




































American Economic & Social Review; Vol. 2, No. 1; 2018  

ISSN 2576-1269   E-ISSN 2576-1277  

                                                      Published by Centre for Research on Islamic Banking & Finance and Business 

 

 

41 

 

Insurgence and National Security in Nigeria: A Focus on Boko 

Haram 

 

Able Shibinya Zhizhi1 & Emmanuel Okokondem Okon2 

 
1Department of Politcal Science, Nasarawa State University, Keffi, Nigeria 
2Department of Economics, Kogi State University, Anyigba, Kogi State, Nigeria 

Correspondence:Emmanuel Okokondem Okon, Department of Economics, Kogi State University, Anyigba, Kogi 

State, Nigeria, E-mail: tonydom57@yahoo.com. Tel: +2348023275716  
 

 

Received:  January 6, 2018                        Accepted: January 9, 2018                   Online Published: January 18, 2018   

 

Abstract 
The contemporary Nigeria has become a theatre of genocide, bloodshed and insecurity over the past years due to the 

carnage activities of terrorist groups. Terrorists of various groups and camps unleash havoc on the Nigerian 

populace. Though these groups are numerous, one of the most noticeable and deadly group is Boko Haram. This 

paper attempts to investigate if this group is one of the major security challenges confronting Nigeria today. The 

result reveals that a number of factors, including bad governance and religious and political manipulations, and the 

long and porous borders of Nigeria promote Boko Haram activities. As such, there is significant relationship 

between Boko Haram insurgency and national security in Nigeria. This paper recommends that at all levels of 

government, governance should be taken as a serious business especially in the area of provision of security and 

public goods such as improved infrastructure and the creation of the enabling environment needed for investment 

that would in turn creation opportunities for employments which will lead to reduction in poverty. 

 
Keywords: Insurgence, National Security, Boko Haram, Nigeria. 

 

1. Introduction 

For most people, the history of Nigeria is that of violent conflicts, chaos, and disorderliness, and retrogression. Some 

people have become inured to the ugly and obscene pictures of the maimed, charred human bodies, and the wanton 

destruction of properties as a result of some of the violence reminiscence of the Nigeria civil war. It is possible for 

anyone to develop amnesia over these horrible violent incidents that have occurred over some decades. And many 

people cannot live down the orgy of violence resulting to the savage carnage and horror. The overall consequence is 

that the collective psyche of the people has been affected (Udama, 2013).              

Terrorism though not new in Nigeria history, but has become the popular vehicle for instilling fear and conducting 

violence against the citizens in the country. In recent times, Nigeria is experiencing a new wave of violence which is 
terrorism conducted in different forms, means and places. These includes bombing and killing of persons and 

targeting certain persons and places such as worship centre‟s, living homes, commercial buildings, 

telecommunication masts, government installations and infrastructure, kidnapping as well as depriving people of 

their legitimate entitlements (Udama, 2013). These terrorist activities are carried out by non-state actors and do not 

exclude politicians and government functionaries including security agencies that ought to protect lives and 

properties. 

Since 2001, a new crop of young and daring Muslim faithful known as Boko Haram, where most of them are from 

the semi-middle class and educated have aggressively embraced a stricter version of Islam, rejecting anything 

Christian and western education and culture, have had undiluted resilience carrying high profile terrorist attacks 

particularly in the northern states of Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, Plateau, Kaduna, as well as the 



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Federal Capital Territory (FCT) (Udama, 2013). They also have freed suspects from prisons, killing high profile 

politicians, and carried out the first suicide bomb attack in the Abuja police force Headquarters. This has prompted 

the question of who will protect the Nigerian citizens, if the forces saddled with the responsibility are helpless. 

This paper seeks to answer the following research questions whether a number of factors, including illiteracy, 

unemployment and poverty, corruption, bad governance and religious and political manipulation, and the long and 

porous borders of Nigeria, its vast forest and deserts most of which are not adequately protected, as well as weak 
institutional frameworks, constitute weaknesses that promote Boko Haram activities. The basic research proposition 

of this paper is that there is no significant relationship between Boko Haram insurgency and national security in 

Nigeria. 

2. Conceptual Review 

2.1 National Security     

The term national security lacks specific definition. This is partly because the nature and concept of national security 

may vary from one State to the other. Meanwhile, security refers to the effort to protect the lives and properties of 

people from threats. It is the state of being secure; freedom from fear, anxiety, danger, and doubt. The threats that 

people are being protected from via security can take several forms, and could be from anywhere, they could be 

internal, external, visible, and perceived. Accordingly, in order to possess national security, a nation needs to 

possess economic security, energy security, environmental security, etc(Sciencedaily, 2015). Security threats 

involve not only conventional foes such as other nation-states but also non-state actors such as violent non-state 
actors, narcotic cartels, multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations; some authorities include 

natural disasters and events causing severe environmental damage in this category.  

Generally, Braithwaite (1988) quoting the encyclopedia of the social sciences defines national security as “ability of 

a nation to protect its internal values from external threat”. Also, Lipmann defines it by stating that “a nation has 

security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interest to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain 

them by war”. Morgenthau (1948) posits that national security and national interests are inter-related; where the 

former is seen in terms of power and therefore is the essence of politics. Imobighe (1981) refers to it as the defense 

and survival of the state. The danger of looking at national security from this narrow angle according to Nweke 

(1988) is three-fold; but we shall concern ourselves with the first two: First is the tendency to equate “defense” with 

“security” and to bestow undue responsibilities to the military as if the armed forces alone are the guardians of 

national security. This tendency in turn creates in the minds of the armed forces that it is only through them that 
security, stability and progress can be achieved. Secondly, national security has been used by civilian statesmen as 

political rhetorics or slogan for rallying the citizens in the face of perceived internal or external threats to the 

governments in power and for bolstering their local influence and political base (Adebayo, 1986). 

Dyke (1966), concludes that there is no doubt that national security embodies the sovereignty of the state, the 

inviolability of its territorial boundaries, and the right to individual and collective self-defense against internal and 

external threats. But the state is secure only when the aggregate of people organized under it has a consciousness of 

belonging to a common sovereign political community; enjoy equal political freedom, human rights, economic 

opportunities, and when the state itself is able to ensure independence in its development and foreign policy. 

Freedman‟s (1998) view is that once anything generates anxiety or threatens the quality of life in some respect, it is 

thus labeled a “security problem”. The notion of economic security thus encourages a confrontational approach to 

trace policy, while that of “environmental security” has often served more to confuse than to clarify by encouraging 

a search for adversaries.   National security according to Otubanjo (1989) is the concern of government about the 
stability and safety of a state. Similarly, Adesola (2011) explains national security as the measures taken by a state to 

ensure its survival and safety. In the Nigerian context, Edem (n.d.) defines national security as the ability of Nigeria 

to pursue her national interest and protect her core values. The thrust of this state centred definition is to view 

national security in terms of defence and survival of the State. In this context, “defence” is equated with “security” 

and the military as the custodians of national security (Oshio, 2009).  Furthermore, Otto and Ukpere (2012, p.6767) 

asserts that “security means protection from hidden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life in homes, 

offices or communities… security must be related to the presence of peace, safety, happiness and the protection of 

human and physical resources or the absence of crisis, threats to human injury among others.” 

There is a remarkable difference between what the concept of national security is in contemporary and traditional 

periods. National security was traditionally viewed as referring to the protection of the territorial integrity of a state 

and the protection of its citizens from external threats, with specific focus on protection against military attack. This 
concept has been described as an evolving one which changed and became seen as not only covering protection of a 

state‟s territory from external threats, but to also cover internal threats including unrests, as well as enhancing the 

lives of the of the people in the state, and the provision of infrastructure needed for development.  



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The concept has in contemporary times gone beyond those two to include protection not just from internal and 

external threat, but also to threats to a state‟s way of life. The present scope of the threats that states seek to protect 

themselves from goes beyond military threats, unrests and other upheavals, to include other forms of threats such as 

economic, health, social or political. Therefore, the modern understanding of national security however extends 

beyond the physical protection of a territory through military intervention, to the provision of better quality of life 

and promotion of sustainable development. In this light, national security can be described to include providing 
higher standard of living through health, economic, human, physical and environmental and food security among 

others (Bello, n.d.).  

2.2 Insurgency 

Scholars and theorists have given different definitions of insurgency. While some of these definitions are closely 

related, others are not so related though contain common elements and this still makes the subject technically 

difficult. Perhaps insurgency is best understood by first considering what it is not. Insurgency is not terrorism or 

conventional war for example, though it shares with them some similarities such as the use of force or guerrilla 

tactics to achieve an end which is often political (Liolio, 2013). Basically, the difference between insurgency and 

terrorism lies in the scope and magnitude of violence. While for instance, terrorism rarely brings about political 

change on its own, insurgency attempts to bring about change through force of arms. Similarly, terrorists often apply 

a wide range of damages when compared to insurgents. On the other hand, while conventional war involves 

adversaries more or less symmetric in equipment or training, insurgency involves adversaries that are asymmetric, 
weak, and almost always a sub-state group. 

Traditionally however, insurgencies seek to overthrow an existing order with one that is commensurate with their 

political, economic, ideological or religious goals (Gompert and Gordon, 2008). According to Kilcullen, 

“Insurgency is a struggle to control a contested political space, between a state (or a group of states or occupying 

powers), and one or more popularly based, non-state challengers” (Kilcullen 2006). Kilcullen also try to draw a 

line between classical and contemporary insurgencies thus: while the latter seek to replace the existing order, the 

former sometimes strive for the expulsion of foreign invaders from their territory or seek to fill an existing power 

vacuum (Kilcullen 2006). Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary defines insurgency as “an armed rebellion 

against a constituted authority (for example, an authority recognized as such by the United Nations) when those 

taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents.” 

The British Army counter-insurgency manual, Army Field Manual (AFM) defined insurgency as: “The actions of a 
minority group within a state, who are intent on forcing political change by a means of a mixture of subversion, 

propaganda and military pressure, aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of the people to accept such a 

change. It is an organized, armed political struggle, the goals of which might be diverse.” 

This definition also conform with the US Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) which 

defined insurgency as “an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and 

legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent 

control”(Petraeus and Amos 2006).  

Apart from the definition by Kilcullen and to an extent that of Oxford dictionary, the author does not totally agree 

with the other definitions as they fail to reflect the complexities of modern insurgencies especially with regards to 

their political, economic and social dimensions which Kilcullen simply describe as “struggle.” By implication, the 

other definitions branded insurgency as a predominantly military problem. However, in what seems to be a 

replacement of the 2006 FM 3-24 definition of insurgency, the 2009 Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency 
Operations, defined insurgency as “the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks 

to overthrow or force change of a governing authority.” While the author agrees more with this definition by the 

Joint Publication, he wishes to stress that such definition excludes any insurgency that does not seek to overthrow or 

change the governing authority. A good example would be separatist insurgencies which aim for secession from 

within a state or reformist insurgencies which seek to influence government policies by forceful means.  

In all, insurgencies connote an internal uprising often outside the confines of state‟s laws and it is often 

characterized by social-economic and political goals as well as military or guerrilla tactics. Put differently, it is a 

protracted struggle carefully and methodically carried out to achieve certain goals with an eventual aim of replacing 

the existing power structure. To launch their anger on the state, insurgents often target civilians and infrastructures. 

However, other than the violence of insurgency are its political and social-economic dimension, where often lies its 

causes and effects. 

3. Insecurity in Nigeria 

The myriad of security problems confronting Nigeria have had dire impact on the socio-economic and political 

development in the country. Odeselu (2011), confirms that insecurity in Nigeria has affected Air transport 

negatively. It scares away passengers and is like draining blood from a man, it drains the resources that could have 



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been used to improve safety, including finance and time. It induces multiple levels of security checks at the airports 

with the attendant stress on the traveling public. Otto (2008) has shown that insecurity took a great toll on oil 

production in Nigeria between 1999 and 2008 Nigeria was producing at about 10% of its potentials of 3.4 million 

barrels of crude oil per day in 2007. Currently, the cost of petroleum production in Nigeria is higher than it was 

before 1999 because of the higher security expenditure necessary now (Otto and Ukpere, 2012).  

Also, insecurity increases the unit cost of doing business in Nigeria. Apart from the fall in output and the increase in 
unit cost of production, many firms in different industries relocated away from the Niger Delta in particular. And 

some left the country completely. Example, include Michelin, Dunlop, among several others. An insecure 

environment impinges directly on development; it disenfranchises communities, contributes to poverty, distorts 

economies, creates instability and stunts political development. In Nigeria, apart from the millions of people who 

had been killed in course of one security breach or another, sources of livelihood were destroyed, families got 

disintegrated and social infrastructure were disrupted (Otto and Ukpere, 2012). 

3. 1. Boko Haram Attacks in the Country  

Boko Haram was a local radical Salafist group which transformed into a Salafi-jihadist terrorist organization 

(Chimezie, n.d.). On 6 July 2009, first clash was with security agencies in Bauchi State after an all-night attack on 

Dutsen-Tanshi Police, 39 members, two police, one soldier killed.   27 July 2009, first attack in Yobe State during 

an invasion of Potiskum Divisional Headquarters led to the death of three policemen, one Fire Service officer. On 29 

July 2009, confrontation with security men at Mamudo Village, along Potiskum/Damaturu Road, Yobe, 33 Boko 
Haram men killed(Sani, 2011). On the same date in all-night battle with combine security operative at Railway 

Terminus, Maiduguri, Borno State, Boko Haram did not only kill but destroyed operational base of the combine 

security.  

Since 2009, the Islamic sect Boko Haram has been blamed for many attacks in different parts of Nigeria including 

the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. See Appendix for a timeline of attacks for which the sect has claimed 

responsibility. 

4.  Research Methodology 

4.1 Area of Study 

Nigeria is located between 4°N and 14°N of the equator. The western frontiers runs from 3°E and the eastern 

reaches nearly 15°E of the meridian (Margottini et al, 2013). Since it was impossible to conduct the research in the 

whole areas in Nigeria where BokoHarram attacks had happened. A few places were selected where severe impact 
and casualties were recorded after the attacks by Boko Haram. As such, the study purposely selected Kabba in Kogi 

State and Nyanya in Abuja.   

Nyanya is a town, and a suburb of Abuja city in centralNigeria. It is a district of KaruLocal Government Area, 

Nasarawa State, and is among the towns that make up the Karu Urban Area, a conurbation of towns stretching to 

Nigeria's capital city, Abuja. Its neighbouring towns are Mararaba, Ado, Masaka, New Karu and Kurunduma and 

villages that grew, as a result of the rapid expansion of administrative and economic activities of Abuja, into 

neighbouring towns, coupled with the evacuation of tens of thousands of people from Abuja by the Federal Capital 

Territory administration (Wikipedia, 2013). 

Kabba is a town in Kogi State in mid-west Nigeria. It lies near the Osse River, at the intersection of roads from 

Lokoja, Okene, Ogidi, Ado-Ekiti, and Egbe. The town is near Abuja. Kabba was the administrative headquarters of 

the Kabba province of the defunct Northern Region of Nigeria, which includes all of the current Kogi State. The 

town is the headquarters of the Kabba/Bunnu local government area of Kogistate.Kabba is a trade centre for coffee, 
cocoa, yams, cassava, maize, sorghum, shea nuts, peanuts (groundnuts), beans, cotton, and woven cloth produced by 

the Yoruba, Ebira, and other peoples of the surrounding area (Wikipedia, 2014). 

4.2 Instrument Validity 

To assess the validity, the instrument was piloted among 3 randomly selected household in each areas of the study. 

Responses, views, impatience and difficulties to complete the questionnaire were noted instantly by the researchers, 

this warranted restructuring the questionnaire by collapsing some instruments and resorting to two-option response 

format as against the Likert-type scale from 1 to 4. As such the questionnaire was kept simple but still containing 

vital questions regarding the issue at hand. The final draft of the questionnaire was sent to a few colleagues who are 

knowledgeable in this field. It should also be noted that in-depth interview was conducted among the respondents in 

the study areas. 

4.3 Sampling 
60 questionnaires were administered randomly to households in Kabba  inKogi state  and also 60 households were 

randomly selected in Nyanya in Abuja where questionnaires were administered. A total of 100 questionnaires were 

retrieved out of 120 administered.  This represented 83 percent retrieval rate. Table 2 in Appendix shows the 

questionnaire that was administered and the response. 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abuja
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle_Belt
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle_Belt
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle_Belt
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karu,_Nasarawa_State
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karu,_Nasarawa_State
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karu,_Nasarawa_State
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nasarawa_State
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karu_Urban_Area
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conurbation
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mararaba
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ado,_Nasarawa
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masaka,_Nigeria
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Karu
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Capital_Territory_%28Nigeria%29
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Capital_Territory_%28Nigeria%29
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Capital_Territory_%28Nigeria%29


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Data collected were subjected to statistical analysis using several statistical tables and analytical tools: descriptive 

statistics which use means and percentages for answering questions; inferential statistics such as one way analysis of 

variance classification; Chi2 test and t test adopted in testing formulated hypothesis of the study at 5% level of 

significance. 

5. Results and Discussion 

The demographic result in Table 1 regarding the gender composition of respondents show 53% males while 47% of 
the respondents are females. 74% of the respondents are within the age of 21-30 years while 10% of the respondents 

are within the ages 1-20 years, also 10% of the respondents are within the ages 41-50 and 6% of the respondents are 

within the ages of 31-40 years. The marital status of respondents shows 85% of the respondents as single while 4% 

are married. However, 10% of the respondents are widowed and 1% of the respondent appeared divorced. Majority 

of respondents as shown in the Table  have tertiary education (80%) while 18% of the respondents have 

primary/secondary education. Nonetheless, 2% of the respondents have other educational qualification. In terms of 

occupational distribution, the bulk of respondents are students (78%);10% of the respondents are civil servants; 11% 

of the respondents are business men/women; and 1% of the respondents is into trade. Still, from the bio data section 

of Table 1, 79% are respondents are Christians while 21% are Muslims.  In section two of the questionnaire where 

research questions were ask, the information in Table 1 shows that most of the respondents (89%) are aware that 

Boko Haram insurgency exists in Nigeria. Similarly, 85% said that they have been directly or indirectly affected by 

their insurgence.  
About 78% of the respondents were of the opinion that Boko Haram insurgency has negatively affected national 

security in Nigeria while 22% of the respondents disagree that Boko Haram insurgency has negatively affected 

national security in Nigeria. Invariably, most of the respondents agree that Boko Haram insurgency has negatively 

affected national security in Nigeria.  Moreover, 79 respondents representing 79% of the respondents agree that 

religious and political manipulations in Nigeria is an indication of Boko Haram insurgency while 21% of the 

respondents disagree. A large sum of respondents (86 in number or 86%)agree that if religious and political 

manipulations is minimized in Nigeria, it will reduce Boko Haram insurgency. 

On the subject of well-being, 87% of the respondents are of the perception that illiteracy, unemployment and 

poverty are responsible for Boko Haram insurgency in the country. Similarly, a large percentage of respondents 

(90%) are of the opinion that corruption, bad governance and weak institutional framework also promote this 

insurgence. 
On the issue of borders, 92% of the respondents agree that the long and porous borders, vast forest and deserts in 

Nigeria promotes Boko Haram insurgency while 8 respondents representing 8% of the respondents disagree on this 

on. A lot of the respondents (79%) were highly of the opinion that if security is beefed up around the long and 

porous borders, vast forest and deserts in Nigeria, it will reduce Boko Haram activities. In a similar manner, 

majority of the respondents(88%) disagree that the federal, state and local governments in Nigeria have done enough 

to reduce the sect‟s activities.  The security operatives and security agencies have not done enough either. This is as 

expressed by 86% of respondents. A very high percentage of respondents (99%) disagree that the fight against Boko 

Haram insurgency should be left for the security operatives and security agencies. if the general populace is 

educated on the need and importance of security and security consciousness at all times, it will reduce Boko Haram 

insurgency in Nigeria. This is the take of 98% of respondents. 

5.1 Verification of Research Proposition 

5.1.1 In-Depth Interview Report 
The researchers interviewed ten respondents who were purposively chosen because of the questions they answered. 

These respondents include security operatives, security experts and journalists who were the key informants that 

gave detailed information about the subject under study. A summary report is made of the in-depth one-to-one 

interviews among the ten respondents to bring out the central messages of the interviews so as to avoid repetition as 

there are so many similarities in the answers given by the various respondents. 

The respondents said that Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria is as a result of different factors ranging from 

illiteracy, unemployment, poverty, corruption and bad governance, religious and political manipulations, the long 

and porous borders, vast forest and deserts. Commenting on illiteracy, the interview revealed that so many youths in 

all parts of Nigeria are still uneducated and this is causing serious problem as these uneducated youths engage in all 

forms of social vises. On unemployment, the interview revealed that graduated youths are parading the streets due to 

lack of jobs. On poverty, the respondents say that the level of poverty in the country is alarming owing to the fact 
that so many people cannot afford the basic necessities of life. On the issue of corruption and bad governance, the 

respondents say that in Nigeria, the federal, state and local government has failed in the provision of basic amenities 

such as infrastructure, health care delivery, education, and security despite the huge resources gotten from oil. On 

religious and political manipulation, the respondents say that Religious indoctrination and its influence have played 



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great role in crisis in Nigeria and political manipulation has been in existence since independence and this has 

manifested itself in the area of access to power which guarantee access to resources and revenues. On the long and 

porous borders, vast forest and deserts, the respondents say that is has become worrisome in recent time as terrorist 

groups enter the country unchecked and use Nigeria‟s forests as their bases for recruitment and training camps for 

their new followers. 

According to the respondents, the federal, state and local governments have not done enough to fight Boko Haram 
insurgency in Nigeria in the sense that security operatives are not provided with up to date weapons and security 

gadgets to tackle Boko Haram insurgents. 

5.1.2 Statistical Verification 

H0 states that there is no significant relationship between Boko Haram insurgency and national security in Nigeria. 

The Binomial test was used concerning the issue of security in Nigeria. As such the responses from the following 

questions were analyzed: Has Boko Haram insurgency negatively affected national security in Nigeria (NSEC)? 

Does the long and porous borders,vast forest and deserts in Nigeria promote Boko Haram insurgency(DLONG)?  

 
Decide whether to reject H0. The p value in this case is .000 which is less than or equal to our α level of .05. Thus, 

we reject H0that there is no significant relationship between Boko Haram insurgency and national security in 

Nigeria. 

6. Conclusion and Policy Suggestions 

The conclusion of this research is that terrorism is real in Nigeria especially with the activities of Boko Haram which 

includes bombing and killing of persons and targeting certain persons and places such the worship centre‟s, living 

homes, commercial buildings, telecommunication masts, government installations and infrastructure, kidnapping as 

well as depriving people of their legitimate entitlements. These terrorist activities are carried out by non-state actors 

and do not exclude politicians and government functionaries including security agency that ought to protect lives 

and properties. This paper suggests that: 

The various levels of government should take governance as a serious business especially in the area of security 

(i.e., all government functionaries should be provided with sophisticated information gathering equipment that 
would enable them to detect terrorist activities early and nip them in the bud. Also, there is need to educate the 

general populace on the need and importance of security and security consciousness at all times) and provision of 

public goods such as improved infrastructure and the creation of the enabling environment needed for investment 

that would in turn creation opportunities for employments. The government should address the myriad of problems 

such as poverty, corruption, unemployment, drug trafficking and abuse etc., which are the likely precursors to 

violent reaction and the consequence insecurity. 

Similarly, government should endeavor to make poor youth‟s part and parcel of development opportunities.  More 

vocation that is youth centered should be introduced in Nigeria to enhance unskilled labor and boost their mental 

ability. Seminars/workshops on hand and personal skills should be organized for youths at the grass root level and 

there should be periodic evaluation of individuals so as to know their operational strength. This will help reduce 

social vices like political unrest, kidnappings, bombing and killing and so on, indulged by the youths in the society. 
In the same vein, government should build and renovate every dilapidated primary and secondary school and 

provide more education for the people at affordable rate, so that poor people can be educated. The acquisition of 

formal education enhances self-worth and develop human mental faculty. 

For effective control of corruption, the society should insist on the development of the culture of relative openness, 

in contrast to the current bureaucratic system of secrecy. Leaders must ensure transparency and accountability in all 

levels of government and must be published. In that regard, the role of the press in public enlightenment campaign 

against corruption is very important in an attempt to eradicate corruption in Nigeria because this strategy can help to 

raise the peoples‟ awareness about the problem. 



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Appendix 

 

Table 1: Timeline of Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria From 2009 to 2014          

Date Location Of Action Number  

Of Deaths 

Number  

Of Injured 

6 July 2009 Dutsen-Tanshi Police station,  Bauchi State 42 Xxx 

27 July 2009 Potiskum Divisional Headquarters, Yobe State 4 Xxx 

29 July 2009 Mamudo Village, Yobe State 33 Xxx 

29 July 2009 Railway Terminus, Maiduguri, Borno State several Xxx 

8 Sept. 2010 Bauchi Central Prison, Bauchi State xxx Xxx 

25 Dec.2010 Maiduguri 6 Xxx 

30 Dec.2010 JOS 32  

31 Dec.2010 Abuja, Mogadishr military Barracks 11 13 

9 Oct.2011 Maiduguri xxx xxx 

http://www.google.com.ng/
http://rieas.gr/images/alban.pdf
http://www.nigerdeltacongress.com/narticles/nigerian_state_and_national_secu.htm
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.2.Pdf
https://www.google.com.ng/search?biw=1271&bih=634&tbm=bks&q=inauthor:%22Claudio+Margottini%22&sa=X&ei=DsX9VNC7OYrtUvy3g2A&ved=0CB0Q9AgwAA
https://www.google.com.ng/search?biw=1271&bih=634&tbm=bks&q=inauthor:%22Paolo+Canuti%22&sa=X&ei=DsX9VNC7OYrtUvy3g2A&ved=0CB4Q9AgwAA
https://www.google.com.ng/search?biw=1271&bih=634&tbm=bks&q=inauthor:%22Kyoji+Sassa%22&sa=X&ei=DsX9VNC7OYrtUvy3g2A&ved=0CB8Q9AgwAA
https://books.google.com.ng/books?isbn=3642313191
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/07/boko-haram-history-ideas-and-revolt-6/
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/07/boko-haram-history-ideas-and-revolt-6/
http://thenet.ng/2014/06/2014-a-timeline-of-boko-haram-attacks-in-nigeria/
http://thenet.ng/2014/06/2014-a-timeline-of-boko-haram-attacks-in-nigeria/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Nyanya
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kabba


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8Aprail2011 Suleja, INEC office 16 Xxx 

16June 2011 Abuja, Nigerian Police Headquarters 8 44 

26June 2011 Maiduguri 25 12 

23 July 2011 Maiduguri 3 several 

30 July 2011 Maiduguri 5 10 

26Aug 2011 Abuja, UN House 26 116 

13Sep.2011 Maiduguri 4 Xxx 

4 Dec.2011 Azare,Katagum L.G.A Bauchi State 3 xxx 

7 Dec.2011 Kaduna 7 Xxx 

13 Dec.2011 Maiduguri 10 30 

22 Dec.2011 Maiduguri &Damaturu 4 xxx 

25 Dec 2011 Jos, Suleja&Yobe 43 xxx 

28 Dec 2011 Sapele, Delta, Hausa Quarters xxx 7 

30 Dec 2011 Gombe, Hotel xxx 15 

5/6 Jan.2012 Gombe& Adamawa State 28 Xxx 

7 Jan. 2012 Adamawa 17 12 

20 Jan. 2012 Kano 162 Xxx 

22 Jan.2012 Bauchi 11 Xxx 

3 Feb. 2012 Kogi State, Police Station 4 Xxx 

11March2012 Jos 10 xxx 

24March2012  Kano 2 Xxx 

8 April 2012 Jos 20 Xxx 

8 April 2012 Kaduna 40 Xxx 

25 April 2012 Maiduguri, Police Headquarters 7 xxx 

26 April 2012 Abuja, Kaduna 6 xxx 

29April 2012 Bayero University, Kano 16 Xxx 

30April 2012 Taraba 11 Xxx 

3 June 2012 Bauchi 12 Xxx 

8 June 2012 Maiduguri xxx Xxx 

10 June 2012 Jos 8 Xxx 

17 June 2012 Kaduna & Zaria 40 Xxx 

22 June 2012 Abuja xxx Xxx 

13 July 2012 Maiduguri 5 Xxx 

30 July 2012 Zaria & Kaduna 5 Xxx 

14August2014 Kaduna 4 Xxx 

23 Sept. 2012 Bauchi 2 46 

5 Oct. 2012 Maiduguri 1 11 

6 Oct. 2012 Taraba xxx 8 

8 Oct. 2012 Maiduguri 35 Xxx 

28 Oct. 2012 Kaduna 8 100 

7 May 2013 Bama 55 Xxx 

6 July 2013 Yobe State 42 Xxx 

12 Feb. 2014 Konduga 39 Xxx 

12 Feb. 2014 Wajirko 4 6 

16 Feb 2014 Borno 90 Xxx 

19 Feb 2014 Bama 60 Xxx 

25 Feb 2014 BuniYadi 59 Xxx 

1 March 2014 Maiduguri 51 Xxx 

1 March 2014 Mainok 39 Xxx 

10 April 2014 Kala Balge 60 xxx 

10 April 2014 Dikwa 8 Xxx 

14 April 2014 Nyanya, Abuja 88 125 



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1 May 2014 Nyanya, Abuja 19 60 

5 May 2014 GamboroNgala 300 Xxx 

18 May 2014 Kano 4 Xxx 

20 May 2014 Jos 118 56 

21 May 2014 Chikongudu 25 Xxx 

25 May 2014 Yobe&Borno State 48 Xxx 

27 May 2014 Borno State 48 xxx 

31 May 2014 Kala/Balge 40 Xxx 

 

Source: Thenationon(2014),  Thenet(2014). 

Table 2: Questionnaire Administered and the Response 

Part One: Bio Data About  Respondent 

Sex Frequency Percentage 

Male 53 53% 

Female 47 47% 

Total 100 100% 

Age Frequency Percentage 

1-20 10 10% 

21-30 74 74% 

31-40 6 6% 

41-50 10 10% 

51-Above - - 

Total 100 100% 

Marital Status Frequency Percentage 

Single 85 85% 

Married 4 4% 

Divorced 1 1% 

Widow 10 10% 

Total 100 100% 

Educational Qualification Frequency Percentages 

Primary/Secondary 18 18% 

Tertiary 80 80% 

Others 2 2% 

Total 100 100% 

Occupational Status Frequency Percentages 

Civil Servants 10 10% 

Business Men/Women 11 11% 

Students 78 78% 

Traders 1 1% 

Total 100 100% 

Religion Frequency Percentage 

Islam 21 21% 

Christianity 79 79% 

Traditional Worshippers - - 

Total 100 100% 

Part Two: Research Questions 

Does Insurgence Exist In Nigeria Frequency Percentage 

Yes 89 89% 

No 11 11% 

Total 100 100% 

Has Boko Haram Insurgency Affected You Directly Or Frequency Percentage 



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Indirectly 

Yes 85 85% 

No 15 15% 

Total 100 100% 

Has Boko Haram Insurgency Negatively Affected 

National Security In Nigeria 

Frequency Percentage 

Yes 78 78% 

No 22 22% 

Total 100 100% 

Is Illiteracy, Unemployment And Poverty Responsible 

For Boko Haram Insurgency 

Frequency Percentage 

Yes 87 87% 

No 13 13% 

Total 100 100% 

Is Corruption,Bad Governance 
And Weak Institutional Framwork The Cause Of Boko 

Haram Insurgency 

Frequency Percentage 

Yes 90 90% 

No 10 10% 

Total 100 100% 

Is Religious And Political Manipulations An Indication 
Of Boko Haram Insurgency 

Friquency Percentage 

Yes 79 79% 

No 21 21% 

Total 100 100% 

If Religious And Political Manipulations Is 
Minimized,It Will Reduce Boko Haram Insurgency 

Frequency Percentage 

Yes 86 86% 

No 14 14% 

Total 100 100% 

Does The Long And Porous Borders,Vast Forest And 

Deserts In Nigeria Promote Boko Haram Insurgency 

Frequency Percentage 

Yes 92 92% 

No 8 8% 

Total 100 100% 

If Security Is Beefed Up Around The Borders And 

Deserts,Will It Reduce Boko Haram Insurgency 

Frequency Percentage 

Yes 79 79% 

No 21 21% 

Total 100 100% 

Has The Federal, State And Local Government, Done 

Enough To Reduce Boko Haram Insurgency 

Frequency Percentage 

Yes 12 12% 

No 88 88% 

Total 100 100% 

Has Security Operatives And Security Agencies Done 

Enough To Reduce Boko Haram Insurgency 

Frequency Percentage 

Yes 14 14% 

No 86 86% 

Total 100 100% 

Should The Fight Against Boko Haram Insurgency Be 

Left For The Security Agencies And Security 

Operatives Alone 

Frequency Percentage 



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Yes 1 1% 

No 99 99% 

Total 100 100% 

If The General Populace Are Educated On The Need 

And Importance Of Security And Security 

Consciousness At All Times,Will Reduce Boko Haram 

Insurgency 

Frequency Percentage 

Yes 98 98% 

No 2 2% 

Total 100 100% 

Source: Field survey. 

 

 

 

 

 

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