




































In ternationa l
Scholars
Journa ls

  

African Journal of Environmental Economics and Management ISSN 2375-0707 Vol. 5 (3), pp. 290-301, March, 2017. 
Available online at www.internationalscholarsjournals.org © International Scholars Journals 

 

Author(s) retain the copyright of this article. 

 

Full Length Research Paper 
 

A study of the security concerns and policies of  Asian 
developing countries with regard to sustainable 

development and impact of nuclear energy 
 

Devi Rani Bindu 

 
School for Environmental Sciences, Babasaheb Bhimrao Ambedkar University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, 

India. Email. devi_ranibindu_0@yahoo.com. 
 

Accepted 02 December, 2016 

 
The problem of global climate change will be solved by meeting stringent, long-term policy targets that are 
much more ambitious than the short-term, greenhouse gas emission reductions that some countries currently 
attempt to reach. The large-scale implementation of carbon-free technologies constitutes one of the measures 
essential to realize the mitigation of global warming. Nuclear power generation involves no carbon dioxide 
emissions, but the current use of nuclear energy cannot be considered sustainable. However, in attempting to 
achieve sustainable development - and to establish transition paths towards sustainable energy systems in 
particular - nuclear energy might, for the moment, need to remain a component of the global energy mix. Asian 
developing countries, aspiring to embark upon paths of rapid economic growth and to increase levels of 
welfare, should carefully consider the relatively high costs involved in the development of nuclear power when 
designing long-term, sustainable, and affordable energy infrastructure. This paper argues that if countries such 
as China and India continue to expand the use of nuclear energy, they would do better not to choose a nuclear 
fuel cycle based on reprocessing, but to adopt a once-through fuel cycle instead. 
 
Keywords: Nuclear energy, sustainability, global climate, fossil fuel. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Nuclear energy remains a controversial issue for policy-
making on energy and environment because of 
arguments concerning radioactive waste, reactor 
accidents, nuclear proliferation, economic 
competitiveness, and public opinion. The issues of 
climate change and supply security have provided a new 
rationale for its reappearance on the international political 
agenda. Recent national policy directions in some 
countries show that such a potential comeback of nuclear 
energy is not just wishful thinking of the nuclear 
establishment. Because nuclear energy currently faces 
stagnation, it is unrealistic to consider it a serious option 
for significantly reducing carbon emissions in the short 
run. On the other hand, it seems a mistake to exclude at 
this time any of the available options - including nuclear 
power -that could possibly contribute to mitigating 
emissions of GHGs (greenhouse gases) in the longer 

 
 
 
 
run. Whether or not nuclear energy will play a role of 
significance in the long term, all energy technologies - 
including nuclear ones -ought to be considered in terms 
of their potential to contribute to goals of sustainable 
development, including aspects related to environmental, 
economic, and social risks, particularly climate change 
prevention and supply security support.  

It is widely recognized that, in addition to other factors, 
the availability and use of electricity can improve the 
standard of living in developing countries and, in fact, 
may be an indispensable driver of economic and social 
progress (IEA 2002). Economic growth towards higher 
levels of wealth in these countries is intimately linked to 
increases in per capita utilization of energy. However, in 
attempting to establish effective, efficient, affordable, and 
sustainable energy production and consumption in the 
developing world, one must be careful not to automatically 



Bindu          291 
 
 

 
transpose to developing countries existing energy 
technologies, infrastructures, and modi operandi as 
currently employed in developed countries. The resource-
related, technological, cultural, legal, and societal 
differences between developing and developed countries 
should be carefully contemplated and integrated into the 
design of energy systems in the developing world. Many 
consider the lack of proper energy facilities in the 
developing world as one of the world's prime 
development problems, to be tackled on priority. The 
solution lies in an intelligent, regional - probably 
decentralized - approach, which takes into account local 
needs, capabilities, and customs.  

In this context, the question is what the future role of 
nuclear energy may be in addressing the energy 
challenges of the 21st century in developing countries, 
particularly in Asia. This article provides an overview of 
some of the main issues concerning the prospects for 
nuclear energy in Asian developing countries, and 
presents some perspectives of nuclear development in 
China and India—however different these two countries 
may be from a nuclear point of view. In these countries, 
the expertise required for nuclear expansion is available; 
their governments too are firm in their efforts to enlarge 
the deployment of nuclear power capacity. This paper 
discusses whether it is wise to let nuclear energy 
increasingly contribute to domestic power generation in 
China and India, and how the share of national nuclear 
power production is likely to develop. Some 
recommendations are given on how potential nuclear 
development, if deemed necessary, could best be 
pursued.  

After providing this outlook on the global future use of 
energy and the role of fossil fuels and energy supply 
security therein, the chapter puts nuclear energy into the 
perspective of sustainable development and presents the 
results of a simple scenario analysis, through which the 
merits of nuclear energy can be assessed in terms of 
climate change control. It goes on to describe some 
elements relevant for the economics of nuclear energy 
and, in particular, of reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. It 
then analyses the potential role of nuclear power in Asia, 
takes up two detailed cases of China and India, and 
concludes. 
 
 
Data And Methodology 
 
The present study is analytical study based on secondary 
sources of data and information. the data And information 
have been compiled from Economic survey of India, 
report on trend and progress of Natural resource 
management commission ,basic statistical returns 
relating to energy consumption in india .for the 
preparation of present study various journals, magazines 
and newspapers like Indian journal of energy and 
environment ,economic and political weekly, financial 

 
 
 

 
express, economic times etc. have also been used .the 
period has been chosen considering the availability and 
consistency of data. 
 
 
Global Fossil Energy Outlook 
 
The global fossil resource base is abundant and 
estimated at approximately 5000 Gtoe (gigatonnes of oil 
equivalent) (Rogner 1997). Given that the current global 
primary energy use amounts to approximately 10 Gtoe 
per year, this amount is largely sufficient to fuel the world 
economy throughout the 21st century, even if demand 
rises significantly. Of course, the geological existence of 
large hydrocarbon resources does not necessarily 
guarantee energy supply stability or security. Energy 
supply uncertainties exist for many reasons. First, these 
uncertainties concern the costs of resource recovery and 
conversion to usable fuels. Second, hydrocarbon 
development and production decisions often lie with 
public sector agencies and are therefore not driven by 
market considerations alone, but by international political 
arguments as well. Temporary energy supply shortages 
and volatile market prices will thus continue to mark the 
development of the energy system, and it is unlikely that 
the development of that system will be less volatile in the 
future than it has been in the past.  

Most important, however, the largest source of energy 
supply uncertainty seems to be the environment. The 
CO2 (carbon dioxide) emissions from the combustion of 
fossil fuels constitute the main reason for the increase of 
the atmospheric GHG concentration. This increase 
results in a higher global average temperature of the 
earth's surface, leading to regional and local effects of 
climate change. The combustion of fossil fuels - 
especially coal - is also the cause of various forms of air 
pollution, with detrimental effects for both human health 
and the natural environment. The environment is likely to 
constrain the use of fossil fuels long before global 
resource scarcity comes into play, so that resource 
availability limitations are unlikely to drive the global 
energy system away from a continued reliance on fossil 
resources. If humankind wants to avoid destabilizing the 
global climate and preserve local air quality, it will need to 
operationalize environmental policies, such as the 
implementation of full-cost pricing, that is, the 
internalization of the external costs of energy production.  

Resource constraints are unlikely to drive down 
hydrocarbon production during the 21st century, if 
technological progress continues to improve 
productivity—a phenomenon incessantly observed in the 
past. Oil production from existing, recoverable oil 
reserves is expected to peak within a few decades, but 
this will at some point spur the development of 
alternatives, such as the transformation of currently 
uncertain conventional oil or marginal unconventional oil 
into the conventional oil of the future. The oil era is thus 



292          Afr. J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 
 
 

 
likely to last well beyond the time frame suggested by the 
currently known, recoverable, conventional crude oil 
reserves. With global demand for oil rising, pressure on 
oil prices can be expected in the long run. At times, 
volatile fluctuations of oil prices may well be encountered, 
with alternating periods of rapidly increasing and 
decreasing price movements, around an otherwise long-
term trend of gradually rising production costs. However, 
the volatility fluctuations are unlikely to be caused by 
resource scarcity, rather by the time lags between market 
signals such as prices and the point in time when new 
exploration investments become production-effective.  

In addition to conventional and unconventional oil, there 
are large amounts of natural gas and coal recoverable 
from the earth's crust. From an aggregate carbon 
quantity-cost curve for the total global fossil resource 
base, one can deduct that for a maximum of 40 dollars 
(1990) per barrel of oil equivalent, most of the global 
fossil resource base is recoverable from the earth when 
some (modest) level of technological progress over a 
100-year period is anticipated (Rogner 1997). This 
underlines the likelihood that fossil fuels remain the 
predominant form of energy use throughout the 21st 
century. Until 2100, however, humankind may have 
emitted an amount nearing 2000 GtC (gigatonnes of 
carbon) into the atmosphere, which pushes the 
atmospheric CO2 concentration to a level well above the 
700 ppmv (parts per million by volume)—more than 
double the pre-industrial concentrations. Such an 
increase will almost undoubtedly imply considerable 
impacts on living conditions and the environment as a 
result of climate change.  

The industrialized world is today responsible for the 
majority of CO2 emissions. If humankind is to stabilize 
atmospheric CO2 concentrations at a level that prevents 
a dangerous human interference with the climate system, 
then the developing countries need to be engaged in 
efforts to limit and reduce GHG emissions. These 
emissions are growing much faster in developing 
countries than in industrialized countries, more as a result 
of economic growth than population growth. To help 
maintain stability in the world's climate system, 
(especially) Asian countries such as China and India 
must, as their economies and populations grow, fuel their 
development with not only economically competitive but 
also clean energy technologies (Wirth, Boyden, and 
Podesta 2003). Asia will experience the most rapid 
energy demand increase among all world regions 
because of its expected robust economic growth over the 
coming decades. The most important environmental 
issues for the Asian region are local. To control local 
environmental pollution, as well as CO2 emissions, the 
best strategies for Asia focus on rapid technological 
progress and the use of energy resources other than coal 
(IIASA and WEC 1998).  

In 2030, the world energy system will probably 
continue to be dominated by fossil fuels, with a continued 

 

  
 

 
proportion of 80%-90% of total energy supply. Oil will 
probably remain the main source of energy (with an 
expected 34%), followed by coal (28%), while natural gas 
is projected to represent some 25% of global energy 
supply by then (EC, IEPE, BFP, et al. 2003). Coal is 
fuelling the largest share of power generation worldwide 
and will most likely supply an increasing percentage of 
the growth in demand in the future, particularly in the 
developing world. Over the coming 30 years, about two-
thirds of the increase in coal supply will, in all probability, 
come from China and India. Because of the abundant 
coal resources in Asia, the share of its coal usage 
remains high (42%) and will not change significantly. In 
contrast, the shares of oil and gas increase rapidly at the 
expense of biomass that is almost phased out (probably 
dipping to around 6% of primary energy consumption in 
2030, compared to 30% in 1990). By 2010, Asia will be 
the world's largest consumer of primary energy. By 2020, 
China and India are expected to produce more carbon 
emissions than the US and the European Union 
combined. Asia already imports around 60% of its oil from 
the Middle East, and Asian dependence on this volatile 
region is increasing (Manning 2000). This dependence is 
a growing concern for Asian governments, which view 
energy largely in strategic terms as a matter of 
fundamental national security.  
In the Asian region, over the past 25 years, there has 
been a general decrease in the energy intensity of the 
gross domestic product, driven both by structural and 
technological factors (Datt, Kacker, Mehra, et al. 2002). 
This decrease has been beneficial for the development of 
a sustainable energy sector in Asia. In the areas of 
improving access to modern energy forms and arresting 
adverse environmental impacts of energy development, 
progress has been less impressive. The trend towards 
the use of economic instruments to support 
environmental legislation needs to be strengthened, while 
the role of governments in improving access to energy 
needs to be enhanced. Still, in the coming decades, 
countries like China and India are not likely to realize a 
share of commercial energy production from renewable 
energy resources much beyond the 1% level. This brings 
up the question of the extent to which nuclear energy 
could contribute to establishing transition paths towards 
sustainable energy infrastructures in Asia - China and 
India in particular - over the decades to come. 
 
 
Nuclear Energy And Sustainability 
 
Only recently has nuclear energy been subjected to 
detailed studies in terms of its potential contribution to 
establishing sustainable development (see, for example, 
NEA 2000; Rogner 2001). Most analysts confirm that 
nuclear energy currently does not meet some essential 
requirements for representing a sustainable energy 
resource (see, for example, Bruggink and van der Zwaan 



Bindu          293 
 
 

 
2002) and that, in particular, the current use of LWR (light 
water reactor) technology cannot be qualified as 
sustainable (Rothwell and van der Zwaan 2003). 
Arguments concerning radioactive waste, reactor 
accidents, nuclear proliferation and terrorism, and 
economic competitiveness all feature in the discussion on 
the sustainability of nuclear energy. Likewise, however, it 
has been pointed out that it is hard to claim that any of 
the existing, so-called ‘renewables’ meet all the criteria of 
a sustainable energy resource (Bruggink and van der 
Zwaan 2002). One of the major reasons is that 
renewables have so far not been applied on a large 
(global) scale, so that the risks involved in their usage 
cannot yet be apparent. Fundamental issues determining 
the (un)sustainability of renewables relate to land usage, 
materials usage, waste production, and environmental 
impact.  

While it is not recognized as a sustainable energy 
resource today, nuclear energy - along with other 
currently available energy options -could play a 
transitional role towards establishing sustainable energy 
systems. Whereas changes in energy infrastructures, 
particularly nuclear ones, generally occur relatively 
slowly, nuclear energy should still be viewed in a dynamic 
way. During a transitional phase with some role for 
nuclear power, some of the more problematic aspects of 
nuclear energy might be rendered more sustainable 
through, for instance, waste minimization, accident 
reduction, proliferation control, resource use optimization, 
and enhancement of economic competitiveness (Rothwell 
and van der Zwaan 2003). Over the past few decades, 
technological developments in the nuclear field have 
been considerable, demonstrated, for instance, by the 
substantially declining likelihood - since the 1986 
Chernobyl catastrophe - of experiencing another serious 
reactor accident with significant consequences for the 
external environment. These technological advancements 
are likely to continue, for instance with respect to 
increasing reactor safety, reducing radioactive waste 
lifetime and toxicity, or building more proliferation-
resistant reactors.  

This could give nuclear energy a potential role beyond 
the aforementioned transition period. To some extent, 
depending on perspectives of both time and location, 
nuclear energy could contribute to establishing paths 
towards sustainable energy systems and thereby to 
achieving sustainable development.  

In the past, an important reason for developing 
domestic nuclear energy capacity was its potential to 
greatly enhance national energy independence, mainly 
since nuclear fuel (uranium) is widely available and can 
be cheaply acquired and easily stored. Arguments of 
energy supply security will continue to motivate countries, 
including those in the developing world with currently 
modest or absent shares of nuclear energy in electricity 
production, to develop domestic nuclear power facilities. 
Since the subject of climate change mitigation has been 

 
 
 

 
recognized as one of the most significant existing global 
challenges, nuclear energy has received renewed 
consideration. As will be pointed out later, whereas even 
a massive global expansion of nuclear energy would not 
be a panacea for the problem of global warming, its 
potential share in controlling atmospheric temperature 
increases could be significant (Sailor, Bodansky, Braun, 
et al. 2000; van der Zwaan 2002). Given the size of the 
global change challenge, nuclear energy might indeed 
deserve increased attention. Nuclear power might need 
to be expanded on a global scale, or at least should not 
be left out of the current energy mix. Developing 
countries could, in principle, play roles in continued and, 
perhaps, intensified employment of nuclear fission. 
 
 
Nuclear Energy And Climate Change 
 
Through a simple scenario analysis, one can readily 
estimate the global potential of nuclear energy in 
reducing carbon emissions and, hence, in mitigating 
global warming. In other words, if for ease of analysis, 
one momentarily discards (still important) questions 
regarding the feasibility and desirability of a large 
increase in nuclear energy use, what then are the 
climate-change-related merits of nuclear power when it is 
expanded massively? Since today, about one-third of 
total global commercial primary energy is supplied in the 
form of electricity, an answer in first approximation to this 
question would be that for the moment nuclear energy 
would not readily be able to reduce carbon emissions by 
much more than one-third (since nuclear energy is today 
primarily available through power generation). Suppose, 
in a slightly more detailed analysis, that the current ‘400 
EJ (exajoules) world’ is expanded over the coming 75 
years to one that consumes 1200 EJ per year. Currently, 
three fossil fuels together fulfil the major portion of 
commercial primary energy supply (approximately 86%, 
responsible today for around 6 GtC per year of 
emissions), while hydropower, nuclear fission, and 
renewables account for shares of about 7%, 6%, and 1%, 
respectively. Let us make the stylized assumptions that 
the use of fossil fuels is decarbonized, by 2075, to the 
level of the current carbon intensity of natural gas power 
generation, and that global energy consumption (total, 
and specified by resource) increases, in two scenarios (I 
and II), according to the factors stated in Table 1. (For a 
more extensive description of the corresponding analysis, 
see van der Zwaan [2002]).1 The main features of the 
scenario analysis according to Table 1 are that 
hydropower retains its relative share of energy supply, 
over the 2000-75 period, while the use of renewables is 
ambitiously assumed to increase by a factor of 100 over 
this time frame. Nuclear energy is supposed to stagnate 
at its current absolute level in Scenario I, while it is 
expanded by the hypothetical factor of 10 in Scenario II.  
Table 2 shows the results of a corresponding exercise in 



  
 
 

 
Table 1. Expansion factors of total energy demand and of the 
non-carbon emitting hydropower, renewables, and nuclear 
energy supplies, in Scenarios I and II 

 
Energy expansion factors 

 
  Scenario I Scenario II 

 
     

 Total energy 
3 3  

 
demand  

   
 

 Hydropower 3 3 
 

 Renewables 100 100 
 

 Nuclear energy 1 10 
 

    
 

 

 
Table 2. Annual and cumulative carbon emissions in a simple energy scenario analysis Economics of 
reprocessing and recycling in LWRs (light water reactors) and FBRs (fast breeder reactors) compared to 
that of the once-through cycle (directdisposal of spentfuel) in LWRs 

 
   Scenario I Scenario II Difference  
       

 Annual emissions in 2075 7.7GtC
a
 per year 5.3 GtC per year 31%  

 Cumulative emissions over 2000-75 549 GtC 440 GtC 20%  
     

  Break-even price uranium ($/kgU) Increase electricity costs (mills/kWh)  
       

  Reprocessing in LWR 360  1.3  

  Reprocessing in FBR 340  7  

  Source Bunn, Fetter, Holdren, et al. (2003)     
       

  a
gigatonnes of carbon     

 

 
terms of annual and cumulative carbon emissions over 
the period considered, in a comparison between 
Scenarios I and II.  

One concludes that if nuclear energy were expanded 
ten-fold, it could contribute significantly to reducing 
carbon emissions. Such an expansion could avoid about 
20% of cumulative CO2 emissions over the period 2000-
75, while annual emissions in 2075 would be reduced by 
about 30%. Still, it is evident from this calculation that 
nuclear energy can be no panacea for global warming. 
Even with massive expansion, nuclear energy should be 
complemented by drastic fossil fuel decarbonization and 
massive renewables development, preferably in 
combination with far-reaching efficiency and savings 
measures, to attain an emission profile involving a carbon 
reduction down to one-third of the current level during the 
latter half of the 21st century (and to lower values after 
that).Figure 1 demonstrates, through a comparison of the 
two scenarios, the potential significance of a huge 
expansion of nuclear power in terms of total energy-
related (annual and cumulative) carbon emissions. 

 

 
Nuclear Economics 
 
The costs and capital intensity of electricity generation 
alternatives are essential determinants for energy policy 
decisions, more so for developing countries than for 
countries in the industrialized world. Whereas nuclear 
energy has proven its ability to compete with other (fossil) 
alternatives in a few cases, on a global level it has never 
done so in a convincing manner. In the current context of 
liberalizing electricity markets, the capital intensity of 
nuclear power constitutes an increasing economic 
disadvantage. Also the intrinsic uncertainties and 
liabilities of nuclear power generation (related, for 
instance, to radioactive waste, decommissioning, and 
reactor safety) render nuclear energy economically 
unattractive. On the other hand, once nuclear power 
plants are fully depreciated - typically after 30 years of 
operation - their low fuel costs imply that reactors become 
competitive on a marginal-cost basis, even in a 
deregulated environment. Another aspect in favour of 
nuclear energy is that its negative environmental 

294          Afr. J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 

 

 



Bindu          295 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

(a) (b) 
 

Figure 1. a. Energy-related carbon emissions (gigatonnes per year), from 2000 to 2075. b. Monte Carlo 
analysis of the break-even uranium price as a function of the cost of reprocessing, for various sets of 
assumptions about the cost of other fuel-cycle services Source Bunn, Fetter, Holdren, et al. (2003) 

 
 
 
externalities have been more extensively included in 
electricity costs than in the case of its fossil-based 
counterparts. Like for most renewable energy resources, 
and unlike for fossil fuel energy systems, the external 
costs of nuclear energy are expected to be small (Rabl 
2001).3 Proper internalization of negative externalities for 
all energy resources would thus probably reinforce the 
competitiveness of nuclear energy. Two possible caveats 
in this respect, for nuclear energy, are perhaps reactor 
accidents and nuclear proliferation.  
As for large reactor accidents with major external 
radioactivity pollution, a justified argument can be made 
that the environmental costs corresponding to the 
resulting radioactive contamination damage can be very 
substantial. In the external cost calculations of Rabl 
(2001), reactor accidents and their effects have been 
included. Only, their contribution to total costs proves 
small, as a result of their relatively low occurrence. Since 
the earliest days of the nuclear era, another aspect 
unfavourable to nuclear power has been the prevention of 
nuclear (military) proliferation.  

The related costs are not accounted for in externality 
calculations, partly because it appears difficult to do so, 
and partly because it appears controversial how to do so. 
For example, the costs required for maintaining 
international institutions such as the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, designed to warrant the civil use only of 
nuclear energy, are not included in external costs. But 
since these are small in comparison to other (external) 
costs, this omission probably does not affect the end 
result of external cost calculations. How does one go 
about dealing with the expenditures of the (nuclear) 
military build-up of one country in response to the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons by another? The 

 
 
 
corresponding costs are surely not accounted for in 
electricity prices or external costs, however much the civil 
use of nuclear energy opens the door to its military use. 
Since the 9/11 attacks in 2001 on New York and 
Washington, DC, public and political fear has been 
expressed regarding the use of nuclear fission or 
radiological devices by terrorists. Among potential 
radiological threats are those involving material or 
facilities related to the civil nuclear power industry. 
Terrorist risks to nuclear power plants and spent fuel 
cooling ponds may be considered especially high 
(Alvarez, Beyea, Janberg, et al. 2003; van der Zwaan 
2003), and costs to enhance security against terrorist 
attacks (supposing that through heightened security 
measures such attacks, and their potential results in 
terms of costs incurred, can be avoided) should be taken 
into account in - and are unfavourable for - the economics 
of nuclear energy.4  

If a country decides to develop a civil nuclear power 
programme - that is, if it chooses to do so after having 
thoroughly weighed the costs against the benefits of 
starting off and maintaining such a programme - it still 
needs to make a careful cost-benefit analysis of the 
various nuclear options available, especially with regard 
to the adoption of an open or closed nuclear fuel cycle. 
There is general agreement on the fact that with today's 
low uranium and enrichment prices, the reprocessing and 
recycling option (allowing to close the nuclear fuel cycle) 
is more expensive than the alternative of direct disposal 
of spent fuel (implying an open fuel cycle). Arguments 
exist, however, over the magnitude of the difference, and 
how long this difference is likely to hold. Advocates of 
reprocessing often argue that the extra cost of 
reprocessing is small today, and might soon disappear, 



 
 
 

 
as uranium supplies become scarce and their prices rise. 
In some recent studies, by contrast, it is demonstrated 
that the margin between the cost of the closed fuel cycle 
and that of the direct disposal option is wide, and is likely 
to persist for many decades to come, if not longer (MIT 
2003; Bunn, Fetter, Holdren, et al. 2003).For example, 
with central estimates for key fuel-cycle parameters, 
reprocessing and recycling plutonium in existing LWRs 
will be more expensive than direct disposal of spent fuel 
until the uranium price reaches over 360 dollars per kgU 
(per kilogram of uranium). This price is not likely to be 
seen for many decades, as current uranium prices are 
about an order of magnitude smaller (typically 40 dollars 
per kgU or lower). With reprocessing and recycling of 
plutonium, the electricity cost would be increased by 
some 0.13 dollar-cents (1.3 mills) per kWh (kilowatt-
hour), compared to a total back-end cost for direct 
disposal of about 1.5 mills per kWh. With central 
estimates for key fuel-cycle parameters, reprocessing, 
and recycling plutonium in FBRs (fast breeder reactors) 
(involving an additional capital cost, compared to new 
LWRs, of 200 dollars per kWe (kilowatt-electric) will not 
be economically competitive with a once-through cycle in 
LWRs until the price of uranium reaches around 340 
dollars per kgU. Electricity from a plutonium-recycling 
FBR would cost over 7 mills per kWh more than electricity 
produced with a once-through LWR (Table 3).  

The findings of Table 3 are obtained through detailed 
calculations that include assumptions on all parameters 
determining the costs of nuclear power through either of 
the two types of fuel cycle. By how much would the costs 
of the various parameters have to change in order to 
significantly modify the results on the economics of 
reprocessing and recycling in LWRs and FBRs in 
comparison to that of the once-through cycle in LWRs? 
Figure 2 provides the answer through an illustration of the 
results of a Monte Carlo analysis of the break-even 
uranium price as a function of the cost of reprocessing, 
for various sets of assumptions about the cost of all main 
fuel-cycle services. It is evident that even when optimistic 
assumptions are made regarding the costs of all 
elements of the entire reprocessing cycle, it remains 
difficult to reach values of the uranium break-even price 
that approximate prices at which uranium can today be 
purchased on commercial markets.  

The economics of reprocessing is an increasingly 
important issue, since some countries in both the 
industrialized and developing worlds need to take major 
decisions on the future management of their spent fuel. 
For developing countries like China and India, 
particularly, the high costs involved in reprocessing and 
recycling must be given careful consideration, now that 
important decisions regarding the possible construction of 
large commercial reprocessing facilities in these countries 
are soon to be taken. Of course, economics is not the 
only factor determining whether or not a country should 
close the fuel cycle through the establishment of a 

 

  
 
 

 
reprocessing industry. Other arguments matter, such as 
the property of reprocessing to enhance (uranium) 
resource efficiency. More pertinently, reprocessing may 
lead to substantial reductions in the overall volume of 
waste production (for example, per unit of electricity 
generated) and may contribute, in principle, to 
ascertaining long-term energy supply security. In both 
China and India, however, vast opportunities exist for 
underground geologic waste storage, so that waste 
volume reduction is probably not a very important issue. 
Arguments can be made for creating a reprocessing 
economy since it could enhance energy security but, as 
will be pointed out next, such reasoning does not appear 
very strong here. Therefore, in decisions regarding 
whether to reprocess or not, economics probably plays a 
fundamental role in these countries. 
 
 
Nuclear power in Asia 
 
Today, only eight developing countries (excluding those 
with economies under transition in Central and Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union) possess nuclear 
power or are in the process of building one or more 
nuclear reactors: Argentina, Brazil, China (including 
Taiwan), India, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, and South 
Africa (IAEA 2002). Of these, five are in Asia. Almost the 
entire current expansion of nuclear power capacity in 
developing countries today takes place in Asia, with 
Argentina being the only non-Asian developing country 
that has currently a reactor under construction (South 
Africa will probably build one or more again in the near 
future), and Pakistan being the only Asian developing 
country (of the ones that already possess some nuclear 
capacity) that currently has no additional power plant 
under construction (the other four Asian developing 
countries with nuclear capacity or aspirations have at 
least one unit under construction).  

Even seen from a global perspective, nearly all nuclear 
power expansion currently takes place in Asia. Today, the 
two countries in the world pursuing an expansion of their 
nuclear power capacities most actively (with the largest 
numbers of reactors under construction) are China (with 
three units under construction, totalling a net capacity of 
about 2.5 GWe (gigawatt-electric) and India (with eight 
units under construction, totalling a net capacity of over 
2.5 GWe (IAEA 2002). Having tested a range of different 
reactor types, largely from Canadian, French, Russian, as 
well as domestic designs, China is now moving to 
standardization and self-reliance in design, 
manufacturing, construction, and operation. India has 
already occupied for some time a leading place among 
Asian nations in indigenous design, development, 
construction, and operation of nuclear power reactors. 
Because of their leading roles in the nuclear field in 
developing Asia, their ambitious nuclear expansion plans, 
and their potential to become major exporters of nuclear 

296          Afr. J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 

 

 



Bindu          297 
 
 

 
technologies, the decisions of China and India regarding 
nuclear energy will determine its development in Asia and 
may have a sizeable effect on its evolution worldwide. 

 
 
 

 
fuel cycle, the currently proven domestic uranium 
reserves would probably be used up within a few 
decades (Zhang 2001). 

 
 
China 
 
In 1997, electricity generation in China was 1163 TWh 
(terawatt-hours), about three-quarters of it coming from 
coal-fired plants (IEA 2000). Over the coming two 
decades, it is expected to grow by about 5% per year, so 
that by 2020 electricity generation will amount to some 
3691 TWh. In 1997, electricity generation through the 
combustion of coal, oil, and natural gas amounted to 863 
TWh, 83 TWh, and 7 TWh, respectively. By 2020, these 
values are projected to increase to 2568 TWh, 197 TWh, 
and 149 TWh, respectively. Hydropower is estimated to 
generate around 622 TWh in 2020 (196 TWh today), 
while renewables remain negligible over the two decades. 
Due to its large population and its heavy reliance on coal, 
China's contribution to global GHG emissions stands 
high. In 1997, its CO2 emissions were 14% of the world 
total; by 2020, they are expected to climb to nearly 6.5 Gt 
(gigatonnes)—roughly 18% of the world total. 
 

Today, China has eight large nuclear reactors in 
operation, representing a net capacity of over 6 GWe. 
Five of these started operating only during the past two 
years. Within the next few years, three reactors currently 
under construction should be in operation too, taking the 
total available net nuclear power capacity to nearly 9 
GWe. China's official plans for further expansion of 
nuclear capacity are ambitious and, until recently, 
reached as high as an installed capacity of 20 GWe by 
2010 and 40 GWe by 2020.5 It is probable, however, that 
these official goals will not be met. Still, China may well 
have installed a nuclear power capacity of about 20 GWe 
by 2020. Nuclear energy's contribution to electricity 
generation in China is currently a little over 1%, and will 
most likely remain below 3% for decades.  

To realize and support the long-term expansion of its 
nuclear power programme, China plans to reprocess its 
spent nuclear fuel produced, and to recycle the resulting 
plutonium in mixed oxide, or MOX, fuel for both LWRs 
and FBRs. China already possesses a small - more or 
less operational - civilian pilot reprocessing plant with a 
capacity of 50 tonnes of spent fuel per year, and has 
started the construction of an experimental FBR with a 
capacity of 25 MWe (megawatt-electric). Decisions are 
pending on whether or not to build a large commercial 
reprocessing plant with an annual capacity of 800 tonnes 
of spent fuel as well as a 300-MWe FBR. Energy security 
is a major reason for China's desire to operate a closed 
nuclear fuel cycle, rather than an open cycle in which 
spent fuel once discharged from the reactor is considered 
as waste and stored as such. Indeed, under China's 
existing nuclear programme, based on a once-through 

 
 
India 
 
In 1997, electricity generation in India was 463 TWh, 
about three-quarters of it coming from coal-fired plants 
(IEA 2000). Over the coming two decades, it is expected 
to grow by about 5% per year, so that by 2020 electricity 
generation will amount to some 1483 TWh. In 1997, 
electricity generation through the combustion of coal, oil, 
and natural gas amounted to 339 TWh, 12 TWh, and 28 
TWh, respectively. By 2020, these values are projected to 
increase to 1008 TWh, 32 TWh, and 216 TWh, 
respectively. Hydropower is estimated to generate around 
171 TWh in 2020 (75 TWh today), while the contribution 
of renewables will probably increase to the 1% level over 
the two decades. Whereas India's population will soon 
surpass China's, India's level of GHG emissions will 
remain significantly lower over the decades to come. In 
1997, its CO2 emissions were 0.9 Gt; by 2020, they are 
expected to climb to nearly 2.25 Gt—a factor of three 
smaller than that of China.  

India currently possesses a rather large number of 
(small) reactors. Today, it has 14 reactors in operation 
(with a cumulative capacity lower than the eight in China) 
representing a net capacity of around 2.5 GWe. By the 
second half of this decade, the eight reactors now under 
construction should all be in operation, taking the total 
available net nuclear power capacity to over 5 GWe. The 
Indian government's official plans for further expansion of 
its nuclear power capacity are ambitious. Like with other 
countries, the main rationale for India to embark upon an 
expansion of its nuclear power programme is its desire to 
create domestic energy security (Iyengar 1999). It is 
realistic to assume that India will have installed a nuclear 
capacity of around 15 GWe by 2020. The current 
contribution of nuclear energy to electricity generation in 
India is close to 4%. With the domestic nuclear capacity 
increase as projected, this contribution could amount to 
8% by 2020.  

Like China, India has chosen the closed fuel cycle for 
realizing a long-term expansion of its nuclear power 
programme, and thus plans to reprocess the spent fuel 
generated by its nuclear power plants. India's programme 
is based on a three-stage plan, to eventually exploit its 
abundant domestic resources of thorium through the use 
of FBRs. In this plan, the first stage involves the 
construction of mainly PHWRs (pressurized heavy water 
reactors) for electricity generation with the production of 
plutonium as a by-product. In the second stage, FBRs are 
built, to be fuelled with this plutonium and depleted 
uranium, to produce uranium-233 in their thorium-loaded 
blankets. In the third stage, FBRs are fuelled with thorium 
and the uranium-233 initially produced from the second 



 
 
 

 
stage. A small 14-MWth (megawatt-thermal) test FBR 
has been successfully operated for over a decade now, 
while a detailed design of a 500-MWe prototype FBR has 
been completed and a construction site approved. If 
current construction plans are realized, India's first large 
FBR could be commissioned by the end of this decade. 
As for China, a major reason for India to choose the 
closed nuclear fuel cycle is energy security. Indeed, 
under India's first-stage, largely PHWR nuclear power 
programme, domestic uranium reserves are expected to 
represent some 400 GWe-years worth of electricity, 
which would be consumed within a few decades under 
current nuclear power expansion plans (Gopalakrishnan 
2002).Is reprocessing the right choice for Asia?  

A recent study by the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology concludes that, over at least the next 50 
years, the best choice to meet nuclear energy's 
challenges is the open, once-through fuel cycle (MIT 
2003). It judges that there are adequate uranium 
resources available at reasonable cost to support this 
choice under a global growth scenario of nuclear power. 
China and India have arrived at the critical point of 
deciding whether or not to develop large-scale 
reprocessing and breeder programmes. For both 
countries, energy security is one of the main arguments 
not to opt for the once-through nuclear fuel cycle that 
obviates the need to reprocess and recycle spent nuclear 
fuel. Below, through at least six arguments, it is pointed 
out that energy security in China and India constitutes 
insufficient ground for justifying the elevated costs that 
the establishment of a closed nuclear fuel cycle would 
entail.6  

First, advocates of a large nuclear energy programme - 
including a plutonium recycling economy - claim that it 
would reduce national dependence on foreign energy 
resources such as oil. This is true, since through nuclear 
energy one can decrease dependence on oil for 
electricity production. However, it is true only to a limited 
extent: nuclear energy and oil are today largely 
complementary energy resources, rather than substitutes. 
Oil's largest application is currently in the domain of 
transport, for which nuclear energy is for the moment still 
unsuitable. Only in the longer term could nuclear energy 
be used for the production of hydrogen, which is fit - in 
principle - for large-scale employment in the transport 
sector.  

Second, in the two scenarios depicted for China and 
India, 3% and 8%, respectively, are possible (and 
probable) electricity shares for nuclear energy in 2020. 
(Much higher shares by that time are deemed unlikely.) 
These shares correspond to a share in the national 
demand for energy (rather than for electricity) of a few 
percentage points at most. In view of the larger scheme 
of energy security, these numbers are too small to make 
any significant difference for the energy dependence of 
either of these countries. How the projected nuclear 
energy is produced - for instance, whether it is through a 

 

  
 
 

 
reprocessing cycle or not - matters little. Third, if China's 
and India's energy infrastructures become more 
dependent on nuclear energy beyond the forthcoming two 
decades, while domestic fissile resources are rapidly 
used up, energy security could become a concern. 
However, a depletion of global uranium reserves is 
unlikely for a long time to come, due to the existence of 
large global reserves of uranium, the possibility of 
enlarging these by factors when exploration at higher 
costs is allowed, the likely presence of large and yet 
undiscovered uranium resources, and the availability in 
oceans of vast amounts of uranium, presumably 
recoverable at competitive prices. With a continued 
existence of well-established, commercial world markets 
for uranium, the supply of nuclear fuel does not seem in 
danger for many decades, if not centuries.7  

Fourth, several countries including South Korea have 
shown that a large nuclear power programme can be 
easily realized, operated, and maintained without 
possession of large domestic uranium resources, 
extensive local enrichment facilities, and national nuclear 
fuel production. The reason is that the existing global 
market for uranium products is hardly subject to 
fluctuations in supply or price, and has - so far - not 
displayed the volatility that industries relying on the 
supply of petrol experience in global oil markets.  

Fifth, uranium suppliers in the world are diverse, both 
geographically and politically, and are unlikely - quite 
contrary to common practice in the global oil market - to 
collude to raise prices dramatically or limit supplies 
substantially. Also, in this respect, the differences are 
large in comparison to the behaviour of global oil 
markets, where even private consumers dependent on 
petrol for transportation regularly experience the 
fluctuations occurring in crude oil prices.  

Sixth, even if domestic uranium supply security were to 
become a matter of concern at some point in the future, a 
strategic reserve of uranium fuel could be realized easily - 
surely more easily than in the case of strategic oil 
reserves - since uranium is inexpensive to buy, simple to 
handle, and easy to store.  

Furthermore, the separation of plutonium increases the 
risk of illicit purchase by states or non-state/sub-national 
entities wishing to acquire nuclear weapons, as well as 
the risk of theft by terrorist groups attempting to develop 
nuclear fission devices. This implies increased costs and 
enhanced burden of safeguards and physical protection. 
The policies of China and India regarding reprocessing 
could significantly influence the attitude of the 
international community and the posture of powerful 
nuclear and economic actors in particular. Indeed, the 
civil use of plutonium in these countries could serve as an 
encouragement or excuse for its use by other nations, 
especially when the latter have interests in using 
plutonium for military purposes. If China and India were to 
decide not to develop civilian reprocessing, a good 
example could be set for other countries in the region 

298          Afr. J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 



Bindu          299 
 
 

 
contemplating the reprocessing and recycling of 
plutonium. Also, it seems that China and India currently 
need to worry little about issues of public opinion 
(concerning safety, waste, and costs, for instance). The 
Japanese case, however, may be indicative of how 
sensitive the matter of maintaining a reprocessing 
industry can become in these countries as well. The 
evolution of the reprocessing industry in Japan will 
probably also influence its potential development in other 
Asian countries, including China and India.  

With these arguments - unfavourable to the 
development of a reprocessing industry - an obvious 
question arises. Why do some countries still choose this 
fuel cycle option, rather than considering spent fuel as 
waste once it leaves the nuclear reactor? Indeed, China 
and India currently seem to continue to push for 
expanding reprocessing technology, and probably not 
merely for the aforementioned ‘standard reasons’— 
enhancing uranium resource efficiency and reducing 
radioactive waste volumes.8 In the way India's nuclear 
tests have been driven, partly by domestic policy and 
psychological factors, including the authority of the 
nuclear establishment (perhaps more than by geopolitical 
factors [Perkovich 1999]), both in China and India the 
desire to possess the ability to reprocess may be 
associated with the virility of the nuclear research elite 
and thus with the prestige of the country. The Chinese 
and Indian push for reprocessing technology may partly 
be explained by elements like the domestic political need 
to show prowess and also the desire of scientists for 
continued access to research money and personal fame. 
Clearly, one should look for arguments beyond 
economics to understand why countries like China and 
India push for reprocessing, but it goes beyond the scope 
of this paper to go into these matters more extensively. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As summarized in the beginning of this paper, the fossil 
resource scarcity perception of the late 20th century was 
probably unjustified, that is, if one takes a long-term 
perspective. As the experience of western nations in the 
1970s demonstrated, however, threats to energy security 
remain in terms of the possibility for the world community 
to need to face short-term energy disruptions. Energy 
cooperation, increased energy efficiency, and 90-day 
strategic petroleum reserves were the western response 
to these disruptions in the late 1970s (Manning 2000). In 
this, there maybe important lessons for Asia. The US 
remains a resource- and energy-fuel-rich country, 
compared to most of the rest of the world, particularly 
East and South Asia. China and India are generally richer 
in energy fuels than the rest of East and South Asia, but  

for most of these fuels not as rich as the US (May 
1998).Thus, for Asian countries, nuclear power is partially 
an insurance policy, the only long-term, internally 

 
 
 

 
sustainable energy resource now in sight that can 
generate electricity at affordable prices. Holding back on 
nuclear power, including reprocessing, is therefore a 
more serious gamble for these countries than it is for the 
US. They are, therefore, unlikely to abstain from 
developing nuclear energy.  

A major challenge facing humankind during the 21st 
century will be to ascertain adequate, affordable, and 
reliable energy services in a sustainable manner. Energy 
is a critical input for social and economic development. 
With energy use in many developing economies in Asia 
still at a low level, with about 60% of the world's 2 billion 
people without access to modern energy services living in 
this part of the world, and with the global increase in 
energy demand concurrent with expected economic 
growth for a large part taking place in this region, it is 
important that the right (sustainable) energy choices are 
made (Saha 2003). In developing countries, supply of 
energy should not become a constraint to their economic 
growth. Security of supply does not seem to become a 
major issue for decades to come at least, if not longer, 
not in developing countries or elsewhere in the world. 
Rather, the question is whether we can afford the current 
patterns of energy production and consumption to 
continue in the rapidly deteriorating health of our common 
environment. Efforts to control climate change are 
becoming increasingly important, as well as the role that 
should be played herein by the implementation of carbon-
free energy resources. For the time being, it seems safest 
to adopt a hedging strategy, in which all non-fossil energy 
technologies have a share in an energy mix as diversified 
as possible, including nuclear energy. Still, however large 
an expansion of nuclear energy may once be realized, it 
will never contribute by more than a significant part to 
mitigating global warming, and cannot ever constitute the 
panacea to the challenge of climatic change. Irrespective 
of what energy technology blueprint humankind finally 
deems most appropriate, and adopts, taking a transition 
path away from the current unsustainable patterns of 
energy use is one of the main challenges for both 
developed and developing countries. In attempting to 
establish sustainable energy systems worldwide, whether 
in the nuclear field or elsewhere, it is important not to 
simply impose the model in use in developed nations to 
countries in the developing world, given the latter's 
distinct (past) societal and economic evolution and 
different (current) social and cultural characteristics. 
 

China and India have a vast potential over the 2 ist 
century to affect regional and global energy markets, 
linked inextricably to an interdependent world energy 
sector (see, for the Chinese case, Ogiitcii 1998). Meeting 
their energy needs in a secure, efficient, and sustainable 
manner remains one of the most significant challenges 
China and India face. The developments in the energy 
field in these two countries will not only determine (to a 
large extent) domestic economic prosperity and security 



300          Afr. J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 
 
 

 
but also affect the global economy and environment. 
Therefore, it is no longer useful to think purely in discrete 
European, American, or Asian policy terms when 
analysing regional energy futures. In the increasingly 
interlinked world energy system, more integrated geo-
strategic policies and international cooperation are 
essential to sustain economic growth; to carry out 
multinational energy projects between China, India, and 
the industrialized world; and to protect the global 
environment. Regional and international cooperation will 
remain important not only for harnessing and trading 
cleaner forms of energy, but also for addressing 
transboundary environmental concerns (Datt, Kacker, 
Mehra, et al. 2002).  

Nuclear energy is an option that probably should (and 
will) be pursued by China and India, as well as other 
Asian countries, and perhaps by the developing world at 
large. Nuclear energy can complement other options on 
the path to realizing clean and affordable energy 
production and consumption, and possesses intrinsic 
value in terms of the diversification of energy supply. It is 
important, however, that the right choices are made in the 
development of nuclear energy, if a decision is taken to 
include this option in national energy programmes. China 
and India, or other developing countries for that matter, 
do not need to pursue a reprocessing programme in the 
foreseeable future, based on the arguments made in this 
paper. It is cheaper to choose the option of direct 
disposal of spent fuel, rather than to opt for the alternative 
of reprocessing and recycling. Substantial savings can be 
realized by going in for direct disposal. The resulting 
financial means, especially needed in developing 
countries, can be usefully employed in other domains, for 
example in the development of other clean energy 
options. The decision to eventually adopt a nuclear 
reprocessing economy or not should therefore be 
postponed, for at least a couple of decades to come, but 
probably longer. Meanwhile, as new and more advanced 
nuclear technologies might emerge, the interim storage of 
spent nuclear fuel from a once-through cycle can be 
effectively and safely employed. Since the expert 
discussion about reprocessing is likely to continue for 
years, countries like China and India could, for the time 
being, best employ the once-through nuclear cycle, until 
the reprocessing conundrum has been fully resolved and 
more technological clarity has been achieved on the 
nuclear technology to be employed in the future. 

 
REFERENCES 
 
Alvarez  R, Beyea J (2003). Reducing the hazards from stored spent 

power-reactor fuel in the United States Science and Global 
Security11(1): 1-51  

Bruggink JJC,  C (2002). The role of nuclear energy in establishing 
sustainable energy paths International Journal of Global Energy 
Issues18(2, 3, 4): 151-180  

Bunn M (2003). The economics of reprocessing vs direct disposal of 
spent nuclear fuel: managing the Atom Project Cambridge, USA: 
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Kennedy 
School of Government, Harvard University. 

 
 

 
Datt D ( 2002).Sustainable   energy:   trends   and   perspectives   for 

AsiaPacific and Asian Journal of Energy12(2): 129-149  
EC, IEPE (Institute of Energy Policy and Economics), BFP (Belgian 

Federal Planning Bureau), IPTS (Institute for Prospective 
Technological Studies).(2003) World energy, technology and climate 
policy outlook 2030Brussels: European Commission  

Gopalakrishnan A (2002). Evolution of the Indian nuclear power 
programmeAnnual Review of Energy and the Environment27: 369-
395  

IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) .(2002)Nuclear power 
status around the worldIAEA Bulletin IEA  (2000).World Energy 
Outlook Paris: International Energy Agency, Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development  

IEA (2002).Energy and Poverty (Special issue in the World Energy 
Outlook (2002)Paris: International Energy Agency, Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development  

IIASA (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis) and WEC 
(World Energy Council) . 1998Global Energy Perspectives, edited by 
Nakicenovic N, Griibler A, McDonald A Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press  

IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) . 2001Climate 
Change 2001: the scientific basis[Contribution of Working Group I to 
the Third Assessment Report of the IPCC, edited by J T Houghton, Y 
Ding, D J Griggs, M Noguer, P van der Linden, X Dai, K Maskell, C I 
Johnson]Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press  

Iyengar PK (1999). Problems and prospects for nuclear power in India 
In Nuclear Energy: promise or peril?, edited by van der Zwaan B C C, 
Hill C, Mechelynck A L, Ripka G Singapore: World Scientific. 288 pp. 

 
Manning RA (2000). The Asian energy predicamentSurvival Perkovich 
G (1999). India's nuclear bomb: the impact on global  

proliferationBerkeley: University of California Press. 597 pp. Rabl A 
(2001).The importance of external costs for the competitiveness  

of renewable energiesInternational Journal of Global Energy 
Issues15(1/2)  
Rogner HH (1997).An assessment of world hydrocarbon 

resourcesAnnual Review of Energy and the Environment 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
1
All energy consumption patterns from 2000 to 2075 are 
assumed to increase linearly.  

2
Such a carbon emission profile would preclude reaching 
over a doubling of the CO2 concentration in the 
atmosphere. A doubling of this concentration 
corresponds to an increase of the average atmospheric 
temperature on earth by around 1.5-4.5 °C (referred to 
as the ‘climate sensitivity’; see IPCC 2001).  

3
The data on nuclear energy in Rabl (2001) comes from 
the French nuclear power programme. This does not 
necessarily correspond with that from nuclear 
programmes in other countries because, for example, 
safety measures may not have been implemented as 
strictly in China as they have been in France. 

4
Also, if in some country or by some terrorist group, civil 

separated plutonium will one day be diverted into an 
atomic explosive, this may well provoke military and/or 
anti-terrorist expenditures the world over, and is also 
likely to adversely affect civil reprocessing programmes 
in all countries practicing the closed fuel cycle. These 
consequences are not accounted for in external cost 
calculations. Similar arguments can be made regarding 
the possibility to construct radiological devices (dirty 
bombs) from spent nuclear fuel material. 



Bindu          301 
 
 
 
5
Meanwhile, it seems that this impressive aim is currently 
being adjusted downwards.  

7
Admittedly, arguments three through six hold less for 

India than they do for China, given the embargo and 
isolation it has experienced from most western and 
other nuclear suppliers since its underground nuclear 
tests in 1974. Still, if after further exploration of potential 
land and ocean resources, uranium proves to be 
insufficiently abundant domestically, uranium could in 
principle be imported from countries that are not 
members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (for instance 
Nigeria in Africa). 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

 
 
 

 
Also, at some point, a solution may be found for the 
current political international impasse regarding India's 
nuclear programme.8By engaging on the reprocessing 
path, China and India are apparently prepared to spend 
more for those other reasons; how much more has 
been calculated by Bunn, Fetter, Holdren, et al. (2003). 



 


