Chemins Alternatifs

Articles

Tuning in to Democracy: Community Radio, Free Speech

and the Democratic Promise

Hilary Goldstein

The historical record is rife with demonstrations of abuses that arise

when governments and leaders exploit information and communication

channels. The excesses and horrors of the 20th century have revealed

how press systems have been utilized to spread dangerous propaganda,

instigate conflict, and promote the abuse of human rights. History has

witnessed governments manipulating information to control the aware-

ness of their citizens, imposing restrictions on diversity and choice, and

effectively closing avenues for citizens to seek redress or air grievances.

Guarding against such offenses, at the very least, requires a democratic

understanding of free speech and press, a dedicated civic journalistic

body, and a public service oriented media system. It would logically fol-

low that countries that endorse the value of democratic governance

regard information and communication as essential human rights to be

protected and upheld.

Given this understanding, what does it mean when in one of the most

authoritarian and repressive regimes, a small independent press promot-

ing democracy could—with difficulty—survive and flourish, and in the

alleged democratic leader of the world, a major independent outlet pro-

moting free speech, expression, and diversity was almost crushed?

What does this say about the connections between democracy, free

speech, and communication?

Analyzing the experiences of two media outlets within two contra-

dicting social systems illuminates a definite break between the theories

and ideals of democracy and the reality of their application in the real

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world. One story centers around Pacifica Foundation—America's first

listener-supported, non-commercial radio network—devoted to exercis-

ing free speech and representing diverse and dissenting viewpoints. The

Foundation began as one station in California, formed in the late 1940s,

to provide a contrast to the rising commercialism of mainstream radio

and to promote pacifism. It grew into a network of stations that would

become the model for alternative, community-based radio dedicated to

democratic and participatory notions of media and communication. Pro-

viding a relevant counterpoint is the story of B92, a Serbian radio station

(named for its frequency position) that has endured legal repression,

state censorship, and outright attacks for trying to maintain an unbiased

source of accurate news in an otherwise completely state-controlled

media environment. In the midst of a repressive atmosphere, B92's radi-

cal, pro-free speech stance transformed the station into a symbol of the

potential for a democratic society.

Although these two stations exist within completely different con-

texts and have encountered different obstacles, many of the underlying

issues they both faced are identical. Occupying this common ground is

the realization that the relationship between citizens and governments

continually proves to be the decisive factor in the existence and mainte-

nance of a democratic culture. For democracy to survive, it must not be

left to the devices of governments, but requires the vigilance of citizens

to give rights their weight and substance. Unfortunately, too much of

history demonstrates that our rights to free speech and expression are

only powerful when they are being fought for. In fact, a closer examina-

tion of practical examples of media systems and governmental function-

ing throughout the 20th century reveal how truly vulnerable and tenuous

our hold on democracy is.

The Price ofSpeech

A wealth of scholarly research and critique has focused on how commu-
nication contributes to democracy both from the standpoint of individual

access to free speech rights, and in terms of the role that journalism and

media systems play in the public discourse. 1 The emphasis on journalism

and media systems centers on the need for journalistic integrity to ana-

lyze and critique the decisions and policies of the government and other

power elites within society and to provide a forum for communication

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and discussion among a nation's citizens. "Democracy," as Robert

McChesney notes, "requires a media system that provides people with a

wide range of opinion and analysis and debate on important issues,

reflects the diversity of citizens and promotes public accountability of

the powers-that-be and the powers-that-want-to-be" (McChesney, 1998).

Essential components of a democratic media include journalistic integ-

rity, the journalist as 'watchdog' 2 of the political and economic elite, and

the necessity of an independent press not beholden to this elite group to

dictate content (Curran, 1996:84). Spaces for community input in the

making of media messages form another important—if often over-

looked—aspect to democratic communication systems. Patrick Watson

of the CBC, Canada's public broadcasting system, notes, "People who

equate democracy with the electoral process are missing about 90 per

cent of what democracy is all about. It is really about empowering citi-

zens. And that, in turn, is linked to finding ways to express ourselves and

to see ourselves as part of a community"(Policy Options/Options poli-

tiques, 1995:32).

Interestingly, these specific requirements are more often presented as

Utopian goals than practical realities, even in the most democratically

organized countries. An equal, if not more significant, body of media

research and critique has focused on investigating the constraints pre-

venting media from fulfilling its role as promoter and supporter of

democracy. There is no shortage of academics and critics that have

observed and analyzed these obstacles, underscoring media's frequent

use as a tool of social control; its connection and dependence on com-

mercially-based funding; its configuration as a system that usually oper-

ates in a unidirectional format with little space for community input; and

how it is often wielded as a tool to repress dissent and control social life

(Former, 1993:46-47). The most definitive examples of media's power

are those that demonstrate what happens when media is used to serve the

interests of those in power, in blatant disregard for the human rights and

dignity of the population as a whole.

Media and Power

Marc Raboy's UNESCO report on public broadcasting noted, "In many

parts of the world, the problem is still one of totalitarianism and the

equation of the public interest with the particular interests of the nation

state" (Raboy, 1997:78). Politically, media provides powerful interests a

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potent vehicle to impart controlled information and spread propaganda

to shape public opinion. Dissent is stifled, diversity is sacrificed to bol-

ster conformity and national unity, and lies persist to control public per-

ceptions. For example, no one would argue that the press systems within

the State-Communist structures of the USSR, Eastern Europe or China

were or are open or free.
3 Censorship and self-censorship have domi-

nated the region's media. Information has been tightly controlled; the

leadership, not the population, dictating government policy. But, one

cannot deny that these repressive purposes are not limited to authoritar-

ian regimes (Schramm, 1956:105-46). Noam Chomsky and Edward Her-

man argue "It is much more difficult to see a propaganda system at work

where the media are private and formal censorship is absent" (Chomsky

and Herman, 1988:1). In this sense, the United States is just as guilty.

Propaganda plays a prominent role in the US where it is used to filter

news and even report false information for strategic purposes, applied to

marginalize dissent, and shaped to serve the needs and agendas of gov-

ernment and dominant private interests.

Media in the United States

The trajectory of media development in the US, especially electronic

media forms, has placed media control squarely in corporate hands. It's a

configuration that traces back to the introduction of advertising revenue

as the main source of media funding, resulting in the commercial-based

media system that dominates the American broadcast industry today.4

Advertising Age, a media industry magazine, published the net advertis-

ing revenues (which generates the main source of income) of the top 100

media firms worldwide. The top five: Time Warner, Comcast Corp.,

Viacom, Walt Disney Co., and NBC Universal (General Electric Co.)

each showed 2003 revenues toping 50 billion (Advertising Age Maga-

zine, 2003).

It is an ironic situation considering that, "The press as envisioned by

its American founders—Paine, Franklin, Jefferson—was the antithesis

of the modern corporation. It was individualistic, rebellious, idiosyn-

cratic, and ferociously opinionated. It was expected to poke, pester, and

prod powerful institutions" (Matic, 1999). Instead, a media system run

by corporations, dependent on consumption, tends to swing focus away

from the issues and concerns that might work to counter the underpin-

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nings of such a system, such as media activists, political dissenters, low-

income and other marginalized populations. Political candidates must

purchase slots of expensive broadcast time to air their platforms to the

American public (McChesney, 2003:18). Potential candidates, unable

to secure the million-dollar price tag simply cannot compete. 5 And

media corporations also wield substantial power over elected officials.

For example, between 1993 and mid-2000, media corporations gave

upwards of $75 million dollars in campaign contributions to politicians

in both political parties, providing these companies with the leverage to

push for policy decisions like profitable tax cuts and favorable media

ownership rulings (Center for Public Integrity, 2000). It is questionable

how this media configuration can foster industry diversity, democratic

participation, or an open debate over the issues. It is unclear how this

system works to ensure that the needs and interests of these low-income

and marginalized groups are included in the agenda. In a market-based

environment, the crucial question becomes how and where First Amend-

ment freedoms protected.

According to the First Amendment of the US Constitution, expres-

sion is supposed to be free and uncensored, but because broadcast fre-

quencies were deemed a scarce resource, broadcasters would have to

bear certain responsibilities inconsistent with First Amendment provi-

sions. Through the Communications Act of 1934, Congress created the

Federal Radio Commission, which later became the Federal Communi-

cation Commission (FCC), to regulate frequencies. This would serve to

prevent overcrowding of the limited space on the electronic spectrum

and the intentional and unintentional jamming of other's use of the air-

waves. The airwaves would belong to the people but would be leased to

private companies for periods of time provided that local stations serve,

"the public interest, convenience, and necessity" (McChesney,

1993:245). The term 'public interest' has always remained undefined

though, and the legislation that gave rise to this amorphous concept

offered no accompanying guidelines to measure it (Krattenmaker and

Powe, 1994:34).6 Difficult to define, it is also difficult to enforce, leav-

ing the system open to potential exploitation. Recognizing the danger of

complete corporate control of the airwaves prompted the government to

create an alternative, non-commercial broadcasting system to serve the

public interest over commercial and political agendas.

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Enter the public broadcasting system: federally created to provide a

forum for debate and controversy, to grant a voice to groups that are oth-

erwise ignored or marginalized, and represent the true diversity of the

American nation. A democratic purpose, indeed. But, critics argue that

constant political interference, a highly centralized and conservative

organizational structure, and an over-dependence on corporate financial

support have only undermined this mission. In failing to create a stable

and sustaining funding source for public broadcasting, programs are

increasingly underwritten by corporate sponsors, contributing to the

increasing commercialism of this purportedly non-commercial system.

These sponsors are able to control content by threatening to withhold

financial support if a station airs material that damages their public

image. The fact that the President appoints CPB members solidifies

unavoidable political influence (Barsamian, 2001:10-24). And provi-

sions for diversity and emphasis on chronically underrepresented groups

like minorities and the poor do not exist in a substantial way, limiting the

extent of community participation or coverage (Tracey, 1997:119).

Without adequate funding or regulatory protections, public broadcasting

has been increasingly limited in the range of programming it could pro-

vide and therefore its potential impact has never been realized.

Public Broadcasting in a post-Communist Environment

Despite the limitations of the public broadcasting system, the US gov-

ernment has at least demonstrated some intent to provide democratic

communication systems. When critiquing the pros and cons of public

broadcasting, one must recognize, "in Eastern Europe, in most of Africa,

and in much of the rest of the 'transitional' world, public service broad-

casting is a distant ideal, not a working reality" (Raboy, 1997:78). The

fall of the Berlin wall and the toppling of dictatorships throughout

Europe ushered in profound changes and an open orientation towards

democratic principles throughout the region. But for European countries

transitioning from centralized structures to more socially pluralist con-

structions, democratizing the media has been a challenging process. As

hard as it is for those in control to relinquish their share of power, it is

equally difficult for a population, long denied rights and freedoms, to

claim and exercise these rights or trust that they will be supported and

upheld by a formerly repressive leadership.

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Karol Jakubowicz argues "in a demoralized, deeply suspicious and

skeptical society, where there is no accepted definition of the public

interest, no ideal of public service, no trust in public regulation of social

life and in the institutions called upon to develop and enforce such regu-

lation... the conditions for the emergence of public service broadcasting

can hardly be said to exist" (Jakubowicz, 1997:125). It's a chicken and

egg argument: media is necessary to promote democracy but requires an

already stable democratic society to operate successfully. Jasminka

Udovicki asserts that in Yugoslavia and Serbia, although the country

made initial efforts towards introducing some progressive press policies,

the government still tried to maintain ideological control over political

information. She argues that, nationalism, strongly promoted and manip-

ulated by Slobodon Milosevic's regime, effectively blocked progressive

social and political change and halted any real steps towards instituting

more democratic laws and policies (Udovicki, 1997:6).

Alternative Broadcasting

To introduce new social values, to carry through a progressive agenda of

change, and break through the status quo, requires access to the news

agenda. Where in the former Yugoslavia, the government's attempts to

control political information and debate limited the potential for opposi-

tional concepts to be introduced to the mass public. News broadcasts

contained no position other than that of the government. Whether strug-

gling against government-controlled information or corporate domi-

nance, both countries' media systems provided little room for people

with alternative viewpoints to participate in the public dialogue, to influ-

ence the public agenda, and to realize their right to communicate.

But beyond the mainstream channels, other alternate and community-

based media forms exist to break and bend these boundaries. Clemencia

Rodriguez offers, "even if the information and communication channels

are left untouched, even if the mainstream media structure is left unal-

tered, citizens' media are rupturing pre-established power structures,

opening spaces that allow for new social identities and new cultural def-

initions, and, in a word, generating power on the side of the subordinate"

(Rodriguez, 2001:160). Although corporate media news outlets and

restrictive authoritarian governments may limit the range of perspectives

and issues covered, citizens are not necessarily isolated from other

potential sources of information and perceptions (Darnofsky, 1995: 223-

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232). Just because people live in a totalitarian regime, does not mean

they are unaware of the forces of control around them. It does not mean

that they are unable to create or contribute to alternative understandings

of their social situation, even if such understandings are difficult to build

and maintain. Likewise, not all Americans take "all the news that's fit to

print" in the New York Times as gospel, and often seek out other infor-

mation and alternative ways of knowing and understanding.

In Peter Lewis' study of alternative/community media, he found that

most alternative media projects exist to promote the values of free

speech and expression and work to actualize democratic media (Lewis,

1984:1). The true character of democracy and democratic media in Ser-

bia did rise in large measure through the contribution of local, commu-

nity, and alternative media outlets.
7 These media groups educated the

citizens of an alternative societal structure, awakened them to new rights

and liberties, and invited them to play a role in the shaping of their own
government (Kazmir, 2001:5-38). In Serbia, Radio B92 was one of the

only broadcast outlets bold enough to criticize the government, con-

stantly directing attention towards critics and dissenters who were other-

wise ignored by the state-run news programs. Against brutal force and

incredible odds, B92 became a center of cultural and artistic experimen-

tation and political awakening that was able—for a time—to grow

almost as strong as the state media machine. By promoting free speech

and the principles of democratic governance, B92 was instrumental in

introducing these concepts to communities that had no access to infor-

mation outside of the standard state channels.

Alternative media have also played an essential role in the United

States, by helping to raise awareness of causes from civil rights, to free

speech, to the acceptance of gay and lesbian life-styles. John Downing,

in his extensive research of American alternative media projects, found

that alternative media promote community involvement in media mak-

ing and expand the range of information and dialogue available. They

tend to be more inclusive of voices and opinions of those usually not

represented on the corporate channels and the issues that never seem to

make the mainstream agendas (Downing, 1984:1-54). For example, dis-

sent against the Vietnam War was initially construed as unpatriotic and

not considered a thoughtful critique against government policy. The

Pacifica Foundation was for many years, the only place where this dis-

sent was addressed and voiced. Pacifica's coverage provided the ground-

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work for the anti-war movement to grow and eventually break through

into more mainstream coverage. Always solidly promoting free speech

rights, Pacifica stood up against government repression, and in doing so

helped to discredit that repression.

B92 and Pacifica were able to offer an alternative to corporate or

state-controlled information and contribute to democratic communica-

tion by providing a space for dissent and a critique of powerful societal

forces, whether governmental or corporate. In doing so, they promoted

one of the most important concepts inherent in understanding the value

of democratic rights and freedoms. Namely, it is vital to protect dissent

because democracy is not necessarily about every person having the

exact same opinion or vision. Democracy involves the ability to listen

and appreciate even the most unpopular viewpoints because they can

open the dialogue to expand understanding and help to envision new

possibilities.

The Serbian Context: Radio B92

Serbia's main media sources were traditionally government run and

operated. With information so heavily controlled and filtered through the

eyes of the state, civic journalism projects had little space to grow,

thrive, or reach a widespread audience. What is so remarkable about the

story of Radio B92 is how a small alternative outlet could rise to stand

up and challenge such decisive controls and restraints, and not only sur-

vive, but succeed. A brief examination of the development of Belgrade's

Radio B92 station provides a true testament to the persuasive strength of

the democratic promise.

Yugoslavia 's Transition

B92's existence actually traces back to Yugolsavia's distinct history and

policy development under the guidance of Josip Broz Tito during his 40-

year tenure in office. Yugoslavia was a country structured into six fed-

eral republics: Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia,

Montenegro, and Slovenia with two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and

Vojvodina. Within these republics, Yugoslavia's extremely diverse pop-

ulation consisted of five main ethnic groups, three major religions, and

four dominant languages that have tenuously co-existed throughout the

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country's existence (Splichal, 1992:200). When he entered office, Tito

initially sought to align the country with the Soviet bloc, to obtain eco-

nomic and political support for his country. As part of this plan, Tito

organized the country as a bureaucratically centralized state under a

Communist philosophy. Communism had broad appeal, was inclusive of

all nationalities, and therefore served to quell the historic ethnic and reli-

gious rivalries that had caused past internal warfare and conflict over

disputed territories (Bennett, 1995:53). But when the economy lan-

guished, Tito was more than willing to introduce some democratic

reforms to appeal to the growing profusion of Western aid aimed at

stemming the spread of Communism throughout Europe.

Transferring some authority and economic power from the state to

the various republics, Tito began allowing room for the sanctioned rise

of independent, self managed media groups and progressive media laws

that elevated the concepts of free press and expression to the level of

constitutional status (Robinson, 1977:18, 41-43). But despite these dem-

ocratic initiatives, "the government and political parties still tend[ed] to

reproduce the old form of hegemony based on the new, but still exclu-

sive political and nationalistic ideology" (Splichal, 1992:200). The State

interfered in the organization of broadcast media, from controlling who

could obtain a broadcast license to trying to maintain influence over

political news content.

The Center Could Not Hold

One federal economy gave way to eight separate but regionally central-

ized ones, but increasing decentralization only served to splinter both

economic and political power. Efforts to manage an economy from the

center while ensuring flexibility to the changing demands of the market,

proved futile. Ideas of autonomy and self-determination among the

Republics began to take concrete shape, threatening the cohesion of the

Federation as a whole. Nationalistic and ethnic pride surged, paving the

way for the cultural clashes and warfare that would consume the territory

for much of the 1990s. In the various republics, people began to identify

themselves by ethnic category, as Croats or Serbs or Slovenes, instead of

Yugoslavian (Tepavac, 1997:72).

The dramatic pulls between democratization and authoritarianism

could not be sustained. As the Berlin Wall's fall toppled, and Commu-

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nist governments fell throughout Eastern Europe, the Yugoslavian feder-

ation dissolved as the clash between calls for greater democratic

governance and more consolidated nationalistic controls could not be

resolved among the Republics. Capitalizing on the wave of nationalistic

fervor, Slobodan Milosevic took control of Serbia by promoting a strong

rhetoric of Serbian pride while taking aggressive control of political

power and the most important media sources. The media had always

been a political tool, but Milosevic utilized its potential in true opportu-

nistic fashion. Clearly understanding the power of the visual medium,

Milosevic catalyzed support for his political campaign by promoting fear

of other republics and systematically excluding domestic opposition

from media coverage (Gordy, 1999:71).

It was into this environment that a group of students and media activ-

ists launched a bold experiment in democratic media. B92 was the first,

and for many years, the only independent radio station in Serbia. It

began in Belgrade in 1989 as a student-run, experimental station, granted

an initial 15-day license through a connection with the local chapter of

the youth Communist league (Collin, 2001:21). In the beginning it

served as a cultural showcase of alternative popular culture and news to

counter the bland mainstream music and controlled information that

dominated the airwaves. It was a bastion of noisy rock and sub-cultural

posturing, operating as a refuge for the different and unpopular within

society; the world not seen on the state-run channels.

Envisioning its potential, editor-in-chief Veran Matic, sought to cen-

ter its mission on the principles in the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights, specifically those rights that spoke to freedom of expression,

press and personal liberties; rights that were steadily being crushed in

Milosevic's regime. Though not aligned to any particular party or plat-

form, Matic believed that if B92 was to serve as a genuine alternative it

would have to be completely radical. The station began this track by giv-

ing voice to the growing urban resistance against Milosevic.

In December 1990, as Milosevic was confirmed as the president of

Serbia in the first multi-party elections in the Republics, he began to

establish his regime by imposing strict hold over the society from educa-

tional institutions to the courts to the media system (Bennett, 1995:121).

Students, angered over the almost complete exclusion of the opposition

party in the state-controlled news, exploded in protest on March 9, 1991.

Demands for democratic media formed their rallying cry. While armed

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forces ruthlessly suppressed the protests, the state media pronounced

demonstrators destructive and overtly violent. B92 was the only news

outlet besides the independent television station Studio B that covered

the events. As a result, the government shut them both down. Only

allowed back on the air under the proviso that there would be no news

coverage, B92 became increasingly creative, using music to replace

words. Songs like Public Enemy's "Fight the Power" and "White Riot"

by the Clash purveyed the messages of protest and dissent to the listen-

ing audience (Collin, 2001:28). Within a day, B92 resumed operation,

with a renewed strength and altered mission.

Aggressive Alternative

B92 defied government warning and threats of station closures to broad-

cast the 'real' news, and in doing so became the "center of a social

movement: anti-war, anti-nationalism; pro-democracy, pro-human

rights" (Collin, 2001:56). When fighting broke out in Bosnia in 1992

and the state-media ignored it, B92 told the stories and dragged the con-

flict into people's living rooms, at the constant threat of closure and

attack by State police. After the Dayton Peace Accords—signed in 1995

to end the fighting in Bosnia—Milosevic declared himself the purveyor

of peace and savior of the Serb nation. Meanwhile he set about to dis-

qualify the 'democratic' elections that gave a majority of votes to the

party of his opposition (Bennett, 1995:208). The democratic promise

touted by the government was exposed as a facade prompting over

200,000 citizens to take to the streets to demand the validity of their

votes. When the state-media downplayed the protests, B92 aired the

voices and noise of the demonstrations. B92 began to openly promote

ideals of economic reform and ethnic cooperation and kept lines open to

the international community. One listener describing the time said, "we

stopped traveling—we stopped living, actually—so the only contact we
had with the outside world was through B92"(Collin, 2001:104). As the

regime clamped down hard on society, B92's impact began to spread

beyond its fashionable urban liberal audience to become the source of

information for all those opposed to Milosevic.

Milosevic did not take such open signs of dissent lightly, and

attacked B92 repeatedly, arresting and fining journalists, jamming radio

signals, and shutting down the station. To counter the attacks, B92 again

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devised creatively innovative tactics. Though Milosevic had set out to

restrict Internet access to the country, B92 set up an Internet site and

connection through the assistance of XS4ALL, a free speech web portal

in Amsterdam (Pantic, 2001:203). Though the Internet had minimal

impact in the country, it proved a crucial strategy to raise awareness in

the international community. B92 soon became the focus of protests and

demonstrations, not only with Belgrade citizens demanding the return of

their trusted media source, but from international media and human

rights organizations as well. But B92 found a way to reach domestic and

rural territories as well. When shut down, B92 rerouted their broadcasts

through the web. The BBC would download the files and rebroadcast the

programs, via radio, back into Serbia. The growing international focus

and pressure ultimately forced Milosevic to allow B92 to return to the

air.

Inspired to extend the reach of the broadcasts in a more sustained

way, B92 combined efforts with seven other stations across Serbia to

expand the reach of programs and broadcasts across the entire territory.

This collaboration became the Association of Independent Electronic

Media (ANEM). Re-transmitting programs through BBC world service,

ANEM could cover 70% of the country, even connecting with stations in

Kosovo and Montenegro, and "...inspired hopes that a coalition of inde-

pendent broadcasters could seriously rival the previously unchallenged

supremacy of the state media" (Collin, 2001:143). The association cre-

ated the opportunity for collaboration and program sharing between sta-

tions, gave broadcasters the ability to counter misinformation in other

parts of the country, and reached a much wider constituency then their

frequency limits would otherwise allow.

1999 saw an escalation in fighting in the territory from multiple ends.

Milosevic sent troops in to invade Kosovo while the NATO bombing

campaign started its assault on the region, going so far as to violate inter-

national law and bomb Serbia's state media tower. On the first day

NATO bombing strikes began, policemen attempted to silence B92's

broadcasts. They went so far as to actually seize the B92 studio, taking

over B92's frequency and station identification and installing a pro-gov-

ernment staff that mimicked B92's style to a tee. To the casual listener,

nothing had changed in the format or tone of the programs, except for

the fact that the station was suddenly broadcasting state propaganda

instead of critiques of the system (Collin, 2001:153). B92's staff finally

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got back on the air months later, broadcasting as B2-92, utilizing chan-

nel space borrowed from the independent TV station Studio B (Commit-

tee to Protect Journalists, 1999). The station quickly rose to third most

popular news station in the city, garnering around 1.5 to 2 million listen-

ers. ANEM was a vital component in expanding B92's audience share,

and for the first time, independent media successfully and directly com-

peted with state radio. The puppet B92 quickly slid down the ranks

before dropping out completely (Collin, 2001:182). But it was only in

October of 2000, when Milosevic abdicated his rule, that B92 could

finally reclaim its original station and frequency (Committee to Protect

Journalists, 2000).

A Progressive Solution

Milosevic left a failing economy, a war-torn landscape, and tens of thou-

sands of displaced citizens in his wake. The struggle to build the founda-

tion of a new society requires a strong media system, but Serbia lacked

the leadership necessary to monitor its progress. Many media companies

throughout the former Yugoslavia were torn by contradictory impulses.

They hoped to reorient their organizations and adapt their systems to

market forces while developing a new regulatory broadcast legislation to

undo the damage of the previous regime. The goal of this legislation was

to transform Radio-Television Serbia (RTS), the state-run media, into a

public service broadcaster and establish a Broadcasting Agency to regu-

late the communications industry. Despite the initial enthusiasm over the

project, the legislation garnered criticism from media organizations

wanting more democratic provisions, and political groups wanting to

maintain a more centralized media system. With much political harangu-

ing, the finalized legislation did not pass until two years after the fall of

Milosevic (International Federation of Journalists, 2002).

The language of the legislation shows a dedication to upholding some

ideals of a public broadcasting system. In the new Serbian Broadcast

Law, community input is relatively limited but the emphasis on indepen-

dent productions and the requirements that broadcasters serve the needs

and interests of minority groups within society, demonstrates positive

acknowledgment of the need for pluralistic programming (B92 Online -

b92.net, 2002). The language of free speech permeates throughout the

legislation, as does the recognition that the independence of public

media outlets is necessary to guarantee of the overall development of

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democracy and social harmony. The Law goes on to prohibit censorship,

call for principles of impartiality and fairness in political information

and require that broadcasters give free and balanced time to candidates

without discrimination. It also maintains non-discriminatory and trans-

parent procedures for issuing broadcast licenses.

In a clear departure from the American model, Serbian broadcasters

are required to pay a fee for the right to broadcast. This fee is justified by

the understanding that broadcasters benefit from the use of the airwaves,

and should therefore help to provide for their maintenance. As added

incentive, broadcasters pay reduced fees if their programming provides a

public service. Public broadcasting is additionally sustained through a

mandatory fee on owners of television and radio receivers. The public is

required to pay for media, which is not necessarily in accordance with

the goals of universal accessibility, but not too far from proposals that

media funding be included into government tax laws as a public service.

There are specific controls to prohibit media concentration including

limits on the number of media outlets one person or company can own.

Where in the US a broadcaster can own up to 8 radio stations in a single

market, in Serbia the limit is one television and radio outlet per area,

with percentage limits on control and market share of other media in the

same area.

Hesitant Victory

Despite its progressive language, the unfortunate fact is that implemen-

tation of the Serbian Broadcast Law is behind schedule and not being

followed with open disclosure of activities or full adherence to the new

rules. In 2004, debates are still raging, especially over the appointment

of the Broadcast Agency members, who will be responsible for ensuring

the independence of the public broadcasting system (Beta News Agency,

2004). These delays and problems only serve to question how committed

Serbia is to rectifying the legacy of Milosevic's media control. Serbian

authorities seem unwilling to break old practices having taken only mod-

est departures from the former regime's policies of media control. In a

joint statement by ANEM, media organizations throughout Yugoslavia

held that, "neither the political nor the social elite displays a sufficient

grasp of the independent position of media and the importance of this

position for the success of social reform and the pursuit of the public

interest"(B92 Online -b92.net, 2002). Ultimately—though it presents

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well on paper— it will be a matter of time before we can consider with

any validity, whether the Serbian Broadcast Law is or will be able to

contribute to a more democratic communications system and thereby

support the establishment of a democratic government and a culture of

rights.

The American Context: The Pacifica Foundation

While the obstacles facing B92 were easily recognizable and overt, those

plaguing Pacifica were more puzzling and complex because they dealt

with assumed a priori American rights—including access to certain free-

doms and liberties—that are broadly assumed to exist without question.

Pacifica's story reveals the failures of the American public broadcasting

system and the limits of the US's commercial media environment that

have narrowed avenues for oppositional movements and alternative per-

spectives to seek representation and redress. Though it formed before the

advent of the PBS system, the Pacifica Foundation has always stood as

the 'other' model of public broadcasting, an alternative more closely

aligned with the spirit contained in PBS's founding documents.

The nation's first listener-supported and only non-commercial radio

network, the Pacifica Foundation, founded in 1949 in Berkeley, Califor-

nia, was devoted to representing diverse and dissenting viewpoints. The

original inspiration for the station was to create the antithesis of the free

market model of communications increasingly dominating the airwaves.

More specifically, Pacifica operated under a philosophy of broadcast

communication committed to First Amendment freedoms, a Quaker-

inspired pacifism and an effort to provide a true voice for the people

(Downing, 2001:325). Pacifica's Articles of Incorporation contain the

mission: "...to promote the full distribution of public information; to

obtain access to sources of news not commonly brought together in the

same medium; and to employ such varied sources in the public presenta-

tion of accurate, objective, comprehensive news of all matters affecting

the community" (Koch, 1968:1).

The Pacifica Foundation actually began as one station, KPFA, taking

its place on the newly emerging FM frequency. Eventually Pacifica

would grow to a network, five stations strong, with 800,000 listeners,

serving as the largest media outlet on the left, and setting the benchmark

for public-service radio (Dinges, 2003). Pacifica's development as a

community radio station was not an instantaneous inspiration, but actu-

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ally a progressive ladder of experiments. Though adhering to First

Amendment rights would always be the underlying theme, Pacifica

struggled both internally and externally to find its orientation.

Pacifica's founder Lewis Hill, felt the motivation for radio should be

enlightenment and objective information without the influence of a

profit or power motive. He applied this value system not only to content

and programming but also to the structure of the organization. He cre-

ated a radical internal structure by dismantling traditional formations of

staff hierarchy, allowing those who did the broadcasting to make the pol-

icy decisions. Pacifica's self-perpetuating Board members were initially

drawn from station workers (Koch, 1968:1 1-12).

Though KPFA's programs developed with creativity and innovative

style, internally there were major problems. Funding would always

remain the network's Achilles heel. In arguably his most revolutionary

move, Hill rejected an ad-based funding stream as well as the prospect of

government money in order to prevent the influence of the political and

economic elite. But Pacifica still required money to function. Hill finally

decided to follow Gandhi's philosophy, which holds that public institu-

tions should be voluntarily supported by those who benefit from the

offered services. Listener donations became a major income source.

Foundations like the Ford Foundation, which saw Pacifica's potential to

speak to issues and areas not addressed by other media, provided another

significant funding stream (Downing, 2001:328).

Initially, programming was intended to support the politics of paci-

fism through a town hall type format. In reality, the station served more

as a culture of refuge, a safe haven to protect those with controversial

ideas and the most unpopular views. Despite the all-inclusive approach,

relations among programmers were not always harmonious. There was

always a crisis over personality or ideology or the direction and mission

of the station. Combined with the constant budgetary shortcomings and

growing popularity of television that caused an initial downturn in the

FM market, Pacifica was a hotbed of pressure and emotion. Plagued by

these persistent problems as well as personal troubles, Lewis Hill com-

mitted suicide in 1957. Ironically, his death came just before the FM
market rebounded and KPFA was awarded the George Foster Peabody

Award for Public Service, radio's highest award. Two years later two

new stations were added to the Pacifica network, KPFK in Los Angeles

and WBAI in New York, fulfilling Hill's ambitious visions for the future

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expansion of the Foundation into larger and more diverse communities

(Koch, 1968:14).

First Amendment Radio

In the 1960s, infused with the energy of Berkeley's burgeoning student

activism and the Free Speech Movement (FSM), KPFA became a clear-

inghouse of grassroots activist voices promoting democracy and popu-

lism and scrutiny of the status quo. In 1962, WBAI aired an interview

with a whistle blowing FBI agent, the first broadcast attack and critique

of the FBI and Director Herbert Hoover. Though the story became a

major topic in the mainstream news, Pacifica would bear the brunt of

government retaliation. The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee

(SISS) immediately set out to investigate Pacifica for possible Commu-
nist affiliations. In broadcasting the subsequent hearings, Pacifica played

a major role in publicizing the real intent of SISS and The House Com-
mittee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) to a wider audience. It

helped unmask McCarthy's crusade for what it was; an attempt to under-

mine and discredit liberals and radicals more than stem the "red tide"

(Koch, 1968:14).

Surviving these government attacks facilitated a shift in Pacifica's

direction. Before his death, Hill had felt that freedom and individual

rights were the secondary mission of the foundation, and that peaceable

communication among humans was of paramount importance. Forced to

fight for their constitutional rights, the Board shifted this order, and in

doing so, the Pacifica Foundation invented what was to become the basis

of alternative radio-aka First Amendment Radio (Lasar, 1999:165). The

concerns with balanced programming were overshadowed by what was

considered a growing need to supply what was lacking in commercial

broadcasting. They wanted Pacifica to present information that couldn't

be found in other sources, most specifically the voices of dissent. This

was not because they necessarily agreed with these voices, but because

no one else would allow them a fair platform.

This new mission would allow the stations to explore more aggres-

sive critiques of social, economic, and political aspects of public life.

Pacifica opened the door to allow new categories of marginalized voices

and burgeoning social movements an avenue of expression, including

racial minorities, the gay and lesbian movement, and women's liberation

movement, among others. It was a courageous and bold step. Pacifica

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Chemins Alternatifs

would be among the first to air anti-Vietnam war voices. Chris Koch

from WBAI became the first American to cover the war from Hanoi.

Pacifica broadcast a live interview with Che Guevara before his assassi-

nation. Pacifica claimed to be the only news organization willing to

broadcast Seymour Hersh's story of the My Lai massacre (Lasar,

1999:220).

Competition in a Changing Context

The 70s welcomed two more stations into the fold, KPFT in Houston,

Texas and WPFW in Washington D.C. (WPFW was notable in that it

was meant to establish a black voice in a majority black city). It also

welcomed in a new debate about the mission of the network, its ultimate

purpose. Mike Shuster, a Pacifica reporter in this period noted, "Pacifica

was great in the early seventies, but when the war ended in 1975, and

even before when the antiwar movement petered out, Pacifica began to

grope for what to do. That was when the splinter programming came in"

(Dinges, 2000:5).

The numerous social movements in the 1970s made for an increas-

ingly fragmented sphere of issues and influence. To keep in line with the

times, the foundation's spokespersons shifted the mission once again, re-

defining Pacifica as 'community radio,' where community was not con-

fined to a local geography, but to a diverse array of interest groups, cul-

tural constituencies, and political activists (Lasar, 2003:68). Pacifica's

emphasis on diversity continued to provide an outlet for community

groups and voices still marginalized in the mainstream. At the same

time, the varied mix of programming tended to appeal to increasingly

selective audiences, which actually worked to fragment its base of pro-

gressive listeners, rather then bind them together. This broad orientation

led to worries that Pacifica would just become a soap box stand for any

person or position to air their grievances and travails, but not connected

to a broader picture of social change or civic engagement.

During this third phase, the structure of the communications system

and industry was also undergoing major changes, both weakening Paci-

fica's potential influence as well as reinforcing its importance in the

world of community media. Congress introduced the public broadcast-

ing system and the National Public Radio (NPR) service in the late

1970s, supported by federal funding. All at once, Pacifica no longer held

the franchise on public-service radio (Lasar, 2003:64). NPR created a

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nation-wide noncommercial programming style that appealed to a listen-

ing base confused by the increasingly patchwork nature of Pacifica's

community focus. Facing competition from NPR's more even and cen-

tralized programming, Pacifica would eventually have to receive fund-

ing from CPB, though many within the Foundation would balk at the

concession (Dinges, 2000:5-1 1).

The entrance of cable and satellite systems in the 1980s and the expo-

nential increase in channel choice also resulted in increasingly seg-

mented audiences. The new abundance of choice led the government to

question the viability of public broadcasting because the scarcity ratio-

nale no longer applied to the broadcast space (Krattenmaker and Powe,

1994:217-218). Seeking to quantify impact, audience numbers began to

prove the significance of public broadcasting. In the mid-80s, NPR pro-

duced a report, the Audience-Building Task Force Report, which called

for public radio stations to build audiences by professionalizing formats

(Goodman, 2003). CPB began to gradually increase audience require-

ments for public radio stations to receive funding, resulting in the chan-

neling of federal dollars towards the larger stations. Smaller stations,

most specifically those serving minority and rural communities, were

increasingly swallowed up by the bigger players (Dunaway, 2002:67). It

would soon become almost impossible to create more listener-supposed

radio stations in an urban region (Lasar, 2003:64). Audience share had

never constituted a central concern at Pacifica, but now it stood as the

critical measure of Pacifica's impact and relevance.

The most immediate effect of pressures for audience and financial

independence translated into the hardening of formats into proven

money-makers to appeal to educated, suburban, and middle-class listen-

ers with future donation potential (Barsamian, 2001:27-35). In the face

of declining government funding, many community broadcasters would

resort to introducing more corporate underwriting and replacing niche

programs with more mainstreamed fare, like NPR news programs. The

problem with NPR is that it is an expensive resource that doesn't provide

the representation or diversity one would expect from a non-commercial

and alternative media source. The cost to air NPR news programs runs

upwards of $50,000 a year, a prohibitive expense for many low-budget

community stations even despite high audience demand (Goodman,

2000). Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting (FAIR) conducted a report

on urban public radio stations and NPR programs and discovered trends

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similar to corporate station formats. The FAIR study found that host and

news anchors were primarily white (87%) and male (69%), and did not

reflect the diversity of the metropolitan areas the stations serve (Rendall

and Creeley, 2002). In contrast, Pacifica offered news and public affairs

programs and satellite distribution services at a much lower cost. A
growing number of community and grassroots radio stations turned to

Pacifica as a more affordable alternative. In doing so, they bolstered the

impact of Pacifica programming by broadcasting its shows to a larger

audience (Dinges, 2000:10).

Pacifica remained a vibrant media source because it was one of the

few major venues open to community-based broadcasting. But in this

kind of environment with the shift in public radio programming priori-

ties, there grew a scarcity of space to provide for the influx of alternative

and minority, cultural and political groups wanting airspace, especially

those with smaller overall constituencies. Trying to appease all sides led

to internal tensions and power struggles among Pacifica' s programmers

because no one wanted to lose time for their own broadcasts. To contain

the mounting problem, Pacifica tried to centralize its organizational

structure. While many felt that this was a step back from an ideological

commitment to a democratic configuration, it allowed the station to try

some innovative experiments, including the creation of nation-wide pro-

grams. In the rush for audience share, the hope was that this new pro-

gram venture would compete with NPR and attract more listeners. One

such program, Democracy Now!, a nationally-based, independent public

affairs and news program, spearheaded by Amy Goodman, quickly

became one of the most popular, respected, and recognized programs on

the network (Lasar, 2003:65). "The project resulted in the most dramatic

increase in audience in Pacifica Radio history, expanding its potential

audience to 25 million households" (Democracy Now—democracy-

now.org). At the same time, the new centralized orientation would ulti-

mately set the stage for the most severe dilemmas to affect the station.

The Politics ofDeregulation

During this time, changes in the larger United States media environment

applied another set of pressures onto Pacifica and other community

broadcasters. Despite the government sponsoring the development of

public radio, new legislative developments would relax requirements for

commercial broadcasters to program in the "public interest." One major

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loss was the Fairness Doctrine; a FCC legislation that had stood as the

cornerstone of public interest broadcasting. This legislation encapsulated

a journalistic, ethical code of balanced and objective information to

guide decision-making. In many ways, it stood, "as a symbol of what

Americans hope for (and many demand from) the broadcast industry:

neutral, detached presentation of significant public issues," that would

educate and enlighten the population without manipulating voter deci-

sions or values (Krattenmaker and Powe, 1994:239).

As with the public interest concept, the Fairness Doctrine was left

open to broad interpretation and application, which had actually pro-

vided a powerful tool for organizations to obtain media access. For many

years the legislation was employed by environmental and health groups,

among others, to "ensure voters had the information they needed to

make informed decisions at the ballot box" (Krinsky, 1994). In 1987,

Congress and the Senate had actually voted to make the doctrine law,

which would legally require the FCC to make sure media groups were in

compliance with the legislation. But in a 1987 court case, Meredith

Corp. v. FCC, the courts declared that enforcement of the Fairness Doc-

trine was subject to the FCC's discretion. Months later, the Congres-

sional vote was vetoed by President Reagan, part of a long line of anti-

regulation actions during his presidency. These events ultimately gave

the FCC the power to dissolve the doctrine, which it did later that same

year (Encyclopedia of Television).

The passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (also known as

the Telecom Act) solidified the trend to dismantle programming in the

public interest while profoundly changing the shape of the media land-

scape. This landmark antitrust legislation, ironically, opened the doors

for corporate broadcast outlets to rapidly consolidate their share of the

media market under the impetus that competition provides the best

incentive to offer the widest range of fare. In 1983, Ben Bagdikian,

author of The Media Monopoly, wrote that American media production

was dominated by fifty companies whose control extends across the

board from television and film to newspapers, magazines and book pub-

lishing. While his prognosis was dim for the future of communication

access, he was criticized for not having faith in the free market system to

provide numerous alternatives. With every following edition though, the

number shrank, bottoming out at a mere five companies dominating the

mediascape by his latest edition, released in 2004 (Bagdikian, 2000:viii).

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Despite the variety of media types and outlets available to citizens and

consumers, this consolidated ownership only provides the illusion of

choice, diversity, and competition.

The most powerful rationale behind the removal of the Fairness Doc-

trine and the introduction of the Telecom Act was the addition of new

media forms, namely cable in the 1980s and the Internet in the 1990s,

which brought an exponential explosion of new media outlets and ven-

ues to the scene. The argument held that the sheer amount of media

channels now available allows citizens infinite access to a diversity of

media and therefore government intervention in the market is no longer

warranted. The scarcity rationale that inspired the legislation in the first

place seemed to no longer apply. But many channels don't translate into

more diversity.

Contrary to popular opinion, the Internet is plagued with the same

staggering consolidation by the same media conglomerates that control

information offline. According to Nielson/Netratings—the self-pro-

fessed global industry standard for Internet audience analysis—over

90% of Americans use the following search engines to maneuver

through the Internet; Google, Yahoo, MSN, AOL, which are owned,

operated by, or maintain close partnerships with one or more of the top

five media organizations (Sullivan, 2004). According to Hindeman and

Cukier's studies of Internet usage patterns, "Relying on links and search

engines, most people are directed to a few very successful sites; the rest

remain invisible to the majority of users"(Hindman and Cukier, 2004).

Though the Internet does provide important access to information and

innovative ways for activists to organize and communicate, the question

is whether the Internet can break through the dominance of the corporate

mediated websites to alter way the majority of Americans access news.

The elimination of public interest requirements is the most funda-

mental problem in the current US media system. 'Public interest' was

important enough that it was listed over 100 times in the Communica-

tions Act of 1934. Now these requirements hardly exist, resulting in a

marked decrease in program standards. Even some commercial broad-

casters agree. According to Barry Diller, creator of FOX broadcasting

and former head of media giants including Paramount and ABC Enter-

tainment, "If we had said in this Communications Act of96 that we
would actually impose real public service obligations on broadcasters

and not tossed them out, much of this consolidation would have (still)

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happened, but it would have allowed other voices to come in. The public

service quotient gave some sense of responsibility at least to remind

broadcasters that the airwaves still belong to the public. There was some

measure of balance involved" (Movers, 2003). Without even the sem-

blance of required standards, public affairs programming is on the

decline and information and news content is increasingly combined with

entertainment that spotlights sensationalism over the ongoing issues that

more materially affect the way people live.

Corporate dominance over media outlets has not only affected con-

tent but has lead to the increasing restriction of citizens' access to radio

broadcast space. Virtually every local radio market is dominated by only

a handful of firms. The largest four firms in most small markets control

90 percent of market share or more. One company, Clear Channel, offers

the most extreme case of consolidation. After the 1996 Telecom Act, the

company's ownership of stations grew from 40 radio stations to 1,240.

Potential competitors don't even control a fourth of this number

(Toomey, 2003). Interestingly, a New York Times study found that in this

same period, the listenership for community and public radio had been

growing at a remarkable rate from less than 10 million in 1985 to almost

20 million in 1995 (Dunaway, 2002:65). This study provides clear evi-

dence; as consolidation and commercialism grows unbridled, people

want an alternative.

Pacifica's National Board claimed that in this rapidly changing media

environment it was necessary to appeal to a broader audience and to

become more profitable in order to better demonstrate Pacifica's rele-

vance. They wanted to get rid of the checkerboard programming and

focus more on national programs that would air on affiliate stations and

bolster Pacific's overall audience share. The more traditional and long-

time supporters of the Network contended that this new strategy could

only work at the expense of Pacifica's mission, its programming man-

date, and the integrity of the network. They claimed that it would only

contribute to the increasing containment of the airwaves (Dinges,

2000:6). Despite their stated intentions, the Board ultimately employed

tactics that triggered a crisis, and almost destroyed the network in the

process.

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Crisis on the Dial

The crisis began when the Pacifica Foundation Board began to systemat-

ically remove democratic processes from the organizational structure,

creating a more Board-centralized power dynamic. The Board disman-

tled the Local Advisory Boards that had previously served as the major

vehicle for community feedback and participation. They also withheld

the minutes from Board meetings, which violated Pacifica' s policies, as

well as the dictates of the 1934 Communications Act. On March 31 st

,

1999, the Foundation's Executive Director, fired KPFA's long-time gen-

eral manager without notice or community consultation. This action was

swift and shocking and prompted immediate protest. A number of coali-

tions all representing various constituencies formed to organize demon-

strations and file various lawsuits against the foundation for breach of its

mission. With names like Save Pacifica and Committee for a Demo-

cratic Pacifica, outraged listeners projected the general sentiment of

Pacifica as a sinking ship. They contended "democracy is more than a

word you put on a mass mailing to get someone to send you a cheque"

(Lasar, 1999:1).

These Board actions proved to be a stark contradiction to the Paci-

fica's founding principles. Dennis Bernstein, a long time broadcaster for

Pacifica News Network described the Board's tactics as more closely

resembling a corporate takeover. The Board hired lawyers experienced

in fighting unions, security firms specializing in 'hostile terminations'

and a PR firm to handle public reception of the changes. Bernstein

asserted that the government also played a role in that these actions,

"took place with the connivance of the government's Corporation for

Public Broadcasting, which worked closely with the top Pacifica man-

agement and encouraged the move away from local oversight" (Bern-

stein, 2000).

The Board countered the protest with claims that their aim was to

bring more diversity to the network and to better allocate Pacifica's

already scare resources, a factor that they felt justified the rapid turnover

of staff and program content. But this explanation seemed to contradict

their actions including purging the stations of representatives of people

of color, including the head of KPFA's Third World department. When a

memo detailing plans to sell KPFA or WBAI was accidentally inter-

cepted, it left no doubt in many minds that diversity was not the only

motivation for the many changes. The memo insinuated that the Pacifica

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Board intended to sell either of the stations, worth upwards of $50 and

$80 million respectively, at the time, in order to endow the Foundation

and to help deal with financial and budgetary shortcomings (Dinges,

2000:3). Though the Board denied any serious consideration of the pro-

posal, the leak led to a quick loss of credibility for the Network.

Concerned with rising tensions within the station, the Board hired

armed security guards to patrol the offices and called in union busting

firms to fragment the network of employees and volunteers at the vari-

ous stations. They also maintained a gag rule to prevent staff from dis-

cussing the policy issues over the air. Those staff unwilling to leave their

audience in the dark found their programs shut off. Over 1 00 staff at the

smaller stations, KPFK, KPFT, and WBFN were fired for violating the

rule despite the fact that the issue was a major topic in large papers like

the Los Angeles Times and Washington Post (Buffa, 2002). An on-air

confrontation between armed guards and a talk show host, who openly

defied the gag rule, broadcast the conflict to a wide audience and

prompted a new round of listener protests. The Board used the display to

justify shutting down all broadcasting, boarding up the KPFA studios,

and suspending the staff without pay. The lockout lasted three weeks

until a mass demonstration of over 10,000 forced the Board to relent

(Solomon, 2002). It was the largest mass demonstration in Berkeley

since the Vietnam War, and one of the first major demonstrations

demanding the preservation of a free speech media outlet.

Protest and demonstrations also grew within the Pacifica network.

Stringers for Pacifica News Network, another Pacifica banner public

affairs program, began to boycott their own programs to protest the man-

agement-generated censorship. Taking advantage of the growing Inter-

net revolution, they created Free Speech Radio News, an alternative

news webcast that would connect a network of community radio stations

to fill the "urgent, unmet demand for a wider range of alternative media

choices than those offered by an increasingly bureaucratized Pacifica

Foundation" (Solomon, 2002).

Other programs would follow suit. In December 2000, the Pacifica

board took another round of decisive action, this time against New
York's station, WBAI, in what was to become know as the Christmas

Coup. Three veteran staff received word that they were fired, without

cause or previous notice, including Juan Gonzalez, co-host of Democ-

racy Now', the most popular show on the Pacifica network. Feeling that

84 Volume 20, 2004



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the environment at WBAI was no longer safe, Amy Goodman moved the

operations off site. Though Democracy Now\ continued producing daily

shows, Pacifica no longer aired them, suspending the staff without pay

(Barsamian, 2001:77-78). The loss ofDemocracy Now!, the staff purges,

and listener protests proved to be the final straw, prompting affiliate

community radio subscribers to break their connection and withhold

subscription fees to the foundation. In April 2001, Pacifica dissenters

formed WBAI in EXILE (WBIX.orgj, a web-based version of many of

WBAI's most popular shows that had been removed from the airwaves

(Lasar, 1999:6).

But ultimately, the intensive protest and lawsuits filed by listeners

and advisory boards finally and successfully settled. In December of

2001, the Board bucked under the pressure and national focus and

resigned their positions. But, the initial triumph was quickly dampened

when news surfaced that Pacifica was on the brink of financial ruin

(Buffa, 2002). An audit revealed that the National Board had been

spending excessive amounts of money to clamp down on the network.

Auditors found huge sums spent on public relations firms, security

patrols, and over $200,000 in unpaid banking fees, revealing multiple

levels of fiscal mismanagement. The legal battles alone racked up fees

totaling $1.4 million. By the conclusion of the crisis, the network's debt

had racked up to a total of $5 million, networks with grassroots media

were shaken, and the future of the Pacifica Foundation was uncertain

(Douglas, 2002).

Having won the most pressing battles though, listeners and staff

forged ahead with a renewed vigor. A new interim governing body

formed which included members of the old majority, members elected

through local advisory boards, and five dissidents. This interim Board

immediately set to reinstate fired employees and institute new by-laws

requiring listener elections of local advisory boards at all of the stations.

They ordered all five stations to spend two hours per week with pro-

grams directly covering the governance and by-law changes (Save Paci-

fica - Savepacifica.net, 2002).

After heated negotiations, mainly focusing on costs, Democracy

Now! eventually came back to Pacifica. The affiliate stations have also

started to re-connect to the station, hopefully to begin rebuilding a more

stable and widespread audience. These events have led many media

activists in the United States to claim the victory at Pacifica as a victory

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for a progressive media movement. But, as David Adelson, chair of

KPFK's local advisory board aptly noted, "if we just treat winning Paci-

fica as the endpoint, it's a loss. Reclaiming Pacifica has got to be used as

a driving wedge for the fight to win more democratic media" (Buffa,

2002).

The crisis has passed, but a closer inspection reveals that the root

problems remain. The non-commercial broadcasting domain is full of

thousands of radio programmers and community groups who urgently

need more space for their visions and work. At the same time, there are

thousands of commercial stations owned by just a handful of corpora-

tions. And these corporations actively work to keep community radio

programs from draining their audience share and their access to potential

consumers. This leaves the community stations in a race against one

another, struggling to prove their relevance and to compete for a limited

supply of funds. Representation and diversity is sacrificed, as the sta-

tions increasingly seem to resemble one another by buying into the same

national programs in the hopes of building stable audiences. Although

audience share is an important factor in determining relevance, this stan-

dard is not necessarily indicative of radio's potential reach. It is impor-

tant to recognize that not all media must be large and overwhelming to

provide an impact and that homogeneity does not provide appropriate

space for dialogue and debate.

Today Pacifica remains alone in a hostile and prohibitive media envi-

ronment, still retaining the pressure of being one of the few wide-reach-

ing venues for progressive and alternative voices, underserved

communities, and fringe identities. Lasar rightly offers that what

occurred at Pacifica cannot be dismissed as an internal squabble within

the left. "The conditions that precipitate this conflict - 20 years of sys-

tematic hacking away at the public sector - have created a tense, over-

crowded non-commercial domain that cannot be micro-managed without

causing havoc" (Lasar, 1999:7). Unfortunately this broader connection

has yet to be made by the majority of media activists, or even many pro-

grammers within the Pacifica Foundation itself.

There is still the question of Pacifica's ability to incorporate both the

input of community voices and the need to restore and enhance the rele-

vance of Pacifica's overall programming. Given the near close demise of

the Network, finding the answers is an urgent necessity, especially con-

sidering that Pacifica has a potential audience share that almost matches

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Chemins Alternatifs

NPR's. The issue is not whether the Network should appeal to a wide

core of listeners or continue to narrowcast programming towards a small

core of supporters. The question is how to balance both agendas without

losing sight of the greater need for democratic media.

The Medium and the Message

In July of 1999, Radio B92 and ANEM sent a message of solidarity to

Radio KPFA in Berkeley, and WBAI in New York. It stated:

The similarity of the media situation in our two nations,

which differ in many things, demonstrates that the character

of media repression is virtually the same under openly total-

itarian dictatorships as it is under democratic systems which

are increasingly influenced by conservative structures (Free

B92 and ANEM, 1999).

Despite the differences in their social and political environments the

similarities between the Pacifica Foundation and Radio B92 are remark-

able. Both are community radio stations dedicated to the principles of

free speech and expression as essential human rights. Both understand

that the protection of these rights cannot be sustained or maintained by

dependence on market forces that see audiences as consumers or politi-

cians who seek to control information to achieve certain political ends.

They both sought to expand the reach of an alternative base of communi-

cation, while building networks that would transcend their own geo-

graphic locations. In doing so, both contributed to movements to

democratize communication within their respective countries. Both also

survived attacks from their respective governments who used legislative

tools and legal means attempting to discredit their media organizations.

Both were shut out of their own studios and had powerful forces trying

to dictate the scope of their programming. And when attacked, both

attracted huge demonstrations of support from their own communities,

revealing the effectiveness of their programming and demonstrating the

desire for alternative voices in the media landscape.

Media and Democracy

Even with these many similarities, the differences between the stations

are still glaring. Where B92 is the ultimate tale of the underdog rising

Volume 20, 2004 87



Alternate Routes

against an uncompromising obstacle, Pacifica's story raises puzzling

questions about the extent of free speech within an already democratic

society. But it is precisely because the B92 case study stands as such an

extraordinary counterpoint to the Pacifica story, that it is ultimately able

to provide significant insight towards understanding the greater environ-

ment of the United States' media infrastructure.

Initially, pre-Milosevic leaders introduced certain progressive poli-

cies to Serbia. They instituted a self-managed media system to facilitate

the country's proposed shift towards a more socialist-democratic orien-

tation. But in Yugoslavia, in the wake of a political culture that worked

to centralize control of information, this transition would have to be

more than a process of changing laws. A democratic society is not estab-

lished only through the adoption of certain values, but also depends on

how these ideals intersect with a country's historical and cultural tradi-

tions. For a citizenry long denied the ability to speak their own views,

critique the workings of their government, or live outside certain pre-

scribed codes of accepted conduct, true democratic transformation

requires a complex shift in social understanding. One must first develop

openness to a wide range of political thought, and cultivate some mea-

sure of trust in the process of democratic governance.

In controlling the extent of political communication, the Yugoslavian

and Serbian governments effectively denied political debate, and in sup-

pressing a pluralism of ideas they reduced the legitimacy of the demo-

cratic model. For Milosevic to have claimed the existence of some kind

of democratic structure is laughable. The events that occurred in Serbia

counter every facet of democratic communication, and in doing so high-

lights all the more forcibly, the importance of having independent

voices.

But the inevitable question remains: How could so many of these

repressive constraints also occur within the Pacifica Foundation, in a

country where democracy is assumed to be more than words on a docu-

ment encased in glass? Why would it be so difficult to sustain a commu-
nity-based media outlet in a country where free speech is protected,

promoted, and celebrated? The ultimate crisis that threatened Pacifica's

survival can be dismissed as an internally based problem; a division

between the ideological commitments of the staff and the management

of an organization. But this explanation misses a very large portion of

the equation. A glimpse of the surrounding economic, political, and

88 Volume 20, 2004



Chemins Altematifs

social spheres emphasizes the corporate media environment and the dis-

solution of broadcast regulations as having a direct impact on Pacifica's

trajectory.

Over the last twenty years, the U. S. government aggressively limited

citizens' access to the airwaves. As Lasar argued, "The systematic

assault on public and locally accessible noncommercial media in the

United States has left Pacifica isolated. The network shoulders the bur-

den of being too many things to too many people, within the context of

too little space."(Lasar 2003:66-67). But instead of directing efforts to

address government media policy and to invigorate and strengthen an

alternative, noncommercial, broadcasting sector, "the network's leader-

ship had clearly chosen to capitalize on its possession of the last big sig-

nal, noncommercial, independent airspace in America" (Lasar, 1999:2).

The result has been a tense, heated, and overcrowded media system,

where any attempts to shift programming could be construed as an ideo-

logical attack.

In some ways this situation mirrors the ethnic squabbles that erupted

in Serbia. During Tito's reign, ethnic groups lived together peaceably,

side by side. When filled with fear, prompted by factors such as an

aggressive use of propaganda and societal cohesion manipulated by the

political leadership, harmonious ties were broken. It is in this context

that the internal conflicts should also be addressed. Pacifica's struggle

illustrates the problems that will always exist in trying to find common
ground and harmony among people with conflicting ideological commit-

ments. What Pacifica should have done, was focus attention on problems

in the overarching media environment; the containment of the airwaves,

the endless pursuit and competition for an ever-larger audience. Instead,

the leadership internalized the struggle and thus made no strides towards

a larger project of media democratization. In the process, Pacifica lost

sight of the mission that made the network of stations such an important

and unique part of the media landscape.

Rule by the People

If one important difference can be highlighted between these two case

studies, it is the fact that in Serbia, the people knew, and have always

known that their government controls information. Milosevic's reign is

less a story of a man publicly supported and advocated by the people,

and more a public situation of habit and/or apathy. "Deprived of alterna-

Volume 20, 2004 89



Alternate Routes

tives, people opposed to the regime are condemned to political resigna-

tion and escape into private life, while the lack of enthusiasm of regime

supporters hardly matters"(Gordy, 1999:22). Though democratization

was the rallying cry of post-Communist development throughout Eastern

Europe, it seemed less important to the majority of Serbians. For exam-

ple it was hard to convince the population of the value and power of a

citizen electorate. For most Serbians, voting did not mean choosing lead-

ership or affecting government decisions, considering the futility of past

election attempts. True societal transformation would require more than

the seemingly superficial symbols of democratic governance.

An important factor in the relationship between democracy and free

speech is the desire and willingness of citizens to play their role in soci-

ety and not acquiesce to the interests of powerful forces. In The Culture

ofPower in Serbia, Eric Gordy found that, "those people inclined to be

satisfied with the information readily available to them from regime-

controlled sources do not have the motivation to seek other sources or to

be bothered by questions of objectivity or balance. Such effort likely

interferes with the comfort they achieve by trusting, or pretending to

trust, that they are already adequately informed" (Gordy, 1999:97). This

was especially true for older, rural, and less educated Serbians who
formed the majority of support for Milosevic's regime. It is not strange

that under these circumstances that the force behind Radio B92 and other

alternative outlets was a discontent but educated youth, not as willing to

live under the same restrictions as their parents (Collin, 2001: 200). For

those seeking for better information, who wanted to debate the issues to

search for options, independent alternative media provided a sense of

connection to a much larger community.

The regime was most successful at establishing its control in the rural

areas, precisely because there it was easier to suppress alternative

sources of information and prevent people from gaining an understand-

ing of realities external to Serbia. But such intense government control

only last so long. Faced with severe economic hardship, the visible

effects of the war and the eventual bombing of their cities, dissent grew

among the Serbian population. The more that Milosevic's democratic

promises fell flat, people who had once discounted B92 now turned to it

as their trusted source of information. And ANEM's efforts broadcast

B92 to a larger constituency was an influential factor in spreading alter-

90 Volume 20. 2004



Chemins Alternatifs

native information to areas previously only served by regime media

(Gordy, 1999:206).

In the United States, although the media system has been steadily

reduced to a shadow of a democratic one, most Americans would believe

their media is free and that their First Amendment freedoms are strong

and protected. It may be easy to say the American public is naive, but

such a simplistic answer ignores a complex set of contributing factors,

for instance, the weakening of journalistic integrity in US media. News

and public affairs programming has declined only to be replaced by an

influx of sensationalistic news and entertainment-based fare. The

absence of public interest requirements has left little space or incentive

for diverse programming. News stations are increasingly reliant on gov-

ernment sources for news with reporting taking place more in press

pools or with 'embedded journalists' than in actual on the spot reporting

(Darnofsky, 1995:228). The civic project ofjournalism is losing ground.

Powerful forces-both political and economic-are increasingly control-

ling information, as strongly as any propaganda issued out of Serbia. It is

perhaps ironic, that considering the history of the media structure within

Yugoslavia, and Serbia in particular, that the current broadcasting legis-

lation adopted post-Milosevic, contains more safeguards and protections

of free speech, expression, and diversity than the American system, at

least rhetorically.

In addition to the shortcomings of the media industry are the system-

atic ways that civic engagement in politics and participation in public

dialogue have become relegated to the sidelines. Avenues for citizen

input have eroded, and people tend to feel resigned to the culture at

hand, comfortable enough in America's high standard of living to not

readily oppose fundamental flaws in the way society has come to be run.

Dismal voting rates within the United States speak to a high degree of

citizen apathy. People are consumed with the burdens and struggles of

daily life, which can seem far removed from the larger ideological prin-

ciples of media consolidation. Robert Hackett finds, "given marketing

and cultural pressures towards social fragmentation, many consumers

want fewer voices and less complexity in their daily media fare, not

more. Many consumers also identify with the branded images, products,

programs, and celebrities that constitute the corporate mediascape"

(Hackett, 2001). Given the popularity of mainstream media and the

amount of channels and choices that now exist, it becomes difficult to

Volume 20, 2004 91



Alternate Routes

convince someone to question the familiarity and viability of NBC or

CNN.
But studies show that as citizens become more aware of these issues

they overwhelmingly tend to disagree with media consolidation and

view it in a negative light. The Telecom Act and the more recent 2003

FCC regulation reviews occurred with few if any kind of public forums

or debates of the issues, with little word from Congress, and understand-

ably even less coverage in the news media. In February 2003, the Project

for Excellence in Journalism found that 72% of Americans had heard

absolutely nothing about the FCC's plans to further deregulate already

controversial media ownership rules (Schmeizer, 2003). But by July of

2003, a Pew Research Center for People and the Press report found that

nearly half the American public knew about the issue, and of that num-

ber, a marked 70% had a negative opinion of the proposed changes (Pew

Research Center, 2003).

This increase in public awareness can be attributed to the education

efforts of a variety of organizations. Now back on the Pacifica airwaves,

Amy Goodman, has been consistently providing strong political com-

mentary on the dangers of consolidation in her Democracy Now! pro-

gram. Organizations like MoveOn.org, a community of activists who
work to energize democratic participation by collectively determining

their issue priorities, have placed media reform at the top of their

agenda. To many people's surprise, even historically conservative

groups like the National Rifle Association (NRA), have become media

activists. Both MoveOn and the NRA collected hundreds of thousands of

signatures on petitions demanding that the FCC keep the ownership rules

intact. Another public-interest group, Common Cause, launched a

$250,000 advertising campaign against the FCC's proposed changes,

placing ads in the New York Times and Washington Post to raise public

awareness (Ahrens, 2003, A01). These efforts helped contribute to the

unprecedented Congressional rejection of the proposed changes, which

was followed by rejections in the Senate and a US Appeals Court in June

of 2004 (Squeo and Flint, 2004, A3). But the fight is not yet over as the

FCC is working to redraft a new version of the legislation and will con-

tinue pushing for their proposed changes.

These examples illustrate that the commitment to the principles of

free speech does in fact exist. But it is important to realize that it is

mainly during strained and oppressive times that rights and freedoms

92 Volume 20, 2004



Chemins Alternatifs

take on their greatest significance. Robert Hackett aptly notes "demands

for participatory communication are historically more frequent in times

of revolutionary upheaval when people's stories, actions, and protests

are prominent in public communication" (Hackett, 2001). It is therefore

not surprising that both Pacifica and B92 could design their most robust

ideological commitments in the face of repressive forces. Likewise the

recent surge of interest in media reform is closely connected to the local

and global turmoil since the attack of September 1 1, 2001, the ongoing

war the US has waged against Iraq, and the dampening of domestic civil

rights under the guise of security concerns.

In the wake of September 11
th

, we witnessed broadcast and cable

news audiences jump to record highs not seen since the first Gulf War
(Kovach, 2002). We saw audiences reach out for Pacifica, NPR, and

other public radio outlets in search of accurate and reliable information.

During this crisis, and in response to tangible threats from both terrorists

and the State, the need for journalists to resume their role as purveyors

of news and the public interest became stronger than it had been in

decades. But we also witnessed the government openly telling journal-

ists not to ask certain questions, not to challenge government policy, and

to follow the government's lead in deciding when and where to broad-

cast certain information. We saw the Patriot Act pass through Congres-

sional review with little debate, even though the legislation blatantly

attacks basic civil rights. We have seen incredible censorship aimed

mainly against people critiquing the government's reaction to the cam-

paign against Afghanistan, and later Iraq. In this charged climate, dissent

and critique have been punished rather than protected, precisely at a time

when we need to truly question the motives and judgments of our lead-

ers.

In this repressive environment, Pacifica and other alternative media

organizations have stepped up to the challenge of maintaining a space

for dissent, allowing the disagreements, debates, and the claims of the

anti-war movement to break though to the mainstream in a more sub-

stantial way. These media groups have analyzed the actions of our lead-

ership and asked the critical questions while the mainstream media

acquiesced to the government line. And as the war progressed without an

end in sight and the death toll of Iraqi civilians and US soldiers climbed,

these media groups helped to give voice to the dissent and disapproval

that was increasingly expanding beyond traditional activist circles. They

Volume 20, 2004 93



Alternate Routes

helped fuel the growing discontent with the mainstream media coverage

of the issues.

Lessons Learned

That alternative media exist to provide this service is an essential factor

and warrants preserving independent voices in the media landscape. An
important lesson from Pacifica's history though, is that efforts to pre-

serve space for these independent media outlets cannot remain too nar-

row in focus or we risk losing the momentum that could bring a larger

media reform struggle to the next level. In the case of KPFA, though

protestors came out to support the station, in numbers not amassed since

the demonstrations against the Vietnam War, the root of the problem

was not being addressed. Listeners spent endless effort and energy to

protect a somewhat fringe alternative media outlet, while corporate con-

solidation continued its profound altering of the media landscape.

Today, the growing attention and frustration over the shortcomings of

the media industry could set the perfect stage upon which to really build

a large-scale media reform movement in the US. The recent triumph in

the battle against the FCC, and the variety of organizations stepping into

the fight are important components. They are joining long-running

media watchdog organizations like FAIR and the Institute for Public

Accuracy, and advocacy groups like the Center for Digital Democracy

and the Media Alliance Project, to name a few, who have been out at the

forefront of media activism. But the real obstacle to building this move-

ment is that there is not enough substantial coordination and collabora-

tion between these groups to make media reform a national agenda

priority. These groups need to abandon diverse agendas and competition

over funding and join together in the struggle for a common goal that

can reach American citizens everywhere. And the way to do that is to

present the issue in a way that everyday people can understand and relate

to it. Robert McChesney and John Nichols believe a real movement can

only form if media activists, "reach out to and involve organized groups

that currently are not very active in media reform, but are seriously ham-

pered by the current media system... organized labor, teachers, librari-

ans, civil libertarians, artists, religious dominations, and civil rights

groups" (McChesney and Nichols, 2002:2). The movement needs to

connect with people to the extent that they can understand how media

reform affects their daily lives, on par with other civil rights and free-

94 Volume 20, 2004



Chemins Alternatifs

doms such as voting. At least for the time being, there is ample upheaval

in America's political system to direct people's attention towards these

important issues. Whether a movement will be able to grow and sustain

itself beyond the country's current state of instability, remains to be

seen. The challenge is for a media reform movement to translate that

growing awareness and discontent into positive momentum for change.

If we really want to talk about the relationship between free speech

and democracy, perhaps apathy is the biggest threat; a significant com-

ponent being the failure of citizens to truly understand and appreciate the

underlying principles of free speech as essential human rights. If media

outlets are to promote democratic communication, it cannot be only in

times of turmoil. It is in the quiet moments, when people are less apt to

pay attention and question the workings of powerful groups, that these

rights must also be fought for. The cases of B92 and Pacifica provide

important lessons for ensuring a strong press able to preserve and sup-

port the public interest. B92 reveals that the government cannot be too

involved with the media industry, especially in terms of guiding and

influencing political content. The potentials for abuse are many. As in

Serbia, if journalists are prevented from carrying out their watchdog

duties, they are rendered incapable of contributing to the formation or

legitimacy of a democratic culture. Broadcasters cannot serve the public

interest if they are utterly dependent on the government to guide their

path and provide the parameters for what is suitable for discussion.

American news media, on the other hand, are clearly dominated more by

what sells than what is in the interest of the public. Too much substance

is sacrificed to appeal to corporate interests, and then citizens are ren-

dered unable to make truly informed decisions. The need for public

interest programming is vital enough to require that the government not

step too far away from regulating and controlling media. But the most

fundamental lesson from both cases is that democratic media requires

decisive controls that cannot be left to the devices of political and eco-

nomic elites to protect its functioning in moments of political quiet.

In order to guarantee a powerful and functioning democratic media

system it is vital to reinvigorate the concepts of public interest and pub-

lic service by bringing back useful measurements like those found in the

Fairness Doctrine. It is necessary to create concrete policy to guard

against media monopolization while creating higher standards for public

accountability of media organizations. Attention must be focused on bal-

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Alternate Routes

ancing the financial sustainability of non-commercial media enterprises

with the need to maintain a level of diversity and competition in a mar-

ket environment. Media organizations need to operate according to prac-

tices that are fair, non-discriminatory, transparent, and open to public

input and consultation. And democratic media requires a critical journal-

istic body to examine, analyze, and question the policies of the govern-

ment, to guard against the dangerous effects of rumor, gossip, and

propaganda, and to not sacrifice this duty for fear of being labeled unpa-

triotic.

At the same time, it is too easy to lay the burden of responsibility on

mass media for the democratic well being of a nation's citizens. Ulti-

mately it was through the sustained protest of Pacifica's listeners

—

through the people themselves standing up and demanding rights and

responsibilities—that a true representation of dissent could be demon-

strated and lead to change. An essential component of democracy is an

active citizenship. This requires that people be continually reminded of

what the principles of free speech really entail, not the expression of

coinciding opinions, but the protection of even the most minority view-

point. Citizens need to understand that critique and debate enhance our

understanding of issues rather than hinder or manipulate public opinion.

We must maintain the right to petition our own government when we
disagree with its policies. We must re-exert our position and power as

citizens, because democracy is ultimately rule by the people for the peo-

ple. We must acknowledge that Pacifica and B92 and other alternative

and noncommercial stations are vital to maintaining a space for dissent,

a place for community input, and a forum for dialogue. But we must also

recognize that the battles for these stations are only the first steps. The

task of building a viable reform movement still lies ahead. If these sto-

ries teach us anything it is that this movement is critical to ensure the

continued presence of democracy and to sustain people's access to their

share of rights and privileges.

Notes

l.McQuail, (1987), Chomsky and Hermann (1988), McChesney (1993, 1998,

2003), Atkinson (1997), Curran and Gureritch (1996) are a few notable

scholars in the field of media studies.

96 Volume 20, 2004



Chemins Alternates

2. James Curran's "watchdog" function of media forms the "key element of the

ideology that legitimates the printed press" in both the US and the U.K. By
exposing wrongs, analyzing actions, and questioning policies, journalists apply

pressure and provide information to ensure the exercise ofjustice and to prevent

the misuse and imbalance of power whether political or economic

(Curran,1996).

3. According to Wilbur Schramm's Communist Press Theory, Communist mass

media functions specifically to mobilize, proselytize, indoctrinate, and persuade

the public toward the purposes of the government (Schramm, 1956).

4. Robert McChesney notes, "it was only in the late 1920s that capitalists began

to sense that through network operation and commercial advertising, radio

broadcasting could generate substantial profits"(McChesney, 1997).

5. McChesney found that an astounding 90% of campaign contributions toward

elections are made by the wealthiest 1% of Americans (McChesney, 2003).

6. In a famous speech, FCC Commisioner Michael Powell noted his own
confusion with the concept when he "waited for a visit from the angel of the

public interest" which never appeared. He likened the concept to modern art in

that its meaning rests on the eye of the beholder, which he claimed was not a

sound foundation for determining a legal standard (Powell, 1998).

7. In Velimir Curgus Kazimir's documentation of the citizen resistance in

Serbia, he notes that media forms promoting democratic concepts of rights and

information equality would lay the groundwork for introducing a new reality.

(2001).

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I06 Volume 20, 2004