

































Abstract: Women are historically and presently underrepresented in the U.S. Supreme Court. More speci!cally, from 
2000 to 2013, only 14.2% of lawyers who argued before the Supreme Court were women despite making up about 
51% of the U.S. population and 37.4% of American lawyers. Between those same years, women made up between 
22% and 33% of Supreme Court justices. Not only are women underrepresented within the Court, but they also 
experience discrimination. Researchers Patton and Smith (2020) evaluated the relationship between lawyer gender 
and the interruptions they experience when arguing before the court and found that justices demonstrated more 
interrupting behavior in quantity and length of interrupting behavior for female lawyers compared to male ones 
at a statistically signi!cant level. A follow up study by Patton and Smith (2021) showed that the disproportionate 
interruption of female lawyers was more likely to come from male and/or conservative justices. Jacobi and Schweers 
(2017) noted similar statistically signi!cant gendered speech patterns among the justices themselves, with female 
justices being disproportionately interrupted at a higher rate and male justices disproportionately interrupting at a 
greater rate. In addition, lawyers are more likely to !nd success, as de!ned by receiving the votes of a justice, if they 
adhere to gender norms within their oral argument (Gleason, 2020). "ese conclusions suggest that the substantive 
representation of women in the Supreme Court is limited not just by their numerical disadvantage but also by the 
systematic limitation of women’s speech during oral argument through verbal interruptions and the enforcement of 
gender norms.

Aisthesis      Volume 13,  202252

“I’m Speaking”: Gender and Interrupting Behavior During 
Oral Argument at the U.S. Supreme Court

by Kaira Brown

 "e law and the courts have historically been 
considered male domains, as evidenced by the fact 
that the !rst woman was not legally permitted to 
attend law school in the United States until 1919. 
It was almost another sixty years until Sandra Day 
O’Connor became the !rst woman con!rmed to the 
Supreme Court in 1981. Despite this glass ceiling 
being shattered, gender imbalances continue in 
America’s highest court. Most lawyers who argue 
before the Supreme Court are men. From 1979 
to 2013, approximately 11% of layers before the 
Supreme Court were women (Patton & Smith, 2017). 
Speci!cally, from 2000 to 2013, the percentage of 
women before the Court was 14.2%, so the number 
of women before the Court is slowly increasing 
(Patton & Smith, 2017). Because the Supreme 
Court is a deliberative body where oral argument 
has the potential to in#uence the votes of justices, 
and thereby the laws by which Americans live, it 
is important to understand how attorney gender 
plays a role in the e$ectiveness or experience of 
oral argument (Ringsmuth et al., 2013). Women 
also have di$erent policy priorities than men when 

it comes to “gendered issues.” "ese issues include 
“health policy, social welfare, education, family and 
children issues, and civil rights” (Yildrim, 2021). "e 
idea of women representing themselves on the issues 
most important to them is referred to as substantive 
representation (Mansbridge, 1999). "us, if women 
have di$erent priorities than men but are less able 
to advocate for themselves, either from the bench 
or as lawyers, this will negatively impact the ability 
of women to substantively represent themselves 
in Court and likely result in Court decisions that 
negatively impact women. "e purpose of this 
literature review is to ascertain the relationship 
between gender and interrupting behavior during 
oral argument before the United States Supreme 
Court between 1979 and 2015. 

Speaker Gender
 "e number of women both on the bench and 
arguing before the bench is steadily increasing. As 
the proportion of women at the Supreme Court 
increases, researchers have become more interested 
in the e$ect of gender on interactions in the Court. 



“I’m Speaking”: Gender and Interrupting Behavior During Oral Argument at the U.S. Supreme Court

Aisthesis      Volume 13,  202253

It is well documented that men are on average more 
talkative and more assertive in their speech patterns 
than women (Leaper & Ayres, 2007). In addition, 
when women are in group settings, they tend to 
be regarded as less capable, especially in !elds 
where they are o%en underrepresented such as the 
legal !eld (Mendleberg & Karpowitz, 2016). "is 
perception can result in them regarding themselves 
as less capable as well (Mendleberg & Karpowitz, 
2016). "us, there are major indicators that women 
might be disadvantaged in the setting of the Supreme 
Court oral argument, a form of group discussion, 
due to both numerical minority status as well as 
gendered speech tendencies and gendered patterns 
of group behavior.

Justices’ Interrupting Behavior 
 When the Supreme Court takes on a case, both 
parties submit written briefs and then come to the oral 
argument, the most public part of the Court’s decision 
process. Each side is allotted about thirty minutes 
to present their case. During that time, justices 
interrupt lawyers to gather information, challenge 
arguments, or persuade other justices (Phillipps & 
Carter, 2010;  Ringsmuth et al., 2012). As such, oral 
arguments have the potential to in#uence justices’ 
decisions and their written opinions (Johnson et al., 
2006). Interruptions are an inevitable part of oral 
argument for these reasons. Interrupting behavior 
can be measured by who does the interrupting, who 
is interrupted, how long interruptions last, and the 
frequency of interruptions.

E!ect of Lawyer Gender on Justices’ Interrupting 
Behavior 
 Patton and Smith (2020) studied the di$erence 
between male and female lawyers’ speaking time 
and the interruptions they experience during 
U.S. Supreme Court oral arguments from 1979 to 
2013. In order to build the data set, they used an 
automated content analysis. "e systematic analysis 
of 34 years of Court transcripts, which is as far back 
as validated online transcripts go, allowed them to 
evaluate overall patterns and reduced the chance 
that their data would be skewed by the dynamics of 
a particular set of justices. As a part of this wide data 
range, the researchers also controlled for changes in 
court makeup in their overall data, thereby turning 
a possible threat to internal validity into a strength. 

"ere is also no risk of sampling error because by 
using all available data, the researchers are essentially 
conducting a census.
 Patton and Smith began by downloading all 
3,583 of the oral arguments before the Court from 
1979 to 2013 from Lexis-Nexus. "e researchers 
then used Python computer programs to “split each 
oral argument by presentation and then split each 
presentation into individual speeches by attorney 
and justices,” yielding a total of 10,345 observations. 
"ey analyzed the length in words of speeches 
by lawyers and justices as well as the quantity of 
interruptions by justices. "ey posited that each of 
these measures demonstrate “the Court’s willingness 
to allow lawyers to present their cases” and “how 
deferentially the justices treat the lawyers,” both of 
which are themes with strong external validity. "ey 
also leveraged data from the Supreme Court Data 
Base which helped them to control for variables 
such as the issue being litigated, ideological 
alignment between the Court and the lawyer, and 
which side won the case. "e identi!cation and 
explanation of all these control variables in addition 
to the demonstration of the e$ect size of each control 
variable on the dependent variables strengthened the 
internal validity of the study as well. 
 Once all data was collected, they employed 
di$erence of means tests for male and female lawyers 
on each dependent variable. "ey found that women 
were interrupted, on average, 3.6 more times than 
their male counterparts. "ey demonstrated that 
men are allowed an average of 225 words before the 
!rst interruption while women were permitted an 
average of 192 words, demonstrating a 33.3 average 
word di$erence. Put another way, female lawyers 
get about 5% less time to begin their arguments. 
Male lawyers were also permitted approximately 
95 words between interruptions whereas female 
lawyers averaged 83 words, with an average of 12.1-
word di$erence. When controlling for the client the 
lawyer is representing, these disparities persisted 
with male lawyers being permitted an average of 
63.8 more words in their opening statements and an 
average of 17.1 more words between interruptions. 
All results had at least a .01 statistical signi!cance. 
"e study could have been strengthened, however, 
by individually listing the statistical signi!cance of 
each !nding.



“I’m Speaking”: Gender and Interrupting Behavior During Oral Argument at the U.S. Supreme Court

Aisthesis      Volume 13,  202254

E!ect of Justice Gender on Justices’ Interrupting 
Behavior 
 Researchers Jacobi and Schweers (2017) looked 
beyond attorney gender and investigated the e$ect 
of gender on justice-to-justice interruption in the 
Supreme Court in 1990, 2002, and 2015. "ese years 
each represent a unique type of gender distribution 
on the Court. In 1990, there was one female justice. 
In 2002, there were two female justices, and one of 
them was the ideologically median justice. Jacobi 
and Schweers have also posited that the e$ects of 
gender and ideology on oral argument patterns are 
intertwined. "us, this 2002 data set allowed them 
to disentangle those e$ects and improve internal 
validity. 2015 represents the Roberts Court in which 
there were three female justices as well as the !rst 
female justice of color. "e concentration on these 
three terms, rather than the analysis of a long 
continuous range of terms, permitted a more in-
depth analysis of those years as well. 
 Across these three years, Jacobi and Schweers 
analyzed 156 oral arguments, during which there 
were 422 interruptions. Using a computer program 
to search transcripts for the “--” that indicates an 
interruption, they examined the speaking and 
interrupting behavior of the 13 justices that have 
served on the bench in those years. In addition to the 
computer program, they double checked computer-
marked instances of interruption to ensure that 
they were true interruptions and not simultaneous 
speech. "ese added quality assurance measures 
strengthened the reliability of measurement in the 
study.
 Before adjusting for the underrepresentation of 
women on the bench, the data shows that they are 
interrupted about 54% of the time although they 
only make up between 11% and 33% of justices 
across these three years. In addition, men made up 
85% of interrupters, despite being 78% of the court 
on average. A%er adjusting for the proportion of 
women represented on the Court, the patterns still 
bear out. In 1990, Justice O’Connor, the lone female 
justice, experienced 26% of interruptions despite 
being 11% of the Court and in 2015, female justices 
experienced 65.8% of interruptions despite making 
up 33% of the Court. With p values of .0029 and 
.0000 respectively, these are incredibly statistically 
signi!cant !ndings. By comparing the years 1990 
and 2015, it is clear that as the number of women 

on the Court increases, the percentage di$erence 
between percent representation of women on the 
Court and the interruptions experienced by women 
increases. In 1990, it was a percent di$erence of 15%, 
and in 2015 it was 22.8%. "is demonstrates that 
rather than acclimating to the presence of women on 
the Court, male justices are working harder to assert 
their verbal dominance over their female colleagues.
 On the other hand, Sandra Day O’Connor 
committed 5% of interruptions in 1990 while making 
up 11% of the Court, and in 2015 three women 
committed 17% of interruptions while making 
up 33% of the Court. "e 1990 di$erence among 
interrupters is not signi!cant, likely due to low 
sample size, but the 2015 data has a p value of less 
than .01 which is very signi!cant.  "e inconsistency 
of data presentation within the study is a major 
weakness. Raw data was sometimes presented but 
percentages or ratios appeared at other times with 
minimal discussion of the reasoning for the disparity 
in presentation. On occasion, the tables were o%en 
di&cult to understand and not well explained within 
the discussion of the data. "erefore, the data is 
consistently presented as a percentage within this 
literature review for increased legibility.
 Both studies examined the interplay of speech 
and gender in the U.S. Supreme Court through 
di$erent lenses. While Patton and Smith (2020) 
focused on the interruption of lawyers by justices, 
Jacobi and Schweers (2017) were more concerned 
with interruptions between justices. "e evidence 
of outsized interruption of female speakers in both 
justice-to-lawyer interruptions and justice-to-justice 
interruptions demonstrate that gendered dynamics 
on the Court are more prevalent across power 
dynamics.
 Although the limited presence of women before 
the Court and on the bench posed a challenge to both 
researchers in terms of the amount of data available 
to them, both researchers still managed to !nd 
strong data sets and statistically signi!cant evidence 
of gender bias against women in the Supreme Court. 
Both studies also build upon and do well to include 
many studies on the interplay of gender, speech, 
politics, and power throughout. "is helps the reader 
to understand their foundation for the assertion that 
implicit gender bias, or a need to assert dominance 
plays into the greater interruptions of women and 
the outsized interrupting behavior of men. 



“I’m Speaking”: Gender and Interrupting Behavior During Oral Argument at the U.S. Supreme Court

Aisthesis      Volume 13,  202255

Factors In"uencing Justices’ Propensity to 
Interrupt of Lawyers
 Patton and Smith (2021) built upon the question 
of gender interruption of lawyers and conducted a 
study aimed at understanding gender bias in the U.S. 
Supreme Court by analyzing oral arguments from 
2004 to 2014 and observing the e$ects of attorney 
gender, justice ideology, and justice gender on the 
proportion of words a person speaks during oral 
arguments. "e study was strengthened by both 
by removing Justice "omas from the study due to 
his outlier status as well as the plethora of control 
variables included in the data analysis such as 
ideological alignment, case salience, and lawyer 
a&liation. Another major strength of the study 
was the treatment e$ects analysis which de%ly 
demonstrates e$ect size by essentially using each 
justice as their own control in the experiment. A%er 
adjusting for controls, the researchers found that 
75% of the justices (9 out of 12) spoke more on 
average when a woman presented than when a man 
presented and that the di$erences all had a statistical 
signi!cance of at least .01%. "ey also found that 
e$ect size among those proli!c speakers was at least 
.50% higher for conservative justices than liberal 
justices. Across gender lines, e$ect size is also 
strongly demonstrated. Patton and Joseph note a 
nearly 0.6 percent greater e$ect size for male justices 
than female justices when a female lawyer speaks.

Gender Norms and Lawyers’ Success in the U.S. 
Supreme Court
 Gleason (2020) broadened the lens of gender and 
the U.S. Supreme Court by examining the impact 
of attorney adherence to gender norms on success 
before the U.S. Supreme Court from 2004 to 2016. 
He conducted a textual analysis of one-on-one oral 
arguments before the Court and demonstrated that 
while there is a positive relationship between the 
a$ective content of oral argument and securing a 
justice’s vote for female attorneys, there is a negative 
relationship for male attorneys with correlation 
coe&cients of approximately 0.5 and 95% con!dence 
intervals for both sexes. "e e$ect size of female 
attorney’s use of a$ective content on securing judicial 
votes is about 21.5% with a statistical signi!cance of 
p<.01. "e discussion of multiple control variables 
strengthens the internal validity of the study. "is 
!nding is signi!cant because a$ective speech is 

customarily discouraged by legal institutions such 
as the Court. However, a$ective speech is a female 
gender norm. "us, it would appear that women are 
being discouraged from speaking in a way that better 
allows them to !nd success before the Court. 

Conclusion
 "is literature review provides evidence of a 
strong correlational relationship between a speaker’s 
gender and their interrupting behavior before the 
Supreme Court during oral argument. "rough a 
detailed examination of 34 years of Supreme Court 
transcripts, Patton and Smith (2020) found that 
female lawyers are a$orded less speaking time than 
their male colleagues. 
A%er controlling for a variety of factors, the study 
demonstrated a statistically signi!cant correlational 
relationship between the presence of a female 
lawyer presenting and lesser speaking time allowed 
to lawyers. "ey also found correlation between 
female lawyers and more frequent and longer justice 
interruptions. 
 A follow up study by the same researchers 
con!rmed these !ndings and indicated that 
conservative justices and male justices demonstrate 
a greater e$ect size in their propensity to interrupt 
female lawyers. A study by Jacobi and Schweers 
(2017) provided strong evidence of a similar pattern 
in justice-to-justice interruptions. "ey used three 
representative Supreme Court terms to demonstrate 
that female justices are interrupted at a far greater 
per capita rate than their male colleagues and 
that male justices are far more likely to interrupt 
their colleagues than female justices are. Gleason 
(2020) also provided evidence that gender norms 
are enforced by the Court, with lawyer adherence 
to gender norms having a statistically signi!cant 
correlation to winning one’s case. Taken together, 
these studies demonstrate the strong presence of 
implicit gender bias among Supreme Court justices 
as evidenced by their speech patterns and judicial 
decision-making practices.



“I’m Speaking”: Gender and Interrupting Behavior During Oral Argument at the U.S. Supreme Court

Aisthesis      Volume 13,  202256

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