




































American International Journal of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences  

Vol. 1, No. 2; 2019 

ISSN 2643-0061   E-ISSN 2643-010X 

Published by American Center of Science and Education, USA 

 

17 

 

 

Social Cohesion and Cultural Diversity in Contemporary Britain: Impossible 

Mission! 
 

 

Hassen Zriba PhD 

Assistant Professor 

University of Gafsa, Tunisia 

E-mail: hassen_zriba@yahoo.fr 

 

 

 

Abstract 

In contemporary multicultural Britain, the concept of social cohesion has been a pressing priority for not only 

politicians and sociologists but also for the various British ethnic minorities. Race riots like those of 2001 in 

Northern Britain and the events of 7/7 in London (2005) put into question the allegiances of different British ethnic 

populations. They equally shed light on the real or perceived lack of social and cultural communication between the 

established British host population and the British ethnic and immigrant communities. Hence, social cohesion came 

to the fore as the new jargon of governance in contemporary Britain.This article analyzes on the concept of social 
cohesion and its applicability within an officially declared multicultural community like that of Great Britain. The 

concept will be reviewed, defined and approached from different liberal political perspectives (Robert Dahl’s 

pluralist approach and Arend Lijphart’s consociationalism to the more recent Will Kymlicka’s group-differentiated 

citizenship) while paying special attention to the British context. Bhikhu Parekh’s conception of the different 

theoretical approaches to the issue of social cohesion that are pertinent to liberal capitalist societies in general and 

the British context, in particular, is investigated. The aim of this study is to highlight the complexity of the 

normative accounts of the political scientists regarding the challenges that face multicultural Britain in coming to 

terms with its endeavour of creating “unity within diversity”.  The 2002 White Paper and security speech of David 

Cameron (2011) political discourses are analyzed and evaluated to decipher how they understood national identity in 

relation to cultural diversity and social cohesion.   

Keywords: Social Cohesion, Diversity, British Ethnic Minorities, Race. 

1. Introduction 

Generally speaking, social cohesion is one of the most fundamental concepts in sociology. In fact, all sociologists 

dealt with this concept from their diverse and different perspectives. Thus the ultimate task of sociology has been 

considerably dominated by the idea of how societies cohere, and what factors help construct social and societal 

harmony and cohesion. For example, Emile Durkheim was concerned with how society coheres through what he 

called mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity. In his landmark, The Division of Labour in Society (1893) 

Durkheim distinguished between two types of solidarity which he considered as important concepts in organizing 

societies and keeping them functional. He argued that there was no such social contract that did not rest on a 

common and generally shared normative value system (Durkheim, 1964: 209-214). 

The same is for other sociologists such as Max Weber (1997), Auguste Comte (1976), Talcott Parsons (1971) and 

many others. Within functional sociology, society is perceived as a group of individuals who maintain a degree of 

social solidarity and mutual expectations. To secure such solidarity and fulfil each other’s expectations, society is 

conceived as composed of multiple communities that are linked together by some shared societal and political 

values. Even conflict-based theories of social relations such as Marxism, though stressing the inevitability of 

struggle and conflict, postulate the need for a certain consensus to preserve communitarian ties and social cohesion. 

If Marxists refuse the capitalist system, it is simply to replace it with an alternative system (allegedly a socialist 

one). However, such a socialist and communist society has to be cohesive from within in order to succeed as a 

system. There must be a value consensus that secures plausible degrees of harmony and cohesion. In this section, I 

try to define the concept of social cohesion. The different conceptions of the issue will be churned out. Also, the 



www.acseusa.org/journal/index.php/aijhass         American International Journal of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences          Vol. 1, No. 2; 2019 

 

18 

 

 

British theoretical tradition will be prioritized. I argue here that the British experience is, in many respects, unique in 

its broaching of social cohesion problematic. As will be clarified later, the concept has been elusive or to use one 

commenter’s phrase a “quasi-concept” (Bernard, 2000: 3). It has been used with many different modifiers which 

stress the fact that it meant many things to many people; Is it social cohesion, community cohesion or even national 

cohesion? 

Arguably, different modifiers reflect different ideological assumptions and value orientations. Generally, the British 

theorists and officials prefer to use the modifier “community” (Worley, 2005). One major question is: what are the 

terminological differences between the above-mentioned modifiers of the headword “cohesion”. Another question is 

whether such terminological differences convey categorical and absolute ideological propensities.  

I want to suggest in this article that social cohesion-although it can be easily related to other non-ethnicity related 
phenomena like generation gap, class system, globalization etc- has often been invoked in relation to ethnicity and 

race relations: what I propose to name “the ethnicisation or racialisation of social cohesion”. Within the classical 

sociological theory, when the issue of social cohesion is invoked, it is usually related to class relations. Individuals 

are classically and simplistically divided into distinctive social classes depending on their economic positions in 

society. Classical liberal thought was basically interested in individual natural rights the most important of which 

was the economic pursuit of happiness. When the radical politics of Marxism came to the stage, they asked for a 

redistribution of wealth according to egalitarian and socialist criteria. Class conflict was envisaged as the inevitable 

outcome of such a new utopian vision. The victim of such conflicts would be social cohesion which was 

theoretically expounded as the need to share compatible and harmonious values and world views.  Functionalist 

conceptions of the social system reflected (and perhaps constructed) a need to reach a consensus based on the 

acquiescence and consent of the majority of the population; a kind of social contract that would set up and preserve 
the rules of the game. Such a consensus would be the basis of a common value system and of a socio-political safety 

valve against the social deviant values.  

However, the advent of mass immigration into post-colonial western countries posed new challenges to liberal 

thought and added new dimensions to the traditional conflict theories. The class thesis seems to have been relegated 

to a subordinate position vis-à-vis race thesis. The social conflicts have been read as cultural and racial conflicts. 

There seems to be a racialisation of social boundaries and an ethnicisation of the rhetoric of governance. The class-

based social conflict has been largely replaced by a race-related one. The vertical class struggle is substituted by a 

horizontal racial one. The contemporary discourses of cohesion in Western democracies in general and in Britain, in 
particular, are replete with images of ethnic minorities as sources of striking value differences and hence a challenge 

to the social cohesion. In Britain, the adoption of the phrase “community cohesion” highlights the myth that Britain 

is a community that needs cohesion. The choice of the modifier “community” stresses, I believe, the ethnic 

dimensions of such official discourses.    

This article is divided into two parts. In the first one, I will review the various approaches to the concept of social 

cohesion from Robert Dahl’s pluralist approach, Arend Lijphart’s consociationalism to the more recent Will 

Kymlicka’s group-differentiated citizenship. In general, all those theories tried to normatively offer diagnoses and 

solutions to the problem of the lack of social cohesion. Each of those theories provided a distinctive, though in many 
respects controversial, paradigm. The second part contextualizes the theoretical approaches to social cohesion within 

the relevant British tradition.  However, it is vital to define the concept in question so as to highlight its controversial 

and multi-dimensional aspects.   

2. The definitional problematic of social cohesion 

The concept of social cohesion has been defined differently by different political theorists and sociologists. The 

definitions of the concept are, to use James Moody and Douglas R. White’s phrase “often vague and difficult to 

operationalize” (2003:103). It is an all-encompassing quasi-concept as Paul Bernard suggested above.  

Moody and White believe that the concept lacks adequate scientific rigour. In order to make the concept analytical, 

they distinguished what they called the ideational and the relational aspects of social cohesion. They spoke about 

relational togetherness and a sense of togetherness (ideational) which they considered two different components of 

social cohesion. Such theoretical categorization was also expressed by Mark Mizruchi when he distinguished 
between the “shared normative sentiments” (ideational) and “objective characteristics of the social structure” 

(relational) of the concept of social solidarity (Mizruchi, 1992). The conflation between the ideational (subjective) 



www.acseusa.org/journal/index.php/aijhass         American International Journal of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences          Vol. 1, No. 2; 2019 

 

19 

 

 

and the relational (objective) aspects of social cohesion “limits our ability to ask questions about how a relational 

component of solidarity affects or is affected by ideational factors” (Moody and White: 106). Thus, such analytical 

distinction, I believe, would make it easier to deal with social cohesion as a mental concept as well as a social 

relation. Being a social relation, social cohesion could be empirically measured through various social structures and 

institutions. Consequently, cohesion becomes more than a subjective attitude and unfolds as a lived experience. The 

absence of relations between members of the same community is thus a symptom of the lack of cohesiveness.         

For the concern of this paper, I adopt Jane Jenson’s definition which is considered as a synthesis of different 

sociological traditions, namely that of Alexis De Tocqueville and Emile Durkheim as well as contemporary ones 

(Stanley, 2003). The definition of Jenson has also been borrowed by the British authorities in order to theoretically 

inform their politics of community cohesion. In the table below, Jenson introduced the major theoretical traditions 

and theorists that broached the issue of social cohesion: 

Box 1 

Three Theoretical Traditions 

Social Cohesion Theories 

(examples: Durkheimian and Parsonian social theory, Tories) 
Social order results from interdependence shared loyalties and solidarities. 

Classical Liberalism 

Social order results from private behaviour in private institutions such as markets. 

•  Tocquevillian Liberalism 

(examples: Tocquevillian social and political theory, Putnamian social capital) 

Social order results from private behaviour in private institutions such as markets, families and social networks. 

Democracy Theories 

(examples: social democracy, Christian democracy, positive liberalism) 

Social order – and change – results from active democratic government guaranteeing a basic measure of 

economic equality and equity. 

 

Source: Jenson’s Mapping Social Cohesion: The State of Canadian Research (p12)  

Jenson identified five dimensions of the concept of social cohesion. They are stated in binary oppositions; she shows 

what helps social cohesion and what hampers it. The binary oppositions are as follows: 

Recognition / rejection,  

Belonging/isolation, 

Legitimacy / illegitimacy,  

Participation / non-involvement, 

Inclusion / exclusion (Jenson, 1998: VI) 

Those five dimensions refer to different types and degrees of involvement. The first two oppositions 

(recognition/rejection and belonging/isolation) refer to social involvement. The other two (legitimacy/illegitimacy 

and participation/non-involvement) tackle the issue of political involvement while the last (inclusion/exclusion) 

designates economic involvement. The value of equality in the distribution of social resources and benefits looms 

large in creating and maintaining social cohesion. Dick Stanley wrote: “If society fails to distribute its social 

outcomes equitably, social cohesion deteriorates and social outcomes suffer (2003: 8). Hence, social cohesion is 

rather a “reciprocal function of equality” (8) which enhances the values of cooperation and solidarity. For 

cooperation to succeed there should be the willingness and also the capacity to cooperate. Willingness and capacity 
are two concepts governed by two different but complementary processes. Willingness emanates from a sense of 

belonging that propels individuals to cooperate. However, capacity is an objective ability based on the politics of 

empowerment to give free and equal access to socioeconomic opportunities so that individuals are empowered to 



www.acseusa.org/journal/index.php/aijhass         American International Journal of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences          Vol. 1, No. 2; 2019 

 

20 

 

 

cooperate. The two processes have to coexist to fulfill successful cooperation and thus secure social cohesion. 

Willingness (desire) without capacity (ability) or vice versa will hinder cooperation and undermines social cohesion. 

Stanley expressed such formula when he stated: “Social cohesion then is the sum over a population of individuals' 

willingness to cooperate with each other without coercion in the complex set of social relations needed by 

individuals to complete their life courses”. (Stanley, 2003:9).   Jenson acknowledges the difficulty to define the 

concept. She wrote: “… definitional efforts are rare, however. It is much more common to deploy the term rather 
than to define it, to treat it as if “it goes without saying.” (1998: 5). However, she argued that interdependence and 

interrelatedness of the five dimensions make up the basic components of the whole social cohesion agenda. She 

stated: “The literature on the social economy hypothesizes that improving one dimension of social cohesion 

(inclusion) depends on coupling it with another dimension (participation). The two together will then generate 

stronger feelings of belonging and citizenship.” (30). Jenson warns that the belief that “shared values” are the 

defining features of social cohesion has to be taken with caution. She insists that a stronger version of shared values 

cohesion can stifle the idea of social cohesion itself. She urges to differentiate between those values that have to be 

shared and those that can be confined to certain minorities or social groups. Jenson commented: “We must know 

more precisely the consequences of these differences for social cohesion. This means knowing which values must be 

shared and which can differ without threatening the capacity to engage in “developing a community.” (31). In her 

treatment of social cohesion, Jenson moves on to introduce what she called a “research agenda” that has to be 

followed by the future researchers in order to effectively address the social cohesion problematic. The table below 
charts the different research questions that have to be researched:   

Box 2 

The Role of Institutions in Recognising Diversity and 

Developing a Community of Shared Values 

A Research Agenda: 

1. What are the consequences, if any, of existing differences in values? Which differences matter and which are 

the inevitable – even desirable – manifestation of Canada’s multinational and polyethnic history? 

2. Which values must be shared and which can differ without threatening the capacity to engage in “developing 

a community”? 

3. Which kind of institutional practices reinforce each of the dimensions of social cohesion? Which practices, if 

any, weaken social cohesion? 

4. Do public institutions of representation have the capacity to mediate conflicts of value and recognise the 

contributions of all citizens, no matter their ethnic, cultural or socio-economic circumstances? 

5. Does sufficient institutional space exist for participation, or have governments, parties, and others effectively 

closed down discussion about priorities and collective choices in order to get on with their own projects? 

Source: Jenson’s Mapping Social Cohesion: The State of Canadian Research (p32). 

Kenneth Bollen and Rick Hoyele suggest the same definition of the concept of social cohesion or what they 

“perceived cohesion”. Their definition is based on the need of belonging and membership to a certain community. 

They wrote:  

“Perceived cohesion encompasses an individual's sense of belonging to a particular group and his or her feelings of 

morale associated with membership in the group” (italics in the original) (Bollen and Hoyele, 1990: 482).   

Within the British context, the Commission on Integration and Cohesion (CIC), which was set up in August 2006, 

had the mission of deepening the understanding of community cohesion politics and provide the practical 

approaches and procedures to apply those politics locally. It provided a list of the features of the aspects and 

characteristics of cohesive communities. Below is what is necessary to diagnose any community as cohesive:   

        “1. Equality of opportunity, access, treatment, and services  

2. Engagement and participation 

3. Respect for diversity and social trust 



www.acseusa.org/journal/index.php/aijhass         American International Journal of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences          Vol. 1, No. 2; 2019 

 

21 

 

 

4. Meaningful interaction across groups 

5. Solidarity and collective community action”. (Commission on Integration and Cohesion, 2007: 20) 

In general, the discourses of the British version of social cohesion resorted to Jane Jenson’s model to identify the 

politics of involvement as the organising concept of post-2001 race riots politics of community cohesion. Jane 

Jenson suggested above a research agenda on social cohesion. What comes next is a consideration of how the 

concept has been conceptualized and perceived by the various western liberal approaches, notably Robert Dahl’s 

pluralism, Arend Lijphart’s consociationalism and finally Will Kymlicka’s group-differentiated or multicultural 

citizenship.  

2.1 Liberal approaches to social cohesion  

As stated above, this section will identify and review the major approaches of the concept of social cohesion within 

liberal democracies, from three distinctive perspectives; Robert Dahl’s pluralist approach and Arend Lijphart’s 

consociationalism to more recent Will Kymlicka’s group-differentiated citizenship.  

2.1.1 Liberal pluralism 

I start with the pluralist tradition best epitomized by the writings of the American political scientist Robert Dahl as 

well as the writings of other sociologists such as Edward Shils and Michael Mann. The theory of political pluralism 

of Robert Dahl has been very influential in explaining the nature of the post-war American liberal society in 

particular and other western democracies in general. Dahl’s monumental books (such as A Preface to Democratic 

Theory in 1956 and Who Governs? Democracy and Power in An American City in 1961) were influential in 
theorizing the liberal socio-political pluralism. Dahl’s theory of political or interest-group pluralism has been 

employed by scholars to explain how minorities (national or cultural) co-exist and thrive while respecting each 

other’s differences.  

Dahl wanted to show that pluralist America was governed neither by a socio-political oligarchy nor by the rule of 

the majority. For him, along with other pluralists, the American society was to be governed by delicate and ever-

changing balances of powers and interests. Dahl believed that constitutional rights could not be an effective 

guarantee to minorities. He wanted to protect those minorities from what Alexis De Tocqueville termed “the tyranny 
of the majority”. He wrote “(I)n the absence of certain social prerequisites, no constitutional arrangements can 

produce a non-tyrannical republic” (Dahl, 1956 neither: 83). Thus the social pluralism in which each group is 

engaged in a dynamic process of negotiation with other groups, along with the freedom of association for 

individuals, would result into a common framework that allows groups as well as individuals to advance their 

agendas and get their rights recognized. Consequently, no group is dominant in all or most domains. Decision-

making is a continual process of negotiation and compromise. There should be social coalitions, or what Antonio 

Gramsci would call “historic block”, in which the rights and duties of the all are protected, recognized and advanced 

in the public realm. A system of checks and balances would be the outcome of such pluralism. The mosaic nature of 

each majority would hinder it from being a tyrant. The internal diversity of interests within such a majority would 

propel and secure a culture of negotiation and compromise.  Dialogue would be the norm to solve any conflict of 

interests.  

Expounding the nature of liberal democracies, Dahl argued: “if there is anything to be said for the process that 

actually distinguished democracy…from dictatorship, it is not discoverable in the clear-cut distinction between 

government by a majority and a government by a minority. The distinction comes much closer to being one between 

government by a minority and government by minorities (italics in the original) (Dahl, 1956: 133).  

The government in a pluralist society is neutral and theoretically unbiased to any group at the expense of other 
groups. There was a shift from simple majoritarian representative governments “towards a unanimity-rule basis (in 

which only proposals with which everyone agrees can be implemented)” (Dunleavy, 1981: 202). Thus no 

concentration of power is permitted and the pluralist government has to make special arrangements to prevent the 

translation of economic power into political power such as recruiting specialist personnel with no overlap with 

business. Also, powerful business interests can be checked and thus balanced by powerful trade unionism. The 

society that emerges out of the classical or conventional pluralism is one “in which there are multiple (plural) 



www.acseusa.org/journal/index.php/aijhass         American International Journal of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences          Vol. 1, No. 2; 2019 

 

22 

 

 

centres of power, and one in which the ordinary citizen can intervene relatively easily and effectively” (Dunleavy, 

1981: 202).  

However, the question is how social cohesion is achieved in the liberal pluralist approach. This could be attained in 

different ways. First, social groups are perceived as dynamic and overlapping, their interests intersect and 

intermingle. This simply means that the structure of such groups is ever-changing according to the specific agendas 

advanced by the individuals who make up such groups. Individuals can move to and fro, and vacillate between 

different coalitions according to their interests and strategies. The efficacy and even the survival of coalitions are 

governed by the extent of their success in advancing certain interests. Individuals who fail on certain fronts are 

likely to succeed in others. This multiple and fluid nature of membership is a safeguard against persistent and 

chronic failure or marginalization.  

Theoretically, no group is excluded and marginalized from public governance. Pluralist politics would make all 

groups and individuals belong to the wider community and enjoy a degree of inclusion and participation. Back to 

Jenson, those concepts constitute the bulk and core of the concept of social cohesion itself. Being included in the 

system and given a constant opportunity to participate in the public decision-making urges social actors to be loyal 

and committed to the system, and thus consensus and social cohesion are kept intact. Moreover, according to Dahl, 

social cohesion is secured by the citizens’ adherence to a democratic creed or what Edward Shils calls the “central 

value system”.  There must be a general consensus over what it means to be a part of the system or rather the 

compliance to the general “rules of the democratic game”. A common value system is to be upheld by all members 

of the community. No inclusion in the American community is allowed without a sincere adherence to the general 

democratic values such as the “freedom of speech”, “freedom of religion” and “democracy”. To reject such values is 

thus equal to rejecting being a member of such a liberal pluralist community. Without broaching the variants in the 
liberal pluralist tradition, social cohesion is secured by the specific and dynamic nature of the liberal pluralist society 

as imagined by liberal pluralists; a publicly plural and dynamic society in which (at least theoretically) all groups 

and individuals can advance, to differentiated degrees, their interest-based agendas. The dynamic and coalitional 

nature of such society secures and is secured by a considerable degree of “checks and balances”. Also, the mobility 

and openness of the system render all members capable to seek for new social and political alliances to avoid being 

consistently, constantly and systematically marginalized. One can be excluded from one opportunity, but included in 

another. Importantly, no cohesion is tenable without being a member of the community whose values one has to 

agree on. Such pluralist and organic nature of liberal pluralism is the core of the consensus theory and social 

cohesion within liberal western democracies in general and America in particular. Plurality, belonging, mobility and 

commitment have been paramount concepts in liberal democracies and also guarantees the social consent and 

cohesion. Dahl’s promotion of shared and common values as an indispensable trigger of social cohesion is also 

reflected in Shils’ “central value system”.  

Edward Shils believed that every society has a centre which imparts the dominant values. Such an abstract system of 

values is a social and political need for social actors. He argued that “The existence of a central value system rests, 

in a fundamental way, on the need which human beings have for incorporation into something which transcends and 

transfigure their concrete individual existence” (Shils, 1981: 244). From his macro-social perspective, Shils 

postulated the existence of a central value system which is clearly hegemonic. However, he argued that the gap 

between the central values and the periphery is not such wide. Central values are vulnerable and subject to 

opposition and at least to negotiation from various social agents. The consensus that emerges from such central 

value system is not a perfect one and is permeable to different sets of oppositional values and interests. Even such a 
value system is “neither unitary or homogenous” (248) yet consensus and social cohesion are proffered by its 

“ideological potentiality” (243). The centre’ ideological potentiality bestows the dominant values with a sense of 

“sacredness” and defines the norms and the roles for the rest of society.  

Michael Mann was interested mainly in the extent to which different classes-and by analogy, different ethnic 

groups- in liberal societies internalize norms, values, and beliefs which legitimate the social order. He extensively 

reviewed the value consensus-related sociological literature and concluded that even in well-integrated and cohesive 

liberal societies, like the United States and Britain, an absolute “value-consensus” did not exist. He identifies two 
types of consensus: dominant consensus and deviant consensus. The relationship between these two binary value 

systems is dialectical. However, it remains vital to explain why the dominant value system succeeded in holding 

together the conflicting elements in a generally accepted consensus. Mann opts for the Marxist perspective to 

account for social cohesion and liberal consensus. He explains the role played by manipulative socializing agencies 



www.acseusa.org/journal/index.php/aijhass         American International Journal of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences          Vol. 1, No. 2; 2019 

 

23 

 

 

such as education and mass media in disseminating dominant values across various social groups. Confining his 

arguments within the class thesis, Mann argues that the working classes develop a pragmatic role acceptance since 

they envision no appropriate and reliable alternative to the dominant liberal value system. Also, the lack of internal 

cohesion within the lower classes keeps them subordinate to the more coherent and cohesive capitalist oligarchy. He 

wrote: “A significant measure of consensus and normative harmony may be necessary among ruling groups, but it is 

the absence of consensus among lower classes which keeps them compliant” (Mann, 1981: 265). Hence, in a sense, 
the elements of conflict within lower classes can be powerful sources of consensus and social cohesion.  

Dahl, shells, and Mann, though differing in their perspectives, attempted to investigate and answer one major 

sociological question: How could liberal societies manage social and cultural differences (even conflicts) and secure 

a necessary degree of consensus which is indispensable for social cohesion? All of them stressed the importance of 

having shared common values and norms which would facilitate social cooperation and demote socio-cultural 

fragmentation.  However, no values can be common without being relevant and responsive, at least theoretically, to 

the needs and interests of all community members. Issues of participation, belonging and power-sharing are so vital 

in maintaining and creating social cohesion because “only those actually sharing in societal power need develop 
consistent societal values” (Mann, 1981: 263).                                                          

2.1.2 Consociationalism 

Consociationalism is a political normative theory that tries to deal with the issue of social cohesion within deeply 

culturally and ethnically divided societies. The theory was developed by the political scientist Arend Lijphart in his 
seminal article “Cultural Diversity and Political Integration,” (1971). Terminologically, the term Consociationalism 

is derived from the root word “consociation” which is composed of two items: the prefix “con-“and the word 

“sociation”. Lexically, the concept “consociation” means the coexistence of different societies each of which is 

separate from the others, but exist side by side and have specific relations.  

Consociational democracy is, according to Lijphart, a combination of “autonomy” and “power-sharing” within 

deeply segmented societies. He wrote that there was an agreement “that the successful establishment of democratic 

government in divided societies requires two key elements: power-sharing and group autonomy. Power sharing 
denotes the participation of representatives of all significant communal groups in political decision making, 

especially at the executive level; group autonomy means that these groups have authority to run their own internal 

affairs, especially in the areas of education and culture.” (Lijphart, 2004: 96). 

The lack of certain socio-cultural homogeneity is deemed as a grave problem for the process of democratization. 

However, what antagonistic social groups need to share in a consociational democracy is a respect to the rules of the 

democratic game. Each group “interacts” with other groups through representatives who are supposed to be 

competent and professional members of those segmented communities.  Within the British context, what is generally 

referred to as “ethnic community leaders” can be considered as an example of consociational arrangements. The 
local authorities in Britain tend to negotiate with those leaders whenever an ethnicity-related issue is under 

consideration. For instance, the outbreak of ‘race riots’ of 2001 in some northern British cities was an opportunity 

which local authorities and police used to negotiate with Muslim community leaders certain arrangements for 

violence appeasement and curtailment. Such practice validates Lijphart claim that what he and other consociational 

theorists did was simply to academically study what politicians had already invented many decades before the 

official appearance of the theory of power-sharing democracy or consociationalism.   

Consociationalism, unlike other comparative political theories, does not require social or cultural homogeneity. The 

difference is respected but it is confined to specific pillars. That is no cultural or social group is to impose its world 
view and ways of life on others. There is nothing called the influence of the dominant culture in the political sharing 

of power. The theory is meant to deal with a society in which no or few memberships cut across socio-cultural and 

ethnic cleavages. In a consociational society, power is shared cooperatively between the different segments of the 

society in question. For the theory to work effectively, Lijphart suggested that consociational democracies are 

characterized by four major features: grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportionality and mutual veto 

(Lijphart, 1977). Without delving into the details of those features, it is sufficient to show how they are related, and 

above all how they contribute to the ethnocultural conflict management. And so, they result in social cohesion. 

Being divided into different socio-cultural segments, consociational society respects such segments and allows for 

cooperation between their representatives: the elites. Each segment or pillar is proportionally represented in the 

governing oligarchy which prevents a situation of majoritarian dominance and tyranny. Moreover, mutual veto 



www.acseusa.org/journal/index.php/aijhass         American International Journal of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences          Vol. 1, No. 2; 2019 

 

24 

 

 

creates a balance of interests and guarantees each pillar’s security. Consociational democracy is thus built upon 

collaboration rather than competition.  Answering our question on the difference between majoritarian democracy 

(pluralist one like that advocated by Robert Dahl) and consociational democracy, Lijphart affirmed that “ [t]he 

difference between majoritarian and consociational systems is not that one is elitist and the other is not, but that 

majoritarian systems have competitive elites and consociational systems have cooperative elites” (Lijphart, 2007).  

Social cohesion is thus the outcome of the cooperation and collaboration between the different representative elites. 

It is also achieved by discouraging mass interaction and permitting minorities to make their own decisions for their 

communities. It seems that consociationalism breeds a sense of segmental self-determination and propels a strategy 

of avoidance between ethnically and culturally divergent communities. However, it is necessary to emphasize that 

consociationalism, like other theories of democracy, is a solution to a specific problem. It is an option taken within 

severely fragmented societies to manage conflict and secure a satisfactory level of social cohesion.     

2.1.3 Multicultural Citizenship 

“How far is the theory of differentiated citizenship successful in providing an appropriate political framework for 

liberal democratic states like Britain to sustain an acceptable degree of community cohesion?” 

Such a question has been the concern of sociologists of race relations and urban studies in many western countries 

which have sizable ethnic minorities. One of the most distinguished sociologists that tackled such issue was the 

Canadian sociologist Will Kymlicka. A basic concern for Kymlicka has been how to attain a balance between the 

particular needs of minorities and the universal need for social cohesion.  The aim was to reconcile the liberal norms 

of equality and justice with the multicultural character of the modern multicultural societies. Kymlicka believes that 

classical liberalism with its stress on state neutrality in the liberal society is not tenable. Such neutrality is ultimately 

in favour of the dominant majority. The values and symbols of the majority tend to be popularized and represented 
as the values and symbols of the whole society. The result is marginalizing the cultural values of national and ethnic 

minorities. Liberal citizenship, being rested on such cultural definition of membership, is likely to cast minorities as 

second class citizens or even “denizens”. Sticking to the rule of the democratic game, the state will inevitably 

uphold the values of the dominant culture as the norm and any different value systems will be delineated as deviant. 

Citizens will, consequently, obtain unequal differentiated positions vis-à-vis the concept of citizenship. Kymlicka 

tried to rework the relationship between the theory of liberalism and group rights. In Liberalism, Community, and 

Culture (1989), he represented the liberal view of the community and showed how the values of the community and 

those of the individual can be compatible. However, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, 

which he wrote in 1995 was a landmark in the political sociology. Kymlicka dealt in his book with the issues of 

multiculturalism and theorized how it is possible to incorporate the diverse values of different communities within 

the framework of liberal thought. He introduced the idea of differentiated citizenship in order to recognize the 

specific needs of minorities. His multicultural citizenship includes specific measures that integrate the values and 
cultures of minorities into the mainstream culture. However, Kymlicka divides minorities into two different 

categories with different measures of integration: poly-ethnic minorities and national minorities. Poly-ethnic 

minorities, in order to integrate, require rights like civic education, training in the official language, anti-

discrimination laws, and cultural recognition. National minorities require another set of rights such as language 

rights, special representation and in some cases self-determination. Those specific rights, it is thought, would 

promote minorities’ integration into and membership of mainstream society which would aid and encourage social 

cohesion.  Avigail Eisenberg wrote: “the values and identity of group-differentiated citizenship are not meant to 

conflict with the particular ethnic or national identities of minority groups, but rather to encompass or include them” 

(Eisenberg, 2002).  Social cohesion is thus achieved within this paradigm by having minorities’ values and cultural 

identities recognized and accommodated. Also, such recognition is to be sustained by relevant socioeconomic and 

political arrangements of the integration of minorities into the mainstream. If given such rights and measures, 
minorities are expected to share with the mainstream majority an identity that values diversity while accepting the 

need for social cohesion. 

3. British ethnicity-related politics 

“Secure border-safe haven”, was the official understanding of how to broach the increasingly multicultural nature of 

the early 21th century British society. That issue became the wisdom of the day since the events of race riots in some 

northern British cities alarmed the national government to the possible dangers that national identity and social unity 



www.acseusa.org/journal/index.php/aijhass         American International Journal of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences          Vol. 1, No. 2; 2019 

 

25 

 

 

might be facing. With the increasing number of immigrants and their offspring along with their demands of socio-

cultural and economic rights, multiculturalism has become the new ideology of governance at the end of the 20th 

century and beyond. The race riots of Bradford, Oldham, and Burnley of 2001 were symptomatic of an urgent need 

to contain and respond to new multicultural demands in order to avoid socio-cultural conflicts, and hence the 

eradication of social cohesion 

Suffering from various types of disadvantages, the British ethnic minorities, and notably, the second and third 

generations, demanded citizenship rights with specific multicultural sensitivities. Ethnic minorities have been 

suffering from what is generally perceived as “institutional racism” which was spectacularly detected in the 

notorious case of the police investigation and conduct in response to the murder of the black teenager, Stephen 

Lawrence. Based on the behavior of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), William Macpherson defined the 

concept of institutional racism as: 

The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because 

of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes, and behaviour 

which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist 

stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people. (Macpherson, 1999, p. 28) 

The Macpherson Report was produced in 1999 and affirmed the ethnic fears of a biased and institutionally racist 

government. Such incidence had a cumulative effect on the behavior of ethnic minorities’ teenagers who went 

violent.   

The successive British governments, whether Labour or Conservative, have been aware of such inherent and 

underlying ethnic wrath. They employed different discourses that attacked multiculturalism and opted for the 

alternative politics of cultural diversity. Two outstanding speeches framed the early race related discourses in 

contemporary Britain both politically and ideologically. Those political discourses are the white paper of the British 

Home Secretary David Blunkett (2002) and the speech of Prime Minister David Cameron (2011). I do not argue 

here that these two discursive discourses are exclusive in their relevance and importance, yet, it is suggested that 

they were, in many respects, foundational of a new and direct rejection of multiculturalism as a political ideology 
while they opted for an alternative cultural diversity agenda. Such agenda encourages multiculturalism as a lived 

(every day) experience that champions cultural diversity and plurality without sacrificing national cohesion and 

unity. The same agenda, arguably, delineates the cultural contours that would sustain a “consensual” national 

identity considerably compatible with the hegemonic constructions of the British “imagined community” to use 

Benedict Anderson expression.     

3.1 The Blunkett White Paper and the new British “pure” identity 

A few months after the national events of Bradford and other British cities and the international attacks of 

September 2001, a new White Paper was produced in February 2002 as a response to the real or perceived dangers 

ushered by them. The Paper attempted to prove that social cohesion can be sustained by the consolidation of a 

national identity that embraces certain dominant common values. Even before the production of the 2002 White 

Paper, David Blunkett expressed his conviction that no social cohesion is possible without core values and a 

considerable degree of “cultural conformity”. In an interview with the Sunday, he declared that: “If we are going to 

have social cohesion we have got to develop a sense of identity and a sense of belonging” (Brown, 2001). What the 

Home Secretary suggests is that the lack of national identity and a sense of belonging within ethnic minorities is the 

ultimate trigger of social and cultural divisions. The cure is then a higher dose of culture; this time mono-culture not 

“multi-culture”. In the same vein, the White Paper, as its very title suggests, asked for the need to control 
immigration in order to facilitate integration and make cultural diversity fruitful rather than destructive. The 

document is replete with references to immigrants’ numbers and statistics. 

One major goal of the Paper is to propel the cohesion-oriented political and social agenda. It states that the 

“Government sets out our key objectives for the development of citizenship and nationality policy. To ensure social 

integration and cohesion in the UK” (Secure Borders, Safe Haven, p 10). To reach this target, immigration has to be 

controlled since it was deemed as the cause of increasing social disharmony. The same message is voiced all over 

the document. On page 20, it states that: “… (the government)  will develop … (its)  citizenship and nationality 
policy to create a supportive, safe and cohesive community”, and again, this could be possible only if immigrants 

and the borders are controlled in the best possible ways. The conclusions already reached by the Cantle Report 



www.acseusa.org/journal/index.php/aijhass         American International Journal of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences          Vol. 1, No. 2; 2019 

 

26 

 

 

(2001) are confirmed by Blunkett’s document. He even builds his arguments on them. The Cantle Report identified 

residential segregation and the lack of ethnic communication as the most crucial cause of the race riots. The same is 

implied in Blunkett’s White Paper, yet importantly a direct link is constructed by Blunkett between the need for core 

national identity and social cohesion and the immigration-related policies. While the Cantle Report focuses on 

ethnic minorities within, the White Paper concentrates on the potential ones without. An equilibrium is sought by 

Blunkett between the need to avoid ethnocentrism and the must of sustaining, if not, creating social cohesion. Nira 
Yuval-Davis wrote that: “Blunkett is trying hard not to be ethnocentric and to embrace the cultural and ethnic 

diversity of British citizens, although he constructs this diversity as a result of immigration of outsiders and a basic 

unavoidable problematic that resulted from this” (2004:226).  That was the challenge that the White Paper and, in 

fact, all the British government had to cope with: making the two ends meet; diversity and cohesion.  

3.2 David Cameron and the failure of State Multiculturalism 

Multiculturalism is thought to be the cause of the cultural stagnation and the lack of intercultural communication. 

Different researchers and politicians declared even the death of multiculturalism and they affirmed that social 

cohesion and genuine cultural diversity were victimized by the officially adapted and adopted multiculturalism. In 

February 2011, the British Prime Minister David Cameron gave a speech at the Munich Security Conference in 

Germany. He outlined what he deemed as the failures of ‘state multiculturalism’ in British society.  

Cameron believed that the old official policies of multiculturalism sowed the seeds of segregation and interethnic 
enmity. There was a genuine lack of communication between the British mainstream society and its ethnic 

minorities, notably Muslim ones. This attitude confirmed the findings of the 2001 Cantle Report, which identified 

residential and cultural segregation as the major cause of the 2001 race riots in Britain.  So, the segregation of the 
mainstream British community was the trigger of extremism and violence. And social cohesion is the victim. 

Cameron stated:  

“But these young men also find it hard to identify with Britain too, because we have allowed the 

weakening of our collective identity.  Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have 

encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the 

mainstream.  We’ve failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong.  

We’ve even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to 

our values. (2011)  

As early as 2002, the British political writer Arun Kundnani declared the death of multiculturalism and argued that 

multiculturalism as a political ideology failed to respond to the needs of both the host British society and ethnic 

minorities as well. What the ideology of multiculturalism did was at best to keep the status quo and at worse to 

worsen it. Kundnani wrote that “Multiculturalism became an ideology of conservatism, of preserving the status quo 

intact, in the face of a real desire to move forward” (2002). Equally, Cameron declared the failure of what he called 

“the doctrine of state multiculturalism”. State multiculturalism, thus, encouraged separatism in all walks of life. It 

stifled the common sense of belonging to a national shared identity. Consequently, it created patches of “ethnic 

niches” that were mutually exclusive. Here, I would refer to the increasing power of what came to be called 

“community leaders” who enjoyed considerable influence on their respective communities. Yet, arguably, those 

leaders were representative of the British state in their communities. Thus, there seemed to be no direct contact 

between various ethnic minorities and mainstream society. Crucially, there was no real contact between ethnic 
minorities themselves. They seemed to lead “parallel lives” within their “comfort zones” (Zriba, 2014).  Britain 

turned out to be a patch of different separate ethnic communities (white ethnicity is included as well) with no real 

sense of belonging or clear identity attachments.  Seemingly, Britain was nearer to the consociationalist approach of 

social cohesion than the pluralist or multicultural citizenship one. However, as stated above, consociationalism is an 

option available to the multinational states; states with different national communities, not ethnic communities. 

Maybe, it is theoretically immature or irrelevant to the British case to speak about “ethnic consociationalism” where 

different ethnic communities resort to community leaders to reach consensus on tricky problematic issues so that to 

create and sustain social cohesion. But, real instances of cultural and social bargaining have been noticed between 

community leaders and British authorities which may bestow certain credibility to the claim that Britain leads a 

specific race-related model of “ethnic consociationalism”.  



www.acseusa.org/journal/index.php/aijhass         American International Journal of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences          Vol. 1, No. 2; 2019 

 

27 

 

 

Cameron refused such “ethnic consociational” arrangements and suggested that the British ethnic population, 
notably the young, needed to belong to the mainstream culture and adopt the values of the British national 

community. He stressed the failure of state multiculturalism to broach some illiberal cultural practices of ethnic 

communities such as the South Asian tradition of “arranged marriages”. Accordingly, ethnic cultures seemed to 

represent “states within the state” and endangered not only the British national identity but the possibility of social 

cohesion itself. The inability of the second and third generations of the ethnic population to identify with both their 
homelands’ cultural traditions and be fully accepted by the British mainstream “imagined community” alienated and 

marginalized them. “And this all” Cameron argued “leaves some young Muslims feeling rootless.  And the search 

for something to belong to and something to believe in can lead them to this extremist ideology” (Ibid). To avoid 

this alienation and to fight against the socio-cultural disintegration, and increasing terrorism, Cameron states that “it 

is time to turn the page on the failed policies of the past”. He adds “second, instead of encouraging people to live 

apart, we need a clear sense of shared national identity that is open to everyone” (Ibid). It is obvious that the 

commonness and sharedness of a national identity are the clue to the British ethno-racial and security-related issues. 

In fact, this renewed belief in and reinvigoration of the discourses of the nation and the myth of the common 

national origin have always been present in the British rhetoric of governance with different pitches and paces in 

accordance with and in response to the zeitgeist of the day.   

4. Conclusion 

Community cohesion or social cohesion has been the political jargon that has dominated British politics at the onset 

of the twenty-first century. It is the direct outcome of real or perceived threats to the “homogeneity” of the British 

national culture given the increasing national and global challenges that the nation-state has been facing. Arguably, 

the worry about social cohesion is not novel in British society, yet, I argue that with the intersection of different 

“anti-statist factors” such as multiculturalism, devolution, and globalization, it has become a pressing need to respect 

and maintain what Nira Yuval-Davis (2004) called the “holy trinity”: state, territory, and people. The social 
cohesionist agenda is thus concerned with how to make sure that the British citizens-whatever their ethnicity was- 

would keep their allegiances to the British state. Both Blunkett and Cameron voiced such concerns and thought that 

social cohesion and unity can be achieved only when Britishness-in its very basic definition - is sustained and 

fostered.  

References 

Bernard, P. (2000) Social Cohesion: A Dialectical Critique of a Quasi-Concept? SRA. Strategic Research and 

Analysis, Department of Canadian Heritage, Ottawa: English translation of Bernard, Paul (1999) “La 

cohésion sociale: critique dialectique d’un quasi concept,” Lien social et politique – RIAC: numéro 41, 
printemps 1999: 47-59.  

Blunkett, D. (2002)  Secure Borders, Safe Haven. White Paper. Home Office, London.  

Bollen, K and Hoyele, R. (1990) “Perceived Cohesion: A Conceptual and Empirical Examination”, Social Forces, 

Vol. 69, No. 2, pp. 479-504, published by University of North Carolina Press. 

Brown,  C. (2001) “'If we want social cohesion we need a sense of identity'” Sunday, 9 December. 

Cameron, D. (2011)” PM's speech at Munich Security Conference” 

(https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference), accessed on 30 

May 2016.  

Cantle, T. (2001) Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team, London: Home Office. 

Clarke, T. (2002) Report of the Burnley Task Force. Burnley: Burnley Local Council. 

Comte, A. (1976) Auguste Comte: The Foundation of Sociology, Michigan:  Nelson Edition, University of 
Michigan. 

Dahl, R. (1956) A Preface to Democratic Theory, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 

Denham, J. (2002) Building Cohesive Communities: A Report of the Ministerial Group on Public Order and 

Community Cohesion, London: Home Office. 

Dunleavy, P. (1981) “Alternative theories of liberal democratic politics: the pluralist-Marxist debate in the 1980’s” 

in Potter, D et al. (1981) Society and Social Sciences, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd: London.   

Durkeim, E. (1964) The Division of Labour in Society, Free Press: New York. 

Eisenber, A. (2002) “‘Pluralism, Consociationalism, Group-Differentiated Citizenship and the Problem of Social 

Cohesion”. University of Victoria: Victoria, British Columbia, Canada.  

(http://www2.arts.ubc.ca/cresp/plurpap.pdf) (Accessed on 10/01/2008) 



www.acseusa.org/journal/index.php/aijhass         American International Journal of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences          Vol. 1, No. 2; 2019 

 

28 

 

 

Gordon, P. (1990) “A Dirty War: The New Right and Local Authority Anti-Racism”, in Ball, W. and Solomos, J. 

Race and Local Politics, London: Macmillan.   

Jenson, J. (1998)  Mapping Social Cohesion: The State of Canadian Research (Ottawa: CPRN F-03).  

(http://www.cprn.org/documents/15723_en.pdf), accessed on 13/05/2008. 

Kundnani, A. (2001)“From Oldham to Bradford: the violence of the violated”, in Race and Class, 43, 2: 105-131: 

Institute of Race Relations. 
Kundnani, A. (2002)“ The death of multiculturalism” Institute of Race Relations. (http://www.irr.org.uk/news/the-

death-of-multiculturalism/), accessed on 12 April 2016.  

Kymlicka, W.( 1989)  Liberalism, Community and Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  

Kymlicka, W.   (1995)Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University 

Press.  

Lester, A. (1998) “From Legislation to Integration” in Blackstone, T., Parekh, B. and Sanders, P., Race Relations in 

Britain: a developing agenda. London: Routledge. 

Lijphart, A. (1971) “Cultural Diversity and Political Integration,” Canadian Journal of Political Science IV:1 

(March) 1-14. 

Lijphart, A.  (2004) “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies”, Journal of Democracy, Volume 15, Number 2, 

pp 96-109. 

Lijphart, A. (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, Yale University Press: New 
Haven, CT. 

Malik, K. (2001) “The trouble with multiculturalism”. Spiked-Politics Online,  

(http://www.spiked-online.com/articles/00000002D35E.htm) Accessed on 02/06/2008. 

Malik, K. (2002) “Against multiculturalism », New Humanist 

(http://www.kenanmalik.com/essays/against_mc.html).  Accessed on 15/8/2008. 

Malik, K. (2006) “multiculturalism and the road to terror”, handelsblatt, 3 January 

(http://www.kenanmalik.com/essays/muslims_handelsblatt.html) accessed on 20/11/2008. 

Mann, M. (1981) “The Social Cohesion of Liberal democracy” in Potter, D et al (1981). Society and Social 

Sciences, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.   

Mizruchi, M. (1992) The Structure of Corporate Political Action. Cambridge, MA and London, England: Harvard 

University Press.  
Moody, J. White, D. (2003) “Structural Cohesion and Embeddedness: A Hierarchical Concept of Social Groups”, 

American Sociological Review, Vol. 68, No. 1. (Feb. 2003), pp. 103-127. 

Ouseley, H. (2001) Community Pride not prejudice, Bradford: Bradford Vision.  

Parekh, B. (2000a) 'Defining British national identity', Political Quarterly, 71, pp. 4-14. 

Parekh, B. (Ed) (2000c) The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, London: The Runnymede Trust. 

Parsons, T. (1971) The System of Modern Societies, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.  

Pilkington, A. (2003) Racial Disadvantage and Ethnic Diversity in Britain,  London: Palgrave Macmillan. 

Ritchie, D. (2001) Oldham Independent Review, Oldham: Oldham Local Council.  

Shils, E. (1981) “Center and periphery” in Potter, D et al (1981). Society and Social Sciences, Routledge and Kegan 

Paul Ltd: London.   

Stanley, D. (2003) “What Do We Know about Social Cohesion: The Research Perspective of the Federal 

Government’s Social Cohesion Research Network”, Canadian Journal of Sociology, Vol.28 No. 1, Special 
Issue on Social Cohesion in Canada. (Winter, 2003), pp. 5-17.    

Weber, M. (1997) The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, New York: Free Press. 

Worley, C. (2005) ‘It’s not about race. It’s about the community’: New Labour and ‘community cohesion’, Critical 

Social Policy Ltd 0261–0183 85 Vol. 25(4): 483–496; London: Sage Publications. 

Yuval-Davis, N. (2004) “Borders, Boundaries and the Politics of belonging” in May, S., Modood T., and Squires, J.  

Ethnicity, Nationalism and Minority Rights, London: Cambridge University Press.  

Zriba, H.(2014) “Representation of “Ethnic Residential Segregation” in British Post-2001 Race Riots National 

Reports”, European Journal of Academic Essays 1(3): 20-27. 

 

Copyrights  

Copyright for this article is retained by the author(s), with first publication rights granted to the journal. This is an 

open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution license 

(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). 

 

http://www.kenanmalik.com/essays/against_mc.html
http://www.kenanmalik.com/essays/muslims_handelsblatt.html

