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A REVIEW OF THE EXISTING KNOWLEDGE ON ADVERSE POSSESSION OF REGISTERED 

LAND* 

 

Abstract 
This study critically examines some of the existing literature on the doctrine of adverse possession in the context 

of registered land, exploring its rationale, critiques, and implications under the Lands United Kingdom’s Lands 

Registration Act 2002 (LRA 2002) and Lagos State Lands Registration Law 2015 (LRL 2015). It highlights the 

dichotomy between the perception of squatters as trespassers and the legal framework that allows them to acquire 

ownership through prolonged occupation. Judicial opinions, including those of Lord Denning and Neuberger J., 

emphasize the inherent conflict between adverse possession and the principle of indefeasibility of title central to 

modern land registration systems. The LRA 2002 in England is analyzed as a significant reform, offering a model 

for balancing the rights of registered proprietors and adverse possessors. Comparisons are drawn with LRL, 

which retain outdated provisions that undermine legal certainty and equity. The article critiques justifications for 

adverse possession, such as preventing stale claims and encouraging land use, arguing that these rationales are 

less applicable in systems where registration provides conclusive proof of ownership. It concludes by advocating 
for reforms that align adverse possession laws with the principles of fairness, transparency, and the integrity of 

registered land systems. 

 

Keywords: Adverse possession, Registered Land, Land Registration Act 2002, Indefeasibility of title, Lagos 

State Lands Registration Law 2015 

 

1. Introduction 
The doctrine of adverse possession occupies a paradoxical space in property law, where it simultaneously disrupts 

and upholds the integrity of land ownership. At its core, adverse possession allows a person who occupies land 

without the owner’s consent to acquire legal title after a prescribed period, provided certain conditions are met. 

This seemingly anachronistic principle, rooted in the maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt—the 

law aids the vigilant, not the indolent—has been a subject of enduring controversy. While it ostensibly rewards 
industrious use of land and prevents the perpetuation of stale claims, it also poses a direct challenge to the sanctity 

of registered titles, particularly in systems premised on the indefeasibility of title. In jurisdictions with advanced 

land registration systems, such as England, the tension between adverse possession and the principle of 

indefeasibility has prompted significant reforms. The Land Registration Act 2002 stands as a landmark in 

addressing this tension, introducing mechanisms that protect registered proprietors while acknowledging the need 

to resolve conflicts over long-term occupation.1 LRA 2002 significantly reformed adverse possession laws for 

registered land, aligning with the principle of title indefeasibility. The reforms prioritize protecting registered 

proprietors' rights while introducing safeguards for adverse possessors. Key features include a notification and 

consent mechanism, where adverse possessors must apply to the Land Registry after 10 years, notifying the 

registered proprietor and allowing them to object within two years. Adverse possessors are no longer automatically 

registered as proprietors after the limitation period expires. Exceptions permit adverse possession in limited cases, 
such as boundary disputes or unconscionable denial of claims. The LRA 2002 also modified the Limitation Act 

1980, superseding its limitation period rules for registered land and subjecting adverse possession claims to stricter 

requirements. Additionally, the Act introduced a new regime for adverse possession, reducing the limitation 

period from 12 to 10 years. Ultimately, these reforms ensure greater protection for registered landowners against 

unnotified claims, striking a balance between the rights of landowners and the interests of adverse possessors.2 

Conversely, LRL 20153 retains traditional adverse possession rules in such a way that it will automatically 

override and terminate the interest of the registered land owners upon making application to the Court where the 

land has been adversely possessed by the adverse possessor without more for a period of twelve (12) years. This 

more or less conflicts with modern land registration principles, leading to legal uncertainty and inequities. 

 

This study undertakes a critical examination of adverse possession in the context of registered land, juxtaposing 

its application under LRA 2002 and LRL 2015. It interrogates the justifications for the doctrine, its evolution 
through judicial interpretations, and its impact on registered land systems. By drawing on key case law, academic 

discourse, and statutory analysis, the article explores whether adverse possession remains a necessary tool for 

balancing competing interests in property law or an outdated relic in need of reform. It concludes by advocating 

for a recalibration of adverse possession laws to ensure they align with the overarching principles of fairness, legal 

certainty, and the integrity of land registration systems. 

 

                                                             
*By Idris ODEKUNLE, PhD (Lagos), LLM (London), LLM (OAU), LLB (Lagos), BL, ACIArb (UK), FCTI, ANIM, 
ACIS, Lecturer, Department of Private and Property Law, Faculty of Law, University of Lagos, Akoka, Lagos, Nigeria. Email: 
aodekunle@unila.edu.ng, feyintoluodekunle@yahoo.com, Tel: 09027861671, 08110434750 
1 Schedule 6 LRA 2002 
2 Ibid 
3 Sections 66(f), 100, 112 of the LRL 2025 

mailto:feyintoluodekunle@yahoo.com


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2. Review of the Existing Knowledge   
The debate surrounding the rationale for adverse possession of registered land is both contentious and 

intellectually significant, especially in light of recent legal developments in this area across various jurisdictions. 

The characterization of squatting as a form of land theft, juxtaposed with the notion of the first in possession, 
represents a dichotomy frequently discussed by both judicial authorities and legal scholars.4 Squatters are often 

portrayed as outsiders infringing upon protected spaces5—invaders6 described by Lord Denning7 as ‘itinerants, 

drifters, and the antitheses of a stable, homogenous, identifiable community.’ Lord Denning further expounded 

that squatters are culpable of both a criminal offence,8 as captured under the Forcible Entry Act of 1381,9 and a 

civil wrong, being trespassers from the moment of entry and throughout their occupation. This perception 

underpins much of the discourse on adverse possession, with the law paradoxically requiring that ‘a successful 

adverse possession claimant must have committed the tort of trespass over the true owner’s land.’10 Denning’s 

views are echoed in subsequent judicial commentary. For instance, in Buckinghamshire County Council v 

Moran,11 Nourse LJ defined adverse possession as ‘possession of wrong,’12 a perspective endorsed by the Law 

Commission in its 1998 consultative document,13 which described adverse possession as ‘tantamount to 

sanctioning a theft of land.’14 
 

Neuberger J., in Pye v Graham,15 offered particularly incisive criticisms. He argued that merely because an owner 

had no immediate plans for their land and allowed another to trespass temporarily, it did not justify the trespasser 

acquiring ownership for nothing.16 He deemed the doctrine ‘incompatible with justice’ and unsupported by 

practical considerations. Neuberger emphasized that the traditional justification of adverse possession—avoiding 

uncertainty in land ownership—was largely obsolete in the context of registered land, where ownership could 

easily be ascertained from the Land Register.17 He considered the notion that an owner ‘slept on his rights’ 

illogical, as the existence of the 12-year limitation period was the very reason for such a characterization. Without 

this limitation, the owner could reclaim possession at will. Neuberger’s critique hints at the implied license 

doctrine, introduced by Lord Denning in Wallis Cayton Bay Holiday Camp Ltd v Shell-Mex and BP Ltd,18 where 

occupation by a squatter was seen as implicitly consented to by the owner. Although this doctrine has faced 

attempts at eradication, it remains a recurring consideration in adverse possession discussions.  
 

Lord Bingham, in his concurring judgment, highlighted the inapplicability of adverse possession in the context of 

registered land, where the LRA 2002 addresses the risk of title loss through inadvertence. He argued that requiring 

compensation for the dispossessed owner would be more equitable, as registration removes the uncertainties that 

previously justified the doctrine. Dockray19 identified three traditional justifications for adverse possession: (1) 

Protection from Stale Claims: Long-term possessors are shielded from the evidentiary difficulties associated with 

litigating ancient disputes, thereby reducing litigation risks. (2) Encouraging Vigilance by Owners: Owners are 

incentivized to actively manage their property, with the law implicitly punishing neglect. (3) Securing Possessors’ 

Confidence: Adverse possession prevents hardship and ensures land remains marketable by denying owners the 

ability to reclaim land after extended periods. Dockray also recognized that adverse possession remedies defects 

in formalities of ownership transfer, particularly when land registration formalities have not been fulfilled. 
However, he critiqued the law’s apparent disregard for the moral culpability of trespassers, questioning why the 

law should protect wrongdoers, sometimes equating their actions to theft. The Law Commission contended that 

these justifications lose relevance for registered land,20 as the Land Register provides conclusive proof of 

ownership. It argued that possession forms the basis of title for unregistered land, whereas in registered land, title 

                                                             
4 According to Lord Denning in ’McPhail v Persons unknown [1975] Ch 447, 456B, a squatter ‘is one who, without colour of 
right, enters an unoccupied house or land, intending to stay there as long as he can. 
5 D.R. Klick, ‘This Other Eden: Lord Denning’s Pastoral Vision’ (1994) 14 Oxford J Legal Studies, 46. 
6 Lamb v Camden Borough Council [1981] QB 625, 633C 
7 Lawshelf Educational Media ‘Acquisition by Adverse Possession’ available at https://lawshelf.com (accessed 28 December 
2024). See section 9 of the Limitation Law of Lagos State, 2003  
8 McPhail v Persons unknown [1975] Ch 447, 456F. 
9 5 Ric 2 St 1 c 7. 
10 A. Goymour, ‘Squatters and the criminal law: can two wrongs make a right?’ (2004) CLJ, 484. 
11 11[1990] Ch 623. 
12 Supra note 7 
13 Law Commission for England and Wales, Land Registration for the Twenty First Century: A Consultative Document (Law 
Commission No. 254, 1998). 
14 Ibid at 10.5 
15 [2000] 3 WLR 242. 
16 Supra note 7 at 710 
17 Pye v Graham supra note 15 
18 [1975] QB 94. 
19 M. Dockray, ‘Why do We Need Adverse Possession?’(1985) Conveyancer 272. 
20 Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution – Number 271 (July 2001) paras 2.70, 14.3, 
14.54; Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document – Number 254 (September 1998) paras 10.9-
10.10. 



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is conferred through the register. Consequently, the LRA 2002 rendered registered land virtually ‘squatter-proof,’ 

requiring squatters to apply to the Registrar, with the registered owner having the right to object and evict them. 

Despite Dockray’s skepticism, English law continues to justify adverse possession as promoting legal certainty 

and reducing unnecessary litigation. However, these rationales seem most compelling for unregistered land. In 
the context of registered land, as Neuberger J. observed, ‘it becomes hard to see what principle of justice entitles 

the [adverse possessor] to acquire the land.’21 

 

Omotola22 raises the question of whether an adverse possessor under the Limitation Law obtains a fee simple 

estate at the end of the statutory period. He explains that the aim of the Registration of Titles Act is the 

regularisation of land titles to reduce fraudulent dealings. The Act addresses two key questions: who is entitled to 

deal with a piece of land, and which title should be registered. He notes that the Act prioritises persons with the 

power of sale and, when referring to ‘any other person entitled at law or in equity to an estate in fee simple,’ it 

means only those with a valid claim to the fee simple. Omotola23 argues that after the statutory period lapses under 

the Decree, the adverse possessor becomes the sole individual capable of dealing with the land. He concludes that, 

as the original owner’s title is barred by law, the adverse possessor should have the right to register he title under 
the Registration of Titles Act, having acquired an absolute right once time runs in their favour. However, Omotola 

overlooks the fact that adverse possession conflicts with the fundamental concept of indefeasibility of title—a 

cornerstone of registered land law. Adverse possession, when applied to registered land, should no longer 

extinguish ownership because the justifications for the doctrine in unregistered land do not entirely translate to 

registered land. Indeed, the perception of unqualified adverse possession in registered land appears to some as an 

endorsement of ‘land theft.’ 

 

Martin Dixon24 examines how adverse possession initially operated uniformly across registered and unregistered 

land. The introduction of the LRA 2002 sought to address the perceived arbitrariness of acquiring title through 

adverse possession in registered land, aiming to align the doctrine with the principle of title by registration. 

Dixon25 notes that under the previous regime, possession was the foundation of title for both unregistered and 

registered land, but he questions the rationale for applying the same rules to registered land, given the 
fundamentally different bases of title. He analyses the landmark judgment of Nicholas Strauss QC in Beaulane 

Properties Ltd v Palmer,26 describing it as potentially transformative for adverse possession and its intersection 

with human rights law. Dixon highlights how the case brought into focus the potential incompatibility of the law 

of adverse possession, as applied before the LRA 2002, with Article 1 of Protocol No.1 of the European 

Convention on Human Rights. In Beaulane, the argument was straightforward: the pre-LRA 2002 law deprived 

property owners of their land without sufficient public interest justification and disproportionately interfered with 

their rights. Consequently, the Human Rights Act 1998 required the common law to be interpreted in a manner 

consistent with the Convention wherever possible.27 

 

Strauss QC demonstrated that the Limitation Act 1980's departure from the Leigh v Jack28 line of authority resulted 

from historical accidents, such as the need to address uncertainties in unregistered titles and the rise of title 
registration, rather than deliberate policy choices. While Parliament’s intention as expressed in the Limitation Act 

1980 should be respected, Dixon suggests that the public interest in secure titles must also consider economic and 

social factors, such as encouraging landowners to use or forfeit underutilised land. Dixon further observes that the 

Pye v United Kingdom 29judgment limits Beaulane’s significance, as it applies only to the law before the LRA 

2002. Under the LRA 2002, the process of acquiring title through adverse possession has been fundamentally 

altered to ensure compliance with human rights standards. The new process prevents the automatic loss of title 

unless the paper owner is unfairly negligent or inattentive. However, Dixon questions whether this change suffices 

to make the LRA 2002 fully compliant with Article 1 of Protocol No.1. If, as Beaulane implies, registered title 

eliminates the public interest justification for deprivation of title based on limitation, why should it matter if the 

paper owner fails to respond to a Land Registry notice? The applicant’s claim to title relies on the owner's inaction 

rather than uncertainty of ownership. Dixon argues that this manufactured uncertainty undermines the public 

interest rationale for awarding title to an adverse possessor.30 
 

                                                             
21 Supra note 19 
22 J.A. Omotola, J.A., The Place of Possession in the Acquisition of Title to Land (The Conveyancer, Vol. 37, 239-258 
23 Ibid 
24 M.J. Dixon, ‘Land Registration, Adverse Possession and the Nature of a Registered Title’ (2020) 79 Cambridge Law 

Journal, 415. 
25 M.J. Dixon, ‘The Reform of Property Law and the Land Registration Act 2002: A Risk Assessment’ (2003) Conveyancer, 136 
26 [2005] EWHC 817 (Ch) 
27 M.J. Dixon, ‘Adverse Possession and Human Rights in Registered Land’ (2005) Conveyancer 345. 
28 [1879] 5 Ex D 264. 
29 [2005] ECHR 921. 
30 Supra note 27 



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Pawlowski and Brown,31 in their insightful analysis, highlight the legal distinctions and practical implications of 

adverse possession under the Limitation Act and LRA 2002. They begin by underscoring the trite principle that 

unregistered land subjected to adverse possession for 12 years leads to the automatic barring of the paper owner’s 

title.32 In contrast, registered land operates differently: an adverse possessor must apply for registration as 
proprietor after ten years of possession, with no automatic barring of the paper owner’s title.33 This distinction, 

they argue, raises critical challenges for adverse possessors, especially given the limited grounds on which such 

applications may succeed under the LRA 2002. The authors contend that the procedural hurdles and risks of 

opposition by registered proprietors discourage adverse possessors from applying for registration. For instance, 

while an abandoned piece of land might present lower risks of objection, contested cases involving occupied 

properties significantly deter applications. This reluctance, they suggest, is amplified by the principle of the 

relativity of title, which holds that possession confers better rights against the world save for those with superior 

legal claims. In registered land, however, this principle becomes less relevant as successive possessors cannot 

aggregate their periods of possession to meet the ten-year threshold required for registration under the LRA 2002. 

Pawlowski and Brown critically examine the three exceptional grounds under Schedule 6 of the LRA 2002, 

focusing particularly on the equitable estoppel exception. They argue that this ground is inherently limited, as 
possessors occupying land under circumstances giving rise to proprietary estoppel typically do so with the paper 

owner’s consent, negating adverse possession. Thus, this provision likely applies only to specific cases, such as 

mistaken building on disputed land or informal transactions lacking perfected title. Moreover, even where 

proprietary estoppel is established, the Land Registry retains discretionary power to deny registration, further 

complicating the process for claimants. The authors argue that while the LRA 2002 ostensibly allows squatters to 

apply for registration after ten years of adverse possession, the practical obstacles make successful applications 

rare. Consequently, many possessory estates persist indefinitely, creating a tension with the policy goal of limiting 

‘off-the-register’ dealings with registered land. To address this, they propose a legislative amendment introducing 

a limitation period for squatter applications following ten years of adverse possession. Failure to apply within this 

extended period would extinguish the squatter’s possessory estate, precluding indefinite claims and aligning with 

the overarching principles of the LRA 2002. 

 
The proposed amendment, according to Pawlowski and Brown, would mirror the automatic extinguishment of the 

paper owner’s title in unregistered land under the Limitation Act. However, unlike the current law, which allows 

a squatter’s fee simple to ripen into ownership, a failure to apply within the specified period under the amended 

LRA 2002 would render the squatter a mere trespasser. This would eliminate any defense against the registered 

proprietor’s claim and preclude reliance on the three grounds in Schedule 6, thus ensuring the integrity of the 

register. Pawlowski and Brown further argue that the existence of possessory estates enduring indefinitely off the 

register undermines the core principle of land registration—that title is based on registration, not mere possession. 

They cite the Law Commission’s emphasis on this principle, which underpins the LRA 2002. The authors propose 

that the limitation period for squatter applications could also commence upon written notice from the registered 

proprietor, ensuring fairness and prompt action. Such an approach, they argue, would achieve a dual effect: 

compelling legitimate claims to be registered promptly while extinguishing unmeritorious claims. In conclusion, 
Pawlowski and Brown assert that their proposed amendment would enhance the integrity of the land registration 

system by curbing the proliferation of possessory estates existing outside the register. By aligning with the 

rationale of the LRA 2002, this reform would reduce the ‘dark market’ of possessory estates, ensure timely 

conversion of valid claims into registered titles, and solidify the public’s confidence in the land registration 

framework. Their analysis invites a reevaluation of current policies to reconcile the competing interests of 

possession and registration, ultimately fostering a more transparent and equitable system of land ownership.34 

 

Park35 observes that virtually all legal systems recognize adverse possession as a mechanism for acquiring interests 

in land, with such interests often arising and continuing without formal recordation. This unrecorded status, Park 

argues, contravenes the foundational principles of registered title systems, which emphasize certainty and 

transparency Park elaborates that the essence of title registration lies in the precise recording and continual 

updating of details about individual parcels, ensuring that boundaries and ownership are accurately reflected. He 
invokes Ruoff's36 ‘mirror’ and ‘curtain’ principles, which collectively aim to provide an unassailable record of 

title that obviates the need to examine prior transactions. Yet, Park contends, adverse possession disrupts these 

principles by creating a situation where the dispossessed titleholder remains recorded as the proprietor, 

                                                             
31 M. Pawlowski and J. Brown, ‘Adverse Possession and the Transmissibility of Possessory Rights: The Dark Side of Land 
Registration?’ (2017) Conveyancers Journal 116 
32 See English Limitation Act 1980, s. 15 
33 See LRA 2002, s.96. 
34 See M. Pawlowski, ‘Criminal Squatting and Adverse Possession: A Case of Interpretative Logic’ (2015). 24 Nott. L.J, 129. 
35 M.M. Park, The Effect of Adverse Possession on Part of a Registered Title Land Parcel. 29 (Barbara Bogusz, Roger Sexton, 
2003) 
36 T.B. Ruoff and R.B. Roper, On the Law and Practice of Registered Conveyancing. 4th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 
1979) 



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undermining the mirror principle and fostering conflicts between recorded and unrecorded rights. Griggs37 extends 

the analysis by situating adverse possession within the framework of the Torrens system of title registration in 

Australia. He critiques the doctrine as antiquated, arguing that its justification diminishes under modern 

registration systems that prioritize indefeasibility of title. Griggs highlights the adverse implications of adverse 
possession, including its potential to undermine the functional utility of registration systems and the economic 

markets that rely on them. Analyzing Pye v Graham, he characterizes adverse possession as a violation of 

registered owners’ rights, fostering squatting and eroding confidence in the legal formalism of registration. 

However, Griggs's critique of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in Pye has been 

contested. Critics argue that the equitable framework provided under English law, including the Limitation Act 

of 1980, aligns with human rights standards by balancing the interests of registered proprietors and adverse 

possessors. Restrictive judicial interpretation, guided by restitution principles, is advocated as a means to protect 

registered owners and uphold the integrity of registration systems. 

 

Smith38 examines the Nigerian context, focusing on the LRL 2015. He critiques the law's provisions for registering 

adverse possession, highlighting the challenges they pose to the indefeasibility of registered title and the broader 
principles of fairness and constitutional property rights. Smith notes that the LRL provisions enable squatters to 

acquire title through adverse possession39 in a manner that jeopardizes the interests of third parties, such as 

mortgagees, and undermines the objectives of modern registration systems. He proposes excluding adverse 

possessors from registration or instituting a rigorous regime to make it exceedingly difficult for squatters to 

acquire title against the wishes of registered proprietors. Drawing comparisons with the qualified veto rule under 

the LRA 2002 in England, Smith suggests adopting similar safeguards in Lagos State to protect legitimate 

titleholders. Ojo40 contributes to the discourse by emphasizing the transformative impact of the LRA 2002 on the 

doctrine of adverse possession in England and Wales. He highlights that the Act shifts the burden to the squatter, 

ensuring that the mere passage of time cannot bar the rights of registered proprietors. Ojo strongly advocates for 

the abolition of adverse possession in Nigeria, describing the doctrine as outdated and morally indefensible. If 

retained, he recommends adopting the English model, which incorporates robust checks and balances to safeguard 

the interests of registered proprietors. 
 

A review of the literature reveals a consistent focus on the principle of legal certainty as the cornerstone of land 

registration systems across jurisdictions. While the rationale for adverse possession has evolved, its application 

remains contentious. In England, the enactment of the LRA 2002 represents a paradigm shift, demonstrating how 

modern legal frameworks can reconcile the doctrine with the imperatives of registration. By contrast, LRL 

grapples with outdated frameworks that fail to align with contemporary expectations of fairness, transparency, 

and property rights protection. The prevailing consensus among scholars underscores the need for legislative 

reform to address the tensions inherent in the coexistence of adverse possession and title registration. 

 

Dockray41 critiques the Limitation Act for its failure to provide a comprehensive rationale for its policies, arguing 

that it only incentivizes landowners to protect their interests if they are aware, or should reasonably be aware, that 
time is running against them. However, he notes that neither actual nor constructive knowledge of the accrual of 

a cause of action is required for the statute's operation.  Doctray42 and Omotola43 provide contrasting justifications 

for adverse possession in the context of registered land. Doctray defends the doctrine as a mechanism to protect 

long-term possessors from stale claims, promote the quieting of title, discourage landowners from neglecting their 

rights, and ensure that possessors can rely on their claims after a statutory period has elapsed. Omotola, 

meanwhile, ties the doctrine to the aims of the Registration of Titles Act, which seeks to regularize land titles and 

reduce fraudulent dealings. He argues that once the title of the original owner has been barred by the limitation 

law, there is no basis for denying the adverse possessor the right to register under the Registration of Titles Act. 

Both scholars anchor their arguments on principles of equity and fair play, asserting that legal rights are not 

perpetual but must be exercised within statutory limits. However, Doctray’s justification overlooks the 

transformative role of title registration in providing certainty and conclusiveness of ownership. For registered 

land, the act of registration itself removes ambiguity and serves as definitive proof of ownership, unlike 
unregistered land, where possession forms the basis of title. Omotola’s stance similarly fails to reconcile the 

doctrine of adverse possession with the principle of indefeasibility of title, a cornerstone of registered land 

systems. Allowing adverse possession to override registered title fundamentally undermines the philosophy of 

land registration by introducing uncertainty into a system designed to eliminate it. 

                                                             
37 L. Griggs, ‘Possession, Indefeasibility and Human Rights’ (2008) QUT Law Review, 2201. 
38 I. O. Smith, Essays on the Lagos State Lands Registration Law 2015, (Department of Private & Property Law, Faculty of 

Law, University of Lagos, 2017) 
39 See the combined effect of Sections 66(f), 100 and 112 of LRL 2015 
40 G. Ojo, ‘Acquisition of Title to Land by Adverse Possession: Need to Stop Endorsement of Land Theft’ (2016) The Gravitas 
Review of Business & Property Law, 1. 
41 Supra note 16 
42 ibid 
43 Supra note 19 



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Dixon,44 Pawlowski and Brown,45 Park,46 Griggs,47 Smith,48 and Ojo 49critique adverse possession in registered 

land systems on various grounds. They argue that the doctrine contradicts the concept of indefeasibility of title, 

perpetuates unfairness, and effectively legalizes land theft. The notion that title is relative rather than absolute has 
particularly troubling implications in cases involving successive adverse possessors, where each squatter’s claim 

rests on their occupation of the land. For registered land, such scenarios are even more problematic because the 

transfer of a possessory estate between successive squatters cannot be registered. Smith50 highlights the injustices 

inherent in the LRL 2015 provisions on adverse possession in Lagos State, proposing that the law should either 

exclude adverse possessors’ claims from registration—making them susceptible to eviction—or adopt provisions 

akin to the LRA 2002, which impose stringent requirements on the registration of adverse possession claims. Such 

measures would better protect registered owners and uphold the integrity of the registration system. 

 

The academic consensus overwhelmingly condemns the doctrine of adverse possession in registered land systems, 

identifying it as morally and legally problematic. By unjustly enriching adverse possessors at the expense of 

registered owners, the doctrine undermines the principles of fairness and equity that underpin land registration 
systems. 

 

3. Case Law Overview 

 

English Case Law Perspective 

The inconsistency test, as articulated in the case of Leigh v Jack51, establishes that acts by an adverse possessor 

must be inconsistent with the title owner’s enjoyment of the land for its intended purposes. In this case, the 

plaintiff’s predecessor had designated parts of his estate as proposed streets, namely Grundy Street and Napier 

Place. The intention to use these adjoining lands as streets was evident to all parties involved. During the limitation 

period, the defendant had encroached upon these areas, placing old graving dock materials and other refuse on 

them, and eventually enclosing the land. Despite these actions, the defendant did not acquire title under the 

Limitation Act 1833. This ruling introduced complexities into subsequent interpretations of adverse possession, 
as it failed to provide clear boundaries for assessing inconsistency in possession claims. The case of Pye v 

Graham52 further highlighted the challenges of interpreting adverse possession. The Grahams, under a grazing 

agreement with Mr. Pye, continued to occupy 23 hectares of land valued at £10 million after the agreement 

expired. When Pye failed to take possession, the Grahams sought ownership through adverse possession. 

Neuberger J, at the High Court, ruled in their favor under the Land Registration Act 1925. However, the Court of 

Appeal overturned this decision, reasoning that the Grahams’ occupation was linked to the grazing agreement. 

Ultimately, the House of Lords unanimously reinstated the High Court’s ruling, underscoring the principle that 

non-action by the registered owner could enable an adverse possessor’s claim. This case signaled the inherent 

tension between adverse possession and the principles of land registration, particularly regarding registered land. 

In Beaulane Properties Ltd v Palmer,53 Nicholas Strauss QC sought to address this tension by reviving the rule in 

Leigh v Jack. He concluded that the pre-2002 regime for registered land contravened the true owner’s rights under 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Invoking Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, Strauss 

QC applied the Leigh v Jack principle to protect the owner’s title from being overridden by adverse possession, 

marking a judicial shift toward aligning property law with human rights obligations. 

 

The Law Commission of England and Wales, in its 1998 consultative document,54 characterized adverse 

possessors as ‘land thieves’ whose actions undermined the security of registered titles. This critique informed the 

enactment of the LRA 2002, which sought to safeguard registered proprietors by restricting adverse possession to 

situations justified by fairness or marketability of land. However, LRL 2015, despite drawing inspiration from the 

LRA 2002, failed to replicate its safeguards, allowing adverse possession to override registered titles—a 

significant legislative inconsistency. The case of Paine v Sexton55 further elucidated the requirements for adverse 

possession, emphasizing a ‘totality of circumstances’ approach. The plaintiffs, who operated a campground on 

disputed land for over 20 years, successfully demonstrated their open, notorious, and exclusive use of the property. 

                                                             
44 Supra notes 24, 25, 27 
45 Supra note 31 
46 Supra note 36 
47 Supra note 38 
48 Supra note 39 
49 Supra note 41 
50 Supra note 39 
51 [1879] 5 Ex D 264, 
52 [2002] UKHL 30 
53 [2006] Ch 79 
54 Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document, Law Com No 254 
55 20 LCR 292 



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The court’s reliance on precedents like Kendall v Selvaggio56 and Sea Pines Condominium II v Steffens57 

underscored the weight given to visible acts of occupation. However, the decision prioritized the adverse 

possessor’s interest over the registered owner’s rights, perpetuating the conflict between adverse possession and 

the principle of indefeasibility inherent in land registration systems. This judicial approach disregards the 
foundational rationale of land registration, which is to eliminate uncertainty and provide conclusive proof of 

ownership. By privileging adverse possessors, courts undermine the registered owner’s security of title.  

 

Nigerian Case Law Perspective 

The Nigerian judiciary has consistently held that adverse possession cannot override registered title. In Atunrase 

v Sunmola,58 Mogaji v Cadbury,59 and Ngene v Igbo60  courts affirmed that adverse possession is incompatible 

with land registration principles. Similarly, in Bello v Birma61 the Court of Appeal unequivocally stated that 

‘adverse possession, however long, does not confer title against the rightful holder.’ Post-LRL 2015, courts have 

maintained this stance. In Jauro v Danmaraya 62the court reiterated that long-term adverse possession cannot 

mature into ownership. Likewise, in Akanbi v A.G. Federation,63 the court held that adverse possession does not 

confer title by prescription. These rulings reveal a judicial consensus rejecting adverse possession’s applicability 
to registered land, yet statutory inconsistencies persist, leaving registered owners vulnerable. 

 

4. Statutory Inconsistencies 

The LRL 2015’s provisions on adverse possession conflict with Lagos State statutes, such as Land Use Act 197864, 

the Lagos State Criminal Code 201165, and the Property Protection Law of Lagos State 2016,66 which criminalize 

adverse possession. This raises a critical question: if adverse possession is illegal under these statutes, can it confer 

ownership? The answer, clearly, is negative. Adverse possession, once a vital mechanism in land law, now faces 

challenges in adapting to modern land registration systems. Traditionally justified by the need to quiet titles and 

encourage diligent land use, the doctrine appears increasingly outdated within regimes that prioritize the principle 

of indefeasibility of title. The reforms introduced by the LRA 2002 in England and Wales highlight a more 

balanced approach, incorporating procedural safeguards that protect the interests of registered proprietors while 

addressing long-term possession claims. In contrast, retention of adverse possession, particularly in the face of 
legislative inconsistencies such as the LRL 2015, undermines the reliability of its registration system. While the 

judiciary has consistently upheld the primacy of registered titles, as seen in landmark cases like Atunrase v 

Sunmola and Jauro v Danmaraya, the absence of coherent statutory reforms perpetuates insecurity and inequity. 

 

5. Conclusion 
The gap between Nigerian case law and the statutory framework highlights the inadequacies of Lagos State’s 

legislative protections for registered title owners. To secure land ownership and uphold the principles of equity 

and fairness, legislative reform is imperative. Adverse possession must be reconciled with the core tenets of land 

registration to ensure the integrity of property rights in Lagos State. A shift in approach is necessary for Lagos 

State to align its land laws with global best practices. Legislative reforms should aim to abolish or limit adverse 

possession in registered land systems, incorporating safeguards similar to those in the LRA 2002.  The evolving 
jurisprudence and legislative reforms surrounding adverse possession reflect a growing recognition of its 

incompatibility with registered land systems. While the LRA 2002 has mitigated some of the doctrine’s 

shortcomings, further refinements are necessary to align adverse possession with principles of fairness and human 

rights. In jurisdictions like Lagos State, adopting safeguards akin to those under the LRA 2002 would enhance the 

integrity of land registration systems and protect legitimate titleholders. Ultimately, the future of adverse 

possession lies in striking a balance between practical considerations and the imperatives of legal certainty and 

transparency. By reconciling these competing interests, policymakers can foster a more equitable and efficient 

framework for land ownership. 

                                                             
56 413 Mass. 619 (1992) 602 N.E.2d 206 
57 61 Mass. App. Ct. 838  
58 [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1) 105 
59 [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt. 77) 383 
60 [2000] 4 NWLR (Pt. 651) 133, 
61 [2014] LPELR-23969, 
62 [2016] LPELR-40328, 
63 [2017] LPELR-43121 
64 Section 37, Land Use Act 1978 
65 Section 280 of the Lagos State Criminal Code 2011 
66 Section 4 of the Property Protection Law of Lagos State 2016 


