The Transdisciplinary Approach:
A Critical Appraisal from an

“Islamic Perspective”
Ali Paya

Abstract

This paper argues that the transdisciplinary approach, contrary to
the views of some of its advocates, is not a methodology but a meta-
method. In the first part I shall briefly discuss the similarities and
differences between science/knowledge and technology to explain
important epistemic implications of placing this approach in the lat-
ter category. Next, I shall critically examine the views of Basarab
Nicolescu, one of the most prolific proponents of a particular read-
ing of this approach. Part three discusses the function of the trans-
disciplinary approach as a meta-method. In the fourth and final part
I shall try to introduce some examples from the intellectual econiche
of Islamic culture in a bid to shed further light on this approach’s
potential as a meta-method. The conclusion, which I draw from my
own critical examination, is that the transdisciplinary approach can
be used in an effective way, provided that its users adopt an appro-
priate philosophical framework. Such a framework, I contend, could
be provided by critical rationalism.

Keywords: Transdiscilinary approach, critical rationalism, sci-
ence and technology, methodology, methods, and meta-methods

Ali Paya is a senior visiting research fellow at the Department of Politics and International Re-
lations, University of Westminster, London; an associate professor of philosophy at the National
Research Institute for Science Policy, Tehran; and a philosophy professor at the Islamic College,
London. He has a PhD in the philosophy of science (University College London), an MSc. in
the history and philosophy of science and mathematics (Chelsea/Kings College London), an
MA in philosophy (University of Tehran), and a BSc in Electronic Engineering (Sharif Uni-
versity of Technology). His research interests include Muslims’ intellectual legacy (including
Muslim social and political thought); philosophies and methodologies of social and human sci-
ences; the cultural, social, and ethical impact of modern sciences and technologies; and Futures 



Introduction
The transdisciplinary approach is a relatively new concept. It seems that its
title and general idea was first suggested by Jean Piaget in 1970.1 Since then,
many writers have used it, developed it further, and applied it to research proj-
ects in various fields.2 However, even a casual observer can detect differences
(some rather sharp and substantive) as well as nuances in how those who write
about this approach have discussed it.

To make effective use of this approach, we have to better understand its
main characteristics and functions. To this end, the first section explains the
differences between science/knowledge and technology in order prepare the
ground for the third section, where I shall introduce the transdisciplinary ap-
proach as a meta-method. In the second section I shall deal at some length with
the views of Basarab Nicolescu, who holds that the transdisciplinary approach
is a methodology. I shall try to show that his views, which are informed by a
rather dubious philosophy of science, suffer from serious defects. In the fourth
part I briefly touch upon some examples from the intellectual econiche of Is-
lamic culture in a bid to shed further light on the transdiciplinary approach’s
potential as a meta-method that could be used in various fields of research. The
paper ends with a brief conclusion.

But before embarking upon my critical exploration, I need to clarify an
important point. The term Islamic perspective simply means the perspective
adopted by a Muslim (i.e., a person whose world outlook and universe of moral
values are [at least partially] shaped by Islamic ideas and ideals). My perspec-
tive is further informed by critical rationalism.3 The adjective Islamic does not
imply anything sacred, divine, or infallible, for all man-made constructs are
fallible and imperfect and thus in constant need of further improvement.

Science and Technology: Similarities and Differences4
Science/knowledge and technology are both socially constructed, although dis-
tinct, entities. Science, or more generally knowledge, responds to human cog-
nitive needs. Technology, on the other hand, serves two main purposes: human

24 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 32:1

Studies. His latest publications include “A Critical Assessment of the Notions of ‘Islamic Sci-
ence’ and ‘Islamisation of Science/Knowledge,” International Studies in the Philosophy of Sci-
ence (2015), “Islamic Philosophy: Past, Present, and Future,” Philosophical Traditions (Royal
Institute of Philosophy: 2014); The Misty Land of Ideas and the Light of Dialogue: An Anthol-
ogy of Comparative Philosophy: Western & Islamic (2013); Iraq, Democracy, and the Future
of the Muslim World (2011). He would like to thank David Miller for his insightful comments
on an earlier draft as well as an anonymous journal referee. 



non-cognitive needs (e.g., cars, cutleries, chairs, democracies, banks, and many
other technologies) and facilitators for human cognitive needs, none of which
can directly respond to human cognitive needs (e.g., telescopes, laptops, uni-
versities, books, and many other inventions that facilitate the pursuit of knowl-
edge). Some technologies, of course, could play both roles, mobile phones
being a case in point.

Science/knowledge is objective (i.e., publicly accessible and assessable)5
and consists of our best conjectures about reality, all of which are expressed
in terms of statements. Conjectures can only be regarded as proper knowl-
edge-claims if they are criticizable (either by empirical or analytic-rational
means or both); tautologies and analytic statements are empty, for they tell us
nothing about reality. Our conjectures provide us with knowledge about reality
in two ways: via negativa and via positiva. The first category refers to all of
our falsified conjectures, for they tell us what reality is not like. The second
category refers to all conjectures that, despite our best efforts to expose their
defects, have remained corroborated. They tell us, in a provisional and tem-
porary manner and until better conjectures are found, what reality is like. In
any case, knowledge is and forever remains conjectural.6

Knowledge or science claims, which are general or universal, differ from
both data and information. Knowledge also differs from intuitions, flashes of
insight, inspiration, epiphanies, and private and personal experiences. These
“existential states” are not knowledge, and yet their role in producing knowl-
edge is vital.7

Although scientists are immersed in local cultures and traditions and carry
their cultural and metaphysical baggage, as well as value systems, along with
them, they do their best, in their bids to understand different aspects of reality,
to keep their conjectures free of such external influences in order to depict re-
ality itself as faithfully as possible. The aim of science/knowledge is to move
ever closer to a true representation of reality, regardless of the scientists’ per-
sonal or cultural preferences. The only exception to this is when knowledge
about these preferences is the goal of the research in question. This aim is
achieved by the critical assessment of knowledge claims in the public arena.
In this sense, science/knowledge is therefore value-neutral, or at least strives
to be so.8

In the case of technology, on the other hand, being impregnated with the
values cherished by its inventors or end-users is not only a virtue but also an
indispensable characteristic. Technology ought to be user-friendly, whereas
science/knowledge claims ought to be true (i.e., faithfully represent reality re-
gardless of people’s preferences).

Paya: The Transdisciplinary Approach 25



Science/knowledge conjectures seek to transcend particular contexts,
whereas technology is context-sensitive. For instance, it may not be possible,
without the proper fine-tuning, to use a technology devised to respond to the
needs of people living in a particular environment or context to work properly
in other contexts. Science/knowledge is cumulative, whereas technological
know-how is, to some extent, tacit and non-cumulative. Since part of techno-
logical know-how is transferred through a sort of master-disciple relationship,
in many cases if the know-how is lost it is lost forever, or at least its retrieval
would be extremely difficult.9

The criterion for judging advances in science/knowledge is approaching
the ideal of the truth about reality. In technology, such pragmatic considera-
tions as more effective practical problem-solving provide measures for
progress. Technology, contrary to the view of Martin Heidegger10 and a num-
ber of other writers, has no “essence,” but only “function.” Different kinds
of technology are individuated according to their functions. Users of tech-
nology can add or omit specific functions in order to tailor them to the pur-
pose(s) they have in mind. While for science/knowledge the final arbiter is
always reality, for technology the users’ tastes and preferences (which together
form an important part of their networks of meaning) are just as important as
the constraints imposed by reality on the function(s) that each technology can
possess.

Each specific technology is identifiable as such only for those who share
a network of meaning or a collective intentionality in which that particular
technology, with its characteristic functions, is recognized. For an indigenous
inhabitant of a remote tribe in the Amazon’s forests, a laptop is only a thing
and not a laptop. This is a case of what philosophers define as the difference
between “seeing” and “seeing as.”11

Science strives to discover the fundamental laws of nature. Scientific laws
only define the limits beyond which technology cannot operate. For example,
the law/principle of energy conservation implies the impossibility of con-
structing a perpetual motion machine, and entropy states that a machine with
a 100 percent efficiency is impossible.12 Technology rely on what is known
as technological/phenomenological laws,13 those that are “derivable” from
fundamental laws.14

A Critique of Niclosecu’s Views
As briefly stated above, the transdisciplinary approach means different things
to different writers. According to Nicolescu, its various explanatory accounts

26 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 32:1



can be roughly divided into two main camps. One camp, represented by writers
like Michael Gibbons and Helga Nowotny,15 maintains that this approach is
not a methodology but a method that concentrates “on the joint problem-solv-
ing of problems pertaining to the science-technology-society triad.”16 The other
camp, headed by Nicloescu and his colleagues, distinguishes three varieties of
transdiscilinarity, namely, theoretical, phenomenological, and experimental.17

Nicolescu suggests that the first camp represents the phenomenological
manifestation of transdiciplinarity, whereas the theoretical manifestation of
this approach is a methodology under which many different methods could
be used.18 He classifies his own view as a theoretical approach and therefore
considers it to be a methodology. In addition, he states that experimental trans-
disciplinarity is concerned with “a great number of experimental data already
collected in the framework of knowledge production, but also in many fields
like education, psychoanalysis, the treatment of pain in terminal diseases, drug
addiction, art, literature, the history of religions etc.”19

In what follows I mostly limit myself to Nicolescu’s  views,20 which are
fairly representative of his latest thinking on the issue. My focus in the section
is to show why his philosophy and philosophy of science suffer from serious
shortcomings. Nicolescu claims that transdiscplinarity’s most important
achievement has been the formulation of a methodology that is, more or less,
universally accepted and adopted by many researchers. He claims that this
methodology has an axiomatic nature that resembles the axioms of modern
science. The main axioms of these two methodologies are, according to him,
as follows.21

Table 1. Axioms of Modern Science vs. Axioms of Transdisciplinarity 

Axioms of Modern Science Axioms of Transdisciplinarity

There are universal laws of a The ontological axiom: There are different 
mathematical character. levels of the object’s reality and, correspond-

ingly, different levels of the subject’s reality.

These laws can be discovered The logical axiom: The passage from one level 
by scientific experiment. of reality to another is ensured by the logic of 

the included middle.

Such experiments can be  The epistemological axiom: The structure of
the perfectly replicated. totality of all levels of reality is a complex struc-

ture: every level is what it is because all of the 
levels exist at the same time.

Paya: The Transdisciplinary Approach 27



Despite his critical attitude toward the positivistic approaches to science,
Nicolescu, apparently inadvertently, subscribes to (at least) some positivistic
thesis. For example, with regard to science’s second axiom, he maintains that
these laws “can be discovered by experiment.” But this is clearly a positivistic
creed. Critical rationalists had argued long ago that “all observations are the-
ory-laden” and demonstrated that experiments and observations can only help
researchers critically assess theories and conjectures.22 In other words, they
cannot help us discover anything. Both induction and abduction, as methods
for discovery, are not only ineffective but also impossible.23

In explicating his own proposed axioms for transdisciplinarity, Nicolescu
further reveals his positivistic tendencies, despite the fact that the positivist
philosophy of science has long been discredited by such philosophers as Karl
Popper.24 He suggests: “Axioms … have their roots in experimental data and
theoretical approaches ....”25 However, experimental data are mute and contain
no axioms, for axioms are constructed (as conjectures) by investigators and
researchers. Data is then interpreted in the light of those axioms whose validity
we accept without argument.

Having introduced the axioms of modern science and his own axioms of
transdisciplinarity, Nicolescu goes on to further elaborate his conception of
these axioms’ content. But in doing so, he reveals more of the flaws in his
own philosophical views. For example his third axiom, which is supposed to
be epistemological in nature, is formulated in a way that makes it a continu-
ation of his ontological axiom. Of course, in all fairness it should be pointed
out that in 2011 he renamed his third axiom “the complexity axiom” and
changed its formulation slightly, as follows: “The structure of the totality of
levels of Reality or perception is a complex structure: every level is what it is
because all the levels exist at the same time.”26 But this new formulation, if
anything, is even more confused since it apparently tries to posit the complex-
ity of an objective reality. The use of the connective or rather than and in the
above formulation implies that Nicloescu equates something that ought to be
essentially objective with something that is, by definition, subjective.

For another example of carelessness when dealing with sensitive theoret-
ical issues, one need look no further than how he refers to the use of experi-
ments in science. Nicloescu claims that “such experiments can be perfectly
replicated.” But this is inaccurate and misleading, for what is “replicated”
when scientists repeat certain experiments are new phenomena that only re-
semble the original phenomena (which were produced in the original experi-
mental setup) within certain limits of accuracy. However, the “replicated”
phenomena are not identical with the original phenomena, and the new ex-
perimental set-ups are not identical with the original setup.27

28 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 32:1



Nicolescu differentiates between what he calls “real” and what he dubs
“reality”: “Real designates that which is, while Reality is connected to resist-
ance in our human experience.”28 This distinction presumably alludes to
Kant’s distinction between the noumenon and the phenomenon. Elaborating
on his first axiom, Nicloescu further claims there is a discontinuity in the struc-
ture of reality’s levels because each level has its own specific set of laws. His
guiding analogy in making this claim is the difference between classical and
quantum laws. 

Here it seems that a more cautious epistemic approach is required. First,
it is necessary to differentiate between the laws of nature and the laws of sci-
ence, the latter being our best conjectures with regard to the former. Nicolescu
does not appear to have been particularly clear about this distinction. The fact
that the laws we have discovered so far imply “discontinuity” at the level of
phenomenal reality can, at most, allow us to conjecturally and not categori-
cally posit “phenomenal discontinuity.”

Having introduced his distinction between the “real” and “reality,”
Nicolsecu goes on to suggest that transdisciplinarity is “the possibility of
knowledge [about reality] beyond disciplines.”29 In his bid to develop a new
way of acquiring knowledge about reality, which, in his view, is not restricted
by the boundaries of any particular discipline, Nicolescu moves to re-introduce
the idea of unity between object and subject, an old idea upheld by mystics
like Ibn Arabi and Eckhart,30 idealist philosophers like Hegel,31 and realist
theosophists like Mulla Sadra.32 They all believed that genuine knowledge of
reality could only be achieved when such unification is achieved. Muslim
philosophers have even coined a term for this “type of knowledge”: knowledge
by presence.33

But as critical rationalists have explained, such a state of unification is the
result of a personal experience. This experience is only a temporary existen-
tial state, due to which the subject acquires some private non-propositional
dispositions. However, these dispositions cannot be regarded as knowledge34
because the subject, in the course of this unificatory experience, cannot, by
definition, be aware of himself/herself, his/her status, and also his/her expe-
rience. Such an awareness can only be achieved through reconstructing the
experience in question by means of language and concepts and through the
use of memory. Such a reconstruction is not identical with the original expe-
rience, which is a pure existential state and not a representation of that state.35
In other words, knowledge by presence is not knowledge at all. Removing the
epistemic boundary between subject and object results not in a more accel-
erated growth of knowledge, but rather makes acquiring knowledge impos-

Paya: The Transdisciplinary Approach 29



sible by reducing objective knowledge to the processes of personal, subjec-
tive experience. 

Of course such subjective experiences, as the critical rationalists argue,
are vital for enriching the subject’s World 2 (i.e., his/her subjective world of
cognition, emotion, and volition).36 A rich World 2 can prepare the ground for
producing fruitful conjectures as solutions to the problems/challenges that re-
ality (i.e., World 1) introduces to the subject.37

Knowledge, as explained earlier, ought to be publicly accessible since it
belongs to the objective (in the above sense) World 3.38 World 3 is the abode
of the thoughts that human beings have produced in response to their cognitive
and non-cognitive needs and that have remained publicly accessible: scientific
theories and knowledge claims, blueprints of technological machines and sys-
tems, stories, novels, music, melodies, movies, rules, conventions, and similar
things.39 Of course, an individual can have personal, subjective knowledge.
But such knowledge should not be conflated with the processes of personal
experience in which the subject is unified with the object. An individual’s sub-
jective knowledge can be presented to the public arena, since it is formulated
in terms of concepts and language. Personal experience should also not be
conflated with objective knowledge about reality, whose abode is not the sub-
jective World 2 but the objective World 3.40

Nicolescu’s suggestion concerning removing the boundary between ob-
ject and subject, contrary to his intention, neither helps to introduce new spir-
ituality into our knowledge-garnering pursuits nor to make progress with
respect to acquiring knowledge about an objective reality. Instead, it leads to
a debilitating idealism of the sort that had bedevilled Hegel’s and the philoso-
phies of other German idealist system-builders.41

In line with the main tenet of idealism, Nicloescu maintains that “physical
objects cannot be thought of as existing apart from a thinking mind.”42 The
above statement, of course, as Rasmussen43 has argued, can mean two things.
The first, which is endorsed by idealists, is that physical objects, or reality,
somehow depend, for their very existence, upon a thinking mind. Nicloescu
asserts that quantum mechanics has provided evidence that supports this po-
sition.44 The other sense, which is endorsed by realist philosophers, is the com-
monsensical view that in order to think of physical objects or reality, a thinking
mind is needed. In other words, realist philosophers make a distinction be-
tween the act of thinking and the object of thinking, whereas idealists believe
that a thinking mind (whether of individuals or a supreme being) is causally
(whether partially or wholly) responsible for bringing the physical reality into
being.45

30 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 32:1



Niclosecu’s second axiom needs particular attention. The way he has for-
mulated it implies that he, like the early Wittgenstein and the logical positivist
members of the Vienna Circle, views that reality itself as having a “logical
structure.” This logical structure apparently conforms to the axiom of the in-
cluded middle, as defined by Niclosecu. 

At least three important objections can be raised against Nicolescu’s sec-
ond axiom. First, the demise of logicism and the abortion of the logical posi-
tivists’ program for logical reconstruction of reality, as well as Wittgenstein’s
repudiation of his assumption concerning the logical structure of reality in his
later works, provide powerful counterexamples with regard to a conjecture or
axiom that suggests a logical structure for reality.46

Second, it ought to be noted that logic is a tool devised to deal with the
validity (or otherwise) of our arguments. Logic does not tell us anything about
reality in a direct way. In this respect, it is even more general and abstract
than mathematics. This was the main reason behind the (doomed) project of
logicism, which had sought to reduce mathematics to logic.47 While mathe-
matical axioms (at least according to realist philosophers of mathematics)
refer to some possible worlds and not all (e.g., the axioms of Euclidian geom-
etry are not valid in a non-Euclidian world), logic is applicable to all possible
worlds. In fact, as a formal tool it has got nothing to do with the contents of
our arguments.

Third, the axiom of the included middle, which seems to be a restatement
of Hegel’s triad of “thesis, anti-thesis, and synthesis,”48 suffers from a number
of shortcomings. In the first place, the import of this axiom conflates logic (a
pure formalistic tool) with metaphysics (which makes substantive claims
about reality and beings). Moreover, in a strict logical sense, the acceptance
of just one contradiction opens the floodgates for the acceptance of the most
ludicrous claims.49 Furthermore, it seems this principle, as far as garnering
knowledge about reality is concerned, violates Ockham’s advice: If we find
inconsistencies in our thinking, we need not to ascribe it to reality. In the words
of a philosopher of science and a philosopher of logic, “[m]ost thinking is
through inconsistencies (problem solving); successful thinking eventually
straightens the inconsistencies out.”50 Nicolescu’s appeal to quantum mechan-
ics as a way of “justifying” his introduction of the principle of the included
middle does not seem to be of much help. As a philosopher of science who
prefers to remain anonymous has observed, 

[the] idea that quantum mechanics shows that there are different contradictory
levels of reality seems to me to be lazy thinking. Even on the most charitable
interpretation, waves are not the contradictories of particles; waves and par-

Paya: The Transdisciplinary Approach 31



ticles are different aspects of reality that (perhaps) cannot be fully displayed
at once. But this is an old story: the table that is made of wood and the table
that is made of atoms also reveal different aspects of reality, but (except for
those who want to be scandalous) they do not show that reality is contradic-
tory. Plato identified the four elements with four of the five regular convex
polyhedrals, and sought to explain the observable world in geometric terms.
None of this licenses the introduction of the law of [the] included middle.51

Other aspects of his model also deserve close scrutiny. Like many con-
temporary philosophers of science, Nicolescu is against scientism.52 However,
while he is right to be concerned about the negative effects of the ideology of
scientism on the growth of knowledge, he seems to be completely oblivious
to the fact that his own faulty philosophical model is not only incapable of
countering the danger of scientism, but also poses a threat to the growth of
knowledge.

One of scientism’s most influential forms was advocated by the members
of the Vienna Circle. Nicolescu, as was argued above, shares some of the main
tenets of a positivist philosophy of science, albeit unwittingly. Moreover, in
his bid to break away from the shackles of scientism he makes a fatal move
towards idealism by taking two mistaken steps: insisting upon removing the
theoretical boundary between subject object, and unknowingly accepting the
positivists’ misguided conception of objectivity.53 In passing, it must be noted
that positivists, notwithstanding their emphasis on objectivity, were forced to
embrace idealism or, even worse, solipsism.54

In criticising the views of those who regard the transdisciplinary approach
as a method and not a methodology, Nicloescu asserts:

This version of transdisciplinarity does not exclude the meaning “beyond dis-
ciplines” but reduces it to the interaction of disciplines with social constraints.
The social field necessarily introduces a dimension “beyond disciplines,” but
the individual human being is conceived of as part of a social system only.
The spiritual dimension is therefore absent in this approach. It is difficult for
us to understand why “joint problem solving” must be the unique aim of
transdisciplinarity. It is certainly one of the important aims but not the only
aim. The use of such a narrow characterization seems to us dangerous, as in
religion, allowing unnecessary wars and unproductive dogmatism.55

He does not explain how the spiritual dimension could be included in this
approach. Critical rationalists argue that while the inquirers’ spirituality must
not interfere with the objectivity of their research, intellectual honesty and ad-
herence to ethical norms are indispensable if the pursuit for knowledge is to
be successful.56 Moreover, they endorse Immanuel Kant’s view that while

32 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 32:1



ethics does not need the support of religion or the sacred, it would, inevitably,
lead to an appreciation of the sacred and a spiritual/religious (though not in
the sense of established religions) aspects of reality.57 Furthermore, they argue
(as we have already seen) that while scientific findings ought to be as devoid
as possible of the inquirers’ values, technology is informed by its inventors’/
users’ values. A spiritually enlightened user of the transdisciplinary approach
could use it in ways that are commensurate with his/her values.

It is not clear why Nicolescu thinks that “joint problem solving” would
lead to dogmatism, as dogmatism stems from absolutist, utopic, exclusivist
worldviews that leave scant room for pluralism and critical assessment. How-
ever, for a critical rationalist who maintains, on the one hand, that “all life is
problem solving,”58 and, on the other, emphasizes that our ignorance is bound-
less and yet it is not impossible for us to collectively move closer, by means
of a critical assessment of our ideas, to a more truthful understanding of reality,
a method (or a meta-method) that could improve our joint problem solving
ability need not be regarded as a means for producing dogmatism.

Nicolescu seems to want to argue against relativists and post-modern
philosophers.59 But once again his own faulty philosophical approach betrays
him and leads him to embrace theses that are relativist in tone and/or very
similar to the way post-modern philosophers develop their own arguments. A
case in point is how he makes use of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem.

This open structure of the unity of levels of Reality is in accord with one of
the most important scientific results of the twentieth century concerning
arithmetic, the theorem of Kurt Gödel, which states that a sufficiently rich
system of axioms inevitably leads to results that are either undecidable or
contradictory. … The Gödelian structure of levels of Reality implies the im-
possibility of a self-enclosed, complete theory. Knowledge is forever open.60

Gödel’s theorem is a meta-logical theorem about formal axiomatic sys-
tems. Given that it does not say anything directly about physical reality, de-
ducing any direct conclusion from it concerning the nature of reality amounts
to a category mistake and the abuse of knowledge. The above quotation re-
minds one of the postmodern writers’ inappropriate use of such scientific the-
ories like morphogenetic or homology and differential topology in the social
sciences and humanities. The American physicist Alan Sokal, in his Intellec-
tual Impostures,61 exposed and parodied the above approach. Ironically,
Nicloescu is not unaware of Sokal’s book and arguments.62

Due to space constraints, I must end my critical assessment of Nicolescu’s
philosophical views here. But before ending this section I would like to high-

Paya: The Transdisciplinary Approach 33



light another serious weaknesses of his “philosophical system”: his fondness
of using “definitions” in lieu of arguments. He writes:

Based upon our definition of levels of Reality, we can identify other levels
than the ones in natural systems. For example, in social systems, we can speak
about the individual level, the geographical and historical community level
(family, nation), the cyber-space-time community level, and the planetary
level.63

Alas this “system” of categorisation, far from serving as a guide to un-
derstanding reality, only reminds one of Jorge Luis Borges’ famous “system
of classification for animals,” which a character in of one of his essays attrib-
utes to a certain Chinese encyclopaedia entitled the Celestial Emporium of
Benevolent Knowledge.64

The Transdiciplinary Approach as a Meta-method
The confusion between methodology and method seems to be common in
most of the methodology and research methods textbooks, many of which
contain very little or no mention of the term and concept of methodology or
use it interchangeably with method. Similarly, in many research proposals,
PhD theses, and MA/MSc dissertations, authors discuss the methods they in-
tend to use in the “Methodology” section. The following examples are self-
explanatory. In his book Research Methodology: A Step-by-Step Guide for
Beginners,65 the author only mentions methodology five times (including on
three title pages and one section heading). In fact, there is no discussion what-
soever of this concept except for the following paragraph in the preface:

Research methodology is taught as a supporting subject in several ways in
many academic disciplines such as health, education, psychology, … The
core philosophical base for this work comes from my conviction that, al-
though these disciplines vary in content, their broad approach to a research
inquiry is similar. … It is true that some disciplines place greater emphasis
on quantitative research, and some on qualitative research. My own ap-
proach to research is a combination of both. …66

The following quotation from another work is equally revealing:

The proposal should also be very specific about methodology: the research
participants you will study, what instruments or techniques you will use to
study them, and how you will analyze the data collected. Finally, the pro-
posal should answer the “so what” question: Assuming the study goes for-
ward, how will the findings from this study make a difference to other
researchers (basic research study) or practitioners in the field (applied re-

34 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 32:1



search study)? By the end of the proposal, the reader should have a clear
idea of how the study will be conducted and why it is important.67

Such examples, unfortunately, can be multiplied many times. Few books
on research methods make it clear that methods are mere tools or techniques
for collecting data and information are, in and of themselves, blind and there-
fore need to be guided with regard to the data and information they collect.
Methodologies, which are part of epistemologies, deal with issues such as the
criteria for assessing the merit of competing theories and conjectures (includ-
ing interpretations used to evaluate the data collected), evaluating the effec-
tiveness of models of explanation, and guidelines concerning the choice of
suitable methods for the type of research under consideration.68

As a technology, the transdisciplinary approach is a meta-method. The idea
of meta-methods is familiar to all students of methodology. Meta-methods are
used in cases where large amounts of various types of data from different fields
are required. A case in point is research conducted in the field of Futures Stud-
ies. In the course of developing scenarios for various trends concerning specific
phenomena, these researchers make use of two major meta-methods, namely,
foresight and forecast, in order to collect the required data from a large number
of experts who work in fields related to the phenomena in question. Under the
general umbrella of these meta-methods, many more specific methods could
be used.69

It seems that transdiciplinarity, in a similar way, could also be regarded as
an all-covering umbrella under which various disciplines’ methods could be
used in the service of collective problem-solving in cases where “the problem”
under consideration needs to be tackled from numerous angles and with the
assistance of all types of experts working in different disciplines. Researchers
in the subfields of a major transdiciplinary approach could use various meth-
ods and meta-methods, including interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary ap-
proaches. At the level of transdisciplinary research, all such approaches and
data collected by methods/meta-methods are combined to produce a unified
view of the problem at hand. The problem under consideration, of course, is a
multi-faceted one and hence requires the concerted and coordinated efforts of
practitioners from diverse fields.

As suggested earlier, there are many cases of actual real scientific re-
search in which researchers have claimed that they have been able to apply
the meta-method of transdiciplinarity to the problems being analyzed. In their
review of transdisciplinary research in sustainability science (a survey of 236
transdisciplinary papers), Patric Brandt and his colleagues correctly con-
cluded that:

Paya: The Transdisciplinary Approach 35



Transdisciplinary sustainability research utilizes a broad range of different
methods for knowledge integration and production, and there is no clear
set of tools required for different process phases or integration of different
types of knowledge. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to develop a broad
suite of accepted and (to some extent) standardized methodological tools.
This may increase the efficiency, effectiveness and repeatability of trans-
disciplinary research in sustainability science and help to communicate its
findings to both other scientists and the wider public.70

In view of what I have discussed so far, I suggest critical rationalism
as an “all-encompassing methodological/philosophical” framework for the
meta-method of transdisciplinarity. As a methodological framework and
philosophical perspective, critical rationalism subscribes to and upholds
the following theses, among others71: (1) All knowledge is conjectural, and
yet it is not impossible to get closer to a true understanding of reality,
whether natural or socially constructed; (2) We learn though our own mis-
takes and by reflecting upon the mistakes of others; (3) Confirmation and
confirming evidence do not add one iota to our knowledge; it is through
the process of refuting knowledge claims that we learn about reality; and
(4) Knowledge advances in two complementary ways: via negativa and via
positiva. The former pertains to what we learn from refutations of the con-
jectures made about reality: we learn that reality is not as these conjectures
explain. The latter pertains to conjectures that, so far and despite our best
and sincerest efforts to refute them, have proved resilient and remained cor-
roborated. Such claims are regarded as our best provisional candidates for
knowledge about reality. But such positive knowledge is and always remains
provisional, since sooner or later even our best corroborated conjectures will
be replaced by better ones that lack the defects found in the existing cor-
roborated ones. No matter how accurate our conjectures are, they always
fall short of fully capturing reality simply because reality is, as the critical
rationalists explain, infinite and we are finite creatures with limited cognitive
abilities.72

Critical rationalism also subscribes to the theses summarized in the fol-
lowing list: realism; the comprehensibility of reality; correspondence truth;
epistemic pluralism; dialogue as a tool for assisting knowledge pursuits; rejec-
tion of all sorts of relativism, dogmatism, inductivism, justificationism, foun-
dationalism, radical scepticism, and scientism; and intellectual honesty. For a
comprehensive introduction to critical rationalism, one should consult the
works of Karl Popper.73

36 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 32:1



The Transdiciplinary Approach: Some lessons
from the Muslim Experience
If the reader does not accuse me of anachronism, I would like to suggest the
following conjecture: It seems that the spirit, although certainly not the term
and strict structure, of the transdisciplinary approach, in the sense explained
in the previous section, was to some extent not alien to Muslim scholars during
Islamic civilization’s “golden age” (eighth to thirteenth centuries).74 In the
modern era, as I shall explain, some modern Muslim scholars have apparently
tried to apply this meta-method to a rather misguided project known as “The
Islamization of Knowledge.” 

As far as the Muslim scholars of the golden age are concerned, I must em-
phasize, as suggested above, that they were not consciously aware of the status
and significance given to this approach in our own time. They had a vague idea
of the fact that systematic and organized intellectual collaboration among dis-
ciplines could facilitate and accelerate the growth of knowledge. Accordingly,
some of them actually engaged in research that required them to move beyond
the boundaries of specific disciplines. The result was the creation of a wealth
of new and useful knowledge as well as the production of many new machines
and incredible innovations that paved the way for the Renaissance.75

The first group to successfully apply “the transdisciplinary approach”76
was the Ikhwan al-Safa (The Brethren of Purity), who are hailed as the initia-
tors of “Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam.”77 They were also responsible
for the first scholarly encyclopaedia in the intellectual history of Islam,78 a
collection of texts that appeared in the form of a series of epistles (rasā’il).
They explained the work’s structure in the first epistle:

We have produced an epistle for each branch of … sciences and mentioned
in them some of those meanings, and we have completed them with a gen-
eral epistle to awaken the negligent and guide the beginners. 

Know, my brother, that there are three kinds of sciences with which people
busy themselves, namely: the propaedeutic [that is, introductory] sciences,
the sciences pertaining to revealed law and the sciences of true philosophy.

The propaedeutic (sciences) are … of nine kinds: (1) writing and reading;
(2) language and grammar; (3) calculation and operations; (4) poetry and
prosody; (5) auguries and auspices, and the like; (6) magic, talismans,
alchemy, mechanical devices and the like; (7) professions and crafts; (8) sale
and purchase, trades, cultivation and breeding; (9) the study of campaigns
and history.

Paya: The Transdisciplinary Approach 37



[R]eligious sciences … are of six kinds: (1) the science of revelation; (2)
the science of interpretation (ta’wīl); (3) the science to do with transmissions
and reports (from past religious authorities); (4) the science of jurisprudence,
norms and laws; (5) the science relating to remembrance, exhortations, as-
ceticism and mysticism; (6) the science of the interpretation of dreams.

The philosophical sciences are of four kinds: (1) mathematical; (2) logical;
(3) physical; (4) divine.79

In their fourth epistle, the Ikhwan clearly show that they favor an approach
that is not far from the spirit of the transdisciplinary approach:

Know this, my Brother: we are not opposed to any science, we do not to
cling fanatically to any doctrine, and we do not keep ourselves away from
any of the books that the sages and the philosophers have written or com-
posed on the various sciences and the subtle meanings which they have ex-
tracted by their intellects and observations.80

Their openness to scientific and philosophical ideas, which was greatly
encouraged by the Buyid (Buwayhid) dynasty, not only led them to introduce
fascinating new visions, but also encouraged fellow-travellers to take bold
and innovative steps toward developing new ideas and technologies.81 An in-
teresting case in point is the Persian astronomer Abu Said Sijzi (945-1020),
“who spent some time at the Buwayhid court in Shiraz and assisted in 969/970
at the observations of the solstices … .”82 One of his great achievements was
the invention of a heliocentric astrolabe, a great conceptual leap for the time.83
Abu Rayhan Biruini, another great Muslim scientist (of whom we talk more
below), writes the following about this invention:

I have seen a simple astrolabe – it did not contain a northern or southern
section – made by Abu Sa’id al-Sijzi and called al-zawraqi. I liked it very
much, for he had invented it by employing an independent theory, held by
some people, stating that the apparent universal motion is due to the earth
and not to the heavens. I earnestly believe that [such motion] is difficult to
ascertain and analyse, and it should not concern those who depend on geo-
metric lines, i.e. the engineers and the astronomers, for it does not invalidate
their craft in any way. The natural philosophers, however, are the ones
charged with the analysis of such problems and doctrines.84

The Samanid dynasty (819-999), another enlightened Persian dynasty that
preceded the Buyid dynasty, tried to provide an environment for collaboration
among scholars from different fields. This environment paved the way for a
“transdisciplinary” collaboration. An interesting example that highlights these
scholars’ attitude is the critical exchanges that took place between Abu Rayhan

38 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 32:1



Biruni (Alberonius, 937-1048) and Ibn Sina (Avicenna, 980-1037) with regard
to some of the intricacies of the accepted cosmology of the day.

Ibn Sina was, like his fellow Persian-learned colleague, was a polymath
well-versed in many branches of sciences who sought to defend the received
scientific paradigm in the face of Biruni’s detailed challenges. These two pre-
dominant figures of the eleventh century discussed, at length, a number of im-
portant issues covering a wide range of cosmological and physical topics.85
The technique of “Questions and Answers,” as some scholars have argued,
was used extensively in the Islamic intellectual tradition86 and played an im-
portant role in promoting the spirit of the transdisciplinary approach. Their
correspondence served as a model of scientific and scholarly exchanges
among Muslim scholars during this period and further facilitated the trend to-
ward lateral thinking and “transdisciplinary” interaction. The following ex-
cerpts from one of their exchanges vividly demonstrates the point made above
about the presence of the transdisciplinary approach’s spirit among Muslim
scholars. Here, the narrator is Ibn Sina, who also formulates Biruni’s question.
The letter may have been written by one of Ibn Sina’s close disciples, most
probably Ma’sumi, who later on answered some of Biruni’s other questions
on behalf of his master.87

In the name of Allah the Most Merciful the Most Compassionate. This letter
is in response to the questions sent to him [i.e. Ibn Sina] by Abu Rayhan al-
Biruni from Khawarazm. May Allah surround you with all you wish for, and
may He grant you all you hope for and bestow on you the happiness in this
life, and hereafter, and save you from all you dislike in both lives. You re-
quested—may Allah prolong your safety—a clarification about matters some
of which you consider worthy to be traced back to Aristotle, of which he
spoke in his book, al-Sama’ wal-‘alam, and some of which you have found
to be problematic. I began to explain and clarify these briefly and concisely,
but some pressing matters inhibited me from elaborating on each topic as it
deserves. Further, the sending of the response to you was delayed, awaiting
al-Masumi’s dispatch of letter to you. Now, I would restate your questions in
your own words, and then follow each question with a brief answer. 

The first question: You asked—may Allah keep you happy—why Aris-
totle asserted that the heavenly bodies have neither levity nor gravity and
why did he deny absence of motion from and to the center.88

Ibn Sina’s response, as indicated above, is within that period’s dominant
peripatetic paradigm, to which Biruni also subscribed. But being more in-
volved with astronomy and empirical sciences than Ibn Sina, he had his doubts
about its complete validity.

Paya: The Transdisciplinary Approach 39



We can assume that since the heaven is among the heaviest bodies—and
that is an assumption, not a certainty—it does not require a movement to
the center because of a universal law that applies to all its parts judged as
similar. If every part had a natural movement toward the center, and the parts
were all connected, then it would result in a cessation (wuqūf) [of all motion]
at the center. Likewise, we can assume that the heaven is among the lightest
of all bodies, this would not necessitate (i) a movement from the center until
its parts have separated and (ii) the existence of vacuum outside the heaven.
And if the nonexistence of vacuum outside the heaven is an established fact,
then the heaven will be a composite body like fire. [And you also say] that
the circular movement of the heaven, though possible, might not be natural
like the natural movement of the planets to the east [which] is countered by
a necessary and forceful movement to the west. If it is said that this move-
ment is not encountered because there is no contradiction between the cir-
cular movements and there is no dispute about their directions, then it is just
deception and argument for the sake of argument, because it cannot be imag-
ined that one thing has two natural movements, one to the east and one to
the west. And this is nothing but a semantic dispute with agreement on the
meaning, because you cannot name the movement toward the west as op-
posite of the movement to the east. And this is a given; even if we do not
agree on the semantics, let us deal with the meaning.89 

While the above examples were positive instances of Muslim scholars
moving beyond the boundaries of known disciplines, my last example touches
upon a negative case: the project of Islamization of Knowledge, which has
been pursued by some Muslim scholars in Islamic and western countries since
the late 1960s and early 1970s. Its promoters, who are critical of modern sci-
ences and somewhat like Nicolescu, maintain that modern science has lost its
link with spirituality, the sacred, and the divine. They claim that by using the
resources found in Islamic culture and civilization, as well other spiritual cul-
tures and devising new methods and methodologies that would overcome the
present rigid boundaries between sciences, it would be possible to develop a
new science that would greatly improve our ability to understand reality.

This project of Islamizing knowledge or producing sacred science has many
representatives, the best known of whom are Ismail Faruqi (d. 1986), Seyyed
Hossein Nasr, Seyyed Naqib Al-Attas, and Ziauddin Sardar.90 But the snag with
this particular project, whose advocates actually promote a transdiciplinary ap-
proach not dissimilar to what Nicolescu suggests, is that their research project
is misguided.91 For example, Sardar has produced a lengthy table (partially re-
produced below), in which he contrasts the differences between his own model
of “Islamic science” and what he maintains to be “modern science.”92

40 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 32:1



Table 2. Western Science vs. Islamic Science 

Western Science Islamic Science

Puts its faith in rationality Places its faith in revelation

Values science for the sake of science Sees science as a form of worship
that has a spiritual and a moral 
function

Posits one all-powerful method as the Uses many methods based on rea-
only way of knowing reality son as well as revelation

Claims impartiality – to be value free; Claims partiality – towards the
a scientist is not responsible for the truth; consequences must be mor-
use to which his/her work is put ally good

Claims the absence of bias Admits the presence of subjectivity

Reduces the world to what can be Admits the reality of the spiritual
empirically verified dimension

Is fragmented into disciplines Values synthesis, is multidisciplinary
but holistic in its approach

The above table, as I have argued elsewhere,93 suffices to show the fallacy
of category mistake committed by this project’s advocates.

For example the claim that the so-called Islamic science “places its faith in
revelation” tells nothing substantive or worthwhile. On one reading, i.e., if
it is taken to mean that Islamic science accepts apparent meaning of revela-
tion in a blind manner, it can promote a dangerous epistemic attitude. On
another reading, i.e., if it is taken to mean that it accepts revelation, as a po-
tential source of knowledge, then it says nothing special. The reason is that
when a researcher uses revelation or any other potential source of knowl-
edge, for that matter, he/she must interpret it. Interpretations are, inevitably,
conjectures made by fallible human beings. As such they cannot be perfect
representations of reality. Their shortcomings must be disclosed in the public
arena and through critical assessments. But this is exactly what modern sci-
ence does with all potential sources of knowledge, including revelation.94

The claim that Islamic science “sees science as a form of worship which has
a spiritual and a moral function” betrays other types of confusions. Worship,
as explained above, is a form of technology. It assists the believer in his/her
pursuit of knowing the Master of the realm of being. But worship, like all
other technologies, does not provide us with knowledge. Moreover, as crit-

Paya: The Transdisciplinary Approach 41



ical rationalists argue, science/knowledge and morality go hand in hand. In
the absence of a moral attitude the chances of improving our knowledge
about reality are drastically reduced.95

Conclusion
In his recent An Inquiry into Modes of Existence, French anthropologist Bruno
Latour narrates the story of a French anthropologist who has become frustrated
with the way modern anthropologists put others into neat boxes and subject
them to research according to the canons of modern sciences. She decides to
apply her knowledge to an analysis of western society itself. In the course of
her research, when she asks her subjects about their view of modern society, 

[t]hey explain that with the end of the age of theocracy, collective life has
become rationalized, professionalized and secularized, resolving itself into
a set of separate “domains” such as law, economics, politics, and of course
science, which trumps all the others.96

Latour, through the champion of his book, argues that the doctrine of sep-
arate “domains” is nothing but a self-serving delusion.97 The snag with La-
tour’s diagnosis is that in his bid to uphold his social-constructivist approach,
he forgets the fact that socially constructed realities, notwithstanding their de-
pendence on our collective intentionalities, have power and to a large extent
are independent of us, whether individually or collectively.98

Boundaries of knowledge, like all other boundaries, are imposed by us
upon reality. But such boundaries, despite being man-made, are our best con-
jectures to help us, as it were, “carve reality at its joints.” These conjectures,
like all our other conjectures, will be replaced as soon as new refuting evidence
is found. But until such evidence appears, we are rationally entitled to regard
our existing best corroborated conjectures as our best guides to reality.

Latour and other like-minded researchers who are dissatisfied with the
present boundaries should take a leaf from the work of another French scholar
who also happened to be dissatisfied with the knowledge-claims of modern
science and wanted to make room for religious beliefs: Pierre Duhem (d.
1916). This scholar did his best to develop an instrumentalistic interpretation
of modern science. However, interestingly enough, in his endeavor to reject
the veracity of scientific claims he came to the conclusion that while a physical
theory should be regarded as an instrument, nevertheless it “is not merely an
artificial system, suitable today and useless tomorrow, but … an increasingly
more natural classification and an increasingly clearer reflection of realities
which experimental method cannot contemplate directly.”99

42 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 32:1



Present-day scientific disciplines are our best classifications, to date, for
moving closer to reality. Although they are not written in stone, they cannot
be changed according to the whims of this or that group. The transdisciplinary
approach can serve scholars in various fields to better appreciate the limita-
tions of their disciplines and encourage them to dialogue with fellow re-
searchers working in other fields. This would increase the degree of epistemic
pluralism in our own cultural/knowledge environment. The combination of
this pluralism plus a critical rational attitude toward knowledge claims would,
it is hoped, provide us with our best chance of improving our knowledge.

Endnotes

1. Basarab Nicolescu, “Transdisciplinarity as a Methodological Framework for
Going beyond the Science-Religion Debate,” Transdisciplinarity in Science and
Religion 2 (2007): 35-60, 1. 

2. David Cassinari, et. al. “Transdisciplinary Research in Social Polis,” 2008, avail-
able at http://public.citymined.org/Transdisciplinarity_print.pdf; B. A. Pesco-
solido, et al., “Under the Influence of Genetics: How Transdisciplinarity Leads
Us to Rethink Social Pathways to Illness,” American Journal of Sociology 114,
no. S1 (2008): S171-S201; Andrea Aeberhard and Stephan Rist, “Transdiscipli-
nary Co-production of Knowledge in the Development of Organic Agriculture
in Switzerland,” Ecological Economics 68 (2009): 1171-81.

3. I briefly discuss some of critical rationalism main tenets’ in section 3. For further
information on critical rationalism, see Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1979); Karl Popper, The Myth of the Framework
(London: Routledge, 1994); David Miller, Critical Rationalism: A Restatement
and a Defence (Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 1994); David Miller, Out of
Error (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).

4. This section partially draws on two of my papers: “How Indigenous are ‘Indige-
nous Sciences’? The Case of ‘Islamic Sciences,’” in Asia-Europe Dialogue and
the Making of Modern Science: Implications for History, Philosophy, and Soci-
ology of Knowledge, ed. Arun Bala, (147-66) (New York: Palgrave, 2011) and
“Faqih as an Engineer: A Critical Assessment of the Epistemological Status of
Fiqh,” Journal of Law and Religion (2015) (forthcoming). 

5. Ali Paya,  “The Misguided Conception of Objectivity in Humanities and Social
Sciences,” in The Crisis of the Human Sciences: False Objectivity and the De-
cline of Creativity, ed. Thorsten Botz-Bornstein (151-84) (Kuwait: Gulf Uni-
versity for Science & Technology Publications, 2011).

6. Popper, Objective Knowledge; Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies
(London: Routledge, 1945/1962); Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery
(London: Routledge, 1959/2002); Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (Lon-
don: Routledge, 1963/2002); Miller, Critical Rationalism; Miller, Out of Error.

Paya: The Transdisciplinary Approach 43



44 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 32:1

7. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations; Ali Paya, Analytic Philosophy: Problems
and Prospects, rev. ed. (Tehran: Tarh-e Nou, 2015).

8. Paya, “Misguided Conception.”
9. Joseph Agassi, Technology: Philosophical and Social Aspects (Dordrecht: Rei-

del, 1985).
10. Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” Basic Writings

(London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993).
11. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, II. xi (Oxford: Wiley-Black-

well, 2009), 193-229, especially p. 204e.
12. Miller, David, “Putting Science to Work,” lecture presented at a number of ac-

ademic centres in 2006 and 2013. One version of the paper (December 2009)
was kindly provided by the author; Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism
(London: Routledge Paul, 1957/2002).

13. Miller, Out of Error; Paya, Analytic Philosophy; Paya, “How Indigenous Are
‘Indigenous Sciences’?”

14. Paya, “How Indigenous Are ‘Indigenous Sciences’?”; Nicholas Maxwell, “The
Need for a Revolution in the Philosophy of Science,” Journal for General Phi-
losophy of Science 33 (2002): 381-408.

15. Michael Gibbons, et. al., eds., The New Production of Knowledge (London: Sage
Publications, 1994).

16. Nicolescu, “Transdisciplinarity as a Methodological Framework,” 39; Basarab
Nicolescu, “Methodology of Transdisciplinarity: Levels of Reality, Logic of the
Included Middle and Complexity,” Transdisciplinary Journal of Engineering &
Science 1, no. 1 (2010): 19-38, 26.

17. Nicolescu, “Transdisciplinarity as a Methodological Framework,” 40; Nicolescu,
“Methodology of Transdisciplinarity,” 23.

18. Nicolescu, “Transdisciplinarity as a Methodological Framework,” 40.
19. Ibid.
20. Nicolescu, “Transdisciplinarity as a Methodological Framework”; Basarsab

Nicolescu, “Methodology of Transdisciplinarity”; “The Latest on the Sokal Af-
fair: Beyond Three Extremisms.” Comments on Alan Sokal, Pseudosciences et
postmodernisme: Adversaires ou compagnons de route?” Transdisciplinarity in
Science and Religion 1 (2007): 228-32.

21. Nicolescu, “Transdisciplinarity as a Methodological Framework,” 41-42.
22. Popper, Conjectures, chap. 1.
23. In compliance with a set of constructive advice suggested by an anonymous ref-

eree of this journal, I provide a brief explanation of terms that may not be familiar
to some readers. Induction is used both a method of inference: it comes to gen-
eralization (a general statement) from a limited number of facts, data, and ob-
servations about particular things, events, and processes. It is also used a method
for generating hypotheses based on examining limited samples. Abduction is
another method of inference used to generate hypothesis. Upon the examination
of a particular event, it (allegedly) helps investigators discover its cause. See
Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery: Miller, Critical Rationalism; Miller,



Out of Error; Norwood Hanson, Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press: 1958). 

24. Karl Popper, Unended Quest (London: Routledge, 1974/2002).
25. Nicolescu, “Transdisciplinarity as a Methodological Framework,” 42.
26. Nicolescu, “Methodology of Transdisciplinarity,” 29, emphasis added.
27. Isaac Ben-Israel, “Philosophy and Methodology of Intelligence: The Logic of

Estimate Process,” Intelligence & National Security 4, no. 4 (1989): 660-718,
684-86.

28. Nicolescu, “Transdisciplinarity as a Methodological Framework,” 43.
29. Nicolescu, “Methodology of Transdisciplinarity,” 23.
30. Reza Shah Kazemi, Path to Transcendence: According to Shankara, Ibn Arabi,

and Meister Eckhart (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2006).
31. Jonael Schickler, Metaphysics as Christology: An Odyssey of the Self from Kant

and Hegel to Steiner (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).
32. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Sadruddin Shirazi (Mulla Sadra),” in A History of Muslim

Philosophy, ed. M. M. Sharif (Weisbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1963): 932-61.
33. Haeri Yazdi, The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy: Knowledge

by Presence (Tehran: Academy of Philosophy, 1992).
34. Karl Popper, The Open Society; Paya, Analytic Philosophy; Paya, “How Indige-

nous are ‘Indigenous Sciences’?”; Paya, “Faqih as an Engineer.”
35. Paya, Analytic Philosophy.
36. Popper, Objective Knowledge.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Popper, The Open Society; Roger Trigg, Reality at Risk (Brighton: Harvester

Press, 1980); Douglas Rassmusen, “Review of The Reality at Risk,” Reason
Papers 9 (1983): 85-90.

42. Rassmusen, “Review of The Reality at Risk,” 85.
43. Ibid. 
44. Nicolescu, “Transdisciplinarity as a Methodological Framework”; Nicolescu,

“Methodology of Transdisciplinarity.”
45. Rassmusen, “Review of The Reality at Risk.”
46. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge,

1922/1981); Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World (California:
University of California Press, 1928/1967); Paul Benacerraf, “Frege: The Last
Logicist,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6, no. 1 (1981): 17-35.

47. Hans Sluga, Gottlob Frege (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1980).

48. Nicolescu define his axiom of “included middle” in the following way: “To ob-
tain a clear image of the meaning of the included middle, let us represent the
three terms of the new logic — A, non-A, and T — and the dynamics associated
with them by a triangle in which one of the vertices is situated at one level of

Paya: The Transdisciplinary Approach 45



Reality and the two other vertices at another level of Reality … . The included
middle is in fact an included third. If one remains at a single level of Reality, all
manifestation appears as a struggle between two contradictory elements. The
third dynamic, that of the T-state, is exercised at another level of Reality, where
that which appears to be disunited is in fact united, and that which appears con-
tradictory is perceived as non-contradictory.” Nicolescu, “Transdisciplinarity as
a Methodological Framework,” 50. 

49. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, ch. 15.
50. Miller, Out of Error, 236.
51. Private correspondence with the author.
52. Scientism is a “pejorative term for the belief that the methods of natural science,

or the categories and things recognized in natural science, form the only proper
elements in any philosophical or other enquiry.” Simon Blackburn, The Oxford
Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 344). Nicolescu,
“Transdisciplinarity as a Methodological Framework,” 37; Nicolescu, “Method-
ology of Transdisciplinarity,” 21.

53. Paya, “Misguided Conception.”
54. “Solipsism: The belief that only oneself and one,s experience exists.” Blackburn,

The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 430; Friedrich Stadler (ed.), The Vienna
Circle and Logical Empiricism: Re-evaluation and Future Perspectives (Alphen
aan den Rijn: Kluwer 2003).

55. Nicolescu, “Methodology of Transdisciplinarity,” 23.
56. Mariano Artigas, The Ethical Nature of Karl Popper's Theory of Knowledge

(Berne: Peter Lang Publishing, 1999); Zuzana Parusniková and Robert Sonné
Cohen, Rethinking Popper (Berlin: Springer, 2009).

57. Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, ed. Allen Wood
et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

58. Karl Popper, All Life Is Problem Solving (London: Routledge, 2013).
59. Nicolescu, “Methodology of Transdisciplinarity.”
60. Nicolescu, “Transdisciplinarity as a Methodological Framework,” 31.
61. Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Intellectual Impostures (Hatton Gardens: Profile

Books Ltd., 1998).
62. Basarab Nicolescu, “The Latest on the Sokal Affair,” 228-32.
63. Nicolescu, “Methodology of Transdisciplinarity,”  27.
64. Jorje Luis Borges, “The Analytical Language of John Wilkins,” Other Inquisi-

tions 1937-1952 (New York: Washington Square Press, 1964).
65. Ranjit Kumar, Research Methodology: A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners

(London: Sage Publications, 2005).
66. Ibid., xvii.
67. Scott VanderStoep and Deirdre Johnston, Research Methods for Everyday Life:

Blending Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,
2009): 10.

68. Carlos Verdugo, “Popper’s Thesis of the Unity of Scientific Method: Method
Versus Techniques,” in Zuzana and Cohen, Rethinking Popper, 155-60; Robert

46 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 32:1



Nola and Howard Sankey, Theories of Scientific Method (Stocksfield Hall: Acu-
men, 2007).

69. P. Assakul “Futures Studies Methods,” (2003), available at: www.cgee.org.br/
atividades/redirKori/565; Theodor Gordon and Jerome C. Glenn, Futures Re-
search Methodology – V2.0 (Washington: AC/UNU Millennium Project, 2003).

70. Brandt Patric, et al., “A Review of Transdisciplinary Research in Sustainability
Science,” Ecological Economics 92 (2013): 1-15.

71. This is based on my “How to Promote ‘Modern Critical Thinking’ in the Context
of Islamic Studies in the Virtual Environment?” in The Proceedings of the E-
Learning and Islamic Studies: An International Conference, London, 24 May
2014. The proceedings of the conference will be published by the ICAS Press,
2015.

72. Ben-Israel, “Philosophy and Methodology”; Sokal and Bricmont, Intellec-
tual Impostures.

73. Popper, Objective Knowledge; Popper, The Myth of the Framework; Popper,
Conjectures and Refutations; Miller, Critical Rationalism; Miller, Out of Error.

74. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam (Chicago: ABC Inter-
national Group, 2007).

75. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines (New
York: State University of New York Press, 1993); Nasr, Science and Civilization;
George Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance
(Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2011); Ahmad
Hassan and Donald Hill, Islamic Technology: An Illustrated History (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

76. In view of the above qualification, whenever I refer to the use of Muslim scholars
of the classic period of the transdisciplinary approach I place this phrase in in-
verted commas.

77. Joel Kraemer, Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam: The Cultural Revival
during the Buyid Age (Leiden: Brill, 1992).

78. Richard Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists: An Introduction to the Thought of the
Brethren of Purity (London: Routledge, 2002).

79. Rasa’il Ikhwan al-Safa’, I:274, 266-67, quoted in Godefroid de Callataÿ, Ikhwan
al-Safa (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2005): 59-61.

80. Rasa’il Ikhwan al-Safa’, IV:167, quoted in de Callataÿ, Ikhwan al-Safa, 73.
81. Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists.
82. Helaine Selin (ed.), Encyclopaedia of the History of Science, Technology, and

Medicine in Non-Western Cultures (Berlin: Springer, 2008): 159.
83. Nasr, An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines.
84. Quoted in M. J. I. Young, et al. (eds.), Religion, Learning, and Science in the

‘Abbasid Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1990.
85. Rafik Berjak and Muzaffar Iqbal (translators), “Ibn Sina–Al-Biruni Correspon-

dence,” Islam & Science 1, no. 1, 2003; also available at http://www.encyclope-
dia.com/doc/1G1-119627460.html (accessed 18 Octobr 2014); Seyyed Hossein
Nasr, “Al-Biruni vs. Ibn Sina: Two Geniuses Aged 24 and 17 Debate the Nature

Paya: The Transdisciplinary Approach 47



of the Universe,” in Al-Biruni: A Universal Genius (Paris: The Unesco Courier,
1974), 27.

86. Berjak and Iqbal “Ibn Sina–Al-Biruni Correspondence”; Mohsen Jahangiri,
“Khordeh Giran Ibn Sina” (“Ibn Sina’s Critics”), Ibn Sina’s Millennium (Tehran:
UNESCO Publications, 1980).

87. Berjak and Iqbal, “Ibn Sina–Al-Biruni Correspondence,” 92-93; Jahangiri,
“Khordeh Giran Ibn Sina”; Nasr, “Al-Biruni vs. Ibn Sina.”

88. Ibid.
89. Berjak and Iqbal, “Ibn Sina–Al-Biruni Correspondence.”
90. Mohammed Aslam Haneef, A Critical Survey of Islamization of Knowledge

(Kuala Lumpur: International Islamic University Malaysia, 2005).
91. Ali Paya, “Muslims and Modernity: After Two and a Half Centuries What Have

We Learnt? A Meta-Study of the Main Lessons of an Eventful Encounter,” Islam
and Civilisational Renewal 4, no, 4 (2013): 548-61; Paya, “How Indigenous are
‘Indigenous Sciences’?”

92. Paya, “Muslims and Modernity,” 557.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid., 557-58.
96. Jonathan Ree, “From Straight Talk to Speaking Well,” TLS, January 10 (2014):

7-8, 7.
97. Ibid.; Bruno Latour, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence (Cambridge, MA: Har-

vard University Press, 2013).
98. John Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (London: Penguin, 1996).
99. Pierre Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1954/1982): 270. 

48 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 32:1