STUDYING PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC KNOWLEDGE:
NOTES TOWARD A WORKING DEFINITION OF IDEOLOGY*

Mary-Anne Kandrack
Department of Sociology-Anthropology

Carleton University

In the broadest terms, my interest in psychotherapy concerns
the production and circulation of knowledge and the
reproduction/transformation of relations of domination and
subordination. More specifically, I am currently examining the
limits and possibilities of feminist therapy as a transformative
politics and emancipatory intervention. The purpose of this
discussion, assuming that it is in and through discourse and
discursive practices that knowledge and ideology are linked, is to
suggest how ideology might be defined in the development of an
analytical framework for the critical exegesis of feminist therapy
that is being undertaken.

Before proceeding, it should be noted that my attempt to
( re)conceptualize ideology is, at least in part, a response to
Foucault's rejection of the concept (cf., 1980: 118). This simply
cannot be detailed here. Suffice it to say that it is imperative to
recognize power/knowledge as discursive practices that are as
enabling as they are constraining (Foucault, 1972, 1980; Thompson,
1980) and, at the same time, to employ the concept of ideology as
an analytical tool for specifying, with greater clarity and
precision, the distinction between subjugation and empowerment
(Kress, 1985).

The concept of ideology, as the literature demonstrates, is
highly controversial (Larrain, 1978; Marx and Engels, 1970;
Ricoeur, 1986; Thompson: 1984). It is not within the scope of this
discussion to provide even a cursory review of the work in this
area. One significant issue concerning the concept, however, is the
manner in which it has lost its critical, analytical edge inasmuch
as it has been used to refer to belief systems in general with
little or no reference to the critique of domination for which it
was originally intended (Jacoby, 1975; Thompson, 1984). The result
of this is that virtually everything and anything can be and has
been construed as ideological thereby rendering the concept little
more than a descriptive label. In short, the concept becomes an
adjective with minimal , if any, analytical utility. Notwithstanding
the difficulties associated with efforts to theorize ideology, I
take the position that such a concept is invaluable to my research
to the extent that it assists in distinguishing between domination
and resistance.

My effort to reformulate the concept of ideology proceeds by
situating it in relation to the substantive problem at hand,
namely, the contemporary discourse of mental illness. Therefore, it
is important to consider the discursive practices/knowledges

90



characteristic of psychotherapeutic rationality in the apparatuses
of subjugation, regulation and control. The rise to pre-eminence of
positivistic science, for example, has been a significant concern
in the history of psychiatry (Brown, 1984; Foucault, 1973; Ingleby,
1983; Scull, 1979). Positivistic rationality is implicated in the
knowledge(s) that construct the comprehension of socio-cultural as
well as material reality (Habermas, 1970). There are a number of
problems with the transposition of these epistemological and
methodological precepts from the natural to social worlds
(Ingleby, 1983; Turner, 1988).

Habermas (1970), for example, provides a clear articulation of
the implications of these developments for the 'social life world'.
Most notable among these is the ' ob jectif ication' of fundamentally
social processes, namely, human behaviour and experience. While
science and technology are referred to as ideological, the concept
of ideology is never explicitly defined. His analysis is
nonetheless informative although the meaning of ideology must be
inferred from its usage. In an effort to reformulate the concept
for the purpose of my analysis of feminist therapy, I would suggest
that for Habermas (1970) the concept of ideology refers precisely
to the objectification of social processes for the purpose of
technical manipulation and control (as opposed to practical or
emancipatory aims {Habermas, 1972}).

Habermas (1970) breaks with the orthodox Marxist preoccupation
with the strictly economic determination of social relations
inasmuch as he suggests that science and technology constitute the
contemporary system of domination and subordination which is
particularly insidious because it also provides for its own
legitimation. This opens a much broader space in which to examine
the power/knowledge nexus (Foucault, 1980) compared to that
determined by economic exigencies. In short, the objectification of
human subjects is in no sense determined exclusively or
unproblematical ly by the economic. Moreover, legitimation is itself
another dimension of ideology to the extent that "relations of
domination are represented as legitimate" (Thompson, 1984: 131).

A third dimension of ideology is the manner in which language
constructs specific understandings of social life (Kress, 1985). I
would concur, that is, with Finn's (1982) argument that ideology
refers specifically to discourses that mystify the nature of social
reality. More specifically, mystification refers to the
presentation of "a partial truth about reality as if it were the
whole truth" (Finn, 1982: 41). To illustrate this, consider the
notion of the 'individualization' of deviance. In this process,
deviance is located inside the individual as a function of some
defective organic and/or biographical process. This is only part of
the story as it were, since individualization obscures the social
relations/processes constitutive of and constituted by agency,
deviant or otherwise. Related to this is what Thompson refers to as
"dissimulation" in which "relations of domination. . .present

91



themselves as something other than what they are" (1980:131). For
example, psychotherapeutic discursive practices are never
articulated as processes of regulation and control but rather as
humane treatments.

Lastly, Finn (1982) also argues that ideology is involved not
only in the mystification of social reality but also in its
reif ication . This suggests that certain conceptualizations of
social processes and human subjects ascribe to them fixed,
immutable properties (ie., objectif ication) that circumscribe both
conceptual and practical activity vis-a-vis the process/subject in
question (ie., mystification). These conceptualizations become
reified to the extent that they are taken to be objectively given
facts revealed in and through language. This serves to obfuscate
the socially constructed nature of knowing and knowledge by
separating the knower from the known (Finn, 1982). Reification
affords certain discourses and discursive practices a
transhistorical and universal character thereby reproducing the
power relations within which they are articulated. This is to
suggest that, in the case of the individualization of deviance,
efforts to account for and ameliorate deviance must conform to that
which is construed as most 'reasonable' (cf., Foucault, 1973),
namely, those aimed at the individual.

This is, admittedly, only a sketch of the contours of
ideology, but it is a start. The dimensions of ideology outlined
above provide a starting point for an analysis of ideology, as it
is articulated in discursive practices, as discourses that
reproduce rather than contest power relations (Thompson, 1984:
131). What remains to be done in fleshing out the concept is to
conceptualize it in relation to a broader social theory (Thompson,
1984). This cannot, however, be undertaken here.

By way of conclusion, it is clear that the study of the
production and circulation of knowledge(s) benefits significantly
from the considerations proper to post-structuralism, most notably
Foucault (1972; 1980), which inform my research. The present
discussion in no way addresses or settles all of the problems
nascent in this area of research, and in fact, may well add to
them. However, I would suggest that it provides some direction in
conceptualizing ideology as an analytical tool in a critical
examination of disciplinary knowledges, in this case, feminist
therapy

.

ENDNOTES

* These 'notes' are drawn from a discussion developed in my
doctoral thesis, Knowledge, Ideology and Resistance: Politics and
Possibility in Feminist Therapy.

92



REFERENCES

Brown, P. "Marxism, Social Psychology, and the Sociology of
Mental Disorders", International Journal of Health Serv ices,
vol 14, 2, 1984: 237-264.

Finn, G. "Women and the Ideology of Science", Our Generation , vol
15, 1, 1982: 40-50.

Foucault, M. The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on
Language, Pantheon Books, New York: 1972.

. Madness and Civilization , Vintage Books, New York:
1973.

. Discipline and Punish , Vintage Books, New York:
1979.

. Power /Know ledge , Pantheon Books, New York: 1980

Habermas, J. Toward a Rational Society , Beacon Press, Boston:
1971.

Ingleby, D. "Mental Health and Social Order", in: Social Control
and the State , S. Cohen: and A. Scull ( eds ) , Martin Robertson
and Co., Ltd., Oxford, 1983: 75-105.

Jacoby, R.
" Social Amnesia: A Critique of Contemporary Psychology

from Adler to Laing , Beacon Press, Boston: 1975.

Kress, G. "Ideological Structures in Discourse", in T.A. van Dijk
(ed), Handbook of Discourse Analysis , vol 4, Academic Press,
London, 1985: 27-42).

Larrain, J. The Concept of Ideology , Hutchinson University
Library, London: 1978.

Marx, K. and F. Engels. The German Ideology , International
Publishers, New York: 1970.

Ricoeur, P. Lectures on Ideology and Utopia , G. Taylor (ed),
Columbia University Press, New York: 1986.

Scull, A. Museums of Madness: The Social Organization of Insanity
in 19th Century England , Penguin Books, London: 1979.

Thompson, J. Studies in the Theory of Ideology , University of
California Press, Berkeley: 1984.

Turner, B.S. Medical Power and Social Knowledge , Sage
Publications, London: 1988.

93