

## **The Future of the Arab Spring in Postnormal Times**

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To understand how the Arab Spring may evolve over the coming years, we have to understand its specific context. The “revolutions” across the Middle East are not just a product of discontent and fury against dictatorships; after all, the Arabs have been raging against their rulers for well over half a century. The Arab Spring is also a creation of a particular period of time, a time in which globalization, interconnection, and instant communication are the norm, and authority and political legitimacy are in flux. It is a period of uncertainty, ambiguity, chaotic behavior, and rapid change that I have elsewhere described as “postnormal times.”<sup>1</sup> Moreover, as Nader Hashemi has observed, “the Arab Spring is not a single event but rather a long-term *process* of political change. Its precipitating factors were both political and economic; and while history has yet to render its ultimate judgment, fundamental questions remain about how best to understand the nature, character, and trajectory of Arab revolts.”<sup>2</sup> I contend that we need to grasp the context of postnormal times, which served as a catalyst for the Arab revolts and within which the long-term process of political transformation is taking place, to comprehend the dynamics of the Arab Spring and anticipate its trajectory.

To appreciate the reality of contemporary times, it is important to realize that the problems of the Arab state, indeed the problems of all societies, national as well as international, are complex. The politics of a democracy, the questions of economic reforms, the hopes and aspirations of a diverse and pluralistic society, the stubbornness of entrenched institutions such as the police and the military, are all complex issues that do not have simple or straightforward answers. Complexity is enhanced by the fact that all such problems

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are interconnected, have a direct bearing on each other, occur simultaneously, and can rapidly acquire a global dimension. Hence nothing can be solved in isolation, and little can be hidden from the global gaze. Interconnected, complex problems often generate positive feedback. Things multiply quickly, and change is rapid and occurs in geometric proportion. Thanks to mobile phones, blogs, e-mails, 24-hour news media, Facebook, and Twitter, we are constantly in the know. Citizens are thus primed to react instantly, equipped with the means to set off new patterns of chain reactions. Under such circumstances, governance in emerging democracies is a formidable challenge.

Complex, interconnected problems often lead to chaos. The important point to note about chaos is that small differences and perturbations in any political or economic system can make a big difference and lead us to what is known as “the edge of chaos.” This phenomenon is popularly described as the “butterfly effect”: the flap of a butterfly’s wings in Brazil sets off a tornado in Texas.<sup>3</sup> A handful of bankers can bring down the entire global financial system, a disease in a remote village can become a global pandemic in a matter of days, and a vegetable vendor can start a revolution that quickly crosses national boundaries and spreads throughout the region. In postnormal times, a handful of individuals have tremendous potential to generate chaotic behavior.

Apart from chaos and complexity, which are interlinked and feed on each other, there is a third characteristic of postnormal times: contradictions. There are obvious contradictions around us that have been there for some time, such as the disparity between rich and poor within and among nations, the desire to preserve local culture while enjoying the financial benefits of globalization, and the fact that certain segments of society and culture are going through unprecedented change while other aspects of social life remain quasi-static. But in postnormal times they become magnified and more visible. Such times also generate their own contradictions: the contradictory aspirations of various groups within a highly diverse and pluralistic society; the demand for instant solutions to pressing problems, such as unemployment, when real solutions require long-term policies and effort; and the quest for certainty during a period when uncertainty is the norm. In general, contradictions cannot be resolved; they have to be transcended.

So the Arab Spring is a product of a time of globalization, complexity, chaotic behavior, contradictions, and rapid change. It owes its initial success to the underlying dynamic of this state of affairs. New democracies have emerged within the environment of postnormal times, the in-between period when old orthodoxies are dying, new ones have yet to be born, and very few

things seem to make sense. Whether these new democracies succeed or fail depends on how well they navigate the turbulence of postnormal times. And the Arab Spring provides us examples of both: states that are likely to succeed and states that will probably fail.

To appreciate the special character of postnormal times, it is worth comparing them with what we may call “normal time” – that is, the time before the Arab Spring. In normal times, a generalized acceptance of the existing distribution of power and the hierarchy of interests is maintained. There may be a corrupt dictator at the top, but most people know their position in relation to power. Normal times are not without dissent or dissatisfaction, including attempted rebellions, but change is overwhelmingly accepted as working through and with the way things are. The political and social compact that holds society together is the acceptance that the vested interests and power holders, however corrupt and greedy, will ultimately do something for the nation and the common good. Indeed, some of them actually did. Therefore, the powers that be and the hierarchical order of things are the basis from which a better future is envisioned and the premise on which a society directs its efforts to realize the future.

In normal times, a rich mythology underpins the popular understanding and support for society and economy. This mythology may glorify the army or the “nation”; it may even be based on a dissenting vision of an alternative ideology that will, one day, usher in a utopia, such as the notion of an “Islamic state” based on the Shari‘ah. There are caveats and escape clauses that allow for imperfections in the governing system; however, such caveats do not undermine collective belief in and acceptance of the national narrative. Mythological underpinnings also create the most sought-after luxury of normal times: time. Things may be difficult and rulers may be oppressive, but there is some confidence that problems will eventually be sorted out given ample time.

In postnormal times, there is no luxury of time: liberated from the shackles of a dictator and with rising hopes and expectations, citizens demand immediate attention to their problems and urgent solutions. But attempts to meet their demands and solve their problems only lead to further entanglement in a complex web, where they multiply rapidly, concurrently, and dangerously. The problems are aggravated. Disgruntled citizens and groups with vested interests, now freshly empowered, take over the streets again and generate positive feedback, which rapidly leads to chaotic behavior and a new impasse.

It is important to note that protests in postnormal times work not as conventional demonstrations with an identifiable leader, such as a politician, a

union spearhead, or a student trailblazer, but rather as a network without leaders. A network is an elusive entity manipulated by nodes of communication. Street politics thus acquires a new and powerful dimension: instant communication means that massive crowds can appear rapidly, the presence of global media ensures that a national issue becomes an international event, and the lack of a clear and well-defined leadership means that there is no one with whom to negotiate. The potential for chaos to emerge, as we saw in Brazil's June 2013 demonstrations,<sup>4</sup> which ended with the government conceding to most of the protestors' demands, are therefore exceptionally high.

Moreover, in postnormal times there is no confidence in the society's institutions. All of the state's basic institutions – the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the police, the army – are identified with the old regime. But at least the dictators got things done and kept a lid on warring tribes and sects, which are now free to vent their suppressed anger on each other. All that the citizens took for granted seems to evaporate and cannot be trusted to deliver what little it is supposed to deliver. There is no new narrative to replace the mythology of normal times; the utopians have won, democracy has been delivered, and there are no alternative narratives of hope. Thus in postnormal times the problem is not a dictator or a police state, but society itself. And it is a complex, iterative problem that has no simple or immediate solutions, while the citizens demand instant quick fixes.

In normal times, uncertainties are small and manageable. You knew what the dictator likes and dislikes and kept on his right side. But in postnormal times, uncertainty takes center stage. Since everything is interconnected, complex and chaotic, and changing rapidly, nothing can actually be described or trusted with any certainty. The citizens are totally bewildered: the past was so radically different from the present that there is no history to learn from, the contradictions of the new polity seem impossible to deal with, and the euphoria of the revolution gives way to new anxieties.

Seen from this perspective, it is not too surprising that the Arab Spring has turned into a winter. The elected rulers of Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya discovered that to become thriving democracies they needed to deal with, or in some cases establish, complex systems of governance. In a democracy, governments are made up of many people and groups with different vested interests – some armed with weapons – within entrenched institutional frameworks (e.g., bureaucracies, the judiciary, and the army) with their own privileges to preserve, all regulated with their pre-democracy norms, procedures, and precedents. It is not just a question of many different and diverse parts, but of how these parts interacted to produce a complex whole. Moreover, the leaders of new democ-

racies have to deal with this diversity and complexity in a rapidly changing environment, rising expectations, and constant threats of chaotic behavior from disgruntled citizens or groups with vested interests. One could argue that the mere fact that Arab Spring democracies have survived in a postnormal environment is a measure of their success rather than their failure.

Highly complex functional and successful systems evolve gradually and take generations to reach a stable state. But to be successful they have to be able deal with some of the postnormal world's basic characteristics. Take, for example, globalized markets that serve only those who pay; or democratic politics, which is all about the balance of power. So any post-Spring economy that is purely market based is not going to cater for those who are, and were systematically, marginalized by mainstream financial and economic sectors. And any polity that is not inclusive and pluralistic will be unstable. If governance is dominated by a particular segment of society, or certain national stake-holders feel totally powerless, or if attempts are made to impose the will of a particular segment of society on others, politics comes to a grinding halt. Empowered citizens take to the street – and chaos takes its natural course. One of the main principles of survival in a complex environment is that its controlling mechanism must itself be complex, a principal known as Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety.<sup>5</sup> In other words, plurality and diversity have to be at the heart of governance and reflected in all state institutions for the new democracies to endure. When this does not happen, even the most successful states face serious obstacles.

A good example is provided by Turkey. Here we have one of the Muslim world's most successful economies, led by a pragmatic and moderate Islamic party: the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The AKP has not only improved the economic lot of the vast majority of the citizens, but has even managed to force the military, the guardians of Turkish secularism, to abandon their concern with politics. Indeed, it is the most popular, democratically elected government in Turkey's history. Yet as the May-June 2013 demonstrations in Istanbul's Taskim Square demonstrate, the Sublime Porte, an apt term to describe contemporary Turkey as it seeks to rediscover its Ottoman heritage and culture, has little understanding of postnormal times.

The protests started over the proposed plans to build a shopping mall in Gezi Park. Given the plethora of shopping malls in Istanbul, one can legitimately ask: What need is there for another one, built over a much loved historic park? But the shopping mall is a natural outcome of the aggressive capitalist, market-driven economy that AKP has pursued. It is not about the

needs or desires of citizens; it is about markets, money, and corruption. Gezi Park, however, is not just a park: it is a metaphor for a particular notion of “Turkishness” that the AKP seeks to impose on the entire population. In other words, it is as much about a politics of identity as it is of markets. The AKP is proud of its Islamic identity – and rightly so.

But identity is not something that can be manufactured let alone levied; and the values it generates have to be intrinsic and not imposed from the outside. Those who embrace the AKP’s Islamic values in Turkey do so willingly, and those who reject them are equally free to do so. The type of secular nationalism that the party seeks to promote is based on socially conservative Islamic values that cannot, or will not, be uniformly embraced by all segments of society. The plan to ban alcohol has been described as the “last straw” by many people. Again, alcohol is not just alcohol; it is also a metaphor for individual freedom. No one can force anyone to drink. But in a pluralistic democracy, those who wish to drink have the right to do so. Moreover, to impose a single notion of identity on a diverse society is to go against the forces of complexity and postnormal times, with all its attendant consequences.

This is perhaps the most difficult thing to grasp for all varieties of Muslims, with opinions covering one end of the spectrum to the other. In the contemporary world plurality has a very specific meaning: It means that everyone, including those who totally embrace western values, are included within the overall framework of society. Of course you can disapprove; but you cannot ban, exclude, or marginalize.

There is an unstated assumption in Islamic thought that Islamic values, however they are defined, are “natural” and hence can be enforced on others with impunity. And it is this tendency that led Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to face accusations of “totalitarianism.” Of course he is not a totalitarian in the classic meaning of the term. But confusing populism with pluralism is a category mistake. When confronted with the indictment, Erdoğan just did not know how to react: “Do not come to me with abstract accusations that are outside the realm of politics. Can you give me specific and tangible examples?” he declared. But of course, as Taha Ozhan, director of the think tank Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı (SETA), which is closely aligned to the AKP, notes, there is no “tangible response other than, “We are afraid and we feel repressed.” Similarly, Erdoğan asks the same question to those who stated that they do not want intervention in their lifestyle. When the protestors say “We would like to partake in decisions that involve our city, we want participatory democracy,” Erdoğan, then, asks, “Who are you?” This question does not have a tangible answer either, be-

cause the Gezi Park protests are no one and everyone at the same time. Ozhan suggests that Erdoğan needs to overcome his nineteenth-century positivism to “be free of accusations of totalitarianism.”<sup>6</sup> I would argue that he also needs to transcend ninth-century Islamic thought and acquire some grasp of postnormal reality.

Postnormal times cannot be piloted with traditional Islamic thought, which has autocracy and authoritarianism at its core. Moreover, it would be a category mistake for such contemporary democratic leaders as Erdoğan and President Mohamed Morsi of Egypt to see democracy as nothing more than an instrument for acquiring autocratic rule. Notice how Erdoğan addressed the demonstrators in Taksim Square, giving them ultimatums and describing them as “riffraff” (*capulcu*). Clearly he has no idea of the power of the crowd in the contemporary world, and how rapidly, through positive feedback, it can become chaotic and acquire a global dimension. The clash in Taksim Square was not between an Islamist party and the secularists, as the international media has suggested, but rather a specific product of our time, a time in which dealing with plurality is truly a complex problem.

Erdoğan behaves as an autocrat for another reason: to simplify the complexity of democratic governance. But that, according to Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety, is a recipe for disaster. In fact, autocracy is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the simplicity it introduces makes the complex system unstable, which requires its controlling mechanism of governance to be correspondingly complex. On the other hand, there is always the danger that the seduction of a simpler system, such as autocracy, leads to its entrenchment through various means, including violence. For the beneficiaries of the Arab Spring, it will mean nothing less than a return to the status quo.

This is where the main threat to the Arab Spring is located. Witness how ex-President Morsi has tried to relegate all powers to himself and hence turn himself from a legitimately elected ruler into an autocrat. While the revolution was able to break authoritarianism’s physical framework, it left mental authoritarianism intact. That traditional Islamic thought is totally inept in dealing with plurality is quite evident in the new Egyptian constitution.<sup>7</sup> Most members of the drafting committee belonged to the ruling Islamist party, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), and the ultra-conservative Nour Party. Article 1 describes the “Arab Republic of Egypt” as “an independent sovereign state, united and indivisible, its system democratic.” Article 2 declares that “Islam is the religion of the state and Arabic its official language,” which is fair enough, given that Egypt is an Arab Muslim country. But then the article goes on to state: “principles of Islamic Shari‘ah are the principal source of legisla-

tion.” Given that Shari‘ah means different things to different people, even among Muslims let alone non-Muslims, this is a recipe for inviting dissent, inevitable disaster, and a clear attempt to suppress diversity and plurality. Once you bring the Shari‘ah into play, Egypt can hardly remain, as subsequent events have demonstrated, “united and indivisible.”

To ensure that traditional ideas about gender, non-Muslims, and other equally inequitable notions of the conventional Shari‘ah remain intact, Article 4 gives power of interpretation to “Al-Azhar Senior Scholars” who “are to be consulted in matters pertaining to Islamic law.” This is, of course, not all that different from the constitution of Iran, which gives these powers to a Supreme Leader and a Council of Guardians. The basic assumption inherent in these articles is that the people cannot be trusted, the very people who led the revolution, with issues of public morality or with knowing what it means to be a Muslim in the twenty-first century: they have to be instructed and shepherded by a select elite. Finally, in case there was any doubt, Article 219 makes it clear that “the principles of Islamic Shari‘ah include general evidence, foundational rules, rules of jurisprudence, and credible sources accepted in Sunni doctrines and by the larger community.” So the Shi‘ah, the Sufis, the Isma‘ilis, and other varieties of Muslims who do not subscribe to the Sunni tendency need not apply for citizenship; women should remain at home, their obligations toward family and society are enshrined in the constitution; and non-Muslims should make for the exit.

The president appoints one-tenth of the members of the Shura Council, the members of which are supposed to be elected by a secret ballot (Article 128). He appoints the heads of all national institutions, including the central bank and the audit bureau, which makes labelling them as “independent” a bit of an anomaly. This means that the president has almost complete control over the legislative process.

Moreover, the constitution has a string of other equally obnoxious articles. While Article 45 grants freedom of thought and opinion in absolute terms, Article 44 prohibits defamation of messengers and prophets and thus opens the door to blasphemy *à la* Pakistan, where numerous innocent people have suffered from such legislation and even young Christian boys have been sentenced to death. Indeed, it is not just the prophets – you cannot show any contempt to any other human being according to Article 31. Given that the president is also a human being, any criticism directed toward him leads a citizen directly to jail for “insulting the president.” And if you were to insult the army, say by accusing it of corruption, heavy-handedness, or mismanagement, you would be tried in a military court for “crimes that harm the armed forces.”

One would expect the Islamists and ultra-conservatives to be more than happy with the new constitution. “Supporters argued that the Constitution would bring stability,” notes Ahmad Taher, “and therefore enable the development and foreign investment that was required to achieve ambitions and aspirations of the Egyptian people. They also claimed that Article 2 and Article 219 would work to moderate Islamic Shari‘ah rule.” The problem is that “Islamic Shari‘ah rule,” far from bringing stability, development, and foreign investment, has always resulted in injustice, oppression, and strife. It is a monolithic institution in a world that requires complexity to deal with complex problems. It curtails freedom and equality in a world that demands it. It drags society back into ancient history when the world itself is moving forward. Perhaps that is why the segment of the Egyptian population not enamored with “Islamic Shari‘ah rule” shiver at the very idea. “The opponents claimed that the constitution would bring about a new tyranny by equipping the president with absolute authority and broad powers while leaving no room for accountability and oversight. It was thought to reduce citizen’s rights and impose restrictions on freedom to such an extent that opponents demanded a reinstatement of the 1971 Constitution along with a new Constituent Assembly,”<sup>8</sup> writes Taher. In other words, half of Egypt was so horrified that it preferred legislation drafted by a dictator!

In contrast to Egypt, which is too deeply anchored in traditionalist Islamic thought, Tunisia shows more awareness of postnormal reality. Like Egypt, Tunisia’s ruling Ennahda Party is a product of the Islamic movement; and like Egypt, Tunisia too had to go through a tough process of creating a new constitution, which emerged after a number of different drafts.<sup>9</sup> Tunisia is as “Islamic” as is Egypt, and declares in the preamble to the constitution that it will “remain faithful to the teachings of Islam.” Article 1 states that Tunisia’s “religion is Islam, its language is Arabic,” but the country trusts its people: Article 3 announces that “sovereignty belongs to the Tunisian people” (not to God, Who is the ultimate Sovereign in any case, which we find in the constitution of Pakistan and which has been a source of endless confusion and scholarly amusement). Moreover, there is absolutely no mention of “Islamic Shari‘ah”; rather, what is emphasized are human rights; the rights to work, healthcare, and education; and the separation of powers. Thus, legislative power belongs not to the president but to a Chamber of Deputies “elected by universal, free, and secret vote” (Article 18) that advises and authorizes the president “for a set period of time and for a specific purpose, to issue decrees which he submits, as the case may be, to ratification by the Chamber of Deputies” (Article 28). Moreover, there is a formula to ensure that the Chamber of Deputies is representative

of the society as a whole with appropriate representation from regions, employers, farmers, workers – and the deputies represent not their own interest but that of the entire nation. The judiciary is independent and selects judges from among its own ranks, and local authorities have enough autonomy to run their own affairs.

It is worth noting that while Ennahda insisted on creating a parliamentary system with checks and balances and full accountability, the secular parties fought for a semi-parliamentary system that featured an active president with far great power. These irresolvable (and ironic) contradictions between the different positions were eventually resolved through dialogue and negotiation. Ennahda's aim was not to produce a constitution that is about management and control, but one that represented the views and aspirations of its diverse society and involved all sections in nation building. Apart from being more open and inclusive, the Tunisian constitution recognizes the plurality and diversity of the society it seeks to guide. It provides a complex system of governance for a complex society and times. Despite this, Tunisia has not been free of protests, mostly a product of high youth unemployment and economic depression about which the government, indeed any government, can offer no instant solutions. But the only protest that acquired a chaotic proportion was the riots initiated by the Salafis during June 2012, after they attacked an art exhibition. However, such difficulties notwithstanding, Tunisia seems to be able to negotiate a cautious way forward.

The difference between Tunisia and Egypt, as reflected in their respective constitutions, is essentially a difference of mode of thought. Egypt is facing the prospect of a "civil war" precisely because its Muslim Brotherhood leaders are struck in an ossified framework of Islamic thought that has never really been able to deal with diversity and plurality. It is a linear structure that shuns complexity. Tunisia's stability, even though it is rather fragile, comes from the very fact that it has embraced its citizens' diversity and plurality and has placed complexity at the heart of governance.

The predicaments of postnormal times just cannot be resolved with traditionalist Islamic thought and modes of doing things. Ironically, for those who are most concerned and obsessed with "Islam," who beat their chests and shout the loudest about "defending Islam" and "Islamic Shari'ah," Islam itself presents the greatest danger. Complexity tells us that no single mode of thought, model of behavior, or method can provide an answer to all our interconnected, complex ills. The "free market" is as much a mirage as the suggestion that liberal secularism or some idealized monolithic notions of Islam will rescue us from the current impasse. It is thus foolish to place our faith in

a single ideology or a monolithic notion of truth. Diversity and plurality are essential both to understanding and dealing with complexity, as well as to resolving our interconnected problems.

This leads us to one of our most difficult conclusions: To navigate post-normal times, Muslims must abandon the goal they cherish above all others: to impose a single truth on a diverse society and a plural globe. The notion that Islam is the only truth sets up false oppositions within Muslim societies as well as between Muslims and non-Muslims. If all truth is the same for everyone at all times, then if I am right, you must be wrong. And if I really care for truth, I must convert you by persuasion, legislation, or force if necessary, to my view; or, at the very least, I must ensure that my truth somehow remains dominant in society. Muslims must move forward from the old recipe that “Islam is supremely important, and therefore all men must have one true Islam” to the new formula that “Islam is supremely important, and therefore every man must be allowed to live by the Islam which seems true to him, or reject what does not seem true to him.”<sup>10</sup> This is something the pious and conservative will find hard to swallow. But the reality is that their historic and traditional notions of “Islamic truth” is dangerously obsolete in postnormal times and serve only as a source of strife and violence.

In postnormal times, a moral order can be constructed only on the basis of equality and dialogue. Contradictions teach us to accept and appreciate different perspectives and be humble. There are no absolutely right or absolutely wrong answers to any given problem. Even a very basic understanding of a problem requires a dialogue on its various dimensions, an undertaking that involves a whole range of perspectives and interests, including those held by citizens of different faiths, Muslims of different persuasions, men, women as well as children, people of different social and cultural backgrounds, and different ethical notions. As contradiction cannot be resolved, we need to put our differences aside and manage contradictions and complexity through negotiated and consensual dialogues in which all participants are given an equal voice. No authoritarian or violent means can resolve contradictions or dealing with complexity; rather, they only add further layers of complexity and move the whole of society even closer to the edge of chaos.

Humility, modesty, accountability, responsibility, diversity, and dialogue, which some may see as good old Islamic values, are not added extras but essentials if Arab democracies are to survive postnormal times of uncertainty, chaos, complexity, and contradiction. They can attempt to reduce uncertainty by injecting a heavy dose of traditionalism or autocracy, but this does not, as we see in Turkey and Egypt, eliminate uncertainty – it simply changes it. As

we can never eliminate uncertainty and cannot have total control of any situation, our claims must by definition be humble. Similarly, we can never have complete knowledge of a complex system – social, cultural, or religious; it will always be tentative and provisional. So we have to be modest about the claims we make about such knowledge. If Arab democracies fail to acknowledge uncertainty and the complexity of certain situations, they will not only make a *technical* error but also an *ethical* one. Old, normal times will thus return once again.

## Endnotes

1. For a more detailed discussion of postnormal times, see Ziauddin Sardar, “Welcome to Postnormal Times,” *Futures* 42 (2010): 435-44; “East-West in Postnormal Times,” *East West Affairs* 1 (January-March 2013): 3-12; and Merryl Wyn Davies, ed., “Postnormal Times,” *Futures*, special issue (2011): 136-227.
2. Nader Hashemi, “The Arab Spring Two Years On: Reflections on Dignity, Democracy, and Devotion,” *Ethics and International Affairs* 27, no. 2 (2013): 207-21.
3. For more on chaos, see Ziauddin Sardar, *Introducing Chaos* (London: Icon Books, 1999; and several editions since).
4. On Brazil and the general phenomenon of global protests, see Peter Beaumont, “Global Protest Grows as Citizens Lose Faith in Politics and the State,” *The Observer*, 22 Jun. 2013.
5. Alexander S. Gard-Murray and Yaneer Bar-Yam, “Complexity and the Limits of Revolution: What Will Happen to the Arab Spring?” arXiv:1212.3041, December 11, 2012.
6. Taha Ozhan, “The Protests and Erdoğan,” *Hurriyet Daily News*, 14 Jun. 2013, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/the-protests-and-erdogan.aspx?pageID=449&nID=48757&NewsCatID=436>.
7. Egypt’s new constitution can be downloaded from <http://www.worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/egypt-039-s-new-constitution-in-its-entirety-in-english/egyptian-constitution-egypt-constitution-mohammed-morsi-morsy-/c1s10493/>.
8. Ahmed Taher, “The New Egyptian Constitution: An Outcome of a Complex Political Process,” *Insight Turkey* 15, no. 1 (winter 2013): 25-37.
9. Tunisia’s new constitution is available at <http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/Tunisiaconstitution.pdf>.
10. See Jonathan Sacks, *The Dignity of Difference*, 1st ed. (London: Continuum, 2002), where the former chief rabbi argues that all three monotheistic faiths have to make this radical shift to survive and avoid the “clash of civilisations.” But serious protests from orthodox Jewish groups forced him to remove this assertion, and a “new edited edition” was hurriedly brought out in 2003.