







































Aisthesis      Volume 16,  202584

Disassembling Assembly: An Exploration of Normativity, 
Gender Performativity, and Assemblage !eory 

by Avery Segall 

Introduction
 !e question of identity holds profound weight 
and value in a myriad of contexts for discourse in 
current society. On many levels, it plays a signi"cant 
role in informing both the ways we interact with the 
world around us as well as the way the world interacts 
with us. Moreover, the patriarchal capitalistic 
systems of power that govern our daily lives create 
the connection to identity by categorization—and 
o#entimes oppression—based on a person’s place in 
this hierarchy of power. Something so fundamental 
to the daily lives of the people in a culture centered 
around identity should be able to speak to their 
individuality. However, this is generally not the 
case; the denominations associated with the term 
“identity”—which, for the purposes of this paper, 
refers to normative and essentialized identity—do 
more to support hierarchical structures of power 
than they do the people they describe. !at which 
can lead to the freedom for self-expression for some 
can be a means of restriction for others, particularly 
those whose lived experiences do not "t precisely 
into the space of a particular label. 
 !e hierarchical structure provided by labels, 
which are societally created and subsequently 
enforced, can cause the stagnation of a person’s 
identity. !ey can feel stuck within their label, 
which can allow for their existence to be legible 
to others, but may not fully encapsulate a more 
dynamic personhood. If there were more space 
within the structures of society to allow $uidity 
to be recognized, the actual lived experiences of 
individuals may be made more legible. However, 
this comes into contention with the normative 
system of categorization—how do we break down 
this contention between self-expression and 
normative society? How much of one’s own $uidity 
or subversivity can one expect to be intelligible in a 
system whose existence is contingent on the usage of 
labels and the upholding of oppressive and normative 
structures?

 In their work, Judith Butler writes from a 
poststructuralist theoretical standpoint, aiming 
to explore the ways systems of power construct 
knowledge. Butler particularly focuses on the way 
the concept of gender is created and upheld with 
their theory of performativity. It is from this context 
that Butler wrote their book Gender Trouble,1  
which explores the way power structures produce 
the normative concepts of gender that exist within 
a gender binary. In this text, Butler presents their 
theory of gender performativity, arguing that the 
social construction of gender is maintained through 
the cyclical enforcement and reinforcement of gender 
roles and norms. Moreover, they assert that whether 
one "ts into normative gender roles “successfully” 
determines whether one is intelligible in normative 
society.2  If one does not "t neatly into the category 
of a dimorphic gender identity, one is rendered 
illegible. !is illegibility can be harmful; non-
normative identities go unsanctioned by normative 
society. !us, these identities are o#en targets for 
the ostracization and persecution of those who fall 
outside of the gender binary, as we frequently see 
in cases like the current rise in anti-trans rhetoric. 
Comparably to how the gender binary exists within a 
hierarchy, so do cisgender and transgender identities. 
!ese hierarchized identities are created through 
systems of power and are continually upheld by the 
norms that become associated with these identities. 
 Assemblage theory contrasts sharply with 
Butler’s performativity theory, removing these 
identity markers altogether. First introduced by 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in their book A 
!ousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,3  

1 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the 
Subversion of Identity. (New York: Routledge, 2007).
2 Butler, Gender Trouble, xix
3 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A !ousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia. (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1987).



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Aisthesis      Volume 16,  202585

and later expanded upon by Manuel De Landa,4  this 
theory recognizes and allows for $uidity of identity. 
Focused on studying the relation between parts and 
wholes, assemblage theory highlights the totality 
of human existence, rather than reducing it to one 
singular aspect. !e wholes, or assemblages, are 
created by the uni"cation of individual components, 
which can either function on their own or as part 
of the assemblage in its entirety. In this essay, an 
assemblage generally pertains to a singular person and 
the various aspects of their sel%ood. In assemblage 
theory more broadly, however, an assemblage can 
include groups, organizations, populations, nations, 
and other entities. What makes assemblage theory so 
valuable, for the purposes of this paper and beyond, 
is the extent to which it recognizes that entities are 
never "xed, nor are they permanently stable. Instead, 
they can, and frequently do, change. 
 Using Judith Butler's theory of performativity in 
tandem with assemblage theory, this essay explores 
the dissonance between the con"guration of identity 
and the variability that is so intrinsic to the human 
experience. I use Butler’s theoretical framework 
to examine how identity is constructed and made 
normative before delving into assemblage theory, 
which I believe o&ers a means by which we can start 
to consider methods of deconstructing normative 
identity. While the scope of this paper is limited 
speci"cally to identity as it pertains to gender, this 
concept can and should be expanded upon to analyze 
the construction of other identities, including—but 
not limited to—sexual orientation, race, and class. 
!e existence of normative structures, upheld by the 
usage of labels and repetition, restricts the freedom 
for identity to evolve and for $uidity to exist. We 
must critically examine the ways in which the current 
patriarchal capitalistic system of power rei"es and 
accordingly restricts identity and thus determine an 
alternative means for understanding personhood.

!e Construction of Identity…
 To understand the broader context for Butler’s 
theory of performativity, we must "rst examine the 
way they contrast sex versus gender. Butler claims 
that both are socially constructed, as opposed to the 

4 Manuel De Landa, A New Philosophy of Society: 
Assemblage !eory and Social Complexity. (New York: 
London New York Continuum, 2006).

common idea that gender is socially constructed and 
sex is naturally occurring: 

“!e category of ‘sex’ is, from the start, 
normative; it is what Foucault called a ‘regulatory 
ideal.’ In this sense, then, ‘sex’ not only functions 
as a norm, but it is part of a regulatory practice 
that produces the bodies it governs, that is, 
whose regulatory force is made clear as a kind 
of productive power, the power to produce—
demarcate, circulate, di&erentiate—the bodies 
it controls. !us, ‘sex’ is a regulatory ideal 
whose materialization is compelled, and this 
materialization takes place (or fails to take place) 
through certain highly regulated practices. In 
other words, ‘sex’ is an ideal construct which is 
forcibly materialized through time.”5  

 
 !erefore, gender and sex are fabricated by 
systems of power, and each is a'liated with its own 
history and politics. Sex is that which informs gender, 
which then reinforms the sex binary: the foundation 
upon which the gender binary is built and from 
which gender norms are created. Reducing sex to 
either “female” or “male” minimizes sexual diversity 
to one of two sets of essentialized components and 
causes harm in the sense that a person’s intelligibility 
is only recognized if their gender performativity 
aligns with the reductive traits of their assigned 
sex. If it does not, they are rendered unintelligible.6 
Further, this essentialization leads to attempted 
universalized identities on the gender binary, 
despite the fact that this does not account for the 
variation of identities based on their given context. 
As Butler puts it, “once ‘sex’ itself is understood in 
its normativity, the materiality of the body will not 
be thinkable apart from the materialization of that 
regulatory term. ‘Sex’ is, thus, not simply what one 
has, or a static description of what one is: it will be 

5 Judith Butler, “Introduction” in Bodies !at Matter: On 
the Discursive Limits of Sex. (New York: Routledge, 1993), 
xi-xii.
6 Tangentially, this essentialized sexual binary also leads 
to the erasure of intersex people, which can and does lead 
to issues with identity as well as issues within the medical 
"eld, particularly in cases of intersex babies who receive 
sex assignment surgery at birth and are not made aware of 
their chromosomal makeup.



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one of the norms by which the ‘one’ becomes viable 
at all, that which quali"es a body for life within 
the domain of cultural intelligibility.”7  Currently, 
the terms “assigned female at birth (AFAB)” and 
“assigned male at birth (AMAB)” help depict this 
phenomenon; they recognize and describe the 
experience of having one’s sex inform said gender 
and the subsequent performance of that gender. 
 !is brings us to the central tenet within 
Butler’s theory of performativity, which posits that 
gender is constructed by the dominant culture and 
its conventions, created and enforced by repeated 
gendered acts: “!ere is no subject who is ‘free’ to 
stand outside these norms or to negotiate them at a 
distance; on the contrary, the subject is retroactively 
produced by these norms in their repetition, 
precisely as their e&ect.”8  !rough this process, 
gender identity itself becomes a rei"ed construct 
instead of a means for self-description, and is 
consequently restrictive. While initially, an identity 
marker—in this case, “male” or “female”—can be 
the means by which one is intelligible to others, the 
repetition of gendered actions associated with the 
given label can become what is normative. What was 
once potentially dynamic becomes static. !e label 
no longer serves those it may have previously. It is 
harder to subvert prescribed gender roles once they 
become rei"ed, as identity inevitably becomes more 
static at that point. 
 It is important to di&erentiate between 
gender performativity and the performance of 
gender. Performativity should not be reduced to 
performance.9  For Butler, “Performativity...is to be 
read not as self-expression or self-presentation, but 
as the unanticipated resigni"ability of highly invested 
terms.”10  In other words, gender performativity 
is speci"cally characterized by the roles that are 
inscribed into the gender binary as well as the way 
one performs gender through normative systems of 
power:

Performativity is a matter of reiterating or 
repeating the norms by which one is constituted: 
it is not a radical fabrication of a gendered 

7 Butler, “Introduction,” xii
8 Judith Butler, “Critically Queer” in !e Routledge Queer 
Studies Reader. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 22.
9 Butler, “Critically Queer,” 25; paraphrased.
10 Butler, “Critically Queer,” 28

self. It is a compulsory repetition of prior and 
subjectivating norms….!e practice by which 
gendering occurs, the embodying of norms, is 
a compulsory practice, a forcible production, 
but not for that reason fully determining. To 
the extent that gender is an assignment, it is 
an assignment which is never quite carried out 
according to expectation, whose addressee never 
quite inhabits the ideal [they are]11  compelled 
to approximate. !is failure to approximate the 
norm, however, is not the same as the subversion 
of the norm.12 

 Gender is forged through systems of power 
that survive by creating division between gender 
identities, as well as restricting people’s freedom of 
expression through said identities. Additionally, the 
repeated signi"cation of dichotomous gender norms 
maintains the normativity of the gender binary and 
related gender roles. 
 It is from the rei"cation of identity, like that 
pertaining to gender, that assemblage theory forms. 
!is rei"cation is accomplished by labeling the 
identity (i.e. “male” or “female”), leading to the 
aforementioned universalization and essentialization 
of identity. As Deleuze and Guattari describe it, 
“...names are taken in their extensive usage, in other 
words, function as common nouns ensuring the 
uni"cation of an aggregate they subsume….!is 
jeopardizes, on the side of words and things both, 
the relation of the proper name as an intensity to the 
multiplicity it instantaneously apprehends.”13  !e 
repetition of the cycle of gender—in which a person’s 
sex assigned at birth (already typi"ed by genealogy of 
related norms) informs their gender performativity, 
which then further upholds normative gender—then 
only serves to further reify the social construct of 
gender. In assemblage theory, this is demarcated by 
the concepts of territorialization/deterritorialization 
and coding/decoding: 

...the processes of assembly through which 
physical, biological, and social entities come into 

11 I speci"cally changed this from the original phrasing, 
“s/he is,” to re$ect the shi# to increasingly common usage 
of the gender-neutral “they” in academic writing since the 
publication of “Critically Queer” over 30 years ago. 
12 Butler, “Critically Queer,” 22-23 
13 Deleuze and Guattari, A !ousand Plateaus, 28



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Aisthesis      Volume 16,  202587

being, processes that must be conceptualized 
as recurrent. !is implies that assemblages 
always exist in populations, however small, the 
populations generated by the repeated occurrence 
of the same processes…!e combination of 
recurrence of the same assembly processes at any 
one spatial scale, and the recurrence of the same 
kind of assembly processes (territorialization and 
coding) at successive scales, gives assemblage 
theory a unique way of approaching the problem 
of linking the micro- and macro-levels of social 
reality.14 

 !is process in assemblage theory ties back to 
the Butlerian conceptualization of the role repetition 
plays in formulating knowledge or, more speci"cally, 
the matrix of gender. !rough the repetition of 
gendered acts, gender is then created. Assemblage 
theory also recognizes that recurrent processes 
assemble an entity, like identity. !e de"nition of 
this entity, whether it is through territorialization 
or coding, is that which upholds and rei"es it. !is 
essentialized construction of identity—in this paper, 
gender identity speci"cally—is harmful because it 
limits the intelligibility of the vast variety of human 
experiences. !e social entity of gender identity 
means that it “...is always a doing, though not a 
doing by a subject who might be said to pre-exist the 
deed.”15  As long as normative identity is upheld, the 
intrinsic variability of an individual’s personhood 
is not free to exist. Normative identity does not 
allow a person to be in control of their own gender 
expression. Rather, gender is thrust upon them, and 
they are put in the position of "nding their place 
within the existing dimorphic system of gender. 

…So !at It Can Be Deconstructed
 If the construction of something like gender 
identity is so inherently ingrained into structures of 
power, then how do we go about subverting it without 
inadvertently reinscribing the very system which we 
are trying to deconstruct? !is is where a framework 
like assemblage theory is particularly valuable. As 
opposed to an identity-based framework, like that 
of intersectionality, assemblage theory holds space 
for connections of individual parts without the need 
14 De Landa, A New Philosophy, 18
15  Butler, Gender Trouble, 34

for a stable, universal identity. Applying assemblage 
theory does not devalue intersectionality, which 
valuably recognizes the ways one's various identities 
and cultural contexts interact. Rather, comparing 
the two approaches highlights the parallel way in 
which the two frameworks help conceive a notion 
of $uid identity. Assemblage theory highlights the 
importance of critiquing the stagnation of a person’s 
intelligibility caused by a stabilized identity and 
o&ers the potential to reframe the way in which 
we understand ourselves in the context of our 
experience.  
 Identity itself is de"ned through its linearity 
and permanency over time, and this “...timelessness 
works to consolidate the "ction of a seamless stable 
identity in every space.”16  Because of the static nature 
of identity, it inevitably works toward creating a 
universalized de"nition that can work in all contexts. 
Even if the identity label in question is intended to be 
more inclusive or $uid, it inevitably becomes rei"ed 
by repeated usage. Essentialized identity aligns with 
patriarchal and capitalistic systems of power, placing 
an individual within hierarchized institutions, their 
place designated by one aspect of who they are. 
Both theories of identity and assemblage emphasize 
the role of these individual aspects; assemblage in 
particular notes that the whole will change with the 
addition or removal of any given part. However, 
identity-centric frameworks keep these components 
separate, whereas assemblage theory gives space for 
these individual parts to intertwine so that the whole 
adjusts across time. As Jasbir K. Puar states in “Queer 
Times, Queer Assemblages,”

!e Deleuzian assemblage, as a series of dispersed 
but mutually implicated networks, draws together 
enunciation and dissolution, causality and e&ect. 
As opposed to an intersectional model of identity, 
which presumes components…are separable 
analytics and can thus be disassembled, an 
assemblage is more attuned to interwoven forces 
that merge and dissipate time, space, and body 
against linearity, coherency, and permanency. 
Intersectionality demands the knowing, naming, 
and thus stabilizing of identity across space and 

16 Jasbir K. Puar, “Queer Times, Queer Assemblages” 
in !e Routledge Queer Studies Reader, (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2013), 520.



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time, generating narratives of progress that deny 
the "ctive and performative of identi"cation....”17 

 While both assemblage theory and 
intersectionality theory are entry points to exploring 
the role of power in the conceiving of one’s sel%ood, 
assemblage is more helpful in understanding 
the $ux of human existence with its reliance on 
emotions and a&ectivities, as opposed to declaration 
and stabilization of what it means to be a human. 
!e stabilized subject reduces personhood to a 
singularity. While this phenomenon allows for 
intelligibility in an identity-centric institution, the 
harm lies in staticity. When an individual does not 
"t into an essentialized meaning of an identity, they 
are no longer legible within this system. 
 Frameworks based in identity are reliant on the 
essentialization, universalization, and rei"cation 
of existence, while “...assemblage theory does not 
presuppose the existence of rei"ed generalities.”18  
Instead, the theory centers itself around the idea of 
multiplicities and assemblages, where an assemblage 
refers to the way wholes and parts relate and a 
multiplicity, while similar, is less strictly de"ned 
along those lines and can describe nearly anything. 
Deleuze and Guattari explain the relationship 
between the two by saying “An assemblage, in its 
multiplicity, necessarily acts on semiotic $ows, 
material $ows, and social $ows simultaneously. 
!ere is no longer a tripartite division between a 
"eld of reality...a "eld of representation…and a "eld 
of subjectivity….Rather, an assemblage establishes 
connections between certain multiplicities drawn 
from each of these orders.”19 !e multiplicity of an 
assemblage is what makes it ideal for exploring how 
to make the instability of being legible; because the 
various entities that comprise an assemblage “[come] 
forth from all directions,”20  it has the capability to 
uphold $uidity. 
 With an understanding of assemblage theory, 
how then can we work toward deconstructing the 
institutionalization of identity? De Landa claims 
that in order “[t]o avoid rei"cation we must instead 
focus on the historical processes that produce these 

17 Puar, “Queer Times,” 520
18  De Landa, A New Philosophy, 25
19 Deleuze and Guattari, A !ousand Plateaus, 23
20 Puar, “Queer Times,” 520

products, with the term ‘historical’ referring to 
cosmological and evolutionary history in addition to 
human history.”21  !e genealogy of identity is that 
which stabilizes it and ergo restricts the ability for 
the variability of an identity to be recognizable. 

Conclusion
 In contrast to claims that labeled identities are an 
inherently negative social construct, the comparison 
of performative and assemblage theories highlights 
the limits of assuming that a given set of labels, like 
those for gender, are adequate to represent human 
experience. Labels are not inherently bad; they serve 
to describe the lived experiences of many. However, 
the way normative structures cra# identity aims to 
uphold social institutions, and the limits of these 
labels become apparent when they fail to include 
those who exist outside them. In the words of Butler, 
“!is is not an argument against using identity 
categories, but it is a reminder of the risk that attends 
every such use.”22  Identity is not bad; it allows for the 
intelligibility of people in varied contexts, especially 
in a society reliant on essentialized labels. Moreover, 
many people "nd security and stability by identifying 
with and using certain universal labels. However, 
there are those for whom a stabilized identity is 
restrictive and who are inevitably harmed by the 
way these essentialized structures are maintained. 
As Butler’s theory of performativity demonstrates, 
normative identities on the whole generally do 
more harm than good. No one can "t precisely and 
completely into the ascribed gender role into which 
they are placed. Each lived experience is unique 
and consequently informs one's own identi"ed 
experience. Indeed, the endeavor to develop a matrix 
of identity is the inherent $aw.
 !erefore, while there is certainly value in the 
normative identity structures that are currently in 
place, it is crucial to consider not only how they 
impact people individually but also the way they 
function in their totality. In what way are these 
structures necessary in the current iteration of our 
social landscape? Conversely, how do these structures 
do a disservice to individuals by summarizing an 
individual experience in a handful of universalized 
words? In what ways do these structures reinforce 

21 De Landa, A New Philosophy, 26
22 Butler, “Critically Queer,” 20



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Aisthesis      Volume 16,  202589

a patriarchal capitalist system that aims to suppress 
multiplicity? 
 Lived experience requires conceptualizing 
identity in a way that intrinsically represents and 
maintains a space for $uidity and change. What 
could be the most bene"cial and accurate means 
for conceptualizing identity lies in a lack instead 
of in an abundance. It is in the attempts to de"ne 
and understand the complexities of identity 
that theoretical frameworks fall short, and o#en 
inadvertently reinscribe systems of power. Perhaps 
instead, the answer is formulating a framework that 
is explicated by the absence of structure; maybe 
it is not even a framework in the "rst place. !e 
solution to this conundrum likely is contained 
within assemblage theory, which maintains a space 
for $uidity, accurately supporting and making 
intelligible lived experience. No individual is 
unchanging for the entirety of their life. Identities 
may be static, but lives are $uid. It is paramount that 
we devise and utilize a theory that recognizes this. To 
not do so would be a disservice to life itself. 

Bibliography
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Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the 
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Butler, Judith. . “Introduction.” In Bodies !at Matter: 
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York: Routledge, 1993. 

De Landa, Manuel. A New Philosophy of Society: 
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Puar, Jasbir K. “Queer Times, Queer Assemblages.” 
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