The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 8, No. 3, 1991 573 

Views and Comments 

An Islamic Conception of Change 

It is always refreshing to witness Muslim scholars debating one of the 
most important phenomena of the modern Islamic revival: the question of 
the "use of force." There is no doubt that this issue is deeply misunderstood 
and indeed misused by Islamists and non-Islamists alike. Any attempt to shed 
light on the subject is therefore highly appreciated and welcomed. As Muslims 
witness the transformation of the international political and economic system 
questions and expectations are raised regarding its possible impact on the 
Muslim world. In this context, the article which occasioned this response 
(AbiiSulayman, 'AbdulJ:Iamid, "Guiding Light: The Qur'an and the Sunnah 
on Violence, Armed Struggle, and the Political Process;' AJISS 8, no. 2 
[September 1991]: xi-xxxv) and the debate it is likely to generate (including 
the proposed World and Islamic Studies Enterprise's symposium on the subject 
in early 1992) is not only timely, but also highly fitting. 

From the outset, I would like to emphasize that I approach thi topic 
with a great deal of academic interest and open-mindedness. Only an objective 
and detached analysis by, and debate among, Muslim scholars can yield a 
better understanding of the Islamic conception of the ' use of force." The 
following are some remarks that may, I hope, contribute to a better 
understanding of the phenomenon under discussion. 

On the Structure of the Debate 

There is a need to restructure the debate about the "use of force," sharpen 
its focus, clearly define its vocabulary, and place it within its proper context­
the Islamic conception of change. This is not a debate about "power" and 
"power relationships," but rather one of change and the Islamic political theory 
(and practice) of change. In this context, the debate is three-dimen ional, 
for it seeks to provide answers to the following three groups of questions: 
a) What is the !Ulture and definition of change? How can we recognize change
when we see it? What is the "normal" or "ideal" model which we seek to
emulate and institute?; b) What instruments of change are Islamically permitted,
pragmatically affordable, and most cost-effective given the nature and
constraints of domestic and international politics?; and c) What means and
strategies of change are most appropriate and effective and, above all, not
prohibited by the Shari'ah?



514 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 8, No. 3, 1991 

Specifically, we seek to determine the nature of the Islamic order, its 
norms, principles, laws, and codes of conduct as well as its boundaries and 
the rules governing its transformation. The Islamic order consists of the 
recognized patterns of individual, societal, and governmental behavior. But 
these patterns are never static, for they undergo continuous change and may 
also be transformed. The purpose of defining the Islamic order’s norms, 
principles, laws, and codes of conduct is so that one can determine when 
a change has taken place and distinguish between a change within the order 
and a change of the order. Only the second change transforms an Islamic 
order into an un-Islamic one. 

As the article under review fails to articulate the argument in this context, 
it ignores one fundamental justification for the violent use of force by Islamic 
movements and activists. Indeed, since the article sees the issue in terms 
of “power relationships” rather than change, the essence of the argument 
becomes one concerning “individuals . . . tak(ing) the law into their own 
hands,” thus aborting the debate from the start. Yet, to most participants in 
this debate, the question revolves around the “reconstruction” of the Islamic 
order and not its management, as the article implies. Most participants, from 
Ibn Taymiyah to Abii a1 A11 a1 Mawdiidi, Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad ‘Abd 
a1 Salim Faraj, and Jawdat Sa‘id Muhammad make the distinction between 
the Islamization or non-Islamization of state and society the cornerstone of 
their arguments. The question of the existing order’s nature cannot be resolved 
by assertion alone; it must be proven in light of evidence from the Qur’an 
and the Sunnah . 

The article’s emphasis on “power relationships” leads it to embrace the 
notion of “political stability.” But if we were to see the question from the 
perspective of change and transformation, stability becomes irrelevant. Indeed, 
one may argue that the idea of “stability” may stand in opposition to the Islamic 
idea of a continuous and eternal struggle between right and wrong, good 
and evil. In and by itself, stability may not be a value worth protecting, except 
for those who benefit from it. Those who proclaim the kufr of the existing 
order pay little attention to the benefits of its stability. The substance of the 
order, not the nature of its arrangement (stable or unstable), becomes the 
subject of concern. 

The second dimension concentrates on the instruments of change. It is 
here that the author most excels. The article’s emphasis on distinguishing 
between the “use of force” by the individual or the group on the one hand, 
and by the state or the legitimate authority on the other, is very well placed. 
It is here that the question of “power relationships” becomes most crucial. 
Many participants in the debate have tended to underestimate, sometimes 
deliberately, this distinction. Included in this dimension one also finds other 
issues, such as the role of the “Muslim group” (ul jumiibh al muslimah), 



The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 8, No. 3, 1991 575 

its amir, and the individual in bringing about the desired change. How can 
we distinguish between the duties of the state and those of the individual? 
Can individuals or Muslim groups undertake to perform certain state functions 
when the state fails to carry out these functions? For example, can they institute 
the hudiid (Islamic punishments) when the state replaces Islamic laws with 
British or French ones? What about the collection of zakah, the defense and 
protection of Islamic territory, the enforcement of moral codes, the jihad 
to liberate occupied Islamic land, and so on? Does the state have a monopoly 
over the execution of all of these functions even if it consciously and deliberately 
abdicates that role? What role, if any, is there for the individual or the group? 
When, if ever, and how? What should be the criterion for inclusion or exclusion 
in the domains of the state and the individual? 

The third dimension concentrates on the question of means and strategies. 
It is surprising, and indeed disturbing, to see an Islamic academic paper 
shying away from the use of appropriate terms when such use might be 
unpopular or undiplomatic. Means of change can only be violent or nonviolent. 
The paper resorts to surrogate terms such as “use of force” to mean the violent 
use of force, and nonviolence is replaced by terms such as shiirii and peaceful 
means. While there is nothing wrong with these terms, they do, however, 
remain imprecise and inadequate when it comes to providing the full meanings 
and implications which we seek to convey. For example, use of power and 
force may occur peacefully, i.e., by nonviolent coercion; and nonviolence 
is most effective when it involves the manipulation of power and force, i.e. , 
the power of the word, idea, masses, money, organization, and so on. 

In discussing means of change, the author from the outset indicates his 
emphatic preference for the “peaceful” and the “political .” “Shiirii,” argues 
the author ”is the only legitimate way of addressing the issue of public order 
in Islam” (p. 5 ) .  He bases his conclusions on two criteria: the laws of the 
Shari‘ah and the ineffectiveness of violence. The first criterion requires a 
detailed analysis beyond the limits of this review. The second criterion, which 
postulates the efficacy of nonviolence, deserves a quick rejoinder. I share 
the author’s devotion to nonviolence as a means of struggle. But I would 
like to caution that it is exceedingly difficult to bring about fundamental changes 
in existing orders even under the best of circumstances. Change not only 
requires great adjustment and assimilation on the part of masses but also 
the destruction of existing order and the fostering of new behavior patterns. 
Given the extent and severity of conflicts of interest in any state, it is fair 
to assume that such changes can hardly come by shiirii alone. This is true 
not only at the legislative or constitutional level (i.e., the legal institution 
of Islamic norms and principles), but even more so with respect to the behavior 
of the individual who is expected to abide by these laws and codes of conduct. 

The purpose of these comments is not to postulate the efficacy of violence; 



576 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 8, No. 3, 1991 

rather, they seek to suggest that any naive hopes concerning the effectiveness 
of shiirii or da’wuh alone constitute a serious, albeit common, failing among 
Muslim activists and scholars alike. 

On Defining and Operationalizing Nonviolence 
as a Strategy for Action 

Discrediting violent means of change without providing a nonviolent 
alternative is not very constructive. Those seeking to learn something about 
the strategy of nonviolence will have to look elsewhere, as the proposed article 
fails to provide even a simple definition of nonviolence. Indeed, the term 
nonviolence is never mentioned in the whole article. Muslim activists will 
find it hard to appreciate the value of nonviolence until they understand its 
meaning, forms, and techniques. Just how does a Muslim scholar propose 
to promote nonviolence when he or she sees no need to define and 
operationalize it and to demonstrate its efficacy? 

Understanding the meaning, nature, and requirements of nonviolence 
is essential to its success. From the outset, it should be clear that nonviolence 
is not synonymous with pacifism. It is a form of resistance and a means 
of change. It has great power potential and is a means of wielding even greater 
power if applied cleverly and fearlessly. It uses psychological, social, economic, 
and political weapons. It demands resolve, determination, and discipline in 
the face of likely state repression. It may take several forms: a) da’wuh, such 
as the use of mosques, the hajj, schools, universities, electoral participation; 
the use of parliaments (when feasible) to institute Islamic legislation; the 
publication of books, journals, and periodicals to spread ideas and preach 
imiin and tuqwii; and the building and educating of individuals and families; 
b) symbolic, such as demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, hunger strikes, vigils, 
raising banners and flags; c) active intervention, such as blockades, stopping 
traffic, nonviolent occupation of public buildings; d) noncooperution, such 
as economic boycotts, labor, commercial, and student strikes, social boycotts; 
e) civil disobedience, such as refusing to obey orders, pay taxes, resigning 
from public posts; and finally f) the creation of purullel or alternative 
institutions, such as educational, health, and economic systems. Muslim 
activists and scholars will find The Politics of Nonviolent Struggle (Boston: 
Porter Sargent, 1973) by Gene Sharp (director of the Program for Nonviolent 
Sanctions at Harvard University’s Center for International Affairs) highly 
instructive. For those who can read Arabic, a translation of the book (a lousy 
translation, I am afraid) has been published in Jerusalem by the Palestinian 
Center for the Study of Nonviolence under the title ul Muqiiwumh bi lii 
‘Unf (Resistance without Violence) in 1986. 



The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vd. 8, No. 3, 1991 577 

Contemporary Islamic movements have utilized one or more of these 
forms of nonviolence. The Muslim Brotherhood has generally tended to 
emphasize some types of the first form, that of h k h ,  particularly the 
educational and reformist aspects; the Islamic revolution in Iran relied on 
the other forms as well, with emphasis on noncooperation and civil 
disobedience; the Jordanian, Tunisian, and Algerian Islamic movements chose 
to enter the political life of their countries through the democratic process. 
This is another type of h h u h ,  but it does not exclude the resort to other 
forms (as the Algerian and Tunisian experiences show). 

On the Historical Perspective 

Devoid of its historical setting, the discussion of change (and particularly 
its means and strategies) cannot be fruitful. The article under review lacks 
the historical depth which would give it a solid foundation. Without the benefit 
of our past Islamic experience, we might find it difficult to provide evidence 
in support of the inevitability different interpretations. The violent rise against 
Mu'Gwiyah, the endemic resort to violence by contenders during much of 
the Abbasid caliphate, the internal violent strife in the Muslim world prior 
to and during the Crusades, the continued violent attempts by some Islamic 
viluyets to gain a measure of autonomy from the Ottomans, are only some 
of the examples that must be examined for lessons and insights. Furthermore, 
modem Islamic experiences such as those of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt in the 1940s and 1950s, the radical Egyptian Islamic groups in the 
197Os, the Jordanian brotherhood since its inception and entry into Parliament 
in 1989, the Iranian revolution in 1978-79, the Syrian revolt in the early 1980s, 
the Algerian entrance into local government in 1989, and the Sudanese use 
of the national army in 1990 all provide invaluable case studies which need 
to be investigated and evaluated. To pass judgment on the efficacy of violence 
or nonviolence based on current local and international circumstances, but 
without the benefit of such evaluation, deprives us of a wealth of knowledge 
and experience which can be gained from the historical perspective. 

On an On-going Debate 

The reader of the article under review is not told much, if anything, 
about the on-going debate among Muslim scholars and activists concerning 
change and the violent and nonviolent uses of force in Islamic theory and 
practice. For a scholarly paper, this is a serious and unforgivable defect. 



578 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 8, No. 3, 1991 

To provide an informative, balanced, and objective analysis and to avoid 
accusations of engaging in polemics, the author needs to trace the evolution 
of Muslim scholars’ thinking about the issues under discussion. One might 
not need to go back to early Muslim thought, or even to Ibn Taymiyah, but 
modem writings (i.e., those of al Afghm-, Abduh, al Banni, Mawdiidi, Qufub, 
a1 Hudaybi, and the leaders of Islamic groups and movements, such as Faraj , 
Sirrya, MuSpfii, Ghaniishi, and Madani, and Muslim activists and scholars 
such as Jawdat Sa‘id Muhammad, Khiilid M. Khiilid, Siilim a1 Bahnasiiwi, 
Muhammad ‘Wnmiirah and others) have already made major inroads into 
this important issue. The author needs to place his own contribution to the 
debate into its proper place in light of and along with the contributions of 
others. Needless to say, proper documentation and footnoting would be greatly 
appreciated by the serious reader. 

On Prejudging the Issue 

Making the violent use of force synonymous with the “illegitimate, 
criminal, and immoral act of murder and bloodshed,” as the article under 
review does, is tantamount to aborting the debate in its early stages and to 
leveling serious accusations against men like a1 Husayn in the early Islamic 
period and al Islimbiili in the present period. Only after a serious and an 
in-depth investigation, taking into account Islamic principles, norms, and 
historical experience, can a final judgment be passed, if ever. 

On Causal Relationships 

The article also clouds the issue under discussion by resorting to 
unverified, and indeed spurious, causal relationships. For example, the paper 
finds that a major cause of “political instability and political decline of 
contemporary Muslim societies . . . (and) the authoritarian tendencies in 
the structure and approaches to Muslim political and social system as well 
as organizations including the family, political parties, voluntary societies 
and governments” (sic) in “the lack of clear understanding and proper handling 
of the issue of power and power relationships by Muslim societies and groups.” 
@. 2) The author provides no evidence to support both assertions: the existence 
of a “lack of understanding” of power and the causal relationship between 
that and Muslim problems. The same criticism applies to the author‘s assertion 
of similar causal relationships between “sh(ying) away from studying political 
issues, . . .” and “confusion between the political, the legal, the legitimate 



The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 8, No. 3, 1991 579 

and between the internal and the external;· and "apathy and lack of intellectual 
analysis ... of these issues," and "loss of ummatic (nation-buiJding) movements 
and aspirations," and the "tendencies to fragmentation and the lack of public 
concern and spirit in the Muslim ummah and societies" (p. 2). The author's 
pessimistic tendency should not have been allowed to cloud his scholarly 
judgment. The author's tendency to resort to assertions and to express hi 
views in law-like statements comes out loud and clear. 

And a Final Word 

One more thing comes out loud and clear from reading this paper: the 
author's great sincerity and his overwhelming concern for the future of the 
Muslim nation and the sanity of its intellectuals and activists. His desire to 
encourage scholarly debate on this issue and his insistence on systemic and 
comprehensive analysis prompted me to demand the same from him. The 
author's scholarship is demonstrated by his insistence on seeking evidence 
from the Qur'an and the Sunnah. His conclusion are not unreasonable and 
should provide an incentive to others to seek to confirm or challenge. By 
raising this issue at this juncture, the author has done us all a big favor indeed. 

Khalil Shikaki 

World & Islam Studies Enterprise 
Tampa, Florida