










































AGORA International Journal of Economical Sciences, http://univagora.ro/jour/index.php/aijes 

ISSN 2067-3310, E-ISSN 2067-7669 

Vol. 18, No. 2 (2024), pp. 170-184 

 

170 
 

BREAD, POWER, AND NEOLIBERAL MUNICIPALISM: THE HALK 

EKMEK A.Ş. AS A CASE OF BREAD AND CIRCUSES POLITICS 

 

E. METE 

 

Emre Mete 

National University of Public Service, Hungary 

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5921-0569, E-mail: emremete76@gmail.com  

 

Abstract: This article explains the historical process and political importance of Halk 

Ekmek A.Ş., a public bread production company, since its establishment. In this context, Halk 

Ekmek A.Ş. was considered an example of a Socialist Municipality in the past, but today, it is 

used as a political tool in neoliberal municipalism. Although municipal enterprises such as 

Halk Ekmek, which are taken as an example in this study, are generally presented as social 

enterprises, they have also become enterprises of profitability and political gain, especially as 

a result of neoliberal municipal practices. Bread is both a fundamental part of culture and 

nutrition for the Turkish people and a unique part of the control system in which the 

government is also involved. For this reason, public bread enterprises, such as Halk Ekmek 

A.Ş., are seen as valuable by those in power to control society and create a political argument. 

As a result of this examination, it will be investigated that this order established through public 

means is essentially a part of a "bread and circus" politics that appeases the public and 

strengthens the political power of the governments. As a result of the findings obtained, it will 

be seen how Municipality Participation can create a system that serves political purposes and 

kills competition. This study contributes to the public administration literature, where there 

are very few studies on this subject, by critically analysing how the socialist municipality 

period implemented in the historical process has essentially transformed into neoliberal 

municipal practices. As a result, the sustainability of this system will be questioned. 

“Life, misfortune, isolation, abandonment, poverty, are the fields of battle which have 

their heroes; obscure heroes, who are, sometimes, grander than the heroes who win renown…. 

Firm and rare natures are thus created; misery, almost always a step-mother, is sometimes a 

mother; destitution gives birth to might of soul and spirit; distress is the nurse of pride; 

unhappiness is a good milk for the magnanimous.” (Hugo, 2017: 433).  

Keywords: Bread and Circus, Socialist Municapilism, Halk Ekmek, Neoliberal 

Governance, Public Bread 

 

1. INTRODUCTİON 

Bread, which contains only flour, water, salt and yeast, has been the most fundamental 

source of nutrition in the whole world. Especially in Anatolia, bread, which has many varieties, 

has a significant and even sacred place in terms of society. In fact, the famous traveller Evliya 

Çelebi also states in his Seyahatnâme that the angel Gabriel brought wheat to Adam for the 

first time. He also states that Adam was the first person to make bread in the world (Yerasimos, 

2019: 71-73). Bread, which finds its place in novels, poems, social texts, and religious 

teachings, and its relationship with poverty makes bread a social phenomenon. In fact, during 

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5921-0569
mailto:emremete76@gmail.com


Emre METE 

171 
 

the French Revolution - although its accuracy is debatable - it is claimed that Marie Antoinette 

said, "Qu'ils mangent de la brioche" [Then let them eat bricohe] when the French Queen was 

told that the peasants had no bread to eat. This situation is still used today to describe the deep 

gap between the misery of the people and the aristocracy (Thompson, 2003). For this reason, 

bread has become a field of control and power both socially and publicly. In the Ottoman 

Empire, therefore, the laws stated what kind of a product bread was, how it was to be produced, 

and what the bread production should be. After the establishment of the Republic of Türkiye 

after the Ottoman Empire, policies based on the economic, social and political aspects of bread 

continued.  

 

Halk Ekmek Discussions in Social Sciences 

The literature on social sciences does not broadly discuss bread or Halk Ekmek A.Ş. 

(People’s Bread). Outside the field of social sciences, bread is seen as food, which is why food 

engineers, agricultural experts, and gastronomy experts have examined bread as a "product." 

However, due to its unique status, bread is the most political item in Türkiye, and even 

Türkiye's economic situation is understood by how much bread can be consumed per 

household. In the literature in the field of Public Administration, authors such as Malbeleği 

(2018) and Özdemir (2008) examined Halk Ekmek within the scope of Municipal Economic 

Enterprises. These researchers saw these companies as an element of a neoliberal municipality, 

in which municipalities switched to a business model. In this model, municipalities establish 

many companies to provide public services instead of using money from the central budget. 

These local government companies create more space for their budgets, and municipal 

economic enterprises implement public policies in areas such as transportation, infrastructure, 

energy, food, etc. In addition to profitability, this situation is also politically beneficial for 

municipalities. These companies provide additional income to their budgets and votes from the 

poor classes, which is like a win-win deal. Municipalities that present the policies of these 

companies as social services create a control system behind populist rhetoric. 

However, although they have the social phenomenon of bread behind them, it is also a 

reality that bread calls for a political reality. What makes this study different is that it addresses 

the Halk Ekmek A.Ş. issue as a form of control outside of this rhetoric, that is, as a part of the 

"bread and circus" policy, which is what makes this study more original. The problem statement 

of the study is that Municipal Economic Enterprises such as Halk Ekmek A.Ş. are a reflection 

of populist discourses. In order to prove the hypothesis in the article, Court of Accounts 

Reports, policy documents, and different research will be used. Halk Ekmek A.Ş. is affiliated 

with local governments in Türkiye as a public bread production centre, and local governments 

carry out these economic enterprises as an element of Socialist Municipality. Therefore, before 

starting the discussion, it is necessary to examine the historical roots of the relationship between 

bread and the municipality in Türkiye. 

 

2. Roots of Socialist Municipalism 

In Europe, since the thirteenth century, when city governments first emerged, the social 

character of municipalities emerged when they began to collect taxes from the public for public 

services, which is the basis for the emergence of modern municipalities. Naturally, in the past, 

there were city-states in Ancient Greece, or the “Municipal” management model in Rome, and 



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various commune managements. However, while the modern municipality model emerged in 

the nineteenth century, this situation was based on the collection of taxes in European cities 

from the thirteenth century onwards. In the past, cities were the places of epidemics, military 

conflicts, food shortages, and urban death crises. This situation caused many people to be in 

need of assistance. For example, in Hamburg in 1787, while 10 per cent of the population was 

in need of assistance, 20 years later, 32 per cent of the population was in need of assistance, 

which also led to an increase in chaos and crime rates in cities. This chaotic society led to the 

emergence of voluntary aid organisations, especially those based on religion, throughout 

Europe. These religious-based organisations emerged as organisations that helped people 

experiencing poverty, widows, the elderly, and blind people (Clark, 2009; Oktay, 2008: 12). 

The first example of the idea of social municipality was experienced in the Paris 

commune, which emerged in 1871 - also as the first administrative experience of the working 

class. The Paris commune constitutes the politicisation process of local governments in a 

historical sense, in other words, the first core of the modern understanding of municipality. In 

this short-term self-government experience, public services were implemented through direct 

initiative, and it was demonstrated that direct democracy could be applied in a metropolitan 

city (Güler, 2009: 127-128). However, this experience was relatively short-lived, and later on, 

modern examples of social municipality emerged in the nineteenth century with the experience 

of "Municipal Socialism". The shocking effects of the Industrial Revolution were very evident 

in these cities, and as a result, the demographic structure changed, especially in Europe with 

the Industrial Revolution, and it increased late from rural to urban areas. In England, which 

was considered one of the centres of industrialisation in the nineteenth century, the country's 

population more than doubled between 1750 and 1850. Many people migrated from rural areas 

to industrial cities because of their proximity to factories. At the same time, improvements in 

health and increased food production reduced the mortality rate. This extreme situation created 

a public policy problem for the poor working classes in crowded industrial cities (Wilde, 2020).  

The problems experienced by the working masses in the cities - infectious diseases, 

water, sewage, garbage, housing, etc. - made it very difficult to manage daily life. In the face 

of these problems that occurred in industrial cities such as London, Liverpool and Manchester, 

the British Parliament made a series of regulations under the name of the "Public Health Act" 

in 1848. The British Government saw these problems only as a matter of poverty and tried to 

overcome them only with legal regulations. Later, in 1858, with the Local Government Act, 

local administrators were elected to office more radically, and thus, practical consequences 

arose for the working class (Prest, 2011). During this period, policies aimed at improving living 

conditions and public health were implemented in various cities in England with the resources 

of local governments. In this direction, social reforms were attempted to be carried out by local 

governments, and all these practices were seen as "Municipal Socialism", and Municipal 

Socialism was widespread, especially in cities such as Glasgow and Birmingham (Gehrke, 

2016). 

According to Ruşen Keleş, municipal socialism aims to provide a public service 

approach instead of an individualistic profit motive. This approach, which argues that it is more 

appropriate for public services to be carried out by local factions, was developed by the 

Webbler and Fabian socialists and was eventually based on various principles. According to 



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these principles, an order based on the will of the plural, not landowners, should prevail in 

cities. As a result of this approach, municipalities should undertake most of the local services. 

Ultimately, municipal socialism sees small communities (local governments, cooperatives and 

unions) as the basic unit of human life. Developments in the nineteenth century increased the 

needs of local communities. This approach against the nationalisation of these needs, and they 

see the nationalisation of services as a movement against municipal socialism. Finally, it 

assumes that local governments should benefit from a particular area of freedom (Keleş, 2014: 

41-43). 

The main arguments of the administrations where municipal socialism is implemented 

are to maintain order in cities, to prevent the spread of diseases, to improve public health and 

to reduce crime. In working-class cities such as Glasgow and Birmingham, municipal socialism 

is implemented, and it aims to improve living standards in the neighbourhoods where workers 

live intensively. In other words, the driving force of municipal socialism, which expresses 

socialism applied in matters related to local governments, has been the working class 

(Bayramoğlu, 2015: 36-37). This understanding has been developed further over time, and 

municipalities have been given entrepreneurial, distributive and productive duties; it has taken 

on an understanding that defends the welfare of the people and distributes social aid in a social 

sense. Socialist municipal practices continued until the 1980s, especially in England in the 19th 

century; these services (electricity, water, housing, etc.) that were implemented with continuity 

were at a level that could compete even with the socialist states of that period. However, these 

practices seen through municipalities manifested themselves with central government policies 

after 1945. These practices, which are described as the welfare state approach, have enabled 

the socialist municipality approach to spread to the state (Bayramoğlu, 2015: 52-53). 

 

3. Socialist Municipality Practices in Türkiye 

 With the establishment of the Republic, the aim was to restructure cities with practices 

carried out with the principles of etatism. This all-out revival and the adoption of statism 

policies in production would also show itself at the town level, and the production of many 

public services would be “municipalised”.  Here, municipalities aimed to create “healthy” and 

“civilised” cities (Tekelioğlu, 2012). The Municipalities Bank was established in 1933 to 

provide financial support for the development of these cities and to realise the drinking water 

investments of the municipalities. However, all these practices were practices aimed at 

improving public services that were intertwined with the state. Socialist municipality practices, 

which had been seen in England since the nineteenth century, would only be possible in Türkiye 

in the 1970s (Bayramoğlu, 2015:149). 

The reason for the Socialist Municipality movement that emerged in Türkiye in the 

1970s was political and economic crises. Some social democratic mayors who emerged during 

this period pursued policies that aimed to end the understanding of municipalities under the 

control of party leaders. The profound social and service problems that emerged in the cities 

during that period brought such a situation to the forefront. As a result, the 1973 elections were 

elections in which urban problems directed the political conjuncture (Güler, 2009: 134). In the 

1973 elections, the fact that the central government and the local government were from 

different parties created a contradiction between them. At the centre of this contradiction, for 

the first time, social democratic mayors won the elections with the votes they received from 



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the shantytowns of the city and shaped their policies through shantytown policies (Tekelioğlu, 

2012: 245). Because most of the urban problems were undertaken by the shantytowns. 

The period, called the Socialist Municipality in Türkiye, was remembered with the 

names of social democratic mayors who were elected to solve the problems in the big cities. 

Mayors such as “Vedat Dalokay (1973-1977) in Ankara, Ahmet İsvan (1973-1977) and 

Aytekin Kotil (1977-1980) in Istanbul, İhsan Alyanak (1973-1980) in Izmir” shaped this 

period. Socialist municipality studies in Türkiye are generally explicitly addressed in these 

periods. Apart from these examples, the period when Fikret Sönmez was the mayor of Fatsa, 

the period when Osman Özgüven was the mayor of Dikili, and various projects carried out by 

various municipalities (such as the Milk Lamb Campaign and Neighborhood Committees) are 

also seen as reflections of the socialist municipality (Bayramoğlu, 2015: 150-151). What is 

really important in the social municipality is that some actions are visible, and the first of these 

visible actions is to open the door to a socially just structure. The reason for the application that 

will especially please the shantytowns is to show that this socially just structure is being served. 

This situation is also expected to be reflected in the voting rates. In addition to the socially just 

structure of social municipalities, the aim is to establish a municipality that is productive rather 

than a supervisory one, where all layers of the public participate in the participation process, 

where the municipality does not allow monopolistic rent (Tekelioğlu, 2012: 251-255). 

 

4. Neoliberal Municipalism and “Bread and Circus” Politics  

The Latin phrase “Panem et Circenses”, literally “bread and circuses”, was a political 

term in Roman times symbolising the well-being of the population. As the Roman satirist 

Juvenal put it:   

“iam pridem, ex quo suffragia nulli vendimus, effudit curas; nam qui dabat olim 

imperium fasces legiones omnia, nunc se  continet atque duas tantum res anxius optat,  

panem et circenses”. (Juvenal & Persius, 2004: 372). 

“Now that no one buys our votes, the public has long since cast off its cares; for the 

people that once bestowed commands, consulships, legions, and all else, now meddles 

no more and longs eagerly for just two things – Bread and Games.”  

  The concept of “bread and circus politics” proposes that the vast masses in society can 

voluntarily exchange their democratic freedoms for a stable but controlling government. To 

this end, in the Roman period, the Roman emperors used tools such as food distribution, baths, 

exotic animals, and theatre to prevent the people from rebelling, eliminate their discontent, and 

prevent anarchy from emerging. In this context, the concept is used as the general definition of 

compassion for government policies that ensure the continuation of dominant ideologies and 

offer short-term solutions to social unrest (Esdaw, 2022; Dove, 2024). Local governments, as 

the closest administrative unit to the people and their problems, do not hesitate to pursue 

palliative “bread and circus” politics under the name of “social municipality” in order to turn 

the destructive effect of mass power into an advantage. These policies will likely increase, 

especially in periods when economic crises are experienced, and deep poverty spreads to the 

whole society. In Türkiye, organisations such as the “Deep Poverty Network” have focused on 

the impact of poverty that has deepened in society since 2018 (DeepPovertyNetwork, 2024). 



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As anticipated, the minimum services expected from local governments are providing 

the city’s infrastructure services, preparing urban planning, providing garden and garden 

services, allocating drinking water to citizens, and finally, collecting and disposing of the city’s 

waste. All of these duties are public services that the public demands from local governments 

at a minimum level. However, in addition to these needs, local governments can also implement 

social municipality practices that will ensure the unity of the society, develop social and 

cultural relations, and reduce poverty. In Türkiye, municipalities with a population exceeding 

50 thousand have been authorised to offer all kinds of social and cultural activities. The social 

and cultural duties of these municipalities include “opening women’s shelters, producing 

houses and plots for low-income people, allocating plots for disaster victims, cooperating with 

the disabled and their associations, and carrying out various social projects through the city 

council” (Kurt, 2009: 287). 

The Social Municipality practices that we have mentioned so far have been minimised 

due to the neoliberal municipality approach that came into effect in the 1980s. The neoliberal 

municipality sees such social practices as unnecessary burdens on municipal budgets, and 

public policies that were previously offered as “services” are now transformed into “sectors”, 

and various services (education, health, water, etc.) are commodified. In parallel with general 

economic doctrines, the main goal of a neoliberal municipality is to privatise public services 

as much as possible. Social services have now been replaced by “social services” surrounded 

by populist discourses aimed at gaining votes. The aim here is to consider social services as a 

political element and to receive more votes from the poor community. We can understand this 

situation from the budgets that municipalities allocate to social responsibility and social 

municipality practices. For example, in the 2014 general budget of Çanakkale Municipality, 

social services only covered 1 per cent of the budget (İpek & Çıplak, 2016: 209). According to 

the “Local Government Social Budget Monitoring Report”, Denizli Metropolitan Municipality 

spent 2.49% of its budget on social expenditures in 2009, Bursa Municipality 4.69%, 

Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality 15.66%, Kocaeli Metropolitan Municipality 2.62%, and 

Kadıköy Municipality 9.7% (Şeker, 2011). In a more recent study, the total average of social 

expenditure rates of Adana, Mersin, İzmir and Ankara Metropolitan Municipalities between 

2010-2017 corresponds to 3.1% (Karadağ & Şahin İpek, 2020: 189). The reason behind the 

increase in social expenditures is local elections. Local governments increase social 

expenditures, which constitute a tiny portion of their budgets, in order to gain votes before the 

elections. Within this framework, social expenditures now take the form of “Social Politics”, 

and municipalities pursue social politics through the companies they establish. For example, 

the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality has exactly 28 joint stock companies affiliated with the 

fields of Transportation, Construction, Environment Energy, Services and IT (Information 

Technologies). These enterprises, which are called Municipal Economic Enterprises (MEEs), 

are defined as “private law legal entities established by municipalities or in partnership with 

them for the purpose of carrying out many local services, with independent budgets, and 

subject to private law provisions as a rule” (Malbeleği, 2018: 34). Although these institutions 

are seen as public organisations, they are essentially private law legal entities subject to private 

law rules. These private companies were established with the aim of providing most of the 

public services and social-cultural services with a “profit margin”. 



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The reasons for the establishment of Municipal Economic Organizations (MEOs) were, 

firstly, the desire to establish a company outside of public control and in the field of private 

law. Thus, bureaucracy and its legal limitations were reduced to a minimum level, and a new 

source of income was created for the municipality through companies. In addition, populist 

politics was also implemented in the elections due to uncontrolled personnel recruitment. They 

can also employ those who are close to their political parties in the areas they create in different 

areas. These personnel also have the opportunity to receive higher salaries than central 

government officials. Since these Municipal Economic Organizations are not subject to the 

"State Personnel Regime", people can be employed freely. In Türkiye, there is an increase in 

personnel employment in both general and local elections. There is always a decrease in 

personnel employment in the year following the election. Based on this study, there has been 

an increase in personnel recruitment in the local election years 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2019 in 

Türkiye in the last 20 years. There was a decrease in civil servant recruitment in the year 

following the election. This situation alone shows that ICTs are actually part of a "social 

employment policy" that goes far beyond their social purposes (Oğuz, Taşbaşı, & Soykut 

Sarıca, 2020). Although it seems to be established for the purpose of reducing poverty in 

society, the aim is to provide more income to municipal resources. Municipalities implement 

neoliberal municipal practices by becoming companies and transferring resources from 

companies (Malbeleği, 2018: 38-40). 

Municipal Economic Enterprises (MEEs) are established as partnerships by the 

municipality, which has more than half of its capital in the municipality. The reason for this 

partnership is the idea that social service maximisation will be provided through companies. 

Through this relative autonomy, BITs are freed from regulatory provisions such as the “State 

Tender Law, General Accounting Law, Court of Accounts Law” and are able to position 

themselves in an area outside the tutelary control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Özdemir, 

2008: 43-44). In short, MEEs are private, municipal joint ventures that provide non-audited 

public services but are not public institutions. According to Karanfiloğlu, these enterprises are 

groundless in terms of the Municipalities Law: 

“There are only two provisions in our legislation that allow municipalities to 

establish companies and participate in established companies. The first of these is the 

provision of Article 19, paragraph 5 of the Municipality Law, and the second is the 

provision added to the Municipality Law by Law No. 5656. According to these 

provisions, companies, which are one of the institutional principles outside the 

municipal organisation, can only be used in public transportation, meat transportation 

and housing construction listed in the law. This situation leaves many municipal 

companies established today without a legal basis” (Karanfiloğlu, 2020: 58). 

Among the companies established by municipalities, companies have been established 

in many unrelated sectors such as textile, apparel, forest products, vegetable oil, cement, 

construction, plastic paint production, weapons, tourism, television, etc. (Karanfiloğlu, 2020: 

60). Municipalities can create monopolies in local areas far from the control of the central 

government through these companies. In this study, Halk Ekmek A.Ş., a Municipal Economic 

Enterprise, will be taken as an example. 

 



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5. Istanbul Halk Ekmek A.Ş. as a Case Study 

Halk Ekmek is one of the most important and most profitable companies among the 

MEEs mentioned in the previous section, which makes it possible to describe this company as 

a public bread initiative. Although it was one of the subsidiary organisations with a more social 

aspect when it was founded, Halk Ekmek later became a tool -especially in shantytowns- to 

gain votes in big cities. The poor classes in Türkiye mainly apply bread-based diets, which is 

also proven by statistics. Türkiye ranks first among the countries that consume the most bread, 

with an annual bread consumption of 199.6 kg (440 pounds) per capita. Of course, this statistic 

also includes other pastries such as simit, pide, and lahmacun, but the most consumed pastry is 

"somun" bread (Martinez, 2023). This makes bread the most consumed food in Türkiye. For 

this reason, bread attracts the attention of politicians and becomes both a social and political 

phenomenon. For this reason, it is helpful to examine the bread issue from different aspects. 

According to official figures, İstanbul Halk Ekmek A.Ş. produces 1.8 million bread daily in 

Istanbul, which has a population of 15.4 million and is at the heart of the bread market, with 

more than 3,000 buffets located almost everywhere. According to the data shared by İstanbul 

Halk Ekmek A.Ş., it meets the bread needs of 12% of the people of Istanbul (İHE, 2024). In 

this way, İstanbul Halk Ekmek emerges as the city's largest bread producer.  

Halk Ekmek A.Ş. was established as a private subsidiary affiliated with the municipality 

based on the provision in Article 71 of the Municipality Law, "The municipality may provide 

its services with special income and expenses by establishing a business within the budget with 

the permission of the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization" (Mevzuat, 2005). 

Municipalities in Türkiye use their social background to establish such subsidiaries, thus 

opening the door to a social policy and generating additional income for their budgets. This is 

true even for water. Although mains water is a public service, packaged water is dependent on 

private subsidiaries. Hamidiye A.Ş. -which is affiliated with the Istanbul Metropolitan 

Municipality- produces water and exports the produced water to forty-two countries, acting as 

if it were operating as a business rather than a social enterprise (Malbeleği, 2018: 47). 

The state has both regulatory, supervisory and controlling powers for bread. The first 

regulation is realised by intervening in bread prices, which is called the "Price Ceiling 

Implementation", so the aim is to sell bread at the maximum selling price. The price ceiling is 

the maximum selling price that official institutions set for the sale of goods. Although the 

private sector seems to be in the hands of bread, the state has a dominant role in pricing, and 

the municipality intervenes in the bread market through price intervention, that is, by setting a 

price. According to Aydın, this is a manifestation of oligopoly behaviour (Aydın, 2021: 2158). 

Price control on bread first emerged in the Ottoman Empire and was implemented in 

the Republic of Türkiye. The "Law on the Obligation of Non-Haggling Sale" numbered 3489, 

enacted in 1928, was aimed at the seller to label their goods and not to sell goods below the 

label price. The control of these prices was also given to the municipalities with the Law 

numbered 1580 enacted in 1930. Today, pricing is prepared by the chambers to which the 

tradesmen are affiliated according to the "Law on Tradesmen and Craftsmen Professional 

Organizations" numbered 5362. However, in case of objection to these prices, a commission is 

convened within 15 days upon the application of the highest civil administrator, governor and 

mayor of that place. However, this pricing changed in 2017, and more institutions became 



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involved in the pricing of bread (Yaman, 2022: 262-263). The price change process on the 

Ministry's website is defined as follows with the latest update: 

“First of all, the chambers of tradesmen and craftsmen, whose members are 

registered in the profession of bakery and flour products manufacturing and trade, 

prepare the bread/simit price tariff and apply it to the union they are affiliated with. 

The union that receives the application will carry out the procedures for establishing a 

commission consisting of the representatives of the relevant municipality, provincial 

directorate of trade, provincial directorate of agriculture and forestry, chamber of 

trade and industry or chamber of commerce and the relevant chamber in order to 

ensure that the bread/simit price tariff presented by the chamber is discussed by holding 

a meeting with the participants stipulated in the said Regulation. The representatives 

above should be informed that participation in the commission is mandatory, and the 

invitation should be made in writing. Suppose anyone does not accept this written 

invitation. In that case, this should be clearly stated when sending it to our Ministry for 

approval, and the invitation letter sent to the representatives should be made an annexe. 

The commission decision received should first be sent to the Turkish Bakers Federation 

by the relevant union for its opinion. Then, the commission decision should be submitted 

to our Ministry by the relevant union together with the opinion of the Federation for its 

opinion. Suppose the opinion of our Ministry is positive. In that case, the bread price 

tariff will enter into force after the relevant union approves the tariff after the opinion 

of our Ministry is received. However, suppose the tariff requested by our Ministry is 

given a negative opinion. In that case, the union will re-submit the new tariff request 

with its justifications to our Ministry without convening a commission and will approve 

it after the opinion is received.”. (Ministry of Trade, 2024) 

As it appears, many state institutions in the pricing system show that bread price tariffs 

are now centralised. Bread and simit bakers are faced with a strict pricing policy by the central 

government, and they are also forced to compete with municipalities since municipalities are 

direct producers. For Tekelioğlu, the notion of the municipality has changed; the notion of 

“Producer Municipality, Not Controller” has come into play. Because municipalities produce 

public goods, including bread (Tekelioğlu, 2012: 254). Municipalities feeling responsible for 

the pricing, production and distribution of bread in this way is not a phenomenon we encounter 

frequently in other countries except Türkiye (Akalın, 2003: 42-43). There are Public Bread 

factories and thousands of sales buffets in 12 metropolitan municipalities throughout Türkiye. 

In these cities, where over 37 million citizens live, a total of 534 million somun bread is 

produced in a year (Yaman, 2022: 269). In big cities, the class differences between the rich and 

the poor are visible, and the poor masses live densely in big cities. It is possible to normalise 

this situation by helping the poor living in big cities. However, even in cities with small 

populations, such as Afyonkarahisar, Düzce, and Kastamonu, there are Public Bread factories, 

and they produce thousands of bread per day. For the first time, in 1978, the bread production 

process of municipalities was based on the notion of cheap, healthy, high-quality production in 

order to provide better service to the people of Istanbul. Nevertheless, this notion changed, and 

producing bread was used as a political argument. However, before focusing on the problem 

of municipalities producing bread, we need to address what bread means economically and 



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socially and what kind of sound it is. In other words, the problem is whether bread is a public 

good or a private good. 

Bread is considered a private good due to its characteristics and its marketability, and 

due to these economic features, the private sector must produce bread. If bread is to be 

considered a social good or a virtuous good, it must be subsidised by municipalities from their 

main budgets. However, in Türkiye, on the contrary, bread production is carried out by 

municipal companies in a way that competes with the other bakeries in the market. In fact, the 

Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality is considering selling the Halk Ekmek company because 

of its high profitability (KARAR, 2024). In a place where there is a liberal market economy 

like Türkiye, it would be logical for the Halk Ekmek companies not to enter the market at all, 

assuming that a market with so many producers will find its equilibrium price. Municipalities 

may be willing to produce bread for two reasons. The first reasons that will allow municipalities 

to enter the market are stated as "preventing bakers from forming cartels among themselves, 

that is, ensuring competitiveness", or the second reason is "eliminating income inequality in 

cities, preventing poor people from being able to eat or even facing hunger" (Akalın, 2003: 43-

44). In both cases, municipalities should not be in a position to eliminate competition. The 

Competition Board reports show that municipalities do not assist competition in the market for 

social purposes. On the other hand, municipalities could not eliminate monopolisation; on the 

contrary, municipalities themselves show the potential for monopolisation, and these reports 

also reveal how large the Halk Ekmek companies are. 

For example, in a case filed in 2010, an application was made by a local bakery owner 

to the Competition Board with the claim that “the general managers of Ankara Halk Ekmek ve 

Flour Factory A.Ş., İstanbul Halk Ekmek Factories A.Ş. and BESAŞ Bursa Bread ve Nutrient 

Ind. came together and decided not to increase the prices of public bread”. It was stated that, 

according to the rapporteurs, there was no need to open an investigation. However, Istanbul 

Halk Ekmek General Manager Salih Bekaroğlu stated at that time that “they were selling 300 

grams of white bread for 40 kuruş, that when the recent price increases in raw materials were 

added to the cost, this increase did not necessitate a price hike for the price of the bread, and 

that as an enterprise, they were not bound by the decisions of any other bread company, that 

while a worker working in a normal bakery produces 200 loaves of bread per day, a worker in 

their own factory can produce 2,500 somun bread per day, and therefore a great cost 

advantage was achieved, and that Istanbul Halk Ekmek was currently one of the most profitable 

companies of the Istanbul Municipality” (Competition Board, 2010). As can be understood 

from this, Halk Ekmek is essentially a large enterprise. Other local bakery actors in the market 

do not have a chance to compete with Halk Ekmek A.Ş. -especially in cities such as Istanbul, 

Bursa and Ankara, where the majority of the population in Türkiye lives, agreements to be 

made due to political conjuncture can lead to a “cartelisation”. 

One of the advantages that Halk Ekmeks have -as a public institution- is that they can 

obtain the raw material they need for production much more cheaply. They also have a very 

high storage capacity. The bread production and storage areas of the relatively minor private 

capital are not large enough to allow them to produce bread cheaply. In addition, small 

businesses have to buy more expensive agricultural products like flour, wheat, and nuts than 

municipalities, and there have been many complaints about this unfair competition to the 

Competition Board in Türkiye. For instance, in 2010, a bakery owner stated that he wanted to 



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produce and sell the Golden Bread and Golden Cake. However, the Turkish Grain Board sold 

roasted hazelnuts to İstanbul Halk Ekmek at a 60% discount, and according to him, İstanbul 

Halk Ekmek caused unfair competition by allowing these hazelnut products to be sold both at 

its own sales points and private sales points and by benefiting from state support. Then he 

applied to the Competition Board with the request that the necessary be done. However, the 

Competition Board similarly stated that Halk Ekmek was not dominant in the market, that its 

activities should not be considered predatory pricing or discrimination for abuse, and that “As 

a result, there are reasonable economic and political reasons for Turkish Grain Board to sell 

roasted and chopped hazelnuts to İstanbul Halk Ekmek at a low price by using the authority 

granted to it by the Council of Ministers, without exceeding its founding purpose” (Competition 

Board, 2010b). At this point, it was decided that competition was not distorted. However, it 

was not stated for which public benefit a public-looking Main Company produced Golden 

Bread and Golden Cake. Apart from these two examples, there have been many claims that 

Halk Ekmek prevented competition in the market. These examples were the subject of 

complaints not only in İstanbul but also in Malatya and Sakarya, which are relatively more 

minor settlements. No positive result was obtained from any of the 8 applications made 

between 1999 and 2010. In addition to the Competition Board reports, the Court of Accounts 

Reports also reflect the irregularities committed and show the areas in which Halk Ekmek spent 

its income. 

In the 2015 Court of Accounts Audit Report of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Halk 

Ekmek A.Ş., the commercial profit of the company was declared as 6,047,157.00 TL. 

According to this report, Halk Ekmek A.Ş. is ranked 623rd among the 1000 most prominent 

companies in Türkiye and 94th among all public companies. Despite this profitability, the 

company also includes problematic practices such as:  

- Some personnel working in the company taking annual paid leave in violation of the 

legislation to fulfil their military service  

- Provision of supplementary health insurance for board members, general manager and 

assistants, personnel working as consultants, managers, chiefs and their family 

members  

- Faulty practices and payments regarding price differences 

- The partnership structure of the company consists of 5 founders, a habit dating back to 

the period of Law No. 6762 

- Failure to use marketing and advertising expenses in a way that would increase the 

company’s profitability 

- Although the company employs two lawyers, only one of them follows up on lawsuits 

filed in favour of and against the company 

- The personal expenses of personnel who go abroad are paid from the company budget. 

These findings essentially show that the company is poorly managed and that there are many 

irregularities.  

The most interesting of the problems identified in the Court of Accounts reports is that 

Halk Ekmek A.Ş. pursues policies that are entirely incompatible with Halk Ekmek's social 

vision, such as advertising, sponsorship, and organising congresses. According to the Court of 

Accounts Report, Halk Ekmek advertised in TV and radio programs, newspapers and 



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181 
 

magazines for 1,182,402.00 TL (391,262 Euro) in 2015 and signed various sponsorships with 

different companies. The situation becomes more apparent when the Euro exchange rate is 

added in parentheses. While the Euro exchange rate was around 3.50 TL against TL in 2015, 1 

Euro is around 35 TL in 2024. Similarly, Halk Ekmek revealed they paid 318,253.00 TL 

(105,386 Euro) for the rental fee of the Wyndham Grand Istanbul Hotel, where the 15th 

International Cereals and Bread Congress also held 11,800.00 TL (3,907 Euro) for the stand 

rental fee at the World Technology Innovation and Entrepreneurship Conference, and 

20,672.00 TL (6,844 Euro) for the food served to the guests. As if to confirm the Ekmek Circus 

politics concretely, Halk Ekmek paid 295,000.00 TL (97,682 Euro) to the Istanbul Municipality 

Sports Club Association, which is a football team. It has also been revealed in the Court of 

Accounts reports that 122,720.00 TL (40,625 Euro) was paid to web TV advertisements shown 

in the municipal social facilities (Sayıştay, 2016). According to the report, it is clear that these 

organisations are subsidiaries of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and various press and 

publication organs. The Court of Accounts Report states that the IHE company should follow 

various paths to increase its profitability and that it is necessary to follow a path that is in line 

with the requirements of commercial life without forgetting that it is a structure that uses public 

resources to a large extent (Sayıştay, 2016: 22). 

In this context, Halk Ekmek transfers its source of income by advertising to its other 

municipality budget's subsidiaries; the organisation that Halk Ekmek advertises for is another 

municipal company. In short, Halk Ekmek is a company that aims to increase the municipality 

budget rather than its social aspect. We can understand this situation from the statements of 

Halk Ekmek company that the somun bread - called typical bread - has very little commercial 

return. Therefore, they have turned to other products and from the Court of Accounts reports. 

While Halk Ekmek uses the loaf of bread for social purposes, it also uses other luxury 

derivative bread and bakery products to maximise profitability. Therefore, it reveals that Halk 

Ekmek's social aspect is only apparent. Practices that will support this argument also emerge 

in Ankara Metropolitan Municipality Halk Ekmek A.Ş. outside of Istanbul Halk Ekmek. In the 

2020 Court of Accounts report, it was reported that Ankara Halk Ekmek had 15 defective 

practices. In addition to the defective practices committed commercially, practices that prevent 

competition in the bread market were also revealed (Court of Accounts, 2020). 

These findings are “Not Accruing Late Payment Interest at the End of the Year for 

Receivables That Could Not Be Collected on the Due Date; Not Using the Severance Pay 

Account; Incomplete Recording of Monthly Commission Fees That Were Not Paid by the 

Contractor; Not Tracking Program and License Purchases in the Rights Account; Not Applying 

Late Payment Interest to Commission Fees That Were Not Collected within the Payment 

Period; Not Entering Any Record in the Inventory Book at the End of the Activity Period; 

Exceeding the Upper Limit in Purchases Made Based on Exception Provision 3-g of the Public 

Procurement Law; Making New Contracts in a Short Period of Time with Two Companies 

Whose Contracts Were Terminated by Mutual Agreement on the Grounds That They Could 

Not Procure Flour from the Market; Carrying Out Work That Should Be Done Through Open 

Tender by Dividing It Into Parts Using the Direct Procurement Method; Signing of Contracts 

Exceeding the Representation Authority Amount by the General Manager Without a Decision 

of the Board of Directors 9. Delaying the Application of Delay Penalty Until After the 

Termination of the Contract; Applying a Delay Penalty Based on the Missing Day to the 



BREAD, POWER, AND NEOLIBERAL MUNICIPALISM: THE HALK EKMEK A.Ş. AS A 

CASE OF BREAD AND CIRCUSES POLITICS 
 

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Contractor Company That Does Not Fulfill Its Commitments on Time; Signing a Contract with 

a Company in Composition; Exceeding the Limit Regarding the Annual Overtime Working 

Period Determined in the Labor Law” (Court of Accounts, 2020). 

 

6. CONCLUSIONS 

Many metropolitan municipalities changed hands for the first time in the 2019 local 

elections in favour of the opposition parties. After 25 years, the CHP won in Istanbul and 

Ankara, where more conservative voters were elected in 2019. Although this election success 

did not affect the 2023 general elections, the opposition parties managed to hold more 

metropolitan municipalities in their hands in the 2024 local elections. Local governments, 

especially big municipalities, are places where deep poverty is most felt, which has affected 

the attitude of the voters. Because deep poverty and economic crises also create such 

opportunities for politics, the social municipality discourses of municipalities showed their 

effect in the 2024 local government election. Although it is not the primary duty of 

municipalities, Metropolitan Mayor candidates used some election promises for voters in 2024, 

such as "neighbourhood nurseries, market shopping assistance, assistance to retirees, student 

scholarships".Social municipal policies -targeting such poor classes- have become the 

determinant of Turkish politics, and Halk Ekmek A.Ş., as a municipality subsidiary, is seen as 

an element of this social policy.  

Halk Ekmek affiliates, which had social purposes since their establishment, emerged 

with the aim of reducing the social inequalities of the poor in society and became institutions 

expected to provide a kind of social justice. However, the neoliberal municipality 

understanding that emerged as a manifestation of today's neoliberal system has taken on a 

different meaning. In the neoliberal municipality understanding, municipalities have become 

profit-oriented formations like companies, as in many public institutions. In this plane, 

municipalities have both maximised profits through their companies and, as a populist 

reflection of these policies, they have seen companies as "vote-gathering" tools. At this point, 

the "Bread and Circus" politics mentioned in the article also offers a conceptual set that makes 

it easier to understand these populist political forms of municipalities because it has been 

known since the past that the most accessible forms of controlling society have been sports and 

food. Because although human beings are social creatures with complex structures, some of 

our primitive instincts make us more easily controllable. As we understand from public policy 

documents, municipalities have also used these extremely archaic techniques. They are using 

Halk Ekmek A.Ş. both as a current policy tool and competing in a way that could harm local 

merchants. In this context, future academic studies can also focus on another Municipal 

Economic Enterprise. Because the framework of this study is limited to Halk Ekmek A.Ş., 

municipalities have subsidiaries in different areas. If we give a current example, the “Kent 

Lokantaları” (City Restaurants) that Ekrem İmamoğlu opened in 2022 after becoming the 

mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality can also be one of the different tools of 

municipalities in the face of deep poverty because it seems easier to create control mechanisms 

over the poor people, especially in periods of deep poverty. 

 



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