Alternate Routes
A Journal of Critical Social Research

Presentation and Editorial Policy

Alternate Routes is a refereed multi-disciplinary journal published annually by graduate students in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Carleton University. The journal provides an important forum for the presentation of graduate research and discussion from across the field of critical social inquiry.

The editorial collective is interested in receiving papers written by graduate students (or co-written with faculty). The editorial emphasis is on the publication of critical and provocative analyses of both theoretical and substantive issues which clearly have relevance for progressive political intervention. To date, the main focus has been on debates within feminism, Marxism, and cultural studies and we welcome papers which challenge or advance questions and issues raised by these broadly defined perspectives. We also encourage responses to and reviews of recent publications.

Call For Student Papers

Alternate Routes is seeking submissions for Volume 12, 1995. The editorial collective is interested in papers that address current theoretical and substantive issues within the social sciences. Manuscripts will be anonymously reviewed by faculty members from academic institutions across the country. Please use the American Psychological Association (APA) referencing system and keep endnotes to a minimum. Papers should be submitted double-spaced and in triplicate. Floppy disks formatted in WordPerfect 5.1 or Microsoft Word are required for papers accepted for publication.

We also welcome responses to recent publications, book reviews and discussions of work in progress.

Responses to this invitation to contribute should be postmarked no later than October 1, 1994.

Alternate Routes est à la recherche d'articles pour sa publication de 1995. Nous sommes intéressés à recevoir des analyses interdisciplinaires portant sur un vaste éventail de questions théoriques et substantives propres aux sciences sociales. Les manuscrits seront critiqués de façon anonyme par des professeurs de diverses institutions académiques du pays. Nous vous invitons à suivre le système de référence de l'American Psychological Association (APA) et à limiter la quantité des notes de fin de document autant que possible. Les articles devraient être présentés en format double interligne et en trois copies. Une disquette devrait accompagner le document et contenir le texte sur logiciel Wordperfect 5.1 ou MicroSoft Word.

Nous apprécierions par ailleurs des critiques des récentes publications, comptes rendus et travaux en cours.

Les réponses à cette invitation devraient être postées au plus tard le 1 octobre 1994 (le cachet de la poste en faisant foi).

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Critical Reviewers

The *Alternate Routes* editorial board would like to thank the following individuals who reviewed manuscripts for the past two issues.

Introduction

Publishing *Alternate Routes* is no easy task. Members of the editorial collective and board are volunteers who receive no compensation and little formal recognition for their work. Every year there is the inevitable scramble to balance our own full-time pursuits with the strains of editorial meetings and the pressures of publication deadlines. Once one volume is issued, we immediately begin the arduous process over again. And all along, there is the constant struggle to maintain the financial support and subscriber base we need in order to keep our journal a viable enterprise.

Faced with such headaches, many may wonder whether all the trouble is worth it. I think I speak for all members of the editorial collective when I say that we would have it no other way. Despite the problems we face, we are all deeply committed to this project. We believe that *Alternate Routes* is a vitally important journal. It is one of the few spaces in the academic world reserved exclusively for quality graduate student work. It is also one of the few publications in which scholars can present *critical* and progressive social research.

The papers collected in the current volume represent our ongoing commitment to publish original and provocative research. Joel Reimer, a doctoral candidate with the Sociology and Anthropology Department at Carleton University, provides a detailed and timely analysis of the complex forces and structures at play in Somalia. His principle argument is that one of the underlying causes of state disintegration in Somalia was the imposition of a Western-style state structure in the post-colonial era. Reimer's analysis thus raises some unsettling questions about practices of development and peacekeeping in the 'New World Order.'

Si Transken is a feminist therapist, social worker, and activist. She is currently completing her Ph.D in Sociology at the University of Toronto. Her paper addresses a central dilemma facing front-line community organiza-

tions—how does state funding of these organizations affect their ability to make positive interventions in the lives of socially disadvantaged groups? Drawing upon the seminal work of Dorothy Smith, Transken reveals how the funding process adversely affected a women's ethnocultural organization with which she was involved. Her work should encourage more research into how the demands of funding agencies impact upon the goals and internal workings of women's groups.

François Huot, a doctoral candidate with the Communication Department of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, provides an intriguing semiotic analysis of the American labour publication, the *AFL-CIO News*. Finding inspiration within the pioneering work of Roland Barthes, Huot argues that ideological practices are not limited to 'right-wing' mainstream discourses, but are present on the 'Left' as well. The narrative and discursive structure of the *AFL-CIO News*, he suggests, is such that prevailing relations of power are disseminated, maintained, and reproduced.

Janice Hladki is a cultural worker and Ph.D student in Cultural Studies and Feminism at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education. She is active in theatre, film, and the performing arts. Her paper examines the complex issue of 'cultural appropriation.' She reviews current debates about whether mainstream artists from the dominant culture should be allowed to 'speak' for non-dominant cultures. Does this practice of cultural appropriation represent a form of 'cultural exploitation,' or is it simply a form of free artistic expression? Hladki argues that neither view is completely justified and she instead proposes a feminist and post-structuralist re-working of the issue of appropriation.

Both pieces of work presented as 'research in progress' address the issue of state policy in a global economy. David Skinner and David Robinson argue for the need to 're-think' traditional approaches employed in the study of cultural policies, particularly in an era dominated by profound technological, economic, political and social changes. J. Rachel Macdonald provides an insightful and thought-provoking analysis of how the ideology and practice of free trade has influenced current changes to Canada's social safety net.

As a last word, I would like to take the opportunity to thank an individual who has worked tirelessly to support *Alternate Routes* from the very beginning. Our departmental assistant, Eva Hegmann, has been an invaluable asset. Thanks to her remarkable efforts, we continue to enjoy regular financial support from the Department of Sociology and Anthropology. Eva has also campaigned on our behalf during the recent round of office reshuffling to ensure that *Alternate Routes* continues to have office space. She has patiently taken the time to answer our questions, provide advice, and listen to our complaints. Without her, *Alternate Routes* would remain only a fanciful whim.

D.C. Robinson
Ottawa, Canada
Spring, 1994

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Future Probabilities for a Somali Nation State: Development and Governance

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INTRODUCTION

Somalia's state structure disintegrated in early 1991. This can partly be attributed to clanism, or at least to hostility between specific Somali clans. However, clan relations in Somalia are inextricably linked to historic context which cannot be ignored. Clan hostilities are part of Somali cultural history. The eruption of an apparently clan based civil war in Somalia in the 1990s is at least partly due to historically generated clan relations, but is inseparable from the history of successive Somali state governments promoting, in their rhetoric, Somali homogeneity as inconsistent with clan membership or affiliation.

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I begin my analysis with an investigation of the idea of Somali homogeneity through an examination of the clan structure. Inter-clan relations within Somalia will be examined to highlight the integral place these relations have in Somali social organization. Clan affiliations, more than any other feature of Somali social organization, play a significant role in determining social status, access to resources, and the perception of individual and group interests. An examination of clan affiliations provides a picture of Somalia as a loose confederation of clans, often with divergent interests, a view which counters the picture of a homogeneous society.

The examination of Somali clan structure is followed by an analysis of the structure and function of the Somali state immediately after independence in 1960 and of the succeeding government in 1969 of Siad Barre. This analysis provides insight into the role of the state in Somalia and the interaction of clan organization within the state structure itself. In the final analysis, the Somali state is shown to have acted more as a veneer of unified purpose and identity, while dominant clan groups suppressed diverging views and interests through the use of a variety of technologies of domination.[1] The current state of social disintegration is presented as evidence for these conclusions.

It is the purpose of this paper to analyze the underlying causes of state disintegration in Somalia, and to suggest that a major element in this disintegration was the external imposition of a Western style state structure in the post-colonial era. This implies a historical examination of the administration of the country and its 'statization,' which further requires an analysis of the history of government in Somalia, and of those who were governing.

I proceed to an analysis of the influence of international development on the government of Somalia. This involves an examination of both the interest of the Somali government in maintaining its own security, and the interests of Western management of Somalia through development. Practices of development which used technologies of government in the interests of the West, and not in the interests of Somalis or the Somali government, contributed to the disintegration of the state.

Present international involvement in peacekeeping and humanitarian aid to Somalia appear geared to the 'normalization' of society, and the setting up of a new state. Somali people themselves appear desirous of a new state structure (Togane, 1993:3). The reorganization of Somalia into one or more states is important, since without a recognized state, the West, through the United Nations (UN) will not recognize Somali sovereignty. Unless Somalia regains its identity as a member state through a legitimate government, it remains ineligibile for UN sponsored national reconstruction projects (Notes on Ergada Conference Proceedings, Ottawa, June 25, 1993). This in itself

does not speak to the absolute necessity for the re-establishment of a Somali state. However, it is the position of this paper that Third World populations are inextricably integrated within a global political and economic system of management, administration, and government. Thus, the disintegration and destabilization of Somalia also has implications for the security of the region and the wider political and economic field. A state structure is required not simply for the administration of some types of development funding, but for the wider discursive practice of global political and economic management and governance.

My analysis is facilitated by the use of the concepts of field, interests, and relations of domination from Bourdieu (1977:183ff) and theories of governance from Foucault (Gordon, 1991:19-21). Fields are constituted by sets of negotiated discursive practices and by the material and symbolic profits or stakes which can be gained from practices. Interests of agents within a field of practice can be understood as targets or 'objects' of practice with regard to the profits to be gained in the field. Agents within a field have individual interests which are misrecognized and mystified, and which determine their participation in the field in pursuit of the profits to be gained. The field of international development is presented in this paper as comprised by a project of governance, articulated to other discursive practices of political and economic management, comprised in a Foucaultian construction of governance as conducting the conduct of others.

The state in the Somali context functioned historically as a vehicle for the domination of Somalis, but failed in the long term to administer or manage the population. At present, the military presence in Somalia is attempting a similar practice of management and control. It is the view of this paper that many Somalis recognize the UN military administration of Somalia as a practice of domination similar to that of the Siad Barre government which preceded it and not as a practice of liberation.

THE MYTH OF HOMOGENEITY

Somalia is commonly thought of as a nation comprised of one of the largest single homogeneous ethnic and cultural blocs in Africa (I.M. Lewis, 1988:1). About 90 percent of the Somali population is ethnic Somali—people of African and Arab descent. Somalis speak a single language (with dialect variations) and uniformly practice Sunni Islamic religion (Miller, 1982:4). Successive Somali governments since 1960 have tried with varying degrees of success, and always only temporarily, to mobilize the population using a campaign of "pan-Somalism" which emphasizes the separation of Somalis from other Africans (Adam, 1983:32; Davidson, 1975:27).

One can make the case for a unified Somali identity when discussing Somali relations with other peoples, but clan and lineage organization is the basic internal principle of organization within Somali society (Lewis, 1984:159). Clans represent economic and political security in an individual's attachment to kinsmen (Laitin and Samatar, 1987:45). Modern bonds of citizenship have not replaced older bonds and networks of cooperation thirty years after Somali independence and the constitution of Somalia as a nation state (Casanelli, 1982:260).

Prior to the creation of a Western-style state, Somalia was characterized by an absence of state institutions, an absence of institutionalized authority roles, and a lack of formal political offices. The closest thing to institutional government in pre-colonial Somali history were clan sultans and religious men (Sheikhs), who operated by charisma and influence rather than coercive and legislative authority (Laitin and Samatar, 1987:42). Clans developed their own alliances with other clans, and Somali politics have traditionally run along clan lines. The predominant historical occupation, nomadic pastoralism, militated against both the development of stable territorial groups and against the formation of state-like political, economic, and administrative institutions (A.I. Samatar, 1989:26).

Clans form a lineage derived socio-economic organizational framework within Somali society, which is legitimated by Islamic religious belief and tradition. The notion of shared religious heritage and common history is

encapsulated in the genealogies of the cornucopia of Somali clans and lineages (Casanelli, 1982:129). Islamic heritage prompts the formulation in popular belief of clan genealogies tracing Somali roots to Arab ancestry (Laitin and Samatar, 1987:44). These genealogies maintain every Somali's place in the social system (Casanelli, 1982:129). Divisions of tribal and general differences result from differences in perceived descent from the prophet Mohamed on the part of the two major lineage groups, the Samaale and the Sab (Lewis, 1980b:251).

This differentiation carries over to differences between clans within the two major groups. The local security system for livestock traders was based on lineage political structure, and was developed to safeguard the movements of pastoralists between pasture and water, and to market (Samatar, Abdi Ismail, 1987:359). Each clan thus comprised a lineage-based independent polity which interacted with others to further its own needs or interests. More than this, clan affiliation comprises a network of affection and loyalty which is analogous to a close family, and ties to one's lineage and clan and its history are strongly felt.

Hostility between clans and lineages has normally been such that despite common language and culture, religion is the only permanent factor upon which Somali society can depend to establish any sort of unity (Lewis, 1973:347). Inter-clan hostility, as well as hostilities between Somalis and their non-Muslim neighbours was not anomalous to the "habitually warring" pastoral nomads (Lewis, 1980a:34). The traditional picture of Somalia is predominantly one of a nation of loosely connected nomadic pastoralists. The culture itself centres around this mode of production and the corresponding societal institutions that support it, notably the clan system and Islam.

Politics in Somalia are tied to kin obligation and reliant on client relationships. This is partially based on clan loyalties, partially on reciprocal economic ties between clans (Miller, 1982:16). Clan affiliation plays a major role in Somali politics over and above religious and regional differences (Laitin and Samatar, 1987:155). Thus, Pan-Somalism, as the ideology of homogeneity was called, promoted the interests of the dominant clans as

synonymous with Somali interests and sought to repress the historic existence or interests of other clans. Consequently, the Somali state disintegrated as the government lost popular support, the economy deteriorated, development funding stopped, and clan militias became more heavily armed.

Historically, clans have defended their own interests against other clans. The socially structured situations, or fields (see Bourdieu, 1977:76), within which Somalis' interests have historically been defined have made this necessarily part of Somali social relations. This is especially the case when a major part of the field of practice is constituted by the need to counter the interests of what are perceived to be rival clans and their interests in the same field. Successive Somali governments have been perceived by Somalis as promoting a small number of clans' interests. The selective promotion of interests in Bourdieu's definition, represents domination as the appropriation of the mechanisms indispensable to the functioning of the field of practice, and consequently the appropriation of symbolic and material profits (Bourdieu, 1977:183-4).

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DOMINATION AND THE SOMALI STATE

Somali state politics were, to a large extent, connected to clan politics. Within the Somali state there was continuing domination of clan membership on every level of political decision making (Haakonsen, 1984:58). Political parties, which first began to form in the 1950s, were clan based—for example, the Somaliland National Society (Ishaaq) and the United Somali Party (Dir and Darood) (Lapidus, 1988:860).

Politics in Somalia are tied to kin obligation and reliant on client relationships. Clan affiliation plays a major role in Somali politics over and above religious and regional differences (Laitin and Samatar, 1987:155). Appointments, coalitions, the distribution of civil service posts, allocation of natural resources, and access to economic opportunities have rested histori- cally almost entirely on kinship affiliation (Laitin and Samatar, 1987:155).

Political power and government continued to be deeply associated with clan affiliation throughout the 1970s and 1980s even with the increasing

urbanization of the Somali population. Urbanization did not radically diminish clan feeling or the power of clan affiliation in Somali society. In fact, clan feeling intensified in urban politics. Politicians exploited kinship loyalties to prolong and maximize political careers. This manifested itself in the form of patronage job appointments, contracts, and cash payments for support.

Ethnic support in Somalia has been the key to political success. Concomitantly it became advantageous for the state to distribute scarce natural resources through the clan structure. As a result, urban Somali politics witnessed an alarming resurgence of intra/inter-clan conflicts (Laitin and Samatar, 1987:46). Examples of this can be drawn from the experiences of successive governments of the Somali Republic since independence in 1960.

The parliamentary model of the Somali Republic in 1960 was fashioned after an Italian system, reconstructed after twenty years of Fascist rule (Davidson, 1975:25-26). However, the Somali manifestation of this parliamentary model reproduced the problems of patronage, and the exploitation of voting power for sectional or personal gain (Davidson, 1975:26). A power-struggle began shortly after independence in 1960, evidenced by the fragmentation of political leadership, each of which resorted to the backing of their own clans and lineages—the clan became the means to power within the state (Sheck and Mohamoud "Ashur," 1978:152).

The state democracy was reduced, in essence, to the machinery of parliamentary representation (Davidson, 1975:26). The Somali clan self-rule system, in which clans and clan alliances operated, adapted into a party system. Political parties began to represent clan interests and alliance interests. This further resulted in parliamentary conflict over sectional advancements (Davidson, 1975:26). As a result, the government could not reinforce even a minimal Pan-Somalism, but broke down into clan based interest groups (Davidson, 1975:27).

In October of 1969, Somali army general Mohamed Siad Barre took power in a coup and established the Somali Democratic Republic. The new

government idealized the 'revolution' as having been against European models of government, but also against aspects of Somali structure and custom that proved throughout pre-colonial history to be handicaps to progress (Davidson, 1975:29). Old values that were inconsistent with the direction of change were to be abolished (Siad Barre, 1974). Ostensibly, the major target of this ideal was tribalism/clanism.

Siad Barre's new 'scientific socialist' government was determined to liquidate the "malicious system of tribalism in every form and every other phenomena in bad practice in state activities" (Sheck and Mohamoud "Ashur," 1978:154-155). Corruption and tribalism were presented as having derailed the first independent Somali government leaving behind a system where "educated people" remained at the bottom and "worthless people" were at the top (Siad Barre, 1974:58). This situation was blamed for the destruction of pan-Somalism.

Siad Barre promoted an explicit policy of egalitarian modernization, which subscribed to the ideal of nomadic equality. Somali government rationalization for this policy was that it would unify the population under a banner of Pan-Somalism (Davidson, 1975:29-30). It was hoped that a new Somalism would arise and that people would forget previous clan ties in favour of a new spirit. The goal of pan-Somalism at the expense of clan affiliation was not achieved for several reasons.

The first reason was that the Siad Barre coup itself was enabled by a set of clan alliances. The Siad Barre coup shifted power from the northern Majerteen clan and its affiliate clans who had been in power from 1960-1969 to southern clans (Schraeder, 1986:647). This resulted in the stacking of important government positions with individuals of Said Barre's clan groupings (Schraeder, 1986:647). Consequently, political tensions were reproduced along a new axis between clans from the formerly British northern and central regions, and the formerly Italian southern regions (Schraeder, 1986:647).

Siad Barre's regime continued to rule from a clan supported power base. Three clan groups were of special prominence in Siad Barre's govern-

ment, a formation that was unofficially called the M.O.D. configuration. 'M.O.D.' corresponded to the three major clan groups that formed the top of the political power structure. These were the *Marehan* (Darood): the president's patrilineage; *Ogaden*: Siad Barre's mother's clan; and *Dhulbahante*: Siad Barre's chief son-in-law's lineage. Siad Barre acknowledged vital maternal links in the Ogaden region through which he was able to exercise control over Somali external relations with Ethiopia. The M.O.D. manifested itself in the '*Marehanizing*' of the Foreign Service and government bureaucracies (Sheik-Abdi, 1981:166), as well as the disintegration of the ruling junta into clan groupings, and the tribalization of the military (Samatar and Samatar, 1987:684). Additionally, the construction of the power structure in this manner reproduced political friction between northern and southern parts of the country (Lewis, 1988:222).

In 1976, the government changed to a civilian single party government. This merely created a widely representative setting for the M.O.D. power bloc. All the members of the former Supreme Revolutionary Council and 19 new members (most, but not all, military personnel) formed the new Central Committee. This was seen as a sign that Siad Barre was not interested in modifying his version of benign despotic paternalism but rather in giving his authority greater legitimacy (Lewis, 1988:223). It also provided a means for consolidating control of the population and mechanisms of government.

This did not take place in an absence of resistance. Several guerrilla resistance groups fought against government forces. Like the government, resistance groups had specific clan affiliations. The Somali National Movement (SNM) was formed primarily by people from northern lineages and was dominated by members of *Ishaaq* clans (Samatar, Ahmed I., 1988:141). The Siad Barre government was overthrown in early 1991 by the forces of the United Somali Congress (USC). The USC whose name is misleading, has come under criticism from Somali academics as a party connected to the Hawiye clans, and once again not representative of Somalis as a whole. The number of factions rivaling for power in Somalia in the 1990s is evidence supporting this assessment.

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The history of Somali state politics is one of a shifting 'field of play' in which the politics of clan interests were transformed into a state organization. The creation of the state did not change the interests of individuals and clan groups, except to enlarge the stakes. The field "calls forth and gives life to a specific form of interest...as tacit recognition of the stakes of the game" (Bourdieu, 1992:117). The specific interest and practice in the field varies according to the position occupied, be it dominant or subordinate (Bourdieu, 1992:117). Somali states have acted within a transformed field of practice according to culturally and socially defined interests produced by historically delimited fields. These fields of practice have at their root a cultural history of clan relations, which make certain modes of thought appear necessary, inevitable, and desirable. Siad Barre was not merely a despot, and the government he overthrew was not merely corrupt. Within Somali society, the field as set up by the West began to operate according to Somali 'rules of play' and Somalis demonstrated a practical mastery of these 'rules.'

Political turmoil was a 'stake' in which actors were interested, intrinsically tied to the field of practice, because the game to be played in the field was imposed from outside and never fully internalized. Somali interest and investment was born out of a transformed field of practice and a historical system of dispositions adjusted to the practice proposed by the field. This implies a sense of the practices the field proposes and of the stakes involved, an inclination and an ability to act (Bourdieu, 1992:118).

The implications of this is that Somali political disunity and clan hostility is not exclusively to blame for the current situation. A major part of the difficulty is that Somalis suddenly found themselves living in a nation-state, and not just a territory, and politics was suddenly a new game, on a new field, with new rules. The field of practice was given to Somalia, but Somalis were abandoned to adjust historic interests to the new field.

Under Siad Barre, the Somali government stated as one of its main goals the development of the Somali nation. The Siad Barre government was at one level characterized by its attempts to develop Somalia. Siad Barre cultivated and retained a popular image of a modest man of the people (I.M. Lewis,

1988:211). A literacy campaign and a rural development program were instituted. The literacy campaign, as well as official government opposition to Ethiopian rule of the Ogaden territory stimulated nationalist sentiment in Somalia and for a time bolstered the popularity of the government (I.M. Lewis, 1988:236). The Somali government mobilized to aid and resettle drought stricken nomads in 1974-5 famine, with the help of massive inputs of international aid and relief funds (I.M. Lewis, 1988:218). While the famine relief helped again to generate popular support for the government, it also helped to forward two of Siad Barre's long term development plans: resettlement of nomads, and detribalization (I.M. Lewis, 1988:218).

Deeper analysis suggests that Siad Barre's interest in development stemmed largely from the underlying goals of maintaining and increasing the administration and management of Somalia by his government. It provided a means for the undermining of clan affiliations and identities which were the source of much of the internal political opposition to his regime. Nomads were resettled in agricultural or fishing cooperatives among people of unrelated clans synthetically creating communities of Somalis which were not based on clan identity. Additionally, the settlement of a large proportion of the predominantly nomadic and dispersed population allowed for increased government administrative control over this population (Schraeder, 1986:648).

The Siad Barre government was unable to maintain this level of support from and control over the population in the long term. This is due to a variety of factors. The preeminent place of the pastoral way of life in Somali culture mediated against permanent settlement, especially in combination with a Somali cultural disdain for farming and fishing (Haakonsen, 1984:109; Sheck and Mohamoud "Ashur," 1978:156). Clan feeling also played a role in that farming and fishing historically were occupations of lower status clans in the social structure. Somali herders did not identify themselves with the new forms of life, preferring instead to return to camel and cattle herding as soon as it became possible. In the end, the government found itself unable to complete the process of fusing forms of settled life and their associated

material, social, and cultural 'profits' with Somali individual and clan identities (see Rose, 1992:32).

Finally, the Ogaden War (1977-78) left a catastrophic political and economic aftermath. The economy, put under strain by a massive refugee influx, coupled with a the disenchantment of the population because of Somalia's defeat, left a series of clan alliances and antagonisms in the place of the 1970s buoyant nationalism and stripped Siad Barre of what popularity he had retained (I.M. Lewis, 1988:260-261).

WESTERN INTERVENTION: DEVELOPMENT AS GOVERNANCE

Development in the common sense view is a practice of economic and political improvement and transformation of other, 'less-developed' areas. Historically, its moral rationality, its justification, has been constructed in terms of a mission of 'civilization' (Pearce, 1988:165). The discourse of development contained an inherent, absolute need for civilization and progress (Pearce, 1988:124; Schaar, 1979:68).

Development is better defined as a form of government or administration—a practice of management, a set of political rationalities and practices for conducting the conduct of other nations.[2] Development as a locus of governing is not concerned with the legitimacy of the practice of government in which it is involved, but rather with a form of security: the preservation and enhancement of a certain global level of existence and through this, the endurance of its field of government over a prolonged period of time (Gordon, 1991:19). Security as conceptualized here embraces the future well being of a field of governance and as such encompasses prosperity, abundance, equality, and freedom which are necessary conditions of this security (Gordon, 1991:19). A founding principle of development is that economic and political development of marginal regions is a necessary condition of global security, the development of the capacity to preserve and enhance a certain global level of existence (c.f. Gordon, 1991:19). This is simultaneously coupled in development discourses with an assumption that less-

developed countries desire and should desire development (Shils, 1968:7-9; Cochrane, 1971:34).

The Siad Barre government had been interested in development primarily because it enabled the extension of government throughout the population, while furthering political interests of dominant groups. The interest was the security of the nation, deeply associated with Siad Barre's clan affiliations, and therefore the prosperity (economic, political, social etc.) of the state. However, aspirations for development lead to increasing amounts of foreign assistance. During the 1974-5 drought/famine and especially after the dismissal of Soviet advisory personnel from Somalia in 1977, Somalia came to be increasingly dependent on international development, aid funding, and personnel to further its programmes and plans to improve the performance and develop the national economy. Dependence on foreign development assistance brought with it increased scrutiny and monitoring of Somalia by development agencies and brokers, and a concomitant decrease in local control over Somalia's economic and political affairs.

Western economists and social scientists continue to carry out a specific role in liberal development enterprises, notably that of proposing constraints on Third World states in various attempts to force conformity to Western development models (Cochrane, 1971:23). Such constraints include IMF prescriptions for currency devaluation and imposed conditions on how Third World governments are allowed to spend their money. The IMF and Western banks control the process of development, partly by making any assistance contingent on Third World governments adopting policies that further specific development strategies supported by the IMF (Frank, 1981:132).

Because development and underdevelopment are products of the same historical process, the country to be developed must first be made to accept itself as, and then to operate as being 'underdeveloped' (Frank, 1975:17). This necessarily implies a discursive practice through which 'underdevelopment' is created in the Third World. 'Underdevelopment' is misrecognized as due to the survival of archaic institutions or the existence of capital shortages

in 'less-developed' regions, but is actually generated by the same historical processes that generated economic development (Frank, 1966:23).

Those being developed are subject to domination by the West which accumulates knowledge about the Other and can then exercise power over the known region (Foucault, 1980:69). A managerial criterion is set up by the discourse through which the conduct of the country being developed is conducted (Foucault, 1980:68). Development takes into account all processes related to the population of the country being developed, as discussed in Foucault's definition of the economy (Foucault, 1991:100). The knowledge of the West engaging in development discursively relocates the country being developed within a field of relationships in which it becomes an object upon which intervention is possible (Procacci, 1991:157).

This necessarily implies a state of government in Foucault's definition, and therefore the justification of security, since development involves interventions which function to assure the endurance (security) of social and economic processes.[3] Security is the necessary requisite of the exercise of power and a principle of political practice (Gordon, 1991:20). In the case of international development, the concern is not with the security of individual nations being developed, but rather the security of the political-economic system managed by watchdog organizations like the IMF.

However, countries being developed are not only *subject to* the management of development forces. They come to act as authors and *subjects of* their own conduct (Donald, 1992:14). Government as implied in development is not merely the way in which the conduct of developing countries might be directed, but also practices which are calculated to act upon the possibilities of action of developing countries (in Donald, 1992:14). Development makes the exercise of managing power unnecessary as developing countries make the effects and constraints of power play on themselves, becoming the principle of their own subjection (Foucault, 1979:202).

For example, Somalia desired development notably to extend mechanisms of government over the population of the nation and to improve the security of the state. In applying for international development assistance,

Somalia became the object of political and economic interventions, but also the subject of its own development practice, necessarily tied to the practice of international development agents. Somalia made development plans for itself, but the IMF and World Bank demand to see development plans before any assistance will be given (W.A. Lewis, 1983:274). The issue was not whether Somalia should be developed, but whether it would conform to practices calculated to contribute to some form of global prosperity and through prosperity, the security of the global system—an issue of government and not altruism.

The IMF encourages the development of "areas of comparative advantage" (Laitin and Samatar, 1987:126). During the tenure of the Siad Barre government (1969-90), the IMF's stated aim was to transform Somalia into an exporter of primary and plantation products to the industrial world (Laitin and Samatar, 1987:126). These aims are reflected in the Somali government's development plans of the 1980s.

Somalia became involved in the international development 'game' because of specific interests in the field. It entered as a free player in that it had a knowledge of the field, an apprehension of the 'rules,' and a sense of the stakes or profits to be made within the field. The dominating players were the IMF and Western development interests who control the various resources and capital being 'played' for. Development for Somalia meant following the standard IMF package of currency devaluation, spending cuts, discontinuation of subsidies to social programs, privatization of state enterprises, and reduced wages. Major international development brokers, such as the IMF were mainly interested in stabilizing Somalia, economically and politically, and making Somali economic and political systems accommodating to the West, an interest also inherent in Siad Barre's construction of a state and emphasis on development (Miller, 1982:14).

The price for pursuing the stakes of the international development field was implicit and complicit agreement by the Somali government that Somalia was an underdeveloped country. The stakes became objectified, mediated by objective, institutionalized mechanisms, ensuring "the reproduction of the

structure of the distribution of the [social and economic] capital" which reproduces the relations of domination (Bourdieu, 1977:184). Relations of domination in development practice are set up "in pure objectivity between institutions," which is to say between socially recognized qualifications and defined positions and thus through the social mechanisms which guarantee the qualifications and positions and their distribution between individuals and institutions in a field of practice (Bourdieu, 1977:187-188). What Bourdieu refers to as the "misrecognition" of the relations of domination as a relationship between two reasonably equal parties results in a complicity on the part of the dominated in their own domination, the dispositions or interests which incline them to complicity being themselves the effect of domination (Wacquant, 1992:24).

Once Somalia had 'agreed' it was underdeveloped and had balance of payments difficulties, lack of economic growth, rapid inflation, and other 'normal' traits of underdeveloped countries, the government could not 'un-accept' the situation. In 1981, Somalia turned to the IMF and World Bank for assistance and formed agreements which were to relieve economic pressures stemming from arrears on the payment of interest on its foreign debt (Gray, 1989:132).

The agreement involved devaluation of the Somali Shilling and a decrease in state economic involvement in return for IMF approval of several large scale USAID and World Bank economic projects which were designed to generate hard currency (Laitin and Samatar, 1984:71). Somalia was also granted credit facilities of US$150 million between the years 1981-87 which contributed to a high enough level of imports to keep the urban population content for this period and protected Siad Barre's popularity and tenure, at least in the Mogadishu area.

In 1987, sharp devaluation of the Somali Shilling resulted in an equally sharp increase in the price of imported consumer goods and a corresponding increase in domestic unrest. The cause was an experimental "two-tier" foreign exchange rate set up under IMF conditions. The rise in prices and unrest resulted in the government discontinuing the "two-tier" rate and

returning to a fixed exchange rate of 100Shillings=US$1 (Gray, 1989:132). Somalia also failed to meet required payments on its foreign debt.

Because of this, Somalia was declared ineligible to use the general resources of the IMF, and due to the IMF classification of Somalia as 'non-cooperative' any large scale development organizations affiliated with the IMF such as USAID, World Bank, CIDA, and the UN also refused to participate in bilateral development programs. Somalia had demonstrated that it understood the field, and its position in the field, and expressed interest in the profits to be gained, but ultimately had refused to pursue its interests in the proper way, essentially attempting to win without playing by the rules.

Somalia was still seen as disadvantaged, underdeveloped, but had demonstrated an unwillingness to enter into the practices that went with the field, and as a result became further marginalized. In a post-Cold War era however, such marginalization did not present a danger or challenge to an incorporating and universal program of government. Somalia's non-cooperativeness could be ignored provided that Somalia itself could remain out of sight (see Rose, 1992:39). "On the margins of a form of civilization seen as self-sustaining, the marginal can be exposed to the harsh exigencies of fate, can be consigned to control by the forces of law and order, or can act as the useful objects of improving charity" (Rose, 1992:39). Charity, which Somalia did receive in the form of food and other humanitarian aid, remains in development discourse as an act of choice in which richer countries choose to improve themselves by their participation in practices to help those less fortunate than themselves (see Rose, 1992:39).

In the end, Somalia has not remained in a 'swept under the carpet' state. Civil war, the disintegration of civil society, and famine due to the use of food as a political weapon have made Somalia too visible to ignore. Additionally, the proximity of Somalia to Kenya, a nation with large international interests, coupled with the influx into Kenya of large numbers of Somali refugees, is likely to have contributed to a sense of necessity for Western intervention in Somalia before Somali problems became regional problems, and then global problems. It seems highly coincidental that American troops, moving to

peacekeeping duty in Somalia, were present and purposefully obvious in Nairobi at the time of Kenya's federal election in December 1992. In any event, in trying to curb a global problem before it occurred, the West has constituted Somalia as a global problem, left now to the forces of global law and order.

But What Now?

The Siad Barre government was finally unable to maintain effective political control of the country. Involvement in the Ogaden War, which had originally contributed to national solidarity, ended with increased unrest as Somalis from various clans came to believe that Siad Barre had acted out of personal clan interests at the expense of the others. Regulatory practices by the IMF and development brokers contributed to the disintegration of the Somali state through imposing constraints that raised inflation, made goods less available, and consequently resulted in more repressive exercise of power by the government to retain control.

Currently, the West is involved in peacekeeping in Somalia, a practice associated with regulating conduct through use of military force, consigned to control by the forces of global law and order in a practice of normalization of society (see Rose, 1992:39). Peacekeeping is also viewed as a mechanism of Western control, which has contributed to the polarization of the conflict, rather than to its end. The focus of attention and attacks on Mohamed Farah Aideed and select other clan leaders generates a system of shifting alliances between the clans who support Aideed against the UN and clans who oppose Aideed in a situation where 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend.' In this case, the field is Somali, the rules are Somali, the interests and stakes are Somali, and the UN is trying to define new boundaries on the field, as Siad Barre attempted to do before them. There is little Somali interest in 'order for order's sake,' nor for a new repressive government under a UN flag.

If development is to be done in Somalia, Somalia must have a state or similar structure since development is contingent on an agreement between developing states and development institutions and developed states through

development brokers. A transitional UN trusteeship followed by elections and the setting up of a new government is likely to result in chaos, with the winner forming a government, and opposition forming almost immediately to denounce the new government as illegitimate (Notes on Ergada Meetings, Ottawa, June, 1993).

A simple Western style trusteeship is unlikely to fare well in Somalia because of the importance of the clan and lineage in the Somali mode of life. One's lineage in Somali society constitutes an individual's identity. It is one's family in a very real sense, operating as it does to promote the interests of its members, assure their material, political, and economic security. The Somali clan also operates as a welfare system. One cannot simply work around clans, ignore them, or dissolve them. To do so amounts to destroying a society in order to improve its condition. Unless the new state structure incorporates the Somali clan structure in a manner that allows egalitarian access to the stakes—social, political, and material profits to be gained—the situation of civil disintegration will be reproduced. A new state organization for Somalia requires that it be constructed out of a Somali set of perceptions, dispositions, practices, and mechanisms of organization in order to contribute to Somalia's own security as defined by this analysis.

The formation of a state remains in Somali interests. A state, or similarly recognizable institution, is necessary since development requires a relationship of a developing state with Western states and institutions through development brokers. Beyond this, within the political and economic global system of governance, the disintegration of Somali society represents a threat to the prosperity and security of not only Somalia, but also to the region and consequently to global governance. Somalia's situation is constructed as a problem, and as such requires interventions and solutions. The discourse of development and governance not only define the problem, but also the range of appropriate and possible solutions to the problems. State formation and integration remains a discursively constructed interest, not only of development agents, but also of the Third World.

The current trend is still toward political and economic normalization through administration. Peacekeeping forms another locus of government despite the record of development in Somalia. The present economic and political situation in Somalia suggests that while the era of development may be all but over in the country, with the end of the Cold War and the reconstitution of ideologies of global security, a transformation of the process may result in a process of management that includes economic management as a core ingredient, but as a part of a more overtly comprehensive process of global pacification and security.

In fact, relations of ruling appear to necessitate themselves in reference to previous failings or imperfections. Development has formed a locus of governmentality in an array of practices and strategies constituted as a never ending process of perfection. Development has failed to regulate and perfectly govern Somalia. This does not generate a necessity to reject development as a project of governance, but rather is fundamental to the project of government. The shortcomings of previous strategies of development, as conditioned by discursive relations of ruling, reproduces development in a perpetual quest for the perfection of governmentality. To put it simply, governance always fails, and failure is an incitement to further governance.[4] Development has always fallen short of achieving its goals, and this incites new strategies for development.

It is here we see further evidence for development as part of a project of government. A purely altruistic or commercial motivation for development would not continue to incite development. The agencies and individuals interested in development would have cut their losses and given up. Governmentality continues to hold the stakes high, suggesting that the stakes are attainable, and ever more within reach. But it is a misrecognition that serves to reproduce not only the political rationalities and practices of development, but also the possibility for the reproduction of failure and thus the necessity for new technologies and strategies of governance.

Development and peacekeeping are not done for altruistic purposes, nor for simple reasons of economic opportunism and exploitation of less powerful

countries by the powerful. Moral justifications for managing practices are tied to the necessities of government in a system of discursive practices which require global security. This is a situation within which one cannot ask "should development be done." Development is only one of a system of technologies of government. The practice of government continues, and will continue, because it is necessary to the maintenance of security and order. Somalia may get a new state organization which incorporates and listens to the various interests of the majority of the clans. Short of a major redistribution of social, economic, and political capital within the global fields of power relations however, it is unlikely that Somalia will escape forces of domination and government.

Notes

1. By 'interests' I mean the perceived "forthcoming realities" that actors pursue sensitized and mobilized by their identities and affiliations (Bourdieu, 1977:76; Wacquant, 1992:26).

2. Foucault, cited in Gordon (1991:19).

3. Foucault. Lecture, College de France, 5 April, 1979 in Gordon 1991:19.

4. This is Alan Hunt's (1993) interpretation of Rose and Miller's (1992) theorization of governance as a congenitally failing operation. The world is not so much conceived as governed, but rather is characterized by the 'will to govern,' a continual interest in 'doing better next time.'

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