


































Advances in Politics and Economics
ISSN 2576-1382 (Print) ISSN 2576-1390 (Online)

Vol. 8, No. 1, 2025
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape

92

Original Paper

How does China’s Belt and Road Initiative outperform EU’s

Global Gateway Strategy
Yujin Yang1

1 Beijing Foreign Studies University, Beijing, China

Received: May 26, 2025 Accepted: June 11, 2025 Online Published: July 078, 2025

doi:10.22158/ape.v8n1p92 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v8n1p92

Abstract

The paper compares the European Union’s Global Gateway strategy with China’s Belt and Road

Initiative (BRI), analyzing their strategic goals, implementation models, and outcomes. It highlights the

EU’s focus on geopolitical balance, competitiveness, and value-driven diplomacy, aiming to counter

China’s growing global influence while promoting democratic values. However, the paper argues that

the EU’s approach is hindered by internal divisions, insufficient resources, and mismatched priorities

with developing countries. In contrast, China’s BRI demonstrates greater stability, inclusivity, and

sustainability. The BRI’s cooperative framework, centered on mutual benefits, has led to more

significant infrastructural and economic development in partner nations. By prioritizing local needs

and fostering long-term collaboration, the BRI surpasses the EU’s Global Gateway in terms of tangible

impact, highlighting the limitations of a values-driven, top-down approach. This paper concludes that

while both initiatives seek to reshape global infrastructure, China’s BRI is more effective in addressing

the challenges of the Global South.

Keywords

China, EU, Belt and Road Initiative, Global Gateway Strategy, Geopolitics

1. Introduction

The European Union’s “Global Gateway” policy is a global infrastructure investment strategy proposed

by the European Commission in December 2021. It aims to mobilize 300 billion euros between 2021

and 2027, focusing on infrastructure projects in developing countries across Africa, Southeast Asia,

Central Asia, and Latin America. The initiative targets five key areas: digitalization, climate and energy,

transport, health, and education. Anchored in the core principles of “democratic values, high standards,

and transparency,” it emphasizes leveraging public funds to catalyze private investment. Financing is

channeled through instruments like the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) and



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the European Investment Bank (EIB), utilizing the “Team Europe” approach to coordinate efforts

among EU institutions, member states, and financial institutions. Recent progress includes projects like

energy transitions in Africa (e.g., the Green Hydrogen Initiative in Namibia), digital infrastructure

development in Southeast Asia (e.g., the ASEAN Green Initiative), and undersea cable expansion in

Latin America. By early 2024, nearly 100 projects had been launched, with plans to add over 120 new

sustainable development projects in 2024.

2. The Political Intensions Behind the EU’s Global Gateway

2.1 Geopolitical Balance: Responding to China’s Rise and Safeguarding Traditional Spheres of

Influence

The primary motivation behind the EU’s Global Gateway is to counter China’s rapidly expanding

global influence through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), particularly in regions traditionally of

strategic interest to the EU, such as Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. Since China proposed

the BRI in 2013, it has established an extensive global cooperation network spanning infrastructure,

energy, digital connectivity, and other fields. By 2022, China had invested over 155 billion euros in

infrastructure projects in Africa, while in Southeast Asia, it deployed key projects such as submarine

cables, 5G networks, and fintech under the “Digital Silk Road.” This rapid expansion of influence has

directly struck a sensitive nerve in the EU, where there is a widespread perception that China is

reshaping the geopolitical landscape through economic means, severely eroding the EU’s traditional

spheres of influence. (Note 1)

The geopolitical design of the Global Gateway policy is explicitly targeted. European Commission

President Ursula von der Leyen has stated clearly that the plan aims to counterbalance China’s growing

influence and provide a better alternative to Chinese infrastructure financing. This counterbalance is

reflected not only in the comparable scale of investment but also in the deliberate geographic

overlap—Africa is explicitly listed as a key investment region for the Global Gateway. Through the

“EU-Africa: Global Gateway Investment Package,” the EU has pledged 150 billion euros, accounting

for half of the initiative’s total funding. In Southeast Asia, the EU launched the “ASEAN Green

Initiative” in 2022, committing 783 million euros to countries like Laos and Vietnam to promote green

transition. Such regional choices are no coincidence; they deliberately target areas where China’s BRI

projects are concentrated, seeking to weaken China’s geo-economic ties by offering alternatives that

“better align with Western standards.”

Moreover, the Ukraine crisis has further intensified the EU’s geopolitical anxieties. The energy security

dilemma caused by the crisis has made the EU acutely aware of the urgency of building supply chain

“resilience” and “de-Russification.” The Global Gateway’s focus on energy infrastructure—such as

Albania’s floating solar power plants and the Balkan Power Corridor—is precisely aimed at

establishing new energy routes bypassing Russia. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and

Security Policy Josep Borrell emphasized that the initiative is a “key tool for the EU to demonstrate



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leadership in an era of geopolitical competition,” with the goal of “consolidating relations with Global

South countries and preventing them from fully aligning with other major powers.” This geopolitical

logic reflects the EU’s profound concerns about shifts in international power dynamics and its strategic

ambition to maintain its role as a global pole through economic means.

2.2 Reshaping Economic Competitiveness: Ensuring Supply Chain Security and Competing for

Standard-Setting Power

The second core driver of the Global Gateway initiative stems from the EU’s growing “competitiveness

anxiety” in the economic sphere. Following the 2008 financial crisis, the EU economy has been mired

in prolonged low growth, with its digital economy lagging particularly behind China and the United

States. According to European Commission data, the EU’s 5G network coverage stood at just 14% in

early 2021, far below levels in China and the U.S. during the same period. This technological

disadvantage has fueled concerns within the EU about being marginalized in the Fourth Industrial

Revolution. Meanwhile, the COVID-19 pandemic exposed vulnerabilities in global supply chains, with

the EU’s over-reliance on Asia for critical supplies such as medical equipment and semiconductors

further amplifying this sense of crisis. The Global Gateway initiative is thus seen as the EU’s systemic

strategy to consolidate internal resources, capture emerging markets, and secure supply chains.

At the economic level, the policy is designed around two key objectives: first, boosting EU technology

exports through foreign infrastructure investments, and second, competing for global standard-setting

power in emerging sectors. In selecting investment areas, the EU has prioritized industries such as

digitalization, climate and energy, and smart transportation—fields where no unified global standards

have yet been formed. For instance, in digitalization, the plan supports developing countries in

deploying digital networks based on the EU’s 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox and the General Data

Protection Regulation (GDPR), aiming to establish the bloc’s data governance rules as global standards.

In green energy, the EU promotes the African Single Electricity Market through the “Africa-EU Green

Energy Initiative,” requiring recipient countries to adopt EU environmental and technical standards.

This “standards-first” strategy seeks to create “regulatory dividends” for European companies,

positioning them at the forefront of future global market competition.

A defining feature of the Global Gateway, distinguishing it from past EU programs, is its innovative

financing mechanism. The plan attempts to pool resources from EU institutions, member states, and

financial entities (such as the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction

and Development) through a “Team Europe” approach, using public funds to leverage private

investment. However, this mechanism faces significant challenges. On one hand, EU member states’

finances have been severely impacted by the pandemic, with average government debt reaching 90.9%

of GDP in 2022—far exceeding the 60% ceiling set by the Stability and Growth Pact. On the other

hand, the long-term and high-risk nature of infrastructure investments makes them unattractive to

private investors. Germany’s Handelsblatt pointedly noted that the initiative still lacks concrete plans



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for mobilizing private capital. This financing dilemma reflects the inherent limitations of the EU’s

economic strength and exposes the vast gap between its ambitions and reality.

Notably, the Global Gateway aligns with the EU’s internal development strategies. The “twin green

and digital transition” strategy proposed by the EU in 2019 extends its external dimension through this

initiative, such as linking its domestic “Digital Compass” plan with digital infrastructure projects in the

Global South. This internal-external synergy demonstrates the EU’s attempt to integrate domestic

industrial upgrading with external market expansion. By participating in global infrastructure

development, the bloc seeks not only economic benefits but also aims to establish EU-centered global

value chains in future industries like artificial intelligence and clean technology. This economic

strategy is essentially a form of “rules-based mercantilism,” whose outcome will directly impact the

EU’s position in the future international economic order.

2.3 Exporting Values: Ideological Competition and the Transformation of Normative Power

The third key driver of the Global Gateway lies in the EU’s attempt to reinforce its role as a normative

power by using infrastructure investments as a new vehicle to propagate Western values and ideologies.

Unlike China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which emphasizes “extensive consultation, joint

contribution, and shared benefits,” the EU’s plan explicitly ties investments to political conditions such

as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, reflecting its distinct “values-driven diplomacy” logic.

This ideologically motivated economic strategy underscores the EU’s need to strengthen its identity

amid global systemic transformations and its deep-seated wariness of China’s growing influence. These

principles carry strong political undertones. For instance, the EU claims it will help host countries resist

“geopolitically motivated economic coercion” and avoid “debt traps”—rhetoric clearly targeting China,

implicitly stigmatizing the BRI as “neo-colonialism”. Operationally, the EU requires recipient countries

to comply with environmental and social impact assessments, transparent public procurement, and

similar conditions, which are embedded in connectivity partnership agreements with nations like

Indonesia and Vietnam. Such conditional investments politicize economic cooperation, aiming not only

to differentiate the EU from China’s “non-interference” principle but also to cultivate pro-EU elites and

societal forces in developing countries.

The value orientation of the Global Gateway initiative is manifested in its six core principles:

“democratic values and high standards,” “good governance and transparency,” “equal partnerships,”

“green and clean,” “security,” and “mobilizing private investment.” These principles have strong

political implications. For instance, the EU claims it will help host countries resist “geopolitically

motivated economic coercion” and avoid “debt traps”—rhetoric clearly targeting China, implicitly

stigmatizing the BRI as “neo-colonialism”. Operationally, the EU requires recipient countries to

comply with environmental and social impact assessments, transparent public procurement, and similar

conditions, which are embedded in connectivity partnership agreements with nations like Indonesia and

Vietnam. Such conditional investments politicize economic cooperation, aiming not only to

differentiate the EU from China’s “non-interference” principle but also to cultivate pro-EU elites and



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societal forces in developing countries.

However, the EU’s values-driven approach faces acute issues of “incompatibility with local

conditions.” Many developing countries have waning interest in Western democratic models and

growing resentment toward external interference in domestic affairs under the guise of investment.

Former Bolivian President Evo Morales publicly criticized the EU for “attempting to act as masters of

natural resources rather than equal partners.” In Latin America, the EU’s investment clauses

emphasizing personal data protection and cybersecurity rules are perceived as a new form of “digital

colonialism.” This resistance has significantly slowed the implementation of the Global Gateway

initiative. As of 2024, beyond a handful of former colonial states, most projects remain confined to

political declarations with limited tangible progress. German media has even derided the initiative as

potentially becoming a “multi-billion-euro graveyard.” This dilemma reveals the structural

contradiction of EU values diplomacy: on the one hand, they hope to expand their ideological influence

through economic means, but on the other hand, they cannot escape the arrogance of “Eurocentrism”

and find it difficult to truly understand the core demands of developing countries.

From a deeper perspective, the Global Gateway program marks a transformation of the EU’s concept of

normative power. Traditionally, the EU has mainly promoted its values through trade agreements and

expansion policies; In the era of great power competition, the plan attempts to bundle economic aid,

rulemaking, and security demands, forming a more geopolitical value. The High Representative for

Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union, Borrell, declared: "A stronger Europe

means being able to firmly uphold 'European values'... Our vision of connectivity must be based on

internationally accepted standards and rules." This statement reshapes economic cooperation as a tool

for building ideological camps, reflecting the EU's strategic intention to establish a third force in the

face of the China US game. However, this ambition is limited by internal divisions and insufficient

resources within the EU, and its actual effect may backfire - excessive politicization will weaken the

EU's economic presence in developing countries and further compress its strategic space.

From a deeper perspective, the Global Gateway initiative marks a transformation of the EU’s concept

of “normative power”. Traditionally, the EU has promoted its values mainly through trade agreements

and enlargement policies. In the era of great power competition, the initiative attempts to bundle

economic aid, rule-making and security demands to form a more geopolitical value. Borrell, the EU’s

High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, declared that a stronger Europe means

being able to firmly uphold European values. Our vision of connectivity must be based on

internationally accepted standards and rules. This statement reshapes economic cooperation into a tool

for building ideological camps, reflecting the EU’s strategic intention to establish a third force in the

face of the Sino-US game. However, this ambition is limited by internal divisions and insufficient

resources in the EU, and its actual effect may be counterproductive - excessive politicization will

weaken the EU’s economic presence in developing countries and further compress its strategic space.

In summary, the proposal of the EU’s Global Gateway initiative is the result of the combined effect of



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three driving factors: geopolitical balancing, the reshaping of economic competitiveness, and the export

of values. The policy reflects the EU’s strategic anxieties and self-repositioning in an era of power

shifts, yet the numerous contradictions in its implementation also expose the structural limitations of

the EU as a global actor.

3. The Strengths of China’s Belt and Road Initiative Compared to EU’s Global Gateway

3.1 More Stable

Compared to the EU’s Global Gateway strategy, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) demonstrates

greater stability, primarily reflected in two aspects: “major-country endorsement” and “major-country

experience.”

As the world’s largest emerging economy, China has a vast domestic market, a comprehensive

industrial chain system, and a solid economic foundation. Despite the complex international

environment, China’s economy continues to maintain medium-to-high growth, demonstrating robust

vitality. Its strong risk resilience and development potential provide solid backing for the effective

implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In the autumn of 2013, Chinese President Xi

Jinping proposed the major initiatives of building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century

Maritime Silk Road. Over the past decade, the BRI has achieved remarkable results, becoming the

world’s broadest and largest platform for international cooperation. In the field of economy and trade,

the total import and export volume between China and the co-building countries has reached 19.1

trillion US dollars, with an average annual growth rate of 6.4%. The two-way investment exceeds 380

billion US dollars, covering 240 billion US dollars of China’s outward direct investment and 140

billion US dollars of co-building countries’ investment in China, forming a mutually beneficial and

win-win pattern. In contrast, the EU’s Global Gateway strategy, launched in 2021, pledged to invest

300 billion euros in infrastructure development for developing countries by 2027. However, it has faced

numerous challenges from the outset, exhibiting significant instability. Economically, the EU itself is

struggling with weak economic conditions. Financial crises, the European debt crisis, the COVID-19

pandemic, and the energy crisis triggered by the Russia-Ukraine conflict have left the EU with sluggish

long-term growth. Eurozone countries have high government debt-to-GDP ratios and tight fiscal

conditions, making it difficult to allocate sufficient public budgets to support the strategy. Mobilizing

market and private capital has also proven challenging. For example, in some African projects, a lack

of private-sector investment has left large amounts of funding idle. Internally, the EU faces significant

disparities in socio-economic development among its member states, leading to conflicts and

disagreements. Different regions have varying infrastructure needs, and fiscally constrained Southern

European countries show little interest for the Global Gateway strategy. The EU’s complex

decision-making mechanisms further hinder policy implementation, resulting in inefficient project

planning and execution. In short, the EU’s internal instability makes its Global Gateway strategy far

less reliable in practice than China’s Belt and Road Initiative.



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As the world’s largest developing country, China’s economic development model offers valuable

experience for the vast number of developing nations. Chinese modernization has broken through the

traditional Western model characterized by capital expansion and colonial plunder. By grounding its

approach in national conditions and systematic planning, China has accelerated industrialization while

protecting the ecological environment, participated in global division of labor while safeguarding

economic sovereignty, and maintained rapid economic growth while achieving social equity. Ghanaian

scholar Frimpong points out that Chinese modernization has shattered the myth that modernization

equals Westernization, providing a tangible development model for Global South countries. Although

all member states of the European Union are developed countries, their economic development models

are not replicable for most developing nations. The two follow different historical development paths.

Europe underwent a prolonged capitalist development process, accumulating vast wealth and

technology through colonial expansion and the Industrial Revolution, which laid its economic

foundation. In contrast, most developing countries were once colonies or semi-colonies, facing

challenges such as weak economic foundations and imbalanced industrial structures after gaining

independence. There are also differences in economic structures. Europe’s economy is dominated by

high-end manufacturing, modern services, and high-tech industries, with agriculture also achieving a

high level of modernization. The economic structures of developing countries, however, are more

complex. Many have weak industrial foundations, agriculture still accounts for a significant proportion

of their economies, service sectors remain underdeveloped, and they face the daunting task of industrial

upgrading and optimization. As a result, they cannot directly copy Europe’s high-end industry-led

development model.

In summary, while the EU’s Global Gateway strategy claims to assist developing countries in

promoting infrastructure construction and upgrading, China clearly holds the advantage of “direct

experience” when it comes to addressing the economic development challenges of these nations.

3.2 More Inclusive

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) demonstrates greater inclusivity compared to the EU’s Global

Gateway strategy. This is primarily reflected in BRI’s long-standing adherence to the “Three

Principles” (extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits) and the “Five Connectivity”

framework (policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and

people-to-people bonds).

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) adheres to the principles of extensive consultation, joint

contribution, and shared benefits, providing a broad platform for cooperation between China and other

developing countries. “Extensive consultation” emphasizes equal dialogue to align interests and ensure

projects meet participants’ actual needs. For instance, through sustained high-level dialogues, China

and ASEAN substantively concluded negotiations on the upgraded China-ASEAN Free Trade Area

(FTA 3.0) in 2023, expanding cooperation from traditional trade to emerging sectors like the digital and

green economies. This process exemplifies “pooling wisdom”, balancing diverse concerns via



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multilateral consultations to create an institutional framework integrating regional development needs

and international rules. The full implementation of the ​ Regional Comprehensive Economic

Partnership (RCEP), a multilateral agreement initiated by ASEAN with China’s deep involvement,

further strengthens regional industrial chain synergy, serving as a model of institutional cooperation

under this principle.

“Joint contribution” leverages complementary resources to advance projects. For example, China and

Vietnam integrated China’s technological expertise with local resources to co-plan cross-border railway

networks, significantly boosting regional logistics efficiency. In ASEAN, China’s investments in ports

and highways have improved local transport networks while spurring industrial park development,

forming a virtuous cycle of “connectivity-driven industrial clustering.” Data shows China-ASEAN

trade grew by 9.4% year-on-year in the first three quarters of 2024, reflecting efficient resource

allocation through joint efforts.

“Shared benefits” ensures equitable distribution of outcomes to promote sustainable development.

Under China ASEAN cooperation, the trade structure is gradually upgrading from primary products to

high value-added products. Malaysia's digital infrastructure construction and Vietnam's manufacturing

upgrading have both benefited from the technology spillover effects of cooperation projects. Clean

energy projects in Indonesia and the Philippines have optimized local energy mixes, while medical aid

and training programs enhanced public services—tangible proof of the “community with a shared

future for mankind” vision.

In contrast, the EU’s Global Gateway strategy, while touting principles liken “good governance,”

“green transition,” and “private-sector mobilization,” prioritizes its own interests and geopolitical

competition. The European Union invests in green energy and mineral development in Africa through

its “Global Gateway Initiative,” aiming to reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels and secure

resources for Europe’s green transition. However, it pays less attention to the comprehensive needs of

the relevant countries’ own energy industry development and the potential impact on the regional

energy landscape. The European Union embeds environmental, labor, and digital standards (such as the

General Data Protection Regulation, GDPR) into its trade agreements, disregarding the historical and

social realities of partner countries and pressuring them to adopt European rules. In essence, this serves

to eliminate non-tariff barriers for EU businesses and consolidate their technological dominance and

market control. In Africa and the Indo-Pacific, the EU positions itself as an “alternative” to China’s

Belt and Road Initiative. For instance, while the EU criticizes China for creating “debt traps,” it offers

investments under its Global Gateway with attached political conditions, aiming to pull developing

countries into a pro-European camp.

The “Five Connectivities” – policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade,

financial integration, and people-to-people bonds – constitute the core philosophy of building the “Silk

Road Economic Belt.” Policy Coordination​ emphasizes the alignment of development strategies and

the harmonization of institutional rules among nations. Through high-level dialogues, multilateral



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agreements, and joint planning, countries eliminate cooperation barriers at the top-level design stage.

For instance, China and Pakistan established a long-term cooperation mechanism via the

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Long-Term Plan, facilitating the implementation of energy,

transportation, and other infrastructure projects. This has significantly enhanced Pakistan's power

supply capacity and created tens of thousands of jobs. Such cooperation models improve policy

transparency and reduce political risks in cross-border projects.

Infrastructure Connectivity​ focuses on linking transportation, energy, and communication networks.

A prime example is the China-Laos Railway, which transformed Laos from a “landlocked” to a

“land-linked” country, reducing freight costs by 40% and boosting agricultural and tourism revenues

along the route by approximately 20%. Additionally, the Lower Kafue Gorge Hydroelectric Power

Station in Zambia, constructed by Chinese enterprises with a total installed capacity of 750 megawatts,

has effectively alleviated local power shortages, providing stable electricity for industrial production

and daily life.

Unimpeded Trade​ promotes cross-border commerce through tariff reductions, streamlined customs

procedures, and unified standards. After the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area Upgrade Agreement took

effect, bilateral trade surged nearly threefold over a decade, with Vietnam’s agricultural exports to

China growing at an annual rate of 12%. The China-Europe Railway Express, operating on a

“door-to-door” model, has turned inland cities like Chongqing into global electronics manufacturing

hubs while upgrading logistics industries in transit countries such as Kazakhstan and attracting foreign

investment for regional distribution centers.

Trade Facilitation promotes cross-border commerce by reducing tariffs, streamlining customs

procedures, and harmonizing standards. Since the upgraded China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement took

effect, bilateral trade volume has nearly tripled over a decade, with Vietnam’s agricultural exports to

China growing at an average annual rate of 12%. Meanwhile, the China-Europe Railway Express, with

its “door-to-door” transport model, has turned inland cities like Chongqing into global hubs for

electronics manufacturing. It has also spurred logistics industry upgrades in transit countries such as

Kazakhstan and attracted foreign investment to establish regional distribution centers.

People-to-People Bonds​ foster social cohesion through education, healthcare, and cultural exchanges.

By 2025, the “Silk Road” Scholarship had supported over 100,000 students from partner countries to

study in China, with Mandarin centers in Uzbekistan and elsewhere reaching 80% of major cities.

Under the China-Africa Paired Hospital Cooperation Mechanism, Ethiopia’s cardiac specialty hospital

quadrupled its annual patient capacity while maternal mortality dropped by 30%. Such livelihood

initiatives improve quality of life, strengthen public support for cooperation, and lay a social foundation

for long-term collaboration.

In contrast, the European Union’s “Global Gateway” initiative clearly carries hidden motives,

attempting to propagate the EU’s value model under the guise of economic cooperation. It imposes

political standards like so-called “democracy” and “human rights” as prerequisites for collaboration



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with developing nations. For instance, in the “EU-Africa: Global Gateway Investment Package,”

democratic reforms are made a condition for African countries to access funding. Josep Borrell, the EU

High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, openly stated that this approach aims to

demonstrate “the certainty that democratic values bring” through infrastructure cooperation. When

selecting investment targets and projects, the EU prioritizes countries with political systems and

governance models like its own, or those willing to undertake political reforms according to EU

standards. For example, in negotiations with certain African and Eastern European nations, the EU

explicitly requires adjustments to electoral systems, government transparency, and citizen political

participation—pushing them to align with the EU’s “democratic” model in an attempt to impose

Western political systems and ideologies.

Moreover, the policy disproportionately emphasizes “high-end agendas” like green transition and

digital infrastructure, while neglecting basic livelihood projects such as roads and bridges urgently

needed in Sub-Saharan Africa. Notably, the EU’s infrastructure investments in Africa amount to

merely ​ one-third​ of China’s, with funds predominantly channeled to “model countries” with high

governance ratings, leaving high-demand nations like the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria

underserved.

In summary, compared to the Belt and Road policy, the EU’s Global Gateway initiative lacks

inclusiveness—a fundamental flaw rooted in its value-driven exclusivity. It fundamentally fails to

address the development challenges of developing nations, nor can it ensure that policy implementation

genuinely improves the livelihood of people in these countries.

3.3 More Sustainable

The Belt and Road Initiative delivers more sustainable benefits compared to the Global Gateway

strategy, primarily manifested through the CEC development dynamics model and the re-optimization

of four key developmental elements advocated by Belt and Road Development Studies.

As the core theoretical framework of Belt and Road Development Studies, the CEC Development

Dynamics Model addresses two critical challenges in global development - insufficient growth

momentum and persistent developmental imbalances.

“Connectivity” activates the flow of production factors. Currently, there is a severe “maturity

mismatch” in the global infrastructure investment market, with infrastructure development and

connectivity lagging in developing countries. “Connectivity” has unlocked access to rivers and seas for

many “landlocked” regions, expanded international markets for developing countries, and facilitated

the free flow of economic factors worldwide. The China-Laos Railway has created a new, efficient land

transport corridor connecting China with Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and other Indo-China Peninsula

countries. It has significantly reduced inland freight time, enabling goods to reach major cities like

Bangkok, Thailand, in just one day through rail-rail and rail-road intermodal transport.

“Enablement” Reshapes Comparative Advantages. After World War II, numerous developing nations

liberated themselves from colonial and semi-colonial status and pursued their own industrialization and



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modernization. However, some have long been trapped in the “resource curse,” relying solely on

exporting raw materials and low-value goods to sustain sluggish economic growth. “Enablement,”

primarily through industrial cooperation, helps developing countries restructure their factor

endowments and comparative advantages, enabling them to better integrate into global supply chains

while optimizing and reshaping global production and value chains. For instance, the Jakarta-Bandung

High-Speed Rail (HSR) project in Indonesia not only introduced China’s HSR technology but also

trained over 2,000 local technicians through joint programs, upgrading Indonesia’s rail industry

standards. Once operational, the HSR cut travel time between Jakarta and Bandung by 75% and

indirectly boosted tourism along the route by 23%.

“Coordination” Enhances Collaborative Efficiency. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) promotes a

multi-tiered cooperation mechanism encompassing policy dialogue, regulatory alignment, and

benefit-sharing frameworks. This approach balances market mechanisms with social welfare while

ensuring goal consistency and complementary actions among all parties. As the highest-level platform

for policy dialogue, the BRI International Forum has been held three times and established itself as a

regularized mechanism. Through its combination of main forums and thematic sub-forums, the Forum

facilitates policy coordination in infrastructure, the digital economy, green development, and other key

areas. For instance, the third Forum in 2023 produced 89 multilateral outcomes, including the

establishment of the BRI Green Development International Alliance and the signing of the Digital

Economy Partnership Initiative by over 40 countries. These achievements demonstrate the growing

consensus among nations on low-carbon transition and digital governance.

In contrast to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the EU’s Global Gateway program demonstrates

significant gaps between its proclaimed objectives and actual implementation across the three key

dimensions of “Connectivity,” “Enablement,” and “Coordination.” Regarding Connectivity, while

claiming to enhance global infrastructure interconnections, the program exhibits markedly fragmented

characteristics in both funding allocation and project execution. A case in point is Kenya's

infrastructure project in Africa, where the EU provided merely 30 million euros for a specific highway

section to upgrade - a stark contrast to its promised “systematic infrastructure upgrade.” Furthermore,

its projects are excessively scattered across over ten regions including Europe, Africa and Asia, lacking

strategic focus on key markets, which has resulted in limited actual improvements in logistics

efficiency. By comparison, China’s BRI has successfully connected landlocked Central Asian countries

to global maritime networks through cross-border transport systems like the China-Europe Railway

Express. The Global Gateway, however, has yet to establish land-sea intermodal corridors of

comparable scale.

In the realm of “Enablement”, the EU’s incorporation of stringent political conditionalities and

anti-corruption review mechanisms in project approval has significantly delayed collaborative progress.

Taking the digital sector as an example, African nations widely report that their digital economy

projects face an 18 to 24 months cycle from proposal to implementation - far exceeding developing



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countries’ needs for technological iteration speed. Meanwhile, China’s “Digital Silk Road” has

established over 20 data centers and fiber-optic backbone networks across Africa, with its efficient

project execution model better aligning with local development priorities. These procedural barriers not

only diminish the Global Gateway’s appeal but also reveal the EU’s misalignment with developing

nations’ actual needs.

At the “Coordination” level, significant divergences in interests among EU member states have

severely constrained their capacity for coordinated action. During the inaugural 2023 Global Gateway

Forum, Italy was conspicuously absent, while Germany sent only low-level representation—reflecting

a lack of strategic prioritization among core member states. Furthermore, the EU’s inclusion of

Portugal’s EDP Group, partially owned by Chinese investors, in its Business Advisory Committee

exposed internal inconsistencies in regulatory coordination. Such contradictions between political

commitments and commercial practices have further eroded developing countries’ confidence in the

EU’s collaborative governance capabilities. The root of these issues lies in the EU’s attempt to strike a

balance between “values-driven conditionality” (e.g., democratic norms screening) and “market

efficiency,” yet excessive political prerequisites have diverted resource allocation away from economic

rationality. Unlike the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which rapidly consolidates resources through

multilateral cooperation frameworks, the Global Gateway remains mired in inter-member bargaining

and bureaucratic procedures, struggling to establish a sustainable model of synergistic development.

The Development Studies of the Belt and Road Initiative posits that the re-optimization of the four key

development elements—government, capital, society, and ecology—facilitates the effective operation

of the CEC dynamic development model. Active government coordination is particularly crucial for

developing countries where market-based resource allocation mechanisms remain incomplete. A

proactive government provides reliable guarantees for infrastructure development, industrial policy

formulation, social equity enhancement, and international cooperation alignment.

The Kyrgyzstan National Fertilizer Plant project (contracted in 2023 and operational in 2024)

exemplifies the re-optimization of governmental functions. Through a policy dialogue mechanism, the

Chinese and Kyrgyz governments signed a cooperative framework agreement, incorporated the project

into the outcomes list of the China-Central Asia Summit, and coordinated the removal of policy barriers

such as customs and taxation to ensure rapid equipment clearance. Government-led institutional

synergy not only unlocked investment channels but also optimized Kyrgyzstan’s ecological standards

for fertilizer production by introducing China’s clean energy technology standards, achieving a

two-way empowerment of policies and regulations.

In the international investment community, private capital tends to favor short-term projects with a

focus on immediate returns. In contrast, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has innovated investment

and financing models that emphasize shared benefits and risk-sharing, effectively mobilizing funds

from multilateral development banks, institutional investors, and private investors to create a massive

“capital aggregation pool.” This approach addresses the “financing difficulties” faced by developing



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countries in their economic development. The 485MW Hussein Combined Cycle Gas Power Plant

Project in Jordan, constructed by SEPCOIII (a subsidiary of Power China) under an EPC contract,

received joint financing support from financial institutions such as ICBC and multilateral agencies

(including MIGA and IFC). Upon completion, the project effectively alleviated Jordan’s power

shortages, providing stable and sustainable electricity to support the country’s industrial upgrading,

economic growth, and livelihood improvements. The Development Studies of the Belt and Road

Initiative views the vast populations of developing countries as the driving force behind modernization

efforts.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) adopts the philosophy of “teaching a man to fish rather than giving

him a fish” by enhancing vocational education to effectively improve employment opportunities for

local impoverished populations. Qingdao Electronic School established a branch in Nepal, pioneering a

“2+1” training model (two years of local study plus one year of practical training in China) and

co-authoring a bilingual Chinese-Nepali textbook Electronic Technology Practical Training. This

system equips Nepalese youth with skills in circuit design, photovoltaic power generation, and other

technologies, supporting the country’s infrastructure development and electronics industry growth.

A healthy ecological environment is the foundation for developing countries to achieve sustainable

economic growth. In the context of global carbon reduction, only by maintaining ecological balance,

driving industrial transformation, and mitigating climate risks can nations build resilience for long-term

economic growth, safeguard public health and social stability, and unlock high-quality development

potential. Under the BRI framework, China promotes synergistic development between economic

growth and ecological conservation in partner countries through cooperation in green infrastructure,

clean energy, and low-carbon technologies.

China’s investments in Pakistan—including the Karot Hydropower Station, Sachal Wind Farm, and

Punjab Solar Park—form the largest clean energy cluster in South Asia. These projects not only reduce

CO₂ emissions by approximately 2 million tons annually but also enhance local energy self-sufficiency

through technology transfer. Cumulatively, they have created over 12,000 jobs and shifted Pakistan’s

power supply structure toward renewable energy by more than 35%.

Compared to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the EU’s Global Gateway strategy has inadequately

addressed the practical realities of developing countries across the four key development elements:

government, capital, society, and ecology. First, the Global Gateway’s excessive dependence on market

mechanisms and existing funding frameworks has led to misalignment with partner countries’

development strategies. For instance, in Kenya, the EU repackaged an old highway project under the

Global Gateway label but allocated only 30 million euros—far below actual needs—and failed to

integrate it with Kenya’s National Integrated Transport Plan. Complex EU internal approval processes

and an overemphasis on private capital participation have delayed projects, leaving them fragmented

and unable to systematically support local priorities like digitalization and clean energy. The Global

Gateway aims to mobilize 300 billion euros through public funds to catalyze private investment.



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However, the EU’s budgetary leverage is constrained. For example, the European Sustainable

Development Fund Plus (EFSD+) offers only 39.7 billion euros in guarantees to target 135 billion

euros in investments. Post-pandemic fiscal deficits have further strained public resources: EU

government debt reached 90.9% of GDP in Q2 2021. Even flagship projects like Botswana’s solar

plants and Ghana’s wind turbines face funding shortfalls. In South Africa, only 88 million euros of a

280 million euros grant came from the EU budget, with the rest reliant on slow-moving member-state

contributions. The Global Gateway’s focus on urban and elite-oriented projects risks widening social

divides. In Latin America, investments in digital infrastructure (e.g., submarine cables) primarily serve

multinational corporations and urban middle classes, while rural areas lack basic healthcare and

education. Similarly, Africa’s “vaccine localization” initiatives restrict technology transfer to select

partners, limiting affordable medicine access for the public. Such selective investments may fuel

grassroots discontent by deepening urban-rural disparities. The Global Gateway mandates strict EU

environmental standards (e.g., carbon emissions, biodiversity protection), often disregarding

developing countries’ capacities. The EU Deforestation Regulation, which requires small-scale African

cocoa and coffee farmers to provide geolocation proof of sustainable land use, imposes high technical

and cost barriers. This may push farmers toward illegal land clearance, ironically worsening

deforestation. Additionally, large-scale solar farms in the Sahara could alter surface albedo and local

hydrology, potentially disrupting arid ecosystems. In short, the Global Gateway’s top-down

approach—prioritizing EU standards and market logic over local contexts—contrasts with the BRI’s

emphasis on strategic alignment and adaptability. These structural flaws hinder its effectiveness in

addressing the systemic needs of developing nations.

In summary, guided by the principles of Belt and Road Development Studies, countries along the Belt

and Road and other developing nations have continuously optimized their development paths based on

their actual conditions, driving sustainable economic prosperity.

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Note

Note 1. Heldt, E. C. (2023). Europe’s global gateway: A new instrument of geopolitics. Politics and

Governance, 11(4), 223-234.


