Microsoft Word - APE-V3N4-p34 Advances in Politics and Economic ISSN 2576-1382 (Print) ISSN 2576-1390 (Online) Vol. 3, No. 4, 2020 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape 34 Original Paper Deteriorating Image of Political Parties in Malang, Indonesia Budhy Prianto1* & Dwi Suharnoko1 1 Department of Public Administration, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Merdeka Malang, Indonesia * Budhy Prianto, Department of Public Administration, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Merdeka Malang, Indonesia Received: August 25, 2020 Accepted: October 16, 2020 Online Published: October 22, 2020 doi:10.22158/ape.v3n4p34 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v3n4p34 Abstract In the democratic countries, political party acts as mediator bridging communication between government and its citizens. The decline of political party taking place before and after the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections and legislative elections certainly affects the political parties in carrying out their roles. Conducted in Malang, objective of this study is to describe factors contributing declining image of political parties and its implications. The findings showed that image of political parties are deteriorating due to lack of trust towards the political parties and politicians in the parliament. The Decree on direct vote system for both presidential and regional head election and establishment of an open proportional system in legislative election also contribute to the deterioration. Implications of the phenomenon are negative attitude and declining interest towards political party. Keywords democracy, presidential election; legislative election; political party, constituent 1. Introduction Number of political partiesincreas sharply in the reformation era. The General Election Commission reported that 48 political parties participated in 1999 Election. However, the number plummeted to 24 political parties in 2004 Election. There are 38 political parties including 6 local political parties in Nangroe Aceh Darussalam in 2009 Election. In legislative election conducted on April 9, 2014, the number declined sharply 12 national political parties and 3 local political parties in Nangroe Aceh Darussalam. In 2019 Election, the number slightly increased into 16 national political parties and 4 local political parties from Nangroe Aceh Darussalam (Tempo, April 22-28, 2019). The fluctuation is inversely proportional to the number of voters participating in the last four Elections. In 1999 Election, the number of voters is pretty high, and percentage of abstentions is only 10.21%. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape Advances in Politics and Economic Vol. 3, No. 4, 2020 35 Published by SCHOLINK INC. However, in the next three General Elections, the percentage keeps increasing. Percentages of abstentions in 2004 Legislative Election, the first round of 2004 Presidential Election and the second round of the election are 23.34%, 23.47%, and 24.95%. In 2009 Election, the percentages increase into 29.1% during 2009 Election and 40% in 2009 Presidential Election. Percentage of abstentions in 2014 Legislative Election is 30%—the highest among the Legislative Election in (Tempo, April 20, 2014, p. 31; Tempo, April 27, 2014, p. 20). However, in 2019 Election where both Presidential and Legislative Election took place on April 17, 2019, percentages of abstentions fall sharply to 19.24 % (Surbakti, 2019). Meanwhile, percentage of abstentions in 2019 Regional Head Election is 27.9%. According to several political observers, the percentages indicate that image of Indonesian political parties is deteriorating, and the public trust towards the parties is critically low (Republika, Juni 29, 2018). Voters, particularly young voters are sceptical towards General Election because of a number of criminal acts involving prominent figures of Indonesian political parties. As an addition, younger voters are not familiar with most political party cadres. According to Andrinof Caniago, a political observer from University of Indonesia, Jokowi won 2014 Presidential Election because voters and younger voters in particular voted for him rather than Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle (PDIP), Jokowi’s party. As the result, Adrinofstated that political parties should improve their image among public in order to get more votes in the upcoming General Election (Kompas, April 28, 2013). Indonesian Survey Institute (LSN) stated that political parties become a democratic institution that gains the least amount of public trust (42%). Percentages of public trust towards public organization, non-government organization (NGO), press institution and survey agency are 57.5%, 58.5%, 65.1% and 69.3% respectively (Republika, July 16, 2013). Survey conducted by Surat Kabar Harian Kompas, one of the daily newspapers in Indonesia revealed that an aspect determining how many votes political parties can get is performance of 6,607 legislative candidates competing in 2014 Legislative Election. It has been proven that voters tend to vote for legislative candidate rather than political parties these candidates represent (Kompas, April 14, 2014). This phenomenon occurs not only in the city but also in rural areas. Vice Secretary General of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), Mahfuz Sidikadmitted that political apathy has spread widely in rural areas these days. He said that they did not see any change even though they have visited polling stations (TPS) repeatedly (http://politik.news.viva.co.id/news/read/484404-wasekjen-pks--masyarakat-desa-makin-apatis-politik). The public is thinking that political parties can no longer carry out their role effectively, are corrupt, and tend to neglect public aspiration. Various non-professional polls, empirical studies, and open discussions reveal how deteriorating image of Indonesian political parties among the public is (see Surbakti, 2019). An idea that an aspect that determines result of 2014 Presidential Election is people’s coalition instead of political coalition had once emerged (Kompas, April 26, 2014). Based on the background, the first objective of this study is to identify some factors that results in deterioration of Indonesian political parties’ image or critically low public trust towards the political parties in 2014 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape Advances in Politics and Economic Vol. 3, No. 4, 2020 36 Published by SCHOLINK INC. Presidential and Legislative Election. Secondly, it also aims to provide theoretical and practical implication on deteriorating image of the political parties after 2014 Presidential and Legislative Election. 1.1 Role and Function of Political Party The 2008 Decree number 2 on Political Parties and its amendment, Article 10 (2) of the 2011 Decree number 2 stated that the specific objectives of political party are: a) Increase political party members and public participation in carrying out political and governmental activities, b) Fight for ideals of political party within the life of society, nation, and state, and c)Develop political ethics and culture within the life of society, nation, and state. Theoretically, Kantapawira (1980, pp. 63-64) stated that objectives of political party are: a) participating in the government system, b) conducting social control, and c) stream-lining raw opinion. On the other hand, the 2008 Decree number 11 stated that functions of political party are as a means of: a) political education for its members and the public raising their awareness on their rights and obligations as citizens, b) creating a conducive climate for the unity and integrity of Indonesia and ensuring public welfare, c) absorbing, gathering, and channelling public political aspiration in formulation and establishment of state policies, d) political participation of Indonesian citizens, and e) political recruitment in the process of political position assignment through democratic mechanism while taking into account gender equality and justice. Theoretically, the functions of political parties are: a) a basic for the mobilization of masses of citizens; b) a means of recruiting and socializing political leaders; c) structured political identity, at both the masses and elite levels; d) a method of control within a government structure; e) a means of interest expression and articulation; and f) a basic of supportive function (Shively, 1991:172-180; Budiardjo, 2008, pp. 405-410; Macridis, 1988, pp. 27-31). 1.2 Political Party and General Election Different from the era of direct democracy where representing institution that voices public interest, demand and support to government authorized for decision-making is not a requirement, political modern system in then ation-state needs political party (Agustino, 2007, p. 100; Amal,1988, p. xi). Norris (2005, p. 3) even argue that modern democratic system cannot work well without political party. Pivotal role of political party is shown in a number of functions it should carry out. Shively (1991, p. 172) noted that political party plays various different roles, namely: a basis for the mobilization of masses of citizens; a means of recruiting and socializing political leaders; structured political identity, at both mass and elite levels; and a method of control within a government structure. In relation to political system, functions of political party closely associated to General Election are nomination and recruitment, policies, and legitimating (Panggabean, 1991, pp. 182-186). Political parties would later be analyzed based on the third function. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape Advances in Politics and Economic Vol. 3, No. 4, 2020 37 Published by SCHOLINK INC. 1.3 Deteriorating Image of Political Party and Its Implication In his most current article, Ignazi (2014) stated that recently many political parties create innovation to alter and improve their image. However, many considered their innovation powerful and yet distrusted. String political party does not have any legitimacy. Political observers considered this phenomenon deteriorating image of political party (see for example, Suara Merdeka, August 1, 2013; Republika, July 16, 2013; Kompas, January 8, 2019). In general, this phenomenon emerges as public dissatisfaction towards performance of political party in the government system, party management, and relationship between political party and grass root community. It is the result of false campaign promises, ideological labels and political speeches. In several aspects, the responses are the results of boastful campaign promises (Pamungkas, 2010). National Survey Institute (LSN) conducted polls at the beginning of May in 33 provinces in Indonesia which identify four aspects resulting in a sharp decline of public trust towards political parties (Republika, July 16, 2013). First, the public are aware that members of the political parties in the House of Representatives are involved in corruption cases. Second, the public is thinking that political parties tend to neglect issues taking place in the society. Third, most political party members are unable to realize their campaign promises. Fourth, some political party members are arrested because of adultery, and drug abuse. Anti-party sentiment is also associated to political party and elitist’s failure. Social, political and economic issues are waiting for solution; however, a lot of party leaders are irresponsible, violate their access to public resources and prerogative rights, and even commit the act of corruption or nepotism. This elitist domination results in cartel politics. Cartel politics emerges as the result of coalition among political elitists to minimize loss in either General Election or coalition. Cartel puts higher emphasis on incorporation from elitists who have different ideological background (Supriatma, 2009, p. 8). Collecting evidence, Ambardi (2009, p. 3) formulated five characteristics of cartel politics in Indonesian political party system, namely: (1) absence of ideological role of political party as determining factor of party coalition behavior; (2) permissiveness in making coalition; (3) absence of opposition; (4) result of election barely influences political party behavior; and (5) political party tendency to act collectively as a group (see Kristiadi, 2009). These characters, according to Supriatma (2009, pp. 9-10), bring at least four important political consequences towards Indonesian politics. First, cartel focuses solely on pragmatism. Radical activists interested in entering political sectors are forced to adjust to this climate. Second, blurry line between government and the opposition. Both government and opposition tend to compromise rather than showing their opposing perspectives. Third, cartel is collutive system eradicating people’s power. Fourth, cartel has such ironic impact towards political power of the people. It produces a relatively passive community similar to the floating masses in the New Order Era. Ambardi (2009, p. 3) argued that this relationship refers to effort of these parties to maintain their collective survival, forcing them to develop cartel. This collective survival is determined by mutual interest to protect existing sources of funding, particularly one from the government via rent-seeking. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape Advances in Politics and Economic Vol. 3, No. 4, 2020 38 Published by SCHOLINK INC. Tan (2013, pp. 81-82) in a study in three Southeast Asian countries—Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines—mentioned a number of indicators of the decline political parties’ prestige. Those are: • Level of identification with parties; that the low level of identification is associated with negative behaviour that leads to a low level of trust in the party; • Undecided voters; if voters are still in doubt, it could be that they cannot determine a difference between parties, and therefore cannot determine who should be elected. • Turnout. This is problematic because voting can degenerate with various reasons such as understanding the importance of contests, personal beliefs about the benefits of voting, and changing electoral systems. • Spoiled votes. Voting can also show dissatisfaction with the parties offered, and in a complex electoral system may cause many votes are invalid even though the voters may not have an interest doing protest. • Party membership figures. Party membership number; the membership number of the party is to measure the anti-party attitude. If pro-party people, they will be more likely to join the party, and the number of membership will increase. And when the anti-party attitudes are high, then, the amount of party support will decrease. The statement of Daalder as quoted by Pamungkas (2010) complements the indicators stated by Tan above. Daalder stated that anti-party sentiments could actually be divided into 4 (four) attitudes. First, the denial of party. The idea of this category is to deny the role of party legitimacy, and to view the party as a threat to the good society. Second, the selective rejection of party. The thinking in this group is to see certain types as “good” party types and others as “bad” ones. Third, the selective rejection of party system. This group sees certain party systems as “good” and other party systems “bad”. Finally, the redundancy of party. This group sees that anti-party sentiment is a logical consequence of a period where the party loses its relevance because of the emergence of other political actors in democracy such as the mass media, individuals and interest groups, and pressure groups. The new actors seemed to take over the main function of the party in which the party had played a role. Tan (2013, p. 82), furthermore, also stated that the impact of the decline in the prestige of political parties can vary, depending on the political context. In general, the decline in the prestige of political parties carries the risk of weak political party legitimacy and elections, which in turn contributes to the institutionalization of an unhealthy party system. Efforts to break the circle are with legislative reform, specifically relating to the formulation of the party law and new elections (see also Ignazi, 2014). In terms of political parties Pamungkas (2010) proposed the opinion, that to avoid the worst possibility of the decline in the prestige of political parties, a number of measures to strengthen political parties need to be considered. First, political parties need to balance behaviour between politics to seek power and politics to fight for the interests of the people. Political parties must be aware that the history of the existence of political parties is not solely for power but also for the welfare of the people. Second, in order to balance this behaviour, political parties need to have a clear ideological line (bringing ideology www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape Advances in Politics and Economic Vol. 3, No. 4, 2020 39 Published by SCHOLINK INC. back in). In this case, the ideology is referred to a guide that will be used to conduct the political choices taken when a policy has to be set. Finally, they need to institutionalize political parties. This institutionalization will make political parties take root in society, stable in contestation when elections and internal stability of the organization can be better maintained. Similar opinion was also expressed by Mahfud MD, that it is necessary to use political movements while making healthy political parties available. By fixing the Political Party Law and politics also need to be closer to religion. The recruitment pattern of political parties should be beneficial abiding good laws and animates religious teachings (Kompas, February 19, 2012). Symptoms of the decline in prestige of political parties of this kind are perhaps what Mack (2010, p. 8) refers to as disalignment, which points to the state of a major loss of support for political parties among core voters (core basic voters). Disalignment conditions are characterized by at least: strong issues concerning national identity crisis and leadership failure; the split between the party and its main base; severe and permanent loss of support among their core voters; and the displacement (displacement) of the main party positions by previously small political parties or new parties; as well as by the electoral system applied. 2. Method This qualitative research approach focuses on two aspects: first, the relationship between political parties (political party elites) and voting members or communities and the arguments that underlie the behaviour of political party members and the voting community and their preferences in determining choices in legislative and presidential elections in 2014; and second, the practical and theoretical implications of the decline in prestige (public distrust of) political parties, both the implications that have already been manifested and the latent implications that are still in the form of predictions. Data or information obtained through documentation studies sourced in Kompas newspapers and Tempo Magazine and in depth interviews with a purposive number of political party leaders, social-cultural activists, and voters in Malang area by using snow-ball technique. The process of processing and analysing data uses the steps as stated by Cresswell (2010). 3. Results and Discussion 3.1 Relations between Political Party Elites and Constituents and the Voting Community Seeing the data stated above, in general, the phenomena emerged in all types of political parties that determine the decline of political parties prestige (image) are four factors. First, the public perceives political parties in parliament as being heavily involved in corruption cases. Some of the cases that emerged were scandals involving the Partai Ddemokrat (PD) and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS). Later another cases involving officials of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), Partai Gerindra and Partai Demokrat Indoensia Perjuangan (PDIP). Second, related to the decline in public trust that people consider the existing political parties are having little concern over the various problems that befall the www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape Advances in Politics and Economic Vol. 3, No. 4, 2020 40 Published by SCHOLINK INC. people; the main people at the grassroots. Third, the behaviour of party politicians by some people are considered as very pragmatically act, where party officials are perceived to tend to behave pragmatically in dealing with various strategic national issues. This pragmatic behaviour was later recognized as transactional politics. Transactional politics have damaged the noble values in political science. In addition, it damages the morals and order of society. The further impact is that ideology-based parties as well as Islam-based parties are experiencing degradation. Transactional politics carried out by the elite of political parties is then imitated by some people. People no longer believe in ideology but rather to deify money (Kompas, 14 May 2014). Transactional politics has ruined everything. Such transactional political practices are one reason for the decline in support of a number of political parties. While the fourth cause, is still related to the behaviour of party politicians who have been implicated in amoral scandals such as infidelity, many wives and drugs. On the other hand, parties perceived as caring about people’s problems and rarely involved in corruption get a pretty good public appreciation. From the constituent’s point of view, political parties are the link to fight for their interests which are expected to be realized in a state policy. Constituents are part of a wider community that has diverse interests and needs. Political parties as a bridge between the community and the state have a bargaining position as one of the main channels in knowing how to fight for the interests of the people in the political system in this country. Therefore political parties are very dependent on the support of constituents in the general election (Fionna, 2013, p. 139). Society and the State both need political parties to build relations between the people and the state. The relations between these three parties (community, political parties, and the state) are closely related (Surbakti, 2019). Constituents certainly expect political parties to be close to them and can always be trusted to be their bridge in the life of the state. On the eve of simultaneous general elections - presidential elections and legislative elections held simultaneously-in 2019, constituents from each political party only become the main target of the political parties concerned to achieve the interests of political parties, namely winning the presidential and vice presidential seats as well as winning as many parliamentary seats. This is as said by a constituent informant of a political party: “Their new election moment usually becomes a moment to come to us. So that the relationship between the party and the constituents is in my opinion just a relationship that has no bound; it happens only when there are general elections. If there is no general election, then the party’s relationship with us as a constituent would be impossible”. The mutual relationship between political parties and constituents as consumers should lead to the creation of loyalty between the two parties. However, this does not seem to have become a reality in Malang. In the end, constituents tend to have a negative view of political parties, including political parties and their elected legislators during general elections. The statement of a socio-cultural observer who was a research informant strengthened the phenomenon of these negative views: “I think it is natural for a constituent’s view to be like that, and that is indeed a result of low trust in the party and the relative inadequacy of the image of legislators among constituents”. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape Advances in Politics and Economic Vol. 3, No. 4, 2020 41 Published by SCHOLINK INC. The facts above found were supported by various polls conducted by the Indonesian Survey Institute since 2004, which found fairly consistent results that the public tends to have a negative view of political parties. In early 2015, the level of trust in political parties and the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR) was in the range of 50%, far below the confidence in the president (83%) and the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi/KPK) (81%). The negative view of constituents as the main consumers of political parties is reflected in their opinions about political parties or politicians. One of socio-cultural observers in Malang stated: “In Malang some time ago, there was corruption done in congregation, I was ashamed, because one of them was my protege, her name was Nanda. That’s an example; it turns out that they don’t have the traits of a statesman. This is due to the political party being in power for too long, its elites always set short goals. These short objectives are wrapped in various jargon of struggle, but their purpose is how to gather power and opportunity by doing corruption. The corruption case in Malang was a failure of political parties. Now when the young generation, millennial generation, is not interested in the political frenzy, they cannot be blamed”. So, three negative things that people often remember are that politicians often don’t keep promises; only care about personal and group interests; and like to talk about themselves or arrogant. The negation of the three negative things is a key condition of the creation of trust in a relational relationship. It is no wonder that the level of constituency trust will always be low for political parties. Consistently, various polls have also found that constituents feel they are not close to political parties, with a value between 15-20%. This will make it difficult for political parties to approach their constituents. The results of these polls are one of the reasons constituents change their choices in each election. The relationship created between constituents and political parties has been only a transactional relationship, and it will be quite difficult to move towards a relational relationship where trust from both parties is absolutely necessary. Good party management and political credibility greatly influence the level of constituents’ trust in them. These two things have not been seen in the political context in Indonesia. The wearing down of the constituents’ trust in political parties which is still experiencing internal conflicts will naturally occur. This will continue as long as political parties do not try to regain the confidence of their constituents. “This is a result of political parties forgetting too long their obligations to carry out political communication and education to their constituents,” urged a research informant. The phenomenon as stated above ultimately makes the life of political parties encourage the strengthening of democratic practices elitist. This practice is more directed at political parties becoming office-seeking parties that are influenced by the tendency to gain power. This is possible because positions in government offer incentives to accumulate financial resources through rent seeking. The social basis of the masses can be ignored and party ideology can be set aside. This elitist practice of democracy by Mack (2010, pp. 6-7) on one hand is called leadership failure and on the other hand as a form of alienation from the core base that causes disalignment in political parties. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape Advances in Politics and Economic Vol. 3, No. 4, 2020 42 Published by SCHOLINK INC. 3.2 The Regulatory Aspects of the General Election and the Decline in the Image of Political Parties Amendment of the rules as referred to in article 56 paragraph (2) of the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 32 of 2004 to become articles 56-59 of RI Law 8 of 2012 concerning General Elections lies in the addition of parties from outside political parties that are given the right and given the authority to propose themselves and or propose individuals to nominate as pairs of candidates for regional head. Through articles 56-59 of Law Number 8 of 2012, the state responds to the public’s desire to continue to use an open proportional system, a system in which the determination of legislative candidates is based on the mechanism of majority votes. This system has been used since the 2009 general election, after the previous article governing the closed proportional system based on the serial number in the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 10 of 2008 through judicial review was declared invalid by the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi/MK). In its consideration, the Constitutional Court stated that the determination of legislative candidates based on serial number was not in accordance with the substance of people’s sovereignty as regulated in article 27 Paragraph 1, Article 28 D Paragraph 1, Article 28 D Paragraph 3, and Article 28 I Paragraph 2 of the 1945 Constitution. Politics the law on the 2009, 2014 and 2019 general election system at least indicates that the state hopes that by removing the nomination of legislative candidates based on the serial number, it will provide equal opportunity and treatment to all legislative candidates in contesting in the 2014 legislative elections and beyond. All contestants can carry out fair competition in building popularity and electability before the voting audience. Through the amendment of article 59 of Law Number 32 of 2004 to article 59 of Law Number 12 of 2008, it clearly shows that political parties are no longer the sole party that has the right and authority to propose candidates for regional head candidates in the election of regional heads. This change in its development then certainly had an impact on the reduced role of the party on the one hand and increased opportunities for the role of the community on the other hand in the process of proposing pairs of candidates for regional head. Pursuant to Law Number 8 of 2012 concerning General Elections of Members of the People’s Legislative Assembly, Regional Representatives Council, and Regional People’s Representative Council, specifically in 5 paragraph (1) the rules regarding the electoral system for DPR, Provincial DPRD and Regency / City DPRD members. Article 5 paragraph (1) stipulates that elections to elect members of the DPR, the provincial DPRD and the regency / city DPRD shall be conducted using an open proportional system. Then in article 7 it is also emphasized that participants in the General Election to elect DPR, provincial DPRD and regency / city DPRD members are political parties. The operationalization of the open proportional system in the voting process for the election of members of the DPR, Provincial DPRD and Regency / City DPRD, is clearly regulated in article 154 which stipulates that the voting for the election of members of the DPR, DPD, provincial DPRD, and regency / city DPRD is conducted by cast a single vote on the number or image mark of a political party and / or the name of the candidate on the ballot. www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape Advances in Politics and Economic Vol. 3, No. 4, 2020 43 Published by SCHOLINK INC. However, the most crucial thing in setting the open proportional system is in the process of determining the elected candidates for members of the DPR, Provincial DPRD, and Regency / City DPRD. For this reason, article 215 of Law Number 8 of 2012 concerning General Elections of Members of the DPR, DPR and DPRD regulates this matter in detail. The full article 215 states as follows: The determination of elected candidates for members of the DPR, provincial DPRD, and regency / city DPRD from Election Contesting Political Parties is based on the acquisition of seats of Election Contesting Political Parties in an electoral district with the following conditions. a. Elected candidates for members of the DPR, the provincial DPRD and the regency / city DPRD are determined based on the candidate who receives the most votes. b. In the event that there are two or more candidates who fulfil the provisions as referred to in letter a with the same vote acquisition, the determination of the elected candidates is determined based on the distribution of the vote acquisition of the candidates in the constituency taking into account women’s representation. c. In the case of candidates who meet the conditions referred to in letter a, the number is less than the number of seats obtained by the Election Contesting Political Parties, the undivided seats are given to the candidates based on the subsequent acquisition of the most votes. This clause in article 215 points a, b, c, empirically has a very large consequence on the views and attitudes of the constituents of political parties and the public over political parties. In a number of cases the phenomenon emerged that during the election voters were more likely to vote for a candidate’s name than to vote for a political party. Various provisions with all kinds of changes regulated in Laws on Political Parties, Laws on General Elections, as well as Regional Government Laws and Decisions handed down by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia relating to the holding of elections have clearly had an impact on the life and role political parties. The rules of the proportional system are open and the rules that open up opportunities for individual candidates in presidential and regional head elections seem to be clearly more personable than the role of political parties. This fact reinforces the opinion of Mack (2010, p. 7) that the electoral system is one of the preconditions that causes disalignment of political parties. 4. Conclusion To overcome the decline of political party’s prestige, thus, requires internal and external solutions. On the internal side, transactional politics and wild political party oligarchies are the effects of an open proportional system that has major implications for liquid or fading ideology, so that constituent ties with political parties become very loose. Political parties, in turn, tend to be fragmented and easily fragmented. Even further than that, virtue, integrity, especially attitudes prioritizing the public interest are almost no longer visible. Therefore political parties must have the courage to change their perspective to immediately rebuild a party ideology, something far more valuable than power and money. In this ideology, in addition to the people’s ideals and state ideas that must be fought for, the soul bond between political parties and their constituents is also linked. By re-holding and building the ideology of www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape Advances in Politics and Economic Vol. 3, No. 4, 2020 44 Published by SCHOLINK INC. politicians, political parties will be more demanded to politic by upholding ethics and morals, politically politic to be more beneficial to society. On the external side, given the widespread practice of pragmatic and transactional politics in the context of legislative elections is the implication of an open proportional system, it needs to be reconsidered to return to a closed proportional system. Transactional political practices are also rampant since the implementation of the direct election system for regional heads at the provincial and district / city levels. Therefore it is better if the regional head election system at both levels of the regional government is handed back to the DPRD according to their respective levels. Indeed, this step raises fears of a strengthened oligarchy (elite) of political parties if a closed proportional system again applies to legislative elections, and an indirect electoral system in regional elections. However, a number of studies say that the implementation of an open proportional system and the direct election system for regional heads are more disadvantageous than the possibility of the practice of oligarchy (elite) political parties in the administration of democracy. 4.1 Suggestion Referring to the above research conclusions, suggestions can be made regarding the strengthening of political parties. Internally, political parties must strive to avoid transactional politics and oligarchy of political parties, political parties must also return to the ideological basis that forms a bond between political parties and their constituents. Externally, the rules that establish an open proportional system in the general elections of legislative members and the rules that stipulate the system of electing the regional head directly must be changed, because this system in practice actually further alienates political parties from constituents. In elections, constituents tend to look more at candidate figures than at the political parties that nominate them. Acknowledges The authors would like to acknowledge the funding of the Directorate of Research and Community Service, Directorate General for Research and Development at the Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education, Indonesia No.: 229/SP2H/LT/DRPM/2019, 19th February 2019, which made a portion of this research possible. 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