R e f l e c t ions Islam i za t i o n of Psychology : From Adaptation to Sublimation Louay M. Safi This article argues that modern secular psychology with its antireli- gious origins depends on a limited ontology of human nature which excludes human volition as well as its transcendental and unchanging elements. This article challenges the negation of human nature by demonstrating how the metaphysical presuppositions of Freud and Skinner actually assume a specific conception of human nature while denying its existence. This conception of human nature undermines the possibility of human volition, effectively excluding responsibility, self- determination, and moral choice as factors that shape human action. This article then turns to the ideas on psychology embedded in the works of classical Muslim scholars to argue that Islamic psychology is based on volition and sublimation. Modern Social Sciences and the Problematique of Secularization Modem social sciences emerged in Westem society as a result of the struggle between the scientific community, which emphasized the impor- tance of observation and experimentation for ascertaining truth, and the religious community, which insisted that truth must be deduced from divine scripture and has to be upheld regardless of whether it coincides with observed phenomena. In the long run the scientific tradition triumphed over the religious tradition, gaining the upper hand in guiding public life. The process of secularization, which pushed out moral and spiritual religiosity from the public domain and confined it to the realms of private life, drew its strength from a new epistemology introduced by a Frenchman, R e d Descartes, and an Englishman, Francis Bacon. Descartes moved the locus of certainty from the objective world to the subjectivity of individual ration- ality, while Bacon confined it to empirical observation and inductive meth- ods. The subjective rationalism of Descartes and the empiricism of Bacon were later unified by Kant who confiined reasoning and rationality to the Louay M. Safi is an Associate Professor and Acting Dean of Research Institute at IIU Malasia. 118 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 15:4 empirical phenomena. Kant, while declaring the autonomy of human rea- son and its ability to ascertain the truth on its own, insisted that reason can only comprehend the empirical world, thereby reducing truth to empirical truth. The early founders of Western secularism were mindful of the impor- tance of divine values. Descartes, for example, endeavored to predicate the multitudinal representation of the external world on the idea of God. Similarly, Kant insisted that ethical life finds its ultimate justification in the belief in God and in life after death. “Thus without a God and without a world invisible to us now but hoped for,” Kant observed, “the glorious ideas of morality are indeed objects of approval and admiration, but not springs of purpose and action.”’ nerefore secularization was initially an attempt by Western scholars to undermine the dominance of the Catholic church over society and to respond to the irrational and superstitious ele- ments of premodern Western thought. Gradually, however, the process gave rise to excessive empiricism on the intellectual level and to material- istic and hedonistic tendencies on the moral and psychological levels. The advent of social sciences in modem Western thought represents an advanced stage in the secularization of Western knowledge. Not only did the advocates of these sciences deny the significance of transcendental val- ues and metaphysical knowledge, but they denied the interdependence of the various fields of knowledge. With the development of modem social sciences, the unity of human knowledge was destroyed and the interde- pendence of the spheres of knowledge, which was maintained in the philo- sophical stage of modem scholarship, was henceforth done away with. Ethics was reduced to one of the various spheres of knowledge, independ- ent of economics, political science, psychology, and all other fields of social sciences. Thus morality does not figure in economic studies as a legitimate concern for the specialist in the field. Economic transactions are valued or devalued in relation to the concern of utility maximization. Moral and ethical considerations are marginal Secularization of Psychology Like other disciplines of social sciences, psychology endeavored from its inception to examine its subject matter in isolation of the totality of human life and experience and to sever psychological phenomena from their tran- scendental roots. Thus writes an eminent psychologist around the tum of the twentieth century: Sdi: Islamization of Psychology: From Adaptation to Sublimation 119 The most striking fact about the world of human experience is the fact of change. Nothing stands still; everything goes on. The sun will someday lose its heat: the eternal hills are, little by little, breaking up and wearing away. Whatever we observe, and from whatever stand- point we observe it, we find process, occurrence; nowhere is there per- manence or stability. Mankind, it is true, has sought to arrest this flux, and to give stability to the world of experience, by assuming two per- manent substances, matter and mind: the occurrences of the physical world are then supposed to be manifestations of matter, and the occur- rences of the mental world to be manifestations of mind. Such an hypothesis may be of value at a certain stage of human thought; but every hypothesis that does not accord with the facts must, sooner or later, be given up. Physicists are therefore giving up the hypothesis of an unchanging, substantial matter, and psychologists are giving up the hypothesis of an unchanging, substantial mind. Stable objects and substantial things belong, not to the world of science, physical or psy- chological, but only to the world of common sense? By denying the fact that the mental world is the manifestation of a tran- scendental mind, mainstream Western psychology gave rise to a determin- istic conception of man in which the ideas of “human will” and “individual responsibility” are negated. Thus behavioralism conceives of human behavior in terms of a series of responses induced by external stimuli that can be explained solely with reference to environmental factors. In a simi- lar fashion, psychoanalysis explains human behavior by attributing indi- vidual actions to mental activities induced by early childhood memories unconsciously stored in the human brain. Therefore, both Freud and Skinner rejected the notion of transcendental human nature as unnecessary and insisted that transcendental concepts of purpose, attitude, value, and the like are pre-scientific. The denial of an essential element in the human psyche, the human spir- it, with inherent qualities and intrinsic capabilities is influenced more by the ontological commitments and moral dispositions of the denying scholar than of any empirical evidence. Human experience demonstrates that cer- tain human qualities can always be observed, regardless of the temporal or special conditions of the actors, including passion, empathy, courage, responsibility, and creativity. Yes, the form of expression through which essential human qualities are manifested may change and do change over time pursuant to circumstances and conditions. Yet one can hardly deny continuity and permanency on the account of changing foms or media of expression. 120 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 154 The only way to explain the dubious denial of permanent human nature by appealing to change in patterns of expression is to locate such claims within the larger context of secularization of science and life which has been going on in Western society for a couple of centuries. The denial of permanent and transcendental human nature is part of a process of secular- ization whose goal is to reject the relevance and possibility of metaphysi- cal and religious truth and to confine the role of scientific endeavors to the ascertainment of empirical “facts,” devoid of any metaphysical substance or essence. As we will see below, the efforts to deny a truth and essence that lie beyond the direct reach of the senses is ironic because it is based on a series of presuppositions of metaphysical nature which the denying schol- ar has to postulate to give coherence to his claims against a metaphysical and essential truth. Metaphysical Presuppositions of Psychology But is it possible for psychology to do away with the concept of tran- scendental mind, and can psychological research proceed without the notion of human nature? The answer is an emphatic no. For even the most staunch opponents of the concept of a transcendental human nature presuppose in their theories and arguments a specific notion of human ~ t u r e . Thus on examining Freudian psychology closely one can identify a set of metaphysical princi- ples and a specific conception of human nature at the root of Freud’s psy- chological arguments. Freud’s metaphysical assumptions may be summa- rized in the following five points: human actions are caused by mental states; the most important mental determinants of individual action are uncon- scious; human personality consists of three domains: id, ego, and superego. human behavior can be explained by referring to a few basic motives, most notably, the life instinct (eros), the death instinct (thanatos), and the pleasure instinct (libido); and the experiences of infancy and early childhood are very crucial in the process of character formation. It is true that one can justify the assumption of “mental states,” “super- ego,” or “death instinct” by reference to certain behavioral patterns that can be explained by such assumptions. But by the same token this is also true in the case of postulating an essential nature capable of recognizing good , Sdi: Islamization of Psychology: From Adaptation to Sublimation 12 1 and evil, right and wrong, apart from the type of preconditioning or stimuli to which the person is exposed. Similarly, Skinner‘s conception of human nature can be summarized as fo~lows: - - human behavior is determined by external conditions, hence, identical human conditions produce identical patterns of behavior; m e n d structures, such as intention or will, are insignificant to under- standing human behavior; and therefore, the empirical study of human behavior is the only scientific method for making inferences about human psychology. Both Freud’s psychoanalysis and Skinner’s behavioralism substitute a concept of human nature that emphasizes human volition, and hence the accountability of the human being for the actions he affects, with one in which human behavior seems to be affected by uncontrollable forces from within or from without. It should be of great concern to us that the conception of human nature adopted by the most prominent schools of Western psychology undermines the idea of a human volition capable of restructuring individual behavior in accordance with a set of values and beliefs; such a conception has far-reaching consequences on the methods used in the areas of education and social conditioning. A psychology which denies self-determination and human volition is bound to emphasize adaptability, encourage submissive- ness, and condone deviance. It is true that humanistic psychology has attempted to overcome the lim- itations of psychoanalysis and behavioralism. But the contributions of humanistic psychologists continue to be eclectical and provisional, as they cannot break out from the secularist framework that forms the foundation of modem social sciences. Thus we see very clearly that leading figures in this school, such as Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow, advance opposing views with regard to the basic structure of human nature. For while the for- mer completely rejects the notion that man is the outcome of his social environment, so much emphasized by behavioralism, the latter strikes a balancing position between Skinner and Rogers. Yet the ideas of both are in direct contradiction to important Islamic ideas and aspirations. Rogers’s insistence that people are intrinsically good is apparent in the following statement: In my experience I have discovered man to have characteristics which seem inherent in his species, and the terms which have at different times which seemed to me descriptive of these chmcteristics are such 122 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 15:4 terms as positive, forward moving, constructive, realistic, mstwor- thy.3 Rogers, however, proposes that the inhinsic goodness of human nature manifests socially in the continuous improvement in the quality of the human species. Thus Rogers’s pemption of human nature corresponds with, and gives rise to, an evolutionary conception of history. Such an argu- ment undermines the intimate relation between moral choices and good liv- ing, associating good life with modem man, while ascribing evil doing to antiquity. Maslow on the other hand takes a markedly different position. While asserting the basic goodness of man, he emphasizes the corrupting impact of society. It is too simple to say “man is basically good” or “man is basically evil.”. . . The correct way now would be to say “man can become good (probably) and better and better, under a hierarchy of better and better conditions.” The fact is people are good, if only their fundamental wishes are satisfied, their wish for affection and se~urity.~ While it is hard for anyone to dismiss the idea that good environment is conducive for the development of good individual character, one can hard- ly miss the social deterministic undertone of Maslow’s arguments. Maslow completely overlooks the irnportance of the human will, influenced by cer- tain beliefs and values, in determining the goodness of the individual, and predicates goodness on the satisfaction of psychological needs. My point is simply this: while Westem psychology can provide us with important insights into human nature it can never fumish us with a com- plete system of psychological ideas that can be meaningful. It is for this rea- son that the development of an Islamic psychology, or undertaking Islamization of psychology, becomes imperative. But how do we develop an alternative? Where should we start? Naturally, our point of departure should be an examination of the psychological views of early Muslim scholars. But while early Muslim psychological writings can suggest to us some useful models of how we can draw on Divine wisdom embedded in revelation, they do not (by any means) amount to a full-fledged theory of human psychology, as the subsequent discussion illustrates. Safi: Islamization of Psychology: From Adaptation to Sublimation 123 Psychological ideas in Classical Muslim Scholarship While modem Western psychology endeavored, for the most part, to obscure the transcendental elements of mental activities, the psychological writings of early Muslim scholars never lost sight of the interconnectedness of the empirical and transcendental aspects of the human psyche. What strikes us when we examine the work of early Muslim scholars is their emphasis on the concepts of “sublimation” and “volition” in explaining human behavior. The difficulty, though, in studying classical Muslim psychological ideas lies in that classical Muslim scholars did not discuss psychological aspects of man under a distinct discipline, but scattered their psychological views in various works that deal with ethics, aqidah, andfiqh. Such works as Al-Mawardi’s Adab al-Din wa al-Dunya, Ibn Al-Qayim’s Ma’arij al-Salikin. and Al-Ghazzali’s Zhya’ Ulum al-Din are filled with psycholog- ical insights and wisdom. But because my aim here is not to undertake a survey of classical works on psychology, but to underline their views of human nature, I will focus on Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali’s conception of human nature. In Zhya’ Ulum al-Din, Al-Ghazzali draws on both Qur’anic interpretations and empirical observations to identify the nature of the inner self or the qalb.5 The qalb, he argues, refers to the intrinsic element that constitutes the human being, and that consists of his four parts: spiritual (ruhi), cognitive (latifa ‘alima), psychic (nafi), and biological (ismi). The cognitive element of the self is capable of perception and learning about the surrounding envi- ronment as well as of imagination; the psychic element induces feelings and emotions, such as desire or anger; and the biological element makes it possible for human imagination and desire to be actualized in the real world. The spiritual element is the sublime element where human knowl- edge and human volition unite. Al-Ghazzali identifies four mental states that precede human action: al-khutir (impression), whereby an image or a thought is borne in the mind; al-may1 (disposition), whereby the impression takes the form of an urge desiring fulfilment and action; hukm (judgment), whereby the self evaluates the action in light of the deeply seated values and the interests of the indi- vidual; and al-ham (volition), whereby the action becomes imminent, hin- dered only by external conditions and circumstances.6 This perception of the psychological roots of behavior underscores the importance of human “volition” in the determination of action. Human action no longer appears 124. The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 15:4 as a spontaneous response to external or internal stimuli directly affecting the life of the individual, apart from hisher purposes and intentions. Bringing the notion of “volition” (iradah) to the center of our conception of human nature has far-reaching implications for the fields of education and psychotherapy, for it opens wide the door for the possibility of “subli- mation” (razkiyah), i.e., the profound transformation of personality and character. Through adopting a more comprehensive approach b studying human nature, similar to the one developed by early Muslim scholars, we can free ourselves from the ethos of adaptation to which modem psycholo- gy has succumbed, and rise once again to the ethos of sublimation, trans- formation, and self-control. The difference between the current predominant secular approach and an Islamically based approach can be brought to sharp focus in the area of psy- chotherapy. Modem psychotherapeutic techniques aim at overcoming the feeling of guilt associated with one’s failure to fulfill internal aspirations (psychoanalysis) or external expectations (behavioralism). These tech- niques, interestingly enough, have great affinity to those used by the Catholic Church for releasing the feeling of guilt and shame resulting from committing sins through “confession.” The object of both practices is to reconcile oneself with hisher human weakness. Clearly, the principle at work here is adaptation. An Islamically-based conception of the human psyche is bound to give rise to a markedly different psychotherapeutic approach, as the emphasis moves from reconciliation with weakness to sublimation and transcen- dence. Although an Islamic alternative to secular psychotherapy is still in its infancy, some promising techniques and approaches have already been proposed by some contemporary Muslim psychologists. Al-Zub;lir Bashir Taha, for example, has already made a proposal for an alternative psy- chotherapy rooted in the Qur’anic concept of rawbah (repentance). In Surar af-Furqan, ayah 70, a specific course of action is prescribed to those who violate the requirements of a good life by accepting falsehood, taking inno- cent life, or committing adultery. In addition to being aware of the evil nature of the act committed, the Qur’an requires the repentant to strengthen his belief in and the desire for the good, as well as compensating the nega- tive with a positive action. A positive action, whose aim is the good, rein- forces one’s commitment and takes the actor far beyond the state of aware- ness of human weakness that a confession can produce. Some Mudim psy- chologists have used the above therapeutic technique and have seported positive results? Further experimentation and study of such new approach- Safi: Islamization of Psychology: From Adaptation to Sublimation 125 es and techniques can take the project of Islamization of psychology to new heights. Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Ibid., 29. 7. Immanual Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1%5), 640. Edward B. Tichner, A Tesr Book of Psychology (New Yo&: Macmillan. 1910). 15. Carl R. Rogers, “A Note on the Nature of Man,” Joumul of Consulting Psychology, Abraham Maslow, A Memorial Volume (California: Pacific Grove, 1972), 88-95. Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali, Ihyu Ulum al-Din (Beirut: Dar al-Ma’rifa. n.d.). vol. 2. See Al-Zubair Bashir Taha, “The Qur’anic Technique of Cognitive Behavior.” in Abharh Nudwat Ilm al-Nufs (Cairo: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1993). 61-68. no. 4 (1957): 200. 10-13.