

































As the climate crisis grows more severe, social science has emerged as a necessary tool to respond to climate 
change. More speci!cally, understanding human opinion and behavior is crucial for governments and institutions 
to adapt to climate change e"ectively. To better understand opinions, researchers have deployed various survey, 
audience segmentation, and qualitative typology strategies; however, much scholarly attention has been focused on 
industrialized, Western nations. Morocco has emerged as a leader on the international climate-policy stage, but the 
climate change opinions and beliefs of Moroccan citizens are unknown. In this study, I use the same survey, audience 
segmentation, and qualitative typology techniques to develop a greater understanding of Moroccan climate change 
opinions and subsequently compare them to American opinions. Findings indicate that Moroccans are more likely 
to believe in climate change, perceive risk from climate change, support bold climate policy, and discuss climate 
change with their immediate social circles. Double the percentage of Moroccans fall within the audience segment 
most concerned about climate change, and cultural di"erences likely play a large role in pro-climate motivations.

Aisthesis      Volume 14,  202342

Cross-Cultural Comparison of Climate Change Opinions, 
Beliefs, and Risk Perceptions in Morocco and the United 
States

by Isaac Conrad

1.0 Introduction
 Climate scientists (97%) have come to the 
consensus that global climate change is anthropogenic 
and a threat to society (Cook et al., 2016). If global 
greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) continue at their 
current rates, it is likely that the planet will exceed 
the 1.5° C temperature increase limit set by the 2015 
Paris Climate Agreement (IPCC, 2022). #us, bold 
climate policy targeted at reducing GHG is necessary. 
Understanding human opinion and behavior is 
crucial for governments and institutions to adapt to 
climate change e"ectively (Schipper, 2020; Shwom 
et al., 2017). To better understand climate change 
opinions, researchers have deployed various survey, 
audience segmentation, and qualitative typology 
strategies. In this study, I utilized the same methods 
to compare the climate change opinions, beliefs, and 
risk perceptions of Moroccans and Americans. 

1.1 Climate Opinion Surveys
 Public opinion, risk perception, and climate 
awareness are some of the biggest predictors of a 
nation’s policy response to climate change (Gromet 
et al., 2013; Leiserowitz, 2006; Marx et al., 2007; 
O’Connor et al., 1999). Opinion related to climate 
change has been well documented in the United States 
(Ballew et al., 2019; Howe et al., 2015; Leiserowitz, 

2006). Recent !ndings from surveys conducted by the 
Yale Program on Climate Change Communication 
(YPCCC) and the George Mason University 
Center for Climate Change Communication 
(CCCC) demonstrate 76% of Americans believe 
in global warming, whereas 12% deny its existence 
(Leiserowitz et al., 2021b). Common trends within 
these data demonstrate that beliefs, risk perceptions, 
and support for climate policies di"er among political 
parties and generational gaps. Questions regarding 
communication behavior depart from these trends. 
Liberal-leaning Americans report discussing climate 
change more frequently than conservative-leaning 
Americans, but both liberal and conservative 
Americans report similar levels of media exposure 
to climate change (Lesierowitz et al., 2021b).
 A similar climate opinion survey has been 
replicated in over thirty-one di"erent nations, which 
has led to in depth cross-cultural comparisons of 
climate opinions throughout the world (Leiserowitz 
et al., 2021a). Of note, Americans were the least 
likely to say they needed more information about 
climate change, but of the 31 nations included, 
Americans ranked 26th in agreement that climate 
change is happening. Nigeria and Egypt, two of the 
three African nations represented and both near 
Morocco, ranked 28th and 30th, respectively. While 



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informational, the international survey was not as 
extensive as the opinion survey conducted in the 
United States. My study attempts to address this gap 
while investigating Moroccan opinions.

1.2 Audience Segmentation Strategies
 Audience segmentation is a strategy used to 
identify di"erent subgroups within a target audience. 
Using audience segmentation in the United Sates, 
researchers have identi!ed six di"erent subgroups 
or “interpretative communities” (Leiserowitz, 2005; 
Maibach et al., 2011; Roser-Renouf et al., 2014). 
Questions from the surveys mentioned above were 
used to help identify these communities. Also known 
as “Global Warming’s Six Americas,” #e Alarmed, 
#e Concerned, #e Cautious, #e Disengaged, 
#e Doubtful, and #e Dismissive constitute these 
six communities. Each possesses a unique set of 
beliefs in climate change, support toward policies, 
and behaviors regarding climate change. Identifying 
these communities allows messaging strategies 
aimed at shi$ing opinion or behavior to be tailored 
to speci!c audiences.
 Two segments, #e Alarmed and #e Concerned, 
are considered pro-climate. #us, climate messaging 
is not regularly tailored toward these groups. #e 
Alarmed segment consists of those most convinced 
that climate change is happening; the issue is of 
much importance to them, and they tend to be the 
most informed of the “causes, consequences, and 
potential solutions” of climate change. #is segment 
is most likely to view climate change as a threat to 
themselves and the United States. #e Concerned 
segment consists of those that are less convinced of 
climate changed, yet they are still worried about the 
issue. #ey are somewhat informed about the issue, 
but they are less likely to view climate change as a 
threat to themselves and the United States. 
 Climate messages aimed at changing opinion 
and behavior are regularly tailored toward #e 
Cautious and #e Disengaged. #e Cautious are 
only somewhat convinced of climate change; they 
are less informed about the issues, as only half 
believe climate change is human caused, and only 
a third are convinced of the scienti!c consensus. 
#is segment does not perceive climate change as 
a threat to themselves, but they do view climate 
change as having somewhat of an impact on future 
generations. #e Disengaged segment is not sure 

that climate change is happening; this group is 
most likely to change their minds regarding climate 
issues. #ey know little about the issue, and they are 
not convinced that climate change poses a threat to 
themselves or the United States. 
 Of the six communities, #e Doubtful and 
#e Dismissive are the least likely to change their 
mind about climate change, so climate messaging 
is not o$en tailored toward these communities. #e 
Doubtful segment does not know if climate change 
is happening, and they issue is of little personal 
importance to them; they are equally uninformed 
and not worried about climate change. #ey are 
unlikely to change their mind, and they do not 
perceive climate change as a threat, to themselves and 
to the United States, for at least another 100 years. 
#e Dismissive segment is the !nal segment. #is 
group is sure that climate change is not happening; 
the issue is unimportant, and they are not worried. 
#ey are so certain of these views that they will not 
change their mind. #ey !rmly hold ideas like that 
there is no scienti!c consensus of climate change, 
the issue is a natural phenomenon, and the issue will 
never impact themselves or the United States.
 #e international opinion survey outlined 
earlier (Leiserowitz et al., 2021a) also segmented the 
respondents in each nation. Of the African nations 
represented, South Africa had more respondents in 
the Alarmed category (47%) than the United States 
(34%). Nigeria (33%) was just under the United 
States, but Egypt (17%) had the lowest percentage of 
respondents in the Alarmed segment. Of all nations, 
the United States had the highest percentage of 
respondents in the Dismissive segment (11%). For 
comparison, South Africa (1%), Nigeria (4%), and 
Egypt (6%) had smaller percentages of respondents 
who were dismissive to climate change. 

1.3 Qualitative Typology
 To further aid in the development of e"ective 
climate messaging strategies, scholars have attempted 
to build an understanding of why an audience holds 
certain opinions (Gustafson et al., 2022). Qualitative 
work like this utilizes a typology to analyze free 
responses to help identify the motivations behind 
pro-environmental opinions. Surveys designed 
by the National Geographic Society have been 
deployed in eleven di"erent nations around the 
world. #ese surveys utilize a typology to organize 



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Aisthesis      Volume 14,  202344

pro-environmental motives into one of three 
categories: “ecocentric,” “anthropocentric,” and 
“other.” Ecocentric values are centered on the nature’s 
bene!ts to protecting nature; for example, protecting 
nature “protects animals.” Anthropocentric values 
are centered on the human bene!ts to protecting 
nature; for example, protecting nature “protects 
natural resources.” Other values focus on more 
abstract bene!ts of protecting nature; for example, 
we must protect nature out of “religious obligation.” 
#e ability to organize and understand motivations, 
beliefs, and values allows for the creation of better 
tailored campaigns that result in behavior or policy 
change (Hurst & Stern, 2020; Luong et al., 2019; 
Wolsko et al., 2016). 

1.4 !e Case for Morocco
 While climate opinion surveys and audience 
segmentation strategies similar to “Global Warming’s 
Six Americas” are increasingly being used to develop 
messaging strategies surrounding climate change 
and policy, much of the literature has not focused 
on African nations—a continent particularly at risk 
for negative climate change impacts like decreased 
freshwater availability, increased %ooding probability, 
decreased ecosystem productivity, and decreased 
crop yield  (Muller et al., 2014; Serdeczny at al., 
2017; Zinyengere at al., 2017). For example, studies 
similar to the “Global Warming’s Six Americas” have 
been conducted in Australia (Morrison et al., 2013), 
Germany (Metag et al., 2015), India (Leiserowitz et 
al., 2013), and Singapore (Detenber et al., 2016). Of 
the thirty-one nations surveyed for YPCCC’s most 
recent international climate opinion study, only 
three were in Africa (Leiserowitz et al., 2021a). As 
the continent with the second highest population, 
Africa is poised to play a leading role in responding 
to the climate crisis (Okonjo-Iwelea, 2020); thus, 
the climate opinions of citizens in African nations 
should not be overlooked.
 #e Kingdom of Morocco (from hereon, 
Morocco), the furthest northwest nation in Africa, 
is projected to be one of the countries most severely 
impacted by global climate change. #e nation has 
a projected temperature increase of 6°C, which 
will result in various negative impacts, including 
but not limited to droughts, severe weather events, 
decimation of the agriculture industry, rising sea 
levels, and biodiversity loss (Camargo et al., 2020; 

Schilling et al., 2012). While the country contributes 
little to global climate change, it is considered one 
of the world’s leaders in climate policy. Morocco is 
ranked 8th on the international Climate Change 
Performance Index—an index that leaves the !rst 
three spots blank because no nation has done enough 
to reach their respective climate goals. #e index 
ranks nations based on GHG emissions, energy use, 
and policy (CCPI, 2022). #e United States is ranked 
55th. 
 Unlike the United States, Morocco is a 
constitutional monarchy in which the King (currently 
King Muhammad VI) and a bicameral parliamentary 
body share power; however, the King still wields 
broad political authority. While not a full democracy, 
Moroccan citizens still participate in government by 
voting for representatives and petitioning for policies 
(Zaid, 2016). Civil society and non-governmental 
organizations play a heavy role in shaping policy, 
as they tend to have greater in%uence on members 
of the parliament. As the country becomes more 
democratic, petitioning is strengthening the citizens’ 
role in government (Zaanoun, 2021). #is suggests 
that, although perhaps less in%uential than in the 
United States, public opinion regarding climate 
change holds signi!cance in policy implementation.
 Morocco’s national government has taken a 
di"erent approach to global climate change than that 
of the United States. #e new Moroccan constitution, 
passed in 2011, explicitly states “all citizens have the 
right to a healthy environment.” Climate change 
education and communication have also been a policy 
priority for the Moroccan national government. #e 
nation’s 3rd National Communication with United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
states, “the !ght against climate change depends on 
everyone…it is necessary to intensify awareness-
raising e"orts by facilitating access to information, 
by organizing training workshops, [and] deploying 
a large-scale communication campaign (mass or 
social media)” (UNESCO, 2021). 
 #e Moroccan government’s bold stance on 
climate change is re%ected in the youth of Morocco; 
in a survey of youth aged 18-29 across all the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) nations, identifying as 
Moroccan had the strongest e"ect size on predicting 
whether one values environmental quality (Dibeh 
et al., 2021). In 2021, the United Nations Resident 
Coordinator in Morocco recognized Morocco as 



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a key player in the !ght against climate change: 
“#anks to its climate policy for the past years, 
Morocco has become a key leader on initiatives for 
climate action and is one of a few countries with a 
nationally determined contribution in line with the 
global target of 1.5º C” (UNSDG, 2021). It is clear 
that the Moroccan government has positioned itself 
as a leader in the climate policy, and its policies have 
been strong enough to in%uence young Moroccans’ 
views of environmental quality and gain recognition 
by the United Nations.

1.5 Moroccan Climate Opinions
 Morocco’s position as a leader in climate policy 
while a minimal contributor to climate change 
provides a stark contrast to the United States; 
however, the opinions, beliefs, and risk perceptions 
related to climate change have not been documented 
in Morocco as extensively as they have been in the 
United States (Afrobarometer, 2021; Najib, 1999), 
nor have they been documented in a way that is 
directly comparable to opinions of other nations. 
Comparison across country and culture may provide 
valuable insight into future message development. 
#is study aims to address that gap in the extant 
research. To develop a better understanding of the 
Moroccan perspective toward global climate change 
and compare it to that of the United States, this study 
documents the opinions, beliefs, and risk perceptions 
of Moroccan citizens; segment the same population 
according to “Global Warming’s Six Americas;” and 
gain an understanding of why Moroccans hold pro-
environmental opinions. Speci!cally, I aimed to 
answer the following questions:

Q1: What are the climate change opinions, beliefs, 
and risk perceptions of Moroccan citizens, and 
how do they di"er from American opinions?
Q2: How does a Moroccan audience #t into Global 
Warming’s Six Americas?
Q3: Why do Moroccans hold pro-environmental 
or pro-climate opinions, and how do these 
motivations di"er from American motivations?

2.0 Materials and Methods
 To answer the questions outlined above, I 
conducted a single survey that combined the climate 
opinion surveys, audience segmentation analyses, 
and qualitative typology for motivations discussed 

above. #is study utilized survey questions from 
previous studies conducted in the United States 
and internationally to ensure the validity of the 
comparison of the data across studies. #e survey 
was implemented using Qualtrics research so$ware 
from May 15 to June 25, 2022. I collected data 
from 327 participants via Facebook recruitment 
advertisements. Survey participants were asked 
for consent and a series of demographic questions. 
All participants were 18 years of age or older, and I 
provided surveys in three language options: English, 
French, and Arabic. 

2.1 Demographics of Survey Population
 I asked all survey participants (n=327) to answer 
a series of demographic questions including their 
age, gender, level of education, political a&liation, 
and city of origin. Participants aged 25-34 made 
up the largest portion of respondents (31.5%), 
while those aged 65 or older constituted the 
smallest percentage (2.75%). #e age distribution 
of participants follows that of the national age 
distribution. Participants’ gender distribution did 
not follow the national gender distribution; male 
respondents (77.46%) were heavily overrepresented. 
#is di"erence may be attributed to the roles of 
men and women in Moroccan culture. Men have 
traditionally played bigger roles in civic life, making 
decisions about what is good for the community and 
country, whereas women have historically served in 
roles related to the home. #is has created a societal 
norm that results in an expectation of men to 
participate in public discussion at a higher level than 
that of women. I found that a large portion of survey 
respondents hold a university level degree (47.2%) 
or a U.S. high school equivalent degree (42.5%); 
however, it is unclear if these data are nationally 
representative, as there are no publicly available 
statistics to compare to. Most participants (64%) 
preferred not to report their political a&liation, and 
this, too, may be motivated by cultural di"erences 
surrounding politics. Morocco lacked democratic 
representation in government until the constitutional 
reform in 2011; as a result, politics have been taboo 
for centuries. To oppose political decisions made by 
the King was an act of treason. #us, Moroccans for 
centuries have refrained from discussing politics in 
public spaces. Due to a lack of information available 
to weight our survey population, I deemed the 



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Aisthesis      Volume 14,  202346

population not nationally representative; however, 
results from this study may provide insights to future 
studies regarding Moroccans’ opinions toward 
climate change.

2.2 Survey Design
 A$er demographic and consent questions 
were answered, participants completed a series of 
18 questions targeted at climate change opinions 
and audience segmentation. To answer Q1, sixteen 
questions, based on YPCCC and CCCC surveys, 
were used for the climate opinions portion of our 
survey (Ballew et al., 2019; Howe at al., 2015). #e 
questions were broken down into four categories: 
beliefs, risk perceptions, support for policies, and 
information acquisition/communication behaviors. 
Four questions, used to determine the size of the 
six “interpretive communities” (Leiserowitz, 2005; 
Maibach et al., 2011; Roser-Renouf et al., 2014) in 
Morocco, were pulled from the “Six Americas Short 
Survey” (SASSY) audience segmentation analysis 
tool (Chryst et al., 2018) and used to address Q2. 
#ree of the questions addressing Q1 and Q2 
overlapped. For Q3, a single question adapted from 
the National Geographic Society’s Valuing Nature 
project’s international survey aimed at determining 
pro-environmental motives (Gustafson et al., 2022) 
was included. A complete list of survey questions is 
included in the supplemental information.

2.3 Data Analysis
 Upon completion of data collection, I utilized 
Statistical Program for Social Sciences (SPSS) to 
calculate the mean percentage of support and 
opposition for statements to the 95% con!dence level 
from Moroccan survey responses. I then compared 
these percentages to U.S. percentages of support and 
opposition for the same statements; American data 
(n>28,000) were made publicly available by YPCCC. 
 #e questions used for the audience segmentation 
analysis were compiled and uploaded to the “SASSY 
Group Scoring Tool,” a so$ware made available by 
YPCCC. I was then able to compare the percentages 
of Moroccan participants (n=327) in each of the six 
communities to the percentages of Americans in 
each community via open access data provided by 
YPCCC.

 To determine pro-environmental motives, 
responses to the question “what do you believe 
is the most important reason to protect nature?” 
were categorized using the typology outlined in 
Table 1 adapted from Gustafson et al. (2022). #e 
typology was one of the !rst aimed at building an 
understanding of why pro-environmental opinions 
are held. I used the same typology so data from 
this study can be directly compared to data from 
Gustafson et al. (2022). Valid Moroccan responses 
(n=134) were coded into one of twelve themes 
outlined in Table 1, and each theme corresponded 
to a category consistent with those outlined above 
(ecocentric, anthropocentric, and other). Invalid 
responses were not included (invalid responses were 
either missing, vague, unclear, or policy solutions). 
Once coded within the typology, I compared the 
frequency of each theme in the Moroccan population 
to the frequency of each theme in the American 
population.



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3.0 Results
3.1 Comparison of Moroccan and American Climate 
Opinions      

 Table 2 shows the percentage of Moroccans and 
Americans that reported an answer of support or 
opposition to the corresponding survey question. 
“Don’t know” responses were not included in Table 
2; however, they are visually represented in Figure 
1. Overall, a higher percentage of Moroccans held 
opinions of support for most of the survey questions. 
Moroccans held stronger beliefs in climate change 
(Q1), its anthropogenic cause (Q2), and the scienti!c 
consensus of human cause (Q3) on average by 23.4 
percentage points. #e largest gap in climate change 
beliefs was the anthropogenic cause of climate 
change, with 85.0% of Moroccans holding that 
belief as compared to only 56.5% of Americans—a 
di"erence of 28.5 percentage points (see Q2 in Figure 
1).

 #ere was a higher perception of risk regarding 
climate change among Moroccans (Q4-Q10). On 
average, Moroccans perceived risk 19.3% more than 

Americans. Both Moroccans and Americans are the 
least concerned about personal harm due to climate 
change (Q6); however, this was also the largest gap 
in risk perception between the two populations. 
74.2% of Moroccans perceived potential personal 
harm due to climate change, but 46.8% of Americans 
reported the same risk perception—a di"erence of 
27.4 percentage points. Both Moroccans (92.0%) and 
Americans (71.3%) report the most perceived risk 
for plants and animals.
 Climate policy proposals (Q11-Q14) were 
supported by Moroccans on average 24.1% more 
than by Americans. #e policy proposal outlining a 
requirement for utilities to produce at least 20% of 
their electricity from renewables (Q14) was most 
strongly supported by Moroccans at 97.5%; this same 
policy was least supported by Americans at 64.3%. 
We observed a 20-percentage point di"erence in 
support for the policy proposal outlining funding for 
research into renewable energy (Q11). Americans 
favored the policy more than any other policy with 
76.9% indicating support, but Moroccans reported 
stronger support with 96.9% of responses indicating 
support.
 #e information acquisition/communication 
behaviors portion of the survey (Q15-16) resulted 
in both the largest and smallest gap of support 
between the two populations overall. #ere was a 
45.3% di"erence between the number of Moroccans 
and Americans who reported regularly discussing 
climate change with friends and family (Q15); 
Moroccans indicated support at 80.7% while 
Americans indicated support at 35.4% (see Q15 in 
Figure 1). #e frequency at which Moroccans and 
Americans reported regularly hearing about climate 
change in the media (Q16) only di"ered by 2.3%. In 
the lowest levels of support throughout the survey, 
only 35.0% of Moroccans and 32.7% of Americans 
reported hearing climate change-related stories at 
least once a week. 

3.2 Audience Segmentation
 Figure 2 shows the percentage of both 
survey populations in each of the “Six Americas” 
interpretive communities. Most Moroccans, 71%, 
fell within the Alarmed community; the highest 
percentage of Americans, 33%, also fell within the 
Alarmed community. Due to such a high percentage 
of Moroccans in the Alarmed community, the 



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percentages of Moroccans in the other !ve 
communities were much smaller. #e second 
largest segment of Moroccans was the Concerned 
community with 16% of the survey population. 
A larger percentage of Americans, 25%, made up 
the Concerned community for that population; 
the Concerned community was also the second 
largest segment of Americans. In descending order, 
the Cautious, Doubtful, and Dismissive were the 
next smallest segments for both Moroccans and 
Americans. Similar in percentage, the Disengaged 
community was the smallest for both populations; 
2% of Moroccan participants and 5% of American 
participants were classi!ed in this segment. #e 
Dismissive segment made up 9% of the American 
population, but only 3% of Moroccans fell within the 
same segment.
 To summarize the quantitative portion of 
this study, it is important to note that Moroccans 
demonstrated an average level of support for climate 
opinions, risk perceptions, and policies, 21.6% 
higher than that of Americans. Also of note, 80.7% of 
Moroccans discuss climate change regularly, and only 
35.4% of Americans report the same communication 
behavior; however, the media coverage of climate 
change does not seem to be a viable explanation for 
this behavior, as Moroccans and Americans reported 
similar levels of regularly hearing about climate 
change in the media, 35.0% and 32.7% respectively. 
 #e percentage of Moroccans in each segment 
of “Global Warming’s Six Americas” is also 
consistent with Moroccans expressed support of 
climate opinions, risk perceptions, and policies. #e 
Alarmed segment consists of those most aware of 
and concerned about climate change; in a population 
with such high levels of support for climate opinions, 

risk perceptions, and policies, it is to be expected 
that a large percentage will fall within the Alarmed 
segment.

3.3 Reasoning to Protect Nature
 Here, I used the typology outlined in Table 1 to 
code responses to the question, “what do you believe 
is the most important reason to protect nature?” 
I then compared the frequency of each response 
to American data. Responses coded “Survival 
of All Life” constituted the highest percentage, 
22%, of Moroccans’ reasoning to protect nature. 
For Americans, “Human Health & Survival” was 
the largest percentage at 22%. #e least frequent 
responses for Moroccans were those coded “protect 
Plants and Animals” at 3% and “Human Enjoyment” 
at 3%. “Survival of All Life” was the least frequent 
reasoning for Americans, as it was found in only 4% 
of responses included in analysis.

 Anthropocentric reasons were the biggest 
motivators for Americans, as 44% of responses were 
coded this way. #ese reasons center on human 
bene!ts of protecting nature. Moroccans reported 
anthropocentric reasonings in 31% of answers—a 
di"erence of 13 percentage points when compared to 
Americans. Ecocentric responses were the smallest 
percentage of Moroccans’ reasoning to protect 
nature at only 18% of responses; however, ecocentric 
responses were the second largest block of responses 
from Americans with 39%. #ese reasons centered 
nature’s bene!ts from protecting nature. Ecocentric 
responses were reported with a 21% di"erence in 
frequency. 
 #e largest gap in frequency (25%) was responses 
coded in the Other category; these include “Survival 
of All Life,” “Moral Imperative,” and “Future” 

48



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responses. 54% of Moroccan responses were classi!ed 
in the Other category. Much of this was driven by 
responses coded “Survival of All Life” (22%) and 
“Future” (21%), the two largest frequencies for the 
Moroccan survey population. While “Future” was 
recorded at the second highest frequency (17%) for 
Americans, only 29% of all responses fell within the 
Other category. 

4.0 Discussion
 Moroccans believe in climate change, its 
anthropogenic cause, and the scienti!c consensus on 
climate change at higher rates than Americans (Figure 
1; Table 2). #is follows trends previously established 
by YPCCC; most other countries that deployed 
climate opinion surveys saw a higher level of belief in 
comparison to the United States (Leiserowitz et al., 
2021a). American disbelief in climate change may be 
driven by both the politicization of climate change 
and climate change disinformation campaigns 
within the United States (Elsasser & Dunlap, 2013; 
Van der Linden et al., 2017). It’s important to note 
that, as previously discussed, political conversations 
are taboo in Morocco. While climate change has 
been framed as a political issue in the United States, 
the willingness for Moroccans to discuss climate 
change suggests that climate change is not a political 
issue, or at the very least, not an issue of political 
division. Moroccan belief in climate change may be 
in part driven by support for the King. A main pillar 
of Moroccan identity is unwavering faith and trust 
in the King (Gozlan, 2011), so King Mohammad VI’s 
outspoken support for climate policies and initiatives 
may play an important role in Moroccan opinion; 
however, future studies will need to be conducted to 
accurately determine the role of the King in shaping 
Moroccans’ beliefs regarding climate change.
 Perceived risk regarding climate change is 
also higher among Moroccans than Americans. 
Psychological distance has been o"ered by many 
scholars as an explanation for why Americans 
are reluctant to perceive risk from climate change 
(Akerlof et al., 2013; McDonald et al., 2015). With a 
country as large and populous as the United States, 
it may be easier for Americans to hold climate 
change at a further psychological distance; however, 
for Moroccans, impacts of climate change have 
become an everyday reality. Moroccans are facing 
more frequent heat waves (Kasraoui, 2022), record 

droughts have le$ dams at 25% capacity (Rahhou, 
2022; Aamari, 2022b), and communities are !ghting 
the worst wild!res in their history (Aamari, 2022a). 
#at is not to say similar challenges are not being 
confronted in the United States; however, Morocco’s 
population and land mass are both smaller than 
that of the United States, so the likelihood that 
a Moroccan will be directly impacted by climate 
change is much higher. While Moroccans perceive 
risk at a greater rate than Americans, it is important 
to note that both Moroccans and Americans are 
the least concerned about personal harm due to 
climate change. #is !nding o"ers some support 
to the claim that individuals view climate change 
as distant from themselves; however, future studies 
must be conducted to determine the di"erence in 
psychological distance from climate change between 
Moroccans and Americans. 
 Support for climate policy provisions was higher 
among Moroccans. #is trend may be driven in 
part by the fact that Morocco has already adopted 
aggressive climate change policies (Kousksou et al., 
2015). Renewable energy initiatives are not new to 
Moroccans, as Morocco is home to the world’s largest 
solar power plant – the Noor Facility. Carbon free 
electricity has faced much higher levels of resistance 
in the United States (Susskind et al., 2022; Van de 
Gri$ & Cuppen, 2022); in light of resistance e"orts, 
lower levels of American support for climate policies 
are logical.
 Communication behaviors were perhaps the 
most interesting of the !ndings from the survey. 
By far, Moroccans discuss climate change more 
frequently (Figure 1; Table 2). Interestingly, media 
attention to climate change does not seem to be 
driving this discussion, as levels of media attention 
to climate change reported by Moroccans and 
Americans in this study were relatively the same. 
#e high levels of discussion may perhaps again be 
driven by the lived reality of Moroccans facing severe 
climate impacts.  
 Audience segmentation shed light on a large 
majority, 71%, of Moroccans falling within the 
Alarmed community. With such high levels of 
support for the various climate opinions investigated, 
this high percentage was to be expected. It has 
been suggested that climate messaging strategies 
should be directed toward the Cautious and the 
Disengaged communities, but only 7% of Moroccans 

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Aisthesis      Volume 14,  2023

fell within these audience segments. With 87% 
of Moroccans identifying with the Alarmed and 
Concerned community, the need for more bold 
climate communication campaigns in Morocco 
is not pressing. #is suggests that future research, 
instead of focusing on opinion alone, should direct 
more attention to the messaging strategies that may 
have contributed to a large majority of Moroccans 
expressing concern for and willingness to address 
climate change.
 #e motivations for pro-environmental attitudes 
di"ered greatly between Moroccans and Americans. 
Americans demonstrated much higher levels of 
anthropocentric and ecocentric motivations; they 
were most motivated to protect nature for “Human 
Health and Survival.” Moroccans were most 
motivated to protect nature for the “Survival of All 
Life” and “Future” generations. #is study cannot 
provide exact explanations for why the motivations 
di"er between the two nations, but one can speculate 
that cultural, religious, and political norms play 
a role in determining why individuals hold pro-
environmental motives. For example, Americans 
live in a society that tends to focus more on 
individual success, whereas Moroccan society tends 
to place more in%uence on collective action. #ese 
cultural di"erences shed light on the prevalence 
of “anthropocentric” motivations in American 
responses and “other” responses—more consistent 
with collective action—in Moroccan responses. 
One motivation for a qualitative analysis like this 
is to provide climate communication campaigns 
with ideas of which values to utilize in messages. As 
previously stated, research into the e&cacy of climate 
communication campaigns should be explored 
to demonstrate their role in Moroccans’ climate 
opinions and risk perceptions; future research can 
utilize the pro-environmental motives found in 
this study to help identify any correlation between 
messages and these values.

5.0 Conclusion
 Morocco is in a unique position as a climate 
policy leader that has contributed little to climate 
change to begin with. While Morocco may not have 
contributed much to climate change, the nation 
continues to confront the burdens of climate change 
head on. #is study is one of the !rst in Morocco, 
and Africa, to use survey methods that have been 
deployed in Western, industrialized nations aimed 

at understanding climate opinions. Studies like these 
are conducted in hopes of guiding future messaging 
strategies regarding climate goals. Moroccans are 
overall more aware of and concerned about climate 
change. #is trend follows previously established 
trends that populations in other nations have greater 
levels of awareness and concern than Americans. 
Communication behaviors regarding climate change 
in Morocco seem to provide an interesting area of 
future research due to the di"erent levels of discussion, 
yet similar levels of reported media attention. Results 
from this survey supported the results of “Global 
Warming’s Six Americas,” as high levels of support 
for climate opinions, risk perceptions, and policies 
indicate a high level of Moroccans should fall within 
the Alarmed audience segment. While the factors 
that contribute to Moroccans’ pro-environmental 
motives are unknown, this study suggests that 
“Survival of All Life” and “Future” generation values 
are the most common motives among Moroccans. 
In summary, results of this study suggest that future 
research in Morocco should be aimed at identifying 
the methods and theoretical explanations that have 
driven a large majority of the nation to support bold 
action on climate change. 

Acknowledgements
 #is study was a labor of love, and I am grateful 
for everyone who helped this culmination of my 
undergraduate experience come to fruition. First 
and foremost, I want to thank Dr. Kathryn Haglin 
for taking me under her wing when I was lost and 
desperately searching for ways to combine my 
interests into one research project. Your mentorship 
and guidance are invaluable to me. Joelle McGovern, 
thank you for your relentless support and dedication 
to me and my fellow UHers. Your impact on this 
program and our academic careers does not go 
unnoticed, and I am forever grateful to call you 
a mentor, supporter, and friend. Dr. Ryan Goei, I 
don’t know where I would be without you. You have 
continually pushed me to become the best student, 
researcher, and person I can be, and I can never thank 
you enough for the doors you have opened for me, 
the opportunities you have given me, and the belief 
you have in me. To the URSA Morocco 2022 cohort, 
all of you have le$ a lasting impact on the person 
I am today; thank you for the most unforgettable 
adventure of my life. Most importantly, Nora Gri&n-
Wiesner, thank you for willingness to walk with me 

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Aisthesis      Volume 14,  2023

through some of the highest highs and lowest lows of 
my life. Whether it’s wandering the streets of Rabat, 
challenging existing structures and societal norms, 
or pondering life’s biggest questions, there is no 
other individual I would want by my side.

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7.0 Supplemental Information
Survey Questions

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