Property Rights and Communication

Andrew Reddick

Carleton University

Introduction1

Inthe current federal neo-policy and neo-regulation process

in the communications sector2 , euphemistically referred to as the

Information Highway, the development, rules ofgovernance and

terms ofaccess to information and communication networks are

being framed by the preferences for, and extension o£ private

property rules and practices. These policies and practises erode

and undermine the democratic common property right ofaccess

to information and knowledge. 3 Canadians' right ofaccess willbe

undennined in a market approach due to lack of sufficient

financial resources and the availability of affordable, quality

service featuring diversity of content. A "have and have not"

bifurcation in Canada based on such factors as income, education,

and geographic location willbecome exacerbated in communica-

tion and information.

The ramifications of this policy change extend beyond the

currentnarrow debates emanating fromgovernment and industry

leaders about the use, ownership or, ostensibly, the wealth

generating or emancipatory potentials ofthe technologies. Inter-

estingly, such prophetic claims are even being made by those on

different sides of this issue. Some public interests attribute an

empowerment of public rights through the new technologies.

This tendency of limiting public discussion and analysis to the

potentialities of technology obscures and dismisses the broader

issues relating to social and economic justice. The two dominant

views emerging from these technological detenrrinist perspec-

tives are that such omnipotent technology will lead us either to

l?fr

Alternate Routes, Volume 13, 1 996



Alternate Routes, Volume 13, 1996

some Utopian economic or to social/cultural panacea.

Technologies are not drivers ofchange, but tools subject to

political, economic and social forces and decision making. What

is significant in the current changes is that the stakes involve not

so much the technologies, but information. This is a resource of

the mind, language and humanity. Information is the stuff of

understanding, communication, creativity and change. But how

do we think about information? Questions of its control raise

structural issues, but the more fundamental issues of availability,

diversity, quality and need, necessary for a level of 'natural'

human existence, can broaden debate to the universal dimension

and importance of the resource.

In a broaderpolitical economic context, information isbeing

subjected to a process of privatization and commercialisation,

particularly in those aspects of life which until now have been

unquestionably considered public. This deepening and extension

ofprivate property market relations is a broad assault upon the

^^ previously non-commodified public and private (individual) ac-

tivities, space, relations and lives ofpeople and society. So what

is the problem? Why should this concern us? Quite simply, with

the destruction and transformation of public information and

public space, the basis of democracy, of economic and social

justice, is threatened (Schiller, 1986:39).

This paper considers these issues in four parts. The first

section offers a way oftheorizing or thinking about information

as a property right in the context ofthe role ofthe state and our

communication system The next two sections consider how this

is being played out as process and practice in Canadian policy

making and communication industry restructuring. These sec-

tions also analyse the class dimensions of this change, and the

actors and social claims being made in this struggle. This includes

an analysis of the strategies being used by different class actors

and agents within the core state policy making apparatus. The

concluding section revisits these core themes and considers the

potential for the realization ofthe 'market' or 'democratic' goals



Reddick/ Property Rights and Communication

in the emerging information society.

Information

Before considering the changes in Canadian information and

communication policy, it is useful to define what is meant by

information, its role, and the claims which have come to be made

on it in a capitalist liberal democratic market society (CMS).

Much ofhow we think about information is defined by how
we think about society, our view of society and people's place in

it. The difficulty in defining information lies in attempting to

separate what it is or where we find it, from what one does with

it or what it should be used for. This difficulty is more clouded as

one tries to abstract 'information' fromthe context ofthe political

economic relations of the society in which we live. Within the

structural context of our society, information is often posited in

terms of spheres, for example the social sphere, the education

sphere, the market sphere, and so forth. While this helps us in

clarifying our views of society, it risks artificially polarizing or #g|
drawing lines between what are more aptly described as interde-

pendent or mutually influencing processes and activities (Resnick

and Wolfe, 1 987).
4We can eachbe economic, political, social and

cultural actors in separate processes and activities and in various

combinations or degrees. The point is that, at times, with some of

these there is a preponderance ofone type of activity or process

over the others—more social than economic, or more cultural

than social, let us say.

In thinking about society this way, there are a number of

ways ofthinking about a 'public' as opposed to a 'market' view

of information—what it is, what it should be, or how it is used.

Herb Schiller, who has long argued for the protection ofinforma-

tion rights, sees information as central to the development of a

democratic society. As Schiller writes,

information serves to facilitate democratic decision

making, assists in citizen participation in government,



Alternate Routes, Volume 13, 1996

and contributes to the search for roughly egalitarian

measures in the economy at large (1991:42).

In this view, of information as a social good, a democratic

resource, benefits the lives ofindividuals, and through its collec-

tive use, the overall governance of society. Indirectly, or as a

subsequent step through its use, information provides economic

benefits by providing people with the means and ability to

participate and benefit from direct economic exchange. As well,

information allows people to participate in a host of other

activities, which by their very nature, provide the 'economic

sector' with an 'informated subject'. By 'informated subject' I

mean individuals who, through their ability to access and benefit

from information (literacy, education, experience, etc.), are able

to contribute to the general economic, social and culturalproduc-

tion ofsociety. Theyhave a demand for the information and other

products of society arising from their participation (Zuboff^

1988:9-10). 5

G) Michael Apple, borrowing from Pierre Bourdieu, differen-

tiates information as symbolic capital from information as finan-

cial capital. On the one hand, information as financial capital is

useful only in the sense that it can be valuated as a physical

commodity, its value is defined by its exchange (sale) value and

time value (generally short term). On the other hand, Apple

appeals to the more abstract and 'public' nature of information

when he describes it as also symbolic capital (Apple, 1991:25).

Simply put, thisvalue is cultural in the sense that it is a lived, every

day resource. It is accessible, usable, and readily exchangeable for

its own sake and not based on a commodity transaction. Through

this, the developmental qualities of information arise.

The underlying theme of such views, is that information is

first, diverse, broad, dynamic—a product ofhumanity and inter-

action—ideas in substance. Secondly, perhaps most importantly

in terms ofpractise, and the battlefront in current policy making,

information is a public resource that allows for the achievement



Reddick/ Property Rights and Communication

of some 'end' goals. In a democratic view, these goals allow

people to learn, express, exchange and interact in social and

cultural ways for the sake ofpersonal well being, development

and understanding. It is that which contributes to being a citizen

and to the maximization ofone's individual utilities and abilities.

This is a view of society that includes commerce rather than the

inverse, a commercial market system that includes society. The

corollary to this is that individuals are then able to participate in

society and benefit from this. Whether a capitalist market society

or some other form, in this view people can participate in

activities and social relations which allow for 'production' that

reproduces one's self and society. In our liberal democratic

capitalist market society this should include, and gfve some

balance to, the two sets of property rights; the 'democratic'

—

civil, social, political rights and activities—and 'liberal'—eco-

nomic activities.

An imbalancebetween the 'liberal' and 'democratic', whereby

the liberal (market, economic) is given too much weight erodes dffi

an economic justice perspective underlying the democratic view

whereby social norms and ethical values prevail over impersonal

market values (Clement, 1988: 14). In the hierarchy ofindividual

rights, civil and political rights can be satisfied on an individual

basis, though there is a collective purpose to these. However,

social and economic rights, which now increasingly rely on the

ability of individuals to access and use modern communications

and information to be fully realized, need collective property

rights to fully develop and be realized (Clement, 1988: 14). This

isthe basis ofthe current contradiction within capitalism such that

the imbalance favours individual private property.

However, to achieve these democratic goals in a complex

modern society at either an individual or collective level is near

impossible without those institutions, practices or processes

generallythought ofas the 'public sphere'. This, in addition to the

'market sphere or sector', is the other halfofthe front in the battle

to detennine what it is and what information ought to be.



Alternate Routes, Volume 13, 1996

Habermas has characterized the social sphere or process as

"the realm of social life where public opinion can be formed.

Access is guaranteed to all citizens .... citizens behave as a public

body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion", in other words

freedom of association and expression (1974:49-55). The insti-

tutions we associate with these processes can be informal or

formal. These include schools, libraries, cultural organizations,

or more informal means of interaction, such as local groups.

However, and this takes us back to the nexus of the conflict in

communication policy, the means required to do this in a collec-

tive way in a complex society are the various physical communi-

cation media, technologies and institutions. These would include

traditional media—the text, the newspaper, magazine, newslet-

ter, public meeting, radio, television, and the new media, compu-

ter-based networks and similar technologies.

Democratic Rights, Information as Property

£f% In a liberal democratic capitalist market society some amount

ofinformation will invariably be a commodity—a liberal market

valued resource. Information will also be a democratically valued

resource, a common public good.

How should we argue for and defend the democratic aspect

ofinformation? This could be done in many ways, such as using

political or social rights arguments. In a market society, an

appropriate case can be made through an argument based on

property. Our society values property over all else, and defines

the right ofproperty as an individual right. In the current policy

debate over information; the rights to it, its use and access, can

usefully be grounded in a theory ofproperty that underpins our

liberal democratic market society. Using property rights as an

entry point for analysis permits a discussion of democratic

objectives as well as providing the means to reveal and explore

the inherent contradictions in the current market centred debate

over information, and the possible resolutions of this debate.

These possible resolutions can have democratic or anti-demo-



Reddick/ Property Rights and Communication

cratic consequences.

The work of C.B. Macpherson (1973,1978,1985) is useful

for this analysis because it helps us position information as a

fundamentalhuman right and a property right. Thiswork also sets

out the role ofthe state and the tensions and contradictions arising

in a capitalist market society (CMS) in the articulation and

achievement ofsuch property rights. The challenge is to achieve

some mitigation between an individual right to private property

(market valuation) and an individual right to common (public)

property (democratic valuation) as it relates to information. In the

first, the right exists to exclude others from access unless certain

economic terms are met. In the second, the right is to not be

excluded from the use or benefit of something, though some

limits over collective access may exist. These limits generally

ensure measures of equality.

The stakes are high in current policy making as radical neo-

liberal ideology drives its agenda across a broad sweep of state

responsibilities and initiatives (Clark, 199 1).
6 The contemporary ^^

debate about communication and information policy has become

limited to a religious-like mantra from the proponents of the

liberal market place. This mantra of competition, privatization,

and deregulation argues for a rigid ideological adherence to

social relations exclusively based on individual private property

relations. Entrenchment of such a view in policy would reduce

society to that which is only peopled by economic producers and

consumers. This agenda is a crude narrowing from a view of

society, of 'mankind' and social practise, though not in any way
in equilibria, that included that of the citizen in democracy.

Instead, an economic vision is propagated that takes the form of

a religion because it claims to be the inevitable result ofhigher,

more powerful forces than individuals or society; a god or gods

—

the market, technology, globalization. This view imposes closure

on other views and alternative ways of seeing and doing. It

advocates conformity and impotence.

This tension between market freedom and the need to set



^^

Alternate Routes, Volume 13, 1996

limits to achieve democratic, common freedom and opportunity

is summarized by Macpherson in the following statement:

When the individual property right is written into law

as an individual right to the exclusive use and disposal

of parcels of the resources provided by nature and

parcels ofthe capital created by past work on them, and

when it is combined with the liberal system ofmarket

incentives and rights of free contract, it leads to and

supports a concentration ofownership and a system of

power relations between individuals and classes which

negates the ethical goal of free and independent, indi-

vidual development (1978:199-200).

In communication, this liberal market narrowing occurs with the

unequal relations involving exclusive control over, the creation

o£ the terms of access to, and use o£ information. This includes

the shaping andvaluating ofinformation and knowledge andhow
its worth (economic or other) is determined. The current policy

and market trends are an intensification ofthe process Raymond

Williams identified as a 'selective tradition' whereby someone's

vision of legitimate knowledge, information and culture

"enfranchises one group's cultural capital at the expense of

another" (Williams, in Apple and Christian-Smith, 1991:1).

Currently, the trend isto the privatization ofinformation, the

materialization ofmformation into a thing that can be commodified,

and the institutionalization of these inherently unequal class-

based relations (legal, economic, political). People, in this liberal

market view, are seen as 'market man', a maximum utilizer of

resources and capacities. This model ofsociety features compet-

ing individuals—consumers and appropriators (extractors)

—

where the accumulation of property, in this case information, is

an end in itself. Developmental possibilities for other objectives

(e.g., social, cultural, political, common capital) are excluded in

this view. Interestingly, in the liberal market view this accumula-

tion for selfgain is equated to at its most fundamental level with



Reddick/ Property Rights and Communication

the end goal offreedom. This goal is shared with the democratic

purpose ofproperty, which the individual property right presup-

poses. However, by privileging private individual over collective

individual rights, it negates the achievement ofa broader sense of

freedom (Macpherson, 1973:82-86; 1978:46-47).

Applying Macpherson' s ideas to information, and the politi-

cal relations of this property, one way of viewing the current

contestation over communication policy making is over the

morality of different property claims. In other words, contesta-

tion over what information and the terms of its creation and

access are, and ought to be. The underlying right is not contested

by liberal or democratic proponents in this debate. But the

contradiction arises when the set of economic claims (private

ownership) are posed against democratic claims (not to be

excluded, common property). Historically in Canadian commu-

nication policy making, there has been agency or mutual determi-

nation in this debate over goals and practises. Overtime, this has

resulted in a mix of economic and social policies designed to Q)
mitigate or balance such claims, e.g., the development ofpublic

broadcasting, or provincially and privately owned telecommuni-

cation networks, Canadian content, obligation to serve. Still,

these remain inherently contradictory claims in a capitalist market

system (Macpherson, 1978:3,5; 1985:84).

This battle over democratic and liberal ideals is being played

out in many sectors ofwhich communication and information is

only one. Others include welfare state institutions and practises,

education, health, transportation and finance. The state's role is

central in these changes. Only the state can make policy and

manage national economic, political and social relations. Moreo-

ver, while individuals may have the rights of property, it is the

state that creates or changes these rights and establishes the

institutions (e.g., law) that protects these rights, sets limits on

them, and authorizes or enables their articulation in social rela-

tions. The state is the terrain of contestation over claims and the

resulting output is policy in the broadest sense. Although this



Alternate Routes, Volume 13, 1996

contestation has always been unequally weighted or tilted in

favour ofthe economic or capitalist class, the policy goals ofneo-

liberals will further erode the democratic potential and practices

in communications by limiting the state's role and ability to seek

some balance or mitigation between these claims.

The view ofthese neo-liberal proponents is that the state's

role must be minimal—for the protection and stabilization of

markets and individual economic liberty. This liberty takes the

form ofboth producer rights and consumer rights (whereby those

with the most ability to pay have access, as opposed to participa-

tory democracy whereby all citizens rather than consumers have

the right of access in order to realize personal benefits in some

measure of equality). This static liberal view of 'mankind' and

society sees social purpose and social relations as extractive (self-

interest and gain). In the discourse ofthe day, the 'market' and

'competition', normally thought ofas 'means' to an end, become

'ends' in themselves. Any social, cultural, political or other

0f% collective democratic purpose is discounted or marginalized. In

the final analysis, this view reduces information to a commodity

to be accumulated or exchanged for capital. As a consequence,

social relations involving information are not to be developmen-

tal and shared whereby individuals could equally have access to

personally benefit, grow and develop (Macpherson, 1985:57-

58).

Information, Opportunity and Crisis

Ifnot technological or other determinisms, then what are the key

factors behind the marketization ofpublic information? Informa-

tion has always been important as part ofthe economic and social

capital of society. What is different in the current era ofcompe-

tition is the strategic purpose ascribed to information by decision

makers in society, and in particular members of the dominant

capital class, including the state. At the heart ofthe matter is the

potential and the increasing ability to extend the control, produc-

tion and use ofinformation as an industrial sector in its own right.



Reddick/ Property Rights and Communication

Two decades ago, the 'information economy' was seen by liberal

theorists as a logical extension of industrialism (Bell, 1973).

More recently, it has come to be defined as the necessary strategy

to escape a crisis of our capitalist market society.

The value, strategically or economically, ofinformation has

always existed in human relations. Harold Tunis (1951) in his

various writings, has emphasized the importance of a balance

between monopolization or control ofinformation and its decen-

tralization and accessibility. For Innis, the bias ofcommunication

meant that at certain historic junctures the strategic choice,

design and use of certain technologies biased power and social

relations in society. The inequalities of such monopolization in

modern society, in this view, are intertwined with the way
western society has made a religion of science and the rnachine.

Innis states, "industrialism implies technology and the cutting of

time into precise fragments suited to the needs ofthe engineer and

the accountant" (Innis, 195 1: 140). In this statement, Innis char-

acterizes the essence ofthe information age, the commodification ^Pl

oftime and its disjuncture fromlong term thinking, continuity and

broader social purpose. In an industrialized or post-industrial

society, one that is linked by mass communication, whether text,

electronic or other form, the measurement and commodification

of time also includes the destruction and repackaging oftime's

content, and this content is information. Modern communication,

on this basis, emphasizes individualism over collectivism, insta-

bility and change over stability and permanence, and competition

over participation (Innis, 1951:80-81).

In the 1960s, proponents of an 'information society' or

economy touted this as a goal that was a natural extension and

growth ofa market society. Theorists such as Daniel Bell (1973),

an early apostle ofthe post-industrial society, saw information as

the valued industry ofthe future. In keeping with a liberal market

view, this extension of the market would result in efficiency,

productivity and growth benefitting all.

The information society, first seen as an evolutionary expec-



Alternate Routes, Volume 13, 1996

tation, has since become an ideological imperative considered by

decision makers as necessary for systemic survival in the face of

economic crisis. The crisis has variably been described as one of

production or overproduction, too much low cost foreign com-

petition, under consumption, falling rate of profit, and so forth.

Responses have resulted in the restructuring ofpolicy, economic

and social relations and institutions, leading to mass unemploy-

ment, a reduction in support for human services, and unqualified

faith in an idealized notion of competition. State policy has

favoured redistribution benefitting the market at the expense of

the citizenry, with a rather specific effort of narrowing and

redefining traditionally de- or uncommodified aspects oflife. For

the market, this has meant less government control and oversight

of corporate behaviour, a declining quality of work, and the

removal of the traditional policy barriers which make market

practises publicly accountable. Essential to the policy of escape

from crisis (also euphemistically referred to as restructuring) is

^^ the pursuit for more competition, the creation of an idealized

market Utopia, and a focus on the development ofan information

industry (Webster and Robins, 1986:319; Schiller, 1986:30).

This is done while social and cultural activities which meet

individual needs but have no direct relation to commerce are

ignored. They have not, nor can theyhave by their very definition,

commodity value in and of themselves in order to accomplish

their intended purpose. Any attempt to privilege the economic or

commodity criteria as more important, or better able to deliver

the service, means that only the most profitable rather than the

most necessary or useful service is available.

But these changes are not some instrumentally foreordained

set ofpractises and conclusions. Change involves social struggle

and competing claims. This holds true with information and

technology and for the broader social and economic policies and

practises of society. Competing claims by social actors, though

often made within a set ofunequal power relations, none-the-less

shape final policy outcomes and social practises. Agency, which



Reddick/ Property Rights and Communication

is the effectiveness of resistance or initiative by social actors,

whether from within the dominant class against others in this

class, or arising from those in the subordinate classes, mutually

influence results (Foucault, 1972: 162-163).

The current changes in Canadian capitalism are being led as

much from within by fractions of the capitalist class as from

external outside forces. Such change approximates Gramsci's

notion ofreform from within or a passive revolution (1971: 1 06-

107). As argued by Michel Foucault, the success of this 're-

formed' hegemony, its permanence, requires its pervasion into

the conscious and subconscious levels ofsociety andthe citizenry.

Hegemony is society's social glue of understanding and world

view. The complexity of modern society relies on the use of

technology and, increasingly, the control of information "to

pervade the whole ofthe social body" (Foucault, 1972:156). The

existing class-based ownership and power relations of media/

information ownership backed by state complicity puts demo-

cratic claims at a particular disadvantage in the current period of ^^
change. The claims made by dominant class actors to support or

validate these inequalities are expressed in a waywhich ostensibly

appeals to shared democratic ideals, but in reality cannot deliver

because they are based on economic criteria alone. This ideology

has power through its social dominance. It attempts to frame

discourse and seeks to control opinion and ideas, to define the

acceptable parameters of discussion, and the possible. Its goal is

to define howwe are to see and value society and, as part ofthis,

information and knowledge. Information is, therefore, not inher-

entlyjust, equal or democratic. It must be constructed and shaped

by social relations. For it to be democratic (in access, diversity,

and use value) it must be defined as such, and the claims seeking

this must be broadly recognized (social consciousness), accepted

(political) and institutionalized (law and practise) (Foucault,

1972: 162). The prospect for achieving this broader democratic

view in the current struggle over our changing hegemony as it

relates to information seems thin.



Alternate Routes, Volume 13, 1996

Policy, Discourse and Social Reality

This section considers the shifts in federal policy in Canada

necessary to accommodate the process of information

commodification and marketization, and the strategies employed

by the market, as well as the responses of social actors. In so

doing, it highlights the class dimension of the dominant actors

within and outside the state, and the social relations which are

emerging in our 'information society'.

Neither the state, dominant or subordinate social classes are

homogenous in their ideologies, values or practises in the rela-

tions involving the competing claims of rights, strategies or

objectives in the changes relating to information and the commu-

nication sector. There is no homogeneity in the views of actors

within each ofthe government, market or public sectors. Agents

with differing views ofsociety, characterized by opposing liberal

and democratic objectives, exist within groups in each sector.

Competition for dominance (policy and practise) of ideas is

G) ongoing between agents within each sector and between sectors.

But these are not simple 'pluralistic' relations. Domination by

elites based on different types ofpower (e.g., economic, political)

is also inherent in each of these groups and sectors, though

particularly so with industry and the state.

This domination is based on both the class and power

positions ofmembers. This is clearer and more established in state

and capitalist class components than social groups. While social

groups (e.g., low-income, seniors, cultural organizations, etc.)

are class-based, they tend to see themselves more in terms of

special or group interests (Jenson, 1989:83). In policy making,

the world view is more conducive of, and an acquiescence to, a

pluralistic view of social interaction and representation. As a

result this masks the underlying structural inequalities and limits

the public's ability to achieve substantive change. This difference

allows discursive and ideological appeals by the state, in an

attempt to justify and achieve public consensus on policy and



Reddick/ Property Rights and Communication

values, to be phrased as being in the interest ofthe citizenry. This

occurs in particular where these pronouncements tend to appeal

to democratic objectives while masking structural changes

benefitting individual private property practises. The discourse of

the dominant class also conceals the inherent economic (power)

inequalities of this agenda. While appealing to the values of

participatory democracy or a broad notion of community and

shared values/benefits, in practise what is being promoted is a

system of consumer or dollar democracy. Dollar democracy,

based on one's ability to pay, becomes the ticket to individual

participation and equity. The antithesis, participatory democ-

racy, in its broadest sense, is the ability to have equal access to,

and equally share in, the cumulative social and capital production

ofsociety. In the market place, this democratic 'end' and purpose

for social and economic restructuring, exists in name only. It

becomes a justification for change but with no real prospect of

delivery due to the underlying inequalities and structural limita-

tions of class-based economic relations. ^^
The main armaments used by government and industry to

date to create acceptance by the public of these changes are

propaganda and policy/regulatory changes. Using government

jargon, the 'optics' ofthe message for change focus on claims of

the socially and economicallyliberating benefits ofan information

society. This justificatory strategy is shared by market players.

Government alone, but in close consultation/negotiation with the

dominant market actors, has also, and continues to, rewrite policy

and regulation necessary to reconstruct and lay the foundations

for structural changes to permit the privatization and

commodification of information.

The concordance of ideological views between decision

makers in government and dominant information industry actors

is reflected in formal policies, public and private sectors docu-

ments, and studies which serve as justificatory devices to affect

public opinion in support of such change. As well, special

initiatives are undertaken, such as public hearings, e.g., Informa-



Alternate Routes, Volume 13, 1996

tion Highway Advisory Council (MAC), Canadian Radio-televi-

sion Telecommunications Commission (CRTC). These formal

and informal hearings are used by government to create the

appearance of inclusion and to dispel opposition. With few

exceptions, the resulting policy outputs are only partially shaped

but not changed in any substantive way by public claims. The

shared government and industry ideology proscribes the reliance

on market forces to achieve economic, social and cultural goals

orbetterment. Perhaps one ofthe most damaging examples ofthis

ideological shift, given its broad impact on structuring the frame-

work ofthe information society, was the writing ofthe 1993

Telecommunications Act. The Act contains the contradictory

objectives: "to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the social and

economic fabric of Canada" (Sect. 7. a.); "be affordable and

accessible to all Canadians" (Sect.7.b.); respond to the "eco-

nomic and social requirements ofusers"(Sect. 7.h.); and, in a shift

to a method instead of an end, "to foster increased reliance on

^^ market forces for the provision oftelecommunications services"

(Sect. IS.). In practise, this 'method' section has become the

overriding context andraison d'etre used by the Canadian Radio-

television and Telecommunication Commission (CRTC) and

policy branches in Industry Canada for setting the framework for

policy decisions, while other sections are considered subordinate

or irrelevant.

This approach is not unique to Canada. In the U.S., the

government has ordained that "the Information Highway is to be

built, owned and operated by the private sector" (McChesney,

1995:7). In reflecting on these changes in the U.S., McChesney

observes that their communication policy "was written by and for

business in the U.S. and is one ofthe most corrupt pieces of

legislation in U.S. history" (1995:8). McChesney argues this is

corrupt not only due to the back room dealing making between

government decision makers and corporate lobbyists, but also

because, as has become the model in Canada, social issues are

relegated to a caretaking item to be dealt with after a commercial



Reddick/ Property Rights and Communication

system is in place.

In Canada, a plethora ofgovernment decisions, documents

and studies similarly promote this way of seeing technology,

information and the presumed benefits for society. In its decision

on restructuring the telephone and cable industries in Canada (the

main players in our information society) the CRTC saw telecom-

munications as "a tool for information management and a produc-

tivity enhancer for business" (CRTC, 1994a: 1). Two ofthe core

objectives for the CRTC in their decision were universal access

and to "encourage development and widespread availability of

new technology and innovative services to respond to the needs

ofbusiness and residence consumers" (1994a: 2). In this narrow

view ofa society populated by producers and buyers, lost are the

notions ofaffordability and access to other forms ofnot-commer-

cial content by citizens and the use ofthis for other not-for-profit

purposes.

Similarly, the introduction ofthe final report ofthe federal

government's Information Highway Advisory Council (IHAC) ^^
clearly sets the benchmarks for the new social reality in stating,

In the new information economy, success will be

determined by the market place, not by government

The private sector should build and operate the Infor-

mation Highway" (IHAC, 1995:x).

The governments' role is relegated to that of referee and the

setting ofground rules.

Private property as the heart ofcurrent social change is also

exemplified by proposed changes to copyright law with respect

to information. Copyright determines the ownership of a com-

modity as well as its terms of access. At its core, the creation of

an information market relies on this form ofproperty creation and

legal protection. The federal government's IHAC report on

copyright determines that "copyright and the development of

appropriate mechanisms are fundamental to the creation of a

content market place to give the Information Highway its raison



Alternate Routes, Volume 13, 1996

d'etre" ( NGL Nordicity Group Ltd., 1995, :71).

Even the terms ofreference and the fifteen issues identified

for analysis by the IHAC were cast using a market framework

valuation. The issues were:

1. Timing and Financing

2. Competition and Regulation

3. Canadian Ownership and Control

4. Standards

5. Government Co-ordination

6. Copyright and Intellectual Property

7. Culture and Content

8. Information Controls

9. Government Programs and Services

10. Privacy and Security

11. Research and Development

12. Growth and Competitiveness

13. Universal Access

14. Consumer Awareness and Learning

15. Government Operations (IHAC, 1995:v,vi).

^^ Of these, Issues 7—Culture and Content and 13—Universal

Access would suggest some reprieve for social and cultural

concerns. However, a closer reading shows that culture and

content issues were largely approached from the perspective of

copyright (getting paid for products) and the international mar-

keting ofCanadian cultural products. This trade viewundermines

the non-economic valuation ofculture in Canada, as exemplified,

for example, by the cultural exemption secured under the North

American Free Trade Agreement. Universal access is defined as

an objective where government should only intervene ifmarket

failure occurs (EHAC, 1995:121,169). The common property

right of access particularly in terms of social and cultural infra-

structure is thereby dismissed.

It is also government confirming industry's ability to de-

velop, own, and control access to information within the broad

policies of neo-regulation, privatization and commercialization

that is essential to a commitment by industry to invest in, and



Reddick/ Property Rights and Communication

expand, this market. That government is compliant in this, often

with little or no empirical economic or social research and

justificatory evidence to support claims for the need of such

change, is not always enough for industry. Industry players have

produced reams of studies, reports and analyses which promote

these same objectives. However, they package these with threats

of capital withdrawal, hold-back or under investment in an

attempt to keep government decisionmakers on course. Govern-

ment is warned that if it doesn't tow the line the Information

Highway will not be built, jobs will be not created, and Canada

will not be competitive and grow economically (CCTA, 1994).
7

Key industry actors also propose a managerial or corporatist

approach to policy making and market development, which

excludes other stakeholders and leaves only industry and govern-

ment as partners. The industry role is seen as planning, designing,

owning, developing and operating networks and services. Evalu-

ation ofinvestment and development is to be based on economic

variables alone. 'Success' is to meet the test ofthe market place, ^^
where only that which is profitable is available. In this view, the

role ofgovernment policy is to pursue initiatives which favour a

market driven agenda and competitive market place. However,

the removal ofgovernment oversight from the market structure

means that concentration of ownership and market power in-

creases. As such, competition becomes a euphemism for in-

creased dominance and a redividing of the existing, and new,

market pie by a few large players. Those who currently dominate

will continue to do so only with fewer barriers and restrictions,

particularly with their expansion of market activities to previ-

ously uncommodified areas. Public regulation is diminished as

market regulation replaces it. In future, this means that with our

public networks there will be much less public involvement in

oversight and decision making. In turn, this may reduce their

ability to meet the full range ofthe public's economic and non-

economic needs and to even address the failures ofthe provision

of such services.



Alternate Routes, Volume 13, 1996

To address the concerns ofthe public at large, and in part to

counter public interest group detractors, the agenda of self

interest is subsumed by appeals to 'increased choice', consumer

'needs' response, the 'empowerment' of consumers to commu-

nicate, and the protection and enhancement of 'culture'. That all

this is increasingly denned in narrow market terms, a choice

between commodities, means that social and cultural content

valuated only by the profitability ofits production is obfuscated.

This rhetoric suggests that only an inherently efficient

market is able to achieve economic, social and cultural objectives.

However, the inability ofmarket forces to address or provide for

not-for-profit national or local political, social, cultural commu-

nication and information or even for that matter, economic

management, is ignored byboth government decision makers and

industry. Tipping the balance from a predominance of public

regulation to that of market regulation, begs the question, is

industry really prepared for this role? Does it have the ability to

^% undertake these social and cultural duties and responsibilities?

Given the imperative ofeconomic goals and methods, one would

think not (See, for example, Stentor: 1993).
8

Industry actors also raise the spectre that outside forces

create an inevitable need for this particular type of change.

Technological advancement, globalization, convergence, osten-

sibly all beyond the control ofhuman kind or their governments,

have lead to a crisis in the traditional way that society operates.

The only solution in this market view ofhuman kind and society

is to redefine traditional social relations and decommodified

activities and resources, which were built and perpetuated by

social, cultural and political policy goals, to an economically

denned approach. Stentor Telecom Policy's report, "Culture and

the Information Highway" elucidates about this view,

The policy measures that have bolstered the broadcast-

ing and cable industries; enabling them to carry out

their social and cultural objectives, may not be sustain-



Reddick/ Property Rights and Communication

able in a free-trade environment. In response, these

measures may have to give way to a more competitive

model for the domestic market (Ellis, 1994:2).

Class

There is a class dimension associated with the congruence

between government and industry decision makers. Non-class

issues are also involved in policy making, with this representation

largely taking the form ofnew issue-based interest groups. This

class matrix can be distinguished using criteria of political and

economic power; a private property (market approach) as op-

posed to social values and a common property (mixed approach)

predisposition; and position and importance in relation to others

in the policy and regulatory processes.

Dominant class fractions include members ofthe informa-

tion industry and inner circle decision makers in government.

These interests favour the pro-market agenda (private property).

Another part of the matrix is an information petit bourgeoisie, G^
professionals working within the various information industry

sectors, which tend to have split loyalties between selfinterested

private property (labour relations and as producers) and the

broader social and cultural (non-commodity) processes and

relations. There is also a set of subordinate class actors. Tradi-

tional players in the policy process, consisting of unions and

public interest groups, are generally driven by issues relating to

economic and social justice (inequalities). Issue or ostensibly

non-class interest groups are also involved in the policy process.

One form, usually single issue oriented, has historically pursued

social or cultural rights, for example information content. A new
type of group, exhibiting post-modern values relating to indi-

vidual differences and pluralistic notions ofcommunities, tends to

focus on alternative socio-political processes.

Within the structure of government, and in particular the

departments charged with policy making on these issues (Indus-



Alternate Routes, Volume 13, 1996

try, Heritage, Finance, Treasury Board, Justice) there are com-

peting visionsbetween individuals, managers and sector branches

on policy. These competing views are often underpinned with

implicitly conflicting values about individual and collective prop-

erty rights. However, in terms of final policy decision making,

these power relations are unequal. Certain managers and sectors

within the departments, an inner circle, (usually policy and

regulatory branches) have the greatest influence and power over

policy outcomes. This is usually in concert, but at times can be in

conflict, with their political masters. With the current pro-market

agenda there is a particular concordance of views between

industry, these inner circle bureaucrats and the dominant politi-

cians (e.g., Cabinet Ministers).

Interestingly, the schismbetween the views ofthese elites in

government and many of their employees or colleagues closely

resembles the schism in society at large between the expectations

and values of the public and the elite decision makers of both

^^ government and the market. The public tends to seek a much

more balanced set of social relations in general and information

policy specifically than these elites. Recent studies have shown a

growing class-based polarization over economic and social ob-

jectives between elites and the public at large. A recent report by

Ekos Research Associates argues that there is "relative discon-

tent with the narrow and unsuccessful pursuit ofprosperity and

competitiveness", a market agenda, and that this '^neo-conserva-

trve agenda still seems to be a powerful force in the elite world of

government and business" ( 1 995a: 20). In a comparison oftwenty

two values of elites/decision makers and the public, elites were

most concerned with economic issues such as competitiveness,

prosperity, rriinimal government and the like. The public's con-

cerns were largely the inverse, focusing on collective and social

values, including freedom, environment, health and equality

(1995a: 12). With regard to information, recent surveys by Ekos

(1995b) and Compas (1995) on Canadian culture and informa-

tion content (television, films, books, music, etc.) showed a



Reddick/ Property Rights and Communication

strong preference by the public for a diversity ofcontent to meet

social and cultural needs in addition to economic 'choice' options

and, a desire for government intervention through policy and

program support to meet these needs.
9 However, these views

receive little play in current policy making.

The potential for a more equitable balance in policy making

is further aggravated by the revolving door of employment

between the senior levels ofgovernment and industry. The little

lag time between assuming responsibilities from one employer to

the next, and the fact that many ofthese elites move from a senior

policy position in one sector, to a comparable position in the

other, reinforces the shared ideology of these interests. For

example, since the federal government shifted to a pro-market,

neo-regulatory regime, seven senior individuals responsible for

defining and implementing this government policy have since

taken up the following private sector positions:
10

Vice President - Regulation, Canadian Cable Television

Association #^
President - Alliance Communications

Vice President - Regulatory Affairs, Stentor Telecom Policy

Inc.

Vice President - MultiMedia, Bell Canada

Vice President - Bell Mobility

Vice President - Unitel Communications

President - Canadian Cable Television Association

Individuals from a number of government departments have

moved to an industry player that is directly affected by (and often

benefits from) the changes in regulation and policies. Similarly,

those in senior levels ofindustry also move into senior policy or

management positions in key communication policy setting de-

partments. Those representing the publicview are often excluded

from this type ofaccess to this inner circle. However, to counter

the public 'flak' that tends to arise about insider decision making,

both the CRTC and the federal government have undertaken

public consultative initiatives—ostensibly pluralistic proceed-



Alternate Routes, Volume 13, 1996

ings which give equal time and opportunity for all players,

including the public, to affect policy. The unequal resources the

dominant corporations bring to these venues, and the weight

attached by government to their representations as compared to

public efforts, maintains rather than mediates the unequal power

relations in policy making. The recent IHAC is instructive on the

class dimension of this issue.

As shown in Chart One, of the tiiirty one IHAC council

members, twenty represented the market whereas six represented

the public interest. Twenty one ofthese participants (Information

Industry, Cable, Telephone, Commercial Content, and Finance)

represented dominant companies in the information field. With

the recent industry restructuring, take-overs and the like, these

companies also exhibit an increasing level of economic interde-

pendency and cross-ownership relations. Three public institu-

tional representatives on the IHAC straddled the public interest

and market agendas. These three (education, health, library)

#
ft increasingly rely on the market for the provision and delivery of

their services. Ofthe six representing the public, one ofthese, the

Consumers Association of Canada (1995), tended to represent

the views ofbusiness by presuming that open competition would

provide maximum consumer choice and that this would eventu-

ally result in social and cultural goals being achieved after a new
market regime had been established.

11 Also disturbing about the

IHAC process was that many ofthe council members had little

formal training or broad experience in the areas of communica-

tion, policy and information. Much ofthe first halfoftheir tenure

was spent being briefed on the basics of policy and practises in

these areas. Moreover, no small amount of time was spent by

members representing specific industry's and companies fighting

to protect their own interests.
12

Chart One: IHAC COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP
Information Technology Industry 9

Cable Television Industry 3



Reddick/ Property Rights and Communication

Telephone Industry 6

Commercial Content Industry 2

Finance Industry 1

Public Interest Organizations 6

Public Institutions 3

Labour 1

Chair 1

The inner circle of companies which consistently lobby policy

makers behind the scenes and are represented in majorpolicy fora

including CRTC hearings is relatively small. They include the

following:

Chart Two: Regulatory Intervenors

Alberta Government Telephone

Allarcom (Pay-TV) *

Canadian Association of Broadcasters

Canadian Business Telecommunication Alliance *

Canadian Cable Television Association *

Canadian Daily Newspapers Association

Canadian Federation of Ind. Business %Jtf

Canadian Independent Telephone Association

Canadian Satellite Communication Inc.

Canadian Satellite Users Association

Competitive Telecommunication Assoc.

Director of Competition, Competition Bureau

Northwestel Inc. *

Quebec-Tel

Government of Saskatchewan

Sprint Canada

Stentor Telecom Policy Inc. *

Unitel Communications *

Rogers Cable *

Shaw Cable *

Western International Communications *

Information Technology Association of Canada

Those who were also represented on the IHAC directly or indirectly are

asterisked.
13

In comparison, the public interest groupswho most consist-

ently participate include the Federation Nationale du



Alternate Routes, Volume 13, 1996

Consommateurs du Quebec, the National Anti-Poverty Organi-

zation, the Public Interest Advocacy Centre, the Consumers'

Association of Canada (national and provincial), the Telecom-

munications Workers Union and the Communication, Energy

and Paper Workers Union of Canada.

This corporate representation in these policy/regulatory

activities also correlates with their respective positions ofdomi-

nance in the information industries in Canada. Through take-

overs, mergers and alliances this industry is extremely concen-

trated and largely controlled by these interests. For example, in

television, five companies reached 62 per cent of all Canadian

viewers in 1993 (including Allarcom, Eaton's, Asper). Ten

companies in this sector received 90 per cent of all revenues. In

cable, three companies (Roger's, Videotron, Shaw) controlled

56 per cent of the market in 1994. In radio, ten companies

controlled 55 per cent of all revenues (including Allarcom,

Roger's, Shaw). In magazine publishing, 12 companies control

^^ 5 2 per cent ofcirculation. In book publishing in 1992 twenty one

of370 firms (6 per cent) controlled 5 1 per cent oftotal sales. With

barriers between these traditional sectors removed by policy, the

race now for these players is entry and dominance of the elec-

tronic market place for existing products and the extension ofthe

market into private (home) and other traditionally non-market

social and cultural activities and institutions (Winter and

Hassanpour, 1994:10-17).

The Canadian Cable Television Association has defined

these new market opportunities as the 'unclaimed territory'

(CCTA, 1994:3,6). These types ofservices include electronically

based information services, distance education, health, libraries,

home shopping, E-mail, government information, games and

entertainment, among others. This territory has been described as

'unclaimed' for two reasons. First, none of the existing compa-

nies have finished developing the networks and applications

necessary to produce and distribute these products and the

consumer market is still being developed. Secondly, none ofthe



Reddick/ Property Rights and Communication

existing companies have achieved market dominance in these

services. Most ofthese commodities are intended to be accessed

by individuals from the home.

Public Claims, Class and Interest Groups

In addition to this agency in the dominant class fraction, subor-

dinate class agency occurs both in more traditionally class-based

group andnew interest group forms. This agency is both reactive

and oppositional (progressive) in relation to the unequal eco-

nomic and political power of the domination information class.

With both these segments of the subordinate class, the goal is

shared; a struggle against these inequalities. However, the tradi-

tional groups, who tend to have developed some degree ofclass

consciousness, react to economic inequalities (e.g., pricing,

affordability). Those in the newer segment in contrast, have

formed as interest groups and are less class aware, but argue for

a more democratic structure and practise for an information

society, a community or communities view, than do the tradi- ^^
tional groups.

While the traditional groups recognize the class nature of

social relations, they have tended not to attempt to change them

or offer a different vision for social relations, so much as argue for

welfarist forms of redistribution to ensure access. Many in the

new interest groups, in fact, argue implicitly for greater social

control over decision making in the development and access to

information networks and resources. It also is not coincidental

that the new interest groups formed largely over concern about

broad 'information content' issues, whereas the traditionalgroups

formed over narrower economic issues relating to access to basic

public communication infrastructure, or around narrower cul-

tural content (e.g., broadcast policy). Both segments are elite led

and have only recently started working together in coalitions

around common policy goals. In the current policy changes,

which are driven by a more entrenched bilateral government-

industry corporatism, both types ofgroups are required to adopt



Alternate Routes, Volume 13, 1996

new approaches in influencing policy making thanhave been used

in the past. This means they must pursue more aggressive behind

the scenes lobbying in addition to formal, public interventions.

The traditional groups have generally taken one of two

forms. One group, class-based, have represented low income or

disadvantaged Canadians. Other interest-based groups have rep-

resented Canadians in general on the basis ofshared culturalneed,

and regional disparities and claims. The first group includes the:

National Anti-Poverty Organization;

Telecommunications Workers Union;

Federation Nationales des Consommateurs du Quebec

(FNACQ);

Public Interest Advocacy Centre;

Ontario Federation of Labour;

British Columbia Public Interest Advocacy Centre;

Communication, Energy and Paper Workers Union of

Canada.

The claims made by these groups concern issues ofaffordability,

^^ availability and access to basic media (e.g., networks, books,

etc.). The second grouping tends to focus on a specific need or

issue important to a constituency, such as Canadian content or

technical requirement. Members of this grouping include the:

Canadian Association of the Deaf;

The Friends of Canadian Broadcasting;

Television Northern Canada;

The Canadian Conference of the Arts;

Consumers Association of Canada;

Canadian National Institute for the Blind;

A common thread linking both types ofgroups is that their claims

on policy are centred around the public nature ofcommunication

and the need for Canadians to have access to be able to participate

in society.

The dominant class sees information and communication as

a strategic investment to develop innovative and widespread uses

(widely distributed, and sold and resold) of new information

based commodityproducts. The traditional public interest groups



Reddick/ Property Rights and Communication

see a duality to these services however. On the one hand, there

exists a commercial component, as argued by the information

companies. But at the same time, these groups argue that there is

a public utility or public goods function. As such, access and use

are "necessary for economic, social and cultural development,

participation and integration for society at large" (Reddick,

1995:32). These groups argue that the current policy trend will

create a society ofinformation "have and have nots" based on the

ability to pay, particularly given the need for companies to

recover massive proposed investments. For example, the phone

and telephone companies alone are planning investments ofup to

$15 billion just for network upgrading.

The new interest groups have been formed by academic and

professional elites who are generally associated with institutions

involved with information and knowledge. These groups and

their members (usually other elites or similar professional organi-

zations rather than the general public) tend to be either early

adopters ofnew technologies, orhave been pushed into informa- ^^
tion societypractises by their employers, or those financing them;

often provincial governments. For example, most provincial

governments have developed strategies ofelectronic information

production, distribution and exchange of government services,

education, library and health services. The new interest groups

would include:

The Coalition for Public Information;

The Ontario Library Association;

The Canadian Library Association;

The Canadian Teachers Federation;

Provincial Privacy and Information Commissioners;

Telecommunities Canada (Freenets);

Information Highway Working Group;

Public Information Highway Advisory Council.

Some ofthese groups have been in existence for some time, such

as the library associations. They and the others are considered

'new' because of their recent interest and activities involving



Alternate Routes, Volume 13, 1996

broad communication policy because that their previous or other

activities or mandates were much less or not at all concerned with

communications.

The claims ofthese groups focus less on economic issues of

access or ownership in the industry, and instead, involve the need

forpublic space, in addition to commercial space, in an informa-

tion society and a diversity of information (social, cultural,

political), in addition to commercial commodities. Interestingly,

some also promote the development of a highly connected, high

capacity 'information system' to all individuals, often embracing

similar emancipatory Utopian expectations to that ofthe market

proponents of the Information Highway (Coalition for Public

Information, 1995:1,2,4,5).

Some of these claims seem to be made without a clear

understanding by some of these actors of the economic costs

associated with such objectives or the proclivity ofthe market to

actually invest or provide service to market segments (low

&% income) or areas (rural) which offer little return on investment.

Nonetheless, the claims these groups do make are a recognition

that economic imperatives are an assault on 'public' information

and the traditional public sphere. They also recognize that the

market can not or will not meet these social, cultural and political

needs.

Some groups, by uncritically embracing and promoting the

mythical and Utopian possibilities ofthe information society risk

imdennining the potential that they will achieve their end goals.

As a result there is a shared discourse with economic actors that

new technology can 'decentralize' society, link everybody, 'em-

power' citizens and groups, create electronic communities and so

forth. But they lose sight of the fact that these occur within a

wider, centralized and integrated privately financed and owned

structure. Economic criteria still define what is a justified invest-

ment, what can be 'economically' provided. The increasing

private control over information also sets the limits and terms of

this decentralization which are not equal or designed for social



Reddick/ Property Rights and Communication

ends. The risk ofa market driven approach is that electronic grids

and information products and services will not be emancipatory.

Moreover, public space and information resources will not be

broadened and reflect social diversity, instead these become

narrowed, eroded and filtered as they are commodified. Gorz

calls this emergingnetwork infrastructure, one that extends to the

private and leisure activities of the home, "the glue of serial

impotence" (Gorz, in Webster and Robins, 1986:322). In this

view, people become a mass of linked, impotent consumers.

These groups need to better define, articulate, develop strategies

for, and adhere to their goals and ideas to avoid becoming

complicit by default with the market agenda (Webster and

Robins, 1986:321-23).

Other actors involved in these policy debates, which have

had a fairly consistent level ofrepresentation are self employed

professionals—an information petit bourgeoisie. These actors

tend to have two major economic interests influencing their

objectives in addition to cultural and social concerns. On the one ^^
hand, they have a stake or claim on information content or

products as labourers on behalfofcorporate producers. This set

ofrelations they share in common with an increasing number of

members ofthe subordinate class who are becoming information

workers or where traditional work is being affected by the

increased use ofinformation technology in the production proc-

ess. As well, many also have a claim as owners (producers) of

information products. These are producers of information and

information based works for both social/cultural (use) value, but

also as much, ifnot more so, for their commodity/exchange value.

This means that at times, there can be concordance or discord-

ance with other public interest groups depending upon the

particular policy issue at hand. Groups representing these actors

at policy fora include:

The Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers in

Canada;

Association of Canadian Television and Radio Artists



Alternate Routes, Volume 13, 1996

(ACTRA);

The Independent Film and Video Alliance;

The Writers Union of Canada.

The general public interest is represented in varying degrees by

this constellation ofunions and public interest groups, but often

the public is not fully aware of the substantive policy and

structural changes being implemented until these have already

occurred. One can speculate on the reasons for this, but they

probably include: failure ofcommunication by their group repre-

sentatives; low levels ofinterest; complexity ofthe issues; lack of

availability ofuseful/informative information; under reporting or

biased press coverage; and inattention by politicians, among

others. In addition to these barriers, much ofthe decision making

occurs behind the scenes, through lobbying, private studies,

consultations with experts and dominant actors (capitalist class

and subordinate class interest groups) both in private and in

controlled access fora.

49| Recently, a number ofthe traditional andnew public interest

groups have started working in broader alliances. For example,

the coalition People for Affordable Telephone Service (PATS)

was formed by over 60 organizations representing 10 milhon

Canadians (PIAC, 1995: 1). This is not a formal organization but

a number of groups who share a common interest around one

issue—telephone service. Being a single issue coalition, it has

been relatively easy for the group to achieve consensus over

common objectives on policy. The objectives deal with the

availability and afTordability of basic telephone service.

Another public coalition, the Alliance for a Connected

Canada (ACC), was formed to deal with both basic technical

access, information content and employment issues (Brehl,

1 995 :B3 ). This coalition links traditional and new public interest

groups on a cross-sectoral basis as a tactic to strategically give

these interests more political clout on policy decision makers.

Strategically, the ACC is also a means to create a democratic

process for forming consensus and action around core issues. In



Reddick/ Property Rights and Communication

particular, they are focusing on inequalities relating to access

(affordability), content development and diversity (non-commer-

cial social, political and cultural needs) and quality and abundant

levels of employment. The strategists of this alliance are largely

academics or experts in the field of communications mirroring

Gramsci's conception ofcounter-organic intellectuals. They are

attempting to create an oppositional (ideological) praxis to

counter the attempted hegemonic shift desired by the dominant

'information' class. This is very much a response to the class-

based, market inequalities of the information society which are

emerging out ofpre-existing class-based structural inequalities.

Members ofthis alliance bythe summer of 1996 included the

Public InterestAdvocacy Centre, the TelecornmunicationsWork-

ers Union, the Communication, Electrical and Paperworkers

Union, the Council ofCanadians, Telecommunities Canada, the

Coalition for Public Information, the Federation nationales des

associations des consommateurs du Quebec (FNACQ), the Na-

tional Library of Canada, the Information Highway Working ^k
Group, the McLuhan Program in Culture and Technology, the

Canadian Library Association, the Canadian Teachers Federa-

tion, the Assembly of First Nations, and the Association pour

Pavancement des sciences et des techniques de la documentation

(ASTED).

Groups such as PIAC and the TWU also represent tradi-

tional class-based groups such as low income Canadians and

telecommunication workers. The cross-sectoral nature of this

coalitionwas a strategic choice on the part ofthese groups, in part

to counter government's current strategy of categorizing par-

ticular consumer groups in the pejorative as 'special interests'.

Forming a broader constituency has generated some concern and

attention by policy makers because as a coalition these groups

have much more political clout and media impact. This concern

has arisen because the group is politicizing policy awareness and

extending debate to include a broader set of'ordinary' Canadians

through their representative organizations who have not been



Alternate Routes, Volume 13, 1996

centrally involved in information or communicationpolicy (Brehl,

1995:B3).

Government Managerialism and Policy

The federal government's strategy in policymaking and approach

and response to public interest groups and the information class

is based on the managerial or corporatist model. The corporatist

strategy with respect to the 'public' generally takes two forms.

On the one hand, as discussed above, many groups or interests are

included in the traditional 'pluralist' policy fora. While this

affords some influence on policy by the public, such processes

have little real impact on policy. Instead, these processes tend to

neutralize public opposition by permitting this form ofexpression

and interaction. For those groups who exhibit more political

eflfectivity on issues—more of a challenge to the ideology and

agenda ofgovernment and its corporate allies—these groups are

either marginalized or brought into the corporatist arrangement

djffr under terms set by government. This is not to say that they are

equal partners in some tripartite managerial set ofrelations. Even

if this were so, the relations themselves would still be undemo-

cratic by the wider exclusion of individual participation by the

public and the other representative groups. Instead, these 'in-

cluded' groups are more like 'junior partners' with no real ability

to change the overall policy agenda. If it were a baseball game,

these groups have moved from the bleachers to the dug-out, but

they still aren't on the field or calling the shots to the real players.

Occasionally, minor policy or regulatory concessions are made to

continue their participation or appease substantive opposition

which generates around specific policy issues. For example, the

federal government recently ordered massive telephone rate

increases. In an attempt to dispel opposition from public interest

groups, the government promised to establish through regulation

a Lifeline program and similar affordability options for low

income Canadians (Brehl and McCarthy, 1995:B1).

There is however, a price to be paid by groups to be included



Reddick/ Property Rights and Communication

closer to the centre of this form ofback room decision making.

These groups must devise a strategy to achieve some of their

goals within the rules and discourse set by government. Current

policy frames issues in the context of an 'information market

place'. For example, Industry Canada told one of the groups

mentioned above that with respect to 'consumer policy':

Globalization and technological change have changed

the dynamic ofthe market place. This market place is

increasingly consumer driven. Consumer power and

judgement, consumer acceptance ofproducts and feed-

back dictate to companies now. Consumers have a

stake and role in the economy. In thisnew economywe
want nimble producers and, as well, we need nimble

consumers. The focus of Industry Canada is on the

market place now. The challenge is to get this frame-

work right. We need an efficient, competitive market

and as a result we will end up with quality products and

consumer choice. The premise forthispolicy is to make Gr
sure that the market works. The new consumer policy

paradigm is that the government will intervene as an

exception not as the rule where there is market failure.

The goal is to get the market and competition working

right.
14

The inclusion of public interests, organizations or academics is

based on their limiting their criticism ofgovernment policy to the

details of its implementation, instead ofthe overall policy direc-

tion at large. Groups are also required to adopt some of the

discourse of this policy agenda—essentially agreeing to a nar-

rowing ofdebate to conform to the economic imperatives under-

lying policy. For example, Industry Canada has dictated that the

new discourse with respect to the public or consumer is that

citizens are now only consumers operating in an information

market place. Interest groups are expected to adopt this stipu-

lated discourse and policy agenda. To be critical or oppositional



Alternate Routes, Volume 13, 1996

risks marginalization or exclusion. The words 'class', 'have and

have nots', 'vulnerable consumer', 'poor' and the like are to be

replaced by the generic catch allterm, marketfailure. In thisview,

the devil is not the overall policy or ideology, but in the details of

its implementation and practise. 'Dysfunction' becomes an aber-

ration in the ideal market, where there are no losers.
15

The potential for co-opting and neutralizing the most effec-

tive public interests through such a process is great, particularly

where any substantial part of a group's funding comes from

government. Dominelh and Hoogvelt, writing on how the U.K.

government hasrefined a similar strategy, remindus ofFoucault's

warnings ofthe dangers ofconforming to the duality ofdiscourse

and practise. Foucault says that through both,

the individual and the group gradually become drawn

into a new world of lived experience that gradually

detaches them from their own critical consciousness,

ideology or value commitments (M. Foucault, in© Dominelh and Hoogvelt, 1995 : 20).

Where public interest groups or experts produce information/

research for government as part ofthese relations, Dominelh and

Hoogvelt have labelled this structural relationship and power

over, by government, to public agency as 'contract government'.

This is the corporatist state's response to the "differing goals of

agents from the policy goals of government" (Dominelh and

Hoogvelt, 1995: 10). The authors describe this as a key compo-

nent in the process of commodification and marketization of

information and knowledge. In this process, "the tool for control-

ling manual workers is being used as an instrument for reorgan-

izing mental labour" (Dominelh and Hoogvelt, 1995:11). With

commodification, the product of this labour, information, is

commodified. This strategy is based on making "the agents

interests the same as government, structuring, monitoring, and

controlling each stage of the information/research process"

(Dominelh and Hoogvelt, 1995: 1 1). I would also add, it controls



Reddick/ Property Rights and Communication

the degree of access the groups have to decision makers and the

weight given to their views on policy.

Conclusion

Recent surveys suggest that for the majority of Canadians there

may not be strong demand for new information commodities.

Statistics Canada analysis on the income ofCanadians has found

that there has been a consistent decline in income levels and

disposable income over the past several years. With persistent

public and private sector employment cuts, the scarcity ofnew

'good' jobs, and the tendencyfornewjobsto be in the lowerwage

service industries, this trend is not expected to change for some

time (Statistics Canada, 1993). This means that it is unlikely that

there will be strong mass demand for the very commodities that

industry is relying on to build the information society.

Affordability and class challenges to participation in an

information society are also supported by a recent study con-

ducted by Ekos Research Associates. In constructing a model or ^^
typology of the socio-economic grouping of Canadians, this

study, Rethinking Government, found that 41 per cent ofCana-

dians were "economically distressed" and another 16 per cent

forming part of the middle class were "economically insecure"

(1995a: 90-95). Of the remainder, 24 per cent of Canadians

formed the "secure" middle class and 1 9 per cent belonged to the

'^insiders". The insider or high social class represents upwardly

mobile, high income Canadians. This group correlates with the

initial target market identified by information companies for their

new information products—the communication intensive house-

hold. There is less certainty about the economic ability ofthe 40

per cent ofCanadians in the middle class and, in particular, the 4

1

per cent in the lower social class to fully participate in this society

beyond a rriinimal level.

What this means is that in the emerging class-based informa-

tion society, many Canadians who lack sufficient economic

resources or live in areas ofCanada where it is not economically



Alternate Routes, Volume 13, 1996

viable or profitable enough to provide service, will be largely

excluded from participating in economic, social and cultural

information resources. The 'have and have not' bifurcation in

Canada based on such factors as income, education, geographic

location and so forth, will also exist in communication and

information.

This outcome is not inevitable, however. Participation by

the public in policy making can have some affect on the develop-

ment of our communication/information society. As well, the

above trends also mean that a fundamental contradiction is

emerging whereby a required mass of individuals with sufficient

disposable income necessary for the successful development of

an information society as envisioned by itsproponents maynot be
realized. If so, what will develop in its place? Will this meet the

varied needs ofsociety or be a limited service only available to an

information caste?

Current government policy making and market decision

^^ making over the development and availability of information

resources amounts to little more than ideology on the part of

government that an information market place will exorcise us

from economic stagnation, and on the part of dominant compa-

nies that they will realize private gain. The current economically-

based 'Inquisition' of our long developed social and cultural

policies and practises are an assault on our moral, ethical and

democratic goals. This is all done in the name of a new market

doctrine. This market-like religion conveys a powerlessness

about ourselves as individuals, as a broader citizenry, and our

democratic national institutions and polity. The God of the

market is not new. In Greek mythology he was called Hermes or

Mercury. The Greeks mainly knewhim as the 'God ofCommerce

and the Market', but he was also called the 'Master Thief

(Hamilton, 1942:34). 16

Ifthe information society is to be democratic, that of'for the

people', then limits must exist on the processes ofcommodification

and marketization. As Macpherson argues above, property rights



Reddick/ Property Rights and Communication

must balance social interests and permit mil individual develop-

ment and participation in social, cultural and economic processes

and activities in society. These must be valuated based on their

own criteria (morality, ethics, economicjustice) not by economic

essentialism alone. The fundamental democratic individual prop-

erty right to freedom ofwhich Macpherson speaks must include

the right not be excluded from participation and access to

communication and diverse information resources. Information

and knowledge in the broadest sense must be recognized as

fundamental to being human, for existence as social beings, and

to being democratic as a society. These goals also require that the

public be more included in the decision making process about the

development and availability of these resources and services..

Those alone vested through enfranchisement with the right and

responsibility of governing should guide debate and decision

making. At issue is whether we are to be a society within

'commerce' or whether 'commerce' should be subsumed within

society. ^?fc

Notes

1. For helpful commentaries on an earlier version of this paper, I wish

to thank Wallace Clement, John Harp, Vanda Rideout and Michael

Janigan.

2. The federal communication sector includes broadcasting, telecommu-

nications, intellectual property and copyright, national libraries, data

protection, privacy, access to information, trade and competition policy.

3. In this paper the term information includes knowledge.

4. See Resnick, S. and Wolfe, R. 1987 Class and Knowledge. Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, pp. 2,3,5,24,52 for a discussion on the

process of over determination or social interdependency.

5. Zuboffhas written about using information technology to informate

individuals. In other words, the use of technology to create new informa-

tion and, at the same time, increase the skill and knowledge levels of

individuals as workers and citizens. See Zuboff, S. 1988 In the Age of
the Smart Machine. New York: Basic Books, Inc., pp. 9-10.

6. Neo-liberal is defined as a current mix of contemporary liberal and



^&

Alternate Routes, Volume 13, 1996

conservative ideologies which together advocate reduced state power and

a lesser role for government in society, and an increased reliance on

market forces, competition and individualism. See for example, B.

Clark, 1991 Political Economy: A Comparative Approach. New York:

Praeger, pp. 83,97, 119.

7. See for instance the submission by the Canadian Cable Television

Association to Order-In-Council P.C. 1994-1689.

8. See for example, 'The Information Highway: Canada's Road to

Economic and Social Renewal, A Vision Statement", Stentor Telecom

Policy Inc., Oct. 1993.

9. "Canadians' Attitudes Toward Broadcast Issues", Compas Survey,

Sept. 1995; "Staging the Future", Ekos Research Associates Inc. for

Human Resources Development Canada, January, 1995b.

10. Most of these came from the CRTC.

11. See for example, the Consumer Association of Canada submission to

Public Notice CRTC 1994-130 for comments on Order-In-Council P.C.

1994-1689.

12. The author was a policy advisor in Industry Canada during this

period and interacted with the Council on a number of occasions on

policy matters.

13. See for example the list of Parties for such hearings as CRTC 1994-

130 (1994b); Telecom Decision CRTC 92-12 (1992); Telecom Decision

CRTC 94-19 (1994a); Telecom Decision CRTC 95-21 (1995).

14. The author was a participant at this meeting representing a public

interest group in December, 1995.

15. The author was a participant at this meeting representing a public

interest group, November, 1995.

16. It is interesting to note that the dominant telephone companies in

Canada call their national lobbying group Stentor Telecom Policy Inc..

In Greek mythology, Stentor was a herald with a powerful voice who
died after losing a shouting contest with Hermes (Collins, 1994: 1133).

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Alternate Routes, Volume 13, 1996

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