Socialist Feminist Theory:
the Issue of Revolution

Eileen Saunders

This paper explains the reproduction of sexual inequality in

socialist systems with the argument that an emancipated role

for women is strategic during the phase of revolutionary

mobilisation but, given the productive priorities of the new

state, equality will be downplayed during the period of

consolidation. The case of China is used to illustrate the

tension between female productive and reproductive roles and

to support the argument -hat, since revolution is an engineered

process, female status is partially determined by the

priorities of the engineer

.



Introduction

Socialist feminists are beginning to arrive at some common

understanding of the role of women under capitalism, at least at a

general level of analysis. We agree that we must focus on the

interconnections between patriarchal relations and the historically-

situated interests of capitalism, supporting our arguments with

research detailing the relationship between the exigencies of evolving

capitalism and the socio-political position of women.

The position, however, on the relationship of women to socialism

is less clear. While Juliet Mitchell was calling for the

"articulation" of our relationship to socialism over a decade ago, our

response has been uneven, at times contradictory, and, above all,

limited at the theoretical level. As with the proverbial donkey, we

dangle the carrot of socialist revolution in front of our collective

noses, with the implicit knowledge that its consumption may alleviate

the hunger without eliminating it. We know that which we negate, but

are not as sure of that which we affirm. But, that said, we still fall

back on a precarious "after-the-revolut ion-trust" fWeinbaum, 1978:8) .

Accordingly, confronted by feminists who point to existing sexual

inequalities in various contemporary socialist states, the response,

though varied, contains one unifying theme, the attempt to 'explain

avey' the inequalities. This occurs in several ways:

Ch the one hand, there are those who would deny that inequality

persists in socialism, citing bourgeois propaganda, liberal

distortions, and North American ethnocentric standards as the sources

of such conclusions. Essentially, they argue that female emancipation

can be demonstrated through a comparison of pre-social ist and socialist

female status. Oi the other hand, there are those who would argue that

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persisting inequality is a consequence of cultural lag, the remnants of

a feudal tradition which will eventually disappear. Finally, a similar

strand focuses on technological underdevelopment, arguing that full

emancipation must await sufficient development in the forces of

production.

Wiile obviously different in terms of their focus of analysis,

each category of response assumes a processual transition from the

pre-revolutionary period through to the post-revolutionary period. In

other words, there is an implicit acceptance of the linear rationality

of socialist revolution; namely, that ideology of women's role

developed during the concrete revolutionary process is a pre-figurative

version of the post-revolutionary regime's policy toward the role of

women in the 'new' society. Underlying this assumption is an

expectation of gradual elevation in female socio-political status as

the socialist regime extends its control over the entire society. If

the expectation remains unrealized, we are locked into either examining

the pre- figurative version (i.e. where did Engels go wrong?) or

arguing that the transitional process has not fully evolved (i.e. give

us another ten years to get the 'kinks' worked out)

.

Essentially, the motivation for this paper lies in a

dissatisfaction with the socialist feminist response to the feminist

dismissal of socialism. What appears to have happened is that

socialist feminists have felt we must either deny the 'accusations' or

argue for patience in the face of impending cultural/economic

development for the 'accused' regime. Wiat I would argue is that

neither approach sheds light on the role of women within a socialist

revolution, lb deny the reality of the phenomenon is as meaningless as

to apologize for history by promising a better future.
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The real theoretical problems are to account for the context of

the participation of women relative to men, and to articulate the

mechanisms of change . Female emancipation under socialism is not an

all-or-nothing phenomenon; it is a process which has taken on different

dimensions in different historical periods. It is precisely this

fluctuating nature of progress and retrenchment in women's issues under

socialist revolution which must be explained, lb accomplish this, one

must look at the historical process involved in the development of

socialist revolution. In other words, we must use history to determine

the mechanisms of change, not merely to "compare the present to the

past and see progress" (Sidel, 1974:123).

A starting point in this task is to treat as problematic the

assumption of a processual transition from pre- revolutionary ideology

to post-revolutionary praxis. In other words, I will begin by treating

as analytically separate the period of revolutionary insurgency and the

period of post-revolutionary consolidation of power. The problem is to

examine the interaction of the revolutionary Party/State exigencies in

each period and policies concerning the productive and reproductive

roles that women play in each period, d] Hopefully this approach will

avoid the error of treating ideology as determining praxis, by arguing

that historical material realities necessitate a praxis which may have

little to do with the ideology of liberation. In the following, I will

attempt to suggest how one can proceed to investigate the interaction

of socialist revolutionary requisites and policies regarding women, and

how one can use the 'model' to make sense of certain developments in

the Chinese Revolution.

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Revolution: The Process and the Product

As suggested in the introduction, the analysis of socialist

revolutions must take account of two distinct phases: the process of

attempting seizure of the incumbent state apparatus; and the process of

consolidation of the new state apparatus (in Marx's terms, the

insertion of a 'dictatorship of the proletariat') . [2] The problem is

that there is a void within Marxism in terms of a political theory

which addresses either process in any detail (see Miliband, 1977 and

Boggs, 1977) . Although there is a general framework with which to

approach the issue of socialist revolution and transition (i.e. the

notion of a proletariat achieving self-anancipation with the aid of an

organizing party) , the problem of HOW, and the problem of TRANSITION to

a new stage was never fully worked out by Marx. The emphasis on the

historical inevitability of the transition has subordinated the

question of how a revolutionary movement actually brings about the

process.

This problem becomes even more acute when an industrial

proletariat is either weak or non-existent, and when capitalism is at

an early stage of development (and often inserted from outside) . The

general framework, as mapped by Marx and Engels and modified by Lenin,

seems even more remote in these cases, cases which become important

vshen one looks at the growth of socialist movements in the Third Wbrld.

The fundamental question becomes: how does a revolutionary socialist

movement build socialism under those conditions? In other words, what

is required of the organizing revolutionary party? And , how can those

requisites affect policy toward women? I turn first to the process of

seizure of power.

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A. Phase of Insurgency

lb begin, one can isolate two clear tasks of a revolutionary

party at this stage. First, the movement, through the direction of the

party, must seize effective control of the state apparatus from the

incumbent elite. Thus, through force , the movement can remove a regime

from power. This is essentially a military question concerning the

strategic mobilization and deployment of armed forces. I am not

concerned with the relation of this task to the role of women, other

than to point out the necessity of replacing labour power displaced by

military mobilization. Second, the movement, through the direction of

the party, must destroy loyalties to the old regime. This task is

essentially a question of dealing with the impact of traditionalism, an

obstacle which cannot be dealt with by force alone. As Mliband

(1977:47,50) argues, it involves a "battle for consciousness":

The problem, for victorious revolutions, is to prevent tradition
from corroding them and ultimately defeating them from
within. . .traditions are sustained and mediated by a network of
particular institutions, which are actively involved in the
performance of a process of transmission.

It is in terns of this task that the relationship of women to

revolutionary goals may be understood. What role do women play in the

'institutions of tradition' and how may a revolutionary party overcome

this obstacle?

A significant contribution can be made to this set of questions

by drawing upon the work of Gregory Massell (1974). Massell's intention

was to study a ' revolution-from-above' in this case, the Soviet Union's

extension into Central Asia (between 1919-1929), with the following

questions in mind

:

...how and to what extent, political power may be deliberately
used in the revolutionary transformation of societies,
especially those we call 'traditional' societies; conversely,
how, and to what extent, traditional structures and life styles

may serve as obstacles to engineered revolution, (p.xx)

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The problems faced by the Soviets in Central Asia were typical of

traditional society: no industrial proletariat to speak of and the

minimal presence of a capitalist mode of production. Massell (75, 76)

argues that their solutions essentially broke down into two possible

responses: on the one hand, the use of force to 'excise' the

traditional elites and coerce the population into compliance and, on the

other, the discovery of "a weak link in society, a relatively deprived

and hence potentially subversive stratum susceptible to militant appeal,

a surrogate proletariat where no proletariat in the real Marxist sense

existed". Both responses were used by the Soviets in Central Asia, but

what is interesting for the issues at hand is their perception of the

weak link and its strategic contribution to the subversion of

traditionalism.

Through an analysis of Soviet documents, Massell (76)

demonstrates that women in these traditional Moslem societies were

defined as "crucial actors" whose mobilization would severely weaken the

key institutions. This plan of action obviously assumes that class

position was not the sole basis for expression of social conflict;

rather, patriarchy vested in a range of authority relations was a key

element (87-88)

.

Chce the decision to mobilize women was taken, the task of the

revolutionary party became to "maximize female discontent" and "channel"

it into directions optimal to the revolutionary movement (Massell,

1974:131-132). The source of the discontent was fairly clear; a quick

scan of female status in traditional Moslem societies gave clues as to

the potential tension inherent in their roles. Thus, the 'payoffs' for

women in mobilization were the wide range of citizen rights not

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previously open to them (ranging from rights to education to protection

from sentence of death for illegitimate loss of virginity) .

The payoffs for the revolutionary movement were not as obvious.

The links between the mobilization of women and the demise of

traditionalism were more implicit than explicit. This is exactly where

the significance of tessell's argument to the issues raised at the

beginning of this paper emerges. He articulates those linkages by

demonstrating the expectations the Soviets expressed through their

policies and action regarding women. His analysis illustrates the

leverage gained by the Soviet state through the strategic use of women

to destabilize the traditional regime. Briefly summarized, the "payoffs

of female mobilization" are (133-181):

1. Liberation and Humanitarian Implications:

The moral legitimation of the Soviet movement on
humanitarian grounds become an important rallying point for
both appeals to foslem women (who gained personal benefits)
and for the recruitment of cadres to work for the cause.

2. Implications for Traditional Authority Relations:

The role network links between authority, kinship, lineage
and male superiority become vulnerable when the political
cohesion afforded through the female role is removed.

3. Implications for Kinship and Community:

The increased opportunities to women, the liberalization of
divorce, and the stress on public participation subordinates
local traditional loyalties based on clan, family and custom
ties. In addition, the disruption of kinship control over
sex and marriage strengthens loyalties to the new regime
among women and young people. To undercut primary social
units and induce 'fragmentation' makes individuals more
accessible to mobilization and the society more open to
penetration.

4. Implications for Religion and Custom:

To challenge the legitimacy of religious control over daily
life through the subversion of Islamic custom regarding
women is a key to weakening the overall control of these
religious institutions and their elites.

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5. Implications for Property Relations:

The importance of the links between customs involving the
female role and certain 'institutions of property* (arranged
marriage, bride-price, etc.) suggests that mobil izat ion of
women can weaken patterns of property control- This is
compounded with challenge to lack of control over property,
including land. Moreover, the new accessibility of poor
males to marriage increases the latter' s attraction for the
new regime.

6. Implications for Recruitment of Labour and Technical Cadres:

The mobilization of women involves the provision of a large,
previously untapped labour pool which increases the scope of
economic development and the optimal productive potential of
the society.

7. Implications for Recruitment of Political Cadres:

The recruitment of indigenous cadres through appeals to
Moslem women is useful not only in expanding party influence
but also in their serving as prefigurative models of the
role of women in the new society.

8. Implications for Revolutionary Potentials Abroad:

This theme, more historically tied to the nature of the
Soviet 'satellite' system, involves the expectation that the
OFttern set for women in Central Asia could serve as a
revolutionary model for societies on its borders.

The importance of Massell's analysis to socialist feminists lies

in his focus on the strategic use of feminist issues both to weaken the

traditional regime and to strengthen loyalties to the emerging regime.

Again, this is not to say that 'liberation' motives played no part in

their policies on women, only that these were secondary to the

priorities of gaining a foothold in the society. This fact becomes even

more apparent when Massell documents the retrenchment and, even,

reversals in policies of mobilization within two and one half years of

their origin (1974:322-389).

However, it is concerning the problem of explaining the

retrenchment that I think Massell fails. He notes that the "imperatives

of insurgency are not easily reconciled with imperatives of incumbency"

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(1974:407-408) but, when faced with the elaboration of the latter

imperatives, he falls back on the idealist argument that the threat

posed by radical policies of liberation to male identity , vested in

tradition, created a situation of tension which was unhealthy for a

regime seeking stabilization. Wiile one cannot ignore this dimension of

resistance, to give it causal status is, I think, misleading. It

obscures the question of what set of conditions emerges when a

revolutionary party is transformed into a legitimate state apparatus.

It is necessary to specify the conditions under which the

'payoffs' became too costly. To do that one needs to question the role

of the state in socialism, its tasks, and how they interact with the

role of women in the new regime. In other words, is the new regime

forced to retrench its position on women (for reasons of resistance,

cultural lag or whatever) or, are there payoffs to the socialist state

for retaining or reproducing particular elements of patriarchal

relations?

B. Phase of Consolidation/Development

As I discussed earlier, there is a lack of analysis by Marxists

of the role of the state in socialism. The explanation of the socialist

state apparatus cannot be found, though, by merely equating the state's

role in capitalist and socialist states as some convergence theorists

would seek to do. The conditions within which the state operates cannot

be ignored. Collective ownership of the means of production and the

absence of an appropriating class cannot help but have an effect on the

concrete operations of the socialist state.

Vfriat then can one say of the requisites the socialist party faces

at this phase? On a general level, what is required is the replacement

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of the seized state apparatus with a new organ of planning and control

and the replacement of engineered separation from old regime loyalties

with popular support and loyalty to the new regime. Moreover, it is

important to recognize the broad constraints on the state in terms of

its ability to meet those requisites. Ch this point, Miliband's

discussion of the 'functions' of a state is incisive. Essentially, he

argues that every state must carry out the following functions, although

the conditions of doing so will vary (1977:90):

1. the repressive function (the state must maintain social

order within its boundaries)

2. the idealogical-cultural function (the state must engineer

and maintain consent to the form of the system)

3. the economic function (used in the broadest sense, the state

must sustain the population and foster productive growth)

4. the international function (the state must foster and

protect the 'national* interest in international matters)

The important question is how the 'nature' of socialism affects

the role of the state in carrying out these functions. While it is

fairly clear how the capitalist state operates as a class instrument

(although we may debate its degree of autonomy) in the performance of

these functions, the matter is complicated in the analysis of socialism

by its economic context. As Miliband (1977:114, my emphasis) notes:

. . .the collectivist character of the society precludes it from
being such an instrument .. .Instead, the state may be taken to
'represent' the collective society or system itself, and to have

as its function the service of its needs as these are perceived

and defined by those who control the state .

The role of the party/state (in socialism the terms are

realistically interchangeable in terms of actual control) is, then, to

define needs and the strategy for dealing with them. This is not to

suggest that the state becomes an instrument for bureaucratic class

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privilege although one cannot deny that privilege can accrue in this

manner. Rather, the state is still constrained by the "rationality of

State action" in a socialist context; i.e. "state- fostered economic

growth... and state- fostered provision of social services and cultural

developments" (Miliband, 1977:113-114). But, a factor which _is

significant is the degree of power wielded by the apex of the socialist

state in the interpretation of needs and allocation of resources to meet

them. This does not imply a purposeful conspiracy of those individuals

who hold the reins of state power but it does recognize the place of the

state in intersecting historical material conditions through planning

direction and implementing policy . Certainly, one must recognize the

genuine role of mass parties in socialist states, but these are parties

which are "distinguished by their pyramidal structures, with an extreme

concentration of power at the top of the pyramid" (Miliband, 1977:115).

lb return to the issue of women in this process of consolidation

and development: the above discussion focuses attention on the

interplay of the historically situated material conditions which

socialist regimes inherit; the role of the state in intersecting the

material conditions and the necessity of growth and provision of

services; and the policies regarding women in the consolidation of

socialism as a reflection of the conditions proceeding from the first

two factors rather than from a prefigurative ideology or their role in

the insurgency phase.

My argument is that to talk about women's relationship to

socialism is a complex matter. It requires that we first look at the

conditions of taking power , its requisites and the strategic role women

can play, and, secondly, look at the conditions of replacing and

consolidating power , its requisites and the strategic role women can

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play. This mode of analysis does not assume the party/state as an a_

priori monolith. Quite the opposite. It suggests, to rework an old

Marxist adage, that socialist parties/states make history, but not under

conditions of their own choosing. In other words, socialist ideology

concerning women does not necessarily transform into socialist praxis

towards women.

Case Application: China

I have been attempting to suggest that a focus on the stages or

phases in the building of socialism in traditional societies and on

their parallel requisites can lead to a better understanding of the

unfulfilled promise of socialism for women. I would now like to suggest

how one might make sense of particular developments in China with

respect to policies regarding women. Cbviously, in a paper of this

scope, I cannot mount a full historical analysis of the role of women in

China from the pre- revolutionary period through the present. What I

will attempt is a selective discussion of the broad policies of the

Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) relevant to the role of women. I will

focus specifically on the phase of insurgency and the phase of

consolidation/development.

A. The Phase of Insurgency

Keeping in mind the two periods of alliance between the C.C.P.

and the Guomindang nationalist party (1923-27 and 1938-45), the

important periods of insurgency are 1927-37 and 1945-49. Tne period of

1927-33 is important as the time during which the initial collectivist

Soviets were established as rural bases in Central and Southeast China.

They are especially important as a 'testing ground' for development of

party policies regarding women, policies later expanded in the Liberated

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Areas of northern China following the Long March of 1934. Mule there

are many policies of significance in the insurgency period, those

regarding marriage are of particular relevance. I will focus on these

policies, and also make brief reference to labour and land policies.

Two key marriage policies in the insurgency period are the

ferriage Regulations (1931) and the Marriage Law (1934). T3] Both

policies contained an emphasis on:

1) freedom of choice in marriage by individuals involved

2) freedom of choice in divorce by individuals involved

3) registration of marriage and divorce with local party officials

4) responsibility of the male in divorce action to provide for wife and
children (the latter remaining in custody of wife)

The Law of 1934 seems to have taken a qual ifed stand on

divorce. [4] The restrictions placed on women who were seeking divorce

from males serving in the Red Army are particularly interesting since

such a suit required the husband's consent. As Croll notes, several

documents appeared during this period viiich stressed the difference

between freedom and 'absolute' freedom in marriage and divorce. This

was, apparently, a response to negative reaction to the Law (1978:195)

on the part of peasants. Vrtiile recognizing that the implementation of

the Law was uneven, what can we say about its links to revolutionary

goals at large? Following is a brief summary of what I think are some

of the important linkages:

(i) The C.C.P. policies on marriage most certainly reflected

liberation and humanitarian themes. Their recognition of the impact of

such practices as marriage, bride-price and widow suicide on women as

individuals became an important inducement for the feminist

organizations in China at that time to join with the communist cause.

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(For discussion of this engineered alliance, see Croll, 1978:117-152).

(ii) The impact of the Marriage Law on traditional authority

relations is particularly significant in China where a women was subject

to three authorities in her lifetime: that of her father, her husband,

and her son. The granting of unprecedented female rights disrupted that

entire role network. With respect to the attack on an arranged marriage

system, the Law significantly affected the practice of the land-holding

classes to use marriage as a mechanism for social mobility (See Wolf,

1969:107). The disruption of traditional authority is particularly

evident with respect to the role of Confucian ideology in sustaining a

hierarchy of authority. At the root of the Confucian system of 'proper

relations' was the notion of patriarchy, vested in the dominance of the

male 'yang' over the female 'yin.* Indeed, to challenge the legitimacy

of this domination was to challenge the whole Confucian system of

authority relations.

(iii) The granting of equal rights to women in marriage and divorce

seriously undermined the control of the kinship system over such

processes. In so doing, it undermined a crucial link between the

peasants and the ruling class; namely, the clan system. As Barrington

Moore notes (1966:207), peasant conservatism in feudal China can largely

be explained through the extended kin groups, the clan. It was the one

binding link between ruled and ruler and it was determined by

patrilineal descent. To 'equalize' women as partners in a freely-chosen

marital arrangement (including the retention of maiden name) is a direct

challenge to the lineage system and the control exercised by the clan.

This is even more significant when the locus of 'approval' is

transferred to the C.C.P. through registration of marriage and divorce.

The local officials had significant discretion in the recognition of

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such arrangements.

Also important is the fact that it was the middle and upper class

members of a clan who really controlled the clan itself, generally

because of the importance accorded to literacy as a requisite of

political poter (Wblf, 1966:108-109). Thus, the undermining and

subordination of clan authority to party control was a blow against

class authority as well. In this manner, radical reform in marriage

custom provided important leverage for the C.C.P. in breaking the strong

clan ties, ties which often encompassed entire villages. In addition,

the new accessibility of the sexes encouraged the loyalty of poor male

peasants (known as 'bare sticks') vho previously could not afford

brides, and of young people in general.

(iv) The impact of the Marriage Law on religious tradition is

important with respect to the place of Confucian ideology in sustaining

traditional authority, as discussed above. Not only did the Law i

challenge the legitimacy of Confucian beliefs and values in relation to I

women, it extended the challenge to the fundamental axis of filial duty
j

and to ancestoral worship (again based on patrilineal descent).

(v) The links between the Marriage Law and property relations are

quite clear. The former fundamentally challenged the tradition of

females as property to be used and disposed of at will by father or

husband. In outlawing arranged marriage and bride-price, it took away

significant control from fathers. In liberalizing divorce, it eroded

the control of husbands over their wives. In both cases, it increased

the accessibility of women to the revolutionary movement, a significant

consequence vhen a party is seeking the quick mobilization of

individuals for revolutionary tasks.

In addition to marriage policies, the linkages of land and labour

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,



reform policies to female mobilization are significant. The Land Reform

laws[5] formulated during the period of the early Soviets, withdrawn

during the 2nd Lhited Front and expanded during the civil war period,

contained one important theme, the equal right of all individuals to

land allotments, and went so far as to issue separate deeds to husband

and wife to specify the share of each. The impact of this law was clear

in one respect. Redistribution of land on an individual basis rather

than on a family unit basis broke the village network apart at its base

by undermining the crucial link between property and kinship and forging

a new link between the individual and the C.C.P. Thus, while C.C.P.

documents of this time contain explicit reference to the equation of

land reform and female liberation (see Eavin, 1976:26-27) the more

obvious consequence was the subversion of the traditional property

network. This becomes clearer when one notes the refusal of the C.C.P.

to extend allotments to all 'landless' women. Class position of the

husband was a determinate boundary.

Policies regarding the labour of women in the insurgency phase

contained one dominant aim: the mobilization of women for the war

effort. In a society dependent upon labour-intensive agriculture for

subsistence, the ability to recruit military forces was directly tied to

the ability to provide for the dependents left behind. tack of

financial resources for 'welfare support' leaves but one choice, to

replace the lost labour power. This was the primary role of Chinese

women in the revolutionary process, engaging in support activities for

the Red Army. They were not recruited into combat activity. We know,

for example, that only fifty women went along on the Long March of

50,000 (Salaff and terkle, 1970:82).

In contributions other than agricultural labour, their tasks were

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consistently of a domestic nature. This selectivity of participation

was reflected in the issues dealt with by the Women's Congresses of this

period. Davin summarizes the major subjects of debate of the 1933

Women's District Congress as: enlarging and giving aid to the Red Army,

caring for dependents of the latter, learning to plough, and selling

personal valuables to finance the movement (1976:26). Issues such as

literacy, health care, footbinding, and feudal marriage were relatively

ignored by these 'ffminist' organizations in the pursuit of the party

priorities. For those feminists, like Ding Ling in 1941, who protested

the subordination of these questions, the party response was that sexual

liberation was already established and further feminist action was

harmful to the cause (see Davin, 1976:36). Apparently, the strategic

use of women had its limitations, imposed by party priorities.

Trie general Labour Law of this period, modelled after the Soviet

union Labour Code, did not have much impact on women's labour due to its

emphasis on industrial workers, a significant minority in the Liberated

Areas. It _i£ significant as a prefigurative version of protective

legislation restricting women's labour, limiting certain industries,

night work, and 'heavy' labour (see Croll 1978:263-264 and Davin

1976:31). Also included was a policy to arrange day care services at

the female's place of employment so that she might better organize her

dual responsibilities.

The above discussion provides, I think, some clues as to the

relationship of women and revolutionary requisites in the insurgency

phases in China. Certainly, there were payoffs for Chinese women and to

ignore this fact is to do a gross injustice to the real successes of the

revolution. Trie equally interesting question, however, is the degree to

which these payoffs were in keeping with party requisites in seizing

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power and combatting traditionalism. The admittedly brief summary of

certain policies and their links to revolutionary goals seems to suggest

that feminism had its value, but only to a point. The retrenchment in

divorce during the civil war, the emphasis on the war effort over

particular female-specific reforms, the segregation of women from active

military participation, and the extension of domestic-type tasks

indicate some of the boundaries of patriarchy that the party was not

willing to cross.

B. The Phase of Consolidation/Development

As elaborated earlier, the essential requisites of the socialist

state in this phase are the fostering of economic growth and the

provision of necessary services to the population. These are carried

out under the restraints of particular material conditions which the

state intersects through the implementation of policies defined as

necessary by those in control of 'problem perception 1 . To understand

the role of women in the Chinese socialist state, one must first examine

the conditions under which policies regarding their role emerged.

Again, there is a significant body of literature addressing various

developments in post-revolutionary China which time does not permit me

to pursue here. Rather, I will attempt to summarize what seem to have

been the major shifts in policy regarding women. I will restrict the

time period in question to 1953-1960, for reasons involving the

'statistical blackout' of 1961 and policy shifts and factional struggles

in China since 1960 which reflect the competing models (the "two roads

to socialism") which emerged in the first decade.

Two quite different approaches to economic development emerged in

China following the demise of the New Democratic Period in 1953 and the

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break with a capital isr mode of production. The first was a

Soviet-modelled, urban-oriented and capital-intensive strategy, the

First Five Year Plan (1953-1957). The second model was really Mao

Zedong's version of a dual approach to economic development, the Great

Leap Forward (1958-196C) . Based on mass mobilization of labour power,

it stressed the simult< neous development of small-scale and large-scale

industry, employing labour-intensive means in the former and

capital-intensive means in the latter. These alternative strategies for

promoting growth led to differing and sometimes contradictory policies

on women.

1. The First Five Year Plan

The problems facing post-war China were severe: a fragmented,

war-torn economy, a weak industrial base, technological backwardness and

low labour productivity in agriculture, and a population of about five

hundred million (see Eckstein et al., 1968). With Soviet guidance and

support, the C.C.P. attempted a massive industrial drive by increasing

the state capital investment by sixty percent by 1956, by sharply

increasing industrial output, and by creating a massive in-flow to urban

areas ;see Yeh, 1968). The difficulties contained in this approach were

the inordinate share of fixed investment in heavy industry, about

eighty-six percent in the 53-57 period according to Cheng (1974:55), and

stabilization of the agricultural sector at low growth levels.

The impact of these conditions on women was a significant

retrenchment of previous policies. During the contraction of the urban

market in 1955-1957, the "whole apparatus of persuasion and propaganda

was mobilized to keep women out of the labour force" (Howe, 1971:97).

It was also in 1955 that Davin notes a significant increase in women's

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organizations known as Dependents' Associations, groups whose purpose

was to encourage the participation of women, not as productive workers,

but as wives and mothers (1976:59-61).

An additional consequence of the focus on heavy industry was a

decline in the state's investment in consumer goods to about nine

percent of total investment (Cheng, 1974:55). As Weinbaum argues, the

slack led to inflated consumer prices and thus to higher wage demands by

state workers, lb deflect rising wage costs, the state encouraged women

to engage in domestic production of consumer goods for use (Weinbaum,

1976:42-43). Again, women's organizations played an important role in

implementing this policy. Indeed, the slogan of the Women's Congress of

1957 became "Build up the country economically; manage the household

thriftily; and struggle for socialist construction" (Davin, 1976:65).

Finally, family solidarity was an important theme in this period

and divorce became increasingly difficult to obtain (see Kristeva,

1975:65). The overall thrust was a resurgence in traditional female

roles (including arranged marriage) during the period of urban-centered

industrial expansion.

By the end of the Plan, industrial growth was impressive, but it

was not in any way matched by growth in agriculture. Intersectoral

imbalances led to raw material shortages, supply bottlenecks and

inadequate consumer goods provision (Eckstein et al . , 1968:6). It was

in the context of these conditions that the Leap policy was implemented.

The problem they faced was that of maintaining industrial growth in

addition to fostering agricultural growth.

2. The Great Leap Forward

Mao's solution, that of 'walking on two legs' was the

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simultaneous development of agriculture and industry, heavy and light

industry, and modern and traditional technology (Hou, 1968:379). In a

context of scarce capital, the state's solution was to use

capital-intensive means in heavy industry and substitute labour for

capital in other development (Hou, 1968:381).

The impact on the policies regarding women was clear. Mass

mobilization of labour power for socialist development demanded the

large scale entrance of women into production. Vt\at is interesting,

however, is the context of their entrance. In rural areas, where male

cadres significantly controlled the production process, women were

overwhelmingly represented in seasonal labour and in sectors of

traditional technological organization such as irrigation, reclamation

and flood-control (see Andors, 1976:91 and Hou, 1968).

In urban areas there were several consequences of significance.

First, between 1958 and 1960, the state set up a state-controlled sector

of urban commune cr 'street' industry. This sector employed a total of

two million workers, of whom eighty-five percent were women (Hou,

1968:381). Organized for small-scale production of consumer goods, this

sector allowed several advantages: it alleviated the state's need for

consumer goods production given its low rate of investment; it brought

private supplementary income into the household, lowering the necessary

wage bill to the state, and, finally, it was a means of absorbing a

large supply of labour in the urban area (Weinbaum, 1977:43). In

addition, a sectoral division of labour by sex tended to peripheral ize

women into either service sectors or the traditionally organized , low

investment sectors of industry (see Hou, 1968) .

Finally, in 1959 the birth control campaign of earlier periods

was halted (Hou, 1968:383). Apparently the strategy of using labour as

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a primary form of capital implies a renewed emphasis on the role of

women as reproducers. Unfortunately, the state expected women to serve

both productive and reproductive roles with no compensation and little

service support for the latter.

The Leap period was a dismal failure for several reasons, not the

least of which were a variety of natural disasters. In the years to

follow, what occurred was really a power struggle concerning approaches

to development. While right-wing strategists controlled the state, a

reversion to social conservatism and material incentives was accompanied

by a retrenchment in the role of women, including the revival of feudal

customs such as bride-price in certain areas (£ndors, 1976:94). When

Mao regained control, a re-anphasis on Leap strategies led to policies

on women similar to those of 1958-60. While historical conditions

obviously differed, the real patterns for fluctuating state policies on

women in socialism stem from the first decade of Chinese development.

While an in-depth historical treatment of these periods is

required to fully explore the role of the state and its manipulation of

female status, I think the above discussion is suggestive of the

linkages. Essentially, it indicates that women are used to 'absorb 1 the

costs of production in socialism. I emphasize that the tenor of this

analysis is not to suggest that socialist revolution is, therefore, a

dead-end for socialist feminists. Certainly in China, the position of

women has progressed remarkably relative to pre-revolutionary

conditions. What I am suggesting is that there have also been blocks in

that process toward liberation, blocks which do not seem to wither away

with time or technology. The task seems to be that of articulating the

process of revolution, the process of transition to socialism, and above

all, our place in these processes. Glib references to historical

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inevitability can only bind us to a naive faith in the historical

ocnent. Ultimately, it is necessary to realize that revolution is an

engineered process and, consequently, that female status is partially

determined by the priorities of the engineer.

NOTES

fl] The distinction as employed here refers to the type and organization
of labour performed. 'Productive' refers to labour performed in the
public sphere and 'reproductive' refers to labour (including actual
reproduction) performed in the private sphere of the family unit.

[2] It is perhaps important to note at this point that I am not
concerned in this paper with the issue of conditions leading to
socialist revolution in the pre-revolutionary period. Rather, I am
interested in the point at which the revolutionary movement is
already in progress and, subsequent to success, is transformed into
a socialist regime.

[3] Documents available in English in Meijer (1972).

[4] For extended discussion, see Croll (1978:194-196) or Davin
(1976:28-29).

[5] For extended discussion, see Wong (1973) and Hsiao (1969). Hsiao
also contains English translations of documents.

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Davin, Delia
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