REFLECTIONS ON THE REPRODUCTION OF DICTATORSHIP IN
IRAN:

COMMUNICATION AND DICTATORSHIP

Behncan Behnia

Carleton University

When thinking about the fall of any dictatorship, one
should have no illusions that the whole system comes to
an end like a bad dream with that fall. The physical
existence of the system does indeed cease. But its
psychological and social results live on for years, and
even survive in the form of subconsciously continued
behaviour. (Kapuscinski, 1985:58)

The protest movement against the Iranian dictatorial regime

began in the Spring of 1977, and it gradually became a massive force

that overthrew the regime in February 1979. However, soon after the

revolution, the Islamic faction of revolutionary forces started to repress

other political and social forces. The Islamic faction abrogated all

freedoms and democratic rights gained during the revolution in order to

build a society that was based on Islamic laws and led by the clergy.

A review of the analyses of the 1979 revolution reveals that
scholars are divided on whether there were one or two revolutions.

Those who believe in one revolution (i.e. the "Islamic Revolution") argue
that rapid modernization and westernization generated anomie and moral

disintegration, and fostered the desire to return to authentic culture

amongst Iranians. Accordingly, these scholars consider Islam and

clergymen as forces of revolution.

Scholars in favour of two revolutions (i.e. the "Iranian revolution"

and the "Islamic Revolution") argue that the Shah directed repressive

policies against the Left and other progressive opposition, and

comparatively soft policies towards the religious groups. This

unevenness put the latter group far ahead in resources such as

independent organizations and financial means. According to these

scholars factors such as the distribution of resources, the mistakes of the

liberals and the leftists, and Khomeini's political ability made it possible
for the Islamic faction to seize political power. They consider the Islamic

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revolution as one alternative among others, rather than an inevitable
outcome.

However, what these scholars of Iranian revolution have
overlooked is the presence of a contradiction in Iranian political
collective action. Here I refer to the fact that Iranians, who during the
revolution demanded freedom and democracy, supported and tolerated the
growth of a dictatorship of a different form when they discovered the
possibility of realizing their demands after the revolution.

In this paper, the reproduction of dictatorship in Iran is studied

in relation to the impacts of dictatorship on the processes of political

socialization and the formation of the political culture of social groups.

In order to explore the impact of dictatorship, it is not enough to learn
about mechanisms and apparatuses of repression or numbers of the secret
police. Instead, one should ask, what impact does living under constant
fear of being reported, arrested, and tortured have on the processes of
political socialization? What is the impact of living in a social
environment where people cannot trust others in sharing their opinions?

In other words, it is correct that the dictatorial state cannot produce a

social order where its laws are "obeyed promptly, predictably", because
its "bloody sword is utterly external to the wills and the consciousness of
men (sic)" (Walzer, 1970:125). However, there are differences in
political socialization under dictatorial or non-dictatorial regimes.

I will argue that dictatorship not only represses and censors but

also educates and trains individuals. With its repression, its censorship
and surveillance, dictatorship shapes and influences the social

environment within which people live, interact and grow up. Therefore,
dictatorship is not a power "localized" in the sphere of politics (Lefebvre,
1991:147). It is a power that "produces reality" (Foucault, 1979:194) by
influencing the structures and functions of the agencies of political

socialization. This in turn conditions the formation of the political

culture of members of society.
In this paper, distorted communication is considered as one of the

channels through which dictatorship deeply influences society. It is

through communication that social groups and their identities as well as

political culture are formed. Dictatorship's repression of the democratic

rights undermines the conditions of communication and produces

distorted communication. The presence of the distorted communication,
in turn, affects the structure of social relationships and institutions, the

processes of coordination of action and collective identity formation of

social groups, and the size and structure of social gatherings.

Accordingly, distorted communication may force people to develop new
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institutions or to modify the structure of.already existing institutions in

order to sustain the processes of communication. For example, they may
find trust and truth in their friendship and kinship relationships, rather

than in the activities of formal organizations.

Following this model, I will study the Iranian political system,

distorted communication, and the institution of dowreh (circle) in order

to illustrate political values and norms that are socialized by them.

However, this is not to say that other agencies of political socialization

like family, school, and mass-media are not important in these regards.

Historical Background

In 1921 Reza Khan, a military commandant, staged a bloodless coup. In

1926, after establishing himself as the "dominant personality" in Iranian

politics, made himself the Iranian Shah (Halliday, 1979:23; Wilber,
1986:125-126). In 1941 the Soviet Union and British armies invaded Iran

and Reza Shah, who sympathized with Hitler and opposed the Allies'
plan of sending supplies to the Russian front through Iran, abdicated in

favour of his son Mohammad Reza (Halliday, 1979:24; Wilber,
1986:131).

After the fall of the Reza Shah, Iranians, after almost two

decades of severe repression, began to enjoy freedom of expression and

organization. During the 1941-53 period the political scene of Iran was

dominated by the Iranian communist party, the Tudeh, and the secularist

National Front, not the Islamic forces. Emerging soon after the fall of

the Reza Shah, the Tudeh Party had a total of 100,000 active members,

a 355,000 member trade union and three cabinet ministers in 1946
(Abrahamian, 1982:303).

Since the end of the Second World War, Iranians had been in

favour of the nationalization of the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil

Company (Halliday, 1979:24-25). In 1951, Mohammad Mossadeq, the
leader of the National Front, became prime minister. Mossadeq

nationalized the oil industry- as soon as he took office. This, however,

put his government in conflict with the Shah and the British and US
governments. In September 1951, the British oil company removed all

its staff, and closed down its oil installations. At the same time, the
British government reinforced its naval presence, in the Gulf

(Abrahamian, 1982:268; see also Carter, 1978:59-60). On July 1952,
Mossadeq clashed with the Shah on the nomination of the war minister.

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Following the Shah's refusal of his nominee, Mossadeq resigned and

appealed directly to the public, publicly criticizing the Shah for violating

the constitution. Following popular pressure, the Shah had to ask for

Mossadeq's return to office (Abarahamian, 1982:268-272).

The first military coup against Mossadeq failed and the Shah
escaped to Rome. However, after three days, the second military coup,
organized by the CIA, succeeded in August 1953. After the coup, the

Shah abrogated all democratic rights and banned and crushed all

opposition. In 1975, the Secretary General of Amnesty International said:
"No country in the world has a worse record in human rights than Iran"
(Halliday, 1979:85).

In 1960-1963, as a result of an economic crisis, several strong

protest demonstrations took place in Iran. In several cases the regime

used the army in order to control the situation. The regime of the Shah,

however, was in difficulty not only from domestic problems but also

from the new US Administration's pressures. As Halliday (1979:26-27)
writes, the Kennedy Administration made it

be known that it would only continue to support the
Shah on condition that he put through a programme of
reforms. A $35 million US loan was made dependent on
certain policies being implemented. ..within which land
reform held a specialplace.

In 1963, the Shah announced his "White revolution". His reforms,

however, dissatisfied religious leaders, in particular, the issues of land

reform and women's rights. In July 1963, for three days religious forces

rioted under the leadership of Khomeini. Despite the presence of general

discontent, the riots were restricted to a small number of towns (including

Qom), and few towns and workers, civil servants and students did not

join them (Abrahamian, 1982:425-26). It is important to note that when
the Islamic forces were protesting against the Shah's reforms, in the

Iranian universities the slogan of the protestors was "Yes to reforms; No
to Dictatorship!"

The 1960-63 defeat of the opposition marked "the end of any

hope that the forces released during the 1941-53 period could soon

reverse the verdict of the 1953 coup" (Halliday, 1979:234). In the late

1960s, different opposition groups, influenced by the Cuban and

Vietnamese Revolutions, emerged in Iran and opted for armed struggle.

However, by early 1976, as a result of heavy losses as well as the

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development of schisms among them, they failed to realize their plans to
spark the popular revolution by their armed struggle and sacrifice.

The 1979 Revolution

After the December 1973 oil price increase, Iran's annual revenue
quadrupled, jumping from $5 billion to $19 billion (Graham, 1980:16; see

also Halliday, 1979:138-139). The Shah predicted that by the year 2000,

Iran would become one of the top five world powers (Nyrop, 1978:6).
However, after two years, international oil demand dropped. Considering
that oil revenue made up 78 percent of the Iranian budget the impact of
such fluctuations in international demand was dramatic (Graham,
1980:100). After a brief period of economic boom where "Iran's GNP
grew by 30.3 percent in 1973-1974 and by a further 42 percent in 1974-

1975", there was "the economic debacle" (Amir Arjomand, 1986:397; see

also Nafisi, 1982:200, Hetherington, 1982:373).

Iranians started to face such difficulties as a high rate of inflation

and shortages of housing and commodities. Housing became one of the

main social problems. The annual inflation rate reached "about 30

percent" (Kazemi, 1980:89). The regime blamed bazaaris for inflation,

and in August 1975 started the 'anti-profiteering' and 'price war'

campaign. This campaign generated more shortages, stimulated the

black-market, and added the bazaaris to the malcontents (Graham,

1980:96). Regarding the devastating impact of this anti-profiteering

campaign on the bazaar, Parsa (1989:103) writes that by

October 1977, approximately 109 800 Tehran
shopkeepers, out of a total of 200,000, had been
investigated for price-controlled violations....According
to the Ministry of Interior, 20,000 shopkeepers had been
jailed by the end of 1977. By fall 1978, the nationwide
total of shopkeepers in violation of the controls was
220,000.

Furthermore, the regime challenged the economic viability of the bazaar.

State corporations were established to import and distribute basic foods,

such as wheat, sugar, and meat (Abrahamian, 1982:443). In 1976 it was

suggested that the bazaar be demolished. These factors pushed bazaaris

into the opposition. As one bazaari said, "if we would let him, the Shah
would destroy us" (Parsa, 1989:102).

The bazaar is not only a commercial centre but also a community

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that "includes one, or several, mosques, public baths, the old religious

schools and numerous tea houses" (Graham, 1980:223).
Financially, the bazaar is a strong economic centre that controls

the carpet trade and other major export items (e.g. nuts and dried fruits).

This enables the bazaaris access to foreign exchange. In total, the bazaar

accounts for two-thirds of domestic trade and accounts for at least 30

percent of all imports (Graham, 1980:224). For instance, by the time of

the revolution Tehran's central bazaar had,

close to forty thousand shops and workshops, one-half of
which were located within the covered bazaar and the
remainder in the immediate vicinity. Shopkeepers outside
the covered bazaar followed bazaari politics, even though
their shops were not part of the bazaar proper. (Parsa,
1989:92)

Bazaar mobilization has always played a crucial role in Iranian

political history. The financial support of the bazaar, for instance, was
decisive in the victory of the 1979 Revolution. The bazaar financially

aided the university students and teachers as well as the striking

workforces, civil servants, and oil-workers (Graham, 1980:225; see also

Zabih, 1979:27-30).

In the 1970s, the Shah increased his efforts to reduce the clergy's

power. In 1971, for example, the Shah established 'The Religious Corps'

that were sent into the villages as Islamic preachers (Wilber, 1986:178).

In addition, the government increasingly took control of holy

endowments (owqaf) (Bill, 1982:25).
In 1975 the Shah decided to establish a one party political system

and pressured Iranians to join it. The Shah said:

We must straighten out Iranians' ranks. To do so, we
divide them into two categories: those who believe in
Monarchy, the Constitution and the Sixth Bahman
Revolution (the Shah's White Revolution); and those who
don't...A person who does not enter the new political
party and does not believe in the three cardinal principles
which I referred to, will have only two choices. ...Such an
individual belongs in an Iranian prison, or if he desires
he can leave the country tomorrow, without even paving
exit fees, (cited in Halliday, 1979:47)

The new party, the Resurgence Party, with its branches in all cities and

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villages, became a new instrument of control in Iran.
Despite the widespread discontent, Iranians could not express

their frustrations in mass protest as a result of the presence of strong

repression. Jimmy Carter's stress on the theme of human rights during
his electoral campaign, and the fact that he mentioned Iran as a friend

country with a bad record, worked in favour of the Iranian opposition.

In order to please the new president, the Shah made some mild
political reforms. For instance, in early 1977 a new law was passed
which declared that "all political detainees had to be charged or released

within twenty-four hours and that trials for political opponents were to be

held by civilian rather than military courts" (Parsa, 1989:108; see also

Graham, 1980:211; Abrahamian, 1982: 500). Iranian intellectuals and

former opposition politicians, taking advantage of Carter's human rights
campaign and the Shah's controlled liberalizations, started to speak up

early in 1977 (Abrahamian, 1982:500-510; see also Zabih, 1979:49). As

Moghadam (1989:152) summarizes:

social democratic and liberal intellectuals began to write
open letters of protest and criticism. A number of
associations and societies were formed and revived, such
as the Association of Iranian Jurists, the Writers' Society,
and the National Association of University Teachers,
which demanded improved civil and political rights, and
end to censorship, and academic freedom

After almost two years of mass protests, strikes and street

fighting, the Shah left Iran, and in February 1979 the revolution

succeeded. There emerged a situation where political forces were in

balance. The Islamic forces were divided among themselves into three

factions: fundamentalists, moderate and radical. The Left was strong but

highly divided among themselves and included independent, pro-Soviet,

Maoists, pro-Albanian, and Trotskyist groups. There were also national

minorities, like Kurds, Turkemen and Arabs, who were not Shi'a Muslims
and demanded regional autonomy from the central government. In

addition, there were liberal, social democratic, and independent

organizations.

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Critical Review of the Analyses of the 1979 Iranian Revolution

Scholars of Iranian revolution are divided on whether there were one or
two revolutions. Generally speaking, these two positions are based on
two approaches, namely breakdown

1

and the resource mobilization
2

approaches.

Those following the breakdown approach argue that what
underlaid the widespread desire for revolutionary changes was "a
fundamental disorientation and anomie more than a superficial and short-
run frustration of material expectation" (Amir Arjomand, 1986:397).

Swenson (1985:124), expressing this line of analysis, suggests that the
presence of rapid modernization and anomie, as well as the leadership

position occupied by the Islamic clergy Islam and the clergy as the

motivated the Revolution:

the Persian carpet of interwoven cultural codes
experienced transformation and modification under the
rapid, secularist, "modernization" processes during
Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's regime. Rapid social
change is intrinsically psychologically disequilibrating:
that experienced in Iran... inherently implied radical
alterations in 'making sense' of material ana moral value
changes. This disequilibrating experience leads to a sense
of incohesion, fragmentation, disintegration in the
passing away of traditional ways of rendering meaning.

Explaining why the revolution took place in 1979 and not before,
she points out that "the toll of rapid modernization had not yet been

wrought upon the masses." She goes on to state that the revolution "was

brought about through the mobilization of the masses at the local level

by mullahs and enlightened Muslim martyrs" (1985:125; see also Arani,

1980: 14-15; Kimmel, 1989:494). Islam was "both the means and the end
of this revolution" (Kimmel, 1989:507; Amir Arjomand, 1984; Skocpol,
1982:275). These authors emphasize 'rapid' modernization and

westernization as the cause of the revolution. However, they do not

explain why the 1925-1941 modernization by the father of the Shah
3
was

not more rapid and traumatic than that of 1960s-1970s. Why is it that

the strongly anti-clerical measures of Re/a Shah (1925-

41) did not arouse any massive protest movements or
concerted action by the ulama and/or the bazaaris,

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whereas his son's measures toward the ulama (which
were. ...less extreme and less of a sudden wrench with
Islamic tradition) did arouse protest. (Keddie, 1982:288)

Scholars in favour of two revolutions, using the resource
mobilization approach, argue that at the time of revolution the Left and
other progressive forces were far behind the religious groups in terms of

independent resources.
4

They do not believe that the revolution was
made by Islamic ideology and leaders. First of all, the clergy were late
in joining the revolution. In late August 1977, when Khomeini realized
the lack of initiative on the part of the clerics, he issued a statement

inviting them to take advantage of political reform. Khomeini said:

today we are faced with an opportunity [an opening] in
Iran and you should take advantage of it...Today
members of various parties find fault and voice their
criticism in signed letters to the Shah and the
government. You should write too and a few of the
learned members of the clergy should sign also. ...others
have done so and we have witnessed that they have said
a lot but nothing has happened to them' (cited in
Nomani, 1990:8-9)

In addition, Moghadam (1989: 152) writes that "it was not until
late 1978 that the Ayatollah Khomeini became the undisputed leader of
the revolution. Even so, the Islamicists saw fit to rule with the National
Front and other secularists, liberals, and social democrats, for the first

year." Thus, the revolution was not started by Islamic leaders.
The lack of independent resources whereby the opposition could

gather and organize themselves without fear of being attacked and
arrested by the police, led Iranians to use mosques, funeral ceremonies

and other safe institutions. For instance, in October 1977, the Iranian

Writers' Society organized a number of poetry readings. These were held
at the Irano-German Institute in Tehran in late October and attracted

crowds of over 10,000 (Graham, 1980:210; see also Zabih, 1979:20,
Kamrava, 1990:87). What is significant about this event is that at the
place of gathering, the Irano-German Institute, diplomatic immunity
protected the participants. The following month, however, when the
Writers' Society organized another poetry reading program on the Tehran

university' campus, participants were attacked by the police. The same
phenomenon happened to bazaaris who in the initial stages of the

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uprising mobilized outside the mosque. Because of represseion, and in

absence of alternative channels of moilization, the bazaaris changed their

position, and began to encourage the clergy to oppose the regime (Parsa,

1989:95; see also Zabih, 1979:31).

Those in favour of one revolution stress the presence of Islamic
demands. For instance, Kimmel (1989:507) in demonstrating Islam as
the motive of revolution, quotes Khomeini's remark: "We did not want
oil. We did not want independence. We wanted Islam." Amir Arjomand
(1986:405) mentions Khomeini's famous statement, "we did not make the
Islamic revolution so the Persian melon would be cheap", in order to
show that the revolution was driven by Islamic motivations rather than

economic ones (see also Snow and Marshall, 1984:139).
What should be stressed is that these authors quote Khomeini's

remarks after seizing power, and not before. Theorists in favour of two

revolutions, by contrast, emphasize how Khomeini's positions during and
after the revolution were 180 degrees apart. During the revolution,

Khomeini said that under the Shah regime "the individual's freedoms are
eliminated, elections are prohibited, press and political parties are

suppressed, agriculture is ruined" {L'Unitd, 5.6.1978; see also Bavat,

1983:33-34; Parsa, 1989:209). Khomeini accused the Shah' of
"condemning the working class to a life of poverty, misery and drudgery,

creating shantytowns and neglecting low-income housing (Abraham ian,

1991:113). Therefore the reaction of a factory worker to Khomeini's

statement is understandable. He said:

they say we have not made revolution for economic
betterment! what have we made it for, then? They say,
for Islam! What does Islam mean then? We made" it for
the betterment of the conditions of our lives, (cited in
Bayat, 1987:48)

Khomeini in Paris did not disclose his real agenda. For example,

in a Paris interview, Khomeini responding to a question about "Whether

the Islamic government means theocracy?" answered:

No. We do not intend to govern. We only indicate to
people objectives and vindications of Islam. Since the

majority of Iranian people arc Muslim, the Islamic

government means the government sustained by the

majority of people. (Paese Sera, 24.10.1978)

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Although the above sketch of Iranian revolution confirms the two-
revolutions arguments, these scholars have overlooked the support and
tolerance of the masses for Khomeini's repressive policies after the

Revolution.

Political Socialization and Political Culture

Political culture consists of political values and attitudes, as well as
beliefs about forms of political interaction and political institutions. As
Verba (1969:513) explains, "it refers not to what is happening in the
world of politics, but what people believe about those happenings."
Political culture shapes and influences the processes of interpretation and

understanding of political life.

Political socialization consists of a life experience process

through which members of a society acquire their political culture.
Political culture is formed as the result of the processes of political

socialization in agencies such as school, family, workplace, mass media,
political parties, voluntary associations, as well as experiences with the

political system (Verba, 1969:551; see also Kavanagh, 1972:35).
According to Dowse (1986:215) there are different types of agencies in
which joining them "involves the learning of skills, attitudes, and norms
much more specific to the institution."

Following this argument, I maintain that depending upon the
values and goals of the agencies there will be different political cultures.

In this regard, Gramsci's distinction (1989:181) between the 'corporate',
'class' and, 'hegemonic' or universal levels of consciousness is used. The
corporate level refers to the moment when the members of a social group
"are conscious of its unity and homogeneity, and of the need to organize

it, but in the case of the wider social group this is not yet so" (Gramsci,

1989:181). For example, trade unions at this stage of development tend
to "articulate a 'corporate consciousness' which focuses on their shared

interests, but this may co-exist with rivalry against some other group of
workers" (Hunt, 1990:312). The class awareness level consists of a
situation where the members of a social class become conscious of their
common interests "but still in the purely economic field" (Gramsci,
1989:181). The hegemonic or universal moment refers to a level where
a class transcends "the corporate limits of the purely economic class, and
can and must become the interest of other subordinate groups too"
(Gramsci, 1989: 181; see also Hunt, 1990:312).

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Following this distinction. I differentiate between institutions and

agencies of political socialization with 'corporate' and 'universal' values

and goals. Depending on the type of the agencies their members are
socialized with corporate or universal conceptions of democracy. A
social group which is at a corporate level is engaged in articulating and

defending its own corporate interest and develops a corporate rather than
a universal concept of democracy. For them, democracy consists of an

ensemble of rules that protect the immediate interests of that particular
social group.

Dictatorship and Communication

Communication has an essential role in the processes of political
socialization. It is through the process of communication that individuals

reach an understanding and agreement on an issue, realize their shared

common interests, and coordinate their actions. The formation of
collective identity and political culture of a social group is the result of

the processes of communication within and between social groups and

classes. Dictatorship, with the suppression of democratic rights, indeed

undermines the conditions of communication.

Habermas, in his theory of 'pragmatic universal', develops the

theory of communicative action in relation to the conditions of

communication, rather than to the content of communication (i.e.

information) or means of communication. According to Habermas there
are four conditions: comprehensibility, truth, trust, and normative

background which need to be fulfilled in order to have a communicative

action. In a process of reaching understanding the speaker must

choose a comprehensive expression so that speaker and
nearer can understand one another. The speaker must
have the intention of communicating a true
proposition. ...so that the hearer can share the knowledge
of the speaker The speaker must want to express his
intentions trustfully so that the hearer can believe the
utterance of the speaker (can trust). Finallv, the speaker
must choose an utterance that is right so that the nearer
can accept the utterance and speaker and hearer can
agree with one another in the utterance with respect to a
recognized normative background. (Habermas, 1979:2-3)

As soon as one of these elements, for any reason, comes under question,
the stream of communication halts and it can be interrupted or distorted

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In order to rectify the disturbed communication it is essential that "no
external constraints" prevent "participants from assessing evidence and
argument, and in which each participant has an equal and open chance
of entering into discussion" (Giddens, 1985:131). These conditions are
not met in a dictatorial regime and the following section deals with the
issue of communication under dictatorship.

Vertical, Horizontal, and Oblique Voices

Hirschman, in his argument on the differences between democratic and
non-democratic social environments, has developed two terms, 'voice' and
'exit', as means of communication between the citizens and the
government, consumer and seller, employer and employee. In a
democratic social environment, an unsatisfied consumer or citizen can
communicate his/her feelings by voice (writing, wording, marching in the
street, and so on), or by exit (changing the store, voting for another

political party). In a non-democratic situation, however, one or both of
these mechanisms may be absent. If there exists only one store, one
employer, or one political party, then exit is impossible, making voice the
only option. The worst scenario, however, is when a person can use
neither of these mechanisms, as, for example, in totalitarian one-party
systems, terrorist groups, and criminal gangs (Hirschman, 1970:121).
Accordingly, in a dictatorial regime, exit and voice are absent; exit

becomes 'exile', voice becomes 'silence' or 'oblique voice'.
O'Donnell, based on his experience in Argentina, distinguishes

'vertical voice' from 'horizontal voice'. The vertical voice consists of
voice that is "addressed to the 'top', by customers or citizens, toward

managers or governments," but when "I am addressing others, or others
are addressing me, claiming that we share some relevant characteristics,
we are using horizontal voice" (O'Donnell, 1986:250). What must be
emphasized is the importance of the role of the horizontal voice in the
formation of political culture and collective identity. In a democratic

environment:

we assume that we have the right to address others,
without fear of sanctions, on the oasis of the belief that
those others are 'like me' in some dimension that at least
I consider relevant. If we actually recognize ourselves
as a 'vye' (for example, as workers who have the right to
unionize), we have taken a necessary, and at times
sufficient, step towards the formation of a collective

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identity. (O'Donnell 1986:250)

Under dictatorship, "oblique voice" or symbolic language replaces
the horizontal voice, which means certain unconventional. ..ways of
dressing, clapping hands with excessive enthusiasm in front of the public

authorities, going to the recital of singers or musicians who were known
to disagree with the regime, some quick glances in the streets and other
public spaces (O'Donnell, 1986261) .

In summary, the argument on the voice suggests that dictatorship,

while inhibiting the use of horizontal voice, encourages the use of

vertical and oblique voice. The fear of using horizontal voice and the

presence of mistrust lead individuals to an atomized and privatized life

based on mistrust. Accordingly, they approach with caution the "few

remaining occasions of sociability" (O'Donnell, 1986:260; See also

Pohtzer, 1989).

The Iranian Political System

Bill defines the Iranian political system as a "circular" or "web" system

with the Shah at the centre surrounded by an elite network. The rivalry
and conflict between elites at all levels of Iranian society stems from

their struggle to gain greater favour with then Shah (Bill, 1972:40-41, 42;

see also Bill, 1973:141). In this political system the Shah was the

ultimate decision maker and the network that served as channels of

access included

ministers, generals, courtiers. ...relatives, personal friends,
old classmates and trusted advisors. These personalities
'who circle the power of the monarch' filter and relay
information and petition to the Shah. Thev, in turn, are
surrounded by their own entourages each member of
[whom] serve's as a lower level but additional channel to
power. (Bill, 1973:134)

Due to the lack of formal political institutions, members of the political
network as well as their drivers, cooks, and secretaries were sought after

as intermediaries between the petitioner and the power. The Shah's

administration was highly "centralized, totally unintcgrated, and

responsive only to him" (Fatcmi, 1982:49; see also Halliday, 1979:54,

Kamrava. 1 7-23). The Shah appointed "prime minister, ministers, deputy
ministers, ambassadors, governors, and executives of government

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BehniaDictatonkip

organizations" (Fatemi, 1982:51).

Even membership in the web system did not create security. As
Zonis (1971:241) comments, "when the Shah reached the conclusion that
a given member of the elite [was] dysfunctional, in any sense, no amount
of wealth or membership [could] save the individual from dismissal,
disgrace, or demotion" (see also Bill, 1973:144).

The Iranian political system disturbed the processes of social
group formation by both reinforcing vertical voice and obstructing
horizontal voice. The atomization of the members of social groups was
shared by all social classes. For instance, many scholars believe that the
collapse of the Iranian army after the departure of the Shah in 1979 was
due to the absence of the spirit of comradeship in the army. This

occurred because the generals had to report to the Shah and no general

could visit Tehran or meet with another general without the Shah's
specific permission (Halliday, 1979:68; see also Afshar, 1985:186-189).

Distorted Communication in Iran

This section aims to illustrate the impact of dictatorship on four

conditions of communication in Iran.

Dictatorship and Intelligibility: Under dictatorship the
intelligibility of language suffers. Dictatorship, by inhibiting the use of

horizontal voice, encourages the use of oblique voice or symbolic

language. For instance, Bill (1972:76) reporting his survey of 50 Iranian

poems writes that there is:

an extraordinary emphasis upon such themes as 'walls',
'loneliness,' 'darkness,' 'fatigue,' and 'nothingness'. These
poems deplore the situation of the Iranian intellectual and
obliquely criticize and condemn the existing
sociopolitical system in which the intellectual is chained.

Accordingly, in Iran such terms as "oppressiveness,

darkness. ..collapse, quagmire, putrefaction, cage, bars, chain" were

prohibited because they "could hide allusions to the Shah's regime"

(Kapuscinski, 1985:44). This created paranoia among both Iranians and
the censors, because it became difficult to understand the real intention
of a speaker or writer.

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Alternate Routes. Volume 10, 1993

Dictatorship and Trust: Under dictatorship the issue of trust, as
a result of the high risk, becomes the main element of communication.
The presence of mistrust amongst Iranians is referred to by several
authors. It does not have any class boundaries and crosses all social
strata. Zonis (1971:268) writes that "the inability of Iranians to count on,

to be assured of the meaning of the behaviour of others is taught early.
So are Iranians taught early in life to mask their own thoughts" (see also
Westwood, 1965:124).

The following example illustrates how deeply political repression
can influence and shape everyday life and ways of seeing of members of
a dictatorial society. It is about a conversation between an old man with
a bad heart and a SAVAK agent (Iranian secret police) 5 at a bus stop in
Iran on a hot afternoon. The old man said:

"It's so oppressive you can't catch your breath". "So it
is," the Savak agent replied immediately, edging^ closer
to the winded stranger; "It's getting more and more
oppressive and people are fighting for air." "Too true,"
replied the naive old man, clapping his hand over his
heart "such heavy air, so oppressive." Immediately, the
Savak agent barked, "Now you'll have a chance to regain
your strength," and marched him off.

The other people at the bus stop

...had been listening in dread, for they had sensed from
the beginning that the feeble elderly man was committing
an unpardonable error by saying "oppressive" to a
stranger. Experience had taught them to avoid uttering
such terms as oppressiveness, darkness, burden, abyss,
collapse. ...because all of them, these nouns, verbs,
adjectives, and pronouns, could hide allusions to the
Shah's regime.

The strong presence of paranoia and suspicion is illustrated in the rest of
account:

for a moment a new doubt flashed through the heads of
the people standing at the bus stop: What if the sick old
man was a Savak agent too 9 Because he had criticized
the regime (by using "oppressive" in conversation), he
must have been free to criticize. (Kapuscinski. 1985:44-
5)

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Beknia/Dictatonhip

Dictatorship and Truth: In Iran, instead of truth there existed
rumour. The presence of severe censorship and control over the means
of communication and information, as well as government fabrications,
led Iranians to distrust their mass media. In Iran truth was related to
trust.

Fatemi (1982:58) points out how rumour encouraged Iranians in
their struggle against the Shah:

the hypothesis that the Shah was no longer the master of
his destiny gained particular momentum in the first week
of January 1979, when the leaders of the United States,
Britain West Germany, and France attended their long-
scheduled summit meeting on the Island of Guadeloupe.
According to the Teheran Grapevine, the participants
decided, among other things, that "the Shah must go."

Dictatorship and the Normative Background: The intervention of
the Shah in all spheres of social life, made Iranians perceive him as the
main enemy. In this way the sources of all social problems were reduced
to the Shah (Westwood, 1965:134). The normative background was
narrowed down to the opposition to a common enemy and Iranians
communicated and understood each other's grievances on this basis. This
narrow normative background created what Khomeini called the "unity
of purpose"(Khomeini, 1981:253; See also Moghadam, 1987: 13). Green
(1982:87), for example, writes that

a prominent academic and researcher at the Plan and
Budget Organization revealed in an interview during the
midst of the revolution, 'I hate Khomeini but if anyone
says anything bad about him I get angry. Why, you ask?
Because I hate the Shah even more!'

Iranians believed that once they had overthrown the Shah's regime all
problems would be solved. As a result of the distortion of
communication they did not realize that the basis of one's opposition to
the Shah was different from another's. As the result of the distortion of
elements of communication, the processes of collective identity formation
of social groups was disturbed, wherein, members of social groups did
not draw their social and class boundaries by becoming aware of their
identity in the processes of communication.

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Altemcte Routes. Volume 10. 1993

The Institution of the Dowreh

After the coup d'etat of 1953, the suppression of political organizations

and persecution of all forms of political activities led Iranians interested

in politics to informal, small and selected forms of group. Except for a

few who decided to stage organized political activities and therefore
undertook the underground form of political activity, the people opted for

dowreh (circle), a small social setting of trusted persons. As Green
(1982:43) explains, "an activity such as arguing about politics, generally

a risky proposition, was often undertaken within the security of groups
that were composed of old friends who had known and trusted one
another for years."

Dowreh consists of a small number of people, from 10 to 20,
who "organize about some common purpose and meet on a regular basis.
Dowrehs exist for card playing, poetry, music, and, of course, politics"
(Zonis, 1971:238). Dowrehs meet monthly, weekly, or more often. The
way that Miller determines the number of dowreh participants indicates
the informal character of this institution. The number of people is
"limited to those who can stand beside a buffet dinner table or sit along
the walls of a living room" (Miller, 1969T64).

6

Miller (1969:159), distinguishing between "dowreh" and the

"system of dowreh", writes that "the dowreh is an upper class social
habit, while the system refers to a particularly Persian behaviour of

political activity and communication." Dowreh, according to Miller

(1969:163-164), has a "general meaning of social circle, salon or clique.

It expresses the gracious manner associated both with past Iranian social

patterns and with attitudes acquired by those who have been educated
abroad or who have lived for considerable periods in the West."

Writing about the dowreh system, Miller (1969:159) says "in the

absence of effective political parties, the dowreh system is the substitute

used by Iranian politicians to discuss, organize and communicate with

their followers" (see also Banuazizi, 1977:238). The dowreh system
includes the bazaari shopkeepers, artisans and labourers who meet each
other

regularly in bazaar caravansaries, teahouses and
restaurants that serve as the headquarters for those in a
particular craft or trade. Very much in the pattern of the
old guilds, merchants and workers, will gather together
over tea or kebab, to discuss business, exchange rumour
and news and, inevitably, debate politics. (Miller.

102



Rehnia'Dictatorship

1969:165; see also Spooner, 1971:171-172; Thaiss,
1971:201-202)

Dowreh, indeed, is a circle of homogeneous people who share
similar socio-political ideas and backgrounds as well as interests and

perspectives. It is not a "public" of people who are divided in their ideas
on an issue, nor was it a "public sphere", namely a social realm open to
all citizens "with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association

and the freedom to express and publish their opinions- about matters of

general interest" (Habermas, 1974:49; see also Habermas, 1989).
Borrowing the Gramscian distinction, one can argue that dowreh

system is a social setting at a corporate stage where a corporate

perspective can develop. The formation of homogeneous groups that

were not permitted to interact outwardly with other groups led them to

develop a corporate or non-universal perspective of democracy.

Dowreh participants were engaged in elaborating, defining and
reinforcing the immediate interests and ideas of their members rather than

that of the larger or the whole society. They did not, and were not able

to, develop a universal perspective as a result of the lack of

communication and social struggle with other social forces. Dowreh

reinforces norms and values shared by its members and is a place for

articulating their immediate needs. Therefore, the concept of democracy

that could emerge in this kind of gathering was a corporate one:

democracy not as a universal value, but as a system of rules that satisfies

and protects the needs of the small group.

To summarize, the absence of democratic rights that guarantee
the fulfilment of four conditions of communication, led Iranians to seek

guarantee in small, informal and selected forms of groups. However, in

these groups it was the corporate rather than the universal perspective of

democracy that developed.

Conclusion

The corporate conception of democracy had played an important role in
the reproduction of dictatorship in Iran and the change of Iranian political

collective action. After the victory of the revolution, Khomeini and his

faction had the ability to attack one section of opposition while

exempting the remainder and maintaining their support or tolerance. For

instance, Khomeini called for the repression of the independent press

because, according to him, their critiques of the government would

103



Uternate Routes, Volume 10, 1993

during the revolution became an obstacle to the anti-imperialist struggle.
The leftist groups, stressing the difference between the bourgeois and
revolutionary' democracy, did not support the protest of independent

journalists. However, as soon as censorship was exercised over leftist
publications, they came to recognize the government as repressive.

7

The role of corporate perspective of democracy in the process of
the establishment of the new dictatorship can be summarized as follows:

when the national minorities mobilized for autonomy,
bazaaris did not join their struggles. Students and the
Fedayeen were the only groups who actively supported
the national minorities. When universities came under
attack, bazaaris and liberal organizations approved of the
assault because students had shifted to the left. ...By the
time bazaaris began mobilizing and came under attack,
other groups and classes had either been demobilized or
did not have an interest in joining their struggles. As a
result, repression against one social group or class did
not invoke new protests by other groups, which might
have led to the escalation of conflict and, consequently,
neutralized repression. (Parsa, 1989:295-296)

The corporate perspective of democracy functioned in dividing

the Iranian political and social forces in the sense that they agreed on the

suppression of other groups' rights. The corporate conception of

democracy allowed Khomeini's success in following his suppression of

democratic institutions and rights, as well as in crushing political,

religious and ethnic groups with the mass support or tolerance.

Notes

1. See Tilly, 1975:4-6.

2. On Resource Mobilization theory sec among others: Tilly (1978); Zald
(1977, 1988); Turner (1987, 1992); and Freeman (1979).

3. Reza Shah secularized the judiciary and educational system of Iran that

were in the hands of clergy. In addition, in the political sphere, Reza

Shah's policies reduced the political power of traditional groups such as
the clergy The percentage of clerics serving as deputies in parliament

declined from 40 percent in the sixth majlcs to 30 percent in the seventh

104



BehnuSDictatorship

majles to zero in the eleventh majles which met in 1937. At the same
time, Reza Shah favoured greater participation by women in social life.
He ordered that the chador, or traditional women's veil, be abandoned in
favour of western clothing. The Majles even passed a uniform dress
law' instituting compulsory Western dress for men (Parsa, 1989:36; see
also Akhavi, 1980:37-55, Abrahamian, 1982:140-144, Carter, 1978:54).

4. Moghadam (1989:153), comparing the resources, writes: "It is
sufficient to note that in Iran on the eve of the revolution, no liberal or

left-wing parties or institutions operated legally. On the other hand, there
existed a nationwide network of mosques, theological seminaries,

religious shrines, charitable endowments, and religious lecture halls....

The religious thought was given predominance and allowed dissemination
in a way never enjoyed by the left or even liberals. The resources that
were available to the clergy had been consistently denied to the Left" (see
also Moghadam, 1988; Green, 1982:xiii; Abrahamian, 1985:149-174,
Akhavi, 1980:129). Hiro (1988:20) writes that "estimates of qualified

clerics vary from 90,000 to 120,000 and there are an unknown number
of unqualified village preachers, prayer leaders, theological school

teachers and procession organisers."

5. In 1957, the ill-famed secret police SAVAK (National Security and
Information Organization) was created with the help of Israeli and US
advisors. Branches of SAVAK were present in universities, factories, and
offices. Their activities were so multifarious that today "almost anyone
who does voice protest about the government runs the risk of being
suspected of being a SAVAK agent" (Halliday, 1979:82; see
alsoAbrahamian, 1982:435-37; Rudolph, 1978:372). Although the exact

number of its personnel is not available, "informed United States
government sources estimate the number of full-time personnel at 10,000.
The agency is also believed to employ a large number of part-time
informants... estimated... as high as 200,000" (Rudolph, 1978:373).

6. The Shah's regime did not tolerate formal groups and organizations.
Bill (1972: 47-48) writes that in "1961, for example, eight middle-class

Iranian friends and scholars met and formed a dowrah to discuss

sociopolitical issues. They agreed upon certain areas of concern and
mimeographed a confidential one-page statement presenting their mutual

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Alternate Routes, lolume 10. 1993

opposition to corruption, injustice, and oppression. Each member took
a copy and the rest were locked away. Five months later, the Chief of
the Secret Police called on one of the men and confronted him with a
copy of the statement. It was one of the original eight copies. The
dowrah broke up immediately. This kind of occurrence explains a great
deal about the secret police and the dowrah system, but it also sheds light
on one of the major reasons why social interaction in Iran is extremely
informal. In the episode described, there was one real element of
organization and formality — the printed statement. And this was the
evidence that was used to destroy the dowrah and to threaten the lives of
its members."

7. The same mechanism was used in suppressing women's rights in Iran.
See Haines and Woods, 1986:43-47; Sansarian, 1982:99-102; Afshar
Soraya, 1983:157-162;Tabari, 1982: 126-140; Abrahamian, 1989:189-190.

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Italian Newspapers:

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111



Carleton University

Sociology and Anthropology
Work-in-Progress Seminar*

scheduled for: Friday, October 22, 1993; Loeb A720

For information, write to: Graduate Student Caucus

(attention Wendy Larner or David Hubka)

Department of Sociology and Anthropology

Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario K1S 5B6

"formal paper presentations and discussions; tea, coffee, lunch