Book Reviews a 123 

The Islamic Theory of International Relations: 
New Directions for Islamic Methodology and Thought 

By MdulHamid AbiiSulaymiin. (Islamization of Kizowledge, series 3, 
no. I ) .  Herndon, M: International Institute of Islamic nought, 19V, 
184 pp. 

This book provides a remarkable reformist approach to Islam in general 
and to the Islamic theory of international relations in particular. The author 
begins by attributing the tragic condition of the modem Islamic world to its 
stagnation, brought about by the predominance of taqlid. Only with a resolution 
of the ”time-place issue” @. 4), a phrase that recurs throughout the book in rela- 
tion to the necessity of distinguishing between what is permanent and what is 
a mere dated application in another time and place, does AbQSulaymzin believe 
that “the badly needed original dynamic and realistic policies” (p. 4) can be 
found. 

The author distinguishes between the Shari’ah and fiqh (writings of Islamic 
jurists), which he maintains has been inaccumtely considered to be “law in itself 
and not a secondary source of Islamic law” @. 4). The siyur (i.e., juristic writings 
related to international relations), AbQSulaymGn argues, is not “an Islamic law 
among nations’’ that constitutes “a sort of unified classical legal code” (p. 7). 
He also criticizes some writers for overlooking the diversity of classical opinion, 
saying that Majid Khadduri in particular presented only the “strict position” 
of a1 Shifi‘i while ignoring “the equally authoritative opinion of Abii Hanifah” 

AbQSulaymSin insists that it is necessary to understand the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah “in the context of conditions at a time when the early Muslims were 
confronted by unceasing aggression and persecution” (p. 35) and criticizes the 
use of abrogation (naskh) to exclude a more tolerant outlook. It is necessary 
for today‘s Muslims, the author says, ”to go back to the origins of Muslim thought 
. . . . and reexamine and reform their methods and approaches” (p. 49). The 
task of developing the required new methodology, he argues, must not be left 
to the ulama alone, because they “no longer represent the mainstream of Muslim 
intellectual and public involvement” and are not educated in “the changes. . . in 
the world today” (p. 76). 

Characterizing “modern Muslim thought in the field of external affairs” 
- particularly an “aggressive attitude involved in the classically militant ap- 
proach to jihad” in the case of “a people who are [now] weak and backward 

(P. 17). 



1L-r 

intellectually, politically, and technologically - as irrelevant, AbiiSulaymSin 
nevertheless sees a need “to respond and accommodate” the modern world 
“within the general Muslim outlook” (p. 91). In order to provide the founda- 
tion for a new systematic approach, he reexamines the policies of the Prophet, 
particularly in relation to prisoners taken at Badr, the Banii Qurayzah, the 
Quraysh, and the People of the Book. Instead of constituting a model which 
must be followed under all circumstances and in all times, such events are ex- 
plained in terms of the Prophet’s “realism, with its wide margin of political 
maneuverability” (p. 98), thus putting classical Islamic rules relating to such 
matters as ri& andjizyah in a new light. As for mkh, AbiiSulaymsin is critical 
of the way it has historically been applied, arguing that the verses which were 
revealed later should not, except for a few “clear cases,” be understood as 
abrogating previous revelations which had come in response to different cir- 
cumstances. He also stresses the need to reexamine Qur’anic verses in relation 
to their context. 

On the basis of such rethinking, AbiiSulqmiin proposes the development 
of “an Islamic ideological base or framework for a systematic empirical approach 
to the field of international relations” @. ll6). He identifies five basic principles: 
1) tawhid, which calls for “freedom of destiny and self-determination” and “holy 
tolerance toward non-Muslims @. 117); 2) justice, the specific content of which 
must ”be decided” (p. ll8); 3) peace, mutual support, and cooperation, allowing 
for new arrangements of a “federal or confederal or multinational political system 
for the Muslim world” (p. 121) rather than demanding the replication of the early 
Islamic unity which occurred under totally different circumstances; 4) jihad 
or self-exertion “in every effort and act, personal and collective, internal and 
external,” not just in the narrow military sense (p. 123); and 5) respect and fulfill- 
ment of commitments. 

In contrast to what he calls “the rigid legalistic attitudes of the traditionalists,” 
he presents four basic Islamic values, which “promote moderation and self- 
restraint”: 1) “no aggression ( trdwiin)”; 2) “no tyranny (tughylin)”; 3) “no cor- 
ruption (firslid)”; and 4) “no excesses (isrlij)” (p. 126). The author contrasts 
his “dynamic framework” - moral principles that “set no rigid formulas for 
policy action” - with both what he considers the outdated classical approach 
and the usual modernist approach based on “imitation [taqlid] and piecing 
together [ ta@q],” which he believes to lack mobilizing capacity @. 129) as well 
as “originality and contingency” @. 140). 

AbiiSulqmiin has presented an unusually creative and systematic approach 
not only to the Islamic theory of international politics but also, more broadly, 
to Islamic jurisprudence. While the sympathetic critic might ask about the 
chances of having such a new methodology accepted and, in the absence of 
an ecclesiastical structure, about the procedures whereby any authoritative deci- 
sion (a new zjmi~‘?) could be made (it seemingly is meant that each individual 



Book Reviews 125 

should decide for himself or herself), AbiiSulaymiin’s treatise has the virtue 
of presenting a clear idealistic vision of an Islamic theory of international rela- 
tions divorced from its medieval epiphenomena (doctrines he would probably 
say do not need to be set aside by anybody since they were never integral to 
Islam anyway). But, while I may be raising a question that requires much further 
study, I believe that AbiiSulaymiin’s major contribution is that of explicitly and 

& w ras Sn-ea&y ae- 
cepted. I do not know to what exent the szyar is emphasized at such places as 
al Azhar today (and AbiiSulaymh, of course, does not think that only the pro- 
ducts of those institutions have the right to an opinion) or, assuming that con- 
cepts like that of a diir al Isliim permanently at war with a diir al k r b ,  punc- 
tuated by truces of no more than ten years duration, actually are given any 
salience, whether they are seriously presented as principles which have to be 
applied today. But my impression is that Islamic movements, even including 
those of the revolutionary type, hardly think rigidly along classical lines. For 
example, revolutionary Iran, instead of restoring the concept of ahl aldhimmah, 
has given Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians representation in the parliament 
(whose very existence demonstrates an absence of slavish commitment to 
medieval political patterns) in proportion to their percentages of the total popula- 
tion of the country. And Islamic mwements have invoked the concept of exertion 
(jihad) against colonialism, in places like Palestine and Afghanistan, and des- 
potism (real or perceived), and not indiscriminately against the diir al b r b .  

This book deserves to be widely disseminated and should be assigned in 
whole or in part in courses dealing with Islam and the modern world. A con- 
cise, article-length version that avoided the repetitiveness and occasional am- 
biguity of the book might help it to reach a wider audience. 

The long introduction by al Shahid Dr. Isma’il R. al Fiiniqi was written, 
shortly before his assassination, in much the same spirit as the book itself. 
Presenting the West’s hilure in the area of world community and stressing the 
pressing need for a new international order, he argues that only Islam has such 
a legacy (p. xxiii). What he presents is a new kind of universalism - rejecting 
both the “terror” which Western hegemony has imposed on humanity (p. xiii) 
and, implicitly, much of the classical Islamic pattern as well - in which racial 
and ethnic divisions would be replaced by purely voluntary, equal millahs, in- 
cluding nonreligious ones (p. xxvi). 

Glenn E. Perry 
Professor of Political Science 
Indiana State University 
Terre Haute, Indiana