Conference, Symposium, and Panel Reports

Islamic Political Thought after the Arab Spring

On December 7, 2012, Ermin Sinanovic (assistant professor, Department of
Political Science, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD) presented
his “Islamic Political Thought after the Arab Spring,” at the headquarters of
the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT; Herndon, VA). After open-
ing with several questions – How have the events in the Middle East and Arab
world influenced and continued to shape Islamic political thought? Why did
the Arab Spring happen now? What were the contributing factors? How is Is-
lamic political thought being reshaped by these events? – he began to make
his case that the underlying political theory of the Arab Spring represents
something new in Islamic political thought.

One of his contentions is that traditional Islamic political thought is now
seen as out of date, as caught up in the past. This situation began to change
first among the Shi‘ah and was instrumental in Iran’s revolution. The Arab
Spring has accelerated this reawakening among the Sunnis, which began in
the 1970s, thereby showing that Islamic political thought was no longer
static. But because this uprising is still so recent and ongoing, scholars are
still trying to make sense of it and thus all conclusions up to this point remain
tentative.

In historical terms, Islamic and other forms of political thought developed
through abstract theorizing and ideal archetypes, as well as through actual
practice (viz., trial and error). The aftermath of the Arab Spring will produce
new insights and developments, for such things are a normal part of imple-
menting a given theory. What adjustments need to be made will become
clearer over time, as was the case with democracy in the United States. 

As this region-wide rebellion against what had been the status quo is not
happening in a vacuum and remains ongoing, there is a great deal of second
guessing. Thus the “law of unintended consequences” is also in play. For ex-
ample, the parties involved are making normative commitments. Whether they
are serious or not is an entirely different matter, but their true attitudes will be-



come clear in the future. What is important today is that they are establishing
a paper trail and record to which their adherents will hold them. Thus even if
they are not sincere today, they may be forced to keep their promises because
the negative consequences of not doing so would be considerable. And, quite
naturally, none of them wants to become irrelevant. 

Sinanovic then focused on classical Sunni political thought that, grounded
in the memory of the political chaos of the first two centuries, demanded that
all subjects render complete obedience and loyalty to the ruler and allowed
rebellion only in very rare circumstances. This view was also based on hadiths
asserting that the people should tolerate their rulers’ excesses because such
things are part and parcel of political reality. What matters are order and sta-
bility, for they allow the society to function smoothly. Other Sunni trends em-
phasized justice and virtue, which led to a certain tension between justice and
piety/religious identity (cited by Ibn Taymiyya). In essence, justice was held
to be more important than belief because justice affects everybody, while Islam
is just a personal belief. 

Such hadiths are reappearing today, among them the historically largely
ignored “The best form of jihad is to speak truth to an unjust ruler.” Hamza is
being cited as a person who spoke truth to power. Moreover, the idea of what
constitutes an “acceptable” status quo has changed. Now, the fitnah caused
by dictators is considered greater than the fitnah caused by rebellion. Now
that the right to dissent has entered the lexicon of Sunni political thought, the
classical understanding has been eclipsed. Even al-Azhar has approved of
demonstrations as well as free and direct voting (which represents the Islamic
idea of sh´rŒ), approved of a constitution and the separation of powers, the
ruler being bound by a constitutional framework, and other contemporary
western political practices.

Many Salafis have abandoned their traditional opposition to western-style
democracy after many years of asserting that it is nothing short of shirk and
kufr. Those who had supported Mubarak, as did al-Azhar, began to change
their minds as the revolution unfolded. This represents a fundamental shift for
them. The Muslim Brotherhood even went so far as to form a political party:
the Freedom and Justice Party. It remains unclear if this organization really
accepts electoral democracy for the long haul, but its leaders have made state-
ments that they cannot retract. Despite the different definitions of democracy
that exist, all participants in the electoral process have accepted the basics and
cannot go back. Clearly the ongoing discourse of basic rights and freedoms,
the people’s right to elect/choose their leaders, and establishing democracy
within the framework of the Shari‘ah is something totally new for them.

Conference, Symposium, and Panel Reports 149



Another departure from classical Sunni political theory is who will have
the final say. Traditionally this belonged to the khal¥fah (president). But now
Parliament is becoming far more important because it can limit the president’s
power. And then there is the emergence of the maqŒ§id al-shar¥‘ah. This is
not a new approach, for it was practiced even in the days of Muhammad, but
its principles were only really systematized by al-Shatibi (d. 1388), who re-
mained largely unknown until his works began to be published during the
1880s. It reappeared in the 1920 with the Tunisian scholar Ibn ‘Ashur (1879-
1973) and more recently with IIIT, which has done a great deal to bring it into
the political discourse. Traditionally the maqŒ§id al-shar¥‘ah were geared to-
ward achieving five objectives, each of which has three levels. For example,
the Shari‘ah does not ban alcohol for no reason; rather, it aims to protect a
person’s dignity and mind or to avoid/resolve the social problems associated
with intoxication. Ibn ‘Ashur added a sixth element: freedom. The fact that
the maqŒ§id al-shar¥‘ah has transcended the legal/jurisprudential sphere and
has entered the political discourse is also something new.

Sinanovic maintains that these new developments are addressing the tra-
ditional blind spots in Sunni political theory. They are not expounding the
classical tradition, but are challenging it. He sees hope for a Sunni/Shi‘ah rec-
onciliation and believes that Sunni thought and Shi‘ah revolutionary thinking
are moving closer in some aspects. Could we be, he wondered at the end of
his presentation, seeing the beginning of post-Sunni Islam?

Jay Willoughby
AJISS

Herndon, VA

150 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 30:2