Islam Under Siege
Akbar Ahmed

Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2003. 213 pages.

Ahmed’s Islam Under Siege is among the most popular books of the post-
9/11 period both in the West and in the Muslim world. The subtitle of the
book poses as its summary: Living Dangerously in a Post-Honor World. 

This multifaceted book addresses a wide audience, including those
Americans in the Midwest who fearfully reflect upon the proverbial ques-
tion “Why do they hate us?,” Muslims who incessantly lament the acrimo-
nious reality of Islam being associated with terrorism, and intellectuals who
strive to discern the underlying factors of the crisis between Muslims and the
West. Ahmed responds to the query “Could acts of violence be relegated
merely to Muslim societies?” by adeptly elucidating the underlying factors
of the Muslim world’s crisis and the West’s failure to understand Islam. In a
historical context, he ponders the emergence of what he coins the “post-
honor” world in which we live, and finally offers a road map to global peace.
To alleviate extremist behavior and the rise of terrorism, he stresses the
indispensability of – sine qua non – dialogue. He invites Muslims to acquire
a self-critical retrospective insight so that they can apprehend their contri-
bution to today’s quagmire, and calls on non-Muslims to exercise more dis-
cernment in understanding the complexities in Muslims’ lives. 

The fulcrum of his argument is the notion of ̀ asabiyah and its convo-
luted form, dubbed “hyper-asabiyya,” which he states creates an extremist
demeanor in the Muslim world and ultimately results in violence. The term
`asabiyah refers to social cohesion, as described by the medieval social
philosopher Ibn Khaldun, and is accrued in a society that is based on jus-
tice, compassion, and knowledge. The need to maintain it against the
threat of any danger to the established social solidarity engenders a hyper-
bolic form of ̀ asabiyah, namely, “hyper-asabiyya.” Given that ̀ asabiyah’s
main goal is to protect and preserve the society’s “honor,” the trepidation
over losing honor or any loss of honor spurs a voracious desire to main-
tain or recover that honor. This inherent urge to preserve the “core” or
regain what is already lost intensifies the emergence of “hyper-asabiyya.”
In other words, the breakdown of `asabiyah (a lack of social cohesion)
engenders “hyper-asabiyya,” which is characterized by control and vio-
lence. Hence, ironically, while “hyper-asabiyya” arises because of the lack
of `asabiyah, the former is an exaggerated form of the latter. 

Book Reviews 105



The most recent example of “hyper-asabiyya” is the 9/11 tragedy.
Ahmed argues that the attacks’ underlying impetus was the search for “lost”
honor. According to Bin Laden, Muslims have long been humiliated across
the globe due to their lack of confidence and their suppressive, corrupt
reigning regimes that act in alliance with the United States. In order to
reclaim this lost Muslim honor, Bin Laden aimed at the honor of the United
States, the one country from his vantage point that was, in a way, responsi-
ble for the subjugation of Muslims. As a result, he came to be considered a
hero by many Muslims. On the other hand, Bush was dubbed a “man of
honor” for responding by attacking Afghanistan to reclaim the damaged
honor of the American people. Hence, ironically, honor brought both Bin
Laden and Bush to the same platform. The attacks became a defining
moment for the outset of the “post-honor” world.

Ahmed discusses globalization’s inextricable contribution to “hyper-
asabiyya.” Globalization plays a paramount role in creating critical masses
of socially, politically, and economically frustrated Muslims. He stresses
the distinction between the Muslims’ stance on the notion of “globaliza-
tion” and the current trajectory of globalization. It is not globalization per
se to which Muslims, as members of the developing world (after all, the
author points out, Muslims promoted a relative globalization ideology dur-
ing their civilizations), object, but to the invariable “favoritism” promoted
by the West, in particular the United States, to serve its own interests. This
creates discomfort, sentiments of humiliation, and the urge to reclaim jus-
tice and revenge, all of which ineluctably add to the factors that engender
“hyper-asabiyya.” The author also pays attention to the apprehension of
“too much change at too great a pace” vis-à-vis globalization among
Muslim societies.   

Ahmed’s thesis on leadership is well-received by devout Muslims:
The closer the political leadership is to the Islamic ideal, the lesser the
tension in society.  Ahmed calls for an “Islamic ideal” based on Qur’anic
principles and the Prophet’s Sunnah. He moves through the four cate-
gories of governance, namely, clerical, monarchy-militarist, socialist-
communist, and democracy, and infers that democracy is the most viable,
for it is the means to reach the “Islamic ideal.”  

He refers to the plight of Muslim women today as “catastrophic.”
While women were active members of Islamic society during the revela-
tion’s early years, in many parts of the Muslim world their role gradually
deteriorated and came to be defined more by culture than by religion.
Islamic history is replete with examples of women professionals, warriors,

106 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:1



thinkers, and intellectuals. While ruminating over the reasons behind the
“collapse” of Muslim women, Ahmed’s discussion of colonization’s
impact on Muslim lands rivets the reader’s attention.  Ahmed proclaims
that nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonization played a significant
role in the emergence of “hyper-asabiyya” factors, and, in return, engen-
dered a “loss of confidence” among Muslims. This loss, in turn, triggered
the need to “protect” women via control and restraint. 

In the last chapter, Ahmed turns to possible alternatives that Muslims
can use to move forward toward a road map. His empirical comparison of
the ideal of inclusion and the exclusionist approach patently depicts that
Muslims must pursue the ideal of inclusion, namely, the path of dialogue
and tolerance. 

Ahmed asserts that the Muslim world has to establish the aforemen-
tioned “ideal of Islam.” To a certain extent, he alludes to pragmatic means
to achieve this goal. Nonetheless, there are still questions to be addressed,
one of which is how to contend with western governments, some of which
actually bolster the current instability in the Muslim world and thus quench
the democratization process. His road map for western governments – to
promote justice via promoting “real” democracy – is valuable. Nevertheless,
it is based on a “moral” compass, which means that its applicability becomes
problematic for those who may lack such a compass.  

Merve Kavakci
Elliot School of International Affairs

George Washington University
Washington, DC

Book Reviews 107