R e f l e c f i o n s Muslims as Co-Citizens in t h e West-Ri gh ts, Duties, Limits a n d Prospects Murad Wilfiied Hofmann One major side-effect of the current process of economic and cultural globalization seems to be that our world is becoming multireligious. In particular, this results from the accelerated spread of Islam. There are already six million Muslims in the United States, virtually all of them American citizens, with an impressive and growing infrastructure. In Europe, due to labor migration, foreign students, war refugees, and asy- lum seekers, the number of Muslims is around four million in France, perhaps three million in the United Kingdom, and 2.5 million in Germany. Altogether, including Bosnia-Hercegovina, there may be about twenty million Muslims in western and central Europe today.’ Due to its structural tolerance vis-A-vis “peoples of the book,”2 the Muslim world has always been multireligious. Islam expanded into for- merly Christian temtories-the Near East, North Africa, Spain, Byzantium, the Balkans-without eliminating the Christian communi- ties. Nowhere is this more evident than in Cairo, Damascus, and Istanbul, and in countries like Greece and Serbia. This situation was facilitated by the fact that the Qur’an contains what may be called an “Islamic Chri~tology.”~ Coexistence with the large Jewish populations within the Muslim empire-aside from the Near East in Muslim Spain,and subse- quently in North Africa and the Ottoman Empire-was facilitated, in turn, by the extraordinary focus of the Qur’an on Jewish prophets in gen- eral and Moses in particular! On this basis, Islamic jurisprudence devel- oped the world’s first liberal law called al-siyar for the status of religious minorities (~l-dhimrni).~ In the Western world, developments were entirely different. Here, reli- gious intolerance became endemic, even between Christian churches; M m d Wilfried Hofmann is a former German ambassador to Algeria and Morocco. 88 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 14:4 many sects were outlawed (as during the first Ecumenical Council in Nicaea, in 3 2 3 , massacred (e.g., the Donatists in North Africa in the 5th century and the Albigenses and Cathari in the thirteenth century), sub- dued as victims of a “crusade” (Constantinople in 1205), or deserted (like Orthodox East Rome during the siege by Sultan Fatih in 1453). In Germany, a war lasting thirty years between Protestant and Catholic princes decimated the population (1618-1648). Under these circumstances and fueled by the Church dictum extra ecclesia nullum salus (no salvation outside the church), even minimal tolerance of Muslims could not be expected. The expulsion of both Muslims and Jews from Spain in the sixteenth century-the first case of “ethnic cleansing” in modem history-ade Europe virtually “Muslim- free.” There was interaction between the two camps-trade, scientific penetration, diplomatic missions-but no living Muslim presence in the Occident until the twentieth century. Against this background, it is not surprising that Muslims find it difficult to be accepted as fellow citizens in the West. There simply is no historical precedent for such a coexis- tence. Worse, collective memories dating from the Crusades and the Ottoman campaigns into central Europe linger below the surface. The Catholic Church, too, has not fully amended its negative attitude toward Islam. Although the Church (since the Second Vatican Council) has come to accept Islam as a way to salvation, it still shuns Muhammad as the guide on this way and refuses to acknowledge the Qur‘an as God‘s Word. This unfavorable climate has of course been reenforced by events inside the Muslim world-not least of them being the Salman Rushdie affair, the second Gulf War, and massacres in Algeria. Therefore, what appears as discrimination against immigrant Muslims is frequently a result of real fear of a fast growing foreign population seen as potential- ly aggressive and culturally very different. In the process, Islam risks becoming more the victim of ethnic prejudice than religious prejudice. To put it crudely: The man in the street in Cologne does not see Islam as the religion which opposes the notion of Trinity-he couldn’t care less about that!-but rather, as the civilization which makes Turks so strangely Turkish. Under these conditions, contemporary Muslims may well pose them- selves the question already posed in Spain 500 years ago, i.e., Is it per- missible for a Muslim to take up residence in what has been labeled aizr al-harb or aizr al-kufr? This question was discussed in considerable depth when Spanish Muslims, overrun by the Reconquista, chose to stay, and even before this event, because the Prophet sent a group of Makkan Muslims to Christian Ethiopia (615-622). Some of the ‘ulamu, including Imam Abu Hanifa, disapproved of permanent Muslim residence in non- Muslim temtory. Imam Shafi‘i, on the other hand, believed that Muslims Hofmann: Muslims As Co-Citizens in the West 89 could stay behind in former Muslim lands, provided that they could prac- tice Islam and were not subject to Christian missionary efforts. In con- trast to that, already in the eighth century, Imam Jafar al-Sadiq under- lined that Muslims might serve Islam better when living among non- Muslims than when living only with Muslims. Al-Mawardi concurred with this opinion in the eleventh century. Later on the Hanifa madhhab became even more liberal. It accepted the idea that there might be pock- ets of dar al-Zslam inside non-Muslim territories; in addition, they were ready to exempt emigmnt Muslims from observing certain parts of the shari‘ah if this seemed necessary because of ikrah (compulsion), durura (hardship), or maslaha (benefit).6 Today, during the third Industrial Revolution-the communications revolution-there can be no doubt that Muslims in non-Muslim coun- tries are not prevented or discouraged byfiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) to maintain their residence there. In fact, (non-Qur‘anic) concepts like dar al-Zslum and dar al-harb have virtually lost their r e l e ~ a n c e . ~ Most Muslims in the West find it rather easy to practice the essentials of their faith for the following two reasons: First, the West has become irreli- gious to a point where it tolerates almost anything posing as religion, assuming that it is a “private matter.” Second, freedom of religion has become part of the human rights bills and conventions universally applicable today.8 Indeed, Islamic research institutes are now flourishing in the West uncensoredg; mosques are being built from Zagreb via Rome to Lyon; and Islamic communities enter into treaty relationships with their countries of residence.l0 Should this trend continue, as it is my wish and my hope that it will, then sometime in the twenty-first century, Islam in Europe might become part of what is considered “normal.” And there is a model to be followed: German Catholics at the end of the nineteenth century were still suspected of being disloyal citizens because of their links to Rome. Because of the bitter division between the two Christian denominations, in many German cities and even villages one still finds a Protestant church facing a Catholic church in the very center of town.’ ’ Today, this architectural confrontation no longer makes sense, and it is only logical for mosques, too, to be added. The prospect of normalization of the Islamic presence in the West rais- es the issues of integration and assimilation. To what extent can Muslims be integrated without losing their identity (and their faith with it)? As it is, Muslims-whether foreigner or citizen (born outside the West or born in the West)-= seen as different in four respects: 1. Appearance: Men wearing large beards and caftans or other national dress, and women abiding by the traditional Islamic dress code, more often than not without any redeeming touch of fashion. Many of the 90 2. 3. 4. It The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 1 4 4 Muslim population, even of the second generation, speak the local language with an accent. Eating habits: The Muslims refuse alcohol and other drugs as well as pork and blood-sausages and demand halal slaughtering, thus clash- ing with local legislation, Rituals: The Muslims want to interrupt their work for prayer, cele- brate their own religious holidays, go on pilgrimage during specific days, build mosques with minarets (used for the a d k n ) , and bury their dead in a particular way, also frequently clashing with local leg- islation. Faith: The Muslims deny major tenets of Christian dogma (divinity of Christ; the trinity; original sin; Jesus dying on the cross); in addi- tion, their ideal of the relationship between men and women, inside and outside of marriage, clash with what is considered politically cor- rect. Also Muslims are seen as having second thoughts about democ- racy and human rights. is obvious that normalization, let alone integration, hinges on whether the Occident is willing to compromise with-such fea&s, and to what extent the Muslims are able and willing to compromise. As far as the Muslims are concerned, there is room for flexibility, but only to the extent of what is considered “Islamic” civilization and not Islamic creed. Looking at the four points just listed, obviously there is no room for compromise as far as points 3 and 4 are concerned; there is no leeway within aqiiia and ‘ib&&zh. In ,mticular, the old Hm&i idea of exempting emigrant Muslims from parts of the shari’ah should be reject- ed; otherwise, there would be no end to this process of assimilation, lead- ing the Muslims to compromise their d h . A case in point is riba. If the Muslims allowed it, how could they propagate their scheme of profit and risk-sharing as a panacea for some woes of Western economies in which people increasingly refuse to accept risks, a behavior bound to destroy the essence of entrepreneurship? However, by this I do not want to argue against the possible development of what might be called a madhhab ul- urubi, a fiqh for Muslim dhimmi (!) as developing fromfutuwah issued by Westem ‘ulama for specific Western problems-if there is such a thing at all. Concerning points 1 and 2, however, there is considerable room for adaptation. Hardly anybody will deny that a Muslim in the West is not obliged to eat with his hand, sit on the floor, or clean his teeth with a siwwak after eating. But it should be equally obvious that Western Muslims are under no obligation to wear the national dress from their countries of origin and-regarding Muslim women-to dress without any attempt at making their Islamic attire aesthetically pleasing. Nor is it indispensible that Muslims spice their everyday language with exclama- tions in Arabic-fmm subhanu Allah to masha’ Allah. In fact, anythmg Hofmann: Muslims As Co-Citizens in the West 91 which reenforces the misconception that Islam is the specific religion of the Arabs (as Judaism has become for ethnic Jews) should be avoided. The result of such attempts should not be a “European Islam” or “American Islam,” let alone a French or Belgian Islam, but an eternal Islam practiced by people who in some other respects adhere to a partic- ular culture. Indeed, as long as a Moroccan Muslim can easily be distin- guished from a Pakistani one, and a Turkish Muslim from a Senegalese one, why not a German Muslim from an Emhati one? In the pmcess of helping the West to become acquainted with Islam, Western Muslim intellectuals have a large role to play. Foremost is mak- ing the extremely important point that Islam, far from being a religion for obscurantists, is a religion for rationalists. Is there any holy script that appeals to man’s power of reasoning more often and more emphatically than the Qur‘an? Is Islam not the religion which began with the appeal “Read”?12 In contrast, Christian dogma is based on “mysteries” and extrarational Gnostic concepts. It is Islam which-like (later) European philosophy (especially Hume and K a n t j h a s always denied the exis- tence of a natural law of causality,13 and it is Islam which has remained conscious of the philosophically insoluble dilemma between predestina- tion and responsibility: features of rationality which the Western intel- lectual world should positively appreciate. Muslim intellectuals should help also to respiritualize Islam in the West.14 All too many immigrants from the Muslim world practice their religion in a rigid, legalistic fashion which impresses by its routine more than by its spiritual content so that Islam is not recognized, in a Christian environment, as a living creed which satisfies the spiritual aspirations of an “emancipated” individual. Local Muslim intellectuals have an additional, indispensible task Only they can develop the organizational infrastructure necessary for the Muslim communities in the West in their legal dealings with local authorities at the highest level15; and only they can provide the literature indispensible for effective da’wuh. Time and again, it is proven that Islamic books coming from the Muslim world are usually unsuitable for Western audiences. There are many reasons for this, such as faulty print- ing and translation; however, the major reason for this failure is that only a Western Muslim, raised within Westem culture, can fully know how Western people “tick,” what their hang-ups are, and what makes them anxious. In this context, it is essential-and possibly decisive for the future of Islam in the West-that Westem Muslim intellectuals explain the Islamic position on the following three points: women’s rights, human rights in general, and democracy. As far the the gender roles are concerned, Muslims cannot and will not abandon God’s own dictum that boys are not like girls (AI-Zmrun:36). 92 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 144 Concerning human rights and democracy the matter is different. There never has been a valid justification for Islamic jurisprudence to absent itself from the universal human rights discourse. It is entirely possible to make a case, based on the Qur’an and Sunnah, for the legitimacy of an Islamic democratic republic which practices division of power and judi- cial control over the rule of law, enforces a human rights bill, encourages a multiparty parliamentary system with free elections of an amir and shuru council. Prestigious Western Muslims and Muslim fusaha living in the West have defended this position-from Muhammad Asad to Fathi Osman and Rashid al-Ghannoushi.16 But such voices tend to be discredited and drowned-out by statements-as in Germany by Bassam Tibi-about the incompatibility of Islam with dem~cracy.’~ For this, European and American Muslims are paying the price. To some extent, we have surveyed the historical background and a bit of the present situation of Islam in the West. The question is, Under the given circumstances, what are the prospects? Will Islam become the dominant religion of the next century? Will it fade away in a process of assimilation, engulfing the third generation of immigrants who, like the previous two, have found themselves mesmerized by the paradise of Western consumerism? Or, as a third alternative, Will Islam be forcibly ejected from Europe? I submit that all of the above are possible.18 Superficially, prospects seem good for Islam, thanks to the prevalent ideology of postmodernism (provided it is prevalent!). Modernism is the arrogant conviction that man is the measure of everything, that his rea- son is capable of solving everything, and that the resulting Western cul- ture means everything to everybody and therefore rings in the end of his- tory (the Fukuyama-Huntington syndrome which was, and is, most inim- ical to Islam). This kind of thinking threatens to relegate the Muslim world to a sort of zoological garden, a marginalized reservoir of obscu- rantism, fanaticism, and bigotry. In contrast, postmodemism promises to honor whatever wants to remain particular, seeing to it that “small is beautiful” and “black is beau- tiful.” Also, postmodernism-the ideology of the so-called green move- ments-emotionally favors the Third World and its cultures. There are other trends that seem to come to the aid of Islam: Re- enforced by food scandals and animal diseases, many Western people are now more conscious than ever of the need to eat healthy food and to stay away from pork. The addiction to drugs of all kinds has started to fright- en many people. Even the all-powerful American tobacco industry is heading for financial disaster. All this might help Westerners to appreci- ate the Islamic position on food and drugs. Western feminists have recognized that it is was a mistake to seek, be- yond equal opportunities, an equality with men that borders on the Hofmann: Muslims As Co-Citizens in the West 93 impossible, i.e., identity. But their basic a i m - t o protect the dignity of women and to save them from male sexual exploitation-is identical with the Islamic concern. So, there too, prospects seem to be bright for better understanding. Finally, not only in the United States-which hardly practices athe- ism-but also in Europe-which largely practices a de fact0 atheism- there now is a remarkable resurgence of anti-establishment religion at the grass roots 1 e ~ e l . l ~ In addition, the dogmas of the Incarnation and the Trinity have rapidly been losing credibility, even within the Christian churches. Both factors‘ could create a more favorable attitude toward Islam. Nevertheless, in spite of such silver linings on the horizon, there are quite a few black clouds as well. As far as postmodemism is concerned it seems, alas, that all minorities might profit from it except Islam. It is the one minority that is considered dangerous, aggressive, and intolerant. While concern about drugs has grown, it is also true that the police consider the “drug war” virtually lost. The green movements, the great proponents of postmodernism, favor drug legalization and the “right to drug oneself,” a position in direction opposition to Islam. While more women than men convert to Islam in the West, it is also true that the average Western woman continues to be Islam’s most fer- vent foe, considering Islam an unacceptable threat to the very hard fought freedoms Western women have only recently gained. While religious resurgence is a good thing, it has also produced fanat- ically anti-Islamic Christian groups whose professed aim is the elimina- tion of Islam from Europe.2o Even the president of the Protestant Church of the German State of Hesse, Dr. Steinacker, in writing and on TV con- tinues to maintain that Christians and Muslims “do not have the same God,” implying that Allah is a mere idol. Which of the contradictory trends will prevail will largely depend on the acceptance of Islam as part of European heritage. When reference is made to it, people speak of Europe’s “Christian-humanistic” heritage, which may include Judaism but definitely is meant to exclude Islam. Therefore, it is essential to remind the Occident that all three monotheis- tic religions were born in the Near East and that Christianity has absorbed many more elements of Oriental thought and speculation than Islam. The Occident should also be reminded that the largest city, by far, on the European continent-Istanbul-is Muslim; Spain has been Islamic longer than it has been Catholic; the European Renaissance would have been unthinkable without the Muslim “input”; and 94 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 14:4 the absence of a “church” in Islam saved the Muslim world from a sit- uation that required Voltaire’s and Lessing’s confrontation (the Enlightenment) with a stifling Church; Islam therefore had no need for reenacting the European experience: In other words, Westem Muslims have to bring home the idea that not only is Islam there to stay, both in Europe and the United States, but also that it belongs there as much as Christianity. They have to convey the idea that it is not an Arabic or a Turkish religion but the universal reli- gion of submission to God as first practiced by Ibrahim, our common forefather. Unfortunately, this task will be made more difficult by the effects of economic globalization on the employment possibilities in Europe. Resulting from the free flow of capital, technology, industrial products, and labor, all European countries currently experience structural crises which lead to a decline of the standard of life and demand severe cut- backs in all fields of social State intervention. It is almost certain that the present high level of unemployment will become structural, and it looks as if Western democracies cannot effectively cope with the unpopular measures thus required. All this spells possible disaster for the Muslim work force in Europe, which is already effectively accused of taking away jobs from local workers. It does not take much for a populist leader like Le Pen in France to focus public frustration in such a way that eco- nomic anxiety and racial phobia combine to make Islam in Europe the victim. However, I admit this is the worst case scenario. Wu Alluhu ‘ a h . Notes 1. The Muslim Population in the United States by Fareed H. Nu’man (Washington, D.C.: American Muslim Council, 1992) gives the American Muslim population for 1991 already at 5,330,000. For the U.K. see M.M. Ahsan, “Islam and the Muslim Community in Britain,” paper delivered at Casablanca on March 22, 1997, during the 4th Session of the Islamic University al-Sahwa; and J. Nielsen, Muslims in Western Europe (Edinburgh, 1991); the same, “Citizens or Aliens?,” Muslim Politics Report (New York. NY, 1997) no. 15. 2. Major Qur’anic verses on tolerance and religious pluralism are 2256; 5:48; 11:118; 16:93; and 42:8. 3. Qur’anic Christology is mainly found in surahs 3,4, 5, 11, 16, 19, and 42; also see William E. Phipps, Muhammad and Jesus (London, 1996). 4. Major parts on Moses are found in surahs 7, 10, 18,20,26,28, and 40. 5. For the status of non-Muslim ah1 al-dhimmuh as it ideally should be, see Abdur Rahman I. Doi, Shari‘ah, The Islamic Law (London, 1984), pp. 426-435, and Muhammad Sa’id R. A1 Buti, Jihad in Islam (Damascus, 1995), pp. 114-139. For the fiqh al-siyar as actually practiced during the Middle Ages, very much against the spir- it of the Qur’an, see lbn Nawawi, Minhuj al-Trilibin, trans. by E.C. Howard (Lahore, 1914, 1977), pp. 468-469. For a future development of the status of dhimmi into citi- zenship rights, see Fathi Osman, “Human Rights on the Eve of the 21st Century,” paper presented in London to the Conference on Islam and Modernity (July 6, 1996), 6. For details see Khaled Abou El Fadl, “Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities,” Islamic Law and Society, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Leiden, August 1994). lbn Nawawi, Minhaj al-Tdibin, writes on p. 463: “The law recommends a Moslem inhabiting an infidel country to emigrate, even though he may enjoy there the free exercise of his religion.” pp. 19-21. Hofmann: Muslims As Co-Citizens in the West 95 7. Fathi Osman put it succinctly when saying that “the division of dar al-Islam apart from the other world. . . , was historical and theoretical” (my emphasis). See F. Osman, “Human Rights on the Eve of the 21st Century.” 8. Such clauses are Art. 18 of the General Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948; Art. 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms of 4 November 1950; and Art. 18 of the International Pact concerning Civil and Political Rights of 19 December 1966. 9. Examples are the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies and the Graduate School for Islamic and Social Sciences in Leesburg, Virginia. 10. The most liberal and complete arrangement for any Muslim community in Europe was concluded on April 28, 1992, between the Spanish minister of justice and the Spanish Islamic Commission, ratified by the Spanish Parliament on November 10,1992, by law no. 26/1992. It provides, e.g., for immunity of Islamic centers, religious instruc- tion even in private schools, Muslim holidays, halal slaughtering, Muslim access to hos- pital and prisons, and working hours during Ramadan. 11. Under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, the German Catholics, suspected of “Ultramontanism,” went through what was called “Kulturkampf” (cultural battle) long before Samuel Huntington’s analysis. 12. %:l. 13. See Yamine Bouguenaya Mermer, “Induction, Science and Causation: Some Critical Reflections,” Islamic Studies, Vol. 35, no.3 (Islamabad, Summer 1996). 14. European Sufis like RenC G d n o n , Martin Lings, Frithjof Schoun, and Michel Chodkiewicz have always contributed to this spiritualization. 15. Currently there exist several Muslim umbrella organizations in the U.K., France, and Germany but already a central Muslim organization at the European level has been formed, located in Strasbourg+he Muslim Coordination Council in Europe, with Dr. Abdalla Boussouf as cordinator. 16. A pioneering work was Muhammad Asad’s The Principles of State and Government in lslam (Gibraltar, 1980). For Fathi O m a n see, e.g., his Sharia in Contemporary Socie-The Dynamics of Change in the Islamic Law 0.0s Angeles, 1994), with chapters on “Shura and Democracy” and “Voting”; also see his paper “Human Rights on the Eve of the 21st Century-Problems for Muslims and Others,” submitted to the Conference on Islam and Modernity in London (July 6, 1996); for Ghannouchi see, e.g., “Towards Inclusive Strategies for Human Rights Enforcement in the Arab World-A Response,” Encounters, Vol. 2, no. 2 (Leicester, September 1996). 17. Bassam Tibi denies that in Islam human beings are autonomous subjects. Therefore he claims that there is no such thing as an individual right in Islam. See Bassam Tibi, Die Krise des mdernen Islams (Frankfurt, 1991), pp. 260 and 271. No wonder there are books titled Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, ed. Ghassan SalamC (London, 1994). 18. I have tried to give a more concrete answer to these pertinent questions in Murad Hofmann, Islam 2000, (Beltsville, Md.: amana publications, 1996) and Islam: The Alternative (amana publications, 1997). 19. See Religion in Contemporary Europe, ed. John Fulton and Peter G. Lampeter (Wales, 1994). 20. A German ultraconservative Christian organization called “Christliche Mitte” has been conducting an anti-Islamic hate campaign for several years now.