

Three Decades of Iran's Policy of Exporting the Islamic Revolution: Politics, Ends, and Means

Bahram Navazeni

Abstract

Three decades after its 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran's foreign policy remains committed to "exporting the revolution" (*sodoure enqelab*). Through this policy, the Islamic Republic of Iran wants to make the world safe for not only Islam and Muslims, but for all oppressed people around the world. The idea is based on the ideology of Imam Khomeini, who presented it in a general way in his important work on jurisprudence. To him, the role of Imam is to preserve the Islamic ummah's unity, liberate the Islamic homeland from the seizure and influence of the colonizers and their puppet governments, and initiate the just Islamic government.

In this article, I explore the politics, ends, and means of exporting the revolution in the overall context of Iran's foreign policy as well as show how the divinely inspired nature of the revolution was to bring Islamic justice to humanity and the various peaceful and coercive means it adopted to provide happiness, well-being, and salvation to all nations. To Imam Khomeini and his followers, the final end of "great Islamic community" could not be achieved in the current arrogant international society without helping the disintegrated Muslim nations to unite with each other and using adequate force.

Bahram Navazeni is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science, Imam Khomeini International University (IKIU), Qazvin, Iran. He received his Ph.D. from the Australian University of NSW (1991) and has authored/translated eight books and over fifty articles and papers published in academic journals and conferences. His latest book is *Export of the Islamic Revolution* (Iran: 2010). For the past three years, he has also served as the head of IKIU's international office. He can be contacted at info@navazeni.ir.

Introduction

We export our revolution to the whole globe because our revolution is Islamic, and till the call of “No god but Allah, and Mohammad is Allah’s prophet” is not reverberated throughout the globe there will be struggle, and till the struggle against the arrogant is found all over of the globe, we will be standing.¹

Ahmadinejad’s speeches against Israel shed light on the late Imam Khomeini’s declaration of wiping Israel from the scene and ignited a new crisis between Iran and the West. The move demonstrated that Iran’s underlying commitment to “the export of the revolution” (*sodoure enqelab*) is still alive and well. It also demonstrated that an assessment of the relative impact of Iran’s export activities, when compared with the indigenous causes of Islamic resurgence in other societies, can have profound implications for not only the Muslim world but also for the international system as a whole. Such an assessment is the principal burden of this essay, which seeks to inquire into the global impact of the Iranian revolution. My main objective is to explore the politics, ends, and means of exporting the revolution in the overall context of Iran’s foreign policy.

Politics

The appellation “the export of the revolution,” unlike such terms as “intervention,” “aggression,” and “self-defense,” is not commonly found in the literature of international relations. Yet the basic idea underpinning the act of exporting revolution is part of ancient as well as modern international relations. As religious as the Islamic revolution may be, and as secular as the American, French, and Russian revolutions may have been, or even great or small, the concept of exporting revolution is a corollary of the phenomenon of any revolution throughout world history. By intervention, the United States wants to make the world safe for democracy – witness the recent cases of North Korea, Libya, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, as well as the older ones of Kosovo, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. By invasion, the Russian Federation wants to make South Ossetia and Abkhazia safe from Georgian aggression. By the export of its revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran also wants to make the world safe for Islam and Muslims, as in the cases of Tajikistan, Iraq, and Lebanon.

In his classic work on revolution, Crane Brinton discusses the universalistic nature of deep-rooted revolutions. He observes that revolutionaries

throughout history “all sought to spread the gospel of their revolution.” It is therefore possible to make the generalization that exporting revolution seems to be a natural outgrowth of revolutionary zeal, particularly because revolutionaries are self-righteous and because “our orthodox and successful extremists ... are crusaders, fanatics, ascetics, men who seek to bring heaven to earth.”² Exhibiting as it does the features of a classic revolution complete with its own crusades and crusaders, the Iranian revolution is no exception to Brinton’s rule, despite its unique form and context. There is evidence that a few years before the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution and in the earliest days of the Islamic Republic, the idea of exporting the revolution was alive in the revolutionaries’ minds, in editorials in Teheran’s daily papers, and, more importantly, in sermons delivered as Friday prayers.

The issue, still in existence after nearly three decades, was based on the ideology of Imam Khomeini, which he put forward in a general way in his important work on jurisprudence.³ Later on, he theorized it as an alternative to the monarchical regime in his thirteen class lectures delivered in 1970 during his exile in Najaf. These lectures were first published in Tehran in 1973 under the title *Guardianship of Jurisprudent (Velayate Faqih)*.⁴ The formal ideology of the state and of the revolution in Iran reflects his particular interpretation of Shi’i Islam and its two bases of imamate and justice,⁵ according to which the Imam is the only person who understands the truth and has the right to dispense justice. He denied the separation between the religious and political powers and believed that the *faqih* (Islamic jurisprudent) is the only legitimate governor.⁶

According to his writing, the Islamic community had been a single unified community (*ummate vahede*) since the time of Prophet Muhammad; later on, however, it disintegrated due to internal anti-Islamic behavior and external pressures of the colonizing powers. Through a revolution, he prescribed, these scattered territories must be integrated once again. As Prophet Muhammad built a government and appointed the rulers [viz., Imam Ali and his descendents at Ghadir Khum] after him, he concluded that government is obligatory in Islam⁷ and the Imam’s role is to “preserve the order and change the Muslim’s differences into unity.” He further wrote:

To preserve the unity of the Islamic Ummah and to liberate the Islamic homeland from the seizure and influence of the colonizers and their puppet governments, we have no choice but to build a government. To realize the unity and liberation of the Muslim nations we have to collapse the tyrannical and puppet governments first and to initiate after the just Islamic government that would be at the service of the people.⁸

Although Imam Khomeini had not rejected the proposed federation of the Islamic states during his exile in suburban Paris,⁹ his main theme was “one great Islamic state” as he lectured to the Kuwaiti mission on 26 February 1979:

I hope that all Islamic nations who have been disintegrated and take opposite side to each other due to the miss propaganda of the foreigners, wake up and be with each other and build one great Islamic state, one state under the flag of “No god but Allah,” and this state dominate the whole world.¹⁰

Khomeini's idea of *velayate faqih* was essentially incorporated into the Islamic Republic of Iran's new constitution, ratified in 1980, which itself represented “an honest aspiration of the Islamic Ummah.” Article 4 reads:

During the occultation of the *Vali al-`Asr* (may Allah hasten his reappearance), the *Velayate Amr* and Imamate Ummah (leadership of the Ummah) devolve upon the just and pious *Faqih*, who is fully aware of the circumstances of his age, courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrative ability, will assume the responsibilities of this office in accordance with Article 107.¹¹

As to the export of the revolution, the constitution explicitly mentions and provides “the necessary basis for ensuring the continuation of the Revolution at home and abroad.” In its preamble and under the title of “The Form of Government in Islam,” the constitution bases the revolution's export on “the Islamic content of the Iranian Revolution” and emphasizes that:

The Constitution will strive with other Islamic and popular movements to prepare the way for the formation of a single world community (in accordance with the Quranic verse “This your community is a single community, and I am your Lord, so worship Me” [21:92]), and to assure the continuation of the struggle for the liberation of all deprived and oppressed peoples in the world.

Despite of all these constitutionally recognized ideas of the one “just and pious *Faqih*,” “a single world community,” and “the continuation of the Revolution at home and abroad,” there were uncertainties about the practicality of these ideas in the world of politics from the early days of the revolutionary order. From Mehdi Bazargan's appointment as prime minister of the provisional government in February 1979 until students followers of the Imam seized the American embassy in Teheran in November of that year,

the principle of “equilibrium” or “negative equilibrium” dominated the theory and practice of Iranian foreign policy. The principle of equilibrium had its basis in Amir Kabir’s policy during his short-lived premiership in 1848-51 as an antidote to the European balance-of-power principle and was similar to Mossadeq’s policy of “negative equilibrium” during his equally short-lived premiership in 1951-53.

Accordingly, Bazargan’s provisional government believed that Iran might better ensure its independence by maintaining equilibrium between rival American and Soviet influences than by aligning itself with one or the other imperial power. His government terminated Iran’s membership in the American-sponsored Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Iranian-American defense act of 5 March 1959, while repudiating articles V and VI of the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1921.¹² The Bazargan government sought amicable relations with Iran’s Muslim neighbors, as evidenced by its desire to strengthen the Regional Cooperation Development (RCD) arrangement of 1964 with Pakistan and Turkey.

However, after the seizure of the American embassy in Teheran on 4 November 1979, the Bazargan government was forced to resign two days later and the students, supported by the Islamists on the extreme right (among which were many among Khomeini’s clerical disciples), struggled for control of foreign policy against later foreign ministers, namely, Abul Hasan Bani-Sadr and Sadeq Qotbzadeh, both of whom were labeled pejoratively as “liberals” by their opponents because of this inspiration by Mossadeq’s foreign policy orientation. These two, who accorded first priority to Iran’s national interest rather than the interests of the Muslim world or the whole Third World,¹³ considered the seizure contrary to the law of nations and sought to settle the dispute with the United States by peaceful means.¹⁴

The seizure of the embassy was dubbed the “second revolution” and was an event that Khomeini himself considered even more significant than the overthrow of the shah’s regime. Whether lay or clerical, these radical idealists interpreted the Ayatollah’s call for the export of the revolution to mean that it should be put into practice at any price. In defiance of Iranian policy makers, particularly Bani-Sadr and Qotbzadeh, the students sponsored an international conference in Tehran of some sixteen liberation movements from around the world. Other radical idealists, such as Muhammad Montazeri (the son of Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri), took it upon themselves to try to export the revolution by any means, including the use of force. Muhammad Montazeri organized the Iranian Revolutionary Organization of the Masses of the Islamic Republic and tried to dispatch Islamic

fighters to Lebanon as early as December 1979, long before the Revolutionary Guards were sent there in 1982.

As none of the early revolutionary foreign ministers, namely, Karim Sanjabi, Ibrahim Yazdi, Abul Hasan Bani-Sadr, and Sadeq Qotbzadeh, believed in exporting the revolution, this policy was neglected until 11 August 1980, when Muhammad Ali Rajaei was appointed prime minister and also led the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He found this policy quite in accord with the political ideology of Imam Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution. The policy, however, was not formally implemented into the country's foreign policy until the "third revolution," when President Bani-Sadr was forced to fly the country in June 1981 and began questioning the very legitimacy of the existing international system.

Mir Hossein Musavi was the first foreign minister to envisage the need for creating a committee in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that would "determine the basis of the foreign policy from an ideological perspective, and the principle of rule of theocracy." Moreover, he decided to draw up a "plan for an Islamic front" worldwide, which he said would be "followed up" by the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs "because the fight against imperialism should take place all over the world."¹⁵ Rajaei and Musavi, together, introduced into Iran's foreign policy the principle of "neither East nor West, but the Islamic Republic" (*na sharqi, na gharbi, jomhoori-e Islami*), which meant that neither the East nor the West, but only Islam, will provide humanity with ultimate happiness and can, independently from either, guarantee each person's bliss and ascendancy.

The suppression of the liberal nationalists and leftists through the "second" and "third" revolutions ensured the Islamists' political ascendancy; however, they later broke up into what Khomeini referred to as "two schools of thought" or "factions," as Hashemi Rafsanjani simply spoke of them. These two, who were later best known as "radical idealists" and "pragmatic realists," had no differences in the interconnectedness of Iran's revolution with its export. This idea has been reinforced continually since then by different factions and leaders. Ayatollah Khamenei, the Islamic Republic's third president and current supreme leader, had continually pointed out that "the foundation and the idea of this revolution is not limited to our country and this nation."¹⁶ Ayatollah Rafsanjani, the republic's fourth president and current head of the Expediency Council, had emphasized that "from early on when the revolution succeeded we realized that a revolution is not a phenomenon which would stay limited within one border."¹⁷ For both of these leaders, exporting the revolution amounts to spreading the ideas, spirit, and

enthusiasm of the revolution.¹⁸ Of even greater consequence was the consolidation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which later incorporated the Islamic liberation movement unit from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to Iran's constitution, the IRGC itself "will be responsible not only for defending the borders, but also for the mission stated in the Book, of holy war in the way of God and fighting to expand the rule of God's law (Shari'a) in the world."

This interconnectedness is very obvious for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the republic's current president, for he also believes that "revolution is the continuous evolution and reformation to reach the zenith of the individual and social perfection and therefore inaction and slump in the reform movement and social evolution is only *bide* and reactionary." Accordingly, he insists upon "permanent revolution" by emphasizing the need to "preserve the kinetic energy and the revolutionary impetus" and believes that it is the "only way for survival of the Islamic Revolution and for [the] realization of its economic, cultural, political and ideal ends."¹⁹

The Ends

To understand the desired outcome of exporting the revolution, it is necessary to examine Imam Khomeini's political philosophy and its relevance to the ends and means of this undertaking. The answer to this desire may be explored in the context of his view of the essential nature of the Islamic revolution. In contrasting modern revolutions, including the French and the Russian with the Iranian, he contended that the first two revolutions were inspired primarily by "material" considerations, whereas the Iranian one was motivated mainly by the "divine." Due to this distinctive spirituality of the Iranian Revolution, "Islamic justice for all" can bring happiness to humanity as a whole. This essentially Manichaeic dichotomy between the material and spiritual is well known in the intellectual history of the Middle East; however, Imam Khomeini was the first intellectual in modern times to interject it into the discourse of Iran's foreign policy.

An example of this effort is found in Khomeini's letter of 1 January 1989 to Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev, in which he stated in no uncertain terms that both the East and the West are ideologically bankrupt because they lack spiritual values. Khomeini offered to fill this "ideological vacuum" with Islamic values, which alone "can be a means for the well-being and salvation of all nations." To him, Marxism "does not answer any of the real needs of man. It is a materialistic ideology, and it is not possible to save humanity

through materialism from the crisis of lack of conviction in spirituality which is the most fundamental ailment of human society in the West and the East.” While many in the West welcomed Gorbachev’s *glasnost* and *perestroika*, Khomeini advised him: “I strongly urge you that in breaking down the walls of Marxist fantasies (*khialat*) you do not fall into the prison of the West and the Great Satan.” Reiterating that the unhappiness found in both the West and the East reflects the lack of spirituality, he told Gorbachev categorically:

One should turn to truth. The main difficulty of your country is not the issue of ownership, economics, or freedom. Your difficulty is the lack of true faith in God, the same difficulty that has also dragged the West toward decadence and a dead end. Your principal problem is a long and futile combat with God, the origin of existence and creation.

In trying to introduce Gorbachev to the alternative path of Islam as contrasted with the western way of life, Khomeini suggested that the Soviets could conduct research in Islam by referring, “in addition to the books of Western philosophers, to the books written by Farabi and Bu-Ali Sina.” He also referred him to the books of Sohrevardi regarding “the philosophy of illumination” (*hekmat-e eshraq*) and to the works of mystics, “particularly those of Muhyiddin Ibn Arabi.” In conclusion, he said: “I openly announce [that] the Islamic Republic of Iran, as the greatest and most powerful base of the Islamic world, can easily help fill up the ideological vacuum of your system.”²⁰

The twin column of Iran’s foreign policy principle is explicit in Imam Khomeini’s letter to Gorbachev. First, by rejecting both the eastern and western ways of life on the grounds of their lack of religious spirituality, Khomeini was invoking the principle of “neither East nor West.” Second, by suggesting that Iran, as the Islamic world’s most powerful base, could easily fill the ideological vacuum everywhere in the world, Khomeini was actually engaging in the export of the revolution, in this instance to the Soviet Union, by means of philosophical discussion.

Thus, when viewed in light of the Irano-Islamic political culture and Khomeini’s political ideology, three overriding goals of exporting the revolution became apparent. In the short term, it is a means for defense of the Islamic Republic domestically led by one supreme jurisprudent (*faqih*). It is also a means for ensuring the republic’s security internationally, particularly in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. In addition, in the end it is a means for the ultimate establishment of a world order under the umbrella of Islamic justice. The Iranian constitution obligates the government to exert its contin-

uous efforts toward realizing the comprehensive unity of the Islamic world and, in fact, uses the very word “goal” about “the happiness of human beings in all human societies” as the ultimate end. This is due to the fact that in Khomeini’s view, the attainment of universal Islamic happiness is a matter of hope and gradual occurrence. In his words: “We hope this will gradually come about.”²¹

The Means

Concerning the means for exporting the Islamic revolution, there was some ambiguity right from the beginning of the new order – mostly about the use of force. Although Imam Khomeini had on many occasions declared that “swords” should not be used and his dictum was clearly stated that “It does not take swords to export this ideology. The export of ideas by force is no export,”²² this does not mean that using armed force is thoroughly prohibited. Moreover, the events of the past three decades reveal that the policy of exporting the Islamic revolution has been going on through a number of governmental and non-governmental institutions. One may easily find numerous examples and a wide variety of methods that the revolutionary government adopted, including war, military intervention, and other coercive operations.

In his sermons, for example, Imam Khomeini repeatedly emphasized the method of “communication, dissemination, announcement, and propagation,” all of which convey the meaning of the Arabic word *tabligh*. He also used *dawat*, meaning “calling,” in the same way as used by Martin Luther and explained by Max Weber.²³ In this way, according to Khomeini, the enthusiasm of revolution can create a “model society” (*madineye nemuneh*) in Iran and this will be exported through cultural transformation, communication, and propagation, thereby encouraging others to follow:

If Islam realizes in Iran as it truly is, surely this will happen in other states ... in Iraq, Kuwait, Egypt and everywhere. If we well play this role ... then it will export from us to other countries and we hope that all Moslem countries will be Islamic and the government in the globe will be Islamic government or the Islamic justice will be global.²⁴

In addition to all of these peaceful means, Imam Khomeini never ruled out the need for iconoclastic (*botshekani*) methods and the possibility of using physical force and coercive means to build a divine government. Accordingly:

Muslim clergies (ulama) must come to the scene, bring Muslims to the battleground through preaching or propagation (*tablighat*) ... and to give awareness to governments. If they submitted and agreed to behave in accordance with Islamic tenets, support them; if not, fight them without fear of anyone.²⁵

Although this excerpt does not indicate the precise manner by which to implement the revolution's export, it does encourage other religious leaders to do the same in their own countries, just as the Iranian religious leaders actively revitalized religious sentiment among the Iranian people and encouraged them to fight the shah's regime. In Imam Khomeini's view the use of force was permissible only in self-defense, and this was actually used for exporting the revolution because his worldview accorded to the territorial nation-state a lower priority than that granted the abode of Islam, which has no recognizable borders anywhere around the world. Furthermore, it deemed it impossible "to wipe out Israel from the world scene" and make the aggressor evacuate the territories without using force. The mottos at the time of the Iran-Iraq war, "war, war, till victory" and "the path to Jerusalem goes through Karbala," clearly show that the final end of "great Islamic community" could not be achieved without helping the disintegrated Muslim nations unite with each other and use adequate force. At the outset of the eight years of bloody war with Iraq, Imam Khomeini told the Iranians that:

You are fighting to protect Islam and he [Saddam Hussein] is fighting to destroy Islam. At the moment, Islam is completely confronted by blasphemy, and you should protect and support Islam. ... Every person should defend Islam according to his ability.²⁶

Since it was obvious that Iraq invaded Iran on 22 September 1980, it may be argued that Iran was at that time acting in self-defense, as the concept is defined territorially, although it did so in the name of Islam. This impression was reinforced by Khomeini himself in March 1982, when the successful Iranian offensive in the Shush-Dezful area foreshadowed the recovery of Khorramshahr in May and the eviction of almost all Iraqi forces from Iranian territory by July:

Today Iran is still bound by what it said at the outset; we do not intend to fight against any country, Islamic or non-Islamic. To date we have engaged only in self-defense, which is a divine duty and human right enjoined upon all. We have never intended to commit aggression against other countries.²⁷

Yet on 13 July 1982, Iran carried the war into Iraqi territory. In addition, the war continued until 18 July 1988 because Imam Khomeini and other revolutionary leaders sought to export the revolution. On 22 February 1989, it was clear that Iran's insistence on "final victory" was aimed at exporting the revolution, for Khomeini stated:

Every day of the war, we had blessing, which we utilized in all aspects. We exported our revolution to the world through the war; we proved our oppression and the aggressor's tyranny through the war. It was through the war that we unveiled the deceitful face of world-devourers; it was through the war that we recognized our enemies and friends. It was during the war that we concluded that we must stand on our own feet. It was through the war that we broke the back of both Eastern and Western superpowers. It was through the war that we consolidated the roots of our fruitful Islamic revolution.²⁸

Due to the thorny ambiguity of the concept of self-defense and although the Iranian constitution clearly prohibits the government's interference in the internal affairs of other nations, both the Islamic government and the radical idealist factions (e.g., that of Mehdi Hashemi or military organizations such as IRGC) from doing so. The Iranian government has continually been accused of a wide variety of interventionist acts, ranging from inciting propaganda to protracting war. The principal targets of the export of the revolution have consisted of four major geographic areas: the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

In the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Lebanon, Shi'i Muslims have been the primary targets, in Sudan and other regions the Muslim Sunnis have been supportive, as have some pro-Iranian factions of the Afghan Mujahidin based in Iran and the pro-Iranian Hezbollah movement located in Lebanon. One successful revolutionary incursion occurred during June 1982, when a contingent of Revolutionary Guards was dispatched to Lebanon to help local Shi'i militants engage in armed conflict with the Israeli forces that had invaded Lebanon. This has also been seen in several other cases, such as in the new Islamic governments of Afghanistan and Iraq, which clearly show no change in Iran's policy of exporting the revolution throughout the past three decades.

Conclusion

Axiomatically, Iran's policy of exporting the revolution, like any other aspect of its foreign policy, reflects the dynamic interaction between the

country's domestic politics and its external environment. In concluding this study, it is appropriate to specify that the one aspect of Iran's domestic politics that most often shaped this official policy during the past three decades of the Islamic Revolution was the Imam's ideology and leadership. In order to serve Iran's overall interest in "Islamic unity" and renewing the "great Islamic community," he consistently balanced the various political factions, including both the radical idealists and the pragmatic realists. Thus, the Iranian government has followed policies and practices derived from the revolution and based explicitly on revolutionary principles. As long as Ayatollah Khomeini follows suit, all forces, be they peaceful or coercive will push the policy of exporting the revolution forward.

Endnotes

1. Imam Khomeini, *Collected Works (Majmoue Asar)* (Tehran, POIKW Press, 2000), 12:148.
2. Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York: Vantage Books, 1965), 192.
3. Ruholla Khomeini, *Kitab al-Bay*, 5 vols. (Najaf: n.p., 1390-91/1970-71).
4. Imam Khomeini, *Guardianship of the Jurisprudent (Velayate Faqih)* (Tehran: Sayyed Jamal Press, n.d.). An English translation is also available: Ruholla Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981).
5. See Farhang Rajaee, *Islamic Values and World View: Khomeini on Man, the State, and International Politics* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1983).
6. Imam Khomeini, *Guardianship of the Jurisprudent*, 28.
7. *Ibid.*, 25-34.
8. *Ibid.*, 36.
9. In an interview on 28 Nov. 1979 (8 Azar 1357). See Imam Khomeini, *Collected Works*, 5:142.
10. *Itela'at Newsletter*, 26 Feb. 1980 (7 Isfand 1357), 7. Quoted in Bahram Navazeni, *Chronology of Iran's Foreign Policy: From 23/3/1978 till 20/8/1988* (Tehran: CIRI Press, 2002), 122-23.
11. For the text of the constitution, with R. K. Ramazani's introductory note, see *Middle East Journal* 34 (spring 1980): 181-204.
12. The Soviet Union claimed that these articles gave it the unilateral right to intervene militarily in Iran whenever it judged that its security was threatened from Iranian territory. For decades, Iran vehemently opposed this Soviet interpretation. Reza Shah secretly tried to cancel the articles in 1935, and his son made a similar effort in 1958-59. The Bazargan government's cancellation of these articles was affirmed on 10 November 1979 by the Revolutionary Council. For

- details, see Bahram Navazeni, *Irano-Soviet Treaty of Friendship 26 Feb. 1921 (Ahdnameh Mavadat Iran and Shoravi)* (Tehran: Hamrah, 1990/1369).
13. *Ittela'at Newsletter*, 11 Nov. 1980 (21 Aban 1358), 10.
 14. Manouchehr Mohammadi, *An Analysis of the Islamic Revolution (Tahlili Bar Inqelabe Islami)* (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1986/1365), 157.
 15. *Ittela'at Newsletter*, 6 Jul. 1980 (15 Tir 1360). Quoted in Bahram Navazeni, *Chronology of Iran's Foreign Policy: From 23/3/1978 till 20/8/1988* (Tehran: CIRI Press, 2002), 286.
 16. Ali Khamenei, *Four Years with [the Iranian] People (Chahar Sal ba Mardom)* (Tehran: Hezbe Jumhuriye Eslami, 1985/1364), 354.
 17. Akbar Rafsanjani, *Message of the Witnesses (Payame Shahedan, Bargozidde'i az Sokhamane Hojat-al-Islam Rafsanjani)* (Mashhad: Jahade Daneshgahi, n.d.), 8.
 18. See R. K. Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy: Contending Orientations," *Middle East Journal* 43, no. 2 (spring 1989): 202-17.
 19. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, "Ashamed Revolutionaries" (*Inqelabiyoune Sharmande*) (Jahat: 2007/1386), 2.
 20. *Ittela'at Newsletter*, 5 Jan. 1989 (15 Dey 1367). Quoted in Bahram Navazeni, *Chronology of Iran's Foreign Policy: From 20/8/1988 till 8/6/2001* (Tehran: CIRI Press, 2002), 28.
 21. *Ittela'at Newsletter*, 26 Feb. 1979 and 11 Feb. 1987. This was repeated in Imam Khomeini's testament, revealed on 6 June 1989 to the Council of Experts. Quoted in Bahram Navazeni, *Chronology of Iran's Foreign Policy: From 20/8/1988 till 8/6/2001* (Tehran: CIRI Press, 2002), 47-49.
 22. Imam Khomeini, *Collected Works*, 18:364.
 23. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), 79-92.
 24. In a speech to the audiences from Bonyade Mostazafan on 30 Sept. 1979. For the text, see Imam Khomeini, *Collected Works*, 10:180.
 25. Sermon delivered on 2 Jan. 1983.
 26. *New York Times*, 19 Oct. 1980.
 27. *Ittela'at Newsletter*, 4 Apr. 1982 (14 Farvardin 1361). Quoted in Bahram Navazeni, *Chronology of Iran's Foreign Policy: From 23/3/1978 till 20/8/1988* (Tehran: CIRI Press, 2002), 301.
 28. Imam Khomeini, *Collected Works*, 21:283.