Pa ge 1 Pa ge 37 American Journal of Arts and Human Science (AJAHS) Review of Russia-Africa Cooperation in Diplomacy, Trade Relations & Security William Dishon Warigon1, Omodot Udim Idiong1*, Yang YiLin1, Agwu Chudi Joseph1, Uche George Omerenma1, Nweke Edunna Daniel1, Chia Faith Ngufan1, Gladys Ossai1, Gabriel Tobiloba Abioye1 Volume 4 Issue 2, Year 2025 ISSN: 2832-451X (Online) DOI: https://doi.org/10.54536/ajahs.v4i2.4528 https://journals.e-palli.com/home/index.php/ajahs Article Information ABSTRACT Received: February 06, 2025 Accepted: March 11, 2025 Published: April 15, 2025 Russia’s growing involvement in Africa over the past two decades reflects a strategic push to expand its geopolitical, economic, and security influence on the continent. Drawing on historical ties from the Soviet era, Russia has positioned itself as a key partner for African nations, offering military assistance, counter-terrorism cooperation, and peacekeeping support. Key findings highlight Russia’s significant role as a leading arms supplier to Africa, accounting for nearly 40% of the continent’s arms imports between 2018 and 2022. Additionally, the deployment of private military contractors (PMCs), such as the Wagner Group, has become a hallmark of Russia’s security strategy, enabling it to project power while maintaining plausible deniability. The 2019 Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi marked a turning point, symbolizing Moscow’s commitment to deepening ties with Africa, resulting in numerous bilateral agreements and increased diplomatic engagement. Economically, Russia has focused on energy projects, such as nuclear power plants and gas collaborations, though its trade volume remains modest compared to other global powers. These efforts align with Russia’s broader strategy to counter Western influence, secure access to natural resources, and position itself as a reliable partner for African governments facing security challenges. This paper examines the evolution of Russia-Africa relations, focusing on security cooperation, and assesses its implications for regional stability and global geopolitics. Keywords African Sovereignty, Economic Diplomacy, Geopolitical Strategy, Peacekeeping, Russia-Africa Relations 1 Department of Theory and History of International Relations, Patrice Lumumba Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (RUDN), Moscow, Russia * Corresponding author’s email: omodotudim@gmail.com INTRODUCTION Russia’s ties in Africa have significantly increased over the past two decades, driven by geopolitical, economic, and security considerations. Historically, Russia’s relations with Africa date back to the Soviet era, when Moscow supported anti-colonial movements and established strong military ties with African nations as part of its ideological struggle against the West (Legvold, 1970; Shubin, 2004). In recent years, Russia has re-emerged as a strategic security partner, offering military assistance, counter-terrorism cooperation, and peacekeeping support. The resurgence of Russia’s interest in Africa is part of a broader strategy to reassert its global influence, particularly in regions traditionally dominated by Western powers. After the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia’s presence in Africa diminished as the country focused on internal reforms (Stronski, 2019). However, under President Vladimir Putin, Russia has sought to reclaim its role as a global power, with Africa becoming a key arena for this ambition. The 2019 Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi marked a turning point, symbolizing Moscow’s renewed commitment to the continent and its intention to expand influence through security cooperation (Korendyasov, 2020). In 2006, Russian President Vladimir Putin made an official visit to the Republic of South Africa, a move later followed by his successor, Dmitry Medvedev, who traveled to Egypt, Angola, Nigeria, and Namibia in 2009. Russia’s diplomatic dealing with Africa intensified significantly after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, when Western sanctions prompted Moscow to pursue new geopolitical alliances and economic opportunities actively. Since then, numerous high-ranking Russian officials, including Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, and Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, have made frequent visits to various African nations. These efforts have resulted in the signing of numerous bilateral agreements spanning military, economic, and security cooperation and the cancellation of billions of dollars in African debt (Droin & Dolbaia, 2023). However, unlike most Western and European powers historically, Russia does not have a negative colonial experience with African countries, either politically or economically. On the contrary, it has contributed to supporting national liberation movements in some of them. Thus, Russia has built a base of trust with Africa which could pave the way for further future cooperation (Balytnikov et al., 2019). This legacy of anti-colonial solidarity has laid a strong foundation for contemporary Russia-Africa security partnerships, fostering trust and mutual respect. Many African nations view Russia as a reliable partner that respects their sovereignty and offers an alternative to Western-dominated security frameworks (Pham, 2010). For example, Russia’s historical support for Nigeria during the Biafran War (1967–1970) established a lasting relationship that continues to thrive today (Matusevich, 2003). Similarly, Algeria’s strategic partnership with Russia, rooted in their shared history during the Algerian War of Independence, has evolved into a robust collaboration encompassing military, economic, and energy cooperation (Mousli, 2019). These Pa ge 38 https://journals.e-palli.com/home/index.php/ajahs Am. J. Arts Hum. Sci. 4(2) 37-43, 2025 historical ties provide a unique advantage for Russia in its current dealings, enabling it to build on a legacy of trust and shared goals. These efforts align with Moscow’s broader foreign policy objectives, including countering Western influence, securing access to natural resources, and positioning itself as a reliable partner for African governments facing security challenges (Issaev et al., 2021). Russia’s security cooperation with African nations is multifaceted, encompassing military partnerships, counter-terrorism initiatives, and peacekeeping operations. Hence, this paper examines Russia-Africa security cooperation by simplifying their relations in recent times. MATERIALS AND METHODS This study employs a qualitative analysis of Russia-Africa cooperation, drawing on historical records, bilateral agreements, and recent developments in diplomatic, economic, and military relations. The analysis is based on a review of scholarly articles, government reports, and news sources, focusing on key events such as the Russia-Africa Summits, arms deals, and the deployment of PMCs. The study also examines Russia’s counter- terrorism initiatives and peacekeeping efforts, assessing their impact on regional stability and Russia’s broader geopolitical objectives. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION The result and discussion area will focus on three key aspect which are Diplomatic Engagement and Multilateral Forums, Economics and Trade Relations and Military and Security Cooperation. Diplomatic Engagement And Multilateral Forums Russia’s ties with Africa date back to the Cold War, when the Soviet Union provided military, economic, and ideological support to African liberation movements and post-independence governments (Droin & Dolbaia, 2023). After the Soviet Union’s dissolution, Russia’s involvement with Africa declined due to internal crises but began to revive in the mid-2000s. The country’s dealing with Africa gained momentum with President Vladimir Putin’s 2006 visit to South Africa and subsequent high- level diplomatic missions by Russian officials, including Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and Western sanctions further accelerated Russia’s outreach to Africa as it sought new diplomatic and economic partners (Droin & Dolbaia, 2023; Ferragamo, 2023). Russia has played a key role as a mediator in African political conflicts, notably in the Central African Republic (CAR). In September 2018, Russia brokered a secret peace meeting in Khartoum between the Christian Balaka Militia and the Muslim Seleka faction, resulting in a joint commitment to peace (Dabanga, 2018). Later that month, under Russian initiative and with Sudanese support, CAR’s armed groups signed an agreement outlining principles for peace and security, praised by Russian envoy Konstantin Shuvalov as a step toward stability (Russia Today, 2018). The African Union endorsed the Khartoum Declaration, leading to a peace deal in February 2019 (Sudan Tribune, 2018; Sky New Arabia, 2019). Diplomatically, Russia strengthened ties through high-level visits, including Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s trips to South Africa and Rwanda in June 2018, and Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev’s visits to Angola, South Africa, and Algeria later that year (Stronki, 2019). President Vladimir Putin also attended the 2018 BRICS Summit (Munusamy, 2018). Between 2015 and 2019, 12 African heads of state visited Moscow, and the Russian Duma hosted African delegations in July 2019 (Stronki, 2019). A key milestone was the inaugural Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi in 2019, which emphasized Moscow’s intent to strengthen ties with the continent. The summit co-hosted by President Vladimir Putin and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, marked a significant milestone in Russia-Africa relations. Attended by 43 African heads of state, the summit led to several treaties and agreements, including partnerships with the African Union (Clifford, 2021). Similarly, the second summit in 2023, held despite Western sanctions and the Ukraine conflict, attracted 17 African heads of state and resulted in agreements on security, economic cooperation, and debt relief (Droin & Dolbaia, 2023). Russia has used these diplomatic efforts to secure African support in international forums, particularly at the United Nations. Many African nations have abstained from or opposed UN resolutions condemning Russia’s actions in Ukraine, reflecting Moscow’s success in building political goodwill across the continent (Ferragamo, 2023). As Pham (2010) notes, the Soviet Union played a pivotal role in supporting African liberation movements and newly independent states during the Cold War, providing military aid, training, and ideological backing. In recent years, Russia also funds different educational and cultural exchange opportunities in the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields to support the Kremlin’s soft power efforts in Africa (Droin & Dolbaia, 2023). This legacy of anti-colonial solidarity has laid a strong foundation for contemporary Russia-Africa security partnerships, fostering trust and mutual respect. Economic And Trade Relations Russian-African trade grew from 9.9 billion in2013 to 9.9 billion in 2013 to 17.7 billion in 2021, with Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco as key partners (Droin & Dolbaia, 2023). Despite Russia’s growing diplomatic presence, its economic involvement with Africa remains modest compared to China, the United States, and the European Union. Russian trade and investment in Africa have grown significantly, particularly in the Maghreb, Egypt and Sudan (Paczyńska, 2020). Russia primarily exports grain, coal, refined petroleum, and arms to Africa, while importing agricultural products like fruits and sugar. A key economic strategy has been Russia’s focus on grain Pa ge 39 https://journals.e-palli.com/home/index.php/ajahs Am. J. Arts Hum. Sci. 4(2) 37-43, 2025 exports. After withdrawing from the Black Sea grain deal in 2023, Moscow pledged to supply free grain to select African nations, positioning itself as a critical player in Africa’s food security. Grain exports hold significant importance in Russia’s trade relations with Africa, as nearly 30 percent of the continent’s grain supplies originate from Russia. Moscow’s primary trade partners in the region are North African nations, particularly Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco, which collectively account for around 67 percent of Russia’s total trade with Africa. Russia primarily exports wheat, coal, refined petroleum, and electronics to these countries, while importing agricultural products such as fruits, sugar, and vegetables in return. This trade dynamic underlines the strategic economic ties between Russia and key African nations (Droin & Dolbaia, 2023). Additionally, Russian state-owned companies, including Rosneft, Gazprom, and Rosatom, have expanded their presence in Africa’s energy sector. Rosatom, for instance, is constructing Egypt’s first nuclear power plant and has signed agreements with other African countries to develop nuclear energy infrastructure (Elbassoussy, 2022; Kohnert, 2022). For instance, in summer 2022, it received permission from an Egyptian regulator to start building Egypt’s first nuclear power plant, based on the 2017 agreement signed between President Putin and President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. The plant is expected to become fully operational by 2030 (Droin & Dolbaia, 2023). These efforts reflect Russia’s broader strategy to expand its influence in Africa through economic diplomacy. For example, Russia’s strategic energy agreements with Algeria, where Gazprom and Sonatrach (Algeria’s state gas company) have collaborated on gas projects, highlight the potential for mutually beneficial partnerships (Katz, 2007). The 2019 Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi highlighted Moscow’s commitment to deepening economic ties, resulting in numerous trade agreements and a pledge to increase bilateral trade beyond its current annual volume of approximately $20 billion (Issaev et al., 2023). In Mozambique, Russia’s involvement in combating insurgency has been linked to its interest in outmaneuvering French energy projects, such as the Total LNG initiative. This demonstrates how Russia’s security cooperation can also pave the way for economic collaboration, benefiting both parties (Sukhankin, 2019). Additionally, Russia’s partnerships in the nuclear energy sector, particularly with countries like South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia, shows its commitment to supporting Africa’s development goals while securing access to critical resources (Weiss & Rumer, 2019). More recently, Alrosa, Russia’s top diamond mining company, has expanded its operations in Angola, Congo, and Zimbabwe. These efforts reflect Russia’s broader strategy to expand its influence in Africa through economic diplomacy (Guensburg, 2022; Droin & Dolbaia, 2023). RUSAL, a leading global aluminum producer, operates bauxite mining in Guinea, while Nord Gold conducts mining activities in six African countries, including Burkina Faso and Guinea (Baobab, 2019). Uralchem, specializing in phosphate production, is active in southern Africa, particularly Zambia and Zimbabwe. Additionally, Norilsk Nickel, known for nickel and palladium mining, operates in South Africa and Botswana (Baobab, 2019). Military And Security Cooperation Russia has significantly strengthened its military and security ties with African nations through arms deals, security training, and the deployment of private military companies (PMCs), most notably the Wagner Group. Between 2018 and 2022, Russia accounted for approximately 40% of Africa’s arms imports, surpassing competitors such as the United States and China (Ferragamo, 2023). Key recipients of Russian arms include Algeria, Egypt, Mali, Sudan, and the Central African Republic (CAR). These arms deals are often accompanied by defense agreements that include training programs and technical support, further solidifying Russia’s military ties with African nations (Droin & Dolbaia, 2023). Russia’s military cooperation extends beyond arms sales to include training programs, joint exercises, and the deployment of military advisors. For example, in the Central African Republic (CAR), Russia has provided military training and equipment to the national army, helping to stabilize the country after years of civil war (Issaev et al., 2023). Similarly, in Mozambique, Russian PMCs have been involved in training local forces and combating insurgent groups in the Cabo Delgado region (Sauer, 2019). These partnerships are often framed as part of Russia’s broader strategy to combat terrorism and promote stability in Africa, but they also serve to enhance Moscow’s geopolitical influence on the continent. Goumıdı (2023) further emphasizes that Russia’s historical ties with Africa provide a unique advantage in its current and future endeavors. Many African nations view Russia as a reliable partner that respects their sovereignty and offers an alternative to Western-dominated security frameworks. In countries like Nigeria, Russia has signed agreements on military cooperation, counter-terrorism, and maritime anti-piracy, demonstrating its commitment to addressing Africa’s security challenges (Hedenskog, 2018; Abdu & Ching, 2021). Additionally, Russia’s naval base in Sudan and its agreements to build military bases in Mozambique, Madagascar, and other strategic locations highlight its efforts to secure key maritime routes and enhance Africa’s maritime security (Ersozoglu, 2021). Private Military Contractors (PMCs) The use of PMCs, such as the Wagner Group, has become a hallmark of Russia’s military cooperation in Africa. These companies operate in a legal gray area, allowing Russia to project power without the formal commitment of state forces. PMCs have been deployed in several African countries, including Libya, Sudan, and Mali, where they provide security services, train local forces, and protect Russian economic interests (Rácz, 2020). The Wagner Group, now rebranded as the Africa Corps Pa ge 40 https://journals.e-palli.com/home/index.php/ajahs Am. J. Arts Hum. Sci. 4(2) 37-43, 2025 Figure 1: Key Countries of Russian Security Operations Source: CRS, from U.S. government statements and news reports. under the control of Russia’s military intelligence agency (GRU), has played a pivotal role in countries such as Mali, CAR, and Sudan. These deployments are often framed as part of Russia’s “military-business model,” where security services are exchanged for access to natural resources and strategic influence (Congressional Research Service, 2025). However, the mutiny and subsequent death of Wagner’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in 2023 have raised questions about the future of Russian PMC operations in Africa (Ferragamo, 2023). Arms Sales and Defense Agreements Russia has emerged as a leading supplier of weapons to African nations, accounting for nearly half of the continent’s arms imports between 2015 and 2020 (Wezeman, 2022). Russia ranks second after the USA in terms of arms exports; during 2014–2018, with the country’s exports of arms, which constituted 21%of global exports (Wezeman et al., 2019). Major recipients include Algeria, Egypt, and Angola, with exports ranging from fighter jets to missile systems (Wezeman et al., 2021). These arms transfer not only bolster the defense capabilities of African nations but also serve as a strategic tool for Russia to deepen its influence on the continent. Russia’s no-strings-attached approach to security cooperation, which avoids conditions related to governance or human rights, makes its military assistance particularly attractive to authoritarian regimes seeking to maintain internal stability (Elbassoussy, 2022). This approach has enabled Russia to build alliances and secure access to strategic resources in exchange for security services (Droin & Dolbaia, 2023). Mathew & Moolakkattu (2022) highlight the strategic value of Russia’s military partnerships, particularly in regions such as the Horn of Africa, where Russia has supported the establishment of naval bases and other infrastructure. These initiatives not only enhance Africa’s maritime security but also contribute to regional stability by safeguarding critical trade routes and combating piracy. From small arms to advanced combat systems, Russia’s arms sales are often accompanied by training programs, technical assistance, and the establishment of maintenance facilities. Table 1: Russia-Africa Military Agreements Country Year Signed Nature of Agreement Algeria 2018 Arms sales, training Egypt 2019 Defense cooperation Sudan 2020 Military base talks Central African Republic 2021 PMC deployments Mali 2022 Counter-terrorism aid Counter-Terrorism Initiatives Russia’s counter-terrorism initiatives in Africa aligns with historical precedents set during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union provided military and ideological support to African nations fighting colonial and imperialist forces (Legvold, 1970). However, contemporary Russian involvement is less ideologically driven and more focused on securing strategic and economic interests. Counter- terrorism has become a central pillar of Russia’s security cooperation with Africa, particularly in regions plagued by extremist groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al- Shabaab in Somalia, and Islamic State-affiliated factions in the Sahel. Russia has positioned itself as a key partner in Africa’s fight against terrorism, offering military assistance, intelligence sharing, and training programs to African nations (Kohnert, 2022). Russia’s counter- terrorism initiatives include the provision of military equipment, intelligence-sharing, and the deployment of private military companies (PMCs). In Nigeria, Russia has supplied helicopters, armored vehicles, and other military hardware, alongside training Nigerian security forces in counter-terrorism tactics (Fahaum Network for Social Justice, 2020). Similarly, in Mali, Russian PMCs and military advisors have supported the government’s efforts to combat jihadist groups (Issaev et al., 2023). Pa ge 41 https://journals.e-palli.com/home/index.php/ajahs Am. J. Arts Hum. Sci. 4(2) 37-43, 2025 For instance, in Mozambique, Russian mercenaries and military hardware were deployed to assist the government in fighting jihadists and insurgents in the Cabo Delgado province though their effectiveness has been mixed (Issaev et al., 2023). This collaboration not only helped stabilize the region but also opened doors for future economic and political partnerships, including the prospect of a Russian naval base in the country (Sukhankin, 2019). Similarly, in Mali, Russia’s deployment of private military contractors effectively replaced French troops, marking a significant shift in the regional security landscape and demonstrating Russia’s ability to address complex security challenges (Ersozoglu, 2021). Russia’s counter-terrorism efforts are framed as part of its broader strategy to combat extremism and promote stability. However, they also serve to enhance Moscow’s influence in regions where Western powers have traditionally dominated. By positioning itself as a reliable partner in the fight against terrorism, Russia has been able to build alliances with African governments and gain access to strategic resources, such as oil, gas, and minerals (Stronski, 2019). Furthermore, this cooperation strengthens Russia’s diplomatic ties with African nations, increasing its leverage in international forums like the United Nations (Kohnert, 2022). Duursma & Masuhr (2022) highlights the effectiveness of Russia’s counter- terrorism efforts, particularly its ability to offer tailored solutions that address the unique security challenges faced by African nations. Russia’s approach emphasizes respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs, making it a preferred partner for many African governments Peacekeeping Efforts Russia’s involvement in peacekeeping in Africa is a complex and often contentious aspect of its security cooperation. While Russia has contributed personnel to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions, its reliance on private military companies (PMCs) and bilateral cooperation complicates its role as a peacekeeper. Russia has participated in UN peacekeeping missions, albeit on a limited scale. For example, Russian military observers have been deployed to missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and South Sudan, where they have supported ceasefire monitoring and peace processes (United Nations, 2020; Elbassoussy, 2022). These contributions have reinforced Russia’s image as a reliable security partner. Russia’s peacekeeping efforts are closely tied to its broader strategic and economic objectives. By supporting African-led peacekeeping initiatives and deploying military advisors, Moscow gains diplomatic goodwill and strengthens its influence in key regions. For example, in CAR, Russian military advisors have enhanced Moscow’s role as a mediator in the country’s ongoing conflict (Issaev et al., 2023). However, this strategy allows Russia to maintain flexibility. Goumıdı (2023) suggests that Russia’s peacekeeping contributions are motivated by a desire to enhance its international reputation and demonstrate its commitment to global stability. However, the study notes that Russia’s involvement in peacekeeping is often overshadowed by its more prominent role in arms sales and military partnerships. Discussion Russia’s growing involvement in Africa over the past two decades reflects a strategic push to expand its geopolitical, economic, and security influence on the continent. Drawing on historical ties from the Soviet era, Russia has positioned itself as a key partner for African nations, offering military assistance, counter-terrorism cooperation, and peacekeeping support. The 2019 Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi marked a turning point, symbolizing Moscow’s commitment to deepening ties with Africa, resulting in numerous bilateral agreements and increased diplomatic engagement. Russia’s historical support for anti-colonial movements has fostered trust and mutual respect, enabling it to build on a legacy of shared goals and solidarity. Economically, Russia’s trade with Africa has grown, particularly in energy projects such as nuclear power plants and gas collaborations. However, its trade volume remains modest compared to other global powers. Russia primarily exports grain, coal, refined petroleum, and arms to Africa, while importing agricultural products. Russian state-owned companies like Rosatom and Gazprom have expanded their presence in Africa’s energy sector, reflecting Moscow’s broader strategy to secure access to natural resources and strengthen economic ties. In the realm of security, Russia has emerged as a leading arms supplier to Africa, accounting for nearly 40% of the continent’s arms imports between 2018 and 2022. The deployment of private military contractors (PMCs), such as the Wagner Group, has become a hallmark of Russia’s security strategy, enabling it to project power while maintaining plausible deniability. These PMCs have been involved in training local forces, combating insurgent groups, and protecting Russian economic interests in countries like the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, and Mozambique. Russia’s counter-terrorism initiatives and peacekeeping efforts have further solidified its role as a reliable security partner, particularly in regions plagued by extremist groups. However, challenges remain. Russia’s economic footprint in Africa is still limited, and its reliance on PMCs raises concerns about accountability and long-term stability. While Russia’s security cooperation has contributed to regional stability, it is often viewed as driven by strategic and economic interests, complicating its role as a neutral peacekeeper. Moving forward, Russia’s collaboration with Africa is poised to grow, particularly in security and energy cooperation. To sustain its influence, Russia must balance its strategic interests with a commitment to transparent and mutually beneficial partnerships, ensuring that its involvement contributes to long-term stability and development in Africa. CONCLUSION Russia’s growing role in Africa highlights its strategic Pa ge 42 https://journals.e-palli.com/home/index.php/ajahs Am. J. Arts Hum. Sci. 4(2) 37-43, 2025 efforts to reassert global influence, particularly in regions traditionally dominated by Western powers. Based on historical ties and offering security partnerships that emphasize sovereignty and non-interference, Russia has established itself as a reliable partner for many African nations. Key achievements include significant arms sales, the deployment of PMCs, and counter-terrorism initiatives that have strengthened Russia’s geopolitical standing. However, challenges remain. Russia’s economic footprint in Africa is still limited compared to China, the United States, and the European Union, and its reliance on PMCs, such as the Wagner Group, raises concerns about accountability and long-term stability. While Russia’s counter-terrorism and peacekeeping efforts have contributed to regional security, they are often viewed as strategic and economic interests, complicating its role as a neutral peacekeeper. Russia’s involvement in Africa expands global influence, but its success will depend on addressing these challenges and fostering more sustainable and transparent partnerships. Future Prospects Looking ahead, Russia’s collaboration with Africa is poised to grow, particularly in the areas of security and energy cooperation. The increasing demand for military equipment and counter-terrorism support in Africa presents opportunities for Russia to expand its arms sales and PMC deployments. Economically, Russia’s focus on energy projects, such as nuclear power plants and gas collaborations, could strengthen its ties with key African nations, but it will need to compete with other global powers to secure a larger share of Africa’s emerging markets. Diplomatically, Russia’s ability to maintain African support in international forums, such as the United Nations, will depend on its continued emphasis on mutual respect and non-interference. However, the ethical and political implications of its security strategies, particularly the use of PMCs, could pose reputational risks. 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