HISTORICAL MATERIALISM BY CROSS- SECTIONAL SURVEY
DESIGN

:

THE LIMITS OF E.O. WRIGHT'S STUDY OF CLASS
STRUCTURE

DAVID S. HUBKA
Carleton University

INTRODUCTION

Few sociological debates have generated as much interest as
those dealing with Marxist or neo-Marxist class analysis. The most
discussed and critiqued contribution to this area in the past
decade has been that of E.O. Wright (e.g. Wright, 1978; Wright,
1986a). Wright's project has undergone a number of significant
revisions and reformulations, as Wright has continually
acknowledged and incorporated suggestions by his critics (see
Wright, 1989). This discussion will first review Wright's attempts
to extend Marx's analysis of class. Though the author is
supportive of Wright's general project to seek high levels of
Marxist theoretical integration (1989, p. 277), it is argued that
this integration is limited by a theory of history based on a
flawed thesis of structural determinacy with respect to class.
While Wright's efforts are specifically and admirably in the
interests of 'grand theorizing' (i.e. viewing class structures as
macro-level societal properties), his research focus is on micro-
level mechanisms related to individual class positions (pp. 274-
278). Though much discussion elsewhere deals with this and other
issues related to Marxist theories of history, the work of Marxist
historian Derek Sayer is presented as an example effective in
emphasizing the shortcomings of Wright's analysis. In sum,
Wright's practice of placing class position as causally prior to
other variables related conceptually to authority, autonomy and
property in a cross-sectional survey design provides less of a
basis for emancipatory strategy than do traditional Marxist
attempts to explain class through historical analysis. The most
optimistic prospects for Wright's efforts are finally argued to be
in repeating his research in the future, thereby providing a basis
for addressing historical evolutions in capitalist class relations.

In his most recent work, Wright (1989) considers a full range
of the many criticisms directed at his conceptualization and
analysis of class structure. His first assertion is that class as
a fundamental determinant of social change is "at the core of
Marxian class analysis" (p. 269). Theoretical impulses arising from
this core feature are, as Wright sees it, torn between developing
either simple or complex models of class structure in order to
enhance its explanatory power. To occupy class location is thereby
for Wright to be affected by a set of mechanisms which limit

64



individual capacities to make choices and act (p. 275). These
mechanisms for Wright generate empirically observable effects, one
of which is the capacity for collective action (p. 280). This
derives partially from a model of class in which individual
consciousness comes about through commonly lived experiences (in
this case jobs) and the theoretical assumption that class structure
shapes class conflict (p. 286). Wright seems limited in many ways
to describing how, in a single historical instance of class
relations, classes represent exploitative relations. Marxist
emancipatory strategy, on the other hand, can be argued as best
achieved by explaining class relations through historical analysis,
rather than by explaining various individual conditions by class
position through a cross-sectional survey design.

Wright (1986a) contends that Marx's original theory is
polarized between analysis of abstract structural maps and concrete
conjunctural maps (p. 6). The first of these is a structural
account of class positions, while the second is concerned with the
collective struggles of individual actors. Marx, according to
Wright, failed to systematically define and elaborate a concept of
"class" (ibid.) and thus provided little basis for linking these
polarized elements of structure and action. Despite this, recent
theory and research has attempted to bridge this gap between the
concrete and the abstract. Wright (1986a) describes the first of
these neo-Marxist attempts as dealing directly with the problem of
the "new middle class" (p. 8). The second of these attempts has
focused on processes of class formation. These processes have been
characterized through institutional mechanisms which are largely
autonomous from class structure, for example, political ideology
(ibid.). In general, neo-Marxist theory has attempted to reconcile
traditional Marxism with contemporary sociological class theory.
Wright's work (e.g. 1978; 1989) has also focused on this
reconciliation, and has in this way made significant contributions
to neo-Marxist debate. It is in this spirit of theoretical
integration that the present discussion weighs Wright's approach
with that of a more historically oriented method.

Wright's class theory (1978, 1986a) motivated the design of
the survey used in the machine-readable data file: Class Structure
and Class Consciousness: merged multi-nation file (1986b). This
project was intended to provide data for comparative research of
relational dimensions of inequality with special emphasis on
authority, autonomy, and property. While providing the basis for
scores of interesting studies, it can be argued that these data
provide Wright little basis for asserting macro-level theoretical
claims. It is argued in the present paper that this limitation is
a result of Wright's failure to adequately specify historicity
within the context of class formation and the potential for large
scale social change. Wright's theory of history is next reviewed,
and counter-arguments are presented.

65



THE HISTORY OF EMPTY PLACES

Wright (1986a) typifies Marx's analysis of class as
elaborating 1) Abstract Structural Maps: The determination of a
structure of empty places in class relations which are devoid of
people and 2) Concrete Conjunctural Maps: The manner in which the
people occupying these empty places organize in class struggle. He
argues that Marx emphasized only the second of these analyses:
"While he gives us a list of descriptive categories, corresponding
to the actual actors in the conflicts, he does not provide a set of
precise concepts for decoding rigorously the structural basis of
most of those categories" (p. 7). Wright's purpose is thus to carry
on Marx's work, 'filling in' the elaboration of these abstract
structural maps, in order to develop an 'effective correspondence'
between the two levels of analysis (p. 8).

Wright thus proceeds to apply concepts derived from historical
analysis, without himself carrying out historical analysis. He
contrasts Poulantzas and Skocpol , claiming that while Poulantzas
argues that the level of abstraction of mode of production is
sufficient to characterize the historical association of class and
state, Skocpol rejects the validity of this level of abstraction,
and argues for a "strictly historical (i.e. conjunctural)" analysis
of the relationship of the state to class structure (1986a, p. 12).
Both, claims Wright, are theorizing on the same level of
abstraction - that of the level of social formation. In Marxist
analysis, according to Wright, social formation equates to mode of
production. For Wright, mode of production is hence at the core of
the Marxist theory of the "developmental stages" of capitalism
(p. 17). Given that these stages are in fact "a specific kind of
general structural property" (ibid.), the level of abstraction of
the mode of production is, for Wright, effective in analyzing
historical stages of development.

By combining conceptually four historic modes of production,
Wright develops a typology of interpenetrated forms of production.
He is then able to identify divergent phases of capitalism, and to
thereby provide a range of possible immanent phases (Wright, 1983).
Wright furthermore discredits Marx for failing to develop this
so-called 'legitimate' form of historical materialism. In focusing
on the historical conditions of the formation of "concrete class
organizations, parties, shop floor organization unions," Marx is
argued to have 1) neglected the structural conditions of class:
"institutional variability in class relations in given jobs" (p. 9),
and furthermore to have 2) failed to develop a link between
theorized conjunctural class formation and undertheorized
conjunctural class structure (p. 13).

In proposing a 'Theory of History' Wright (1986a) provides a
"Typology of class structures, exploitation, and historical
transitions" (p. 115). The types of social formation in this
typology are sequentially feudalism, capitalism, statism, socialism

66



and communism. Wright also provides the 'historical task of
revolutionary transformation'. These in "turn represent
respectively increasing levels of emancipation: individual
liberty, socializing means of production, democratization of
organizational control, substantive equality, and
sel f -actualization. These increasing levels of emancipation, he
claims, represent the conditions by which successful transition to
the next stage may be made. The probability of achieving his tasks
depend directly on the level of the development of productive
forces on each level (p. 116). His trajectory of future societies
is thus probabilistic, as it is contingent on a set of
preconditions (ibid.). The historical transitions outlined by
Wright's version of historical materialism are consequently not
'iron laws', but rather provides a range of possibilities which
depend on the class structure at each given stage.

This is claimed to be an effective modification of traditional
historical materialism, which argues: "whenever a transition from
one form of class relations to another becomes historically
possible, forms of class struggle will develop that guarantee that
some transitions will occur" (Wright, 1986a, p. 117). In developing
a thesis specifically of "Capitalism's Futures'", Wright takes to
task rescuing historical materialism from this iron-clad law of
history: "one of the central thrusts of historical materialism has
always been that historical development occurred along a single
developmental trajectory... it is for this reason that historical
materialism is often considered a teleological philosophy of
history with one final state inexorably pulling social change
towards it" (Wright, 1983, p. 122). Arguing for a new structural
mode of production: "statism", Wright claims to effectively show
that there is not one future to capitalism (socialism), but in fact
two (socialism and statism). The structural determination of
capitalism's futures thus becomes a probabilistic determination
rather than an inexorable determination.

Not only does Wright claim to rescue historical materialism
from its surfeit of determinacy, but also increases the
revolutionary strategist's level of certainty. The primacy of
productive relations remains the key to social change, given that
this power structure determines the manner in which essential
resources can be used: "the decisive alternatives that are
historically possible revolve around the system of production and
appropriation" (p. 123). Thus, in the event of "revolutionary
rupture", an active, conscious effort must be made to prevent a
restoration of both capitalist power and statist power. Invaluable
to the revolutionary is this guide to the 'actual patterns of
social change' not readily provided by an unmodified historical
materialism (p. 123).

It can be argued, on the other hand, that Marx's method
supports neither an iron-clad law of history, nor a
probabilistically contingent one. The charges that Marx's

67



interpretation of history promotes iron-clad laws, resulted
partially from the fact that his method of presentation differs
from his method of inquiry (eg. Sayer, 1979, pp. 96-103). Marx
notes: "(inquiry) has to appropriate the material in detail, to
analyze its different forms of development, to trace out their
inner connections. Only after this work is done, can the actual
movement be adequately described. If this is done successfully...
it may appear as if we had before us a mere a priori construction"
(Marx quoted in Sayer, 1989, p. 92). "What is designated with the
words 'destiny', 'goal', 'germ', or 'idea' of earlier history is
nothing more than an abstraction from later history, from the
active influence which earlier history exercises on later history"
(ibid., p. 74).

There is evidence that Marx was hostile toward interpretations
of his work as advocating a generalized model of historical
determinacy. In rebutting such an interpretation, Marx charges the
author with taking out of context incidental texts and
"transforming (his) historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism
in Western Europe into a historico-philosophical theory of the
general course fatally imposed on all peoples, whatever the
historical circumstances in which they find themselves placed..."
(Marx quoted in Sayer, 1989, pp. 69-70). Gramsci's criticisms of
Bukharin are also suggestive here. Bukharin's division of Marx
into two components: 1) "a theory of evolution appearing as
sociology" and 2) "a philosophy which amount to crude materialism",
leads to an empty typology of historical forms. "Separated from
the theory of history and politics, philosophy cannot be other than
metaphysics, whereas the great conquest in the history of modern
thought, represented by the philosophy of praxis, is precisely the
concrete historicization of philosophy and its identification with
history" (Gramsci, 1971, p. 436).

If one accepts this as a viable interpretation, Marx's methods
and conclusions seem opposed to rather than elaborative of those
suggested by Wright. Production as an historical abstraction is a
theme common among Marxist scholars, but is itself "multiply
divided and diverges into different determinations", and as such
facilitates the identification of divergent, more concrete features
of these abstract continuities (Marx quoted in Sayer, 1989, p. 74).
While all historical epochs have different determinations of
production, they also have certain common determinations. This is
given by the very nature of production as an historical continuity
(p. 74-75). The labour process is the production of use-value,
which is necessary for affecting exchange of matter between people
and nature. This necessity implies that the production of
use-value is common to every phase of human existence. This
continuity, however, is not the entire picture and indeed, is not
even the most crucial part, in that it fails to provide the
differing social conditions of the production of use-value (for
example slavery, capitalism or hunting and gathering). From this
position, one can assert that Marx's method involves somewhat more

68



than identifying a rigid model of production relations and that, in
fact, such models could only form a single level of abstraction
useful only in defining a common aspect from which essential
differences can be further concluded. Marx claims: "success will
never come with the master-key of a general historico-philosophical
theory, whose supreme virtue consists in being supra-historical"
(ibid., p. 73).

Yet three traditional Marxist theses are redefined according
to Wright's "sympathetic" modifications. The first rejects the
traditional view (Marx's own) that "socialism is the immediate
imminent future capitalism", given that such a transition would
necessitate the equalization of two "exploitation assets": means
of production and organization (1986a, p. 117). There is clearly no
logical necessity for these to simultaneously occur, and hence
Wright concludes that both statism and socialism are possible
futures to capitalism. Second, Wright argues that other classes
have the potential to carry out revolution, and hence refutes the
Marxist opinion that "the proletariat are the only bearers of a
revolutionary mission within capitalism" (ibid.). Third, Wright
claims to show that socialism, contrary to Marx, has a "distinctive
form of exploitation". Marx, he claims, argued that socialism is
not a mode of production and merely constituted an intermediate
step to communism (p. 118). These three modifications do not,
according to Wright, undermine the important notion of progression
in Marx's view of historical trajectory, and consequently supposes
to retain support for Marx's claims (p. 118).

Wright (1986a) provides a typology of exploitation relations
which correspond to specific class structures, described as
"essentially a typology of modes of production" (p. 109). He
admits, however, that no society has only one form of exploitation.
In order to better characterize the form of exploitation observed
in societies, Wright provides three "axes of variabilities", which
typify the unique combinations of types of exploitation: 1)
"relative weight" of exploitation, 2) the degree of linkage of
exploitation to "internal" or "external" relations, and 3) the
degree to which various exploitations "overlap" or are "distinct"
from each other in a given society.

Given the possible combinations of four modes of production,
which necessarily involves four types of exploitation (feudal,
capitalist, statist, or socialist), Wright attempts to
operationalize the "relative weight" of these exploitations. He
first rejects the Marxist notion that one or another form of
exploitation must remain the "dominant mode", on the basis that two
or more forms may in fact carry equal weight in a single society
(p. 109). Possible operationalizations of relative weight are then
identified as 1) "the relative, aggregate magnitudes of...
appropriations of social surplus based on property rights by owners
of different exploitation-generating assets", 2) "a measure of the
'class power' of those who appropriate surplus", 3) the degree to

69



which the dominant mode is functionally associated with subordinate
modes and 4) the "dynamic effects of different exploitations"
(p. 109-111)

.

Wright then proceeds to argue for the fourth approach, but
claims that due to the "theoretical underdevelopment of our
understanding of the dynamics rooted in each of the forms of
exploitation other than capitalism, let alone the possibility of
distinct 'laws of motion' forced by distinct combinations of these
forms of production" it is overly difficult to operationalize this
notion of exploitation (p. 112). Wright provides no means of
identifying the degree to which types of exploitation overlap, or
are distinct from one another. He does assert, however, that in
societies where an overlap occurs, a higher degree of class
polarization exists. Implied in this is the notion that multiple
forms of exploitations, as reflected in class structure, can have
an additive effect on class struggle when combined in the same
society

.

Wright's form of structural causality is neither linear
(historic), nor expressive (i.e. reducing the constituent parts to
an essence of totality), but rather represents a causality
"imminent" in its effects. Though supposing to contribute to
con junctural , historical analysis through survey method, Wright is
limited by the historical specificity of cross-sectional data. His
model of class structure derives from Marx' s historical analysis of
the development of capital, but is reduced to expressing the
constituent elements of capital (e.g. class structure, class
struggle, class consciousness) within a recursive, cross-sectional
causal model

.

Cohen (1982) comments on the demise of Marxian sociology:
"despite the variety of theoretical strategies and political
positions that make up the spectrum of neo-Marxian class theory, an
unreflective relation to the Marxian original is characteristic of
them all" (p. 2). In contesting the theory of class boundaries
advocated by Poulantzas and Wright, she remarks: "The analysis
always proceeds from the side of 'structure', juggling and
elaborating categories ad infinitum in order that they might mesh
with the 'realities' of social stratification. Yet it is unclear
whether these realities are simply given, or, worse, derived from
the structures themselves. Since the old class concepts and
prejudices are presupposed from the onset, the key dilemma endemic
to any class theory based on Das Kapital cannot even be posed"
(p. 10).

Schmidt (1981) represents another opposition, and identifies
the dominant lack of interest in history as not simply the demise
of current western sociology, but also as a function of the
progress of bourgeois society (pp. 1-2). A generalized loss of
historical consciousness, leads to a failing conception of the
nexus of past and future. This further undermines a comprehension

70



of the causes of present conditions, and delimits the role of
individual agency in effecting future states. Wright's analysis of
cross-sectional data permits no explanation of the causes of
present class structure, and provides no evidence that present
exploitative relations are not in fact natural and eternal.

Wright attempts in this sense not even a crude historiographic
analysis, but rather proposes a series of hypotheses to be tested
within historically decontextualized data. Wright relies on
historical analysis only to the point that Marxist analysis has
already provided him with static class categories. Failing to
incorporate historical data, Wright's form of statistical method is
not justified by, but rather tends to require the causal
determinacy of class structure. Wright ' s method in effect does not
conform to, but rather opposes the logic of historical materialism.

CLASS STRUGGLE BY CLASS STRUCTURE

The criteria for developing his model of class structure,
claims Wright (1986a, pp. 27-37), is based on six constraints: 1)
class structure imposes limits on class formation, class
consciousness and class struggle. This constraint does not imply
that class structure exclusively determines class formation, class
consciousness, and class struggle (p. 29), but does necessitate the
conception of a causal association of class structure on these
other elements of class: "The argument that class structure imposes
basic limits on class formation, class consciousness, and class
struggle is essentially a claim that it constitutes the basic
mechanism for distributing access to resources in a society, and
thus distributing the capacity to act" (p. 28). This mechanism of
distribution is a qualifier placed by Wright on the claim made by
'most Marxists' that class structure is identified one way or
another as the basic determinant of the other three elements
(ibid.). While deeming class structure to be the basic mechanism
determining these elements, Wright acknowledges that he is unable
to provide a description of the precise manner in which this
determination occurs. Though offering that the precise mechanisms
are cognitive, or psychological, Wright proposes to inform as to
the more important, 'real' social mechanisms of determination.

Class struggle, in Wright's schema, provides the
'transformative principle' of class, but is ultimately determined
by class structure (p. 30). His second conceptual constraint is
thus: 2) "class structures constitute the essential qualitative
lines of social demarcation in the historical trajectories of
social change" (ibid.). Not only does class structure determine
class formation, class consciousness, and class struggle, but it
also "limits the possibility for other aspects of social structure"
(p. 31). Class structure, in this way "constitutes the central
organizing principles of societies" and within the area of
classical Marxism "the crucial historical line of social
demarcation remains class relations" (p. 31). From these premises,

71



Wright is able to claim that "class structure is the central
determinant of social power" (p. 31).

Organizational status is hence for Wright, a function of class
structure, which in turn imposes limits on an individual's or a
collectivities' capacity to act. Consciousness is the "realization
by the subordinate class that it is necessary to transform the
class structure if there is to be any basic changes in their
capacities to act, and the realization by the dominant class that
the reproduction of their own power depends on the reproduction of
the class structure" (1986a, p. 28). Though acknowledging that
class struggle constitutes the central transformative principle of
class structure, Wright argues that this process is itself
determined by class structure.

Wright's third constraint is simply 3) the concept of class
is a relational concept. This argument simply dissociates Marxist,
relational class concepts from gradational , typically income
determined class concepts. Wright argues that gradational class
concepts could not possibly provide the necessary "demarcations"
upon which a theory of history could be developed (p. 35). 4) The
social relations which define classes are intrinsically
antagonistic rather than symmetrical. Stated simply, classes
constitute opposing interests. Consequently, 5) the objective
basis of these antagonistic interests is exploitation, and hence
results in exploitative relations. Finally, 6) the fundamental
basis of exploitation is to be found in the social relations of
production. Here, Wright argues that Marxist class models are
necessarily production-centred.

In studying a cross-section of class structure, consequently,
Wright limits his approach to testing hypotheses in which class
position is causally prior to other variables measured in his
survey. While he identifies this ?.s a distinct contribution
fundamentally opposed to other types of class analysis (1989,
p. 269-78), he also claims to be committed to a high level of
Marxist theoretical integration (ibid., p. 277). The impetus for
this commitment comes partly from Marx's untimely death during his
work on class categories in the last chapter of Capital Volume III:
"What Constitutes a Class" (see Tucker, p. 441). Marx identifies
the three "big classes" of modern society as: 1) wage labourers 2)
capitalists and 3) land owners. Though Marx views the class
divisions of his England as "obliterated" by middle and
intermediate strata, he views the process of capital as one of
increasing polarization or "the (concentration) of scattered means
of production into large groups" (p. 441). Answering what
constitutes a class, Marx responds (at first glance) "the identity
of revenues and sources of revenues" (p. 442). This, however, is
seen as far too simplistic, given that, for example, physicians and
officials also constitute separate classes with this criteria.
Marx hence proposes that each class further involves an "infinite
fragmentation of interest and rank into which the division of

72



labour splits labourers as well as capitalists and landlords"
(p. 442). This suggests again that Marx's concept of class should
not be reduced to crude analytic categories, but as a continuing
process of polarization and concentration of class interests.

Sayer (1979) describes the paradox of Althusserian interpretations
of Marx, which seems relevant in addressing Wright's specific
approach. They attempt to overcome Marx's difficulty by ensuring
a correspondence of concept and reality. The "mystif actory
mechanism" which corresponds to ideological and phenomenological
forms could not be located as a subjective error of experience, but
must rather be seen as a subjective falsehood. In other words,
reality is not misinterpreted, but rather misrepresents itself. If
consciousness itself was to be doubted, a scientific interpretation
of reality would be impossible. Marx could not begin to promote
the "falsity of ideology (through a) materialist theory of
consciousness" if he were to accept that this falsity is only
subjective (p . 31)

.

Emancipation, could not, for Marx, be promoted through such an
investigation as is prescribed by Wright (1989, p. 16). It is not
the subjective illusions of capital, but rather the illusory
function of the objective forms of capital which promote human
alienation. It is an empirical analysis of the historical
development of these objective forms that provides the historical
revelation that capital is not given by nature, but is rather
imposed on people, by people.

Sayer (1979) argues: "fetishism involves a two-fold
transgression of proper categorical boundaries... on the one hand,
properties which distinguish phenomena as individual members of
classes and hence ought properly to be the object of historical
categories are subsumed under transhistorical categories and
explained by theses logically capable of accounting only for the
characteristics of the classes to which they belong... and on the
other hand, the historical attributes of the phenomena are thereby
falsely universalized (p. 46). Wright's analysis of class
categories does not avoid the fetishized nature of class, but in
fact contributes to it. For instance, the class distribution of
respondents appears to Wright only as a cross-sectional
description, not as historically contingent on capitalist forces of
production. "Fetishism presents a dehistoricized, desocialized
world whose makers are reduced to passive spectators in a mystery
not of their making. Marx's critique points behind this, to a
history. This is how Marx promotes the overcoming of human
self-alienation" (Sayer, 1979, p . 47 )

.

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CONCLUSION

Wright (1986a) claims to defend what he identifies as "The
core theses of Marxism" (p. 2). He terms his segment of the
academic community "analytic Marxism"; "The systematic
interpretation and clarification of basic concepts and their
reconstruction into a more competent theoretical structure"
(ibid.)- In reference to Marx's unfinished section of Capital,
volume 3 "What Constitutes a Class", Wright proposes that Classes
(1986a) represents an extension of Marx's theory of class structure
and class formation "faithful both to the theoretical agenda forged
in Marx's work, that is, understanding the development of the
contradictions of capitalism, and the political goals that agenda
was meant to promote" - understanding the conditions for the
revolutionary transformation of capitalist society (p. 16).

Historical materialism can be viewed as an approach wherein
the various forms of exploitation as manifested in certain
historical instances are studied. This materialist conception thus
generates a higher level of theoretical abstraction whereby
specific, less abstract societal forms can be understood. The key
to Marx's analysis is not the generalized mode of economic
exploitation as prescribed by Wright, but rather the specific
historical forms or manifestations of this universal fact.

Wright's empiricism fails to move beyond describing existing
structures, and is never conditioned by an awareness of the
diachronic. This implies that to understand a structure, one must
also understand both its transformations, and the range of its
possible transformations. Though Wright (1989) admits that his
method of class analysis "risks losing the dialectical and dynamic
character" of Marxist explanations, he claims that these risks are
worth taking (p. 16). Admitting further that his empirical
operationalizations of Marx's theory of class have generated only
modest insights, they have nonetheless served to "clarify a range
of dilemmas" (ibid.). Given, however, serious departures from both
Marx's methods and observations, Wright possibly reifies a
questionable version of Marx's classes, rather than extend his
explanations .

Wright admits that while progress has been made in the
conceptualization of class through his project in the past decade,
"nevertheless the goal of producing a class structure concept which
is at one time theoretically coherent and empirically comprehensive
remains elusive" (1989, p. 270). His approach remains, however,
that of increasing the complexity of his various class structure
typologies as a means of enhancing their explanatory power. In
discussing advances made in his project, Wright alludes to the
value of a general Marxist theory of history. His new structural
typology, Wright argues, has a "much stronger connection to the
general Marxist theory of history than did the earlier framework.
The structural typology on which the class structure map was based

74



had a clear standing within the general theory of the historical
trajectory of social forms" (p. 306). However, conceptually basing
a class typology on a generalized notion of epochal forms of
material relations is no more than paying a lip service to the
logic of historical analysis. The transformative principles
providing the means to emancipation at each stage can only be
implied, and not directly accessed through Wright's micro,
ahistorical research focus.

This is not to say that Wright's project is not valuable, for
it is in fact highly valuable. The survey has provided data for a
wide range of interesting and important studies (e.g. Clement,
1990; Hubka and Gillespie, 1989; Baer et al , 1987; Black and Myles,
1986; Winn, 1984) and has made significant inroads to combining
classical social theory with contemporary quantitative research
methods. However, as I have argued above, class is more
interesting as a dependent variable than as an independent variable
and, in the interests of social change, is best seen as a process
rather than as a structure. This opposition, on the other hand, is
a fact of meta-theory, and is not to be resolved presently, if at
all. The most valuable contribution of Wright's work will possibly
be made, ironically, at the point that his project itself becomes
a part of history - data of a past phase in capital relations.
Historians, for example, often rely on centuries old church records
to understand past demographic compositions. Marx's 18th Brumaire
is a now famous schematic of class interests and material
relations. Erich Fromm's survey of class consciousness among the
working class in Weimar Germany is a fascinating and insightful
study during an important period in world history (Fromm, 1984) .
The value of these sources of data to the social researcher today
lies in the capacity to observe an historical trajectory. The rise
of quantitative social research has involved a number of ongoing
survey projects (eg. The General Social Survey conducted by
Statistics Canada) enabling for the first time study of changes in
survey data over time. Given recent changes in the world order,
the predicted decline of U.S. economic strength and the continuing
rise of global capital, it seems likely that Wright's in depth
study of class structure will increase in value in the coming
decades

.

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REFERENCES

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