PUBLIC BROADCASTING IN CANADA:
SUBORDINATE SERVICE

DAVID SKINNER
Simon Fraser University

INTRODUCTION

It is a popular conception that although broadcasting
regulation was undertaken to give public broadcasting the central
role in the broadcasting system, today the situation is reversed
and the public service mainly compensates for the inadequacies of
private broadcasters (Salter 232). Generally, proponents of this
view frame the history of broadcasting as a struggle between
competing interest groups, with those representing the cultural
objectives of broadcasting locked in a losing battle with
economically motivated private interests.

This paper places the history of public broadcasting, as
represented in the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), in a
different perspective. Focusing on the historical relations
constructed between the state and private capital through
intervention, it demonstrates that the structure of regulation has
subordinated public broadcasting to the economic interests of
private broadcasters since the legislation of the 1932 Broadcasting
Act. While the history of broadcasting is indeed the product of
real historical struggles, the regulatory framework has
contextualized these struggles so as to foreground the reproduction
of private capital. In this way, the marginal ization of public
broadcasting can be seen as more the product of the regulatory
framework than the political prowess of any particular interest
group

.

THE STATE, CAPITAL, AND REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS

The history of broadcasting regulation is of course
inextricably bound up within the history of the Canadian state.
From the rationales that have both prompted and guided
intervention, to the regulatory bodies that have shepherded the
growth of the system, to the political -economic forces that have
contextualized its growth - the state and its attendant instruments
and policies have played a central role in shaping the broadcasting
system. To develop a purchase on why public broadcasting is now
marginal to private interests within the broadcasting system, the
historical relations between the state and private capital must be
examined.

Tracing such relations has long been the project of Canadian
political econcr.iy. Here, the growth of private capital in Canada

26



has often been seen as fostered by government intervention. As
Aitken (184) notes:

The standard interpretation of the entire history of the
Canadian economy assigns to the state a major role in
guiding and stimulating development; on any reading of
the historical record government policies and decisions
stand out as the key factor.

Moreover, Panitch (14) writes that the state has "provided the
technical infrastructure for capitalist development when this was
too risky or costly for private capital to undertake itself, "and
that state ownership has not traditionally been undertaken "with
the aim of managing or controlling the economy, but always with a
view to facilitating further capital accumulation in the private
sphere to the end of economic growth." However, there is little
consensus as to why or how the state has acted in this manner.

Marchak (692) illustrates that the literature in this area has
traditionally forwarded two basic perspectives on the Canadian
state: i) an "instrumentalist version," which leads to the
expectation that the state "heeds capitalist demands in specific
instances"; ii) a structuralist version, which instead suggests
that the state "has 'relative autonomy' from business and
introduces legislation in response to numerous pressures." While
the instrumental approach is useful for sketching social relations
in particular historical moments, it portrays the state as subject
to the whims of particular individuals or elites and offers little
illustration of how the structure of the state constrains
relationships between the state and private capital. The
structuralist perspective, while moving to overcome this weakness,
often falls prey to a functionalist vision of the relations between
the state and private capital and fails to illustrate how these
relationships are maintained through changing social conditions.

The work of Claus Offe offers a way out of this impasse. For
Offe (13), the impetus to state intervention is embedded in the
very structure of the capitalist system which leaves the state both
dependent on the process of accumulation for its survival and yet
prohibits it from "organizing" production according to its own
political criteria (because) "property is private." Thus the state
is trapped in contradiction: on one hand, forced to intervene in
the economy to guarantee its own reproduction; on the other, to
structure its interventions such that they do not interfere with
the prerogatives of private capital. In accomplishing this the
state "protects and sanctions a set of rules and social
relationships" which give rise to accumulation. Over periods of
time, these practices are sedimented into institutional relations
between the state and private capital . Here the state is not the
instrument of the ruling class, nor does it defend the interests of
one class in some mechanistic way. Rather, by contextualizing
social struggles in terms of reproduction of private capital, it

27



protects the "common interest of all members of a capitalist class
society." Following Offe's line of analysis, both the regulatory
commission and the crown corporation, instruments central to the
broadcasting system, can be seen as sets of institutional
relationships born of government support for the orderly growth and
maintenance of capital accumulation: the former acting as an
arbiter between competing interests; the latter providing
infrastructure for capital development.

The first regulatory commission was instituted in 1903 for the
resolution of problems between competing economic interests in the
operation of the railways. As the railways opened up areas of the
country for exploitation, tensions developed between railway
companies and economic interests situated in the hinterland. The
structure of the state proved inadequate for dealing with this
competition, and pressure mounted for an "independent" agency that
would possess both the expertise to make decisions regarding
railways and be distant enough from government to be somewhat
insulated from political currents of perquisites and patronage.
The regulatory commission combined legislative, judicial, and
executive functions in one structure and basically functioned to
adjudicate disputes between private interests and offer some
assurance of the regular operation of these vital links in the
economic infrastructure.

The literature on regulatory commissions generally interprets
their evolution in one of two ways: older works see state
intervention as moving to "correct the failures of the marketplace,
enhance the quality of life, and ensure economic efficiency and
minimum rates by bringing a broader conception of public
responsibility to bear on the conduct of private monopoly;" while
more recent analyses forward "a much more critical 'capture'
theory, which holds that regulatory agencies almost invariably
become servants rather than masters of the industries over which
they preside, and that in the rational pursuit of its long term
security, business actively sought state regulation to escape the
travails of the market," (Nelles 189). However, questions of
whether or not regulation was instituted at the behest of industry
tend to obscure larger questions regarding the role of the
regulatory commission in the economy. As the Privy Council (110)
notes

:

Regulatory commissions ... exists largely because the
adjudicative role which they perform could not be
performed by departments under the more or less
continuous direction of a minister ... commissions and
tribunals are uniquely constructed to dispense privileges
- usually amongst competing interests - and arbitrate
rights

.

Indeed, in their dispensing of privileges and rights the Board of
Railway Commissioners and its progenitors can be seen as dedicated

28



to the smooth allocation of property rights and the orderly growth
and maintenance of private capital . Whether adjudicating between
directly competing groups of private capital, or between monopoly
capital and the "public interest", they foreground an allocative
rationale that focuses on the growth or development of the system
within which they are embedded. In fulfilling this role, the
regulatory commission constructs a particular set of relations
between the state and private capital - relations which are not
dependent on the policy stream in which the instrument is located.

Government ownership too was born out of pragmatic necessities
in the maintenance of capital accumulation. With the Union Act of
1840, the state became directly involved in the development of
economic infrastructure such as canals and railways. Innis (1933:
80) offers a summary of the operational imperative of this
activity

:

Government ownership is fundamentally a
phenomenon peculiar to a new country, and an
effective weapon by which the government has
been able to bring together the retarded
development and the possession of vast natural
resources, matured technique, and a market
favourable to the purchasing of raw materials.
It was essentially a clumsy, awkward means of
attaining the end of immediate investment of
tremendous sums of capital, but it was the
only means of retaining a substantial share of
the returns from virgin natural resources.
Canada's development was essentially
transcontinental . Private enterprise was not
adequate to the task, although the success of
government ownership has tended to obscure the
paramount importance of its contributions
during the early stages of capital formation.

Through both subsidy and direct ownership, the early Canadian stage
was able to rapidly secure territory and develop resources while
deferring the cost of development through legislative structures.
The crown corporation represents a further institutionalization of
this process.

Fuelled by the unsubstantiated optimism of the federal
government in the first decade of this century and the trials of
war in the second, the debts of two of Canada's three
transcontinental railways had grown beyond the management of the
private sector by 1917. After much deliberation, nationalization
seemed to be the only way to prevent bankruptcy and the negative
effects on both private individuals and Canada's credit in foreign
capital markets that might arise from it. The Canadian National
Railway (CNR) was the state's response to this crisis.

29



As a means for the consolidation and public appropriation of
private debt the new corporation was quite a success, investors
were largely protected and the railways were maintained. However,
the structure of the company was not conducive to capital
accumulation. On one hand, its assets were a patchwork of isolated
railways. While these were important for the maintenance of
commercial activities in the communities which they serviced, as
commercial enterprises they were marginal at best. On the other
hand, the company was saddled with a tremendous debt to service and
subject to small and unpredictable Parliamentary appropriations for
working capital. As Innis (1933: 58) notes, this structure placed
the CNR in a subordinate position to the CPR in relation to both
railway markets and advances of new transportation technologies
and, over time, would lead it "to become a buffer between the
Canadian Pacific and the vicissitudes of railway earnings in
Canada." Rather than offering direct competition to private
enterprise then, this structure focussed the crown corporation on
the edges of the commercial railway system and extended the reach
of private capital in the development of national resources.
Further to this point, Innis (1933: 55-56) writes:

government ownership at present represents a force in
favour of continued and rapid exploitation, and there is
little evidence that it is being used, or that it can be
used, as a weapon designed for other purposes of
importance to the Canadian people in the long run.
Government ownership will continue to be a most potent
factor in the rapid development of the country.

Historically then, these regulatory instruments sedimented
particular sets of relations between the state and private capital
in institutional form: the regulatory commission working to
safeguard the smooth allocation of resources and expedite the
orderly expansion of capital; state ownership, with its focus on
commercially marginal activities, working to extend the reach of
private capital in the development of resources.

THE ORIGINS OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING

Prang notes that the introduction of public broadcasting to
Canada was a move of "defensive expansionism" as the state strove
to protect and nurture its broadcasting resources from the
intrusion of American broadcasting signals. However, this
intervention was not motivated solely by economic concerns, for
radio broadcasting was imbued with nationalist cultural
significance early in its history. To understand how these
cultural concerns structure broadcasting policy, some illustration
of the historical significance of the nationalist ideal that gives
rise to these concerns and its relation to the Canadian state is
necessary

.

30



As Charland (202) illustrates, the early development of the
Canadian nation state had both physical and discursive components:

(1) The existence of a transcontinental Canada required
the development of a system of transportation
facilitating territorial annexation, colonization, and
the implantation of a physical presence. (2) The
existence of this Canada also required the development of
a rhetoric which ideologically constituted those in
Canada as Canadians, united in the national project and
under the political authority of a national government.

Through constituting a particular set of historical subjects,
this discourse constructed the idea of a "Canadian" nation state.
Legitimated by this notion of nation, the state was empowered to
intervene in the economy and undertake the physical components of
nation building. However, once the project of Confederation was
firmly underway, this "discourse of nationalism" did not simply
disappear. It remained a central legitimating force in
underwriting federal initiatives.

While the discourse of nationalism informed the practice of
radio broadcasting in the early 1920's, it was not until the Report
of the Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting (Aird Report) that it
became central to the development of broadcasting policy. Informed
by a commercial rationale, private broadcasting in Canada was
largely constructed as an extension of American broadcasting
empires. This inhibited the growth of a Canadian based industry
and raised nationalist concerns. Building on these concerns, the
Aird Report (6) stated that radio "could become a great agency in
fostering national consciousness and unity" but because of the
preponderance of foreign programming available "the minds, ideals,
and opinions of Canadians, particularly the young, are being shaped
into moulds not specifically Canadian." Here then, the commission
implicitly recognized what Innis (1951) would call the "space
binding" nature of the new medium. Central to this vision, was a
conception of the medium as a purveyor of nationalist cultural
ideas the might bind the country together. From Aird on, these
nationalist concerns became a central feature of broadcasting
policy discussions. These concerns, in concert with the structure
of regulation, set up a series of relations between the state,
private capital, and the practice of broadcasting - relations which
have been instrumental in the marginalization of public
broadcasting in Canada.

The struggle for public broadcasting that followed the Aird
Report is well documented in the literature and does not need to be
rehearsed in detail here. It is generally argued that with the
legislation of the 1932 Broadcasting Act and the institution of the
Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission (CRBC) the nationalist
forces won the day, (Prang). Indeed, the discourse of nationalism

31



and its attendant concerns appear to firmly undergird Prime
Minister R. B. Bennett's speech to the House of Commons introducing
the first Broadcasting Act:

this country must be assured of complete
Canadian control of broadcasting from Canadian
sources, free from foreign interference of
influence. Without such control radio
broadcasting can never become a great agency
for communication of matters of national
concern and for the diffusion of national
thought and ideals, and without such control
it can never be the agency by which
consciousness may be fostered and sustained
and national unity still further
strengthened. .. .no other scheme than that of
public ownership can ensure to the people of
this country, without regard to class or
place, equal enjoyment of the benefits and
pleasures of radio broadcasting. Private
ownership must necessarily discriminate
between densely and sparsely populated
areas.... Happily... under this system there
is no need for discrimination: all may be
served alike. (Cited in Peers 101-102.)

However, in practice, the CRBC fell short of being the "great
agency" promised in Bennett's speech.

The CRBC was somewhat of a hybrid of the regulatory commission
and crown corporation: on one hand, empowered to regulate private
broadcasting; on the other, charged with carrying on the business
of broadcasting in Canada. This division of responsibilities
recognized the legitimacy of private ownership within the system
while allowing for public participation. However, positioned as a
government department, the commission's powers of self-
determination were severely constrained by legislation,
particularly regarding the acquisition of property, the appointment
of staff, and the acquisition and disposition of funds. Attempts
to have the Broadcasting Act amended to provide greater autonomy
were to no avail, (Peers 118-128). This structure, which
circumscribed the commission's activities in the marketplace and
left it open to pressure from both the government and the private
sector, focussed the commission's activities toward the edges of
the commercial system.

While enough money to make a substantial step toward building
a wholly publicly owned broadcasting system was generated through
regulation, the CRBC was dependent on the government for passing on
these funds and they were not forthcoming, (Peers 108-136).
Consequently, the commission's plans to construct a chain of high-
powered stations across the country were stymied and most of its

32



efforts focussed on network broadcasts and program production,
(Malone, 31). In those early days, high transmission costs
mitigated against network broadcasting in Canada, (Weir 50-55).
But because such arrangements were seen as important to the
national character of the system, they were undertaken almost
single-handedly by the commission. In an effort to induce
broadcasters to run Canadian programming rather than import or copy
American programs, the commission produced and distributed
programming free of charge. When private stations balked at this
prospect, the commission often paid them to affiliate with its
networks and/or take on its programming, (Weir 56). Further,
because of national considerations, commercially unprofitable
service to less populated areas of the country was shouldered by
the commission.

In practice then, the CRBC's nationalist vision of
broadcasting generally subordinated its activities to the
commercial interests of the private stations. In the face of
foreign broadcasting incursions, it moved to develop aspects of the
Canadian broadcasting resource that private industry was loathe to
and subsidize the operation of private stations with both
programming and cash during the tough economic times of the early
1930's. The role of the discourse of nationalism is crucial here.
For, though constituting nationalist goals for broadcasting, it
directed the activities of the commission away from those of
private broadcasters. Coupled with a structure that left it open
to both budget restrictions and pressure from private broadcasters,
these goals narrowed the activities of the commission to those of
primary national concern. As a result, the CRBC moved to fill in
the void created by the contradiction between the logic of
commercialism and the discourse of nationalism and lay the
foundation for the development of a Canadian-based broadcasting
system. While the form of public broadcasting and its
technological conditions have changed through time, the basic
relations between the state, public broadcasting, and private
capital constructed by regulation have remained the same.

THE EARLY CBC

The 1936 Broadcasting Act transferred the CRBC's regulatory
powers to the CBC while clearly distancing it from the government
through casting it in the form of an "independent" crown
corporation. But while it had a guaranteed income, the ability to
borrow money, and control over its staff, the CBC's powers were
still severely circumscribed by the requirements that it have
permission from the Governor-in-Council for expenditures over a
certain amount, for the acquisition of property, or for securing
loans or advances. Because the ability to acquire and dispose of
capital is the essence of corporate freedom, the CBC's independence
was in practice more of a possibility than an achievement. This
structure, combined with its sel f -espoused national mandate,
continued to focus the public broadcaster's commercial, network,

33



was in practice more of a possibility than an achievement. This
structure, combined with its sel f -espoused national mandate,
continued to focus the public broadcaster's commercial, network,
and programming policies away from the practices of private
broadcasters and toward the development of the national system.

Network activities were again structured in favour of private
capital. While network broadcasting in the late 1930's was still
not lucrative enough to attract private investment, it continued to
form a major portion of the CBC's activities. Private stations
formed an important role in this network, filling in large gaps in
national coverage. Revenue sharing arrangements for such
broadcasts were more generous than those American stations struck
with their affiliates, and little if any pressure appears to have
been exerted on private stations to join the CBC network or carry
CBC programming (Malone 34). As the economic climate improved and
the CBC demonstrated the viability of network operations, pressure
from the private sector resulted in both an increase in the CBC's
national network coverage and the relaxing of network affiliation
rules to allow private stations to form their own regional
networks

.

Through this period the CBC's production practices continued
to offer little interference with the private sector. Production
often focused on types of programming that were considered to be
either culturally enriching or of national significance, such as
symphonies and radio plays or "actuality" broadcasts and current
affairs. These types of programming were not particularly
attractive to advertisers because of their narrow audience appeal
and/or expense. Advertising practices too were different from
those of private broadcasters. In an attempt to set a high
standard for advertising content, the CBC formulated a commercial
acceptance policy which considerably narrowed the types of
advertising revenue it would accept. Further, because it perceived
itself as a "national" broadcaster, the CBC does not appear to have
contracted either local business or spot advertising through the
1940's, leaving this business for private broadcasters (Weir 200-
203) .

The crown corporation structure also left the CBC both
financially and authoritatively ill-equipped to regulate the
activities of the private sector. Transgressions regarding
commercial activity, content requirement, and promises of
performance were often reprimanded yet evaded punishment in the
face of unclear authority. These problems continued to grow
through the 1940 's and were compounded after World War II with the
introduction of television in the United States. Until, as Peers
(1969: 379) notes, by the year 1948:

several questions demanded the attention from the
government. First, an authoritative answer was needed on
who should regulate and control the activities of the

34



private stations; their scope and function had to be
defined or restated. Second financial provision had to
be made for the CBC; the license fee... was now clearly
inadequate... Third, there was the new problem of
television. The country, it seemed, would be faced with
the same kinds of difficult choices that had confronted
it when radio broadcasting developed. The difference was
that the pace would be faster, the costs would be greater
- and the stakes would be higher.

While the CBC began to make plans for the implementation of
television in 1947, these were dealt a serious blow early in 1948
when the government refused them funding. From this time until the
legislation of the 1958 Broadcasting Act, the federal government
assumed the responsibility for setting television policy, as both
public and private broadcasters jockeyed for position in this new
broadcasting market.

In early 1948 it looked as though the CBC would be relegated
to a licensing and regulatory role regarding television, similar to
the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC). However, the
applicants apparently most able to proceed were foreign-owned,
which raised objections from the Canadian Association of
Broadcasters (CAB), (Peers, 1979: 11). Delay followed and
Canadian cities were flooded with programming from American border
broadcasters

.

Under pressure from a number of sources, the government
announced an interim television policy in March of 1949. This
policy stated that television would be developed by both public and
private enterprise, with the CBC establishing stations and
production centres in Toronto and Montreal and supplying
programming to private stations in other parts of the country.
However, these plans were again modified in 1952 when the
government, reacting to the nationalist concerns of the Report of
the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters,
and Sciences (Massey Commission) made another major television
policy statement:

The government believes, with the Royal Commission, that
television should be developed in Canada with the aim of
benefitting our national life and that it should have the
structure and means required by Canadian conditions to
ensure adequate amounts of Canadian programs for
Canadians as well as using some of the material from
outside the country. Television will undoubtedly play a
considerable part in the lives of many Canadian
families... The government believes it should be so
developed in Canada that it is capable of providing a
sensible pattern of programming for Canadian homes with
at least a good portion of Canadian content reflecting

35



Canadian ideas and creative abilities of our own people
and life in all parts of Canada, (Fowler Report: 315).

While the nationalist goals of broadcasting contextualized
this statement, the system the government envisioned was not a
purely public model. This plan moved to establish CBC stations in
Ottawa, Halifax, Vancouver, and Winnipeg as well as Toronto and
Montreal while leaving other centres open to development by private
interests. Only one station would be licensed in any given area
and network arrangements, still too expensive to be attractive to
private capital, would be the responsibility of the CBC.

The CBC began broadcasting in September of 1952 in Toronto and
Montreal , and the first private station opened in Sudbury in
October of 1953. From this point television grew extremely
quickly. A year and a half later there were seven CBC stations and
nineteen private stations. And, by March of 1958, there were eight
CBC stations and thirty-six private outlets, (Ellis 35). The CBC
supplied much of the impetus to this growth, funnelling
$170,000,000 into the development of television between 1952 and
1957. Much of this money indirectly subsidized the operations of
private broadcasters through supplying them with programming and
facilities. Further, affiliate agreements between the CBC and
private broadcasters operating in economically marginal markets
acted as a buffer between these businesses and the travails of
market development.

After their election, the Conservatives made good on their
longstanding promise to institute an independent regulatory
commission in broadcasting with the passage of the 1958
Broadcasting Act. With this Act, the CBC lost control over
licensing and network regulation and was set on more or less equal
footing with private broadcasters before the Board of Broadcast
Governors (BBG), competing for licenses and privileges. However,
in practice this realignment of power relations was not as dramatic
a shift from the status quo as some critics claim. The 1957 Report
of the Royal Commission on Broadcasting (Fowler Report: 224) had
already recommended the creation of a separate public agency that
would be responsible for all matters of regulation. While this
report took pains to point out that this was not the same
organization as the independent regulatory board advocated by
private broadcasters, it did note that before the new board there
might be "competition between the CBC and private applicants for
new licenses." Further, because the government had acted as an
arbiter between the CBC and private interests in the competition
for television licenses, the new legislation was in many ways
simply legislative recognition of existing regulatory conceptions
and relationships.

The al locative rationale of the new board quickly became
apparent. As the BBG assumed its responsibilities, the government
announced that in mid-September of 1959 applications for second

36



stations in areas already served with television would be
considered. Rising out of this second station policy, an
application to operate a private network was heard in April of 1961
and the CTV network began broadcasting in October. As Anderson
(84) illustrates, the new stations', and consequently the new
network's, success was largely dependent on the degree to which
they could "cut into CBC commercial revenues and the amount of
programming it could sell to the Corporation's affiliates." While
both the new stations and the new network got off to a rocky start,
with a little help from the BBG by way of relaxing regulations, the
second stations were soon profitable while the CBC reported
declines in commercial revenue.

Encouraged by government and its structure as a regulatory
board, the BBG had both explicit and implicit mandates to expand
the broadcasting system. Throughout its tenure it was almost
constantly at odds with the CBC over how such expansion would be
undertaken. With the CBC constrained both financially and through
its dedication to the national purposes of broadcasting, it was
inevitable that thi.s expansion would come at the expense of the
public broadcaster. 6

THE CRTC

With the 1968 Broadcasting Act, and the institution of the
Canadian Radio-Television Commission (CRTC), the relations between
the CBC and private broadcasters were little changed. However,
with this Act the nationalist goals of public broadcasting finally
found voice in legislation and the CBC was officially harnessed to
presenting a "balanced service of information" in both English and
French, extending service to "all parts of Canada", and
contributing "to the development of national unity... (and the)
continuing expression of Canadian identity," (Section 3(g)). While
the forces at work in the broadcasting system during the 1970's and
1980 's have been varied and complex, both the structure of
regulation and the CBC's mandate continued to focus public
broadcasting toward the edges of the system.

Following an al locative rationale, the CRTC sought to enhance
Canadian representation within the broadcasting system during the
1970's by increasing the number of licensees. Generally, this led
to a further marginalization of public broadcasting through both
intensifying competition for audiences and increasing the amount of
foreign programming available within the system. Following its
mandate, the CBC fought this tide by increasing its commitment to
the production of Canadian programming, extending broadcasting
service through its Accelerated Coverage Plan, and devoting
increasing attention to issues such as northern and native
broadcasting. As the 1970's drew to a close though, the
uncontrolled reception of American satellite broadcasts threatened
the whole regulatory framework, (CRTC, 1980). In an effort to head
off this latest invasion of American programming, the CRTC

37



increased its licensing activity further fragmenting broadcasting
markets, (CRTC, 1985).

Throughout this period, budget cuts undermined the CBC ' s
abilities to respond to these changes in the broadcasting
environment. Since the mid-1970's, recessionary pressures on the
state have placed increasing emphasis on the role of the private
sector and the supposed benefits of competition, (McNulty 196).
Coupled with the increase in private sector representation, these
economic forces have further diminished the role of public
broadcasting in the system.

As the private sector has continued to fill the broadcasting
system with more foreign programming, the CBC has predictably
reacted by renewing its commitment to develop a greater quantity of
"distinctive" Canadian programming. This strategy is evidenced
in how the corporation dealt with the 1991 budget cuts:
withdrawing from local news production (ostensibly because this
service "duplicates" that of the private sector); promising
increased regional news programming (a market now underserved by
private broadcasters); and renewing its commitment to
"Canadianizing" its program schedule . However, this strategy again
finds the public broadcaster emphasizing values that are marginal
to the commercial system and it will put a further strain on the
CBC's resources. Given that local news and foreign programming
have traditionally been major sources of commercial revenue, these
cutbacks will bring about both a decline in revenue as audiences
shrink and an increase in production costs as new programs are
produced.

It is interesting to note how these commitments, with their
apparently negative impact on the commercial revenue of the
corporation, come at a time when the proliferation of private
broadcasting services have severely fractured advertising markets
and threatens loss of income to all. However, while there has
undoubtedly been pressure from the private sector to push the CBC
further away from commercial advertising markets, the greatest
impetus in this direction appears to have come from within the
corporation itself as it has moved to pursue cultural concerns in
the face of increased foreign program incursions and focus on
developing aspects of the system that are being overlooked by the
commercial rationale of private broadcasters.

38



CONCLUSION

While the history of broadcasting in Canada has indeed been a
history of struggles between competing interests, the structure of
regulation has consistently placed the public sector forefront in
developing the broadcasting system. First with the CRBC, and later
with the CBC, public broadcasting has functioned to both generate
and consolidate broadcasting resources. With their abilities to
both generate revenue and distribute it to specific sites, these
organizations excelled as development instruments. Under their
shepherding the private sector flourished, leading to pressure for
further allocation of available resources as private capital
developed the capacity to undertake more responsibilities.

At the centre of this division of labour between the private
and public sectors has been the contradiction between the cultural
goals of broadcasting and the economic rationale that guides
private capital. Presently, this contradiction is expressed at a
number of different levels within the various elements of the
system: in the practices of the CBC, where it is torn between the
commercial imperatives of broadcasting and the pursuit of broad
social and nationalist goals; in the practices of the private
sector, where the purchase of cheap foreign programming is favoured
over program production; in relations between the private sector,
the public broadcaster, and the regulator, where the private sector
is generally found to be in a better financial position to assume
new licenses than the CBC; and in Parliamentary debates and
government studies, where commendations of the public sector are
often accompanied by calls for further austerity. These
contradictions have moved to frame power relations between the
private and public sectors such that the public sector both seeks
and is pushed toward the economic edge of the system and a
subordinate position with regard to revenue production. However,
while the mandate of the corporation will inevitably continue to
focus its activities on the economic margins of the system, it need
not continue its slow drift to obscurity. Through instituting some
form of funding independent of the political and economic fortunes
of the state - a form upon which the corporation might generate
future revenue opportunities - the CBC could strengthen its
position at the leading edge of the broadcasting system.

39



Endnotes

1. In this way they represent a step in the historical
institutionalization of capital relations between the state and
private capital. See Dubruc (1966) for a discussion of how the
Canadian state has historically moved toward the promotion of
private capital accumulation.

2. While the concept of discourse presented here dovetails with
Charl iid's notion of the term there are several important
differences, particularly regarding the relationship between
rhetoric and discourse and the role of technology in this
discourse. For a comparison see Charland (1986: 196-21) and
Skinner (1988: 5-24).

3. See Canada. Canadian-Radio Broadcasting Act Statutes of
Canada, (C. 51, 1932): Section 8 A.

4. Interestingly, Weir (165) illustrates the CRBC's first network
contract with the railroad telegraph companies was sensitive to
their commercial interests and contained this clause:

The commission undertakes and agrees not to employ the
said transmission lines for commercial broadcasting
purposes and agrees not to compete with the railways in
the commercial broadcasting field. If, however, the
commission hereafter determines to undertake commercial
broadcasting, it shall give to the railways and to each
of them reasonable notice of its intention so to do and
in such an event the commission shall not undertake such
commercial broadcasting unless and until the amounts to
be paid by the commission to the railways for the use of
the said transmission lines for such purposes shall have
been mutually agreed upon.

5. Weir (200-203) illustrates how the CRBC's close relationship
with government led to its eventual downfall with the "Mr. Sage"
scandal .

6. As the general manager of the CBC noted in 1946, scheduling
practices often worked in conjunction with program production to
minimize audience appeal

:

The CBC does not try to obtain a mass audience all of the
time. The easy and profitable way of doing this is to
put programs which are not supposed to be big audience
builders outside peak listening times. This we have
resolutely refused to do. (Quoted in Weir 272).

7. See the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Annual Report 1959.
Further, Weir (331) notes that "during the first three months of
the life of most private television stations, up to 85 per cent of

40



their programs were supplied by the CBC without cost to them."
Also, through lease agreements, the CBC was a major source of
financing for the Trans-Canada Telephone System's microwave system
and it often shared these channels with the private networks free
of charge, (Weir 331).

8. Skinner (1988) offers a thorough discussion of how this
expansion took place at the expense of the CBC.

9. Through its interest in the latter, the corporation played an
important role in financing the development of satellite
broadcasting as Telesat's only broadcasting customer from 1973 to
1981.

10. See for instance: the CBC The Strategy of the CBC 1983; CBC
Let's Do It! 1985; CBC New Broadcasting Policy For Canada March
1987.

41



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