









































Abstract: This research focuses on foreign intervention in the mining sectors of Zambia and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), concentrating on the transparency of agreements and regulation, or lack thereof, which 
contributes to the sustainability of mining practices and the livelihoods of local citizens. The current state of public 
information regarding natural resource extraction in both countries creates questions about state motives and 
investors’ incentives, with consequences of inequality, human rights offenses, and underdevelopment. Applying 
Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-systems theory, I describe the economic rationale behind global involvement in the 
region’s mining operations and identify potential power imbalances. I use commodity statistics, state documentation, 
and nongovernmental reports to analyze reporting trends on mining operations. Intergovernmental databases with 
development statistics also contribute to the research. In this study, I argue foreign intervention in underdeveloped, 
mineral-rich countries does not have to be a purely exploitative relationship as emphasized by Wallerstein’s theory, 
which can be demonstrated through the implementation of international transparency initiatives. These programs, 
employed to benefit resource-abundant countries like Zambia and the DRC, can increase corporate and government 
accountability related to mining activities. Complete reporting on natural resource extraction increases investment 
values and the development and productivity of the mining industry.

Aisthesis      Volume 9,  20181

“Why Can’t I Find It?”: Mining Transparency in Zambia 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo

by Sophia Fortmeyer

Walking into an American mall on a Saturday 
afternoon, the typical scene greeting the eye involves 
busy shoppers interspersed with rows of electronic 
gadgets, sparkling jewelry, and newfangled 
appliances. With little thought to sourcing, 
construction, or ethical concerns, consumers buy 
into the latest fads and go about business as usual, 
assuming companies and governments deal with the 
go-between details honorably. However, the process 
is more complex. Exposed by the media, depicted in 
films, and protested by nonprofit organizations, the 
mining of natural resources used to make cherished 
products has become somewhat controversial 
recently, yet little is known about it.

The manufacturing of high-demand commodities 
uses raw materials extracted from specific resource-
abundant areas of the globe. The African region 
encompassing Zambia and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) holds many of the world’s most 
valuable natural resources. As of 2015, the DRC 
owned approximately 24 trillion dollars worth of 
mineral assets, primarily composed of gold, copper, 
diamond, coltan, and cobalt deposits (“DR Congo: 
UN Advises,” 2011). Zambia possesses additional 

resources, but specializes in copper extraction, 
holding the world’s most productive reserves 
(Observatory of Economic Complexity, n.d.). The 
countries’ natural resource abundance entices 
global investors, leading to potential for successful 
business partnerships, but also dangers of corrupt, 
manipulative extraction. Prioritizing capitalist self-
interests, multinational corporations (MNCs) risk 
exploiting these resources.

Demand for raw materials to engineer high-
value products motivates international interest in 
resource-rich countries like Zambia and the DRC. 
Globalization and technological advances in mining 
and manufacturing during the early twentieth-
century coincided with colonial rule in Africa. 
Colonial powers extracted raw materials from the 
continent to fulfill European capitalist motives, 
while reconstructing the political spheres of African 
nations. Both countries won independence in the 
1960s from European colonizers—Zambia from 
Britain and the DRC from Belgium—entering 
a tumultuous period of economic and political 
adjustment (Sikamo, Mwanza, & Mweemba, 2016; 
Human Rights Watch, 2009). Attempting to regain 



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Aisthesis      Volume 9,  20182

economic stability and international recognition, 
Zambian and Congolese governments encouraged 
multinational mining within national borders 
(Sikamo, Mwanza, & Mweemba, 2016; Human 
Rights Watch, 2009). Thus began a new boom of 
foreign investment and involvement in the mining 
industry, with indirect international infiltration 
into the economic and political structures of each 
country. In recent years, as these trends continue, so 
does resource extraction.

However, despite obvious mineral extraction 
and relationship building between foreign 
companies and the states, an industry-wide 
pattern has appeared: mining data and statistics 
are incomplete, unbalanced, or completely absent. 
Gaps in disclosure allow conflicts and inequalities 
to fester, enabling powerful companies and 
governments to exploit both resources and miners. 
In the DRC, resource smuggling and fraudulent 
reporting financially benefit political elites, while 
71% of Congolese citizens live in extreme poverty 
(The Sentry, n.d.). Zambia, while not as politically 
turbulent, likewise maintains years’ worth of gaps 
in mining statistics (“Commodity Trade Statistics 
Database,” 2017). Speculation about foreign interests 
affecting the transparency of mining operations—
meaning business contracts, revenues, or changes 
in ownership—raises ethical concerns for investors 
and consumers. While Zambian and Congolese 
governments and mining companies see value 
in transparent reporting, strategic interests take 
precedence, dictating the type and amount of data 
publicly available.

In this paper, I explore foreign intervention 
regarding mining operations in Zambia and the 
DRC, analyzing whether the actions of international 
transparency initiatives correspond with Immanuel 
Wallerstein’s theoretical idea of relationships 
between the developed world and its less 
developed counterparts. The study examines public 
information involving natural resource extraction 
and relationships of state governments, international 
investors, and nongovernmental organizations. 
Wallerstein’s world-systems theory conceptualizes 
the economic rationale behind global involvement 
in regional mining operations and analyzes foreign 
intervention in evolving markets. In accordance 
with the theoretical framework, problems within the 

mining sector can be attributed to developmental 
power imbalances. I apply the theory to mines in 
Zambia and the DRC, two mineral-rich countries with 
different economic and political environments. The 
study analyzes mining regulation and public records 
to identify data gaps and incentivize participation 
in accountability initiatives. Involvement in 
transparency programs could improve the value of 
investments and accountability of the whole mining 
industry.

I argue foreign intervention in underdeveloped, 
mineral-rich countries is not purely exploitative 
by rule, which can be demonstrated through 
implementation of international transparency 
initiatives. At the onset, I present economic, social, 
and political effects of multinational mining 
investments. Next, I introduce world-systems theory, 
applying the concept of core-periphery relationships 
to foreign intervention and mineral extraction 
in Zambia and the DRC. The methods section 
underlines data collection of mining activities and 
analyzes transparency initiatives. Next, I integrate 
world-systems theory to suggest a non-exploitative 
relationship is possible. Lastly, I highlight the 
significance of international accountability programs 
within the mining industry and show the importance 
of state and public support to such initiatives.

Literature Review
Economic Effects of Extractive Investments

Within the scope of economics, governments 
entice foreign investors with tax incentives 
and regulatory reductions. Since the structural 
adjustment period of the 1980s, foreign investments 
have appealed to many African economies. Natural 
resource privatization grants more control to large 
international firms, therefore limiting state ability 
to monitor resource management and ownership 
trends. For example, following the emergence of 
neoliberal economic policies, foreign influence over 
the Zambian economy weakened national stability 
and bargaining power (Larmer, 2005). Global 
institutions like the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund encourage privatization as financial 
leverage (Lungu, 2008). The privatization of 
previously state-owned entities privileges outside 
investors over domestic interests. To capitalize 
on foreign investments and maintain economic 



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Aisthesis      Volume 9,  20183

stability, African states rely upon natural resource 
wealth. Public record of investments and contracts 
adds legitimacy to the industry and could justify 
continued negotiations between states and external 
actors.

As multinational corporations build investments 
with intentions of profitability and market 
expansion, they extract resources at the expense 
of weak national governments. Within strategic 
investment agreements, operating countries grant 
deductions and exemptions to companies who then 
routinely avoid paying corporate taxes, on grounds 
of maintaining investments for contracted periods 
of time (Lungu, 2008). As profitability comes first, 
MNCs will interfere in domestic issues or political 
conflicts to protect shareholder interests, even at the 
risk of damaging the operating country (Saleem, 
2002). Large MNCs control power structures and 
mining securities, creating exploitative extractive 
systems. Consequentially, by not prioritizing long-
term African resource security, multinational 
investments could jeopardize the stability of 
African economies. States can take significant steps 
towards mitigating companies’ conflicts of interest 
by releasing clear public records of all mining 
transactions.

According to social scientists, the state’s 
role as head of political and economic forces 
becomes complicated due to increased commercial 
relationships with foreign companies. Weakened 
political institutions coupled with a strong 
multinational presence do not create a stable 
view of people-centered sustainable development. 
The crippling economic effects of the resource 
curse can be linked to structural shortcomings 
in bureaucratic institutions (Idemudia, 2009). 
For example, overwhelmingly dependent on oil, 
Nigeria’s economic history demonstrates the state 
is not equipped with the management capabilities 
necessary for efficient industry regulation and 
reform (Idemudia, 2009). African economies have 
become substantially dictated by outside interests 
rather than domestic needs, potentially weakening 
stability within national power structures. The 
complexity of resource relations requires a strong 
state presence against manipulative interference 
in order to maintain a legitimate sense of national 
sovereignty. 

Additional Effects of Multinational Mining
As previously mentioned, the lack of transparent 

regulatory frameworks in the mining sector 
provokes recurrent resource exploitation and social 
inequalities. Multinational corporations and the 
state engage in strategic commercial negotiations 
to incentivize foreign investment, despite the risk of 
long-term economic degradation. Both parties can 
undertake responsibility to release clear, structured 
agreements, presenting the details of continued 
mining projects. Proposals like the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) encourage 
governments and MNCs to voluntarily commit 
information about extractive involvement to boost 
business repute and political legitimacy (Le Billon, 
2006). With international platforms, civil society 
groups can push law reform towards initiatives 
like EITI to better gauge government expenditures 
and accountability related to foreign intervention 
(Lungu, 2008). Corrupt mining agreements between 
state entities and multinational corporations run 
the risk of inciting ethnic conflict and militant 
activity, further incentivizing government reporting 
(Kemp, Owen, Gotzmann, & Bond, 2011). With 
the high concentration of mining activities in the 
Central African Copperbelt, a lack of transparency 
can potentially hurt the credibility of international 
companies and the state. Based on research into 
social responsibility standards, engagement in policy 
reforms could increase the industry’s accountability 
and boost local standards of living. Such research 
could illuminate problems and subsequent solutions 
to improve mining and community sustainability.

Company-community relations create potential 
social change in the mining industry. With 
opposing cultural dynamics at play, multinational 
corporations and communities work through 
various social conflicts and differences. Facing 
financial and legal issues, local communities become 
more assertive with natural resource management. 
Advocates protest for labor rights and environmental 
conservation, but often run into strong corporate 
bureaucracy seeking to silence opposition (Talla, 
2010). Company-community conflict heightens 
with management negligence and institutional 
repression of local protests, especially regarding 
indigenous lands (Kemp et al., 2011). Advocacy is a 
social tool with the potential to activate transparent 



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Aisthesis      Volume 9,  20184

regulatory structures within the mining sector. 
Research into such structural benefits could also 
support communities affected by foreign mining 
investments.

Corporate citizenship initiatives have become 
a trend within the sphere of economics, stemming 
from grassroots advocacy movements and collective 
action protests. Participating in constructive 
development work or engagement projects benefits 
MNCs, improving community relations and 
adding legitimacy to investments. For example, 
the Canadian government has prompted national 
mining companies to engage in efforts to broaden 
corporate accountability initiatives and improve 
human rights records in conflict zones (Le Billon, 
2006). Other international mining companies have 
also presented frameworks for community feedback 
to increase local dialogue and resolve disputes 
(Kemp et al., 2011). Past corporate actions show 
potential for change within the extractive sector, 
but also emphasize structural imbalances. The 
desire for profit runs the risk of disincentivizing 
social responsibility and consequently continuing 
exploitation at the expense of local livelihoods. 

World-Systems: A Critique of Inequality
Within the realm of social science, world-

systems theory seeks to clarify social and economic 
power differentials between countries across 
developmental stages. Immanuel Wallerstein (2004) 
analyzes history and economic markets to highlight 
inequalities between strong and weak states. Based 
on the theory, the relationship of the “core” to the 
“periphery” can appear patronizing, as core states 
attempt to control the social and economic success 
of less-developed nations. The core, having been 
developed longer and more substantially, provides 
a model for the periphery to encourage growth, 
but also takes advantage of the periphery’s lack of 
development by exhausting peripheral resources 
(Wallerstein, 2004). World-systems theory critiques 
exploitative power relations of the world, common 
in post-colonial African governments and markets 
(Babones, 2014). Peripheral states depend upon 
core states for support, linking peripheral economic 
and political success to more developed nations. 
World-systems theory explains exploitative trends in 
economic relationships between African nations and 
the West. 

More developed states assert expertise, gleaned 
from years of political and economic shifts in the 
world-system, upon less-developed peripheral 
nations and can subsequently dictate usage of 
essential domestic elements, such as land, labor, and 
capital. Foreign economic involvement intensifies 
core-periphery disparities. Systemic inequalities 
can be deeply rooted in an oppressive colonial past. 
Western Europe colonized much of what is known 
as the “Third World,” leaving behind a state of 
underdevelopment explaining current social turmoil 
(Chirot & Hall, 1982). Furthermore, international 
influence can obstruct development, as inputting 
foreign capital into a developing economy could 
cause potential market manipulation and a corrupt 
redistribution of wealth and power (Wellhofer, 
1995). Multinational corporations play a leading 
role in exploitative relationships between the core 
and periphery, extracting peripheral resources and 
returning profits to the core. As world-systems 
theory maintains, the global market often supports 
the economic goals of multinational companies, 
gaining strength from powerful capitalist-centered 
nations. Holding MNCs accountable through 
transparent reporting could create a more equal 
economic exchange, thus lessening chances of social 
and political tensions in underdeveloped states. 

According to world-systems theorists, the core 
strips the periphery of resources and establishes 
standards to protect self-interests. Stronger countries 
are thus able to dictate advantageous trade terms. 
On the other hand, weak states are unable to fight 
dominant powers and could lose important labor 
and capital. The core can assert exploitative power 
through labor and property regulation, subsequently 
damaging peripheral economic goals (Wallerstein, 
2004). Poor economic growth in peripheral nations 
shows the disproportionate correlation between 
production and compensation in developing 
countries (Wellhofer, 1995). International mining 
companies invested in the Central African 
Copperbelt epitomize powerful core interests in 
peripheral environments. 

Data and Methods
While researching, I analyzed mining projects 

and agreements between companies and states 
through official state and corporate archival 



“Why Can’t I Find It?”:Mining Transparency in Zambia and the DRC

Aisthesis      Volume 9,  20185

documents. To find mining statistics, I accessed 
governmental databases from each country, such as 
the Zambia Chamber of Mines and the Ministère 
des Mines of the DRC. I also accessed the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act from the United States National Archives, using 
Section 1504, which is focused on the transparency of 
multinational mineral extraction in Africa, including 
Zambia and the DRC. To complete the data, I accessed 
reports from reputable nongovernmental and inter-
governmental organizations. I used the African 
Power Mining Projects archive, an initiative seeking 
to provide objective public disclosure of African 
mining projects. The files include critical extractive 
information about forty-seven mines in various 
regions of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. I also utilized World Bank studies on mining 
performance and production to gauge the success of 
development programs. 

To analyze qualitative research, I employed 
thematic coding, producing data files from the 
literature. As many Congolese archival sources were 
only available in French, I created corresponding files 
in English to compare strategic clauses in Zambian 
and Congolese mining contracts. The patterns I 
found within the data illustrate the logic of using 
thematic coding as the primary analytical method. 
With quantitative data, I used summary statistics 
to narrow down the findings. To analyze statistics 
from the African Power Mining Projects database, 
I condensed organized information into a specific 
spreadsheet more relevant to the DRC and Zambia. 
While the previous report contained data for over 
four hundred mines, I restricted the spreadsheet 
to forty-seven mines for more succinct analysis. 
I then utilized maps of both countries to create 
a visual basis of mine concentration. With fewer 
mines to analyze, I can spot production patterns 
and differences between the mines in respect to 
geographic locations. Furthermore, using summary 
statistics for quantitative data, I can more specifically 
identify comparative trends between Zambia and the 
DRC.

Analysis
External interests threaten national mineral 

sovereignty, as foreign ownership dwarfs 
domestically owned mining companies in Zambia 

and the DRC. Of forty-seven prominent mines 
analyzed across both countries, multinational 
companies own and operate forty, with a majority, 
if not 100%, of the shares in each mine (World 
Bank Group, 2016). Mine privatization contributes 
to this trend, as foreign bidders take precedence 
during mining negotiations (Serlemitsos & Fusco, 
2003). Thus, smaller, nationally-based companies 
are unable to compete for influence and ownership. 
By redistributing state power to capitalist-minded 
multinational players, privatization could increase 
the risks of domestic problems like unemployment 
and labor inequalities. In a Wallerstein world, MNCs 
represent influential international actors controlling 
potentially exploitative relationships between the 
corporate world and less powerful mines. 

Mining companies investing in Zambia and the 
DRC, in conjunction with state governments, engage 
in established initiatives to increase transparent 
regulation and address economic discrepancies. 
However, these accountability initiatives have 
not been headed by national governments, but 
by outside institutions. For example, the United 
Nations General Assembly backed the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), which uses 
state regulatory requirements to hold the diamond 
industry accountable regarding the influx of conflict 
diamonds into the legitimate trade (The Role of 
Diamonds, 2002). Mining negotiations between the 
Congolese diamond mining company, La Societé 
Minière de Bakwanga, and de Beers Centenary 
reference commitment to the certification system, 
adhering to the principles of an established 
regulatory framework such as the KCPS (Protocole 
d’Accord, 2005). Similarly, the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative, established in 2003 as the 
global transparency standard, incentivizes Zambian 
and Congolese governments to publicly release 
information about expenditures and relationships 
with mining companies (Rogan, 2016). Efforts 
toward established regulatory frameworks for 
transparency mostly originate outside the state. 
Thus, international transparency initiatives attempt 
to hold both Zambia and the DRC, along with 
multinational investors, accountable. 

Critics could suggest states actively choose 
to disregard intervening pressure to implement 
government transparency programs, arguing that 



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Aisthesis      Volume 9,  20186

such decisions could threaten national interests. 
As multinational companies do not want to release 
data with potentially negative consequences, states 
might desire to take protectionist stances against 
external regulatory interference. For example, in 
conflict-ridden countries like the DRC, releasing 
certain information could incite tensions between 
ethnic factions (Kemp et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
foreign direct investment accounts for 1.7 billion 
dollars worth of the Congolese GDP, and ironically, 
the Zambian GDP as well (General Profile: DRC, 
2015; General Profile: Zambia, 2015). Consequently, 
wealth and power from foreign investments 
could overshadow the states’ commitment to 
ethical business practices. This tendency increases 
the importance of international pressure for 
transparency. To accommodate states’ refusal to 
provide details on mining revenue and activity would 
confirm the exploitative core-periphery relationship 
world-systems theory proposes.

International transparency legislation challenges 
world-systems’ consistent description of core-
periphery interactions. A Wallerstein view expects 
transparency initiatives to pursue self-interests in 
reporting, yet, the programs act only to increase 
data accessibility of mining activities. In 2015, 
the Ministère des Mines of the DRC released 126 
official contracts and documents through the 
ResourceContracts.org database, in adherence with 
EITI standards (Okenda, Pedersen, Toledano, & 
Young, 2017). The Columbia Center on Sustainable 
Investment and Natural Resource Governance 
Institute began this initiative in 2015, supported 
by the World Bank and UK Department for 
International Development. The program aims to 
accommodate corporate, media, and governmental 
goals for due diligence in reporting (Columbia 
Center on Sustainable Investment, n.d.). While 
focusing on transparency issues within the DRC, 
this international initiative and others do not seek 
to exploit the host countries Wallerstein would label 
“peripheral.” The objectives of such programs are 
to educate and raise awareness of statistical mining 
discrepancies.

Skeptics of this interpretation could question 
the motives of inter-governmental organizations 
(IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) seeking to promote transparency of mining 

operations. The risk of an institution playing savior 
and claiming technological or infrastructural 
superiority to teach less developed countries like 
Zambia and the DRC would fit with Wallerstein’s key 
theoretical components of core-based exploitation. 
Also, as MNCs act with self-interests in mind 
with mineral extraction and operational reports, a 
similar skepticism of NGOs’ objectives for releasing 
information is valid. For example, as of 2017, over 
ninety global financial institutions actively support 
EITI’s mining revenue disclosure platform, leading 
to potential postulations of the organization’s 
monetary conflicts of interest (Investors’ Statement 
on Transparency, 2015). Similarly, nongovernmental 
organizations often carry the burden of taking a 
top-down understanding of development situations 
in projects, consequentially becoming more of a 
hindrance than a help to underdeveloped countries 
(University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, 
n.d.). While recognizing the possibility of outliers, 
nongovernmental organizations involved in mining 
transparency prioritize ethical interests and logic to 
advocate for public disclosure. Tangible statistics and 
evidence of governmental and investor cooperation 
validate these programs. 

International nongovernmental organizations 
challenge multinationals’ selective release of mining 
data. NGO-initiated programs seek to hold MNCs 
accountable through regulation. As both actors are 
parts of the developed core, the battle between the 
two relieves pressure in core-periphery relationships, 
shifting tension to the core. Since the implementation 
of EITI standards in 2008, Zambian Mining Code has 
reintroduced corporate income tax and decreased 
royalty rates, creating a more equitable mining 
sector (Baxter et al., 2016). The EITI, a product of 
the Norway-based EITI Association, has goals to 
strengthen and keep governments accountable in the 
extractive sector (Governance of the EITI, n.d.). By 
challenging potentially exploitative foreign interests 
in Central African mining, international efforts for 
transparency illustrate commitment to addressing 
power imbalances. Wallerstein’s theory maintains 
capitalist interests insure core dominance at the 
expense of developing economies, but these “core 
versus core” interactions between MNCs and NGOs 
introduce another non-exploitative relationship, 
beneficial to developing countries.



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Aisthesis      Volume 9,  2018

Even if transparency programs originate outside 
the realms of the state, the results can be encouraging 
to localized efforts for mining transparency. With 
multinational interests dictating policy and publicity, 
small-scale initiatives can push for transparency with 
international programs. For example, the US-based 
Carter Center has partnered with an independent 
research association, Moabi DRC, and collaborates 
with civil society groups, governments, and private 
organizations to accumulate over 800 mining reports 
(Congo Mines, 2017). In Zambia, the Publish What 
You Pay coalition, or PWYP (also active in the 
DRC), unites fourteen civil society organizations to 
supplement EITI records and initiate collective action 
against statistical discrepancies  (Publish What You 
Pay, n.d.). The relationships between international 
organizations such as the Carter Center and PWYP 
show cooperative methods of dealing with deficient 
data. Working with small-scale projects to address 
accountability problems within the mining sector, 
NGOs can use advanced platforms to highlight 
industry issues.

Advocates for maintaining state credibility 
could argue against state responsibility for initiating 
national transparency proposals if other reputable 
legislation exists. Post-privatization, individual 
investors own many mines between Zambia and the 
DRC. Without state ownership, advocates raise a 
viable critique of national responsibility to regulate 
the industry with state resources. Since legislative 
changes in 1995, Zambia’s Mining Code has 
limited governmental intervention to a regulatory 
rather than participatory role to coincide with 
the changes in state to private ownership (Ndulo, 
2013). The Democratic Republic of Congo took a 
similar position in 2008, citing financial feasibility 
as justification for a more regulatory stance in the 
mining industry (Müller-Koné, 2015). Yet, while 
both countries have chosen indirect roles in the 
extractive sector, mining activities and revenue 
directly impact national governments and citizens. 
Thus, states are responsible for producing transparent 
data about national and corporate agreements. With 
this argument, state-initiated transparency efforts 
are just as necessary as externally initiated regulatory 
frameworks. 

Governments and MNCs have undergone 
pressure for disclosure of mining records, enough 
to create requirements for mineral importation and 

extractive agreements. The push for transparency 
shows the value of public disclosure is not limited 
to local citizens. For American companies, before 
recognizing contract legitimacy, Section 1504 of the 
legislation commonly known as the Dodd-Frank Act 
lays out explicit requirements for complete disclosure 
of financial, time, and project logistics (Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform, 2010).  Without these records, 
reporting discrepancies can permit potential 
economic damage. For example, the current Mining 
Code in the DRC allowed for losses of 1.36 billion 
U.S. dollars between 2010 and 2012, due to a lack 
of reporting between Canadian Banro Corporation 
and the Congolese president (Müller-Koné, 2015). 
Global pressure to release mining documents creates 
accountability with the potential to rectify financial 
losses. These disclosures paired with formal state 
regulation of mineral extraction would improve the 
nature and efficiency of mining investments. 

As legislation like the Dodd-Frank Act suggests, 
regulatory efforts to publicize mining activity 
benefits investing multinational companies. Legally 
obligated to provide risk assessment for investors, 
MNCs must publish business transactions. To 
balance responsibility, Zambian and Congolese 
governments could argue the necessity for more 
corporate involvement in reporting, subsequently 
shifting some obligation to mining companies. 
For example, of the five companies invested in 
Zambia’s nine largest mines, three, all based 
outside of Zambia, have published reports, 
showing inadequate domestic reporting (“African 
Mining Project Database,” 2010). Also, based on 
a 2015 support statement to EITI, ninety-three 
international investing companies recognize the 
value of transparent reporting in the extractives 
sector (Investors’ Statement on Transparency, 2015). 
Considering corporate legalities, companies should 
push for transparency. Declarations such as the 
aforementioned set corporate standards for other 
companies to strive towards. Collaborative efforts 
between MNCs and national governments to 
increase transparency could increase the scope and 
productivity of such programs.

Taking part in transparency initiatives such as 
EITI increases state credibility abroad, as mining 
companies hope for risk-averse environments 
for investors. Operating in fifty-two countries, 

7



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Aisthesis      Volume 9,  2018

EITI compliance offers a globally recognized 
transparency standard. The program has increased 
reporting on mining activities, with marked 
progress in participation. In the seven years since 
the DRC committed to EITI membership, the 
number of reporting companies in the extractive 
sector has increased 450%, with higher reported 
revenues (Rapport annuel d’avancement, 2015). EITI 
holds multinational corporations accountable by 
essentially peer-pressuring competitors into releasing 
mining statistics (Frequently asked questions, 
n.d.). Well-established transparency initiatives 
possess the leverage to keep MNCs accountable to 
investors and host countries. As emphasized by 
EITI’s success, nongovernmental organizations can 
support peripheral nations by advocating for mining 
disclosures. 

Discussion
Industrial Accountability

Multinational investment in the extractive 
industries in Zambia and the DRC instigates resource 
exploitation largely benefiting investment companies. 
MNCs originate from developed capitalist countries 
and are better equipped to infiltrate and manipulate 
resource-rich markets. With mine privatization, the 
state’s regulatory role becomes convoluted, giving 
mining corporations more control. The movement 
of capital and resources from the periphery to the 
core characterizes Wallerstein’s world-systems 
theory. Consistent with world-systems theory, 
shifting mineral wealth from peripheral economies 
to core-dominated markets leaves the economies 
of countries like Zambia and the DRC dependent 
upon investing companies. Without significant state 
regulation and surveillance, resource exploitation 
will continue.

The mining sector’s privatized structure grants 
companies direct control of mining activities, but 
leaves regulatory responsibilities to the state. Amid 
highly concentrated foreign involvement in the 
industry, an orchestrated effort for operational 
transparency by Zambian and Congolese 
governments would build state accountability. Several 
significant programs promote public accessibility of 
mining data and have engineered support from both 
states, but they originate outside national borders 
and jurisdiction. Despite cooperating with initiatives 

like EITI, neither state shows intentions of creating 
a national push towards regulatory transparency 
programs. The lack of records and statistics available 
to interested consumers on archival and government 
websites introduces postulations of state passivity. 
With international critiques of the political policies 
and competencies of both countries, particularly the 
DRC, initiatives to fully disclose mining activities 
would increase credibility abroad and improve 
mining sustainability.

Advocacy for Regulatory Reforms
The national governments of Zambia and the DRC 

should proactively monitor extractive activity. While 
the state’s role has become more regulatory, both 
nations have not instigated policies to keep MNCs in 
check. Independent researchers and NGOs recognize 
the potential for capitalist multinational influences 
upon mining legislation and resource extraction. The 
EITI incentivizes countries like Zambia and the DRC 
to annually release reports highlighting tax code and 
legal agreements to analyze mine ownership, but 
usually encounter barriers to full disclosure (Rapport 
annuel d’avancement, 2015). By researching mine 
ownership, an internationally prominent program 
like EITI requires states to scrutinize corporate 
mining practices. Nongovernmental publication of 
industry research and statistics should motivate state 
governments to investigate regulatory loopholes and 
potentially shady mining agreements. 

Investors and consumers should hold MNCs 
accountable for operations in Zambia and the DRC, 
demanding publication of mining contracts and 
company decisions. With shareholder pressure, 
companies may see value in releasing mining reports. 
Thus, motivating civil society to pressure MNCs into 
releasing operational data would advance consistent 
standards for transparency. External interests drive 
corporate action and social policy in these countries 
more than domestic concerns (Amuwo, 2009). 
Similarly, while this research shows production 
trends from internationally-originated transparency 
initiatives, the programs tend to prioritize Western 
goals for accountability, even if inapplicable to 
African societies (Idemundia, 2009). A demand 
for MNC accountability ought to come from 
the shareholders the companies seek to impress. 
Transparent data accompanies smart investments, 

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Aisthesis      Volume 9,  2018

and MNCs should recognize the value of releasing 
all data to the public.

Regardless of profits from MNC investments, 
Zambia and the DRC should choose to prioritize 
publishing complete mining data. If this study’s 
argument is valid and the release of information 
about mining activities constitutes a battleground 
between corporate interests and nongovernmental 
agendas, then states would develop mining policies 
to maintain advantage. Based on revenue and export 
statistics, Zambia and the DRC could appear shackled 
to multinational interests rather than domestic needs 
(World Bank Group, 2016). The nations also depend 
upon the aid and research of NGOs, but resource 
wealth and investor expectations motivate state 
agendas (Le Billon, 2006). Transparent reporting 
should become normative within the mining 
sectors to showcase national control despite foreign 
intervention. State credibility would increase, as 
would mine sustainability and development. 

Conclusion
Foreign interests influence Zambian and 

Congolese economies, dictating mineral extraction 
through mine ownership and attempting to control 
publication of mining data. However, international 
interests do not necessarily have to be exploitative, 
as Immanuel Wallerstein’s theory suggests. The 
transferal of power and mine ownership from the 
state to multinational companies permits resource 
exploitation, and NGOs and IGOs informally 
regulate the industry, setting reporting standards. 
By establishing transparency initiatives to make 
mining figures publicly accessible, external actors 
seek to benefit the industry, workers, and host 
countries through clear reporting. Investors and 
consumers in the developed world also benefit 
from comprehensive data and can advocate to hold 
MNCs and governments accountable. The mining 
industry in Zambia and the DRC, while struggling to 
maintain economic, social, and political credibility, 
can address industrial issues with efforts to increase 
transparent reporting across the sector.

Similarly, if the Zambian and Congolese 
governments recognize correlations between 
community development and mining transparency, 
state support for clear reporting could increase and 
benefit the industry for the future. With collaborations 

for research and development between NGOs, state 
governments, and MNCs, mining in the Central 
African Copperbelt could improve, from the bottom-
up. Then, as shoppers worldwide peruse aisles lined 
with glittering gadgets, they could have confidence 
in the integrity of the products, stemming from 
transparent, accessible information about sourcing 
and production. With this result, even Wallerstein 
could add an exception to his rules.

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