Commentary: Ontological Gerrymandering? Non-Identity vs. Differance Adorno Contra Derrida Wade W. Deisman Carleton University What the conjurers of ontological philosophizing strive, as it were, to awaken is undermined by real processes, however: bythe production and reproduction of social life. The effort to justify "man" and "being" and "time" theoretically, as primal phenom- ena cannot stay the fate of the resurrected ideas. T. Adorno, Negative Dialectics The system of language associated with phonetic-alphabetic writing is that within which logocentric metaphysics, determining the sense of being as presence, has been produced. This logocentrism, the epoch of full speech, has always placed in parenthesis, suspended, and suppressed for essential reasons, all free reflection on the origin and status of writing. J. Derrida, Of Grammatology The impetus to revisit Adorno today, though no longer principally historical, is at the same time, both historically informed and historically conditioned: That is, it derives from deep seated doubts about the developing disparity between the first and second generations of critical theory, it is equally the outcome of uncertainty about the totalizing tendencies associated with the contemporary 'communicative turn;' and yet, like a seedling, it springs forth finally only in the fertile foreground ofan era that feels itselfto be fragmenting and is henceforth haunted by Adorno's harrowing analyses ofthe authoritar- ian personality, culture industry and administered society. Cursory charac- Alternate Routes, Volume 12, 1995 Alternate Routes, Volume 12, 1995 terizations of the recent renaissance with Adorno in terms of a revival of interest, may belie a much more ambitious interest in revival (Crook 1994; Zuidervaart 1994), clearly connected to Adomo's prescient anticipation of the problematics posed by postmodernism (Jameson 1990) 1 and made manifest in a variety of attempts to re-deploy Adorno in the contemporary context. Yet, if Adomo's analyses of 'fractured totalities' bears familiar and sometimes canny correspondences with Foucault's focus on discontinuities and Derrida's deconstruction, it is by now bromide to simply cite Adomo as a proto-postmodem thinker (Best and Kellner, 1991:228-234). Moreover, alleged affinities with Derrida, however supported by some salient methodo- logical similarities and an ostensibly parallel program for the dissolution of philosophy, are ultimately the purview ofthe pedestrian in so far as they tend to ignore and thereby undermine Adomo's anti-authoritarian impulses and manifestly materialist commitments (Habermas, 1993:185). Indeed, al- though both Derrida and Adomo take a careful reading ofthe text as the point of departure in their critique of western philosophy, Adomo's resolution of the problem of 'presence' found in Husserl is clearly at odds with Derrida's ^^ deconstructive turn (Dews, 1987: 36-39). Whereas Derrida denies both the *& stability ofthehermeneutic horizon and the possibility ofanything beyond the text and therefore urges an endless unravelling of texts, Adomo enacts a 'theoretically informed' reconstructive moment: one which not only links forms of philosophical thought with broader social forces, but also attempts thereby to expose the more sublime structures of reality. Both thinkers brave the paradoxes and perils associated with the critique of reason, but they are not guided by consonant concerns or convictions, nor ought their approaches be seen as different answers to the same problem (Habemias, 1993: 185). Adomo's efforts are intended to address and come to terms with the totalizing tendencies of thought, and specifically speak to the aetiology of fascism. For him, objective knowledge of these processes is still attainable, but onlythrough a process ofrigorous reconfiguration which recontextualizes philosophical phenomena in terms of their relationship to broader social and economic relations. Derrida's efforts are intended to undercut the logocentric foundations of philosophical thinking as an oppressive apparatus tout court and the process of deconstruction is, itself, seen as an act ofjustice. In what follows, I will argue byway ofexplication that cavalier compansons between these two thinkers do not endure sustained theoretical inquiry and moreover, that Adomo's lasting legacy resides in his resistance both to the kinds of textually totalizing impulses ofsome post structuralism and also the kinds of theoretically totalizing tendencies sometimes implied in the current commu- nicative emphasis of critical theory. This thesis indicates that Adorno is in a middling position between the internecine schools of critical theory and post- structuralism and suggests that contemporary cultural theory might benefit from a more sustained engagement with Adomo. The first phase of my argument is explicative and consists chiefly in an overview of Adorno and Derrida at the level of method. In the second stage I shall simply suggest something of the benefit Adorno's approach brings to current debates in cultural theory and allude to some of the shortcomings associated with exhuming Adorno. My comments on the future of critical theory are in closing. *** Although Adorno comes closest to a programmatic statement of principles at the level of method2 in his landmark Negative Dialectics, the overall effect of his work3 is only to emphasize the degree to which a materialist critique of philosophy effectively undercuts the distinction be- tween theory and method. His procedure, however, is avowedly dialectical: it encompasses a negative deconstructive moment and a reconfiguring reconstructive movement, each of which also maintain their own dialectical character. In the first moment, Adorno juxtaposes antithetical concepts to produce a "logic of disintegration" and thereby expose "the irreconcilability of concepts" with the reality they purportedly describe (Buck-Morris, 1977:63). This procedure both denies the synthetic movement in Hegel and reflects the materialist contention that the contradictions between reason and reality are not ultimately reconciled by the movement of thought4 . Indeed, Adorno's insight into the architechnonic nature ofcapitalist cognition is that concepts are in a perpetual process of attempting to appropriate their 'other' but that this impulse can never culminate in a synthesis. Recalling Lukacs' conception of reification in order to account for the fact that philosophical concepts are seen to have a reality apart from and apriori to productive processes, Adorno's analysis links the capitalist commodity structure to the abstraction of phenomena from their socio-historical roots. Philosophical idealism is thus understood both as a form of consciousness which arises out ofthe conjunction of specific socio-historical conditions and as a kind of all consuming rage which seeks to reconcile reason with reality through a totalizing movement of identification (Adorno, 1966)5 . Adorno's key contrariant claim is that the contradictions of capitalist society cannot be Alternate Routes, Volume12, 1995 eradicated by "means ofthought" nor can they "within thought" itself(Buck- Morris 1977:61). Hence, in opposition to the rage ofidealist thought, Adorno asserts that there is, in principle, a non-identity between concept and reality. Tins principle of non-identity forms the foundation of negative dialectics (Habermas, 1989:187). Adomo's approach contrasts with the more mechanical 'Ideologikritik' of other members of the Frankfurt school which inclined to an analysis of philosophy as an expression of superstructure. Adorno calls his process "immanent critique" and uses it to unearth and identify a dialectic process at work with philosophical thought itself. While his initial intent is only to "expose the contradictions which riddle idealist categories and, following their inherent logic, push them to the point where the categories were made to self-destruct" 6 , the ultimate goal of immanent critique is to transcend idealism by "leading its concepts via their own immanent logic to the point of self-liquidation" (Buck-Morris, 1977:70). 7 Adomo's deconstructive movement is fundamentally informed by the insight that the crisis of idealism mirrors the current social order such that as "reason and reality lost touch with each other outside ofphilosophy, they lost touch within philosophy also" (Buck-Morris, 1977:71). Hence, he argues that Husserl gives birth to a phenomenology aimed at objective knowledge of things in themselves but, because this mode of reasoning is riddled with the contradictions ofcapitalistthought, he ends up in contradiction. Phenomenol- ogy erroneously accepts natural phenomena as given immediately in experi- ence but, in fact, is only able to achieve abstraction. Adorno argues, in contradistinction, that objective knowledge is possible through a process of concretion which links phenomenal formsto larger totalities. Objects are thus made to matenalize in a sense that surpasses identity, but only by the mediation of conceptual reflection can their relationship be understood. In order to combat the reification processes typical ofcapitalistthought, Adorno deploys his own principles of"differentiation, nonidentity, and active transformation," (Buck-Morris, 1977:96) in an attempt to negate the he- gemony ofconsciousness brought about by the mode ofeconomicproduction An analysis of the linguistic forms of idealist philosophy provides the point of departure for an exploration of their underlying connection to broader social and structural forces. Here Adorno is informed by a conception ofthe dialectic that surpasses the strictly Hegelian sense between the particular and the universal. Indeed, according to Buck-Morns, his supposition is that the structure of the general persists within "the very surface of the particular" (Buck-Morris, 1977:97). Adomo's notion of the concrete particular ex- presses this synecdoche concept of the relationship between part/whole. His argument is thatthe imprint ofthe macrocosm can be read in the microcosmic. Hence 'particulars ' contain cryptic codes, initially enigmatic, that are subject to subsequent differentiation/de-differentiation in an effort to expose their underlying structural connections. This process consists in a rigorous separation, dissection and differentiation of the forms to derive isolated elements. Conceptual phenomena typically supposed as similar are empha- sized as dissimilar, while phenomena typically taken as dissimilar were shown to have underlying commonalities. The latter process, which was achieved by a juxtaposition of opposites worked to reveal an inner logic of structuration at work within capitalist society, while the former, worked to expose the false connections between phenomena perpetrated by ideology. The method found application not only in natural phenomena but also in the relationship between phenomenal forms and linguistic referents, as is demon- strated in Adorno's analysis of history and nature as concepts. The second phase of analysis, that of non-identification, consists of Adomo's attempt to locate individual elements according to a conceptual architecture borrowed from Freudian psychoanalysis and Marxist theory. Phenomenal forms here are not subsumed under conceptual categories but rather, the categories themselves are tailor made to fit and describe the form. In providing for such phenomenal priority, Adomo is adhering to the dictates of a method which implies the reflexive connection between thought and being. Conceptual categories do not identify social phenomena but merely provide for the possibility of interpretation. Hence, the principle of non- identification denotes the fact that respective phenomena provide an image of the concept, but are not identical to it. Phenomena are instead understood as mimetic approximations while retaining their concrete referenial status. The dialectical method culminates in a transformative manner. The ideological or structural underpinnings ofthe phenomenal forms laid bear and situated within the context ofa larger Marxist/Freudian theoretic, the isolated pieces of Adorno's analysis are now available for reconstruction according to the inner logic revealed in analysis. The roots of the contradiction are exposed and what appeared as one thing is discovered to be "essentially its opposite" (Buck-Morris, 1977:99). This transformative movement identifies the acme of the dialectical process of reconstruction in which Adomo reassembles the isolated elements by mediatingthem in a way that they could become representational. The cryptic nature of the ciphers and their recon- Alternate Routes, Volume12, 1995 stitution into constellations of concepts provided by Marx and Freud allows for reinterpretedon and redeployment. *** From the foregoing it should already be clear that there are some obvious continuities between Adomo and Derrida. Both insist on a rigorous reading and rereading of texts as the key to excavating their underlying structure. Both are also informed by the assumption that the structure of philosophictexts, when pushed to extremes, actually culminates in contradic- tion. Finally, both are substantially influenced by Husserl in the critical development of thinking about the contradictions implied by the western philosophical project, hi Derrida's case, however, the grounds for arriving at the claim for contradiction are substantially different from those arrived at by Adorno. Indeed, in Adorno, a principle of non-identity between the concept and reality infonns his method, while Derrida deploys thenotion of"differance" in his deconstruction. Adorno identifies Husserl's phenomenology as the apex ofidealist thought and engages in a vigorous critique ofthe transcenden- tal associated with the epoche. Derrida, however, is not entirely content to simply abandon the phenomenological commitment to a transcendental standpoint with its attendant protection from the perils of relativism and historicism(Dews, 1987:5). As Peter Dews has convincingly argued, Derrida discovers that language emerges as the "necessary condition" of all commu- nication while writing his introduction to Husserl's "Origins of Geometry". Here it becomes clear that speech is not the expression of objects, but in fact "constitutes objects" and hence, it is speech itself which is the "concrete condition oftruth" (Dews, 1987: 36). Most significant to Derrida, however, in Husserl, is the realization that writing is the telos of speech. That is to say, that writing is the permanent form, independent of any specific subjectivity. Derrida sees this finding as doubly contradictory both because writing itself is not transcendental, but rather is historical and transitory, and also, because speech as opposed to writing, is privileged as an intentional act that makes meaning present intheHusserlian schemata. This insight is into the paradoxi- cal "status ofwriting that forms the basis of Derrida's analysis ofphilosophi- cal and literary texts"(Dews, 1987: 36). The focus of deconstruction as an activity is to "discover the systematic incoherences within a text, rather than striving to reveal a unified meaning, a project referred to as deconstruction" (Norris, 1987:46). Deconstruction 'works to undo the idea, the ruling illusion of Western metaphysics, that reason can somehow dispense with language and arrive at a pure, self authenticating truth or method' (Norris, 1991 :34). Though, philosophy strives to efface its textual or "written" character, the signs of that struggle are "there to be read in its blind spots or metaphor" (Dews, 1987:38). Deconstruction is thus an activity of reading that "remains closely tied to the texts it interrogates", and "can never be set up as a self- enclosed system of operative concepts"(Norris, 1991:22). In fact, Derrida more than Adorno, maintains an extreme and exemplary scepticism when it comes to defining his own methodology. The "deconstructive leverage supplied by a term like writing depends on its resistance to any kind ofsettled or definitive meaning" (Norris, 1 99 1 :54). Not withstanding his own cautions about method, it is clear that Derrida deploys the notion of differance to accomplish his analysis and at the same time develop an alternative way ofproceeding. That is, anew mode ofthought that "suggests the impossibility of closing off differing and deferral of meaning and the possibility ofa potential ofan endlessness in interpretation" (Norris, 1991:46). Differanceas a mutablenotion derives from the Saussure's description of language as a differential network wherein "there is no one to one relation between signifier and signified, the word as (spoken or written) and the concept it serves to evoke" (Norris, 1 99 1 :46). Derrida redeploys the distinction between parole and la langue but argues against Sassaure's spoken as opposed to written priority. Derrida argues that thi s is a propensity in Western philosophy more generally, find in Sassaure a "blindness,which does not recognize in language a speaking signifying system which exceeds all bounds of 'presence' and speech" (Norris, 1 99 1 :49). Derrida sees a whole metaphysics at work behind the privilege granted to speech in Sassaure's methodology. As is well known in the contemporary context, Derrida shows a whole plethora of dualisms which betray an implicit or explicit privileging of one term over the other. Derrida formulates a specific and "shifting battery of terms which cannot be reduced to any single self-identical meaning" (Dews, 1987:42) to develop a deconstructive analysis oftexts that denies this privileging even as it undercuts it. Differance is perhaps the most well known of these, since it sets up a "disturbance at the level ofthe signifier (anomalous spelling) which graphically resists reduction" (Norris, 1987:46). Its sense remains suspended between the two french verbs "to differ" and "to defer " Its Derridian revolutionary significance consists in the extent to which the former is found to yield to the latter: meaning is always deferred. Yet, the designation 'differance' also exceeds a solely strategic function and may identify Derrida's own entrance into the metaphysical. Indeed, as Dews argues, the Alternate Routes, Volume12, 1995 term 'differance' not only indicates Derrida's attempt to pursue an alternative heading, it also represents 'the non-originary convergence of meaning and non-meaning that is, in fact, unthinkable' (Dews 1987:5). Whether and to what extent this really represents Derrida's venture into the metaphysical, however, is a matter best left to another inquiry. The critical continuities and contrasts between Derrida's deconstruction and the procedure of immanent critique developed by Adomo can now be developed more clearly. Principally there are five somewhat superficial similarities which bear observation and a number of key differences at the epistemological level which have quiet clear implications for both further study and critical theory. Both thinkers are quite clearly engaged in an analysis of "apparent philosophical contraries" in an attempt to show how they implicitly or "surreptitiously depend on one another" (Dews, 1 987: 48). This is evident in Adorno's discussion of history/nature and subject/object. In Dernda there are many examples: speech/writing and signifier/signified being principle. Both thinkers are also concerned with "reversing the traditional order of these privileged dualisms is order to expose their false foundations" (Dews, 1 987: 48). This characterization may be more accurate in the case of Adorno, however, since he wants to reverse the order only to overturn the inequality between subject and object that is produced by bourgeois social relations. Derrida, although engaged in this project, appears to see it as a stage, with the higher goal of calling into question the grounds for the distinction. Adorno, in contrast, does not want to get rid ofthe subject/ object distinction but instead wants to direct attention to the fact that it is a product of a specific material conditions. Both thinkers are also essentially opposed to identity based essentialism and the attempt in philosophy to transcend language and yield di rect knowledge ofthe transcendental signifier . Adorno acknowledges that this goal is epitomized by Hegel and Derrida sees this in Husserl Yet again, they are different at this level as well . For Adorno is quite clearly critical of identity at the epistemological level while Derrida is critical of identity at the level of the subject. Derrida primarily asserts an attack on the basis of knowing through subjective meaning. Still, both locate the source of contradiction in Western philosophy in the attempt to textually suppress or repress the meanings in an effort to produce truth claims and both insist on using the text itself as the ultimate material for analysis and disclosure, making a virtue of careful reading to discover what the text does not want to say In Adorno's case, however, this technique derives from a commitment to rework and renew the categories of thought whereas in Derrida it derives from a desire to show volatility of textual meaning. Despite these commonalities in approach, there are significant differ- ences between the two thinkers that have important consequences. Namely, Derrida's insistence on the "dissemination" of the text appears to have the "logical consequence...not [of the] volatization of meaning but its destruc- tion" (Dews, 1987:186), while Adorno's approach to the relationship be- tween facticity and concept does not end in such annihilation. Meaning is achievable through analysis and reconstruction using the process of exact fantasy 8 . Derrida on the other hand, struggles with the impossibility of even provisional closure. Adorno and Derrida also differ substantially in respect to their assess- ment of experience. The former provides for a concept of experience that mediates between subject and object in such a way that "something" is given, but nothing is given "immediately". Derrida's appeals to experience simply seem to imply "a lapse to a metaphysic of presence" (Dews 1 987: 1 88). This has clear implications for the range of mobility and phenomena explored. Adorno is free to analyze how material conditions work to determine and mediate experience without falling into a performative contradiction. The concomitant consequence is that Derrida seems ultimately able to offer only a negative project for sociology, one which is appealing only in so far as it invites insight into the multiplicity of possible readings and contingencies implied in any reading. In contrast, Adorno's approach takes us into theory as a practical activity. Finally, as mentioned earlier, with Derrida "thought seems more tied to a conception of consciousness" (Dews, 1987:189) than with Adorno's, despite the formers claims to the contrary. The basis for this allegation consists in the fact that Adorno establishes a schemata of identity and non- identity as interdependent. The supposition ofa non-identity between concept and facticity provides for an ongoing dynamic of development but is not fundamentally grounded in a correspondence between the subject and object. Derrida, however ironically, appears to recapitulate the very hazard he is trying to avoid by making "differance" so preeminent as to culminate in absolute identity. It's omnipresence in the Derridian scheme arguably negates its impact. There are, no doubt, other things to say about these two complex and thinkers, and much more might be made of their similarities and differences in a more expansive forum. For the present purposes, it still remains to turn Alternate Routes. Volume12, 1995 to the question of Adomo's anti-authontanan impulses and more specifi- cally, contemporary debates about the requirements and possibilities for 'critical theory'. To revisit Adomo today, in full knowledge ofthe vicissitudes that have accompanied the evolution of critical theory is to suggest not simply that something of the analytical acumen of the first generation of the Frankfurt School has been lost in more recent incarnations of critical theory, but also a desire to regain it. If nothing else, the foregoing analysis has suggested that the currency of Adorno's approach in the contemporary context consists at least in part in the fact that his text driven approach does not devolve into the totalizing abyss of endless analysis often identified with post-structuralism. Yet, Adorno's approach also seems to resist the tenor of totalizing ambitions often associated with communicative theory. The significance ofthis resist- ance becomes clear when one considers current debates about the nature and possibilities associated with the critique of reason. Indeed, whereas Derrida is alleged to have perpetrated a dissolution of reason by truncating the foundations for philosophical thought (Habermas, 1987), Habermas is frequently charged with having reinstitutedthe authoritarianism of reason by insisting on another metanarrative. Both camps want to lay claim to forms of post-metaphysical thinking and both are vulnerable to critiques on the grounds of their totalizing tendencies. Adomo offers a third way: one which is neither premised on the endless dissembling of the text nor the straining claims of the ideal speech situation, but on the simple claim that there is always, in principle, a non-identity between concept and reality. The importance of non-totalizing approaches to theorizing that still retain a commitment to truth claims cannot be understated, not simply because internecine struggles between postmodernists and modern perspec- tives are ultimately incommensurable, also because, apropos of Adomo, the kinds ofsocial, economic and political conditions that contribute to totalizing thinking and therefore an insurgence of irrationalism are equally apparent today. Indeed as Stephen Crook notes on introducing a new collection of Adomo's essays on culture. while paranoia has been consigned to the modem side of the modem/postmodern divide in at least one account, mere are grounds for regarding paranoia as linked to postmodemizing change The paranoid character of manyfin de siecle concerns about health and the environment is really quite marked: our brains will turn into blancmange if we eat beef, power lines will give us cancer, we will be boiled by global warming or fried by ultra-violet light. Of course, the age old adage holds that 'just because your paranoid it doesn't mean there are not out to get you ' and our fears may be well grounded. It is not the scientific basis ofhealth and environmental issues which is at issue here so much astheway in which they are generated byforms ofmedia coverage which might be regarded as encouraging paranoid thinking. (Crook 1994:27) *** While the future of critcial theory remains uncertain, there has perhaps been too much celebration and too little debate among critical theorists about that the overall implications of the movement away from a epistemological grounding in the philosophy of the subject to one based in claims to an intersubjectively secured epistemological grounding. The totalizing tenden- cies associated with the communicative turn, however, are by now well known, and include not only the attempt to universalize Kohlberbs theory of moral development but also the claim to an ideal speach situation. Still, recent work in critical theory suggests the situation is changing even as awareness about the developing disparity between the first and second generations of critical theory continues to grow. Recent work in critical theory undertake to overcome this tendency toward polarization between the first and second generations of the Frankfurt School (Dubiel, 1992: 5) while other works perpetrate a rigerous critique of the more grandiose claims of the Theory of Communicative Action (McCarthy 1991: Welmer 1986). Behind each of these efforts there lingers Adorno's silent, but nonetheless adamant lament that we ought to wonder about the dissolution ofthe subject that has come to chracterize our time, and not simply embrace it. Notes 1. Jameson develops a compelling critique of attempts to appropriate Adorno as a contemporary proto-postmodernist. (Jameson, 1990: 4-5), and the concluding sections (Jameson, 1990: 1-3) of the work. 2. .Although a number of works have excavated and explicated the connections between theory and method in Adorno, this discussion draws heavily on Susan Buck Morris' Alternate Routes, Volume12, 1995 "Origins of Negative Dialectics" which is clearly the best analysis to date on the methodological movements and theoretical influences that underlie Adorno's approach. 3. On the question of an oeuvre, commentators differ. For example, the clear and pronounced continuities in Adorno's work are enough to persuade Jameson to propose a synchronous reading. Jay, however, is content to take one essay as paradigmatic of his approach. Adorno clearly saw his work as linked and continuous. However, it is unlikely that he would have been sympathetic to attempts to treat any part of his work as representative of the whole. Indeed, as Jameson notes (1990:5), Adorno insisted in a brief exchange with Benjamin that one must be thoroughly acquainted with the diversity of his work before any attempt at assessment. This might be seen as somewhat ironic, since Adorno's approach to other texts is that the structure of the whole is contained in the particular. 4. Buck Morris states: "Adomo saw no possibility of an argument coming to rest in unequivocal synthesis. He made negativity the hallmark of his dialectical procedure precisely because he believed that Hegel had been wrong: reason and reality did not coincide. As with Kant, Adorno's antimonies remained anatomical, but this was due to the limits of reality rather than reason". 5. This discussion entitled "Idealism as Rage" is perhaps most informative about Adorno's overall approach to philosophy. The spectre of Nietzsche appears as Adomo writes "the system is belly turned mind, and rage is the mark of each and every idealism It disfigures Kant's humanism and refutes the aura of higher and nobler things" (Adomo, 1973 : 22). 6. "It is this goal, the accomplishment of the liquidation of idealism from within, that Adomo had in mind when he formulated the current demands of philosophy as necessitating a logic of disintegration" (Morris: 69). 7. "the need to liquidate philosophy emerged out of the philosophical material at its present stage of development. Adomo used terms of natural decay in his speech to describe idealist concepts and tenets of philosophy, treating them like material objects with a life and a death of their won, and thereby conveying there historical character and transitoriness". (Morris, 70). Again, this is an extensive discussion of in the first section of Negative Dialectics. 8. Although I have not had space enough here to detail this method, I do not mean to imply that it is inconsequential in Adorno's overall analysis. References Adorno, Theodor W. 1967 Prisms. Great Britain: Neville Spearman Limited. Adorno, Theodor W. 1973 Negative Dialectics. New York. 1978 Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life. London: Verso. 1 994 The Stars Down to Earth and Other Essays on the Irrational In Culture. Ed. and Intro, by Stephen Crook. Routledge: New York, Best Stephen and Douglas Kellner. 1 99 1 Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations. Guildford Press: New York. Buck-Morris, Susan 1977 Origins ofNegative Dialectics. Sussex: Harvest Press Derrida, Jacques. 1968 Differance. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 1984 Writing and Difference . Chicago: Chicago University Press. Dews, Peter 1987 Logics ofDisintegration: Post-Structuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory. London: Verso. Habermas, Jurgen. 1978 The Philosophical Discourses ofModernity. Massachusettes: M.I.T. Debiel, Helmut. 1992 "Domination or Emancipation? The Debate over the Heritage of Critical Theory". Cultural-Political Inten'endons in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment. Honneth et Al. Editors. Massachusettes: MIT. Jameson, Fredric. 1990 Late Marxism: Adorno, or, The Persistence of the Dialectic. London: Verso. Jay, Martin. 1984 Adorno. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. McCarthy, Thomas. 1993 Ideals and Illusions: On Reconstruction and Deconstruction in Contempoarary Critical Theory. Massachusettes: MIT. Norris, Christopher. 1991 Deconstruction: Theory and Practice Revised Edition NY: Routledge. ^) Alternate Routes, Volume 12, 1995 Tar, Zoltan 1977 The Frankfurt School: The Critical Theories ofMax Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno. NY: John Wiley & Sons. Zuidervaart, Lambert. 1 994 Adorno 'sA esthetic Theory: The Redemption ofIllusion. Massachusettes: MIT.