeable expansion in the formal presence of the state in Kananga (Weigel, 2020, p. 1852). 

Uganda has had a similar political environment of corruption and ineptitude. In 2012, an investigation 

found that aid money worth US$20 million effectively disappeared from public accounts (Martin, 2014, 

p. 6). Whilst the scandal was covered by Ugandan media, and despite the fact that Uganda relied on 

such aid to fund many public goods, surprisingly citizen outrage was almost non-apparent. There was 

little political consequence for the incumbent party. However, when local government in Lira, a 

Ugandan city, stopped collecting trash from a local market, the citizen outrage was in stark contrast to 

that of the aid scandal (Martin, 2014). To be a vendor at this market required a fee payment—a tax of 

sorts—used to fund local government. In return for this fee, the government agreed to collect the 

market trash (It’s evident why the participants were upset when the trash stopped being collected). In 

protest to the overabundance of trash the market vendors left the garbage in front of the City Hall and 

threatened to similarly dump it at council member’s houses (Martin, 2014, p. 5). In short, collection of 

the trash was swiftly resumed.  

An example of the undeniable potential of tax in paving broader democratic reform comes from Ghana. 

In the 1990s Ghana faced increased fiscal deficits and consequently in 1995 the government introduced 



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a Value-Added Tax (VAT) on goods and services to combat its losses (Prichard, 2015, p. 218). The 

government was met by nationwide protests which saw tens of thousands take to the streets. Whilst the 

introduction of a sales tax sparked the initial protests, they quickly grew into demands for broader 

policy transformation (Prichard, 2015). The movement, in unifying previously disparate opposition to 

the repressive government, developed into demands for dramatic expansions in accountability and 

representativeness. The VAT was repealed and not introduced again till 1998 after it had been reformed 

(Prichard, 2015). In successive governments when further increases in VAT were attempted, the 

government had to first agree—at the behest of the public—to designate the new revenue to specific 

public programs. This led to the creation of the National Health Insurance Scheme and Ghana 

Education Trust Fund (Prichard, 2015). The overall result was significant progress towards 

transforming Ghana into a more inclusive and open political environment. 

Comparatively, prior introductions of taxation in Kenya did not lead to sustained civic engagement nor 

immediate government concessions. When a VAT was introduced in the early 1990s, opposition to this 

tax was relatively absent (Prichard, 2015, p. 122). This absence has been attributed to Kenya’s 

repressive government which would have limited taxpayer scope to bargain or organize (Prichard, 

2015). Such passivity supports the reservation that levying tax is not always guaranteed to result in tax 

bargaining outcomes. However, even when direct bargaining isn’t available, taxpayers can still slowly 

undermine an administration through evasion—simply refusing the tax altogether. 

Despite the absence of instantaneous results in Kenya, it’s likely that longer term change did still occur. 

Tax resistance in Kenya during the nineties incrementally weakened the government’s fiscal stability 

and likely aided the eventual political transition in 2002 (Prichard, 2015, p. 3). The incoming 

government—likely aware of the detrimental impact of tax resistance on the previous 

government—explicitly sought to reform tax administration and improve local accountability (Prichard, 

2015). Whilst in some contexts such as Ghana the effects of taxation on democracy do seem to appear 

overnight, this is often not the case. Yet, incremental changes not observable for years into the future 

can still come to fruition, suggesting tax had a positive impact after all—changing norms and 

expectations may take time. Often, it may only be later governments that recognize the need to reform. 

Ethiopia has also demonstrated similar challenges to the ease with which tax can solve all problems. 

Previously, Ethiopian governments have attempted to raise taxes, however, on each occasion there has 

been a noticeable lack of associated tax bargaining (Prichard, 2015, p. 190). This may likely have been 

the result of a weak private sector and repressive political characteristics (Prichard, 2015, p. 191). Low 

public expectations of government responsibility may have also played a role. However, once again 

more subdued resistance to tax likely contributed to incrementally improving democracy in Ethiopia. 

(It’s suggested that fiscal crisis was pivotal in ending the repressive Derg leadership in the late eighties 

(Prichard, 2015, p. 169). Before democracy can prevail, civil society organizations and other 

independent groups that can facilitate bargaining may need time to develop. Indeed, after the expansion 

of business taxes in Ethiopia business associations that engaged with the government were eventually 



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increasingly established (Prichard, 2015, p. 3). Despite the challenges, tax—if salient—will ignite 

outrage, and that is what’s important. 

Finally, an obvious though not yet discussed argument for the use of taxation to further democracy is 

the alignment of objectives targeting GDP growth. A government that earns its revenue through 

taxation is only as rich as its economies’ GDP permits and will quickly find incentives to boost 

economic growth. Rational governments should therefore invest in economic growth policies; 

optimistically, this could include encouraging the employment of women and minority groups. In the 

case of nations such as Saudi Arabia, this could have transformative and long-lasting effects for female 

empowerment.  

 

5. Future Implications 

The finding that introducing tax has a behavioral impact and consequent democratic effect has 

important implications for international policy. First and foremost, the centrality of taxation to not just 

economic, but political development, needs to be more critically considered. There should be a greater 

shift away from the perception of tax as a solution to simply generate revenue towards a solution that 

encourages civic engagement in its own right. Much of the current focus of international tax 

development, in particular that of the OECD in re-allocating taxing rights more equitably away from 

havens (OECD, 2021), whilst important, synonymizes tax with revenue. Whilst increasing federal 

revenue is useful in that it can fund public services, without a functioning system of governance in 

place first this revenue isn’t guaranteed to be distributed, let alone efficiently distributed, to the citizens. 

There is considerable scope for a greater focus of international development to include the behavioral 

applications of tax in the pursuit of democratic change.  

However, where tax is pursued as a democratic solution, certain characteristics must be included in any 

reform attempt if it is to be transformative. Firstly, implemented taxes must be salient to taxpayers. This 

means that taxpayers must both feel the effect and be well educated in exactly what the tax is and its 

operation. In some regions, property or land taxes are the most salient and effective tax to implement, 

in other regions, this mightn’t be the case (Weigel, 2020, p. 1898). In designing new tax, administrators 

should consider how to explicitly link each tax to specific public expenditure or governance oversight 

programs to gain public support. Equally, the bargaining efforts of citizens should also be salient where 

possible. People tend to follow their peers—one needn’t look far to know this. When citizens believe 

their fellow citizens are similarly engaged in tax bargaining, the effects are further compounded (Del 

Carpio, 2014, p. 31).  

Secondly, tax infrastructure should be designed with horizontal equity. Taxpayers must believe they’re 

being treated similarly to their peers—it does no good if civilians are simply encouraged to turn on one 

another. Perhaps not immediately intuitive, but this is most important amongst aristocratic taxpayers 

who have the power to bargain on behalf of the wider population. If faced with a uniform tax burden, 

elites—who have the greatest capacity to do so—will be more incentivized to make collective demands 



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through their united agenda (Bates & Lien, 1985, p. 53). The allowance of discretionary tax exemptions 

for wealthy parties has no effect other than to be self-serving. Furthermore, tax bargaining and 

collective action should be actively encouraged. This may include supporting local institutional 

pathways for bargaining. It will also require using outreach to taxpayers to provide sufficient 

information to allow their participation. Though not exhaustive, these features are a good start. 

The elephant in the room—or rather, this paper—concerns the role of foreign aid. Dramatic tax revenue 

declines in Ethiopia have been correlated with increased foreign aid assistance—and this example does 

not exist in isolation (Prichard, 2015, p. 260). If international aid inflows can directly undermine 

civilian propensity towards action, should foreign aid be ceased altogether? Whilst this might be 

tempting from a budgetary perspective, severing all external aid flows is unlikely to be the solution. 

Simply removing inflows of aid won’t guarantee that tax collection will be used as a substitute in the 

recipient country. Rather, aid should be strategically directed at providing technical assistance to these 

governments. Too often aid benefactors focus on simply increasing revenue or correcting market 

distortions rather than on the broader picture of developing an environment that is supportive of tax 

bargaining (Prichard, 2015, p. 261). Including local tax contributions in aid packages may help to 

increase beneficiaries’ feelings of ownership over the total revenue—and hence their call to action. 

What is most important, is that aid is not supplied to developing regions with the intention to merely 

replace tax revenue; democratic gains should be able to outlast intervention. 

In encouraging developing governments to introduce tax there are a few minefields to navigate. Namely, 

that some governments in anticipation of the resistance they’ll meet actively choose to forego tax 

revenue, preferring to avoid citizen’s demands altogether. It is telling that in some countries, including 

Uganda and Ethiopia, taxes have been reduced prior to elections (Martin, 2014, p. 4). Alternatively, 

such leaders may also choose to implement more opaque taxes (Weigel, 2020, p. 1898). For example, 

the introduction of consumption or other indirect duties—where the cost isn’t immediately 

clear—mightn’t spark enough citizen action to spur collective movement. Although, an indirect tax in 

of itself isn’t necessarily always invisible—after all, the mass protests that prompted broad change in 

Ghana were sparked by the introduction of a sales tax (Prichard, 2015, p. 91). Whilst the introduction 

of tax holds transformative potential, it must be acknowledged that not every leadership will be 

interested in this transformation—even if it would deliver them more revenue. Unfortunately, the 

contexts in which tax bargaining may be most necessary, are also those in which it is likely most 

difficult. 

Finally, when designing tax infrastructure to develop an economy, the timeline of reigning power 

should be considered. When frequent elections with alternating leadership are the norm, longer-term 

incentives are introduced to governments (Prichard, 2015, p. 76). If a government has confidence that, 

should they lose power, there is a reasonable chance they’ll be re-elected in the future, they’ll be more 

incentivized to produce longer-term benefits. Comparatively, leadership with shorter timelines will be 

hesitant to make fiscal changes, the benefits of which should they be forced out, will go to their 



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successors. 

 

6. Conclusion 

6.1 We the People 

Transitioning an autocracy to democratic leadership ultimately requires that the people demand it. 

However, the challenge lies in convincing them to do so—taxation is one such solution. The behavioral 

effects of levying taxes are an increasingly robust empirical phenomenon that should be more broadly 

applied to international development efforts. Critically, there needs to be a repositioning of tax amongst 

international development communities as more than simply a means to an end to provide social 

welfare, but as a central tool of democratization. 

As the world continues to marvel at the increasing flippancy of oil price volatility, it’ll also witness 

how the petrostates cope with the aftermath. Some have the coffers to weather price storms into the 

near future, yet others have balance sheets that already aren’t adding up, even despite the current 

historically high prices. When oil revenues once again decline such states inevitably will begin to ask 

their citizens to make sacrifices, governments may have to meet them halfway. Perhaps taxpayers in 

Saudi Arabia would be more enthusiastic to contribute tax if the Crown Prince sold his US$550 million 

yacht first (The Economist, 2020). Will these nations seize this opportunity for democratic reform or 

will governments coercively take taxes from the people with little regard for their interests? Whether 

the latter strategy will hold in the long run is unlikely. However, what is clear is that 2020’s collapse in 

the price of oil didn’t just present the opportunity to leave the remaining hydrocarbons in the ground, 

but so too the days of governance that doesn’t represent its people. And just like the threat of climate 

change, the clock is also ticking on unsustainable governance. 

 

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