Europe and the Arab World
Samir Amin and Ali El Kenz

London: Zed Books, 2005. 166 pages.

Concise, succinct, and informative, this book skillfully elucidates and
assesses the patterns, prospects, and complexities of Arab-European rela-
tions contextualized in a globalizing (read “Americanizing”) world. It also
identifies the ambiguities and limitations of social movements and struggles
within the Arab world, as well as their implications for mutual relationships
(p. vi). The authors’ main thesis is that both global capitalism and the
American determination to construct a “new” Middle East in its own image
have undermined the possibilities of domestic reforms and external realign-
ments in most Arab countries. American hegemonic influence, together with
the growing sway of politicized Islam on public life, have added more lim-
itations and constraints to other failures to transform the underlying eco-
nomic and political structures defining the relations between members on
both sides of the Mediterranean.

The book comprises four chapters: three written by Amin (chapters 1, 2,
and 4), and one (chapter 3) by El Kenz. The first chapter is a critical survey
of conditions in the Arab world in general and that of the Arab “state” in par-
ticular. Amin designates the latter structure as a manifestation of “mameluke
power,” reflecting a complex traditional system that has merged the person-
alized power of warlords, businessmen, and men of religion (p. 3). The Arab
state, he argues, has never really embraced or understood modernity. Egypt,
Syria, and the Ottoman Empire underwent a first phase of ineffective mod-
ernization during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The second
phase was associated with the populist nationalism of Nasserism, Baathism,
and the Algerian revolution between the 1950s and 1970s. With the end of
this phase, a multiparty system gave way to a paradoxical regression into the
mameluke type of autocracy (pp. 10-12). Whereas Europe broke with its
past, which allowed for its modern progress, the Arabs have not. Amin iden-
tifies modernity with such a historical break as well as with secularism, the
differentiation of religion and politics, the emancipation of women, and the
rest of the term’s conventional elements (pp. 2-3). 

He criticizes currents “claiming to be Islamic” (p. 6), particularly those
of the Wahhabi type, viewing Islamic militant groups as manifestations of a
revolt against “destructive” capitalism and “deceptive” modernity (p. 6),
more interested in sociopolitical issues than in matters of theology. Amin dis-
misses Iran as being no different, although he provides no details (p. 8), and

106 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23:2



views non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as smokescreens reflecting
postmodern capitalist interests (pp. 31-38). He writes that postmodernity
offers a “scholarly” version of an ideology of capitulation to such interests,
while “good governance” offers its popular counterpart (p. 38). Also dis-
cussed are the socioeconomic conditions of individual case studies of key
Arab countries and the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation

Chapter 2 focuses on international policy issues and the European
states’ geopolitical interests. by examining the extent of these interests’ auton-
omy in light of American hegemony and whether they are compatible with
socioeconomic development in the Arab world. Amin concludes by stress-
ing that final global strategic decisions are made by the United States, while
Europe simply plays the role of an auxiliary (p. 73). Both, however, repre-
sent an “imperialist” condition in their own way (p. 71).

Chapter 3, by El Kenz, presents an extensive analysis of the Euro-
Mediterranean Barcelona project, the role of globalization and regionaliza-
tion in developing asymmetric relationships, and the ensuing disillusionment.
The project is seen as nothing more than a “defense” agreement aimed at
protecting Europe against possible social, political, and cultural “overflow-
ing” from the countries south of the Mediterranean (p. 82). El Kenz per-
ceives Europe as seeking the same objectives as the United States, but in a
more “civilized,” less “brutal” way (p. 82). He concludes that the Barcelona
process is one of large-scale corruption of political leaders, for it ties them
down as domestic and regional representatives of neoliberalism’s global
goals and policy objectives. (p. 124). 

Chapter 4 concludes the book by asserting that Europe is an integral part
of the interrelated agenda of liberal globalization and American hege-
monism in the service of the interests of dominant capital (p. 136). The agen-
da’s association with democratic slogans and political rights, while ignoring
their socioeconomic counterparts, serves more to undermine the credibility
of democracy, which is cynically seen as a tool of manipulation and “double
standards” raised against an opponent regime to weaken it while swept
under the rug when an ally is involved (p. 137). 

This study offers much in terms of critical analysis of the dynamics of
global capitalism. However, imbued with a clearly visible dose of Marxist
analysis, its approach sometimes carries with it the inertia and baggage of
dogma. This detracts a bit from what otherwise is an insightful piece of work.
For example, it does not deal adequately with the pressing issue of how left-
ists or Marxists could perceive a transformed relationship with disparate
Islamic currents or how both social forces could coalesce to engender change

Book Reviews 107



that would meet the material, spiritual, and cultural needs of Arab and
Muslim societies. The authors’ perhaps justified hostility toward “Islamic”
movements, which had linked up in an unholy alliance with the United States
during the cold war era, render them incapable or unwilling to see the differ-
ence that Iran makes (p. 8). In their Marxist view, an Islamic system can only
reflect a new “comprador” power (p. 8). 

Yet the problematic should perhaps be approached more in sociologi-
cal, rather than in metaphysical, terms camouflaged and couched in socio-
economic discourse. Otherwise, one may fall into dogmatic fallacies – being
so obsessed with social contradictions that forms of cultural struggles are
considered superfluous and “imaginary,” thus ignoring their complementary
and dialectical connection (p. 9). It does not occur to the authors that Iran’s
Islamic revolution may actually reflect a shift to the left of conventional
Sunni sociopolitical thought. Perhaps it may be a harbinger of a new and dif-
ferent relationship between Islamic revolutionary movements and social and
liberationist groups, one that is crucial and necessary if neoliberalism is not
to end up being the sole global player, with its opponents divided and con-
quered. Change in the Arab world requires a united front of all social forces.
Intellectuals, therefore, should not be the source or instruments of divisions,
whether driven by inertia or dogma; rather, they should be the source of
visionary leaders.

Amr G. E. Sabet
Docent, Department of Political Science

University of Helsinki, Finland

108 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23:2